Norms of belief

Simion, Mona ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7289-0872, Kelp, Christoph and Ghijsen, Harmen 2016. Norms of belief. Philosophical Issues 26 (1) , pp. 374-392. 10.1111/phis.12077

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Abstract

When in the business of offering an account of the epistemic normativity of belief, one is faced with the following dilemma: strongly externalist norms fail to account for the intuition of justification in radical deception scenarios, while milder norms are incapable to explain what is epistemically wrong with false beliefs. This paper has two main aims; we first look at one way out of the dilemma, defended by Timothy Williamson and Clayton Littlejohn, and argue that it fails. Second, we identify what we take to be the problematic assumption that underlies their account and offer an alternative way out. We put forth a knowledge-first friendly normative framework for belief which grants justification to radically deceived subjects while at the same time acknowledging that their false beliefs are not epistemically good beliefs.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Published Online
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Publisher:	Wiley
ISSN:	1533-6077
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	26 October 2017
Date of Acceptance:	10 June 2015
Last Modified:	03 Nov 2022 09:47
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/105981

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