Carter, J. Adam and Palermos, Spyridon Orestis 2015. Active externalism and epistemic internalism. Erkenntnis 80 (4) , pp. 753-772. 10.1007/s10670-014-9670-5 |
Abstract
Internalist approaches to epistemic justification are, though controversial, considered a live option in contemporary epistemology. Accordingly, if ‘active’ externalist approaches in the philosophy of mind—e.g. the extended cognition and extended mind theses—are in principle incompatible with internalist approaches to justification in epistemology, then this will be an epistemological strike against, at least the prima facie appeal of, active externalism. It is shown here however that, contrary to pretheoretical intuitions, neither the extended cognition nor the extended mind theses are in principle incompatible with two prominent versions of epistemic internalism—viz., accessibilism and mentalism. In fact, one possible diagnosis is that pretheoretical intuitions regarding the incompatibility of active externalism with epistemic internalism are symptomatic of a tacit yet incorrect identification of epistemic internalism with epistemic individualism. Thus, active externalism is not in principle incompatible with epistemic internalism per se and does not (despite initial appearances to the contrary) significantly restrict one’s options in epistemology.
Item Type: | Article |
---|---|
Date Type: | Publication |
Status: | Published |
Schools: | English, Communication and Philosophy |
Publisher: | Springer Verlag |
ISSN: | 0165-0106 |
Last Modified: | 25 Feb 2019 14:21 |
URI: | http://orca.cf.ac.uk/id/eprint/106971 |
Citation Data
Cited 12 times in Scopus. View in Scopus. Powered By Scopus® Data
Actions (repository staff only)
![]() |
Edit Item |