Tanesini, Alessandra
2018.
Epistemic vice and motivation.
Metaphilosophy
49
(3)
, pp. 350-367.
10.1111/meta.12301
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Abstract
This article argues that intellectual character vices involve non-instrumental motives to oppose, antagonise, or avoid things that are epistemically good in themselves. This view has been the recent target of criticism based on alleged counterexamples presenting epistemically vicious individuals who are virtuously motivated or at least lack suitable epistemically bad motivations. The paper first presents these examples and shows that they do not undermine the motivational approach. Finally, having distinguished motivating from explanatory reasons for belief and action, it argues that our epistemic practice of vice attribution supplies evidence in favour of motivational accounts of vice.
Item Type: | Article |
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Date Type: | Published Online |
Status: | Published |
Schools: | English, Communication and Philosophy |
Publisher: | Wiley-Blackwell |
ISSN: | 0026-1068 |
Date of First Compliant Deposit: | 15 December 2017 |
Date of Acceptance: | 12 December 2017 |
Last Modified: | 29 Jun 2019 07:15 |
URI: | http://orca.cf.ac.uk/id/eprint/107611 |
Citation Data
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