Epistemic vice and motivation

Tanesini, Alessandra 2018. Epistemic vice and motivation. Metaphilosophy 49 (3) , pp. 350-367. 10.1111/meta.12301 Item availability restricted.

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Abstract

This article argues that intellectual character vices involve non-instrumental motives to oppose, antagonise, or avoid things that are epistemically good in themselves. This view has been the recent target of criticism based on alleged counterexamples presenting epistemically vicious individuals who are virtuously motivated or at least lack suitable epistemically bad motivations. The paper first presents these examples and shows that they do not undermine the motivational approach. Finally, having distinguished motivating from explanatory reasons for belief and action, it argues that our epistemic practice of vice attribution supplies evidence in favour of motivational accounts of vice.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Published Online
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Publisher:	Wiley-Blackwell
ISSN:	0026-1068
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	15 December 2017
Date of Acceptance:	12 December 2017
Last Modified:	22 May 2019 15:33
URI:	http://orca.cf.ac.uk/id/eprint/107611

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