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The market for non-executive directors: does acquisition performance influence future board seats?

Mira, Svetlana, Goergen, Marc and O'Sullivan, Noel 2019. The market for non-executive directors: does acquisition performance influence future board seats? British Journal of Management 30 (2) , pp. 415-436. 10.1111/1467-8551.12290

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Abstract

This paper investigates whether non-executive directors associated with good (bad) board decisions are subsequently rewarded (penalized) in the market for directors. This question is addressed by assessing whether the post-acquisition performance of acquiring companies influences the number of non-executive directorships that non-executives involved in these acquisitions hold subsequent to the acquisition. We find that non-executives on the boards of acquirers that increase (omit or cut) their dividend subsequently hold more (fewer) non-executive directorships in listed companies. Our findings suggest that the non-executive labor market is efficient and rewards (penalizes) non-executives for good (bad) acquisitions.

Item Type: Article
Date Type: Publication
Status: Published
Schools: Business (Including Economics)
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
ISSN: 1045-3172
Date of First Compliant Deposit: 7 February 2018
Date of Acceptance: 22 January 2018
Last Modified: 04 Jun 2019 10:42
URI: http://orca.cf.ac.uk/id/eprint/108921

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