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Saying and believing: the norm commonality assumption

Simion, Mona 2019. Saying and believing: the norm commonality assumption. Philosophical Studies 176 (8) , pp. 1951-1966. 10.1007/s11098-018-1105-8

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One very popular assumption in the epistemological literature is that belief and assertion are governed by one and the same epistemic norm. This paper challenges this claim. Extant arguments in defence of the view are scrutinized and found to rest on value-theoretic inaccuracies. First, the belief-assertion parallel is shown to lack the needed normative strength. Second, I argue that the claim that assertion inherits the norm of belief in virtue of being an expression thereof rests on a failed instance of deontic transmission. Third, the inheritance argument from the norm for action is proven guilty of deontic equivocation. Last but not least, it is argued that, on a functionalist normative picture, assertion and belief are governed by different epistemic norms, in virtue of serving different epistemic functions.

Item Type: Article
Date Type: Publication
Status: Published
Schools: English, Communication and Philosophy
Publisher: Springer Verlag
ISSN: 0031-8116
Date of First Compliant Deposit: 7 March 2018
Date of Acceptance: 1 March 2018
Last Modified: 05 Feb 2020 03:55

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