Security Community-Building in the Mediterranean Sea: The Roles of NATO and European Union in Managing Maritime Challenges

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Abstract

Europe’s greatest challenges emanating from the Mediterranean Sea are irregular migration and maritime terrorism. These challenges have received great attention from the European Union (EU), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and beyond. In light of this, the EU and NATO as traditional and regional actors have adopted various approaches, initiatives and maritime operations to cope with these challenges. These operations include, among others, Operation Sophia for counter-migration and Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) for counter-terrorism. This thesis explores the current development of maritime security operations to combat terrorism and the migration crisis, and analyses how these initiatives play a role in security community-building process in the Mediterranean Sea. In particular, the thesis examines the application of the security community framework in maritime security through the enactment of maritime practices. The thesis provides a detailed analysis of the activities, actors and forms of cooperation constituting the EU and NATO’s practices to address maritime challenges in the Mediterranean Sea.

This thesis adopts qualitative research methods to examine the expansion of the security community in the Mediterranean Sea by analysing the case studies of NATO and EU’s counter-terrorism and counter-migration initiatives. It examines the maritime policies, initiatives, and operations implemented by NATO and EU since 9/11 to combat these threats. Based on the repertoire of practices, the case studies examine the extent to which the security community is evidenced within the maritime activities. Findings from the case studies evidence the process of security community building, including through the practice of cooperative security and partnerships. In the conclusion chapter, the future research agenda for maritime studies and security community research is also explored. Ultimately, this thesis offers nuanced insights into the dynamics of security community research, contributing to the development of the framework into maritime security studies.
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<td>AMS</td>
<td>Alliance Maritime Strategy</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>EMSA</td>
<td>European Maritime Safety Agency</td>
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<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUMSS</td>
<td>European Union Maritime Security Strategy</td>
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<td>EUROJUST</td>
<td>European Union’s Judicial Cooperation Unit</td>
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<td>EUROMARFOR</td>
<td>European Maritime Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>EUROPOL</td>
<td>European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation</td>
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<td>EUROSUR</td>
<td>European Border Surveillance System</td>
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<td>FRAN</td>
<td>Frontex Risk Analysis Network</td>
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<td>FSC</td>
<td>Frontex Situation Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRONTEX</td>
<td>European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union</td>
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<td>IMO</td>
<td>International Maritime Organization</td>
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<td>Integrated Maritime Policy</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<td>JHA</td>
<td>Justice and Home Affairs</td>
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<td>MD</td>
<td>Mediterranean Dialogue</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
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<td>NCC</td>
<td>National Coordination Centre</td>
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<td>OAE</td>
<td>Operation Active Endeavour</td>
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<td>SHADE-MED</td>
<td>Shared Awareness and De-confliction of Mediterranean</td>
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<td>SNMG</td>
<td>Standing NATO Maritime Group</td>
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<td>SNMCMG</td>
<td>Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Maritime Group</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
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CHAPTER 1

Mediterranean Sea: The Emerging Security Challenges

1.1 Introduction

In the modern era, international security has been associated not only with states and war but the emergence of transnational security issues, a non-military threats that cross borders and pose a challenge to the state authority. Complicating the picture is the fact that many transnational issues are driven by non-state actors, such as international terrorist organisations and smugglers. The spread of radical terrorist groups, the increase in cross-border drug trafficking, the potential proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the continued degradation of the environment may jeopardise the security of the states (Shearman and Sussex 2004: 3). In addition, these transnational threats do not only affect the land boundaries, but also have the potential to challenge the security of maritime domain.

As the maritime realm is geographically vast and complex, it is consequently difficult to govern and as such, vulnerable to security threats (Germond and Grove 2010: 10). There are several issues which currently pose a challenge in the maritime domain such as piracy, maritime terrorism and possible attacks on shipping, irregular migration, the proliferation of WMD, human smuggling and drug trafficking (Boyer 2007: 77). These issues are not only significant for the coastal states, but also pose concern for the international community. In the post-Cold War era, the Mediterranean is at the centre of a security predicament and surrounded by areas of great instability. The dangers posed by terrorist organisations are preeminent particularly after 9/11 terrorist attacks, while another notable issue is the massive flow of migrants towards Europe and human trafficking. The Mediterranean Sea is also vulnerable to these security threats. Moreover, the adjacent Gulf of Aden is grappling with various threats and instability particularly piracy, it is consequently, may affect the security of the Mediterranean Sea.
The end of the Cold War has had a profound impact on the international system whereby it was widely assumed that peace and stability of the international system has been achieved (Greenberg et al. 2006: 1). This perception however has slowly declined with the recognition that global stability is undermined by the rise of transnational security challenges. There are security problems that arose as a consequence in the post-Cold War era which demonstrate the changing nature of conflict. In the past, security has been defined largely in a military context (Gillespie 1994: 13), though the post-Cold War era witnessed the potential of a wide variety of other threats to security. These new threats, aggravated by the increasing number of non-state actors required completely different approaches than those traditional defence that states have used for military aggression between nation states. Threats from non-state actors are more complex and perplexing because of their unrecognized identities, unidentified locations and the haphazard nature of their attacks.

The nature of the maritime environment contributes itself to a broad range of plausible attacks. Maritime environment covering the high seas that lie beyond any states jurisdiction makes it difficult to be monitored and regulated (Greenberg et al. 2006: 2). In addition, maritime environment also vulnerable to diverse potential attacks due to its growing importance as a trade and commerce routes. On the one hand, maritime terrorism is one of the challenges faced by Europe which has dominated its security debate since the horrific attacks of 9/11. The challenge of maritime terrorism is not a new phenomenon, rather it has started since early 1960s (Murphy 2007: 49). Despite numerous terrorist attacks on shipping at sea, however, cooperation and counter-measures to combat terrorism remained limited until the notable terrorist attack in 2001. On the other hand, the maritime domain has also increasingly received international attention as a frontline area for irregular migration. The massive number of migrants’ flow via the sea has changed the dynamic of the security landscape, which is increasingly seen as a serious humanitarian problem (Calleya 2012: 85). Moreover, clandestine migration across the sea has also been increasingly linked with organised cross-border crime and transnational terrorism (Lutterbeck 2006: 61).
The Mediterranean Sea, located at the crossroads of three continents, connects the Atlantic Ocean to the Black Sea and Red Sea variously through the Strait of Gibraltar, the Dardanelles and Bosporus, and the Suez Canal (Boyer 2007: 75). The Mediterranean Sea has always been the focus of European and global attention particularly due to the political instabilities and regional crises surrounding it. The Mediterranean Basin is therefore geographically, culturally, and politically diverse with states of different ideologies and religions. Among the main concern of threats in the Mediterranean Sea are maritime terrorism, irregular migration and trafficking of persons (McNerney et al 2017: 4). Maritime security in the Mediterranean concerns over 500 million people with about 150 million situated on the coast, and as a consequence, plays a key role, ensuring economic stability, environmental protection and safety of European peoples (Evans 2011: 11).

The importance of the Mediterranean as a maritime highway has increased significantly in the post-Cold War era due to globalisation. For instance, the period between 1990 and 2004 illustrates a remarkable advancement in maritime commerce particularly within Europe, the United States and North Africa (Boyer 2007: 76). Furthermore, the large quantity of crude oil and crude oil products that transit the Mediterranean Sea via its choke points including the Suez Canal, Bosporus Strait and Sumed pipeline\(^1\) have increased significantly during the same period (Boyer 2007: 76). It has been estimated that almost one quarter of a million vessels carrying more than 100 tonnes gross register tonnage (grt) of crude oil and natural gas are transiting the Mediterranean Sea every year (Dalby 2011: 20). That said, other than oil and oil products, large amounts of liquefied natural gas (LNG) are also moved across the Mediterranean Sea. The majority of this natural gas is mainly exported from the oldest gas exporter in the world, Algeria, which is transported for European consumption via the Mediterranean Sea (Calleya 2012: 73). In addition, other than serving as an important sea lanes of communication (SLOC) for economy purposes and as a medium of transportation, the

\(^{1}\) The Sumed pipeline links the Ain Sukhna terminal in the Gulf of Suez with the Sidi Kerir terminal in Egypt. It allows larger oil tankers to pass through the Suez Canal to reach the Mediterranean for transport (Boyer 2007: 76).
Mediterranean Sea is also of great importance for its natural resources. The basin is rich with natural resources which supports local economies and provides large sources of food for the states surrounding it, particularly through fisheries (Boyer 2007: 76). Large amount of fisheries sources of about 500,000 tonnes are harvested with more than forty thousand fishing boats in the Mediterranean Sea every year (Boyer 2007: 76). In sum, these developments have changed the security dynamics of the Mediterranean Sea which not only increased the importance of the basin for goods transportation, but also increased security considerations for the EU, particularly with the emergence of transboundary risks and non-military threats in the basin which concern all the EU coastal states.

1.2 Research Questions

In the post Cold War era, the Mediterranean Sea has gained importance in terms of security, particularly due to the crises and instabilities surrounding it, including civil wars in Syria, political turmoil in Arab countries and the emergence of radical groups. The two major actors in the basin, NATO and EU have expressed their commitment to sustain the security and safety of the Mediterranean and on account of their initiatives, the Mediterranean is enclosed and very well policed and under constant surveillance (Germond 2010: 67). The entire area is also within easy and rapid reach of sophisticated military and naval resources (Dalby 2011: 20). Nevertheless, the Mediterranean Sea is still very vulnerable to certain threats, the two most notable are terrorism and irregular migration.

Cooperation with Mediterranean partners is embedded in the EU’s strategic priorities but most notably evidenced through the implementation of the Mediterranean Maritime Strategy which was designed to enhance maritime safety, security and surveillance (Evans 2011: 9). The Internal Security Strategy of November 2010, formulated specifically to strengthen the EU’s external border, thus also serves as a useful platform to address security risk in the Mediterranean (Manservisi 2011: 8). This objective has resulted in increased cooperation between the member states concerning border surveillance to deal with the migration crisis (Manservisi 2011: 8). The EU has also actively enhanced its international security through the evolution of the Common Security and Defence
Policy (CSDP) in 2004. The 2005 EU Counter-terrorism Strategy and the employment of its Action Plan demonstrates how maritime security has become one of the top priorities for the EU security agenda (De Kerchove 2011: 33). Also, the Treaty of Lisbon asserts the clause, in which the EU and its member states shall act collectively if a member state is confronted with terrorist threats (Evans 2011: 9). Therefore, the Mediterranean Sea is certainly an arena of importance for counter-terrorism measures in the EU and these also include transport (passengers, tourism, freight) and maritime border security (De Kerchove 2011: 33). As a result, Frontex and European Border Surveillance System or commonly known as EUROSUR (outlined in greater detail in Chapter Six) were established in 2005 and 2013 respectively and are mainly responsible for enhancing the security of the external borders of the European countries.

As a traditional naval force in the region, NATO has more advantages compared to the EU in terms of experience, assets and credibility (Germond and Grove 2010: 16). NATO maritime forces with the participation of the US has adept ‘hard security’ capabilities with more assets and power in the Mediterranean Sea. The EU, on the other hand, has developed a collective approach, coordinating various European agencies such as Frontex and European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) who are responsible in maritime security affairs to maintaining the stability of the sea (Germond and Grove 2010: 16). Therefore, both actors have advantages and complement each other. This serves as a medium for NATO and EU to integrate collectively in maritime security cooperation, thus contribute to the stability and security of the Mediterranean Sea.

On another note, the basin’s diversity and history have divided the basin into two; the North and South which maintain different approaches to security and crisis management (Boyer 2007: 75).2 “Northern” states in the basin promote the practice of cooperative-security among themselves to resolve any disputes or conflicts. This includes the participation in international alliances and institutions

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2 After the end of Cold War, the Mediterranean region has often been perceived as a new ‘arc of crisis’ whereby the North-South division is replacing the East-West rivalry. The North division represents the industrialized and developed states, meanwhile the South division represents the states with economic, political and social problems (Kinacioglu 2000: 27).
such as NATO, the EU, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Barcelona Process, to name a few (Boyer 2007: 75). “Southern” states on the other hand are less inclined to participate in any alliances or security arrangements with other states due to their suspicion over other’s states motives or intentions (Attina 2004: 24). These states alternatively are more likely to promote security cooperation within their own territorial boundary or at a certain point, form short-term alliances with like-minded states (Boyer 2007: 75)

In the Mediterranean Sea, the main challenge is not just about coping with security threats, but also maintaining stability at sea; preventing and disrupting the activities of the illegal and hostile actors. The complicated security environment requires improved interoperability among all agents in order to deal with the threats (Germond and Grove 2010: 15). It is important to ensure that maritime activities promoted by the major security actors in the Mediterranean do not overlap, rather they should adopt a comprehensive approach to combat illegal activities at sea and ultimately enhance the efficacy of these operations in safeguarding the basin. For that purpose, this thesis concerns the dominant maritime threats faced by the European member states in the Mediterranean Sea and focuses on maritime initiatives implemented by the EU and NATO in order to cope with these challenges. This thesis develops and utilises within a case study analysis, a security community framework to study how security community has evolved in the Mediterranean Sea after the end of Cold War. In order to achieve this, the thesis will focus on the security community practices which exhibited within the maritime operations in the Mediterranean Sea. This framework has contributed to the wider implications for the debate on security community, particularly to broadening the dynamics of security community research in the maritime security practices.

1.3 Aims of the Research

The maritime environment is a particularly important domain for European cooperation on security challenges. The post-Cold War era illustrates the changes of security dynamics in the Mediterranean Sea where the region faces varied challenges surrounding it, including unresolved territorial disputes, religious
extremism, proliferation of arms and the risks associated with terrorist organisations. Since 9/11, NATO has taken a comprehensive approach for counter-terrorism through Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) which integrates its military tasks within the Alliance and their partners (Cesaretti 2008: 3). The other challenge that merits discussion here is the massive flow of irregular migration across the Mediterranean which also simultaneously increases the risk of human trafficking into and within Europe. The events of fatal shipwrecks and accidents in the Mediterranean have clearly highlighted the problems of clandestine immigration into Europe. The number of migrants’ arrivals have increased dramatically every year. Some 74,676 migrants were reported to have arrived in Greece and Italy for the first quarter of 2016 for example (IOM 2016b). This statistic however does not include the 374 migrants who lost their life at sea in trying to reach Europe (IOM 2016b). These realities have pushed the EU to improve their coordination in order to deal with irregular migration, which has resulted in the reinforcement of effective border control including, among others, the EU’s external border security agency, Frontex and maritime border surveillance system.

Therefore, this study will first scrutinise and identify major security threats in the Mediterranean Sea and will thoroughly examine the imminent threats faced by European states in the post-Cold War era. In order to answer the question of how these issues have become threats at sea, the case studies chapter will briefly discuss the securitisation process, by which issues become the subject of security concern, particularly in the case of irregular migration. Second, the research focuses on maritime security cooperation, approaches and initiatives implemented by the EU and NATO to deal with these maritime issues. This objective is addressed in greater detail in the case studies chapters, discussing what has been done by both actors to manage the security threats in the Mediterranean Sea. The study also examines the extent to which the initiatives contribute a functional role to enhance safety and maintaining good order in the Mediterranean Sea. Third, the study scrutinises the evolution of the security community-building process through the implementation of maritime security practices by the EU and NATO in the Mediterranean Sea. More precisely, it investigates whether, and how, the
EU and NATO through their maritime initiatives can create a regional community that enhance security and reduce crisis around the Mediterranean Sea.

1.4 Significance of the Study

Due to the significant maritime traffic every year, the importance of the Mediterranean Sea is paramount. It serves as a major transit corridor, and has linked the Atlantic and Indian Oceans since the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 (Bal 2011: 18). The high number of vessels carrying invaluable products and cargo transporting natural gas and petroleum from Middle East to Europe has increased security risks in the Mediterranean Sea. In addition, the Mediterranean Sea is also vulnerable to piracy attacks surrounding it. High seas are a vast and unregulated space which poses questions about whose responsibility it should be to sustain the security in the area. Is maritime security included under NATO and EU whereby they should have a presence in international waters? Or is maritime security an exclusive responsibility for the littoral states?

The definition of maritime security concept is too vague to determine what is at stake in the current debate on maritime security. As Bueger and Germond explain, the concept of maritime security is the recent buzzword in international relations (Bueger 2015: 159) which was not often used before the end of the Cold War (Germond 2015a: 137). The upsurge of maritime security in academic literature began to take place in early 2000, following the impact of piracy attacks at sea and the 9/11 terrorist attacks which increased the risks of potential maritime terrorism (Germond 2015a: 137). Before the end of the Cold War, maritime security primarily referred to the naval context such as territorial disputes and control of maritime zones (Germond 2015a: 138). This scenario however, changed after the Cold War ended. Maritime security is now described more in a context of illegal activities at sea (including trafficking of people and terrorism), the preventive and reactive measures (counter-terrorism operations) and the emergence of non-state actors rather than hard power confrontation (Germond 2015a: 138). Germond also suggests that maritime security involves activities

3 Although the Mediterranean is not directly affected with the attacks of pirates, nonetheless the vessels transiting through the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean to and from the Mediterranean are vulnerable to the risk of piracy (Fave 2011: 31).
which disrupt the good order at sea, such as discreet pollution and environmental and economic considerations (Germond 2015a: 138). In other words, maritime security has to do with (illegal and disruptive) human activities in the maritime space (Germond 2015a: 138) and the absence of aforementioned threats (Bueger 2015: 159).

The traditional notion of maritime security is primarily associated with naval concepts including naval warfare and and the seapower. This explains the legitimate use of force by state actors in order to respond and maintain the security within maritime domain (Germond 2015a: 138). Nonetheless, the current debate of maritime security also emphasises relations between the concept of seapower and maritime security. Bueger suggests that the concept of seapower is related to maritime security, in which emphasise the role of naval forces in maritime security (Bueger 2015: 160). The concept of seapower evaluate the extent to which naval forces should operate beyond its territorial waters and engage in international waters (Bueger 2015: 160). That said, this discussion merits exploration of the maritime security threats and the maritime security operations\(^4\) in far greater detail, and this constitutes the principal aim of this thesis.

The thesis addresses the illegal and disruptive activities at sea which jeopardise the security, safety and good governance within the maritime domain in the Mediterranean Sea. Likewise, the reactive approach by the EU and NATO is also examined thoroughly in this thesis, contributing to a greater understanding of the roles of naval forces in the Mediterranean Sea. Exploring the threats and approaches by the actors, clarifies the current roles and responsibilities of the major maritime security actors. Deliberations on counter-terrorism and counter-migration in the thesis require a framework of analysis, not only to give empirical knowledge of the policy but to also contribute to broader security discourse.

\(^4\) ‘Maritime security operations’ has become a trendy concept particularly with the increased role of naval forces to preserve security and maintain good order at sea. As cited in Till (2009), the Royal Navy defines ‘maritime security operations’ as: ‘Actions performed by military units in partnership with other government departments, agencies and international partners in the maritime environment to counter illegal activity and support freedom of the seas, in order to protect national and international interests’ (See Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-first Century (New York: Routledge, 2009).
range of practices are partially involved in maritime security including, among others, maritime surveillance, information sharing, training and exercises, legal enforcement activities (e.g. extradition and imprisonment), maritime strategies and capacity building (Bueger 2015: 162). Maritime security often requires inter-state coordination and multilateral operations with actors playing critical and complementary roles. It also requires efficient enforcement of controls and coordinated responses (Bueger 2015: 163), especially given that the sea is vast and difficult to monitor. That said, in order to determine the kind of activities implemented by the maritime actors and how these actors can cooperate with each other, the concept of maritime security communities is paramount to address this discussion.

The concept of security communities explains the cooperation between actors and the practices that are viable to understand how this cooperation takes place. The concept of security communities, as proposed by Karl Deutsch, highlights the absence of war, the peaceful settlement of disputes among a community members, and the development of shared identities and trust (Deutsch 1957: 2). The concept of security communities emphasises the process of how threats are identified and how the members cooperate together to settle the conflicts. There are six vital repertoires of practices to sustain a security community mechanism. The repertoires are as follows: the practice of self restraint (the abstention from the use of force); the importance of partnerships within the community members interaction; comprehensive cooperative security; the natural practice of diplomacy; the creation of transnational security dialogue; and military planning, confidence building measures and policy coordination (Adler 2009: 71). Each of these practices is explored in detail in Chapter 2, however it is important to emphasise the development of the security community framework as an analytical tool in the thesis to demonstrate how useful the framework is to understand the maritime security practices in the Mediterranean Sea.

Maritime security cooperation must effectively benefit all parties; therefore it is crucial to focus on the challenges the EU, NATO and the
Mediterranean countries face when managing maritime security in the Mediterranean Sea. In addition, the thesis discusses how the security communities framework evolved through the maritime practices in the Mediterranean Sea. The security community framework has been used widely to explain the cooperation and alliances between states, which has mainly focused on the land-oriented issues. Nevertheless, very few preceding studies are available to discuss the concept of the security community and its application in the maritime domain. That said, this thesis develops new insights of security communities, whereby it can not only be applied on land issues, but also it can be used to discuss security issues and cooperation in the maritime domain.

The thesis as a whole contributes to the literature of maritime security threats in the Mediterranean Sea, there is a focus on two principal threats; terrorism and irregular migration. The thesis also analyses counter-terrorism and counter-migration operations in the Mediterranean Sea and finally explores the development of the security community framework in the maritime domain. For counter-terrorism and counter-migration operations, this thesis scrutinises the spectrum of activities by NATO and EU in order to to tackle these problems, particularly after the attacks of 9/11. This includes maritime surveillance, maritime security strategies and activities at sea (e.g. patrolling, escorting and inspections). In the context of counter-terrorism and counter-migration operations, the thesis demonstrates how terrorism and irregular migration in the Mediterranean Sea can undermine the national security of the member states which eventually leads to the enforcement of the aforementioned operations. It also demonstrates what kind of activities are conducted when EU and NATO expressed their commitment to maintain the security, safety and good order in the Mediterranean Sea. Finally, in the discussion of the security framework, the thesis contributes to the security community literature by developing an analytical framework to evaluate how actors cooperate in maritime security. The concept of security community also clarifies the quintessential form of collaboration and practices between actors in the maritime domain. It adds novelty to distinct security communities field in the maritime security spectrum.
1.5 Thesis Overview

This study is comprised of six further chapters. Chapter 2 examines the theoretical framework which is used throughout this study and makes a connection with the cooperative-security enforcement in the Mediterranean Sea. This chapter examines in detail the origins of the concept of the security community framework according to Deutsch’s foundation text, *Political community and the North Atlantic State* (1957). The chapter focuses on the modification framework of the security community by Adler and Barnett according to their groundwork text, *Security Communities* (1998). This provides a broad overview of the security community framework and analyses its main elements, particularly cognitive regions; common meaning, and community; as well as the development of security communities. Following this, the expansion of the security community is explored. This includes the security community repertoire of practices which indicate the spread of security community within a region. This chapter also considers supplementary points by other scholars in the field, who discuss the evolution of security community framework in the other region and how it can be used to study the practices of maritime security. Finally, the possibilities for a broadly applicable security community framework are discussed, whereby the focus is placed on the spread of the framework in the study of counter-terrorism and counter-migration by the EU and NATO in the Mediterranean Sea.

Chapter 3 analyses the methodological aspect of the research. This chapter explores in detail the methodology involved in order to gain and collect all the related data, sources and information for this research. This chapter explores the research design involved to analyse the development of the EU and NATO maritime security strategy in the Mediterranean Sea. This chapter starts with the explanation of major research questions, followed by the research design used in this study and finally describes the methodology and methods carried out to analyse the data. The rationale for the adopting qualitative research methods when conducting this research is also analysed. The research is based on a mixture of desk study, textual analysis and field work. Desk study involved analysis of academic writing, official government reports and other related documents,
international conventions, case studies and conference papers. Reference is also made to relevant internet sources. The field work component included conducting interviews with selected interviewees, attending and presenting papers in relevant workshops, seminars, symposiums, and conferences relating to maritime security matters, especially those related to the Mediterranean Sea. Figures, data and any related information from relevant international bodies pertinent to this study such as International Maritime Organization (IMO), International Maritime Bureau (IMB), NATO and EU were also gathered in the course of the research. Finally, this chapter justifies the selection of case studies which are discussed throughout the research.

Chapter 4 delves into the history, background and nature of maritime situation in the post-Cold War in the Mediterranean Sea. The principal objective of the chapter is to introduce and assess the core actors in the Mediterranean Sea and analyse their roles and initiatives in the Mediterranean Sea. This chapter provides insights and general overview of the past and current initiatives in the Mediterranean, implemented by the EU and NATO since the end of the Cold War. The chapter covers the beginning of the security initiatives by the EU and NATO with regards to Mediterranean security dialogue, maritime strategy and partnerships with Mediterranean countries. Therefore, the chapter focuses into varied strategies and initiatives, including, among others, Mediterranean Dialogue, Alliance Maritime Strategy, European Security Strategy and Barcelona Process to analyse their roles in managing maritime security challenges in the Mediterranean.

Chapter 5 and 6 focus on the primary case studies of this thesis and examine the roles of the EU and NATO to combat terrorism and irregular migration. The first case study focuses on the terror threat in the Mediterranean Sea which dates back as early as 1960s with the emergence of modern maritime attacks by Palestinian insurgents. This section also covers the principal counter-terrorism initiatives in the Mediterranean Sea that commenced in 2001 soon after the 9/11 attacks. The chapter analyses the history, development and enforcement of NATO’s Operation Active Endeavour (OAE); primarily established to address
the terrorist threat following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States. Also in this chapter, the roles of the EU are examined in regards to counter-terrorism measures. This section discusses EU counter-terrorism strategies, maritime operations and counter-terrorism centre which serves as a central information hub for the EU member states. Chapter 6 then further discusses the second case study, irregular migration. The chapter starts with discussion on migration incidents and statistics of migration flows in the Mediterranean Sea, looking at how this issue has proliferated from the issue of human security to become a security threat to one’s state. This chapter focuses on the counter-migration policies and responses by the EU and NATO to tackle the influx of migration movements via the Mediterranean Sea towards Europe. The study firstly details the efforts made by the EU to deal with migration crisis in the Mediterranean, through Operation Sophia and the EU’s Frontex agency, amongst others. This section also examines the roles of NATO in counter-migration in the Mediterranean. Although NATO’s role is limited compared to that of the EU, NATO has demonstrated a desire to participate and engage more actively with the existing EU counter-migration operations. NATO expressed its commitment to provide assistance to the EU to tackle the migration crisis and also announced their transition of OAE to the new Operation Sea Guardian. Such an operation is created to support Operation Sophia mainly focuses in the Aegean Sea.

Chapter 7 concludes this thesis with a summation of findings concerning the relations experienced between security community practices and maritime initiatives in the Mediterranean. By exploring security community practices, this chapter scrutinises the extent of security community expansion through the EU and NATO’s maritime security practices. The chapter demonstrates the relation between maritime security and security community framework, which has demonstrated through the enactment of cooperative-security, partnerships and confidence building measures. Finally, the chapter includes some relevant discussions and recommendations for future research. The chapter also includes the thesis impact and the contribution that can be made for the future field.
CHAPTER 2
Application of the Security Community Framework in Maritime Practices in the Mediterranean Sea

2.1 Introduction

The concept of security community provides an ideal explanation for the high level of cooperation and interaction to resolve disputes and conflicts, thus contribute to the long-term peace in the region. Specifically, it is a framework for analysis intended to study regional interactions and their relationship to security practices. The framework offers an alternative look into security politics, challenging the traditional realist paradigm of nation states’ security politics towards institutions interactions (Adler and Barnett 1998: 6). Initially proposed by Richard Van Wagenen in the early 1950s, it was not until Karl Deutsch and his associates resuscitated the concept in 1957 with in-depth theoretical and empirical treatment. Deutsch coined the concept to implicitly challenge the claims made by realists, that war is an inevitable feature in international politics which may one day eliminate the human race (Deutsch 1957: 4). Alternatively, Deutsch proposed the formation of security communities within political communities which eliminate war and the expectation of war within their boundaries. Deutsch emphasised that security communities mean the absence of interstate war (Deutsch 1957: 5).

Despite its importance in security politics, the security community, however was never a prevalent concept during the Cold War, claimed as unfit for application within international politics situations. As Adler and Barnett (1996) argue, security communities began to receive greater attention after the end of the Cold War with the changes in global politics and international relations theory (Adler and Barnett 1996: 69). The movement of international relations theory away from rationalism and materialism and toward exploration into the role of identity, norms, and the social basis of global politics has made the security community a widely used concept (Adler and Barnett 1996: 72). The post-Cold
War era has witnessed the emergence of community-building, whereby states place themselves within a political community and become full members of the community. By becoming the full members of a political community, it indicates the willingness of states to share similar identities, values, norms and interests. Membership into a security community means the ability to shape a shared collective destiny.

The concept of security community has gained importance and has been widely used in explicating security situations, not only in European region, but also in other regions such as Africa and Asia (Adler and Crawford 2006: 12). This includes the development of the African Union (AU), ASEAN, and Southern African Development Community (SADC). For instance, the seminal work of Christian Bueger (2013) developed the study of the security community within the scope of African maritime security regimes meanwhile Alan Collins (2014) in his work, analyses the security community building within ASEAN. These previous works on security-community building suggests that although limited, the importance of the concept of security community has gradually increased internationally. That said, the expansion of security community in the Mediterranean region has also gradually developed particularly to understand the relations between security practices and regional interactions in addressing contemporary security situation. Further discourse on the relationships of security community and these regions is examined in the latter part of this chapter.

This chapter explores the origin of the concept of security communities as formulated by Karl Deutsch and later followed by the refined definitions by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett. The first section focuses on the core

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assumptions of security communities laid out by Deutsch in the late 1950s; the second considers the advanced concept of security communities refined by Adler and Barnett in the late 1990s; and the third highlights the development from Adler and Barnett previous works, which includes the introduction of repertoire of practices to understand the mechanism of security communities. Finally, the possibilities for a broadly applicable security communities framework within security practices in the case studies are discussed.

2.2 Security Communities: Origins of a Concept

The concept of security communities was initially proposed in 1952 by Richard van Wagenen (Adler and Barnett 1998: 6). Nevertheless, it had to wait until the pioneering study by Karl Deutsch and his associates in their seminal work, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience published in 1957, for detailed conceptual and empirical analysis. Security communities are a type of political communit which reject the use of force or threat to resolve disputes. They challenge the fundamental thinking of realists which claim that war is inevitable in international politics (Ditrych 2014: 350). In other words, the basic premise of security communities is that war is no longer considered as a possible way to resolve disputes among its members, but the members will settle the conflicts through peaceful means.

Deutsch defined a security community as a political community which integrated to the point where there is a ‘real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way’ (Deutsch 1957: 5). Integration in this context does not necessarily indicate the merging of peoples or governmental agencies into a larger unit. Rather, Deutsch explains that “integration mean the attainment, within a territory, of a ‘sense of community’ and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a ‘long’ time, dependable expectations of ‘peaceful change’ among its population” (Deutsch 1957: 5).
Deutsch emphasises that integration requires some kind of organisation at the international level. Peaceful change on the other hand is a resolution of social problems by institutionalised procedures without the use of violence (Deutsch 1957: 5). The presence of a ‘sense of community’ is essential in order to ensure peaceful change. As Deutsch asserts, “by sense of community we mean a belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least this one point: that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of peaceful change” (Deutsch 1957: 5). In other words, ‘sense of community’ implies the situation where members of the community demonstrate a verbal attachment to shared values, mutual considerations, trust, loyalties and cooperative action (Deutsch 1957: 36). Ultimately, if the entire world integrated into a security community, the likelihood of war would be an unlikely occurrence among the states. Deutsch observed security communities in two varieties, that is ‘amalgamated security community’ and ‘pluralistic security community’. In the next section, I explore these two kinds of security communities in further detail.

2.2.1 Amalgamated Security Community

An amalgamated security community exists when there is a ‘formal merger of two or more previously independent units into a single, larger political units, with a common government’ (Deutsch 1957: 6). This common government could be federal or unitary, and Deutsch offers the United States as an example of the amalgamated security community who became a single governmental unit after a formal merger into an expanded state. According to Deutsch, amalgamated security communities entail early establishment of common laws, courts and police forces to maintain the balance of power among the members of a larger union or federation, in order to prevent one country from becoming much stronger than the others (Deutsch 1957: 27). If one member state is far stronger than the rest, the political elite have the disposition to neglect the needs of other smaller member states, which results in loss of responsiveness among the members. This may eventually prevent the integration process throughout the community and refrain the formation of security community between states.
In order to establish successful amalgamated security communities, Deutsch identifies some essential requirements which eventually lead to the integration of the political communities. If a group of states fulfil these essential conditions, it means that they are likely to be successful in the amalgamation process. First, values and expectations are the essential conditions required to form a successful amalgamated security community (Deutsch 1957: 46). In this context, the political behaviour of the political units is motivated by the common values shared between each other. For instance, the elimination of different values from the internal politics in certain aspects such as religious values and domestic issues (i.e. slavery and race problems) provides an essential precondition for the establishment of a successful amalgamated security community in some countries (Deutsch 1957: 47). In other ways, it demonstrates the states’s motivation to eliminate the distinction of their domestic politics, rather they incorporate and accept it together. Second, successful amalgamated security communities require capabilities and communication processes among the members. The crux of this condition is effective channels of communication between the members, including political and administrative capabilities of members (Deutsch 1957: 50).

The third condition required for an amalgamated security community is the mobility of persons (Deutsch 1957: 53). Free mobility of persons is essential for political amalgamation in order to advance the process of integration. The easy movement of people across national boundaries demonstrates the willingness of states to become associated with others, which promotes the integration between the states to form an amalgamated security community. Deutsch suggests the unification of German states as the example of the inter-regional mobility accompanying amalgamation (Deutsch 1957: 53). Fourth, the condition present in amalgamated security community is the multiplicity and balance of transactions. A successful amalgamated security community requires a range of common functions and services, with different institutions to execute the tasks (Deutsch 1957: 54). For instance, the set up of common institutions to implement specific functions such as in cultural, educational and legal divisions. The final conditions for the successful formation of amalgamated security community is the mutual
predictability of behaviour of the members. To be precise, it means that the members expect compatible behaviour whereby the members are familiar enough with each other’s behaviours that they can anticipate their actions and eventually respond accordingly with that prediction (Deutsch 1957: 56). In sum, these conditions are essential in order to determine whether or not a political community successfully forms an amalgamated security community. These conditions promote the integration between the members where they develop the ‘we-feeling’ and mutual trust among themselves, which finally constructs a successful security community.

2.2.2 Pluralistic Security Community

The second type of security community is the pluralistic security community. This type of security community is different from amalgamated security community wherein it ‘retain[s] the legal independence of separate governments’ (Deutsch 1957: 6). This means that two or more separate governmental units which form a security community retain their legal independence without being merging under a single, larger government. Political communities within a pluralistic security community possess similar core values, mutual identity, loyalty, and a sense of “we-ness”, however they retain the legal independence of separate governments and their supreme decision-making power (Deutsch 1957: 6). Pluralistic security communities indicate that the member states voluntarily cooperate collectively, adhering to peaceful resolutions of conflict, and eliminating the possibility of war, while at the same time retaining their independence and political autonomy.

In a pluralistic security community, the basic premise which indicates the emergence of such community is the elimination of war. War has become less attractive and improbable among the members of political communities. Deutsch points out three reasons behind the absence of war among members of pluralistic security communities. First, war became less attractive because members are apprehensive of the major destruction and devastation war may cause the states (Deutsch 1957: 115). Second, war becomes improbable because of the risk of
international entanglement that could expend the warring states. For instance, inter state war may lead to great power interventions imposed as a deterrence against war between the two states (Deutsch 1957: 115). Interventions of several great powers will aggravate the war, therefore states are likely to refrain from war through every possible means to avoid international conflicts. Third, war becomes unattractive because it is not within the interest of domestic politics of all (Deutsch 1957: 116). For instance, although there is a political strain between two conflicting states, however war becomes unthinkable and not even an option to resolve the disputes. Rather, states will adopt a peaceful means to settle the conflicts. In sum, the absence of war within this period indicates the presence of a pluralistic security community between the states.

In order to form a successful pluralistic security community, there are three important conditions required to achieve it. According to Deutsch, the first essential condition for the success of pluralistic security community is the compatibility among the primary political values of the member states (Deutsch 1957: 66). For instance, two states with similar types of regimes are more likely to form a community among themselves, as opposed to states with different political ideologies. Sheehan, nevertheless, argues that ideological compatibility itself is not sufficient as a condition for a security community (Shehan 2006: 28). Later generations of security community theorists have attempted to explore the possibilities of security communities formation among non-democratic states (Sheehan 2006: 28). In addition, it also indicates the absence of any incompatible values which motivate the political behaviour of the political units. In other words, the compatibility values implies that members of the political community agreed to a set of socially accepted values that makes them become attached to each other.

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6 Sheehan gives an example of how states with similar political ideologies are not sufficiently able to form a community. Although sharing the same political values, Turkey and Greece however failed to form a stable democratic regime during the Cold War and failed to become part of security community, which at the time was a characteristic of other NATO states (Sheehan 2006: 28).
Second, there should be an established network of political and other communications, to provide a sufficient and immediate response towards member states’ messages and needs without resorting to physical force (Deutsch 1957: 66). The key of this conditions is an increase in the responsiveness in the process of decision making. The capacity of members to respond to each other’s messages implies not only that they have received the messages, but the members also understand and consider the messages for their political decision making (Deutsch 1957: 67). Good communication is crucial in the security community to hinder any distrust and sceptical feeling between members of the community. Deutsch (as quoted in Adler) stressed that communication is the pillar of social group and political communities. He asserts that communication alone enables a group ‘to think together, to see together, and to act together’ (Adler and Barnett 1996: 66). Through communication processes and transaction flows between peoples, it instills a sense of community not only among elites, but also among the peoples (Adler 1998: 174). Third, a successful pluralistic security community exists when there is a successful dynamic interaction of the first two conditions. It requires mutual predictability on the relevant aspects of each partner’s political, economic and social behaviour which can be acquired from similar political cultures (Deutsch 1957: 67). In short, states who shared similar values are able to understand each other’s behaviour better because it reflects the resemblance between them. Similarly, communication networks are able to provide the states an idea and predictable picture of the other (Sheehan 2006: 29).

In sum, security communities focus on the interstate practices and transnational forces that build up the confidence among the member states to settle their differences through means other than war. Core principles in security communities therefore dictate how states govern their domestic behaviour in ways that are consistent with the community. The essential conditions of a security community is the elimination of war, but a peaceful means as a way to resolve disputes and conflicts between the community members. Existence of war or military action signals the breakdown of the community. Those states that form a security community have created a stable order and peace. In spite of a lack of
acceptance for the concept of security communities during the Cold War, the concept has been revived after the end of the Cold War. Constructivist scholars have been at the forefront of the revival, using Deutsch’s concept to grasp how social processes and international community may transform international politics (Adler and Barnett 1996: 72). Security communities formed after the Cold War are more relevant and suit security politics as they acknowledge the social character of global politics, identities, interests, culture, values and norms. In sum, this section explored the origins of the concept of security communities as formulated by Karl Deutsch and analysed the two kinds of security communities. In the next section, I will delve into the advanced concept of security communities as proposed by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett.

2.3 Evolution of Security Community

This section will draw on the seminal work of Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, Security Communities (1998) to extend the argument of the concept of security communities. Despite their admiration for Deutsch’s work, they argue that his conceptualisation of security community framework lack theoretical, methodological and conceptual treatment (Adler and Barnett 1996: 73). Therefore, Adler and Barnett propose a number of refinements and modifications to Deutsch’s original concept. This includes the distinction between loosely and tightly coupled pluralistic security communities and a three-stage model for the formation of security communities. Adler in his work also includes a broader definition of community to give more understanding on the correlation between security and the community itself (Adler 1997: 250). The refinement of the concept of security communities also draws attention to the importance of the concept in order to understand contemporary events.

In the next section, I will explore the extensions of the concept of security communities, by Adler and Barnett. They have further advanced the concept of security communities by providing refinement concept of pluralistic security communities by Deutsch. In this section, first I explore the conceptual vocabulary of security community with the further discussions of two types of pluralistic
security communities, loosely and tightly coupled pluralistic security community. Adler and Barnett argue that such communities are socially constructed ‘cognitive regions’ or ‘community regions’ (Adler 1997: 250). That said, I will also explore the emergence of security communities in non-Western regions. Second, I analyse the development of security communities by presenting three stages of security communities as observed by Adler and Barnett. Third, I scrutinise the spread of security communities within its repertoire of practices that sustain the security communities mechanism. Finally, I will explore the emergence of security community in the Mediterranean region via maritime security practices.

2.3.1 Security Communities – A Refinement of a Concept

In the refinement of the security community framework, Adler and Barnett extend the definition of a pluralistic security community as initially formulated by Deutsch. According to Adler and Barnett:

“Pluralistic security community is a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change.” (Adler and Barnett 1998: 30).

Peaceful change here defined as “neither the expectation of nor the preparation for organised violence as a means to settle interstate disputes” (Adler and Barnett 1998: 34). Although peaceful change assumes the elimination of war between states, it is however, important to understand that security communities do not imply the absence of interstate disputes at all, rather it implicitly specifies the systematic peaceful resolution of these disputes. In other words, a security community is an academic expression for the “social fact of interstate peace” and the mechanisms that sustain dependable expectations of peaceful change (Adler and Greve 2009: 69). The pluralistic security community was developed in an attempt to measure the extent to which the members can be called a community. Adler and Barnett emphasise that:

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Adler and Barnett emphasised that peaceful change implies that states do not perceive other security actors within the community as a source of military threat to their legitimacy and autonomy. Therefore, security communities can still exist without a formal alliance, so long as there is a formal consensus and regulations that prohibit states from adopting war as a means to settle their conflicts (Adler and Barnett 1998: 34-35).
“Pluralistic security communities can be categorized according to their depth of trust, the nature and degree of institutionalization of their governance system, and whether they reside in a formal anarchy or are on the verge of transforming it.” (Adler and Barnett 1998: 30)

Accordingly, Adler and Barnett suggest that the above categories enable the formation of two distinct ideal types, namely, loosely and tightly pluralistic security communities. They further elaborate the difference between these two types of pluralistic security community with the emphasis that the key distinctive feature of a security community is the existence of transnational community and interstate interactions linked to dependable expectations of peaceful change (Adler and Barnett 1998: 31). According to Adler and Barnett:

“Loosely-coupled security communities observe the minimal definitional properties and no more: a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change. [...] Tightly-coupled security communities however are more demanding in two respects. First, they have a “mutual aid” society in which they construct collective system arrangements. Secondly, they possess a system of rule that lies [...] between a sovereign state and a regional, centralized, government; that is, it is something of a post-sovereign system, endowed with common supranational, transnational, and national institutions and some form of a collective security system.” (Adler and Barnett 1998: 30).

As Adler and Barnett concede, what makes these two types of security community different is the nature of sovereignty and authority relations (Adler and Barnett 1996: 79). Loosely-coupled security communities expect that other members will refrain from warlike activities and hence, self-restraint is practiced among the members (Adler and Barnett 1998: 30). Tightly-coupled security communities, on the other hand demonstrate that states retain their authority and autonomy and are free to act based on their interests as long as it is within the frame of the common understandings of the community and they comply with the regulations of the region (Adler 1997: 266). In other words, members of tightly-coupled security communities have unlimited authority and sovereignty to act as they deem
necessary in the international system. States only perceive insecurity when their legitimacy is challenged and the shared understandings of the community are endangered. In both cases, a security community means states expect peaceful change between members. It is important to understand the definition of community itself to determine the relationships between security and community.

2.3.2 The Meaning of Community

In general, a security community is a group of people (states) who share a similar identity and values. However, what actually defines a ‘community’ in the international politics? How can we perceive which groups of actors form a community and under what condition is a community created? In order to understand how communities can construct norms and identities to form an alliance with the outsiders, we first need to understand what defines a community. Adler and Barnett argue that there is no definite definition of community (Adler and Barnett 1998: 31). In general, the existence of communities is ‘based on commitments, duties, obligations and expectations held collectively by the group’ (Adler 1997: 263). Community also refers to a social structure consisting of the members’ shared identities and interest (Adler and Crawford 2006: 12). However, Adler and Barnett offer a useful definition of community to understand global politics. Adler and Barnett proposed three characteristics that define community.

First, ‘members of a community have shared identities, values and meanings’ (Adler and Barnett 1998: 31). Common meanings are the basis of community where they develop the ‘we-feeling’ to understand common actions, norms and feelings. Common meanings also include people who share common traditions, language and usage. Common meanings will enable people to live in the same regulated world. Deutsch previously had also mentioned that community building results from common meanings. When everybody shares common objectives, common actions will make them into a community (Adler 1998: 174). Common meaning is the key for security communities and it is necessary for

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8 See also Edward Hallett Carr, Conditions of Peace (London: MacMillan Company, 1942); and Ernst B. Haas, Nationalism, Liberalism, and Progress (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997). In their seminal works, Carr and Haas agree that common meanings are the building blocks of the collective identities on which international or transnational communities are based.
interactions between the members, if it is not available, then institutional and individual agents are needed to construct it.

Second, community means the existence of direct relations among those members, in order to eliminate possibilities of indirect and isolated interactions between members of a community (Adler and Barnett 1998: 31). Those in the community communicate through some form of face-to-face encounters in various settings. However, Adler suggests that recent technological breakthroughs have facilitated the development of a sense of community among people “who are not physically present” (Adler 1997: 262). Adler asserts that security communities might emerge between non-contiguous states. This means that a state can still become a member of security community despite the fact that they are geographically located at a great distance from the “core” members (Adler and Barnett 1998: 33). Regardless of Adler’s argument however, Alex Bellamy (2004) argues that the requirement of direct interaction would still be a causal factor which may undermine the formation of community above the geographic settings (Bellamy 2004: 31). Bellamy proposes that members of the community do not necessarily have to have direct interactions with one another to form a community. What matters most is that they have shared sense of community (Bellamy 2004: 32).

Third, communities require a shared long term interest and need to refrain from self-centric behaviour while interacting with other members in the community (Adler and Barnett 1996: 74). In other ways, it demonstrates the high level of communication and interdependent between the members of community whose shared similar interests. All these characteristics can exist at the local, domestic or international level (Adler and Barnett 1998: 32). In sum, the actors who share identities, values, and meanings, direct interactions and mutual cooperation can form a security community. Specifically, the criterion that distinguishes a security community from other kinds of communities is that its members entertain dependable expectations of peaceful change.
Dependable expectations of peaceful change can be assessed through two criteria. First, "stable expectations can be achieved from the actors with pre-given interests and preferences; and secondly from the actors with common identities and interests which are shaped by their environment" (Adler and Barnett 1998: 34). In other words, the emergence of dependable expectations of peaceful change build on the political actors with shared identities and interests which will assure war-avoidance practices. According to Adler and Barnet, peaceful change can best defined as:

“Neither the expectation of nor the preparation for organized violence as a means to settle interstate disputes” (Adler and Barnett 1998: 34).

If states perceive any security behaviour from other members within the community as threatening, it will jeopardise the security community mechanism. As reiterated throughout the thesis, the fundamental regulations of security community is the absence of a military encounter for conflict settlement. In addition, Adler also proposed that power plays a crucial role in the development of security communities. Power in security communities is understood as the “authority to determine shared meaning that comprises the identities, interests, and practices of states, as well as the conditions that confer, defer, or deny access to ‘goods’ and benefits” (Adler 1997: 261). In this context, power constitutes the institutional power to legitimise and authorise their behaviour, without having conflicting interests within the frame of common understanding of the community.

In sum, community with mutual norms, interests and identities tend to form an alliance with the outsiders and finally create a security community. Power is never isolated in security communities, rather it helps to attract and reproduce common interests among the members. Powerful states are deemed to be necessary for the development of security communities, as their presence will allure weaker states to share the security and welfare associated with them.
The concept of security community describes a collective with a high level of transaction and communication in which emphasise the peaceful means to resolve a conflict. The discussion on security community focuses on the emergence of shared interests and identities, in which this interests can be understood as an ideal type to pursue collective security in the security issue area. Security community is particularly important and useful to explain the convergence of cooperation in the security issues whereby members of a community do not foresee the other members as threats, rather they developed a common identity and cooperate in joint activities and projects. Security community is an ideal type to understand the cooperation between the members in which it provides main criterion that the members have a shared understanding of what constitutes a threat and what does not, and what threats do require security action from the members (Bueger 2013: 301). The framework has contributed for better understanding of the states’ behaviour and level of cooperation in conflict resolution which has previously dominated by liberalism. Liberalism approach has dominated the discussion of cooperative-security through the construction of institutions to encourage cooperation. However, Adler and Barnett offered alternative framework to explain the mutual engagement and development of shared interests between members to collaborate collectively in joint projects. In addition, constructivism with its focus on constitutive norms and identities in shaping state interests supported that security community can be better understood with the premises of constructivism. This is due to the fact that constructivism offers the notions that peaceful change might be achieved through the institutionalisation of values and shared identities, indicating the relevance of constructivism in complementing the concept of security communities. After we understand what a community is, the next section will extend this discussion by exploring Adler’s (1997) concept of ‘cognitive regions’.

2.3.3 Cognitive Regions

After a detailed narrative on the definition of community, we need to understand and identify what constructs a community between political actors. States who construct a community share similar identities and interests which evolve from
interactions across transnational regions. In a similar way, it can understand as the assimilation of interests of one states with another through various interactions such as economic and cooperative practices. States who share ethnic or national identities promote the idea of the formation of community-regions.

According to Adler, community-regions are “regional systems of interdependent group of states who shared identities, values and meanings, which may transcend the territorial boundaries” (Adler 1997: 253). Adler categorises community-regions into three companion elements: (a) people who actively interact beyond state borders, (b) people who are actively interdependent in regional politics engagement in order to achieve regional purposes; and (c) people who as citizens of states, compel the constituent states of the community-region to act as agents of regional good (Adler 1997: 253). Within community-regions, the fundamental requirement from the members is that they shared mutual perceptions towards external threats and at the same time practice non-threatening activities between each other (Adler 1997: 254). In other words, community-regions build on a set of groups which are interdependent, not within a geography setting alone, but rather constructed by a shared culture, history, economics and politics. This is in accordance with Adler and Barnett’s argument that a security community can exist when there is a common characteristic between the actors at the international level, the members do not have to be geographically contiguous (Adler and Barnett 1998: 33).

That said, community-regions can also be perceived as cognitive regions which establish the mutual interests and practices of the members. Cognitive regions help to formulate the mutual understandings and identities among the members which at the end will assure that region is kept ‘in place’ (Adler 1997: 254). Although a region is constructed beyond the territorial base, the constitution of cognitive region with mutual values, understandings and norms enable the actors to construct a community. This community region is what makes ‘security communities’. Adler suggests that the EU is the appropriate example of a community-region (Adler 1997: 254), where the members interact actively across
state borders pursuing regional goals either in political, economic, or culture purposes. To sum up this discussion about community-regions, it is best to understand community-regions as a group of political communities, constructed beyond specific geographic settings, and comprised of actors who have common identities and interests and actively engaged to pursue the regional purposes. In other words, the states with mutual identities and understanding will keep the region in place although they are geographically distant. The members promote the idea of economic interdependence, a high degree of communication and cooperative activities which contributes towards the absence of war within community-regions. In the next section, I will analyse different perspectives of security community expansion which was previously focused on developed countries. By contrast, I will explore the spread of security community building in the other regions, including, among others, Africa and Southeast Asia.

2.3.4 The Building of Regional Security Communities

The emergence of a security community has always been associated with developed regions including North America and Western Europe. In Europe, it was claimed that they have achieved the level where they can expect peaceful change within their boundaries using security community practices (Adler and Crawford 2006: 12). Nevertheless, the emergence of such community has also regained its importance in the other regions where cooperation among states has gradually increased. The security community transcends Europe, and can also been seen in Southeast Asia, Africa and the Balkan region for instance.

Bueger, in his work, *Communities of Security Practice at Work? The Emerging African Maritime Security Regime* (2013) explains how the expansion of maritime security communities has taken place particularly in African security. With the growing concerns over maritime threats in Africa especially piracy, there has been a significant effort to construct a maritime security regime complex. Bueger stressed how attempts to formulate African maritime security strategy is portrayed through the African Union (AU) and the framework of Southern African Development Community (SADC). The article discusses how the security community framework can be used to study the practice of African
maritime security through the application of shared repertoires, joint enterprises and mutual engagement (Bueger 2013: 300).

Similarly, Suzette Grillot in her works, *Developing Security Community in the Western Balkans: The Role of the EU and NATO* (2010), examines the roles played by the third-parties, such as international organisations towards fostering the development of a security community and international integration. Using the Western Balkans as the case study, Grillot investigates how the EU and NATO play their roles as mediators to encourage the development of a security community through the process of socialisation (Grillot 2010: 62). Grillot explores how the practices of the EU and NATO in the Western Balkans post-conflict are geared towards developing a regional security community. For that purpose, Grillot examined the initiatives of the EU in the Western Balkans through the implementation of Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) in 1999, which offers a possibility of future EU membership (Grillot 2010: 74). SAP is an initiative which promotes the integration of Western Balkan countries into the EU political and economic structures (Grillot 2010: 74). With this initiative, the EU attempted to instill a sense of community among the Western Balkans states through membership requirements, which required them to engage collectively in regional cooperation and finally contributes to the development of security community. NATO on the other hand, offer a membership of Partnership for Peace (PfP) for the Balkan states, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro after its involvement in the peacekeeping operations in those countries (Grillot 2010: 75). PfP also promotes the idea of integration into political and security agendas among the members, whereby it required the members to engage in regional interaction. That said, the integration has contributed significantly to the evolution of a security community among Western Balkan countries. Ultimately, this article argues that both NATO and EU have contributed to the evolution of security community building in the Western Balkans particularly through their membership initiatives and policies in the region.
Although the spread of security communities regained its importance beyond regions, there is some contradiction from scholars who perceived security community expansion differently. For instance, within the ASEAN framework. ASEAN has always been the favoured example to describe the nascent non-liberal pluralistic security community as it fulfills the mechanisms required to build a security community (Adler 1997: 256; Adler 2008: 222; Adler and Greve 2009: 76). However, Collins argues that there is a contrasting point about the communities mechanism. Alan Collins in his works, *Bringing Communities Back: Security Communities and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Plural Turn* (2014), points out that ASEAN is an institution which emphasises self-restraint as its fundamental practice among the members. However, Collins argues that the practice of self-restraint prevent the formation of security community within ASEAN (Collins 2014: 10). Collins asserts that ASEAN has not created a security community, liberal or non-liberal because it has not developed the linkages (material and ideational) among its member states, and peoples, that create a sense of community (Collins 2014: 2). Despite Adler’s admiration towards the emergence of ASEAN as a security community, Collins however concerns that principles which are the main pillars of ASEAN have somehow prevented ASEAN from developing into a security community.

There are principles which should be obliged by the member states in order to create one non-liberal security community. The member states require common understanding about security and abide with principle not to interfere in each other’s affair to preserve the harmonious and stability of every member. The norms that underpin ASEAN have however prevent the type of interaction that can establish an intrusive governance mechanism (Collins 2014: 10). This norm represents the restriction of interactions between member states, therefore it does not consistent with the practices as being delineated in the security community, which are strongly emphasised on the collective-security as their basic norms. ASEAN’s main principles of non-interference also somehow undermine a process towards establishing a real community (Collins 2014: 10). The limited nature of interactions between ASEAN’s members is also reflected in the application of the ‘self-restraint’ principles among them. ‘Self-restraint’ in ASEAN context means
no interference in each other’s domestic affairs, consequently led to the absence of a sense of belonging between the members (Nathan 2006: 284; Collins 2014: 10). ASEAN is indicating that they are gradually moving towards pluralism with active engagement with a variety of stakeholders while at the same time legitimise civil society organisations (Collins 2014: 13). However in order to transform into security community, ASEAN needs to eschew their fundamental principles of self-restraint. The future of ASEAN to become a pluralistic security community although probable still remains uncertain.

Comparatively, Nathan (2006) argues that domestic stability is also a missing condition when discussing the development of security communities (Nathan 2006: 275). Domestic stability is one of the conditions towards security community, as it relates to the security of people (Nathan 2006: 278). Dependable expectation of peaceful change is not subjected to the states per se, but also include the population or people embodies in one territory. Moreover, domestic stability is a necessary condition of a security community because it provides the connection between intra and interstate conflict. In this case, domestic violence will lead to suspicious and tension between states, preventing them from achieving the mutual trust and sense of collective identity (Nathan 2006: 280). Domestic instability or internal violence may interrupt the progress of building a security community because it will undermine the regional stability. Domestic repression also obstructs the process of making a security community because there will be a trust issue among the states, stifling the sense of common identity among the member states. Furthermore, chaotic situations resulting from political instability in one state may lead their neighbouring countries to take collective action in order to help and maintain peace. Nevertheless, this action will lead to a greater opposition by the population creating disorder where the development of security community between states may be at stake. The other reason which makes domestic stability a necessary condition of a security community relates to the volatility and uncertainty associated with instability (Nathan 2006: 287). Although domestic instability does not always lead to cross-border violence, the risk of such violence cannot be dismissed (Nathan 2006: 287). Concerns over the spill-over effects of domestic violence may heighten due to several factors; (i) the
scale, intensity and duration of domestic violence, (ii) proximity, and (iii) balance of power (Nathan 2006: 287).

In conclusion, the evolution of security communities can also be studied in non-Western regions. The spread of security communities has gradually diffused throughout the world where states have begun to enhance their interactions and form an alliance to share collective actions not only against external threats, but also to enhance cooperation in economy, culture and social. Security communities do not only explain the emergence of cooperation among the developed states, but they also transcend to other regions. We can observe the pattern of security cooperation has expanded in Southeast Asia, Africa and Balkan, although some missing conditions for security mechanism were identified in certain regions. In the next section, I will delve into the three stages of formation for security community to understand the evolution of how states transform into a security community.

2.4 The Formation of Security Communities

The concept of security communities provides a basis to understand the development and existence of a community and how it influences the interaction between states in security politics. However, in order to understand the development of security communities itself, Adler and Barnett offer three stages and indicators present in the formation of a security community. The three designed stages are nascent; ascendant and finally, the mature phase.

Phase I: Nascent

The nascent stage is where two or more states begin to consider coordinating their relations between each other to expand their mutual security, reduce the transaction costs associated with their exchanges, as well as to strengthen and develop more interactions in the future (Adler and Barnett 1996: 86). In this context, we can predict that it will involve various exchanges including diplomatic, bilateral and multilateral exchanges (Adler and Barnett 1998: 50). This phase demonstrates the growing needs of the state to engage with multilateral
relations to share their mutual interests. To ensure cooperation, states will normally establish ‘third parties’, consisting of organisations and institutions which can act as an observer to assure participating states are obliged to the contracts and rules (Adler and Barnett 1996: 86).

There are a number of reasons which motivate states to extend their interation with other members of the security community. For example, they may discover that they share common interests which require collective action, inspiring them to form a strategic alliance (Adler and Barnett 1998: 50). One of the possible mechanisms that motivate states to form institutions is a mutual security threat. Parenthetically, states also seek to create organisations to enhance cooperation between them in area of interest, e.g. health, economic and environment. The creation of organisations will make the members become more interdependent (Adler and Barnett 1996: 87). In this case, Adler and Barnett offer Arab states for reference, by which they suggests the Arab states should intensify their security and political interactions, allowing them foster political community between themselves, rather than putting too much concern over the external threat. In sum, this phase is recognised as the initial phase where states begin to regain interest to have more interactions with other states which share similar interests and needs collective cooperation to engage in particular area they deem need necessary.

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9 This presupposition however has criticised by Ondrej Ditrych (2014). In his works, Security Community: A Future for a Troubled Concept? International Relations (28), pp.350-366, Ditrych argues that the benchmark indicating the beginning of security communities is insufficient to prove the emergence of security communities within states. He emphasised that security communities not only exist within states with shared interest, rather it can be observed everywhere, including at the global level (Ditrych 2014: 354).

10 Deutsch suggests that when states discover that they share common threat, it is a sufficient condition to initiate an alliance between states, and finally form a security community. States discover that they require collective action and coordination policies to settle their common threats (Adler and Barnett 1996: 86).

11 Laurie Nathan (2006) argues that domestic stability is a missing condition when discussing the development of security communities (Nathan 2006: 277). Nathan stressed that domestic stability should be one of the norm that required in developing security community as it relates to the security of people (Nathan 2006: 278) (See Laurie Nathan 2006, Domestic Instability and Security Communities. European Journal of International Relations, 12 (2), pp. 275-299.)
**Phase II: Ascendant**

According to Adler and Barnett, this phase demonstrates the development of networks (Adler and Barnett 1998: 53). Likewise, new institutions and organisations begin to consider either to create tighter military coordination and/or decrease fear that the other represents a threat; and states begin to trust each other more than before and encourage dependable expectations of peaceful change (Adler and Barnett 1998: 53). When the interactions begin to develop, the community that shared mutual interests and identity will create new institutional and organisational. In short, this phase is defined as an intensification of relations between states, where core states or a coalition of states play important role in sustaining the development of security communities. The ascendant phase demonstrates where the security community begins to diffuse among states and existing channels that were identified and intensified in the nascent phase. In this phase, more interaction emerge, various new social institutions and organisational forms take place, and states make efforts in promoting greater regional interaction, states will also empower various groups in civil society including nongovernmental organisations, social movements and expert groups (Adler and Barnett 1996: 90). In sum, this phase demonstrates where states generate more interactive cooperation between members. They also increasingly share consensus over the mutual threats they face with, and simultaneously resort to peaceful settlement of any conflicts.

**Phase III: Mature**

The mature stage is where the security communities define and entertain dependable expectations of peaceful change (Adler and Barnett 1998: 55). At this stage, war is likely to be improbable, rather members of the security communities will respond to any external threat or attack as a collective security system. The differences between members have diminished, therefore it is unlikely for them to prepare war among themselves (Adler and Barnett 1998: 55). In general, the mature phase provides a broader distinction between loosely and tightly-coupled security communities. As briefly discussed in the earlier section, loosely-coupled security community assume that the cognitive region whose shared meanings and
mutual identity form a high level of trust between each other. That said, although some conflicting interests still exist between members of the community, it will never disrupt the interactions between the members (Adler and Barnett 1998: 55). Instead, members of the community will share dispositions of self-restraint.\footnote{This has been re-emphasised by Adler (2008) in his works, The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO’s Post-Cold War Transformation. \textit{European Journal of International Relations} 14 (2), pp. 195- 230. Adler emphasised that security community at this phase implies the evolution of particular security community practices, including self-restraint. Self-restraint signals the guarantee that member states will handle any disputes through compromise and diplomatic means without resorting to the use of force, especially military encounters to settle the conflicts (Adler 2008: 204-205).}

In order to determine the existence of loosely-coupled security community, Adler and Barnett offer few essential indicators: multilateralism; unfortified borders; changes in military planning; common definitions of threat; and discourse and the language of community (Adler and Barnett 1998: 55-56). First, multilateralism indicates the high degree of trust among the members. Multilateralism will likely lead to unified decision-making process and conflict settlement due to high level of consensus between members of the community (Adler and Barnett 1998: 55). Second, unfortified borders are implemented increasingly between the members. This does not indicate the entire absence of military encounters against threats, rather it implies that members of the community promote the expansion of border checks and patrols instead. Third, the security community comes into existence when there is a changes in military planning. The enlargement of military pact and operations between members however never perceived as a probable source of enemies, rather seen as a way to increase cooperation between the members to address mutual challenges (Adler and Barnett 1998: 56). Fourth, members of the security community share a common understanding and definition to identify any particular security concern that may be perceived as a threat to their survival and legitimacy. Finally, the community achieve specific standards of regulations and actions, by which the patterns of their interactions and communications are different from the outsiders. This demonstrates the similar way of life between the members with similar governance system whose at the same time maintaining a ‘we-feeling’ that eventually unite all the members and develop security community.
Conversely, a tightly-coupled security community is different from the former in certain respects. Specifically, it focuses on few additional aspects than the previous indicators of loosely-coupled security community. Adler and Barnett offer different indicators, namely cooperative and collective security; a high degree of military agreement; policy coordination against ‘internal threats’; free movement of the population; and the internationalisation of the population (Adler and Barnett 1998: 56-57). The first indicator which is cooperative and collective security presupposes that the members advance from mutual arms control and confidence building to “cooperative security” to adjudicate security issues within the community. Meanwhile “collective security” refers to responses and actions agreed between member states against external threats outside the community (Adler and Barnett 1998: 56). Second, the level of interdependence between members increase whereby they will observe common threats to be handled with a high level of military cooperation merging the use of military resources between the members. Third, tightly-coupled security communities emphasise the importance of policy coordination to address the external threats, which have been mutually identified by the members. Fourth, the development of the free movements of the population between the members’ states demonstrates the existence of a tightly-coupled security community. For instance, waiving visa requirements for citizens to travel across the members’ states implies that the members have increasingly developed the ‘we-feeling’, seeing themselves as one large community, compatible and not a threat to each other (Adler and Barnett 1998: 57). The fifth indicator is the internationalisation of authority. This indicator explains the process where domestic laws of the members become consolidated in efforts to accommodate security situations of the community. This eventually leads to the internationalisation of law where all members abide to agreed practices of law and the mechanism of its enforcement (Adler and Barnett 1998: 57).

In summary, security communities are not community born with the existing cultural traits which shapes the frameworks, rather they are created. They start with preliminary interactive processes, which later leads to greater regional interaction where the members of the communities start to develop the feeling and
sense of community among themselves, and finally reach the peak of the
development process where they are now within a group of community with a
high degree of communication, trust and shared identity. The security
communities are at their highest level of interaction where any discrepancies are
eliminated, war is improbable and states are expected to resolve their disputes
peacefully. The failure to achieve this mutual trust in the future is the signal of the
breakdown of security communities.

2.5 Security Community Mechanism and Repertoire of Practices

After a comprehensive discussion on the formation of security communities from
the perspective of Adler and Barnett, this section analyses the spread of security
communities mechanism through the employment of repertoire of practices. This
collection of security practices are adopted primarily to reiterate that any external
threat to members’ survival is best governed by cooperative-security measures,
confidence building and creation of partnerships which incorporate all the
members. As has been reiterated repeatedly throughout the thesis, the necessary
condition for the security community mechanism is the absence of war between
states in a security community. The decay of this notion indicates the failure of
security communities. For this reason, a set of repertoires is required to assure
sustainability of security community mechanism. According to Emanuel Adler
and Patricia Greve (2009), there are six vital repertoire of practices which help to
sustain the security community mechanism.13

First, dependable expectations of peaceful change are based on the practice
of self-restraint; the abstention from the use of force as a means to conflict
adjudication. Adler defines that “self-restraint is not (only) a political choice […]
nor is it just a habit […] — it is a disposition (Adler 2008: 205). Norbert Elias
(1982) suggests that self-restraint from a psychological perspective includes the

13 See Emanuel Adler and Patricia Greve (2009), When Security Community Meets Balance of
Studies, 35 (S1), pp. 59-84. Adler and Greve propose that mutual trust and collective identity are
the conditions for the formation of alliance/alignments to prevent security dilemmas among the
members. Therefore in order to maintain the mechanism of a security community, a set of
practices are necessary to acquire the peaceful change between states in a security community
(Adler and Greve 2009: 71).
‘taming of emotions and affects’ and the ‘extension of mental space beyond the moment into the past and future’ (Elias 1982: 236). Similarly, Alexander Wendt (1999) also proposes the definition of self-restraint as a strengthening of the principle of “respect for difference”, in a way that states will feel less anxious of any potential loss if they compromise their interests with other states (Wendt 1999: 363). The fundamental idea of security community is a mutual trust between members, however it is undeniable that there may still be contestation over their interests (Adler and Greve 2009: 71). With the practice of self-restraint, this contestation can be overcome between the members whereby violence is no longer an option, what matters most is that they adopt peaceful means through compromise and diplomatic measures to settle their conflicts. Adler further emphasises that self-restraint evolves not only within domestic members of the states, but it also transcends the transnational communities of the community (Adler 2009: 205). When the practice of self-restraint spread to non-liberal communities, it may motivate the non-members to develop cooperative security as a way of communication, and consequently help them evolve into non-liberal security communities (Adler 2008: 206). In summary, self-restraint is not merely a political tool or habit; rather it is a disposition which enables all the people in the security community to interact collectively without considering war as a means to settle any disputes.

Second, repertoire of practices that sustain the security community mechanism is the inclination towards the importance of common enterprises, projects, and partnerships in the radius of interaction between the members (Adler and Greve 2009: 72). According to Attina (2006), partnerships can be defined as a “security arrangement between international actors to enhance stability of the region without the use of force, but instead establish more agreements, multilateral dialogue, confidence building measures and security treaties” (Attina 2006: 242). As part of the partnership arrangements, the members will not only promote peaceful change in the region, but also gain the benefits the partnerships offer (Adler 2008: 207).

Third, Adler and Greve point out that ‘cooperative security’ which is indivisible and comprehensive is the natural security practice of security communities (Adler and Greve 2009: 72). The comprehensive cooperative security is the inclusion of traditional security elements to economic, environmental, cultural, and human right factors. It is also indivisible, in the sense that one state’s security is closely interlinked and may affected the security dynamics of the other states (Adler 2006: 9). In other words, any transboundary security issues faced by one state will be shared by the neighbouring states, and thus any unilateral actions will directly affect the other states as well. The most important attributes of cooperative security is the cooperative itself, in which “security is based on confidence and cooperation” and the peaceful settlements of conflicts with collective practices of the multilateral institutions (Adler 2006: 9). Adler emphasises that cooperative security includes a set of security practices to confront the threats that compromise the survival of the members. These practices include the creation of transnational dialogue and confidence building as the most appropriate way to manage any conflicts settlements (Adler 2008: 207). In other ways, cooperative-security provides assurance for the members not to feel vulnerable to long-standing threats which may affect their survival (Marquina 2003: 310). Cooperative security also assumes the idea to promote regional identities and include neighboring states into the community as a member to handle security threats (Adler 2008: 207).

Fourth, security community mechanisms advocate that diplomacy is a normal or natural practice in a security community. This implies that violence is not an option for conflict settlement, rather members of the community will adopt ‘norms of consultation’ and multilateral decision-making practices (Adler and Greve 2009: 72). In other words, members of security communities focus on reassurance of good intentions between each other rather than deterrence. Fifth, a ‘disposition towards spreading the community outward through explicit or implicit practices of socialisation or teaching’ upholds the security community mechanism. These includes the creation of partnerships, transnational security dialogues, or the formation of regions around a focal point (Adler and Greve 2009: 72). Finally, the sixth repertoire of practices that sustain security
community mechanisms is the expansion of more specific practices which include changes in military arrangement and the implementation of confidence building measures (military integration, joint planning and exercises, intelligence exchanges, revision of army doctrines from traditional war-fighting to post-conflict reconstruction), policy coordination, and unfortified borders\(^\text{15}\) (Adler and Greve 2009: 72).

In sum, the sustainability or breakdown of a security community therefore relies upon whether or not these repertoire of practices can be upheld. These repertoire of practices lie at the heart of dependable expectations of peaceful change, hence the commitment of all member states to abide and comply with the repertoire of practices will ensure the sustainability of the security communities. In this section, I explored the repertoire of practices that sustain security community mechanism and are sustained by it in return. By and large, I have discussed the core principles and essence of security community framework. This includes the origins of the concept, the evolution and modifications of the concept, the formation of the security community and repertoire of practices of the security community mechanism. In the next section, I will scrutinise the security community building process in the Mediterranean region which constitutes the principal focus of this thesis.

### 2.6 An Emerging Security Community in the Mediterranean Region

In this section, I will explore the expansion of security communities with a particular focus in the Mediterranean region which is the essence of this thesis. Security community building in the Mediterranean and particularly discussion of maritime domain has not really featured in security community studies. That said, I will focus on two essential areas of discussion in the Mediterranean Sea, that is terrorism and irregular migration. For this purpose, I will draw on Emanuel Adler (1998) and Niklas Bremberg’s (2016) works as they have studied the Mediterranean region from a security community perspective.

\(^{15}\) In their works, *Security Communities* (1998), Adler and Barnett assert that unfortified borders as one indicator of the existence of security community. They presume that instead of military invasion, border checks and patrols are the better way in border control management against external threats (Adler and Barnett 1998: 55).
The Mediterranean, according to many political scholars, is less than a region but comprises of states with varieties of dynamics and identities. The Mediterranean region has shown expansion of institutional cooperation despite the limited similarity in values and common identity (Attina 2006: 239). Emanuel Adler (1998)\textsuperscript{16} has studied the construction of regional security partnerships in the Mediterranean from a security community perspective. Adler suggests the possibility for the Mediterranean region to develop toward becoming a security community. Accordingly, the Mediterranean Sea is extremely vulnerable to varied threats, principally due to the fact that the economy and trade are booming in the basin. These threats include, among others, global terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, interstate military conflict, drug trafficking, and irregular migration. Adler argues that in order to handle the security risks from these threats, EU members adopted a collective system, creating multilateral security dialogues, ‘track-two’ diplomacy, and confidence building measures within the EU institutions such as Western European Union (WEU) and the Council of Europe, to name a few (Adler 1998: 186). The process of regional building in the Mediterranean however has been interrupted by a number of factors including endless violent conflict in the Middle East and suspicions over the projection of Western expansion in the Mediterranean (Adler 1998: 187). The forms of cooperation has remained limited in the Mediterranean Sea before the end of the Cold War. However, after Cold War, the regional economic development through cooperative institutions has gradually increased. For instance, the plan for the establishment of Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) was proposed in early 1990s by several southern European countries. The principal aim of CSCM was none other but to expand regional cooperation and promote mutual trust between the members (Adler 1998: 187). NATO also played an important role in regional building in the Mediterranean with its formulation of Mediterranean policy in 1994 to boost collaboration with non-members (Adler 1998: 188).

Comparatively, Emanuel Adler together with Beverly Crawford (2006) have also explored the Mediterranean from a security community perspective.\footnote{See Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford (2006), Normative Power: The European Practice of Region-Building and the Case of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. In. Emanuel Adler et al. (eds). The Convergence of Civilizations: Constructing a Mediterranean Region, pp. 3-50. This work promotes the idea that construction of a Mediterranean region as a pluralistic security community within the EMP and Barcelona Process is a long term goals of political actors.} Adler and Crawford claimed that the creation of partnerships and dialogues in the Mediterranean is framed within pluralistic security community processes and practices (Adler and Crawford 2006: 18-19). In order to demonstrate how the integration in the Mediterranean region takes place, the security community framework is the most suitable concept to use. Using the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and Barcelona Process as a case study, Adler and Crawford suggests that within cooperation to tackle security threats in the Mediterranean has constructed Mediterranean region as a pluralistic security community (Adler and Crawford 2006: 18).

The effort to construct the Mediterranean as a region is not novel, rather it started decades ago during the period of Cold War. However the effort to integrate Mediterranean failed because of lack of participation from the Mediterranean non-member countries. In addition, different perception towards which security issues could potentially challenge the stability of the region has made it difficult to integrate the states and form a region. In 1972, the European Community created the Global Mediterranean Policy in order to promote bilateral economic relations as well as to provide assistance and agreements between non-member countries of the Mediterranean (MNMCs) (Adler and Crawford 2006: 21). However, due to lack of participation from the non-member countries, this cooperation failed to develop. The next effort took place in 1973 when the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) attempted to create regional cooperation with the regional experts in economics, science, culture and the environment. However this effort has also failed because the cooperation program received little attention from the United States, which at that time gave more attention to East-West conflict (Adler and Crawford 2006: 21). The Barcelona Process and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), demonstrate the application of security community
practices in particular political and security dialogue between the members, community building and seminar diplomacy (Adler and Crawford 2006: 26).

Another notable study of the spread of security community in the Mediterranean region is by Niklas Bremberg (2016). His work, Diplomacy and Security Community-Building: EU Crisis Management in the Western Mediterranean focuses on the analysis of the expansion of security community building in the Mediterranean to handle non-military threats and transnational challenges. Bremberg argues that repertoire of practices of security community mechanism, particularly cooperative security has gradually increased in the Mediterranean as a means for conflict resolutions (Bremberg 2016: 3). Bremberg claimed that the insecurity/security in the Mediterranean, particularly in the southern Mediterranean is essential in the post-Cold War period as the region is confronted with varied security challenges. These include the threats of terrorism, illegal migration, radicalist networks, and economic recession. In order to study the correlation between member states and non-members of Mediterranean, it is essential to discover the process of security community building by the EU through security practices (Bremberg 2016: 3). The empirical focus of his work is the relations between Spanish and Moroccan diplomatic relations to engage with crisis management in the region. Focusing on civil protection and CSDP demonstrates how the EU promotes security community building outside the EU with non-members (Bremberg 2016: 21). It has also enables the study to explore the roles of the EU as a security community-building institution in the Mediterranean to promote security beyond its borders.

To sum up, the Cold War era demonstrates very limited study on regional building in the Mediterranean, particularly for maritime domain which has not really featured in security community research. However, we can still presume that the practices implemented in the Mediterranean via the institution practices implies that the security community process began decades ago, although it was limited in nature. Adler and Crawford suggest that limitation of security community building in the Mediterranean during the Cold War was due to the irrelevance of the concept for security politics during the time. The end of Cold
War however has shown that various initiatives and security dialogues have been formulated in the Mediterranean region to create regional security community. It began to materialise because of the contemporary security issues Mediterranean region was grappling with as a result of the emergence of non-state actors and transboundary threats. On the other hand, Bremberg provides an exemplary works as a foundation to study Mediterranean region from a security community perspective and to understand how the expansion of security community materialises through cooperative security practices for crisis management. Although Adler and Bremberg provide empirical studies of Mediterranean region from a security community perspective, it lacks empirical study on maritime domain. Other important transnational threats have also been neglected in security community research. For this reason, the principal discussion of this thesis merit broader exploration of the Mediterranean region, with emphasis on the maritime domain in the Mediterranean Sea. The thesis will also focus on transnational threats in the Mediterranean Sea, namely terrorism at sea and irregular migration. In order to understand the correlation between security community building and security practices in the Mediterranean Sea, I will delve into the initiatives and policies for both counter-terrorism and counter-migration by the EU and NATO. Focusing on these two major areas of security practices, it will contribute to new insights into the dynamics of security community research.

2.7 Security Community Building: Maritime Security Practices in the Mediterranean Sea

The section will explore the study of the security community and its repertoire of practices into maritime security practices in the Mediterranean Sea. The empirical focus of the thesis is the relations between EU and NATO in enforcing counter-terrorism and counter-migration activities. A crucial question now arises. Which practices of security community mechanism are observable in maritime security practices through counter-terrorism and counter-migration activities? This is important to understand the security community building process through the maritime security practices in the Mediterranean, and concurrently enables us to identify the formation stage of security community building in the Mediterranean.
For that reason, I will therefore explore empirical case studies from a security community framework. I will explore which repertoire of practices are relevant in the security practices in the Mediterranean Sea. For the first empirical case study, counter-terrorism, the repertoire of practices which is perceptible for the study of security community research is evident. As both EU and NATO are tightly-coupled security communites and increasingly developed into ‘mutual aid society’, cooperative security practices have considerably expanded. Furthermore, I will observe practices of confidence building measures and military engagements in the Mediterranean Sea. First, the enforcement of counter-terrorism operations by NATO, Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) clearly exemplifies the practices of partnerships and confidence building measures. It demonstrates the high level of trust between NATO members to adopt cooperative security as a means to collectively deal with terrorist threats in the Mediterranean. This operation also conforms with the description whereby it involves military joint operations, intelligence exchange and unfortified borders with additional form of partnerships with its partners.

The second case study, the security practices for irregular migration also indicates observable features of security community practices. What I mean here is, counter-migration activities by the EU and NATO demonstrate apparent attributes of security practices. First, I will study the spread of cooperative security within the implementation of counter-migration activities. Cooperative security as a natural practice of EU and NATO enables these institutions to adopt collective actions to deal with mass movement of people across the Mediterranean Sea while at the same time disrupt the smuggler networks. This can be examined from the enforcement of Operation Sophia, for instance. For this operation, EU has engaged in a close relationship with its agencies such as Frontex, NATO and Libyan authorities to manage the migration crisis in the Mediterranean. Confidence building measures also merits broader exploration as it demonstrates the spread of security community practices in the basin. This can clearly be observed within various military cooperations, joint planning and exercises within the frame of counter-migration activities. This includes joint operations by Frontex such as Triton and Nautilus. These operations not only involved actively
in joint operations but also enforce various training and exercises with other actors, particularly naval forces and border guards. That said, I will observe these security activities to analyse the process of security community expansion in counter-migration in the Mediterranean Sea.

In sum, this section explores the evolution of the security community framework within the maritime security practices in the Mediterranean. Focusing on the empirical case studies of counter-terrorism and counter-migration, I explore which security practices are evident to demonstrate the expansion of security community building in the Mediterranean Sea. In other ways, I link the concept of security community, in particular, of security community practices, to maritime security practices and argue that practices which embody a set of values are essential sources of community-building. Accordingly, few repertoire of practices were identified within the implementation of maritime activities at sea. Through the maritime security practices in the Mediterranean Sea, it seems clear that both NATO and EU have reached the mature phase of a security community. A community is considered as a mature security community when they conform with the essential indicators, which includes cooperation and collective security; high level of military integration and adoption of policy coordination against internal threats. Accordingly, maritime activities for counter-terrorism and counter-migration in the Mediterranean demonstrates the existence of military engagement and joint military operations between the members of the community (i.e. Operation Active Endeavour, Operation Sophia, Operation Sea Guardian, and Operation Coherent Behaviour). In addition, various cooperative security practices including multiple training and exercises, policies, dialogues, are also actively expanding to deal with these threats. A relevant point to be emphasised here is that practicing cooperative security as a collective way to deal with transnational threats implies that security community building spreads in the Mediterranean Sea. In this thesis, it seems clear that the repertoire of practices demonstrate cooperative security by the EU and NATO in the Mediterranean, wherein more confidence building measures have been taken, joint exercises held, and intelligence exchanges to manage maritime security in the Mediterranean have taken place.
2.8 Chapter Summary

This chapter has explored the security community framework, firstly discussing the origins of the concept introduced by Karl Deutsch in 1957. Deutsch argues that there are two types of security community, which is amalgamated and pluralistic security community. Nevertheless, the origins concept of security community is no longer relevant to contemporary world politics due to the fact that the dynamics of international politics have changed after the end of the Cold War. While still agreed with some of the conceptual foundation, Adler and Barnett have established a refined definition of security community framework to conform with current circumstances with some additional works. Adler and Barnett have introduced the distinction between tightly and loosely coupled pluralistic security communities, as well as developed three stages model for the formation of security community. Furthermore, Adler and Greve also delineates six repertoire of practice which help to keep security community mechanism in place.

Security community practices have been widely diffused in the Mediterranean region, in this case it can be demonstrated through cooperation building in the Mediterranean Sea between NATO, EU and the Mediterranean countries either regionally or internationally. The concept of security community is an attempt to find a remedy for the insecurity of states in international arena. In other words, the security community aims to provide a collective security for members through the implementation of mutual actions and cooperation. According to the repertoire of practices delineated to sustain security communities’ mechanism, these attributes are evidently demonstrated within the maritime operations in counter-terrorism and counter-migration and ultimately demonstrate how the cooperative security has been implemented in managing maritime security issues in the Mediterranean Sea. The security community in this context also implies how it has developed a comprehensive and strong community based on the practice of self-restraint, the elimination of the possibility of war among themselves but with a focus on mutual cooperation.
This chapter explores the essential conceptual foundation for the thesis and offers a framework to assess the relations between security community practices and maritime security operations. The correlation between the concept of security community and repertoire of practices demonstrates that practices are certainly an important source of community building. The chapter specifically analyses the extent to which the security community process is exhibited in maritime security operations, which at the same time addresses the main research question of the thesis. In order to demonstrate how the security community framework can be used to answer the research questions, the next chapter delves into the methodology conducted to analyse the case studies of counter-terrorism and counter-migration in the Mediterranean Sea.
CHAPTER 3
Research Design and Case Selection

3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter explored the security community framework, the foundation of the framework and the repertoire of practices of the security community mechanism. This chapter explains the research design of the thesis. Specifically, the chapter analyses adoption of qualitative approach as a research method for the thesis, the rationale for case study selection and details the methods used for the collection of empirical data. The essential point here is the use of the security community framework to explain the spread and expansion of security community building in the Mediterranean Sea. This can be demonstrated through a linkage of the concept of security community, in particular security community practices, with maritime security practices.

The research design adopted for the study focuses on the concept of security community as a framework in this research. The adoption of qualitative research methods and case selection are made to determine the presence of maritime security threats and to aid with analysis of security community practices in the Mediterranean Sea. The essence of the framework is that the elements and mechanisms enable us to evaluate the security community evolution through the implementation of counter-terrorism and counter-migration initiatives in the Mediterranean Sea. Specifically, the framework assists to determine the direction of this research, allows for the mapping of maritime security and enables us to answer the research question of what actors deal with security threats in the maritime domain. In so far as the security community framework has never been employed in a maritime context, the thesis plays an important role, bringing new insights into the dynamics of security community research.

That being said, this chapter explores the rationale of adopting qualitative research approach for this research. Also, I analyse the reason behind the selection of the empirical case studies and discuss why the thesis focus only on terrorism
and irregular migration instead of other potential maritime threats in the Mediterranean Sea. Finally, the chapter explores the methods used throughout the study for data collection, that is textual analysis and interviews. The section focuses on a discussion of selected empirical material and the process of conducting interviews in order to acquire additional information for the research. The discussion intended to explicate how the empirical materials were used to answer the research objectives and research questions of the thesis.

3.2 Qualitative Research Approach

In conducting a research, qualitative research method is one of the essential approach used for data collection and data analysis. Qualitative research is commonly associated to ‘social science research’ (Sjoberg and Horowitz 2013: 104), which involves a specific set of methods to achieve critical outcomes such as archival research, content analysis and in-depth interviews. In qualitative research, a broad and holistic approach is required to study and understand the social phenomena (King and Horrocks 2010: 7). Qualitative research can be conducted for a wide range of studies including, among others, to understand social interactions among people; to understand behaviour, beliefs or opinions of the study participants; and to study complex issues such as human trafficking (Hennink et al. 2011: 10). Qualitative research allows the researcher to identify issues and understand a phenomenon from the perspective of participants, which is through their experience or interpretations. In other ways, qualitative research concerns how the social, cultural or economic context could shape and influence people’s behaviour. This is referred to as the interpretive approach. In order to understand people’s behaviour or subject of the study, the researcher needs to be flexible and open-minded settings to allow for neutral, equitable and unbiased judgments towards the participants information (Hennink et al. 2011: 9). Interpretive research does not intend to prove how accurate the defined concept or framework are, rather it focuses on how the framework can be used in a certain study (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 40). For instance, this research used qualitative/interpretive research methods, as this study attempts to trace a connection between the security community framework and maritime security.
practices through the implementation of maritime security initiatives. In short, qualitative research is a way to provide in-depth understanding of the contextual influences on the research issues, provide depth and nuance to the research issues, as well as making sense of the research studies.

This thesis adopted a qualitative research approach in order to understand the process of security community building in order to achieve better understanding of a maritime security phenomenon. In determining the spread of the security community framework in the Mediterranean Sea, it is necessary to study the spectrum of threats in the basin and examine the processes involved through the employment of maritime security practices. In order to answer the research objectives and to provide answers to the research questions, a qualitative study based on in-depth content analysis was conducted. The thesis used textual analysis and interviews as the main methods for data collection. Supplementary sources featuring statistics, such as the number of migrants’ arrival to the European countries and number of migrants’ death at sea were also used to support the qualitative data derived from textual analysis and interview. These statistics were useful in providing additional information in relation to irregular migration issues, explaining how the issue has worsened. In line with the methodology and selection of methods to collect the data, it therefore seemed relevant that this thesis adopted a qualitative research approach throughout the research.

Previous research on the security community framework were also widely constructed within qualitative research approach. For instance, Niklas Bremberg (2016) used qualitative research to study the security community building in the Western Mediterranean. Bremberg studied the role that the EU plays as a security community building institution by using Spain and Morocco as case studies in order to explain how the security community expanded between Spain and Morocco to tackle non-military threats and transboundary risks through the practices of diplomacy and cooperative security. Similarly, in this thesis I explore how the practices within counter-terrorism and counter-migration connect the concept of security community practices with the community-building process in
the Mediterranean Sea. In order to collect empirical data for the analysis, Bremberg made use of government policies, legislative documents and semi-structured elite interviews\textsuperscript{18} to collect information of Spanish-Moroccan cooperation. In my own study, I conducted a smaller number of interviews with five interviewees including the EU and NATO officials due to the in-depth nature of my research. The purpose of interviews in my research is to complement existing data from textual analysis and provide additional useful information, which I could not retrieve from the documents. Also, the interviews were intended to achieve depth of information (rather than breadth), therefore only few participants are needed in my research. Furthermore, Bremberg also collected secondary sources such as policy reports and made use of statistical data to explain EU’s external trade relations (Bremberg 2016: 19). Likewise, making use of secondary sources was useful in my own study too as it aided to provide additional information and allows producing the detailed narratives of the issues. Statistical data assists to describe the research issue accurately particularly capturing essential aspects such as the number of migrants’ arrival to Europe and total fatality from the boats casualty in the Mediterranean Sea. Ultimately, the statistical data enables to describe the real pressing situation of migration crisis in the Mediterranean. This thesis took a similar approach to the study of security community expansion in the Mediterranean Sea.\textsuperscript{19}

Fotios Moustakis (2003) has also used qualitative research to study security community expansion in the Eastern Mediterranean. He studied Greece and Turkey as principal case studies and analyses the application of pluralistic security communities in the Mediterranean within the context of cooperation between Greece and Turkey. His study examines the extent to which both Greece and Turkey have achieved or fulfilled the conditions required for a pluralistic security community through their cooperative mechanism (Moustakis 2003: 89).

\textsuperscript{18} Bremberg conducted around seventy interviews with various European and national government officials, diplomats, military officials and civil protection experts (Bremberg 2016: 20).

\textsuperscript{19} Likewise, Bremberg made use of secondary sources such as policy reports, newspaper articles and academic works to acquire further information about the cooperation between Spain and Morocco. He also used statistical data including trade volume and military spending between EU and Morocco, in order to establish the connection between their cooperation and security community building in crisis management (Bremberg 2016: 19).
The study is similar to my own in a way that it adopted case study research to concentrate on specific case studies in relations to security community expansion, only that in my case I focus on cooperation in counter-terrorism and counter-migration to study the spread of security community in the Mediterranean Sea. The key point here is that his study adopted similar model to what this thesis employs, in that we aimed to scrutinise the extent of security community expansion through the repertoire of practices of security community framework.

In sum, qualitative research is the most prevalent approach to be used in conducting a research of security community framework. While previous research on the security community framework has generally preferred the qualitative approach, I applied the similar approach to study and understand security community expansion through counter-terrorism and counter-migration policies in the Mediterranean Sea. Qualitative research, particularly textual analysis and interview, allow me to understand how the process of security community building takes place through the employment of maritime practices. This is achieved from the useful information obtained from the interviews and extensive literature explaining the forms of maritime practices that exist in the Mediterranean Sea. It also assists to establish understanding about the terrorism and irregular migration as a security threats in the Mediterranean Sea with detailed information and substantial data acquired from various sources of documents and interviews. This is discussed in further detail in the latter section of the methods of data collection. Therefore, to reiterate, qualitative research is required in this thesis not only to study maritime security in the basin, but more importantly allow to understand security community mechanism in the Mediterranean Sea.

3.3 The Case Study Research and Case Selection

The implementation of counter-terrorism and counter-migration policies by the EU and NATO in the Mediterranean Sea were selected as the main case studies in this thesis. This is because, as indicated in Chapter 1, the Mediterranean Sea is among the busiest maritime highways in the world, which makes it particularly important for trade and economic purposes. After the end of the Cold War, the
Mediterranean became the centre of the security nexus and instabilities surrounding it, including inter-state disputes, illegal migration, terrorism and drug trafficking, to name a few. The instabilities and conflicts surrounding the region have exposed the region with the potential security risks, which can undermine the stability and economic growth in the Mediterranean Sea. Terrorism and irregular migration are by far the most dominant threats in the Mediterranean Sea. As they are included within the top priorities of NATO and EU security policy, this indicates that the threats deserve greater space for analysis. Additionally, it is essential to study the roles of the EU and NATO as the main security actors in the region to maintain the safety and security of the Mediterranean, and focus the study on their security policies, in this case counter-terrorism and counter-migration.

The collection of data for the thesis draws upon process-tracing techniques. Pouliot proposes that case study methods like process-tracing contributes to enhancing internal validity (Pouliot 2013: 45). In this process-tracing, the researcher examines histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to find the link between causes and observed outcomes (George and Bennett 2005: 6). This technique is particularly well-suited for qualitative research because it concentrates on detailed case studies with a particular focus on the intervening variables to test theories, which makes it suitable to be used in developing conceptual frameworks (Bremberg 2016: 15). Moreover, case studies allow for conceptual refinements with a higher level of validity over a smaller number of specific cases (George and Bennett 2005: 19). This supports my rationale for employing the case study model for counter-terrorism and counter-migration. These two case studies can demonstrate the extent to which the security community framework has developed in the Mediterranean Sea with the focus on the repertoire of practices of the framework. These two case studies are also an ideal options for the case study approach, allowing in-depth research of maritime security studies. Similarly, I adopted textual analysis and interviews as the methods to collect the data for the research and it is relevant in relation to studying whether the security community
framework is evident in the sequence of maritime practices in the selected case studies.

In choosing empirical cases, the thesis aimed to select security threats, which received greater attention and involved various cooperative tools from the EU and NATO. More importantly, the essential criterion in case study selection is the need to establish new perspective of security community framework within the maritime boundaries. The security community has been widely used to analyse threats emerging from or at land-sources, therefore in order to bring nuanced insights in the research framework, the maritime domain will be the centre of the thesis.

It is evident that the Mediterranean is not only battling with terrorism and irregular migration problems, but also other security threats such as drug trafficking, inter-state disputes, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and possible acts of piracy. To put into consideration, threats such as environmental pollution and IUU fishing are also considered as a threats in the Mediterranean. However, these threats would lead to very different studies particularly in explaining the relevant actors dealing with the threats in the basin. In regards to the security community framework, it would also lead to different perspectives of security community research had the other threats selected instead of terrorism and irregular migration. The purpose of this thesis is not only to study the security community from the maritime domain perspective, but also to assess the extent to which the security community has evolved and exhibited within the maritime security practices in the Mediterranean Sea.

For instance, drug trafficking is a possible security challenge for the Mediterranean, in as the region serves as a crucial crossroads for drug smuggling by organised criminal groups in Europe. This includes the smuggling of heroin mainly from Afghanistan, cocaine from South America, and cannabis from North Africa (Delicato 2010a: 2). The most prominent zones for drug smuggling towards Europe is the Balkan routes in the Black Sea or Adriatic Sea (Germond and Grove 2010: 13). The Balkan serves as the main route for worlds’ drug
trafficking with various types of drugs being smuggled every year, including, among others, heroin, cocaine, cannabis, and even ecstasy (Delicato 2010a: 2). The Balkan route has poor capacities of coastal monitoring and policing, which makes it even more vulnerable for drug smuggling. One of the Balkan routes within South-Eastern Europe has become an increasingly important gateway for drug trafficking routes to Western and Central Europe, particularly in the supply of heroin. These are a few examples of drug smuggling threats via the Balkan route and considering the importance of this issue, this could be worthy of study on their own merits. In addition, diverse drug flows come from various directions and multiple modes of transport includes air, land and sea using a range of methods. However, the most popular and traditional route of drug trafficking to Europe is via land route since 1980s. This also supported my rationale not to focus on drug trafficking as a case study for the thesis, as the principal aim is to focus on a threats emerge primarily at or from maritime domain more than a land based issues.

Other potential case studies for analysis in the Mediterranean were considered, such as environment pollution. Known as one of the busiest sea routes in the world, Mediterranean Sea is the main transit for ships exporting and carrying crude oil and crude oil products. It is estimated that about 220,000 vessels of more than 100 tonnes each across the Mediterranean Sea via the Suez Canal, Strait of Gibraltar, and Bosporus Strait every year (EEA 2006: 25). The

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20 Land route has been dominating drug trafficking route to European consumer markets particularly the trafficking of cocaine where Turkey play an important role as a transit hub from Asia and Middle East before arriving Europe (EMCDDA, 2015b). According to the Report on Analysis of Opioid Trafficking Routes from Asia to Europe published by EMCDDA in 2015, there are three major factors influencing the trafficking routes to Europe. First, traffickers have the tendency to pursue for specific route that is safer and will likely to avoid areas of instability and conflicted. This is to guarantee the safety of drug consignments before reaching Europe. In contrary, however, traffickers may also choose to use the areas of conflict as a trafficking route, due to the fact that conflicted areas are always less policed and have weak governance. Traffickers will likely use this opportunity to exploit for drug trafficking activities via that area of conflict. Secondly, in relations to the rigid law enforcement activities to tackle the proliferation of trafficking networking, the traffickers are likely to shift their modus operandi and route of trafficking to avoid the possibility of being arrested (EMCDDA, 2015b). The third factor influencing the trafficking routes is the development of transport infrastructure, including courier services and container shipping. The development has facilitated towards more rapid connection and transportation between drug production and drug consumer markets, to reduce the possibility of being intercepted by the law enforcer (EMCDDA, 2015b).
increasing volume of goods moved through the Mediterranean Sea has exposed the basin to greater challenges of pollution. One of the challenges facing by the Mediterranean Sea is the oil discharged from the ships. It is estimated that about 250,000 tonnes of oil were discharged every year from varied shipping operations such as fuel and discharge oil, illegal bunkering and tank cleaning practices (EEA 2006: 25). In addition, around 80,000 tonnes of oil have been spilled every year in the Mediterranean Sea resulted from shipping accidents (EEA 2006: 26). However, 80% of the pollution in the Mediterranean Sea comes from the land based sources including industrial emissions, domestic waste and urban waste water (Scoullos 2010: 1). In short, there is a potential to study pollution in the Mediterranean Sea as a case study of the thesis, however I decided to exclude discussion about pollution in the thesis for two reasons.

First, threats related to pollution and environment are not apt for the thesis because the threats are better known as ‘softer’ or non-violent threats, whereas the focus of the research is to investigate the maritime threats which involve more on security aspects or normally known as ‘violent threats’. Introducing pollution as a case study would have diverted the approaches of the security actors when dealing with the other violent threats such as terrorism. Secondly, pollution in the Mediterranean Sea involves initiatives including environment convention and declaration in order to prevent pollution and protect marine environment. By contrast, the practices of security community framework highlights the practices of military integration, security dialogue and confidence building measures to coordinate cooperation between the members of community. Therefore, the missing link of this repertoire of practices would have led to very different studies in security community research had this pollution issue been selected instead of terrorism and irregular migration. After all, the purpose of the research is dedicated mainly to assess the extent of security community expansion through

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21According to statistics by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), it has been estimated that millions tons of sewage, mineral oil, mercury, lead and phosphates are dumped into the Mediterranean every year. Apart of industrial and domestic waste, pollutants also include pesticides and nutrient chemicals derived from agricultural activities, oil and petroleum hydrocarbons, litter, and radioactive and thermal inputs (EEA 2006: 16-17).
the maritime practices, and so this is why terrorism and irregular migration are a relevant cases to study.

It should be noted that the Mediterranean Sea is also currently challenging in terms of potential acts of piracy. In fact, European waters are not affected by this activity, however Somali coasts with high-risk piracy area, situated in close proximity to Europe may cause spillover effects to the Mediterranean Sea. As a result, few operational initiatives have been employed by the EU such as Operation Atalanta in order to tackle the series of attacks of piracy in the Gulf of Aden (Germond and Grove 2010: 13). However, to reiterate, unlike terrorism and irregular migration, piracy is not a predominant threat in the Mediterranean Sea. Owing to counter-piracy initiatives employed in Somalia coasts, the proliferation of piracy would not concern the security of the Mediterranean Sea. In addition, the purpose of the research is to investigate the approaches of both EU and NATO, however in the case of piracy the absence of NATO engagement in the Mediterranean Sea would not answer the research questions of the thesis.

In order to examine the rationale of why terrorism and irregular migration present a security threats in the Mediterranean Sea, a historical background was discussed in Chapter 5 and chapter 6 respectively. This historical overview was provided to demonstrate the reasoning of how terrorism and irregular migration considered as a security threats to Europe, and also to explain why both threats received greater attention from the EU and NATO in their security policy in the Mediterranean Sea. Moreover, an overarching historical background was also provided in Chapter 4 principally to demonstrate the development of NATO and EU roles in the Mediterranean Sea after the end of the Cold War. Such a development assists in understanding the enlargement of NATO and EU maritime strategies in the Mediterranean Sea, in order to address multiple security challenges in the basin in the post-Cold War international system. These include Alliance Maritime Strategies, Mediterranean Dialogue, European Union Maritime Strategies and other maritime operations in the Mediterranean Sea. By analysing the roles of actors in the Mediterranean Sea after the Cold War, it can demonstrate
which actors play the most dominant roles to provide stability and security in the region, and so that is why NATO and EU are the relevant security actors to study in the thesis. Therefore, the historical background of Chapter 4 provides a foundation for the subsequent case studies chapters by exploring the historical context of NATO and EU maritime initiatives in the Mediterranean.

One significant reason behind the selection of counter-terrorism and counter-migration as case studies is because these case studies are interlinked. Irregular migration has always been linked to terrorism (Schmid 2016: 74). In the Mediterranean Sea, terrorists could possibly exploit the migration crisis. With thousands of refugees crossing the Mediterranean from Africa and Middle East, terrorists may take advantage to smuggled into Europe undetected, disguised as a migrants. For instance, Islamic state militants were claimed hiding among migrants crossing the Mediterranean disguised as asylum seekers, which are most likely the militants who pushed out from Libya (Batchelor 2016: 1). Therefore, the interlink between these two case studies is highly evident whereby one initiative of counter-terrorism may lead to counter-migration initiatives and vice versa. In other ways, counter-migration initiatives could potentially assist in combatting terrorism particularly with the management of external borders, which may help to detect terrorists during security checks at key arrival points in frontline member states. The link supports why case study of terrorism and irregular migration is relevant and essential to be analysed in the thesis.

Principally, the rationale of selecting terrorism and irregular migration as case studies implies the purpose of the thesis to analyse the maritime security practices implemented in the Mediterranean. Subsequently, it intends to explore the expansion of security community framework, particularly through these maritime security practices. In so doing, maritime activities from both counter-terrorism and counter-migration enable to demonstrate how security practices have been implemented in the Mediterranean Sea. In contrast, the other potential threats as mentioned above would have led to different studies if they had been selected as a case study. For instance, an initiative to combat drug trafficking and
pollution prevention does not demonstrate the spectrum of repertoire of practices as delineated by security community framework, such as military planning or confidence building measures. Taking this into consideration, it is therefore relevant to justify the selection of counter-terrorism and counter-migration as both activities demonstrate how security practices were employed within the policies and ultimately demonstrates the evolution of security community-building in the Mediterranean Sea.

3.4 Methods for Data Collection

The empirical material collected to analyse the case studies covers the period from 2001 particularly after 9/11 terrorist attacks until 2016. The bulk of the empirical material consists of two primary parts; documents and interviews. As for documents, it covers the most part of the material used for the thesis, such as official policies and legislative documents for counter-terrorism and counter-migration by NATO and EU. For interview, data derived from interview transcripts after the completion of interview session with several related interviewee.

3.4.1 Textual Analysis

For this thesis, the bulk of data derived from document collection and analysed afterwards. Pouliot proposes that textual analysis is among the methods to gain indirect access to data, such as selecting particular textual genres that lead into the subject of studies (Pouliot 2013: 49). Accordingly, the principal data for the thesis was retrieved from official policies and legislative documents of the EU and NATO in relation to their policy on counter-terrorism and counter-migration in the Mediterranean Sea. These documents were analysed intended to understand the process of counter-measures in the Mediterranean Sea, and subsequently provide substantial information to evaluate the roles of NATO and EU in maritime operations. In addition, textual analysis also consisted of literature analysis from academic works and general texts on EU and NATO selected policy fields. The texts have been analysed and provide the bulk of narratives for
Primary sources from the EU have been retrieved mainly from the institutions’ web-based archive. This includes, European Maritime Strategy adopted by the Council of the EU, regulations adopted by the European Commission, conclusions adopted by the European Council, joint statement by European External Action Service, press release, as well as Regulations on Establishing Frontex and EUROSUR from the European Parliament. The selection of the EU official documents primarily draws on related policies to counter-terrorism and counter-migration, which indicates the process of maritime activities or maritime legislation in the Mediterranean Sea. For instance, in helping to determine which maritime threats pose greater concern for the EU, I analysed the EU policy, European Union Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) that covers both internal and external aspects of EU’s maritime security. The strategy identifies the risks and threats that the EU is currently dealing with in the maritime domain. To that end, the strategy provides essential data that is appropriate to explain the maritime security situation in the Mediterranean Sea. Furthermore, other EU policies were analysed to investigate the maritime activities in the Mediterranean Sea. For instance, European Council decisions dated June 2015 on the proposal of adoption of Eunavfor Med operation in the Southern Mediterranean were analysed for this purpose. This document provides legal mandates and strategic directions of the operation which functions as a main legal framework for EU counter-migration initiatives in the Mediterranean Sea and serves as essential textual analysis in the thesis.

Likewise, the resources for NATO were also retrieved largely from their official web pages. This includes press releases from NATO Warsaw summit, conclusions adopted by NATO regarding Operation Sea Guardian, various committee reports by NATO Parliamentary Assembly of combatting terrorism and maritime security in the Mediterranean, as well as parliamentary speech on Operation Active Endeavour. For example, to analyse the current NATO
operations in the Mediterranean Sea, the Warsaw Summit Communiqué serves as important document to identify NATO maritime activities. This document highlights distinct provision in regards to implementation of Operation Sea Guardian to deal with migration crisis in the Mediterranean Sea. The Wales Summit Declaration, on the other hand also serves as fundamental framework for NATO engagement in the maritime domain particularly with the provision on the counter-terrorism operation, Operation Active Endeavour. This declaration also highlights provision on NATO’s commitment to enhance its naval forces to support maritime situational awareness and to conduct maritime operations. Ultimately, these primary sources including official policies and declarations are substantial for collecting essential information of NATO maritime activities.

Another sources for empirical data also obtained from academic works and regional specialists on EU and NATO policies in counter-migration and counter-terrorism. For instance, *Navigating Troubled Waters: NATO’s Maritime Strategy* by Jason Alderwick (2010), *NATO’s Role in the Struggle against Transnational Terrorism* by Anton Bebler (2008), and *NATO’s Role in the Mediterranean and Broader Middle East Region* by Alberto Bin (2008), explored NATO’s maritime strategies to combat terrorism at sea, particularly through its Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean Sea. There are a large number of academic journals, articles and books relevant to the study of EU and NATO policies in the Mediterranean Sea. This academic writing serves a major role in contributing to the empirical discussions particularly in relation to maritime security threats in the Mediterranean Sea. Secondary sources derived from media sources, including newspaper, articles, policy report and commentaries have also been analysed to provide additional useful information for a more detailed narratives of the empirical studies.

### 3.4.2 Interviews

Another important part of the empirical sources derived from semi-structured elite interviews. As Pouliot suggests, qualitative interviews are particularly suitable to provide different perspectives for the researcher (Pouliot 2013: 51). Moreover,
interviews assist researchers to scrutinise the issues discussed in more detail considering the broad knowledge the interviewees have. In-depth interviews are useful in order to reconstruct the knowledge because the ideas and information gained from the interviews often reveals more than the documents material (Pouliot 2013: 51). Therefore, in order to collect more contemporary and reliable resources, I conducted several elite interviews with NATO military officials, EU military officials and enforcement officials of the EU agencies. I have conducted five interviews during a period from June to November 2016. The interviews were conducted in several places including in Warsaw, Rome and Cardiff. The interviewees include, spokesperson and Chief of Media Cell Eunavfor Med, the EU Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, spokesperson of Frontex, former NATO’s Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Operations and Operational Manager of Joint Operation Triton (EU).

Before the interview was conducted, there are several factors taken into account in the selection process and type of interviews to be conducted. For my research, I have selected a semi-structured interview rather than structured interview because it provided more flexibility for both interviewer and interviewee during the interview session to vary the sequence of the questions and pursue more information with the follow-up questions. After all: ‘semi-structured interview[s] can be useful if the interviewer needs to adapt to respondents with varying levels of comprehension or ability to articulate their responses’ (Blakeley 2013: 160). As for the selection process of interviewees, they were selected according to their background, rank, and experience, which appropriate for the research. The interviewees are the operational and military officials who have been directly involved with the implementation of counter-terrorism and counter-migration activities in the Mediterranean Sea. The data gleaned out from the interviews serves as important information to support the materials derived from the other texts and documents. The interviews also fill the gap of missing data unable to be retrieved from the textual analysis.
As a standard procedure for the interview, a set of questions were prepared prior. However, as the interviewees represent different agencies from one another, all interviewees have been asked a different set of questions according to their expertise. In general, only during the beginning of the interview they were asked the same question about the roles of their agencies in counter-terrorism and counter-migration in the Mediterranean Sea. The interview then pursued with follow up question of various themes or topics that were required for the research. The representatives from the EU agencies were asked to elaborate about the details of the EU current maritime operations in the Mediterranean in the respective policy fields related to terrorism and irregular migration. They were also asked about the future cooperation with NATO to deal with maritime threats in the Mediterranean Sea. Similarly, representative from NATO was asked the similar theme of questions. However, the questions also include how they perceive their future role in the Mediterranean Sea in order to engage more actively as they have limited enforcement operations in the area in comparison to the EU. All the interviewees agreed to be recorded during the interviews and transcripts were made available for the thesis. Direct quotes are used throughout the thesis with only very few adjustments where necessary for clearer comprehension.

3.5 Chapter Summary

In this chapter I have explained the rationale behind adopting a qualitative research approach. The justification of the selection for case studies in this research has been clarified, explaining why the other potential alternative cases were not included in this thesis. This chapter also explained the methods conducted for data collection, including textual analysis and interviews. Having explored the methodological foundations and research design for the thesis, in the next Chapter 4 it explores the important historical background of the Mediterranean Sea security environment after the end of the Cold War. The next chapter also provides a broad overview of the relevant actors in the Mediterranean Sea and their initiatives, maritime operations and security strategies to deal with the security threats in the basin. It provides a detailed narrative and essential
background of the type of maritime activities which are already in force in the Mediterranean region, before the subsequent discussion on specific case studies in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 respectively.
CHAPTER 4
Mediterranean After the Cold War: Actors and Initiatives

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapters have explored security community framework and the methodology involved throughout the study. This chapter links the security community practices with the maritime activities and maritime security actors in the Mediterranean. The chapter provides an initial overview about the security actors in the Mediterranean after the end of the Cold War and further to analyse initiatives, approaches and strategies in order to cope with varied challenges in the region. The chapter explores the broader discourse on cooperative tools as a reactive measures for the maritime security threats, beginning in the post 9/11 terrorist attacks.

The Mediterranean Sea is defined in strict geographic terms as consisting of the territories of only those states that have a Mediterranean coastline (Winrow 2000: 3). The Mediterranean Sea is bordered by states with different political ideologies, southern shores mostly dominated by authoritarian and semi-authoritarian states with large Muslim populations. Meanwhile, its northern shore consists of several liberal democracies, and its eastern shore shared by liberal democracies, namely Israel and Lebanon, as well as Syria as an authoritarian state (Boyer 2007: 75). Historically, The Mediterranean Sea is the ‘oldest’ sea, where the rise of naval and economic history began. It has also been a theatre of conflict between the Christian and the Muslim world (Begarie 2006: 30). The Mediterranean Sea, because of its geographic position between three continents has been called the ‘keyboard of Europe’ and has become the world’s trading routes and offered numerous resources (Till 2006: 242). The Mediterranean Sea

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22 The Mediterranean states include Algeria, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Croatia, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Slovenia, Spain, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. This would exclude Jordan and Mauritania, two of the Mediterranean dialogue countries in NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue (Winrow 2000: 3).
remains an important shipping route, where approximately 20 to 30 percent of the world’s ships pass through the Mediterranean Sea every day (Till 2006: 244).

Mediterranean Sea was a theatre of power struggle between the great powers during the Cold War era, that includes the Soviet Union, United States, and Europeans that are Great Britain, France, Italy, and to a lesser extent, Spain (Germond 2010: 65). European countries and the United States were most concerned with the presence of Soviet Union in the Mediterranean during the Cold War, therefore their primary objective was to contain the Soviet Union from expanding its power in the Mediterranean at that time. As for the Europeans, they had different interests towards expanding their power in the Mediterranean Sea. UK had an interest to expand its power outside their territory, Italy and Spain were more concern with the security issues emerge from the Mediterranean Sea due to close proximity with the basin23, meanwhile France has the interest to expand its power overseas and maintain their presence in the basin which is a very strategic and pivotal route for trade and economic (Germond 2010: 65).

Meanwhile, the Mediterranean Sea is also surrounded by a number of ongoing conflicts, especially the tensions between Greece and Turkey, the Israel-Arab wars, the Suez crisis, the Algerian war, Lebanon war and increasingly domestic instability throughout the region. The Arab Spring had a serious negative impact in the region and has changed the dynamic of security environment in the Mediterranean by which not only it affected the stability of the region, but also resulted in an exodus of refugees to the Europe.24 The crises and instability across

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23 The Mediterranean Sea is surrounded by areas of great instability and linked to adjacent maritime theatres which have their own personal dynamics, therefore security issues are strongly interrelated. This includes the piracy problems in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean which may directly affected the security of the coastal states, including Spain and Italy (Germond and Grove 2010: 11).

24 The consequences of Arab Spring have exposed the region with security risks and instability, including the failure of Morocco to regain stable government since the Arab uprisings; chaos and civil wars in Syria, Yemen and Libya; and the emergence of new radical groups in Syria, Yemen, Libya and Iraq (See Alsoudi 2015: 41-57). With many Arab countries facing serious challenges to their security and stability because of the political turmoil and social unrest, it has resulted to massive migration movements to Europe. The instability has forced thousands of people to flee their conflicted countries in search for better life and economic opportunity. The Arab Spring also has had a disastrous impact on the economy of the EU. Economic crisis led to low economic growth and high unemployment in the conflicted countries. The unrest led to fluctuations in the price of oil which has affected the economy of the EU, by which the Eurozone crisis hit the North
the Middle East and North Africa region, as well as the threats of terrorism across the region and beyond, indicate that the unrest of the region has direct implications to the EU.

Then, the end of the Cold War manifested the emergence of a broader concept of security. Rather than one solely based on territorial defence, new terms of security encompassing terrorism, proliferation of WMD, transnational organised crime, irregular migrations and environmental concerns were developed (Winrow 2000: 140). In the post-Cold War era, the Mediterranean is at the centre of changing security dynamics with the growing division of two interdependent shores, one to the North, and one to the South. According to Germond (2010), there was a feeling of distrust between the Northern and the Southern states of the Mediterranean region (Germond 2010: 67). On the one hand, Northern states are concerned with the crisis and instability surrounding the Southern states, such as civil war and political turmoil, while the Southern states on the other perceive Europe and US involvement signal a power enlargement in the region (Germond 2010: 67; Winrow 2000: 114). The presence of security actors in the region was initially to address the traditional military threats, however the nature of conflict in the post-Cold War era is contrasted with the Cold War era with the emergence of new non-military security threats. Terrorism, proliferation of WMDs, massive flows of irregular migrants and drug trafficking are feared to threaten the safety of the basin, therefore it has urged the security actors to retain their presence in the Mediterranean. NATO and the EU have increased their presence and security efforts in the Mediterranean demonstrating their readiness to preserve the stability and security in the basin after the end of the Cold War. The two organisations have also explicitly stated the importance of the Mediterranean Sea in terms of security.

This chapter explores the presence of security actors in the Mediterranean Sea and delves into their maritime strategy, cooperative tools and mechanism of

states, meanwhile most South states of the Mediterranean facing severe financial crisis (See Knoops 2011: 17-18).
collaboration in the Mediterranean Sea. The chapter starts with the background of security actors which made their presence dominant in the Mediterranean after the end of Cold War, namely NATO and the EU. In addition, this chapter examines various strategies, initiatives and approaches including multilateral dialogues and maritime operations by the security actors to enhance the stability and security of the Mediterranean. The chapter provides a broad overview of maritime activities by NATO and EU in order to address varied threats in the region and serves as a bridge to link the security community framework with the maritime security practices in the Mediterranean. The chapter is essential to address the power enlargement of NATO in the Mediterranean after the end of Cold War, particularly to actively engage in promoting stability and security in the region. The chapter provides the history of NATO’s presence in the region and the list of cooperative security tools that developed in the Mediterranean, including, NATO maritime strategy and Mediterranean security dialogue. The chapter is also important as it provides a broad idea about the implementation of the EU security strategy in the Mediterranean, including the European Security Strategy and Barcelona Process, for example. With this broader idea in mind, the chapter focuses on the discussion to explore the security strategy and operational operations by NATO and EU to address security threats in the Mediterranean region, particularly looking at the maritime domain.

4.2 Post Cold War: NATO in the Mediterranean

NATO presence in the Mediterranean Sea during the Cold War was primarily to contain the Soviet Union’s influence in the basin (Kinacioglu 2000: 28). NATO was uneasy with the ambitions of Soviet Union to gain political influence in Mediterranean states such as Syria, Algeria, Egypt and Libya (Winrow 2000: 51). NATO believed that the presence of Soviet Union in the Mediterranean Sea posed a threat to the sea lines of communication and trade routes. Mediterranean during that period was “the most intensely utilised maritime corridor of the world” because of the Mediterranean-Persian Gulf connection and the transport of energy supplies and oil (Winrow 2000: 51). Soviet Union’s interest in the Mediterranean was significantly reflected through the development of weaponry and permanent
naval forces in the Mediterranean Sea. In response to the expansion of Soviet Union’s presence in the basin, NATO established a Maritime Air Force in Naples to coordinate surveillance in the Mediterranean in June 1968 (Winrow 2000: 51). A year later, a naval-on-call force for the Mediterranean, namely NAVOCFORMED has also been deployed in the Mediterranean Sea.

The end of the Cold War was followed by the breakup of Soviet Union, therefore NATO no longer perceived the Soviet Union’s influence as a serious challenge or a factor that could affect the interest of NATO in the Mediterranean (Winrow 2000: 50). Winrow claims that for NATO members such as Spain and Portugal, the Soviet threat was a distant one, reassured that Soviet Union will be less of a challenge in the Mediterranean (Winrow 2000: 50). This stance however shared differently with the other NATO members, for instance Turkey and Italy in which they perceived the Soviet as a real threat in the region. Notwithstanding, generally the European members of the NATO were more interested in economic, social and political problems such as the migration issue, originated from the Maghreb rather than the Soviet Union threat (Winrow 2000: 50).

After the end of the Cold War, the importance of the Mediterranean Sea has tremendously increased in terms of security, with the disputes and instabilities surrounding it. NATO as a traditional naval actor in the Mediterranean has constantly engaged with the security issues of the sea and remained active in deploying their forces to carry out operations in the basin. The end of Cold War also marked the changes in security landscape in the Europe, which required NATO to work beyond merely collective self-defence (Reichard 2006: 103). NATO urged to build a new partnerships with all the nations in Europe as reflected in the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept which classified partnership as one of the Alliance’s fundamental security tasks (Herd 2013: 68). The Strategic Concept was designed with the aspirations to stimulate comprehensive partnerships, cooperation and dialogue with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area. With this objectives, NATO aspired to achieve mutual confidence and capacity for joint operations with the Alliance (Herd 2013: 68).
In the Mediterranean, NATO has developed a closer security partnership with countries in the region, where this marks a shift in Alliance priorities towards greater involvement in these strategically important region. In order to show its commitment towards the safety and security of the Mediterranean, NATO has developed Alliance Maritime Strategy (AMS) which was in accordance with the objectives of the Strategic Concept and also introduced multilateral dialogue such as NATO Mediterranean Dialogue. These dialogues and cooperative tools are mainly to address issues related to counter-migration, counter-terrorism, counter-trafficking, proliferation of WMDs and other pertinent issues which have become a serious concerns after the end of the Cold War.

After the end of the Cold War era, NATO has experienced several enlargement process in order to adapt and prepare themselves with the new security challenges. NATO has enlarged three times during the Cold War. It was first started with the Greece and Turkey joined in 1952, followed by West Germany in 1955 and Spain in 1982 (Dunay 2013: 50). Later in 1999, NATO extended its enlargement to Eastern Europe which involved Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic in spite of the strong opposition from Russia (Dunay 2013: 52). The remarkable transformation of NATO was during the second eastern enlargement, at the time of the Prague Summit in 2002, where it expanded its mission to increase its military capabilities and strengthen its partnerships (Santis 2003: 177). This enlargement took place with major rearrangement largely shaped by the international security concerns, notably the threats of terrorism. Greater alliances were deemed necessary to address terrorism at that time, therefore this enlargement met the purpose to enhance the support from the allies whose main concern was the threat of terrorism (Dunay 2013: 54). The Alliance’s enlargement was initially motivated by the expansion of the new membership but latter was also driven by the needs to build more partnerships and alliances with states that share identical interests and concerns.

NATO has been actively promoting and developing cooperative tools in the Mediterranean due to several reasons. The leading reason is to promote dialogue and foster stability and security in the Mediterranean due to significantly
growing number of security challenges in the region after the end of Cold War (Germond and Grove 2010: 11). The heightening of security threats such as terrorism, proliferation of WMDs, the influx of irregular immigrants and failed states are common concerns shared by NATO member states and also countries in the Mediterranean region. This has consequently led towards common responses and cooperation between NATO and the countries in the region, in order to effectively deal with the challenges and to ensure the effectiveness of the operations. NATO has actively engaged in the areas beyond Europe, including in the operation of maritime counter-terrorism in the Mediterranean. To better address the maritime challenges after the end of the Cold War, NATO has established its first maritime strategy encompassing strategies and cooperative tools on maritime challenges.

4.2.1 Alliance Maritime Strategy

NATO is fundamentally a maritime organisation as its name implies, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Alderwick 2010: 13). The Alliance during the Cold War played a vital role through its higher-end naval warfare includes anti-submarine warfare and major fleet action (Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 47). NATO is a fundamental key player of maritime power to preserve the security in the North Atlantic region (Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 47). Maritime forces were indeed the paramount military foundation of the Alliance during the Cold War (Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 47). Consequently, NATO has published a Maritime Strategy in 1984, but the objective was to accommodate the current Cold War security circumstances. Later in July 2008, NATO acknowledged the needs to develop a new Alliance Maritime Strategy (AMS) and a supporting Maritime Security Operations Concept (MSO) to better address the new maritime security challenges (Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 48). The development of the AMS was a phased approach, later in 2009 the North Atlantic Council endorsed the idea to develop the maritime strategy, and then during the Alliance summit 2010 in Lisbon all the member states adopted a new strategic concept which was completed in 2009. Accordingly, member states are bound to the essential purpose
of the strategic concept, which is to preserve freedom and security (Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 48).

As a traditional naval security actor, NATO has the necessary advantage in maritime capabilities (Germond and Grove 2010: 15). NATO affirmed that the capabilities rather for the naval warfare purpose, will be generated towards operationalising maritime security operations (Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 49) in particular to secure the safety of the world maritime transportation and maintain good order at sea for all the passages. After several phases of developing the AMS, finally NATO released its new comprehensive Maritime Strategy in 2011 to complement the previous maritime forces and policies to achieve NATO’s goals. Although AMS and MSO were designed to complement each other, nevertheless its work tasks are slightly different. On the one hand, the AMS provides a long-term framework for the next 20-30 years (Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 49), working towards accomplishing goals and missions in the maritime domain as desired by the NATO. Concurrently, the MSO Concept, on the other, supporting the maritime security operations including the provision of immediate operational guidance of allied naval forces operations (Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 49).

The contemporary threats and the rising number of unpredictable non-state actors in the maritime domain has urged NATO to equip themselves with the capabilities to tackle the issues. Consequently, NATO has introduced five roles to achieve their missions in sustaining the security in maritime sphere, that is deterrence and collective defence; crisis management; cooperative security; building partnerships capacity; and maritime security operations (Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 49). The three core tasks distinguished for Allied forces in the 2010 Strategic Concept, in which NATO’s unique maritime power could help address critical security challenges are commonly known: collective defence; crisis management; and cooperative security. In addition, the strategy later introduced the fourth area: the support of maritime security in a broader sense (Chapsos and Kitchen 2015: vi). The Strategy provides broad guidelines on how to maximise the use of the capabilities and evolve with it.
The first core task of NATO as delineated in the maritime strategy is deterrence and collective defence. NATO has significant maritime capabilities and flexible maritime forces, which are the key to deter aggression. The maritime forces of NATO contribute to high-end collective defence and promote security and confidence in the North Atlantic region (Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 50). The principal self-defence for NATO includes nuclear deterrence in which NATO provides missile defence capacity for territory protection. Nuclear deterrence of NATO is highly depends on the extension of deterrence under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and also with support from deterrent forces of other NATO members, which is United Kingdom and France (Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 50). Another prominent self-defence measure for NATO is the counter-proliferation of WMDs. NATO enforced its counter-proliferation of WMDs with the assistance from the U.S. who provide missile defence, to deter any forms of not merely nuclear but also conventional attacks at sea against member states (Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 50). NATO is committed to deploying its maritime forces rapidly, carry out a command and control role from the sea, preserve freedom of navigation and conduct effective mine counter-measure activities.

Secondly, the core task of NATO is crisis management with NATO maritime forces as a key player. The responsibilities include enforcing an arms embargo, conducting maritime interdiction operations, contributing to the Alliance’s counter-terrorism efforts, providing immediate humanitarian assistance in the aftermath of a natural disaster, crisis response operations, conflict prevention, and peace enforcement. Crisis management of NATO also includes deployment of combined, joint forces in adamant non-permissive environments (Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 51). To this end, the AMS provides four maritime contributions in crisis management. Firstly, the capacity to secure sea control and denial, to carry out interoperable maritime strikes, and to execute command and control at sea, including in operations involving non-NATO navies and

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organisations. Secondly, NATO naval forces contribute to the rapid humanitarian assistance and disaster aid. Thirdly, navies must be able to provide flexible and continuous responses to crises, including a simple presence through ‘demonstrations of force’, peace-enforcing missions, the enforcement of embargo and no-fly zones, counter-terrorism, and evacuation of civilians in crisis situation. Finally, naval forces must adept to provide logistical support for joint force operations in hostile environments, including for afloat command bases.

Third, collaboration approaches to international security through partnerships, dialogue and cooperative security significantly contribute to the strategy’s missions. The importance of building comprehensive cooperation and partnerships is clearly highlighted in the Strategic Concept. Therefore, the Alliance is committed to engage with more relevant countries through cooperative security. NATO’s maritime forces not only contribute to ensure Alliance security, but also to provide security among its partners. The Alliance’s maritime operations and partnerships are focused on diplomatic activities engagement, port visits routine with the ships from the Standing NATO Maritime Groups, building partnership capacity to response to maritime threats, and joint exercises and training. Engagement with partners through joint training and exercises helps to build regional security and stability, contribute to conflict prevention and enhance information exchange (Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 52). These efforts also promote cooperation and complement other key actors in the maritime domain, such as the United Nations, IMO and the EU. Working closely with its international partners, NATO is committed to achieve its maritime missions together to prevent war, avoid the conflicts and preserve the freedom passage of the seas.

The fourth core task in Alliance Maritime Strategy as highlighted by NATO is maritime security. It entails the capacity of NATO naval forces to

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undertake whole range of maritime interdiction missions, including in support of law enforcement and to prevent the transport and deployment of weapons of mass destruction. The strategy reiterates NATO’s commitment to help protect vital sea lines of communication and maintain freedom of navigation. This includes surveillance activities, information sharing, maritime interdiction, and contributions to energy security, including the protection of critical infrastructure. Concluding, it suggests that NATO maritime forces play a key role to contribute to a safe and secure maritime environment with a high degree of coordination, joint training and exercises. To better enforce maritime security operations, NATO is working closely through its maritime components, namely Allied Maritime Command (MC) and Maritime Command (MC). Allied Maritime Command Northwood, United Kingdom, reports to Joint Forces Command Brunssum in the Netherlands, meanwhile Maritime Command Naples, Italy is under Joint Forces Command Naples (Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 53).

There are two Standing NATO Maritime Group (SNMGs) and two Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Maritime Groups (SNMCMGs) which consist of integrated and multinational naval forces to perform operations at sea under NATO command and control. The Standing Naval Forces are an essential maritime capabilities contribute to regional maritime security capacity-building within their maritime operations and joint exercises (Chapsos and Kitchen 2015: vi). For each standing group, the operations carried out with the naval capabilities includes six to ten vessels which are provided by the member states on a rotational basis (Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 53) for a period of four to six months. They are also involve in joint exercises, maritime interdiction missions and crisis intervention, as well as sea patrolling activities to protect shipping lanes from any potential conventional attacks.

The forces of SNMGs and SNMCMGs are responsible in their specifically designated area. On the one hand, SNMG1 and SNMCMG1 carried out the operations in the Eastern Atlantic and report to MC Northwood in the United

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Kingdom (Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 54). SNMG1 operates a number of operations, where they mostly carried out their tasks underway with training exercises and cooperation with non-SNMG1 naval forces. They use all the trainings available and support facilities to conduct the operations. SNMG1 participates in major NATO and national exercises at sea, apart of developing new NATO naval warfare tactics (Morse 2010: 48). On the other hand, SNMG2 and SNMCMG2 are assigned to conduct patrolling missions in the Mediterranean Sea and report to MC Naples. However, they have also deployed to pursue the Operation Ocean Shield in the western Indian Ocean, mainly for counter-piracy missions against Somali piracy (Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 54).32 For SNMG and SNMCMG, operations will be conducted based on routine participation among the member states. Other than Standing Maritime Group forces, the integration of all forces of NATO is also vital to sustain the effectiveness of the maritime operations. All the forces compound of land, air, sea and other special operations forces components should be integrated extensively to assure the effectiveness of its missions. Sea forces always need to integrate effectively with the air and land forces to ensure necessary actions can be taken promptly upon arrival. The NATO Response Force (NRF) is committed to implement all forces integration and also in position to operate successfully in a threat environments (NATO 2016c).33

According to Morse (2010), the primary objectives of the establishment of the naval standing forces are to complement and preserving the capability to (i) ensure the presence of NATO maritime forces are more visible to demonstrate the confederation of the Alliance’s members working together in a single force; (ii) provide NATO with immediate readiness for any times of crisis, dispute or limited aggression; (iii) equip NATO with the elements of formation of a more powerful force if required; and (iv) assist to enhance the capabilities of NATO’s naval forces through extensive participation in multinational exercises and day-to-day operations (Morse 2010: 49). NATO standing naval forces have been an

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32 In the first quarter of 2015, SNMG2 consist of flagship USS Vicksburg (CG 69), Turkish ship TCG Turgutreis (F 241), Canadian ship HMCS Fredericton (FFH 337), and German oiler FGS Spessart (A 1442), ready to deployed in the Mediterranean Sea serving as NATO’s maritime force dedicated to maintaining peace and stability in the region (Available at: http://www.mc.nato.int).

influential forces in the Mediterranean and assuredly demonstrates the Alliance’s commitment towards collective action among its members states.

4.2.2 NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue (MD)

Security of the Alliance in the post-Cold War era remains subject to numerous risks and challenges, not merely military but also non-military. The proliferation of non-state actors exposed the states towards greater challenges in dealing with unpredictable threats, it is therefore paramount for the Alliance to broaden its approach in security tasks. Moving from collective defence towards a collective security organisation, NATO has equipped itself with in strengthening the partnerships and enhancing multilateral dialogues with other countries. One of the primary instrument of this policy is the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD). NATO’s MD is the principal instrument to accomplish NATO’s ambitions in building tangible partnerships and dialogues (Bin 2008: 726).

The Mediterranean Dialogue was launched in December 1994 during a Brussels Ministerial meeting. It currently involves seven non-NATO countries of the Mediterranean region: Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and Algeria (McNerney et al 2017: 15). MD was initiated as a result of the Alliance’s reflection that security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean region (Santis 2003: 180). With the principle objectives to contribute to regional security and stability, NATO’s MD also intended to promote better mutual understanding and confidence, as well as good and friendly relations across the Mediterranean. At the same time, MD helps to fix any misconceptions about NATO’s policies and goals among Dialogue countries, to better represent themselves as an essential security actor in the Mediterranean (Herd 2013: 71). According to Boening (2007), MD was initiated to reach out to non-NATO member countries who might share identical pursuits and have an interest in cooperating with security projects carried out by NATO (Boening 2007: 6). These ‘partners’ will be at first be involved in confidence building programs before becoming members when they fulfill some major qualifications such as developments in domestic military capability (Boening 2007: 6; Herd 2013: 72). It is an integral part of NATO's adaptation to the post-Cold War
security environment, as well as an important component of the Alliance’s policy of outreach and cooperation.

Since its inception, MD highlighted the principles of non-discrimination and self-differentiation, as well as encourage bilateral and multilateral consultations between NATO and its Mediterranean members. Members are free to participate in the Dialogue, which includes the freedom to participate in programs organised within the Dialogue. The programs encompass several fields, namely seminars and workshops in the field of information, science and environment, crisis management and military cooperation (Boening 2007: 6). The Alliance’s MD also complements other international efforts, primarily those of the EU’s Barcelona Process which aims in tackling the socio-economic imbalances of the region. The imbalances perceived as the main cause of conflicts and tensions in the area. While the EU is working towards balancing socio-economic factors within the region, MD is concurrently working towards coordinating and complementing the efforts (Santis 2003: 180).

Since its inception, the Dialogue has been specifically dedicated to improving Mediterranean security perceptions and tackling any concerns that may arise from its partners, which includes peacekeeping and peace supporting. The Alliance laid out a few key principles of the MD to better accommodate all its members; (i) the dialogue is progressive in terms of participation, allowing additional countries to join and the content of the dialogue to evolve; (ii) the structure of the dialogue is bilateral, lessen the vulnerability of disruption due to political developments in the region; (iii) emphasis is placed on non-discrimination among partners, where all are offered the same basis for cooperative activities; (iv) the dialogue is intended to complement other international initiatives such as those of the EU, Western European Union (WEU) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); (v) activities within the dialogue are paid for by the partners themselves, except for certain information activities (Said 2003: 188).

The Mediterranean Dialogue is based upon the twin pillars of political dialogue and practical cooperation (Santis 2010: 142). For the political dialogue,
political consultations in the NATO+1 are held on a regular basis both at Ambassadorial and working level. These discussions provide an opportunity for sharing views on a range of issues relevant to the security situation in the Mediterranean, as well as on the further development of the political and practical cooperation dimensions of the Dialogue. The political dimension also includes visits by NATO Senior Officials, including the Secretary General and the Deputy Secretary General, to Mediterranean Dialogue countries (Santis 2003: 180). The main purpose of these visits is to conduct high-level political consultations with the relevant host authorities on the way forward in NATO's political and practical cooperation under the Mediterranean Dialogue.

The Dialogue is a phased approach: five founder countries were first invited to participate before another two countries later brought in to join the partnership. Through the Mediterranean Cooperation Group (MCG) established in July 1997 at the Madrid Summit, NATO countries are directly involved in the political discussions with the representatives of the Dialogue (Santis 2003: 180). High level meetings between NATO and MD countries have taken place on a regular basis ever since, and an annual MD Work Program (MDWP) has been established. Activities under MDWP are within the range of information, civil emergency planning (CEP), science and environmental (SEA), crisis management, defence policy and strategy, small arms and light weapons (SALW), global humanitarian mine action (GHMA), proliferation of WMDs, terrorism, and the MD Military Program (MDMP) (Herd 2013: 72). The development of the Work Programme and the results, however, remain modest despite making some progress. This is mainly due to budget constraints. Since most of the activities within the Dialogue are based on self-funding, this has slowed down the development of the activities (Sanz 2003: 196). Slow progress also likely occurred due to little enthusiasm showed by the Dialogue partners towards common activities offered by NATO. Furthermore, Dialogue countries have different perceptions of what they expect from NATO and consequently have allocated different resources to the process (Herd 2013: 72).
A particular effort has therefore been made to stimulate the development of the Dialogue. In 2002, NATO decided to upgrade the political and practical dimensions of the Dialogue by introducing new initiatives including consultation on security matters, including terrorism-related issues (Santis 2003: 180). During the Summit meeting in Istanbul in June 2004, NATO's Heads of State and Government (HOSG) invited Dialogue partners to establish a more ambitious and expanded framework for the MD. NATO offers expanded the framework beyond merely dialogue, confidence and understanding but rather towards ‘enhanced practical cooperation’ with the objective to contribute towards regional security and stability through stronger practical cooperation. The objective included the elevation of the existing political dialogue, achieving interoperability, developing defence reform and contributing towards the fight against terrorism (Behnke 2013: 175). Since then, an annual MDWP has focused on agreed priority areas, and has been the main cooperation instrument available and has been expanded progressively.

4.3 Maritime Security Operations in the Mediterranean

NATO’s operational concept for maritime security is to enforce operations and security arrangements among its member states in order to enhance cooperation and capabilities to tackle terrorism and other illicit activities at or from sea, as well as to enhance information sharing amongst them. The main operation being implemented is Operation Active Endeavour, launched under Article V of the Washington Treaty. In what follows, the next section will probe the background of OAE from the aspect of the enforcement and the structures. As the only maritime operation in the Mediterranean, OAE is vital to represent the efforts of NATO to contribute towards the security and safety of the region from the terrorist organisation threats from 2001 until present day.

4.3.1 Operation Active Endeavour (OAE)

NATO at present has actively deployed its SNMG at sea, not only for training and joint exercises but also to conduct patrolling missions. Recent NATO deterrent
patrols focusing in the Mediterranean Sea aims to prevent the escalation of terrorist threats. NATO’s anti-terrorist operation in the Mediterranean Sea, Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) was formally begun on 26 October 2001, having evolved out of NATO’s immediate response following the 9/11 attacks on the United States (Feldt 2011: 16). This operation was mainly designed to prevent the movement of terrorists, weapons of mass destruction at or from sea and also other illicit activities at or from sea. Initially, OAE focused on a naval presence as well as surveillance operations in the eastern Mediterranean Sea using naval forces assigned to the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean and Standing Naval Force Atlantic (Boyer 2007: 84).

From October 2001 until March 2003, OAE had a mandate to monitor the ships in the eastern part of the Mediterranean. From March 2003, the NATO mandate has been extended to include on-board inspection to those suspected vessels at sea with the consent of the merchant vessel’s master or the flag state (Germond 2010: 68). From February 2003 until May 2004, NATO naval forces operating in the Mediterranean Sea also served to escort civilian ships through the Strait of Gibraltar from Alliance member states requesting them (Germond 2010: 68). The expansion of the operation was most likely intended to avoid further terrorist operations learning a lesson from the previous attack on the French oil tanker Limburg off the coast of Yemen in 2002 (Boyer 2007: 84). After March 2004, the OAE was extended to the whole Mediterranean Sea to ensure better command of the entire sea. OAE missions not only conducted within member states, but also reach out to other non-NATO nations including Ukraine, Russia, Albania, Algeria, Georgia, Israel and Morocco (Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 55).

Expansion of OAE’s mandate to vessel queries and compliant boarding is normally assigned under the task of Task Force Endeavour (TFE) comprising a conduct by aircraft and surface units (Global Security 2017). In practice, before boarding the suspicious ships NATO forces will first gather all the information and pass it to the Maritime Component Command Headquarters in Naples (CC-MAR Naples) and the NATO Shipping Centre in Northwood, United Kingdom (NATO 2016b). After the authorisation from North Atlantic Council (NAC), the
NATO forces will then board and inspect the vessel. If any terrorist-related activity is found on the vessel, OAE forces will be promptly deployed to the area ready to carry out the approved action by NAC (Boyer 2007: 84). On the other hand, if irregularities other than terrorism are found, the law enforcement authorities will convey this information to the appropriate law enforcement agency for the action at the vessel’s next port of call (NATO 2016b). Nevertheless, in the case of a refusal from the suspicious vessel upon the inspection and boarding of NATO forces, NATO will cooperate with national authorities once the vessel enters the alliance member’s territorial waters for further action (Boyer 2007: 84).

The expanded OAE operations intended to cover the entire Mediterranean Sea, was then followed by the adoption of the new operational pattern by NATO in October 2004. According to Cesaretti (2008), the new operational pattern has focused on gathering and processing information and intelligence to target specific vessels of interests (Cesaretti 2008: 2). Specific tasks such as tracking and boarding of vessels were conducted, as well as providing enhanced presence and intensive surveillance capability with the cooperation from Alliance’s Standing Maritime Group (Boyer 2007: 85). The pattern of these operations emphasised that the primary task of the OAE forces is to help deter and disrupt any action supporting terrorism at or from the sea; controlling choke points- the most important passages and harbours throughout the Mediterranean.

Assigned Joint Task Force ENDEAVOUR is responsible for addressing any terrorist-related activities with the high equipped capabilities of land, air and sea (Boyer 2007: 85). The Task Force consists of balanced collection of surface units, submarines, and Maritime Patrol Aircraft (Boyer 2007: 85). Task Force ENDEAVOUR is regularly assisted by NATO’s maritime elite forces and standing NATO Maritime Groups. The combined forces helped to increase the presence of NATO forces at sea on-mission to prevent terrorism and other illicit activities. In addition, joint capabilities of all units have increased interoperability, built capacity and improved cooperation and information sharing.
4.4 Summary

In summary, NATO was always a Mediterranean alliance during the Cold War era and continues to have vital interests in the region after the end of Cold War. The post-Cold War security environment marked great changes in the Mediterranean. The region is now an area of central geo-strategic interest to NATO. Security in the Mediterranean has taken a different shape after the end of Cold War where the challenges are now not only derived from the traditional military threats, but also non-traditional security threats. The emergence of non-state actors and transnational security threats including terrorism and irregular migrations in the region has raised NATO’s concern to retain its presence in the Mediterranean.

NATO introduced Maritime Strategy in 1984 focused on how NATO might prevail in Cold War circumstances, however NATO revised the strategy in 2008 in response to the changing security environment in the Mediterranean. The strategy highlighted four overarching tasks including deterrence and collective defence; crisis management; cooperative security; and maritime security operations. NATO’s maritime forces are the key player operating in the Mediterranean Sea. SNMG2 and SNMCMG2 are assigned to conduct a patrolling mission in the Mediterranean, dedicated to serve in counter-terrorism mission and any illicit activities at or from sea. In addition, NATO also enhances its cooperative tools through partnerships and dialogue within NATO itself and with non-NATO actors in the region. Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) is the catalyst to build tangible partnerships across the Mediterranean, with the emphasis on promoting mutual understanding and confidence among its members, representing its contribution to Mediterranean stability and security. Besides strengthening partnerships and dialogues, NATO is also committed with its maritime operations in Mediterranean Sea, notably in counter-terrorism operations. OAE has a mandate to monitor the ships, on-board inspection and escorting civilian ships to avoid any potential terrorist attacks at sea. The mission involves not only member states, but also with non-NATO actors of the region.
NATO is a traditional naval force in Mediterranean, and has significantly established its presence in the region since the Cold War era. Nevertheless, after the end of Cold War, EU has shown its keen interest in the rise of important new challenges to maritime security in the region. Other than NATO, EU is also an important multilateral actor involved in fostering maritime cooperation in the Mediterranean. Europe and the Mediterranean are more strongly linked today than during the Cold War era because crucial security challenges addressed by the Europeans are centered in this area and directly affected the security of EU member countries. Consequently EU has endeavoured to develop maritime policy and strengthening partnerships in the Mediterranean in order to preserve and sustain the well-being and security of its members in the region.

Twenty-eight states belong to the EU, and all of them, as well as the European Community (EC), are party to UNCLOS. European seaports are vital sea lines of communication for trade, with millions of passengers and billions of tons of cargo passing through the waterways per year (Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 58). After the end of the Cold War, Mediterranean has been identified as a fundamental security area because ‘new’ security challenges identified by the Europeans are now focusing in the Mediterranean (Germond 2010: 68). The Mediterranean provides the main corridor to Europe for transnational threats, such as irregular immigration, drug trafficking and terrorism. Consequently, EU has strongly involved within the wider Mediterranean area in order to effectively respond to these various maritime threats.

This section of the study focuses on different EU institutions involved in shaping the EU’s approach to maritime security. Then the section follows with an overview of various instruments and initiatives implemented by the EU in the Mediterranean Sea. There are a variety of institutions involved in shaping the EU’s approach to maritime security. The key actor among those includes the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Commission. European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) and Frontex are also among other
relevant agencies of the EU responsible with maritime security approaches in the Mediterranean Sea. This study later examines the initiatives and approaches shaped by those aforementioned major agencies to maritime security in Mediterranean including bilateral agreements, political dialogue and military forces. EU strengthened its strategic partnership with the Mediterranean member states by introducing the ‘EuroMed Partnership’ (EMP) or better known as Barcelona Process in November 1995 to address regulatory and governance issues related to maritime security. EU has also launched a number of common border control operations through Frontex such as Operation Triton and the establishment of EUROSUR framework as well as enhanced cooperation with its partners. The study focuses on these initiatives mainly because they are the key instruments that demonstrate the efforts and capabilities of EU in policing maritime operations in the Mediterranean Sea.

4.5.1 European Security Strategy (ESS)

After the end of the Cold-War period, the EU is facing numerous security challenges from its immediate neighbourhood as well as further afield. EU has been committed to increase cooperation across Europe and enhance its capabilities to cope with tangible crisis management. European Council defined the needs to fulfill the Petersberg tasks which includes humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace making (Rehrl and Weisserth 2010: 12). Consequently, European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was launched in 1999 and has been a foundation for EU crisis management.

The first operational mission of ESDP was initiated in 2003 and since then, ESDP has initiated over twenty crisis management operations and addressed key threats and challenges facing Europe. In 2009, ESDP was renamed as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) as part of the Lisbon Treaty (Rehrl and Weisserth 2010: 12). CSDP has made significant progress since it was first launched. EU has adopted a comprehensive approach to peace and security, which
EU has launched the three main EU strategic documents which formed the core of the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), namely the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS, and the 2010 Internal Security Strategy (Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 59). ESS is a comprehensive strategy which outlines key security concerns from the eyes of the EU. ESS was adopted to serve as the overall policy document guiding CSDP. ESS listed five key threats which have been identified as new emerging threats which require robust measures to tackle; terrorism, proliferation of WMDs, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime. According to the document, terrorist movements have made Europe both the target and base for their operations, for instance UK, Spain, Italy, German and Belgium.

ESS also highlighted the EU’s concern over the proliferation of WMDs, which it identified as the most largest threat to their security, and the nexus between the movement of terrorist and WMDs could exacerbate the security in the region. In addition, organised crime is also associated with terrorism activities, including human and drug traffickings as well as movement of irregular migrations. Europe is believed to provide easy access for the immigrants to flee from the failed and conflicted states, be it to gain economic opportunity or escape from economic hardships and political repression (Marsh 2012: 146). As the ESS observed, the Mediterranean area is facing serious problems of economic stagnation, social unrest and unresolved conflicts. ESS therefore emphasised the

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importance for EU to continuously make greater efforts in the Mediterranean region through the framework of the Barcelona Process for economy, culture and security dimensions.\textsuperscript{40}

After five years since the inception of ESS, EU has reinforced its implementation with the launch of 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS. This document intended to evaluate the progress has been made throughout the ESS framework and seeks ways to enhance the effectiveness of ESS in demonstrating the EU’s security interests.\textsuperscript{41} In the report, EU repeatedly stressed its concern over the Mediterranean region, notably with the escalation of irregular migration and political unrest, which has lead to another level of bilateral cooperation between the EU and several Mediterranean partners to address the issues.\textsuperscript{42} EU has also addressed its concern over a new dimension of maritime security, namely piracy which has been a crucial challenge especially in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, which required immediate response to prevent the escalation of the threat.\textsuperscript{43} ESS has been a significant tool and has played a major role for EU’s security policy which has gradually developed over time to prevail as the current security situation in the region.

4.5.2 Blue Book- Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP)

After the implementation of ESS, EU has adopted its Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP) in October 2007 with the vision to integrate the various European policies concerning maritime affairs and marine issues as a whole. The integration is crucial to assist good conduct at sea and to combat the transnational threats at sea (Germond and Grove 2010: 16). IMP is a guideline to ensure that the maritime

The policy seeks to provide a more coherent approach to maritime issues, with increased coordination between different policy areas. It focuses on issues that do not fall under a single sector-based policy e.g. "blue growth" (economic growth based on different maritime sectors) and issues that require the coordination of different sectors and actors e.g. marine knowledge. Specifically it covers these cross-cutting policies: (i) blue growth; (ii) marine data and knowledge; (iii) maritime spatial planning; (iv) integrated maritime surveillance; and (v) sea basin strategies. Since its creation in 2007, the Integrated Maritime Policy has sought to enhance the sustainable development of the European maritime economy and to better protect the marine environment by facilitating the cooperation of all maritime players across sectors and borders (Schafer 2009: 1).

The IMP was created to reassure that maritime dimension has become one of the crucial attentions of European Union. IMP was initially set out ocean governance related principles and focused only on trade and fisheries, leaving behind the maritime security dimension (Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 62). Nonetheless, adoption of IMP indicates the EU’s efforts to include the maritime dimension in its security policy, as they never had done before. IMP works as a cardinal platform to ensure stability and sustainability in Europe. The Commission is preparing to provide the best conditions for sustainable economic development to come from the sea. Building on those achievements, Blue Growth is the objective for the coming years. Blue Growth will drive a second phase of the IMP to achieve a healthy maritime economy that delivers innovation, growth and sustainability for European citizens.

The Blue Books has a limited approach to maritime security and is limited only to trade and fisheries. Nonetheless, one of the main principles in the Blue Books highlights the importance of an interoperable maritime surveillance system.

At the European level, they are committed to enhance inter-agency cooperation among the member states and related agencies especially in the use of a tracking system used together for marine environmental protection and also for maritime migration (Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 63). In order to counter the illegal maritime trafficking in people and drugs at sea, coordinated maritime surveillance is vital to achieve effective implementation.

### 4.5.3 European Union Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS)

EU places great emphasis on strengthening the cooperative tools in the Mediterranean to maintain good order at sea. Following the adoption of ESS and IMP, in order to better strengthen the cooperation and achieve tangible results, the EU has endorsed the EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) in 2014 to enhance their efforts to complement existing cooperative tools which are already in force. The EUMSS was adopted as a result of a longer process which mainly shaped by the Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP) adopted in 2007 (Carrera and Hertog 2015: 14). EUMSS was adopted to identify the maritime interests of the EU such as prevention of conflicts, protection of critical infrastructure, effective control of external borders to help secure the Union’s maritime external borders, the protection of the global trade support chain and the prevention of illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing. The new strategy was also developed to address the risks and threats the EU and its citizens may be confronted with: territorial maritime disputes, maritime piracy, terrorism against ships and ports or other critical infrastructure, migration flows, organised sea-borne crime and trafficking, as well as potential impacts of natural disasters or extreme events.

EUMSS highlighted the strategy to protect the international maritime domain, notably the safety of shipping lanes from any potential risks or threats. The Mediterranean Sea provides the vital oil lifeline to Western Europe and North America and exposes the strait’s users to numerous maritime threats (Anderson

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and Fenech 1994: 14). The principles and objectives of the EUMSS will be embedded in the existing and future regional EU strategies where it covers each of the European sea and subsea basins, including Mediterranean Sea.\footnote{Council of the European Union, European Union Maritime Security Strategy. Brussels, 24 June 2014, pp. 3.}

In order to work towards a coordinated approach on maritime security issues in an international fora and with third countries, EUMSS through its Action Plan, puts into practice four leading principles: a cross sectoral approach, functional integrity, respect for rules and principles, and maritime multilateralism—including the decision-making autonomy of the EU.\footnote{Council of the European Union, European Union Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS)-Action Plan, Brussels, 16 December 2014, pp. 2.} The Action Plan plays important roles as it underlines all the regulations for the member states and relevant EU bodies and agencies. The agency that leads most of the initiatives of the EUMSS is the European External Action Services (EEAS).

EUMSS through its Action Plan also highlighted strategies on maritime awareness, surveillance and information sharing. Under this strategy, the EU seeks to establish comprehensive ‘maritime awareness’ on maritime surveillance and maritime security to improve the effectiveness in responding towards any early warnings on danger at sea.\footnote{Council of the European Union, European Union Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS)-Action Plan, Brussels, 16 December 2014, pp. 8.} To assure the success of this strategy, relevant EU agencies were invited to facilitate inter-agency coordination and cooperation, as well as to develop common maritime awareness among them. The relevant EU agencies involved including European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA), Frontex, European Defense Agency (EDA), and Europol.\footnote{Council of the European Union, European Union Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS)-Action Plan, Brussels, 16 December 2014, pp. 8.} All the agencies will coordinate to improve the information exchange and optimise the effectiveness of maritime surveillance. Information sharing is crucial in order to ensure all the respective agencies are responsible for their own designated tasks. This will increase situational awareness and reaction capability at the external border of the member states for
immediate response in detecting, preventing and combatting cross-border crime and irregular migration, as well as attempting to ensure the safety of migrants.

EUMSS aims to address the maritime issue as a whole, with the adoption of an Action Plan as its main driver. It aims to deliver cross-sectoral actions in a comprehensive and coordinated approach, with the cooperation from all major actors in the global maritime domain. Relevant actors at EU and member state level should play their respective roles to ensure that operations align with the provided strategies. EUMSS, which was adopted after several processes of predecessor strategies, indicates the readiness and commitment of the EU to tackle the proliferation of maritime security challenges. EUMSS is believed to be the stepping-stones towards providing the sustainable growth of the maritime realm, not only for the EU but also the member states and international fora.

4.5.4 Barcelona Process

EU has adopted its own guidelines in maritime related dimension through the implementation of the maritime security strategy. The strategy emphasised the importance and the needs for the EU to engage closely not only with its member states but also with other multilateral actors. EU therefore initiated its security initiative with the launching of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership or Barcelona Process. With objectives that were more coherent than those of its predecessor, the Barcelona Process was launched in November 1995 to replace the previous New Mediterranean Policy (NMP). The Barcelona Process initiated to quickly address the issue and policy towards relations with the Mediterranean countries (Adamo and Garonna 2008: 74).

The Barcelona Process is the first ever EU-Mediterranean summit held where fifteen EU member states met with eleven Mediterranean countries and representatives of the Palestinian Governing Authority (Marsh 2005: 187). This conference was principally intended to be the first step towards a Euro-Mediterranean partnership (Marsh 2005: 187). Barcelona Process generally claimed as a huge success in addressing issues between the EU and Mediterranean
partners, where greater amounts of EU aid has been allocated for the southern Mediterranean states to tackle the problems related to control of migration, crime and drugs (Marsh 2005: 187). The aid was also meant for the Mediterranean states to address the issue of anti-terrorism, self-determination and nuclear non-proliferation (Marsh 2005: 187).

Despite the great results achieved at the Barcelona Declaration, disappointment has been greatly raised by the Mediterranean countries outside of the EU. The fact that EU received greater benefits than the other Mediterranean partners through this declaration was seen as a betrayal towards the Mediterranean countries (Marsh 2005: 187). Barcelona Declaration believed to be dominated by the demands and ideas of the EU negotiators, while on the other hand the Mediterranean countries have no choice but to agree with what has been offered by the EU (Marsh 2005: 187). Consequently, both the EU and the Mediterranean countries envisaged a better cooperation which will benefit both parties in a greater way. This initiative has lead towards the relaunch of Union for Mediterranean (UfM) in 2008, to replace the Barcelona Process, which mainly believe has failed to achieve the aims as agreed between the EU and the Mediterranean partners beforehand (Marsh and Rees 2012: 151).

UfM was introduced to address and improve cooperation across member countries pertaining to maritime security issues. UfM has seen as a vital platform in fostering maritime security operation in the area. It preserves the acquisitions of the Barcelona Process and reinforces its achievements and successful elements (Adamo and Garonna 2008: 76). UfM is a multilateral partnership of 43 countries from Europe and the Mediterranean Sea: the 28 member states of the EU and 15 Mediterranean partner countries from North Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Europe including Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Palestine, Syria (suspended) Tunisia and Turkey with Libya as an observer (EEAS 2016d).

UfM was adopted in July 2008 under the initiative of President Sarkozy and designed with particular interest to strengthen the EU’s regional policy
towards its Mediterranean neighbours (O’Donnell 2011: 163). The Union has the aim of promoting stability and prosperity throughout the Mediterranean region. The Union promotes economic integration and democratic reform across the neighbours to the EU’s south in North Africa and the Middle East (Marsh and Reen 2012: 150). The relaunch was an opportunity to contribute towards a more concrete and visible policy with the initiation of new regional and sub-regional projects. The new UfM emphasises the projects that are relevant and bring advantages for the people of the regions, such as economy, environment, energy, health, migration and culture with particular emphasis to be put on promoting regional cohesion and economic integration, as well as to develop infrastructural interconnections (Marsh and Rees 2012: 150).

Since its inception, the UfM delineates a number of pivotal initiatives on its agenda, namely (i) the de-pollution of the Mediterranean Sea, including coastal and protected marine areas; (ii) the establishment of maritime and land highways that connect ports and improve rail connections so as to facilitate the movement of people and goods; (iii) a joint civil protection programme on prevention, preparation and response to natural and man-made disasters; (iv) a Mediterranean solar energy plan that explores opportunities for developing alternative energy sources in the region; (v) a Euro-Mediterranean University, inaugurated in Slovenia in June 2008; (vi) and the Mediterranean Business Development Initiative, which supports small businesses operating in the region by first assessing their needs and then providing technical assistance and access to finance (EEAS 2016d).

4.5.5 Frontex

EU has emphasised the importance to secure its external borders from any potential threats and to preserve the free movements of persons, goods, services and capitals. Since 1999, the European Council on Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) has been working towards strengthening cooperation in the area of migration, security and asylum. Consequently, Frontex, the EU Border Agency was launched as a result of operational developments in the field of European
border surveillance. Frontex was established in 2005 and became responsible for a large maritime role in managing the external borders of the Schengen area (Codner 2013: 33). Frontex sea border surveillance operations provide major steps for the EU in its efforts to develop common EU rules on maritime surveillance (Carrera and Hertog 2015: 1). Maritime surveillance operations do not only consist of human mobility, but also focus on the efforts to enforce an effective search and rescue at sea and enhance the effectiveness of drug interdictions. Frontex has been actively facilitating drug interdiction operations particularly in the Western Mediterranean through CeCLAD-M (Codner 2013: 34).

EU is currently facing the biggest of refugees crisis where the numbers of asylum seekers is dramatically increased every year. Irregular migratory flows in the Mediterranean Sea become the greatest challenge to the EU with thousands of peoples lost their lives during the attempts to cross the sea. At the EU level, they mobilise all their assets to deal with search and rescue operations under the aegis of Frontex. It includes the interception of ships at sea (also high seas), search and rescue and disembarkation, as well as to assist any persons or boats in distress (Carrera and Hertog 2015: 10).

Frontex is currently coordinating several joint operations in the Mediterranean, including Hera, Nautilus, and Triton. Operation Triton was launched on November 2014 and hosted by Italy (Carrera and Hertog 2015: 9). The operational area only covers within 30 nautical miles off the Italian coast, which is approximately 245,000 km$^2$ east and south of Italy and Malta which involves 21 member states who participate with personnel deployment and maritime assets in the area (Muschel 2015: 2). Recent headline cases of deaths at sea in the Mediterranean has also urged EU and national actors to increase their cooperations in the area to prevent the escalation of the issue. This has been

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51 Centre de Coordination pour la Lutte Antidrogue en Mediterranee (CeCLAD-M) based in Toulon, is an anti-narcotics law enforcement platform, aimed at intercepting drug trafficking from Northern and Western Africa in the Western Mediterranean Sea (Codner 2013: 34).
reflected with the development of maritime surveillance systems and technologies, namely European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR), the maritime surveillance project MARSUR and the Common Intelligence Sharing Environment (CISE) (Carrera and Horteg 2015: 1).

In October 2013, the EU has launched the EUROSUR through Frontex where information will be integrated through the National Coordination Centres (NCC) (Codner 2013: 33). EUROSUR was launched after the long process of negotiation with participation of all member states. EUROSUR is a European border surveillance network focused on the integration of common information environment for all parties involved including maritime safety to increase “situational awareness” and “reaction capability” (Carrera and Horteg 2015: 17). Under the aegis of Frontex, EUROSUR will also gather all information from other related agencies including Europol, the EU Satellite Centre, the EMSA, EEAS and the European Asylum Support Office before entered into EUROSUR for further actions (Carrera and Horteg 2015: 17).

EUROSUR is a multipurpose system where the objectives are to detect, to prevent and to combat irregular migration and cross border crime (Carrera and Horteg 2015: 17) with an efficient external border surveillance system along the Europe’s southern maritime border (Andersson 2016b: 32). It also put particular emphasis on protecting and saving the lives of migrants attempting to cross the sea (Carrera and Horteg 2015: 17). Under the framework of EUROSUR, Frontex is also working closely with EMSA to monitor the movements of the cargo vessels to fight against organised migrant-smuggling at sea (Muschel 2015: 3). In summary, EUROSUR has a mandate to improve inter-agency cooperation and facilitate information exchanges within the agencies. EUROSUR is an essential surveillance framework aims to ensure the protection of human rights and actively engage in maritime surveillance to combat transnational crimes at sea, lead by its main actors Frontex (Carrera and Horteg 2015: 17).
4.6 Chapter Summary

This chapter has provided the historical context prior to the case studies in the following chapter. It has demonstrated the evolution of security community repertoire of practices, particularly through cooperative-security and partnerships among NATO and EU in the Mediterranean. Beginning after 9/11 terrorist attacks until present day, the initiatives enforced in the Mediterranean demonstrate the expansion of the security community through cooperative security practices, by which members of the community respond to any external threats collectively.

Both NATO and EU have explicitly addressed the varied maritime security challenges they have confronted within the Mediterranean Sea. Possessing different interests in the region, however NATO and EU undoubtedly share similar motives and objectives in maintaining the stability and security of the Mediterranean Sea from maritime threats. In order to deal with these security challenges, NATO and EU have initiated multiple cooperative tools, operations and strategies in the name of peaceful passage and good order in the Mediterranean. Forums such as the EU’s UfM and NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue remain effective platforms for fostering maritime security cooperation in the region. Comprehensive maritime missions have been implemented to address the threats in Mediterranean such as OAE to fight against terrorism, and EUROSUR to tackle mass irregular migration movements.

As a traditional actor in the Mediterranean, the presence of NATO is essentially regarded as necessary, albeit at times it is perceived as a power projection of the Western countries in the region. Mediterranean states and NATO share similar concern over the risk of security threats and instability in the region, in which NATO’s MD in this scenario is seen as a stepping stone for both organisations to address the issue and simultaneously work together to enhance cooperation and provide stability in the region. Through the enforcement of political dialogue and regular meetings, MD is an important platform to discuss various issue to the security situation in the Mediterranean and to further develop
cooperative security tools in the region. Furthermore, the establishment of AMS was founded at the crucial time when the region was struggling with the security threats derived from the maritime domain, particularly potential terrorist threats and regional conflicts. NATO’s maritime strategy delineates five core tasks to be achieved, in which one of these tasks focus on the maritime security operations. Following this task, two main naval standing forces, SNMG2 and SNMCMG2 were deployed in the Mediterranean Sea to conduct patrolling and multinational exercises on a daily basis.

Meanwhile, the EU presence in the Mediterranean is imperative due to the fact that the instability in the region will somehow have a direct effect on the security of European countries. ESS was launched by the EU with the idea that it encompasses a comprehensive strategy that identifies major security concerns from the EU perspectives, including, terrorism and organised crime. ESS also highlights the migration crisis in the Mediterranean Sea as one of the top political concerns for the EU. In line with this, the adoption of EUMSS in 2014 has again reflected the comprehensive efforts of the EU to address security threats in the maritime domain. EUMSS highlights the EU strategy on maritime awareness, surveillance and information sharing. This strategy pledged to improve the capability of every member state to respond immediately in any stressing situations at sea, facilitated by the EU agencies, including, Europol and Frontex. Frontex played a crucial role as an external border agencies responsible to provide assistance for the EU member states to manage their external borders, and assists with search and rescue activities if necessary.

Based on the discussion of NATO and EU initiatives in the Mediterranean region, this chapter has demonstrated the link between the concept of security community practices with maritime security practices, which embody an important sources of community-building in the Mediterranean Sea. For instance, MD demonstrates how cooperative security, partnership and confidence building measures as a natural practices of the Dialogue have integrated the members and partners through their collective collaboration to address security threats. As
discussed above, one of the essential requirements needed to be a partner of MD is a high level of military integration between members. Moreover, partnership between NATO and non-NATO members who’s shared mutual interests is the indicator of security community expansion in the Mediterranean. When a group of people who shared similar interests integrate into a political community and pursue their cooperation collectively, that is an indication of the presence of security community in the region. That said, MD serves as a good example of security community expansion in the Mediterranean.

Pluralistic security community emphasised on the assumptions whereby the member states cooperate collectively to resolve a conflict peacefully while at the same time retaining their political autonomy. Security community which consists of a group of states whose share similar identity, interest and values collaborate accordingly to achieve their interest, in particular to resolve the conflict through cooperative security without the presence of military encounter. Reflecting on the concept of security community, the link between the repertoire of practices and maritime activities in the Mediterranean is visible through the implementation of various maritime initiatives as discussed above. Security community offers novel alternative theory to link the cooperation between countries which previously has been dominated by the liberalism theory. The presence of similar values, interests and identity has encouraged the cooperation between states, in which it proves that cooperative security could be achieved through the common interests and not only to maximize prosperity or economic benefits as assumed by liberalists. In addition, the application of the security community framework in this chapter has been portrayed through the nature of maritime activities, including partnership in Barcelona Process and expansion of military arrangement and exercises, particularly through OAE. The enforcement of OAE clearly exemplifies the practices of partnerships, military integration including exercises and training, as well as confidence building measures. That said, the enforcement of OAE conforms how NATO maritime initiatives reflected the evolution of security community building in the Mediterranean.
The enforcement of maritime initiatives to combat terrorism in the Mediterranean has clearly reflected the evolution of security community building among the members. Security community framework has provided understanding that collective identities, shared values and shared understandings as regards to the threat perceptions are of significant importance for the building of security community. Security community framework allows members to share understanding and thus respond more effectively to common concerns. In sum, without the application of security community framework, one would not be able to understand the relations of how members construct securitisations with one another as well as how members with shared understandings may respond collectively in the security issue area.

Maritime security cooperation requires collective cooperation from all sides, the Mediterranean countries, the EU and NATO. Therefore confidence building measures and information sharing among all actors in the Mediterranean is of particular importance. A comprehensive and multilateral approach to maritime security in the Mediterranean is the key, with both NATO and the EU playing critical and complementary roles. In the following chapter, after an extensive overview of NATO and EU presence in the Mediterranean and their general security strategy discussed above, I will look towards security community building through the enforcement of maritime security practices and activities by both EU and NATO to combat terrorism in the Mediterranean Sea. The following chapter analyses the roles of NATO and EU in counter-terrorism in the Mediterranean Sea through their maritime initiatives.
CHAPTER 5

Combatting Maritime Terrorism: The Roles and Policies of NATO and EU in the Mediterranean Sea.

5.1 Introduction

(Maritime) terrorism is one of the key contested concepts in academic as well as policy-making circles (Bossong 2012: 5). Maritime terrorism has always been linked to piracy where their characteristics tend to overlap to each other (Nelson 2012: 16). The concept of maritime terrorism has a lack of definitional consensus because the definition may be perceived differently across different states. Despite the ambiguity of the definition, some scholars nevertheless propose simple definition to understand the concept of terrorism.\(^\text{52}\) The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) also offer a useful definition of maritime terrorism. In February 2002, CSCAP defined maritime terrorism as “the undertaking of terrorist acts and activities (1) within the maritime environment, (2) using or against vessels or fixed platforms at sea or in port, or against any one of their passengers or personnel, (3) against coastal facilities or settlements, including tourist resorts, port areas and port towns or cities” (Chalk 2008: 3). This definition is not limited to but also extends to include the use of the maritime domain as a means to smuggle terrorist groups or materials into a country (Marlow 2010: 670).

In comparison to land-based incidents, the number of actual terrorist attacks against maritime domain is relatively very minor and only represents a very small percentage of overall terrorist attacks (Nincic 2012: 1). According to the terrorism incident database by RAND, only 2% of terrorist attacks overall have been maritime terrorism incidents over the past 30 years (Murphy 2007: 45).

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\(^{52}\) Terrorism is a complex term to define. However, Robert Snoddon (2007) proposed useful definition of terrorism as “the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against people of property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives (See Robert Snoddon, 2007. Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: Naval Responses to Existing and Emerging Threats to the Global Seaborne Economy. In Peter Lehr (ed). Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism, pp. 228).
Despite their rarity, the potential of maritime terrorist attacks however poses a real threat given a few previous notorious attacks that have taken place at sea.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States have caught Western media attention and raised awareness of the potential terrorist attacks towards nation states (Calleya 2013: 71). After 9/11, there has been evidence of growing interest by Al-Qaeda particularly in the acquisition and possible use of WMD (Parashar 2008: viii). This has brought to the fore concerns of the international community over the possibilities for terrorist groups to use container traffic as a mean of transport for WMD. There is also growing fear of the possible attacks to the vital installations such as ports, oil platforms, oil refineries and nuclear power station in vital maritime choke points by terrorists. The immediate response of the US after the 9/11 terrorist attacks was to launch the Global War on Terror. Similarly, the EU’s response to international terrorism following the 9/11 attacks was also brought to public attention and demonstrated the EU’s commitment to addressing the terrorism issue. Counter-terrorism has for a long time been a part of judicial and domestic policy in the EU (Bendiek 2006: 7). Other than the EU, NATO also expressed their concern in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks when they invoked Article V for the first time in history, in support of the counter-terrorist campaign of the US.

This chapter focuses on the development of the EU and NATO’s capacity to fight against terrorism in the Mediterranean Sea. The analysis focuses on the EU and NATO counter-terrorism policies to demonstrate how the security community developed through the practice of cooperative security, confidence building measures, creations of partnerships and military integration. The analysis is threefold. First, this chapter discusses the background and history of maritime terrorism incidents particularly in the Mediterranean Sea. In order to provide readers with some knowledge about terrorism in general, this chapter introduces how incidents of maritime terrorism have evolved from as early as the 1960s not only in the Mediterranean Sea, but also in other vital maritime choke points particularly in Southeast Asia. Secondly, this chapter examines the evolution of cooperation and initiatives enforced by NATO in regards to counter-terrorism in
the Mediterranean Sea. I will then scrutinise the counter-terrorism operation’s specific kinds of activities. The study investigates how NATO could aspire to become a significant counter-terrorism actor in the Mediterranean Sea during the formative period between 2001 and 2016. The in-depth investigation throughout this period provides important insights into how the security community building evolved in the Mediterranean Sea through the crisis management by NATO in the case of counter-terrorism.

The third part of this chapter highlights the analysis of the security community building through the EU crisis management in the Mediterranean Sea. To establish the connection between security community building and crisis management in the basin, I will delve into counter-terrorism operation and maritime strategies adopted by the EU to fight against the threats of terrorist group in comparison to NATO. With that thought in mind, this chapter will provide an extensive overview in regards to security community building in the Mediterranean Sea within the practice of counter-terrorism operations. In relation to the question of how NATO and EU promote security community building through their counter-terrorism operations, OAE and EU counter-terrorism strategies are relevant because they indicate how NATO and EU engage with their member states in cooperative security practices. Thus, the focus of this chapter lies with a detailed narrative of the development of NATO counter-terrorism operations and activities together with the EU’s counter-terrorism strategies in the Mediterranean Sea.

5.2 Maritime Terrorism in the Mediterranean Sea

Maritime terrorism incident is relatively less significant and a rare phenomenon constituting only 1-2 per cent of all terrorist attacks (Lehr 2015: 203). However, it should be noted that a remarkable number of terrorist attacks at sea have taken place. In addition, the increasing numbers of maritime vessels like cargo vessels, warships and commercial vessels traversing the major international straits daily expose them to the terrorist attacks. The terrorist risk linked to shipping operations commonly stemmed from the use of vessels as weapons to support terrorist activities (Marlow 2010: 670). The threat of terrorism has gradually
increased with the technology breakthrough including the possession of high-speed vessels and high technology weapons by terrorist groups (Ronzitti 2012: 33). The terrorist attacks are directed not only at navigation, but also at other maritime activities including oil rigs and platforms on the continental shelf (Ronzitti 2012: 33). The principal motives of maritime terrorism are political, and incidents usually involve hijacking vessels and hostage-taking (Nincic 2012: 1).

The incidents of maritime terrorism date back to the early 1960s with the emergence of modern maritime attacks by the Palestinian insurgent (Murphy 2007: 49). In 1961, the hijacking of Santa Maria has brought to public attention the emergence of maritime terrorism. The hijacking of Santa Maria is regarded as the first incident of modern maritime terrorism (Greenberg et al. 2006: 20). The Santa Maria was hijacked by Portuguese insurgents with political motives to overthrow the government at that time. During the attack, officers of the ship were killed and other crew members were attacked (Joubert 2013: 118). On 21 February 1982, the merchant ship Saint Bedan was bombed in Northern Ireland. The terrorist hijacked and blew up the ship upon its arrival at Moville pier (Villar 1985: 57). A year before, a 1393-ton coaster Nellie M was also hijacked and bombed by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in a similar way to Saint Bedan in Moville pier (Villar 1985: 58). Other terrorist attacks include the bombing of a Spanish destroyer in Spain. Basque guerillas claimed responsibility for this attack in which they used magnetic mines and explosive devices to hijack the vessel (Villar 1985: 58).

Although the attack of Santa Maria was the first maritime terrorism attack in modern history, the Achille Lauro incident also brought far-reaching publicity. The hijacking of the cruise ship Achille Lauro in the Mediterranean in 1985 was highly notable in the history of maritime terrorism, bringing it to public attention and having a significant impact on international relations. The act has remained a symbol of terrorism at sea and can be considered as the birth of maritime terrorism (Samarasinghe 2008: 75). The vessel carrying more than 750 passengers was hijacked by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) off the coast of Egypt, en route from Alexandria to Ashdod (Johnson 2007: 145). During
the attack, the terrorists took 331 crews and 120 passengers as hostage (Snoddon 2007: 229). The hijacking took place in attempt to seize the vessel and coerce the release of 50 Palestinians being detained in Israel (Greenberg et al. 2006: 20). One of the passengers on board, Leon Klinghoffer, was killed during the attack, which resulted in great concerns over the security level provided by the owners and operators of the cruise company (Johnson 2007: 145). Following the hijacking, there was a sharp decline in the Mediterranean cruise liner industry, raising great concerns and questions about the security measures taken at ports and aboard ships (Simon 1986: 1).

The attack against Achille Lauro had a great impact especially on the international cruise industry, international law and the domestic law of countries such as the US (Joubert 2013: 119). Following the incident, the IMO adopted a resolution mainly focused on measures to prevent unlawful acts, in order to preserve the safety of ships and security of passengers and crew (Ronzitti 2012: 39). The incident has also led to the proposal for a convention for the suppression of unlawful acts in November 1986. The SUA convention proposed that unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation include the use of force in seizure of ships, violence and harmful attacks against safety of the persons on board, and the use of any volatile devices which may cause damage to the ships (Bateman 2006: 89). Held at Rome in 1988, the SUA convention dictates provisions for acts of terrorism against fixed platforms on the continental shelf (Ronzitti 2012: 39). Through this convention, enforcement jurisdiction of the coastal states has been extended beyond the territorial limits. It has also allowed the exercise, in certain special circumstances, of enforcement jurisdiction in an adjacent State’s territorial sea (Bateman 2006: 89).

In South Asia, the region lies between the strategic choke points, Strait of Hormuz and Strait of Malacca, which are of great geo-strategic importance to the navigation and transport of oil from the Arabian Gulf (Sakhuja 2008: 40). Consequently, it has exposed this region to the vulnerabilities of terrorist groups attacks. There have been several incidents involving the terrorist group, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) and Sri Lankan Navy (SLN). The LTTE
demonstrated their capabilities against maritime domain when they attacked a Sri Lankan naval supply ship *Abheeta* in November 1991 (Acharya 2007: 79). The group also involved in several hijackings at sea, including the attack of the *Irish Moa* in 1995, the *Princess Wave* in 1996, and the *M/V Cordiality* in 1997 (Kraska & Pedrozo 2013: 357). LTTE is known for its ability to exploit the sea to lethal effect for logistics and offensive operations particularly against SLN assets (Sood 2008: 22). The maritime ability of LTTE is something to be considered with a serious approach. According to Sakhuja, the LTTE owns and operates a fleet of deep-sea going ships, which is perceived as one of the large-scale maritime operations ever conducted in the northeast of Sri Lanka (Sakhuja 2008: 44). The LTTE rebel forces again demonstrated their next attack in 1998 against cargo vessels, *MV Princess Kash* which was on its way to Mullaitivu coast of eastern Sri Lanka (Sakhuja 2008: 45). Another notorious incident between LTTE and SLN was in October 2000, when the LTTE destroyed the Sri Lanka naval craft at the Trincomalee naval port (Sazlan 2008: 116). On May 19, 2009, the special force team of Sri Lankan Army (SLA) gained control of the rebels. The LTTE founder and leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran together with all the top leadership of the LTTE were killed and the group was dismantled (Yass 2014: 70). Before the defeat in 2009, the maritime wing of the LTTE, the “Sea Tigers” were successfully sinking over 30 percent of the small boats in the Sri Lankan navy (Kraska & Pedrozo 2013: 357), which made them the most effective maritime terrorist organisation in the world.

In most but not all cases, the factor that greatly contributes to the attacks of maritime terrorism is geography (Murphy 2007: 47). In Southeast Asia, the maritime environment of Southeast Asia is highly volatile and has received a high volume of maritime traffic every year. Its maritime space which connects Europe, Middle East, Northeast Asia and the Pacific Ocean nations, is critical to international trade and transport of oil (Sazlan 2008: 107). There are relatively few terrorist groups acting as principal actors in the Southeast Asia. The Free

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53 Serves as one of the busiest SLOC with high volume of maritime traffic, Strait of Malacca for instance labeled as “the iron highway”. This strait provides important sea-lanes for almost 30 percent of world trade carrying huge amount of world’s crude oil and liquefied natural gas (Lehr 2007: ix).
Aceh Movement (GAM), the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Jemaah Islamiah (JI) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) have developed as terrorist organisations with high maritime capability in the region (Murphy 2007: 65). In 2004, the ASG attacked the inter-island SuperFerry 14, a commercial vessel in Manila Bay, carrying 899 passengers and was believed to combine with elements from JI (Greenberg et al. 2006: 22). The attack that caused 116 fatalities reportedly occurred because the ferry operator refused to concede a ransom demand by the hijackers (Murphy 2007: 66; Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 744). The incident was marked as one of the worst terrorist attacks in Asia since 9/11, only surpassed by the first Bali bombings of 12 October 2002 (Banlaoi 2007: 121). The ASG has demonstrated both its capabilities to terrorise shipping lanes and explode ships at strategic choke points, and also how terrorism has greatly expanded at sea. This concern has previously been shared by higher officials in Southeast Asia, where the attacks are now feared to be directed not only towards hub ports, but also shipping. In 2003 during Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore’s deputy Prime Minister, Dr Tony Tan expressed his concern, and warned of the possibility of the targets shifting from merely hub ports to commercial shipping (Acharya 2007: 81).

In the Gulf of Aden, a few number of attacks by terrorist groups also took place. The growing interest among terrorist groups in target assets in the maritime domain was evidenced by the highly bold attack on USS Cole on 12 October 2000. The bombing killed 17 U.S sailors, two terrorists, and 39 others were reported injured (Greenberg et al. 2006: 21). The attack against USS Cole manifested the capabilities of the terrorist group which extended towards not only commercial vessels but also high value maritime assets including naval vessels (Acharya 2007: 79). Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility in this attack. After the 9/11

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54 Other attacks on commercial vessels in Southeast Asia include, among others, the bombing of the Philippine ferry Our Lady Mediatrix in February 2000; August 1991 bombing of the ship M/V Doulous; and bombing of Indonesian ferry Kailifornia on December 2001 (Bateman 2007:257).
55 After the attack, ASG claimed responsibility for the attack and warned that it was part of vengeance for Bangsa Moro amid the crisis between Philippine government and Filipino muslim in Mindanao (Banlaoi 2007: 121). ASG also confirmed that one of the passenger in the vessel was the suicide bomber in the attacks. The hijacking of the commercial vessel was an eminent case of maritime terrorist attack and demonstrates the capability of ASG to undermine not only hub port but also shipping industry.
attacks, the possibility of terrorist attacks has been growing in the maritime sector. According to Acharya, this has been demonstrated by a number of attacks and attempted or planned attacks, which involve several established terrorist groups including Al Qaeda (Acharya 2007: 80). As a result of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the potential of terror attacks in the maritime domain became more alarming. The attacks demonstrated the capabilities of Al Qaeda to broaden their attack to maritime sectors including shipping, port infrastructure, the supply chain and container traffic (Acharya 2007: 78). In the Mediterranean, there was an attempt to attack British and US merchant and naval vessels in the Strait of Gibraltar in June 2002. The attempt however was successfully foiled and the terrorist was arrested by Moroccan authorities (Roell 2009: 2).

Despite the increased awareness of the vulnerability of maritime assets and trade safety to terrorist attacks, maritime security did not receive sufficient attention until the terrorist attack on 9/11. The reason for this was mainly the low numbers of terrorist incidents in the maritime domain, until questions were raised as to whether maritime terrorism should be perceived as a clear and real threat or otherwise. Despite this ambiguity, a former UK First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff (as cited in Nincic) conceived of maritime terrorism as a clear and present danger that may imperil the global economy (Nincic 2012: 1). Regardless of the rarity and small number of attacks of terrorist groups in the maritime domain, the most concerning thing was the issue of how minor maritime attack can cause severe damage to major port or maritime facilities. There was also a growing fear that the hijacked ship can potentially be used as a delivery platform for WMD (Joubert 2013: 111).

Nonetheless, the subsequent attack on M/V Limburg in October 2002 was another milestone event in maritime history. The attack was launched by the terrorist group against French tanker M/V Limburg carrying 158,000 tonnes crude oil in the Gulf of Aden in Yemen (Acharya 2007: 80). Limburg was bombed using a small boat loaded with explosives and caused the spill of ninety thousand barrels of oil into the Gulf of Aden (Joubert 2013: 125). The mastermind behind the attack of the Limburg, Abd al Rahman al Nashiri, was successfully arrested and it
led to the discovery that the ships in the Mediterranean had been a target for Al Qaeda for their next attack (Koknar 2005: 2). Al Nashiri also revealed that the terrorist group were preparing to launch an attack in the Strait of Gibraltar, leading to NATO’s immediate response to enhance security in the western Mediterranean, especially around the Strait of Gibraltar (Koknar 2005: 2). There was also a growing concern about the potential attack from Al Qaeda across the Strait of Gibraltar into Europe, particularly after the bombings attack in Madrid (Snoddon 2006: 231).

Similarly, the attack against M/V Limburg had far reaching implications for international security concerns, in particular the maritime security issues in the area of Bab el- Mandab, since it was widely assumed there was a link between the incident with Al-Qaeda (Praussello 2011: 368). The incident caused great calamity to the Yemen, particularly to the tourism sectors given the cost of cleaning-up operations and the limited use of the port (Praussello 2011: 368). Likewise, the number of monthly container transhipment in Yemen sharply declined from 43,000 to 3,000 containers after the incident (Roell 2009: 3). Bab el-Mandab is a vital strategic strait that joins the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden (Praussello 2011: 368). Any vessels carrying crude oil navigating from the Persian Gulf must traverse this strait before entering the Suez Canal (Praussello 2011: 368). Consequently, should these areas come under attack the potential consequences would be devastating and would disrupt the global economy (Luft and Korin 2004: 3).

Following the attack against Limburg, the littoral states, port authorities and international organisations have adopted a few security measures to meet the requirement by the IMO. One of them is The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. ISPS Code was drafted in late 2002 with the primary objective to enhance the security level surrounding ports and protect maritime shipping from any potential terrorist attacks (Sazlan 2008: 110). The ISPS Code was also meant to provide appropriate security levels and corresponding security measures, as well as increasing security awareness on board to help reduce the overall vulnerability of the ships (Bateman 2006: 88). ISPS Code entered into
force on 1 July 2004 where it required shipping companies, vessels, port authorities and contacting governments to meet several security criteria before they were given the ISPS code certification (Sazlan 2008: 110). ISPS contains detailed security-related requirements for governments, shipping companies and port authorities where the ships may be denied the right of entry into one’s ports if they failed to comply with the code (Kawamura 2008: 158). According to ISPS, ships are subject to a system of survey, verification, certification and control to ensure that the security measures are in fully complied with (Kawamura 2008: 159). The ISPS Code has contributed to a greater awareness of the potential maritime security including to maritime industry. The enforcement of the ISPS Code has also led to a substantial reduction in the number of maritime crime, including cargo fraud and cargo pilfering (Bateman 2006: 88).

In recent years, following the attack on the Limburg, there was only one attack against ships, which is the attack on the Japanese large crude oil carrier *M Star* in the Strait of Hormuz in 2010. The Strait of Hormuz is the world’s most critical oil chokepoint with a daily oil flow of approximately 17 million barrels per day, accounting for about one-third of all global oil traded by sea (Johnson 2016: 1). In addition, the strait is a key conduit for ships carrying LNG, particularly from Qatar, which made it crucial to the global economy. When tankers were frequently attacked in the strait between 1984 to 1987, the shipping volume was severely declined which prompted the US to intervene in the area. However, this was during the period of the tanker war, a campaign of economic attrition and political intimidation during the Iran-Iraq war from 1980 to 1987, whereby both nations attacked each other’s oil-tanker shipping frequently in the strait. Thus, the decline of oil-export and shipping volume during that period was primarily resulted from the tension between Iran and Iraq, not because of the terrorist. After the US intervention, the strait since then has been free from any

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56 In spite of greater acceptance of the implementation of ISPS Code, there is however some problems with its effectiveness. First, ISPS only applies to the so-called SOLAS ships, that is a commercial vessels over 500 gross tonnage and does not include smaller vessels under 500 gross tonnage. Second, ISPS Code is a U.S. code and developing countries are having difficulties to accord with the code. Third, the implementation of ISPS Code increase considerable cost for the vessel owners. This includes additional cost for extra crew, management and vessels security-related equipment (Bateman 2007: 251).
terrorist group attacks until the incident of 9/11, which triggered the terrorist group attack against *M Star* in 2010. Almost a decade since the deadliest attack of the terrorist group against *SuperFerry 14* in 2004, maritime terrorism incidents have been in a long hiatus hitherto.

Nevertheless, there is currently an ongoing debate about the growing potential of terrorist group attacks on the shipping lanes. On 16 July 2015, the so-called Islamic State militants have claimed responsibility for the attack of the Egyptian coastguard vessel in the Mediterranean Sea near the Sinai Peninsula (Nightingale 2015: 1). The attack sunk a 25 meter *Swiftships*, a fast patrol boat as claimed by the IS group. The incident has demonstrated the increased capability of the group compared to their previous attack against ship in the Suez Canal (Nightingale 2015: 1). Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has also become a trend debate these days following their announcement to use Libya as a gateway to Europe. Libya is just 300 miles way from Sicily, 250 miles from Malta and only 100 miles from Lampedusa, which makes it a strategic gateway to Europe (Martino 2015: 1). As a failed state, Libya can easily provide access to the Europe for the ISIS, mainly by the Mediterranean Sea. The potential for the fisherman boats to be boarded by the terrorist group has become more alarming than before. There is also a threat of attacks on maritime targets, such as cruise liners in the Mediterranean. Propaganda released by ISIS to hijack immigrant boats from Libya crossing the Mediterranean to cause terror has received great concern among the international community over the possibility of another destructive act of terrorism at sea (The Independent, 2015).

5.3 NATO Counter-Terrorism Operation in the Mediterranean Sea

NATO is an active security actor and participates in counter-terrorism measures in the Mediterranean through its mission codenamed Operation Active Endeavour (OAE). NATO, for the first time in history, invoked Article V on 4 October 2001 as an immediate response after the terrorist attack in the US on September 11, 2001 (Feldt 2011: 16). OAE formally began its operation on 26 October 2001. It has a mandate to monitor maritime trade routes and provide surveillance activities to the ships and vessels in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. Additionally, NATO’s
Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED) deployed in the basin also focused on monitoring the safety of ports and narrow sea-lanes (Nevers 2007: 41). In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attack, other than the OAE mission, NATO had also provided assistance to the US in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. According to Article 33 in the Special Report of the War against Terrorism 2002, NATO deployed nine ships and eight-nation task forces in the basin to assist the US ships in their mission of counter-terrorism in Afghanistan. NATO also sent its Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft as part of Operation Enduring Freedom to assist in the campaign against terrorism. This mission is what can be interpreted as a NATO commitment to unite together with the US after the terrorist attack in parallel to Article V, which says that an armed attack against one ally is considered as an attack against all allies:

The deployment of the NATO airborne early warning capability to the US is to augment the US national capability. It also patrol the sky of the US from any other potential air launch attack. The operation was to show the idea that the allies are with the US, the allies stand with the US and NATO might provide some help with the implementation of our first Article V. This is the first time we ever use Article V when there is an attack, signifying that we take this issue seriously considering activated of Article V.

(Interview No. 5, Former NATO’s Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Operations)

The OAE was created with two principal aims. Firstly, to detect any suspicious or unusual events at sea that are related to terrorist acts; and secondly to react immediately to that detection. Following the two focal points, the OAE mission has focused mainly on deterring, defending, disrupting and protecting

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against terrorist acts at sea.\textsuperscript{60} In the pursuit of accomplishing the objectives and reinforcing legitimate users of the sea, the operational and tactical mission has therefore been coordinated in that direction. Calleya (2013) suggests that there are four separate elements to the OAE: i) to maintain a deterrence presence and surveillance particularly in the eastern Mediterranean, to safeguard the civilian sea traffic, and to preserve the security of the area with their inspection capabilities to suspected vessels; ii) to carry out regular route surveys in choke points area such as Straits of Gibraltar; iii) to provide escort assistance to the vessels requiring it while navigating the Straits of Gibraltar; and iv) to strengthen the OAE’s mission through the support of Mediterranean Dialogue partners (Calleya 2013: 136). In summary, the OAE was established in 2001 as an immediate response to the 9/11 terrorist attack on the US. However, it also needs to be taken into account that NATO invoked Article V for the first time due to concern of the European sides as asserts below:

The second reason to invoke Article V was the concern on the European sides. We need to determine what is the threat of the Europe from the south and east of Mediterranean. Hence, what we can do is to make sure nobody bring weapons, exposes, chemical biological nuclear weapons and smuggle the bombs. That’s the scenario we have been looking at.

(Interview No. 5, Former NATO’s Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Operations)

During the early years since its inception, the OAE focused mainly on maritime surveillance in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. However, the OAE has significantly evolved since then and has extended its remit to conduct regular surveillance not only in the eastern Mediterranean Sea but also the entire Mediterranean Sea. The OAE has also extended its mandate to patrolling the Strait of Gibraltar in particular, due to the fact that it is a vital choke point in the Mediterranean Sea (Cesaretti 2008: 3).

\textsuperscript{60} NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Parliamentary Speech on Operation Active Endeavour: Recent Political and Military Developments, July 2007, pp. 2.
In this chapter, I organise the missions by OAE into six predominant activities as follows. Firstly, the operation conducted through OAE is surveillance, tracking and monitoring, which emphasised monitoring any unusual acts or movements of vessels in the Mediterranean, particularly in Strait of Gibraltar. Secondly, operation of OAE consists of escorting the vessels which requested it while navigating Strait of Gibraltar. Next, the operation includes compliant boarding and inspection to suspected vessels in accordance with international law. In addition, OAE also focuses on active training and exercises with key regional actors, such as sharing experiences and conducting tactical navigation exercises between naval partners. The fifth operation also includes the support of Mediterranean Dialogue partners, in which NATO invited participation from any interested Mediterranean Dialogue partners to contribute to the OAE. Finally, this section discusses the mission of OAE, which also extended to not only maritime surveillance, but also to providing humanitarian assistance and support for high visibility events.

- **Surveillance, tracking and monitoring.**

Strategically, the OAE has focused on maintaining a deterrence presence in the eastern Mediterranean Sea since it was first established, as well as safeguarding the civilian sea traffic. Firstly, the OAE in the Mediterranean has essentially aimed to deter any potential terrorist acts at sea by carrying out regular route surveys. Since its commencement in late 2001, the OAE began its surveillance in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. According to Article 30 in the *2010 Committee Report of Maritime Security: NATO and EU Roles and Coordination*, the OAE has evolved significantly over the years since it was first incepted. Its remit was later extended to include the coverage of not only the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, but also the entire Mediterranean Sea. Due to fears of another attack by Al-Qaeda following the attacks of the *Limburg* in 2002, the OAE operation has been expanded to cover the entire Mediterranean Sea particularly the Strait of Gibraltar, the important choke point for vessels navigation in the Mediterranean Sea. For

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example, it has been claimed that Al-Qaeda were preparing for acts of violence and to launch an attack against western ships crossing the Strait of Gibraltar. However, as a result of vigorous surveillance, that attempt has been successfully foiled by the Moroccan authorities (The Guardian 2002). It has prompted the NAC to agree on February, 4, 2003 to expand this mission with the additional mandate of vessel queries, compliant boarding and escorting commercial vessels sailing through the straits, for those who request it.\footnote{NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Committee Report on Progress in the War Against Terrorism, November 2003, pp. 12.}

In addition, tracking and monitoring also play a vital part in surveillance operation. Since the beginning of its operation, the OAE has actively tracked and monitored the movements of thousands of merchant vessels sailing through the basin. The OAE decided to focus on expanding its intelligence-sharing activities, which includes developing a network for tracking merchant shipping and potential terrorist movements through the Mediterranean, and committing to share this intelligence with all the Mediterranean countries (Nevers 2007: 41). NATO committed to share and exchange the information with its partners to enable a more comprehensive understanding of merchant shipping in the basin (Cesaretti 2009: 479). With the ability to monitor the merchant shipping traffic in the Mediterranean, it helps law enforcement agencies including other naval forces in the basin to exercise immediate and effective response against the problems. The regular monitoring of vessel movement in the basin has proven to be one of the main factors contributing to the success in keeping the basin free from potential terrorist plots. Commenting on the effectiveness of the OAE in the Mediterranean, a NATO official was keen to point out that the presence of NATO has greatly contributed to this success:

There is a high volume of shipping in the Mediterranean and they normally have to inform when they leave the port and where they are going. However they can change for several reasons. So following that and knowing what is the maritime situational picture in the Mediterranean, it was a success when NATO gets involved there. As a
result, there was no terrorist attack launched in Europe from the sea. So as the number one measure effect, yes it is absolutely effective.

(Interview No. 5, Former NATO’s Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Operations)

In addition, the OAE has also reinforced an ‘information-based and intelligence-led operation’ where the essential element in the operation has focused on information processing. According to Article 30 in the 2010 Committee Report of Maritime Security: NATO and EU Roles and Coordination, the OAE has evolved significantly where it is “focusing on gathering and processing information to target specific vessels of interest rather than patrolling” 63. To ensure the effectiveness in information collection and information sharing, the Joint Information and Analysis Centre (JIAC) is the important tool driving the efforts. According to Cesaretti, JIAC is responsible for fostering information collection amongst the partners, providing analysis and warning, and offering advice regarding the assets deployed in the basin (Cesaretti 2009: 479). All the partners or agencies can use the information gathered and collected in JIAC, if and when required.

During the NATO Parliamentary Assembly on July 2007, Rear Admiral of CC-Mar Naples in his speech stated NATO’s commitment to expand its intelligence-sharing activities through developing a network for tracking merchant shipping in the Mediterranean. 64 NATO’s capabilities in tracking and monitoring have improved significantly with the tracking software called Baseline for Rapid Interative Transformational Experimentation (BRITE) and FAST2CAP in operation. 65 BRITE and FAST2CAP are the software used to analyse the multitude of tracks vessels and to identify unusual events at sea. 66 The use of

64 NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Parliamentary Speech on Operation Active Endeavour: Recent Political and Military Developments, July 2007, pp. 1.
BRITE and FAST2CAP is greatly complementing the use of the Automatic Identification System (AIS) transmitter mandated by IMO and is simultaneously enhancing NATO’s ability to track shipping. AIS is compulsory for all the ships weighing over 300 tons. All vessels are required to provide information including the vessels identity and other related information in order to assist in monitoring and tracking the vessels. It enables NATO to get real-time pictures of the maritime traffic in the Mediterranean, leading to high alert of any unusual or suspicious vessels.\textsuperscript{67} If they discovered any suspicious vessels at sea which meet the specified criteria, a NATO naval will immediately hail it before boarding the vessels for inspection. The tracking and monitoring operations are essential for identifying any suspicious vessels that may have a connection to terrorist groups and to assure there are no vessels carrying suspicious cargo or personnel.\textsuperscript{68} During the hailing operation, NATO naval and aircraft units will contact and question suspicious vessels and they are required to identify themselves. These procedures have been closely administrated under the authority of Allied Maritime Component Command Naples (CC-MAR Naples) since 2004, which is also responsible for two immediate response forces, SNMCMG2 and SNMG 2.\textsuperscript{69}

\textbullet\hspace{0.5em} \textit{Escorting}

Secondly, another vital operation of the OAE is escorting the vessels which requested it. As aforementioned, the mandate of the OAE was extended in 2003 to also include vessel queries, compliant boarding and escorting commercial vessels sailing through the Straits of Gibraltar, which requested it. After NATO extended its mandate to include escorting operations, a great number of commercial vessels took advantage of this offer to ensure safer navigation in the Mediterranean Sea. In 2003, NATO’s \textit{Operation Strait of Gibraltar} (STROG) was created in the light of the goal to offer an assistance to OAE, responsible to controlling the vessel’s entry into the western Mediterranean Sea (Alexander 2006: 226). The Strait of

\textsuperscript{68} NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Committee Report on Progress in the War Against Terrorism, November 2003, pp. 12.
Gibraltar provides an entrance to the Mediterranean Sea with thousands of merchant vessels and oil tankers passing it every year, which makes the strait a crucial choke point. This operation is implemented with heavy reliance on the logistics support including a number of naval assets by the NATO member countries. Over time, the operation was extended to also include the participation of other Mediterranean countries such as Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco. (Ronzitti 2012: 43). Through the escort operation, by 2007, 488 allied commercial ships have been successfully escorted through the Strait of Gibraltar (NATO 2008a: 4).

- **Boarding and inspection**

Thirdly, compliant boarding and inspection of suspected vessels are also an essential component of the OAE in furtherance of deterring terrorist attacks in the Mediterranean Sea. Through the OAE, the operation in practice involves the hailing of the merchant vessels sailing the Mediterranean Sea every day. Since April 2003, NATO has been systematically boarding suspect ships. The suspected vessels are boarded with the compliance of the ships’ masters and flag states in accordance with international law. During the boarding and inspection operation, up to eight navy vessels are deployed in strategic locations of the cargo flows, which includes the entire Mediterranean basin (Koknar 2005: 5). While the boarding takes place, it is crucial that the boarding is consensual, as a NATO official explained:

> There were many boardings whereby most of them were consensual. I do not think it allows us to do non-consensual boarding.

(Interview No. 5, Former NATO’s Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Operations)

In practice, during the inspection of the suspicious vessels at sea, the information collected from the vessels inspected by the SNMG 2 will be reported to CC-MAR Naples and NATO Shipping Centre in England for further actions (NATO 2014b). If any irregularities are discovered, a team of 15 to 20 specially trained personnel of NATO may board the vessel to inspect the documentation and cargo, with the
compliance of flag states and the ship’s captain (Cesaretti 2008: 3). If any evidence related to terrorism is discovered in the ships, NATO will then take any necessary actions as authorised by the NAC (NATO 2008a: 3). The practice of boarding the suspected vessels will not only ensure that there are no terrorist-related vessels sailing through the basin, but also help to deliver a message about the NATO maritime presence in the Mediterranean Sea.\textsuperscript{70} During the boarding, the NATO standing naval forces will collect the information regarding the vessels and disseminate to the coastal countries and their allies for further actions in order to detect and prevent any potential terrorist attacks. According to Froh, in some cases the information is also shared with the Mediterranean Dialogue partners (Froh 2016). Since the beginning of the operation until late October 2007, more than 89,000 ships have been hailed and approximately 125 have been boarded in the eastern Mediterranean (NATO 2008a: 4).

In the Mediterranean, CC-MAR Naples works directly with the NATO naval forces operating in the basin. This cooperation leads to strengthening the security of the Mediterranean, particularly in enhancing interoperability and immediate response capability to any possible terrorist attacks. For example, in June 2003, naval assets of southern-region countries reported a suspicious vessel operating in the Mediterranean (Cesaretti 2009: 478). Following this report, CC-MAR Naples immediately shared the information with relevant partners to raise awareness of any possible actions that should be taken following the report. Subsequently, the Allies Coast Guard will be able to take necessary steps to the same vessel when it enters the country’s territorial waters either to hail or board the ships for further inspection (Cesaretti 2009: 478). National authorities will begin with a thorough investigation of the particular vessels with all the information collected, and this includes diverting the vessels to the nearest port to be examined, and sometimes handled by the national authorities, when it is necessary. A NATO official explained the whole process, which takes place during the boarding:

\textsuperscript{70} NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Committee Report on Progress in the War Against Terrorism, November 2003, pp. 12.
So you hail on the captain, captain will stop and the authorities will go on board. Alternatively, they may divert to the port and when it comes to national waters, they have the authority to take the ships and move it to the port and examine it. They can also report it to the national authorities, the French, Italian, Spanish, the Greek, Albanian and other authorities. This allowed NATO to have a better understanding of what was moving in the Mediterranean.

(Interview No. 5, Former NATO’s Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Operations)

- Training and exercises

Fourthly, the next vital operation in OAE is the extensive and forceful capacity building between the key regional actor, accomplished by conducting active training and exercises. Spain, Morocco and Italy are among the key regional players in the Mediterranean and continuously collaborate through joint training and exercises with NATO. In pursuit of securing the safe sea-lane in the Mediterranean Sea, NATO naval assets conducted regular exercises, trainings and port visits in support of the OAE operation in the Mediterranean (Cesaretti 2009: 483). From time to time, NATO naval assets will make a port visit during its deployment in the Mediterranean. This operation is particularly intended to increase maritime security levels and readiness in support of the OAE operation. The response force responsible in this task is the Standing NATO Maritime Group (SNMG 2), which conducts regular port visits and exercises with the Allies partners. SNMG 2 is operating in the Mediterranean based on the three-months rotation basis in support of this operation (Cesaretti 2009: 483).

In August 2015, SNMG 2 made a scheduled port visit to Tunisia as part of a routine and diplomatic visit to Allied partners. It also intended to manifest the NATO’s presence in the region to assure them that the Mediterranean Sea is a safe shipping lane for everyone (NATO 2015c). During the assignment in the Mediterranean Sea, SNMG 2 is conducting a visit to its partners’ ports as part of the OAE operation, in order to reinforce inter-operability training. During the
visit, the Commander also meets the high-ranking representatives of the port’s nations to discuss the plans of counter-terrorism at sea particularly in the Mediterranean. This activity has been a routine for the groups deployed in the Mediterranean in support of the OAE operation.

Similarly, the task of counter-terrorism measures in the Mediterranean is also shared by SNMCMG2. For example, on September 5, 2014, seven NATO ships assigned to SNMCMG2 made their scheduled port visit in Casablanca. The Group’s deployment composed of naval assets of Italy, Turkey, Greece, Spain, UK, Germany and Belgium are initially responsible for conducting mine countermeasures activities, but later also assist in counter-terrorism operations (NATO 2014a). For example, during port visits, the Group shared its experiences in mine warfare operations and participated in passing exercise and a tactical navigation exercise with the Royal Moroccan Navy (RMN) ships. The shared experience is certainly useful in conducting counter-terrorism operations since these activities at sea are particularly important to increase inter-operability and immediate response capabilities between naval partners (NATO 2014a). Later in March 2015, SNMG 2 also arrived in Casablanca for its scheduled port visit. During the visit, NATO and RMN discussed issues of shared importance including cooperation in OAE. NATO and RMN committed to enhance inter-operability and mutual understanding between naval partners through participation at sea (NATO 2015b). SNMG 2 participated in the exercises at sea with RMN including “communications drills to improve information sharing between partners, manoeuvering drills to practice ship handling in close proximity, and boarding exercises between ships” (NATO 2015a). As one of the MD partners, Morocco plays an important role in the regional maritime security through its military engagement and shared exercises with NATO forces.

• **Support of Mediterranean Dialogue partners**

The fifth element of the OAE also highlights NATO’s commitment to strengthening this operation through the support of Mediterranean Dialogue partners. At the NATO Summit in Istanbul in June 2004, NATO proposed to enhance the effectiveness of the OAE with the participation of NATO partners,
including the Mediterranean Dialogue countries (Cesaretti 2008: 5). NATO has therefore invited interested Mediterranean Dialogue countries to join the OAE, at which three of the Mediterranean Dialogue countries: Algeria, Israel and Morocco had expressed their desire and interest to participate in the OAE. These Mediterranean Dialogue countries contributed to the operation through an individual cooperation programme (ICP), which is based on the needs of the operation. These countries cooperate in the OAE by providing information about any suspicious shipping operations in their waters for further action by the naval force operating in the area. In addition, three other NATO partners, Croatia, Georgia and Sweden also indicated their interest to join the operation (Cesaretti 2008: 3). The participation of these countries would be decided on a case-by-case basis (NATO 2008a: 5). The OAE has gathered great attention from Mediterranean Dialogue partners, not only offering the use of ships or aircraft, but more importantly is their interest to exchange information amongst them. It has benefited NATO and the partners to gain more understanding about the environment where they operate in, leading to more efficient and potent actions to be taken in response to any unusual or suspicious actions at sea.

In addition, the OAE’s task also extends to involve participation from other interested partners. For instance, NATO sought to cooperate with Russia in the OAE to allow the mission extension into the Black Sea; however the proposal was opposed by Russia (Nevers 2007: 41). However, later in 2006 two ships of the Russian Navy participated in OAE patrols in the eastern Mediterranean (Beblere 2008: 9). Moreover, Ukraine has also joined the operation since April 2005 to provide support for the OAE. Ukraine deployed their ships in the Mediterranean Sea to help with the operation and to increase practical cooperation and inter-operability with NATO (NATO 2007). In order to prepare Ukrainian ships with comprehensive training to be able to participate effectively in the operation, NATO has been sending mobile training teams to Ukraine. This

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73 Russia opposed the proposal because they presume the current operation is sufficient to manage the problems and preserve the stability in the area.
training was intended to ensure that Ukrainian navies could adapt and follow standard procedures of the operation (NATO 2007). Furthermore, NATO has also conducted several set of training at sea with Ukrainian ships to allow Ukrainian naval forces to perform joint operations with NATO, including vessel’s boarding and inspection (NATO 2007).

- **Humanitarian assistance and support for high visibility events**

Finally, the sixth element of OAE is not limited to maritime surveillance and boarding suspected vessels, but also includes additional counter-terrorist tasks, which involve providing assistance and support for high visibility events on request. The events have included more than thirty events including NATO’s Istanbul Summit 2004 and Athens Olympic in 2004 to defend against any possible terrorist attacks. For such events, NATO employed together its land, air and naval assets (NATO 2008a: 5). In the case of the Athens Olympics in 2004, early warning aircraft (AWACS) was used to monitor air traffic together with the coast guard to conduct surveillance and compliant boarding in international waters around the Greek Peninsula in order to ensure maritime security for the Olympic Games. Providing support for such high visibility events is always conducted under the mandate of standing naval forces where they will set up a separate command for those activities, as a NATO official explained:

The standing naval forces would take it on more than likely, it would be a ship and a nation might even take their ships out of NATO command and have a do that task. We may set up a separate command for them, where they may do it independently or may do it under standing naval forces mandate. Or otherwise they may also do such activities under OAE.

(Interview No. 5, Former NATO’s Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Operations)

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Additionally, with the force ready at sea, NATO has acquired the opportunity to also participate in a broad range of situations and emergencies. Humanitarian operations, search and rescue, and disaster relief operations in the Mediterranean are among the broad occasions in addition to combatting terrorism missions. For example, NATO ships and helicopters have rescued 84 workers evacuated from stricken oil rigs in high winds and heavy seas in December 2001 (NATO 2008a: 4). Moreover, NATO forces also gave life-saving support to 254 refugees of a sinking ship in the Eastern Mediterranean off Crete in January 2002 (Cesaretti 2009: 478). Furthermore, it also needs to be taken into account that the responsibility of providing search and rescue is consistent with the law of the sea as the NATO official explained:

Any ship’s captain and ship’s masters who come across somebody in need, it is bound by the law of the sea to assist them and provide them with enough water and food, as well as enough fuel to go back to the land.

(Interview No. 5, Former NATO’s Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Operations)

5.4 Summary

While conducting the operation in the Mediterranean Sea, NATO’s OAE assets have successfully detected, reported, and boarded hundreds of suspicious vessels, which may have related to terrorist activities. In addition to that, while conducting counter-terrorist operations NATO naval forces have also encountered unexpected benefits such as success in interception of other illegal activities at sea, including transport of illegal explosives and WMD, drug smuggling, irregular migration as well as human trafficking. All the data and information collected during the interception are shared with the national authorities for further actions.

Despite the success of OAE enforcement, it is however limited due to

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several factors. Firstly, the OAE tracking system is heavily dependent on the AIS system, which has resulted in a limitation to identify and detect any vessels weighing less than 300 tons. AIS signal reception stations can collect this useful information, however it is still insufficient. It is reported that data collected from AIS is either incomplete or incorrect in 70% of all cases due to the fact that the ships are less than 300 tonnes in weight or sometimes the equipment is malfunctioning (Duquesne 2011: 26). However, the reliance on AIS is not always a problem. According to Froh, it is not necessary to know every little rubber boat at sea due to the reason that they may not have the same capability as the larger vessels have (Froh 2016). Furthermore, the use of AIS is one of the requirements for insurance claiming and this will benefit the vessels companies (Froh 2016). On another note, General Marc Duquesne suggests it is important to merge data collected from AIS with data from other captors including, among others, via radars, semaphores and electro-optical sensors (Duquesne 2011: 26). As the OAE is constantly evolving since it was first incepted, this operation has also faced limitations due to the insufficiency of assigned refueling ships. Since NATO’s naval operations in the Mediterranean is under a rotation basis among participating members, it is therefore always reliant upon the availability of the nation’s ships. These naval ships are usually in high demand for the national activities, therefore it will be more advantageous to have additional acquisition of refueling ships to facilitate operational capacity and enhance the efficacy of the OAE. Nonetheless, NATO practices a concept of ‘fair burden sharing’ among its member states to overcome the issue of insufficiency of refueling ships:

NATO has a fair burden sharing, where each nation should be taking its share. If they don’t have a warship, we expected them to contribute in another way. Nations do have navies, so we try to influence them and they have force-planning goals to develop and feel capabilities that NATO need for collective defence.

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In the longer term, NATO recognizes that fighting against terrorism at sea requires all stakeholders to work together in various degrees of cooperation particularly between NATO and its Mediterranean partners.

The OAE represents the commitment of NATO to continue developing comprehensive tools in combatting maritime terrorism with friendly cooperative relations with the Mediterranean partners as well as Mediterranean Dialogue countries. All the vessels sailing through the Mediterranean Sea are advised to remain vigilant towards any potential attacks from the terrorist groups and cooperate favourably with the naval vessels operating in the area. The OAE has been a very effective tool in countering terrorism in the Mediterranean and with consistent cooperation in the operation, there has been no terrorist plot detected in the Mediterranean. There were some other illegal activities found in the Mediterranean, but nevertheless there has never been any imminent attack or dirty bomb by the terrorist group in the basin. The presence of NATO in the Mediterranean has benefited to prevent the possibility of terrorist attack and has simultaneously succeeded in maintaining safety and security in the basin.

5.5 The EU Counter-Terrorism Operation in the Mediterranean Sea

The 9/11 terrorist attacks were not only calls to action for NATO, but also the EU. Since 9/11, the EU’s role in combatting terrorism has been considerably boosted and they have made tremendous progress in their efforts to combat terrorism. Above that, terrorism from the Mediterranean region has also become an internal security concern for the EU (Wolff 2012: 161). As a result, the EU has systematically introduced and developed a number of strategies, action plans and operations for counter-terrorism in the Mediterranean Sea. Member states have actively conducted the operations within NATO monitoring operations, such as the OAE. Such operations have also been conducted with the cooperation of non-NATO multinational naval forces, such as the EUROMARFOR. Therefore, in this section, I discuss a framework of counter-terrorism measures, which has been
introduced by the EU since 2001, including the implementation of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW), the EU Action Plan 2001, the Declaration on Combating Terrorism 2004, the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy 2005, the Euro-Mediterranean Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism, the Operation Coherent Behaviour 2002, and the European Counter Terrorism Centre.

- **Counter-terrorism strategies**

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the EU has introduced several counter-terrorism strategies to address its commitment to the fight against terrorism. Firstly, the EU invoked its first key policy in 14 September 2001, which is the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) and the framework decision on terrorism. This policy was enforced in June 2002 and rightly emphasised the EU’s pledge to improve the mutual recognition of judicial decisions among member states in regards to criminal prosecutions or detention orders.  

80 This policy delineates a number of acts punishable by the law including terrorism and emphasises the border controls among member states.  

81 The objectives of the EAW are to abolish extradition between member states and promote free movement in judicial decisions in criminal matters including terrorism.  

A further important framework used to respond to the threat of terrorism was the EU Action Plan to Fight Terrorism. It was created on 21 September 2001 and aimed at making fighting against terrorism a top priority for the EU. The EU Action Plan affirms the EU’s commitment to work “in concert in all circumstances” in the efforts to fight terrorism.  

82 It pinpoints the following vital plans of action: improving police and judicial cooperation (to enhance the implementation of EAW, adopting a common definition of terrorism and strengthening cooperation and information exchanges between intelligence agencies of the EU); developing international legal instruments to fight against

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terrorism; preventing the continuous funding of terrorism; increasing the level of aviation security including “protection of cockpit access”; and coordinating the EU’s global action by increasing the consistency and coordination of all the EU policies. However, in the wake of the terrorist attacks in Madrid in March 2004, the EU Action Plan has been revised and the Declaration on Combating Terrorism has been adopted.

The Declaration on Combating Terrorism was created on 18 June 2004. It identified seven strategic objectives for the EU to prevent and combat terrorism including the following: i) strengthen the international consensus and enhance international efforts to combat terrorism; ii) put an end to the financial access and other economic sources by the terrorists groups; iii) enhance capacity within EU bodies and member states to improve the efficiency to detect, investigate, and prosecute terrorists and prevent attacks; iv) improve the security of international transport and ensure an effective border control system; v) reinforcing the capabilities of the EU member states to deal with the consequences of a terrorist attack; vi) identify factors which facilitate radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism; vii) focus on EU external relations towards priority third countries, where counter-terrorism capacity needs to be enhanced. The declaration emphasises the strengthening of international consensus and efforts to combat terrorism with the capabilities of member states. Rather than providing new measures, the declaration focuses more on improvising the implementation of the existing action plan.

In addition, the document also reiterates the EU’s commitment to ensuring an effective border control system. Border control is not only vital in counter-terrorism measures, but it plays a significant role in countering illegal migrants, particularly through Frontex. For example, in the course of conducting illegal migrant clampdowns in the Mediterranean Sea, EU forces assigned for Frontex also assisted in the prevention of terrorism. Although mainly focused on border

control and surveillance, Frontex is particularly relevant for counter-terrorism as it helps to prevent terrorist attacks with the stronger European border control (Argomaniz 2011: 48). The same idea is shared by Skordeli (2015) in which she suggests that terrorism could sometimes be associated with irregular migration, hence prevention measures for irregular migration are frequently correlated with counter-terrorism measures (Skordeli 2015: 10). As part of the task in the Declaration of Combating Terrorism, it provides technical assistance with the partners (Wolff 2009: 148). For example, the EU through its counter-terrorism capacity building project with Algeria, Indonesia and Morocco attempted to synchronise national budgets and the EU budgets under single framework for counter-terrorism policy (Wolff 2012: 166). As this project is relatively sensitive, very limited information has been released. Other counter-terrorism technical assistance which tackles radicalisation in potential identified environments such as prison or worship places, border and maritime security, and training on crisis management.\(^8\) Moreover, Morocco and Algeria also received training on crisis management to enhance their competence concerning counter-terrorism measures (Wolff 2012: 166). In other ways, the privileged experiences of some Mediterranean countries, such as Italy and Spain in maritime security operations are fundamental for other partners, in which they could share their expertise to achieve their goals in combatting terrorism at sea (Calleya 2012: 136).

Another series of terrorist attacks in the London bombings of July 2005 has urged the EU to adopt another extraordinary measure as matter of urgency. On 30 November 2005, the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy was adopted with the approval of the Justice and Home Affairs Council. This document defines comprehensively counter-terrorism measures in the aftermath of 2005, and declares terrorism a threat to all states and to all peoples.\(^9\) This document delineates its strategic commitment in the counter-terrorism activities as follows: ‘to combat terrorism globally while respecting human rights, and make Europe safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, security and justice’.\(^10\)

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The strategy demonstrates the will of EU to combat terrorism globally to make Europe a safer place as well as to maintain the area of freedom, security and justice for the well being of its citizens. The strategy puts forward the need for cooperation at the national, European, and international levels to decrease vulnerability to terrorist attacks (Prezelj 2008a: 25). The strategy aims to cover four main pillars of work: prevent, protect, pursue and respond. The first objective is to prevent people from turning to terrorism, hence the EU pledged to reinforce the action plan in tackling the root causes leading to radicalisation and recruitment into terrorism. The second objective of the strategy is to protect the citizens and infrastructure from vulnerability to terrorist attacks. Protection is the key part of the strategy in which it emphasises the need to improve border and transport security as well as other cross-border infrastructures from potential terrorist attacks. In the pursuit of this pillar, first regulation in the field of maritime security was adopted with the objective to secure and enhance the security of port facilities and ships (Casale 2009: 105). The regulation emphasises the importance of preserving the security of the European community shipping and its citizens from any potential unlawful acts such as acts of terrorism, piracy or similar (Casale 2009: 105). The third objective of the Counter-Terrorism Strategy is to pursue the disruption of terrorist activity and its networks. This pillar highlights the importance of adoption of the EAW to pursue and investigate terrorists across borders. In addition, key priorities on ‘pursue’ also include maximising the use of Europol and Eurojust in judicial and police cooperation in combatting terrorism. The fourth objective of the strategy is to prepare member states to deal with the aftermath of the attacks, as well as improving coordination with international organisations to respond on the terrorist attacks.

The Euro-Mediterranean Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism is also an essential framework designed to improve cooperation between the EU and its

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neighbours in North Africa and the Middle East. The code was agreed upon at the Barcelona Summit of late November 2005 and aimed to enhance cooperation in accordance with UN resolutions (Reinares 2006: 4). This code of conduct brings the spirit of solidarity of all participating countries to stand against terrorism through a legal framework and international cooperation, and condemns it in all its forms.98 The Euro-Mediterranean Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism is recognised as one of the far-reaching tools to enhance cooperation in combatting terrorism in the Euro-Mediterranean region. The partners committed to combat terrorism and address all its causes in accordance to UN resolution and Security Council Resolutions on Terrorism.99 In addition, the code demonstrated the commitment of all partners to continue protecting the people from terrorist attacks, in which they will strengthen their aviation field and maritime security.100 The code also indicates the importance of experience and information changes to minimise the consequences of the attacks (Reinares 2006: 4). The Euro-Mediterranean Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism requires the members to strengthen international cooperation with the regulation guidelines to address the threat of terrorism particularly in preventing, containing and eradicating terrorism, regionally and internationally.

While the EU has created a unified counter-terrorism strategy, explicit measures in the maritime domain have remained limited particularly in the Mediterranean. This is due to the previous documents which are adopted by the EU on counter-terrorism measures provide insufficient agenda for terrorist threats in the maritime domain compared to land-oriented terrorism. Recently, in the wake of the potential terrorist threats to cruise ships in the Mediterranean from ISIS, great concern has been expressed to the international community regarding the security levels in the maritime domain. Potential areas for the adoption of the maritime counter-terrorism policies need to be considered in order to prepare the

EU with the possibilities of maritime terrorist attacks which may jeopardise the security of its member states. Other areas for improvement within the EU framework are better coordination of counter-terrorism implementation and better sharing of information to prevent the vulnerability towards terrorist attacks at sea.

- **EUROMARFOR (Operation Coherent Behaviour)**

Despite the limited area of cooperation in maritime counter-terrorism, the EU however has been involved in monitoring operations in the Mediterranean Sea with non-NATO multinational naval forces, such as the European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR). EUROMARFOR is a naval force adopted in 1995 by France, Spain, Portugal and Italy and since then it has worked closely with its regional partner including NATO. It has later been enlarged by the participation of Greece and Turkey as the observers. The EUROMARFOR has only been activated a few times for shorter operations (Hallams 2013: 180). In 2002, EUROMARFOR had its first operation, Operation Coherent Behaviour in the Eastern Mediterranean from 1 October 2002 until 30 November 2002 (Global Security 2012). The operation was a surveillance mission primarily focused on illegal drug trafficking and counter-terrorism. This operation was conducted with close coordination with NATO in the frame of OAE. Although it was a very short-term operation, this operation nevertheless has contributed to OAE in two ways: in a separate operation, coordinated with NATO; and as part of NATO operation (Feldt 2011: 16). Cooperation with OAE may contribute to a long-term strategic partnership for Europe (Faleg and Blockmans 2015: 4). EUROMARFOR demonstrated the capacity of active EU engagement in order to restore stability in the Mediterranean Sea.

- **European Counter-Terrorism Centre (ECTC)**

Following the growing number of terrorist attacks, the EU is currently facing, it is particularly important for the EU to strengthen its response to terror, and to enhance its strategic understanding of the threats. On this note, Europol has launched the European Counter-Terrorism Centre (ECTC) in January 2016 to demonstrate their strategic efforts to fight against terrorism more effectively
(Europol 2016). The centre serves as a central information hub providing the member states with collective support to fight against terrorist attacks (McNerney et al 2017: 16). ECTC also provides intelligence sharing among member states, enhance the exchange of information between law enforcement agencies, and increases inter-operability between member states. As one of the EU officials asserts:

This centre has recently established by Europol. It is basically links up the responsible department at Europol. Additionally, the different tools Europol provide is data bank and we are trying to push for the member states to use Europol more frequently and to insert more data into the system or the tools to make it successful. Europol can work to it only if the member states are in the search data.

(Interview No.1, EU Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism).

As a central information hub, ECTC serves as a centre of expertise, providing analysis for current investigations of terror attacks in the Europe, as well as coordinating immediate responses in the event of major terrorist attacks (Europol 2016). With the establishment of ECTC, Europol aims to coordinate awareness and improve cooperation between different counter-terrorism authorities in the EU (Europol 2016). In addition, the EU attempts to connect the capabilities used for counter-migration with the established tools and counter-terrorism (CT) networks of Europol, to give more access to Europol for certain databases of the EU, which was originally assigned for migratory crisis, including the access to Schengen information system (Europol 2016).

5.6 Results and Chapter Summary

Terrorist threat at sea has always been seen as less significant in comparison to land-based incidents due to the low number of attacks reported at sea. Nonetheless, several previous dreadful terrorist groups attacks at sea particularly Achille Lauro and the attacks against shipping and merchant vessels by the Islamic State militants in the recent years have demonstrated that terrorism at sea presents a real threat. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, NATO promptly launched
OAE under Article V with the mandate to monitor shipping lanes and provide surveillance activities to the vessels in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. As part of the operation, SNMG2 has been assigned in the Mediterranean to support this operation, performing the patrolling tasks on a daily basis. The OAE is the operation, which encompasses comprehensive strategic tasks to fight against terrorism, including surveillance, boarding, inspection and regular training. By contrast, the EU’s role in crisis management in the case of maritime terrorism in the Mediterranean is somehow still far behind that of NATO. While several strategies have been introduced and adopted, they are mainly focused on land-oriented terrorism. Nonetheless, EU naval forces have indirectly engaged in counter terrorism at sea, particularly in the course of conducting counter-migration operations enforced by Frontex. With the premise that irregular migration is strongly interconnected with terrorist activities, Frontex’s safeguarding of the external borders will also eventually help to prevent terrorist group attacks at sea.

In addition, a number of strategies and documents were adopted following the terrorist attacks in order to tackle radicalisation and recruitment into terrorism. Albeit brief, Operation Coherent Behaviour conducted by EUROMARFOR has also been part of the EU counter-terrorism operations conducted with close cooperation with the OAE. In summary, a more robust EU presence in the Mediterranean is particularly essential in the current regional security circumstances. Most visibly, the NATO presence in the Mediterranean Sea for counter-terrorism operations has positively increased through the enforcement of OAE, even though it has remained limited for the EU. The EU perceives cooperation with NATO in the fight against terrorism as somewhat difficult due to the fact that not all EU member states are NATO member states. There are ongoing dialogues, consultations, and general coordination between NATO and the EU in general terms on counter-terrorism, nevertheless to what extent it will be further developed remains ambiguous.101

101 Interview with EU Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism, 15 June 2016.
The relationship between the EU and NATO regarding counter-terrorism policies including security strategies, partnerships and military cooperation demonstrates the extent to which both organisations promote security community building processes beyond their borders in order to collectively deal with maritime terrorism in the Mediterranean Sea. In particular, the findings explain how far such cooperation and initiatives constitute an approach to community-building that eliminate traditional realist approaches to cooperation in international relations, but instead suggests the creation of Mediterranean region as a rationale ground for cooperation in the notion of security community. Taking all factors into consideration, the EU and NATO’s counter-terrorism policies in the Mediterranean fulfil the components of security community practices in that they not only widespread cooperative security practices but also they seek to collaborate collectively to handle terrorist threats. In other ways, the EU and NATO as major regional organisations in the Mediterranean promote the emergence and sustainability of security community building for civilian crisis management with the maritime security practices. The findings implies that there is an evident connection between the security community practices with the maritime activities of counter-terrorism, ultimately demonstrate that the maritime initiatives by the EU and NATO have created a regional community that increase security from the terrorist attacks in the Mediterranean.

As reiterated throughout the thesis, the concept of security community emphasises the absence of violence means to settle the conflict, but instead promoting cooperation between the members through the implementation of strategies and partnerships. For instance, the application of the framework through NATO and EU maritime initiatives to combat terrorism is clearly reflected in the Mediterranean. Various strategies, declaration and centre for information sharing as developed by the EU portrayed the direction of partnerships among the member states. The introduction to the EAW and EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy reflects the disposition towards creation of transnational security strategies and policy coordination as delineated in the security community framework. In addition, the implementation of various training and exercises in OAE reflects the practice of military cooperation, while at the same time applied the practice of partnerships
creation. This can be proven from the involvement of non-members to participate in the surveillance and monitoring activities in the Mediterranean Sea, including Ukraine. Partnerships has also portrayed through EU counter-terrorism operation including the partnerships with Algeria, Morocco and Indonesia to synchronise national budgets for counter-terrorism policy. Similarly, Operation Coherent Behaviour illustrates the application of security community in the Mediterranean through the military engagement, including military cooperation and intelligence exchanges with NATO in conducting surveillance activities to disrupt the movement of terrorists. In sum, the security community framework provides better understanding of how the emergence of shared interests and identities among the communities can shape affinity towards identifying the security issues for them and understand the development toward a new collective identity of states to provide collective security. Further considerations regarding security community building within counter-terrorism policies will be discussed in the final conclusion chapter.

In the next chapter, I will analyse the second case study, which is irregular migration in the Mediterranean Sea. With many appalling tragedies and incidents involving migrants from the Middle East and North Africa crossing the Mediterranean to reach Europe, it has topped the EU and NATO’s political agendas regarding asylum policies and how to deal with the migration crisis. For that reason, it is essential to highlight what the EU and NATO have done so far to engage with this pressing situation, and ultimately increase the security and reduce crisis around the Mediterranean.
CHAPTER 6

Tackling the Irregular Migration Crisis: The Roles and Policies of the EU and NATO in the Mediterranean Sea

6.1 Introduction

Migration has been one of the most contentious issues in Europe since the end of the Cold War. There are various factors that contribute to the influx of migration to Europe, including, terrorism, social unrest, extreme poverty, prolonged insecurity and authoritarian government in their home countries (Schmid 2016: 6). Migratory flows, be the flows of asylum-seekers, labour migrants or irregular migrants have become a serious problem, not only in terms of a humanitarian challenge but also in terms of a security risk (Lutterbeck 2006: 59). As a result, migration has been more of a security issue rather than a socio-economic one (Panebianco 2010: 8). There is substantial increase of migration flows particularly from the southern European countries towards the North, in which Italy and Greece received the peak arrivals of migrants to their countries (Schmid 2016: 8).

It is important to define what is meant by the term “migration” in order to better understand this study. According to Schmid (2016), migration defined as follows:

Migration refers to the in-[immigration] or out-movement [emigration] of (groups of) people from one place to a usually distant other location, with the intention to settle at the destination, temporarily or permanently. This process can be voluntary or forced, regular (legal) or irregular (illegal), within one country or across international borders. Refugees are a sub-group of international migrants who seek asylum or have obtained protection abroad under the terms of the UN Refugee Convention of 1951.
On another note, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines irregular migration as a migration movement that takes place beyond the normal regulation forms of the sending, transit and receiving countries as epitomised in the following passage:

Irregular migration is a movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries. There is no clear or universally accepted definition of irregular migration. From the perspective of destination countries it is entry, stay or work in a country without the necessary authorisation or documents required under immigration regulations. From the perspective of the sending country, the irregularity is for example seen in cases in which a person crosses an international boundary without a valid passport or travel document or does not fulfill the administrative requirements for leaving the country. There is, however, a tendency to restrict the use of the term "illegal migration" to cases of smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons (IOM 2011).

Irregular migration can be classified into four common forms: unauthorised entry; fraudulent entry (without valid documents); visa overstaying; and violation of the visa’s conditions (Baldwin-Edwards 2007: 115). For most but not all cases, the majority of irregular migrants in Europe stem from the latter forms where they violate the conditions of the visa and in certain extent, have long been visa overstayers in the EU states (Andersson 2016a: 1058).

Irregular migration is not a novel issue. Significant recent waves started in the 1980s when the southern European countries emerged as a countries of immigration (Baldwin-Edwards 2007: 115). A large number of migrants boosted the workforce in most of the European countries during the period, whether via

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102 This is a working definition for migration term. For more precise definition of migration, see also A.P. Schmid (Ed.). *Immigration Policy: A Search for Balance in Europe* (Driebergen: Synthesis Foundation, 2001).

103 (Available at: https://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms).
Germany’s ‘guestworker’ programme or low skilled labour mobility from former colonies into Britain and France (Huysmans 2006: 65; Andersson 2016a: 1056). Although in the beginning there was no security concern over the influx of these irregular immigration, it has increasingly become a subject of public concern because it creates destabilisation of public order (Huysmans 2006: 65). Of particular concern, there are multiple causal relations between irregular migration and terrorism (Till 2009: 298). Irregular migration has become increasingly controlled by human smugglers and trafficking networks (Lutterbeck 2006: 74) and largely associated with varied security risks. Migration flow, from merely a humanitarian issue has grown into a security issue in which the ‘securitisation of migration’ has taken place (Leonard 2010: 231).

Before we further discuss the migration issue, it is crucial to understand how this particular issue became a security issue and jeopardised the safety of the states. In order to understand the migration issue in a security spectrum, we can draw on the debate of securitisation framework. According to Bueger (2015), securitisation of maritime security establishes two possible analyses (Bueger 2015: 162). First, what are the factors that determine one maritime issue recognised and accepted as posing a threat (Bueger 2015: 162). Second, the question relies on what are the reference objects that may be affected by these maritime security threats and therefore need to be protected (Bueger 2015: 162). In other ways, the securitisation of the maritime security agenda determines the list of maritime issues that become an existential threats to the intersubjective audience, and what are the measures taken to protect the referent objects. In the case of migration, the findings suggest that migration is not merely a threat to

104 Terrorism attacks with deliberate targets on civilians is a major driver of forced migration/irregular migration. Historically, the number of criminal or terrorist in mass migration movement is low, but terrorist always have a criminal background. The possibility for migrants can be terrorist or vice versa is as follows: (a) some economic migrants are kidnapped and forced by terrorist to join the organisations (e.g. by Boko Haram in Nigeria); (b) the terrorists involved in acts of terrorism, including suicide terrorism during the return journey to their home countries as part of refugee channel (See Alex P.Schmid, Links between Terrorism and Migration: An Exploration (Netherlands: ICCT, 2016), pp. 3-4).

105 Irregular migration has always associated with human smuggling and trafficking organisations, and also other transboundary organised crime. It seems clear that the increasing number of human smugglers arrested across external borders of the EU demonstrates that trafficking of person involving irregular migration is a serious problems in the EU (Lutterbeck 2006: 74).
economy stability, but includes humanitarian perspectives particularly with the involvement of trafficking networks.

The securitisation process of migration has been widely discussed by Huysmans (2006) in which he argued that migration is now increasingly being related to security (Huysmans 2006: 1). Huysmans argued that both at national and European levels, the irregular migration issue has been accepted as an existential threat to the security of the EU (Huysmans 2006: 81).\(^{106}\) The core reason that demonstrates irregular migration as a security threat is the growing number of trafficking organisations that are involved in the irregular migration movements (Lutterbeck 2006: 61). The existence of human trafficking networks is a major problem because of the difficulties in detecting and arresting the criminals.\(^{107}\) In addition, the 9/11 attacks has again redefined how significant migration issues have contributed toward security risks to the states and peoples (Lutterbeck 2006: 59). The terrorist attacks have been associated with the failure of immigration control which has assisted the attacks of 9/11 (Collyer 2006: 257). In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in 2001, the tightening and strengthening of external border control portrayed EU’s pledge to fight against not only terrorism, but also to restrict the access of migrants and asylum seekers.

The 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) emphasises that irregular migration is one of the current threats faced by European countries that may always be associated with terrorism.\(^{108}\) To this end, the EU has committed to strengthen border controls among the member states, which ultimately has led to the establishment of Frontex in 2004. Frontex was established with the idea that it is one of the ‘extraordinary measures’ deployed by the EU as a tools to tackle migration that is largely perceived to be an existential threat to the survival of the


member states. Asylum and migration issues have, ever since, been at the top of EU’s political agenda. In 2006, a year after the activation of Frontex operations, the late Federal Austrian Interior Minister, Liese Prokop stressed the issue of migration as one the security challenges facing by the EU during the conference on ‘Media, Migration and Asylum’ (EU Presidency 2006). In his speech, he declared that ‘besides the threat from organised crime and terrorism, dealing with migration movements is today one of the main challenges facing us [Austria and the EU] in terms of security’ (EU Presidency 2006). Such developments have prompted numerous research projects from scholars and non-governmental organisations (NGO) on the subject of migration flows and the threat they pose to Europe. Such developments have also largely influenced national and EU policies in regards to asylum and migration flows across Europe (Leonard 2007: 5).

In the case of NATO, they have been attempting to deal with this instability for many years. NATO pledged to cope with irregular migration flows in and across the Mediterranean Sea with the involvement of NATO naval forces since 2002. NATO’s Mediterranean fleet was deployed to the eastern Mediterranean under OAE in 2002. As discussed above, OAE primarily fulfills its purpose to combat terrorism at sea. Nevertheless, while conducting counter-terrorist operations, NATO naval forces have also pursued the important mission to tackle irregular migration and trafficking of people in the Mediterranean Sea. In 2016, NATO demonstrated its readiness for joint operations with the EU if asked to help with the rising problem of irregular migration in the area. Despite the lack of operations conducted by the NATO to address the challenge of irregular migration in the Mediterranean it represents an acknowledgment that NATO is now ready to actively contribute to deter irregular migration and human smuggling in the Mediterranean Sea.

This chapter analyses the development and evolution of the EU and NATO operations that engage with the migration crisis and human trafficking in

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the Mediterranean Sea. The analysis is threefold. First, this chapter examines the overview of irregular migration in the Mediterranean Sea in detail. The movement of irregular migration in the Mediterranean Sea is described from a historical and contemporary perspective. It provides a narrative of the migration and trafficking of people in Europe. The section examines closely the pattern or recent trends of migration flows in the Mediterranean. The second part concentrates on the evolution of operations and initiatives implemented by the EU to tackle the issue of irregular migration and human trafficking in the Mediterranean Sea. This section will scrutinise varied EU operations at sea which demonstrate the spread of security community practices, in particular, cooperative security, development in partnerships creation and advancement in military engagement. This includes joint operations at sea under the aegis of Frontex and Operation Sophia to disrupt smugglers’ business model. In the latter section, accordingly, I will discuss the main features of NATO enforcement and the breadth of their measures to tackle the migration crisis and to combatting human trafficking, particularly through the implementation of surveillance activities and capacity building. The analysis demonstrates that practicing cooperative security as crisis management helps to promote the development of security community building in the Mediterranean. It implies a means for NATO to engage member states and also non-members in cooperative security practices.

6.2 Irregular Migration in the Mediterranean Sea

A major humanitarian and security challenge for the Mediterranean region is the movement of people (Boyer 2007: 78). Over the past decade, the Mediterranean Sea has become a hotbed for irregular immigration particularly from the African continent toward Europe. In recent years, irregular migration in the Mediterranean Sea has been Europe’s greatest challenge and regarded as the largest migrant movements across Europe since the Second World War (McNerney et al 2017: 5) The major transit routes in the Mediterranean Sea include the Strait of Gibraltar (through the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla), from the Canary Islands, from Libya and Tunisia (via island of Lampedusa), and across the Adriatic from Greece (Andersson 2016a: 1057; Boyer 2007: 78). In 2015, the Greek islands of
Lesbos, Chios and Samos have been the top receiving shores for migrants primarily from Syria. In April 2015, almost 400 migrants drowned after their boat capsized in the Mediterranean Sea. The boat was loaded with about 550 people from Syria making their way to the island of Lampedusa (The Guardian 2015b). Following the incident, the issue of migrants at sea once again made headlines across the world when over 700 migrants were feared dead following a series of shipwrecks in the Mediterranean Sea (The Guardian 2015a). This issue is not something new, rather it has been a long-established challenge faced by European countries.

There are three main patterns or trends of migration routes in the Mediterranean Sea. Firstly, the most common and current trend of migration flows is the Eastern Mediterranean route, consists of south-north movements mainly from North African countries to southern European countries, primarily Italy, Greece and Turkey. The migrants that arrive via this route are primarily departed from countries of origin such as Syria, Afghanistan and Somalia (Frontex 2016a). The second pattern through Western Mediterranean routes originally involve migrant movements from Morocco and Algeria to Spain, particularly via Melilla and Ceuta. However, with the increasing instability and conflicts in sub-Saharan countries in recent years, the number of migrants departing from countries such as Syria, Nigeria, Sudan, South Sudan, Mali, Chad and the Central African Republic has exponentially increased. In 2015, migrants from Syria recorded the highest number to reach Europe through this particular route (Frontex 2016d). Meanwhile, the third route of migration movement is via the Central Mediterranean routes. The popular destination countries for this route are Italy and Malta, where the migrants originally coming from Libya, Syria, Tunisia, Somalia, Nigeria, Eritrea, Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana, among others. In 2014 alone, more than 170,000 migrants arrived in the island of Lampedusa which is believed to have a link with the political unrest in Libya and civil war in Syria (IOM 2015b). The majority of these irregular migrants arriving in Italy are known as ‘economic migrants’, in this case they come to Europe to seek a better life and job opportunities. By contrast, irregular migrants from Eritrea arriving in Italy are

\[111\] Interview with Ewa Moncure, 15 July 2016, Warsaw.
primarily categorized as asylum seekers, that have fled their country to seek protection from the oppressive regime.\textsuperscript{112} As one interviewee at Frontex asserts:

> The majority of migrants coming to Italy, 95\% of them are Africans. Majority of them we called as economic migrants. But we also have asylum seekers primarily from Eritrea, which known with very repressive regime and also not a big country. For years so many Eritreans left Eritrea and seek asylum in Europe, which around 25\% or 30\% is asylum seekers.

\textsuperscript{(Interview No. 3, Spokesperson of Frontex)}

The arrival of migrants via Central Mediterranean and Eastern Mediterranean routes dramatically increased in 2014, rising by more than 300\% compared to the previous year. Nevertheless, 2015 marked the significant changes in migration phenomena. The deadliest shipwrecks accidents were reported in the Mediterranean Sea involved hundreds of thousand immigrants. The number of arrivals for irregular migrants particularly via Eastern Mediterranean routes showed a sharp increase compared to the previous year, which accumulated around some 885, 386 (Frontex 2016a). The graph below illustrates the patterns of migrant flows for aforementioned routes in the Mediterranean Sea from 2008 until 2016 respectively.

\textsuperscript{112} Interview with Ewa Moncure, 15 July 2016, Warsaw.
Since 2002, a great number of migrants predominately from the Horn of Africa dominated the irregular migrant movement across the Mediterranean Sea trying to enter Europe (Calleya 2012: 85). Among these, the Libyan coast has recently been the main transit route from which the migrants departed toward the European coast, particularly Italy and Spain (Delicato 2010: 1). Illegal movement of people across the Mediterranean Sea toward Europe has been greatly facilitated by the geography factor between North Africa and the Europe. In most cases, irregular migrants flee their homes driven by numbers of factors, mainly as a result of conflict and political instability, as well as severely poor economic situation. Mediterranean Sea provides a gateway for irregular migrants from Maghreb, North Africa and Middle East to the Europe in which Greece, Italy and Spain as the main destination countries. Greece has been the main destination country for irregular migrants since 2000 with approximately three million of them recorded to arrived illegally in Greece (Giuliani 2015: 1). The number of irregular migrants crossing the Aegean Sea has dramatically increased each year where more than 10,445 irregular migrants reportedly arrived in early 2015 (Giuliani 2015: 1). A substantial number of irregular migrants have also been
recorded travelling via Turkey through the archipelago of islands in Greece to reach Europe by sea. Various islands mainly in eastern Greece provide the main departure point for irregular migrants to the smugglers’ ships that help the to cross the sea to the Europe (Giuliani 2015: 1).

Besides Greece, Italy also provides an opportunity to enter Europe for irregular migrants from North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and Indian sub-continent in particular to the Sicilian coasts. In 2008, almost 35,000 migrants arrived at the Sicilian coasts alone (Delicato 2010b: 3). The number, however, has dramatically decreased the year later when just 6,588 persons arrived in Sicily as a result of strengthened border controls implemented by Frontex (Delicato 2010b: 3). Main routes toward Italy that are commonly used by the irregular migrants include that from Libya to the Sicilian coasts, from Tunisia to Sicily and from Algeria to Sardinia (Delicato 2010b: 3). The number of migration flows however showed a sharp increase in 2013 as a result of regional instability resulting from the Arab revolts. In 2013, more than 500 people reportedly drowned off the Italian island of Lampedusa trying to reach Europe from North African coast (Amnesty UK 2015). The incident was a wakeup call to Italy about the needs to strengthen their border controls to restrict the access of migrants to their country as well as to take various measures in a bid to curb the influx of migrants flow. As a result, the Italian government launched Italian Navy-led operation Mare Nostrum on 18th October 2013 after the humanitarian tragedies off the Italian island of Lampedusa (Gour 2015: 6). The main task of this operation was to combat illegal activities including trafficking, but more importantly focus on search and rescue activities in the Strait of Sicily (Mungianu 2016: 199). During one year of its operation, 421 operations were conducted and some 150,810 migrants were rescued in its operational area (Mungianu 2016: 199). The Mare Nostrum was halted in October 2014 and later replaced by Frontex’s Joint Operation Triton.

Between January to September 2014, a total of 134, 272 irregular migrants reportedly crossed Italian coasts, mainly from Libya and Syria trying to flee the instability and violence in their home country (Giuliani 2015: 1). In the same year, the number of shipwrecks laid at nearly 700 resulted to 3,500 people drowned
from the incidents trying to cross the sea and more than 200,000 migrants were rescued over the same period (BBC 2015). The situation has urged Italy to declare irregular migration as a threat to the entire EU due to the fact that irregular migration not only raises economic concerns but also poses a potential security threat in terms of terrorist and criminal infiltration to the whole Europe (EUrActiv 2015).

In the Western Mediterranean, Spain has been the primary destination country for irregular migrants, mainly from struggling African countries such as Mali. Since 1995, irregular migrant flows via Ceuta and Melilla have become a crucial issue for Spain (Andersson 2016a: 1057). Irregular migrants trying to reach Ceuta and Melilla via the Strait of Gibraltar due to the fact that the strait is geographically strategic for boat people. Portugal, Senegal, Sahara and Morocco are also facing the same pressure from the migration flows, given the fact that the narrow Strait of Gibraltar offers a good opportunity for small boats or ships carrying irregular migrants to reach Europe. Nevertheless, intensified controls enforced on shore especially in Ceuta and Melilla has contributed in decline of migrants’ number crossing Straits of Gibraltar (Germond and Grove 2010: 15). In addition, with the agreements made between these countries to tackle and counter trafficking networks, the number of irregular migrant arrivals in the area remained at a relatively low number (Giuliani 2015: 1). The increased number of irregular migrants trying to reach Europe via the sea has also lead to the proliferation of the trafficking networks (Lutterbeck 2006: 74). Mediterranean Sea is mainly controlled by trafficking networks that make business by smuggling irregular migrants fleeing violence and conflict in their country to the Europe. Each year, thousands of vessels smuggle irregular migrants across the Mediterranean toward Europe with highly paid fees ranging from two and six thousand euros (Boyer 2007: 78). The irregular migrants are smuggled across the Mediterranean Sea in the overloaded poor quality boats that result in hundreds of migrant deaths every year as a consequence of the shipwrecking and accidents at sea. With the EU’s active border controls in the Mediterranean Sea, a total of 2,641 smugglers have been successfully arrested in 2014 (Giuliani 2015: 1). It has also led to a remarkable number of rescues from the shipwrecks carrying irregular migrants of
over 40,000 in 2014 (Giuliani 2015: 1).

In the recent years, Mediterranean Sea has witnessed significant numbers of accidents and shipwrecks involving the irregular migrants and refugees trying to reach Europe by sea. In April 2015, the deadliest shipwreck accident in the Mediterranean Sea took place in which more than 800 people lost their lives at sea en-route to Europe (Amnesty UK 2015). The shipwrecks and traffickers exploitation of migrants draws most of the attention particularly for EU and NATO. Even though a number of traffickers were successfully intercepted every year, the business of human trafficking remains precarious in the Mediterranean Sea and involves thousand of deaths every year. The continuous movement of migrants has also become a security challenge in the Mediterranean Sea and also a challenge for the EU’s countries to cope with the population of irregular migrants that has increased significantly over a very short time. This incident was therefore a wakeup call for the EU and NATO to play a more positive role to curb the problem of migration flows and also the issue arise from the traffickers of the migrants. To this end, the fight against migrant smuggling has been top of the political agenda for the EU in their policy to tackle irregular migrants at sea.

Irregular migration flows across sea primarily in the Central and Eastern Mediterranean Sea has recorded significantly increased numbers in recent years. In 2014, the flow of irregular migrants via the sea recorded a remarkable number beyond 220,000 migrants, which indicated the increase of 310% from the previous year (Frontex 2015a). In addition to the figures, it has been reported that around 3,000 migrants have lost their lives in the Mediterranean Sea while trying to cross the sea (UNCHR 2015). In the first half of 2015, the number of irregular migrants reaching Europe across the Mediterranean has reached above 103,000 (UNHCR, 2015). The majority of the migrants arrived in Italy with almost 54,000 of them, followed by 48,000 in Greece, 91 in Malta and 920 in Spain (UNHCR 2015). During the same period, 6000 migrants and refugees reported have been rescued in a major operation conducted by the Italian Coast Guard with the cooperation of Frontex and safely disembarked at the southern Italy (UNHCR 2015). Large numbers of the migrants and refugees are from Syria, Afghanistan,
Iraq and Eritrea who are fleeing violence, repression and economic hardships in their home country (McNerney et al 2017: 5).

In addition to Italy, Greece has also received the unprecedented inflows of migrants and refugees particularly in Aegean islands (Frontex 2016c). The number of migrants arrived in Greece up until September 2015 reached more than 710,000, within which the Syrian migrants remain the dominant nationality to have arrived in Greece (Frontex 2016c). Among the factors that contribute to the influx of migrants in Greece is geographic proximity to conflicting countries including Syria and Iraq. This geographic factor has facilitated the migrants’ crossing of the Mediterranean Sea to reach wealthy countries of Europe particularly Greece which provides a gateway and transit points for migrants (Dickinson 2017: 100). The total number of irregular migrants and refugees that arrived in both in Greece and Italy in 2015 has increased to 1.04 million, which was more than five times the number of the previous year (Frontex 2016c). Table 1 below illustrates the overall number of arrivals to Europe and deaths of migrants and refugees throughout 2015. Following the table below is the map of migratory routes in the Mediterranean Sea for said year. The map clearly shows that Greece, Italy and Spain remained were the top receiving countries for migrants in 2015, whereas Malta has gradually become a popular destination country for migrants, with the numbers of arrivals increasing year on year.
### Table 1: Arrivals by sea and deaths in the Mediterranean Sea (2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Arrival</th>
<th>Arrivals</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>853,650</td>
<td>806 (Eastern Mediterranean route)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>269</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>153,842</td>
<td>2892 (Central Mediterranean Route)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>106</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>3845</td>
<td>72 (Western Mediterranean and Western African routes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Estimated Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,011,712</strong></td>
<td><strong>3770</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: International Organization for Migration (2016)

### Map 1: Mediterranean Migration Routes 2015

The number of arrival of irregular migrants and refugees has steadily increased every year. The first quarter of 2016 shows that a remarkable number of migrants and refugees arrived in the two top countries, Greece and Italy with around 68,778 and 5,898 respectively (IOM 2016b). The number has grown rapidly in the following months due to good weather and continued flows of migrants from Libya (Frontex 2016c). By the end of 2016, some 363, 348 migrant arrivals were reported in the main destination countries, including Greece, Italy, Cyprus and Spain. Table 2 below illustrates the number of arrivals and deaths of migrants trying to reach Europe from January until December 2016 according to the yearly report by IOM. Following the table, the figure illustrates the dominant nationalities for migrants arriving in Europe in 2016, in which Syria remained as the dominant nationalities, this continues a pattern from the previous year with 47% of the total numbers. The map of migratory routes in the year 2016 also demonstrates that there is no significant changes in migration routes from 2015, by which Greece, Italy and Spain remain primary destinations countries for irregular migrants in 2016.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Arrivals</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>181,436</td>
<td>4576 (Central Mediterranean route)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>173,561</td>
<td>434 (Eastern Mediterranean route)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>8162</td>
<td>69 (Western Mediterranean route)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>363,348</strong></td>
<td><strong>5079</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2: Main countries of origin for migrants arrivals in 2016

Source: International Organization for Migration (2016)

Map 2: Mediterranean Migration Routes 2016

Source: International Organization for Migration (2016)
In response to the growing migrant crisis in the Mediterranean Sea, the EU established a number of significant naval mission and operations. Those operations and naval mission aimed to enhance and strengthen the border control off Europe’s shores as well as to disrupt the traffickers’ business of smuggling irregular migrants across the Mediterranean Sea. EU also aimed to strengthen its search and rescue to save the lives of irregular migrants at sea from any shipwrecking and accidents. To this end, the EU is working on the EU Action Plan Against Migrant Smuggling, with a focus to enhance prevention measures and restrain the influx of trafficking networks (European Commission 2015a). The Action Plan aspired to strengthen cooperation with both origin and destination countries, enhance intelligence sharing, investigation capacities and reinforced legal frameworks in order to counter the trafficking networks.\(^\text{113}\) The next section discusses in detail the operations at sea implemented by the EU to tackle irregular migration in the Mediterranean Sea.

### 6.3 EU Counter-Migration Operation in the Mediterranean Sea

Irregular migration flows have become a security concern in the Europe, which has led to various measures and initiatives by the European countries designed to strengthen border controls and restrict access to irregular migrants. In the last few years, the EU has developed a number of operational initiatives and naval missions aimed to tackle the influx of migration flows at sea. One of the remarkable initiatives is the establishment of the European agency, Frontex in May 2005, which is responsible for coordinating cooperation at the external borders of the EU member states. Frontex has long established before the migration crisis of the Mediterranean in 2015, however after the crisis started the roles of Frontex have become intensified than it has before. Within Frontex itself, several joint operations were conducted such as Hera, Nautilus and Triton. These joint operations are focused primarily in the Central Mediterranean and designed to support member states struggling with the influx of irregular migrations’

arrivals in their territories. In addition, EU also introduced its surveillance system called EUROSUR in 2013 to improve situational awareness and to save live at sea. In 2015, another operation took place in the Mediterranean Sea, EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia pledged to fight against human traffickers at sea. This section discuss how EU efforts to tackle irregular migration have generated numbers of significant operations in the Mediterranean Sea and how it has helped to decrease the number of irregular migrants’ arrival to Europe. This section provides some critical discussions about the nature and specific tasks of Frontex such as those related to joint operations and its surveillance system, as well as the naval mission conducted through EUNAVFOR Med to ensure the protection of lives at sea.

6.3.1 European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex)

European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (hereinafter Frontex) was established on 1 May 2005 with the principal purpose to ‘improve the integrated management of the external borders of the Member States of the European Union’. In addition, it also aims to improve coordination and cooperation in managing border control capabilities amongst the member states, be it at sea, land or air borders (Gour 2015: 5). The responsibility for external borders of the EU always remains with the member states and Frontex was created to support the member states. Frontex provides assistance for member states particularly related to technical and operational issues in managing the EU’s external borders (Trevisanut 2016: 216). Elaborating the main task of Frontex, an official from Frontex pointed out their responsibilities below:

Frontex is a mechanism that was created when the member states were facing pressure at the external borders. They can be helped by the

115 Interview with Ewa Moncure, 15 July 2016, Warsaw.
deployment of border guards and equipment from another country. But the responsibility for the borders will still remain and a responsibility of the member states. We are a border agency, and when we deploy, we deploy for border control purposes. So with maritime operations, we deploy vessels, we deploy helicopters that support the maritime assets of the member states in their border control efforts. The first priority and responsibility for everybody at sea, be it coastguard, Frontex, leisure boat, fishing boat, or tankers is to give help to those who are in stress at sea.

(Interview No. 3, Spokesperson of Frontex).

Frontex has its headquarters in Warsaw and became operational in 2005. The headquarters serves as the administration office, responsible for risk analysis and provides a centre for all the reports and information reported by member states. Here they are validated and can be distributed for further action.\textsuperscript{116} Cooperation between the EU member states in regards to the external control of borders has been established since 1985 with the development of Schengen Agreement. Originally, the agreement was only signed by five member states; France, Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands agreed to abolish internal border checks.\textsuperscript{117} The Schengen Area promotes the idea of free movements between these EU countries for their citizens.\textsuperscript{118} This so called ‘Schengen acquis’ was incorporated into the EU frameworks on 1 May 1999, following the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty (Leonard 2010: 233). The Schengen Area gradually expanded to nearly every member state and to date, 26 European countries (of which 22 are EU states) are part of this agreement.\textsuperscript{119}

\textsuperscript{116} Interview with Ewa Moncure, 15 July 2016, Warsaw.
\textsuperscript{119} European Commission, Europe Without Borders: The Schengen Area, 2014, pp.4.
United Kingdom and Ireland however opted to be excluded from this agreement. The Schengen agreement also adopted an essential framework including increased police and judicial cooperation among member states to preserve and guarantee security within the Schengen area.\(^\text{120}\)

Map 3: Schengen Area (as of 2013)

Frontex was established to reinforce cooperation regarding the control of the external borders among the member states. The efforts to strengthen border

\(^{120}\) European Commission, The Schengen Area and Cooperation, August 2009, pp.1.
controls are mostly driven by the desire to restrict the access of migrants and asylum seekers to their territory (Leonard 2010: 234). In addition, this effort also signifies a contribution in the fight against terrorism particularly after the 9/11 attacks (Argomaniz 2011: 48). In order to regulate Frontex, there are several EU legal frameworks used to govern it, including the Schengen Borders Code. The Schengen Borders Code, was established in 2006 and intended to improve the legislative part of the integrated border management of the EU policy. It set out the rules on the control of persons crossing EU external borders and on the temporary reintroduction of border controls at internal borders. The Schengen Borders Code emphasises that effective border control is paramount in helping combatting irregular migration and human smuggling. In 2010, the EU Council approved Decision No. 2010/252 to supplement this Code with external border surveillance within the range of Frontex’s operational cooperation (Di Filippo 2013: 60).

Frontex was created as a result of a visible relationship between migration and borders, as well as security and terrorism. On 20 September 2001, the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council called ‘the Commission to examine urgently the relationship between safeguarding internal security and complying with international protection obligations and instruments (Council of the European Union, 2001). The call has put forward the idea of a clear relationship between migration and asylum with security. It reiterated the assumption that the failure to control undocumented migration flows has affected the security of the states and therefore increased the risk of terrorism (Neal 2009: 339). To this end, Frontex introduced the idea to implement the concept of ‘integrated border management’, which places an emphasis on coordination between all public authorities of the

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member states, particularly related to border surveillance, including border checks and risk analysis at the borders (Leonard 2010: 234).

Frontex highlights six main tasks of its operation in strengthening external border controls; (1) to coordinate operational cooperation between member states in external borders management; (2) to assist member states with the training of national border guards, including the establishment of common training standards; (3) to carry out risk analysis; (4) to follow up on the development of research relevant for the control and surveillance of external borders; (5) to provide assistance for member states requiring technical equipment and operational assistance for border surveillance; and (6) supporting member states in organising joint return operations (EU, 2004).124 In the early stages of the establishment of Frontex, it promoted a pilot project initiating a network of national contact points among member states to assist in surveillance of the external maritime borders in the Mediterranean (Rijpma and Vermeulen 2015: 457). The next section discusses the core tasks of Frontex to fulfill its mandate to improve the integration of external border control of the EU member states.

• Operational coordination between member states

The first task of Frontex is to coordinate operational cooperation amongst member states in managing external borders. This requires the agency to bring together technical equipment and capacities from member states, as well as border forces to incorporate into one unit to implement border controls in its territory. This task required Frontex to coordinate all joint operations at air, sea and land external borders as proposed by the member states or by the agency itself.125 The Agency should also evaluate the success of the joint operations, and has the authority to restructure the operations in order to improve the efficiency of the future

operations. In order to assist with the deployment of technical equipment from various member states, the database to manage the operation of Frontex called the ‘Central Record of Available Technical Equipment’ (CRATE) was introduced in 2007 (Frontex 2010). This database provides information on the technical equipment available to identify and organise equipment of surveillance that are available to use for operations upon the request of Frontex for a certain period of time. Member states are required to provide data on the types of technical equipment they possess, different profiles of experts include document experts, surveillance experts, medical team, maritime experts, briefers, screeners, and border guards, among others that might be available for the operations. One of the interviewees at Frontex explained in greater detail the scope of CRATE and its functions, as further epitomised below:

We have a database where we ask member states to enter the types of technical equipment that might be available for our operations. So we know how many people or different profiles that are available. There is a very clear define requirement that everybody needs to speak English, they have to have the expertise in a certain area for technical equipment. There are also requirement in terms of inter-operability. This means that they can talk to each other, they have to have a system that is compatible. During deployment it is a very important factor.

(Interview No.3, Spokesperson of Frontex).

In summary, CRATE was purportedly aimed to foster the implementation of ‘burden sharing’ between member states and to enhance the efficacy of operations at external borders by providing an early overview of the assets availability by the

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127 Central record of Available Technical Equipment (CRATE) is a record that lists items of surveillance and control equipment that member states are willing to put at the disposal of another member states for a temporary period of time. At the beginning of 2010, the CRATE comprised of 26 helicopters, 113 vessels, 22 fixed wing aircrafts and 476 other items such as vehicles, mobile radar units, thermal cameras, and mobile detectors (European Commission, 13 February 2008).


129 Interview with Ewa Moncure, 15 July 2016, Warsaw.
member states to support operations at sea (Leonard 2010: 239).

Frontex had also established a Frontex Situation Centre (FSC), located at its Warsaw headquarters, which is principally responsible for acting as a crisis centre and mechanism for emergency response (Argomaniz 2011: 49). The FSC is a centre where all the information received regarding the operations from different parts of the external borders will be visualised and validated. The FSC is responsible for verifying the number of incidents that take place at sea with the number of people involved before compiling all the information together to be shared with all the participating member states.\textsuperscript{130} Even though the FSC serves as a crisis centre that is responsible for distributing information with all the member states after being validated, however, operations at sea are still coordinated locally by member states. Every operation is conducted according to an operation plan, which defines the scope of the operation, the aim of the operation, the operational area and the duration of operation.\textsuperscript{131} In the case of Greece for example, the coordination centre is located in Piraeus where there is a liaison officer together with Hellenic coast guard, Hellenic police and all the national officers of Greece.\textsuperscript{132} In another case, for example if Norwegian boats are deployed at the island of Lesbos for search and rescue activities, on every boat there will be a Greek officer on board for coordination and decision making purposes.

Another vital framework created to strengthen the management of external borders within Frontex is the Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABITs). RABITs were introduced in 2007 and it offers assistance by specially trained experts from member states who can be deployed by Frontex should any of the EU state’s national border guards need assistance in urgent crises on a temporary basis (Argomaniz 2011: 49; Trevisanut 2016: 222). RABIT operations are implemented in accordance with the principle of ‘compulsory solidarity’ which in this context is defined as a requirement for the member states to ensure its border guards are available for a RABIT deployment if requested by the Agency, ‘unless there is an exceptional situation affecting the discharge of national tasks’

\textsuperscript{130} Interview with Ewa Moncure, 15 July 2016, Warsaw.
\textsuperscript{131} Interview with Ewa Moncure, 15 July 2016, Warsaw.
\textsuperscript{132} Interview with Ewa Moncure, 15 July 2016, Warsaw.
RABIT is a Joint Operation that is deployed overnight to address immediate crises at the member states’ external borders.134 In previous years, Frontex has needed to send a request to the member states every time there is a crisis situation that requires immediate asset deployment at the external borders. However, Frontex currently has a pool of 1,500 officers from all member states that are available for immediate deployment as part of a RABIT. The 1,500 officers are ready to use by Frontex at all times during crisis situations and will take three to five days to be deployed to the operation area.135 In addition, a significant number of RABIT exercises were conducted by Frontex in particular training sessions relating to the operational cooperation. These training activities aim to increase the competence of national border guards as well as to develop common standards to be implemented during joint operations (Leonard 2010: 241).

- Training and exercises

The second task of Frontex is to assist member states with the training of national border guards across Europe, including the establishment of common training standards. Under this task, Frontex is required to provide assistance for national border guards particularly when dealing with unforeseen circumstances such as mass illegal border crossing. For example in 2014, the highest number of illegal border crossing was recorded in the Mediterranean Sea since Frontex was established. The remarkable number of irregular migrant arrivals particularly in the Central Mediterranean has urged Frontex to increase its operational activity with the national border guards to curb the rising tide of migrants. To this end, Frontex launched Joint Operation Triton with 18 member states to help Italy, which received the largest number of irregular migrants during that period of time. JO Triton aims to improve border control through joint patrols using the assets provided by the participating member states.136 Other training programmes include a specialized training regime for border guards in the use of night vision

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133 See also Regulation 863/2007 of Frontex Regulation Article 4 (3).
134 Interview with Ewa Moncure, 15 July 2016, Warsaw.
135 Interview with Ewa Moncure, 15 July 2016, Warsaw.
goggles during nighttime helicopter patrols. Another training programme conducted by Frontex is the VEGA children, in which training focuses on providing border guards with the best practices to identify potential victims of trafficking of children at the airport. In addition, Frontex also expanded the range of training for member states particularly in the area of border control. The interviewee point out the available training tailored for member states as follows:

We created several years ago what we called Core Common Curriculum for border guards across the EU. We call it Border Guard Basic Training (CCC BASIC) and it was introduced in 2008. The requirements- because we have the common border, are that our border guards have to be trained in the same way to have common standards. Now we have taken it a couple steps up, where you can actually have sectorial qualification in border guarding. We created a Masters programme for border guards across Europe and an international Masters. So it is an opportunity to create highly qualified border guards with a European profile to understand how borders are managed.

(Interview No. 3, Spokesperson of Frontex).

The training for border guards encompasses four main pillars, including a general part and different modules of air, land and sea border operations (Frontex 2008a).

- **Conducting risk analysis**

The third task of Frontex is to conduct risk analysis. Risk analysis is one of the key tasks in Frontex which covers all external borders of the EU member states and tailors reports based on an analysis of situational changes, potential risks or other possible threats on the security of the EU’s external borders (Argomaniz 2011: 49). Frontex analyses various potential threats to EU borders including the evolution of irregular migrations and the proliferation of human smuggling into its territory (Leonard 2010: 242). These risk assessments lead to operational recommendations and provide a basis for a strategic work plan between member

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137 Interview with Ewa Moncure, 15 July 2016, Warsaw.
states before being implemented in the joint operations (Argomaniz 2011: 49). Within Frontex, the Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN) was introduced in 2006 to be a platform of information and intelligence exchange between member states (Andersson 2016a: 1061). This may help to increase knowledge and prepare the member states with better operational activities to address the situational risk faced by the EU.138 For instance, cooperation between Frontex and its partners under the Western Balkans Risk Analysis Network (WB-RAN) is seen as a benchmark for the beginning of cooperation between Frontex and its Balkan neighbours in assessing the risk of irregular migrations in that area.139 Additionally, Frontex also cooperate closely with other third countries such as Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus through the establishment of the Eastern European Borders Risk Analysis Network (EB-RAN) to improve situational awareness on external borders.140

- **Research development**

Another main task of Frontex is to follow up on developments in research relevant for external border controls and surveillance. Under this particular task, Frontex shall conduct additional training courses and seminars related to surveillance of external borders to member states and may also conduct training in their territories. In addition, any further development and progress in research related to surveillance of external borders shall be disseminated to other member states and the European Commission (Leonard 2010: 243).141

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• **Support to Member States Requiring Operational Assistance and Technical Equipment at External Borders**

The fifth task of Frontex is to provide support to member states that require technical and operational assistance during the surveillance at external borders. According to Article 8 in *Council Regulation of establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union*, any member states that require technical and operation assistance shall request it from the Agency. In return, the Agency shall provide the member states with support in terms of experts or technical equipment’s to facilitate member states conduction of border surveillance.\(^{142}\)

Under this mandate, Frontex is responsible to respond promptly when the member states required additional assistance during their operations at sea, including surveillance and search and rescue.\(^{143}\) In this situation, Frontex will deploy its assets and experts to the member states to assist with the control and surveillance of external borders in order to enhance the efficacy of their operations. Moreover, Frontex is responsible for coordinating the cooperation and operation between two or more member states at the external border to avoid any issues of overlap during the surveillance activities.\(^{144}\) In certain circumstances, Frontex is also ready to deploy their assets in order to provide assistance with search and rescue conducted by national authorities.\(^{145}\) In other ways, Frontex is responsible to provide technical equipment and operational assistance as well as prepared to deploy its assets in a situation where the member states need support at the external border during maritime operations and border surveillance.


\(^{145}\) Interview with Ewa Moncure, 15 July 2016, Warsaw.
• Joint return operations

The final task of Frontex is to provide assistance to member states for joint return operations. Within this task, the EU return policy aims to send the irregular migrants back to their country of origin or asylum seekers whose applications have been rejected by the EU member states (Leonard 2010: 245). Frontex may assist the member states through providing them with charter flights to carry irregular migrants back to their country of origin.146 Following the huge flow of migrants from Turkey to Greece since early 2016, an agreement was signed between the EU and Turkey on 18 March 2016 to halt irregular migration from Turkey to the EU. The agreement aims to address the enormous number of migrants travelling from Turkey to the Greek islands. The agreement is a bilateral readmission agreement, which serves as the basis for Greece to return to Turkey all the new irregular migrants who arrived in Greece after 20 March 2016.147 The agreement also stipulates that Turkey will take any measures to prevent any possibilities of sea or land routes that may be used by the irregular migrants from Turkey to the EU.148 As of September 2016, 460 migrants were returned to Turkey after arriving in Greece, primarily arrived from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, India and Africa.149

In sum, establishing stated tasks within Frontex is of critical importance and enable the agency to strengthen its surveillance and border control, as well as enhance coordination among the member states notably their assets deployments. Frontex proposes that improved maritime border surveillance and member states’ cooperation has led to an increase in the effectiveness in combatting people smuggling and preventing the loss of lives at sea during their perilous journey toward Europe (Gour 2016: 5). The next section will detail several lead joint operations at sea conducted within Frontex’s authority.

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147 Interview with Ewa Moncure, 15 July 2016, Warsaw.
149 Interview with Ewa Moncure, 15 July 2016, Warsaw.
Frontex Joint Operations at Sea

Since its establishment, Frontex has coordinated several joint operations at sea to provide assistance for the member states to strengthen their external borders and to engage with irregular migration crisis and human smuggling. These operations may take place on the high seas, in the territorial waters of the member states or within the territory of the third country (Trevisanut 2016: 231). The operations of external border surveillance need to be conducted according to the operational plan. The operational plan includes interception, rescue operations at sea and disembarkation (paragraph 17).

While most of the operations are particularly focused on the Central Mediterranean due to the huge numbers of migrants travelling between Italy and Malta, some other operations also take place in other parts of the Mediterranean Sea to assist with increasing numbers of migrants notably from sub-Saharan countries. The following are some of the vital operations at sea that have been conducted since 2006, the year Frontex became operational.

- **Joint Operation Hera**

Joint Operation Hera started on 17 July 2006 and lasted until 31 October 2006. This operation has been coordinated and co-financed by Frontex and initial divided into two phase that is Hera I and Hera II. Operation Hera was established to assist Spanish authorities that were struggling with the enormous numbers of migrants arriving on fishing boats to the Canary Islands from African coasts (Carrera 2007: 21; Baldaccini 2010: 239). The first phase of this operation involve experts from France, Italy, Portugal and Germany that assisted with the identification process of irregular migrants who arrived at the Canary Island without legal documents (Baldaccini 2010: 239). The experts also cooperate with the Spanish authorities to interview the migrants in regard to the process of crossing the sea and asking if the journey had been facilitated by any parties (presumably the trafficking

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networks) (Frontex 2006). With the information established from interviews, the top nationalities identified were migrants from Senegal, Gambia, and Ivory Coast (Frontex 2007a). The first phase recorded remarkable numbers of almost 19,000 migrants who were successfully identified by the experts together with the Spanish authorities and 6,076 migrants were sent back to their countries of origin (Baldaccini 2010: 239).

The second phase of this operation (Hera II) started on 11 August 2006 after Frontex received a request from Spanish authorities. This operation was carried out by Italy, Portugal and Finland. All three member states they offered their assets such as vessels and aircrafts to help Spanish authorities to patrol the coastal areas of Mauritania, Senegal, Cape Verde and Canary Islands (Frontex 2007a). During this operation, the main mission was to detect any boats or ships departing towards the Canary Island and to divert them back to the departure point (Frontex 2007a). More than 3,500 migrants were successfully intercepted close to the African coast during this operation and diverted to their countries (Frontex 2007a). This second phase finished on 15 December 2006, however due to the pressing situation of massive migration flows towards the Canary Islands, the operation was continued with the Operation Hera III.

A follow-up Operation Hera III started on 12 February 2007 and lasted for two months. During this operation, the number of migrants that arrived on the Canary Island was reported to be very low with only 585 migrants arriving during that time (Frontex 2007a), and a total of 1,167 of migrants were successfully diverted back to their origin departure points from West African coast (Baldaccini 2010: 240). Effectively, this operation aims to establish the identity of the migrants and to prevent the migrants from risking their lives with the long journey at sea with the aim to reduce the loss of human life (Frontex 2007a). The operation involved joint patrols by aerial and naval assets from several member states including France, Luxembourg, Italy and Spain along the coast of West Africa (Frontex 2007a). Operation Hera is so far the longest operation coordinated by Frontex, in which the operations are conducted in several phases throughout the year. During Operation Hera 2008 started from February to December 2008,
some 5,969 migrants were sent back to their countries and 360 individuals believed to be involved in facilitating the journey were arrested (Baldaccini 2010: 240). The migrants were dominantly from Mauritania, Senegal and Guinea. Operation Hera succeeded in preventing most migrant boats carrying clandestine migrants from West African coast to the Canary Islands and diverted them back to their countries of origin.

- **Joint Operation Nautilus**

In October 2006, Frontex launched Operation Nautilus, an operation focused in the Central Mediterranean designed to tackle the increased flow of irregular migration from Libya and the Tunisian coast to the island of Lampedusa, Pantelleria, Sicily and Malta (Ifantis 2014: 10). The first phase of Nautilus took place in June and July 2007 and ended in October 2007 with the aim to strengthen the border control in Central Mediterranean and to support Malta authorities with technical and operational assistance to deal with the influx of irregular migration in their territory (Frontex 2007b). The operation was hosted by Malta and Italy, in which every member state participated and assets from the member states were deployed for the operation. During this phase, the participating countries are Germany, Spain, Greece and France.

During the first phase 464 migrants were detected or intercepted and a total number of 166 migrants were rescued (Frontex 2007b). The main nationalities involved were migrants from Eritrea, Somalia, Ethiopia and Nigeria (Frontex 2007b). The other nationalities of the migrants for this route were also reported to be from Tunisia, Bangladesh and Ghana (Baldaccini 2010: 240). According to the Frontex Annual Report 2007, the total cost for operation Nautilus is 5,080,053.00 euros (Frontex 2007b). Initially, the operation was delayed and interrupted due to uncertainties over the effective roles of Libya to manage irregular migrants originating from their country (Calleya 2012: 89). However, Operation Nautilus has finally successful to launch its first operation after the agreement between Italy and Libya, in which Libya affirmed to clamped down as a transit point for the migrants (Calleya 2012: 89). The mission has also been strengthened with close cooperation between Italy and Libya focused on
coordinating the operational coordination at their external borders effectively (Rijpma and Vermeulen 2015: 456).

The first phase of operation Nautilus was regarded as a success with the remarkable decrease in the number of irregular migrants to Malta. Following the success, phase two was continued in May 2008 until October 2008, with Italy and Malta remaining as the host countries. Participating member states included Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal, Romania, Spain and United Kingdom (Frontex 2008b). The second phase of Nautilus aimed at coordinating risk analyses in managing external borders control based on operational cooperation between Member States. To achieve the mission, surface and air patrolling assets provided by the participating member states were coordinated to ensure that it worked effectively in the operation. The coordination effectively helped the member states to detect and intercept irregular migrants as well as traffickers responsible for organising the movement of the migrants via the sea (Frontex 2008b). The Nautilus 2008 operation cost the EU of around 6,818,134.50 euros (Frontex 2008b).

Operation Nautilus was continued from April 2009 until October 2009 with the total cost of 3,561,361 euros (Frontex 2009). Malta remained as a host country; meanwhile the member states that participated in this operation consisted of Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and Romania. Every member state deployed significant assets to support the operation. Nautilus 2009 was focused in Central Mediterranean with the objective of increasing the capacity for border surveillance by the cooperation of member states to detect and intercept irregular migrants flow trying to enter the Schengen area via boats from Libya (Frontex 2009). Following the operation, Frontex reported a decline in irregular border crossing in 2009 with 165,700 clandestine migrants were detected, a 22% decrease from the previous year (Ifantis 2014: 31).

Frontex experienced some limitation in its operation due to the fact that they had very limited access to the assets deployed in the operations. During Operation Nautilus 2007, Frontex only acquired two German helicopters, the occasional presence of Greek and Spanish vessels, and the Italian patrol aircraft
Another limitation faced by Frontex during its operation has been the lack of Libyan participation particularly in detecting the migrants upon their departure from Libyan coast (Calleya 2012: 89). It is vital to have more active participation from Libya as Libya is the main migration transit point between Africa and Europe across the Mediterranean Sea. Active participation and cooperation with Libya will greatly assist in decreasing the amount of migrant flows. Despite the lack of participation from Libya, Malta has been actively lobbying to strengthen Frontex contingency planning to tackle the mass migrant movements from Africa to Europe (Calleya 2012: 90). This is due to the fact that Malta has been receiving large numbers of irregular migrants and asylum seekers than any other European country in a very short period of time, forcing it to adopt an immediate approach to tackle the problem. In December 2007, Libya and Italy finally reached an agreement on joint maritime patrols between those two countries, whereby Italy offered its technical expertise and border control equipment to Libya (Calleya 2012: 90).

- **Joint Operation Triton**

Another Frontex operation is the Joint Operation Triton, which has been officially introduced in November 2014 to replace the previous Mare Nostrum Operation. In the beginning of the operation, the operational cost each month was 2.9 million euros, however the cost added up to 26.25 million euros for 2015 (Mungiany 2016: 200). JO Triton was designed initially to operate in its operational area not extending beyond 30 nautical miles from the Italian coast, however later extended to 138 nautical miles south of Sicily (Mungiany 2016: 200). JO Triton was set to focus in providing assistance and additional support to the member states in search and rescue activities in the Mediterranean Sea, particularly for Italian authorities as well as to provide support to manage their border surveillance. Such operation also focused on tackling the rising of irregular migration flows in the Central Mediterranean. During an interview with the official from operation Triton, Mr Florea Ganea explained the mandate of JO Triton as follows:

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151 Interview with Florea Ganea, 14 July 2016, Warsaw.
Triton operation is the biggest Frontex operation ever. We are monthly deployed in Italy with six big vessels with special so called operational vessels with huge vessels capacity to stay at up to seven bay ten bay, where they can do search and rescue activities. In addition, we also conduct a border surveillance which is our mandate. The mandate of Operation Triton is to provide additional supports to Italy when it comes to border surveillance. We help the boat to search and rescue, to implement this operational activity and coordinate surveillance to control this irregular immigrations towards the EU. But to tackle cross border crime that means to help border security to help with the operational cooperation. The most important is the contribution to search and rescue, exchange information between participants (we have 27 member states), to identify possible threats, establishment of structure and then training and so on.

(Interview No.2, Operational Manager of Joint Operation Triton).

Additionally, JO Triton also involved in second line of activity implemented within the ‘hotspot’ area. ‘Hotspot’ concept is a concept that was introduced by the European Commission on the agenda of migration in 2015 to provide support to member states that are grappling with this migration crisis. Mr Florea further explained the operational task of JO Triton in the ‘hotspot’ area particularly in aiding assistance for Italy as below:

Not only border surveillance but support for search and rescue, plus it is a second line activities dimension that we are doing in the hotspot, that is identification, fingerprint and document checks. In case of Italy, the hotspot is the embarkation area where migrants are being disembark and where we are doing the enforcement. All the EU agencies support the Italian authorities in their line of expertise. So Frontex is present in the hotspot to help with the identification of people with so called ‘screen activity’. Then we check document and we conduct fingerprint activities. And then Europol is helping the Italian authorities with this. So the

coordination tools of all these activities within the hotspot area which is called EURTF Catania, the European Union Regional Task Force of Catania are present to coordinate the experts and then to support Italian authorities from the frontline.

(Interview No.2, Operational Manager of Joint Operation Triton).

JO Triton has the primary mandate for border surveillance, nevertheless it also provides additional support for member states to tackle other cross-border crime as summarised by Mr Florea:

Not only this but also Triton is a multi-purpose operation, particularly when we come across or when we detected the smuggling of goods. So even though it’s not our mandate, but we are the enforcement agencies and we take action with national authorities cooperating. We have discovered lots of drugs especially hashish, human smuggling and illegal fishing activity that we report to our partners.

(Interview No.2, Operational Manager of Joint Operation Triton).

This operation cover the operational area includes territorial waters of Italy and also involved in SAR for Italy and Malta (Frontex 2014a). Frontex assisted the Italian authorities by collecting and providing crucial information about criminal networks operating in Libya particularly, as well as other transit countries. In addition to that, coastal patrol boats also used regularly to deal with small intervention and boarding of suspicious vessels at sea.

As mentioned above, the main mandate of JO Triton is to support Italian authorities with border surveillance and also to provide additional support in search and rescue activities in the Italian territorial waters. On one hand, search and rescue activities are the responsibility of the country in search and rescue area where the incidents occurred, which means coastal states and national authorities are always responsible for coordinating these activities. Frontex on the other hand is always prepared to deploy their assets to support the existing assets of coastal states who are in need of support. As in 2016, Frontex has the availability of
around 15 or 17 boats available to be deployed for search and rescue activities to support Italian authorities. In 2015, JO Triton recorded a remarkable achievement when it saved more than 3,000 migrants in the Mediterranean Sea during the search and rescue (Frontex 2015b). The migrants were departed mainly from Sub Saharan Africa towards Italy using the rubber inflatable boats that carried more than 100 people on board, which exposed them to the possibility of shipwrecks and drowning at sea.

In conclusion, Frontex was particularly designed to coordinate and integrate the EU member states’ national maritime patrol to address the issue of irregular migration. In addition, there are also a number of essential Frontex instruments used for border surveillance. The most important among these are the Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABIT, a pool of experts deployed in exceptional situations) and the Central Record of Available Technical Equipment (CRATE, a database of border surveillance equipment). With these two instruments, it has helped Frontex to effectively coordinate various equipment provided by the member states. Frontex has provided significant assistance to the member states in order to help them enhance their efficacy in managing and strengthening external control borders, and simultaneously help to sustain the security of Mediterranean Sea from the mass migration flows as well as proliferation of human smugglers at sea.

In addition to counter-migration operations, Frontex is also moving towards developing a multi-purpose operation. Although Frontex principally aims to tackle the migratory pressure, they will also extend the tasks to detect and intercept other potential crimes in the Mediterranean Sea, including terrorism. Frontex emphasised that all the information gathered with one asset will be used for different purposes including processing personal data such as names, vehicle identification numbers and phone numbers of suspected personnel that will later be reported to other EU agencies involved, such as Europol for further investigation. With access to the Schengen information system, visa

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153 Interview with Ewa Moncure, 15 July 2016, Warsaw.
154 Interview with Ewa Moncure, 15 July 2016, Warsaw.
155 Interview with Ewa Moncure, 15 July 2016, Warsaw.
information system and Europol database of stolen/lost documents, Frontex will
be able to analyse other potential crime at the border and simultaneously
contribute towards increasing the security at the EU external borders.

6.3.2 European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR)

Efficient border control is essential to prevent irregular migrants from entering
European countries. In order to tackle irregular migration and human trafficking, a
more effective protection of external borders is particularly required by the EU
and its member states. Consequently, the EU has introduced an effective and
integrated border management (IBM)\textsuperscript{156} as one of its policy priorities to increase
the security level at their borders. The concept of IBM is principally defined as a
‘national and international coordination and cooperation among all the relevant
authorities and agencies involved in border security and trade facilitation to
establish effective, efficient and integrated border management systems, in order
to reach the objective of open, but well controlled and secure borders’.\textsuperscript{157} IBM
emphasises that sufficient response to migration issue is paramount in order to
cope with this crisis effectively (Carrera 2007: 1).

As a result, the EU developed a surveillance system with the main goals of
coordinating better border management and to save lives at sea. The surveillance
system known as European Border Surveillance System (hereinafter EUROSUR)
was officially launched in December 2013 with the principal purpose to improve
cooperation between national guard forces and to simultaneously strengthen the
management of external border controls for member states (Rijpma and
Vermeulen 2015: 454). EUROSUR is related to the second task of Frontex as

\textsuperscript{156} JHA Council on 4-5 December 2006 has concluded that the conceptual framework of IBM is to
include the following dimensions: i) border control (checks and surveillance) including risk
analysis and crime intelligence; ii) detecting and investigating “cross-border crime” in cooperation
with all the relevant law enforcement authorities; iii) the four-tier/filter access in third countries of
origin or transit, cooperation with neighbouring countries, measures on border control at the
external borders and control measures within the common area of free movement; iv) inter-agency
cooperation in border management including border guards, customs and police, national security
and other relevant authorities; and v) coordination and coherence at the national and transnational
level (See Council of the European Union, Justice and Home Affairs, 2768\textsuperscript{th} Council Meeting,
Brussels, 4-5 December 2006, Press Release, 15801/06).

\textsuperscript{157} See European Commission, 2004, The Guidelines for Integrated Border Management in the
Western Balkans, Brussels, pp. 17.
mentioned before, which is to assist member states in national border guards including establishing common training standards.\textsuperscript{158} On the one hand, Frontex remains a central hub of the external border system, while EUROSUR on the other, is essentially an information-exchange and surveillance system focused on irregular migrations that provides immediate data for situational changes or risk at the external borders (Rijpma and Vermeulen 2015: 454; Andersson 2016b: 32).

EUROSUR became operational on the 2 December 2013. EUROSUR was established with the idea of addressing the challenges of cross-border crimes, irregular migration and to rescue migrants at sea. This includes the active involvement of the member states in maritime borders surveillance and information exchange (European Commission 2013a). Through information exchange and interagency cooperation between member states’ authorities and Frontex, the objectives of EUROSUR are threefold. First, EUROSUR aims to enhance the effectiveness in migration flows control and simultaneously to reduce the number of undetected irregular migrants entering Europe.\textsuperscript{159} EUROSUR provides the member states’ authorities with timely and relevant information allowing them to detect and intercept irregular migrants promptly before they enter Europe (Bellanova and Duez 2016: 28). Second, EUROSUR will protect and save lives at the external borders. This can be achieved with EUROSUR technology capacity, in which improve the competency to detect small boats in the open sea and simultaneously assists in search and rescue activities at sea (Rijpma and Vermeulen 2015: 459). Third, EUROSUR will prevent cross-border crime at the external borders by increasing the internal security of the EU (European Commission 2013a). In other ways, border surveillance is not only the prevention of illegal border crossings, but also includes other related cross-border crime such as terrorism, trafficking of people, narcotics smuggling and arms trafficking.

Under the EUROSUR mechanism, member states’ authorities involved in


border surveillance (border guards, coast guards, police, customs and navies) are encouraged to exchange information with neighbouring countries while conducting maritime surveillance (Article 20.1), while other related international organisations shall also provide relevant information to Frontex for border surveillance (Article 18.1).\textsuperscript{160} Surveillance for the external land and sea borders should include monitoring, detection, identification, tracking, prevention and interception of unauthorised border crossings (Article 2.1).\textsuperscript{161} This is perfectly in accordance with the purpose to prevent and combat irregular migration and cross border crime, to ensure more lives could be saved at sea. The use of the EUROSUR tools is strictly subject to the respect of fundamental rights and in compliance with the principle of non-refoulement (Article 2.4).\textsuperscript{162} The EUROSUR regulation emphasises several guidelines to ensure Frontex and the member states comply with those principles. These include prioritisation to the special needs of children, unaccompanied minors, victims of human trafficking, persons in need of urgent medical assistance, persons in need of international protection, persons in distress at sea and other persons in a particularly vulnerable situation (Article 2.4).\textsuperscript{163}

Under the EUROSUR mechanism, the vital component is the enforcement of border surveillance and its regulations are very much emphasised on the primary objective of saving lives at sea (Frontex 2013).\textsuperscript{164} According to the European Commission, EUROSUR is the new tool to save migrants’ lives and prevent cross border crime in the EU borders as follows:

EUROSUR will make an important contribution to saving lives of those who put themselves in danger to reach Europe’s shores. It will also equip the EU and its Member States with better tools to prevent cross-border crimes, such as trafficking in human beings or trafficking in drugs, while at the same time detect and provide assistance to small migrant boats in distress (European Commission 2013b).  

EUROSUR is designed to provide the member states with infrastructure and tools required to improve situational awareness and capacity to respond immediately at the external borders in order to detect, prevent and combat irregular migrations and cross-border crime. In order to strengthen the surveillance of border controls, EUROSUR delineates frameworks which will help the efficacy of border surveillance at sea. The framework consists of the following components: (1) national coordination centres; (2) national situational pictures; (3) a communication network; (4) a European situational picture; (5) a common pre-frontier intelligence picture; and (6) a common application of surveillance tools.  

The most important component of EUROSUR is the National Coordination Centres (NCCs). The main role of the NCC is to coordinate the border surveillance activities on a national level and operate as a hub for the information exchange among the member states (Article 5.1). NCCs consist of multiple entities from the member states involved, including border guards, (border) police, national guards, minister’s office, the coast guard and the armed forces (Carrera and Hertog 2015: 17). Principally regarded as the essence of EUROSUR, NCCs play an important role to ensure timely and relevant information between all national authorities for border surveillance to enable them

to take immediate action to deal mainly with search and rescue activities. In addition, NCCs establish and maintain the national ‘situational awareness’ as well as to ensure better management of resources and personnel for search and rescue activities (Article 5.3).

EUROSUR represents an ‘intelligence-driven approach’ for the border surveillance system which gathers ‘situational pictures’ of the external borders and as of the pre-frontier (Andersson 2016b: 33). EUROSUR is considered as a backbone of Frontex’s operations at sea (Bellanova and Duez 2016: 25). One of the examples of how EUROSUR acts as a surveillance tool is with the development of the Spain’s coastal radar system- *Spanish Sistema Integrado de Vigilancia Exterior* (SIVE) along the coast of Andalusia and later extended to Canary Islands (Andersson 2016b: 1059; Bellanova and Duez 2016: 28). The system is designed to monitor and control irregular migration flows at sea with mobile radars and sensors (Bellanova and Duez 2016: 28). According to Spanish navy guards, the system has successfully detected the movement of irregular migrants in the Straits of Gibraltar, and hence decreased the number of irregular migrants arriving in Spain (Bellanova and Duez 2016: 28). EUROSUR also has a capacity to detect the early movement of irregular migrants and their boats at sea, and therefore has contributed to the process of search and rescue effectively. It has also lead to a significant decrease in the number of shipwrecks, drowning and loss of life at sea (European Commission 2013b).

The EUROSUR framework outlines the three phases of its operational plan. The three phases are [i] upgrading and extending national border surveillance systems and interlinking national infrastructures in a communication network; [ii] developing and improving the performance of common tools and sensors for border surveillance; and [iii] to gather all relevant data from national surveillance, new surveillance tools, European and international reporting systems as well as intelligence sources to be shared between relevant national authorities

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169 Situational awareness measures how the authorities are capable of detecting cross-border movements and finding reasoned grounds for control measures (Commission of the European Communities, 2008).

During the first phase, the surveillance systems of the member states shall be interlinked and streamlined (Rijpma and Vermeulen 2015: 460). In this process, NCCs as well as the national surveillance systems would be upgraded and Frontex plays an important role as an intelligence sharing and gathering hub. The next step under the first phase also involved supports to the third countries to develop their border surveillance infrastructure, to enhance their efficiency in migratory flows management (Commission of the European Communities 2008). This includes the setup of NCCs in the eight member states of the EU southern maritime borders in the Mediterranean Sea and the southern Atlantic Ocean. The second phase emphasises the development and improvement of surveillance tools and sensors for border surveillance at the EU level (Rijpma and Vermeulen 2015: 460). Satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) should be developed for deployment in the ‘pre-frontier’ areas such as the open sea and third country territories. The third phase aims at creating a common information sharing environment for the EU maritime domain. To develop such a system, all related reports and data of traffic monitoring and activities at sea will be gathered and disseminated between national authorities. The first step of such integration however is limited to the Mediterranean Sea, the southern Atlantic Ocean (Canary Islands) and the Black Sea.

In conclusion, the EUROSUR framework has resulted a good outcome in detecting irregular migrants in Spain coastal area. With the modern technology of radar and sensors used by EUROSUR, it will help if the surveillance system can also cover the whole Mediterranean Sea. Although the number of fatalities remain high, the EUROSUR framework has demonstrated that it could potentially

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171 Portugal, Spain, France, Malta, Italy, Slovenia, Greece, Cyprus (See Commission of the European Communities, 2008, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Examining the creation of a European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR), Brussels, 13 February 2008.


assisted to save more lives at sea in the future.

6.3.3 EUNAVFOR MED- Operation Sophia

Following the deadliest shipwreck incident off the Libyan coast in April 2015 which involved almost 800 deaths, the EU has immediately responded by setting up its naval mission called EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia (hereinafter Operation Sophia). The operation was established on 22 June 2015 and has a mandate of “identify, capture and dispose of vessels as well as enabling assets used or suspected of being used by migrant smugglers or traffickers, in order to contribute to wider EU efforts to disrupt the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean Sea” (EEAS, 2015). The mandate of Operation Sophia is further explained by one of the official at Eunavfor Med:

Our mandate is very clear and it is written in the council decision dated 18 May 2015. Undertake systematic efforts to identify, capture and dispose of vessels and enabling assets used or suspected of being used by migrant smugglers or traffickers, in order to contribute to wider EU efforts to disrupt the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Southern Central Mediterranean Sea. That is very clear. We have a strong valid mandate focus on the smugglers and traffickers, so the migrants are not our targets, but the traffickers and smugglers are our target. Of course, it is limited geographically because we can operate only in the southern central Mediterranean Sea, according to the mandate. There is only one mission focus on targeting the smugglers and traffickers-the only mission is Operation Sophia.

(Interview No. 4, Spokesperson and Chief of Media Cell Eunavfor Med)

Although the main mandate is to target human smugglers and traffickers, Operation Sophia also has a mandatory task and legal responsibility under international law to rescue people at sea and participate in search and rescue

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activities.\textsuperscript{175}

The operation became operational in one month after the decision made by the Council of European Union on 18 May 2016 to launch a military operation for the international law enforcement. This indicates an effective and solidarity of the EU member states to stop migration crisis and to fight against human smuggling and criminal networks at sea. On the 26 of June 2016, the first vessels began their operation in the Central Mediterranean. Operation Sophia focuses primarily to respond immediately for search and rescue, reduce the loss of life at sea, prevent the proliferation of human smugglers and ultimately disrupt the traffickers’ networks at sea.\textsuperscript{176} It also determine to address the root causes of irregular migrations with cooperation of countries of origin and transit, such as poverty, political unrest, and civil wars.

The operational headquarters of EUNAVFOR MED are located in Rome, Italy and the total personnel deployed for the operation, as to date, almost 1,300 people from 22 EU countries.\textsuperscript{177} The enforcement of EUNAVFOR MED demonstrates the EU’s commitment to fight against human traffickers at sea.\textsuperscript{178} The operation Commander for Operation Sophia is Rear Admiral Enrico Credendino and to date, the operation assets include seven ships (Italian light aircraft carrier, GARIBALDI serves as the task force’s flagships) and three air assets (Luxembourg, France, Spain).\textsuperscript{179} The direction of this operation is divided into several phases and liases closely with other partners, namely IOM, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and also its regional partners, the AU (Faleg and Blockmans 2015: 2). The first phase of this operation focuses on

\textsuperscript{175} Search and rescue at sea is an international obligation under the International Convention of Safety of Law at Sea (SOLAS) and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). All assets of Operation Sophia are prepared and equipped to perform search and rescue activities in the central Mediterranean, and believed to have achieved measurable results in saving lives at sea (House of Lords, 2016, \textit{Operation Sophia, the EU’s Naval Mission in the Mediterranean: An Impossible Challenge}).


\textsuperscript{179} Interview with Antonello de Renziz Sonnino, 9 August 2016, Rome.
surveillance and assessment of human trafficking as well as trafficking networks in the southern central Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{180} This phase is an intelligence phase in which Operation Sophia analyses the modus operandi of the smugglers network and simultaneously integrates their forces together ready for the operation.\textsuperscript{181} The second phase focuses on the search and seizure of suspicious vessels if necessary. The third phase pledges to dispose vessels and smugglers’ assets and ultimately seizes the smugglers in compliance with international law.\textsuperscript{182} The fourth phase is the completion of the operation and withdrawal of forces from the area of operation. The duration for the initial mandate is for one month and the cost is approximately 11.82 million euros. This operation renamed \textit{Operation Sophia} in September 2015.\textsuperscript{183}

The initial mandate for Operation Sophia is for one year involving three active phases. However, following the success of the operation, on 20 June 2016 the Council extended the operation until 27 July 2017 with two additional tasks supporting the core existing mandate. The two additional tasks introduced to reinforce the operation’s mandate are: i) training for the Libyan coastguards and navy; ii) contribute to the implementation of the UN arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya (European Council 2016).\textsuperscript{184} The training for the Libyan coastguards and navy focuses on the management and control of territorial waters, including training on the implementation of search and rescue activities, training on cooperation with the police activities, and finally training on the procedures to tackling the smugglers operating in the territorial waters.\textsuperscript{185} The training allows the Libyan coastguards and navy to become involved actively in their territorial waters; improve their capability to tackle the smuggling and trafficking in the Libyan shores (Libyan coastguards and navy have very limited

\textsuperscript{181} Interview with Antonello de Renziz Sonnino, 9 August 2016, Rome.
\textsuperscript{183} Council of the European Union, EUNAVFOR Med: EU agrees to start the active phase of the operation against human smugglers and to rename it "Operation Sophia", Press release, 28 September 2015.
\textsuperscript{185} Interview with Antonello de Renziz Sonnino, 9 August 2016, Rome.
capabilities and assets to operate at its territorial waters due to its civil war in 2011); as well as to improve the security of Libyan territorial waters from the threat of criminal networks.

The second additional task of Operation Sophia is to provide the Libyan authorities with information sharing and the implementation of the UN arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya in accordance to UN Security Council Resolution 2292 (European Council 2016).\textsuperscript{186} Operation Sophia is responsible for preliminary tasks including boarding vessels suspected of smuggling arms on the high seas and then diverting these vessels to another port of destination for further investigation by the national prosecutors.\textsuperscript{187} The request made by the Libyan authorities requesting for assistance in training demonstrates a promising future and stimulating the next step for better cooperation in the Mediterranean Sea.

The first phase of this operation took place from July until September 2015 and focused in the south west of the Mediterranean Sea as this region maintained the highest migration movement. This area is located between the Libyan towns of Zuwarah and Misrata, and the waters offshore towards the island of Lampedusa.\textsuperscript{188} During the first phase, the operation focused on developing understanding and awareness about the maritime traffic and merchants’ profiles in the area. In addition, the operational plan during this period also emphasised attaining information of the migration vessels’ flow, identifying the patterns of traffickers routes and analysing the operational structure of the smugglers networks.\textsuperscript{189} With this knowledge, the operational force of Operation Sophia has better understanding of the smugglers modus operandi at sea and their business models, which has greatly facilitated in reducing the number of human smuggling in the Mediterranean Sea, particularly from Libya. According to the six-month report of Operation Sophia, more than 3,000 migrants were successfully rescued

\textsuperscript{186} European Council, 2016. EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia: Mandate extended by one year, two new tasks added, Press Release, 20 June 2016.
\textsuperscript{187} Interview with Antonello de Renziz Sonnino, 9 August 2016, Rome.
by the end of the phase 1.190

The second phase (Phase 2A) entered into force in October 2015. This operation took place in the high sea particularly across the Lampedusa triangle in order to disrupt the smuggling and trafficking business model.191 In order to assist with the operation, various assets from member states were deployed including nine surface units, a submarine, five helicopters, three fixed wing maritime patrol aircraft and one tactical UAV.192 This phase coordinated all land, sea and air assets by providing the force with real time situation to enable them to respond immediately and effectively during interception at sea. With the military assets, Operation Sophia is able to monitor migrants movement efficiently and tracking the smugglers at sea. Any boats suspected of human smuggling will be monitored using the air assets and the materials, and subsequently evidence and facts concerning the smugglers will be sent to the prosecutor before the apprehension.193 In accordance to international law particularly Palermo Protocol 2000,194 it permits the assets to be coordinated effectively to board and arrest the suspicious vessel. During this second phase, Operation Sophia successfully rescued 8,336 migrants and diverted them to the nearest safe port.195 The second phase 2(B) extends the operation into territorial waters only when it fulfills the requirement of necessary conditions; i) invitation of the legitimate government of Libya (currently is GNA); ii) upon the release of applicable UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) authorise them to operate in the territorial waters; iii) consent from the Political Security Committee (PSC) thereby all 28 member states

193 Interview with Antonello de Renzis Sonnino, 9 August 2016, Rome.
194 Palermo Protocol 2000 is the protocol adopted by the United Nations to fight against transnational organised crime. The Convention is further supplemented by three Protocols which address specific areas of transnational organised crime: the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children; the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air; and the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition (UNODC, 2016).
approved the transition to the next phase. In other words, Operation Sophia requires political authority of all member states to transit to the next phase of operation.

During the first six months of its operation, Operation Sophia had its first transition of operations into the high seas. The operation consists of ships and air assets provided by the member states. During that period, 46 suspected smugglers were arrested and 67 boats used for smuggling were disposed. Following intense and continuous rescue operations by Operation Sophia, more than 2,000 lives were rescued in the central Mediterranean Sea, mostly migrants who tried to cross the sea using the rubber or wooden boats (EEAS 2016a). Operations conducted by the Operation Sophia are also assisted by Frontex joint operations at sea such as Operation Triton. With extensive assets including medical capabilities, high speed satellites data transmission and specific systems have enabled Operation Sophia to respond immediately in urgent situations at sea as well as help with humanitarian and disaster relief operations effectively (EEAS 2016a). Operation Sophia has shown significant success with the remarkable decline in numbers for migrant’s arrival from Libya from 1 January 2015 until the end of June 2015. Before Operation Sophia became operational, the migration flow was 50% from Libya and 50% from the Balkan route, however, in the second part of the year, the number declined to only 16% migrants arriving from Libya after Operation Sophia began its operation in the area.

In addition to naval operations and activities, Operation Sophia also committed to establish relations with main international and regional actors for information sharing purposes. Consequently, the Shared Awareness and De-confliction in the Mediterranean (SHADE-MED) was established on 26 November 2015. SHADE-MED provides a platform for interested nations and organisations engaged in maritime operations to coordinate and de-conflict their

196 Interview with Antonello de Renziz Sonnino, 9 August 2016, Rome.
198 Interview with Antonello de Renziz Sonnino, 9 August 2016, Rome.
activities.\textsuperscript{199} The seminar was attended by more than 80 representatives including the armed forces of the coastal states of the Mediterranean, United Nations (UN), the EU and other organisations that were directly involved with rescue operations pertaining to irregular migration across the Mediterranean Sea. This seminar was established to promote better understanding between different agencies involved in the Mediterranean Sea and to enhance interaction among them in relating to the cooperation mechanism for counter-migration and counter-trafficking.\textsuperscript{200}

The second meeting was hosted by the Italian Navy in Rome on 12 May 2016 where more than 140 representatives from 35 different countries were present.\textsuperscript{201} SHADE-MED is working towards arranging eight working groups, providing an opportunity for participants to exchange opinions and share information. These working groups include, i) operational working groups; ii) communications and information systems; iii) legal working groups (to propose best practices in countering smuggling activities at sea); iv) shipping working groups (discuss on issues to mitigate impact on shipping company); v) migration working groups (managing data related to the migration movements); vi) search and rescue working groups (to identify safe place for irregular migrants); vii) smugglers business model working groups (to discuss issues pertaining to smugglers business models structure and technical and tactical procedures (TTPs); and viii) effects on countering smugglers business model working group (EEAS 2016b). In addition, Operation Sophia also maintain good relations with other actors, including IOM, International Red Cross, UNHCR and NGOs such as Save the Children, among others. Operation Sophia signed the MoU procedure with Save the Children, in order to establish best principles of managing the migrants, notably the children.\textsuperscript{202} All the crew of Operation Sophia will receive training from the UNHCR and Save the Children before joining the forces to equip them with the best possible practices of migrant management.

\textsuperscript{201} Interview with Antonello de Renziz Sonnino, 9 August 2016, Rome.
\textsuperscript{202} Interview with Antonello de Renziz Sonnino, 9 August 2016, Rome.
While maintaining good relations with other organisations, Operation Sophia is always working closely with the EU agencies, such as Frontex. The cooperation with Frontex includes information exchange\textsuperscript{203}, mechanisms of communication, and the deployment of Frontex Liaison Officers within Operation Sophia structures and vice versa.\textsuperscript{204} This is to enable the coordination of their assets and personnel while operating at sea, particularly through Operation Triton by Frontex. Additionally, Operation Sophia also use Frontex’s experience and protocol as a major benchmark for their operation, for instance the mechanism and best practices to approach the migrants; as well as the procedures established with the Government of National Accord (GNA) of Libya. Furthermore, Operation Sophia is also dedicated to improve cooperation with other EU agencies, such as Eurojust and Europol particularly for information exchange related to trafficking networks in the area.\textsuperscript{205} Cooperation with Europol is on a daily basis, notably concerning information exchange, as Europol is the agency responsible to investigate the business model ashore.\textsuperscript{206}

Operation Sophia has achieved significant results in its first year of operation. The number of migration flows using the central route towards Italy and Malta has decreased by 9\% for the first time in three years as a result from continued efforts of this operation in the area.\textsuperscript{207} In October 2015 after four months of the operation, it successfully transitioned to the second phase or phase 2A (High Seas) and now focuses on the counter-smuggling operation. Statistics until July 2016 show that Operation Sophia has successfully rescued a large number of irregular migrants and arrested the smugglers with the assets of Operation Sophia as the interviewee of Operation Sophia asserts below:

Until now more than 21,000 lives were saved by the Sophia assets. 81 suspects were apprehended and delivered to Italian prosecutors, and 241

\textsuperscript{203} Interview with Ewa Moncure, 15 July 2016, Warsaw.
\textsuperscript{206} Interview with Antonello de Renziz Sonnino, 9 August 2016, Rome.
boats were disposed. You can see how many rubber boats compared to wooden boats because wooden boats are quite difficult be accessed. The rubber boat you can buy from the outside because it is very cheap, but they are very weak and very unprofessional. You can also consider 35,000 more people rescued by other organisations but with our help. For example, normally we have three airplanes, three helicopters patrolling, so maybe we are the first one who are locating a migrant boats before they sink. Then, we will give alarm to other organisations about the incident. That is why we have to consider the other 35,000 more to this number.

(Interview No. 4, Spokesperson and Chief of Media Cell Eunavfor Med)

Although primarily aimed a disrupting the business model of human smugglers and traffickers, Operation Sophia also provides assistance in search and rescue activities and collaborates with other operations in the Mediterranean, including JO Triton. Elaborating on their coordination during search and rescue activities, the interviewee further explained the process as below:

The rescue activity is coordinated by the competent Italian maritime rescue coordination centre. That is a centre here in Rome controlled by the Italian coastguard, due to the international law, is the one responsible to coordinate all the units of rescuing people. So it is under their coordination. So normally the first alarm is sent to them. And then they control before they send the other ships, helicopters or patrol boats belong to other organisations.

(Interview No. 4, Spokesperson and Chief of Media Cell Eunavfor Med)

During the summation of the discussion of Operation Sophia, the official from Eunavfor Med concludes the whole breadth of Operation Sophia in the Mediterranean Sea:

Operation Sophia is an international law enforcement using military assets. Because military assets have the tools and the expertise, as well as the experience to be use also in the civilian activities like enforcing their law
at sea. The police boats, the coastguard boats, and all the other units can stay days at sea. Sophia also have technical equipment and radar system to monitor the situation, so that the people can get there faster with motorboats. So this is the reason why I can classify Operation Sophia, an international law enforcement using military assets.

(Interview No. 4, Spokesperson and Chief of Media Cell Eunavfor Med)

In spite of the success of the operation, Operation Sophia however also encountered some drawbacks in conducting the operation at sea. The main challenges are in regards with time and the speed. With the absence of a permanent structure of a naval command and fleet, it is challenging in fact that the vessels for the operation are mainly contributed by the member states based on a rotation basis. Nevertheless, the effective routine operation by Operation Sophia in the international waters has contributed to interrupt the smugglers networks, particularly from Libya. The continuous patrol of Operation Sophia in the international waters has prevented the smugglers to operate in the high seas. Simultaneously this situation also contributes to reduce the number of irregular migrants departing from Libyan shores in particular.

6.4 Summary

In summary, the EU has been actively involved in counter irregular migrations and human trafficking operations since 2001. Italy and Malta, the most popular destination countries for irregular migrants have been constantly flooded with large numbers of migrants’ arrivals every year. In addition, Spain and Greece have also recorded a remarkable number of migrants’ arriving in their countries and the number has been constantly growing each year dominated by migrants from Sub Saharan Africa and North African countries. In order to combat this problem, the EU has introduced Frontex in 2005 which was primarily focused on tightening and strengthening border control amongst the member states. Their roles have been intensified particularly after the fatal shipwreck accident in 2015

208 Interview with Antonello de Renziz Sonnino, 9 August 2016, Rome.
in the Mediterranean Sea. Frontex also introduced essential surveillance systems, known as CRATE and RABIT to assist with the coordination of assets and equipment provided by the member states. Within Frontex, several joint operations were conducted at sea. These include Operation Hera, Operation Nautilus and Operation Triton. These operations are designed primarily with the objective to enhance capabilities of border control and identify the movement of irregular migrations, and ultimately to stop mass migration movement in the Mediterranean Sea. These operations show remarkable achievement, successfully contributing to the decline in the number of irregular migrants crossing the border of European countries. These operations have also been successful in search and rescue activities and have saved more than a thousand live from any fatal accidents at sea.

The adoption of a surveillance system known as EUROSUR in 2013 is seen as a great system for border control in the Mediterranean Sea. EUROSUR is responsible for information-exchange and provides immediate data for any potential risk at the external borders. EUROSUR has demonstrated its capabilities as a significant component of border surveillance and has helped to save lives at sea. The final component of EU counter irregular migration is the set up of its naval forces known as EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia. This operation, established in June 2015 was designed with the mandate to identify, capture, and dispose vessels, which were believed to have connection with the smugglers networks. The EU has also emphasised its commitment to the protection of lives of migrants crossing the sea during search and rescue operations within the range of Operation Sophia. The challenge of irregular migrants across the Mediterranean cannot be eliminated, however it must be controlled and regulated. With the continuous and active efforts by the EU, is hoped to help decrease the number of irregular migrants trying to reach Europe, and ultimately eradicate the trafficking networks in the Mediterranean Sea.

6.5 NATO Counter-Migration Operation in the Mediterranean Sea

Unlike EU, the current role of NATO in counter-migration in the Mediterranean Sea is limited in certain aspects. NATO’s role in maritime security in the
Mediterranean primarily focuses on the integration of military tasks across the members and amongst relevant partners. NATO has no specific operations for counter-migration at the Mediterranean Sea, however since 9/11 NATO has taken on counter-terrorism as a task, assisted under the operation of Active Endeavour. According to NATO, in the course of conducting counter-terrorism operations in the Mediterranean Sea, the OAE has had a visible effect on security in the Mediterranean. For instance, NATO ships and helicopters assigned for OAE have intervened on several occasions to rescue people from sinking ships (Cesaretti 2008: 4). During the counter-terrorism operation in 2006, the ships assigned for OAE have assisted Greek authorities to stop the irregular migrants from reaching the Greek coast (Ryan and Mitsilegas 2010: 273). In the process, NATO has contributed to maintaining peace and stability in the region. The presence of NATO has also had a significant impact for those criminals and trafficking networks that may have otherwise used the Mediterranean Sea for crime activities, including irregular migration.

Although NATO’s role in counter-migration is limited than those of the EU, however in 2016 NATO has expressed its commitment to actively engage in tackling the problem of irregular migration and deterring human smuggling in the Mediterranean Sea. During the Defense Ministers’ meeting in Brussels, NATO pledged to expand its naval forces operation and to deploy its assets in the Aegean Sea in effort to assist with disruption of human smuggling networks from Turkey to Europe (McNerney et al 2017: 10). NATO began to deploy its Standing Maritime Group in the Aegean Sea in its counter-trafficking mission at the end of February 2016 (NATO 2016b). The operation is not focused on rescue activities, rather it is conducting ‘reconnaissance, monitoring and surveillance activities’ of illegal crossing in the Aegean Sea to tackle smuggling and irregular migrants (EEAS 2016c). In this process, NATO’s naval forces cooperate with the EU’s border agency, Frontex to provide relevant information to the Greek and Turkish coast guards. The information will help both Greece and Turkey to deal with illegal human smugglers and simultaneously save lives at sea (NATO 2016b). Turkey is currently confronting a new mass of refugees along its border with Syria, while Greece struggles with huge numbers of refugees who have fled
violence in Iraq, Afghanistan and other conflict countries. In addition, the operation in Aegean Sea is not only limited to monitoring and surveillance, but NATO is also bound by the law of the sea to provide humanitarian assistance including search and rescue for immigrants who are at risk at the sea. According to Froh (2016):

For humanitarian assistance, if we come across immigrants moving in danger, we tried to drag them back to where they came from or to a safe harbor. But if necessary, we bring them on board and a lot of our ships had hundreds of the immigrants onboard.

(Interview No. 5, Former NATO’s Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Operations)

Deployment of NATO’s naval forces in the Aegean Sea does not serve as a national coast guards, rather NATO provides support and assistance for Turkey and Greece authorities to carry out the operations to combat human smuggling in the area (NATO 2016b). It is conducted in close cooperation with these authorities, subject to full respect of national sovereignty and in full accordance with the international law (NATO 2016b). NATO’s presence in the Aegean Sea helps to provide greater information exchange between Turkey and Greece for immediate and timely action upon distress at sea. NATO Shipping Centre serves as a good platform for information sharing on shipping, which also has good links with the civilian industry, the shipping industry and the insurance company (Froh 2016). The information gathered will be disseminated to the coastal nations for further actions. The information is not only important to help with irregular migration, but also substantial to stop potential terrorist plots (Froh, 2016). NATO is also signalling that they are ready to get more involved in the Central Mediterranean to assist with the existing operations in the area. During the NATO Summit in Warsaw on 8-9 July 2016, NATO has announced their transition of OAE, the operation in the Mediterranean to fight against terrorism, to a non-Article 5 maritime security operation (Article 91). The operation is now known as Operation Sea Guardian and will be able to perform maritime security

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operation tasks, if necessary. This is an effective contribution to existing operations conducted in the Mediterranean Sea to tackle the flows of irregular migration in that area. According to Article 93 in the Warsaw Summit Communique, NATO agreed to provide full support to complement Operation Sophia including to enhance capabilities through intelligence sharing; logistics support; contribute to capacity building of the Libyan coastguard and navy, if requested with close coordination with the EU. During an interview with NATO official, he further explained the broader mandate of Operation Sea Guardian in comparison to OAE:

OAE really did maybe one part of two maritime task. But Operation Sea Guardian is doing three with the possibility of doing the other two, so potentially a much broader mandate. The important part is looking at the Eastern Mediterranean and Central Mediterranean. I don’t think there is much in the Western Mediterranean but I think they have the authority if necessary going to Western Mediterranean and do a broader range of task.

(Interview No. 5, Former NATO’s Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Operations)

Operation Sea Guardian was created to conduct any of the seven maritime security operational tasks, as needed. These include i) maritime situational awareness; ii) freedom of navigation; iii) maritime interdiction; iv) countering the proliferation of WMD; v) protecting critical infrastructure; vi) conducting counter-terrorism operation at sea; and vii) maritime security capacity building (NATO 2016b). Operation Sea Guardian is currently conducting three core missions in the Mediterranean that is broader than the previous OAE. The first core mission is to provide support to maritime situational awareness and logistical support to the EU’s Operation Sophia. This task focuses on information sharing between NATO and the civilian agencies, including information about the movement of vessels at sea and details of the vessel’s original departure port

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212 The principal aims of OAE are to detect any suspicious or unusual events at sea that is related to terrorist acts; and to react immediately to that detection.
Secondly, this operation provides support to maritime counter-terrorism similarly as the previous OAE mission. This task includes the planning to detect, deter, disrupt and defend the vessels from potential maritime terrorist activities (NATO 2016b). The third mission of Operation Sea Guardian in the Mediterranean is the maritime security capacity building. In this particular task, NATO will provide assistance to both military and non-military authorities, including assisting coast guards and other navies (NATO 2016b). The capacity building includes variety of assistance as epitomised in the following passage:

We could be doing a lot of capacity building with the other nation’s coast guard. For the training, we produce the ships, we give training for the crews to work on the structure, and we trained them about the command structure, the communications for passing information and how to do it right. We also give them help to setting up the programs and the systems they use to command control. We also give training for them about the maintenance of the equipment so they can maintain and store it properly. Capacity building is about building everything up so they have the capacity on their own, so we don’t have to deal with them.

(Interview No. 5, Former NATO’s Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Operations)

In this regard, Operation Sophia welcomed the presence of NATO in the area of operation, determined that the more number of ships patrolling the area indicates better capability of operations at sea. The presence of NATO ships will help Operation Sophia enlarge the area of controlling and monitoring to tackle the irregular migrants more effectively. However, very little cooperation is available between Libya and NATO. NATO has received a request from Libya to assist them with the defence planning but the request is very specific nonetheless (Froh 2016).

NATO provided support to the Libyan government by providing them the training about board force planning, supplies system, commanding control and building integrity in new government. In spite of this cooperation

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213 Interview with Antonello de Renziz Sonnino, 9 August 2016, Rome.
214 Interview with Richard Froh, 30 November 2016, Cardiff.
between NATO and Libya, it is still uncertain whether there will be more improvement in cooperation between them in the future as explained in the following clause:

Well the cooperation with Libya is still possible. With Libya we did say we worked, but they were very specific. However we don’t know because of the history. What happened in 2011, it may be more difficult for NATO to involve. But NATO nations are still there and NATO probably watch closely.

(Interview No. 5, Former NATO’s Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Operations)

Nonetheless the EU sees NATO involvement in this operation as necessary assistance to them dealing with the migration crisis. NATO also expressed its desire to work closely with the EU and believes that this cooperation is a good start towards a greater cooperation between the EU and NATO in the Mediterranean. NATO is committed to providing assistance to the EU when it is necessary as explained by the NATO official:

Therefore, when the EU asked for help with the illegal immigration, NATO had a force that are able to reposition. Operation Sea Guardian is providing intelligence, the ships are available to use, and they are gaining information from people. The big improvement of this new operation is getting the NATO nations to support the EU. The EU agreed that it is a joint effort and then we have to work much closer with Frontex. And by the time I saw a huge improvement and much better cooperation with the EU, and I’m hoping we can even gone along farther.

(Interview No. 5, Former NATO’s Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Operations)

In conclusion, the deployment of NATO’s naval forces in the Aegean Sea marks NATO’s first intervention in the irregular migration crisis, which previously has been managed mostly by the EU. Dedicated to assist Turkey and
Greece to deal with the substantial numbers of irregular migrations’ arriving in their borders, NATO also committed to curb the expansion of human smuggling networks in the region. NATO vessels will continue to monitor the waterways and provide relevant data for prompt action by the EU and other relevant authorities. In the process, NATO also committed to patrol the waterways and enhance its surveillance at the Turkey-Syria border to monitor the movement of irregular migrants and smugglers activities. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg emphasised that NATO is doing their best to tackle the problem and to work closely with the EU in the most pressing issues (NATO 2016b). The NATO counter-migration in the Mediterranean is obviously very limited, and it is therefore at present, difficult to evaluate. The intervention of NATO in this issue may not be the solution to the recent migrant and refugee crisis, however it demonstrates the efforts NATO to partake after so many years to engage more actively in the Mediterranean Sea.

6.6 Results and Chapter Summary

Irregular migration in and across the Mediterranean Sea is a long-established phenomenon of the region. The migration and refugee crisis have been years in the making and until present day there is no solution to resolve the problem. Nevertheless, the EU and NATO have worked continuously to engage and address the challenge of irregular migration and human smugglers in the Mediterranean Sea, particularly with the establishment of maritime operations. This chapter has explored various maritime operations conducted by the EU and NATO to engage with migration crisis in the Mediterranean. On the one hand, Frontex play a key role in migration crisis management, which responsible to assists member states in managing their external borders. Furthermore, various joint operations conducted under the aegis of Frontex, such as Hera, Triton and Nautilus have contributed to reduce the number of migrant’s arrivals to the European shores. In addition, the implementation of EUROSUR as a surveillance system in the region has provided assistance for the member states to receive prompt and accurate information of any irregular movements and human smugglers at sea. On the other hand, NATO has also stepped into the crisis for the first time, which has otherwise been
managed predominantly by the EU. Through intelligence and surveillance activities, NATO determined to disrupt human smuggling networks particularly in the Aegean Sea with the cooperation of Frontex, including the provision of relevant information in regards to migrant’s flows to the Greek and Turkish coast guards. Another major transition by NATO has taken place in July 2016 when Operation Sea Guardian were first adopted following the existing OAE in the Mediterranean. This operation has the mandate to provide support for Operation Sophia to curb human trafficking and arms smuggling, and at the same time to identify potential maritime terrorism at the early stage. While there is no quick solution to this issue, we can expect Europe’s migrant crisis to persist for the foreseeable future. On this note, the EU and NATO’s role is essential to continuously control, regulate and cooperate closely with each other to stop the migration issue and human smuggling in the Mediterranean Sea, and ultimately preventing the further loss of life at sea.

The findings imply that a spectrum of practices in counter-migration activities link to the security community practices, and therefore demonstrates the evolution of community-building in the Mediterranean Sea. These activities including joint operations, cooperative security, capacity building and military cooperation demonstrate the development of security community practices through communities of practitioners that is EU and NATO. These maritime security practices are useful to evaluate the roles of the EU and NATO as a security community-building institutions in the Mediterranean Sea through migration crisis management.

In this chapter, the application of security community framework can be seen clearly through various maritime activities implemented by the EU and NATO. The first initiative by EU that is Frontex reflects the spread of security community practices within counter-migration initiatives. This includes the transnational cooperation and partnerships with various EU agencies and the EU member states. Frontex is conducting various cooperative operations at sea including with Operation Triton, Operation Nautilus and Operation Hera whereby Frontex provides a joint training and exercises to enhance the effectiveness in
regulating migration flows to Europe. The advancement of military cooperation and training reflects the building of security community which exhibited in these maritime activities. In addition, the enforcement of Operation Sophia and Operation Sea Guardian reflects the application of security community framework through their activities. For instance, NATO is committed to enhance cooperation with the EU to address the migration problem in the Mediterranean, which includes information sharing, intelligence exchanges and maritime security capacity building. NATO provides the assistance to the EU including assisting coast guards and other navies in the Mediterranean. This activities reflect two practices of security community framework, that is cooperative-security and implementation of confidence building measures. These activities evidenced that security community practices featured in counter-migration, thus serve as a vehicle for security community-building in the Mediterranean Sea. Further details on the evolution of security community-building through the implementation of counter-migration practices will be discussed in the next conclusion chapter.

The application of security community framework in this chapter provides better understanding of how the framework shapes the formulation of cooperative-security and various partnerships among the members states of NATO and EU. The framework has extended the understanding on shared values and interests which play a dominant role in influencing the cooperation, interactions and mutual engagement of the communities. Security community is therefore useful to induce the study of the practices in which members interact with one another, build shared repertoires and increasingly developed joint projects. In this chapter, the enforcement of maritime initiatives has been clearly constructed with the shared interests and values as its core tenet. NATO and EU shared common concerns of how migration can be a threat to their interests, thus respond in a collective way particularly through the development of partnerships and cooperative security.

In the following chapter, a comparison will be made between this case study and the previous case study on counter-terrorism initiatives in the Mediterranean Sea. The comparison will help to justify the extent to which
security community-building process has evolved and expanded, in particular through security community practices, the two case studies. The next concluding chapter revisits the fundamentals of security community practices which expands in greater details of how actors cooperate in maritime security. The concluding chapter provides more substantial discussion on the relations between security community practices and a spectrum of maritime practices in the Mediterranean Sea as been explored in the case studies chapters. This way, a broad conclusion can be drawn regarding the development of security community practices to tackle transnational threats in the Mediterranean Sea, in particular, of counter-terrorism and counter-migration initiatives.
CHAPTER 7


7.1 Introduction

This thesis has developed a security community framework and applied it to the maritime security studies, in particular, of counter-terrorism and counter-migration practices enacted by the EU and NATO in the Mediterranean Sea. In the preceding chapters, the thesis has explored in details the roles the EU and NATO play as the most important regional actors in the Mediterranean Sea in addressing terrorism threats and irregular migration. This thesis has also scrutinised the relations between the concept of security community, in particular, of security community practices, to maritime security activities of the EU and NATO. The findings from the two case studies have demonstrated that security community-building has evolved through the implementation of counter-terrorism and counter-migration initiatives in the Mediterranean Sea. These practices include, training and exercises, capacity building, cooperative security and military integration.

In this conclusion chapter, I provide an overview of the preceding chapters, discussing the main contents in each chapter. The chapter also summarises the main findings from the research questions, probing the relations between the security community practices and maritime security initiatives by the EU and NATO in response to terrorism and irregular migration issue in the Mediterranean Sea. The chapter explores the contribution of this research in the academic field, particularly the spread of the security community within maritime security activities in the Mediterranean Sea and the new insights into the dynamics of security community research. The chapter ends by proposing a set of recommendations that can be developed for future research endeavours.
7.2 Maritime Challenges in the Mediterranean Sea Post Cold War: A Chapter Summary

This thesis has explored the initiatives carried out by the EU and NATO as part of their counter-migration and counter-terrorism policy notably after the 9/11 attacks. This thesis has also developed a detailed security community framework, which has been used as an analytical tool throughout the thesis and explain the findings from empirical case studies.

Chapter two examined the security community framework and its components, including, the conceptual vocabulary of the security community; two types of pluralistic security community, loosely coupled and tightly coupled; meaning of community; cognitive regions; repertoires of practices and the three stages of security community formation as comprehensively discussed by Deutsch (1957) and later, further refined by Adler and Barnett (1998). It claimed how the formation of the security community led to the absence of interstate war, but a peaceful means as a way to resolve conflicts (Adler and Barnett 1997: 6). Although the concept was not prevalent during the Cold War era, it began to revive after the end of Cold War when states began to become members of the political community. States attempt to construct institutions and improve cooperation in order to protect their survival and create the conditions for a stable peace through international community. In the early establishment of the security community concept, Deutsch introduced two types of security community; amalgamated and pluralistic. Deutsch emphasised that the presence of any war or military actions signal the breakdown of the community (Deutsch 1957: 7).

Adler and Barnett proposed a refined and definition of the security community, due to the lack of theoretical, methodological and conceptual treatment in Deutsch’s original concept (Adler and Barnett 1996: 73). Adler and Barnett proposed the distinction of security community; loosely and tightly coupled pluralistic security community. This chapter explored the security community practices, which are the essential indicators to explain the development of security community. Additionally, attention was given to the contemporary issues to understand the relations between the security spectrum
and the community itself. It is essential to highlight the conceptual foundations of the security community in order to understand how the security community shapes and explains the behaviour of the members. In this thesis’s empirical research involving the EU and NATO counter-terrorism and counter-migration policy in the Mediterranean Sea, the security community framework allow the evaluation of the relations between maritime security practices and community-building.

Chapter three discussed the methodology and methods involved in conducting the research. This thesis involved a primarily qualitative approach with which rigorous data collection involving textual analysis has been conducted. This includes the use of institutional documents, policy proposals, official reports, press releases and various sources from archives including ministerial meetings, official journals and summit reports. These textual sources have provided the best sources in analysing the case study and ultimately answering the research question of the thesis. While the bulk of this research is centred on documents and its analysis, interviews were also applied as the research progressed. Interviews with high level officials from both the EU and NATO were conducted to collect additional information and data, which were not available from the textual analysis. These interviews provide useful data particularly some recent statistical data and valuable information related to the maritime operations in the Mediterranean Sea. The data obtained from these interviews offers not only beneficial statistical information, but also provides a nuance insights that helped to understand the responses and level of cooperation of both organisations in dealing with terrorism and irregular migration. The chapter also discussed the justification of the case studies selection and the rationale to exclude other potential threats in the Mediterranean Sea. In addition, other aspects also took into consideration to justify the selection that includes the evident presence of security community practices within the maritime initiatives of counter-terrorism and counter-migration.

Chapter four provides a broad overview of the EU’s and NATO’s initiatives and approaches in the Mediterranean. This overview was essential to
establish a historical chronology of how both organisations began to make their presence in the Mediterranean Sea known in order to address the changes in the security spectrum after the Cold War. NATO’s presence in the Mediterranean Sea started in the post-Cold War period, principally to contain the Soviet Union’s influence in the basin (Germond and Grove 2010: 5). Nonetheless, the increased instabilities and political violence in the region have been the driving forces for the Alliance’s enlargement in the Mediterranean to conform to the new security challenges. AMS (2008) is the key strategy developed by NATO to generate maritime policies and achieve their goals in the maritime domain. AMS highlights five fundamental roles to accomplish its missions; deterrence and collective defence; crisis management; cooperative security; building partnership capacity; and maritime security operations (Kraska and Pedrozo 2013: 49). Under the maritime provision, SNMGs and SNMCMGs were established responsible for designated area of operations at sea and their work tasks. SNMG2 and SNMCMG2 have been assigned for patrolling activities in the Mediterranean to ensure NATO’s readiness to respond and react immediately at the time of crisis (Morse 2010: 48). The AMS has performed as a guideline for maritime operations for NATO and enabled NATO to maximise the use of its capabilities.

NATO has introduced Mediterranean Dialogue in 1994, primarily to contribute to regional security and stability, as well as to promote better understanding and good relations with countries across Mediterranean (Bin 2008: 726). The Mediterranean Dialogue is currently joined by seven non-NATO countries of the Mediterranean region who share and pursue similar interests in security-cooperative tools enforced by NATO in the region (McNerney et al 2017: 15). Based on political dialogue and practical cooperation, the Mediterranean Dialogue functions as a platform for the members to discuss security situations in the region and develop further cooperation with NATO (Santis 2003: 180). In addition, Operation Active Endeavour is the fundamental NATO’s maritime operation in the Mediterranean since 2001 after 9/11 attacks. Serving as NATO’s sole maritime operation in the Mediterranean, Operation Active Endeavour has certainly contributed to ensuring stability at sea identifying none potential terrorist group attacks during its operation (Germond 2010: 69). Although the main
mandate is to counter-terrorism, this operation has also provided other assistance during its operation, including humanitarian assistance and search and rescue.

Chapter four also extensively discusses the initiatives of the EU to address the security challenges in the Mediterranean. The most visible is the implementation of ESS, which highlights the key security concerns of the EU (Rehrl and Weisserth 2010: 12). Among the EU’s principal security concerns are terrorism and organised crime. IMP is also another essential policy by the EU which aims to integrate various European policy related to maritime affairs and marine issues. The integration is crucial to enhance better coordination between different policy areas, including, among others, economic growth and sea basin strategies (Germond 2010: 16). After the success of the ESS and IMP, subsequently EUMSS was introduced in 2014, focusing on maritime interests of the EU, particularly on the management of external borders control (Council of the EU 2014: 8). The Action Plan functions as the main driving force, highlighting essential maritime strategies for the EU and ensuring all regulations are upheld by the member states and related EU agencies. While EUMSS concentrates on maritime strategies, UfM on the other hand, functions as a platform to foster maritime cooperation between the EU and other Mediterranean countries while promoting stability across the Mediterranean (Adamo and Garonna 2008: 76). This chapter also explored briefly the roles Frontex play in the Mediterranean. At present, Frontex is conducting several joint operations in the Mediterranean Sea to provide assistance for mass migration flows via the sea, including, Hera, Nautilus and Triton. This chapter is useful from a historical perspective to chart the gradual community-building of maritime practices within the EU and NATO, before embarking on the empirical case studies.

Chapter five analysed the first case study, maritime terrorism. This chapter explored the background of the maritime terrorism cases globally and importantly described terrorism situation in the Mediterranean Sea. Although terrorist activity in the Mediterranean is relatively very low and does not pose a real threat unlike in other regions, the political unrest and instability in the region have nevertheless, increased the potential for a terrorist attack in the Mediterranean (McNerney et al
The threat of ISIS is imminent particularly after a series of ship attacks in 2015 near the Sinai Peninsula. ISIS also claimed that they will use Libya as a gateway to Europe via the Mediterranean Sea, it is therefore important to note that ISIS in the future will pose a new threat to the safety and security in the Mediterranean Sea (Nightingale 2015: 1).

Chapter five explored in detail the development of the EU and NATO in combatting terrorism at sea within their strategies and counter-terrorism operations. NATO has launched an immediate naval operation in the Mediterranean Sea known as OAE to provide assistance to the United States to contain terrorist threats after the 9/11 attacks (Feldt 2011: 16). Initially, OAE carried the main mandate to monitor maritime trade routes and provide surveillance activities in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, but the mandate has been extended to the entire Mediterranean Sea with aim to disrupt any terrorist acts at sea. The OAE is responsible for six core tasks within its mandate, including surveillance and tracking; escorting ships; boarding and inspection; the provision of training; support to MD partners; and the provision of other humanitarian assistance including search and rescue (Calleya 2013: 136). Rigorous operations and surveillance of OAE has assumed to be effective in countering terrorism whereby Mediterranean Sea has been safe from terrorist plots (Cesaretti 2008: 2). The NATO presence in the basin has assisted in providing security and stability in the Mediterranean Sea not only from terrorist threats, but also other illicit activities.

The number of counter-terrorism measures implemented by the EU in the Mediterranean Sea are relatively low compared to NATO. Nevertheless, the EU has adopted several counter-terrorism measures to address the threats of terrorism, including counter-terrorism strategy, Declaration on Combating Terrorism and European Arrest Warrant. European Arrest Warrant is the first policy introduced by the EU in relation to framework decision on terrorism, principally to promote free movement in judicial decisions and eventually provides easy access for extradition among member states (Council of European Union 2002: 1). In order to enhance the effectiveness in combatting terrorism threats the EU has introduced
the Declaration on Combating Terrorism in 2004 with seven strategic objectives. This declaration emphasises the role the EU and its agencies play to coordinate cooperation with their partners in capacity building projects, including Algeria and Morocco (Wolff 2012: 166). Following the horrific terrorist attacks in London bombing in 2005, the EU stepped up with extraordinary measures to respond to the attacks. The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy was adopted in 2005 with four main pillars; prevent, protect, pursue and respond (Council of the EU 2005: 6). This strategy aims to tackle the root causes of radicalisation and ultimately preventing further terrorist recruitment. Another EU operation that took place in the Mediterranean Sea for counter-terrorism is Operation Coherent Behaviour. This operation was a brief naval operation in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, conducted with close cooperation with NATO within the frame of OAE. Although it was brief, Operation Coherent Behaviour was primarily focused on counter-terrorism and also aimed to intercept drug traffickers operating in the basin (Faleg and Blockmans 2015: 4). In addition to the aforementioned strategies, Europol, the main EU agency addressing terrorist threats launched the European Counter-Terrorism Centre in 2016. The centre functions as an intelligence sharing hub, providing analysis for terror attacks in the Europe and enhancing better coordination among the member states (McNerney et al 2017: 16).

Chapter six explored the second case study, that of EU and NATO counter-migration policies in the Mediterranean Sea. This chapter scrutinised the main trends of migration routes via the Mediterranean Sea, notably the Central Mediterranean, Western Mediterranean and Eastern Mediterranean. On the one hand, the Central Mediterranean received the highest numbers of migrants particularly from Libya, Tunisia and Algeria en-route to Italy, including island of Lampedusa and Sicily coasts (Moncure 2016). On the other, the Eastern Mediterranean route via the Aegean Sea towards Greece and Turkey received unprecedented numbers of migrants from Syria, Afghanistan and Somalia who fleeing their conflicted countries. Western Mediterranean is the popular route for migrants originate from African countries such as Mali towards Spain via Strait of Gibraltar (Frontex 2015a). In addition, the issue of irregular migrants trying to illegally embark to Ceuta and Melilla has been a long overdue crisis which Spain
has been confronted with since 1995. Nonetheless, with effective cooperation between Spain and Morocco has successfully decreased the number of irregular migrants trying to reach Spain via Ceuta and Melilla.

This led to the advancement of the EU and NATO counter-migration initiatives. Frontex has been a key player as the main EU agency dealing with migration crisis in the Mediterranean. The main mandate of Frontex is to manage the external borders of the Europe in order to restrict the access for irregular migrants, and providing assistance for member states during the crisis (Leonard 2010: 234). Several joint operations are currently conducted under the aegis of Frontex, including Hera, Nautilus and Triton. Operation Triton is primarily launched to tackle the mass migration influx in the Central Mediterranean and provide support to the Italian authority whenever needed (Gour 2015: 7). The support includes information sharing, boarding the suspicious vessels, as well as provides assistance for search and rescue activities.

Analysis then moved on to another EU initiative, that is Operation Sophia. This operation was launched immediately following the shipwreck incident off the Libyan coast in 2015. After one year in operation, this operation has been extended for another year after the remarkable success achieved in intercepting human smugglers and reducing the number of irregular migrants crossing the sea. With the initial mandate to dispose vessels used by smugglers and to disrupt human trafficking, Operation Sophia has successfully decreased the numbers of migrant’s arriving into Europe and also has saved a remarkable number of lives during its operation (Council of the EU 2016). In addition, Operation Sophia also enhances cooperation with Libya, in an effort for Libya’s clamping down as a migration transit point between Europe and Africa. This included the inclusion of training for Libyan coastguards on the management of territorial waters, the implementation of search and rescue activities and the training to handling the smugglers apprehended in their territorial waters (De Renziz Sonnino 2016). In order to enhance the effectiveness of the operation, Operation Sophia is working closely with Frontex in terms of information exchange and liaison officers’ deployment to improve the mechanism of communication.
Unlike the EU, NATO has very limited initiatives for counter-migration. Nevertheless, NATO deployed naval ships in the Aegean Sea in 2016 to provide assistance to the EU in the migration crisis (McNerney et al 2017: 19). The deployment also provides assistance for search and rescue activities and supports Turkish and Greek authorities in combatting human trafficking in the area. In July 2016, NATO has again reiterated its commitment to become more involved in the Central Mediterranean and provide assistance to existing EU operations in the area. That said, NATO has announced the transition of OAE to a new operation known as Operation Sea Guardian. Such operation is primarily established to conduct maritime security operational tasks, including, maritime security capacity building and maritime situational awareness (McNerney et al 2017: 10). During the operation, Operation Sea Guardian cooperates with EU, Turkish and Greek navies as well as providing assistance to the coast guards to monitor the maritime situation. The case study findings strongly demonstrated that the EU and NATO counter-migration initiatives exemplify the security community practices, thus embody the community-building in the Mediterranean Sea.

7.3 Results

The research question asked what are the initiatives and approaches that have been implemented by the EU and NATO to address terrorism and irregular migration in the Mediterranean Sea. In order to explore the EU’s and NATO’s approaches in managing these security threats, the historical analysis in Chapter four explored the development of security community practices, through the implementation of maritime operations, security dialogues, cooperative security and partnerships by the EU and NATO. It detailed important maritime strategies and operations that were in force to combat the maritime threats in the Mediterranean in a broad overview. This was explored further in the empirical chapters five and six that specifically focused on the two case studies with detailed narrative of the EU’s and NATO’s maritime security practices to fight against terrorism and irregular migration. The findings demonstrated that both organisations play a crucial role in tackling these problems. Nevertheless, while
the EU seems to be more competent in their counter-migration policies, meanwhile NATO is more advanced and capable in its counter-terrorism policy.

The core objective of the thesis, nonetheless, was to examine the security community building in the Mediterranean Sea, through security community practices of counter-terrorism and counter-migration. In Chapter Two, extensive discussions were explored in regards to the security community framework. This chapter will therefore examine the relations between security community practices and maritime initiatives in the Mediterranean Sea. Deploying the notion of the security community, this section discusses a detailed analysis of the EU and NATO, their activities and forms of cooperation forming both organisations practices and addresses maritime challenges in the Mediterranean. Below I provide a detailed comparison between the terrorism and irregular migration case studies. I examine how the security community practices exhibited in the activities of both cases. It emphasises the roles played by maritime activities in security community building and analyses how the EU and NATO became security community building institutions in the Mediterranean Sea. The findings will allow justify the purpose of this research to understand regional cooperation in the maritime challenges epistemic community.

7.3.1 The Spread of Security Community Practices in Counter-Terrorism Initiatives

The core research objective intended to answer the question of the expansion of the security community framework through the implementation of maritime security practices. In other words, it analyses the extent to which the security community practices exhibited within counter-terrorism and counter-migration activities in the Mediterranean. As has been explored in Chapter Two, there are six essential repertoire of practices, which help to sustain a security community mechanism. This set of practices is the indicator which demonstrates the existence of a security community and the level of integration experienced between members of the communities. In the analysis of counter-terrorism initiatives in the Mediterranean Sea by NATO and EU, it is evident that practices of a security
community are visible and observable through the employment of their maritime activities.

In the case of NATO, the OAE has a long tradition counter-terrorism operation. The array of activities conducted during this operation includes training and exercises, escorting and surveillance for commerce vessels upon request, boarding and inspection to the suspected vessels, as well as providing support to the Mediterranean Dialogue partners. According to the range of practices demonstrated within the frame of OAE, it is evident that the process of security community-building has evolved in the Mediterranean Sea. Through these activities, it seems clear that one of the indicators of a security community mechanism, the establishment of confidence building measures including training and exercises, military cooperation and intelligence exchanges, is present within the exercise of OAE.

Among the core activities conducted within the OAE is training and exercises, which involves NATO forces and the naval coast guards of member states. NATO naval assets are constantly conducting training, exercises and port visits during its operation in the Mediterranean Sea to offer skills and experience, sharing with other naval coast guard to enhance their capability in conducting counter-terrorism operations at sea. For instance, NATO during its port visit to Morocco conducted exercises and shared tactical navigation training with the Royal Moroccan Navy ships (NATO 2015b). The security community framework proposes that the tightly-coupled pluralistic security community exist when a high level of military cooperation, joint planning and exercises are present between the members of community. In other ways, members of the communities develop these practices as a nature in their way of communication and cooperation. Therefore, the implementation of exercises, training and military cooperation between NATO and Moroccon navies in OAE clearly exemplifies the presence of security community practices. In order to implement the OAE for counter-terrorism, NATO does not only perform cooperation with the member states, but also extends their collaboration with other relevant actors in the region to assure the efficiency of OAE in combatting terrorism at sea. These exercises within
counter-terrorism which particularly concentrates on practices of joint planning and exercises, intelligence exchanges and military cooperation implies the link between security community practices as an important sources of community-building in the Mediterranean Sea.

Moreover, another security community practices delineated the behaviour of member states who align consciousness in the direction of partnerships. OAE has not only served as a means for NATO members to cooperate among each other, but it is also increasingly important as a means to involve non-members. This is evident with the creation of partnership between NATO and its Mediterranean Dialogue partners whose interested to participate in the operation. The partnership includes the involvement of the partners through individual cooperation programme with the aim to enhance the effectiveness of OAE in combatting terrorism. Other than that, NATO also provides support for the Mediterranean Dialogue countries through information exchange in order to improve the understanding of all partners regarding the maritime environment. In short, NATO promotes the form of partnership with the relevant partners in order to support the enforcement of OAE in the Mediterranean. Several Mediterranean Dialogue partners have expressed their interest to participate in OAE particularly to cooperate in deterring and intercepting suspicious shipping operations in their waters, including, among others, Algeria and Morocco. In addition, other interested partners such as Ukraine and Russia also participated in supporting the OAE, by deploying their ships in the Mediterranean Sea to enhance practical cooperation and inter-operability among all partners (Bebler 2008: 9). Also, this partnership includes the participation of Ukraine in vessels’ boarding and inspection activities together with NATO. These attributes of partnership, activities and cooperation between NATO and its partners epitomises the expansion of the security community practices through the utilisation of counter-terrorism activities. Consequently, the prospective partnership between actors are feasibly high within their interaction, ultimately benefitting the members as a whole.
By contrast, the EU has limited capacity and are relatively less competent to perform counter-terrorism operations in the Mediterranean than those of the NATO. Nevertheless, the EU has developed several essential strategies for counter-terrorism ranging from counter-terrorism strategies to military cooperation. For the EU, Operation Coherent Behaviour which has been conducted under the auspices of EUROMARFOR conforms to the characteristics of security community practices that is military cooperation and confidence building measures. This operation was conducted in close cooperation with the OAE for one month before its dismissal. Although brief, such operation demonstrates that the EU enacted military integration as a form of cooperation with its partners, thus encourage the development of community-building in the Mediterranean Sea. Also, this operation conducted intelligence exchanges between NATO naval forces and EU maritime forces in the course of conducting counter-terrorism to accustom themselves with standard procedures of the operation and enhance their communications (Feldt 2011: 16). These descriptions demonstrate the relation of security community practices to EU military practices of Operation Coherent Behaviour, and consequently manifested the spread of security community-building. Cooperation between the EU and NATO now involves wider military integration to coordinate and execute their policies which aid to sustaining the security community mechanism.

In addition, the establishment of the ECTC which serves as a central information hub for counter-terrorism in the Europe also indicates the expansion of security community in the Mediterranean Sea. As a central information hub, the ECTC supplies the member states with information such as real-time data and intelligence sharing between law enforcement agencies and the member states in order to enhance inter-operability (Europol 2016). The following activities illustrate the implementation of confidence building measures including intelligence sharing and policy coordination as highlighted within the security community practices. This explains the relationship between these EU activities with security community practices. The findings suggest that these practices evidently are important source of community-building within EU and NATO in the Mediterranean Sea.
The findings from counter-terrorism measures by the EU also demonstrates the enforcement of cooperative security practice, which is a natural security practice of security community. It has already been noted that the Declaration of Combating Terrorism was adopted in 2004, signalling a stronger commitment of the EU to enhance international efforts to combat terrorism and ensure effective border control system. For instance, EU through its external border agency, Frontex provides technical assistance and supports for the member states to manage their external borders. Moreover, the EU also increased its counter-terrorism capacity building project with Morocco, Indonesia and Algeria to coordinate budgets for counter-terrorism policies (Wolff 2012: 166). This cooperation also includes the training for crisis management and border control. The implication that follows from these findings has a clear significance with the security community framework. It demonstrates that non-military threats and transboundary challenges need to be managed through cooperative security within the communities of practitioners. It is therefore evident that development in cooperative security, coupled with the creation of partnerships for counter-terrorism measures by the EU promote the spread of community practices. Indeed, the security community-building is expanding in the Mediterranean Sea.

Another activity for counter-terrorism by the EU, the formation of Euro-Mediterranean Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism 2005 also demonstrates the expansion of security community practices in the Mediterranean Sea. The code was created primarily to address the threat of terrorism with focus to prevent, contain and eradicate terrorism regionally and internationally. The code also worked to establish a partnership and further cooperation between the EU and its neighbours, particularly the Middle East and North Africa (Reinares 2006: 4). The code of conduct has increasingly important as a means for the EU members to involve non-members to promote the fight against terrorism. This reaffirms the presence of security community practices, when the members disposed towards spreading the community through the creation of partnerships. In other ways, the EU seeks to enhance partnerships and cooperative security with not only EU member states, but also their non-members in the course of conducting counter-terrorism. This is an important finding in a relation to the question of how the EU
promotes security-community building through its security practices. It seems evident that these activities of counter-terrorism serve as an important sources of community-building in the Mediterranean Sea. Through these cooperation, the EU members reinforce their capabilities to prevail against the potential of terrorist attacks.

In conclusion, through the enactment of counter-terrorism measures, it is evident that security community practices have expanded to tackle the terrorist threats in the Mediterranean Sea. Diverse activities including policies, confidence building measures, military integration, cooperative security and the creation of partnerships demonstrate the spread of a security community practices. The execution of these activities also ensures that the mechanism of the security community are sustained between the security actors. In the table below I provide a summation of the relationship between security community practices with the security community-building process in the Mediterranean Sea. The relations demonstrate the extent to which the security community practices expansion features within counter-terrorism initiatives, through the prism of the security community framework.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Repertoire of Practices</th>
<th>Counter-terrorism operations</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| 1. Importance of common enterprises, projects, and partnerships in the radius of their interaction. | Implementation of Operation Active Endeavour (NATO):  
• OAE also involved Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) partners, including Algeria and Morocco.  
• OAE also extend the cooperation and partnership with other interested partners such as Russia and Ukraine whose provide supports in the operation. |
| 2. Cooperative security is indivisible and comprehensive. | Cooperative-security between the EU and its partners or agencies:  
• Adoption of Declaration of Combating Terrorism 2004 highlights the EU pledge to enhance management at the external borders with cooperation of other relevant agencies and partners.  
• EU adopted strategic cooperation with Frontex to manage external borders of European member states.  
• EU developed counter-terrorism capacity-building project with Algeria, Morocco and |
Indonesia. This includes training on crisis management and border control.

Adoption of European Arrest Warrant (EAW):

- The objective of EAW is to abolish extradition between member states and promote a free movement in judicial decision including terrorism.
- This policy emphasises the needs for member states to agree and abide with the regulations of EAW. Ultimately all the EU members are required to cooperate collectively to improve border surveillance at the external borders.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>3</th>
<th>Disposition towards creation of partnerships, transnational security dialogues, or the constitutions of regions.</th>
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<tr>
<td>•</td>
<td>EU creates a partnership with Algeria, Morocco and Indonesia to synchronise national budgets and the EU budgets for counter-terrorism policy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>•</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Cooperation between the EU and its neighbours from North Africa and Middle East.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- This code has the mandate to address the threat of terrorism particularly in preventing, containing and eradicating terrorism.</td>
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<th>4</th>
<th>Changes in military planning and the implementation of confidence building measures (military cooperation, joint planning and exercises, intelligence exchanges, policy coordination and unfortified borders)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>•</td>
<td>Implementation of Operation Active Endeavour (NATO):</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Naval exercises including tactical navigation and mine warfare exercises with Royal Moroccan Navy to share skills and experience of conducting counter-terrorism operations.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Information exchange with Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) partners.</td>
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<td>•</td>
<td>Implementation of Operation Coherent Behaviour (EU):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Conducted under the auspices of Euromarfor.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Includes military cooperation and intelligence exchange with OAE.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Military integration with NATO operation to conduct counter-terrorism operations, including surveillance.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Intelligence exchanges between NATO and EUROMARFOR to familiarise themselves with standard procedures and enhance their communications.</td>
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The establishment of European Counter-Terrorism Centre (ECTC):
7.3.2 The Spread of Security Community Practices in Counter-Migration Initiatives

In the case of counter-migration measures conducted in the Mediterranean Sea, the EU plays a dominant role in tackling the massive flows of irregular migrants trying to reach Europe by sea. Various strategies, surveillance activities, border controls, and maritime operations by naval forces have been implemented to address this pressing issue. One of the most notable operations is the management of member states’ external borders by Frontex. Frontex was created with the main objective to coordinate operational cooperation among member states to strengthen security at the external borders of the EU member states (Leonard 2010: 233). Frontex is also involved in the coordination of exercises in the Mediterranean, with the deployment of military ships to patrol the coastlines (Leonard 2010: 233). International or bilateral cooperation is an essential component to control the massive flows of clandestine migrants. Likewise, Germond (2010) explained that in order to deter, to arrest or to rescue irregular migrants in the Mediterranean, states must engage their navy, coast guards and police forces (Germond 2010: 70). Since 2005, the EU has actively involved through Frontex to coordinate various operations conducted multilaterally by European navies across the entire span of the Mediterranean, including in the Aegean Sea.

The establishment of Frontex serves as a good example of the spread of the community practices within counter-migration initiatives. This is demonstrated by the creation of partnerships and transnational cooperation. Frontex plays a significant role as the EU agency that is responsible to ensure the coordination between member states in managing their external borders. The management of external borders remain the states’ responsibility, nevertheless Frontex was created to provide support, assistance and immediate response for the member states during distressing times at sea. In other words, the EU has
established Frontex to collaborate collectively for external borders management (Leonard 2010: 233). For that purpose, national borders and coast guards with designated tasks are available to provide support for counter-migration. Evidently, the formation of partnerships between the EU member states demonstrates the expansion of security community-building through Frontex and its security practices.

Frontex through its various joint operations at sea, also fulfil the attributes of security community practices, which include military cooperation and the implementation of confidence building measures, such as joint training and exercises. Other than being responsible for managing external borders, Frontex also conducts various joint operations at sea, Operation Triton, Operation Nautilus and Operation Hera. Such operations were introduced in order to provide assistance to the EU member states who were confronted with the major migration crisis in the Mediterranean, particularly Italy and Greece. The analysis suggests that the advancement of military cooperation and exercises to tackle migration crisis in the Mediterranean explains the extent to which the security community practices are exhibited in these maritime activities. In addition, Frontex and the member states engage with each other more intensively than before in terms of training, exercises and joint operations, thus promoting the spread of security community practices within counter-migration measures in the Mediterranean Sea. For instance, Operation Triton was created mainly to provide assistance and support for Italian authorities with border surveillance, operational assistance and information sharing on the human smuggling networks (Gour 2015: 77). Indeed, this would be consistent with the security community practices, and consequently epitomises the expansion of community-building in the Mediterranean Sea. Moreover, the EU actively promotes the adoption of collective cooperation between its member states through Frontex operations, therefore it is evident that cooperative security practices have also continuously developed within the EU counter-migration measures in the Mediterranean Sea.

Another essential mechanism that has been implemented in the Mediterranean Sea for counter-migration measures is the creation of the
surveillance system, EUROSUR. The creation of EUROSUR also serves as another example of confidence building measures through capacity-building projects, joint exercises and intelligence sharing. This can be supported by the development of technology capacity including tracking and detection systems which were built up to effectively to monitor the situation at sea and simultaneously allow authorities to take an immediate response (Rijpma and Vermeulen 2015: 454). Moreover, the initial purpose of EUROSUR is to improve cooperation between national guard forces and border guards to strengthen the external borders management. EUROSUR serves as a platform which provides quintessential information exchanges between the member states to allow rapid response to detect and intercept irregular migrants at sea. The adoption of EUROSUR, has assisted the improvement of confidence building between the EU member states whereby they are willing to exchange information and data, not only among the border guards but also other relevant agencies. These findings evidenced that security community practices featured in counter migration through confidence building and cooperative security, thus serve as a vehicle for security community-building in the Mediterranean Sea.

Furthermore, as the counter-migration case study revealed, the practice of cooperative security can be seen to features in the Operation Sophia. Within cooperative security, a set of security practices are adopted by multilateral institutions of security communities, on the premise that threats to the community’s security are best handled by confidence building and dialogue, thereby promoting strategic cooperation (Adler 2008: 207). Operation Sophia was established with the core mandate to disrupt the business model of human trafficking in the Mediterranean Sea. Capability assets for this operation primarily rendered by the member states on a rotation basis. Nevertheless, it is important to note that Operation Sophia is working closely with other agencies, including Frontex, NATO and Libyan authorities. This cooperation includes information exchange, training for Libyan coast guards and navy and also sharing information of human trafficking networks with NATO (European Council 2016). It is paramount for the EU to ensure coordination between member states in maritime governance structure. That said, cooperation between NATO, Frontex and also
Libya has aided the EU to deal with the migration crisis and disrupt human trafficking networks. The findings suggest that the EU actively seeks to promote military cooperation beyond the frame of the EU, thus encourage the development of cooperative security practices within the EU, NATO and Libya to cope with migration crisis and human trafficking. Ultimately, the findings provide an important answer of how security community expand in the Mediterranean Sea through counter-migration practices.

Likewise, this scenario is also illustrated in NATO activities for counter-migration measures. Previously dominated by the EU, NATO has expressed its commitment to actively address and engage with the migration crisis in the Mediterranean Sea. In order to do so, NATO has enhanced its cooperative-security with Frontex, Greek and Turkish coast guards. The Mediterranean is becoming more of a region of cooperation where all activities are better coordinated, and the members share similar values and common identities as a result of cooperative-security between various actors in the basin. Similarly, interactions among states and societies within non-homogenous regions are also growing in number. There have been constant discussions on the issue of EU-NATO coordination in various areas, where maritime surveillance in particular is one area where coordination is likely and desirable. The EU and NATO are currently cooperate to conducting surveillance and monitoring activities in the Mediterranean- with Frontex and Operation Sea Guardian respectively. NATO and the EU both in the Aegean Sea aim to disrupt human smuggling networks with the ultimate goal to support Greece and Turkey with the provision of information of human smuggling networks operating mainly in Libya (Gour 2015: 7). Frontex and Operation Sea Guardian can be conducted more effectively in a coordinated manner, which limits unnecessary task duplication as both EU and NATO are informed of their respective roles in the Mediterranean Sea. The EU Council in 2009 has also emphasised the need to enhance cooperation in certain potential areas with relevant organisations, including NATO. Hence, these elements demonstrate the expansion of security community practices whereby cooperative-security evidently features in counter-migration initiatives. The
implication from these findings has a clear bearing on how cooperative security perform an important function in security community building in that they transcend beyond their boundaries, but to assist each other to tackle irregular migration in the Mediterranean Sea.

In summary, security community practices have been widely developed in the Mediterranean region, in this case it can be illustrated through counter-terrorism and counter-migration cooperation in the Mediterranean Sea within NATO and the EU. The concept of security community is an attempt to provide alternative resolution for states in the international arena to resolve conflicts and handle crisis management. Accordingly, it is related to the concept of collective security, in the sense that the members of the security community disposed to promote cooperative security practices within themselves. According to six repertoire of practices delineated to sustain the security community mechanism, we can observe that these practices are featured in both counter-terrorism and counter-migration measures. The practices demonstrate the relations between the security community practices and community-building in the Mediterranean Sea. The security community in this context also demonstrates the development of a comprehensive and strong community, concentrates the importance of cooperative security, advancement of confidence building measures and final, evidences the creation of partnership among the members. In the table below I provide a summation of the relations between the security community practices and counter-migration activities by the EU and NATO. The relations determine the extent of security community expansion exhibited in counter-migration initiatives, through the prism of the security community framework.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Repertoire of Practices</th>
<th>Counter-migration operations</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Cooperative security is indivisible and comprehensive.</td>
<td>The implementation of Eunavfor Med Operation Sophia:</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The mandate of Operation Sophia is to disrupt business model of human trafficking in the Mediterranean. In doing so, this operation built close cooperation</td>
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with other agencies such as Frontex, NATO and Libyan authorities for information exchange, training and exercises and capacity building project.

The establishment of Operation Sea Guardian by NATO to provide support to Operation Sophia:

- NATO pledged to enhance cooperation with the EU to address the migration crisis. Such cooperative-security includes intelligence sharing, logistics support, and capacity building.
- EU and NATO also conducting surveillance and monitoring activities together in the Mediterranean to disrupt smugglers networks.

The establishment of Frontex and cooperation with other member states.

- Under the aegis of Frontex, several joint operations were conducted to deal with migration crisis and people smuggling.
- For instance, JO Triton was created mainly to provide assistance and support for Italian authorities with border surveillance, operational assistance and information sharing on the human smuggling networks.

<table>
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<th>2</th>
<th>Disposition towards creation of partnerships, transnational security dialogues, or the constitutions of regions.</th>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The establishment of Frontex:</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Frontex is the main agency of EU responsible to ensure coordination among all EU members in managing their external borders.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• For that purpose, national borders and coast guards form parts of Frontex with designated tasks to provide support for the member states. The formation of</td>
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</table>
| 3 | Changes in military planning and the implementation of confidence building measures (military cooperation, joint planning and exercises, intelligence exchanges, policy coordination and unfortified borders) | The establishment of Frontex:

- Frontex conducted various joint operations, including, among others, JO Triton and JO Nautilus to provide assistance for the EU member states to deal with migration crisis.
- Frontex also conducted training and exercises with naval forces and border guards of the member states to enhance their capabilities in border surveillance and patrolling at sea.

The adoption of surveillance system EUROSUR:

- The adoption of EUROSUR includes capacity-building measures such as tracking and detection system to effectively monitor the situation at sea.
- EUROSUR also provides information exchanges between the member states to allow rapid response in detecting and intercepting irregular migrants at sea. |

### 7.4 The Academic Contribution

This thesis explores maritime security study into greater details with an expanding literature on transboundary threats and maritime security community framework. The thesis focuses on terrorism and irregular migration as the main subjects of the study, and subsequently explores the relations between security community framework with the maritime practices in counter-terrorism and counter-migration activities. The security community framework formulated in Chapter two is an analytical tool, which has been used broadly to analyse the expansion of security...
community practices in counter-terrorism and counter-migration initiatives in the Mediterranean Sea. By deploying the repertoire of practices while conducting the research, the findings were able to determine the extent to which this framework has been exhibited in maritime security practices by the EU and NATO to combatting terrorism and irregular migration. In other ways, the framework was intended to explain the relations between security community practices and maritime security activities in the Mediterranean. By applying the framework within counter-terrorism and counter-migration studies, I was able to further develop the broader security community framework for future research in security studies, notably in maritime security studies.

The thesis has refined the concept of maritime security communities. While previous research primarily concentrated on the traditional theories such as realism and liberalism to discuss maritime security (Germond 2015: 3), this thesis provided novelty in maritime studies by developing a security community framework to understand states’ behaviour and level of cooperation in conflict resolution. The case studies of counter-terrorism and counter-migration policies provide detailed analysis of maritime security practices of the EU and NATO in the Mediterranean Sea. Liberalism approach has dominated the discussion of cooperative-security and the construction of institutions to encourage cooperation between states as its core tenet. However, the thesis has introduced nuance and alternative theoretical framework, security community which adept to explain the high level of communication and cooperation between international institutions and interstates interactions.

On the one hand, realist theories posit that war is always expected, based on the assumptions of anarchy and self-interest of states. Realists argue that it is uncertain how shared identity will be able to prevent conflict among states. Nevertheless, neorealists espouse that war may be absent temporarily when the balance of power, alliances, hegemonies and deterrence are present (Adler and

\[215\] Stephen Walt explicitly rejects the proposition that anarchy may help states to overcome fears. He proposed that it is very unclear how a shared ‘civic identity’ will inhibit conflict among states. Walt also proposed that groups sharing similar traits and identity are more difficult to resolve a problem among them (Stephen Walt, “Commentary: Is There a Logic of the West?” *World Policy Journal* 11 (Spring 1994), pp. 118).
Neoliberals on the other hand propose that cooperation between states is very likely to develop when states construct institutions to pursue their mutual interests. Nevertheless they are still incapable to switch from rationalism, rather they are sceptical towards the possibility to construct a community through shared identities. As a result, much of international relations theory is reluctant to consider the possibility of community because these theories argue that it is uncertain how shared identity can prevent conflict between states (Adler and Barnett 1996: 72). Hence these traditional theories always dominated the discipline of security studies in general, and maritime studies specifically. This thesis however introduced an alternative framework to explain the absence of war and the possibility of cooperation through community members whose shared mutual trust and interests. The security community framework emphasises the notion that war between states is unlikely due to the integration of a group of people who share similar interests and identities. This group of people develop a ‘sense of community’ which ensures that disputes and social problems should be resolved through a ‘peaceful change’. In other ways, the security community framework applied in this thesis has favourably introduced alternative notions and challenges the traditional assumptions of war and conflicts to better understand the absence of war, cooperation between institutions and interstate interactions for security situation in maritime domain. By developing this process, my research has contributed to the broader debate of the maritime security communities with the empirical study of counter-terrorism and counter-migration in the Mediterranean Sea.

The thesis has also contributed to the academic field notably by extending literature of security dynamics in the maritime domain. Regardless of extensive existing research on transnational crime, they were however focused primarily on land-oriented issues. Conversely, maritime security studies are still insufficiently researched in which scholars academia give very little attention to the maritime security agenda in comparison to land security issues (Germond 2015b: 3). To date, very few studies are available which address the transnational threats in the

maritime domain. For instance, studies on terrorism are widely discussed as they pose an absolute threat to the security of the states, however these are primarily land-oriented discussions. With the expansion of transnational threats related to the maritime domain such as irregular migration, terrorism, piracy and smuggling activities, it is essential to extend a study on maritime security agenda. Considering the growing potential of terrorism at or from the sea notably after several evident cases of hijacking and terrorist act from terrorist organisations at sea, it is crucial to broaden security studies beyond traditional land-centric analyses but to include it within maritime security studies agenda. Although more studies on maritime security have been conducted in other regions, Southeast Asia for instance, studies on maritime security threats in the Mediterranean Sea is still insufficient.

On another note, the thesis helped bring the study of maritime security into a broader context with wider literature on maritime security actors. Preceding research by Basil Germond (2015)\textsuperscript{217} for instance explores the maritime dimension of European with a particular focus on the EU. Meanwhile, Niklas Bremberg (2016)\textsuperscript{218} in his recent work study, the security community-building in the Western Mediterranean focuses on EU crisis management. Contrary to their outstanding works, this thesis suggests nuance in the maritime security agenda, by extending literature on other security actors in the maritime dimension of European security, through NATO. This demonstrates that maritime dimension of European security, particularly Mediterranean is not restricted to the EU dynamics alone, but also interrelated with NATO.

This thesis therefore aided to fill the loopholes in maritime security studies. The thesis provides comprehensive research on major maritime threats at present, namely terrorism and irregular migration at or from the sea. The thesis offered extensive discussion of what the broader security situation is in the maritime domain, with particular attention to evaluate what actors actually do to

enhance maritime security. Moreover, the thesis demonstrates the interactions and cooperation of the security actors involved in managing maritime threats in the Mediterranean Sea. Based on the conclusions in the case studies analysis and findings from empirical research, it demonstrates how the perception of European countries towards security threats in maritime domain may affect the security of their nations and its citizens. It also demonstrates approaches and initiatives which have been adopted in dealing with the threats, and ultimately enhances maritime security and the safety of its people.

The research scrutinises the maritime security concept and demonstrates the roles of security actors in the maritime domain to enhance maritime security. Existing research on maritime security discusses various security issues and challenges in the maritime domain, nevertheless very little unravel what security actors actually do to address these issues. When analysing the framework, the case studies revealed how the security community practices explains the response of the EU and NATO in the maritime domain. In other ways, the maritime security community framework evaluates how actors collaborate in maritime security and the extent to which the states would engage with other security actors to enhance maritime security. The maritime security community framework also explores a set of practices of maritime activities that take place in the Mediterranean Sea. In these case studies, findings demonstrate the maritime activities which involved the EU and NATO to combat terrorism and irregular migration as well as human trafficking at sea. Such activities include joint exercises, maritime surveillance, legal enforcement activities such as apprehended and extradition, legal instruments, capacity building, military cooperation and adoption of maritime strategies. The thesis also demonstrates how these maritime security practices contribute to the ideal concept of maritime security community through the implementation of various maritime practices as mentioned above. Empirical studies have demonstrated what NATO and EU actually do in order to combat maritime terrorism and tackle irregular migration in the Mediterranean, and eventually provide evident understanding of how much has been done to manage the maritime security in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, the thesis has provide substantial understanding of how security community practices within maritime
initiatives serve as an important sources of community-building in the Mediterranean Sea.

7.5 Maritime Security and the Future Research Agenda

In this thesis, I have focused on two case studies, the threats of terrorism and irregular migration in the Mediterranean Sea. Also, the second case study of irregular migration provides extensive discussions of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Mediterranean Sea. There is, nevertheless, also another set of lessons for future research that can be drawn in security challenges in the Mediterranean Sea. Future case studies could include other emerging threats such as trafficking of arms and drugs. Drug trafficking has become a more pressing issue in Europe, in which Europe has long served as an important corridor for illicit drug trafficking routes from other world regions owing to its geographical location and large production and consumer markets. Most drugs, particularly heroin trafficked to the Europe is originally from Afghanistan via the Balkan route (Delicato 2010a: 2). For geographical reasons, Spain has become a major point of entry for cannabis, which is produced largely in Morocco. Consequently, the Strait of Gibraltar has become a hot spot of the trafficking route for cannabis to Europe. In addition, with the increasing European demand for high value drugs, the risk of intensification of drug smuggling has become a security hazard for the EU. As for the Netherlands, it remains as a redistribution centre for heroin coming via the Balkan route. Meanwhile, Greece has become a major entry point for heroin to the EU from Bulgaria (Frontex 2013: 46). Therefore, possible future case studies could include the EU and NATO policies and initiatives to fight against drug trafficking in Europe via the sea, and also to what extent is drug trafficking could become a threat to the European countries.

A second, slightly different approach on collective collaboration in the Mediterranean Sea can be drawn. The thesis concentrated on the EU and NATO approaches to combat the threats of terrorism and irregular migration, respectively. It is, nevertheless, essential to examine the relationships of North-South states of the Mediterranean region in addressing maritime threats in the Mediterranean. Other than initiatives from the EU and NATO as an organisation,
it is also useful to explore the policies of these states either individually or bilaterally to combat terrorism and tackle migration crisis in the Mediterranean Sea. The growing North-South dynamics, with more developed North on the one hand, and more unstable South in terms of politics, economy and social on the other, has changed the security policy consideration in the region and potential for future cooperation in the Mediterranean (Kinacioglu 2000: 27). The two shores, though interdependent, always developed a suspicious and distrust between each other which made cooperation seem very unlikely to materialise (Germond and Grove 2010: 9). Therefore, this analysis is useful in understanding the limitations and challenges underlying the cooperation between North-South countries in the region. Therefore, future research could include the cooperation between North-South in managing maritime issues and the extent to which distrust could undermine the cooperation between each other.

After a comprehensive research conducted to analyse the policies of the EU and NATO in their counter-terrorism and counter-migration in the Mediterranean Sea, the findings led for a new possible question. The question lies at the thought of what are the possibility for collective collaboration between the EU and NATO in the maritime domain particularly in the Mediterranean Sea, in this case. As previously discussed in chapter five and six, I examined closely the approaches of EU and NATO individually in combatting terrorism and irregular migration. Nevertheless, I began to encounter cooperation between the EU and NATO in the Mediterranean, particularly for counter-migration initiatives. Although very limited, there is an opportunity for closer cooperative-security between NATO and EU and they are also signaling that cooperation in combatting maritime threats is definitely beneficial to enhance the efficiency of their operations. For that reason, future studies on EU-NATO relations in the Mediterranean Sea will be able to further develop the roles of these security actors to safeguard maritime security.

A fourth possible way forward for future research would be to take a comparative approach, by which the framework used in this thesis could be applied to study maritime security in the other region. The Mediterranean Sea is
linked to adjacent maritime theatres, which have their own security dynamics. Therefore, the security issues in the region are strongly interrelated (Germond and Grove 2010: 11). On the one hand, possible future case studies could include maritime security in the Africa region, due to its geographical reason. Geographically located adjacent to the Mediterranean Sea, the Horn of Africa is grappling with piracy problems and recorded the highest case of piracy and robbery at sea (Germond and Grove 2010: 11). The Horn of Africa is often seen as a hot spot of maritime threats in the world and the problems in that region may affect security and stability of the Mediterranean. From a comparative perspective, the research question could include the extent to which organisations in the region engage and promote cooperative security practices among its community members. For that reason, it is particularly advantageous to explore further the security dynamics in that region and compare the roles of security actors in the region to address the security threats. On the other hand, Southeast Asia has also been confronted with massive migration flows from the neighboring countries, which can be seen as a similar situation as in the Mediterranean Sea. The migration crisis in Southeast Asia is nothing new and they have been grappling with this crisis for years. Countries like Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand have been offering assistance for the refugees, including providing the migrants shelter and humanitarian assistance. Therefore, future studies could study the comparison between approaches adopted between Southeast Asia and Europe to stop this long-running migration crisis. By developing this study, it is beneficial to discover the most effective approaches to resolve the outflow of irregular migrants and disrupt transnational crime network, both in Southeast Asia and Europe. Also, the comparative studies may benefit for security community research as we can analyse the process of security community expansion in these different regions within their maritime security practices.

The concept of maritime security communities is an ideal form to study cooperation between security actors in maritime dimension. In order to analyse the spread of security community practices in the Mediterranean Sea, it is essential to first understand how security communities today work. The expansion of the maritime security agenda is now beyond the traditional concept of security,
particularly with the resurgence of transboundary maritime related issues. To this end, the efforts to tackle non-military and transnational threats are no longer restricted within the traditional frame of ‘realist’ analytical framework, which primarily focus on states’ naval capabilities, but rather promote the spread of cooperative security practices. This can be seen clearly from various initiatives and approaches at sea. The point that this thesis makes is that practicing collective security as a way to manage maritime threats may help to evaluate how actors collaborate collectively in the Mediterranean Sea. Regional cooperation in the Mediterranean has benefited from the creation of varied EU and NATO instruments, including maritime strategies and operations at sea. This means that the advancement of cooperative-security, partnerships and confidence building measures as being explored in the thesis have demonstrated the expansion of security community practices through maritime initiatives of counter-terrorism and counter-migration enacted by the EU and NATO, which ultimately promote the community-building in the Mediterranean Sea.
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**Interviews**


