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Caring for esteem and intellectual reputation: some epistemic benefits and harms

Tanesini, Alessandra 2018. Caring for esteem and intellectual reputation: some epistemic benefits and harms. Philosophy 84 , pp. 47-67. 10.1017/S1358246118000541

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This paper has five aims: it clarifies the nature of esteem and of the related notions of admiration and reputation (sect. 1); it argues that communities that possess practices of esteeming individuals for their intellectual qualities are epistemically superior to otherwise identical communities lacking this practice (sect. 2) and that a concern for one’s own intellectual reputation, and a motivation to seek the esteem and admiration of other members of one’s community, can be epistemically virtuous (sect. 3); it explains two vices regarding these concerns for one’s own intellectual reputation and desire for esteem: intellectual vanity and intellectual timidity (sect. 4); finally (sect. 5), it offers an account of some of the epistemic harms caused by these vices.

Item Type: Article
Date Type: Published Online
Status: Published
Schools: English, Communication and Philosophy
Additional Information: Supplementary Volume on Harms and Wrongs in Epistemic Practice
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISSN: 0031-8191
Date of First Compliant Deposit: 12 June 2018
Date of Acceptance: 8 June 2018
Last Modified: 17 Oct 2019 21:55

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