Equality and Diversity Training: An Ethnographic Approach

Netta Chachamu

Cardiff University

This dissertation is submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

November 2017
Abstract
Equality and Diversity (E&D) training is currently a widely used practice which aims to improve E&D in workplaces, including universities. There has been considerable research on contemporary E&D training from the perspective of management studies, with an interest in evaluation of efficacy. However, E&D training has been a neglected topic in the sociology of education, and there have been few studies illuminating what happens in E&D training using ethnographic data. This thesis begins to fill that gap with an in-depth ethnographic exploration of present day E&D training for staff at universities. In this thesis, I ask how the prevalence of E&D training came about, and what exactly happens in E&D training?

I place contemporary E&D training in its socio-historical context by tracing the historical roots of E&D as a practice. I show that those roots lie in the social psychology of the 1920s in the USA, which was beginning to operationalise the concepts of attitudes, stereotypes and prejudices. These psychological ideas are intertwined with the development of E&D training and continue to be significant components of training today. Tracing this history to the UK shows that training has grown as a response to police racism, and extended to become a technique for responding to other forms of oppression such as sexism and disablism.

The ethnographic research was undertaken at universities in England and Wales. The findings show that E&D training in its current form usually attempts to cover several axes of oppression during one half-day session. The pedagogic techniques used are primarily didactic teaching and small group discussions, while the curriculum is dominated by two forms of knowledge – legal and psychological. Where the law forms the curriculum of the training, I argue that the complexity of the Equality Act 2010 makes it difficult to use the concepts and vocabulary of the Act to convey a consistent analysis of discrimination. Where psychological concepts inform the training, psychology is used to claim that everyone inevitably has prejudices and biases. I argue that as well as depoliticising the concept of discrimination, this can be understood as a way of navigating around trainees’ anxieties about being identified with the discursive figure of the ‘bigot’. I argue that neither approach effectively overcomes the pedagogic challenges of E&D training.
ANNEX 1:
Specimen layout for Declaration/Statements page to be included in a thesis.

DECLARATION

This work has not been submitted in substance for any other degree or award at this or any other university or place of learning, nor is being submitted concurrently in candidature for any degree or other award.

Signed .................................................. (candidate) Date 28.06.18

STATEMENT 1

This thesis is being submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of .......(insert MCh, MD, MPhil, PhD etc, as appropriate)

Signed .................................................. (candidate) Date 28.06.18

STATEMENT 2

This thesis is the result of my own independent work/investigation, except where otherwise stated, and the thesis has not been edited by a third party beyond what is permitted by Cardiff University’s Policy on the Use of Third Party Editors by Research Degree Students. Other sources are acknowledged by explicit references. The views expressed are my own.

Signed .................................................. (candidate) Date 28.06.18

STATEMENT 3

I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available online in the University’s Open Access repository and for inter-library loan, and for the title and summary to be made available to outside organisations.

Signed .................................................. (candidate) Date 28.06.18

STATEMENT 4: PREVIOUSLY APPROVED BAR ON ACCESS

I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available online in the University’s Open Access repository and for inter-library loans after expiry of a bar on access previously approved by the Academic Standards & Quality Committee.

Signed .................................................. (candidate) Date
Acknowledgements

I would like to acknowledge my gratitude to:

The Economic and Social Research Council, who funded this research and also funded my studies on the Social Sciences Research Methods MSc which gave me the skills to become a sociologist.

The many trainers, trainees, equality and diversity practitioners, and universities who so kindly supported the research by letting me take part in their training. I am especially grateful to those practitioners and trainees who met with me and/or agreed to be interviewed for the research - I gained immensely from these thoughtful discussions.

My supervisors Valerie Walkerdine and Michael Arribas-Ayllon. Since becoming Valerie’s student, I have left every meeting and phone call feeling re-energised and excited about my work. Michael has always been generous with his time and thoughtful challenges - I am particularly grateful for his willingness to meet with me on very short notice! I could never have completed this dissertation without their help and guidance.

My progress reviewer Dawn Mannay, whose interest in my PhD research and broader career development made every meeting a pleasure.

Corinda and Adriano at the Graduate Office for their help navigating the bureaucracy of the PhD.

All of the friends and family who have supported me with their friendship and love over the last few years, and especially:

My PhD buddies Julie, Grace, Vicky, Catt, Alisa, Amy, Alison and Jenny.

Rachel, Bethan, Kate, Amo, Kirstie, Catt, Zoe, Laura and Sarah for their generous hospitality.

Cas, Grace, August, Bessie, Gabrielle, and Nikki for very helpful comments on drafts of chapters.

Alison and Robbie for pointing me in the right directions when I was stuck.

My wonderful parents, Miriam and Mordechai, whose tangible and intangible support throughout the PhD process has helped me more than I can say.

This dissertation is dedicated to Cas, with my love and thanks.
# Contents

**Abstract** ................................................................................................................................. i

**Declarations** ............................................................................................................................. ii

**Acknowledgements** ................................................................................................................ iv

**Contents** ........................................................................................................................................ 1

**List of Abbreviations** .................................................................................................................. 5

## Chapter 1: Introduction.................................................................................................................. 6

1.1 Why study Equality and Diversity training? ........................................................................... 6

1.2 Situating E&D training at universities ...................................................................................... 8

1.3 The academic significance of E&D training ......................................................................... 10

1.4 Detailed thesis structure ......................................................................................................... 13

## Chapter 2: Methodology.................................................................................................................. 17

2.1 Introduction: Research as a journey ......................................................................................... 17

2.2 Personal experiences and MSc research .................................................................................. 17

2.3 Poststructuralism, Foucault and Feminism .............................................................................. 22

2.4 Why history? ............................................................................................................................... 25

2.4.1 To ‘make the familiar strange’ ............................................................................................. 26

2.4.2 Identify discourses and institutions of interest .................................................................... 27

2.4.3 Understand political meanings ............................................................................................ 28

2.4.4 Position the groups who are the topic of training ................................................................. 28

2.4.5 Historical method .................................................................................................................. 29

2.5 Ethnographic research design: Choosing the sites ................................................................. 31

2.5.1 Access: Shifts, compromises, and learning about the field ................................................ 32

2.6 Ethnography .............................................................................................................................. 36

2.6.1 Why ethnography? ................................................................................................................ 36

2.6.2 Positioning myself in the field .............................................................................................. 39

2.6.3 Informed consent ................................................................................................................... 45

2.6.4 Inhibiting engagement? ......................................................................................................... 47

2.6.5 Writing and expanding field notes ....................................................................................... 48

2.5.6 Details of sessions observed ............................................................................................... 50

2.7 Clarifying my research questions ......................................................................................... 51

2.8 Interviews: How and why ......................................................................................................... 58

2.9 Data analysis .............................................................................................................................. 60

2.10 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 62

## Part 1: E&D training in historical and social context...................................................................... 63
Chapter 3: The development of E&D training in the USA ................................................................. 63
  3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 63
  3.2 Before the Civil Rights Act: 1920-1964 ................................................................................ 65
  3.3 Civil Rights Act 1964: 1964-1979 .......................................................................................... 73
    3.3.1 Blue Eyes, Brown Eyes: Promoting empathy ................................................................. 75
    3.3.2 ‘White Awareness’ ............................................................................................................ 78
  3.4 Case study: Training in the USA military, 1970-1980 ............................................................ 80
  3.5 Training from 1980s-1990s ....................................................................................................... 83
  3.6 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 87

Chapter 4: The development of E&D training in the UK ................................................................. 90
  4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 90
  4.2 Immigration and race relations: 1940s-1970s ....................................................................... 91
  4.3 Police training: Scarman and Macpherson reports ............................................................... 101
  4.4 The Disability Rights Movement .......................................................................................... 110
  4.5 Legal developments from the 1990s to the present .............................................................. 114
    4.5.1 The Equality Act 2010 .................................................................................................... 116
  4.6 Managing diversity? ............................................................................................................... 121
  4.7 Insights from UK history ....................................................................................................... 122
  4.8 Conclusion: How did the practice of E&D training come about historically? ................. 125

Chapter 5: E&D Training at UK universities: Literature review .................................................. 129
  5.1 Introduction: Studies, personal accounts and theory ............................................................. 129
  5.2 Theoretical orientations: The university .............................................................................. 129
    5.2.1 Equalities courses for university students ...................................................................... 131
  5.3 Critical, qualitative studies of E&D training ......................................................................... 134
    5.3.1 Competing representations of oppression ...................................................................... 135
    5.3.2 Trainee resistance ............................................................................................................ 137
    5.3.3 Theorising trainee resistance: the figure of the ‘racist’ .................................................... 140
    5.3.4 Theorising social dominance: the figure of the ‘bigot’ .................................................... 143
    5.3.5 Trainers’ roles ............................................................................................................... 145
    5.3.6 Constructions of knowledge ......................................................................................... 146
  5.4 Mandatory or voluntary? ....................................................................................................... 148
  5.5 Training practices .................................................................................................................... 151
  5.6 Managing Diversity ............................................................................................................... 153
  5.7 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 156

Part 2: E&D Training in the Present ............................................................................................. 161
List of Abbreviations

CRA1964: Civil Rights Act 1964
CRE: Commission for Racial Equality
DSM: Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
E&D: Equality and Diversity
EA2010: Equalities Act 2010
EEOC: Equal Employment Opportunities Commission
EHRC: Equalities and Human Rights Commission
EU: European Union
GIRES: Gender Identity Research and Education Society
LGAT: Lesbian and Gay Awareness Training
LGBT: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Trans
RAT: Racism Awareness Training
RRA: Race Relations Act
UK: United Kingdom
UPIAS: Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation
USA: United States of America
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Why study Equality and Diversity training?

A shop owner becomes aware that her employee is refusing to serve disabled customers. The employer tells the employee to treat disabled customers in the same way as other customers and sends the employee on a diversity training course. However, the employee continues to treat disabled customers less favourably. One such customer brings a claim against both the employee and the employer. The employer may avoid liability by showing that she took all reasonable steps to stop the employee from acting in a discriminatory way. (Equality Act 2010, Explanatory notes)

This extract from the explanatory notes provided to the Equality Act 2010 describes how employers can avoid liability for the discriminatory acts of their employees by providing ‘diversity training’. Of course, this legal vicarious liability is an important motivator for the provision of training. Here, I want to draw attention to how a ‘diversity training course’ is treated as a self-evidently adequate response to the employee’s act of direct discrimination against disabled people. This key text, explaining how to apply the provision of the Equality Act 2010, makes no mention of the specific contents or approach of the ‘diversity training’. There is no consensus on what constitutes ‘diversity training’, or indeed of what constitutes ‘diversity’ (Ahmed 2012). In this sense, ‘diversity training’ in policy discourse is profoundly underspecified. It is imbued with promise, as a practice considered effective and serious enough to demonstrate that an employer is committed to equality, and yet is not described or defined.

This absence of a clear definition or description makes Equality and Diversity (E&D) training a complex phenomenon to understand politically. Although there have been insightful critiques of the idea of ‘training’ as a solution to social inequality and discrimination, and of specific forms of training (Gurnah 1984; Sivanandan 1985; French 1992), there has been very little research which looks in detail at what actually happens during these training sessions (Peel 2002b). Evidence as to the efficacy of training is mixed, and seems to depend on the specific exercises used and approach taken, as well as on how efficacy is measured (see Lindsey et al. 2017; Dobbin and Kalev 2016; Paluck and Green 2009). In addition, whereas training used to explicitly focus on specific groups or forms of discrimination, as in ‘Racism Awareness Training’ (Sivanandan 1985), in recent years an increasingly popular form of training aims to address all the legally protected groups in one session, or to
promote ‘diversity’ in general. Although there have been studies of diversity trainers and other diversity practitioners (Kahn 2011; Brewis 2016), evaluations of the effectiveness of ‘diversity training’ (Kalev et al. 2006; Dobbin et al. 2007), and manuals advising on how to do it (Clements and Jones 2002), there has been an absence of research illuminating and analysing the interactions that take place during training, and particularly in this more recent form of E&D training.

Due to the broadness of the term ‘diversity training’ or ‘E&D training’, and the popularity of training as a strategy to promote equality, it becomes necessary to understand the details of what training does and how. Rather than engaging directly with the question of effectiveness as some other researchers have (Dobbin and Kalev 2016; Paluck and Green 2009), I approach training as a historically and socially situated practice which needs to be understood in terms of social interaction. Rather than asking, ‘Does E&D training work?’, this thesis asks, ‘What happens in E&D training, and how did we get here?’.

This thesis interrogates E&D training with the critical, ethnographic analysis which has been used to study other forms of education (Walkerdine 1988; Ivinson and Murphy 2007; Epstein 2003). Although comparable research has been undertaken on some forms of equality training, such as Peel’s work on Lesbian and Gay Awareness Training (LGAT) (Peel 2002b), the face-to-face training which now takes place at universities is far more likely to be framed as ‘diversity’ or ‘equality and diversity’ than it is to be about a single protected group. As Equality and Diversity appears to be a rapidly changing field, the continuities and discontinuities in the practices of training and in the broader context need to be clearly understood.

In the next section, I briefly describe the recent changes in legislation and the controversies which have surrounded Equality and Diversity at universities over the course of my research. I then describe my own journey towards this topic, and discuss the academic relevance of the research. Finally I conclude the introduction with a chapter by chapter outline of the thesis.
1.2 Situating E&D training at universities

Equality and Diversity (E&D) training is a widely used strategy to address inequality within universities and other workplaces. In some ways, this represents a continuity since the 1980s, when ‘Racism Awareness Training’ began to be widely used in public sector workplaces across the United Kingdom (London Social Policy Unit 1987). This thesis traces some of the threads of continuity in the practices of E&D training, such as the key justifications given for training. However, there have also been major shifts in the discourses surrounding training, and the contexts that training is embedded in.

One example of such a change is the language used to describe organisational initiatives around equality, once ‘equal opportunities’, then ‘diversity’ (Ahmed 2012), with the term ‘inclusion’ becoming increasingly prominent in recent years (Sherbin and Rashid 2017). Over time, the subject matter of training has shifted from training solely around race, to a proliferation of training on other groups, such as Lesbian and Gay Awareness Training (Peel 2002b). As an increasing number of groups became legally protected from discrimination, training which aimed to cover ‘equal opportunities’ in general became more prominent, with ‘diversity’ training becoming popular in the 1990s as a form of training which attempts to incorporate all forms of human diversity. During the period of my research, training on ‘unconscious bias’ is becoming increasingly fashionable, as I discuss in the thesis.

The legal framework in the United Kingdom (UK) surrounding discrimination has also shifted significantly with the passing of the Equality Act 2010. The Equality Act aimed to harmonise and streamline existing equality law, created new protected groups and shifted the definition of others, and introduced the legal term ‘protected characteristic’ into UK law. The Equality Act also created the ‘public sector equality duty’, requiring all public bodies to have ‘due regard’ to the need to eliminate discrimination and harassment, advance equality of opportunity, and promote good relations between people who share a protected characteristic and those who don’t. These legal changes are reflected in the E&D training which currently takes place in UK universities.

In addition to these shifts in legislation, the field of equality and diversity at universities more generally appears to be in continuous motion. Over the course of my
research, begun in 2013, a new equality award for universities, the ‘Race Equality Charter’, was piloted and instituted (Equality Challenge Unit 2016). Issues surrounding equality at universities were in the news periodically throughout the time of my research. This included instances of high profile activism from students and staff - a few examples were the ‘I, Too, Am’ campaign, protesting against racism, spreading around UK campuses in 2014 (Haidrana 2014; Shackle 2014); the Oxford branch of the ‘Rhodes must fall’ campaign, protesting against the statue of Cecil Rhodes in Oriel College Oxford in 2015 (Tunzelmann 2016); and Professor Sara Ahmed’s widely publicised resignation from her post at Goldsmiths University of London in 2016, protesting against the university’s response to the sexual harassment of female students by male staff (Weale and Batty 2016; Ahmed 2016). These were responses to long standing issues at universities; there were also examples of high profile figures in academia coming to national attention for comments perceived by some as being at odds with the ideal of equality. For instance, Professor Tim Hunt resigned from his post at University College London following his widely reported comments about women in science made during a short speech (“you fall in love with them, they fall in love with you, and when you criticise them, they cry” (McKie 2015)); or the recent furore after the Oxford University Vice Chancellor, Louise Richardson, stated that her response to “many conversations” with students who expressed discomfort with their lecturer’s homophobic views was “my job isn’t to make you comfortable” (BBC 2017).

These events, whether framed as a problem of ‘snowflake’, delicate students who need to toughen up (Fox 2016; Howard 2017; Roberts 2017) or as appropriate responses to discrimination and harassment (Salisbury 2017), suggest that (in)equality at universities continues to be problematic and that universities continue to be a site of contention. As well as disagreements about what discrimination means, as demonstrated through the varied responses to these instances of activism or of offensive statements, there has been a media focus on the cultures surrounding equalities at universities. As the Equality Act 2010 does not include the university curriculum in any sense, and generally continues to protect academic freedom of speech, many of the controversies surrounding universities go beyond the legal obligations of the university and address wider questions of what equality means.
Against this apparently turbulent backdrop, training to raise ‘awareness’ of Equality and Diversity issues continues to be a significant component of universities’ strategies for equality. Training can be a way to ensure employees are aware of specific legal responsibilities and legal definitions of discrimination and harassment; of spreading knowledge about the policies and procedures of that particular university; of increasing ‘sensitivity’ towards minority groups, or ‘awareness’ of cultural differences; as well as many other possibilities. As I argued in Section 1.1, ‘E&D training’ is a broad term which can encompass a wide range of intended outcomes, subject matter, and pedagogic practices. This makes it all the more important to study E&D training in its historical and social context, and to understand which conceptions of equality are being communicated and contested through the training.

1.3 The academic significance of E&D training

... teaching and learning diversity are often quite different from teaching and learning other subjects. One of the key reasons for this is that diversity training can be very destabilizing for people. This is often because people have their sometimes ‘cosy’ view of the world challenged in a way that they normally would not. (Clements and Jones 2002, p. 113)

As Clements and Jones (2002) describe, E&D training has academic and political significance as a pedagogic space which is explicitly devoted to social change, through addressing ‘attitudes’ and ‘awareness’. This sets it apart from many other pedagogic spaces, which are understood as addressing knowledge and perhaps skills (see Clements and Jones 2002). The similarities and differences between E&D training and other forms of training and education are therefore of academic interest.

I first became interested in E&D training through having attended equality related training as a student volunteer, on specific topics such as disability. My experience as a participant was complex and ambivalent, and sparked my personal and academic interest in the pedagogic space of training on equalities, leading me to study a specific form of training for my MSc: ‘Mental Health First Aid’ (Chachamu 2013). This background puts me in an unusual position compared to other researchers of E&D training or education, most of whom came to the topic through being trainers themselves (Peel 2002b; DiAngelo 2011; Westerman 2008). I describe this early journey in more detail in Chapter 2. Following the MSc, I continued to be interested in training which is conceptualised as addressing social inequality...
through raising ‘awareness’. Realising that training which is on ‘Equality and Diversity’ in
general is now more prevalent than training on specific forms of oppression, I chose to
study E&D training for staff at universities.

This thesis begins to address the major gaps in our understanding of E&D training by first,
placing E&D training in its historical context, showing the conditions of emergence of E&D
training; and second, using ethnographic and interview data to analyse the curriculum and
delivery of present day E&D training. I chose to focus on the training delivered to employees
at universities, to narrow the focus of the research. I undertook fieldwork in nine
universities in England and Wales, acting as a participant-observer in at least one E&D
training session for staff at the university. I define E&D training, for my purposes, as
whatever forms of training are offered under the heading of Equality and Diversity. Today at
universities, most such training is not focused on any one type of oppression, but on
broader ideas of equality and of diversity, and this is reflected in the training I observed;
however, I did take part in some training sessions which were more specific in focus. I also
interviewed some trainers and some training participants about their experiences of
training, and had informal conversations with E&D practitioners and trainers. As well as
these in-person training sessions, I accessed online training provided at three different
universities; however, this online training did not form part of this research project. Using
this data, I address the overall question of what happens in E&D training for university
employees in England and Wales.

The research questions addressed in the thesis are:

1. How did the practice of E&D training come about historically?

Brown (2006) argues that depoliticization occurs through removing practices from their
historical context. I aim, as described by Peel (2002b), to analyse E&D training as a political
practice. History is a helpful tool in coming to understand E&D training as a political
response to specific situations and contexts, with political implications. For instance, Wise
and Stanley (1987) use a historical analysis of the terminology and concept of ‘sexual
harassment’ to show how the concept, initially a description of one aspect of patriarchy,
was successively transformed into a description of some workplace behaviour which was
disconnected from a wider analysis of gendered power relations. By tracing the practice of
E&D training back through different historical moments, I show that training developed as a
response to riots and fears of disorder – that is, as a form of government. This enables a new understanding of the present (Walkerdine 1986).

2. What happens in E&D training?
   2.i. What is the curriculum of the training, and how come?
   2.ii. How are participants positioned in relation to discrimination?

As already noted, there is a major gap in the literature on what takes place during E&D training. This thesis begins to fill that gap by describing training in detail, identifying the discourses used in training and considering how these produce subjects in particular ways. To address the broader question of ‘what happens’, I ask first about the curriculum. This refers to those components of training which are planned in advance: the information on slides, the choice of exercises and the topic of those exercises, and so on.

I particularly attend to the question of how participants are positioned through these discourses in relation to discrimination – as perpetrators, bystanders, victims, and so on. The resistance to E&D training on the part of trainees which is noted in the literature (Clement and Jones 2002; DiAngelo 2011) can be understood partly in terms of participants’ anxieties around how they will be positioned, and particularly whether they will be positioned as perpetrators of discrimination through the training.

The thesis begins with the methodology (Chapter 2), written in a narrative form which tells the journey of the research from its inception. This gives a detailed explanation of the development of the research questions, including the relevant methodological and theoretical literature. The rest of the thesis addresses the research questions, in two parts. Part 1 situates the fieldwork, by addressing the historical research question: how have we arrived at the present-day situation with respect to E&D training? This is addressed in Chapters 3 and 4. Many, but not all, of the relevant theoretical concepts and empirical findings are incorporated into these historical narratives; the remaining relevant literature is analysed in a literature review in Chapter 5. The question of ‘what happens in E&D training?’ is addressed in Part 2, which analyses the data gathered through fieldwork – ethnography and interviews. This section is made up of Chapters 6, 7 and 8, which each consider a different aspect of the data. Finally, Chapter 9 draws together the overall arguments of the thesis, and sets out the implications of the findings for policy, practice and future research.
In the final section of this introduction I explain the structure of the thesis in more detail with an outline of each chapter.

1.4 Detailed thesis structure

The Methodology chapter (Chapter 2) is written in a narrative form and tells the journey of the research. This journey incorporates the formation of a research plan and subsequent changes due to practical and ethical considerations. Where relevant, I incorporate and critically review the methodological literature, situating the research in relation to other scholarship in terms of the ethics and politics of the research, and the approach to history, ethnography and interviews. In explaining and justifying my choices about the methodology I incorporate the methods used for analysing data and writing up, as well as for collecting and producing the data. I also describe the gradual formation and reworkings of the research questions, which took firmer shape over the course of the research and analysis. Whereas many research questions are narrowed and clarified by undertaking a literature review, I found that that the gaps in the current literature were too substantial for this process to be a significant help in my process of writing the research questions. This was one key reason for undertaking historical research; also for this reason, I place the literature review after the historical overview in the thesis itself.

There are two historical chapters, Chapters 3 and 4; Chapter 3 sketches the history of E&D training in the United States of America (USA), and Chapter 4 the history of E&D training in the United Kingdom (UK). These chapters trace the development of UK E&D training from its American origins, which were intertwined with developments in social psychology. I argue that the earliest forms of E&D training were training on race and racism, which was a response to problems of government, being instituted in response to rioting and fears of disorder, in both the USA and UK. In America, training on racism was not a mainstream demand or practice of the Civil Rights Movement or Black Power Movement; this training developed as the response of white male psychologists to the problem of ‘prejudice’, and became a mainstream workplace practice as an attempt to comply with anti-discrimination legislation such as the Civil Rights Act 1964 (which itself was a response to the Civil Rights Movement). A range of approaches to the contents of anti-racism training developed in this period, but the idea of training became firmly established. When enforcement of anti-discrimination law began to drop off in the 1980s during the Reagan years of deregulation,
the justifications given for the importance of training shifted to focus on a ‘business case’ for ‘managing diversity’.

The development of E&D training in the UK, described in Chapter 4, has important parallels: training began with anti-racism training; responded to crises of governing the population; and developed into a broader form of ‘diversity training’. Both specific training materials and broader ideas behind the training often came to the UK from America. In the UK, the key, watershed moment in the growth of training was the Macpherson report (Macpherson 1999) which famously found that the Metropolitan Police were institutionally racist. Although the extent to which the report has had an impact on police culture over the subsequent years is debateable (see Rollock 2009), the symbolic impact of this report on the entire public sector was immense. This chapter also traces the development of training and legislation on women, disabled people, lesbian, gay and bisexual people, and trans people. I include an overview of the Equality Act 2010 and an analysis of the conceptions of in/equality which underpin it.

A literature review of the current literature on E&D training is undertaken in Chapter 5. In this chapter, I review literature which relates specifically to universities. I also review reflective accounts by lecturers and trainers on their experiences of conducting various forms of E&D education, theories of what training does or should do, and briefly review the ‘managing diversity’ literature with a focus on ‘diversity’ training. Using a range of sources, and drawing on Ahmed’s (2012) analysis of the figure of the ‘racist’, I introduce the theoretical construct of the ‘bigot’ as a discursive figure, arguing that anxieties around being perceived as a ‘bigot’ produce powerful effects in E&D training which create challenges for the trainer(s).

In Part 2 of the thesis, I address my central research question of what happens in E&D training. Chapter 6 provides an analytic overview of the training, which describes the atmospheres, practices, and materiality of training, and considers the effects that these have. I argue that while a range of practices and curricula are used by different E&D trainers, there are some areas of continuity between trainers. The substantial majority of the curriculum is derived either from psychology or from the law, with relatively limited attention to other possibilities such as history, sociology or the development of practical skills. I also argue that, contrary to some of the literature which presents E&D training and
particularly ‘diversity’ training as relying on ‘experiential’ learning (Thomas 1990; Geber 1990), the range of pedagogic approaches used is comparable to that of mainstream education, with small-group discussions, whole-group discussions and lecture-style teaching overwhelmingly predominating over techniques which are more identified with ‘training’, such as role-play. I discuss participant expectations of and attitudes towards training, focusing on how these are shaped by whether the training is mandatory. I argue that training which is mandatory or which draws on ‘vicarious liability’ as a justification for the training implicitly positions trainees as potential perpetrators of discrimination. Finally, this chapter argues that one key implicit goal of training is to convey the continued existence of discrimination, and that trainers draw on psychological, legal and sociological data to make this case.

Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 each look in more detail at one aspect of the training curriculum. Chapter 7 focuses on the use of law by trainers, as this discourse is a prevalent component of the training curriculum. Following on from the discussion of the Equality Act 2010 in Chapter 4, I show that the Equality Act is used to frame much of the training, but that training varies widely in terms of the depth in which the law is described and discussed. I argue that the law encourages a higher emphasis on disability, due to the unique legal provisions for disabled people. I also argue that it is difficult to use a legal framework to express a view of society as patriarchal, due to the framing of sex discrimination as discrimination based on sex rather than discrimination against women. More generally, I argue that the terminology and conceptual framework of the Equality Act 2010 are difficult to use when trying to express a consistent and coherent analysis of (in)equality. Finally, I examine the use of ‘scenarios’, an exercise used widely in training, and analyse the ways in which scenarios position participants in relation to discrimination.

Chapter 8 focuses on the ways in which the discursive figure of the ‘bigot’ is discussed, negotiated and worked around in E&D training. I analyse guides to language and behaviour in terms of how they relate to this figure, arguing that this guidance may effectively calm the anxieties associated with the figure of the ‘bigot’ but in doing so also legitimise these anxieties rather than interrogating them. I then describe the use of a social psychological discourse which positions bias as an intrinsic component of human nature. I argue that this discourse is used strategically to encourage participants to view themselves as potential
discriminators, while circumventing trainees’ resistance to being positioned as ‘bigots’. The psychological discourse attempts this by universalising and depoliticising the notion of discrimination. I also argue that there are intrinsic tensions in this discourse, over the question of whether it is possible to deliberately shift or remove biases. These tensions make the psychological discourse ultimately ineffectual at dispersing the anxieties associated with the figure of the ‘bigot’.

In Chapter 9 I draw these arguments together, and consider their implications for policy, practice and future research. I review the informal parameters that E&D training operates under, arguing that despite the apparent range of training discourses and practices, in fact there are significant continuities across my research sample, with legal and psychological discourses being used extensively. I describe the limitations of my research, and argue that there is a need for further ethnographic research of E&D training, as the absence of a detailed understanding of what happens in training undermines the possibilities of effective training. I argue that policy should be similarly attentive to the specificity of training curriculum and delivery, and particularly that training can and should look beyond the psychological and legal discourses which currently predominate. Finally I argue that activists should prioritise other forms of action above workplace training.
Chapter 2: Methodology

2.1 Introduction: Research as a journey

This chapter takes the reader through the journey of my research, including the twists and turns when events did not go according to plan! I aim to do this not at the expense of clarity or rigour, but in order to give a realistic understanding of the research process and of how the research questions partially ‘emerged’ from the research itself. Representing my methodology in this way is in keeping with my broader feminist aims of being honest about how in research, “What happens’ is idiosyncratic and redolent with ‘mistakes’ and ‘confusions’ and almost invariably differs from … [mechanistic] descriptions” (Stanley and Wise 2002, p.150).

I did not begin the research process with a clearly defined set of research questions. Rather, my research questions emerged from an initial set of concerns, or ‘foreshadowed problems’ (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995) developed through personal experiences, my own politics and my MSc research. I used history, interviews/conversations and ethnography to explore my concerns and clarify them into a set of research questions; I then used the historical research, ethnography and interviews to address these research questions.

As such, this chapter is structured around my experience of doing the research, and is broadly chronological. I give theoretical, pragmatic and ethical explanations of my decisions throughout the research process and reflect on the many aspects of the research which did not conform to my plans or expectations.

2.2 Personal experiences and MSc research

I became interested in Equality and Diversity (E&D) training after being a participant on training sessions for volunteers, as part of student volunteering schemes. I found these short courses sociologically fascinating as well as emotionally and personally engaging – particularly one on “Disability Awareness” and one on “LGBT+ Awareness” (Lesbian, gay, bisexual and trans, with ‘queer’ and other sexual and gender minority identities represented by the plus sign). I was interested to notice firstly, that the disability awareness training focused on the challenges faced by the parents and carers of young disabled people, although the volunteer role was to work directly with young disabled people at a youth club. This prompted an interest in the politics of training – why was it important for us to
empathise with parents and carers? Was this in keeping with the politics of the Disability Rights movement? Secondly, at the conclusion of this training, once all of the ‘curriculum’ had been covered (which included a strong focus on seeing disabled people as having dignity and autonomy), one of the trainers told us that we would enjoy volunteering because ‘you get a lot back – they have minds of their own’. This phrase suggested the need to reiterate that ‘they’, disabled young people, are not mindless; implying that we were not expected to believe in disabled people’s autonomy or dignity. I found this contradiction between the ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ messages of the training fascinating as well as upsetting.

During the LGBT+ awareness training, I was frustrated by the experience of being addressed as someone who needs to learn about LGBT+ communities and vocabularies – implicitly, as someone who is heterosexual and cisgender (not transgender). I am cisgender, but as a bisexual woman and activist I experienced a growing irritation over the ways in which my own experiences, political priorities, and vocabulary were being overridden by the trainer (for discussion of how bisexual people are marginalised within the ‘LGBT’ movement see Eisner 2013; Serano 2013). This prompted an interest in participants’ experiences of training on marginalised groups, and following my attendance at these two sessions, my understanding of ‘awareness training’ was no longer that it was a self-evidently good and progressive practice.

After my own resistance to being positioned as someone who needs to be made ‘aware’ of LGBT+ needs and lives, I tried to unpick this resistance into its components. I was frustrated by feeling that I was being closeted – actively positioned as heterosexual and cissexual – particularly in a context that was meant to create positive changes for people like me. I had political disagreements with the trainer: with his priorities for what to include in the training, the definitions he gave of specific terms, and the ways in which he talked about some of the LGBT+ identities he included in the training. I was also frustrated by the lack of specificity and coherence of the training, which did not seem to be tailored to the specific service that we were being trained to provide (a non-judgemental and non-advisory telephone listening service).

The question of who is included or excluded through the use of particular pedagogic methods was also on my mind at this time both as a student and as a researcher. The ideas
of ‘safe spaces’ and of ‘trigger warnings’ were a regular topic of feminist and anti-feminist debate, both among students and more widely. Of all of the debate which surrounded this and continues to (Foster 2016; Filipovic 2014; Halberstam 2017; Burrows 2017), I was and am most moved and inspired by Cross’s (2011) intervention in which she interrogates the pedagogy and politics which underpin the use of ‘shock’ as a teaching tactic, asking “Who is learning at whose expense?” (para. 41). This question stayed with me as a crucial element of pedagogy that required interrogation.

I began to study training on stigmatised identities and experiences in my MSc (Chachamu 2013), looking at ‘Mental Health First Aid’, a two-day training course in which participants are taught diagnostic criteria for a range of mental illnesses, given instructions on how to support someone currently experiencing a psychotic episode, depression, suicidal thoughts or a panic attack, and also given general information about various mental illnesses (such as prevalence and risk factors).

Attending two ‘Mental Health First Aid’ courses as an ethnographer, and carrying out follow-up interviews with some participants and one of the trainers, reinforced my interest in the detailed interactions that take place during adult education focussing on stigmatised identities and experiences, that try to reduce stigma and teach ‘good practice’. I was particularly interested to find that the two trainers took different approaches in their positioning of participants on the course, from the beginning of each course during trainee introductions. One trainer, ‘Ruth’, emphasised our privacy and safety by saying that there was no need to ‘disclose’ anything we didn’t want to. During participant introductions, no participant mentioned having lived experience of mental illness. This continued for most of the course, although the participants and Ruth referred frequently to relatives, colleagues and friends who had experienced mental illness. The other trainer, ‘Carys’, emphasised openness by saying that we could talk about ourselves and others if we wanted to. A number of people mentioned their own mental illnesses in their introduction and continued to refer to their personal experiences of mental illness throughout the course.

These different framings suggested different understandings of stigma and how it is best negotiated and contested. Ruth’s framing implied that stigma surrounding mental illness is a powerful presence in the training which participants needed to be protected from by suggesting the dangers of talking about one’s own mental illnesses, with the word
‘disclosure’ and the emphasis on being allowed not to disclose. Carys’s framing implied that stigma could be overcome within the context of the training through openness and suggested possibilities for speaking from a position of authority on one’s own mental illness.

These different framings had ramifications for how knowledge and power were understood and negotiated throughout the courses. Whereas on Ruth’s course participants referred to their professional knowledge, or their knowledge as friends or relatives of people with mental illnesses, to elaborate on, agree with or challenge the trainer’s statements, on Carys’s course some participants referred to their personal experiences to do this, for instance with one participant saying that her own depression felt more like a grey fog than like a ‘black dog’.

These experiences and initial research became a cloud of issues which I wanted to unpick further. At this stage, I was interested in ‘awareness raising’ training on marginalised groups because it is an obviously political practice, focusing on the inclusion, equality or liberation of marginalised groups. As a political practice, it is used widely by activist groups, and when beginning my research I had rarely heard training being questioned as a component of activism, although I later became aware of these critiques (see Gurnah 1984; Sivanandan 1985; French 1992). As such, I had a political interest in E&D training, which seemed to have become a panacea – I was sceptical as to whether this was justified.

I was also academically interested in E&D training as an instance of adult education. Studies of adult education have suggested that the techniques used by teachers of adults to maintain control over the classroom and interest in the topic might differ from those used by teachers in schools (Salisbury 1986). This is interesting in its own right, but research in this area can also contribute to more mainstream ethnographies of education by ‘fighting familiarity’ and hence enabling researchers to ‘see’ more of the social setting, as Delamont and Atkinson have argued extensively (Delamont and Atkinson 1995; Delamont 2005; Delamont, Atkinson and Pugsley 2010). As well as being an instance of adult education, which has received less attention than children’s education in the ethnography of education, E&D training is a context in which “knowledge” might be understood as being partially based in personal experience. This could lead to participants privately or publicly contesting the ‘knowledge’ presented by the trainer where it conflicts with their own experiences (as I experienced with the ‘LGBT+ Awareness’ training, and as confirmed by the
literature; see Peel 2002b, pp.149-155). Finally, I was struck by E&D training as an educational context in which the subject matter to be learned is often framed as knowledge or ‘awareness’ (see Clements and Jones 2002), but is also conceptualised in emotional terms and as trying to teach particular attitudes or emotions and to calm fears (Brewis 2016). This seems different from educational contexts which are focused on skills such as use of software, or on knowledge such as history.

However, I struggled to articulate my research questions with any precision, finding that I couldn’t translate my ‘foreshadowed problems’ and my interests into ‘research questions’. As such, I began planning my research to first clarify my questions.

Having experienced via ethnography the way in which two trainers were able to create different atmospheres using the ‘same’ curriculum and many of the same course materials, I knew that ethnography had to be a key component of my method; and I had also found interviews useful in showing how differently other participants experienced the course compared to me and in understanding trainers’ reasons for approaching the material in particular ways.

As part of my initial interest was in how members of marginalised groups who were participants in ‘awareness training’ about their own marginalisation would find this experience, I initially wanted to compare training on two different (though overlapping) marginalised groups: people with mental illnesses (‘mental health awareness’) and LGB and T people (‘LGBT awareness’). I was interested in ‘LGBT awareness’ because I am a bisexual woman - this ‘insider’ status was politically and ethically relevant to me as a feminist researcher. I was interested in training on mental illness as a continuation of my MSc research, and because my previous education and research was in psychology and psychiatry. I also considered these two groups to be interesting to compare due to being currently and historically intertwined, with the removal of homosexuality from the DSM often being hailed as a milestone in gay liberation and current controversy and activism surrounding ‘Gender Dysphoria’ being a DSM diagnosis (see Davy 2013).

As I began to look into the provision of these courses, however, I realised while there is continued provision of courses on ‘mental health awareness’ (for instance by Mind) and on ‘LGB awareness’ and ‘LGBT awareness’, UK organisations are overwhelmingly more likely to
offer or make mandatory a course on ‘Equality and Diversity’ than on either of these specific topics. I realised that while it would still be possible to compare courses on LGBT awareness with courses on mental health awareness, it would be more relevant to study ‘Equality and Diversity’ training. This was a substantive shift in the nature of the research project, which meant that ‘insider/outsider’ distinctions became far more complex and a far broader set of social movements and liberation theories became directly relevant. Every form of oppression and marginalisation referred to under ‘diversity’ was now part of my research project – a prospect I found very daunting! Although I had changed the scope of the research by choosing to study a more general form of training, I still had no clearly specified research questions. Instead I continued to have general areas of interest: how E&D training compared to more mainstream educational settings, how trainers would negotiate questions of knowledge and power, and how trainees would manage agreement and conflict between their own politics and experiences and those prioritised in the training.

As I carried out much of the research with my research questions as a work in progress, I clarify these later in this chapter, in Section 2.7. Although my research questions only took shape gradually, my overall approach to research has been similar throughout; I describe this approach in the next section.

2.3 Poststructuralism, Foucault and Feminism

The theoretical underpinnings of my approach to this research have remained largely constant throughout the research process. Throughout, I have conceptualised the current social world as the contingent result of historical events and processes. I use the concept of ‘discourse’ to order my thoughts and observations about training. As ‘discourse’ is a term which can be used in a wide range of ways in current sociological research (Keller 2013), it is worth clarifying the underpinning theoretical ideas here before continuing with the research journey.

I use ‘discourses’ in a way which is closely related to Foucault’s conception of discourse, but not identical. Gordon (1994) defines Foucault’s idea of discourses as “identifiable collections of utterances governed by rules of construction and evaluation which determine within some thematic area what may be said, by whom, in what context, and with what effect” (p. xvi). In other words, a discourse is a body of knowledge; a way of making sense of the world,
which makes some ideas obvious while others are impossible to conceptualise. For Foucault, ‘discourse’ referred to a collection of statements with a set of relations to each other which, taken as a whole, constitute a discourse. Understood in this way, discourses both produce and constrain our thoughts. This is an essentially poststructuralist conception of ‘discourse’, and is importantly disconnected from materiality.

Some critique the overuse of the term ‘discourse’, such as Hacking (1998). In this work, he analyses the conditions of possibility for the emergence of the mental illness ‘fugue’, and develops his own analytic vocabulary in doing so – one of ‘vectors’ and ‘ecological niches’. Hacking argues eloquently against the wholesale adoption of Foucault’s analytic vocabulary, and further argues that the term ‘discourse’, taken from linguistics, would not have been in adequate to analyse the emergence of ‘fugue’:

Of course language has a great deal to do with the formation of an ecological niche, but so does what people do, how they live, the larger world of the material existence that they inhabit. That world must be described in all its peculiar and idiosyncratic detail. (Hacking 1998, p.86)

While I admire Hacking’s analysis in this book, and accept that ‘discourse’ is more evocative of speech than of material practices, I have found ‘discourse’ a helpful term ‘to think with’. With Hacking, I argue that we do need to be attentive to “the larger world of ... material existence” (1998, p.86); but I use ‘discourse’ in a sense which goes beyond language. Rather, a ‘discourse’ can be taken as a broader term which incorporates ‘discursive practices’ – those technologies, techniques and aspects of materiality which are used to produce subjectivities within a particular discourse.

The term ‘discursive practices’ used in this sense comes from Henriques et al. (1984), who begin with Foucault’s framework but go beyond it to produce their own analytic methods, which interrogate subjectivity. They argue that discourses, in Foucault’s sense, position subjects in multiple, sometimes contradictory ways, and these ‘subject positions’ are productive of particular ways of understanding the world. In attending to the process by which discourses involve subject positions which people then use to understand themselves and each other, Henriques et al. point to the relevance of practice and of materiality:

The analysis which we propose regards every discourse as the result of a practice of production which is at once material, discursive and complex, always inscribed in relation to other practices of production of discourse. Every discourse is part of a
discursive complex; it is locked in an intricate web of practices, bearing in mind that every practice is by definition both discursive and material. (1984, p.106)

Walkerdine (1984, 1988) uses the term ‘discursive practices’, referring to the practices associated with a particular discourse. This enables an analysis of how discourses produce subjectivities, through the use of particular technologies which are understood in particular ways. For instance, Walkerdine (1984) recorded a mathematics lesson which was structured through the discourse of progressive developmental psychology, in which children are believed to learn through a predictable, universal sequence of stages. The task of the teacher is to intuit when a child is ‘ready’ to move on to the next stage and then to guide them through this stage; the child’s learning is again conceptualised through their use of specific, prescribed methods for reaching the correct answer to the question. The ‘discursive practices’, then, are the specific techniques which are both used by the teacher and inscribe her within them. Within this discourse her role as teacher is to create the ‘right’ learning environment, to produce knowledge about the child which enables her to decide whether the child is ‘ready’, and to assess whether learning – again, understood within this discourse – has taken place.

This idea of ‘discursive practices’ makes sense within Foucault’s conception of power/knowledge. Foucault refers to power/knowledge as a way of describing the way in which knowledge and power are mutually constitutive:

> We should not be content to say that power has a need for a certain discovery, a certain form of knowledge, but we should add that the exercise of power creates and causes to emerge new objects of knowledge and accumulates new bodies of information ... The exercise of power perpetually creates knowledge and, conversely, knowledge constantly induces effects of power. (Foucault 1975, quoted in Gordon 1994 pp. xv – xvi)

These ‘effects of power’ which knowledge ‘constantly induces’ are induced not solely through utterances or statements, but through discursive practices; technologies and apparatuses which order the world according to the logic of the discourse. As such, I include practice(s) as a component of discourse. To maintain clarity on this point I sometimes refer to ‘discursive practices’.

As is evident from this discussion of my use of language, Foucault’s work has had a profound influence on the way I theorise. However, rather than drawing primarily on Foucault’s own
work in situating myself theoretically, I have primarily situated myself in relation to post-structuralist feminist works (e.g. Walkerdine 1984; Bacchi 1999; Brown 2006). While many of these are explicitly influenced by Foucault, I have found these works more productive in directing my thinking as their research topics and political impetus more closely overlap with my own. Throughout the research I have tried to maintain a focus on the implicit assumptions and politics of the discourses surrounding training.

2.4 Why history?

Usually, research question(s) are clarified and sharpened by undertaking a literature review. However, the contemporary literature consists largely of manuals and advice for trainers, studies which evaluate training, reflective papers by trainers and educators, and some interview studies of diversity practitioners. I review these in Chapter 5. While this literature contains many valuable and relevant insights for my project, I was unable to find any ethnographic literature on E&D training as currently practiced in the UK; that is, training which usually ‘covers’ several different forms of marginalisation. (Towards the end of my research I learned about a recently completed PhD dissertation, which combined interviews and observational data in studying diversity practitioners and diversity training in the UK through a Foucauldian lens (Brewis 2016). I discuss aspects of this study in detail in the literature review in Chapter 5). The ethnographic research that does exist has focused on training or workshops which focus on one form of discrimination or oppression, with Peel studying LGAT in the UK from 1998-2001 (Peel 2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2008; Harding and Peel, 2007; Peel and Kitzinger, 2005) and Srivastava studying anti-racist workshops in feminist and social action groups in Canada (Srivastava 2005, 2006).

Although the work of these scholars is fascinating and thought-provoking, there remain huge gaps in the ethnographic literature about E&D training. Srivastava and Peel were both practitioners – that is, they delivered some of the training that they analysed – and neither studied a general E&D training which covers a range of oppressions. Although there is qualitative research on more general E&D training (e.g. Hayat and Walton 2012) and on E&D education (e.g. Collins and Wilkie 2010), most of this research is not ethnographic and does not analyse in detail the interactions which take place on the course. Overwhelmingly, the accounts given are those of educators and practitioners who were actively involved in the delivery of the courses they describe and analyse.
I decided to turn to the history of E&D training to clarify my focus. I hoped this would be helpful for four reasons: to enable me to ‘see’ the taken-for-granted aspects of present-day training or ‘make the familiar strange’; to gain an understanding of the political origins of equality and diversity training; to identify discourses of interest; and to learn more about the history and positioning of different groups who might be the topic of the training. I explain each of these reasons in more depth below:

2.4.1 To ‘make the familiar strange’
There has been a call within the sociology of education, and particularly the ethnography of education, to improve our ability to notice, and analyse, aspects of education which we often do not notice because we take them for granted (e.g. Delamont and Atkinson 1995, Delamont et al. 2010). The idea of ‘making the strange familiar, and making the familiar strange’ has a long history within anthropology and sociology (Delamont 2010). Delamont offers several mechanisms by which researchers can ‘fight familiarity’, one of which is to study a wider range of educational settings than compulsory schooling of children and teenagers (2002, 2005). In this sense, as E&D training in its current form has rarely been studied ethnographically (though see Brewis 2016), the research project may be useful to other educational researchers in ‘making the familiar strange’. However, this is not quite the sense in which I use the term here. Delamont (2002, 2005) does not include historical study as a means of troubling the taken-for-granted (except for reading educational ethnographies of the past), but this method of enabling both researcher and reader to question the present is extensively used by Foucault (1978a, 1978b) and others (e.g. Brown 2006; Wise and Stanley 1987; Rose 1996; Bacchi 1999), including in the field of education research (Walkerdine 1984). There were two aspects of the ‘familiar’ that I particularly wanted to question: the rationale for E&D training taking place at all, and the specific discursive practices of training.

My sense, going into the research, was that ‘training’ is understood by most people in the UK as an obvious component of E&D policies (this continued to be my sense throughout the research). Further, at least in some circles, training sometimes seems to be the only or the main avenue imagined for change. Over the last few years I have encountered many student campaigns for staff to have more training (e.g. in sexual harassment, unconscious bias, mental health, disability awareness). I have also heard employees of organisations, and
teaching staff at universities, excuse themselves from taking responsibility for a range of problems experienced by minoritised service users or students because they ‘can’t afford training’ or ‘haven’t been trained’.

Studying the history of how this came about is one way of destabilising E&D training as an ‘obvious’ or ‘natural’ practice, both to enable me as the researcher to perceive different aspects of the field, and to enable readers of the research in the same way. This approach is associated with Foucault’s ‘histories of the present’ (e.g. Foucault 1978a, Foucault 1978b); historical study not as an end in itself but a way of orienting oneself towards the present with insights gained from the history. In this sense, it is also comparable to the histories offered by Brown (2006) of ‘tolerance’, and by Wise and Stanley (1987) of ‘sexual harassment’, as these studies combine history with a direct analysis of the present. Foucault’s genealogy of discipline (1978) includes an analysis of the ‘training’ of soldiers, school children and factory workers; although he does not explicitly connect this to the present, many of the practices he describes and analyses are recognisably still used today, such as exams and assessments.

One of Foucault’s methodological techniques to partially step outside the present was genealogy – the historical study of discourses. By tracing the changes in the conceptualisations of a particular domain, such as sexuality, the historical contingencies by which we have reached our present-day concepts of sexuality become visible. This in turn makes aspects of our current discourses visible and open to question, and may enable new understandings and conceptions to be reached. Although it is impossible to take a position outside discourse, it is possible to shift our way of seeing the world, so that some aspects of discourse which we had taken for granted become open to analysis.

2.4.2 Identify discourses and institutions of interest

Through this attentiveness to history and politics, I hoped to identify the discourses (as defined above in Section 2.2) which I might see when conducting ethnography, and further, to see when they began to be used and in response to which pressures. Tracing this history would give me a deeper understanding of the present when I came to study it ethnographically.
I also hoped the genealogy would identify some key institutions, which might be appropriate sites for fieldwork. As discourses have specific conditions of emergence and are prominent in particular places and times, there might be major differences between the E&D training in the private and public sectors, or the training provided to teachers compared to the training provided to police officers. Training might have arisen in these workplaces in response to separate situations or following different trajectories, and by tracing the history of E&D training I expected that these would also become visible to some extent.

2.4.3 Understand political meanings
To understand the political implications and meanings of a set of practices, those surrounding training, requires some understanding of how the present day political situation came about as well as an understanding of what the present day political situation is. In fact, Brown argues that “Depoliticization involves removing a political phenomenon from comprehension of its historical emergence and from a recognition of the powers that produce and contour it” (2006, p.15). In recognition of this, I wanted to learn, did the initial impetus for ‘training’ come from liberation groups or from elsewhere? Who set the curriculum, and what was the curriculum? What sorts of resistance did the practice encounter? These were the sorts of questions I was interested in answering through historical study. This is similar to the “archaeology of knowledge” undertaken by Wise and Stanley of the term and concept ‘sexual harassment’, who use their archaeology to show how “the feminist analysis of such problems is successively worked up and transformed; ... men’s culpability for their behaviour ‘becomes’ something else” (1987, p.19). This use of ‘archaeology’ is distinct from Foucault’s use of the term (Foucault 1972); Wise and Stanley attribute their ‘archaeology of knowledge’ to “Mary Daly (1978) and now many other women as well” (1987, p.56).

2.4.4 Position the groups who are the topic of training
The socio-political context of E&D training can be conceptualised in relation to human resources, management, and adult education. However, another component of the context of E&D training is the social position of the groups who are the ‘topic’ of the training. To understand the political implications of particular training methods and curricula, I needed to know more about the histories of the minoritised groups who (I assumed) would be
spoken about in training. In current UK equality legislation (the Equality Act 2010), there are nine ‘protected characteristics’ – sex, age, sexual orientation, race (which covers colour, nationality, and ethnic and national origin), gender reassignment, pregnancy and maternity, marriage and civil partnership, disability, and religion and belief (I explain this law in detail in Chapter 4). At the outset of the research I had substantial gaps in my knowledge about these forms of marginalisation and the history of some of the social movements that led to these inclusions in the legislation – for instance, about the disability rights movement and about anti-racist struggles in the UK. Because at the outset my interest had not been in equalities in general but in the struggles for equality specifically in relation to LGBT people and to mental health, I had a lot of catching up to do in terms of situating the specific political trajectories of each of the other groups who are legally protected against discrimination and who I assumed were likely to be discussed in training.

2.4.5 Historical method

As I noted above, the type of history that I wanted to do was inspired by Foucault’s genealogies, which look for the ‘conditions of possibility’ of particular historical shifts. Foucault’s method involved gathering and analysing large volumes of historical material from the period of interest, and using this material to form an idea of the discourses of the time. Rather than relying on famous, well-known or ‘influential’ texts, Foucault used ‘ordinary’ sources from the historical period he was interested in (Arribas-Ayllon and Walkerdine 2008). My aim was similarly to trace the practice of ‘equality and diversity’ training back through time, looking to find and understand the metamorphoses the practice underwent – for instance, the move from ‘equal opportunities’ to ‘diversity’, and how different groups became the ‘topic’ of training.

My method differed from a Foucauldian genealogy in that I drew on existing historical accounts to orient and guide my research, most notably Rose (1996), Gordon (2015), Anand and Winters (2008), Kelly and Dobbin (1998), and Hiro (1992). These directed me to key historical sources, but I also in general accepted their accounts. Unlike Foucault, I focused on sources which were widely cited as influential or significant; for instance, key court judgements, and the Scarman report (Scarman 1981) and MacPherson report (MacPherson 1999). In other words, my method was more conventional and less thorough than Foucault’s in terms of my ability to create new historical insights, as I was using many of the
same texts as other researchers. This was primarily for pragmatic reasons – I viewed the historical research as a means to the ends noted above in Section 2.3.1, rather than as the central aim of the thesis.

At the initial stages I read sources such as training manuals, studies evaluating the effectiveness of training, and the personal reflections of trainers. As I learned more I read more widely, looking for references to training in sources about social movements – for instance in histories of the Civil Rights Movement in the USA and in manifestos, autobiographies and other documents authored by activists in the Civil Rights Movement. I also looked specifically to understand the history of ‘equality and diversity’ training in the UK. As well as many shifts of terminology, pedagogic approach and theoretical approach, I also found many absences (for instance, a lack of references to training or anti-racist education in texts of the Civil Rights Movement – see Chapter 3) as well as presences which took me by surprise.

After a period of historical research, I realised that history was an integral component of my interest in E&D training, and that I was now able to formulate and answer the question, “How did the practice of E&D training come about historically?”

Additionally, I was aware of some of the key sites where the practices of training evolved (the USA military, see Section 3.4) and where ideas about the value(s) of ‘diversity’ and ‘equal opportunities’ were debated (USA university admissions, see Section 3.5), as discussed in Chapter 3. I had partially achieved my aim of becoming more knowledgeable about the specific histories of minority groups. The results of this research are discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.

However, the process of historical study did not succeed in clarifying my research interests which related to present-day E&D training – described above in Section 2.1, such as an interest in comparing the pedagogies of E&D training and mainstream educational settings – into research questions about the present. I needed to get into the field to be able to link what I had learned through the historical study with the current practices of E&D training and use the fieldwork, together with my general interests and aims, to develop well-defined research question. As such, I began my fieldwork still without a clear idea of what my
ethnographic research questions were. Although I worried about this a lot at the time, this is not unusual, according to Hammersley and Atkinson:

Ethnographic research should have a characteristic ‘funnel’ structure, being progressively focused over its course. Over time the research problem needs to be developed, and may need to be transformed; and eventually its scope must be clarified and delimited, and its internal structure explored. In this sense, it is frequently well into the process of inquiry that one discovers what the research is really about … (2007, p.160)

2.5 Ethnographic research design: Choosing the sites

My initial intention was to study two specific institutions, such as a police department and a social work department. This would have given me some continuity and consistency as the type of training, the trainer and their curriculum, and the workplace would stay the same (while all the participants in the training would change with each session). I hoped to be able to study each specific institutions’ training in depth, watching the same trainer deliver training multiple times, because I thought that by watching the ‘same’ curriculum being delivered repeatedly to different groups of staff, as I did when studying ‘Mental Health First Aid’ (Chachamu 2013), I would be able to study the ways in which the pedagogy varied across different groups of participants (see Ivinson and Murphy 2007). This was the rationale for preferring to stay within a given institution, rather than watch the training delivered at many different institutions; the choice to study two institutions in depth, rather than one, was a compromise which would have enabled me to combine this in-depth examination of how the ‘same’ curriculum can nonetheless vary, with an appreciation of the differences between the curricula and delivery by different trainers in different institutions. However, it still remained to choose the institutions.

Most of the key institutions identified through the genealogy, either as pioneers or as centres of debate, were American: the USA Military stood out as pioneering (see Section 3.4), while universities stood out as a centre of debate (around ‘affirmative action’ (Bacchi 1996) in student admissions (see Section 3.5). In the UK, the key institution was the police service, following the Scarman report on the Brixton disturbances (Scarman 1981) and the Macpherson report on Stephen Lawrence’s murder (Macpherson 1999; Clements 2000). Schooling and social work were also sites of interest as ‘multicultural practice’ and
'multicultural education' have received considerable academic attention (Arora and Duncan 1986; May 1999).

Studying E&D training within the police service would have been a fascinating topic. However, police culture, the work of policing and the specific problems relating to the police and minority groups are well-researched areas in their own right which, going into the PhD, I knew nothing about; additionally, police services are often difficult to access for research. While important to the wider history of E&D training in the UK, police training has also been distinctive and often separate from the training which took place at other institutions – for instance, much police training on E&D historically took place at a specialist police training college which ran two-week residential courses in equal opportunities (Oakley 1990). As such the training undergone by police was not necessarily closely connected to the type of training provided in other public-sector workplaces. Further, a problem for my research shared by the police, social work departments and schools is that these institutions are generally not big enough for regular E&D training to be realistic - I assumed that training would be unlikely to take place in a given social work department more than a few times a year.

As such I began by trying to access institutions where I did understand some of the wider business of the institution – universities. At this stage in the research I assumed that E&D training would be carried out on a regular basis (at least weekly) at universities, as there were so many staff to train – I later learned this was a mistaken assumption. Under this misapprehension, I thought I would be able to study two universities’ training provision in depth. The choice of universities also gave me, to a degree, an ‘insider’ status as I also study at and work for a university (and have been connected as an employee or student to universities throughout my adult life); I discuss this in more detail below. In the next section, I describe how this initial plan was modified by the contingencies of access and timing.

2.5.1 Access: Shifts, compromises, and learning about the field
As is common in ethnographic and other sociological research, there were some sharp changes of direction following difficulties with access. In describing the ways in which my research plans changed as a result of access difficulties, I also want to bring out the ways in which the necessary access negotiations taught me about the field (as highlighted by other
researchers, e.g. Cipollone and Stich 2010; Scourfield and Coffey 2006) and helped me make connections with trainers I would later want to interview.

My intention was to begin with one university at which I had understood from initial enquiries that training was run on a regular basis, by an internal trainer, with multiple sessions per week. I planned to begin by being a participant-observer at two sessions per week over a month. As described above in Section 2.4, I hoped in that way to become familiar with one trainer’s choice of curriculum, exercises, and so on, and keep one element relatively ‘constant’, enabling me to observe the interactions between participants, the emotional responses of participants, and the dynamics of each training group.

Although the trainer was happy to grant access, there were difficulties in gaining agreement from administrators, which took four months. During that time, I attempted to make contact with nineteen other universities, using the email addresses on their websites for Equality and Diversity. I chose these universities primarily on the basis of location – being able to get to the university relatively easily on public transport from a few ‘bases’ where I would be able to stay overnight without paying for accommodation.

Of these, eight never got back to me, and two responded saying immediately that they would be unable to help with my research. Of the remaining nine, seven noted in their responses that they use online modules as their main or only form of E&D training. I also began to hear more about online training when having informal conversations with university staff who I met at talks and conferences. While the specifics varied between different universities, it was clear that online training was a central component of the E&D training offered at most universities. Some universities offered no other training at all; most supplemented their online training with face-to-face training, which might be mandatory for some groups of staff, all staff, or entirely optional.

I requested access to online modules wherever I learned that these were used by a university, and was given access to the module at three universities. At another, they commented that their online training provider was the same as one already in my sample, so their online training was identical. I hoped to include an analysis of the curriculum and structure of these courses in my research. In the end, due to time constraints, online training was not incorporated into the research.
Of the universities which did offer in-person E&D training, some offered a range of courses on specific topics, each of which took place only once or twice a year. Examples included ‘Mental Health Awareness’, ‘Leading On Diversity’, ‘Cultural Awareness’, and ‘Unconscious Bias’. Where this was the case, I asked to attend some of these courses. My choices were limited, as there were only a few courses running during my fieldwork period and some clashed with existing commitments (including other fieldwork). However, I aimed to choose more general courses, as these would be closer to mainstream E&D training (courses using terms like ‘unconscious bias’ and ‘diversity’). In general, I attended only one at each university; as the trainer and training group would be different each time, the benefits of being able to return to the same site were limited. I preferred to widen my sample and observe training at as many universities as possible. Other universities offered an ‘Equality and Diversity’ course, which in some cases was mandatory for new staff. I asked to attend these sessions, which varied in frequency from once a month to twice a year. At one university, where training sessions occurred twice a year, I asked to observe both sessions, six months apart. At the other two universities where training occurred each month, I asked to attend only once. This decision was based on my expectation that when my original research site access was sorted out, I would be doing regular fieldwork there, and would supplement that fieldwork with one-off sessions at other universities.

During fieldwork, I learned that the structure of many universities precluded regular, centralised training, with each faculty or school arranging training for their own staff. This meant that establishing contact with the E&D Manager did not necessarily lead to me learning about all the E&D training taking place at the university. For instance, at the university which I initially hoped to use as my main research site, when I was eventually granted access, I learned that although training was conducted multiple times a week (the factor which had initially made me choose this university as my research site), only one session a month was open to all members of staff. The other sessions were scheduled in particular departments at the request of that department – ‘bespoke’ training. Trying to attend these courses would have meant negotiating access with that department as well as with the centralised Human Resources department. When I learned this, I planned to attend only the monthly training sessions which were open to any member of staff. However, of the four sessions that I expected to attend, only one session took place. Two others were
cancelled, which I was told was due to the trainer’s availability. The trainer then left her role at the university before the final session would have taken place. This led to me losing access to that university’s training altogether, and was instructive in terms of demonstrating the high turnover of staff working in E&D – at the nine universities that finally took part in the research, four of the members of staff I had arranged my access with had left by the end of my fieldwork, as well as another of the trainers in my sample.

Gaining access to E&D courses was often a slow process involving phone calls or a face-to-face meeting with a member of the E&D team. When I did meet with a member of the E&D team at a university, they often taught me a lot about the field, sharing anecdotes about their experiences, telling me about their own history of how they got into the field of training or of E&D practice, and giving their own perspective on my reasons for finding their field interesting. I wrote up these meetings as ethnographic notes (Mannay and Morgan 2015) and they profoundly informed my understanding of the field, but I am not using the notes as ‘data’ in the same way as my formal ethnography (for instance, by including notes from these meetings as data extracts in the thesis), as this is not what the participants were intending when they agreed to meet.

After two particularly interesting conversations with E&D practitioners, I asked if they would be willing to have a recorded interview with me. I hoped to get a better record of their anecdotes and ideas, and to be able to use these as an official source of ‘data’. As such I approached the interviews as a conversation, giving them this explanation. While they agreed, both participants made it clear that the interview situation was distinct from the informal conversations that we had before and after, and tailored what they said accordingly. Realising this, I stopped requesting unstructured ‘interviews’ with these participants, instead focusing on writing down what I could remember about our conversations, although I continued to treat these as ‘off the record’ in terms of explicit inclusion in the thesis. Hall (2003) describes his decision to stop recording interviews (with young homeless people who were participants in his ethnography) in similar terms.

In some cases, the members of staff I spoke to asked to receive a copy of my thesis, and in one case for me to write a report of my observations. I always agreed to these requests, after clarifying that I was not there to evaluate courses. However, I found it very difficult to write this report and to gauge what would be considered relevant or not. In addition, a six-
week interruption of study began soon after this session; as a result, it was weeks after the session before I finally sent in my report. I now think it was a mistake to agree to write a ‘report’ without having first discussed much more extensively what kinds of information should be in it.

Following these access negotiations with members of staff, one university refused access on the grounds that they were not convinced participants would be able to truly consent to participation in the research, as their attendance at training was mandatory. However, most universities who had provided face-to-face training and who responded to my initial email did grant me access to their training.

Due to these complications, the months that I expected to spend researching just one setting intensively were instead spent travelling to universities across England and Wales, meeting with different trainers and other E&D workers and attending training sessions. Rather than simply ‘entering the field’ I was continuously negotiating access to different institutions while also taking courses at universities who had granted me access. Unlike ethnographers of schools and other fixed institutions, I was unable to devise a structured ‘schedule’ for being in the field (see Renold 1999) and simply attended courses wherever possible, which sometimes meant attending two in quick succession at different universities. To gather what I felt was enough data on training at universities, I ended up spending the entire fieldwork period observing training at different universities. My fieldwork was profoundly shaped by the uncertainties of access and, in the end, deviated strongly from my initial image of the research. I give a summary of which sessions I did observe in Section 2.5.6 and in Appendix 4.

In sum, it was only through these access negotiations that I realised that mandatory online training is far more widespread than face-to-face E&D training; that training is not all centralised; and that universities’ policies on training (e.g. whether it was mandatory) and practices of training (e.g. the types of training offered) differ widely between institutions.

2.6 Ethnography

2.6.1 Why ethnography?

I chose ethnography as my main research method because my interest was workplace E&D training as a social, interactive setting. Although I learned through my access negotiations
that face-to-face training is no longer the dominant form of E&D training, my academic interest was in ways that trainers attempt to engage with participants. I wanted to engage with the practical and interactional details of what takes place during training, and to watch training unfold rather than relying on accounts of training. As I discussed in Section 2.1 about my MSc research (Chachamu 2013), ethnography can illuminate discursive practices and show both constants and variations in the practice of ‘training’. Previous ethnographic research on Gay and Lesbian Awareness Training (Peel 2002b, 2008; Peel and Kitzinger, 2005) has demonstrated how the interactions which take place during training can be very different from those described in guides for trainers; this is suggestive of the importance of studying social interactions as they occur, and not only through engagement with written sources or interview data.

In particular, I wanted to contribute to the ethnography of education by undertaking an ethnography of E&D training. The research which has most inspired me has used ethnography as a central method to understand specific educational settings (Peel 2002b; Walkerdine 1984, 1988; Ivinson and Murphy 2007; Epstein 1993, 2003). Although these examples of ethnographic research in education come from differing theoretical perspectives and do not ask identical questions, they all provide a detailed interrogation of the curriculum of the educational setting, how this curriculum is delivered, and the ways in which students are positioned by these practices and respond to them. This approach differs from those ethnographies in educational settings which are focused on the children’s construction of their identities within the school, with only limited attention paid to the role of the teachers and particularly of the teacher in the classroom (Renold 2005; Pascoe 2007).

Analyses such as those presented by Ivinson and Murphy (2007) are possible only using ethnographic data. Ivinson and Murphy observed classrooms in two secondary schools as non-participant observers. They noted the details of how precisely the teachers convey material, including the precise language used, mannerisms, tone of delivery and so on, and how the students behaved in the classroom. This data enabled them to offer explanations of what is going on in the classroom. More specifically, Ivinson and Murphy demonstrate how the interactions between teachers and students are shaped by gendered expectations, which themselves are part of the histories of the ‘subjects’ (in the sense of mathematics, or English literature) being taught. For instance, a science teacher, Mr White, teaching the
same’ lesson to a single-sex class of girls and to a single-sex class of boys, repeatedly warned the girls, but not the boys, to be careful with the equipment. Ivinson and Murphy describe the behaviour that ensued, showing that the class of girls remained focused on the task at hand, but rarely explored the possibilities of the equipment beyond the closely prescribed experiment to be done. By contrast, the class of boys was chaotic, with multiple boys burning themselves and miscellaneous splints and stationery, and several boys never actually undertaking the experiment which was the official activity of the class. Ivinson and Murphy analyse these effects in terms of the ‘historical legacy’ which identifies subjectivity with girls and objectivity with boys, and the way in which teachers and the children’s peer culture offer ‘positions’ to the girls and boys over the course of the lesson – for instance, as passive observers while a teacher acts as a performer, or as active and competent participants in the classroom. These analyses would be impossible without observational data. Similarly, thinking back to my own resistance to being positioned as a person in need of being made aware – by a gay cisgender man – of LGBT+ ‘issues’, I wanted to be able to observe positionality in the E&D training while it was happening, and to be able to theorise about what happens in E&D training on the basis of observational, rather than interview, data.

Epstein (2003) analyses sex education teaching in the final year of primary school. Her analysis is similarly attentive to the language and pedagogic practices used by the teachers and how these situate the children, but is focused on affect. She shows the teachers’ high levels of anxiety surrounding the provision of sex education, using their comments about this to each other and to her before and after the lessons. In analysing the teaching which finally takes place, Epstein argues that there are many unintended effects of the session, of which the main one is the transfer of the teachers’ anxieties to the children and particularly to those children who have experienced sex. Again, this form of analysis would be impossible without observational data. As I note in Section 2.1, part of my interest in E&D training was the idea that ‘learning’ in the context of E&D training is conceptualised differently to ‘learning’ in mainstream education. The learning that is at stake in E&D training is partially an emotional and attitudinal shift, rather than an intellectual one. As such, ethnographic research was well suited to learning firstly, about the extent to which
this is true (that is, whether E&D training really does differ from mainstream education the way it addresses ‘attitudes’); and secondly, about the effects that this has in the classroom.

Given these research interests, participant observation, including discussions with participants and trainers and analysis of any documents used in training, was the approach that best lent itself to my interests. I used the process of ethnographic data collection and analysis first to clarify my research questions, and only later to answer them. In the next section, I describe my specific approach to ethnography, in terms of how I positioned myself in the field and how I used my own feelings and responses to the pedagogy as data.

2.6.2 Positioning myself in the field

What it would mean to be an ‘insider’ is complex in the context of my research, as I was not studying a social group or position (for instance, lesbian women in the UK (Kitzinger 1987), or sexual harassment advisors (Westerman 2008)) but a social setting (E&D training for university staff). Participants are a very diverse group, who may only have their workplace in common. As such, while my positionality continues to be relevant, describing this in terms of ‘insider’/’outsider’ may be misleading. However, as this is the commonly used terminology to describe positionality, in what follows I briefly review this debate and situate myself in relation to it, before going on to discuss my positionality in a more practical way.

I place myself in the feminist tradition which argues that ‘insider’ research is not simply interchangeable, either epistemologically or ethically, with ‘outsider’ research. As such, many feminist writers position themselves in relation to their research topic (and this is now, to some extent, mainstream in ethnography). In many cases this is limited to a few sentences, as where Krieger (1983) states that she was a member of the women’s community she studied. Others describe their position in more depth and detail, as where Kitzinger and Perkins (1993) introduce their arguments on therapy and lesbian community with stories about their own lives and experiences - much as I have above in Section 2.1.

This acknowledgement of positionality is dealt with in different ways by different authors. Ettorre (1980) states that she has “established and looked beyond” (p.13) her biases (as a lesbian studying lesbians); the questions of what these biases are, how she established them and how she looked beyond them are left unanswered. I agree with the many feminist authors who have argued that this kind of ‘value free’ research is an impossible fiction (e.g.
Instead, we should embrace our “situated knowledges” (Haraway 1988). Instead of appealing to neutrality or to claims of having ‘looked beyond’ biases, reflexivity can mean understanding and acknowledging one’s own ‘position’ such that this is openly incorporated into the text; and further, that reflexivity is about openly and analytically incorporating the inevitable shifts in the researcher’s relationship with the material and with participants, as demonstrated by Walkerdine (1986b, 1989).

Wilkinson and Kitzinger (2013) outline four different approaches to conducting and writing ‘insider’ research, which they term ‘minimizing’, ‘utilizing’, ‘maximizing’ and ‘incorporating’. An example of ‘minimizing’ is that of Ettorre (1980) as described above; to largely ignore or play down, at least in writing, one’s position as insider. I argue that this approach applies equally to ‘outsider’ research.

‘Utilizing’ refers to the pragmatic use of being an insider to gain access and to build rapport in the field. Finch vividly describes the effect on the chaplain’s wives she interviewed on learning that she was also married to a clergyman:

I initially merely introduced myself as a researcher. I found however, that before I arrived for the interview, some people had managed to deduce my ‘true’ identity. The effects of this unmasking so clearly improved the experience for all concerned that I rapidly took a decision to come clean at the beginning of each interview. The consequence was that interviewees who had met me at the front door requesting assurances that I was not going to sell their story to a Sunday newspaper, or write to the bishop about them, became warm and eager to talk to me after the simple discovery that I was one of them. (1984, p.79)

I also had experiences where participants attempted to ‘place’ me, for instance by asking whether I myself intended to become an E&D trainer (a sensible question, as Peel (2002a, 2002b, 2008), Srivastava (2005, 2006), Westerman (2008) and Clements (2000) were practitioners as well as researchers!). I answered these questions honestly, though more fully with people I was more comfortable with (those who I perceived as curious, friendly and interested, rather than cautious of me as a researcher) and where time was not stretched. In the context of the fieldwork, I did not experience any moments where participants suddenly warmed to me or opened up; however, I did experience such moments during initial meetings to discuss access. This seemed to be based less on shared identity, for instance as women or as Jewish (though I am sure this played a role), and more on shared political conviction – I was both someone who ‘cared about’ E&D, and someone
who would listen sympathetically to stories about, for instance, being faced with racism from trainees.

‘Incorporating’ consists of openly incorporating, as data, one’s own experiences as a member of the group being studied. For instance, in her early work on the social construction of lesbianism, Kitzinger (1987) positions her own lesbian politics and opinions on lesbianism, by providing the same data on herself as she does on the participants in her study (responses to a Q-Sort). While Kitzinger gives this detailed information about her lesbian politics, she does not use personal narratives – for instance, about her family life or relationships – to position or explain herself. As Wilkinson and Kitzinger (2013) note, methods of ‘incorporating’ are often motivated by egalitarian politics, trying to redress the balance between researcher and researched; however, this method in effect gives the researcher a double voice – they contribute to the research project both with their explicit opinions or feelings (as research participant) and with their analysis (as researcher). Additionally, they argue that it is very difficult for a researcher not to prioritise her own voice above that of other participants, illustrating this with reference to the work of Chmielewski and Yost (2013).

Wilkinson and Kitzinger’s comment about the ‘double voice’ of the researcher who incorporates herself into the research is sharply observed. However, where the researcher’s inclusion of her own ‘voice’ as a participant is comparable with that of other participants, this is still in some sense a levelling between researcher and participant, making it clear that the researcher has emotions and opinions comparable to those of her participants. Incorporation has ethical potential as well as ethical pitfalls, in that if we – as researchers – are unwilling to scrutinise our own words, emotions, life stories and so on, using the methods we use to study our participants (and if we are unwilling to publish the results of this scrutiny) then this can be indicative of a problem in our research methods, suggesting that they may be exploitative and/or dehumanising of our participants. When analysing my data and writing up I have tried to bear this in mind, and where appropriate, include my own use of the discourses I analyse (Chapters 6, 7 and 8).

‘Maximising’ refers to focusing exclusively on one’s own experiences, as in some autoethnographies (Ellis and Bochner 1996; see Reed-Danahey 2001 for a methodological description of autoethnography). Wilkinson and Kitzinger (2013) note that this may feel too
exposing to some researchers, and further argue that while this ‘gives voice’ to the researcher, it does nothing to shift power between the researcher and research participants, as the focus remains exclusively on the researcher; Delamont (2009) makes a similar point about autoethnography and power. I consider ‘insider’/’outsider’ to be a meaningless distinction when discussing autoethnography which focuses exclusively on the self.

While Wilkinson and Kitzinger (2013) focused on ‘insider’ research, in my own research I was always simultaneously both insider and outsider. The only sense in which I could be a clear ‘insider’ would be through sharing the workplace of the participants – which in one sense I do (as I am a university student who is also involved in undergraduate teaching work, and has previously worked as a research assistant). I did find that having this workplace in common was helpful to me in building connections in the field; however, in many relevant ways I was still an outsider, in that my relationship with the university is now primarily as a student, and in my affiliation to my own university rather than those I studied. To the extent that I could be considered an ‘insider’, I aimed to both utilise and incorporate (as defined above) my insider status.

Initially going into the research, I assumed that my positioning would be straightforward - I would be a participant on the courses like other participants, only I would also be a researcher. However, over time, I found that this shifted both in my own mind and in that of others, as I acquired a detailed knowledge of the things E&D trainers were teaching: psychological and sociological studies, laws around equality, and so on. While I aimed not to volunteer answers in large-group discussions of the sort that I would not have been able to at the beginning of fieldwork (for instance, listing the nine protected characteristics under the Equality Act 2010), I found that trainers sometimes referred to me as someone who could be expected to already know all the material they were teaching:

Karishma (the trainer) said that there is a study about sex and power in Britain which shows that year on year, 15-20% of people in positions of power are women, for instance in the judiciary, vice chancellors, those sorts of post. She asked if any of us had seen this study and said ‘Netta has probably?’ I think I shrugged or made some other non-committal response but not sure.

My note in these expanded fieldnotes that I am ‘not sure’ how I responded is suggestive of the discomfort and confusion I felt at the time at being positioned like this. This episode is
also indicative of the ways in which my role in the classroom, or my positioning, were shaped by others as well as by my own choices. In another instance, I observed one trainer (Rex) twice, six months apart. During the first session, I was largely positioned as a participant (with Rex saying “Netta you too of course” when introducing an exercise); during the second, I tried to maintain this positioning but found that Rex no longer positioned me in this way:

Rex has been talking about the fight/flight response and added ‘freeze’. He said that freezing doesn’t change anything. ‘Now I’m not saying go back to work and have a few fights’ but freezing never resolves problems. Then he asked us, how many of you came in here and decided to sit at the back? Several people raised their hand including me. He said ‘Netta’s technically with me’ and turned instead to the others.

Much writing in educational ethnography focuses on the complexities of an adult researcher trying to be accepted as a peer by children (e.g. Pascoe 2007; Renold 1999; Epstein 1998). Aspects of these discussions have been highly relevant to my own thinking about my role; particularly, the ‘least adult role’ these researcher discuss is in some ways analogous to my attempts to avoid participants perceiving me as in a ‘deputy’ trainer role. Pascoe (2007) discusses her difficulties with deciding how much of her own politics and identity to reveal to the young lesbians in her study that she felt a strong affinity with; this discussion resonated with me as I tried to decide how open to be about my own politics in the field.

Rather than trying to build rapport or trust by taking on an unthreatening persona, I aimed to behave much as I normally would, chatting with participants about Cardiff, how far through the PhD I was and how I was finding it, and so on. This was partly for ethical reasons – as participants would make decisions about how much to tell me, whether to participate in my research, and how much to share with the group partly on the basis of their ‘sense’ of me, I didn’t want to actively mislead them. Additionally, I felt that I would struggle to be fully emotionally present in the room if I was actively trying to maintain a persona.

Having said this, my ‘normal’ behaviour in classrooms as a student is active and sometimes dominant (I am usually what Bourdieu and Passeron call a “seasoned zealot” in educational settings – Bourdieu and Passeron 1990, p.109). I did try to change this in two key ways. Firstly, I held back from being the first to answer most questions - to give myself an opportunity to find out what someone else would say, to avoid disrupting others’ learning, and to avoid being positioned as an authority on the topic. Secondly, I held back from
expressing some of my political disagreements with participants and trainers – again, wanting to see what would happen, and not wanting to be perceived as an authority. I found this much more difficult and it was a bigger departure from what I experience as my ‘normal’ self. For instance,

Rex wrote up a list of protected characteristics with a brief description of each. On ‘gender reassignment’ he said, this is someone who has had or plans to have a sex change, so for instance, a man who is passing as a woman.

The phrase ‘sex change’ has for several years now considered to be outdated and offensive terminology (see Trans Media Watch 2010; Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation 2016), and the idea that a trans woman is ‘a man who is passing as a woman’ clearly genders the trans woman as male. While ‘passing’ is a term which continues to be used in reference to trans women (see Serano (2007) for discussion of this), this trainer’s phrasing left no doubt that he considers trans women to be men. I was, naively, shocked by this construction of trans women coming from an E&D trainer, but did nothing in response.

I later wrote about this episode,

Of everything that happened in that session which I disagreed with politically, this was by a long way the most uncomfortable. I worried for several days afterwards about whether I’d said nothing because I was there as a researcher or just because I was afraid of the conflict.

In spite of being unhappy and uncomfortable about this episode, I soon came to believe that staying silent had been the right thing to do, in the context of fieldwork.

Although I didn’t want to dominate sessions, I also wanted to make it clear that I was there as a participant. The extent to which I actively participated in sessions, answered questions, and expressed agreement or disagreement with the trainer(s) and with participants varied across the sessions, and varied depending on the session itself. In general, I was more active during work in pairs or small groups.

Taking courses only at universities had the advantage that all my participants were familiar with students, and many were researchers who were less likely to be intimidated by my presence as a researcher. This was particularly marked at one research site when a participant began an enthusiastic conversation with me during the break about her admiration for my supervisor Valerie’s work. This closeness between my everyday
environment and ‘the field’ made it easy for my “ethnographic self” (Coffey 1999) to be similar to my everyday self.

Towards the end of my fieldwork, I also began to occasionally volunteer as an ‘LGBT inclusion’ trainer for an LGBT charity. At the same time I began to be involved in developing materials for the charity to use in their training. I made fieldnotes about my experiences as a trainer, although as none of the trainees or co-trainers in the LGBT training were consenting participants, these have remained entirely private. However, these experiences were transformative in helping me see training, and particularly the choices of exercises, phrasing, and facilitation style, from new perspectives.

2.6.3 Informed consent

I have already touched on informed consent in my argument that since participants make decisions about participation based partially on their ‘sense’ of the researcher, it is ethically relevant for the ethnographer to represent themselves truthfully. Informed consent has a controversial status in ethnography. The ‘informed consent’ model of research ethics has grown out of medical research, in which there is a relatively discrete event or set of events (such as taking an experimental drug over a period of time) which a potential participant can choose whether to consent to. Some social scientists have argued that while the ‘informed consent’ model is viable in those medical contexts, it is necessarily meaningless to say that a participant in qualitative social science research can give ‘informed consent’ to being a research participant (Atkinson 2009). This is because the nature of the research and often of the research questions is still not fully formed at the point at which the research begins. Some researchers have written about their experiences of being presented by gatekeepers to groups of participants without being introduced as a researcher; that is, without those participants having the opportunity to decide whether to take part (Atkinson 1997; Marzano 2007).

I agree that ‘informed consent’ is not the only consideration when trying to conduct ethical research, nor is it straightforward to achieve in any context (see O’Neill’s (2009) arguments about informed consent in medicine). However, rather than dismissing the concept as irrelevant to qualitative, ethnographic research, I instead view informed consent as an ongoing and necessary process, inspired by Renold et al. (2008). The difficulty in applying this understanding to my own research is that I would not be establishing long-term field
relations with any participant, with the exception of one or two of the trainers. Each time I took part in an E&D training course, all the participants would be different. This was a necessary feature of studying the courses (as opposed to studying a specific workplace) and mirrors a trainer’s experience of conducting training – they are not able to undertake long-term work with a group but see new groups at each session. Usually at university training sessions participants also do not know each other, or know only one or two others present.

I believe that it is possible, though complex, to study a social setting or group and respect the wishes of any member of that groups who wishes to be excluded from the study. This means omitting from fieldnotes anything about people who have opted out, so that anything they say or do is not included in the writing. Inevitably this provides a partial and distorted picture of the social setting, but without the genuine possibility of opting out of research, participants’ ‘consent’ becomes meaningless. This did occur in one session, as I describe below.

When planning the research, I thought it would be possible for participants to opt out simply by not signing the consent form at the beginning of the session, and all participants giving me their consent forms at the beginning of the session (as I did in my MSc research (Chachamu 2013)). However, the absence of name badges, along with sometimes large groups, made this approach impossible. Instead I asked participants to opt out by raising a hand, and complete the paperwork at any point during the day. During one session, a trainer expressed her scepticism about this method as an expression of genuine consent, so I shifted to asking participants to opt in by raising a hand and continued to use this ‘opt in’ method in future sessions. Using this method, for the first time, people taking the course did start to opt out of participation. However, this was only practical in smaller groups in which it was easy to see people who had not raised a hand.

Ideally, in keeping with the principle of ongoing rather than one-off consent to research, I would have preferred participants to be able to decide, one or two hours into a session or at the end of the training, that they would prefer to be excluded from the research. If this had happened, I would have done my best to go through my notes and remove any references to them, and I would certainly have been able to exclude them from that point onwards; but in practice, with up to 35 people in a session and no name badges, much of the time I was noting down comments made by participants or making notes about their facial expressions.
and body language without also noting their name, and hence later being unable to reconstruct clearly which participant they were. For this reason, I always made it clear to participants in my spoken introduction that if they have doubts about participation it would be best to opt out from the beginning as then I can be confident of completely excluding them from the research.

To ensure that potential participants had time to think about their decision and to ask questions about participation, I requested at each site that a copy of the information sheet and/or a short paragraph about the research, including my contact details, was circulated to participants beforehand. This usually happened, but not always, particularly with participants who signed up at the last minute. In addition, three trainers were taken aback by my presence; in one case because they had forgotten, but in other cases because they had not been told.

2.6.4 Inhibiting engagement?

A key ethical concern, both for me and for some gatekeepers, was whether my presence and behaviour as a researcher would form a barrier to participants’ ability to take part in the training. My presence might be inhibiting, preventing them from contributing with questions and comments, and it might also be distracting, preventing them from being able to focus and to learn from the course.

It was impossible for me to be sure whether this was the case for my participants or to be certain of preventing it. However, I tried to minimise participants’ discomfort by using accurate but neutral examples when explaining my role and describing the sorts of notes I was making (as part of explaining what opting in and opting out would entail for them). I emphasised that my interest is in the training, the approach taken by the trainer and the sorts of materials and exercises they use, but that in order to fully understand the training I need to also think about the participants’ experiences of the training. When participants asked for more details about the notes I was making I would give examples along the lines of, ‘if a trainer said something and I wasn’t sure why, but then I could see that everyone was smiling in response, that would be relevant to understanding why she had said it’. I aimed to accurately convey that I was making notes about language, facial expressions and body language, but tried to minimise self-consciousness on the part of participants by focusing on the trainers’ role and using positive or neutral examples and language.
The other way in which I tried to minimise participants’ discomfort was in (not) making notes. When participants were talking about difficult life experiences, such as their experiences of being bullied at work, I often made very minimal notes and trusted to memory, as I felt that in the moment of sharing something difficult, it might be inhibiting to see me making notes. This is in keeping with the practice of other ethnographers: Emerson et al. write that “fieldworkers must constantly rely upon interactional skills and tact to judge whether or not taking jottings in the moment is appropriate” (1995, p.23).

I promised confidentiality to all participants in my research, including anonymising the universities at which I was conducting research, and the companies which provided their training services. As such I chose to refer to institutions by ‘xxx’ where I refer to them (following Ahmed 2012), although I give each institution a letter in Appendix 4 to clarify which institutions were observed on multiple occasions. I gave pseudonyms to each trainer (aiming for names in keeping with the trainer’s sex and ethnic background). I also gave pseudonyms to participants who recurred in my fieldnotes, and chose not to give information about location or status of any specific university.

2.6.5 Writing and expanding field notes
In the field, I aimed to write down comments, speech and body language that I found particularly interesting; and more generally to make notes that would remind me of what had taken place in the session, including elements that I experienced as mundane or dull (bearing in mind the comments of Delamont et al. (2010) about the importance of ‘fighting familiarity’ and of Delamont (2002) about how boredom can be, in itself, data). I never used a laptop, instead using notebooks and the handouts given out by trainers. As Delamont (2002) notes, it is rare for researchers to share any part of the scribbled fieldnotes made in the field in their final written report; but I see this as in keeping with the feminist aim of honesty about the messy process of research (Stanley and Wise, 2002).

A typical extract of my notes made in the field, reproduced here exactly including my shortening of ‘because’ to ‘bc’:

‘where you choose to sit’

‘picked on’ – we were right though, weren’t we, bc when you picked on someone she was in the front
‘freeze’ getting added – ‘go along with things to try’ to avoid conflict, keep the peace

Expanded later, this episode becomes:

Trainer says that this affects ‘where you choose to sit’ and asks something like, how many of you sat at the back because you didn’t want to be ‘picked on’. Someone responds, we were right though, weren’t we, because when you picked on someone she was in the front.

Trainer now adds ‘freeze’ to the ‘fight’ and ‘flight’ on the flipchart paper, and describes the freeze response as to ‘go along with things’ to try to avoid conflict and keep the peace.

I have used quotation marks around direct quotations from participants in both the original notes and the subsequent expansion. This can be confusing to read as when someone is speaking, only those parts which I am confident were the exact words being said are in quotation marks; however, I think this is worth it for the resulting distinction made between my own reconstruction and exact quotations.

Expanding fieldnotes was a very time consuming and emotionally draining process. A three-hour session could become about 9,000 and 15,000 words of expanded notes (including typing out handouts). Although Delamont (2002) and other ethnographers recommend that the process of expansion take place as soon as possible, ideally the same evening, I never found this feasible. At my fastest the process of expanding fieldnotes was completed in three days of intensive, focused writing, beginning shortly after exiting the field. More often, and especially where I had attended multiple sessions in quick sessions and needed to travel between them, the process of expanding fieldnotes lasted for months with many stops and starts, which inevitably resulted in less detailed and vivid recollections. I struggled with how to write about episodes that I did not fully remember, particularly where a heated conversation had taken place, where trainers gave a lot of information quickly, or where my notes seemed cryptic. One training session which had been particularly conversational (rather than being clearly structured through the slides) was never fully expanded. Instead I relied on my notes made in the field, the handout, and on the segments which I had described in detail.

I also struggled to write about episodes that upset me, even in the moments in which they were taking place. One example from my expanded notes:
Karishma gave two examples of members of staff with disabilities, one who seemed to be a well-known lecturer at the university who I think was blind. I don’t properly remember because I didn’t feel right writing down the details, not knowing how those members of staff felt about being included as examples in this kind of talk. She was talking about some of the reasonable adjustments that needed to be made for those academics. I felt uncomfortable listening as well, without writing down. This bit stayed uncomfortable for me as she then asked us to suggest other reasonable adjustments for people with disabilities and talk about them.

This has obvious effects on the fieldnotes that became my ethnographic data – I lost some richness of detail in terms of what the trainer was saying, but in this case gained some insight into the strength of my own emotional response to the situation. In this case, it is also notable that I was too preoccupied with my own feelings to look around the room and try to understand other participants’ non-verbal responses. As noted in Section 2.6.4, there were also times when I chose not to make notes in case this led to participants feeling uncomfortable.

In keeping with my interest in how training may be experienced differently by minoritised people and majoritised people, I tried to note the gender and colour or ethnic background of each trainer and trainee (e.g. ‘white’, ‘Brown’, ‘Black’, ‘East Asian heritage’) and include this in my fieldnotes. Although other aspects of difference, such as sexuality and disability, were raised in training, trainers and trainee only very rarely ‘came out’ as LGB or as disabled, except for the Disability Awareness trainer who incorporated discussion of her visual impairment into the training. As I didn’t ask anyone about their gender identity or ethnic background, inevitably this reflects my own perceptions which may well differ from their identity, except in those cases where participants actively shared aspects of their identity or background. However, as these perceptions are still significant in how the social world is navigated, I chose to also include these in the version of the fieldnotes included in the thesis. Where a participant’s gender or ethnicity is not mentioned, this is because it is not mentioned in my notes.

2.5.6 Details of sessions observed

To maintain the anonymity of the universities which took part in the research, here I give information about the research sites only in a general way; see Appendix 4 for a table. In total I was a participant-observer at eleven E&D training sessions, at a total of nine universities. Ten of these sessions lasted for three hours with a tea break, and one for six
hours with an hour’s lunch break and a morning and afternoon tea break (an all-day session). I describe these sessions in more detail in Chapter 6.

I took part in six sessions that were titled ‘Equality and Diversity’ or similarly named. Of these, one was optional, with four delegates (the only all-day session), and the rest were mandatory, with attendance from 12-30 delegates (three hour sessions). I attended these sessions at five different universities – two Russell Group and three non-Russell Group.

I also took part in five further sessions on more specific topics, still offered under Equality and Diversity – ‘Unconscious Bias’, ‘Cultural Awareness’, ‘Preventing Harassment’, ‘Disability Equality Awareness’, and ‘Leading on Diversity’. Each lasted for three hours. ‘Leading on Diversity’ and ‘Unconscious Bias’ were mandatory for some groups of staff, while the others were optional. They took place at four different universities, of which three were Russell Group universities.

As I described in Section 2.4.1, of the twenty universities I attempted to make contact with, only ten responded positively to my initial request, and one then decided not to grant access. I made my initial requests for access on the basis of location – where I could feasibly travel within my research budget. The universities which ended up taking part were therefore in effect a convenience sample and did not include any universities from Scotland or Northern Ireland.

2.7 Clarifying my research questions

Despite my aim of being honest and realistic about the process of research, in this section I simplify the process of writing research questions considerably. Having at last resolved many of my confusions around this process, it is difficult to recreate the fog of uncertainty that surrounded my research questions for much of the research. I would formulate research questions and feel perfectly satisfied with them, then find that I was unable to remember them; or formulate research questions feeling confident in a good ‘fit’ between my research interests and the questions, only to find that I was unable to ‘think with’ the question I had written. Even late in my data analysis I would find that, although I was satisfied with my analysis of a particular area, it bore only a tenuous connection to any of my ‘research questions’. As such, the evolution I describe below is much clearer than the actual process of developing research questions was. This process went back and forth
between analysing data, and trying to phrase this analysis in terms of a ‘research question’; only to realise that as I deepened the analysis, it no longer bore much relation to the research question it was intended to address, and trying to write the question again.

Throughout my fieldwork and my analysis of the ethnographic and interview data, I wrote and re-wrote research questions. I reflected on which aspects of training had ‘jumped out’ at me and made strong impressions, which aspects of my fieldnotes I found particularly interesting, and thought about why these particular moments were important – what question were they addressing? I also reflected on how the contingencies of access, and the unexpected length of time that access negotiations had taken, led to me studying a specific sector: Higher Education Institutions across England and Wales. The sector had clearly been a big influence on the kind of data I was collecting and co-producing, with many trainers discussing with me the specific challenges and rewards of E&D training with university staff (as opposed to training in other sectors). These challenges and rewards centred around questions of authority, knowledge and power, based not only on personal experience but on the position of academics as knowledgeable and authoritative.

In writing the research questions focused on the ethnographic data, I was inspired by Bacchi’s ‘What’s the problem represented to be?’ approach to policy analysis (Bacchi 1999, 2009). In my first attempts to write research questions, I used a directly Bacchian approach to my data, and formulated the question ‘What problem is represented through E&D training?’ Although I eventually reformulated this question, it is instructive to present the theory which underlies this question, as this mode of analysis continued to influence my thinking throughout the data analysis process.

This question is inspired by Bacchi’s (1999) pathbreaking work on social policy, in which she argues that social policy ‘solutions’ to social problems reveal an implicit construction of a social problem which the policy is designed to ameliorate or resolve. She analyses social policy as a ‘solution’ or response to a constructed problem, where the construction of the problem can be seen most clearly not through explicit statements or definitions of what ‘the problem’ is but rather by inference from what the proposed response(s) are.

Bacchi’s use of ‘represented’ in the central question, ‘What’s the problem represented to be?’ is not intended to imply that there is a ‘real’ problem which is in some sense being
represented more or less accurately within the policy. Nor is she arguing that, as policy represents ‘problems’, there is in fact nothing to be concerned about beyond the policy. Rather, Bacchi is arguing that we are governed in specific ways through these problematisations, and that multiple, different problematisations are possible, and indeed arise in different times and places. For instance, asking how a university’s policy on ‘widening access’ constructs the problem of social inequality is not to imply that there is no social inequality, or that social inequality should not be viewed as problematic. Rather, this approach acknowledges that particular situations and relations of power are only sometimes conceptualised or constructed as problems, and that the specific form that this construction takes is worthy of study. Social policies inevitably construct representations of social problems, because policies are designed as interventions – implying that there is a need for an intervention, in other words, a problem.

Rather than focusing the analysis only on the problems produced (or ‘represented’) via policies, Bacchi also looks for silences and absences, asking what is not problematized within particular policies and policy debates. Genealogical research can be an important part of this method. Bacchi uses Foucauldian genealogy, policy in a range of countries, and analysis of the same domain from different political perspectives to ‘denaturalise’ problematisations in discourse and to ask both, ‘what’s the problem represented to be (within this policy)?’ and ‘what is not problematized in this representation?’.

This approach is derived from and inspired by Foucauldian theories of power/knowledge, but Bacchi’s approach is ‘affirmative’ in that it is “committed to emancipatory political activities despite the acknowledged difficulties with claiming some undistorted access to knowledge” (1999, p.43). By asking who benefits from particular problem representations and who is marginalised by those same problem representations, Bacchi’s work enables theorists to think through the possibility of interventions which are based on different assumptions and might benefit different groups.

Bacchi (2009) describes her ‘What’s the problem represented to be?’ (shortened to WPR) form of analysis as a reformulation of Foucault’s study of governmentality. It is a reformulation in the sense that she generalises the idea of problematisations, arguing that problematisation is inherent in social policy:
Dean and Hindess (1998, p.9; emphasis added) make explicit the link between
governmentality, as a study of different mentalities of rules, and problematisation when
they describe a neoliberal ‘mentality of rule’ as ‘a style of problematisation, a mode of
reasoning that can best be identified by examining problematisations’. A WPR approach
takes this basic insight – that problematisations provide an entry point into how rule is
thought – but introduces a methodology that encourages a wider application of this
argument. It makes the case that every policy, by its nature, constitutes a
problematisation. (Bacchi 2009 p.31)

Bacchi applies this method only to written texts (including written records of speeches). This
necessarily leaves out the complexities of how practice combines with language to form an
overall framework, and while it is a powerful tool for policy analysis, it analyses policy rather
than the wider social world. My interest is in social practice – what happens in E&D training
sessions (see Peel 2002b), and how the trainer and participants co-construct meaning
through their interactions during the training.

Bacchi has generalised Foucault’s insights about how problematisations relate to ‘forms of
rule’ or government, arguing that since the existence of social policy is based on the
assumption that policy ‘fixes’ problems, problematisation is inherent to social policy. I would
argue that the same is true for education. Education presupposes the need for a change in
those being educated, whether this is conceptualised as a ‘lack’ (for instance, a lack of
knowledge) or as a shift in what is already there (for instance, a change in attitude). If there
was no presumption that some change is desired in those being educated, there would be
no education. In this sense, education presupposes a ‘problem’, and can be analysed in
terms of how it represents the ‘problem’.

As such, I felt the ‘What’s the Problem?’ approach could also be usefully extended to study
the social setting of E&D training, and that this analysis of what actually happens during
training has the potential to provide a more in-depth understanding of how policy translates
into practice. For instance, Bacchi writes that “… plans to increase the representation of
women in managerial positions which emphasize training programmes for women create
the problem as women’s lack of training” (1999, p.66). This analysis responds only to the
policy itself, and accurately describes how the policy constructs the problem of women’s
representation as due to women’s lack of training, or perhaps our lack of skills, knowledge
or particular attitudes. For instance, if the ‘training’ was ‘assertiveness training’, I would
argue that it is not women’s lack of ‘training’ being constructed as the problem, but
women’s lack of assertiveness. However, even with this caveat, by studying what takes place in these ‘training for women’ sessions one might find that they involve mutual support, sharing effective practice, and building working networks between women. That is, while the policy of ‘training for women’ constructs the problem as women’s inequality due to women’s lack of ‘training’, the practice of ‘training for women’ may involve multiple, different representations of the ‘problem’ such as a lack of women’s professional networks. This does not invalidate analysis of social policy, but does suggest a case for ethnographic research to complement social policy analysis. In the case of ‘E&D training’, I would argue that the training can construct a wide range of ‘problems’ depending both on the practices of the training itself, and how it is framed within the organisation.

As such, my early formulation of an ethnographic question in Bacchian terms attempted to operationalise Bacchi’s question in terms of ethnographic analysis rather than policy analysis. I tried to ‘work with’ this question for some time over the process of data analysis. It had the advantage of being very open ended – that is, it did not assume that the problem being represented through training would be discrimination, or lack of diversity, or inequality. However, for the same reason, I found the question too difficult to answer. Working with the ethnographic data, aspects of the data were continuously jumping out at me in ways which I could not seem to fit into the methodology of ‘what’s the problem represented to be?’ I particularly struggled with how to understand interaction between participants and trainers, or moments in which there did not appear to be a ‘problematisation’. Without a structure for breaking down the question into more manageable areas, I was not able to ‘think with’ this Bacchian question when reading my data.

During this period in which I was trying to work with this question, I tried to break down the question into smaller, more specific sub-questions of interest. It was at this stage that I formulated the research question ‘How are participants positioned in relation to discrimination?’ This question reflected my broader interest in ‘who is education for’ (see Cross 2011), and continued the approach of my MSc research about Mental Health First Aid (Chachamu 2013). One finding of this research was that through different implicit conceptions of ‘stigma’ and hence how to combat it, the two trainers positioned the training participants in different ways with respect to mental illness – as carers, people with lived
experience of mental illness, professionals, and so on (see Section 2.2). I continued to be interested in how participants in training are positioned with respect to the subject matter of training. In the context of E&D training, I wanted to learn more about how trainers reconcile the tension between addressing participants as victims of discrimination (who might be understood as needing empowerment) and addressing participants as perpetrators of discrimination (who might be understood as needing to change their behaviour and/or attitudes).

More than any of my other questions, this research question is derived from the literature. In her study of anti-harassment practitioners, whose role includes education work, in Canadian universities, Westerman argues that:

> Education is meant to simultaneously teach people about case law, institutional obligations, and policy, while also empowering those who are potential victims by teaching them about their rights and changing audience members’ behaviours and attitudes by teaching them to respect one another, thereby preventing harassment and discrimination from happening. When the amount of time for the session is minimal, the practitioner may have less success in communicating all the different facets of education that they might deem necessary or important. (2008, p.127, original emphasis)

Here Westerman points out that education is ‘meant to’ reach both potential victims of discrimination, and potential perpetrators of discrimination, but in different ways. Potential victims should be “empower[ed]” while potential perpetrators should be taught “respect”. Westerman identifies competing constructions of the position of the participant – as the (apparently neutral) worker who needs to learn about “case law, institutional obligations, and policy content”; as “potential victims” who need to be empowered; and as potential perpetrators who need to be taught to “respect” their colleagues. Each of these suggests a different construction of ‘the problem’ of harassment – as one of ignorance, ‘empowerment’ of victims, or of changing the attitudes of perpetrators. Westerman’s interview data suggests that trainers may consider all of these aspects to be part of the ‘problem’ of harassment, but in the interactions of training, some of these aspects may be emphasised over others.

Much of the literature on training and education related to race emphasises the fears of (white) participants that they will be perceived as racist (Srivastava 2005; Ladson-Billings 1991; Tatum 1992; Katz 1978). Peel (2002b), studying LGAT, argues that participants actively
try to position themselves as not homophobic and to demonstrate to the trainer and to other participants that they are not homophobic. Westerman (2008) notes that participants in sexual harassment training become defensive if they feel they have been positioned as possible perpetrators of harassment.

Short (1999) argues that anti-racist education should focus on bystander behaviour and conformity, as inaction from bystanders and conformity to peer pressure to behave in oppressive ways gives racism its power. ‘Bystander training’ has existed in America at least since the 1950s (Allport 1954), a form of training with the explicit aim of encouraging ‘bystanders’ to speak up. I review existing work about positioning of participants in relation to discrimination – as possible perpetrators, victims, and bystanders – in greater detail in the literature review (Chapter 5). When reading my data, this issue of how participants are positioned continually struck me as essential to understanding E&D training.

However, analysing my data with this question in mind did not seem to bring me any closer to answering Bacchi’s question. Eventually, I realised that the difficulty with applying ‘what’s the problem represented to be?’ to ethnographic data is that to answer it, I first needed to know what happens during training. A policy document sets out what is going to be done, or what should be done – for instance, banning a particular drug. As such, after reading the policy document, the researcher knows what the policy ‘is’, and can turn to a deeper analysis of how the policy represents problems. In a classroom, the curriculum is often much less clear. To fully answer ‘what problem are represented through training’, I would need to first know what happens in E&D training, including what the curriculum of training is, how it is delivered, and how participants responded to this. Without first analysing my data in this way, it was impossible to grasp the broader question of what problematisations were being represented through the training. ‘What happens in E&D training?’ became the necessary preliminary to answering ‘What problem is represented through E&D training?’

As such, I reframed my thinking in terms of being able to describe the curriculum of training, asking ‘What is the curriculum of the training?’ Although answering this research question was still not straightforward, I found it enabled me to order my thinking and my analysis much more clearly. However, this question is largely descriptive rather than analytic. This was unsatisfying, because over the course of analysis I was also thinking about what took place during training in terms of how it had come about. In interviews and informal
discussions, trainers described the reasoning behind the approaches they took; I also made inferences about the particular form that various interactions took. To encapsulate this more analytic interrogation of training, I expanded this question: ‘What is the curriculum of the training, and how come?’

I now had two clearly specified questions which I was conceptualising as ‘sub-questions’ of the overarching, Bacchi-inspired question: ‘What problem is represented through E&D training?’ However, when these questions were addressed, I realised that the amount of analytic work needed to move from my answers to these preliminary questions to the Bacchian questions was too ambitious within the framework of the doctorate. As such, I realised that the research question I had answered was the one which I had initially thought of as only as a preliminary: ‘What happens in E&D training?’ In addressing this question, I had two sub-questions: ‘What is the curriculum of the training, and how come?’, and ‘How are participants positioned in relation to discrimination?’.

To recap, the questions I finally generated for the research as a whole were:

1. How did the practice of E&D training come about historically?
2. What happens in E&D training?
   2.i. What is the curriculum of the training, and how come?
   2.ii. How are participants positioned in relation to discrimination?

In retrospect, I would certainly have been in a better position to answer these questions if I had begun fieldwork with the questions already clear in my mind. For instance, I rarely made notes about exactly how long trainers spent on different exercises or particular areas of the curriculum, data which would have been very helpful in thinking about ‘what is the curriculum of the training’. However, as I wrote these questions to reflect my interests, they had already been the focus of many of my notes in the field. I discuss these questions in more detail in Section 2.9, and return to Bacchi’s ideas in Chapter 9 where I suggest some possible avenues for future research in this area. In the next section, I describe and explain my approach to interviewing.

2.8 Interviews: How and why

After eleven sessions of ethnographic data collection, I began to approach trainers and participants asking if they might be willing to have an interview using fieldnote extracts as
prompts for discussion. These interviews began with some general questions about the
trainers’ role and memories of the training, or about the participants’ expectations of the
training. I would then go on to present some expanded fieldnote extracts from the training
session, and use these as prompts for discussion.

I chose this interview structure for several reasons. I wanted to give trainers and
participants an opportunity to give their perspectives on the crucial moments which had
become central to my thinking about their training – this aim is in keeping with that of other
feminist researchers such as Connell et al. (1982), who met with their research participants
to discuss their early analysis.

I also wanted to access more of the ‘private’ emotions that trainers and participants
experienced during training – moments in which relief, pleasure, embarrassment, irritation
and so on might have been experienced but not expressed in a way which I had been able to
notice. As I was not able to form long-term connections in the field, particularly with
participants, interviews were an important way of learning more about how other people
experienced the training. By using fieldnote extracts I hoped to focus the discussion on
specific moments and to evoke memories in the interviewee, moving away from an
‘evaluation’ format in which people are asked generic questions about their experience of
the training and respond in a similarly generic way – as I found when using unstructured
interviews with participants in my previous research (Chachamu 2013).

I did not expect to encounter any difficulties with access at this stage in the research, but in
practice I did meet difficulties. There was a gap of up to a year between my initial
ethnographic fieldwork and my request for interviews from participants. This was partly due
to my difficulties in ‘writing up’ my fieldnotes, described in Section 2.6.5, and hence having
the fieldnote extracts available to bring to the interviews. It was also partly due to my
worries about not having real ‘research questions’ which would inform the interview
schedule. By the time I contacted universities asking for access to research participants as
interviewees, some university administrators did not want to forward the request to the
participants. Others simply didn’t respond to emails or phone calls, and in some cases (four
out of nine) the member of staff I had originally negotiated access with had since left the
university.
Although it would have been technically possible to make direct contact with participants (as I knew their place of work and full names from the consent forms) I felt this would be unethical, as in signing their names to the consent form they were not intending to enable me to contact them in this way. In addition, one of the few questions that participants asked me before signing consent forms was whether their participation would involve any time or effort from them beyond signing the form, to which I always answered no. If I could re-do the research, I would have used consent forms for the ethnography which included an option for participants to include their email address if they were willing to be contacted about an interview, thus avoiding the need for gatekeeper agreement later in the process.

In the end, I interviewed two trainers (Liz and Rex) and two training participants, attempting to use this interview structure. The two participants both attended the same session – an ‘Unconscious Bias’ session (with the trainer Akanna). I expected participants to volunteer to have an interview on the basis of their interest in the subject matter and in discussing what took place in the training session. In fact, both of my interview participants seemed to be motivated more by a desire to help an early-career researcher with her research, as both claimed not to remember anything from the session (almost a year earlier) without being prompted. However, the use of ethnographic data as a memory prompt was a very effective way of reminding these participants of the training.

As I was not intending to analyse interview data using a form of analysis such as Conversation Analysis in which pauses, intonation and so on are relevant, I transcribed some of the interviews and paid for others to be transcribed without this level of detail.

In the next section, I discuss my approach to data analysis.

2.9 Data analysis

I analysed my data in a few different ways, which complemented each other. Firstly, I wrote some analysis as well as description in the immediate aftermath of taking part in training. In these notes I included anything that had particularly struck me during the training, and initial interpretations or ideas, as well as my own feelings about the session and about my role as a researcher.

In the process of expanding fieldnotes, I also included short analytic memos where these came to mind while I typed the fieldnotes. I then read the expanded fieldnotes as a
narrative, occasionally adding details I had forgotten, but primarily making notes about what I thought various extracts might mean. I particularly noted similarities and differences between training sessions. Reading the fieldnotes as a narrative was also helpful in establishing the routines of training – such as introductions, instructions about fire safety and mobile phones, evaluation sheets to fill in at the end, and so on. I was not using specified ‘codes’ or themes, but looking at the flow of the session and making comments about what I thought was going on at each point.

I attempted to use qualitative analysis software (NVivo) to code one set of fieldnotes. Although I did gain new insights into that data through the process, I decided my dataset was not large enough to justify the cumbersome process of coding using software. However, the insights I gained through this convinced me of the value of systematic coding. I began to sort my data in various ways, such as checking which groups become the ‘topic’ of training, and how they were spoken of. To address the research question of how participants are positioned in relation to discrimination, I found each instance in my data which could be read as participants being positioned as victims, perpetrators, or bystanders. I then looked at each instance in context, which enabled more complex, detailed readings of the meanings of each incident.

I also sorted my data according to concepts from the literature review, such as the idea of participants’ ‘resistance’ to the training. Again, I combed my data for anything which could be read as evidence of ‘resistance’, and looked at these instances together to find patterns and divergences and to gain a sense of the prevalence of the ‘resistance’ which is much talked about in the literature on anti-racism education (Srivastava 2005, 2006; Ladson-Billings 1996a).

As the analysis developed, I realised that most of the training curriculum drew on legal or on psychological discourses. To identify and describe these discourses, I read over all my fieldnotes noting each instance of legal or psychological concepts or language. Sorting these into documents, I analysed these in more detail, trying to understand these as ‘discourses’ as described in Section 2.2. I then moved back and forth between the ethnographic data, the literature, and the historical research, trying to trace these discourses and situate them historically.
2.10 Conclusion

This methodology chapter has taken the reader through the journey of my research project as a whole. Although I have tidied the narrative to make it easier to follow (as in practice several different things would be happening at any one time), the chapter still communicates the non-linear nature of the research.

The research began with a cloud of concerns and ideas which were not formed into ‘research questions’ but could be thought of as ‘foreshadowed problems’. Much of my early research, rather than being undertaken in order to answer a clearly specified research question, was in fact part of the process of clarifying my foreshadowed problems into research questions. While the conventional means of undertaking this clarification process is through a literature review which should highlight gaps and areas for future research, my literature review found no ethnographic research on the type of E&D training I wanted to study. As such, I clarified my research questions primarily by looking for the underlying themes in the notes that I made about my fieldwork.

Perhaps as a result of this non-linear approach to research, some aspects of my fieldwork did not work out as planned. In particular, access negotiations were longer and more difficult than I expected. However, I did eventually gather a dataset of eleven training sessions across nine universities in England and Wales. In addition, I formally interviewed one E&D manager (who also conducts training which I was not able to incorporate into my fieldwork, because it was ‘bespoke’ training which would have required access negotiations with the department as well as with the centralised Human Resources department) and one E&D manager and trainer (Sophia) before taking part in her training session; two further trainers (Rex and Liz) after taking part in their training sessions; and two participants in a training session, about a year after we attended a training session together (see Appendix 4).

As such, my approach to these research questions, combining historical analysis with present day ethnography, has the potential to add depth and complexity to the sociological understanding of E&D training as practiced today. In the next chapter, I begin to address my first research question: How did the practice of E&D training come about historically?
Part 1: E&D training in historical and social context

Chapter 3: The development of E&D training in the USA

3.1 Introduction

E&D training came about as a response to a problematisation that training was thought to address. The idea of ‘training’ as an appropriate response or solution to this problematisation also arose in a specific context. In the previous chapter, I set out the aim of this historical sketch of Equality and Diversity (E&D) training: to understand how and when training began to be used as the ‘solution’ to a problematisation, and what form this problematisation took. As I argued, the concept of education or training implies the need for change in the people being educated or trained. As I show in this chapter, the history of E&D training is bound up in the history of the concept of ‘attitudes’ (and attitudinal shifts), ‘prejudice’ as a psychological concept, and the conceptual apparatuses of pedagogy, psychology and education. It is also bound up in problems of government, in the sense of how to manage a population. This chapter addresses these issues of how and when training came about, and how it has changed over time to take its current forms.

In addressing the research question “How did the practice of E&D training come about historically?”, I divide my account into two chapters. The first deals with the emergence and development of training in relation to equalities in the United States of America (USA), where this practice first began. The second gives an account of the emergence of E&D training in the United Kingdom (UK) and brings the historical account up to the present day. In tracing the history of E&D training in the UK, I show the continued influence both of USA training practices and of the political contexts in which E&D training emerged in the USA.

As one of my aims in this chapter is to show the connections between the current practices of E&D training with the history of E&D training, I specifically draw out these connections in the narrative. In particular, I draw out the influence of psychology and later the increasing influence of the law. Legislation, psychology, social science, the Civil Rights Movement and Black Power movement, the Women’s Liberation Movement and later social movements such as the Disability Rights Movement and the Gay Rights Movement all played a part in the development of American E&D training. A full understanding of the context of early
equality training is not possible without a detailed understanding of the racial politics of the USA throughout the twentieth century – a huge topic which goes beyond the scope of this thesis. Rather than attempting to describe this history in full, I focus only on the key elements which were significant for equalities training.

In this chapter, I give a broadly chronological account of the development of E&D training in the USA. I begin my account with the study of ‘attitudes’ in the USA in the 1920s. Practices which could be seen as early forms of ‘equality training’ were present from the 1920s, in the form of educational programs on race and culture. Initially, the focus of educational efforts was in mainstream institutions of education: schools, where the ‘inter-cultural education movement’ began in the mid-1920s, and universities, where there was hope that sociology courses on ‘the race problem’ were also having antiprejudice effects on the students. These early interventions grew together with early social science research on ‘attitudes’ and on ‘prejudice’ (Gordon 2015). Training on ‘race relations’ spread further in response to race riots which followed the migration of Black Americans to formerly white areas; however, it did not become a mainstream practice in workplaces until after the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Although the Civil Rights Act itself came about partly in response to the Civil Rights Movement, anti-racism training per se was not a focus of either the Civil Rights Movement or the Black Power Movement at any stage.

These educational programs and the psychological research that informed and evaluated them entered the workplace via the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which legislated on employment discrimination, among other civil rights. There was a proliferation of approaches to training in the 1970s and 1980s. I describe various forms that training took, but focus in more detail on two significant approaches to training: Elliott’s Blue Eyes, Brown Eyes training, and Katz’s ‘White Awareness’ training (Katz 1978). Training on sex discrimination developed in the 1970s, and in the mid-1980s there began to be a movement towards thinking about ‘diversity’, incorporating all differences and similarities between people (such as race, gender, disability, and age, but also personality and work styles). The rationale for ‘training’ on these topics has varied over the decades, as have the practices of training.

This chapter, tracing the development of E&D training in the USA, begins with the study of attitudes and attitude change from the 1920s to the 1950s. I note the separation between
the growth of antiprejudice education, led by educators and academics, and the Civil Rights Movement and Black Power Movement. I then discuss the impact of the Civil Rights Act 1964, which made discrimination on the basis of race and sex illegal in employment. I give an account of training in the military from 1970-1980, as this training program was both well-documented and widely influential. I conclude the chapter by discussing the changes of the 1980s and 1990s, and particularly the rise of the ‘managing diversity’ movement.

The language used both to describe minority groups and to describe training and education varies in the sources used. In this chapter, I use 'Black' to refer to Black Americans except when quoting sources. However, I aim to refer to training and education programs in different historical periods by the language used at the time, such as 'human relations training'.

3.2 Before the Civil Rights Act: 1920-1964

Until the 1920s, American psychology around race was largely focused on attempting to demonstrate the superiority of white people, particularly over Black people. In the 1920s, there was a shift in focus, from searching for evidence of objective racial differences, to studying racial attitudes and particularly ‘prejudice’ (Samelson 1978). This was a profound reframing of the ‘race problem’ from Black pathology to (both white and Black) irrational prejudices. Having problematised ‘attitudes’, and with developing techniques to measure attitude, the idea of trying to change the attitudes of others took hold (Gordon 2015). The influence of social psychology, including new techniques of measurement, over the development of early race relations training is evident throughout the emergence and development of E&D training, as I describe in this section.

From the 1920s to the 1950s, social psychological work was having a growing impact both in the arena of legislation (where psychological and sociological work was accorded the status of scientific expertise) and in that of attempts through education to reduce or eliminate discrimination and prejudice (Gordon 2015). This was dramatically accelerated by American involvement in the Second World War (Vickery 1953).

The ‘inter-cultural education movement’ began in schools in the late-1920s as a response to the mass migration of Black Americans to the Northern states, and of European migrants to the Eastern states (Bradley 2007). They “employed cultural performances, curricular
interventions, and planned interracial contact to encourage white tolerance and minority self-esteem” (Gordon 2015, p.30). In opposition to assimilationist responses to migration, the intercultural education movement promoted the celebration of cultural differences (Bradley 2007).

Also in the 1920s, religious organisations (Jewish and Christian) began to sponsor “antiprejudice educational initiatives and research on their effectiveness” (Gordon 2015, p.30). This early growth in antiprejudice education and research thus happened together:

Although professional networks linked researchers to this nascent movement for intergroup goodwill, the relationship between antiprejudice education and scholarship on race was not always direct. ... Research on prejudice often generated findings that were inconsistent or inconvenient for reformers, moreover, while many antiprejudice activists used social science only loosely or selectively. Still, the simultaneous rise of research on and educational efforts to alter prejudice was hardly a coincidence. The psychology and sociology of prejudice and education for tolerance reinforced each other as activists frequently relied on scholarship to legitimize their programing and scholars claimed that activist group needed their research. Together the two grew through the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s. Each would generate much new interest as the nation entered World War II. (Gordon 2015, p.31)

Antiprejudice education rapidly went beyond the education of children, to the education of university students. Rachel DuBois, a key founder of the intercultural education movement, began teaching at Boston University in 1933 (Bradley 2007). In 1927, Young conducted the first widely cited study of whether university education on race produced attitudinal shifts, evaluating an undergraduate Sociology course on ‘American Race Problems’. Shifting student attitudes was implicit in the lecturers’ expectations of what the course would achieve, but the course itself was conventionally academic (lectures and discussion seminars based on required readings):

The course begins with an analysis of racial characteristics and their significance. Then the racial and national elements in the population of the United States are surveyed, starting with the American Indian, continuing with the Oriental immigrant, the Negro and the European immigrant, winding up with a summarizing discussion centered around the topic of race prejudice. The examinations show that the students have obtained a fair understanding of the subject and the instructors are duly gratified at a useful work well done. (Young 1927, p.236)

This is described as fairly typical of sociology courses of the time, and Young goes on to place this in the overall context of the undergraduate educational experience:
Not infrequently the matter of race is disposed of as one of a large group of other problems such as poverty, the insane, the feebleminded, the deaf, the blind, the illegitimate and the dependent child. (Young 1927, p.235-236)

This description suggests that the study of race did not depart from the rest of the student’s experiences – unlike the intercultural education movement for schools, which signified a change from the rest of their schooling. Young’s study found no effect of the course. However, the lecturers’ expectations that attitudes would shift, which Young discusses in his introduction, are significant in their suggestion that prejudice stems from misinformation, and hence could be changed by accurate information. Henriques describes how “the idea of error continues to crop up in social psychology’s attempts to explain racial prejudice” (1984, p.78) – I return to his analysis of the role of “error” in the next chapter.

The study of attitudes more generally was taking off in the 1920s and thoroughly established in the 1930s in the USA (Rose 1996). Techniques for ‘measuring’ attitudes using questionnaires were published by Thurstone in his 1929 book “The Measurement of Attitudes”. Likert worked on refining these techniques throughout the 1930s (Rose 1996) and this fed into research on anti-prejudice education and growth of antiprejudice education (Gordon 2015). The study of attitudes during the 1930s followed a number of different paths, including how attitudes differ from behaviour; of which the most famous example is LaPiere’s 1934 study showing that hotels which in practice let rooms to a Chinese couple later answered ‘no’ to the question of whether they would be willing to accommodate “an important Chinese gentleman” (LaPiere 1934, p.234; Rose 1996). This discrepancy between ‘attitude’ and behaviour seems logically to create a substantial difficulty for the use of questionnaire measurements of attitudes; however, questionnaires measuring ‘social distance’ and attitudes continued to be used both then and in the present day (Rose 1996).

In the 1940s as America entered the Second World War, social science became preoccupied with the question of ‘morale’, in both the general population and the army (Rose 1996). Social psychologists studied the effects of news and rumour on morale, and the effects of particular forms of army training such as orientation videos. While social psychology was growing as a field during this time, the field of race relations was both growing and shifting. In schools, the popularity of the ‘intercultural education movement’ gave way in the early 1940s to the ‘intergroup education movement’, which focused more closely on antiprejudice education relating to Black Americans, rather than to new immigrants (Bradley 2007).
However, the field was also expanding well beyond educational institutions – in part, as a response to race riots during the war following the movement of Black workers to formerly largely white areas. The American Council on Race Relations was founded in 1944 as a response to race riots “to bring about full democracy in race relations” (Embree 1944, p.563). They planned to conduct or sponsor research and literature reviews into race and race relations, offer advice to those in “the interracial field”, develop “materials and programs for use in the public schools and other educational institutions” and increase “knowledge about racial groups by popular education through ... mass communication” (Embree 1944, p.563).

As an example of their activities, in 1945 the American Council on Race Relations cosponsored (with the Committee for Interracial Progress) the ‘Institute on Community Relations’, which “aimed to alleviate racial tensions by training more than 15,000 county officials and employees [in Los Angeles] to provide better service to all population groups, specifically minorities” (Bernstein 2010, p.79). This was the first mandatory training for local government employees in ‘intergroup problems’ in America (Bernstein 2010). This shift in focus from the formal education of children and university students to ‘training’ county officials should be understood in the context of the rioting which resulted in a focus on local officials and particularly the police, with the American Council on Race Relations producing materials and courses to train police officers in race relations (Balthorpe 2001). Training would “alleviate racial tensions”, perhaps by improving service provision to minority groups. This frames “racial tensions”, a euphemism for riots, as resulting from poor service provision to ethnic minority groups by county officials, and service provision as something which could be improved by training in the workplace.

Although the American Council on Race Relations closed in 1949 (Balthorpe 2001), the field of race relations training continued to grow. By the time of the publication of Allport’s pioneering work ‘The Nature of Prejudice’ in 1954, there was a substantive body of research and practice on improving race relations through various forms of education and of mass media, with a recent census showing over 1,300 organizations “devoted explicitly to the improvement of group relations” (Allport 1954, xvii). In the final chapters of The Nature of Prejudice, Allport reviews and evaluates these efforts, dividing them into:
Formal educational methods
Contact and acquaintance programs
Group retraining methods
Mass media
Exhortation
Individual therapy (1954, p.480)

Of particular interest to this history are formal educational methods, contact and acquaintance programs and group retraining methods, as these can be understood as the practices from which E&D training has developed – although individual therapy has also been influential. Allport’s description shows that the methods of the intercultural education movement were still being used in the 1950s, as was the ‘informational approach’ taken with university students. Other methods had also proliferated, including the use of media “that invite the student to identify with members of an out-group” (1954, p.484), and ‘small group process’ which “applies many principles of group dynamics, including discussion, socio-drama, and group retraining” (1954, pp.484-485).

‘Group retraining’ is described as the use of the ‘new’ technique of role-play, designed to encourage empathy, understanding and identification with people in different social positions. In addition, Allport describes “incident control” as training for people who want to “develop a skill for use in everyday life – skill in offsetting the bigoted remarks that stain our national habits of conversation” (1954, p.492). This skill is developed through “hours of practice under supervision in a group setting” (1954, p.492) – this would now be called ‘bystander training’. Of individual therapy, Allport (1954) notes that this is likely to be highly effective but will never be able to reach a substantial proportion of the population. This is an interesting comment, as much of Allport’s analysis is of prejudice understood as a distortion of good judgement, rather than a deep-seated psychological disposition (see Henriques (1984) for comparison of Allport’s analysis of racism with Adorno’s earlier theories of the ‘authoritarian personality’).

These different approaches to “the improvement of group relations” each rely on particular assumptions about the underlying causes of conflict between groups, with some focusing on the role of the bystander (who needs skills, rather than attitudinal change); some focused on empathy or understanding, and some on knowledge. Notably, empowerment of minoritised groups is absent as a strategy; approaches which would actively reconfigure economic
inequalities, such as the payment of reparations, are also absent. (Legal changes are discussed in a separate chapter; Allport (1954) concludes that there is a ‘fait accompli’ effect, in which people rapidly accept new laws and policies regardless of their opinions before the law was passed).

From this review it is evident that by the 1950s a range of approaches to improving race relations were becoming established in America. In addition, through the early 1950s, US psychologists were studying the effects of discrimination and segregation on the 'personality' of Black children. In general, discrimination was found to have negative psychological effects on Black children, or effects that could be inferred to be negative (Allport 1954). The most famous of these studies was the series undertaken by two Black American psychologists, Mamie and Kenneth Clarke, looking at self-esteem and ego formation in young Black children. For instance, they asked children to colour in a line drawing “the color that you are” and to colour another drawing “the color you like little boys (or girls) to be” (Clark and Clark 1950, p.342). They found that many Black children coloured 'themselves' in a lighter colour than the experimenters judged them to be, and chose still lighter colours when asked to colour the drawing in the colour they “like little boys (or girls) to be”. The psychologists inferred that these and other responses were signs that Black children's self-esteem was suffering as a consequence of racism. One paper concludes:

These results seem most significant from the point of view of what is involved in the development of a positive, constructive programme for more wholesome education of Negro children in the realities of race in the American culture. They would seem to point strongly to a need for a definite mental hygiene and educational program that would relieve children of the tremendous burden of feelings of inadequacy and inferiority which seem to become integrated into the very structure of the personality as it is developing (Clark and Clark, 1950, p.350).

The Clarks were called as expert witnesses in some of the District Court cases on desegregation of schools, and were involved in preparing a brief for the Supreme Court case Brown v Board of Education (1954). The Supreme Court ruled that segregation of schools was unconstitutional, and used psychological arguments and evidence as part of the ruling, stating that segregation of schoolchildren “generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone … this finding is amply supported by modern [psychological] authority” (Brown v
There was mass resistance to the *Brown* decision among the Southern states of America, such that in practice segregation of schools continued in the decade following the ruling. There was no mandatory training for school governors or teachers during this period; however, voluntary organisations such as the National Conference of Christians and Jews (founded in 1927 as the National Conference of Jews and Christians) provided support to schools and other institutions in the process of desegregation, including through training provision (Gordon 2015). Their sub-group ‘Committee on Integration’ “published “a guide book of strategies that have actually worked in previous integration situations”, provided lists of speakers, and sponsored workshops and in-service teacher trainings on human relations throughout the South” (Gordon 2015, p.171).

To the extent that the Civil Rights Movement of the late 1950s and early 1960s focused on education and/or training, it centred around the education of Black people – teaching Black adults to read, as part of an emphasis on voter registration; training activists to respond non-violently to the verbal and physical attacks they could be expected to encounter on marches or during sit-ins or kneel-ins; teaching Northern activists come to the South how to behave in a way that Southerners would find socially acceptable; and fighting for Black children’s rights to education (Robnett 1997). Unlike the earlier ‘interracial’ and ‘intercultural’ movements, the training or education of white people in a formal capacity is noticeable only by its absence. However, training in non-violence for activists seems to have reflected the practices of ‘incident control’ described in Allport (1954).

The Black Power Movement of the late 1950s and 1960s differed from the Civil Rights Movement in many ways, but similarly was not concerned with training or educating white people. Instead, the movement focused on combating police brutality through demonstrations and patrols, providing free breakfasts to school children, providing alternative education for Black children, doing ‘consciousness raising’ work with Black adults through reading groups, and reaching out to Black people to improve their quality of life and bring about revolutionary consciousness. There was debate and disagreement about the possibilities for involvement of ‘sympathetic’ whites, with the famous example of Malcolm X telling a white college student that there was ‘nothing’ she could do about racism (X 1965). X did regularly deliver lectures to primarily white audiences of college students; Davis
described one lecture which she attended as “Malcolm was addressing himself to white people, chastising them, informing them of their sins, warning them of the Armageddon to come, in which they would all be destroyed” (Davis 1974, p.127) The reasons for these lectures may have been partly financial - some white people donated to Black Power organisations such as the Black Panther Party and were sometimes specifically approached for donations (Brown 1992). However, there was minimal discussion of the value of changing the attitudes of racist white people, with the possible exception of X’s later statement (quoted in Katz 1978, taken from the later section of his autobiography) that he now believes that the important work white anti-racists can do is work in their own community to help other white people become anti-racist (X 1965).

While the Black Power Movement in the USA focused on police brutality towards Black people and inadequate education for Black children, their response in the late 1960s and 1970s was not concerned with changing the attitudes of police or teachers (in the sense undertaken through racism awareness training). Rather, they worked to bring the education of Black children into the control of the Black community – for instance, the Black Panther Party founded a full-time school for children – and to combat police brutality through, for instance, armed patrols which followed police patrols to witness and intervene (Brown 1992). These approaches did not rely on the fundamental goodwill of the white community who, if properly educated, would improve the conditions of life for Black people; they were attempts to gain direct power and control over their own lives.

To summarise, it seems that the earliest formal education directed towards equalities arose in response to problems of assimilation and integration of new immigrant children in their schools. ‘Antiprejudice’ interventions for adults began to grow in the late 1920s and 1930s together with a new social psychological interest in ‘attitudes’ and ‘prejudice’ (Gordon 2015; Rose 1996). These interventions remained as relatively isolated experiments or studies until race riots in 1944, following mass migration of Black Americans into previously white areas. This led to the first mandatory race relations training for thousands of council employees in the area where there had been rioting (Bernstein 2010). Training here was a response to disorder, locating the problem in the behaviour of council employees. Similarly, following the mass protests responding to the Brown v Board of Education (1954) ruling which made segregated schools unconstitutional, the National Conference of Christians and Jews
provided optional training to school teachers (Gordon 2015). However, training continued to be a relatively minor practice until the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This is despite the growth of both the Civil Rights Movement and the Black Power Movement. Thus, the development of ‘white awareness training’ and ‘racism awareness training’ didn’t come directly from Black activists involved in the Civil Rights Movement or in the Black Power Movement in the USA. This is suggested by the complete absence of discussion of the education or training of white people in historical accounts such as Robnett (1997), Davis (1974), Brown (1992), and X (1965); although some individual activists did work as anti-racist educators, as with the example of Audre Lorde, described in the next section.

3.3 Civil Rights Act 1964: 1964-1979

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (henceforth CRA1964) was concerned with a wide range of civil rights issues, including desegregating schools and public facilities such as libraries and swimming pools, preventing unequal requirements for voter eligibility, and continuing funding for the Civil Rights Commission (created by the Civil Rights Act 1960). Although schools were meant to be desegregated as a result of the case Brown v Board of Education in 1954, in fact in 1964 fewer than 2% of Black children in the South went to schools with white children (Tarr 2013). The CRA1964 allowed the government to cut off federal funding for institutions which discriminated on the basis of race, such as white-only schools, creating a more effective mechanism for ensuring compliance with the law. To facilitate desegregation, the CRA1964 authorised the arrangement with “institutions of higher education” of “special training designed to improve the ability of teachers, supervisors, counselors, and other elementary or secondary school personnel to deal effectively with special educational problems occasioned by desegregation” (CRA1964, Title IV, Sec. 404). This is suggestive of how established ‘training’ for race relations had become by this stage; and that it was offered by “institutions of higher education” (colleges) rather than by independent consultants or training providers.

However, the most significant aspect of the Act in terms of its direct effect on equalities training was Title VII, about discrimination in employment. Equality training in workplaces emerged as a response to the provisions of the 1964 Act, which made it illegal for businesses with over 15 employees to discriminate against employees or potential employees on the basis of sex, colour, religion, race or national origin. To enforce this, the Equal Employment
Opportunities Commission (EEOC) was created, a body which would investigate allegations of discrimination in employment.

The CRA1964 did not define discrimination or explain the conditions of compliance (Kelly and Dobbin 1998). Perhaps as a result of this ambiguity, there was initially only a minimal response from employers. This shifted around 1972, when the scope of the EEOC was expanded to include the ability to sue employers, and the case of *Griggs v Duke Power Company* (1971) found in favour of the plaintiffs without evidence of intentional discrimination, but instead relied on ‘disparate impact’ of employment practices on Black employees. This expands the remit of the law to include what in the UK was later called ‘indirect discrimination’. This led to a rapid expansion of equal opportunities policies and of Equal Opportunities specialist roles within organisations (Kelly and Dobbin 1998).

In the decade after the CRA1964 was passed, a high number of discrimination cases were brought to the EEOC, and when ‘probable discrimination’ was found, the court could require that all employees at the organisation undergo training. Some businesses attempted to pre-empt problems by mandating training for all employees. This training included an explanation of the legal requirements for the organisation and of company policy: “For most companies, the training was a one-time event, but some required (and many still require) brief periodic refreshers of company policies and signatures from every employee to acknowledge that they had read and understood the policies and the consequences of noncompliance” (Anand and Winters 2008, p.356). The EEOC was given enforcement powers by the Equal Employment Opportunities Act 1972, further reinforcing the importance of equalities training for corporations. In a retrospective account, Anand and Winters (2008) describe the corporate training of the 1960s and 1970s as strongly focused on legal compliance.

Sex discrimination was included in the CRA1964, but was only included as a relatively late amendment to the Act. The Women’s Liberation Movement was growing through the 1960s and 1970s, with the term ‘sexual harassment’ emerging through women’s consciousness raising in 1974, and becoming a key focus of feminist legal work (Wise and Stanley 1987; MacKinnon 1979; Siegel 2003). Workplace training expanded to include sexism in the 1970s, with educators also relying on parallels between women’s oppression and Black oppression to encourage white women to become anti-racist (e.g. Katz 1978).
The amount of time devoted to education or training varied widely with different organisations. As quoted above, some corporations had training as a one-off event. Some institutions, such as police colleges and teacher training programs, included courses on racism as a part of the curriculum which, like other courses, took place over a semester. The materials used in these various training programs were varied, with individual practitioners having their own method. For instance, Lorde has spoken about her experiences as an educator in 1969, in interview with Rich:

They were inaugurating a program in the Education Department for these white kids going into teaching in the New York City schools. Lehmann used to be 99 percent white, and it was these students coming out of the Education Department who were going to teach Black children in the city schools. So the course was called "Race and the Urban Situation." I had all these white students wanting to know, "What are we doing? Why are our kids hating us in the classroom?" I could not believe that they did not know the most elementary level of interactions. I would say, "When a white kid says 2 + 2 = 4, you say 'right.' In the same class, when a Black kid stands up and says 2 + 2 = 4, you pat him on the back, you say, 'Hey, that's wonderful.' But what message are you really giving? Or what happens when you walk down the street on your way to teach? When you walk into class? Let's play act a little." And all the fear and loathing of these young white college students would come pouring out; it had never been addressed. ... mostly women, and they felt like unwilling sacrifices. (Lorde and Rich, 2007/1981, pp.95-96)

This description may be indicative of the kind of 'special training' referred to in the CRA1964, to help educators deal with the challenges of desegregation. Lorde went on to teach similar courses at a police college. Lorde here describes her methods which could be seen as encouraging self-reflection, self-knowledge and interpersonal skills through techniques such as discussion and role-play, although she uses none of these terms.

As these accounts suggest, the passage of anti-discrimination laws – both the CRA1964 and the Equal Employment Opportunities Act 1972 – was pivotal in creating a demand for training on equal opportunities in corporations. Much of this training was focused on legal compliance, but there was a range of training styles available at this time. In the next two sections I briefly describe and analyse two particularly well-defined forms of training: Elliott’s “Blue Eyes, Brown Eyes” training, and Katz’ “White Awareness” training.

3.3.1 Blue Eyes, Brown Eyes: Promoting empathy

Elliott invented her “Blue Eyes, Brown Eyes” form of training in 1968 with her all-white class of 8-year-old children. This training could be viewed as a more intense, immersive version of
the use of books, films and so on “that invite the student to identify with members of an out-group” (Allport 1954, p.484). Rather than encouraging students to engage with and identify with fictionalised accounts of life as a minority, Elliott created a hierarchy between the children and actively discriminated against those at the bottom of the hierarchy, in an attempt to give them life experience that would enable them to empathise with the experiences of Black Americans.

In 1970, a documentary showed Elliott doing the exercise over a few days with 8-year-old children (The Eye of the Storm 1970). She began by discussing racism with them and suggesting that they do an exercise over the next few days to help them understand “what racism feels like”. She created a hierarchy based on eye colour, with blue-eyed children as superior to brown-eyed children, introduced physical markers of inferiority (wearing a collar), and made eye colour salient in every interaction she had with the class. The next day she reversed the hierarchy and continued the exercise. Finally, she debriefed: the children were guided through reflections on their experiences and made comparisons between what they experienced for a few hours and what Black Americans experience over a lifetime.

This exercise was featured in the local press and from there to the international press, and Elliott began to modify the exercise for adults and use it as training for educators and later for other workers. She continued to work as a teacher (and conduct the exercise with her class on a yearly basis) until 1985, when she moved to focus full time on conducting her exercise with adult groups. As of 2005, according to an article about Elliott,

She has led training sessions at General Electric, Exxon, AT&T, IBM and other corporations, and has lectured to the IRS, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Department of Education and the Postal Service. She has spoken at more than 350 colleges and universities. She has appeared on the "Oprah Winfrey Show" five times. (Bloom 2005)

Elliott continues to be a world-renowned diversity educator, although her work with adults is substantially more streamlined than the work with children described above – for instance, she no longer ‘flips’ the hierarchy created (for detailed descriptions see Stewart et al. 2003; Elliott 2003a; for a partially filmed session see “The Event: How Racist Are You?” (2009)).
Swan (2007) offers an interrogation and critique of the assumptions of Elliott’s training method. Firstly, the training relies on drawing an equivalence between the way Elliott treats the participants, and the way Black and other minoritised people are treated; this can be inaccurate, as Elliott is highly confrontational and even sadistic in her classroom behaviour, whereas interpersonal racism can range in subtlety (see for instance Rollock 2012b). As well as relying on this equivalence of treatment, the training assumes that the discriminatory treatment is experienced in the same way (despite being a one off rather than an ongoing reality), and further, that empathy for the experience of discrimination is sufficient for empathising with minoritised people more generally; reducing Black lives to the experience of being discriminated against (Swan attributes this argument to Gilroy (1992)).

Even more centrally, as Swan argues, the training method attributes white people’s emotions and empathy as the key to change:

... it is white people’s empathy and suffering that is the focus for the workshop and video. Although [Elliott] silences any white participant who attempts to discuss her feelings, the narrative of the whole workshop is around whites feeling better. One of the ways that this operates is that Elliott is herself white. In fact, she is blue-eyed. In essence, she offers the white participants the therapeutic promise of progression. ... in presenting herself as enlightened, her performance is a congratulation of the white saved self, and her crusade to save other white selves. In contrast, the black and minority ethnic participants have no way out of the racism of which they are on the receiving end in life. Although there is room for them to express emotions of anger, frustration, and sadness during the workshop about the racism they encounter, the focus for the narrative is the fate of white people. There is no transformational narrative for the black and minority ethnic participants as theirs is not the main feature. (2007, p.198)

Although Elliott’s approach to training became famous worldwide, it did not spread widely in that it is rare for other educators to take up her approach of deliberately discriminating against some participants in their own training session (though see Swan (2007) for an example of one educator who does use this approach). Elliott has not produced any resources to help other trainers take up her approach. However, extracts from the documentaries produced about her training, particularly ‘The Eye of the Storm’, are still used in E&D training today to promote empathy and spark discussion (Brewis 2016). In the next section I describe Katz’s approach to training as set out in her 1978 training manual, then compare the two approaches.
3.3.2 ‘White Awareness’

The popularity of Katz’s approach to training may be attributable to the publication of her training manual, ‘White Awareness’, in 1978. Katz emphasises that as racism is a white problem, the responsibility for ending racism lies with white people (drawing on Myrdal (1944) and others). Further, she argues that the use of Black anti-racism trainers is exploitative, and that white people should be leading anti-racism workshops and courses. As such, her training is designed to be taken by all-white groups, with at least one of the facilitators being white. Katz draws heavily on psychological concepts and on intergroup techniques such as role-play which were being developed in the 1940s and 1950s (see Allport 1954). Her focus is not on developing knowledge about or appreciation for “other cultures” but on re-conceptualising racism as a system which permanently implicates every white American, such that the only positive response is to become an “anti-racist racist”. As Gurnah (1984) argues, the conceptual system which underpins Katz’ approach to training is partially derived from Rogerian psychology, which compares the current self with one’s ideal self-concept, and conceptualises mental health as deriving from a good match between the current and ideal self.

The training is divided into ‘stages’ with several suggested exercises for each stage. The first stage, “Racism: Definitions and Inconsistencies” focuses on developing definitions for racism, bias, prejudice, and other relevant terms. Stage two, “Confronting the Reality of Racism” aims to convince participants of the reality of institutional racism. Stage three, “Dealing with Feelings” encourages participants to confront and express the emotions that have come up – this is described as an essential stage as it should lead to a change in behaviours. Stage four, “Cultural Differences: Exploring Cultural Racism” involves looking at language and IQ tests in terms of the cultural privileging of whiteness. Stage five, “The Meaning of Whiteness: Individual Racism” is focused on introspection, with participants examining their own attitudes, beliefs and behaviours in relation to race and whiteness. Finally in stage six, “Developing Action Strategies”, participants develop their plans for anti-racist action.

Techniques include role-play, films and stories followed by discussion, group work and group discussions, readings and quizzes. Katz suggests that the training can be adapted according to the time available, “ranging from three-hour introductory sessions to forty-
five-hour semester-long university courses” (Katz 1978, p.28). Short (three hour) courses are limited to stage one and Katz warns facilitators to keep their expectations low when facilitating these. Although Katz quotes from activists involved in the Black Power Movement as justification for her approach, the use of formal anti-racist training for white people is in no way part of the focus of the Black Power Movement, which was relatively separatist and interested in what Black people could do for their own community (see Section 3.2). I return to the details of Katz’ approach in Section 4.3, which discusses the extensive take-up of her approach in the UK and presents the critiques of Black activists in the UK of this approach.

In comparing these two approaches, it is evident that there are important areas of overlap in the theories that underpin them, although there is only a limited overlap in the techniques used (in one particularly direct connection, Elliott has some resources developed by Katz available to download on her website under ‘learning materials’ (Elliott 2003b)). For both Elliott and Katz, the white identity of the trainer is significant, and training is understood as an intervention for white people. (In practice, Tatum (1992) describes having used Katz (1978) as part of developing a course on the psychology of racism; suggesting that in fact these materials are also used by Black educators with racially diverse groups of students). Neither justifies the importance of their approach in terms of legislation, but in terms of a combination of achieving social justice for Black people and achieving improved mental well-being for white people. Both Elliott and Katz explicitly use a ‘disease’ metaphor to describe racism and seem to mean literally that racism is a mental illness (The Oprah Winfrey Show 1992; Katz 1978). Both claim that change is possible and racism can be unlearned, but also describe the system of socialisation into racism as overwhelmingly powerful. Finally, for both, because white people are conceptualised as those having power in comparison with Black people, they are also those who have the power to end racism; a very different model to that of Black people taking power through self-organisation.

In reviewing these two approaches, both developed by white women and fundamentally focused on educating white people, I do not mean to imply that only white people were involved in race relations training during the 1960s and 1970s. However, I would suggest that the movement towards training for white people came about only indirectly through the direct efforts of the Civil Rights Movement or the Black Power Movement (in that the
CRA1964 came about partly in response to these movements). Rather, training both in corporations and more widely was overall a white response to changes in legislation (in the case of legally focused training) and partially the activity of white people who viewed the process of overcoming their own racism as a component of ‘self-actualisation’ and becoming a psychologically healthy person. I discuss the idea of training as a psychological ‘technique of the self’ in Chapter 5 (see Brewis 2016). In the next section, I turn to a specific context in which training took place: the USA military, asking what can be learned from the way in which training was instituted in this organisation.

3.4 Case study: Training in the USA military, 1970-1980

The USA military is widely cited as the ‘origin’ of Racism Awareness Training (RAT) (e.g. Sivanandan 1985; Luthra and Oakley 1991), and was influential in spreading the practice of training. Hope wrote that “The origin and development of the Race Relations Education Program in the military represents the most massive effort to change attitudes and behaviours that has ever been undertaken in an institutionalised setting” (1987, p.91). As such, I give a detailed history of the early training in the USA military, including its relationship with research.

Until a presidential executive order in 1948, the USA military was formally segregated by race. The executive order both banned discrimination on the ground of race and religion, and created a committee to look into existing procedures and make recommendations about changes which would promote equality (Executive Order 9981, 1948). Nordlie argues that in fact desegregation occurred in the early 1950s as a result of the practical demands made by the war in Korea (Nordlie 1987). However, this was not accompanied by a shift in training or educational practices.

Training in race relations began as a response to rioting among members of the military, beginning in the late 1960s and continuing in the early 1970s. The most famous of these riots was that of on the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk, involved in the Vietnam war, in which there was violence between Black and white servicemen in 1972. Although some of the official policy responses to these riots denied racism in the armed forces, other policy responses chose to institute “race relations instruction”. In 1969, “the Department of the Army directed that race relations instruction be incorporated into the Army educational system” (Nordlie 1987,
Race relations began to be included as a four-hour component of basic combat training. In 1971, the Defence Race Relations Institute was founded, with the aims of training Equal Opportunities specialists for the military, and conducting evaluative research on the Equal Opportunities training programmes. As such, a relatively large body of research exists focusing on the training conducted within the military; this contributed to the impact that the military programme had on the development of race relations training more widely.

The rioting on the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk is particularly interesting in the context of these race relations efforts, as the report on the reasons for the rioting disclaimed any racism, in terms similar to those of the Scarman report on the Brixton disturbances in the UK a decade later (Scarman 1981):

During the course of this investigation we found no substantial evidence of racial discrimination upon which we could place true responsibility for causation of these serious disturbances. Certainly there were many perceptions of discrimination by young blacks, who, because of their sensitivity to real or fancied oppression, often enlist with a "chip on their shoulder." Those young blacks, who enter the service from the ghetto with a complete black awareness, probably for the first time find themselves immersed in a predominantly white society which, in civilian life, they had come to mistrust. ...To repeat, what many of these men view as discrimination is, more often than not, a perception rather than a reality. (Report by the Special Subcommittee on Disciplinary Problems in the US Navy 1973, Section 5C)

The report also critiques Black unity as resulting in a situation where the grievances of one Black serviceman becomes the grievance of all, and describes this as ‘polarization’ between the Black and white recruits. As with the Scarman report, the report on the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk riots does acknowledge the possibility of individuals with “attitudes of discrimination”, and justified the need for “human relations programs” on these grounds. Unlike Scarman, this report suggested that “individual attitudes of discrimination” might be against “blacks or whites, or any other ethnic or racial groups” (see below). Another key difference between the problematisations expressed in the two reports is that the report on “disciplinary problems in the US Navy” argues that these programs can be part of the problem, when not properly conducted, by encouraging Black unity and undermining the chain of command:

... Since there may well be individual attitudes of discrimination among some persons serving in those forces--discrimination directed toward blacks or whites, or any other ethnic or racial groups--human relation programs remain essential.
6. Where Human Relation Councils and Minority Affairs offices are manned solely by minority personnel, they become conduits for minority personnel to bypass the normal chain of command. Used properly, as another set of eyes and ears to keep the commander informed as to personnel problems, they can be worthwhile; but used as vehicle for the settlement of individual minority grievances which should be resolved within the command structure, they are divisive and disruptive of good order and discipline and encourage further polarization. The equal opportunity and human relations programs of the Navy must not, in any way, dilute the authority of the chain of command. (Report by the Special Subcommittee on Disciplinary Problems in the US Navy 1973, Section 5C)

Despite the conclusions of this report that the key factors leading to the rioting were the unusually low quality of the Black recruits (due to hiring standards having lowered in response to the Vietnam war), “permissiveness” and lack of discipline, and too much unity among the Black servicemen, the program of training in “human relations” and “equal opportunities” continued to expand. In 1972, the standard training was expanded to eighteen annual hours of unit training in Equal Opportunities. The early Defence Race Relations Institute programme for training instructors – developed between 1971 and 1974 – took place over eleven weeks. This course was a combination of sociological and historical information about minority groups, instruction in “behavioural sciences” with a focus on race relations (including discussion of both individual racism and institutional racism), “educational techniques” such as lesson planning, leading discussion groups, and “intergroup relations”, and one long weekend spent in various “minority communities” to gain direct experience of other cultures (Hope 1987, p.93). The influence of social psychology is clear in this programme, although it maintains elements of traditional pedagogy as well.

This programme evolved over the following years – for instance, the weekend spent with minority communities was cut from the programme in 1974. New regulations came into force in 1974, which formulated the purpose of race relations education in the Army as “to maintain the highest degree of organisational and combat readiness by fostering harmonious relations among all military personnel” (Department of the Army 1974, p.1). This rationale aligns race relations education with the organisational drives of the military, as the managing diversity movement would later do for corporations. However, it also aligns race relations education specifically with the reduction of disorder through developing “harmonious relations”; this is reminiscent of the introduction of race relations training in
Los Angeles in response to rioting. In 1974, “Sex” was newly included in the definition of a minority group. However, there is no further mention of sex in the policy, which is titled “Race relations education for the army” and refers often to “race relations/equal opportunities” (Department of the Army 1974).

Regulations effective from 1977 again reformulated the purpose of training, which becomes “to promote equal opportunity by developing maximum potential of all available talents and resources; by fostering harmonious relations among all personnel under Army control; and by providing positive motivation of all personnel” (Department of the Army 1977, p.31). This formulation is still more similar to that of the managing diversity movement a decade later. In this policy document, ‘race relations’ and 'equal opportunities' are no longer used interchangeably, and the focus now includes sex and age discrimination.

Beginning in 1976 there was a major two-year research study of Equal Opportunities training. This research found that “not more than half of the training required by the regulations was actually being given ... where it was being given, the training was frequently of low quality and often related to race relations or equal opportunity in name only – the subject matter being far removed or only tangentially related” (Nordlie 1987, p.79). Additionally, the research found that soldiers of higher ranks were not receiving training. This kind of research begins to point to the gap between policy and practice in equal opportunities training. In particular, while policies may attempt to align ‘equal opportunities’ with the organisation’s main goals, this perception may not be reflected in the implementation of the policy; high status people are able to effectively avoid training; and policies may be more ambitious than practice. I return to these issues in the literature review. In the next section, I describe the developments of the 1980s and 1990s, particularly focusing on the rise of the ‘managing diversity’ movement.

3.5 Training from 1980s-1990s

Enforcement of anti-discrimination laws dropped off in the early 1980s, as Reagan’s government wanted employers to be responsible for enforcing their own antidiscrimination policies without government involvement (Kelly and Dobbin 1998). This led to a decrease in the delivery of legally focused training. Alternate forms of training became more popular,
with ‘sensitivity’ training, confidence training for minorities, and diversity training all taking off during this period (Anand and Winters 2008).

‘Sensitivity’ training focused on teaching participants about cultural differences, prejudices and stereotyping. For instance, one common exercise involved participants being asked to associate words or phrases with a ‘type’ of person such as a white woman or a black man. Trainees were then led to reflect on and challenge the stereotypes which emerged (Anand and Winters 2008).

Confidence and efficacy training for minoritised people, including women, was based on the assumption that minoritised people underperform in businesses traditionally dominated by white men not because of a lack of innate ability or qualifications but because of a lack of confidence and experience with the culture of those institutions. This form of training began to be established in the mid-1970s but grew in scope over the 1980s and 1990s (Anand and Winters 2008). This approach has a core similarity with the ‘diversity management’ movement, which is the assumption of a bad match between the culture of a business and the cultural expectations of minoritised people. However, the solution to this problem is the diametric opposite, with the focus being on teaching minoritised people to conform to the business culture rather than on the business culture transforming so as to be inclusive and welcoming of difference.

‘Diversity’ training began to supplement and even replace ‘affirmative action’ and ‘equal opportunities’ training in the USA in the mid-1980s, with ‘diversity’ emerging as having a distinctive rationale separating it from ‘affirmative action’ and the training programmes associated with it. The emergence of ‘diversity’ terminology is deeply intertwined with a focus on race and ethnicity, but ‘diversity’ attempts to move “beyond race and gender” (Thomas 1990) and consider broader differences between people as having relevance to equal opportunities. The question of what ‘diversity’ does and should refer to first emerges in the context of higher education in the USA, with challenges to and justifications for programmes of affirmative action.

In 1970, it became legal for goals and timetables to be used by federal contractors to increase the employment of minorities. In 1972 this was extended to universities, and included ‘women’ as a minority group. A number of universities responded with affirmative
action programmes, for instance, reserving a set number of places for “minority group” students. This was challenged by Bakke, a white male applicant to the University of California Medical School, in 1974. The Supreme Court judged *Regents of the University of California v Bakke* (shortened to *Bakke*) in 1978, judging that it was unconstitutional to reserve places for “minority group” candidates.

The Medical School argued (among their other arguments, relating to justice and resource distribution) that they wanted to obtain “the educational benefits that flow from an ethnically diverse student body” (*Bakke* 1978, p.307). The argument about the educational benefits of diversity was the only one which was upheld by the judge, who described this as a “permissible goal” (*Bakke* 1978, p.437) for a university while the others were held to be irrelevant or unproven. However, the judge ruled against the university on the grounds that:

> The diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element. Petitioner’s special admissions program, focused solely on ethnic diversity, would hinder rather than further attainment of genuine diversity. (*Bakke* 1978, p.316)

This use of the concept of ‘genuine diversity’ (as encompassing a broad range of personal attributes) as being integral to the mission of the institution for business, rather than moral, reasons, began to appear in the business world in the mid-1980s. A school of thought which claimed ‘diversity’ as an ideal successor to ‘affirmative action’ in corporations emerged. The American Institute for Managing Diversity was founded in 1984 under the name ‘Institute for Corporate Leadership and Management at Morehouse College’ (Thomas 1991). “Diversity training” started in the mid-1980s, but grew hugely in the early 1990s, when it began to reach the mainstream.

‘Managing Diversity’ was developed by Thomas and others in business management/consultancy as a response to a ‘diverse’ workforce which is distinct from either ‘affirmative action’ or ‘celebrating difference’. Thomas (1991) characterises ‘affirmative action’ as a focus on recruiting members of a specific demographic, sometimes using quotas, for moral/ethical reasons and/or as a way of complying with employment laws; and ‘celebrating difference’ as a way of embracing differences between employees – particularly cultural differences – in an attempt to make all employees feel at home and to increase understanding and communication between groups, without changing the employment
environment in any substantial way. By contrast, Thomas (1991) described ‘managing diversity’ as an approach which prioritises a *business/economic* approach to diversity. It stresses getting the best out of every employee, treating employees as individuals, ‘diversity’ as something which could refer to *any* differences and similarities between employees, and an approach which involves long term changes to the deep culture and values of an organisation. However, ‘managing diversity’ was not meant to replace these other approaches, but as Agócs and Burr put it, was conceptualised by Thomas as:

... a strategy for dealing with issues that affirmative action left unaddressed. These issues include the retention and career development of women and minorities hired under affirmative action plans, and the need to warm the chilly climate for these groups in many workplaces. (1996, p.30)

In the early 1990s ‘diversity training’ had an ideology which was distinct from that of other prevalent kinds of training such as ‘sensitivity training’ (along the lines of the training described in Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2). A case study published in 1990 is suggestive of the type of training implied by ‘diversity management’:

First, Avon initiated awareness training at all levels. "The key to recruiting, retaining, and promoting minorities is not the human resource department," says Worthing. ... Third, in conjunction with the American Institute for Managing Diversity, Avon developed a diversity training program. For several years, the company has sent racially and ethnically diverse groups of 25 managers at a time to Institute headquarters at Morehouse College in Atlanta, where they spend three weeks confronting their differences and learning to hear and avail themselves of viewpoints they initially disagreed with. "We came away disciples of diversity," says one company executive. (Thomas 1990, p.108).

This account suggests that the ‘managing diversity’ approach included intensive residential courses which focused on expressing and respecting different perspectives. Here ‘diversity training’ refers specifically to this type of intensive training. However, ‘diversity’ soon became a catch-all term for any training about equal opportunities or diversity. By 1996, Thomas complained that ‘diversity’ had become the polite, accepted way of referring to the simple presence of Black people in an organisation (rather than, as he intended, referring to a huge range of differences and similarities between employees). He wrote that the word ‘diversity’ had become extremely popular, but without a concurrent embrace of the rationale or practices of ‘managing diversity’ (Thomas 1996). It is certainly true that ‘diversity’ moved into standard use during the 1990s. For instance, Hemphill and Haines (1997) use ‘diversity training’ as an umbrella term for all types of training (and recommend
removing the term ‘diversity’ because it is associated with ‘backlash’ by majority group members – precisely one of the elements of ‘affirmative action’ that some takes on ‘managing diversity’ saw diversity management as overcoming, e.g. Kandola and Fullerton 1994).

The extent to which the shift towards ‘diversity management’ was a shift in practices, rather than rhetoric, is highly questionable. Kelly and Dobbin describe the practices of diversity specialists as “old wine in new wineskins” (1998, p.978). They argue that the key new element of diversity management was the ‘culture audit’ in which a specialist consultant would come into an organisation with the aim of understanding the workplace culture and identifying those elements of the culture which held back diversity. This was also one of the least common practices, as it was costly and involved external rather than internal specialists. The most popular ‘diversity’ initiatives were the same as the most popular affirmative action and equal opportunities initiatives – training and policies (Kelly and Dobbin 1998). However, the curriculum, pedagogy and tone of the training may have shifted; it is difficult to know from their account whether this was the case.

3.6 Conclusion

This history has shown that the origins of education and training for equality were intertwined with the beginnings of social psychology, and especially the study of attitudes, prejudice, and attitude change. The earliest antiprejudice education, in the 1920s, was limited to schools and was motivated by a desire to respect and celebrate pluralism rather than requiring new immigrants to become ‘Americanized’. At the same time, charitable organisations were engaging in both antiprejudice education, and evaluations of this education by psychologists.

With America’s entry into the Second World War, there was a rise in racial tensions including rioting, particularly where the availability of war work encouraged Black people to move to the cities. The increase in visible racial tensions led directly to the creation of committees and organisations which promoted good race relations via training and other means. At the same time, social psychology’s status was growing as psychologists researched the nation’s morale and how it could be improved, the effectiveness of various means of educating and training soldiers, and so on.
In the 1950s there were key changes to legislation, most significantly, the desegregation of schools in *Brown vs Board of Education* 1954. Psychological evidence about the negative effects of segregation on Black children’s self-esteem were used as key evidence in this ruling. There was huge backlash against *Brown* among Southern whites, to which some organisations such as the National Conference of Christians and Jews responded by offering educational resources for teachers and schools, including training. However, training on race was by not offered in most institutions at this stage.

Following the CRA1964 there was a huge increase in businesses incorporating race relations training into their business practices. This training was largely compliance focused, teaching the relevant law and the company’s policies in relation to discrimination. Outside businesses, different forms of training proliferated, such as Jane Elliot’s ‘Blue Eyes, Brown eyes’ training, which was used primarily with children until the mid-1980s.

At this stage, the key institutions for developing anti-racist education were no longer schools and universities (although these continued to incorporate education about race), but the military. From 1970 the USA military began an ambitious programme of race relations training, alongside research to evaluate the effectiveness of this programme. This was again a response to rioting in the Navy, apparently instigated by Black men who were perceived as having been excessively influenced by the Black Power Movement.

In the 1970s, the concept of sexual harassment came to prominence through the work of MacKinnon and other feminists involved in the Women’s Liberation Movement. Although not specifically mentioned in the CRA1964, cases of sexual harassment were successfully pursued in the courts under the category of sex discrimination, leading to training being broadened to incorporate sexism as well as racism, and particularly to incorporate sexual harassment. However, as with training on racism, the use of training was a response by Human Resources to the possibility of being sued, rather than a direct demand or practice of the Women’s Liberation Movement.

Following the political shifts of the 1980s which emphasised deregulation and reduced enforcement of anti-discrimination employment laws, compliance-oriented training in workplaces became less prominent. Training designed to raise awareness and encourage sensitivity to cultural differences became more popular, as did training for members of
minority groups which hoped to give them confidence with fitting into the workplace culture.

The ‘diversity management’ approach to training began in the mid-1980s and grew throughout the 1990s. This shifted away from the moral underpinnings of previous approaches to workplace equality, and instead gave a business rationale for the importance of ‘managing diversity’, meaning shifting workplace cultures so that they are inclusive of everyone and fully utilise each individual’s abilities. However, although the term ‘diversity’ became extremely popular as a term for describing any initiative relating to equality, this does not indicate a similar take up of the principles and practices which underlie ‘diversity management’ as outlined by practitioners such as Thomas (1990, 1991, 1996).

In the next chapter, I turn to describing the history of E&D training in the UK. This history has been profoundly bound up in the development of E&D training in the USA. Throughout my account I draw attention to parallels, differences, and the direct influences the USA had on the UK in terms of laws, social movements, and the discourses and discursive practices of training.
Chapter 4: The development of E&D training in the UK

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I describe the conditions of emergence of E&D training in the UK. There are important parallels between the development of E&D training in the UK and in the USA. In both places, formal training in equality and diversity began with training on race and culture. Similarly, ‘Racism Awareness Training’ (RAT) seems to have emerged in both contexts more strongly as a white response to racism than as an approach proposed by Black, Asian or other minority ethnic activists. However, there are also key differences. First, the picture of race relations in the USA has always differed in important ways from the UK, with distinct histories of colonialism, empire, involvement in slavery, and immigration; while these may not be taken into account in E&D training, they do create a different context in which the training takes place. Second, training in Britain developed much later, and was substantially a response to police racism, first with the Brixton disturbances in 1981 (Scarman 1981) and later the Macpherson report on Stephen Lawrence’s murder (Macpherson 1999).

The histories of E&D training in the UK and USA are also interlinked, with the UK following the lead of USA trends in various ways. UK racism awareness trainers used and adapted materials and analyses that came from the USA, particularly from Katz’ (1978) training manual (Sivanandan 1985; Gurnah 1984). Police training in race relations in the UK was modelled on the race relations training of the USA military. Additionally, UK social policies on race relations more generally were influenced by aspects of what happened in the USA, particularly by a desire to avoid the rioting which happened in the USA in the 1960s. There were also profound American influences on the other social movements of the UK, such as the Women’s Liberation Movement, Disability Rights Movement and Gay Rights Movement; and on legislation around discrimination.

‘Black’ has historically been used in the UK as a political term referring to racialised people (e.g. Mirza 1997), and is still used in this way by some organisations (for instance, Southall Black Sisters, and the National Union of Students). This usage began to fall out of favour in some circles in the 1980s, and its merits are still debated (Sivanandan 1985; Andrews 2016b). Throughout this thesis, I use ‘Black’ to refer to people of African-Caribbean or African descent rather than as an inclusive political term, except when quoting sources.
This historical sketch of E&D training in the UK begins by giving a broad overview of race relations in the UK leading up to the 1980s, including the training which already existed before the 1980s. The earliest training was focused on cultural differences between white British people and migrants from the Commonwealth (Luthra and Oakley 1991). I also describe early anti-discrimination legislation, including the Race Relations Acts and the Sex Discrimination Act, and disability awareness training, which began in the late 1970s. I then describe the impact of two racist incidents, both involving the police – the Brixton disturbances in 1981 (Scarman 1981) and the racist murder of Stephen Lawrence in 1993. Both of these incidents were followed by official investigations, both of which recommended training for the police (Scarman 1981; Macpherson 1999). The training which became prevalent in the 1980s, RAT, was focused on the idea of white racism rather than the ideal of multiculturalism, and was partially modelled on Katz (1978). I draw on the critiques of Gurnah (1984) and Sivanandan (1985) to describe the influence of psychology on this form of training. I then turn to the newer social movements and particularly the disability rights movement, describing the developments in training in this area in the 1980s and 1990s. From this, I turn back to the developments in legislation, describing the increase in anti-discrimination legislation in the 1990s and 2000s, culminating in the Equality Act 2010. Finally, I briefly discuss the rise of ‘diversity’, replacing the terminology of ‘equal opportunities’ in the UK; here again the influence of the developments in the USA is evident.

4.2 Immigration and race relations: 1940s-1970s

Training on ‘race’ is generally cited as the first form of training on equalities that took place in the UK, predating the more general ‘equal opportunities’ training and training on other forms of oppression (Gillespie-Sells and Campbell 1991). Immigration was at the heart of the UK’s often fraught race relations from the 1940s onwards, and the history of early anti-discrimination legislation is intimately tied up in the history of immigration controls. To understand the assumptions underpinning anti-discrimination legislation, it is necessary to see them in their broader context. As such, I begin my narrative by sketching the overall trajectory of race relations in the UK from the 1940s until the 1980s.

As in the USA, training was not the focus of organisations of Black and Asian people between the 1940s and 1970s. Instead, Black and Asian groups focused on issues such as
problems with housing, education and employment through efforts within the community. Supplementary schools on Saturdays were started for Black children to compensate for the racism and white-centred curriculum of the mainstream educational system, as well as the more general failure of this system to meet the learning needs of Black children (Anim-Addo 1995; Reay and Mirza 1997; Andrews 2016b); members of the Asian community who could read and write in English filled in forms on behalf of those who couldn’t (Hiro 1992); and small, informal credit unions were formed as a means of affording housing (Anim-Addo 1995). This is not to say that there were no active attempts to increase ‘understanding’ between white UK citizens and some groups of immigrants; for instance, the India League, which had lobbied for Indian independence until this was achieved in 1947, then redefined its aim as creating better understanding between Indian and English people. One of their activities was to show Indian films with English subtitles to primarily English audiences in London (Hiro 1992). However, in general, it was not until the 1980s that training became a focus of activism in Black and Asian communities in the UK. Training on race relations framed as ‘multiculturalism’ took place beginning in the 1960s, primarily in the public sector, as I describe below; but this did not emerge from the efforts of Black or Asian activists.

Immigration was a key issue in UK race relations in the 1950s and 1960s. Immigration of Black and Asian Commonwealth citizens to the UK increased in the 1940s and 1950s. There was a labour shortage in Britain following the Second World War, which led to companies actively recruiting workers from other Commonwealth countries, particularly the West Indies. The 1950s National Health Service recruited nurses from the Caribbean and doctors from India and Pakistan. In 1952, the USA introduced much stricter immigration controls which limited immigration to the USA. As a consequence of these and other factors, the Black and Asian population of the UK increased rapidly in the 1940s and 1950s. At this time, it was theoretically part of British colonialism to welcome Commonwealth citizens as immigrants to the UK, the ‘Motherland’ (Hiro 1992) – although whether this was ever actually the case is questionable, as even relatively small numbers of ethnic minority migrants were historically treated with hostility (e.g. the race riots of 1919 in which white sailors attacked ethnic minority sailors in ports across England and Wales (Jenkinson 2009; Hiro 1992)).
In the light of this increased migration in the 1950s, Conservative politicians (then in government) began to argue in favour of immigration controls while most Labour politicians (in opposition) argued that restricting immigration from the Commonwealth would be immoral. The 1958 Notting Hill riots, in which white men attacked Caribbean cafes and homes of Black residents, became a widely publicised display of the racism of white British citizens. Following the riots Labour continued to argue that “any form of British legislation limiting Commonwealth immigration into this country would be disastrous to our status in the Commonwealth and to the confidence of the Commonwealth people” (quoted in Hiro 1992, p.204). This stance was held, at least publicly, by some Conservative politicians as well (Hansen 2000). Shortly afterwards, in 1961, the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill was proposed by the Conservative government (Hiro 1992). The Bill aimed to reduce migration from the Commonwealth to Britain by allowing immigration only to Commonwealth citizens who had been issued with a government voucher.

As late as November 1961, when the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill was read for the second time in Parliament, Labour opposed it on the grounds that it “will be widely regarded as introducing a colour bar into our legislation” (Hansard, 16 November 1961, col 705). However, it passed in 1962, introducing strict restrictions on immigration to the UK from the Commonwealth for the first time. By 1964 both parties were arguing for the necessity of restricting immigration. Labour reconciled their capitulation to a ‘colour bar’ in immigration legislation by expressing support for a Race Relations Act. Rather than seeing a contradiction between the Commonwealth Immigration Act’s creation of a ‘colour bar’ and the apparent anti-racist intention of the Race Relations Act, these were seen as going hand in hand, on the assumption that ‘integration’ of immigrants would be more successful with a smaller immigrant population (Small and Solomos 2006). This approach was famously summarised by the then-Labour MP Roy Hattersley who claimed that “without integration limitation is inexcusable, without limitation integration is impossible” (quoted in Sivanandan 1985, p.3). This policy and rhetoric represented the ‘problem’ as one of numbers of immigrants (there were too many, or there was a risk that there would be too many) and of ‘integration’ — meaning that immigrants to the UK needed to adapt to the culture and language of the UK and learn to fit in.
The first Race Relations Act (henceforth referred to as RRA) passed in 1965, legislating against discrimination “on the ground of colour, race, or ethnic or national origins” (RRA1965, Ch. 73 Sec 1 (1)) in some service provision (for example, hotels), and against “incitement to racial hatred”. This law included white British people as a group to be protected from racial discrimination, and in fact there were convictions of Black activists for incitement to racial hatred of white people, most famously the case of R v Malik 1968 (Twomey 1994).

To facilitate ‘integration’, materials were provided for teachers in the mid-1960s about how to help immigrant children assimilate into the UK (Luthra and Oakley 1991). Similarly, police service in areas with a large immigrant population instituted the position of ‘Community Liaison Officer’ in the 1950s and in the late 1960s Community Liaison Officers began to be trained specifically for the role, initially with an annual training seminar (Oakley 1990).

In 1966, the official government policy moved from assimilation to ‘pluralistic’ integration – what later became known as multiculturalism. This parallels the philosophy of the Intercultural education movement of the USA in the 1920s, which wanted to enable children to maintain a connection with their heritage rather than becoming ‘Americanized’. Section 11 of the Local Government Act 1966 also made funds available for local authorities “to make special provision in the exercise of any of their functions in consequence of the presence within their areas of substantial numbers of immigrants from the Commonwealth whose language or customs differ from those of the community” (Local Government Act 1966 s.11). In response, service providers such as teachers and social workers began to undergo cultural information training. Luthra and Oakley describe this training as “the provision of ‘cultural information’ about ethnic minorities, delivered by ‘experts’ or by ‘representatives’ of such groups, to a practitioner body drawn exclusively from the self-defined majority” (1991, p.9). The pedagogy of a lecture delivered by an expert differs substantially from the interactive workshops which became integral to the ‘intergroup education movement’ of the USA by the 1950s (Vickery 1953), but the underlying representation of the ‘problem’ is similar: the lack of awareness and appreciation of white UK citizens for the cultures of ethnic minority groups.

The policy of restricting immigration of racialised Commonwealth citizens and simultaneously legislating against racist discrimination remained powerful through the 60s,
70s and 80s (Small and Solomos 2006). For instance, the Commonwealth Immigration Act 1968 restricted immigration to the UK to those who had a father or grandfather born in the UK in an attempt to ensure that white expatriates of the UK could return, while refusing entry to racialised Commonwealth citizens. In the same year the second RRA was passed, increasing the power of the RRA1965 by extending it to cover housing and employment. Each successive RRA expanded the remit of the law on racial discrimination, with the RRA1976 Act creating the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE), a body with the power to conduct formal investigations into possible cases of racial discrimination and given the task of “eliminating racial discrimination and promoting equality of opportunity and good race relations” (CRE 1978, p.4).

Although the RRAs were in practice paired with restrictive immigration laws, the RRAs were often controversial. The most notorious speaker against both immigration and race relations legislation in the UK was Powell, who made a speech in 1968 which came to be known as the ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech (The Telegraph, 2007). Although the speech is remembered primarily as a racist anti-immigration polemic, Powell also argued against the RRA1968. I examine some of the details of this speech in Section 5.3.3 of the literature review, in which I identify Powell’s use of the discursive figure of the racist. The RRA1968 was particularly significant in terms of later workplace training. This Act was the first to apply to employment (as opposed to service provision), and included the notion of the employer being liable for the discriminatory acts of their employees which were done “in the course of his [sic] employment ... whether or not it was done with the employer’s knowledge or approval” (RRA1968, Ch 71, Part 1, 13(1)). In addition, the RRA1968 introduced the possibility of the employer defending themselves on the grounds that “he [sic] took such steps as were reasonably practicable to prevent the employee from doing in the course of his employment acts of the same description as that act” (RRA1968, Ch 71, Part 1, 13(3)). This provision was included in all subsequent law relating to discrimination in employment; I return to a discussion of the relevance of this “vicarious liability” of employers when describing the provisions of the Equality Act 2010 in Section 4.5.

By the late 1970s, the concept of ‘multiculturalism’ had come under intensive debate among educators and activists. Some argued that ‘multiculturalism’ was apolitical and failed to acknowledge and address the power imbalance between cultural and ethnic groups, and
hence masked the problem of racism (Luthra and Oakley 1991). However, it was also seen as a positive move away from assimilationist mentalities in which immigrant communities were expected to lose their culture and ‘integrate’ with the white British culture. Multicultural training continued to be popular in practice through the 1980s and 1990s (Swan 2007). Although ‘multicultural’ training continues to be delivered (my ethnographic data included one session of ‘Cultural Awareness’ training), it is no longer the main or only type of race training available, as was the case in the 1970s.

The RRA1976 placed a duty on local authorities to “have due regard” to the need to combat racial discrimination, although without sanctions for non-compliance. This was phrased in terms of the need to “eliminate unlawful racial discrimination; and ... to promote equality of opportunity, and good relations, between persons of different racial groups” (RRA1976, Part X, Sec. 71). The RRA1976 also introduced what would later be called ‘indirect discrimination’ as an addition to the existing concept of direct discrimination – that is, the same criteria is applied across racial groups, but serves to particularly disadvantage some (as in *Griggs v Duke Power Company* (1971) in the USA, see Section 3.3). This concept acknowledges the existence of group differences, so that indirect discrimination refers to treating people’s characteristics as irrelevant where in fact they are relevant; in contrast to direct discrimination, in which people’s characteristics or group membership are treated as relevant when they should have been treated as irrelevant.

Many local authorities responded by introducing ‘race equality units’ which wrote policy and created training designed to implement race equality policies (Luthra and Oakley 1991). However, the training response to the RRA1976 was relatively marginal, underfunded and scattered. For example, formal training on racism is given little attention in the 1978 report of the CRE, which notes only that “Since teacher education is not confined to initial training we also continued to press for the development of a wide range of in-service courses that will enable teachers to develop the skills required in a multi-racial classroom” (CRE 1978, p.12).

This initial emergence of ‘cultural information’ training is significant in the context of the wider ideas around immigrants to the UK. The passage of increasingly restrictive immigration acts could be understood as an ongoing act of discrimination against racialised Commonwealth citizens, denying most of these citizens the right to live and work in the UK.
This inevitably entails the state treating Black and Asian Commonwealth citizens less well than white citizens in related ways, for instance through families being split up by the process of immigration in which only the person with the right to work in the UK was allowed to enter the UK. Immigration restrictions were justified through the ideal of ‘assimilation’, and in particular, the idea that assimilation would not be possible if there were too many immigrants. Areas with a high proportion of immigrants were problematised, with the Local Government Act 1966 allocating increased funds to these areas; this is in keeping with concerns about the difficulty of ‘integrating’ immigrants into the mainstream of UK society. ‘Cultural information’ training was in keeping with this, in that immigrant communities were seen as requiring a distinctive approach on the part of service providers, but the training was not necessarily underpinned by the aim of creating integration (compare to, for instance, the provision of classes for adults to learn English).

At the same time as the governments of this period passed discriminatory legislation with respect to immigration, they also legislated against acts of discrimination by businesses. The RRAs were thus part of a balancing act in which the government gave with one hand and took with the other (Hiro 1992). The growth of ‘multiculturalism’ in the late 1970s and 1980s was in some ways a distinct shift from the earlier efforts towards ‘integration’. As Swan writes, in multicultural training, “Cultures were understood as something which didn’t ‘melt’ into the melting pot and therefore needed to be understood, experienced, and protected” (2007, p.204). This certainly represents a partial shift from the earlier ideal of assimilation; however, like the earlier ‘cultural information’ training, multicultural education does not problematise or acknowledge racism.

In the next section I describe the first UK laws relating to sex discrimination, and the role of the Women’s Liberation Movement in formulating and promoting the concept of sexual harassment and in developing anti-sexist education.

4.2 Sex discrimination: Legislation and the Women’s Liberation Movement

The Race Relations Acts of the 1960s were the first substantive anti-discrimination legislation in the UK, although there are earlier instances of legislation granting rights to specific groups, such as extending voting rights to women. Unlike the USA, in which the CRA1964 included sex as well as race, legislation on different groups remained separate in
the UK until the legislation was unified into the Equality Act 2010 (EA2010). There were two key Acts in the 1970s relating to sex discrimination, both of which I describe in this section. This was followed by almost twenty years in which no further substantive anti-discrimination legislation was passed, until the Disability Discrimination Act 1995. In order to maintain an approximately chronological order in this account, in this section I describe only the sex discrimination legislation of the 1970s, and return to describing legal developments in Section 4.5.

The first sex discrimination law passed in the UK was the Equal Pay Act (1970), a direct result of the strike by women working in the Ford factory in Dagenham, which made it illegal for employers to pay different rates based on sex for the same work. Litigants were required to find a ‘comparator’ – a person of the other sex who did the same, or similar, work for more pay. Alternatively, the ‘comparator’ could be doing work which had been rated by a job evaluation scheme as equivalent (Deakin et al. 2015). This legal framing constructs the problem as one of equal pay for equal work, which as Bacchi (1999) points out, does not problematise the differential value placed on work which is associated with women. Although the Equal Pay Act 1970 was a response to women’s campaigns around lower pay, the language used is not specific to women – either men or women could in theory bring a case claiming they had been discriminated against.

The next sex discrimination law was the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, which made direct and indirect discrimination on the basis of sex and of marital status illegal, with various exceptions and exemptions. For instance, “no account shall be taken of special treatment afforded to women in connection with pregnancy or childbirth” (Sex Discrimination Act 1975, Part 1 Sec 2 (2)). The Sex Discrimination Act 1975 used the same conceptual framework as the RRAs. Again, both men and women are protected from sex discrimination – which represents the ‘problem’ as one of sexism, rather than misogyny. The Sex Discrimination Act 1975 does not explicitly legislate against sexual harassment, although cases of sexual harassment were brought under the act as ‘sex discrimination’. Courts often interpreted ‘discrimination’ narrowly – for instance, one applicant 1994 brought a claim that her colleagues prominently displaying pornographic images of women constituted sex discrimination, and lost the case on the grounds that a man might be equally offended by the pornography (Samuels 2003). The requirement to demonstrate unequal treatment as
part of proving that there had been sexual harassment only ended in 2005 with amendments to the Sex Discrimination Act. I return to the legal definition of sexual harassment in Section 4.5.

Despite this legal protection, I have struggled to find any examples of training in the 1970s or 1980s which was specifically focused on sexism, although there are examples of sexism being included as part of anti-racism education (e.g. Menter 1989; London Social Policy Unit 1987; Coffey 1992). Perhaps due to the prominence of police racism as the key issue around which equalities training developed, training around sexism and sexist discrimination as a topic in its own right has not been a major component of workplace equalities training in the UK. Rather, workplace training about gender inequality has constructed the problem as a skill or confidence deficit in women, leading to the proliferation of training for women (Bacchi 1999), with the European Union (EU)’s initiatives relating to ‘gender mainstreaming’ including a strong focus on encouraging women into stereotypically ‘male’ jobs via training for women (Rees 1998).

The Women’s Liberation Movement in the UK was very active from the early 1970s through the 1980s, and did include actions related to education or self-development. ‘Consciousness raising’ groups (a concept which came to the UK via the Women’s Liberation Movement of the USA), were popular through the 1970s and 1980s as a grassroots method for women to reach a new understanding of their oppression. Some feminists worked on the ideas of anti-sexist or non-sexist schooling, studying the classroom discourses and practices which excluded girls (Delamont 1980; Spender 1982; Walkerdine 1998; Coffey and Delamont 2000) and the impact of classroom or school based interventions to promote girls’ achievements or confidence (Reay 1990; Epstein et al. 2001). However, there are only limited accounts of how this area of activism affected teacher training, with some suggestions that while anti-sexism was incorporated into the early stages of teacher training, this was not integrated into practical knowledge of how to behave in the classroom to promote gender equality (Menter 1989).

One area in which training did develop as a response was sexual harassment. As Wise and Stanley (1987) show, the first references to ‘sexual harassment’ in the UK were in 1979 in response to American cases of sexual harassment. Early union guidelines on sexual harassment, published in 1981, do not include any mention of training either as a
preventative measure or as a response to incidents of harassment (Wise and Stanley 1987), and Wise and Stanley’s historical account, published in 1987, does not include any mention of training as a contemporary response to sexual harassment. However, by the early 1990s guides on preventing sexual harassment which emphasised the role of education and training were being published (Herbert 1992, 1994). Herbert (1997) describes having worked “over the last few years ... as a sexual harassment educator and consultant” (p.21) and describes the various aims of the kind of education she was being asked to deliver at schools and universities (as well as various kinds of consultancy work, not quoted here:

> There are those who want to train a variety of people to deal with people who are victims of [sexual harassment] in an effective and sensitive way, those who want me to train managers to intercept, intervene and to bring incidents to a rapid but effective conclusion, those who want me to raise people’s awareness about the issue of sexual harassment generally, those who want to have people trained as investigators to be able to conduct an investigation efficiently and competently, those who want me to teach some of their pupils about the topic ... (p.21)

In effect, these different approaches are either focused on raising awareness and knowledge, or on practical skills to deal with incidents as they arise. This idea of ‘awareness’ is reminiscent of other forms of training described in this chapter, but is implemented somewhat differently to ‘multicultural awareness training’ or ‘disability awareness training’ (see Section 4.4), in that the ‘awareness’ is not of a minoritised group’s culture or social situation, but ‘awareness’ of the definition of a type of oppressive behaviour and the laws and policies surrounding this behaviour (sexual harassment). In this sense it is more comparable to the later RAT where ‘awareness’ refers to knowledge and understanding (and hence prevention) of racist attitudes and behaviours.

In thinking about the trajectory of training on sexism compared to training on racism, some aspects of the conditions of emergence of E&D training in the UK are apparent. Training was not a focus of activists either in the Black and Asian communities of the UK or in the Women’s Liberation Movement; however, training on ‘race’ emerged earlier and more strongly than training on ‘sex’. Until the emergence of training specifically on sexual harassment, education on sexism seems to have been an addition to education on anti-racist practice rather than a form of training in its own right. I would suggest that this can be related to the arguments of Brown’s (2006) genealogy of ‘tolerance’. Brown (2006) points out that the emancipation of women has rarely been conceptualised in terms of the need
for ‘tolerance’ of women; instead, the discourse surrounding women is one of ‘equality’. Brown (2006) describes in detail the arguments of Wollstonecraft and Mill in the late eighteenth and late nineteenth century respectively, showing that while both argued for women’s full formal political equality with men, they also argued that women’s domain as wives and mothers would not be substantively affected by this change. In other words, women’s equality did not entail a shift in their social position as women who were domestically subordinated to men. In comparison, the arguments surrounding the rights of Jewish men during the same period were framed in terms of tolerance. Brown argues:

As critics of liberal feminism have often pointed out, when women are made candidates for political equality, a heterosocial division of labour is by no means called into question ... With legal equality, social and economic sex segregation persists and so literally domesticates the effects of women’s enfranchisement as citizens. An official policy of complete religious neutrality and racial equality, however, does promise and promote such integration and its attendant ramifications: once Jewish men are fully enfranchised and are full bearers of rights, the “Jewish difference” lives on institutionally only in an epiphenomenal fashion. ... Thus, the language of tolerance, which always signals the undesirable proximity of the Other in the midst of the Same, becomes an index of this very capacity for mixing and of the perceived threat to a social norm that it portends. (2006, p.73)

To the extent that E&D training can be understood as a practice of ‘tolerance’, which was certainly the emphasis of ‘cultural awareness training’, this may be a partial explanation of the relative absence of training around women and sexism.

In the next section, I discuss the profound impact of police racism on the understandings of racism in UK society as a whole, and on the provision of race-related training from the 1980s onwards. This occurred through two key incidents, followed by widely publicised investigations and reports: the Scarman report on the Brixton disturbances (Scarman 1981), and the Macpherson report on the racist murder of Stephen Lawrence (Macpherson 1999).

4.3 Police training: Scarman and Macpherson reports

Training remained a minor part of race relations practice until a stop-and-search operation in Brixton in 1981 led to rioting, raising the profile of racial tensions and race-related training. The government commissioned an investigation into the disturbances to be carried out by Lord Scarman, leading to the publication of the Scarman Report later that year. Scarman recommended more training of the police force on racism and race relations. RAT
began to take off – particularly in London – as a consequence. The Scarman Report is analysed in depth by Sivanandan (1985) and Henriques (1984); here I address only those aspects which are directly relevant to this thesis. I draw out the connections between Scarman’s approach and cognitive social psychological concepts, and the implications that his approach had for training.

Lord Scarman was commissioned to investigate the underlying causes of the riots. In his report, he famously dismissed allegations of ‘institutional racism’ both in Britain as a whole and in the Metropolitan Police:

> It was alleged to me by some of those who made representations to me that Britain is an institutionally racist society. If by that is meant that it is a society which knowingly, as a matter of policy, discriminates against black people, I reject the allegation. If, however, the suggestion being made is that practices may be adopted by public bodies as well as by private individuals which are unwittingly discriminatory against black people, then this is an allegation which deserves serious consideration, and, where proved, swift remedy. (Scarman 1981, p.11)

Scarman goes on to dismiss ‘institutional racism’ within the Metropolitan Police. ‘Institutional racism’, when applied to the police, is interpreted by Scarman as a direct criticism of the individuals who are senior in the police force, and this is described as an “attack … upon the integrity and impartiality of the senior direction of the force” and an “injustice”:

> The direction and policies of the Metropolitan Police are not racist. I totally and unequivocally reject the attack made upon the integrity and impartiality of the senior direction of the force. The criticisms lie elsewhere – in errors of judgement, in a lack of imagination and flexibility, but not in deliberate bias or prejudice. The allegation that the police are the oppressive arm of a racist state not only displays a complete ignorance of the constitutional arrangements for controlling the police: it is an injustice to the senior officers of the force.

Such plausibility as this attack has achieved is, sadly, due to the ill-considered, immature and racially prejudiced actions of some officers in their dealings on the street with young black people. (Scarman 1981, p.64)

Scarman limits his critique to the racist prejudices and actions of some junior police officers and describes these as ‘immature’. As Henriques argues, “prejudice is constituted as an individualized, exceptional phenomenon, automatically exonerating society as a whole … the implicit assumptions which make Scarman’s claims at all intelligible, are understanding prejudice as an irrational response which originates in ignorance” (1984, p.62). Scarman’s
refusal to identify structural racism is a clear illustration of Ahmed’s analysis of the ways in which “structural or institutional forms of racism recede from view, by projecting racism onto a figure that is easily discarded ... who does not represent a cultural or institutional norm” (Ahmed 2012, p.150). The ‘easily discarded’ figure of the racist in Ahmed’s description is one that I argue in the next chapter can be (partially) generalised into the discursive figure of the ‘bigot’ in present day E&D training.

It is instructive to compare Scarman’s analysis with that offered in the official report on the ‘disciplinary problems’ on the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk in the American Navy. Both reports claim that there is no evidence for discriminatory practices, and that the widespread perception among Black people of discrimination is a result of excessive in-group identification. Scarman states that the culture of gossip among young Black people leads to isolated incidents being blown out of proportion and seen as representative (Scarman 1981); in effect, this locates the problem with Black people’s perceptions, which are understood as a distortion of reality (Sivanandan 1985). Sivanandan describes this fundamentally cognitive social psychological problematisation in detail and links it directly to the strategy of RAT:

Racism, for Scarman, was in the mind – in attitudes, prejudices, irrational beliefs – and these were to be found on both sides of the divide – black and white. Institutional racism was a matter of black perception, white racism was a matter of prejudice. Or that, on the face of it, was what Scarman seemed to be saying – and at worst, it was even-handed, liberal even. But what he had effectively done was to reduce institutional racism to black perception and replace it with personal prejudice – and so shift the object of anti-racist struggle from the state to the individual, from changing society to changing people, from improving the lot of whole black communities, mired in racism and poverty, to improving the lot of ‘black’ individuals. (1985, p.23)

In line with Scarman’s analysis of the problem as being a minority of junior officers who are ‘racially prejudiced’, he recommends more training for police officers and more stringent checks at the recruitment phase of the police force (Scarman 1981). In response to this recommendation following the riots, funding from local government for RAT took off, and Section 11 workers – that is, people who worked in local authorities whose salary came from the budget allocated by Section 11 of the Local Government Act of 1966, see Section 4.2 above – were increasingly channelled towards being RAT trainers, as described in this personal account of a former Race Relations Advisor in Bradford local authority, Nanda:

...the training area became a power base for people who were otherwise fairly isolated within the system. Within that power base and within training the one area that we
were allowed to go into was race training, and it was called Racism Awareness Training. In that area we had time, money and resources, and an enormous amount of freedom; freedom that we weren’t given in any other area of local authority work. ... It did not increase the number of [black] employees in the council significantly nor did it improve services in the black community. Instead they virtually invited black people to come in from the community and do racism awareness training. (Nanda in London Social Policy Unit 1987, p.16)

Anti-racism training modelled on the USA military’s Defence Race Relations Institute – by this point renamed the Equal Opportunities Management Institute – was introduced for the UK police force in response to the Scarman report in 1989, after previous models of training were received negatively by police officers (Oakley 1990). As with the training in the USA military, there was intensive training available for some police officers, who were meant to then take these values, knowledge and practices into the rest of the force (Oakley 1990).

Early RAT in the UK was heavily influenced by Katz (1978); for instance, the idea that ‘racism is prejudice plus power’ and the view that racism can be likened to a disease which all white people have and can never fully recover from, as I described in Section 3.3.2 (Sivanandan 1985; Gurnah 1984; Luthra and Oakley 1991; Oakley 1990). Gurnah (1984) points out that this prominence of the ‘White Awareness’ manual in the UK was not a result of comparable popularity or prominence in the USA, and that there was almost no evaluative literature on the effectiveness of Katz’ 1978 training manual (though see Katz and Ivey 1977).

Nonetheless, American exercises and slogans were used in UK training. This is likely to be part of the reason that Irish people were never conceptualised as a minority group in this practice. Mac an Ghaill (2000) argues powerfully against the prevalent exclusion of Irish people as a national group in academic studies of race relations in Britain, and describes this partially as an outcome of the influence of American models of race relations:

> British theorists, in adopting the American model, often failed to adapt it to the ‘peculiarities of British nation-state’ with its specific class formation and reproduction, and as part of the wider historical project of European colonialism and imperialism. (p.140)

This exclusion of the Irish from British analyses of racism extended to the absence of Irish people as an ethnic minority group within E&D training. Sharkey, speaking on a panel on RAT held in London in 1985, stated that:

> [RAT] chooses to ignore and even deny [Irish people’s] history and the similarities in our anti-imperialist, anti-racist struggle and that of black people and ethnic minority
people ... Race Awareness trainers (many of those whom we’ve dealt with are white British middle-class) like to impress on Irish people that they are not discriminated against, never experience racism and that their history either (a) never happened; or (b) is lies. We wonder in whose interest it is to deny the obvious connections and similarities in our experience and that of the black and other ethnic minority peoples, to deny a whole area of racism, and to pursue the personal to the absolute exclusion of the political? (Sharkey in London Strategic Policy Unit 1987, p.23)

As these sources show, the subject of early race relations training was the relation between African, African-Caribbean and South Asian Commonwealth immigrants to Britain and white British people. The exclusion of Irish people as an ethnic minority group seems to have continued to the present day.

Variations on this form of training continued through the 1980s despite criticisms from various activists and academics, who argued that the analysis of racism embedded in RAT was fundamentally flawed and that the money channelled into RAT should have been spent on community groups self-organising (Sivanandan 1985; Gurnah 1984; Luthra and Oakley 1991). However, some disagreed, and in particular argued that this analysis failed to take into account the actual practice of trainers; for instance, with some conducting training separately for Black and white employees, and using their training for Black employees as ‘Black awareness’ training akin to consciousness raising (London Social Policy Unit 1987).

Two comprehensive critiques of RAT (Sivanandan 1985; Gurnah 1984) analyse a range of problems with RAT, all of which still have resonance today and clearly identify some early discourses and discursive practices of training. Here I pull out three components of their critiques in particular: theoretical and practical incoherence, the primacy of psychology (including the practice of ‘confession’), and the use of RAT as a strategy for management of the population in a Foucauldian sense.

Gurnah and Sivanandan both describe RAT as fundamentally incoherent, using an eclectic mixture of theoretical traditions in a way which produces a “mixed and confused” (Sivanandan 1985, p.28) practice. Gurnah (1984) identifies Katz’ manual as being based on a combination of Marxist analysis and Rogerian psychology in a way which UK trainers failed to recognise or interrogate. Sivanandan describes the analysis of racism embedded in RAT as “a combination of mental illness, original sin and biological determinism” (1985, p.28). The practice of E&D training as incorporating conflicting, disparate discourses and analyses of
discrimination and inequality is one which I return to in Chapter 8, in which I describe present day trainers’ use of a ‘psychological’ discourse during training.

Sivanandan and Gurnah also explicitly point to the confessional practices of RAT and question their utility:

...if whites cannot possibly by-pass or overcome their guilt and their responsibility for racism, they can alleviate their situation by admitting to it in a Pentecostal fashion, by showing that they repent ... Thus RAT depends on, nay demands that people doing these sessions must confess their racism. (Gurnah 1984, pp.18-19, emphasis in original)

Gurnah goes on to connect these feelings of guilt and the ritual of confession to middle class subjectivities:

The whole basis of middle-class worthiness is that they have guilt feelings to agonise about. For not to feel guilty in the face of widespread oppression is callous. It is as if feeling guilty compensates us for our involvement in the capitalist system. (1984, p.15, emphasis in original)

The practice of ‘confession’ (Foucault 1978b) continues to be highly relevant to present day E&D training (Brewis 2016). Both Sivanandan (1985) and Gurnah (1984) also critique RAT as a technique of control and appeasement by the state. As Gurnah writes,

In the last analysis, the only real measure of anti-racist success is concrete transformation of black people’s conditions in Britain. However, in the last three years during which RAT has been increasing its activities, what is noticeable is the increase in state racism ... the impression is that state institutions are still not significantly responding to the criticism of racism, but display the ability to “manage” these criticisms, and better “cope” with blacks making them. (1984, p.14)

Sivanandan (1985) points out that the local areas which had the most extensive focus on RAT were those which had seen rioting in 1981 or were seen as “ripe for ‘riot’” (p.22) in 1981. This analysis connects to the argument of the previous chapter that training was instituted at various times to manage disorder – to govern or manage the population in a Foucauldian sense.

As these analyses show, RAT grew rapidly in the early 1980s. However, as the decade went on, ‘equal opportunities’ in general began to supplant training which focused specifically on race and racism. This may have been as a result of other social liberation movements gaining increased prominence, such as the Women’s Liberation Movement and Disability Rights Movement.
The next incident to have a major impact on training in the UK was the racist murder of a Black teenager, Stephen Lawrence, by a group of young white men in April 1993. Although not in itself an unusual occurrence – see Appendix One of Cottle (2004) for a list of racially motivated murders in the UK from 1970-2003 – this murder came to national attention. The failure of the police to act on local information received, maintain a functional working relationship with the bereaved family, and ultimately to prosecute and convict the suspects became a national scandal (Cottle 2004; Cathcart 1999). There were multiple investigations into the conduct of the police officers involved in the case, culminating in a public inquiry headed by Macpherson, beginning in 1998. This led to the eventual publication of the Macpherson report in 1999 which famously concluded that institutional racism did exist in the Metropolitan police force. This appeared to contradict Scarman’s earlier findings; however, institutional racism was defined by Macpherson as:

The collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and professional service to people because of their colour, culture, or ethnic origin. It can be seen or detected in processes, attitudes and behaviour which amount to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness and racist stereotyping which disadvantage minority ethnic people. (Macpherson 1999, Section 6.34)

This definition differs from that of Ture and Hamilton (1967), who did not describe institutional racism as ‘unwitting’; however, it marks a significant shift from Scarman’s implicit definition of institutional racism as meaning that the senior positions within an organisation are held by racist individuals. Macpherson’s definition is more resonant with Scarman’s suggestion that ‘institutional racism’ may refer to “practices … adopted by public bodies as well as by private individuals which are unwittingly discriminatory against black people” (Scarman 1981 p.11), which he wrote “deserves serious consideration, and, where proved, swift remedy” (Scarman 1981, p.11) – but does not pursue any further in the report.

Macpherson’s definition draws heavily on social cognitive psychology: “unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness and racist stereotyping”. While ‘ignorance’ and ‘thoughtlessness’ are non-specialised concepts with broad interpersonal relevance, ‘stereotyping’ and ‘prejudice’ are concepts from social cognitive psychology; the history of the psychological idea of ‘attitudes’ was described briefly in Section 3.2 and is explored in depth by Rose (1996). ‘Unwitting prejudice’ can be understood as a precursor of
‘unconscious bias’ – the same concept using different terminology. In effect, Macpherson defines institutional racism as the result of unintentional and unknowing racism on the part of a high enough proportion of the employees in an organisation. Training which raises ‘awareness’ of racism, cultural differences, and perhaps of psychological concepts such as stereotyping is then an obvious solution – which is one of Macpherson’s key recommendations.

In spite of the growth of RAT following the Scarman report, Macpherson found that “not a single officer questioned before us in 1998 had received any training of significance in racism awareness and race relations throughout the course of his or her career” (1999, Section 6.35). Like Scarman more than a decade earlier, Macpherson recommended universal police training in “racism awareness and valuing cultural diversity” (1999, pp.48-54). Macpherson also argued for a strong alignment between non-racism and professionalism, stating that training should “develop the full understanding that good community relations are essential to good policing and that a racist officer is an incompetent officer” (p.48). This argument follows the logic described by Ahmed (2012) in which diversity practitioners attempt to align ‘diversity’ with whatever is already valued by the organisation – in the case of universities, this value is ‘excellence’. Although Macpherson is writing about anti-racism and professionalism, there is a similar attempt to align a set of ideas (anti-racism or non-racism) which were seen as marginal to the fundamental purpose of the organisation with the values which are seen as central (professionalism). This is perhaps influenced by the logic of the ‘managing diversity’ movement which aligns ‘managing diversity’ with efficiency and ‘the bottom line’.

The Macpherson report was widely reported on in the UK media and the findings of ‘institutional racism’ was widely publicised (Cottle 2004). In some ways, the report marked a watershed, or seemed to, with many public sector institutions releasing public statements which for the first time acknowledged ‘institutional racism’ within their organisation. The equalities sector, including training provision, grew in response. However, the policies and organisational cultures of police forces does not appear to have changed substantively in response. Rollock (2009) found that in the ten years following the publication of the Macpherson report, the figures regarding racial disparities in people stopped under ‘stop and search’ showed that proportionally even more Black people were being stopped in 2009
than 1999, and that the proportion of police officers who were Black had increased by only 2%.

Police E&D training in some senses has developed separately from E&D training more generally, with training taking place in police colleges and in specialised centres (Sivanandan 1985; Oakley 1990). However, in practice the trainers and their training materials may move from one place of work to another; in the course of my fieldwork I spoke with five trainers or E&D practitioners who, while now based at a university or a training provider, had spent substantial periods of time employed as trainers and diversity managers with regional police forces. Many mentioned the Macpherson report during training as a turning point either in terms of their own journey towards working in E&D or in terms of the UK history of race relations.

This analysis of the impact of the Scarman report (Scarman 1981) has argued that training became a widespread response in the UK to what was fundamentally framed as a psychological problem with individuals (Henriques 1984; Sivanandan 1985). Ignorance and ‘immaturity’ in a small proportion of police officers – and only those of low rank in the police service – was the problem that training sought to address, in policy terms. The form that training took in the 1980s was primarily RAT, substantially modelled on Katz (1978) manual, but with less emphasis in practice on trainers needing to be white. This model of training emphasises that all white people are racist; indicating the possibilities of a gulf between the problematisation communicated through the discourses of training, and those which are embedded in the policies which institute training.

The Macpherson report (Macpherson 1999) appeared to shift the problematisation away from the actions of individual police officers, instead agreeing that there is ‘institutional racism’ in the police force. However, there are also significant continuities between Scarman and Macpherson in their reliance on psychological concepts, with both referring to the importance of stereotyping, prejudice, and ignorance. Macpherson, unlike Scarman, described the ‘institutional racism’ that existed in these largely psychological terms, and in particular, described these as ‘unwitting’. Thus, although the Macpherson report was widely seen as a milestone in UK race relations, there was a continued reliance on social psychology, and an emphasis on ‘unwitting’ prejudice; what would later come to be called ‘unconscious bias’, a significant concept for present day training. In the next section, I turn
to a different social movement: the Disability Rights Movement, and trace the emergence of training on disability.

4.4 The Disability Rights Movement

Disability awareness training began to take off in the 1970s and in the 1980s began to shift its practices and rhetoric to become ‘disability equality’ training. In this section I describe how training in relation to disability has developed since the 1970s, and how this related to the broader context and politics of disability.

The Disability Rights Movement developed in the UK from the 1960s, partially inspired by the other social rights movements growing at this time, and partially by the growing Disability Rights Movement in the USA, which itself developed from the Civil Rights Movement. The key areas of contestation for the Disability Rights Movement were distinctive. Disability activists focused on the right to independent living, integrated schools, freedom from poverty, and inclusion throughout society (Campbell and Oliver 1996; Oliver 1996). This responded to a situation in which disabled children were educated separately from non-disabled children, and disabled adults were made to live in residential institutions. Campbell and Oliver (1996) theorise that the disability rights movement began to emerge in the 1960s because:

Britain in the 1960s had recovered from the effects of the war and was entering an age of affluence, when people were told and believed that they had never had it so good. Except, of course, disabled people, who in the main remained poor and excluded from society, whether they lived in their own homes or in institutions.

The second specific aspect ... was the existence of a significant number of residential institutions established after 1948, in which a large number of disabled people were not only incarcerated but slowly coming to realise the injustice of such incarceration. (p.61)

The Disablement Income Group, who campaigned for all disabled people to receive income from the government, was formed in 1965. The passing of the Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act 1970, which in principle increased the provision of welfare services for disabled people, was initially seen as a partial realisation of this; however, some members of the Disablement Income Group became disillusioned. A new group formed in 1972 through the coming together of disabled people who were frustrated with the organisational structure of the Disablement Income Group – the Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation (UPIAS) (Campbell and Oliver 1996, UPIAS 1981). UPIAS argued retrospectively
that “The CSDPA [Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act] won greater advances for professional and specialist services than for physically impaired people themselves” (Union of the Physically Impaired Against Segregation 1981, p.1).

What came to be called the ‘social model’ of disability was developed initially by the UPIAS. Their mission statement, passed in 1974 but amended in 1976, begins:

The Union aims to have all segregated facilities for physically impaired people replaced by arrangements for us to participate fully in society. These arrangements must include the necessary financial, medical, technical, educational and other help required from the State to enable us to gain the maximum possible independence in daily living activities, to achieve mobility, to undertake productive work, and to live where and how we choose with full control over our lives. (UPIAS 1976, p.1)

As this suggests, the focus of the Disability Rights Movement was trying to gain recognition of disabled people as being entitled to full social participation in both work and education. This meant a struggle against segregation through residential institutions and separate schools, but also a struggle for appropriate service provision. The question of service provision was two-fold, in that there was a need for enough services, but also for these services to be provided in a way which did not undermine the rights of the disabled service user. Possibly this need for a transformed social relation between disabled people and their service providers explains why training for non-disabled people was more integrated into the Disability Rights Movement than the other social liberation movements.

The key theoretical development which occurred in the mid-1970s was the articulation of the social model of disability, and the interrogation of what was called the ‘individual’ or the ‘medical’ model of disability. The social model was first articulated by UPIAS in their mission statement:

In our view it is society which disables physically impaired people. Disability is something imposed on top of our impairments by the way we are unnecessarily isolated and excluded from full participation in society. Disabled people are therefore an oppressed group in society. (1976, p.14)

This was contrasted with the mainstream view of the time, which Oliver (1983) described as the ‘individual’ model but became more widely known as the ‘medical’ model. The medical model of disability views disability as a personal tragedy of the disabled person, calling for their disability to be treated by medical professionals like an illness, and for the disabled person to be cared for with decisions about their care and treatment being made by medical
professionals. This view of disability implicitly underpinned the way in which disabled people were treated both by society in general and specifically by medical professionals and within residential institutions.

The social model of disability called attention to discrimination against disabled people by drawing a sharp distinction between a physical impairment, defined as “lacking part of or all of a limb, or having a defective limb, organ or mechanism of the body” (UPIAS 1976), and a disability, defined as the experience of barriers to participation in mainstream social life. The development of this model had immediate impacts on training around disability. A training manual for Disability Equality Training explains:

Forms of DET [Disability Equality Training] have been organised and run by disabled people for over ten years, but it has developed a formalised structure only since 1985. Around that time emphasis began to be placed on equal opportunities policies and practices towards women, black and minority ethnic people and lesbians and gays. It seemed a natural extension to include disabled people under the same equal opportunities umbrella. In order for people to understand why policies were necessary and why their work behaviour needed to change to accommodate good equal opportunities working practices, a range of training and education programmes was established. The area of disability was left until last so work around disability awareness (as it was then known) did not get off the ground until after racism and under [sic] awareness training. This worked in its favour, however, as disability awareness trainers learnt from the successes and mistakes of their colleagues working around the other issues. (Gillespie-Sells and Campbell 1991, p.1)

Gillespie-Sells and Campbell go on to explain that a major difficulty in RAT had been the levels of guilt experienced by participants, and as such, that their model of training was intended to avoid evoking high levels of guilt. They describe their model as ‘facilitated discovery’, avoiding both moralising and directly giving information in favour of discussions and exercises. The “formalised structure” they refer to is that of disability equality trainers (who had to themselves be disabled – suggesting an important area of disagreement with the approach taken by Katz 1978) becoming accredited by the Disability Resource Team.

Oliver describes the impact of the social model of disability on disabled people’s practice as trainers in the early 1980s:

The articulation of the social model was received much more enthusiastically by disabled people [than by medical professionals] because it made an immediate connection to their own experiences. It quickly became the basis for disability
awareness and later disability equality training. ... I myself questioned the way the social model was becoming a strait jacket for our experience in ... a talk I gave to the annual course for disability equality trainers organised by Jane Campbell and Kath Gillespie-Sells of the Disability Resource Team in 1989. (1996, p.31)

The shift from the language of ‘disability awareness’ to the language of ‘disability equality training’ seems to have been connected to a shift in practices and discourses, with ‘awareness’ being seen as more psychological and less political than ‘equality’. One such practice, used in ‘disability awareness’ training, was ‘simulation exercises’, in which non-disabled training participants are given temporary impairments through, for instance, blindfolding to simulate blindness. French critiqued the use of these exercises in training:

Simulation exercises have the aim of informing non-disabled people of the situation of disabled people, but they clearly provide false information. At best these exercises only simulate the onset of disability, but even that is not achieved because the people concerned know very well that at the end of the day, or at any time they chose, they can stop being ‘disabled’ and return to their non-disabled status. It is quite obvious that if a person is suddenly deprived of his or her hearing, sight, or ability to walk or use his or her hands, difficulties will be experienced and fear and frustration may be felt, but this is not the situation disabled people are in because they have had time to develop coping strategies or unusual dexterity or strength in other areas of their bodies, and are therefore likely to be far more calm and able than the non-disabled person’s experience would suggest, which is not to minimise the difficulties they do experience. (1992, p.260)

French (1992) went on to argue that the use of simulations encourages non-disabled people to view disabled people as heroic or superhuman for being able to achieve everyday tasks, a perception that the Disability Rights Movement had been campaigning against; and that this type of exercise was not used by the disabled trainers who have come through the Disability Equality Training programmes, for this reason. The training manual by Gillespie-Sells and Campbell (1991) concurs, contrasting simulation exercises with the use of written scenarios about a situation in which a disabled person has been discriminated against, or best practice scenarios, to spark discussion. This is described as “experiential” rather than simulation. Notably, the use of scenarios is not suggested as a training exercise in Katz (1978), although fictional vignettes are used as discussion prompts.

In this discussion of early training around disability, I have argued that training and education for non-disabled people was important in the early Disability Rights Movement in a way that differs from the early histories of other social liberation movements. I have suggested that this may be explained by the profound influence of professionals, both
medical and in social care, over the daily lives of disabled people at this time. I have also traced the shift from one specific training practice, simulation exercises, to another – the use of scenarios. Disability Equality Training began before there was significant legal protection for disabled people in employment, introduced with the Disability Discrimination Act 1995. I describe this legal development in detail in the next section, along with changes in the legal and social status of LGBT people.

4.5 Legal developments from the 1990s to the present

Here I give a brief history of the development of anti-discrimination law on disability, sexual orientation and gender reassignment (being transgender), all of which already had some legislation before the EA2010. Throughout this period, EU guidelines and regulations played a major role, with the UK passing legislation and amendments to bring UK legislation in line with EU expectations.

The Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (DDA1995) was partially inspired by the example of the Americans with Disabilities Act 1990, which showed that it was more cost-efficient to get disabled people into work than for the state to support them. Discussions around the DDA1995 were focused on this cost analysis (Bagilhole 2009). This legislation differed substantively from the Sex Discrimination Act (1975) and RRAs, which relied on the concepts of direct discrimination and indirect discrimination. The DDA1995 instead introduced the concepts of a ‘reasonable adjustment’ and of ‘discrimination arising from a disability’. The duty to make ‘reasonable adjustments’ was a proactive, anticipatory duty on employers and service providers; in this respect it reflects the ideas of the social model of disability, in which people with impairments are disabled by the barriers they face. The concept was also derived from the Americans with Disabilities Act 1990, which introduced ‘reasonable accommodations’. As with the concept of ‘indirect discrimination’, the DDA1995 acknowledged that there are situations in which disabled people need to be treated differently from non-disabled people in order to ensure equality.

The DDA1995 also introduced the concept of ‘disability-related discrimination’, which referred to discrimination against someone not on the basis of their disability per se, but on the basis of something which has come about as a result of their disability. An example from case law was a man who was unable to work for a prolonged period following an injury at
work and was fired as a result. Even if a non-disabled person, absent from work for the same period, would have been treated in the same way, the court of appeal ruled that this still constituted disability-related discrimination in the case of *Clark v Novocold* (1999). This provision was in effect nullified by a later decision made in the court of appeal in the case *London Borough of Lewisham v Malcolm* (2008), which ruled that the correct comparator was the same as that in a case of direct discrimination: a person who had behaved in the same way but was not disabled. The provision of ‘disability-related discrimination’ was reintroduced under the name ‘discrimination arising from a disability’ in the EA2010. I describe the EA2010 in detail below after briefly describing the development of legal protections for LGBT people and early LGAT.

Amendments made to the Sex Discrimination Act in 1999 expanded its remit to include discrimination based on ‘gender reassignment’, that is, being transgender. The definition of gender reassignment in this amendment was “a process which is undertaken under medical supervision for the purpose of reassigning a person’s sex by changing physiological or other characteristics of sex, and includes any part of such a process” (*The Sex Discrimination (Gender Reassignment) Regulations 1999*, Regulation 2). Discrimination on the basis of ‘sexual orientation’ became illegal in 2003. Both of these amendments and new laws in the UK relating to gender identity and sexuality were adopted partially to bring UK law in line with EU regulations following case law at the European level (Bagilhole 1997, 2009). The creation of legal protections for LGBT people raised the profile of training on these groups.

However, there was already a small practice of formal training on ‘sexuality’ (focusing on lesbian and gay sexualities) being delivered in the 1990s before this form of discrimination became illegal. Peel (2002b) describes LGAT provision in the mid-1990s as a very marginal practice, which expanded towards the end of the 1990s. Although by this point there was Equal Opportunities training and education which intended to cover many types of oppression, the focus tended to be race, sex and disability (Peel 2002b). I describe Peel’s empirical research on LGAT in detail in the literature review (Harding and Peel 2007; Kitzinger and Peel 2005; Peel 2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2008). At the time of Peel’s research (1998-2001), this training did not incorporate transgender awareness. Trans awareness training began in the mid-2000s, with the Gender Identity Research and Education Society (GIRES) offering training beginning around 2002 (GIRES 2017), Gendered Intelligence being
founded in 2008 (Gendered Intelligence 2017) and some individuals also offering training beginning around this time (Arundel 2015).

As already noted in Section 4.2, UK legislation on sex discrimination did not specifically mention sexual harassment as a type of discrimination until 2005, with a further amendment to the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 – the Employment Equality (Sex Discrimination) Regulations 2005. The amendment, like most of the Sex Discrimination Act, is gender neutral in that it defined “unwanted ... conduct of a sexual nature” (Employment Equality (Sex Discrimination) Regulations 2005, Regulation 5, 4A) towards both men and women as sexual harassment – in contrast to feminist analyses which reserve the concept of sexual harassment for unwanted sexual conduct from men to women (Wise and Stanley 1987; Herbert 1992, 1994). However, this was a significant change from the earlier provisions on sexual harassment, which classified unwanted sexual conduct as a form of sex discrimination, requiring plaintiffs to prove that a man would not have been subjected to the same or equivalent treatment.

Sexual harassment was defined in the 2005 amendments in relation to the victim’s perception as well as the perpetrator’s intentions, encapsulated by the phrase “purpose or effect”; however, while Herbert (1992, 1994) emphasises the victim’s perceptions as the only relevant criterion, in fact there was a further criterion: whether this perception is “reasonable”. This is closely related to the legal situation of the time in the USA, with courts using the criterion of whether a “reasonable person” would consider the behaviour to have been sexual harassment (Risser 1999).

4.5.1 The Equality Act 2010

The Equality Act 2010 (EA2010) superseded almost all this existing legislation, bringing it into a more unified framework. The intention was to bring the UK in line with more recent EU guidelines, and simplify and unify the legislation against discrimination. The EA2010 created ‘protected characteristics’, that is, characteristics on the basis of which it is illegal to discriminate. These are race (which, as with the RRAs, incorporates colour, race, and national and ethnic origins), sex, sexual orientation, gender reassignment, disability, age, pregnancy and maternity, marriage and civil partnership, and religion and belief. Each of these was already protected in at least some areas of employment or service provision, but as they were protected under various Acts and Amendments at different points in time,
each have had their own trajectory of case law and some forms of discrimination did not apply to all of the characteristics. Some of the protected characteristics were also redefined by the EA2010; in particular, gender reassignment no longer requires medical supervision, and disability is defined slightly more openly, as I explain in greater depth below.

The EA2010 defines various types of discrimination, all of which already existed in some form in previous legislation, but simplified the legislative framework by extending some of them (particularly ‘discrimination by perception’ and ‘discrimination by association’) to be applicable to any protected characteristic. The types of discrimination defined in the EA2010 are direct discrimination, indirect discrimination, discrimination by association, discrimination by perception, failure to make reasonable adjustments, discrimination arising from disability, harassment, and victimisation. However, the EA2010 kept many of the specific features of previous legislation; for instance, the categories of ‘reasonable adjustments’ and ‘discrimination arising from a disability’ continue to be central to disability discrimination in the EA2010, while ‘reasonable adjustments’ do not exist for other protected characteristics. Harassment, including sexual harassment, continues to be defined in a gender-neutral fashion, with the perception of the victim being one of the factors to be taken into account, but also a question of whether it is “reasonable” for the behaviour to have been experienced as harassment. In addition, the EA2010 continues the pattern of previous legislation in that while ‘protected characteristic’ for disability still means a protected group – people with a disability (as with the DDA1995) – in the case of sex and race the ‘protected characteristic’ is one that applies to everyone (as with the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and the RRAs).

As I note above in Section 4.1, direct discrimination (which includes discrimination by association, and discrimination by perception) refers to treating people’s characteristics as relevant, in cases where they should be irrelevant – for instance, denying someone promotion or not hiring them because they are Black (or associate with someone who is Black, or are perceived to be Black). Indirect discrimination, by contrast, refers to practices which are applied equally across all employees but which have a disproportionately negative impact on some groups. This concept acknowledges the existence of group differences, so that indirect discrimination refers to treating people’s characteristics as irrelevant where in
fact they are relevant – for instance, by holding team meetings on Friday evenings, excluding some Jewish employees from being able to attend.

As I describe above, the categories of ‘failure to make reasonable adjustments’ and ‘discrimination arising from a disability’ are both specific to disability and have historically applied only to disability. ‘Failure to make reasonable adjustments’ is a concept comparable to indirect discrimination – it acknowledges that disabled employees and service users may need ‘reasonable adjustments’ to be able to access the workplace or services on an equal level with non-disabled people, and places a duty on employers to make these adjustments. However, the right to ‘reasonable adjustments’ is a stronger category than ‘indirect discrimination’ as there are fewer circumstances in which employers and service providers can legally justify not making reasonable adjustments, compared to those in which they can justify indirect discrimination. ‘Discrimination arising from disability’ is, again, a concept which acknowledges that difference can be relevant. Although the concept of a positive duty to make ‘adjustments’ is in line with the social model of disability, disability continues to be defined medically in the EA2010 (comparably to previous legislation):

A person (P) has a disability if—

(a) P has a physical or mental impairment, and

(b) the impairment has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on P’s ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities. (EA2010, Part 2, Chapter 1, Section 6)

Disability is further defined in Schedule 1 of the EA2010, which defines ‘long-term’, substantial adverse effect, and specifies some medical conditions as being disabilities from the point of diagnosis. This definition differs from those which would be suggested by the social model of disability; organisations such as the Disability Rights Commission recommended “focusing disability anti-discrimination legislation on the act of discrimination, and not the extent of the impairment” (Disability Rights Commission 2006, quoted in Work and Pensions Committee 2009, para.71). However, it is slightly looser than previous legislation, particularly in the inclusion of some medical conditions as disabilities from the point of diagnosis without a need to demonstrate adverse effect.

The creation of ‘characteristics’ as the grounds on which it is illegal to discriminate appears to be an attempt to identify examples of structural discrimination and counteract them.
Forms of discrimination which cannot be tied to a ‘protected characteristic’ are still legal – for instance, discrimination on the basis of appearance (where this is not connected to a protected characteristic), or on the basis of opinions which do not have the legal status of a ‘belief’. However, the choice of what becomes a ‘protected characteristic’ seems to have been based on EU guidance and on previous law, rather than on a sustained analysis of the power structures in UK society (in which case class would certainly have been included). In addition, the creation of protected ‘characteristics’ rather than protected groups suggests an analysis based on ‘prejudice’, ‘bias’ and ‘stereotypes’ rather than an analysis of the exclusion of some groups of people from positions of security and power; at the same time, some ‘protected characteristics’ do in fact refer to minoritised groups (disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity).

The EA2010 also includes the provision first introduced by the RRA1968, and incorporated into all subsequent anti-discrimination employment legislation, which makes employers liable for the discriminatory acts of their employees, unless they can show that they have taken “all reasonable steps” to prevent those acts from occurring:

In proceedings against A’s employer (B) in respect of anything alleged to have been done by A in the course of A’s employment it is a defence for B to show that B took all reasonable steps to prevent A—

(a) from doing that thing, or
(b) from doing anything of that description. (EA2010, c15, part 8, 109, (4))

Although “all reasonable steps” is not explicated in the law itself (just as “such steps as were reasonably practicable” was not explicated in earlier laws), the EA2010 is accompanied by explanatory notes which spell out what is meant. In the example given of an employer successfully avoiding liability, this is attributed to “diversity training”. The training is provided to the perpetrator of discrimination, not to the rest of the workplace or to the victim:

A shop owner becomes aware that her employee is refusing to serve disabled customers. The employer tells the employee to treat disabled customers in the same way as other customers and sends the employee on a diversity training course. However, the employee continues to treat disabled customers less favourably. One such customer brings a claim against both the employee and the employer. The employer may avoid liability by showing that she took all reasonable steps to stop the employee from acting in a discriminatory way. (EA2010 explanatory notes)
Imagining this same scenario if E&D training was meant to act primarily on bystanders (as Short (1999) argues it should), we would expect all the shop owner’s employees to have been sent on the diversity training course before they could claim that they have ‘taken all reasonable steps’. Instead we see that diversity training is conceptualised in the law as targeted at perpetrators or potential perpetrators. The EA2010 also includes a separate clause which sets out an obligation for “public authorities”, that is, any public sector organisation, to “foster good relations”:

A public authority must, in the exercise of its functions, have due regard to the need to … foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it.

Having due regard to the need to foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it involves having due regard, in particular, to the need to—

(a) tackle prejudice, and

(b) promote understanding. (EA2010, c.15, 11, Chapter 1, 149)

This is a substantial extension of the duty, first introduced in the RRA1976, to “foster good relations”, both by extending it to all protected characteristics and by extending it to every “public authority”. Notably, this newer legislation uses the psychological language of “prejudice” and “understanding” rather than the previous language of “eliminate unlawful discrimination”. Again, the suggestion that fostering good relations is primarily about “the need to tackle prejudice and promote understanding” suggests a focus on perpetrators – people with prejudices that need to be tackled (although “promote understanding” can be understood more widely). So, where the reason for training is understood as being because of the law, participants are positioned as possible (or current) perpetrators of discrimination.

In this section I have described the introduction of a different set of legal ideas about discrimination – those relating to disability. These were derived from the social model of disability described in Section 4.4, and from the Americans with Disabilities Act 1990. I have also noted the expansion in the 1990s and 2000s of legal protection from discrimination for more groups, partially in order to meet the requirements of new EU guidelines. The EA2010 unified and superseded much of the legislation described through this chapter, such that some ‘types’ of discrimination which had previously applied only to only some protected
groups (for instance, ‘discrimination by association’) were now applicable to all protected characteristics. It also introduced the terminology of a ‘protected characteristic’. Because ‘protected characteristic’ refers in some cases to a protected group (married people, trans people, disabled people, people who are or have recently been pregnant) and in other cases to a protected characteristic (sex, age, race, sexual orientation, religion and belief), it is difficult terminology to use accurately or to use in conveying an analysis of social oppression. I return to this point in Chapter 7, which discusses the uses of law in E&D training. In the next section I briefly note a development of the last twenty years in the UK – the rise of ‘diversity’ language.

4.6 Managing diversity?

As with many of the other developments described in this chapter, both the conceptual framework of ‘managing diversity’ and the term ‘diversity’ as a catch-all term for workplace initiatives with a connection to social inequality began in the USA. ‘Managing diversity’ came to the UK some years later than the USA, and is widely credited to the publication of a textbook on the subject by Kandola and Fullerton (1994).

Kandola and Fullerton (1994) were UK-based consultants on E&D. This textbook largely adopts the American model of diversity management, particularly in its emphasis on the ‘business case’ for diversity; but included some important differences from Thomas (1990, 1991). Thomas viewed managing diversity as a necessary supplement to affirmative action – managing diversity was not intended to replace or undermine affirmative action (see Agócs and Burr 1996). By contrast, Kandola and Fullerton (1994) directly opposed schemes of positive action. They also argued that any preferential hiring, training, mentoring or other support offered only to one group in the workplace would sow divisions and backlash, and failed to treat each worker as an individual. As seeing every employee as an individual was central to their vision of ‘managing diversity’, they saw positive action as directly contrary to this vision. As such, they recommended an increase in flexibility throughout the workplace – a willingness to adapt working practices to individual needs – in a way which was not tied in any sense to group membership.

However, while the term ‘diversity’ became very popular in Britain in the late 1990s and 2000s as a catch-all term for socially relevant differences and for what were previously
called equal opportunities initiatives (Tatli 2011; Ahmed 2012; Brewis 2016), the philosophy of managing diversity as something that actively excludes group-based initiatives has been less successful. I discuss this contradictory area of recent developments, and the implications of ‘managing’ diversity, in more detail in Section 5.6. Having brought this historical sketch to the present day, in the next section I summarise the arguments of this chapter.

4.7 Insights from UK history

Comparably to the history of E&D training in the USA (Chapter 3), E&D training became popular in the UK as a policy solution to problems associated with discrimination, and not as a grassroots development, with the possible exception of training around disability.

However, while in the USA ‘training’ became widespread primarily as a response to the enforcement of Civil Rights legislation (and then took on a life of its own with ‘managing diversity’, Kelly and Dobbin 1998), in the UK, legislation has not been the primary driver. Instead, national scandals of police racism became a focal point, with training being put forward as a (partial) solution to the problem of police racism. There have been no comparable scandals or turning points with respect to other minoritised groups - although there have been strong grassroots movements such as the Women’s Liberation Movement and Gay Rights Movement, training on these groups has a shorter history and never achieved the same level of popularity. The development of training in the UK has often responded in some way to the social movements, psychology and human resources initiatives which first emerged in the USA.

This chapter has traced the history of E&D training in the UK, beginning with the race relations of the 1950s and 1960s. By looking at the broader context of race relations in the UK, it becomes clear that the race relation strategy of the 1950s was a balancing act by the state, in which the state passed racist, restrictive laws on immigration while trying to encourage ‘integration’ of Commonwealth immigrants to the UK with white UK society, partially through laws against racial discrimination (Hiro 1992). In the mid-1960s the overall strategy remained the same, in that immigration laws were still paired with anti-discrimination laws, but the rhetoric had shifted away from assimilation and towards ‘cultural diversity’ or multiculturalism. Multicultural awareness training began to take place
in the 1960s and this remained the main form of training on race until the end of the 1970s, when RAT began to be offered (Luthra and Oakley 1991).

The 1970s were also a time of change for women, with two key laws being passed about women’s status in the workplace – the Equal Pay Act 1970 and the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. I have argued that the relative absence of training on ‘women’ as a minoritised group and on sexism may be related to the way in which women’s liberation has been viewed differently from that of other minoritised groups, who are more likely to become the subject of ‘tolerance’ (Brown 2006). However, training on ‘sexual harassment’ specifically seems to have grown in the late 1980s and 1990s. Unlike early training on race, which conceptualised the problem as ignorance about other cultures and about the problems of racism, training on sexual harassment did not conceptualise the training as bridging a ‘culture gap’ between men and women. Instead, training on sexual harassment worked to convey to both men and women a clear definition of a particular set of behaviours which had been identified by feminists, and procedures about how to deal with these behaviours in the workplace.

Training on race grew substantively in response to two incidents involving the police: the Brixton disturbances in 1981 (Scarman 1981) and the murder of Stephen Lawrence in 1993, or more precisely, the inquiry into how the police mishandled the murder (Macpherson 1999). Although there were important differences between the official responses to these two reports, with Scarman in 1981 dismissing the possibility of ‘institutional racism’ while Macpherson in 1999 made a finding of ‘institutional racism’, I have argued that the similarities are also crucial, and in particular that both Scarman and Macpherson were ultimately reliant on a psychological discourse about the nature of discrimination. The key shift between the two is that whereas Scarman conceptualised racially prejudiced attitudes as both rare and a property only of lower-ranking police officers, Macpherson’s definition of ‘institutional racism’ suggested that “unwitting” prejudice and bias were widespread. This represented a change both in terms of whether overt, conscious prejudice was the focus, and in terms of how common prejudice was understood to be.

The form that training on race took in response to the Scarman report was RAT, an approach modelled closely on Katz (1978), a training manual written by a white American. Katz argued that since racism is a ‘white problem’, training should also be designed and led by white people for other white people. There was a mixed response to this aspect of Katz’ model in
the UK, in that RAT was led by Black and minority ethnic people as well as by white people; however, other aspects of her model took hold, such as the use of techniques derived from social psychology and an overall approach which was strongly influenced by Rogerian psychology (Gurnah 1984; Sivandan 1985). This form of training grew substantially in the public sector over the course of the 1980s. Perhaps because of this American influence, colonialism and empire have been marginal topics in UK training, and Irish people have not been described as an ethnic minority in RAT (London Social Policy Unit 1987).

Also in the early 1980s, training around disability was growing in popularity in the public sector despite the absence of any legal protections from disability discrimination. Unlike the Women’s Liberation Movement and the anti-racism social movement in the UK, training was a key component of the practice of many disability activists from early in the Disability Rights Movement. I have argued that may be partially explained by the importance to the movement of service providers, and in particular service providers reconceptualising their role in relation to disabled people. The social model of disability was developed in the UK and spread rapidly among Disability Equality Trainers. Also in contrast to the model of RAT, which was unregulated and could be led by a white trainer, Disability Equality Training was rapidly regulated and was led only by disabled people as an integral component of the training practice.

Whereas the forms of training described so far were primarily offered in the public sector, in the 1990s the corporate ‘managing diversity’ movement began to grow in the UK, a few years after its inception in the USA. This movement emphasises the ‘business case’ for diversity, and the business benefits of having a ‘diverse’ workforce; however, these benefits are understood as only materialising if the diverse workforce is properly managed. Although the key text on managing diversity in the UK, Kandola and Fullerton (1994), advocates eliminating any positive action and measures which are put in place for one group only, in practice diversity management maintained many earlier practices (such as training) (Tatli 2011). While the idea of ‘management’ is explicit in the managing diversity movement, the use of training to respond to crises of government is evident throughout this history both in America and in the UK. Training was a response to riots and to the fear of riots, and took place primarily in places where there had been rioting (Sivanandand 1985). In this respect training can be seen as a form of government which seeks to manage and reduce disorder,
partially as a redirection of anti-racist protest (Sivanandan 1985) and partially through being an apparently concrete programme of action apparently intending to lead to better relations between different groups.

4.8 Conclusion: How did the practice of E&D training come about historically?

The last two chapters have addressed the question, “How did the practice of E&D training come about historically?”. In this conclusion I pull together the various threads of argument over the last two chapters to clarify how the present-day practice of E&D training has come about in relation to developments in social psychology, social liberation movements, and anti-discrimination legislation.

In the previous chapter I began to describe the historical development of E&D training, with the inception of training on race and culture in the USA from the 1920s to the 1990s. In this analysis of the development of E&D training in the USA, I argued that this history shows the significance of psychology and particularly social psychology for training in terms of both the curriculum of training, in which social psychological concepts are often taught, and techniques of training, such as role-play. There was a connection between rioting and the growth of training, with training being rolled out as a response to riots in multiple times and places, suggesting that training is used as a tool of government. The historical sketch highlighted the importance of anti-discrimination employment law in spreading training beyond limited segments of the public sector into the private sector. I also argued that training as a “solution” to discrimination was developed by white psychologists, activists and educators, rather than ever having been a focus of the Civil Rights Movement or Black Power Movement, or later, the Women’s Liberation Movement and Gay Rights Movement. This is suggestive of possible ongoing difficulties with reconciling the politics which underpin these liberation movements, and the politics which underpin training. The shift in the late 1980s from “equal opportunities” to “diversity” originated in corporate management, but the rhetoric of “diversity” rapidly spread, although whether this was accompanied by substantive shifts in practice is questionable.

As I described in this chapter, E&D training in the UK began later, and was profoundly influenced by developments in the USA. There were many parallels between the two national contexts in terms of the development of training. In both contexts, training did not
develop from liberation movements or grassroots activism – I have argued that Disability Equality Training seems to be an exception, partly because the Disability Rights Movement began to grow at a time when other forms of equality training were already in place, and partly because a central facet of the oppression of disabled people was and is the relationship between disabled people and medical professionals. As in the USA, training grew in the public sector of the UK in direct response to rioting, and grew in the private sector in response to anti-discrimination employment legislation. E&D training began with training on race and culture, and later grew to incorporate other groups, either in separate training or in a broader “equal opportunities” framework. I have argued that training on sexism did not take place to the same extent or in the same ways as training on racism, with sexual harassment being a focus of training on sexism. Training focused on sexuality, specifically lesbian and gay sexualities, grew substantially in the late 1990s, and training on transgender awareness began in the 2000s. With the growth both of different liberation movements and of legislation covering different groups, training focused on a single group has become less popular than training which in some way attempts to “cover” all protected groups, either using a legal framework or using a “diversity” framework. The EA2010, which harmonised existing equality legislation and created nine “protected characteristics” (each of which were already protected in some form under existing legislation), is likely to have boosted the popularity of training with a broad focus on E&D in general rather than on particular groups. The rise of “managing diversity” in the 1990s and 2000s also involved increasing rhetoric of attending to individual rather than group based differences as the basis of E&D training.

The practice of E&D training could thus be said to have come about initially as a result of social psychological ideas about prejudice and attitudes, which grew in the USA in the 1920s. However, it grew into a mainstream practice in the public sector as a result of attempts to manage racial tensions which had led to rioting in both the USA and the UK, and became a mainstream practice in the private sector as a result of anti-discrimination employment legislation. The groups covered in training expanded over the decades with the growth of anti-discrimination legislation covering more groups and with the growth of social movements, leading to the growth of forms of training which cover “diversity” rather than particular groups. In addition, specific concepts were incorporated into training in response
to their articulation within social movements, such as sexual harassment and the social model of disability. In these ways, training has functioned as a governmental strategy, ‘managing’ both the liability of employers for the acts of their employees, and the demands of socially oppressed groups.

These historical sketches thus also point to some preliminary answers to the research questions which are focused on the present day, “What happens in E&D training?”, and more specifically “What is the curriculum of the training, and how come?”, and “How are participants positioned in relation to discrimination?” The history outlined over the last two chapters suggests that the curriculum of training is likely to be profoundly influenced by psychology and by the law. The long association of social psychology with training suggests that social psychological ideas are likely to remain a key component of training, and that “experiential” learning techniques such as role-play are likely to be used. As such, I went into my fieldwork with an increased awareness of the possible role of psychology. The significance of legislation suggests that describing and explaining legislation may be a component of training, although from this historical sketch it is unclear whether the law would still be a central part of the curriculum of training in a public institution such as universities. This historical sketch has also highlighted the relevance of guilt as an emotion which has been evoked through training, suggesting that this may be part of the legacy of training today.

In this chapter, I argued that the explanatory notes to the “vicarious liability” clause of the EA2010 suggest that diversity training is for possible perpetrators of discrimination, rather than for bystanders or victims. However, there have also been examples of training which is specifically aimed at bystanders, in the early 1950s in the USA; and practices which are focused on possible victims of discrimination, such as consciousness raising, which some trainers also adopted (London Social Policy Unit 1987). The EA2010, and the rise of the ‘managing diversity’ movement, suggest that it may be more difficult to target workplace training specifically to likely victims, as so many interpersonal differences are now seen as relevant in the context of training. This suggests that participants may be positioned in multiple ways in relation to discrimination within the same training session.

I follow up on each of these points in the literature review and in the ethnographic chapters to come. In the next chapter I turn to a literature review which considers some of these
discourses and practices in more depth in the context of the university and in the present day.
Chapter 5: E&D Training at UK universities: Literature review

5.1 Introduction: Studies, personal accounts and theory

In this chapter, I provide an overview of current practice by reviewing a range of relevant literatures, including literature from countries beyond the United Kingdom (UK) and United States of America (USA). As such this chapter also sets the context of the rest of the thesis, which focuses on analysis of the ethnographic data generated through the research.

I have found only one example of ethnographic research on E&D training as currently practiced in the UK; that is, training which usually ‘covers’ several different forms of marginalisation (Brewis 2016). The rest of the small body of ethnographic research has focused on more specific forms of training or workshops, with Peel studying LGAT in the UK from 1998-2001 (Peel 2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2008; Harding and Peel 2007; Peel and Kitzinger 2005) and Srivastava studying anti-racist workshops in feminist and social action groups in Canada (Srivastava 2005, 2006). As such, this review includes personal accounts by E&D trainers focusing on specific equality topics, interviews with trainers and participants in training, manuals, and many reflections on practice by people engaging in more sustained forms of equalities education – for students, children, trainee teachers and social workers, and so on. I also include literature on the university as an institution, particularly in the UK. These combine to build up a picture of the discourses of E&D training.

5.2 Theoretical orientations: The university

My orientation towards the university as an institution has been deeply influenced by Ahmed (2012), an analysis of diversity at universities in England and Australia. Ahmed (2012) reflects on her experiences of working on policy documents on race, attending conferences on diversity, and working within universities; and also includes analysis of interviews with ‘diversity practitioners’, including both those who work within universities and those working for external organisations such as the Equality Challenge Unit (ECU). ECU “works to further and support equality and diversity for staff and students in higher education across the UK and in colleges in Scotland” (ECU 2017).

Ahmed (2012) cautions that we cannot assume that the ‘equality regime’ – that is, the work being done in and on the university in the name of equality, such as the provision of
training, the creation and circulation of policy documents, and so on – exists in order to counter or to overcome the ‘inequality regime’, that is to say, business as usual. She describes the position of diversity practitioners within universities as working both for and against the university. Diversity practitioners work for the university in that they are university employees, and are expected to protect the institution’s reputation and standing – for instance, by resolving complaints, winning equality awards such as Athena SWAN\(^1\), and so on. They work against the institution in that they attempt to change established procedures and cultures, a process which the university resists. Multiple practitioners described the experience of meeting this resistance as “banging your head against a brick wall” (Ahmed 2015, p.6). The paradox of working simultaneously for and against the institution is described similarly in Westerman’s (2008) study of harassment advisors in Canadian universities. Westerman uses the term ‘tempered radical’ to describe the process by which the tensions inherent to the position of the sexual harassment advisor ‘temper’ the radical ambitions and intentions which advisors have when they begin the job.

In her analysis of ‘diversity’ at universities, Ahmed (2012) notes that the language of diversity, and the ‘business case’ which is associated with it, is often understood by diversity practitioners and academics studying diversity both as an American export, and as part of the ‘marketisation’ of the university. That is, there is a perception of ‘diversity’ as being inappropriate to the public sector, belonging to a corporate vision rather than a public service provider.

These analyses of ‘diversity’ deconstruct the work of the diversity practitioner, demonstrating the paradoxes and contradictions inherent in their work. This complexity is evident within the literature as well as in my ethnographic data. In the next section, I focus on accounts of the experience of teaching university students about equalities, from the perspective of lecturers. I also touch on the evidence of ongoing racial inequality at UK universities for both staff and students.

\(^1\)Athena SWAN is an award given to university departments by ECU. Athena SWAN is intended to recognise a commitment to women’s equality. Stonewall, a charity that has historically been LGB but during my fieldwork became an LGBT charity, also gives awards to universities for being LGB-friendly or later LGBT-friendly. The Athena SWAN award was the main equality award active at the time of my fieldwork. However, the Race Equality Charter, also awarded by ECU, was being launched during my fieldwork and it is now in use.
5.2.1 Equalities courses for university students

There are analogies between the setting of a university course for students on race, anti-oppressive practice, multiculturalism, and so on, and the setting of E&D training for staff. There are also substantial differences – education for students generally takes place over a full term or semester, students have different incentives to take part in these programmes, students are tested in some way as to what they have learned, and the power relations between university lecturers and students differs from that between university employees and diversity trainers. However, the similarities are still important: both types of education occur in the university, with adult learners, and may include similar material or have a similar political perspective and purpose. As such I review the literature on equalities teaching of undergraduates at universities here. I also note the evidence of continued racial inequality at UK universities.

There is a body of literature of personal reflections on delivering this kind of education, taking place over a term or semester, in teacher training (Ladson-Billings 1991, 1996), social work education (Collins and Wilkie 2010), and psychology education (Peel 2010). In addition, some educators have conducted evaluations of these courses – as described in Chapter 3 (see Young 1927). Katz’ only published evaluation of her White Awareness programme assesses attitude and behaviour change in twenty-four white undergraduate students who took her programme as a university course (Katz and Ivey 1977). These accounts tend to be focused on an educational course, rather than on changing an institution more broadly (cf. Ahmed 2012).

Ladson-Billings (1991, 1996) analyses her experiences as a Black woman professor delivering multicultural teacher training education in the USA. Her teaching includes readings, class discussions, films, and exercises such as an activity called ‘Is this Racism?’ in which students read a series of statements and discuss whether or not the statements are racist. Later in the course students look for “ways to make the curriculum more responsive to culturally diverse students and issues” (1991, p.153). The course ends with students visiting local schools to “search for evidence (or lack thereof) of the schools’ attempts to meet the needs of culturally diverse students” (1991, p.153). This is noticeably different from the ‘field trips’ of earlier training in the USA and education in which trainees visited the homes and
communities of ethnic minority Americans (see Chapter 3) – the students are being asked to think in terms of inclusion and diversity rather than observe cultural differences.

Students are also required to keep a reflective journal. Ladson-Billings uses student journals to demonstrate the fears and resistances of her white students as well as the anger and struggle of her racially minoritised students. For instance, a white woman wrote in her journal:

I felt very uncomfortable talking about the subject of racism in an academic arena ... Feeling uncomfortable talking about racism is very strange ... (it) comes from not knowing ... do I call a black person, black? Do I call an Asian person Chinese? ... What I do know is that I did not feel comfortable giving my opinion about whether (something) is racist or not. If I said it wasn’t and it really was, does that make me racist? I was nervous. (1991, p.152)

I see this as illustrative of the anxiety evoked by the discursive figure of the ‘racist’ in the uncertainty expressed about which words to use and the key anxiety of ‘does that make me racist?’ I give a fuller description of the ‘racist’ as a discursive figure below in Section 5.3. By contrast a Black woman wrote:

... by the end of the film, I found myself not only angry , but trembling, and wanting to cry and kick, and yell, and speak my mind to all of the white students in the class ... Just listening to the reaction of white students following the film, I realised how ignorant people are to the problem of racism. Sometimes I wonder if making them more aware of the problem will make them more sensitive to it. I believe that some people will become more sensitive, but others won’t because they’re in a position of power ... (1991, p.152)

Rather than assessing student progress on the basis of attitude tests as in Katz and Ivey (1977), Ladson-Billings (1991) used a brief knowledge based assessment before and after the course, using concepts and historical moments of the Civil Rights Movement and of multicultural education, most of which were not directly addressed on the course. She found that all students’ scores increased, but racially minoritised students tended to do better on this test than white students both before and after the course. She notes that this group difference “suggests something about the nature of the relationship between knower and knowledge ... there may be some merit in investigating the effects of multiculturally oriented content on minority student academic performance” (1991, pp.153-154).

Tatum (1992, 1994, 1997) also teaches on race and racism in the USA, to psychology students. She uses the ‘racial identity development’ model developed by Helms (1990) to
frame and analyse student responses to the course at different times. Tatum also incorporates this model into the curriculum, giving students a theory which enables them to reflect on their own feelings during the course. Similarly to Ladson-Billings, Tatum (1997) uses student journals to illustrate students’ learning, including feelings of anxiety and resistance.

Nicoll has written in an Australian context about teaching undergraduate students about Aboriginal culture(s). Nicoll writes about the pedagogy of trying to teach undergraduate students about Aboriginal culture(s) as a white woman without re-inscribing colonial attitudes towards Aboriginal people. When talking to students about how power structures in Australia favour whiteness, one white woman student challenged her. Nicoll describes this incident and her response:

One said with all the self-righteousness of someone opposing her ‘politically correct’ lecturer: ‘She’s just imposing a stereotypical view of white women’. It was challenging to respond constructively to these comments. And as I blustered through what I hoped was an adequate reply, the student looked me in the eyes and asked aggressively: ‘Are you calling me racist?’ I was taken aback … by the extent to which – in the six or so years of Howard’s campaign against ‘political correctness’ – the very idea of suggesting that someone might be racist has been elevated to a crime to rival (if not displace) racism itself. (2004, p.20)

Nicolls is describing the Australian context, which is beyond the scope of my study. However, her perception that this intensely defensive response is in some sense a new development based on a shifting political background would certainly be misplaced if applied to the UK, and this defensiveness has been described by other sociological researchers a decade earlier in the USA, as I describe below in Section 5.3.2.

There is little comparable work about teaching on race in UK universities – perhaps because Black Studies is very new to the UK, with the first Black Studies course having only begun in 2016 (Andrews, 2016a). The literature on race and employees in UK universities tends to be focused on experiences between staff and management or staff and colleagues, although there is some discussion of mentoring students (see Ahmed 2007, 2012; Rollock 2012a, 2012b; ECU 2009, 2015; Alexander and Arday 2015). There is also a literature on student experiences in relation to race and racism (see National Union of Students 2011; Alexander and Arday 2015). This literature explores issues of a white-centric curriculum, the scarcity of
Black academics, experiences of racism from lecturers, and broader factors such as educational background before university.

There is a small literature on teaching about sexualities at universities, both in the UK and elsewhere. Peel (2010) describes a psychology course on ‘sexualities’ which she teaches at a UK university. Like Ladson-Billings (1991, 1996) she uses students’ reflective diaries, kept as part of the course, to show their learning process. An exercise used by Peel (2010) which provokes a high level of reflection from students is ‘homowork’ in which students are asked to acquire a gay or lesbian magazine and read it in public. In their diaries, students describe this as a powerful experience in revealing to them their own investment in being perceived as straight. Allen (1995) reflects on the shifts in her teaching practice in family psychology at a USA university as she fell in love with a woman and ended her heterosexual marriage, using her own teaching diary to analyse the experience of being closeted in the classroom and on coming out. Her course is on family psychology rather than specifically about sexualities, but her teaching aims have come to include working against homophobia; she includes several suggestions as to how lecturers can do this, including recommending reflective assignments for students, the use of a reflective teaching diary for lecturers, and the deliberate inclusion of families which include same-sex relationships.

These studies, examining a process of longer term education, illuminate the roles of self-reflection, anxiety, resistance and identity in the process of education about oppression. As these educators have access to written student assignments, including self-reflection, their observations can cast light on some of the processes of learning which are less visible in educational contexts premised entirely on discussion. While these studies give useful clues about the social situation of training, they also suggest possible differences between longer term educational programmes and training, in which trainers do not have access to written assignments and do not have the time to explore many issues in depth. As such I now turn to ethnographic, reflective and interview studies of E&D training.

5.3 Critical, qualitative studies of E&D training

Although there is only a minimal literature on E&D training for employees within universities (Hayat and Walton 2012), there is a wider reflective, critical literature on E&D training more generally. These also tend to concern training which is focused on one or two types of
oppression (for example, racism or homophobia) or oppressive behaviours (for example, sexual harassment). The exception is Brewis (2016) who studied diversity practitioners and diversity training in the UK in depth.

I consider this literature under four themes: the use of competing representations of oppression, the experience of resistance from trainees, theorising this resistance, and trainer’s roles and authority.

5.3.1 Competing representations of oppression

Peel (2002b) conducted an ethnographic study of LGAT in several different workplaces. She was one of the trainers in her data, and used audio tape recordings to record the sessions as well as interviewing some participants and trainers. Her work analyses the implicit politics of training, and also aims to improve training. As well as her doctoral thesis (Peel 2002b), Peel has analysed her data elsewhere in several papers (2001, 2002a, 2008; Kitzinger and Peel 2005).

Kitzinger and Peel (2005) use the topic of HIV/AIDS (Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome) to show how trainers’ conceptions of what constitutes homophobia differed from that of their participants, and further, differed from the textbooks giving guidelines for trainers. Training manuals advise trainers to dispute any link between HIV and gay men, claiming that participants will often name and believe in this link. In an interesting reversal, Kitzinger and Peel (2005) show that in fact the construction of HIV as an ‘equal opportunities’ virus was one that was introduced and defended by participants in the training; while trainers expressed their disagreement with the idea that anyone is at equal risk of HIV/AIDS, stating that in the UK gay men are much more likely to have HIV/AIDS than straight men.

Analysing this reversal, Kitzinger and Peel argue that campaigns relating to HIV/AIDS have responded to the political moment. When HIV/AIDS was widely believed to be a ‘gay plague’, medical research funding was minimal, because gay men’s lives were not valued. At that time, gay campaigners promoted the message that HIV/AIDS can affect anyone, as this seemed to be the best way to get research funding and healthcare for people with HIV/AIDS. As this message took hold, people came to believe that linking HIV/AIDS with gay
men is homophobic; for the same reason, training manuals advise trainers to dispute this link.

However, over time, this idea of HIV as an ‘equal opportunities virus’ was used to cut funding for gay and bisexual men’s sexual health services. As such gay and bisexual men’s campaigns began to focus on the higher prevalence of HIV/AIDS among gay and bisexual men, trying to gain recognition of the importance of these services. In this context, many of the trainers in Peel’s research were arguing that there is a link between HIV and gay men.

Kitzinger and Peel show that the disagreement between trainers and trainees about what homophobia is, as relates to HIV/AIDS, remained unresolved in the training sessions. Trainees struggled to understand why the trainer was presenting them with ‘facts’ that they (the trainees) believed to be homophobic. Comparing this account to that given by Ladson-Billings (1991, 1996) of the exercise ‘Is This Racism?’ used over a longer educational programme, it suggests the ways in which shorter training sessions may encounter disagreements as to the meaning of homophobia but without confronting these head-on, and hence without reaching resolution. The ways in which different constructions of racism can be linked with personal identity is explored in Ladson-Billings (1996), who gives an account of a disagreement among Black teachers about the construction of racism during the ‘Is This Racism?’ exercise:

In one workshop, a group of teachers, the majority of whom were African American, were divided over the statement, "The best players on our basketball team this year are Black." Most of the teachers felt strongly that the statement represented racism. However, a few of the African American teachers expressed the opposite opinion. As one teacher said, "I think the statement is just the truth. I mean, when you look at the basketball games, you can see who is making the most points." I then asked, "what if this White teacher (who indicated that she thought the statement reflected racism) had said she thought the statement was not racist?" The African American teachers who said the statement did not reflect racism laughed and said, tongue-in-cheek, "then we would’ve had to deal with her!" These teachers’ seemingly contradictory responses underscore the multiple ways that discussions about race and racism can be constructed. As African Americans, this group of teachers felt they could stand apart from the other African American teachers to express an alternative view of the meaning of racism. However, in their minds, the position of the other teacher as a White woman did not allow her to confront the stereotype (of Black males as basketball players) in another way. To them, her White privilege carries White responsibility to uncover and acknowledge racism. (Ladson-Billings 1996, p.253)
Kitzinger and Peel’s (2005) analysis illustrates that what happens in training sessions can be the opposite of what is described and recommended in training manuals. It also illuminates a more fundamental point: that different implicit constructions of ‘homophobia’ were in play during these training sessions, and that these constructions had a particular history and social context.

5.3.2 Trainee resistance

Peel (2002b, Kitzinger and Peel 2005) argues that trainees try to present themselves as non-homophobic during the training session. Peel (2002b) describes how trainees distance themselves from language and stereotypes that they believe to be homophobic, for instance, by claiming not to have heard of the homophobic slurs in an exercise on language, and by describing stereotypes only with the disclaimer that they do not believe the stereotype to be true.

Srivastava’s research (2005, 2006) is on anti-racism efforts in Canadian organisations which she describes as “feminist, pedagogical and social movement sites” (2006, p.56). Although her main method was interviews, she also draws on participant and non-participant observation of anti-racism workshops and organisational meetings. Her focus is on white women’s emotional resistance to anti-racism and “how and why these emotional responses have been able to block, defuse, and distract from change” (Srivastava 2005, p.29).

The emotional resistance Srivastava describes includes indignation, tears and anger:

Rayna’s description notes that anger, indignation— “You’re calling me a racist?”—and tears are typical responses of whites to organizational discussions of racism: “The indignant response, anger, the rage that turns into tears, the foot stomping, temper tantrums, which are very typical responses. Every single organization that I have been in, every single one. So I realized that it wasn’t about me . . . after a while [laughter]” (interview transcripts, April 1996). (2005, p.43)

Srivastava goes on to argue that “If one’s identity as feminist, as woman, as Canadian, as liberal rests on being tolerant and just, then antiracist challenges profoundly unsettle that foundation” (2005, p.43). Tatum writes on a related note that “Those Whites who are highly identified with a particular subordinate identity may also struggle with claiming Whiteness as a meaningful group category because they feel far from the White male norm” (Tatum 1997, p.103), giving Jewish people and white lesbians as examples. Srivastava links the form of emotional resistance displayed by white feminist women with the historical association
between middle class white women and notions of morality and innocence; the specific investment that white feminists have in their identity as both innocent and tolerant; and the culture of emotional openness within the white women’s movement which encourages emotional expression.

Analogously with Peel’s argument that participants in LGAT work to present themselves as non-homophobic, Srivastava describes white women’s attempts in these workshops to be seen as anti-racist or as non-racist:

Yasmin describes a typical reaction by some white women who were challenged for not having contributed to an antiracist workshop exercise. That, Yasmin says, “just led to tears on the part of the white women . . . and blah, blah . . . things like, ‘I’ve tried really hard to see where I’ve come from, and who I’ve oppressed as a white woman’” (interview transcripts, May 1996). One can hear these women’s anxiety that their endeavors to be good antiracist feminists should be recognized; they remain anxious to present themselves as good feminists with good intentions. (2005, pp.46-47)

As Srivastava argues, there is cultural specificity in the strength and form of these responses (her focus being on women’s organisations in Canada). However, I suggest that an attachment to personal ‘innocence’ and to liberal politics is also widespread in the UK, and that this is well illustrated by the reflective writing of students undertaking anti-oppressive courses as described above in Section 5.2.

1. There are also clear parallels between the reactions of undergraduate students to anti-colonial education as described by Nicoll (2004) in Australia and those described by Srivastava (2005, 2006) in Canada.

DiAngelo (2011) theorises these displays of resistance somewhat differently, arguing that white Americans are “fragile” in their inability to tolerate “racial stress”, a phenomenon she named “White Fragility”. She bases this account partially on responses of white Americans to “cultural competency training” in workplaces or “multicultural education courses” in college. DiAngelo argues that:

...not all multicultural courses or training programmes talk directly about racism, much less address white privilege. It is far more the norm for these courses and programs to use racially coded language such as “urban”, “inner city,” and “disadvantaged” but to rarely use “white” or “over-advantaged” or “privileged”. This racially coded language reproduces racist images and perspectives while it simultaneously reproduces the comfortable illusion that race and its problems are what “they” have, not us. Reasons why the facilitators of these courses and trainings may not directly name the dynamics and beneficiaries of racism range from the lack of a valid analysis of racism by white facilitators, personal and economic survival strategies for facilitators of colour, and the
overall pressures from management to keep the content comfortable and palatable for whites. However, if and when an educational program does directly address racism and the privileging of whites, common white responses include anger, withdrawal, emotional incapacitation, guilt, argumentation, and cognitive dissonance (all of which reinforce the pressure on facilitators to avoid directly addressing racism). So-called progressive whites may not respond with anger, but may still insulate themselves via claims that they are beyond the need for engaging with the content because they “already had a class on this” or “already know this.” These reactions are often seen in anti-racist education endeavors as forms of resistance to the challenge of internalized dominance (Whitehead & Wittig, 2005; Horton & Scott, 2004; McGowan, 2000, O’Donnell, 1998). These reactions do indeed function as resistance, but it may be useful to also conceptualise them as a result of the reduced psychosocial stamina that racial insulation inculcates. I call this lack of racial stamina “White Fragility.” (2011, p.56)

As well as ‘White Fragility’ being a helpful theoretical concept, DiAngelo’s writing here offers both a description of, and explanation for, the popularity of training and education which avoid directly naming and addressing racism.

DiAngelo (2011) goes on to argue that white Americans grow up not only racially insulated in the sense of being surrounded by other white Americans, but also insulated from challenges to their dominance and perceived superiority as white. For instance, the more uniformly ‘white’ a neighbourhood is, the more it is perceived by the dominant culture as a good and safe place to live. Racial isolation is thus compounded by racial superiority with the result that white people have no experience of being perceived as inferior on the grounds of their race. DiAngelo’s analysis thus draws on psychological ideas about the development of, and importance of, ‘resilience’.

It is notable that ‘White Fragility’ theorises these displays of white resistance to acknowledging the ongoing existence of racism, or to actively taking part in anti-racist endeavours, by attributing a (negative) psychological trait to white people. This is reminiscent of Katz’ and Elliott’s earlier claims that ‘racism is a mental illness’, discussed in (see Section 3.3.2). However, while Katz’ and Elliott’s analysis of racism as a mental illness relies on the idea that white racism is in some sense a break from reality (with the reality being that ‘races’ don’t exist scientifically, and that people of all colours and cultures are equal), DiAngelo’s analysis relies only on ideas about vulnerability to challenge – ‘fragility’. Whereas members of racialised groups have the life experience to cope with their race being made relevant in interaction, white people do not. In the next section I discuss how in
my study I draw on Ahmed’s description of the figure of the ‘racist’ and suggest a theoretical construct helpful for the analysis of present day E&D training, the figure of the ‘bigot’.

5.3.3 Theorising trainee resistance: the figure of the ‘racist’

The literature previously discussed in Sections 5.2.1 and 5.3.2 on trainee’s identity construction uses a range of theoretical concepts to structure the analysis: ‘Racial identity development’ (Tatum 1992, 1994, 1997), ‘White Fragility’ (DiAngelo 2011), and emotional resistance (Srivastava 2005, 2006). As outlined in Chapter 2, I am using the concept of ‘discourse’ to structure my analysis. As such, I understand both trainers and participants in training as speaking and acting from subject positions within discourses (Henriques et al. 1984). I would argue that across discourses about racism and other forms of structural oppression there exists a figure which I term the ‘bigot’. This has been most clearly described in the literatures on race, racism and whiteness. Within this discourse, racism is conceptualised as existing on a personal and interpersonal level, and not on a structural or institutional level (as outlined by Jones 2000; Ahmed 2012; Sivanandan 1985; and many others). Racism is further regarded as rare, unusual or aberrational rather than ‘business as usual’. A minority of people are ‘racist’ in holding explicitly racist views and behaving in evidently racist ways, whereas the majority of people are non-racist and ‘good’.

The figure of the ‘racist’ is the figure of the ‘real’ racist, while others may make mistakes but are not fundamentally bigoted. Ahmed describes the figure of the racist as “allow[ing] structural or institutional forms of racism to recede from view”:

One difficulty is that responses to racism tend to exercise the figure of “the racist” as the one who can be charged and brought before the law. The very appearance of this figure is what allows a reduction of racism to an individual person who suffers from a false set of beliefs. The figure can do a great deal of work: it is relatively easy for someone to respond to a critique of racism by insisting or even showing that they are not that figure ... The reduction of racism to the figure of “the racist” allows structural or institutional forms of racism to recede from view, by projecting racism onto a figure that is easily discarded (not only as someone who is “not me” but also as someone who is “not us”, who does not represent a cultural or institutional norm). (Ahmed 2012, p.150, italics in original, bold emphasis added)

Ahmed goes on to describe how this anxiety negatively affects the ability and willingness of whiteness to make changes as a result of critique:

Critiques of racism are heard as possible attacks on reputation (repeat: “how can you call me that?”), such that one of the biggest accusations you can make is the very
accusation that you are accusing someone of racism. As Fiona Nicoll suggests, “The very idea of suggesting that someone might be racist has been elevated into a crime to rival (if not displace) racism itself” (2004: 20). The reproduction of racism to an accusation is part of the displacement and thus reproduction of racism. (2012, p.150)

I see Nicoll’s analysis here as missing some historical context, at least if applied to the UK. In the UK, “suggesting that someone might be racist” has been perceived as a shocking accusation for a long time. I draw on two historically significant moments to make this argument: Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech made in 1968, and the Scarman report on the Brixton disturbances (Scarman 1981).

As previously noted in Section 4.1, the ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech is notorious primarily for its inflammatory, racist rhetoric on immigration. The speech also argues against the new Race Relations Act of 1968, using what is intended as an emotive example of an elderly white widow surrounded by Black immigrants who she fears. The relevant part of Powell’s speech is reproduced here in full:

Eight years ago in a respectable street in Wolverhampton a house was sold to a Negro. Now only one white (a woman old-age pensioner) lives there. This is her story. She lost her husband and both her sons in the war. So she turned her seven-roomed house, her only asset, into a boarding house. She worked hard and did well, paid off her mortgage and began to put something by for her old age. Then the immigrants moved in. With growing fear, she saw one house after another taken over. The quiet street became a place of noise and confusion. Regretfully, her white tenants moved out.

The day after the last one left, she was awakened at 7am by two Negroes who wanted to use her ‘phone to contact their employer. When she refused, as she would have refused any stranger at such an hour, she was abused and feared she would have been attacked but for the chain on her door. Immigrant families have tried to rent rooms in her house, but she always refused. Her little store of money went, and after paying rates, she has less than £2 per week. She went to apply for a rate reduction and was seen by a young girl, who on hearing she had a seven-roomed house, suggested she should let part of it. When she said the only people she could get were Negroes, the girl said, "Racial prejudice won't get you anywhere in this country." So she went home.

The telephone is her lifeline. Her family pay the bill, and help her out as best they can. Immigrants have offered to buy her house - at a price which the prospective landlord would be able to recover from his tenants in weeks, or at most a few months. She is becoming afraid to go out. Windows are broken. She finds excreta pushed through her letter box. **When she goes to the shops, she is followed by children, charming, wide-grinning piccaninnies. They cannot speak English, but one word they know. "Racialist," they chant. When the new Race Relations Bill is passed, this woman is convinced she will go to prison. And is she so wrong? I begin to wonder. (added emphasis) (Powell 1968, available from The Telegraph 2007)
This part of Powell’s speech focuses on an old white English woman as the victim of immigration, and specifically of Black immigrants. She is portrayed as behaving in an ordinary, unprejudiced way when Powell comments that her choice not to allow two Black men into her house to use her phone was identical to the choice she would have made with respect to ‘any stranger’; however, her refusal to rent rooms to Black families is evidently a result of racism. This racism is recognised by another white character in the story – the “girl” who refused to give a rate reduction.

The importance of this story in the way that it illustrates the figure of the ‘racist’ is in the power attributed to the Black children. Alongside more concrete threats, such as having windows broken, Powell conjures up an image of Black children who, although unable to speak English, still know how to accuse white people of racism. Powell’s choice to use this example as the emotional centrepiece of his argument against immigration and against the RRA1968 suggests that the perception of a power imbalance between white and Black people as skewed in favour of Black people, partially because of the availability of the accusation ‘racist’ – or in the language of the time, ‘racialist’ – is not new. Although Powell’s speech was recognised as racist by many at the time, and led directly to his being fired as Shadow Defence Secretary, the speech also had high levels of popular support.

My second example, the Scarman report in 1981, is made in more measured language. As I describe in Section 4.3, Scarman interpreted claims of ‘institutional racism’ in the police as an “attack … upon the integrity and impartiality of the senior direction of the force” and an “injustice” (1981, p.64). As Sivanandan argues in his critique of Racism Awareness Training (RAT) and of the Scarman report, this completely obscures an understanding of ‘institutional racism’ as referring to the practices and processes of an institution which discriminate against Black people:

My business is not to train the police officer out of his ‘racism’, but to have him punished for it – if, that is, he is meant to be accountable to the community he serves. Nor does changing the attitude of an immigration officer stop him from carrying out virginity tests – but changing immigration law (or merely the instructions from the Home Office) would. Nor can (middle-class) housing officers who have undergone RAT change conditions for the black working class, as long as the housing stock is limited. Nor, finally, does disabusing the minds of the owners and editors of the yellow press of

2 The Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘racialist’ as “an earlier term than racist, but now largely superseded by it” (Oxford English Dictionary 2008). As with ‘racist’, ‘racialist’ could be either noun or adjective.
their ‘racism’ prevent them from propagating their poisonous ideology of racism (when it sells papers); only a concerted continuing, public and political campaign can do that.

RAT, however, professes to change attitudes and behaviour, and thereby power relations – not in reality, but by sleight of definition: by defining personal relations as power relations. (Sivanandan 1985, p.28)

These examples suggest that the discursive figure of the ‘racist’ has existed in some form in the UK at least since the 1960s. Despite the important differences between Powell’s speech and Scarman’s report (Powell being an open white supremacist and Scarman being a liberal), both conjure up and disavow the discursive figure of the racist; and both see ‘racist’ as a powerful accusation or attack. Ahmed (2012) shows that the resistance to a structural analysis of racism, and to acknowledgement of personal racism, is ongoing. In the next chapter I introduce the way in which I extend this account to other forms of structural inequality.

5.3.4 Theorising social dominance: the figure of the ‘bigot’

The term ‘bigot’ is rare in the literature, and does not appear in my ethnographic data. However, the majority of the training sessions in my data ‘covered’ multiple forms of discrimination. I chose the term ‘bigot’ to define this figure not because it is used by participants in my fieldwork or in the literature, but as a term which refers generically to a person who is discriminatory. As the trainers in my fieldwork either attempted to cover all nine protected characteristics, or talk generically about ‘unconscious bias’, a generic term for the figure was needed. This is somewhat paradoxical as I will argue that the generic analysis offered by much of the training is inadequate to tackle the particular forms that discrimination can take; however, since training was generic, participants’ worries about how they might appear often seemed to take a generic form. I discuss this in more detail in Chapter 8 in which I extensively use this theoretical construct in analysing my data.

A key facet of the discursive figure of the ‘bigot’ is that it arises only in relation to forms of oppression with historical roots and which involve structural inequality. For instance, the ‘bigot’ figure arises as a figure to be disavowed in discussions of racism (the marginalisation of, and discrimination against, Black and other racially minoritised people), misogyny (the marginalisation of, and discrimination against, women), and homophobia (the marginalisation of, and discrimination against, gay, lesbian and bisexual people), but does not arise in the same way in discussions of prejudice against tall people, or against men, or
white people. This figure is being invoked where a person is described as ‘a racist’ or ‘a sexist’.

The existence of people who ‘are bigoted’, and others who are not, is one of the most common ways for racism, sexism and other forms of oppression to be understood. This is a discourse based in morality, and being sexist or racist are seen as immoral in this discourse. As such, people seek to disavow the figure of the bigot in relation to themselves: not homophobic, not sexist, not racist, and so on. The anxieties surrounding the position of ‘bigot’, leading people to avoid positioning themselves as bigoted, apply only to historically rooted, structural oppressions, and are stronger around racism than any other form of marginalisation. Activists and academics note how ‘racism’ can be understood as denoting a type of person – the racist; and so ‘racist’ is experienced as a slur against white people. This is described by a journalist:

The first thing to understand is how white Americans, especially in rural areas, hear accusations of racism. While terms like “racist,” “white privilege,” and “implicit bias” intend to point out systemic biases in America, for white Americans they’re often seen as coded slurs. These terms don’t signal to them that they’re doing something wrong, but that their supposedly racist attitudes (which they would deny having at all) are a justification for lawmakers and other elites to ignore their problems. (Lopez 2016)

Reframing this using Ahmed’s terminology of the figure of the racist, this quotation describes how for people who would like to position themselves as non-racist, being positioned by others as a ‘racist’ can be a source of anger. In fact, a different analysis is coming into play – one which conceptualises inequality as systematic and societal, rather than individual – but is being interpreted through the discursive figure of the racist and thus is heard as accusation, precisely as described by Ahmed (2012) and by Nicoll (2004).

Overcoming the anxieties associated with this figure is often described as a challenge by educators working on equalities, and other diversity workers, as the ‘racist’ figure competes with discourses which conceptualise racism as structural and ingrained in organisations (Ahmed 2012; Tatum 1997; Nicoll 2004). In analysing my data, I see the theoretical construct of the discursive figure of the ‘bigot’ as necessary where participants and trainers are talking about discrimination in generic terms. However, where there is a specific form of bigotry, such as racism, being invoked, I refer to the figure of the ‘racist’, or of the ‘sexist’, and so on.
5.3.5 Trainers’ roles

Brewis discusses the different ways in which diversity practitioners “construct the relationship between themselves and their organisation/clients” (2016, p.159). She groups these into six “subject positions” – the educator, provocateur, comforter, warrior, cynic and conduit. Of particular interest for this account are the educator, provocateur, and comforter, as the “warrior” and “cynic” are both “backstage” positions, not taken up in front of clients, and the “conduit” refers to the relationship between diversity practitioners and organisations, rather than a way that they act during training.

The “educator” role was articulated in terms of encouraging clients and training participants to “think for themselves” (p.164), but where this is contrasted not with the diversity practitioner doing the thinking for them, but with allowing the media to do their thinking. It was also articulated in terms of clarifying what diversity “means” – this is reminiscent of Herbert’s (1989) descriptions of her work explaining what sexual harassment is.

The “provocateur” also educates, but through the specific technique of “provoking discomfort” (p.169) in clients. This involves giving negative feedback to organisations about how well they are doing in terms of diversity, challenging organisations and individuals to do better. The importance of this work is also described by diversity practitioners in Ahmed’s study of universities, in which practitioners described getting negative feedback from ECU on their policies as a more helpful event than getting positive feedback (Ahmed 2012). Whereas positive feedback created a “marshmallow feeling” (Ahmed 2012, p.101) that all was well and enough had been done already in the production of the relevant documents, negative feedback created a sense of urgency and action.

The “comforter” is the position of reassuring the organisation and individuals within it. This is described as necessary because of the fears of organisations, as described clearly by some of Brewis’s participants:

“I think people are frightened about equality and diversity […] I think people are frightened still of making mistakes” (John-C)

“…there’s quite a lot of people feeling like they’re treading on eggshells” (Isabelle-SP) (2016, p.175)

These practitioners’ descriptions of the ‘fear’ and anxiety of others is in keeping with the anxieties already described in this chapter, which I theorised through the need to disavow
the figure of the ‘bigot’. Some of Brewis’s participants connected this need to reassure organisations with the practice of earlier trainers:

“There were a lot of trainers that went out there with a very confrontational ‘all white people are racist’, ‘you can’t ask for a black coffee because it’s racist’, ‘you can’t call a blackboard a “blackboard” because it’s racist’ and it all got very silly and it turned people off. [...] I came across a lot of trainers who were confrontational and switching people off. People became frightened to talk about it in case they said the wrong thing and got their heads bitten off.” (2016, p.176)

Others associated the need to be reassuring with their own practice of being provocative:

“…kind of challenging but I’m kind of nice with it you know, you have to be nice with it. [...] You don’t want to give people the excuse to say ‘oh well I don’t want to have anything to do with him’” (2016, p.177)

These accounts suggest the careful management of emotions, with trainers working to challenge complacency – creating discomfort – but also needing to create a sense of ‘safety’ for their clients such that dialogue and discussion become possible.

In the next section I discuss the role that personal experience plays in trainers and participants constructions of knowledge relevant to E&D training.

5.3.6 Constructions of knowledge

Peel (2002b) discusses the ways in which personal experience can be used by both trainers and trainees to construct themselves as knowledgeable on the topic. Her interviews with trainers show that they believe their message can be undermined by participants’ use of personal experiences. She also shows that trainees are more likely to ask personal questions of the trainer if the trainer has drawn on their own life to illustrate the session (Peel 2008). While this is of obvious practical interest for trainers, who may tailor their use of personal anecdote accordingly, the question of trainers’ authority is also an epistemological and political one. The question of whether it is necessary to be a member of an oppressed group to be able to reach valid knowledge about that group is hotly debated within feminist scholarship, as already discussed in relation to research in Section 2.6.2 (see Bar On 1993). These questions have been significant not only within academic research communities but also within activist groups – who has the (moral, political, ethical, epistemological) authority to lead or direct a group, and why? Further, women of colour particularly have argued that
the expectation placed on them to ‘educate’ members of the oppressor groups (e.g. white women) on the nature of their oppression or of their culture is exploitative:

We’ve all heard it before: it is not the duty of the oppressed to educate the oppressor. And yet, I often do feel pressured to become an instructor, not merely a “resource person”. I don’t usually hear “Hey, what do you think of the work of such and such Latin American feminist author” but rather, “Teach me everything you know.” (Moschkovich 2002, pp.79-80, original emphasis)

While this has most often been argued in relation to informal settings, activist settings and everyday interaction (where it has been analysed as unpaid labour, as in Moschkovich 2002), it has also been discussed in the context of formal training. For example, Lorde stated that “I began to feel by the end of two terms [of paid work as an anti-racist educator of mainly white teachers] that there ought to be somebody white doing this. It was terribly costly emotionally” (Lorde and Rich 1981, p.96). There are echoes of this feeling expressed by the trainers in Peel’s study who say that they sometimes feel on display, “like some strange thing at a zoo” (Peel 2002b, p.150) and described intrusive questions from participants:

... Katie (L 09) reported that 'the worst thing' she was asked by a trainee was 'how I got my child'. She 'found that profoundly intrusive' and was 'so angry' because she was personally implicated in the group's view that 'they had come to be trained in how to deal with lesbians and gay men' and therefore she was (as an individual) 'up for grabs'. Katie described dealing with the question by saying "if I was to ask you to describe the mechanics by which you became pregnant would you enjoy that in front of this group". (Peel 2002b, p.150)

These experiences and analyses suggest that while there may be political and pedagogic benefits to, for instance, lesbians and gay men acting as the trainers on LGAT, this can also come at a personal and, perhaps, political cost. As discussed in Section 3.3.2, Katz (1978) set her approach to training apart from existing approaches by arguing that the use of Black anti-racism trainers was a form of exploitation.

With the shift towards ‘diversity’ and a loss of focus on specific forms of oppression, particularly racism, these questions of epistemology and authority become particularly complex. Within E&D training which tries to cover all nine protected characteristics as set out in the EA2010, it would be rare for a trainer to be oppressed in terms of each ‘characteristic’ they cover. As such, most trainers are faced with the challenge of teaching
about forms of oppression in which they are privileged and others in which they are oppressed.

5.4 Mandatory or voluntary?

There has been much discussion in the literature about whether training should be mandatory or voluntary. In part, this is because mandatory training ties in to questions of resistance and of backlash. In terms of my own research questions, this is particularly important for understanding how training ‘positions’ participants in relation to discrimination (as perpetrators, victims, bystanders, allies and so on). Westerman argues in relation to anti-harassment practitioners that educational measures are usually understood as “preventative measures” (2008, p.102). In this section I include insights from both quantitative and qualitative studies, and critically analyse the assumptions that underpin some of this literature.

Thomas, the founder of the ‘managing diversity’ movement in the USA, argued that diversity training should be mandatory for all members of staff, as this communicates its central importance to the organisation (Dobbin and Kalev 2016). Voluntary training has been portrayed as pointless because it fails to target the people who most need to change (perpetrators), as described in this anecdote:

An executive of the AT&T School of Management Studies stated during a 1992 national diversity summit that AT&T chose to stop offering “diversity awareness” classes because women and minorities were the only ones attending. A “preaching to the choir” mentality emerged and training often became a divisive force as differences were once again accentuated. (Hemphill and Haines 1997, p.6)

Implicit in this account are two ideas: firstly, that training should bring people together and create a harmonious workplace, rather than strengthen groups in their different politics (as in consciousness raising); and secondly, that training is for likely perpetrators of discrimination, implicitly, white men. As “women and minorities” are not seen as likely perpetrators, their attendance at training has limited value, and can be seen as a reason to end the provision of classes (see also Kulik et al. 2007).

Others have argued on the basis of quantitative data that mandatory training is pointless or even harmful (Dobbin and Kalev 2016; Kalev, Dobbin and Kelly 2006; Dobbin, Kalev and Kelly
2007). Longitudinal data of American companies who chose to implement various diversity initiatives, including mandatory or voluntary diversity training, was analysed in terms of correlations between the introduction of these initiatives and the proportions of staff from different groups in middle-management roles, with data being broken down by both gender and ethnicity. While mandatory training was correlated with decreasing proportions of Black women and Hispanic men and women in managerial jobs, and had no significant correlations with the presence or absence of other groups, voluntary training was correlated with increases in the proportions of some minoritised groups in managerial jobs. Dobbin and Kalev (2016) speculate about the reasons for this:

Trainees tell us that people often respond to compulsory courses with anger and resistance—and many participants actually report more animosity toward other groups afterward.

But voluntary training evokes the opposite response (“I chose to show up, so I must be pro-diversity”), leading to better results: increases of 9% to 13% in black men, Hispanic men, and Asian-American men and women in management five years out (with no decline in white or black women). ...

Companies too often signal that training is remedial. The diversity manager at a national beverage company told us that the top brass uses it to deal with problem groups. “If there are a number of complaints...or, God forbid, some type of harassment case...leaders say, ‘Everyone in the business unit will go through it again.’” Most companies with training have special programs for managers. To be sure, they’re a high-risk group because they make the hiring, promotion, and pay decisions. But singling them out implies that they’re the worst culprits. Managers tend to resent that implication and resist the message.

This analysis suggests that precisely because training is widely understood as targeting likely perpetrators of discrimination, it will be resisted by participants and this will be evident both from trainee behaviour during the course and from the lack of improvement to workplace relations following the course. While Dobbin and Kalev pick up on the issue of how framing training as “remedial” may affect the atmosphere and effectiveness of training, they do not discuss the question of who chooses to attend voluntary training (perhaps because this is not visible from their data). Their suggestion that trainees who attend voluntarily perceive their presence as evidence of their commitment to diversity aligns with Tatum’s observation that white participants in an antiracist workshop expected their attendance to act as “proof of their trustworthiness”:
For example, in a racially mixed group of educators participating in an antiracist professional development course, a Black man commented about using his “radar” to determine if the group would be a safe place for him. Many of the White people in the room, who believed that their very presence in the course was proof of their trustworthiness, were upset by the comment, initially unprepared to acknowledge the invisible legacy of racism that accompanies any and every interaction they had with people of color. (1997, p.104)

Tatum links the white participants’ ‘upset’ over the Black man’s comment with white people’s expectation of being treated and seen as individuals rather than as representatives of their race. However, it can also be seen as a comment on the effects of optional training on the subject positions readily available to the attendees. The white people who chose to attend the antiracist course positioned themselves as antiracists, feeling that their attendance reinforced this, and had been confident that they would be perceived in this way by Black attendees as well. Similarly, participants in LGAT commented in interview that the training session they had (voluntarily) attended was “preaching to the converted” (Peel 2002b, p. 191). Peel discusses the significance of this claim:

These examples unambiguously categorise those who attend training as ‘enlightened’ or ‘converted’, prior to attending training … by describing those who attend LGAT in this way they are managing the potential assumption or (hypothetical) allegation that they themselves are prejudiced towards lesbians and gay men. By classifying the characteristics of trainees as a group as ‘converted’ they circumvented directly saying I am enlightened, whilst at the same time portraying trainees in this way indirectly positions them in this category, and gives authenticity to the position that LGAT, in fact, ‘doesn’t go to the right people’ (Lynn, my emphasis) (Peel 2002b, p.192, original emphasis)

Peel thus highlights the investment of participants in being able to frame attendance at training as evidence of already being “enlightened”. This positioning is facilitated by the training being voluntary.

From this discussion, it is evident that mandatory training is seen in the literature as positioning trainees as potential perpetrators of discrimination. This is either implicitly viewed as positive, in that mandatory training is the only way to conduct training which doesn’t “preach to the converted”; or as negative, in that it will inevitably lead to backlash and anger. Quantitative studies in the private sector in the USA show no positive effects of mandatory diversity training in terms of changing the demographics of middle management (Dobbin and Kalev 2016), but how this generalises to the public sector or to the UK is unknown.
5.5 Training practices

In this section I review the literature which offers detailed descriptions of what happens during training. This includes ethnographic literature, and training manuals which suggest possible exercises, discussion topics and so on. Although some researchers have highlighted the differences between what is described in manuals and what happens in practice (Peel 2002b, Kitzinger and Peel 2005), training manuals can still give a useful sense of the ‘idealised’ form of training.

Peel describes the contents of LGAT in detail:

> Out of a total of 35 hours of tape-recorded training, the total number of hours devoted to exercises was 29 (83%). The remaining six hours (17%) contained: trainers’ introductions, information about services, session overviews and ground rules; trainees’ introductions and what they wanted to gain from the session; questions from the floor; and time spent completing questionnaires. (2002b, p.75)

From this it is evident that the substantial majority of training time is devoted to exercises, but that there are other significant components of training. Both trainers and trainees introduce themselves, and trainee’s introductions include “what they wanted to gain from the session”. Trainers provided a session overview and “ground rules”, and also have a role as the providers of information, evident both through the trainers giving “information about services” and through the time spent taking “questions from the floor”. (The “questionnaires” referred to may be evaluation forms, which were included in these sessions, or may be homophobia scales which were used as part of the research project rather than as part of the training per se.)

This time spent framing the main training with introductions, ground rules and giving an overview of the session is incorporated into some guides to training, such as Herbert, who provides a detailed description of a “typical one day programme” (1994, p.139). During the 9-5 session she suggests that between 9.45 and 4.45 the time be devoted to nine activities, and three breaks (for morning coffee, lunch, and afternoon tea). Before 9.45 she suggests coffee and registration, introductions, and a welcome; the last 15 minutes are set aside for ‘questions and feedback’.

Both of these accounts suggest very limited time spent on information provision, or didactic teaching. All but one of Herbert’s suggested activities is structured by small
group work, followed by a whole-group discussion or “plenary”. The exception is didactic teaching on the law, which is allocated half an hour: “A presenter will have to give an overview of the Sex Discrimination Act (1975)” (Herbert 1994, p.142).

Experiential learning, activities and exercises are similarly emphasised in Geber’s description of diversity awareness training:

- Experiential exercises are always part of awareness training. Facilitators at U.S. West place labels on participants’ foreheads with words such as “CEO,” “Joker” or “Passive.” Eerily, the labels become self-fulfilling prophecies … 3M conducts workshops … and asks participants to assess their attitudes towards 16 stereotypical statements about race, age and gender. Then they all pick two areas they consider personal sore spots and consider how their biases affect their ability to be good managers. (1990, p.29)

Clement and Jones (2002) do not suggest these specific exercises, but do suggest that small group discussions and role-play be extensively used. Peel describes the prevalence of exercises in her sample of LGAT:

- The exercises used by trainers were relatively varied and included, for example: two minutes in pairs talking about ‘your experience of LGBs’ (LGAT 1); watching and discussing videos (LGAT 7 & 11); drawing stereotypes of lesbians, gay men, bisexuals and heterosexuals (LGAT 6); a multiple choice quiz (LGAT 5); and guided visualisation (LGAT 2). In this chapter I analyse five exercises in detail (approximately 12 and a quarter hours were devoted to these exercises, so they form about 35% of the entire core data set and about half (42%) of the total time spent on exercises).

- The exercises I analyse in this chapter are: 1) Language Exercise (in eight LGATs); 2) ‘Life Stories’ (in six LGATs); 3) Case Studies and scenarios (in six LGATs); 4) the ‘Challenging Heterosexism’ pair work task (in three LGATs); and 5) ‘What can you do to make your workplace more LGB friendly?’ (in six LGATs). My ordering of these exercises (roughly) reflects their chronological order within training, so as to mimic the progression of sessions, and thereby more realistically reflect and contextualise training (c.f. training manuals). (2002b p.75)

The ‘language exercise’ consists of generating terms used to describe LGB people, and then discussing them; ‘life stories’ involves telling another trainee about your weekend, but omitting information such as who you spent it with and where you went (to mimic the experience of closeted LGB people); ‘case studies’ are descriptions of workplace interactions where participants are asked to discuss how they would respond to the situation presented, or how they feel it should have been handled; and ‘challenging heterosexism’ is a paired exercise in which participants read homophobic statements and discuss how they would challenge them in the moment.
From these accounts, it seems that didactic teaching has a very minimal role in training, and exercises and activities are by far the most widely used training technique. In particular, exercises which begin with a small group discussion and then become a whole group discussion seem central.

5.6 Managing Diversity

There are multiple areas of debate in the literature on ‘managing diversity’. In this section, I argue that the different versions of ‘managing diversity’ result in confusion and incoherence, with the ‘diversity management’ movement sometimes being critiqued for practices that, in some versions, it is opposed to. Agócs and Burr express this complexity well:

Some have claimed that managing diversity provides a less controversial alternative to affirmative action, others see it as complementary to a mandatory policy that is still needed as an antidote to inequality, while still others view managing diversity as a strategy for dealing with issues that affirmative action left unaddressed. These issues include the retention and career development of women and minorities hired under affirmative action plans, and the need to warm the chilly climate for these groups in many workplaces. (1996, p.30)

While the ‘diversity training’ in Thomas (1990) referred to a residential, intensive course in which participants were encouraged to discuss and confront their differences and learn to value them, ‘diversity training’ now can mean almost any form of training related to E&D (see Section 3.5). Tatli (2011) interviewed diversity managers in private sector organisations in the UK, asking about their organisations’ diversity practices as well as discussing more abstract issues such as how diversity is defined in their organisation. She found that the rhetoric of ‘managing diversity’ movement was heavily used by all respondents, with a focus on individuals fulfilling their potential, and universal inclusion. However, the practices of ‘diversity’ which her respondents described were without exception group-based, and were often focused on legal compliance – for instance, mentoring programmes for ‘ethnic minority’ staff and monitoring proportions of women staff at different levels. This was similar also for future plans, which focused on introducing initiatives relating to the new ‘protected characteristics’ – in other words, legal compliance. On the basis of this data, Tatli (2011) argues that the supposed shift away from ‘equal opportunities’ – group based and compliance-focused – towards ‘diversity’ is only partial, occurring at the level of discourse but not of practice.
Similarly, Kelly and Dobbin (1998) argue in the American context that ‘diversity management’ is a re-packaging of management practices which were associated with affirmative action. This suggests that Tatli’s (2011) findings are not the result of the way in which diversity management has been ‘lost in translation’ between America and the UK, but that those practices of diversity management which were specific to diversity management – including culture audits and ‘diversity training’ which involves intensive training specifically in how to work in diverse groups and appreciate difference – never became mainstream while the language of ‘diversity management’ did become mainstream.

Wrench (2005), writing from Denmark about the adoption of American ‘diversity management’ practices in European businesses, provides one of the most comprehensive critiques of the ‘managing diversity’ movement, which I summarise and critically analyse here. He divides criticisms of ‘diversity management’ into five strands: “… diversity management is a ‘soft option’; it dilutes the focus on ‘race’; it encourages ethnic reification; it replaces the moral argument by the business argument; and it mystifies the basis of social inequality” (Wrench 2005, p.75).

By a ‘soft option’, Wrench is referring to a “continuum of equal opportunities measures” with targets, affirmative action and group based positive action at the ‘hard’ end while the ‘soft’ end includes practices such as ‘intercultural awareness training’ and having broad, non-specific policies about E&D. This is certainly an accurate depiction of diversity management, but in some versions (e.g. Thomas 1991) diversity management is seen as a complement to the ‘hard’ measures such as affirmative action, which he says should continue; whereas Kandola and Fullerton (1994) want to replace these ‘hard’ measures with the ‘soft’ measures of diversity management. This critique thus has greater or lesser force depending on which version of diversity management is under consideration.

“Diluting a focus on racial exclusion” refers to the intentional broadening of the equal opportunities agenda to include many more groups, usually without the allocation of substantive additional resources to meet this broader agenda. It seems inevitable, then, that the initial focus of equal opportunities – race, and later gender – would be addressed less effectively than before. To the extent that the principle of focusing on the individual rather than on ‘groups’ is adhered to in diversity management, this is logically going to follow; however, as Tatli (2011) argues, in practice diversity practitioners continue to work
on group-based measures. The expansion of these groups beyond a focus on racial exclusion may then be attributable to the expansion of anti-discrimination legislation rather than only to the rise of ‘diversity management’; however, it does seem likely that ‘diversity management’ has contributed to this shift.

On ‘Encouraging ethnic reification’, Wrench writes that “diversity management operates from an unnaturally reified view of ethnicity and exaggerates the importance of cultural differences” (2005, pp.76-77). This critique is reminiscent of critiques of earlier ‘cultural awareness’ practices, which Thomas (1991) explicitly distinguishes from the managing diversity approach. Given that managing diversity is meant to be about each individual worker’s potential, one could argue that the ‘diversity training’ which relies on stereotypes of cultural differences is not ‘real’ diversity training. However, it is clearly happening under the label of ‘diversity training’. In addition, it is plausible that this would happen because part of the ‘business case’ for diversity is not only about getting the ‘best’ person for the job without being distracted by extraneous elements, but about the benefits of a diverse workforce as such – for instance, creativity, improved access to global markets, and so on (Kandola and Fullerton 1994). These benefits of a diverse workforce are understood as coming about not because the ‘best’ people have been selected, but because diversity itself is supposed to create them. This suggests a need for diversity to be defined in such a way that there can be more or less diversity, hence cultural awareness training which relies on stereotypes.

“Replacing the moral with the business argument” is a common critique of the managing diversity movement. This critique argues that the focus on the ‘bottom line’ and profit in diversity management is dangerous. The business benefits of diversity may only appear over the long term or may not appear at all, as research on this topic has found mixed results (Wrench 2005). It is argued that the business case does not co-exist with, but actually displaces moral arguments for equal opportunities; in which case, if and when the ‘business case’ is not compelling, there is no further purpose to recruiting a diverse workforce or to changing the company culture such that people find their work fulfilling. Tatli (2011) presents data which supports the idea that the business case is used as the primary or exclusive way to ‘sell’ diversity to people with organisational power. However, as Ahmed (2012) describes, diversity practitioners use discourses strategically to achieve their aims; Westerman (2008) similarly describes anti-harassment practitioners using whatever
arguments are available to them to get the desired results. Arguably, this suggests that perhaps where the ‘moral case’ is expected to be effective, it continues to be used.

The critique that diversity management “mystifies the social basis of inequality” is that by moving away from equal opportunities and group-based policies, diversity management also shifts the discourse away from the reasons for having group-based policies: that is, long standing histories of oppression and exclusion (Wrench 2005). In this case, it is precisely the shift in rhetoric rather than practice that is at stake; another way to put this criticism would be that the discourse of diversity management depoliticises the field of equality. I agree with this critique, and pursue it further in later chapters.

As Wrench (2005) notes in conclusion, a wide range of practices occur under the term ‘diversity management’. Kahn (2011) studied diversity practitioners in the USA and concluded that as well as diversity practitioners having a range of views and priorities, the approaches of individual practitioners were not clearly aligned with the approaches set out in the literature. This review of ‘managing diversity’ has begun to highlight this complexity.

5.7 Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that the literature on E&D education and training, although lacking in ethnographic studies, still illuminates the affective responses of participants, particularly in educational programmes which take place over some weeks or months. This literature suggests that the participants in E&D training may demonstrate forms of resistance, although it may be expressed in subtle ways and may not be evident in the moment. I have drawn on the literature and genealogy to formulate a theoretical construct, the discursive figure of the ‘bigot’, as a way of analysing and understanding the spoken and unspoken around issues of discrimination and inequality. In addition, the literature on ‘managing diversity’ indicates that a multiplicity of practices and theories exist within the terminology of ‘diversity’, which suggests that the delivery of ‘diversity’ training may involve contradiction and complexity.

Returning to the question, ‘What happens in E&D training?’, these chapters have built up an image and analysis of what may take place in present day E&D training, through a combination of tracing the development of training and reviewing the literature. In this conclusion I summarise the evidence presented so far.
Training against discrimination began in the USA as a practice associated with social psychology. The ideas of ‘attitudes’, ‘prejudice’ and ‘bias’ began to be debated and measured by social psychologists in the USA, in the 1920s and 1930s (Rose 1996). Training and education was one of the many routes then suggested as being a possible route to changing attitudes and reducing bias (with other possibilities including mass media and individual therapy). In this period there was a rapid shift from conceptualising white racism as a reasonable response to Black inferiority (Samelson 1978), to conceptualising white racism in terms of negative psychological characteristics and thinking of prejudice as an ‘error’ in judgement (Henriques 1984).

The practice of training and education grew together with the study of attitudes and of prejudice, with research and antiprejudice education lending each other urgency and legitimacy (Gordon 2015). The earliest evaluation of attitudes using a before/after measure following education was that of Young (1927), who was assessing an undergraduate course on the ‘race problem’ to see whether it brought about any change in attitudes. Although he found that it didn’t, the approach of presenting participants with information about psychological constructs such as ‘prejudice’, and information about the social situation of minority groups, has persisted.

More generally, ‘training’ shifted from straightforward provision of information (didactic teaching) with discussion, to having ideals of more participative and active learning. Techniques such as role-play, developed through social psychology, became closely associated with training. This has continued throughout the development of training, with ‘experiential’ techniques being described in manuals such as Katz (1978) and Clements and Jones (2002), used by Elliott in her famous ‘Blue Eyes/Brown Eyes’ style of training (Swan 2007), and described as central to training in much of the literature on training where training practices are described (Geber 1990; Anand and Winters 2008; Clements and Jones 2002). The emphasis placed on ‘experiential techniques’ seems to cut across other theoretical training divisions, with Sivanandan (1985) arguing that the forms of training in the UK which carefully distinguish themselves from RAT are nonetheless using identical techniques, such as identical ice-breaker exercises, which are equally derived from social psychological practice.
The current ethnographic and reflective literature on training and education in both the UK and the USA continues to place an emphasis on experiential learning. For instance, Peel (2010) required students to undertake exercises such as obtaining a copy of a lesbian or gay magazine and reading it in public. However, in the more recent literature, there is also a clear distinction between the techniques used in longer term educational programs and those available to trainers, in that many educators working with undergraduate students require extensive reflective writing over the course of the semester (Tatum 1997; Ladson-Billings 1996; Peel 2010). This technique has not become a component of workplace training, which tends to be much shorter.

In the early years of race relations training in the USA, training was often introduced as a policy response to a crisis of government: that is, rioting and urban disorder (Bernstein 2010; Nordlie 1987). Training was thus understood as having the potential to make the population easier to govern, perhaps by teaching officials appropriate behaviour. Following the CRA1964, which made workplace discrimination on the grounds of sex and race illegal, training spread beyond the education of public sector employees, children and students, and became an accepted workplace practice as well. Training was mandated by courts as one component of findings that there had been workplace discrimination (Anand and Winters 2008). This led to a rapid growth in the provision of training which was focused around the law and compliance. The use of training as a pre-emptive measure by companies suggests that training continued to be understood as a tool of governance, used to avoid disorder and smooth over tensions.

Turning to the growth of training in the UK, this link between management and training is evident in the UK history of training as well. Gurnah (1984) and Sivanandan (1985) analyse the rapid growth of training following the Brixton disturbances in 1981 as a containment strategy by the UK government, which directs the attention of activists away from systematic failures and instead focuses on the individual attitudes of police officers. The further growth of training in the UK following the Macpherson report (Macpherson 1999) is suggestive of the continued focus on individual attitudes rather than institutional discrimination. In fact, Macpherson (1999) redefined institutional discrimination such that the definition incorporated “unwitting prejudice” – using social psychological concepts even where trying to think about discrimination in terms of the institution.
The growth of anti-discrimination legislation in the UK led to a shift in the focus of training comparable to that which earlier took place in the USA. Peel (2002b) writes that institutions were encouraged to have “equal opportunities” training focused on sex, race and disability. As the number of protected groups expanded rapidly from the mid-1990s, training on “equal opportunities” rather than on one specific form of oppression grew, particularly in the corporate sector. Also during this time, the language of “diversity” was growing in popularity in both the USA and the UK, although it originated in the USA. Although the “managing diversity” movement described itself as a development away from “equal opportunities”, implementation often continued to include measures associated with “equal opportunities”, such as policies which were focused on legally protected groups (Tatli 2011; Kelly and Dobbin 1998). However, what these shifts had in common was a movement away from the focus on a specific group, with its particular history of oppression and in some cases a distinctive analysis of the conditions for equality. Both the legalistic “equal opportunities” and the corporate “diversity” incorporate many differences under one term.

With the Equality Act 2010, defining nine protected characteristics, further impetus was given to training which would “cover” multiple groups simultaneously. There has been very limited research on the effects that this has had on present day training. However, Brewis (2016) found that although diversity practitioners embraced the language of diversity, within training provision the law was always included as part of training. This agrees with the arguments of Tatli (2011) that diversity practice continues to be taken up with legal compliance.

The literature review has added to the arguments made through the historical analysis by examining in more detail what takes place during training in terms of the interaction between trainers and participants. This literature confirms both that experiential training continues to be seen as an important component of practice (Peel 2002b; Ladson-Billings 1996), and that the law is central to current training (Brewis 2016).

Many contemporary accounts have highlighted displays of resistance to training, and more broadly to diversity practice (Ladson-Billings 1996a; Westerman 2008; Ahmed 2012; DiAngelo 2011; Srivastava 2005, 2006). Some have also described trainee behaviour in terms of an effort to maintain an identity construction of being liberal and progressive (Srivastava 2005, 2006; Peel 2002b). The behaviours of resistance described are more
extreme in accounts of anti-racism workshops (Srivastava 2005, 2006) compared to workshops on homophobia (Peel 2002b). This may be attributable to national differences, or to different strengths of affect surrounding the discursive figure of the ‘racist’ compared to the discursive figure of the ‘homophobe’. I have used this literature to synthesise an account of the discursive figure of the ‘bigot’ which I go on to use in the ethnographic analysis.

In the next chapter, I give an analytic overview of my ethnographic data, giving a broad description of the ‘contents’ of training in terms of both the curriculum and the practices of training.
Part 2: E&D Training in the Present

Chapter 6: Contents and curriculum of training

6.1 Introduction

This chapter begins to analyse my ethnographic data, and to address my overall ethnographic question of “What happens in E&D training?”. This broader question is addressed primarily through two sub-questions: “What is the curriculum of the training, and how come?”, and “How are participants positioned in relation to discrimination?”. As these sub-questions are interrelated, this chapter begins to address both questions; it also considers issues which fall within the overall question of ‘what happens’, but are not directly relevant to either of the sub-questions: material, atmospheric and pedagogic practices. I begin with a summary of the arguments made so far in the thesis which drew on historical analysis, and on a critical literature review. I then clarify what these suggest in relation to the ethnographic research questions, in particular, what they suggest about the likely curriculum of the training and about how participants are positioned in relation to discrimination. In the rest of the chapter I use the ethnographic and interview data to outline what happens in training, including questions of curriculum and positioning. I note the overwhelming predominance of two discourses, the legal and the psychological, and use this chapter to describe and analyse those aspects of training which are not encompassed by either of those discourses.

The historical sketches of E&D training in the USA and the UK suggest several threads of analysis to pursue in terms of what happens in present day training for staff at universities, which I picked up on in the literature review. Of these the most important are the use of different understandings of inequality; the rise of ‘diversity’; and resistance to training.

The tensions between different analyses of oppression has been treated as a resource by some educators who use this to structure their educational programme (such as Ladson-Billings) and as a source of confusion and misunderstandings in some analyses of what happens in training (Kitzinger and Peel, 2005). This literature suggests that as well as some analyses being entirely absent from training (as critiqued by Gurnah 1984; Sivanandan
there are likely to be conflicting analyses of oppression and inequality expressed during the training.

The literature review showed that resistance to training is a key concern for educators (Peel 2002b; Ladson-Billings 1996a; Westerman 2008; DiAngelo 2011; Srivastava 2005, 2006; Nicoll 2004; Herbert 1992, 1994) as well as for diversity practitioners more generally (Ahmed 2012). This resistance can manifest as silence (Ladson-Billings 1996a; Peel 2002b), refusal to attend (Hemphill and Haines 1997), refusal to participate in exercises (Peel 2002b), walking out of the session (Peel 2002b), expressions of anger about ‘reverse discrimination’ (DiAngelo 2011), tears (Srivastava 2005), and mocking the topic (Herbert 1992, 1994). Although various theories of this resistance were described, I picked up Ahmed’s (2012) theorising about the figure of “the racist” as particularly relevant to my own research. I understand Ahmed’s description of “the racist” as a discursive figure, which draws on both psychological notions of prejudice as “error” (Henriques 1984) and on the legal discourse in which one “can be charged and brought before the law” (Ahmed 2012, p.150). I argued that this figure has a long history and appears in both liberal and conservative accounts of racism. I also argued that with the rise of “diversity”, it may be helpful to theorise a more general discursive figure, that of the “bigot”. This literature suggests that what happens in training will be shaped by the figure of the “bigot” and by participant resistance to being identified with this figure, and more generally, by participant attempts to position themselves as liberal (Peel 2002b). At the same time, it is important to remain attentive to the different strength of anxiety and resistance engendered by different “bigot” figures (the “racist”, “homophobe”, “sexist” and so on); Rollock (2015) has argued that there is a particular silence around race and racism at universities. Descriptions of the atmosphere of training tend to be dominated by these discussions of resistance, and how to manage resistance; however, Peel (2002b) highlights the use of humour by trainers trying to create a pleasant, engaged atmosphere.

The increasing use of “diversity” language in universities has been analysed in terms of the “corporatisation” of the university, and as an American influence (Ahmed 2012). In addition, researchers have argued that the discourse of “diversity management” and particularly the “business case” for diversity is used strategically by diversity practitioners (Tatli 2011; Ahmed 2012). Brewis (2016) found there was slippage between the “business case” and
“social justice case” in the way that diversity practitioners described their work, which suggests that multiple justifications for training and for the value of diversity may be invoked during training. This is in accordance with some of the suggestions made in training manuals, such as Herbert (1994) who suggests the training exercise of trainees discussing the implications of sexual harassment for the individual being harassed (such as psychological harm – invoking the social justice case) and for the organisation as a whole (such as loss of efficiency – invoking the business case). This suggests that the “business case” for diversity is likely to be part of the training curriculum. It also suggests that diversity, and associated ideas such as the importance of treating people as individuals, is more likely to be invoked during training than “equal opportunities”.

To summarise, the historical sketches and literature review drew attention to training as “management”; the role of psychology, and particularly social psychology; the importance of the law; and the language of “diversity”, including the “business case”. These suggest that training will include psychological and legal discourses; multiple justifications for the importance of the topic, including the business and moral cases; and will be embedded in a managerial, ‘human resources’ approach.

The literature review also highlighted some more specific discourses and practices of training. “Exercises” of some sort seem to be widely used in training (Peel 2002b; Brewis 2016) and are recommended in manuals (Katz 1978; Clements and Jones 2002; Herbert 1994). Evaluation feedback forms are also widely used, and a ‘horseshoe’ shape for chairs is seen by some trainers as the ideal layout (Peel 2002b). The social model of disability is the central concept in Disability Equality Training (Oliver 1996). Brewis (2016) found that the law was included in every diversity training session in her data.

In this chapter, I bear these portrayals of E&D training in mind when setting the scene by discussing E&D training as an ethnographic setting. I begin by discussing how the institutional context of training – whether it is voluntary or mandatory – affects what happens in training. In particular, I discuss how this relates to the positioning of participants in relation to discrimination. I place this discussion in its legal context, picking up on the description of ‘vicarious liability’ from Chapter 4.
I then describe the atmospheres, material practices and pedagogic practices of the training, comparing these to the descriptions in the literature review. These practices vary widely, from entertaining lectures to paired discussions; but in my sample the majority of pedagogic practices are recognisable from mainstream education. I draw out how these material and discursive practices can be related to broader discourses of pedagogy.

I then turn to the curriculum of the training, most of which falls into two areas: legal and psychological. I conceptualise the curriculum in terms of its implicit aims, and argue that there are three main implicit aims, all interconnected: firstly, to convince participants of the importance of ‘equality’ and/or ‘diversity’. Trainers drew on moral, legal and business arguments to make this case; although no participants disputed the moral or legal arguments, some did dispute the ‘business case’. Secondly, convincing participants that discrimination is real and ongoing in the UK and in their own workplace. I argue that as well as drawing on law and psychology, trainers draw on sociological studies and institutional data to achieve this. Thirdly, encouraging participants to view themselves as having some level of personal responsibility for ending discrimination. This is particularly challenging due to the resistances and anxieties associated with participants’ attempts to distance themselves from the figure of the ‘bigot’, described in Chapter 5. Trainers drew on legal and psychological discourses to position participants as people who might perpetrate discrimination while skirting around the figure of the ‘bigot’, and also included guidance on language and behaviour, which can be understood similarly as positioning participants as possible perpetrators of discrimination.

Equalities law is central to much the E&D training which currently takes place at universities, in that the law is what mandates the provision of training. I address the question of how the law affects training more fully in the next chapter – here I focus on anti-discrimination law only in that the law mandates the provision of training. I discuss the way in which this is sometimes acknowledged during the training itself.

6.2 Training in its institutional context

One key factor affecting training, already touched on in the literature review, is whether the training is mandatory or optional. This has obvious implications in terms of participants’ attitudes to their presence at the training session. To fully explicate this, the interpretation
of the EA2010 needs to be taken into account. In this section I discuss the university’s legal liability for acts of discrimination by their employees, how this is interpreted, and how this affects the way participants are positioned during training.

As I detailed in Chapter 2, training became a widespread solution to discrimination in the USA only with the introduction of anti-discrimination laws. Although anti-discrimination laws have been a less significant factor in the UK by comparison, they still play an important role. In the UK now, the EA2010 includes two components which suggest (though do not explicitly state) the importance of universities providing training: the ‘vicarious liability’ clause, and the ‘promote good relations’ clause, both introduced in Chapter 4. Both of these have a profound influence on the provision of E&D training in universities, but the ‘vicarious liability’ clause is particularly significant. I argued in Chapter 4 that these two clauses suggest that perpetrators of discrimination should be attending training. As such, where participants are positioned as a subject under these aspects of the law, in effect they are positioned as a possible perpetrator of discrimination. However, participants are not always positioned as subjects under this aspect of law. Whether or not these aspects of law come into play depends both on the structural features of the training – that is, the institution’s approach to the training, such as making it mandatory or non-mandatory – and on the trainer’s decisions regarding the framing of the session. I will show that some trainers do frame the training session as existing because of liability law, and discuss the effects of this and the reasons for it.

I build on my earlier analysis of the EA2010 in Chapter 4, showing that my data supports the interpretation that the law frames the purpose of the training as preventing discrimination by teaching people about their legal ‘responsibility’ not to discriminate. Thus, participants who are positioned as subjects under this law are positioned as possible perpetrators of discrimination. I go on to discuss the extent to which this is relevant to participants’ experiences of training, by first examining the structural features of training and then analysing how trainers frame the training.

### 6.2.1 Vicarious liability and promoting good relations

The central legal reason for universities to provide mandatory E&D training is vicarious liability – the employer (the university) is liable for acts of discrimination by their
employees, unless the employer can show that they have taken ‘all reasonable steps’ to prevent the discrimination or harassment from taking place, as described in Chapter 4.

At each of the universities I contacted, online E&D training is theoretically mandatory for all staff, often with a quiz at the end of the training which participants need to pass or repeat the online training. I describe this online training as ‘theoretically mandatory’ because often there are few or no mechanisms in place to follow up on staff not doing the training, except repeated reminder emails. These online E&D training courses are generally focused on the law, but also include some mentions of stereotyping and unconscious bias. There was a much wider range of practices regarding in-person E&D training. Some universities I contacted did not offer any. At others, training was mandatory only for staff above a certain pay grade, or with line management responsibilities. Sometimes the university had ‘recruitment training’ which included components focused on E&D, which was mandatory for staff with responsibilities for recruitment. This suggests that the reason for training is to prevent people from committing acts of discrimination or harassment, due to the university’s legal obligations. At some universities, training is mandatory for all staff within a few months of joining the institution. This communicates that training is provided as a matter of routine university policy, which may or may not be linked by the trainer to the law on liability.

6.3 Structural positioning of participants by the university

A key factor affecting the atmosphere of training was whether the training was mandatory or not. As one practitioner described at interview, “anything mandatory you’re going to get people who are meeeuh, ‘why am I here?’ and even some people who are exhibiting childlike behaviours and sitting in the backrow muttering ... almost reverting into sort of child mode a bit”. Some training sessions are not required by the central university, but are a requirement for departments to achieve Athena SWAN and other awards (see Section 5.2). In some cases the training is mandatory for all staff, in others it is mandatory for a particular group of staff. Each of these different institutional situations positions participants in a different way with respect to the law.

Training that is mandatory for a particular group of staff can be experienced by those staff as an accusation, as the requirement that they attend frames them as (possible or probable)
perpetrators of discrimination (Dobbin and Kalev 2016). In some cases, it is clear that participants do experience the requirement to attend E&D training as an accusation, as described by one trainer, Rex (a white man), at interview. He recounted the following response from a group of housekeeping staff who were made to attend training after student complaints that they were being treated unfairly by these staff. The housekeeping staff who attended the training said they were being discriminated against by their managers:

Rex: ... and when we came in, to basically get them to think about what they’re doing; our trainer got the end of “what are you doing this to *us* for?”

Netta: Wow.

Rex: And we had to stop the session.

Netta: So they were really kind of experiencing it as a punishment?

Rex: Yeah. They were thinking “What are you doing this to *us* for? It’s *those, these* people need talking to, not us!”

In this example, training is explicitly being framed by the university – and understood by both the trainer and the participants – as responding to discrimination by making the perpetrators attend training, and hence positioning the participants as perpetrators of discrimination. The housekeeping staff responded to this positioning angrily, and explained to the trainer that they themselves were being subjected to racial discrimination from their managers – who had not been required to attend training. (On further investigation Rex learned that the participants’ accounts were accurate and that the university had chosen not to put pressure on the managers and focus instead on the housekeeping staff. How this relates to the housekeeping staff’s treatment of students is less clear.)

In an informal meeting, a university diversity practitioner also discussed the use of ‘training’ as an institutional response to individual students who had made public homophobic statements. Again, in this context the institutional is targeting training at perpetrators of discrimination. However, these examples are of specific groups of staff being made to attend training as an explicit response to an existing problem which has come to the institution’s attention; this is more implicit in mandatory training for all staff, especially all new staff, who are therefore positioned more as potential than as current perpetrators of discrimination.
Some institutions offer optional training and present training as an optional Continuing Professional Development opportunity – often on specific topics, such as Mental Health Awareness, Disability Awareness, or Cultural Diversity. I attended four such optional sessions, of which three were on the specific topics Disability Awareness, Cultural Diversity, and Preventing Harassment (the fourth was on ‘Equality and Diversity’ in general). This is a very different framing – as the training is not mandatory for any of the staff who attend, it cannot be understood as a legal requirement in the same way. Further, the simple fact of attendance at these sessions functioned to distance participants from the subject position of the perpetrator, as their attendance could be constructed as evidence of their commitment to social equality. This is described in the literature on anti-racism education discussed in Chapter 5.

In my ethnographic research, at the ‘Preventing Harassment’ session several participants said while introducing themselves that they chose to attend because they have been victims of harassment. A few said that they chose to attend because they want to become official ‘mediators’ at their university. In these cases, participants are positioning themselves as potential/actual victims of harassment, or as attending in order to develop their skills – their participation in the course does not immediately position them as subjects of the law or of university policy (though trainers may do so). This frees up possibilities for participants to be positioned as people who are committed to E&D, and are going beyond the strict requirements of the law (see Ahmed 2012). Similarly, participants on an optional course on ‘Cultural Awareness’ said that those of their colleagues who would most benefit would not choose to attend:

After reading out the final slide, the trainer Sarah, a Black woman, asks if we have any questions?

Nancy, a white woman participant, asks whether this is going to become compulsory?

Sarah answers no.

Nancy responds, I think it would benefit a lot of staff

Josie (also a white woman participant) says, that’s an understatement!

Nancy jokingly rephrases, more staff should be encouraged to take it.

Josie jokingly responds, that’s very diplomatic.
Nancy responds again, then Sarah says that the feeling is that there is too much mandatory training.

A white trainee chimes in commenting that international students are here whether you like it or not – but there are areas of the university administration who just won’t change, and won’t go on training.

Nancy agrees, their attitude is ‘my way or no one’s way’

These participants are positioning themselves as aligned with the values of the course and as accepting of cultural diversity by virtue of their attendance, in contrast to those who would not attend and do not appreciate or accept cultural diversity.

A form of training which is somewhere between ‘mandatory’ and ‘optional’ is training which is undertaken on a department-wide level in order to gain an accreditation. Equality awards organised by the Equality Challenge Unit (ECU), such as the Athena SWAN award (see Section 5.2), sometimes require members of a given department to have undergone some form of E&D training, and this is emphasised particularly for those who are in positions of recruitment (whether or not this is the case depends on the department’s own decisions about how they plan to improve gender equality in the department). Similarly, the British Philosophical Association (BPA) and the Society for Women in Philosophy (SWIP) have a joint accreditation called the ‘Good Practice Scheme’ which states that “Departments should make sure that members of hiring panels know about the workings of unconscious bias” (BPA/SWIP 2014, p.1). This can be understood in the same way as other mandatory training, with the important caveat that the Athena SWAN award, and comparable awards, configure equality as a sign of excellence in a department (see Ahmed (2012) for analysis of how diversity is configured as ‘excellence’; see also Bowl 2016). In addition, the team putting together the submission for the award includes members of the department. This submission team and their colleagues will be participants in the training sessions. Although for most individuals their presence at the training is still in effect mandatory, they are substantially closer to the decision-making process which led to this being the case than they are when the decision to make training mandatory has been taken by a central Human Resources department. This may make it easier for participants to take pride in their presence at the training session, and align themselves with the values of the training. As in the case of optional training, their attendance can already function as a sign of their commitment to equality (as described by Tatum 1997), and does not immediately position
them as subjects of the law. This is especially so given that departments may choose to have ‘Unconscious Bias’ training, which would be psychological rather than legal in its focus.

6.4 Framing the training: Vicarious liability

So far I have described the ways in which the institution’s decisions about training – whether training is for a specific group identified as needing training following a problem, self-nominated staff, managers, people with recruitment responsibilities, or all members of a department – in itself constructs the participants as being subjects under the law (which I have argued positions them as possible or current perpetrators of discrimination), or positions participants without direct reference to the law.

However, what is said and understood by the trainer and by the participants about why staff are attending a training session is also crucial. This is highlighted by Ahmed in her reflections on the movement of ‘race equality’ policy documents at UK universities:

> When I arrived at my new institution in 2004, not only was I given a pack that included the college’s race equality policy, but the personnel officer took the policy out of the pack and said, “I am required to show you this under the terms of the Race Relations Amendment Act.” The officer pointed to the document by pointing out that she was required to do so under the terms of the law. Such an utterance places the circulation of the documents “under the law” and makes the gift of the document a way of being subject to the law. (2012, p.97)

This personnel officer removed their own interest in the race equality policy, and even their institution’s interest in the policy, by framing the significance of the policy exclusively in terms of a legal obligation. Similarly, where trainers and participants publicly emphasise the law as the reason for E&D training, the training itself becomes a way of being subject to the law – although this only happens when training is mandatory.

One trainer, Karishma, strongly emphasised the relevance of the ‘vicarious liability’ component of the Equality Act, explicitly justifying the training in these terms:

> Karishma said, “OK let’s move on. Vicarious liability. This is why we insist all new members of staff do this training within three months [of beginning their jobs at the university]” ... “We have to be able to say that we have done our duty in telling you your responsibilities because the university is vicariously liable for acts of discrimination unless we can show that we have taken all reasonable steps to prevent them from happening”

Here Karishma was explicit in linking this component of the law to the reason we are in the room – making us subjects under the law. Further, the phrasing ‘we have to be
able to say that we have done our duty’ emphasises the need for proof and documentation of having ‘done our duty’ – as opposed to, for instance, ‘we have to do our duty’. This again highlights the avoidance of liability, rather than an intrinsic value in providing training.

Sophia also told us about vicarious liability, but did not explicitly link this to our own training:

Sophia said there are three forms of liability: company liability, vicarious liability and personal liability. Vicarious liability means that if an employee does something that’s against the Act the employer is held vicariously liable unless they show that they ‘did all they could possibly do’, so they provided training, they had line management, they’ve created a culture of equalities, they have policies in place.

Sophia then went on to say that there is also personal liability, and to give an example from case law.

I will return to the question of personal liability, and this episode, later in this chapter. Unlike Karishma, Sophia does not make the link between our own training and this law explicit – but it is not clear why this law would be relevant to us otherwise. The use of ‘vicarious liability’ law as an explicit or implicit justification for training seems to undermine the institution’s commitment to equality, framing the training provision as something that the institution is being made to do by the government, rather than something they actively want to do to improve their workplace culture (Ahmed 2012). Further, it seems to undermine the curriculum or contents of the actual training session. The focus on ‘vicarious liability’ constructs the ‘problem’ as one of the university’s liability, in that it implies that simply by providing ‘training’ – regardless of the specific curriculum or pedagogy of the training – the university is avoiding liability. This problem representation suggests that whatever takes place during the training is less important than simply providing training.

Given that the trainers I met, without exception, came across as passionate about equality and diversity, why would they frame the training in this way? I would suggest that this framing of training as being necessary because of ‘vicarious liability’ laws may be a response to past experiences of participant resistance to training. At the only mandatory training session where participants were asked to introduce themselves and also say why they were there (Coral’s session), the majority of responses (though not all) emphasised that it was mandatory:
‘I’m here because I was made to’ (participants laughed in response to this)

‘I’m not gonna fluff, I’m here because we were told we have to’

The response ‘I’m not gonna fluff’ positions the possibility of responding to the question in terms of personal interest or commitment as meaningless and perhaps dishonest. Nonetheless, some positioned themselves as actively committed to equality, while still noting that they hadn’t been given a choice about their presence:

‘Because it’s mandatory and perhaps because it’s life changing’

Although compulsory, thrilled to be here

Only a minority didn’t mention that the training was mandatory:

Want to know rights and responsibilities

‘Sounded interesting’

At Rex’s training sessions, early on, he asks participants to raise their hand if they didn’t want to be there:

Rex asked us to have a look at the handout and turn to the learning agreement. The key elements of the learning agreement are to engage and be honest. So now, please be honest and tell me, did you really want to be here this afternoon, with the weather not too bad for this time of year and [he reels off other reasons why it might be more fun to be somewhere else]. Raise your hand if you didn’t want to be here, and be honest!!

I count sixteen hands raised. About four people’s hands stay down.

Rex continues, thank you for being honest. Now that half of you don’t want to be here, please engage.

Neither Karishma or Sophia, who placed more of an emphasis on vicarious liability, gave participants this opportunity to express their feelings about being made to take part on the course. However, Sophia’s awareness of some participants’ dislike of the mandatory course was clear in her comments, manner and anecdotes throughout the course, including a request that ‘if you feel very strongly about the legislation please don’t take it out on me’ early in the training. Sophia’s session also included one participant, a senior white academic man, who displayed his lack of interest for most of the training, including by looking at the clock repeatedly, yawning visibly, and trying to leave early.

I would suggest that by raising the law on vicarious liability, these trainers attempted to deflect participants’ frustration about having to take part in the course onto the law or
government, invoking an authority other than themselves who made the decision that training should be mandatory for all staff. This frustration on the part of attendees is likely to be partially the result of being made to take time out of a packed schedule in order to attend the course. However, I would suggest that it may also be related to the issue of how by making training mandatory, all participants are placed in the subject position of a potential perpetrator of discrimination. Participants’ dislike of being placed in this subject position is closely related to the fear and anxiety surrounding the figure of the ‘bigot’. I discuss the way trainers manage the figure of the ‘bigot’ in more detail in Chapter 8.

6.5 Atmosphere, material and pedagogic practices

In this section, I begin to examine the ethnographic data by giving an idea of how sessions ‘feel’ as educational settings: in terms of the numbers of trainers and participants, the length of sessions, the availability or otherwise of refreshments, the lay-out of the rooms, and so on.

5.5.1 Demographics of trainers and participants

The sessions I took part in had between five and forty participants, including me as a participant. There were one or two late participants at most sessions. At mandatory sessions, there was an approximately even split of men and women present; at optional sessions (which were smaller, with no more than twelve participants) there were never more than two men participating. At optional sessions, there were no academic employees present, while mandatory sessions included several participants with academic jobs. Training which took place in connection to Athena SWAN appeared to be solely for academics.

There was only ever one trainer, although in three sessions an assistant was also present: twice this was someone to assist with administrative tasks as the trainer was injured or had a visual impairment, and once the E&D manager of that university who was occasionally called on to explain E&D programmes or statistics specific to the university. Some training manuals recommend training in pairs as a way of creating a more supportive environment for the trainers (Clements and Jones 2002), but this is evidently not a mainstream practice in UK universities at present.
Despite the presence of these assistants at three sessions, there was always one person clearly identified as the trainer. Of the ten trainers I watched, four were Black women (Malorie, Zoe, Sarah and Akanna); one was a Brown woman (Karishma); one was a white man (Rex); and four were white women (Sophia, Liz, Coral and Rose). In addition, three sessions included professional actors making brief cameo performances near the end of the session to provide material for discussion.

6.5.2 Room layouts and material practices

There were three forms of room layout used. Group seating, where participants were seated around tables designed to seat six, was used by Karishma, Coral and Rose, with between five and thirty participants. This is a typical layout for primary school classrooms in the UK, and was suggestive of ‘group work’, discussion and exercises in small groups. In one session, the tables were also provided with further materials:

The room was fairly large and was set up as several large round tables which seated 6 people comfortably. At each place, there was a whole set of materials – large coloured scented pens, ballpoint pens, small construction toys made of little linking segments, coloured post it notes, a see-through coloured folder with handouts inside. At one end of the room there was a projector for the slide show, a flipchart stand with flipchart paper ready and different coloured pens.

Chatting with the trainer at this session, Karishma, afterwards, she commented on the sensory engagement provided by all these materials to help people connect to the training.

Seating in rows facing the front (where the trainer stood, with either flipchart paper or a slideshow) was used by Rex and Akanna. In Rex’s sessions, there were no tables in front of participants, evoking the atmosphere of a performance rather than of a typical academic environment – this was reinforced by Rex’s training persona as an entertainer, making jokes and often speaking dramatically:

Rex asked Stephen to come to the front and help him with a demonstration. Stephen stood at the front and Rex said to us something like, how many times have you heard this? Then he walked confidently towards Stephen with his hand outstretched and said ‘It’s great to put a face to the voice, great to put a face to the voice!’ Then he added something like, ‘but inside you’re thinking: Are you sure you’re Stephen? I thought you’d have’ short dark hair, and I thought you’d wear glasses, and I thought you’d be taller, and I thought you’d have a short neck and green eyes and … (this kept going for some time, getting faster and more comical as it went on) … Are you sure you’re you?

This got a big laugh from the rest of the group.
In Akanna’s case, the room was a large lecture theatre owing to a last-minute change of rooms. There were between twenty and forty participants in these sessions. The lecture room layout is typical of university level classrooms in the UK, and is suggestive of training which is focused on the delivery of information from the trainer to the participants in a ‘lecture’ style. Both Rex and Akanna made jokes throughout the training and came across as engaging and entertaining – something which participants commented on positively during the tea break or at interview. A participant in one of Rex’s sessions, a white man, asked me during the tea break whether the use of humour was something I saw elsewhere in my fieldwork. I noted that he told me that:

He was enjoying the training and thinks the humour is great because when you think of the topic you think it’s going to be very serious and dull so it’s good to keep it light. He had two colleagues who had done the morning session and they also said it was fun, not what you would expect, but they hadn’t told him any more than that.

Similarly, a participant in Akanna’s session, a British Indian man, commented at interview that “I think it was very positive, because I think a lot of people- people were a lot more engaged than they would have normally been engaged, at a Diversity and Equality session ... usually, it’s very dry”. This echoes the written feedback discussed by Peel (2002b) in which participants expressed appreciation for the humour used by trainers.

In the five other sessions, with between ten and twenty participants, participants sat along three sides of a square or rectangle made of tables (a ‘horseshoe’ shape, as described by Peel (2002b)), with the trainer standing or sitting at the final side near a whiteboard showing slides. This is typical of seminar and small-group university level teaching, as well as some sixth form education. It is also typical of some workplace meetings. These sessions tended to include several paired and small-group discussions or exercises, with two exceptions - Sophia’s session, which was primarily delivered as a lecture, and the session on Preventing Harassment, which was primarily a whole-group discussion.

Almost every trainer (nine out of ten) used slide shows as part of their training. The trainer who didn’t, Rex, used flipchart paper to write things down during the session, and gave out handouts at the beginning of the session which included ground rules, some information, and guidance on the exercises to be done. Of the trainers who used slide shows, some also gave out the slides with space to write notes as a handout, and one sent the slides to
participants after the session ended. This use of slideshows as handouts was reminiscent of university lectures.

All but one training session (Coral’s) incorporated at least one handout – these varied in content and style, and included copies of the slideshow, copies of university policies, articles with some relevance to E&D, guides to language, written ‘case studies’ or scenarios, and other written materials used for group exercises (e.g. a ‘True or false?’ fact sheet) or to structure the training (e.g. a bound booklet incorporating various information and exercises to be referred to throughout the training).

All but one session lasted for three hours, taking up either one morning or one afternoon, with a tea break somewhere in the middle. One session, Sophia’s, had two short tea breaks. The only session to last longer than three hours was Rose’s session, which lasted from 10am-4pm with an hour for lunch and a short tea break in the morning and afternoon; lunch was not provided, which one trainee commented to me was unusual for training at that university. This is suggestive of the E&D training being less institutionally valued than other forms of workplace training.

Every session had tea and coffee freely available during the break; most also had hot drinks available beforehand. Usually there were also biscuits, and two morning sessions included more substantial food available beforehand and during the break – pastries in one case and giant cookies in another. These refreshments were usually in a separate space to the main training room, either outside the room in a corridor area or in another room. Refreshments marked the training as being a workplace event for adults who were to be treated as equals in a way that does not apply to, for instance, undergraduate students in seminars or lectures. The provision of tea and coffee also facilitated socialising between participants during breaks and before the session.

6.5.3 Registration, introductions and ‘housekeeping’

To register for most sessions, there was a requirement to have completed an online e-learning course available to all university employees, focused on E&D law. Other than this online module, generally mandatory for all staff regardless of their participation in further face-to-face training, only two trainers (Malorie and Akanna, who worked at the same training provider) requested that any form of other work be done before taking part in the
training. Their pre-course work was the online Implicit Association Test (IAT) available on the Harvard university website. Participants received an email with instructions about this, recommending the race and gender tests specifically, along with details about the place and time of training. On arrival at each session there was a sign-in sheet for participants to sign and prove their attendance. This immediately positions participants as subject to the bureaucracy of the university.

Many trainers began sessions by giving information about fire exits, the nearest toilets, whether there was a fire alarm planned and by requesting participants to switch their phones off if possible or, if expecting an urgent call, to take it outside the room. This acknowledgement that participants may need to take an urgent call positioned the participants’ time as valuable and respected.

Early in every session except Akanna’s (her session had around thirty participants and took place in a lecture theatre), trainers requested that each participant introduce themselves to the group as a whole. These introductions always included name and role. Three trainers also asked participants to include when they had started work at that university – this was at training sessions where training was theoretically mandatory for all new staff within a few months of joining. While the overwhelming majority of participants were new starters, a few had changed jobs within the organisation and so were taking the training for the second time; a few were there to ‘refresh’ the training having taken it already three years prior; and one participant stated that she had been working at the university for three years but had never been available for the training before – suggesting that even where training is ‘mandatory’, some employees do not attend. Four trainers asked participants to include why they were at the training, or what they hoped to gain from it, as part of their introduction – generally this was at training sessions which were not mandatory; only one mandatory training session included this, as I discussed above in Section 6.4.

Some trainers commented on these introductions by occasionally asking participants further questions, repeating their name, or taking the opportunity to explain more about that participant’s role to the group as a whole:

After each person introduced themselves, Karishma said some things to them or about them, like commenting on how important their job was, explaining how their department fits into the university as a whole, asking them to say more about their role,
talking about the history of different areas of the campus, and sometimes asking a few questions like checking she could pronounce their name. In one or two cases she asked someone ‘where do you come from?’ - one of them seemed confused or put out, giving his birth place, and she answered that she’d actually meant where was his last university/place of work. He gave that instead and she commented on it.

Karishma’s commentary on the university as a whole gave the impression of being an overall welcome and introduction to the university as well as an E&D training session. This recurred at various points during the session, and was not an impression I had in any other training session.

I introduced myself as a researcher either before or during these introductions:

Malorie, the trainer, asked us, ‘Do you all know each other?’ People responded by shaking their heads and saying ‘no’ – me included. She said we’ll have introductions going around in order, starting on this end (she gestured towards the end furthest from me). People included themselves by name, role, and what they hope to get out of the training.

When it was my turn, I introduced myself as a researcher – they all had my information sheets and consent forms already. I asked people to raise their hand to let me know if they are happy to take part. Malorie commented ‘active consent’ – I think of this as a feminist concept so was pleased. Some people raised their hands, but one participant, a white man, began to ask questions about anonymity and how the data will be used. After answering, I asked people to raise their hands again to take part as I wasn’t able to make a note of who is participating before. Most do. I made the relevant notes, said thank you and sat down.

Almost every session ended with an evaluation form which all participants were expected to fill in and which were collected by the trainer. These evaluation forms position participants as consumers and trainers as service providers. This is routine in workplace education and is becoming increasingly common in university-level education as well, though usually on a termly basis rather than following each session. Trainers in discussion often mentioned the positive written feedback they got; this accords with Peel’s finding that written feedback at the end of LGAT was usually extremely positive (Peel 2002b).

6.5.4 Pedagogy and exercises

All trainers had components of their training which were ‘lecture’ style, in that the trainer held the floor for a sustained period of time in which they imparted rules, information or anecdotes to the group as a whole (didactic teaching). Three showed short videos as part of the training. The proportion of training time devoted to didactic teaching varied widely between trainers. The tone of these ‘lectures’ also varied widely. In one case, I noted that
the trainer, Sophia, spoke very briskly and at times spoke so fast that I could not make meaningful notes, although I was always able to follow what she said if I stayed focused. Three trainers sometimes read factual information aloud from their notes – such as the results of surveys about student experiences, or descriptions of different cultural practices. At times, these three trainers came across to me as nervous and/or inexperienced:

Sarah sounded a bit sheepish each time she introduced a new ‘exercise’ or ‘activity’ and got more sheepish with each exercise, as though she thought that ‘exercises’ were beneath us, or were treating us as children, or in some other way didn’t fit well with who she is and how she wants to relate to us as a group.

The other seven trainers did not appear to use notes although some referred to their slides or read aloud from them. Other trainers came across as relaxed and confident and some were entertaining, with participants laughing or smiling often throughout the training:

Akanna showed us a photo of what looks like a living room with two people in it and asked what we see. After taking various responses, she told us anecdotes about comments she’s had from other groups when asked what they see. One group who had something to do with interior design said as their first comment ‘lovely sofas’ (this got lots of smiling from men and women in the audience). One group to do with television had said – I can’t remember whether Akanna invited us to guess or whether someone, a man, just called out, ‘three remotes!’ Akanna agreed by imitating one of the men from that session saying “there’s a telly in there somewhere!”. She was very funny and I think people were really enjoying this.

All trainers also included other forms of teaching – whole group discussions, paired or small group discussions, exercises, and/or quizzes. Five trainers (Liz, Rose, Sophia, Akanna and Malorie) included ‘scenarios’ (also called ‘case studies’) as an exercise to be done in groups (Rex included these as a whole-group activity). Scenarios are a particularly interesting exercise because of the way in which the ‘scenario’ positions participants in relation to acts of discrimination; I discuss this in detail in Section 7.7.

Scenarios were the most common group exercise, with all other small-group exercises or discussion topics being used by only one or two trainers. These less common exercises included quizzes, used by three trainers – one on disability, one on the experiences of minoritised students, and one on cultural differences; a discussion of barriers particular groups of students might face at university; an exercise on stereotypes; discussions of who or what we are afraid of (framed in evolutionary psychology terms as ‘who is a mammoth to you?’, used by Malorie and Akanna who work for the same training provider); an exercise
classifying words and phrases as offensive or not; a paired exercise about ‘personal space’; and several others.

All but one trainer (Rex) incorporated group or paired discussions of specific topics or exercises, followed by feeding back to the group as a whole and/or a whole group discussion. One practitioner, who had a background in teaching, described how her training style had been influenced by her teacher training experience: “I often put people in small groups and pairs and mix things up a bit, rather than, I’m not so comfortable giving straight lectures. I’m much more comfortable in an interactive environment.” This is suggestive of how interactive work in groups and pairs, which was unusual and progressive as recently as the early 1990s (e.g. Epstein 1993), has become a key pedagogic tool of mainstream education. This may partially explain its popularity as a pedagogic technique in my dataset.

Although Rex included a lot of participation from the trainees, this was always in the form of an individual participant speaking with Rex in front of the rest of the group, speaking with one of the actors who had enacted a ‘scenario’ for us. While participants did speak to each other during the sessions this was never a form of interaction that was encouraged or mandated in Rex’s training sessions:

The rest of the group listened while Rex talked to a trainee (a Brown woman) standing at her seat at the back – Shreya – about her answer to an exercise we all did, in which we had to guess his car. She asked him ‘can I have another guess?’ and there was a lot of laughter from the group. A couple of other participants chimed in and Rex said to the whole group firmly ‘You’re all getting involved, actually I’m just talking with Shreya’.

This exercise, described by Rex as a ‘quiz’, in which participants are told to make ‘assumptions’ about the trainer and these assumptions are then discussed with the group as a whole, was the most confrontational practice I observed during my fieldwork. The whole group were asked to silently write down their answers to questions about him, including a request to write down ‘in the first three to seven seconds of seeing me, one thing you didn’t like about me … and it can be absolutely anything at all.’ Rex then debriefed the quiz by collecting answers from several volunteers, who are then asked to stand (sometimes at the front of the room) and answer questions about their responses to the ‘quiz’. These questions often involved repeating the participant’s words back to them and probing the assumptions that were made about him in reaching that answer. This practice of putting participants ‘on the spot’ by asking them questions in front of the rest of the group held all
the participants’ attention but could be very uncomfortable to watch. In the following extract, a white woman, Emma, has been the first to answer the question about his car, and has responded to his first questions about why she chose that car by saying that it is a reliable and efficient car, used by people she knows – sales people – who do a lot of driving as part of their job. Rex suggested that she is using a stereotype. Emma responded that she wouldn’t say a stereotype, but that she is being normative:

Rex repeated, normative. What do you mean by that?

Emma said, I’m assuming that your car is similar to the cars that I know other people who travel a lot drive in, because I know their cars are efficient and reliable for long distances.

Rex asked, how do you know?

Emma started by saying, I don’t really know–

Rex picked this up and interrupted, ‘so you said that you know, but you actually don’t’

Emma went on, ‘do you mean, how do I know that it’s an efficient and reliable car? I do know that’

Rex asked how?

Emma said, ‘someone who knows all about cars told me’

Rex asked who this person was – one of the sales people?

She said no, ‘an ex-boyfriend’.

Watching this, although I have seen Rex’s training before, I was assuming that he would drop this line of enquiry, but he continued:

He asked, when did you last see him?

She said about six months ago

He asked, ‘do you like him?’

She answered, ‘not really?’

He asked, ‘do you like me?’

She answered, ‘that’s a really unfair question!!’. She sounded upset and agitated. He responded with something like, ‘I’m being unfair?’, sounding incredulous, and then rephrased his question by asking, ‘do you have an answer to question three?’ [A question asking us to write down about something we dislike about him]

She said yes.

He talked a bit about how she’s made an assumption about his car based on information given to her months ago by an ex-boyfriend she doesn’t like. Emma sat and
Rex asked the next participant who has given an answer to stand, which she did. The rest of the participants have been completely silent through this exchange.

This is an extreme moment of the exercise, in that the questions Rex asked Emma are unusually intrusive compared to the questions Rex asked most participants. The session in which this exchange took place was also the only session in which I felt that participants were forming social bonds in opposition to the trainer – but this exchange between Rex and Emma had already taken place when a white male participant described the session as ‘fun’ to me during the break.

6.6 The training curriculum

Having described the practices of training in terms of the materiality of the classroom, and how the framing of whether training is voluntary positions participants in relation to discrimination, I now turn to a general overview of the training curriculum.

The vast majority of the training curriculum can be divided into two areas: legal and psychological. Where trainers are focused on the law, they explain the history of equalities legislation in the UK and the provisions of the EA2010. In some sessions this is as basic as listing the nine protected characteristics, but some trainers go into a high level of detail. I discuss this aspect of the curriculum in Chapter 7.

Where the training content is psychological, this is focused primarily on conveying cognitive psychological ideas about stereotypes and about ‘unconscious bias’. Some trainers also incorporate psychological concepts about communication styles or conflict management. I discuss the use of a ‘psychological discourse’ in training in detail in Chapter 8, placing it in the context of participants’ resistances to being positioned as perpetrators of discrimination; as this is closely related to guidance on behaviour and language (to avoid becoming a perpetrator of discrimination), I also examine these in Chapter 8.

However, these discourses do not encompass the whole of the training curriculum. Trainers include content which is intended to convey that discrimination is (still) real. While this content can be legal (in the form of case law and information about, for instance, the prevalence of employment tribunals) and psychological (for instance, encouraging participants to own their biases through the Implicit Association Test), trainers also use
sociological information and social experiments to convey the ongoing reality of discrimination. In the next section I discuss this use of sociological data in E&D training.

6.7 Uses of sociology: “it still happens”

A small minority of trainers incorporated statistical, population level data into the training. Rose included a quiz about survey data about students’ reported experiences of university which show that some groups of students report high levels of harassment and discrimination – for instance, transgender students. This, like most instances of sociological studies and data being used in training, conveys the ongoing reality of discrimination.

However, sociological data was also used to convey more general information. Liz, who ran a Disability Awareness session, included a ‘True or false?’ quiz early on, to be done in pairs, which among other information incorporated statistics about the prevalence of various disabilities. Liz described her reasoning for the early inclusion of the quiz at interview (my interjections of ‘yeah’ and ‘right’ have been removed, hesitations in speech such as ‘umm’ were not transcribed, and ellipses represent my removal of some sentences for the sake of clarity and coherence, rather than ‘trailing off’ in speech):

I don’t have a huge amount of time, I need to sort of get on, talk about the topic quite quickly, but I also appreciate that sometimes people-it’s a topic that might be a little bit daunting, in terms of not knowing what’s politically correct or what to say or, y’know, not maybe knowing too much about it in the first place, or you know, just having some thoughts about what the training may or may not be about. ... Quite often they don’t know everybody in the room ... It’s a bit of an icebreaker with a purpose I suppose ... Get people talking to each other but also talking about the topic and it’s specifically true or false so as you’ve got a 50/50 chance of getting it right ... I usually say that, you know, it’s not too serious, I don’t expect people to know all the answers ... So it’s very non-judgemental, it’s very open, and just have a guess if you don’t know. It starts conversations, it gives me an opportunity to perhaps do a little bit of myth-busting.

Liz suggests that people can find E&D training ‘daunting’ and be unsure about what the content will be (I return to the idea of ‘political correctness’ in Chapter 8). She suggests that as well as acting as an icebreaker, the quiz is reassuring in being relatively straightforward. The quiz did not include data about the prevalence of discrimination, instead focusing on which conditions are legally defined as disabilities, what proportion of the population is disabled, and so on.

In another instance Sarah, who ran the ‘Cultural awareness’ training, incorporated information about different cultures as a central component of training, using videos,
reading out information, and exercises. The training included descriptions of cultural differences in physical contact, ‘personal space’, the meaning of gestures and facial expressions, and timekeeping.

The use of sociological data by trainers has the potential to convey an analysis of discrimination in terms of power and societal structures, rather than prejudice and personality. However, most trainers did not draw on sociological concepts, but on specific experiments and data such as survey data or information about the institution – for instance, the proportions of men and women at different levels in the university hierarchy. These were used to encourage recognition of discrimination and inequality as directly relevant to the participants.

Some trainers described the results of sociological experiments such as sending two fictional, near-identical job applications, with different names, to potential workplaces and comparing the proportion of invitations to interview for the application with a ‘white British’ name compared to a name identified with an ethnic minority group. Trainers use these studies to counter expressions of scepticism from participants as to whether employment discrimination happens in their own field:

Next slide is a list of things that you might judge someone based on – clothes? Education? Gender? It was a long list and went well beyond protected characteristics. Malorie said something like, when you are thinking about what sort of person you want when you hire, who is a xxx sort of person, how does it relate to these factors?

A white male participant, Alex, objected - speaking possibly for the first time since introductions. He argued, In science, it’s none of these. If someone’s published a Nature paper they’re going to get the job, and that’s what we want, nothing to do with these things.

Malorie said, what if you had two candidates with a paper in Nature? Would any of these affect which of them got the job?

Alex - OK, but it’s very hard to get two identical candidates, there’s always some difference between them.

Malorie said, in 2013 there was a study of British university students, applying to university for the first time, looking at their weight. When the applications were on paper only – there was no problem, no effect of weight. For young women with a higher BMI [Body Mass Index], if the application process involved an interview, they were less likely to be accepted. For men there was no effect of higher BMI, but for women there was. Our cultural associations around size – about lack of intelligence, being slow - affected the way those women were seen at interview.
Another white male participant, Matthew, objected to the slide listing a wide range of attributes on the grounds that some factors listed, such as education, are directly relevant to an applicant’s job performance, whereas others such as colour are not. This led to an extended conversation between participants about how relevant previous educational success is, in which two participants, including Matthew, discussed having just chosen to hire someone without a PhD for a role where the job advertisement listed a PhD as an essential requirement – which the Human Resources department strongly objected to. Two white women trainees, Grace and Emily, chimed in citing research about the gender difference in people applying for jobs that they don’t meet ‘essential criteria’ for:

Grace said that a lot of people who might have been just as good might have been put off applying by knowing they didn’t have something that was listed as an essential criterion. She said something like, there’s research that shows that women usually don’t apply for jobs if they don’t meet 95% of the listed criteria, whereas men will look at the list and go ‘yeah I can do that’ even if they only meet half the criteria. Emily backed her up in this – Grace said something like, we must have been on the same training before!

One of them [Grace or Emily] asked Matthew and the woman who has also just hired a non-PhD applicant whether their great applicant with no PhD was a man or a woman. The woman said in her case it was a man, and Matthew said that in his case it was a woman but among his applicants it was the opposite pattern, a lot of women applied who weren’t at all qualified. Emily said something like oh really, that’s so interesting!, and Matthew answered quickly, sounding irritable, no it’s not interesting, the sample is too small to be significant. But surely (sounding frustrated) we’re missing the point, which is that judging applicants based on their education is ‘a qualitatively different level of awfulness’ from judging them based on their sex or colour or anything like that?

Here a participant (Grace) rather than a trainer, raises sociological data as part of commenting on social inequality. The argument Grace makes is that if one applicant who didn’t meet the ‘essential criteria’ was better than those who did, the criterion was not essential, and because it was listed as essential, women were disadvantaged in the hiring process. Grace and Emily seem to have both learned this on a previous training course.

Matthew returns the conversation to his original objection: despite having been mistaken about the necessity for a PhD to fulfil the role he has recently hired for, a distinction should be made between discrimination on the basis of sex and race, and discrimination on the basis of educational background. In other words, Matthew seems to be arguing against the ‘managing diversity’ approach which sees any exclusion based on human differences as equally problematic. This may be because he sees educational background as genuinely relevant to job performance in a way which ‘sex or colour or anything like that’ is not.
Malorie does not address this head on, but describes another study showing employment discrimination, returning the subject to direct discrimination on the basis of sex and of race:

Malorie, who has stayed out of the discussion between Matthew, Grace and Emily, now says that there’s a study of psychology departments which shows that with absolutely identical applications, where the only change made was to the sex of the applicant, in a 2:1 ratio men were chosen as successful applicants.

Matthew says that the same thing was found in the US [United States], with African-American sounding names.

Malorie says that the same has been found here as well – the DWP [Department of Work and Pensions] did a big study – and this includes organisations that believe they have a very fair hiring process, charities, third sector organisations, organisations that are passionate about equality.

This starts a discussion about anonymization in recruitment and selection – someone says that applications for non-academic jobs are anonymised, but not for academic jobs. Someone says that must be because of publication record. People talk about whether some degree of anonymization is still possible. Malorie then moved on to a slide about the development of unconscious bias.

While this intervention did not resolve Matthew’s disagreement with the message of the training, Malorie reinforced the message she was giving earlier in response to Alex’s objection – that discrimination is still real and ongoing, including at universities and including for academic jobs. In this training session, the trainer sharing the outcomes of these sociological studies moves the focus to structures and processes, with participants beginning to discuss the possibilities for anonymising job applicants and hence removing the bias from this stage of the recruitment process.

As well as drawing on these studies to counter direct objections from participants, trainers sometimes anticipate the idea that discrimination is over and provide evidence that discrimination is ongoing. For instance, Karishma attempted to play a clip of a social experiment designed to test whether racism is ongoing in the UK:

Karishma clicked through the link which didn’t work. She then said that there’s no flash player on this computer but you have the link – sorry. She went on to say that we think racial discrimination is over, is that true or not? The link is a video showing groups of people who were phoned up. They were looking for a receptionist, ringing agency staff saying ‘we want a receptionist’ but we want them to be white, ‘normal’. A high percentage of them said right, understood.

A participant asked, when was this?

Karishma answered, two or three years ago.
Karishma’s reference to the idea that ‘racial discrimination is over’ is a reference to what Andreouli et al. (2016) call the ‘end of racism’ discourse. Andreouli et al. (2016) conducted focus groups with young people in the UK and conducted a discourse analysis of the ways in which young people talked about racism. They found that the young people constructed racism as something that occurs elsewhere, in other times and places, and particularly as something that existed in the past but is ‘over’ now. This is in keeping with a more general narrative of progress (Hartviksen, 2015) in which Western countries are conceptualised as no longer having substantive problems of inequality. As Brown (2006) argues, ‘tolerance’ has become discursively identified with the West, while ‘intolerance’ is conceptualised as something that happens elsewhere – in the past, in Muslim-majority countries, and in other non-Western countries.

In this case, Karishma has claimed that “we think racial discrimination is over”, and this claim is reinforced by a participant wanting to know when the sociological demonstration took place. The implication of the question is that the further in the past the demonstration took place, the more readily it could be discounted as relevant evidence of present discrimination. Karishma also drew on other sociological data to argue that discrimination is ongoing. In another session, the ‘end of racism’ discourse and narrative of progress was raised by a participant following the trainer’s description of a neuropsychological study:

Akanna talks about how some people claim that they ‘just see people’ (I see a participant laughing in response). Akanna goes on to talk about how brain scanning studies show that in white people the amygdala is activated when they see images of Black people. And the same is true for Black people who see images of white people, their amygdala is activated as well – “we’re all at it”.

A white male participant said that that must have been true when the study was done, but now we have a new generation, this sort of attitude changes with time. The participant told an anecdote about a friend’s child which presented the child and their school as non-racist. Then he went on, but this fear of people of different ethnicities, is it innate or can it be dealt with culturally over time?

Akanna said very firmly that racial prejudice is not innate, it is cultural, but she’s talking about the scientific evidence about fear of people of a differ colour to us – there are always anecdotes about how things are getting better in the next generation, but we have to listen to the science rather than the anecdotes.

As these extracts show, E&D trainers acknowledge the widespread belief in societal progress towards equality, and question its validity using sociological and psychological data. However, at times trainers also use narratives of progress, sometimes framed in terms
of their own experiences as a professional in the field of equalities. However, this narrative is more tempered and complex, and comes up most often when comparing ‘direct discrimination’ with ‘indirection discrimination’:

Annie (a Black woman trainee) asked what do you do if you see discrimination – for instance, she’d seen a job advert on twitter for a club which said ‘chicks only’, we have enough men? She’d seen stuff like that and not known how to respond. Rose told her that in that particular case you could inform the advertising agency which doesn’t allow openly discriminatory job advertisements, and/or you could contact the organisation directly and tell them to take it down and that it’s illegal. It’s rare now to get those openly discriminatory job advertisements – but it’s still there in more subtle forms, like a lot of organisations will advertise for someone ‘dynamic’, and if you press a bit on what that means basically it means they want someone young, they don’t believe an older person can be dynamic.

Rose is describing progress in a sense – a reduction in openly discriminatory job advertisements – but this is qualified by her statement that discrimination is ongoing, but increasingly subtle.

Three trainers also showed participants statistical data from the university they were training at which demonstrated that women, and Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) people, are less likely to have high-level positions at the university. The interpretation of this data was often contested by participants:

Akanna changed slide to one titled ‘Academic staff by gender and ethnicity’, with two images. One showed the proportion of men to women at each stage of academia – ‘researcher’ is 60% women, ‘lecturer’ is majority men, and ‘professor’ is about 75% men. The other showed the proportion of white people to BME people at each stage of academia, there is a clear downward trend of BME people being employed in higher status positions, but it is less visually dramatic because the highest proportion, early on, is less than 15%.

Looking around the lecture room while making frantic notes, I saw three women (two white, one Latina) laugh and cover their face, a gesture I interpreted as expressing ‘how awful!’. One of them said ‘oh my God’ and met my eyes. A white man said aloud that it’s ‘difficult to know what to make of it’.

Some participants had raised their hands, Akanna invited a man at the back to speak. He talked about childcare, arguing that women make choices to stay at home looking after children at the expense of their career, and that accounts for their proportions getting lower and lower as academic careers progress.

A woman participant responded by talking about Athena SWAN which she has some involvement in. She said their work suggests there are complex and multiple factors involved in women being disadvantaged in their careers and childcare issues are only part of the overall problem. Akanna chimes in with an agreement, saying that there is a
context to the choices that women make at work. The discussion continued until Akanna moved on to a slide titled ‘Unconscious bias - Breaking the cycle’.

Despite Akanna having presented substantive evidence earlier in the session about ongoing workplace discrimination against women and against ethnic minorities, including the Department for Work and Pensions (2009) study and several studies focused on academia, three out of the four men who spoke about the university’s statistical data commented that it is difficult to interpret (with the fourth saying that he used to have a boss who was a woman who would not hire women in case they had children). Of the four women participants who took part in the discussion, one argued that women’s workplace disadvantage is not solely due to childcare choices, one commented that there is a problem with class and race discrimination across the whole of the UK academic sector, one commented on a lack of role models, and one said passionately that men who say there’s ‘no problem’ – this is a problem, and it needs to be acknowledged. Here, as elsewhere in Akanna’s session, there appeared to be clear divide between the men and women present in terms of their analysis of discrimination, with the women being more likely to name discrimination as a part of their and other women’s experience.

I raised this slide again while interviewing one of the participants from this session, a British Indian man:

Participant: This is the worrying bit.

Netta: So... yeah. The trend is a bit more obvious with women, because they start out being 60%, but...

Participant: They drop down as time goes on; and we’ve discussed this ad nauseam; there are lots and lots and lots of reasons for this; it’s just... to say “there is just bias” would be wrong. It’s a much more complex situation.

Netta: What more do you think is...?

Participant: Oh, there’s lots goes into the mix! Lots goes into the mix.

The participant went on to mention personality affecting choices; that jobs with higher levels of responsibility do not suit everyone; the ongoing relevance of stereotypes and role models, and the ‘biological’ fact of women’s pregnancies meaning that they are likelier to take time off and perhaps lose faith in their own ability to keep up due to the workplace changing in their absence. After discussing the problems posed by career breaks, he summed up by emphasising again that ‘there’s more to it than that’:
Participant: I’m not saying – again, it would be wrong – to say that’s everything; I think there’s more to it than that. There is cultural conditioning; there is the stereotypes; there is... everything. And there is bias.

Netta: Yeah

Participant: By saying there is no bias, we’d be wrong. There’s always a fear, especially with short-term appointments, ‘cause do you take a woman on, or do you rather prefer a male because you don’t want to take chances?

Netta: Right.

Participant: And no matter what anybody says, that thought crosses everybody’s mind. Now whether they can rise above it or not, is different.

From the participant’s note that this applies especially to ‘short term appointments’, the implication is that again the possibility of pregnancy is the key factor which means that employing women is seen as a riskier choice than employing men.

6.8 Conclusion

This chapter has begun to address the research questions of ‘What happens in E&D training?’, as well as the sub-questions of ‘What is the curriculum of the training, and how come?’ and ‘How are participants positioned in relation to discrimination?’. I began by addressing one component of how participants are positioned in relation to discrimination, by thinking about the effects of whether the training is mandatory or not, and how this is framed by trainers. I argued that mandatory training implicitly positions participants as potential perpetrators of discrimination, and is widely understood in this way by participants and trainers. Trainers use various techniques to manage the resistance that mandatory training arouses; I have suggested that telling participants about the university’s legal liability if training were not conducted is one such technique. However, this technique has the effect of reinforcing the trainees’ positioning as possible perpetrators of discrimination, while simultaneously conveying that the contents of the training are less important from the institution’s perspective than simply the fact that ‘E&D training’ took place, and hence the university is no longer liable for the trainee’s actions. This may undermine the message that both the trainer and the university care about eliminating discrimination. Where training is optional and ‘vicarious liability’ is not mentioned, it is easier to frame the training as having intrinsic value to the trainees’ professional development, and for trainees to be positioned as possible victims of discrimination or as
people who are already committed to equality. This may have a complicated relationship with trainees’ willingness to reflect on their own prejudices or discriminatory behaviours.

I have argued that the practices of E&D training vary, but that there are clear areas of commonality. Different trainers use a variety of pedagogic practices, such as quizzes, exercises, lecture-style delivery of material, introductions, and role-play, in conducting training. Particular styles of classroom layout can encourage some of these while discouraging others, for instance, small-group discussions are more difficult where participants are seated in rows facing the front; and a range of classroom layouts were used. However, commonalities of pedagogic practices can be found, with some practices such as didactic teaching, slideshows, handouts, and occasional small group or paired discussion being almost universal, while more ‘experiential’ techniques such as role-play were rare.

Similarly, there are differences and commonalities in the material practices surrounding the training setting. Every training session included the provision of tea and coffee and at least one break (but some sessions also provided biscuits or pastries) and almost every session was three hours long. There were sign-in sheets and evaluation sheets at every session, marking the training as a component of the institutional bureaucracy. These material, pedagogic and atmospheric aspects of training address my broader question, ‘what happens in E&D training?’, looking at those aspects of ‘what happens’ which my two sub-questions do not capture. I have argued that the literature on E&D training is suggestive of training as a more experiential form of learning than mainstream educational settings, whereas in fact I found most of the pedagogic techniques and atmospheres of training very familiar from mainstream education. I would also suggest that the material practices surrounding training, such as evaluation sheets and the provision of refreshments, have significance in how they frame the training; for instance, evaluation sheets position trainees as ‘consumers’. How this relates to questions such as trainees’ resistance to taking part in mandatory training would be interesting to explore.

Turning to my sub-question of ‘What is the curriculum of the training, and how come?’, I have argued that most of the curriculum can be divided into two areas, with trainers differing substantially in terms of which area they devoted the majority of training time to: law (the focus of the next chapter) or psychology (the focus of Chapter 8). However, these two areas do not fully encompass the training content, which also includes sociological data.
and studies, guidance on language or behaviour (discussed in Chapter 8), and content focused on specific areas in the case of training which is not general ‘E&D’ but specific, such as ‘Preventing Harassment’. I have argued that sociological data and studies are used primarily to convey that discrimination is real and ongoing. This acts to counter a ‘narrative of progress’ which views discrimination as something that happens primarily in the past and/or elsewhere (Andreouli et al. 2016). It also functions as a justification for the training, and as an argument for the importance of the subject matter of the training. In the next chapter, I examine the ways in which the law is invoked in E&D training.
Chapter 7: Legal discourse in E&D training

7.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I argued that there are two central discourses deployed in the E&D training I observed: legal and psychological. I began to describe the effects of the legal discourse by looking at how trainers used the idea of ‘vicarious liability’, and argued that this could be understood as a response to trainee resistance to mandatory training. ‘Vicarious liability’ enables trainers to explain mandatory training in terms of legal obligations, which can be understood as objective, rather than a moral mandate, which can be understood as subjective.

In this chapter, I focus on other aspects of the legal discourse in E&D training. The main area of law raised in E&D training is equality law, which has been unified in the UK into the EA2010, but other areas of law are touched on in my fieldwork by trainers or participants. These include health and safety, data protection, and immigration law. I view law as a discourse within which subjects are positioned as citizens, a position which includes ‘rights and responsibilities’. As such, this chapter, as with the other two ethnographic analysis chapters, addresses both of my ethnographic sub-questions: “What is the curriculum of the training, and how come?”, and “How are participants positioned in relation to discrimination?”. Where the law is being described in ‘neutral’ terms, I incorporate this into the analysis; where participants are being positioned as possible victims of discrimination (who need to know their rights) or possible perpetrators of discrimination (who need to know their responsibilities), I also draw this out explicitly. More rarely, participants are positioned as bystanders; I discuss this in Section 7.7.3.

Equalities law is central to much of the E&D training which currently takes place at universities. As well as the ways in which legal liability mandates the provision of training, explored in the previous chapter, much of the curriculum content is communicating and discussing the provisions of the law. I will argue that many trainers ground the training in the EA2010 and use this strategically to emphasise the importance of equality in the workplace. However, trainers also make clear distinctions between their own views and the provisions of the law. In addition, some trainers distinguish between the values which underpin the law and the law’s effectiveness at achieving its aims.
As my interest is in how E&D training incorporates the law, I only examine the provisions of these laws to the extent that this sheds light on how trainers and participants used the law. By comparing the EA2010 as written with the way it is described and discussed in training, and comparing different training sessions, I make the case that even where training purports to be based on the law, the law influences but does not determine how trainers and participants construct issues of discrimination.

I begin by analysing my data in terms of the prevalence of legal discourse in training, linking this with the literature reviewed in Chapter 5. I then recap the discussion of the EA2010 in Chapter 4, connecting this with my ethnographic data. I explore the ways in which the EA2010 is in tension with the idea of ‘diversity’ encapsulated in the ‘managing diversity’ movement (Section 7.4). I look at various protected characteristics in detail, showing first that the law affects trainers’ choices of what to include and exclude from training, and second that even trainers using the ‘same’ legal framework communicate different underlying ideas about the protected characteristic in question (Section 7.5). In Section 7.6 I turn to the question of how participants are positioned by training, and I continue this focus in Section 7.7, about how trainers use scenarios. Finally I draw this together and discuss the implications (Section 7.8).

### 7.2 Prevalence of legal discourse in training

All but one of the ten trainers in my sample explicitly mentioned the EA2010. The exception was a trainer delivering an ‘Unconscious Bias’ session, whose only mention of the law was implicit (by using the phrase ‘protected characteristic’). The other nine trainers included a list of the protected characteristics in their training, with two of these trainers also giving brief descriptions of some of the protected characteristics and four giving detailed explanations of the protected characteristics. Four trainers also defined the different types of discrimination laid out in the EA2010: direct discrimination, indirect discrimination, discrimination by perception, discrimination by association, failure to make reasonable adjustments, harassment, and victimisation. These four trainers – Sophia, Coral, Rose and Karishma - of which three were in-house trainers, devoted a substantial proportion of the training time to explanations or discussions of the EA2010. This prevalence of legal discourse seems similar to that reported by Brewis who states that in her sample of diversity
training observed in the UK “Trainers invariably provided a list of the protected characteristics at some point during training” (2016 p.312).

The four trainers who drew substantively on the law in their training differed in terms of their willingness to critique the law and the government. Sophia, who spent the highest proportion of training time on the law, strongly emphasised herself as ‘the messenger’ for the law, as a way of side-stepping debate. Early in the session, she said that:

…she would be telling us a lot about the legislation and some of us might feel very strongly about it, ‘if you feel very strongly about the legislation please don’t take it out on me’! She described herself as the messenger and said she is happy to give us the address of the government and we can write to them if we want to express our disagreement with the legislation. This got smiles and quiet laughter.

Sophia thus drew a distinction between her own views and those which are expressed by the EA2010. Her own views were not at stake, whereas the law was. Unlike some trainers who deliberately provoked debate and discussion regularly throughout the session, Sophia conveyed that this session is primarily about us receiving information about the law – her own views, and ours, are not relevant to the session. Brewis (2016) describes this approach as one of the neutral provision of information, or alternatively the provision of neutral information. In keeping with this framing of the session as consisting of neutral information provision, Sophia’s style for much of the session was didactic, rapidly conveying information about the law with occasional short pauses for questions. However, Sophia did share her own views on some of the legislation, and from her tone it was often clear that she approved or disapproved of specific areas of law. I give an example of this in Section 7.5.1. Karishma also framed the legal components of the session as the neutral provision of information, but her training session incorporated more psychological and sociological material in addition to the legal material.

By contrast, both Coral and Rose encouraged discussion of whether trainees agreed with the law. Rose extensively used exercises such as small-group discussions around case law. Coral asked deliberately provocative questions of the group as a whole, and encouraged speculation about the law (for instance, asking participants to define the different kinds of discrimination) rather than beginning by giving trainees the information. In the next section I discuss the difficulties of the language of ‘protected characteristics’.
7.3 Protected characteristics

Other than legal liability, discussed in Chapter 6, the component of the law which is regularly invoked in E&D training is anti-discrimination law on employment and service provision – the EA2010. As I described in detail in Chapter 4, the EA2010 defines various types of discrimination. These incorporate multiple underlying ideas about discrimination: on the one hand, it is discriminatory to treat a characteristic as relevant when it should be irrelevant (direct discrimination, harassment); on the other hand, it is discriminatory to treat a characteristic as irrelevant when it is relevant (indirect discrimination, failure to make reasonable adjustments, and discrimination arising from disability). The EA2010 also defines nine characteristics on the basis of which it is illegal to discriminate. These are race, sex, sexual orientation, gender reassignment, disability, age, pregnancy and maternity, marriage and civil partnership, and religion and belief. Again, these incorporate different underlying conceptions of inequality, with some being protected characteristics and others being protected groups. I argued in Chapter 4 that this makes it difficult to use the terminology of ‘protected characteristics’ accurately or to express coherent ideas about the nature of inequality or of discrimination. In this section I substantiate this argument with examples from the ethnographic data.

As I argued in Chapter 4, the EA2010 does not take an approach which focuses on structural discrimination and existing power imbalances in society, in that rather than creating protected groups, it creates (in most cases) protected characteristics. Taking the case of racist discrimination, this legislation protects people of every race from having their race used as a reason to disadvantage them in the workplace. By explicitly ‘protecting’ people who are structurally advantaged (white people), giving them protections which are identical to the protections given to those who are structurally disadvantaged, the law implies that the structurally advantaged are equally in need of these protections. This applies to sex, race, sexual orientation, religion and belief, and age.

However, this is not true of all nine protected characteristics. Some protected characteristics protect only the group who are structurally disadvantaged: this applies to disability, gender reassignment, pregnancy and maternity, and marriage and civil partnership. This means it is impossible for an unmarried man to bring a claim that he has been discriminated against on the grounds that he is unmarried.
From this explanation of protected characteristics, it is clear that all adults have multiple protected characteristics, as everyone has a sex, race, age, and sexual orientation, and some religion or lack of religion. This framing has been a feature of the UK’s equality laws since they were first introduced (see Chapter 4), and is similar in the USA (see Chapter 3). The language of ‘protected characteristics’ seems to offer a way of talking about many types of marginalisation at the same time, maintaining a view of inequality in general rather than specific forms of inequality. But in fact, this universality makes the language of protected characteristics difficult to use accurately when talking about structural inequality.

Most of the trainers who include the nine protected characteristics in their training explain who is counted as having a given protected characteristic when describing the protected characteristics. For instance, after covering ground rules and introductions, one trainer, Rex, listed and then rapidly described the protected characteristics:

Rex then started on content by listing the protected characteristics on a piece of flipchart paper. As he wrote gender reassignment he explained this refers to ‘people going through sex change’.

... Then Rex started to go through them in more detail. He explained that race means ‘every single race, not just minorities’ and also includes national origin. On sex he said that this protects both sexes. ...

Along with Rex’s definitions of each characteristic – for instance, that race ‘includes national origin’ – he adds information about who is ‘protected’. This is similar to the practice of other trainers. One trainer, Coral, repeatedly asked the group ‘Who is protected?’ as a way of leading into a discussion of the protected characteristic in question:

We’ve moved on to ‘Age’. Coral asks us, ‘Who is protected?’

Two people respond, ‘everybody.’

Coral responds firmly, no. Not everybody.

The group discusses the details of the age provisions, and Coral raises the question of work experience. The group agrees that employers require a certain number of years of experience for a job ‘all the time’ even though this is illegal. Coral concludes by agreeing that ‘People still do it. It’s an outrage, but who is going to take it to court?’ She goes on to explain that no one under 18 is protected under the Equality Act in public service provision - and whole sectors are exempted, for instance the police and army. She then begins a discussion about retirement.

Although most trainers who include a legal focus include this kind of information about ‘who is protected’, it is rare for these explanations and discussions to include consideration
of what this means politically in terms of the underlying problematisation of inequality. The exception to this is ‘pregnancy and maternity’, which is routinely critiqued for not protecting men from discrimination on the grounds of paternity.

Someone ‘having a protected characteristic’ is understood colloquially as someone who is in some sense structurally marginalised or oppressed, although this is often an inaccurate usage. One trainer, Akanna, used the language of ‘protected characteristics’ in this way when telling an anecdote:

Akanna then started talking about how in her training people often start telling her about problems they have at work with someone, and when she asks “have you spoken to them about it?” they say No – because they have a protected characteristic and I don’t want to.

It is unclear from this whether ‘protected characteristics’ is a euphemism being used by participants in her training, or a way of aggregating multiple different forms of oppression (from different encounters with participants). In either case, though, this use of ‘protected characteristics’ evokes marginalised groups, rather than the legal meaning of protected characteristics. Akanna’s intended meaning is communicated clearly, but this can only be achieved through a distortion of the legal meaning of ‘protected characteristic’. Similarly, the trainer Sophia evokes the idea of ‘groups’ when defining types of discrimination by her use of the term ‘belong’:

Sophia then moves on to types of discrimination starting with direct discrimination. Direct discrimination is treating someone less well because they ‘belong to a protected characteristic’.

This tension between conceptualising the underlying problem as being inequality which results from systematic oppression of groups of people (such as women or immigrants) and conceptualising the problem as being any unfair treatment based on a ‘characteristic’ (such as sex or national origin), is present throughout my fieldwork, particularly where there is a legal focus to the training. This tension is perhaps exacerbated by the inconsistency of the term ‘protected characteristic’, which in some cases does refer to a group, and in others to a personal characteristic. I continue to discuss these issues in Section 7.5 which deals with specific protected characteristics. In the next section, I discuss the tension between ‘managing diversity’ and the EA2010.
7.4 Managing diversity and the law

‘Protected characteristics’ appears to be an attempt to identify examples of structural discrimination and counteract them – in contrast to the rhetoric of the ‘managing diversity’ approach, which treats all types of unfair discrimination as equally relevant and equally wrong. Forms of discrimination which cannot be tied to a ‘protected characteristic’ are still legal – for instance, discrimination on the basis of social class, or on the basis of opinions which do not have the legal status of a ‘belief’. Under a ‘managing diversity’ approach, discrimination on these bases should be considered just as problematic as discrimination on the grounds of a protected characteristic (Thomas 1990, 1991, 1996; Kandola and Fullerton 1994). This brings the law into direct conflict with the idea of ‘managing diversity’ (in the sense of ‘diversity’ as meaning any difference between people, rather than referring to the ‘business case’ for diversity).

The creation of ‘protected characteristics’ distinguishes the approach of the EA2010 from an approach which considers all forms of unfair discrimination as illegal. This was implicitly raised by two trainers who drew heavily on a ‘managing diversity’ approach. One trainer, Rex, joked about the inadequacy of legislation in both of the sessions I observed:

Rex has been conducting the ‘assumptions’ exercise in which delegates are asked to make assumptions about him, and is on the ‘what do you dislike about me?’ stage of the exercise. He has got a white man to come to the front and has quizzed him about his answer, which was ‘no tie’. The trainee didn’t seem to be enjoying it. Rex told him he could go back to his seat and started talking to the group as a whole about how the problem isn’t making assumptions or judgements but making sure that you are behaving fairly – he addressed the individual trainee again as he got back to his seat, ‘you’re OK so far’. The trainee responded with what looked like a clearly forced smile. Rex then joked that they’ll need to make a tenth protected characteristic for you – tie discrimination! That got what looked like a much more genuine laugh/smile from the trainee.

Later in the same session Rex joked about ‘shoe discrimination’; at the second session I observed he joked about creating a tenth protected characteristic, ‘shirt discrimination’ (again in response to comments on his clothes during this stage of the ‘assumptions’ exercise). Although these comments were always phrased as jokes, and drew laughter from the trainees on each occasion, they were also in keeping with Rex’s broader themes which were focused on unfairness of any kind, rather than on forms of oppression which are
systematic and widespread. This in turn is in keeping with the ‘managing diversity’ approach as described by Thomas (1991, 1996) and by Kandola and Fullerton (1996).

Another trainer, Malorie, used the ‘business case’ to construct the problem as one of irrelevant attributes getting in the way of accurately judging employees:

Next slide is a list of things that you might judge someone based on. It was a long list and included some protected characteristics but also things that aren’t protected like clothes and educational background. Malorie said something like, when you are thinking about what sort of person you want when you hire, who is a xxx sort of person, how does it relate to these factors?

Without directly criticising the law, Malorie steps around it (having already opened the session with a list of the protected characteristics) by emphasising that a wide range of factors could feed into an inaccurate assessment of people’s abilities (this episode is described further in Section 6.7).

Two trainers with a legal focus criticised the absence of ‘social class’ from the list of protected characteristics, with Karishma commenting that ‘if [social class] was a protected characteristic we could really bring about equality’. A third trainer, Coral, introduced the law by saying that:

The Equality Act ‘swept the floor’ with other legislation. The case law from before the Equality Act still stands, but now the act is more consistent. That’s not to say it’s perfect – it is NOT. NOT everyone is protected.

Coral did not spell out who should be protected and isn’t. But it seems that where trainers seriously criticise the overall approach of ‘protected characteristics’, it is to critique their incompleteness. In these cases, the critique is focused on a specific form of structural oppression which is not included in the legislation (social class), rather than on the lack of attention to every difference between people, as advocated by the managing diversity approach (and as Rex and Malorie seem to be suggesting could be of comparable importance). Most trainers, then, seem to broadly be in agreement with an approach which focuses on those aspects of difference which are associated with structural discrimination.

In the following sections, I describe how trainers and participants discuss the specific provisions relating to some of the protected characteristics, and how these discussions are
influenced by understandings of the law, beginning with how sex discrimination is understood in E&D training.

7.5 Contestations over meanings

In this section I discuss four of the protected characteristics in detail: sex, gender reassignment, race and disability. These each have significant unique features which I draw out in the analysis. I have chosen to focus on sex, race and disability as these are the histories I discussed in the most detail in Chapters 3 and 4; and on ‘gender reassignment’ as an example of something which has changed substantively in the EA2010, in ways which are reflected in the way it is discussed (or not discussed).

7.5.1 Sexism

‘Sexism’ is a contested term in general discourse, as described by Clements and Jones:

Although the definition of sexism can apply to discriminatory behaviour or beliefs towards both sexes, the term ‘sexism’ is almost universally used to describe unequal treatment of women. (2002, p.70)

Trainers differed as to whether they emphasised sexism as unequal treatment of women – misogyny (although no trainer or participant used the term ‘misogyny’) – or sexism as unequal treatment on the basis of sex. Sexism was explicitly discussed in every session except for Liz’s session on disability awareness, which only listed sex in passing as a protected characteristic. In Malorie’s, Akanna’s and Sarah’s sessions – all of which had minimal focus on the law – sexism was raised only as misogyny. Rex, Sophia, Coral, Rose and Karishma incorporated the idea of sexism as discrimination on the basis of sex, but generally emphasised that women are more often disadvantaged by sexism.

Sex is an example of a protected characteristic in which everyone is protected. This has been the case in the UK since the first introduction of equality law relating to sex, the Equal Pay Act (1970) and the Sex Discrimination Act (1975) – both explicitly protected both men and women from discrimination on the basis of sex. In my fieldwork, trainers who included explanations of the law usually framed the issue as one of ‘sex discrimination’ or ‘gender discrimination’, affecting both men and women, though they sometimes stated that this was a more prevalent issue for women. For instance, a slide from Karishma’s training read:

Gender
- Definition of Gender Discrimination
  - Gender discrimination is the practice of letting a person’s sex unfairly become a factor when deciding who receives a job, promotion, or other employment benefit. It most often affects women who feel they have been unfairly discriminated against in favour of a man.

Although this definition focuses on discrimination against women, this is phrased as something women ‘feel’ has happened to them, rather than something that has actually happened to them. Where trainers or participants critiqued the law regarding sex discrimination, this was in order to argue that the protected characteristic ‘pregnancy and maternity’ should not have been gendered - men should also be protected from paternity discrimination. One trainer, Sophia, explained each protected characteristic in turn. When defining pregnancy and maternity (the final characteristic in her presentation), she commented on this immediately:

  Sophia said: pregnancy and maternity, ‘before you ask’ this is for women only. My personal opinion is, I personally think, that paternity should also be covered. Paternity is covered in employment law but I think it should also have been covered in the Equality Act because we should be treating people equally.

Sophia frames her critique as anticipating and agreeing with the criticisms of participants. In Coral’s session, she does not critique the law for this perceived inequality but participants do:

  Coral said in relation to pregnancy and maternity that this generally applies to women, but it can happen that trans men, men who were born female and then transition to be men, who kept all their internal organs, get pregnant and have a baby. So it can happen that people who are legally male have a baby.

  A white man responded, sounding frustrated and angry, we [at this university] have new paternity policies, we have paternity leave here, why are we still talking about maternity?

  There followed a passionate discussion about the university’s policies on maternity and paternity leave.

The provisions against pregnancy and maternity discrimination are one of the few areas of sex discrimination law in which women are ‘protected’ from discrimination while (cis) men are not (this dates back to the Sex Discrimination Act (1975), as described in Section 4.2). As these extracts show, this was conceptualised as itself being discriminatory in failing to treat men equally to women.
When discussing sex inequality, legally focused trainers and women participants are generally clear that women are disadvantaged in the UK. Sophia noted the pay gap:

Sophia said that an important aspect of the Equality Act in her opinion was that it brought together the Sex Discrimination Act with the Equal Pay Act. A white woman participant, Kay, was smiling and nodding enthusiastically while Sophia said that the gender pay gap in the UK is 18.5%, the highest in Europe, and it may be that part of the problem has been that the legislation on equal pay was separated from the legislation on sex discrimination. She told it as a story, something I noticed at other points as well, along the lines of ‘So the government thought, why don’t we bring together the …’ etc.

Even where trainers are raising issues of underrepresentation, the tendency is to choose examples of men being underrepresented in relatively low status fields, and women being underrepresented in high-status fields. For instance, Sophia used sex discrimination to talk about ‘positive action’, choosing ‘nursing and midwifery’ as a field that men are underrepresented in and ‘the boardroom’ as an area that women might be underrepresented in:

Sophia then talked about how the Equality Act has also changed law on positive action and increased the scope of legal positive action. She said that an example of positive action would be that if an organisation has a low proportion of women in top levels like the boardroom, they might have confidence training for women in their organisation, that would be an example of positive action (Kay, [the participant mentioned in the above extract] was nodding during this example). Sophia kept explaining the difference between positive action and positive discrimination by saying that you could, since men are underrepresented in nursing and midwifery, advertise a position and include the information that men are underrepresented in this field and you welcome applications from men. So you are encouraging men to apply, that is positive action, but you are not automatically giving them the job, which would be positive discrimination. (A white man was nodding while Sophia explained this.)

Similarly, when the trainer Karishma leads a discussion of both horizontal and vertical segregation in employment, the examples offered by participants of horizontal segregation are that women are more likely to be or to work in “school meal ladies, primary teaching, nursery (work at nurseries)” while men are more likely to be or to work in “CEOs, builders, finance/banking”.

As such, looking at the issue of sex inequality from the perspective of men’s underrepresentation in certain fields ends up reinforcing the idea that women are structurally oppressed. Karishma goes on to agree with a participant that vertical segregation is caused by a ‘glass ceiling’. She shares statistics about the gender
imbalance of people in positions of power, and tells the participants about the university’s participation in Athena SWAN. However, she also expresses her commitment to men as a group when talking about staff networks:

Karishma said that there is a women’s staff network group and added, ‘we’ve tried very hard to start a men’s staff network and it hasn’t happened, so if any men here want to start one, then be in contact!’

The idea of a men’s staff network was similarly raised by another trainer, Sarah, during an informal conversation with me after the training:

Sarah said, they have a women’s network and someone contacted her asking if they could set up a men’s network and she said sure, she has no problem with that. In fact men are in the minority at the university, 70% of staff are women.

I expressed surprise, asking whether that applies to senior management as well? She said no, the further up you get the more men there are, that statistic applies to staff overall.

As noted in Chapter 6, some trainers (Malorie, Akanna and Coral) also shared statistics about the proportions of men and women at different levels of the university hierarchy specific to that university when conducting training. These statistics always show the proportions of women dropping further up in the hierarchy. Trainers thus construct sexism both as the social oppression of women (through discussions of the ‘glass ceiling’, sharing statistics about women’s advancement in academia, and so on), and as unfair treatment of either sex. The only aspect of law which explicitly protects women and not men from discrimination (pregnancy and maternity) was critiqued as itself being sexist.

In the four sessions which discussed the law in detail, sex discrimination per se (as opposed to sexual or sexist harassment) was discussed extensively only in one – Karishma’s session, in which horizontal and vertical segregation were both raised by the trainer as discussion topics. Sex discrimination was also touched on in an exercise involving matching the name of the type of discrimination to the example, in Rose’s session:

On indirect discrimination, the example was of someone having to work from 8-11pm. I asked if it was against women because women are more likely to have caring responsibilities and Rose said yes.

In addition, Sophia gave two examples of positive action relating to sex, as described above. By contrast to this relative lack of focus on sexism and on problems which specifically affect women in the workplace in legally-focused sessions, two of the three trainers with a strong
focus on unconscious bias (Akanna and Malorie, who work for the same training provider) devoted a substantial component of training time to discussions of sexism and examples of sexism.

In the legally focused sessions, sexual harassment was a more popular focus of detailed discussion. Here, again, the EA2010 does not define sexual harassment as unwanted sexual conduct from men to women (unlike, for instance, Herbert (1992, 1994)). The EA2010 defines sexual harassment as a type of harassment without reference to the sex or gender or the perpetrator or victim, as explained in Chapter 4. Trainers who covered this area of law were clear that sexual harassment is not defined with reference to sex or gender. For instance, my fieldnotes on Sophia’s coverage of sexual harassment read:

Sophia then put up a slide about sexual harassment and said that this was unwanted sexual conduct and it’s NOT just men to women, she’s talking about men to women, women to men, women to women and men to men – it can be anyone the important thing is that it is unwanted sexual conduct. She also said (and it said on the slide) that it is illegal to discriminate against someone because they have submitted to sexual harassment or because they have refused to submit to sexual harassment, so for instance who was submitting to sexual harassment and then ended the relationship can’t be discriminated against on those grounds.

Here it seems clear that sexual harassment is being explicitly defined – both by the law and by trainers – as something with no necessary link to patriarchy. But when trainers present this definition, they are defining sexual harassment against a pre-existing conceptualisation of sexual harassment as something that men do to women – hence the active movement away from this, ‘it’s NOT just men to women’.

Two trainers, Rex and Rose, included an example of sexual harassment as a scenario. In both cases, the perpetrators were men and the victims were women. One trainer, Malorie, also included an example of sexist harassment as a scenario; this was of a man harassing women (by making sexist jokes, making anti-lesbian jokes and comments, and standing too close to a lesbian colleague). This pattern mirrors that of other scenarios. Although the law protects everyone around sex discrimination and several other protected characteristics, scenarios do not depict ‘reverse discrimination’, suggesting a tension between the idea that anyone can become a victim, and the idea that in fact only minoritised people become victims of harassment or discrimination. I return to the uses of scenarios in Section 7.7.
These examples suggest that the law affects the way trainers define sexism, in that legally focused trainers are more likely to explicitly define sex discrimination as discrimination on the basis of sex, which can affect both men and women. Similarly, trainers when focusing on the law emphasise that anyone can be a victim or perpetrator of sexual harassment. Some trainers also raise the idea of a ‘men’s network’ as something that the university aspires to institute.

However, underlying even the legally focused sessions, was a conception of sexism as something that primarily negatively affects women – through the misogyny and sexual harassment of women depicted in scenarios, and the examples chosen of fields in which women and men are under-represented. I give examples of how trainers who draw more extensively on psychology in their training discuss sexism in Chapter 8. In the next section I discuss how the protected characteristic of ‘gender reassignment’ is discussed in training.

7.5.2 Gender reassignment

Gender reassignment was generally raised only in the context of the law. That is, in moments that were not legally focused or explicitly using a legal framework, trans people were mentioned only three times, over two sessions; both sessions drew heavily on a legal discourse. Karishma appeared to incorporate trans people almost by accident, saying she had forgotten what the T of LGBT stands for:

Karishma has been covering each of the protected characteristics. We have already covered age, disability, gender reassignment, race, gender, pregnancy and maternity (in that order). The current slide is about sexual orientation. When saying that there is an LGBT staff network, Karishma asked us does anyone know “what does the T stand for”, I don’t remember? and got a chorus of ‘trans’, ‘transgender’ and ‘transsexual’ from at least four trainees, including me.

Although this episode is embedded in a legal framework (of discussing each protected characteristic in turn), it is notable that the LGBT staff network is mentioned only in relation to sexual orientation, although we have already named “transsexuals” when covering the protected characteristic of gender reassignment. This is indicative of the ongoing association of the ‘LGBT’ acronym with identities related to sexuality (lesbian, gay and bisexual) rather than gender identity, and more generally the marginality of trans people within the LGBT movement (Serano 2007, 2013).
Both other occasions took place in Rose’s training session. Statistics on trans students’ experiences were included in a quiz about student experiences of discrimination, and ‘gender identity’ was listed along with race and sexual orientation with the question for discussion on a slide “How confident do you feel in discussing equality issues (for example race, gender identity, sexual orientation)?” In their response to this question (which I discuss in detail in the next chapter), no participant mentioned gender identity; at the close of the discussion Rose gave everyone two handouts which were guides to language, one about race and one about gender identity.

The definitions given by trainers of ‘gender reassignment’ sometimes used language which has been considered offensive or outdated by trans people for many years, such as the phrase “sex change” or the phrase “a woman passing as a man”:

As Rex wrote gender reassignment on the list of protected characteristics he explained this refers to ‘people going through sex change’ … Soon after when defining the characteristics more fully he said gender reassignment refers to ‘a man passing as a woman or a woman passing as a man’ and does not require medical involvement.

Karishma used the example of “a woman who decides to live permanently as a man”. She said that “she would be covered” … “and this woman has decided to live permanently as a man” whereas a crossdresser is someone who likes to wear the clothes of the opposite gender, they are not protected. Living permanently is the key factor.

In both of these examples, the trans people are referred to using the sex they were assigned at birth rather than their identified gender. That is, rather than referring to a man who was assigned female at birth but now identified and lives as a man, Karishma continues to refer to this hypothetical trans man as a “woman” and uses the pronoun “she” to refer to him. Similarly, Rex’s use of the phrase “a man passing as a woman” (my emphasis) evokes someone who is really a man, and only “passes as” a woman (see Serano 2007).

The example of “a woman who decides to live permanently as a man” echoes that given in the explanatory notes to the EA2010, which is phrased in a way which compromises between the language recommended by trans activists (for instance, the phrase “gender assigned at birth” (Trans Media Watch 2010)) and more widely used language (e.g. “born male”, a phrase used by one trainer in explaining this protected characteristic):
A person who was born physically female decides to spend the rest of her life as a man. He starts and continues to live as a man. He decides not to seek medical advice as he successfully ‘passes’ as a man without the need for any medical intervention. He would have the protected characteristic of gender reassignment for the purposes of the Act. (EA2010 Explanatory notes)

Other trainers used language and phrasing more in keeping with that used by trans activists, or relied on the knowledge of the group:

Sophia asks us what gender reassignment means. Short awkward pause is broken by a white man who says something I didn’t hear properly about people wanting to change from the sex they were born with – nearly sure he used the word ‘change’ and didn’t use ‘trans’ (as prefix or as word) but don’t think he used term ‘sex change’ either. His phrasing was unexpected to me. Sophia agrees and says this can be male to female or female to male. Means you want to live in the other sex. This refers to people who are transsexual or transgender, not transvestite, a transvestite is someone who is happy with their own body and doesn’t want to change it, admires and respects the other gender, and sometimes wears the clothes of that gender to express that. She also said that there is no need to be under medical supervision to have this protected characteristic which used to be the case.

In a different training session:

Coral asked the whole group (as part of going through each protected characteristic in turn), What about gender reassignment?

Someone answered, that protects people who have gone through gender reassignment or going through the stages of gender reassignment

Coral asked, What is gender reassignment?

Someone answered, Changing gender

Coral asked, Do you need any medical procedure?

Someone answered, No

In general, when talking about gender reassignment, trainers (Karishma, Sophia, Coral, Rose) included the information that there is no need to be under medical supervision, in some cases stating that this is a shift from the previous legal situation. Some (Karishma and Sophia) also emphasised that this does not protect crossdressing, and one (Rose) noted the distinction between “gender reassignment” and “gender identity” in a broader sense (Coral noted that not everyone identifies within the gender binary, but did not raise the issue of whether they are therefore not protected from discrimination on the basis of ‘gender reassignment’). This information in itself did not lead to any debate or discussion in any of the training sessions. However, in the only two training sessions where the rights of trans people were explored in more detail (Rose and Coral’s sessions), some participants voiced
amazement and some disapproval. This centred on the lack of a legal requirement for “proof” of gender identity; the perception of a conflict between religion and trans identities; and the perception of a conflict between cis women’s rights and trans women’s rights. I discuss both of these episodes below.

In Rose’s training session, there was an exercise about ‘best practice’ which extended the concept of ‘reasonable adjustments’ to other groups, but phrased this as ‘reasonable accommodations’ (the American terminology for what in UK law is called ‘reasonable adjustments’). Rose was clear that there is no legal requirement to make ‘reasonable accommodations’ on the grounds of protected characteristics other than disability, but suggested this was a useful way to think about best practice. She gave us a short list of possible ‘reasonable accommodations’ relating to other protected characteristics, of which one was “Providing a single room as an alternative to dormitory sleeping on a field trip for a student who is transitioning”.

Annie, a Black woman, checked what ‘transitioning’ meant, and was told that it means changing gender. There was immediate agreement that the accommodation suggested would be fine, but someone asked what if the student didn’t want to do that?

Rose answered, they would stay in the dorm like everyone else. Annie responded, looking astonished and maybe disturbed, ‘would you need to do anything to prove that? If I decided I identify as a man could I just start using the men’s toilets?’

Someone, I think Rose, said ‘yes’. I said that trans people are entitled to be treated as the sex they identify with, regardless of any legal or medical changes that they’ve undergone (but I said it at much greater length than that). Rose agreed. Annie looked amazed.

A white man, Paul, said that they’d had these conversations when he worked in [retail? Or a night club?] because ‘we don’t want paedophiles pretending that they’re women’ and using the women’s toilets.

A white woman, Mary, asked, what about if there’s another student in the dorm and say their religious beliefs conflict, or say a woman said that ‘my personal experiences of sexual assault’ make it impossible for her to share a room with a trans woman (‘a trans woman’ wasn’t the vocabulary used in this question but I don’t know what was), then what would happen?

Rose said that if possible that person with the problem would be offered separate accommodation.

The surprise expressed by Annie over the lack of a requirement for trans people to “prove” that they are trans suggests that although the lack of a need for “medical supervision” is
mentioned in other training sessions, the implications of this are not understood unless they are spelled out, as they have been by the discussion around this hypothetical example. Paul’s comment about ‘paedophiles pretending they’re women’ doesn’t specify whether this is his view of trans women (that trans women are in fact men pretending to be women), or a perception that male paedophiles could use the systems created for trans women to gain access to women’s toilets; but it reflects the widespread perception of trans women as sexually deviant (see Serano (2007) for a critical review of this perception in mainstream culture, feminism, and academia). Finally, a third trainee reinforces the idea of trans women as sexually threatening by suggesting that a (cis) woman who has experienced sexual assault could find sharing a bedroom with a trans woman traumatic; and also suggests that there may be conflicts between religious beliefs and trans people. Possible conflicts between religion and sexual orientation, religion and trans rights, and on one occasion women’s rights and ‘cultural awareness’ were raised in various sessions, never from the perspective of an openly religious person (as described by Peel 2002b) but as theoretical issues, as in this example.

Continuing the episode in Coral’s training session described above, Coral went on to discuss some of the issues in depth. She began by asking the group to think about when protection would begin in relation to the process of coming out as trans, giving the hypothetical example of having an employee called “Tony with a y” who one day says that she identifies as a woman and wants to be referred to as “Toni with an i”. Again, trainees raise questions and objections on the grounds of “proof”:

A white man, Adam, asked, Is there any dependency on diagnosis with gender dysphoria? Do I have the right just to say ‘I feel like this’ or do I need medical...?

Coral responded, There’s no need for a medical diagnosis any more. Some people will need an exploratory period, there are some people who don’t decide they are the ‘opposite’ gender, some define by neither, some people use the pronoun ‘they’ rather than he or she, we shouldn’t be questioning their identity – we can just accept it.

Trainees also seemed concerned about the lack of a requirement for advance notice.

In response to Coral asking when Toni began to be legally protected:

A woman, Jo, responded: Don’t you need to give a bit of time? It sounds awful but I don’t believe an employee can just turn around and come in with a dress because what about everyone else’s diversity?
While Jo frames this generically (perhaps euphemistically) as a conflict with “everyone else’s diversity” – presumably a reference to religion, beliefs or culture – another trainee framed their objection in terms of the need to prepare students so that they respond appropriately:

Another trainee agreed, students may respond badly or they might need a bit of advance notice in order to respond well.

Coral then raised two practical questions: their name badge, and use of gendered toilets. While any changes to the name badge seemed to be accepted as straightforward, the question of how to respond to the possibility of people raising difficulties about toilets was more fraught:

Coral went on, further practicalities – the next day, Toni uses the ladies’ toilets. Some women see her going in and complain: there’s a man in the ladies. What do you do?

Someone said, explain the situation

Coral asked rhetorically, what is there to explain? Is Toni a man or a woman?

There was a prompt chorus of ‘woman’ from the delegates.

Coral went on, So a woman is using the ladies’ room.

A man said awkwardly, but medically not a female…

Adam asked, Is it sex or gender?

I didn’t clearly understand either Adam’s intervention here or the discussion that followed, in which Coral said that the whole idea of toilets being separated by gender is a social construction, made a comparison with changing rooms and suggested that the use of individual cubicles resolves any difficulties. However, one reading would be that Adam was asking whether it is (medical) sex or (socially constructed) gender which ought to determine which toilet is used. Coral’s response leans towards social construction but also suggests that there is no need to worry about this scenario because individual cubicles protect privacy. During this discussion, another trainee asked, “Where does that leave other protected characteristics? Religion. One has to trump the other”. Coral suggested in response that communication could resolve any issues.

However, Coral’s broader point here is that while staff may object to Toni (who they perceive as a man) using the women’s toilets, Toni is entitled to use the toilets which accord with her gender – and that responding to these objections by outing Toni as trans is not an acceptable line of response. She goes on to clarify this by saying:
In my time here, I haven’t heard of trans people questioned about toilets, and we’d like to maintain that. There is very strict data protection around trans people. You must NEVER tell someone that someone used to be of a different gender – that is breaking the data protection act. You must be very very careful about data. We have a healthy trans community here.

This is the only time a trainer mentioned that “outing” people could be problematic in relation to any LGBT identity. Gender history is considered “sensitive information” under the Data Protection Act 1998. Coral used this to reinforce that it would not be acceptable to smooth over any objections to a trans woman using women’s facilities by referring to her gender history.

To summarise, the case of gender reassignment shows a clear influence of the law over the curriculum of training, in that trans people were almost never mentioned in a non-legal context. In most sessions, gender reassignment was listed as a protected characteristic and was briefly defined, often in ways which define trans people more by the gender they were assigned at birth than by their lived and identified gender. Beyond this trans people were not referred to in most sessions. In each of the legally focused sessions, ‘gender reassignment’ was described in more detail, including the lack of a requirement for ‘medical supervision’. However, on the two occasions when trainers explored the implications of this more fully in terms of how trans people have a right to be treated in the workplace, questions and objections arose along the same lines in both sessions. These questions were around proof of gender identity; trans women being perceived as threats to cis women; and conflicts between religious beliefs and trans identities. That none of these questions arose in other sessions suggests that trans people’s rights under the EA2010 were not being clearly communicated in other training sessions. The recent wave of sustained, hostile press attention to trans rights and particularly trans women’s rights (see Fox and Owl 2017) may have since raised the profile of trans rights in E&D training sessions.

7.5.3 Race

As with sex, race is a protected characteristic which applies to everyone. This was emphasised by Rex and by Coral when first introducing the protected characteristic:

Coral asks us, what is race?

Someone says “Ethnicity”, someone else says “nationality”. There is a long pause, broken by some giggles.
Coral breaks the silence to add: Colour, culture. White people are also protected, for instance Welsh colleagues, whites can be racist against whites – think of the Brits and French for instance.

She then explained that there is a new scheme for race equality called GEM, it started as a big survey of thirty higher education institutions. Also, within race there is caste. She explained a bit more about the legal status of ‘caste’.

A participant spoke up, saying, I thought race is like Caucasian, Native Americans…

Coral responded, yes all of that, it covers all of that. Race is a social construct, we like to box people up into categories. Caste is on the horizon to be under consideration, we have lots of students from South East Asia where caste is very important.

She explained that the university usually puts international students from the same area of the world together in their student housing, but this can be problematic because of caste discrimination between students.

The same participant said jokingly, that sounds like a social experiment!

Other trainers who cover ‘race’ as a protected characteristic, for instance, Sophia, Karishma and Malorie, do not incorporate the idea that ‘race’ covers everyone, including white British people:

Malorie asks us, “what is diversity? And please don’t say the dance group! Someone always does!”

There is some joking chat about the dance group. A participant then answers that diversity means inclusion of everybody regardless of … (she lists things like race, gender, religion – I don’t remember what she actually lists! It’s not a list of the protected characteristics as such, or at least not a complete one. Malorie summarises this as “the list” (saying it like a catchphrase). She asks us, do you all know “the list” in the Equality Act?

People nod in response. She asks Dan (her assistant, a white man from the same organisation) to write them on the flipchart as people say them. After he writes ‘race’ in big letters she tells him jokingly that he’ll have to write them smaller to fit them all in.

Participants call out various answers: ‘race’, ‘gender’, ‘religion’, ‘sexual orientation’, ‘age’, ‘disability’, ‘marriage’, ‘nationality’, ‘transgender’, ‘pregnancy’ – the process is messy, with multiple people saying things or calling them out but not all being heard, some are phrased as a question like ‘is pregnancy one?’, and some being changed by Malorie as they are called out before they are written down. This is the case right from the beginning with ‘race’. Matthew, a white man participant, responds audibly that there’s no such thing as race. Someone says ‘ethnicity’ and Malorie answers that ethnicity is actually not covered – ethnic origin is. The category is race, colour, nationality and ethnic origin. She asks, what’s the difference between ethnicity and ethnic origin? Matthew answers, ‘ethnicity is self-defined and race doesn’t exist at all, I think the correct way to say it is that people are racialised.’ Malorie agrees, saying ethnicity can change, for instance she could identify her ethnicity as Black Caribbean or as Black British and that could change, and that’s why they decided to stick to ethnic
origin. She doesn’t directly respond to the ‘race doesn’t exist’ part but I have the sense that she agrees but doesn’t think it worth going into at this moment.

In one session – Karishma’s – there is some discussion about the inclusion of ‘nationality’ in the definition of race, with a participant perceiving this as contradictory with immigration law:

Earlier in the session, Karishma asked for examples of ‘difference’ and written them on flipchart paper as they were called out. She has now asked us whether they are legally protected. She reads out, “Nationality?”. The two responses are ‘No’ and ‘not sure?’.

Karishma responds: ‘Yes – under race’.

Then she said that we were missing a protected characteristic, which is gender reassignment, a new protected characteristic (she may have written it on). Once we had gone through them all she put up a slide which lists the protected characteristics.

A woman asked: Nationality, how can this be a protected characteristic, when it’s built into employment, all job ads say you must have right to work? How is that not discrimination based on nationality?

Karishma replied: If someone doesn’t have the right to work, that’s a different thing. But as long as you have the right to work, you can’t discriminate based on nationality.

The woman objected again. Karishma reiterated the idea that ‘Work permits and things like that’ are a separate issue to discrimination on the grounds of nationality. She then moved to a slide about the history of equalities legislation and commented on how race is one of the oldest to be protected with the first race relations act.

This participant, in querying how nationality can be a protected characteristic while also being intimately bound up in decisions about who has the right to work in the UK, is pointing to the apparent contradiction between the UK government’s discriminatory immigration policies and the EA2010. As is evident from the history described in Chapter 4, UK immigration law was designed to enable white Commonwealth citizens to move to the UK while keeping out Black and Asian Commonwealth citizens and former citizens. The racism of these decisions was widely recognised at the time. However, this history is no longer widely known and was not mentioned by any trainer. Although many gave a brief historical narrative of equalities legislation, as Karishma does here, no trainers made the connection between the history of anti-discrimination legislation and restrictive immigration law.

Only one trainer, Karishma, mentioned the concept of ‘institutional racism’:

Karishma changed the slide to one titled ‘Race’, reading:

➔ Definition of Racial Discrimination
Racial discrimination means any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, nationality and ethnic or national origins.

→ Definition of Institutional Racism

- The collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and professional service to people because of their colour, culture or ethnic origin.

This definition is taken from the Macpherson report. Karishma said that institutional racism is something that is embedded in an organisation. The Stephen Lawrence inquiry about a Black teenager who was murdered. She talked admiringly about his family’s persistence in looking for justice and acknowledgement, and said that the Macpherson Inquiry coined the term institutional racism.

However, Karishma was not the only trainer to mention Stephen Lawrence, with two other trainers noting that they had become diversity practitioners in response to the Stephen Lawrence case. Either during the training or in conversation, five (half) of the trainers I observed mentioned having at some point worked with the police on equalities.

The case of race demonstrates how differently even legally focused trainers can choose to approach a topic. Only two trainers emphasised that ‘race’ is a protected characteristic that everyone has when first defining ‘race’. No trainer included examples of discrimination against white people at any stage of the training. Trainers differed very widely in terms of the time and attention devoted to race and racism, with Sophia only mentioning race in an initial list of protected characteristics and never returning to the topic, while Karishma and Coral discussed racism in more depth.

7.5.4 Disability

Although disability was mentioned in every training session (for instance, by being listed as a protected characteristic), the practicalities of treating disabled people equally in the workplace were discussed in far more detail in each of the legally focused sessions than in any of the sessions which were more grounded in psychological discourses of ‘stereotyping’ and ‘unconscious bias’. Although disability was mentioned in some of these psychologically focused sessions, this was only in the context of attitudinal barriers – stereotyping of disabled people – rather than including information about practical measures that could or should be taken to reduce or eliminate institutional barriers. The only exception to this was a scenario in Malorie’s session in which one of the characters was dyslexic, in which questions arose of how best to support him. By contrast, disability was discussed in detail in each of the legally focused sessions.
In this section I briefly recap some of the description and analysis of Chapter 4 relating to disability in the EA2010, before describing how trainers and trainees talk about disability law. The EA2010 was intended to harmonise existing anti-discrimination legislation, but kept many of the provisions of earlier laws. Anti-discrimination law on disability incorporated concepts which were unique to disability, such as ‘reasonable adjustments’. The EA2010 makes specific and unique provisions for disability. Firstly, the protected characteristic of disability is defined such that only disabled people are protected from discrimination on the grounds of disability; non-disabled people cannot make a claim that they have been discriminated against because of their status as non-disabled. As such, the protected characteristic of disability is really a protected group: disabled people. (This is not unique to disability – the same applies to marriage and civil partnership, and to gender reassignment).

Secondly, unlike the protected characteristic of gender reassignment (which states explicitly that to have the protected characteristic of gender reassignment, there is no need to be under medical supervision), having the protected characteristic of disability is not tied in any sense with personal identification as ‘disabled’; instead it is tied to the duration of the impairment and its impact on day to day activities as defined by medical professionals.

Thirdly, there are two categories of discrimination which apply only to disability. These are failure to make reasonable adjustments, and discrimination arising from a disability. These two forms of discrimination which are specific to disability reflect the idea that there are differences between disabled and non-disabled people such that disabled people may have legitimate needs for specific aspects of their working environment to be changed. ‘Failure to make reasonable adjustments’ also reflects the social model of disability, as described in Section 4.4.

Discrimination arising from a disability is a particularly important category in its difference from the provisions made for other protected groups. The example given by the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) guidance on universities is of an autistic student whose disruptive behaviour in seminars is a result of their autism (EHRC 2014, p.18). Although the same behaviours might lead another student to be excluded from seminars, in the case of this student the disruptive behaviour is a result of their autism and hence the institutional response should be different.
Taken together, these legal provisions for disability reflect a different conception of disability compared to all other protected characteristics. This can lead to difficulties when trainers are trying to communicate a consistent analysis of what equality and diversity are.

One of the E&D training sessions which I observed was focused exclusively on disability. This session included facts about disability, an explanation of the social model of disability, scenarios, and a discussion of terminology. Disability was also raised as a topic for explanation and discussion in all four of the four sessions which were focused on the law. In general, disability was a protected characteristic which received more attention in these sessions compared to sessions focused around unconscious bias. Disability was one of the few protected characteristics which legally focused trainers defined in detail. In these sessions, discussions focused on the definition of disability, and the legal requirement to make reasonable adjustments (including the question of what is used to judge whether an adjustment is ‘reasonable’). ‘Discrimination arising from disability’ was defined in only two of these sessions and became a topic of discussion only in one (Sophia’s).

Disability was the example that trainers turned to when defining equality, using disability to argue that that being treated ‘equally’ does not mean being treated as ‘the same’. For instance, early in Karishma’s training session, she asked the group, ‘what is equality?’:

A white woman answered: ‘treating everybody the same’

Karishma seemed to settle into a comfortable teaching mode: ‘I’m going to give an example.’ She said, addressing the whole room, suppose you have work starting strictly at 9, but the wheelchair accessible bus only arrives at 9.30. So if you treat everyone the same everyone has to be there at 9 even though people who need to use the wheelchair accessible bus can’t get there ‘til 9.30.

Turning to the woman who has answered her, she asked: Is that what equality is about?

The participant responded, ‘No’.

Karishma agreed, then put up a definition on the slideshow: creating a fairer society, in which everyone has the opportunity to fulfil their potential.

Similarly, Coral used the example of an induction loop to make this argument. The legal requirement to make reasonable adjustments codifies this: to treat disabled people ‘equally’, there is a duty to treat them differently, by making reasonable adjustments. The duty to make reasonable adjustments is much stronger than the law against indirect
discrimination, but rests on a similar principle, as described in Section 4.5. In these cases, the example of disability helps trainers to clarify what is meant by equality. In other cases, the legal definition of ‘disability’ differs from the other protected characteristics and leads to confusion. For instance, disability is not legally defined by self-identification but by ‘objective’ measures. Where ‘identities’ have been emphasised by the trainer, this can be confusing. For instance, Sophia opened the training session by telling the group that ‘Equality and diversity is all about identities’, but described disability as follows:

The next slide was about disabilities and contained the legal definition of disability in the Equality Act 2010 (duration, substantial impact, etc.). Sophia emphasised that this covers many people who don’t think of themselves as disabled. In general the disorder or impairment needs to last twelve months or be expected to, including intermittent disorders like IBS [Irritable Bowel Syndrome], bipolar, depression, but there are three illnesses which are considered to be disabilities from the moment of diagnosis: MS [Multiple Sclerosis], cancer, and HIV [Human Immunodeficiency Virus]. The legislation uses the social model as opposed to the medical model of disability, which means that the problem is seen as society not being accessible to people with disabilities, rather than the problem being the disabilities themselves. So it’s not about self-definition.

Sophia then asked, half-jokingly, are any of you here psychiatrists? There was silence with some people shaking their heads, and she went on to say that’s good because I had a real (she made a gesture with two fists pushing against each other and a frustrated face) with one about this recently.

She went on: There are some things which are not considered to be disabilities and they are addiction, a tendency to set things on fire, and a tendency to abuse children. With addiction, the addiction itself is not considered a disability but if, suppose, someone is addicted to alcohol and they develop liver problems, the liver problems may become a disability. But someone with a tendency to abuse children cannot say in their defence that that is their disability. That psychiatrist had argued about it but that is the law.

Coral gave a similarly detailed definition of disability, leading a discussion which she begins by asking ‘What is a disability?’. In the fieldnotes quoted above, Sophia went into a high level of detail about disability law. She pointed out that disability is not legally defined by self-definition or self-declaration but by specific criteria relating to the type of illness, duration, and so on. As a result, many people are legally protected who may not see themselves as disabled. Sophia emphasised the medical conditions laid out in the law to be considered disabled.

Within our training session, these definitions were not contested as invalid by participants or by the trainer, Sophia. However, she did share a previous controversy with us by telling us about an argument she had had with a previous participant, who argued that some people with psychiatric disorders who are not currently protected by legislation ought to be
protected. It is clear from Sophia’s manner throughout the session that she does not like being challenged in these ways. She dealt with these arguments by presenting herself as ‘the messenger’ for the law.

Another area in which disability law was perceived as contradicting other areas of anti-discrimination law was positive discrimination. Because ‘disability’ refers to a group, and not a characteristic in the sense of race, sex or sexual orientation, it is legal to treat disabled employees and job applicants more positively than non-disabled employees and job applicants. This most often arose in discussion of programmes such as Access to Work (a government organisation which provides financial support with reasonable adjustments to enable disabled people to work), and the ‘Two Tick’ scheme (a scheme, symbolised by two ticks, in which employers agree to give a job interview to all disabled people who meet the essential requirements for the job – this was current during my fieldwork but has since been replaced with the Disability Confident scheme and symbol (Department for Work and Pensions 2016)). For instance, Karishma, in describing the ‘Two Tick’ scheme stated that ‘it is a little bit of positive discrimination but it is acceptable when it comes to disability’. In another session, a participant asked why this scheme existed only for disability:

Sion (a white male participant) asked why does this exist for disabled people but not for other protected characteristics, is it because they might be receiving benefits so the government wants to get them jobs?

Sophia said maybe that was a factor, but it’s more because of centuries of discrimination against disabled people, people have unconscious biases that disabled people can’t do certain jobs so if they get an interview that’s an opportunity to show that actually yes they can do that job.

Sion said he just thought, if there was a money agenda...

Sophia said probably that was part of it but mainly it is about countering discrimination.

This exchange again suggests the lack of a political and historical context to E&D training. As described in Chapter 4, debates around introducing the DDA1995 did centre around the question of whether it was more cost-effective to facilitate employment for disabled people than to support disabled people through unemployment benefits, as Sion speculates here.

Other than the definition of ‘disability’, the most commonly discussed issue in relation to disability was ‘reasonable adjustments’. This was described and discussed in all four of the legally focused sessions, as well as in Liz’s session specifically on disability; it was not mentioned in any other session. Three approaches to exploring ‘reasonable adjustments’
were used: Sophia used a scenario in which a new employee tells you, as her line manager, that she has bipolar disorder and gives a list of the side effects of her medication. The exercise involves thinking about confidentiality and disclosure, and about which reasonable adjustments could be offered or put in place. Liz similarly used scenarios, including one about event planning. Rose gave a list of possible adjustments and asked us to discuss in small group whether these were ‘reasonable’ or not, then moved to a whole-group discussion in which she explained the answers. Coral similarly gave examples for discussion, but these were discussed by the whole training group rather than first being discussed in smaller groups. Karishma gave examples of reasonable adjustments used by current members of staff with sensory impairments, and asked for further examples of reasonable adjustments:

Karishma gave two examples of members of staff with disabilities, one who seemed to be a well-known lecturer at the university who I think was blind. I don’t properly remember because I didn’t feel right writing down the details, not knowing how those members of staff felt about being included as examples in this kind of talk. She was talking about some of the reasonable adjustments that needed to be made for those academics. I felt uncomfortable listening as well, without writing down. This bit stayed uncomfortable for me as Karishma then asked us to suggest other reasonable adjustments for people with disabilities and talk about them. The first was Noam, a white Israeli man, who said some students required their slides in large print on handouts.

Karishma asked, have you done that or just heard of it?

Noam, sounding surprised, answered ‘I’ve done it’

Karishma responded sincerely: ‘…and I’m sure they were very grateful’ before looking around for other suggestions.

This exchange was unusual in my ethnographic data, in two ways: firstly, the trainer’s use of named individual members of staff as examples of people who required reasonable adjustments. While this may have taken place with the permission of the individuals concerned, Karishma did not say so as part of the training, creating the impression that people with disabilities could be used as teaching exercises in this way. Secondly, the trainer expressed an expectation that disabled students would feel grateful for receiving something they are legally entitled to. This perspective, while common, is not in keeping with the social model of disability, as expressed through the slogan “rights not charity” (Parker 1995; see also Galvin 2004). Three trainers, including Karishma, incorporated the social model into the session:
The next slide is titled **Medical model of Disability is now old and outdated ...**

The image shows ‘The impairment is the problem’ in the middle and, radiating out, it says ‘GPs’ ‘Doctors’ ‘Special schools’ ‘Training centres’ ‘Sheltered workshops’ ‘Benefits agency’ ‘Occupational therapists’ ‘Speech therapists’ ‘Child development team’ ‘Social workers’ ‘Surgeons’ ‘Special transport’ ‘Educational psychologists’.

At the bottom it says ‘Disabled people as passive receivers of services aimed at cure or management’. Karishma said that this is a very outdated model. Next slide is titled **Social model of disability is now the acceptable model.**

Image says ‘The structures within society are the problem’ and radiating out it says ‘Lack of useful education’ ‘Discrimination in employment’ ‘Segregated services’ ‘Poverty’ ‘Belief’ in the medical model’ ‘Inaccessible information’ ‘Inaccessible transport’ ‘Prejudice’ ‘De-valuing’ ‘Inaccessible environment’. Along the bottom it says ‘Disabled people as active fighters for equality working in partnership with allies’.

Karishma said that discrimination in employment still happens, and repeated ‘it still happens’. People think, ‘we want to work with able-bodied people around us’.

Sophia similarly included a succinct definition of the medical and social models of disability. Liz described both models in substantially more detail, describing the various kinds of barrier which are part of the social model of disability. She also emphasised that the social model of disability was created by disabled people – the only time any trainer attributed importance to the social position of people creating knowledge or theory:

The social model of disability is a different model and a very important point about this model is that it was one that disabled people themselves came up with in the 70s. They got together and came up with their own definition of disability and their definition was ‘disability is the experience of barriers’.

She then incorporated her personal journey into the description, explaining that for her personally, learning about the social model was extremely helpful:

Liz said, I heard about the social model for the first time over ten years ago around the time that my sight loss began. For me it was really liberating because it helped me realise it wasn’t all my fault that a lot of things were hard. If it’s hard to do my shopping, hard to borrow a library book, [she lists a few more], that wasn’t all my fault – some of that didn’t need to be hard but there were barriers in place that made it difficult. The barriers needn’t be there.

When talking about how to determine whether or not an adjustment was ‘reasonable’, trainers differed in terms of whether they included cost as a component of the decision-making process, and more generally in terms of the process of decision-making they described. Sophia strongly emphasised that the disabled employee needs to have an appointment with Occupational Health; this led to a discussion about whether or not they
could be ‘made’ to go to Occupational Health which was never fully resolved. Rose suggested that best practice is to begin from a position of ‘why not?’, but also stated that the reasonable adjustment that the employee asks for may not be the one you actually make and that it is legitimate to explore the reasons they want that adjustment. I was struck by the reasoning of one example Rose gave in particular:

Rose said she knew of a case where there was a wheelchair user who worked in broadcasting and did international reporting. He needed to fly business class due to his disability and that meant significantly higher costs for the organisation, a serious financial commitment, but it was very good for the business – they got kudos from having a disabled person as an international reporter and the staff felt inspired by the example of that person – so they decided it made sense for them, that on balance it was worth spending the additional money.

In this example, what makes an adjustment ‘reasonable’ is the fundamentally disablist attitude of the organisation, in which disabled people are valued for being ‘inspiring’ (Hadley 2016). This perception of disabled people as ‘inspiring’ clearly comes from the “personal tragedy theory of disability” (Oliver 1996, p.31); disabled people are ‘inspiring’ because they are perceived as having overcome their tragedy. Further, the organisation decided that there was a public relations value to having a visibly disabled international reporter, and hence invested in reasonable adjustments for him; it is clear from this example that disabled employees who cannot similarly be made into the visible face of diversity (see Ahmed 2012) would not receive comparable investment in their career. This example shows again how the medical, or the individual, model of disability (Oliver 1996) can continue to permeate the reasoning behind the ostensibly ‘social model’ requirement to make reasonable adjustments.

As with the other protected characteristics discussed above, the case of disability shows that trainers can remain focused on the law and its applications while communicating different underlying priorities and conceptualisations of disability. As with gender reassignment, disability is given a higher priority in legally focused sessions than in psychologically focused sessions. I would suggest that the relative priority given to disabled people in legally focused training can be attributed to the unique legal status of disability. I have argued that this unique status can make disability an exemplar for other protected characteristics (when explaining that equality does not mean treating people ‘the same’),
but can also complicate the broader terrain of equalities legislation due to being a protected group rather than a protected characteristic.

In the following sections I turn from analysing the way specific protected characteristics are spoken about, to how the law more generally is used to position participants in relation to discrimination.

7.6 Framing the training: Rights, responsibilities, and liability

When setting out the purpose of training at the beginning, trainers often referred to the importance of knowing your ‘rights and responsibilities’. This phrase encompasses victims and perpetrators – if your rights are being violated, you are a victim of discrimination; if you are failing to live up to your responsibilities under equality law, you are a perpetrator. Taken together, the phrase ‘rights and responsibilities’ evokes a different discourse and subject position: that of the citizen.

I see ‘rights and responsibilities’ as an example of a ‘citizenship’ discourse, closely bound up in legal discourse. While the phrase, ‘rights and responsibilities’, positions participants as potential victims and potential perpetrators, different aspects were emphasised at different moments. Some emphasised our rights, in other words the possibility that we will be victims of discrimination: for instance, when opening the session, Coral said that it is “a bit of a shocker how little people know about their rights”, and later said that the EA2010 “doesn’t stop any of this from happening, but now you know your rights”. Another trainer, Rex, joked that we could take the university to court if the university does not follow its own policies about discrimination:

Rex has been talking to a white male participant, who is standing at his seat. Rex told him to come out to the front (for a discussion in front of the whole group) and the trainee answered ‘I’m not comfortable’. Rex said to him firmly ‘you’ll be alright’ and then, while the trainee started picking his way out of his row and forward to the front, the trainer said to the room as a whole ‘He will be alright. I mean what I say. So do your policies.’ Rex then joked ‘If not, take them to court!’ in a dramatic tone which got a laugh.

In this interaction, a participant has attempted to opt out taking part in a discussion with the trainer in front of the rest of the participants. Rex overrode his objection by telling him ‘you’ll be alright’, then tried to reassure the group as a whole that there was no problem by telling us ‘I mean what I say’. He then took the opportunity to reassure us that ‘your
policies’ also mean what they say – in other words, that we could rely on university staff to follow policies and procedures correctly. This implies either an absence of discrimination, or a supportive and helpful response to instances of discrimination. Given that early in the session, Rex asked the group who had actually read the university’s policy on ‘dignity at work’ and no one claimed to have read it, it was perhaps unconvincing to tell us that these policies would be followed. Rex goes on to invoke a higher authority than the workplace by suggesting that we could ‘take them [the university] to court’ if an attempt to make the university follow its policies is unsuccessful. This clarifies that Rex is referring to the university’s response to instances of discrimination or harassment: either the policies will be followed, or the law will correct the problem. This places the participants in the subject position of potential victims of discrimination, but reassures them/us that the university is on the side of the victim, or at least the law is on the side of the victim. In doing so, Rex emphasised our legal rights rather than our legal responsibilities.

Similarly, Sophia explained that the ‘dual discrimination’ part of the EA2010 has not come into force, but that a case of dual discrimination brought to the European Court of Human Rights was ruled in the plaintiff’s favour:

So we don’t have this in English law but you could always take your case to Europe!
(told as a smiling gentle joke)

In these instances, trainers avoided using law, case law and university policy to suggest that we need to be more careful to avoid becoming perpetrators: instead they present policies and laws as protecting us from discrimination or harassment. Again, this framing places participants in the subject position of the potential victim of discrimination, and assures us that we have ‘rights’ which will ultimately be upheld by the legal system.

In other cases, trainers present legal information in a way which frames participants as potential (unwitting) perpetrators of discrimination:

Sophia told us, the NHS is notorious for asking how many days of sick leave someone has taken. If you divulge that information you are breaking the data protection act.

In the next section I give further examples of how participants can be positioned as potential victims of discrimination when trainers talk about the law.
Participants as victims

I have already discussed in Section 7.6 above how trainers sometimes refer to law or policy as protecting trainees, often in passing. In the cases already described, this positioning of participants as potential victims is brief and casual. Trainers working within a legal or a policy framework rarely addressed participants as possible victims of discrimination beyond these brief comments and jokes. The exception to this is in discussion of harassment. Detailed explanations of what your options are as a victim of harassment came up in two of the legally focused general E&D sessions (Karishma’s and Coral’s), as well as in the only session which was specifically about harassment (Zoe’s). In Sophia’s session, there was no in-depth discussion of the university’s procedures, but Sophia segued from a discussion of harassment to giving advice on what to do if something “offends” you (without having been asked for this advice). Many of these episodes draw more heavily on psychological discourse than the legal discourse, and I analyse this in the next chapter; however, law and policy were clearly implicated in each case (for instance, Sophia suggested that “I could take you to court” is something a victim shouldn’t say in response to harassment).

At first glance, these episodes are similar across training sessions. Both Karishma and Coral talked participants through their options as victims in a way which is analogous to the way their responsibilities as possible perpetrators of discrimination are discussed in other moments of training (see Section 7.7). These trainers encouraged participants to come up with their own solutions, but also provided their own suggestions when participants stopped volunteering ideas:

The slide defines bullying and harassment, including a list of other terms for bullying: “personality clash, strong robust management, attitude problems, unreasonable behaviour, kicking ass”

Karishma comments on this part of the slide, saying, but at the end of the day you would know that this is bullying if it is happening to you. Karishma then asks the group, suppose you are starting at xxx and you have a colleague who makes you feel very uncomfortable, what should you do?

Someone answers, speak to your line manager.

Karishma agrees, speak to them. If you are not comfortable who should you talk to?

Someone answers, HR [Human Resources]

Karishma presses, anybody else?
Someone suggests, support group or adviser?

Karishma agrees, saying the university has specially trained advisors.

Someone suggests, also trade union reps

Karishma adds, also counselling, its mainly for students but it can happen that people get hurt and then staff can also use the service. She then changes slide to one which gives a detailed list of actions to take if you are being harassed or bullied, including documenting the harassment, asking the harasser to stop and using an advisor. The slide also includes a list under the title of ‘Body language’, advising that you speak calmly and slowly and are ‘assertive’.

The sequence is very similar in Coral’s session, except that Coral does not give advice on staying ‘calm’:

Coral suggests, can you tell that person what has happened and how it made you feel? If not, how would you get around that?

A woman responds, talk to you guys! [The E&D team]

Coral agrees, lots of people do. She goes on to suggest unions and lists some – UCU, Unison and Unite – and mediation. She also says that sometimes these problems are “very small things which balloon, because somebody hasn’t said something” and goes on to say that by law the focus is on a protected characteristic, but 90% of claims at xxx are nothing to do with a protected characteristic. She then moves on to talk about the difference between bullying and harassment.

In Zoe’s and Sophia’s session, this question-and-answer format was not used. Zoe’s session on ‘Harassment’ devoted a substantial proportion of training time to discussing tactics and options for what to do when you have been a victim of harassment. She included detailed discussion of speaking to the person directly, writing a letter, or using mediation. As when Karishma discussed these possibilities, some of the advice was framed in terms of the importance of being ‘assertive’, and avoiding an accusatory tone. Zoe’s training included lots of anecdotes from her professional experience, and several participants described their experiences as victims of harassment. Among other anecdotes, Zoe described her experiences of how bullies can sometimes effectively claim to be victims. These stories gave the training a pragmatic tone which frequently acknowledged that that outcome of complaints or of mediation might not be favourable to the victim. In this session participants were positioned as possible victims of harassment from the very beginning, as many participants mentioned their previous experiences of being harassed in their introductions.
Sophia’s discussion of harassment appeared to position participants as possible victims of harassment in the same way as Karishma, giving advice on being ‘calm’ and discussing the issue directly. However, seen in context, I would argue that in fact what happens in Sophia’s session is more complex and ultimately is not addressing participants as victims, but as perpetrators. This episode in context is given below:

They were talking about the handout, titled “Study says office banter could cost UK firms up to £292bn” which describes a wide range of behaviour which could be construed as harassment and argues that many workers continue to believe that a range of workplace behaviours are acceptable when in fact they could lead to “claims of harassment”. Sion, a white man, quizzed Sophia [the trainer] on the ‘blaspheming’ mention in the handout. She was saying that yes it can be considered environmental harassment.

Sion asked if for instance he messed something up and said ‘Oh God’ would that potentially be a problem as it is blasphemous.

Sophia says yes, but that sort of thing would have to have happened at least twice to matter, it is only sexual harassment, or extreme things like if you hit someone, that count as harassment although they have only happened once. Otherwise it would only be if someone had told you that it makes them uncomfortable and then you continued to do it that there would be a problem. She then said, I’m not telling you what to do, but this is just my advice for how to approach someone if they have offended you. First of all give them the benefit of the doubt. So you can just politely say to someone, I’m not sure if you’ve realised, but when you said this this morning, I found that offensive. So saying I’m not sure you’ve realised, that gives them the benefit of the doubt that they didn’t mean to offend you. And then tell them what you want them to change, so for instance, I would appreciate it if you don’t use that word any more. If you approach people like that they are very likely to listen but if you come to someone and say, THAT WORD YOU USED THIS MORNING OFFENDED ME AND I COULD TAKE YOU TO COURT, they will just get defensive.

Lots of people laughed at her imitation of someone being angry and rude.

Sophia went on to tell an anecdote about how she successfully and subtly convinced her daughter that she didn’t really want expensive trainers (discussed in Section 8.14), linking this advice for victims of discrimination with broader discourses of human nature. At first glance, this episode is just another example of a trainer advising people who are hurt by harassment to manage their behaviour such that they stay calm and polite (I give further examples in the next chapter). However, in context, I see this episode very differently.

Sophia has just been questioned by participants about what could constitute offensive workplace behaviour. The participants have been attempting to explore the outer limits of what could constitute ‘harassment’, giving examples of workplace behaviour that they see
as reasonable and asking whether they could still be classified as harassment. This responds to the handout which explicitly states that most workers struggle to understand where the line is drawn. This can be related to Brewis’ (2016) analysis of the different ‘roles’ that diversity practitioners play in relation to organisations. The handout is used by Sophia in the ‘provocateur’ role, challenging participants to rethink their behaviour and positioning them as possible (unwitting) perpetrators of discrimination by emphasising that many behaviours which are usually not considered to be harassment can be construed as harassment.

Sophia then pulls away from this conversation, and from her own positioning as unreasonable or ‘politically correct’ (as she has given us this handout), and immediately segues into giving advice on what to do if you have been offended. In this advice, she assures the participants that she does not advocate threatening people with court cases. This can be understood as a way for trainers to try to contain the anger of the oppressed – but as they are implicitly aligned with the oppressed (particularly in the case of women such as Sophia, and the majority of trainers in my sample), it is also an implicit promise to the group that if the trainer is offended, they will not be aggressive about it. ‘Give them the benefit of the doubt’ is another way for trainers to say, ‘I will give you the benefit of the doubt’. My reasoning here is comparable to Ahmed’s when she writes that:

‘The speech act “we would not accuse you of racism” can be translated into “I am not racist” insofar as the “I” that would not accuse the “you” has already identified with that you.’ (2012, p.147)

Similarly, insofar as the speaker is already identified with the one who may be offended, her advice can be read as a statement of her intentions about how she will behave when offended.

In some contexts, trainers may state this intent explicitly. Although no trainer in my research did this, in my voluntary work as an LGBT inclusion trainer, one of our ground rules is ‘assume goodwill’. Trainers explain this rule to groups by explicitly including the trainers as subject to the rule – assuring the participants that we, the trainers, were going to assume the best about them and their intentions, and give them the benefit of the doubt if they say something which could be seen negatively by us. Although the trainers in my fieldwork did not say this explicitly, I understand Sophie’s statement as more concerned with positioning
herself as unthreatening than with the participants’ experiences of being subjected to harassment.

When participants respond to their positioning as possible unwitting perpetrators with anxiety and a need for clarification, Sophia then takes on the position of the ‘comforter’ (Brewis 2016), reassuring participants that she is advocating for a workplace where harassment is handled informally, calmly and politely. To bring Brewis’ analysis into my own framework, I would argue that both the provocateur and the comforter roles are directed towards people who may perpetrate discrimination, not towards victims of discrimination; the comforting is needed to calm people’s fears about the consequences (for them) of perpetrating discrimination, not to help victims of discrimination feel better. In this episode, then, Sophia appears to address the trainees as possible victims of discrimination; but in fact her intervention can best be understood as providing comfort or reassurance to possible perpetrators of discrimination by describing how victims ought to behave unthreateningly. I return to this analysis in Chapter 8 where I analyse comparable episodes which are not legally focused.

In this section I have argued that it is rare in legally-focused training for participants to be positioned as possible victims of discrimination. In general, this happens in passing, as part of a “rights and responsibilities” framework. However, there is a key exception, which is in discussion of harassment. In the session focused exclusively on harassment (Zoe’s) and in three other legally focused sessions, trainers gave guidance and advice on what to do if you are the victim of harassment. In three of the four cases, this advice included advice about being calm and ‘assertive’. I have also argued that this emphasis on remaining calm when ‘offended’ by something can function as a form of reassurance from the trainer to the trainees, by communicating that the trainer will not become angry if ‘offended’. In the next section I discuss moments when this suggestion of trainees as possible perpetrators of discrimination was more explicit.

7.6.2 Participants as perpetrators

As discussed in the previous chapter, mandatory training and discussion of ‘vicarious liability’ can position participants as possible perpetrators of discrimination or harassment. This positioning was often softened by the emphasis placed on lack of knowledge – that is, that any harassment or discrimination would be taking place only unwittingly. One clear
example of this was the handout on harassment in Sophia’s session, an article which stated
that “There’s a fine line between friendly, acceptable banter and unlawful
harassment/discrimination, but encouraging and educating workers to stay on the right side
of the line is not as easy as it sounds.” In describing the difference between “friendly”
workplace behaviour and illegal harassment as “a fine line”, this article reinforces the idea
that one could easily harass someone unintentionally.

Another instance from Sophia’s session occurred when Sophia was explaining different
types of liability. Having explained vicarious liability, she said that there is also ‘personal’
liability, and then illustrated this with an anecdote. In this case, a woman in banking had
sued her line manager for harassment. Sophia ended by saying that:

The judge ruled that she should get £120,000 from her line manager over and above
what the bank paid, and her manager gave an interview in a newspaper I read saying
that he’d had to sell his house to be able to pay it.

A white woman, who had been very quiet through the session (maybe her first
comment?) asked ‘what if you don’t have a house to sell?’ Sophia answered that
they look at all your assets, house, car, money in the bank, savings, when they
decide how much. You won’t be asked for money you don’t have.

The question, ‘what if you don’t have a house to sell?’ is suggestive of anxiety over the
possibility of being sued. This can be read as responding to the way the anecdote has been
framed in terms of ‘personal liability’.

At other moments, participants mentioned their own past actions with some worry or
embarrassment as part of seeking clarification on the law or on best practice. For instance,
in Rose’s session:

Paul (a white man) said that he used to be a retail store manager. He prefaced this
with comments along the lines of ‘probably you’re all going to say how awful this is’
and then asked is it discrimination if you recruit sales people based only on their
interview and not their experience or qualifications or anything, but just trust your
gut feeling during the interview? Is that legal?

Trainers were generally reassuring and diplomatic in their manner, while still explaining the
law or best practice, in response to this kind of query. In this case, Rose stated that since it is
difficult to be sure that you have no conscious or unconscious biases, it is safer to have
clearer criteria (I discuss this in more detail in Section 8.11). In the next section discuss a
specific technique of training: scenarios.
7.7 Uses of scenarios

‘Scenarios’ are fictional vignettes followed by questions and discussion on what should be done. Trainers used the terms ‘case study’ or ‘scenario’ to describe these; I use the term ‘scenarios’ exclusively, reserving the term ‘case study’ for any references to case law. These were an exercise used in some form by seven of the ten trainers. In general, scenarios involve being in a position of responsibility (such as being a manager or an event organiser) and making decisions about how to respond to a range of situations. Of course, ‘rights’ are still relevant in that part of the difficulty is how to uphold the rights of the students or employees in question; but it is not our own rights that are in question when doing a ‘scenario’ exercise. Rather, our responsibilities are emphasised. This is in keeping with the idea that the central purpose of training is to prevent discrimination or harassment from taking place by educating people who might otherwise perpetrate it.

Scenarios, particularly when acted, can be a way of making discrimination and harassment ‘real’ and concrete for the trainees. Although fictional or fictionalised, they offer an opportunity for working through some of the dilemmas that could actually be encountered in the workplace; and are set at universities, again making the issues of discrimination more directly relevant to the trainees (compared to case law, which was mentioned often in three of the sessions and examined in depth in Rose’s session). Peel (2002b) suggests that scenarios also function as a way for trainers to check on trainee’s learning, acting as an informal assessment and opportunity to redirect trainees if they are either over-emphasising or under-emphasising the relevance of sexuality for the characters in the scenarios.

Many, though not all, scenarios are followed by questions and discussion on legal obligations and/or best practice. Scenarios as an exercise have particular significance in the way that they position participants in relation to discrimination, because many scenarios incorporate the participant as a character in the vignette in some way. For instance, one scenario begins:

Sarah is a newly-appointed member of staff (full-time) managing a research unit with four full-time researchers, two doctoral students and a part-time database manager. You are Head of School under which this unit operates.
Of the seven trainers who used scenarios, three used scenarios which explicitly positioned participants in this way. The scenarios used by other trainers took the form of vignettes with named characters, where participants might then be invited to think about the situation from the perspective of a manager or of the university, by responding to question such as ‘what should the university do?’. In some cases, participants were not asked to think about the scenario from any particular perspective but to explore it in general.

I begin by analysing those scenarios where participants are either positioned directly as a character in the situation, or where participants are invited to take up a particular perspective via the questions following the scenario.

7.7.1 Responsibility to avoid discrimination

Where participants are directly positioned within the scenario (it is addressed to ‘you’), their perspective is always that of a person with some responsibilities for the other characters or for the situation: an event organiser, or a manager. For instance:

> There is a student open day. You are in charge of access provision. Your goal is to get the highest ever attendance rate of disabled potential students. Describe how you go about this goal, giving details and specifics.

Thinking about this in relation to discrimination, there has been no discrimination yet in this scenario (except perhaps historically in a failure to make reasonable adjustments at previous open days). The discrimination will arise if the participant, as the person responsible for access provision, does not consider and implement the appropriate access provisions. In effect, the participant is positioned as potentially being a perpetrator of discrimination through the failure to make reasonable adjustments. This is similar to scenarios in which you are the line manager of someone who discloses a disability to you (as in the case of Sarah, quoted above in Section 7.7) – there has been no discrimination yet, but there could be if you make the wrong decisions.

7.7.2 Responsibility to deal with existing discrimination

In other cases, the participant is again positioned as a possible perpetrator of discrimination, but discrimination has already been taking place between the staff that they manage. Malorie’s training session included the most complex scenario, in which you have newly been made the manager of a team of four. The written scenario hints at possible sexism from one of the team to another member of the team, but on the basis of the written
scenario there is no clear discrimination taking place – the issues appear to be related to personality, workload and productivity. Participants in this session then role-played with professional actors, with the actors coming in for individual ‘meetings’ with participants in the role of their line manager. Through the role-plays, it gradually emerged that one member of the team was in a same-sex relationship which she had not mentioned to her manager, but which her colleagues knew about and were harassing her about. Another member of the team, who had been presented as staying out of office politics, was dyslexic but had not disclosed this at work as he believed the other members of the team were likely to tease him; he was also not using his real name at work as his name had been anglicised early in his employment.

In this scenario, again, the participant has the potential to perpetrate discrimination – for instance, by being dismissive of the harassment and failure to make reasonable adjustments which are evident in this team. Similarly, Rose’s session included a scenario in which a group of male students have sexually harassed two women students; the questions on this scenario focus on what the university should do and what the university’s legal obligations are.

However, unlike the scenarios which focus on reasonable adjustments for new members of staff or for potential students, in these scenarios there is an existing problem of discrimination, with a victim and perpetrators. The experience of the role-play makes it clear that this situation will be complex and difficult to resolve, but that it is the participant’s job as the manager to ensure that there is a resolution; similarly, from the discussion of the sexual harassment scenario it is clear that the university has a responsibility to resolve the situation.

The participants, then, can either in some sense ‘save’ the situation or exacerbate it. Notably, the people who are already discriminating against others in the scenario have been positioned as below the participants in the organisational hierarchy. In some ways, this decision makes sense, as it places the responsibility for ending discrimination in the workplace on those who have organisational power. However, positioning participants as ‘above’ the problems of discrimination in this way also draws on existing discourses which locate ‘intolerance’ in the less privileged. I noted this in relation to the Scarman report in Chapter 4, in which Scarman locates the source of the problem of racism in the
Metropolitan Police exclusively in the lower ranks of the force. Similarly, scholars have identified a white middle class displacement of racism onto white working class people, in which being middle class is defined in opposition to the ‘racism’ of the working class (Sullivan 2014), middle class displacement of sexual harassment onto working class people (Kitzinger and Thomas 1997) and a Western displacement of ‘intolerance’ and particularly of sexism and homophobia onto non-Western countries (Brown 2006).

This is not to say that every scenario exercise involved the only discriminatory behaviour being displayed by employees who were positioned as below the participants in the workplace hierarchy. While those scenarios which explicitly positioned the participants as characters in the scenario functioned as described above, scenarios which did not do this incorporated a wider range of situations in terms of where in the organisational hierarchy the discrimination was evident. I describe these in the next section.

7.7.3 Scenarios which do not directly incorporate participants

Zoe’s session included several scenarios, none of which incorporated the participants as characters. The scenarios used in Sophia’s session included one which did not place the participants as characters in the scenario. In this scenario, a manager, ‘James’, was being excluded by the Head of School from relevant meetings, and having his deputy’s contributions be treated as more important than his. This deputy manager also made homophobic jokes and made caricatured ‘effeminate’ gestures when around James. James sees the Head of Department to complain about this behaviour.

In this scenario, the most blatant homophobic harassment is being directed at James by someone who is below him in the workplace hierarchy; but this is tacitly endorsed by the Head of Department, who is above him in the workplace hierarchy. The majority of questions on this scenario are focused on the legal definitions and implications of the situation described (such as “Is calling someone a nickname based on sexual orientation a form of harassment?”). However, there are also questions about what the Head of School should do or should have done. The scenario continues:

As the rest of the team members found the term amusing, the Head of Department felt that James was simply being oversensitive and so no further action was necessary. But the Head of Department moved James’s office to the other end of the corridor to defuse the situation.
This is a clear example of someone who is high up in the workplace hierarchy behaving in a discriminatory way (victimisation – penalising the victim of discrimination for having made a complaint about discrimination). This is drawn out by the question ‘Was it acceptable for the Head of School to move James’s office?’.

Akanna similarly used a scenario in which an employee resigns from his job, citing as his reason a racist and classist atmosphere which his manager responded to by suggesting that he needed to be more ‘tough’. The questions for reflection included what his manager could have done differently, and trying to identify any similarities between the atmosphere and behaviours described by the employee and the atmosphere at that university as a workplace.

Although these questions direct the participant’s attention to the role of the manager in the discriminatory atmospheres and behaviours in the workplace, they do not identify the participants as managers. The critique that is invited from participants can act as a form of dis-identification from the managers who have been negligent or actively discriminatory in their behaviour towards these employees.

Finally, in Rex’s sessions, the scenarios were all role-played by two actors. Trainees had the opportunity to ask each actor questions ‘in character’, and the scenario was then discussed with the whole group, facilitated by Rex. In these scenarios, it seemed that trainees were being positioned as bystanders. The first scenario was about sexual harassment of a Black woman PhD student, ‘Maria’, by her white male supervisor, a professor. The scenario includes unwanted touch, and Maria being told that there would be career consequences for her if she told anyone because she wouldn’t be believed. In response to questions, Maria tells trainees that she was warned about this supervisor by his former students, but had hoped that nothing would happen to her. In the first session I observed, our positioning as bystanders was very explicit:

Rex said that if you’re in a work environment where this is happening and you ignore it because you’re relieved it’s not me, how will you feel at an employment tribunal? You’ll be wishing you’d done something earlier.

I noted in the first session that Rex’s focus in the discussion phase of the scenario was on university policies (which have been contravened by the professor’s behaviour) and on the law, but that I had struggled to get any concrete sense from him about what a
bystander should do (leaving aside the fact that ‘Maria’ said in response to questions that the professor never acted like this where there were witnesses). As such, I tried to push on this in the second session. I quote my fieldnotes at length:

The two actors have just acted the sexual harassment scenario. Rex then turned to the rest of the delegates and said that ‘there will be things happening at work’ that are like this.

He asked questions leading trainees to say that Maria was warned about the professor by ‘rumour’ and then asked us whether it’s right to spread rumours in a workplace?

One or two people said usually no but in a case like this it’s different / they’re not so sure / it was good because it warned her. Rex asks whether the warning has actually made a difference or stopped the situation and people say no. Rex asks, ‘Instead of spreading rumour what should we be doing?’

Someone answers ‘taking action’. We get into a conversation about how we know from watching the scenario that there is a problem. Someone says that he threatened her with an outcome. Someone else says that he touched her. Rex agrees and tells us that any unwanted physical touching can be seen as sexual harassment. He also reminds us of the language used by the professor, calling her ‘lady’ and ‘prick tease’. Rex tells us that Maria’s fight/flight/freeze response in this case was fight – asking to change supervisor – but that wasn’t enough to resolve the situation.

Rex says that the professor’s behaviour goes against ‘your policies’ – dignity at work – [he rattles off a list of policies]. There are also laws being broken – sexual assault. Maria could actually have called the police; the police would come and investigate this sort of situation.

I raise my hand and speak as a participant for the first time this session. I say that at one of the universities I’ve been a student at, there was a man who obviously enjoyed making people and especially women feel uncomfortable but I never actually saw him touch anyone. Someone once told me that everyone knows that he sleeps with his grad students but I never knew any of those students or heard it directly from them. So in that situation what should I have done – I didn’t actually know anything so surely I couldn’t ring the police? (I was genuinely wondering about this but I also wanted to push a bit on this ‘take action’ thing which seemed to be addressed to us as bystanders. I blushed as people turned to look at me.)

Rex responded: In this session you’ll need to manage feelings about things you’ve done or not done before. (I was listening carefully for guidance on what to do in the situation I had just described, but there was none, although he kept talking.)

Rex: If no one does anything, what with the professor think?

Someone answers that there’s nothing wrong with his behaviour.

Rex agrees, the professor will think he can act like this and nothing will happen.
Rex also says that at this point, with the university having heard nothing about the Professor’s behaviour, if he lodges a complaint about Maria blackmailing him, who will the university believe?

Trainees answer ‘him’ and Rex agrees. Rex then talked about the importance of empowering bystanders, and a white woman trainee, Emma, talked a bit about her work around empowering bystanders.

This episode shows a clear rhetorical emphasis on doing ‘something’ and on ‘taking action’, However, there is no information about what the action could or should be. Unlike the way trainers in other episodes talked about the options open to victims of harassment, or the guidance offered by Herbert (1994) on how to support victims of sexual harassment, in this session there are no specifics about what a bystander should do – perhaps partly because our positioning as bystanders is fundamentally incoherent with the information given by the actors in the scenario. My request for more specific suggestions about how a ‘bystander’ with limited information should act was heard by Rex as an intrusion of emotions into the training situation – a failure to ‘manage feelings’ about my own past inaction.

In summary, in my fieldwork, where participants are directly given a role in a fictional scenario, this role is always one of responsibility. There may or may not already be a problem of situation which the participant needs to resolve; if there is, the problem is identified as occurring between employees who are further down the organisational hierarchy. Where a manager or another senior member of staff is identified as being a perpetrator of discrimination, the scenarios are written in such a way that the participant is not directly involved. In addition, some trainers use scenarios in which participants are not directly involved, but are positioned as observers or bystanders.

7.8 Conclusion

This chapter has continued to address the research questions, ‘What is the curriculum of the training, and how come?’ and “How are participants positioned in relation to discrimination?’ by focusing on one component of the training curriculum: the law, and particularly equality law. In describing the prevalence of the legal discourse, the emphasis on some aspects of the law, and the variations between trainers of whether and how much they draw on the law to provide the training curriculum, I have clarified the prevalence of the law in the curriculum of E&D training.
In this chapter, I have argued that the law is drawn on to some extent in every session in my data; this accords with the findings of Brewis (2016) who found that diversity trainers listed the protected characteristics in every session she observed. However, the amount of training time devoted to the law, and the level of detail in which the law was discussed, varied widely in my sample. Even within legally focused sessions there is a wide range of approaches to the topics covered, and the topics themselves involve a range of underlying ideas about in/equality.

In Section 7.3 I pursued further the suggestion made in Chapter 4 that the language of ‘protected characteristic’ is difficult to use accurately in communicating an idea of social marginalisation, because of the inconsistency within the terminology. Although the EA2010 is presented by trainers as having harmonised pre-existing legislation, a range of approaches to equality are present within the EA2010. The inconsistency embedded in the term ‘protected characteristic’ means that the EA2010 encodes both the idea of discrimination as unfair or unwarranted judgements; and the idea of discrimination as a systematic privileging of some groups (as in the cases of disability, pregnancy and maternity, and gender reassignment). This in turn means that on those occasions where the law does protect a group rather than a ‘characteristic’ (as with maternity), this selective protection is often perceived as in itself being unfair discrimination. In choosing to protect ‘characteristics’ rather than groups, the EA2010, like previous legislation on race and sex, encodes an analysis of discrimination as being about ‘unfairness’ rather than institutional power relations.

In Section 7.4 I explored the EA2010 from another perspective, that of ‘managing diversity’. The EA2010 differs from a ‘managing diversity’ analysis in that it limits discrimination as a legal category only to certain ‘characteristics’ or groups, whereas under a ‘managing diversity’ approach any factor which is not strictly job-relevant should not be forming part of how employees and potential employees are judged. This is jokingly highlighted by one trainer, Rex, while some other trainers simply avoid using the law in favour of a ‘diversity’ framework.

In Section 7.5 I argued that where the law provides the main framework underpinning the training, different issues arise compared to those sessions in which the law is only mentioned briefly. I illustrated this in relation to specific protected characteristics: Some
issues, such as programmes to enable disabled people to access work, were only addressed in sessions which devoted a substantial proportion of training time to the law, and in the session which was devoted exclusively to Disability Awareness (Section 7.5.4). Similarly, trans people were mentioned only in passing or not at all in the sessions which did not include a substantive legal focus, whereas legally focused sessions all included some explanation of trans people’s rights in the workplace (Section 7.5.2). I also showed that the inclusion of some groups, such as disabled people, as part of the ‘topic’ of training does not necessarily imply that the way the ‘topic’ is approached will be in keeping with the way disability rights activists would approach the topic, and similarly that trans people are regularly referred to by trainers using outdated and offensive language.

In the case of sex (Section 7.5.1), I argued that in sessions that were not legally focused, sexism was seen predominantly as misogyny; whereas in sessions that were legally focused, there was a dual perception of sexism as unfair treatment of either sex, and of sexism as misogyny. Trainers expressed the idea of men as a group that is discriminated against through critiquing the ‘maternity’ provisions of the EA2010 as discriminatory, and through mentioning ‘men’s networks’ (although notably there were no cases in which there was in fact an active ‘men’s network’ at the university). By contrast, although ‘race’ has a similar legal status as a characteristic rather than group, trainers did not refer to a perceived need for a ‘British network’ or a ‘white network’ for staff. I would suggest that among other factors, this may be because of the absence of any legal provisions in the EA2010 specifically for racially minoritised people, in comparison to the pregnancy and maternity provisions which are specifically for cis women.

So far, this analysis addresses the question ‘What is the curriculum of the training, and how come?’. In the rest of the chapter, I addressed my second ethnographic research question, ‘How are participants positioned in relation to discrimination?’. I began by discussing how the ‘citizenship’ discourse of ‘rights and responsibilities’ encodes both the possibility of becoming a victim (who needs to know their rights) and of becoming a perpetrator (by not fulfilling their responsibilities). I then discussed how trainers can prioritise drawing out ‘rights’ or ‘responsibilities’ through the way they present the law. In Section 7.6.1 I argued that it is rare for trainers to position participants within the legal discourse as possible victims of discrimination, and argued that when this does happen it is in relation to
harassment. When possible victims of harassment are given advice on what to do, this advice is generally relatively concrete and includes advice on being calm and assertive. However, I argued that in one case, this advice functioned within the training session as ‘comforting’ participants by reassuring them that the (internal) trainer advocates that people remain calm and respectful when they have been offended.

In Section 7.7 I explored participant positioning further by examining the uses of scenarios as a training technique. I argued that scenarios never position participants as victims of discrimination, instead positioning participants as having some responsibility or (more rarely) as being observers or bystanders. This responsibility may take the form of preventing discrimination from taking place (in the case of the duty to make reasonable adjustments, Section 7.7.1), or of responding discrimination or harassment which is already occurring between employees lower in the workplace hierarchy (Section 7.7.2). In both cases, the trainee has the potential to become a perpetrator of discrimination; however, they are not already positioned as perpetrators when the scenario opens. When participants are not directly “written in” to the scenarios, there is a broader range of scenarios in terms of the relative power of the perpetrator and victim, including the perpetrator being a senior manager (Section 7.7.3). In these cases trainees are invited to comment as outsiders; however, this was blurred in Rex’s training sessions where trainees were positioned as bystanders. I argued that this ‘bystander’ positioning was more focused on the rhetoric of taking action than on giving trainees tools to take action with.

This chapter has addressed the question of curriculum by looking in greater depth at the ‘legal’ discourse in E&D training, including considering how this discourse can be used to position participants in relation to discrimination. In the next chapter, I take this analysis further by examining what I call the ‘psychological’ discourse in training. Where trainers do not draw extensively on the EA2010 to provide the framework and curriculum of training, the other main discourse used is psychological – in particular stereotyping, unconscious bias, and evolutionary biology/psychology. The next chapter explores this discourse in depth, again looking at both the curriculum and the way that trainees are positioned in relation to discrimination.
Chapter 8: The psychological discourse and the bigot figure

8.1 Introduction

In the previous two chapters, I have been building towards answering my two ethnographic sub-questions: “What is the curriculum of the training, and how come?” and “How are participants positioned in relation to discrimination?”. In Chapter 6, I stated that there are two main components of the curriculum of the E&D training in my sample: legal and psychological. I explored the legal discourse in depth in Chapter 7. In this chapter, I explore the psychological content of training in depth, and particularly pay attention to the “how come?”. I will argue that a specific discourse which I term the ‘psychological discourse’ can be identified and should be understood in relation to a discursive figure which I term the figure of the bigot, described in Chapter 5. As such, this chapter also explores the figure of the bigot more broadly in relation to the curriculum and delivery of E&D training. This sets the scene for examining the psychological discourse.

Psychological concepts and studies make up a substantial component of the E&D training curriculum. Ideas from cognitive social psychology such as stereotypes and unconscious bias are particularly prominent, but trainers also draw on evolutionary psychology, neuroscience, and on psychological ideas about communication styles. The prevalence of psychological ideas should be understood in the context of the historical connections between social psychology and E&D training, described particularly in Chapter 3, where I argued that E&D training first came about hand in hand with social psychological studies of ‘attitudes’.

The discourse which I term the ‘psychological discourse’ specifically refers to a discourse about ‘human nature’ which describes bias as an innate, inevitable part of being human. As described in Chapter 3, this is not intrinsic to psychology; for instance, trainers and educators have drawn on the idea of racism as a ‘mental illness’, arguing that psychologically healthy people are not racist. Similarly, Kitzinger (1987) describes the developments within psychology which moved from seeing homosexuality as a mental illness to seeing homophobia as evidence of psychological ill health. Psychology, then, is a broad discipline which incorporates a wide range of ways of conceptualising discrimination. However, within my data, psychology was overwhelmingly used to argue for the universality
of bias and the inevitability of making ‘assumptions’. As such, the term ‘psychological
discourse’ is my chosen shorthand to define this discourse.

I introduced the concept of the discursive figure of the ‘bigot’ in Chapter 5, and describe this
figure in greater depth in Section 8.2 below. The figure of the bigot is that of a person who
can be identified as bigoted (and hence as immoral). I will argue that participants’ resistance
to being positioned as perpetrators of discrimination can be understood as a response to
this figure. Being identified with the discursive figure of the bigot acts as a threat to
reputation and perhaps also to self-image, and participants work to manage the possibility
of being identified with the bigot. I see much of what happens in E&D training as an attempt
to negotiate around this figure and the anxieties and defences associated with it; in
particular, the use of psychology can be understood as an attempt to circumvent the figure
of the bigot by universalising ‘bias’ such that no one person could be identified as a ‘bigot’.

The psychological discourse positions everyone as biased and this bias as a natural and
essential part of being human, via a set of ideas and techniques drawn from evolutionary
psychology and cognitive psychology. Thus, rather than discrimination arising from rare
bigots, discrimination arises from everyone and is an inevitable result of human nature. The
concept of ‘human nature’, as understood through psychological ideas and techniques, is
central in this discourse. ‘Human nature’ seems to render moral ideas about fairness, as well
as political ideas about justice, as largely irrelevant. This discourse is used strategically to
convey that discrimination is real and ongoing (rather than being elsewhere or in the past);
to encourage ‘confession’ of biases (which the discursive figure of the bigot makes difficult);
and more broadly, to encourage participants to take responsibility for ending discrimination.

The psychological discourse positions participants as potential perpetrators of
discrimination, but takes the sting out of this positioning by framing the issues in terms of
‘human nature’. However, beyond this basic idea that bias is an essential part of being
human, there are tensions and contradictions within the psychological discourse. I draw out
these tensions and describe the difficulties inherent in using the psychological discourse as a
motivator for change.

To make sense of these tensions, I begin by fleshing out the theoretical idea of the ‘bigot’ as
a discursive figure, as this figure is central to my analysis of the tensions of the psychological
discourse in practice. I go on to describe and analyse the comparatively rare occasions on
which trainers address the figure of the bigot directly, by talking about areas of discomfort and anxiety that people have when talking about inequality and discrimination (Section 8.3). I then analyse the (few) exercises and moments of training which are devoted to avoiding offensive language, using the figure of the bigot to explain these interactions (Section 8.4); similarly, I analyse the moments where trainees are guided on avoiding offensive behaviour (Section 8.5). I conclude this analysis of the bigot figure by exploring what is meant by offensive behaviour and language in more depth, showing how the notions of ‘offence’ and of ‘respect’ are used in a way which does not distinguish between the respect owed to marginalised people and respect being owed to those who harass them or discriminate against them (Section 8.6).

I then turn to the psychological discourse, beginning by describing the prevalence of psychological concepts in my data (Section 8.5). I describe what I mean by the ‘psychological discourse’ in more depth (Section 8.6), and in the rest of the chapter analyse the specific concepts, techniques and terms used within this discourse, incorporating assumptions (Section 8.9), stereotypes (Section 8.10), unconscious bias (Section 8.11), evolutionary psychology (Section 8.12), perceptual illusions (Section 8.13) and folk psychology (Section 8.14). In practice, both the figure of the bigot and the various elements of psychological concepts and techniques are interwoven throughout the training, such that my analysis throughout this chapter circles around the psychological discourse.

8.2 The discursive figure of the bigot

As discussed in Chapter 5, ‘resistance’ from trainees is widely perceived as a challenge for E&D educators. There is a range of theories about this resistance. For instance, Peel (2002b) describes participant resistance to some exercises in terms of participants trying to present themselves as ‘liberal’; DiAngelo (2011) theorises this as ‘White Fragility’; Tatum (1997) analyses it in terms of racial identity development. The theoretical construct that I found most helpful was Ahmed’s (2012) description of how ‘the figure of the racist’ obscures a structural analysis of discrimination, and how white people ‘disavow’ the figure of the racist. What this analysis highlights is the widespread understanding of racism as fundamentally a matter of racist individuals, conceptualised as rare, or at least as always somewhere else (Andreouli et al. 2016). As such, ‘racist’ is understood always as an accusation of individuals
The term ‘institutional racism’ is used, see Chapter 5), and is understood (by white people) as a slur against white people.

The term ‘discursive figure’ is helpful because it clarifies that the figure is inscribed in discourse but is not limited to any particular discourse. It is beyond the scope of this study to fully describe the discourses which surround the figure of the racist, as it exists across multiple domains: in psychological ideas of the ‘mentally ill’ racist or of the ‘authoritarian personality’ (see Chapter 3), in liberal discourses around race (as in the Scarman report analysed in Chapter 5) and in right wing, conservative discourses around race (as in Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech, also analysed in Chapter 5). This flexibility and pervasiveness of the discursive figure of the racist make it difficult (if not impossible) for trainers to discuss racism without the influence, whether acknowledged or not, of the white anxieties and defences which surround the figure of the racist. Although these discourses will not be fully described here, I will describe some of the ways in which the figure of the ‘racist’ is commonly understood, which are directly relevant to the analysis presented in this chapter.

With the shift towards training to cover multiple groups and multiple forms of oppression, the figure of the ‘racist’ is not enough to explain the resistance shown by participants to some aspects of training. As such, I described in Chapter 5 the idea of the discursive figure of the ‘bigot’. This figure is invoked when participants try to position themselves as not ‘an offensive person’ (as one trainee put it). My use of the generic term ‘bigot’ is not intended to imply that all forms of discrimination or bias are perceived as equally dangerous to one’s reputation or standing as a moral person. In particular, the fears surrounding the figure of the racist seem to be stronger than for any other form of bigotry. This becomes a topic for discussion in two training sessions (Rose’s and Karishma’s), as I will describe in the next section.

However, I first want to flesh out more fully some of the important features of how the discursive figure of the ‘bigot’ functions. Firstly, the fears and anxieties surrounding the ‘bigot’ are fundamentally about reputation and self-image. Taking racism as an example, the fear is not of doing harm by being racist, but of being perceived as a racist. For instance, Tatum quotes from one of her students’ reflective writing, and explains her response:

“… the fear of speaking is overwhelming. I do not feel, for me, that it is fear of rejection from people of my race, but anger and disdain from people of color. The ones who I am
fighting for.” In my response to this woman’s comment, I explain that she needs to fight for herself, not for people of color. After all, she has been damaged by the cycle of racism, too, though perhaps this is less obvious. If she speaks because she needs to speak, perhaps then it would be less important whether the people of color are appreciative of her comments. She seems to understand my comment, but the fear remains. (1997, p.194)

This student expresses a fear of being seen as racist by “people of color” who she sees herself as “fighting for”. Tatum’s commentary on this student’s fear suggests that the student is fearful because she is prioritising the wrong thing: being perceived as non-racist or anti-racist by people of color. Tatum suggests as a way forward that this student transform her understanding of anti-racist action such that speaking out against racism is necessary for everyone for themselves, rather than being in effect a favour done to people of color by white people. In my fieldwork, this way through the anxiety was not suggested by any trainer; where these fears were acknowledged by trainers, they were rarely explored more deeply in terms of where the fears come from. Instead, trainers offer guides to behaviour or language which contain an implicit promise that if the rules are followed, any offence caused by the trainee’s words or actions would be unjustified. I discuss this in greater depth in the following sections.

Secondly, bigots are conceptualised as rare, or perhaps as always somewhere else, particularly in the past (Andreouli et al. 2016). Although this would imply there is no need to distance oneself from this figure, there is also a widespread perception that those who are privileged are unable to understand what “counts” as bigoted language or behaviour, and in some cases that they cannot “keep up” with evolving language (Pinker 1994). This feeds into the anxieties and fears of majoritised people about their good intentions going unrecognised or being misunderstood. Again, trainers rarely explore this, instead offering guidance through exercises, discussions and handouts.

In the next section, I discuss the occasions on which trainers addressed the figure of the bigot directly, although using different terminology.

8.3 Discussing the bigot figure

The ‘bigot’ figure is evident primarily through silences, resistance, avoidance and non-engagement. However, there is also some mention or discussion in E&D sessions precisely of these silences, without actually breaking the silence which is described. The bigot figure
was presented as a discussion topic when a trainer, Rose, was leading a discussion on whether it is easy for us to talk about the different protected characteristics. This was a six-hour session with a trainer from an external training provider. The session was not mandatory and was attended by only five trainees, including me. None of the other participants held an academic position.

Towards the end of the day, Rose put up a slide reading:

Mind your language

- Are there differences in the language/banter you are happy for friends to use in comparison with others?
- How confident do you feel in discussing equality issues (for example race, gender identity, sexual orientation)?

We then discussed the questions in small groups. It is notable that the second question is unclear or even euphemistic. For instance, it is not spelled out (and the trainer did not spell out) what an ‘equality issue’ might be; whether this refers to an ‘issue’ in the sense of a problem (e.g. low rates of admission of Black and minority ethnic people to elite universities) or as a more neutral topic, and what kinds of things we would be discussing if we did feel ‘confident’ discussing ‘equality issues’.

As there were only five participants in the session, including me, I was paired throughout with a white woman, Camilla – the other three participants were sitting on a separate table. She had not been very engaged with the training throughout the day, often checking her phone during paired exercises, though not while Rose was speaking:

Camilla and I were both quite non-committal about these questions. We were both a bit like ‘I don’t really get it’. The only point at which she became more engaged and animated was saying that actually maybe she could think of an example, which was that she and her colleague (or boss?) were talking about a student who has a lot of mental health problems and her colleague said that the student’s family is ‘mad’, and she felt OK about that from a colleague because they both know that she doesn’t mean it in that way and that she is talking about the family and not about mental health, but if anyone outside her workplace said something like that to her she’d feel uncomfortable about it and would not be sure whether they meant something different.

It was not clear to me what the ‘OK’ meaning of ‘mad’ was to her and what the not-OK meaning is – it seems to me like an insult referencing mental health problems as being negative – but I didn’t press it. I said I didn’t like being addressed as 'love' or 'dear' by strangers, but I don't mind it from friends.
Throughout the session, Camilla and I had less animated and engaged discussions than those taking place on the other table. Even so, our reactions were indicative of the areas of discomfort and silence that the trainer, Rose, was asking us to reflect on: neither of us were willing to engage with the question of whether we find it easy to talk about race, gender identity, sexual orientation and other ‘equality issues’, instead focusing exclusively on the first question about whether we talk differently with our friends compared to with strangers (which I understood both then and now as asking whether we are less ‘politically correct’ with friends). Our refusal to engage with the second question was justified partly by the roundabout nature of the phrase ‘equality issues’, as noted above. Rather than stepping out of the silence which Rose described (which, as she later explains, results from the fear of being perceived as bigoted) and analysing the discourse, we stayed within it.

When we all came to answer, Paul and Mary both answered ‘yes’ and Paul said a bit more. Mary said that she was ‘quite happy’ and would ‘ask them questions’ – a reference to the second question; the people she would be happy asking questions of are, presumably, those that ‘equality issues’ personally affect. [My notes say: ‘some people don’t have filters’ and then ‘did I hear that?’ – I think a reference to a participant talking about how people may say offensive things because they ‘don’t have filters’ and how surprising these can be.] I think Rose asked how is it different if you know them, and got the response that you know they’ll agree with you or be able to discuss it. Rose suggested that it’s also about trust? Mary agreed that yes, they could tell if you ‘are actually an offensive person’ or not.

Here, a participant – Mary – makes it clear that she thinks there is a distinction between being ‘actually an offensive person’, and being a person who happened to say something offensive. This facilitates people distancing themselves from the figure of the bigot, by emphasising a clear distinction between bigots and non-bigots. Knowing the person you are speaking to is a protective factor against being identified as an ‘offensive person’. This conveys Mary’s confidence that she is not ‘an offensive person’ – a person who knows and understands her would not be offended by something she said. Again, this expresses the view of the privileged around the figure of the bigot: they may be mistakenly viewed as a ‘bigot’ (and may, in some interactions, be nervous about the possibility of being classified as a bigot), but they are clear that this would be a mistake because they know themselves (and others ‘like them’ – cf. Ahmed 2012) to be a non-bigot. In response, Rose emphasised the importance of context and relationships, suggesting that there may be nothing wrong with what initially appear, to outsiders, as shockingly callous jokes:
Rose said that in some professions it's a release mechanism – police and doctors use very harsh humour – she was quite shocked when she was first working with them by how brutal and callous they sounded, but eventually learned firstly that they trust each other and secondly that it's necessary to relieve tension because of the kind of work that they do.

Here, Rose implies that we should not be quick to judge others’ ‘banter’ as offensive as we may not understand their context.

We moved onto the question about whether people feel 'confident' talking about all the protected characteristics. Annie, the only Black participant, said that she's confident in the ones relating to her but not others like disability, she's comfortable talking about them but 'not confident I'm right', more interested in listening to people who have those experiences.

Mary said that we need to make mistakes to learn so it's good to ask questions.

I said I'm not sure what the question means.

Rose explained, some researchers recently looked at race at universities and what they heard when talking to people at universities about race at their institution is 'we don't have a dialogue around race', we are 'scared of getting it wrong' and being called racist if race is mentioned. People are afraid of the attitude 'I've got something and you haven't' [I didn't understand what she meant by this phrase and still don’t]. They're afraid people will say that it's 'not that I made a mistake, it's that I'm racist'.

Rose here identifies and describes the figure of the ‘racist’ (Ahmed 2012), and white people’s anxiety about the possibility of being identified as a racist (although they don’t think they are racist). She describes the way that people’s uncertainty about what ‘counts’ as racism combines with their desire to avoid being identified with the figure of the racist, leading to silence about race. This formulation of white people feeling afraid of ‘being called racist’ is common in popular culture (see e.g. ‘Politicians ‘too scared of being called racist to tackle integration by immigrants’, says top Tory’, Blanchard 2016 in the Mirror) and has a long history, partially described in Chapter 5. It arises in the reflective writing of students in anti-racism workshops (e.g. Ladson-Billings 1991; Tatum 1997) as well as in media discourses. As is evident from this framing, the fears surround reputation and image (as non-racist) rather than being a fear of doing harm, as I argued in Section 8.2 above.

In keeping with Rose’s suggestion that there is a ‘lack of dialogue around race’, all participants in this session resisted the idea that they were afraid of, or uncomfortable around, discussing any of the protected characteristics, including race, and there was very
limited engagement in the discussion Rose tried to spark. Rollock (2015) argues that it is particularly difficult to speak about race within UK universities.

Rose is the only trainer in my sample to explicitly speak about this problem in this level of detail. She went on to describe certain words or phrases as ‘sticky’ and telling us that we all need to think about what is ‘sticky’ for us. Rose didn’t elaborate on what she meant by this. I was struck by this use of ‘sticky’ as the term is also used by Ahmed (2012) in her analysis of ‘diversity’ at universities. Although Rose didn’t explicate what she meant, I understood her as referring to words and phrases that we fear saying in case they are understood as racist. This fear is suggested by complaints about ‘political correctness’, and claims that language is changing ‘too fast’ such that words or phrases formerly seen as unproblematic are now considered offensive (e.g. Pinker 1994). From my ethnographic data, at least some anxiety over language can be seen in discussion. For instance, Sophia asked participants to avoid saying ‘homosexual’ in favour of ‘gay’, which some argued against, and appropriate language use was a key exercise in a training session focused on disability, both discussed in the next section.

I understood Rose in this extract as referring to the affect around words and phrases where the speaker suspects that the word or phrase in their mind might offend the person they’re talking to, and may in the end choose not to say anything. The challenge of managing the inferences of their language use is too great and so the entire area is avoided. This is described by one of Ladson-Billings’ students in her reflective diary, quoted in Chapter 5:

> I felt very uncomfortable talking about the subject of racism in an academic arena ... Feeling uncomfortable talking about racism is very strange ... (it) comes from not knowing ... do I call a black person, black? Do I call an Asian person Chinese? (Ladson-Billings 1991, p.152)

Rose argued that this happens especially in relation to race and that this detrimentally creates a lack of ‘dialogue around race’. She then gave us two handouts, one about language and race and one about language and trans people; implicitly suggesting that this applies also to language around trans people and gender identity (a suggestion also made by the slide which listed race, gender identity and sexual orientation as probable areas of silence or discomfort).
Rose’s analysis acknowledges the anxieties of the privileged around the bigot figure and the relationship between these anxieties and language use. The handouts function as a guide to appropriate language use, implicitly reassuring participants they can have a ‘dialogue around race’ and a dialogue about gender identity by using the language provided in the handout. However, even this attempt to directly engage with the ‘bigot’ figure analytically and think about how it affects us remains roundabout and slippery. The trainer never spells out what an equality issue is, what she means by ‘sticky’, or what sorts of things we talk about if we did have a ‘dialogue around race’.

Another trainer to openly acknowledge the possibility of participants being uncomfortable talking about race, and specifically about racial stereotypes, was Karishma, who contrasted this with people’s comfort level in talking about age:

Karishma asked us to come up with positive attributes of older employees. There was a chorus of ‘experience!’ from the table next to mine - mostly older women, who then laughed. There were more suggestions. Karishma added ‘wisdom’, commenting that for her this was part of her religious perspective. She then asked for negative attributes of older workers, and there were a few suggestions. (I think these were all being written on flipchart paper).

Karishma then asked for positive attributes of younger workers, then negative attributes, and again collected a few responses for each.

Karishma then asked ‘what were we doing?’ and someone answered ‘Stereotyping’. Karishma agreed and said ‘It was easy!’ She went on to say that ‘if I had put men and women or black and white, it would have been difficult, we would have felt uncomfortable’ – but with age it still feels fine to hold stereotyped views.

Here Karishma implicitly argued that listing positive and negatives attributes of women employees – for example – would be difficult not because we don’t know and believe stereotypes about women and work, but because we know we shouldn’t: “we would feel uncomfortable”. She was pointing to the difficulty of openly expressing these beliefs, not to their absence. This accords with my suggestion that the anxieties around the figure of the ‘bigot’ are strongest around racism compared to other forms of bigotry. However, Karishma doesn’t linger on this difference between people’s inhibitions regarding expressions of racism and sexism and their lack of inhibition regarding expressions of ageism, and instead moves on to list and disagree with specific stereotypes relating to age, as I discuss further in the chapter (Section 8.10).
In summary, only one trainer in my sample, Rose, tried to instigate a discussion of the anxieties surrounding the discursive figure of the (racist, transphobic, homophobic) bigot, addressing this figure directly, although using different terminology. Trainees generally did not engage with this discussion topic, claiming to be “happy” talking about any form of oppression. Three other trainers mentioned issues of anxiety and fear around being perceived as bigoted. Karishma made the point that this anxiety surrounds race and sex but not age. Two other trainers, Liz and Akanna, mentioned issues of anxiety and fear around being perceived as bigoted; I analyse these moments below in Section 8.4 (Liz) and 8.12 (Akanna). In the next section, I examine how trainers talk about acceptable and unacceptable language use.

8.4 The bigot figure and language

Whereas Peel (2002b) describes ‘language exercises’ as a routine component of LGAT, in my research only one trainer – Liz, whose session focused exclusively on disability – made use of a comparable exercise. There were significant differences between the exercise she used and the exercise described by Peel (2002b), as I will describe in this section. Rose included a guide to language about race and about gender identity as a handout, as described above, rather than as an exercise. Other than in these two training sessions, questions of which words are appropriate or inappropriate to use arose only in passing, as I will describe.

Peel (2002b) describes a ‘language exercise’ which was used in eight out of the fifteen sessions in her dataset (p.76). In this exercise, trainees are asked to brainstorm in small groups all the words they can think of which relate to ‘lesbians’, ‘gay men’ and ‘bisexuals’ (in some sessions ‘heterosexuals’ was also included). The lists of words generated then formed the basis of discussion, with trainees being asked to analyse the ‘themes’ underpinning the lists generated. This exercise uses the trainees’ own knowledge of the language used to describe LGB people to enable stereotypes about LGB people to be analysed. Although the primary aims of the language exercise are to explore and challenge negative stereotypes of LGB people, some trainees also took the opportunity to ask about which words are “offensive” to gay and lesbian people (Peel 2002b, pp. 93-94).

Peel gives a detailed analysis of the ways in which trainees resist engagement in this exercise, writing that:
Trainees used this exercise as an opportunity to display their lack of prejudice, in four main ways. By: (a) Displaying ignorance; (b) Resisting engagement; (c) Self-other distancing; and (d) Focusing on the positive. These four strategies for denying prejudice, as I now go on to discuss, operate through different constructions of the self and the world. Displaying ignorance is an intra-psychic denial of prejudice; trainees claim they simply lack ‘homophobic’ thoughts. Resisting engagement plays on the distinction between internal thoughts and (resisting) their public display. Self-other distancing operates on an inter-group distinction. In other words, the participants can present themselves in a positive light by reference to other (worse) individuals or groups. Lastly, Focusing on the positive implies a societal lack of “homophobia” (2002b, p.88).

These strategies relate primarily to the phase of the exercise in which words are generated – claiming not to know any terms; expressing discomfort with saying the terms aloud, or writing them down; claiming that the terms are those that other people would use, not themselves; and searching for ‘positive’ terms for LGB people.

In my data, no trainer used a ‘language exercise’ which took quite this form (although an analogous exercise is routine in Mental Health First Aid training, see Chachamu 2013). However, exercises on ‘stereotypes’ were sometimes used which included participants being asked to generate stereotypes or to share their ‘assumptions’. I discuss these exercises in Sections 8.9 and 8.10, drawing on Peel’s analysis of resistance to the language exercise. In this section I focus on moments when trainers discussed or mentioned avoiding discriminatory language.

The only language exercise in my dataset was used by Liz, who spent much of the session explaining the social model of disability, including an explanation of ‘attitudinal barriers’ – negative or uncomfortable attitudes towards disabled people acting as a barrier to their full participation in social life. In the last part of the session, Liz introduced an exercise about language:

When everyone had handed back the books, we moved onto an exercise about ‘Language and Terminology’. Liz said, ‘As we all know, language evolves’ and ‘Disability language evolves faster than most’. She said the exercise would be about sorting words and phrases into categories, acceptable represented by a tick, unacceptable which would be a cross, and maybe or not sure which would be a question mark.

In general my group categorised things quickly and easily, then having done it one or two of us commented uneasily on how we had a lot of ticks. I looked around the other groups and was able to read upside down some of the words being categorised by the group opposite us, who had far more in the X category than we did.
As with the language handouts given out by Rose, this exercise offers participants some reassurance about how to avoid being perceived as disablist because of their language use. However rather than simply giving participants recommended words and phrases, the exercise relies on participants’ willingness to make their own judgements about the language examples, and share their thoughts on the words and phrases. Compared to a handout, this exercise requires participants to engage more actively with the language used to describe disabled people, and also enables more discussion during the training of where the terminology comes from and why it may offend some people. This exercise is analogous to the ‘Is This Racism?’ exercise used by Ladson-Billings (1991, 1996). As when some of Ladson-Billings’ white students felt nervous that if they classified something as non-racist that might mean they were themselves racist, my group was ‘uneasy’ that we had classified too many words and phrases as ‘acceptable’ – interpreting this as possibly meaning that we were insensitive to disabilism, and hence disablist ourselves.

Liz said, in response to someone expressing how hard they found it to look at these words and talk about them, ‘If you get really worried we’re back to attitudinal barriers’ and said that this exercise was about trying to be more aware of our language.

Here, as in Peel’s descriptions of participant responses to equivalent ‘language’ exercises in LGAT (Peel 2002), a participant expresses her discomfort with being asked to discuss terms of abuse. Peel analyses these responses as an attempt on the part of trainees to signal openness and lack of prejudice to the trainer and other participants. In my fieldwork, the trainer Liz framed this expression of reluctance to take part in the exercise as an example of an ‘attitudinal barrier’, rather than seeing the discomfort with the language as evidence of positive liberality. The anxiety around being positioned as a bigot is described as being, in itself, a barrier to understanding how to stop using bigoted language. Liz’s framing here is reminiscent of other analyses of the fear and anxieties of the privileged as leading to a lack of meaningful engagement with institutional critique (Srivastava 2005). Although this does not spark a discussion, Liz’s comment can be understood as a critique of the anxieties surrounding the figure of the (disablist) bigot.

Unlike the language exercises described by Peel (2002b), this language exercise is framed around questions of ‘acceptable’ and ‘unacceptable’ language use. Rather than questions of offence, and guidelines about language, being tangential to the exercise, the central aim of
the exercise is to develop or communicate guidelines around language – by the end of the exercise there is a list of ‘acceptable’, ‘unacceptable’ and ‘context dependent’ terms and phrases, and each term has been discussed in terms of appropriate usage. Liz used the exercise to explore the implications of terms like ‘carer’, and to explain the history of terms like ‘handicapped’; this made any guidance given feel reasoned rather than arbitrary. Liz was also cautious in her guidance, saying “I’m not here to tell you not to say these things” and maintaining a friendly tone. This exercise was the final exercise of the training, and I noted that “there had been a lot of laughter and camaraderie over this exercise” although Liz had laughingly said that this was the part of the training that gets “controversial” and where “people fall out”.

This exercise, and the handouts given out by Rose, were the only substantive episodes in my data where trainers focused on language. In both cases, trainees are being positioned as potential unwitting perpetrators of discrimination through a lack of knowledge about appropriate language use. Simultaneously, participants are positioned as having the intention not to discriminate or offend, thus distancing them from the discursive figure of the bigot. Three other trainers touched on issues of language. In two cases, this was with a focus on sexuality. Sophia included a note about language as part of an explanation of the definition of each protected characteristic:

Sophia said, the groups who are covered are heterosexual, gay, lesbian or gay woman, bisexual or bisexual woman (as usual she spoke very quickly – I was a bit puzzled by her distinction between ‘bisexual’ and ‘bisexual woman’). She went on to say that these are the categories in the most recent census, there were four categories, heterosexual, gay, lesbian or gay woman, and bisexual. There are other kinds of sexualities, for instance pansexual and asexual, and you should look them up and find out about what they mean, but those four are the ones that are protected.

Sophia went on, this is just my personal advice but I would recommend avoiding the term ‘homosexual’ because until 1993 homosexual was used to mean a mental disorder. So some people find that term offensive. Now if you have to use this term, say for instance you are in the medical field and it’s the widely used term in your field, I would recommend that when you use it you acknowledge that some people may find it offensive and explain that you are still going to use it because it is the most common term in your field.

Sophia’s intervention here includes a term to avoid, with an explanation of why this term (homosexual) is offensive to some people. She goes on to suggest why it might still be valid to use the term, and how to frame this choice to avoid causing offence. This inclusion of
advice about language is in keeping with the concerns of privileged people around how to avoid being perceived as a bigot, and specific anxieties around language. The session continued:

A man asked a question about which term should you use then, are you meant to use gay? Sophia said yes. He says that ‘gay’ is a slur in the playground, youth use it as a slur, so in 10 years will that be the forbidden word and we’ll all have to use something else? Sophia responded in a non-committal way and we moved on quickly.

I understand the participant’s comment about ‘gay’ being a playground slur as a rhetorical complaint against rapidly evolving language, perhaps implying that it is not worth trying to ‘keep up’ with the changing language as it will only change again as the newer term becomes associated with the stigma and is used as an insult – what Pinker terms the ‘euphemism treadmill’ (Pinker 1994). This, again, is part of the anxiety surrounding the figure of the bigot – the perception that the ‘rules’ about how to avoid being seen as a bigot as rapidly changing. In her session, Liz pre-empts this type of comment by stating that disability language evolves ‘faster than most’ and including caveats in her responses to the categorisation in discussion, such as emphasising the importance of context.

Rex’s comment on language is even briefer than Sophia’s, and again is about sexual orientation. Rex has led the group through an exercise in which we were asked to make assumptions about him (for instance, what car does he drive?), and he then collected responses, demonstrating that we had all reached different conclusions. He then questioned some participants in detail about their reasons for their choices, aiming to demonstrate that assumptions say more about the person making them than about the person they are making them about. He drew this together with the list of protected characteristics which he wrote on flipchart paper at the beginning of the session:

Rex then talked about how many of the protected characteristics had been mentioned, how relevant they had been to people’s assumptions about him. He went through a few of them himself but also asked delegates to make the connections. A white woman said that thinking he is married with children assumes he is probably heterosexual. He agreed and also thanked her for using that term – the only time that he thanked someone or commented on what they said in that sort of way. She also said that he probably hasn’t undergone gender reassignment, which he seemed to take as a joke – saying something faintly mocking like ‘you think? yes, probably not’.
Here the word in question is ‘heterosexual’, which the trainer praises as an appropriate word for the participant to use – perhaps in contrast to ‘straight’. The relative merit of ‘heterosexual’ compared to ‘straight’ is not featured in mainstream guides to LGBT related language, e.g. the Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation Media Reference Guide (GLAAD 2016) so it is unclear why the trainer perceives ‘heterosexual’ as a particularly appropriate term. However, leaving aside the question of whether this trainer’s perception of appropriate language aligns with the language preferences of LGBT people, it is still notable that the trainer makes this intervention about language use. The only other comments on language made in this training session were about scenarios enacted by professional actors – participants commented on the misogyny of, for instance, a woman’s PhD supervisor calling her ‘girlie’. As with the analysis of Liz’s exercise and Rose’s handouts, Sophia’s passing comments about language position trainees as possible unwitting perpetrators of discrimination through ignorance. Rex’s comment is different in that it highlights and praises a term already being used by a trainee, positioning her as already having the language and knowledge to behave in a non-discriminatory way.

Finally, Akanna included commentary on language use which did not act as a guide to which words to use, but made an argument about the significance of language use which did not rely on the idea of ‘offence’ but on psychological arguments about how language shapes thought:

Akanna says that one approach to why we should be careful of the language we use focuses on dignity and respect, I ‘don’t want to offend’ anyone by my use of language. She says that she takes a different approach: we need to be careful of our language because language influences thought.

She then changed the slide to one which cited a psychological study about how the same object (a bridge) gendered male in Spanish and female in German, is described by speakers of those language. German speakers, shown a photo of a bridge, used descriptors like “beautiful” while Spanish speakers used descriptors like “sturdy”. Another object, gendered female in German and male in Spanish, showed a similar effect of the gendering of the object. Akanna explained the study, then summarised by saying: so, ‘don’t call me a girl’, ‘not because I’m a stroppy feminist’ but because it will actually affect the way you see me.

This intervention gives a scientific, psychological explanation for why language use is important. Akanna explicitly distances herself from the idea of ‘offence’ and of being a ‘stroppy feminist’, presenting the case for caution with language use in ‘objective’ terms.
Unlike the other moments where trainers gave guidance on language, Akanna’s point is about the broader question of why language use matters, rather than about the specific words to use or avoid, although she does give one example of inappropriate language (calling adult women ‘girls’). Akanna thus positions herself as an activist (in this case, on behalf of women) – a way in which she is already positioned by being the E&D trainer – and implicitly addresses trainees as possible unwitting perpetrators of sexist discrimination, but in a way which also gives trainees a 'scientific' justification they could use when making their own interventions about language. Rather than leaving trainees reliant on a trainer's guide to particular words or phrases, Akanna offers a mode of intervention which, due to its reliance on 'science', may result in less backlash than requests to avoid particular terms because they cause offence.

In summary, several trainers included guidance about language about language use in their session, and one trainer instead provided a psychological justification for the significance of language use. This guidance can be understood as an attempt to work around the figure of the bigot, calming anxieties by directing participants towards or away from particular language. To the extent that the fear of being perceived as a bigot can be attributed to uncertainties about language, this is a sensible way to work around the silencing effect of this anxiety. However, this approach also implicitly accepts these anxieties or fears as valid without a deeper analysis of where they come from and what they mean (compare to Ladson-Billings 1996a; Tatum 1997; Srivastava 2005, 2006). Liz directly addresses one participant’s hesitation over thinking about the terms provided by describing this as an ‘attitudinal barrier’, using the social model of disability. In spite of this, I would argue that the provision of guidance about specific terms and phrases to use or avoid can act to legitimise the fears and anxieties associated with the figure of the bigot. By contrast, Akanna’s intervention justifies the importance of language in a way which is explicitly distanced from notions of offence and which may then be used by trainees to argue for avoiding particular terms. In the next section, I turn to an aspect of the training curriculum which is very similar to that described in this section: guidance and advice about behaviour.

8.5 Guides to behaviour

As I described in Chapter 7, there were moments in E&D training when trainers advised participants on how to act when they had been 'offended' by something, or when they had
been victims of harassment or bullying. When talking about the law, trainers also gave specific examples of behaviour which could be unlawful, and when discussing or debriefing scenarios both trainers and participants discussed appropriate behaviour. In this section I describe a particular kind of guidance: how to avoid discriminatory behaviour, without reference to the law. This is very similar to the guidance on language described in Section 8.4, but has a broader focus and was a more mainstream part of training, being used by Liz, Sarah, Malorie and Akanna. Again, by describing how to avoid discriminatory behaviour, trainers are implicitly positioning trainees as possible unwitting perpetrators of discrimination, while simultaneously positioning trainees as having the intention not to offend or unfairly discriminate.

Liz's training included a slide which listed 'General good practice'. This came immediately following the scenarios, and immediately before the language exercise. This included some specifics such as "Say who you are and say their name if you know it when greeting a visually impaired person", but also more general guidance such as "Do ask if someone needs any assistance, but do not assume they do" and "Tone of voice and body language – not like to a child". Liz expanded on these, for instance, giving a specific protocol about deciding whether to offer assistance and how to approach people when offering assistance. This slide also included "Do not be embarrassed about using common expressions like ‘see you later’, ‘I’ll be running off’" – this suggests that people need to control their anxieties about whether they have been offensive or not. This again points to a tension – the provision of guidance suggests a need for guidance, that is, a need for people to behave in specific ways; at the same time, people's feelings of anxiety around whether or not they have been offensive is presented as itself problematic. The next slide gives guidance on font choice and poster design for accessibility.

A similar tension arises in Akanna's training. Akanna gives a list of 'micro-aggressions' and goes through each item on the list. The first was 'consistently mispronouncing a person’s name'. My fieldnotes read:

Akanna said, 'having a name people from the dominant culture don’t know how to pronounce makes you a mammoth’. People get worried about not being able to say your name, they avoid you, they become scared of you and nervous around you – it's really hard.
A white man asked, but is this really an issue? Because some names cannot be pronounced.

Akanna said immediately and firmly, that’s nonsense. [My sense was that most of the room was with her, but hard to be confident of this!]

He answered, I have a German name, English people can’t say it.

Another man sitting near him agreed with him. A woman said that when she tells people her name and they respond, ‘what’s that? I will never be able to say that’, she thinks it’s unacceptable in a work environment. Akanna agreed with her.

Akanna’s reference to being a 'mammoth' is a reference to an earlier point in the training in which she describes people's stereotypes and fears as having evolved from early humankind’s fight or flight response to mammoths – I discuss this in detail in Section 8.12. Here, Akanna has inverted the earlier exercise – "who is a mammoth to you?" – by talking about how it feels to be an object of fear to others ("a mammoth"). She simultaneously argues that it is important to learn to pronounce people’s names – that to fail to do this is a micro-aggression – and that the anxiety which surrounds this process is itself problematic: "people get worried about not being able to say your name, they avoid you, they become scared of you and nervous around you". As with Liz’s advice not to be "embarrassed" by using phrases like "see you later" to someone with a visual impairment, Akanna is advising trainees that they need to learn to pronounce people’s names but that this should not become a source of tension or anxiety which affects how they relate to that person. In the exchange that follows, trainees whose names are not traditionally English debate with each other whether mispronunciations are acceptable or not. The trainee’s comment that “some names cannot be pronounced” is a statement of acceptance that people will mispronounce his name, and a refusal to see this as discriminatory; other trainees and the trainer disagree.

Akanna has a list of ‘micro-aggressions’ and ‘micro-affirmations’ and encourages participants to avoid micro-aggressions and deliberately use micro-affirmations; the micro-aggressions refer to ethnicity and nationality (“confusing a person of a certain ethnicity with another person of the same ethnicity”) or gender (“taking more questions from men than women”) as well as some which are examples of generic rudeness (“interrupting a person mid-sentence”). All of the micro-affirmations are generic (“Positive body language and eye contact”). Malorie incorporated a very similar list of micro-aggressions and micro-affirmations. Occasionally participants spontaneously took the opportunity to identify
themselves either as having been victims of the specific behaviour described, or as having done these behaviours to others. One trainee spoke up during the list of micro-aggressions in Akanna’s training:

A white woman commented that she’s treated completely differently by the men and women she teaches. Men will just address her by saying ‘hey Leah!’ whereas women will call her ‘Professor’.

Akanna expressed sympathy and asked her how she deals with it.

A white man said, I have the opposite of that, I want to be addressed by my name but women call me Professor and men call me by my first name.

I spoke up at this point, feeling frustrated by the absence of a feminist analysis, saying that’s not the opposite, it’s the same thing – women are treating you with respect and men are treating you like an equal.

The man disagreed. Akanna said (to me) “you’re right”, and then addressing the group as a whole said that they’re not opposite experiences, they’re part of the same thing.

It is clear here that different ideas about what explains this student behaviour are in play. The woman who raised the issue said that men treat her as their equal although she is a professor, implying that this is related to her gender. She made it clear that her preference is to be addressed using her title. The man disagreed by highlighting that he prefers to be addressed using his first name, and in his case it is the women who do not address him in line with his request.

From the man’s comment, it seems that the professors’ preferences are not important - men estimate their own social standing as high, and accordingly talk to professors as their equal, and women estimate their own social standing as low relative to the professors’. This in itself is indicative of the way in which students are affected by misogyny (Phipps and Young 2013). However, the implication of his comment is to dismiss Hannah’s experiences of being disrespected by her students. Speaking up about experiences of being a victim of discrimination is not straightforward and can always be contested in this and other ways.

Finally, Sarah’s ‘Cultural Awareness’ training included an extensive list of advice on communicating across cultures. This list initially advises participants to “mirror” the mannerisms of whoever they are speaking with, adjusting their tone, body language, and facial expressions to be similar to those of the individual they are talking to. Immediately following this, the list became a generic list of ‘customer care’ guidance including “use
positive, open body language and tone of voice”, which was then broken down into more specific guidance, including “be friendly and enthusiastic”, and “Avoid sighing or breathing heavily (these can show boredom or lack of attention)”. In effect, trainees were encouraged to do more emotional labour (Hochschild 1983), regulating their emotions and expression of emotions; but this advice was given in somewhat contradictory ways, with trainees being told both to mirror the body language of the “customer” and to keep their body language open, friendly and enthusiastic. The language of the “customer” is also important, framing students as consumers.

Each of these examples has been a guide to behaviour towards people who are marginalised in particular ways: disabled people, people who are not white or British, and women. One trainer, Zoe, included advice on how to avoid harassing or bullying others, but framed this advice generically, without reference to any particular form of oppression. Some trainers incorporated more generic advice on interpersonal interaction in general. Karishma referred to “communication styles”, saying that we should be assertive but not aggressive or passive; Zoe presented a framework in which people act as ‘parents’, ‘adults’, or ‘children’, saying that we should aim to have adult-to-adult interactions in the workplace; and Malorie and Rex both argued that we need to monitor our behaviour to ensure that we are treating everyone equally.

When this guidance became generic, there was also slippage between advice on how to avoid discriminatory behaviour, and advice on how to manage a situation in which someone else has been discriminatory. I discussed some of this advice on how to behave as a victim of discrimination in the previous chapter. In the next section I explore this tension in more detail.

8.6 “Dignity, courtesy and respect”

In this section I discuss the ways in which the language of “respect”, “offence”, and psychological ideas such as “assertiveness”, can be used in relation to either perpetrators of discrimination (who need to learn to “respect” others) or victims of discrimination (who need to respond to discrimination “assertively” and without “offending” anyone). These discourses can thus cover over the differences in status and interpersonal power between a person being harassed and the person doing the harassing, insisting that everyone
concerned just needs to be more “polite”. As such, when trainers begin sessions by laying down ground rules about respectful disagreement, it is not clear at this stage whether they are trying to prevent discriminatory language from being used. This only becomes clear, if it does, based on the trainer’s approach later in the session.

Many trainers begin the session by laying out ground rules relating to treating each other respectfully:

Malorie says we’re going to have some ground rules. ...

The next rule is ‘respect’. Again she checks for agreement and people nod.

Although the ground rule of “respect” (or an equivalent term) was routine, I only once heard these ground rules being referred to again later in the session. This was in order to give an example of the sort of behaviour which would go against the rule of “dignity, courtesy and respect”. We had just been working on case studies in small groups, including a case study about reasonable adjustments for an employee with bipolar disorder:

Sophia called us back to a whole class discussion which she started by saying that she should have mentioned at the beginning [of the exercise] but she wants to remind us now to remember dignity courtesy and respect, she can’t hear everything that is said everywhere in the room, but once she had done this exercise with a group where some people were making fun of the scenario and one of the delegates actually had a child who has bipolar disorder and she found the experience very, very distressing and was crying afterwards. So please remember dignity courtesy and respect.

There was a murmur of sympathy from the trainees.

Here, ‘making fun of the scenario’ is seen as directly disrespectful to people with bipolar disorder and their allies or relatives. Sophia is aligning disability discrimination with failing to treat people with ‘dignity courtesy and respect’.

In this instance, ‘respect’ was used to try to prevent participants from being discriminatory in their behaviour during the course. More often, the narrative of ‘respect’ was linked to moments where participants are encouraged to be calm and assertive, not aggressive, when they are offended by others. This displaces notions of structural power imbalances with the idea that if everyone remains assertive and respectful, this will resolve problems of discrimination. This idea is clearly expressed by Moran in her autobiographical feminist manifesto/memoir:
**Don’t call it sexism.** Call it ‘manners’, instead. When a woman blinks a little, shakes her head like Columbo, and says, ‘I’m sorry, but that sounded a little ... uncivil,’ a man is apt to apologize. Because even the most rampant bigot on earth has no defence against a charge of simply being rude. (2011, p.133)

The apparently apolitical nature of a demand for politeness is viewed as having the potential to overcome perpetrators’ resistance to having their behaviour described as sexism. Although not expressed as explicitly as Moran in this extract, some trainers draw on this idea in describing how people should behave at work.

**Karishma,** for instance, told the following story:

> Once she was training a small group, four members of the cleaning staff. Her training is very different for part time staff, only one hour long and she doesn’t use a slideshow, just chatting. So during one of these training sessions a woman said to her, ‘I don’t like gay people’. So she asked, ‘What happened?’ The woman answered ‘In my kitchen, there were two boys kissing’. That woman had been brought up to believe being gay is wrong, that was part of her culture and part of her religion. So one morning she was cleaning and those two men were kissing in her last kitchen that she had to clean that day. Karishma then asked us to guess what happened next?

Several suggestions were offered. Karishma then asked us to classify each suggestion as passive, assertive or aggressive.

Karishma continued: So what actually happened? Karishma asked her, What would you have done if it had been a boy and girl? The woman answered, Told them to leave. The trainer asked, What did you do? The woman answered, Went to find supervisor. The trainer pointed out that none of us had thought of this as an option. And what did the supervisor do? Tell them to leave - exactly the same.

Karishma described the woman’s [negative] response when she saw the two men kissing as having ‘tapes playing in her head’, acquired from her culture. She went on to say “She’s not the only one with tapes playing in her head, I’m sure none of us about sexual orientation”, but it can be anything, not only protected characteristics. Karishma then went on to say that **we all have within us the ability to practice assertiveness.** [Added emphasis]

Here, it is the person with homophobic views – who could easily become a perpetrator of discrimination – who needs to find a way to manage a situation ‘assertively’ rather than ‘passively’ or ‘aggressively’. Being assertive is presented here by the trainer as a way to manage the consequences of discriminatory thoughts. The homophobic views don’t need to be challenged or changed, as they are not a problem as long as the cleaner avoids being aggressive and stays assertive. Karishma’s discussion of this episode shows the tension between the attempt of the psychological discourse to describe bias as universal – “she’s
not the only one” – without ever becoming accusatory and hence invoking the figure of the (homophobic) bigot – “I’m sure none of us about sexual orientation”. “Tapes playing in her head” is also a cognitive psychological mode of expression of this trainee’s feelings about the men who were kissing.

Later in the same session, Karishma asks us ‘how can we make sure race discrimination doesn’t occur at xxx – what can we do about it?’

    Participants answered, train and educate people. Constantly review procedures.
Karishma added, raising our own awareness. Being willing to say, assertively, without discriminating, without offending anyone, saying, this is not right.
[emphasis added]

Here, Karishma explicitly connects the idea of being ‘assertive’ with not being discriminatory and not offending anyone – but here, it is not the perpetrator who needs to avoid being discriminatory and offensive, but a bystander: someone who has noticed that ‘this is not right’. People who want to address discrimination must simultaneously be willing to speak up, but also ensure that they do not, in speaking, ‘discriminate’ or ‘offend anyone’.

Ideas about communication styles, behaving with politeness, and respect, can thus be used to equalise the roles of perpetrator, bystander and victim, brushing aside imbalances of power: instead we simply have employees who need to behave politely and assertively at work. The rule of being polite and assertive is applied equally to those trying to stand up against injustice, to those who have discriminatory thoughts, and to those who are victims of discrimination.

In the rest of this chapter, I focus on the psychological discourse, showing how trainers use psychological ideas to present their training as authoritative; to evade the anxieties associated with the figure of the bigot, by positioning everyone as biased; and to present a case for how discrimination is real and ongoing.

8.7 Prevalence of psychology

I argued in the previous chapter that four of the E&D courses I observed included a substantial focus on the law. These were the sessions in which the different types of discrimination under the EA2010 were defined, and a substantial component of training time was devoted to explanations or discussions of the law. However, the law was mentioned, directly or indirectly, in every training session.
The prevalence of psychological ideas and terminology was comparable to that of the legal discourse. Three trainers – Rex, Malorie and Akanna - used psychological ideas as the main focus of the training session. I observed one of these trainers, Rex, twice; the second session was different in atmosphere but very similar in content. Akanna and Malorie worked for the same training provider, and there was some overlap in the content they used, but as their sessions also included distinctive content and a different structure, I count them separately.

The term ‘stereotype’ was mentioned by seven out of the ten trainers; two further trainers did not use the word but did refer to the dangers of making assumptions. One trainer, Karishma, incorporated an exercise explicitly about ‘stereotypes’; three trainers used at least one exercise about ‘assumptions’. Seven trainers referred to ‘unconscious bias’ or ‘unintended bias’, with two (Malorie and Akanna) also using the ‘Implicit Associations Test’ as a pre-course exercise and as a focus for discussion during the course. Three trainers (Rex, Akanna and Malorie) referred to evolution; two of these also referred to the brain and used perceptual illusions to illustrate their argument about our distorted social perceptions (Akanna and Malorie).

As this brief review shows, the psychological discourse was the main discourse used by three of the trainers, and was drawn on to a varying extent in other training sessions as well. Most of the training I saw attempted to steer away from the ‘bigot’ figure, with its implications that bigotry is always elsewhere and is rare. Instead, trainers drew extensively on psychological ideas and on anti-discrimination law in framing the subject matter of training. These discourses are theoretically able to create a space in which participants can more openly discuss discrimination without feeling demonised if they are positioned as possible perpetrators of discrimination. In the next section I describe the way in which the psychological discourse aims to create this space, the internal incoherence of this psychological discourse, and the continued presence of the bigot discourse as shown by the difficulties inherent in portraying participants as potential perpetrators of discrimination.

8.8 The psychological discourse

Gordon (2015) makes a historical argument about the shift in analysis in the USA of the problem for racism “from power to prejudice”. As she argues, and I also argued in Chapter 3, psychological concepts and language such as ‘prejudice’ have been bound up in the
development of E&D training from its inception. However, in this chapter I am focused on two different ideas about discrimination, neither of which is about ‘power’ in the sense of being focused on institutionalised inequality and discrimination (rather than individual attitudes). Instead, I am making a distinction between the psychological discourse – which attributes the ongoing existence of discrimination to aspects of human nature which are shared by all people, but maintains a focus on the interpersonal rather than the structural – and the figure of the ‘bigot’, with its implications that discrimination is caused by a minority of bigots.

Unlike the resistance and anxiety surrounding figure of the ‘racist’, which is extensively documented in academic literature on racism, the psychological discourse – while academic in its origins – has not been commented on to the same extent within sociological literature on inequality (though see Sivanandan 1985; Gurnah 1984; Henriques 1984; Gordon 2015). As noted in Sections 8.1 and 8.8, I use ‘psychological discourse’ to describe a focus on ‘human nature’ as an explanation for discrimination. This includes concepts from social cognitive psychology such as stereotypes and unconscious bias, neuroscientific studies of bias, and concepts from evolutionary psychology such as the fight or flight response. These concepts are used by trainers to emphasise the universality of bias and hence of discrimination, thus rendering the position of bigot or non-bigot increasingly meaningless. While some of these concepts, such as stereotyping, have been prominent in psychological work on prejudice for many years (e.g. Allport 1954), the language used to describe them has shifted, with ‘unconscious bias’ now being a very popular term in training.

As I will describe, my interpretation of the three training sessions which drew most heavily on the psychological discourse is that they aimed to teach methods of mitigating the effects of bias. In Rex’s session, this was primarily about questioning one’s own assumptions about people and monitoring behaviour so as to ensure that everyone is treated ‘fairly’. In Malorie and Akanna’s sessions, many other techniques were mentioned and studies about unconscious bias, stereotype threat, and so on were included in the curriculum. In order to get to this ultimate goal (of trainees implementing, and appreciating the value of, techniques to counteract the effects of unconscious bias), trainers needed to first convey that bias is real, ongoing and directly relevant to trainees. For instance, removing identifying details from job applications before consideration would be a pointless, bureaucratic
process if bias was not real or relevant to the organisation. I argued in Chapter 6 that trainers use sociological data, including data specific to the institution at which they are training, to communicate that discrimination is (still) real. In this chapter I examine the use of psychological concepts, studies and techniques to make the same case. This message has the advantages of being (theoretically) focused on behavioural outcomes, and so not being open to accusations of removing ‘freedom of thought’; drawing on psychological studies and hence having a ‘scientific’ status; and providing a method for working around the figure of the ‘bigot’, by using the distancing language of psychology.

While this is a logically coherent explanation of what is communicated through training, I will argue in the rest of this chapter that in fact the messages communicated through the psychological discourse are much more paradoxical, complicated and frequently incoherent. One such incoherence is that evidence of bias or stereotyped thinking is often understood not as a fact to be worked around, but as a problem to be addressed by trying to think in a less biased or an unbiased way. Even where trainers repeatedly state that everyone has biases, it is inevitable that we will make assumptions about people, and so on, they often also convey the message that we should stop, or try to stop, making assumptions. This creates an incoherence within the psychological discourse.

Another tension in the psychological discourse is the difficulty of admitting to those biases which are strongly associated with the figure of the bigot, particularly racist biases. There is an element of ‘confession’ in trainers’ techniques for exploring bias, both with trainers admitting to some of their own biases, and with trainees being encouraged to ‘confess’ biases through exercises. This can bring both trainers and trainees dangerously close to the anxieties around being identified with the bigot figure, leading to a focus on those biases or stereotypes which have only limited connections to minoritised groups.

In the rest of this chapter I try to describe the different psychological concepts and techniques used by trainers systematically. I describe exercises and discussions centring around ‘assumptions’; stereotypes; unconscious bias; Implicit Association Tests (IATs); evolutionary psychology; illusions being used to demonstrate fallibility of judgement; and finally touch on folk psychology. However, there is immense overlap between these – for instance, IATs are understood as proving the existence of unconscious biases; ‘assumptions’ are described as based on stereotypes; and so on. As such I often cross-reference to
episodes already analysed in this chapter or between the upcoming sections of this chapter.

I begin by discussing exercises which require participants to make ‘assumptions’.

8.9 Don’t assume

Although, as I described above in Section 8.4, no trainers in my sample used a ‘Language Exercise’ comparable to that described by Peel (2002b), some trainers did ask trainees, as an exercise, to (deliberately) make assumptions, and to reflect on these assumptions. One trainer (Karishma) asked trainees to generate stereotypes; I reflect on this exercise in the next section. In this section I focus on exercises about ‘assumptions’. These were sometimes linked to ‘unconscious bias’ and to ‘stereotypes’, but ‘assumptions’ was the key term.

Trainers with a psychological focus included material about the importance of questioning assumptions. Because they framed bias as intrinsic to human nature, they generally stated that making assumptions was an unavoidable process; but that as assumptions are often wrong, it is important to be aware of our assumption when we make them and to be aware of the biases which underpin our own assumptions. However, the exercises used by trainers to convey this often involved an element of “confession” on the part of trainees. Trainers’ responses to this sometimes implied that the assumption the trainees admitted to should not have been made – suggesting that the message was “don’t assume”, rather than “notice and question your assumptions”. “Don’t assume” came through in other moments as well, as in this ground rule:

The next slide reads “Try not to assume …” Malorie elaborates – that your colleagues know particular things, that they believe particular things, that they have particular attitudes. If we all try not to make assumptions about each other that will help everyone to be included.

I explore these mixed messages throughout this chapter. Peel (2002b) describes how the ‘Language Exercise’ is reliant on trainees’ willingness to generate terms, including terms of abuse, for LGB people. This is a fraught activity for the participants, who need to demonstrate their discomfort with this abuse (to maintain a liberal position), but also need to come up with relevant words in order for the exercise to function. This tension is evident in my data also where trainers are asked to ‘assume’. This comes up in Rex’s and Akanna’s sessions.
Rex’s training sessions were premised on trainees’ willingness to play along with a ‘quiz’, described in Chapter 6. To recap, the ‘quiz’ initially involves making guesses about specific aspects of Rex’s life (e.g. what car he drives) and finally stating “one thing you didn’t like about me”. The quiz, including the debriefing or processing, takes up about an hour out of the three hours of training time, and I describe it in detail later in this section. Before the quiz, Rex leads up to it with various commentary about “assumptions”, including some exercises:

Then Rex asked us, what would you have assumed about me if I had ‘a 7” scar down the right side of my face, and a spider web tattoo down the left side of my neck”? As he spoke he gestured at his face and neck.

Answers came slowly from different people in the group, including:

“Trouble maker”, “poorly educated”, “junkie”, “threatening”, “gang involvement”. I think it was Stephen who suggested “you like spiders” and got huge laughter in response from the delegates.

When the group had run out of suggestions, Rex repeated them back to us. He asked if they were positive, negative or neutral, and people answered that they were negative. He repeated the negative ones and agreed that they are negative then said that liking spiders is neutral or maybe positive, but said sceptically to Stephen that he was sure that hadn’t been his first thought.

In this exercise, trainees mostly played along, although Stephen’s response was perceived by other trainees and by Rex as a humorous refusal to reveal his “real” assumptions. In other moments, participants more clearly chose not to express stereotyped views as part of an exercise:

Rex asked, if someone was called ‘Audrey O’Connor’, what age might you assume they are? The only responses were that you couldn’t tell, they could be any age. He then asked, what if they were called Charlotte Harris? Again the only responses were that they could be any age.

There was a similar episode in Akanna’s session where participants were played a short clip of reggae music and asked what sort of person it made us imagine as the musician:

One man called out ‘locks’. Then a woman said that she knew from context he was probably a blonde white man (I took ‘context’ as ‘this training session in which you are trying to show us that not everyone fits a stereotype’).

Akanna praised her, saying she [the participant] was already doing what she [the trainer] is trying to get us to do, which is called ‘conscious questioning’. 
Akanna’s response suggests some possible reasons for participants’ resistance to putting their assumptions or biases on display on request. Firstly, trainees already know that the underlying message of the exercise is going to be that they should control their biases and monitor their assumptions (or that they should not have biases or make assumptions). As such, they prefer to skip past the part of the exercise where they provide the evidence which will then be used to tell them to behave differently and cut as quickly as possible to the ‘message’ of the exercise. While this means that the exercise cannot function in the way that it is intended to – in particular, this trainee may not have gained any self-knowledge – Akanna’s praise of ‘conscious questioning’ seems to accept and work with this ‘skipping ahead’. Another instance of jumping to the moral occurred in one of Rex’s training sessions, after he asked participants when we might make assumptions about people before we have met them:

Answers were email, during recruitment (based on their CV), on the phone – later someone said ‘hearsay’ and Rex seemed to have been waiting for this response. Rex then started questioning specific people about what you might assume from an email.

A woman said that you might assume they are rude if you thought the email was rude, but then find out they are lovely in person.

Secondly, participants are avoiding being identified with the figure of the bigot via their participation. Again, Akanna’s praise of ‘conscious questioning’ suggests that refusing to take part in the expected way may be rewarded.

Other examples of participants being implicitly encouraged not to make assumptions, although they have explicitly been told to as part of the exercise, occurred frequently during Rex’s ‘assumptions quiz’. For instance, Rex had already quizzed two people about which car they attributed to him in answering his question about which car we think he drives. He then asked:

When you were thinking about my car, did anyone give me a family?

A woman (I perceived her as having East Asian heritage) said yes. He asked her name and she said Lillian. He asked her to stand and face us, which she did. He asked what exactly did she write down? She said she doesn’t know much about cars so she’s just put ‘family friendly’. He asked why and she said anyone with a family needs a family friendly car.

He asked her, how old am I?

She said 45...ish
How many kids do I have?
‘I don’t know’
What sex are they?
‘I don’t know’
What age are they?
‘I don’t know’

He repeated some of this back and then asked us, what could she have said when I asked how old I am?

Stephen answered, ‘old enough to have children’

Rex responded, what else could she have said?

Someone answered, ‘don’t know’ [as in, that is what she could have said]

Rex agreed, thanked Lillian and said she can sit down, which she did.

As in the extract from Rex’s ‘quiz’ in Section 6.5.4, most participants keep answering when Rex asks probing questions about precisely why they wrote what they did. In this case, Lillian soon stopped answering with assumptions or guesses. Rex implicitly praises her for this by criticising the only instance on which she responded with a guess (about his age), leading the trainees to say that she could have admitted that she doesn’t know, as she did with all the other questions. This seems to convey that we shouldn’t be making assumptions; although Rex frequently states explicitly that assumptions are inevitable and therefore it is monitoring our behaviour that matters.

In another moment of Rex’s training focused on ‘assumptions’ (before the main quiz), the exercise moved in a direction which I did not encounter in any other training session, with the participant who is actively taking part being positioned by the trainer as a possible perpetrator of discrimination:

The trainer, Rex, then asked what sort of assumptions might we make about someone during recruitment and selection?

Emma, a white woman, made several suggestions. First, she said you might make an assumption about their age based on when they did their qualifications. Rex said something like ‘I know you’re all wondering, so to save you the effort, I’ll tell you: I started working for the police when I was eight’ and got a laugh.

Someone, possibly Emma, said you might make an assumption about their ethnicity, national origin and religion based on their name.
Emma also suggested you might make an assumption about them having children if there was a gap where they’d taken time off. I think this was her third suggestion (one or two other people had made one too) and at this point Rex said something like ‘you’ve got to watch out for this one, she’s making assumptions all over the place!’ in reference to Emma. She responded (defensively?) ‘I’m not saying I would, I’m saying somebody might.’

Here, Emma responds to the exercise without signs of being inhibited by a fear that she will be thought to be endorsing discrimination, or that she will be seen as a bigot (Emma has said earlier in the session that she used to work in E&D and has offered answers to earlier questions). Far from trying to make participants feel comfortable by reassuring them that their participation in the exercise does not mean that they themselves should be seen as bigots, Rex lightly mocks her confidence in taking part by strongly implying that she is ‘making assumptions’ which would lead to discrimination.

One way to understand this incident is as an example of a teacher figure using his authority to quash an overly enthusiastic, highly participatory member of the group. This form of classroom control in adult classrooms has been described in the sociology of education literature. For example, Salisbury (1986) found that the adult education teacher in her study told a highly participatory member of the class to ‘wind your neck in!’ when he had been active in answering questions. This attempts to redress the balance of participation such that more of the trainees will participate, and time will not be dominated by one confident student. However, it is notable that Rex quashes Emma not through a generic put down (as he does to various trainees at other moments in the session by saying ‘calm down Emma’ or ‘calm down Stephen’), but through the specific implication that she makes inappropriate assumptions. Although the role of the trainer and the participant appears reversed in this example compared to the previous examples, what remains is this association between exercises about assumptions, stereotyping or bias, and the possibility that by taking part in the exercise as instructed, trainees are also implicating themselves as potential perpetrators of discrimination.

These examples suggest that the tension embedded in ‘assumptions’ exercises (between the requirement to make assumptions for the exercise to ‘work’, and the knowledge that we are going to be told that we should not be making assumption) is understood by trainees, who negotiate their participation in these exercises in various ways: some explicitly refusing to express an assumption; some expressing ‘joke’ assumptions; some demonstrating that
they already know where the exercise is going; and some actively taking part. If, as I suggested in Section 8.8, the overall intended narrative of the psychological discourse is that biases inevitably affect all of us and therefore mechanisms to mitigate this should be put in place, the refusal to honestly explore one’s own biases is a refusal of the opportunity to become more effective at counteracting our own biases. Despite this, trainers generally praised rather than critiqued a refusal to take part, conveying the message that it is wrong to make assumptions. However, a refusal to ‘confess’ or admit to an assumption would grind these exercises to a halt, if every participant deployed this tactic. As such, I suggest that despite trainers’ repetitions of the statements that biases are part of human nature, that we have evolved to have them, and so on, these exercises often convey that assumptions are wrong per se. In the next section I discuss similar issues which arise in relation to ‘stereotypes’.

8.10 Stereotypes

Stereotypes have been mentioned throughout this chapter in my data and analysis. In my dataset only one trainer, Karishma, had a strong focus on ‘stereotypes’ rather than ‘assumptions’ or ‘bias’, although the term ‘stereotypes’ was raised by seven trainers. Stereotypes, like assumptions, were understood as problematic and needing interrogation, but also inevitable. Additionally, stereotypes were sometimes presented as containing grains of truth, which made the notion of avoiding their use even more incoherent. This tension between the ‘truth’ in stereotypes and the unfairness of stereotypes could be compared to the tension between the notions of direct and indirect discrimination, discussed at length in Chapter 7. This could be described as a tension between an approach which treats difference as both real and appropriately relevant, and as either not real (and therefore not relevant) or something which may be real but should be ignored. Whether stereotypes are indicative of real differences between groups, and how this should relate to the treatment of individuals, are the questions which trainers implicitly address during training.

I have already described in Section 8.3 an episode in which Karishma encouraged participants to list attributes of older and younger workers, and then pointed out that this was stereotyping. In this section I begin by analysing the other two discussions or exercises
around ‘stereotyping’ in Karishma’s training, then briefly analyse references to ‘stereotypes’ in other training sessions.

Karishma first explored stereotypes through a small-group exercise in which two of the groups were asked to come up with examples of stereotypes, while other groups were given tasks like ‘Where do stereotypes come from?’. Each group was given a large piece of flipchart paper to write on. I was a member of one of the groups allocated the task of listing examples of stereotypes:

There was an awkward, quite long initial silence in my group in which I’d picked up the pen and was smiling brightly and expectantly at the rest of the group. I started to feel the strength of Karishma’s (and others’) worries about people feeling watched by a researcher. I was concerned about people feeling too self-conscious to say anything with me there participating, because making ‘stereotype’ statements feels a lot like endorsing them. There were a few comments along the lines of ‘I just can’t think of anything’ or ‘my mind’s gone blank’, including from me. Finally I suggested ‘mathematicians don’t have social skills?’ thinking about how this is a university and a few people nodded or no one disagreed so I wrote it down. A woman suggested something about women – something quite classic like ‘can’t read maps’. A Brown (South Asian?) man suggested ‘Asians love cricket’. Around this point Karishma came round to us and encouraged us saying we were doing very well and to try to think of positive as well as negative stereotypes, like the one we had about cricket. I think we ended with six or seven in total.

Before the first group (mine) read out our examples with the rest of the participants, I noted that:

... before we started, Karishma defended/praised us as a group, saying we’d done very well at a very difficult task and she wanted to be clear that no one from this group believes these stereotypes, we were just doing the exercise.

The atmosphere as our stereotypes were read out was light, with several people laughing and Karishma commenting that there can be truth to stereotypes, using the ‘Asians love cricket’ stereotype as an example. Before the second group read out their examples, I noted:

The spokeswoman for this group, a white woman, was obviously very uncomfortable and said that she wanted to say that none of them in the group believe these stereotypes are true and that doing the exercise, coming up with the examples had actually made her feel sick.

Karishma agreed, “I’m sure no one here is like that” [that is, believes these stereotypes].
This group’s examples were phrased as ‘all x are y’ and were statements like ‘All Black people steal’, ‘All Muslims are terrorists’. The atmosphere while these were being read was very serious.

In this exercise, there was an expectation on the trainer’s part that participants would feel threatened by reading out stereotypes that they have come up with, and needed to be reassured that these were not being interpreted as evidence that they are biased. Some participants evidently did experience the exercise as positioning them as possible perpetrators of discrimination, and this clearly fed into my own nervousness around how to participate in the exercise. This is another example of how the ‘bigot’ figure affects what can be said and done during training: while trying to teach psychological ideas about ‘stereotypes’, Karishma draws on the figure of the bigot to assure participants that we are not “like that” and that we do not “believe these stereotypes”. My group treated the exercise more lightly, perhaps directed by my choice to lead with a stereotype which does not refer to a marginalised group; I think the implicit decision to stereotype our own groups (as expressed through a woman stereotyping women and an Asian man stereotyping Asians) rather than express stereotypes about other groups may have made the exercise less threatening to my group, though perhaps also less meaningful. The requirement of this exercise to come up with stereotypes is similar to that in the ‘Language exercise’ analysed by Peel (2002b) and was treated as threatening to participants’ self-presentation as ‘liberal’ and non-bigoted; however, the overall aim of the exercise was to explore stereotypes as a concept, rather than to learn about a majoritised group’s stereotypes about a minoritised group.

The next discussion of stereotypes took place while going through the list of protected characteristics in depth. Karishma first encouraged trainees to come up with stereotypes about older and younger workers, as described in Section 8.3. She then changed slide:

The next slide is colourful and is titled **Age myths and stereotypes** and consists of speech and thought bubbles. Inside they say:

- ‘The younger chap will probably think more about his love life than his work’ (a male trainee called out ‘that’s true’).
- ‘I’d rather employ an older woman – this girl will leave within a year’. Karishma asked ‘and do what?’ and a woman replied ‘get pregnant and have babies’.
- ‘How many doctor’s appointments do you need for arthritis?’ Karishma asked ‘Who gets arthritis?’ Someone answered ‘older people’ and Karishma replied that anyone can get arthritis.
- ‘You can’t teach an old dog new tricks’,
- ‘Edward won’t attend IT training – not at his time of life’
- ‘I doubt Lucy is really ill – hung over more like!’ Karishma asked how old do we think Lucy is and someone said ‘young’. Karishma replied ‘actually, 62, and she’s an alcoholic’. She went on to say that far more younger than older people take sick leave. Older people are very loyal.

Karishma uses this slide apparently to expose and ‘debunk’ (gendered) stereotypes about age. In practice, some of these stereotypes are simply presented, rather than argued against; when a participant expresses direct light-hearted support for one of them, this view is not challenged but is treated as an acceptable joke (the same thing happened in Akanna’s training, when Akanna shared her own ‘biases’ about people in photographs). However, Karishma ends by going a step further and giving a ‘positive’ age stereotype to counter a negative one – claiming that older people are less likely to take sick leave, and implicitly linking this to a trait – being ‘very loyal’ (a ‘positive’ of employing older people which was not mentioned earlier). Rather than consistently conveying that people’s traits as employees cannot be predicted from their age, Karishma seems to be emphasising that our ‘common sense’ assumptions about age may be mistaken. There is an incoherence to the presentation of this slide, with some stereotypes being simply stated and possibly supported while others are contested (arthritis) and some are replaced with others (‘older people are very loyal’).

As with ‘assumptions’, this incoherence as to whether we should be avoiding stereotyping altogether, whether this is possible, and what we should be doing if this is not possible, was a feature of other trainers’ discussions of stereotyping, as I describe below.

Sarah’s ‘cultural awareness’ training was premised on the notion of being able to describe ‘cultures’. Much of the training time was devoted to descriptions of cultural practices and how they differed from the UK, and to examples of cross-cultural misunderstandings and frustrations. This was in direct tension with the idea of avoiding assumptions and stereotyping. An early slide included the advice “challenge your stereotypes” as part of a list of ways to build cultural awareness. Later in the training, the trainer delved into examples of cultural norms from outside the UK. Introducing this segment of training, the slide read:

The following are some general communication and language guidelines you may find helpful when interacting with people from different regions of the world.

However, keep in mind that individuals are different; never make assumptions based on someone’s ethnic origin.
This tension was present throughout training, and was generally managed by Sarah providing information about different cultures but following this with reminders that everyone is an individual. If stereotypes are understood as an explicit belief that ‘all x are y’ (as in “All British people are polite”) – as in the examples of stereotypes given by one of the groups of trainees in Karishma’s training – then “individuals are different” does act as a counter to the information being provided about non-UK cultures. However, if stereotypes are understood as a simplistic, incomplete understanding of what it means to be a member of a particular group, or as implicit associations between group membership and particular traits or practices, then it is difficult to see how a whistle-stop tour of cultural practices can fail to either reinforce existing stereotypes or create new ones.

A closely related difficulty came up during Coral’s training, in which the final exercise was to think in small groups about the challenges that might face people with particular protected characteristics. These were picked out a hat by someone on each table, the trainees sitting around the table then brainstormed about it, and their ideas were then fed back to the whole group. At times, Coral pointed out that some of these suggestions were premised on stereotypes, as with the suggestion that older people might struggle with technology. At the close of the exercise, she explained that we had just done an Equality Impact Assessment (a particular technique for ‘paying due regard’ to the need to avoid indirect discrimination, in which possible impacts of a proposed change or policy are considered taking each protected characteristic in turn). How to carry out this exercise without stereotyping was not discussed.

Akanna referred to stereotypes by name when saying that we don’t have to believe stereotypes are true for them to have an effect on us (as part of discussing the effects of unconscious bias); trainees in this session also referred to stereotypes by name a few times during training. Rex referred to stereotypes when discussing responses to the ‘assumptions quiz’, for instance, pointing out that a trainee who suggested his car was black was using gender stereotypes. Malorie talked about stereotypes when describing a study which compared the words people associated with men and women with the words people associated with leadership. In each case, it is implied though not stated that stereotypes are intrinsically problematic.
8.11 Unconscious bias

Several trainers commented on ‘unconscious bias’ as a current ‘buzzword’. One trainer, Rex, discussed this in interview. He said he had been doing his exercise on assumptions – in which participants are invited to make assumptions about him, and he then discusses these assumptions with them – for twelve years. He went on to talk about the different branding this exercise has had over the years, initially having just been called an ‘assumptions quiz’:

... we are exploring assumptions we make without knowing it and linking it to our natural fight flight freeze phenomenon. More recently, some organisations like xxx, they call it ‘Equality and Diversity Awareness’, but in the last three or four years it is being called unconscious bias. That’s the big buzzword, and unconscious bias is our natural fight flight, so I now call it ‘Understanding Unconscious Bias’ or ‘Exploring Unconscious Bias’ ...

This suggests that while there has been little or no shift in this trainer’s practice, the language he uses to sell the course to organisations has changed in accordance with the fashions of the field. Tatli (2011) similarly argues that while the language of practitioners of ‘diversity’ positions their work as a distinct improvement over ‘equal opportunities’, their practice is very similar to that undertaken using the language of ‘equal opportunities’. As the language of ‘diversity’ replaced or supplemented the ‘tired’ language of ‘equal opportunities’ (Ahmed 2012), ‘diversity’ is in turn being replaced or supplemented with ‘unconscious bias’, which by giving a cognitive psychological name to the training also brings it into the domain of scientific knowledge. This gives the training credibility as authoritative and scientific. As the bias is ‘unconscious’, this is suggestive of the need for psychological techniques in identifying its presence, as I discuss at greater length later in the next section. In another sense the term ‘bias’ brings us back to ‘equal opportunities’ as it is again suggestive of issues of fairness, justice and equality. One practitioner commented on how the name sets people at ease but the content makes them uncomfortable: “when they hear unconscious bias there aren’t defences, but the more you get into it the more it becomes personal”.

Although only one of the training courses I watched was titled ‘Unconscious Bias’, most trainers referred to the concept of unconscious bias during the training. For instance, in a training session focused on disability, the trainer Liz used ‘unconscious bias’ as part of her
explanation of the social model of disability. After defining and explaining environmental barriers and organisational barriers, Liz went on:

The third is ‘what’s known as attitudinal barriers?’ Liz’s pitch rises at the end of the sentence as if asking a question – she sounds cautious. She went on to say that she’s not saying that everyone has a negative attitude to disability, she doesn’t think that at all, but “I think – my opinion – we can all fall into this sometimes” is that through not wanting to patronise – not wanting to treat you differently – people panic. And trust me, you can tell when people are thinking of you differently, and think of you as a fire hazard or whatever else. And I include myself in that, with other disabled people, even though I spend a lot of time with other disabled people I still sometimes catch myself, it’s easy to fall into, they call it unconscious bias. It’s hard to change environmental barriers and it’s hard - in a big organisation like xxx, it’s hard to change the organisational barriers as well, I imagine even small changes take some doing! But attitudinal barriers are something we can all change and we can all change our own attitudes.

Liz simultaneously suggests that we can control this anxiety and stop having this ‘attitude’, and that it is difficult to do so fully – “I still sometimes catch myself, it’s easy to fall into”. This could be read as an instance where the figure of the disablist bigot affects what is said within the psychological discourse: the trainer’s tone becomes more cautious, as if she is trying to ward off objections before they arise; she reassures participants that she’s “not saying that everyone has a negative attitude to disability”. As part of her reassurance that she is not positioning participants as bigots, she includes herself in the depiction of people who sometimes unhelpfully panic when interacting with disabled people.

Liz suggests that rather than arising due to negative attitudes, discriminatory behaviour arises when people are trying to ineptly ‘do the right thing’, but are so uncertain about how to behave that they panic. Their panic then creates the barrier, as the disabled person can sense their discomfort (‘you can tell when people are thinking of you differently’). This is a description of the anxiety experienced by privileged people about the figure of the (disablist) bigot and an analysis of its effects – the fears around the figure of the (disablist) bigot are so intense that they cause panicky, discriminatory behaviour. To move away from the idea that discrimination is due to a minority of bigots, Liz positions everyone, including herself, as sometimes being discriminatory, and uses the psychological terminology of ‘unconscious bias’ to explain this. This is in keeping with Liz’s guides to language and behaviour, which emphasise the negative role that non-disabled people’s anxiety and panic plays in interactions between non-disabled people and disabled people.
Rose referred to ‘unconscious bias’ in response to a participant’s question about laws around recruitment:

Paul (a white man) said that he used to be a retail store manager. He prefaced this with comments along the lines of ‘probably you’re all going to say how awful this is’ and then asked is it discrimination if you recruit sales people based only on their interview and not their experience or qualifications or anything, but just trust your gut feeling during the interview? Is that legal?

Rose said, can you be sure that you don’t have any bias, whether conscious or unconscious, about hiring particular people?

Paul said yes, I hired all sorts, I’m sure I didn’t have any biases.

Rose said ok, but in any situation where you’re not sure that you have no biases, there’s a risk that those are being applied – and even if you don’t have any biases, if someone who you don’t hire says to you ‘I think your judgement was influenced by …’ then you need to prove it wasn’t. So it’s safer to have criteria.

Paul said interviews show how they (applicants for a sales job) come across, do they bond well? Rose said those are valid criteria to have. Paul said that in sales it’s all about interaction and engagement, and he ‘can tell straight away’ if someone’s going to be good.

Rose said that she used to work for a local authority and their recruitment was a very long process with no room in it at all for ‘gut feeling’ and she thought that actually that was a shame and it led to sometimes the wrong person for the job being appointed. She tried to do recruitment always in a panel and to be very aware of her own feelings. So for instance she realised that she had a bias against graduates for non-graduate jobs because her experience had been that they are restless/impatient/don’t really like the job. So as soon as she understood that, she told the other panel members that she has this bias and could they please watch out for it and check her.

There are several striking features of this episode. First, it is almost by definition impossible to identify all of our ‘unconscious biases’, because they are unconscious. Rose’s question of “can you be sure...” could therefore have been understood as a rhetorical question, pointing out that in fact you can’t be sure. However, faced with Paul’s interpretation of the question literally and his statement that yes, he is sure he had no biases, Rose accepts this interpretation rather than exploring the concept of unconscious biases in greater depth. This shifts away from the psychological discourse’s ideas about human nature including biases by accepting, on the basis of self-report, that a person can be free from biases. Interactionally, this makes sense, as it is difficult to directly contradict someone’s statements about themself (particularly when doing so could be understood as identifying them with the figure of the bigot that they have in that moment disavowed).
Second, Rose responds partly by referring to the possibility of the appearance of bias even if there is no actual bias (returning to the idea of liability, discussed in Chapter 6). Third, Rose uses herself as an example of a person with bias. This tactic for universalising bias, putting the trainer on the same level as the trainee, is also used in my data by Liz (discussed above), Malorie (Section 8.11.1), and Akanna (Section 8.13). I discussed this with two of the trainers I interviewed, who both said that talking about their own bias is a good way to help participants be open to the idea that they have biases, and to be open about these biases; Clements (2000) recommends that trainers admit to their own biases for these reasons. In other words, they are trying to demonstrate and encourage a way of responding to discriminatory beliefs or acts without invoking the figure of ‘the racist’ or ‘the bigot’, and thus without immediately prompting disavowal and distancing from that figure at the expense of self-examination or engagement with critique.

Finally, the specific choice of which ‘bias’ to admit to – while giving an example of good practice – is significant. Rose says that she was open with her colleagues about her realisation that she has a bias against graduates in non-graduate jobs. This is a bias against people with a particular kind of privilege (educational experience), who are not socially marginalised in any sense or legally protected from discrimination. A ‘confession’ to this type of bias is thus not imbued with any of the significance of those biases which invoke the figure of the bigot, and hence is much less threatening. Whether a bias against employing young women, or a bias against employing non-British people, should also be openly admitted to and discussed with colleagues on a hiring panel is not discussed.

Whereas in the training delivered by Liz and Sophia ‘unconscious bias’ is mentioned only in passing, in Malorie and Akanna’s training ‘unconscious bias’, using that terminology, was central throughout the training. For Rex, unconscious bias was central and was occasionally referred to by name, but the overall tone of the training was not about delivering scientific information but about self-exploration through Rex’s guidance. Rex’s technique of questioning trainees to probe into the assumptions they had made about him enables him to maintain tight control over the session, but could also be generalised as a technique for use on the self: what Akanna called ‘conscious questioning’, noticing and questioning our own assumptions when we make them. In the next section I discuss the psychological
technique of Implicit Association Tests, and explore the implications of this test in terms of how participants are positioned through it.

8.11.1 Implicit Association Tests

Akanna and Malorie (who work for the same training provider) both required participants to take two online psychological tests, called ‘Implicit Association Test’ (IAT), available on the Harvard university website. They recommended a test for racial bias and one for gender bias.

IATs use reaction times to look for implicit, or unconscious, associations between words and concepts. A test looking for associations between gender and ‘career’ and ‘family’ would have, for instance, ‘man’ and ‘career’ on the left-hand side of the screen, and ‘woman’ and ‘family’ on the right hand side of the screen, as illustrated in Figure 1. The participant is then required to classify words such as ‘salary’ as belonging to the left or right-hand side of the screen. In general, people are slower to respond and more likely to make mistakes when ‘female’ and ‘career’ are grouped on the same side of the screen, compared to when ‘male’ and ‘career’ are grouped together.

![Example of an Implicit Association Test screen during the test.](image)

In both sessions where participants were expected to do some of these tests in preparation for the training, participants were invited to talk about how they felt about the tests, whether they were surprised by their results, and so on. This psychological test was then used as evidence of unconscious bias.

The expectation that participants share their IAT results led to a sometimes ‘confessional’ quality to the session. Participants ‘owned up’ to the bias revealed by the test, often together with statements about the mismatch between their test result and their personal lives or their consciously held views. People used the language of the test to do this, saying
that the test had shown that they have “strong associations” or “moderate associations” between men and science, or another of the tests (although pre-course instructions specifically recommended doing the test on race and on sex, in Malorie’s session no trainee mentioned their result on race. In Akanna’s session, a few did mention their result on race).

Some participants argued against the validity of the test, and this was a response which trainers expected:

A man objected saying he didn’t think it was a meaningful test, there were so many extraneous variables, for instance his phone rang while he was doing it and he went to answer it so there was that long pause which will have been averaged in to the results. He may have also raised other objections like order in which they did the tasks – I’m not sure.

Akanna changed slide to one which read:

Don’t fight the feedback
- I don’t agree with the results
- It just seemed to be measuring manual dexterity
- I got confused when it switched the way I was supposed to categorise things and it slowed me down
- I already knew I had that bias

This suggests that in spite of the way in which the IAT paradigm draws on unconscious, rather than conscious or deliberately held, associations, participants still feel the need to distance themselves from results which show stereotyped associations. The IAT is intended to reveal aspects of one’s psychology which are not accessible to conscious thought. That is, introspection would not reveal the presence of the associations which the test is designed to show. IATs were used to frame discussions about discrimination such that ‘unconscious bias’ was a central cause and mechanism of discrimination. To the extent that this removes conscious choices from the picture, this removes individual responsibility for acts of discrimination. At the same time, it becomes difficult to see how individuals could take responsibility for ending discrimination, if it is occurring at an unconscious level which cannot be consciously influenced:

Malorie then said, a lot of people when they take these tests think, OK I may have these unconscious biases, but they “wouldn’t impact on my decisions in work”. But how can you be confident of that? We don’t necessarily know when our unconscious biases are influencing the way we see things.
No one in the session has raised the objection that unconscious biases don’t affect them at work, but Malorie pre-empted the objection by raising and rebutting it herself. Interestingly, her rebuttal is built on uncertainty: we don’t know what exactly our IAT score means and we don’t know that our judgements at work are shaped by unconscious bias (as measured by the IAT). In context, this uncertainty should make us concerned that our decisions may be shaped by unconscious bias without our conscious knowledge (implying a need for institutional practices which mitigate the discriminatory effects of unconscious bias). A participant responded:

Matthew started talking, saying that surely it’s reasonable that we have these biases – we should be thinking not about what ought to be, but what is, and with our media and so on ...

Here Matthew argued that given the societal-wide misogyny and racism, as expressed through media, it is inevitable and ‘reasonable’ for us (implicitly, everyone) to have these biases. Here as elsewhere the psychological discourse is connected to a critique of bigotry on a societal level via the implied mechanism for how we became biased: through absorbing societal norms and beliefs. This makes the psychological discourse less individualistic in its conceptualisation of what discrimination is – although still looking at individuals, their beliefs and feelings are understood as deriving from society. In her response Malorie supported this view:

Malorie said, settling into a recognisably ‘story telling’ register, that she did all of the IATs for the first time years ago and before doing them she had thought, ‘this is my job’, ‘hopefully I’ll be reasonably neutral’ - and she was in many of them but not race. Even though she is a Black woman she had a positive association with white people and a negative association with Black people. She was really shocked by that and started to think about where it came from. And she realised that when she was a child, her family had moved from London, from a very ethnically diverse area, to somewhere more rural, where they were the only Black family. So not only was it the case that when she was growing up all of her friends, her teachers, everyone she spent time with outside her family was white, but also when her parents were explaining the move to her, they used to tell her, you’ll do better here. We’ll do better here. They didn’t say, because everyone’s white, but they didn’t have to!

This is one of the few instances in my research where someone discussed their own anti-Black bias (the other occasion was during Akanna’s training, when a Latina woman spoke about having been raised to be afraid of Black men, and having only overcome this fear since having Black colleagues at her current university). Being a Black woman perhaps
makes this possible for Malorie in a way which it may not be for white trainers, in terms of
the experienced need to avoid being identified with the figure of the racist. Even where bias
is framed in terms of the unconscious, white trainers continue to avoid naming their own
anti-Black bias. This again shows the continued relevance of the figure of the racist: trainers
and participants are reluctant to name themselves as having anti-Black biases, because this
identifies them too closely with the discursive figure of the racist.

Malorie went on speaking: And it was the same with sex – her IAT said that she
thought women should be at home, women in the kitchen, men should be at work
having careers – and her conscious beliefs are in complete contradiction with that!
And she is a woman who works.

Malorie’s interpretation here of what the IAT shows is not in keeping with the official
interpretation as expressed by the psychologists working on Project Implicit:

The IAT measures the strength of associations between concepts (e.g., black people,
gay people) and evaluations (e.g., good, bad) or stereotypes (e.g., athletic, clumsy).
The main idea is that making a response is easier when closely related items share
the same response key. We would say that one has an implicit preference for
straight people relative to gay people if they are faster to categorize words when
Gay People and Bad share a response relative to when Gay People and Good share a
response key. (Project Implicit, undated)

Malorie’s framing of IAT results as showing what you believe ‘should’ happen suggests the
IAT is a more powerful tool than it claims to be, and its results more potentially alarming in
their ability to classify participants as racist or misogynist (for instance, people who believe
women “should” be at home while men “should” be at work – as opposed to only
identifying unconscious associations between women and home, and men and work). This
makes strategic sense as it encourages participants to take their results seriously, but could
easily be undermined by participant expressions of disagreement with this interpretation. I
understand this as an instance of incoherence and tension within the psychological
discourse – IAT results only hold emotional significance in so far as participants are
emotionally invested in avoiding identification with the figure of the ‘bigot’. The question of
whether change is possible is significant here. This was raised by a participant soon after
Malorie shared the results of her IAT and her interpretation of these results:

Someone asked Malorie ‘have you done the test recently?’

Malorie said yes, a few weeks/month ago

They asked, and did your result change?
Malorie answered, it changed a little (pause) but it hasn’t changed a lot. It’s not easy to shift unconscious biases – the sorts of things that have been shown to change unconscious bias are things like ‘literally living with someone for a period of time’.

I return to the question of change in the next section. Here it is noticeable that the results of the IAT, which show associations exist, are being treated as inherently problematic by the trainer, rather than as something inevitable and expected which therefore requires systems that counteract the effects of unconscious bias to be universally implemented.

I would suggest that there are several reasons for trainers to include IATs as part of training. Firstly, as a demonstration that discrimination is real, ongoing, and that trainees are implicated in it. I argued in Chapter 6 that trainers use sociological data to make this case; trainers also share the results of psychological experiments and studies to argue that discrimination is still relevant. However, these studies perhaps do not make discrimination personal in the way that IATs (and other techniques which are understood as delving into the trainee’s own biases, assumptions, etc.) do. The message that discrimination is real and implicates trainees personally is helpful both to justify the relevance and importance of the training itself; and to justify any practices which trainers recommend that trainees institute.

IAT results showing stereotypical associations could be understood in at least two ways: as something we should work to change in ourselves, or as something we need to accept and work around in ourselves (through techniques such as conscious questioning, or through institutional practices such as anonymous marking). Although these ways of looking at IAT results (and at bias, assumption and stereotypes more generally) are logically difficult to reconcile, both were present. IAT results were seen as something that we should work to change, but also as something very difficult to shift. In the next section I discuss the reason given by trainers for why we will always, inevitably, make assumptions: our evolved human nature.

8.12 Evolutionary psychology

Evolutionary psychology is one of the strongest ways for trainers to make links between prejudice or fear, and an idea of innate, biological human nature. Trainers did this in two different ways – either as a catch-all explanation of behaviour (Rex), or as a route into discussing which groups of people we are afraid of (Malorie and Akanna). Rex used the
concept of the ‘fight’, ‘flight’ and ‘freeze’ response throughout the training session as an explanatory framework for how people respond to conflict. Early in the session, after covering ground rules and introductions, he began a conversation about assumptions and led this into a conversation about the evolutionary development of the ‘fight or flight’ response:

Rex asked, ‘why do we do it’ [make immediate assumptions] and got the answers “human nature”, “tribal”, “based on experience”, “friend or foe”, “protection”, “survival instincts”

He leapt on ‘survival instincts’ and started talking about ‘fight or flight’. He described people faced with a mammoth needing to respond quickly to the threat, they had to either fight the mammoth or run away from it. Then he asked us when have we felt, so far during this session, that we were having a fight or flight response?

First answer was ‘as soon as we walked in’ from a man at the front. He said he had been nervous and not sure how the trainer was going to react to them being late, ‘but you were very welcoming.’ Trainer answered ‘so far’ and got a laugh from lots of people.

Rex added ‘freeze’ as an evolutionary response to perceived danger, and for the rest of the session, all discussions of workplace conflict were explained by him through this lens. For instance, going along with something that makes you uncomfortable was a ‘freeze’ response. This broad explanation, encompassing any instance of discomfort, allowed Rex to frame all workplace interactions through the lens of evolutionary psychology. This aspect of the psychological discourse produces a psychological subject whose reactions to others can all be traced back to primitive instincts.

The other two trainers who talked about ‘fight or flight’ (Malorie and Akanna) used this as a way to encourage participants to talk about what groups of people they are afraid of (these two trainers worked for the same training provider). These discussions were framed as ‘who is a mammoth to you?’ and conducted in pairs. Responses which were then fed back to the group as a whole in Akanna’s session included spiders (twice), ‘kids in hoodies’, ‘after 7/7, anyone wearing a big backpack’ and ‘older men’.

The exercise to talk about ‘who is a mammoth to you’ is intended as a question about groups of people who make us nervous or fearful. This exercise follows a discussion of our IAT results, suggesting that if participants are honest, socially marginalised groups will be mentioned among our ‘feared’ groups. Participants tried to avoid this implication by
emphasising ‘neutral’ aspects of their descriptions and leaving out aspects like race – 
‘anyone’ wearing a backpack becomes an object of fear, although fear of terrorists is 
generally a racialised fear in the UK. None of the participants’ responses in Akanna’s session 
made explicit reference to racialised groups or otherwise oppressed groups as objects of 
fear. I see this as an effect of the discursive figure of the bigot– the framing of the exercise 
as about ‘mammoths’ has been insufficient to overcome participants’ desire to avoid being 
identified with this figure. After acknowledging these responses:

Akanna started talking about how in her training people often start telling her about 
problems they have at work with someone, and when she asks “have you spoken to 
them about it?” they say No – because they have a protected characteristic and I 
don’t want to.

Akanna filled the gap created by participants’ refusal to engage with the exercise as 
intended, not by talking about her own fears, but by telling an anecdote about previous 
participants in the training; implying that as we, the current participants, have not 
responded in the way that she needs us to in order to make her point, she needs to draw on 
previous participants instead.

Akanna’s anecdote describes areas of silence which may be comparable to those which Rose 
describes when she says that staff report that

...‘we don't have a dialogue around race', we are 'scared of getting it wrong' and 
being called racist if race is mentioned.

However, rather than focusing on race or on the nebulous ‘dialogue around race’, Akanna 
talks about problems between members of staff which are never brought into the open or 
discussed, ‘because they have a protected characteristic and I don’t want to’. In the context 
of the question, ‘who is a mammoth to you?’, ‘I don’t want to [talk to them]’ can be 
understood as an expression of fear and discomfort. People who ‘have a protected 
characteristic’ are presented here as something which causes others to be silent and to fear 
criticising them – this makes sense in the context of the ideas which surround the figure of 
the bigot, as marginalised people are understood as those who set the ‘rules’ of whether 
behaviour is bigoted. I discussed the difficulty of using the language of ‘protected 
characteristic’ accurately in Chapter 7; in Akanna’s example, it is clear that ‘they have a 
protected characteristic’ is a euphemistic way of saying that the employee in question is 
minoritised. Unlike Rose’s discussion of the topic, Akanna does not go on to explain what
this fear is about; instead fears of those who are ‘different’ are presented in an evolutionary framework which suggests they are inevitable and biologically determined (although both Akanna and Malorie state that in fact they are “learned”).

Both Malorie and Akanna introduced ‘fight or flight’ after first having discussed ‘unconscious bias’, using ‘fight or flight’ as an explanation for present day unconscious bias – although using more psychological jargon, this can be seen as analogous to Rex’s presentation of evolutionary theory as the explanation of why present day people make snap judgements and assumptions:

Malorie, the trainer, moves on from a discussion of unconscious bias and how it affects hiring practices, to a slide about the development of unconscious bias.

She asks, why have we developed unconscious bias?

I can’t remember whether someone answers, but Malorie gives the standard mammoth/fight flight explanation of which I have noted snippets:

‘mammoths and being cave people basically’ ‘fight flight or freeze’ ‘need to react very quickly’ ‘I’m sure we’re all very familiar with that’

Slide shows image of mammoths, image of human brain with activated amygdala, text on it reads something like ‘Early man’s response to mammoths?’

Malorie went on to talk about the amygdala in more detail and describe a study which found that white people’s amygdalas are activated by pictures of Black people, and Black people’s amygdalas are activated by pictures of white people. She describes the amygdala as a very old part of the brain which is activated when someone’s fight, flight or freeze response is activated. Akanna presents the same study in her training session.

This neurobiological focus again constructs the participants – and all people – as having incomplete access to their own minds and emotions. Implicitly, neuroimaging studies were necessary to learn about white people’s fear of Black people, and Black people’s fear of white people, rather than these fears being accessible through self-reflection or social observation. These fears are also presented in exactly the same way, implying an analysis in terms of “in groups” (see Tajfel 1982) rather than an analysis which takes into account the realistic possibilities of harm that majoritised groups can do to minoritised groups; I return to this discussion in the next section.
This fear is located in ‘a very old part of the brain’, suggesting it is integral or unchangeable, and is described as an activated ‘fight, flight or freeze response’ – this language creates distance. On the one hand, this (theoretically) opens a space for a discussion of racist fears within E&D training, as the framing of ‘having a fight, flight or freeze response’ is perhaps easier to admit to or to think about than ‘being afraid of’ minority groups. For instance, one practitioner used this language in interview when recounting a moment in her Unconscious Bias training, in which a white woman had described her experience of attending a conference at a historically Black university in the USA: “she sort of felt for the very first time ... [being], one of the only white people on campus, and you get a fear response ... quite often, not always, but ... until you’ve experienced that you don’t really have that insight”. It is notable that this example is specifically of a white person’s temporary experience of being a racial minority, framed as giving them some insight into Black people’s experiences of being a racial minority; this may be less threatening than admitting to a fear of Black people in contexts where Black people are the minority.

This evolutionary psychological language allows participants to simultaneously own and disown their fears by acknowledging them while attributing them to a specific and primitive part of the self, in some way distinct from the ‘real’ self. On the other hand, this distancing language is suggestive of our own lack of control over this primitive self, making social change seem impossible if inequality is due to our human nature. This makes it difficult to see the value, in terms of social change, of conceptualising discrimination in this ‘innate’ way:

Someone asks, but is that just how it is or is it learned? Malorie answers, it’s learned, it’s a learned response, but we learn it very young and it’s hard to shift.

This response, like Liz’s description of the process of removing one’s own ‘attitudinal barriers’, tries to balance the psychological discourse’s positioning of *everyone* as biased with the need to provide hope for change and a justification for the existence of the training – if fear of outgroups really is this intrinsic to human nature, this implies that nothing can be done about it, and undergoing E&D training will make no difference. In fact, as I suggested in Section 8.8, mechanisms exist to mitigate the effects of unconscious bias, such as removing identifying information from job applications in recruitment, suggesting possible roles for E&D training even if bias is impossible to change. However, in practice this tension
about change is regularly raised within the psychological discourse and often creates incoherence and uncertainty.

Malorie then leads us into a discussion about what people or groups of people frighten us, framed through the euphemisms of the fight/flight/freeze discourse as ‘who is a mammoth to you’:

Malorie then says to talk in small groups about who is a mammoth to you? Now that there are no mammoths, what gives you that fight, flight or freeze response?

She splits us into groups of 3-4 participants.

The responses to this question are a strong illustration of the way in which the ‘bigot’ discourse continues to exist in these training sessions as a shadow or boundary which creates areas of silence. Even though from context it is clear that we are being asked to admit to prejudices and fears about groups of people, almost no one engages with the question on that level. As described above, in Akanna’s session the most common answer was ‘spiders’. Discussing this with a British Indian participant in an interview a year later, he viewed this response as facetious, but also viewed the facetious responses as a sign of discomfort and that the training was working well:

Quite a few people were being facetious, if I remember rightly! *(Laughs)* … Well I think it was very positive, because I think a lot of people... people were a lot more engaged than they would have normally been engaged, at a Diversity and Equality session. Usually, it’s very dry; but the very fact that they were made to think, even if, quite often, I think humour – or trivialising – is because people feel uncomfortable. And you could see the discomfort there ... when a lot of people start getting facetious, or start trivialising it, it usually means they’re not in very comfortable territory.

I think this analysis is sound in its explanation of why people gave trivial, facetious responses. In Malorie’s session, responses to the ‘who is a mammoth to you’ question included ‘managers’ and ‘passive-aggressive people’. Only one person named a marginalised group, a white woman who has been a very enthusiastic participant so far in the session:

Emily says in a confidential tone, I can tell you mine – people with mental health disorders or huge amounts of distress, because I feel so much empathy for them. I feel so responsible for them but I need to be a manager and that can be really hard.

Malorie responds in a neutral tone by saying something like, so it’s hard for you to balance your role as a manager when people are in a lot of distress. Emily agrees.
Emily named a marginalised (and legally protected) group as her fear – people with mental illnesses – but groups them with people who are experiencing ‘huge amounts of distress’, clarifying that the illness itself is not the problem but the distress that it causes them. This enabled her to frame the fear as a response to the mismatch between her need to stay ‘in role’ as a manager, and her empathy, which presumably makes her wish she could act in the role of a friend. This allows her to continue to frame herself as being non-bigoted and progressive on equality issues despite her expression of fear of a marginalised group, which in other contexts may be viewed as bigoted.

Akanna and Malorie, more strongly than Rex, use biological and scientific language and studies to describe and explain prejudice and bias; but all three are using the same basic framework of evolutionary psychology and the idea of a fear response, described as ‘fight, flight or freeze’ by Malorie and Rex and the more familiar ‘fight or flight’ by Akanna. In each case, these concepts connect the emotional response to fear with underlying bias and ultimately with discrimination. Whereas bias and stereotypes can be understood as cognitive rather than emotional, by linking biases with ‘fight, flight or freeze’ responses associated with the experience of early humans encountering a mammoth, emotions and particularly the emotion of fear becomes central. This is particularly so in Rex’s training which continually returns to the idea of fight/flight/freeze. When fear, discomfort and anxiety become central to explanations of discrimination, there are evidently connections to be made between discrimination and the anxieties surrounding the ‘bigot figure’. As I showed in Section 8.5, Akanna makes these connections by talking from personal experience about how it feels to be treated as a ‘mammoth’ – this use of evolutionary psychology did not come up in other sessions.

In this section I have argued that trainers use the language and concepts of evolutionary psychology to universalise bias, and to provide a framework for thinking about one’s own fears, distanced from the figure of the bigot. There was greater engagement in the question “who is a mammoth to you?” in both Akanna’s and Malorie’s training session than in the somewhat analogous question “How confident do you feel discussing equality issues?” in Rose’s training session. Both questions invite participants to admit to fears, discomfort or anxiety; but Rose’s question was more narrowly focused on “equality issues”. Given that most of the engagement with the “mammoth” question centred on participants’ feelings
about groups which are not minoritised (e.g. “managers”, “students”), it is impossible to
gauge whether the engagement was facilitated by the psychological discourse, the openness
of the question, the manner of the trainers, or a combination of factors. However, what is
clear is that people’s ‘confessions’ of fears, even when using the “mammoths” framework,
are still powerfully influenced by the figure of the bigot, and trainees avoid admitting to
racist fears and to fears of minoritised groups.

I have also argued that in making the ideas of “mammoths” or of “fight, flight and freeze”
central, fear is given an important role in the analysis of bias and discrimination. By framing
any fears experienced in relation to minoritised groups as an evolved response, these
feelings of fear, anxiety or discomfort are seen as both natural and inevitable. This is in
tension with the idea of fears of outgroups as having social origins and being a “learned
response” (although both Malorie and Akanna include this idea). It also precludes an
analysis of what precisely people are so afraid of. Whereas Rose explains the fear in terms
of being mistakenly perceived as racist, and Liz in terms of being so invested in “treating
people normally” that it causes panic, when fear is explained in evolutionary terms there is
no need for a different or deeper analysis. The fear of minoritised people or majoritised
people is thus described identically to the fears of majoritised people of minoritised people,
despite their very different implications (see Henriques 1984). In the next section I turn to
another psychological argument used by trainers – using perceptual illusions to
demonstrate human fallibility of judgement.

8.13 Illusions and executive function: Human fallibility

All the trainers who made extensive use of the psychological discourse conveyed ideas
about the fallibility of our judgement due to inbuilt ‘errors’ in processing (Henriques 1984).
Both Malorie and Akanna drew on perceptual illusions to reinforce this message, making an
implicit analogy between how we misjudge sizes, colours and so on when viewing a
perceptual illusion, and how we misjudge people due to our biases and stereotypes. Akanna
drew on optical and auditory illusions to demonstrate that we can be mistaken about what
we see:

Akanna changed slides to a visual illusion slide showing two small circles, one on the
left and one on the right. The one on the left is surrounded by larger circles, making
it look small, and the one on the right surrounded by smaller circles, making it look
big³. She asked us something about which was bigger. Someone answered, and Akanna said that in fact they are completely identical, and only look different because of how our brain interprets them. A lot of people disagreed or made disbelieving noises and she said jokingly (but it was also true) that she’s got tracing paper that can prove it and they are welcome to check for themselves later – the optical illusion was printed in our handout.

Malorie’s training included similar slides on visual illusions. Akanna also played us videos of the McGurk effect⁴. Having demonstrated to us – using our own perceptions, rather than by giving accounts of studies – that our senses are not fully reliable, Akanna argued by analogy that our social perceptions of the people around us are skewed by factors beyond our conscious control. In this she used studies to back her up, for instance, a study famously showing that holding a warm drink affected people’s judgements of others (inclining participants to rate others as ‘warm’ personalities (Williams and Bargh 2008)). Both Akanna and Malorie shared the results of several psychological studies which showed that judgement of students or of prospective employees is influenced by irrelevant characteristics such as Body Mass Index. Malorie also drew on anecdote to talk about our unreliable judgement, immediately following the discussion of IATs described in Section 8.11.1:

Once I was on a recruitment panel, there were 3 people on the panel. “One person had much higher marks for one candidate than we did” and so we went through that candidate point by point and he’d noted down things she’d said which she just hadn’t said, and we both had to say to him, no she didn’t say that. I couldn’t believe it, he remembered her completely differently from how we remembered her. So we went through everything and at the very end, he said - “she was gorgeous though wasn’t she” (Malorie puts on a different tone of voice when quoting him, kind of sighing as if referencing other-worldly beauty).

This line – she was gorgeous though wasn’t she – is the punchline/climax of the story and participants are smiling and shaking their heads in response.

Malorie went on, I don’t think he was thinking, let’s get more hot women in the office, or let’s employ her because she’s attractive. I really don’t think he was being like that. He believed he had heard what he had written down – he heard what she said differently because he was already so predisposed to like her.

A white man says: ‘that’s awful’

³ The Ebbinghaus Illusion.
⁴ The McGurk effect, first written about in McGurk and MacDonald 1976, is a perceptual illusion in which visual input is integrated with auditory input to produce the illusion. The sound of a person saying ‘ba, ba’ is combined with the visual film of a person saying ‘ga, ga’. The sound perceived by the observer is ‘da, da’.
Malorie goes on, All of us believe that we are perceiving things accurately and that we are being fair in our recruitment. We will hear things differently because we are different - but also becoming aware, can we shift what we do?

[I find her story really unsettling in terms of my subjectivity as a researcher. I find myself wondering whether I am paying extra attention to the participants who I click or don’t click with, who I like or dislike, whether my notes are accurate, especially how my reconstructions are accurate or inaccurate when I write fieldnotes.]

In this episode, the coherent narrative that I describe in Section 8.8 comes through clearly. “All of us believe that we are perceiving thing accurately and that we are being fair in our recruitment” – hence the need for anecdotes, psychological studies and data such as our own IAT in order to demonstrate that we have biases which affect our judgement. Only after overcoming this belief in one’s own objectivity can we move forward: “becoming aware, can we shift what we do?”. One way forward has already been suggested by the anecdote – doing recruitment in panels rather than by individuals, and having these panels be “diverse” (not all white men). However, rather than moving straight on to describing techniques for mitigating the effects of unconscious bias, Malorie goes on to use the Stroop test on the participants, as I will shortly describe. As my fieldnotes show, I found this anecdote both convincing and personally troubling in the moment. Although I already knew the psychological and sociological data showing widespread bias, and thought I had already accepted that my research findings (like everyone else’s) would always be only one possible interpretation of the (co-constructed) data, the anecdote functioned effectively as intended in that it made me feel that our imperfect human judgement posed a serious problem.

Akanna also used the Stroop test shortly after debriefing the IATs. Rather than using anecdote to make the case that we should take the results of IATs seriously, she shared her own biases, using photos which were presented side by side and giving a positive account of the person depicted in one photo (‘professional’) and a negative account of the person in the second photo (‘scruffy’), with four pairs of photos. She introduced this by saying “I’ll tell you some of mine” and joked that she didn’t mind and she was never going to see us again anyway – linking back to the idea of reputation management, suggesting that she had no need to manage her reputation in relation to us as our encounter was a one-off. In response to one of her descriptions of her biased responses to the people in the photos, a trainee called out ‘that’s probably true’, just as in Karishma’s description of stereotypes based on
age described in Section 8.10; this was not challenged by anyone. The Stroop test came immediately following this account of her biases.

The Stroop test is a test of executive function in which the person doing the test has to say aloud the colour of a word, where the word itself is the name of a colour, as in the word ‘blue’ (which might be printed in red). People are slower and less accurate with this task than they are when reading colour names, which are presented in their own colour. Akanna and Malorie presented the Stroop test as a collective task – the trainees as a whole tried to perform the task in the training room, with the stimuli being presented on a slide. Trainees first did the task where the colour words were presented in their own colour, and then when there was a mismatch between the colour of the word and the meaning of the word. Both trainers treated the Stroop test as showing our minds struggling to process information which does not ‘match’ in some way: “it’s easier to go with what matches” (Malorie).

These tasks, or exercises, were used to emphasise “human nature” as including imperfect processing of information and fallible judgement. They were quick, so could be done on the spot during training, unlike the IAT; and act as demonstrations using trainees’ own perceptions, unlike the studies which trainers referred to. As these exercises have no direct relationship to ‘bias’ in the realm of human relationships, they do not invoke the figure of the bigot and participants freely discuss and laugh about the illusions and the difficulty of the Stroop task (although one trainee did claim that the Stroop task was easy for him). These tasks reinforce the argument being made about the universality of bias and the impossibility of perfect judgement, by generalising this to forms of judgement which are not social.

8.14 Folk psychology

As a final example of trainers drawing on psychological concepts during training, I now turn to Sophia, a trainer who generally avoided the psychological discourse, preferring a legal discourse. Sophia focuses on the law throughout most of the session and rarely mentions unconscious bias, evolutionary psychology, or other explicitly psychological ideas (although she mentions ‘unconscious bias’ as the reason that disabled people are discriminated against in the workplace). However, in the more personal moments of training she implicitly used psychological ideas, as I describe below.
Following a discussion of what legally ‘counts’ as harassment, Sophia advises us on how to approach someone if they have offended us:

Sophia said that this is only her opinion and she’s not telling us what to do, but her advice is to give them the benefit of the doubt and tell them what you want them to change. She demonstrated: “I’m not sure if you’ve realised, but when you said this this morning, I found that offensive.” She said that if you approach someone like that they are likely to listen, but if you go to them and say, THAT WORD YOU USED THIS MORNING OFFENDED ME AND I COULD TAKE YOU TO COURT!!!, they will just get defensive.

Lots of people laughed at Sophia’s imitation of someone being angry, and she went on to say that her 18-year-old daughter is now into designer fashion, and the other week her daughter showed her a photo of trainers which were £500 a pair and said how much she wanted them. So she’d answered saying ‘you’re right, they look great, I’d like a pair as well’ and immediately her daughter didn’t want them anymore. If mum wants them I don’t want them! It works!

This story got laughter from lots of people and one man joked that she was lucky her daughter hadn’t called her bluff, that would have cost a thousand pounds! Sophia laughingly agreed. She then moved on to a slide about victimisation.

After humorously advising us on staying calm and friendly when offended, Sophia immediately segues into a story about her daughter – not a story about harassment or offence. Instead, the narratives are connected by the theme of avoiding conflict through an accurate understanding of human nature and of how people will respond to the things that you say. The story of how she successfully and subtly changed her daughter’s views on the £500 shoes suggests that she is able to speak with some expertise about human nature and on using this knowledge to avoid conflict and to reach the desired outcome. Sophia does not explicitly reference psychological theories or studies, but rather draws on an implicit idea of human nature and psychology. This has much in common with Rex’s rhetoric of “our natural fight-flight-freeze response”.

8.15 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that the figure of the bigot haunts equality and diversity training. Occasionally the figure of the bigot becomes the subject of discussion, analysis or commentary. More often, trainers provide guidance on language which assume that participants are experiencing anxiety and uncertainty about the possibility of being perceived as a bigot, and hence are looking for guidance about what to say or avoid saying. This guidance simultaneously calms the fears associated with the figure of the bigot by
clarifying how participants can avoid assuming this position, while also legitimating these anxieties. These discussions and exercises take up only a small proportion of the time spent in training; however, the bigot figure continues to influence training as a whole, as the anxieties associated with the figure of the bigot are never fully resolved.

The psychological discourse is currently widespread in E&D training for staff at universities. This discourse positions everyone, including the trainer and participants, as people who have biases, make snap judgements and unfounded assumptions, hold stereotyped views and experience a ‘fight or flight’ response to others. The psychological discourse is organised around the idea of a human nature which can be understood through psychological concepts and techniques. By positioning everyone as a possible perpetrator of discrimination, this discourse aims to diffuse the tension and fear associated with the figure of the ‘bigot’. I have argued, using examples from my fieldwork, that this strategy does not manage to overcome participants’ fears and anxieties around being identified with the figure of the bigot. Even where trainers have drawn on psychological discourses about evolved human nature to the extent of asking participants to describe “who is a mammoth to you”, participants rarely name a minoritised group as an object of fear.

I have argued that the most logical and coherent version of the psychological discourse would be that since bias is inevitable, systems must be put in place to mitigate the effects of this bias. There are moments in training when this message does come through. However, more often, there are conflicts and tensions within the discourse about whether or not biases can and should be changed; and whether self-awareness is possible, and if so, how. The psychological discourse in practice continually slips between different interpretations of the nature of discrimination. This is partially because of the inability to fully circumvent the figure of the bigot.

Where trainers draw on evolutionary psychology, this adds an extra dimension of ‘scientific’ authority to the training. However, it also prioritises fear, discomfort and anxiety as central mechanisms for bias and discrimination, as opposed to the more cognitive models of discrimination and bias. Evolutionary psychology (as used by trainers in my data) presented fear of ‘outgroups’ and people who are ‘different’ from oneself as natural and inevitable. As well as prioritising fear in the analysis this also has the effect of negating differences in power between groups – “we’re all at it”. This makes it difficult to sustain an analysis of
discrimination in terms of institutional power and in terms of the power of majoritised groups over minoritised groups. In this, it is similar to the narratives about ‘respect’, ‘offence’ and ‘assertiveness’, which similarly end up instructing both the victim and the perpetrator of harassment to be polite, calm and assertive.

To put this analysis in the context of my research questions, I turn to each research question here.

8.15.1. “What is the curriculum of the training, and how come?”

I have argued that what I have called the discursive figure of the bigot is occasionally acknowledged and analysed directly in training, but is more often acknowledged obliquely through, for instance, the provision of guidance on language or behaviours to avoid. It is rare for trainers to discuss the anxieties and silences surrounding the figure of the bigot in depth, or to interrogate the reasons for this anxiety. By instead providing guidance on which words and actions should be avoided, trainers in effect acknowledge the legitimacy of the fears of the privileged in relation to being perceived as bigots. This obscures the questions of why the prospect of being mistakenly identified with the figure of the bigot is so frightening for majoritised people.

Psychological studies and concepts form a substantial component of the curriculum of training. In particular, these are used as part of a “psychological discourse” which describes bias as intrinsic to human nature. To reinforce this idea of human fallibility of judgement some trainers draw on perceptual illusions. To further emphasise how intrinsic this bias is some trainers use evolutionary psychology to argue that bias is part of our fight/flight/freeze mechanism. Some trainers also extensively reference psychological studies and use psychological jargon to convey the results of these studies. However, more commonly trainers draw loosely on ideas about ‘stereotypes’, ‘unconscious bias’ and ‘assumptions’ to convey a general impression of bias as widespread or universal.

I have argued that the most internally coherent narrative offered by this training would be in two parts. First, the psychological discourse justifies the importance of the topic and of the training, by positioning the trainees and all other people as possible unwitting perpetrators of discrimination through their unconscious biases influencing their behaviour. Second, trainers offer a solution through mechanisms to mitigate or limit the effects of
these biases. In practice, both ‘parts’ of this narrative involve high levels of contradiction and confusion. When communicating that bias exists, trainers are faced firstly with resistance from trainees to acknowledging that bias is relevant to them. Both trainees and trainers also convey in various ways that bias is intrinsically problematic, rather than something to be expected and managed; exercises such as Rex’s probing of assumption end up conveying that trainees should not have been making assumptions. This suggests a different narrative – that the solution to bias is to internally and individually suppress it or try to eliminate it, as in “try not to assume”. This directly contradicts the broader notion of bias as inevitable. Turning to the second part of my suggested ‘internally coherent’ psychological narrative, the idea that we can treat people fairly even while having biases through the use of appropriate mechanisms, the confusion arises in relation to what these appropriate mechanisms are and whether they are adequate to counteract bias. While trainers offer occasional specific suggestions and guides, most of the time they are both generic and perhaps difficult to implement, as with Malorie’s suggestion that managers should be equally friendly with everyone they work with. In general, there was a sense that knowing about one’s own bias would in itself counteract the effects of that bias.

Turning to the question of ‘how come’, I have argued that the use of a ‘scientific’ discourse gives the trainers authority in relation to trainees and offers an ‘objective’, non-emotive justification for training and for the need for action in relation to discrimination more generally. There is also a long history of E&D training drawing on psychological knowledge as a justification for the training and as part of the contents of the training, as described in Chapter 3. Finally, overall, I have argued that the psychological discourse is an attempt to overcome the silences and anxieties created by the figure of the bigot. By positioning everyone as biased, the figure of the bigot becomes meaningless, as there is no longer a meaningful distinction between bigots and non-bigots. I describe this in more depth below in relation to how participants are positioned with respect to discrimination through this discourse.

8.15.2 “How are participants positioned in relation to discrimination?”

The psychological discourse positions trainees as possible perpetrators of discrimination. This results in resistance from trainees, which I have analysed as a consequence of the discursive figure of the ‘bigot’. The psychological discourse aims to overcome this resistance.
in various ways, enabling trainees to be positioned as possible perpetrators of discrimination with (perhaps) less resistance than would otherwise arise. First, trainees are positioned as possible *unwitting* perpetrators of discrimination; their good intentions are assumed through the provision of guidance which usually frames the possible problem as ignorance rather than bigoted views. Second, trainers work to convey that everyone is a possible perpetrator of discrimination, because bias is intrinsic to human nature. This is reinforced through the psychological content described above, anecdotes, and ‘confessions’ about the trainer’s own biases. Third, rather than focusing on discrimination perpetrated by privileged people against socially marginalised people, trainers use ideas of ‘offence’, ‘respect’, ‘assertiveness’ and ‘bias’ in ways which do not distinguish between majoritised people and minoritised people. In some cases, discrimination itself is removed from the picture: instead we have professional behaviour. In other cases, discrimination is presented as having the same origins and meanings regardless of whether the target is already privileged or already disadvantaged (for instance, by presenting an analysis focused on fears of ‘outgroups’).

Trainees were not addressed directly as possible victims of discrimination using the psychological discourse. However, participants sometimes spontaneously identified themselves as current or previous victims of the behaviours listed as behaviours to avoid, as described in Section 8.5; whether or not participants viewed these experiences through the lens of discrimination varied.

The psychological discourse thus troubles this research question by sometimes removing ‘discrimination’ from the terrain of E&D training and by continually presenting bias as universal in a way which undermines the idea of any one individual being more biased than another. In the following chapter I pull the arguments of the thesis together to answer each research question, drawing out the implications for policy, research and practice.
Chapter 9: Conclusion

9.1 Introduction

This thesis has investigated E&D training, from historical and ethnographic perspectives. It has made a number of arguments about ‘what happens’ in E&D training, which have implications for present policy and practice and for future research. In this chapter, I draw together the various threads of the thesis, bringing out the arguments made about both the development of E&D training and the forms it currently takes. I summarise each chapter and discuss the implications. I then consider each research question in turn, clarifying the answer to the questions developed over the whole thesis. I then discuss the implications that the findings have for policy, practice and future research, before finally turning to the broader implications.

9.2 Summarising the thesis

In the introduction (Chapter 1) I placed the topic of E&D training at UK universities in its political and academic context. I argued that equalities at universities in the UK has been a topic of continued popular and academic interest, with student protests and actions relating to equalities receiving particularly high levels of media attention throughout my fieldwork. Although there has been sustained academic attention to particular equality issues at universities, such as Ahmed’s work on diversity (Ahmed 2012), there has been limited research exploring the approach to equalities embedded in present day E&D training. I argued that my research would begin to fill that gap by describing “what happens” in E&D training at universities, and by situating this historically. I also presented my specific research questions here.

Chapter 2, the methodology chapter, described the trajectory of the research, including the development of the research questions. I described and justified my chosen research methods, in particular, history, ethnography and interviews, and the feminist poststructuralist approach taken to these. By giving an honest account of the difficulties encountered both in the field and in the process of data analysis, I enabled some of the complexity of the research process to come through. I set out each research questions and explained how they will be answered in terms of the choice of which data to analyse, the method of analysis and the theory underpinning both questions and analysis. As I explained, each research question was developed alongside the process of data analysis. The first
research question, “How did the practice of E&D training come about historically?”, required historical data and analysis; I primarily used secondary sources from the USA and the UK to address this question. The second research question, “What happens in E&D training?” required ethnographic and interview data, analysed in the context of the literature on E&D training and the historical analysis.

In Chapter 3, I presented a historical sketch of E&D training in the USA. I traced this history from the early 1920s with the beginnings of psychological research into ‘prejudice’ and the start of the ‘intercultural education movement’ in schools. ‘Prejudice’ at this time was studied primarily in terms of prejudice on the basis of race and of religion. With the growth of research into attitudes and particularly ‘prejudice’ there was a concurrent growth in training and educational initiatives trying to reduce or overcome prejudice. There was occasional local training in response to race riots. With the CRA1964, which outlawed discrimination on the basis of race (including colour and national origin), sex, and religion in employment, training became a mainstream component of workplaces. Courts sometimes mandated entire workplaces to receive training; however, there was no standardisation in terms of what this training should consist of. Different approaches to training proliferated in the 1960s and 1970s, of which Jane Elliott’s ‘Blue eyes, brown eyes’ training is the most famous. In the 1970s, the CRA1964 was enforced relatively strictly, leading to the rapid growth of an equalities industry. With Reagan’s policies of deregulation in the 1980s there was less obvious incentive for companies to incorporate equalities training; at this point, a different rationale for training gained prominence – ‘managing diversity’. The managing diversity movement emphasised the ‘business case’ for diversity, claiming that a diverse workforce – if well managed – had business benefits. This history shows that E&D training grew and developed in response to a range of pressures, but particularly as a response to legislation and to race riots. Psychology has been interwoven with E&D training since its earliest years, with psychological research and concepts being drawn on to support the training, to evaluate it, and to give it content and form.

Chapter 4 continued to explore the research question of how the practices of E&D training developed historically, now looking at the development of training in the UK. As in the USA, this began with race and culture and later expanded to include sex, then disability, then ‘diversity’ more broadly. I paid particular attention to the development of anti-
discrimination laws, showing how their development has been influenced by the broader context such as restrictive immigration controls in the case of the Race Relations Acts, and the influence of the EU on the expansion of anti-discrimination laws to include sexual orientation and to include concepts such as discrimination by association. I also discussed the analysis of inequality which underpins these laws; the law around some ‘protected characteristics’ is, and has always been, focused on ideas of fairness (no one should be discriminated against because of this protected characteristic) whereas other ‘protected characteristics’, especially disability, created protected groups, reflecting an analysis that these groups are oppressed. I discussed the distinctive histories of training on race, sex and gender, arguing that responses to police racism have been a key driver of training on race while the concept of ‘sexual harassment’ has taken a central role in training on sex. I also argued that developments in the USA have always influenced training in the UK, with ‘managing diversity’ being one clear example of this.

Chapter 5 brought the analysis up to date with a literature review which examined various branches of literature related to E&D training. I focused on qualitative and critical studies which looked in depth at the experience of delivering E&D education or training, although I noted the presence of an evaluative literature which looks at outcomes of E&D training in terms of either psychological or organisational measures. The qualitative literature highlighted the role of participants’ resistance, with various theoretical paradigms being used to explain this. I set out my own paradigm, the ‘bigot figure’, modelled on Ahmed’s description of the figure of the racist (Ahmed 2012), as an analytic tool in this chapter. This review implied that resistance would be a significant feature of training which would need to be taken into account in any analysis. I critically analysed the literature on managing diversity, showing that the idea of ‘managing diversity’ is fraught with contradiction and that a variety of practices are operating under this term. From this, I concluded that it would be difficult for trainers to draw on the idea of ‘managing diversity’ in a coherent way; this was borne out by the ethnographic data. This literature review also indicated some possibilities for what to expect from present day training in terms of curriculum, pedagogy, specific exercises and material practices as well as in terms of participants’ attitudes. As I argue below, many of the expectations I had on the basis of this review were not borne out.
Part Two of the thesis is concerned with the ethnographic and interview data. Chapter 6 places the training in its institutional and legal context, analysing how the question of the university’s ‘vicarious liability’ for discriminatory acts of employees becomes an explicit or implicit justification for mandatory training. This both suggests that the training is a ‘tick box’ exercise, and implicitly positions participants as possible perpetrators of discrimination, a positioning which may evoke resistance; by contrast, where ‘vicarious liability’ is not mentioned and training is optional, participants can more easily be positioned as already committed to equality. I went on to describe the ‘feel’ of training, focusing on the atmospheres and material practices of training, noting both commonalities and differences between sessions. Contrary to some of the literature, the substantial majority of pedagogic techniques are widely used in mainstream educational settings – such as didactic teaching using a slideshow for structure, paired and small group discussions, quizzes, and whole-group discussions led by the trainer. Techniques such as role-play were rare. This suggests that ‘what happens’ in E&D training may be more comparable to what happens in other educational settings than is sometimes argued in the literature (e.g. Clements and Jones 2002). I then analysed the curriculum of training, dividing it into two main areas: law, the subject of Chapter 7, and psychology, the subject of Chapter 8. In the rest of Chapter 6 I analysed the inclusion of sociological data and studies in the curriculum of training. I argued that sociological data is used primarily to convey that discrimination is real and ongoing. This both acts to counter what Andreouli et al. (2016) have called the ‘end of racism’ discourse, and implicitly argues for the value and importance of the training itself. This suggests that part of the curriculum of training is about making the case for why the training matters.

I then considered the uses of law in more depth, in Chapter 7. This analysis followed on from the argument made in Chapter 4 that although the EA2010 is presented as having ‘harmonised’ existing equalities legislation, in fact there are substantial differences between the treatment of different ‘protected characteristics’. The data presented in this chapter showed the resulting difficulties in using the EA2010 to communicate an internally coherent model of equality. I used sex, gender reassignment, race and disability as examples to show the (sometimes conflicting) models of inequality at play in legally focused training sessions. Using the same examples, I argued that while the law does influence the curriculum of
training, trainers also differ substantively in the way that they describe the law and the emphasis they place on different aspects of the law. The conclusions I drew from this were that the law cannot fully determine the curriculum of training; the law could thus be used more explicitly to support a “social justice” case for equality rather than being presented as ‘neutral’ knowledge (Brewis 2016). I then turned to how trainers use the law to position participants as possible victims or possible perpetrators of discrimination, arguing that much of the training emphasises the possibility of becoming an unwitting perpetrator of discrimination rather than the possibility of being a victim of discrimination; the exception is when trainers discuss harassment, when advice to possible victims is given. Finally, I analysed the most common training exercise in my data, ‘scenarios’, in terms of how these position participants in relation to discrimination. I argued that where trainees are ‘written in’ to the scenario, they are written as having positions of responsibility; in some of these cases, discrimination has already been occurring among people who they manage. Where scenarios explore discrimination or harassment perpetrated by people higher in the organisation, the trainee is not written in to the scenario but is looking at the situation from the outside. The implication of this analysis is that training is designed to give trainees the skills and knowledge to prevent or manage discrimination from a position of responsibility; and not to empower trainees in standing up for their own rights in the workplace, with the occasional exception of victims of harassment.

In Chapter 8 I discussed the other key discourse present in training – a ‘psychological’ discourse. I describe the ‘psychological’ discourse as one which positions bias as a universal human trait. I argue that the prevalence of this discourse can be understood as a strategic response to the discursive figure of the ‘bigot’, a source of anxiety and tension. By making the case that everyone is biased, trainers try to defuse the negative affect associated with the figure of the bigot. Occasionally the fears around the figure of the ‘bigot’ become the subject of discussion, analysis or commentary. More often, trainers tacitly accept that these fears exist and provide guidance around language use and behaviour which gives participants a template for non-bigoted behaviour, which simultaneously calms and legitimates this source of anxiety. These discussions and exercises take up only a small proportion of the time spent in training; however, the figure of the bigot continues to influence training as a whole, as the anxieties associated with this figure are never fully
resolved. I use ethnographic examples to argue that the psychological discourse is in practice internally incoherent, particularly on the question of whether and how change is possible. I further argue that if the psychological discourse is understood as a strategic attempt to overcome participants’ resistances and anxieties around being positioned as a ‘bigot’, this attempt is ultimately unsuccessful.

9.2.1 Reflecting on the research journey as an activist scholar
I undertook this research project with ideas about political activism alongside my intellectual interest in E&D training. I wanted to understand what E&D training is doing in the world, and how we reached our current political landscape with respect to E&D training as a workplace intervention. I found it difficult to reconcile my role as a scholar with my role as an activist throughout the process, and particularly struggled to reconcile my role with the hopes of the trainers who generously participated in the research (see Peel 2002b). There is a fundamental incompatibility between the kind of research I would have been doing if I had set out to evaluate “effectiveness” within the terms of the training, and the kind of research I chose to carry out.

E&D trainers are working in an extremely challenging climate, often with little institutional support and an understaffed team. We shared a passion for equality, although in some cases our conceptions of what that means was not well matched. In my “activist” role, I would have seen myself as politically aligned with many of these trainers. As such it was often difficult to know that the thesis itself would be of limited practical value to trainers, and that much of my critique would not be constructive from the point of view of someone who designs and implements training interventions. In addition, I worried that some training may act in positive ways which I was unable to capture, due to a dataset which narrowly focused on the social setting of E&D training rather than a broader focus on how this training fits into wider organisational practices. For instance, one outcome of E&D training where the trainer works within the university is that participants meet a member of the E&D team of the university. This may then influence their willingness to approach HR when issues of harassment or discrimination arise at work – an effect which could not be captured using my methodology.

Trainers may have been partially motivated to give me access to their training in the hope that I would be able to offer either validation or constructive criticism; but from early in the
research process I started thinking about tensions in training which run so deeply through
the endeavour that I struggled to imagine how training could effectively reconcile them. For
instance, the need to overcome or circumvent participant resistance is in tension with the
need to address discriminatory attitudes or behaviour displayed by those participants; and
the need to effectively reach potential victims, perpetrators and bystanders all within one
training session. My interest in drawing out and understanding these tensions and how they
are navigated in the training session was continually in tension with my

desire to make an
immediate difference to the universities and trainers who enabled me to carry out the
research.

These limitations frustrated and worried me continuously throughout the research.
However, I have also believed throughout the process that by refusing to engage directly
with the question of “effectiveness”, I was still engaging in an important form of politics.
Being willing to reflect on what exactly takes place during training, and on how we arrived at
the political situation in which “training” is taken for granted as a practice, is one way to
shift the political conversation in directions which may be more ultimately productive.

9.3 Revisiting the research questions

As I described in Chapter 2, the research questions were fully developed during the process
of data analysis. These were:

1. How did the practice of E&D training come about historically?
2. What happens in E&D training?
2.i. What is the curriculum of training, and how come?
2.ii. How are participants positioned in relation to discrimination?

In what follows I address each of these in turn.

9.3.1. The history of E&D training

How did the practice of E&D training come about historically?

I have argued that the practice of equalities training began with training about race, in the
USA. Other scholars tracing the history of a specific form of equalities training, RAT (Gurnah
1984; Luthra and Oakley 1991), trace its origins to anti-racism training in the US military in
the 1960s. I argued that while this approach to training did take off as these scholars
describe, practices which resemble E&D training were already beginning to appear in the USA in the 1920s. These were initially in mainstream educational institutions – schools and universities – but grew beyond these in the 1930s. Training and education grew in tandem with academic interest from psychologists in the concept of ‘attitudes’, and how and whether these could be changed (Gordon 2015). As such, E&D training has drawn on psychological discourses for both its curriculum and its justification since its inception. This interdependence between psychology and E&D training has continued throughout the history of E&D training, with different psychological ideas being drawn on to a lesser or greater extent by different approaches to training. This means that training did not develop as a ‘grassroots’ movement, or with strong connections to either the Civil Rights Movement or the Black Power Movement; instead, training was developed as a response from psychologists to the problem of ‘prejudice’. Ideas of ‘prejudice’ and ‘attitude’ have been at the heart of training since the beginning; this suggests the inherent unsuitability of training as a method of addressing institutional racism, as indeed a prominent American psychologist argued in the 1950s (Allport 1954). Training was generally institutionalised as a practice during this time in response to rioting and disorder. Training can thus be seen as a technique of management in a broad sense; by approaching discrimination as a psychological and interpersonal phenomenon, discrimination becomes both manageable and apolitical.

Following the CRA1964, the prevalence of training in workplaces grew immensely, and a range of approaches to training proliferated. Many of these were derived from or inspired by particular schools of thought in psychology such as humanism (e.g. Katz 1978). Despite the early interest in evaluating training and education, there was very limited evaluation of many of these approaches. When government enforcement of the CRA1964 was reduced in the 1980s as part of a more general policy of deregulation, the justification for training and for other ‘equal opportunities’ initiatives metamorphosed into a business justification (Kelly and Dobbin 1998), with the claim that businesses could not be competitive if they did not make full use of the their employee’s abilities – which would be impossible while employees felt undervalued, were being harassed, or being judged by their identities rather than their skills. ‘Managing diversity’ included the idea that all human differences are equally relevant; this meant that ‘diversity’ included everyone, including those seen as already privileged.
under the previous vocabulary of ‘equal opportunities’ or ‘affirmative action’. However, this shift in the discourses of training from ‘equal opportunities’ to ‘diversity’ did not involve a major change in the practices of either the training or more general policies in most workplaces (Kelly and Dobbin 1998). This supports Ahmed’s argument that the institutional reluctance to make substantive change results in the language surrounding (in)equality becoming ‘tired’: “you have to repeat the terms because they are not doing it; they are not doing it because you are repeating them” (2012, p.61). This “tiredness” then creates a need for a new vocabulary, which at present is still (mostly) “diversity”. By its emphasis on positivity and business values, this new vocabulary creates an apparent alignment between the institution and “diversity” (Ahmed 2012). The language of “diversity” and the disavowal of earlier terminology such as “equal opportunities” which become associated with a ‘compliance’ and/or ‘excessive’ approach, thus becomes part of a narrative of progress within the diversity field, in which practitioners can justify their work partly by distancing themselves from earlier approaches (described by Ahmed 2012; Tatli 2011; Brewis 2016). At the same time, the language of ‘managing diversity’ promises a cultural shift within institutions which was not backed up by a change in practice.

E&D training in the UK began later than in the USA, but similarly began as training on race and culture. A model of ‘assimilation’ was soon partially displaced in the mid-1960s by a model of ‘multiculturalism’, expressing an ideal of multiple cultures maintaining their own cultural practices in a state of harmony and mutual understanding. Training at this time was focused on teacher education and social work, and was not widespread even within these professions. Training on race grew substantially in direct response to the Scarman report on the Brixton disturbances in 1981 (Scarman 1981), not only in the police but in other public-sector organisations. This training, RAT, was heavily influenced by Katz (1978), an American training manual based on humanist psychology. Soon training on sex, and on disability, also became established, but these were each separate forms of training. I have argued that with the exception of training on ‘sexual harassment’, the main way in which training was used to respond to sexism was by offering training in work-related skills for women only. This trajectory implies that training was being used to manage disorder, as argued by Sivanandan (1985) and Gurnah (1984), and that the analysis underpinning early training was both psychological and came from the USA. As the history of race relations in the USA has
substantial differences from the history of UK race relations, to the extent that the curriculum of RAT was suited to the USA context, it will have been an imperfect fit for the UK. The relative absence of training on sexism suggests that sexism and racism were not yet being incorporated into a one-size-fits-all psychological model of ‘prejudice’ and ‘stereotypes’, but were at the time understood as distinctive issues requiring different responses.

Training again gained prominence in response to the Macpherson report on the police reaction to the murder of Stephen Lawrence by a racist gang. The report famously found ‘institutional racism’ in the Metropolitan police (Macpherson 1999), leading many other organisations to describe themselves as institutionally racist (Cottle 2004). This led to a renewed prominence and focus for E&D initiatives in the public sector, including training.

In the 1990s, the idea of ‘managing diversity’ gained traction in the UK. The scope of anti-discrimination legislation increased substantially in the 1990s and 2000s, largely due to pressures from the EU, with more types of discrimination becoming illegal. The merging of formerly separate bodies working on race discrimination, sex discrimination, and disability discrimination, in 2007, suggested a unified response to discrimination against different groups; this was reinforced by the EA2010 which unified all previous anti-discrimination legislation. A combination of the ‘managing diversity’ approach, which treats all human difference as equally relevant; the expansion of anti-discrimination legislation to cover many different characteristics or groups; and psychological ideas such as ‘unconscious bias’, have led to E&D training which is increasingly generic, presenting all forms of discrimination as having the same roots and solutions. From a historical and socio-political perspective, different forms of discrimination are embedded in specific, although inter-connected, contexts and power relations; for instance, racism is embedded in immigration policy, and disablism has a medical and institutional history. The different forms that different types of oppression take mean that there are particular sites of struggle for those engaged in anti-racist practice, anti-sexist practice and so on. As such, where training is generically focused on ‘diversity’ or on ‘protected characteristics’ it seems inevitable that this training will fail to engage with different kinds of discrimination in their specificity, and will not give trainees the skills to recognise or combat the specific forms that different kinds of discrimination take.
9.3.2 What happens in E&D training, and how come?
I have largely addressed this question through two sub-questions, each of which are considered below. However, I have also considered pedagogic techniques, atmospheres and material practices, as these are also integral to understanding ‘What happens’. Here I summarise my findings on these before moving on to address my two sub-questions in Sections 9.3.3 and 9.3.4.

Pedagogic techniques

The pedagogic techniques used in training are similar to those used in mainstream educational settings. This partially reflects historic shifts in which pedagogic techniques are used in mainstream educational settings, with small-group and paired discussions having become a routine component of mainstream classroom teaching in the UK (compared to the description of group work as highly unusual in Epstein 1993). All trainers used some didactic teaching (lecture-style), almost always structured by a slideshow. At least one handout was given out by almost every trainer. Discussions, either in small groups or among the whole class, were used by all trainers. This didactic pedagogy reflects the priority given to conveying knowledge – usually of the law, psychology, or both. However, it also reflects the skills and experience of the trainers in my sample, as I discuss below.

‘Scenarios’, usually to be discussed in small groups, were the most common training exercise. Role-play was limited to one training session, and other more ‘experiential’ pedagogic techniques were also relatively rare. Where these were used, they are suggestive of the importance given to engaging trainees in introspection and skill development; however, experiential learning was much less prominent than is suggested by the literature on diversity training (e.g. Geber 1990). Experiential learning techniques – for instance, role-play, scenarios involving professional actors, and in-depth conversations about trainee’s own ‘assumptions’ - were used almost exclusively by external trainers. I would suggest this can be partially attributed to the background, skills and experience of the trainers; internal trainers had a background in E&D more generally, rather than being trainers by professional background. It can also partially be attributed to the level of financial investment the universities were making into E&D training; using an external trainer is significantly more expensive than using an internal trainer. The inclusion of, for instance, professional actors, reflects a willingness to invest financially in training.
Although these practical factors can make sense of the overall predominance of didactic teaching and small-group discussion over other pedagogic techniques, this predominance is a significant finding. E&D training is described as a particularly challenging form of education because “when people engage in an exploration of their attitudes, values and beliefs, this may be an uncomfortable process. For some they will find things about themselves that will cause them emotional pain” (Clements 2000, p.144). This discomfort is described as a “necessary factor” (p.144); however, in most of the E&D training I observed, expectations on trainees to engage in a process of self-exploration were very limited. Brown analysed the visitor experience of the “Museum of Tolerance”, writing that “almost all thinking about tolerance, bigotry, and prejudice is undertaken by the museum, notwithstanding the frequent injunction to the visitor to “think.”” (2006, p.115) Similarly, although my original interest in E&D stemmed from an assumption that it would be a form of education in which attitudes and emotion would be directly addressed in some way, this did not appear to be the case to anything like the degree I imagined on the basis of either the historical research or the literature review. Although psychology was a prominent discourse, the pedagogic techniques which accompanied it not seem to succeed in creating space for (uncomfortable or painful) self-exploration.

There was no explicit assessment during any training session (although trainers probably used scenarios as a way of checking whether trainees were expressing the ‘right’ attitudes and knowledge (Peel 2002b)). However, evaluations of the training to be filled out by trainees at the end of the session were used by all trainers. This is commonplace in workplace training, but not in more mainstream educational settings, suggesting the more complex power relation in play where trainees are ‘consumers’. From this account of pedagogic practices, I conclude that while there are differences between workplace training and more mainstream educational settings, ‘what happens’ in E&D training is more focused on conveying information (knowledge) than on practising skills, or introspection and emotional work on the self. This is the case even where the curriculum of training is focused on psychology, as I discuss in more detail in Section 9.3.3.

Atmosphere and material practices
All but one training session consisted of a one-off sessions lasting three hours. This length was obviously an important factor in how much material could be covered, and in the group
dynamic, as most trainees did not know each other or the trainer before the training began. All included the provision of hot drinks during a break and often before the training began. In some cases, biscuits or other sweet foods were also provided. The atmosphere in training sessions varied widely between and within sessions. Optional sessions tended to be smaller and more intimate; the atmosphere was generally friendly and interested. At these smaller sessions, trainees usually sat in a horse-shoe shape with the trainer at the front, although in one small, mandatory session trainees sat around two tables. At the generally larger mandatory sessions, a wider range of layouts were used, with trainees sitting in rows, or around tables, or in a large horse-shoe shape.

Some trainers were entertaining, and kept trainees laughing and smiling often during the session; being entertained seemed to be valued by trainees. While descriptions of anti-racism training in the literature include visible distress or anger from trainees, including shouting and crying (e.g. Srivastava 2005; DiAngelo 2011), this was notably absent within my data. Although disagreement, non-engagement, and boredom were occasionally evident, strong negative emotions were rarely openly expressed by trainees. This may be partially due to cultural differences between the UK university and the places where these responses have been described (the USA and Australia); for instance, Peel’s study on LGAT in the UK (2002b) does not describe comparable displays of emotion, but does describe less dramatic forms of resistance which were evident in my data. However, Nanda wrote about her experiences of delivering RAT in Bradford that “there were very, very few ‘born again anti-racists’. Largely it produced tears, anger, guilt and a lot of money that was not spent on the black community” (London Social Policy Unit 1987, p.16). This account is suggestive that the key factor in this calm atmosphere is not national context but the subject matter; in my data there was no particular focus on racism. I have argued that the defences and anxieties surrounding the figure of the bigot seem to be stronger than those surrounding many other forms of bigotry; this suggests that training which did focus more closely on race and racism would generate stronger (negative) emotions in trainees. I also attribute the generally calm, academic atmosphere to the work done by trainers to keep the tone entertaining or informative rather than confrontational or accusatory. This was a question not just of tone but of curriculum content, with trainers generally avoiding a structural analysis of
oppression in favour of a psychological analysis of in-groups and out-groups and/or a legal framework which emphasised questions of legality rather than morality.

DiAngelo (2011), describing contemporary American ‘multicultural training’, argues that:

... not all multicultural courses or training programmes talk directly about racism, much less address white privilege. It is far more the norm for these courses and programs to use racially coded language such as “urban”, “inner city,” and “disadvantaged” but to rarely use “white” or “over-advantaged” or “privileged”. (p.56)

Although only one training session in my data was a ‘cultural awareness’ session, this description is helpful in pointing to the absence of politics in contemporary training. In my own data, I did not identify any “racially coded language” of the kind described by DiAngelo; the depoliticised language used in my data was the legal language of “protected characteristics” and/or the psychological language of “unconscious bias”, “assumptions” and “stereotypes”. Terms such as “racism”, “misogyny” and “homophobia” were very rarely used. This supports DiAngelo’s argument that contemporary training is usually divorced from an analysis of structural discrimination; from the descriptions of training in the literature review and genealogy it is evident that this disconnect has not always been as complete as it is today.

9.3.3 The curriculum of training

What is the curriculum of the training, and how come?

Overwhelmingly, the curriculum of training was either legal, psychological, or both. Some trainers also incorporated sociological content. The implicit, and sometimes explicit, message of much of the curriculum was demonstrating that discrimination and bias continue to be real and relevant; this can be understood as justifying the existence and relevance of training.

Almost all training included a list of the protected characteristics in the EA2010, similar to the prevalence of this described by Brewis (2016). Of the four trainers whose sessions were mandatory for all members of staff, three included a significant focus on the law which involved defining each ‘type’ of discrimination in the EA2010 and each protected characteristic. Of the remaining six trainers, only one included a substantial focus on the provisions of the EA2010; perhaps because many of these optional sessions were about a specific area of E&D, such as ‘cultural awareness’. This suggests a possible link between the
status of training as mandatory, and the decision to focus on legal ‘rights and responsibilities’ as the subject matter of training.

I have argued that the focus on legal ‘rights and responsibilities’, and its connection to the ideas of the ‘vicarious liability’ of the institution and the personal liability of the employee, can be understood as a response to trainees’ resistance to being required to attend training. This trainee resistance can be seen both as a response to being made to take time out of their work day to attend at a particular time and place, and a response to the way mandatory training implicitly positions the trainee as a possible ‘bigot’. By emphasising the need for knowledge of the (relatively recent) law, trainers avoid connotations of morality or immorality.

There were clear differences in curriculum between legally focused sessions and psychologically focused sessions, in terms of groups who were the ‘topic’ of training. Training which was focused on the law had a greater focus on disability, particularly the legal provision of a requirement to make ‘reasonable adjustments’. Trans rights were also raised almost exclusively in the context of legal discussions rather than in the context of sociological data or psychological ideas such as stereotyping. As there is so much law that could potentially be covered, different trainers choose to emphasise particular areas of law with the result that some legal concepts (such as discrimination arising from a disability) were rarely covered.

Even those topics which were raised in both psychological and legal sessions – such as sex and race – were talked about very differently when trainers were focused on conveying the law, compared to when trainers were discussing sociological or psychological data. I have suggested this is due to the legal framing of sex and race as ‘protected characteristics’ which people of any sex and race have, making it difficult to convey an analysis of patriarchy while using the law as the justification and framework of training.

I have also argued that the multiple meanings of ‘characteristic’ in the EA2010, reflected in the different provisions for and definitions of the various protected characteristics, make it difficult for trainers and trainees to use the vocabulary of ‘protected characteristics’ accurately and meaningfully, and to communicate an internally consistent and coherent model of equality and diversity. In addition, the notions of ‘indirect discrimination’ (a failure
to take relevant differences into account such that some groups are disadvantaged) and ‘direct discrimination’ (making decisions based on differences which are not relevant) exist in some tension with each other as the question of how to know whether the difference in question is relevant or not was not explored.

Psychological concepts were also widely drawn on in training, particularly social psychological concepts such as stereotyping and bias. The three trainers who used psychology more extensively to frame the training also included evolutionary psychology, and sometimes incorporated the ‘fight or flight’ response, Implicit Association Tests, neuroscience, and perceptual illusions among other psychological concepts and studies. I have argued that a ‘psychological discourse’ can be distinguished, defined by the central idea that it is intrinsic to ‘human nature’ to be biased. This argument is not made with reference to philosophical ideas about the impossibility of value-freedom, but using psychological ideas about the human mind.

I argued that the most internally coherent version of the psychological discourse in training is that it is used to make an argument for the importance of mechanisms which mitigate the effects of bias. These include spending longer over making decisions; having clear criteria in hiring and promotions such that personal biases have less of a role to play; and anonymising personal data in recruitment. Trainers make this argument by first arguing that bias is real and ongoing (which also justifies the existence of the training itself), and then giving advice and guidance on how to reduce the effects of bias. This message occasionally comes through clearly; however, I have argued that more often, the message is clouded and confused. This is partially due to the tendency to see ‘assumptions’ and bias as intrinsically problematic, and hence focus on how to reduce or eliminate bias rather than work around it. This arises both through trainees’ questions on the topic of how to change their biases, and through trainer’s implicit and explicit messages of ‘don’t assume’ or ‘try not to assume’. This creates an incoherence at the heart of the psychological discourse, as if assumptions and biases are intrinsic to human nature, it is impossible to stop using them.

Another important feature of the psychological discourse is that it makes no distinctions between the fears of minoritised people of majoritised people, and vice versa. In this, it has similarities with some of the rhetoric of the ‘managing diversity’ movement, which emphasises the importance of seeing every individual as unique and trying to get the best
work from that individual. In some versions of ‘diversity management’, any group-based measure becomes an obstacle to this goal of seeing the individual (Kandola and Fullerton 1994). Similarly, the psychological discourse sees no justification for any response to a person which incorporates traits such as their gender or race. In this it differs from the many analyses of inequality which place significance on group membership, including for instance a need for spaces which are for minoritised people only (e.g. Tatum 1997; Ahmed 2012). I have argued that this universalisation of ‘bias’ as an aspect of human nature is an attempt to work around the discursive figure of the ‘bigot’; by claiming that everyone has unconscious biases, makes unwarranted assumptions, and so on, the idea of bigots as a type of person becomes meaningless. However, I have also argued that this attempt to navigate around the figure of the ‘bigot’ is usually unsuccessful, in that trainees continue to work to position themselves as non-bigots, and this is sometimes reinforced by the reassurances offered by trainers.

Another aspect of the training curriculum is advice for trainees; this is often part of the debriefing after looking at scenarios, but arises in other moments as well. Where trainers have drawn on the psychological discourse, this advice is often presented as a way of either changing one’s biases or mitigating their effects. Trainees are occasionally given advice about appropriate language and/or appropriate behaviour; I have argued that this advice often legitimises and reinforces narratives surrounding what I have called the discursive figure of the ‘bigot’, in which people are afraid of being identified with the figure of the ‘bigot’ and this creates areas of silence. Although trainers sometimes mention or actively discuss questions of being ‘afraid of being called racist’, the origin and meaning of this fear and anxiety is never discussed in depth.

Finally, there was some sociological content, with trainers including information about cultural differences; the prevalence of discrimination or harassment; and the proportions of different groups (e.g. men and women) at different levels of the organisational hierarchy. I have argued that sociology was used primarily to make the case that discrimination is real and ongoing.

9.3.4 How are participants positioned in relation to discrimination?

My data shows instances of participants being positioned as possible victims of discrimination. This usually only happened in passing, through phrases about knowing one’s
'rights' in the workplace; it was rare for trainers to give any in-depth guidance about how to respond to becoming a victim of discrimination. The exception to this was when discussing harassment, where some trainers explained in detail the possible avenues of response and what resources were available to help victims of harassment. This sometimes extended to advice on what to do if you have been ‘offended’ by something, which leaves open the question of whether you are objecting to someone’s behaviour or language on your own behalf or someone else’s. Trainers giving advice on how to respond to ‘offence’ emphasised staying calm, ‘assertive’ and non-accusatory. I have suggested that this can also function in the training session as an implicit promise to trainees about how the trainer will react to ‘offensive’ comments from participants.

More often, participants are positioned as possible perpetrators of discrimination, particularly as possible unwitting perpetrators of discrimination. In the psychological discourse, the possibility of trainees discriminating against others with no conscious knowledge of doing so is given priority over the possibility of trainees deliberately discriminating against others. Trainers emphasise that everyone is biased and may reflect this in their behaviour, encouraging trainees to acknowledge their own complicity in discrimination (cf. Brown 2006, p.117). In the legal discourse, trainees are positioned as possible perpetrators of discrimination when trainers emphasise their legal responsibilities.

Scenarios are used as the most in-depth tool for applying participants’ knowledge to real situations. These scenarios never position participants as victims of discrimination or harassment. Instead, where participants are given a role in the scenario, they are positioned as holding a position of responsibility for preventing or managing discrimination. While this does position participants as possible perpetrators of discrimination (for instance, by failing to make reasonable adjustments or failing to take a harassment complaint seriously), participants are not positioned as current perpetrators of discrimination who need to change their behaviour in some way. Scenarios also sometimes involve an existing situation of discrimination between employees further down in the organisational hierarchy, where this situation needs to be resolved by the participant.

Where participants are not directly given a role in scenarios, the scenarios in effect position participants as bystanders. Their implicit role is analogous to that of a mediator or a member of the Human Resources team, in that they stand outside the situation and try to
decide what should happen next. These scenarios sometimes include discussion of
discrimination, harassment or victimisation by people relatively high up in the organisational
hierarchy, such as the head of a department or a senior manager. Occasionally participants
are directly positioned as bystanders by being encouraged to ‘speak up’ about any situation
in their workplace which is comparable to that depicted in the scenario.

The extensive use of psychology to provide the concepts used in training, and to re-
configure the concept of being a perpetrator of discrimination such that the
perpetrator/victim binary disappears in favour of the universal figure of the flawed, biased
human, is highly significant. Although psychology has always played a central role in
training, this has not always resulted in an emphasis on ‘stereotypes’ and ‘assumptions’ in
such a way that, for instance, a woman’s negative feelings about men are seen as equivalent
to a man’s negative feelings about women. For instance, Katz’ (1978) ‘White Awareness’
training included the claim that the term ‘racism’ can only be applied to the oppression of
Black people by white people, and included analysis of racism as a central component of
training. This attempt to combine the psychology of ‘prejudice’ with the sociology of power
relations was not necessarily effective or internally coherent; however, it is indicative of the
possibility of training which is based on psychology without completely removing questions
of power.

9.4 Implications of the research
9.4.1 Implications for policy

Throughout this thesis I have argued that ‘E&D training’ can refer to a wide variety of
educational events, in terms of both curriculum and delivery. As such, institutions seeking to
go beyond avoiding liability (which is met by online training) could benefit from being more
specific about is needed in their institution, whether that is legal knowledge, knowledge of
university policies and procedures, knowledge about unconscious bias, interpersonal skills,
or something else. The range of practices and discourses marketed as ‘E&D training’ suggest
that it is impossible for training to act effectively as a catch-all solution to workplace
discrimination.

I have suggested a possible narrative which drives the use of the ‘psychological discourse’ in
training, in which the ultimate aim of training is to convince participants to use mechanisms
which will mitigate the effects of their unconscious biases. However, many of the known
strategies which aim to mitigate the effects of bias need to be implemented on a broader level than that of individual trainees questioning their own bias; for instance, anonymised recruiting, or visual representations of successful women being present in the environment. This suggests that training is not the best arena for bringing about these changes. Rather than small groups of trainees being talked through a wide range of possible measures, and implementing these (or not) on an ad-hoc basis, policy makers should focus on making institutional changes to procedures and to the material environment which reflect the research evidence on how to improve outcomes for minoritised groups. Training can then be used to explain and justify the existing procedures and practices of the university.

The ‘standardisation’ of training into blocks of three hours is one factor which has led to training which focuses on generic ideas about ‘bias’ rather than on understanding the specific forms that different types of oppression can take. The provision of training which is longer or more specialised may achieve different results. One possibility would be for employees to be required to take one form of E&D training, but for this training to be focused on a specific group or particular type of discrimination. Given that three hours of training is not long enough to cover all the relevant aspects of the EA2010, universities could let go of the illusion of a ‘complete’ training session and instead provide more in-depth training on each protected characteristic, to be conducted by trainers specialising in that area. This would be an unusual practice, as it would mean that different members of staff receive very different training; however, it might mean that the overall levels of knowledge in a department would be higher. This would also reduce the likelihood of the vocabulary used by trainers and the messages conveyed through training being out of step with current ideas about best practice, as I described happening in the way some trainers talked about disability and about gender reassignment.

9.4.2 Implications for practice

Although this research was not undertaken with the aim of evaluating training on effectiveness, the in-depth examination of E&D training at universities has nonetheless highlighted areas which may be helpful for E&D managers and trainers.

There was a high level of turnover in E&D personnel, suggesting that more needs to be done to support diversity practitioners. One suggestion made often in the literature is of having multiple trainers; this is seen as advantageous partly because it creates possibilities for
broader expertise (for instance, Peel 2002b reports that having both a gay man and a lesbian trainer was widely seen as ideal in LGAT), but also because it may create a more supportive environment for trainers and E&D managers.

The use of ‘vicarious liability’ as a justification for training may act to undermine the intrinsic value of training and also to position participants as possible perpetrators of discrimination. This suggests that the inclusion of ‘vicarious liability’ should be avoided in legally focused training, which could instead present mandatory E&D training as part of the university’s ethos.

I have suggested that there is a possible coherent narrative being presented by the ‘psychological discourse’, but that this narrative is undermined by the tension between whether unconscious biases should be changed or not, as well as by a lack of clarity on how unconscious biases should be mitigated. I would suggest that, if the idea that bias is inevitable but should be managed is the narrative that trainers want to convey, trainers could avoid exercises and advice which leave participants with the impression that bias is something that should be changed. In addition, the focus on ‘stereotypes’ and ‘bias’ results in a lack of attention to some groups, such as disabled people and trans people, where many of the barriers they are faced with cannot be reduced to stereotyping or bias; the psychological discourse does not seem to be adequate for tackling these areas.

Turning to the provision of legal knowledge by trainers, I have argued that in some cases, trainees find the law unproblematic unless encouraged to think it through in more depth, as in the case of trans rights. This suggests that where trainers have not explained the law in depth, trainees have not necessarily realised the implications in terms of how they should be treating trans colleagues or students. To make the training relevant to practice, where legal provisions are not widely known or are surprising to trainees, there needs to be enough detail to show what trans people are entitled to; the same is likely to be true for other groups, such as pregnant people and disabled people.

I have argued that despite the absence of strong negative emotions from trainees in my data, trainees resist taking part in public self-examination or ‘confessional’ practices where these are perceived as having the potential to identify them with the discursive figure of the ‘bigot’ and particularly the figure of the racist. Although trainers show that they are aware
of this resistance and difficulty in various ways, ultimately most trainers do not directly challenge the way the ‘bigot’ is discursively constructed. Reassurances and guidance about language or behaviour work around the anxieties associated with the figure of the ‘bigot’ without addressing their nature and cause. Some scholars have emphasised how the figure of the racist obscures a structural analysis of inequality (e.g. Ahmed 2012; Nicoll 2004). However, in my data, a structural analysis of inequality was generally not being offered by trainers. Examples in the literature of a deeper analysis of where the fears and anxieties surrounding the figure of the ‘racist’ come from draw on the reflective writing of students (Ladson-Billings 1991; Tatum 1997); this is suggestive of how these fears are difficult to speak about openly and analytically in a social situation. One possibility might be to draw on the personal reflections of both majoritised and minoritised people on the difficulties of speaking about racism and other forms of bigotry and using these as a basis for discussion, rather than expecting trainees to speak about their own anxieties during training.

Other than through the occasional use of a narrative of progress by trainers and participants, mentions of the Stephen Lawrence case, and mentions of when particular anti-discrimination laws were passed, there was an almost complete absence of history from E&D training. This is part of the overall depoliticised nature of the training, which tended to treat all minoritised groups as having fundamentally similar problems, and further tended towards an analysis of discrimination as ‘unfairness’ which could disadvantage anyone, rather than as an institutionalised set of processes which systematically disadvantage some groups. The inclusion of historical information, for instance about liberation movements, could be one way to politicise E&D training. I turn to the broader questions of how training relates to liberation politics in Section 9.5.

9.4.3 Directions for future research

This thesis has demonstrated the value of looking in depth at what actually takes place during training. Trainees’ resistance to being positioned as ‘bigots’ is well known from previous research and confirmed by my research, although the manifestations of this resistance were less dramatic than in some other descriptions of training (DiAngelo 2011; Srivastava 2005). However, techniques for overcoming this resistance within a short training session are less well understood. My research suggests that the techniques currently being
used by E&D trainers in UK universities are not fully effective in circumventing or overcoming this resistance. This would be a fruitful area for future research.

My analysis of E&D training stopped short of fully addressing the Bacchian question of how training constructs social problems. In various ways I have partially addressed this question, arguing that by focusing on ‘unconscious bias’ and on the law, training constructs ‘the problem’ as psychological or legal (thus largely avoiding constructing the problem as social or structural). However, this is not a full answer; as suggested by the contradictory messages given as to whether ‘unconscious bias’ is, in itself, a problem or not. In addition, the pedagogy of training can sometimes construct ‘the problem’ differently from the curriculum of training, as described by Brown (2006) in her description of the ‘Museum of Tolerance’, which repeatedly tells visitors to ‘think’ but is pedagogically structured such that there is no room for independent thought. Similarly, if ‘unconscious bias’ per se was being constructed as ‘the problem’, one would expect a therapeutic pedagogy focused on eliminating bias; instead, to the extent that the pedagogy is didactic, it is knowledge of ‘unconscious bias’ which is being constructed as the problem in psychologically focused training sessions.

One possible framework for thinking about how training constructs social problems would be to consider how training addresses knowledge, skills and/or attitudes. Although these are impossible to fully separate, I have suggested that the use of scenarios and role-play tries to teach skills, whereas the provision of information (whether legal, psychological, sociological or something else) is focused on knowledge, and in some cases on attitudes. The question of which knowledge, skills and attitudes are in question could then be addressed. This thesis addressed the question of which knowledges are at stake in E&D training, and which pedagogic techniques are used to convey this knowledge; however, to answer the question of ‘what the problem is represented to be’ through training would require a broader framework which incorporates questions of what type of learning is meant to take place in E&D training. This might be helpful in illuminating what ‘awareness’ means in practice.

My data set included a broad range of types of E&D training, but each trainer was observed delivering a single session, with the exception of one trainer who was observed twice. To gain a deeper understanding of the dynamics of training and particularly to address ‘how
come’ training comes to take certain forms, it would be useful to observe the same
trainer(s) on multiple occasions within the same institution (anti-harassment trainers in
previous research have described their approach differing with “a receptive audience,
versus a neutral audience, versus a hostile audience” (Westerman 2008, p.109)). This would
enable an analysis of which challenges arise consistently and which more rarely, and how
these are dealt with by trainers.

Early in the research process, I conceptualised the research as a sociological study of an
understudied educational setting. In particular I assumed that E&D training was a setting in
which the pedagogic aim was changing attitudes, rather than increasing knowledge or skills.
My assumption was that this pedagogic aim would call for different pedagogic techniques;
and as such that I would be in a position to study a kind of teaching which is rarely examined
by sociologists of education.

In fact, as outlined in section 9.3.2 above, the pedagogic techniques I studied as a
participant-observer were overwhelmingly familiar from mainstream educational settings.
Further, trainers often explicitly distanced themselves from the idea that they were there to
change ‘attitudes’, instead focusing on knowledge – usually legal or psychological
knowledge. Although not what I expected to see, this is itself an important finding both for
the sociology of education and for the sociology of in/equality. One way to understand this
finding would be to see it as a drawing away from the challenge embedded in the idea of
E&D training, creating a setting which as far as possible conforms to mainstream pedagogic
techniques and learning outcomes. By framing the purpose of training in terms of
knowledge – like mainstream educational settings – and using standard pedagogic
techniques to achieve this, E&D training avoids some more emotive and complex
possibilities.

9.5 Broader politics and implications
So far, these implications for practice have focused on the practice of trainers and
managers. I now turn to the implications for practice for activists working within and on
universities, for instance, students in the National Union of Students liberation campaigns.
This thesis joins other analyses of the role of training (Gurnah 1984; Sivanandand 1985) in
arguing that, for activists, training is ultimately a diversion from the more significant work to
be done.
Gurnah (1984) and Sivanandan (1985) based their arguments against RAT on the political situation in which RAT became popular, and the effects that RAT had on broader anti-racist struggle; and on their knowledge of RAT apparently on the basis of Katz’ (1987) training manual, which was widely in use by RAT trainers at the time. At a conference discussing RAT, some practitioners objected to this critique on the basis that this could not adequately describe or capture the work they were actually doing as trainers. In this thesis, I set out to understand ‘what happens’ in present day E&D training at universities. Although a ‘big picture’ analysis in terms of liability would suggest that E&D training is part of the institutional practice of the university in order to manage risk, I was interested in the details of what people do, experience, learn and feel during the time they spend as trainees; and in the political implications this has. As I argued in Section 2.7, the practice called ‘E&D training’ may have a wide range of effects, not all of which can be understood without detailed ethnographic analysis. As research has shown significant differences between ‘what happens’ and what is described in training manuals (Peel 2002b; Kitzinger and Peel 2005), there is a clear value in analysing E&D training on the basis of ethnographic data as well as on the basis of what might be expected from manuals.

Having now completed this analysis, my sense of what training is ‘doing’ in the university is that it does have a range of effects, which cannot be fully captured by the ideas of responsibilisation or risk management (although these certainly play a major role). Training also included a lot of information about the law, about psychology, and occasionally about the institution or about UK society; in some cases, these forms of knowledge were treated as surprising and new by trainees. Trainers offered legal, psychological, business and moral justifications for the importance of E&D practice, and some of these may have been convincing to trainees; I certainly found myself caught up in some of the narratives being offered by trainers. However, I have argued that both the legal and the psychological narratives contained significant areas of incoherence. In the legal discourse, this arises due to the multiple meanings of ‘protected characteristics’, and due to the tension between whether or not difference should be treated as relevant (comparing direct and indirect discrimination). In the psychological discourse, this arises due to the tension as to whether it is possible to change our biases; and if not, what the possible ways forward are.
As a participant-observer, I certainly experienced some moments of training as personally meaningful and thought-provoking. For instance, trainers’ definitions and descriptions of harassment and bullying led to me re-evaluating the behaviour of some people I have encountered in academic life; in one case, realising that there were clear grounds for complaints which, as far as I know, were never made, and which at the time never crossed my mind to make. Where trainers effectively emphasised that we are all biased and that this affects our social perceptions, I found myself increasingly insecure about my observations and analysis as a researcher.

These experiences suggest that training can bring new insights to trainees; however, what happens with these insights is a different question. Although many trainers offer lists of things to do or not do (see Section 8.5), these may embed contradictory demands (for instance, both to ‘smile’ and to mirror the facial expressions of the client), be impossible according to the discourse of the training (‘don’t assume’, ‘try not to assume’), require a high level of emotional labour which has not been taught as part of the training (e.g. detailed instructions on body language, tone of voice, etc.), or simply be difficult for trainees to remember. The amount of time apparently required to communicate the initial basis of training – that discrimination is real, ongoing, and affects trainees personally – can leave the solutions feeling more like an afterthought than the relatively fraught process of discussing or contemplating one’s own assumptions or biases, or the evidence that there are high levels of gender inequality within the university. I have also argued that those solutions which require particular systems from the university (for instance, anonymised recruiting) need to be implemented by the university, not suggested to participants in training.

Training will continue to be useful to universities in meeting their institutional aims, which can include ‘taking action on diversity’ as a sign of excellence (Ahmed 2012) as well as the need to avoid liability. As such, training which is intellectually coherent, prioritises those areas of particular concern, conveys that equality is important to the university’s ethos rather than being a ‘tick box’, and is not oppressive in terms of the explicit and implicit messages being given about minoritised groups such as trans people, is certainly better than training which does not meet these criteria. However, in terms of where activists concentrate their energy, I now see this kind of short, generic workplace training as mostly a dead-end.
As I described in Section 2.4.1, in some circles ‘training’ is widely suggested as a solution to problems where both the problem to be solved, and the pedagogy and curriculum of training are underspecified. When researching Mental Health First Aid, I noticed how often people to whom I mentioned my research topic would enthusiastically say that ‘mental health is just as important as physical health’ and that therefore Mental Health First Aid was such an important course. This response was based entirely on the name of the course, which conveys the impression of conveying scientific, medical knowledge and skills which will enable a ‘lay person’ to act as a ‘Mental Health First Aider’. Similarly with E&D training, over the last few years at universities I have seen students campaign for ‘more training’ on particular topics such as sexual harassment, without including details about what this training should include; or even more worryingly, seen employees disclaim responsibility for minoritised clients or students on the grounds that they ‘haven't been trained’ or ‘can’t afford training’.

I had concerns about this from the beginning of this research, but was interested in exploring further the possibilities and potentials in E&D training. I now think that this overreliance on ‘training’ as a tool for social change suggests a poverty of political imagination, and that what happens in E&D training in no way justifies the level of faith placed on training by some activists. As the genealogy demonstrated, it was only in the 1980s in the UK that anti-racist activists began to focus their energies on providing RAT, and this was critiqued by some at the time as a diversion (Gurnah 1984; Sivanandan 1985; London Social Policy Unit 1987). Training emerged as a technique interrelated with social psychology, which through its focus on ‘prejudice’ as error (Henriques 1984) provided an apolitical analysis of, and response to, discrimination and inequality. It grew as a technique of management, particularly being used to respond to race riots and urban disturbances, and later to manage the risk of employment tribunals. The current embrace of training by many activists does not reflect a long history of training being used as a tool of change by activists; it is a relatively recent phenomenon.

I have argued that part of the difficulty of using ‘training’ as a tool for change is the way that ‘diversity’ is widely understood as referring to any and every difference between people, and the psychological discourse accords with this; while legally focused training attempts to cover all nine protected characteristics. The findings amply bear out the worry expressed in
Wrench (2005) that ‘diversity management’ will result in a loss of attention to race and racism; in fact, the use of a generic framework fails to do justice to any minoritised group. This tendency towards a generic analysis can also be seen in other forms of activism; for instance, the way Crenshaw’s concept of ‘intersectionality’ (Crenshaw 1989, 1993) has been co-opted to refer generically to any kind of ‘multiple oppression’ (perhaps reaching its peak in Dobson (2013) which defined intersectionality as “the belief that oppressions are interlinked and cannot be solved alone”, using the character of a striped triangle who is oppressed both by being a triangle and by being striped). This generic analysis is in sharp contrast to Crenshaw’s work which demonstrated the precise ways in which Black women were excluded from feminist analysis and practice, anti-racist analysis and practice, and legal remedies for discrimination (Crenshaw 1989, 1993).

In addition to the tendency towards a generic analysis, which, by trying to incorporate everything, fails to effectively address anything, class has almost disappeared from training and from university-based activism. I would suggest that as well as being absent from the EA2010, the materiality of class is problematic for analysis and politics of difference which are focused on identity, and with psychological ideas about the importance of avoiding stereotyping and bias. This inability to incorporate class is particularly telling in terms of the inadequacy of the framework which underpins training, and the forms of activism which pin their faith on interventions like training.

Over thirty years ago, Sivanandan argued that:

> My business is not to train the police officer out of his ‘racism’, but to have him punished for it – if, that is, he is meant to be accountable to the community he serves. ... RAT, however, professes to change attitudes and behaviour, and thereby power relations – not in reality, but by sleight of definition: by defining personal relations as power relations. (1985, p.28)

Despite this continued excessive reliance on ‘training’, there is a wide range of activism taking place at universities today, which has made universities and university students the target of continual abuse in the media (see Section 1.2). In the last month, there have been at least two further furores; one about the decision of Murray Edwards College Cambridge, a women’s college, to admit trans women regardless of whether they have a Gender Recognition Certificate (a decision which current students of that college campaigned for, although this was not mentioned in any press coverage; for instance, Williams (2017)).
is a form of social change which is directly linked to current and historic exclusions facing trans women, who have a long and ongoing history of exclusion from feminism and from women’s spaces in the UK (Jacques 2015) as well as elsewhere (Serano 2007, 2013). Soon after, the ‘decolonise the curriculum’ campaign at Cambridge University was portrayed in the press as an individual Black woman student having “force[d] Cambridge to drop white authors” (see Khomami and Watt 2017; Okundaye 2017). This campaign, which directly acknowledges and confronts British colonial history and tried to improve the education of all students by moving away from a Eurocentric curriculum, is again tailored to a specific, current issue at universities in the UK, and relies on pressure rather than goodwill.

Although the analysis presented in this thesis does not enable me to say whether these forms of activism will be effective - and I am sure they have their own complexities – I would suggest that the analysis of the thesis does show that it is very difficult to use E&D training to support radical politics; and that given its history, we shouldn’t expect it to. As such, the energy and ideas of activists should look beyond training and embrace approaches which are focused on the needs of minoritised people, such as the two very recent examples given above.
Bibliography


*Brown v Board of Education of Topeka* (1954) 347 U.S. 483 [USA]


Civil Rights Act (1964) [USA]


Department of the Army (1977) Equal Opportunity Program in the Army. *AR 600-21*.


*Employment Equality (Sex Discrimination) Regulations* (2005) Regulation 5 [UK]


*Equality Act* (2010) [UK]


340


Race Relations Act (1965) Ch. 73. [UK]

Race Relations Act (1968) Ch. 71. [UK]

Race Relations Act (1972) Part X. [UK]


Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978) 438 U.S. 265 [USA]


*Sex Discrimination Act* (1975) Part 1 [UK]

*Sex Discrimination (Gender Reassignment) Regulations* (1999) Regulation 2 [UK]


*The Oprah Winfrey Show*. ABC, 14th July 1992 (USA)


Appendices
Appendix 1. Example ethnographic information sheet and consent form

Cardiff University School of Social Sciences
Glamorgan Building
King Edward VII Avenue
Cardiff, CF10 3WT

Name: Netta Chachamu
Telephone: 02920 226881
Email: chachamun@cf.ac.uk

Participant Information Sheet

Equality and Diversity Training: An Ethnographic Approach

What is the research about?
For my doctoral dissertation, I am studying the experiences of participants on Equality and Diversity training courses. I am interested in knowing more about participants’ experiences of the course, and in understanding the dynamic that develops during the courses between the trainers and participants. To do this, I am going to take part in Equality and Diversity training sessions over the next year and make fieldnotes on what happens.

What will happen to the information?
All information will be completely anonymised. As well as giving each participant a pseudonym, I will be anonymising the institution they work for. I will be using it in my doctoral dissertation, and may also present at conferences and publish in journals. My full doctoral dissertation will be available online, and there will also be a copy kept in the Cardiff University library.

Who are the researchers?
My name is Netta Chachamu, and I am a doctoral student in the School of Social Sciences at Cardiff University. My current research interest is in equalities and education. My supervisor for this study is Professor Valerie Walkerdine. The research is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council and has been approved by the Cardiff University School of Social Sciences Ethics Committee.

What does participation involve?
If you are happy to participate in the research, I may include some of the things you say and do during the Equality and Diversity course in my study.

What if I wish to withdraw or do not want to participate?
Your participation is entirely voluntary and you can withdraw at any time, without giving a reason. This means that although we will still be taking the course together, I will not be including anything you say or do in my research. You can also let me know if there is
anything specific which you would like me to leave out by contacting me during the course or at the end of the course.

**Contact Information**

If you would like further information about the study please do not hesitate to contact me or my supervisor:

Netta Chachamu: [ChachamuN@cardiff.ac.uk](mailto:ChachamuN@cardiff.ac.uk)

Professor Valerie Walkerdine: [WalkerdineV@cardiff.ac.uk](mailto:WalkerdineV@cardiff.ac.uk)
Participant Informed Consent Form

Equality and Diversity Training: An Ethnographic Approach

Researcher: Netta Chachamu

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Please initial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sheet \textit{(18.09.14 version 1.1)} for the above study. I</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>questions and have had these answered satisfactorily.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I am free to withdraw at any time, without giving a reason.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. I agree to take part in the study.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

____________________          ____          __________            
Name of participant  Date    Signature

____________________          ____          __________            
Name of researcher    Date    Signature
Appendix 2. Example interview information sheet and consent form

Equality and Diversity Training: An Ethnographic Approach

What is the research about?

As you know from when we last met, for my PhD thesis, I am studying Equality and Diversity training courses in workplaces. The history of Equality and Diversity training shows a wide range of approaches and theories underlying the practice of training. I am now connecting this history with present day practices. I am interested in trainers’ approaches to training, and in participants’ experiences of the training. To study this, I have been taking part in Equality and Diversity training sessions over the last year. I have been taking part like any other participant, and making notes on the content of the training, the delivery style, and discussions that take place during training. I am now going to be interviewing trainers and participants who I have shared training sessions with, to learn more about their experience of the sessions.

What will happen to the information?

All information will be completely anonymised. As well as giving each participant a pseudonym, I will be anonymising the institution they work for. I will be using it in my PhD thesis, and may also present at conferences and publish in journals. My full thesis will be available online, and there will also be a copy kept in the Cardiff University library.

Who are the researchers?

My name is Netta Chachamu, and I am a PhD student in the School of Social Sciences at Cardiff University. My current research interest is in equalities and education. My supervisor for this study is Professor Valerie Walkerdine. The research is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council and has been approved by the Cardiff University School of Social Sciences Ethics Committee.

What does the interview involve?

The interview will be recorded, and will last between half an hour and an hour, in a quiet location of your choice. I will invite thoughts and reflections on the training session which we both experienced, and share some extracts from the notes I made describing the training session to form a basis for discussion.
What if I wish to withdraw or do not want to participate?

Your participation is entirely voluntary and you can withdraw at any time, without giving a reason, by letting me know that you do not want to participate. At the end of the interview I will check whether you are still comfortable with me using the recording of the interview as part of my data.

Contact Information

If you would like further information about the study please do not hesitate to contact me or my supervisor:

Netta Chachamu: ChachamuN@cardiff.ac.uk

Professor Valerie Walkerdine: WalkerdineV@cardiff.ac.uk
**Participant Informed Consent Form**

*Equality and Diversity Training: An Ethnographic Approach*

Researcher: Netta Chachamu

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet (<em>12.11.15 version 1.3</em>) for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and have had these answered satisfactorily.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Please initial</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, without giving a reason.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. I agree to take part in the study.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

______________________   _____   _________   ______________
Name of participant       Date             Signature

______________________   _____   _________   ______________
Name of researcher        Date             Signature
Appendix 3. Example of fieldnote extracts used as prompts in interview

Then Rex [trainer] had a conversation with Shreya, a brown woman at the back, who said that because he is a man she imagines him driving a black car and because he used to be a policeman and the police are threatening, she imagined him driving a black Mercedes. He commented on the stereotype – black of men and pink for women – but I don’t think he took up the point about whiteness or about the police. Then before he moved on to the next question – hobbies – she asked what car does he actually drive. He asked whether she really wants to know or just wants to know whether she was right in her assumption. When he gave his answer, she said she could see how it was appropriate to him/ how it fit with her guess. She also asked is he married and does he have children – I think the answer was yes, and two children.

**

Trainer then moved on to the third thing – something we don’t like about him. He takes a different line to the previous ones – much better controlled. He first asks, did anyone put anything to do with my height. No hands went up. He then asked, did anyone put anything to do with anything that I’m wearing. A few hands went up. He picked a white woman sitting around the middle of the rows but off on the opposite side of the room from me who said that she’d put that she didn’t like that he was wearing a suit. He began to do the comedy thing again – I can’t remember what exactly – repeating what she’d said in a mock-outraged tone or something. She didn’t go along with it and instead asked seriously, sounding a bit put-upon, ‘do you want me to explain’

He said, still being a bit exaggerated and comic, something like ‘yes that would be nice’.

She said, ‘because it’s an equality and diversity session I was hoping and expecting to be challenged by the trainer being less conformist’.

I think the trainer responded by talking about how quick she was to think that his clothes meant he is ‘conformist’. After a bit she said ‘can I sit down’. He went back to a more back-and-forth style:

‘Have you ever done diversity training before?’

‘Yes’

‘What were they like?’

‘Casual’

‘More casual than me?’

‘Yes’

‘When did you last see them?’

‘One and a half years ago’

‘So is that feeling about me or you?’

‘I don’t dislike you’ (she sounded irritated and put upon) and then she went on to say something about how she had good memories of that training but that didn’t mean this training wasn’t also good (or something like that – saying something about how that training has been good but she wasn’t complaining about this). That conversation happened with her standing at her seat (Shreya had also stayed standing by her seat). The trainer moved on to another delegate, a man (I think not
white british but not sure what ethnicity), who said that he thought the trainer was ‘smartly dressed, no tie’. The trainer told him to come out to the front and the man answered ‘I’m not comfortable’. The trainer said to him firmly ‘you’ll be alright’ and then, as the man starting picking his way out of his row and forward to the front, the trainer said to the room as a whole ‘He will be alright. I mean what I say. So do your policies.’ And then made a joke like ‘If not, take them to court!’ in a dramatic tone which got a laugh.

**

Emma also suggested you might make an assumption about them having children if there was a gap where they’d taken time off. I think this was her third suggestion (one or two other people had made one too) and at this point Rex said something like ‘you’ve got to watch out for this one, she’s making assumptions all over the place!’ in reference to her. Emma responded (defensively?) ‘I’m not saying I would, I’m saying somebody might.’

**

He then asked Emma to stand up at her seat so that we’d be able to hear her better. She did. He then asked her why she’d put her answer.

Emma answered: you said you travel a lot [‘up and down the country’ may have been phrase used?], and the people I know who have jobs that involve a lot of driving drive Vauxwagon Passats because it’s a reliable and efficient car [don’t remember exactly but this sort of reason] and most of those were estates.

[this is reconstruction from memory but on the same afternoon as it happened. Maybe in a slightly different order and definitely is a condensed, shortened version of what Rex said, but exchange is similar in spirit to what happened]

Rex said, so you heard from me, from my own mouth, that I travel a lot, and you thought I must drive the same sort of car as other people you know, people from your background and upbringing, who travel a lot. What did these people do?

Emma said, they were sales people

Rex said, sales people. So you were grouping me with sales people. And when did you last see these sales people?

Emma said, maybe four months ago.

Rex said, four months ago. So you’re using a stereotype based on some sales people you last saw four months ago.

Emma said, I wouldn’t call it a stereotype, I’d say I’m being normative.

Rex repeats, normative [sounding a bit mocking or like she was being posh/full of herself]. What do you mean by that?

Emma said, I’m assuming that your car is similar to the cars that I know other people who travel a lot drive in, because I know their cars are efficient and reliable for long distances.

Rex asks, how do you know?

Emma starts by saying, I don’t really know [as in I don’t actually know, not I don’t know how I know] –
Rex picks this up and says 'so you said that you know, but you actually don’t’

Emma goes on ‘do you mean, how do I know that it’s an efficient and reliable car? I do know that’

Rex asks how?

Emma says ‘someone who knows all about cars told me’

He asks who this person was – one of the sales people?

She says no, ‘an ex-boyfriend’

He asks, when did you last see him?

She says about six months ago

He asks, ‘do you like him?’

She answers, ‘not really?’

He asks, ‘do you like me?’

She answers, ‘that’s a really unfair question!!’ sounding upset, agitated. He responds with something like, ‘I’m being unfair?’ sounding mocking and incredulous.

He asks, do you have an answer to question 3?

She says yes

He talks a bit about how she’s made an assumption about his car based on information given to her months ago by an ex-boyfriend she doesn’t like.

She sits down and he asks another woman to stand at her seat.
### Appendix 4. Details of sessions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Session</th>
<th>University</th>
<th>Trainer pseudonym</th>
<th>Internal/External</th>
<th>Length (hours)</th>
<th>Number of trainees (approximate)</th>
<th>Interviews</th>
<th>Specific topic?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Rex</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Rose</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>Coral</td>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>Akanna</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Two with trainees</td>
<td>Unconscious Bias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>Sarah</td>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Cultural Awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Karishma</td>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>G</td>
<td>Sophia</td>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>One with trainer</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Rex</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>One with trainer</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>Zoe</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Harassment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>Liz</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>One with trainer</td>
<td>Disability Awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Malorie</td>
<td>External</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>One with manager</td>
<td>Diversity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>