Abstract
The 1960 Belgian Congo crisis is generally seen as demonstrating Anglo-American friction and British policy weakness. Macmillan’s decision to ‘stand aside’ during UN ‘Operation Grandslam’, especially, is cited as a policy failure with long-term corrosive effects on Anglo-American relations. This article recasts this decision as a shrewd manoeuvre in extremely tight circumstances, balancing multiple interests and preventing an open breach with Kennedy’s Congo policy. Moreover, ‘stand aside’ facilitated subsequent Anglo-American cooperation in the Congo, which this article demonstrates by examining events beyond December 1962, where much of the current analysis peters out.
Item Type: |
Article
|
Date Type: |
Publication |
Status: |
Published |
Schools: |
Department of Politics and International Relations (POLIR) |
Publisher: |
Taylor & Francis |
ISSN: |
1361-9462 |
Date of First Compliant Deposit: |
3 August 2018 |
Date of Acceptance: |
4 May 2018 |
Last Modified: |
16 Mar 2020 06:02 |
URI: |
http://orca.cf.ac.uk/id/eprint/113873 |
Citation Data
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