Production of Informal Trading Spaces

A Case of Karachi, Pakistan

This thesis is submitted in fulfilments for the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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School of Geography and Planning, Cardiff University

2019
This thesis is dedicated to my mother who always believed in me unconditionally.
Abstract

This thesis explores the production of informal trading space in the markets of Karachi, Pakistan. Karachi is a multi-ethnic migrant city that has a history of violent struggle between various ethnic groups following partition in 1947. Ethnic claims to space are highly politicised and have led to contest and division in the city. The research focuses on the mechanisms and contextual histories of economic spatial claims as they are intertwined with complex social networks and the power dynamics of multiple actors.

Karachi is a divided city whose port-based economy has drawn extensive migration into the city. This has led to political and ethnic tensions and increasing violence between different ethnic communities. While the impacts of violence in Karachi on political divisions and ethnically segregated housing have been researched, their impact on informal trading sector of Karachi is very limited. This research addresses that gap. Drawing on the literature, the research defines the concept of informal trading space as space used for street trading falling outside formal legal and regulatory control, created by street traders and other urban actors through their actions, social relations and political and power dynamics.

Based on case studies of three areas (towns) within Karachi, the former colonial commercial centre of Saddar, the 1970s informal settlement of Orangi, and the port-city of Lyari, and studies of informal space used for trading within the main markets of these towns, the research found extensive evidence of ethnically segregated and highly contested street trading areas. Street traders are unable to access trading space unless they are affiliated to a wider network of protection, either ethnic, political, criminal networks or market unions. In this context, urban street traders – particularly the urban poor – have to become affiliated to powerful actors and networks to survive.

In conclusion, this research departs from the common perception in the literature of street traders as a marginalised group victimised by the state. In a divided city such as Karachi, the empirical evidence suggests a more complex reality, whereby street traders’ networks become complicit actors in the power struggle over economic gains, political domination and territory, and street traders are political actors in a wider struggle for power.
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This work has not been submitted in substance for any other degree or award at this or any other university or place of learning, nor is being submitted concurrently in candidature for any degree or other award.

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<td>Awami National Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDGK</td>
<td>City District Government Karachi</td>
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<tr>
<td>JI</td>
<td>Jamat-e-Islami</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K.Electric</td>
<td>Karachi Electric. (Previously, Karachi Electric Supply Corporation)</td>
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<td>KMC</td>
<td>Karachi Metropolitan Corporation</td>
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<td>KRC</td>
<td>Katchi Rabita Committee</td>
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<td>KWSB</td>
<td>Karachi Water and Sewage Board</td>
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<td>LDA</td>
<td>Lyari Development Authority</td>
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<td>LG</td>
<td>Local Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDA</td>
<td>Malir Development Authority</td>
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<td>MNA</td>
<td>Member National Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPA</td>
<td>Member Provincial Assembly</td>
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<td>MQM</td>
<td>Muttahida Qaumi Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAC</td>
<td>People's Aman Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKMAP</td>
<td>Pakhtunkhawa Mili Awami Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Pakistan People's Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTI</td>
<td>Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf</td>
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<tr>
<td>SITE</td>
<td>Sindh Industrial and Trading Estate</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLGA</td>
<td>Sind Local Government Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHO</td>
<td>Station House Office (in local Police Station)</td>
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1. Introduction

1.1 Introduction

The study is motivated by an observation of routine evictions and resurgences of street traders in Karachi’s informal markets. In Karachi it is estimated that 75% of the working population work in the informal economy (Hasan and Mohib 2003), yet despite its key role in providing subsistence to a large population, informal workers are highly vulnerable in encounters with state institutions and frequently face evictions and displacement. However, it was observed that street traders return to their places after brief negotiation with local officials. Earlier studies conducted by the researcher identified a need to further investigate the processes of negotiation between street traders and other actors in order to understand the production of informal trading spaces. Thus, the central focus of interest for the research is to explore the key mechanisms and processes whereby street traders negotiate and, by such strategies, establish spatial claims to trade in the city. The research demonstrates the manner in which contextual embeddedness of street traders influences their capacity to draw upon the social and political opportunities within distinct contextual settings.

Karachi provides sustenance to 24 million residents through trade, commerce, services and endowment activities (Budhani et al. 2010). The city is also known for its extreme violence and has been referred to as ‘the most dangerous megacity’ based on ethnic and political encounters between established residents, and with incoming migrant groups (Khan 2013). The violence has soared since 2000 – more than 20,000 people have been killed in last eighteen years, with 2,700 killings in the year 2013 alone (Gayer 2014).

1.2 Background

Since partition in 1947, Karachi has experienced several influxes of migration which have caused a rapid growth of population (Chapter 4). In two decades, the city has grown from
13 million (1998 census) to an estimate of 24 million currently, which makes it one of the fastest growing cities in the world (Khawar 2017). The formal provision has not met the needs of the expanding population for housing, employment and utilities, leaving many of Karachi’s residents to rely on informal provision to fill the gaps. The provision of jobs and service delivery by informal actors was based on ‘ascriptive’ identities (Pellissery 2013) – ethnicity in conjunction with political support, which further reinforced the division among various contending groups in the city.

As a result of waves of migrations from various parts of Pakistan, areas of Karachi have often become the site of intense turf wars among rival groups for land, political power and ‘rent’. As one key informant said in the inception period of the research;

> The issue/problems of people (here) might not be due to ethnicity but they will definitely be solved through ethnicity (KI)

The early research suggested that the ethno-political control in informal trading spaces (ITS) is exercised through various implicit and explicit mechanisms of conflict and contest, about which very little is known. The operations and processes of the production of informal trading spaces is the main focus of this research.

### 1.3 The Research Problem

Informality has become integral to the dynamics of urbanisation under neo-liberal policies in cities of the Global South (Roy 2009; Varley 2013). The state’s incapacity and failure to ensure the just distribution of resources brings informality to the centre stage of the broader politics of access to employment and, housing opportunities (de Soto 2000; Roy and AlSayyad 2004; Brown 2006). The failure of economic policies to provide sufficient employment for the expanding population leads to a tendency for the informal sector increasingly to provide alternative or subsistence livelihood opportunities. The economic sector policies are biased against the urban poor, exacerbating informality which has become a prime mode for survival in the thriving market economy.

Urban informality is not only associated with the activities of the poor, or a particular status of labour, or of marginal groups. Rather, it is a natural consequence of the paradigm of neo-
liberal policies in which formal authorities of the state withdraw or deregulate their powers and resources, to give personal or political favour to powerful non-state actors, creating a vacuum of formal powers. This broader politics around control over opportunities and resources brings multiple formal and informal powers into the contest, which the poor have to negotiate to survive (Bayat, 1997; Ray Bromley, 1978; Cross, 2000).

Power struggles over the land, often lead to socio-spatial segregation by social, political or religious groups in the city. The current discourse on informality explains this process of spatial separation and division as being largely related to housing and land. However, the implications of such divisions on the production of informal trading spaces remain an underexplored field of research. Such divisions on informal trading spaces (both street and market traders) are vital because any exclusion would limit the ability of the poor to engage in employment activities.

Current studies of the informal economy have investigated how street traders locate themselves in urban public spaces in the city (Rincon 2007; Brown 2006) in violation to state regulatory mechanisms (Sarin 1982; Bhowmik 2007; Kettles 2007; Varcin et al. 2007). Other studies on street trading have highlighted the embedded nature of street markets in broader social relationships (Lyon 2007; Stillerman and Sundt 2007). A few studies have explored the processes whereby street traders occupy places in the Middle East (Bayat 1997; Kafafy 2017), and Latin America (Cross 1998; Donovan 2002; Crossa 2009).

Meanwhile, the literature on informal land development is focused on the processes of development and occupation of land for housing in Karachi (Schoorl 1983; Van der Linden 1983; Lodhi and Pasha 1991; Hasan 2004, 2006; Hasan et al. 2013) and in other contexts (Banerjee 1981; Alsayyad 1993; De Souza 2001; Jenkins 2004; Leduka 2004; Arnott 2008). As Cross (1998, p. 44) suggests “while land invasion [for squatting] has long recognised inherently political, the political nature of informal commerce (street trading)…[has] not been studied carefully despite of its sensitivity to state politics”. Little research has been undertaken on social networks and the ability of street traders to claim space in Karachi. This research, therefore, examines this gap in the literature, in seeking to understand the complex networking relations between street traders and other state and non-state actors, mechanisms and hidden processes of claiming space in informal trading space through the a case of three
distinct towns in Karachi – Saddar, Orangi and Lyari – and ITSs within one major market in each town.

1.4 Research aims and objectives

In a city with contested socio-political spaces, informal actors with diverse social, political or ethnic identities play a vital role in the production of informal trading spaces. This creates contested spaces within a city, which on one hand provide groups with defined employment spaces yet, at the same time exacerbates conflict and division in the city. Furthermore, this division limits employment opportunities for certain social groups and forms divided spatial zones within larger informal trading areas. This argument will be examined through a case study of ITS within the three market areas of Empress Market and vicinity (Saddar), Aligarh Bazaar (Orangi) and Jhatpat Market (Lyari).

The aim of this research is therefore, to examine the production of informal trading spaces in Karachi, and how the social capital of informal actors from diverse ethno-political identities, and influence of contest, conflict and politics impact on informal trading spaces, and how this contest affects the poor’s ability to access employment in the city.

To examine this aim the research stated the following objectives:

Objective 1: To examine critically the production of informal trading spaces and the factors and actors that establish this process.

Objective 2: To explore different socio-political characteristics of informal trading spaces in Karachi.

Objective 3: To examine the role of social capital of informal actors from diverse ethno-political backgrounds in the production of informal trading spaces.

Objective 4: To examine the mechanisms and processes of spatial claim in informal trading spaces.

1.5 Thesis structure

Chapter 2 examines academic debates around four broad themes: i) the link between informality and informal trading activities; ii) production of informal trading space (ITS); iii) impacts of social capital and power dynamics of actors or stakeholders on the nature and configuration of informal trading spaces (ITS); and iv) how the conflict in the social capital
and power dynamics among actors produces division in ITS. It explores the existing literature around the key themes in order to position this study within this existing knowledge. The review concludes by highlighting the gaps which this research seeks to fill.

Chapter 3 positions the research process in the context of both the research methodology, and the research methods. The chapter outlines the theoretical implications for the methodology, and the reasons for the choice of research methodology, with an overview of the methods used. Finally, it considers the validity and reliability of the research findings and issues related to ethics and safety. The justification for selecting the case study towns, and the three market areas is also given in Chapter 3.

Chapter 4 outlines the context for the case studies, discussing first the wider context of Karachi and then three case study towns. The chapter sets the framework for the research for a thematic analysis of the case studies in the following two chapters. The chapter demonstrates the contextual analysis, starting by discussing the economic and strategic importance of Karachi, and the demographic changes associated with multiple waves of migration, and how they have affected the ITS of Karachi. Finally, it describes the three case study towns of Saddar, Orangi and Lyari. It gives a brief historical account of the development of the areas, the contest between different groups in each area, and how political parties intensify the contests in informal trading through identity-based politics.

Chapter 5 explores the social dimension of street traders’ networks in the case study markets of Empress Market, Aligarh Bazaar and Jhatpat Market. The objective is to examine critically the role of various social groupings in the production of informal trading spaces. In order to understand the spatial dynamics of social groupings, the chapter examines the four main types of networks that influence the acquisition of space in ITS. These networks are specifically identity-based, political, criminal and market unions. The chapter provides detail of the social groupings which exist in the case study areas, with the specific focus on how the social groups align to identity and ethnicity-based, politically-motivated, criminal networks or market-unions, with considerable overlap between these four domains.

Chapter 6 argues that claiming space is a key spatial strategy for the survival of traders in the case study areas. The spatial claim of street traders in ITS – their territoriality – is primarily
used as a way to claim control, or counter the control, of a dominant political, or economic, group. This results in a division of territories, which can be seen as the spatial expression of the power tussle within ITS amongst the various actors and networks described in Chapter 5. This chapter critically examines various mechanisms deployed to maintain territorial claims between the two groups. It further examines the hidden processes that underlie boundary making and spatial claims, and the role of middlemen in claiming and controlling space and the overlapping claims between different institutions over space.

Chapter 7 concludes the thesis by drawing together the analysis. It develops analytical conclusions by addressing each research objective to summarise the debate. The chapter discusses the limitations in the examination of ITS. Finally, it concludes by identifying recommendations and possibilities for future research.
2. Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the background literature which provides an understanding of the process of production of “informal trading space” and the factors and actors that establish it. There is little in the literature which directly relates to the production of informal trading space, and so the chapter explores wider literatures on the informal economy and the production of space to analyse and define the concept of informal trading space, and the social capital and power dynamics that underpin its formation. The literature review aims to position this study within existing knowledge and identify the gaps which this research seeks to fill.

The literature review examines academic debates around four broad themes. Section 2.2 seeks to conceptualise and understand the origins of the urban informal economy and street trade in particular. It considers key debates surrounding the drivers of urban informality and informal trading. Section 2.3 discusses key geographical theories relating to the production of space and applies these to informal trading. This section concludes with a definition of the key concept underpinning this thesis – Informal Trading Spaces (ITS). Sections 2.4 and 2.5 delve deeper into the concept of ITS. Section 2.4 examines the important influence of social capital on the nature and configuration of ITS, with a particular focus on the role of networks. Section 2.5 considers the significance of power dynamics between different actors in shaping ITS, and how struggles between different actors are reflected in the geography of ITS. Section 2.6 is the conclusion.
2.2 The informal economy and urban informality

This section explores the emergence of the informal economy in the background of urban informality. First, it traces the evolving conceptualisations of the urban informal economy. The second part outlines socio-economic and political drivers of urban informality, with a focus on street trade. The findings of this section finally reflect on various debates and concepts introduced earlier whilst addressing the gap in the current literature.

2.2.1 Conceptualising the urban informal economy

Debates on defining and understanding informality are diverse and inconclusive. Roy (2005) argues that the identification of capitalist processes is a key reason of informality. Under a neo-liberal development paradigm, urban informality is seen to have become integral to the dynamics of urbanisation i.e. failure of economic policies to provide sufficient job growth for the expanding population leads the growth of informal sector to provide alternative or subsistence livelihood opportunities (Cross 1998a; Roy 2009). The widespread acceptance of neo-liberal policies in the global South and the state’s incapacity to ensure just distribution of resources brings informality to centre stage of the broader politics of access to employment and housing opportunities (de Soto 2000; Roy 2005). These writers argue that capitalist-driven economic policies, with the intent to create surplus values and profit, are biased against the urban poor, and thus limit the access of the urban poor to formal jobs and services leaving them with no option than to find alternatives in informal economic activities.

The ‘informal sector’ emerged as a concept in the early 1970s. The basic classification between the formal and informal sector based on distinctive employment patterns was first identified in a report on Kenya by the International Labour Organisation (ILO 1972). The categorisation of informal sector activities in the ILO report included seven main assets: (i) ease of entry; (ii) reliance on indigenous resources; (iii) family ownership of enterprises; (iv) small scale of operation; (v) labour-intensive and adapted technology; (vi) skills acquired outside the formal school system; and (vii) unregulated and competitive markets’ and conversely for the formal sector activities. The following year, anthropologist Keith Hart (1973), based on his studies
in Ghana, used the term ‘informal sector’ to refer to small unincorporated enterprises and individually based work that was not fully compliant with formal procedures.

During the 1990s and early 2000s collaboration between the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the International Expert Group on Informal Sector Statistics, and the global advocacy network Women in Informal Employment (WEIGO) led to a broadening of the concept and definition of the informal sector to include unregistered labour, proposing three broad concepts; the informal sector; informal employment; and the informal economy.

Chen (2012, p. 8) defines these concepts as follows: “the informal sector refers to the production and employment that takes place in unincorporated, small or unregistered enterprises; informal employment refers to employment without legal and social protection, both inside and outside the informal sector (ICLS 2003); and the informal economy refers to all units, activities, and workers so defined and the output from them. Together, they form the broad base of the workforce and economy, both nationally and globally”.

This analytical framework was developed through work in different regions. Cathy Rakowski (1994) based her study in Latin America and Roy and AlSayyad (2004) in their South Asia and the Middle East studies categorise two different perspectives of urban informality: structuralists and legalists. Structuralists see the informal sector as subordinate to the formal capitalist system. Competition among formal firms allows the formal sector to outsource work on low wages to reduce input and labour costs and thus to increase the competitiveness of large capitalists firms. Hence, the nature of capitalist development is seen as being one the prime reasons for growth of informal economy (Moser 1978; Portes et al. 1989). Legalists argue that the informal sector is an alternative response to complex and retributive legal processes that are difficult for micro-entrepreneurs, who therefore decide to operate informally in order to avoid complying with restrictive legal procedures. An influential proponent of the legalist approach is the Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto, who argued that over-regulation is itself accountable for the spurring of informal sector growth and is a consequence of excessive state regulation (de Soto 1989).

Various perspectives have been advanced over the years in the large and heterogeneous discourse of the informal economy. Two other dominant perspectives; ‘Dualists’ and
‘Voluntarists’ prevail. **Dualists** see the informal sector as a distinct economic sector, not related to the formal sector. They argue that the existence of the informal sector is due to its exclusion from modern economic opportunities and limited opportunities within the formal economy to absorb excess labour due to rapid population growth (Hart 1973; Sethuraman 1976; Chen 2006). However, the divisions and groupings of micro-entrepreneurs that limit the economic opportunities and access to resources of certain groups over others are not well explained and explored in the above categorisation. **Voluntarists** see the informal sector as more flexible and profitable than the formal sector. Unlike legalists, who find legal processes of formal systems cumbersome, the voluntarists argue that micro-entrepreneurs seek to maximise their incomes and flexibility by deliberately opting out of taxation and costly social protection in the formal economy (Levenson and Maloney 1998; Maloney 2004).

It is clear from the literature that urban informality remains an uncertain and manifold concept in urban and development debates due to its multiple interpretations in variable contexts. Waibel and McFarlane (2012), based on the “Urban Planet” workshops series in Berlin, explain four general approaches in which the formal–informal divide becomes manifest:

- First informality is seen as a **spatial categorisation** used to describe informality as those territories outside the legal, political, economic, social and environmental margins of the city. This spatial interpretation of informality as relating to marginal spaces in the city was later challenged by many authors, such as, Diken (2005) who argues that the **favelas** of Rio de Janiero are much more than marginal spaces in the city, both in physical and conceptual terms. Informality is not confined to discrete physical or political boundaries, but as Roy and AlSayyad (2004) argue it is the central logic of urbanisation under neo-liberal policies.

- Second, informality is considered an **organisational form**, which sees informality as characterised by unorganised, non-structured, ineffective and unregulated labour. Although disorganisation sometimes characterises labour in the informal economy, in practice such labour is often highly organised and disciplined; for example in Brazilian
*Favelas* communities have developed innovative and structured forms of social, economic and political networks outside the formal sector developments (Arias 2004).

Third, informality is categorised as a *government tool*. This approach explains how the tension between the formal and informal is often deployed by states as an organisational or regulatory device that defines particular domains and forms of interventions as ‘formal’ or ‘informal’. Roy (2009a: 10) also explains this formal / informal dualism in relation to planning that “informality doesn’t lie beyond planning; rather it is planning that inscribes the informal by designating some activities as authorised and others as unauthorised, by demolishing slums and granting legal status to equally illegal suburban developments”.

Fourth informality is explained as *negotiable value*– this approach places informality in the realm of the lived experience, the everyday struggle that is not opposed to the formal but constantly interacts with it producing an interface, a space of interaction in which people move from one category to the other. Important proponents of this approach such as Roy and AlSayyad (2004) explain informality as negotiable, which does not exist in isolation from the formal city, as formal practices of the state have blurred the boundaries between the formal and informal for political benefits. Thus the state, by placing itself outside the law, uses informality as an instrument of accumulation of resources and power for elite urban development. Roy (2009b: 83) furthers the debate on informality as a negotiable value by seeing it as “a deregulated rather than unregulated system” and also that “informality lies within the scope of state rather than outside it” (Roy 2009a: 826).

The evolution of the literature, as reviewed above, suggests that an absolute division between formal and informal is not possible. Varley (2013), considers the earlier debates on informality as ‘binary thinking’ describing divisions that in practice do not exist. The boundaries between formal and informal domains are always blurred and vary with respect to the contextual realities (AlSayyad 2004). Yiftachel (2009, p. 89), also discounts the formal / informal dichotomy as a legal / illegal binary in spatial terms, considering the informal as
“grey space – between the ‘whiteness’ of legality/approval/safety and the ‘blackness’ of eviction/destruction/death”. The formal / informal divide is a multifaceted process of naming, managing, governing and producing contemporary cities, in that informality and formality fold into one another and even its definition oscillates within the same context due to political reasons (McFarlane 2012).

The literature above, suggests a viable categorisation of the urban informal economy, arguing that the blurring of boundaries between legal and illegal domains may be used as an organisation tool for socio-economic, political and physical spaces of the informal economy. This often leads to contested spatial zones with continual struggle between various actors. This concept will be useful to take forward in this research and apply in contexts such as Karachi where extreme multi-scale physical, ethno-political, and socio-economic divisions exist.

2.2.2 Socio-Economic and political Drivers of urban informality

This section discusses the social and political drivers of informality and its spatial implications on urban space.

Socio-economic drivers of the informal economy

According to Roy and AlSayyad (2004), urban informality is an organised logic for urban transformation under a paradigm of neo-liberal policies, and does not simply relate to the activities of the poor, or to a particular status of labour or marginality. The global restructuring of cities under neo-liberal imperatives of profit-making and socio-spatial enclosure forms the basis of socially and economically biased urban development (Brenner et al. 2009; Butler 2011). It is a process that has resulted in significant socio-economic inequalities in the urban domain by allowing selective enforcement of planning norms as ‘calculated informality’ (Cross and Karides 2007; Roy 2009). This ‘calculated informality’ is used as a tool to benefit privileged classes and creates barriers for the urban poor, giving rise to uneven geographies and divisions within cities (Roy 2009, p. 83). For example, in Karachi, urban informality is used as a ‘government tool’ to benefit market investment – in 2003
traders were removed from the downtown area, tagging them as a source of environmental pollution and reclaiming the land they occupied for a mega shopping mall development (Hasan et al. 2008).

de Soto (2000), links the failure of the formal sector to complex legal processes that act as a barrier for micro-entrepreneurs to access formal markets. He presents an image of urban informality as ‘heroic entrepreneurship’, and the creative response of the urban poor to exclusionary market forces and the state’s incapacity to access critical goods and services including livelihood opportunities. He explains informality as a system of property or economic activity, in which the final product is legal but the development path is circumscribed by complex and inefficient bureaucracy, unjust laws and administration (Bromley 2004). Therefore, de Soto emphasises the importance of legalising the ‘mushrooming extra-legal sector’ in order to accelerate the economic development that will also bring prosperity to the poor. However, de Soto’s theories of ‘legalising’ the informal sector are based on impractical assumptions that have not taken into consideration the legal, political, socio-economic and administrative constraints of diverse contexts (specifically developing countries) and the prevailing neo-liberal market growth which controls development patterns. Thus de Soto’s concept is an over-simplistic generalisation and misleading for markets of the global south as it draws on developed world models and is pro-capitalist (Bromley 2004; Payne et al. 2008; Otto 2009).

In general, studies of the socio-economic drivers of informality fail to fully recognise the wider social influences on urban informality. Noticeably absent is a detailed consideration of ethnic drivers which appear to be significant in Karachi. The ethno-religious divide amongst the urban poor that controls the socio-economic spaces of the urban informal economy is relatively under-explored; this research seeks to examine this gap.

**Political drivers of the informal economy**

The literature also finds evidence that the rise of alternative forms of governance to compete for perpetual circulation of capital results in weakening powers of the state and a diminution of its role and authority. Purcell (2002) argues that transference of state functions to non-
state and quasi-state bodies shifts 'government' to 'governance' and thus "governing decisions are made by actors who are not directly accountable to the local electorate and conventional democratic control" (p. 101). Such actors may be legal entities, such as public private partnerships, but more often decisions are made through informal processes driven by coalitions of interest (Andrae and Bäckman 2010). In this context the state is tacit in its support for urban elites, thus creating further disenfranchisement for the urban poor, who are excluded from these processes.

Another key body of literature links the failure of the formal sector and rise in informality, directly or indirectly, to failure by the state and official socio-economic and political programmes to meet basic needs and provide equal access to urban goods and services to the majority of the people. Roy and AlSayyad (2004) consider urban informality as the failure of formal planning processes or as indirect state failure. They see urban informality both as the reaction of the urban poor or marginal or excluded sectors of society and also as the replacement of an old mode of urbanism by new urban processes. Roy (2003) argues the old mode of agrarian transactions at the rural / urban interface was initially responsible for the tremendous expansion of informal subdivisions and ever expanding illegal urban boundaries. However, new urban actors have evolved as a result of liberalising governments for example real estate developers, transitional investors and urban elites who have also become part of this new mode of urbanisation or urban informality.

Roy (2009) also discussed informality as a result of state failure by suggesting the state itself is a political construct, and that failure to support low-income populations can be intentional or a side effect of neo-liberal policies adopted with the political objectives of benefiting from global land markets or local land-based development. The blurring of the formal-informal divide, suggesting that the formal government actors de-regulate markets intentionally so that they can benefit by taking over as informal actors and providing goods and services to the urban poor for personal or political gain (Lichbach 1989; Roy 2009).
Political clientelism\(^1\) is also seen as another factor that excludes the poor from economic opportunities. Several studies on street trading (Cross 1998b; Roy 2004; Bandyopadhyay 2009; Crossa 2009) illustrate the importance of political clientelism in claiming and negotiating the access to land and physical infrastructure. Auyero (1999) argues that political clientelism is beneficial for those who are excluded from formal systems. Cross (1998b) demonstrates that in the context of Mexico State, political parties manipulate competition between the leaders of street traders’ group in exchange for their votes and other forms of political support.

The relationship between informal economy, workers and state actors is a complex process of negotiation. Current studies on informal street trading highlight some of the factors that impact street traders’ ability to negotiate their claims to access informal markets (Bayat 1997a; Cross 1998a; Bandyopadhyay 2009), but the everyday relations of street traders with other networks, political parties and other state agents have not been widely addressed. Therefore, this study will examine various street traders’ networks and the political capacity they acquire over time to negotiate their claims with state and non-state agents in Karachi.

**Spatial implications of the informal economy**

The acquiescence of the neo-liberal state and related urban policies is also a significant extent drives the development of the informal economy (Gilbert 2004). The exclusionary, biased and uneven nature of capitalist development creates accumulation of resources in the hands of a few and excludes the poor. The Marxist geographer, Harvey (2008), explains that the evolution of the class phenomenon on an economic basis creates socio-spatial divides in cities. He argues that the perpetual need for a capital surplus leads to the creation of exclusive, class-based developments that dispossess the poor from profitable land to create new class-specific

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\(^1\) Fox (1994; p. 153) defines political clientelism as ‘relationship based on political subordination’ in which the least privileged class gain access to state resources by gaining political patronage of power political groups.
entrepreneurial opportunities for formal real estate development and market-led investment, for example in city centres where urban renewal is often followed by gentrification.

Urban public space is the visible stage of socio-economic and political negotiation between multiple stakeholders. City authorities use public space as a tool for their political and economic domination and justifies the exclusion of poor from public space on the grounds of city ‘beautification’, ‘aestheticisation’ and ‘upgradation’ schemes (Roy 2005; Brown 2006). Regulation and policies also enable urban elites to dominate public space. The urban poor are thus in a continuous struggle with the city authorities and urban elites to access the public space as their livelihood strategy.

Street traders are important claimants of public space, but there are many examples where capitalist development has reserved the space for corporate investment to the exclusion of traders, and thus the role of the state is confined to the facilitation of larger capitalist markets (Middleton 2003; Cross and Karides 2007). In an example of street traders in Mexico, Cross (1998a) argues that state provides patronage to the leaders of street vendor groups rather than opening up powers to the masses. Thus, the state subjugates the voices of street traders at the grassroots level by co-opting popular leaders and by using them for political benefit. Empirical work on street traders in different contexts focuses on the division between the government and the informal actors examining the struggle and negotiations between formal and informal actors. This perspective does not explain the lateral division between informal groups on the basis of religious, political and ethnic identities that exacerbates conflict and violence regarding control over such public goods and services, which this research addresses.

2.2.3 Discussion

This section argues that urban informality is associated with the activities of the poor, or a particular status of labour or marginality. The literature also suggests that informality has an organised logic as a direct response to the paradigm and operation of neo-liberal policies (Roy and AlSayyad 2004; Roy 2005; Brenner et al. 2009; Butler 2011). The control over land is key in capitalist-driven development (Harvey 1985), which brings multiple formal and informal powers into the contest.
Power struggles over the control of resources, including land, often lead to power contestation (Brenner and Theodore 2002), political conflicts (Lichbach 1989), violence and socio-spatial segregation (Kliot et al. 1999) on the basis of social, political and religious identities represented by various groups in the city (Hasan et al. 2013). These groups negotiate informality through various forms of ‘spatial categorisation’, ‘ organisational form’, ‘government tools’ and ‘negotiable values’ (or a combination of these at different scales) (Waibel and McFarlane 2012), to gain access and control which limits the participation of certain groups, thus exacerbates contest and division in the space.

The deregulation of powers of the formal authorities in order to benefit personally or politically (Bayat 1997a, 2004; Hasan 2004) is also highlighted in street trading literature where informal economy workers seek political clientelism to access the negotiation process with state actors (Cross 1998b; Auyero 1999; Bandyopadhyay 2009). The role of the identity of street traders in everyday negotiation process, and how their networks build political capacity over time is less explored in literature, therefore this research seeks to explore this gap.

2.3 Production of Informal Trading Spaces

The objective of this section is to explore the debates around the social production of space to understand informal trading spaces. The section is structured into four sub-sections. The first section reviews various theoretical perspectives on the social production of space. The second section examines urban public space as a source of power and conflict and identifies how various actors interact and negotiate in space. The third section works towards a definition of the concept of Informal Trading Spaces – a pivotal concept to be used throughout the thesis. The last section summarises the debates of production of space with a focus on street trade.

2.3.1 The social production of space

Various concepts of space that have been discussed in geopgraphical literature, and have evolved from an understanding of space as a quantifiable entity (one with immovable grids
which lead to absolute space); to a relative notion of space involving non-Euclidean geometries; then to spatio-temporality where it is impossible to understand space as a concept independent of time; to relational concepts in which various processes shape the space, and space itself does not hold any meaning; and to representational space and spaces of representation (Jammer 1954; Lefebvre 1992; Massey 1994; Madanipour 1999; Harvey 2004). This research specifically seeks to examine the social facet of space and argues that the production of informal trading spaces falls within wider debates on production of space.

Spaces are a representation of daily journeys embedded in social and cultural realities of individual experiences (Harvey 2004). Madanipour (1999, p. 879) explains that “the spaces around us everywhere, from the spaces in which we take shelter to those where we cut across and travel through, are part of our everyday social reality”. The relationship of spaces to people is governed by human agreement that makes people live and act in certain ways. Searle (1995) sees this ‘human to space relationship’ as an ‘institutional fact’. He defines another facet of space as ‘brute fact’ which is independent of human-created agreements or institutions, for example, spaces in cities that exhibit a collection of objects (natural and man-made) and people. Objects and people do not exist in isolation or function independently. Rather, the forces that govern interaction between ‘objects’ with ‘people’ or ‘people’ with ‘people’ are social conventions that tend to assign roles to human beings or symbolise the objects.

Lefebvre (1992, p. 52) emphasises the integral nature of space and social relationships suggesting that “space is a social and political construct, and it is in any meaningful sense, produced in and through human activities and the reproduction of social relations; thus it represent the spatial manifestation of social relations”. Carmona et al. (2010) also highlight the interrelationship between space and society, arguing that space without a social content and society without a spatial content cannot be envisioned. A similar concept of space as the fundamental notion of our social existence is discussed by Madanipour (1999), who argues that the spatial behaviour of human beings is defined by and defines the spaces around. Expressions of fear, bliss, imagination, hallucination are all part of daily life and thus interwoven with surrounding space; therefore, space and spatial relations are integral to
social reality (Lefebvre 1992). Objects and materials in space only have a physical presence, and they can only be significant or meaningful if associated with groups or institutions to give them meanings in space (Madanipour 1999; Brown 2006).

Social space is subjected to diverse interpretations and meanings based on individual experiences and feelings that transform into images and symbols that surround the individual (Madanipour 1999). Each individual lives in their own spatial web that derives its meaning from the cultural experiences and norms that thus define the nature of social space produced by them. So different groups give different meanings to space — space has thus become multilayered with distinctive combinations of individual symbolisms (Knox 1995; Madanipour 1999). Thus, social dimensions are essential to the conceptualisation and visualisation of space.

Lefebvre (1992) also argues that conception of space is impossible without an understanding of the human activities and social relations that it encompasses, and thus he denies all conceptions that consider space as mere a physical product or as part of the superstructure of society. Smith (2003), furthers Lefebvre’s concept, suggesting that how space is ‘produced’ is a central part of the mode of production in which space is used as a profitable commodity to increase the exchange value. Mass production and bureaucratically controlled mass consumption processes that aim for continuous capital surplus are important indicators of the use of space as the central mode of production in which human relations are in constant tension (Cross and Karides 2007).

Production of space is a multi-layered process of human relations derived from people’s social experiences and spatial attributes. Thus, the understanding of space and spatial relations is similar to the way we understand the other aspects of social life. Lefebvre’s ‘spatial triad’ is the fundamental pillar in his book ‘Production of Space’ that explains spatial dialecticism according to three principal characteristics (Lefebvre 1992):

i) **Spatial practice** is the *perceived space* based on social practice through which human beings produce and reproduce themselves within space. This reflects the ‘multilayered’ urban space identified by Madanipour (1999), which is filled with the
multiplicity and rich web of individual emotions that ‘produces’ space. Soja (1980: 31), explains that “space itself may be primordially given, but the organisation, use and meaning of space is a product of social translation, transformation and experience”. Lefebvre, also argues that spatial practice can also be seen as ‘deciphering space’, in other words that people’s everyday perceptions and experiences of their world, affect the conceptualisation of their space (Merrifield and Lefebvre 2000).

ii) **Representational space** is the *conceived space* of scientists, planners, urbanists, and social scientists, which is in constant re-appropriation by those who are living within it. The notions attached to these pre-conceived and conceived spaces belong to the history of ideologies; power, knowledge and contextual experiences are embedded in its representation (Casey et al. 1997). Conceived space is the dominant space of any society because it is closely linked to the order of relationships imposed to achieve the conceived space, constructed by assorted professionals and technocrats. Lefebvre (1991), believes this space to be the "space of capital which express in monuments, towers, factories, office blocks and the bureaucratic and political authoritarianism immanent to a repressive space” (p. 19).

iii) **Spaces of representation** are *lived spaces*, a combination of perceived and conceived space, the spaces of everyday practice. These spaces, produced and modified over time, represent a person’s actual experience of the daily life, where social relations unfold, and thus lived spaces are inevitably central in everyday life and invested with symbolism and meaning (Lefebvre 1992; Stewart 1995; Soja 1996). It is the space experienced through complex symbols and images of its ‘inhabitants’ and ‘users’, which overlays physical space, making symbolic use of its objects. These spaces are felt more than thought, and are alive and elusive to the extent that thought and conception usually seek to appropriate and dominate them. (Dimendberg 1998; Merrifield and Lefebvre 2000).

The relations between conceived, perceived and lived spaces are unstable, and they resonate and merge into one another with changing culture, life relationship and events. Lefebvre’s spatial quest to expose and decode space is fundamental to understand the core of space production, especially in modern capitalist-led processes of urbanization. For Lefebvre (1992)
categorisation of space involves a harmonious relationship between absolute space (nature), abstract space (mental or formal abstractions about space), and differential space (the space influenced by human action or quest for the individuality of a social body, human needs and corpus of knowledge).

**Absolute space** is a space carved out, usually built upon sites of nature (caves, mountain tops, rivers) forged by intrinsic natural attributes (Stewart 1995). The natural qualities of absolute space vanish with social processes of appropriation, production and modification; thus space is layered with a second nature. Lefebvre symbolises the Greek city as an absolute space due to its harmony between the artistic, religious and political forms (Dimendberg 1998). The spaces of representation predominate in absolute space.

**Abstract space** represents an economic mode of life in which “reproducibility, repetition and reproduction of social relationships” are given preference over nature (Lefebvre 1992; Dimendberg 1998). The industrial and political revolutions of the eighteenth-century mark the abstraction of space with the emphasis on the exchange value of spatial and monetary practice displacing the use value. This transition marked a fundamental re-orientation of the value of space. Cities used to be of intrinsic worth for their ‘use value’, representing the oeuvre or ‘work of art’ of city life – the benefits of urban living which accrue to all citizens. With the commodification of urban land, use value has been transformed into a monetarised ‘exchange value’, which supplants social values in urban living, and dispossesses those who cannot afford the ‘exchange value’ of space (Harvey 2008; Smith 2008).

Thus space, especially in late capitalism, becomes a profitable commodity to be bought and sold, thus exchanged for higher value, which contributes to the scarcity of space. Thus abstract space is characterised by the disappearance of the qualitative and its replacement by quantitative practices of measurement, exchange and calculation; i.e. the commodification of space (Stewart 1995; Merrifield and Lefebvre 2000). This is best illustrated in bureaucratically controlled mass production and consumption processes designed to perpetuate a capital surplus.
The quantitative representation of space in monetary or other terms gains inordinate power over spatial practice and spatial representations and creates an abstract space that ignores its qualitative attributes. The example of this space is the capitalist space of mass production, erasing the differences between individual locations and contexts. Whereas, the counter approach to this simplistic generalisation is what Lefebvre calls differential space that negates the generalisation that shatters the integrity of the individual body, the social body, the corpus of human needs and the corpus of knowledge (Stewart 1995).

The theoretical perspectives on the production of space reviewed in this section signify some important points. The understanding of social relations of human beings reflects and is reflected in the production of space, and these social relations modify the ‘brute facts’ of human existence through ‘institutional’ arrangements (agreements) to create social space. Lefebvre’s ‘spatial triad’ and categorisation of space holds an immense importance and provides a basis to understand the production of space. However, the detailed account of spatial dialectics by Lefebvre was mostly influenced Anglo-American geography and urbanism, and does not explicitly explain the role of identities and associated power dynamics in the production of space in the developing world.

Lefebvre’s work has also been criticised as an incomprehensible framework on spatio-temporality which does not address the factors that shape human experiences and practices in space (Unwin 2000; Smith 2003). Castells (2003) also objected to Lefebvre’s interpretation of ‘the urban’ which in his view is oversimplified and explained as a ‘coherent scientific object’, while the uniqueness and complexities of urban contexts are underexplored in Lefebvre’s work. The explanation of Lefebvre’s spatial triad and space categorisation is limited to the harmonious relationship and reciprocation of one type of space to another, in which the ideological construction of the urban context needs further examination.

Furthermore, the derivation of power through an ideological construction of space and the way in which power dynamics influence social relations in the production of space is an unexplored dimension. In Lefebvre and other Marxist literature, power domination in space is limited to exploring the economic division between rich and poor. Power dynamics within
the lateral divisions of society and their impact on space and the ways in which, for poor communities, these dynamics are constructed on a variety of identity-based social divisions, such as ethnicity or political affiliation are not widely explored. This notion is missing in current debates, yet it holds significance in the production of space in contexts such as Karachi, which along with social processes need further exploration, especially in the context of this research.

2.3.2 Urban public space: a symbol of power and conflict

Urban public space is an important asset within which relations of power are constructed and deployed (Whitson 2007). These spaces symbolise political significance and thus are a representation of the power of the state, where multiple actors interact to gain access and control (Peach 1995; Dikeç 2001; Yiftachel and Yacobi 2003). Powerful actors, with greater access to resources such as the state or capitalist entrepreneurs are able to create what De Certeau (1984, p. 390) called ‘proper’ space. He explained proper space as being that which “can be delimited as its own and serve as the base from which the relations with an exteriority can be managed”. Cross and Karides (2007) argue it is the ‘proper space’ which delimits the space claimed by capitalist entrepreneurs who use and control public space for their benefits. With the tag of profitable use of public space, Low and Smith (2013) argue that capitalist states justify the privatisation of public space for political and economic benefits.

Harvey (1985), argues that space is an ‘active moment’ in the expansion and reproduction of capitalism. Many of the associated phenomena and practices of modern capitalism – i.e. colonised and commodified, bought and sold, created and torn down, used and abused, speculated and fought over – are internalised in space and these dynamics describe the nature of space. In neoliberal forms of urbanisation, the spaces of informality (informal housing and trading) are a direct expression of uneven power relationships between economic and political elites, often between the state and the working poor (Whitson 2007). Capitalist-driven urbanisation creates exclusionary class-based developments that dispossess the poor from profitable land, and unjust treatment on the part of the state leaves the poor with no
option except to seek alternatives for housing or livelihoods in informally occupied space, often urban public space.

This research draws on the description of urban public space used for street trading proposed by Brown (2006), which she argues should be seen as the "physical space and the social relations that determine that space. It includes all space that is not delineated or accepted as private and where there is at least a degree of public or community use. This includes formal public space in parks, squares and streets, and also space at the margins – between the pavement edge and building façade, on road reserves or river banks, or in vacant and unfenced lots – space where public access is possible but not formalised. The definition is independent of ownership, as such space may be in government, private, communal or undefined ownership, but implies some sort of accepted communal access or use right.” (Brown 2006, p. 22).

However, this definition does not explore the social relations that determine the space, and how these are influenced and derived from power relations between different stakeholders who claim space, nor the different levels of claim by different groups. Therefore, this research seeks to broaden this definition and examine in detail the spatial claims built on power hierarchies in the informal trading space of Karachi.

Public spaces are the most visible and contested domain where power relations are played out between different stakeholders. Kilian (1998), argues that due to changes in social, political and economic trends, and the rise of global capitalism, control of the production of contemporary public space predominantly favours powerful actors and thus the state controls power relationships within space. Public space has therefore become the ultimate locus and medium of struggle due to the unimpeded commodification (Stewart 1995). State and other capitalist entrepreneurs symbolise public space with their bureaucratic and political authority and thus the 'spatial practice' (perceived space) in public space is dominated by the ‘representational space’ (conceived space).

Conflict between street traders and state actors over the use of urban place is an ongoing process. Local governments in various contexts have attempted to evict street traders for
many reasons including; pressure from corporate economic agents; the prevention of traffic obstruction; and the imposition of law and order (Bayat 1997a; Cross 1998a; Seligmann 2004; Brown 2006; Bhowmik 2007; Garcia-Rincon 2007; Donovan 2008; Hasan et al. 2008). Studies on street trading also demonstrate that the abilities of street traders to subvert eviction attempts by local state authorities varies in different contexts (Cross 1998b; Seligmann 2004). However, the literature does not address the factors and processes that influence the street traders’ abilities to negotiate the access in urban public space.

Urban public space is thus a representation of the power contestation amongst social actors who compete for space. The competition and struggle to access the space creates conflict between social groups/actors at various scales: firstly, by economic division, i.e. between rich and poor, and secondly, by social division based on the ethnic, religious and linguistic differences.

2.3.3 Production of Informal Trading Space

There is relatively little in the literature about the production of space and power relations that frame ITS, but this section draws together those references within the street trading and informal economy literature which provide some useful pointers for this research. Whitson (2005) argues that informal work space is a space where multiple expressions of power are found, which thus negates the standard dichotomy of power and powerlessness in favour of a multiform, complex conceptualisation of power. Cresswell (2000), also explains the multiple expressions of power in space as “power that is not localised in a single institution or actor, rather is seen to be something that is exercised by everyone, that is potentially productive and at the heart of social relations” (p. 261).

A useful description of street trading recognising the heterogeneous and complex nature put forward by Brown et al. (2010) draws for this study which defines street trade as “all small-business entrepreneurs, generally own-account or self-employed involved in the manufacturing or sale of legal or socially acceptable goods or services who trade from the street, informal market or other publicly accessible space (whether publicly or privately owned), but whose operation takes place at least in part outside the prevailing regulatory
environment and thus flouts either business regulation, planning codes or other legal requirements”. The term excludes criminal activities. However, this definition does not address multiple power expressions that are involved in the production of informal trading spaces.

Street traders see urban public space as a key asset for their livelihood, where they can avoid or minimise the overhead costs of rent and utilities that make their goods and services affordable to the target group (Cross 2000; Cross and Karides 2007). At the same time, urban public space is a contested domain where street traders are in constant struggle with city authorities (Setšabi and Leduka 2008). In the case of informal trading spaces, multiple and overlapping spaces of power come into play in which various actors – traders, city authorities, formal enterprises, ethnic trading groups, political affiliates, adjacent property owners or informal landlords and others – interact to shape certain kinds of space (Dasgupta 1992; Mackie et al. 2014), although the role of different actors and the interplay between them is not widely explored.

Production of informal trading spaces is thus an underexplored subject within the literature on informality. While urban public space is a key asset for the informal trading spaces and livelihoods of the urban poor, it is entangled with multiple power relations and actors who participate in the production of urban public space. The configuration of informal trading spaces is dependent on the social relations of actors (producers/co-producers), but the production of informal spaces of ‘trading’ remains underexplored.

Therefore, this research defines production of ITS as “space used for street trading falling outside formal legal and regulatory control, which is created by street traders and other urban actors who influence or control the use of urban public space, through their actions, social relations, and political and power dynamics, which is the spatial manifestations of these social relations and power dynamics”.

Literature Review
2.3.4 Discussion

The dynamics of production of informal spaces for ‘housing’ and ‘trade’ differ significantly. In the production of informal housing spaces, the urban poor are often forced to find space away from the city centre, where they are faced with less resistance as compared to visible and profit generating space (city centre) of the city. In contrast, the nature of ITS is completely different because street traders cannot survive in the peripheral spaces; public space which is accessible to their customers is an essential requirement for their survival as these spaces act as a magnet for potential buyers. Thus, street traders become the visible claimants/actors in public space who are in ongoing contest with other claimants of space. Unlike housing, the production of informal trading spaces cannot be a hidden process but has to be visible and open to public view, and hence require different kind of social relations and political negotiations. Conclusively, power relations played out in urban public space to produce ITS are an unexplored area in the academic literature, which this research seeks to address.

2.4 Social Capital, networks and trust in the production of ITS

The definition of ITS in the previous section highlighted the importance of social relations and networks and these are generally discussed within a wider literature on social capital. Hence, the main objective of this section is to examine the role of social capital in the production of ITS. The first part defines social capital. The second part examines both the tangible and intangible dimensions of social capital and its importance for the urban poor. The third part delves deeper into definitional debates surrounding social capital, before the final part focuses on the pivotal concepts of trust and networks in social capital discourse.

2.4.1 Conceptualising social capital

Debates on defining and understanding the role of social capital in the informal economy are diverse. However, there is a common thread amongst these debates, and a consensus on some basic concepts, including; social capital as a relationship of trust and reciprocity, networks, norms, interactions and ties that are developed by a group of people to acquire resources for

The original development of the concept of social capital is traced back to the work of French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu and American sociologist James Coleman, who used small or dense groups as the core of their inquiry. With some noteworthy disparities, both scholars focused on the central idea of ‘ties’ between individuals and families as an important measure of accumulating benefits (Portes and Landolt 2000). Bourdieu in his highly influential work ‘Distinction’ identifies three dimensions of capital: economic capital (directly convertible into money and may be institutionalised in the form of property rights); cultural capital and social capital which transform into each other to accumulate the benefits within a group (Schuller et al. 2000). However, the primacy of economic capital remains intact in his debates as he argues the eventual diminution of all three forms to economic capital, to advance social positions within specific socio-economic or cultural domains (Portes 2000).

Hence, through the acquisition of social capital, groups or actors gain access to the economic resources (loans on easy instalments, subsidised construction materials, jobs, vending businesses or sites) and enhance cultural capital by gaining access to experts and professionals and government officials through group ties and associations, banking on ‘power with’ and ‘power to’ aspects of empowerment (Section 2.5). Thus, the definition of social capital extends beyond an individual asset to the communal relationship between and among individuals. The recognition of social capital as mutual networks and trust, formed by individuals or groups, is defined by Bourdieu (1977, p. 51), as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition…which provides each of its members with the backing of collectively owned capital”. This ‘power with’ notion of empowerment reproduces social relations in a given context, and thus impacts social production of space, beyond the confines of conventional ‘representation of space’ (Section 2.3.1).

Economic, cultural and social capital within a group is represented by ‘nobiles’, the individuals who are known and give voice to the interests of the entire group. Bourdieu (1986) explains these ‘nobiles’ as representatives (individuals) who have acquired symbolic
power. Symbolic power is associated with the social authority and position of an individual (or group), who is richly endowed with any form of capital (social, cultural or economic) and thus attained symbolic character (power) in society (Bourdieu 1989; Siisiainen 2003). Acquisition of symbolic power is the basis of 'symbolic capital' which Bourdieu (1989) describes as granting the power and authority to individuals in the group, based on recognition and social position in the group, community or society. Thus the social position of actors accrues power and, therefore, increases the individual's capability to advance the position in the social network for the attainment of communal interests or goals. Bourdieu (1986, p. 249), explains the social position of an actor in the network, arguing that “the volume of social capital possessed by a given agent……..depends on the size of the network of connections that they can effectively mobilise”. Thus a strong and effective network enhance social relationships and positions of actors, and therefore, grant them power to influence in political negotiations and decisions.

In contrast, Coleman (1988) defined social capital by its function as “a variety of entities with two elements in common: They all consist of some aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actor whether persons or corporate actors within the structure” (Coleman 1988; p.98; 1990, p.302). In his definition, social capital is viewed as a resource that can be drawn upon; its presence encourages certain actions, which facilitates the accomplishment of mutually beneficial ends. Coleman (1988), argues that “social relations constitute useful resources for actors through processes such as establishing obligations, expectations and trustworthiness, creating channels for information, and setting norms backed by efficient sanctions” (p.103-04). Moreover, social capital in the family and community play a crucial role in creating human capital (defined as individual skills and abilities) in the next generation (Leonard 2004).

Both Bourdieu and Coleman worked on social capital within tightly confined groups, focussing on strong ties and bonding and consequential mutual cooperation and benefits within that group. However, their narrative is limited and does not explain social relations and ties between other groups formed on identity-based social divisions, such as ethnic, political or religious divides that create a lateral division within society. The construction of groups on an ethnic identity basis, as argued by various researchers (Budhani et al. 2010) in
the case of Karachi have created a spatial segmentation in the city. The rift in social relations between the groups is also reflected in the spaces produced by the actors of opposite groups (Kaker 2014). This spatial segmentation has been explored in relation to housing and low-income settlements, but is not so well-developed as a lens through which to examine operation and spatial patterns of the urban informal economy, particularly street trade. Therefore, the spatial segmentation due to fractured social capital in informal trading space needs to be investigated further.

2.4.2 Networks and Trust

Work of Robert Putnam is significant here, as he extends the concept of social capital beyond ‘ties’ within dense groups or families to ‘networks’. His work on social capital is highly acclaimed being fundamentally based on three components; networks, trust and norms. Putnam (1996, p. 56) gave a concise definition of social capital as “the feature of social life-networks, trust and norms that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives”. He suggests that “physical capital refers to physical objects and human capital refers to properties of individuals [whereas] social capital refers to connections among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them” (Putnam 1996, p. 56). Networks and trust are the two key concepts that are discussed more frequently in the social capital literature by many authors, (Fox 1974; Gambetta 1988; Luhmann 1988; Knoke and Kuklinski 1991; Fukuyama 1995; Castells 1998) whose work are most cited in social capital literature. The terms ‘norm’ and ‘obligation’ are so general that their application in social theory and research cannot be properly covered.

Social networks and trust hold noteworthy importance in the context of this research where identity based grouping, networking and divisions play vital roles in the production of informal trading spaces. Multiple identities lead to groupings and division in Karachi (Gayer 2003). Karachi is the hub of diverse socio-economic, ethnic, political, and other groups from all over Pakistan, whose networks contribute significantly to divided spatial zones. The two important dimensions of social capital, as discussed above, ‘network’ and ‘trust’ are discussed in detail in this section.
Network

The key dimension of social capital is a network, which Castells (1996, p. 470), defines as a ‘set of interconnected nodes’. These are important institutions that informal actors are associated with to gain legitimacy. Networks are “open structures, able to expand without limits, integrating new nodes, as long as they are able to communicate within the network, namely as long as they same communication codes” (Castells 1996, p. 470). The significance of networks in social relations holds primary importance for the flow of information and for building common interests. Thus, social relations are strengthened by the networks and the transfer or flow of material and non-material resources helps in the extension of the network and in integrating new nodes into the existing structure (Knoke and Kuklinski 1991). This expansion of network with new resources forms a social network, which Meagher (2005), defines as the “capacity of social forces to provide a flexible regulatory framework embedded in popular relations of solidarity and trust” (p. 218).

Although there is no consistency in the definition of ‘social networks’, considering the scope of this research the term here is stated as “informal organisational arrangements based on social ties” (Meagher 2007, p. 219). In the case of fragile states and markets, social networks have the capacity to negotiate by informal means and are capable of filling the vacuum in formal institutions and regulatory bodies (Stiglitz and Dasgupta 2000). In the context of informal trading, social networks perform an organisational role by offering informal mechanisms of socio-economic and political coordination (Seligmann 2004; Crossa 2009). Social ties within and among the networks play a significant role in the socio-economic and political negotiations with formal power structures (Meagher 2006). The nature and configuration of social networking and its linkages with other social networks and power structures is vital in the production of ITS. In order to understand the role of social capital, in the context of this research, the classification of social networks used by Meagher (2005) is useful to discuss here as it gives two perspectives of the social network. First, is the ‘the social capital approach’ and second the ‘institutional perspective’.
**Social capital approach**

The social capital approach is also referred to as the ‘embededness approach’ which sees social networks more as a property of groups and communities than of individuals. Within close bonded groups, relationships of kinship, friendship and ethnicity shape a compact network of solidarity and cooperation which has the tendency to enhance economic efficiency through the mobilisation of cheap labour, training, information, etc. (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993; Granovetter 1995; Waldinger 1995). Social networks are also viewed as resources that allow marginalised groups to combat the institutional constraints and forces of exclusion within a society (Lomnitz 1977; Long 2001).

Another important dimension within social capital perspective put forward by Ouchi (1980), Powell (1991) and Powell and Smith-Doerr (1994) is the ‘governance approach’. In this approach, means of earning livelihoods or filling gaps in the formal economy is not seen as informal, rather, as an innovative alternative to inaccessible market-based economic organisations. Social networks are considered as flexible and efficient under conditions of economic instability (Powell and Smith-Doerr 1994). For example, in Mumbai, India, the proliferation of informal social networks within the formal governance of urban service provision are situated within the broader set of innovative initiatives adopted by the urban poor against inaccessible neo-liberal market conditions (Weinstein 2008). In the same paper, citing an example of Dharavi, a squatter settlement in Mumbai, Weinstein argues that residents gained access to basic utilities and services by being the members of such informal social networks (*vardhabhai*), while others were lacked the facilities. In exchange for the services provided by the informal networks, these organisations were able to strengthen their links to formal political institutions and community networks. These were later seen as a threat to city law and order and thus to safety and security. Since these ‘networks’ of individuals and groups or ‘*nobiles*’ can also be categorised as examples of informality, in terms of livelihood etc., thus the thesis addresses the gap in the literature on informality, identified in Section 2.1, and proposes that informal ‘networks’ are mechanisms which fill the gap created by the failure of the state in the impartial provision of urban services.
Institutional approach

The institutional approach argues that social networks are not an independent entity, rather they are shaped by the institutional practices ingrained in the particular context. The institutional perspective connects social networks with issues of history, power and institutional process (Meagher 2005). It emphasises that social networks are not defined by their autonomy from the state, but, in fact, are shaped by the nature of their relationship with the state at the micro (local) and macro (city/national) level. The regulatory capacities of networks are formed by institutional practices embedded in the particular context and this also reflects in the nature and type of linkages of social networks with the wider society and state (Grabher and Stark 1997). In the case of Mumbai, as Weinstein (2008) argues, the state coalesces with informal networks (‘ghoondas’ – informal organised groups) to execute its own development objectives.

Similarly, Viqar (2014) presents a case of an ethnically concentrated neighbourhood in Karachi, where people trust their localised networks of powers, so the state deliberately blurs the boundaries between legitimacy and illicitness and, therefore, people rely on these local social networks. Thus, the institutional perspective also suggests the argument that formality and informality are linked and interdependent. The institutional approach also highlights the role of power relations within social ties and network. It goes beyond the notions of strong and weak ties within networks to class formation and social exclusion processes under punitive market conditions (Blokland and Savage 2001). Sayer (2001) argues that influence of power is as important as solidarity in the networks and moreover in the case of Mumbai and Karachi that the groups are associated with kinship networks, and their access to political negotiations with the state and formal institutions are governed by power dynamics within and between the groups.

Both social capital and institutional perspectives of social networks exclude those who are outside the close network. The social capital research makes the assumption that social relations within a community equate to community participation and cooperation (Lyons and Snoxell 2005a). However mutual relationships within a community are subjected to other variables and are context dependent, so that friction is created, resulting in a disparate set of
social features, such as trust and norms. Closely linked with this is the struggle of social capital
to determine the relationship between individual, small groups and large structural
organisations. The understanding of interconnections and struggles between different scales
of social networking and their subsequent impact on the production of space is of prime
importance in setting the context of this research. Most of the existing research focusses on
the social relations within a close knit group while excluding other scales of network, so the
inter-linkages and complexities between micro, meso and macro levels analysis seem to be
an under investigated area in literature. The current research aims to bring forward
understanding in these various areas.

**Trust**

Trust is another significant feature of social capital. American political scientist Fukuyama
(1995, p. 26), defined trust as “expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest
and cooperative behaviour, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other members
of the community...these communities do not require extensive contractual and legal
regulation of their relations because prior moral consensus gives members of the group a basis
for mutual trust” (p.26). Another comprehensive perspective on trust is found in the work of
Fox (1974), who offers three major perspectives. First, he identifies ‘institutionalised trust’
suggesting that although trust is usually thought to be based on personal relations, in reality
trust and distrust “are embodied in the rules, roles and relations which are imposed on, or
seek to get accepted by others”. Thus, he argues that personal relationships of trust between
individuals are actually structured and institutionalised. Second, he identifies the ‘high and
low-trust situations’ based on the level of reciprocity. Fox (1974) argues that reciprocity
between individuals characterises the level of trust between them: in the short term, the trust
level will be lowest, and for longer-term enduring reciprocal relationships trust will be
higher. He also identifies the distinction between vertical and lateral trust, found in conflict-
affected situations due to conflicting power relations within a group or institution. Variable
power hierarchies across different socio-economic, cultural and ethno-racial groups de-
stratify trust relationships and thus result in division and conflicts in the society. While,
within the same socio-economic, cultural and ethno-racial group the trust level is much
stronger, which Putnam (1993) relates with voluntary associations, it is more lucid in the case of lateral trust through interactions and reciprocity.

2.4.3 Social capital: importance for the urban poor and link with informality

Several authors suggest that the urban poor use multiple assets to overcome their livelihood vulnerabilities and thus mitigate the risks and shocks of limited access to urban resources (Wallace et al. 1999; Seligmann 2004; Bhowmik 2005; Lyons and Snoxell 2005b; Meagher 2005). Moser (1998), categorises the assets of the urban poor as 'tangible' assets such as labour, human capital and housing and 'intangible' assets such as household relations and social capital. The urban poor use these assets strategically for their livelihoods by making networks of social trust and connections (Lyons and Snoxell 2005a; Lewandowski 2012). Furthermore, Moser (1998) argues the vulnerability of the poor in terms of their 'resilience' to overcome the negative effects of changing socio-economics and competitive market scenarios. Thus, individuals, households or communities who are rich in building up the assets will be less vulnerable and more responsive to the negative trends and insecurity of the environment.

Thus, the urban poor build an asset portfolio which is an important poverty reduction strategy, that Moser (1998, p. 5) describes in her analysis of the 'asset vulnerability framework'. Rakodi and Lloyd-Jones (2002, p. 6) argue the urban poor’s 'survival strategy', is a non-static view of their abilities to construct livelihoods. This concept recognises that people may be poor, yet have alternative non-material or non-monetary means to support their livelihoods. Such means include skills, labour, friends and family, experience in certain contexts, health and others which they can draw upon or develop at different times.

In the context of street traders, these intangible and non-monetary resources become essential to the formation of networks of trust and social relations. Empirical work on social capital from various contexts on informal trading sees such trading as an important asset forming active reciprocal support networks, family ties and bonding, networks of social trust and connections (Macharia 1997; Lyons and Snoxell 2005a, b; Meagher 2006; Pratt 2006; Kadushin 2012). These help to enable traders to generate collective actions and to access political spheres. For example Lyon (2007) describing Ghana’s street traders sees trust and family ties as the fundamental factors in building social relationships with other traders,

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buyers and wholesalers. Family ties initially helped new street traders to access the network and with time to build connections and networks. Lyon found that through repetitive interactions, trust developed among street traders, and thus helped the formation of a strong network that helped them in developing credit relationships without the need for cash. Stillerman and Sundt (2007) similarly, in their research on street traders in Santiago and Chile highlight the role of embedded networks (kin- and non-kin networks) in the reciprocal support to manage the risk in dealing with legally perilous and unfriendly context for street vendors.

However in the context of Karachi, the notion of social capital involves a complex web of actors. Mechanisms of collaboration, social relations/networks and trust are dictated and controlled by multiple factors (Budhani et al. 2010). The poor are categorised by political, religious, and ethnic heterogeneity. This variance can facilitate network formation, but such differences can also hamper or militate against bonding. The factors that impact on the ‘asset vulnerability framework’ of the poor are multi-layered and multi-faceted, and vary from power dynamics at the city level that shape macro level political processes to socio-political fragmentation at community or tribal scale that has a major impact on the production of space. These factors are important to investigate, especially in the case of the proposed research context. Detailed analysis on the impacts of power dynamics and political processes on the production of space will be examined in the next section, while this section focuses on social capital and their related debates.

2.4.5 Discussion

One of the central virtues of social capital is that its role extends beyond individual agents to communal relations between and among agents/individuals, institutions and social sections/units. This is important for the urban poor, as lacking income they need assets to become resilient against socio-economic hardships. The most discussed notions in the social capital literature are the relationship of trust, ties of kinship, solidarity, reciprocity, and networking.
In the background of informal economy, social networks are portrayed as an alternative way to gain access to the negotiations with the formal actors for the attainment of livelihood resources. The negotiations for spatial control is derived from the power dynamics and relation within and among the groups, thus the stronger social network has better access to resources and *vice versa*. However, the current debate on social capital amongst street traders is primarily focussed on close-knit or dense groups formed on the basis of economic division, and does not further explore the social groupings formed on ethno-political and religious grounds.

Thus the fragmentation and conflict in social relations within and among social networks (either formed in isolation or in conjunction with formal institutions) on the basis of ethno-political and religious divisions, and the consequential patterns of interaction and negotiations for spatial control and dominance that results in divided spatial territories of informal trading is thus an important dimension that needs further examination.

### 2.5 Power dynamics and the production of ITS

In addition to social capital and networks, the definition of ITS puts significant emphasis on power dynamics and political processes. Therefore, the main objective of this section is to understand the influence of power and political processes in the production of informal trading spaces. First, the section explores the dynamic relationship between power and space, highlighting the importance of claimed spaces, which are created by less powerful actors in response to the dominant power holders. Next, these claimed spaces and the role of substitute power are explored in the context of informal trading. It also examines the way in which informal groups are organised in a diffuse and networked pattern. The section then delves briefly into literatures on the power struggles that exist between traders and representatives of the state. The findings of this section are then finally drawn together to rethink the role of power in ITS.
2.5.1 Dynamics of Power and Space

Conceptualising Space

Space is directly derived from the expression of power and in which it becomes the primary resource for power (Hirst 2005). Social theorists, geographers and anthropologists rejected the metaphysical conception of space as an empty container, a field, or as an inert and passive holder of social relations, cultural meanings and political confrontations (Dimendberg 1998). Lefebvre (1992, p. 24), argues space is not an inert container, but rather is; “a social product….. it is not simply ‘there’, a neutral container waiting to be filled, but is a dynamic, humanly constructed means of control, and hence of domination, of power”. In other words, space is an active vessel of social and political conflicts.

The social and political conflicts inherent in space are the expressions of power struggles among multiple actors who contest the control of spatial resources and the income-earning potential they hold, through the deployment of diverse forms of power (Whitson 2007). Space is the centre stage of the power struggle among various actors, which reflects the nature of the space (Gaventa 2005). Power cannot exist in isolation without a subject, or subordinate, but needs a subject, or actor, to influence, to control, and to gain authority in terms of actions and resources (Foucault 1982). The relation between power with the subject can be ‘unilateral’ when one actor exercises power over the other, or ‘bilateral’ when both actors exercise power over each other (Goldhamer and Shils 1939). The nature of ‘unilateral’ and ‘bilateral’ power relations among the subjects can be identified as ‘negative’ or ‘positive’, whereby oppression of actors to gain a superior position is considered as negative and destructive (Lukes 1974).

However, power is not always oppressive or exclusionary. Foucault, for example, denies the negative notion of power and proposes that “we must cease once and for all to describe the effect of power in negative terms: it ‘excludes’, it ‘represses’, it ‘censors’, it ‘abstracts’, it ‘masks’, it ‘conceals’. In fact power produces – it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production” (Foucault 1977, p. 194). The negative and positive notions of power are
relative, as in the case of urban informal economy. Informal power structures, according to some authors, such as Hall and Pfeiffer (2000), are considered to be non-conforming and deviant as they render cities ungovernable. Other authors, such as Bhowmik (2005); Roy (2005); Budhani et al. (2010), consider informal power structures as a positive response to the shrinking formal job sector and in the provision of goods and services to the urban poor.

Contest over public resources between non-state actors in the city can result from the absence of formal political government as the service provider and regulatory authority. In this case, the deployment of power is not localised in a single institution, or actor, rather it is the possession of everyone and its efficacy can be gauged through social relations at various scales (Cresswell 2000). Social relations enable a power struggle to dominate and control. Foucault (1982, p.781) categorises this ‘struggle’ in three types: i) against the *form of domination* (ethnic, social, religious); ii) against the *form of exploitation* of the capabilities which separate individuals from what they produce; and iii) against subjection and *forms of subjectivity* and submission that make the individual submit to others.

Such power struggles prevail either in isolation, or in conjunction, but one form of power usually dominates, depending upon the context and the subject’s relationship with power (Foucault 1982). In order to resist against domination, exploitation and forms of subjectivity power disseminates from one subject/actor to another. (Gaventa 2003, p. 3) explains Foucault’s notion of power as ubiquitous rather than concentrated and he argues that "power is neither wielded by individuals, not by classes, nor institutions – in fact, power is seen as dispersed and subject-less, as elements of broad strategies but without individual authors. Rather than wielding power, subjects are discursively constituted through power; their actions may contribute to the operation of power”.

Power relations in space shape the boundaries of participation and control the involvement of actors in the produced space, dictating who may enter the space, with what motives and intentions and with what identities and discourses. (Hayward 1998, p. 2) explains the Foucauldian idea of boundaries as an expression of power, whereby power operates “as the network of social boundaries that delimit fields of possible action”. The power relations that
control or delimit certain actors in a space depends upon the influence of a power holder on the subordinate group. Goldhamer and Shils (1939) categorises the power exercised to influence the subject in three forms: ‘force’ – the influence of a power-holder on the subject through a physical act (attack, or imprisonment); ‘domination’ – to influence behaviour by imposing the notion of a power-holder on the subject (command, or request); and ‘manipulation’ – to influence the behaviour of the subject without making explicit the notion of power-holder.

The exercise of power in shaping the boundaries of participation could either be one of the above (‘force’, domination’ or ‘manipulation’), or a combination, depending on the context and actors to participate. For example many ethnic, or religious, based minority groups deliberately occupy a space in the city to express their physical and ideological territory, thus delimiting the access and participation of other groups. Cornwall (2004, p. 25) explains such spaces that shape identity and participation as ‘organic spaces’, or ‘sites of radical possibility’, where the excluded class raise their voice against the exclusionary, or uneven, form of development. Gaventa (2005, p. 12) considers such spaces as ‘claimed/created’ spaces, which are ‘created by less powerful actors from, or against, the powerful holders’. Other literature defines these spaces as ‘third spaces’, or spaces that are the direct expressions of hegemonic and uneven development where deprived masses dismiss ‘hegemonic space’ and create spaces for themselves (Soja 1996).

**Claimed/created spaces and substitute power**

To understand the dynamics of power in ‘claimed/created’ spaces, the concept of ‘substitute’ power by Goldhamer and Shils (1939, p. 174) is significant to understand informal power structures. ‘Substitute’ power appears when the legitimate and designated power fails to execute (Goldhamer and Shils 1939). In the context of African countries, Utas (2012) refers to the role of ‘Big Men’ (informal economic and/or political actors) as ‘substitute’ power and an alternative form of governance that fills the socio-structural voids of weak and/or absent state institutions. In order to counter a social-legal marginalisation by the state that would benefit large corporations - to which Roy (2005) refers as intentional absence of state - street
traders take over as substitute (informal) powers to legitimise their economic activity (Cross 2000). Other studies on informal trading have examined the role of informal institutions that substitute for state provision of public goods (Casson et al. 2010; Golub and Hansen-Lewis 2012), and particularly ethnic-based groups that use innovative enforcement mechanisms as a substitute for formal rules and regulations (Meagher 2006; Casson et al. 2010).

Informal trading space is the direct expression of uneven power relationships exercised in society due to neoliberal policies. Uneven development is the visible expression of the geography of capitalism, which is thought to create a terrain of political struggle leading to social exclusion and gentrification (Smith 2008). The political struggle of capital accumulation has marginalised and deinstitutionalised disadvantaged groups, such as the unemployed, casual labourers, street traders, and which, creates a landscape of uneven development of class struggle (Bayat 2000). Smith (2008), argues that uneven development is the evident expression of production of space under capitalism that blurs the division of labour for the production of surplus product. In addition, the surplus production spurs the bourgeoisie, or wealthy, to expand the basis of surplus. Several authors of the street trading literature argue that the underlying factors of the state power over street traders, such as evictions, displacement and harassment, operate in order to promote economic globalisation (Middleton 2003; Hansen 2004; Setšabi and Leduka 2008).

The shaping of cities by the logic of capitalism has triggered a process of social exclusion and informalisation. The spaces of social exclusion, as discussed earlier in this section are claimed, or created, spaces where the absence of formal power is taken over by ‘substitute’ or ‘informal’ power in order to legitimise its influence in the accession of goods and services (Goldhamer and Shils 1939). The interaction and role of actors in space is complex and is constructed by various forms of political power. The role of informal power structures in the provision of housing outside the legal domain for the urban poor targets spaces that are hidden, or less profitable, from the lens of capitalist markets. Therefore, the informal actors organise and form a network by augmenting the strength of the powerless group through collective action and social mobilisation. However, informal trading spaces differ from informal housing land by virtue of their shared nature, temporality, and often competing claims on space. Informal
trading space is also an expressions of ‘created/claimed’ space (Soja 1996), however it is subject to power relations because it occupies public space, which tends to be the most visible and contested space in the city (Brown 2006).

**Diffuse and networked control**

Power relations influence the articulation of space in which power is exercised, in which conflicts are pursued and social control attempted (Hirst 2005). The spatial implications of power are seen in *diffuse*, or *networked*, attempts to control a fixed territory, which impact on political engagement and the exercise of institutional powers (Allen 2004). Diffuse patterns are explained by Bayat (1997) as a ‘passive network’ in which street traders act as atomised individuals, and become active for collective action at the time of a complex situation, such as the threat of harassment, displacement, or eviction. As the collective actions are instantaneous and unstructured in the case of a ‘passive network’, they tend to be volatile and lead to situations of conflict rendered in a public space (Bayat 1997b). Urban public space is, therefore, a locus for power struggles where street traders contest to attain social and political power. (Cross and Karides 2007; Setšabi and Leduka 2008).

Some examples of networked patterns of control are discussed by Viqar (2014) (also mentioned in Section 2.4.2) in an ethnically concentrated network in Karachi that was able to participate and negotiate in state level politics. The strong horizontal connections built up on ethnic trust and solidarity enabled certain communities’ access to socio-economic and political benefits at the state level.

### 2.5.2 Power and its role in the Production of Informal Trading Spaces

Understanding power dynamics is essential in understanding the socio-spatial divisions in ITS. There is a constant power contestation among various actors (formal and informal) over the control of resources. The power struggle (to control, to exercise, to hold, to profit) is socio-economically class-based. This is driven by complex geographies of power as Allen (2004, p. 22) suggests, in which ‘power is seen to flow upwards and downwards through the different scales of economic and political activity’. In the case of street trading, which by
virtue of its nature occupies the most visible domain of public space, power relations are in constant flux among formal and informal actors for economic and political interests (Bayat 1997a; Brown 2006; Madanipour 2013; Brown 2017).

At the city-level, formal actors exploit power relations to form political alliances with groups of potential voters (in this case street traders) in return of their electoral constituency (Cross 1998a; Auyero 1999; Baken 2003). Thus, the power dynamics of city-level politics defines the nature of spaces produced, including informal trading spaces. For example, in the case studies of street markets in Mexico City, Cross (1998a) argues that formal actors (state and other political institutions) compete for government positions so that they can develop a patron-client relationship with street traders. This relationship between formal actors and street traders works in two ways. First, the state can control the demands of a subaltern group by limiting vested power to control access of the masses to one person on the other side, a leader or representative of the group, and thus avoid horizontal mobilisation. Second, and in response, street traders can subvert this narrow point of control by acting as political actors, for example, demonstrating en masse, to prevent the usage of state power against them and manipulate their powers to gain the entrepreneurial incentives to expand their markets and spatial configuration.

In a socially divided city, Peach (1995) explains that spatial segregation on an ethnic, religious or socio-cultural basis is a result of contestation amongst groups in order to maintain their political power and assure basic economic and social needs. This contestation is also reflected in the poor's access to public space for their livelihoods, as it is mediated, contested and negotiated through multi-layered factors that represent the constant struggles of street traders with various power holders, including; city authorities, formal enterprises and other competing interest groups (Bromley 1978; Bayat 1997b; Cross 2000). Yiftachel and Yacobi (2003) also hints at the power contestation in the making of urban space, in which, powerful groups rule out minorities ('ethnic’ – as referred in the paper) and thus, reconfigure space through domination.
2.5.3 Rethinking Power and ITS

The production of informal trading spaces is a result of political processes that involve power contestations that define the inter-relations between various powerful actors and sources. Political actors of the state exploit the needs of the poor for their legitimacy and benefit, by creating a vacuum of formal, and legal, power. The power vacuum is created either by governmental failure to distribute goods and services evenly, or through intentional abandonment in the interest of capitalist markets. It is then filled by power intermediaries, or an excluded group with informal and substitute powers. Ethnic, political, class, and/or religious fragmentation in social relations within the informal sector is also reflected in power struggles, and thus exacerbates contestation and segmentation in the production of trading spaces.

Therefore, spatial segregation (based on groupings that allow power-holders to maintain, or upgrade, their powers) form the boundaries of participation that exclude, or control, the access of certain groups in processes of space production, and thus produce divided trading spaces in the city. However, the power dynamics and the impacts of spatial segregation to the production and nature of informal trading spaces is a relatively under explored area in the academic literature that requires further investigation.

2.6 Conclusion

This review has explored various strands in the literature including debates on; urban informality, the production of space, social capital, power, and the role of power in the production of ITS. The broader theoretical discussions on the informal economy suggest that it is a diverse sector with complex relationships between actors, including the state, street traders and social groups that underpin processes of urban development. Urban informality has been variously conceptualised, but usually in relation to the formal sector, which assumes state marginalisation and the victimisation of informal economy workers. For example, Roy (2009) argues that the state selects ‘calculated informality’ in order to benefit the privileged class, which leads to socio-economic inequalities in society. The tacit assumption is sometimes that the urban poor are a unified group and there is a relation between informal
groups and state actors. This assumption, however, limits the understanding of the complexity of relations within the informal economy and its wider urban setting. Another image of urban informality proposed by de Soto is ‘heroic entrepreneurship’ – the creative response of the urban poor to exclusionary market forces, also based on the broad generalisation of the formal/informal dichotomy, whereby the complex legality of formal institutions is assumed to be the main reason why the urban poor choose to work in the informal sector. This model does not address the multiplicity of actors who have stakes in both formal and informal sectors, for example political parties, who are responsible for limiting the access of urban poor based on their identity or political affiliation.

The failure of local state institutions is due to the transfer of decision making power from a local scale to either central, or provincial, scales is another crucial point in the emergence of informal powers. As Purcell (20012) suggests, decisions made by actors that are not directly accountable to a local electorate, opens up the possibility for informal power groups to consolidate their claims. This is an important inference to take forward in this research in order to address the complex relationships between local, provincial and federal levels of governance (Chapter 4).

This review has demonstrated an extensive theoretical discussion on the production of space. This research will draw on the production of space, proposed by Lefebvre (1974), as an expression of power, which is produced through human activities and social relations. This study will explore various conceptions of urban public space, including ‘proper space’, ‘capitalist space’, and ‘profitable space’ (used as a commodity to increase the exchange value), in order to understand the underlying social, economic, and political processes between different actors. Thus, this thesis puts forward a concept of the ‘production of informal trading space’ which is under-theorised and under-explored in the street trading literature.

Social capital is a key attribute in the informal trading literature that operates to claim, negotiate and access trading markets. This review suggests that networks within social capital discourse are fundamental to understanding ties of kinship, solidarity, trust and reciprocity. Meagher’s (2007) interpretation of social networks as ‘informal organisational arrangements’ is instrumental for this research, however, the study argues that informal organisational
arrangements are an ongoing process of forging, making, negotiating and shifting alliances between street traders and other actors such as police, municipal agents and political parties. These alliances are critical in understanding the social capital of street traders who dismiss ‘hegemonic space’ and create spaces for themselves, which Gaventa (2005) defines as spaces ‘claimed or created’ by subordinate actors against more powerful actors. This research challenges the assumption that state and neo-liberal institutions are always the most powerful urban actors, and provides a lens to examine the complex relationships of power between street traders and other actors, who are involved in the production of informal trading spaces. Thus, the literature review has provided a framework for this research in the context of Karachi, where ethno-political networks are powerful groups in the processes of negotiating and asserting spatial claims.
3. Research Methodology

3.1. Introduction

This chapter situates the research process in the context of both the research methodology, defined as ‘a way of thinking about and studying social phenomena’ (Strauss and Corbin 1990, p. 12), and the research methods, ‘the techniques and procedures used to collect and analyse data’ (1990, p. 12). The sections that follow set out the reasons for the choice of research methodology, in this case, qualitative research informed by social constructivism, with an overview of the methods used. The final sections consider the validity and reliability of the research findings and issues related to ethics and safety.

3.2. Research strategy

The research aim is to examine the production of informal trading spaces (ITS), and how the social capital of informal actors from diverse ethno-political identities impact on informal trading spaces, within the wider context of contest, conflict and politics at a macro level – how this political contest impacts both the production of new spaces and influence on the existing ones. Its focus is on the social processes and phenomena that shape the politics of territorial control in informal trading spaces of the city.

3.2.1. Research paradigm

There are four major paradigms in qualitative research conducts: positivism, post-positivism, critical theory and constructivism (Guba and Lincoln 1994). This research used a constructivist paradigm to explore the underlying theoretical grounding for the processes observed and address the research questions. Constructivism is defined as ‘the view that all knowledge, and therefore all meaningful reality as such, is contingent upon human practices, being constructed in and out of interactions of human beings and their world, and developed and transmitted within an essentially social context’ (Crotty 1998, p. 42).
Although the research explores the gaps identified from the literature review to provide a framework for data collection and analysis, it is not intended to verify the research aims and objectives by applying positivist and post-positivist research paradigms. Moreover, the research also deviates from critical theory, which tends to position the inquirer/researcher in a more authoritative role rather than as a facilitator of the inquiry process to collect local and specific (re)constructed realities (Guba and Lincoln 1994; Schwandt 1994). The key elements of the constructivist paradigm – that various forms of human interactions, communication, conflict, negotiation, rhetoric etc. underpin knowledge – which are used to form the basis of this thesis to understand socio-political dynamics in ITS led to a decision to use this approach.

This research also aims to explore the social dimension of space in which space cannot be understood in isolation from human activities and therefore is subject to diverse experiences (Section 2.2.1). This complexity results in the creation of multiple realities (or representation of multiple realities) constructed 'by the research out of stories by research participants… trying to explain or make sense of their stories to themselves' (Corbin and Strauss 2008, p. 10). The constructivist approach is inductive in nature, with an open-ended and flexible approach that allows participants to help frame the research questions as well as assist with data collection (Guba and Lincoln 1994; Golafshani 2003). Therefore, the research adopts data triangulation by using multiple methods – documentary analysis, observations, informal conversations, mapping of trade activities, interviews, and focus groups – to explore the diverse experiences that lead to the construction of multiple realities.

### 3.3. Research design

Hammersley and Atkinson (1995, p. 24) define research design as the ‘reflexive process operating through every stage of a project’. Thus social science research follows a non-sequential and flexible approach to provide an in-depth account of events with the related processes and experiences, to define the particular event (Denscombe 2014). This research follows a non-linear approach to address the research questions by using a descriptive and exploratory research approach. It outlines various experiences and conflict events in informal markets to examine the mechanisms by which various groups construct socio-political identity, and how they create division in the informal trading spaces studied.
3.3.1. **Quantitative and qualitative research**

Quantitative research methodology is related to objective measurements, statistical and numerical analysis of data using computational techniques, and generally adopts fairly inflexible methods with mostly ‘closed-ended’ research questions. In contrast, qualitative research, adopted in this thesis, is focussed on examining ‘processes, relationships and discursive practices’, with the result that the researcher must adapt more flexible methods to address the research questions (Strauss and Corbin 1998). Thus, the researcher develops a perspective from multiple representations of reality (Eisner 2017). The nature of inquiry for this thesis is focused on the process and variety of relationships amongst street traders and other actors in ITS. This led to the selection of qualitative methods for the research.

3.3.2. **Case study research**

This section provides a justification of the research design and description of the specific methods used. The research is based on comparative case studies as the research design seeks to be both historically interpretive and casually analytical, thus allowing analysis of ‘casual mechanisms across the parallel cases’ (Ragin 2014, p. 34). The three case studies chosen for this research are set within a comprehensive examination of the contextual settings, which helps to understand their unique situation and to underpin their detailed findings.

In social science research, a case study contributes to understanding social and political phenomena at a localised scale (Yin 1994). To gain an in-depth localised knowledge, researchers tend to adopt single case or multiple case studies to investigate the research questions. Furthermore, a case study provides a unique opportunity comprehensively to investigate real-life events on which otherwise scarce information is available (Yin 1994; Kumar 2011). A significant strength of the case study approach is to examine and unfold the relationships and processes underlying complex social networks that constitute any social setting (Feagin et al. 1991).

Research on the informal economy requires contextual groundings derived from a comprehensive investigation of micro-events, to inform a broader understanding of the local culture and its influence on the social behaviours and actions of the actors (Feagin et al. 1991; Zainal 2007). To date, many studies on the informal economy have focussed on a single or a few cases to gain an understanding of contextual groundings (Bromley 1978; Cross 1998; Roy
2009; Utas 2012; Gazdar and Mallah 2013; Mackie et al. 2014). However, contextual situations differ significantly across locations, and case study research is needed to help to gain a consolidated place-specific knowledge which can be used to compare similar studies in different geographical locations.

A case study is defined as ‘...an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context’ (Yin 1994, p. 13). Yin put forward three criteria for deciding to undertake case study research, which this research design meets, that: i) the research questions ask what, why and how; ii) the research explores events over which the researcher has no control; and iii) the research investigates contemporary contexts. Yin classified case study research under four categories: single-case (holistic design); single-case (embedded design); multiple-case (holistic design), and multiple-case (embedded design), based on the rationale of the unit of analysis. The holistic design strategy in both single and multiple-cases addresses the single unit or variable of analysis, while, the embedded case deals with multiple variables. Thus, to examine the identity-based divisions in informal trading spaces of Karachi, this research adapts a ‘multiple-case (embedded design)’ case study approach (Yin 1994, p. 38), as the politics and power dynamics among various networks in informal trading spaces constitute multiple variables that can be better understood by adopting a multiple-case research design.

The study deals with two scales to investigate the complex contextual settings of Karachi. Firstly, at the city scale (Chapter 4), it examines the historical development of the city over time, demographic changes and the emergence of various socio-political groupings, and the role and politics of formal and informal actors in service provision, division, contestation and violence. Secondly, at neighbourhood or Union Committee (UC) level the research examines informal trading spaces in markets to investigate the impact of city level and local politics on informal trading spaces, and how the division and contestation among political groups territorialise informal trading spaces in the city.

The two scales of investigation at city and neighbourhood market levels allow an understanding of the causal mechanisms of social and spatial relationships in ITS, and the intrinsic networking patterns amongst multiple actors. For example, at city scale, the state’s failure in basic service provision allows various informal actors – unelected representatives of political parties, the local police, municipality agents, or tribal/religious leaders – to fill the
void which leads to conflict over the control of resources. At neighbourhood/market scale, the analysis includes a study of the mechanisms of conflict between multiple claimants and how this leads to the ethno-political divisions of ITS.

**Case study selection**

The choice of areas of the city in which the case studies for this research were located was based on their strategic importance in the city, the types of conflict amongst multiple actors, and the turbulent history of violence experienced in each area over recent decades.

The selection of the case studies followed a strategy which responded to the research questions. In the initial stage, interviews were conducted with experts and academics who have in-depth knowledge about the city. From their responses, a table was developed to identify different types and nature of groupings in informal markets across the city in order to identify prospective case studies (Table 3.1). From this investigation, four broad categories of control were identified which lead to conflict among various social groups in ITS:

a. Control of one dominant group in an ITS occupied by street traders from multi-ethnic backgrounds;

b. Control of multiple groups in an ITS predominantly occupied by street traders from one ethnic group;

c. Control of one dominant group in an ITS predominantly occupied by street traders from one ethnic group, and

d. Control of multiple groups in an ITS occupied by street traders from multi-ethnic backgrounds.

Based on this analysis, Table 3.1 identified twenty six potential trading areas, of which five possible case studies were identified for further examination (highlighted in orange), exhibiting contrasting characteristics, in terms of settlement type, types of control and social groupings. From these three were finally selected for study, based on the justifications given in Table 3.2. These are shown in bold type.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LEGAL STATUS OF SETTLEMENT</th>
<th>TYPE OF CONTROL</th>
<th>SOCIAL GROUPS</th>
<th>EXAMPLES OF AREAS/NEIGHBOURHOODS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monopolistic control – i.e. one dominant (political, religious or ethnic group) claimant of the space</td>
<td>Multiple identities (Type a. people from multiple identities are trading under monopolistic control)</td>
<td>Tariq Road</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Planned/ Formal Settlement</td>
<td>Predominantly one identity (Type b. one dominant identity trading under multiple controllers)</td>
<td>Liaquatabad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Multiple identities (Type d.)</td>
<td>Gizri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Akhtar Colony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>More than one contender claims the control over space (or multiple claimants of the space)</td>
<td>Predominantly one identity (Type c.)</td>
<td>Meena Bazaar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Multiple identities (Type a.)</td>
<td>Rizvia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ancholi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Gulistan-e-Jahaur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lines Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Baloch Colony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lyari – Jhatpat market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Saddar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Khori Garden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bolton market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Burns Road</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Patel Para</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Qasba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monopolistic control</td>
<td>Multiple identities (Type a.)</td>
<td>Mianwali Colony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Teen Hatti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Azam Basti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Manzoor Colony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>More than one contender claims the control over space (or multiple claimants of the space)</td>
<td>Pre-dominantly one identity (Type b.)</td>
<td>Lines Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Multiple identities (Type d.)</td>
<td>Bacha Khan Chowk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sohrab Goth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bhawani Chali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Orangi – Aligarh Bazaar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The contention for power and control by multiple actors in ITS were dominant reasons of conflict among the various groups, so, at the first stage, case study areas representing contending social groups (ethnic and political) were identified for further examination. As Herriot and Firestone note, the application of ‘similar data collection and analysis procedures in each setting’ makes the research more robust and comprehensive (Herriott and Firestone 1983, p. 14). So to do a cross-site comparison, emphasis was given to developing the same strategy in order to examine the similarities or differentiation reflecting the attributes of each site (Pelto and Pelto 1978).

The next step was to identify the informal trading spaces in Karachi where the conflict among multiple groups over control leads to ethno-political division in the market. Based on the justification developed (Table 3.2) and interviews with experts and academics, three case studies were selected; Saddar, Lyari and Orangi. The key criteria for selecting these case studies are:

- Conflict over the control of space – multiple power claimants of the space
- Diversity of social groups (ethnic, political) working in ITS
- Evidence of conflict among the groups and other actors (state and non-state) in ITS
- Informal trading spaces (markets) located at different locations of the city; inner-city, city centre and periphery, representing different times of development; pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial
- Accessibility to the key informants and locations of ITS, given Karachi’s general lack of security
Table 3.2: Justification for selection of three case study locations from short-list of five

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASE STUDIES</th>
<th>Justification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. <strong>Empress Market and vicinity – Saddar</strong></td>
<td><strong>Representation of multiple power claimants amongst Pakhtuns, Muhajirs, local political party agents and local police and municipality.</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics:</td>
<td><strong>Yes</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• A pre-partition planned city scale market which over time developed as the biggest wholesale and retail hub of Karachi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The largest informal street trading market of Karachi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• This area has experienced multiple evictions, displacement and relocation drives against street traders, but despite all these operations, informal street trading has expanded over time.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Conflict and violence have occurred between Pakhtun, local police and other ethnic groups; Muhajirs, Saraikis, Punjabis. This has divided the trade into ethnic enclaves.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. <strong>Jhatpat Market – Lyari</strong></td>
<td><strong>Representation of multiple power claimants</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics:</td>
<td><strong>Yes</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• One of the oldest markets in the Old Town of Karachi.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Records of extreme intra-group violence, between two criminal gangs; Uzair Baloch and Baba Ladla resulting in rocket-propelled projectiles and gunfire in March 2014.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Less documentation of impacts of intra-group conflicts/violence on informal trading.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Key informants known who can help in gaining access to the area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. <strong>Aligarh Bazaar, Bacha Khan Chowk - Orangi</strong></td>
<td><strong>Representation of multiple power claimants</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics:</td>
<td><strong>Yes</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The prime market of the Orangi town, located at the periphery of Pakhtun and Muhajir areas/neighbourhoods.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The area is called an engine of ethnic conflict initiated between Muhajir and Pakhtun in the 1980's and is ongoing.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Various contending groups in ITS (further divisions on tribal basis; Achakzaïs, Kakers, Tarin, Syed and Asher), Muhajirs, Punjabis, Saraikis.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Evidence of contest and violence within and among the groups mentioned above.</td>
<td><strong>Extreme</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Easy and safe access as it is centrally located</td>
<td><strong>Yes</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Access to key informants of the area</td>
<td><strong>Yes</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Various contending groups in ITS (predominantly two; Balochis and Katchis)</td>
<td><strong>To some extent</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Evidence of contest and violence within and among multiple actors (state and non-state) and its visible impacts on ITS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Easy access</td>
<td><strong>Yes</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Access to key informants of the area</td>
<td><strong>Yes</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Representation of multiple power claimants</td>
<td><strong>Yes</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Various contending groups in ITS</td>
<td><strong>Yes</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Evidence of contest and violence within and among multiple actors (state and non-state) and its visible impacts on ITS</td>
<td><strong>Extreme</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Easy access</td>
<td><strong>Yes</strong> (through...)****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics</td>
<td>Justification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple waves of conflicts and violence have been recorded in this area.</td>
<td>OPP-NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initially, Aligarh Bazaar was dominated by Mohajirs, but after brutal incidents in the 1980s and various waves of migration from Northern Pakistan, Muhajirs moved out of the area and it is now dominated by Pakhtuns.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defined Mohajir and Pakhtun street trading zones with separate trade unions representing particular ethnic groups.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact of identity-based conflict on ITS has not been documented before.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Access to key informants of the area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Azam Basti – Mehmoodabad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Characteristics:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emerging market along the main artery of Mehmoodabad area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various ethnicities and religious minorities doing business in the same area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Although people from various ethnicities and religious backgrounds exist in this area coalition among them leads to agreement on most of the issues.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market/bazaar exists in an unplanned settlement (un-notified)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbourhood scale ITS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relatively peaceful area of the city</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Representation of multiple power claimants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Various contending groups with divided trading zones in ITS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes, but no volatile confrontatio n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evidence of contest and violence within and among multiple actors (state and non-state) and its impacts on ITS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not really</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Easy and safe access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Access to key informants of the area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. LaluKhet – Liaquatabad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Characteristics:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market located in planned settlement of Liaquatabad Town</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biggest market of the Town</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One political party (MQM) controls the area, therefore, the space is dominated by Mohajir traders. Sizeable number of Pakhtun street traders also working defined zones within the market.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Few cases of violence reported on either side of the ethnic divide.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traders willingly paying rent (extortion) to the designated ‘in charge’ for the security provided by political party representatives.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Representation of multiple power claimants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In some zones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Various contending groups in ITS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In some zones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evidence of contest and violence within and among multiple actors (state and non-state) and its impacts on ITS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Easy and safe access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Access to key informants of the area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Finally, from the shortlist of five potential case studies, three were selected for the research – Lyari, Saddar and Orangi – as best fitting the selection criteria. Saddar is the colonial city center and the biggest commercial hub of the city with diverse ethnic representation of street traders claiming and contesting space. The old quarter and inner-city area of Lyari is a unique example of control by drugs mafia and war over ‘turf’. It is known as one the most crime-ridden and violent neighbourhoods of the city with a sizeable population working in informal trade. When Orangi was first settled it was on the outer periphery of the city, and the strategic location of the area resulted in its rapid expansion due to various waves of migrations. Orangi was always at the forefront in any ethnic riots, making it the most dangerous part of the city. The broad locations within the city are shown on Map 3.1, and detailed descriptions of the areas’ characteristics and maps are included in Chapter 4.

Map 3.1: Case studies locations in Karachi
Source: Dawn GIS
3.4. Data collection methods

The main fieldwork took place between January and June of 2016. Preliminary site visits were scheduled to the potential case studies (Table 3.1) to inspect the availability of gatekeepers and security and safety conditions. The process of finalising the case studies was based on building connections with local NGOs, residents, trade unions who could be potential gatekeepers, to get access to the site. This was completed by the end of February 2016, followed by detailed fieldwork which continued until the first week of June 2016. Once the case study sites had been selected, the main source of data collection was through documentary analysis, observation and informal conversations (un-structured interviews), interviews (semi-structured and unstructured), mapping and focus groups. Each is discussed in detail below.

3.4.1. Documentary analysis

Documentary analysis is a common strategy in case study research as it provides a particular lens to examine social events. It allows the researcher to gather rich descriptions for a particular event, phenomenon or context (Stake 1995). According to Yin (1994, p. 81), the key role of document analysis is ‘to corroborate and augment evidence from other sources’. The range of documents used for this research includes: newspaper reports and articles; government documents and publications; minutes of meetings, and other documents presented by street traders and key informants during interviews. The latter include letters and applications to the local police station or municipal departments, electricity connection approvals from K-Electric (Karachi’s electrical supply authority), and similar individual records.

Despite the obvious usefulness of documents, they could be biased and often formulated for other purposes (Henn et al. 2005). The use of documents thus needs to be critically carried out and require triangulation (Mason 1996). The examination of information collected through different methods allows corroboration of findings across data sets, and therefore the impact of possible bias can be reduced in research (Bowen 2009).

Documents in this research were significant in triangulating and complementing other sources of data. A missing link in an interviewee’s narrative regarding a particular event was
corroborated and clarified by the analysis of documents. Therefore, data triangulation was used as a key strategy during data collection and analysis phase in this research. Another important aspect of document analysis was to situate contemporary responses in a historical context to allow a comparison between ‘observer’s interpretation of events and those described in documents related to the events’ (May 2001, p. 175). For example, the recent crackdown on the gangsters’ network in Lyari made it impossible to interview any gang leaders, but various versions of an interview with a gang leader in local newspapers provided a useful comparative perspective on the events in the area. Similarly, news articles by some investigative journalists about the banned political and religious organisations who were important actors in controlling the informal trading spaces in the past helped to situate the current account or status of the area within its historical context.

Documentary analysis was conducted in parallel with the observations, informal conversations and interviews. Extensive review of press coverage on issues related to informal trading over the last five years was undertaken to supplement the other data collection methods. The newspaper articles contributed significantly to the document analysis of this study supported by other archival means. The “Express Tribune” and “Dawn” were the two key newspapers used, as their reporters have followed and mapped violent conflict in Karachi for some time. Reports, interviews and events covered in other local newspapers were also used. The documentary analysis provided important background information on the case study areas, and their situation within the wider context of the city, and augmented understanding of the underlying causes of socio-political division in ITS.

3.4.2. Observations and informal conversations

Observation is a key method in any anthropological and social research. It involves staying out in the field to immerse oneself in understanding the lives, experiences, interactions and language of the research participants (Bernard 2013). Observation helps the researcher to understand how something actually occurs and works in the field as it provides the deeper understanding of a contextual setting to interpret the socio-cultural behaviour of the people (Flick 2014). As Mulhall mentioned, observation is the key attribute of any social research as it ‘acknowledges the importance of context and co-construction of knowledge between the researcher and researched’ (2003, p. 307).
Drawing of positional maps regarding street trading locations and their linkages with other networks was an effective way to record the observation. Before conducting the interviews, the first few weeks of each case study were spent in understanding and mapping the spatial movements and relationship of various trading networks within a contextual setting, as suggested by Seligmann (2000). However, for clarity the manual maps were redrawn diagrammatically, as shown in Chapter 5 and 6. In the informal conversations with street traders, and later semi-structured and un-structured interviews, the maps became an interactive tool as some traders shared their views on the maps by indicating the details about various networks. For example, details provided included rationale of the physical presence of a network at particular location, impact of eviction drives in that area, interaction of the network with the neighbouring network, expanse of a network etc. These details otherwise would be difficult to understand in interviews without comprehending the complexities of the context. Also, knowing the sensitivity of the research topic, it was evident that street traders felt more comfortable sharing details or drawings on maps than through formal interviews.

Figure 3.1: Chai dhaba - a congregation space for street traders
The informal conversations with street traders and other actors in trading zones in each case study also formed an important source of data gathering, and was carried out in the initial and later stages of fieldwork. These regular conversations and interactions with street traders at their trading places, nearby chai dhaba (local tea shops), and at their homes formed a substantial data input for the research. A brief note of these conversations was noted in the field diary during these conversations, while the details were completed later in the same evening.

Visiting a market every day and responding to the questions of street traders and their union in-charge or leader helped gain trust in the market. The chai dhaba within the market was an important place to have conversations with local people, visitors, street traders and other actors. Although not many street traders came to the chai dhabas for a long time due to their demanding working hours, a brief chat during their lunch break was very useful in answering some of the research questions. This place was also valuable in making links for possible future interviews, for example, one chai dhaba in Saddar was owned by the leader of the Pakhtun street traders’ union and people from other market unions used to congregate here to discuss the market-related issues. The post-meeting interaction with the group was significant in getting an interview commitment from other trade union leaders. Also, listening to their conversations and observing the interactions among them and other actors enabled an understanding of the different pattern of negotiations exist within the same ethnic
group, discussed in Chapter 5, which were not apparent before. Important themes have been
gathered from these interactions and observations which assisted in organising the semi-
structured interviews with key informants, and in developing themes for data analysis.

These observations and informal conversations provided an understanding of complex
alliances between street traders and other agents and their places of trading, were important
sources of data in their own right, and also helped inform the design of the questionnaires.
Some interactions revealed information that helped to put together a story, for example, a
call to a network leader of one of the Pakhtun networks (to confirm interview timing) was
received by another network leader. In the later discussion, it became apparent that both
network leaders were members of the same political party and running an area office. In
another example, in fixing an interview with the market union leader in Orangi, the
interviewee confirmed the interview place at the Unit Office\(^1\) of the area, suggesting political
affiliation to the MQM party, which was dominant in that area although the Union
Committees were not functioning at the time. These experiences provided a chance to
understand the interests of various actors in the market, their connections and alliance to
various agents such as other market associations, political parties, local police and state
institutions, and their interests in the trading locations which were not spoken about during
the interviews. As Seligmann (2000) indicated in the case of Peruvian street traders, the
complexity of alliances between street traders and other agents can only be mapped through
perpetuated and closed interactions. Similarly, the close interactions and two-way discussions
with street traders in the case study areas helped in mapping the power politics around
identity and how it is played out in ITS.

3.4.3. Expert, key informant and street trader interviews

The next phase was to conduct the key informant and street trader interviews. Interviews
allow a researcher to gain an in-depth understanding of opinions, feelings, emotions and
experiences of the context being researched (Denscombe 2014), and are thus well suited for
this research on ITS. Interviews are also significant in gaining a detailed understanding and

---

1. A Unit Office is the smallest political unit in the organisation (MQM political units) looked after by
the unit in charge. 15-20 unit offices comes under the sector office headed by the sector in charge
(refer Gayer, 2014, p. 104; table 5.3).
insight of specific cases and exploring complex situations (O’Leary 2005; Kumar 2012). Interviews provide an opportunity to know the richness of the context by acquiring a first-hand experience of an interviewee’s experience, and can ‘... yield rich insights into people’s biographies, experiences, opinions, values, aspirations, attitudes and feelings’ (May 2001, p. 120). The ‘primacy of the respondent’ in qualitative interviews is another key aspect which stimulates insightful discussion as Jones put it ‘In order to understand other persons constructions of reality, we would do well to ask them...and to ask them in such a way that they can tell us in their terms (rather than those imposed rigidly and a priori by ourselves) and in a depth which addresses the rich context which is the substance of their meanings’ (Jones 1985, p.46).

The three fundamental categories of interviews used in social science research include structured, semi-structured and unstructured interviews. Structured interviews follow a structured questionnaire, with closed questions and strict adherence to the wording and sequence of the questions. Semi-structured interviews employ semi-structured questionnaires which include flexible questions or prompts that are likely to stimulate a focused discussion around the case study protocol. Unstructured interviews follow an open discussion around a research plan, but in this type of interview a researcher has a minimum control over the interviewee responses (Bernard and Bernard 2012; Sarantakos 2012; Bryman 2016).

**Interview approach**

The two formats of interviews were used in this research: **semi-structured and unstructured interviews**. The selection of these formats over structured interviews was primarily due to the flexibility for the interviewee to respond on their terms, rather than following ‘standardised interview permits’ (May 2001, p. 123). The fluidity of semi-structured or unstructured questionnaires over the rigidity of structured interviews allowed the respondents to communicate their views and expand their ideas based on their beliefs and experiences, and at the same time encouraged a guided conversation reflecting on the research questions (Yin 1994; Robson 2002; Rubin and Rubin 2011).

Another important concern in the interviews was that – given the security situation – any confusion regarding the researcher association with a political party or anti-encroachment department was avoided by keeping the interview format semi-structured or unstructured,
and the mode of discussion flexible around the issues of market that are relevant to the subject of the research.

The selection of participants was guided by ‘purposive sampling’ which refers to a deliberate way of selecting respondents based on the research purpose and questions (Punch 2014). In order to avoid biased opinions, participants for an interview were selected across the identity-based (ethnic and political) groupings in the market. Due to this reason, the interview process took longer. In addition, safety concerns about accessing the areas added to the difficulties of the fieldwork, and in some areas the researcher had to find gatekeepers to help her access the area and interviewees. In total 85 in-depth interviews were conducted covering city-scale and neighbourhood scale respondents. An individual interview duration spanned half an hour to up to three hours.

Table 3.3: Table showing number and types of interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number of interviews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City level experts</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists &amp; NGOs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State officials</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key informants / Political party agents</td>
<td>Saddar</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Orangi</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lyari</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Street traders</td>
<td>Saddar</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Orangi</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lyari</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total interviews</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>85</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Expert and key Informant interviews

Interviews with experts were mostly based on semi-structured interviews. For each category of experts and key informants, a detailed framework (Table 3.4) was developed which linked the areas of inquiry to the Research Objectives. From these frameworks, a detailed questionnaire proforma was developed (Appendices 3.1-3.4).
To have a comprehensive perspective on the identity-based divisions and conflict in the informal trading spaces, four categories of key informant interviewees were identified. Numbers are given in Table 3.3 above and explained further in Table 3.5:

i) *City level experts and professionals:* these interviews were aimed broadly to identify various types of social groupings and power claims that exist in informal trading spaces.

ii) *Political party agents:* these highlighted the role of elected and non-elected members of political parties in controlling informal trading spaces in their respective UCs. The interviews further explored the negotiation of these political agents with the street traders, union leaders, local police and municipal agents and how the relationship among different political parties in the area contributes to the ethno-political segregation of trading zones.

iii) *Journalists, NGO’s agents and social activists:* these interviews sought to explore the perspective of actors who are involved in different ways in the selected case study area. Journalists were an important source of information, and most of those who had covered the stories related to identity-based conflict in the markets were contacted to ask about a) their perspective on types and functioning of various groups which exist in the case study areas and b) how the police (formal controllers) in these areas were influenced by the identities of the informal social groups (e.g. market union leaders and gangsters).

iv) *Law enforcing agencies / state representatives:* these interviews explored the perspective of state officials and their relation to various identity-based groupings that exist in ITS, and examined the process of mediation between state actors and street traders and the role of local political agents in the mediation.

The broad categories of questions (Table 3.4) prepared for each of the four stakeholder groups included:

- *Contest and spatial division in ITS* – the reasons for contest and territory demarcation in ITS,
- *Types of social groupings* – role of various groups in producing and controlling ITS; and
- *Power claims* – the presence of power claimants or intermediaries in ITS and how they claim resources with other stakeholders.

Since any conversation in the market is closely noticed by other street traders, the meetings with the key informants in the markets were either held at their houses, inside shops, restaurants or warehouses where they could discuss the power relationships and conflicts outside the premises of the market and without being heard by other people. Also, time slots were chosen carefully for interviewees to have time to be attentive, specifically early morning before the market opens up, the Friday prayer break and near market closing hours were preferred slots. All the interviews were recorded and later transcribed for data analysis.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholder</th>
<th>Production of ITS — Contested and Divided</th>
<th>Social Groupings</th>
<th>Power Claims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To examine how and why informal trading spaces are contested and divided?</td>
<td>How identities play a role in claiming the power to produce and control informal trading spaces?</td>
<td>How power intermediaries/brokers interact with different stakeholders to claim resources and produce ITS?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exports/Key Informants</strong></td>
<td><strong>Control</strong></td>
<td><strong>Conflicts</strong></td>
<td><strong>Division</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Space Control</strong></td>
<td>- Space control (Who/How)</td>
<td>- Space of resistance/conflict</td>
<td>- Conflict — Space (how conflict played out in space)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>(Administrative hierarchy)</strong></td>
<td>- Administrative structure (Informal controlling mechanisms)</td>
<td>- Factors/Reasons of conflict</td>
<td>- Types of social groupings (social grouping)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conflict and Division</strong></td>
<td>- Hierarchy of control</td>
<td>- Boundaries or territories of conflict</td>
<td>- How they access, claim and control space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>- Policy and manifesto</strong></td>
<td>- Difficulty to control in conflict</td>
<td>- Conflict in overlapping of authorities/jurisdictions</td>
<td>- Social grouping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>- Overlapping of authorities/jurisdictions</strong></td>
<td>- Space Control in (in such scenario)</td>
<td>- Reasons of division</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>- Claimants of Space</strong></td>
<td>- Current status of safety and security in the area</td>
<td>- Space Control in (in such scenario)</td>
<td>- Social grouping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>- Role of market</strong></td>
<td><strong>2. Social Capital</strong></td>
<td><strong>Types of Network/Ties/Groups Exist</strong></td>
<td><strong>Various types of identity-based groupings</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Types of Network/Ties/Groups Exist</strong></td>
<td>- Ties/Link of political parties with other actors (formal and informal)</td>
<td>- Division in social capital in the divided or segregated territories</td>
<td>- Types of network exist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>- Ties/Link of political parties with other actors (formal and informal), users and other beneficiaries of space</strong></td>
<td>- How political parties bond with other actors to build a network and intervene in the conflict boundaries</td>
<td>- How political parties interact with other actors in the divided or segregated territories</td>
<td>- Various types of identity-based groupings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>- Contending groups/actors</strong></td>
<td>- Impact of city level politics on area level politics and vice versa.</td>
<td>- How political parties interact with other actors in the divided or segregated territories</td>
<td>- Various types of identity-based groupings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. Power Networks</strong></td>
<td><strong>Negotiations/Interactions among various actors/claimants to claim the resources</strong></td>
<td>- Interaction with contending claimants/actors</td>
<td>- Interaction with contending claimants/actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Negotiations (Formal and Informal actors)</strong></td>
<td>- Role of political parties in conflict scenario</td>
<td>- Interaction with other stakeholders/actors</td>
<td>- Interaction with other stakeholders/actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>- Interaction with other stakeholders/actors to control space</strong></td>
<td>- Interaction with other stakeholders/actors</td>
<td>- Mechanisms to deal with stakeholders</td>
<td>- Mechanisms to deal with stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>- Power hierarchy (Why unit/sector in charge/leader (informal actor) has more power?)</strong></td>
<td><strong>- Negotiations (Formal and Informal actors)</strong></td>
<td><strong>- Interaction with other actors</strong></td>
<td>- Interactions of power networks with other stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>- Negotiations (Formal and Informal actors)</strong></td>
<td>- Interaction with other actors</td>
<td>- Dealing mechanisms of political parties with other different actors</td>
<td>- Dealing mechanisms of political parties with other different actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>- Interaction with other actors</strong></td>
<td>- Role of political parties in dealing with power brokers from various identities</td>
<td>- Role of political parties in dealing with power brokers from various identities</td>
<td>- Role of political parties in dealing with power brokers from various identities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.4: The questionnaire framework
Street trader interviews

For the interviews with street traders, it was initially intended to complete a semi-structured questionnaire, with the framework and questionnaire given in Appendix 3.5. However, it quickly became apparent that questionnaires could not be filled out during the interview, because of the security situation and to avoid any suspicion that the questionnaire was an official document being used against street traders. Also, as most of the interviews were conducted at trading locations, nearby chai dhaba or in public space, any formal paperwork could have alarmed the respondents, preventing them from participating in the interviews or discussing their issues. In all three case studies, interviews with street traders were conducted in more than one sitting. Information gathering in one sitting was mostly difficult and incomplete due to their busy trading schedule, so in some case, interviews were carried out in different slots of the day, and in many others interview spanned two days. Data in the form of personal experiences, small stories, documents (market union registration forms, photographs, lease documents etc.), and events were gathered after several rounds of conversation with each trader.

Street trader interviews explored the multiple claims that exist in ITS and how they control the space, and the various groupings and mechanisms that lead to the identity-based division in ITS. The interviews further examine the role of a group representatives such as a middleman, power intermediary or claimant in negotiating the control with other formal and informal actors.

The questionnaire for street traders is considerably longer than for other stakeholders as it covered extensive details regarding: i) work details (space acquisition and contextual information, work-home relationship and expenses); ii) management and development of market (provision of infrastructure in the market, market unions and other networks, role of presence of political or religious group in the market and their role); iii) market-related issues (displacement and evictions, various groups’ conflict, strikes and shut downs, safety and other safety and security-related problems).

However, at the onset of fieldwork it was realised that street traders showed reluctance to respond to a question when the researcher was writing during an interview, so, the researcher had to change the format of interviews from semi-structured to an unstructured interview format and started noting information in bullet points. During the exploratory phase, most
of the street trader interviews were recorded with their consent and later transcribed verbatim. In situations where street traders were reluctant to record their interview, or the recording was inaudible due to the traffic noise, notes were taken in the field diary, while the details of the interviews were drafted the same evening so not to lose any important piece of information.

All the street trader interviews were with men, except for three women whom the researcher managed to interview in Lyari. In general street trading is almost entirely male-dominated in Karachi.

![Image](image.jpg)

**Figure 3.3: Interviews with street traders**

**Focus groups**

A focus group refers to "small group discussions, addressing a specific topic, which usually involve 6-12 participants, either matched or varied on specific characteristics of interest to the researcher" (Morgan and Spanish 1984). Focus group or group interviews are a useful tool of investigation for obtaining the communal perspective of a group of people through their interactions around issues and topics that the research wishes to investigate (May 2001). The advantage of a focus group is that the people’s perception and their agreement and disagreement in a group become evident, providing a collective community insight about a
particular topic or issue (Greenbaum 1990; Morgan et al. 1997). Focus groups thus supplement the data collection and add to the triangulation of data.

Due to the sensitivity of the theme of this research, conducting focus groups in all three case studies was not possible. Street traders in two case studies thought that it would be considered a threat to the controller of the area (in this case a market union leader and gangster) if all assembled at one location and that they would be threatened. Despite assuring anonymity and suggesting a neutral interview venue, the fear of some potential focus group participants did not let them congregate in one location as a group. Therefore, focus groups of street traders could only be conducted in one case study area. Overall three focus group were conducted, two with Saddar street traders, and one with a local UC member and a town officer in Lyari. However, these added valuable comparisons about the relationships of various groups, the nature of conflict for trading spaces and locations, and connections of individual groups with the local police and municipal agents.

The first focus group comprised six street traders and one group leader of Achakzai community; four out of six street traders were fruit sellers, and two were selling children’s plastic toys. All of them were of Pakhtun ethnicity and knew each other, but were connected to different tribes in North Pakistan and Balochistan. This group was useful in identifying the intra-ethnic group differences and how powerful ethnic groups acquired prime trading locations within ethnic agglomerations. The second focus group was an ethnically mixed group of four street traders. They all were trading at the same street and knew each other. Two were cousins and were Punjabis; one was Sindhi and the other was Mohajir. They provided some important insights into ‘Pakhtun versus others’ groupings in the market.

The last focus group had three members; a Union Committee councillor, a town officer from the Lyari Municipal Office and a local activist of Lyari who was working part-time in the Municipal Office. The process of criminal gangsters’ control of socio-economics and politics in Lyari was explained in this focus group. All three focus groups were digitally recorded with their consents and later transcribed verbatim. The focus groups are coded in Chapter 5 and 6 as below;

- First street traders’ focus group, Saddar; FS/ST-01
- Second street traders’ focus group, Saddar; FS/ST-02
• Third local officials’ focus group; FSole-01

Figure 3.4: Focus group interview conducted at the warehouse of the Saddar Bazaar

3.4.4. Difficulties

Various obstacles were encountered during the research fieldwork. The most critical issue was the security concern as this research is conducted in the violence-prone areas of the city. Also, the nature of inquiry of the research, which is concerned with conflict among various (formal and informal) groups in ITS, was a key obstacle to gaining access to the case study areas. When street traders were directly questioned about various ethnic and political groupings in the market, their responses were either complete negation of such phenomena or polite rambling talks about other topics. Other street traders asked about the usefulness of the research and how it will help their current status in the market.

During the fieldwork, street traders in Orangi and Saddar faced the threat of eviction which was another hurdle to gaining access. The researcher was sometimes thought to be either the representative of the Anti-Encroachment Department or a journalist working for state or other commercial entrepreneurs who present street trading as illegal activity. Building trust amongst the street traders, to reassure them that any information collected would only be used for academic purpose and that the researcher was not affiliated to state departments or a journalist, took a considerable time.
The research was mostly conducted in Pakhtuns’ dominated markets which posed another problem for the researcher, as a Mohajir. To maintain the neutrality, the researcher tried to conduct interviews in public space – shared by both Pakhtun and Mohajirs street traders. There was an instance, when the researcher was seen interviewing on the Mohajirs’ side of the market, which prompted a concern from a Pakhtun group that the researcher belonged to their rivals.

The other concern was regarding the researcher’s security. There were two risks to the researcher during the fieldwork: the conflict among ethnic and political groups which made them suspicious of her identity and links with the opposite group, and the gender of the researcher which was a hindrance in getting access to the male-dominated areas where women in public space are not welcomed, and where some participants were reluctant to be interviewed by a woman. In Orangi, the researcher had to hire a male assistant who helped in facilitating interviews with male traders and trade union leaders.

Some of the important interviews with the city’s key political party members did not happen despite approaching them through many sources. The research coincided with the Rangers’ Operation which particularly targeted MQM on ethnic and political grounds (Section 4.3.4), and so their members refrained from any public engagement, and thus it was not possible to arrange interviews with elected representatives of MQM.

To ensure anonymity, all the interviews are coded in the write-up. The codes of the interviewees with their identity are mentioned in Table 3.5. In cases, where sensitive information was disclosed by the respondent, and specifying identity could become a threat to their security, the researcher anonymised identity and code ‘KI’ (key informant) (has been used in the text.
Table 3.5: Table showing interviewees’ codes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Identity</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L/ST-01 - L/ST-14</td>
<td>Street traders selling range of perishable; fruits vegetables, seafood, cooked food and other and non-perishable goods; jewellery, clothes, plastics, hand bags, used electronic products and others</td>
<td>Lyari</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O/ST-01 – O/ST-14</td>
<td>Street traders selling range of perishable; fruits vegetables, seafood, cooked food, salad and other and non-perishable goods; jewellery, clothes, plastics, hand bags, shoes, used electronic products and others</td>
<td>Orangi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/ST-01 – S/ST-11</td>
<td>Street traders selling range of perishable; fruits vegetables, seafood, cooked food, salad and other and non-perishable goods; jewellery, clothes, plastics, hand bags, shoes, used electronic products and others</td>
<td>Saddar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FS/ST-01 and FS/ST-02</td>
<td>Focus groups of street trades mostly selling perishable goods</td>
<td>Saddar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSOLE-03</td>
<td>Focus group of local officials</td>
<td>Saddar and Lyari areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOU-01 – JOU-07</td>
<td>Journalists</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KI-01 – KI-16</td>
<td>Key Informants</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOLE-01 – SOLE-10</td>
<td>State officials</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXP-01 – EXP-07</td>
<td>City level experts</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.5. Data analysis

Data analysis is a creative and arduous process of interpreting data through inductive reasoning. The method of data analysis involved classifying ‘conceptual categories and their properties through comparing different parts of data for similarities and differences’, and mapping ‘…relations among the categories and their properties’ (Glaser and Strauss 1967; p.35). The richness and complexity of qualitative data provides multiple perspectives and ways to analyse the data. Coffey and Atkinson argue that to ‘explore the different versions of
social reality’ a researcher is required to interpret the data from multiple techniques to address the research questions (1996, p. 14).

Due to the diverse and pluralistic nature of data analysis in qualitative research, this study did not follow any rigid model to analyse data. A flexible model can be used and adapted to manage, scrutinise and interpret data collected (Goffey and Atkinson 1996). A critical discourse analysis approach was used to develop a logical consistency in the data derived from the interviews, especially to answer the core questions regarding the social capital and territorialisation in informal trading spaces.

The analysis is a complex, lengthy and interesting phase of the research process. Many rounds of analysis were carried out during and after finishing the fieldwork. The post-fieldwork analysis started with listening to the interviews and transcribing all of them verbatim. The interviews were then translated from Urdu into English, and a transcript of an individual interview was prepared. Transcripts were read many times to prepare a summary and start filling up the data into matrices identifying initial themes and categories. At this stage the transcripts were uploaded into Nvivo software to start the data coding process. The quotations used in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 were highlighted and translated as precisely as possible.

Coding data is vital in the analysis process, and is used to overcome overlapping and inconsistency. It involves the sub-division of data and assigns it to a category (Dey 2003). Codes are usually assigned to words, sentences, phrases or paragraphs based on the set of rules or settings pre-established by the researcher (Miles et al. 1994). Coding is key to noticing a relevant case or phenomenon by analysing information from various sources to find similarities, differences, patterns and structures. Coding also helps the researcher to compare across data and develop a hierarchical order (Seidel and Kelle 1995). In the first stage, the data was coded in broader themes reflecting to the main themes of the literature review as identified in Table 3.6.
Table 3.6: Table showing initial coding of data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Questions</th>
<th>Power</th>
<th>Social capital</th>
<th>Space</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What is the role of power in ITS production?</td>
<td>How identities influence ITS production?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Who controls the ITS and how (case study)</td>
<td>Which social identities dominates and why?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How nature of different power actors impacts configuration</td>
<td>How different social identities built social capital?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(and nature of ITS produced etc.)</td>
<td>How different social capitals leads to different ITS types/</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How the interaction and negotiations between different power</td>
<td>configuration/nature of business/scale etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>groups/networks in ITS production</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What is the role of identities/networks/social capital)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How power (power intermediaries) influence or are influenced by</td>
<td>How space (also location) of ITS impact/link with social identities or the</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>various identities?</td>
<td>poor group attached to it?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How nature (type) of power structure leads to linking with different</td>
<td>How the larger context (or neighbourhood) limit the access of certain social</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>type of social group.</td>
<td>groups in ITS?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What the dynamics of social groups to sustain in particular power</td>
<td>Etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>network?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How power and political processes influence the production of ITS?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How the identities of different power actors (intermediaries/brokers)</td>
<td>How power struggle between diverse actors reflect in the nature of ITS?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>impact on production of ITS?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>How politics on city level played out in claiming the resources at</td>
<td>What are the visible/invisible boundaries of power networks? (case study)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>area level (controlling ITS)?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What social identities dominates and why? (case study)</td>
<td>How division within the power networks leads to the production of divisive ITS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The next step was rather a meticulous process of detailing out the coding of the transcripts. The main codes (called 'nodes' in Nvivo) are subdivided into sub-categories (called 'child nodes') and parallel nodes (called 'sibling nodes') in the tree under main nodes. One by one all the interviews transcripts are analysed under each category of 'nodes', sub-nodes and 'sibling nodes' by selecting various segments of texts or highlighting the specific quotation. The data was coded in multiple steps below as detailed in Table 3.7:

- Broad categorisation of interviews based on themes identified in literature review
- Arranging the initial coding into sub-nodes and linking to the initial themes
- Finalising of three main categories
- Detailing of each node into sub and parallel nodes
Table 3.7: Framework for analysis

![Diagram showing the framework for analysis]

The coded data was then analysed to identify similarities and differences. This step involved linking data to find the substantive relations between different categories to weave a narrative. This helps in de-contextualising the data – first by categorising the events into themes and then recording links in the chain of events to find the relationships between them (Coffey and Atkinson 1996; Deit 2003). Matrices and tables were used as the vital tool to compare information across cases.

In the final stage, the data was corroborated by many iterations, referring back to the earlier phases of analysis to produce a coherent descriptive account. Re-contextualisation was inherent in data corroboration, as data gathered from individual instances, and events was assembled into case studies at neighbourhood and city scale.

Quotations from participant interviews are used substantially in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 of the research. This has benefitted the outcome of research in two ways. Firstly, it has given the participants voice and contributed to the transparency and credibility of the research. Secondly, it helps the analysis to be embedded in the contextual settings.
Although the three categories of space, social capital and power were inherent in the research design, it was decided in the analysis to concentrate on space and social capital, because of the significant overlaps in the analysis process.

3.6. Research ethics

The research conforms the principles of the research ethics throughout the project. A major concern was to put in place appropriate strategies in order to avoid any problems for street traders interviewed in their contentious context.

An important ethical concern was the researcher's relationship with key informants. Since the research involved sensitive information about various ethnic and political networks, the research motives were clearly stated to participants before conducting interviews. In such contexts, complete information about 'what the research will be used for and who will have access to the information gathered' is important so that an interviewee can decide whether to participate or not (Scheyvens 2014, p. 142). This was the protocol followed in this research. Given that competitive politics in ITS coincided with conflict at the time of the research, it was important that the researcher ensured the neutrality and connections with every group or network of the markets.

An approval from the Ethics Committee of Cardiff University was obtained before beginning the fieldwork. Throughout the fieldwork, the researcher ensured the continual communication with her supervisors to discuss progress and challenges in the field, and to assure the wellbeing of participants and the researcher.

3.6.1. Informed consent

Gaining informed consent from people participating is regarded as pivotal in the ethical conduct of the research (Tinker and Coomber 2004). Informed consent requires that all prospective participants are presented with complete information about the research project, that their participation is entirely voluntary, and that they may withdraw at any stage without causing any pernicious consequences for them (Crow et al. 2006; Kvale and Brinkmann 2009). Particularly knowing the vulnerability of participants – street traders in the case of this research – they were assured about the confidentiality and protection of participant anonymity.
Informed consent is generally obtained in written format at the outset of the research. In practice, the reliance on a generalised written consent format fails to recognise the contextual particularities and is devoid of the flexibility to incorporate emerging issues during the research (Hemmings 2006; McAreavey and Muir 2011). The diversity of social research involves various types of interactions, research design, methods and objectives, therefore, written consent in some situations can create a position of ethical uncertainty for the researcher (Miller and Bell 2002; Kvale and Brinkmann 2009). Acquiring written consent in this research was also not possible for most interviews. Therefore, verbal consent was used to meet the ethical requirements. Participants were told the nature of the project and the potential risks and benefits at the beginning of an interview, which only proceeded if they were willing to participate. The main reason for using implied verbal consent was that many people wanted to participate, but when they were asked to sign the consent slip they refused to take part in the study. Also, many could not read and considered that any documentation would create adverse situation for their safety and security, due to the complex power dynamics around ethnicity and political affiliation between the street traders, market union leaders, local police and political agents in the case study areas. Many participants (key informants, street traders) who could read also resisted signing a document as they linked it with government attempts to displace them from the market.

### 3.6.2 Confidentiality and Anonymity

Confidentiality and anonymity are of key importance in this research. Confidentiality ensures the removal of any elements of personal information from the research record that might unveil the participant’s identity, while anonymity implies non-disclosure of the participant’s name (Berg and Lune 2014). This research ensures that data collected was used so that the identity or personal information on the participants could not be known to anyone other than the researcher. The interviewees were assured of confidentiality before the interviews conducted. Due to the sensitivity of the research the names of all the interviewees were anonymised and coded to avoid any possible security threat to the respondents. Interviewees who, despite having security threats, agreed to provide the sensitive information, especially on the critical links between political parties and law and enforcement agencies (such as local police, Deputy Commissioner’s office, Municipal office),
were given the anonymous coding of ‘KI’ (key informant) to avoid any possible link to trace the source.

To maintain the neutrality between groups working in markets was also of prime importance in this research. As the study was conducted in the areas where ethnic and political conflict was severe, the researcher ensured equal participation from each group and wherever possible conducted interviews in a public place to keep things transparent, and to avoid harm to the participants or the researcher. The researcher was accompanied by a local gatekeeper, at least in the initial phase of the field visits, which gave people trust to openly discuss the matters related to the research. Furthermore, the local dress code was strictly observed by the researcher, particularly in Pakhtun dominated markets. For example, in one interview, the participant asked the researcher to cover the head with her dupatta (scarf) if she wanted to proceed with an interview.
4. Context

No one has even the slightest idea
that this might also be
the cry of someone alone
calling for help.
Karachi’s taken for
an inhuman throng
by those who don’t come to assist.
Or a crowd of the blind
who get hungry
and are fed only rice pudding;
who cry out
and are made to sit through speeches;
they take each other by the hand
or not,
they move,
and draw gunfire into the air.

Zeeshan Sahil (1995)

This excerpt from Zeeshan Sahil’s book ‘Karachi aur Dusri Nazmen’ (Karachi and other poems) portrays the ‘routinisation of violence’ in Karachi, and how the city’s residents became accustomed to violence. Since 1947, Karachi’s residents had seen so many waves of violence that by the mid-1990s, any form of extreme violence, including acts of torture and mutilation or civilian massacres, no longer belonged to the realm of the extraordinary, but rather to that of day-to-day reality.
4.1 Introduction

Chapter 4 outlines the context for the case studies, discussing first the wider context of Karachi and then three case study areas. The chapter sets the framework for the research for a thematic analysis of the case studies, the next two chapters. Section 4.2, the contextual analysis, starts with discussing the economic and strategic importance of Karachi, and the demographic changes associated with multiple waves of migration, and how they have affected the informal trading spaces (ITS) of Karachi.

Section 4.3 describes the three case study areas; Saddar, Orangi and Lyari. It gives a brief historical account of the development of the areas, the contestation between different groups in each area, and how political parties intensify the contest at in informal trading through identity-based politics.

4.2 Context of Karachi

Karachi, the megacity and the provincial capital of Sindh, is the largest city of Pakistan covering an area of 3,527 km², with an estimated population of over 23 million people (Blank et al. 2014). The city is the financial capital and revenue-generating base for Pakistan, and contributes substantially to the national exchequer and provincial revenues. By 2006, Karachi accounted for more than 25% of national GDP, 54% of central government tax revenues, 70% of national income tax revenue and 30% of industrial output for the country (MPGO 2007). The head offices of banks, insurance companies, large corporations, and the key financial and commodity markets are also located in the city. In the recent outbreak of violence the daily economic loss to trade and industry was calculated as Rs. 10 billion (approx. £600,000) and thus the slightest disruption in the financial capital impact the national economy of Pakistan (Shahid 2012).

Karachi is known as a “mini-Pakistan” for being home to most of the major ethnic groups of Pakistan, making it a diverse, multi-ethnic city (Budhani 2010). Historically, Karachi has been transformed from a fishing village in 1729 to a diverse mega-city (Hasan 1999). It has always been a city of migrants – 80% of the Karachi’s population consists of people who either migrated themselves, or are second or third generation descendants of migrants who arrived in the city after 1947 (Hasan 1999; Gazdar and Balbo 2005).
The strategic location of Karachi always kept it at centre of regional politics. During 1838, the British occupied the Karachi’s seaport as a base for their soldiers to block Russian advance towards Afghanistan. The opening of Suez Canal in 1869 made Karachi a major port of call for ships outbound from Europe. Karachi was also used as a principle port for British interventions in Central Asia in both World War I and II (Hasan and Mohib 2003). More recently during U.S. war in Afghanistan, Karachi was a key entry port and corridor for arms, ammunition, equipment and food, supplied to Afghanistan by the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) since 2001 to present under the U.S. sponsored Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement.

Karachi’s indirect involvement in the Afghan wars contributed significantly to the city’s destabilisation. The arrival of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan1 (TTP or Taliban) in Karachi in the mid 2000s was a direct result of Pakistan military incursions into the tribal areas on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Karachi, with its substantial business opportunities, urban sprawl and unstable law and order situation offered a great opportunity for Taliban militants to fundraise and operate from here, and the TTP organisation used ethno-political divisions to access vital financing opportunities in the city. According to Yusuf (2012), 3000 madrassahs (religious schools) are run by Taliban and other banned organisations in Karachi, used by TTP militants for recruitment which further fuelled ethno-political violence and the emergence of rival interests in Karachi.

After the 2001 NATO treaty, new commercial opportunities were created in transporting NATO supplies from Karachi to Afghanistan. This greatly benefited the Pakhtun community who already dominated the transport sector in the city (see Section 4.2.1). Both the important transit routes to Afghanistan through Khyber Pass in northwest Pakistan and through Balochistan, originate in Karachi (Map 4.1). The booming opportunities in transport and other illicit war economies, including the import of arms and other contraband and the

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1 Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, also referred to as the Taliban, is an Islamic armed group which is an umbrella organization of various militant groups based in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province along the Afghan border in Pakistan. Most Taliban groups in Pakistan coalesce under the TTP. In 2008, Pakistan government banned TTP.
export of illegal drugs, provided a robust platform for TTP to gain a hold in the thriving unofficial economic sector of Karachi (Rehman 2017).

Map 4.1: NATO supply routes through Karachi
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:NATO_supply_routes_through_Pakistan.svg

4.2.1 Migration and politics in Karachi

This section examines the politics of migration in Karachi and how multiples waves of migration have affected the socio-political and spatial dynamics of the city. This section is divided into five sub-sections. The first briefly traces the various migration waves since partition of Pakistan from India and the transformation of Karachi from a Baloch-Sindhi settlement to multi-ethnic city. The second discusses the rise of MQM (Muttahida Qaumi Movement) as the dominant political party in Karachi. The third and fourth sub-sections explain how Pakhtun challenged the hegemony of MQM which reinforced the segregation of groups on an ethno-political basis. The final sub-section examines the role and scale of the informal sector in trade and service provision in Karachi.
Various waves of migration

Successive waves of migration are responsible for the current diverse ethnic demography of Karachi. Since partition, migration into Karachi can be broadly classified into five major events. The first wave of migration between 1941 and 1961 was the Mohajir Muslim migrants from India – during this period the city’s population grew by 430 percent (Kudaisya and Tan, p. 185). Thus, the city’s indigenous Sindhi-Hindu population was outnumbered by the immigrant population. The second wave happened between 1960 and 1980, when the government's green-revolution and industrialization policies created an expanded industrial sector in Karachi and a need for labour and skills that encouraged Pashto speakers (Pakhtun) from Pakistan’s Northern Province to work in the city’s industries, and Punjabi professionals, businessmen and artisans to earn livelihoods in the city’s expanding services sector (Hasan 1999). These migrants mostly lived in informal settlements in the peripheral areas of Karachi, around SITE (Sindh Industrial Trading Estate) and Orangi. Ethnic enclavisation in Karachi started during this period, particularly in the Pakhtun enclaves around Orangi which has become the centre of the Mohajir-Pakhtun riots in 80s (see Section 4.3.2).

In the third wave of migration between 1970 and the 1990s, many Sindhis moved into Karachi, as a result of pro-Sindhi policies pursued by President then Prime Minister Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto during the 1970s, which heightened Mohajirs resentment. The third wave of migration occurred in parallel with second and fourth waves. The fourth migration from 1980 to the 1990s brought many Afghan (mostly Pakhtun) immigrants to Karachi following the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. The rise of MQM (the dominant political party of Karachi, see below) which excluded other ethnic groups from political power was also evident during this period (Ahmar 1996). The fifth migration took place from 2000 onwards and resulted from natural disasters – the 2005 floods in Sindh, the 2010 earthquake in KPK – and army operations on the border of north-western Pakistan and Afghanistan. This fifth migration became a major contributor to Pakhtun political consolidation, and saw the emergence of ANP (Awami National Party, representing Pakhtun) which challenged the MQM power base in Karachi (Waseem 1996).

The steady migration of Pakhtun into Karachi during the fourth and fifth migration waves changed the demographic profile of Karachi. According to an estimate, currently the Pakhtun
population is 5 to 7 million, around 25 per cent of Karachi’s population which makes it the second largest ethnic group in Karachi after Mohajirs (Farukh 2010; Rehman 2017).

Thus Karachi has become a melting pot of diverse socio-economic, ethnic, religious and other groups from all over Pakistan, a diversity in politics around ethnic and religious groups

The Rise of MQM

The foundation of ethnic division was sown in Sindh during the first wave of Mohajir immigration from India. Initially people who migrated after partition in 1947 from the United Province in India failed to integrate with the local population because of their different language and culture (Gayer 2003). As these Indian migrants were well-educated and experienced in bureaucracy, and many acquired prominent positions in every sector of Karachi’s economy, which created resentment amongst the local Sindhi population. Further, the decision of the Constituent Assembly in 1948 to separate Karachi from Sindh and make it a federally-administered area intensified the resentment of local Sindhis towards the incoming population (Gazdar and Mallah 2013).

At state level, local elites challenged the control of migrant population over the bureaucracy and within almost a decade Mohajirs lost political control (Bengali and Sadaqat 2002). Successive events of 1969, 1970 and 1972 dampened the status of the migrant population in the state apparatus. First, a bill in 1969 approved restoration of the four provinces – Sindh, Punjab, Balochistan and North West Frontier Province – which bestowed political identity to Sindhis, Punjabis, Balochis and Pakhtuns, and reduced the status of Karachi. The Mohajir population living in Sindh, who spoke Urdu and often did not speak Sindhi, were called ‘New Sindhi’ or ‘Urdu speakers’ which they found a threat as they were not then recognised in the political realignment. Second, in 1970 ‘one person one vote’ was introduced, which established Mohajir migrants as a minority in Sindh Province despite being a large majority in Karachi. Then in 1972, a bill reinstating the Sindhi language as the official language of Sindh, and introduction of the urban-rural quota system which discriminated against Urdu-speakers when applying for government or semi-government jobs, or to higher education, further alienated the Mohajir population and intensified their crisis of political identity (Hasan 2015).
The erosion of the migrants’ political and economic entitlements made them search for a common political denominator. The experience of migration from the new India became the dominant factor in their identify, as they could no longer use Urdu for official purposes following the 1972 bill on the Sindhi language (Bengali and Sadaqat 2002). Thus, the term ‘Mohajir’ (literally meaning people who migrated) became the new identity of this group.

Soon the Mohajirs started searching for political patronage through two key narratives. First was their historical legacy, and the role of frontline Muslim reformists in the ‘Independence Movement’ in colonial North India (Gayer 2014c). Second was their ‘victimisation’ – the material and physical sacrifices that migration had caused to this ethnic group. Thus, rebellion and ethnic pride became the key identities around which a new political group emerged called MQM (Mohajir Quami Movement, meaning national movement for refugees from India) founded as a secular political party in 1984 (Kennedy 1991). MQM soon became the ruling party of Karachi after comprehensively winning the general elections in 1988.

**Pakhtun challenge to the MQM hegemony**

The successive migrations have defined the socio-politics of Karachi. While the initial conflict was between the MQM representing the Mohajir population and PPP (Pakistan People’s Party) representing the local Sindhi population, later Pakhtun migrant populations from Afghanistan and north Pakistan (fourth and fifth waves of migration) also started carving out territory in the already conflicted resources of Karachi. Pakhtun control over the illegal land market and transport was key to acquiring a strong economic position and to political challenge.

The illegal land subdivisions in 1980s opened up huge market opportunities for Pakhtun entrepreneurs in Karachi. Rapid population growth and lack of serviced housing sites resulted in large-scale encroachment of land for housing. There were two distinct patterns of acquiring land informally in Karachi, ‘unorganised invasions’ and ‘illegal subdivisions’ (Van Der Linden et al. 1985, pp. 67–68). Unorganised invasions started soon after partition when

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2 The Indian independence movement encompasses the efforts to free India from British rule from the Nineteenth Century until the granting of Independence in 1947. The Independence Movement involved a range of different strategies from revolutionary acts of violence, to peaceful non-violent protests.
refugees occupied vacant state land. Illegal subdivision started after 1960 when suburban land
started to be developed by private entrepreneurs who did not possess property titles – they
came to be known as *dallals* (patrons). These *dallals* earned trust through their connections
with police and politicians, which provided some security against evictions. Until the 1980s,
most of the *dallals* were Mohajirs or Punjabis, but as Pakhtun became more influential in the
informal land market of Karachi, imposing a new *modus operandi* based on the politics of
coercion, Mohajir and Punjabi entrepreneurs lost their control (Hasan 2015).

Transport is another important sector which enabled Pakhtun to challenge the supremacy of
MQM in Karachi through control of inter- and intra-city passenger and freight transport.
Booming transport opportunities in 2001, created by demand to move NATO supplies from
Karachi Port to Afghanistan, lifted the economic profile of Pakhtun (Yusuf 2012). Their
control of transport also enabled them to become significant in the construction industry and
drug economy, and profits were invested in formal and informal real estate, enabling them
to invest in strategic locations such as major markets (formal and informal) (Hasan 2002).

From 1980s onwards the Pakhtun of Karachi have affiliated to various political parties to
achieve political representation. By early 2000, ANP had emerged as the strongest political
contender in many constituencies formerly MQM dominated. The leader of ANP, Shahi
Syed, in an interview with Rehman (2017) clearly stated the domination of MQM in Karachi
was the most important reason for Pakhtun resistance against them. Thus, Pakhtun increased
their economic clout and challenges MQM which led to many episodes of ethnic violence in
Karachi. The Orangi settlement in north-western Karachi is an example of such violent
ethno-political clashes Pakhtun and Mohajirs (Section 4.3.2).

**Political affiliation**

Political affiliation has become synonymous with ethnicity in Karachi. People prefer to live
with the same ethnic group for two reasons; first they can access an area through their
community by virtue of sharing the same language, and second, they receive support from
the locally dominant political party in return for an assurance of their vote (Hasan 2010).
This pattern of ethnic communities has divided the city into ethno-political enclaves, as
clearly shown in Map 4.2. As a resident from Orangi said:
...we have to make good connections with the local Unit Office even if you don’t want to be associated with a political party.... You have to say salam/dua (hello/hi) to these people (the person in charge of the Unit Office or other workers in the office) and keep on good terms with them, otherwise, we will not get a turn in the queue to fill water from the public taps which they control ....(KI-19)

Map 4.2: Map showing the Ethnic Geography of Karachi
Source: Dawn-GIS

The polarization of ethnic and religious groups in Karachi is also reflected in contests over space. Land grabs and mechanisms to control land for political and personal gain have become the norm in the city (Hassan et al, 2013). Spatial segregation, enclavisation and contest is especially evident in housing areas, which exacerbates violence in the city (Kaker, 2014), but is also reflected in informal trading areas, which have received less prominence in larger debates than the contest over land and housing in the city.

**Karachi’s informal development and economy**

Karachi’s informal economy dominates the city’s economy, serving the physical and social needs of low and lower-middle income communities and settlements. An estimated 75 percent of Karachi’s working population is employed informally, and the informal sector in
Karachi has seen significant growth (Hasan and Mohib 2003). The research interviews frequently cited the commercial potential of Karachi as a considerable draw. For example, a street trader in Saddar said that he migrated to Karachi in the 1980s for better livelihood opportunities. He started working with one small kiosk and later managed to expand his business and invited around 50 people from his village to join him as he said:

> Nobody sleeps hungry in Karachi.....this city provides employment opportunities (small or large) to anyone who comes here....this city is like a mother who will not let their children sleep on an empty stomach...’

(S/ST-13).

For the vast majority of Karachi’s population, the formal sector cannot serve their needs for jobs, services of housing as its products are unaffordable and its organizational culture far away from their lifestyles (Hasan et al 2013). Thus, there is a distinct division between Karachi’s formal and informal settlements, known as ‘planned’ and ‘unplanned’ respectively, which stretches far beyond the layout of the settlement and whether or not occupants have land titles. For example although many properties in unplanned settlements have now received land titles, infrastructure, housing conditions, access to basic services, medical facilities, and schooling, vary significantly between two types of settlements. According to Hasan (1999, p. 166), in unplanned settlements ‘health, education and recreational facilities….are developed incrementally and informally over time and remain inadequate and badly operated’.

Table 4.1 shows a comparison between planned and unplanned areas, compiled by Arif Hasan for the 1996 UNCHS Global Report on Human. It reveals the disparity in economy and provision of social and physical services in these two types of settlements.

Table 4.1 clearly indicates that, when the analysis was done in 1996, unplanned settlements provided shelter to more than 50 percent of the people living in the city. A higher proportion of people living in unplanned areas were working than in planned settlements. However, the access to housing, utilities, health and education in unplanned areas was difficult and the inhabitants had to pay a higher percentage of their income to access these facilities. The table also shows that households in unplanned areas were more dependent on daily wage labour.
to earn income than in the planned areas. According to Hasan (2002) the failure of the state to enable the basic of the poorest in society is the key reason for their vulnerability.

Table 4.1: Comparison between planned and unplanned settlements of Karachi.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Planned Areas</th>
<th>Unplanned Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demography</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Average household size</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Percentage of age gender distribution (male)</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Percentage population &lt; 20</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>56.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Crude Birth Rate</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Percentage of permanent structures</td>
<td>70-90</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Percentage of semi-permanent structures</td>
<td>10-30</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Percentage temporary structures</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Built-up meter square per person</td>
<td>19.25</td>
<td>11.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) Number of persons per room</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to Utilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Percentage water connections</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>50.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Percentage gas connections</td>
<td>98.4</td>
<td>75.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Percentage sewage connections (estimated)</td>
<td>75.3</td>
<td>35.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Percentage population rate &gt; 10 years</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>48-67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Percentage population with primary education</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Percentage population with intermediary education</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Percentage population with Bachelor and above</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Percentage population employed</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>64.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Percentage population unemployed</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Percentage housewives</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income / Expenditure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Average Income (Rs. per month)</td>
<td>3808-4930</td>
<td>1899-2158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Percentage earned through wages</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>77.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Percentage earned through profit</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Average expenditure (Rs. per month)</td>
<td>3083</td>
<td>1648-2109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Percentage spent on food</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Percentage spent on rent</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Percentage spent on saving</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.2.2 Governance and the ‘devolution of power’ policy

Over the last forty years, Pakistan has seen significant changes in the structure of government and relative powers of federal, provincial government and local government. In order to understand the politics of current reforms which hand powers from local government to the provincial and federal level, this section examines a brief history of local government in Pakistan. Pakistan has a three tier system of government – federal, provincial and local. The system of local government has changed considerably, but there have usually been distinctions between urban and rural councils. At urban level, local government has usually been divided into three or four tiers – city, district, tehsil (sub-district) and Union Council (ward) levels.

The politics of local government in Pakistan involve a complex web of actors. Since partition from India in 1947, Pakistan has seen periodic military regimes – 1958-1969, 1979-1988 and 1999-2008, interspersed with democratic government. The oscillating pattern of democratic and military government has significantly affected the organisation and function of local government. Rather surprisingly, the local government system was generally strengthened under military rule, while during the civilian regimes powers were devolved to the provincial tier of government rather than the lower tiers. According to Cheema et al. (2005, p. 22), military regimes’ advocacy of local government was essentially to ‘legitimise their control’ over the state. According to the 1973 Constitution (still enacted), establishing local government is a provincial subject, therefore, democratic governments during their reign restored powers to the provincial level to curtail local and federal government interventions.

Pakistan inherited a local government system from the British at the time of partition from colonial India. This system consisted of ‘local self-government’ in which separate tiers were created to manage civic operations through elected District and Civic Committees for rural and urban areas. The political parties which were dominant in the independence movement in the constituencies that later became Pakistan operated at provincial and central level and not at the local level. Thus, the British granted greater autonomy to the provinces which led to the establishment of a weak local government system (Rizvi 1976).

It is not within the scope of this section to discuss in detail the various models of local government imposed historically in Pakistan, but rather to give a brief account of the
evolution of local government and the current situation to give a better understanding of the politics of distribution of resources in Karachi. Two periods of local government are discussed in detail due to their relevance to this research, and the socio-economic and political impacts on the case studies. The two key phases of local government (2001-2012 and 2013 onwards) were initiated by the Devolution of Power Plan 2001 (DOPP 2001) and the Sindh Local Government Act 2013 (SLGA 2013). Local government was in a transition between the two phases when the fieldwork was conducted in 2016, because although SGLA was passed in 2013, local government elections in Karachi and Sindh were delayed until 2017, so the new Union Committee offices were not in operation until 2017. A brief discussion of key periods of local government are below;

1947-1958: local government in the early years of Pakistan was poorly developed, and the local bodies/offices were run by the government-appointed administrators. The intense pressure on scarce resources meant that there was little scope for the federal government to establish a democratic local government (Alam and Wajidi 2013).

1958-1969: under the first period of martial rule, the military government dissolved national and provincial assemblies and established local government under a programme of ‘Basic Democracy’ (Cheema et al. 2005). The new local governments consisted of four tier hierarchy Union Council, Tehsil Council, District Council and Divisional Council. Though entitled Basic Democracy, bureaucratic power actually lay with the ‘controlling authority’, as the key decision-making power was vested in the District and Divisional Councils and popular representation was extremely limited (Friedman 1960).

1969-1979: under the era of ‘civilian martial law’ imposed in 1971 under Zulfqar Ali Bhutto, local bodies (all tiers of local government) were disbanded, and powers vested in official administrators. The 1973 Constitution makes local government a provincial subject and thus whenever a democratic government served the country it devolved power back to provincial level (Alam and Wajidi 2013).

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3 The elected political government imposed two positions to Zulfqar Ali Bhutto in 1971: first, the president of Pakistan and second the Civilian chief martial law, therefore this era is referred as the ‘Civilian martial law’.

Context
**1979-1988:** the second spell of military government, under General Zia ul Haq, is considered important in reinforcing local government and was the first time since partition that elections were held in all local councils on the basis of universal adult franchise. Like the preceding military government, the system combined political centralisation at federal level, while devolving power from the provincial to local government. This era is considered significant for the consolidation of local government as the provincial devolution to local government was achieved through promulgation of Local Government Ordinances (LGOs), and local bodies were elected in all four provinces through non-party political elections (Cheema et al. 2005).

**1988-1999:** three civilian administrations during this period reverted local powers back to the provincial and national assemblies. Initially, local government election were held on a non-party political basis but major development funds were controlled by provincial and federal government⁴, and so the elected MNAs (Member of the National Assembly) and MPAs (Member of the Provincial Assembly) ‘personalised patronage’, and used these funds to increase their own chances for re-election (Wilder 1999; Bank 2000). The lack of political cohesion between different tiers of government escalated tension between provincial and local politicians, while several special development schemes of various Prime Ministers and Chief Ministers’, which assigned provincial and federal control over local government, led to the adjourning of local bodies⁵ (Zaidi 2005).

**The Devolution of Power Plan (DOPP) 2001**

Under the military coup in 1999 led by General Pervaiz Musharraf, pressure from international donors brought forward local government reforms, resulting in significant devolution of administrative and revenue powers to local governments. The key change in this plan was the devolution of budgeting, planning and development functions from provincial to district level (Cheema et al. 2006). The restructuring of various departments at sub-provincial (district level and below) was unique to DOPP – service delivery which had

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⁴ During 1980s and 1990s more than 96 percent revenue collection of Pakistan was under the control of Federal and Provincial governments.

⁵ ‘Local bodies’ is the collective term for the various tiers of local government, which is widely used in Pakistan.
been a bureaucratic function controlled by the upper tiers of government, was now devolved to the local government. This was the first time that a new elected district (local) government was officially connected to the lower tiers of Tehsil and Union Councils. The legacy of powers allocated to the Deputy Commissioner was abolished and new senior District Coordination Officers (DCOs) were responsible for report the Nazim (mayor). DCOs were the point of coordination between the provincial and local government through the Nazim. For the city of Karachi, another key aspect of DOPP was to merge the five districts governments and Karachi Development Authority into one powerful institution called the Central District Government of Karachi – CDGK (Murtaza and Rid 2017).

The new administrative and financial powers vested in the Nazim have had key consequences for the politics of Karachi, as whichever political group dominated the newly-created three-tier local government system could channel resources to their respective ethnic group. Although at the district level, one political party (MQM) dominated in elections, due to the distribution of service delivery powers across all three tiers, political (and thus ethnic) identity played a vital role in the development process. To understand the politics at various tiers of local government it will be important here to mention various functions that were assigned to different tiers of local government;

- **District Governments** (upper tier) were in charge of: health, education, agriculture, community development, finance and planning revenue collection, taxes and other funds made accountable to the district government;
- **Tehsil (town) Governments** (middle tier) were responsible for municipal functions e.g. infrastructure development, water, sanitation and waste disposal;
- **Union Councils** (bottom tier) had responsibility for proposing, planning and monitoring of service delivery. Union Councils were also given the autonomy to undertake small development projects at UC level. The dissemination of funds to Union Councils was directly from district level (Alam and Wajidi 2013).

Under this system, the devolution of powers to local level worked reasonably well, although the lack of funding and weak local tax collection powers remained problematic. However, after the 2008 general election when the PPP-led civilian government came in power at both federal level and in Sindh Province, the DOPP started eroding. From 2009 until 2013 various
hybrid models of local government that were promulgated historically reintroduced in the four provinces of Pakistan. After prolonged debate and disagreement between various coalition partners, the Sindh Local Government Act 2013 (SLGA 2013) was imposed in Karachi.

**Sindh Local Government Act 2013**

The SLGA was introduced in 2013 but was not implemented until late 2016. In Karachi, the pre-DOPP (pre-2001) districts were re-established and the powers of Karachi Metropolitan Corporation – KMC (which had been merged into CDGK under DOPP 2001) were relocated to the Commissioner’s office under the provincial government. The new three tiered local government system consisted of Union Committees⁶ (UCs) (which replaced the former Union Councils), District Municipal Corporation (DMCs) and one joint Karachi Metropolitan Corporation (KMC) covering all six DMCs. Due to immense pressure from MQM, as the dominant political party of Karachi, the Sindh Government proposed KMC as the overarching institution for all the DMCs but in reality most of the powers which KMC held under DOPP 2001 were transferred to the province, particularly those which had revenue-earning potential. For example, development authorities, police, building control, administration, revenue and land management was given to the provincial government with almost no participation of local governments (Murtaza and Rid 2017).

Unlike the previous local government system, where important functions were devolved to local governments, the SLGA 2013 reinforces the control of bureaucracy over local governments. Under the SLGA 2013 there was a significant reduction in the mayor’s powers, which made local government dependent on the provincial government for many administrative and financial matters that were previously controlled the mayor (Table 4.2). According to SLGA 2013, a bureaucrat is nominated as the Chief Executive of the respective

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⁶ Union Committee is the lowest tier of LG and smallest unit in the urban areas of Karachi. The population of UC varies from 40,000 to 50,000. It consists of a Chairperson, Vice Chairperson, four general members, two women members, one labourer or peasant member, one youth member and one non-Muslim member.

In the previous Devolution plan, the distinction between rural and urban division was ruled out and Union Council was made as the lowest tier of LG. While, in SLGA 2013, the rural urban division was re-instated and Union Council was made as the lowest tier for rural and for urban division it is renamed as Union Committee.
committee or council to ‘supervise the financial and executive administration of the council’. Thus, the Chief Executive had power to control the mayor, although the exact terms his powers were not spelt out in the act (Cheema et al. 2006). In contrast, under DOPP 2001, the District Coordinating Officer was subservient to the mayor, but after 2013 the mayor became subordinate to the DC, especially in Karachi. According to expert EXP-03 interviewed for the research, who was the official reviewer of the SLGA 2013, the ambiguity in the role of Chief Executive was kept intentionally to remove powers from the Mayor, mainly to reduce the power of MQM, and make it subservient to the main political party in Sindh Province, the PPP.

The formation of the Provincial Financial Commission (PFC) was another key feature of SLGA 2013. The majority of the members of PFC are either officials from provincial government or nominated by them which retained financial power at the provincial level. At provincial level, there are two separate divisions of PFC:

i) the Secretary, Planning and Development – which undertakes the planning and approval of all projects, and

ii) the Secretary, Local Government, which is responsible for the maintenance of budgeting tasks (Murtaza and Rid 2017).

Although two of the members of the PFA are the Mayor of Karachi and Leader of the Opposition, they are in the minority so their influence on decision making is limited. Thus, along with political and administrative powers, financial powers were also returned to the provincial government.

Table 4.2 further details the functions of Mayor/Nazim under DOPP 2011 and SLGA 2013 across various state departments. It highlights that city Nazim under DOPP 2011 had significantly more powers in every division, particularly the control over development and financial sector had major impacts on the pattern of development in the city. The city evidenced major investments in MQM constituencies led to the resentment of other groups in the city (Kennedy 1991). In addition, significant parts of Karachi are controlled by other agencies, e.g. the Port Authority and Defence Authority, and thus the 2013 reforms, combined with historical land jurisdictions, had the effect of emasculating local government in Karachi.
Table 4.2: Comparison of Powers of Mayor/Nazim under SLGA 2013 and DOPP 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functions of Nazim under Musharraf DOPP 2011</th>
<th>Functions of Mayors/Chairperson under SLGA 2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Provide vision for the district-wide development, leadership and direction for efficient functioning of the District Government.</td>
<td>• Preside at all meetings of the Council, and regulate the conduct of business at such meetings in accordance with rules.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Develop with the assistance of the District Administration strategies and timeframe for accomplishment of the relevant goals approved by the Zila (District) Council.</td>
<td>• Watch over the financial and executive administration of the Council and perform such executive functions as are assigned to him by or under this Act.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Perform functions relating to law and order in the district.</td>
<td>• Exercise supervision and control over the acts and proceedings of all servants of the Council and dispose of all questions relating to their service, pay privileges and allowances in accordance with the rules; provided that service matters of the members of the Councils Unified Grades shall be referred to Government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ensure implementation of the functions decentralised to the District Government.</td>
<td>• Have power in cases of emergency to direct the execution or stoppage of any work or the doing of any act which requires the sanction of Government or the Council, and the immediate execution or stoppage or doing of which is, in his opinion, necessary for the service or safety of the public and the action so taken shall forthwith be reported to Government or, as the case may be, to the Council at its next meeting: provided that he shall not act under this clause in contravention of any provision of this Act or order of the Council or Government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Oversee formulation and execution of the annual development plan, delivery of services and functioning of the District Government.</td>
<td>• Present proposal to the Zila Council for approval of budget for District Government, Zila Council and intra-district fiscal transfers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Present proposal to the Zila Council for approval of budget for District Government, Zila Council and intra-district fiscal transfers.</td>
<td>• Maintain administrative and financial discipline in the District Government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Present tax proposals to the Zila Council;</td>
<td>• Present report on the performance of the District Government in person to the Zila Council at least twice a year.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Present report on the performance of the District Government in person to the Zila Council at least twice a year.</td>
<td>• Preside over the meetings of the Zila Mushawarat (Discussion) Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Take charge, organise and prepare for relief activities in disasters or natural calamities;</td>
<td>• Authorise officers of the District Government to sign documents on its behalf.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Authorise officers of the District Government to sign documents on its behalf.</td>
<td>• Initiate inspections of Tehsil Municipal Administration, Town Municipal Administration and Union Administration in the district pursuant to section 135.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Establish and supervise the working of the Internal Audit Office.</td>
<td>• Establish and supervise the working of the Internal Audit Office.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Issue executive orders to the District Coordination Officer and Executive District Officers for discharge of the functions decentralised to the “District Government.</td>
<td>• Issue executive orders to the District Coordination Officer and Executive District Officers for discharge of the functions decentralised to the “District Government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Represent District Government on public and ceremonial occasions.</td>
<td>• Represent District Government on public and ceremonial occasions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Perform any other function as may be assigned to him by the Government.</td>
<td>• Perform any other function as may be assigned to him by the Government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The Nazim shall not employ any advisor, special assistant or a political secretary other than support staff allocated to his office from amongst the officials available in the district.</td>
<td>• The Nazim shall not employ any advisor, special assistant or a political secretary other than support staff allocated to his office from amongst the officials available in the district.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: INSPIRING (Institute of Progressive Ideas to Re-Inform Governance) Pakistan Islamabad and PILER (Pakistan Institute of Labour Education and Research, Karachi).
The section has highlighted the multiple claimants over its ownership, and how the sense of entitlement by various ethnic groups became the key reason for the strong process of ethnic enclavisation in the city. Ethnicity in Karachi is linked to political affiliation, as political parties vie for voters through increased access to land and extortion in the ethnic enclaves. The ethno-political fragmentation in the city was facilitated by emasculated local government with their politics of patronage further added to the multiplicity of claims over Karachi.

4.3 Case Studies

This section discusses the three broad case studies selected for this research (Map 4.3). It examines a brief historical background of each area and the various socio-political actors and mechanisms that shape informal trading spaces (ITs). The section discusses the characteristics of the wider areas in which the three market case studies are situated, as these are mirrored in the market case studies. Justification for the selection of market case studies, and a description of the markets themselves is given in Table 3.2. The contextual analysis of the case studies draws on both primary and secondary data. Journal articles, books, news reports, official documents and maps were the main sources of secondary data, while the interviews served as the main source of primary data. Below is the brief introduction of the three case studies which are then each discussed in detail.

**Saddar**, the historic central business district of Karachi, Saddar Town, particularly the central Empress Market and surrounds, is the most lucrative trading location, and accommodates the largest concentration of formal and informal traders in Karachi. The struggle for trading space is highly competitive in Saddar due to multiple claims for ‘control’ by economic and political agents.

**Orangi** is located in the second ring of Karachi. It was initially developed as an unplanned area from the 1960s and is now a suburban township in the north-western part of Karachi. Orangi is considered to be the epitome of the ethnic fight between Mohajirs and Pakhtun, one of the most violent ethnic interfaces of Karachi, with clashes reflected in its largest market, Aligarh Bazaar.
**Lyari** is the pre-colonial town of Karachi which housed the ‘Asli Karachi Walay’ – original people of Karachi. The proximity of Lyari to the sea port and the major trading corridors leading west and north out of the city made it a magnet, and migrants settled there after partition. From the mid-1990s (See section below), the area also a stronghold of gangsters who dominate socio-economic and political matters in Lyari, making it a distinctive case study. Although the fight to control land and the economy is similar to the other two case studies, in Lyari ethnic territories are replaced by gang ‘turfs’. Lacking an official political mandate, the gangs – violent economic entrepreneurs – are constantly forming shifting alliances with political actors and public officials, as illustrated in the case study of Jhatpat Market.

Map 4.3: Locating case studies on the map of Karachi
4.3.1 Saddar

Saddar is the main commercial area of Saddar Town, in the central district of Karachi. Its commercial heart, Empress Market and its surrounds, is the commercial hub of Karachi, and provides many jobs both in the formal and informal sectors. Saddar is also the colonial commercial centre created by British in 1839 soon after they annexed Karachi. Initially, Saddar was built as a shopping centre to serve the British military camp, located between the bazaar and the walled city, but was later developed as a viable commercial market for European families who were living in the Cantonment area. After the unsuccessful ‘Revolt of 1857’ against British rule, the colonial administration started modernising Karachi to become a major trading city, as an alternative to Bombay and Calcutta, for the internal security of the Indian empire (Hasan 1993; Lari and Lari 1996). This was followed by huge investment in Saddar Town, and during this era Saddar grew rapidly as many European firms and banks opened branches there.

The location of Saddar is critical to understand its current socio-economic characteristics. Karachi was divided into two distinct zones. The ‘European Town’, including the Cantonment, Civil Lines and Saddar Quarter was mostly occupied by European, Parsi, Goan and few wealthy Muslim and Hindu merchant families. The Parsi and Goan residential areas were located within the bazaar, while European quarters were situated at the periphery of the town. The ‘Old/Native Town’ was dominated by Hindu and Muslim working-class families who worked in the wholesale markets or other port-related jobs. 'Bundar Road' now called 'MA Jinnah Road' was the dividing line between the European and the Old Quarter (Map 4.4). Saddar Bazaar, the upmarket commercial centre, was situated at the border between the European and Old Towns, and became a competitor to other markets in the old city, and competition to access its business opportunities was acute. According to well-known commentator Hasan (1993);

Saddar remained an area distinct from the hustle and bustle of the walled city – although a horse-drawn tramway did link it up with the native quarter in 1885. Pir Ali Mohammad Rashdi, the celebrated Sindhi writer, describing the Saddar of his youth, maintained that no badly dressed man
dared enter the bazaar even as late as the 1930s. He speaks of it as “a place of intellectual assembly and sophisticated English-style shops” (Hasan 1993).

Saddar, being the learning and commercial centre, thus became a magnet for migrants to find employment and housing opportunities. The years following independence in 1947, and

Map 4.4: Map showing European and Native Town segregation
Source: http://srifhasan.org/maps/historical_maps_of_karachi

creation of West and East Pakistan, intensified competition in the commercial hub of Karachi. Around 600,000 refugees from India moved into Karachi. Karachi became the new capital of West Pakistan, and many migrants settled in Saddar or the adjacent Cantonment Quarter. Government servants lived in the old army barracks, while the refugees with no land entitlement documents had to settle in the open spaces/plots available in Saddar quarter and its precincts (Hasan et al. 2002). The migrant population transformed the geography of
Saddar. Various ethnic groups started spatial demarcation to protect their identities. Business/work was also divided on an ethnic basis, which later became a key cause of conflict.

The centrality and commercial potential of Saddar made it important for all ethno-political groups to gain a foothold in the area. Thus, with every wave of migration (see Section 4.2.1) the competition led to antagonism and the ethnic division of trading spaces in Saddar (Gayer 2014c). An old trader interviewed for the research, who had worked in Saddar since 1951, mentioned the 1960s as critical in shaping the current geography of Saddar.

....the daily business here is in hundreds of thousands of rupees, every group wants to work in Saddar. Initially (before 1960), people were flexible and worked with each other, but in the 1960s when government started to industrialise the country, there was a major impact in Karachi, specifically in Saddar. During this time, a huge influx of Pakhtun came into Karachi to find better jobs here....they had the money and although not all Pakhtun who migrated here were rich, their influential kinsmen helped set up business for the community. Therefore, they managed to occupy the most important business locations by bribing state officials...later they invited more people from their villages and tribes to consolidate their hold on commerce (KI-08).

The change in the function of Saddar from a social hub for literary people, with cafes hosting lively political debates and book shops full of college and university students, to a transit hub is critical to its decline. The decline started in the late 1950s early 1960s when the government planned two townships for refugees outside Saddar, 15 miles to the east of Karachi. Most of the population who settled in these township were working in Old Town, SITE (Sindh Industrial Trading Estate), and the port, and to get to work had to pass through Saddar, which thus became a major transport hub. Also, after student riots in the 1950s, the university shifted outside the urban limits 15 km to the north east of Karachi, further adding to the transit character of Saddar (Hasan et al. 2008). Residential buildings were converted into warehouses for the growing commercial activities. There was no formal planning for the markets, warehouses, the transport terminal or related infrastructure, which led to the physical degradation, social estrangement and administrative convalescence (Hasan 2002).
From the 1960s there was a rapid growth in commercial activities to cater for the daily commuters who passed through Saddar. In particular, informal trading grew to serve the increasing transit population – all the available public spaces; pavements, public squares, vacant plots, road junctions filled with street traders as groups competed to occupy the space (Hasan et al. 2008). The dominant ethnic trading groups in Saddar were Pakhtun, Punjabi, Mohajir and Sindhi. The major influxes of Pakhtun, first during 1980-1980 and after 2000 (Section 4.2.1) further reinforced their position as key stakeholders in street trading in Saddar. According to one estimate by 2012, 80,000 Pakhtun refugees who migrated to Karachi had settled in Pakhtun-dominated neighbourhoods (Yusuf 2012). By then, informal trading in Saddar was already dominated by Pakhtun which gave new migrants easy access to start a business there. Although, there were differences among Pakhtun on a tribal and area of origin – for example, Pakhtuns from Baluchistan and KPK had easier entrance to the market that Afghan Pakhtuns, but all had easier access to space than traders from other ethnic backgrounds.

**Lobbies of power:**

Over time, various powerful lobbies with economic and political interests have emerged in Saddar. As Gayer (2014c) noted, the ‘battle for Karachi’ is predominantly the struggle over its formal/informal economies and territories – which is critical in Saddar as an economic hub in Karachi. However, the various ethnic groups do not work in isolation, and various interest groups are protected by state authorities, political parties and bureaucratic elites. These powerful lobbies have major political and economic interests especially in the commercial centres of the city. Some of most influential sectors identified through interviews, articles, news clipping in Saddar are:

- *Real estate developers* own prime property in Saddar, whose main motive is to keep property values high. Pakhtun are the most influential amongst this power lobby, their monetary power gives them access to bureaucratic circles and influence over the planning process. The influence of Pakhtun in real estate can be traced back to the 1960s, during the dictatorship of Ayub Khan, whose aggressive industrialisation process was mainly focused in Karachi. This generated immense demand for cheap
labour which was filled by Pakhtuns from NWFP\(^7\). Later in the 1970s and early 1980s a new zoning regulation permitting high rise development in the area enhanced their property ownership.

- *The transport operators’ lobby* is a powerful group, as public transport is mostly privately run in Karachi. As Saddar became the major transport hub for public buses, para-transit, freight transport and construction trucks, all the major offices were located there and many transport operators bought prime land in Saddar. These private entrepreneurs have been known to dictate routes, bus stops and fares to the public agencies by virtue of their monopoly in the transport sector (EXP-05). They later rented out the space along the bus stops to street traders and bribed the local police to enable them to converted temporary office shelters into permanent shops.

- *The shopkeepers’ lobby* is powerful through the trade and shopkeepers associations. Only two market unions were found to be registered in the case study area. The other associations were informal but had a strong presence in economic and political market affairs. For example, the ‘Hawkers Ittehad Biradary’, a formal market union on Dubai Chowk, was able to influence the traffic re-routing at the junction of Mansfield Street and St Patrick Street to claim the space for street traders from their community. In the past, other unions prevented certain streets being converted into one-way streets, or being declared as no-parking zones (Hasan et al. 2008).

- *Informal land grabbers* are important in land development both in Saddar and elsewhere in Karachi. As distinct from squatters, these are elite operators who have close links with most development agencies and police in the city, and are well informed about development plans before they are available to public. For example the vacant plots along the corridor of New MA Jinnah road were illegally occupied by this ‘mafia\(^8\)’ in early 2000, even before the start of the road project. The spaces were initially rented out to street traders for a weekly market, and after some time the sites were developed for mixed commercial/residential development (SOLE-02).

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\(^7\) NWFP, the former North West Frontier Province, now known as KPK (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa)

\(^8\) ‘Mafia’ was a term used by several key informants during the research to describe informal cartels.
4.3.2 Orangi

**Aligarh Bazaar.** Orangi Town is situated in the north-western region of Karachi, the largest squatter settlement in the city covering an area of approximately 8,000 acres. Orangi Town lies within District West of Karachi. It shares a border with Gulberg Town in the east, New Karachi Town in the north, SITE Town in the west and Liaquatabad in the south. Orangi has a total population of approximately 2.4 million, and consists of 86 informal neighbourhoods which accounts for 75% of the total population of District West (Hasan and Mohib 2003). The average household size in Orangi Town has increased to nine people per house in the last two decades as it has accommodated a major influx of people who have migrated to Karachi from northern Pakistan due to natural catastrophes (earthquake, floods) or anti-Taliban army operations (Hasan 1993; Rehman 2017).

Many of the dominant ethnic groups living in Orangi live in segregated areas which broadly follow Union Council boundaries. The town has a mixture of income classes, including lower middle class, and many residents work as transporter workers across Pakistan (Raman 2012).

Since the 1980s, Orangi has witnessed major ethnic riots. The first major 'ethnic riot' in Karachi took place in Orangi in 1985 between Pakhtun and Mohajirs and claimed hundreds of lives. To extend their territory, Pakhtun gunmen targeted the neighbourhoods (muhallas) of comparatively newly arrived Mohajir migrants from East Pakistan. Pakhtun dominated the Banaras Chowk area and Mohajirs the Metro Cinema area. The boundary areas between these two zones was remembered as a battleground by older residents and traders interviewed for this research (see Map 4.4) (KI-02, KI-11, KI-12, ST/O-14).

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9 Karachi has gone through violence is the past as well. First in early 1950s anti-Ahmedi riots, late 1950s and mid-1960s anti-Pakhtun riots. Then Sindhi-Mohajir riots in late 1960s and early 1970s. However, the scale and ruthlessness of the 1985 ethnic riot was unprecedented to the events occurred in the past and therefore, it is usually considered as the first major ‘ethnic riot’ of Karachi.
The 1985 transport riots in Karachi are seen as of the trigger for wider ethnic conflict, initially between Pakhtun and Mohajir but later between other ethnic groups (Gayer 2003). To cater for the transport needs of the growing city population, between 1973 and 1979 the Karachi Road Transport Corporation (KRTC) introduced publicly mini-buses without any formal planning for maintenance, inspection or repair workshops (Ali 2011; Gayer 2014b). Within first few years the KRTC incurred a loss, and sold the operating licences to private entrepreneurs. These were mainly sold to Pakhtun, but to make their investment profitable they had to carry large number of passengers and to increase the number of trips each day (Hasan 1986). This caused them to drive recklessly and thus resulted in regular accidents – soon these buses known as the ‘yellow devils’\(^{10}\) (2007). Writing in 2002, Hasan states that, ‘of the 13,200 minibuses in Karachi, 6,000 were unregistered since there was a ban on their

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\(^{10}\) The Yellow Devil – Ayub Khan, the president of Pakistan (1958-1969), awarded the permits of operating buses/mini buses to the Pakhtuns for their help in the election win in 1960. They sublet the permits and buses to the other parties/operators (mostly Pakhtun drivers who newly arrived to Karachi) on high interest rates as there was no monitoring process in place. To meet the budget and pay off the debt they overfilled the buses with passengers and drive rashly to multiply the number of trips. They also got a legal cover from the police department as many Pakhtun policemen jointly running the business with Pakhtuns operators (Hasan 1986).
registration, and that the minibus operators paid around US$ 13 million a year in bribes to the city administration to use the roads as bus terminals, depots and workshops' (Hasan 2002).

A mini-bus accident in April 1985 in Liaquatabad caused city-wide riots when a Pakhtun mini-bus hit a school van resulting in a death of Mohajir student – Bushra Zaidi. The demonstration by angry young students was joined by Mohajir and Islami Jamiat-e-Tuleba (IJT)\textsuperscript{11} activists, which elicited a heavy-handed police response. The police were also accused of molesting female students entering Sir Syed College which further incited anger amongst Mohajirs and Punjabis and heightened violence in the city in the following days (Tambiah 1990). The scale of violence intensified into riots when a bus carrying students to Bushra Zaidi’s funeral was attacked by a Pakhtun band in Banaras Chowk, who molested female students and killed others. Since then Banaras Chowk, an important junction in Orangi, and its precincts (including Aligarh Bazaar) has become a violent interface between Pakhtun and Mohajir gangs, both seeking to extend the limit of their territorial boundaries. The ethno-political demarcation of territory extends beyond a simple physical interpretation and Feldman (1991, p. 28) describes the interface as ‘the topographic ideological boundary sector that physically and symbolically demarcates ethnic communities’.

Although the 1985 riots in Orangi, known as the ‘Aligarh massacre’, were started as student-driven protest against Pakhtun transporters in the Mohajir-dominated neighbourhoods of Nazimabad and Liaquatabad, they soon they spread to the unofficial settlements of Orangi. The strategic location of Aligarh Bazaar and Qasba Colony (Map 4.5) was a key factor in the 1985 riots, which resulted in brutal bloodshed, claimed hundreds of lives, and saw the burning of dozens of houses and shops, and unprecedented economic loss (Kennedy 1991; Gayer 2014c). Although, the riots were portrayed as a spontaneous ethnic clash that erupted after a student-led demonstration, in fact Pakhtun real estate entrepreneurs wanted to claim the older neighbourhoods of Orangi, which were located at the interface of their newly

\textsuperscript{11} IJT initially was a Marxist and leftist student body spread across the educational institutions in Karachi. The students used to hold small scale protests against the capitalist leaning government often met by harsh police treatment. The police cracked down in late 50s and early 60s led to dozens of students’ death escalated the animosity against the government and later this body got politicised and convert into a strong student body and by 1970 (Gayer 2007).
developed territories (Hasan 1986). A respondent from the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) EXP-02, who was involved in 1986 in the ‘OPP riot repair’ programme said:

‘....these people (Pakhtun mafia) had already got hold of many katchi abadis (informal settlements) that were located at the outskirts of Karachi due to the muscle power they gained from the drug and arms’ trade. Now, they wanted to acquire land in the old settlements of Karachi, and thus Orangi was an important strategic location for them. To extend their ‘turf’, they offered the residents of unofficial settlements of Orangi, who lived at the margins of their territory, three to four times more than the actual value of land. But when they met with resistance they used coercive means to gain land. This piece of land (the western side of Bacha Khan Chowk – Aligarh Bazaar, Metro Cinema, Qazba Colony) was important for the Pakhtun mafia for three reasons; first, there used to be an unplanned bus terminal here which they wanted to expand to serve their transport business. Second, they wanted to extend their turf on the western side of Banaras Chowk, as the eastern region was already dominated by Pakhtun. Third, the value of land in Orangi was increasing enormously at that time due to its proximity to the industrial area and major markets. They knew that the simple equation to becoming a powerful actor in Karachi was to buy more land’.

The images (4.1 and 4.2) below are from the report that was prepared after 1985-86 Orangi riots by the OPP under ‘Riot Repair’ programme to provide loans and technical help to the people who had suffered from the event.
Figure 4.1: 1985-86 riots in Orangi

Figure 4.2: Statistics of 1985-86 riots
The 1985-86 riots are critical to understanding the present socio-political situation in Orangi. While the ethnic divisions in Orangi had existed before the riots, there was none of the animosity amongst the different ethnic communities that emerged after the riots. The subdivision of 29 Union Committees\(^\text{12}\) in Orangi also reflects the ethnic and political division around power claims for land, extorted funds and other resources. The settlements located at the border of contesting groups are particularly vulnerable to ethno-political violence which was evident in the case study of Aligarh Bazaar.

4.3.3 Lyari

Lyari is one of the oldest settlements of Karachi, famous for its sporting activities such as boxing, football and karate. Lyari is characterised by its narrow streets and mid-rise concrete buildings, vibrant bazaars and overpopulated neighbourhoods, politics and gang warfare. It is often referred as the 'Karachi ki Maa' (Mother of Karachi) by the locals and old residents of Karachi (Gayer 2014c), and the original small fishing village of Lyari has spurred the growth of Karachi into one of the largest metropolis of the world.

Lyari’s original residents were Sindhi fishermen and Baloch nomads from Makran, Kalat and Lasbela districts who each comprised approximately 50 percent of the population of Lyari (Kirmani 2015). After partition in 1947, Lyari experienced different waves of migration, which added to the demographic diversity of the area including influxes of Katchis, Sindhis, Pakhtuns, Punjabis, Bengalis and small number of the Urdu speaking community. Lyari’s strategic location near the port, wholesale markets and central business district makes it a natural destination for new migrants (Map 4.6), and labourers from other provinces and cities in Sindh settled there to gain access to the extensive job and business opportunities in Karachi. Lyari is also a religiously diverse compared to other areas of Karachi comprising a

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\(^{12}\) Union Committees replaced the former Union Councils after the 2013 Sindh Local Government Act
large number of Christians and Hindus and a considerable number of Zikri\textsuperscript{13} community (Badalkhan 2008).

Map 4.6: Map showing strategic location of Lyari

Lyari is located in the District South in Karachi, with an estimated population 1.5 and 1.8 million covering a land area of approximately 1800 acres. Under the former local government structure, until 2013, Lyari Town was one of the 18 municipalities, which have been combined into six districts after the SLGA 2013; Central, North, South, East, West and Malir (Viqar 2014). In land area, Lyari is the smallest town in District South, but it is the densest

\textsuperscript{13} Zikris are predominantly Baloch, living in the southern part of Balochistan called Makran. Besides Makran, they also have settlements in Awaran, Khuzdar, Lasbela, and in the Sistan region of Balochistan. Zikris are Mahdiist group who believes in Imam Mahdi, a descendant of Prophet Muhammad. The Indian Sufi Syed Muhammad Jaunpuri, a follower of Imam Mahdi is considered as the founder of the group, the origin of Zikris dates back to 15th century.
neighbourhood of Karachi with over 4,000 people per hectare (Hasan 2014). The entrenched conflict in Lyari, as in other areas of Karachi, is over the control of land and its resources.

Lyari has always been a neglected area as far as infrastructure development is concerned. Historically, Hindu merchants who founded the Karachi, never intended to invest in Lyari as it was the working-class neighbourhood for Muslim labourers and slaves. The British colonialists did not develop the area due to its poor existing condition and as it was located in the ‘Old/Native Town’, which was not a priority area for development works. So, Lyari grew haphazardly around unplanned settlements without the access to basic infrastructure, and in the nineteenth century the relocation of polluted factories near Lyari further degraded the area (Gayer 2014c). The neglect of this area continued after independence when the major concern of the government was the resettlement of migrants from India rather than improving the living conditions of the native low-income population (Slimbach 1996).

As Karachi grew, markets, manufacturing and warehousing also expanded. In the process, a growing population of working class migrants moved in to serve these facilities. Many of the original two- and three-storey homes were pulled down and replaced by buildings with warehousing and commercial and industrial activities on the ground floor, and workers’ accommodation on the five to six floors above (Hasan 2002). These developments meant a large increase in the number of heavy vehicles moving through the narrow lanes of Lyari, resulting in further degradation and traffic congestion. As a result, wealthier residents from the old city relocated to new housing schemes developed by the Cantonment Boards and the Karachi Development Authority (KDA). Very few old neighbourhoods survive in Lyari and where they do, the environment is poor.

There is a considerable stigma in living in Lyari, and many of the research interviewees from Lyari identified continuing state discrimination against residents. An older resident of Lyari further explained that a sense of marginalisation is deep-rooted in people’s mentality:

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14 The slaves arrived to Karachi from East Africa through the ports of Baluchistan and Sindh around 200 years ago. Locally, they are called as Sheedias or Hubshis and in Karachi most of them live in Lyari. 30 to 40 slaves were ‘imported annually’ who cost between sixty to forty Pakistani rupees at that time. Later, in 1939 British made this trade illegal but according to some news articles it perpetuated for few more years.
...if your identity card mentions an address in Lyari, then every institution starts looking at you in a derogatory way....my daughter who has an MA(Masters) in Economics had an interview in a good school in Saddar, and they offered her a job. Later when she submitted her official documents, she was denied this job as documents say she lives in Lyari...there are many other examples where such incidences of discrimination happened with the people of Lyari... (L/ST-05).

In the last two decades, Lyari has experienced unprecedented violence due to political, criminal and gang-related activities. For many years the area had been dominated by warlords and bandits, but over the last 20 years political and criminal violence has spread beyond the confines of Lyari to influence the wider city. Politically, Lyari was transformed from a centre of resistance against hostile right wing political governments to a ‘no-go’ area in the hands of criminal gangs (Ahmed 2015). The key factor that exacerbated the violence in Lyari was its strategic location beside the port. This enabled gangsters to gain a foothold in the territorial cross-border trade in arms, smuggling through Karachi Port, and drugs, including the export of drugs from Afghanistan, both of which were vital sources of income for the criminal gangs (Kirmani 2015).
The emergence of gangs in Lyari

The criminal landscape of Lyari started to emerge in the 1960s through the work of Nabi Bakhsh (also known as Kala Nag – the Black Serpent). He was a Baloch drug peddler and smuggler who was making large sums of money by selling smuggled goods to shopkeepers in the Old City markets and running a network of pickpockets (Ahmed 2015). Kala Nag was killed in 1967 while absconding from police custody and was replaced by his two trainees Dad Muhammad (known as Dadal) and Sher Muhammad (known as Sheru). These two brothers were famous ‘angry young men’, who belonged to the prestigious Asfahan family from the Iranian part of Baluchistan. The social standing of the family in the Baloch culture played a key role in enabling them to gain power amongst other bandits in Lyari, despite having limited ‘muscle power’ (followers and arms) at their disposal (Ahmed 2015). In the early 1960s, during President Ayub Khan’s regime, they were hired by the ruling political party to intimidate the opposition during political gatherings and on election days at polling stations. Gayer (2014a) sees this event as the critical point which gave Sheru and Dadal’s group (particularly Dadal’s son – Rehman Dakait) an entry into Karachi’s political sphere.
Sheru and Dadal consolidated their control in Lyari until the arrival of Kala Nag’s son, Allah Baksh (known as Kala Nag II). With the arrival of Kala Nag II the fight for territory between the gangs became ferocious, and the introduction during this period of an armed culture throughout Karachi intensified the violence gang activities. After the 1980s this area became one of the violent zones of Karachi.

The arrival of Kala Nag II changed the culture of gang politics in Lyari. Kala Nag II made an alliance with Iqbal Babu (known as Babu Dakait) to strengthen his power and gain control over territories that had previously belonged to Sheru and Dadal. Kala Nag II and Babu Dakait expanded their influence by combatting another local gang lord, Lal Muhammad (known as Haji Lalu) in successive battles.

Older residents of Lyari interviewed for this research said that until the late 1960s the gang activities left local people unscathed, as gangster activities had not permeated everyday life, and their fights were limited to fists and knives. But by the 1980s, in the wake of the Afghan War, the inflow of weapons and drugs increased across Karachi, and gang fights used more lethal weapons. Karachi’s coastal belt became an important corridor for transporting arms, drugs and other contraband items across national boundaries. During this time, Lyari’s criminal economy also started to extend across transnational borders with the supply of drugs through the famous ‘Alexandrian route’ from Makran coastal belt in Karachi running through Baluchistan to European and African markets (Mujtaba 2012). Further, in 1977, Prime Minister Bhutto banned the consumption and production of alcohol, and thus the local brewery and gambling houses required protection from criminals or police to survive (Suhail and Neruda 2015). The muscle power of the gangsters became engaged in protection for these racketeers.

In the 1990s the thriving criminal economy of Lyari coincided with the entry of Dadal’s son, Rehman Baloch (known as Rehman Dakait) onto the criminal landscape of Lyari. Rehman Dakait has a violent past. According to repute, at thirteen he stabbed someone and at sixteen he killed his own mother. Until Rehman Dakait took the command, the political and criminal networks had not been interwoven in Lyari. The resentment of the original residents of Karachi towards the migrant population never allowed MQM to gain a foothold in the area, and thus the left-wing PPP (Pakistan People’s Party), formed in 1970, made Lyari their
stronghold. Ever since the 1970 general election, PPP has consistently won power in Lyari in every national and provincial election (Gayer 2014a). The long-standing involvement of Rehman’s gang in politics made his entry into PPP easy (Pakistan’s Political Party).

Rehman allied with another local drug peddler, Haji Lalu, and together they dominated both drugs and arms smuggling in Lyari. They eventually split in a fight over ransom money, and Haji was arrested for kidnapping. Haji’s son Arshad Pappu took control over his father activities (Ahmed 2015). The conflict between Rehman and Arshad amplified in the coming years when in 2003 Arshad’s men kidnapped and killed a transporter Faiz Muhammad (Rehman’s relative and Uzair Baloch’s father). The killing of Faiz Muhammad initiated a deadly fight between the two groups which claimed at least 500 lives (Ali 2012). For many, the fight among the gangs was seen as a proxy war between MQM backing the Arshad Pappu gang, and PPP supporting Rehman’s gang (Gayer 2014c).

The volatile battle over territory continued until the election of 2008, when PPP won one of two National Assembly seats and three Provincial Assembly seats from Lyari, and the formation of the PAC (People’s Aman Committee, a militant group tied to PPP) (Gayer 2014c). This provided Rehman with increased powers and he managed to negotiate a peace deal with Ghaffar Zikri (Arshad Pappu’s successor). With patronage from the then ruling PPP, Rehman skilfully engineered the formation of PAC, nominally as a charity organisation for the wellbeing of the people of Lyari.

**People’s Aman Committee**

The formation of People’s Aman Committee is seen as the consolidation of power by PPP in Lyari, who made their ‘devoted worker’, Rehman Dakait, head of the organisation (Suhail and Neruda 2015). It was also the key opportunity for PPP to respond to the complaints of Lyari residents that they had been abandoned to the criminal networks during President Musharraf’s era (2001–2008), without the patronage that they had received in the past. Thus, the beginning of PAC was marked by extensive development work throughout Lyari. Development funds were allocated under the direct control of Rehman who established his name by opening dispensaries, primary schools and tuition centres, distributing monthly food rations to poor families, restoring football grounds and boxing clubs, and supplying exercise books and uniforms to school children (Gayer 2003). These activities built trust for PAC
amongst the local residents and they preferred to go to the PAC office for any problem resolution or to make complaints against the civic administrations (Kirmani 2015).

According to Suhail and Neruda (2015, p. 6) the PAC project was actually a ‘rebranding’ of the criminal factions which advanced Rehman Dakait to new position ‘Sardar Abdul Rehman Baloch’\(^{15}\). Although Rehman’s unprecedented connections to the central leadership was considered as a key PPP political strategy to regain their diminishing political clout in Lyari, the rising political influence of Rehman put him in competition with local PPP representatives, especially with Nabeel Gabol who won the NA-248 National Assembly seat in Lyari. Rehman demanded nomination as the PPP candidate for the same seat, which created conflict between the two, and is considered as the main reason for his violent death in a police encounter in August 2009 (Gayer 2014a).

After internal conflicts for the ‘throne’, Rehman’s relative, Uzair Baloch, became the new leader and the head of PAC. Uzair initially tried to follow Rehman’s footsteps by continuing to support social activities in Lyari, but soon the main focus of PAC was limited to the competition for \textit{bhatta}\(^{16}\) (extortion) with rival groups, MQM in particular. The old animosity amongst gangs also resurfaced after Rehman’s death followed by an intra-gang fight for turf within Lyari. PAC also started extending its territory into established wholesale markets outside the Lyari, according to some reports even as far as Saddar, which threatened MQM dominance in several areas (Ali 2010).

\textbf{Reclamation of Power in Lyari Markets by PAC}

The key PAC strategy was to reclaim control of the lucrative wholesale markets that were carved out of Lyari in DOPP 2001\(^{17}\). An older resident of Lyari and journalist interviewed in

\(^{15}\) Sardar is the title of nobility given to the Baloch tribal leader. In Lyari, this term usually associated the Baloch leader from Iran or Interior Sindh.

\(^{16}\) \textit{Bhatta} is mainly obtained by criminal groups, political parties (usually armed faction of the party) from businessmen, traders and residents in the name of ‘protection’ money. Its amount varies, usually the financial means and standing of people determine the amount of \textit{bhatta}. Coercive means are recorded to be involved while extracting \textit{bhatta} and reluctance or refusal to meet the demands often met with violence in Karachi.

\(^{17}\) According to the Devolution of Power Plan 2011, the South District of Karachi was divided in a manner that some important profitable wholesale markets, port and central business district were separated from the constituency of Lyari, and were combined with the MQM dominated areas.
the research, JOU-04, who had witnessed the gang fights said that the formalisation of the criminal network through PAC was actually a step towards legitimising the control of the most economically lucrative areas in Lyari. PAC started opening up their offices initially in Lyari and later to other areas, imitating MQM’s Sector and Unit Offices in Karachi. In Lyari, PAC first targeted the main markets as locations for their offices, knowing the huge amount of bhatta that could be generated from these areas. For this reason, PAC chose Jhatpat Market (a case study for this research) as their head office.

Another important strategy of the gangsters was to establish a parallel power in opposition to MQM. The physical presence and political foothold in Lyari helped them access the main entrance and exit points of the city’s wholesale and retail markets, higher-income residential neighbourhoods, and Karachi Port. The expansion of PAC was swift, and within four years they extended their influence power from Rangiwara and Chakiwara UCs (Map 4.7) to almost all the UCs of Lyari (JOU-04). Then they targeted areas on the outskirts of Karachi, which were comparatively underdeveloped and easy to access. The gangsters who had infiltrated these areas – Ibrahim Hyderi, Machar Goth, Kiamari, Malir, Gadap and Baldia – were mentioned during various interviews (KI-10, JOU-01, JOU-04). PAC’s next target was the MQM strongholds before it was officially banned in 2011 by the government due to mounting pressure from MQM, the PPP coalition partner in government (Gayer 2014c).
PAC continued to work effectively until 2013 despite being banned by the Sindh Government. The government launched various failed police operations to clear out criminal elements in Lyari (Kirmani 2017). These operations strengthened the support for Uzair Baloch in Lyari, as they heightened the narrative of state marginalisation of Lyari. A week long police-led operation against the gangsters between 27 April and 4 May 2012 killed at least forty-five people, mostly innocent bystanders caught in the crossfire which intensified mistrust of the state security apparatus (Hashim 2012). This event helped Uzair to reinforce his altruistic image as the saviour of the oppressed minority targeted by state and the MQM.

In 2013, an internal split within the Uzair gang led to the weakening of PAC in 2013. Baba Ladla, the most powerful commander broke with Uzair after the murder of Zafar Baloch in September 2013, the mastermind and spokesperson of PAC. This led to brutal and bloody fights between the groups dividing Lyari into two turfs. With this division, Lyari witnessed
another phase of gang warfare, leading to hundreds of lives lost in the crossfire and bomb blasts (Baloch 2014).

To counter this situation, under the direction of PML-N government, Sindh Province launched a paramilitary operation by the national Rangers\textsuperscript{18} force in September 2013 across Karachi. The operation was designed to secure Lyari and target its gangs, along with other violent groups of the city. An arrest warrant was issued by anti-terrorist cell against Uzair Baloch who fled the country as the operation begun. Other reports confirmed that Baba Ladla was apprehended on the Baluchistan–Iran border (Ali 2017; Ashraf 2017).

![Image of police operation in Lyari, 2012](http://newsweekpakistan.com/the-dacoits-of-lyari/)

**Figure 4.4: Police Operation in Lyari, 2012**

Source: http://newsweekpakistan.com/the-dacoits-of-lyari/

Two distinct narratives of the Rangers' operation were put forward by the respondents during the interviews. The first was that traders and businessmen saw the Rangers Operation as creating only a temporary lull in the violence of the Lyari gangs because the root causes of criminality were not taken into account, and when the gangs became a threat to the state sovereignty, their political bosses subdued them with a politically motivated game (the

\textsuperscript{18} The Rangers are a national paramilitary force with a remit to secure international borders, other security sites and to support the policy in law and order. There are two branches in Lahore and Karachi.)
Rangers Operation). The second view was that the violence subsided because of the ‘fear’ and ‘insecurity’ of young Baloch men in the face of the (mighty) Rangers forces. The Rangers suspected the young Baloch men as ‘gang informers’\(^\text{19}\) and were killed during the encounters.

### 4.4 Conclusion

This chapter discusses the structural conditions of Karachi’s long conflicts, and how these have affected the three towns in which the case study markets are located. Karachi has been a melting pot for the diverse socio-economic and religious groups that represent Pakistan’s multi-ethnic communities. Since partition in 1947, Karachi has suffered several waves of migration and each led to the formation of ethnic enclaves in Karachi. Of particular significance was the Mohajir (meaning ‘the migrants’) influx after partition, and the Pakhtun migrations from 1980 onwards. The Mohajir influx outnumbered the local Sindhi and Baloch population which became the major bone of contention over ‘sense of entitlement’ and ‘rightful owners’ of Karachi. The Mohajir soon united under a political patronage which was based on the key narrative of ‘victimisation’ – the material and physical sacrifices that migration has caused to this ethnic group. Thus, rebellion and ethnic pride became the basis of the formation of dominant political force of Karachi – the ‘MQM’.

The city’s involvement in the Soviet and Afghan War, first in early 80s and then in 2000s when Pakistan became the US ally in the ‘War on terror’ against Afghanistan, brought armed culture which resulted into the militarisation of political culture of Karachi. From 1980s onwards the Pakhtun have affiliated with various political parties to achieve political representation in Karachi. Their control over illegal land markets and transport were key to acquiring a strong economic position and to political challenge of MQM. Thus, the ethnic diversity has led to economic and political conflict. The initial fight over the control of smuggling routes and the unofficial property market has been reframed by political actors as ethnic conflicts. Over the years, violence has been heightened due to the lack of effective

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\(^{19}\) The word ‘gang informer’ was used most often in my interviews in Lyari. For the people of Lyari, this word resonated the meaning of ‘fear’ and ‘insecurity’. During the Rangers’ operation, many innocent Baloch men were detained and tortured to death of being suspected as the ‘gang informer’.
government and the overlapping claims of various levels of government; federal, provincial and local – over the development of the city.

Local government has been a particular casualty, especially from 2013, when the SLGA returned power to the province. Union Committees (previous Union Councils) are now reinstated, but tend to be highly politicised and dominated by one party over another. In addition, successive waves of mass migration formed the basis of two distinct types of development; planned and unplanned, in both housing and the economy. The state’s relative lack of action towards unplanned settlements provided opportunities for informal actors to gain a strong foothold in unofficial property and employment businesses. The substitution of Mohajir and Punjabi dallas (patrons) with Pakhtuns after 1980 is an example of informal actors gaining powers of in the development sector of Karachi.

The complex ethnic-political history has significantly shaped the socio-political attributes of informal trading spaces in Karachi, reflected in the case studies of Saddar, Orangi and Lyari. Saddar was the former colonial commercial centre, and after 1947 became the major trading hub of the city. Initially traders from different ethnicities were working in Saddar. From the 1980s onwards, and particularly since 2000, as Pakhtun communities increased in wealth, they bought properties in the area, for example around Empress Market, and started managing the surrounding streets. Therefore, the case study noted that conflict is most evident in Empress Market and its surrounds, selected as the detailed case study for this research.

Orangi was informally settled from 1960 onwards, and was an important settlement for the workers in SITE industrial estate. The conflict between Mohajir and Pakhtun communities, escalated into violence with the militarisation of politics. The violence was particularly evident in Aligarh Bazaar, the Orangi case study, which became the physical and symbolic interface between Mohajir and Pakhtun street traders. In contrast, Lyari is dominated by Baloch population and is situated in the Old Town of Karachi. Lyari’s strategic location near the port, fluid borders with Baluchistan province and east to Iran and Afghanistan makes it an important neighbourhood to control the key trading routes in the city. From the beginning, the gangsters’ control in Lyari limited other ethnic contenders from gaining a foothold in the markets. Thus, Lyari is divided into gang ‘turfs’, unlike ethnic and/or political
territories that are seen in the other two case studies. At the height of the violence in Lyari between 2008 and 2013, Jhatpat Market, the detailed case study in Lyari, was a lucrative market for extortion money and therefore one of the most contested trading areas.

In conclusion, Karachi is a complex migrant city with multiple claimants over its ownership, which has led to the development of the city on ethnic and political fault lines, and a strong process enclavisation in the city. The battle over land, employment, extortion, electoral boundaries and other utilities has escalated violence and the city has experienced brutal stretches of ethno-political violence, especially between 2010 and 2015. The ethno-political fragmentation in the city has been facilitated by emasculated local government, which has fundamentally affected the character of informal trading space, as the next chapters show.
5. Social Capital – A Tool to Negotiate the Territory

5.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the social dimension of street traders’ networks in the case study markets of Saddar, Orangi and Lyari. The objective is to critically examine the role of various social groupings in the production of informal trading spaces. To understand the spatial dynamics of social groupings the chapter examines four key networks noted in ITS; identity-based, political, criminal and market unions. It further examines how these networks are formed; the stakeholders and operations of each type of network; how identities have been negotiated in the networks for political and economic benefit; and how the processes of negotiation shape the ITS.

Section 5.2 explains the typology of social groups and how they align to different social networks functioning in ITS. Section 5.3 details the operation of networks; the role of market unions in dealing with complex power structures; negotiation patterns of various stakeholders with particular reference to identities negotiated for economic benefit; how reactionary politics determine the power hierarchy in the network; and the role of power brokers/mediators in the network operation. Finally the conclusion draws together the findings from this analysis. The main argument in the chapter is that the contest within and between social groups underpins the contest over informal trading spaces (ITS).

This section provides details of the social groupings which exist in the case study areas, with the specific focus on how social groups align to identity and ethnicity-based, politically motivated, criminal networks or market-unions, with considerable overlap between these
four domains. The section highlights two key impacts of these social networks on street traders: first, how informal social networks were able to strengthen their stability and control by developing links to political institutions or criminal networks in exchange for services; and second the significance of traders’ membership to various informal networks in enabling them to negotiate for access to ITS.

As outlined in Chapter 4, the three case studies for this research were selected as major trading areas where conflict could be observed, and the analysis here focuses on the stakeholders with whom street traders have to negotiate to establish physical, commercial and political claims within ITS. The three case studies are very different.

- In Orangi, the markets are divided along ethnic fault lines defined by different identity-based networks, predominantly Mohajir versus Pakhtun. In this case study, ethnicity becomes the primary factor in contest over economic trade – the ethnic based agglomeration is controlled by a political party to gain votes and access to lucrative terrain for extortion. Political agents in these networks are backed by elected members of political constituencies supported by state institutions (Section 5.2.1).

- In Saddar market, the political alliance dominates and controls the other networks operating in the market. The connections of middlemen with political groups, strong men of the area and local officials control the ethno-political identity based traders’ group in Saddar (Section 5.2.2).

- The trading areas of Lyari were the stronghold of criminal networks, mainly of competing Baloch origin, where geographical presence in the gangsters’ ‘turfs’ determined the affiliation of traders – both were under constant negotiation, as the gangsters manipulated alliances of traders to serve their interest (Section 5.2.3).

Section 5.2 and Section 5.3 discuss ethnic/identity-based Networks, and Political Alliances, drawing on the case studies of Orangi and Saddar where these two networks were dominant. Section 5.4 discusses criminal networks, mainly drawing on the Lyari case study where gangsters dominated. Section 5.5 discusses market union as a fourth important network operating in ITS.
5.2 Identity-based networks

This research uses the concept of Identity-based Networks, defined to mean groups with ethnic, tribal, clan, religious, or friendship ties, which are often based on region or village of origin. The section is divided into four sub-sections. The first sub-section explores how kinship and friendship act as key social capital for street traders to locate them in the city and access trading space. The second sub-section examines social networks as innovative alternative means of support for the disadvantaged groups who otherwise would not be able to access the socially and economically controlled markets. The third sub-section highlights the financial support received within close-knit groups. The fourth sub-section examines how gaining critical mass as a group in the market empowered the group to negotiate with other actors.

One of the most important attributes of social capital is a network (Bourdieu 1977; Portes and Landolt 2000; Putnam 2000). Indeed, social networks are key to survival in the city. Interviewees frequently explained the importance of building linkages and trusting relations with various social actors. A street trader in Saddar said:

‘We cannot survive in the market without associating with the (powerful) group which represents our people, our community, our relatives…. they listen to our issues and find a way to solve them. They either solve problems within the group or take them to the authorities so that they can address them’ (FS/ST-03).

Informal actors across Karachi are affiliating and networking in order to gain the power to negotiate with the state and other agencies. Case studies demonstrated that identity-based groupings, particularly those based on ethnic and tribal identities, form dense networks of support. The identity-based networks in Saddar and Orangi reflect the ‘embededddness’ identified by Granovetter (1983) who described social networks as close-knit groups based on relationships of kinship, friendship and ethnicity. Two main types of identity-based networks are found in the case studies. The first are ethnic groups, distinguished by different language and cultural backgrounds, who maintain their distinct ethnic identity in ITS. For
example, groups of Mohajirs, Punjabis, Sindhis, Hazaras, Saraikis, Baloch and Katchis are ethnic groups found across the case studies. The second are tribal/clan-based groups, who share the same ethnicity, language and geographical origin to others, but are distinguished by their distinct tribal affiliation and dialect. These are the strongest amongst Pakhtun communities in Karachi, many of whom retain strong kinship relations with the tribal regions of northern Pakistan, for example the Achakzais, Kakers, Yousufzais, Swatis, Ashers and Tareens found in the case studies, but they are also evident amongst other ethnic groups. These groupings give traders the power to make demands of other formal and informal groups in the market.

Both bonding and bridging form of social capital are found across case studies. This accords with Putnam’s (200, p. 23), (Section 2.4.2) work, which argues that bonding social capital is important for ‘getting by’ but bridging social capital is instrumental for ‘getting ahead’. Although Saddar and Orangi case studies manifested higher degree of bridging social capital than Lyari which helped street traders in acquiring other forms of social capital. Street traders across case studies initially bond within homogenous group to access the trading space, and later bridge across other networks to attain a stable negotiating position.

### 5.2.1 Kinship and friendship

Street traders in all case studies defined kinship, a form of inherited social capital, as playing a key role in enabling them to be linked with identity-based networks that have evolved in parallel to the formal institutions and legal structures of the state. Association with these networks empowered an individual to negotiate with police and local officials. For example, Achakzai traders in Saddar were given an informal electricity connection by K-Electric, the formal electricity supply company, due to their leader’s ties with the company, which advantaged the Achakzai group over other street traders in the market. (KI-05). The importance of networks in helping street traders access to everyday negotiation was mentioned by a group of street traders in Saddar;
‘To access anything (electricity, a sweeper, a security guard) in this market you have to have a link with ‘khas logo ka halqa’ (network of powerful people), otherwise you are most vulnerable here…’ (S/FST-03).

In Orangi, for most street traders, the main reason for their choice of trading location was having a family member in the area. The familial connection in Orangi for trading is more important than in other case studies as it is the most violent ethnic interface, between Mohajirs and Pakhtuns (Section 4.3.2). The tribal/clan-based networks facilitate entry for a newcomer to the ethnically controlled markets in Orangi. For example O/ST-08, a 35 year-old male street trader in Aligarh Bazaar, explained that a family member initially found him shelter in the city, and then provided a reference to help him search for work. Thus, the choice of location becomes important in enabling newcomers to join existing networks who then support them socially and financially in starting a business. As Kadushin (2012a) identifies, such ‘social support’ is a key aspect of social capital enabling individuals to access jobs and financial help, which also results in reinforcing the network. A street trader in Saddar explained the consolidation of network:

‘I came from Dera Ghazi Khan 21 years back to work in Karachi through my chacha’s (uncle’s) contact…. then I invited my brothers and cousins to work with me or find work through the contacts that I have developed over the years in this market… it was easier for them to find work here…’(S/ST-11).

Similar responses were made by two other Pakhtun street traders from Orangi, who explained the importance of knowing a person from the same tribe or clan as a crucial factor in the choice to locate in the city and to start a business.

‘People from my village, sharing the same language, and the same culture, live in this part of the city (Frontier Colony, Orangi). Therefore, I chose to work and live in this area…’ (O/ST-12).

‘I have my friends and relatives living in the Metroville area, so that’s why I came and settled here…. initially I worked with my relative at his stall to
understand the market, know people and save some money and later I rented my own raeri (push cart)...’ (O/ST-1).

Many street traders said that an introduction to the market by family members or friends was a key to accessing the market (S/ST-04, KI-13, FS/ST-01, KI-03, KI-09, O/ST-02, O/ST-04, O/ST-05, O/ST-06, O/ST-08, O/ST-09, O/ST-10), and people’s choice of housing or work location is also determined by their family members. A seller of second hand handbags in Saddar commutes every day from Korangi (about 25 km away in east Karachi) as he finds it more secure and comfortable to live in his community (S/ST-06). Similarly, a Pakhtun street trader moved from Jodia Bazaar (the central wholesale market near Saddar) to Orangi as he said that working within his community provided him with more opportunities in business (O/ST-06). The pattern of accessing ITS illustrates how networks spread and people from the same region, ethnicity, or tribe start working or living in the same area.

Street traders across the case studies emphasised the importance of diverse connections with other sub-ethnic groups in ITS. Although tribal and familial connections are important in accessing a market, having a wide range of connections was mentioned as equally important in negotiating claims. The importance of diversity and richness of embedded resources in case studies is discernible in Granovetter’s concept of ‘weak ties’ in social capital, in which he argues bridging across groups is key to accessing social resources (Granovetter 1983; Kadushin 2012b; Putnam 2000). The importance of diverse associations was visible in all case studies particularly in Aligarh Bazaar, Orangi, where a group leader of Swati street traders explained:

‘... our connections grow from the connections of other Pakhtun tribes, and we all get benefit from each other’s links to find a trading place and deal with police...’(KI-01)

5.2.2 Social networks as a key resource for marginalised groups

Under conditions of economic instability, social networks provide an alternative to market-based economic organisations that would be otherwise inaccessible. An academic, EXP-03,
explained that social networks are also an effective means of finding work in the absence of opportunities in the formal economy. Informal social networks provide street traders with social, economic and institutional support to challenge the monopoly of formal market mechanisms or actors (Meagher 2005). Some of the benefits of informal social networks mentioned by street traders include: access to credit; distribution of tasks among the members; mobilisation of cheap labour; flexibility in working hours; and sharing transport (O/ST-09, S/ST-09, S/ST-11).

Many of the street traders saw social networks as a way for disadvantaged groups to withstand institutional bias. Long (2001), for example, also sees social networks as a source of strengthening the capacity of marginalised groups to withstand exclusion from the wider society. The Pakhtun traders in Orangi suggested that community ties are pivotal, especially in migrant areas to mitigate against discrimination (KI-02, O/ST-02, O/ST-03, & O/ST-05), and that traders new to the market rely on social networks to reduce the risk of being dislodged by city authorities. Therefore, Pakhtuns maintain their traditional, or inherited, social network even in an urban context.

At a city scale, the ‘Pakhtun Jirga’ is an informal network which supports Pakhtuns who have newly arrived in the city in setting up a business through interest-free loans, helping them finding a house to live, introducing them to established traders from the community, and mediating conflicts or disputes (market related or any other dispute). All the market-scale networks operate under the patronage of the ‘Pakhtun Jirga’ which supports street traders in dealing with state institutions and opposing political parties (EXP-03).

In Lyari, social networks are seen as a key way to mitigate the community’s exclusion in the city. With its large Baloch community, one street trader in Lyari (L/ST-03) explained that Balochs like to work amongst members of the same community both for reciprocal relations and for fear of discrimination, because the Baloch are always treated unfavourably with respect to other ethnic groups in the main trade markets. The journalist, JOU-01, who has written extensively about the socio-economic disparity that Lyari faced over the years, also said that the Baloch were not given equal opportunities compared to other ethnic groups in the mainstream markets in Karachi, and this insecurity means they were unable to compete in
the wider markets. This leads to an introvert trading approach, in which individuals focus on trading within their own community.

Familial links often override commercial imperatives in ITS. Although introducing a newcomer into the market increases commercial competition, the value of filling an area with traders from the same ethnic or tribal group to consolidate territory (Section 5.2.3) outweighs the additional market competition created (KI-19). Street traders mentioned that the presence of family of community members also means that a group supports each other financially, thus increasing their economic efficiency (O/ST-05, O/ST-12, S/ST-10).

5.2.3 Financial support

A street trader in Saddar explained how individuals within the group provide financial support for their networks;

‘To start trading in the market, typically a friend or relative will show you spaces where you can trade. Initially they will share space on their kiosk and will let you sell the part of their merchandise… during this time they don’t share the profit with you, but will give you a daily wage… Over time, you develop your own contacts and find another place to start your own trade. Most of the traders here have started working here this way… they help and finance each other.’ (S/ST-03).

At the initial stages of starting a business the financial support and trust which comes through close bonds of kinship, friendship, and ethnicity is a significant advantage (O/ST-04, O/ST-07, O/ST-08, S/ST-03, S/ST-11, & FS/ST-02). Thus social capital provides opportunities for economic development of a community. This was particularly evident from interviews in Orangi but also in Saddar, and usually takes the form of interest-free credit for goods. Thus, there is considerable financial investment by established social networks in setting up the businesses of novice street traders.
Once established, solidarity and cooperation consolidates the network and enhances economic efficiency. In both Orangi and Saddar, new traders built up their customer relationships with food buyers and wholesalers based on relationships of trust developed over a long time between community members who have been trading in the area for years (O/ST-08, O/ST-08, S/ST-01, FS/ST-02, & KI-09). New traders can therefore get goods on credit without the need for upfront capital, which supports their upward mobility in the market. In Saddar, on Dr. Daud Pota Road, most of the traders are from the Achakzai tribe¹ and they help new traders from the same tribe (i.e. people from Qila Abdullah, Baluchistan) by introducing them to the wholesalers they know to get credit for a month (KI-09, KI-06, KI-08). A market union leader from Saddar explained his upward mobility in the market

‘...our community was working in the market and helped other members of the community to start a business here... we have trust in each other and help them to excel in business. There are many examples where a family started with one stall, and over time and with each other’s help and support they expanded to many stalls... I started by selling vegetables in a basket, and now I have two shops and one stall in the market which is run by my family members’ (KI-09).

Sharing accommodation and living costs is also seen as a common strategy of support (KI-09, KI-13, KI-06, FS/ST-03) as a street trader from Saddar mentioned;

'I have rented a room with eight other members from my village, who are also working here (Saddar). We share rent, food and utility billings to minimise the expenses’ (S/ST-09).

5.2.4 Achieving critical mass to negotiate the claims

Achieving critical mass was found to be an important tactic to control, claim and negotiate street traders’ demands with local police, municipal agents and local government and other

¹ The Achakzai tribe are based in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of NW Pakistan and in SW Afghanisatn.
street traders’ groups. The phenomenon of encouraging people of a similar identity to move into an area helps consolidate the voting base during elections, and establishes the relations that enable the network to negotiate their claims. This phenomenon is seen in all three case studies, but most clearly in UC-28 (Saddar), UC-13, UC-14 and UC-15 (Orangi). The network seeks to increase the numbers of their community members and supporters and extend their territorial boundaries to strengthen their influence in political negotiation with state and non-state actors (territorial claims are explained in more detail in Chapter 6). In an interview, an expert EXP-01, said that survival in the complex city that is Karachi, where multiple actors and forces are vying to get access to commercial property and trading resources, is not possible except through ties with powerful networks who promote and guard their members.

The Pakhtun street traders are the most active in inviting people from their tribes to join the trading community. Amongst Pakhtuns in both Saddar and Orangi, circular migration amongst traders in the market was common; whereby a street trader works for six months and then goes back to the village to support a family from his savings. In his absence, he rents out the space to a member of his clan so the rotation continues amongst the same tribe. A key informant in Saddar associated this practice with ethnic clustering of trading spaces:

‘The grouping of hawkers in this (Saddar) market is kinship-based – a street trader will sell or rent his space only to family members, relatives, and friends (preferably from the same village). For example, Jahangir Park zone in Saddar now completely belongs to Pakhtun traders. It began with one Pakhtun trader, who started selling fruit in front of the Park and then invited people from his tribe (Qilla Abdullah, Baluchistan). Now, the entire stretch of Jahangir Park is dominated by Pakhtun traders. The entry of KMC officials and the police into their area is not easy compared to other streets in Saddar, because of the large numbers and political contacts they established over time’ (KI-06).

Another hawker from Saddar, emphasised the advantage of working in a large network from the same ethnic group;
‘…..we can put pressure on local officials and negotiate for the *patharay ki jagah* (trading space) because of our strength in numbers…’ (S/ST-11).

KMC has also used the strategy of infiltration to gain control, and some interviewees thought they were deliberately planting people to weaken the power of the market networks (FS/ST-02). The hawkers of Dubai Chowk area in Saddar mentioned that in previous eviction drives by KMC’s Anti-Encroachment Department, new traders were brought into the area to create divisions amongst them (S/ST-09, S/ST-10).

‘…..we will not give this space to an outsider as we don’t know if they belong to KMC, or the Police, etc. They want to throw us out from this area (Dubai Chowk, Saddar) by sending in their people’ (S/ST 11).

Strategic investment in land purchase is seen as another key strategy to reinforce identity-based networks. One of the journalists interviewed for this research (JOU-01) cited an example of two primary markets of Karachi; Kehkashan and Jubilee Market, which have now been completely taken over by Pakhtun, by buying up shops at much higher price than the actual market value of the land and property.

‘Pakhtuns are investing strategically…. for example, The Jubilee Market on MA Jinnah Road is located in MQM territory, but to enter into this area one Pakhtun bought a shop at double the market price and soon after the entire market was taken over by their community.’ (JOU-01).

Ethnicity-based incursions in ITS are dividing the market into distinct social groups (JOU-05, EXP-03). An interviewee in Orangi, a Pakhtun rickshaw driver (O/ST-04) who arrived forty-five years ago from Buner (KPK Province, Pakistan) then invited his family members and friends to start working with him and they were introduced to Aligarh Bazaar through the contacts he developed over the years. They all started living in the same residential neighbourhood, Frontier Colony (UC-15), which once was a multi-ethnic residential area but is now a predominantly Pakhtun area. A similar phenomenon of enclavisation has happened in Aligarh Bazaar where the market is divided into two distinct identity-based zones.
controlled by Pakhtuns and Mohajirs. A market union leader of Pakhtun network in Orangi commented;

‘... if we do not strengthen our (trading) places they will be captured by opposite groups.’ (KI-04)

The interview above clearly indicates that limiting access of opposing groups in ITS is a key strategy to reinforce the network. The ethnicisation of markets leads to distinct ethnic enclaves, providing political parties with an opportunity to manipulate the market for their own gain. The next section examines the operation of networking of political networks and their links with street traders’ groups and other stakeholders in ITS.

5.3 Political networks

Political affiliation is an important means of accessing resources and support for street traders. As outlined in Chapter 4, politics in Karachi is acutely divided along ethnic lines, with the KMC dominated by MQM politicians affiliated to the Mohajir population, Sindh Province dominated by the PPP affiliated to the Sindh population, and Pakhtuns supporting the JI, PTI and, before them, the ANP (Hasan 2002). Politicians seek political support by patronising their voters, for example providing support to negotiate with state actors in accessing the market, which enhances the ethnic and sectarian divides, demarcations which are acutely witnessed in ITS.

The next section examines the roles and mechanisms employed by political networks to influence the operation of ITS. The section is divided into four sub-sections. The first sub-section explores how the political affiliation of a network helps to access the local state and negotiate claims. The second sub-section examines the informal controls used by political parties operating in ITS. The third sub-section discusses the reciprocal relationships between social networks and their political allies. The fourth explores the factors that determine the extent of control of political parties in ITS.
5.3.1 Connection with the local state

The political affiliation of street trader networks is key to strengthening connections with the local state (Union Committees). Street traders’ networks make their claims with the local state by establishing acquaintance with powerful political actors of the area. Across the case studies, political party networks are found to be most influential actors in liaising with the local state, but they also use this influence to assert control, which is reflected in ITS. Gayer (2014) explains different modes of operation of various political parties in the city:

“The competitive claims over the ownership of the city are at the heart of its increasingly complex conflicts, where the battle for votes overlaps with a contest for economic rents (land, water, electricity, jobs, development funds, bhatta...). For the smaller stakeholders, such as the PPP, the ANP and the PAC, ownership entails the exclusive control of the populations and economic rents of their respective turf. MQM remains more ambitious. Although its militants are involved in a small-scale turf war against political rivals or criminal groups, MQM is not merely fighting for the turf in Karachi, but for control over the local state and its different organs – the city government, the police, the courts, universities and colleges, hospitals and so on.” (Gayer 2014, p. 30).

A street trader in Orangi (O/ST-12) and others across all three case studies (O/ST-02, O/ST-06, L/ST-04, L/ST-05, S/ST-01, S/ST-11, S/FST-02) all mentioned the importance of the political party in providing access to local officials. As one said:

‘… if you have jaan pechchan (connections/links) with the political party then your demands and claims will be heard…”(O/ST-02).

Access to a market via connections with a political party is also an important strategy in establishing and reinforcing a network. Politically driven connections are important for affiliation to a group in the market regardless of identity. KI-02, a Pakhtun market union leader in Orangi, indicated how politically based incursions are essential for a group to access
ITS. New arrivals eventually establish a group of street traders of similar political affiliation, usually belonging to the same ethnic background, trading in a particular area which is a key strategy for surviving in the market.

‘...Mohajirs traders would have thrown us out long ago from this market, if we (Pakhtuns) didn’t build our network stronger here though our (political) party’s support’ (KI-02).

The informal ties with political networks are fundamental in accessing and negotiating with state institutions because of the mediating ability of political networks with local officials. The case studies of both Saddar and Orangi showed several significant instances where informal networks had infiltrated the formal governance system. The leader of a Pakhtun network in Saddar explained why political support is fundamental to survival in the market.

‘.....we support them (political parties) to survive in the market – we cannot run the business without these groups. KMC says it is illegal to sell products on the road; we cannot rent shops, so the only way to continue the business is to get the backing of powerful political parties in the area to protect ourselves from KMC drives’ (KI-09).

The political connections and identity are primary to obtaining access in the market space. Street trader groups all compete with one another to capture or recapture prime locations. Street traders from the weaker networks find it difficult to keep their place without the support of local city officials. The political agents also manipulate identity-based differences to benefit their political agendas (JOU-05). One of the respondents in Lyari considered that the current politically induced violence in Lyari had been deliberately used to create instability between groups. These rifts allowed political agents to access space or a stall in a locality, as access is limited to people supporting the same political and/or criminal group (KI-05). The state coalesces with informal networks (musclemen of the political party or local informal groups) to execute its development objectives. An older resident of Lyari explained how state-affiliated agents started their operations;
People from various ethnicities (Katchis, Ghanchis, Memons, Katiwari, Balochs and others) in Lyari were living in unity without any differences, as we see in other areas of Karachi. Inter-marriages between Baloch, Sindhi, Katchi, and Mobajir were common, and the diversity of culture was always celebrated among the people of Lyari before PPP (ruling political party from 2008-2013) sent their allies (PAC – People Aman Committee, explained in Section 5.2.3) in this area to divide us…‘(KI-17).

In all three case studies, the complex relationships between political party and local officials shaped operations of the traders’ social networks, and played a key role in the occupation or reoccupation of trading space by social networks in the markets (KI-06, SOLE-02). A street trader from Saddar explained the importance of connections with political parties to occupy a place in the market.

‘Twelve years back I had started working in this area (Saddar)… At that time, there were few places available to work in the market... but people around did not let me trade even on the vacant places, until my friend took me to Fazal bhai² (an old shopkeeper and political activist) who used his contact with PPP to secure a place for me…any outsider without (political) connections cannot work here…’ (S/ST-12).

5.3.2 Informal political controls

Political affiliations are key, across case studies, in strengthening social networks which derive power from the dominant political party in a locality (EXP-01). Unelected political party representatives are the most powerful in mediating the claims between street traders and other stakeholders. The presence of a political party’s office is highly significant in negotiating or renegotiating the claims of traders’ networks with the local police and

² Bhai, bhen are terms of respect for a man and woman respectively.
municipal agents (KI-16). MQM’s ‘Unit Office’ in UC-13 and JI’s *baithak* in UC-14, Orangi, are two key examples. The social networks that develop around political alliances are not independent, but are found to be aligned with the political party’s milieu. Meagher (2005) has also argued that social networks are shaped by institutional practices ingrained in the particular political, legal and institutional settings of their context. A network leader of Mohajir street traders in Orangi explained the importance of political alliance;

‘I go to the (Unit) office every evening to say *salam dua* (‘greetings’), also discuss market related matters to them (Unit In-charge and other party members)...in the time of any difficulty who else will support us? ...’ (KI-01).

Access to the (informal) political party’s office by the elected Provincial and National Assembly members is also crucial for its strong controlling position in an area. The political party’s office is considered as the symbol of control in an area. For example in Aligarh Bazaar UC-13, MQM had set up a Unit Office which was involved in various ways in the market, from settling disputes amongst the traders to market management (KI-16). The head of the (informal) market union at Orangi explained the role of the political party office in the market as follows;

‘The MQM’s Unit Office helps us in resolving the matters of the market. Our trading spaces are secured due to their (the Office members’) presence on this side of the market. They have connections with big people (state officials and other political parties) which make us stronger here..... (KI-01).’

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3 Unit Office is the smallest political unit led by the Unit In-charge. It is essentially the public face of the political party. The office in itself doesn’t hold any decision making power, but follows the order or command of the central MQM Organisational Committee (Tanzeemi Committee).

4 In JI the smallest unit of organisation in Orangi is ‘baithak’, which literally means ‘sitting’, thus a sitting place for JI political party members to resolve issues or matters in the area.
5.3.3 Extent of control

The extent to which political parties can exercise control in a particular territory is linked to their representation in state offices (SOLE-04). Political constituencies play an important role in defining territories of control, and the division of the market by ethnicity broadly follows the Union Committee (UC) (electoral ward) boundaries (discussed in detail in Section 6.2.2).

Street traders are prepared to submit to political affiliation, in order to be able to negotiate with state institutions. Powerful groups with strong political affiliation are best placed to establish their claims with local officials and others in the area. More marginalised groups are forced to work ‘hand-in-glove’ with powerful groups to gain security and to be included in negotiations with the local officials. The head of an NGO who had run a micro-credit programme in Orangi, explained how political parties access ITS and draw their boundaries of control with the alliance of street traders’ groups;

‘...they (political parties) set up their unit office or ward in a market to gain control – this is the best way to enter in the market. Initially, to gain the trust of the street traders and make their roots stronger in the market, the party workers play benign politics. They support the traders selflessly in every matter from resolving market-related, personal disputes to giving credit for buying goods. This wins the trust of the traders and thus the market becomes the unspoken territory of that political party. Later, with the support of traders they expand their territory into the adjacent markets. After getting complete control of an area they start extortion in the name of ‘security money’ and later through armed coercion. Traders acquiesce to the illegal demands of the party’s workers to buy them support from the municipal office and local police station. Thus the impoverished group resorts to support from the criminal faction of the political party, while the political party maximises their territory and secures the political constituency’ (KI-19).
Thus it is clear that in trading in Karachi, ethnicity is almost always synonymous with political affiliation, and so the political networks use street traders as a tool to create, control and profit from political territories in the markets. Political networks see ethnic clustering of street traders as the primary strategy for controlling a market; first to consolidate the potential for electoral gain, and second to define the territory from where a (political) group can collect extortion money (SOLE-08).

Political control in ethnically segregated areas pressurises non-affiliated groups to leave. For example, due to security concerns, many Mohajirs who used to live on the border of UC 13 and UC 14 moved to Banaras Colony and Qasba Colony where the Mohajir community is dominant. A street trader in Orangi explained the impact of such political control on the market;

‘...when MQM used to call a strike that side of the market was completely shut, but our side was open, protected by (party) guards at both ends’ (O/ST-12).

While individual groups (Pakhtun or Urdu speaking) control particular areas of the markets, these divisions are institutionalised at city scale. Both Orangi and Saddar case studies demonstrated the triangular links between market unions and political parties, the city administration and the local UC, which define social networks' sphere of control. Grabher and Stark (1997) found a similar phenomenon – that the regulatory capacities of networks are formed and reinforced by the connection with wider society and the state. In the case of Mumbai, as Weinstein (2008) argues, the state coalesces with informal networks (musclemen) to execute its development objectives. This was clearly illustrated in a quote from one of the members of the market union in Saddar.

‘PPP’s support for the Kaker Street Traders' network leader makes his group very strong in Saddar... when he goes to the local police station he sits on the SHO’s desk (Station police officer – in charge of the local police station) and the SHO can only say ‘Yes sir’ to him...’ (KI-08).
While complete markets tend to be dominated by a particular political party, for street traders the access to a particular location within the market is controlled by identity-based divisions. Three patterns of the territories in the case studies were found; ethnic, tribal and gangster-controlled. The first division was the ethnic distinction between Pakhtuns, Mohajirs, Punjabis, and Sindhis ethnicities, although in Orangi, spatial division is stronger between Pakhtuns and Mohajirs (Map 5.1). Other, less numerous ethnicities share space with Mohajirs. The second division was within the same ethnic group by tribal differences (Section 5.2). The third division was the unique case found in Lyari where the territories in the market are controlled by criminal gangs (see Section 5.4). Unusually, there did not seem to be strong product or sector-based associations, as found in many other cities (Brown et al 2010).

Map 5.1: UC boundaries define Mohajirs and Pakhtuns territories in Orangi
5.3.4 Patron-client relationship

The mutual interests of traders, political parties, and other institutions are multi-layered. A state representative from Deputy Commissioner Office, Karachi South, SOLE-08, explained how an Achakzai group in UC-28 (Dubai Chowk section, Saddar), asserts control through political support. Initially, a small paan (betel leaf and tobacco) cabin was set up by the party worker from PKMAP (Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party) to obtain physical access to the space. Later, the political party helped the network leader to invite people from Qilla Abdullah (a district in North West Baluchistan) where the Achakzai group is in power. Within a year, the entire block (Map 5.2) was taken over by the Achakzai community and the area was marked as PKMAP party territory. In return for trading space, the traders were required to give payments (extortion) to the political party and participate in their political activities. For example it was mandatory that all network members should attend political rallies held by that party (SOLE-08).

Map 5.2: Map of Saddar showing PKMAP & Pakhrun Street Traders’ dominion
Over time, these informal networks have developed political capacity to negotiate over the production of ITS (Section 2.2.3). Political support helps social networks to organise, developing a multi-tiered hierarchy which helps them to negotiate with local and district officials. In Orangi, the multi-tier hierarchy of Pakhtun street traders, supported by JI, is an example of how political capacity can help fulfil their demands with the District Municipal Authority (KI-16). Three Pakhtun dominated market unions, Anjuman-e-Tajeeran Bacha Khan Chowk, Anjuman-e-Tajeeran Aligarh Bazaar, and another informal market union in Aligarh Bazaar coalesced to draft a document (locally referred as 'bill') for DMC West to allow street trading in particular zones. They also sought approval from the Pakhtun Jirga (the Pakhtuns platform in Karachi, more details in Section 5.2.3) to reinforce their claims. The Pakhtun Jirga controls the large transport and construction industries in Karachi which makes them a powerful stakeholder, strengthened further by their overlapping powers through JI political party. A state official of DMC West explained the power of Pakhtun network thus:

’They (Pakhtun market union leaders) came here with their Jirga leader to get the bill signed by the Administrator (head of DMC West)… they assembled outside the office of the Administrator. He felt under considerable pressure and had to leave the office by the back door to avoid any confrontation … A bill with the signature of market unions’ and Pakhtun Jirga’s leader is so powerful that even the District Administrator could not refuse to sign it…he knows that the entire transport and construction sector of Orangi would go on strike if their demands were not met...' (SOLE-09).

Another example of reciprocity between a political party and social networks was found in Saddar. The market turnover (Section 4.2) makes it the most sought after market by political parties to benefit from ‘rent’ and votes. The exorbitant rate of daily extortion was seen as the key reason that PPP\(^5\) supported Pakhtun networks in Saddar (SOLE-05). The Pakhtuns were thus able to consolidate their trading activity.

\(^5\) PPP was the ruling political party between 2008 and 2013, having formed a coalition with ANP (Pakhtuns’ dominated political party).
in four zones, impenetrable to outsiders (Map 5.3), where no non-Pakhtuns could start trading (KI-05, KI-06).

Map 5.3: Map of Saddar showing Pakhtun Street traders’ strong agglomerations

5.4 Criminal networks

This section examines the criminal networks, found mainly in Lyari, which operate instead of the identity-based and political networks found elsewhere. The two main aspects of social capital; relationship of trust and network of tightly confined group (Fukuyama 1995, Castells 1996) are most visible in Lyari. The case study evidenced that criminal networks operate in close-knit groups in which trust between gangsters and traders holds a key importance to do trade in the area. The first sub-section examines how gangsters got involved in controlling the local markets and related politics of Lyari. The second sub-section examines the spatial
access based on connections with gangsters and why identity was less important as compared to other case studies. The third sub-section discusses how the interface between two opposing gangs impacted on the case study. The fourth sub-section examines various strategies of control deployed by gangsters to assert their influence in ITS.

5.4.1 Political clientelism

Criminal networks are most strongly embedded in Lyari, largely replacing identity and politically based groups (see Sections 5.2.1 & 5.2.2). The involvement of criminals in the local politics of Lyari can be traced back to the 1990s (see Section 4.3.4 and Box 5.1), when the smuggling trade declined and gangs started to expropriate property and land. This was a complex process that required support from political parties (EXP-03), whose supporters coalesced with the gangs, and many properties including vacant land, commercial plots, and private residences were illegally occupied (EXP-01). Many respondents in Lyari specifically mentioned 2001 onwards as the critical phase when gangsters started getting involved in violent activities and emerged as the sovereign power, challenging MQM dominance (JOU-01, KI-23, L/ST05). A key informant from LRC (Lyari Resource Center) – this organisation was closely allied with People’s Aman Committee (PAC), the de facto armed wing of PPP (Chapter 4.3.3) – said in an interview;

‘...the most important reason why gangsters got involved in local affairs of Lyari was MQM’s prejudice against them... back in 2011, when I talked to Zafar Baloch (the right-hand man of Uzair Baloch) he said that that we (the Baloch) are the actual owners of Karachi. For generations we have lived here... these (Mohajirs) people have come here recently and want to capture the whole Karachi. We will not allow them to control us...’ (KI-07).

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4In 2001, Local Government Ordinance (LGO 2001) was enacted under President Musharraf which devolved the powers from provincial to local government. Thus, the MQM elected mayor was empowered with administrative and financial powers to carry out development works in Karachi. The major disbursement on development works was focussed on MQM dominated areas, which were later reinforced by MQM-led CDGK (City District Government Karachi).
The formation of PAC in 2008 was seen by interviewees as the time when gangsters were formally included in the socio-economic affairs of Lyari supported by the elected PPP government (JOU-04, Viqar 2014). Many informal institutions were created by the gangsters to establish a writ over Lyari, which expanded to other areas of Karachi with the help of their political affiliates (KI-15). As mentioned by a journalist in an interview:

‘Gangsters are so well knit into the daily life of the people of Lyari that, from resolving personal affairs to market or business-related issues to legal matters, people can access them for everything. Their presence in all matters is the statement of their power – local police and other agencies could not enter in Lyari when they were in power’ (JOU-05).

During the period of PPP control between 2008-2013, when they were in a majority at both Provincial and Federal levels, the gangsters gained significant influence in Lyari and, despite being wanted by the police in criminal cases, they were given important political positions in the area. The PPP provincial government adopted a strategy of ‘selective presence’, achieving political outreach through selected gangsters (Gayer 2014). The most important stratagem of this politico-criminal integration was the formation of the PAC – the violent political affiliate of PPP (Section 4.3.4). The then Home Minister of PPP, Zulfiqar Mirza, was personally involved in the formation of PAC, with the intention of bringing together the gangs onto the same platform, to fight against MQM (JOU-04). Gaining a stronghold in Lyari was key to manifesting the old rivalry between MQM and PPP (Box 5.1), which manipulated the Lyari gangs into infiltrating the adjacent MQM neighborhoods.
Box 5.1 – From traditional leadership to PAC control

Lyari was dominated by the traditional leadership of Haroons, Gabols and Huts – influential Baloch families who had been living in Lyari for decades. The politics of Lyari changed post-Bhutto era to become staunchly pro-PPP, and the influential Baloch families left Lyari. Thus, Lyari was left without a traditional populist leadership, and this void was filled by the gangs and by the real estate lobby. The gangs in Lyari were key players in smuggling goods from the Gulf to Karachi, mainly traffickling gold, foreign exchange, and contraband goods, with support from local police and customs officials. After economic liberalisation in 1990s, the import of both foreign exchange and gold was legalised which left these gangs with no businesses, and they started losing their control in Lyari (EXP-03).

During the 1970s Lyari had become the political base for the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP – the Sindhi speaking party), in a city that was gradually falling to the Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM – the Urdu speaking population of Karachi). The Bhutto’s social rhetoric of providing food, shelter and clothing to everyone found an ideal setting in Lyari, being one of the most disadvantaged areas of Karachi, and thus in elections during the 1970s, PPP swept all the seats in Lyari.

PAC – the product of old rivalry between MQM and PPP

The PAC was a gangster-controlled market union, initially started from Rangiwara, Chakiwara and then expanded to all UCs in Lyari, and then from Lyari to other areas. Initially, they targeted the less developed areas in the urban periphery; Ibrahim Hyderi, Macha Goth, Kamari, Malir, Gadap, and Baldia (JOU-04). Their main target was MQM, so they encircled Karachi by establishing their units in these areas. The plan was to surround MQM areas, and they were successful, being able to threaten local leaders in these areas due to government (provincial) backing (JOU-01, KI-17, & KI-18). As Lyari lies in a strategically important location adjacent to the Karachi Port, city centre and key radial roads, the gangsters were able to control some of the main arteries into and out of the city, both the wholesale and retail markets, port operations, and higher income residential neighborhoods. The strategy was then to establish areas of control in the outer ring, to squeeze MQM out, and gain complete control of the entire city (JOU-04, EXP-02, KI-07).
5.4.2 Identity trade-off

Many street traders in Lyari said that the acquaintance with the criminal networks and gangs was the condition for entry into the market regardless of ethnic affiliation (L/ST- 01, L/ST- 03, L/ST- 04, L/ST- 06, L/ST -13, L/ST- 15). For example, an important informant in Lyari explained that gangsters were mainly Baloch, but during the hold of the PAC (a gangster-controlled market union) in Jhatpat Market, many Katchis, Ghanchis and Memons were given trading spaces as they had strong links with the gangsters (KI-10).

Traders and major informants from Lyari identified two crucial reasons why identity was not particularly important in Lyari. First, geographical location provided the main link to gangsters (L/ST-02, L/ST-05, KI-17, KI-18). This accords with the notion of ‘spatialised community’ (Modan 2008, p. 326) in which a particular geographical location becomes an overarching factor for social actors. In Lyari, the gangsters’ physical presence in a particular neighbourhood marked the boundaries of street traders’ interactions with the other group. As discussed in Section 5.2.3, Lyari is divided into territories associated with gangsters, and people living in particular location are tagged as the supporter of the gangster to whom the territory belongs regardless of their ethnic identity, and are usually tapped for ‘protection’ money. Secondly, as identified by a Katchi trader and older resident of Jhatpat Market (KI-15), it is the profitability of businesses and financial stability of communities in prime locations which gives them the ability to pay heavy bribes.

‘When PAC had a hold in Jhatpat Market, each trading spot was sold for PKR 50,000 to PKR 100,000 (£300–£600). You could get access to the market easily if you knew the gangsters and had money in your pocket…. to set up a small kiosk or rent a shop, permission was required from the gang network…. direct access to the gangsters was not possible…. you could only reach the core network through their trusted minions. At a market level, they had a trusted local trader in each section of the market who was responsible for reporting to the gang members on all market-related and financial matters. All the decisions regarding who could do business in the market, the location of the trading space, rent and initial deposit for the trading space, etc. were
controlled by the gangster commanders. The main criteria (for gaining access)
were a reference from the trusted trader and payment of money for the space.
If you met both demands they would let you run a business’ (KI-15).

The monopoly of gangsters to steer market affairs in Lyari, and in Jhatpat Market, reflects
Max Weber’s ‘status group’ concept, represented by those who dominate a fiefdom because
of social standing (Barnes 1992). The political backing of gangsters by PPP gave them power
to control public space by establishing territory and limiting the access on the basis of
geographical location, which fragmented ITS, leading to conflicts over control of prime
locations.

5.4.3 Jhatpat Market – a violent interface

Jhatpat Market, located in UC-13 in the South Division of Karachi, and the central eastern
area of Lyari is one of the oldest markets of the old town in Karachi. The prime location,
availability of cheap smuggled goods from Baluchistan and the high turnover of customers,
made this market very lucrative for criminal networks (L3ST-05).

The control over the economy, particularly over markets, was one of the principal goals of
the gangsters, and the in-fighting between gangs, desire to control and extend their ‘turf’, and
extreme violence in Lyari, witnessed during 2008-2013, was the major reason for the
weakening of their powers (JOU-01). The fight for ‘turf’ was the most violent and visible in
Jhatpat Market due to its geographical location, at the border between two rival gang
territories belonging to Uzair Baloch and Baba Ladla, two dominant stakeholders of the
Jhatpat Market (KI-15).

The lucrative trading at Jhatpat Market had attracted the most illegal land deals, and threats
from the gangsters left residents with no choice but to sell their property at much lower than
market rates (JOU-04). Ownership of the prime properties in Lyari Town gave gangsters
access to the area, and capturing the major markets of Lyari enabled them to make easy
money in ‘bhatta’ (extortion). A butcher of Jhatpat Market who was threatened in the past
by gangsters said that;
‘... these markets were the easiest source for gangsters to earn money... when the other (illegal) means of earning had become difficult, they focussed criminal activities on the local people of Lyari. Kidnapping for ransom, bhatta collection, road crimes, illegal land possessions, etc. had become part and parcel of our daily lives’ (L/ST-07).

Jhatpat Market where the PAC head office was located was the strongest ‘turf’ of gangster leader, Rehman Dakait, and the epicenter of PAC power. After Dakait’s encounter by the police in 2009, the gang split into two groups controlled by Uzair Baloch and Baba Ladla group (Section 4.3.4). Both the groups claimed and fought to make Jhatpat Market their territory, because of its economic value, and the amount of protection money that the market yielded (L/ST-02, L/ST-04, L/ST-05, L/ST-06, L/ST-09, L/ST-14, JOU-04, KI-10). Traders who were working in the market were aware that Jhatpat Market was the strongest ‘turf’ of the gangs, so had shown no resistance to give ‘bhatta’ to attain business security (L/ST-05, KI-10, JOU-04).
Map 5.4 was produced by journalists at the Herald newspaper in 2012 by tracking the progress of violence in Lyari. It shows, the central eastern territory dominated by Balochs was controlled by Abdul Rehman Baloch. The presence of other gangsters from the Arshad Pappu, Ghaffar Zikri and Jaango groups in the north and central western region existed before the formation of PAC. After the formation of PAC, Rehman Baloch gained monopolising control over most of Lyari (with the exception of northwest Lyari) until his death encountering with police, when the gangs split into two groups led by Uzair Baloch and Baba Ladla. Although both gangs belonged to the same ethnic group, the old family rivalry (Section 4.3.4) became the main reason for the split. Thus, the neighbourhoods which were previously the stronghold of Rehman Baloch became the battle ground for these two old rivals. The spatial
claims or ‘turf war’ between Uzair and Ladla group impacted the most on the neighbourhoods of Singu Lane, Chakiwara, Kalakot, Nawa Lane, Baghdadi, and Rangiwara (Map 5.5).

As one street trader in Jhatpat Market said;

‘..... Jhatpat Market was a battleground before the Rangers’ Operation. Uzair’s gunmen dominated the upper section of the market, while Ladla’s men had a hold in the bottom section. Every day, cross-firing from both sides was the routine for us. The main intention of both the groups was to take control of the whole market and thus the huge amount of ‘bhatta’ which it offered. The common people who were working or coming to the market to shop were the most affected. Many people were ruthlessly killed in the cross fire from both sides….we were become so used to hear the firing every day, that when there was a gap, the day seemed to be incompletely….’ (L/ST-02).

Map 5.5: Lyari Gangs Expansion to Bordering Areas
5.4.4 Strategies of control

The power of the gangsters’ network was determined by their extent of their control. The physical presence of gangsters at the entry and exit points of their ‘turf’ was an important control strategy (see Section 6.2). Each group instructed their members to interrogate and confirm the identities of anyone entering their territory (JOU-06). Access in the respective territories or ‘turf’ was restricted people of the same identity, which resulted in the ruthless killing of innocent people. Those living in the territory of the opposing gang were interrogated and if suspected of being an informer for the other side would be subjected to various degrees of violence. Outsiders from a different ethnicity, especially Mohajirs, who are easily distinguished by their physical appearance, dialect and clothing, would be killed without any cross-examination (L/ST-05, KI-10, JOU-04, JOU-05).

The gangsters employed around 5,000 youths from Lyari on daily wages of between 500 to 5000 PKR (£ 3 to £ 30), depending on the nature of work given to them (JOU-04). These youths joined PAC out of choice, because of the lack of jobs elsewhere, and because the stigma of living in Lyari meant that even the literate or skilled were rejected for jobs as they had a Lyari address on their NIC (National Identity Card). The involvement of so many young men in the gangs created an environment of extreme fear and distrust amongst local people, as nobody was certain if the people around them were working as informers for the gangsters (L/ST-01, L/ST-04, L/ST-11, L/ST-13, L/ST-14). The deployment of gangsters’ informers in Jhatpat Market was also mentioned as a significant mechanism of control. A street trader who was working in Uzair Baloch’s territory in Jhatpat Market explained the role of informer;

‘The mukhbir (informers) of both sides (both gangs) were present in the market... if a bhatta parchi (extortion note) on this side came from Baba Lada, Uzair’s mukhbir passed the information on to their commandos, which led to crossfire - a violent message to Baba Ladla’s men that how dare they enter into Uzair Baloch territory...’ (L/ST-04).

Sending an extortion note to the opposite gang’s side of the market created fear among the traders. Street traders mentioned that they were instructed by the gangsters to inform them
if they received an extortion demand from the opposing group (L/ST-01, L/ST-04, L/ST-05). The street traders’ involvement in the fight between the gangs made them vulnerable to violence from both groups. A Katchi shopkeeper in Jhatpat Market, who was working in Baba Ladla territory and who had to shut down his shop for a few months after receiving an extortion note (see Figure 5.1) explained the fear of people who were working in the market;

‘...they (Uzair’s people) had sent me a parchi either to pay PKR 500,000 (£2,500) without telling anyone or accept the bullet... if I had told Baba Ladla’s people, Uzair’s people would have identified and killed me...in both situations it was my loss...’ (L/ST-05).

![Figure 5.1: An Extortion letter to businessmen/traders in Karachi](image)
Source: Dawn Newspaper

Ethnically, Jhatpat Market was more mixed than the other case study areas. Katchis, Ghanchis, Balochs, Gujratis, Memons and others were all working together in the market without any defined territories, unlike in Saddar and Orangi. But selling property to people from outside the community was less common, and people preferred to trade land within the same community (JOU-01, JOU-04). The apartment buildings in Jhatpat Market mostly belonged to the Gujrati (Katchi, Ghanchi) community, giving a concentration of their community (Kl-15). But when the gangsters started to control the Jhatpat Market, many properties were sold outside the community to people who were directly or indirectly
involved with them (JOU-04). A Katchi trader in Jhatpat Market explained it as a tactic to bring their people in the market.

‘….they (the gangsters) had brought their people when they were in power so they can make their hold stronger by outnumbering us (Katchis, Ghanchis).’ (L/ST-10).

Another trader said the dominance of Baloch gangsters in Lyari made survival difficult in the area.

‘Our community (Gujarati) is the most affected by the atrocities of the gangsters….. we hold the major businesses in Lyari and thus suffer the most as victims of extortion and all other crimes, so it is difficult to survive under the dominance of these Baloch gangsters’ (L/ST6).

The real estate business was also very profitable for the gangsters. The plots they occupied were sold to builders for mid-rise residential or commercial development. Thus, between 1991 and 20117 several low rise residential neighbourhoods in Lyari were converted into dense mid-rise, mixed-use areas, especially along the main road arteries (Hasan 2014, JOU-04). This phenomenon has greatly affected the demography of Lyari, leading to a rapid increase in population.

5.5 Market unions

This section explores the nature, roles and responsibilities, and mediating capacities of various formal and informal market unions operating in ITS. The first sub-section examines the formal and informal nature of market unions across the case studies, and how negotiating powers are derived from their links with various stakeholders in ITS. The second sub-section

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7 The 2011 pre-census house counts shows that the population of Karachi increased from 9.8 million to 21.1 million within a decade. The massive housing demands made the government relax bylaws, thus FAR (floor area ratio) was revised all over the city. It was during this time when the low-rise area of Lyari was converted into a medium-rise high density neighbourhood (Hasan 2014).
focusses on pattern of interactions and hierarchy of roles of street traders and other actors within the market union. The third sub-section examines the impacts of politicisation of market unions in ITS. The fourth investigates a unique case of Iyari – a monopolistic-controlled market union.

Market unions cannot be discussed in isolation with identity-based, political and criminal networks as these groups are embedded in the organisation, functioning and controlling of market unions which exist in ITS. Therefore, this section will refer to the social networks discussed in the previous sections.

5.5.1 Formal and informal

Market unions, whether formal or informal, play a key role in unifying street traders and enabling them to negotiate with the authorities and other stakeholders (EXP-03, SOLE-03). A local resident and a har maal (assortment of small items) street trader in Orangi explained the role of the market union in dealing with local police;

‘...dealing with the police and (political) party workers (to be able work here) is too difficult for us as individuals, therefore, we prefer to be associated with a market union who will deal with thaana (local police station) and other people...' (O/ST-09)

Market unions are mainly established to protect the interest of the street traders (O/ST-05, O/ST-13 & KI-01). These unions are significant as they can raise the concerns of street traders with the relevant state offices and other powerful interest groups (KI-02). There are many market unions operating in all three markets, but most of them are not formally certified. Some unions are ethnic or tribal based, some focus on a specific street or locality, while others include people selling the same product, such as meat or spices. There were only two formal market unions in Saddar, namely Anjuman-Tajeeran Empress Market and Hawkers’ Ittehad Baradary, and two in Orangi; Anjuman-e-Tajeeran Bacha Khan Chowk and Anjuman-e-Tajeeran Aligarh Bazaar.
The registered market unions are stronger with an administrative hierarchy and operate visibly in the market. For example, Hawkers’ Ittehad Baradary in Saddar was reported to have better negotiating powers than other (non-registered) small market unions in the same area (KI-06, KI-08). However, the negotiating power of market unions does not only depend on their legal status, but their networks originate from complex social capital relations of political patronage and ethnicity. The connection to the dominant political parties is a key aspect which empowers them to interact with the municipal authorities, local police and Anti-Encroachment Department.

5.5.2 Operations

Market unions are fundamental in consolidating and defining the hierarchy of roles of street traders in ITS (O/ST-1, O/ST-9, O/ST-10, FS/ST-02, S/ST-11, KI-05, L/ST-05). There are various scales of operation of market unions found across case studies, particularly in Saddar and Orangi. Some are operating on a street level, others represent the wider area. It was noted that membership of market unions is not a choice – working in a particular location means that a street trader must automatically become a member of the union operating in that segment of the market (KI-06). Market unions are commonly responsible for: assigning trading space; organising handcarts to enable the traffic to flow; helping in retrieving products seized by KMC; discussing matters with local officials; providing loans; settling disputes over trading spaces; deputing a person from each locality to collect money from each street trader for payments to the police and other local officials; and helping families during sickness or bereavement (KI-01, KI-02, KI-08). These roles were found across the case studies.

Every market union splits their responsibilities and roles among three to six members depending on the size of the group (KI-02, KI-04). The common term used for informal market union representatives is a ‘thaikedar’. A key informant and other street traders explained that someone known as a thaikedar is ‘a person who is working for more than 10 years and owns five to ten handcarts, rented out to individual street traders on daily or monthly rent’ (KI-06). The individual links of thaikedaris with police and other local officials play a significant role in consolidating a position of market union. A representative from KMC signified the powers of thaikedar thus:
‘The Dubai Chowk market union (Hawkers’ Ittehad Bridary) is strong because of the leader’s connections with higher officials...when we conducted an anti-encroachment drive in that area, he (leader/thekaidar) used his connection in the Anti-Corruption department and filed a complaint against us...we received a restraining order from them... let’s see if this court will go in the court...’

The above quote indicates the importance of connections and political patronage of market unions to acquire strong negotiating positions.

5.5.3 Political and institutional patronage of market unions

Market unions (formal and informal) are seen as a key social platform across the case studies to control the politics of the markets. The political and institutional patronage of a market union, for example, supports ethno-political spatial claims, claiming municipal services and other favours, acquiring negotiating powers with state or non-state actors (KI-13, KI-16, JOU-04). The chairman of one of the market unions in Saddar said that in the early 1990s, the massive migration of Pakhtuns from KPK and Baluchistan was an important event which forced the established market unions to seek patronage from political parties in order to limit the Pakhtun control (KI-08).

‘...Market was not like that before...people from different groups (ethnicity, tribe) were working here...it was around 1990s when huge Pakhtun population started coming here which has changed the dynamics of the market....they had the support of agencies and political parties so we also sought support from (political) parties to continue working here...’ (KI-08).

During the 1990s, in parallel with Karachi’s rapid population growth, there was a sharp rise in the informal economy (Hasan and Mohib 2003). The unprotected nature of informal businesses made market unions to seek political patronage. While political parties find this an easy access to huge informal sector. A local police official said:
‘...the market union was the easy way for a political party to claim over the electoral constituency...’ (SOLE-10).

During 2005-2009, when PPP was not the ruling party in the provincial government, MQM was the majority party in the heart of the city, and managed to take control over important service provision state departments (KI-16). For example, KDA (the Karachi Development Authority) was controlled by MQM. KDA has three labour unions, backed up by PPP, JI and MQM. Out of these, the MQM supported union was the strongest which gave MQM control of key planning and development works in the city. Similarly, the strong MQM-dominated labour union in the Anti-Encroachment Department of KMC provide support to market unions associated with MQM. A member of the ‘Hawkers’ Ittehad Baradary’ said;

‘.... They (Mohajir street traders) have support from Anti-Encroachment (Department)....how come their hand carts are removed before the eviction....the head of the department is from their ‘gomiati’ (ethnicity) that is why....’(KI-04).

However, when PPP got back into power in the provincial government, and the SGLA 2013 was enacted, the powers of the mayor were greatly reduced, and KDA was put under the control of the provincial government⁸ (Section 4.2). This has benefitted the market unions affiliated to PPP and its allies JI, PKMAP. For example, the reliance of KMC’s Anti-Encroachment Department on the Sindh Police (the latter comes under provincial government) to conduct an anti-encroachment drive, allowed Hawkers’ Ittehad Baraday and other informal market unions in Saddar (supported by PPP) to use political patronage at the provincial level to try and halt the evictions (KI-06).

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⁸ KDA and KMC were both merged into CDGK (City District Government Karachi) under SGLO 2001 and placed under the direct supervision of the mayor of the city. However after the new local government elections in 2013, the KDA and its associated departments; Karachi Revenue Department, Karachi land Registry, Karachi Department of Transportation, Karachi Mass Transit and Sindh Building Control Authority was removed from KMC. The sub-division of KDA into MDA (Malir Development Authority) and LDA (Lyari Development Authority) further attenuated local government powers (Azam 2016).
Thus takeover of traders’ unions by political parties is a critical factor in the consolidation of ethnic groups in the market to gain potential voters (EXP-02). Once the constituency belongs to a particular political party, new street traders are limited to those with the same political affiliation.

5.5.4 Gangsters-controlled

The Lyari case study shows stronger control of market politics by gangsters than in Orangi and Saddar. The gangsters had completely taken over the market union. (The PAC head office in Jhatpat Market was also the market union office). In Saddar and Orangi, the market unions – both formal and informal – adopted a different negotiation mechanism, as, unlike Lyari, in both cases, only traders from that market were appointed to core leadership positions. Therefore, in Lyari the role of market union as the mediator between the political party, local officials and others was replaced by direct negotiation with gangsters. This gave gangsters exceptional powers so that they were able to completely exclude the participation of other stakeholders such as the police, traffic police and KMC from Lyari. During 2008–2014, Lyari was a ‘sheer No-Go’ area for police, KMC workers, and local officials – this was the time when PAC had a stronghold in every section of Lyari (JOU-01). For example, a police operation in 2008 which aimed to clear Lyari from the gangsters’ control completely failed as the police faced well-trained and skilled commandos who owed allegiance to PAC.

‘Lyari was the strong turf of the gangsters – the primary reason was their monopolistic control over all domains....they were in charge of socio-economic welfare, law and order, and politics. As in other areas of Karachi, we can see that the market network required the support from local officials (the police, KMC, traffic police) to negotiate with the higher authorities. But in Lyari, traders had to negotiate with gangsters for everything....’ (JOU-01).

Networks in Jhatpat Market were seen as being fragile, mainly because of the concentration of power amongst one group, the gangsters. The gangsters’ physical presence in the market served as an espionage network, which never let traders’ groups become powerful, enabling the gangsters to maintain a strong monopolising control. In contrast, in Saddar and Orangi
the pattern of control was quite different, as street traders drew their power from local identity-based networks. Street traders in these networks mainly negotiated through ‘middlemen’ to claim the resources for their members (Section 6.3). The various agglomerations of street traders in Saddar and Orangi were drawing their power from multiple connections to networks and were not controlled by any single network. For example, the agglomeration of Achakzai street traders in Saddar used multiple networks for dealing with local officials when facing displacement, confiscation of goods, police raids at their houses or detention of people from their community. Similarly, in Orangi, the JI political party plays a leading role in supporting the expansion of the Pakhtun street traders’ agglomeration. Thus for street traders, the bridging across multiple networks in both Saddar and Orangi cases studies does not allow a single power group to gain control, and so there are much stronger horizontal network ties compared to Lyari.

5.6 Conclusion

The chapter discusses in depth the nature and functioning of various social networks and their role in shaping the access to ITS. It is divided into four sections, identity-based networks, political networks, criminal networks and market unions. The categorisation is not clear cut, as the networks often overlapped, and worked in parallel to reinforce their negotiating position with political agents and local state officials. Identity-based networks were central in Orangi and Saddar, where networks were formed on the basis of kinship and tribal origin, which enabled street traders to access trading space. Identity-based networks were particularly strong amongst the Pakhtun community, but also evident amongst other street trading groups. The networks enabled street traders to use their identity to strengthen their claim against networks, stakeholders and local officials. The identity of a street trader thus plays a crucial role in accessing the market and setting up in a particular location of the city. Initially this domination by Pakhtun networks was probably chance rather than strategy, until the potential for a political challenge to (by then, militarised) MQM became evident.

Weaker or marginalised groups would affiliate to a stronger, identity-based network as a way of penetrating the otherwise inaccessible market. The case studies show that by virtue of bonding and bridging across social networks, street traders at both individual and group level
were able to challenge the previous systems of market management and acquire a better position to negotiate claims. At an individual level, novice street traders with no urban links would find people from the same ethnic or tribal background to help them start trading. At group level, identity-based networks help mitigate against the discrimination, and enable a group to gain political representation in the city. In Saddar and Orangi case studies, Pakhtun street traders were able to develop their political capacities over time, in opposition to the Mohajir street traders’ network support by MQM.

Close bonds of ethnicity and trust are advantageous financially in trade. When a street trader is starting a business, financial or in-kind support from a family or friend is significant in establishing the business and ensuring upward economic mobility. The case studies show that Pakhtun street traders have more robust relationships of trust than other communities – a significant reason for their expanding network.

Achieving critical mass in ITS is another fundamental strategy used to strengthen influence in political negotiation with state and non-state actors. The phenomenon of dominating an area with people of similar identity provides an opportunity for consolidating the economic and political power of a network, maximising opportunities for rent seeking and ensuring votes during elections. Active strategic investment in land purchase by Pakhtuns is most visible in territorialising ITS which is discussed in detail in Chapter 6.

Section 5.3 focussed on complexity and interrelationship of political networks with other networks in ITS. Political networks are most influential in mediating and negotiating the claims of street traders with state officials. Thus, in all case studies, social networks tend to be aligned with political networks to occupy or reoccupy trading space in the markets. The unelected representatives of a political party are most powerful in mediating the claims between street traders and local officials by virtue of their access (and network) to elected Provincial and National Assembly members. The physical presence of political parties, in Unit Offices or baithak in the market is one that street traders accept in order to be able to negotiate with state institutions. Political networks see ethnic clustering of street traders as the main strategy for controlling markets, both to consolidate the potential for electoral gain in their constituencies, and also to mark the territory from which a political group can collect extortion money.
Another important finding is the extent to which control by particular political networks is linked to electoral constituencies. Political constituencies play an essential role in defining the control of a particular group in the area, and it is observed that the rigid fragmentation of the market by ethnicity broadly follows the Union Committee (UC) boundaries. The bifurcation of UC-13 and UC-14 in Aliqah Bazaar is an example of rigid ethnic segregation between Mohajir and Pakhtun street traders which are followed by distinct political controls. This overlap between political and ethnic boundaries suggests both that informal mechanisms of urban market management have been established for some time, and that they may have emerged during periods when local government was weak or suspended (Section 4.2.2) and following the 2015 UC elections, are now formalised through electoral control.

The reciprocal interests of traders, political parties and other state and non-state institutions are multi-layered. The political networks guard the interests of street traders and, in return for trading space, the traders were required to give payments through extortion to the political party and to participate in their political activities. The mandatory attendance of all network members in political rallies held by that party is an example of such reciprocal obligations.

Section 5.4 emphasised the supremacy of gangsters’ networks in Lyari replacing identity-based and political networks. Unparalleled powers were given to gangsters by PPP, the dominating party at provincial level to fight against MQM, the dominant party in the City, which was a major reason for their monopolistic control in Lyari. The bonding and bridging of street traders within and across other groups in Lyari were weak as compared to other two case studies due to gangsters’ strong control in the area. The research found that the street traders living in the territory of a particular gang were also affiliated to the gang for trade, regardless of their ethnic identity. The Lyari case study shows that gangsters’ ‘turf’ was the key division among street traders in the market.

The formation of PAC – the violent affiliate of PPP – provided the means through which gangsters became involved in the socio-economic and political affairs of Lyari. The case study showed that Jhatpat Market in Lyari was most affected by gang control, as its head office was located within the market, and after the gangs split the market became a violent interface for territorial claims between the gangs. Three tactical strategies were found to be frequently used by a group to claim space and control. The first was sending extortion notes to segments
of the market, which if not contested by other gangs marked the control of the sender. The second ploy was the physical deployment of gang informers, or musclemen, at the strategic locations of the market which defined the boundaries of areas of a particular gang utilised for tapping for ‘protection’ money. The third was the investment in properties in and around major markets of Lyari. Gangsters bought many properties in Jhatpat Market since access to an expanding domain of plots and buildings gave them more leverage to expand their control within their burgeoning ‘turf’.

The last section focussed on the nature, roles, responsibilities and mediating capacities of various formal and informal market unions operating in ITS. The market unions are not working in isolation, their structure and operations are embedded in identity-based, political and criminal networks. Thus, case studies show that various political and criminal actors exploit market unions for economic and political benefits.

Across case studies, market unions – formal and informal – are vital in enabling street traders to negotiate their claims with other networks and stakeholders. However, the legal status of market unions is not the only determinant of their negotiating power; their networks originate from complex social capital relations of political patronage and ethnicity. The connection to the dominant political parties is a pathway which empowers market unions to negotiate with the authorities and the local state.

In conclusion, the chapter highlights that belonging to a social network is critical social capital for street traders. The social networks are complex and intertwined in multiple power relations of various ethnically, politically and criminally controlled actors. This research thus departs from the common perception in the informal economy literature, which portrays street traders as a marginalised group victimised by the state. In an ethnically fragmented and contested context like Karachi, the empirical evidence suggests a more complex reality, whereby street traders’ networks become complicit actors in the power struggle over economic gains and finance, political domination and territory, and street traders are political actors in a wider struggle for power.
6. Claiming Informal Trading Spaces

6.1. Introduction

This chapter argues that claiming space is a key spatial strategy for the survival of traders in the case study areas. The spatial claim of street traders in ITS – their territoriality – is primarily used as a way to claim control, or counter the control, of a dominant political, or economic, group. This results in a division of territories, which can be seen as the spatial expression of the power tussle in ITS amongst various actors and networks described in Chapter 5.

This chapter is divided into three sections. Section 6.2 critically examines various mechanisms deployed to maintain territorial claim between the two groups in ITS. It explains the constant fight to expand and consolidate the territory, how boundaries are defined, and the concept of benign and volatile boundaries. It further investigates the dynamics of inter- and intra-political alliances in defining symbolic and physical boundaries in ITS.

Sections 6.3 and 6.4 examine the hidden processes that underlie boundary making and spatial claim. Section 6.3 examines the role of middlemen in claiming and controlling space. It explores the various power relationships between middlemen and other actors and how these impact on the territorialisation and division of ITS.

Section 6.4 explores the overlapping claims to space between different state institutions and how gaps in legitimate state power have created opportunities for state and non-state actors to collude over spatial claims. This is followed by the conclusion in Section 6.5.
6.2. Claiming territory

This section examines the strategies pursued by various actors to assert and retain control over a territory, and the physical expression of that spatial control. The section is divided into three sub-sections. The first sub-section explores how connections with powerful actors and musclemen (gangsters and thugs) enable street traders to claim a space. The second sub-section explores how informal actors use their visibility and economic power as tools to maintain a territory. The third sub-section discusses the boundary-making strategies that informal actors use to demarcate territories.

6.2.1. Maintaining territory

The territorial struggle in ITS is observed as an ongoing process, and every group is constantly involved in maintaining and reinforcing their territorial control. This section explores how groups use economic power and visibility to gain power and strengthen their spatial control.

Economic power leading to spatial control

Commercial competition among multiple contenders over space is important in setting territorial boundaries. As Yiftachel (1998) argues, the economic superiority of a group is a key resource for territoriality. Conflict over economic trading space is a conflict over maintaining ‘turf’ (an area of control), which leads to contested spatial claims. An academic, (EXP-01), explained, the conflict between Mohajirs and Pakhtuns in Orangi was actually over territorial control of the market. In the past Orangi was a strategically important location for immigrants to establish territorial identities because the major business districts in the centre of the city were inaccessible whilst under the control of Mohajirs. This empirical evidence echoes the findings of Storey (2012), who concluded that less powerful groups strive to gain control of particular geographical space to assert their presence. In Orangi, Pakhtuns claimed territorial control by infiltrating Mohajir territory through economic power. Tablighi space (a space for religious preaching) is an interesting example in Orangi. Pakhtuns managed to enter the market by capturing mosques and madrasahs for religious preaching. They accessed the Jama Masjid (central mosque) of Aligarh Bazaar through a religious jamaat (Muslim group) exchange programme\(^1\). Thus, the Jama Masjid in Aligarh Bazaar became the ideal strategic location for

\(^1\) Every year a Muslim three day religious convention is held in Raiwind, a town located in the city of Lahore. This town is known as the centre of Tabligi Jamaat (religious preaching group) across Pakistan.
Pakhtuns to start infiltrating Mohajir territory, as explained by a representative from the Orangi Pilot Project;

‘... their (Pakhtuns) presence in the mosque gave them the strong roots to enter in this market....’ (KI-19).

In Aligarh Bazaar the mosque became the physical divide between Mohajirs and Pakhtun trading zones. Initially, Pakhtuns accessed the central junction (chowk) where the mosque is situated, and then started investing money in buying up shops towards the south in UC-14. Later, the mosque became the physical barrier between Mohajir and Pakhtun territories (Map 6.1). The strong economic support from the Pakhtun network meant that they could acquire many shops on the southern side of the market. This control over religious space was followed by huge investments in acquiring new properties in an area. Frontier Colony (a residential neighbourhood in UC-15, Orangi is one such investment that gave Pakhtuns power to negotiate a trading space in UC-14 and UC-15. Another example is Metroville – formerly a Mohajir dominated area where Pakhtuns bought the land at a price far greater than market value to take control of an important strategic location (KI-12).

Territoriality based on economic superiority was mainly seen in Saddar and Orangi, where Pakhtun street traders bought their way into the territory. An academic expert, (EXP-03), said that other groups, predominantly Urdu speakers (Mohajirs), lost spatial control in ITS mainly because of their weak economic power. He further explained that Mohajirs raised money mainly from extortion in their constituencies, mostly from Urdu-speakers, whereas Pakhtuns who dominate key business sectors in Karachi, such as construction and transport, have outside interests as well as their extortion money (EXP-03). As a key informant in Saddar explained;

‘There are many reasons why Pakhtuns’ purchasing power is strong. They own all the main transport networks in Karachi. The entire construction industry is dominated by them and they dominate water hydrants, from filling tankers to transporting water to each house. They tapped illegal connections from government sources and sell to the entire Defence colony [an upscale residential neighbourhood of Karachi] at a very high price because they have
a monopoly of these industries. In contrast, the only source of income for Mohajirs is extortion, mostly from other Mohajirs’ (KI-08).

Territory is an important indicator of identity and is another key theme that emerges from interviews with street traders across the case studies. This finding is aligned with Soja’s concept of territory, which ‘provides an essential link between society and the space it occupies primarily through its impact on human interaction and the development of group spatial identities’ (Soja 1971, p. 33).

Several street traders said that knowing that the members from their community are working in the same locality provides them with a sense of identity and belonging to space (S/ST-01, S/ST-12, O/ST-02, O/ST-14). In an interview, an expert (EXP-03) explained that the aggressive upward economic mobility of the Pakhtun community is a major factor in understanding their control over land and informal trading businesses in Karachi. Huge investments in buying land have been made by Pakhtuns, and over time acquisitions have given them economic stability and made them the most powerful stakeholder in informal businesses. An older Punjabi resident of Saddar who has seen the transformation of the area, discussed its transition from a multi-ethnic trading hub to a monopolistic centre of control;

‘... they (Pakhtuns) buy land at double the market price to strengthen their control in the market and force other communities out.... Now they also own the shops in the market which gives them power to limit the access of street traders outside their community’ (KI-05).

The economic power held by a group also leads to political power, which enables them to maintain and extend territorial control. Economic power buys the patronage of local officials and political parties who reciprocate by assisting a group to occupy trading space in the market. The stronger a group’s economic power and political influence the better its position to negotiate space in the market. An information officer, (KI-20), a local bureaucrat in Saddar town explained how important the economic strength of a group is to maintain and expand its territorial network:
‘... money can buy everything.... today Pakhtuns are powerful because of their economic strength...... Party (political), police station anything you can buy (their patronage) with money, and they (Pakhtuns) have the money which is why they are the most powerful group in the market. The entire stretch of Dubai Chowk is captured by Pakhtuns, and police, KMC, Anti-Encroachment Department all are submissive to them because their leader is powerful and greasing the palms from higher state officials to local field officials’ (KI-20).

Visibility as a tool of power and spatial control

Visibility is a strategy used by both identity-based networks and political alliances (Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2) to maintain territory. The importance of working as a group in order to be seen as a force in the market by other groups and local officials was evident from interviews with street traders. Scott (1990) argues a similar notion of spatial control where a less powerful group declares its visibility by creating spaces of resistance, while Bozzioli (1999, p. 6) sees a process of spatial claim by a subordinate group as a ‘public transcript’ in which the visibility is seen as assertion of identity. The visibility as spatial expression of power in ITS is found across the case studies.
Map 6.1: Map showing mosque as a physical divider between Pakhtun and Mohajir turf in Orangi

Having a visible presence in the market strengthens street traders’ ability to build a network and thus to secure fixed trading spots, which is important in gaining regular customers. In all three UCs in the Orangi case study it was evident that street traders with no group affiliation, or who are linked to a minority group, occupied the least visible and least profitable trading locations. Vulnerability of a group due to lack of visibility and connections was particularly evident in the upper north trading location of Bacha Khan Chowrangi (Map 6.2) where traders were particularly vulnerable to evictions and high levels of extortion. Interviews with street traders, (O/ST-01, O/ST-02, O/ST-03), in that zone suggested that without the strength of a group, negotiations with local officials and political party agents are difficult and thus, they are vulnerable to harsher treatment than other groups in the market. Therefore, street traders
prefer to trade in locations where they have a large number of people from similar identity or ethnic backgrounds (KI-02). Police and local officials of the Anti-Encroachment Department of the Orangi Municipal Office also said that local authorities could not do much when there were big agglomerations of traders, because the traders called on politicians for support who then stopped the anti-encroachment drives (SOLE-01, SOLE-09). A street trader leader in Saddar pointed out the ability of a strong network to develop connections with local officials and political parties of the area;

‘... the large number of our community is working here because we have *jaan pehchan* (connections) with powerful people....’ (KI-04).

Map 6.2: Map showing vulnerable group in Orangi
Street traders used this visibility to tap into various opportunities and widen the scope of negotiations with different stakeholders. For example, the leader of a street trader agglomeration at Dubai Chowk in Saddar draws on his power to claim space from the Achakzai Jirga in Karachi. Although the Achakzai’s political party (PKMAP) - Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party) is not strong in Karachi and mainly holds power in KPK province, its involvement in the construction and transport sectors in Karachi gives it the funds to claim and negotiate access to space for the party’s community.

‘…. we are doing business here (in this central market of Saddar) because of our network leader. He has connections with the upper tier of Achakzais’ group, therefore, it is not easy for police and KMC to intimidate us….’ (S/ST-09)

The territorial visibility of a group is key to establishing links with the local political party in power, and political parties also use large ethnic trading groups to gain political advantage. In Orangi, UC-13 is contested between three political parties – ANP, PTI and JI – who all compete to gain sway over Pakhtun trading agglomerations. Parties want political support from these large groups to have a physical presence and thus, ‘hold’ the area or market in order to secure a vote bank, and also to benefit from extortion money from Bacha Khan and Aligarh Bazaar. The ex-branch manager of a local bank in Aligarh Bazaar, UC-13, who was posted here until 2013 (the most volatile year in Orangi) highlighted the economic benefits that political parties reaped from the large street trader’s groups;

‘…. every day extortion collection from these markets is in hundreds of thousands of rupees (PKR) – which is the main reason why political parties want to control a territory….’ (KI-11)

A street trader in UC-14 noted that territorial control by a political party legitimises the extortion collection from the market;

‘…. why wouldn’t they want a seat in UC-13, it’s a huge informal trading market with a high turnover of bhatta (extortion money)….. The fight is to gain ‘hold’ in the market – the party who hoists their flag in an area announces it as their territory, which gives them a permit to collect bhatta from shopkeepers and street traders…..’ (O/ST-12).
In Lyari, the claim of spatial control is contested between criminal gangs. Various mechanisms are devised by gangs to wrestle control of the ‘turf’ in order to claim their presence. For example, the formation of ‘People’s Aman Committee’ (PAC) within the market premises of Jhatpat Market was seen as the key to obtaining physical access in the market (JOU-04, JOU-01, KI-15). For gangsters, getting access to Jhatpat Market was also a strategy to widen territorial gain in the surrounding of Memon and Kachi-dominated areas and markets. PAC thus expanded their network to the Katchi, Memon and Mohajir-dominated areas of Tannery Road, Ahmed Shah Bukhari Road, AgraTaj, Culrey, Nayabad, Daryabad, Memon Society and Khadda (JOU-05), (Map 6.3). The other important concern was to strengthen opposition to MQM in the city by establishing physical presence and a political foothold in Lyari, which gave access to the main entrance and exit points of the city, the wholesale and retail markets, the higher-income residential neighbourhoods and Karachi sea port. (Map 6.3). (FSOLE-01, JOU-04)

Map 6.3: Map showing the importance of strategic location of Lyari
Visibility as a group at a particular location gives street traders the power to negotiate their spatial claims, and to promote their demands with other networks, political parties and local officials. This was a view frequently voiced by street traders in Orangi and Saddar (O/ST-02, O/ST-03, O/ST-13, O/ST-14, S/ST-01, S/ST-07, S/ST-11). For example, a street trader in Saddar said:

‘….. a network with few people is weak…they cannot make an impact or negotiate effectively with other networks, the police or KMC\(^2\) etc. When we unite in a group with big numbers we become stronger and negotiate the entry in the market or the location of trade or the return to our trading space after eviction drives. We work in a concentrated location and therefore exist in large numbers and are represented by powerful people, who have the reach to the MNA (Member of National Assembly), which makes our network stronger than others….’ (STS-11).

Map 6.4 identifies the two distinct street trader groups in Saddar. The north side of Empress Market and the Dubai Chowk junction are dominated by Pakhtun street traders. The southern section represents street traders from mixed ethnic backgrounds, which makes it more vulnerable to municipality threats of expulsion.

The pattern of visibly filling space with people from the same ethnic background is also visible at city scale to secure political constituencies. For example, an expert, (EXP-04), gave the example of Qasba Colony in Orangi where, during the 1970s and 1980s, Pakhtuns from Baluchistan and KPK (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) were brought into the area. This was because it was a Mohajir stronghold, but was still an easy location for migrant communities to settle by virtue of its then location at the periphery of urban boundaries. Thus to attenuate the political clout of MQM, Pakhtuns were strategically settled by opposition parties and therefore many constituencies that previously belonged to Mohajirs came under Pakhtun domination.

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\(^{2}\) The Local Government system of Karachi comprised of KMC which is subdivided into six District Municipal Corporations (DMCs); District Central, District South, District West, District East, Malir and Korangi. Each district is further divided into Union Committees (UCs) headed by Chairman and Vice Chairman (for more details refer to Box 6.1)
6.2.2. Demarcating boundaries

This sub-section analyses the micro-spatial boundary-making strategies of different actors in ITS to assert territorial control. In all three case study areas it is evident that the demarcation of boundaries is key to spatial claims, discussed in the first sub-section below. It is noted that various actors see territory in terms of ‘our’ and ‘their’ jagah (place). In the demarcation of ‘our’ and ‘their’ place, various territorial markers and strategies are evident in the case studies. These are discussed under the second and third sub-sections below: i) visible and invisible territories of power; and ii) benign and volatile boundaries of power.
Defining territories within markets

All the case studies have territories clearly defined by boundaries in the markets – in Orangi and Saddar these mark ethnic divisions and in Lyari, gang territories. KI-05, an older street trader working in Saddar area explains how important the ethnic division is in the market space.

‘If I (as a Punjabi) want to set up a (trading) stall at Dubai Chowk it would be difficult to get access. But, since I have been working for 25 years in this market over time I have developed networks, I can still have the chance to get a space. But it is not possible for a novice non-Pakhtun trader to do business in that territory.’ (KI-05)

KI-05 further illustrates how the ethnic division that developed in the market is impenetrable to outsiders who do not belong to the same community. The two distinct ethnic trade zones in Saddar are Dubai Chowk and Empress Market precinct. These two zones are completely dominated by Pakhtuns – other groups cannot access these territories, even if they have worked in the area for a long time (KI-05, KI-08, S/ST-01). The other streets and zones in Saddar, which also formed part of the case study area, did not show such rigid ethnic clustering. For example, Urdu speakers, Punjabis, Seraikis, Sindhis, and Hazaras were working in the same zones. Although Pakhtuns came much later in Karachi, their financial dominance enabled them to purchase political patronage and so to administer the informal businesses in Karachi (EXP-03).

A similar pattern was recorded in Orangi, where the informal market is divided into distinct Pakhtun and Mohajir territories – the two competing groups of street traders. The strategic boundaries created between the two groups becomes the zone of conflict as each group seeks to extend their existing territory (KI-12, KI-19, SOLE-04, SOLE-09). Gayer (2014, p. 45), argues that such an interface between the two separate networks or groups forms a ‘topographical ideological boundary’ that physically and symbolically demarcates ethnic communities. An ex-branch manager of Aligarh Bazaar said;

‘…… this side and the other side of the market (after the intersection 'chowk') is completely divided on linguistic (ethnic) lines. Mohajirs could not come to
this side of the market, neither could Pakhtuns could go to the other during the conflict...... business has been confined to ethnic clusters' (KI-12).

The ethnic partitioning of the market initially limited traders, but not customers, from crossing into the opposite territory. However, the escalation of violence in 2009-2013 created an atmosphere of fear that also restricted the movement of customers and created zones segregated by ethnicity. Feldman (1991, p. 17) defines these as 'spatial formations of violence'.

A Pakhtun Street trader also explains;

‘... The identity (of customers) was not an issue before... Mohajir and Pakhtun customers used to move around both sides of the market without any fear (and disparity). But when Karachi’s (law and order) situation got worst, Mohajir customers had stopped coming here...’ (O/ST-12).

Figure 6.1: The border street in Aligarh Bazaar, Orangi between Pakhtuns and Mohajirs – the bullet holes showing the intensity of clashes between the two groups.

The role of Union Committee boundaries

The rigid fragmentation in the market on an ethnic basis is also directly linked with Union Committee (UC) boundaries (SOLE-04). Union Committees form the lowest tier of local government, now with an elected member, but these are strongly politically aligned. For
example, the stretch of market from Bacha Khan Chowk to the Aligarh Jama mosque junction comes under UC 14, an area predominantly occupied by Pakhtun traders. UC14 is a constituency where JI political party won the seat in the 2015 local election (previously held by ANP—both parties represent Pakhtun ethnicity). UC 13 starts from the Aligarh Jama junction and runs northwards. It is an MQM stronghold where Urdu speaking (Mohajirs) traders dominate. Both political parties want to extend or reclaim turf to secure political constituencies and control the extortion levied on the huge amount of informal trading activity in the area, as a local NGO activist explained;

‘Political parties manipulate ethnicities in the quest of power struggle and their personal benefits’ (KI-19).

Some interviewees discussed this territorialisation in more detail. As interviewee, (SOLE-08), commented, the control of political parties in a particular territory is linked to their representation in government offices; for example, the Urdu speaking traders are associated with the MQM political party, which gives them the power to establish turf in UC 13. Members of the turf obtained the support of the MQM elected state representative, which helped them to consolidate the area (SOLE-08). Therefore, the access of non-Urdu speaking traders (and of Urdu speakers in UC 14) is controlled with the support of formal state actors. Thus, the spatial division is not only controlled by individual Pashtu and Urdu speaking groups at the market scale, but also, these divisions are institutionalised in politics at the local (Unit Committee) city and national scale.

**Visible and invisible territories of power**

Boundary making in the markets is the physical manifestation of power of different groups. The marking of a territory defines the limits of group power and control, which is similar to the concept of ‘claimed/created’ spaces formed by a non-dominant group to claim control of a particular space (see Section 2.4.2), (Gaventa 2005, p. 25). The demarcation of space through visible or invisible boundaries used by groups for empowerment and to claim space was observed across all three case studies, but the presence of criminal gangs in Lyari make the territorial indicators or markers more visible than in the other two cases.

In Lyari, the territorial markers are fundamental in defining gang ‘turf’. The marking of ‘turf’ is also linked with defining the spatial coordinates of enemies and allies in the area (KI-10). As
mentioned by a local resident, (KI-07), the gangsters’ ‘turf’ limited local residents and people from adjacent neighbourhoods in entering and navigating the area. In an interview, a journalist from Lyari (JOU-04) gave a detailed overview of the process of defining a territory in the area.

First:

‘... gang members patrol at strategic locations (entrance/exit points) in each territory – a key mechanism for marking territory. Where they interrogate you before letting you go inside, they ask you to speak relevant languages (Balochi, Katchi, and Pushto) to confirm your identity. Then they make a phone call to the local resident you are visiting to confirm your identity. This has created major psychological barriers for the people to move around the area. The most difficult time in this area was experienced by Mohajirs, and many people were killed if they could not speak the local languages of Lyari (Baloch, Katchi, Katihawari, Memon) or did not wear traditional clothes (shalwar kameez)’ (JOU-05).

Second:

‘... the killing of an opposing gang member in one’s territory is another way of defining the limits and making it stronger. For example, the murder of Abdul Waheed (a member of opposing Uzair Baloch’s gang) by Baba Ladla’s group in Pak Colony was a message for Uzair Baloch that their control now expanded to this area’ (JOU-05).

A local government official from the District Commissioner’s Office, South, explained further how the boundaries in Lyari are drawn to define the sovereignty of a group in the territory;

‘Jhatpat Market is divided between two groups, which have both marked their territories. At some places the boundaries are visible and cordoned off with physical barriers, while others are invisible. The groups have defined the boundaries in different ways: the façades of the shop are coded with the colour associated with a particular gang – light green for the Baba Ladla gang and darker green for the Uzair Baloch gang’ (SOLE-08).
As well as limiting the residents’ movement in the area, the ‘turf’ boundaries also affected people’s choice of a particular trading location in Lyari. For example, people who live in Rangiwara and Singo Lane were restricted to trading in their own areas as the neighbourhoods belong to opposite gangs. As a shopkeeper in Jhatpat Market, who was working there in 2014-15, before the gangs split and gang war escalated (Section 4.3) commented:

‘…. I live in Rangiwara area of Lyari, when the gang was split into Uzair Baloch and Baba Ladla groups, the commute from my area to Jhatpat Market became very difficult…’ (L/ST-11).

In Orangi, the Ex-SHO (Station House Officer in charge of the local police station) describes the provision of permanent stalls to street traders on the Pakhtun side of the market as a mechanism of control by defining identity ‘turf’. The market president of ‘Anjuman-e-Tajeevan, Aligarh’ by virtue of strong local support and political connections was able to negotiate the construction of permanent kiosks on the public road – which is otherwise not allowed on a public thoroughfare as the Ex-SHO said;

‘The permanent kiosks on the Pakhtun side is the physical expression of the power of the Pakhtun group – in particular the network leader’ (SOLE-04).

Boundary making in markets is different to boundaries in residential areas or other neighbourhoods. None of the groups wanted to limit or restrict the admission of consumers to particular zones or street trader groups. Therefore, there were no visible barricades in any of the three case study areas, but rather, the use of invisible or coded signs to mark boundaries were recorded. For example, interviewees in all three case studies mentioned boundary markers, such as an electricity pole, roundabout, plot or building periphery, loud speakers, political party flag, banners and wall posters (See Figure 6.2, 6.3, 6.4). These were used as key markers to demarcate the boundaries between the groups (L/ST-05, L/ST-13, O/ST-12, S/ST-01, S/ST-10, KI-05, KI-08, KI-09, KI-10, KI-16, SOLE-02, SOLE-08, JOU-01).
Various other mechanisms for marking or controlling territory were documented in Lyari, Orangi and Saddar, which ranged from fixing posters of the political party or gangster leader on walls, to painting shop fronts in different colours (FSOLED-01). Some key physical markers mentioned by key informants, street traders, local officials and journalists were:
Lyari

‘The segment of market before the (electric) pole belongs to Baba Ladla and his boys, who collect extortion from this side, while the market beyond the (electric) pole is Uzair’s territory’ (KI-10).

‘… this (Tauheedi) mosque divides the territory of two gangs…’ (JOU-01).

‘… Baba Ladla’s territory was restricted to Gul Mohammad Lane…’ (KI-10).

‘… Bullets wali gali (the street with bullet holes) defines the boundary between Uzair and Ladla extent of control…’ (JOU-01). (Picture 6.5)

Orangi

‘… this junction (chowk) divides Mohajirs’ and Pakhtuns’ territory’ (O/ST-12).

‘Charpai gali (street) defines the most critical boundary between Pakhtuns and Urdu speaking areas’ (SOLE-04).

Saddar

‘The northern side of Disco bakery belongs to Mohajirs and Hazara street traders, while southern (toward Dubai Chowk) is the Pakhtuns’ stronghold’ (KI-05).

‘… Chai dhaba (tea kiosk) divides the Achakzai and Kaker communities of Pakhtun street traders’…’ (KI-09).

‘Empress Market has become the symbolic power centre for Pakhtuns street traders…’ (KI-08).
Symbolic and visible mechanisms are fundamental to asserting territorial control and to demarcating boundaries. Ardrey (1967) argues that the demarcation of boundaries is a ‘territorial imperative’ that impels groups to defend space. However, the case studies indicate that the territorial imperative was intertwined with a social hierarchy of contesting stakeholders. The wall-chalking in Lyari (Fig 6.6) clearly illustrates that the support of PPP for gangsters, enabled them to reinforce their territorial claim. Figures 6.7 to 6.9 show other wall chalking examples as territorial markers in the case studies.
Figure 6.7: ‘Altaf or death’ - An extortion threat for Lea Market traders from MQM political workers. Source: The Nation Newspaper

Figure 6.8: PPP flag as a symbolic boundary. Source: News One

Figure 6.9: Underside of the bridge painted with ANP flag and leader photo to define the territorial boundaries.
Benign and Volatile Boundaries

Both benign and violent attempts by networks were used to control territory and assert the spatial implications of power. All the case studies demonstrated that the imposition of boundaries in ITS is often violent. However, not all boundaries are violent and the power relations among the networks or actors determine the nature of boundary. This section aims to analyse the benign and volatile boundaries recorded in three case study trading areas.

The first part of the section explains the concept of a benign boundary based on frequent responses from street traders and key informants supported by observed evidence from the case studies. The second part of the section follows the same approach to define volatile boundaries.

Benign boundaries

Saddar

‘... in times of need they (Kaker tribe) let our (Achakzai tribe) people work on their side...’ (KI-04).

Orangi

‘... their (Yousufzai tribe) leader used his sources to negotiate for our (Kakakhel tribe) space... ’(O/ST-02).

A benign boundary is typically a boundary that exists as a tacit understanding between two different social groups (based on tribal difference, geographical location or different dialect) of street traders who share the same ethnicity. The segregation of trading zones is not visible, the movement of street traders across this boundary is negotiable and porous, and the boundary is not defended.

Benign boundaries were observed in both Orangi and Saddar, to define the spatial segregation of a sub-ethnic group of street traders, where social hierarchy provides a privileged position to particular sections of the ethnic group (Gazdar et al. 2010). An NGO worker in Orangi described how Pakhtun traders define tribal territories as a result of inter- and intra-group mechanisms;

Claiming Informal Trading Space
‘There are two groups working at Banaras Chowk. Pakhtuns located towards the Qasba belt are from Quetta, and along the Bacha Khan Bridge mainly from KPK (Swat or Afghanistan) who later migrated to Quetta. The inter-group rivalry between them can be seen; that they have marked their areas – Quetta Pakhtuns towards Qasba and KPK Pakhtuns on Bacha khana stretch. But they keep their internal disputes within themselves and do not let them get in the way of their trade. They unify when they have to fight with other ethnic groups… in larger economic affairs they support each other’ (KI-19).

The porous boundary between sub-ethnic or tribal groups helped the group to negotiate the spatial claims with local officials and police. A representative of Karachi West Zone Law Enforcing Agency explained that the alliance between different Pakhtun street trader groups in Saddar makes it difficult for police and other local officials to enter their territory;

‘… they (Pakhtuns street traders) know their (large) number is their power and their profits and losses are similar… despite tribal disputes they unite when we conduct any anti-encroachment operation… every Pakhtun zone has a separate beater (strongman) in each group but when they have to deal with the area’s police station or relevant municipal office they become one….’

(SOLE – 02).

In the case of a benign boundary no visible markers are recorded in the case studies. Verbal agreement was mentioned as the only way of knowing the limit of the other group, as explained by the lead hawker of Kaker’s (Pakhtun tribe) group;

‘… we decide among ourselves the boundary where their people can park the pushcarts and where ours can … we always keep a ‘gunjaish’ (flexibility) for negotiation… we keep our boundary discreet and don’t let the outsiders know if there is one…’ (KI-09).
**Volatile boundaries**

Saddar

‘... if we (mixed ethnic group; Mohajirs, Punjabis and Hazaras) do not make our people work (trade) on this street (opposite to Dubai Chowk), this will also be occupied by them (Pakhtuns)...’ (STS-12)

Orangi

‘... they (Pakhtuns) cannot come further to this chowk (a central junction in Aligarh Bazaar), we (Mujhajirs) have made our people guard this side...’ (KI-0

Lyari

‘... Baba Ladla's men cannot advance beyond the Morcha (sandbag wall of defence, Figure 6.10)...(JOU-01)

Based on evidence from all three case studies this research defines a volatile boundary as the boundary that exists between two opposing ethnic groups that represents significant numbers of street traders with contested power relations, and which is often violently defended.

The physical presence of a political party's unit/ward office (the lowest level of operation) denotes a contested boundary between two ethnic territories, as a key informant in Orangi, KI-12, explained. Three political parties have defined territories within the larger market (MQM represents Mohajir traders while PTI and JI represent Pakhtun traders). The MQM, PTI, JI unit/ward offices define their concentrations of power and mark the boundary of the respective groups. Despite the intra-ethnic group differences amongst various Pakhtun tribes, the boundaries between PTI and JI are benign, but the boundary between MQM and the other parties is often violently contested. This finding resonates with Cybriwsky and Ley (1974) empirical study on wall graffiti in the inner city of Philadelphia, where zones of aggressive graffiti often overlap within a space of violent confrontation between gangs.

A member of Anjuman-e-Tajeeran Saddar, (KI-08), also said that the prime trading location is key for a violent spatial claim due to the high economic value of the space that groups do not want to lose control of. The Dubai Chowk in Saddar is a violent boundary between Mohajir and Pakhtun street traders, where multiple violent clashes are recorded over territorial claims.
An older shopkeeper who has witnessed the event explained Pakhtuns’ aggressive approach to expand the boundary thus:

‘… when they (Pakhtuns) brought their people onto the Mohajirs’ side overnight, these guys (Mohajir street traders) also gathered their people from the other areas … Both groups were armed but Pakhtuns outnumbered Mohajirs… so Mohajirs could not resist any longer and the Pakhtun boundary expanded to reach Quetta hotel…’ (KI-06).

In Orangi and Saddar identity is the main way to define the nature of a boundary. In contrast in Lyari, where gangsters rather than street traders controlled the area, there were multiple physical markers defining volatile gang territories (Figure 6.10 to 6.12). As explained by a journalist:

‘… here whichever gang puts his symbol of control, the other gang challenges it and the war begins…’ (JOU-04)

Map 6.5: Benign and Volatile boundaries in Aligarh Bazaar, Orangi
Figure 6.10: Bullet holes in the wall and sandbag defence wall as a volatile marker in Lyari

Figure 6.11: Poster of Uzair Baloch (left) with the late Rehman ‘Dokair’ (right) and PPP founders in the background, associated with the sacrifice of gangs, marks an important territorial marker.

Figure 6.12: Cheel Chowk with Uzair Baloch poster and PPP flag marks his territory.

Source: Express Tribune
The Lyari case study demonstrates that territorial divisions between gangs have also resulted in a divide for consumers in the market. The conflict between the two gangs (Uzair Baloch and Baba Ladla), limited customer movement across the market. People living in areas controlled by a particular gang were tagged as informers by an opposing gang, so customers could not go into opposition territory. For example, residents of Bihar Colony switched from shopping in Jhatpat Market to Lea Market to avoid crossing Singo Lane – a zone of conflict (Map 6.6) (JOU-04). This has divided the market between Uzair Baloch and Baba Ladla. Those street traders who were working along the volatile borders were adversely affected both because they lost customers from both sides, and because they were threatened for extortion by gangs from both sides, as both claimed it as their territory. Thus, for street traders, protection by gangs seems to be commercially more valuable than expanding the customer base.

Map 6.6: Division of consumers based on gangs’ turfs, Lyari
6.3. **Middlemen and Spatial Claim**

Having examined the mechanisms for establishing and maintaining spatial control, and the physical manifestation of this control, Section 6.3 now considers the first of the underlying processes considered in this thesis which allow spatial control to take place, looking at the key role of middleman in negotiations over claiming space. Middlemen – known locally as *beaters* – act as exclusive gatekeepers for traders and trading groups in negotiating spatial claims with local officials and other networks. The middleman's political connections, identity and ties across other networks empower the group to challenge social and institutional boundaries in ITS. Hannerz (1980) argues that a group's capacity to define social roles can challenge institutional boundaries and determine its outreach to other strong networks. This section explores various ways of how middlemen claim and control space in ITS.

6.3.1. **Political connections**

The connection of a middleman with political parties has a visible impact on space in ITS. Local officials are less likely to displace, or deal harshly with, street traders who are represented by a middleman with strong political ties and ethnic representation (KI-05, SOLE-04). Street traders with weaker protection are in constant threat of displacement. The role of middleman in taking claims beyond the UC level to municipal or provincial authorities was explained by a representative from a Deputy Commissioner's Office:

"The middleman is the most powerful actor in the complex street trading business. He has support from the police, agencies, political parties and even general public due to the benefits they receive from him.... Police, agencies and political parties are all exposed in front of him, which makes him powerful in negotiating the claims of the group. His job includes, but is not limited to, money (*bhatta*) collection, negotiation for trading space with other networks, the police, and municipal departments, resolving disputes amongst networks etc. He does not belong to any political party in particular (political parties belong to this guy) – all his loyalties belong to the one who is in power" (SOLE-08).

All case studies pointed to the substantial role of middlemen in micro-spatial claims. As an older shopkeeper and activist in Saddar explained, every street has a designated *beater* who is
the spokesperson for street traders within their jurisdiction (KI-06). Street traders usually do not mind paying him beat (the local term for extortion) in return for services such as giving prior intimation about eviction drives (conducted by KMC, Anti-Encroachment Department), helping to recover confiscated products from KMC, negotiating places for new hawkers and dealing with the local police station, traffic police and municipal departments over street traders' issues (STS-07).

In Saddar and Orangi, there are two different circumstances where middlemen are found. First, when a beater deals with both street traders and local officials, and second, when street traders’ groups and the local police station employ separate beaters (KI-01, KI-05, KI-06). The group leader of Achakzai street traders in Saddar explained how the exercise of power is strengthened with an added layer of actors in a group;

‘….. we have one person who collects money every day from traders at this street (St Patrick Street, Achakzai agglomeration). He is then responsible for dealing with the local police station and other sharing partners (traffic police, KMC staff, etc.). Whereas, the group trading at Jahangir Park is more powerful because they have two beaters, first a representative of street traders and another designated by the police which make them less vulnerable…. they get prior information about anti-encroachment operations so they can move their handcarts and be saved from having their products seized…’ (KI-04).

The Saddar case study also found power sharing between the middleman and network leader. Street traders were able to survive at the most vulnerable location3 in Saddar despite multiple volatile confrontations with police and the Anti-Encroachment Department because of the powerful connections between a middleman and network leader of the Achakzai group (Hameedzai clan). The middleman deals with local officials in claiming or settling spatial disputes, while the network leader negotiates territorial control with higher tier authorities (KI-09). The key informant from a different clan (Ghabizai) stated:

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3 The Dubai Chowk in Saddar – intersection of Mansfield Street, New MA Jinnah Road and St Patrick Street has multiple contested spatial claims on this parcel of land. In the Cantonment map it is identified as a public space, whereas in the KMC map the intersection is marked as a rickshaw stand with a tertiary road link between Mansfield and St Patrick Street.
'... the group leader of Hameedzai has a brother who is a local leader of PkMAP political party (the then governor of Baluchistan was from PkMAP) which has had representation in the National Assembly since 2003. This political connection gives the group better position to negotiate with big people of the area...’ (KI-09).

The links with middlemen are particularly important for street trader groups with weaker network connections in dealing with local officials. For example, the Kakakhel street traders’ group in Saddar was vulnerable to eviction by police and municipal authorities until their network leader collaborated with a middleman who had contacts with local officials and political party agents. One of the respondents from Anjuman-e-Tajeeran, Empress Market, linked the encroachment by Kakakhel street traders of the central courtyard and thoroughfare leading to the main food shops with their group’s affiliation to Ex-ASHO (Additional Station House Police Officer). He said;

'Since the Ex-SHO has become their ‘karta dhartha’(middleman) they can put their kiosk or stall anywhere they want...’ (KI-08).

The network leader of the Kakakhel group discussed the power dynamics affecting the operations of street trading in the market and the importance of tapping into certain connections to acquire space in the market;

'... to work in this market it is important to know which institution or actor has got what controls.... to get access to the higher tier authorities one has to follow the hierarchy and fulfil their demands.... one cannot ignore them or else they will make it difficult for us to earn our living.... unless you make contacts with these people (the police or KMC).... you cannot work in the market...’ (KI-13)

The middleman’s complex links with multiple stakeholders helps traders assert spatial claim. For example, the middleman’s connection to the dominant political parties of the particular area enables a street traders’ group to negotiate with other actors including: the local police station; local officials; the unit office/ward (of political parties); concerned municipal departments (Land, Solid Waste, Water Board, etc.). This was particularly clear in Orangi,
when the municipality could not seek compliance from the Pakhtun street traders in Aligarh Bazaar due to the strong connections of their middleman to a local councillor in UC-14, who lobbied the ANP Ward Office⁴ to allow reinforcement of the Pakhtun territorial control (KI-16). Tapping into multiple agencies thus supports spatial claim and security. As an older employee of KMC (KI-16), said, discussing the less restrictive approach to enforcement of the municipality in UC-13, municipal departments become helpless when a middleman draws on multiple connections, as illustrated below:

‘KMC operations regarding illegal encroachments had stopped when Lala (the Pakhtuns’ network representative of UC-13 since 2010) took charge as president of the market union. He has strong connections in the political community and thus KMC, the Police and other state departments, say ‘Yes’ in front of him’ (KI-16).

Street traders from other networks in Saddar said that middlemen who have strong interlinking ties – with members of other networks, market unions, and political party unit offices – are able to secure information about street trading locations before others know about them (S/FST-03). This enables them to secure places in their community, village or tribe, which has been a key reason that Pakhtuns have managed to augment their spatial control in Saddar (KI-06, KI-14). In Orangi, a middleman’s connections within the Orangi Municipal Office gave the group an advantage in obtaining permanent kiosks over other Mohajir traders (Figure 6.13, Figure 6.14) on the Pakhtun side of Aligarh Bazaar (O/ST-12). As a Mohajir trader in Orangi commented;

‘… on the same street of the market they (Pakhtuns) have got the permission for permanent stalls and we haven’t… all this matter is about your leader’s ‘jaan pehchan’ (links/connections) – whoever has the access to powerful people is powerful here…’ (O/ST-14).

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⁴ Ward Office is the smallest unit of ANP political party operating on a UC level.
Figure 6.13: Permanent kiosks on Pakhtun side of the market

Figure 6.14: Permanent kiosk - inside view
Another example of gaining spatial advantage by virtue of close association with a middleman is recorded on the Mohajir side of Aligarh Bazaar. The group was represented by a middleman with connections to MQM political party enabling them to claim a larger space in the central street and have larger display carts (Figure 6.15).

![Figure 6.15: Bigger display carts - Mohajirs' Agglomeration](image)

In Lyari, the role of the middleman is replaced by gangsters (as noted above). As explained in Section 5.2.3, any mediation, or negotiation, within market premises, or with local officials, is dealt with solely by gangsters by virtue of their strong socio-political hold (L/ST-02, L/ST-05, JOU-05). This was in contrast to Saddar and Orangi, where networking across diverse groups was instrumental in gaining influential positions to negotiate spatial claims.
6.3.2. Middlemen’s use of identity

Although most middlemen are able to cross political and ethnic divides, they also trade using their identity to develop links with street traders, as found in all three case studies. A similar process was found by Nair (2005), who illustrates the complex intertwining of identity and claims for space by street traders in Bangalore, India. Many street traders from Saddar and Orangi identified trust as the key factor in this relationship, and prefer a middleman from the same identity or ethnic background (S/ST-01, S/ST-07, O/ST-02, O/ST-08, O/ST-12). In contrast, in Lyari, the gangsters’ hold over a particular market territory decides the identity of the middleman (who is usually a representative of a criminal network). In Saddar and Orangi, dealing with the street traders from the same identity background allows a middleman to establish his authority over the space (EXP-03). However, a middleman with a strong identity is able to subvert the threat of evictions and displacements in his area, reinforcing a group’s position in the market. As a street trader (S/ST-12) from a weak network in Saddar explained;

‘… we are weak in this market because the beater of our street cannot approach the aala afsaraan (higher-tier authorities or political parties). If you compare us to the street traders in Empress Market, police think twice before interfering with them – their beater uses his contacts to suppress any pressure from police and other departments….’ (S/ST-12).

The trading location of street traders thus reflects the ethnic hierarchy in the market. For example, in Orangi, Pakhtun street traders from the Peshawar region in North East Pakistan (Mardan, Kohat, Charsadda etc.) enjoy more status by virtue of sharing their tribal identity with the middleman of the network. These street traders can thus secure prime trading locations in Aligarh Bazaar, which are less vulnerable to expulsion, threat or harsh treatment by the municipal authorities and police. Other street traders without a middleman operating as an advocate are often excluded from the process of negotiating eviction, and are relegated to locations with low customer turnover (KI-19, EXP-02). Similarly, when powerful tribes or groups rent trading space in front of shops to street traders, this reinforces ethnic or tribal control in the market (EXP-04).

In Orangi, the Chairman of UC-14 (SOLE-11) emphasised that boundaries created by middlemen and network leaders are a major hindrance for local officials. The political scenario
in Orangi is complex, and every group, both those politically and ethnically based, wants to take the credit for their successes in claiming space. Thus, the access of local officials to these markets is becoming increasingly difficult, which makes traders more vulnerable to local contests for power.

According to an official from the Deputy Commissioner’s Office, South, (SOLE-08), political reciprocity makes the group stronger and gives a better negotiating position. For example, the official had faced resistance in evicting a small tyre-repair kiosk on the Depot Lines, Saddar, along the park fence. A well-connected middleman approached a provincial minister, which made the operation extremely difficult. As he explained;

‘I received a call from the (sitting) minister that I should be careful as he (the tyre-repair guy) is an important person in the network personally known to him’ (SOLE-08)

Similarly, a representative from the Orangi Municipal Office, (SOLE-01), faced resistance at provincial level in conducting an anti-encroachment operation at Bacha Khan Chowk, Orangi;

‘…. even a shoe cobbler who has an affiliation with the political group is very powerful in this area (Orangi)…. In one of my anti-encroachment drives, I removed a kiosk illegally occupied by a Pakhtun cobbler at the junction of Manghopir and Orangi Road. The same day I had received a message from the Secretary of Law to be gentler with him...’ (SOLE-01).

In an ethnically diverse market where political parties compete intensely to secure a voting majority, the political milieu is extremely combative, and intermediaries tap into the conflicting interests of political parties. In Orangi, a key informant (KI-16) noted that a representative of a Pakhtun political party promised a job in the local police station to the middleman of UC-14, in return for his vow that ‘the street traders’ group in Banaras Chowk and Frontier Colony will vote for his party’.
6.4. Institutional claims over space

This section examines the institutional claims over space that reinforce the physical process of boundary making. It examines the overlapping institutional powers, and the competing claims of different agencies over controlling and managing ITS. These competing claims involve multiple strategies including:

a) alliances between state and non-state actors;
b) co-option of city-level/local actors and state actors;
c) legitimising informal control.

6.4.1. Voluntary alliances between state and non-state actors

The plurality of controlling actors in the informal economy, institutional limitations, and erosion of the regulatory powers of the state, particularly at local government level, are key factors in the proliferation and reciprocal relationship between state and non-state actors. The overlapping jurisdictions between numerous organisations that provide services in Karachi including Karachi Metropolitan Corporation (KMC), Military Cantonments, Railways, and the Port Trust, for example, and their controlling agencies (federal, provincial and local tiers of government (Section 4.2.1) provide a niche for non-state actors to gain alliances with state actors. This is reinforced by institutional weakness on the part of those organisations.

For example, the enactment of Sindh Local Government Act SGLA 2013 (Section 4.2 and Box 6.1) removed power from the Magistrate’s Office, which was previously a connecting platform for all the agencies (the police, Anti-encroachment cell, KMC, DMC, and SSGC). Its powers have since been distributed amongst various agencies (EXP-05). Power devolution from the District Office allows informal actors to gain power and, as mentioned by the District Assistant Commissioner, this has left local government with no option but to ally with them on various platforms (SOLE-08). The Saddar case study is an important example of the complex socio-political context and multiplicity of controlling actors leading to contested spatial claims. The leader of the Pakhtun-dominated network suggests that overlapping powers of multiple agencies in Saddar was the reason for the alliance between state and non-state actors:

‘... if we did not have a representative from the Cantonment Office, the anti-encroachment operations would have only targeted us, as the head of the anti-
encroachment department (which comes under KMC) is a Mohajir so belongs to the opposite group …. the Cantonment is also a regulatory authority in this area, KMC has to listen to them before any operation…” (KI-09)

Overlapping powers enable street traders to manipulate the authorities for their benefits. Operational constraints\(^5\) dictate that KMC has to conduct joint operations with the Cantonment on Mansfield Street (the border between two agencies), and so Pakhtun street traders tap their contacts in the Cantonment to form an alliance and to claim space. An expert, (EXP-03), explained that under varying bye-laws and standards, each authority has slightly different powers to plan, develop and maintain land defined within their jurisdiction. This leads to the conflict of interests amongst the agencies and city-scale territorial claims (Hasan et al., 2015).

For Karachi City Council, the changes under the Sindh Local Government Act, 2013, (Box 6.1), have been extremely damaging, as much of the land authority of Karachi is controlled by other agencies, such as the Cantonment Authority, Defence Authority and Port Authority, many of its significant revenue-raising powers have been removed, and some functions normally ascribed to local government (for example building control) are retained at provincial level. This emasculation of local government is a core reason for informal governance processes to arise.

\(^5\) Karachi has 13 management and land controlling authorities or agencies:

1) Karachi Metropolitan Corporation (KMC) ; 2) Cantonment Boards ; 3) Karachi Port Trust (KPT) ; 4) Port Qasim ; 5) Railway; 6) Defence Housing Society; 7) Katchi Abadi Authority; 8) Government of Pakistan; 9) Recent Allocations (Educational City); 10) Sindh Industrial Trading Estate (SITE); 11) Government of Sindh; 12) Malir Development Authority (MDA); 13) Lyari Development Authority (LDA).
Box 6.1

**Sindh Local Government Act (SGLA) 2013**

SGLA 2013 was the consolidation of powers of provincial government. It reinforced the control of bureaucracy over local governments. After the government dissolved in 2008, various hybrid models of governance were applied with the intent to return powers to the provincial tier, which was finally approved in 2013 under the SGLA. Before SGLA 2013, the DC (Deputy Commissioner) was given a new designation - DCO (District Coordinating Officer) - and was required to report to the city mayor regarding security, land, revenue collection and administration. The later important change was the limitation of local government’s power over these matters. However, according to the new SGLA 2013, the mayor is subservient to the DC, specifically in Karachi. The hierarchy takes the order province, division, district and finally tehsils.

Under SGLO 2013, many functions and services that were devolved to local government had been reassigned to the provincial government. Police, security, land management, and building control are some important tasks formerly under local government control that have now been assigned to provincial government. The participation of the main development authorities was also restricted by transferring the control of these departments to the provincial government, and local government was administered by the province’s local department. The provincial government has the PFCA ‘Provincial Finance Commission Award’ in which the budget allocated to local government is awarded to cities based on their contribution. In provincial government there are two separate divisions: i) Secretary, Planning and Development – where all the projects are planned and approved; ii) Secretary, Local Government – where the maintenance budget resides. The Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution was used as a tool to restructure the governance around bureaucracy and thus many vested powers of the local government (transferred to them in DOPP 2001) were taken away.
In another example, the illegal renting of land identified as amenity plots (public parks) was also seen at two locations on Mansfield Street, another effect of the dysfunction caused by tension between the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation and Cantonment Karachi. A sub-SHO of a local police station further explained the contested claims:

‘... the streets where the limits of two authorities overlapped are useful for the authorities to earn money (extortion)... each authority wanted to take ownership of the contested piece of land or street and the potential for bribes, and so gave illegal permissions to trade in the public park and other amenity plots. But, when any case is filed on the issue, they get away by blaming each other...’ (KI-20).

State actors see the complexity of overlapping powers and jurisdictions as an opportunity to work in alliance with powerful non-state actors for their benefit. Therefore, the state actors decided voluntarily to make a deal with the powerful network leader of the Achakzai and Kaker agglomerations. In an interview, a journalist, (JOU-07), who has reported on illegal encroachments of plots in Saddar, explains this collaboration as a ‘profitable deal hidden behind the legitimate curtains of the state’. At the same time, informal actors take utmost advantage of formal overlapping powers over a particular territory to assert their claims, as explained by an older trader in Saddar;

‘... it was easy for Kaker Sahib (network leader of Achakzai and Kaker's street traders' agglomeration) to encroach the amenity plot on this street (Mansfield Street) and bring in his own people.... KMC says it is the Cantonment jurisdiction and the Cantonment claims otherwise... hee has taken advantage of this conflict...’ (JOU-07).

According to an expert, (EXP-07), the internal politics within state institutions around the transfer of services creates an opportunity for informal actors to form alliances with state actors. Furthermore, state actors intentionally create opportunities for alliances with informal actors for their personal benefit. Saddar is an example where a street traders' network has strong backing from state actors, because of high turnover of extortion money in the area (KI-08, KI-05). Based on a survey conducted by the Urban Resource Centre (URC) (Dawn April 17, 2003), a modest estimate of approximately 2,500 hawkers were then working in Saddar.
Bazaar and the daily amount of extortion paid to staff at Preedy Police station itself was PKR 600,000 (approximately £3700) (SOLE-08). These figures make Saddar’s commercial territory very lucrative for political agents and other alliances;

‘Street traders’ networks are ready to pay any price to get trading space in Saddar… institutions know this fact and that’s why they are making the most of their authority…’ (KI-20, former KMC employee).

As well as overlaps in territorial control, in Saddar, different local and provincial agencies are responsible for service supply. Informal actors also take advantage of the tussle between provincially and locally controlled service agencies as noted by a representative from Deputy Commissioner Office, South;

‘The state institutions that are working here do not come under a single authority, the control is divided amongst various agencies. Informal actors take advantage of this…. whoever has the contact in the respective agencies, uses their contacts to reap the benefits… the benefit is not one way – both parties will enjoy their share….’ (SOLE-08)

Competitive claims over the control of markets often overlap with the battle for votes and rental income. The claims over rents are multiple and contested between state and non-state stakeholders, and in all three case studies, the control of land, utilities, and security were determinant factors. It is observed that groups with a higher economic and political profile can involve formal actors to gain informal service provision. An older shopkeeper who has been working for the last twenty-five years in Orangi explained the mechanisms of control of a strong group in the market;

‘….. service provision from electricity supply to waste collection is controlled by our group leader… everyone knows our leader is a resourceful person and he has both economic and political power so they cannot refuse to work for him…. the illegal electricity connections that every push cart obtains in this segment of the market are provided by the K-Electric staff themselves…the street traders collect PKR 50 (20 for each electric connection, 20 for night watchmen and 10 for waste disposal) every day and give it to their leader. what
remains the leader uses to take care of the police, KMC… although, the people who are involved in informal service provision actually work for the government, they don’t perform the duties that are the part of their job, but (the pay is very low so) instead they take money from the group leader to do the same work…. (O/ST-12).

The identity of people working within state institutions also plays a vital role in developing links between the relevant agencies and the informal market actors. Thus the political and ethnic divisions in the market are reinforced by the actions of state institutions. For example, in Orangi, the municipal office (which comes under DMC West) has favoured Mohajir traders in Aligarh Bazaar as the member of MQM political party was also an employee of the Anti-Encroachment section of the Orangi Municipal Office. This was evidenced by the Information Officer;

The person in charge of the local MQM political party unit works in our (municipal) office. He has developed connections inside and outside the municipal office, which empowers him to negotiate for resources. Police know that he works for the municipal office and that he has political backing. So during raids, the street traders’ leader in that section is informed prior to the operation’ (KI-16).

The complex geography of power amongst various institutions defines the identity of informal actors. An older committee member, (KI-08), of the Anjuman-e-Tajeeran – a market union in Empress Market – identifies a similar case in Empress Market where, during the PPP political party tenure, many Pakhtun traders received preference in acquiring shops as Pakhtuns formed a confederation with PPP in that UC. Although KMC was MQM-dominated, after DOPP 2001 and particularly from 2008-2013, the Land Department within KMC had many PPP workers (when PPP held power in Sindh Province). The staff facilitated land and other legal transactions in return for reciprocal benefits from the PPP. This enabled the Pakhtun network to occupy shops within the market, opening an opportunity to acquire prime land around Empress Market. Empress is a desirable location due to the high volume of pedestrian traffic since it is the largest vegetable and meat market in Saddar and an inter- and intra- city transport hub. Other shopkeepers of Empress Market and older residents (S/ST-12, STS-04,
KI-06, KI-14) also said Pakhtun street traders in the area were dominant as a consequence of their acquisition of shops in Empress Market.

6.4.2. Involuntary co-option of state and non-state actors

The co-option of state actors by non-state actors is important in enabling the latter to claim space. Sometimes, although more rarely, the reverse process happens. Across the case studies, the informal political party networks are most influential in navigating the rules and filling the vacuum of state authority. The multiple actors seeking to gain benefit from the revenue potential of informal markets was seen as a key reason for informal actors to seek to co-opt state actors in ITS. A city expert explained the political party over bureaucracy;

‘The political party’s office (un-elected representatives of the political party) is stronger than state departments for two reasons. First, they are situated in the local area and thus accessible to the community – they know the local problems which connects them to the people from whom they derive power. Second, they control informal markets, the economic potential of these markets enables them to gain support from their elective Assembly representatives (at provincial and federal level) which binds state actors to work for them…’ (EXP-03).

The political party in power can confer benefits – job promotion, transfer to lucrative places and payoffs to state employees were all mentioned by respondents (KI-04, KI-08, KI-16, SOLE-02). According to an expert, (EXP-03), the low salaries of staff in state institutions makes it easy for informal actors to buy their patronage. For example, a respondent from KMC, (SOLE-06), mentioned that high levels of extortion exacted by non-state actors enable them to pay off local staff in Saddar’s local police station, who in turn are able to bring patronage (bribes) to the SHO of the area;

‘…Police can only say ‘yes sir, yes sir’ to them (the network leader of Kaker street traders) when the people who are supporting them are so strong. If the police confiscate their people’s goods, the SHO receives a direct call from a senior political party member. He has to listen to their demands mainly because of huge bribes that the local police station is receiving everyday…’ (SOLE-06).
The alliance between the political parties was mentioned as an important reason for co-option between state and non-state actors. The period between 2008-2013 when PPP was in government was the most difficult period for local authorities (the Anti-Encroachment Department, Police, Traffic Police etc.) as they were virtually unable to conduct any operation against Pakhtun street traders (SOLE-05). The ANP-PPP confederation reinforced the support for Pakhtun street traders due to their political alignment with ANP, and thus local officials faced strong resistance during this period as explained by a respondent from the Anti-Encroachment Department:

‘The five years of ANP representation in the Assembly with a PPP-led cabinet changed the political landscape of Saddar. As ANP represented Pakhtuns’, they put huge pressure on any state department that was involved in conducting anti-encroachment drives in Saddar. I consider their political term as the dormant period for KMC and the Anti-Encroachment Department. The few operations that we conducted during this period faced huge political resistance both from the elected members of ANP and PPP, and the informal networks of these parties. There are incidences of physical violence to police and our department, who were being targeted by the mafia (of political parties) during the drives. The reason for their domination is their political backing…’ (SOLE-05).

He further mentioned the eviction drive that he had conducted in 2010:

“The strongest resistance that we found in Saddar market was along Preedy Street stretching all the way to Empress Market. This entire area is the ‘Pakhtuns’ belt’, who have strong support from both ANP and PPP. During an anti-encroachment drive, they gather in large numbers on the road to protest, which gets media attention and support by playing the victim card…. their political backing is the main reason for being the strongest group in Saddar, which makes it difficult for us to carry out effective clearances’ (SOLE-05).

In a reverse co-option of the network by the state, on New MA Jinnah Road, Saddar, KMC co-opted the Mohajir network leader and gave him the rental rights for space to run a weekly Sunday bazaar in preference to a Pakhtun leader. However, it was a reciprocal process. As
Mohajirs had a strong political position in UC-09, MQM mounted pressure on KMC which made them circumvent the rules by giving preference to the most powerful actor of the area. This is an example of the process mentioned by Webb et al. (2014) (Section 2.2) suggesting that formal actors rely on informal norms and other mechanisms of transaction to gain potential opportunities outside formal processes.

In Orangi, street traders also took advantage of the overlapping of powers of the Member of the National Assembly (MNA – federal government) and Member of the Provincial Assembly (MPA – provincial government) from the adjoining constituency. The MPA of Orangi Town was from MQM, and so the Pakhtun street traders approached MNA of the adjacent SITE Town, who holds a higher position in the power hierarchy, to negotiate their claims. For example, in a negotiation over the electricity supply by KESC (Karachi Electric Supply Corporation) during festive events (mainly the two Eid celebrations), they demanded an improved supply towards the Pakhtun side of Aligarh Bazaar. Previously, the electricity provision was limited to the Mohajir street traders’ zone, until the Pakhtun network leader asked the ‘Pakhtun Jirga’ to co-opt the MNA of the adjoining SITE Town to lobby for an electricity connection on their side of the market (KI-16). As a representative from the SITE Municipal office mentioned:

‘…. we (Municipal Office) are bound to do anything if we get a call from the MNAs, MPAs, or Commissioner...’ (KI-16).

Many respondents voiced strong mafia-style7 support for informal actors as the key factor behind the thriving informal network that manipulates street traders and other formal and informal actors for their benefits (JOU-06, KI-06, KI-08, KI-16). Violent confrontations have been reported against the Anti-Encroachment Department when they tried to remove street traders from important strategic locations. In Saddar, there was a particular example of such violent confrontation between informal actors and the police force. A respondent from KMC

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6 The jirga is a traditional legal system of dispute resolution whereby tribal elders and notables form a tribunal to resolve differences keeping in mind customary laws.

7 Mafia in the context of this research is referred to as an organised criminal group backed up by agencies, and is a term often used by interviewees. The arrangements among the participants of the group differ within each group and these are usually based on illegal contracts (Anderson 1995).
(Karachi Metropolitan Corporation) illustrated how their stronghold over informal businesses is maintained;

‘.... the ex-SHO of Saddar, Ejaz Khawaja had run multiple anti-encroachment operations despite death threats and other resistances. When he didn’t pay any attention to the threats, these people (mafia) had target killed him to show how strong they are... it is the whole mafia running these markets under cover – not these poor hawkers who are being used in this informal politics.... people accuse us (state institutions) of being corrupt, but our hands are tied against the mafia who are so powerful and have the support from big people....’

(SOLE-06).

Identity plays a key role in co-option between state and non-state actors. According to a journalist, (JOU-06), the inter- and intra-politics of state departments impact significantly with those whom they co-opt. The construction of Bacha Khan Flyover, Orangi, is an example of a controversial development for Pakhtuns street traders where KMC had approved the MQM-supported design of the flyover. The Pakhtuns were not included in consultations over its design and impact on the area. According to the chairman of Anjuman-e-Tajeeran, Bacha Khan;

‘The construction of the flyover was politically motivated to separate this (Pakhtun dominated) area from the Mohajirs’ areas. In the original design of the flyover, there was an interchange at the Bacha Khan junction which was deliberately left uncompleted by KMC, as MQM has control over KMC. After the construction of the flyover, business went down in this area. Traffic now bypassed the main junction where our hawkers are concentrated’ (KI-02).
As this narrative indicates, the political dimension of the project suggests that state agencies were biased against Pakhtun street traders. Despite the dominance of Pakhtun street traders around Bacha Khan Flyover (Figure 6.16), street traders from other ethnic backgrounds were also concentrated in this area before the construction of the flyover because of high customer demand (O/ST-02, O/ST-03, KI-02). Another respondent from the Orangi Municipal office, (KI-16), highlighted the monetary benefits that MQM gained from this project. According to him, after the completion of the flyover, the main traffic into the city bypassed Bacha Khan and flowed south to Banaras Town, Orangi No. 5, a strong MQM constituency where the land value has now increased significantly. Banaras Town has become the primary market dominated by Mohajir street traders, controlled by MQM. Due to increased business, the rate of extortion or ‘beat’ in that area increased to as much as PKR 100 (it was between PKR 30-50 before) per day from each hawker, and the number of hawkers in the UC increased. This leads to a significant gain in extortion income for MQM.

![Figure 6.16: Bacha Khan Flyover bypass the Pakhtun dominated trading zone](image)

6.4.3. **Legitimising informal control: gangsters’ power in Lyari**

In Lyari, unlike the other two case studies, the acceptance of hegemony of criminal actors in social, political and economic matters, provides a distinctive stance of institutional claims over space. On examining the involvement of state institutions, a common response from people in Lyari was that, in the absence of the state, gangsters are the sovereign powers who have created...
“a kingdom within a kingdom” (JOU-01, KI-10, SOLE-03). Therefore, the legitimisation of informal control in the context of this research refers to assignment of exceptional powers by state actors to criminal gangs for larger political benefits.

The battles in Lyari were largely over political control. An expert, (EXP-03), explained that the exceptional power of criminal gangs in Lyari had been politically supported to combat the rise of MQM. He also explained that, although the ‘Karachi Rangers’ Operation’* was supposed mainly to focus on the religious hardliners and terrorist organisations, it had also targeted MQM to counter their growing influence in urban areas – specifically in Karachi. PPP was aware of the military build-up of MQM, which provided MQM an advantage in claiming territorial control and extortion over any other political party in Karachi. PPP, therefore, resorted to gangsters who could fight MQM for territorial control. The PPP saw MQM as a threat and wanted to curtail its growing influence in other cities, and to claim back the strong economic centres and neighbourhoods of Karachi. This stance came out strongly in an interview with the editor of Lyari Magazine and current consultant to the Municipal Office, Lyari Town:

‘The most effective way to capture Karachi is to capture its market – the economic engine of Karachi. PPP has known this fact very well and that’s why they strengthened gangs to counter MQM and then used this inter-group fight as the basis to introduce the ‘Rangers’ Operation’ against them’ (KI-21).

The Sindh Local Government Act (SLGA) 2013 was another tool used by the ruling party to strengthen the gangsters’ claim over space in Lyari. The PPP took the utmost advantage of the new SLGA Act 2013, which empowered the provincial government to retain the major functions, such as police enforcement, major local development activities and building control, to favour the gangsters (Table 4.2), (JOU-01). The political establishment saw this alliance as an opportunity to use the gangs’ power against rival ethnic territories, which led to the gangster’s success in expanding their ‘turf’ across Karachi.

*In September 2013, a federal government charged the Pakistan Rangers, a paramilitary force to conduct a security operation in Karachi. The operation was aimed to target individuals involved in target killings, extortions, kidnappings for ransom and acts of terrorism in the city.
The exceptional powers of gangs also troubled the trading areas of Lyari. For example, street traders were not involved in boundary negotiations within Jhatpat Market. Also, the state officials and political agents were not allowed to intervene in defining territorial control, which led to the establishment of impenetrable trading zones contested between the rival gangs. As observed during the fieldwork, the demarcation of boundaries was also respected by law enforcers, as noted by an older shopkeeper of Jhatpat Market, (L/ST-05):

‘…. even the Police have to take the permission from them (the gangsters) if they want to enter the market premises... for this side (West of Tauheed Mosque), they ask Uzair’s people, while for the other they seek approval from Baba Ladla..... if any complaint from the market goes to the Police they refer to the respective territory’s gang to deal with it.... the Police know that if they bypass the gangsters they will receive a direct call from the sitting Home Minister (at federal level)....’ (L/ST-05).

The above interview suggests that the support of the senior officials within the PPP party led to a localised co-option strategy between gangsters and the police in Lyari.

The difference between Lyari and the other two case studies is the level of interaction between political agents and non-state actors. In Lyari, senior PPP officials publicly supported the gangs, which enabled them to establish monopolistic control in all the UCs of Lyari and across the city. Many interviewees have also mentioned the absolute autonomy of gangs in Lyari, which empowered them to carve out a separate siefdom dictated by their own socio-political rules (L/ST-05, L/ST-07, KI-07, KI-10, JOU-01, and JOU-04). In contrast, in both Orangi and Saddar, the involvement of political parties to support informal actors occurred, however it was always hidden from formal interactions.

6.5. Conclusion

The chapter has discussed the expressions and processes of spatial claim including: territorial claim, the role of middlemen and the co-option of the state. These processes work in parallel with the networks of control discussed in Chapter 5, to create complex, overlapping and sometimes violent systems of spatial claim.
Territorial claim is central to assert and retain control in ITS. Part two of this chapter focused on various ways in which street traders make spatial claim to reinforce the territories they occupy and how the territories are demarcated between groups. The claiming of territorial control in ITS is negotiated through connections with two types of powerful actors in the area. First, the identity of street traders plays an important role in forging and making political claims. Union Committees are not neutral government agents, but are politically and ethnically aligned. Street traders use these ethnic divisions to consolidate spatial claims and gain access to ITS since their ethnic association empowers them to negotiate with the UC(s) operating in the area. Second, in Lyari, where the identity of street traders and other actors is less important, power over space is reified through violent contesting claims embedded in connections with criminal gangs, based on aggressive strategies of territorial defence and acquisition.

Maintaining territorial control in ITS is an ongoing process which is necessary for street trader groups to access negotiation with local formal institutions. The case studies show that economic power and visibility are two important mechanisms used by a group to maintain spatial claims. The economic superiority of Pakhtuns allows them to gain spatial control through property purchase and thus expand their territory, enabling them to exclude other groups. The other key mechanism of maintaining territoriality is presence of a group through spatial concentration at key strategic locations. Visibility then enables a group to build political power and negotiate spatial claims with the Union Committees, therefore, the police, municipality staff and other local officials have less powers to relocate the dominant groups.

The demarcation of boundaries in ITS indicates the expanse of territorial control and, hence, the power over prescribed space. The marking of a territory in ITS to define the limit of a particular group often used invisible, coded and symbolic mechanisms to demarcate a boundary. Key boundary markers between two groups recorded in the case studies are electricity poles, roundabouts, building peripheries, loud speakers, political party flags, banners and wall posters. Some boundaries were benign, but others were extremely volatile and violently defended. This research defines a benign boundary as the boundary that exists between two different sub-ethnic groups of street traders. The segregation of trading zones is not visible and the movement of street traders across this form of boundary is negotiable and permeable. The boundary between various Pakhtun tribes in Saddar and Orangi was noted as
benign. A volatile boundary is described as a boundary that exists between two opposing ethnic groups representing a significant size of street traders with contested power relations. The Mohajir-Pakhtun interface in Saddar and Orangi and opposing gang ‘turf’ in Lyari are examples of volatile boundaries.

Sections 6.3 and 6.4 focussed on the complex processes underlying territorial claims that allow spatial control to take place. The first key actor who negotiates spatial claims for street traders with local officials and other networks is the middleman – locally known as the ‘beater’. Middlemen act as exclusive gatekeepers and are an essential link between street traders’ groups and other actors to make spatial and political claims. Groups cannot put forward their demands or make spatial claims without middlemen. The case studies found that middlemen can maintain their role, despite a political change of power, which makes them the most important stakeholder in ITS. Middlemen are found to be involved in various scales of spatial negotiations; they hold a key position in asserting and controlling the inter-group territorial claims to intra-group micro-spatial claims.

Nevertheless, middlemen also trade on their identity and have more control over people from the same tribe or language group. In Orangi, a middleman who shares the tribal identity with the leader of the ‘Pakhtun Jirga’ was given a better trading location than other groups. It was also noted that middlemen who acquire a prominent position in informal markets are able to cross the political divide. For example, a Pakhtun middleman allied with PPP to negotiate spatial claims.

The last section focussed on institutional claims over space which reinforce the process of boundary making in ITS. The plurality of competing claims over space shapes three important strategies of negotiation between state and non-state actors. First, institutional limitations and erosion of state regulatory powers, particularly at local government level, leaves a gap on which the alliance between state and non-state actors is based. Second, the excessive power of informal political party networks and their bureaucratic control compels state actors, particularly politicians, to co-opt with non-state actors. The control of political parties over profitable informal markets enables them to establish their writ over state actors. Third, in Lyari, the hegemony of criminal actors leads to the legitimisation of informal control and the withdrawal of state actors. This gives criminal gangs exceptional power to fight at a city level for ‘turf’ against MQM.
In conclusion, the spatial claims discussed in the chapter are integrally linked to the creation of networks and trading agglomerations discussed in Chapter 5. The spatial claims are intertwined with network dynamics, which is also reflected in negotiating the spatial claims. This chapter thus augments the understanding of the role of networks in agglomerating trading space. The chapter demonstrates the contextual difficulties faced by street traders and the daily resistance and negotiations they undertake in the production and maintenance of territorial power in informal trading spaces.
7. Discussion and Conclusion

7.1 Introduction

This research has examined the production of informal trading spaces by focusing on everyday processes, relationships and negotiations of street traders to claim spaces in informal markets in the context of Karachi, Pakistan. The social networking and process of claiming informal trading space is conflicted, and involves multiple actors linked by complex power relations.

The study was stimulated by political and ethnic-driven territoriality that led to the increasing violence in Karachi. The violence intensified between 2008 and 2014 and as a result the city earned titles, such as ‘the world’s most dangerous city’ and ‘South Asian Beirut’ (Gayer 2014). The impacts of violence in Karachi have been studied at a broader scale; for example ethno-political division in the city (Gayer 2003; Gazdar et al. 2010; Gazdar 2011; Yusuf 2012; Hasan 2014; Kaker 2014) and ethnically segregated housing in Karachi (Ahmad 1993; Sadiq et al. 2010; Hasan et al. 2013; Hasan 2015). However, the research on the implications of ethnic and political divisions on the informal trading sector of Karachi is very limited. This research looked into three informal markets in the towns of Saddar (Empress Market and surrounds), Orangi (Aligarh Bazaar) and Lyari (Jhatpat Market) which have gone through extreme violence in the past, in order to examine the contested socio-political claims that exacerbate conflict and violence in informal trading spaces.

Access to trading space is controversial and highly contested, and due to the violent nature of the case study areas, entry to areas was not easy and needed a protracted period of fieldwork over a long period to build trust with key informants and participants on different sides of the spatial divides in the markets. Research in Lyari has only become feasible in the last three years, due to the previous levels of conflict in the area – now quelled because of
government-led paramilitary intervention. However, by building relationships within the areas, the researcher was able to interview participants across ethnic and political divides and represent the perspective all of key state and non-state actors in order to understand ITS and to make some valuable contributions to existing literature.

7.2 Research objectives and contributions

This section highlights the findings of the research in relation to each of the research objectives and research aim, drawing mainly on Chapters 2, 4, 5 and 6. This section also identifies a number of key contributions of the research in relation to gaps identified in the literature.

7.2.1 Defining Informal trading spaces

Objective 1: To critically examine the process of production of informal trading spaces and the factors and actors that establish it

Chapter 2 explored the wider literature addressing various theoretical concepts around urban informality, production of informal trading space, social capital, and power dynamics in claiming spatial control. The discussion draws on the production of space as an expression of power, which is proposed by Lefebvre (1974). The review highlights the multiplicity of processes; social, political and economic, to examine the complexity of spatial claims in informal trading space. The chapter argues that, while the informal economy is variously conceptualised, it is mostly in relation to the formal sector, while many researchers, particularly on street trade, assume the marginalisation and victimisation of traders by the state and other actors. Yet divisions within the informal economy are not widely considered, and ethno-political drivers, both in trading and in the spatial claim of ITS, are under reported and explored.

There has been extensive theoretical discussion on the production of space, in adopting a theoretical and rights-based approach by many authors who have drawn on the work of Lefebvre. Lefebvre (1992) sees space as a physical and social construct, produced through human activities and the reproduction of social relations. The arguments suggest that economic claims on space are embedded in exchange value where space is traded as a
profitable commodity by strong market actors. In this scenario, bureaucratically controlled mass production and consumption processes aim for continuous capital surplus and are therefore important indicators of the use of space as one of the central modes of production (including capital and labour). However, there has been very little research on the micro-implications of these debates for informal trading space.

Drawing on both academic discussions on the production of space and the street trading literature, the thesis thus defined informal trading space as *space used for street trading falling outside formal legal and regulatory control, which is created by street traders and other urban actors who influence or control the use of urban public space, through their actions, social relations, and political and power dynamics*. This is a new conceptualisation which has not been widely researched.

The literature review also discussed the importance of social capital, particular for weaker groups to assert claim to 'created space' in an otherwise hostile environment. Networks are seen as a key element of social capital which are important for groups to navigate multiple political and power relationships, and thus are important to help in understanding the production of informal trading space. However, the literature review found very little discussion of ethnically concentrated and politically aligned networks, which are particularly important in the context of Karachi.

### 7.2.2 Ethnic and political fault lines

*Objective 2: To explore different socio-political characteristics of informal trading spaces in Karachi*

Chapter 4 examined the structural reasons for the current social-political conditions of Karachi to understand the nature and characteristics of informal trading space, broadly examining the second research question.

Karachi has been a melting pot for the diverse socio-economic and religious groups that represent Pakistan’s multi-ethnic communities. Several waves of migration are responsible for the current diverse demography of Karachi. Of particular significance was the influx of the Mohajir (meaning ‘the migrants’) who migrated from India after partition, who outnumbered the local Sindhi and Baloch population in the city. The Mohajir ‘sense of
entitlement’ to Karachi has become the main dispute between the Mohajir and local Sindhi and Baloch population. The Mohajir soon united under a political patronage which was based on the key narrative of ‘victimisation’ – the material and physical sacrifices that migration caused this ethnic group. Thus, rebellion and ethnic pride became the basis of the formation of a dominant political force of Karachi – the ‘MQM’.

The Pakhtun migrations from 1980 onwards, and the city’s involvement in Afghan Wars brought an armed culture which led to the militarisation of the political arena of Karachi. The Pakhtun soon started carving out territory in Karachi. Their control over illegal land markets and transport were key to acquiring a strong economic position and to political challenge of the Mohajir-based party of MQM. Thus, ethnic diversity led to economic and political conflict. The initial battle over the control of smuggling and the unofficial property market was reframed by political actors as ethnic conflicts. Violence was heightened by the lack of effective government and overlapping responsibilities of various levels of government; federal, provincial and local – over the development of the city.

This complex history has largely shaped the different socio-political characteristics of informal trading spaces in Karachi, as the case study towns of Saddar, Orangi and Lyari show. These three towns of Karachi, while having their singularities, also contributed significantly to shaping the current socio-economic and political landscape of the city. In Saddar, conflict was linked to commercial competition, as it is the most lucrative trading location and accommodates the largest concentration of formal and informal traders in Karachi. Pakhtun traders bought properties around major trading locations, especially around Empress Market, which gave them power to control informal trading space and its lucrative potential for extortion money.

In Orangi, conflict was mainly between Mohajir and Pakhtun communities, which flared into violence as political conflict became militarised, with a clear dividing line through the middle of Aligarh Bazaar – the case study market in Orangi town. Since the 1985 riots, Orangi has become a physical and symbolic interface between Pakhtun and Mohajir, with ethnically segregated trading and residential zones. In Lyari, the presence of armed Baloch gangs meant that neither the government nor other political or ethnic contenders could gain a foothold in the markets, which were divided into gang ‘turfs’ which neither traders nor customers could cross.
Thus it is clear that informal trading spaces are a prism through which socio-political conflict is reflected and intensified because of the visibility they provide and the revenue potential for extortion money. Traders are unable to navigate these complexities without support, and thus have to choose to become politically affiliated in order to survive.

### 7.2.3 Complexity of networks

*Objective 3: To examine the role of social capital of informal actors from diverse ethno-political backgrounds in the production of informal trading spaces*

Chapter 5 explores the importance of social networks for informal street traders from diverse ethnic and political backgrounds in their claim to informal trading space, which broadly addresses the third research question.

The chapter provides an in depth account of the types and functioning of various social networks and their role in shaping the access to ITS. Although the role of social networks in informal economic organisations is discussed in the literature on informal markets (Seligmann 2000) and street trading (Cross 1998; Portes and Landolt 2000; Lyons and Snoxell 2005; Meagher 2006; Lyon 2007; Stillerman and Sundt 2007; Weinstein 2008; Mackie et al. 2014), its complexity and influence on political processes has not been examined before. The findings of this research on the role of networks helps to unpack the complexity that exists in an ethnically fragmented and contested city like Karachi.

Social networks are a central attribute of social capital in informal trading space in Karachi. The empirical data identified four key types of networks: identity-based; political; criminal and market unions. The social groups in informal trading space align with identity and ethnicity-based, politically-motivated, criminal networks or market unions, with considerable overlap between these four domains. There are two key impacts of these social networks on street traders: first, informal social networks strengthen their stability and control by developing links to political institutions or criminal networks in exchange for services, and second, traders’ membership of various informal networks is significant in enabling them to negotiate for access to informal trading space.
Identity-based networks (with highly differentiated groups and sub-groups) are strongest amongst the Pakhtun community. As Chapter 4 finds, the lack of political and social representation in Karachi is significant in explaining why Pakhtun maintain solidarity networks among their tribes and clans. This cohesion is also reflected in asserting control over informal trading space in the city. Similarly, Coakley (2003) has explained three key strategies of self-actualisation by a minority group: i) demanding the rights of the individual, ii) official acknowledgement of the distinctiveness of the group from the host community, and iii) demanding the right to ‘territory’. The territorial concentration of Pakhtun and their critical mass initially enabled them to establish economic control over their environment, and later to claim political control.

Political networks are the most influential of the networks in mediating and negotiating the claims of street traders with state officials. Thus, in all case studies, traders’ social networks tend to be aligned with political networks to enable them to occupy/reoccupy space in the markets. Political networks operate at different scales in the market. For example, the Unit Office and baithak are the neighbourhood points of contact where unelected representatives of political parties mediate between street traders and state actors. Political networks consider the ethnic clustering of street traders as a key strategy for controlling markets, both to consolidate the potential for electoral gain in their constituencies, and to mark the territory from which a (political) group can collect extortion money. Street traders accept the presence and control of a political party in return for accessing a trading space and the negotiation process with state officials. The Unit Office and baithak reflect the concept of ‘substitute’ power (Goldhamer and Shils 1939) that is developed by political networks as an alternative form of governance. Another key finding is the extent to which control by particular political networks is linked to electoral constituencies. The political and ethnic fragmentation of a market broadly follows Union Committee boundaries. The bifurcation of UC-13 and UC-14 in Aligarh Bazaar is an example of rigid ethnic segregation between Mohajir and Pakhtun street traders, which are controlled by distinct political parties.

Although criminal networks were dominant only in Lyari, their networks exerted a major hold on the area. The PPP’s (Pakistan People Party’s) unparalleled support for People’s Aman Committee (PAC), a gangsters-controlled market union, enabled the criminal networks to scale up their operations and became the de facto sovereigns of Lyari. Unlike ethnic and
political premise for the division in ITS, the Lyari case study shows that gangsters' 'turf' was the key division among street traders. Thus, the strategies of claiming and controlling the space in Lyari are more aggressive than other case studies.

Market unions or associations have been quite widely discussed in the literature on street trading as a key form of social capital for traders (Bromley 1979; Donovan 2008; Brown et al. 2010). The literature portrays market unions as the only network for street traders that mediates between the state and street traders. However, this research finds that market unions have little power on their own to access negotiation with state actors because these powers are in fact deeply embedded in identity and political based networks. For example, JI party controls Anjuman-e-Tajeeran, Bacha Khan Chowk (a formal market union in Orangi). An alliance between the market union and the political party reinforces the position of the union in this area whilst they negotiate with state actors.

It is evident from this research that social networks are complex and intertwined in multiple power relations of various ethnically, politically and criminally controlled urban groups. While these findings cannot be generalised beyond the rather specific context of Karachi, the analytical structure outlined above could be applied in different contexts to enable new knowledge and a more nuanced understanding of social networks and their spatial representation on the production of informal trading spaces.

7.2.4 Claiming informal trading space

Objective 4: To examine the mechanisms and processes of spatial claim in informal trading spaces

Spatial claim is important for traders in order to assert and retain control of informal trading space. The assertion of spatial control in informal trading space is negotiated through connections with two types of powerful actors. First, the identity of street traders plays a key role in forging and making political claims. The Union Committees (formerly Union Councils) operating in the area are not neutral government bodies as envisaged in the legislation, but in practice are ethnically and politically aligned. Street traders manipulate these ethnic and political divisions to consolidate spatial claim. Second, in Lyari, the spatial claims are ingrained in connections with criminal gangs, which has led to the aggressive
strategies of territorial accession and defence. Unpacking the complex processes underlying territorial claim is a significant contribution of this research.

This study recorded distinctive ways of demarcating boundaries to define the extent of territorial control in informal trading space. The demarcation of space through visible and invisible boundaries was observed across all three case studies. Visible boundaries were more evident in Lyari because of the presence of criminal gangs. Key boundary markers between two groups recorded in the case studies include electricity poles, street junctions, roundabouts, building façades, loud speakers, political party flags and wall posters. Invisible boundaries were mainly found in Saddar and Orangi, where different trading groups know and understand the boundaries but these are not visible to outsiders. Invisible boundaries remain porous to allow customers to access different sections of the market.

In addition, boundaries can be defined as either benign or volatile and violently defended. From the observations and interviews, a benign boundary is the boundary that exists between two different sub-ethnic groups of street traders, where the segregation of trading zones is not visible, and movement of street traders across the boundary is negotiable and permeable. The boundary between various Pakhtun tribes in Saddar and Orangi is described as benign. A volatile boundary is a boundary that exists between two different opposing ethnic groups representing a significant group of street traders with contested power relations. The Mohajir-Pakhtun interface in Saddar and Orangi and opposing gang 'turf' in Lyari are examples of volatile boundaries.

In addition to the networks discussed above, two additional elements were critical to spatial claim. The first was the role of middlemen – known locally as 'beaters'. These are key people who mediate between street traders and other networks to negotiate spatial and political claims. Social networks are reliant on middlemen to put forward their demands, negotiate with other networks and local officials. The immunity of middlemen to political change of power makes them key stakeholders of informal trading space particularly when their identity enables them to cross the political divide. For example, in Saddar, a Pakhtun middleman was given preference over a Mohajir middleman because of his ability to access the PPP during their period of office in provincial government. While the researcher was able to interview people from almost every group in the markets, middlemen were secretive and she could not access them to ascertain their identity. The role of middlemen in enabling
street traders to access informal trading space is a new area of knowledge which has not previously been researched.

Overlapping institutional claims over space is another key process of territorialisation in informal trading space found in the three case study areas. Three important strategies of negotiation are identified between state and non-state actors. First, institutional limitations and the erosion of state regulatory powers, particularly at local government level, leaves a gap in which alliances between state and non-state actors are formed, for example Orangi Municipal department allied with Pakhtun market union in Aligarh Bazaar to provide permanent stalls. Second, the excessive power of informal political party networks and their bureaucratic control compels state actors, particularly politicians, to collaborate with non-state actors, especially after the 2013 Sindh Local Government Act removed many powers from Karachi Local Government. Third, in Lyari, the hegemony of criminal actors leads to the legitimisation of informal control and the exclusion of state actors, as during the height of violence it was unsafe for local officials to enter the area. This gave criminal gangs exceptional powers to fight at a city level for ‘turf’ against MQM, before the 2013 Rangers operation quelled violence in the area.

7.2.5 Production of informal trading space in Karachi

Aim: To examine the production of informal trading spaces in Karachi, and how the social capital of informal actors from diverse ethno-political identities, and influence of contest, conflict and politics, impact on informal trading spaces, and how this contest affects the poor’s ability to access employment in the city.

Returning to the broad aim of this thesis, the key contribution of this research is the identification and analysis of mechanisms for making spatial claims in informal trading space in a conflicted and multi-ethnic context such as Karachi. Existing literature on street trading does not address the physical manifestation of social networks in informal trading space. Macharia (1997); Cross and Peña (2006); Lazar (2007) alluded to the ability street traders’ networks to claim space, but the processes of how boundaries are demarcated in informal trading space has not been explored before. Therefore useful concepts arise from this research which contribute to this debate including visible and invisible territories of power. Another fascinating finding of this research is the conceptualisation of benign and volatile boundaries.
in ITS, which illustrates the role of identity-driven, politically-aligned and criminally controlled social networks in the configuration of these boundaries.

One of the main contributions of this research is that it departs from the common perception in the informal economy literature, which portrays street traders as a marginalised group victimised by society and the state, who are merely trying to survive in a hostile neoliberal-oriented environment. In an ethnically-fragmented and contested context such as Karachi, the empirical evidence suggests a more complex reality, whereby street traders’ networks become complicit actors in the power struggle over economic gains, finance, political domination and territory, and street traders are political pawns in a wider struggle for power.

7.3 Limitations of research

The issue of gender disparity is important in investigating public space, particularly the employment opportunities in informal trading space. The case studies of informal trading space for this research are very male-dominated, because of the prevailing religious constraints which limit women from certain sects from accessing public space for livelihoods. Verkaaiik (2004) argues that gender-based spatial segregation is an attribute of many Muslim cultures, which is also strongly evident in many areas of Karachi, where men, but few women, are visible in streets and other public spaces. Ring (2006, p. 24) describes such societies as typically having ‘increased concerns with purdah (the seclusion of women from public spaces) in the city’. The presence of women as street entrepreneurs is limited in Karachi because their economic and informal work activities are mainly home-based and do not take place in public markets. The research therefore, is limited in that it does not account for women’s role in the production of informal trading space. This is because the research method focused on Karachi’s public markets and did not examine alternative trading spaces where women are likely to have an active role in the informal economy. The research objectives focused on the ethnic and politically contested spatial claims in informal markets and the scope of the study did not intend to include the domestic informal sector of Karachi.

Another limitation to the research was that it cannot claim to have included the influence of all religious groups operating in the markets. The religious group Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) (affiliated to the Taliban) was politically active in Orangi, but the researcher did not try to gain access to information about this group’s current activities. This group is controversial
because their social and political activities were restricted by the state from 2008. It was therefore, too dangerous for the researcher ask participants about information about this group, both for the researcher and for interviewees.

7.4 Directions for future research

Future research could examine the mechanisms and processes of claiming space in other contexts. For example, it would be useful to question whether or not the processes defined in this case study are similar in diverse geographic and socio-economic contexts which also exhibit strong informal economies, for example, in South America, sub-Saharan Africa, or the Middle-East. This case study has focused on the claims to trading space in a violent context that exhibits institutionally weak governance and is ethnically diverse. Future research could consider the processes of spatial claim and production of ITS in contexts that are institutionally strong and where formal regulations are enforced by the state, in order to question whether such social networks and power structures are present more widely, or are specific to Karachi. A similar academic enquiry into the spatial claims examined in this research could also be applied to an ethnically and politically diverse formal trading sector, rather than to assume that these processes are unique to informal economies.

Little remains known about the social networks of female traders in Karachi, most of whom operate within domestic space, how and if this space is networked or contested. For example, research could consider whether or not, middlemen act as gatekeepers elsewhere, and whether some ethnic groups have power to claim economically viable domestic spaces (e.g. over the home-based industry of stitching and embroidery). A second avenue for future research would be to examine the types of social networks that exist within domestic economic space and the negotiation processes of accessing various domestic spaces for informal employment and trading. A limitation is that the research has restricted its focus to public informal trading space, which in Karachi is dominated by male traders.

This study has demonstrated the importance of social networks in negotiating and claiming space in informal trading space. The role and complexity within the social networks to access negotiation and augment spatial claims is missing in the current street trading discourse. Furthermore, given changes in other contexts, there is a scope for more research to explore
processes and mechanisms of production of informal trading spaces in other cities and regions.
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9. **Appendix 1: Methodology**

**Appendix 3.1:**

**INFORMAL TRADING SPACES SURVEY (Interview Questionnaire) - “Experts”**

Interviewer: __________
Dated: ______________

**Basic Information.**

Title and responsibilities: ____________________________________________
Area of expertise: _________________________________________________
Professional affiliation: _____________________________________________
Works/projects: ____________________________________________________

**City level Problems:**

1. How would you see the various social groups that exist in the city and their socio-political impacts on the physical realm of the city?

Prompts:
- Types of social groupings exist in the city
  - Economic
  - Political
  - Religious
  - Others
- Geography and spatial distribution of social groupings in the city
- Impacts of divided geography on city’s governance
- Impacts of divided geography on city’s economy
- Impacts of divided geography on city’s politics
- Role of state in the construction of social groups in the city

2. ‘Karachi is a divided city’ – as documented by many authors, how do you see the division played out in the city both in physical and non-physical domains?

Prompts:
- Types of divisions exist in the city
- Territories/boundaries of various social groups in the city
- What is the process of development and formation of the physical divisions or territories
- Who is the controller of the boundaries?
  - State
  - Political parties
  - Informal actors
  - Social groups
  - Residents/business owners of the area
- In your opinion, how identities play an important role in the controlling the territories (of various social groups) that exist in the city
- Does state influenced by the identities
- What are the impacts of social groupings and subsequent physical territories generally on the businesses and ITS specifically?

**Conflict and violence**

- How do you explain the current wave of violence in Karachi over the years? And what are the prime reasons of its escalation a penetration in various sectors of the city?

**Rise of informality and informal sector**

- Role of state in the provision of goods and services to the poor.
  - Successful
  - Failed
  - Partially failed
  - Intentionally failed or absent
- Who filled the gap in the scenario of failed or intentionally absent state
- How it impacts on the city politics and geography?
- Rise of informal actors?
- How do you define informal sector?
- Who are the representatives of informal sector?
- How the informal actors acquire power to influence in the ITS.
- Role of informal actors in shaping the boundaries by different social groups.
- In your opinion, are there any boundaries (of identities on political, ethnic or religious basis) exist in informal trading areas
- How these boundaries impact on informal trading
- Presence of informal actors in ITS
- How area and city level politics impacts on its
- Types of networks/ties between state and informal actors in the background of ITS
- Actors involve in negotiating the territories of ITS
Appendix 3.2:

INFORMAL TRADING SPACES SURVEY (Interview Questionnaire) - “Journalists”

Interviewee: __________
Dated: ______________

Basic Information.

Title and responsibilities: __________________________________________
Area of expertise: _________________________________________________
Professional affiliation: _____________________________________________
Works/projects: ___________________________________________________

Objective:

- What are the impacts of diverse social grouping (ethnic, political and religious) in the markets of Karachi generally, and informal businesses specifically?
- How multiple power claimants of the market interact/negotiate for their businesses and other interest?
- To investigate the mechanisms adopted by the hawkers and other stakeholders of the market/area in the event of conflict and violence (especially in the past – before para military operation).

1. How would you see the various social groups that exist in the city?

____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________

2. How socio-political groupings impacts on the economy of the city?

____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________
____________________________________________________________________

3. How divisions in the social groups played out in space (geography of the city)?

____________________________________________________________________

OR

‘Karachi is a divided city’ – as documented by many authors, how do you see the division played out in the city both in physical and non-physical domains?
4. Does the spatial division at city level impacts on the trade/business?

5. If 'Yes' then explain how it impacts the trade/business areas of the city?

6. What are the main causes of violence over the years (specifically in the background of informal trading areas)?

7. Support the above causes/reasons of violence in the background of events that you or any of your colleague have reported/covered.

8. What is the role of identities of social groups in the trade of the city?

9. How trade influenced with the association of particular identity (ethnic, political or religious)?

10. How formal controller/s of the city get influenced by the identities of social groups and how does this effect the trade/business of the city?

11. Explain the above in the light of reported events.
12. Any reported events/incidences of violence in the informal trading areas on the basis of identity?

13. What are the impacts of social groupings and subsequent physical territories generally on the businesses and informal businesses specifically?

14. How various social groups formed and advance their network/s in trading to get the access and control over the resources?

15. Who are the prime actors involved in strengthening the network? Please elaborate their connections with other stakeholders.
Appendix 3.3:

INFORMAL TRADING SPACES SURVEY (Interview Questionnaire) - “Law Enforcers”

Interviewer: __________
Dated: ______________

Basic Information.

Title and responsibilities: ______________________________________________________

Area of expertise: _____________________________________________________________

Professional affiliation: _______________________________________________________

Works/projects: _______________________________________________________________

1. What is your job role, i.e. what are you responsible for? And how long have you been in your current position?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

2. What is the administrative hierarchy of your organisation?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

3. Could you please brief the roles and duties of various departments of your organisation?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

4. Which department is responsible for managing the public spaces of the area?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

5. Since my research focuses on the street hawkers, please provide current plans for the management of hawkers in the public spaces of this area?

________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________

6. What are the main challenges faced by you in managing the hawkers in the public space?
7. What are the controlling mechanisms to restrict the hawkers within certain areas/zones to avoid congestion and nuisance for transport and pedestrians?

8. Which streets/roads/pockets of hawkers in the area are difficult to control or manage? And why?

9. Which social groups (within hawkers) are difficult to manage and control in the area? And why?

10. What are the main causes of conflict in the area? And who are usually responsible for the conflict?

11. Who are the main stakeholders who participate in resolving the conflict? (Any event from the past)

12. Please identify the challenges faced by police and other law enforcing agencies to control the conflicting groups in the area?

13. Who deals with the police on the behalf of hawkers to resolve the conflict of the area?

14. Are there any trade unions/associations exist in the markets? How often do you meet them in dealing the disputes of the market/hawkers?
15. In your opinion, how beneficial are the trade unions for managing the markets of the area?

16. How do you control the conflict in the market between different groups? Please elaborate the controlling mechanisms in detail.

17. What are the main problems you faced in your job/department; funds (timing/disbursement), political support, etc.

18. How the change in ethnic demography is impacting the hawkers of Saddar area?

Evictions and related issues

19. Why the hawkers in Saddar area are most frequently evicted than any other areas of Karachi?

20. What are the issues confronted by the hawkers because of the periodic evictions by police and related departments?

21. In your opinion, what measures should be taken in future to avoid such problems faced by the hawkers?

22. How police act and handle in the situation of eviction in the area? And what problems they might face in this connection?
Appendix 3.4:

INFORMAL TRADING SPACES SURVEY (Interview Questionnaire) - “Street traders”

INFORMAL TRADING SPACES

Questionnaire for Street traders

Interviewer: ____________

Dated: ________________

Observed details and background Information:

About the Area:
- Location in the city
  (Suburbs/centre/old city): ________________________________
- Status of the area: ________________________________
- Controller of the area: ________________________________
- Dominating ethnicity: ________________________________

Interview Questions:

1. Personal Details and origin of living

- Gender: ____________________
- Place of birth: ________________________________
- Age: ________________________________
- Education: ________________________________
- Were you born in Karachi? 1=Yes, 2=No, ______
  if no where were you born, and when did you move to Karachi?
  ________________________________
- Which part of the country your family belong to: ________________________________
- Why you or your family chose to live in this area, explain
  ________________________________
- Ethnicity: ________________, Religious/Sectarian/Political affiliation: ________________

2. Physical Aspects
- **Business Details**
  - Duration of trade in this area: ________________________________
  - Location/Area: ____________________________________________
  - Previous trade location and duration (if any): __________________
  - Are you doing other job/business: ____________________________
  - Does any other member of your family work here or other location: 1. No, 2. Yes, explain the type, place __________________________________________
  - Nature of trade: Permanent/temporary/other: ___________________
  - Location of business: Inside market____, Along roadside____, Edge of the market_____.
    Extension of the shop____, Other______
  - Type of display: Cart____, Kiosk______, Table_______, Basket/Box______, Other______
  - Goods sold: _______________________________________________
  - Busy time of the day and week _________________________________
  - To whom you are paying rent for this space? ___________________
  - How much is the rent? ______________________________________
  - Service provided in return ____________________________________
  - Who are the buyers/customers?
    1. Area residents, 2. Commuters, 3. General public, 4. Others ________________
  - Where do you keep/store your products?
    1. Same place, 2. Rented place, 3. Take home, 4. Others ________________
  - Who is responsible of safety and security of the products that are kept to the trading places? i) Traders' representative ii) Police iii) Market union leader iv) Unit in charge v) Others
  - Is there any union or organisation of hawkers exist in this area? Yes/No. If Yes then: 1. Name of Association:
    _______
  - Who heads it and how they are selected?
  - What benefits do you have from it?

- **Space acquisition and contextual information**
  - How did you choose the current location?

- If answer to the previous question is among the options 2, 3 or 4, then any of your family member belongs to such association? Specify the details

- How much money did you invest initially to get the space in the market? And if it was given in installments or aggregate payment?

- Is the place of business on: i) Rental basis: ______ ii) Ownership basis: ______ iii) Others

- What is the rent or cost of? i) Place only: ______ ii) Place & structure: ______ iii) Other specify:

- To whom have you bought/rented the place/structure? 1. Relative, 2. Friend, 3. Other

- Through whom you acquired the place/structure? 1. Estate agent, 2. Govt. agent, 3. Police, 4. Other

- Nature of documentation done

- From where do you buy the products? 1. Other hawkers, 2. From main fruits and vegetables market (New Sabze Mandi), 3. Others

- Have you traded in any other location/s before? 1. Yes, 2. No

- If Yes to the above then specify the details

- And reason/s and benefits of moving to a new place

- Work-home relationship and expenses

- How far is your house from the trade location?


- Cost of commuting
3. Management and development of the market:

- **Provision of infrastructural services in the market**
  - Do you have an access to electricity supply in this market? 1. Yes. 2. No
  - If ‘Yes’ to the above then who provides the service? 1. Local Government, 2. Private company, 3. Others
  - How much do you pay for the electricity service?
  - Do you have access to water supply in this market? 1. Yes. 2. No
  - If ‘Yes’ to the above then who provides the service? 1. Local Government, 2. Private company, 3. Others
  - How much do you pay for the water supply service?
  - Do you have waste collection service in this market? 1. Yes. 2. No
  - If ‘Yes’ to the above then who provides the service? 1. Local Government, 2. Private company, 3. Traders union, Others
  - How much do you pay for the waste collection service?
  - How the leader will help in solving the problem?
  - Are you satisfied with the management of the market? 1. Yes, 2. No. Explain in both cases

- **Association and kinship**

  **Market association/union**
  - To whom you are associated to and why?
    __________________________________________________________________________
  - How do you get the membership of the association? __________________________________
  - What is the membership criteria and fees of the association? ______________________
  - How helpful is the association for the market? _________________________________
  - Is the association registered or listed? ____________________________
- Does your family, relatives or community work in this market? 1. Yes 2. No, explain
- How important is the presence of family, relatives or community to do the business?
- What benefits you gain from their presence?
- Is your family is associated to any association/political party? 1. Yes 2. No
- If 'Yes' to the above then why and how it is helpful to be the part of such association/political party?
- Is the union/association belongs to one ethnic group? 1. Yes 2. No
- If 'No' to the previous question, then what other ethnic groups are belong to this union/association?
- , how such unions are beneficial for the market?
- Explain the previous question in each case.

**Union leader/representative roles and duties**

- What is the role of the leader/representative of the union/association?
- How people select the union representative/leader?
- How he settles the disputes in the market?
- Is the union leader accessible to the people of market? 1. Yes 2. No
- If 'Yes' to the previous question, then how often traders meet with the leader?
- What are the issues that you do discuss with the union leader?
- What is the trade union hierarchy in terms of positions and roles assigned to various members?
- Any suggestion that you would like to put forward for the betterment of the union

**Presence of Political or religious party and controlling mechanisms**

- Are you associated to any political party?
- Is your family associated to the political party of the area? 1. Yes 2. No
- If 'Yes' to the previous questions, then why and how it is helpful to be the part of any political party
- How do you get the membership of the political party?
- Is the political party belongs to specific ethnic group? 1. Yes, 2. No
- If 'No' to the previous question, then what other ethnic groups are belong to this party?
- In your opinion, how political party is beneficial for the market?
- Explain the previous question in each case
- Are there any other political parties apart from the dominant one?
- If 'yes' to the previous question, then what ethnic or religious group they belong to?
- How political affiliations to political parties impact on the social relations of people/group/communities?
- How different political parties managed their hold/control in the market?

- Are there any past event/s of conflict/violence between the political parties? 1. Yes, 2. No
- If 'yes' to the previous question, please provide the details about it
- What do you think, why the different political parties or groups (as identified in the previous section) are fighting with each other, explain:
- Who resolve the conflict between them?
- In your opinion, which political party or group is better, and why, explain:
- How the political parties or groups increase their network (membership) in the market?
- In case of eviction, displacement etc. are these parties or groups help the people? 1. Yes, 2. No.
- If 'Yes' to the previous question, then how they help the traders/hawkers?

**Role and duties of Political or religious party’s leader/incharge**

- What is the role of the leader/incharge?
- How people select the representative/leader?
- How he settles the disputes in the market?
- Is the leader accessible to the people of market? 1. Yes, 2. No
- If 'Yes' to the previous question, then how often traders meet with the leader?
- What are the issues that you do discuss with the leader?

- What is the political party hierarchy in terms of positions and roles assigned to various members?

- Any problems that you face due to the presence of political party in your area? And comments or suggestion/s that you would like to put forward to resolve it

  - 1. Representative in police, 2. Association with the elected state member of the area, 3. Take help from NGO/CBO 4. Others. Explain in each case.

4. Problems related questions

  • Displacement and Evictions


  - If ‘Yes’ to the above than who was involved in the execution 1. Police 2. Anti-encroachment cell 3. Political party representative 4. Other

  - Explained what happened if you said ‘Yes’ in the previous question (detailed story)

  - How did you come back to the same space/location?

  - How often do you experience the above problems?

  - To whom you negotiate to come back to the same space/location?


  - Over what issue(s)? Please explain what happened in the background of past events
• **Strikes and shut down calls**

- How often this market experiences strike and shut down calls?

- Which party mostly gives the call? 1. MQM, 2. ANP, 3. JUI, 4. JI, PKMAP, 5. Others


- If option 2 is the answer of the previous question, then which area remains open during the strike? And why? Explain

- Which dominant ethnic/political group works in that area?

- Any past event of conflict/violence during strike/shut down calls? _______________ Between who and why? Explain

• **Communal conflicts:**

- Do you have any conflicts among yourselves as traders (individually and collectively), over what issues, and how do you resolve such?

- Are there any particularly powerful traders and landlords? ____________________________

- How do you go about resolving your collective problems as traders?

  1. Contact govt. authorities, 2. Contact market union/association, 3. Contact political party,

  4. Resolve it communally without govt. assistance 5. Other (specify) ___________ and why?

• **Conflict with market union/association**

- Do you have any conflicts with market union (individually and collectively), over what issues, and how do you resolve such?

- Are there any particularly powerful traders that exploit the rules and regulations of market union?
- If ‘Yes’ to the previous question, then how do you go about resolving the dispute with powerful traders?

- **Conflict with market’s political parties**

  - Do you have any conflicts with the political party of the area (individually and collectively), over what issues, and how do you resolve such?

  - Is there any particular powerful political party of the area?

  - If ‘Yes’ to the previous question, then how do you go about resolving the dispute with powerful traders?

  - Is there any particular powerful political party of the area?

  - If ‘Yes’ to the previous question, then how do you go about resolving the dispute with powerful traders?

- **Safety and Security**

  - Who is responsible for the policing of this market? 1. Police, 2. Market union/association 3. Political party, 4. Other (explain)

  - If policing is done by other than police, please explain the process and mechanisms used:

  - Are there problems of violence/robbing/mugging/harassing in the area and surrounding? 1. No, 2. Yes, explain:

  - Have you or any member of your household personally been affected by problems of violence/robbing/mugging/harassing in the area and surrounding 1. No, 2. Yes, explain:

  - Are there any problems with gangs or other anti-social groups in the neighborhood? 1. No, 2. Yes, explain:
- Has there been any problem of political violence or conflict in this neighborhood? 1. No, 2. Yes, explain:

- Are there any other issues or conflicts in this neighborhood and surrounding? 1. No, 2. Yes, explain:

- If issues or conflict arise amongst different communities, how and by whom are these resolved?

- Are you satisfied with the role and working of police and rangers in ensuring safety and security in the neighborhood? 1. No, 2. Yes, explain in each case