PSYCHOANALYSIS AND PSYCHOHISTORICAL METHODS

Garthine Walker with Tracey Loughran

Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) coined the term 'psychoanalysis' in 1896. Freud was among several nineteenth-century thinkers who questioned the popular view that people were rational creatures who always acted in full knowledge of what they were doing. He suggested that people's behaviour and personality was primarily determined by unconscious impulses and drives. Freud's ideas, like those of Darwin and Marx, have been profoundly influential. His concept of the unconscious, use of free association, and emphasis on the importance of dreams informed movements like Dadaism and Surrealism in the visual arts, and works of fiction such as Virginia Woolf's *The Waves*. His ideas also influenced academic disciplines within the social sciences, including anthropology, sociology and history. Biographers began to explain personality traits by referring to their subjects' pasts. Historians became more interested in causation. Before Freud, historians were little concerned with the causes or origins of historical phenomena, preferring to judge how great certain individuals were. After Freud, historians were more likely to consider that people might have motives that were outside their conscious awareness.

Explicit psychoanalytic theory enjoys an uncertain status within the academic disciplines. Despite many adherents in literary and cultural criticism, it tends to be dismissed by academic psychologists as 'bad science'. In universities, psychoanalysis per se is far more likely to feature on curricula outside psychology departments than within them.[1] Even in psychotherapeutic practice, psychoanalysis is now only one of numerous modalities which developed over the twentieth century, especially from the 1930s onwards. Some of these involve radically different ways of thinking about key issues and concepts despite sharing common roots in Freud's ideas.[2]

Historians' reception of psychoanalysis has been mixed. In 1958, William L. Langer, then President of the American Historical Association, proclaimed that incorporating 'psychoanalysis and its developments and variations' into historical research was the way forward.[3] Despite witnessing no such paradigm shift, the decades since have heard several similar clarion calls.[4] Psychoanalytic theory has

made a particular contribution to the fields of historical biography, early modern witchcraft, and holocaust studies. It is attractive to biographers because it provides a way of giving unity to a life. In the cases of witchcraft and the holocaust, psychoanalysis is invoked because the behaviour to be studied is seen as irrational, inexplicable and/or the product of trauma and is thus anchored in the unconscious.[5] Psychoanalytic ideas and terminology have also permeated historical writing in the form of 'common sense' assumptions about human behaviour. There is, however, no consensus. Whereas some argue that the tasks of the historian and psychoanalyst are similar,[6] others maintain their distinctiveness and incompatibility.[7]

Of course, historians have long drawn upon psychological theories, including (sometimes unknowingly) psychoanalytic ones, to try to understand the motivations and subjectivities of people in the past. Lucien Febvre's Annales project advocated acknowledgement of the role of emotions in history; Febvre was particularly influenced by the developmental psychologist Henri Wallon, whose work also informed several psychoanalytic theorists.[8] Norbert Elias explicitly acknowledged the debt to Sigmund Freud in his concept of the civilising process.[9] The Frankfurt School's account of the birth of the 'modern man' attempted to synthesize history, sociology and psychoanalysis into a general account of the modern Western world.[10] Historians who are inspired by the ideas of the Annales, the 'civilising process', and the Frankfurt school therefore often accept psychoanalytic concepts second hand. Historians inspired by these historical approaches therefore may have incorporated psychoanalytic ideas.

Psychoanalytic models and concepts have also entered historical writing via other disciplines and commonly accepted psychoanalytic assumptions. Keith Thomas (b.1933) and Alan Macfarlane's (b. 1941) hugely influential explanation of early modern witch accusations is a case in point: the so-called 'Thomas-Macfarlane' or 'charity-refusal' model of witchcraft was famously based on the concept of projection, popularized by Freud. However, their inspiration was not Freud's work per se but that of the anthropologist, E.E. Evans-Prichard (1902–1973). In the Thomas-Macfarlane version of witch accusations, people projected negative feelings about themselves (guilt for not helping their poorer neighbours who had turned to them for help and the fear that, when misfortune befell them shortly afterwards, God was punishing them for their uncharitable behaviour) onto the source of those feelings (their poorer neighbours seeking alms) by accusing the latter of witchcraft. The fact

that Evans-Pritchard disavowed the use of explicit psychological theory in his own study of witchcraft among Sudanese tribes demonstrates the cultural and intellectual pervasiveness of some popular psychoanalytic ideas even when they are not overtly acknowledged.[11]

Overall, explicit psychoanalysis has remained on the margins of the historical project. Various reasons have been given for this state of affairs ranging from the focus of History as an academic discipline to the personal shortcomings of historians. One commentator has pointed out that 'the default subject for historians' is the rational subject and therefore 'the psychoanalytic subject in all his or her strangeness is only invoked when we already find strangeness present'.[12] Another has identified in professional historians a fear that psychoanalysis undermines the humanistic tradition of historical explanation.[13] Others have claimed not only that 'the overwhelming majority' of historians fail to understand psychoanalysis because they 'have not been analyzed', but even that their objections to it as a method 'probably [...] spring from deep emotional sources' or that their 'narrow, empirical outlook' means that they cannot 'come to grips with theoretical challenges'.[14] These may be valid criticisms of particular individuals. But the historical profession is diverse.

Psychoanalytic theory fails to appeal to many historians because it seems to assume historical constants and essentialism. After all, according to Freud, 'unconscious mental processes are […] "timeless"': they 'are not ordered temporally', 'time does not change them in any way', and 'the idea of time cannot be applied to them'.[15] Many historians favour theoretical traditions that stress anti-essentialism. An anti-essentialist position denies that particular responses universally arise from given causes: one cannot interpret ambiguous feelings towards one's child as *inevitably* arising from the condition of childbirth and motherhood, for instance. Even when things have appeared constant, it does not follow that they *must* be constant – *pace* the oppression of women. The apparent essentialism of psychoanalytic theory that seems to render it ahistorical goes some way to explaining its little impact among historians.

However, intellectually psychoanalysis has been far from stagnant. During the past century, numerous theoretical positions have emerged not only in therapeutic modalities but also in academic theory. Some theorists have challenged the importance of essentialism. Others have explored the relationship between biological drives and culture. Certain scholars have claimed that particular versions of psychoanalysis *are* historical and quite compatible with historical change, arguing

that they may investigate the ‘varied expression in different times and places’ of universal drives and fantasies.[16]

In this chapter, I shall outline some salient points for historians of certain psychoanalytic schools and examine and evaluate examples of their influence in actual historical writing. First, Freudian psychoanalysis and ego psychology, secondly, British object relations theory and Melanie Klein, thirdly, Julia Kristeva’s modification of Lacanian psychoanalysis, and finally, the potential that other forms of psychotherapeutic theory may offer historians. There exist many variants of each of these, and I have not summarized all their main concerns. Rather, I introduce in brief and necessarily simplified terms certain characteristics in order to consider their use by historians. Whereas critics of psychoanalytic theory have conventionally focused on the fragility of its truth-claims or have engaged in *ad hominem* attacks on Freud,[17] I examine the mechanics of the arguments of psychoanalytically-inspired historical writing.

Some Freudian concepts

Like Marxism and Darwinism, Freud’s is a structural theory. Although it deals with the individual psyche, it does not privilege individual agency or choice. Freudian psychoanalysis emphasizes a tripartite personality structure. *Id*, the unconscious, is where mental activities affect the individual’s behaviour outside their awareness. The unconscious contains universal human drives and impulses, the primitive biological instincts of sex and aggression. Dreams, free association, slips of the tongue, art, and comments made under hypnosis all provide access to the unconscious. *Ego* is the conscious mind, which we experience as ‘I’ or ‘self’ and which perceives, understands and makes decisions. *Superego* holds ideals and values derived from the familial and cultural environment, such as social mores and taboos. Of these, the unconscious is the key concept. Freud did not invent the idea of unconscious motivation, that our behaviour is influenced by feelings or impulses of which we are unaware. But he did develop the notion that a mental entity called the unconscious actually exists and contains real truths. Hence, the ‘Freudian slip’, whereby a person consciously means to say one thing, but their unconscious breaks through with a slip of the tongue to reveal their ‘true’ feelings. Freud also adapted pre-existing concepts of ‘repression’ – the idea that painful experiences are kept out of conscious awareness – and ‘projection’ – that people project feelings of anxiety and guilt onto others and

lash out defensively, so that hostile feelings are experienced as part of the external world rather than internally. These psychological phenomena are recognized both within and beyond psychoanalysis.

Freud stated that all individuals pass through certain stages of personality development: oral, anal, phallic, latent, and genital. A pivotal moment in this journey he termed the Oedipus complex, after the mythical Greek hero who unknowingly killed his father and married his mother. Within Freudian theory, boys experience the Oedipus complex between the ages of three and five during the phallic stage of development. The little boy instinctively desires his mother sexually, which leads to his experiencing his father as a rival for his mother's love, and the desire to remove his father by murdering or castrating him. From this arise fears of reprisal, especially being killed or castrated himself. A conflict emerges between self-preservation on the one hand and loving his mother and hating his father on the other. Self-preservation triumphs and the child represses his feelings of sexual love and hate towards his respective parents. Having recognized his father's masculine superiority, the little boy enters the genital stage of development by identifying with his father rather than his mother. Freud termed a roughly comparable process for girls the Electra complex, after the mythological female who killed her mother to avenge the mother's murder of her father. In Greek myth, Electra lures her mother to her death by appealing to her maternal instincts, and after killing her is overwhelmed with remorse. Freud did not clearly theorize the female complex. Feminist psychoanalytic theorists have since developed alternative versions of the female unconscious.[18]

In addition to emphasizing structure, Freudian psychoanalysis stresses conflict rather than consensus. Conflict occurs between the three parts of the personality. For instance, a male toddler's conscious fear of reprisal conflicts with his instinctive sexual desire for his mother and so leads to repression of that impulse within the unconscious. In turn, repressed sexual urges produce anxiety, along with the fear, guilt and shame associated with sexual and aggressive fantasies. The unconscious conflict arising from infant experiences determines adult behaviour. All variants of human activity are caused by the unconscious interaction of and conflict between the two instinctive drives: the constructive sex drive and the destructive death drive. Overall, Freudian psychoanalysis is a biologically rooted essentialist, structural theory. Where a Marxist would look for the underlying economic interest, a Freudian

might try to explain history in terms of the historical subject's unresolved unconscious conflicts.

Among developments from the 1930s onwards among second generation psychoanalysts, including Freud's daughter, Anna Freud (1895–1982), Wilhelm Reich (1897–1957), Heinz Hartmann (1894–1970), and Erik Erikson (1902–1994) was ego psychology. Whereas Sigmund Freud was concerned only with adult patients and his ideas about infant experience originated in his interpretations of adult behaviour, ego psychologists became interested in child development per se and its impact on adult personality. Here, personality develops from the dominance of the unconscious in infanthood to the adult's conscious control over the internal and external world. They were also more likely to consider the role of society and culture (in the form, for instance, of economic opportunities as well as child-rearing methods) in how adults behave and understand themselves, hence Erikson's coining of the term 'psychosocial' to describe his own theoretical contribution. Indeed, Erikson criticized early psychoanalysis for approaching the individual as if he were merely 'a marionette moved by unconscious libidinal forces […] rather than a living human being'.[19] Reich, meanwhile, was interested in the patient's experience in the 'here and now': how a person said something was as important, perhaps more important than what they said. Like Anna Freud, Reich viewed seemingly irrational, maladaptive and self-destructive behaviours as unconscious defences and responses to the environment rather than products of the death drive.

Ego psychology might seem less biologically deterministic than classic Freudianism. Yet the theory, which depends on the premise that humans are biologically programmed to adapt to their culture for survival, developed within a functionalist framework and shares characteristics with modernisation theory.[20] Consensus is seen as positive and conflict negative, for example, and in some versions of ego psychology a failure to conform is the result of a maladaptation to the social environment. While ego psychology remained focused on internal conflicts at each developmental stage, it assumes a necessary and universal drive towards greater ego stability and adaptation to the environment.

Otto Pflanze on Otto von Bismarck

We find Freudian psychoanalysis informing historical biographies, including several written by practicing psychoanalysts, such as Erik Erikson's *Young Man Luther*

(1958) and E. Victor Wolfenstein's study of Lenin, *The Revolutionary Personality* (1973).[21] Freud himself published a psychobiography of Leonardo da Vinci (1910).[22] The example discussed here is Otto Pflanze's examination of Otto von Bismarck,[23] Prime Minister of Prussia and first Chancellor of the German Empire after the unification of Germany in 1871, for which Bismarck is largely held responsible.

Psychoanalytic theory allowed Pflanze to reconcile two contradictory statements made by Bismarck. In 1838, aged twenty-three, Bismarck wrote in a letter that he was motivated to be a great statesman not by patriotism but by 'ambition, the wish to command, to be admired, and to become famous'. In 1874, aged fifty-nine, Bismarck contrarily described himself to the Prussian parliament as 'a disciplined statesman who subordinates himself to the total needs and requirements of the state in the interests of peace and the welfare of my country'.[24] Pflanze explains the discrepancy not in terms of different contexts, audiences, and life-stage but psychoanalytically:

> [T]he Bismarck of 1874 was still the Bismarck of 1838. What occurred may be understood in terms of a common psychic process […] Instinctual impulses that the conscience cannot tolerate are either repressed (i.e., 'thrust back into the id') or projected (i.e., 'displaced into the outside world'). Bismarck projected his quest for power and renown onto the Prussian state. Goals that would have been intolerable if conceived as personal, could, when conceived as in the interests of the state or public welfare, be sought without a sense of guilt [… and] therefore acceptable to his conscience.[25]

According to Pflanze, the religious conversion Bismarck had undergone between these dates compelled him unconsciously to 'protect his ego from the sting of conscience'. Bismarck's ambition of 1838 had been repressed by 1874. Pflanze's use of psychoanalysis allows him to interpret statements of both personal ambition and the absence of personal ambition as having the same meaning. A method that allows for contradictory evidence to lead to the same conclusion is problematic.

Following Reich's 1933 descriptions of Freudian personality types, Pflanze attributes the 'phallic-narcissistic' label to Bismarck. 'Phallic-narcissistic' types are 'self-confident, often arrogant, elastic, vigorous, and often impressive', 'outspoken', and 'tend to achieve leading positions in life'; their 'facial expression usually shows hard, sharp masculine features'; their manner is 'aggressive'. Such persons have 'an

identification of the total ego with the phallus', 'serious disappointments' at the genital stage in the relationship to the mother, and a home in which the mother was the stronger parent'. Pflanze interprets Bismarck's character and past accordingly, claiming that psychoanalytic theory provides 'character suits' in which to dress and tailor to fit historical actors. Bismarck, Pflanze asserts, 'undoubtedly' displayed 'a rather exaggerated masculinity'. During his student years, Bismarck fought twenty-five duels in three semesters, and boasted of drinking six bottles of wine without getting drunk or vomiting. An exhibitionist, he once quaffed an entire bottle of wine in a single gulp to impress assembled officers.[26]

Pflanze viewed events from Bismarck's early life in the light of the Oedipal situation associated with the phallic-narcissistic character type. He quotes a letter in which Bismarck remembered childhood feelings: 'it often appeared to me that [my mother] was hard, cold toward me. As a small child I hated her'. In contrast, Bismarck 'really loved' his father, but felt remorseful because sometimes 'I made a pretence of loving him […] when innerly I felt hard and unloving because of his apparent weaknesses'. The letter seems to conform to Freudian theory only regarding the father to whom Bismarck experienced an Oedipal ambivalence, sometimes loving and sometimes not. This ambivalence arose from respect for his father's authority and jealousy over his possession of Bismarck's mother. According to the theory, Bismarck should have felt love, not hate, for his mother. But Pflanze operates a shift of perspective: 'Toward his mother he expressed a sense of guilt, but no ambivalence and no love. Yet appearances deceive, and here too Bismarck conforms to the pattern'. The evidence is made to fit the theory after all. For 'it is a common phenomenon within psychoanalysis that strong negative feelings towards the parent of the opposite sex turn out to be […] concealing the opposite of what they purport to be. Interpreted in this way, Bismarck's attitude toward his mother has to be read as love rather than hatred'.[27] Effectively, the theory is confirmed whether evidence is present or absent. Freudian psychoanalysis and ego psychology would thus seem to be incompatible with the historical method because its self-confirming nature means that it cannot be tested against evidence. Psychoanalytic theory is treated as if it constitutes a body of universal laws. The past is applied to the model rather than the model or hypothesis being tested against evidence.

While this sort of psychohistory was produced primarily in the 1960s and 1970s, Freudian assumptions continue to lead historians to approach historical

documents as if they allow us to 'reconstruct the mental life of an individual', to identify 'the themes of [that individual's] psychology', and to see into 'the well-springs of [...] personality, motives and emotions'.[28] Whether the subject describes responses to 'real' external or imagined internal events is irrelevant because what matters is the individual's construction of reality, which is based on the need to contain the expression of the sex and death drive.[29] Yet psychoanalytic theory also allows for anxiety to arise from external factors, and the historian has no way of determining whether the origins are internal or external in any particular case.

Reading texts in this way might be a non-problem for psychoanalysis – although we should note that analysts and therapists using theory to support the making of 'wild' connections or substituting analytic interpretation with 'inspired guesswork' has been both observed and criticized within the psychotherapeutic literature too.[30] As the psychoanalyst Patrick Casement observed, even in clinical practice 'when any psychoanalytic assumption is held to be beyond question, interpretations can too easily be imposed upon whatever seems to fit in with that assumption'.[31] Psychoanalysts themselves have acknowledged that theirs is not a predictive theory and have warned against 'transposing back', reducing human situations to the 'earliest, simplest, and most infantile precursor which is assumed to be its "origin"'.[32] Yet this is precisely what crude psychohistories attempt, thereby producing arguments that are essentialist, circular, and unfalsifiable.

British Object Relations and Melanie Klein

Object relations theory originated in the work of Melanie Klein (1882–1960) published between 1919 and 1957. Where classical Freudianism privileged the father's role, object relations theory is much more concerned with that of the mother. Klein emphasized the pre-Oedipal phase of infant development: the first year of life when the infant learns to distinguish its self (subject), from the 'objects' – people (usually the mother) or parts of people (the mother's breast) – with which it comes into contact and develops some sort of relationship. She believed that the infant initially experiences all 'good' things, such as the mother's breast, as parts of itself, and 'bad' things, such as pain, as external. Klein introduced a fundamental shift from classical psychoanalysis by privileging relationships rather than the expression of drives, notwithstanding the concept of the unconscious remaining central. Instead of the primary impulse being to seek pleasure, as Freud believed, for Klein the impulse

was social, a need to form relationships. Here, the desire for relationship explains the life instinct/sex drive (the need to express intimacy) and aggression/death drive (the need to express frustration), whereas other object relations theorists such as Ronald Fairbairn (1889–1964) and Donald Winnicott (1896–1971) considered love and hate, even in infants, to be responses to their relational environment.

Unlike later theorists who perhaps idealized the pre-Oedipal stage and mother-infant relations, Klein emphasized the aggressive anxieties, frustrations, and splitting that the infant experiences in relation to the breast and the mother.[33] The infant psyche, she believed, is experienced in the inner world of 'phantasy', the perceptive filter through which we experience external relationships. It is in 'phantasy' that Freud's instinctual drives of desire and aggression, and the negative emotions of envy, greed, and loss, are dealt with. According to Klein, the infant's ego organizes discomfort, contentment, hunger, and satiety into relationships of need, love, and hate towards the mother and/or breast. Put simply, an infant not only experiences the breast as a source of pleasure and gratification but also as one of frustration when these positive feelings are denied, which produces aggression and hate towards the object. Thus, for Klein, the infant splits the mother/breast in phantasy into either good (satisfying) or bad (frustrating). In turn, the infant seeks to identify with and incorporate the good breast, which represents the life instinct, and projects the anxiety provoked by the death instinct onto the bad breast. The experience of actual mothering (the 'external object') is internalized. Klein also identified envy as a key emotion in this early stage of infanthood. Envy involves the desire to be as good as the envied object (mother/breast), and when this appears to be impossible, the object is attacked in order to remove the source of envious feelings. But the infant hates and envies the bad breast too. This envy is usually dealt with in the process of resolving Oedipal feelings of rivalry; if it remains powerful, the later Oedipal stage is not successfully resolved.[34]

Klein believed the infant ego tended to fragment and split into good and bad as a way of dealing with anxiety (what she termed the 'paranoid-schizoid position'). The anxiety itself was a defensive action to protect the ego from the death drive's destructiveness. Gradually, a more integrated psyche emerges, and the infant begins to fear that his or her destructive impulses might have destroyed the mother or the breast. This introduces ambivalent feelings – rage, guilt, and loss as well as love – towards the mother, who now becomes seen as embodying both bad and good. With

this ‘depressive position’ comes a process of ‘reparation’, wherein the infant experiences restorative phantasies in which harm done to objects is undone.

By paying attention to the pre-Oedipal mother-infant relationship, Kleinian object relations theory demoted the father-centred Oedipus complex privileged by Freud. This has been attractive to some feminists. Feminist object-relations theorists have drawn attention to the way that discourses of motherhood are constructed ideologically. As the individual is interpreted in a cultural context and social relations are central to the construction of the self, object-relations theory is perhaps more compatible with historical analysis than is Freudian psychoanalysis. The defining characteristic of human existence nevertheless remains rooted in a seemingly biological impulse to form relationships with others.

While this may seem essentialist, Klein’s emphasis on the developmental importance of the early weeks and months of life has been confirmed by subsequent research by developmental and attachment theorists. Such research has increasingly focused on children in relation to their caregivers. Klein’s belief that loss and separation are central themes in character formation has stood the test of time although it is ‘the style and general handling of the infant that matters’,[35] as has the importance she placed on the infant’s processes of splitting and projection. Many of her explanations and interpretations, however, such as that new-born infants experience anxiety of a persecutory nature, have been challenged by alternative perspectives both within and beyond British Object Relations theory, including by certain of her contemporaries. Moreover, attachment and developmental research has moved away from the Kleinian emphasis on unconscious destructive phantasies in favour of looking at real deprivation, loss and environmental trauma. Whereas Klein was interested in how the inner world of the infant shaped his or her perception of the object and how the object in question (usually the mother)’s feelings and actions could be shaped accordingly, theorists such as John Bowlby focused on how the caregiver or their absences or inadequacies had an impact on the inner world of the infant.[36] Such ideas are potentially falsifiable and thus may be investigated historically. The problem for historians is therefore not that object relations theory is ‘wrong’, but that some of the aspects drawn upon by historians might be imaginative constructions that cannot be falsified, which makes it incompatible with a historical method that rests upon relative probabilities.

Lyndal Roper on early modern German witchcraft

In an article published in 1991, Lyndal Roper argues that to understand witchcraft we must attend to the 'imaginative themes' of accusations.[37] These themes were maternal: suckling, giving birth, food and feeding, childcare. Several accused witches were lying-in maids, their accusers were newly-delivered mothers, and witnesses were other women for whom the lying-in maids had worked. Roper asks why witchcraft accusations took this form and why some accused lying-in maids confessed to their crimes. She contends that psychic conflicts provide answers to both questions. Object relations theory informs this conclusion.

With regard to the mothers who accused lying-in maids of witchcraft, Roper stresses the biological significance of childbirth. A baby's first weeks produced anxiety in mothers not only because of high infant mortality but also because this time might invoke memories of the mother's own pre-Oedipal stage when she 'may have experienced unadmitted, intolerable feelings of hatred as well as love' towards her own mother.[38] If things went wrong – if the child fell ill or died – these pre-Oedipal residues formed a dramatic psychic script which allowed the mother to project her anxiety and guilt on to the lying-in maid whom she duly accused of witchcraft.[39] Whereas the modern woman might internalize feelings of guilt and experience postnatal depression, the early modern mother used the Kleinian mechanism of 'splitting' to project these feelings onto someone else. Thus, for Roper, the early modern psyche is regulated by the same psychically-induced states as the modern one. Lying-in maids also experienced ambivalent pre-Oedipal emotions, especially envy, for they had no hope of having young families of their own. Drawing again on Klein, Roper states that it is in the pre-Oedipal phase that envy develops. The lying-in maid's admission of envy could lead to a full confession of witchcraft in the context of early modern understandings that associated envy of a woman with a wish to harm her.

There is much brilliant analysis here. Roper's identification of conflicts between women seems incontrovertible, and her contribution to understanding the nature of these conflicts is very important. The *questions* she asks and the areas she explores owe much to her knowledge of psychoanalysis, and on this score, its use has clearly been productive. But when we look at the mechanics of her argument, psychoanalysis perhaps plays a lesser and perhaps sometimes redundant role.

Critics of psychohistory are fond of denouncing it for its circular arguments. Following Karl Popper's claim that psychoanalytic propositions are unfalsifiable – that because they are self-affirming no statement can refute them – they have argued that historians cannot legitimately use psychoanalytic ideas.[40] Roper concedes that her argument may seem circular. Indeed, she seems somewhat to embrace circularity: 'this conceptual difficulty', she says, 'is inherent in the productive use of ideas'.[41] One example of circularity is Roper's explanation for why envy marks witchcraft cases. Envy, psychoanalytic theory informs us, is pre-Oedipal in origin, therefore the explanation for the presence of this envy is pre-Oedipal conflict. This is a perfect circle, in that the conclusion is contained in the premise. The problem, however, is that circularity is *un*productive. It reproduces the same knowledge whatever the sources or evidence.

Roper is far too great a historian not to see this. She immediately qualifies her commitment to circularity by rejecting reductive readings in which 'everything speaks of phallogocentrism or betrays the Oedipal complex'. In fact, she offers a means for psychoanalysis to break out of circularity. On the one hand, she argues that 'there are some primary areas of attachment and conflict – between those in maternal positions and children – which are pretty fundamental to human existence'. This might seem to be an unfalsifiable statement: it is difficult to conceive of any kind of evidence about motherhood that would not confirm the presence of either attachment or conflict or both – but it is confirmed by a huge body of attachment and development theory.[42] On the other hand, she says that 'the *form* those conflicts may take and the attitudes societies adopt to them may change. This [...] is the territory of the historian'.[43] In other words, historians can investigate the varying forms taken by apparently unvarying emotions. The fact of multiple forms renders any common root academic or makes it merely one influence among many. Roper has thus effectively constrained the reach of psychoanalysis in that she concedes that all aspects of human behaviour cannot be reduced to basic psychic mechanisms. This concession – that psychoanalysis should be used alongside other forms of investigation for it alone cannot provide an explanation – is a theoretical gain.

Nevertheless, the explanatory status of psychoanalysis might be reduced further. Roper's explanation for why early modern women sometimes projected their guilt in witchcraft accusations, whereas modern mothers are more likely to be labelled as depressive, is a range of historically rooted cultural assumptions about childbirth,

the body, and women. The psychological predisposition towards guilt and envy enters the explanation only at the level of a *potential* that rules nothing out. Moreover, the postnatal period often passed without incident, as Roper points out, and even when things went wrong, a witchcraft accusation did not always follow. In effect, a confluence of historical factors explains the response to a psychological conflict that *might* result from something going wrong in the postpartum period. These are serious qualifications upon the explanatory power of psychoanalysis. The cost of getting around the problem of circularity has been conceptually to remove psychic conflicts from the centre of the analysis.

Underlying this is a logical issue. Roper classifies her two types of causation hierarchically. Historical circumstances explain the 'form' taken by psychic conflicts, which implies that the latter is a sort of base. Psychology is primary and history secondary. But this hierarchy is difficult to maintain. Since a given behavioural outcome (the witchcraft accusation) depends on two sets of causation (a) psychic conflicts rooted in the pre-Oedipal phase and (b) a range of historical circumstances and phenomena,[44] if either (a) or (b) were removed, the accusation of witchcraft would no longer follow. As both (a) and (b) are necessary to the explanation, we cannot say which is the more important.

Psychoanalytic ideas pervade Roper's analysis. Yet she also suggests that 'the social organisation of motherhood' made possible women's ambivalent feelings towards their children, so that 'a certain kind of psychic dramatic script was available should things go wrong'.[45] Yet presumably other scripts might be used as well or instead, and the women concerned had a degree of agency in terms of their response to adversity. Elsewhere in the same volume she writes that while the 'psychic conflicts attendant on the feminine position – whether Oedipal or related to motherhood – provided the substance of the psychic drama of the witchcraft interrogation', 'most women', managed these psychic conflicts 'without falling prey to morbid diabolic temptation [...] nor did all witches produce witch fantasies'; but when they did, it was 'the possibilities present in [the] culture' that 'enabled' the 'combustion of interests to occur' that produced stories of witchcraft.[46] So, here too, although a *claim* is made for the primacy of psychoanalytic explanation, the explanation seems multicausal.

Although Roper applies psychoanalytic theory in a way that might suggest biological essentialism, circularity and unfalsifiability, she integrates it into a

historical and fruitful analysis. It seems entirely possible to answer those who advocate the wholesale rejection of psychoanalytic theory with evidence that, in practical historical writing, a belief in psychic causality need not lead to historical determinism.[47]

Daniel Pick and Michael Roper: beyond the cultural turn[48]

Kleinian object relations theory has also informed the work of cultural historians interested in subjectivity. Indeed, some cultural historians have viewed it as a means of resolving thorny problems posed by poststructuralist approaches to history and the subsequent proliferation of histories centred on textual analysis. The benefits of the so-called cultural turn include the expansion of 'legitimate' topics of historical enquiry, types of evidence, and methods of interpretation. Yet there has also been a turn *away* from some of the most cherished aspects of an earlier social history, perhaps most notably the latter's emphasis on materiality and politics. For some scholars troubled by the notion that historians cannot access the experiences of people in the past, psychoanalytic theory has offered a solution. If the main precepts of psychoanalysis – the tripartite structure of mind, the centrality of parent-child relationships and childhood experience in determining adult behaviour, and the ability to access the unconscious via agreed interpretive techniques – are accepted, it promises explanatory insight into quite fundamental matters of human motivation, action and experience. From this starting point, certain psychoanalytically-inclined historians have produced nuanced, thought-provoking work which has contributed to historical understanding.

Daniel Pick trained first as a historian, and subsequently as a psychoanalyst. He is therefore a rare example of a scholar with expertise in both fields. Much of his research engages with the history of nineteenth- and twentieth-century approaches to the mind, broadly conceived, but it is in *Rome or Death: The Obsessions of General Garibaldi* (2005), his quasi-biographical work on Italian nationalist and military leader Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807-1882) that Pick moves most closely towards the terrain of psychobiography.[49] Pick does not tell the story of Garibaldi's life from birth to death, as a conventional (psycho)biographer might do. Rather, he is concerned with an episode late in the General's career, recorded but accorded little importance by most of Garibaldi's numerous biographers. In 1875, Garibaldi embarked on a sustained political and financial campaign to divert the course of the River Tiber from

Rome. Garibaldi argued that this was necessary to overcome flood and to cut the number of deaths from malaria, both of which were acknowledged areas of concern for the Government. Yet while the project was technically feasible, it would have been enormously difficult and expensive. Most historical commentators have agreed that the Italian Government was never likely to support it and have viewed Garibaldi's persistent attempts to persuade them otherwise as proof of his naivety. Pick perceives this explanation to be superficial, instead arguing that Garibaldi's obsessive pursuit of this doomed venture is evidence of a complex psychological drama.

Pick's explanation draws on Kleinian psychoanalysis, and especially Klein's concepts of guilt, mourning and reparation. He argues that Garibaldi's mental outlook comprised 'an extremely split representation of the world and a partial picture of himself: no bad thought, it seemed, belonged to him, no good thought to his enemies'.[50] As a military leader, Garibaldi had fought for the ideal of Rome, the symbol of the Italian nation; its moral corruption and (literal) stagnation disgusted him. His project to divert the Tiber constituted a restaging of earlier battles, impelled not only by moral purpose and sanitary concerns, but also by personal loss. His first wife Anita, the love of his life, had died from malaria in 1849 during a dramatic retreat from Rome. Her death continued to haunt him.[51] In Pick's view, 'To salvage the city was, apparently, to reclaim, personally and poignantly, the most vital love object, to see her "unsullied" once again'.[52] Garibaldi sought to 'cure' Rome because 'unconsciously the city also symbolized a still deeper, more personal, damaged "place" that he longer to repair'. Pick argues that the obsessive quality of Garibaldi's quest bears the hallmarks of 'a state of mania', in which guilt and responsibility are denied and virtual omnipotence is claimed.[53] Pick accepts that there were powerful medico-moral arguments for diverting the Tiber – indeed, he provides an impressive analysis of this historical context for Garibaldi's actions – but argues that the project only carried such force for Garibaldi because 'it re-enacted deeper conflicts and dramas'. Moreover, Pick claims that at an unconscious level, Garibaldi not only knew that his plans would fail, but that he sought defeat. Failure 'dramatise[d] his long-standing complaint about his own political marginalisation and the moral impotence of the new state'.[54] Garibaldi's tendency to view the world in binary terms of good and evil, and his reluctance to accept the compromises that political action inevitably

entailed, also meant that ultimately he was perhaps 'more comfortable as a loser than a winner'.[55]

For our purposes, Pick's account of Garibaldi's obsessions is important mainly for his claims regarding both the necessity *and* the inevitable limitations of psychoanalytically-informed history. Pick's aim was twofold: to examine 'the myriad of social, cultural and political connections between health, corruption and the Eternal City in the Victorian age', and to ask 'how far we can piece together the hidden jigsaw of Garibaldi's own motives for reclaiming Rome'.[56] Significantly, these terrains are interlinked: one cannot fully comprehend Garibaldi's relationship to Rome without understanding the symbolic resonance of the city in Victorian culture. This reflects Pick's conviction that there are often severe deficiencies in how both psychoanalytically-influenced historians and cultural historians approach their subjects: the latter often 'unsatisfactorily' bypass questions about interior states altogether, while the former often pay insufficient attention to the reconstruction of 'plausible worlds in the past'.[57] Pick insists that there is something in Garibaldi's story that 'defies obvious logic', and that conventional forms of evidence and historical argument therefore 'cannot provide a full answer' to the question of Garibaldi's motivation.[58] Yet Pick deliberately separates out 'the key historical questions' from those raised 'at a different psychoanalytical level'.[59] Crucially, he frames the psychanalytical part of his task in tentative terms, as a question that it may not be possible to answer.[60] Indeed, whenever Pick ventures onto psychoanalytical territory, his prose is littered with question marks: he poses questions rather than asserts answers. In this way, Pick avoids the over-determination that mars many psychohistories. The value of his work resides less in his speculations on Garibaldi's motivations, which he is aware cannot be disproven, but in his self-conscious presentation of this history as a contemplation on 'the problem of historical biography itself'.[61]

Michael Roper's use of psychoanalytic theory is less tentative but just as productive. In a series of essays published since the early 2000s on emotional survival in the First World War, Roper has criticized cultural history approaches which either exclude subjectivity or elide the gap between public languages and private emotional experiences.[62] Roper argues that such relegation of psychological forms of subjectivity endorses 'a profoundly lifeless notion of human existence' and results in an impoverished form of cultural history. He sees these flaws as particularly evident

in gender histories, at least partly as a legacy of Joan Scott's subordination of subjectivity to representation in her influential analysis of the operation of gender in history.[63] According to Roper, despite an enormous amount of research, histories of gender and war are fundamentally limited by their focus on publicly circulating codes of masculinity and lack of attention to gendered *experiences* of war.[64]

Roper's solution to these problems is psychoanalytic theory. In his view, only histories which give a proper place to the power of unconscious elements in gendered behaviour can illuminate with sufficient analytical purchase 'the precariousness of masculinity at the level of lived experience'.[65] This approach depends on the belief 'that there is a structure to unconscious processes and that their particular forms can be made manifest through the analysis of later memories'; this is an uncompromising methodological claim.[66] However, it is difficult to dispute most of Roper's findings, although his work is potentially vulnerable to all the criticisms of applications of psychoanalytic theory to history raised in the earlier part of this chapter – that it is essentialist, unfalsifiable, and involves circular reasoning. His attempts to access the 'almost-unconscious' involve attention to the role of technologies and practices, as well as manifest content, in the composure of texts – slips of the pen, the use of particular writing implements, or the choice of postcard are read as clues to the internal states of individuals.[67] These close readings are often more thoroughly grounded in physical evidence (the conditions under which a letter was written, changes in style of handwriting, and crossings-out) than those of ostensibly more 'empiricist' historians.[68] His conviction that cultural history has lost 'an adequate sense of the material' means that his work foregrounds the social as well as the psychic: he emphasizes the role of class in shaping experience, the agency of subjects, and the importance of everyday practices such as eating, sleeping, and staying warm in determining emotional wellbeing.[69]

The main value of Roper's work lies in the set of questions it asks, and the subsequent shift in historical perspective it achieves. Precisely because Roper's starting point is not gender, but the nature of psychic and embodied experience, his exploration of emotional survival in the First World War often exposes the gendered assumptions governing other historians' approaches. For example, historians have often described the caring roles performed by subalterns as 'paternal'. Yet, as Roper points out, the characteristic responsibilities of officers – ensuring the physical comfort of men, keeping order, and maintaining a balance between discipline and

sympathy – mimicked those of mothers, not fathers, and subalterns often compared themselves to mothers. Historians have transmuted these direct comparisons into evidence of 'paternal' feeling simply because the tasks were performed by men.[70] Roper's work refuses easy assumptions about masculinity, suggesting that sometimes the default modes of cultural and gender history can obscure other questions and approaches.

For both Pick and Roper, psychoanalytic theory offers a way to reinsert the self into a cultural history which the 'cultural turn' denuded. In prompting different questions, psychoanalytic theory has led them to novel interpretations. The worth of their work stands or falls not on the theory they used to generate questions, but on the evidence marshalled to answer them.

Lacanian psychoanalysis and feminist modifications

Lacanian psychoanalysis and, especially, its modifications by feminist theorists has had a great impact within literary and cultural criticism, which in turn has informed historical research. However, the debt of such work to poststructuralism places it in the very category of historical writing that Pick and Michael Roper found so unsatisfactory.[71] The poststructuralist philosopher and psychoanalyst, Jacque Lacan (1901–1981) advanced his own developmental stages in which, like Klein, he believed 'splitting' to be a fundamental process and the ego to be non-unified. However, unlike Klein, Lacan's stages of development (The Imaginary – The Mirror Stage – The Symbolic) allow for the infant to become a social being only with the appropriation of language and entry into what he termed the 'Symbolic' realm. The Symbolic is a set of external meanings embedded in language, which saturate the unconscious and structure and define social and cultural order. Linguistic determinism thus replaced Freud's biological determinism. Because Lacan believed the unconscious to be structured like language, unconscious desires reflect not the individual subject but patriarchal structure of society, the 'Law of the Father': All interpersonal experiences, including mother-infant interaction, are organized according to this Law and its symbolism. In the patriarchal Symbolic order, man is self and woman 'other'; female existence is given meaning only in relation to the male.

Lacan has been criticized for this eternal repression of the feminine and for defining femininity in patriarchal terms of lack. Yet some feminist theorists, notably

Julia Kristeva (b. 1941), Hélène Cixous (b. 1937), and Luce Irigaray (b. 1930) modified and expanded Lacan's idea of woman as lack or 'other'. For Kristeva, for instance, femininity's place in the pre-Oedipal, unconscious, Imaginary realm allows it to challenge and refuse dominant meanings imposed by the Symbolic. However, by speaking from the Imaginary, there is a risk of being engulfed by a terrifying infantile realm characterized by abjection. The 'abject' is conceptualized as a shapeless, damp, monstrous realm outside culture, is connected to the body fluids and processes of the adult female body and is associated with permeability and the dissolution of boundaries.[72]

Diane Purkiss on the fantasy figure of the witch

Literary critic Diane Purkiss has interpreted seventeenth-century English witchcraft pamphlets accordingly. Drawing on Kristeva and others, Purkiss argues that seventeenth-century people imagined the witch in terms of a 'fantasy-image of the huge, controlling, scattered, polluted, leaky fantasy of the maternal body'. She shows that this was made possible by a range of elite and popular discourses of the body, household, transformation, and femininity, and by social practices surrounding women and childcare, the maintenance of household order, the dispersal of dirt and pollution, and more.[73] Although Purkiss claims that this fantasy image was a constant of western civilization, she demonstrates that its configuration in the early modern witch was constructed socially and culturally. Moreover, because Purkiss stresses the cultural construction of subjectivity, she does not adopt the essentialist idea that a particular effect must inevitably follow a particular event. Rather, she uses the notion of psychic conflicts non-essentially: it was not inevitable that a woman associated other women with witchcraft even when she felt threatened by their speech or actions. Thus, despite Purkiss's claim that psychoanalysis 'offers the richest, most rewarding and most serious ways of reading texts concerned with the supernatural',[74] her method in practice is not distinctively psychoanalytic. In fact, she employs psychoanalytic theory alongside other forms of analysis to produce a non-essentialising historical account of witchcraft.[75]

Prospects for a New Psychohistory

I wish to end by pointing to some ways in which the theoretical frameworks of other forms of psychotherapy may fruitfully inform historical writing. I stated at the outset

that psychoanalysis is now only one of several psychotherapeutic modalities which themselves have established histories in theory and practice. Some aspects of these seem to me to be potentially compatible with the methods of professional historians. I am thinking particularly of certain ideas and concepts underpinning contemporary Gestalt theory, which I shall discuss here, but also intersubjectivity theory and work on personality styles developed from Transactional Analysis, but this is not an exhaustive list.

A brief example comes in the form of my own research on emotional responses to child-killing in England and Wales in the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries.[76] Much work on neonatal infanticide prosecuted under the terms of the 1624 Concealment Act belies 'the deep, complex and varied individual emotional experiences' of suspected women,[77] tending instead to situate them in a fixed and limited emotional landscape. Unmarried women accused of killing their newborn infants and prosecuted for concealing their deaths are usually presented as either victims of patriarchal society, murdering their newborns in order to hide their own shame, or they were rebellious proto-feminists who rejected gender roles in refusing to be positioned as unmarried mothers. Either way, women are presented as purposeful, goal-oriented agents (and guilty as charged).[78]

While I have long been uncomfortable with such interpretations, my training as a psychotherapist has provided a framework in which better to conceptualize the emotional experience of historical subjects. Rather than seek what seems to be a fixed subject position (submissive or rebellious, for instance), I argue that it is possible to be sensitive to the multiple subjectivities experienced by one individual. Crucially, one can do so without falling back on poststructuralist relativism. In Gestalt theory, for example, the self is famously found 'at the contact boundary', while Robert Stolorow and his colleagues' notion of intersubjectivity insists that our experience of the self cannot exist except in the context in which it appears.[79]

Unlike the Freudian construction of the self as a fixed structure or 'thing', Gestalt theory conceptualizes the self as a 'complex system of contacts at any moment', contacts which 'are the structured experience of the actual present situation'.[80] Put another way, the self 'is created in the process of me making contact with the environment' in the present moment, at the boundary where "I" ends and "other" begins'; the self 'arises in contact and is a "process" and not "a thing"'.[81] From a Gestalt perspective, the self is *relational*. This is different too from the

Lacanian and poststructuralist position of the self being defined in oppositional terms, in which I (self) am defined by what I am not (other).

The insistence upon the self as a verb (dynamic) rather than a noun (static) which exists in *relationship* has implications for the way in which we approach the self historically. In 'Child-killing and Emotion', I draw on this understanding to make sense of three distinct and apparently incongruent accounts of the subjectivity of a young woman, Gwen Foulks, who in 1716 was prosecuted for concealing the death of her illegitimate newborn. In one neighbour's testimony, Gwen is presented as acting suspiciously, pretending to have a stomach ailment and obstinately refusing help from her female neighbours when in fact she was in labour in a field, after which (believing she was unobserved) she threw her newborn into a ditch to die and went home. Here we see the familiar historiographical figure of the rebellious denier of pregnancy and killer of her own child. In the second account, Gwen's mistress described finding Gwen later that same evening sitting alone in the dark, weeping, unable to speak when asked what was wrong. Here perhaps we see the alternative infanticidal mother, a desperate victim of circumstance. Finally, Gwen's own examination before magistrates reveals a feisty and self-possessed girl, able to deflect the accusations against her in a way that answered all the points of law that might have otherwise led to her conviction.

If we take seriously psychotherapeutic understandings of the self which stress the relational nature of subjectivity, we do not need to attempt to discern which of these three apparently competing subject positions was authentic. The subjectivity we meet in the separate accounts is no more or less 'authentic' if we reject a notion of the 'self' as a pre-existing entity to be uncovered by brilliant analysis (historical or otherwise). Gwen's experience of giving birth in the field was affected by the presence of her neighbours; if they had been absent, her experience would have been different. Thus the 'self' we may discern in these sources was co-produced in the moment where the parties met with all the contextual weight that implies. Similarly, their accounts and their own investment in the events was also co-created not just by encountering Gwen but also, as was the case for her, by their interaction with the environment and context – the documents were created, after all, in another moment in a legal setting, with all the contextual weight that bore. We do not need to consider these documents primarily in terms of available cultural 'scripts' which the historical subject accessed in full consciousness. We have no way of knowing what was

conscious, semi-conscious or completely out of awareness. Of course, sometimes available scripts *were* drawn on in awareness, but not always. But that seems to me to be a non-problem if we stop reifying the rational subject. Psychotherapeutic theory provides a way to do just that.

Conclusion

What, then, may we conclude about psychoanalysis as an approach to history? To some extent, the arguments about its applicability to historical research is based on misunderstanding. Psychohistory has been dismissed as ahistorical; that is 'its ultimate failing'.[82] Yet we have seen that not all psychoanalytically-inspired histories are ahistorical. Rejections of psychoanalytic theory on the grounds of its essentialism and inability to deal with change are also based partly on a misconception, as we have seen that psychoanalytically-inspired historians *have* grappled with the question of change and essentialism. One reason for the confusion is that psychoanalytically-inclined historians tend to make a *claim* for the theoretical primacy of psychoanalysis even when their arguments and conclusions are grounded in evidence that is compatible with the historical method.

Psychoanalysis and other psychotherapeutic theories have inspired historians to ask new questions, to imagine in new and richer ways the inner landscapes of people in the past. As with all other approaches, concepts and ideas, the success of psychodynamic ones in informing historical writing depends on the brilliance, sophistication and integrity of the historian.

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[1] Sandra W. Park and Elizabeth L. Auchincloss, 'Psychoanalysis in Textbooks of Introductory Psychology: A Review', *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 54 (2006): 1361–80, at 1371; Jonathan Redmond and Michael Shulman, 'Access to Psychoanalytic Ideas in American Undergraduate Institutions', *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association* 56 (2008): 391–408.

[2] Tom Burns and Eva Burns-Lundgren, *Psychotherapy: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2015).

[3] William L. Langer, 'The Next Assignment', *American Historical Review* 63 (1958): 284–5.

[4] Tim Ashplant, 'Psychoanalysis in Historical Writing', *History Workshop Journal* 26 (1988): 102–19; Tim Ashplant, 'Fantasy, Narrative, Event: Psychoanalysis and History', *History Workshop Journal* 23 (1987): 165–73; Karl Figlio, 'Historical Imagination/Psychoanalytic Imagination', *History Workshop Journal* 45 (1998): 199–221; Peter Loewenberg, 'Why Psychoanalysis Needs the Social Scientist and the Historian', in *Psycho/History: Readings in the Method of Psychology, Psychoanalysis and History*, ed. Geoffrey Cocks and Travis L. Crosby (New Haven and London: Yale UP, 1987), 17–29; Hans Meyerhoff, 'On Psychoanalysis as History', in *Psycho/History*, ed. Cocks and Crosby, 30–44. *The Journal of Psychohistory* (formerly *The History of Childhood Quarterly*) and *The Psychohistory Review* are dedicated to psychoanalytic histories.

[5] For examples of historical biography and witchcraft, see below. For an example of psychoanalysis in the field of holocaust studies, see Dominick LaCapra, *History and Memory after Auschwitz* (Ithaca and London: Cornell UP, 1998).

[6] Thomas A. Kohut, 'Psychohistory as History', *American Historical Review* 91, no. 2 (1986): 337.

[7] Fred Weinstein and Gerald M. Platt, 'The Coming Crisis in Psychohistory', *Journal of Modern History* 47, no. 2 (1975): 212.

[8] Lucien Febvre, 'Une vue d'ensemble: Histoire et psychologie', in *Combats pour l'Histoire*, ed. Réjeanne Toussaint and Jean-Marc Simonet (Paris: Armand Colin, [1938] 1992); Lucien Febvre, 'La sensibilité et l'histoire: Comment

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[9] Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations*, rev. edn (Oxford: Blackwell, [1939] 2000); Bernard Lahire, 'Elias, Freud, and the Human Science', in *Norbert Elias and Social Theory*, ed. François Dépelteau and Tatiana Savoia Landini (London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 75–89.

[10] Erich Fromm, *The Fear of Freedom* (Abingdon: Routledge, [1942] 2001).

[11] Keith Thomas, *Religion and the Decline of Magic* ; Alan Macfarlane, *Witchcraft in Tudor and Stuart England: A Regional and Comparative Study*, 2nd edn (London and New York: Routledge [1970] 1999); E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande*, abridged and with an introduction by Eva Gillies (Oxford: Oxford UP, [1937] 1976).

[12] Diane Purkiss, 'Psychoanalysis', in *Writing Early Modern History*, ed. Garthine Walker (London: Arnold/Bloomsbury, 2005), 116.

[13] Paul Robinson, *Freud and his Critics* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and Oxford: University of California Press, 1993), 10.

[14] David E. Stannard, *Shrinking History: On Freud and the Failure of Psychohistory* (New York and Oxford: Oxford UP, 1980), ix; Peter Gay, *Freud for Historians* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1985), 52; Diane Purkiss, *The Witch in History: Early Modern and Twentieth-Century Representations* (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 60, 69.

[15] Cited in Peter Loewenberg, 'Psychohistorical Perspectives on Modern German History', *Journal of Modern History* 47, no. 2 (1975): 261.

[16] Loewenberg, 'Psychohistorical Perspectives', 262.

[17] E.g., Frederick Crews et al., *The Memory Wars: Freud's Legacy in Dispute* (London: Granta Books, 1997); H.J. Eysenck, 'What is Wrong with Psychoanalysis?', in *Psycho/History*, ed. Cocks and Crosby, 3–16; Adolph Grünbaum, *The Foundations of Psychoanalysis: A Philosophical Critique* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); Stannard, *Shrinking History*; Frank J. Sulloway, 'Reassessing Freud's Case Histories: the Social Construction of Psychoanalysis', *Isis* 82 (1991): 245–75.

[18] See the work of Hélène Cixous, Luce Irigary, and Julia Kristeva.

[19] David Shapiro, 'Theoretical Reflections on Wilhelm Reich's *Character Analysis*', *American Journal of Psychotherapy* 56, no. 3 (2002): 341; Erik Erikson, *Childhood and Society* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1950), 60.

[20] Garthine Walker, 'Modernization', in *Writing Early Modern History* (London: Bloomsbury, 2005), 25–48.

[21] See also the case studies in Bruce Mazlish ed. *Psychoanalysis and History*, rev. ed (New York: Universal Library, 1971).

[22] Sigmund Freud, *Leonardo da Vinci and a Memory of his Childhood* (1910), reprinted in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, ed. James Strachey, transl. Alan Tyson (London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1957), Vol. 11, 63–106.

[23] Otto Pflanze, 'Toward a psychoanalytic interpretation of DaBismarck', *American Historical Review* 77, no. 2 (1972): 419–44.

[24] Pflanze, 'Toward a psychoanalytic interpretation': 420–21.

[25] Ibid.: 423.

[26] Ibid.: 426–7, 420.

[27] Ibid.: 429–30.

[28] Lyndal Roper, 'Oedipus and the Devil', chapter five of her *Oedipus and the Devil: Witchcraft, Sexuality and Religion in Early Modern Europe* (London and New York, 1994), 229, 230, 234.

[29] Weinstein and Platt, 'Coming Crisis': 204.

[30] Patrick Casement, *Learning from Our Mistakes: Beyond Dogma in Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy* (Hove: Routledge, 2002), 4; Patrick Casement, *On Learning from the Patient* (London: Routledge, 1985), 4.

[31] Patrick Casement, *Further Learning from the Patient: The Analytic Space and Process* (London: Routledge, 1990), 18.

[32] Ibid.: 217–18; Kohut, 'Psychohistory': 342–3; Peter Blos, 'The Epigenesis of the Adult Neurosis', *Psychoanalytic Study of the Child* 27 (1972): 107–8; Fred Weinstein, 'Psychohistory and the Crisis of the Social Sciences', *History and Theory* 34, no. 4 (1995): 304.

[33] Janice Doane and Devon Hodges, *From Klein to Kristeva: Psychoanalytic Feminism and the Search for the 'Good Enough' Mother* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992), 8.

[34] Stephen A. Mitchell, 'The Origin and Nature of the "Object" in the Theories of Klein and Fairbairn', *Contemporary Psychoanalysis* 17, no. 3 (1981): 374–88 at 374–79; Melanie Klein, *Envy and Gratitude and Other Works, 1946–1963*, ed. M.R. Khan (London: Hogarth Press, 1975).

[35] Jeremy Holmes, *John Bowlby and Attachment Theory*, 2nd edn (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), xxi.

[36] For developmental theory see, e.g., W. R. D. Fairbairn, *Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality* (1952; London and New York: Routledge, 1994); Donald Winnicott, *Maturational Processes and the Facilitating Environment: Studies in the*

Theory of Emotional Development (London: Hogarth Press, 1965); Daniel Stern, *The Interpersonal World of the Infant* (New York: Basic Books, 1985). For attachment theory see, e.g., Holmes, *John Bowlby*; Jeremy Holmes, *The Search for the Secure Base: Attachment Theory and Psychotherapy* (London and new York: Routledge, 2001); John Bowlby, *A Secure Base: Clinical Applications of Attachment Theory* (London: Routledge, 1988); Tracey D. Eells, 'Attachment Theory and Psychotherapy Research', *Journal of Psychotherapy Practice and Research* 10, no. 2 (2001): 132-35; W. Steven Rholes and Jeffry A. Simpson, *Adult Attachment: Theory, Research and Clinical Implications* (New York and London: The Guildford Press, 2004). See also Allan N. Schore, 'The Seventh Annual John Bowlby Memorial Lecture. Minds in the Making: Attachment, the Self-Organizing Brain, and Developmentally-Oriented Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy', in *Revolutionary Connections: Psychotherapy and Neuroscience*, ed. Jenny Corrigall and Heward Wilkinson (London: Karnac Books, 2003), 7-51.

[37] Lyndal Roper, *Oedipus and the Devil*, 199–225; the chapter was first published as 'Witchcraft and fantasy in early modern Germany', *History Workshop Journal* 32 (1991): 19–33.

[38] Roper, *Oedipus*, 211.

[39] Ibid., 215.

[40] Stannard, *Shrinking History*, 24–5; Karl Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge*, 2nd edn (1963; London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), 37; Robinson, *Freud and His Critics*, 208.

[41] Roper, *Oedipus*, 218.

[42] See note 30, above.

[43] Roper, *Oedipus*, 218.

[44] For slippage between psychic and historical causation in another of her essays, see Ibid., 240.

[45] Ibid., 210, 215.

[46] Ibid., 229–30.

[47] Cf. Edwin R. Wallace IV, *Historiography and Causation in Psychoanalysis* (Hillsdale, New Jersey and London: Analytic Press, 1985), 177.

[48] I am very grateful to Tracey Loughran for contributing this section to the chapter.

[49] Daniel Pick, *Rome or Death: The Obsessions of General Garibaldi* (London: Penguin, 2005).

[50] Ibid., 151.

[51] Ibid., 145

[52] Ibid., 155.

[53] Ibid., 204, 206.

[54] Ibid., 206, 207.

[55] Ibid., 210.

[56] Ibid., 12.

[57] Ibid., 149.

[58] Ibid., 147.

[59] Daniel Pick, '‘*Roma o morte*': Garibaldi, Nationalism and the Problem of Psycho-biography', *History Workshop Journal*, 57 (2004): 24, 19.

[60] Ibid.: 29.

[61] Pick, *Rome or Death*, 183.

[62] Michael Roper, 'Re-remembering the Soldier Hero: the Psychic and Social Construction of Memory in Personal Narratives of the Great War', *History Workshop*

Journal, 50 (2000): 181–204, at 183-4; Michael Roper, 'Between the Psyche and the Social: Masculinity, Subjectivity and the First World War Veteran', *Journal of Men's Studies* 15, no. 3 (2007): 251–70, at 251–3.

[63] Michael Roper, 'Slipping Out of View: Subjectivity and Emotion in Gender History', *History Workshop Journal* 59: 57–72, at 60–2, 70. His critique refers to Joan W. Scott, 'Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis', *American Historical Review* 91, no. 5 (1986): 1053–75.

[64] Roper, 'Between Manliness and Masculinity': 345.

[65] Roper, 'Slipping Out of View': 63, 69–70.

[66] Roper, 'Re-remembering the Soldier Hero': 201.

[67] Roper, 'Splitting in Unsent Letters: Writing as a Social Practice and a Psychological Activity', *Social History* 26, no. 3 (2001): 318–39, at 323, 330; Roper, 'Nostalgia as an Emotional Experience in the Great War', *Historical Journal* 54, no.2 (2011): 421–51, at 421–3; Michael Roper, *The Secret Battle: Emotional Survival in the Great War* (Manchester: Manchester UP, 2010), 21, 66.

[68] E.g., Jessica Meyer uses many of the same forms of source material as Roper, but provides a purely textual analysis: Meyer, *Men of War: Masculinity and the First World War in Britain* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

[69] Roper, 'Slipping Out of View': 62, 65; Roper, 'Between Manliness and Masculinity': 360; Roper, *The Secret Battle*, esp. 119–201.

[70] Ibid., 165-6.

[71] For a discussion of Lacanian psychoanalysis, see Scott, 'Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis', and the 'Discussion' in *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 35 (1993), between Laura Lee Downs and Scott: Downs, 'If "Woman" Is Just an Empty Category, Then Why Am I Afraid to Walk Alone At

Night? Identity Politics Meets the Postmodern Subject': 414–37, Scott, 'The Tip of a Volcano': 438–43, and Downs, 'Reply to Joan Scott': 444–51.

[72] Elizabeth Grosz, 'The body of signification', in *Abjection, Melancholia and Love: The Work of Julia Kristeva*, ed. John Fletcher and Andrew Benjamin (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), 90.

[73] Purkiss, *Witch.*, 119–21.

[74] Ibid., 76.

[75] For a longer discussion, see Garthine Walker, 'Psychoanalysis and History' in *Writing History: Theory and Practice*, ed. Stefan Berger, Heiko Feldner, and Kevin Passmore (London: Bloomsbury, [2003] 2010); Purkiss, 'Psychoanalysis'.

[76] Garthine Walker, 'Child-killing and Emotion in Early Modern England and Wales', in *Death, Emotion and Childhood in Premodern Europe*, ed. Katie Barclay and Kimberley Reynolds with Ciara Rawnsley (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 151–71.

[77] Quoting Roper, 'Slipping Out of View': 59.

[78] Walker, 'Child-killing and Emotion', 162-3.

[79] I shall not elaborate on intersubjectivity here, but see Robert D. Stolorow and George E. Atwood, *Contexts of Being: The Intersubjective Foundations of Psychological Life* (Hillsdale, NJ: The Analytic Press, 1992).

[80] Frederick S. Perls, Ralph Hefferline and Paul Goodman, *Gestalt Therapy: Excitement and Growth in the Human Personality* (1951; New York: Gestalt Journal Press, 1994), 235, 147.

[81] Dave Mann, *Gestalt Therapy: 100 Key Points and Techniques* (London: Routledge, 2010), 18; Malcolm Parlett, 'Contemporary Gestalt Therapy: Field

Theory', in *Gestalt Therapy: History, Theory, and Practice*, ed. Ansel L. Woldt and Sarah M. Toman (London: Sage, 2005), 54–55.

[82] Stannard, *Shrinking History*, 151.