Petroleum and its impact on three wars in Africa: Angola, Nigeria and Sudan

Adrian Gonzalez, Cardiff University

This article focuses on the complex role that oil has played in many conflicts on the African continent. It begins by highlighting oil’s influential role within war at a wider international level and provides a brief theoretical base from which to explore oil’s role in the African continent. Then, the article provides evidence of petroleum’s impact on violent conflicts in three African countries, namely Angola, Sudan and Nigeria, in order to highlight oil’s multi-faceted role on war in Africa.

Introduction: oil’s war facets

Oil and gas supplies are becoming scarcer and more expensive. The hunt for the world’s remaining resources is creating new alliances and the danger of fresh conflicts. China is moving aggressively to satiate its growing appetite for energy, potentially setting up conflict with the United States over the dwindling resources of the Middle East and Africa.¹

For many within the academic world, oil has created a fluid, dark foundation on which many of the world’s wars, conflicts, and grievances have been based upon. This, coupled with a geo-strategic energy concern from the world’s leading powers to safeguard and access oil, has led to this resource being at the heart of much of the instability in countries and regions across the globe. For oil remains an integral part of any country and its ability to function at an international, national and local level. Its importance is

¹ Erich Follath, “Natural Resources are Fuelling a New Cold War,” Energy and Natural Resources, (8th August 2006), Available at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,429968,00.html, (accessed 15th May 2010).
paramount with “the oil lobby...in itself a sub government, with roots planted deep in the soil of the real government.”

Oil can have a huge influence on any country and its foreign policy with a clear example being the United States. Beginning immediately after World War Two, the United States moved towards the domination of the global production and distribution of oil. This became closely linked to the containment of the Soviet Union and the prevention of communist control of this valuable resource, though Scott ascertains that it became a naked American determination to control and dominate these oil reserves and prevent this power from passing to anyone else. In practice this meant that “[f]rom Iran in 1957 to Indonesia in 1965 and Ghana in 1966, the CIA was involved in the covert overthrow of governments around the world that...had threatened to nationalise their oil industries.”

More recently, the United States has been embroiled in two major wars in the Gulf.

The author Stephen J. Randall concedes that although,

[c]learly not all...[of the] developments [in the Middle East] were occasioned by the importance of oil resources in the region to the international economic world order, but it is difficult to imagine, in the post Cold War environment...that the United States would view the region as of the highest strategic interest without the oil reserves of the Middle East.

Randell goes on to stress that oil security became a contextual, if not a primary casual factor in the United State’s decision for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Indeed, Stephen Pelletier argues that Saddam and America’s war was no different to the conflict that Mohammad

3 Peter D Scott, Drugs, oil, and war: the United States in Afghanistan, Colombia and Indochina, p.xiii.
4 Peter D Scott, Drugs, oil, and war: the United States in Afghanistan, Colombia and Indochina, p.xii.
5 Peter D Scott, Drugs, oil, and war: the United States in Afghanistan, Colombia and Indochina, p. Xiv.
7 Stephen J Randall, United States foreign oil policy since World War I: for profit and security, p.316.
Mosadeq, Prime Minister of Iran faced against the British in the early 1950s. “Both men felt they had a right to exploit their natural treasure to suit the needs of their country. Consequently, both defied the will of those who were managing the oil system at the time, and both paid for their boldness.”

Thus oil’s impact on individual countries foreign policy has been, and will continue to be highly influential, as an ever diminishing supply of petroleum becomes steadily outstripped by demand. As the above evidence shows, for the United States and her Western allies, oil has been either a key factor or underlying cause for direct military action or covert destabilisation of non-United States or Western backed governments. The competition between the West and developing countries such as China and India will place further demand and strain on oil producing states, not least on those who are politically, economically or socially unstable. Many countries such as these reside within the African continent and it is here that this article will now focus on.

Oil and war on the African Continent

Tied to oil’s impact on individual countries foreign policy has been petroleum’s submerse effects on war and conflict itself. This article will investigate the ways in which oil has directly impacted war through an investigation of the African continent, which houses numerous oil-rich, war-torn countries, whose future has been severely impacted upon as a

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8 Here, the Iranian Senate and Parliament voted to take control of the now disbanded Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) in 1951.
9 Stephen Pelletier, America’s Oil Wars, (Westport, CT, London: Praeger, 2004). Another example could be President Chavez of Venezuela who faced, and successfully survived, a coup in 2002. “Did the United States not try to overthrow him in a coup, one strikingly reminiscent of that which was successfully brought against Mosadeq?” Stephen Pelletier, America’s Oil Wars, p.147.
10 For an insightful analysis of the economic and governance issues within Africa see: Paul Collier, Wars, Guns and Votes, Democracy in Dangerous Places, (London: The Bodley Head, 2009).
result of this natural resource.

“Africa holds a fraction of the world’s proven oil reserves-9 percent compared to the Middle East’s nearly 62 percent”\textsuperscript{11}, but her “[o]il production... is expected to double over the next 20 years while it stays flat or declines in much of the rest of the world”\textsuperscript{12} This doubling of her oil production will see a continual growth in international involvement. For example, “China is already the most powerful outside player in Africa”\textsuperscript{13} In 2005, China imported nearly 701,000 bpd of oil from Africa, which was approximately 30 percent of her total oil imports.\textsuperscript{14} The United States is also heavily involved in the continent, and this looks set to continue. The National Intelligence Council estimates that United States imports of oil from sub-Saharan Africa will increase to 25 percent in the next ten years.\textsuperscript{15}

Consequently, international involvement is, like Africa’s oil production, only set to expand. Still, unlike the increase in oil production and revenue, many of these oil producing nations’ continue to suffer from dilapidated infrastructure, a chronic lack of public services and general populaces that have remained caught in a circle of conflict, despair and destitute poverty. Accordingly, three key African case studies will be examined which highlight the various effects that oil can have on war. Firstly, it will portray how oil has

\textsuperscript{11} Stephanie Hanson, “China, Africa, and Oil,” \textit{Council on Foreign Relations}, (6\textsuperscript{th} June 2008), Available at: http://www.cfr.org/publication/9557/, (accessed 20\textsuperscript{th} April 2010). See also: Stephanie Hanson, “Vying for West Africa’s Oil,” \textit{Council on Foreign Relations}, (7\textsuperscript{th} May 2007), Available at: http://www.cfr.org/publication/13281/vying_for_west_africas_oil.html, (accessed 7\textsuperscript{th} November 2009).


prolonged the Angolan civil war through one side’s control and subsequent revenue of this resource. Secondly, Nigeria will explore how oil has precipitated a low-intensity clash between local people’s claims to its revenue on the one hand and the national government and multi-national oil corporations on the other. Third and finally, it will analyse the situation in Sudan and will describe how her oil sites have been either a root cause or background factor for the long-running civil strife and genocide that has plagued the country. However, before an analysis of these case studies begins, it is beneficial to have a brief understanding of the theory, which can aid in the explanation of this complex situation in reality.

Philippe Le Billion puts forward his theoretical ideas within the book *Angola’s war economy: the role of oil and diamonds*. He observes that there are two key types of resource war. The first is a scarce resource war where people will fight each other for the resources necessary to survive. “To put it a more sophisticated way, resource poor societies are confronted by the capture of resource rents by the elite and are unable to adapt to the scarcity of resources.” An example includes the appropriation of irrigated lands on the Senegal and Mauritania border. Violent confrontations between Mauritanian herders and Senegalese farmers have erupted along the Senegal River Valley over the increasing competition for land. The construction of dams built upstream and downstream has also “exacerbated problems in regional land tenure that has often led to tragic consequences for the area’s residents.”

Philippe Le Billion’s second type of resource war is the abundant resource war. “Here

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again a more sophisticated approach argues that a wealth of resources can result in less
democracy, poor economic growth, and greedy behaviour by competing elites.”18 He goes
on to stress that dominant resources and its control by the state leaders will lead to little
hope for those outside state patronage to improve the quality of their lives or gain a decent
standard of living. In fact, “[t]he more narrowly are the rights held, the less equal will the
society be.”19 This will create growing frustration amongst marginalised groups and the
general populace, who could conclude that violence is the only option open to them to in
order to change their situation. Brutality for the governing body also becomes a method of
maintaining control which will “create and sustain profitable patterns of resource
exploitation and wealth distribution.”20 Subsequently, he concludes that these resource
wars “are conflicts in which violence, or the threat of it, becomes an intrinsic part of the
political economy of resource exploitation.”21 The three African wars, discussed below,
clearly highlight this second resource theory in practice.22

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19 Paul Collier, Anthony J. Venables, “Managing the Exploitation of Natural Assets: lessons for low income
countries,” (Revised 30th October 2008), p.4, Available at:
22 For more in depth analysis of resource wars see: Michael T. Klare, “Resource Wars: The New Landscape of
Angola

“Government forces, once backed by the Soviet Union and Cuba, are now funded by oil revenues.”

“For all its oil and diamond deposits, Angola is situated at the bottom of every development index.” The World Bank highlights that approximately 70 percent of the population live on less than 2 U.S. dollars a day, while one in four children die before their fifth birthday. This is despite the “darling of the oil industry,” earning more than $30 billion [in 2007] from oil exports” Without a doubt, oil has been a key growth driver for the nation and accounted for over 90 percent of total exports during the 1980s and 1990s. In 1999, around 75 to 90 percent of state revenue was generated by oil. The country’s plight was largely due to the twenty-seven year long civil war which plunged the country into chaos, killing an estimated 500,000 people, and leaving 3.5 million people, a third of her

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29 Jad Mouawad, “Angola, one of the poorest places on Earth, is an oil industry darling.”
population fleeing their homes.\textsuperscript{30} It is important to stress that “[i]n the period since independence, oil has acquired a quite exceptional significance in the political economy of Angola, affecting not only the nature of the economy, but also the course and eventual outcome of the war.”\textsuperscript{31} It is oil’s role in the prolongation of this conflict which will now be analysed.

Angola’s plight began with the hugely turbulent decade of the 1970s. This witnessed the end of the War of Independence (1961-1975) following a military coup in Portugal in April 1974, which forced the Angolan Portuguese colonial government to withdraw. In January 1975 the Alvor Agreements were signed by the three independent rebel groups who had all fought to overthrow the Portuguese; the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the Front for the National Liberation of Angola (FNLA). The Alvor Accord had “provided for a joint interim government between the three groups and the creation of an integrated national army.”\textsuperscript{32} However, as the date for military integration neared, the agreement broke down with full scale war between the factions occurring from mid-1975 onwards. It was at this point that the MPLA seized control and backed up by Cuban forces and Soviet tanks, engaged the other factions whilst declaring the birth of the Peoples Republic of Angola in November 1975.\textsuperscript{33}

Two interconnected factors help explain this costly breakdown. Firstly, although the three groups and their leaders had agreed to sign the Alvor Agreement as one political

entity, post-independence brought to the surface the huge ideological and political
differences that were apparent, chiefly between the two largest parties; the MPLA and
UNITA.\textsuperscript{34} The MPLA had been a socialist party since the mid-1950s and this left leaning
politick was not shared by UNITA. Secondly, these ideological differences became connected
to the wider international Cold War that was occurring. The Cold War can be seen as the
catalyst for the long-running civil war, which further divided the two major Angolan
ideological parties and subsequently prevented any meaningful attempt at peace. The
United States, “still stinging from its defeat in Vietnam... backed a two-pronged invasion by
Holen Roberto’s Front for the National Liberation of Angola (FNLA) from the Congo/Zaire
and from South Africa in support of Savimbi’s UNITA.”\textsuperscript{35} UNITA’s backing from the United
States and South Africa was matched by Soviet Russian and Cuban support for the MPLA.\textsuperscript{36}
Both superpowers continued their ideological struggle in the lands of Angola which ravaged
the nation and prevented any chance of reconciling either of the two political entities, who
were able to battle out their own private war under their financial and military support.

However, the collapse of the Cold War fundamentally changed the nature of the

conflict.

Sensing the end of affairs, as they knew it, the Angolan warring parties began an
early scramble for the possession and control of the resource-rich areas of Angola.
They were determined to tap into the necessary resources as early as possible even
if it meant buying their way into continuing conflict. This does not mean that there
was no exploitation of resources before 1988. [Rather]...as of 1986 there was a
deliberate concentration on procuring a foothold in these [resource rich] regions.\textsuperscript{37}

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\textsuperscript{34} The MPLA had been a socialist led party since the mid-1950s. This political outlook was directly opposed to
the populist policies of UNITA.
\textsuperscript{35} Talbot, “The Angolan civil war and US foreign policy.”
\textsuperscript{36} Holger Jensen, “Spoils of War,” \textit{Nando Times, Global Policy Forum}, (15\textsuperscript{th} March 2000), Available at:
http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/221/46994.html, (accessed 20\textsuperscript{th} May 2010).
\textsuperscript{37} Hannelie De Beer and Virgina Gamba, “The arms dilemma: resources for arms or arms for resources?,” in
Jakkie Cilliers and Christian Dietrich eds., \textit{Angola’s war economy: the role of oil and diamonds}, (Pretoria:
Institute for Security Studies, 2000), p.78. That is not to say that resource revenue was not used prior to the
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This scramble for the possession of Angola’s natural resources would have disastrous results for the 1990s peace initiatives that had begun under the Bicesse Peace Accords of May 1991. This Accord finally brought an end to the decades of conflict through a ceasefire and a “triple-zero” clause that prohibited acquisition of new weapons by either party or international actors from supplying such materials. However, there were major issues. Firstly, no unity government was envisaged for the Bicesse post electoral period, which instead allowed a Winner Takes All electoral contest. This became fought along ethnic lines primarily due to the control over natural resources. The MPLA’s “protracted authoritarian governance [had] excluded particular regions of ethnic groups from power and the benefits of development” due to their locality in or away from the government oil regions.³⁸ This further fuelled the deep seated hatred and hostility between the parties.³⁹ What is more, the Bicesse Accords held no formal obligation for either of the factions to disarm or demobilise, which effectively allowed them to maintain and re-equip secret armies.⁴⁰ This weak and fragile political Accord was further hampered by the natural resources which both sides exploited and used to fund their military wings. Indeed, an analysis of the government’s oil revenue highlights how oil helped to prolong this war during the 1990s.

“Direct Angolan state income from the oil sector was in the range of, US $1.8-3.0 billion per year in the period 1990-1999.”⁴¹ This gave the MPLA substantial revenue from which to continue the armed struggle with figures for 1995 and 1996 from the International

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⁴⁰ Vines and Oruitemeka, “Bullets to ballots: The reintegration of UNITA in Angola,” p.244.
Institute of Strategic Studies revealing MPLA military expenditure of $400 million and $450 million respectively.42 “Aircraft, vehicles and artillery from Brazil, helicopters, air-to-ground missiles and a variety of ammunition from France as well as AK-47s, Ural trucks, rocket-propelled grenades, motors, ammunition, T-55 tanks and fighter aircraft from Russia.”43 The scale of these contracts was not small. The Russian press reported that a completed defence contract between the nations in 1998 was worth $1 billion.44 It was these military assets during the mid 1990s, brought through oil revenue that saw the MPLA government reluctant to seek a political settlement with UNITA. However, they were forced to sign the Lusaka Protocol’s and agree to a ceasefire in November 1994 due to the widespread devastation of the country which prevented the consolidation of their power brought through their military gains.45

Nevertheless, it must be stated that oil’s prolongation of the conflict was only one half of the story. The diamond revenue under UNITA also drew-out the war by substituting their loss of foreign military assistance which allowed the rebels to sustain their military campaign. Weakly enforced political agreements further aided UNITA in this matter. Although under the Bicesse Accords, “a United Nations Security Council embargo on arms and oil transfers to UNITA had been in place since 1993, the embargo was not enforced and [UNITA]...openly continued arms purchases.”46 De Beer and Gamba ascertain that UNITA controlled an estimated 70 percent of Angolan diamond production.47 It was at this height of their power in 1994 to 1997, that UNITA was estimated to be marketing on average,

42 De Beer and Gamba, “The arms dilemma: resources for arms or arms for resources?” p.87.
43 De Beer and Gamba, “The arms dilemma: resources for arms or arms for resources?” p.84.
44 De Beer and Gamba, “The arms dilemma: resources for arms or arms for resources?” p.87.
47 De Beer and Gamba, “The arms dilemma: resources for arms or arms for resources?” p.90.
about $600 million worth of diamonds annually.\textsuperscript{48} Taken as a whole, industrial experts put UNITA’s accumulative net revenue between 1992 and 1998 at $2 billion which was far more than the amounts ever received from the United States or South Africa.

The United Nations did eventually impose an international ban on the purchase of UNITA diamonds in July 1998 in an attempt to stem the flow of income for the group. However, this failed to stem the tide fully, with UNITA still achieving around $4 million carats worth in 2000.\textsuperscript{49} It was at this later stage of the decade that President dos Santos’s superior oil assets brought about the collapse of UNITA.

On average during the period from 1997 to 2000, 14.4 percent of the country’s GDP was devoted to defence and security expenditure…[but] the figure is likely to be a substantial underestimate, since it does not include unrecorded or unclassified expenditures on defence and public order.\textsuperscript{50}

This GDP, made up primarily of oil money allowed the MPLA to capitalise on their technological superiority through the importation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) from Israel, alongside brutal scorched earth tactics which eventually led to the death of UNITA’s leader, Jonas Savimbi in February 2002.\textsuperscript{51} Nonetheless, the end to the conflict was also due to the MPLA’s gradual reoccupation of the diamond mining regions which destroyed the natural resource military equilibrium that had existed throughout the 1990s.\textsuperscript{52} This eventual disproportion in resource revenue, coupled with the brutal tactics deployed by the MPLA, and the death of the UNITA leader brought about their eventual victory. At the beginning of

\textsuperscript{48} Hodges, Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State, p.174.

\textsuperscript{49} UNITA were able to circumvent this embargo by selling “rough” diamonds i.e. uncut, directly for weapons. Indeed, these rough diamond caches constituted the primary and preferred means of stockpiling wealth for UNITA once their foreign assets had been frozen. (Hodges, Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State, p180-181).

\textsuperscript{50} Hodges, Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State, p.160.

\textsuperscript{51} Vines and Oruitemeka, “Bullets to ballots: The reintegration of UNITA in Angola,” p.249.

\textsuperscript{52} Hodges, Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State, p.204.
April 2002, the leaders of both parties signed an official ceasefire known as the Luena Memorandum of Understanding which has lasted to this day.\(^53\)

Accordingly, oil and diamonds have played an important post Cold War role in the Angolan civil war. The 1990s witnessed multiple political agreements which were circumvented by both the MPLA and UNITA. It is important to note that peace deals in Africa between warring parties have been successful in the past. Mozambique’s internationally-brokered General Peace Agreement signed in Rome, Italy, in 1992 between the ruling Front for Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) and the Mozambique Resistance Movement (RENAMO) is a case in point but “the fact that the incentives to continue fighting were less than in resource-rich countries such as Angola or the [Democratic Republic of Congo] DRC”\(^54\) helped this peace deal to bear fruition over a far shorter and less costly time period than in Angola.\(^55\)

This is a crucial point and highlights how oil and diamonds gave both parties’ the opportunity to pursue military options and therefore prolong the war and the misery for the Angolan people. Indeed, “[i]f [Angola’s resources of oil and diamonds] were managed properly, [her] economy would be among the most dynamic in the developing world. Its people would be among the best fed, best educated and healthiest on the African continent.”\(^56\) It is this contentious post war issue of rights to the oil revenue in Angola which can be also seen in Nigeria. Here, oil has created a clash between the local people on

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\(^{54}\) Luckham, “The international community and state reconstruction in war-torn societies,” p.493.


\(^{56}\) Hodges, Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State, p.1.
the one hand and the national governments and multi-national oil corporations on the other
over the rights to oil revenue. This second strand of oil’s effect on war will now be analysed.

Nigeria

“There is reasonable evidence that the presence of valuable natural assets increases the risk
of rebellion.”57

Nigeria is currently the United States fourth largest exporter of crude oil but is
currently in the midst of an ever worsening militant situation situated in the Niger Delta,
home to at least a quarter of Nigeria’s total petroleum output.58 “Historically, the people of
the Niger Delta have always been at the mercy of greedy outsiders who plunder their
natural resources without giving them anything in return, from the days of slavery to the
present day.”59 The Delta and the wider nation have suffered through decades of national
government corruption, bad governance, unemployment, insecurity, and a total
indifference to poverty alleviation, which have all become key conflict triggers that underlie

57 Paul Collier, Anthony J. Venables, “Managing the Exploitation of Natural Assets: lessons for low income
countries,” p.22.
58 Wale Adabanwi, “Nigeria: Shell of a State,” Dollars and Sense magazine, Third World Traveler, (July-August
2001), Available at: http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Africa/Nigeria_Shell_State.html, (accessed 11th
November 2009), states that ‘oil revenue now accounts for 90% of Nigeria’s exports earnings (almost $300
billion in the past 40 years.)’ The U.S Energy Information Administration (EIA), “Independent Energy Statistics
and Analysis Nigeria,” has total oil production at 2,352.031 tbd in 2007 and 2,167.827 tbd in 2008. Available at:
59 Ike Okonta and Oronto Douglas, Where Vultures Feast. Shell, Human Rights and Oil in the Niger Delta,
much of the anger and resentment in the Delta. However, it is the national governments and the oil giant’s insensitivity to the local communities’ right to oil revenue which has caused the final escalation to low-intensity conflict.

Amnesty International in 2005 wrote that Delta “inhabitants remain among the most deprived oil communities in the world-70 percent live on less than $1 a day. [And that’s in] spite of its windfall gains, as global prices have more than doubled in the last two years (2007 and 2008).” Living standards for the majority of Nigerians, not just those situated in the Delta, are no better than they were in the 1960s at the start of the oil boom. Not only do the inhabitants have to live in abject poverty but they also suffer “depreciation due to environmental degradation caused by oil spillage.” Royal Dutch Shell has had its operations in the Delta reported as outdated and in such poor condition that they would be illegal in other parts of the world. “Many communities report that they rarely receive any sufficient compensation for land taken by oil companies, or rendered useless by oil spills, acid rain, and other forms of pollution.”

Indeed, the World Wildlife Fund considers that “it is one of the most polluted places on the face of the earth. Nigeria has the highest gas flaring rates in the world; until recently over 80 percent was flared as a result of drilling.” A majority burn for 24 hours a day with

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61 Weinstein, “The New Scramble for Africa.”
64 Okonta and Douglas, Where Vultures Feast. Shell, Human Rights and Oil in the Niger Delta, p.43.
some having remained active for 40 years. This has a direct impact on the local ecology, climate and people’s health and property.\textsuperscript{67} Furthermore, the United Nations has recorded over 6,800 spills between 1976 and 2001 whilst the Nigerian government has recorded over 2,000 contaminated sites in the region.\textsuperscript{68}

Thus, local people have justifiable

[a]nger at the inequalities attributed to the oil economy [which] has led [to] increasing numbers of people from the communities in the oil region to protest [at] the exploitation of what they see as “their” oil—though the constitution provides that all oil is owned by the Federal Government—without benefit to them or compensation for the damage done to their lands and livelihoods.\textsuperscript{69}

The government response to this growing anger has been both brutal and violent, which has further fuelled the hostility within the Delta. For example, in the 1990s, the local Ogoni people of the Niger Delta were represented by the \textit{Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People} (MOSOP) in order to gain a greater national voice for their plight. However, between 1993 and 1998, the military regime of the late General Sani Abacha deployed a military task force on Ogoni land to “keep the peace.” This led to the infamous hanging of MOSOP’s President, Saro-Wiwa along with eight other compatriots on trumped up charges in November 1995 in an attempt to violently suppress the growing Ogoni resentment at their mistreatment.\textsuperscript{70} This repressive governmental policy can be partly explained due to Nigeria’s mono-cultural economy. The Nigerian economy depends almost exclusively on crude oil


\textsuperscript{68} Parker, “War on Water: A Clash over Oil, Power and Poverty in the Niger Delta.” See also: Thill, “Africa: The Next Victim in Our Quest for Cheap Oil.”


\textsuperscript{70} Adabanwi, “Nigeria: Shell of a State.”
which makes it vulnerable to negative market forces, a condition known as the Dutch Disease.\footnote{For more information on this see: “A crude awakening, The Role of the Oil and Banking Industries in Angola’s Civil War and the Plunder of State Assets,” \textit{Global Witness}, p.6.} “When this happens, the state is unable to support itself and maintain domestic stability in the face of competing demands, hence the decision to resort to force.”\footnote{Oshita, “Conflict mitigation in Nigeria: the strategic conflict assessment,” p.261.}

However, it is the government’s failure to address the real grievance here i.e. failing to deliver fair access to oil profits and the ability of her people to build a better livelihood, not only for the local communities but also the wider population, which has brought about the growing conflict.\footnote{President Abuja has tried to satisfy the Niger Delta people with a voice before. Firstly the \textit{Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission} (OMPDEC) was established in 1992 but billions of Naira disappeared into those who ran it. In 2000 a new commission, the \textit{Niger Delta Development Commission} (NDDC) was established to concentrate on the Delta’s infrastructure and ecological concern, but this has largely failed to stem the violence or provide any meaningful solutions.} This has gradually grown in strength. In January 1999, Isoko youths (an ethnic people who live in the Delta) shut down five of Shell’s flow-stations in the Delta state.\footnote{“Chronology for Ijaw in Nigeria,” \textit{Refworld, The Leader in Refugee Decision Support, UNHCR, The UN Refugee Agency}, (2004), Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/topic,463af2212,469f2ea52,469f38c49,0.html, (accessed 19th May 2010).} These attacks have only grown in frequency, magnitude and coordination since the establishment of two highly militant groups; \textit{The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta} (MEND) and the \textit{Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force} (NDPVF). MEND, since its establishment in 2006, has taken over 200 oil workers hostage and reduced Nigerian crude oil production to 1.5 million barrels a day (from its usual 2.1 million per day in 2008).\footnote{Parker, “War on Water: A Clash over Oil, Power and Poverty in the Niger Delta.”} The oil giants Royal Dutch Shell, Chevron and Agip have had to shore up over 300,000 barrels per day to prevent further losses and environmental damage in the Delta.\footnote{Parker, “War on Water: A Clash over Oil, Power and Poverty in the Niger Delta.” See also: Weinstein, “The New Scramble for Africa.”} The author John Ghazvinian stated that in the four or five days that he spent in the Delta, twenty-nine
foreign oil workers were taken hostage or kidnapped by the militants. These actions have badly damaged the Delta’s oil production. Mauowad noted that a quarter of the nation’s oil production, or about 600,000 barrels a day had been cut for nearly two years due to the violence in the Delta.

Nonetheless, recent attempts at consultation by the government have appeared to have made progress. A new Ministry of the Niger Delta has been established in order to reintegrate the people into wider society, the political power structure and mainstream policy making. President Umaru Yar’Adua has also granted a “general amnesty” to all rebel individuals in the hope that this dual strategy will finally bring an end to hostilities. Recent Government reports suggest that “more than 8,000 militants have [already] disarmed and taken the amnesty offer since it began in August [2009].” The ceasefire has been extended to the end of October 2009, so it remains uncertain whether these initiatives have nullified the violence in the region on a longer basis. What does remain clear is that “[u]nless the government and the oil companies change their basic attitude towards the local people in the Niger Delta, conflict and litigation are there to stay.”


78 Mouawad, “Angola, one of the poorest places on Earth, is an oil industry darling.”


This clash between the state and the local people can also be seen within Sudan, where the oil fields of the south have been coveted by both Khartoum and her southern region. Oil’s role here is exceedingly complex, but this next part will chart oil’s chief ramifications on this war torn nation.

Sudan

“Save for a period of roughly a decade, Sudan has endured an intense civil war in its south since its independence [from the British] in 1956.”

Sudan is Africa’s largest nation with an estimated population of 36 million people. These are split into 450 diverse ethnic groups which have created a myriad of social, religious and cultural identities. A key period of the nation’s history followed the Battle of Omdurman in September 1898, which established the Anglo-Egyptian condominium and in effect, made Sudan a British Imperial possession. Britain “sought to modernise Sudan by applying European technology to its underdeveloped economy and by replacing its authoritarian institutions with ones that adhered to liberal English traditions.” However, the south’s poorly developed regions received little attention until after World War One, with the British justification being that the south was “not ready for the exposure to the

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84 For information on this conflict see: Grant, *Battle, A Visual Journey Through 5,000 Years of Combat*, p.241.

modern world” and therefore closed to all foreign outsiders, including northern Sudanese. This British “Southern Policy” as it was known from the 1920s, helped to reinforce separatist development policy and the idea of a distinct southern region of Sudan. In reality, this saw the promotion of Christianity rather than Islam and English rather than Arabic which was justified as protecting southern traditions and culture. It is this policy which would have giant ramifications that have lasted to the present day.

This situation continued until Britain and Egypt concluded an agreement providing for Sudanese self-government and self-determination in February 1953. This heralded a transitional period in Sudanese politics, with the inauguration of her first parliament in 1954 and full Sudanese independence in January 1956. However, the north reneged in on promises to create a feudal political system leading towards Southern independence, which left Southern people disenfranchised and angry. Furthermore, “successive northern governments, civilian and military, were unsuccessful in handling the growing southern problems, ranging from neglect to attempts to reverse British isolation through enforced "Arabisation' and 'Islamisation.' The political inequality coupled with cruel religious and cultural conversions helped to cause the First Sudanese civil-war, a low-intensity conflict fought between southern separatists and Khartoum military forces that would last seventeen years from 1955 to 1972. It was only through the mediation of Ethiopia’s Emperor Haile Selassie that a peace agreement was drawn up; the Addiss Ababa Agreement

86 “Sudan-Britain’s Southern Policy,” Mongabay.
in March 1972.  

A key factor which gave rise to the resumption of hostilities was former President Nimeria’s (1969-1985) introduction of Sharia (Islamist) Law in September 1983. This was viewed with particular alarm and hostility in the south and coupled with the continuing perception of Khartoum malevolence towards the region, led to the resumption of hostilities and Sudan’s second civil war in 1983. This long running and brutal “conflict has exacerbated the already grinding poverty of local communities by destroying their fragile economic base, property and social fabric, as well as inflicting endless misery on several generations.” The war has been terribly costly in human lives with approximately two million people thought to have been killed and a further 4.4 million people displaced. It is this second civil war, fought between the Khartoum government and the southern Sudan’s People Liberation Army (SPLA) and its political wing, the Sudan’s Peoples Liberation Movement (SPLM), collectively known as SPLA/M, which reveals two interlinked impacts that oil has had on this war.

Oil’s first impact on this war reveals a similar if not exact situation to the Angolan civil war of the 1990s. For the government, the conflict provided an excellent opportunity to renew its strategy to displace the indigenous non-Arab rural population from rural areas of the oil region in order to secure and clear territory for oil development and assure a steady flow of revenue. It did so through a smokescreen policy of “defending” the southern oil

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91 “Sudan- First Civil War,” GlobalSecurity.
fields and their Chinese and Western investors via depopulation through force. In reality, brutal tactics were employed which included the “abduction of women and children, gang rapes, ground assaults supported by helicopter gunships, destruction of humanitarian relief sites, and burning of villages.” The United States has in the past accused the Sudanese government of bombing villages whilst “U.N. relief workers were trying to distribute food to tens of thousands of hungry villages.”

It took almost two decades (from the 1970s onwards) and various governments to develop this strategy, but by the early 2000s, Khartoum had wrested control of the oilfields away from the south. Moreover, the income generated “enabled the government to rapidly improve its heavy weaponry, expand its air superiority and purchase attack helicopters” which were used against the SPLA rebels and local populace. Statements from officials within the government provide evidence of this “oil for weapons” exchange.

The president... announced in 2000 that Sudan was using the oil revenue to build a domestic arms industry. The military spending of 90.2 billion dinars (U.S. $349 million) for 2001 was to soak up more than 60 percent of the 2001 oil revenue of 149.7 billion dinars (U.S. $580.2 million).

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“The war effort [alone] cost over U.S $1 million per day in 2001, a staggering figure for a country where 3.1 million people need emergency food aid according to international agencies.”

The second key impact of oil has been its role in re-initialising hostilities. Although the chief reasons that brought about the second Sudanese war have been political and social divisions, “the slightly waxy, light-grade petroleum was merely one more token of the schism between Sudan’s ruling north and neglected south.” Oil had first been discovered in the 1970s within the Muglad and Melut rift basins. These were “situated on the very front line of Africa’s longest-running civil war” and became contested areas of strategic control between the warring factions which witnessed innumerable human rights violations against the civilian population. Indeed, the prize of “black gold” from these fields is not in-substantial. “According to [the] Oil and Gas Journal (OGC), Sudan had five billion barrels of proved oil reserve in January 2009 up from an estimated 563 million barrels in 2006.” It is this lucrative oil revenue that International Crisis Group suggests was a prime reason for Khartoum’s resistance to southern independence. Additionally, “oil is considered the

101 International Crisis Group, God, Oil and Country, Changing the Logic of War in Sudan, p.102.
103 Damien Lewis, “Canadian company part of consortium developing fields being cleared by force in civil war,” Toronto Globe and Mail, Global Policy Forum, (5th October 1999), Available at: http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/221/47161.html, (accessed 20th May 2010).
single leading factor in the perception of [the] Sudanese civil war.”

The ownership of these oil reserves were controlled by Khartoum and it has been the Sudanese regime’s refusal to give the south a say in the development of the fields that “was one of the original causes of Sudan’s 16 year civil war.”

However, two intertwined concessions brought about a breakthrough in the peace talks. The first key breakthrough was that “unlike previous peace agreements in the Sudan it was signed only after war-weary protagonists were convinced that military victory was not achievable.” Secondly, oil itself helped to provide a key end to the war, as the conflict had severely hampered Sudan’s ability to export oil. Thus, Khartoum took the brave step of granting the South rights to a vote of self-determination (after an interim six year period), and crucially, the ability to take the southern oil fields with them. As a proviso, Khartoum allocated the oil profits as a 50-50 split for the interim period, which was in essence a “key economic guarantee for effective implementation of the CPA.” As Salah Wahbi (President of the Sudanese Advanced Petroleum Company) commented, both sides

114 Deng, “The Comprehensive Peace Agreement: will it also be honoured?,” p.15.
“will see that it’s better to share in the oil than to leave it for someone else.”

Nevertheless, the future does not look bright. Although the CPA specified how the oil revenue should be split, the problem is that the southern government cannot verify that the oil figures published by the Khartoum government are correct. All of the southerners that Global Witness’ investigators spoke to suspected that the figures were incorrect. Even the World Bank states that transparency in the Sudanese oil sector ‘is unusually weak.’

The Khartoum government has reported that a smaller volume of oil was produced in the oil fields than that reported by the company that operates them; a full 14 percent lower in blocks 3 and 7 in 2007 and 26 percent in blocks 1, 2, 4 and 6 in 2005. “The difference in question- 12 million barrels of oil-is significant. The oil is worth $370 million2 and is enough to power a city in the US the size of San Francisco for a year.” Longer-term issues concerning oil, such as fair access to the petroleum and the distribution of state resources across rich and poor areas of Sudan have also not been addressed. The situation has been further hampered by the ownership oil-rich Abyei region, which was left unresolved under the CPA agreement. President al-Bashir has stated that he will not budge an inch and has rejected an independent commissions report on demarcation which would seriously affect

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both sides revenue distribution of oil.\textsuperscript{120} This has left the contested regions firmly in the hands of the Khartoum government, which can only breed further grievance.\textsuperscript{121}

This oil discrepancy is further fuelling the decade’s long mistrust between the regions and could well bring about the collapse of the CPA. “A return to conflict looks all too likely. Armies are already massing on either side of the border.”\textsuperscript{122} A war which has already affected the lives of millions of people could once again be resumed due to the long-running dispute over ownership and revenue from oil in Sudan.

Conclusion: Oil’s many murky roles

“The vested interests associated with access to the oil rent flowing to the state remain a powerful obstacle to reform,”\textsuperscript{123}

Thus, as these three case studies illustrate, oil has played a varied role in war and conflict on the African continent. Its role and impact depend very much on the context of the country it is in. Although there has been conflict in all three of the nations highlighted above, each has been affected by its oil resource in similar and different ways. Yet petroleum’s decisive impact on war has been further heightened by two interconnected trends which appear in all three African oil producing countries.

\textsuperscript{120} Edward, “Against the Gathering Storm: Securing Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement,” p.17.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibrahim Hamdi, “Sudan’s President Refuses to Budge Over Oil Region,” Reuters, Global Policy Forum, (18\textsuperscript{th} November 2007), Available at: http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/198/40257.html, (accessed 24\textsuperscript{th} May 2010). Oil revenue makes up over half of the revenue for Northern Sudan and over 95 percent of Southern Sudan’s. Edward, “Against the Gathering Storm: Securing Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement,” p.19.
\textsuperscript{122} “Fuelling Mistrust, The need for Transparency in Sudan’s Oil Industry,” p.5.
\textsuperscript{123} Hodges, Angola: Anatomy of an Oil State, p.206.
Firstly greed, not only from within government but also from individuals connected to the state who wish to harness black gold for their own profits, will cause them to turn their backs on the needs of wider society, which could benefit from this oil revenue and achieve an enhanced quality of life through public investment.\textsuperscript{124} For example, in Angola, a miserly 13.3 percent of the state budget was estimated to have been spent on education, health, social security and housing in 1997 from an oil industry that amasses billions every year.\textsuperscript{125} In the late 1990s, the Angolan government awarded ultra-deep water oil blocks to the French Elf petroleum company whilst the Presidency pocketed a reputed $400 to $500 million that had bypassed the state budget.\textsuperscript{126} Global Witness has figures from 2000 which highlight some $770 million that has “gone missing” between the Ministry of Petroleum and the Ministry of Finance. By 2001, this financial black hole may have increased to an estimated $1.4 billion by 2001.\textsuperscript{127} These facts highlight the disillusionment from international NGO’s who see no real attempt at confronting Angola’s huge post-war societal problems.\textsuperscript{128} It is not just located within Angola. In Southern Sudan, an estimated 45 percent of the state revenue in 2008 was budgeted for salaries which have led to increasingly widespread allegations of corruption.\textsuperscript{129}

Secondly, connected to this first point is that bad governance and accountability mechanisms allows political administrations and multinational oil corporations the ability to

\textsuperscript{125} “A crude awakening, The Role of the Oil and Banking Industries in Angola’s Civil War and the Plunder of State Assets,” Global Witness, p.8.
\textsuperscript{126} “A crude awakening, The Role of the Oil and Banking Industries in Angola’s Civil War and the Plunder of State Assets,” Global Witness, p.10-11.
\textsuperscript{128} Brittain, “Angola: what kind of a peace after decades of war?,” p.96.
\textsuperscript{129} Edward, “Against the Gathering Storm: Securing Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement,” p.27.
avoid political scrutiny on oil expenditure which will lead to growing levels of societal discontent.\textsuperscript{130} When oil was first found in Nigeria in the 1950s, she was on the cusp of gaining independence from Britain, and this oil revenue was seen as the launching pad for the economy, the young nation and her people to prosper. Instead, it has become a perfect launchpad for corrupt politicians and businessman to enrich themselves at the expense of their people.\textsuperscript{131} In Southern Sudan, official government expenditure on defence was 30 per cent though unofficial estimates are much higher.\textsuperscript{132} Oil, whose revenue can be utilised to better the majority of citizens in these three countries, has only led to suffering, strife, ruin and war and it is the innocent who have and will continue to suffer the most.

When drawing together the investigation into the three case studies, a number of repercussions that oil have had on war become apparent. Within Angola, the three independence factions fought for a free post colonial nation. The Cold War threw the political and ideological differences between them into an unfathomable chasm which were played out in a horrific three decade long civil war. Therefore, it was not until the collapse of the Cold War and the removal of the superpowers financial and material support, that oil and diamond revenue became crucial. During the 1990s, it was these resources which were converted into ready cash to fund military campaigns. These military options were also made possible by the weak peace agreements, which lacked credible or viable methods of


\textsuperscript{132} Edward, “Against the Gathering Storm: Securing Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement,” p.27.
control. It is difficult to know if these Peace agreements would have been adhered to and sustained in the 1990s without Angola’s large natural resource wealth. Certainly Mozambique’s peace agreement reveals that successful political solutions are possible between embittered enemies. Nevertheless, what can be stated justifiably is that the Angolan civil war was prolonged during the 1990s through both oil and diamonds at the cost of peace.

The role of oil in Nigeria and the low-intensity conflict here is different to Angola. It has been shaped by successive governments and international oil companies who have ridden roughshod over local people’s rights for many decades. These local people deserved a share in Nigeria’s oil wealth and the ability to improve their livelihoods and standard of living but have been constantly denied any right to oil wealth and revenue even though oil is being extracted from their land. During the early and mid 1990s, the government responded brutally to perceived “rebels” that threatened Nigeria’s oil supply, but this tactic only increased the deep rooted animosity and injustices felt within the Niger Delta. It was due to the government’s disregard of the fundamental injustices felt by these people that caused this widespread militant campaign, with current government initiatives attempting to provide a greater political voice and legal impunity for the rebel actions. These initiatives, although a positive step are not enough. Oil in Nigeria, a hugely valuable commodity for any nation to possess and which promised so many economic and social benefits, not only for the people of the Niger Delta, but also for the wider country, has caused an explosion of violence that need not have occurred. Her government and civilian elite have only grown richer on the backs of the local Delta communities and it is this greed for oil revenue which has fuelled the flames of conflict.

In Sudan, a dual impact of oil is seen on this war. For Khartoum, the discovery of oil
reinvigorated governmental policy to “tame” southern Sudan in order to control this valuable pool of revenue. It also removed, at least to begin with, any attempts at gaining a peaceful resolution to the conflict, as Khartoum now wished to suppress Southern Sudan once and for all and gain complete domination of the resources. It did eventually achieve this objective, which gave them the ability to acquire greater and more sophisticated levels of weaponry and continue to wage the war against the SPLM/A. Once, again, this was achieved at the cost of the development of the nation, or any meaningful attempt at tackling the humanitarian catastrophe within Darfur.

The second impact of oil is linked to the first, and indeed to oil’s role in 1990s Angola. In Sudan, the war here was not originally about oil fields, but instead a war of southern self-determination that had been fuelled by the British policy of an “alternative” southern Sudan. The discovery of oil gave those fighting the war yet another reason to continue the struggle and gain both political and resource independence. Peace has only born fruition when the issue of who controlled the oilfields was taken, albeit, within a delayed interim period. However, greed has reared its ugly head, and it is now no longer clear if Khartoum is willing to be transparent with the south over oil extraction totals. This will be highly damaging to the fragile peace that has existed and could well cause a re-initialisation of war with the innocent the main casualties.

Overall, oil has had and will continue to have, a decidedly murky role not only on these three wars, but any future wars on the African continent which contain this resource. Oil can fund military campaigns, prolong war, shatter peace initiatives and cause untold suffering and misery on civilian populations. Its potential positive effect on national development has been lost in a myriad of greed, corruption and poor governance whilst its effect on war is all too clear.
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