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Delegation and coordination with multiple threshold public goods: Experimental evidence

Corazzini, Luca, Cotton, Christopher and Reggiani, Tommaso 2020. Delegation and coordination with multiple threshold public goods: Experimental evidence. Experimental Economics 23 , pp. 1030-1068. 10.1007/s10683-019-09639-6
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When multiple charities, social programs and community projects simultaneously vie for funding, donors risk mis-coordinating their contributions leading to an inefficient distribution of funding across projects. Community chests and other intermediary organizations facilitate coordination among donors and reduce such risks. To study this, we extend a threshold public goods framework to allow donors to contribute through an intermediary rather than directly to the public goods. Through a series of experiments, we show that the presence of an intermediary increases public good success and subjects’ earnings only when the intermediary is formally committed to direct donations to socially beneficial goods. Without such a restriction, the presence of an intermediary has a negative impact, complicating the donation environment, decreasing contributions and public good success.

Item Type: Article
Date Type: Publication
Status: Published
Schools: Business (Including Economics)
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HA Statistics
H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HJ Public Finance
Publisher: Springer Verlag (Germany)
ISSN: 1386-4157
Date of First Compliant Deposit: 28 January 2020
Date of Acceptance: 7 December 2019
Last Modified: 16 Nov 2020 11:41

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