Entwistle, Tom ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6457-4749 2021. Why nudge sometimes fails: fatalism and the problem of behaviour change. Policy and Politics 49 (1) , pp. 87-103. 10.1332/030557320X15832072208458 |
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Abstract
Nudge theory presumes that decision making is guided by intuitive biases and heavily influenced by the environment in which choices are made. Critics argue, however, that in place of the quick thinking envisaged by nudge theory, behaviour change reflects deeper and broader thought processes. One of these patterns of thinking – fatalism – has been identified across health and allied disciplines as key to explaining the reason why many people ignore authoritative advice. Insights drawn from a critical review of the fatalism literature explain why sometimes nudges fail. While a fatalist mindset seems to make some of us more susceptible to nudge, it prompts others to respond to nudge in surprising and dysfunctional ways.
Item Type: | Article |
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Date Type: | Publication |
Status: | Published |
Schools: | Business (Including Economics) |
Publisher: | Policy Press |
ISSN: | 0305-5736 |
Date of First Compliant Deposit: | 18 June 2020 |
Date of Acceptance: | 2 March 2020 |
Last Modified: | 05 Dec 2024 23:45 |
URI: | https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/132603 |
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