Is the National Health Service (NHS) a Religion?

RUSSELL SANDBERG
Professor of Law, Cardiff University

During the COVID-19 lockdown the initial British Government mantra of ‘Stay home. Protect the NHS. Save Lives’, the ritualistic weekly public clapping for the NHS and the overall tone of the media coverage led several commentators to raise the question of whether the NHS had become a religion. This question is legally significant. English law provides the right to manifest religion or belief under the Human Rights Act 1998 and the right not to be discriminated against on grounds of religion or belief in relation to employment and the provision of goods and services under the Equality Act 2010. This raises the point: during the lifting of lockdown when authorities require people to go back to their workplace or send their children to school, could individuals who refuse say they were legally entitled to decline on the basis that such a requirement breached their belief in protecting the NHS?

This brief comment explores whether such an argument could be made. A belief in protecting the NHS would potentially fall under the definition of belief rather than religion. There is confused and contradictory case law on the meaning of belief for the purpose of religion or belief discrimination law. This is underscored by four recent cases. The first two are contradictory decisions on vegetarianism and veganism: the decision in Conisbee where a

1 I am grateful to Frank Cranmer, Dr Sharon Thompson and Dr Caroline Roberts for their comments on an earlier draft of this comment.

2 See N Spencer, ‘Clapping for the NHS, our New Religion’ THEOS and L Woodhead, ‘The NHS, Our National Religion’ Religion Media Centre. Such an analogy is not new and was famously used by Nigel Lawson in his memoirs. The British Medical Journal featured an editorial on the topic in 1999 (J Neuberger, ‘The NHS as a Theological Institution’ (1999) 319 BMJ 1588) and the NHS had a starring role in the Opening Ceremony of the Olympics in 2012. A study into the Cultural History of the NHS by Warwick University is exploring how people believe in the NHS. The analogy has been used by commentators both to praise and to criticise the NHS (P Toynbee, ‘The NHS is our Religion: It’s the only thing that saves it from the Tories’ and B Spencer, ‘The NHS is the Closest Thing we have to a Religion – and that’s why it must be privatised’). Perhaps most notably, the then Health Secretary Jeremy Hunt is reported to have said that the treatment of the NHS as a ‘national religion’ meant that anyone who questioned its orthodoxy could be left ‘facing the Spanish inquisition’.


belief in vegetarianism was not capable of being protected, and the decision by the same judge in Casamitjana that ethical veganism is a belief that qualifies for protection. The second two cases concerning beliefs that sex is biologically immutable in Forstater and Mackereth, which both held that such beliefs were not protected by the Equality Act 2010. This comment will explore the case law on the definition of belief and the tests that Employment Tribunals have used as a whole, collating and comparing to these recent decisions as well as paying particular to the decision which is most analogous to the question set here, the cases of McEleny in which it was held that a belief in Scottish independence was capable of being protected and Maistry in which the Employment Tribunals held (and the Court of Appeal did not challenge) the finding that a belief in public service broadcasting was capable of being protected as a belief (though the claim then failed on substantive grounds). This comment will explore the preliminary tests that a belief in the NHS would need to satisfy in order to be potentially capable of being protected under the Equality Act. In so doing, it will become apparent how malleable and therefore unsatisfactory the current approach to the definition of belief under discrimination law is.

The turning point in the case law on the definition of belief was the decision of the Employment Appeal Tribunal in Grainger which concluded that a belief in man-made climate change was capable of constituting a ‘philosophical belief’ because it met the criteria laid out by the case law of the European Court of Human Rights which was directly relevant. This was important for two reasons. The first was the EAT’s insistence that the Strasbourg case law was to be followed. Much depends upon the evidence adduced.

7 Compare the earlier decision in Alexander v Farmtastic Valley Ltd and others [2011] ET 2513832/10 in which a belief in the treatment of animals which included vegetarianism and aspects of Buddhism was held to be a protected belief.
13 [2014] EWCA Civ 1116.
14 It is worth noting at the outset that Employment Tribunal decisions are not binding on each other. Much depends upon the evidence adduced.
‘any religious or philosophical belief’\textsuperscript{16} while the ECHR makes no distinction between philosophical or non-philosophical beliefs and has taken an expansive approach even considering political beliefs like communism\textsuperscript{17} and Nazism.\textsuperscript{18} The case law as a whole has invariably considered claims without questioning whether such claims fit the definition of religion or belief and this suggests that a belief in the NHS would fall under Article 9 ECHR.\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Grainger} suggests that this broad approach is to be taken to domestic equality law.

The second reason why the decision is important is because it provided five tests which Employment Tribunal Chairs have subsequently applied these requirements as if they were statutory tests.\textsuperscript{20} As \textit{Forstater} noted, these five criteria are also expressed in the Equality and Human Rights Commission’s Employment Statutory Code of Practice\textsuperscript{21} and that ‘the Tribunal is required to take the code into account where it is relevant but is not bound by it’.\textsuperscript{22} Nonetheless, subsequent Employment Tribunal decisions have followed the tests to the letter.\textsuperscript{23} However, some decisions have stressed that ‘the threshold for establishing the \textit{Grainger} criteria should not be set “too high”’.\textsuperscript{24} The following will therefore explore each of the five tests in turn to see how they could be applied to the question of whether a belief in the NHS and the need to protect it could constitute a belief for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010 (and so interference with that belief could amount to discrimination, harassment and / or victimisation).

\textsuperscript{16} Equality Act 2010 s10.
\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Hazar, Hazar and Acik v Turkey} (1991) 72 D&R 200.
\textsuperscript{18} \textit{X v Austria} (1981) 26 D&R 89.
\textsuperscript{19} There is no case on point of whether a belief in the healthcare system would be protected as a belief but in \textit{Nyyssönen v Finland} [1998] App no 30406/96 (15 January 1998), the European Commission of Human Rights held that ‘alternative medicine as a manifestation of medical philosophy falls within the ambit of the right to freedom of thought and conscience’. The claim failed because no evidence had been submitted that could lead to the conclusion that he was prevented from manifesting his belief.
\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Forstater v CGD Europe &Ors} [2019] ET 2200909/2019 at para 51.
\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Forstater v CGD Europe &Ors} [2019] ET 2200909/2019 at para 51.
\textsuperscript{23} An exception is \textit{Conisbee} [2019] ET 3335357/2018 where Counsel put forward additional tests but the only additional test that the tribunal referenced in its decision was that ‘the belief must have a similar status or cogency to religious beliefs’ (para 43). This is questionable given that the word ‘similar’ has been removed from the statutory definition of belief under the Equality Act 2010: see the discussion in F Cranmer and R Sandberg, ‘ACritique of the Decision in Conisbee that Vegetarianism is not a Belief’ (2020) 22 (1) Ecclesiastical Law Journal 36.
1. The Belief must be Genuinely Held

The first test that the belief must be genuinely held is usually easily met. In Conisbee\textsuperscript{25} and Casamitjana\textsuperscript{26} this point was conceded by the respondents and accepted by the tribunal. It was also accepted in Mackereth\textsuperscript{27} and Forstater,\textsuperscript{28} which reiterated the principle found in the House of Lords decision in Williamson\textsuperscript{29} that this inquiry was limited to considering whether the belief is held in good faith. However, despite Williamson also stating that ‘it is not for the court to embark on an inquiry into the asserted belief and judge its “validity” by some objective standard such as the source material upon which the claimant founds his belief or the orthodox teaching of the religion in question’, a number of employment tribunal decisions including Casamitjana\textsuperscript{30} have said that they have based their finding on the evidence submitted. This is compliant with Williamson if this assessment is based on quantity rather than quality. In Streatfield\textsuperscript{31} it was held that the Claimant’s humanist beliefs were genuinely held because there was evidence she had held these beliefs from an early age and had ‘lived her life adopting a general adherence to those principles’. That decision also confirmed that a belief would still be treated as genuine even if it was not manifested by the claimant at all times. A belief in protecting the NHS, provided that the claim was not made in a vexatious way in order to avoid legal obligations, would surely be able to meet the first Grainger test. In Maistry\textsuperscript{32} the fact that the belief was ‘of great personal significance’ to the claimant given his career and experiences was mentioned as part of Employment Judge Hughes’ finding that there was ‘no reason whatsoever to doubt the strength of the claimant’s feelings about this’ but it is questionable whether this is to taken as requiring such significance for this test to be met in all cases.

\textsuperscript{25} Mr G Conisbee v Crossley Farms Ltd &Ors [2019] ET 3335357/2018 para 38.
\textsuperscript{27} Mackereth v The Department for Work and Pensions &Ors [2019]ET 1304602/2018.
\textsuperscript{28} Forstater v CGD Europe &Ors [2019] ET 2200909/2019 at para 53.
\textsuperscript{29} R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment and others ex parte Williamson [2005] UKHL 15 at para 22.
\textsuperscript{32} Maistry v The BBC [2011] ET 1213142/2010 at para 8. It was also confirmed that the extent to which the claimant had raised the question of belief during capability or grievance proceedings, though relevant to the quesiton of liability, did not affect the question of whether the belief was genuine unless it could be inferred that the failureto mention it demonstrated that it was not a genuine belief at all: para 16.
2. **It must be Belief rather than an Opinion or Viewpoint**

The second requirement is that a belief must not be merely an opinion or viewpoint based on the present state of information available, but this has been applied in an inconsistent way. The requirement originated in *McClintock*\(^{33}\) concerning a Justice of the Peace who resigned since he could not in conscience agree to place children with same-sex couples because he felt further research was needed on the effect this would have upon the children. Both the Employment Tribunal and the Employment Appeal Tribunal held that the claimant’s objection did not constitute a belief because he had not as a matter of principle rejected the possibility that single sex parents could ever be in the child’s best interest: it was not sufficient ‘to have an opinion based on some real or perceived logic or based on information or lack of information available’.\(^{34}\) In *Farrell v South Yorkshire Police Authority*\(^{35}\) it was held that this requirement was met since, unlike in *McClintock*, the claimant had come to a conclusion that the evidence pointed one way and not another. The crucial factor was that whilst he was prepared to admit that he might be wrong, he did not believe himself to be wrong. This was applied in *Forstater*\(^{36}\) where it was accepted that her belief was ‘more than an opinion or viewpoint based on the present state of information available’ and that the claimant was ‘fixed in it, and appears to be becoming more so’.\(^{37}\)

However, in other cases this requirement has been taken further to suggest that even where the claimant had reached a settled conclusion this will not be sufficient. Notably in *Conisbee*\(^{38}\) Employment Judge Postle held that this test had not been met because ‘it is simply not enough to have an opinion based on some real, or perceived, logic’.\(^{39}\) This refers to the first limb of the *McClintock* test but does not explain why the tribunal found that the belief was an opinion or viewpoint rather than a belief capable of protection. Employment Judge Postle seems to have posed questions about the validity of belief that *Williamson* warned

\(^{33}\) *McClintock v Department of Constitutional Affairs* [2007] UKEAT/0223/07/CEA.

\(^{34}\) At para 54.


\(^{36}\) *Forstater v CGD Europe &Ors* [2019] ET 2200909/2019 at para 54.

\(^{37}\) The point does not seem to be discussed in the judgment in *Mackereth v The Department for Work and Pensions &Ors* [2019] ET 1304602/2018.


\(^{39}\) The reference to ‘an opinion based on some real, or perceived logic’ comes from *McClintock v Department of Constitutional Affairs* [2007] UKEAT/0223/07/CEA at para 45 but this does not create a distinction since protected beliefs too will be presumably based on a real or perceived logic.
against. This is underlined by his decision in *Casamitjana*\(^{40}\) that this test had been met because ‘ethical veganism carries with it an important moral essential’, ‘is founded on a longstanding tradition’ and therefore is ‘not simply a viewpoint, but a real and genuine belief and not some irrational opinion’. Such an approach is not only deeply conservative but is fundamentally inappropriate: it is not for judges to decide whether beliefs are rational or not and to hold that irrational beliefs are mere opinions and so not protected. It would appear that the discussion of this in *Conisbee* and *Casamitjana* is a misstatement of the law.

Even allowing for his ambiguity in the case law, it would appear that a belief in protecting the NHS could satisfy this second text provided that the claimant’s belief was fixed and not dependent on (say) whether the NHS could cope at a particular time. Other decisions have stressed that there is a low threshold to satisfying this second test. *Grainger*\(^{41}\) itself insisted that a “philosophical belief does not need to amount to an “-ism”” and *Hashman*\(^{42}\) confirmed that beliefs regarding specific matters can meet this threshold if they form part of a larger philosophy: beliefs concerning hunting met this requirement because the Claimant’s beliefs were to be ‘considered within the parameters of his general beliefs ... in the sanctity of life’. In *Maistry*\(^{43}\) the test was met on the basis of statements about the purpose of public broadcasting and the fact that the importance of the independent public space had ‘attracted commentary by philosophers and academics’. It is likely that the same conclusion would be reached in relation to NHS, on grounds of the importance for public health care and the role of the welfare state. It is difficult to imagine an Employment Tribunal chair dismissing a belief to protect the NHS as being a mere opinion subject to change. Indeed, in *McEleny*\(^{44}\) the tribunal rejected the respondent’s argument that a belief in Scottish independence failed this test because all political beliefs were ‘up for debate’ and ‘cannot be held as a matter of principle’. The employment tribunal insisted that the belief was not ‘susceptible to change if challenged by empirical evidence’ but was instead ‘unshakeable’ and so the test was met.\(^{45}\)

\(^{40}\)*Casamitjana v The League of Cruel Sports* [2020] ET 3331129/2018 at para 34.


\(^{44}\)*McEleny v Ministry of Defence (Scotland : Disability Discrimination, Religion or Belief Discrimination)* [2018] UKET 4105347/2017

\(^{45}\) Para 32.
3. **It must be a Belief as to a Weighty and Substantial Aspect of Human Life and Behaviour**

In most cases the third requirement that the belief needs to relate to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour is easily satisfied. In *Forstater*\textsuperscript{46} it was simply accepted while in *Grainger*\textsuperscript{47} itself it was stated that this did not exclude “one-off “beliefs such as pacifism and vegetarianism which do not govern the entirety of a person’s life’. In *McEleny*\textsuperscript{48} it was stated that while it was not necessary for others to share the belief, ‘it must have an impact on others’. This does not mean that it needs to affect the whole of humanity: short shrift was given to the respondent’s argument that a belief in Scottish independence would not ‘extend far beyond Scotland’ meaning that ‘since it had no substantial impact upon the lives of citizens in for example Tanzania, Peru or India; it is not a substantial aspect of human life or behaviour’\textsuperscript{49}.

Again, the decisions in *Conisbee* and *Casamitjana* took a more restrictive approach. In *Conisbee*\textsuperscript{50} it was concluded that ‘vegetarianism is not about human life and behaviour, it is a lifestyle choice. While this was ‘an admirable sentiment’ it could not ‘altogether be described as relating to weight and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour’. By contrast, in *Casamitjana*\textsuperscript{51} the same Employment Judge concluded that veganism is ‘at its heart between the interaction of human and non-human animal life’ and that: ‘The relationship between humans and other fellow creatures is plainly a substantial aspect of human life, it has sweeping consequences on human behaviour and clearly is capable of constituting a belief which seeks to avoid the exploitation of fellow species’. It is difficult, however, to see why the same could not be said of vegetarianism and this contradiction means that it is difficult to extrapolate points of principle from how these two decisions dealt with this test and indeed if it were possible it would be questionable whether such points would be legally correct: again, we see Employment Judges entering into questions of

\textsuperscript{46} *Forstater v CGD Europe &Ors* [2019] ET 2200909/2019 at para 82.
\textsuperscript{47} *Grainger PLC v Nicholson* [2009] UKET 0219/09/ZT at para 27.
\textsuperscript{48} *McEleny v Ministry of Defence (Scotland : Disability Discrimination, Religion or Belief Discrimination)* [2018] UKET 4105347/2017 at para 33.
\textsuperscript{49} At para 17.
\textsuperscript{50} *Mr G Conisbee v Crossley Farms Ltd &Ors* [2019] ET 3335357/2018 at para 40.
validity and worth. In any case, it is difficult to see how the Conisbee precedent could lead to the conclusion that this test is not capable of being met in relation to a belief in the NHS. By contrast, the decision in Maistry seems to suggest that such a belief would satisfy the third test. Employment Judge Hughes held that:

‘A belief in the importance of providing a non-commercial, non-Governmental, independent public space in which a cultural, social and political tensions can be debated and explored and in which tolerance of other viewpoints is fostered, clearly relates to weighty and substantial aspects of human life and behaviour.’

The respondent’s case had been that this test was not met because ‘the legislation could not have been intended to cover a belief of this nature because really it was no more than a “mission statement”’. The respondent argued that ‘if the claimant was right, then it would follow that beliefs in the aims and values of a whole host of public organisations, if genuinely held, could amount to philosophical beliefs’. The example given by the respondent is important given the subject matter of this comment: ‘the respondent suggested that a belief that the aim of the NHS should first and foremost be to look after the health and welfare of its patients could, if the claimants were correct, amount to a belief’. The respondent argued that this would be ‘absurd’ but Employment Judge Hughes held that the fact that the public aims of an organisation could amount to a philosophical belief if those aims were the results of an underlying philosophical belief. For Hughes, that the beliefs ‘might fairly be characterised as idealistic in nature and / or as a “mission statement” ... does not negate the evidence before me was that those purposes arise because of a shared belief in the importance of public service broadcasting in a democratic society’. This suggests that a similar belief about public healthcare would satisfy the third test.

4. **It must attain a Certain Level of Cogency, Seriousness, Cohesion and Importance**

The requirements of the fourth test that the belief needs to attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and importance are taken from the human rights jurisprudence. The

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53 Para 9.
54 Para 18.
leading case on this is the Employment Appeal Tribunal decision in *Harron*[^55] in which Langstaff J confirmed that ‘there is no material difference between the domestic approach and that under Article 9’[^56] and that Lord Nicholls’ speech in *Williamson*[^57] is to be followed. For Langstaff J, this meant that ‘the belief must relate to matters more than merely trivial’ and coherence ‘is to be understood in the sense of being intelligible and capable of being understood’.[^58] This is uncontroversial. However, Langstaff added that ‘where a belief has too narrow a focus it may, depending upon the width of that focus, not meet the standards at the appropriate level identified’.[^59] He stated that this followed Lord Nicholls’ rubric that the belief needs to be on a fundamental problem: ‘That might be thought to exclude beliefs that had so narrow a focus as to be parochial rather than fundamental’.

This has, however, led some Employment Tribunal chairs to conclude that the fourth requirement is not met because the belief is ‘parochial’ without explaining why they have considered it so and therefore again potentially breaching *Williamson* by determining the validity of the belief. In *Lisk*[^60] Employment Judge George held that belief that one should wear a poppy to show respect to serviceman failed this test because he would characterise the claimant’s belief as ‘a belief that we should express support for the sacrifice of others and not as a belief in itself and this was ‘too “narrow”’ to be characterised as a philosophical belief’. Similarly in *Mackereth*[^61] the Employment Tribunal ran the third and fourth tests together and held that, although a belief in *Genesis* 1.27 and a lack of belief in transgenderism met these requirements ‘given the low threshold’, a belief that it would be irresponsible and dishonest for (say) a health professional to accommodate and/or encourage a patient’s impersonation of the opposite sex did not meet these requirements ‘because of the narrowness of the issue they represent’. No further explanation was given. In *Conisbee*[^62] it was held that this test was not met because there were ‘numerous, differing and wide varying reasons for adopting vegetarianism’ in contrast to veganism. Not only is this monolithic understanding of

[^55]: *Harron v Chief Constable of Dorset Police* [2016] UKEAT/0234/15/DA.
[^56]: Para 33.
[^57]: *R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment and others ex parteWilliamson* [2005] UKHL 15 at para 22.
[^59]: Para 37.
veganism suspect,\textsuperscript{63} it is questionable whether this is relevant to the question of whether the belief is cogent and seriously held. Imposing a requirement that it cannot be too narrow or that there needs to be an agreed, singular reason for the belief is far too conservative.\textsuperscript{64} It also raises problematic questions of how this is to be determined by the tribunal. In \textit{Farrell}\textsuperscript{65} Employment Judge Rostant held that some sort of objective assessment of the cogency and cohesion of the philosophical belief is expected of the Tribunal. He held that ‘the assessment of cogency and coherence must take into account the broadly accepted body of knowledge in the public domain’. He held that the test had not been met in the case of the Claimant’s belief in conspiracy theories regarding 9/11.

This is difficult, however, to reconcile with the human rights jurisprudence including \textit{Williamson}. Other tribunal decisions have taken a much more lenient approach. In \textit{McEleny}\textsuperscript{66} it was held that this test was met where a belief is taken seriously, ‘is intelligible and capable of being understood’. In \textit{Forstater}\textsuperscript{67} it was held that the need for coherence ‘mainly requires that the belief can be understood’ and that this test would not be failed even when there was ‘significant scientific evidence that it is wrong’. This is correct: the fourth requirement is about how important and serious the belief is to the claimant; it is not concerned with the objective question of how important or serious the belief is considered to be. The fact that, objectively, such beliefs are unlikely to be true is irrelevant. Atheists would maintain that all religions would fail to meet this test. The type of claim which the fourth test seeks to exclude is the deliberate sham religion.\textsuperscript{68} There is, therefore, no reason why a belief in protecting the NHS could not satisfy this requirement. It is notable that this requirement was seen to be easily met in \textit{Maistry}\textsuperscript{69}: ‘a strongly held belief in the purpose of mission statement of their public or private sector employer would be protected’.\textsuperscript{70}

\textsuperscript{64}See also in \textit{Casamitjana v The League of Cruel Sports} [2020] ET 3331129/2018 at para 37 in which it was held that ethical veganism met this test because ‘a community within businesses and restaurants clearly exists ‘which adheres to this ethical principle’. \\
\textsuperscript{65}\textit{Farrell v South Yorkshire Police Authority} [2011] ET 2803805/2010 at para 6. \\
\textsuperscript{66}\textit{McEleny v Ministry of Defence (Scotland : Disability Discrimination, Religion or Belief Discrimination)} [2018] UKET 4105347/2017 at paras 18 and 34. \\
\textsuperscript{67}\textit{Forstater v CGD Europe \\&Ors} [2019] ET 2200909/2019 at para 83. \\
\textsuperscript{68}An example of such a claim can be found in the US case of \textit{United States v Kuch} 288 F Supp 439 (1968). \\
\textsuperscript{69}\textit{Maistry v The BBC} [2011] ET 1213142/2010 at para 19. \\
\textsuperscript{70}It was held that the claimant’s belief was not a political belief and even if it was this did not mean that it was not protected. There is a significant and contradictory case law on the issue of whether political beliefs are
5. It must be Worthy of Respect in a Democratic Society

The fifth and final requirement is that the belief must be worthy of respect in a democratic society, be compatible with human dignity and not in conflict with the fundamental rights of others. Beliefs will meet this threshold unless they abuse the rights of others. As Baroness Hale noted in Williamson: ‘A free and plural society must expect to tolerate all sorts of views which many, even most, find completely unacceptable’. In Conisbee, Casamitjana, McEleny and Maistry, it was readily accepted that this condition had been met. Indeed, in the case law to date there are mostly only hypothetical examples of when this test would not be met. Lord Nicholls in Williamson gave the example of beliefs ‘involved subjecting others to torture or inhuman punishment would not qualify for protection’, while in Grainger it was suggested ‘a racist or homophobic political philosophy’ would be excluded.

However, Mackereth and Forstater now provide an actual example of this test being failed. In Mackereth, a belief in Genesis 1.27, a lack of belief in transgenderism and a belief that it would be irresponsible and dishonest for (say) a health professional to accommodate and/or encourage a patient’s impersonation of the opposite sex were all held to be ‘incompatible with human dignity and conflict with the fundamental rights of others, specifically here, transgender individuals’. Similarly in Forstater Employment Judge

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71 At para 24.
72 R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment and others ex parte Williamson [2005] UKHL 15.
73 Para 77.
74 Mr G Conisbee v Crossley Farms Ltd & Ors [2019] ET 3335357/2018 at para 42
76 McEleny v Ministry of Defence (Scotland : Disability Discrimination, Religion or Belief Discrimination) [2018] UKET 4105347/2017 at para 35.
78 R v Secretary of State for Education and Employment and others ex parte Williamson [2005] UKHL 15 at para 23.
83 Though in a ‘footnote’ to the judgment it was stressed that: ‘It is important given the public interest in this case that we make clear this case did not concern whether Dr Mackereth is a Christian and if that qualifies for protection under the Equality Act. That was never in dispute’ (para 261).
Tayler concluded that the ‘claimant’s view, in its absolutist nature, is incompatible with human dignity and fundamental rights of others’ since it denied ‘the right of a person with a Gender Recognition Certificate to be the sex to which they have transitioned’. This test was the ground upon which the claimant lost. It is difficult to disagree with Hambler’s conclusion that the emphasis upon the ‘absolutist’ nature of the belief is misplaced in that this flies against the other tests under Grainger. Equally compelling is Hambler’s argument that this is a misinterpretation of the fifth test on the grounds that it ‘seems to conflate the notion of harassment, as understood under discrimination law, with incompatibility with human dignity (under Grainger)’ and does this without any authority. If they are correctly decided, Mackereth and Forstater suggest that balancing of competing rights is a consideration under the fifth test. It would appear that a belief that leads the claimant not to respect the law would fail under the fifth test. It would seem, however, that this controversy would be unlikely to affect any claim concerning a belief in the NHS. It is difficult to conceive of a situation where a belief in protecting the NHS would fail this faith requirement.

**Conclusion**

Whether a claim that forcing the claimant out of lockdown discriminates against them on grounds of their belief in the NHS would be successful in a tribunal would depend upon the evidence adduced including how the claimant had been disadvantaged. This comment, however, has suggested that the current state of the case law concerning the Grainger tests shows that such an argument is capable of being made and falling for protection under the Equality Act 2010. If ‘BBC values’ can be protected, as Maistry confirmed, then a belief in NHS values could also be protected. If a belief in Scottish independence falls under the Equality Act, as McEleny confirmed, then a belief in the need to protect and maintain a public health service will also qualify. This would raise a further interesting potential scenario. Given that in such a claim some consideration is bound to be afforded to Article 9 considerations, there would need to be discussion of Article 9(2) which states that freedom to

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86 Ibid 240.
90 McEleny v Ministry of Defence (Scotland : Disability Discrimination, Religion or Belief Discrimination) [2018] UKET 4105347/2017
manifest one’s religion or belief can be subject to limitations that are necessary in the interests of, *inter alia*, public health.

This comment has also highlighted how inconsistent the case law on the definition of belief under the Equality Act 2010 is. Many of the tests are not only elastic in nature but have forced tribunals to reach binary judgments that are inappropriate in relation to genuinely held convictions. And these judgments are sometimes made by reference to the tribunal’s supposedly objective determination of the worth of the belief rather than focusing on what it means to the claimant. That ought to be the test. It is ironic that while *Grainger* said that the ECHR case law was relevant and used this to fashion the tests, the interpretation of the *Grainger* tests has sometimes strayed far from a human rights approach. The NHS may well be a religion – sociologically, theologically, philosophically and even potentially legally – but it is also true that the law on the definition of belief itself needs to be nursed back to health.