A partially exclusive rent-seeking contest

Leppala, Samuli ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1702-0417 2021. A partially exclusive rent-seeking contest. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 187 , pp. 60-75. 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.04.018

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Abstract

This study presents a novel contest model in which interest groups compete for partially exclusive rents, and the number of winners is endogenous. Partial exclusivity can explain the low empirical estimates of rent dissipation that create the Tullock paradox. However, partial exclusivity also increases aggregate effort and social waste. The effort-maximising contest design follows a simple rule of limiting the expected number of winners to half the number of contestants.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Business (Including Economics)
Publisher:	Elsevier
ISSN:	0167-2681
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	23 April 2021
Date of Acceptance:	13 April 2021
Last Modified:	18 Nov 2024 15:30
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/140752

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