Equality of opportunity and the acceptability of outcome inequality

Sugden, Robert and Wang, Mengjie 2020. Equality of opportunity and the acceptability of outcome inequality. European Economic Review 130 , 103597. 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103597

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Abstract

In many real-world situations, unfairness of outcomes is not directly related to fairness-related properties of individual decisions; it is an unintended consequence of procedures in which individuals interact. Attitudes to such unfairness may be revealed in emotions of anger and resentment rather than in preferences over alternative decision outcomes. We conjecture that inequality is viewed with relatively little disfavour when it results from procedures that allow individuals equal strategic opportunities. We define a concept of procedural fairness which formalises intuitions about equality of opportunity. We report a Vendetta Game experiment in which negative attitudes to inequality can be expressed in costly and counter-productive ‘taking’ of co-players’ assets. A given degree of material inequality induces more taking if the procedure that has generated it is unfair rather than fair. Surprisingly, there is excess taking by players whom procedural unfairness has benefited as well as by those it has harmed.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Business (Including Economics)
Publisher:	Elsevier
ISSN:	0014-2921
Date of Acceptance:	16 October 2020
Last Modified:	25 Jan 2022 14:30
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/146808

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