Lewis, James H. P. 2018. The discretionary normativity of requests. Philosophers' Imprint 18 (20) , pp. 1-16. |
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Official URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3521354.0018.020
Abstract
Being able to ask others to do things, and thereby giving them reasons to do those things, is a prominent feature of our interpersonal lives. In this paper, I discuss the distinctive normative status of requests – what makes them different from commands and demands. I argue for a theory of this normative phenomenon which explains the sense in which the reasons presented in requests are a matter of discretion. This discretionary quality, I argue, is something that other theories cannot accommodate, though it is a significant aspect of the relations that people stand in to one another, and the kinds of practical reasons that flow from those relations.
Item Type: | Article |
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Date Type: | Publication |
Status: | Published |
Schools: | English, Communication and Philosophy |
Publisher: | Michigan Publishing |
ISSN: | 1533-628X |
Funders: | White Rose College of the Arts and Humanities |
Date of First Compliant Deposit: | 4 October 2023 |
Date of Acceptance: | 12 May 2018 |
Last Modified: | 07 Nov 2023 00:42 |
URI: | https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/162926 |
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