Lies in art

Dixon, Daisy 2020. Lies in art. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (1) , pp. 25-39. 10.1080/00048402.2020.1844772

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Abstract

This paper aims to show that any account of how artworks lie must acknowledge (I) that artworks can lie at different levels of their content—what I call ‘surface’ and ‘deep’—and (II) that, for an artwork to lie at a given level, a norm of truthful communication such as Grice’s Maxim of Quality must apply to it. A corollary is that it’s harder than you might think for artworks to lie: Quality is not automatically ‘switched on’ during our engagement with art. However, I show how a work’s curation and genre-membership can ‘switch on’ Quality, allowing artworks to lie at different levels.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Published Online
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy
Publisher:	Taylor and Francis Group
ISSN:	0004-8402
Date of Acceptance:	4 October 2020
Last Modified:	21 Nov 2023 13:00
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/163864

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