Cardiff University | Prifysgol Caerdydd ORCA
Online Research @ Cardiff 
WelshClear Cookie - decide language by browser settings

The optimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames

Azacis, Helmuts ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6061-2100 and Collie, David Robert ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3132-648X 2009. The optimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames. Economics Letters 105 (1) , pp. 56-57. 10.1016/j.econlet.2006.11.025

Full text not available from this repository.

Abstract

The result of Colombo and Labrecciosa [Colombo, Luca and Labrecciosa, Paola (2006). ‘The suboptimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames’, Economics Letters 90, pp. 116–121.] that optimal punishments are inferior to Nash-reversion trigger strategies with decreasing marginal costs is shown to be due to the output when a firm deviates from the punishment path becoming negative.

Item Type: Article
Date Type: Publication
Status: Published
Schools: Business (Including Economics)
Subjects: H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management
Uncontrolled Keywords: Optimal punishments; Trigger strategies; Collusion; Cartels
Publisher: Elsevier
ISSN: 0165-1765
Last Modified: 19 Oct 2022 09:41
URI: https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/21875

Citation Data

Actions (repository staff only)

Edit Item Edit Item