Azacis, Helmuts and Collie, David Robert 2009. The optimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames. Economics Letters 105 (1) , pp. 56-57. 10.1016/j.econlet.2006.11.025 |
Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.11.025
Abstract
The result of Colombo and Labrecciosa [Colombo, Luca and Labrecciosa, Paola (2006). ‘The suboptimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames’, Economics Letters 90, pp. 116–121.] that optimal punishments are inferior to Nash-reversion trigger strategies with decreasing marginal costs is shown to be due to the output when a firm deviates from the punishment path becoming negative.
Item Type: | Article |
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Date Type: | Publication |
Status: | Published |
Schools: | Business (Including Economics) |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General) H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management |
Uncontrolled Keywords: | Optimal punishments; Trigger strategies; Collusion; Cartels |
Publisher: | Elsevier |
ISSN: | 0165-1765 |
Last Modified: | 04 Jun 2017 03:29 |
URI: | http://orca.cf.ac.uk/id/eprint/21875 |
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