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The optimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames

Azacis, Helmuts and Collie, David Robert 2009. The optimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames. Economics Letters 105 (1) , pp. 56-57. 10.1016/j.econlet.2006.11.025

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Abstract

The result of Colombo and Labrecciosa [Colombo, Luca and Labrecciosa, Paola (2006). ‘The suboptimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames’, Economics Letters 90, pp. 116–121.] that optimal punishments are inferior to Nash-reversion trigger strategies with decreasing marginal costs is shown to be due to the output when a firm deviates from the punishment path becoming negative.

Item Type: Article
Date Type: Publication
Status: Published
Schools: Business (Including Economics)
Subjects: H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor
H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management
Uncontrolled Keywords: Optimal punishments; Trigger strategies; Collusion; Cartels
Publisher: Elsevier
ISSN: 0165-1765
Last Modified: 04 Jun 2017 03:29
URI: http://orca.cf.ac.uk/id/eprint/21875

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