The optimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames

Azacis, Helmuts and Collie, David Robert 2009. The optimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames. Economics Letters 105 (1) , pp. 56-57. 10.1016/j.econlet.2006.11.025

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Abstract

The result of Colombo and Labrecciosa [Colombo, Luca and Labrecciosa, Paola (2006). ‘The suboptimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames’, Economics Letters 90, pp. 116–121.] that optimal punishments are inferior to Nash-reversion trigger strategies with decreasing marginal costs is shown to be due to the output when a firm deviates from the punishment path becoming negative.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Business (Including Economics)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General) H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Optimal punishments; Trigger strategies; Collusion; Cartels
Publisher:	Elsevier
ISSN:	0165-1765
Last Modified:	04 Jun 2017 03:29
URI:	http://orca.cf.ac.uk/id/eprint/21875

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