POLITICAL ACTION AND SOCIAL CHANGE: MORAL EMOTIONS, AUTOMATICITY, AND IMAGINATION

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To the everyday people who have struggled against group-based hierarchy and oppression, and to those privileged few who have had the honour to articulate their moral sentiments and dreams of freedom; and to the memory of my grandparents, Molly (“Nan”) and George (“Gramp”) Cady
I have the audacity to believe that peoples everywhere can have three meals a day for their bodies, education and culture for their minds, and dignity, equality, and freedom for their spirits. I believe that what self-centered men have torn down, other-centered men can build up… human progress is neither automatic nor inevitable... We are now faced with the fact that tomorrow is today. We are confronted with the fierce urgency of NOW. In this unfolding conundrum of life and history there is such a thing as being too late... this is no time for apathy or complacency. This is a time for vigorous and positive action.

— Martin Luther King, *The Nobel Prize Speech*, 1964

[Capitalism] is not a success. It is not intelligent, it is not beautiful, it is not just, it is not virtuous—and it doesn’t deliver the goods. In short, we dislike it, and we are beginning to despise it. But when we wonder what to put in its place, we are extremely perplexed.


There is no reason to accept the doctrines crafted to sustain power and privilege, or to believe that we are constrained by mysterious and unknown social laws. These are simply decisions made within institutions that are subject to human will and that must face the test of legitimacy. And if they do not meet the test, they can be replaced by other institutions that are more free and more just, as has happened often in the past.

— Noam Chomsky

People’s lives are in turmoil. There is a sense of crisis for men as well as for women, and for children too. Do we have an idea or even a glimmering about how people can and should live, not as victims as in the past for women, nor as atoms just whirling around on their own trajectories, but as members of a human community and as moral agents in that community?

— Barbara Ehrenreich
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Thesis Summary

This thesis develops three independent lines of investigation on the social psychology of political action and social change. Rather than developing a grand theory, I focus on adapting current perspectives in the social psychology of emotion, automaticity, goals and mental simulation to the study of political action and social change. The approach taken is eclectic both theoretically and methodologically.

In Chapter 1, I review the social psychology of political action and social change. In doing so, I conceptualise political action and social change and explore current explanations of these phenomena. I also introduce moral emotions, automaticity and imagination in order to mark the way for the subsequent chapters.

In Chapter 2, I examine the role of the moral emotions in political action and social change. Specifically, I explore the antecedents and consequences of anger, sympathy, and admiration. Drawing on theories of intergroup relations and emotion, I show that legitimate status, competence, and warmth all elicit admiration. Notably, admiration towards the authorities and centres of group power inhibits political action aimed at challenging the social order. However, when the target of admiration is a subversive hero or “martyr”, admiration uniquely predict willingness to challenge the status quo.

In Chapter 3 I investigate the role of automaticity in political action. More specifically, I develop a dual process account of political action. I demonstrate that controlled (vs. automatic) processes lead to an increase in political action tendencies in members of a disadvantaged group. Notably, automatic protest attitudes influence political action through anger. That is, the more positive one’s automatic protest attitudes are the more anger they feel in relation to group grievances. Notably, automatic attitudes are more likely to predict political action when one is low in the motivation and ability to deliberate on political issues.

In Chapter 4 I examine the role of imagination in political action and social change. I demonstrate that being able to imagine a particular social change goal (e.g., revolution or reform) uniquely predict political action tendencies aimed at that goal. Notably, imagination also qualifies the influence of efficacy and anger on political action tendencies. Put simply, anger only predicts political action for collective mobility when group members can imagine this social change goal. In addition, efficacy only predicts action aimed at revolution when one can imagine an alternative social system (e.g., economy).

In Chapter 5 I draw some conclusions, and discuss the limitations and issues that arise from the work presented here. Finally, I propose some avenues for future research. In
addition, I put forward a typology of social change in the hope that it will engender future work on the social psychology of political action and social change.
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**GENERAL DISCUSSION**

**CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE PROSPECTS**

Towards a typology of social change goals

System perception

Social value efficacy

Inclusiveness

Collective mobility

Amelioration

Social justice

Creativity

Separatism

Regressive revolution

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Clarification and Issues

Conclusion

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction and overview

Imagine Paris in 1789, Moscow in 1917, Washington in 1968, or Soweto in 1976. All of these places and times are characterized by political action. From reform to revolution, the history of human affairs is inexplicably marked by political action. Indeed, such action seems to characterise humanity at its best (and worst). So why did Africans (“slaves”) and Europeans take political action to end the transatlantic slave trade? Why did African-Americans and European-Americans engage in civil rights protests? Why did millions of Britons take to the streets in 2005 to oppose the British government’s planned invasion of Iraq? The answer to why people take political action aimed at social change is perhaps one of the “biggest” questions in social science. Political action, and any subsequent social change, has important repercussions. It might take a group of people from slavery to freedom or from totalitarianism to democracy. Any substantial answer to this question is bound to include both psychological and social factors. In what follows, I examine the effects of social and cognitive processes on the way people think, feel, and act in relation to political issues. In doing so, I aim to offer a social-psychological account of political action and social change.

Any approach to political action and social change is necessarily limited. It is impossible (and perhaps not useful) to include every social-psychological factor that may play a role in such processes. The focus adopted here is based on exploring how recent developments and trends in social psychology (for reviews, see Fiske, Gilbert, & Lindzey, 2010; Kruglanski & Higgins, 2007) might be usefully employed to add to current perspectives on political action and social change. In the remainder of this chapter I will review social-psychological approaches to political action and social change and
introduce three new areas that may add to current perspectives: moral emotions, automaticity, and imagination.

**Social psychology and political behavior**

Political behavior has been a central part of social psychology since its birth. From Allport’s (1954) seminal work on racial prejudice to Milgram’s (1974) work on obedience. Much of social behavior is political in nature. That is, it is concerned with social relations involving authority or power. There are two main approaches to political behavior in social psychology. On the one hand, there is political psychology. This approach is characterized by the study of the attributes, attitudes, decisions, and behaviors of citizens generally within representative democracies. Its primary concern is examining whether individuals hold “wise” attitudes and beliefs, and how these and other factors determine voting behavior (for a review, see Krosnick, Visser, & Harder, 2009). This approach presupposes that representational democracies function; that is, that public opinion shapes government policy, and that voting leads to meaningful differences in government policy. It is not clear that these assumptions of political psychology are (fully) met in many western representative democracies (see Chomsky, 2007; Ferguson, 1995; Page & Bouton, 2006).

On the other hand, a second social-psychological approach to political behavior is work on collective political action and social movement participation (for reviews, see Klandermans, 1997, 2003; van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2010; Wright, 2001b). This work is characterised by the study of social-psychological factors that determine protest behavior and social movement engagement. It is this latter form of political behavior that I am concerned with here.
Collective political action

Collective action can be defined as any action by a group member that is aimed at improving the conditions of the group as a whole (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). This definition is widely employed in the social psychology literature and reflects the importance of social identity in intergroup relations (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1987). Indeed, most of the examples of political action and social change that I have covered above reflect group-based inequalities, oppression, and grievance (for a review, see Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). As such, the social psychology of intergroup relations is an important theoretical and conceptual basis for thinking about political action and social change. Collective action can involve non-violent “normative” actions (e.g., demonstrations, protest, lobbying, etc) or violent “non-normative” actions (e.g., armed struggle, terrorism, etc) by group members (Wright, 2001b). Collective action theorists have recently pointed out that the definition of collective action precludes action by outgroup members in solidarity with or on behalf of the ingroup (Wright, 2009).

Solidarity-based collective political action

Many of the examples of political action and social change given above are characterized by members of ingroups and outgroups taking action to improve the situation of a disadvantaged group (e.g., African-Americans, Africans/“slaves”, Iraqis). Although there is no denying the existence of ingroup bias (for a review, see Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002), advantaged group members still take political action in solidarity with the disadvantaged. Indeed, recent collective action research has attempted to explore the psychology behind this form of political action (see Leach, Snider, & Iyer, 2002; Reicher, Cassidy, Wolpert, Hopkins, & Levine, 2006; Subasic, Reynolds, & Turner, 2008; Thomas, McGarty, & Mavor, 2009). The approach adopted here is inclusive. That is, I take political action to involve both collective and solidarity-based action.
Therefore, *political action* can be seen as any action taken by or in solidarity with a group that is aimed at improving the group’s conditions.

**Moral emotions and political action**

Recently psychologists have come to view emotion as fundamental to analyses of people’s social thought and action (for reviews, see Keltner & Lerner, 2010; Mackie & Smith, 2002; Parkinson, Fischer, & Manstead, 2005; Tiedens & Leach, 2004). Since the time of the Scottish moral sentimentalist, moral emotions have been thought to be particularly important in political and moral action (Hume, 1739-1740/1969; A. Smith, 1759/2010). The moral emotions can be thought of as those emotions that are associated with moral judgment, motivation, and behavior (Prinz & Nichols, 2010). For this to mean anything I need to specify a working definition of morality. Morality is usually conceived of as concerning harm, rights, and restrictions on people’s autonomy (for a broader approach, see Haidt, 2008). Haidt (2003) suggests that we can think of moral emotions as those emotions that are linked to the welfare of others (e.g., other individuals or society in general). Given that politics is about social relations involving power and authority, it follows that moral emotions should be relevant to political issues; a point that political scientists are beginning to appreciate (Groenendyk, 2011).

Prinz and Nichols (2010) suggest that there are three types of moral emotions; prosocial emotions such as sympathy, compassion, and concern; self-blame emotions such as guilt and shame; and other-blame emotions such as anger, contempt, and disgust. This treatment of moral emotions is useful for thinking about some of the behavioral outcomes of such emotions. However, it misses one key set of moral emotions; the other-praising emotions such as admiration, respect, and awe (Algoe & Haidt, 2009; Haidt, 2003; Haidt & Algoe, 2004; Keltner & Haidt, 2003; Weiner, 2006). With so many moral emotions it is difficult to know where to start when trying to examine their role in
political action. Based on a review of attribution-based approaches to emotion, Weiner (2006) suggests that anger and sympathy are the two most important moral emotions in determining social behavior. Supporting this, Prinz and Nichols also suggest that anger is one of the most important moral emotions.

**Anger**

Although one’s understanding of anger (and other emotions) depends on which theory of emotion you subscribe to (for a review, see Moors, 2010), there is some general consensus that anger is a negative emotion that is associated with a sense that some aspect of the self has been offended or injured (Lazarus, 1991). In addition, anger has been linked to a sense of certainty about what has just happened, particularly concerning the event’s cause. Anger has also been associated with the belief that another is responsible for the negative event, and that one has the efficacy to cope with the situation (Lazarus, 1991; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Scherer, 2001; Weiner, 2006). Work on political action has demonstrated that anger is a powerful predictor of collective action (e.g., H. J. Smith & Kessler, 2004; Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). The more that members of a disadvantaged group perceive that disadvantage as unjust the more they are likely to feel anger, and this increased anger leads to greater willingness to engage in collective action (see Figure 1.1). Similarly, anger has also been shown to predict solidarity-based action by advantaged group members. For instance, Leach, Iyer, and Pedersen (2006) found that European-Australians who saw themselves as relatively advantaged over indigenous-Australians felt greater anger about the way that indigenous-Australians are treated, and this anger was associated with greater willingness to perform political actions (e.g., send a letter of protest to government, organizing a demonstration, etc).
Sympathy

Sympathy is associated with the plight of another who has, through no fault of their own, suffered an undesirable event (Ortony et al., 1988; Weiner, 2006). Sympathy is a typical empathic response to another’s suffering and has been shown to predict a host of pro-social behaviour (Batson, Batson, Todd, Brummett, & et al., 1995; Batson, Chang, Orr, & Rowland, 2002; Dovidio, Allen, & Schroeder, 1990). Although there is no work (that I am aware of) examining the role of sympathy in collective action, there is some work examining its role in solidarity-based action. Iyer, Leach, and Crosby (2003) found that the belief that African-Americans are discriminated against predicted European-Americans’ feelings of sympathy and guilt. Whereas “white guilt” predicted support for African-American compensation it did not predict support for stronger equal opportunity measures. However, sympathy did predict support for affirmative action policies aimed at social equality (see Figure 1.2).

Admiration

The deserved success or praiseworthy actions of another elicit admiration (Ortony et al., 1988; Weiner, 2006). There is very little empirical work on admiration. Although the impact of admiration on political action has not been
examined, theorists addressing other-praising emotions have suggested that they should play a key role in regulating social hierarchy (Keltner & Haidt, 2003). Subordinates should feel admiration toward dominants and as a result of this they should defer their interests to those of the dominants (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Keltner & Haidt, 2003).

Indeed, work from the Stereotype Content Model suggests that admiration towards high status groups is linked to helping members of that group (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008). On the one hand, I expect that admiration toward dominant groups and authorities should inhibit political action. On the other hand, I also predict that when admiration is aimed at subversive “rebels”, it may have the ability to engender political action aimed at social change.

**Social change in social psychology**

Good science starts with clear conceptualization and construct definition. However, like many social science concepts social change is hard to define; it is caught up in a complex web of human values and interests. Yet, to paraphrase an infamous definition of another socially contestable phenomenon (pornography), “we know it when we see it”. While social change can essentially include any cultural, technological, economic, political, kinship, or other change in the “social system” (Parsons, 1951), a social-psychological approach must employ a narrower scope. Despite this narrower
focus there is still much room for conceptual confusion in social-psychological
approaches to social change, not least due to the tendency not to define what is meant by
social change. Implicit or unclear definitions of concepts can lead to confusion and can
impede attempts at theoretical and empirical progress. Social change has been studied as
war (Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty, & Hayes, 1992), overturning incidental group
disadvantage (Van Zomeren et al., 2004), or the redistribution of resources (Wakslak,
Jost, Tyler, & Chen, 2007). Often social change is implicitly defined as redressing
inequality in intergroup relations (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2009; Thomas et al., 2009;
Wright & Lubensky, 2008).

To be clear, here I refer to social change as a change in the absolute or relative
“social value” of a group within a social system. Here, social value refers to the *symbolic*
and *material* things for which people strive or attempt to avoid (for details of intergroup
differences in social value, see Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). On the one hand, social change
could involve an increase in positive or/and decrease in negative social value for those in
subordinate groups, also known as “progressive” social change. On the other hand,
change could involve an increase in positive or/and decrease in negative social value for
those in dominant groups, also known as “regressive” social change. As hinted at above,
social-psychological approaches to social change are usually concerned with some form
of progressive social change. Recently, collective political action researchers have made
some attempts to explicitly define their notion of social change. For example, Kessler
and Harth (2009) define social change as, “the change in the relative position of
individuals and groups within a common society” (p. 244). The important distinction
between this treatment of social change and my own is in its emphasis on the *relative*
position of a group. Although it is often the relative position of groups on a dimension
of social value that is psychologically important (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), the absolute
position is also of importance to understanding social change. For example, on average
members of Group A may earn $10,000 dollars a year as opposed to $100,000 for well to do counterparts in Group B. This can be compared to a situation where Group A earns $100,000 on average while Group B earns $1,000,000. While the relative difference (ten times more) remains the same what this actually means for the potential options open to the groups in terms of resources for social change are obviously different. This difference perhaps reflects the way in which different intergroup approaches focus on relative/“subjective” relations (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979) vs. absolute/“objective” factors (e.g., Sherif, 1966; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Here I include both relative and absolute notions of changes in social value. To restate, social value includes both symbolic and material things for which people strive (positive social value: good health, jobs, education, status and esteem) and try to avoid (negative social value: contact with the criminal justice system, disease, fines, stigma, physical assault and murder).

In an informative footnote Louis (2009) defines social change as, “both formal policy change to benefit a group, and informal changes in their social value, status or power” (p. 727). My treatment of social change shares some properties with this definition. However, it is not clear how extreme social change such as revolution would be encompassed in such a definition. The replacement of a political and/or economic system would seem to be a case of formal institutional change. However, Louis’ definition leaves policy change benefiting a group as the only means of formal social change, with all other forms being informal. To describe the Russian revolution as a change in policy seems to downplay the importance of institutions and the societal systems that they make up (Merton, 1957; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). By defining social change as a relative or absolute change in a group’s social value (which in my use includes status, power, and everything else people strive for in a society) I am able to give a simple but inclusive treatment of social change that allows for a broad social-psychological approach.
Explanations of social change

Now that I have conceptualized social change, I briefly review social-psychological accounts of social change. As mentioned earlier, the social psychology of intergroup relations provides an important theoretical and conceptual basis for thinking about political action and social change. As such, it is primarily intergroup relations theories that concern me. The first thing one notices when reading contemporary theories of intergroup relations is that they tend to be focused on explaining the paucity of social change (Reicher & Haslam, 2006). For instance, both system justification theory (SJT: Jost & Banaji, 1994) and social dominance theory (SDT: Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) are concerned with explaining the maintenance of systems of social hierarchy. Therefore, it is not clear how either theory accounts for social change. That said, some tacit conclusions can be drawn from a detailed reading of these theories. A SDT reading of social change would imply that progressive and regressive social change are fluctuations in the system of group-based hierarchy. The theory posits that individual, ideological, and institutional factors combine to act as hierarchy “attenuating” or “enhancing” forces. For example, institutional power is one important force, with aggregated institutional changes such as affirmative action having a progressive impact, while aggregated institutional discrimination can be seen as leading to regressive social change, all else being equal. Recently, social dominance theorists have begun to focus on social change. These attempts place ideology, opportunity (ecological affordances), and intergroup behavior at the centre of social change (Stewart & Pratto, 2010). With its emphasis on the dynamic nature of group-based hierarchy it is not clear how such an equilibrium-based approach (see also Kay & Friesen, in press) would account for radical social change in a social system (i.e., revolution). Indeed, while SDT and these developments of the theory are impressive in terms of their multi-level (sociological and psychological) analysis of intergroup relations (Huddy, 2004) and the kind of “objective”
systems approach to social change that the theory would imply, it is perhaps weaker in terms of accounting for the “subjective” psychology of social change, that is my focus here. To be clear, the present thesis aims to develop a social-psychological account of political action and social change. This is a much more modest goal than developing an objective theory of how social change occurs (Stewart & Pratto, 2010).

SJT posits a psychological “motive” to defend and justify the status quo. As such, SJT would seem to suggest that progressive social change may occur when the system justifying motive is weak or is overpowered by competing individual or group justification (enhancement) motives (Jost & Banaji, 1994). System justification (SJ) theorists have recently suggested that these inhibitory effects of the SJ motive can be diminished or eliminated by framing change as being consistent with protecting the status quo – “system-sanctioned change” (Feygina, Jost, & Goldsmith, 2010). While this observation is interesting, one must question its applicability to the kind of social change we have seen recently in the “Arab spring”. It is hard to think that one could frame the Egyptian revolution as being in line with maintaining the status quo (i.e., the Mubarak regime). The relationship between the SJ motive and regressive social change is less clear. Is it the case that the motive to maintain the status quo also leads to active enhancement of group-based inequalities? Or is the motive only associated with maintaining, and not enhancing, the status quo? These and other questions remain to be addressed if we are to accurately assess SJT’s contribution as an intergroup explanation of social change.

Recently, Kay and Friesen (in press) have suggested that social change is, indeed, most likely when factors that increase system justification (i.e., system threat, dependence, inescapability, and low personal control) are absent. The authors go some way beyond this, to suggest that system justification may not take place when systems are seen as completely illegitimate. This proposition raises two general points for discussion.
First, if the system justification motive can be eliminated when an individual appraises the system as illegitimate, then exactly what is the proposed relationship between the SJ motive and appraisals of illegitimacy? Although SJT was initially offered as a system-level motivational account it is not clear how the theory accounts for (or interacts with) non-motivational factors at the individual and group-level – e.g., individual or group legitimacy and stability appraisals (see Spears, Greenwood, de Lemus, & Sweetman, 2010; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Second, the idea that a completely (vs. slightly) illegitimate system is not subject to the protective influence of SJ suggests that the SJ motive is subject to “social reality constraints” (Spears, Jetten, & Doosje, 2001). This is perhaps strange for a motive, a point I will return to below when I look at motives and goals in accounts of social change. It is not clear how SJT would account for support for particular types of social change (e.g., reform vs. revolution). Is it the case that support for revolution would entail a lower SJ motive than support for reform? It is possible that SJT would also appeal to ideology as an explanation for endorsing different social change goals. However, unlike SDT, SJT does not provide a developed account of the system-challenging role of ideology.

Both SJ and SD theorists have stated that their respective approaches build upon classic theories of intergroup relations. Some of these older theories were developed, in part, to account for the social change in intergroup relations during the second half of the last century. For instance, the “fraternal” relative deprivation (RD) approach (Runciman, 1966) highlights how social comparisons with others that have things of social value, and that one feels entitled to, can lead to resentment and political collective action (for reviews, see Olson, Herman, & Zanna, 1986; Walker & Smith, 2002). The RD approach warrants credit for introducing the importance of emotions (e.g., anger and resentment) in engendering collective political action for social change. However, it is fair to say that the theoretical focus of RD work has been on documenting the
antecedents of RD as opposed to its possible consequences (e.g., social change). In addition, RD accounts did not always provide a satisfactory answer as to when RD leads to action for social change.

To some extent, social identity theory (SIT: Tajfel & Turner, 1979) can be seen as providing an answer to this question. SIT suggests that a “social change belief system” is characterized by the belief that a group member is unable to improve their position or conditions by moving out of the group into one with relative greater status. In other words, they are unable to pursue an individual mobility strategy. Faced with this situation group members may instead pursue a “social creativity” strategy, where they seek relative positive distinctiveness by changing or redefining the comparative setting. This includes: (1) comparing the ingroup and outgroup on some new dimension, (2) rejecting the value of attributes assigned to the group, and/or (3) changing the comparison outgroup. However, if group members perceive intergroup relations as insecure (vs. secure) they may engage in “social competition”. More specifically, group members that consider their group’s status position as illegitimate and/or unstable (changeable) will attempt to compete with the outgroup. There is a large body of evidence supporting SIT’s predictions for when disadvantaged group members will take collective action (e.g., Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996; Reicher & Haslam, 2006; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Wright, 2001b; Wright et al., 1990). That said, there are a number of issues with SIT’s treatment of social change. Tacitly, SIT suggests that social competition between groups is the only way in which intergroup social change occurs. On the one hand, this treatment of social change (social competition) appears to leave a wide array of intergroup behavior under the umbrella of social competition (e.g., war, political action for reform, hate crimes, revolutionary action). On the other hand, it seems to leave out other forms of intergroup behavior that may result in social change (e.g., solidarity-based
action by advantaged group members, social justice movements, consensually “fair”
competition between groups).

This somewhat narrow treatment of social competition, and therefore social
change, perhaps highlights the difference between my and SIT’s treatment of political
action and social change. Ultimately for SIT, social change means competing with an
outgroup in order to gain a positive social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Given the
definition of social change proposed earlier, it follows that not all social change has to
stem from social competition, at least not as social competition is conceptualized in SIT.
For instance, under the current approach a social creativity strategy may lead to social
change. When a subordinate group changes the value associated with an attribute of the
group or already values it, this could lead to social change if that value becomes a social
value, that is, consensually shared across dominant and subordinate groups. While this
type of increase in relative or absolute social value is achieved through changing what
counts as social value, it is nonetheless a form of social change under my definition.
Obviously this form of social change is unlikely to lead to fundamental changes in the
overall social hierarchy.

One could conceptualize this type of change as tokenism or benevolent prejudice
(Glick & Fiske, 1996; Wright, 2001a). However, it still meets my definition of social
change and is not without the possibility of conflict. Given that the new type
(dimension) of social value must be something that is consensually striven for (positive
social value) or avoided (negative social value), social influence is a necessary part of
creativity. Getting a dominant group to consensually value an attribute that the
subordinate group possesses is no easy task. As Tajfel & Turner (1979) rightfully
pointed out in their treatment of this subtype of social creativity, it is likely that groups
will positively evaluate their own traits as opposed to those possessed by an outgroup.
The extent to which this type of social change occurs depends, I suspect, on minority
influence processes (Moscovici, Mucchi-Faina, & Maass, 1994). That is, subordinate groups must convince dominant groups that a particular symbolic or material thing, that they possess more of, is worth striving for or avoiding. This is likely to be difficult because of the social identity threat associated with such influence attempts. As a result one would expect an increase in intergroup tension as a result of subordinate groups attempting to actualize this type of social change (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

**Goals and motives in social change**

Having examined intergroup approaches to social change I am now able to delineate my approach and the way in which it builds on these existing perspectives. More specifically, the present approach aims to use the notions of imagination and social change goals to bring conceptual clarity to the broad SIT notion of social competition (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), and in doing so put forward a more complete social-psychological treatment of social change. This involves both building on and departing from the previous approaches outlined above. I do this in two main ways. First, I distinguish between social change *goals* and *motives* for social change. Second, in the next section I will explore how imagination is at the heart of a goals-based approach to social change. The key point in this section is that the role of goals and motives in approaches to social change has been, to date, insufficiently theorized. I argue that an approach based on current motivational science allows us to offer a more adequate account of the motivational factors involved in social change. Specifically, the notion of social change goals enables me to offer an account that integrates much of the work in intergroup relations, but at the same time enables me to offer a flexible account of the goals that political action is aimed at achieving.

Social change can be seen as engendered by a range of different motives. SIT proposed that a motive for a positive social identity would influence intergroup behavior
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Subsequently, researchers from the SIT perspective have attempted to shed light on the role of motivation in intergroup relations (e.g., Hogg, 2001; Otten, Sassenberg, & Kessler, 2009). SJT is also based on a motivational account; a reading of the theory would suggest that individual, group, and system justification motives should impact on intergroup social change. SDT would imply that ideological values (e.g., SDO) and the need for social value should act as motives for or against social change. Based on all this work I suggest that various intergroup motives (e.g., positive social identity, belongingness-distinctiveness, meaning and uncertainty reduction, justification, SDO, justice, and social value motives) may lie at the motivational heart of intergroup social change. Recent work on group-based self-regulation has attempted to complement earlier work on group-based motives by showing how group members pursue these motives (Sassenberg & Woltin, 2009). This work has shown that many motivational processes that apply to the individual self (Higgins, 1987) also apply to the collective self (Sassenberg & Woltin, 2009). While this work certainly advances our understanding of motivation in intergroup relations, such group-based regulation accounts do not distinguish “needs” or group-based motives with group-based goals.

In my approach I distinguish group-based motives from group-based goals in order to give a better account of social change. In seeking to clarify such motivational constructs, Elliot and Niesta (2009) define a goal as “a cognitive representation of a future object that an organism is committed to approach or avoid” (p. 58), whereas a motive is a “dispositional tendency to desire or be fearful of a particular type of positive or negative experience in a particular life domain” (p. 61). As such, motives represent relatively stable dispositions, whereas goals are relatively flexible situation-specific aims (Elliot & Niesta, 2009). These clarifications from motivational science form the basis of the present approach to social change. Specifically, a goals-based approach to social change allows us to explore the psychological basis of different social change goals (e.g.,
reform vs. revolution), and enables us to integrate the plethora of group-based motives (e.g., positive social identity, belongingness-distinctiveness, meaning and uncertainty reduction, justification, SDO, justice, and social value motives) under a single approach. That is, while any of the group-based motives are expected to play a consistent role in motivation for social change, the type of social change that group members desire (i.e., goal) will be more flexible. Let us illustrate this important point with an example. During the US civil rights movement African-Americans advocated a broad range of social change goals ranging from reforms to separatism to revolution (R. D. G. Kelley, 2002). I would argue that these different goals for the future of American race-based intergroup relations were motivated by the same set of group-based motives (e.g., positive social identity, belongingness-distinctiveness, meaning and uncertainty reduction, justification, SDO, justice, and social value motives), but that groups like the Black Panthers, Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee, the Black Liberation Army, Student’s for a Democratic Society, and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People all varied in the social change goal that they endorsed. In other words, they all imagined different endpoints or “dreams” for the future of African-Americans (R. D. G. Kelley, 2002).

**Imagining social change goals**

Humans may be unique in their ability for prospection, that is, the ability to simulate the future by “pre-experiencing” it in our minds (Gilbert & Wilson, 2007). Imagination and the generation of alternative realities or “mental simulation” is a common factor in a complex array of neuro-, social-, developmental-, clinical-, and cognitive-psychological phenomena (for a review, see Markman, Klein, & Suhr, 2009). Here I focus on imagining different social change goals – the way in which group members would like intergroup relations to change. By this I mean more than just
imagining new “ideal” attributes of one’s ingroup (e.g., smarter, richer, etc). Rather, I am interested in how group members may imagine alternative systems of intergroup relations. This may be the alleviation of intergroup prejudice and discrimination through reforms (e.g., laws) that alleviate their effects (see Figure 1.3) or may involve revolution and radical new institutions that fundamentally change a system of intergroup relations. For instance, imagining an alternative economic system (i.e., institutions or “ways of doing” production, allocation, and consumption) could be a social change goal for those who are concerned with intergroup relations based on class (Albert, 2002a; Merton, 1957).

Social psychological theories of intergroup relations have not explicitly dealt with revolution. A search of *psychINFO* (1806 to November Week 4 2011) reveals only 4 hits for the search “intergroup relations” (key word) AND “revolution/Political revolution” (keyword). Perhaps this is because what counts as a revolution is a tricky judgment to make, akin to the noted conceptual problems inherent in definitions of social change. Similarly, there are various definitions of revolution with some endorsing the distinction between the “great” (e.g., French and Russian) as opposed to “lesser” (e.g., German and Japanese) revolutions (Pettee, 1938). Recently we have seen “Arab revolutions” in the Middle East and North Africa. There are extensive differences between all these episodes of revolutionary social change. However one thing is common to all these examples, revolutions are aimed at increasing social value for disadvantaged groups, who sometimes make up the majority, in a particular social system. However, as history shows us the results of revolution may not always be so “progressive” (Albert & Hahnel, 1981).
Figure 1.3: *Group C pursues an amelioration social change goal. Here the focus is on stopping the institutional agency (enforcement of norms, rules etc) that constrains group C’s possibilities for social value*

Here I conceptualize revolution as a fundamental change in one or more (sub)systems (e.g., economic, political, kinship, or cultural/religious) in a society. Fundamental means that *alternative* institutions, procedures, and “ways of doing things” (Merton, 1957) are enacted in the social system that fundamentally alter its functioning and the amount of social value that is distributed across groups. For example, the Russian revolution resulted in the removal of the economic institution of private ownership over the means of production. As such, this single institutional change had a
CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

Figure 1.4: Having implemented a set on alternative institutions (in solidarity with Group C) that resulted in the psychological and/or physical exit of Group A from the system, Group B pursues a regressive revolutionary social change goal. Here, the focus is on, the now dominant, group B using its new institutionalized power and influence to maintain or increase relative social value.

fundamental effect on economic intergroup relations: eliminating the capitalist class and putting the means of production under state ownership. However, as mentioned before the results of revolution may not always lead to progressive social change (see Figure 1.4). Even if a revolution is progressive to start with and has an inclusive/egalitarian scope it may change over time. As status differences between leaders (and their subgroups) and followers develop an intergroup dynamic may emerge between
leadership and followers such that authority is no longer prototypical (representative) of
the wider group. This idea is in line with SIT approaches to leadership which predict
that under such circumstances leadership will resort to power and coercion in order to
influence the wider group (Hogg, 2001; Turner, 2005). The potential for regressive social
change from this point is clear. Although theorists have suggested that the Russian
revolution is an example of progressive revolution (Davies, 1962), it could be argued that
the October (Bolshevik) Russian revolution is a good example of this regressive dynamic,
with Lenin distancing the “party” from the wider group (e.g., the soviets) as illustrated in
the quote below:

We say that all the land, without exception, must become the property of the whole
nation… A party is the vanguard of a class, and its duty is to lead the masses and not
merely to reflect the average political level of the masses. (Vladimir Lenin, Speech on the
Agrarian Question, 1917)

Lenin’s words show how leaders may appeal to the inclusivity of the revolution,
here “land for the whole nation”, but at the same time they may also express the
exclusive nature inherent in regressive revolution. Here Lenin talks of the superiority of
the party or “vanguard”. Indeed, he makes explicit that this exclusive subgroup
(authority) should not be prototypical of the whole group (Hogg, 2001; Turner, 2005).
Conceptualizing and examining social change goals allows the present approach to ask
new questions in the social psychology of political action and social change. For
example, does political action aimed at revolution stem from the same psychological
factors that predict action for reform?

I am not the first to suggest that imagination should play some role in political
action and social change. The SIT notion of cognitive alternatives implies the
importance of whether other outcomes of social comparison are imaginable in the future (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Although stability and/or legitimacy of the social comparison (secure vs. insecure) have been theorized as the crucial factors determining whether alternative outcomes are conceivable, I wish to take a step back and ask what outcomes or goals are being imagined in the first place? More recent SIT treatments of political action and social change go someway in demonstrating the processes that may lead to cognitive alternatives (Reicher & Haslam, 2006). However, even these attempts do not pay much conceptual attention to what types of alternatives are imagined. In other words, what social change goals do those taking political action envision? Likewise, traditional approaches to collective political action and social change have focused on what predicts action for change (Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). In short, I am interested in what types of social change people imagine and how this influences action.

The idea that collective political action for social change is undertaken solely because of a set of group-based motives or needs does not seem to fully capture the array of dreams and visions that are associated with episodes of social change (R. D. G. Kelley, 2002). Indeed, Robin Kelley’s work exemplifies how it is the ability to convey a dream of an imagined alternative future that helps to inspire social change efforts. If so, contemporary approaches to collective political action are missing an important part of the social psychology of social change: imagining the goal of political action. More specifically, what alternative arrangement in intergroup relations is envisioned as the goal of action? This does not mean that injustice, identity, and efficacy (Van Zomeren et al., 2008) play no role in engendering political action for many different types of social change. Rather, it is important not to presume that all political action is the same psychologically no matter the goal. I suggest that imagination and the idea of social change goals are important additions to a social-psychological approach to political action and social change.
Referent cognitions theory (RCT: Folger, 1986, 1987) also offers an account of imagination’s role in social change. Although this relative deprivation (RD) approach was mainly developed with egoistic (individual) deprivation in mind, its theoretical propositions can be applied to group or “fraternal” deprivation (Folger, 1986). RCT suggests that the more a person can imagine a superior or “higher referent outcome” the greater the level of RD. Put simply, if you can imagine your group as having more social value than it does presently, you are more likely to feel resentment and RD. However, this depends on whether you perceive the means or “instrumentalities” of allocating that outcome (i.e., system and institutions) as justified (see also Merton, 1957). RCT proposes that it is under conditions of high referent outcome and low justification that the greatest levels of resentment and RD are felt (Folger, 1986, 1987). By focusing on imagined intergroup relations, my approach goes beyond simply imagining a better “hedonic” outcome to incorporate the imagination of alternative intergroup relations. In RCT terms this means that the scope of imagination that I propose includes outcomes (i.e., greater social value), instrumentalities (i.e., institutions and systems), and relations. It seems that many dreams and visions of social change are not necessarily outcomes-focused. Rather, it is the relations, means, procedures, or systems that manifest those outcomes that are often the target of social change (Merton, 1957). This is important as a focus on instrumentalities and institutions (i.e., way of accomplishing necessary social tasks) may offer insights into when efforts for social change lead to tyranny instead of more equitable outcomes (Reicher & Haslam, 2006).

RCT draws on insights from the cognitive biases literature (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1982) to place imagination at the heart of RD. This work has obvious implications for imagination’s role in political action and social change. For instance, work on the simulation heuristic has famously demonstrated that people determine the likelihood of an event based on how easy it is to picture mentally (Kahneman & Tversky,
1982). This suggests that the ease of engaging in the mental simulation of different social change goals (e.g., reform vs. revolution) is likely to influence perceptions of efficacy for that goal, what I call the *simulation hypothesis*. In addition, it is possible that imagination may qualify the role of established predictors of political action, what I call the *qualification hypothesis*. For instance, it may be the case that mentally simulating alternative intergroup relations may be particularly important to those goals that are based only on logical possibility (e.g., egalitarian revolution) as opposed to past experiences (Folger, 1987).

Drawing on the goal construct in social psychology (Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007; Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996; Moskowitz & Grant, 2009) I conceptualize social change goals as high-order end states (goals) regarding desired changes in intergroup relations. As such, social change goals add some specificity to the SIT notion of cognitive alternatives. In short, I would argue that the content of cognitive alternatives, that is, the specific social change goal that a group member imagines should have important implications for political action and social change. In addition, by adopting a goal-based approach I am also able to give a more specific treatment of the SIT notion of social competition. Rather than being one homogenous intergroup behavior with a fixed set of predictors, social competition can be represented through a range of social change goals from reform to revolution. This leaves open the possibility that political action aimed at one social change goal (e.g., reform) may be driven by different factors than action aimed at another social change goal (e.g., revolution).

*Automaticity and political action*

The above paints a picture of political action as a careful, committed, deliberative action. In contrast, over the past twenty years much of social psychology has been concerned with the idea that much of our everyday social knowledge and cognition is
automatic, unintended, and unobservable. Automaticity has influenced many areas of social psychology (for reviews, see Andersen, Moskowitz, Blair, & Nosek, 2007; Dijksterhuis, 2010; Hassin, Uleman, & Bargh, 2005). In intergroup relations stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination have been examined through the lens of automatic processes (Devine, 1989; Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). However, unlike emotion, automaticity has as yet not been applied to the study of political action and social change. Despite the upsurge of interest in utilizing implicit measures, research on collective political action has hitherto relied exclusively on self-report measures (Van Zomeren et al., 2008). In general, sole reliance on self-report measures is problematic because people may not always be willing or able to report their attitudes accurately. Implicit measures of (automatic) attitudes avoid these biases. Although it is not clear that these measures assess attitudes that are completely outside of awareness, the measures circumvent participants’ conscious control over their responses by tapping an evaluation that occurs automatically in response to the salience of the attitude object (Fazio & Olson, 2003).

On the face of it, political action seems to be a deliberative controlled behavior. As such, it is not well suited to an automaticity-based approach. However, research has demonstrated that social behavior can be significantly, and sometimes surprising, influenced by automatic processes (e.g., Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996). Furthermore, dual process accounts of social behavior suggest that both automatic and controlled (i.e., deliberative) processes can work together to determine social cognition and behavior (for reviews, see Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Evans & Frankish, 2009). For example, automatic attitudes may play a more important role in predicting behavior when individuals are low (vs. high) in motivation and ability to process information deliberatively (Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999).
Taken together, these insights point towards a possible role for automaticity in political action. I suggest that the examination of attitudes towards protest provide a good opportunity to explore the role of dual processes in political action. Indeed, leading researchers have called for the insights gained from the study of automaticity and implicit social cognition to be employed in the study of political action (van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2010). As well as the particular circumstances (e.g., low motivation and ability to process information deliberatively) that may moderate the relationship between automatic protest attitudes and political action there is another way in which automatic processes may influence political action. Dual process theorists have conceptualised emotion as part of the “Level 1” or automatic system (Evans, 2008; E. R. Smith & Neumann, 2005). As such, automatic protest attitudes may influence political action through their impact on emotion.

The present research

This thesis attempts to address various gaps in the literature that were touched upon in the preceding introduction. Specifically, I take three developments (emotion, automaticity, and imagination/goals) in social psychology and apply them to the understanding of political action and social change. In doing so, I add to current perspectives on the social psychology of political action and social change, and illustrate various way in which the social-psychological study of these issues could be methodological and theoretically advanced.

In Chapter 2 I present the results of five studies that look at the role of moral emotions in political action and social change. Specifically, building on theoretical suggestions that other-praising emotions regulate social hierarchy (Keltner & Haidt, 2003), I examine the impact of admiration on political action and other intergroup behaviors (e.g., deference and learning). In addition, I examine admiration’s antecedent
appraisals and their indirect effects on action. Moreover, I explore the influence of this moral emotion in the presence of both anger and sympathy. In doing so, I offer the most complete account hitherto of moral emotion’s role in political action and social change.

In Chapter 3 I present the results of three studies examining the influence of protest attitudes on political action. In particular, I examine both explicit and implicit measures of protest attitudes and their indirect effects on political action. This chapter demonstrates how dual process approaches can be usefully applied to the study of political action. As well as examining the relationship between automatic processes and emotion, I also explore the interaction between automatic attitudes and motivation and ability to process political information (i.e., political engagement). This chapter offers the first account of automatic processes’ role in political action.

In Chapter 4 I present the results of two studies that investigate the influence of imagination on political action and social change. More specifically, I explore how imagining a social change goal influences political action for that goal. In doing so, I explore how political action aimed at different social change goals (e.g., reform vs. revolution) may be predicted by different social-psychological factors.

Finally, in Chapter 5 I summarize the results of my research and draw some overarching conclusions. I address some of its limitations and implications, and outline some directions for future theory and research. Specifically, I propose a typology of social change goals.

It is worth noting that the three empirical chapters are based on multiple-study papers that were, or are in the process of, being submitted to peer-reviewed journals. As such, the introductions and some discussion points may show some overlap with the Introduction and Overview and Conclusions, Limitations, and Future Prospects, but this is done to ensure that each chapter can be read independently. Given that the research in
these three empirical chapters was conducted in collaboration with others, I use the
pronoun “we” rather than “I” throughout these chapters.
CHAPTER 2

Moral emotions and political action: admiration regulates social hierarchy*

THIS DISPOSITION to admire, and almost to worship, the rich and the powerful… though necessary both to establish and to maintain the distinction of ranks and the order of society, is, at the same time, the great and most universal cause of the corruption of our moral sentiments. (A. Smith, 1759/2010)

Picture Adolph Hitler. For many, this simple task may cause a cascade of negative emotions such as disgust, anger, fear, or contempt. However, for a few, Hitler evokes positive emotions such as admiration, respect, and even awe or reverence. While Adam Smith argued that moral emotions like admiration play a functional role in regulating social hierarchy, he also warned us that such emotions debase our moral sense. Despite Smith’s stark warning, little work has been carried out in the subsequent 250 years to examine the influence of admiration on social behavior. The present research examines the extent to which moral emotions influence political action. We argue that admiration regulates social hierarchy by affecting how we act in response to political and moral issues such as war, inequality, historical wrongdoing, immigration, and political freedom.

The Rise of Emotions

Over the past 10 years psychologists have come to view emotion as fundamental to analyses of people’s social and political thought and action (Mackie & Smith, 2002;
Parkinson et al., 2005; Tiedens & Leach, 2004). Emotion has featured in efforts to understand a range of core social-psychological topics such as prejudice (Mackie & Smith, 2002) and inter-group conflict (de Rivera & Páez, 2007), but it is the role of emotion in political action that concerns us here. In this respect, emotions have proved to be unique predictors of important social phenomena. For example, guilt has been found to predict a range of political (intergroup) attitudes, such as support for social policies, apology for historical wrong doing, and restitution for racial wrongs (see Branscombe & Doosje, 2004). However, it is emotion’s role in motivating collective political action that has arguably proved to be most impressive. Supporting this view, a recent meta-analysis has shown that affective measures of injustice proved to be superior to non-affective measures as predictors of collective political action (Van Zomeren et al., 2008). In terms of specific emotions, research has shown that anger is among the most powerful predictors of collective political action by disadvantaged group members (H. J. Smith & Kessler, 2004; Van Zomeren et al., 2008). However, anger’s role is not limited to the disadvantaged; along with feelings of sympathy, anger has been shown to facilitate political action by dominant group members in solidarity with the disadvantaged (Iyer et al., 2003; Leach et al., 2006). Here moral outrage or anger directed towards one’s own group or a third-party (i.e., authority, government) engenders action (see Thomas et al., 2009).

These initial emotion-based approaches to political action have proven very successful at explaining which appraisals and emotions lead to actions that support social change. However, we suggest that a focus on action-oriented emotions like anger, sympathy or guilt may obscure an important facet of the regulation of social hierarchy (social change). Rather than social hierarchy being maintained (alone at least) by a lack of anger, sympathy, or guilt over injustice, we suggest that its maintenance is more emotionally active. A key point of the present research is to examine the emotion-based
roots of social hierarchy, examining how emotion can act to challenge but also to maintain the status quo. In line with Adam Smith’s observations, we argue that admiration plays a crucial role in regulating social hierarchy, and that it does this via its impact on political action and other intergroup behaviors.

Admiration Regulates Social Hierarchy

Recent research has shown the important role that positive emotions play in human well-being and behavior (for reviews, see Fredrickson, 2009; Keltner, 2009). Among these positive emotions is a distinct set of other-praising emotions that include admiration, awe, reverence, elevation and respect. These emotions are all associated with appreciating or praising an “other” (Algoe & Haidt, 2009; Keltner & Haidt, 2003; Ortony et al., 1988). We are likely to feel admiration towards those who engage in praiseworthy actions (Ortony et al., 1988). It seems that these other-praising emotions are moral in nature, characterizing our feelings towards saints as opposed to sinners (Haidt, 2003; Haidt & Algoe, 2004; Weiner, 2006).

At the intergroup level, other-praising emotions such as admiration are felt towards groups perceived as being high in competence and warmth (Cuddy et al., 2008). Here warmth represents the extent to which groups have shared goals (cooperation), and competence is said to stem from a group’s position in the social hierarchy (status). From this stereotype content model (SCM) and behaviors from intergroup affect and stereotypes (BIAS) perspective, admiration should be associated with helping and cooperating with members of that group (Cuddy et al., 2008). Although other intergroup perspectives have not dealt directly with admiration or its consequences, it is likely that admiration is elicited by legitimate status and/or power (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Here the target of admiration could include an outgroup, third-party (governing authority or institution), sub/superordinate group, or system (Thomas et al., 2009). The power, skill, and legitimate status of the “other” are
likely to induce admiration, and it is suggested that this emotion carries with it a tendency for subordinates to defer to the target of the emotion (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001; Keltner & Haidt, 2003). In this sense, these emotions can be seen as maintaining social hierarchy, at least when they are targeted towards the powerful and prestigious. But just how does admiration accomplish this? We propose that admiration maintains social hierarchy by shaping political action. More specifically, admiration inhibits (i.e., negatively predicts) political action aimed at progressive social change. If so, admiration may indeed, as Adam Smith warned, corrupt our moral sentiments when it comes to important political and moral issues. However, we suggest that admiration’s influence may be more nuanced. In line with emotion theory we suggest that the target of emotion should play a fundamental role in its influence on social behavior. Specifically, when admiration is directed at subversive “heroes”, it will lead to actions that challenge the status quo. In other words, admiration regulates social hierarchy depending on its target.

The Present Research

We aim to demonstrate that admiration plays a crucial role in regulating social hierarchy, and that it does this via its impact on political action and intergroup behavior. More specifically, we suggest that admiration towards the dominant and powerful will inhibit political action aimed at progressive social change, and engender deferential behavior. This suggestion adds to current perspectives on collective political action and social change in two key ways. First, it places positive emotions at the heart of social hierarchy and suggests that the maintenance (and change) of the status quo relies on positive, as much as negative, emotions. Moreover, it focuses on the way in which emotions inhibit, as opposed to facilitate, political action (see also Miller, Cronin, Garcia, & Branscombe, 2009). Second, we integrate insights from various intergroup perspectives to gain a better understanding of a pervasive social phenomenon (i.e., social hierarchy). We tested our ideas by examining the unique influence of admiration on
political action over historical wrongdoing (Study 1) and income inequality (Study 2 & 3),
deferential and other intergroup behavior (Study 4), and action for political freedom
(Study 5). Throughout we choose to focus conceptually on admiration as it is the most
prototypical other-praising emotion (Ortony et al., 1988).

**Study 1**

The effect of emotion on political action is most central to explaining social change
or the lack thereof. As a first step, we wanted to explore admiration’s role in predicting
solidarity-based action on an unfamiliar issue towards which participants were unlikely to
hold pre-formed attitudes and opinions. Therefore, in Study 1 we examined political
action tendencies to redress a relatively unknown historical wrongdoing. Specifically, we
examined British participants’ admiration towards the British influence in world affairs
and their willingness take political action over the forced expulsion of the Chagos
islander from their historic island home of Diageo Garcia.

**Method**

*Participants, Design, and Procedure*

Participants in this correlational study were 100 British undergraduate students
(20 men and 80 women; age: $M = 19.68$, $SD = 3.26$) recruited from a university
participant panel. The study was presented as a survey of students’ political attitudes and
of their responses to a documentary detailing the “complexities” of international
relations. As part of the cover story for the study and as a means of making (British)
social identity salient, participants were informed that the survey was being carried out
cross-culturally in the UK and India. Participants then checked a box to indicate their
own national category (Indian or British). All participants indicated being of British
nationality. Participants then watched a 10-minute clip from the documentary “Stealing a
Nation”. The film details an historical wrongdoing by the British: the harsh expulsion of
the Chagos islanders from their island home of Diego Garcia (for details see http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-3667764379758632511). After viewing the film, participants completed the measures of interest, along with several filler items. Debriefing revealed that none of the participants had previously heard of the Chagos islander case.

**Measures**

*Admiration.* We measured admiration for the British “establishment” (governing authority) by asking participants to what extent they felt: “admiration,” “respect,” and “reverence” when thinking about the UK’s role in world affairs (α = .88).

*Political action tendencies.* Participants used a scale from 1 (very unwilling) to 7 (very willing) to indicate the extent to which they would be willing to perform several actions to support the grievances of the Chagos islanders. The political action items were derived from van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, and Leach (2004): “send an email of protest to the government/MP”, “participate in a demonstration”, “help organize a petition”, “participate in some form of collective action to stop this situation”, “donate money to the cause”, “do something together with others to stop this situation”, and “participate in raising our collective voice to stop this situation” (α = .88).

**Results and Discussion**

As predicted, admiration (M = 3.24, SD = 1.17) for the British establishment and its role in world affairs negatively predicted willingness to engage in political action (M = 3.27, SD = 1.75) aimed at addressing the UK’s transgression against the Chagos islanders (β = -.199, p = .049). Feeling admiration for the governing authority inhibits political actions aimed at making reparation for the historical wrongdoings of the ingroup. Of importance, this finding demonstrates the power of positive emotions to regulate social hierarchy through inhibiting political action. Here it is the presence of admiration for the
ingroup’s representatives and the power and prestige that they wield on the world stage that inhibits action aimed at progressive social change.

**Study 2**

Although the findings from Study 1 support our notion that admiration regulates social hierarchy by inhibiting political action, we are unable to infer causality due to the correlational nature of the study. As mention above, in intergroup relations terms, admiration could be conceptualized as implying an appraisal of legitimate status and/or power. In this study we manipulated the legitimacy of the actions of the target of admiration. More specifically, we manipulated whether “prestigious universities” legitimately (vs. illegitimately) enabled their students to earn more on graduation than those students graduating from “less prestigious universities”. Whereas Study 1 used an unheard of group-based grievance this study employed a more familiar and perhaps more involving group-based grievance. This enables us to examine the antecedents of admiration and to address the weaknesses of the preceding study.

**Method**

*Participants and Design*

Participants were 89 undergraduate students (sex and age were not directly recorded, but the modal age was 19 years, and approximately 70% of participants were female) recruited from a university participant panel. Participants were randomly assigned to two conditions (target's actions: legitimate vs. illegitimate).

*Procedure*

The experiment was presented as a survey of student attitudes towards a research report examining levels of graduate income. Participants were told that the survey was comparing students at different “classes” of university highlighted in the report. We used six universities, three higher and three lower in status than the participants’
In order to enhance category salience, participants rated students from each class of university on a series of traits relating to the dimensions of warmth and competence. Participants were then instructed to read the report’s executive summary. This documented an inequality in graduate earnings between classes of institution, with graduates from prestigious universities earning more on average than their counterparts from less prestigious universities even after accounting for relevant personal characteristics (e.g., gender, class, age, educational attainment, employer satisfaction etc.).

In the illegitimate condition, participants read that the inequality was explained by the fact that prestigious universities monopolized the “limited amount of available business and political capital”. As such, it is their “business and political links,” not the student’s educational attainment, that accounts for the income inequality. In the legitimate condition, the inequality was framed as being due to the fact that less prestigious institutions “do not play an active role in establishing and maintaining business and political links,” thereby suggesting that the prestigious universities were not responsible for the inequality. Participants then went on to complete the rest of the survey incorporating the dependent measures.

Measures

Manipulation checks. We checked the legitimacy of the prestigious universities’ actions using seven items derived from Gordijn, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, and Dumont (2006). Participants were asked to rate on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) the extent to which they saw the prestigious universities’ actions as: “fair,” “harmless,” “normal,” “rational,” “unjust” (reverse-coded), “prejudicial” (reverse-coded), and “moral” ($\alpha = .85$).
Admiration. We measured admiration towards the prestigious universities by asking participants to what extent they felt: “admiration”, “respect”, “reverence”, “awe”, and “inspiration” when thinking about prestigious universities (α = .92).

Political action tendencies. Using the same items as those used in Study 1, we asked participants how willing they would be to carry out actions to support the grievances of graduates from less prestigious universities (α = .92).

Results and Discussion

Manipulation Checks

To check the legitimacy of the actions by the prestigious university, we ran an ANOVA with the legitimacy manipulation as a between-participants factor and legitimacy appraisals as the dependent variable. As expected, there was a main effect of the manipulation on the legitimacy of the prestigious universities’ actions, $F(1, 89) = 4.51, p = .036, \eta^2_p = .049$. Those in the illegitimate condition perceived the universities’ actions as more illegitimate ($M = 3.89, SD = .94$) than those in the legitimate condition ($M = 4.33, SD = 1.03$).

Path Analysis

To test our predictions regarding the indirect effects of our legitimacy manipulation on political action tendencies, we specified the path model illustrated in Figure 2.1, which also shows the standardized paths, $R^2$, and model fit. The legitimacy manipulation had a significant direct effect on admiration. When prestigious universities’ actions were legitimate, participants felt greater levels of admiration for those universities ($M = 3.96, SD = 1.18$) than when the actions were illegitimate ($M = 3.23, SD = 1.25$).

Of importance, there was a significant negative path from admiration to political action. As in Study 1, admiration for the dominant and powerful inhibited political action aimed at social change. Surprisingly, there was no main effect of legitimacy on political action tendencies. However, we proceeded to test the indirect effects of legitimacy on action
tendencies as exogenous variables can exert an influence on the final endogenous variable(s) in a model in the absence of an association (main effect) between them (see Hayes, 2009). Put differently, the total (main) effect may be the sum of many different paths of influence (positive and negative), not all of which will be represented in the model.

![Figure 2.1. Path-analytic model: Influence of legitimacy and admiration on political action tendencies with pathweights (* p < .05) and R². Model fit: χ²/df = .133, GFI .999, AGFI .994, RMSEA .001](image)

**Analysis of indirect effects.** To test the indirect effects of the legitimacy manipulation we carried out bootstrapping procedures (see Shrout & Bolger, 2002). This involved generating 5000 random bootstrap samples with replacement from the data set (N = 89) and testing the model with these samples. This method does not depend upon a normal sampling distribution (Preacher & Hayes, 2004; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). The analysis revealed a significant indirect effect of legitimacy, with a point estimate of -.075 and a 95% BC (bias-corrected; see Efron, 1987) bootstrap confidence interval of -.169 to -.015. These results are consistent with our predicted causal model. When inequality is explained through legitimate (vs. illegitimate) actions of the dominant party, individuals feel more admiration for the dominant party and are therefore less likely to take action aimed at reducing inequality. This finding supports the notion that admiration is an emotion elicited by legitimate status and prestige. Moreover, it offers further support for the important role admiration plays in regulating social hierarchy.
**Study 3**

The results of Studies 1 and 2 provide evidence that admiration helps maintain the status quo by inhibiting political action. In Study 3 we sought to expand upon these findings in two respects. First, in Study 2 the status position of participants' own institution was not explicitly mentioned. In other words, it is not clear which social identities and categories were salient. Social identity is an important factor in explaining political action (Reicher et al., 2006; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Van Zomeren et al., 2008). This means that participants could have imagined themselves belonging to the high or low status group of institutions, or maybe to a third intermediate grouping. Therefore, we cannot generalize the findings to groups that have a clearly defined advantaged or disadvantaged position in the social hierarchy. Indeed, it may be the case that the role of admiration and its (appraisal) antecedents differ as a function of group status. For instance, it could be the case that ingroup bias may attenuate the inhibitory effect of admiration for those that are clearly disadvantaged. If this is the case, one might expect low status group members’ appraisals of legitimacy not to be associated with admiration for prestigious institutions, and for admiration not to inhibit their political action tendencies. In line with this basic ingroup bias perspective, one may also expect group members to feel more admiration for an ingroup than for an outgroup target. Alternatively, one might expect low status group members to be particularly sensitive to legitimacy concerns when it comes to feelings of admiration towards prestigious institutions and subsequent political action (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

Second, in order to provide support for admiration's unique role in inhibiting political action we need to show that admiration has these effects in the presence of (other) powerful predictors of political action. Therefore, in this study we replicated Study 2, but also added a three-level manipulation of ingroup status (high vs. intermediate vs. low). In addition, we measured what are arguably the two most
important moral emotions, namely anger and sympathy (Weiner, 2006). Previous research has shown that these emotions are key predictors of political action both for the disadvantaged and for solidarity-based action by the advantaged (Thomas et al., 2009; Van Zomeren et al., 2008).

Method

Participants and Design

Participants were 128 undergraduate students (29 men and 99 women; age: $M = 19.47, SD = 2.16$) recruited from a university participant panel. Participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions in a 3 (group status: high vs. low vs. intermediate) X 2 (target’s actions: legitimate vs. illegitimate) between-groups factorial design.

Procedure

The study employed the same procedure as Study 2. However, this time we also manipulated whether participants’ own university was placed in the list of “prestigious universities”, “less prestigious universities,” or “intermediate universities” in the report. To reinforce and check this manipulation participants checked a box to indicate which category their university belonged to. They then went on to complete the rest of the measures.

Measures

Manipulation checks. We checked the legitimacy of the prestigious universities’ actions using the same items as those employed in Study 2 ($\alpha = .87$). Participants checked a box to indicate the status group to which their university belonged.

Anger. We measured feelings of anger using four items taken from van Zomeren et al. (2004). Participants were asked how strongly they felt “angry,” “irritated,” “furious,” and “displeased” in relation to the inequality described in the report ($\alpha = .92$).
For all emotion measures, participants responded on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely).

**Sympathy.** To assess sympathy, participants were asked to what extent they felt “empathic,” “sympathetic,” and “compassionate” (α = .91) “when thinking about graduates from less prestigious universities”. These items were derived from Batson, Early, and Salvarani (1997).

**Admiration.** We measured admiration by asking participants to what extent they felt: “admiration” and “respect” ($r = .88$) when thinking about prestigious universities.

**Political action tendencies.** Participants used a scale from 1 (very unwilling) to 7 (very willing) to indicate what they would be willing to do to support the grievances of graduates from less prestigious universities: “send an email of protest to the government/MP”; “participate in a demonstration” and “participate in raising our collective voice to stop this situation” (α = .83).

**Results and Discussion**

**Manipulation Checks**

Eight participants either checked the wrong box or failed to tick any box on the group status manipulation check and were therefore excluded from analyses. We ran an ANOVA with status (high vs. intermediate vs. low) and target’s actions (illegitimate vs. legitimate) as factors and legitimacy appraisals as our dependent measure. Those in the legitimate condition ($M = 4.32, SD = 1.06$) saw the prestigious universities’ actions as more legitimate than did those in the illegitimate condition ($M = 3.72, SD = 1.06$), $F(1, 114) = 12.324, p = .001, \eta_p^2 = .10$. There was also a main effect of group status showing that those in the high status group saw the inequality as more legitimate than did their intermediate and low status counterparts, $F(2, 114) = 11.06, p < .001$ (see Table 2.1 for details of comparisons). This effect of status on legitimacy appraisals is in line with work that has demonstrated ingroup bias in legitimacy appraisals when one’s own group is the
dominant/transgressing party (Branscombe & Miron, 2004). The interaction was not significant, $F(1, 114) = 1.85, p = .162$.

**Analysis of Means**

*Anger.* There was a main effect of status, $F(2, 114) = 11.37, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .17$, such that members of the high status group felt less anger about the inequality ($M = 2.80, SD = 1.40$) than did their low ($M = 4.08, SD = 1.10$) and intermediate ($M = 3.68, SD = 1.46$) counterparts (see Table 2.1 for details of comparisons). Participants felt more anger when the inequality was framed as illegitimate ($M = 3.75, SD = 1.54$) rather than legitimate ($M = 3.22, SD = 1.25$), $F(1, 114) = 6.14, p = .015, \eta^2_p = .05$. The interaction was not significant, $F(2, 114) = 1.85, p = .163$.

*Sympathy.* The analysis revealed no main effect of status, $F(2, 114) = 2.04, p = .135$. However, the planned comparisons showed that members of the high status group felt significantly less sympathy towards graduates from less prestigious universities ($M = 4.24, SD = 1.43$) than did their low status counterparts ($M = 4.82, SD = 1.23$), while members of the intermediate group ($M = 3.68, SD = 1.46$) did not differ from the other two groups (see Table 2.1 for details of comparisons). These results are in line with findings showing that similarity (self–other overlap) can increase levels of sympathy (Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg, 1997). There was no significant main effect of legitimacy, $F(1, 114) = .18, p = .672$. The interaction was not significant, $F(2, 114) = .03, p = .966$.

*Admiration.* There was a main effect of status, $F(2, 114) = 4.73, p = .011, \eta^2_p = .08$. Here high status group members felt more admiration for prestigious institutions ($M = 4.03, SD = 1.42$) than did their low ($M = 3.36, SD = 1.25$) and intermediate ($M = 3.18, SD = 1.41$) status counterparts (see Table 2.1 for details of comparisons). This was qualified by a (marginal) 2-way interaction, $F(1, 114) = 2.44, p = .092, \eta^2_p = .04$. Simple effects analysis revealed that the main effect of legitimacy was only significant for those
in the low status group, \( F(1, 114) = 5.49, p = .021, \eta^2_p = .05 \). This suggests that when it comes to maintaining social hierarchy, the legitimacy of economic inequalities may be of particular importance to the disadvantaged (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). This goes some way towards an emotion-based perspective on the roots of outgroup favoritism and why members of disadvantaged groups may not always act or think in accordance with group interests (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). It seems that feelings of admiration felt by members of disadvantaged groups towards the prestigious are particularly sensitive to legitimacy/justification concerns. Given that emotion plays a key role in regulating social behavior, it may also be the case that legitimizing ideologies (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) maintain the social hierarchy (in part) through their admiration-eliciting properties. For instance, it is plausible that notions of meritocracy are associated with admiration for the rich and powerful, and it may be this emotional consequence of such ideologies that acts to maintain the social hierarchy.

**Political action tendencies.** There was a main effect of status on willingness to engage in political action, \( F(2, 114) = 4.36, p = .015, \eta^2_p = .071 \). Those in the low status condition were more willing to take action \((M = 4.48, SD = 1.06)\) than were those in the high status condition \((M = 3.57, SD = 1.58)\). The willingness of those in the intermediate condition \((M = 4.00, SD = 1.49)\) fell between that of their high and low status counterparts (see Table 2.1 for details of comparisons). These effects of group status are in line with basic conceptualizations of ingroup bias (Hewstone et al., 2002; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), although they have never been tested in this context (political action) as far as we are aware. Surprisingly, there was no main effect of legitimacy on political action tendencies. The interaction term was not significant, \( F(2, 114) = .68, p = .712 \). However, we proceeded to test the indirect effects of legitimacy on action tendencies as exogenous variables can exert an influence on the final endogenous
variable(s) in a model in the absence of an association (main effect) between them (see Hayes, 2009).

### Table 2.1. Means and standard deviations for all measures across group status (Study 3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Group Status</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegitimate</td>
<td>4.16 (1.02)</td>
<td>3.73 (0.91)</td>
<td>3.17 (1.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimate</td>
<td>4.98 (1.00)</td>
<td>3.86 (1.12)</td>
<td>4.09 (0.71)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4.53&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt; (1.08)</td>
<td>3.80&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt; (1.01)</td>
<td>3.64&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt; (0.99)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegitimate</td>
<td>3.02 (1.60)</td>
<td>3.72 (1.66)</td>
<td>4.70 (0.66)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimate</td>
<td>2.54 (1.09)</td>
<td>3.64 (1.29)</td>
<td>3.50 (1.13)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2.80&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt; (1.40)</td>
<td>3.68&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt; (1.46)</td>
<td>4.08&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt; (1.10)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sympathy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegitimate</td>
<td>4.31 (1.42)</td>
<td>4.57 (1.14)</td>
<td>4.91 (1.25)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimate</td>
<td>4.17 (1.46)</td>
<td>4.56 (1.49)</td>
<td>4.75 (1.24)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4.24&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt; (1.43)</td>
<td>4.57&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt; (1.30)</td>
<td>4.75&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt; (1.24)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Admiration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegitimate</td>
<td>4.00 (1.43)</td>
<td>3.33 (1.54)</td>
<td>2.84 (1.08)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimate</td>
<td>4.08 (1.44)</td>
<td>3.03 (1.29)</td>
<td>3.85 (1.22)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4.03&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt; (1.42)</td>
<td>3.18&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt; (1.41)</td>
<td>3.36&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt; (1.25)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political action</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegitimate</td>
<td>3.55 (1.71)</td>
<td>4.19 (1.58)</td>
<td>4.75 (0.93)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimate</td>
<td>3.55 (1.45)</td>
<td>3.82 (1.43)</td>
<td>4.22 (1.14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3.57&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt; (1.58)</td>
<td>4.00&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt; (1.49)</td>
<td>4.48&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt; (1.06)</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Different superscript (X<sup>a</sup>, X<sup>b</sup>) denotes that means are significantly different from each other at $p < .05$

**Path Analysis**

*Multiple-group analysis.* We tested whether the hypothesized model differed in fit across the three status conditions. Allowing the pathways to differ across groups did not
reliably improve the overall model fit, \( \Delta \chi^2_{16} = 24.51, p = .079 \), enabling us to include the group status manipulation in the full path model.

*Full path model.* To test our predictions regarding the effects of group status and legitimacy, we specified the path model in Figure 2.2. Means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations between all continuous variables in the model are reported in Table 2.2. The standardized paths, \( R^2 \), and model fit are shown in Figure 2.2. Two dummy coded variables (labeled “Low status” and “Intermediate”) were constructed to represent the status manipulation (for Low status, Low status = 1, and high status and intermediate = 0; for Intermediate, Intermediate = 1, and high status and low status = 0). As would be expected on the basis of the main effects reported above there were significant (positive) direct effects of low (vs. high) status on anger and sympathy, and a significant (negative) direct effect of low (vs. high) status on admiration. There was a significant (negative) direct effect of intermediate (vs. high) status on admiration, and a significant (positive) direct effect of intermediate (vs. high) status on anger. That path from intermediate (vs. high) group status to sympathy was not significant. Replicating the findings of Studies 1 and 2, admiration negatively predicted political action tendencies, whereas sympathy and anger both positively predicted action. These findings show that admiration inhibits political action aimed at challenging inequality in the presence of, arguably, the two most important moral emotions (Weiner, 2006).
Analysis of indirect effects. As before, we carried out bootstrapping procedures to test our predicted indirect effects. We first tested the indirect effects of our manipulated variables via the anger pathway. This test revealed that the indirect effect of the legitimacy manipulation was significant, with a point estimate of .086 and 95% BC CI of .018 to .173. When the inequality was framed as illegitimate, rather than legitimate, participants felt a greater sense of anger and this in turn was associated with willingness...
to take part in political action. The indirect effect of low (vs. high) status was also significant, with a point estimate of .158 and 95% BC CI of .084 to .265. Here membership in the low (vs. high) status group increased levels of anger, which in turn were associated with greater political action tendencies. The indirect effect of intermediate (vs. high) status was significant, with a point estimate of .109 and 95% BC CI of .023 to .219. Here membership in the intermediate (vs. high) status group increased levels of anger, which in turn were associated with greater political action tendencies. Next we tested the indirect effects of our manipulated variables via the sympathy pathway. Here none of the indirect effects of our manipulated variable were significant.

Finally, we tested the indirect effects of our manipulated variables via the admiration pathway. This revealed that the indirect effect of low (vs. high) status was significant, with a point estimate of .047 and 95% BC CI of .004 to .131. Here membership in the low (vs. high) status group decreased admiration that, in turn, was associated with increased willingness to engage in political action. In addition, the indirect effect of intermediate (vs. high) status was significant, with a point estimate of .061 and 95% BC CI of .013 to .152. Here membership in the intermediate (vs. high) status group decreased admiration that, in turn, was associated with increased political action tendencies. Here our legitimacy manipulation did not have a significant indirect effect. However, our previous analysis revealed that our legitimacy manipulation only effected admiration for those in the low status group. We therefore specified a model including the interaction term between the dummy variables and our legitimacy manipulation. Analysis showed a (marginal: \( p = .052 \)) indirect effect of the low (vs. high) status x legitimacy term, with a point estimate of .053 and 95% BC CI of .000 to .166. Here our legitimacy manipulation had the predicted effects—but only for those in the low status group. For low status group members greater legitimacy of the earnings
inequality led to increased admiration that, in turn, was associated with less willingness to engage in political action.

Taken together, our findings provide further evidence for the importance of admiration and other moral emotions in regulating political action aimed at challenging social inequality. Our findings show that admiration plays a similar inhibitory role for disadvantaged group members as it does for advantaged and intermediate group members (see Study 1 and 2). This is important as admiration should have similar influences across status if it is to successfully regulate social hierarchy. In addition, our findings point to the importance of status in shaping group members’ emotional reactions to social inequality. More specifically, our findings suggest that when it comes to feelings of admiration for the prestigious and powerful, members of low status groups may be particularly sensitive to legitimacy concerns.

**Study 4**

The results of Studies 1, 2, and 3 suggest that legitimate status elicits admiration that helps to maintain the status quo by inhibiting political action aimed at tackling social inequality and historical ingroup wrongs. We wanted to build on these findings in two ways. First, as mentioned above, there are alternative proposals concerning admiration’s antecedents and consequences. Cuddy et al. (2008) suggested that admiration is elicited by groups that are seen as high in both warmth and competence, and that this emotion leads to active facilitation (i.e., helping). Recent work on the other-praising emotions suggests that admiration may be thought of as a response to non-moral excellence (Algoe & Haidt, 2009). Examining an alternative, but related, set of antecedents of admiration will enable us to examine whether competence is sufficient to elicit admiration, or whether admiration is only felt for a competent other who is also cooperative or moral/legitimate. Second, if admiration regulates social hierarchy, it is important to
show not only that it inhibits challenges to the social order (political action), but also that it engenders deference to the target of the admiration (Keltner & Haidt, 2003). This view is in line with the idea that admiration functions primarily as a means of orientating individuals towards expert models for cultural/social learning, and that this dependency results in those with valued skills obtaining prestige or freely conferred deference (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). Therefore, in the present study we examined the effects of competence and warmth on key SCM/BIAS emotions (admiration, contempt, and pity) and behavioral tendencies (deference, cultural learning, and helping).

Method

Participants and Design

Participants were 123 undergraduate students (17 men and 106 women; age: $M = 19.44, SD = 1.37$) recruited from a university participant panel. They were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 (competence: high vs. low) X 2 (warmth: high vs. low) between-groups factorial design.

Materials and Procedure

Following Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick (2007), participants read about a fictitious ethnic group expected to immigrate to the UK in the near future. Participants were either informed that, “Members of this group are viewed by their society as competent (or incompetent) and intelligent (or unintelligent), and as warm (or not warm) and good-natured (or not good-natured).” Participants then went on to complete the rest of the study.

Measures

Manipulation checks. We checked the perceived warmth and competence of the group by asking participant’s to what extent the immigrant group was thought of as, “warm” and “good-natured” $(r = .88)$, and “competent” and “intelligent” $(r = .92)$. 
Emotions. Participants were asked how likely they were to feel “contempt,” “pity,” and “admiration” towards the new immigrant group. Participants responded on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (extremely unlikely) to 7 (extremely likely).

Action tendencies. We asked participants to indicate the extent to which they would behave in each of the following ways toward the new immigrant group: “defer to” (deference), “learn from” (cultural learning), and “help” (active facilitation). Participants responded on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (extremely unlikely) to 7 (extremely likely).

Results and Discussion

Manipulation Checks

We ran an ANOVA with warmth (high vs. low) and competence (high vs. low) as factors and the warmth rating as our dependent measure. Those in the high warmth condition ($M = 5.49, SD = .99$) rated the immigrant group as more warm than did those in the low warmth condition ($M = 2.90, SD = 1.35$), $F(1, 120) = 145.08, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .55$. There was no main effect of competence, $F(1, 120) = .29, p = .59$, and the interaction was not significant, $F(1, 120) = .22, p = .64$. Next we ran the same ANOVA, but with competence as our dependent measure. Those in the high competence condition ($M = 5.41, SD = 1.03$) rated the immigrant group as more competent than did those in the low competence condition ($M = 3.00, SD = 1.39$), $F(1, 120) = 120.21, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .50$. There was no main effect of warmth, $F(1, 120) = .01, p = .93$, and the interaction was not significant, $F(1, 120) = .47, p = .49$.

Path Analysis

Full path model. In order to test our predictions regarding the effects of competence and warmth we specified the path model shown in Figure 2.3. Means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations between all continuous variables in the model are reported in Table 2.3. The standardized paths, $R^2$, and model fit are shown in
Figure 2.3. As predicted, there were significant positive direct effects of competence and warmth on admiration, and a significant negative direct effect of competence on pity. When the immigrant group was said to be high in competence, participants felt greater admiration for them. Participants also felt greater admiration when the immigrants were described as high in warmth. These effects were additive; the interaction term had no significant direct effects on any of the endogenous variables. This suggests that competence can be sufficient to elicit admiration, although warmth plays an additive role. It seems that admiration can be felt for both competent “friends” and “foes”, if we accept the SCM/BIAS notion that warmth stems from the degree of cooperation between groups. Greater pity was felt when the immigrant group was described as incompetent, although there was no direct effect of warmth on pity. In addition, there were no direct effects of warmth or competence on contempt. The lack of an effect of warmth on pity and contempt is inconsistent with Cuddy et al. (2007). Those authors asked participants to rate how they felt their ingroup (Americans) would feel towards a fictitious immigrant group. In contrast, we asked participants to rate how they themselves would feel. This may explain our failure to replicate these effects. There are advantages and disadvantages associated with both approaches, although like other work on intergroup emotions (E. R. Smith, 1993) we are concerned with how group members themselves feel and with their behavioral tendencies as opposed to how they would imagine other group members to feel and act.

Consistent with Cuddy et al. (2007) there were significant (positive) direct paths between admiration and pity to helping (active facilitation). In addition, there was a significant negative path from contempt to helping. In terms of our novel action tendencies, there was a significant (positive) direct path from admiration to deference. The direct paths from the other emotions to deference were not significant. There was also a significant (positive) path from admiration to cultural learning, and a significant
(negative) link between contempt and cultural learning. As predicted, feeling greater admiration (as well as less contempt) for a group was associated with greater likelihood of social learning from that group and (in the case of admiration) with greater levels of deference. This is initial evidence to support the idea that admiration orientates one towards good models for cultural learning. In addition, the findings of this study offer further support for the notion that admiration plays a vital role in regulating social hierarchy by both inhibiting challenging behavior and encouraging deference to the target of these emotions, be they “third-parties” (authorities, institutions) or novel outgroups. The failure of contempt to negatively predict deferential behavior also supports our notion that the regulation of social hierarchy is active in nature and cannot be assumed to be due to a simple lack of positive predictors.

Analysis of indirect effects. As before, we carried out bootstrapping procedures to test the predicted indirect effects. First, we tested the indirect effects of our manipulated variables on our outcome variables via the pity pathway. This test revealed that the

![Path-analytic model](image)

Figure 2.3 Path-analytic model: Influence of competence and warmth on deference, cultural learning, and helping with pathweights († p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001) and $R^2$. Nonsignificant paths are shown as broken arrows. Model fit: $\chi^2$/df = .770, GFI .987, AGFI .939, RMSEA .001
indirect effect of competence on helping was significant, with a point estimate of -.040 and 95% BC CI of -.104 to -.005. When the immigrant group was described as low in competence, participants felt a greater sense of pity, which was associated with greater likelihood of helping the group. In addition, the indirect effect of competence on deference was significant, with a point estimate of .037 and 95% BC CI of .002 to .107. When the immigrant group was described as high in competence, participants felt less pity, which was associated with greater likelihood of deference towards the group. There were no other significant indirect effects through pity. In addition, there were no significant indirect effects of our manipulated variables through contempt. Finally, we tested the indirect effects of our manipulated variables through admiration. This test revealed that the indirect effect of competence on helping was significant, with a point estimate of .139 and 95% BC CI of .072 to .226. There was also an indirect effect of warmth on helping, with a point estimate of .071 and 95% BC CI of .011 to .153. When the immigrant group was described as high in competence or warmth, participants reported greater admiration, which was linked to increased likelihood of helping the group. This is in line with Cuddy et al.’s (2007) finding that admiration mediates the positive effects of competence and warmth on helping. Analysis revealed an indirect effect of warmth on deference, with a point estimate of .068 and 95% BC CI of .014 to .142. There was also an indirect effect of competence on deference, with a point estimate of .132 and 95% BC CI of .063 to .231. Here as the immigrant group’s competence or warmth increased, participants’ feelings of admiration towards them increased and, in turn, participants were more likely to defer to the group.
Table 2.3. Bivariate correlations, means and standard deviations for all measures (Study 4)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Contempt ($M = 3.12, SD = 1.57$)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Pity ($M = 3.41, SD = 1.53$)</td>
<td>-.17†</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Admiration ($M = 3.22, SD = 1.42$)</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Defer to ($M = 2.69, SD = 1.29$)</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.34***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Learn from ($M = 3.73, SD = 1.49$)</td>
<td>-.29**</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.63***</td>
<td>.23**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Help ($M = 4.40, SD = 1.48$)</td>
<td>-.23*</td>
<td>.19*</td>
<td>.44***</td>
<td>.18*</td>
<td>.57***</td>
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† $p < .10$, * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

These results build on the SCM/BIAS findings (e.g., Cuddy et al., 2007), suggesting that while competence stems from a group’s status, it also elicits admiration that, in turn, engenders deference to the group, thereby potentially acting as a means of maintaining status. Admiration not only elicits helping but also simultaneously engenders deference. Potentially, this is an important qualification of the type of “helping” dominant groups are likely to elicit. This helping could serve as a means of maintaining social dominance over the help-giver, an interesting contrast to the use of “dependency-orientated” helping by dominant groups to maintain their advantage (Nadler, 2002).

Tests revealed that the indirect effect of competence on cultural learning was significant, with a point estimate of .215 and 95% BC CI of .122 to .322. There was also an indirect effect of warmth on cultural learning, with a point estimate of .110 and 95% BC CI of .015 to .222. This supports the idea that competence and warmth elicit admiration that helps to orientate people towards good models for the cultural learning of skills and competences (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). Although Henrich and Gil-White (2001) do not explicitly mention warmth as an attribute of the model, given the cooperation needed for cultural learning it makes sense that warmer models would be preferred to colder ones.
Study 5

The results of the previous studies yield evidence that admiration helps to maintain social hierarchy by inhibiting political action aimed at progressive social change, and engendering deference. However, to show that admiration truly regulates social hierarchy it would be useful to examine the conditions under which such emotions engender challenges to the status quo. One candidate condition is when the target of admiration is a subversive “hero” or “martyr”. Admiration felt towards such targets should engender political action aimed at challenging the existent social hierarchy. As with much work on collective political action (Van Zomeren et al., 2008), our previous studies did not employ behavioral measures of political action. In the present study we aimed to test the impact of admiration towards figures that challenge the status quo on both political action tendencies and behavior. To do this we examined the emotions of Hong Kong residents relating to the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, their willingness to engage in protest, and their decision to sign a petition calling for the Chinese government to change its position on the issue.

Method

Participants and Design

Participants in this correlational study were 390 adult Hong Kong residents (154 men and 236 women; age: $M = 29.03, SD = 9.53$) who were recruited via advertisements on Facebook. Participants were entered into a prize draw for Amazon vouchers.

Procedure

Participants were invited to take part in an online survey of Hong Kong residents’ attitudes and feelings regarding the “June 4th incident” (Tiananmen Square massacre). Participants initially filled in demographics and checks to ensure they were Hong Kong residents. They then read details of the suppression of the Tiananmen
Square protestors and the substantial loss of life. Participants then read that the Chinese government has not apologized for the killings, refuses to carry out a public inquiry, and interferes with the public mourning of those killed on June 4th. They then went on to complete the key dependent measures, along with several filler items. At the end of the survey participants were informed that they had the chance to participate in an online petition calling on the Chinese government to reverse their position on the June 4th event (i.e., full public investigation and apology, compensation to those affected, and the right of family members to publicly mourn those killed). After this participants were fully debriefed.

**Measures**

*Anger.* Participants were asked how strongly they felt “angry,” “irritated,” and “furious” in relation to “June 4th incident” (α = .84). For all emotion measures, participants responded on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 7 (*extremely*).

*Sympathy.* Participants were asked the extent to which they felt “empathic,” “sympathetic,” and “compassionate” (α = .88) when thinking about those affected by the June 4th incident.

*Admiration.* We measured admiration by asking participants to what extent they felt “admiration,” “respect,” and “inspired” when thinking about the Chinese government (α = .77), and the victims of the June 4th incident (α = .89).

*Political action.* Participants used a scale from 1 (*very unwilling*) to 7 (*very willing*) to indicate what they would be willing to do each of five things in order to support a campaign to “reverse the Chinese government stance on June 4th”: “sign a petition addressed to the Chinese government,” “join the annual June 4th protest,” “join the annual June 4th candlelight vigil,” “help organize a petition,” and “donate money to the

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*The Tiananmen protest/massacre is referred to as the June 4th “incident” in China*
cause” ($\alpha = .95$). Protest behavior was measured by recording whether or not participants chose to add their name to the online petition.

Results and Discussion

Structural equation modeling (SEM)

The sample size of the present study allowed us to conduct structural equation modeling using latent variables, which has advantages over path analyses using only manifest variables (Kline, 2005). To test our predictions regarding the effects of admiration (towards the government and the 4th June victims) we specified the model in Figure 2.4. Means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations between all continuous manifest variables in the model are reported in Table 2.4. The standardized paths, $R^2$, and model fit statistics are shown in Figure 2.4. Analysis revealed that, as expected, there was a significant (positive) direct path from anger to political action tendencies, and a significant (negative) direct path from admiration for the Chinese government to political action tendencies. In addition, there was a significant (positive) direct path from admiration for the victims of June 4th to political action tendencies. Feeling admiration towards the victims of the Tiananmen Square massacre was significantly associated with willingness to take political action aimed at tackling the government’s position on the issue, in the presence of anger, sympathy, and admiration for the authorities.

These findings provide further evidence for the importance of admiration in regulating social hierarchy. They also emphasize the importance of the target of emotions (Leach et al., 2002; Thomas et al., 2009). Admiration does not necessarily maintain the status quo. Rather, the target of this emotion influences whether it leads to maintenance or challenge of the social order. In this sense, admiration regulates social hierarchy, evoking and inhibiting behaviors consistent with both challenge and maintenance of the status quo. In contrast, sympathy was not a significant predictor of
political action tendencies. This is consistent with Thomas et al.’s (2009) argument that sympathy is not an optimal emotion for engendering prosocial political action. Finally, and as expected, there was a significant (positive) direct path from political action tendencies to signing the petition. The stronger the action tendencies, the more likely participants were to add their name to the petition.
Figure 2.4 Structural equation model: Influence of anger, sympathy, and admiration (towards government and victims) on political action tendencies and signing a petition with pathweights († p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001) and R². Nonsignificant paths are shown as broken arrows. To simplify, manifest variables and the paths from latent to manifest variables are not shown. Model fit: χ²/df = 2.762, GFI .911, AGFI .878, RMSEA .067.
Table 2.4. Bivariate correlations, means and standard deviations for all continuous measures (Study 7)

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<tr>
<td>1. Anger</td>
<td>$M = 4.83, SD = 1.52$</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Sympathy</td>
<td>$M = 4.20, SD = .97$</td>
<td>.53***</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Admiration government</td>
<td>$M = 2.78, SD = 1.50$</td>
<td>-.45***</td>
<td>-.23***</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Admiration victims</td>
<td>$M = 5.61, SD = 1.53$</td>
<td>.68***</td>
<td>.58***</td>
<td>-.47***</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Political action</td>
<td>$M = 4.67, SD = 1.84$</td>
<td>.70***</td>
<td>.51***</td>
<td>-.55***</td>
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* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Analysis of indirect effects. As before, we carried out bootstrapping procedures to test the predicted indirect effects on our behavioral measure (signing a petition). These revealed that the indirect effect of anger was positive and significant, with a point estimate of .227 and 95% BC CI of .147 to .316. The indirect effect of admiration for the government was negative and significant, with a point estimate of -.099 and 95% BC CI of -.155 to -.046. There was also a positive indirect effect of admiration for the victims of June 4th, with a point estimate of .196 and 95% BC CI of .111 to .305. The indirect effect of sympathy was not significant.

General Discussion

We set out to explore how admiration regulates social hierarchy. Across five studies, employing a mix of correlational and experimental designs, we found that admiration regulates social hierarchy by 1) inhibiting political action aimed at challenging the status quo; 2) engendering deferential behavior; and 3) engendering political action that challenges the prevailing social order, when the target of admiration is a subversive hero. This role of admiration holds in the presence of established predictors of political action (i.e., sympathy and anger). Moreover, we found support for our predictions across a diverse range of political (intergroup) issues involving both collective action by the disadvantaged and solidarity-based action from advantaged group members. As such,
**Table 2.4. Bivariate correlations, means and standard deviations for all continuous measures (Study 7)**

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<td>.51***</td>
<td>-.55***</td>
<td>.77***</td>
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*\(p < .05, **\(p < .01, *** p < .001\)

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**General Discussion**

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it seems clear that admiration is fundamental to analyses of people’s social and political thought and action (Mackie & Smith, 2002; Parkinson et al., 2005; Tiedens & Leach, 2004). Moreover, we found evidence that, at the intergroup level, appraisals of legitimate status, warmth, and competence elicit admiration. Whereas previous work on collective political action has tended to focus on legitimacy or injustice as antecedents of anger both among the disadvantaged (H. J. Smith & Kessler, 2004; Van Zomeren et al., 2004) and advantaged (Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007; Leach et al., 2006; Leach et al., 2002), here we demonstrated that legitimatization both decreases negative emotions like anger and engenders positive other-praising emotions (towards the dominant) such as admiration.

On the one hand, our results affirm that legitimacy is an important antecedent of factors that regulate social hierarchy (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). On the other hand, our data suggests that the maintenance of social hierarchy may not depend solely on legitimacy. Rather, competence or ability are enough to elicit admiration that, in turn, is associated with deferential behavior. This is important as it points towards other (than legitimacy) means in which social hierarchy may be maintained or challenged (Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). It may be the case that engendering admiration through competence and excellence in valued domains, as opposed to relying on legitimization, is an efficient way for dominants to maintain their advantage. One can easily speculate that this may be the case based on the extravagant resources that dominants have put into displaying their excellence and prowess (e.g., monuments, art, songs, etc). Rather than being objects of dominants’ self-indulgence or manifestations of delusions of grandeur, such artefacts could play a functional role in eliciting admiration and, therefore, maintaining the status quo. Here we suggest that the use of admiration in this way represents an indirect or seemingly benign way to maintain social hierarchy (Jackman, 1994).
Returning to legitimacy, we found that low status group members were particularly sensitive to legitimacy concerns when expressing admiration towards dominants. Does this mean that the antecedents of admiration vary as a function of status? Intergroup approaches to emotion (e.g., Cuddy et al., 2007; Mackie & Smith, 2002; E. R. Smith, 1993) are based on appraisal theories of emotion (e.g., Lazarus, 1991), and as such one would not expect some groups to differ in the antecedents of particular emotions. Rather, differences in the relationship between antecedents and emotions may be explained by associated differences in group interests, motivations, and goals. That is, low status groups are motivated to pay attention to legitimacy concerns whereas high status or other groups may either have little motivation or opposing motivations to ignore or dismiss threats to their ingroup’s image (Leach et al., 2002).

Given our findings, is admiration, as Adam Smith warned, the “most universal cause of the corruption of our moral sentiments”? What we show here is that it can indeed influence the way we think and act in relation to moral and political issues. However, our data suggest that Smith’s warning should be qualified in two important respects. First, admiration has a moral/legitimacy component, and as such it is more likely to be felt towards perceived saints than sinners (Haidt, 2003; Haidt & Algoe, 2004). Furthermore, those that are most disadvantaged in the social hierarchy seem to be the most sensitive to legitimacy concerns when it comes to feeling admiration for the dominant; indeed their status arguably has to be legitimate to justify the admiration that will reinforce the hierarchy to their own disadvantage (cf. Tajfel & Turner, 1979). That said, as mentioned above, competence and skills associated with high status may be sufficient to elicit admiration (Algoe & Haidt, 2009; Cuddy et al., 2007; Henrich & Gil-White, 2001). Indeed, it is not difficult to see these processes at work in contemporary moral and political issues. For instance, when a country is engaged in wars that are unpopular with its citizens, campaigns such as “support our troops” or “help for heroes”
may elicit or enable other-praising emotions to be felt towards the nation’s soldiers that may, in turn, increase support for the war. Feeling admiration for your nation’s troops and supporting a war are logically different positions, but it is easy to see how our psychology may leave us vulnerable to the kind of threat of which Adam Smith warned.

The second qualification presents a more optimistic view of admiration than that offered by Adam Smith. Specifically, our findings suggest that the influence of admiration is dependent on the target of the emotion (Iyer et al., 2007; Leach et al., 2002; Thomas et al., 2009). Although we focused largely on targets that were powerful and prestigious institutions, our data showed that when admiration is felt towards subversive “heroes” or victims it can engender actions that challenge the prevailing social order. In other words, other-praising emotions have a specificity (E. R. Smith, 1993) that separates them from more general ideological tendencies that maintain the social hierarchy (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

This more positive take on other-praising emotions is also supported by our findings regarding cultural (intergroup) learning. When these emotions are in relation to an outgroup, they are associated with deference (echoing its regulatory function), but also with tendencies to learn from an unfamiliar outgroup. This is a new avenue for intergroup relations research. Primary questions might include whether learning from outgroups influences intergroup perceptions, evaluations, and behavior. Such intergroup learning is in line with polyculturalism; the intergroup ideology that places value on exchanges of cultural knowledge between groups and highlights how all groups (if they choose to acknowledged it) are the result of such rich cultural exchanges (Kelley, 1999; Prashad, 2001). Indeed, the type of modeling and learning that characterizes polyculturalism is an area of intergroup relations that has been under-theorized and under-explored. In the only social psychological study, as far as we are aware, examining polyculturalism, Rosenthal, Levy, & Moss, (in press) found that it was associated with
reduced sexual prejudice and outperformed multiculturalism and colorblindness ideologies. As such, intergroup or cultural learning seems like a novel area for theoretical and empirical work. It may be that other-praising emotions may play a useful role in such efforts.

Although our studies consistently show the influence of admiration on political actions and intergroup behaviors, there are some potential limitations to our approach and related avenues for future work. First, throughout our studies we choose to focus conceptually on admiration because it is the most prototypical other-praising emotion (Ortony et al., 1988). However, we employed a range of other-praising emotion words to measure this emotion. Although this is conceptually and statistically justifiable, we do not believe that all other-praising emotions will be elicited by the same antecedents and have the same kinds of effects on attitudes and behaviors. For instance, awe is elicited by perceiving something vast that is not easily assimilated into existing mental schemas (Keltner & Haidt, 2003). As such, legitimacy or warmth seem less likely to play the same kind of role in awe as they do in the elicitation of admiration. In addition, awe is unlikely to lead to intergroup learning and is perhaps a stronger predictor than admiration of deferential behavior (Keltner & Haidt, 2003). Future work would do well to explore these theorized differences in the appraisals and behavioral tendencies associated with different other-praising emotions.

At the intergroup level, one could conceptualize awe and admiration as being elicited by power and status, respectively. Although many of the other-praising emotions have been deemed “moral” and not moral, even by the same theorists (Algoe & Haidt, 2009; cf. Haidt, 2003), future work would do well to examine the boundary conditions under which different other-praising emotions are influenced by moral and legitimacy concerns. In addition, future work should examine further the relationship between status and other-praising emotions. Our treatment of this suggests that other-praising
emotions (directed at the powerful) should in general inhibit action aimed at challenging social hierarchy across status groups. However, theorists have suggested that both the subject and object of emotion should be taken into consideration when examining the role of emotion in intergroup relations (Iyer & Leach, 2008). Here other-praising emotions may be experienced differently or have varying effects on behavior depending on the subject (low vs. high group status) and object (ingroup vs. outgroup institution) of the emotion.

As Adam Smith noted over 250 years ago, admiration plays an active role in regulating social hierarchy. The work reported here goes some way to explaining how admiration accomplishes this. Admiration impacts on people’s thoughts and actions about morally charged issues. On the one hand, Adam Smith’s warnings about the dangers of admiration seem justified. However, when this emotion is felt towards moral examples it may help us to challenge social injustice.
CHAPTER 3

In two minds about protest: dual processes and political action

From unemployment, student fees, spending cuts, and war to unpropitious environmental affairs, the causes for grievance and political action are everywhere in society. But what makes some people “take to the streets” in protest, while others are apathetic or wait for elections to bring about “change”? To those who take part in protest, the driving factors may seem to be the importance of the cause, the potential to achieve change, and the injustice of the current situation. An interesting additional potential factor, however, is that different people have varying beliefs about what constitutes appropriate political behavior. For some, protest is a deeply revered action, while for others it is characteristic of wanton troublemaking. In addition to our considered attitudes towards protest, automatic, potentially nonconscious, evaluations of protest may also shape perceptions and decisions to take part in political action, despite the high importance and involvement of the issues at stake. The present research offers the first test of this hypothesis and examines the extent to which dual process approaches can add to current perspectives on collective political action.

Dual Processes and Political Action

A recent meta-analysis by van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears (2008) identified three “key” social-psychological predictors of collective political action: injustice, efficacy, and identity. People are more likely to engage in collective political action aimed at addressing a collective grievance when they experience a sense of injustice. This is particularly the case when members of aggrieved groups feel “affective” injustice. That is, emotions such as anger and moral outrage at their collective disadvantage. Indeed, anger

* This chapter is taken from Sweetman, J., Maio, G. R. & Spears, R. (in preparation). In two minds about protest: dual processes and political action.
and moral outrage at group disadvantage also leads members of advantaged groups to take political action in solidarity with the disadvantaged (e.g., Leach et al., 2006). However, political action is not all about emotion. In addition, people engage in collective political action if they believe that they or their group has the efficacy to change the undesired situation. In contrast to emotion this can be thought of as a more deliberative form of coping with disadvantage (Van Zomeren et al., 2004). It is not yet clear whether efficacy also plays a role in solidarity-based political action by members of advantaged groups. Finally, van Zomeren et al.’s meta-analysis suggested a central role for social identity in collective action. Here, the degree to which individuals share a sense of identity (particularly a political identity) and are committed to that identity increases the likelihood of action. The integrative approach offered by van Zomeren and colleagues has helped to develop collective action research by bringing together theoretical advances in the social-psychology of collective political action (see also Stürmer & Simon, 2004; van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2010). Instead of attempting to synthesize existing social psychological perspectives, the present article aims to add to current perspectives on collective political action by exploring the role of automatic and controlled (dual) processes in political action. We argue that a dual process approach offers collective action researchers a means of developing both methods and theory in the social psychology of collective political action.

Over the last two decades, few developments in social psychology have attracted as much attention as the development of implicit measures for examining automatic aspects of social cognition and behavior (Bargh & Williams, 2006; Fazio & Olson, 2003). Implicit measures have made a substantial contribution to understanding social cognition and intergroup relations through studies of attitudes/prejudice, stereotypes, and social behavior (Bargh et al., 1996; Devine, 1989; Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002; Greenwald et al., 1998). Despite the upsurge of interest in utilizing implicit measures
research on collective political action has hitherto relied exclusively on self-report measures (Van Zomeren et al., 2008). In general, sole reliance on self-report measures is problematic because people may not always be willing or able to report their attitudes accurately. Implicit measures of attitudes may avoid these biases. Although it is not clear that these measures assess attitudes that are completely outside of awareness, the measures circumvent participants’ conscious control over their responses by tapping an evaluation that occurs automatically in response to the salience of the attitude object (Fazio & Olson, 2003). In this manner, implicit measures help to avoid self-report biases, and they do so while providing useful predictors of attitude-relevant behavior. As such, these measures may also be usefully employed in examining collective political action. Indeed, leading collective action theorists have themselves called for the use of such measures (van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2010).

But is it worthwhile to use implicit measures when predicting collective political action? The highly involving nature of collective political action makes it reasonable to wonder whether automatic processes play any role in such behavior. If it is difficult to perform collective action without at least some level of deliberation, then perhaps automatic processes have little predictive power in this context. In our view, discounting implicit measures for this reason would reflect an extreme or at least misleading interpretation of the role of automaticity in social cognition and behavior. Rather, consistent with the general properties of many dual process models (for reviews, see Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Evans, 2008; Evans & Frankish, 2009) we suggest that characteristically deliberative behaviors may still involve the influence of automatic processes. In particular, we suggest that automatic attitudes towards protest will, along with more deliberative processes, play a role in accounting for political action (Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999).

Automatic Protest Attitudes: How and When?
From a dual processes perspective, we would suggest that collective political action is a characteristically deliberative behavior. As such, we would expect controlled processes and deliberation to increase the likelihood of taking such action. In other words, increasing the motivation, ability, and opportunity to engage in deliberative processing regarding a collective grievance should increase the likelihood of engaging in political collective action. At the same time, we would expect that under conditions of low motivation, ability, and opportunity to engage in deliberative processing automatic attitudes towards protest should play an increasingly important role in engendering political action (Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999). As mentioned earlier, anger plays an important role in predicting collective political action. Dual process accounts have suggested that emotion should be associated with “Level 1” or automatic processes (Evans, 2008; E. R. Smith & Neumann, 2005). In addition, there is now a general consensus among emotion theories that automatic processes play a key role in emotion causation (Moors, 2010). In addition to their influence under conditions of low motivation and ability, we expect that automatic attitudes towards protest may have indirect effects on collective political action through the anger (emotion-based) pathway to political action (Van Zomeren et al., 2004).

The Present Research

The present research employed both implicit and explicit measures of protest attitudes in order to examine the role of automatic and deliberative processes in collective political action. We predicted that implicit and explicit measures of protest attitude would predict collective political action tendencies and behavior. We reasoned that increases in deliberative and controlled processing should increase tendencies for political action in the face of a collective grievance. In line with dual process models’ treatment of emotion, we expected automatic protest attitudes to have an indirect effect on collective political action via emotion-based (i.e., anger) pathways to action (Van
Furthermore, we expected automatic attitudes to have their greatest predictive power when participants were low in motivation, opportunity, or ability to engage in deliberative processing about a collective grievance. More specifically, although collective political action is a typically deliberative behavior, those individuals who are low in political engagement should be more likely to be influenced by their automatic protest attitudes. Three studies tested these predictions. Because there is some evidence that the completion of explicit measures may influence subsequent implicit attitude measures (Bosson, Swarm, & Pennebaker, 2000), we presented all implicit measures of attitude prior to the explicit measures.

**Study 1**

Traditional implicit measures (e.g., Greenwald et al., 1998) contrast evaluative responses to two categories (e.g., Black vs. White). There is no obvious or clear-cut comparison category when considering attitudes toward protest. Fortunately, there is an implicit measure that focuses on evaluative responses to one target category, the Single Category Implicit Association Test (SC-IAT), and this test has exhibited good reliability and validity in past uses (Karpinski & Steinman, 2006). Thus, we adapted this measure for the automatic assessment of attitudes toward protest in Study 1, and we conducted an initial test of whether this and an explicit measure of protest attitudes predicted collective political action tendencies. Furthermore, we measured anger in order to examine the relationship between automatic attitudes and emotion.

**Method**

**Participants and Procedure**

Participants were 99 British undergraduate students (80 women and 19 men; age: $M = 19.69, SD = 3.28$) who received course credit for participation. Participants were
informed that there were two separate studies to be completed during the session. The first was described as a social categorization task and as a validation of several individual difference measures. Participants completed the SC-IAT measure of protest associations, explicit measures of attitudes towards protest, and then several filler measures. The next “study” was presented as a survey of students’ political attitudes and of their responses to a documentary detailing the “complexities” of international relations. As part of the cover story for the study and as a means of making (British) social identity salient, participants were informed that the survey was being carried out cross-culturally in the UK and India. Participants then checked a box beside their own national category (Indian or British). All participants indicated British nationality.

Participants then watched a 10-minute clip from the documentary “Stealing a Nation”. The film is a critical investigative report that details an ingroup transgression: the harsh expulsion of the Chagos islanders from their island home of Diego Garcia by the British (for details see http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-3667764379758632511). After viewing the film, participants completed the rest of the measures.

Pre-Film Measures

Protest SC-IAT. Following Karpinski and Steinman (2006), the protest SC-IAT consisted of two stages, each consisting of 24 practice trials. These trials were immediately followed by 72 test trials, comprising three blocks of 24 trials. Each trial presented a picture of the attitude object, protest, or a word representing one end of the evaluative dimension, good versus bad. Seven target pictures of protest were selected to show large numbers of people with placards and signs of different types. To ensure that the general idea of protest was activated, rather than a specific protest issue, the words and phrases on signs and banners were blurred with Adobe Photoshop. The 21
evaluative target words for each dimension were duplicated from Karpinski and Steinman (2006), and all target words were presented in lowercase.

In the first stage (protest + good), protest pictures and words with a “good” meaning (e.g., beautiful, marvelous, excellent) were categorized by pressing the $z$ key, and words with a bad meaning (e.g., horrible, gross, evil) were categorized by pressing the 2 key on the numeric keypad (right of the standard QWERTY keyboard). Protest pictures, good words, and bad words were presented in a 7:7:10 ratio to avoid response bias, resulting in 58% of correct responses on the $z$ key and 42% of the 2 key. In the second stage (protest + bad), good words were categorized by pressing the $z$ key, and protest pictures and bad words were categorized by pressing the 2 key. Protest pictures, good words, and bad words were presented in a 7:10:7 ratio, so that 42% of correct responses were on the $z$ key and 58% were on the 2 key. Within each category, pictures and words were chosen randomly without replacement. Each stage was preceded by a set of instructions specifying the dimension of categorization and the correct response key. Pictures and target words appeared in the centre of the screen, and category reminder labels were at the bottom of the screen. Participants were instructed to make their responses as quickly and accurately as possible.

Explicit measure of protest attitudes. On a feeling thermometer, participants were asked to indicate how negative or positive they felt about protest behavior, by moving the slider to somewhere between 0 (extremely negative) and 100 (extremely positive).

Post-Film Measures

Anger. We measured feelings of anger using two items taken from van Zomeren et al. (2004). Participants were asked how strongly they felt “angry,” and “furious” in relation to the collective grievance highlighted in the film ($r = .80$). Participants responded on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely).
**Political action tendencies.** Participants used a scale from 1 (very unwilling) to 7 (very willing) to indicate the extent to which they would be willing to perform several actions in support of the grievances of the Chagos islanders. The collective action items were derived from van Zomeren, et al. (2004): “send an email of protest to the government/MP,” “participate in a demonstration,” “help organize a petition,” “participate in raising our collective voice to stop this situation,” and “take part in efforts to raise awareness about the Chagos islanders case ($\alpha = .86$).

**Results and Discussion**

Means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations between all variables are reported in Table 3.1. The SC-IAT revealed that participants’ spontaneous evaluative associations with protest were significantly more negative than neutral, $t(98) = -6.82$, $p < .001$. In contrast, our explicit measure suggested that, on average, participants possessed a positive attitude towards protest, $t(98) = 3.21$, $p = .002$. This difference provides some preliminary support for the potential added value of implicit measures of protest attitudes. It hints that the implicit measure may be tapping evaluations that individuals may not always be willing or able to report and suggests some discriminant validity to the implicit-explicit distinction in this domain. Consistent with this view, the SC-IAT was only marginally correlated with the explicit measure (see Table 3.1). Differences between explicit and implicit measures of attitude are common in research on attitudes, and they may be partly attributable to differences in the semantic indicators of good-bad between the explicit and implicit measures (Fazio & Olson, 2003). Thus, a more important question is how both measures predict action tendencies. As shown in Table 3.1, both types of measure were correlated with political action tendencies, as was anger. To explore the direct and indirect effects of our attitude measures we specified the path model in Figure 3.1, which also shows the standardized paths, $R^2$, and model fit. The
analysis revealed significant positive paths from anger and the explicit measure of protest to political action tendencies. This suggests that attitudes towards protest predict action tendencies in the presence of anger. There was no significant path from the protest SC-IAT to action tendencies. However, there was a significant positive path from the protest SC-IAT to anger. In contrast, explicit measures of protest attitudes did not predict anger. This is consistent with the idea that automatic or Level 1 processes can be thought of as linked to emotion in some way (Evans, 2008; E. R. Smith & Neumann, 2005).

Table 3.1 Bivariate correlations, means and standard deviations for all measures (Study 1)

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<tr>
<td>1. Explicit protest (M = 56.63, SD = 20.57)</td>
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<td>2. Protest SC-IAT (M = -.21, SD = .30)</td>
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<td>3. Anger (M = 6.11, SD = .77)</td>
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<td>.21*</td>
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<td>4. Political action (M = 5.04, SD = 1.14)</td>
<td>.56***</td>
<td>.25*</td>
<td>.36***</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Analysis of indirect effects. In order to test whether the protest SC-IAT had indirect effects on political action tendencies via anger we carried out bootstrapping procedures (Shrout & Bolger, 2002). This involved generating 5000 random bootstrap samples with replacement from the data set (N = 99) and testing the model with these samples. This method does not depend upon a normal sampling distribution (Preacher & Hayes, 2004; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). The analysis revealed a significant indirect effect of SC-IAT, with a point estimate of .062 and a 95% BC (bias-corrected; see Efron, 1987) bootstrap confidence interval of .006 to .136. As expected, this demonstrates that more positive automatic protest attitudes were associated with greater levels of political action through increased levels of anger.
Study 2

The findings of Study 1 offer evidence that automatic processes may affect political action through their links to anger. In contrast, explicit measures of protest attitudes are not associated with anger, although they do predict political action tendencies in the presence of anger and implicit measures. We wanted to expand upon these results in three ways. First, Study 1 used pictures of protests as our attitude object. Although we blurred out particular semantic (protest) content of the pictures, it may be the case that these measures tapped automatic evaluations of crowds or large gatherings of people. Interpreting our results would be problematic if this were the case. Therefore, in this study we used protest words as our attitude object. Second, although we found that in contrast to explicit measures of protest attitudes, automatic attitudes seemed to be linked to emotion-based routes to protest (Van Zomeren et al., 2004), we cannot be sure what the general impact of deliberative vs. automatic processing is on political action. Therefore, in this study we manipulated type of processing through instructions to participants. Third, because Study 1 employed a novel (largely unheard of) ingroup transgression as the issue for political action, we wanted to test the predictive value of protest attitudes in a more standard context for collective action research. Therefore, we examined collective political action tendencies of group members who were facing...
disadvantage. More specifically, we examined the extent to which students endorsed political action aimed at addressing disadvantage caused by spending cuts to higher education and increased tuition fees.

Method

Participants and Procedure

Participants were 40 undergraduate students (10 men and 30 women; age: \( M = 22.55, \sigma = 3.24 \)) who received payment for participation. First, participants completed the protest SC-IAT and the explicit measure of protest attitudes. Next, participants were told that we were interested in their attitudes and feelings towards the recent cuts in higher education spending and the increases in university tuition fees. We manipulated type of processing by instructing participants in the controlled processing condition that, “In the questions that follow it is important that you think carefully and give your considered response to each question.” Participants in the automatic processing condition were told that, “… it is important that you give your initial intuitive response to each question.” Participants then went on to complete the measures of interest.

Measures

Protest SC-IAT. We employed the same attitude measures as in Study 1. However, we employed seven protest words (protest, demonstration, rally, march, petition, picket, strike), instead of protest pictures, as the stimuli for classification into the relevant categories.

Explicit measure of protest attitudes. We employed the same attitude measures as in Study 1.

Anger. We measured feelings of anger using the same items as Study 1 with the addition of two other items taken from van Zomeren et al. (2004). Participants were
asked how strongly they felt “angry,” “irritated,” “furious,” and “displeased” in relation to the decision to increase fees ($\alpha = .91$).

**Political action tendencies.** Employing the same political action measures as in Study 1 ($\alpha = .93$), participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they would be willing to perform several actions in order to stop the increase in tuition fees.

**Results and Discussion**

Means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations between all variables are reported in Table 3.2. As before, the SC-IAT revealed that, on average, participants held negative evaluative associations with protest, $t(39) = -3.17, p = .003$. In contrast, the explicit measure suggested a positive attitude towards protest, $t(39) = 2.90, p = .006$. Scores on the protest SC-IAT were positively associated with scores on the explicit measure of attitude toward protest. This was despite the smaller sample size in the present study, suggesting that using protest words, versus pictures, as the attitude object increases the relationship between implicit and explicit measures of protest.

To explore the direct and indirect effects of our attitude measures and processing manipulation we specified the path model in Figure 3.2, which also shows the standardized paths, $R^2$, and model fit. Replicating the results from Study 1, the analysis revealed significant positive paths from anger and the explicit measure of protest to

| Table 3.2 Bivariate correlations, means and standard deviations for all measures (Study 2) |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Explicit protest ($M = 60.42$, $SD = 22.78$) | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 2. Protest SC-IAT ($M = -.15$, $SD = .29$) | .33* | 1 | |
| 3. Anger ($M = 5.46$, $SD = 1.37$) | .10 | .32* | 1 |
| 4. Political action ($M = 5.07$, $SD = 1.35$) | .40* | .24 | .52** |

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

---

1 We tested whether the hypothesized model differed in fit across the processing conditions. Allowing the pathways to differ across groups did not reliably improve the overall model fit, $\Delta \chi^2 = 6.28, p = .616$, enabling us to include the processing manipulation in the full path model.
political action tendencies. Again, there was no significant path from the protest SC-IAT to action tendencies. However, as in Study 1, there was a significant positive path from the protest SC-IAT to anger, with a nonsignificant path between the explicit measure of protest attitudes and anger. In addition, there was a significant positive path from the processing manipulation to political action tendencies. This demonstrates that when participants received instructions to employ controlled (vs. automatic) processing they were more willing to engage in political action. However, the path between processing and anger was not significant. In other words, processing instruction had no effect on levels of anger. As in Study 1, we carried out bootstrapping procedures in order to test whether the protest SCIAT had an indirect effect on political action tendencies via anger. Replicating Study 1, the analysis revealed a significant indirect effect of SC-IAT, with a point estimate of .139 and a 95% BC bootstrap confidence interval of .007 to .362.

Taken together, our findings provide further evidence that automatic attitudes may impact political action by influencing emotion-pathways to action (Van Zomeren et al., 2004). In addition, we find support for our assumption that political action is a characteristically deliberative action. When people are encouraged to think carefully about group grievances they are more willing to take political action.
Figure 3.2. Path-analytic model: Influence of protest attitudes and processing on anger and political action tendencies with pathweights (* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001) and $R^2$. Nonsignificant paths are shown as broken arrows. Model fit: $\chi^2/df = .082$, GFI .998, AGFI .987, RMSEA .001

**Study 3**

While the results of Study 1 and 2 demonstrate that a dual process approach may add to current perspectives on political collective action, we wanted to test when automatic attitudes may be more directly linked with political action tendencies. Although there were significant indirect effects of automatic attitudes, through anger, there was no evidence in previous studies of direct links when other measures are controlled for. As mentioned earlier, a dual process approach to political action suggests that automatic and controlled processes can work in tandem to explain a social behavior (Evans & Frankish, 2009). We reasoned that automatic protest attitudes should predict political action tendencies when participants were low in motivation, opportunity and ability to engage in political issues (Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999). Although we did not find such an interaction in Study 2 (see footnote 1), given the somewhat small sample
size and the difficulty in manipulating motivation, opportunity and ability through basic instructions, we wanted to provide a better test of when automatic attitudes might predict political action. We reasoned that an individuals’ own rating of their general political engagement would provide us with a good potential moderator of automatic protest attitudes. Such that, those who felt more engaged in political issues should rely more on deliberative processes when deciding whether to protests a group grievance. In contrast, those with low political engagement should be more likely to let automatic processes shape their political behavior. Having examined anger in Study 1 and 2 we wanted to explore the relationship between protest attitudes (deliberate and automatic) and injustice and efficacy appraisals. This allowed us to test whether attitudes predicted political action independently of two “key” predictors of political action (cf. Van Zomeren et al., 2008).

Furthermore, a possible weakness in Study 1 and 2 is that the explicit measure of protest attitude was assessed with only one item. Therefore, in Study 3, we used five semantic differential items to measure protest attitudes more reliably. Third, as with much collective action research, Studies 1 and 2 did not employ any behavioral measure of protest. Therefore, Study 3 examined the effects of protest attitudes on behavior. Fourth, although no participants expressed any suspicion (in Study 1 or 2) regarding the possibility of a link between the attitude measures and the political action items, we wanted to minimize any potential for this, so we carried out two separate studies spaced out across a period of time. Given that longer periods of time between attitude measurement and behavioral observation lead to greater attitude-behavior inconsistency (Schwartz, 1978), separating out our attitude and behavior measures also provides a more conservative test of our hypotheses.
Method

Participants and Procedure

This study included 77 British undergraduate students (21 men and 56 women; age: \(M = 21.09, SD = 3.50\)) who received course credit for participation. All participants indicated British nationality when asked. Four participants failed to complete both parts of the study and, therefore, their data were excluded from all analyses. Participants followed the same procedure as in Study 1 with two exceptions. First, participants completed all protest attitude measures in an ostensibly separate study (Part 1). Following this (after an average of three days), participants completed the second study (Part 2), which involved watching the film and completing the measures of interest. Second, after completing the political action measures and receiving a partial debriefing, participants were informed that a local student human rights organization had left some information and a petition on the main notice board down the hall. They were told that they did not have to look at this information, but that it was necessary that they be informed about it. Participants then left the lab after being thanked for their participation. Participants were contacted later to inform them that the petition was bogus and were given the correct details of the human rights organization addressing the issue.

Pre-Film (Part I) measures

Protest SC-IAT. We implicitly measured protest attitudes using the same SC-IAT as in Study 1.

Explicit measure protest attitudes. We explicitly measured protest attitudes using five 7-point (-3 to +3) semantic differential items (\(\alpha = .85\)): ugly-beautiful, bad-good, unpleasant-pleasant, wise-foolish, awful-nice.

Post-Film (Part II) measures
Injustice. We measured perceived injustice with seven items derived from Gordijn, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, and Dumont (2006). Specifically, participants were asked to rate on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) how much they saw the situation described in the documentary as “unjust”, “moral” (reverse-coded), “fair” (reverse-coded), “harmless” (reverse-coded), “normal” (reverse-coded), “rational” (reverse-coded), and “prejudicial” (α = .85).

Efficacy. Two items (r = .85) from van Zomeren et al. (2004) were employed to measure efficacy: “I think together we are able to change this situation”, and “I think we are able to stop this from happening”. Participants responded using a 7-point scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).

Political engagement. Six items were used to measure the extent that individuals felt motivated and able to engage with political issues: “I take an interest in political issues and feel confident in comprehending them”, “I don’t understand these kinds of political issues” (reversed-coded), “When it comes to these kinds of things I am totally lost” (reversed-coded), “I don’t possess the kind of expertise needed to address these political issues” (reversed-coded), “I don’t feel ’qualified’ on these kinds of issues” (reversed-coded), and “These political things are too complex for someone like me to fully comprehend” (reversed-coded). Participants responded using a 7-point scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The internal consistency of the scale was satisfactory (α = .87).

Political action. We measured political action tendencies using 5 items: “send an email of protest to the government/MP”, “help organize a petition”, “donate money to the cause”, “do something together with others to stop this situation”, and “participate in raising our collective voice to stop this situation” (α = .87). Protest behavior was measured by checking whether or not participants signed the petition calling on the UK government to repatriate the islanders and pay them full reparations.
Results and Discussion

Means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations between all variables are reported in Table 3.3. A one-sample t-test revealed that participants spontaneously associated protest with more negative evaluations, \( t(72) = -3.31, p = .001 \). On average, the explicit measures of protest attitudes revealed evaluations that were not significantly different from the midpoint of the scale, \( t(72) = -1.46, p = .149 \). Scores on the protest SC-IAT were not significantly associated with the explicit measure of protest attitudes.

To explore the direct and indirect effects of our measures we specified the path model in Figure 3.3, which also shows the standardized paths, \( R^2 \), and model fit. The analysis revealed significant positive paths from injustice to political action tendencies. There was also a significant positive path from political action tendencies to signing the petition. The path between efficacy and political action tendencies was not significant. This suggests that whether advantaged group members feel that they can change a grievance suffered by an outgroup is not important to engaging in solidarity-based protest. In addition, there was a significant path from the protest SC-IAT x political engagement term to political action tendencies. To interpret the interaction, we performed simple slopes analysis of the protest SC-IAT at low and high levels of political engagement. As can be seen in Figure 3.4, when participants were low (-1 SD) in political engagement, the protest SC-IAT showed the predicted and significantly positive association with collective action tendencies \( (\beta = .31, p = .027) \). This finding is in line with our prediction that the automatic attitudes should play a larger role when people are not motivated and able to think about the issues. In contrast, the exact opposite pattern was found when participants were high (+1 SD) in political engagement \( (\beta = -.44, p = .012) \). This finding was not predicted and hints at the possibility that those who think of themselves as highly interested and competent in engaging with political issues may correct or overcorrect their automatically activated attitude towards protest (see Fazio &
Towles-Schwen, 1999; Wegener & Petty, 1995). For these individuals, there may be a feeling that they must override their “gut instincts” and take a more rational and politically sophisticated approach. Interestingly, there was no significant path between the protest SC-IAT and injustice. This could reflect the fact that we employed non-

Table 3.3 Bivariate correlations, means and standard deviations for all measures (Study 3)

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<td>(M = 5.79, SD = 0.89)</td>
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<td>2. Efficacy</td>
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<td>(M = 4.68, SD = 1.17)</td>
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<td>3. Explicit</td>
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<td>4. SC-IAT</td>
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<td>(M = -.15, SD = .38)</td>
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<td>5. Political engagement</td>
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<td>6. Political action</td>
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† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

affective measures of injustice in this study. As such, one might not expect to find a link between automatic protest attitudes and non-affective (vs. affective – i.e., anger, moral outrage) measures on injustice. In line with this interpretation, there is a marginally significant positive path between the explicit measure of protest attitudes and injustice.

As in Study 1 and 2, we carried out bootstrapping procedures in order to test for the indirect effects of our measures on our behavioral measure. The analysis revealed a significant indirect effect of injustice, with a point estimate of .108 and a 95% BC bootstrap confidence interval of .021 to .240. Furthermore, there was a significant indirect effect of the protest SC-IAT x political engagement term, with a point estimate of -.095 and a 95% BC bootstrap confidence interval of -.209 to -.016.

These results demonstrate the importance of protest attitudes for political action and extend our previous findings in several ways. First, these findings show that protest attitudes have predictive validity not only for collective political action tendencies but also for behavior. Second, these results show that implicit measures predict political action best under circumstances of low motivation and ability. In addition, we find
evidence that high motivation or ability may lead to the over correction for automatic “biases”. Third, our results show that protest attitudes have an independent effect on political action above and beyond injustice and efficacy (Van Zomeren et al., 2008).

Finally, the present study shows that measures of automatic protest attitudes taken days before reacting to a political issue still play a role in determining political action.

Figure 3.3. Path-analytic model: Influence of protest attitudes, political engagement, SC-IAT X political engagement, injustice, and efficacy on political action tendencies and signing a petition with pathweights (* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001) and $R^2$. Nonsignificant paths are shown as broken arrows. Model fit: $\chi/df = 1.378$, GFI .957, AGFI .845, RMSEA .072

Figure 3.4. Political action tendencies as a function of protest SC-IAT and political engagement
**General Discussion**

Across three studies we find evidence for the role of dual processes in political collective action. Specifically, we find that automatic attitudes towards protest can influence political action through emotion pathways (i.e., anger) to action (Van Zomeren et al., 2004). Rather than suggesting that protest action comes solely from automatic or controlled processes our data exemplifies how automatic and controlled processes can combine to explain political behavior. In addition to the predictive role of explicit measures of protest attitudes, it seems that careful deliberative thought in itself leads to increases in the willingness to engage in political action. In line with dual process accounts of social behavior (e.g., Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999), we find that when individuals perceive themselves as low in the motivation and ability to engage with political issues automatic protest attitudes may play an important role in predicting political action. This is even after the influence of injustice, efficacy, and explicit measures of protest attitudes are taken into account. Strikingly, our data demonstrate that individuals who are high in motivation and ability to engage with political issues may correct for their automatic protest bias.

Paralleling work with automatic racial attitudes, we find that these politically engaged individuals may actually over-correct for their bias (see Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999; Wegener & Petty, 1995). This finding is particularly interesting as it suggests that people may have some awareness of their automatic evaluations towards protest. Across three studies we consistently found that, on average, explicit measures towards protest revealed positive evaluations whereas implicit measures demonstrated negative evaluations. Taken together, these findings suggest that people may be “in two minds about protest”. On the one hand, they may espouse protest action as a sign of a healthy democracy. On the other hand, they may have negative automatic feelings regarding
protest. As such, one may have to overcome one’s automatic responses to protest action in order to engage in collective political action.

We find a predictive role for protest attitudes across very different political contexts involving ingroup (i.e., student) disadvantage and (international) solidarity-based protest resulting from ingroup transgressions towards an outgroup. Moreover, this predictive role is all the more impressive when you consider that the measures we employed tapped general attitudes towards protest. That is, we did not measure specific attitudes towards particular types of protest (e.g., human rights, student etc). A lack of specificity in the attitude-behavior measure reduces the predictive power of the attitude measures (Kraus, 1995). Future work would do well to explore the predictive role of more specific implicit and explicit measures of protest attitudes. On the basis of attitude research one might expect such specificity to increase the predictive power of attitudes. However, a more interesting possibility is that general (vs. more specific) attitude measures might turn out to be better predictors of political action, at least in terms of implicit measures. This counterintuitive notion is based on the possibility that evaluations of protest in general may better reflect ideological evaluations of what is, and what is not appropriate political behavior (Oliver & Johnston, 2000). This and other ideological aspects of political action have, hitherto, been largely neglected in social psychological work on collective political action (van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2010). Future work would do well to explore ideological attitudes associated with other political behaviors such as violent or “non-normative” political behavior (Wright, 2001b).

There are a number of issues that we are unable to address in the present article, but that we see as naturally stemming from a dual process approach to political action. First, while we have demonstrated that controlled, deliberative (vs. automatic) processing of intergroup grievances engenders willingness to take political action among disadvantaged group members, we cannot say whether this increase would apply to
solidarity-based action by advantaged group members. It may be the case that, given careful deliberation, advantaged group members may respond with solidarity in the face of outgroup grievances. Alternatively, deliberation may lead to more justification and downplaying of outgroup grievances (Leach et al., 2002). While our data support the notion that emotion is associated with Level 1 or automatic processes (Evans, 2008; E. R. Smith & Neumann, 2005), it is not clear exactly how automatic attitudes may influence emotion. Indeed, some authors have deliberately separated affect from evaluation (De Houwer & Hermans, 2010; although, see Amodio & Devine, 2006). Although reconciling this is beyond the scope of the present paper, we offer some suggestions for further exploration. First, one could consider automatic protest attitudes as individual differences or “person” factors that influence one’s appraisals (Lazarus, 1991). Although Lazarus was concerned with the way an individual’s conscious beliefs and goals influence their appraisals, there is no reason that these person factors could not include automatic attitudes. For instance, it may be the case that those with positive automatic protest attitudes have a tendency to make the other-responsibility appraisals that form one of the key appraisal components of anger (C. A. Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Moreover, automatic protest attitudes could reflect dispositional appraisal tendencies to react with anger (Lerner & Keltner, 2000). Those that have positive automatic responses to protest may be more likely to react with anger across time and situations. Future work would do well to explore these issues and whether there are associations between other automatic attitudes and emotions.

More generally, our findings suggest some provocative issues for those concerned with the applied aspects of social change and political participation. To the extent that liberal democracies are entrenched in a “culture of political avoidance” (Eliasoph, 1998) or institutionally encourage political apathy (De Luca, 1995), we might expect that an individual’s automatic attitude towards protest will guide their political
action. This is a potential concern when we consider that, on average, automatic evaluations of protest were negative despite the more positive picture painted by explicit measures. In addition, these negative automatic evaluations are likely to be linked to lower levels of anger over intergroup grievances. The negative associations may seem paradoxical given the (contemporary) high social esteem of protests and protestors (e.g., civil rights and Martin Luther King, Jr). However, research has demonstrated that protest is often portrayed negatively in the news media (Gitlin, 1980; McLeod & Hertog, 1992). In addition, social-psychological work has shown that those who stand up and rebel on the basis of moral principles may suffer resentment from others who have failed to take such stands (Monin, Sawyer, & Marquez, 2008). This poses difficult questions about the way socialization may engender or hinder political participation.

There is growing recognition that any social behavior can have determinants that are both automatic and controlled. By adopting a dual process perspective we have shown that this applies equally to political behavior. This recognition makes it important to better develop our understanding of the factors that shape our attitudes toward protest, and suggests that approaches encompassing dual processes and emotion can offer collective action researchers many opportunities for empirical and theoretical progress.
CHAPTER 4

Revolution, imagine that! Freedom dreams and social change goals*

Now that I look back with hindsight, my writing and the kind of politics to which I’ve been drawn have more to do with imagining a different future than being pissed off about the present. Not that I haven’t been angry, frustrated, and critical of the misery created by race, gender, and class oppression – past and present. That goes without saying. My point is that the dream of a new world, my mother’s dream, was the catalyst for my own political engagement. (Robin D. G. Kelley. Freedom Dreams: The Black Radical Imagination, 2002)

From the “Arab revolutions” to “Occupy Wall Street”, people across the globe are taking political action aimed at changing their society. Of course political action and social change is, itself, nothing new.

The last century saw the Russian Revolution, U.S. civil rights movement, and anti-Apartheid struggle in South Africa. Psychologists have suggested that anger at injustice, and the efficacy to bring about change, are two key psychological factors that engender such political actions. However, political action itself can be aimed at a broad range of disparate goals – from reform to revolution. Are actions aimed at radical social change (e.g., revolution) underpinned by fundamentally the same psychology as those aimed at more moderate changes (e.g., policy reform) to the system? We suggest that contemporary models of political action have failed to address the diversity of goals at which political action can be aimed. Drawing on classic approaches to political action and contemporary social thinkers, we suggest that the ability to imagine a particular social change goal is key to understanding when and where current models of political action

* This chapter is taken from Sweetman, J., Leach, C. W., Spears, R., & Pratto, F. P. (in preparation). Revolution, imagine that! Freedom dreams and social change goals.
can be applied. While contemporary models of political action may be able to account for action aimed at some social change goals (e.g., reform), we suggest that they may be less powerful when accounting for action aimed at other kinds of social change (e.g., revolution).

Anger and Efficacy Engender Political Action for What?

We all feel anger from time to time as a result of some injustice that we have suffered at the hands of another (Lazarus, 1991). In the political realm it may be that your government has failed to allow democratic participation for people like you or has ensured that the interests of the rich and powerful have priority over those of the general population. There is ample evidence that the resulting anger felt from these injustices engenders political action (H. J. Smith & Kessler, 2004; Van Zomeren et al., 2004). If people believe that their actions can produce desired outcomes they will also tend to take action (Bandura, 2000). For example, today people are faced with catastrophic climate change, but may still fail to act if they believe that our pooled efforts are unable to tackle the problem. This notion of collective efficacy has been repeatedly shown to predict engagement in political action (Klandermans, 2003; Van Zomeren et al., 2008; Van Zomeren et al., 2004).

The causal role of these psychological factors makes good intuitive sense. However, when we try to generalize these insights to examples of real world political action and social change, it becomes less clear whether these constructs apply to all types of political action. More specifically, do anger and efficacy engender political action regardless of what the action is aimed at achieving? A careful reading of the collective action literature suggests that our models are based primarily on examining political action aimed at reform or redress of a particular group grievance, whether this be through “normative” or “non-normative” means (Wright, 2001b; Van Zomeren et al., 2008; although, see Reicher & Haslam, 2006). Therefore, it is unclear how anger and
efficacy relate to political action aimed at other types of social change, such as overthrowing the political or economic system (“revolution”) or pooling group resources in order to out-compete outgroups. Drawing on work in mental simulation and the social psychology of goals, we argue 1) that the ability to imagine a social change goal, that is, having a clear “dream of a new world” in Robin Kelley’s words is a key component of engendering political action, 2) that one’s ability to visualize a particular social change goal may qualify when anger and efficacy get turned in action, and 3) that 2 will depend on the social change goal in question. That is, imagination may be more important when considering unusual or radical social change goals (e.g., revolution) vs. more typical and moderate ones (e.g., reform).

Imagination and Political Action

Humans may be unique in their ability for prospection – the ability to simulate the future by “pre-experiencing” it in our minds (Gilbert & Wilson, 2007). Imagination and the generation of alternative realities or “mental simulation” is a common factor in a complex array of neuro-, social-, developmental-, clinical-, and cognitive-psychological phenomena (for a review, see Markman et al., 2009). Although mental simulation has not played a central role in intergroup relations and political action, it is by no means entirely absent from theorizing. Building on theories of self-regulation (Higgins, 1987), recent work on group-based self-regulation looks at motivational processes in intergroup relations that included comparing “actual” ingroup-self (i.e., perceived state of the ingroup) with mental simulations of “ideal” or “ought” (obligations that the ingroup ought to fulfill) ingroup-selves (Sassenberg & Woltin, 2009; see also, Cinnirella, 1998).

In relation to collective political action, Referent cognitions theory (RCT: Folger, 1986, 1987) suggests that the more a person can imagine a superior or “higher referent outcome” the greater the level of relative deprivation (RD). In other words, if you can imagine your group as higher in the social hierarchy, you are more likely to feel RD and
more likely to take political action. Similarly, social identity theory’s (SIT) notion of “cognitive alternatives” implies the importance of imagining something other than the status quo in engendering collective political action (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). SIT suggests that the perceived stability and legitimacy of existing intergroup relations are the crucial factors in determining whether alternative intergroup relations are conceivable. However, the notion of cognitive alternatives has been taken for granted and thus has not been translated into a concrete suggestion of how the imagination of alternatives to existing intergroup relations is important. Perhaps this is because some scholars have confused legitimacy, stability, and efficacy with cognitive alternatives.

In one of the only studies to explicitly operationalize cognitive alternatives, Reicher and Haslam (2006) measured cognitive alternatives with four items, “I cannot imagine the relationship between guards and prisoners being any different (reverse-scored),” “I think that the guards will always have more privileges than the prisoners (reverse-scored),” “I think that the relationship between guards and prisoners is likely to change,” “I think that it would be possible for the prisoners to have more power than the guards.” We suggest that these measures tap stability, efficacy, and the general appraisal that some alternative exists. This is valuable in itself and the authors’ general findings support the SIT proposition that the presence of cognitive alternatives should engender political action (Reicher & Haslam, 2006). What we are concerned with here is what type of cognitive alternative is being imagined (the content of cognitive alternatives) and how easy it is to picture such an alternative or what we call “social change goal.” Our key point is that what is imagined is an important part of imagination and should affect how political action is predicted.

There are many ways in which imagination may play a role in engendering political action. For instance, work on the simulation heuristic has famously demonstrated that people determine the likelihood of an event based on how easy it is to
picture mentally (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). This suggests that the ease of imagining particular social change goals (e.g., revolution vs. reform) is likely to influence the likelihood of taking political action for that goal. We call this the simulation hypothesis. Specifically, we expect that the easier that people find it to imagine a particular social change goal the more likely they are to engage in political action aimed at achieving that goal. In addition, it is possible that imagination may also qualify how well classic predictors (of political action) like anger and efficacy (Van Zomeren et al., 2004) predict political action. We call this the qualification hypothesis. Specifically, we expect that imagination is more likely to qualify the role of established political action predictors when considering social change goals that are hard to imagine, for instance, those that have not been previously experienced or are based only on logical possibility as opposed to past experiences (see Folger, 1987).

The Present Research

We aim to test the notion that imagination plays a fundamental role in political action and social change. More specifically, our simulation and qualification hypotheses suggest that both the eases of imagining social change goals and the content of those goals (e.g., reform vs. revolution) should play an important role in the social psychology of political action. Our approach adds to current perspectives on political action and social change in two key ways. First, a focus on the goal of political action means that we are able to examine the adequacy of anger and efficacy to account for political action aimed at goals that social psychology has hitherto ignored (e.g., revolution). Second, focusing on the imagination of such goals allows us to explore how mental simulation may be applied to political action. We tested our ideas by examining the role of anger and efficacy, and imagination in predicting political action aimed at collective mobility, that is, out-competing an outgroup (Study 1), and amelioration (redress from authority for ingroup disadvantage) and revolution (Study 2).
Study 1

In the present study we examined the role of imagination, efficacy, and anger in predicting political action tendencies aimed at collective mobility (Derks, Van Laar, & Ellemers, 2009). We explored this in the context of economic intergroup relations (i.e., class). In other words, we wanted to examine the role of imagination, efficacy, and anger in group members’ willingness to collectively build the economic power of the ingroup.

Method

Participants and Procedure

Participants were 117 undergraduate students (39 men and 78 women; age: $M = 20.11, SD = 1.45$) who received course credit for participation. The study was presented as a survey of people’s thoughts about the financial crises and economic inequality. Participants read that there are sharp divides across social class groups, with the super-rich increasingly pulling away from both the middle and working class on a host of economic indicators. All participants indicated their class as either working, middle, or super rich. Participants then went on to complete a number of filler items and then the anger and efficacy items. Following this, participants were told that, “Some groups and individuals are advocating for collective advancement in the economic system... These Economic Advancement Campaigns (EAC) are aimed at members of the (working/middle class) developing their communities in order to maximize their potential for economic progress. EAC is based on bringing members of the class together in order to use collective strength, expertise, and social capital in order to improve the economic prospects of the class as a whole.” Participants then rated the social change goal of increasing the economic power of the ingroup.

Nearly all participants identified as middle class. Only three identified as working class. We included all these participants in our analyses. Removing the three working class participants made no difference to the results.
Measures

*Anger.* We measured feelings of anger using four items taken from van Zomeren et al. (2004). Participants were asked how strongly they felt “angry,” “irritated,” “furious,” and “displeased” in relation to the economic inequality described ($\alpha = .91$). Participants responded on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 7 (*extremely*).

*Efficacy.* We measured efficacy with eight items ($\alpha = .74$), “I think together my group is able to improve its economic situation,” “I think we are able to stop this economic inequality from continuing,” “I think together we are able to change the economic system,” “I feel like my group just isn't able to improve its economic situation (reverse-coded),” “I feel like our group is capable of forcing the government to give us an equal chance to prosper.” “I don't think we can stop the class based inequalities in our economic system (reverse-coded),” “We cannot change the economic system (reverse-coded),” “The government will not listen to my economic class (reverse-coded),” Participants responded using a 7-point scale running from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*).

*Imagination.* Participants were asked, “How easy is this proposal to imagine.” Participants indicated the ease of imagining the social change goal on a feeling thermometer running from 0 (*extremely hard*) to 100 (*extremely easy*).

*Political action tendencies.* Participants used a scale from 1 (*very unwilling*) to 7 (*very willing*) to indicate the extent to which they would be willing to perform several actions to support proposal ($\alpha = .94$). The political action items were derived from van Zomeren et al. (2004): “send an email of protest to the government/MP,” “participate in a demonstration,” “help organize a petition,” “participate in some form of collective action to stop this situation,” “donate money to the cause,” “do something together with others to stop this situation,” and “participate in raising our collective voice to stop this situation.”
Results and Discussion

Means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations between all variables are reported in Table 4.1. To test our main hypotheses, we centred our variables and conducted a multiple regression that entered anger, efficacy, imagination, and all interaction terms as simultaneous predictors of political action tendencies. Results revealed that efficacy ($\beta = .23, p = .017$) and imagination ($\beta = .23, p = .022$) both uniquely predicted greater political action tendencies for collective mobility. Surprisingly, anger did not uniquely ($\beta = .06, p = .543$) predict political action tendencies. However, this was qualified by a significant anger x imagination interaction ($\beta = .20, p = .040$). As shown in Figure 4.1, simple slopes analysis of the interaction revealed that, when participants found it hard (-1 SD) to imagine the proposal, anger showed no significant association with political action tendencies ($\beta = -.14, p = .308$). However, when participants found it easy (+1 SD) to imagine the social change goal, anger showed a positive association with political action tendencies ($\beta = .25, p = .051$). There were no other significant interaction effects ($p > .05$). These findings are in line with our expectations that imagination plays an important role in political action aimed at social change. In this case, anger’s well-documented relationship with political action (H. J. Smith & Kessler, 2004; Van Zomeren et al., 2004) is qualified by being able to easily imagine the social change goal itself. In other words, anger does not predict action for collective mobility (Derks et al., 2009) unless one can imagine the goal that action is aimed at achieving.

Table 4.1. Bivariate correlations, means and standard deviations for all measures (Study 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anger ($M = 4.66, SD = 1.30$)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficacy ($M = 4.53, SD = 1.07$)</td>
<td>.17†</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imagination ($M = 54.79, SD = 20.08$)</td>
<td>-.16†</td>
<td>.23*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political action ($M = 3.95, SD = 1.53$)</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.33*</td>
<td>.24*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Study 2

In the present study we wanted to build on the findings from Study 1 in two main ways. First, although imagination played a role in action aimed at collective mobility (out-competing an outgroup), we wanted to see if this was also the case when political action is aimed at the prototypical form of social change, amelioration – seeking redress from authority for a group disadvantage. Second, as theorized, we expected imagination to be particularly important in radical social change goals. Therefore, we examined the role of imagination, efficacy, and anger in predicting political action tendencies aimed at both reforming (amelioration) and replacing (revolution) the economic system.

Method

Participants and Procedure

Participants were 106 adults (31 men and 79 women; age: $M = 45.57, SD = 10.31$) who participated as part of a marketing research reward scheme. The study was presented in the same way as Study 1. However, this time participants read about and

\[ \dagger p < .10, \; * p < .05, \]

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**Figure 4.1.** Political action tendencies as a function of anger and imagination (Study 1). High and low equals +1 SD and –1SD, respectively.
rated two proposals for social change. Regarding the goal of reform, participants were told that, “Some groups and individuals are advocating for reform of the economic system in the country… These Economic Reform Campaigns (ERC) put forward a host of new economic policies aimed at eliminating any barriers that may stop members of the (working/middle class) from competing on fair terms. ERC is based on reforming any institutional factors (e.g., policies, laws) that may be holding back the economic advancement of the class as a whole.” (i.e., amelioration of disadvantage). Regarding the goal of revolution, participants were told that, “Some groups and individuals are advocating for an alternative economic system for the whole of the country. This would involve the end of the present system. One such system that has been put forward is Participatory Economics (PARECON). Parecon is based on certain institutions (i.e., norms, customs, laws and organizations) that it claims are central to attaining economic equality across economic classes.”

Measures

Anger. We measured feelings of anger using the same items as in Study 1 (\(\alpha = .94\)).

Efficacy. We measured efficacy with same items as in Study 1 (\(\alpha = .75\)).

Imagination. We measured how easy the two proposals were to imagine using the same items as in Study 1.

Political action tendencies. We measured political action tendencies for amelioration (\(\alpha = .96\)) and revolution (\(\alpha = .96\)) using the same items as in Study 1.

Results and Discussion

Means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations between all variables are reported in Table 4.2. To test our main hypotheses, we centred our variables and conducted a series of multiple regressions that entered anger, efficacy, imagination
(specific to social change goal), and all interaction terms as simultaneous predictors of each political action tendency. Results revealed that efficacy ($\beta = .20, p = .033$), anger ($\beta = .35, p < .001$), and imagination of amelioration ($\beta = .29, p = .002$) uniquely predicted political action tendencies for amelioration (reform). None of the interactions were significant ($ps > .05$). When it comes to the prototypical social change goal (of amelioration), imagination does not qualify the role of anger or efficacy. Rather, imagination uniquely predicts political action in the presence of both anger and efficacy. Thus, accounting for the ease of imagining ameliorative social change helps predict the willingness to act to bring it about, above and beyond the factors typically examined in research on political action (Van Zomeren et al., 2004).

In terms of social change through revolution, results revealed that efficacy ($\beta = .15, p = .054$), anger ($\beta = .44, p < .001$), and imagination ($\beta = .38, p < .001$) uniquely predicted political action tendencies. However, this was qualified by a significant efficacy x imagination interaction ($\beta = .18, p = .022$). As shown in Figure 4.2, simple slopes analysis revealed that, when participants found it hard (-1 SD) to imagine an alternative economic system, efficacy showed no significant association with political action tendencies ($\beta = -.01, p = .840$). However, when participants found it easy (+1 SD) to imagine revolution, efficacy showed a positive association with political action tendencies ($\beta = .33, p = .005$). These findings are in line with our expectations that imagination should play an important role in political action aimed at more radical forms of social change. In this case, if one is unable to imagine an alternative economic system then the ability to bring about this kind of social change is not associated with action.
### Table 4.2 Bivariate correlations, means and standard deviations for all measures (Study 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Mean (M)</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Correlation with Anger</th>
<th>Correlation with Efficacy</th>
<th>Correlation with Amelioration Imagination</th>
<th>Correlation with Revolution Imagination</th>
<th>Correlation with Amelioration Political Action</th>
<th>Correlation with Revolution Political Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anger</td>
<td>4.66</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficacy</td>
<td>4.53</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amelioration Imagination</td>
<td>5.47</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolution Imagination</td>
<td>5.47</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>0.19†</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.37*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amelioration Political Action</td>
<td>3.95</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>0.39*</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.34*</td>
<td>0.33*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolution Political Action</td>
<td>3.95</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>0.53*</td>
<td>0.17†</td>
<td>0.34*</td>
<td>0.48*</td>
<td>0.80**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

† *p < .10, * *p < .05,

**Figure 4.2. Political action tendencies as a function of anger and imagination (Study 1). High and low equals +1 SD and – 1SD, respectively**

### General Discussion

Across two studies we have demonstrated that mental simulation – the ease with which changes in intergroup relations can be imagined – plays an important role in engendering a willingness to engage in political action for social change. When political action is aimed at prototypical social change (amelioration), we find that imagination...
uniquely predicts political action tendencies, independent of anger and efficacy. The easier amelioration of disadvantage is to imagine the more willing people are to engage in political action aimed at this goal. This finding suggests that imagination adds unique predictive power to current models of collective action (Van Zomeren et al., 2004). However, when political action is taken for less prototypical social change goals, we find that imagination qualifies the role of anger (in the case of collective mobility) and efficacy (in the case of revolution). In both of these cases imagination moderates the relationship between established predictors and action tendencies. This finding is key because it highlights how important it is to consider the goal of political action when developing models of political action. Anger and efficacy may not be enough in themselves to engender action. Rather, these established predictors may be qualified by the goal of political action and the ease with which this goal can be imagined. In short, we find support for both our simulation and qualification hypotheses.

As suggested above, contemporary approaches to collective political action (e.g., Klandermans, 2003; Van Zomeren et al., 2008; Van Zomeren et al., 2004) tacitly assume that the predictors of action are the same regardless of the social change goal that political action is aimed at achieving. Here we have examined the role of efficacy, anger, and imagination in engendering political action aimed at three different social change goals (collective mobility, amelioration, and revolution). Our findings suggest that the goal of political action does influence the psychological predictors of action. One cannot assume that the psychology behind reform is exactly the same as that underpinning action for revolution. Our findings suggest that imagination uniquely predicts action aimed at all three social change goals. In addition, it moderates the relationship between anger and political action for collective mobility. Imagination also moderates the relationship between efficacy and political action for revolution. As such, imagination influences both “emotion-focused” (anger) and “problem-focused” (efficacy) pathways
to political action (Van Zomeren et al., 2004). First, imagination of the social change goal may be necessary for anger to have its motivational influence. That is, while anger is certainly related to general forms of offensive intergroup behavior (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000), the imagination of social change goals for the group may help to channel this anger into more tailored and specific goal-based actions (Lazarus, 1991). In other words, when one is trying to address group inequality through consolidating group resources and skills in order to outcompete the outgroup (collective mobility), imagining this alternative helps channel the basic action/attack tendencies associated with anger (Lazarus, 1991) into particular political action. In the case of the revolution goal, imagination of the social change goal is also necessary for efficacy to have its positive association with political action for a new economic system (i.e., revolution). The ability to change disadvantage will only predict action for revolution if one can easily picture that social change goal. This finding extends the SIT notion of cognitive alternatives by reemphasizing the importance imagination (Reicher & Haslam, 2006; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and introducing the notion that the specific content of imagination is fundamental to explaining political action.

That said, in evaluating the present contribution we must consider several conceptual and methodological issues our work raises. First, our data are correlational and as such we are unable to infer that imagination causes action tendencies. In line with work on goals and motivational science we would argue that imagining a goal should come prior to action tendencies (Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007; Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996). Second, although we have shown that imagination may play an important role in predicting political action for different types of social change, we do not believe that mental simulation of a social change goal will always plays a role in political action. For instance, people may take action for non-instrumental reasons such as expressing one’s individual or group identities and values (e.g., Drury & Reicher, 2005; Hornsey et al.,
Here work on social identity and ideology may suggest fruitful avenues for research. For instance, one role of “identity entrepreneurs” may be to facilitate the imagination of alternatives to the status quo (Reicher & Haslam, 2006; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; see also, Folger, 1987).

Third, a critic may ask whether our operationalization of imagination is simply another way of measuring efficacy or the (related) SIT notion of stability? It is worth noting that our measures of imagination showed only low levels of association with efficacy. Indeed, in Study 1 imagination was not significantly correlated with efficacy. More generally, imagination seems to have basic construct validity: having the strength to change is not quite the same as imagining a goal/change. In any case, all our models included both imagination and efficacy measures, and as such we are confident that imagination plays a unique role in political action. Fourth, one might ask how a social change goal is different from a cognitive alternative. We suggest that social change goals help to give some specificity or content to cognitive alternatives, and we have demonstrated that this is important in explaining political action. In addition, from a SIT perspective, imagining the goal (of change broadly) is theorized to follow on from appraisals of legitimacy and stability, and is thus an outcome of those appraisals. Whereas our treatment of social change goals suggests that imagination can also precede them, or more generally act somewhat independently in parallel. Future work would do well to explore the temporal nature of these processes.

Finally, across our studies imagination was focused specifically on a particular social change goal (e.g., collective mobility) whereas our measures of anger and efficacy were general in nature. This reflects how efficacy, anger, and cognitive alternatives have been measured and conceptualised in previous work (e.g., Reicher & Haslam, 2006; Van Zomeren et al., 2004). Therefore, one might be able to explain our findings in terms of greater measurement specificity between predictor and criterion variables (Kraus, 1995).
Although this could account for our findings supporting our simulation hypothesis, it is less clear how it might account for our qualification hypothesis. Future work would do well to examine efficacy for particular social change goals in addition to imagination for these and more general cognitive alternatives. It may be that general and specific efficacy and imagination can be seen as complements to understanding political action.

In the present research we have attempted to place imagination and social change goals at the heart of political action. We have challenged the assumption that the psychology underpinning one social change goal is identical to that behind action for another. It is striking that although tacitly mentioned in early theories (SIT and RCT) researchers have failed to give a developed account of the role of imagination and “dreams” that members of oppressed groups have dreamt, advocated, and died for. Much more remains to be done, but we hope that this contribution spurs on the imagination of our fellow social scientists.
Conclusions, limitations, and future prospects

Works are of value only if they give rise to better ones. (William Von Humboldt, *a letter to Charles Darwin*, 1839)

In this thesis I have drawn on current developments in the social psychology of emotion, automaticity, and mental simulation in order to add to current perspectives on political action and social change. As such, my approach has been eclectic both theoretically and methodologically. Separately, these efforts represent three independent programs of research each with its own message, and each situated in a broader area of social psychological knowledge. Taken together, they point towards three general conclusions. First, political action and social change are inherently emotional. That is, one could easily conceptualise the moral emotions (Haidt, 2003; Prinz & Nichols, 2010) as the “political emotions”; something that has not escaped political scientists in the social movement scholarship (Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2001; Jasper, 1998). This idea is also consistent with our second conclusion; automatic processes may shape the way we think about and respond to political issues. Here automatic, unintended, and uncontrolled social cognition may influence what is a characteristically deliberative behavior (i.e., political action). This conclusion could all too easily lead to a view of political action and social change, or the lack thereof, as inevitable, automatic processes that are devoid from human agency and free will (see Jost, Pietrzak, Liviatan, Mandisodza, & Napier, 2008). This relates to an ideology in social psychological theorising that sees conformity and the maintenance of the status quo as default psychological phenomena (see Haslam & Reicher, 2006; Reicher & Haslam, 2006; Turner, 2006). This is not a view that I hold, and it is not, more importantly, one that the data support. The dual process approach to political action that I have taken here suggests that both
automatic and controlled processes play a role in the social behaviors that determine social change or maintenance. As our final conclusion makes clear, human agency, deliberative thought, and “freedom dreams” are very much at the heart of a social psychology of political action and social change; the human capacity to imagine alternative social orders or realities may be one of the most important factors determining political action and social change. Moreover, the ability to imagine or to “have a dream” qualifies how factors like emotion and efficacy affect political action.

Taken together, these conclusions raise several issues, questions, and areas for future work. Rather than repeating the discussion from Chapters 2-4, I will use the remaining space to point towards future work that follows logically from the main conclusions and limitations of the thesis. First, in Chapter 2 we found that competence and legitimate status engendered admiration, and that admiration towards dominant parties and authority inhibited progressive political action aimed at social change. However, we found that when admiration was targeted at subversive “heroes” it engendered action aimed at progressive social change. Nevertheless, we did not examine the antecedents of this type of admiration. Although appraisal theories of emotion suggest that the appraisal components of admiration should be the same in both cases (Lazarus, 1991), it may be the case that legitimacy or moral excellence played more of a role in eliciting emotion in the case of the subversives. This may follow given that Chinese protestors where not effective in bring about democracy in China. In this sense they were not competent (or sufficiently powerful). However, confronting a tank with one’s bare hands may lead to admiration because of the virtuous and moral aspects of one’s actions. As such, it may be moral excellence that is driving this admiration (Haidt & Algoe, 2004). Future work would do well to explore whether different antecedents of admiration have different predictive power when it comes to specific types of action.

Second, given that imagination of social change goals can qualify the affect of anger and efficacy on political action, could they also qualify the role of automatic attitudes? Future
work would do well to explore this. One might expect that if imagination leads to motivation for social change then automatic attitudes may play less of a role in predicting political action when people can (vs. cannot) imagine an alternative social order. In addition, future work would do well to explore whether the relationship between political action and moral emotions, automatic attitudes, and social change goals vary as a function of the type of political action. For instance, perhaps moral emotions are more important in predicting “non-normative” vs. “normative” political actions (Wright, 2001b). While I have shown that automatic protest attitudes are associated with anger over group grievances, it would be interesting to examine whether protest attitudes influence sympathy and admiration. Such efforts may help to highlight how such automatic attitudes influence emotion. It may be the case that automatic attitudes have to be conceptually relevant to influence an emotion. For example, it could be the case that automatic attitudes towards power, status, competence, warmth, and morality could predict admiration towards authorities and subversives. This line of reasoning fits with appraisal tendencies approaches (Lerner & Keltner, 2000).

Finally, in Chapter 4 we developed the notion of social changes goals to add specificity to the SIT’s cognitive alternatives and demonstrated the utility of such an approach. However, one very big question remains; what gets people to adopt or imagine a particular social change goal like revolution or collective mobility in the first place? And how does this relate to automaticity and emotion? In what follows I develop a typology of social change goals in order to sketch out a conceptual answer to these questions. I hope that this typology will serve to focus interests on different types of social change goal.

**Towards a typology of social change goals**

Here we put forward a typology that orders cognitive alternatives to the status quo along three dimensions: *system perception, social value efficacy*, and desired *inclusiveness.*

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* This section is taken from Sweetman, J., Leach, C. W., Spears, R., Saab, R., & Pratto, F. P. (in preparation). “I have a dream”: A typology social change goals
More specifically, we propose that these dimensions guide psychological endorsement of different social change goals and the willingness to pursue them (political action). Put simply, our typology answers three basic questions regarding social change: what, how, and who? Firstly, what can be done to increase social value in the present system? Here the answer is either something (efficacy) or nothing (inefficacy). Secondly, how is/should social value be distributed? Our answer to this is fairly (legitimate) or unfairly (illegitimate)/differently (alternative). Who is the social change for? Here the answer could range from just us (exclusive) to all of us (inclusive). System perception, social value efficacy, and desired inclusiveness are combined in the typology depicted in Figure 5.1. Below we describe each of the dimensions in our typology of social change goals.

**System perception**

Our typology (see Figure 5.1) suggests that perceptions of the system as legitimate or illegitimate and perceiving that alternative systems are possible are likely to influence the social change goal that is endorsed. Although the concept of system appears in intergroup relations theorizing (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) it is, like social change, rarely defined. Here we refer to a system as a plurality of individuals and groups interacting in some social sphere of life that has a set of institutions and procedures regulating it. In this sense we may speak of the economic, political, kinship, and cultural (sub)systems each made up of concrete (corporations, government, marriage, organized religion) and more abstract (economic, political, family, and ethic/religious norms and values) institutions and relations (Merton, 1957; Parsons, 1951). Therefore, the perceived legitimacy of the system relates closely to notions of “procedural fairness” (Lind & Tyler, 1988) or legitimate “instrumentalities” or means in which social value (the material and symbolic things that people strive for) is obtained (Folger, 1986, 1987). This is similar though distinct from SIT’s notion of legitimacy.
where group members consider how legitimate their position in the status hierarchy is. This notion of legitimacy may entail both procedural and distributive (outcome-based) fairness that are worth distinguishing. For instance, work on perceptions of (market-based) capitalist economic systems has shown how people can accept individual and group-based inequities (i.e., outcomes) because they find the use of markets to make economic allocations a legitimate procedure (system) for determining who receives what in society (Tyler, 2006). Therefore, a group may find its position at the bottom of the social hierarchy unfair but may still perceive the means by which it got there as legitimate (see also Folger, 1987). Thus, it is the perceived legitimacy of the system that we suggest is likely to influence the type of social change goal that group members endorse.

When group members perceive the system as legitimate they are likely to pursue social change goals that emphasize only the ingroup’s responsibility in determining the status quo as opposed to “external” unfair procedures, or outgroup actions. Here social change is seen as dependent on the group’s collective efforts within the current system. However, when the system is seen as illegitimate group members may challenge the application of institutional power and its rules. Here they may petition authority or outgroups to live up to common rules, norms, and values or demand the addition of new rules, procedures, and institutions to increase the group’s potential for social value (Simon & Klandermans, 2001).

Our conceptualization of system is important when considering the perception of an “alternative” system – something necessary in our treatment of revolution as a social change goal. Our definition requires that alternative institutions or “means” (of acquiring social value) be imagined (Merton, 1957), as opposed to just any alternative way of organizing intergroup relations (Reicher & Haslam, 2006; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Whereas seeing intergroup relations as illegitimate and/or unstable may lead to group members forming cognitive alternatives, we suggest that cognitive alternatives about
alternative intergroup relations (e.g., fairer, more equal etc) may be distinct from perceiving an alternative system. Unlike general cognitive alternatives, perceiving an alternative system means imagining a set of institutions and means of doing what is necessary for social life (Albert et al., 1986; Merton, 1957).

This view could be considered “functionalist”, and to be perfectly clear it is. Paying attention to the things that need to be done to sustain social life (e.g., production, allocation, consumption, sexual relations, socialisation, family, dispute resolution, legislation, sense of collective identity, meaning, history and shared future etc.) is not the same as legitimizing the particular way that it is done presently. While a functional account can lend itself to the legitimization of the present institutions or means for accomplishing necessary human tasks and needs (e.g., Parsons, 1951), it need not. As Merton (1957) pointed out, there are always alternative ways to fulfil human needs. Indeed, radical social theorists have suggested that it is the way (e.g., institutions) in which we accomplish the fulfilment of some of these human needs that leads to the group-based inequality and oppression that irk us (Albert, 2002a, 2002b; Albert et al., 1986). We argue that a failure to take this functional aspect seriously leads to grave problems for those concerned with social equality. An excellent example of this is seen in Riecher and Haslam’s (2006) BBC prison study. The authors elegantly demonstrate how cognitive alternatives lead to progressive social change (“resistance”). However, what this study also shows is that without imagining a set of institutions (i.e., means or ways of doing what needs to be done) that make up an alternative system, cognitive alternatives can easily end up descending into another group-based hierarchy (“tyranny”). This point about the functional or institutional/system side of group-based oppression cannot be understated.

When an alternative system is perceived group members are likely to endorse social change goals that involve implementing a fundamentally new set of institutions and rules (i.e., system). Viewing the system as illegitimate and perceiving an alternative
system are closely related. On the one hand, calling for new rules (e.g., anti-discrimination legislation) may seem very similar to implementing an alternative system. How fundamentally different alternative institutions have to be to constitute an alternative system, as opposed to a reformed system, is often a tricky judgment to make (Pettee, 1938). For instance, the difference between reform and revolution is, in practice, not always clear-cut. A revolution (alternative system) may be won through a series of meaningful reforms (Albert, 2002b). Indeed, real-life social change is not as discrete as our typology might suggest. However, our aim here is to account for the psychological endorsement of different social change goals, not to explain how processes of objective social change occur – a much more ambitious task that would involve many other social sciences. One thing worth noting is that we do not think of our typology of social change goals as being static. Rather group members may change their goals over time as circumstances and appraisals change; something we will return to later.

**Social value efficacy**

The degree to which group members believe that their social value can be improved by collective efforts *within the current social system* is an important determinant of the social change goal they will endorse. This notion of perceived collective *efficacy* or “group efficacy” is arguably the primary instrumental explanation of collective political action, with the idea being that people will tend to engage more in action when they perceive that action as likely to bring about change (Klandermans, 1997; Van Zomeren et al., 2008; Van Zomeren et al., 2004). What is important to notice in our treatment of efficacy is that it refers to the perceived capacity for achieving social value *within* the current system. As such, this dimension usefully distinguishes those imagined alternatives that appeal to the possibility that a group can progress in the current system (see top row in Figure 5.1) and those that either change that which is of social value itself
or the procedures (i.e., system) for achieving social value (see bottom row in Figure 5.1). In contrast, one would expect general notions of efficacy (the general ability to change things) not to distinguish between such social change goals.

**Inclusiveness**

The third dimension important to determining support for particular social change goals is the desired inclusiveness of social change. This determines whose needs, desires, and well-being (i.e., social value) count as well as whose do not. Put simply, inclusiveness reflects whom the social change is for. That is, it answers the question of whose (i.e., which group’s) social value is to be increased. In this way, inclusiveness specifies the moral community or “scope of justice” (Opotow, 2001). In most cases social change is aimed at improving the social value of some disadvantaged group. Here the scope of social change is restricted or what we term exclusive. This is the case with 5 out of 7 of our imagined alternatives. However, the scope of social change can be more inclusive, that is, aimed at improving the situation of all or most subgroups within the social system. Although inclusiveness has a moral aspect to it, it can also be strategic or instrumental. With limited resources or other contextual factors it may be the case that social change, in the first instance, needs to be exclusive (Opotow, 2001). However, strategic consideration (i.e., who you need to effect social change) may mean that inclusiveness is increased. Here more inclusive social categorizations or higher levels (superordinate) of self-categorization (Turner, 1987; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994) will be utilized in order to influence the way people appraise the status quo and their collective interests. This inclusiveness in terms of salient social identities is a central part of action for social change and reflects the dynamic nature of social identity processes (e.g., Reicher, 2004; Turner, 2005). This process of defining who constitutes the “we” is of course at the same time exclusive, we simply use the distinction to
describe the inclusiveness of social change relative to a common ingroup or social system.

To repeat, our typology answers three basic questions regarding social change: 1) what can be done to increase social value in the present system? Here the answer is either something (efficacy) or nothing (inefficacy); 2) how is/should social value be distributed? Fairly (legitimate) or unfairly (illegitimate)/differently (alternative); and 3) who is the social change for? “Just us” (exclusive) or “all of us” (inclusive). These dimensions are combined in the typology depicted in Figure 5.1. Below we describe each of the social change goals according to our typology and the emotions that characterize them.
Collective mobility

Through group unity determination and creative endeavor, they have gained it... This is exactly what we must do... We must use every constructive means to amass economic and political power... Through the pooling of such resources and the development of habits of thrift and techniques of wise investment, the Negro will be doing his share to grapple with his problem of economic deprivation. If Black Power means the development of this kind of strength within the Negro community, then it is a quest for basic, necessary, legitimate power. (Martin Luther King, Jr. Where Do We Go From Here, 1968)

Collective mobility refers to a picture of the future in which groups are able to advance through ingroup cooperation, hard work and participation within the current system. As such, it is characterized by perceiving the system as legitimate, although this does not necessarily involve any endorsement of the group’s current position in the social hierarchy. Collective mobility in some way resembles a group-meritocracy where group members perceive the efficacy or opportunity to progress as a group in the current system (Derks et al., 2009). This is similar to, although distinct from, SIT’s notion of individual mobility (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Collective mobility is an social change goal for the group as a whole as opposed to individual mobility, which is based on exit from the group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). As the MLK quote suggests, collective mobility is often associated with the belief that outgroups have increased their social value by skill, cooperation, and hard work. As in the case of “Black economics” group members can compete (with outgroups) within the social system to try and advance their group’s position (Karenga, 1993). This type of imagined social change is characterized by a lack of an alternative system; therefore the goal in the Black economics context would be an
increase in Black capitalists and middle class as opposed to the implementation of some alternative economic system.

As implied in the name “Black economics”, group mobility as a social change goal is relatively exclusive in relation to the society as a whole. That is, it is aimed at the advancement of a particular subgroup as opposed to other subgroups (e.g., poor and working class Whites) or the wider common ingroup. This competitive sense of collective mobility develops traditional SIT notions of social competition. It differs in making explicit that this social change goal is based on the assumption that the institutional means of competition (system) are legitimate (Merton, 1957). This is important as it helps to distinguish it from the other cognitive alternatives that we discuss below, most of which can also be seen as forms of social competition. Our increased specificity in the type of social competition goals pursued helps to account for the fact that perceived legitimacy can stop members of low status groups from devaluing domains on which they compare badly (Schmader, Major, Eccleston, & McCoy, 2001). Here it makes sense to ask what subordinate groups might aim to do in this case? We argue that the emulation of other successful groups through disadvantaged ingroup cooperation is an important part of the answer to this question (Derks et al., 2009). However, collective mobility within a legitimate social system seems to be an under-theorized social change goal. This is striking considering it is perhaps one of the commonest cognitive alternatives.

Collective mobility makes clear the possibility that social competition can occur under legitimate circumstances. This is broadly consistent with SIT which suggests that perceived illegitimacy and/or instability can lead to social competition, although this is seen as most likely when circumstances are seen as both illegitimate and unstable (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). What we suggest here is that social competition within a legitimate system is fundamentally different from that within an illegitimate system. The failure of
SIT and other collective political action research to discriminate between the legitimacy of the outcome and procedure/system (Van Zomeren et al., 2008) may have obscured theoretical development of collective mobility as a social change goal. It could be argued that such a social change goal is unlikely to result in social change and as such is of less theoretical interest to those interested in social equality. This is a plausible position. However, it is also correct that such a position may have increased appeal due to Manichean (Fanon, 1967/1990) tendencies in intergroup theorizing. In other words, when we consider intergroup relations in terms of a dominant and a subordinate group it is obvious that power differences will make it unlikely that any subordinate group will out-compete the dominant group, at least by collective mobility. Whereas when we consider a multigroup setting of say five different groups, it seems likely that 5th position could rise, at least, to 4th place in the social hierarchy through collective mobility. This does not hold for all types of hierarchy, but seems likely to have played some significant role in explaining historic changes in different groups’ relative position in the social hierarchy. For example, Asian, Jewish, Irish, and Italian Americans have seen great fluctuation in their relative social positions in the United States. Indeed, MLK’s remarks suggest that collective mobility might account for some of this variance.

Collective mobility as an imagined social change goal should be associated with feelings of aspiration, inspiration and envy towards dominant groups. Such emotions can motivate attempts at self-improvement (Algoe & Haidt, 2009) which at the group level should facilitate the endorsement and willingness to engage in collective mobility as

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1 It is important that collective mobility should be distinguished from assimilation. To “compete by the rules” does not mean to assimilate one’s social identity into the dominant group. Assimilation can be a group social change goal, which is conceptually distinct from SIT’s notion of individual mobility. For example, names and language characteristic of the group may be changed or deemphasized in the next generation of the subordinate group. As noted elsewhere, social change in intergroup relations is characterized by the assimilation and emergence of new social identities (Reicher, 2004). We would expect that commitment to the ingroup would play an important role in distinguishing whether group mobility or assimilation goals are endorsed, with the former goal involving greater commitment than the latter (Derks et al, 2009). However, since assimilation does not meet our social change definition we do not pursue this here.
a social change goal. With its plausible ability to account for changes in social hierarchy over time, we argue that collective mobility is a distinct social change goal that helps to extend and add conceptual clarity to social change and the SIT notion of social competition.

**Amelioration**

When the architects of our republic wrote the magnificent words of the Constitution and the declaration of Independence, they were signing a promissory note... This note was a promise that all men would be guaranteed the inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. It is obvious today that America has defaulted on this promissory note insofar as her citizens of color are concerned... We refuse to believe that there are insufficient funds in the great vaults of opportunity of this nation. So we have come to cash this check. (Martin Luther King, Jr. *March on Washington*, 1963)

Unlike collective mobility, amelioration is characterized by the perception of the system as *illegitimate* and in need of repair or reform. Amelioration is when the goal of social change is to enable a subordinate group to participate on equal terms with dominant groups. As such, amelioration is another form of social competition, one that is linked to a desire to address the inequalities and injustices suffered by the subordinate group. Should amelioration be achieved, one might expect collective mobility to be the subsequent social change goal. It should be noted that the perceived illegitimacy of the system is based on its failure to provide all groups with an equal opportunity, as opposed to anything inherently wrong in the system. As with collective mobility, the scope of category inclusion associated with amelioration tends to be relatively *exclusive*. In other words, amelioration is aimed at getting procedural justice/reparations for the subordinate group, as opposed to wider groups. This characterization of amelioration is illustrated in MLK’s quote above. Here, “people of color” (exclusive) were simply not being allowed
to “cash their check” (procedural justice) although there were “sufficient funds” (nothing wrong with the system per se). Therefore, amelioration is typically associated with the perception that group members can improve their relative social value by collective efforts within the current system once that system is operating properly (i.e., providing equal opportunities for the disadvantaged group).

In some cases, amelioration may simply mean that the system should treat all groups the same. However, it may be the case that in order to provide an equal opportunity to a particular group it may be necessary to treat that group differently, as is the case with policies such as affirmative action. This reflects the complexity and interdependence of different (sub)systems within society. For example, one might have equal opportunities in the economic sphere (sub-system) of life but still have ethnic/“racial” hierarchy in the cultural sphere (sub-system) of life – there is nothing intrinsically racist about market-based capitalism. Therefore, policies such as affirmative action help to offset the influence of one social hierarchy on another.

Perceptions of the system as illegitimate, a focus on a particular disadvantaged group, and the belief that one’s group can gain social value within the current system - if it were applied properly – is probably at the heart of much research on collective action and social change (see Van Zomeren et al., 2008). Indeed, amelioration has been the de facto type of social change that collective action researchers have concerned themselves with. Prototypically this literature examines some minority group suffering from an inequality, outgroup transgression, or a disadvantageous proposal. Their actions are implicitly or sometimes explicitly aimed at an appeal to authority or a more powerful outgroup for amelioration of their situation or a “fair chance”. The actions are not

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2 Our typology reflects an idealized way of looking at social change. There are many other ways of conceptualizing the social system and there are multiple ways in which to understand the dimensions on which social hierarchy is based. We suggest that in order to get any conceptual grip on the psychology of social change it is necessary to choose one. For work looking at how different (sub)systems of social hierarchy may reinforce one another see Albert, et al. (1986). For a more social identity-based approach to the complexity of multiple social identities/categorizations see Crisp and Hewstone (2007).
aimed at replacing systems rather they are aimed at improving or correcting the way the system functions. The prevalence of this type of social change goal in the collective action and social change literature is perhaps best exemplified by the presence of models of social change which are based entirely around amelioration (Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Subasic et al., 2008).

In line with amelioration’s dominance in the collective action literature, we would assume that anger is the typical emotion associated with amelioration as a social change goal. Anger is felt towards an agent that is appraised as being responsible for some illegitimate act or situation (Frijda, 1986). Therefore, anger felt as a result of an inequality or the actions of an outgroup should lead to greater endorsement of amelioration.

**Social justice**

Moreover, I am cognizant of the interrelatedness of all communities and states…

Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere. We are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny. Whatever affects one directly, affects all indirectly. (Martin Luther King, Jr. *Letter from a Birmingham Jail*, 1963)

Social justice is when the goal of social change is to bring about equality of opportunity among *all* groups within the social system. As with amelioration, social justice stems from the perception that the system is illegitimate and there is sufficient collective efficacy to increase social value within the current system. However, unlike amelioration, the endorsement of social justice as an imagined alternative is based on intergroup *solidarity*. Here the scope of social change is inclusive. That is, the system is seen as illegitimate because it does not provide equal opportunities to *all* groups, not just one’s own ingroup. Moreover, one perceives that all groups within the system can, together, collectively increase their social value. This characterization of social justice is
implied in MLK’s famous statement the “Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere”. In these words, and the full quote above, MLK is alluding to the interdependence of groups, and how such interdependence requires an inclusive social change goal. That is, one must recognize how the acceptance of an illegitimate (to anybody) system places all groups in danger of oppression, including one’s own group. Here the scope of justice is very much inclusive (Opotow, 2001).

Because of its inclusive nature, social justice as an imagined alternative is likely to reflect the use of inclusive social categorizations or higher levels (superordinate) of self-categorization (Subasic et al., 2008). However, the extent to which it is solely identification with some superordinate identity that engenders support for social justice is questionable. As MLK’s quote implies it would be logically possible to support social justice solely as a means of advancing/protecting one’s own subgroup’s interests – given that injustice to an outgroup is a potential threat to a person’s ingroup. We suggest that in most cases saliency and identification with both superordinate and subgroup identities are likely to characterize support for the social justice imagined alternative. Here “dual identities” that affirm the distinctiveness of subgroup identities within a common ingroup will act both to broaden the scope of justice and to facilitate cooperation across groups for social justice (Dovidio et al., 2009). This prediction is in line with work showing that such circumstances help to reduce intergroup bias (Brown & Hewstone, 2005). Indeed, when dual identity is salient research has shown that (sub)group-based injustices are more likely to be recognized by majority group members (Dovidio et al., 2004). With its ability to account for the broad range of coalitions among groups (e.g., anti-racism, feminist, ecological, trade unions) engaged in contemporary social justice movements, we argue that social justice is a distinct social change goal that has been, until now, largely overlooked in intergroup approaches to social change.

In line with the inclusive nature of social justice we would assume that empathy
and compassion are the typical emotions associated with social justice as a social change goal.

**Creativity**

We all have the drum major instinct. We all want to be important, to surpass others, to achieve distinction, to lead the parade. ... And the great issue of life is to harness the drum major instinct. It is a good instinct if you don't distort it and pervert it. Don't give it up. Keep feeling the need for being important. Keep feeling the need for being first. But I want you to be the first in love. I want you to be the first in moral excellence. I want you to be the first in generosity. (Martin Luther King, Jr. *The Drum Major Instinct*, 1968)

Instead of competing for social value via collective mobility, amelioration, or social justice goals, subordinate groups can create or adopt a new dimension of social value in order to increase their absolute or relative level of social value. Like collective mobility, the creativity social change goal is characterized by a perception of the system as legitimate. In other words, the procedures that distribute social value in society are seen as fair. However, unlike collective mobility, creativity is associated with perceiving the ingroup as inefficacious when it comes to increasing its position on existing social value dimensions. As mentioned earlier, creativity can be thought of a special case of SIT's first social creativity strategy (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) where the dimension of social value in question that the subordinate group possess is also now something that the dominant group strives for. This process of making some qualities of the subordinate group “cool” or desirable to dominant groups is certainly present in the history of African-Americans and hip-hop culture.

On the surface, creativity may be seen as the least conflictual social change goal in our typology. However, it still meets our definition of social change and is not
without the possibility of conflict. Given that the new type (dimension) of social value must be something that is consensually striven for (positive social value) or avoided (negative social value), social influence is a necessary part of creativity. Getting a dominant group to consensually value an attribute that the subordinate group possesses is no easy task. As Tajfel & Turner (1979) rightfully pointed out in their treatment of this subtype of social creativity, it is likely that groups will positively evaluate their own traits as opposed to those possessed by an outgroup. The extent to which this type of social change occurs depends, we suspect, on minority influence processes (Moscovici et al., 1994).

Creativity is likely to be associated with both negative and positive emotions. The negative “resentment emotions” (resentment, envy, jealousy) are characterized by displeasure at an outcome or situation that is perceived as desirable for someone else (Ortony et al., 1988). Here one might expect the inefficacy of ingroup members and relative efficacy of outgroup members on existing social value dimensions to elicit resentment emotions, which are likely to motivate striving for the endorsement of creativity. Here, one might expect a slightly disingenuous “we don’t care, because we are better at…” sentiment. This should lead to the assertion of new symbolic or material things that the subordinate group possesses. This creation of new types of social value should lead to pride reflecting the legitimate superiority of the ingroup (e.g., Harth, Kessler, & Leach, 2008; for a discussion, see Leach et al., 2002).

Separatism

Without some of this earth that we can call our own, we cannot hope to even become a free nation out of the nation of the slave master. IT IS FAR MORE IMPORTANT TO TEACH SEPARATION OF THE BLACKS AND WHITES IN AMERICA THAN PRAYER. Teach and train the blacks to do something for self in the way of uniting and seeking a home on this earth that they can call their own! There is no such thing as
living in peace with white Americans. You and I have tried without success. (Elijah Muhammad, Message to the Blackman in America, 1965)

Group members may both perceive the system as illegitimate and the ingroup as inefficacious in bringing about improvements in social value within the current system. These perceptions are likely to lead to the endorsement of separatism as a social change goal. Separatist social change is aimed at separating a subgroup (often subordinate) from the wider group and system. For example, Black Nationalism in the US is often associated with separatist social change. Here the lack of efficacy to bring about change in social value translates to the notion that “we will never be free here in this society”. This social change goal is probably the most exclusive in nature, in that it is both aimed solely at the subordinate group and explicitly aims to exclude other groups. The quote from the Nation of Islam’s Elijah Muhammad makes clear the perceived necessity of having one’s own “home” separate from those who would inevitably oppress you.3

Intergroup research on multicultural theory has dealt with separatism as a possible type of intergroup relations, such approaches suggest that separatism involves identification with subgroup identity and a lack of desire for positive relations with the majority or dominant groups within society (e.g., Berry, 1997). We suggest that it may not necessarily be a lack of desire for positive relations with other dominant groups that characterizes separatism. Rather, as Elijah Muhammad sentiments suggest, such positive relations are just not imaginable.

Separatism is somewhat akin to Tajfel’s (1975) notion of “group exit”, in which he distinguishes between psychological exit (e.g., communes) and “boycott” – the threat of physical exit with some other goal in mind. Our treatment goes one step further and

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3 As mentioned above separatism could be more psychological than physical as may be the case with groups that form communes as a means of psychological exit (R. D. Kelley, 2002). The extent to which these cases count as a social change goal depends on the degree to which they increase social value
suggests that group exit may not only be a threat, but may also be the goal of social change. As we have seen recently in the Sudan, separatism as a social change goal may lead to a long drawn-out conflict (Mamdani, 2009). The degree to which conflict will characterize separatist social change is determined by the degree to which dominant groups rely on the subordinate group for the functioning of the system. Thus, if they are a “valuable” part of the system subordinate groups are likely to have to fight for group exit and independence from the system, whereas if they are of little value to the dominant groups (e.g., the homeless, or traveller peoples), as may be the case with commune group members, their psychological or physical exit should be less conflictual.

Separatist social change goals are likely to be associated with frustration, pessimism, and cynicism. These “disappointment emotions” are characterized by the disconfirmation of the prospect of a desirable event (Ortony et al., 1988). As such, it may be the case that the failed attainment of other social change goals (e.g., collective mobility and amelioration) may encourage the endorsement of separatist goals.

Regressive revolution

We say that all the land, without exception, must become the property of the whole nation… A party is the vanguard of a class, and its duty is to lead the masses and not merely to reflect the average political level of the masses. (Vladimir Lenin, Speech on the Agrarian Question, 1917)

Intergroup relations theories have not explicitly dealt with revolution. A search of psychINFO (1806 to November Week 4 2011) reveals only 4 hits for the search “intergroup relations” (key word) AND “revolution/Political revolution” (keyword). Perhaps this is because what counts as a revolution is a tricky judgment to make, akin to the noted conceptual problems inherent in social change. There are various definitions of revolution with some endorsing the distinction between the “great” (e.g., French and
Russian) as opposed to “lesser” (e.g., German and Japanese) revolutions (Pettee, 1938). Recently we have seen “Arab revolutions” in the Middle East and North Africa. There are extensive differences between all these episodes of revolutionary social change. However one thing is common to all these examples, revolutions are aimed at increasing social value for disadvantaged groups, who sometimes make up the majority, in a particular social system. However, as history shows us the results of revolution may not always be so “progressive” (Albert & Hahnel, 1981). It is for this reason that our typology attempts to distinguish between the endorsement of more utopian forms of revolution (progressive) and those that are examples of totalitarian revolution (regressive). Strictly speaking, our typology is aimed at explaining the psychological endorsement of different types of social change, and therefore one might think we have overstepped our brief by distinguishing these different forms of revolution. After all, surely only utopian images of revolution are endorsed regardless of what actually plays out in reality? This is a reasonable view but in the process of applying our dimensions to real revolutionary pronouncements we were struck by how our dimensions were able to account for the difference between progressive and regressive revolutionary goals. Specifically, we suggest these social change goals differ fundamentally in their desired inclusiveness.

Before we attempt to outline these distinctions in full, it makes sense to offer a definition of revolution as a social change goal. Here we conceptualize revolution as a fundamental change in one or more (sub)systems (e.g., economic, political, kinship, or cultural/religious) in a society. Fundamental means that alternative institutions, procedures, and “ways of doing things” (Merton, 1957) are enacted in the social system that fundamentally alters its functioning and the amount of social value that is distributed across groups. For example, the Russian revolution resulted in the removal of the economic institution of private ownership over the means of production. As such, this
single institutional change had a fundamental effect on economic intergroup relations: eliminating the capitalist class and putting the means of production under state ownership.

The main difference between regressive revolution and other social change goals is that endorsement of revolution is associated with imagining an alternative system. This imaginative act has been theorized as a central part of revolutionary social change (Merton, 1957; Pettee, 1938; Selbin, 1997). In addition, endorsing regressive revolution as a social change goal should be associated with perceiving that it is difficult/impossible to increase social value within the current system. Therefore, perceiving an alternative system that would enable the group to increase its social value is what sets this apart from most other social change goals. Finally, regressive revolution is characterized by an exclusive scope. In other words, regressive revolution is aimed at employing the alternative system to increase the social value of distinct subgroups as opposed to all groups in the system or the superordinate group as a whole.

Due to its exclusive nature regressive revolution is often described by group leaders as more inclusive (progressive) in nature. This could reflect the need to legitimize power relations (Jackman, 1994; Nadler, 2002) and the strategic nature of mobilizing enough support for social change (Reicher, 2004; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Turner, 2005). Moreover, even if a revolution starts out with an inclusive scope (progressive) it may change over time. As status differences between leaders (and their subgroups) and followers develop an intergroup dynamic may emerge between leadership and followers such that authority is no longer prototypical (representative) of the wider (inclusive) group. This idea is in line with SIT approaches to leadership which predict that under such circumstances leadership will resort to power and coercion in order to influence the wider group (Hogg, 2001; Turner, 2005). The potential for regressive social change from this point is clear. Although theorists have suggested that the Russian revolution is an
example of progressive revolution (Davies, 1962), it could be argued that the October (Bolshevik) Russian revolution is a good example of this regressive/inclusive dynamic, with Lenin distancing the “party” from the wider group. As the Lenin quote above illustrates, group leaders may appeal to the inclusivity of the revolution, here “land for the whole nation”, but at the same time they may also express the exclusive nature inherent in regressive revolution. Here Lenin talks of the superiority of the party or “vanguard”. Indeed, he makes explicit that this exclusive subgroup should not be prototypical of the whole group.

Reflecting the superior nature of the exclusive subgroup expected to endorse regressive revolution we expect pity and a sense of noblesse oblige (Leach et al., 2002) to characterize the emotions of those that endorse this social change goal. Pity is elicited when an other’s negative outcome is appraised as uncontrollable (Weiner, 2006). Such emotions are likely to be felt for groups who are perceived as cooperative (warm) but incompetent (Cuddy et al., 2008). As the Lenin quote hints at, such emotions may engender paternalistic helping. That is, the kind of helping that actually reinforces power differences (Jackman, 1994; Leach et al., 2002; Nadler, 2002). Here a revolutionary vanguard may pity the wider group as a means of both legitimizing and reinforcing their dominance. Pity here is likely to lead to patronizing speech and behavior that can lead to passive harm, such as neglect and inaction (Cuddy et al., 2008).

**Progressive revolution**

True compassion is more than flinging a coin to a beggar; it is not haphazard and superficial. It comes to see that an edifice which produces beggars needs restructuring… These are revolutionary times. All over the globe men are revolting against old systems of exploitation and oppression and out of the wombs of a frail world new systems of justice and equality are being born… This call for a world-wide fellowship that lifts neighborly concern beyond one's tribe, race, class and nation is in reality a call for an all-
embracing and unconditional love for all men. Now let us begin. Now let us rededicate ourselves to the long and bitter—but beautiful—struggle for a new world. (Martin Luther King, Jr. *Beyond Vietnam*, 1967)

Like regressive revolution, endorsement of progressive revolution is associated with perceiving an alternative system and the inability of the group to increase its social value in the present system. Where progressive differs from regressive revolution is in terms of its inclusivity. Endorsement of progressive revolution is characterized by an inclusive scope. That is, the alternative system is aimed at increasing the social value of a broad range of groups within the society or even across all societies at the most superordinate or human level of social-categorization (Thomas et al., 2009; Turner, 1987; Turner et al., 1994). This inclusive scope is illustrated in the quote above by MLK’s call for a “world-wide fellowship”.

Due to the complex nature of imagining an alternative system for the advancement of all, we suggest that hope and compassion are the quintessential progressive revolutionary emotions. Indeed, in the quote above MLK suggests that these emotions are central for capturing his inclusive imagined alternative. Compassion involves concern for, and the motivation to enhance, the well-being of others (Eisenberg, 2002; Goetz, Keltner, & Simon-Thomas, 2010; Lazarus, 1991). Research has demonstrated that one feels greater levels of compassion for others who are similar or share an ingroup (Cialdini et al., 1997; Dovidio, Piliavin, Schroeder, & Penner, 2006). This might suggest that emotions that are associated with progressive revolution as an imagined alternative are only possible once group members share a superordinate identity (Subasic et al., 2008). This is in line with more cognitive (vs. motivational) accounts of social identity (Turner, 1987; Turner et al., 1994). However, a strict self-categorization approach does not seem to reflect the motivational and emotional aspects that characterize this social change goal, at least as espoused by MLK. Indeed, recent work
has suggested that compassion increases self-other similarity particularly in the case of those who are weak or in need of help (Oveis, Horberg, & Keltner, 2010). Here it seems that compassion may offer a means by which one’s scope of justice or moral community can become more inclusive. From a self-categorization perspective, this is in line with recent work showing that emotion can form the basis of self-categorization (Livingstone, Spears, Manstead, Bruder, & Shepherd, 2011). In addition to compassion, we suggest that hope plays an important role in endorsing progressive revolution as a social change goal. Hope is a future-orientated emotion so seems to have good applicability to imagined future systems. Work has shown that hope is appropriate when one appraises (1) the chances of attaining the outcome/event as realistic, (2) the outcome/event is personally or socially acceptable (legitimate), (3) the outcome or events are appraised as important (Averill, Catlin, & Chon, 1990). Notably, this work also suggests that people who hope will be willing to take action in order to achieve the outcome. It may be the hope that imagining an alternative system inspires that is crucial to the psychology of progressive revolution.

Clarification and Issues

In this section we aim to clarify some points regarding our proposed typology and address some of the issues that such an approach raises. In addition, we point towards the new avenues for research that our typology engenders. In particular, we focus on the implications of adopting the goal construct in the social psychological study of political action and social change.

Are Social Change Goals Necessary for Political Action?

By shining conceptual light on types of social change goal we are not saying that all political action for social change is undertaken with the conscious formation of one of these social change goals. Rather, we are proposing a treatment of social change that
places an emphasis on the kind of “dreams” that disadvantaged group members and others have so elegantly espoused during the history of struggle and social change (R. D. G. Kelley, 2002). What we are suggesting here is that people’s appraisals based on key dimensions of system, efficacy, and inclusiveness will lead to differing levels of endorsement or centrality for each of our social change goals. As mentioned earlier, each of our cognitive alternatives represents a high-order social change goal. Therefore, we would expect many lower-level goals to be enacted in order to reach these high-level alternatives (Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007). As such, political action could be undertaken in pursuit of a massive array of goals (e.g., increasing housing benefit, reducing CO\textsubscript{2} etc.). That said, it is possible that the social change goals we have covered are implicit in some of these lower-level social change goals.

One may question how relevant more radical goals like progressive revolution are to an intergroup understanding of social change. After all we do not have a revolution every week. Do people really ever have such “utopian” dreams? A careful look at the history of social change suggests that these more radical goals or dreams are more frequent than one might think (see R. D. G. Kelley, 2002). Just because there might not be many examples of the successful implementation of radical goals like progressive revolution (although see Hahnel, 2005) does not mean that the imagination of such goals have not played a role in engendering everyday political action and social change. However, our task in the present chapter is to focus on the psychology of social change. This is a much more modest task than offering explanations of actual social change (Davies, 1962; Nowak & Vallacher, 2001; Stewart & Pratto, 2010). By this we mean that we have focused on psychological factors that would facilitate the endorsement and action for a particular social change goal. Obviously, whether endorsement and action for a social change goal leads to actual social change is a much more complex question.
The key point here is that dreams may motivate social change efforts even if that particular form of social change is not ultimately achieved. Radical dreams may produce action and perhaps dramatic change, if not always radical change. By adopting the goal construct in our treatment of social change we are able to make some informed speculations as to the role of more radical, distal, and high-order social change goals. For example, we think revolution and more radical, difficult, and challenging social change goals may be particularly adaptive for social change. In their classic work on goals Locke and Latham (1990) have shown how more challenging and specific goals increase behavioral efforts. As such, it may be the case that high-order and radical goals may increase the level of political action. This may lead to progressive social change without going so far as revolution.

However, Bandura (1989) has suggested that more distal (vs. proximal goals) may be less able to engender performance. It remains an empirical question whether more distal or radical imagined alternatives have a positive effect on political action. One thing that differs in our approach from that of Bandura is that we do not suggest that group members only have these imagined alternatives or high-order social change goals as mental representations. Rather, in line with recent work on the goal construct (Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007), we suspect that there will be lower-order goals (means) that will form the more proximal goals leading to action. Therefore, one would expect the more proximal goal to predict actions that are similar to those lower-order goals. The question of interest is whether high-order social change goals add something to our understanding of political action and social change? The extent to which social change goals (as mental representations) include lower-order goals or “means” is also another important empirical question. We would suggest that this might not be that conceivable with such complex high-order goals. Indeed, we would expect lower-order goals or means to the high-order social change goal to be massively context dependent, at least in order to be
practically actualized. However, it may be the case that imagined alternatives like revolution do indeed have low-order goals (means) like armed conflict as part of these goal constructs. Future work would do well to explore this. It may be the case that opposition to radical social change goals like revolution may not be based on the imagined alternative (high-order end state) itself but rather the low-order means associated with it (e.g., armed conflict). This has massive implications for those concerned with social change. Agents of social change may need to clarify strategy/means when promoting social change goals. This is often harder said than done, due to the massive context-dependency of means, at least if they are to be strategically viable (Albert, 2002a, 2002b).

Relations Between Goals

Our quotes describing each imagined alternative make clear that we conceptualize our typology of social change goals as reflecting a dynamic appraisal approach (for a similar account of emotion, see Lazarus, 1991). In other words, the same individual may move from endorsing reform to revolutionary action, as their relevant appraisals change. This raises the question of whether there is some temporal relationship between the social change goals? It is possible to order the goals in terms of how radical they are, and one could speculate as to whether group members may start off with more radical goals then become less radical as they “mature”. Alternatively, it is possible that group members may start off with more moderate social change goals and then, as these goals are frustrated, turn to more radical goals. This kind of stage model could be tested in future research. Based on the goal literature we suggest that it is possible that any goal could become actively endorsed if other goals are either frustrated or unimaginable (Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007). However, it may be the case that activation of a particular social change goal may facilitate or inhibit others (Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007). For instance, it may be the case that priming collective mobility as a
social change goal could lead to the inhibition of other goals like amelioration. This
notion could help to shed new light on findings that have shown how goals like prejudice
reduction can actually lead to the inhibition of amelioration aimed action (Saguy, Tausch,
Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009). In this case, anything that makes the dominant group look
better (e.g., positive contact) may increase aspiration and collective mobility goals while
inhibiting amelioration or revolution goals. Future work could explore whether reform
(amelioration) inhibits or facilitates revolutionary social change goals. The idea that
social change agents may see these two social change goals as mutually exclusive has
been suggested to be an important barrier to social change (Albert, 2002a, 2002b).

Social Change Goals and Motives

Our approach has placed the goal construct at the heart of social change. This
has meant that we have not given a detailed account of group-based motives in social
change. We have not attempted to identify the fundamental motive driving intergroup
social change (Hogg & Abrams, 1993). Rather, our approach suggests that a range of
group-based motives could engender political action for social change. The adoption of
this approach has some implications for thinking about the motivational route of social
change. Specifically, our distinction between goals and motives helps shed light on why
intergroup relations can suddenly change. If a goal is reached it should stop influencing
action, whereas motives are more chronic and likely to continue influencing behavior. In
this case, if an amelioration goal were successfully achieved one would expect an end in
political action, however, the motives involved in intergroup relations should continue.
In this way the motivation for social change is always present. But its actualization into a
particular goal is dependent on a specific set of appraisals. Indeed, Tajfel and Turner
(1979) were trying to explain the sudden emergence of political action in disadvantaged
groups that seemed apathetic in the face of disadvantage. SIT suggests that the motive
for a positive social identity drives people to embrace their social identities and take
action on behalf of their groups. We add to this by suggesting that motives are channelled into particular social change goals given appropriate appraisals of the system, efficacy for change within the system, and the inclusiveness of the social change.

Automatic vs. Controlled Social Change Goals

Much of recent work on the psychology of goals has focused on the automaticity of the goal construct (Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007). We have not concerned ourselves here with automatic goals. In general, we take social change goals to be high-order goals that are the result of conscious mental simulation. In this sense they share the properties of traditional accounts of the goal construct (Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996). However, once formed there is the possibility that goals for social change may become automatic or unconscious (Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007; Moskowitz & Grant, 2009). This has potentially interesting implications for social change agents. For example, one critique of those engaged in progressive social change is that “the left” is fragmented, and prone to infighting. It may be the case that disagreement with those who all share a desire for change or a set of progressive values may result from having different high-order social change goals either explicitly or even at an automatic or unconscious level. If implicit social change goals underlie such disagreement between activists it may be worth making social change goals clear to avoid such potential for undermining solidarity. It maybe the case that activists may disagree with high-order imagined alternatives but do share a significant amount of lower-order social change goals. Focusing on these may help to build unification amongst those concerned with progressive social change.

Regulation and Other Influences of Social Change Goals

We know that goals can have important effects on information processing (Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996). For instance, goals affect attention, recall, trait inferences, stereotyping, and decision-making (Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996). As such, it seems that the particular social change goal of an individual should have many
implications for political action and social change. Goals could influence the aspects of the problem that one attends to and may shape one’s attitudes and decisions accordingly. For example, it could be the case that a revolutionary goal orients one to the systematic and institutional aspects of a particular social problem (e.g., capitalism in climate change).

With the likelihood that high-order distal (vs. proximal) goals are less likely to lead to action, work needs to focus on self-regulation and the processes in which distal goals like some of our imagined social change goals can be successfully implemented. Such a focus on self-regulation may shed light on the problem of drop-out and sustained participation in social movements (Klandermans, 2003). The self-regulation literature may also shed some light onto other (than our appraisals) factors that influence endorsement of particular goals. For instance, low power groups may prefer prevention focused change goals (amelioration), but high power individuals within low power groups might prefer promotion (collective mobility, revolution) focused goals (Sassenberg & Woltin, 2009). Future work would do well to explore the role of self-regulation in political action.

Does the Typology Hold for all Types of Intergroup Relations?

As our quotes suggest, the development of our typology is grounded in the social change of the African Diaspora. This reflects the primary author’s experiences and idiosyncrasies. But what about other groups? Does our approach apply to every type of group-based hierarchy? This is a difficult question and perhaps depends on an adequate account of different types of intergroup relations. To date, only one attempt has been made to differentiate groups based on age, gender, and arbitrary arrangements (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). We suggest that most of our social change goals are applicable to all intergroup relations. However, it seems that revolution may not be applicable to all intergroup relations. In this sense we think that not all intergroup relations are created equal. Where institutions and systems play a large role in the creation of intergroup
hierarchy it is easy to see how alternative systems would fundamentally alter intergroup relations. However, talking about revolution for more arbitrary groups (e.g., blond people) seems less plausible. In this sense, revolution seems more likely for “structural” rather than “incidental” disadvantage (Van Zomeren et al., 2008).

**Conclusion**

The present chapter has attempted examine how moral emotions, automaticity, and imagination might advance our understanding of political action and social change. In doing so, I draw some (tentative) conclusions based on the insights from Chapters 1-4. In addition, I have put forward a typology of social change goals, and discussed their basis and implications for the social psychology of political action and social change. I hope that this will lead to the exploration of the psychology behind different types of social change. My main point here is that one cannot take it for granted that the psychology behind reform is the same as that underlying revolution. Much work remains to be done, but in line with William Von Humboldt’s sentiments in the opening quote; we hope that the ideas presented here inspire better efforts to account for the psychology of political action and social change.
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