This pdf of your paper in *Archaeology and Memory* belongs to the publishers Oxbow Books and it is their copyright.

As author you are licenced to make up to 50 offprints from it, but beyond that you may not publish it on the World Wide Web until three years from publication (March 2013), unless the site is a limited access intranet (password protected). If you have queries about this please contact the editorial department at Oxbow Books (editorial@oxbowbooks.com).
An offprint from

Archaeology and Memory

Edited by

Dušan Borić

© Oxbow Books 2010
## Contents

List of Contributors  
v

1. Introduction: Memory, archaeology and the historical condition  
   *(Dušan Borić)*  
   1

2. The diversity and duration of memory  
   *(Alasdair Whittle)*  
   35

3. Happy forgetting? Remembering and dismembering dead bodies at Vlasac  
   *(Dušan Borić)*  
   48

4. Forgetting and remembering the digital experience and digital data  
   *(Ruth Tringham)*  
   68

5. Layers of meaning: Concealment, containment, memory and secrecy in the British Early Bronze Age  
   *(Andrew Jones)*  
   105

6. Constructing the warrior: Death, memory and the art of warfare  
   *(Bryan Hanks)*  
   121

7. Memory and microhistory of an empire: Domestic contexts in Roman Amheida, Egypt  
   *(Anna Boozer)*  
   138

8. The depiction of time on the Arch of Constantine  
   *(Adam Gutteridge)*  
   158

9. Archaeology and memory on the Western front  
   *(Paola Filippucci)*  
   171

10. *Terra incognita:* The material world in international criminal courts  
    *(Lindsay Weiss)*  
    183

11. YugoMuseum: Memory, nostalgia, irony  
    *(Mrdjan Bajić)*  
    195

12. Memory, melancholy and materiality  
    *(Victor Buchli)*  
    204
In thousands of languages, in the most diverse climes, from century to century, beginning with the very old stories told around the hearth in the huts of our remote ancestors down to the works of modern storytellers which are appearing at this moment in the publishing houses of the great cities of the world, it is the story of the human condition that is being spun and that men never weary of telling to one another. The manner of telling and the form of the story vary according to periods and circumstances, but the taste for telling and retelling a story remains the same: the narrative flows endlessly and never runs dry. Thus, at times, one might almost believe that from the first dawn of consciousness throughout the ages, mankind has constantly been telling itself the same story, though with infinite variations, to the rhythm of its breath and pulse. And one might say that after the fashion of the legendary and eloquent Scheherazade, this story attempts to stave off the executioner, to suspend the ineluctable decree of the fate that threatens us, and to prolong the illusion of life and of time. Or should the storyteller by his work help man to know and to recognize himself? Perhaps it is his calling to speak in the name of all those who did not have the ability or who, crushed by life, did not have the power to express themselves.

(Andrić 1969)

…Sir, everything that is not literature is life, History as well, Especially history [6]…So you believe, Sir, that history is real life, Of course, I do, I meant to say that history was real life, No doubt at all…[8]

(Saramago 1996)

Will it not then be the task of a memory instructed by history to preserve the trace of this speculative history over the centuries and to integrate it into its symbolic universe? This will be the highest destination of memory, not before but after history.

(Ricoeur 2004, 161)

**Prelude**

Next to my bedside, there is a black and white sepia-toned family photo (Fig. 1.1). The photo shows my grandmother holding my great uncle's son, my other great uncle feeding a horse, the boy sitting on the horse in his impeccable formal navy-like school-boy uniform, this anonymous horse standing still and an equally anonymous kitten in the arms of the boy. The year is 1936. It is the summer on the family farm in the region of Srem, Vojvodina, the northern province of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The tranquillity of the atmosphere on the photo may indicate *a belle époque* of a kind, a perfect, happy moment of a family reunion, only a few years before the official start of the second big war in the same century. The photo was taken five years before the peaceful facial expression disappears from the face of my, at the time 23-year-old, grandmother whose father and brother met their deaths before the firing squad of
the pro-fascist NDH Ustašas state. But trying to trace the inner consciousness of my grandmother on her face, on this photo, she is calm and happy. Yet, despite the tranquillity of the moment that the photo conveys we know that the photo captures time only two years after King Alexander of Yugoslavia was assassinated in Marseille, France, and already eight years after the Croatian delegate Stjepan Radić was shot dead in the assembly of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, which later led to the abolishment of parliamentary life in the country. Both gruesome events, with the benefit of the hindsight, on the plane of political history, could have given uncanny hints of the direction in which the world events were going, slowly creeping into the fragile peace of this family’s lives. Once the war broke out, my great uncle, the father of the boy on the photo, who is behind the camera, had to flee the Croatian city of Zagreb, leaving his business behind. He hid in a German train under the threat of the Ustašas militia, and escaped to the family estate in the village of Erdevik, somewhat of a safe harbour during these hard war years. In this village, German neighbours (Volkeutsche) who had lived in this region along with other ethnicities for centuries, often protected local Serbs from fascist militia persecutions.

Narratives surrounding this photo about the events that my grandmother passed on to me years ago still live in my memories. And, even more vivid are my childhood memories of exploring the attic in the family house that had been the hiding place during the Second World War. Here, among other things, in the dark, secretive and awe-inspiring space criss-crossed by sun-rays that illuminate unreal, floating dust, a large merchant basket, brought to this house at the beginning of the war by my fleeing great uncle, survives as yet another mute material witness of these events. When the basket arrived at the house it was filled with astrakan furs that the great uncle managed to rescue from his Zagreb shop, and this fur load years later, after the war, saved him and secured the existence of his family. The visual image of this now abandoned and wrecked object, slowly eaten by termites that thoroughly channelled its entirety, feeds my memories in an imaginative way.

These images and memories in my mind are mine and yet not only mine; they are a mixture of my own memories and of conjectural evidence of
traces, which were in turn endowed with narrative meaning through testimonies of others. I remember because I am part of a family history of those close to me. Equally so, my family and I remain tied to collective and historical frameworks and my and our memories and these recollections of the past are tied to the wider realm of history and politics, and to the consciousness of a collective entity. In turn, this collectivity, like any other, remembers in a public sphere by celebrating particular (usually violent) founding events. The commemoration of these events can be selective and common memories could be (and always have been) manipulated and abused through ideological projects when certain historical events become skewed and distorted or overemphasised at the expense of other suppressed events. In the last instance, we are confronted with a pathological condition of memory. This pathological condition can exercise its power of manipulation and distortion over individual apprehensions and perceptions of events, their meaning and significance. From private and inward dilemmas of our own remembering and reminiscing on the past as 'mine' and of those close to me, to the apprehension of a collective past of those others with whom we (myself and those close to me) share the same cultural or political belonging and (narrative) identity – all our lives are constituted through memories. Hence on an intuitive level, one can talk of an immanent pre-understanding of the significance of memory in the constitution of our lives. Yet this initial comprehension about the importance of memory is only a hint of the task that this introduction and this volume set out to achieve.

Sketching the task
While on the one hand this volume seeks to examine how the notion of memory can significantly structure the research efforts in the empirical field of archaeology on the basis of contributions that follow, certain aspects of archaeology and its particular take on memory, in turn, could be considered as important elements in defining the field of memory studies. First, the archaeological approaches offered will enable us to explore the diversity of mnemonic systems and their significance in past contexts, examining what can be put under the heading ‘past in the past’. This avenue of research has been the focus of recent interest in archaeology for memory studies (e.g. Borić 2003; Bradley 2002; 2003; Jones 2001; 2007; papers in Chesson 2001; Hastorf 2003; Hodder and Cessford 2004; Kuijt 2001; Meskell 2001; papers in Van Dyke and Alcock 2003; Williams 2003). These useful contributions have covered a number of regional case studies, indicating the importance of memory as a unifying umbrella term to cover a wide range of examples from various past contexts with regard to ways of appropriating and thinking of their own pasts. Such diachronic and cross-cultural perspectives can be used to understand meaningful constitutions and trajectories of particular context-specific mnemonic systems. The present volume provides a diverse set of regional case studies and focuses on a range of prehistoric and classical case studies in the Eurasian regional contexts (papers by Whittle, Borić, Tringham, Hanks, Jones, Boozer and Gutteridge), as well as on predicaments of memory in examples of the archaeologies of ‘contemporary past’ (papers by Filippucci, Weiss, Bajić and Buchli).

The diachronic depths inherent in the accumulative nature of the archaeological record on the scale of the long-term are unparalleled, and the following chapters will take advantage of this condition. In its dealings with the socially constitutive role of material culture, archaeology is well-suited to tackle the problem of the relationship between materiality and memory, through both discursive and undiscursive aspects of social life. Already, this question has been addressed explicitly in various ways by ethnography (e.g. Bloch 1998; Mines and Weiss 1997; Seremetakis 1994), art history (papers in Kwint et al. 1999), and architecture (e.g. Kwinter 2001) and one would think that archaeology has a lot to add to this facet of the memory/materiality debate (cf. Jones 2007; Meskell 2004; Miller 2005; also various papers in this volume). And finally, at a deeper level of ‘foundational’ tectonics, the importance of the epistemological grounding
of archaeology as the discipline of conjectural testimonies and its metaphorical significance in evoking distance and temporal depths will be explored as fundamental to the phenomenology of memory in relation to our historical condition as human beings. Here, also, we shall emphasise the possible way for archaeology to re-define or at least to make explicit its epistemological status, engaging in debates centered around the main goal of historical disciplines, that of the representation of the past. In this way memory, from being the subject of recent archaeological interest, moves on to the plane at which the uses of memory and archaeological practice become confronted with each other, and we shall explore the consequences of this interplay.

In this introduction, I briefly survey, on the one hand, the foundational significance of memory as a philosophical phenomenon, and, on the other hand, the current state of this recently revived theoretical and intellectual currency in the various fields of humanities and social sciences from an archaeological perspective. The relatively recent growing interest in and preoccupation with the issue of memory, remembering and forgetting is a phenomenon in itself, with the outcome in a coincidental proliferation of published works that have as their focus memory across a wide spectrum of unrelated disciplines, in this way reflecting the wider condition of the present-day (see Buchli, this volume). This trend, to which the present volume can serve as an example along with numerous other memory-related recent works referenced throughout, started occupying not only the dominant discourses of disciplines such as sociology, philosophy, history, anthropology or archaeology, but, also, has disseminated into the wider public discourse of the late capitalist society today. Such a condition may perhaps echo the phenomenon of a millenary experience, which ‘has had melancholia itself as a theme of meditation and as a source of torment’ (Ricoeur 2004, 71). This ‘melancholic’ aspect of reminiscing also coincides with an apparent ‘obsession with commemoration’ in our nation-state cultures (see Nora 1996; cf. Le Goff 1992). Yet, following Paul Ricoeur, we see the importance of memory in its role as ‘the womb of history’ and not just as ‘one of the objects of historical knowledge’ (2004, 95–96). Memory thus encompasses both history and archaeology.

Archaeology can be seen as a discipline that contributes to the general field of historical knowledge. The production of both archaeological and historical knowledge is structured under the sign of the philosophical notion of our ‘historical condition’ as human beings, i.e. our ‘historicity’ (cf. Arendt 1958). In Heidegger’s words, this problem is related to the ontological condition of Da-sein, i.e. of the human individual, since ‘… this being is not ‘temporal,’ because it ‘is in history,’ but because, on the contrary, it exists and can exist historically only because it is temporal in the ground of its being’ (1962, 345, original emphasis). This fundamental grounding of human beings in their historicity can be used to overcome the criticism of deconstructionist provenience that underlines the modern condition as the necessary prerequisite for the existence of disciplines such as archaeology (most elaborately Thomas 2004). While one should certainly not downplay the specific social and cultural context of post-Enlightenment thought, i.e. the specifics of the social milieu and epoché, that provided the necessary conditions for a distinctive discipline of archaeology to emerge (with its own set of analytical tools that stemmed from the projects endowed with the Enlightenment spirit), we should be able to show that memory and the related concept of ‘trace’, i.e. seen as an imprint that has been left behind by a past agency and which remains in the present as its testimony (see below), may best evoke the historical conditionality of human existence that significantly precedes those processes that are epitomised under the term modernity. Such an understanding may allow the field of studies we call archaeology to exceed its modernity confinement by admitting that the grounding of the historicity of the human condition is more than just a heritage of a certain epoch (sensu Foucault). Some anthropological works coming from the deconstructionist camp may warn us of the history-centric view of the human condition just sketched and one should carefully examine these critiques.
1. Introduction: Memory, archaeology and the historical condition

Memory for us thus bears its significance on several interconnected levels. In the following section, first, I will examine the ‘what’ of memories and the ‘who’ of memories. These starting remarks about what memories are constituted of, as well as posing the question about the ownership of memories, are contextualised within the time-honoured tradition of Western philosophy that goes back to Plato and Aristotle. This long tradition is then complemented with important conceptual reformulations more recently provided in the fields of sociology and anthropology, challenging the conceptual frontiers of the Western episteme. Second, I examine the epistemological status of archaeology in relation to its method of using conjectural evidence in providing interpretations of the past, both as verbal and nonverbal, discursive and undiscursive expressions of human action and agency. At stake here is the importance that this procedure has for the question about the obligation toward the truthful representation of the past, the question fundamental to the ontological and epistemological status of archaeological/historical knowledge. Finally, I shall specify particular problems encountered in archaeological and anthropological dealings with certain aspects of remembering and forgetting, primarily related to the notions of materiality, temporal depths and (dis)continuities and narrative identities. The concluding part of this introduction tacks between issues related to the constitution of archaeological knowledge and representation of the past on the one hand and memory as a synonym for our historical conditionality on the other hand. The focus here in particular is on moral implications of remembering and forgetting.

Philosophy of memory

The following, partially chronologically ordered, survey of a diversity of philosophical positions from which a number of Western thinkers touched upon the issue of memory is limited in its scope, yet it provides a cross-section and a review of the genealogy of thinking about memory within the Western episteme. At the same time, memory itself has served as a proxy in philosophical debates to address fundamental questions of epistemological as well as ontological orders. Hence memory, in more or less explicit ways, has been invested both in the problematic of how knowledge is possible as well as in the question about the temporal and existential character of human beings, and this doubly coined structure of memory marks this discussion. In the following, thus, I will embark inevitably on both of these central sets of philosophical questions as well as those related to the ethics of memory, while still led by a presumption that memory as an overarching notion can usefully be recognised in its singularity and importance as an ever-present ontological capacity.

The Ancients: Plato, Aristotle

The first philosophical discussion of memory is found in the Greek heritage, and comes to us through Plato’s (428/427–348/347 BC) dialogues Theaetetus and Sophist (see Krell 1990; Ricoeur 2004). In fact, the entire philosophical tradition of memory thinking, subsequently, has been framed around the questions, terminology and metaphors evoked in these early texts. It is in the moment when Socrates discusses the nature of knowledge with Theaetetus that the question arises about the relationship between what one experienced and the memory of this experience (166b). At this point Socrates develops a founding memory metaphor, that of a block of wax in our souls, visualising the process of remembering as imprints (marks, sēmeia) of signet rings into the wax. Thus, what is impressed in the wax, as long as the image stays in the mind, is what constitutes our knowledge (191d). Socrates in this part of his discussion puts a lot of emphasis on the question with regard to the faithfulness of memory established by different perceptions. Interestingly, distinguishing between good and bad memories, Socrates is of the opinion, i.e. the connection of perception with thought, is to blame for false opinion, not memory as such. Another metaphor developed in this philosophical dialogue for memory and knowledge is that of the birdbage, i.e. ‘aviary’ – to reach for a particular ‘memory-bird’ does not relate only to the question with regard to the possession of memories, as much as to an active engagement
in the process of memory search, or hunt. But similar to the metaphor of mistakenly trying to fit a new perception with a previous foot imprint, here too, one can mis-take (Ricoeur 2004, 10) a memory-bird.

Yet, it is in another of Plato's dialogue, *Sophist*, that we go to the initial question about the status of previous experience, formulated in the manner of a temporal aporia about the persistence of something absent in the mind as image, moving further from the imprint metaphor. The question that preoccupies the sophists (and Plato) is how to distinguish an image that is a product of a mimetic technique, as a ‘faithful resemblance’, from an image that is a simulacrum or appearance (*phantasma*). It is here that the crucial question of the danger of connecting memory to imagination arises, i.e. whether one can possibly have a truthful resemblance of the past experience, something that is later emphasised with regard to the distinction between historical and fictional narratives (see below).

In *De memoria et reminiscentia*, Aristotle distinguishes remembering that relates to affection (*pathos*) from recollection (*anamnēsis*), which can properly be called the work of memory through the act of searching. Throughout his treatise, Aristotle insists that ‘memory is of the past’, indicating the idea of temporal distance and distinguishing what comes before and what after as a uniquely human perception of time. Aristotle is interested in what makes something absent endure, and his solution is to suggest the notion of inscription. He is also at the head of the school that put emphasis on the notion of habit, and habit-memory (e.g. Bourdieu 1992; cf. Ricoeur 2004, 441).

Although the first philosophical discussion about memory has in its core Plato's epistemological concerns about the nature of knowledge, memory immediately reveals its doubly coined structure. It relates to the temporal aporia about the persistence of an absent thing in the mind as an image (*eikōn*). In this way the question with regard to memory immediately triggers a set of ontological issues, primarily related to temporality. The following section reviews a number of thinkers lumped together under ‘the tradition of inwardness’ (Ricoeur 2004, 96). What brings these thinkers together is their interest in the constitution of the individual inner experience through various ways of temporal extensions ‘in the mind’.

**Between individual and collective memories: St. Augustine, Locke, Husserl, Halbwachs**

(…) it is in memory that the original tie of consciousness appears to reside. We said this with Aristotle, we will say it again more forcefully with Augustine: memory is of the past, and this past is of my impressions; in this sense this past is my past (Ricoeur 2004, 96).

Ricoeur (2004, 93–132) defines, following Taylor (1989), the ‘tradition of inwardness’ in philosophical dealings with memory. What is at stake with regard to this strand of thinking about memory is the connection between what is an ordinary experience of memory at a personal level and its connection to a collective consciousness and collective memory. This question appears among the Ancients with regard to the discussion about the soul and the city. St. Augustine (354–430) is seen as most clearly voicing the concerns of the tradition of inwardness, providing an original understanding of problems inherited from Ancient Greek philosophy. His discussion of memory is tied to the discussions about the aporias of time and an understanding that sees time as an extension of human soul (*distentio animi*) to include the present of the past or memory, the present of the present or attention and the present of the future or expectation. Yet, the acute problem here is how to connect this individual site of memory to the operations of collective memory. For Augustine uses the first person singular of memories as ‘my’ or ‘mine’. Here one may speculate about the possibility of history or historical narratives as a third time, between phenomenological and cosmological time (Ricoeur 1988; 2004).

The next important author to be mentioned in this school of inwardness is John Locke (1632–1704), whose contribution to the invention of the concept of human consciousness is of utmost importance for all subsequent Western philosophical theories of consciousness. Different from Descartes's *ego* and *cogito*, Lockean self sustains
1. Introduction: Memory, archaeology and the historical condition

Memory, archaeology and the historical condition

a particular personal identity (‘sameness with self’) enabled by consciousness. This personal identity of the self endures in time, something that lacks in the Cartesian *cogito*. The self establishes the difference in relation to ‘all other thinking things’. The question of personal identity and its maintenance through time in Locke is thus directly connected to the question of memory. It is necessary also to mention that the word ‘person’ here belongs to a particular, historically situated ethico-juridical field (Ricoeur 2004, 107). The forensic character of this word comes together with the concept of ‘accountability’ and ‘appropriation’. In this context, the question of personal identity must be problematised in relation to two different interpretations of one’s permanence in time: identity as sameness (*idem*, *même*, *gleich*) and (Lockean) identity as selfhood (*ipse*, Selbst) (Ricoeur 1991b). Identity as sameness refers to a material resemblance (finger tips, genetic code, etc.) while identity as selfhood concerns the narrative coherence of one’s personal identity or what Ricoeur likes to call ‘making a promise’ (Ricoeur 1998, 90). The self-constancy is realised by the interplay of these two types of identity. It is exactly at this point that the question is opened about to whom this Lockean self is accountable. Thus, the discussion on personal identity and selfhood always already involves others than the self, opening again the question of the connection of one’s memory and its coherence in relation to a group, a society.

The third author who dwells on the question of inner perception of time is Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) in his celebrated work the *Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness* (1964). Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy responded to Kant’s view of time as an unrepresentable category, as an *a priori* sensibility, reachable only through transcendental deduction. This author developed the model of Internal Time Consciousness, which is one attempt to solve the aporia of time conceptually. Time is in this analysis grounded in perception, and is immanent to consciousness and thus possesses a certain intuitive character. We have perceptual experience of fleeting moments of time. Thus, if the present moment as a source-point (*Quellpunkt*) is marked as B, a past moment (A) sinks into the thickness of time leaving behind its retentions (A’, A”, A”’…). And in the same logic, future moments (C’, C”, C”’…) are anticipated as protentions. As C becomes a present moment, B is modified into retentions of the past moments (B’, B”, B”’…) etc. In this way, memory and remembering are conceptualised as a perpetual flow of lived experience, accumulating a series of ‘sunk’ memories or gradual temporal ‘shadings’ (cf. Gell 1992, 222ff.; 1998, 237ff.). Yet, how can such ‘extreme subjectivism’ speak to the problematic of the simultaneous constitution of individual memory and collective memory (Ricoeur 2004, 114)? Husserl responds to this question by opening the possibility of the ‘communalisation’ of experience that introduces ‘higher order personalities’ in his ‘Fifth Cartesian Meditations’. This transition from transcendental idealism to the theory of intersubjectivity is not without difficulties: ‘…it is indeed as foreign, that is as not-me, that the other is constituted, but it is ‘in’ me that he is constituted’ (Ricoeur 2004, 118). According to Husserl, the constitution of collective entities is made possible through intersubjective exchanges, *i.e.* through analogical transfers from individual consciousness and individual memory to the collective memory of communities that celebrate or mourn particular events.

It is interesting to note that this question about the ownership of memories was not raised in the Ancient Greek writings of Plato and Aristotle: mnemonic phenomena as affections and as actions can be attributed to anyone and to each one (Ricoeur 2004, 126). Yet, this does not reduce the problem of memories as singular, confined to the sphere of the self. Here, one may wonder whether the hierarchy of memory supposed by the tradition of inwardness in exploring the question of the passage of time and of memories as first being within a singular mind, as mine, and only then through experience shared by a group, is an adequate way to conceptualise the phenomenology of memory. Also, is this an irreversible process? A different order in bridging the individual mind and the collectively shared, intersubjective memory has been suggested by one sociologist, Maurice Halbwachs (1877–1945), who forcefully...
turned the question of who first remembers to society, in the best tradition of Émile Durkheim's sociology. In his works *The Collective Memory* (1980) and *On the Collective Memory* (1992), Halbwachs emphasises the intrinsic connection between memories and the existence of others, of a collectivity. Halbwachs's main thesis is that we are able to remember because we are part of the collectivity: 'a person remembers only by situating himself within the viewpoint of one or several groups and one or several currents of collective thought' (1980, 33). Authors, like Bachelard (1964), similarly have argued for the importance of socially marked places for remembering: the house, the attic, the basement being examples *par excellence* for cherished memories of one's childhood as places that punctuate the life of a family as the first social milieu within which a person remembers. Halbwachs's otherwise very useful account of the importance of the social for remembering, at points slips into a more problematic version of social constructivism when claiming that it is only an illusion that we are owners of our beliefs and memories, arguing for the primacy of social structures with 'a quasi-Kantian use of the idea of framework' (Ricoeur 2004, 123–124). Such a perspective may diminish the role of social actors in remembering who are those individuals who remember.

A realistic view might be to suggest an asymmetric tie between individual memory and collective memory in solving this problem of how to bridge the inwardness of the memory perceived by an individual and the way collectivities retain particular shared memories. Ricoeur insists on the term ‘ascription’ in relation to one's memory as self-ascriptible that must always already be other-ascriptable. These two ascriptions are 'coextensive' (Ricoeur 2004, 127). For this author, remembering is directly connected to narrativity (see below) for which one needs others, the public sphere. By extending phenomenology to the social sphere, as done by Alfred Schutz (1967), one connects contemporaries, predecessors and successors, while at the same time stressing the asymmetry between different possessors of shared memories who as contemporaries belong to the world of shared experience in both space and time. Ricoeur extends this complexity of who remembers what to an intermediary level between the self and a collective of others. He introduces a different kind of memory, what he calls ‘close relations’ or ‘privileged others’ (Ricoeur 2004, 131–132). These friends, or family, those closest to us keep a very particular memory of our lives as individuals that is neither personal nor collective. In this way, the full complexity of memory ascriptions is revealed.

**Enduring images: Bergson**

We will assume for the moment that we know nothing of theories of matter and theories of spirit, nothing of the discussions as to the reality or ideality of the external world. Here I am in the presence of images … Yet there is one of them which is distinct from all the others, in that I do not know it only from without by perceptions, but from within by affections: it is my body (Bergson 1981, 17).

With these words opens Henri Bergson’s (1859–1941) famous work *Matter and Memory* (1981). The most celebrated theses of this work stress duration as a temporal flow phenomenon (see above, Husserl) as well as the idea about an independent survival of the images of the past, *i.e.* representations as recollections of memory. Bergson also makes a distinction between 'habit-memory' and 'event-memory'. The 'habit memory' thus refers to something learnt by heart and remembered with no effort, similar to writing or walking. On the other hand, the 'event-memory' relates to an effort to reproduce an image of a particular memory. An 'economy of effort' to recollect and remember an image (secondary memory) from a simple retention of a particular habit (primary memory) is an important aspect of memory for archaeological case studies (see various papers in this volume).

These two types of memory in fact occupy very different domains: while the habit memory is possible without discursive awareness, secondary memory or recollection is arduous; it is even not presentation of that past moment that is gone but it always must be its re-presentation. What may remain problematic and discomforting in Bergson’s writing for us is his position about the
1. Introduction: Memory, archaeology and the historical condition

independent survival of images, as pure perception, arguing effectively for ‘immateriality of memory’ (cf. Ricoeur 2004, 50–51). Here, the problem of memory’s relationship with imagination is opened up. The relationship between making an image visible through the effort of memory, imagination and its faithfulness to the real, i.e. perception, is directly relevant to all our efforts as archaeologists and historians to represent the past.

Deconstruction of metaphysics: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida

Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) sets the scene for philosophical discourses that deviate from the systemic and move toward aphoristic reasoning (Ginzburg 1989, 124), with Nietzsche as the avant-garde of anti-rationalist modernist thought (Habermas 1987). His rebellious pamphlet against monumental and antiquarian histories directly concerns us here with regard to the questions of (dis)continuities in history and the importance of history for life (Foucault 1984; Ricoeur 1988, 235–240). Nietzsche (1980 [1874]) first denounces monumental history as a celebration of progressive stages and great and powerful figures, and forgetting everything else while, at the other end of the spectrum, antiquarian history only mummifies the past maintaining uncritical preservation and reverence of everything, making the past dead and ineffective. Hence the need for effective and critical history (wirkliche Historie) that would do justice to the past through ‘dangers of research and delights in disturbing discoveries’ (Foucault 1984, 95) and ‘critical exercise of judgement’ (Ricoeur 2004, 290). What Nietzsche attackes is not historiography per se but historical culture: ‘that life requires the service of history must be comprehended, however, just as clearly as the proposition that will subsequently be proved – that an excess of history is harmful for life’ (Nietzsche 1980, 96).

Nietzsche insists on the theme of youth contrasted to old age, as ‘a metaphor for the plastic force of life’ (Ricoeur 2004, 292). One of the main issues with regard to Nietzsche’s work is focused on the question of forgetting that is ‘historical’ and ‘suprahistorical’. As a precursor of Bataille’s later discussions on animality, Nietzsche in the essay compares, on the one side, blissfully ignorant ruminants, grazing and living in a perpetual oblivion and, on the other side, a human being who says ‘I remember’ and is thus determined by one’s past, as a reminder ‘of what his existence at bottom is – an imperfect that is never to be brought to completion’ (Nietzsche 1980 cited by Krell 1990, 255–256). While Nietzsche understands forgetting as inherent in the human animal understood as a ‘necessarily oblivious animal’, memory becomes understood not as typography but as connected to those cases when ‘a promise is to be made’, as ‘an active willing not to get rid of something’ (cf. below Ricoeur’s notion of debt). He also suggests that memory depends on what he calls the ‘prehistory of pain’, i.e. that ‘… in order for something to remain in memory: only what does not stop hurting perdures in memory’ (Nietzsche 1969, 292–297).

This discussion that Nietzsche initiated with regard to the importance of forgetting for fundamental ontology is taken up by Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) who insists that ‘life is historical in the root of its being’ (1962). One of the most distinctive features of Heidegger’s philosophical thinking is his understanding of the past as ‘having-been’ (Gewesenheit). He brings to the fore the feature of the forgetfulness with regard to the meaning of being, left covered-up in everyday preoccupations. Yet, forgetting for Heidegger does not only have a negative connotation, as on the level of being-in, but also a positive ecstatic mode of having-been, as the act of closing off Da-sein’s thrownness in the world (cf. Krell 1990, 240ff; Ricoeur 2004, 442–443; see Borić, this volume).

Heidegger suggests an ecstatic hierarchisation of temporal levels. These are the levels of primordial temporality, also referred to as ‘deep temporality’, historicality and within-time-ness. To start with the level of ‘within-time-ness’, it refers to ordinary representation of time as a series of ‘nows’, i.e. observed changes of passing of days and nights, and seasons. One of the most important contributions of Heidegger’s philosophy is the assertion that this sequence of ‘nows’ does not refer to abstract
moments of linear and neutral time but to preoccupation as an existential characteristic of the subject. This concept of preoccupation is grounded in the ontology of Care as a way of reckoning with time. However, only if this habitual time is detached ‘from this primary reference to natural measures, saying ‘now’ is turned into a form of the abstract representation of time’ (Ricoeur 1980, 174). Ricoeur’s insertion of the significance of narrative at this temporal level, in this way amending Heidegger’s analysis, refers to the constitution of public time that is narrative time (Ricoeur 1980, 175), including ‘others’ (see below).

The main feature of Heidegger’s level of historicality is repetition or recapitulation, which is conceptualised as directed toward the future in a way that it retrieves those potentialities of the past that remained suppressed and without a realisation. It can be considered as a ‘heroic quest’ for new ‘openings’ or as a process of travelling or becoming, breaking out from an existing paradigm. It is described as an ‘existential deepening’ of time, as the repetition/recapitulation go deeper from the ‘levelled off’ surface of the within-time-ness toward the temporal stratum of historicality. The third and the deepest level so strongly proposed by Heidegger (1962) is the level of deep temporality that he relates to Da-sein’s finitude of Being-toward-death, as the most authentic experience of temporality. Heidegger maintains the incommensurability of mortal, historical and cosmic time and does not provide a sufficient answer to the question of how we can bridge the gap between the phenomenological, i.e. ordinary time, and cosmological time. This question is unsolved by stating that the most authentic level of the temporality (the most radical temporality) of Da-sein is Being-toward-death (cf. Ricoeur 2004, 343 ff). It leaves little space for any characterisation of the way for history to be constituted as public (and narrated) time, or for memory. We shall later examine the solution offered by Paul Ricoeur in order to move away from Heidegger’s (unhealthy) fascination with death (see below).

In his book Of Memory, Reminiscence and Writing (1990), David Krell distinguishes two different phases in thinking about memory in the works of Jacques Derrida (1930–2004). The early works, according to Krell, are preoccupied with the question of memory inscription, trace and play or movement of difference, while in Derrida’s later works, the question of memory and mourning is actualised. Derrida’s early works, thus, revolve around what Krell identifies as three models of memory: the typographic model that refers to marks left as traces of a certain (past) presence for a future recall (see above about the Ancient Greek notion of τύπος); the iconographic model that refers to images and ‘likeness’ of absent persons or things (see above about the Ancient Greek notion of ἑικών); and, the engrammatological model, which is related to the problem of re-presentation of the past thing, which creates a gap of difference between the original and a copy, and the solution of this problem through the medium of letters and scripture. For Derrida, trace and difference are related to what he calls arche-writing. Trace, for Derrida, is ‘an originary nonpresence and alterity’. In fact, the agency that left this imprint, or ‘disarrangement’, is never present as such, or as Derrida notes: ‘It is a trace of something that can never present itself; it is itself a trace that can never be presented, that is, can never appear and manifest itself as such in its phenomenon’ (Derrida 1973, 154). There is a sense of an irreducible alterity in the trace as an involuntary testimony of the Other (cf. Lévinas 1972 cited by Ricoeur 1988, 124–125). Derrida suggests that trace is more ‘primordial’ from the phenomenology of presence (Derrida 1973, 67). It is conceived as a play of differences between a cause and an effect and is ‘nonorigin’, replacing the nostalgic search for origins as it ‘becomes the origin of the origin’ (Derrida 1974, 61); similarly as ‘history always precedes history’ (Ricoeur 1988, 247). Yet, Derrida’s notion of trace is understood as being prior to typography: an absence that ‘presents itself’ as ‘an irreducible absence within the presence of the trace’ (Krell 1990, 173).

Differance is what brings about the fact that the movement of signification is possible only if each element that is said to be ‘present’, appearing on the scene of presence, is related to something other than itself, preserving to itself the mark of the past element and allowing itself from the outset to be
hollowed out by the mark of its relation to a future element. The trace is related no less to what one calls the future than to what one calls the past; it constitutes what one calls the present by its very relation to what is not it—absolutely not it; that is to say, not even a past or a future as modified presents (Derrida 1982, 13/13 cited by Krell 1990, 183).

The core of Derrida’s discussion here focuses on the problem of the presence of being or being’s ‘coming to presence’. Derrida’s work Of Grammatology (1974) focuses on the engrammatological model of memory and examines the problem of the tension between speech and text. A question that could stem from such an examination may ask the following: ‘If the principal enigma of memory is resolved always and everywhere in our tradition by an appeal to marks, signs, notations, and text, is not scription rather than speech the privileged place of presence?’ (Krell 1990, 170). Through a genealogical account, Derrida identifies this position as the ‘usurpation’ of speech by writing. For Derrida, trace is difference, and he recognises that there never was a pure presence uncontaminated by the exteriority and instability of the system of signs, no icon that was ever preserved intact’ (Krell 1990, 174). Thus, Derrida questions the heritage of the Western intellectual tradition as logocentric in its search for a transcendental being that serves as the origin or guarantor of meaning. The suggested method of unpacking of this repressive bundle of discourses is what Derrida refers to as deconstruction. Relevant for our discussion about memory, Krell wonders about the usefulness of Derrida’s project: ‘… if Derridean grammatology announces the closure of the metaphysics of presence, the mnemonic model that promises to restore the presence of the past will itself be disengaged and set aside’ (Krell 1990, 7). Yet, even Derrida preserves the sense of the modified past presence, a ‘past present’, or what he calls ‘absolute past’. It marks the impossibility of preserving the evidence of an originary presence.

For Derrida (1974), the graphism of our culture and its interiority that has always accompanied orality is best exemplified in Plato’s Phaedrus that presents the myth about the birth of the writing of history. Grammata are offered to the king as ‘a potion (pharmakon) for memory and wisdom’ (274e). Here one gets to the question about the relationship between memory and history. Is the writing of history a remedy or a poison for memory (Ricoeur 2004, 139ff.)? This question may also echo Nietzsche’s second Unfashionable Observations (see above). The myth insists that the true memory is written in soul, while writing is only seen as a memory aide, a reminder. In a similar fashion, Derrida sees writing as inferior to living memory and living speech.

In his later writings on memory, Derrida turns to the question of mourning and memory, being intimately tied to each other, similar to the way Freud (1989) connected melancholy and mourning. Derrida speaks of memory’s finitude and of memory as always being the memory of the other. In the context of the living memory of committed crimes, Derrida discusses the notion of forgiveness, with its Abrahamic religious origin, as an exceptional act that can only be given unconditionally for the unforgivable:

‘[e]ach time that forgiveness is in the service of finality, be it noble and spiritual (repurchase or redemption, reconciliation, salvation), each time that it tends to reestablish a normalcy (social, national, political, psychological) through a work of mourning, through some therapy or ecology of memory, then ‘forgiveness’ is not pure – nor is its concept. Forgiveness is not, and it should not be, either normal, or normative, or normalizing. It should remain exceptional and extraordinary, standing the test of the impossible …’ (Derrida 1999 cited by Ricoeur 2004, 469).

In the final part of this introduction, I will turn again to this question of ‘guilty memory’ and its material and immaterial spectres that abound.

Narrativity and the continuity of action: Ricoeur

Probably the most comprehensive discussion of the phenomenological approaches to time in Western philosophy to-date is presented in volume 3 of Paul Ricoeur’s (1913–2005) Time and Narrative (volume I –1984a; volumes II–III –1988; see Wood [ed.] 1991; Moore 1990). In this study, Ricoeur discusses phenomenological approaches to time at great length, with extensive
borrowings from the phenomenology of time. His own position relies largely on narrative theory, or to rephrase the author himself, his position is cast through a long journey of a threeway conversation between history, literary criticism and phenomenological philosophy.

In *Time and Narrative*, Ricoeur relies on a lineage of thought that reaches back to St. Augustine and his meditations on time in Book XI of *Confessions* (1961). In this volume Ricoeur uses St. Augustine's conceptualisation and hierarchisation of time as threefold present (past-present, present-present and future-present) in combination with Aristotle's poetic theory of mimesis and emplotment. He bases his argument on the presupposition that any theoretical conceptualisation of time fails to capture time, as shown by the initial phenomenological core present in St. Augustine' analysis that reaches an insoluble paradox, *i.e.* aporia (doubt about what to do). Henceforth the only answer to the problem of time is its treatment within a genre of poiesis, following Aristotle's theory developed in the *Poetics* (Ricoeur 1991a, 180–181). Only in this way, according to Ricoeur, can time be captured, at least temporarily, before it emerges 'victorious from the struggle, after having been held captive in the lines of the plot' (Ricoeur 1988, 274). Furthermore, through the analysis of narrative modes, *i.e.* different ways of telling, time not only becomes thinkable but Ricoeur states that the whole structure of the human experience of temporality becomes inextricably linked to the practice of telling, and becomes viewed as essentially narrative. This reckoning with time can be seen as uniquely human: '... *time becomes human to the extent that it is articulated through a narrative mode, and narrative attains its full meaning when it becomes a condition of temporal existence* ' (Ricoeur 1984a, 52, original emphasis).

In this way, *telling* stories is the basic element of human ontological being in the world. One should note that Ricoeur's whole narrative project continues at the point where another large project related to the phenomenology of time stopped. This last point refers to Heidegger's (1962) *Being and Time*. In the literal translation of Ricoeur's *Time and Narrative* as it stands in its original French title – *Temps et Récit*, *i.e.* 'Time and Telling', an allusion was made that connects 'Being and Time and Telling' (Vanhoozer 1991, 43). With such an emphasis on narration, Ricoeur employs narrative theory in order to mediate questions related to the human experience of temporality.

The possible connection between living and telling is treated differently by various literary theorists and historians alike (see Carr 1986). I find it useful to explicate here a specific answer developed by Paul Ricoeur on this matter that constitutes one of the main achievements of volume 1 of *Time and Narrative*. It relates to the concept of a threefold *mimesis* that explicitly theorises this process of interdependence between narratives and human livelihood, emphasising their reciprocal relationship. The concept of mimesis is borrowed from Aristotle's theory of poetics where plot (*mythos*; the term emplotment is used complementarily, suggesting a more dynamic form) is seen as mimesis of actions. Ricoeur (1991a, 180–181) explains the affinity for the term mimesis as close to a group of terms ending in *sis*, such as *poiesis*, *catharsis*, etc. that allude to the dynamic character of the process that is described. In the case of mimesis this is the dynamic process of imitating or representing something (Ricoeur 1984a, 31) through the circularity of prefiguration, configuration and refiguration.

Under *mimesis*, Ricoeur encompasses the pre-narrative understanding of life. This pre-understanding means that humans are already born in a world that is configured by narratives and that a structure of temporal experience can be described as prenarrative. This temporal level refers to being 'within time' with a preunderstanding of the 'repertoire' of the world (Ricoeur 1984a, 64). It also means that human action is 'always already symbolically mediated' (Ricoeur 1984a, 57) and articulated within a 'conceptual network'. One can assume a practical understanding of intersignifications between the members of a particular conceptual network, *i.e.* 'culture', society, etc.

Ricoeur assigns *mimesis*, a dynamic mediating function, not a simple succession of events, but a process of configuring inchoate elements of lived
1. Introduction: Memory, archaeology and the historical condition

experience into a narrative structure in the act of ‘grasping together’. In this way the episodic dimension of narrative, i.e. events as incoherent and heterogeneous elements of a story of one’s life, are synthesised acquiring the structure of a plot. Lives become meaningful with the coherence of a story and yet the extent of this coherence always oscillates between a ‘discordant concordance’ and ‘concordant discordance’. At this level, one needs to mention features such as the ‘schematism of a story’ with its synthetic function, and the ‘traditionality’ as a dialectic interplay of sedimentation and innovation, stemming from a productive imagination that opens up new paradigms.

Finally, mimesis points to the process of prefiguring lived experience under the influence of narrative as ‘application’ and goes back to the beginning of the circle, i.e. to the level of mimesis: ‘We are following therefore the destiny of a prefigured time that becomes a refigured time through the mediation of a configured time’ (Ricoeur 1984a, 54, original emphasis)

Moreover, it ought to be stressed that this process where mimesis mediates between its two sides – mimesis and mimesis – should not be conceptualised as an endless spiral passing ‘the same point a number of times, but at different altitudes’ (Ricoeur 1984a, 72). To reinforce his main thesis of the resemblance between life experience and story, Ricoeur emphasises the entanglement of plots where the story ‘happens to’ someone before anyone tells it, alluding to untold stories of our lives (Ricoeur 1984a, 75). ‘There is a continual dialectical relationship between lived experience, the narratives we organise it by, and the rhetoric through which those narratives are expressed’ (Hodder 1993, 274; 1995, 168).

Ricoeur’s narrative theory is directly related to his take on memory. Ricoeur emphasises an existing impasse in seeing retention as memory and points out a number of deficiencies related to Husserl’s model of time modifications (Ricoeur 1988, 23ff.). For Ricoeur, a much more potent feature of memory as materialised effect relates to secondary remembrance, i.e. recollection that is contrasted to primary (perceptual) remembrance as retention. Recollection enables repetition or reiteration of the past through free intentionality and is conceptualised as an endless process that transposes the past moments into a quasi-present (Ricoeur 1988, 31ff.). This displacement of a past moment enables a free-floating and open state of memory. Seen as nonperception, recollection is closely linked to the concept of ‘trace’ (see below) as a useful feature employed in memory modelling.

Ricoeur utilises Heidegger’s analysis in Being and Time (1962) that offers a temporalisation, i.e. hierarchisation of different temporal levels (see above). The episodic dimension of narrative as a sequence with an irreversible order is contrasted to the configurational dimension, as a reflective act of ‘grasping together’ in order to invert the time arrow. In this way, the inchoate events acquire a subsequent meaning, as a way of recapitulating a story. Furthermore, telling already means reflecting upon a sequence of events and in this way represents a way of connecting within-time-ness and the subsequent level of historicality, moving from ‘reckoning with time’ to ‘recollecting’ it’ (Ricoeur 1980, 178).

By reading the end into the beginning and the beginning into the end, we learn to read time backwards, as the recapitulation of the initial conditions of a course of action in its terminal consequences. In this way, the plot does not merely establish human action ‘in’ time, it also establishes it in memory. And memory in turn repeats – recollects – the course of events according to an order that is the counterpart of the stretching-along of time between a beginning and an end (Ricoeur 1980, 183).

While finding Heidegger useful to think with, Ricoeur suggests a different solution to the finitude of Da-sein.

Does not narrativity, by breaking away from the obsession of a struggle in the face of death, open any mediation on time to another horizon than that of death, to the problem of communication not just between living beings but between contemporaries, predecessors, and successors? (Ricoeur 1980, 188)

One of the key features in order to communicate between these different temporal horizons is seen in the concept of trace (Ricoeur 1988, 104–126).
Trace is a mark, imprint or material disarrangement left in the passage of a past agency. Traces make reference to a past that really happened, putting a specific ontological weight to the constitution of human temporal experience. The notion of trace can be seen with a decisive role in the constitution of historical time and historic consciousness.

[...] it is in the phenomenon of the trace that we find the culmination of the imaginary character of the connectors that mark the founding of historical time. This imaginary mediation is presupposed by the mixed structure of the trace itself, considered as a sign-effect. This mixed structure expresses in shorthand a complex synthetic activity, involving causal types of inference applied to the trace as a mark left behind and activities of interpretation tied to the signifying character of the trace as something present, standing for something past. This synthetic activity, which is well expressed by the verb ‘to retrace’, sums up in turn operations as complex as those at the origin of the gnomon or calendar. These are the activities of preserving, selecting, assembling, consulting, and finally, reading documents and archives, which mediate and, so to speak, schematize the trace, making it the ultimate presupposition of the reinscription of lived time (time with a present) (Ricoeur 1988, 183–184).

Ricoeur argues for a continuity in the construction of a historical mode of consciousness, seen as a hybrid time. He emphasises that the symbolic meanings in the course of human history are continuous, which itself creates the sense of historicality. In order to strengthen the notion of trace linked to the deep structure of historic consciousness, Ricoeur also introduces the notion of debt, related to the ‘efficacy of the past’ in the transmission of heritage. It primarily refers to the ‘solidarity’ between the living and the dead, where the living maintain the memory of the dead ‘for whom history mourns’, as these are the actual victims of history (Ricoeur 1988, 118, 156, footnote 42): ‘And does this history in turn remain historical only if, going beyond death, it guards against the forgetfulness of death and the dead and remains a recollection of death and a remembrance of the dead?’ (Ricoeur 1984a, 75).

Ricoeur introduces a hyphenated expression Being-affected-by-the-past (Ricoeur 1988, 207ff.) in order to reify the insufficiency of connecting different levels of temporality in Heidegger’s philosophy. However, in the last instance Ricoeur’s answer to the aporetics of time admits the limit of narrativity in concurring time, which is powerful and enveloping.

It has to do with the ultimate unrepresentability of time, which makes even phenomenology continually turn to metaphors and to the language of myth, in order to talk about the upsurge of the present or the flowing of the unitary flux of time (Ricoeur 1988, 243).

Yet, the process of both historical and fictional narration mirroring the life experience may be understood as ‘a timeless human drama, that of humanity at grips with the experience of temporality’ (White 1987, 183). An optimistic solution to this question Ricoeur finds in Hannah Arendt’s celebration of the power of natality and the continuation of action (Arendt 1958; Ricoeur 2004, 486ff.). Arendt sees action outliving the mortal lives of the actors since it always wants to continue. This is a radical break from and protest against Heidegger’s idea of Da-sein’s finitude as being-toward-death. In this context, the importance is given to the moral and political dimensions of the notion of promise, of making and keeping promises. This is the memory of ipseity, of remaining faithful to the given promise, and is thus intimately tied to the notions of ‘debt, fault, guilt’ (Ricoeur 2004, 603, n. 39; cf. Ricoeur 1998, 119ff.).

Beyond the Western episteme

While on the previous pages, the particular Western philosophical genealogy of thinking about memory has been discussed, can we say that the same arguments and the same problems are relevant for the rest of humanity? Are Heidegger’s notion of historicality or Ricoeur’s insistence on the duty of memory and debt to the dead universally shared? The obvious way to tackle these questions is to look
1. Introduction: Memory, archaeology and the historical condition

into ethnography of non-Western contexts or even to the past itself, thus evaluating the adequacy of the concepts developed thus far.

One of the criticisms has been raised in relation to the text and the dominance of textual analogies with memory compared to textual practice (Fentress and Wickham 1992, 6; Thomas 1996, 53) under the influence of the hermeneutic philosophical tradition (Ricoeur 1981; Moore 1990). Memory is recognised as similar to the interpretative practice of reading. Text is conceptualised as independent from the author’s original intentions as it ‘lives its own life’. Thus similar to text memory is never a ‘completed work’ but an on-going montage of ‘scraps’ and fragments of meaning. On the other hand, the hermeneutic approach and ‘textual analogy’ in the study of social memory – predominantly conceptualising memory as conscious archiving of documentary evidence – largely neglected less formal and less conscious aspects of mnemonic activities, such as the significance of routine incorporating bodily practices or ‘techniques of the body’ (Mauss 1979; Connerton 1989).

Further, following Connerton (1989), Rowlands (1993) suggests that frequent emphasis on monuments and monumental sites in discussions about memory could be identified as an inscribing principle. It may relate to a specific European affinity for a monumental material culture inextricably linked with an emphasis on the linear concept of time, having a long historical trajectory. However in various social, cultural and historical contexts, memory is not merely accumulated and ‘stored’ in monuments. Forgetting is sometimes an equally constitutive part of future remembering (e.g. Borić, this volume; Harris forthcoming; Taylor 1996). This ‘negative’ to remembrance related to forgetting, loss, foreclosure, exfoliation, defacement or destruction of either material mnemonic and monumental objects (Küchler 1996; 1999) or knowledge (Strathern 1991) has been emphasised as equally important in the constitution of memory. In this way the recombining of fragments of memory re-constitutes and re-creates one’s identity, where power and creativity lie in the play of gaps or lacunae of meaning and remembering with a general impression of ‘scrappiness’ (Buchli 1999; see Deleuze 1988). Powerful metaphors, such as defacement (Taussig 1999) or the place of buried memory (Küchler 1999) best capture this multidirectional and non-linear temporal working of memory. Küchler’s example of malanggan carvings as part of commemoration practices of the dead in the north-west of Papua New Guinea points to the place of memory displaced from a commemorative, visually lasting monument with its memorial value (see also Gell 1998, 223). The physical disappearance of a monumental object therefore creates a possibility for memory to be implanted in new places.

One recent collection of papers focuses on the question of memory and change in a regional context of Amazonian lowland societies (Fausto and Heckenberger 2007). This region as a whole has previously been considered as one where past is intentionally obliterated from memory. This particular feature of Amerindian thought was famously used by Lévi-Strauss to draw a distinction between hot societies (with history and dedicated to change and innovation) and cold societies (without history, aiming to remain static and stable). Many ethnographic accounts coming from this region over the years thus stressed that across this vast region one encounters shallowness of genealogical time and ties and a general absence of the concept of ancestral ties (e.g. Cunha 1978; Overing Kaplan 1977). For instance, among various groups, the existence of endo- (funerary) and/or exo-cannibalism indicated the need for an intentional erasing of the memory of one’s own dead, or through a complex interplay of predator-prey relations between different figures of alterity (e.g. enemies, animals, spirits, the dead, etc.) of coming to terms with the departure of one’s kin (e.g. Conklin 2001; Taylor 1993; Vilaça 1992; 2000).

One may say that in such a context, questions of the ‘being-affected-by-the-past’ or historicality (see above) of a particular group play out very differently than the previous discussion on memory and time perception that dominated Western thought at least since the time of the Greek polis. Confronted with the Amerindian ethnographic
evidence one is forced to go beyond the preferred philosophical notions of the Western culture, such as the questions about historical consciousness and individual agency (Fausto and Hackenberger 2007). The particular Amerindian ‘openness to the other’ that Lévi-Strauss emphasised from the start, means that identity is not envisioned as a distinction and difference but is produced in relation to figures of alterity by appropriating, or to speak in terms of literal conduct, cannibalising the otherness in a predatory move. It is the notion of ‘structural transformation’ and the metamorphic capacity of the body that become foregrounded in this particular ontological universe. Here, the typical Western realisation frequently stressed in memory studies about the importance of identity seen as self-constancy over time is an oxymoron. The key concept is that of transformation.

‘This Amerindian ‘symbolic economy of alterity’ (Viveiros de Castro 1996) meant that within these societies an equation was born between the dead and many other Others, be it related to the construction of inter-ethnic, inter-species or inter-topological relations. While such an identification of the dead and alterity is widespread across Amazonia, new archaeological and historical research indicates that this particular feature might have been different in the past, and that the whole region was characterised by more diversity in the treatment and the conceptualisation of the dead, countering the usual assumption about ‘genealogical amnesia’ (Chaumeil 2007). New archaeological evidence may after all indicate that across Amazonia before the contact period existed more complex societies than those that were encountered by the first ethnographers. Such hierarchical and ‘complex’ societies showed signs of genealogical reckoning and memory construction, something that can be attested in the Upper Xingu where, for instance, one finds the importance of ancestrality (Heckenberger 2007).

In sum, the construction of social memory in relation to the production of identity, self-constancy and the issue of change over time, take different forms in non-Western contexts, sometimes by a complete inversion of the assumed meanings of these categories. Sometimes, forgetting becomes an important element of social relatedness as well as systematic distancing, and othering of the dead. However, these examples do not relativise our previous discussions about the importance of memory for defining the historical condition of human beings. They rather point to the inherent flexibility for redefining the terms of relations with regard to these categories depending on a particular social and historical context.

Yet, such a conclusion in favour of inherent human historical conditionality cannot in itself be satisfactory in removing doubts with regard to the problematic position occupied by historians or archaeologists in their attempts to represent the past. How dependent are these fields of expertise on their modernist origins and the Western ethnocentrism of traditional history? How ‘real’ is the past that becomes narrated in historical or archaeological accounts, and what separates it from fictional narratives? Finally, what is the relationship between the past represented through these ‘professional’ narratives and collective/ individual memory? The answers for these not easily conquerable questions will be sought in the following section.

Traces, clues and symptoms: Archaeological epistemology and memory

And, during a visit to an archaeological site, I evoked the cultural world gone by to which these ruins sadly referred. Like the witness in a police investigation, I can say of these places, ‘I was there’ (Ricoeur 2004, 40).

Though reality may seem to be opaque, there are privileged zones – signs, clues, which allow us to penetrate it (Ginzburg 1989, 123).

…the true archaeological activity, the one in which the archaeologist finds his true identity and is aware that no one can take his place to advantage, is certainly the ‘establishment’ of facts. In the most general and characteristic case, that of an excavation, it is when he notes a mass of rubble, locates one wall, then the others, and sees a plan forming (...) it is when he differentiates between discarded bones and a grave, between a simple hearth and a localized or generalized blaze; it is when he does this that he is accomplishing work that no one is
better able to do, that no one else can ever do again. (…) He knows that, if he makes a mistake, sees things wrongly, misunderstands, his conclusions will then be irremediably falsified and cannot but lead to other errors among those who use them (Courbin 1988).

In the past several decades, the discipline of archaeology has been thought through a plurality of theoretical and epistemological positions, some of which have been radically opposed to each other. From classic culture history descriptive approaches, through the scientistic paradigm of positivist thought and law-like generalisations of the so-called ‘processual’ or ‘New Archaeology’ to the influence of hermeneutical tactics, structuralist and post-structuralist approaches characterising what has become known as post-modern or, in a confrontational mood, ‘post-processual’ tradition of archaeological thought: archaeology has sought its voice. It has been orienting itself in relation to the conceptual theoretical vocabulary available in the wider field of philosophy, social sciences and humanities. The present cacophony of thought in our discipline is a reflection of a similar condition in all other fields of human sciences where ‘granting agencies function as gatekeepers’ only with a limiting effect while ‘different interpretive ‘federations,’ or simply clusters, coalesce around different questions, different methods, different standards of evidence, different types of argumentation, different career patterns, different sources of symbolic capital, differential placements within the cultural, economic, political, and social fields’ (Rabinow 2003, 5).

In the midst of such a condition, here, I use the opportunity to subject the discipline of archaeology to memory, understood as a moral keeper of historical meaning, and to ask questions about the character of archaeological epistemology and rigour under which it should be practised and understood. This is done with a hope that on the level of elementary archaeological investigatory operations and with regard to the ontological weight of archaeological evidence in the constitution of the general historical knowledge a wider disciplinary consensus is possible.

I find the grounding for such an endeavour in the historian Carlo Ginzburg’s essay ‘Clues: Roots of and Evidential Paradigm’ (1989). Ginzburg (1989, 96) here traces (and this is an intentional choice of the word!) ‘the silent emergence of an epistemological model’ or paradigm in human sciences. What he calls ‘evidential’ or ‘conjectural’ paradigm became a dominant practice in fields as diverse as divination, law, criminology, medicine, palaeography, meteorology, history, palaeontology or archaeology, which all rely on particularities of evidence of individual cases in providing clues about a condition that is being examined, be it for the purposes of interpreting the past or the future. It is also about gathering marginal details, information that the consciousness cannot hold, and ‘infinitesimal traces [that] permit the comprehension of a deeper, otherwise unattainable reality’ (Ginzburg 1989, 101).

While a clearer shape of this rarely recognised paradigm can best be gauged from the late sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries onwards, during the period that Ginzburg reconstructs in some detail, he convincingly argues that the origin of this type of human behaviour can be traced back to the time of hunter-gatherers and perhaps could be related to the idea of following traces of a particular prey in a hunt, or a chase, search for food: ‘[t]his knowledge is characterised by the ability to construct from apparently insignificant experimental data a complex reality that could not be experienced directly’ (Ginzburg 1989, 103). Such an exercise required intellectual operations, such as analyses, comparison and classification (cf. Lévi-Straus 1966, passim). Importantly, Ginzburg suggests a hypothesis that such ability of compiling traces and their interpretation enabled narration as a way of putting incoherent elements into a meaningful sequence of events that comprises a story (on narrative and life cf. Ricoeur 1984; 1988; see above). The roots of this paradigm are then found also in Mesopotamian divination and legal texts (discussing concrete examples), or further in Hippocratic medicine in Ancient Greece, the latter maintaining ‘that only by attentively observing symptoms in great detail could one develop precise ‘histories’ of individual diseases; disease, in itself,
was out of reach’ (Ginzburg 1989, 105). In Ancient Greece, this type of implicit knowledge became eclipsed by a more prestigious type of thinking developed by Plato.

In many ways, the ideas about the trace and image (Greek tupos and eikōn) can be connected to the invention of writing. As we have seen previously, such ideas constitute the core of memory-related discussions among Ancient Greek philosophers but can also be traced in Derrida’s engrammatology and a recent philosophical memory synthesis by Ricoeur (see above). The invention of writing, for Ginzburg, could be related to the idea of following or ‘deciphering’ animal tracks. Here, there is a close connection between the very practice of divination and the task of deciphering messages. Ginzburg reminds us of the Chinese myth that writing was invented by observing bird tracks on a sandy shore (Ginzburg 1989, 103): ‘[e]ven a footprint indicates an animal’s passing. In respect to the concreteness of the print, of a mark materially understood, the pictogram already represents an incalculable step forward on the road towards intellectual abstraction’ (Ginzburg 1989, 104). And further, this process led to progressive dematerialisation of the text, which was gradually purified at every point of reference related to the senses; even though a material element is required for a text’s survival. The text itself is not identified by that element’ (Ginzburg 1989, 107; cf. Buchli 1995).

The evidential or conjectural paradigm can be put in sharp contrast to what Ginzburg calls Galilean sciences, which were formulated with the appearance of the Galilean physics. For what so sharply divides these two different ways of knowing is their different relation to the individual instance and sensuousness: while mathematics and the empirical method assume quantification of repetitive phenomena or law-like generalisations, human sciences are inherently qualitative and rely on individual instances, unique situations and particular events, or single patients. It is the image of anti-anthropomorphic and anti-anthropocentric natural sciences contrasted to a large body of loosely connected human sciences (Ginzburg 1989, 108). But in the course of the eighteenth-century, there was a need for such a heterogeneous group of conjectural disciplines or skills to achieve a scientific status. For medicine, for instance, it was particularly important to go beyond the ‘uncertainty’ and to become a respectful science with a ‘written codification of conjectural knowledge’ (Ginzburg 1989, 115). Ginzburg sees a decisive moment in the Counter-Reformation, and the encyclopaedic systematisation of knowledge, which was further facilitated by the invention of printing and a much easier distribution and availability of books. The experience of others became codified and available across the social classes. Towards the end of the nineteenth-century, this process was well under way and one should only quote the example of the popularity of what Thomas Huxley, publicising Darwin, called ‘Zadig’s method,’ combining diachronic disciplines such as ‘history, archaeology, geology, physical astronomy, and palaeontology, namely, the ability to forecast retrospectively’ (Ginzburg 1989, 117). The rise in popularity of these disciplines lay in the fact that in order to study those things that cannot be experimentally reproduced, one needed to ‘deduce them from their effects’ (Ginzburg 1989, 117).

The described evidential or conjectural paradigm, which refers to a common epistemological model, cannot only be associated with the Enlightenment and modernity. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, modes of conjectural knowledge only become codified, frequently striving to achieve a scientific status, similar to the Galilean natural sciences. This codification of the evidential paradigm happened due to, on the one hand, growing interest in detective stories and narratives about the animal and human past, and, on the other hand, the need for state control over individuals in industrial societies. To the latter, Ginzburg (1989, 118–123) quotes a fascinating example how an indigenous Bengalese conjectural knowledge of the uniqueness of fingerprints was appropriated by the British administration in order to become one of the critical means of control over the identity of colonial and other subjects. Yet, Ginzburg’s paper discovers a fascinating complexity of numerous threads connecting different characters in his ‘excavation’ of this previously unrecognised
epistemological model, for which he uses the metaphor of a (semiotic) carpet.

Surprisingly, there have been little mention and discussion of this seminal paper in archaeology (but see Shanks 1996, 39–40) despite its obvious importance for defining and defending the archaeological project. More recently archaeologists of deconstructionist provenience have primarily been occupied by denouncing archaeological (sinful) grounding in the project of modernity (e.g. Thomas 2004). While, such an identification remains useful and important for understanding various detailed aspects of disciplinary history of ideas and methodologies, perhaps we should not be blinded by modernity’s proximity in our discipline. Ginzburg’s essay, which is itself a detective story or an archaeological dig in identifying the development of particular ways about gaining knowledge about the unknown, is critical for reasserting archaeological epistemology. It may have the potential to bridge separate confederations within archaeology in order to sidestep unproductive positivist vs. post-modern positions still persisting in many quarters, or, at the very least, have the potential to spark discussions on the epistemological grounding of archaeological knowledge with a fresh perspective. But how is all this important for memory studies?

Killing two birds with one stone, Ginzburg’s discussion of the evidential paradigm also reaffirms his dedication to microhistory and the study of details that are at the same time indications (or symptoms) of general phenomena (e.g. Ginzburg 1980). The microhistory project and discussion of variation in scales is not our primary purpose here (but see various papers in this volume). The notion of clue approximates the notion of vestiges and that of trace. The idea of vestiges, including archaeological ones, was highly valued by both the historian Marc Bloch (1964), who speaks of ‘witnesses in spite of themselves’ as a way of putting written testimonies under the historiographer’s scrutiny, as well as by Robin Collingwood (1999) in his ‘critical history’. The question that is opened here, thus, is that of trustworthiness of particular testimony, its relation to memory and the internal-external coherence of documentary proof (sensu Collingwood).

Our previous discussion about the epistemological grounding of archaeology (along with other similar conjectural diachronic disciplines) indicates that even if archaeological or historical facts come shorter of the empirical facts in natural sciences in their exactness due to their having an inherent and ‘unsuppressible speculative margin’ (Ginzburg 1989, 106), these facts can nevertheless be characterised in the Popperian sense as ‘true’ or ‘false’, ‘refutable’ or ‘verifiable’. This means that it would not be possible to equate a historical (archaeological) narrative and fictional narrative. The past really took place – it really happened – and any attempt at relativising it inflicts great danger on what one could call the duty of memory (Ricoeur 2004, passim): [...] the mysterious aspect of the debt [...] makes the master of the plot a servant of the memory of past human beings’ (Ricoeur 1988, 156). Here lies the importance for memory with regard to the previous discussion that firmly establishes the ‘objectivity’ of historical or archaeological knowledge. While this assertion may appear obvious, let us linger a bit longer on this issue and spell out why it is important to take seriously the idea about the ‘truth element of the past’ (cf. Ginzburg 2002).

In a short book with the title The Reality of the Historical Past, Paul Ricoeur (1984b) summarises one of the main points discussed in detail in several of his works: the idea that narrative about the historical past must be at any cost separated from fictional narratives. Using Plato’s ‘great classes’ of the Same, the Other and the Analogue, Ricoeur discusses ways of representing the past: Collingwood’s idea of re-enacting the past (through empathy and the movement of a historian’s thought) in the present under the class of the Same; past seen as a foreign land and difference under the class of the Other, refusing the totalising view of history; and, a tropological approach to the past (such as the rhetorical theory employed by Hayden White (1978) through the tropes of metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche and irony) under the class of the Analogue. While Ricoeur has a preference for the class of the Analogue, i.e. the trace ‘standing for’ the past such as it really occurred (sensu Ranke), his critique touches on what he sees as a danger in
White’s use of rhetorical theory, which ‘runs the risk of erasing the dividing line between fiction and history’ (Ricoeur 1984b, 33).

Narratives are not something we choose or reject at will, nor are they linguistic artifacts we measure against a nonnarrative universe. Stories are what we live in, and in them we find both our worlds and our selves. We differentiate among them, we call some fairy tales and others true stories, and we tend to believe that our favorite tale is the one everyone else should adopt. But we do this from within narrative traditions we can interweave with others but never entirely escape. As our traditions change, so do our histories; as our histories change, so do our worlds; as our worlds change, so do our traditions. Saying that we live inside narrative traditions is not the same thing as saying that any story is as good as another (Klein 1997, 5–6).

There is a political reason for this kind of tacit but clear dividing line between history and fiction, and the frequently quoted example relates to the question of Holocaust victims (e.g. Ricoeur 1988, 187; 2004) as the most striking recent historical example. Moreover, in this context archaeology through its forensic side as part of the evidential paradigm becomes directly involved in the production of important, true facts that in the most obvious way must do justice to the past and those victims the memory of whom must be honoured at any cost (cf. Mitrović 2008; Filippucci, this volume; Weiss, this volume). Similarly this assertion applies to the question of subordinate groups and their rights to use the archaeological past as a way of becoming empowered in the present (Hodder 1991, 10). Such an empowering state, for archaeology, meant admitting the fact about the ‘resistance of the past’ (cf. Shanks and Hodder 1995, 18–22), and that archaeological data can be seen as being somewhat independent of archaeologists’ assumptions (Wylie 2002, 161–167).

The very process of ‘reading’ and interpreting (archaeological) data in order to provide a ‘historical’ and not fictional account can be achieved by providing the ‘guarded objectivity’ for our historical/archaeological narratives (Hodder 1991, 10ff.). In archaeology, I. Hodder (1991; 1999, 32ff.) bases this methodological possibility on the theoretical footage developed within the tradition of critical hermeneutics, of which Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur are the most prominent proponents. The ‘guarded objectivity’ of an archaeological inquiry relies on a) the autonomy of objects, i.e. configured independence of material culture, b) the notion of coherence in interpretation (following Collingwood), c) the necessity of ‘translation’ of the past Other and d) the critical stance against the prejudice of the analyst. Through a dialectic model of question-response, i.e. interrogation and response between the past and us, we reach a specific knowledge of the past that is not purely arbitrary or subjective. This procedure creates a necessary methodological balance regarding the specificity of historical and archaeological discourses when faced with the positivist demand that only empirically observed and scientifically described fact is real (cf. Ricoeur 1984a, 79). In Gadamer’s phrase, the understanding reached through a hermeneutic dialogue can be seen as a fusion of horizons between the worlds of the reader and the ‘text’.

In the previous discussion, it was suggested that if we understand archaeology as part of Ginzburg’s evidential paradigm, it is an heir to an honourable epistemological line. Hence, a frequently justifiable insistence on its modernist ‘guilt’ should not deter us from admitting archaeology’s genuine importance as a developed form of knowledge about past unknowns, which remain experimentally unverifiable, but for that reason not less ‘objective’. Furthermore, traces, clues and symptoms that produce historical/archaeological facts about the past should be seen in terms of ‘true’ or ‘false’ statements in order to preserve the truth element of the past. This reality of the past is of primary importance for the moral obligation of keeping the memory of the dead, those victims of history, and for doing justice to the past when it comes to its re-presentation. Interestingly, the importance of keeping a firm dividing line between historical/archaeological narratives, on the one hand, and fictional narratives, on the other hand, becomes especially obvious when it comes to the testimonies of survivors of particular traumatic events, such as
1. Introduction: Memory, archaeology and the historical condition

the Holocaust or more recent wars in the former Yugoslavia (see Mitrović 2008; Weiss, this volume). It seems that with the temporal distance of the observer from the object of study the emotional link is partly lost and the process of othering subconsciously and inevitably takes place (see Filippucci, this volume).

This gradation between emotional attachments and issues related to different pasts is possible to detect in the present volume when one moves back from the mentioned discussion of the most recent past where archaeological evidence is part of the criminal tribunal that shapes a particular version of history of most recent events relating to the 1990s Balkan wars (Weiss, this volume; cf. Bajić, this volume) to the discussion of the Western front and the archaeology of the First World War (Filippucci, this volume). The latter example still produces an uncanny element of discomfort of instances that are still within the horizon of survivors, awakening all too familiar and carnal feelings. Yet, it already slowly fades into the ‘past past’, endowed with a particular version of history of most recent events relating to the 1990s Balkan wars (Weiss, this volume; cf. Bajić, this volume) to the discussion of the Western front and the archaeology of the First World War (Filippucci, this volume). The latter example still produces an uncanny element of discomfort of instances that are still within the horizon of survivors, awakening all too familiar and carnal feelings. Yet, it already slowly fades into the ‘past past’, endowed with a particular temporal distancing, admittedly midway between the instances of ‘contemporary past’ and older pasts discussed in papers found in the first part of the book. In the next section of this introduction, I turn to questions about the political dimension of memory.

Our historical condition and guilty memory: Spectres and angels

It never happened without blood, martyrdoms, sacrifice, whenever human beings found it necessary to form a memory (Nietzsche 1969).

In this section we move to a wider understanding of memory as part of our historical condition as human beings. It rests on the assumption about the continuity of human action over time and its meaningful constitution. In this way, it incorporates the strands of thought previously discussed, such as the nature of archaeological knowledge in particular as part of general historical knowledge, the scales of investigatory explorations, the material experience of life and the persistence of narrative identity through time. As previously admitted, the understanding of memory is here strongly influenced by Arendtian and Ricoeurean notions about the vitality of life and the power of natality of which memory is a constitutive element. Hence these closing remarks on the connection of memory and archaeology are under the sign of the discussion recently put forward by Ricoeur (2004) with regard to the morality of memory.

What happens when the object of love becomes lost? When good times are gone, and when all that remains is reminiscing on the past? What about nostalgia, and how is it expressed? Already Aristotle mentions that those who cannot stop recollecting turn into melancholics. Only by shattering ‘the mirror of memory’ can nostalgia be extinguished, says philosopher David Krell (1990, 22). In his short essay ‘Mourning and melancholy’, Freud (1989) uses the tradition-laden term ‘melancholia’ and compares this condition to mourning (cf. Buchli, this volume). As a medical condition melancholy produces sleeplessness. It revolves around the issue of the lost object and the object cathexis, as the loss of a love-object compels that the ambivalence in the love relationship comes out in the open. We become prisoners of our memories. As one of the characters in Jean-Luc Godard’s 2001 film In Praise of Love says: ‘I don’t know how memory can help us reclaim our lives’. Reacting negatively to Schindler’s List and its totalising gaze as well as to Hollywood’s cannibalisation of the history of others, in the movie Godard colours the past and leaves the present in the shades of grey, reversing the logic of Schindler’s List. He evokes resistance as a factor of memory and invites understanding of the complexity of historical events, objecting to the way such complex events and memories enter into the public imagination through ephemeral information technologies.

It is as if the past can never disappear against Nietzsche’s best advice. Freud was convinced about the indestructibility of the past once experienced (cf. Ricoeur 2004, 445). Furthermore, how does one reconcile the experience and testimonies of the survivors of traumatic historical events (cf. Weiss, this volume)? Here arises the problem about the boundaries imposed on the historical representation of such limit experiences: ‘A further
reason for the difficulty in communicating has to do with the fact that the witness himself had no distance on the events; he was a ‘participant,’ without being the agent, the actor; he was their victim’ (Ricoeur 2004, 176).

In order to rectify somewhat this situation, Paul Ricoeur suggests the term representation in the work of historians. What he aims to accomplish by the use of representation instead of the Annales school’s notion of mentality has to do with the historiographical operation that emphasises ‘a mimetic relation between the operation of representing as the moment of doing history [by historians], and the represented object as the moment of making history’ (Ricoeur 2004, 229). This is also close to Clifford Geertz’s (1983) idea of self-understanding as being immanent to a culture. Such an emphasis on the notion of representation may help liberate history and the representation of the past from the historical determinism of totalising history and ‘retrospective illusion of fatality’ (Aron 1961, 183). Ricoeur insists on the semantics of the word re-presentation in order to give the voice to the social agents in the past. Historians or archaeologists can rely on the resistance of a particular type of past reality that is in this way being represented. Such a perspective may appear ‘liberating’ to archaeologists in their attempts to understand a particular material culture rhetoric represented in the archaeological record.

In the book of philosophical and theological conversations with Paul Ricoeur made in the late 1990s, Critique and Conviction (1999), this philosopher reveals two orders of motivations for his more recent interest in memory and especially with regard to the issue of the duty of collective memory and duty of justice in relation to memory. Ricoeur explains that the first order of motivations is related to the events of Ricoeur’s generation that are still within the living memory of the survivors of the Second World War and the memory of Holocaust. The second order of motivation, he relates to events in Europe after the fall of the Berlin wall and communism where ‘it is almost as though [people] had been taken out of deep-freeze. They seem to display at times an excess, at times a lack of memory’ (Ricoeur 1999, 125). Perhaps this extremely unstable condition of collective memory can best be treated through the artistic mode of irony that is seen as freedom in negativity (Kafka) by negating personal and cultural ideas through humour (Bajić, this volume).

So, for example, what is one to make out of this excess of history per square mile in the Balkans, a thesis frequently repeated in the wake of the 1990s conflicts in the former Yugoslavia? How does one move away from such resurgence of the past in fragments that triggers destructive political action? Here, we could think of different versions of history that may have some consequences for the political action. This type of understanding of history would be closer to the archaeological method of Michel Foucault (1972) than to the history understood as progress, continuity and the accumulation of knowledge or search for origins. This is a move away from total history (cf. Ricoeur 2004, 240), which draws all phenomena around a single centre (a principle, a meaning, a spirit, a world-view, an overall shape). Instead, Foucault’s general history deploys the space of a dispersion. Foucault’s genealogies ‘are intended, inter alia, to articulate political possibilities in the present by telling alternative histories of the present and by producing a historical ontology of the present – one that reveals fissures and breaks in its production, thereby interrupting a seamless narrative of the past that yielded a seamless architecture of the present’ (Brown 2001, 168). These are histories that emphasise the diversity while drawing on unrealised possibilities. Paul Ricoeur (2004) reminds us that it is our debt to the ‘victims of history’ to revive all those possibilities and crossroads of projects that could have been otherwise. These attempts, apart from their therapeutic value of collective ‘working through’ in psychoanalytic terms, should open space for political action that can build on particularly potent sites of history in a responsible way: ‘[r]edemption of past suffering and retrieval of past possibility both become possible in the project of forging a future’ (Brown 2001, 168).

In one of the chapters of her book Politics Out of History (2001), Wendy Brown compares such puzzling visions of the past as expressed in
1. Introduction: Memory, archaeology and the historical condition

The writing of two authors: Walter Benjamin and Jacques Derrida. In the opening discussion she maintains that ‘the relation of the present to the past is most often figured through idealisations and demonisations of particular epochs or individuals on the one hand, and reparations and apologies for past wrongs on the other’ … ‘Once guilt is established and a measure of victimisation secured by an apology or by material compensation, is the historical event presumed to be concluded, sealed [as cast], ’healed,’ or brought to ‘closure’?’ (2001, 140; see above on Derrida’s view about forgiveness). This ‘economy of debt’, however, seems to be more complex. In fact, do images of past traumas ever disappear? Or can we identify a particular feature of melancholia that a particular loss awakens? It is the feeling of missed opportunities and political formations related to the notion of progress that can haunt both individual and collective experience. One of Walter Benjamin’s Theses on the Philosophy of History emphasises this aspect of loss. He describes ‘the melancholic’s investment in ‘things’ and in precepts of stories that acquire thinglike form’ (Benjamin 1968 cited by Brown 2001, 170).

These haunting images of the past that one cannot break free from and which remain and resurge in the present is what Benjamin emphasises in his Theses on the Philosophy of History when he describes Klee’s painting ‘Angelus Novus’ as the angle of History. Here is what Benjamin says:

A Klee painting named ‘Angelus Novus’ shows an angel looking as though he is about to move away from something he is fixedly contemplating. His eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees only single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. This storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress (Benjamin 1968, 257–258).

This is a powerful and inspiring metaphor in our musings on the theme of the images of the past and their relations to the present. Such a view goes against ‘a fundamental premise of progress, namely that more just and felicitous times have steadily displaced more impoverished ones. For Benjamin, the past is not an inferior version of the present but an exploitable cache of both traumatic and utopian scenes’ (Brown 2001, 157; see Bajić, this volume). Benjamin’s powerful image of wreckages of history piling up in their omnipresence removes a possibility of a comfortable and secure position of the past. We are within history that cannot disappear, whose images are everywhere, haunting the present and the future. In the positive sense, this conceptualisation of history means that all the possibilities are always open as historical memory can be used to undo the inevitability or the givenness of the present. On the negative side, this means that the archive of disturbing possibilities is present around us and can be triggered at any particular moment, in an opportunistic move. Such a position in both empowering and disempowering (see Buchli, this volume; Connerton 2009).

Jacques Derrida’s work Spectres of Marx (1994) can be compared to the Benjaminian vision of the angel of history. As Wendy Brown has put it succinctly, ‘Deities, angels, spectres, and ghosts … what are we to make of these creatures arising from the pens of radical thinkers in the twentieth century as they attempt to grasp our relation to the past and future …’ (2001, 142). Derrida’s imaginative readings of Marx produced this work at the end of one history, the history of Marxism. But he maintains that spectres of Marxism still live among us. This particular reading of Marx focuses on Marx’s own famous words from the first sentence of the Manifesto: ‘All the powers of old Europe have entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this spectre …’ (Marx and Engels 1978). Yet, Derrida’s real aim when suggesting the discipline of ‘hauntology’ is to show in what way the past remains among us and in what way the dead affect the living, the way the past lives indirectly in the present.

These views of Benjamin and Derrida have a double message for us. On the one hand, they are
the reminders of the unfinishedness and latent presence of various historical processes, something that became violently obvious in the 1990s with the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. At that time, suppressed and for many spectators unimaginable atrocities were being committed. It was thus highly naïve to ask the question how this all happened out of nowhere. How was it possible for things to come back? What followed these events was an essentialisation of the peoples of the former Yugoslavia as having something inherently corrupt within them (cf. Todorova 1997). This distancing from the Balkans and similar 'corrupt' ‘Others’ is a naïve way to preserve the comfort of progress and a coherent past and present.

On the other hand, the anti-progressive historiography brings the possibility to draw on historical memory as an archive of potent images to configure responsible historical consciousness that would debalkanise memories. By unearthing buried memories of shared pasts one interprets, explains and understands present cultural differences that could infuse and perpetuate conflicts and intolerance. Penetrating through layers of constructed histories and identities is a possible therapeutic way to curing and reconciliation for diverse collectivities to come to terms with their overlapped pasts, heritage and memories.

Material engagements and memory

Finally, before we turn to particular archaeology-related case studies in this volume, it remains important to turn to the question of what appears as one of the central issues for archaeologists when dealing with memory – the issue of its relationship with the materiality of the world. Recently, archaeologists have been deeply embroiled in discussions about materiality (e.g. papers in Buchli 2002; Jones 2007; Meskell 2004; papers in Miller 2005; Renfrew 2001), regaining confidence on the grounds of their familiarity with the world of material culture that archaeologists routinely come to grips with. Similarly, many of the papers in this volume explicitly or implicitly address the issue of materiality in their archaeological case studies. But is this insistence on materiality and the celebration of its importance for past actors perhaps an apology for late capitalist consumer society? Are we perhaps again caught up in the snares of our own historical positioning?

Tim Ingold criticises this recent emphasis on material culture, ‘which has gained a new momentum following its long hibernation in the basements of museology’ (Ingold 2007, 5). Ingold argues that instead of a too abstract notion of materiality, we, as archaeologists and anthropologists, should rather learn how one can practically engage with the properties and qualities of the materials that the world is made of. Thus, it is not only the material culture that is made into finished objects but everything that surrounds us, and our approaches should explore the consequences of such a perspective. In one of his previous essays, Ingold (1993), for instance directly relates the experience of an archaeologist digging in a particular landscape with the type of testimony about the past that is produced in the process:

... the practice of archaeology is itself a form of dwelling. The knowledge born of this practice is thus on a par with that which comes from the practical activity of the native dweller and which the anthropologist, through participation, seeks to learn and understand. For both the archaeologist and the native dweller, the landscape tells – or rather is a story. It enfolds the lives and times of predecessors who, over the generations, have moved around in it and played their part in its formation. To perceive the landscape is therefore to carry out an act of remembrance, and remembering is not so much a matter of calling up an internal image, stored in mind, as of engaging perceptually with an environment that is itself pregnant with the past. To be sure, the rules and methods of engagement employed respectively by the native dweller and the archaeologist will differ, as will the stories they tell, nevertheless – in so far as both seek the past in the landscape – they are engaged in projects of fundamentally the same kind (Ingold 1993, 152–153, original emphasis).

This explicitly takes us to the idea of remembering and memory by inhabiting and physically dwelling in a certain landscape (cf. Schama 1985), even if only for a short period, during an archaeological
field season. The testimonies we bring from such experiences are not only those of meticulous recording of archaeological facts, but are also of the experience of practical engagement with a particular physical environment inhabited by people in the past. Actively remembering this type of experience and using it in our accounts becomes of vital importance for our project as archaeologist (see Tringham, this volume). In this way, we stop disengaging and distancing from the object of our studies, and become a sort of quasi-witnesses along with the evidence we excavate.

Perhaps this example helps us to suggest collapsing the notion of habit-memory, on the one side of remembering, and, recollection, on the other, or undiscursive and discursive distinctions (Whittle, this volume), that have informed us in the previously discussed philosophical musings. While such distinctions were analytically necessary, I am interested in suggesting the way to use some of the previously discussed philosophical notions in conceptualising the way people were remembering and forgetting in the past through their practical engagements in the world and within a particular landscape, or through particular materials they were surrounded by and which they transformed. Yet, I would suggest three more abstract concepts that may be applicable to various case studies with regard to both the processes of remembering as well as forgetting but that also have very practical applications. These concepts are also clearly laden with layers of meanings added upon them by various theorists, philosophers or artists. I (Borić 2003) suggest the notions of trace, citation and repetition/recapitulation.

**Trace**

The notion of trace has been used by various authors, including Freud, Heidegger, Lévinas, Derrida and Ricoeur (see above), either as a conceptual tool or metaphor, with different and yet complementary and cross-referential understandings. The epistemological status of historiography and archaeology is significantly related to the routine use of traces in a rather intuitive manner, claiming a pre-understanding of their significance. However, the problematic aspect of the ontological status of trace comes with an enigmatic paradox. Paul Ricoeur sums it up by saying that ‘the passage no longer is but the trace remains’ (1988, 119). For Derrida the agency that left this imprint, or ‘disarrangement’, is never present as such. There is a sense of an irreducible alterity in the trace as an involuntary testimony of the Other (Lévinas 1972 cited by Ricoeur 1988, 124–125). It ‘becomes the origin of the origin’ (Derrida 1974, 61) in a similar way that ‘history always precedes history’ (Ricoeur 1988, 247). As already emphasised, Ricoeur (1988, 199ff.) recognises the importance of the concept of trace as a possible tool in bridging phenomenological and cosmic time by the constitution of hybrid time – historicality and historic consciousness. Seen as objectified nodes and marks in the passage of a past agency, traces can be quarrying sites in the constitution of meaningful narrative plots. In other words, the physical resistance of trace is subject to interpretation and questioning in the present. Trace is open for endless individual subversions and re-figuring (see Borić, this volume).

**Citations**

The concept of citation is very prominently found in the work of Walter Benjamin. Arendt (1968) argued that for Benjamin searching into the depths of the past, one could rescue those fragments that in the process of decay do not simply become a ruin of time but instead crystallise into new ‘pearls and corals’ (cf. Gutteridge, this volume). By rearranging such fragments, a citation ‘starts to look back at its original self in new ways’ (Taussig 1999, 45). A similar underlying principle can be seen in artworks of Marcel Duchamp, who made explicit references to and citations of his previous artworks, forming a unique **œuvre** by the use of temporal duration as an active component of artworks’ production. Simultaneously, it represents and **is** the network of stoppages by citing and embodying **material** layers of Duchamp’s previous works. It is a sketch of the fourth dimension in its attempt to incorporate the dimension of time (see Gell 1998, 242–251).

This ‘art of quotation’ (cf. Taussig 1993, 109) can be further complemented by the concept
of citationality that comes from Judith Butler (1993). Butler writes about conceptualising and ‘constructing’ perpetual performativity of sex and gender through historically contingent ‘regulatory schemes’. For Butler, the derivative power of our practices, without an originating will, comes from citationality, i.e. reiterated acting without fixed effects (Butler 1993, 13). In other words, citation mirrors and produces itself rather than some anterior ideal. The concept of citationality here is intrinsically linked to the concept of repetition.

Repetition/Recapitulation
Repetition/recapitulation refers to iterability and is tied to concepts of citation and trace. The concept is used by Heidegger, who in speaking about a ‘grasping moment of vision’ says that ‘repeating is handing down explicitly – that is to say going back to the possibilities of the Dasein that has-been-there’ (1962, 437 quoted by Ricoeur 1988, 76, original emphasis). In this moment of vision, something that is inherited as having-being-there is synthesised with fresh and free possibilities to choose repressed and neglected aspects of what is now abolished and yet still present (i.e. trace). This process is seen as a recovered anticipatory resoluteness of an innovational moment of change. A potential for innovation and change is thus created as repetition ‘opens up the past again in the direction of coming-towards’ (Ricoeur 1988, 76). This gap of creativity means that the concept of tradition and its transmission assumes both sedimentation and innovation as its constitutive features (cf. Ricoeur 1984, passim). Materialised effects that are achieved by reiteration of practices become inevitably confronted with the movement of différence as ‘by virtue of this reiteration gaps and fissures are opened up as a constitutive instabilities in such constructions’ (Butler 1993, 10; see also Strathern 1991).

These notions are dependent of each other and can be variously applied to the evidence of archaeological case studies. Their dynamic interdependence should be seen as reflecting the workings of memory, from its presence as trace, through the active search for it (citation) and its necessary iterability seen not as conservatism but as a way of opening up new possibilities (repetition/recapitulation).

Papers in this volume
This collection of papers arises from the conference ‘Excavating Memories: The Archaeology of Remembering and Forgetting’ held at the Center for Archaeology at Columbia University in the City of New York, April 26th–27th, 2003. Not all of the papers presented at the conference reached this volume and there are also several contributions that were not presented at the conference and were additionally included here. On the whole, papers are organised in the chronological order of the case studies examined, although there are some adjustments to the ‘ascending’ temporal order in those cases when the arrangement of particular memory topics necessitated some re-shuffling of the coordinates of the absolute chronological time.

Whittle’s paper on diversity of memory opens the volume to different case studies. Whittle argues that archaeological arguments can and should draw upon our own experiences, our own memories, and that it is allowed to evoke disparate sources in order to imagine the past and the ways people might have structured the sense of their own past. Whittle illustrates his point about remembering with two different European Neolithic cases studies, both relating to the first Neolithic communities, one on the Great Hungarian Plain and the other in southern England. Both case studies rely on a higher chronological resolution than expected for prehistory thanks to the application of the Bayesian statistical modelling with regard to the radiometric evidence from these regions. Such a chronological precision helps to locate the memory of the past closer to the individual projects of people who dwelt at the discussed sites, exploring diverse scales of remembering and their interdependences: from day to day activities to generational continuities. Yet, Whittle questions whether our own experience allows us to comprehend the possibility of a much longer term memory that prehistoric case studies sometimes suggest.

Borić’s paper continues the discussion about
different scales of remembering and further addresses the question about interdependencies between memory and forgetting in the Danube Gorges region of the Balkans during the Mesolithic period and in the course of the transformation of the Mesolithic foragers affected by the ‘Neolithic’ ways of being-in-the-world. The paper explores the importance of forgetting along with memory, or even as the precondition of memory. This argument evokes Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s ideas about the double valence of forgetting by examining how the arrangement of the material remains of individual human bodies drew on the narrative coherence of a social body by eclipsing the dismembered individuality of its members. Similar to Whittle’s paper, this paper questions the realistic nature of long-term continuities often seen in the prehistoric record along with the problematic assumption about the stability of meanings in a diachronic perspective.

While Tringham’s paper remains within the domain of prehistoric case studies, the period specialisation is subsidiary to the author’s interest in the recording of archaeological data through digital media, and especially with regard to the visual record, following Susan Sontag and John Berger. Through an abundant use of photographs and images in the form of *bricolage*, Tringham draws on a plenitude of colourful biographical examples of her own archaeological fieldwork, seen as a personal depository or trigger of archaeological and other memories, to walk us through the development of digital technologies that have been available to archaeologists in the past 50 years or so. She indicates a rapid pace of changes in the way we record the archaeological evidence in the field. These fascinating reflections expose the dynamic of what in our field experience as archaeologists becomes recorded and discursively remembered and those experiences that are left to the mercy of chance remembering through ‘work shots’. Tringham argues that instead of ‘public’, ‘official’ and ‘dehumanised’ photographs of the archaeological record, the digital record (*e.g.* photographs) can be put to a much better use by producing ‘private’ records that preserve in a transparent way the memory of a particular archaeological process and the wider context of its making. While fully embracing the need for reflexivity that the new digital technologies offer to archaeologists, the author warns us that it would be naïve to think that the era of digital recording will completely save us from oblivion as recording technologies continue to change at an increasing pace. Such ephemerality and immateriality of the current state of affairs echoes certain concerns also raised in Buchli’s paper in this volume.

Jones focuses on the relationship between memory and acts of concealment, defacement and secrecy (following Taussig 1999), which he identifies as tropes that might have characterised the Early Bronze Age Britain, and in particular the evidence of Early Bronze Age Scotland that he discusses in his paper with regard to the mortuary record as well as in relation to practices of structured deposition of metal objects. The author sees homological relations between these different practices. Jones focuses on two different regions of Scotland during the Bronze Age with similarities in the type of mortuary architecture and the presence of prehistoric rock art but with marked differences in the patterns of metal object deposition. During this period there is an emphasis on the containment of bodies either in urns or stone cists and monuments. On the other hand, metal objects (frequently fragmented) are put out of the circle of use and buried, frequently close to dramatic landscape features. One also finds the practice of layering or ‘wrapping’ over bodies or even of monument complexes themselves either by materialities of surfaces (decorated and undecorated pots and stones) or complex (apotropaic?) designs. In this way, the content is guarded from onlookers, while at the same time ‘in memorial terms, the act of forgetting through burial creates a trace to be remembered’. The emphasis on secrecy, Jones connects with the need to control the supply and circulation of metal objects at this time. Acts of deposition, either of bodies or metal objects, might have been intended as spectacles that triggered dramatic memories in the eyes of onlookers.

In a similar vein, exploring further the idea of socially situated remembering, Hanks discusses the construction of a particular warrior identity in the
course of the Bronze and Iron Ages, with a focus on the region of Eurasian steppes. The memory of these buried warrior heroes became inscribed in monumental form across vast landscapes through the practice of creating spectacular burial mounds, *kurgans*. Here again a form of public secrecy trope can be recognised. Hanks discusses in particular examples of burial mounds dated to the first millennium BC, some with preserved traces of rich imagery in the form of complex body tattoos or object decoration, as in the case of the Pazyryk tombs. The emphasis on the decoration of body surfaces as well as interfaces between human and animal skins (e.g. saddles) through the use of the so-called ‘animal style’ imagery, reveal the embodied practices that drew on the potency of the past (heroic) acts and mythical animals. Through tattooing, the body of each of these warriors might also have been inscribed with memories of particular events, creating a particular individual identity. Since many of these tattoos were not openly displayed, as clothes frequently covered tattooed parts of the body, one may suggest that such personal memory props were not always publicly shared. Embodied and narrated memories and myths about the discussed warrior lifestyles persisted over long spans of time and survive even in our cultural imaginary thanks to narratives recorded in Classical times.

Boozer turns our attention explicitly to another facet of identity construction in relation to memory, namely social strategies within the context of urban Roman Egypt, where particular individuals were coping with the constraints of the imperial and colonial rule. She is interested in tracing intertwined aspects of memory and identity at a micro-scale level and examines a recently excavated household in the Roman city of Amheida. Here, the household is seen as the emblem of a particular social standing. Moreover, since Proust many authors have emphasised the importance of houses with regard to memories that are intimate or belong to our ‘close relations’ (see above). In the case Boozer describes, the interior decoration and the choice of Homeric mythological scenes depicted on the house’s preserved walls indicate that the inhabitants of this building at Roman Amheida aspired to the Hellenistic ideal of alliances. These citations of a deep mythological past depicted on the wall scenes expose a complexity of memory work oriented toward a common Roman past, which was embraced on the basis of narratives that were being promoted as desirable for a particular (upper) social class in the city. However, that identity memories are hardly fixed and uniform in such colonial contexts is amply shown on the basis of another excavated house that Boozer mentions. In a different area of the city, a family of a moderate social status left traces suggesting that their identity was clearly referencing an Egyptian heritage by drawing on the potency of locally grounded memories of the past.

While in the previous case study one finds a particular Roman provincial councilor evoking a deep mythological past by painting Homeric scenes on the walls of his house at the edge of an Egyptian desert, by the way of contrast, Gutteridge’s paper takes us to the centre of political power of the Roman Empire, to the city of Rome at the time of the emperor Constantine, the period roughly contemporaneous with the previous example. This paper looks into a particular practice that especially characterises the period of Late Antiquity, that of *spolia*, which consists of the often intentional use of both figurative and non-figurative material fragments of older buildings and monuments that become dismembered and reused by recombining and embedding them in newly built buildings or monuments. In this way new meanings were forged. Gutteridge reviews the scholarship that has looked into decisions that, it turns out, were carefully made in choosing particular spoliated reliefs (from at least three older monuments) when building the Arch of Constantine in AD 315. It was the action of intentional reusing of the past. Gutteridge is interested in the way particular elements of these spoliated reliefs were meant to rearrange the coordinates of linear time. This was not done by a widespread practice of *damnatio* (defacement) but instead through a reverence of the past in the act of disfigurement, achieving the effect of a bricolage. Moreover, in building such a spoliated monument, the message that is conveyed
1. Introduction: Memory, archaeology and the historical condition

is not about the biographical events in the life of Constantine, but about the timelessness and accumulation of all previous glorious triumphs, achieving a temporal elision and conjoining cosmic and biographical time. This choice of composition of spolias, Guterridge defines as trans-temporal. In the final instance, the author metaphorically compares the Arch of Constantine to the practice of archaeology in its constant struggle to reshuffle past fragments in pursuit of meanings that would guard us from threatening forces of oblivion.

The memory that Filippucci’s paper evokes takes us to a very different setting, one where uncanny familiarity creeps into our discussion about memory by referring to the horizon of lived memories of our grandparents, memories that also impinge on our own personal memories through narratives about the First World War. By discussing recent archaeological excavations of the Western Front sites, Filippucci discloses the inbetweenness of this particular past – it is not completely gone from the horizon of living memories nor is it within our experiential reach. As a social anthropologist, in the archaeological process she studies Filippucci takes the role of a participant observer. She interestingly connects the archaeological experience, seen as a material engagement in a particular landscape, with the position that one may call that of quasi-witnesses or second-hand witnesses, in which the materiality of archaeological practice re-enacts experience of soldiers that fought on these grounds, in this particular landscape (cf. Ingold 1993; see above). She further draws a contrast between, on the one hand, the practices of commemoration and memorials, and, on the other hand, the production of archaeological narratives that ‘bring the war past into the present as a reality that to some extent resists incorporation, troubling and disturbing us’. In this way, the ‘matter-of-factness of the past’ is underlined, while the archaeological process becomes a tribute to the dead, a debt and an obligation on the part of the living, as a dedication to the Fallen.

Weiss’s paper develops further the theme that the previous paper triggered, that of the role of materiality of landscapes. She takes an archaeological perspective when dealing with the traumatic consequences of recent atrocities committed in the 1990s Balkan wars. The author introduces a new dimension to our dealings with memory and the construction of knowledge about the past: the role of international criminal tribunals and the judicial body. These tribunals, such as the one for the former Yugoslavia in the Hague, are ‘as much about legitimating historical narratives as [they are] about prosecuting criminals at large’. This court practice and the judicial procedure followed invite constant references to the Holocaust trials after the Second World War. Weiss argues that, in these most recent trials, material evidence is still subsidiary to the witness testimonies, and she is determined to show that it is exactly by comprehending the physicality of evidence and the materiality of particular landscapes in which atrocities were committed that a more encompassing perspective can be forged, especially with regard to truth and reconciliation committees. She illuminates this point with examples from the trial of the late Serbian president Slobodan Milošević in the Hague. In doing so, one reveals the dark side of studying the role of landscapes previously largely considered in phenomenological accounts as ‘felicitous sorts of lived spaces’. Understanding how crime could become inscribed over a landscape in the form of Seremetakis’s ‘islands of historicity’ or Foucault’s ‘heterotopias’, along with the immediacy evoked by material evidence, connects intimately the work of memory and the archaeological practice.

We continue to linger in the topic of the past that does not pass when entering into the maze of significations built by Bajić in his virtual Yugomuseum, located in the constructed imagination of the author’s birth place, the city of Belgrade, the former capital of a now non-existent country – Yugoslavia. Bajić, who is an artist, connects to the archaeological practice of collecting and ordering materialities that symbolise particular events. He juxtaposes various material symbols and images from the 70-year-long (or short) history of Yugoslavia. While the tone may seem nostalgic, the underlying procedure is that of irony, seen as a powerful trope of humour for achieving freedom in the negativity. Messages sent by Bajić in his
meticulous play of associations may, however, to some extent remain opaque to those unfamiliar with the history of Yugoslavia and events that followed its break-up at the beginning of the 1990s. Yet, such varying degrees of opacity with regard to particular objects and their meanings vividly evoke the complexity and historical situatedness of collective memories. The whole project could be seen as an experiment in re-enacting multiple theatres of social memory. By reordering images and symbols, Bajić ‘works through’ (sensu Freud) the memory of a particular collectivity in order to enable the healing of repressed and accumulated traumas (what he calls ‘the malignancy of the era’) by exposing the absurdity and banality of their adherence to particular objects and images. Bajić’s museum can be compared to the previously discussed image of the site of historical wreckages evoked by Benjamin. In the case of Yugomuseum, accumulated materialities are confronted in an attempt to come to terms with these vivid reminders of a difficult past.

At the end, Buchli grapples with all those issues that have followed us on our journey through the complex labyrinths of memory’s relation to archaeology: materiality, melancholy, the modernist emergence of archaeology as a particular field of study (a discipline!). Buchli attempts to describe the present condition of late capitalist society with its subtly elaborated ways of exercising control over individuals as obsessed with preserving everything, similar to the (melancholic) urge of historians or archaeologists for archiving documents or sherds of pottery. Yet, despite all of this, our present-day context is importantly structured by immateriality of information, their ever-changing digital formats, for example (see Tringham’s paper above). Such a condition hinders the work of memory that depends on iterability, material and discursive. In the absence of such an anchorage in the context of the ephemeral superfluity of immaterial, fleeting information (‘the tragic lightness of being’), the pathological condition of melancholy develops. Yet, Buchli insists throughout that this problematic state of affairs can both be empowering and disempowering, enabling and disabling. Archaeology, with its ability to dig through the layers of appearances in destabilising and challenging dominant settlements, should play a pivotal role in enabling the work of memory.

Notes
1. The conference was funded by the Center for Archaeology, Columbia University, and I would especially like to express my thanks to Lynn Meskell, Nan Rothschild and Terry D’Altroy for supporting the conference, and Lucas Rubin for his help in organising it. I am also grateful to a number of students who attended my classes about social memory and archaeology, and who stimulated and influenced my thinking about the subject. I am indebted to the Leverhulme Programme ‘Changing Beliefs of the Human Body’ based at the Department of Archaeology, University of Cambridge for supporting me in completing this work. For useful comments on an earlier draft of this chapter, I am grateful to Dani Hofmann and Alasdair Whittle.

Bibliography
1. Introduction: Memory, archaeology and the historical condition


Ricoeur, P. (1998) *Critique and Conviction. Conver-