This thesis is being submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History, Cardiff University, September 2012.
Summary

This thesis examines French efforts to project their power onto Britain during the Middle Ages, engaging the Welsh as their partners. The subsequent chapters contribute fresh analysis on a range of leaders and periods. This has been done using new theories, particularly military ones, and pushes the boundaries of this area of studies. The concepts of ‘bracketing alliances’ and the strategy of ‘cultivate and eradicate’ have been introduced and applied to this research. In addition, the thesis includes works not commonly found in such a study; reaching outside the field to help clarify points of analysis. For example, Sun Tzu has been included to demonstrate that medieval rulers were practising the most effective methods of warfare, as we recognise them today. Also, by applying modern diplomatic theory, such as ‘Soft Power’, this research not only gives these ideas a wider conceptual use but also connects and makes relevant medieval events to the modern world.

On a broader level, these French-Welsh links demand wider exposure, whether from the perspective of the French attempting to articulate their power within Britain or the Welsh playing a role on the continental stage. This thesis presents new perceptions of these leaders, the conflicts of their times, their diplomatic initiatives and the power relations of the age. Its primary thrusts, therefore, are the dissection of the form and impact of these diplomatic and military relations, focussing on French efforts to project their power onto Britain at moments when friendship was co-ordinated with Welsh leaders. In recognition of the many subjects researched, and to borrow shamelessly from William of Malmesbury, and certainly others, I give note; ‘uolo enim hoc opus esse multarum historiarum breuiarium.’

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Declaration

This work has not been submitted in substance for any other degree or award at this or any other university or place of learning, nor is being submitted concurrently in candidature for any degree or other award. This thesis is the result of my own independent investigation, except where otherwise stated. Other sources are acknowledged by explicit references. The views expressed are my own.

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I wish to thank my supervisors, Peter Coss and Peter Edbury, for their support, advice and positive feedback. I am also very grateful to Cardiff University for its assistance in funding my thesis. I wish to express my gratitude to Anne M. Pilling for her interest, generosity and friendship. Thanks are also due to a whole cast of people for a range of helpful acts, many of them unrelated to doctoral studies. Simon Fry created several of the clear maps within this thesis, artfully creating those images below from my makeshift sketches and dubious descriptions. However, for their academic encouragement, these include Dr. Richard Marsden, Dr. Rob Jones, Dr. Paul Webster and Dr. Dave Wyatt, also Dave McElhill and Dave Slaughter, all of Cardiff University. I also acknowledge contributions made over the years by Sandrine Cham, Rob Cullinane, Jean-Roger David, Steve David, Oliver Hopkins, Hervé Potieris and Jim Rowlands. Lastly, I am grateful for the love and encouragement of my family.

Dedication

This work is dedicated to five incredible people. Firstly, this is for my wonderful wife, Rebecca, for all her support and patience through these difficult years. During this time she has given me our happy, funny daughter and, in December 2012, we welcomed the arrival of our son. Thank you for those greatest of all gifts. Finally, this is also for my loving, inspiring parents, both of whom I lost during this research. They were my passionate, fiery, enthusiastic mother, Mary, and my kind, lovely father, Fred, who was always such an impressive, positive role-model to me. This is for them all.
Abbreviations

**BBCS**
Bellaguet, *Saint-Denys*, Bulletin of the Board of Celtic Studies

**Davies, Revolt**
Bellaguet, L. ed., *Chronique du Religieux de Saint-Denys, le Regne de Charles VI, de 1380 à 1422* (Paris: Crapelet, 1840, 6 vols.)

**Hingeston, RHL Henry IV**

**CPR**

**CCR**

**CFR**

**POPCE**

**Rymer, Fœdera**

Rymer, T., ed., *Fœdera, conventiones, literae, et cujuscunque generis acta publica, inter reges Angliae, et alios quosvis imperatores, reges, pontifices, principes, vel communitates, ab ineunte saecula duodecimo, viz. ab anno 1101, ad nostra usque tempora, habita aut tractata; ex autographis, infra tempora, habita aut tractata; ex autographis, infra secretiores Archivorum regiorum thesaurarias, per multa saecula reconditis, fideliter exscripta.* (London: HMSO, 20 vols, 1704-1735)
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1: Introduction

Aim:
This thesis examines French efforts to project their power onto Britain during the middle ages, engaging the Welsh as their partners. This research therefore describes elements of French diplomatic and military practice during this period, delineating the exercise of a foreign policy in the middle ages. This is an area which some academics feel has been neglected.¹ The subsequent chapters illustrate international relations between leaders in France and Wales and, because this thesis highlights the interconnectivity of medieval states and their rulers, they also encompass the conduct and leaders of other European powers.

This research challenges any notion that medieval Anglo-French relations can be viewed in terms of successful English actions enabling the domination of their seemingly supine French counterparts. The subsequent chapters argue to the contrary, exposing the existence of an intelligent, flexible and aggressive French diplomatic strategy underpinned by military power. Such practices inevitably experience success and failure, and the following cases detail the evolution of this policy, focusing on its liaison with Welsh leaders. This study of French policy begins with a position reliant on the vagaries of the overlord-vassal relationship, which was developed to suit security needs. This progressed over time into a more sophisticated structure which actively sought factional alliances with a variety of powers to suit specific campaign goals. At times, these friendships appear to have been maintained simply as a latent threat, at others they were energetically pursued in attempts to topple the incumbent king of England. The fact that this strategy was retained and nurtured over a timescale of centuries proves its value to successive French governments. Due to the fact that they ultimately triumphed in the medieval phase of their conflict with England, a victory to which this strategy contributed, these efforts merit examination and illumination.

Another main aim of this research is to disprove the perception that the Welsh were a largely ignored irrelevance who played no notable role in contemporary actions. The argument is consistently made that they were able to participate in the key moments considered within this study. These encompass some of the foremost events of the period 1163-1417, namely relations between Louis VII and Henry II, Prince Louis’s invasion and the Magna Carta rebellion, the French resurgence after Brétigny and the brief return of native

governance over Wales in the early fifteenth century. In most of these events the French actively sought Welsh involvement. By illustrating the fact that the Welsh repeatedly engaged with major powers and factions, the thesis aims to disprove any perceived irrelevancy. Moreover, the thesis will prove that the Welsh were able to organise themselves in a manner similar to their peers, as well as standing among them on a footing proportionate to their strength. As that power waned or rose, so did the degree to which they were involved in the key moments of their time.

Little of the following subject matter has been directly covered to date; therefore much of this thesis is new and pushes the boundaries of several fields of study. While principally concerned with medieval diplomatic relations, it clearly engages with the historical narrative of several European nations over the span of two and a half centuries, and makes contributions to studies of military affairs and the politics of power relations. In particular, this research examines the evolution of alliances between great and lesser powers, and considers the value of such arrangements within the framework of local and continental-scale conflicts.

Uncommonly, this also evaluates the actions and machinations of smaller, now extinct, states. They clearly merit inclusion in studies of European history, along with the stories of those larger, still present, states responsible for their disappearance or incorporation. This direction seems to be in tune with current thinking; the first such work on the stories of smaller, now lost, states emerged at the end of 2011.\(^2\) Therefore, this also adds to this developing field of study.

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Method and Content:
The methodology used in this thesis is deliberately uncomplicated. Each of the four research chapters follows a three-stage method of examining its subject. All begin by introducing and contextualising the principal *engagés* within the events and issues of their time. Next, follows a close reading of all of the alliance documents between French and Welsh leaders, examining their form, language, message and intent. Finally, each chapter considers the consequences of these alliances on those who forged them and those within their influence, as well as on their enemies.

The following argument also employs a particular method to support its findings by evaluating the behaviour of those involved where contemporary evidence or secondary analysis proves conflictual or inadequate. Due to the fact that medieval leaders projected a certain image of themselves and generally followed an identifiable pattern of conduct, their reigns leave signatures of their behaviour within the records. This has led to later writers highlighting and labelling their attributes and characteristics; pious, brutal, indecisive, ‘good’ or ‘bad’, for instance. While the more volatile and erratic leaders, such as King John of England, are more difficult to evaluate in this way, the behaviour of most medieval rulers appears sufficiently predictable. When they deviated from expected or distinctive ways, their actions commonly attracted comment in contemporary records. By studying the primary sources of the nations involved, a determinable pattern of behaviour and expectations emerges. Therefore, this research stands on contemporary observations, or indeed a lack thereof, to support its assertions. This thesis explores the effectiveness of this method in providing solutions to long-standing problems, and determines that in several cases it offers a fuller and more plausible picture than currently exists.

In addition, this thesis creates a framework drawing on concepts to which the author has been introduced through military education, training and action, translated into the diplomatic sphere. Elements of current military and diplomacy theories are adapted and applied within a medieval context. This has primarily been done to draw attention to the wider relevance of medieval events and their evident relation to contemporary issues and conflicts. In so doing, this also shows the broader utility of these theories, giving them a conceptual value beyond their current use. Aspects of modern military practice have been applied to this subject and are introduced to a wider audience through this thesis. These military and diplomatic adaptations help make this research original and conceptually alive.
A number of original concepts are introduced within the course of the four subsequent research chapters. Two of these are founded on current military practice and the other, the theory of ‘Soft Power’, has not previously been applied to the medieval period. These subjects recur throughout the thesis and so require brief description here.

The first two chapters study the alliances between Owain Gwynedd and Louis VII, and between Philip Augustus and Llywelyn ap Iorwerth. Within these two examples, the term ‘bracketing alliances’ is used. The notion that states arrange alliances to surround other states seems inadequate – it is rare that one geographic entity becomes truly encompassed on all sides and hence becomes surrounded. Therefore the term bracketing is introduced here to describe how one state formed a union with another on the far side of its enemy’s frontier. While this is contextualised below, simple examples could suggest the French alliance with Castile to bracket English-ruled Aquitaine, or the English bracketing of Castile through Portugal and Gascony. Although not surrounded, the bracketed state faced the prospect of a conflict on two or more fronts already on their borders, should violent dispute arise. This strategy can clearly be seen to be played out across western Europe during the period. Of course, the ideal scenario would see an enemy constricted between several brackets, facing multiple enemies in several places, thereby reducing its ability to act decisively in any one direction. Such a situation offers small powers acting in concert the possibility of defeating a larger enemy. This is demonstrated below in these two earlier examples, and is notably pursued by Philip Augustus and Prince Louis in their ultimately unsuccessful strike against King John. The creation of such a network of supportive alliances required a great deal of diplomatic effort, and this is also discussed below. While the term ‘bracketing’ can be easily understood from an understanding of grammatical parentheses, it is derived from the military practice of ‘bracketing fire’. This is a tactic in which ordnance is fired short and long of an enemy position to establish measurable points of conflict, creating a ‘bracket’ around the target. Subsequent volleys are respectively and continually lengthened and shortened, closing the bracket and, in theory, effectively striking and destroying the enemy. The establishment of a military alliance on the far side of an enemy appears consistent with the longer shot of bracketing fire, while the near side is formed by a state’s border with the enemy. Multiple brackets of course serve to flank an enemy. This term is the author’s own and does not appear elsewhere.

3 Note: I am aware that England also made efforts to ally with Castile through marriages, but French efforts to acquire their amity were more successful, so for the ease of this example, I describe Castile as a French ally.
A second contemporary military-diplomatic strategy is also introduced; ‘cultivate and eradicate.’ This is a method in which one power selects a faction or individual for advancement or destruction and takes diplomatic and military steps to achieve this end. Straightforward examples of this come from the activities of the popes of this period, and are further detailed within the thesis. However, in order to acquire victory for their preferred candidate or ally and defeat for their enemy, the papacy clearly involved itself in temporal power politics. In examples given in more detail below, the popes eroded the power base of an enemy, Philip of Swabia or King John of England, for example, by removing their ecclesiastical supporters and undermining their temporal authority through absolution of their vassals’ allegiance, interdict and excommunication. Eradication is perhaps best characterised by efforts to intimidate, wither, isolate and attack an adversary, in order to defeat them but not necessarily to achieve their death. Obliging obedience appears to be the goal of the strategy, with physical attack as a last resort.

The other side of this strategy involves the empowerment of others, usually factions hostile to their opponent. In the cases studied here this took on several forms, for example, through the absolution of oaths of allegiance, but also by the granting of indulgences, appointments to supporters and, most drastically, through the proclamation of crusades. This step-by-step papal approach to dealing with their enemies has not been identified elsewhere. The granting favours to one side evidently forms part of the ‘cultivate’ strategy. So, the use of moral, spiritual, financial and military support largely defined the papal means of cultivating a faction. This model appears several times in this study. However, it clearly has wider use in studies of diplomacy, politics and warfare. That is to say that one power developing the strength of another by influencing, legitimising, encouraging, defending and supporting it through supply or reinforcement is perhaps the simplest means of describing cultivation. In relation to this research, it is asserted that Philip Augustus and Prince Louis cultivated factions within Britain to support Louis’s attempt on the throne of England; the treaty with Llywelyn formed part of that effort. Equally, Louis of Orleans appears to have cultivated the alliance with Owain Glyn Dŵr in order to support and further his conflict with Henry IV. However, this practice can easily be applied to a variety of other scenarios and time periods, ancient, medieval and modern.

Although it is possible to separate these two ploys and use them independently, they appear most effective when used in combination to reduce an adversary while simultaneously bolstering an ally. Although this strategy describes widespread and long-standing military
and diplomatic practice, ‘cultivate and eradicate’ is the author’s term, in part based on his military experiences.

Although ‘Soft Power’ has long been part of oriental warfare concepts, Joseph Nye further developed the theory as a conceptual measure explaining aspects of the Cold War era in the Twentieth-century, and it has undergone several evolutionary developments since then. However, this research applies it to the medieval period and therefore it requires brief description here to justify its use.

It is perhaps simplest to start with its antithesis, ‘Hard Power.’ This describes the use of force, violent threat, or coercive means to achieve obedience, such as paying troops to fight or bribing garrisons to surrender. Therefore, the actual use of kinetic military force, or intimidating displays of hardware or troops, diplomatic threats, economic sanctions, trade embargoes, blockades, the deployment of mercenaries, bribery and other similar methods are forms of hard power. It is any means of obliging co-operation, retreat or submission, but nevertheless hard power depends on varying degrees of coercion to achieve unwilling obedience. It seems reasonable to suggest that historical studies tend to focus on the measure and display of hard power forces rather than the alternatives and Nye, while writing about modern political concerns, identified that as a grave error.

In stark contrast, ‘Soft Power’ is the strategy of co-option over coercion, attraction not intimidation, and seduction rather than invasion. Nye described soft power as ‘the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment. A country’s soft power rests on its resources of culture, values, and policies." Although Nye used this to explain the global appeal of 1950s America, and thereby to influence other states to lean towards the West rather than the Communist East, this clearly has broader application. He explained soft power in terms of attraction and enticement, revealing it as the ‘ability to shape the preferences of others … [and] to establish preferences tends to be associated with intangible assets such as an attractive personality, culture, political values and institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate or having moral

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authority.\(^7\) The oath made to Louis VII by magnates and prelates at the 1155 Council of Soissons formally secured the supremacy of the French Crown in the lands of those present. It also established the concept of an accepted pattern of behaviour which bound those men to maintain this practice, recognising Louis as the leader they legitimised and recognised of their own volition. Influencing, even subtly dictating, the behaviour of others and freely, peacefully drawing them into this mode of conduct placing Louis above them clearly demonstrates an application of Nye’s ‘soft power’ in the Twelfth century.

Soft power can show interdependence rather than necessarily depicting a state of harmony. So, in order to sustain a mutually beneficial relationship, it might also include the use of subtle threat, such as the withdrawal of supporting troops or the promise of more, to oblige the partner to agree to further demands, for example.\(^8\)

Soft power is a theory which describes a method of shaping the behaviour of others. This is generally achieved through largely intangible means such as achieving the projection of a desirable culture, practices, institutions and society. This gives it legitimacy in the eyes of others which can assist in the establishment of a notion of desirable norms, and thereby influence the aspirations of its neighbours. This gives the culture or state in question influence, and with it power, beyond its borders, without recourse to deploying costly armies, thus making it more difficult to defeat.\(^9\) This research identifies numerous examples of soft power in action throughout the period studied.

The four research chapters examine alliances forged between French and Welsh leaders during the period, 1163-1417. In each case the leader who appears to have initiated and pursued the creation of the alliance is named first in the chapter title. However, it is noteworthy that only the first appears to have been instigated by the Welsh. This considers the context and evidence of the exchange between Owain Gwynedd and Louis VII between 1163 and 1168. The latter addressed his powerful vassal, Henry II, king of England, on a point of feudal order and, at the same time, represented Owain Gwynedd and a number of other small entities in their complaints against Henry. This was a remarkable evolution in Welsh political life; the first such occasion when the leader of the Welsh had approached the king of France for aid. Through a re-evaluation of the subtle, seductive yet potent forces of

\(^7\) Nye, ‘Public Diplomacy and Soft Power’, 95.
\(^8\) Nye, ‘Soft Power’, 169-70.
European power relations of the moment, this chapter concludes that Louis dominated Henry at that time.

The next chapter deconstructs current learning on the still poorly-known alliance between Philip Augustus and Llywelyn ap Iorwerth. So far, this first written treaty between the French and the Welsh, perhaps with any British power, has been outshone by other contemporary events; the culmination of King John’s reign, the barons’ revolt, Magna Carta and Prince Louis’s invasion. Due to that, little work has been dedicated to the alliance. Therefore, this chapter challenges the sole article addressing the subject, which has been taken as the first, last and only word on the matter by academics. This has resulted in a re-dating of the treaty to 1215-7; situating it at a later time enables it to fit seamlessly with contemporary records and events, but also satisfies the otherwise unexplained actions of the leaders involved.

The third chapter discusses the years when two fleets were raised by Charles V and placed under Owain Lawgoch, a Welsh mercenary commander fighting under French colours. The armadas of 1369 and 1372 signalled the first overseas invasion projects in which French and Welsh troops combined. Such a moment therefore deserves illumination. The contemporary state of Wales is also discussed and once more the established view is vigorously disputed.

The final chapter thoroughly evaluates and contextualises for the first time Franco-Welsh relations from 1404 to 1417. It describes how little of this frequently discussed subject has been set within the events of its time and analysed accordingly. Considering the Glyn Dŵr rising in isolation, in effect as a solely Welsh-English conflict with minor foreign intervention, makes it more difficult to comprehend. This work finds that Owain was allied to the Orleanist-Armagnacs who dominated Charles VI’s government at that time, rather than to the king in person. It also reveals the complex factional warfare that wracked the French court. This chapter demonstrates that the Welsh acted in concert with the leading French faction along with France’s allies, the Bretons and the Castilians. In light of that wide connectivity, it is proposed that their joint campaigns constitute another conflict of the Hundred Years’ War, such as those in Brittany or Spain. Charles IV’s court and Owain’s council exchanged a number of documents, therefore this chapter forms the largest part of this thesis.

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**Historiographical Survey:**

Due to the fact that this subject has not been specifically researched previously, this study has revealed a number of *lacunae* in extant learning. This is not necessarily a criticism, since it highlights potential for future study. However, although a number of publications address certain aspects of this research, some are notably poor in terms of their accuracy, analysis and neutrality. Nevertheless, it is worth stating that there are many excellent publications that contribute substantially to learning in this field, and these are evidenced by their inclusion throughout the subsequent chapter footnotes. This study is therefore supported by a wide corpus of academic materials which are included in the argument below, and require no further discussion here. These include original documents, as well as a substantial number of contemporary chronicles which have been published in more recent times. This thesis focuses on the close reading of original sources as far as possible, applying their analysis to the narrative stream. Of secondary importance is the supporting modern literature, mostly from the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. This extensive literature comprises published works, chapters and articles, though largely on related or peripheral themes, since few works directly address the subject in hand. Nevertheless, many of these will be familiar and require no expansive justification for inclusion here. Instead, the purpose of this survey is to reveal some of the difficulties encountered and to show some of the disappointing discoveries uncovered during this research. The principal observation is that this study area has, to a surprising degree, either been ignored or poorly researched. So, a selection of the problematic gaps and publications which presented obstacles to this cross-period, polythematic research is discussed below.

Before discussing observations on the literature relevant to each chapter, it is perhaps appropriate to begin with a further general criticism. Surprisingly few aspects of these historical narratives have been written in context, connecting the subject to contemporary events and leaders. While the numerous monographs inevitably discuss their subject’s direct neighbours or foes, few paint a broader picture. This is particularly noteworthy in works by Welsh historians, none of which situate their subjects within the broader European milieu. Similarly, few, if any, publications concerning the better-known leaders of France or England for example, are viewed from any other perspective than their own or that of their principal adversary. While bilateral studies are evidently useful, no leader solely engaged with just one other in isolation. The point here is that extant works tend to neglect the degree to which
medieval Europe’s states and leaders were connected and, perhaps with the exception of studies of the Black Death, how they were all touched by movements within the continent’s economy, politics and so on.

The first research chapter deals with relations between Owain Gwynedd and Louis VII from 1163-8. The only monograph on Owain Gwynedd is over a century old and was based on a piece composed for an eisteddfod at the end of the nineteenth century. It contains a four-sentence paragraph which incorrectly related Owain’s contact with the French, identifying two letters rather than three.\(^{11}\) Given the absence of a definitive work on this subject, research into this subject has necessarily been undertaken piecemeal, investigating general histories and works on the other leaders involved. The usually garrulous, enthusiastic promoter of Welsh history, J. E. Lloyd, missed the opportunity to expound Owain Gwynedd’s letters to France.\(^{12}\) In 1971, an article by J. Beverley Smith gave a summary of Owain’s career. Even though he mentioned Louis VII in the text and Lloyd’s work in the footnotes, Smith made no mention of Owain’s contact with France.\(^{13}\) David Walker, John Davies, Rees Davies and Kari Maund also took 1168 as the starting point of Owain’s relationship with Louis when, in fact, that date appears to have marked its conclusion.\(^{14}\) Walker, Maund and Rees Davies also imbued Owain with impossible foresight; an ability to predict that future generations of native rulers would need to call upon France for aid, and they suggest that he created the framework within which such discussions could take place. This is best exemplified by Davies who dealt with the matter in one subordinate clause; ‘he anticipated the policies of his successors by forming a Franco-Welsh alliance to embarrass Henry II.’\(^{15}\) Even this brief analysis seems riddled with errors. Realistically Owain could not have foreseen his successors’ policies, needs or any other circumstances, nor did they establish or follow any such ‘policy’. Finally, the aim of the union with Louis was to help Gwynedd to survive, not ‘to embarrass Henry’, whatever that might mean.

\(^{11}\) P. Barbier, *The Age of Owain Gwynedd* (London: David Nutt, 1908) 100-1.

\(^{12}\) J. E. Lloyd, *A History of Wales, from the earliest times to the Edwardian Conquest* (London: Longmans, 1948, orig. 1911-2, 2 vols), vol 2, 522, Lloyd did not mention any of the letters at all, solely ‘an embassy in 1168 to the court of Louis VII, offering help in his war with Henry II and hostages as a pledge of good faith.’


\(^{15}\) Davies, *Age of Conquest*, 49.
Of primary importance to this project is Huw Pryce’s article on the two leaders, which presented, translated and dated three letters from Owain Gwynedd to Louis VII. There is no reason to question the translations or the dating, especially when taking account of the other scholars Pryce credited with assisting his work. The article paraphrased evidence of a meeting between the nobles and messengers of a number of rulers described in one of The Letters of John of Salisbury. Although an immensely useful and sound contribution, Pryce’s article only partially described the relevant meeting. I will show that this was not solely a conference between France, England and emissaries from Scotland and Wales, as could be understood by reading Pryce’s article, but a broader meeting entirely involving the Bretons, Poitevins and Gascons, as well as the kings, Louis and Henry.

Looking further afield brought additional problems. There is a critical difficulty entrenched at the heart of this research; the analyses offered by English- and French-language secondary sources are diametrically opposed to one another, despite citing from the same sources. For example, Warren and Dunbabin bullishly asserted Henry’s ascendancy at the conference held at La Ferté-Bernard and wrote of Louis’s subsequent enforced withdrawal of support from those who appealed to him in 1168, while Pacaut and Sassier arrived at the exact opposite position, saying that the French king refused to abandon them. Others writing on the same kings, neatly exemplified by Gillingham and Aurell, also describe their relationship from positions far distant from one another. This clear division in opinion

19 Millor et al, The Letters of John of Salisbury, 606-7 (‘Huic colloquio interfuerunt Britones et Pictaui et nuntii regis Scotiae et regum Gwalliae, regi Francorum auxillium promittentes et obsides offerentes; et recesserunt obligate. Similiter et proceres Guasconiae.’).
20 M. Pacaut, Louis VII et Son Royaume (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1964), 196, ‘Louis ne pouvait abandonner ses alliés et rien ne sortit de l’entrevue.’; W. L. Warren, Henry II (London: Eyre Methuen, 1973) 108, Warren wrote the strikingly one-sided ‘... the rebels, in despair, pleaded with Louis not to desert them by making peace, and offered them his homage. Envoy of the king of Scots and the prince of Gwynedd were there too, offering help and tendering hostages as proof of their solidarity. Henry refused to discuss peace while Louis consorted with his vassals, and Louis, caught in the toils of his own intrigue, had no option but to break off talks.’; Y. Sassier, Louis VII (Paris: Fayard, 1991), 391, ‘Lors de l’entrevue de la Ferté-Bernard, le 1er juillet, chacun est demeuré sur ses positions, Louis VII refusant obstinément de faire avec Henri une paix qui n’inclurait pas les insurgés bretons et poitevins.’; J. Dunbabin, ‘Henry II and Louis VII’ in Harper-Bill and Vincent in Henry II, New Interpretations, 59, ‘By 1168, the French king was forced to abandon his Welsh, Scots and Breton allies, which did nothing to enhance his popularity when he made a truce with Henry that did not include them.’
indicates that there is a lack of consensus and therefore further analysis is justified. In addition, there is no English language work on Louis VII, and French-language materials appear woefully inadequate in presenting French efforts beyond their shores.  

The lionisation of Henry II in particular has hindered the pursuit of a balanced opinion of this exchange. Even the most modern and well-respected anthology concerning Henry II’s reign discourages the reader from being critical, by describing Warren’s work in terms of perfection. Warren’s well-written 1974 opus is the appropriate place to begin studying Henry’s reign, however, it now appears so factional that its value must be intrinsically reduced. Other points raised by Vincent on Henry’s reign also give cause for concern but are not directly relevant to Welsh-French relations; however they raise concerns over the analytical strength and academic neutrality of the work. Henry II: New Interpretations, although an anthology of well-written chapters by respected academics, did little to clarify matters critical to this research. It confidently reiterated notions of Henry’s military dominance and inferred Louis’s weakness due to the fact that he attracted and made use of allies. The relevant chapter will contend that Louis was able to dominate Henry and that his network of alliances formed part of that successful strategy. So, while Henry II: New Interpretations provides some useful analysis, on these central issues it appears to present a

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22 Aurell, l’Empire des Plantagenêt, 137, 235-6; Aurell, trans., Crouch, The Plantagenet Empire, 123, 214-5. Contrary to Aurell’s claim, the Welsh did not counter-attack into England after defeating Henry also it is anachronistically claimed that Gerald of Wales was ‘one of them’, ie, Welsh; the use of the word ‘Celts’ as a blanket term to describe the Welsh, Irish and Scots is problematic. Other such passages pose similar difficulties.  

23 N. Vincent, ‘Introduction: Henry II and the Historians’ in Henry II: New Interpretations, 18, ‘Warren, like Hume or Stubbs before him, may have failed to maintain complete scholarly detachment, so that his account contains far more of praise and commendation than of caveat or reproach. Nonetheless, as a synthesis of past research and as a basic starting point from which to approach Henry’s reign, Warren’s account is pretty near perfect.’  

24 Vincent, ‘Introduction: Henry II and the Historians’, 1-2. In discussing the grandeur and longevity of Henry’s legacy, he wrote, ‘English rule over Gascony was to last for three centuries, English rule over Ireland as late as the 1920s and indeed over parts of Ireland, however vigorously contested, through to the present day.’ This demonstrates a noteworthy lack of perspective or caution, even briefly considering the Irish example. It is questionable whether English, British, Angevin or even Marcher rule was established over but small fragments of Irish territory during his reign. The extent to which the king enthusiastically encouraged the Marcher lords to go there is highly contentious, and the role of Rhys ap Gruffydd, Welsh troops and the personal ambitions of those Norman lords should evidently be accommodated within this. The eventual conquest of Ireland came centuries later and was not completed because Henry willed it. To give another example, Vincent wrote ‘The Palace that Henry refurbished at Westminster, and the new courts and administrative procedures that he established there lie, even now, at the very foundations of English government and English law.’ However, this attributes far too great an importance to Henry; that place was used for that purpose before him, and they remain incorporated not because of him or in honour of him.  

25 Dunbabin, ‘Henry II and Louis VII’, ‘the French king was forced to abandon his Welsh, Scots and Breton allies’, 59, ‘Louis preferred to put diplomatic pressure on Henry, to support the military initiatives of others rather than to fight himself, because he knew what the result would be.’ 61.
rehash of old, prejudiced positions, rather than offering new interpretations. Elsewhere, a brief section touched upon the matter of Owain’s contacts with Louis. This followed the argument laid out by Huw Pryce’s article, but also added two noteworthy points. The first held that while the French were not at odds with the English because of affections they felt towards the Welsh, the fact that they were in conflict and included the Welsh at peace talks demonstrated that Owain’s dispute with Henry was no minor British affair. Also, that the Welsh were able to make such offers at the talks of 1168 presumed that an alliance of some degree existed.26

The recent and most troubling authorship on Henry, Louis and the Welsh comes from John Hosler. While this commentary by no means intentionally constitutes an attack on Hosler, his work encapsulates my prime criticism of the treatment of medieval Welsh history: it is poorly and inaccurately done throughout. Hosler’s work is well-referenced and therefore his mistakes are all the more surprising. His work is symptomatic of the feeble presentation and promotion of medieval Welsh history to a broader audience, for which Hosler bears no responsibility. In addition, its endemic bias and strikingly inaccurate analysis not only renders his works unusable as texts, but threatens to elevate them as ‘bad examples’. Perhaps of more concern, given that he has two mainstream publications on this subject, his errors risk being reproduced and becoming established as a position from which other writers could argue. This urgently needs to be averted, and the following gives selected examples of assertions from his two recent publications.27

Firstly, Hosler failed to correctly name Owain Gwynedd and Rhys ap Gruffudd, consistently calling them ‘Owain ap Gwynedd’ and ‘Rhys ap Deheubarth’.28 In this he seems linguistically out of his depth; ‘ap’ means ‘son of’ not ‘from’ or ‘of’. This demonstrates a significant failure to comprehend the basic facts of the subject. Hosler commits other surprising errors, such as resurrecting ‘the Picts’ and inserting contingents of them into Henry II’s armies; this is obviously a mistranslation of ‘Pictavi’ or Poitevins.29

This work is significantly tainted by its overweening admiration for Henry and his ‘greatness’, leading to Hosler’s concoction of euphemisms for Henry’s defeats in Wales

while struggling to admit such a thing had occurred. His position on the Welsh is Anglo-centric and poorly phrased: ‘the Welsh were an intractable bunch’ and ‘the Welsh leadership perhaps saw an opportunity to rid itself of English rule.’ There was no recognition that the Welsh did not accept Henry’s claim over them and they were not ruled by the ‘English’ at that time. He also pondered whether ‘the collected lands’ constituted ‘an Empire of Britain.’ Yet Henry did not collect lands in Britain, no Welsh title was appropriated, and, crucially, in the period covered here, none of the native Welsh held any territory of him, nor served him except as mercenaries, and none swore fealty to him. The question of homage is discussed in the relevant chapter. A final point regarding Henry, Louis and Owain will suffice. Hosler painted a scene where Henry acted powerfully beyond his borders, but where Louis was too weak or unable to act. However, John of Salisbury’s letters show that the Welsh, Bretons, Scots, Poitevins and Gascons were all within Louis’s amity and influence at that time; Hosler is therefore incorrect. He described Owain Gwynedd’s efforts to win Louis’s support in terms of boasting of victory against Henry, but ultimately being fruitless. In the subsequent chapter I will demonstrate that Hosler’s claim of Owain’s diplomatic failure is also incorrect. Although he acknowledged that the Welsh had defeated Henry in 1165, he asserted that ‘given Henry’s recent military victories their (those at the conference) temerity seems ever so foolish, but in 1168 these particular rebels had little reason to fear him.’ This typifies the confused and frequently illogical analysis that runs throughout these two publications.

In summary, Warren dealt with the matter of the alliance in half a sentence and erroneously attached it solely to 1168. In the most recent work on Louis VII, Sassier simply drew reference to the Welsh in one passing mention. Pryce’s article excellently presented the

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31 Hosler, Henry II, A Medieval Soldier, 53, 55 (note: the ‘intractable’ quote, 53, appears to derive from Warren’s more cautious and applicable ‘The Welsh princes were less tractable.’ Warren, Henry II, 69.)
32 Hosler, Henry II, A Medieval Soldier, 222. This is opposite to G. P. Cuttino, English Medieval Diplomacy, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), 39 ‘But the fact that he (Henry II) was never able to create a kingdom of Great Britain, which was in his grasp, was the price he paid for ruling an empire.’
33 Hosler, Henry II, A Medieval Soldier, 63, ‘While Henry had busied himself afterwards in Wales and Brittany Louis VII had watched from the sidelines as the English king dabbled in matters outside of the French realms of control, but in April 1167 fresh problems arose across the Continent.’
34 Millor et al, The Letters of John of Salisbury, 606-7 (‘Huic colloquio interfuerunt Britones et Pictaui et nuntii regis Scotiae et regum Gwalliae, regi Francorum auxillium promittentes et obsides offerentes; et recesserunt obligate. Similiter et proceres Guasconiae.’).
letters and translated them, but did not contextualise them and curiously only gave a partial list of those represented at the conference.36

A similar scenario of limited engagement and questionable execution is replayed in reference to the third chapter, describing the relationship between Philip Augustus and Llywelyn ap Iorwerth. Although Lloyd’s major work The History of Wales post-dated Matthews’ 1910 publication of Llywelyn’s reply to Philip, it surprisingly did not discuss the treaty.37 The key secondary text studying the relationship between Philip Augustus and Llywelyn ab Iorwerth is R. F. Treharne’s 1958 article, ‘The Franco-Welsh Treaty of Alliance in 1212’.38 Since publication, this work has been used or credited by all writers on this subject, most notably by Huw Pryce, Christopher Cheney, David Carpenter, Anthony Carr, Rees Davies, Natalie Fryde, Kari Maund, John Smith and Ifor Rowlands, the last of whom wrote of ‘the still somewhat neglected matter of the treaty between Llywelyn and Philip Augustus.’39 The chapter below demonstrates, however, that the study on which they relied is incorrect, and that the alliance was made with Prince Louis’s invasion in mind.

Although a well-constructed article, Treharne’s argument is fatally flawed, and the discussion of it forms a major theme within the relevant chapter below. Treharne pointed out certain of Matthews’ translation and transcription errors, and provided his own transcription, but no complete translation from the Latin; instead he inserted fragments of reworked sentences at various points throughout the text. He also pointed out that before his publication no Welsh writer had mentioned the treaty since Matthews, and none prior to him. He traced its French origins and its reproduction in a small number of French works between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, mentioning in passing how it had not surfaced in any English work prior to 1951, and even then just as a footnote citing a French source.

Treharne’s article made a number of simple mistakes, such as identifying the treaty as ‘the oldest surviving witness to an independent foreign policy pursued by a medieval Welsh ruler.’ Of course, Owain Gwynedd’s letters pre-date this, but also it seems that the use of the word ‘policy’ is not just a semantic choice but rather an attempt to construct a notion of a defined political strategy designed by Llywelyn. This is a contentious and probably erroneous suggestion. Treharne’s work is discussed in detail below and requires no further debate here.

Rees Davies’s seminal work, *The Age of Conquest*, made surprisingly scant reference to Owain Gwynedd’s contacts with France; he dedicated only half a sentence to Llywelyn’s treaty with Philip. Elsewhere in the same work he drew attention to the debate over the two possible dates for the treaty, 1212 and 1216. In *Medieval Wales*, Walker referred to Llywelyn’s negotiations with the nobles of Wales and Philip of France during 1212. No analysis of the relevance or text of the treaty was given. John Davies gave the treaty no more than a passing mention and claimed Pope Innocent III as its originator. Tony Carr also suggested that the idea for a French-Welsh treaty might have come from Innocent. No evidence was presented for this intriguing proposition, nor is the treaty or its relevance discussed in these works. Ralph Turner’s *King John* clearly outlined the problems which brought the Welsh to war with John in 1212. He identified widespread anger with John’s authoritarian rule as the main cause, but John’s punitive demands on Llywelyn in 1211 and his murder of Welsh hostages – the children of Welsh nobles – also hardened attitudes against the king. This was not solely a Welsh affair, however, as discontented English barons plotted to kill John on campaign or to hand him over to the Welsh. French involvement was linked to a letter to an English noble, John de Lacy, in 1209 and to 1216. This work also neglected to engage with the subject of the French-Welsh alliance.

The most recent wide-ranging publication to consider numerous facets of John’s reign emerged in 1999. Although there is an excellent chapter on King John and Wales, it simply rehashed unquestioned Treharne’s 1212 assertion.

43 Davies, *A History of Wales*, 137.
In *The Struggle for Mastery*, Carpenter dealt with Llywelyn the Great’s alliance with Philip of France in half a sentence. The most recent work on Llywelyn is Roger Turvey’s non-academic, populist account, *Llywelyn the Great*. This short work, the only monograph dedicated to Llywelyn’s life, career and importance deals with the alliance with France in just three sentences. The considerable corpus of works on the other protagonists, Philip Augustus and Innocent III, shed no light on the alliance at all.

A similar pattern of limited engagement emerges regarding Charles V’s compact with Owain Lawgoch. Interest in Owain began with a 100-page article by Edward Owen, published in 1901. This work brought together many elements critical to Lawgoch’s story. It established his identity as the well-known *Yvain de Galles*, then described his career in France, England, Switzerland and Lombardy, his lineage and his murder. Although there are a few small flaws, such as mistaking Christine of Pisa’s gender, the argument throughout is persuasive; and this article forms the bedrock for subsequent work on this Welsh nobleman. Although this included a translation, but no original, of the declaration of 10 May 1372, there was no analysis of the alliance. This work also revealed the role of the Spanish and their unwillingness to sail to Wales to make war. Vivid details of Lawgoch’s role in the land campaign around Soubise and La Rochelle were also presented. This article, though dated now, was critical in bringing Lawgoch’s name and deeds to any audience.

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48 Turvey, *Llywelyn the Great*, 58, ‘Emboldened by the papal seal of approval, Llywelyn sought help elsewhere on the continent and found a ready partner in the French king, Philip Augustus. In August 1212 they concluded a treaty of alliance in which they agreed not to make ‘truce, peace or even parley with the English.’ This was a particular triumph for Llywelyn because the initiative for the alliance may not have come from him but the French king.’ However, all three sentences appear problematic. Contrary to the first sentence, there is nothing to support or even suggest that Llywelyn cast about for allies abroad; Philip made the first move. The first and third sentences therefore appear to be contradictory. Also, it is debateable whether the alliance could be seen as a ‘particular triumph’ for him; he did not seek it and it appears to have brought him nothing tangible.
51 Owen, ‘Owain Lawgoch – Yeuain de Galles.’, 59 (Pisa), 61-2 (Lawgoch’s declaration), 67 (Spanish refusal), 66-9 (Soubise). The subsequently published squabble between W. Llywelyn Williams and Edward Owen debated whether *Yvain de Galles* and Owain Lawgoch really were the same person. The arguments produced in the seemingly petty exchange did nothing to supplant the idea that *Yvain* and Owain were one and the same. W.
Owen’s discovery was not followed by any noticeable surge in interest in Owain Lawgoch or his relations with Charles V. The next article on Lawgoch, in 1928, focussed on his unsuccessful adventures against the Swiss in 1375-6, and simply summarised his naval missions as an attack on the Channel Islands and a voyage to Spain.52

Tony Carr is the only writer to carry the flag forward for Lawgoch. A small but notable section of ‘Welshmen and the Hundred Years’ War’ provided a résumé of Lawgoch’s career from Poitiers in 1356 to Mortagne in 1378. Carr contentiously claimed that ‘from 1369 onwards, plans were being laid for a full-scale invasion of Wales. … In 1372 the attempted invasion took place.’ The facts appear to be at odds with these statements; this thesis will argue that two unconnected opportunities arose or were created by the French almost three years apart. He went on to retell the by-now familiar tale of the 1372 fleet’s attack on Guernsey and redirection to La Rochelle to campaign in Saintonge.53 That campaign was again described by Carr in a later article detailing the life of Sir Gregory Sais, a Welsh knight in English service. Curiously, although Lawgoch resurfaced in that text, no mention was made of his connection to Charles V, nor his declaration, nor his attempted invasions of Wales.54

More than sixty years after Owen’s groundbreaking article, Michael Siddons produced a thorough investigation, charting evidence of ‘Welshmen in the Service of France’, which traced Welsh soldiers in French muster lists between the 1360s and 1451. Using the same sources as Owen and Carr, Siddons also confirmed Lawgoch as commander of invasion fleets destined for Wales in 1369 and 1372. He went into no further detail and only mentioned the treaty between Lawgoch and Charles V in one footnote.55 Rees Davies recounted much the same story in ‘Age of Conquest’, while a similar, unrevealing line was followed by David Walker and Carr in their respective tomes, ‘Medieval Wales’.56 John Davies followed suit in his Welsh- and English-language publications.57 David Moore also summarised Lawgoch’s career in the same terms.58 None of these publications examined the

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56 Davies, Age of Conquest, 438; Walker, Medieval Wales, 165-6; Carr, Medieval Wales, 103-4.
57 Davies, Hanes Cymru; Davies, A History of Wales, 193-4.
treaty or provided any further insight into the relationship between Charles and Owain or the relevance of these machinations within the context of the conflict between France and England.

Surprisingly, but similarly to the treatment of Owain Gwynedd and Llywelyn ap Iorwerth, there is only one monograph on this Welshman, Tony Carr’s notable Owen of Wales. The fact that Carr’s text is only 98 pages long, including maps and family trees, suggests that there is more work to do on a thirty-year military career that was cut short by a team of assassins, only one of whom appears to have escaped. The cast of French greats with whom Owain associated is impressive and included Charles V, Bertand du Guesclín, Enguerrand de Coucy and Christine de Pisan. Carr’s work contains a significant section dedicated to Owain’s contacts with the French nobility. However, Carr did not discuss the treaty between Owain and Charles V. It is noteworthy and perhaps curious that although Lawgoch moved among the highest echelons of French society, and participated in some of the critical actions of the period including the recapture of La Rochelle, the tale of a Welsh pretender leading French armies has failed to ignite the imaginations of French historians since the late nineteenth century, or Spanish historians since 1780. His omission from the narrative of the period has continued up to modern times, however, with all recent editions of Froissart’s chronicles erasing him entirely.

60 Carr, Owen of Wales, 19-37.
Modern studies of Owain Glyn Dŵr began in 1931 with Lloyd’s ‘Owen Glendower, Owain Glyndŵr’. This work was a masterpiece for its time and, although it no longer meets modern academic standards in places, it is still a credible presentation of the story and relevant sources. Lloyd wrote passionately throughout this work, but also imbued his text with evocative, emotive imagery which lessens its usefulness to the more detached modern reader. Nevertheless, this work is the blueprint upon which more recent writers, notably Rees Davies, have based their work. Lloyd devoted three chapters to Glyn Dŵr’s dealings with the French and one further chapter on his ecclesiastical initiatives, engaging with elements of the tale of the alliance in just a few paragraphs.

The three chapters which discussed Franco-Welsh diplomatic and military affairs mapped out the course of their joint actions, from late 1403 to the withdrawal from Worcester in autumn 1405. Curiously, neither Lloyd nor any other writer has seriously examined the issue that French-Breton-Welsh military co-ordination began on the ground at Kidwelly and Caernarfon in October and November 1403 respectively, yet overt diplomatic relations only appear to date from May 1404. Lloyd laid out the diplomatic exchanges of 1404, the failed mission of that year under Jacques de Bourbon, the resumption of efforts in 1405 along with the successful landing in Wales and the course of the expedition of that year. It was revealed within this section that Glyn Dŵr made overt the connection between himself and Yvain de Galles to the French, as noted by the Saint-Denis chronicler. The fact that this was something to which Glyn Dŵr could safely allude demonstrated Lawgoch’s ongoing significance in French noble and military circles. The chapter ‘Glyn Dŵr and the Church’ dealt with Welsh ecclesiastics and the Pennal Declaration. Here, Lloyd briefly identified the clauses of the declaration relevant to Wales. He did not offer analysis on them, or on where Owain’s declaration fitted into the geo-political machinations of the period that were played out between the two papal factions and those in their respective adherence. Although he made no connection with the dispute at the Council of Constance, Lloyd astutely observed that Welsh adherence to the French papal candidate, Benedict XIII, was intended to form a breach

64 Lloyd, *Owen Glendower*, 88, For example, of the 1404 mission which failed to reach Wales, he wrote: ‘what is certain is that Glyn Dŵr saw the Tantalus vision of French reinforcements fade away before his eyes ... his year’s toil had proved futile and abortive.’
with England as definite in the ecclesiastical sphere as did military action in the civil.69 This work was of immense value in advancing the study of Owain Glyn Dŵr and exposed notable elements of his contacts with France.

French secondary sources, beginning in the 1960s, have proven frustrating. For example, in the often-cited work, ‘Clos des Galées’, there are extraordinary errors and inconsistencies in standards. Owain Glyn Dŵr is confused with Owain Lawgoch, for example, ‘Owen Glandower dit Yves ou Yvain de Galles ou Gales’ even though the references cited by Chazelas also detail the murder of Lawgoch in 1378. Also, numerous important subjects are found in the text of the book but are not listed in the index, ‘Henry IV ou Henry de Lancastre’ for example, adding to the complexity of the task. Moreover, these records seem inexplicably incomplete; four years were randomly sampled for measurement of the number of entries under each date. Despite the usual maritime commerce, intermittent warfare and launch of at least three war fleets, there were just 41 entries for the decade 1400-10, whereas 1370 recorded 114 entries, 1371 had 40 entries and the period of 1380-5, when a large fleet was prepared for 1385, had 224 entries. In addition there is a long, unexplained break in the texts presented marking the years 1396 to 1411.70 Other well-known French works make similar, perhaps more striking errors. Françoise Lehoux also confused Owain Glyn Dŵr and Owain Lawgoch. She also inexplicably mistook the armed rising in Henry IV’s reign as being led by the Scots and the Welsh in support of a Mortimer claim to the throne. This was then compounded by her reporting that the Welsh were heavily defeated at ‘Humbledon’, clearly Homildon Hill, where the Scots were routed by Percy-led armies in September 1402. In reality, it is unlikely that even a single Welshman fell at Homildon. She also wrote that they continued the struggle until the Welsh and Scots were defeated on 21 July 1403 – the battle of Shrewsbury, where in fact neither side fought. Other major French works covering the same subject include no mention of the alliance or the expeditions at all.71 The most recent French publication on the period mentioned the unsuccessful Bourbon

69 Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 119.
mission, but did not detail its failure, nor make any reference the more successful expedition the following year.ª2

Age of Conquest barely mentioned Glyn Dŵr’s foreign initiatives, summing them up in one line. Although Davies recalled elements of the language used in the Pennal Declaration, nothing else of note is said on French-Welsh relations.ª3 Walker, Carr and John Davies retold the story of Glyn Dŵr’s conflict with Henry IV, noting his acquisition of allies, but not exploring any diplomatic communications or their relevance.ª4

Currently, the principal work on Owain Glyn Dŵr is Rees Davies’s The Revolt of Owain Glyn Dŵr.ª5 This detailed, well-crafted work explored many facets of the story, the personalities involved and some of the context of the events of the time. It stands as the authoritative reference for any study related to Glyn Dŵr. On the subject of the Franco-Welsh alliance during the early 1400s, Davies fluently told the story first outlined by Lloyd in 1931, which requires no retelling here, but also made some intuitive observations. He suggested that the collapse of French support was due to their military failures against English territories in France in 1406 and to their deteriorating internal political situation, where factional disputes erupted into full-blown civil war. Paraphrasing a large section of work, he also considered that had the French simply wished to use aggression against England to bring Henry to the discussion table, determined assaults on Calais and Bordeaux would have been more effective. Therefore, their alliance with Wales was more than just an effort to irritate the English crown. Davies did not present the treaty texts, and his analysis tended to follow the line established by Lloyd; that the letters of 1404-1406 were extraordinary initiatives from Glyn Dŵr, demonstrating his prowess and reputation, as well as showing French willingness to exploit the opportunity offered to damage England.ª6 This thesis shows that the initiative came from France, and that a better understanding of the French courtly factions is critical to furthering study in this field.

David Moore’s account borrowed from Lloyd and Davies, but includes a number of odd inconsistencies, perhaps epitomised by this comment on the diplomatic union of 1404: ‘The French declined to make any promise of military aid, but a fleet of 60 ships soon left for

ª3 Davies, Age of Conquest, 449, 454, ‘he was receiving help, official or otherwise, ... from the French by at least 1403; he concluded a formal alliance with the French king in 1404 and arranged the transfer of his loyalty to the Avignonese papacy in 1406.’
ª4 Walker, Medieval Wales, 170-4; Davies, A History of Wales, 194-205; Carr, Medieval Wales, 108-17.
ª6 Davies, Revolt, 125, 192-6.
Wales.’ Apart from the obvious point that promises must have been made for a fleet to assemble, be armed, equipped, populated, paid and set sail in both 1404 and 1405, these two missions were plain examples of military aid.\textsuperscript{77} He made a number of confused points, for example, in reference to rebellions after Edward I’s invasion, he stated that Wales would not have an ‘Auld Alliance’ with France because of its location.\textsuperscript{78} Yet this ignores the fact that Scotland enjoyed an ‘Auld Alliance’ with France despite being more geographically isolated and having the same neighbour; therefore geography cannot be the determining factor Moore claimed. The Bretons sustained their independence by playing off English and French interests, and fears over one another’s movements on the Breton peninsula. Their duke became a puppet of the alternating power balance between France and England who forwarded their own candidates in the wars of succession. Also, despite nominal independence, Brittany found itself occupied by foreign forces for long periods, for example, an English mandate there lasted from 1364-1398.

He presented the defeat of independent Wales as inexorable, because the historical facts bear out that notion. However, this seems deterministic and, when considering the efforts they made with Wales, the French clearly did not share that view. Moore praised the Scots for avoiding paying homage to English kings and identified that as the reason for their survival, yet he wrote that the opposite actions condemned the Welsh. He then listed examples where states, such as Brittany, survived because they accepted overlordship, thus removing reason to invade. In a further contradiction, he confusingly added that ‘It was arguably better, then, to accept royal overlordship.’\textsuperscript{79} This seems at odds with his own findings; Scotland’s independence persisted because it remained aloof with the support of their French ally, whereas Breton liberty endured because they accepted the superiority of a foreign lord.

In contrast to the diplomatic and military movements, more has been written concerning the 1406 Pennal Declaration and the question raised at the Council of Constance which alluded to the ecclesiastical independence of the Welsh, among others. In 1923, an article gave an account of the personnel who formed Glyn Dŵr’s ecclesiastical upper

\textsuperscript{77} Moore, \textit{The Welsh Wars of Independence}, 169-85.
\textsuperscript{78} Moore, \textit{The Welsh Wars of Independence}, 264, ‘Expediency dictated that there was to be no ‘Auld Alliance’ between Wales and France. Successful European rulers, such as those of Brittany, Bohemia and Poland, were all able to play off emperors, popes and powerful kings against each other because of their geographical positions, but Wales did not enjoy that luxury, and Owain Gwynedd’s apparent recognition of Louis VII as his overlord was therefore never likely to lead anywhere – the king of England was the only lord to whom the Welsh could turn.’
\textsuperscript{79} Moore, \textit{The Welsh Wars of Independence}, 269.
echelon, his bishops, and also drew attention to the Welsh presence at Constance.\textsuperscript{80} A. Jarman’s 1951 article ‘Wales at the Council of Constance’ gave a very brief outline of the Welsh question raised at the Council by the French. It suggested that the French protest was probably an effort to destroy the conference although he provided no explanation as to why that might have been desirable.\textsuperscript{81} Glanmor Williams raised a number of effective points in his work of 1962 concerning the history of the Welsh church. Although he gave a fleeting list of the clauses, significantly, he identified the Pennal Declaration as a political document rather than an ecclesiastical or civil one. He argued that it was designed to break ties with Canterbury in order to act as an organ of a new Welsh state. In reading more deeply into the nature of this document, Williams made a creditable advance in the study of Glyn Dŵr’s diplomatic effort.\textsuperscript{82}

C. M. D. Crowder’s later publication featured a translation of the English response to the question posed by the French which included the matter of the Welsh.\textsuperscript{83} Although in essence incomplete, Crowder’s work is essential to the study of the Welsh question at Constance. Oddly, Rees Davies devoted only a relatively small amount of space to the Pennal Declaration. He enthusiastically described it as being ‘extraordinarily ambitious’ and offered a justification against any accusations of it being a ‘hare-brained’ project.\textsuperscript{84} Gwyn Alf Williams offered a different perspective, waxing lyrical over the Welsh presence at the Council of Constance as Glyn Dŵr’s last stand.\textsuperscript{85}

There is one final point to make regarding the secondary literature, unfortunately a negative one. A surprising and unforeseen difficulty in conducting this research was the jingoism often found secondary sources.\textsuperscript{86} For example, N. H. Nicolas wrote of an Anglo-French clash at

\textsuperscript{80} J. R. Gabriel, ‘Wales and the Avignon Papacy’, \textit{Archaeologia Cambrensis}, 1923, (78), 70-86
\textsuperscript{81} A. Jarman, ‘Wales and the Council of Constance’, \textit{BBCS}, 1951, (14), 220-2
\textsuperscript{82} G. Williams, \textit{The Welsh Church From Conquest to Reformation} (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1962), 222-4.
\textsuperscript{84} Davies, \textit{Revolt}, 172, 195, 214.
\textsuperscript{85} G. A. Williams, \textit{When Was Wales?} (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985), 87, 112.
\textsuperscript{86} Opinion from an earlier volume is worth mentioning here, Dr. Goldsmith and Mr Morrell, \textit{The History of England, from the earliest times to the reign of George II} (London: Brightly and Kinnersley, 2 vols, 1807), vol 1, 194-5 (following the accession of Henry IV): ‘The Scots, shortly after, began to renew their antient disturbances; and while the English army marched north to oppose their incursions, the Welch, on the other side, under the conduct of Owen Glendour, attacked the kingdom on the defenceless quarter. Many were the petty victories gained, and the ravages committed, on either part, in this contest. The name of Owen Glendour is respected among his countrymen to this very day; but as all his conquests procured no lasting advantage,
sea, ‘success depended entirely upon courage and physical strength; and in such contests the English have almost always been victorious.’ French works can also be similarly jingoistic and inaccurate, describing how France’s tiny ships made England tremble for a hundred years. This closing comment acts as a reflection on the amount of patriotic bias encountered during this project; however, it is acknowledged that similar material can be found in works covering all periods.

and as all his victories only terminated in fame, they are scarce worth a place in the page of history. It will be sufficient to observe, that, whatever honour the English lost on the side of Wales, they gained an equivalent on that of Scotland; the Welch maintained their ground, although their chieftain Glendour was taken prisoner, while the Scots still fled before the English, and would neither submit, nor yet give them battle.’ The authors reveal that Owain ‘had been exchanged from prison’ in time to unite with Percy and the Scots, and to fight at Shrewsbury in 1403.


88 Chazelas, *Clos des Galées*, vol. 1 (1977), 104 (jingo), ‘Si dérisoire qu’il puisse paraître, ce chantier où quelques dizaines d’ouvriers construaient des coques de noix, il convient de se souvenir que les barges et les galées de moins de cent tonneaux qu’il produisit, minuscules ancêtres de nos navires de guerre, on fait trembler l’Angleterre tout un siècle.’
# 2. Owain Gwynedd and Louis VII

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*Consult Appendix ‘A’ for this chapter* 310-314
2.1: Personalities and Power.

The Bretons, the Poitevins and the messengers of the Scottish king and of the Welsh kings, were all present at this meeting; they promised aid to the French king and offered him hostages; and they departed under an obligation; so too the nobles of Gascony.¹

This telling sentence from a letter by the English clergyman, John of Salisbury, referred to the 1168 conference at La Ferté-Bernard, where those powers sought French intercession on their behalf in their struggles against Henry II of England. John’s principal reason for writing this letter to his exiled tutor at the Roman Curia was to report on relations between the kings of England and France, as well as the behaviour of Thomas Becket, titular archbishop of Canterbury, but then in exile. John appears to have maintained a largely balanced view of the political crises of his time, although this was understandably tempered by his adherence to the papacy over his king, and coloured by his vision of the world, dictated by his profession. It might be unfair to say that he consistently favoured any side except that of the Church and, in spite of losing favour in the English court, it would be inaccurate to portray him as pro-French. These works provide a substantial collection of first-hand commentary on a wide spectrum of events and personalities.² The details of the involvement of those other nations, which chiefly touched on the complaints of the Bretons and Poitevins, were a consequence of the manoeuvring, confrontations and interplay between Kings Louis and Henry and form part of the discussion on power relations below. This lone sentence appears to be the only primary account which directly recalls the presence of all the plaintiffs, and it is also the only source


to mention the conference in any detail, however scant. John appears to have attended the conference and written to Rome in the same month of the meeting, July 1168.

Welsh inclusion in that conference was the result of a diplomatic exchange between Owain ap Gruffudd ap Cynan, known as Owain Gwynedd, the most influential native ruler at that time, and the court of Louis VII of France. That sequence of letters marks the earliest known diplomatic contact between a ruler of an independent Welsh territory and a French king. Firm evidence of three such letters has been credibly dated to the years 1163-1168. This chapter will therefore introduce the personalities associated with the relevant events of these years, and expose the political landscape into which these letters can be situated. Then, due to Huw Pryce’s work on the letters, only a brief discussion of them seems necessary before, most importantly, an analysis of their impact. That final section will consider the nature of the ‘obligation’ cryptically referred to by John of Salisbury, and also comment on the apparent power relations between the principal engagés.

The little-reported conference at La Ferté-Bernard involved a number of plaintiffs opposed to Henry II, and although the panoply of their individual causes no doubt merits broader exposure, this chapter will only study the Welsh case, making reference to those others where appropriate. Their plurality however is indicative of a troubled period where Henry’s intrusions or attempts to assert his dominance provoked grievances to arise across a broad area of western Europe. That they all approached Louis VII is significant and therefore the relationship between Louis and Henry requires examination. Given the dichotomy in scholarly opinion on their relationship mentioned in the first chapter, a re-evaluation of the behaviour of these leaders offers a new perspective on the power relations of the moment.

Owain ap Gruffudd ap Cynan, known as Owain Gwynedd, was the native ruler of Gwynedd from his accession at the death of his father, Gruffudd ap Cynan, in 1137, until his own death.

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6 The old territory borders are difficult to ascertain, however the monastery at La Ferté-Bernard appears to be in Maine, but close to the border with Normandy and Perche.
in 1170. He has long drawn praise from historians for his balance of military skills, cautious governance and diplomatic talent. The exchange with Louis VII arguably marked his finest hour in diplomatic terms, as the result of the 1168 conference, discussed below, bears out. Owain’s relationship with Henry II was as complex as any other of the period, in which the vagueness of many of the arrangements concerning territorial limits and personal power relations both suited and antagonised those involved. Although Owain did pay him homage, he never gave Henry feudal homage; that is publicly acknowledging the king as his overlord from whom he held his lands. He also faced and defeated Henry twice in battle. John Gillingham makes great play of the declining value of the different forms of homage. In Gillingham’s case it served to lessen the perception of Henry’s inferiority to his French overlord. Since Owain Gwynedd did not hold his lands of Henry, nor owe him tribute or service and never recognised him as his overlord, his acknowledgement of Henry II should therefore only be read as 

hommage en marche; normally occurring on a frontier, it was ‘an act symbolising peace between equals.’ Marcel Pacaut had also previously described these different forms in a manner largely in accordance with Gillingham. In addition, the practice of meeting at the border to resolve a dispute and negotiate future conduct fits entirely with native Welsh custom measurable throughout the medieval period. Therefore, even in the act of making peace, it cannot be shown that Henry obliged Owain to behave as if subject to alien feudal customs.

Moreover, Owain successfully opposed Henry on the battlefield on two occasions. The first was at Ewloe in July 1157 where the English king was wounded and the royal standard was dropped to the ground – a contemporary gesture symbolising acceptance of defeat. This act might have provoked Crown forces to rout and the result is unequivocal; Henry went down in the fighting, his army fled. Owain’s troops held the field and had

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7 Lloyd, History of Wales, II, 487, 522; Davies, Age of Conquest, 33, 44-5, 53; Walker, Medieval Wales, 42, 48; Carr, Medieval Wales, 42, 45.
8 Lloyd, History of Wales, vol 2, 488-9; Davies, Age of Conquest, 44-50; Walker, Medieval Wales, 45; Carr, Medieval Wales, 46.
10 Warren, Henry II, 225-8; Cuttino, English Medieval Diplomacy, 38; Gillingham, ‘Doing Homage to the King of France’, 64-5.
undoubtedly won the day.\textsuperscript{13} Peace was made between the two leaders the following month where it was reported that an act of homage took place.\textsuperscript{14} Therefore homage paid to Henry later that season should be viewed as homage ‘\textit{en marche}’ or as an act of expediency to avoid further confrontation. This was certainly not a case where Henry dragged his foe to the negotiating table because Owain Gwynedd had won the battle against a theoretically superior force and bought peace with a gesture; the recognition of Henry Plantagenet’s position and power was not an acceptance of subservience. Rather, this use of the symbolic media of the time appears a shrewd move to mollify the sting of defeat of his larger, aggressive neighbour. It seems right to identify Henry’s territorial ambitions as the prime factor behind his second attack on Gwynedd in 1165. This time, at Berwyn, Owain led a coalition of Welsh armies that stood against Henry, forcing the king of England once more to retreat humiliated.\textsuperscript{15}

The confrontation at Berwyn took place within the years of Owain’s correspondence with France, and is noted in his third letter.\textsuperscript{16} The first letter can be pinned to 1163-4, a period following the 1163 meeting at Woodstock in which Henry II obliged Welsh nobles, Owain Gwynedd and Rhys ap Gruffudd foremost among them, along with Malcolm IV, king of Scotland, to perform homage. Once that homage had been rendered and in due course its implications became plain, the Welsh revolting.\textsuperscript{17} It is probable that Henry’s insistence on redefining relations between these rulers and their lands in terms favourable to him provoked

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Eyton, \textit{Itinerary}, 29; Warren, \textit{Henry II}, 162; Davies, \textit{Age of Conquest}, 51.
\end{enumerate}
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Owain to seek the assistance of Henry II’s overlord, Louis VII. It could be argued therefore that Henry inadvertently opened the conduit essential for this petition to the French to be perceived by all as legally and morally valid; by insisting that he was Owain’s overlord, Owain could legitimately appeal to Henry’s overlord. The confrontation at Berwyn, two years after the conference at Woodstock, explicitly demonstrated that Owain did not accept Henry as his overlord and would dispute that claim on the battlefield.

Louis VII, king of France 1137-1180, also shared a complex relationship with his Angevin vassal, the powerful Henry II, king of England 1154-1189, whose territories stretched from the Pyrenees to the Scots’ border, and after 1174, included Scotland within his power. Louis’s hegemony encompassed his personal lands focussed around the Île-de-France, seemingly diminutive in comparison to those of Henry, although Louis was nominally overlord of those lands held by others in French-speaking areas, including Henry II’s substantial continental inheritance. Additionally, Henry’s governance of this wide expanse of lands did not imply that he was the master of them all, as subsequent revolts and disturbances would demonstrate. Neither did these expansive territories necessarily equate to comparably large resources becoming available to Henry; perhaps the opposite was true, these lands required a huge outlay in expense and effort in order to retain any measure of authority.

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18 Warren, Henry II, 138-9, 143, 184-6; Barrow, Feudal Britain, 245; Barrow, Scotland and its Neighbours in the Middle Ages, 73-4; Barrell, Medieval Scotland, 73; Duncan, The Kingship of the Scots, 99-102.
As the second son of Louis VI, an ecclesiastical career had been prepared for Prince Louis until the death of his elder brother Philip in 1131 made him heir, he acceded in 1137. His connections to the Church were a significant feature throughout his reign, and he was also a notable figurehead of the Second Crusade, in which he participated between 1147-9, and from which he gained in reputation. Louis’s first marriage, to Eleanor of Aquitaine, was annulled at his behest on grounds of consanguinity in 1152, although their deteriorating relations, provoked by Eleanor’s alleged infidelity, and therefore the decreasing likelihood of

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21 Map 1: French territories circa 1170. Louis VII’s small territory is evident in the centre, as are the Holy Roman Empire to the east and the Plantagenet ‘empire’ to the west. The importance of establishing good relations with Blois, Burgundy, Champagne, Flanders and Toulouse is obvious from this map. Source: Sassier, Louis VII, 249.
producing Louis’s male heir, were also significant. Just weeks after her divorce, Eleanor married Henry, count of Anjou; although destined to become king of England just two years later, this could not have been firmly predicted in 1152. Perhaps in light of Henry’s crowning in England, Louis married Constance, daughter of the king of Castile in 1154. This union to a power south of Eleanor’s – and therefore Henry’s also – lands in Aquitaine, also formed a feature of the strategic tussle between the two kings. While these and other features of Louis’s reign are notable, they require no further elaboration here; Henry had married Eleanor without his overlord’s permission and this was a further, personal point of tension between them. Henry was to have five sons and three daughters with her, to some degree this is noteworthy, perhaps even viewed as insulting to the French king, since Louis’s near fifteen-year union with her failed to produce a male heir. Once he became king of England in 1154, Henry might have also appeared to be more powerful than his overlord.

An intriguing factor that emerges from studies of these two monarchs is the consistency of the message concerning the disparity between their respective powers. Henry is continually portrayed as being the dominant military force. Louis however, has been widely acknowledged as weak and fearful of Henry – although this notion is increasingly under revision. Indeed, when considered within a broader European context, including relations with the other eminent nations; the German empire, the Spanish kingdoms and the Papacy, Louis’s oft-referred to weakness appears out of place with his high position among his contemporaries. It is not only smaller powers that sought the intimacy of alliance with Louis; Castile, England, Hungary and the Byzantine Empire also confirmed marriage alliances with Louis and his family. In the case of Castile, for example, this was a mutually beneficial strategic alliance poised to counter possible threats to their interests in the region from Aragon and Henry II. Due to skilful political manœuvring, the Angevin king of England gained valuable territory in Normandy in the first such marriage alliance between the young Henry and Princess Margaret in 1160. However, Henry’s betrothal of both of his heirs, Henry and Richard, to Capetian princesses demonstrated the enduring desirability of

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26 Warren, Henry II, 108, 230, 236, 496 (et al); Duby, trans. Vale, France in the Middle Ages, 182-9; Bradbury, Philip Augustus, 18, 35-8; Barrow, Scotland and its Neighbours in the Middle Ages, 42; Sassier, Louis VII, 7-12; Dunbabin, ‘Henry II and Louis VII’, 49.
27 Pacaut, Louis VII, 37, n 1; 181; Warren, Henry II, 107, 222.
union and amicable relations with Louis.\footnote{Pacaut, Louis VII, 182; Warren, Henry II, 72, 77, 90, 109, 598; L. Diggelmann, ‘Marriage as Tactical Response: Henry II and the Royal Wedding of 1160’, English Historical Review, 2004, (119), 954-64.} Finally, and to relate this to the matter in hand, were Louis so weak, it seems improbable that the Bretons, Gascons, Poitevins, Welsh and Scots would seek him as their key ally in 1168. The expediency of his geographical proximity might account for their appeals in part, as might an occasionally, even increasingly, adversarial relationship between the rulers of France and England. However, such an ardent desire to secure the involvement of a weak ally seems at odds with the facts. While Henry II was evidently a major force, he was not all-powerful, a point recognised by his contemporaries and also one Warren conceded.\footnote{Warren, Henry II, 231.} The two defeats delivered to him by Owain Gwynedd also serve as ample example of that, and were reported in a letter by John of Salisbury in 1166 in the following way:

> Let anyone turn his mind’s eye to view the number and the quality of the enemies which the Lord has raised against the king [Henry II] since he lifted his heel against God to crush the Church. He will surely be astonished and, if he is wise, filled with reverence for God’s judgement: for he has chosen not emperors or kings or the princes of the nations to quell him, but chose first the remotest of men, the Welsh of Snowdon; and later he fired them to withstand in open fight the king whose footprints they had been used to worship.\footnote{Millor et al, The Letters of John of Salisbury, vol 2, 106-9, ‘Circumferat quis oculos mentis et intueatur quot et quales adversarios ei Dominus suscitauerit ex quo aduersus Deum in depressio ecclesiae erexit calcaneum suum, et plane mirabitur et, si prudens est, uenerabitur iudicium Dei qui non imperatores, non reges, non principes nationum ut ipsum dominaret elegit, sed extremos hominum, Britones Niuicollinos, primo; et postea illos ad contradictionem et solempne certamen animaut, qui uestigia pedum eius consueuerant adorare.’}

Louis’s style has been characterised as preferring ‘to put diplomatic pressure on Henry, to support the military initiatives of others rather than to fight himself, because he knew what the result would be.’\footnote{Warren, Henry II, 108-9, 118, 125-8, 132, 135-6; Sassier, Louis VII, 251; Dunbabin, ‘Henry II and Louis VII’, 61 (Text quote).} This appears to convey a sense that, in comparison to Henry’s energetic and bellicose ways, Louis was a lesser ruler in style and substance. Nevertheless, for all of his apparent military might, Henry did not vanquish or take territory from Louis, neither did the German emperor, Frederick I Barbarossa, whose much-vaunted military prowess appears only to have been paralleled or even eclipsed by that of Henry II. The German emperor viewed the kings of England and France as minor rulers, and was more profoundly engaged in a struggle with the Papacy to determine whether the empire was a
papal fief; an assumption which would challenge and render impotent the emperor’s rights to legitimacy. A different perspective on Dunbabin’s assertion suggests that Louis was a far more skilled political operator; inducing conflict elsewhere not only kept his adversary off-balance in a number of theatres while preserving the integrity of his own forces and economy, but ensured that other powers developed a vested interest in Louis’s survival. To recruit allies of differing sizes and locations therefore appears an intelligent, rather than a desperate strategy. The wide polarity in opinion of these two monarchs betrays the fact that a deeper point on their power relations has perhaps not yet been fully or satisfactorily exposed. Given the scale of any study tackling that matter, only a small part can be discussed here, and the key elements of the power relations between Louis and Henry can be briefly detailed referring to a small number of crucial events.

While perhaps exaggerated, the military superiority of Louis’s adversarial neighbours, Henry and Frederick, has been long held. Louis therefore needed to be more intelligent than his more powerful neighbours in order for his line and kingdom to survive. The most overt strategy was a proliferation of supportive alliances to counter the interests and influence of his rivals; in 1168 this can be seen to also include the Welsh. Another view of Louis’s alliance structure can be identified as territorial and personal. A brief analysis of the former reveals the extent to Louis’s diplomatic arrangements and offers a good example of the engagement of ‘bracketing’ alliances. Although this notion became more distinct in the succeeding generation and is therefore more sharply defined in the following chapter, this model can be seen to be used in this period too.

As established above, Louis’s territories were smaller than Henry’s, but contiguous, unlike Henry’s which were separated by the Channel and were home to numerous languages and dialects in regions which maintained notions of distinct, separate identities. This was probably an advantage to Louis since it presented a smaller front for Henry to exploit and provided clear, though extensive, areas in which to apply Capetian diplomatic and military efforts. In comparison, the Plantagenet ‘empire’, though vast, was a collection of disparate territories some of whom had no interest in adhering to their new Angevin overlord.

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Map 2: A general map of Angevin, Capetian and allied territories.

To the north and east of the French royal domains, Louis pursued the friendships of the great families of Flanders and Champagne. The acquisition of these powers as allies, even without the brokering of a formal treaty, was crucial to France. It not only extended a buffer between the Île-de-France and lands held by Henry but swelled those lands deemed to be in the French obedience, in some measure countering the vastness of the Angevin domain. These unions were sealed with a series of marriages, binding the influential families, as well as the granting

of favours and promotion to offices within the realm. They also entailed Louis sending forces to assist his allies in conflicts within their homelands. Securing ties with Flanders also offered the opportunity to probe Normandy from the east. The connection between Paris and Champagne became personally close; the king took Count Henry the Liberal’s sister, Adela of Champagne, as his third wife in 1160. In return, Louis’s daughters Mary and Alice were married to Henry and his brother, Count Theobald of Blois, in 1162. Before becoming count, Henry of Champagne had been on crusade with Louis, and the alliance between them, personal and territorial, aggrandised and provided support for both. Their friendship, which grew throughout the 1150s, was not only intended to provide a bulwark against any German threat, but as this alliance also encompassed Blois, it offered a potential pressure point in the west. This broad position of strength gave Henry the Liberal an advantageous position that he was able to exploit to further his ambitions by engaging with Louis and Frederick.37

Map 3: The lands of Blois-Champagne.38

Across the south of France, a similar picture of Louis’s diplomatic and military activities is discernible. As Henry asserted the marriage rights to Aquitaine gained in 1152, Louis turned

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37 Pacaut, Louis VII, 179-82; Warren, Henry II, 78 n. 1, 88-90; Duby, trans., Vale, France in the Middle Ages, 195; Sassier, Louis VII, 251-6, 300-1.

his attention to his south-west frontier. He made the above-mentioned marriage alliance with Castile in 1154, an agreement that bracketed Aquitaine and Aragon, the other major threat in the south. He also married his sister, Constance, to Count Raymond V of Toulouse, creating another unit of power in the region and acting as a further bracket and a block to the eastward aspirations of Barcelona and Angevin Aquitaine. The other powers involved also sought to use bracketing relations in the region. Henry II struck up a friendship with Raymond-Berenger IV of Aragon, while Frederick Barbarossa also played a hand in the south, squeezing the southern provinces between the competing interests of larger powers.

Map 4: The territories of south-west Europe.

Although the Toulouse marriage did not last, at its arrangement it appeared to be a strategic coup for the Capetian monarchy. While it stood however, Toulouse bore witness to a critical display of personal and feudal power between Henry II and Louis in 1159, and Louis

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emerged victorious. This is discussed below within the context of feudal relations. Louis advanced his influence in Languedoc and the Auvergne during this time too, cleverly bestowing favours and rights on the Church throughout the region and thus gaining their support, before conducting military campaigns there in person. While Capetian influence there would wax and wane over the years, primarily through a lack of resources to impose his will permanently in the region as well as through foreign intervention, the French king remained an important figure in terms of patronage and support, as well as appeal, showing that many in the south recognised his legitimacy as senior arbiter and regional overlord.\textsuperscript{41}

As Pacaut conceded, friendship with the French throne did not stop provinces on the periphery of the larger states from seeking security and union with other external powers, for many endured undulating relations with their neighbours. For example, the Flemish and Toulousains experienced periods of war, peace and commercial expansion with the English, Aragonese and the Germans.\textsuperscript{42} Establishing that point as acceptable as well as fact also justifies territories on the Angevin periphery acting similarly. In the case of the Welsh, the perception that Owain Gwynedd’s marriage to Cristin was incestuous probably posed a significant obstacle to Owain and Louis developing personal ties. Having had his marriage to Eleanor of Aquitaine annulled on grounds of consanguinity, it would be difficult for Louis to nurture a close amity in the face of the evident ecclesiastical displeasure.\textsuperscript{43} Despite the seeming \textit{bonhomie} expressed between Owain and the French Chancellor in the letters, it was success in war against Henry that gained the Welsh a place at the conference table.\textsuperscript{44} Therefore, the Welsh offered a territorial interest, rather than an opportunity to extend Louis’s carefully cultivated personal cabal.

Louis can also be seen acting beyond his borders; for example his inveigling of Henry’s family. In 1156, Louis encouraged the revolt of Geoffrey, Henry’s brother, who had established himself in Brittany. Although it was ultimately unsuccessful, Henry was obliged to spend time, effort and resources to re-establish his superiority. This was a pattern that was

\textsuperscript{43} Duggan, \textit{The Correspondence of Thomas Becket,} vol 2, (no. 190) 840-1, (no. 202) 874-7, (no. 223) 972-5, (no. 224) 974-7, (no. 225) 977-9 (correspondence from Becket to Owain and Welsh clergymen over the order to abandon Cristin, his wife, and the threat of interdict and excommunication if those orders were not carried out). For the importance, relevance and political turns in this issue, see Diggelmann, ‘Marriage as Tactical Response: Henry II and the Royal Wedding of 1160’, 954-64.
\textsuperscript{44} Barbier, \textit{The Age of Owain Gwynedd,} 54, 124-7; Millor et al, \textit{The Letters of John of Salisbury,} vol 1, (no. 87) 135-6, vol 2, (no. 168) 108-9; Pryce, ‘Franco-Welsh Diplomacy’, 6, 9-10; Duggan, \textit{The Correspondence of Thomas Becket,} vol 1, (no. 43) 177-9, (no. 132) 622-3.
repeated during their reigns, particularly in Brittany where there was genuine native resistance to Henry’s claim to power, and most famously in collaborating and supporting the revolt of Henry’s sons in 1173. There also is a faintly traceable contact between France and Scotland in the 1160s, demonstrating not only Louis’s appeal as an ally, but also his capacity to reach and react far beyond the Île-de-France. In addition, this shows that Louis was willing and able to cultivate good relations and conduct affairs with all ranks of the nobility, whatever their region or mother tongue.

However, since Louis is generally perceived as being weaker than Henry or Frederick, and apparently restricted to a smaller territory surrounding his influential core in the Île-de-France, he must have possessed something desirable to those others who sought his friendship or agreed to his alliance proposals. It might be fair to accuse writers on the subject of attaching too great a significance to visible or even assumed military force, when there is clearly far more at play than the simple deployment of armies. This prevailing and superficial measure ignores the obvious; it would have been folly for any small powers to align themselves with a weak, remote ally when faced with enemies such as Henry II or Frederick I. Yet Louis regularly attracted alliance offers and also wooed factions and leaders to bond with him in some manner. This can be attributed to Louis’s possession and intelligent wielding of ‘power’, which attracted others to him, and provoked others, such as Henry II, to defer to and even to emulate him. As Thomas Bisson and Michel Foucault compellingly argued, power could also be personal, difficult to measure and intangible, but also inducing, seductive, enticing, suggestive and more potent than a tally of soldiers. Louis’s survival, or victory, perhaps depended then on being able to draw Henry, rather than a myriad of allies, into his power.

A critical step in the establishment of this ethereal quality came at the council of Soissons in 1155. The desire for peace and unity within the country had long been urged by the Church and, at that moment, it seemed desirable to the temporal powers also. In addition, the French monarch sought to bind the loyalties of the magnates of France to him. In a move that would reconcile the aims of all three groups, Louis assembled France’s spiritual and secular leaders in a grand council, where, in the presence of their peers, each swore an elegantly worded oath that not only bound them to keep the peace but to act in concert against any who broke it. The ecclesiastical contingent was headed by the archbishops of Sens and Rheims, and included their suffragans, while the landed nobility included the French barony and notably the duke of Burgundy and the counts of Flanders, Champagne, Nevers and Soissons. This agreement was a major coup for it effectively created a coalition of powers willing to collaborate, and placed the French throne in the centre of this new, formal fraternity. The use of ceremony, public declaration and the instilling of a notion of unity for collective interest appears very shrewd. Equally, the lack of threat or coercion is obvious by its absence. Bisson agreed with the notion that Louis VII’s governance demonstrates an ‘intellectual approach to power’. Although he introduced the ideas of sociologist Max Weber on this matter to good effect, other writers have made valuable contributions that can equally be applied to this matter. However, this enticement, influencing, even subtly dictating, the behaviour of other magnates and freely, peacefully drawing them in to this mode of conduct placing Louis above them clearly demonstrates an application of Nye’s ‘soft power’ in the Twelfth century.

The oath made by many at Soissons in 1155 formally secured the supremacy of the French Crown in the lands of those present. It also established the concept of a pattern of behaviour which bound those men to maintain this practice, and it enticed Henry II into a

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similar peaceful arrangement with Louis to whom he swore homage as early as 1158. The promise rendered to the French king then was unequivocal; Henry was Louis’s man and held his continental lands of him. In spite of his clarifying of certain ambiguities, John Gillingham’s passionate, yet speculative denial of Henry’s submission at this early stage contrasts with Henry’s own words and actions. The contemporary evidence explicitly admitted Henry’s acceptance of Louis’s superior position. In addition, Henry’s own behaviour before Toulouse in 1159 vitiates Gillingham’s argument. While those promising to adhere to their vassalic pledges did so, such agreements endowed the French monarch with power, influence and authority over them all. Equally, they had bound themselves to guaranteeing that each held faith with the terms. This complex example of co-opting and consent, forms an essential part of the power relations of the time. Although Foucault explained the transmission of information through symbolic media, such as ritual, as ‘relationships of communication’, he saw these as being inextricably linked to relationships of power, which he described as being ‘rooted in the system of social networks.’ In those terms, this analysis comfortably encompasses Louis’s relationship with his vassals. Bisson also saw such developments as being at the forefront of the advances of the age; consensus


53 Gillingham, ‘Doing Homage to the King of France’, 63-84 (page 75, n. 5 epitomises Gillingham’s position).

54 Stephenson, ed., *Radulphi de Coggeshall Chronicon Anglicanum*, 12; Etienne of Rouen, (Stephani Rothomagensis, monachi Becensis, poema, cui titulus “Draco Normannicus”) in Howlett, ed., *Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II and Richard I*, vol 2, 585-762, 680 (line 552), the fact that this describes Louis returning Henry’s homage, therefore it was Louis’s to return, seems axiomatic; Robert of Torigni in Howlett, ed., *Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II and Richard I*, vol 4, 163-4 (Henry becoming duke of Normandy and count of Anjou), 240 (the agreement and reception of homage by Louis at Montmirail); Delisle, ed., *Actes Henry II*, vol 1, (no. 88) 195, (nos 240-1) 387-8; Millor et al, *The Letters of John of Salisbury*, vol 2, 636-8; Cuttino, *English Medieval Diplomacy*, 38, 40; Dunbabin, ‘Henry II and Louis VII’ 53-4 n. 2. Note: It seems *mauvaise foi* at best, for Gillingham to claim that the act of homage by Henry ‘never happened’ (64) when, although inconvenient to his view of the subject, so many contemporaries noted it as fact and Henry clearly behaved, however reluctant, as if bound by the limits of such an agreement.

and a notion of communal cohesion legitimised those in positions of authority.\textsuperscript{56} Consent then is an instrument of power, in that it enables one element of those locked together in the power relationship to determine the limits of another’s actions.\textsuperscript{57}

This vision of co-operation enticed or repulsed the excluded. It is worth making that distinction here, for soft power needs to be sensitively and intelligently deployed in order to be effective; Louis enticed Henry between 1155-8 and this resulted in an oath of fealty. Henry’s loyalty to his word was tested and convincingly proved by his withdrawal before Toulouse in 1159. The simple act of refusing to attack because his lord, Louis, was present in the town evidently demonstrated Louis’s superior rank within the feudal hierarchy and, in that measure, his dominance.\textsuperscript{58} In contrast, Henry failed to bind the Welsh to a similar agreement in 1163, and war between them followed. These efforts to emulate Louis’s methods of power are testimony to the strength of soft power; not only was Henry drawn into behaving in a way that disadvantaged him, by paying homage to Louis and accepting a subservient position within the European noble fraternity, but he also attempted to replicate that form of power with those people he deemed to fall within his influence. It could be argued that Henry’s attempt to duplicate Louis’s methods unwittingly paid him compliment by giving recognition to their effectiveness. Moreover, in gaining ascendancy over Henry without needing to defeat him in battle, Louis had demonstrated a military aphorism that is as prized in modern warfare as it was when written by Sun Tzu.\textsuperscript{59} This axiom also clearly applied to the medieval period.

The assertion of Louis’s rights over his vassals, including Henry, reinforced their positions within an established power structure which delineated ways of behaving, through precedent, ritual and appeal. The latter formed an important role, and the kings of France figured among the most respected arbiters of noble disputes within Europe. Even Geoffrey of Anjou and his son Henry petitioned King Louis to complain that King Stephen of England

\begin{footnotesize}
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  \item[Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’, 788-9, 793; Bisson, \textit{The Crisis of the Twelfth Century}, 12, 289, 371-8, 389, 429, 442, 459-60, 471-2, 491-2, 494, 569.]
  \item[Foucault, ‘The Subject and Power’, 788-90.]
  \item[S. B. Griffiths, ed. and trans, \textit{Sun Tzu: The Art of War} (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 77; Y. Shibing, trans., \textit{Sun Tzu: The Art of War} (Ware: Wordsworth, 1993), 105. ‘The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.’ Other slightly different translations of this exist, for this rule, chapter 3, entry 2. These are all founded on Lionel Giles’s 1910 translation; L. Giles, \textit{Sun Tzu on the Art of War, the Oldest Military Treatise in the World} (London: Luzac, 1910), 17, ‘supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.’; Minford, \textit{Sun-tzu, The Art of War}, 14, 132-3 ‘the aim of war is to subdue an opponent ... to change his attitude and induce compliance.’]
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was withholding from them rights over Normandy and England, Louis interceded on their side.\(^{60}\) Accepting the French kings’ right and ability to adjudicate in such matters, manifestly accorded them a superior rank above their peers in that regard. This also highlighted the valid rationale behind Owain Gwynedd’s approaches to Louis during the years 1163-8.

Yet Louis’s acquisition and deployment of power appears to extend further. While he was reputedly far more than conventionally pious, he does not appear to have been unaware of the political role and influence of the Church.\(^{61}\) Although it seems reasonable to state that Louis’s motivations in protecting and promoting the Church appear genuine, the political ramifications of his actions and policies contributed to his authority, and require brief consideration. He took pains to bind the Church and monarchy close, to some degree one supporting and legitimising the other.

It can be argued that the schism of 1159 helped this cause further. During 1163-5, France offered a safe refuge for Pope Alexander III in times of schism and enforced flight from Rome.\(^{62}\) Once openly committed, Louis was guaranteed ecclesiastical support due to his steadfast support for the Roman popes, even to the point of agreeing to two, ultimately aborted meetings with Barbarossa to argue Alexander’s case. Henry II’s policy toward the schism was steered by French churchmen. The prelates in Henry’s continental possessions naturally followed the direction of the Gallican church, which not only adhered to Alexander but enjoyed closer ties to the French throne than it did to that of England.\(^{63}\) Although Henry flirted with the idea of supporting Barbarossa’s candidate, ultimately he was obliged to avoid alienating his own clergy. Being able to influence those men consequently possibly enabled Louis to sway Henry to declare fidelity with Alexander in 1160.\(^{64}\) A third perspective is also credible, that the clergy resident in the lands of both kings were able to draw the two

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\(^{63}\) Warren, *Henry II*, 451-2; it is noteworthy however, that even the event of declaring for a papal candidate has also been viewed from Henry’s perspective: ‘Louis could not risk declaring for one pope and seeing his rival take western France into the other obedience.’; Somerville, *Pope Alexander III and the Council of Tours*, 2.

monarchs to supporting their preferred candidate, Alexander, by playing on their mutual fears.65

France was also Thomas Becket’s safe haven following the well-known dispute with Henry II that resulted in his fleeing England in 1164.66 The French king appears to have played his hand intelligently in the Becket case, steering a prudent path between over-committing to Becket and thus antagonising Henry, and yielding to the king of England’s demands and delivering the archbishop. Nevertheless, his legitimate receipt and sustenance of Becket demonstrated an arbitration role expected of an overlord which Henry did not dishonour.67 As described above, the king of France’s role as a legitimate receptacle for appeal was founded on well-established precedent, a responsibility of which even Henry Plantagenet had availed himself.68 Therefore, by protecting the Church and its leaders, such as the pope in exile, and by promoting its various causes, for example in the face of imperial aggression, Louis appears to be consciously investing himself in the recognised and legitimate sources of power. This combining of hegemonic cores; founded on precedent, oaths and feudal rights, and also the protection of clergy from France’s aggressive neighbours, bestowed a wide and profound claim to authority on the French king.

Contemporary literature represents another front in the power struggles of the age. The twelfth century enjoyed a literary flourishing which served many purposes. One such role was a political function designed to legitimise perceived or claimed rights and to imbue leaders of the time with connections to a tradition and a figure of mythical authority – such as the legendary deeds performed by King Arthur, Lancelot or Charlemagne.69 Many of these works were justifications, instructive or moralising, and even moulded extant prophetic messages to suit the purposes of the figures of the day. One of the most relevant examples is ‘Draco Normannicus’ in which a Breton noble, Rolland de Dinan, was portrayed writing a letter to King Arthur in Avalon, and in turn, the mythical leader wrote to King Henry II. In

65 Somerville, Pope Alexander III and the Council of Tours, 2.
his telling but imaginary reply, Henry blamed the tenth-century French king Charles the Simple for according the Normans overlordship of the Bretons. This was a justification for Henry’s assertions over Brittany, and an attempt to establish a precedent and a traditional claim over the Bretons, while simultaneously blaming the French king for that predicament. This century not only saw the continuation and even expansion of chronicle and monastic records, but also many *Gesta* and *Vitae* were produced, expounding the heroic or tragic nature of their subjects, and passing on lessons to the next generation. A good example of such is the work recording the life of Owain Gwynedd’s father, Gruffudd ap Cynan, which was almost certainly commissioned during the decade in focus here. In addition, studies of people and places were made, in which all manner of observations appeared; from interpretive lessons on moral standards, to advice relating to military conquest. Among the most significant were those made by *Giraldus Cambrensis* on Wales and Ireland. Other works created during this period purposefully told the histories, real and imagined, of many of the French and British peoples. Although the myriad texts of the period did not bring any nation to its knees, their role in enflaming the glories of their subject had an effect that was felt throughout contemporary society, and helped shape perceptions of a peoples’ standing. As propaganda with a far-reaching psychological effect, these literary works therefore formed part of the struggle of the time. Even the simple act of writing down a certain language gave it a status above a spoken dialect, and this elevation can be seen to be repeated across the region at this time, from Anglo-Norman to Welsh.

This array of mostly successful ploys and investment in recognised roles of influence show Louis was strategically superior to Henry. By securing ascendancy in the accepted, legitimate sources of power of his age, with perhaps the exception of military force, Louis was able to maintain his position and to extend his influence not only over Henry, but also over the king of England’s vassals, from the south of France to Scotland. Not all his efforts blossomed, and Henry undoubtedly scored diplomatic points of his own creation. However,

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the successful cultivation of an unchallengeable idea of the supremacy of his position inculcated Louis with an authoritative but notional position of power – and it was solely a concept after all – and this disparity in power goes some distance to explaining why Plantagenet military might failed to unseat or dominate the Capetians.
2.2: Letters from Owain, king and prince of Gwynedd.

The evidence for the first Welsh connection to France comes in the form of three letters sent to Louis VII’s court by Owain Gwynedd. Huw Pryce speculated that there were four letters, or at least four missions from Snowdonia, however only copies of three such examples have been discovered and no French replies are known to exist. Although John of Salisbury’s evidence clearly shows that a number of Welsh representatives attended, only letters from Owain have received mention or survived in some form. It has been assumed that these representatives were from the courts of Rhys ap Gruffudd and Owain Gwynedd, however those of other Welsh nobles might have been included. While this gives rise to the intriguing possibility that letters from Rhys and others might exist, this work will focus on those of Owain, who appears to have initiated and pursued this contact with France.

The survival of these letters is due to the efforts of Hugh de Champfleury, chancellor of France, 1150-72, and bishop of Soissons, 1159-75, who ordered copies to be made of much of Louis VII’s correspondence. An overview of Owain’s letters demonstrates a notable evolution in his diplomatic methods. While many of the most noteworthy details are discussed in Pryce’s article, they have not been fully contextualised nor have their consequences been analysed.

The first letter appears naive in form; while sufficiently humble and polite, it was not directed through common diplomatic channels but sent straight to the king. The language used is less florid than the later letters, which acknowledges a need for Owain to change style. Its message is quite direct; he admits that the two leaders are strangers to one another, yet Owain offers himself and his possessions to Louis.

To Louis, very glorious king of the French, Owain, king of Wales, greeting and very devoted service. Since I have heard of the magnificence of your virtue and the very eminent excellence of your dignity and nobility from the announcement of rumour and the truthful report of many, I have for a long time desired with the greatest desire to come to the notice of your highness and have your very delightful friendship. But that which up to now I have not obtained, having been prevented by the rarity of travellers coming and going and the distances of places [between us], from now on I shall

79 See Appendices A 1.1 and A 1.2 below.
endeavour diligently to obtain by both writing and messenger. Placing myself and my possessions, if by any chance they are pleasing to you, at the command of your will, I ask with the greatest perseverance of prayers that you may now deign from now to consider me, largely unknown up to now to your discretion, amongst your faithful and devoted friends. Do not delay to inform me through the bearer of the present letter what it shall please your dearest amiability concerning the proposed petition. May they fare well who desire that you reign happily and long. Farewell.  

Pryce dated this letter as probably following the act of homage paid to Henry at Woodstock in July 1163. That event is the outstanding trigger of the time for such a deliberate pursuit of an alliance with the Capetian monarchy, and therefore seems the most obvious and reasonable catalyst. However, it should not simply be held that fear of invasion compelled the Welsh to write to the French, homage to Henry provided the acceptable expedient to allow such an appeal. The precedent, even long history of such appeals to the kings of France has been established above. It also seems fair to criticise Pryce’s underestimation of Owain’s value to Louis, since the French king was known to deal sympathetically with nobles and ecclesiastics of all ranks, mother-tongue and nation. While perhaps just ‘a minor player’ who was geographically isolated from the Capetian domains, Owain, his forces and his allies offered a military and a diplomatic opportunity for Louis to exploit. The point concerning isolation requires brief consideration here. In this first letter, Owain wrote of the lack of previous amicable ties between them due to ‘the rarity of travellers coming and going and the distances of places [between us].’ It is worth clarifying that this sentence shows that there were no diplomatic bonds between the courts, not that the Welsh were isolated or unknown, for there is significant evidence of Welshmen in French courts at the time which demonstrates the Welsh were more visible than might be supposed. Nevertheless, it is an important consideration that the diplomatic isolation of the Welsh was a result of the assertion of Canterbury’s primacy during the reign of Henry I. When Archbishop Anselm demanded that the bishops of Wales swore allegiance to Canterbury, this effectively relinquished Welsh control or influence of future elections and candidates to those posts. The consequence was that in times of need, the Welsh leaders only had low-ranking and therefore
poorly connected clergymen to rely on as messengers. Perhaps alone among western Europe’s peoples, there was no powerful Welsh voice in Rome, nor anyone of rank in Europe’s royal courts. Those Welshmen who did rise to positions of prominence in the church were, by necessity, loyal to Canterbury. A good example of this comes from Owain’s reign, where Meurig, bishop of Bangor, was isolated by the princes of Gwynedd for being their outspoken critic, as well as being a sworn adherent of Canterbury and the king of England.86

The French king declined to formally respond to the first Welsh petition, for reasons unknown. It seems that this was not viewed as a rebuff, however, because Owain pursued the matter and subsequently received an apparently friendly response. In some sense the first letter appears to be relatively basic in its construction, that is to say it is an uncomplicated, straight-forward message directly addressing the interlocutor. Although it contained elements of the politesses required in courtly dialogue, it nonetheless reads as blunt when compared to other similar diplomatic approaches, such as Owain’s third letter. In Welsh society of the day, according to the contemporary observer Gerald of Wales, anyone in Wales could speak their mind even in the presence of their ruler.87 It might be therefore, that this straight-forwardness and lack of elaboration in direct personal communications denoted a norm among the Welsh.

The second letter is a better-crafted proposition; the language is noticeably more elaborate, the theme of religion, key in dealing with Louis’s regime, runs strongly through it and it was directed through an intermediary, the French chancellor.88 This letter also acknowledges that the chancellor had instructed Owain how to improve his petitions, notably through intercession.

Owain, king of Wales, his very devoted friend, [sends] due and voluntary friendship with [his] greeting to his very beloved friend and father in Christ, Hugh, bishop of Soissons and chancellor to the king of France. I give thanks to God the Father, my venerable one, and to your discretion concerning that which you committed to writing in your letter to me through my messenger Moses, namely that if I should again send my messenger to the lord king of France, I should make him come through you, so that with your help his purpose might be accomplished more effectively. Whence we are now sending this Moses as my messenger to consult with you concerning his business, and vigorously

86 Lloyd, History of Wales, vol 2, 480-4, 521; Millor et al, The Letters of John of Salisbury, vol 1, (letter 87), 135-6; Davies, Age of Conquest, 189-90; Duggan, The Correspondence of Thomas Becket, vol 1, (no. 13) 32-3, n. 5 (1163), (no. 57) 234-7, (no. 58) 236-7, (no. 59) 238-9, (no. 60) 239-41 (all 1165).
87 Thorpe, trans., Gerald of Wales, 245.
88 See Appendix A 2.1 and A 2.2 below.
entreat you to support him vis-à-vis the king and to assist our side for the love of God and us. Farewell. 

The content of the letter clearly placed it between the first letter, which probably dated to late 1163 or early 1164, and the third, which was certainly written between late summer 1165 and Easter 1166. It is worth also situating that letter within the broader spectrum of contemporary affairs, for within this period Pope Alexander III and Archbishop Becket sought Louis’s protection from the military efforts and political machinations of their enemies – Frederick and Henry – and conflict arose in Italy and western France, while the Welsh advanced against Crown interests in Wales. Within that landscape, it is believable that Welsh appeals to France might be given an increasingly fertile reception.

The style and substance of Owain’s last known letter to Louis mark impressive improvements in the form of his diplomacy.

To the very excellent Louis, by the grace of God king of the French, Owain, prince of Wales, his very faithful man and friend, [sends] very devoted service with [his] greeting. Although the report of all, most serene king, proclaims you to be conspicuous as one in whom all can and should have complete trust, the clemency known to me by experience, and the kindness towards subjects and those having complete trust in you, make me choose you as the sole adviser to whom in difficulties I may complain loudly of my necessity. For as often as I have informed you about myself and my cares by the writing of letters, you have received not only the letters but their bearer benevolently and treated them kindly. Through the latter you have counselled me, thanks be to God and you, as a pious king should counsel someone having complete trust in him. Now that, therefore, difficulties are all around me at present, I do not wish my kind adviser to be ignorant of the situation. Preceded by no evil deeds of mine, in the past summer the king of England has waged against me the war which, as is known to you, he has planned for many days with the harshness of his tyranny. But when in the conflict the five armies of our side came together, thanks be to God and you, more of his men fell than mine. Having seen this, he wrongfully and harmfully mutilated my hostages, although he had not presented them previously for the keeping of peace. But, because all things are disposed of not by the wishes of man but by the will of God, he moved the army towards England, not through our merits, perhaps, but through the prayers of the humble to the saints, and by the saints’ intercession to God; however, he left me uncertain of the outcome to the end, because he arranged neither a peace nor a truce with us. Angered therefore because the result had not turned out as he had hoped, on his departure he ordered the foreigners and all whom he gathered together to defeat us to come with him against us again after next Easter. On that account I vigorously entreat your clemency that you will inform me

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92 See Appendices A 3.1 and A 3.2 below.
through the bearer of this present letter whether you are resolved to wage war against
him, so that in that war I may both serve you by harming him according to your advice
and take vengeance for the war he waged against me. But if you do not propose this,
inform me by this bearer what you advise, what help you wish to bestow on me. I have
no way of evading his snares unless you grant me advice and help. I commend to you
moreover my private and familiar cleric and kinsman, Guiardus, that you may provide
him with necessities for the love of God and us. I sent him before into your presence with
my letters, which you did not believe were mine, so we were told. But they were mine, I
bring in God as my witness, and through them I commended him to you from the depths
of my heart. I vigorously entreat your clemency concerning this as well, that just as you
have begun to render peaceful towards me the prelates of the Church, namely the pope
and the archbishop of Canterbury, so you will continue to do so. Farewell.93

Owain began with an appropriate greeting introducing the two interlocutors, praising and
thanking Louis. He sprinkled themes of piety and trust into his message, demonstrating that
he had learned more about Louis’s character. The manner in which Owain explained the
causes and identified the agent of his distress, and in so doing gave the reason for his
contacting Louis, were far more mature and conventional than his previous missives. His
depiction of the Welsh victory over Henry’s unprovoked invasion was intelligently presented;
he let it be known that Henry had been beaten but acknowledged the influence of prayer and
saintly intercession. The sub-text to this delivered two important messages; he was able to
defeat Henry in battle and was therefore a worthy ally, but he was also respectful and pious
and so, perhaps, deserved Louis’s friendship and support. Then Owain revealed the crux of
the message; his need for French intercession, as he had learned that Henry was due to muster
another army destined for Wales after Easter 1166.94 The third letter ends by clarifying any
confusion over the previous letters and thanking Louis for his help in another matter. In doing
so, Owain presented his messenger as a man of the cloth and a man of the blood, touching on
common qualities among courtly messengers throughout the period.95 Owain’s final lines
thanking Louis for his intercession with Thomas Becket and the pope suggest that the French
king’s barely discernible hand was, to a certain degree, already at work on Owain’s behalf.
This third letter is a bold and ultimately successful attempt at inducing Louis to take up
Owain’s cause.96

96 Pryce, ‘Owain Gwynedd and Louis VII’. 1. Pryce only mentions that the representatives of the king of
Scotland and the kings of Wales were present at the conference of July 1168 – that is slightly misleading, since
the Bretons and Poitevins were probably the primary plaintiffs, and the Gascons too were present.
Owain’s victory at Berwyn has not yet received the wider recognition it perhaps deserves. Even before conflict was joined Owain Gwynedd had scored a staggering diplomatic success in Wales, creating an unprecedented alliance of the native powers:

And against him [Henry II] came Owain and Cadwaladr, sons of Gruffudd ap Cynan, and all the host of Gwynedd with them, and Rhys ap Gruffudd and with him the host of Deheubarth, and Owain Cyfeiliog and Iorwerth Goch ap Maredudd and the sons of Madoc ap Maredudd and the host of all Powys with them, and the two sons of Madog ab Idnerth and their host.

Of course, this event has not entirely escaped the attention of historians, and it is mostly recognised as a victory of sorts. However, as a military victory against a far superior force, Welsh efforts at Berwyn have not reached the standing they seem to be due. Although there is no room for an account of the campaign here, it seems that several salient points have been missed. Firstly, on a political and diplomatic level, it is noteworthy that the hosts of the Welsh territories allied themselves under Owain Gwynedd and gathered on his lands, at Corwen. Owain was not militarily strong enough to coerce these other Welsh rulers to join him, nor did they owe him military service required within a feudal arrangement; therefore they did so voluntarily. Next, it is also striking that these Welsh leaders were not naturally allies, and several of them had opposed each other at certain moments; Gwynedd and Powys were long-standing adversaries. In addition, more than half of these hosts were mustered and moved from areas outside Gwynedd and Deheubarth, therefore from areas normally considered Marcher or Crown lands. The ability to raise forces and relocate many miles away, crossing other territories also considered to be under non-native control suggests a serious extant over-estimation of the breadth and strength of Norman power in twelfth-century Wales.

97 T. Jones, trans., Brut y Tywysogyon or The chronicle of the princes. Peniarth ms. 20 version (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1952), 63.
100 Davies, Age of Conquest, 38 (1991), his map clarifies the effective limits of Norman power in Wales.
From a military perspective, a key feature of Henry II’s campaign has not been sufficiently illuminated. Following the clashes in the Vale of Ceiriog, where Owain claimed to have inflicted more significant casualties on Crown forces than those his troops had suffered, Henry moved in a southerly direction to high ground. That action undertaken by Henry, moving away from the enemy and up onto higher ground, denotes a perceived need for security. This supports an idea that the Angevin army suffered more than Henry wished to countenance at that stage of the advance. With that, Henry showed marked caution or a lack of confidence. In the ensuing stand-off, two factors are named as crucial to Henry’s

Map 5: general map of medieval Wales.  

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101 This general map of medieval Wales shows the native Welsh territories and denotes Ewloe, Berwyn and Corwen. Based on Davies, *Age of Conquest*, 38 (1991), his map clarifies the effective limits of Norman power in Wales.

withdrawal; dwindling supplies and a severe storm striking the area.\textsuperscript{103} If not simply cited as a contributory factor for the defeat, then the former suggests poor strategic planning; the duty of the commander. The latter however, is intriguing for two reasons. The campaign broke up due to the storm during August, which was of course possible but would have been unusual for such an army to be deterred by a summer storm. However, it has never been mentioned that the assembled Welsh forces stood under the same skies, yet were not driven from the field by the same weather conditions. With Henry’s near-death experience at Owain’s hands in 1157 in mind, it is worth considering that the defiance of a far larger enemy force camped at Corwen caused Henry to blink first in this face-off.

Having met defeat in Wales, Henry left for France in early 1166 and did not return for four years.\textsuperscript{104} In that time, Henry’s Welsh enemies continued their conflict against him, making notable advances, including the capture of several castles such as Cardigan and Rhuddlan from Crown and Marcher forces.\textsuperscript{105} Events on the continent between 1166-8 served to illuminate the value and credibility of Owain Gwynedd as an ally; Barbarossa’s forces sacked Rome while Henry II moved against the Bretons, deposed Duke Conan IV and began to reduce the native nobles.\textsuperscript{106}

It is in the light of these numerous factors, whether to frustrate or curb Henry’s territorial ambitions, or to support the liberties of a fellow Christian prince, which made all of those powers present at La Ferté-Bernard of interest to the French. These letters and the events which encompassed them provide a number of relevant points. Clearly, the first of which is that there does not seem to have been any Franco-Welsh relationship before Owain’s initiative. Therefore, these letters are the first important step in the course of external relations between Welsh rulers and European powers. They also demonstrate dimensions to Owain’s personality that are not otherwise revealed by other sources concerning his life. The notion of acquiring allies of the magnitude of France shows an appreciation of the broader strategy needed to ensure a secure future for his territory. These letters also demonstrate Owain as a man of some ambition; he was willing to reject Henry’s overlordship and to meet him in battle. Also, he adopted the titles of ‘king’ and ‘prince’ of Wales, the significance of

\textsuperscript{103} Barbier, The Age of Owain Gwynedd, 98; Lloyd, History of Wales, vol 2, 516-7; Warren, Henry II, 163-4; Davies, Age of Conquest, 53; Maud, The Welsh Kings, 168-9; Hosler, Henry II, Medieval Soldier, 141-2.
\textsuperscript{104} Eyton, Itinerary, 92; Warren, Henry II, 164.
which are discussed by Pryce.\textsuperscript{107} These documents also provide evidence of his evolving diplomatic skills. The third letter, written in the expected meter and form of such correspondence, comprised perhaps the peak of Owain’s diplomatic education.\textsuperscript{108} The energy put into these relations show the extent to which Owain desired an alliance with Louis. The result of which was the 1168 conference, about which Seán Duffy cautiously but credibly suggested that it demonstrated that an alliance of sorts existed between them.\textsuperscript{109} The following investigation into the ‘obligation’ reported by John of Salisbury sheds further light on the consequences of any such alliance.

\textsuperscript{108} Pryce, ‘Owain Gwynedd and Louis VII’, 14-5.
2.3: The nature of ‘an obligation’

The somewhat insubstantial evidence from John of Salisbury revealing that the powers opposed to Henry left La Ferté-Bernard with ‘an obligation’ invites comment on two critical matters; the apparent consequences of the 1168 conference and an observation on the interplay of these leaders.

No sources consulted explain or adequately engage with John’s ‘obligation’, yet it is critical since it describes the culmination of Owain Gwynedd’s diplomatic drive. However, analysis of the overt consequences of the conference contributes to an alternative vision of the power relations between those present. This is demonstrated by a survey of the subsequent actions of those powers represented. Since Louis VII’s intercession was sought because of conflict, the military actions that followed should indicate the nature of the obligation in question. Equally, in the absence of irrefutable written evidence, the consequent diplomatic manoeuvring might also provide a compelling answer. In this regard, Scotland, Brittany and Wales appear to provide a consistent response in the aftermath of the conference. Therefore, this section will examine whether Louis required military action from his ‘allies’ – or at least those opposed to Henry at that time – or whether there was something more subtle, but decidedly more powerful at play.

To begin with Scotland, from where originates the most simplistic, but perhaps prevailing notion that Louis instructed the representatives of the powers in attendance to return home and make war on Henry II. This view is forwarded by Geoffrey Barrow, who identified the conference as perhaps forming the root of the Franco-Scottish ‘Auld Alliance’, isolating Henry’s reticence to resolve the matter of the English northern counties as the reason for William the Lion approaching Louis in 1168. Barrow declared that 1173 began with William’s ‘crucial and foolish decision to invade England in support of the young King Henry’s revolt against his father, and in undisguised alliance with the French.’ However, research into these events has failed to reveal any connection between Scotland and France in

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110 Sources consulted on violent revolt in Poitou and Gascony have proved too imprecise to be of use to either condemn or contribute to the following: E. C. Lodge, *Gascony Under English Rule* (London: Methuen and Co., 1926), 18-20; Duby, trans., *Vale, France in the Middle Ages*, 194, ‘Aquitaine was ‘perennially restive and intractable’; Aurell, *L’ Empire des Plantagenêt*, 206-16; Aurell, trans., *Crouch, The Plantagenet Empire*, 187-96.

the five years spanning the 1168 conference to the 1173 revolt by the young King Henry. Therefore this casts a shadow over any suggestion of an ongoing but lost link between the Scots and the French that resulted in William’s involvement in young Henry’s revolt. In the absence of any such military action, threats or diplomatic evidence, then William the Lion’s attack on northern England cannot credibly be linked to any unrecorded obligations to Louis in 1168. In addition, there is nothing to connect the Scots and the French in 1173, except through their mutual support, though for different reasons, of the young King Henry’s rebellion; Scots’ interests were fixed on the long drawn-out question of the northern counties. Therefore this is a tenuous connection to France and cannot reasonably equate to an ‘undisguised alliance’, as Barrow asserts. Moreover, Barrow’s point is countered by Archibald Duncan, who simply connected William’s support for young Henry to a promise to award him the northern counties. No union with France is linked to Scotland’s short-lived involvement in that revolt against Henry II. The idea that the pronouncements given at La Ferté-Bernard and William’s adherence to the rebellion of young Henry were unconnected was echoed by Gordon Donaldson. While he accepted that 1168 could conceivably be construed as the faint origin of the heralded ‘Auld Alliance’ of 1295, he plainly stated that there was no evidence of a formal alliance between Scotland and France in 1168 and indeed nothing ‘to fill the gap between 1168 and the treaty of 1295’. It seems reasonable therefore to say that Scotland did not go to war with Henry II following any military obligations received at the 1168 conference. Rather, the state of affairs that emerge from La Ferté-Bernard suggest peaceful compliance rather than conflict.

The evidence for Brittany, more detailed and factionally complex than Scotland or Wales, also suggests the same conclusion. Galliou and Jones failed to identify any specifically anti-Henrician action that could be connected to the conference. While there is an acknowledgement of noteworthy turbulence during the rule of Conan IV, 1156–1171, none of it is viewed as action taken against Henry on Louis’s command. In fact, for reasons developed below, the period seems to mark relatively peaceful relations between the king and the duke: Conan frequently visited England where he held estates and to attend the 1164 Assize of Clarendon, for example. Things turned sour between the duke and the king in 1166.

113 Duncan, The Kingship of the Scots, 99.
114 Donaldson, Auld Alliance, 24.
when Henry staged a coup against Conan, yet retained him thereafter as a loyal, landed official within the duchy. In that year, Conan betrothed his first-born, Constance, to Geoffrey, Henry’s son. Noble resistance in Brittany was portrayed as related to a historic lack of ducal control which Henry sought to reverse by manipulating Conan and then through the Angevin administration he installed there.115

A more detailed picture of contemporary Brittany emerges from Judith Everard’s study which covers the years critical to this research.116 Henry’s claim to Brittany was founded on terms of precedence and strategic rationale. Duke Alan I had rendered homage to Henry II’s grandfather who, although King Henry I of England, was duke of Normandy. Additionally, as recently as 1113, Louis VI acknowledged that the Breton duke held his territories of the duke of Normandy. The Angevins also held a historic claim to the county of Nantes.117 In strategic terms, Brittany shared a land border with Henry II’s possessions; Normandy, Maine, Anjou and Poitou, and also, but of secondary importance, it occupied a significant geographic point for the passage of naval forces and ship-borne commerce.118 Therefore, Henry’s involvement in Breton affairs began prior to his elevation to kingship. For example, before 1154 he had already campaigned with Breton allies and consistently supported the independence of the Breton Church from that of France. The latter, while popular with Bretons, also served Henry’s later political interest in fracturing the power of the French Church in order to weaken its – and the French king’s – ability to interfere in Brittany. With English support, Dol’s defiance of Tours lasted until Innocent III ruled in favour of Tours in 1199, in a measure intended to please Philip Augustus, whose support that pope tried to cultivate.119 It should also be established here that this extension of authority in the peninsula was not simply a case of the Angevin king of England coveting and acquiring land and influence in Brittany, for many Breton nobles held lands and titles in England, and relations appear to have been bi-lateral.120

As England’s king and Normandy’s duke, and therefore direct overlord of the duchy, it could be reasonably expected that Henry’s involvement in Breton internal politics would deepen. Although the king of England’s involvement in that would outlive Henry, the salient

118 Everard, *Brittany and the Angevins*, 35.
events that resulted in Breton involvement at La Ferté-Bernard can be simplified to the following points. Since the death of Duke Conan III in 1148, there had not been a universally-recognised successor. There were two principal candidates who exercised some form of power over significant areas of Brittany, while a small proportion of the duchy obeyed no-one but the local pre-eminent noble. The main protagonists were Eudo de Porhoët and Conan, son of the late Alan of Penthièvre, heir to the honour of Richmond. Conan’s right to the title came through his mother, Bertha, who had been favoured to succeed her father, Conan III, instead of her brother Hoël. However, Bertha did not gain final ascendancy in that struggle until 1155, and the following year Hoël was ejected from his last stronghold in Nantes. That region was swiftly seized by Geoffrey, Henry II’s younger brother, who held it until his untimely death in 1158, an event which directly engaged Henry II in Breton territorial affairs as he claimed to be his brother’s heir. Bertha’s husband, Alan, earl of Richmond, died in 1146 and she subsequently married Eudo de Porhoët, who exercised power as the heir’s husband. Although raised in England, Conan returned to Brittany in 1156 to claim what he saw as his right. Before the end of the year, his campaigns had been successful enough to earn him widespread recognition as Duke Conan IV. Therefore, by the close of 1156, the Breton factions were split between supporting the new claimant Conan IV, Eudo, the previous and to some extent the de facto duke; they could also look to the Angevin presence in Nantes or opt to maintain an independent stance. This resulted in a decade of intermittent, unresolved civil war.¹²¹

For reasons for that seem unclear or, as Everard asserted, were based on rumours of conspiracy, Henry began to take direct military action in Brittany. In summer 1164 his forces invaded and held certain important lands on the Breton side of its border with Normandy, immediately transferring their administration into the hands of Henry’s Norman officials. Two years later, after crossing to the continent following his defeat at Berwyn, he attacked and took Fougères, destroying the castle there. Ralph, its lord, was one of Conan’s closest allies; the duke failed to defend him in any form. Then, in late summer 1166, Henry staged a coup over the leadership and administration of the duchy. Henry organised the marriage of the infant Constance, Conan’s only surviving child, to his young son, Geoffrey. At the same moment, he deposed the duke, obliging him to hand over administrative control of the duchy. Henry then took the homage of most of the Breton nobles at Thouars and then advanced on and entered Rennes, where Brittany’s dukes were invested. In the meantime he

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appointed a small number of his Norman followers to key posts in the duchy and also took custody of Constance.  

There is no defined spark for the revolt of certain Breton nobles that erupted the following year, however likely reasons were tighter administrative control and, perhaps, the ceding of the ducal crown to a non-Breton interloper, all the while set in a background of ongoing factional conflict. The most prominent native rebels were Eudo de Porhoët, Guihomar de Léon, Ralph de Fougères and Rolland de Dinan, although others clearly participated. They did not form a rebel coalition, and remained divided between themselves although Eudo married Guihomar’s daughter in late 1167, forming an alliance between those factions. Several Gascon nobles, the viscount of Thouars and Louis VII were also implicated as supporters of this revolt. It is telling that before undertaking military action against the Breton rebels in 1167, Henry met Louis to request a truce, just as he had done in 1158, when equally, Henry had also sought his overlord’s permission to act against the Bretons. Although Henry was initially successful during the campaigns of late summer 1167, the death of his mother in September brought a premature end to campaigning that year, obliging him to resume the subjugation of the rebels in spring 1168. Critically, before restarting the offensive, he arranged another truce with Louis, to last from 7 April to 1 July, 1168. The fighting ended shortly before that truce elapsed, with the situation still not finally determined, although conditions largely favoured Henry’s forces.  

The situation in Wales prior to the conference of July 1168 needs only brief re-illumination at this stage. Following Berwyn, the Welsh pressed attacks against Crown and Marcher interests across Wales and, by the end of 1167, they had captured Basingwerk, Prestatyn and Rhuddlan in the north-east, and Cardigan in the south-west. It is noteworthy that there is a dearth of reported military activity in Wales after mid-1168.  

The conference at La Ferté-Bernard took place in July 1168, where, among the Scots and the Welsh petitioners, the Breton lords Eudo de Porhoët and Rolland de Dinan, made

124 Pacaut, Louis VII, 196; Warren, Henry II, 100-1; Sassier, Louis VII, 279-81, 384; Everard, Brittanıy and the Angevins, 40-4.  
125 Everard, Brittanıy and the Angevins, 45 (citing the 1167 entry from Chroniques des églises d’Anjou).  
127 Pacaut, Louis VII, 195-6 (Note: Pacaut has the wrong year here, citing 1167 for events known to have taken place the following year); Warren, Henry II, 81, 106, 108; Sassier, Louis VII, 384-9; Everard, Brittanıy and the Angevins, 44-7.  
128 Lloyd, History of Wales, vol 2, 518-20; Jones, Brut y Tywysogion, 64-5; Warren, Henry II, 164; Davies, Age of Conquest, 49, 53; Pryce, ‘Owain Gwynedd and Louis VII’, 11; Duggan, The Correspondence of Thomas Becket, vol 1, (no. 113) 553.
allegations against Henry that amounted to bad lordship and abuse of his lordly power.\textsuperscript{129} Evidence emerges from John of Salisbury’s letter, which focussed more on troop movements than on discussion content, that Louis threatened Henry with the release of his vassals of their pledges, and it is then that the Welsh and others retired with their ‘obligations’.\textsuperscript{130} As Thomas Bisson postulated, the notion of wilful, violent or lawless rule was one of the important issues of the century and its consequences were visible in an abundance of pan-European examples. He also discussed whether many of the revolts of the period could, in fact, be more specifically attributed to a violent reaction against the ruler in question.\textsuperscript{131} Although Bisson did not specifically examine these examples of resistance to Henry II, complaints against his use of royal power, such as his mistreatment of hostages and reputation for breaking oaths, easily fit within the scope of his descriptions.\textsuperscript{132}

Perhaps because of the lack of a thorough account of its proceedings, other than the few lines rendered by John of Salisbury, the importance of that conference between the representatives of both major crowns, as well as those appealing to Louis, seems to have been overlooked. This gathering of so many rulers or their agents deserves more attention since it appears to mark a watershed in the comportment of those in attendance. The Breton complaints are noted above, and Henry’s apparently heavy-handed assertion of Angevin administration there might have further justified appeals to Louis as Henry’s overlord. For the Scots, the issue of the northern counties had gone unresolved for too long, arguably

\textsuperscript{129} Robertson and Sheppard, eds., \textit{Materials for the History of Thomas Becket}, vol 6, 455-8; Howlett, ed., \textit{Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II and Richard I}, vol 1, 108, William of Newborough, \textit{Historia Rerum Anglicarum}, vol 2, lix-lxx, lxxxiv; vol 4, Robert of Torigni revealed Poitou and Aquitaine were in revolt and that the Poitevins raised complaints against Henry with Louis, 235-6, although claimed that nothing came from La Ferté-Bernard, where only the Bretons and Poitevins are mentioned, and that war broke out between the kings thereafter, 237-8 (Note: the most detailed account of that ‘war’ is provided in Eyton’s \textit{Itinerary}, 116, which claimed ‘more than forty towns’ in Ponthieu were burned by Henry, none are named and no source is offered for verification. This was allegedly done against the estates of Matthew of Boulogne who had apparently prevented military aid reaching Henry. This amounts to the correction of a contumacious vassal rather than a war against Louis, but additionally could be one of the ‘conjectures masquerading as facts’ of which Vincent accused Eyton [Vincent, ‘Introduction: Henry II and the Historians’ in Harper-Bill and Vincent, eds., \textit{Henry II: New Interpretations}, 12-3]. The sources used here also reveal that there was a short campaign in Normandy which saw Louis take one castle town while Henry captured a Flemish military official. Eyton also viewed the issue at stake at La Ferté-Bernard as connected to ‘feudal form’, \textit{Itinerary}, 116); Warren, \textit{Henry II}, 119; Millor et al, \textit{The Letters of John of Salisbury}, vol 2, (no. 279), 603; Everard, \textit{Brittany and the Angevins}, 45-6.

\textsuperscript{130} Millor et al, \textit{The Letters of John of Salisbury}, vol. 2, (no. 279), 604-7.


deliberately so on Henry’s part. There was an established precedence of Scots holding those titles; Henry’s vacillation might easily be viewed as a deliberate denial of their rights. Welsh complaints also easily appear valid; they never held their lands of the English king, they were not his vassals and owed him no service at all. The nominal acts of homage they had recently paid him and his grandfather had never been characterized as feudal homage; at Woodstock in 1163 Henry had redefined that relationship without notice or conference. Moreover, it might be arguable that the oaths they took at Woodstock had been made under a certain duress; Rhys was Henry’s prisoner and the king held some of their children hostages. Even if it were held that Henry was their notional overlord, any justification for invasion was dubious at best – the Welsh had not refused to comply with any requests and had not challenged or attacked him. Also, it might be reasonably argued that he precipitated the revolt against him by his actions at Woodstock. Moreover, his mutilation of Welsh noble hostages, not expressly handed over as guarantors of compliance or prisoners of war, gravely contravened the behaviour expected of a king. Therefore, the session at La Ferté-Bernard contained all of the necessary components for a significant expression of complaint against Henry’s actions and offered Louis an opportunity to hand his adversary a pointed lesson. The actions of the plaintiffs following the conference again offer an answer to the significance of the probable verdict given by Louis.

The post-conference evidence from Brittany recalls a situation similar, if more turbulent, to that of Wales and Scotland, that being a picture of relative peace and compliance. There appears to have been no more fighting that year, despite the conference ending in early July. In January 1169, a treaty was drawn up at Montmirail, following another meeting of the two kings. This was a significant agreement; it brought about a notable reduction in Henry’s direct authority in France and led to almost five years of peace. Perhaps the key point concerned the oaths of fidelity given by Henry’s sons. His heir, the young Henry, did homage to Louis for Brittany and Anjou, effectively making the French king his direct overlord. Geoffrey swore homage to young Henry for Brittany, also connecting him to Louis. Shortly after, Richard was made count of Poitou and duke of Aquitaine at the age of twelve. This

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demonstrates that Henry was following a code of conduct which diffused his power, placing overlordship – and with it avenues of access and appeal – for these prime possessions in Louis’s hands. This, it has been noted, was part of Louis’s strategy, designed to weaken Plantagenet power by dismembering it.\(^{135}\) From that perspective, this treaty appears to mark a notable success for the French king. It was at Montmirail that Louis returned the Breton and Poitevin rebels to their previous obedience within the feudal hierarchy of the time. On so doing, those rebels were pardoned. It is perhaps this act which provoked modern writers to level accusations that Louis abandoned his allies.\(^{136}\) The fact that their obedience was Louis’s to return, and that they do not appear to have resisted that act, strongly implies that the French monarch was the accepted senior noble within this arrangement. In addition, the fact that the Bretons did not rise against the outcome of Montmirail, nor denounce it in literature, demonstrates that it was acceptable to them at that moment. Henry was no longer their ruler, but also the chain of Geoffrey and the young Henry had been placed between the Bretons and the covetous kings of France and England. If Bisson is correct, that such anti-seigneurial revolts were due to a desire to change ruler, then at Montmirail, Louis secured that goal for those on the continent who petitioned him.\(^{137}\) In that light, the removal of Henry from direct lordship over Brittany cannot constitute desertion of the Bretons by Louis, quite the contrary.

If, as has been postulated, Henry planned for all of his sons to rule sizeable territories as princes, then the 1169 Treaty of Montmirail stands as evidence of that.\(^{138}\) While this might have prepared them for their careers as rulers, this devolution of power clearly offered Louis a freer hand over Henry’s continental possessions, by creating more factions to play upon and fissures to exploit. When viewed through the lens of Louis’s ambitions, the notion that the French king abandoned his allies, notably here the Bretons, seems superficial and inaccurate. In consideration of the broader picture of power relations between the factions engaged, La Ferté-Bernard can be seen as the moment after which peace largely descends on these


theatres of war. This seems to have facilitated a more complex peace six months later at Montmirail, which oversaw the wide-scale change in regional leadership, enabling Henry to send Geoffrey, still a minor, to the duchy in May 1169. This five-year period of peace also demonstrated further compelling examples of French 'soft power'; in 1170 Henry II copied the Capetian practice of crowning the heir while the old king still lived.\textsuperscript{139} In addition, Louis was able to develop amicable and profitable relations with Henry’s sons, then induce and support their revolt just four years after Montmirail.

The story of the 1173 revolt of the young King Henry, crowned as heir in 1170, was not born of a son’s dissatisfaction with his father prior to 1168. That revolt, conducted with French connivance, needs no elaboration here, other than to acknowledge that certain, though few, of those Breton nobles who still harboured grievances against Henry II joined the rebellion, and also submitted when the elder Henry was victorious the following year.\textsuperscript{140} It has been credibly suggested that certain factions who rebelled in 1173, the king of Scotland among them, did so because Henry had not fulfilled promises made in 1168 at La Ferté-Bernard.\textsuperscript{141} It was the failure to resolve those ongoing issues rather than a secret or ongoing alliance with the French that brought William into the 1173 conflict. In the settlement of that conflict, made at Falaise, Henry also extended his feudal power over Scotland whose king had been captured while campaigning in the disputed northern counties.\textsuperscript{142} While in Brittany, the only confirmed violence recorded between 1168 and 1173 were actions by Conan IV against the recalcitrant Guihomar de Léon in 1170 on his overlord’s behalf, and a continuation of the same campaign by Henry himself in 1171, following Conan’s death through illness.\textsuperscript{143} Those leaders present at La Ferté-Bernard seem to have kept their peace during this period, so following Conan’s death, Henry appears justified in acting to suppress a contumacious vassal, Guihomar. Military actions against Eudo de Porhoët in the period up to 1173 are more obscure. When he refused to obey Henry’s summons to do homage in Geoffrey’s presence at Christmas 1169, at which homage was rendered by most of Brittany’s

\textsuperscript{139} Warren, Henry II, 110-1.
\textsuperscript{141} Pacaut, Louis VII, 209; Warren, Henry II, 184-5.
\textsuperscript{143} Everard, Brittany and the Angevins, 48, 57-8.
elite, Henry first made a diplomatic approach to him. The evidence for military action that followed has, according to Everard, been confused with the events of early 1168. Nevertheless, in late December 1169 Henry, Geoffrey and their host toured Brittany’s castles receiving homage from the duchy’s nobles and free men who had not previously offered it. Eudo appears to have remained aloof but peaceful, only returning to action in 1173. Even during the revolt of that year, he did not join the other Breton rebels. Instead he returned from exile in the Île-de-France, refortified his home territory at Josselin which Henry had destroyed in early 1168. Probably symbolically, he also reoccupied the ducal seat at Ploërmel which he had previously held. It is in that context that he remained as an adversary of the Angevins and their supporters governing Brittany, rather than as an active rebel. There does not appear to have been any broader conflict between Eudo’s and Henry’s forces during the revolt of the young Henry.

Following the suppression of young Henry’s revolt, Henry II never campaigned again in person in the duchy, handing over responsibility to Geoffrey who, for a number of years, struggled to suppress the forces of Eudo and Guihomar. However, the limited conflicts that did take place in Brittany during these years have been largely explained by a series of personal reasons unrelated to any machination by Louis VII, and might be justified in a broader perspective of power relations due to the disobedience of certain nobles. Nevertheless, the picture of Breton-Angevin relations following La Ferté-Bernard is not one of baronial revolt or outright war against Henry or his adherents, but largely one of compliance and the studied maintenance of peace.

Events in Wales appear to mirror those in Brittany and Scotland following the 1168 conference. Although Henry’s declared plans to attack Gwynedd after Easter 1166 were aborted, principally due to his journey to Brittany to depose Conan that year, the ongoing conflict with the Welsh princes remained unresolved. After retreating from Berwyn in 1165, he mutilated those Welsh noble hostages in his keep, including two of Owain Gwynedd’s sons, before crossing the Channel in March 1166. Following Berwyn, the Welsh advanced

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against Crown and Marcher territories capturing Basingwerk, Prestatyn, Rhuddlan and Cardigan before the end of 1167. After La Ferté-Bernard, events in Wales follow the pattern discerned elsewhere; there was no violence by any faction. Perhaps evocatively, even after Henry’s return to Britain in 1170, no attack followed the peaceful death of Owain Gwynedd in late November that year. Despite the opportunity presented by Gwynedd’s subsequent predictable descent into an internecine struggle for succession, and its power waned, Henry desisted from attacking it in its years of weakness. Given his firm intentions of crushing Gwynedd in the dozen years prior to 1168, this remarkable change in policy and method is highly significant. Clearly, peace elsewhere in his domains would have granted Henry more time, manpower and resources to conduct a more efficient campaign against his Welsh enemies. There is no reason to suggest a unilateral peace was attempted by any side, and the first, indeed only communication between all of the powers that suddenly found themselves at peace can be traced to La Ferté-Bernard. Although Montmirail in 1169 settled the lordship issues of certain continental possessions, it certainly did not affect Wales or Scotland.

This changed approach was highlighted further by Henry’s dealings with Rhys ap Gruffudd. The two men had maintained a hostile relationship throughout the late 1150s and 1160s. Rhys attended a parley in good faith but was taken prisoner and incarcerated. He was released to attend Woodstock in July 1163, where he did homage to Henry. In the ensuing revolt by the Welsh, Rhys led the host of Deheubarth to stand with Owain Gwynedd against Henry at Berwyn. Their relations clearly did not improve during Henry’s absence in France, since Rhys appears to have been represented as a plaintiff at La Ferté-Bernard. However, following that conference, Henry’s attitude became inexplicably pacific towards these previously bitter enemies for the remaining twenty-one years of his reign. In fact, relations between Rhys and Henry rapidly evolved after 1171. Following his return from France,

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Kings, 169. (Note, on p 518, Lloyd declared that Henry ‘made no preparations [to return to Wales]’ following Berwyn, this is specifically refuted by Owain Gwynedd in his own words, see Pryce, ‘Owain Gwynedd and Louis VII’, 7-8, 11) Lloyd, History of Wales, vol 2, 518-20; Jones, Brut y Tywysogion, 64-5; Warren, Henry II, 164; Davies, Age of Conquest, 49, 53; Pryce, ‘Owain Gwynedd and Louis VII’, 11; Duggan, The Correspondence of Thomas Becket, vol 1, xxxix, (no. 113) 553. Lloyd, History of Wales, II, 522; Jones, Brut y Tywysogion, 65; Warren, Henry II, 164-5; Davies, Age of Conquest, 53; Turvey, Lord Rhys, 52-4; This view was echoed by Rees Davies, saying that it ‘was a remarkable turn-about from the politics of bluster and confrontation of 1165.’ Davies, Age of Conquest, 54. Warren, Henry II, 162-8; Davies, Age of Conquest, 52-4; Turvey, The Lord Rhys, 39-51; Maund, The Welsh Kings (2000), 105-10.
Henry made peaceful overtures towards Rhys, rather than the Welshman submitting to the king. Rhys assumed the mantle of Welsh leadership after 1170, and Henry requested a meeting in early September 1171, at which a new, peaceful relationship was forged. The following month they met in Pembroke, while Henry was en route to Ireland. He confirmed Rhys’s possessions – lands he had taken from Anglo-Norman lords – effectively acknowledging the resurrected principality of Deheubarth. In return, Rhys acknowledged Henry as his overlord. Henry clearly required a foil to the ambitions and growing power of the Cambro-Norman lords in Wales and those who had been ousted from Wales to Ireland by Rhys. On his return from Ireland in 1172, Rhys and Henry met again, and the title of Justiciar was conferred on Rhys. This was not the simple granting of a title to a local noble; this gave Rhys judicial and military power over native, Norman and English alike. While this legitimised Rhys within the circles of Henry’s wider realm, it also acknowledged Rhys’s evident military successes over all inhabitants of south-west Wales. At Cardigan and Dryslwyn, Rhys established two power centres to dominate Anglo-Norman and native elements. This changed relationship bore fruit for both parties; for the rest of Henry’s reign there was no more fighting between Crown and native forces, although Rhys still prosecuted sporadic campaigns against marcher interests. When the rebels showed their hand in 1173, Rhys sent his son, Hywel, to France to fight for Henry senior, while he personally led Welsh troops against the king’s opponents at Tutbury the following year. It would be inaccurate to describe their relationship as friendly, but it was of mutual benefit and both made efforts to maintain it. Nevertheless, the catalyst for this mutual change in attitude only appears traceable to the conference of July 1168.

Rather than crediting Henry with the unlikely development of ‘a more liberal attitude’ towards those whose children he had mutilated as recently as 1165, and to whom he had lost territory and not yet reached peace terms, it is worth postulating whether Henry’s volte-face from aggression to peace might have been dictated by Louis. Henry had shown no previous softening or delicacy in his politics, and this dramatic change demands consideration.

157 Lloyd, History of Wales, II, 540-4; Jones, Brut y Tywysogion, 66-9; Warren, Henry II, 164-9; Davies, Age of Conquest, 52-4; Maund, Welsh Kings, 173-80; Turvey, Lord Rhys, 54-9.
158 Warren, Henry II, 164-9, (quote) 166; Davies, Age of Conquest, 54.
Following the conference at La Ferté-Bernard, there is little trace of factional violence until the revolt of 1173. That rebellion, it seems, changed the political landscape and permitted violence to erupt again in Henry’s continental interests and in northern England.\textsuperscript{159} Louis’s commands to those seeking his aid in 1168 therefore cannot have been to make war against Henry, for the opposite is demonstrated by all of the examples examined. Therefore, if Louis had demanded war and resistance to Henry, he was ignored. This is not credible; such an event would certainly have drawn chronicle commentary somewhere and had enduring political ramifications for all sides involved. It is noteworthy that no sources mention the shame that widespread disobedience of Louis would have caused. Relations between Louis and the other parties appear to continue in largely the same vein until Henry’s sons rebelled. In contrast to Dunbabin’s claim of Louis’s desertion and ensuing unpopularity, this suggests that there was no point of friction between Louis and his allies, if that word applies.\textsuperscript{160} Indeed, the fact that Eudo de Porhoët sought and found refuge in Île-de-France up to 1173 appears to categorically disprove Dunbabin’s claim.\textsuperscript{161} The relationship between Louis and the plaintiffs is difficult to define, however, Bisson suggested that ‘under Louis VII the homages of dukes and counts, often in border lands, had tended to define alliance rather than submission.’\textsuperscript{162} Gillingham and Warren reached a similar conclusion and used it to devalue the oaths of submission Henry swore to the French king, dismissing such homage and the obsequious language that accompanied such gestures as ‘vague and cheap’.\textsuperscript{163} Such a portrayal of insincerity must surely be equally applicable to any similar homage rendered to Henry. However, Bisson’s proposal might offer a reasonable vision of the nature of those relations formed and revealed by John of Salisbury’s letter. The acts described in that letter therefore denote the recognition of an alliance with the king of France; in this period the vassal was required to offer his king aid and counsel, and Louis’s allies in 1168 can clearly be seen proposing aid and no doubt intelligence on Henry’s activities, as well as offering hostages as pledges of their faith.\textsuperscript{164} The plaintiffs of 1168 can be shown to be acting in


\textsuperscript{160} Dunbabin, ‘Henry II and Louis VII’, 59.

\textsuperscript{161} Everard, \textit{Brittany and the Angevins}, 49.

\textsuperscript{162} Bisson, \textit{The Crisis of the Twelfth Century}, 304.

\textsuperscript{163} Warren, \textit{Henry II}, 225-8; Gillingham, ‘Doing Homage to the King of France,’ 73, 74, 77.

accordance of the norms and customs of their time, and therefore they should be considered
as allies of France at that time, despite the changing nature of that particular term and idea.

Therefore, a different conclusion to any extant notion is required; the most obvious
arrives at a two-fold hypothesis that can be tested against the evidence from all powers
represented at La Ferté-Bernard. Firstly, that their ‘obligation’ was that Louis required them
to keep the peace and to conduct themselves like responsible subject-rulers; their peaceful
actions in the wake of the conference bear out this hypothesis. That all the plaintiffs made
and maintained peace with Henry appears too broad, common, simultaneous and
extraordinary a coincidence to have been a genuine accident of history. More importantly, the
second assertion is that Louis commanded Henry to act towards those territories in a manner
befitting a responsible overlord. He ceased campaigning in person in Brittany and Wales, for
example, and sought accommodation with principal nobles who had opposed him to the
extent of appointing Rhys ap Gruffudd and Rolland de Dinan as his justiciars or seneschals
within their home territories.\footnote{Lloyd, History of Wales, II, 543; Jones, Brut y Twysogion, 68; Warren, Henry II, 563; Davies, Age of
Conquest, 54; Everard, Brittany and the Angevins, 55, 59.} This does not make them Henry’s lackeys any more that it
represents Henry surrendering rule of those respective regions, rather a realistic settlement
that denotes an entirely new direction in power relations. However, it is possible to perceive a
darker side to this notion that Louis drew Henry to peaceful ways and a change of political
strategy. Henry had previously acknowledged his subordinate status before Louis, his
withdrawal from Toulouse in 1159 for example, and the 1168 conference might also indicate
a powerful articulation of Louis’s supremacy. Its message is implicit in its resolution; if Louis
could bring Henry’s vassals to peace, he might also bring them to war. This satisfies a theme
current throughout this period concerning the dangers of contumacy.\footnote{Warren, Henry II, 87; Galliou and Jones, The Bretons, 196-7; Dunbabin, ‘Henry II and Louis VII’, 59; Bisson,
The Crisis of the Twelfth Century, 143.}

This chapter proposes a fresh vision of the first Franco-Welsh alliance. Although it
alters the dynamic of this first contact and reduces Owain Gwynedd’s role and position away
from being the prime interlocutor with Louis, as perhaps might be understood from Pryce’s
article, it places him instead within an elite group of leaders.\footnote{Pryce, ‘Owain Gwynedd and Louis VII’, 1.} This perhaps more
realistically realigns the conference as being between Louis, hearing the appeals of these
nobles, and Henry, his powerful vassal. Given the relative disparity in wealth and standing
between Owain and Louis, and the lack of a prior relationship, it seems reasonable to
envisage events in this light; that Owain was respected for his position and rank, and stood as a relative equal with other similar rulers. Above them, stood Louis and Henry, whose political power and ambitions enabled them to encompass far broader horizons that comprised much of western Europe, but also tied into the broader spectrum of power relations engaging the Papacy, the German empire and the Spanish kingdoms, among others. Within their machinations then, the ‘regum Gwalliae’ and the others played their important, contributory roles. This, of course, attributes a weightier recognition to the meeting at La Ferté-Bernard than it has previously attracted and doing so, without irrefutable evidence, might draw criticism. However, the notion of Louis encouraging Henry to a more diplomatic, unaggressive style of kingship fits entirely with Louis’s actions from his 1155 council at Soissons onwards. The fact that Henry appears to have enthusiastically worn the coat of the warrior prior to July 1168, and only rarely seems to have done so thereafter, and even then only against wayward even contumacious sons or vassals, has not been adequately pinpointed or explained by experts on either monarch. Therefore, this Welsh-French contact does not appear to demonstrate a direct attempt to project French power onto Britain. Instead, this case appears to highlight one fragment of the power struggle between the king of France and his vassals, notably the burgeoning Angevins. In addition, this sequence of letters opens a door onto the otherwise hidden affairs of medieval rulers and their political conflicts and, in that sense alone, seems to represent an invaluable contribution to such studies.

To assess Owain Gwynedd’s diplomatic efforts between 1163 and 1168 appears relatively straightforward after investigating the wider background and examining the interplay between the factions involved. The letters’ survival allows the accurate placement of his efforts within their historical context, no similar course of correspondence between the other plaintiffs and Louis, for example, appears to have been recorded or exposed to a wider audience. In that role, these letters are highly instructive on the form and function of medieval diplomatic methods, and show that all powers could correspond and inter-relate, irrespective of their remoteness or ignorance of one another. From the viewpoint of Welsh history, these letters not only chart the first known communications with France, but also demonstrate the rapid evolution of Owain Gwynedd’s diplomatic style and success. However, there is a more hard-nosed conclusion to draw here; in writing to Louis, Owain aimed to gain the French king’s intercession and halt future invasions of native Welsh territories. In that respect, these letters clearly demonstrate a nascent idea of native collectivity. Also, Owain’s strategy formed part of a wider process that resulted in peace, and therefore marked a success.
unparalleled by any of his predecessors. This contact also elevated the Welsh to being recognisable players within the events of their time and continent. While certain historians class Scotland’s ‘achievement’ as breaking with its ‘traditional Celtic’ past and becoming ranked among other European nations by adopting Anglo-Norman mores and methods, Owain Gwynedd here proved that there was no need to forsake the traditions and ways of the Welsh in order to gain wider acceptance. In fact there is a direct parallel, since the man credited with transforming Scotland into a society that integrated with Anglo-French culture, was King David I, Owain’s contemporary.\footnote{168 Barrell, *Medieval Scotland*, 1, 15-20.}

To conclude with a comment on power relations, it seems that the most efficient, qualitative measure of power in the relationship between Henry and Louis was determined by its deployment. While Henry’s much-vaunted military power is a noteworthy feature of the period, he did not overcome Louis by force and thereby release himself or his heirs from the constraining overlord-vassal relationship. In fact, he freely engaged in that association and assumed a subordinate position within the European feudal hierarchy. In that light, it can be shown that Henry was the weaker partner, while Louis triumphed with an economy of resource deployment. It might be concluded that the most efficient use of power is not in the measure of its vastness, but in its effective use. Unfettered by attachment to either monarch, it would be difficult to view their relationship in a different light. However, if ascendancy, rather than victory, can be awarded to Louis, it was insufficient to allow his heirs to unconditionally dominate those who inherited from Henry. Therefore, these unresolved power relations would be handed on to the next generation to play out in a similar, but evolving political landscape.\footnote{169 Benjamin, ‘The Angevin Empire’ in Saul, ed., *England in Europe*, 73.}


### 3. Philip Augustus and Llywelyn ap Iorwerth

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3.1: Context and Personalities

Introduction.
This second French-Welsh diplomatic contact joined Philip Augustus, king of France, and Llywelyn ap Iorwerth, prince of Gwynedd. Due to the geo-political orbit to which Welsh leaders were by this time tied, this union inevitably related to events in England, then under King John. However, the influential popes Innocent III and Honorius III also provided an essential aspect of this alliance, particularly during the lustrum in question, 1212-1217. Their careers require no detailed discussion here. However, it will be helpful to give a brief presentation of the context of the moment, illustrating events which contributed to the forming of this alliance and outlining the actions of the leading personalities within this environment. This preludes the re-evaluation of the dating of the treaty between Philip and Llywelyn and discusses concomitant arguments. Despite the fact that most historians writing on this period agree that the alliance between Philip and Llywelyn dates from 1212, this chapter will demonstrate that it was made in 1215 or 1216. Among the daunting list of historians who have identified 1212 as the correct date are David Carpenter, Anthony Carr, Christopher Cheney, Rees Davies, Natalie Fryde, Huw Pryce, John Beverly Smith and Ifor Rowlands, the last of whom wrote of ‘the still somewhat neglected matter of the treaty between Llywelyn and Philip Augustus.’¹ This study brings this largely ignored matter into light and demonstrates that however impressive this list of academics, because they base their work on Treharne’s flawed article of 1958, they are all wrong.² The argument for 1215-16 is more persuasive and supported by reliable contemporary sources, unlike the 1212 dating. This chapter concludes with an exploration of the significance and consequences of this alliance, proposing that this union, in the long-term, was utterly detrimental to native rule in Wales.


Context
The context of the treaty between Philip Augustus and Llywelyn ap Iorwerth cannot be sufficiently described through extant studies of bilateral relations or monographs. This relationship was not simply a feature of the fluctuating conflict between England and France, but part of a wider concurrent struggle in which numerous states, rulers, powerful individuals and movements all played significant roles. For example, in this chapter, which initially and broadly considers the first quarter of the thirteenth century before focussing on a shorter period, at least a dozen states, factions or entities play roles directly connected to this alliance. To briefly illuminate them; Fryde identified as critical ‘the awesome figure of Pope Innocent III’, although his successor Honorius III is also relevant, as were the papal legates and the clergy at large, whatever their allegiance. Also important were the German candidates for the imperial crown and the king of Castile’s ambitions for Gascony. She also signalled the importance of leaders and bishops in the Low Countries, and believed that ‘their allegiances eventually decide the fate of Europe and, in England, precipitate Magna Carta’. Since this treaty can be connected to the revolt surrounding Magna Carta and involves factions and leaders not mentioned by Fryde, the central characters linked with that famous event also merit inclusion here. In brief, they were the Welsh leaders, Llywelyn ap Iorwerth, Maelgwn ap Rhys and Gwenwynwyn ab Owain, as well as the kings of England, France and Scotland and their heirs, and of course, England’s rebel and loyal baronial factions.

There is inadequate space to consider all of the motives and subtleties of their actions, so a passing mention amid the critical details will have to suffice for most. To focus this study more precisely, the timeframe will be narrowed to 1212-1217 and the perspective contracted from a continental scale, to present a scene encompassing Paris, Gwynedd and all in between, but remaining mindful of the extensive influence of the papacy. It is also necessary to consider the main personalities; Innocent III, John, Llywelyn, Otto and Philip Augustus, and the context of the moment which produced the alliance between the French king and the Welsh princes, headed by Llywelyn.

Louis’s invasion of England offers an excellent example of ‘bracketing’ mentioned in the introduction and this model can be seen across Western Europe in this period. To exemplify that point; the papacy in this period was engaged in a number of power struggles,
but principally with the Empire. It sought good relations with France to act as a foil to its puissant enemy faction in Germany. Similarly, German rulers acquired allies in England and the Low Countries, bracketing Philip Augustus’s lands. Equally, the Empire had acquired through marriage the southern portion of Italy, the Kingdom of Sicily, so bracketing the Papal States on whom successive German Emperors applied pressure. The bracketing principle can be applied elsewhere within Europe too. England welcomed and developed friendships with German states and Flanders to aid its struggle against Philip Augustus. The English also allied themselves with the county of Toulouse and the kingdom of Navarre to protect Gascony, from the French on one side and the Castilians on the other. These bracketing alliances can also be seen to be played out across Iberia. English diplomacy wooed Navarre and Portugal to pose as counters to Castilian ambitions north of the Pyrenees. At one point John of England also held friendly discussions with the Muslims of southern Spain. International relations at this time can thus be shown to be unfettered by national, linguistic and even religious strictures. It seems reasonable to apply the same freedom of thought and action to all contemporary states and leaders. This chapter will show that the treaty between Philip Augustus and Llywelyn is a similar move by Philip, to attach a western ally to his son’s alliance to the English barons who invited the French heir to cross to England and assume the throne in 1215.

6 Powell, ‘Innocent III and the Crusade’ 121-7; R. V. Turner, King John (London and New York: Longman, 1994); 131, 134; B. Arnold, ‘Germany and England, 1066-1453’, in Saul, ed., England in Europe, 1066-1453, 82; Warren, King John, 218,223-4; Fryde, ‘King John and the Empire’ 340-6. Note: I am aware that England and certain areas of the Low Countries and the Empire had historical connections that pre- and post-date this event. However, the fact that they were re-affirmed in this period shows a need to reconnect those allies for political purposes.
9 Cheney, Innocent III, 14, 324-5, 357, 395-6; Turner, King John, 165; Fryde, ‘King John and the Empire’ 341.
10 K. Norgate, John Lackland (London: MacMillan, 1902), 182, n. 2; Cheney, Innocent III, 14-5; Turner, King John, 148. Note: I also acknowledge that connections with these entities also pre-date this period and have stronger regional importance (ie, historic connections between regional families) rather than being primarily international concerns. However, the fact that these friendships were relevant at this time also makes them of import to this chapter.
Map 7: French and Iberian lands mentioned in the text.\textsuperscript{11}

Contemporary political machinations were not solely led by the personal relations of leaders, but also operated on a state-level. This involved a ‘cultivate and eradicate’ strategy where simple invasion and destruction of an enemy was not desired or possible. This can also be seen repeated across the continent at this time. The papacy employed such a strategy to ensure its favoured candidate was elected Emperor. It favoured and furthered the careers of its preferred candidate, Otto of Brunswick, and his supporters, early in his competition with Philip of Swabia for the imperial crown, thus cultivating Otto’s faction.\textsuperscript{12} In contrast, it sought to weaken Philip, absolving his adherents from their oaths to him and removing ecclesiastical members of his party, thus eradicating his support.\textsuperscript{13}

These strategies can be seen to be deployed within the context of the treaty between Philip and Llywelyn, and is played out in some detail below. However, briefly introduced here, this Franco-Welsh alliance is tied to the Papacy’s struggle with the Empire. That in turn is connected to Rome’s struggle with England, since John and Otto were allies, although Innocent also had other issues which solely concerned his relationship with John. Innocent’s preference for Otto waned notably prior to the death of Philip of Swabia, murdered over a matter apparently unconnected to the imperial election.\textsuperscript{14} As well as the papacy’s own, independent disputes with England, principally over Stephen Langton’s appointment as the archbishop of Canterbury, it moved to strengthen its position against the Emperor by

\textsuperscript{11} Map 7: This borrows from map 4 and map 2 from the previous chapter, used here for the benefit of the reader.
weakening his supporters. With those two reasons in hand, in 1208 the pope can be seen to be enforcing his will upon John, but also eradicating Otto’s main external support by imposing an interdict on England and by later excommunicating John. Although this failed to find a swift resolution to the problem, even after Innocent excommunicated Otto in 1210 for his aggression against Italian territory, by 1212 the pope also cultivated factions which might prove hostile to John. He absolved the Welsh princes of their allegiance to John, and encouraged them to unite and attack the king of England. Shortly after that, the papacy added the southern side to that bracket by asking the French to attack England. When the French eventually committed to a campaign in England, the English barons were in full revolt against John and had forced him to agree to Magna Carta in the summer of 1215. At the outset of their war with John, the rebel barons, whose centres of influence were northern and eastern England, secured a firm alliance with the Welsh, and later did likewise with the Scots. Before Philip allowed his heir, Louis, to cross to England, he established a firm alliance with the English rebels who had invited the French heir to become king of England. French forces invaded England in late 1215 and remained until the conflict was resolved to their detriment in September 1217. This chapter will demonstrate that within the context of that attempt to gain the throne of England, the French also allied themselves with the Welsh. This can be viewed as an effort to cultivate their own friendly relations with powers on the British mainland or, at the very least, a strategy to remove Welsh troops from John’s musters.

17 Jones, Brut y Tywysogion 87.
20 Anderson, Early Sources of Scottish History, A.D. 500 to 1286, 391-2, 406; Jones, Brut y Tywysogion, 89; Stephenson, trans., Mediaeval Chronicles of Scotland. The Chronicles of Melrose and Holyrood, 45.
21 Luard, Matthæi Parisiensis, vol 2, 647-8; Norgate, John Lackland, 169, 232-9, 253-5; Cheney, Innocent III, 326, 367-86, 391; Turner, King John, 175-257; Warren, King John, 224-40, 246-52; Fryde, ‘King John and the Empire’ in Church, ed., King John: New Interpretations, 345; Turvey, Llywelyn the Great, 56-7. Note: Louis also wrote of his claim to England’s throne through his wife’s lineage in April 1215, Fœdera, vol 1, 140.
22 Giles, Wendover, 307-8, 357-9; Stubbs, Walteri de Coventria, 218-28; Stevenson, Coggeshall, 171-85; Norgate, John Lackland, 256-7; Cheney, Innocent III, 391; Turner, King John, 252; Warren, King John, 251-2; D. A. Carpenter, The Minority of Henry III (London: Methuen, 1990), 44.
The treaty text binding the French and the Welsh still exists, and that document is at the heart of this chapter.  

The conflicts that precipitated this French–Welsh treaty can be identified as the papacy’s campaign to enforce its will over John as well as local noble resentment caused by John’s exploitation of his subjects to fund his continental ambitions. Within these, the baronial struggle that erupted against John, in the face of papal opposition, allied the French, Welsh and Scots with rebel English nobles.

**Personalities**

Many of the machinations of the secular rulers, particularly those of John, Llywelyn and Philip, are developed below in the second section of this chapter and cover the years 1212-7. Therefore the purpose of this brief narrative is to focus more sharply on their related dealings leading up to 1212. That year marks the descent into five years of conflict, politicking and alliances in which the focus of this study occurred. Although the pope’s actions are palpable during that lustrum, there is less analysis of his character and politics. Therefore, since Innocent III helped to create an environment which encouraged revolt in England and Wales, a short interpretation of his papacy prior to that point seems appropriate.

**Innocent III, secular ruler and religious leader.**

Innocent III, pope from 1198 to 1216, played a critical role in the years key to this alliance. His actions ensured that his influence was felt across Europe throughout his reign and he has been identified as one of the medieval papacy’s most powerful leaders. During this period the papacy demonstrated a capacity, indeed an enthusiasm, for increasing its involvement in secular affairs and extending its role within the spiritual lives of Europe’s states. Innocent III is seen as one of the most important advocates of this more robust, engaged approach. As will be discussed below, his politicking in English and French affairs between 1212 and 1216 in particular provided the impetus for the conflict to which this treaty belongs.

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Innocent’s principal aims were three-fold. Firstly, the reform of the Church; stamping out corrupt practices, reorganising financial and legal structures, and enforcing conformity to approved religious practices across western Christianity. This would assist Rome financially, identify irregular or heretical practices to correct, and ensure a commonality of worship and administrative practice across Western Europe. Secondly, the pope wanted to bring to peace the leaders of all peoples in his obedience, as a necessary step in order to achieve his third aim, the raising of a crusading army powerful and united enough to regain the Holy Land. Throughout his pontificate, Innocent demonstrated a continual willingness to interfere in the internal affairs of secular states in order to accomplish his goals, primarily by enforcing obedience to his commands. He proved to be prepared to deal with leaders and states individually, by imposing interdicts or excommunicating kings, for example, or to deal with the entirety of those in his influence at the same time, as happened at the Fourth Lateran Council in November 1215. It was the pope’s readiness to become involved in internal and secular affairs that brought him into conflict with Europe’s rulers and, in so doing, helped create the environment and the catalyst for the war in which the French-Welsh treaty was created.

Innocent acted in several ways which brought him into contact and conflict with European rulers and factions. Firstly, as the secular ruler of the Papal States he took measures to consolidate those areas within his dominion; reorganising the administration and military presence within them as a first step. He then expanded his territories, at times subtly exploiting factional divisions, at others by taking direct military action. The power of the German imperial factions within Italian territories was the main threat to Roman security and stability within Italy. At his accession, much of northern Italy and the whole of the Kingdom of Sicily were under German control. Although his administrative, military and political efforts helped to stabilise his secular position, Innocent also used his papal powers to combat

32 Sayers, _Innocent III_, 49-51.
the threat posed by German interests in Italy. In 1199, he granted indulgences to troops willing to fight Markward of Anweiler, the German commander in southern Italy.\footnote{Cheney, *Innocent III*, 260; Kennan, ‘The Political Crusades’, 135-8; Sayers, *Innocent III*, 77-80, 182-4.} As the man charged with crowning the Emperor, he sought to influence which candidate ascended the imperial throne. In the pursuit of a preferred candidate, Innocent entered into secular politics while exercising his papal authority. He initially opted for Otto of Brunswick, who appeared to pose the least threat militarily and seemed an ideal opponent to the Hohenstaufen, the traditionally dominant German imperial faction. The pope promoted Otto over his popular rival, Philip of Swabia, and used his power to eradicate Philip’s support, by absolving his adherents of their oaths to him and by removing from their posts those clergymen who sided with him. In addition, the pope cultivated Otto’s power by undertaking such measures as requesting that King John paid his nephew large sums of money.\footnote{Norgate, *John Lackland*, 164-5; Cheney, *Innocent III*, 285-7, 291-2; Sayers, *Innocent III*, 58-62; Fryde, ‘King John and the Empire’, 345.} This stance reversed from 1204, with the pope appearing to prefer Philip over Otto, however both parties put their trust into Innocent’s hands to mediate a final settlement in 1206. This change might also reflect John’s loss of Normandy to Philip Augustus, as the alliance between John and Otto lost power, so that of the two Philips, Augustus and Swabia, was ascendant. A feeble Emperor would not be able to protect the papacy nor lead a crusade. However, the imperial contest was concluded abruptly by the murder of Philip in June 1208 by a former potential son-in-law.\footnote{Cheney, *Innocent III*, 292; Arnold, ‘Germany and England, 1066-1453’, 82; Sayers, *Innocent III*, 62.} Following his election in October 1209, Otto IV became the sort of aggressive, imperialistic Emperor the papacy feared. He took possession of numerous towns and territories within Italy, in consequence the pope excommunicated the Emperor in November 1210. Although he subsequently sought peace, Otto was deposed in favour of the young Frederick II, and he eventually retired to Germany in 1212. Although weakened, he was still able to construct and lead an impressive coalition army that attacked northern France in 1214.\footnote{Cheney, *Innocent III*, 277, 282-3; Turner, *King John*, 169; Hauck, ‘Innocent III Desired To Rule The World’, and Cheney, ‘England and France’ in Powell, *Innocent III*, 16-8, 155-6; Arnold, ‘Germany and England, 1066-1453’, 82-3; Sayers, *Innocent III*, 52-65;} However, the conflict with the Empire had repercussions beyond Germany and Italy, as all sides sought allies and favours from powers further afield, as events in England and France illustrated.

However, as the spiritual head of Western Europe, Innocent sought to extend papal influence far and wide. It was in this sphere of activity that Innocent was arguably most active. Although he sponsored missionary projects which expanded Catholicism’s frontiers to
the east, into territories traditionally considered the preserve of the eastern Church, he also acted directly against eastern Christians. Although he issued threats and sentences against the leaders of the Fourth Crusade which captured Constantinople and Zadar, he kept the financial rewards reaped from the mission and absolved those involved with little persuasion. Not only did Rome benefit financially from the assault and capture of Constantinople, which saw nuns raped and thousands of Christians killed by other Christians, but it also weakened the hegemony of the Greek Orthodox Church.

Medieval popes possessed considerable powers which reached into every state under their obedience. Innocent used his immense moral authority and papal powers to apply pressure to secular rulers who did not comply with his wishes. From early in his pontificate he threatened those leaders who resisted his demands and passed sentences on a number of them. Two of the prime papal powers were those of interdict and excommunication. The former denied religious service to an individual or group, diocese, city or country interdicted. This affected marriages, funerals, church services and other roles for which the Church or the clergy were responsible. Cheney described the interdict as ‘a form of warfare between the pope and the king’. Innocent used this power quite freely; interdicts were passed against Leon 1198-1204, Normandy 1199 and 1203, France 1199 and 1200, Norway 1200, England 1209-1214, and London 1215-16. Excommunication denied the sacraments to an individual, which had potentially difficult repercussions for a Christian king, whose moral authority to govern could be questioned if he was banned from and by the Church. Innocent used this measure against rulers and their supporters too; Philip of Swabia in 1198, King Sverre of Norway in 1200, Henry, the Count Palatine and the duke of Brabant, both over 1204-5, and King John from 1209 to 1213. Innocent and his successor, Honorius III, 1216-1227, also excommunicated the Welsh, Scots, French and English factions involved in the 1215-17

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conflict against John and the government of Henry III. In the aftermath of that conflict, interdicts were placed on Wales and Scotland when they failed to obey papal directives and, in the view of the papacy, return to the obedience of ‘their own lawful lord, the new king [of England].’ It has long been contemplated how effective these measures actually were; there was no formal guide describing how to impose and conduct an interdict, no consistently reliable record of its application or effect, and in the case of the English interdict 1208-1213, the papacy allowed the relaxation of certain strictures.

The most formidable weapon in the papal armoury however was the crusade, which Innocent also used a number of times. Several crusades and papal military missions were launched during Innocent’s pontificate; against Markward of Anweiler in 1199, the Baltic states to expand the boundaries of Christendom from 1204 onwards, the Fourth Crusade against Constantinople in 1204-5, the Albigensian crusades from 1207 and those intended to reconquer Spain, particularly after 1210. These were not solely used for religious reasons, as the political mission against Markward of Anweiler, for example, clearly demonstrated. Although there was no crusade called against King John initially, during 1212 the pope began to engage him with military forces. As will be shown below, while augmenting pressure on the king of England, the pope appears to have requested the Welsh princes to form an alliance and make war on King John in 1212. There is a degree of uncertainty over the timing of the French role in this papal project against John. One of the leading voices on the matter, Christopher Cheney, rejected that notion of a papally-inspired mission claimed by the chronicler Roger of Wendover. However, French evidence including letters from Philip Augustus as well as English sources confirm preparations to invade during the early summer

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47 Sayers, Innocent III, 184; Bradbury, Philip Augustus, 190-3.

48 Jones, Brut y Tywysogyon, 87.
of 1213, the evidence for any French military activity prior to that date is scant and unreliable.\textsuperscript{49}

The Welsh, who had been drawn into the pope’s political wars in 1212, found themselves and the allies they joined to fight John, excommunicated by the same power that had encouraged them to take up arms.\textsuperscript{50} Much of the confusion surrounding the papal role in the French-Welsh treaty, evident in the suggestion that Innocent was the originator of the alliance, stems from Innocent’s drive to force John to obey papal commands over the Canterbury election, and the political sea-change which occurred following John’s surrender of the crown in May 1213.\textsuperscript{51} It is within that moment, fickly encouraging revolt then forbidding it because John agreed to become a papal vassal and pay regular tribute to Rome, that Innocent created the framework for both conflicts on the British mainland; that of 1212-13 between the Welsh and John, and the larger 1215-17 French invasion of England in support of the Magna Carta rebels. These are explored below. The pope’s conflicts with the Empire and England, as well as his desire to impose his will and expand papal power throughout Christendom, led to moves to form alliances with factions within and outside John’s domain. The separate engagement of the Welsh and the French to achieve Innocent’s desire appears partly responsible for the subsequent unions between the French crown and parties on mainland Britain. The motives for war that bonded those factions aligned against John had not been washed away by John’s apparently political surrender to Rome and, having encouraged conflict, Innocent found it impossible to prevent the war of 1215-17.\textsuperscript{52}


John, Otto, Philip Augustus and Llywelyn.
Richard I made his nephew, Otto of Brunswick, duke of Aquitaine in 1196. While this strengthened ties between these dynasties, it also gave Otto a direct stake in Anglo-French affairs. As a consequence, Philip Augustus sought alliances with rival German factions to counteract that threat and engaged with the Castilians, to menace Gascony from the south. On his accession in 1199, John sought similar allies to check the ambitions of France and her allies. Meanwhile, he meddled in Welsh affairs, promoting dynastic rivals to Llywelyn ap Iorwerth, who had recently risen to prominence in Gwynedd. Having gained supremacy over other native candidates in a two-year campaign, Llywelyn signed a treaty with John, recognising one another’s positions and John’s dominance.

John’s continental struggles pre-occupied him for the next five years. Critical to which, Philip Augustus took up the Bretons’ case against John for his murder of his nephew, Arthur of Brittany, in 1202. Philip declared forfeit the lands John held of the king of France, and successfully captured Normandy by the close of 1204. He subsequently seized Anjou and the other Angevin territories, bar Gascony, the following year.

John was initially slow to engage Otto as his ally and therefore failed to present a united front to deter or menace France. The loss of most of England’s continental lands was largely due to Philip’s proactive confrontation of the issue, although the English king’s intransigence was also a significant factor. This fracture between England and the Angevin possessions proved critical to the Anglo-French struggle of that period. The state of relative financial parity between the two tipped dramatically in Philip’s favour thereafter. Within two decades the English king’s income stood at just a sixth of that of his French adversary. Innocent III washed his hands of any intervention in the wars in France, advising the local Norman lords to act as their customs dictated, thereby effectively releasing them to pay homage to Philip and ensuring a smooth Capetian takeover. In 1206, John invaded Anjou through Gascony

Map 8: Philip Augustus’s territorial gains from defeating King John.

58 Philip Augustus’s territorial gains from defeating King John. Those shown as ‘Royal lands’ in the legend denote those taken in the west of France (Normandy, Maine, Anjou and Poitou) incorporated into those held by the French king elsewhere in France. Source: Hallam and Everard, Capetian France, 175.
60 Turner, King John, 115-6, 120-7; Warren, King John, 84-93; Bradbury, Philip Augustus, 145-56, 193.

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but failed to gain a decisive victory, and retired, settling for a two-year truce. Otto’s cause waned due to Philip of Swabia’s popularity, weakening John’s position further. His loss of standing helped the French king’s cause, which in turn served to further promote that of his ally, Philip of Swabia, again affecting the Welf-Angevin alliance in consequence.

The dispute between England and Rome began and led to the interdict of lands under Canterbury’s jurisdiction, including Welsh dioceses, followed by the excommunication of King John. The struggle between John and the Pope requires no further elucidation at this point. During the interdict, John began to act firmly to ensure the obedience of England’s nobles. These measures included increased tax and demands of feudal service. He prosecuted military campaigns against nobles who fell out of favour, such as William de Braose, often deploying foreign mercenaries. John also moved against those territories on the periphery of his kingdom, by campaigning against Scotland in 1209, Ireland in 1210, ostensibly in pursuit of William de Braose, and in 1211 against Llywelyn, his son-in-law since 1205. He imposed harsh terms on his adversaries when they sued for peace, and even mocked William the Lion, king of Scotland, for surrendering without battle. While none in the British Isles were ignorant of the power of John’s army, his seemingly unprovoked aggression against these factions and apparently unacceptable treatment of his English nobles began to stir discontent within his domains. David Crouch compellingly made the case that the dissatisfaction of England’s nobility began a number of years previously and probably extended into previous reigns, but that it was John’s mishandling of his elites, among others, that eventually provoked this apparently conservative element of society to take such drastic measures. The seeds of the revolt against John that bloomed later began to grow notably during these years. It is possible that Philip Augustus began to investigate the possibility of

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63 Norgate, John Lackland, 158-9; Warren, King John, 119; Bradbury, Philip Augustus, 156; Barratt, ‘The Revenues of John and Philip Augustus Revisited,’ 90-2, and Fryde, ‘King John and the Empire’ 342.
64 Norgate, John Lackland, 127-36; Cheney, Innocent III, 298-356; Warren, King John, 163-73;
67 Norgate, John Lackland, 132-6, 149-53, 157-9; Cheney, Innocent III, 324, 326; Turner, King John, 135-46; Warren, King John, 191-9; Turvey, Llywelyn the Great, 47, 52-7.
68 Norgate, John Lackland, 158-9; Anderson, Early Sources of Scottish History, 328-9; Turner, King John, 138-42; Turvey, Llywelyn the Great, 56-7.
69 Norgate, John Lackland, 159, 169, 171-4; Cheney, Innocent III, 324, 360-7; Turner, King John, 16-19, 135; Warren, King John, 224-32; Barratt, ‘The Revenues of John and Philip Augustus Revisited,’ 91.
fomenting revolt on the British mainland as early as 1209, although these efforts, if real, were intangible, unsuccessful and irrelevant when compared to subsequent events.\footnote{Giles, *Wendover*, 259; Turner, *King John*, 141; Bradbury, *Philip Augustus*, 288. Note: Bradbury has amalgamated the 1209 letter to ‘John de Lacy’ (Delaborde, *Œuvres de Rigord et de Guillaume le Breton*, vol 1, 245-6; Samaran et al, *Recueil des Actes de Philippe Auguste*, tome 3, 161-2 (entry 1079); Duncan, ‘John King of England and the Kings of Scots’, 258-9), with alleged baronial letters offering the kingdom to Philip in 1212, there is no text for letters to Philip in 1212, but they might refer to baronial letters to the Pope in 1212 (*Fœdera*, vol 1, 184-5; Norgate, *John Lackland*, 182-3) asking for help against John or more likely be confused with the 1215 invitation (Norgate, *John Lackland*, 169, 232-9, 253-4; Cheney, *Innocent III*, 367-86, 391; Warren, *King John*, 224-40, 246-52; Turner, *King John*, 175-257; Bradbury, *Philip Augustus*, 319-24; Turvey, *Llywelyn the Great*, 56-7).}

As Otto exhausted Innocent’s patience and was excommunicated for attacking papal lands in 1210, further opportunities to machinate in England’s affairs appear to have arisen.\footnote{Norgate, *John Lackland*, 166; Cheney, *Innocent III*, 321; Fryde, ‘King John and the Empire’ 344.} During 1212, the Welsh under Llywelyn were incited to revolt by Innocent III, seeking to increase pressure on John during the interdict.\footnote{Norgate, *John Lackland*, 167-9; Jones, *Brut y Twysogion*, 87; Turner, *King John*, 139; Turvey, *Llywelyn the Great*, 56-7.} This was followed up in the first months of 1213 by the conception of a French invasion project.\footnote{Delaborde, *Œuvres de Rigord et de Guillaume le Breton*, vol 2, 254-5 (Liber IX, lines 160-92, line 179 reads ‘Mens mea proponit Anglorum invadere regnum.’); Norgate, *John Lackland*, 175-6, 185; Cheney, *Innocent III*, 331, 337-41; Turner, *King John*, 131; Bradbury, *Philip Augustus*, 185, 192-3, 288-9, 293; Fryde, ‘King John and the Empire’, 345.} Although Philip’s fleet was destroyed at Damme during that summer, this only removed the immediate means of invading, and did not nullify the desire to cause harm in England.\footnote{Norgate, *John Lackland*, 185-7; Cheney, *Innocent III*, 338; Turner, *King John*, 131-2; Bradbury, *Philip Augustus*, 243, 286; Fryde, ‘King John and the Empire’, 346.} In fact, the English victory at Damme, might have served as notice to the French that they needed support from forces across the channel in order to effect a successful attack. The tide of papal pressure was reversed from May 1213 when John surrendered the crown to the papacy, quite probably as a means of avoiding attack.\footnote{Norgate, *John Lackland*, 179-82; Cheney, *Innocent III*, 332-43; Turner, *King John*, 166-74.} However, Rome’s new support for John did not assuage the brewing enmities the king had roused in preceding years.\footnote{Norgate, *John Lackland*, 193-206; Cheney, *Innocent III*, 358; Turner, *King John*, 131-5; Fryde, ‘King John and the Empire’, 345-6.} Although John had surrendered to the pope, he continued to construct an alliance and, in 1214, launched a large-scale, two-fronted campaign in France.\footnote{Cheney, *Innocent III*, 358; Turner, *King John*, 170; Harper-Bill, ‘John and the Church of Rome’, 310-1.} Instead of intervening to halt the effusion of Christian blood, the pope notably failed to order John’s excommunication for his aggression, and appeared to await an outcome.\footnote{Cheney, *Innocent III*, 358; Turner, *King John*, 170; Harper-Bill, ‘John and the Church of Rome’, 310-1.} John’s withdrawal before Prince Louis at La Roche-au-Moine and Otto’s defeat to
Philip Augustus at Bouvines might have convinced the French that they also were entitled to engage in warfare against their Christian neighbours, irrespective of their papal protection.\(^79\) Meanwhile, the English barons’ discontent with John blossomed from rumoured regicidal plots into full warfare which culminated in Magna Carta. It also saw Louis, the French heir, invited to become king of England. That act proves that the French were not dissuaded from attacking by the threat of papal censure.\(^80\) It was within the febrile environment that existed on the British mainland, particularly in England, from 1212 to 1217 that alliances between English, Welsh, French and Scots factions were made.\(^81\) The treaty between Philip Augustus and Llywelyn was made in this period.

The next section will present the source, debate the predominant 1212 theory and demonstrate that this alliance clearly dates to either 1215 or 1216. This will also show that the French-Welsh alliance was well-known during the war in England, 1215-1217, and was referred to in a number of contemporary sources, while few, if any credible ones suggest 1212. Also, certain supporting events, actions and considerations help corroborate the 1215-6 date, and serve to further undermine 1212.

\(^79\) Bradbury, Philip Augustus, 279-315.
\(^80\) Norgate, John Lackland, 169, 232-9, 253-4; Cheney, Innocent III, 367-8, 391; Warren, King John, 224-40, 246-52; Turner, King John, 175-257; Bradbury, Philip Augustus, 319-24; Turvey, Llywelyn the Great, 56-7.
\(^81\) Norgate, John Lackland, 253-4, 258-60; Jones, Brut y Tywysogion, 89; Warren, King John, 247-8; Turner, King John, 252, 256; Bradbury, Philip Augustus, 320-1; Turvey, Llywelyn the Great, 59-60.
3.2: Dating the Treaty

Nothing in the treaty unequivocally reveals the year it was written, and the lack of an explicit reference to it in any contemporary source therefore invites speculation. This section will present the source and engage in a short discussion of related details, before moving on to debate the arguments for 1212 given in Treharne’s article. The evidence supporting the case for 1215-16 as the real date of the treaty is presented here, as are other factors that also indicate those years as the correct date. These debates focus on the existence and timings of meetings of the Welsh nobles, a brief study of the tactics of the contemporary papacy as well as problems with Treharne’s primary source. Then, the primary sources asserting that the alliance took place in 1215-16 are presented. To test this theory further, there is an attempt to build a case for 1212 using primary sources. Finally, the notion that a crusade against England was being planned will be examined.

The Source.

This union was sought by the king of France sometime between 1212 and 1216. The opening contact, a letter from Philip Augustus to Llewelyn ap Iorwerth, is lost. Although there is no known copy and no evidence for its preparation or delivery, Philip’s motives appear evident in Llywelyn's reply. His response has therefore become the principal document in this alliance. The original is held in French archives and is no longer available to view due to its poor condition. It was first transcribed and translated by Thomas Matthews in 1910, although elements of that work were challenged by R. F. Treharne’s landmark 1958 article, ‘The Franco-Welsh Treaty of Alliance in 1212’. This article has been taken as the benchmark for all study on this matter, and it has guided two later treaty translations. However, there are many vagaries in this treaty; no dates, no places and only two names are mentioned, therefore other contemporary sources required examination in order to corroborate Treharne’s dating. Research on the matter provided compelling evidence

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signposting a later date. In light of this, scrutiny of Treharne’s interpretation also exposed fatal flaws in the 1212 supposition and reset the timeframe of this alliance to 1215-16.

To his most excellent lord, Philip, by God’s grace the illustrious king of the French, Llywelyn prince of North Wales his faithful subject greeting and devoted and due service of fealty and reverence. How am I to repay the excellence of your nobility for the singular honour and priceless gift with which you the king of the French, nay foremost of kings on earth, anticipated me, not so much munificently as magnificently, in sending me, your knight, your letter sealed with the seal of gold in testimony of the treaty between the kingdom of the French and the principality of North Wales – which letter I will have kept in the aumbreys of the church as if it were a sacred relic, to be a perpetual memorial and an inviolable witness that I and my heirs, adhering inseparably to you and your heirs, will be friends to your friends and enemies to your enemies and I confidently ask and request that the very same be observed in all respects by your royal dignity in royal fashion towards me and my friends. That it may be inviolably observed, by the testimony of my seal, having summoned the council of my chief men and having obtained the common assent of all the princes of Wales, all of whom I have bound to you in the friendship of this treaty, I promise that I will be faithful to you for ever and just as I faithfully promise I will most faithfully fulfil my promise. Furthermore, from the time I received your highness’s letter, I have made neither truce nor peace, nor even parley, with the English, but, by God’s grace, I and all the princes of Wales, unanimously leagued together have manfully resisted our – and your – enemies, and with God’s help we have by force of arms recovered from the yoke of their tyranny a large part of the land and the strongly defended castles which they by fraud and deceit had occupied and having recovered them we hold them strongly in the might of the Lord. Hence we, all the princes of Wales, ask and request that you make no truce with the English without us, knowing that we will not for any terms or price bind ourselves to them by any peace or treaty unless we know in advance we have your approval.86

A discussion of the text is necessary here, as a preface to a more thorough debate on the dating of the document, because the message delivered by this treaty will inevitably correlate to the milieu in which it was written. Wales, France and England experienced very different political environments in 1212 and 1216. To offer a brief synopsis here, the English were living under papal interdict in 1212 and rumours of serious discontent among the barons drove the king to summon foreign merceneraries to protect him. While John still planned an invasion of France, there were also fears of a French attack on England and the Welsh,

crushed the year before, took up arms in the second half of that year. By 1216, England was a vassal of the papacy, there was open warfare throughout the land. The king and those loyal to him faced a formidable alliance led by a significant proportion of the English nobility, leagued with the French, the Scots and the Welsh. The rebel barons had invited Louis, the French heir, to invade and be crowned king of England. Louis landed in May 1216 and, with his baronial allies, seized London and much of England. In spite of the excommunication and eventual absolution of ‘Rex Ludovico’, as his father addressed him, and many of his English, French, Scots and Welsh supporters, his involvement in the conflict lasted until the end of 1217. The overt, military aspect of the struggle against King John began in 1215 and produced the first ‘Magna Carta’, which was re-issued a number of times over the following years. Therefore, when assigning this treaty to either date, the same terms refer to different factors, and so are likely to have different connotations. Consequently, a thorough debate on the dating of the treaty will be essential to the understanding, relevance and timing of this alliance.

The translations found in the appendices reveal largely the same message; however the text included above is used as the prime document. In the early clauses Llywelyn greeted Philip, presented himself as his servant, even describing himself as Philip’s ‘knight’. He thanked him humbly for the offer of alliance contained in the now lost initial letter. He went on to confirm his and his heirs’ loyalty to Philip, his heirs and their causes. This is highly significant, since it therefore established a permanency to their union, such a clause was lacking in Owain Gwynedd’s correspondence with Louis VII. It might be relevant that Philip’s heirs were mentioned, particularly if Prince Louis were entering the stage around that time. The explicit references to servitude and fealty to Philip should be construed as an acknowledgement of Welsh homage to the king of France. The prince of Gwynedd also asked that the act of support be reciprocated to him and other Welsh leaders. He authenticated the


88 Fœdera, vol 1, 207; Giles, Wendover, 261-385; Stubbs, Walter de Coventria, vol 2, 209-34; Norgate, John Lackland, 221-86; Boussard, ‘Philippe Auguste et les Plantagenêts’, 283-4; R. Vaughan, Chronicles of Matthew Paris (Gloucester: Sutton, 1984), 43, 273; Turner, King John, 225-57; Holt, Magna Carta, 429-73; Warren, King John, 224-56; Bradbury, Philip Augustus, 317-24. Note: it has been indicated to me that the nominative should be used, ‘Rex Ludovicus’, however, the letter from Philip uses the above form.
treaty with his seal, having discussed it with his own council as well as with the other Welsh leaders, whom he bound into the agreement. He sincerely promised to keep his word to Philip, and stated that he had not treated with the English since entering into the French king’s friendship. He reported that they had already attacked and inflicted defeats on their mutual enemy, retaking some of the land and castles of which the Welsh had been dispossessed. Llywelyn concluded by promising not to make peace unilaterally with the English and requested Philip to act similarly. From this response it seems reasonable to deduce that Philip offered Llywelyn alliance and asked him to bind to the venture those in his obedience - his nobles and subjects. In addition, it appears evident that Philip requested that the Welsh made war on John. In addition, it is possible that Philip suggested that Llywelyn recognised him, although the reply given might simply show the prince’s effusive enthusiasm. Finally, Philip’s initial letter might have asked that the Welsh did not make peace unilaterally, hence Llywelyn’s request for the same.89

The treaty text is ambiguous, no events or places are explicitly named, and so might be applied to either proposed treaty dates; 1212 or 1215-16. Over three short pages, Matthews mused innocuously over 1212, 1215 or 1216 as the year the two rulers corresponded. In 1910, Matthews wrote that ‘the choice lies between 1212 and 1216; but a definite decision can only be made with some hesitation.’ This meant that the letters were exchanged sometime within that timeframe, rather than there solely being two years from which to choose. Although he initially identified 1212 as the ‘very probable’ date, the case Matthews created for 1215, or possibly early 1216, was far more compelling; summarising that the evidence ‘decides in favour of the later rather than the earlier date.’90 Matthews’ position was solidly rejected by Treharne, whose claims have gone unchallenged since 1958.91 In fact, Treharne’s 1212 dating has been regurgitated by the imposing list of historians mentioned above, and it has been used as recently as 2005 and 2007.92 Irrespective of their impressive credentials, they are incorrect in ascribing this treaty to 1212. The evidence and the context of the moment definitely place the treaty in 1215 or 1216.

89 See Appendix B 1.5 for differences on the treaty translations.
92 Smith, ‘Magna Carta and the Charters of the Welsh Princes’, 356; Walker, Medieval Wales, 101; Davies, The Age of Conquest, 215, n.1, 243; Carr, Medieval Wales, 56; Rowlands, ‘King John and Wales’, 278, 283, and Fryde, ‘King John and the Empire’, 345 n. 60; Maud, The Welsh Kings, 194; Carpenter, The Struggle for Mastery, 320-1; Moore, Welsh Wars of Independence, 112-3; Pryce, Acts of Welsh Rulers, 392-3; Turvey, Llywelyn the Great, 58.
The language used in the treaty indicates that the author had a well-developed expressive style, comparable in standard to other contemporary documents, as Treharne concurred.\(^93\) It began with an extremely polite, perhaps flattering, greeting from Llewelyn, humbly submitting his lower status before Philip. While this realistically reflected the pre-eminence of France over Gwynedd, it also appears to be an intelligent way of opening a discourse with such a power. While it might be tempting to view Llywelyn as prostrating himself before Philip, it seems more reasonable to suppose that this document uses certain phraseology that was in keeping with contemporary practice. These softly rhyming phrases, for example, ‘non tam munificite quam magnificite’ and ‘vestris amicis amici erimus et inimici inimicis’ are arguably as important to the style and presentation of the letter, as they are in the actual message they conveyed.\(^94\) Throughout the period, the manner in which leaders projected themselves was of great importance to their status; how interlocutors perceived one another and reflected how they perceived and acted towards one another.

Attached to the bold, overt promises of perpetual alliance to the French kings and their allies, was a request that they acted similarly toward Llewelyn and his confederates. The same clause also appears in the Welsh princes’ agreement with the English barons in 1215 and between the Scots and the barons during the winter 1215-16.\(^95\) While formulaic, the commonality of language in use between all parties at the same moment is suggestive of a contemporary link. This also demonstrates that Llywelyn was au fait with contemporary diplomatic procedure and the appropriate language to employ. This inclusive clause might also denote that while pleased at the union of the French king and the Welsh leaders, he was unwilling to act as Philip’s sole pawn on the British mainland. Unilaterally attacking England would have almost certainly been disastrous for Llywelyn and, although it might have temporarily curtailed English actions across the channel, it would probably have resulted in a defeat similar to that of 1211. However, operating as part of a mutually-supportive and probably multi-factional alliance might make joint actions viable, that environment only existed from 1215.

These clauses concerning mutual attachment and consideration when treating suggests that other alliances were being formed or at least discussed, because the French alone, on the

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\(^{94}\) Line 5 of the Latin, ‘not more munificently than magnificently’ and line 10 of the original, from the line stating Llywelyn’s intent to act as friends to Philip’s friends and as enemies to his enemies.

southern shore of the Channel could not have offered any realistic military or logistical assistance against English armies sent to Wales. The Welsh leaders would have been keenly aware of that fact. Equally, it is inconceivable that Philip would request that Llywelyn sent Welsh troops to fight in French territories. The Welsh could not send soldiers to France for want of shipping; also the voyage to France through English-controlled waters was logistically arduous and, more importantly, the Welsh were reluctant to send troops out of Wales for fear of English invasion in their absence. The latter point is amply demonstrated by a letter written between July 1199 and January 1201 to Innocent III from the Welsh beseeching his intervention against the interdicts of the archbishop of Canterbury against them. The underlying messages in that letter are that the Welsh could not send troops on the proposed crusade due to the likelihood of English invasion of their territories in their absence and also that they were disinclined to do so unless the pope aided them against Canterbury’s excesses.96

These points delineate the operational boundaries for this alliance; land-based action by a largely infantry force. Due to the movement restrictions of a force on foot, and the practical impossibilities of transporting Welsh troops by boat, this limited Welsh involvement to Wales, the border or at most within the western or southern part of the British Isles. Significantly, Llywelyn promised to make war on lands lost ‘by fraud and guile’, but made no mention of operating outside Wales. Although not dated, it has clearly and reasonably been assumed that this referred to lands lost in the settlement of 1211.97 However, it cannot be safely asserted that this exclusively meant those lands, neither does the text stipulate that Llywelyn was targeting those lands ceded to John in the north. Since Llywelyn frequently campaigned across Wales, this statement could be fairly applied to any other territory no longer under native control at that time. The enthusiasm to fight is easily recognisable in this treaty, and it is clear that the Welsh had already retaken some territory. There is no indication when or where those lands were taken; whether in recent months or recent years, however any such victory would obviously be worth highlighting in a letter to the French king, their new ally.

Another vital point arising from this treaty is the mention of assemblies of the leading men of Gwynedd and the native princes, possibly the clergy too, although the latter is

disputed. Since these meetings are vital to the dating issue, they must be debated in depth below. However, gatherings of nobles appear in contemporary records which, while not entirely trustworthy, offer some dates and events on which to construct a timeline where this alliance seems possible and desirable. These two elements are essential, and both must be identified in any possible treaty date.

In overview, this treaty appears to be a cautious but enthusiastic diplomatic manoeuvre aligning Gwynedd and its allies with the ascendant force at that time. Philip had defeated John in 1204, dispossessing him of Normandy, Poitou, Maine and part of Aquitaine, fracturing forever the Angevin dominions of his father. John’s 1206 attempt to recover territory in France ended in failure, while in 1214 Philip convincingly defeated John and crushed his continental allies. By November 1215 London had fallen to the barons, French troops had arrived in England and, in May 1216, Prince Louis landed and was proclaimed king. If the Welsh suspected the French were coming, or knew that they were already in England, that would present a realistic opportunity to have such an alliance with France. If the French were still in France, as they were in 1212, then such an alliance would not be in Welsh interests and would imperil them to John’s well-noted wrath.

Clearly, such vague treaty terms can be perceived differently depending on the circumstances. The ambiguities of this treaty are numerous and critical; no dates, no specific events, no place names and no forenames other than Philip and Llywelyn are included. Those absences have allowed questions to arise over the dating of the treaty. Therefore a detailed examination of Trehearn’s reasoning, combined with a consideration of other contemporary sources and fresh analysis is required.

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99 Norgate, John Lackland, 93-103; Powicke, The Loss of Normandy, 251-70; Turner, King John, 115-27; Warren, King John, 84-99.
101 Giles, Wendover, 307-8, 357-9; Stubbs, Walteri de Coventria, 218-28; Stevenson, Coggeshall, 171-85; Norgate, John Lackland, 256-7; Turner, King John, 252; Warren, King John, 251-2.
Treharne’s treaty of 1212.

In his 1958 article, ‘The Franco-Welsh Treaty of Alliance in 1212’, Treharne made a strong case for 1212 as the year that Llywelyn replied to Philip’s original, lost letter. No one has speculated whether Llywelyn’s reply was drafted and sent in the same year as Philip’s mission to Gwynedd. The assumption that it was returned in the same year appears implicit. As noted above, Treharne’s article has found such favour that it has been widely accepted by all later writers as the accurate date of the treaty. However, there has not been any previous rationalisation of Treharne’s influential work, nor has anyone attempted to establish when this alliance was both possible and desirable. The 1212 argument was constructed on half a dozen main arguments to act as a counter to Matthews’ work. The points of contention from this landmark article are deconstructed here, finding the overall conclusion to be fatally flawed, although his first assertion, that the treaty must post-date 1210 due to Llywelyn’s ‘long understanding’ with John, is reasonable.

Welsh noble councils

The argument centred on the Welsh noble councils convened during this time is critical. If inaccurate on this matter, then Treharne’s argument largely collapses on this point. He claimed that ‘the letter was written after the formation of the successful confederation of the Welsh princes early in 1212’, yet he later conceded that there was a good case for there having been no such council in that year. The contemporary source on which Treharne depended, *Brut y Tywysogion*, gives details too inconclusive to support the 1212 theory alone, instead it rather illuminates the noble gatherings of the years 1215 and 1216 as being more eventful, relevant and showing textual similarities with clauses from this Franco-Welsh treaty. That evidence from the *Brut* for these years merits exposure here, as well as the inclusion of material from other corroborating contemporary sources.

To further define the context, on the advice of the noble council of Gwynedd, Llywelyn had submitted to John in 1211. In the same year, John began constructing castles across Wales and also ordered Welsh leaders to combine with marcher forces from Glamorgan and Pembroke and move against two minor Deheubarth nobles who had not

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105 Jones, *Brut Y Tywysogion*, 89, 92.
heeded the king’s summons, Rhys and Owain ap Gruffudd, grandsons of the Lord Rhys.\textsuperscript{107} Faced with such powerful combined enemies they sued for peace with little further opposition.\textsuperscript{108} Before the end of 1211 however, two of those called to John’s side to face Llywelyn that summer, Maelgwn ap Rhys and Rhys Fychan ‘repented of their reconciliation with the king, and they fell upon the new castle at Aberystwyth and razed it to the ground.’\textsuperscript{109} In light of that evidence, it might in fact be more realistic to redefine the ‘1212 revolt’ as one which broke out in 1211 and continued the following year. In addition, the Brut entry for 1212 reveals:

A year after that, Llywelyn ap Iorwerth, prince of Gwynedd, being unable to suffer the injuries which the men from the new castles were inflicting upon him, made a solemn pact with the princes of Wales, namely Gwenwynwyn, Maelgwn ap Rhys, Madog ap Gruffudd Maelor, Maredudd ap Rhobert. And he rose up against the king, and by the end of two months he laid siege to all the castles the king had built in Gwynedd, and he took them all except two, Degannwy and Rhuddlan. And they laid siege to the castle of Mathrafal in Powys, which Robert Vieuxpont had built. ... And in that year Robert Vieuxpont hanged at Shrewsbury Rhys ap Maelgwn, an excellent boy not seven years old, who was a hostage with the king.\textsuperscript{110}

This evidence clearly states, with no mention of the French or the pope, that Llywelyn and other Welsh leaders rose in reaction to English military activity in Wales, and that fighting took place in Gwynedd and Powys. It seems likely that conflict arose elsewhere in Wales too; Maelgwn ap Rhys, was arguably the leading Deheubarth noble of the moment, and Madog ap Gruffudd Maelor of Northern Powys and the Perfeddwlad, which comprised the territory which ran east of the Conway to the English border, were among the revolt leaders. It seems reasonable to assume that they would have fought against Crown and Marcher interests in their territories also, but their conflicts went unrecorded by this brief, general campaign summary. This notion that the Welsh uprising was provoked by the harsh conditions imposed by the 1211 settlement is supported by another contemporary source unconnected with Wales. The Winchester Monastery annals included a noteworthy entry which followed the account of that peace agreement and the construction of new castles. That brief note

\textsuperscript{107} Jones, Brut y Tywysogion, 85-6; Turvey, Llywelyn the Great, 55. 
\textsuperscript{108} Jones, Brut y Tywysogion, 86. 
\textsuperscript{109} Jones, Brut Y Tywysogion, 86. 
\textsuperscript{110} Jones, Brut Y Tywysogion, 86. Note: The original Welsh text is not given in this publication, so it is not included in the footnotes as are other original sources.
explicitly connected the subsequent Welsh destruction of the king’s recent fortifications to the harsh regime imposed by those garrisons.\textsuperscript{111}

Map 9: This general map of medieval Wales.\textsuperscript{112}

\textsuperscript{111} Luard, \textit{Annales Monastici}, vol. 2, \textit{Wintonia}, 81 (‘anno sequenti Wallenses destruxerunt, cum viderent duras conditiones sibi pacis imponi’, my rough translation, ‘the following year the Welsh destroyed [them], when they saw the harsh conditions of the peace imposed on them.’) Note: Mention of the king’s new castles being the focus for the revolt is also found in the later Matthew Paris’s chronicle, Luard, ed., \textit{Matthæi Parisiensis}, 534.

\textsuperscript{112} Map 9: This general map of medieval Wales shows the native Welsh territories to assist the reader. Based on Davies, \textit{Age of Conquest}, 38 (1991) and also appears in the previous chapter.
Papal Tactics and Revolt

Although there is contemporary evidence of external encouragement to attack John in 1212, none of it mentions the French.

In that year Pope Innocent the Third absolved three princes, namely, Llywelyn ap Iorwerth and Gwenwynwyn and Maelgwn ap Rhys, from the oath and allegiance they owed to the king of England. And he enjoined upon them, for the remission of their sins, to direct friendly endeavour and action against the iniquity of that king. And he interdicted the churches for five years in all England and Wales, except for the territory of those three princes and those who were leagued with them. And they by unanimous counsel gained possession of Perfeddwlad, which was before that in the hands of the king, and that with spirited manliness.\(^\text{113}\)

Their absolution cannot be dated with any certainty before the resumption of hostilities in summer 1212 which, as shown above, appear to have begun in late 1211. This absolution therefore could only cautiously be considered as a spark that reignited the conflict against John; it might have arrived after the fact and simply served as an encouragement, albeit a powerful one. In addition, papal encouragement would certainly have legitimised the Welsh offensive and so its mention might appear prominent in order to further serve that end. The 1212 campaign appears to have been well-executed by Llywelyn; other sources support the claims made in the \textit{Brut}.\(^\text{114}\) Another, Roger of Wendover, described the Welsh decapitating all within the castles they took.\(^\text{115}\)

The idea that the pope incited the Welsh to revolt also appears in contemporary sources such as the chronicle of Walter of Coventry, and in the monastic Annals of Osney and Waverley.\(^\text{116}\) It is perhaps noteworthy that the Waverley Annals also included a more

\(^{113}\) Jones, \textit{Brut Y Tywysogion}, 87.
\(^{114}\) \textit{Annales Monastici}, vol. 1, \textit{Margan}, 32 (‘Leulinus princeps Norwalliae omnem terram suam anno præterito perditam, viriliiter pugnando hoc anno recuperat’, my translation, ‘Llywelyn, prince of North Wales, manfully fought this year and recovered all of his lands that had been lost the previous year.’) vol. 4, \textit{Wigornia}, 400, (‘Lewlinus et alii principes totius Walliae, ascitis sibi undecunque copiis militaribus, castra de novo per Walliam constructa capiunt, combrunt, et deiciunt; et crebris irruptionibus marchias nostras inquietant’, my translation, Having acquired military resources from wheresoever, captured, burned and destroyed the newly constructed castles throughout Wales, and with frequent incursions disquieted our Marches.’)
\(^{115}\) Giles, \textit{Wendover}, 257.
\(^{116}\) \textit{Annales Monastici}, vol. 2, \textit{Waverleia}, 268 (‘hoc anno absoluta est Wallia ab interdicto, et a jugo servitutis domini Johannis Regis Angliae,’ my translation, ‘In this year Wales was absolved from the interdict and from the yoke of servitude of lord John, king of England’), vol. 4, \textit{Oseneia}, 56 (‘rebellaverunt Wallenses contra Johannem regem Angliae, incitati mandato domini Papæ, quia idem rex inobediens esse ceperat sanctæ Romanæ ecclesiæ,’ my translation, ‘Incited by papal mandate, the Welsh rebelled against John, king of England.’)
general release for all ‘earls, barons, knights, freemen, clergy, laymen’ from loyalty to John.\textsuperscript{117} The Burton monastery annals also tell of Pandulf, the papal legate in England, absolving the English from their allegiance to John in 1212, although the Waverley and Burton texts are practically identical, suggesting they emanated from a common source.\textsuperscript{118} The chroniclers Roger of Wendover and, later, Matthew Paris also wrote that Innocent encouraged English disobedience and revolt.\textsuperscript{119} These are recognisable elements of a ‘cultivate and eradicate’ strategy; empowering John’s opponents, attacking his legitimacy among the clergy, nobles and the general populace. John appears to have surrendered shortly after.

Curiously, although the British sources appear conclusive enough, no papal record has emerged for the absolution of the Welsh. For the period 1208-1213, the only mentions of Wales or its leaders in Innocent’s letters post-date John’s surrender to the papacy in May 1213. The two most obvious are the initial truce between the Welsh and the English of June 1213 and the instruction of 28 October 1213 commanding all the clergy, nobles and people of Wales and England to obey John and his heirs.\textsuperscript{120} The issue of the absolution of the princes is of some import and requires one further consideration. Without concrete evidence of its veracity and timing, the treaty seems likely to post-date the lifting of the interdict due to the fact that Llywelyn had access to sacrosanct relics on which to swear and to the interior of a church in which to reverently store it. This, of course, assumes that the interdict was enforced in Wales, which is neither proven nor refuted by the sources. Were this papal absolution proven to have come in 1212, this would still not connect Philip Augustus and Llywelyn or rectify certain problems with that year’s entry of Brut y Tywysogion, discussed below. This argument proceeds on the notion that the pope did absolve the Welsh princes, despite there being no papal record, and that he also primed the English to disobey.

The act of absolving supporters from the king’s obedience demonstrated a profound intrusion into the politics and peace of the kingdom by Innocent III, and was entirely

\textsuperscript{117} Annales Monastici, vol. 2, Burton, 269-70.
\textsuperscript{118} Annales Monastici, vol. 1, Burton, 215-6.
\textsuperscript{119} Giles, Wendover, 256-7; Vaughan, Chronicles of Matthew Paris, 21-2.
\textsuperscript{120} Fœdera, vol 1, 178; T. D. Hardy, ed., Rotuli Litterarum Patentium (London: Record Commission. 1835). Vol 1. 1201-1216, 100. ‘truegas capiantur inter nos et Walenses inimicos nostros’ (‘truces arranged between us and the Welsh our enemies.’); Cheney and Cheney, Letters of Pope Innocent III, (entry 930) 154 ‘the archbp., bps., barons, knights, and all the people of England and Wales ... to remain faithful to John, king of the English, and his heirs.’; Norgate, John Lackland, 193-4; Warren, King John, 218; Turvey, Llywelyn the Great, 59.
consistent with papal tactics of the time. These procedures; writing to a potential adversary, sending legates to hold discussions with them, removing their ecclesiastical officials to undermine their authority, then absolving their temporal supporters before pronouncing an interdict and declaring them excommunicate, all served as stages preceding military action against the pope’s enemy. This is classic ‘cultivate and eradicate’, but with a heavier emphasis on the eradication element of this strategy. Alongside, the pope might promote, legitimise and empower adversaries of the papal enemy, thus cultivating a counter-force.

Apart from King John, other good contemporary examples include Philip of Swabia, the Cathars and, slightly later, Llywelyn ap Iorwerth. Philip stood against Innocent’s preferred imperial candidate, Otto, and experienced the initial stages of those papal actions described above, being employed against him in 1204-5. Raymond of Toulouse and the Cathars suffered the entirety of that papal strategy, culminating in the Albigensian crusades. During the pontificate of Honorius III, 1216-1227, Llywelyn ap Iorwerth incurred papal wrath for ongoing warfare against Henry III. For failing to react swiftly enough to Rome’s overtures, which can be dated to 1219 initially, the pope issued this order on 5 October 1223:

Mandate to the archbishop of York and his suffragans to place under interdict the lands in their dioceses belonging to Llywelyn, called prince of Wales, and his followers, and to excommunicate him and his supporters and after six months to declare all to be free of allegiance to them unless they go personally to the apostolic see for absolution.

In 1212 therefore, Innocent III can be identified as taking definable steps to break John’s obstinacy. Having sent legates to England, laid an interdict against the country and excommunicated the king, the absolving of the Welsh from obedience and actively encouraging them to unite against the king followed the pattern of papal tactics deployed against other adversaries of Rome. If the evidence from the Burton, Waverley and Wendover chronicles is reliable, as well as that of Matthew Paris, then Innocent also removed English obedience from John. In addition, sanctions against the king and any clergy who supported

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121 Sayers, Innocent III, 52-62.
122 Kennan, ‘The Political Crusades’, 139-41; Sayers, Innocent III, 143-63; Bradbury, Philip Augustus, 209-13, 328-34.
him over the pope increased noticeably in the early months of 1213. According to the papal modus operandi identified here, having encouraged local dissent and action against John, the next step would be to mobilise powerful, possibly external, help in this cause. It is at this point that direct French involvement can first be traced. Perhaps prompted by a bold baronial approach to the pope in 1212, requesting external intervention against John, Innocent might have recognised an opportunity to act more decisively to end the papacy’s dispute with John. He sent letters to Philip Augustus in January or February 1213, requesting him to take military action against England. It is only from this point onward that plans to attack John emerge in the records of Philip Augustus’s reign. The papal correspondence apparently declaring John’s deposition was read out to Philip’s parliament during Easter 1213. Philip called for a campaign against Flanders in May, which he announced would be followed by an invasion of England. Although the proposed attack on England might have been a ruse to discourage John from taking armies to France, negotiations for Philip’s mission against on Flanders continued into June and an invasion fleet was fateful assembled at Damme. These invasion preparations in early summer 1213 came to the attention of English chroniclers. It appears probable that John, considering this apparently imminent French attack, combined with his limited English baronial support, Innocent’s actions against him and the ongoing conflict with the Welsh, was then persuaded to sue for peace with Rome. On 15 May 1213, John surrendered the crown of England into the hands of Pandulf, the papal legate. Following that, the papacy caused a truce to be made between the Welsh and the English. This was prolonged and included in the general peace ordered by the pope.

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125 Fœdera, vol 1, 184-5; Norgate, John Lackland, 182-3.
126 Giles, Wendover, 261; Norgate, John Lackland, 175, Turner, King John, 167-8.
127 Delaborde, Œuvres de Rigord et de Guillaume le Breton, vol 2, 254-5 (Liber IX, lines 160-92, lines 160-4 read: Hic quoniam facilis locus est quo confluat omnis, Absque mora varias gens circumfusa per urbes, Francigenum ductor prelates ecclesiarum, Et tot procures de regno congragat onmes.’ Lines 179-83 read ‘Mens mea proponit Anglorum invadere regnum, Ut digne feriat pene vindicta Johannem, Aut ignominia regnum comitante relinquat, Servitiumque Dei tandem renovetur ibidem, Anglia quo caruit septem et multo amplius annis.’); Giles, Wendover, 259-61; Luard, Matthæi Parisiensis, 537; Norgate, John Lackland, 175; Boussard, ‘Philippe Auguste et les Plantagenêts’ 283-4; Bradbury, Philip Augustus, 192-3, 288.
128 Giles, Wendover, 271-3; Samaran et al, Recueil des Actes de Philippe Auguste, tome 3, 439-43 (entries 1302, 1304); Bradbury, Philip Augustus, 286-7.
131 Hardy, Rotuli Litterarum Patentium, vol 1, 100; Norgate, John Lackland, 193-4; Warren, King John, 218; Turvey, Llywelyn the Great, 59.
between all of John’s nobles and all of the people of England and Wales. In these sources, there is a notable absence of any of the contact or co-operation between the French and the Welsh in 1212 which becomes apparent in 1215-17. This shows that the primary evidence connects to 1213, an escalation of the quarrel between John and Innocent, and thereafter the direct engagement of Philip and Louis. This was founded on the internal dissent against John by the barons and the Welsh from 1212. There is no overt or suggested link between Paris and Gwynedd in 1212 except in Treherne’s article.

Problems with the Brut

Treherne relied upon Brut y Tywysogion as his principal, and apparently his only, primary source. This appears to lack caution, especially considering the following weaknesses in this otherwise noteworthy chronicle. In addition, his argument rested heavily on the entry for 1212. Therefore, the source requires some scrutiny, and it appears fallible. Several entries in the Brut confusingly contain more than one year in each entry, for example 1207-1208, 1208-1209, 1209-1210, 1210-1211, 1211-1212, whereas others contain two entries for just one year, 1203-1203, 1204-1204, 1205-1205, for example. In entries spanning two years, the events described are not ascribed to a year within that two-year period; they are all contained in a common entry. This mixing of two years’ events in one entry prevents a simple chronological comprehension. Other years were accorded more than one entry adding to this source’s complexity, for example, 1212 has two entries, 1211-1212 and 1212-1212. In other entries some of the key facts are incorrectly dated. The most relevant example of that comes from the 1212 entry, which claimed that the pope laid the interdict against ‘the churches for five years in all England and Wales.’ Clearly this is incorrect, since the interdict was imposed in 1208 and lasted until its full relaxation in 1214. These points should draw sufficient doubt over the reliability of the 1212 entry. Since that entry appears confused, and perhaps unreliable, it was unsound for Treherne to base his theory on this evidence alone.

132 Fædera, vol 1, 178; Hardy, Rotuli Litterarum Patentium, vol 1. 103, 120; Bliss, Calendar of Papal Letters, 39; Norgate, John Lackland, 193-4; Turvey, Llywelyn the Great, 60.
133 Bradbury, Philip Augustus, 192-3.
134 Jones, Brut Y Tywysogion, 82-6.
135 Jones, Brut Y Tywysogion, 86-7.
136 Cheney, ‘King John and the Papal Interdict’, 295; Jones, Brut Y Tywysogion, 87.
1215 and 1216

However, due to the fact that the Brut forms the core of this argument, the entries for 1215 and 1216 demand comparison in order to test Treharne’s faith in 1212. In 1215, the Welsh and the English barons became allies, some of the alliance terms match clauses found in Philip’s proposal to Llywelyn:

And the strife that spread so much that all the leading men of England and the princes of Wales made a pact together against the king that no one of them, without the consent of all the others, would make peace or agreement or truce with the king until ... there should be restored to each one of them their laws and their power and their castles, which he had taken from them without law or truth or justice.137

Although a coincidence is conceivable and that these terms were formulaic, it bears comparison with the treaty with Philip which stated:

Furthermore, from the time I received your highness’s letter, I have made neither truce nor peace, nor even parley, with the English, but, by God’s grace, I and all the princes of Wales, unanimously leagued together have manfully resisted our – and your – enemies, and with God’s help we have by force of arms recovered from the yoke of their tyranny a large part of the land and the strongly defended castles which they by fraud and deceit had occupied and having recovered them we hold them strongly in the might of the Lord. Hence we, all the princes of Wales, ask and request that you make no truce with the English without us, knowing that we will not for any terms or price bind ourselves to them by any peace or treaty unless we know in advance we have your approval.138

Another use of this phraseology comes from the agreement Louis and the English barons made with Alexander II, king of Scotland. The contemporary Melrose Chronicle recorded that Louis and the barons swore ‘upon holy gospels, that they would never enter into any agreement for peace or truce with the king of England, unless the king of the Scots were included.’139 Although this does not claim a uniqueness of the use of these precise treaty terms, similar articles of mutual faith can be found elsewhere, but the fact that the four factions of the alliance can be tied to the same terms at the same time by independent

137 Jones, Brut Y Tywysogion, 89; Turvey, Llywelyn the Great, 59-60.
139 Stephenson, trans., The Chronicle of Melrose, 45.
corroborative evidence suggests that the treaty document dates from the same period as the examples from the Brut and Melrose of 1215 and 1216 respectively.\textsuperscript{140}

The union between the Welsh and the English barons in 1215 is also mentioned in another contemporary source, unconnected to Wales, that of Walter of Coventry.\textsuperscript{141} There is no doubt that the English barons were also allied to the French in 1215.\textsuperscript{142} These overt and active alliances between the English barons, the French and the Welsh opened up a conduit between Paris and Gwynedd. This link does not appear to have existed in 1212.

The Brut described how the Welsh and English rebels met in 1215 to discuss their reasons for revolt, one of which was to restore the rights and liberty of the Church. The presence of clergy at such a discussion is likely.\textsuperscript{143} In 1216, the same chronicle noted at least two congresses of the Welsh nobility which included the clergy:

A year after that, there was an apportioning of land between the sons of the Lord Rhys, Maelgwn and Rhys Gryg, and Rhys and Owain, sons of Gruffudd, son of the Lord Rhys, at Aberdyfi, after almost all the leading men of Wales had been assembled there before the Lord Llywelyn and all the learned men of Gwynedd. ...

That year Gwenwynwyn, lord of Powys, made a solemn pact with John, king of England, and he renounced and scorned the oaths and pledges and charters which he had given to Llywelyn ap Iorwerth and to the princes and the leading men of Wales and England, and he renounced the homage he had done to Llywelyn ... And he [Llywelyn] sent bishops and abbots and other men of great authority to him ... to beseech him to return. And when he had gained nothing thereby, he gathered a host and summoned to him all the princes of Wales, and went to Powys and drove Gwenwynwyn in flight to the earl of Chester; and he subdued for himself all his land and gained possession of it.\textsuperscript{144}

Therefore, Llywelyn met with ‘the learned men’ and ‘bishops and abbots and other men of great authority’ in order to mediate between him and Gwenwynwyn of Powys; these are the only assemblies of Welsh clergy mentioned in the timeframe in question.\textsuperscript{145} While it is conceivable that he met the clergy in 1212, there is no record of it, in stark contrast to this later date. As the entry above shows, Llywelyn was accepted as the leading noble in 1216 and

\textsuperscript{140} Treharne, 'The Franco-Welsh Treaty of Alliance in 1212', 65. (John's agreement with the Germans and the Flemish prior to the 1214 campaign implies a similar desire).

\textsuperscript{141} Stubbs, Walteri de Coventria, 220.

\textsuperscript{142} Fœdera vol 1, 207 (Philip's letter to Louis in England); Annales Monastici, vol 2, Waverleia, 283, vol 3, Dunstaplia, 45; Stubbs, Walteri de Coventria, vol 2, 222; Stevenson, Coggeshall, 172.

\textsuperscript{143} Jones, Brut Y Tywysogion, 89.

\textsuperscript{144} Jones, Brut Y Tywysogion, 92.

\textsuperscript{145} Jones, Brut Y Tywysogion, 92.
displayed his dominance by fulfilling the role of adjudicator in the Deheubarth land settlement.\textsuperscript{146} The role of receiving appeals and judging disputes mirrors the responsibilities of the English and French kings, demonstrating that Llywelyn acted according to the mores of the time and the expectation accorded to his position.

The \textit{Brut} also gave its account of Prince Louis’s invited invasion of 1216 and described how John turned to campaign in the Welsh March. This appears to have been an effort to secure his rear before facing the threat in the east. While at Hereford, John ‘sent envoys to Reginald de Braose and to the princes of Wales, and begged of them to be reconciled to him in every way; but they would not have it.’\textsuperscript{147} As well as being a major Marcher power, the de Braose family had, at this point, intermarried with Welsh noble lines and had certain common interests.\textsuperscript{148} Another effort to win Welsh favour might have been John’s appointment of two Welshmen as bishops to Welsh sees in 1215.\textsuperscript{149} The lack of natives in these positions had long been a point of contention to the Welsh.\textsuperscript{150} With the rejection of John’s \textit{rapprochement} after Louis’s arrival in mind, the treaty provides this resonant line;

\begin{quote}
Furthermore, from the time I received your highness’s letter, I have made neither truce nor peace, nor even parley, with the English, but, by God’s grace, I and all the princes of Wales, unanimously leagued together have manfully resisted our – and your – enemies.\textsuperscript{151}
\end{quote}

While this clause might simply reflect Llywelyn’s intent to keep John at a distance during the crisis, it might also be indicative of the treaty being validated after John’s attempt to win over the Welsh princes. Therefore, in 1216, there were the same ingredients identified by Treharne for 1212; noble councils, followed by violence that was ongoing at the time the treaty was signed. In parallel to the chronicle entry of 1215, that of 1216 also met these criteria and also confirmed the Welsh-English alliance extant at that time, which did not exist in 1212. In addition, 1216 includes meetings with ‘Llywelyn and all the learned men of Gwynedd’ as well as ‘bishops and abbots and other men of great authority’.\textsuperscript{152}

\begin{flushright}\textsuperscript{146} Lloyd, \textit{A History of Wales From The Earliest Times To The Edwardian Conquest}, vol 2, 649; Jones, \textit{Brut y Tywysogion}, 92; J. B. Smith, \textit{Llywelyn ap Gruffudd}, Prince of Wales (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1998), 18-9; Turvey, \textit{Llywelyn the Great}, 61-8. \\
\textsuperscript{147} Jones, \textit{Brut Y Tywysogion}, 93. \\
\textsuperscript{148} \textit{Annales Monastici}, vol 4, \textit{Wigornia}, 405, vol 5, 40-1; Turvey, \textit{Llywelyn the Great}, 53-4, 57-8, 64. \\
\textsuperscript{149} Jones, \textit{Brut y Tywysogion}, 91; Cheney, \textit{Innocent III}, 171-2. \\
\textsuperscript{150} Jones, \textit{Brut Y Tywysogion}, 89; Abse, \textit{Letters From Wales}, 13-5; Pryce, \textit{Acts of Welsh Rulers}, (entry 220) 368-71. \\
\textsuperscript{151} Rothwell, \textit{English Historical Documents}, vol 3, 306-7. \\
\textsuperscript{152} Jones, \textit{Brut Y Tywysogion}, 93.\end{flushright}
It must be concluded therefore, that on the matter of the councils gathering and the campaign that followed, 1212 appears an entirely less credible candidate year than either 1215 or 1216.

More Contemporary Evidence

Moreover, even the papacy was aware of the Welsh alliance to the French, although Louis was viewed as their partner, rather than Philip. As Louis had openly invaded England, and Philip was powerful enough to appear immune to overt accusation, it seems perhaps natural that the heir alone was connected with the conflict and its aftermath. The letters of the papal legate show that he excommunicated Louis and all of his supporters in May 1216. He renewed that sentence and specifically placed the whole of Wales under an interdict on 11 November 1216. 153 In early 1217, Pope Honorius III issued orders to the barons, the Scots and the Welsh, specifically ‘Lewelin’ and his supporters, to disregard the oaths they had taken to Louis. 154

The French-Welsh connection was also proclaimed in the contemporary Waverley Annals, which described the Welsh being punished for being in league with Louis. 155 That


154 P. Pressutti, ed., Regesta Honorii Papæ III, (Romae: Ex Typographia Vaticana, 1888), 2 vols, vol. 1, 44, (entry 244, Laterani 17 Ianurialii), ‘G(ualiae) tituli Sancti Martini preb. Card. Apost. Sed.. Litteras ab eo se accepisse nuntiat, condeoto de eius anxietatibus in regno Angliae propter Ludovicum primogenitum regis Francorum regnum ipsum invadentem, eique auctoritate concedit interdicendi, excommunicandi, et degradandi praetatos, et ordinandi ecclesias cathedrales et abbatias exemptas atque regales de personis regi fidelibus per totum regnum Angliae, Scotiae atque Walliae’, (entry 245, same date), ‘Illustri Regi Scotie et complicibus suis spiritum consilii sanioris. Ut cessent a conspiratione in regem Angliae, sed in eius fidelitate permaneant non obstantibus iuramentis illicitis Ludovicis filio regis Francorum’, this source named those other nobles receiving the same order along with their supporters including ‘Nobili viro Lewelino et complicibus suis’, 45; Bliss, Calendar of Papal Letters, 43; A. Potthast, Regesta Pontificum Romanorum de 1198 ab 1304, (Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 1957), 2 vols, vol 1, 473 (5375, to ‘Princeps Angliae’ the latter probably used as a geographical description, ie, the British Isles, rather than a political unit), 473-4 (5378, barons), 477 (5417, to all English, Scots and Welsh, and 5418, to Scots, rebels and ‘Nobilem Virum Lewelin’).

155 Annales Monastici, vol. 2, Waverleia, 286-7 (‘Walliam totam interdixit, quia cum baronibus tenuit, et ipsos barones cum omnibus complicibus sui excommunicavit, in qua positus est Lodowicus in capite’, ‘All of Wales was put under interdict because it held with the barons, and the barons with their accomplices were excommunicated, Louis having been placed at their head.’ I am grateful to Professor Coss for his thoughts on that sentence.)
entry fell between John’s death and Henry III’s coronation, respectively 19 and 28 October, 1216. This very clearly sited the Franco-Welsh alliance as extant in 1216.

First-hand contemporary English evidence, L’Histoire de Guillaume le Maréchal, dated to 1226, also linked the Welsh and Louis through oath-taking:

I almost forgot to mention that,
Once the talks had taken place
And the truce was concluded
And agreed by all parties,
Lord Louis told and ordered those loyal to him,
Namely his own French,
The Scots [and the] Welsh
And English, come what may to
Observe the truce throughout the land.  

The fact that William the Marshal, earl of Pembroke, and at that moment a partisan of the king during the baronial wars, linked the Welsh and the French at that instant is highly significant. As a marcher lord with lands in Wales, and a key adversary of the French and the Welsh at that crucial time, he was well-placed to identify when and to whom the Welsh were allied. In this evidence, they are clearly placed among Louis’s supporters in the aftermath of the conflict, in 1217.

Yet another source from 1217 recognised the oath the Welsh had taken to the French, the Brut y Tywysogion. Matthews identified that link, but Treharne saw no merit in that argument, insisting that the entry appeared vague. In isolation, it might appear so, however in conjunction with the other sources linking the Welsh and the French by oath, the Brut entry appears to corroborate that connection. It was set in the context of the Treaty of Lambeth made between the barons and the new king of England, the minor Henry III. Peace had been made with Louis who, for a sum of money, would relinquish his claim to the

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156 A. J. Holden, ed., S. Gregory, trans., D. Crouch, History of William Marshal, (London: Anglo-Norman Text Society, 3 vols, 2002-6), vol 1 (2002), v (dating the text), vol 2 (2004), 388-9 (lines 17737 – 17746) ‘D’itant ai fet oblïement, Quant pris furent li parlement, E la triue poralee, De totes pars agraantee. Que sire Loeïs manda, A ses empris e quemanda, Nomeement a ses Franceis, E as Escoz e as Waleis, E as Engleis, que qu’il feïssent, Que la triue par tot tenissent’ (the original text), (The English translation without the square brackets that I have inserted). It is also noteworthy William Marshall’s son defected from the rebels and so would have had excellent knowledge of their discussions and agreements.

157 Jones, Brut y Tywysogion, 96, ‘for the Welsh had no desire to agree to the peace which the barons had made, because they were still bound to their oath or else had been scorned and ignored in that peace.’

English throne. The excommunication of Louis and his adherents was ended, he returned to France and peace largely returned to England. The terms of the treaty were unfavourable to Llywelyn and the Welsh, who had not been consulted in any case. In that light, the Welsh fought on: ‘for the Welsh had no desire to agree to the peace which the barons had made, because they were still bound to their oath or else had been scorned and ignored in that peace.’ This excerpt established that the Welsh continued to fight after the Treaty of Lambeth, giving two compelling reasons for that. The second reason offered, that they had been excluded from the peace, appears quite plausible. It seems that despite promises to the contrary, Louis made peace without reference to his new Scottish vassals either, who learned of his settlement and departure while campaigning in Northumbria. While a point of honour might be considered – the barons had broken their word by negotiating peace independently – more pragmatically this would show Welsh dissatisfaction at the terms, which agreed to restore lands, possessions and other matters to their pre-conflict arrangement. Clearly, having regained and then advanced their territorial possessions, the Welsh would not be satisfied with that Anglo-French agreement. Had the resulting treaty been good enough to accept, it is reasonable to suppose that they would have desisted from further campaigning, irrespective of their absence from the Lambeth negotiations. The more intriguing, first reason describing them as still bound to their oath, implies their promise to Philip. It seems unrealistic that they were unilaterally holding to an oath made to the barons or Louis; the only agreement still in contention therefore was with Philip Augustus. As established above, the parties to that friendship promised not to seek peace without mutual consultation. Since it was widely known that the Welsh had freely negotiated and maintained truces with the English, under the guidance of the papal legates during 1213-14, this mention of remaining faithful to their word cannot refer to an oath they had would have already

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161 *Fœdera*, vol 1, 221-2 (no Welsh signatories); Turvey, *Llywelyn the Great*, 72.
162 Jones, *Brut y Tywysogion*, 96.
164 *Fœdera*, vol 1, 221-2 (Clause 11 laid out the principle of returning to the state of affairs before the conflict, clause 13 tried to bind ‘Lewellino & aliis Wallensibus’ to that.)
openly broken. This must therefore deny the 1212 dating and reaffirm that the oath in question must have been made as or after war broke out again in 1215.

Therefore, according to unconnected Welsh, English and Papal sources, the Welsh were allied to the French in 1215 at the earliest, but there is no mention of any link, treaty, oath or even correspondence in any source between any Welshman and any Frenchman in 1212.

The English Crusade?
Another central pillar of the 1212 argument is the suggestion that the French and Welsh had been enjoined by Innocent III to conduct a crusade against England. Treharne used this claim to firmly date the treaty prior to John’s 1213 surrender because Innocent would not proclaim war against a papal vassal. Importantly, he also used the ‘holy war’ notion as a device with which to attack Matthews. Treharne’s article depended on his defeating the ‘holy war’ and ‘crusade’ idea, both terms he used. He built a case for the holy war being a gathering force which he then described as coming to ‘a sudden end’ when John became a papal vassal in 1213. As he put it, ‘The frequent appeals to divine grace and favour in the latter part of the letter strongly suggest the conception of a ‘holy war’, an idea no longer valid, even for propaganda purposes, after 15th May 1213.’ This, according to the article, dated the treaty prior to 1213.

However, there are two fatal flaws in Treharne’s ‘crusade’ argument. The first is that neither Matthews nor the Brut made such claims and, as Sayers put it, ‘there is no convincing evidence that the pope sanctioned a crusade against England.’ No source describes a direct appeal for such a mission. Matthews wrote cautiously and used neither term, nor did he make a case for such a cause. Instead he claimed that Innocent had ‘called upon Philip Augustus to make war upon John in order to reduce him to ‘the subjection of the Holy Church.’’ He then noted the Brut evidence absolving the Welsh princes of their oaths to John, and assumed that any joint French-Welsh action would therefore ‘be acting under Papal authority against John.’ Matthews also thought it noteworthy that the Brut discussed the 1214 truce and

165 Hardy, Rotuli Litterarum Patentium, vol 1. 100, 103b, 120b; Norgate, John Lackland, 193-4; Cheney and Cheney, Letters of Pope Innocent III, (entry 930) 154; Warren, King John, 218; Turvey, Llywelyn the Great, 59.
168 Sayers, Innocent III, 184; Bradbury, Philip Augustus, 190.
170 Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, xv.
treaty between England and France – which would have transgressed Philip’s treaty with Llywelyn by not involving him – but that same local source made no reference to any French-Welsh union around 1212. Also, and critically, there is no supporting evidence of a call for a crusade by Innocent; there was no proclamation, no recruiting drive, no procession of the Cross, no granting of indulgences for crusaders and no issuing of crusade symbols or other paraphernalia. By 1212 Innocent had previously called for crusades, the Fourth, Fifth and Albigensian crusades for example, for which he had deployed the classic crusading mechanisms such as the granting of indulgences and preaching tours. Therefore, it is compelling that none of the conventional, recognisable means of declaring a crusade appear in this case; calling a crusade was a well-publicised event. While there might be scope to speculate that Innocent might have believed a war against John would be a ‘just’ war, there is no trace of a proclamation or military or financial support for a ‘crusade’ against England.

The conclusion must be that there was no proposition of a holy war against England.

The second argument against Treharne’s ‘crusade’ theory is the dating of Innocent’s request to Philip. As seen above, the period connecting the papacy to Paris falls around Easter 1213, and Philip began to make noises about attacking England thereafter. Correctly, there is no suggestion anywhere that Philip pre-empted the pope’s appeal of 1213 and constructed an alliance before that point. Therefore, if Treharne’s claim was true, that the pope was the motivating force for the treaty, then the French-Welsh alliance must postdate January 1213.

Turning now to the tone of the language used in the treaty which Treharne presented as having particularly religious overtones, writing that the letter ‘strongly suggested the conception of a ‘holy war.’’ However, there is nothing in this treaty that explicitly mentioned holy war, nor is there even a subtle flirting with the notion. In comparison, later

174 Delaborde, Œuvres de Rigord et de Guillaume le Breton, vol 2, 254-5 (Liber IX, lines 160-92); Giles, Wendover, 259-61, 271-3; Annales Monastici, vol. 4, Wigornia, 400; Stubbs, Walteri de Coventria, vol 2, 209; Samaran et al, Recueil des Actes de Philippe Auguste, tome 3, 439-43 (entries 1302, 1304); Norgate, John Lackland, 175.
175 Treharne, ‘The Franco-Welsh Treaty of Alliance in 1212’, 64-73. Note: Part of Treharne’s case regarding the alleged ‘holy war’ rested upon his claim that the treaty included mention of a meeting of the clergy which, in his article, he identified as a mis-translation and an invalid point (see Treharne, ‘The Franco-Welsh Treaty of Alliance in 1212’, 62-3, n. 5.). In that light, it seems invalid therefore to found a point on something he had already dismissed as an error.
Welsh-French correspondence from Owain Glyn Dŵr specifically asked for remission of sins for men of all nations for spilling Christian blood in a war against Henry of Lancaster, which appears a more credible description of such a call. Moreover, the treaty between Philip and Llywelyn does not mention the pope, papal encouragement or support, or his absolution of the Welsh princes. These are critical omissions for a treaty in 1212 when the pope was overtly moving against John.

In fact, the occasionally religious tone of the treaty appears in keeping with other communications of the time; both interlocutors were reputed to be pious and therefore respectful reverence of God in a letter between Christian rulers would be expected rather than revelatory. If anything, this treaty is relatively free of religious flavour. The formulaic recognition that they held their titles ‘by the grace of God’ and Llywelyn’s reference to his swearing on sacrosanct relics, would serve to demonstrate the value he placed in Philip’s friendship, and also to show that Llywelyn had made a recognisably strong pledge on the matter. Other contemporary friendships were formed using similar symbolic behaviour; when the English barons paid homage to Alexander of Scotland in 1216, they also touched sacred relics and swore an oath to him.

The omission of any papal references in Philip and Llywelyn’s treaty is notable and probably helps to place it after 1212. Philip’s relations with the papacy soured dramatically after John’s submission in 1213 and the French king was threatened with excommunication if he invaded England. The fact that this treaty appears to avoid mention of papal favour probably places it more firmly during the period of poor relations between Paris and Rome; that is 1215-1217, rather than pre-1213, when they might have revelled in papal support.

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178 Stephenson, The Chronicles of Melrose, 44 ‘A.D. 1216. In the month of January there occurred an unprecedented destruction of vills and towns in Northumberland, and in southern parts of Scotland. For king John having heard that Alexander, the king of Scots, had laid claim to Northumberland, and had received the homage of the barons of that district, took with him his mercenary soldiers and marched towards Scotland with great energy. As soon as his advance was known to the barons of Yorkshire, who had taken an oath against him, they were so terrified that they fled for protection to the king of Scotland; and when they reached his presence they did homage to him, and gave him security on the reliques of the saints, upon the third of the ides of January [11th Jan], in the chapter-house of the monks of Melrose. The king of England followed up upon their track, and in his revenge devastated their vills and towns, and estates and farms, with fire and sword”; Anderson, Early Sources of Scottish History, 406.
Treharne wrote that Philip would certainly not have been willing to risk papal punishment for invading England, but it is difficult to measure the true strength of Innocent’s influence or accurately weigh the fear of excommunication.\(^{180}\) However, this displayed a startling ignorance of contemporary events. The main European geo-political struggle was arguably that between papacy and Empire, and the English surrender was an important but lesser issue in comparison.\(^{181}\) In addition, Innocent III had placed interdicts and passed sentences of excommunication on other rulers and factions during his pontificate without the recipients being crushed by the experience.\(^{182}\) In addition, it seems fair to suppose that if the English barons, Scots and Welsh nobles were willing to risk and endure excommunication, then there is no justification for thinking Philip would be too scared to expose himself to such a danger. Moreover, Philip had been placed under an interdict by Innocent in 1200 and throughout his reign he strove to keep papal influence to a minimum in French lands.\(^{183}\) Innocent needed Philip’s support in the struggle with the empire and also to realise his crusade projects. Although Innocent threatened and then excommunicated John’s enemies, the king of France appears too powerful to offend directly, and wily enough to have his son bear the sentence for the invasion which could not have been effected without Philip's support.\(^{184}\) Although Innocent delivered threats to his vassal’s enemy by writing to Louis via Philip, he evidently intended to include Philip in this correspondence. France however, appeared to be politically too important to papal crusade plans, moreover, it was militarily stronger than any conceivable coalition the papacy could align against it at that time. This is evident in the different ways Innocent treated John and Philip. He excommunicated John and maintained an interdict against England until John surrendered. He lifted the 1200 interdict against Philip in a matter of months and allowed disputes such as those over Philip’s strategic marriages to continue for over a decade without serious sanction.\(^{185}\) Therefore, contrary to Treharne’s assertion, the French were not too frightened of excommunication to risk attacking John. This is borne out by events; they did invade England, Louis was


\(^{181}\) Cheney, ‘England and France’, 156.

\(^{182}\) Sayers, *Innocent III*, 172-5

\(^{183}\) Bradbury, *Philip Augustus*, 186-94.


excommunicated, the campaign continued and, when unsuccessful, he was absolved in the aftermath.

The Treaty Text, the Hostages and the rest.
Next, Llywelyn’s claim that ‘we will recover from the yoke of the tyrants themselves the great part of the land and the strongly fortified castles, which they by fraud and guile have occupied’ was portrayed as evidence that the successful campaign of late 1212 and early 1213 had not yet taken place.\textsuperscript{186} However, this statement of Llywelyn’s is too vague to be accurately ascribed to any date, region or campaign. Given that it is so unspecific, it is no more valid to apply to his 1212-3 recapture of the Perfeddwlad in north-east Wales, than it is to measure his campaigns in south-west Wales in 1215, or those against Powys, the English border and the south-west once more in 1216. For that matter, the statement could be used in relation to any non-native held castle in Wales or any territory that he or the other Welsh princes intended to retake. It is not credible to suppose that the Welsh wished only to recapture lands lost in the harsh terms of the 1211 treaty and there is no evidence he was referring to those areas.

Another of Treharne’s key points claimed that Llywelyn’s identification of his enemies as ‘English’ could only happen in 1212 when the enemy was a more generic ‘English’ foe, rather than in the 1215 conflict in which the enemy was King John but the ‘English’ barons were his allies. This is a weak argument and questionable from several angles. As illustrated above, there was believed to be a measure of collusion between the barons and the Welsh in the alleged 1212 plot. As already detailed, John took the threat seriously enough to disband the army mustered at Chester in August that year.\textsuperscript{187} However, the obvious point is that it seems natural for a Welsh ruler writing to a French king to describe the enemy as ‘English’. There was no need to detail to whom Llywelyn was precisely referring; it would have been evident to his audience. Since this alliance was intended to be perpetual, then the authors were obliged to describe the enemy as English; they were the permanent adversary of both parties, irrespective of the incumbent monarch. Also, there is an additional and so far unmentioned consideration to this; from a Welsh perspective it would have been crucial to describe the enemy as ‘English’. Contemporary Welsh poetry and chronicles identified John,

the nobles of England and the men of the Welsh Marches as ‘Frenchmen’, with Philip in mind, such a precision of terms was therefore essential. The *Brut y Tywysogion*, the source upon which Treharne relied, referred to Marchers and their troops as ‘French’, whether allied to or fighting against Welsh forces. Prince Louis and his army were also identified as ‘French’ and so a distinction seems to be necessary.\(^{188}\) Other contemporary Welsh sources also refer to John as a ‘Frenchman’, obliging the conclusion that this was a commonly-employed term.\(^{189}\)

Treharne’s dating of the treaty also depended on the fact that there is no mention of John’s murder of the Welsh hostages at Nottingham in August 1212.\(^ {190}\) This enabled Treharne to propose July or early August 1212 as the timeframe of the treaty, pre-dating John’s brutal act. Although possible from that perspective, this ignores two clear but contrary points. Not mentioning the killings does not mean that they had not happened; it could equally mean that they had happened a few years in the past and were not included as events had moved on, therefore pointing to a later date. It is perhaps more likely that, although heart-breaking for the Welsh, the incident would have been irrelevant to a treaty with Philip, especially if it had occurred more than three years previously. However, the main counter-point stands; not mentioning the event does not prove that the document pre-dated it, especially when the matter in question was not key to the establishment of the treaty.

Treharne made a number of other points, perhaps best dealt with briefly here. He speculated over the reasons for the disappearance of the original letter, but then agreed that many documents from this time had been lost, and that there was no reason to ponder that further.\(^ {191}\) He also made a number of inaccurate statements, perhaps best exemplified by this claim that the Welsh uprising in 1212 was ‘the nearest approach yet to a national rising in Welsh history.’\(^ {192}\) Putting aside the difficulties inherent in the terms ‘national’, which is difficult to relate to medieval ‘Wales’, or ‘rising’, which assumes subjugation at a time when much of Wales was still native-ruled, it would be simple to make the case that Owain Gwynedd’s alliance at Berwyn in 1165, the events of the reign of Llywelyn ap Gruffudd or Owain Glyn Dŵr’s campaigns overshadow Llywelyn ap Iorwerth’s 1212 campaign in terms

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\(^{188}\) *Jones, Brut y Tywysogion*, 79-80 (1198), 84 (1209-1210), 88 (1213), 93 (1216).


\(^{192}\) Treharne, ‘The Franco-Welsh Treaty of Alliance in 1212’, 64.
of their size, impact or universality of Welsh adherence. On the matter of John’s intention to build an army to invade France, he also claimed that ‘the Welsh rising of 1212 removed the immediate danger to Philip and altered the course of events.’ While this attributed to the Welsh a substantial role in European history at that moment, it should be treated as unreliable. John’s barons were plainly opposed to service in France at that time and allegedly plotted against him that year, which is a far more likely reason to postpone an attack on France. Were the Welsh truly such a standing threat in 1212, it seems likely that John would have taken the army he built-up and finally took to France in 1214 directly to Gwynedd to crush any threat he faced on the mainland. As 1211 had demonstrated, Gwynedd was no match for a large, determined English army. It lacks credibility to believe that John could have left England in 1214 if the Welsh posed any real threat to his rule. The Welsh did not alter the course of events but, with the barons, contributed to another postponement to John’s desired attack on Philip. Treharne’s article does make other contributory points, however, the main pillars of his argument have been dealt with above. Once closely scrutinised, the overall argument for 1212 appears impossible to sustain.

Deconstructing Treharne’s 1212 argument appears relatively simple. His dependence on the theory that the 1212 council of nobles was the correct one out of three possibilities is refuted by contemporary evidence, which compellingly recommends either the 1215 or 1216 gatherings. His dependence on the Brut y Tywysogion is also telling, and that source also appears to favour a later date. Treharne’s raising and banishing the spectre of a holy war against England was unconvincing, there was no evidence for it and no-one claimed such a project was attempted. The language used in the treaty is more easily connected with other corroborating evidence that also points to 1215-16. Equally, Treharne showed a surprising naivety towards the broader geo-political concerns of the time; the struggle between the papacy and the empire, the relationship between Philip and Innocent, Philip’s dominance of John, for example. However, in Treharne’s defence, it seems noteworthy that none of the Welsh historians writing on this matter have highlighted the linguistic issues surrounding the term ‘Frenchmen’ in native sources either. The 1212 dating also depended on the vague treaty terms which could have applied to a number of circumstances beyond that year. His rejection of Matthews’ was questionable; Matthews offered a number of reasonable,
cautiously expressed points. Finally, although a well-received article, in all, little recommends Treharne’s theory of 1212.
Other factors in favour of the alliance being formed in 1215-16.
The merits and shortcomings of Matthews’ three-page comment on the matter are interwoven in the treatment of Treharne’s article above and need no additional analysis here. Although the evidence makes it impossible to identify any precise date, there are more substantial arguments to propose the French arrival in England, that is to say late 1215 or perhaps early 1216, when Louis arrived, as the probable timeframe for the treaty.\textsuperscript{195} Although the arguments already presented substantially make that case, scrutiny of other issues also points towards the later years. These additional matters concern French strategic and logistical affairs, Scotland, the presence of traitors at the heart of Llywelyn's court and also Welsh strategic concerns. These arguments naturally contain a speculative element, since they are new considerations of this subject. However, since the historian ‘must be ready to speculate’, this seems the appropriate place to consider further inconsistencies in the 1212 case and further strengthen the argument for 1215-16.\textsuperscript{196}

French logistical issues
Communication was evidently a major logistical consideration in the medieval period. With this treaty in mind, it is worth considering, how Philip contacted Llywelyn. Although it is possible that clergymen could pass through regions largely unmolested, during the period of upheaval between Rome and London, it is worth considering the intricacies of this matter. Prior to the 1215 baron’s revolt, the presence of a French envoy in Gwynedd, so far from any legitimate business in the land, would have been remarkable. In the chaos of the conflict of 1215-17, which saw French armies and their English allies control London and large parts of England, a message-bearer might well have passed unrecorded to Llywelyn. During the war Worcester declared for the rebels and Glamorgan was held by one of the rebel leaders, the earl of Essex, giving the barons and their French ally direct access to Wales.\textsuperscript{197} In 1215, the rebel bishop of Hereford, Giles de Braose, rallied support in south-east Wales and co-ordinated diplomatic missions in the March through his brother, Reginald, who was well-received by the Welsh.\textsuperscript{198} It seems that the active revolt of the English barons is key; without

\textsuperscript{196} C. Allmand, \textit{The Hundred Years War, England and France at war c. 1300 – c. 1450}, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 2.
\textsuperscript{197} \textit{Annales Monastici}, vol 1, \textit{Theokesberia}, 62, vol 4 \textit{Wigornia}, 406; Turvey, \textit{Llywelyn the Great}, 64.
\textsuperscript{198} Jones, \textit{Brut y Tywysogion}, 90; Cheney, \textit{Innocent III}, 371, 376; Turner, \textit{King John}, 252.
their aid there is little chance of a messenger passing safely between Paris and Snowdonia. Such favourable conditions only existed from 1215 onwards.

Contemporary sources are clear that the English rebels had met and treated with the French. They had also allied themselves with the Welsh, the fruits of which were visible in the Welsh clauses in the ‘Articles of the Barons’ and ‘Magna Carta’, as well as Welsh representation at the Council of Oxford in July 1215. The northern barons also united with Alexander of Scotland, paying him homage in late 1215 and early 1216. The argument concerning the Scots’ friendship with John prior to 1215 and the reasons for their enmity thereafter is developed below. Following the receipt of the homage of the northern barons in 1216, the Scots met with the French later that year and became more engaged in the struggle. Given the evident formation of connections between these factions in late 1215 and early 1216, it seems likely therefore that the French would also communicate with the Welsh. Where they could not meet in person – there is no suggestion that Louis went to Gwynedd – as did the other three rebel elements, then committing the proposal and agreement to parchment seems a likely, practical measure. The treaty therefore fits within that timeframe but also with other events and movements, diplomatic and military, which it does not in 1212.

The opportunity presented by the 1215 conflict offers a more realistic vision of how this alliance was structured; within the framework of friendly contacts and active alliances between the barons, the Welsh, the French and the Scots, a treaty-bearing messenger seems relatively easy to place in Gwynedd. In comparison, sending any such proposal in 1212 appears rather an ad hoc, opportunistic mission to Gwynedd within a very small window of opportunity late in the year, with no obvious mechanism for delivery and returning the agreement. This seems unworkable from a French perspective and also the desired outcome of the conflict in 1212 is unclear, contrary to the baronial war. Moreover, the lack of a French

199 Giles, Wendover, 357-9; Stubbs, Walteri de Coventria, 226; Stevenson, Coggeshall, 177; Warren, King John, 248.
200 Rotuli Litterarum Patentium, vol 1, 150a; Walteri de Coventria, vol 2, 220; Jones, Brut y Twysogion, 89; Smith, ‘Magna Carta and the Charters of the Welsh Princes’, 345-6, 350-1, 359-60; Holt, Magna Carta, 432-40, 466-9, 486-7.
201 Walteri de Coventria, vol 2, 220; Anderson, Early Sources of Scottish History, 406; Stephenson, The Chronicle of Melrose, 45.
army on the horizon in 1212, or any tangible allies on the British mainland, might possibly have appeared unappealing, even dangerous, to Welsh interests.


French Strategic Interests
The treaty text is clear that this alliance proposal was a French initiative. In contrast to Owain Gwynedd’s letters to Louis VII, this cannot be seen as a Welsh appeal for assistance.

204 Map 10: ‘Louis’s England, 1215-17’, showing the factional divisions in Britain during the conflict. This is a classic, if ultimately unsuccessful, example of a bracketing strategy in action. Sources: Warren, King John, 250; Turner, King John, 290, 294.
Therefore, having established the originator of the treaty as the king of France, it would also
be instructive to outline the likely reasons behind this move, the theatre in which it might be
realised, and to examine the opportunities that might have enabled this alliance to be brought
to life. Establishing these parameters should help narrow the timeframe for this contact.

From a strategic viewpoint, the Welsh offered the French very little in the aftermath
of 1211. Gwynedd had been humbled and Llywelyn shackled to harsh treaty terms which
drained his finances and resources, critical for a war effort. Also, many Welsh leaders had
gone to John’s side when summoned to take the field against the prince of Gwynedd. Even
though some initiated conflicts with Marcher or Crown forces towards the end of 1211, they
were for their personal interests, not in alliance with Llywelyn. He was in attendance at
court in the king’s presence at Easter 1212, and fighting in Wales broke out in the summer.
As late as June 1212, the Welsh were disunited and in no position to fight England. It might
be possible to connect a stiffening of Welsh resolve and growth of the rebellion to John’s
murder of Welsh hostages, the children of Welsh leaders, in August that year. In view of
the threat John posed to Welsh autonomous rule in the aftermath of 1211, it is most credible
to suggest that Llywelyn and others revolted over the menace implicit in the terms and
application of that settlement, as stated by the contemporary sources included above.
Gwynedd was the strongest of the native areas; if it fell, then the other, lesser territories
would fall too. The other princes would have been well aware of that. As shown above,
contemporary sources explicitly named the actions of John’s troops in the recently-built
castles as the reason for the revolt in late 1211 and in mid-1212. Although papal orders might
have encouraged that summer’s action, there is no mention of an alliance with the French.
Unsubstantiated rumours gave the barons and the Welsh the common goal of killing John.
The conflict of 1212 therefore appears to have been one involving the disaffected, the
outraged and those fearful of John’s burgeoning power over them, rather than a war
manipulated by imperceptible French hands. It seems extremely doubtful that France
conceived and activated this alliance in 1212; the political tides were wrong and the
opportunity for Gallic mischief in Wales was not apparent until the latter part of the year. It
is unsound therefore to suppose Philip reacted with any urgency to news, if it ever arrived in

Great*, 57.
209 Jones, *Brut y Tywysogion*, 86.
Paris, of four cantrefs being overrun in north-east Wales by Welsh forces. No record of such news has emerged from French sources; however there is much material on the baron’s war and Louis’s invasion. There was no indication, at its outbreak, that the 1212 revolt would be successful and therefore no reason for the French to pursue an alliance with the Welsh with the resolve signalled within this treaty. The French had not militarily supported any previous conflict, and there is no evidence of French involvement in the 1212 war either; the time-line of that year’s events and opportunities offered them precious little opportunity to engage.

Philip did not seek an alliance with Llywelyn for altruistic reasons; he had no use of weak allies who would be a drain on his resources; in seeking this alliance he no doubt wished Welsh forces to perform a military task. In reality, there are only two such tasks for which the Welsh could have been considered: either to attack John, dividing his forces and resources to lessen his ability to act elsewhere, or as an active support to a military initiative in Britain. Since the former would have entailed fighting John alone on the British mainland, it is a less attractive option to Llywelyn, carrying a far higher risk of experiencing another crushing defeat such as 1211. The latter option appears a better prospect for Welsh strategic interests. With the loyal barons distracted with enemies in England, Welsh military goals were more realistically attainable. This therefore determines that any joint military action would have to take place on the British mainland.

In practical terms, it is almost impossible to imagine French troops landing in Wales at that time. The cost of raising, equipping and transporting an army to and from north Wales in a fleet paid for by the French king would have been prohibitive in balance of the return such a mission could bring. In addition, the route from France to Wales was difficult; any such fleet would have to pass coasts that were English or English-governed. Detection, and consequently military challenge, would probably have been unavoidable. The journey would have been relatively long, through largely hostile waters, and a region known for unpredictable weather and difficult sea states. Extracting that force would prove equally difficult. Although short sea crossings were possible, soldiers and mercenaries crossed the channel from Flanders and France during 1215-16 for example, sea crossings were dangerous endeavours. As if to underline that point, John’s entire relief army under Hugh de Boves was
lost in storms while crossing the Channel in late 1215, at the cost of many lives.\textsuperscript{210} Therefore, because of the risks, difficulties and cost involved, a French naval military mission to Gwynedd in this period seems unviable.

Next, the mechanism of delivery of the treaty to Wales should be considered. In the first instance, a solely nautical route appears doubtful for reasons given above. Also, there is no trace of such a mission being raised, costed or sighted in any sources. When Charles VI sent a fleet to Wales in 1405 it earned abundant references in French and English sources.\textsuperscript{211} It seems unlikely that a naval mission in 1212 would have entirely vanished from all records.

This leaves the overland route from Paris to Gwynedd. Logically, this can only be done with the connivance of English rebels, for it is too far for such a mission to move unseen across hostile England. As Llywelyn’s reply is kept in the French archives, Philip’s diplomatic party must also have safely returned to Paris. The overland means of transporting the treaty appears perhaps impossible in 1212 due to a lack of sure English allies – baronial discontentment with the king did not mean they were French allies. However, the mission seems entirely possible in 1215-16 when the barons invited Louis to become king of England. In addition, a military envoy seems more likely than an ecclesiastical one. During the interdict the movement of French clergy and soldiers across England to Gwynedd seems likely to have been noticed and prevented. After England’s surrender to Rome and the English clergy were unequivocally loyal to pope and king, the use of an ecclesiastical envoy seems impossible. However, during the baronial revolt, connections between the English, French and Scots elements of the alliance were all made by military parties; it seems likely that the same method was used with the Welsh. The only realistic possibility to do that was after 1215.

The final discussion involving the French contacting the Welsh derives directly from the treaty text, which stated that the prince discussed the matter with his nobles and then with those of the rest of Wales. The drafting and witnessing, preceded by this amount of consultation, either travelling or dispersing messengers to the other Welsh princes, would

take time, and most likely lack secrecy. Several sources, mentioned above, recorded after the first Magna Carta, linked the Welsh and French by an oath, yet none mention their connections in 1212, even when the conflict with John was ended by papal legates in summer 1213. John’s own actions suggest that 1215 was the earliest possible date of the alliance, for he made no move or threat against Llywelyn after August 1212, even though strong enough to lead a powerful two-pronged multi-factional alliance against France in 1214. The window of diplomatic opportunity for 1212 was small and only opened in autumn. However in 1215, when they were also building alliances with the English barons who in turn seem to have also recruited the Scots, the French had a great deal of time and opportunity to conceive and complete this project with Gwynedd. By late 1215, when beset by his own nobles, the French and the Scots, John was in no position to act against the Welsh in any authoritative way.

Scotland and the Barons
In reality, it is inconceivable that the French would be interested in the Welsh as their lone alliance partner in 1212; there was no tradition between them, no extant connection, Wales was weak, isolated and remote. The other two potential allies in a conflict against John were the Scots and the English barons. The matter of the Scots’ involvement has yielded previously unconsidered views. Duncan reveals that for 1212 ‘historians have generally lined William and Alexander up among John’s enemies by then; there is no evidence for this, and much for the contrary view,’ while Maxwell wrote that from February 1212 to his death in 1214, William and John ‘remained on excellent terms.’ Contemporary sources certainly point to a close bond between England and Scotland at this time; John knighted William’s heir, Alexander, and also asked for Scots troops to assist in his campaign against Llywelyn later in 1212. It is also noteworthy that although John had advanced against William in 1209, mocked him when he sued for peace without a fight and then demanded thousands of marks from him, William still turned to John for aid in 1212 during a crisis. One reason for John’s aggression in 1209 is the rumour of a marriage negotiation between Philip Augustus and one of William’s daughters, and the English attack demonstrated John’s displeasure. As a

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214 Anderson, Scottish Annals From English Chroniclers, 328-9 (citing Roger of Wendover, Flores Historiarum, vol 2, 50, 139).
result Alexander did homage to John for lands the Scottish crown held of the king in August 1209 and the Scots overtly aided John from that point. However, marriage discussions between the ruling French and Scots dynasties were nothing new and had occurred previously, even as recently as 1201. Among a number of examples of Scottish aid to John are the handing over of Matilda de Braose and her children in 1210 to John by one of William’s nobles, Duncan of Carrick, and William sent intelligence to John of the baronial plot against him in 1212. When an internal revolt proved difficult to quell in 1211, William turned to John for help. That rebellion, led by Guthred mac William, might be more broadly viewed as a threat to kings of the chivalric order, since it was a native revolt against the French-speaking rulers of Scotland, and therefore in John’s interests to support William. Irrespective of the rebels’ motivations, John made a binding friendship with the king of Scots in February 1212, knighted Alexander at Lent and sent troops to suppress Guthred’s uprising later that summer. In that agreement John and William agreed to protect one another in just quarrels, and that the Scots king and his heir, Alexander, would maintain fealty to Henry and preserve him in England, irrespective of what happened to John. Duncan read this as though John gave the same oath to support William’s heir, as this matches the actions of that year. Also, John’s knighting of Alexander does not simply denote an acknowledgement of rank but has a practical significance; as a peer of the realm he was entitled to lead English troops, which John then gave him for the campaign against Guthred. John went a stage further though; he moved his army to Carlisle and also summoned Reginald of Man, king of the Isles, and forced him to swear allegiance, even though he held his title of the king of Norway. This obliged Reginald to act in closing off the western point of entry for Guthred’s Irish support, isolating the rebels in Scotland where they could be dealt with effectively. It was while he was in the north at Durham that John heard of the Welsh rising and the baronial plot against him. All of these Anglo-Scots dealings took place while John was excommunicate, demonstrating the weakness of the papal writ. Therefore, the Scots must be ruled out of involvement in any 1212 coalition against John, weakening further that theory.

216 Anderson, Scottish Annals From English Chroniclers, 331 (citing Roger of Wendover, Flores Historiarum, vol 2, 61); Duncan, ‘John King of England and the King of Scots’, Church, King John: New Interpretations, 261-5.
217 This strategy, most famously recorded by Sun Tzu, focuses on disrupting the enemy’s alliances in order to weaken and isolate him: Shibing, Sun Tzu: The Art of War, 23, 27-31, 87; Minford, The Art of War, 133, 135.
218 Stubbs, Walteri de Coventria, 206; Anderson, Scottish Annals From English Chroniclers, 330 (citing Roger of Wendover, Flores Historiarum, vol 2, 60, and the Annals of St Edmund’s in Memorials of St Edmund’s Abbey,
Far from being enemies in perpetual conflict, relations between England and Scotland in this period appear to have been largely peaceful and usually cordial. John was arguably provoked to attack Scotland in 1216 by Alexander’s receipt of the homage of some of the northern barons. That offensive was the first such invasion since the reign of William Rufus in 1097. It has been postulated that Scots nobles, though perhaps held as poor relations, were still viewed as distant cousins of the English magnates, therefore part of the chivalric order and the rightful masters of their lands. In this period there was cooperation between leaders; William’s brother, Earl David, campaigned in France with John between 1199 and 1203. The point of friction which led to Scots involvement in Louis’s invasion of England dated to the previous century. The previous chapter described the struggle for lordship over the northern counties which led to William the Lion’s fateful incursion in 1173 in conjunction with the revolt of Henry II’s sons. In 1194, William raised the issue of a restoration of his predecessors’ traditional rights and dignities in England. This included the request that Richard I returned to him Northumbria, Cumberland and Westmorland. When Richard refused, claiming that the war with the French precluded such discussions, William offered money for the territory. On advice, Richard agreed on the condition that the English retained and garrisoned the castles in those lands. Unsurprisingly, William withdrew dissatisfied. This did not stop friendly relations between William and Richard. In 1195, a serious illness provoked debate on William’s succession since he had no male heir. William and Richard negotiated a marriage agreement between one of William’s daughters and Otto of Brunswick, arranging for Lothian and the northern English counties as a wedding gift for the couple. William ceased the matter however when he recovered and his wife fell pregnant again. Although another daughter was born negotiations were not revived, and in September 1196 Richard granted Otto, his nephew, the county of Poitou and the title of duke of Aquitaine as recompense. This was shrewd on Richard’s part though, giving Otto a stake in France helped cement their friendship against Philip Augustus. The birth of Alexander in August 1198 altered the viewpoint of the Scots king however.

220 Anderson, Scottish Annals From English Chroniclers, 311 (citing Roger of Wendover, Flores Historiarum, vol 3, 243-6); Maxwell, The Early Chronicles Relating To Scotland, 196-7
It appears that in 1215 the seventeen year old king of Scotland, with no identified connection to the rebels or the French, attempted to profit from John’s woes by pressing his claims to Northumbria by force. Following the barons’ council sessions which followed Magna Carta, on 22 October 1215 he received the homage of the northern barons for the northern counties. They had been ordered to do so by letters from ‘The Twenty-Five’, the barons who composed the council, who had also granted seisin of the counties to Alexander. Probably in riposte to this rendering of homage, and also because he was clearly militarily able, John advanced north in late 1215. In the face of that action, some northern barons are recorded as crossing the border and swearing homage to Alexander again at Melrose. John’s pursued them; his action in Scotland was brief but destructive, burning several key towns in the space of a few short days. While this did not destroy John’s northern and Scottish enemies, it appears to have weakened or dissuaded them, notably the barons. The north saw no effective riposte until August 1216, when Alexander finally succeeded in taking Carlisle. By that time Louis had landed in the south and the French and the rebels were ascendant. The French heir, by then styling himself king of England, appears to have written to Alexander and those English magnates who had not come to him to swear fealty, to do so or to leave England. In light of that, Alexander made the journey south to pay Louis homage for the northern counties, whom he would hold of the new French king of England. This might explain why no Welsh representatives are recorded as meeting with Louis in southern England, they held no lands of the king of England and so had no reason to swear fealty to him on those grounds. In view of that, the French had to deal with the Welsh differently, hence the treaty, and the most likely and legitimate French figure with whom the Welsh could form an alliance remained Philip.

The English barons did offer the French an exploitable source of discontentment in 1212. As described above, there was baronial opposition to John for a number of reasons,

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225 Anderson, Early Sources of Scottish History, 406; Stephenson, The Chronicle of Melrose, 44.
227 Fœderæ, vol 1, 207; Anderson, Scottish Annals From English Chroniclers, 311 (citing Roger of Wendover, Flores Historiarum, vol 2, 181);
principally objections to an increase in tax and feudal service. His alienation and persecution of noblemen such as William de Braose and Hugh de Lacy ensured that by 1212 John had the confidence of few of his nobles. The consequent alleged plot against him that year might be viewed, with hindsight, as offering a very slim possibility of three-way collusion between Philip, any English rebels and Llywelyn. Even if true, these connections are ethereal however, and pale further when compared to the full-blooded, overt alliances that existed after 1215 between the barons and all other parties. It is striking how difficult it appears to bring to life this French-Welsh contact without the involvement of the English barons who, in 1215 fought a war against their king, but in 1212 John confronted nothing more harmful than rumours.

**Traitors in Gwynedd?**

There is an English element to this matter too; Joan, Llywelyn’s wife, stands accused of warning John, her father, of the alleged baronial conspiracy in 1212 to kill or seize him and hand him over to the Welsh. On those grounds, it seems likely that had Joan known about the treaty with France she would also have apprised her father of it. Had John known about the treaty, in which Llywelyn declared loyalty to Philip, he would have been compelled to act against the French acquisition of Welsh homage. The fact that he did not signals that Llywelyn did not receive Philip’s letters, nor discuss the matter with his council or the princes of Wales, before 1215. John came to the Welsh border with an army during the 1215-17 conflict, even though the rebels and the French held London. This advance seems likely to have been an attempt to rebuild relations with the Welsh or at least to neutralise any threat.

With so many people apparently involved in the discussion stages mentioned, the treaty could not, realistically, have been kept secret within Welsh princely circles. Although they might have excluded Joan at the moment of its inception; it is implausible however that she would not have become aware of it at some point between 1212 and 1215. Considering previous behaviour, it seems likely that she would have informed her father. The absence of such evidence from Joan regarding the alliance in 1215-6 does not mean that it did not

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happen then or that she did not discuss the matter with her father; by then he was unable to enforce his dominance over Gwynedd. The fact that unrelated English, Welsh and papal primary sources substantiate that the French-Welsh union existed by 1216-7 probably indicates that it was commonly known within the relevant circles of the time. Joan poses a remarkable figure; she apparently betrayed the alleged 1212 plot, harming her husband’s interests in favour of those of her father, and was later unfaithful to Llywelyn with William de Braose, who was executed for his crime.\footnote{Giles, *Wendover*, 534; Turvey, *Llywelyn the Great*, 89-92.}

While dealing with the subject of treachery from within Wales, to counter Llywelyn’s successes in Wales in 1212, John encouraged the rebellions of two dynastic rivals in Gwynedd, just as he had in 1199-1200.\footnote{Jones, *Brut y Twysogion*, 79-82; Carr, *Medieval Wales*, 55; Walker, *Medieval Wales*, 93-4; Turvey, *Llywelyn the Great*, 35-41, 59.} Although Llywelyn’s cousins, Owain ap Dafydd and Gruffudd ap Rhodri took up the hopeless venture in 1212, these pretenders seem not to have informed the king of Llywelyn’s treacherous and dangerous union with France that year or at any point thereafter. As men of Llywelyn’s line, they are likely to have been among, or at least connected to, those with whom Llywelyn discussed the treaty. Had it happened therefore, it seems probable that they, or Joan, or a marcher source would have learned of it and passed on such information to the Crown at some point between 1212 and the start of 1215. The fact that no such thing was recorded and John took no retribution against Llywelyn also strongly suggests that the alliance was not born in 1212.

**Welsh Strategic Interests**

From Llywelyn’s perspective, an alliance with France might prove dangerous prior to 1215; had news of the agreement reached John before that date, the king had the power to return and annihilate Gwynedd, Llywelyn’s line and Welsh independent rule with it. Therefore Llywelyn might not have welcomed or responded so positively to an approach in 1212. Logistical difficulties dictated that Philip could not have sent troops to intervene in Wales, the Welsh nobles would have been aware of this. Although notional French support would probably have been welcome during any conflict, any knowledge of the Welsh promising allegiance to France would also have indicated that the Welsh had moved decisively against the king of England and could therefore be crushed finally and legitimately, according to the mores of the day. As any hint of English action against John evaporated by the end of
September 1212, a union with France would have been highly risky for the Welsh. By 1215 however, Llywelyn had recovered from the disaster of 1211 and inflicted defeats on royal troops in north Wales during the conflict of 1212-13, perhaps bringing himself to the attention of the French as a result. As Louis prepared to cross the channel in later 1215, the Welsh might have appeared desirable allies to open another front to distract John from the French invasion. If this treaty were made in 1215-16, the king of France might, more realistically, have been seeking Welsh aid for his son’s invasion of England, where a land-based ally, particularly one in a secure mountainous area, would have been of interest to the French and their English allies, who were already confederated with the Welsh. An alliance then, sought by Philip at a moment of French need, seems far more credible than an offer of support to Llewelyn after he had been humbled by John’s victory of 1211. It seems more likely that the French would look for friends in a strike against John while he was struggling with his barons, rather in the aftermath of a successful campaign in Wales. The contemporary evidence claimed that the Welsh sent a powerful force to fight John, probably in 1216, and that the king withdrew. In the same breath, Alexander was at Dover paying homage to Louis for the northern counties.234

There is a final, Welsh factor to consider; Llywelyn’s character. As with all rulers, there are several signature features to their reigns. Perhaps the most outstanding of those is that the prince of Gwynedd can be largely seen to keep his word with notable dependability, even predictability, throughout his supremacy in Wales which spanned five decades. Other key themes of his rule would be his caution and deliberation in matters requiring diplomatic or military action. One example of this is his deliberated, even-handed settling a long-running dispute between multiple claimants at the council of Aberdyfi in 1216.235 In so doing it seems that Llywelyn wished to be seen as a fair and worthy leader among the native princes. Another feature would be his commitment to military action once he had taken that option, as his campaigns in 1212-13 and 1215-17, as well as others during Henry III’s reign, amply demonstrated. Once committed to action, Llywelyn applied himself with determination until

234 Michel, ed., Histoire des Ducs de Normandie et des Rois d’Angleterre, 179, ‘Li Galois vinrent par nuit traire en l’ost, si lor fisent moult grant paour. Longhement furent armé por atendre la bataille; mais il ne l’orent pas, car li rois se traist arriere je ne sai pas par quel consel, et à tant remest. Puis vint li rois d’Escoce, au siege de Dovre, por faire son houmage à Looy.’ My working translation, ‘The Welsh came at night and drew up in battle order, and they were a very strong force. They were armed, ready for battle for a long time; but they did not have it, because the king drew back, I do not know by what advice, and so many returned. Then came the king of Scotland, to the siege of Dover, to pay homage to Louis.’

235 Lloyd, A History of Wales From The Earliest Times To The Edwardian Conquest, vol 2, 649: Jones, Brut y Tywysogion, 92; Smith, Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, 18-9; Turvey, Llywelyn the Great, 61-8.
a military outcome had been decided or an externally-mediated settlement had been reached. For example, he continued to fight after the Treaty of Lambeth, perhaps because of his oath to Philip, perhaps also because the terms did not suit him. Nevertheless, he was difficult to bring to peace. The papacy had to intercede in these Anglo-Welsh conflicts, for example, in 1213, 1217, 1218, 1219 and 1220 as well as at other junctures during Llywelyn’s reign.\footnote{W. W. Shirley, ed., \textit{Royal Letters of Henry III}, (London: Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts, 2 vols, 1862-6), vol 1, 122-3, 141-4; Pressutti, \textit{Regesta Honorii Papæ III}, 44 (entry 244), 324 (entry 1960); Bliss, \textit{Calendar of Papal Letters}, 39, 64.}

Even his long-standing adversaries portrayed him as an honourable man of his word. A good example of this came from William Marshal, who described Llywelyn mediating in a conflict between Marshal and a Welsh noble from Caerleon in 1218.\footnote{Rothwell, \textit{English Historical Documents}, vol 3 (1975), 94-5; Holden et al, \textit{History of William Marshal}, vol 2, 390-7.}

However, if the treaty is applied to 1212, then Llywelyn can be shown to break his word repeatedly by holding discussions and making truces the following year with the English through the intercession of a papal legate, even though he was militarily ascendant in 1213. Yet no taint of such plainly dishonourable behaviour was recorded in any contemporary source. Advancing the earlier date allowed Treharne, Pryce and Turvey to accuse Llewelyn of such disreputable actions ‘So much for the perpetual alliance!’ wrote Treharne.\footnote{Treharne, ‘The Franco-Welsh Treaty of Alliance in 1212’, 71.} Pryce and Turvey also cite Llewelyn’s failure to support Philip against John in 1214 as evidence of Llewelyn’s perfidy towards the French.\footnote{Jones, \textit{Brut y Twysogion}, 88-9; Treharne, ‘The Franco-Welsh Treaty of Alliance in 1212’, 66, 69, 71-2; Pryce, \textit{The Acts of Welsh Rulers}, 392-3; Turvey, \textit{Llewelyn the Great}, 58-9, 67.} However, it is noteworthy that there is a lack of a riposte against him by the French. Had he betrayed his word, it is reasonable to expect some slight or accusation to appear in chronicles or documents. It does not, and Llywelyn’s attachment to the conflict of 1215-17 has been shown to be connected by French desire. It is unlikely that they would court his friendship if he had recently betrayed them. Although possible that he acted out of character, no such treachery was mentioned at the time, even by his enemies. Missing such an opportunity to tarnish an enemy’s name and reputation seems unlikely, were such a stain actually applicable. None of his contemporaries accused Llywelyn of perfidy in relation to any facet of the alliance, only recent writers.

No case has been made by Treharne, or anyone else, detailing how Llywelyn was supposed to aid Philip in 1214; Llywelyn’s letter certainly limits his military actions to Wales. Even without Llywelyn, Philip won a crushing victory that year. If 1212 is correct
then it was Philip who was perfidious because the Welsh rose and fought, but the French did not. The 1212 theory fails to explain why Llywelyn then allied himself to the barons and their French pretender in 1215. As he had received no support from the barons or the French in 1212, there seems little incentive to stand by them in 1215. On the contrary, had he sided with John in 1215, he stood to gain much as a loyal subject of the king and his heirs. There was no such fallout from the failure of the 1212 alliance, because there was no alliance in that year. However, if the treaty were signed in 1215 or 1216, then Llywelyn clearly kept to his word, and the evidence from the treaty text and the other contemporary sources precisely fits the known events of the time.

It is clear that the Welsh princes, the barons, the Scots and the French were all guilty of defying a papal order against attacking John. The fact that this was war fought by the four-nation coalition against John, in the face of papal threats, clearly overturns Treharne’s assertion that Innocent was too powerful to defy. The conclusion must be that the prince of Gwynedd did not break his word to Philip but did risk papal anger along with his three allies; underlining that Philip was more powerful than the pope in 1215, in this region of Europe at least. Mass defiance of the pope could only realistically have led to a negotiated settlement rather than punishment; the papacy could not enforce sanctions against so large an alliance. The 1216 entry in Brut y Tywysogion recorded pointedly Llywelyn’s refusal to treat with John. Therefore, this demonstrates that from 1215 Llywelyn religiously kept his word by spurning John’s overtures. If Llewdyn’s claim in the treaty not to have entered discussions or made peace with John is applied to the historical context of late 1215 or early 1216, then it rings true. Situating the treaty around the later dates, and observing the subsequent behaviour of the prince of Gwynedd, correlates with the posture he typically exhibited and by which he conducted his affairs over many decades. This is another signpost indicating that the alliance with France occurred in 1215 at the earliest.

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240 Fœdera, vol 1, 178; Bliss, Calendar of Papal Letters, 39.
242 Jones, Brut y Tywysogion, 93; Turvey, Llewelyn the Great, 67.
3.3: **Significance, Effectiveness and Consequences of the Treaty**

This final chapter section exploring the treaty’s significance and consequences proceeds on the assertion that the alliance was formed sometime during 1215 or 1216. Determining the significance of the Welsh role in this period might help to explain Wales’s position within Europe in the early thirteenth-century. The reasons for the short duration of this friendship are also explored here, along with considerations of the treaty’s consequences.

The prime observation must focus on the significance of the Welsh role within the political and historical context of this well-known struggle. Clearly, the Welsh princes were considered a distinct, identifiable part of the international community of the time. While it could be reasonably argued that they habitually played a role commensurate to their size, and therefore do not register frequently in the records of the larger powers, on this occasion their role was highly important to those more dominant entities. The enticements of Innocent III, Philip Augustus and King John elevate the Welsh into their influential circles. Wales was not therefore a parochial oddity, but part of a continental community and engaged as such by these three powers. In addition to these direct approaches, other diplomatic moves of the time serve to underline the existence and appeal of the Welsh as a distinct entity. It can be concluded that the papacy considered Ireland to be part of England’s domain; the papal decree following John’s surrender charter of 1213 demanded he paid 300 marks per year for authority over Ireland. Also, in the 1217 Treaty of Lambeth, and in several consequent papal orders, the Scots were ordered to return to the obedience of the king of England. However, there is no record of an absolution of the Scots or the Irish in 1212, for example, outlining Welsh prominence in that papal project against John. The Welsh might be portrayed as acting faithfully to these papal pronouncements because they duly attacked the English in summer 1212, although they also had other, personal motivations to do so at that time. Although there is some proof of a generic absolution of the English, it is not evident in a majority of sources. No specifically defined areas of England, such as Kent, East Anglia or the North, were absolved and encouraged to assist in the struggle against John, and there was no English

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244 Fœdera, vol 1, 221-2; Annales Monastici, vol 4, Wykes, 57; Pressutti, Regesta Honorii Papæ III, 44 (entry 245), 324; Bliss, Calendar of Papal Letters, 43; Cheney, Innocent III, 332; Warren, King John, 208; Harper-Bill, ‘John and the Church of Rome’, 307.
civil war in that year. The papal absolution of the Welsh princes of their oaths to John demonstrates that they were recognised and treated by the pope as not only as legitimate entities separate from, but capable of acting against England. If the contemporary evidence cited previously is reliable on this matter, then Innocent III selected only the French and the Welsh as allies in his fight with John. This demonstrates clearly that the Welsh held a certain distinction and attraction to Rome’s strategic planning to bracket and combat John.

Similarly, the French king, with perhaps a better grasp of regional matters than the pope, also sought an alliance with the Welsh. It is reasonable therefore to say that they must have appealed more to Philip’s court than the Irish, for example, who did not feature in this conflict. In addition, the Scots do not appear to have been directly approached by the French during this campaign, and there is no evidence of a comparable treaty between Philip and Alexander. The Scots commitment to Louis came after union with the barons in 1216 and appears to have been a recognition of Alexander’s need to pay homage for the lands he would hold of Louis, who at that moment appeared the likely next king of England.246 However, the French firstly established bonds with the English rebels in 1215 and also desired Welsh participation in order to pursue their objectives in England. It is noteworthy that the rebel barons secured union with the Welsh and delivered their demands, including Welsh clauses in their Articles and Magna Carta, before inviting French involvement. Although the precise details of John’s approaches to the Welsh remain unknown, it is recorded that he sent them the bishop of Coventry in March 1215 and also came in person when he advanced to the border seeking parley in 1216.247 These three powers’ approaches to the Welsh, at different times and for different motivations, demonstrate that the Welsh were recognised and their help was sought by these powerful parties.

This is not to overstate the Welsh role either, they were not instrumental in resolving Innocent’s, the rebels’ or Philip’s disputes with John, but they were an element of similar importance to other factions involved. Papal absolution of oaths of allegiance can be seen elsewhere, in the earlier case of Philip of Swabia for example.248 Therefore, this is not a unique treatment of the Welsh, or recognition of any special circumstances the Welsh faced. However, this equitable treatment in line with other parts of Europe shows that they were viewed in a similar light. In turn, this also elevates Wales from being an irrelevance on the

246 Luard, Matthæi Parisiensis, 534, 641-2; Anderson, Early Sources of Scottish History, 406; Warren, King John, 249; Turner, King John, 254.
247 Jones, Brut Y Tywysogion, 93; Smith, ‘Magna Carta and the Charters of the Welsh Princes’, 357.
fringe of greater states and firmly, actively placed it within the contemporary European context.

It is clear that Innocent did not show any favours to the Welsh; their appeal of 1199-1201, in which they asked for papal aid against Canterbury as well as for Welsh-speaking clergy in Welsh dioceses, fell on deaf ears.\(^{249}\) This fitted with Innocent’s approach to the politics of the time. He wanted to see large, powerful states from which he could recruit crusader armies.\(^{250}\) This could not be done from a divided, patchwork landscape of mutually distrustful nations. The case of the 1200 invasion and subjection of Navarre by Castile stands as an allegory for Wales and England. Castile invaded on a pretext and consumed the smaller nation; its many and arguably justified appeals to the pope for intercession went unheeded.\(^{251}\) Simply put, Wales and its issues did not feature in the papal Grand Plan of retaking the Holy Land, reforming the Catholic Church and expanding the boundaries of western Christendom.\(^{252}\) Therefore he would stand by and see small nations extinguished or overborne, if deemed to be for a higher cause, in this case to create a large state that could fuel the crusading imperative. A further illustration of this followed Prince Louis’s absolution in 1217, and the papacy ordered the English, the Scots and the Welsh to return to the obedience of the king of England.\(^{253}\) This was of course a two-fold order, firstly to forsake their recent pledges of homage to the French in order to limit Paris’s power, as well as the more superficial directive placing them within the orbit of Rome’s fiefdom, England; effectively expanding papal power through the cultivation of their English proxy. This command is unlikely to have been made deliberately or prejudicially against the Scots and the Welsh, but rather out of Rome’s desire to create potent states whose rulers and populace could be induced to take the Cross. It would also want to see its own vassal become as powerful as possible, since that would directly benefit the papacy in financial, military and influential terms. Irrespective of native designs on sustaining their liberty, the examples of Ireland, Navarre, Scotland and Wales show that the fates of smaller nations were of little import compared to the grand schemes of Rome.

\(^{251}\) Sayers, *Innocent III*, 84-5.  
With this treaty, Wales provides a well-documented microcosm of the broader struggle taking place across Europe between the vying sovereign states as well as with the papacy. This document, when taken in conjunction with its supporting evidence, and correctly contextualised to the events of 1215-16, allows a rare glimpse into the form and application of the international diplomatic machinations of the period. The agreements between the barons, the Scots and the French, if they were committed to writing, have not survived. In that regard, this treaty is not only a notable feature of Welsh, French and English history, but it also appeals to the far broader study of effective diplomacy and alliances within the medieval world.

From a Welsh perspective, this treaty illuminates a moment when their friendship was sought by perhaps the dominant western European power, France, in a period when other conflicting parties, the papacy, King John and the English barons, also desired union with them. The rare survival of this document is of great significance to any understanding of how the Welsh were perceived and how they presented themselves to their contemporaries. It also marks the beginning of a short period, probably only the last few months of John’s reign and the first few months of that of Henry III, when the Welsh considered their notional overlord to be the king of France.

As for France, this treaty offers an insight into the form and extent to which the French government was able to successfully encourage discord in its enemies’ territories. Few other such documents survive and so this treaty is important in that regard also. Philip Augustus can be rightly considered as one of medieval France’s most powerful monarchs, and witnessing his methods of interference is instructive. Not only had Philip dispossessed the Angevins of their home territory of Anjou and their long-held lands of Normandy, Maine and much of Aquitaine, in essence killing the Anglo-Norman realm and isolating the English kings in England, but this alliance with Llywelyn also demonstrates how far Philip was able to penetrate the other lands considered, perhaps incorrectly, as obedient to England. This aspect of his reign has yet to be successfully portrayed in any publications, and further marks Philip as a king of talent and appeal. In that sense, Philip Augustus can be viewed as a capable exponent of hard and soft power.

The treaty’s role within English history is also of note as it came when noble English rebels were also allied to the Welsh, Scots and French, proving interaction and co-operation in the face of the immense moral influences of the king and the pope. These English rebels

were well-organised and their great baronial movement resulted in Magna Carta, a document whose multidisciplinary importance requires no expansive discussion here. This French-Welsh treaty bound those two parties together, both of whom were united to the English barons. Without the strong foundations of these alliances, the movement against John would have been far less stable. This treaty therefore should be considered as part of the broader story of Magna Carta.

Although not a unique or guiding part of Magna Carta, this alliance was made during the conflict which produced the first three drafts of that famous document, and for that reason also it should be connected to the charter.\(^{255}\) Certainly, warfare and the Anglo-French alliance were essential factors in the baron’s adherence to and sustained promotion of that document. With their allies’ support, the barons were confident enough to present their demands to the king and then prosecute a campaign against him. With that same support they were able not only to fight John’s loyalists, but to withstand excommunication and eventually bring Magna Carta into existence. There is no place for a discussion on the origins and ramifications of that charter here. However, the clauses relevant to Llywelyn and the Welsh require inclusion.

56. If we have disseised or deprived any Welshmen of lands, liberties or other things without lawful judgement of their peers, in England or in Wales, they are to be returned to them at once; and if a dispute arises over this it shall be settled in the March by judgement of their peers; for tenements in England according to the law of England, for tenements in Wales according to the law of Wales, for tenements in the March according to the law of the March. The Welsh are to do the same to us and ours.

57. For all those things, however, of which any Welshman has been disseised or deprived without lawful judgement of his peers by King Henry our father, or King Richard our brother, which we have in our possession or which others hold under our legal warranty, we shall have respite for the usual crusader’s term; excepting those cases in which a plea was begun or inquest made on our order before we took the cross. However, when we return, or if perhaps we do not go on our pilgrimage, we will at once give them full justice in accordance with the laws of the Welsh and the aforesaid regions.

\(^{255}\) Rothwell, *English Historical Documents*, vol 3, 311-6, (The Articles of the Barons, 15 June, 1215, Welsh clauses 315), 316-24 (Magna Carta, 1215, Welsh clauses 322-3), 327-32 (Magna Carta 1216), 332-7 (Magna Carta 1216).
58. We will restore at once the son of Llywelyn and all the hostages from Wales and the charters delivered to us as security for peace.\textsuperscript{256}

Therefore, the same legal rights and liberties enjoyed by Englishmen with respect to the dispossessions of the time were also granted to Welshmen.\textsuperscript{257} The jurisdiction and legal method under which cases would be tried was clarified. Perhaps more importantly, with the murders of 1212 in mind, the Welsh hostages were freed and the princes were released from promises given to John in the punitive settlement of 1211.\textsuperscript{258} It is indicative of his power that Llywelyn’s three clauses fall before the one relating to Alexander, king of Scotland, in any of the charters in which both these men feature.\textsuperscript{259} Welsh leaders were present at the discussions at Oxford in July 1215 which further debated the charter.\textsuperscript{260} The pope denounced and annulled Magna Carta, excommunicating all implicated with it, John refused to keep his word and the conflict between loyal and rebel English factions and their allies re-ignited.\textsuperscript{261} The French-Welsh alliance of 1215-16 supported one side and therefore played some part in the success of the movement which created this famous document and, as a consequence, their involvement in this important moment in European history deserves recognition. Their attachment to that cause also briefly continued some form of connection to the great English magnates and Prince Louis, all of whom were later absolved, and also to Philip Augustus who interceded for the excommunicated.\textsuperscript{262}

\begin{footnotes}
\item\textsuperscript{256} Holt, \textit{Magna Carta}, 429-73, Appendix 5, 429-40, (‘The Articles of the Barons’, [429-32, discussion, 432-40, text], dated to mid June 1215 [prob. 18\textsuperscript{th} p 430], has 49 clauses and contains two Welsh clauses, nos. 44 [pertaining to Welsh, English or March law use where relevant] and 45 [freeing Llywelyn’s son], Appendix 6, 441-73, (‘Magna Carta’, [441-6, discussion, 448-73, text], dated on the document as 15\textsuperscript{th} June has 63 clauses [three of which are related to Wales, 56, 57 and 58]), 466, 468 (Latin), 467, 469 (English).
\item\textsuperscript{257} Rothwell, \textit{English Historical Documents}, vol 3, 323, n. 1, ‘Articles 56-7 do for dispossessed Welshmen what clause 52 does for dispossessed Englishmen.’
\item\textsuperscript{258} Turvey, \textit{Llywelyn the Great}, 61.
\item\textsuperscript{259} Rothwell, \textit{English Historical Documents}, vol 3, 315; Holt, \textit{Magna Carta}, 468-9. Note: The hierarchical listing of leaders is common throughout the period, for another good example see: R. Vaughan, \textit{Valois Burgundy}, (London: Allen Lane, 1975), 73.
\end{footnotes}
A little considered consequence of this alliance and the better-known charter with which it is associated, is the peace it brought to France. For years after, England played no hostile role in France, as it had in 1202 and 1206, and it constructed no coalitions to threaten Philip within France, as it had in 1214.²⁶³ The extent of English military ambition in France post-1216 can be seen in Henry’s limited mission of 1225 to maintain his influence in Gascony, rather than any attempt to retake former Angevin lands he still claimed.²⁶⁴ The baronial war, the death of John and the minority of Henry III, which saw years of ongoing warfare with English rebels and the Welsh, enabled Philip to consolidate his hold on former possessions of the English crown in France. He did so swiftly and intelligently, respecting local customs to minimise the impact of the change in ownership.²⁶⁵ This resulted in those lands being lost to the English crown forever, with the exception of the short-lived fifteenth-century occupation of Normandy undertaken by Henry V.²⁶⁶ Since the Franco-Welsh alliance was part of the 1215-17 conflict, some of the fruit it bore can be seen in the expansion of Philip’s realm and the strengthening of his hold on those lands following the resolution of the war.

A further consequence of the treaty was that it helped illuminate the weakness and hypocrisy of the papacy of the day. The pope encouraged the Welsh and the English, and later the French, to unite and attack the king of England.²⁶⁷ Following John’s surrender, Innocent forbad the rebels and their allies from attacking John.²⁶⁸ This was not because John had changed his ways and become a fair or Christian ruler, but because he capitulated to Innocent, taken the cross, arguably with no intention of fulfilling his vow but to buy time, and most importantly he had also promised a sizeable financial tribute to the papacy.²⁶⁹ However, the pope had helped put into motion events which could not easily be stopped and his failure to punish John for his coalition with Otto and Flemish nobles in 1214 might have tarnished Innocent’s credibility as a fair and neutral arbiter. Also, Philip Augustus showed his fury at being ordered not to invade England because he had already outlaid large sums preparing the

²⁶⁶ Allmand, *The Hundred Years War*, 28-36.
attack requested of him by the pope. 270 Innocent’s *volte-face* did not dissuade John’s enemies from continuing to plot action against him. The barons’ war and Louis’s invasion are irrefutable demonstrations of that. In fact, it might be correct to regard Louis’s invasion as a counter-stroke to John’s 1214 campaign. 271 Innocent carried out his threats to excommunicate those who attacked his vassal, John, but regardless of that, they continued their campaign until a natural military conclusion was reached, and this was then completed and bound by diplomatic means. The pope could not prevent or arrest the conflict, and his legates ultimately absolved those involved, and had only a minor influence on the settlement. 272 This treaty, created in 1215 or 1216, is tangible evidence of the will of the secular leaders to defy Innocent and seek their own solutions to mutual problems.

Although he represented himself as the fair arbiter of disputes among Christians, particularly leaders, there is no doubt that Innocent III had a political agenda and was strongly influenced by his personal desires. 273 With regard to that minor part of his inheritance known as Wales, he had ignored written Welsh pleas in 1199-1201 concerning mistreatment by Canterbury and the plight of the Welsh church. 274 However, he recalled their existence when he thought they could serve in his campaign against John. 275 Just three years later, when they became a faction of the wider movement against John, by that time Rome’s subject ruler, he excommunicated them. 276 After baronial success brought John to the negotiating table in 1215, discussions which included the Welsh there and in the resulting charter, John and clergymen sought to negotiate with them individually. 277 At approximately the same time as their excommunication and the great meetings at Runnymede and Oxford, and almost certainly as an inducement aimed at depriving the baronial alliance of Welsh support, two Welshmen were elected bishops in Wales. It seems unlikely that the pope would reward Llywelyn for violence against his vassal, and Innocent must have had a hand in the


277 Jones, *Brut y Tywysogion*, 93; Smith, ‘Magna Carta and the Charters of the Welsh Princes’, 357.
election of Iorwerth to St Davids and Cadwgan to Bangor during summer 1215. These appointments must be viewed with cautious scepticism due to their timing and lack of precedence. This was such an unusual circumstance in fact, that it requires consideration here. Their elevation could be seen as a placatory measure addressing apparent past injuries or as acquiescing to Welsh demands over their church. Some writers have even portrayed their appointment as a victory for Llywelyn. However, these candidates, although viewed as being universally acceptable, were ultimately approved by Innocent and John, and were also instruments of papal leverage inserted into the heart of Welsh territory and society, and at the top of the native church. Such direct contact with Welsh rulers and the population had been impossible when previous bishops were non-Welsh speaking Anglo-Norman absentee. Consequently, the appointments of Iorwerth and Cadwgan re-enforced Rome’s pre-eminence in ecclesiastical matters and offered the pope and his vassal a previously unknown opportunity to affect or perhaps control native affairs. They could work for obedience and loyalty to Rome’s vassal when Wales’s political leaders resolutely campaigned against that end. Far from being a reward or acknowledgment of Llywelyn’s ascendancy, these appointments had the potential to be used as a weapon to split Welsh obedience from their princes. When Rome had no or few native-speakers among their ranks, they had no leverage within that populace. In effect, their appointment could be seen as recognition of Llywelyn’s power and it constituted a move against him. The papal drive at this time, as demonstrated previously, focussed on establishing large, powerful, obedient kingdoms from which the pope could raise crusader armies. It went against that drive to allow the rise of a strong Wales which would forcefully strive for its own interests and recognition, and no doubt fight England in pursuit of those ends. Moreover, it would have been important to Rome to prevent France from acquiring Wales and Scotland as allies or vassals, and thus critically weakening England while in parallel greatly enlarging French power. The imposition of bishops who would be present and active in native affairs, a circumstance largely unheard of in Wales previously, could serve as a check to the burgeoning power of any Welsh leader.

Consequently, the treaty between Philip Augustus and Llywelyn is a demonstration of contemporary leaders’ willingness to defy the papacy over such important matters, since

278 Jones, Brut y Tywysogion, 91; Cheney, Innocent III, 171-2.
279 Lloyd, History of Wales, vol 2, 688-9; Lloyd, Jenkins, Davies and Davies, eds., Dictionary of Welsh Biography, 416; Turvey, Llywelyn the Great, 62.
Rome was acting in its own interests above those of a number of Christian nations. Its utility therefore extends beyond being considered as part of French-Welsh affairs or the baronial wars that led to Magna Carta, but of being of much broader value in studies of alliances and medieval secular rulers defying the papacy.

In practice, this French-Welsh alliance appears to have lasted for a short period, perhaps two years between late 1215 and late 1217. It seems most likely that the treaty was ratified and returned by Llywelyn sometime between November 1215 and May 1216, following the first arrivals in England of French troops and then Prince Louis. Philip showed notable caution in acquiring promises and hostages from the English barons before committing his heir to the campaign across the Channel. It seems likely that seeking other allies on the northern side of the Channel would be a desirable precaution. In the treaty, Llywelyn committed to supporting Philip and his heirs. This clearly encompassed Louis. While the Welsh had no long-standing connection to France, they had a long and a recent history of fighting against the English. They had also demonstrated that they were committed to this particular struggle by allying themselves with the English barons. That caused their hostages to be released and earned them clauses in the Articles of the Barons and Magna Carta, as well as representation at the Council of Oxford. Therefore, the line from the treaty agreeing to act as enemies to Philip’s enemies might well have been specifically included in reference to the context of shifting loyalties of the conflict, rather than simply being a diplomatic nicety. By February 1217, Honorius III had ordered the allied factions to disavow their oaths to Louis. By coercing Scotland and Wales to ‘return their allegiance’ to the king of England, the pope demonstrated his position on politics in Britain and gave Rome’s ongoing vision for Europe – large states under one head. While this did not necessarily close the alliance, it indicated

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286 Pressutti, *Regesta Honorii Papæ III*, vol. 1, 44; Bliss, *Calendar of Papal Letters*, 41, 43; Potthast, *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum de 1198 ab 1304*, vol 1, 473 (5375, to ‘Princeps Angliæ’ the latter is probably used as a geographical rather than a political description, ie, ‘princes of the British Isles’), 473-4 (5378, barons), 477 (5417, to all English, Scots and Welsh, and 5418, to Scots, rebels and ‘Nobilem Virum Lewelin’).
that a possible end to the conflict was in sight. Certainly, when Louis and all of his supporters were absolved in September 1217, an opportunity for all parties to withdraw honourably and quietly from their prior agreements presented itself.\footnote{Fœdera, vol 1, 224; Delaborde, Œuvres de Rigord et de Guillaume le Breton, vol 1, 315; Luard, Matthæi Parisiensis, vol 3, 31.} Also, in spite of the politesse of the settlement at Lambeth, in buying off Louis’s claims and interests in England, Henry III’s government might also have effectively bought off French ties within Britain.\footnote{Fœdera, vol 1, 221-2; Luard, Matthæi Parisiensis, vol 3, 31.} Certainly, peace was easily made between Henry and the Scots although the settlement was decidedly to England’s advantage. Alexander later expressed regret over that.\footnote{Carpenter, The Minority of Henry III, 69-70, 151-3, 196.} In the immediate aftermath of the peace, the French appear to have honoured their promises and not made trouble for Henry, within England at least. In contrast and despite the pursuit of an agreement between Henry, the legate and Llywelyn’s representatives at Worcester in 1218, the Welsh continued to fight until 1223 and then intermittently for another decade thereafter.\footnote{Giles, Wendover, 509-11; Annales Monastici, vol 4, Wykes, 64-5; Shirley, Royal Letters of Henry III, vol 1, 122-3, 141-4; Bliss, Calendar of Papal Letters, 63; Carpenter, The Minority of Henry III, 74-8; Carpenter, ‘The Reign of Henry III, 49-50, 162; Turvey, Llywelyn the Great, 70-99.} It seems implausible that Llywelyn did this with the treaty with Philip in mind, unilaterally upholding its terms. It might well be that Llywelyn had tired of French perfidy; Louis and the barons had negotiated and concluded terms with the loyalists and the government without including – or even mentioning the matter to their Welsh and Scots allies.\footnote{Jones, Brut y Tywysogion, 89, 96; Stephenson, The Chronicle of Melrose, 45, 52.} It seems clear that post-1217, Llywelyn and the Welsh were forcibly pursuing their own aims. Also, had the French wished to support Llywelyn’s struggles with Henry’s government, they were given ample opportunity over those years. There is no indication in any source that they maintained contact with Llywelyn following the demise of Louis’s venture in 1217. The political landscape changed after Henry’s accession and the French prospered during his minority, particularly financially, and only had to contend with an inexperienced youth nominally leading a weakened, poorer adversary governed by a regent.\footnote{Barratt, ‘The Revenues of John and Philip Augustus Revisited,’ 91.} Their dominance can be further explained by the internal conflicts of Henry’s minority during which control was fitfully wrested from Llywelyn and numerous English nobles who fought the Crown during this period. An imperfect settlement, bringing a limited, temporary peace, was eventually reached with Llywelyn in 1218. However, areas such as Carlisle and Cornwall returned to English control, while most English malcontents were eventually killed or returned to
obedience. The perfect demonstration of French dominance came on the occasion of Philip Augustus’ death in July 1223, when Henry’s government demanded the return of Normandy, according to the writ of an earlier treaty with Philip. While Henry’s messengers travelled to Louis, the government mustered an army at Portsmouth to effect an invasion. Louis’s position was firm: he refused the claim and threatened to re-invoke England if it made hostile moves against his territories. The Crown immediately dismissed the army and shelved the claim to Normandy. England’s weakness and faltering control over its home territory perhaps removed the short-term French need for an alliance with anyone on the British mainland. Even a contemporary English source believed the French to be more powerful than England and lamented the loss of La Rochelle. However, as long as any goodwill generated by a successful union could be recalled, France retained the potential to again unsettle England from within.

In terms of this project, this response from Llywelyn is a highly significant document. It is one of the rare examples of the Welsh, speaking with one voice through one leader, acting within an international environment. The context also demonstrated that the French, the Pope and both English factions viewed Llewelyn as an ally worth treating with; a level of recognition infrequently bestowed on Welsh leaders. The message gleaned from the text, discussed above, is important in evaluating how Llewelyn went about his diplomatic affairs and it clearly described his motivations and priorities. Therefore, Llewelyn’s treaty with Philip forms a vital milestone in the French-Welsh relationship which ebbed and flowed between 1163 and 1417. Although it has been established that an earlier, functional alliance existed between Owain Gwynedd and Louis VII between 1163 and 1168, Philip’s negotiations with Llywelyn appear to be of a different tenor. The insistence on this later alliance’s binding nature of the leaders and their heirs, marks a clear movement, not previously witnessed, towards permanent relations with British entities. This perhaps reveals that this treaty explicitly demonstrates a departure from Fryde’s otherwise apparently generically applicable notion that ‘foreign policy at this time was entirely opportunistic and without loyalty or sentiment.’ A lack of surviving contemporary agreements with the Scots hinders comparative analysis, although any corresponding alliance document is notable by its

295 Giles, Wendover, 450; Turvey, Llywelyn the Great, 71.
297 Fryde, ‘King John and the Empire’ 338.
absence. Even in the Acts of Parliament of Scotland listed by Duncan for 1282 and 1291 there is no explicit description of a Franco-Scots treaty. These acts confirm correspondence between Louis and Alexander regarding his fealty for the northern English counties, but there is no mention of an alliance between them even though the union between the king of Scotland and the English barons is mentioned. This critical omission strongly suggests that there was no alliance between the French and the Scots at this time, but a confirmed mutual union with the English rebels. 298 Therefore, since there is no earlier documentary evidence to promote the idea of a permanent connection between France and Scotland, this treaty between Philip and Llywelyn can clearly be held as an ‘Aulder Alliance.’

However, a long view of this period, and the consequences of this treaty, might well identify dark ramifications for any notion of a Wales ruled by native leaders. If the argument can be upheld that all Angevin princes were intended to be given experience in governance in the provinces of their ‘empire’, then John’s loss of Henry II’s territories in France was of enormous importance to Wales. 299 It seems evident that the loss of these lands and successive failures to regain them would naturally refocus elsewhere this need for territories to govern. In that light, England’s efforts in the thirteenth century to subjugate Wales and create a principality for a royal heir to rule appear understandable, even inevitable. English expansion into Ireland and designs on Scotland might also be considered as attempts to replace Anjou, Normandy and Poitou with more northerly equivalents.

The aftermath of the barons’ war specifically demonstrated the dangers of a Wales allied behind a capable leader. The contemporary evidence cited above shows that the French-Welsh alliance was well-known to the relevant powers, and the threat of a strong Wales connected to France must have caused concern. Since 1215, Llywelyn had improved his territorial position and had rights for Welshmen enshrined in binding charters. 300 The weakness of England during Henry’s early reign was evident in the civil conflict to gain and maintain control of England, a struggle that lasted into the 1230s. 301 Llywelyn’s actions while

298 Duncan, ‘John King of England and the Kings of Scots’, 270-1 (citing the Histoires des ducs de Normandie, 179, Duncan informs the reader ‘the letters are listed in the Scottish inventories and thence in the appendix’, citing appendices 1282: 12, 15; 1291: 1, and ‘confederacio inter regem Scocie et barones Anglie olim facta’, 1282: 4); Stephenson, The Chronicle of Melrose, 43-5.
300 Lloyd, History of Wales, 655-7; Carpenter, The Minority of Henry III, 69; Walker, Medieval Wales, 95-6; Holt, Magna Carta, 466-9.
301 Giles, Wendover, 446, 449-54, 484-5, 570; Lloyd, History of Wales, 663-4, 678-81;Carpenter, Minority, 78-89, 108-27, 157-61, 191-221, 227-34, 270-3, 311-8 , 343-75.
in this position of strength were partly responsible for that sapping conflict in England, the Marches and Welsh lands. In Wales, he prosecuted a campaign that resulted in the peace of Worcester, although described as a great victory for the Welsh, it might more realistically be viewed as a truce rather than a conclusion to the war.\textsuperscript{302} The Worcester agreement was unsatisfactory; the letter of its terms favoured the king but their practical application, seen by all, favoured Llywelyn. The prince surrendered Welsh, Marcher and Crown lands won in the conflict to Guala, the papal legate, only to be immediately granted custody of them. He also did little to fulfil his promise to retake lands then held by the Deheubarth nobles, his allies, who had acquired those territories either directly from Llywelyn granting them or they had been captured with his assistance.\textsuperscript{303} Conflict continued with William (II) Marshal in 1219, with Llywelyn’s counter-attack pushing back Marshal’s forces to the coastal castle of Haverford. Marshal complained to the Crown who summoned Llywelyn to talks, but the prince was not punished when he twice failed to attend. The truce with Henry had worn thin by 1220 so further negotiations took place at Shrewsbury in May. Disputes over the interpretation of the resulting terms led Llywelyn to signal that he intended to resume military action and held the Crown responsible. War erupted between Llywelyn and Hugh Mortimer shortly after and that year’s action culminated in an effective invasion of Pembrokeshire by the Welsh.\textsuperscript{304} Warfare continued between Llywelyn, Marcher and Crown forces until the summer of 1223, when a joint campaign by William (II) Marshal, earl of Pembroke, Hubert de Burgh, the king’s justiciar and King Henry III caused Llywelyn and his allies to submit in the face of such might. This brought a temporary cessation of hostilities and the construction of a new castle in a strategically important location at Montgomery. During that campaign the prince of Gwynedd was excommunicated although he was absolved later that year.\textsuperscript{305}

Llywelyn also formed connections and alliances among the English nobles, such as Ranulf, earl of Chester, and John de Braose, and he exploited fractures within the nobility’s


\textsuperscript{303} Lloyd, \textit{History of Wales}, 659-60, 663-4; Davies, \textit{The Age of Conquest}, 242-3; Carpenter, \textit{The Minority of Henry III}, 74-7; Turvey, \textit{Llywelyn the Great}, 74-5.


allegiances and enmities to his own ends. Moreover, he sided with factions he had previously fought against, such as those of Falkes de Bréauté and Richard Marshal, earl of Pembroke, in 1224 and 1233 respectively, when each went into armed revolt against Henry. Whether Llywelyn genuinely thought these disputes with the Crown were just is immaterial. By supporting these rebels, Llywelyn was prolonging the Crown’s instability and England’s weakness. This no doubt suited him in the short-term; a weak king of England would not be able to express his power in Wales as John had in 1211. Alarmingly for native leaders intent on continuing independent rule, a connection to John’s advances surfaced later in Henry III’s reign, when negotiations sought to establish his gains as the norm and desired to re-impose them. The tale of conflicts between Henry, his son Edward, the Marchers and the Welsh leaders does not need to be recounted here; but the mention of Llywelyn’s role in destabilising England served to demonstrate the danger posed by a united, hostile Wales under a leader capable and desirable enough to be sought as an ally by the French. It is worth considering therefore that a treaty with France in the hands of a prince as powerful as Llywelyn was one factor that outlined a need to destroy native rule in Wales. Although not a defining justification for English aggression against Wales in the later thirteenth century, this French-Welsh alliance of 1215 or 1216 starkly illuminated how independent Welsh entities could be used by external powers, the papacy and France for example, to effect change in England. Therefore, removing that threat could be viewed by the crown as an important step to establishing and maintaining peace and security in England. It is probably no coincidence that it was Edward, Henry III’s son, who dedicated so much of England’s resources to wars in Wales and Scotland.

This French-Welsh treaty could be judged a triumph of sorts; both parties had prospered and England had been weakened in respect of its territory, finances and ability to act militarily. This alliance, and the roles of its signatories and their adherents, is inseparable from that success. From a French perspective, although Louis was only the king of England to his supporters, this alliance contributed to bringing chaos to England, prolonging the civil war which weakened the country and saw the end of John’s reign, placing a minor

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306 Lloyd, History of Wales, 657-8; Davies, Age of Conquest, 248-9; Carpenter, The Minority of Henry III, 212, 218.
307 Giles, Wendover, 450-4, 458, 484-5, 570; Lloyd, History of Wales, 678-81; Turvey, Llywelyn the Great, 82-4, 97-9.
308 Smith, ‘Magna Carta and the Charters of the Welsh Princes’, 360.
on the throne in his stead. Following the resolution of their invasion of England, the French were able to consolidate their hold on Philip’s acquisitions in France, to the lasting detriment of the kings of England. As an element of that result, the treaty with Llywelyn should be recalled with a measure of satisfaction by the French, Llywelyn’s ongoing campaigns certainly diverted English military resources to the threat in the west for years after Louis’s return to France. This alliance, in concert with contemporary agreements held with the barons, unequivocally constitutes a serious, determined effort to project French power onto Britain.

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310 Fœdera, vol 1, 207; Stubbs, Walteri de Coventria, vol 2, 225; Luard, Matthæi Parisiensis, vol 2, 654.
## 4. Charles V and Owain Lawgoch

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In contrast to Rees Davies’s assertion that fourteenth-century Wales was a peaceful place, the evidence shows it to be a hotbed of resentment and discontent, a place of riots, murders and risings, as well as the target for more than half a dozen foreign invasion plots.¹ Two of those invasion attempts were conducted under the command of a Welshman fighting for the king of France. This chapter will examine those missions, after having highlighted certain of the key moments of the turbulent, violent environment that was Wales after Edward I’s invasion of 1282. Following a review of the context and details of the expeditions apparently destined for Wales, this short chapter will conclude with an assessment of their rationale and impact.

4.1 The Conquered? Turbulence in Wales after 1283.
The extinction of independent governance in Welsh territories after 1283 does not appear to have deterred the French from including Wales within their strategic interests.² Given their numerous efforts to propagate revolt there or to muster invasion forces apparently destined for Wales over the following century, it seems reasonable to argue that the fall of Gwynedd and the outbreak of conflict following Edward III’s claim to their throne in 1337, more starkly outlined Wales’s potential value to the French.

Even in the years following Edward I’s successful invasion of 1282-3, native revolts found vent in Wales. Despite the brutally efficient extermination of the principal ruling families, the southern noble, Rhys ap Maredudd, raised the standard of revolt against Edward in 1287.³ Although crushed the following year, Rhys’s action highlighted deep dissatisfaction among the Welsh which was not only expressed by poetry but in military action, such as this first brief rising, as well as other acts of more localised violence.⁴ In 1294 another, more powerful rebellion took place, during which Edward himself was besieged in Conwy until

¹ Davies, Age of Conquest, 412. Note: Davies acknowledged that there were numerous social tensions and friction, which were identified in terms of ethnic and racial discrimination fuelled by legal and economic privileges for non-natives, for example, Age of Conquest, 372-4, 385-8, 408-12, 419-21, 431-43. While he renders an effective and accurate description the details of the post-1283 settlement, it seems reasonable to doubt whether an entirely balanced and inclusive peace would have resulted in the same tensions. In that light, it seems fair to identify the source of these frictions as legal-economic, rather than ethnic.
² Lloyd, History of Wales, vol 2, 761-4; Davies, Age of Conquest, 348-54; Walker, Medieval Wales, 129-33; Carr, Medieval Wales, 77-80.
³ G. W. S. Barrow, Feudal Britain (London: Edward Arnold, 1956), 359-62; Davies, Age of Conquest, 360-1, 380-2; Walker, Medieval Wales, 152-4; Carr, Medieval Wales, 87.
spring 1295. Madog ap Llywelyn, that revolt’s leader, was proclaimed ‘Prince of Wales’
 drawing upon the legitimacy afforded him by his descent from a cadet branch of the
 acknowledged Welsh royal line. That conflict raged across most of Wales and saw the
 capture of several of Edward’s new, expensive and much-vaunted fortresses. Edward was
 forced to postpone his activities elsewhere, primarily his intended advance on Scotland,
 where the unexpected respite offered by the conflict in Wales has been identified as a
 possible reason, among others, for the Scots and French swiftly forming an alliance.5 While
 eventually victorious, Edward was humiliated by this revolt in a region he had presumed
 vanquished. Moreover, on top of the large sums dedicated to the ongoing castle-building
 programme, Edward had been obliged to raise an immense infantry force of over 35, 000 men
 in order to suppress the rebels, at the staggering cost of more than £55, 000.6

 The seeds of the ‘auld alliance’ between France and Scotland were sewn during
 Madog ap Llywelyn’s revolt. That union, the Treaty of Paris, was signed in October 1295,
 after France had firstly allied itself with Norway; John Baliol ratified the agreement with
 Philip IV in February 1296.7 Although both kingdoms had previously established diplomatic
 contact with one another, there had been no lasting tie. As France’s friendships and contacts
 are discussed elsewhere in this research, it is worth highlighting that prior to these final years
 of the thirteenth century, Scotland too had a history of making treaties with other states;
 Wales in 1258 and Norway in 1266 for example.8 Although this French-Scots pact is known
 as the ‘Auld Alliance’, this is obviously a back-projection; at its inception it was but one of a
 number of unions made between vying European states.9 However, since it endured, or more
 accurately, was revived on several occasions and bore fruit for the French cause in particular
 during the fifteenth-century, the Franco-Scots ‘Auld Alliance’ deserves brief analysis here.

17-8.
6 Barrow, Feudal Britain, 359-62; Davies, Age of Conquest, 382-6; Walker, Medieval Wales, 136-8, 154-7; Carr,
The Auld Alliance, France and Scotland over 700 years (Edinburgh: The University of Edinburgh, 1999), 18.
7 H. Fenwick, The Auld Alliance (Kineton: The Roundwood Press, 1971), xii and note, 4-5; G. Donaldson. The
Auld Alliance; The Franco-Scottish Connection (Edinburgh: Saltire Society - Institut Français d’Écosse, 1985), 4-
5, 24; Macdougall, An Antidote to the English, 9, 18-20; Macdougall, ‘L’Ecosse à la fin du XIIIe siècle: un
royaume menacé’, 18-9, M. Duchein, ‘Le Traité franco-écossais de 1295 dans son contexte international’, 28-
30, in Laidlaw, The Auld Alliance.
8 Barrow, Feudal Britain, 250-1; Smith, Llywelyn ap Gruffudd, 110-1; R. Turvey, The Welsh Princes. The Native
Although there is a passing acknowledgement of a faint Scots connection to Louis VII dating to the 1160s, the 1295 Treaty of Paris is recognised as founding the French-Scots ‘Auld Alliance’. Edward I was the reason Scotland and France sought stronger ties, but the Treaty of Paris, and all of its subsequent reincarnations heavily favoured the French. Although it was sealed by marriage between nobles satellite to the respective crowns, and quelled existing Norwegian hostility to John Balliol, an overview reveals treaty terms that demanded little of France and much of Scotland. Although it offered the Scots the comfort of friendship with a significant power who was the king of England’s overlord, all of the principal clauses appear loaded to serve French interests. In times of war between France and England, the Scots were obliged to attack England and continue fighting, at their own expense. The treaty tied by oath the Scots’ king, earls, nobles and clergy as well as the communities and towns of Scotland to making war on England, and they were to notify the King of France of that in writing. Philip, on the other hand, was only to continue conflict if one had already started, in Gascony or Flanders, for example. The French king solely had to advise and assist his allies; there was no provision or requirement for direct intervention in Scotland. However, if given sufficient notice, he would respond to an attack on Scotland by moving against the English in other parts, with the aim of distracting English aggression. Although the formulaic convention not to agree peace unilaterally was also contained in the treaty, Philip’s role was clearly limited and conveniently vague. He had gained an ally who might serve to dampen English ambitions in Gascony and Flanders, and one that acted as the northern bracket of his alliances against England and its interests. This is not to present the Scots as dupes, they were not, rather it offers a taste of the realpolitik of the moment and recognition of the disparity in the allies’ powers.

Irrespective of the promises of the treaty’s signatories, within perhaps six months the treaty was formally renounced after Edward’s crushing victory and humiliation of King John. The French had failed to assist their ally or distract Edward, and the Scots were too weak to confront him alone. After defeat by the Flemings at Courtrai in 1302, the French sued for

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peace with Edward the following year and excluded the Scots from the agreement, as requested by Edward and in clear contravention of the Treaty of Paris. The alliance was truly lifeless just a short matter of years, perhaps even months after it had been agreed. Nevertheless, it had established a precedent which was revived largely faithful to its original form during mutual, though mainly French, times of need. Examples of the treaty’s resurrection and joint-action occurred in 1326, 1346, 1359, 1371, 1391 and several more times during the fifteenth century. The early part of that century saw its most spectacular blossoming in the wars in France between 1412 and 1424, where thousands of Scottish soldiers fought with some notoriety for English, French and Burgundian paymasters. Most importantly though, the French and the Scots came to value the alliance formed in 1295 and discovered how to sustain a union through the ebb and flow of time, and against the machinations of their neighbours. Perhaps it is that achievement, rather than the unbalanced terms of the agreement that should be recalled.

During the years 1315-18 in particular, trouble again flared in Wales, where an additional, serious threat was posed by the Scottish. Having effectively won their independence at Bannockburn in June 1314, Scottish forces invaded Ireland seeking to combine with native rebels to roll back England’s frontiers, opening other theatres to distract the English from Scotland. The Scots apparently attempted to extend this campaign into Wales, and attained the support of the leading Gwynedd magnate, Gruffudd Llwyd. The danger of external invasion was only alleviated by the failure of the Irish expedition in 1318 and the death of its commander, Edward Bruce. Although royal authorities had calmed resentment in northern Wales, rebellion broke out in Glamorgan under Llywelyn Bren in 1316. Although this had a limited but damaging effect, Bren’s broad support base

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18 Davies, Age of Conquest, 387-8, 437; Carr, Owen of Wales, 72-3; Carr, Medieval Wales, 89; Barrell, Medieval Scotland, 119-20, 124.
demonstrated the widespread and continuing resistance within Wales, north and south, to rule by the king of England and other, apparently oppressive aliens.19

In the following decade, conflict within Wales involving Welsh soldiery continued but in an altered form. Following the 1282 invasion, new administrative procedures tied the Welsh more firmly to English practices and rule. Although paradoxical to a certain degree, the division of Welsh territories between twenty-five noble families after 1282 served to fragment English royal power in Wales. In terms of jurisdiction, administration and finance, each of these lordships constituted a largely independent territory, although each was held from the king. Throughout Wales, two legal systems ran in tandem. However, the proliferation of lordship boundaries where jurisdictions changed, encouraged lawlessness and disorder, bringing little semblance of domination by the king of England. Within this mosaic of quasi-independent entities there was no consistency, no common tax system, no parliament or other form of representation. In essence, Wales was divided into a mosaic of localities of variable sizes with changing ownership, rather than the larger territorial blocks that constituted the native kingdoms or the great lordships of previous centuries. This meant that the focus of native resentment was localised and more easily contained, but for this reason it made less impact on contemporary records.20 However, violence and resistance were still evident in the decades preceding the Black Death. During the 1320s, the obvious outlet for violence took the form of the private wars between the great English magnates that lasted between 1322-7. Many of their confrontations were played out on their Welsh lands and this period saw armies comprised of Welshmen pitched into the tumult of the political crises of the decade, not solely the tussle for supremacy between the Mortimers and the Despensers, but also the deposition and murder of Edward II.21

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20 Davies, Age of Conquest, 391-6; Walker, Medieval Wales, 160-4.

Rumours of another Scots plan to invade Wales circulated between 1325-7 and similarly in 1335. However, the threat of a hostile insertion by combined French-Scots forces was deemed credible enough to warrant the expenditure of Crown revenue. In 1338 and 1339, Anglesey and North Wales were fortified against the threat of a combined French-Scots invasion of the region.\textsuperscript{22} The dates are noteworthy; the attacks were probably connected to the commencement of hostilities between England and France.

While there were peaceful periods in this time of administrative transition, from that of native governance to a more centralised administration based on English practice, fractured as it was between Marcher authorities, it is clear that tensions ran high between native and alien in Wales post-1282. Within the 1340s there were violent rejections of foreign rule in Wales; the sheriff of Merioneth was murdered while going about his duties, official records were seized, Rhuddlan came under attack and Henry Shaldeford, the Black Prince’s leading official in Wales, was murdered by a band led by a native nobleman.\textsuperscript{23} Although the great plagues that swept Europe at that time provided something of a lull in hostilities, fear of the vulnerability of the west to French-Castilian naval penetration was an ongoing feature of the period, and the direct threat of French invasion of Wales resurfaced in 1346 and 1359.\textsuperscript{24}

Such a consistent determination to resist easily played into the hands of external powers eager to throw into disarray the plans of the king of England. While there is evidence of collusion with the Bruces in 1315-17, the later connections to Scots ambitions in Wales during the years 1325-7, 1335 and 1339 demonstrate that the Welsh were clearly viewed by England’s enemies as strategically exploitable allies. Other European powers therefore recognised the Welsh were held by the king of England, but not under his command. Certain of these dates, 1326, 1346 and 1359, marked years when the French-Scots alliance was reissued and marked with combined military action. Therefore, these threats to invade Wales might have been perceived or made as an extension of those reformed bonds.\textsuperscript{25} It is noteworthy however, that in the range of publications consulted on medieval Scotland that there is negligible reference to any collaboration regarding projects in Wales, either in conjunction with the French or the Welsh.

\textsuperscript{22} Davies, \textit{Age of Conquest}, 437; Carr, \textit{Owen of Wales} 78-9.
\textsuperscript{23} Davies, \textit{Age of Conquest}, 410-1; Walker, \textit{Medieval Wales}, 163-4; Carr, \textit{Medieval Wales}, 91.
\textsuperscript{24} Carr, ‘Welshmen and the Hundred Years’ War’, 26-7; Davies, \textit{Age of Conquest}, 437, 445; Carr, \textit{Medieval Wales}, 92; Moore, \textit{Welsh Wars of Independence}, 165-6.
\textsuperscript{25} Fenwick, \textit{Auld Alliance}, xii, 4-5; Davies, \textit{Age of Conquest}, 437; Carr, \textit{Owen of Wales}, 72-4; Brown, \textit{The Black Douglases}, 211-2; Autrand, ‘Aux origines de l’Europe moderne : l’alliance Franco-Ecosse au XIVe siècle’, 38.
In the 1330s, and probably in response to Edward’s deteriorating relations with the French, Wales once more became of interest to England’s continental adversaries. So, to further expand those conflict horizons, and to return to the focus of this research, the French and their Castilian allies also attempted to draw the Welsh into broader, European conflicts on their side, or at least they threatened to open another theatre of conflict on the British mainland. While 1338–9 brought the threat of a French-Scots invasion, the same spectre, but this time including Castilian support, reappeared in subsequent decades, notably in 1346 and 1359.\textsuperscript{26}

However, as the peace made at Brétigny faded towards the end of the 1360s, and the French gained the initiative in the conflict with England, the prospect of attempted invasions of Wales was once again raised with missions in 1369 and 1372.\textsuperscript{27} These expeditions were placed under the captaincy of a Welshman, whose grand proclamation, naming himself as Prince of Wales and loyal ally of France, merit inclusion in this research.\textsuperscript{28} This third French-Welsh alliance, this time between the French Crown and a Welsh mercenary captain fighting under their colours, saw its fullest fruition with the embarkation of two French invasion fleets, ostensibly bound for Wales, in 1369 and 1372. Although both missions were aborted or, in the case of 1372, redeployed to support other French operations, these efforts mark the first battlefield example of a combined French-Welsh force seeking to act in their mutual interests on the British mainland. This engagement of Welsh forces based in France to carry out an invasion of Wales, clearly demonstrates an active attempt to project French power onto Britain, engaging Welshmen within their strategy. This could readily be identified as part of a wider initiative by a France resurgent after Brétigny, to draw allies into the conflict with England. French machinations with Owain Lawgoch offer a microcosm of a broader strategy which also involved Portugal, Castile and Scotland.\textsuperscript{29} The alliance was between King Charles V and Owain ap Thomas ap Rhodri, a soldier of Welsh royal lineage, more commonly called Owain ‘Lawgoch’.

\textsuperscript{26} Davies, \textit{Age of Conquest}, 437; Carr, \textit{Owen of Wales} 78-9; Moore, \textit{Welsh Wars of Independence}, 165-6.
\textsuperscript{27} Owen, ‘Owain Lawgoch – Yeuain de Galles.’, 6-106; Davies, \textit{Age of Conquest}, 438; Carr, \textit{Owen of Wales}, 21-37; Brown, \textit{The Black Douglases}, 211-2.
\textsuperscript{28} See below and Appendices C 1.1 and C 1.2.
4.2. The Plans of Charles V and Owain Lawgoch

Charles V, king of France 1364-80, reigned through a period which saw France recover the initiative in its long conflict with England. The broader details of his career need not be developed here, except to draw attention to an element of French strategy which became fully evident during his reign. While the policy of foreign engagement, diplomatic and military, is clear throughout the fourteenth-century, during Charles’s sovereignty a more defined overseas strategy is discernible. While the entire range of activities within that policy would be worthy of research, this chapter only includes those examples relevant to Wales and, to a lesser degree, Scotland and Castile. Of those cited, only two of the numerous real or imagined plots to invade Wales are dealt with in any detail because the evidence for them is richer and they correlate to the goals of this research. Charles V twice commissioned one of his numerous Welsh mercenary captains with the purpose of invading Wales. Although neither fleet arrived in Wales, these events are examples of a revived connection between the Welsh and the French, as well as demonstrable efforts to project French power onto Britain. There is no reason to discuss the career of Owain Lawgoch here, save only the relevant years between 1369 and 1372. Although known as *Yvain de Galles* in France, and Owen Rotherick in England, Owain ap Thomas ap Rhodri is more commonly called Owain ‘Lawgoch’. This sobriquet, meaning ‘red hand’, appears to refer to a hand wound earned fighting the English on Guernsey in 1372. Owain is remembered as the last direct descendant of the house of Gwynedd, his great-uncle was Llewelyn ap Gruffydd and his great-great-grandfather was Llewelyn ap Iorwerth.

The 1369.

The build-up to this campaign is situated among the smaller conflicts played out between France and England and their allies, 1360-1369. Although these campaigns were largely conducted through the actions of free companies in Italy and southern France, English and French armies openly fought one another in Spain, Brittany and south-west France. By

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1369, the French had recovered much that had been lost at Brétigny. The French-backed claimant, Henry de Trastamara, eventually won in Castile, and the victorious English candidate in Brittany, Jean de Montfort, paid homage to France. It is perhaps with these gains in mind that they sought to take the conflict to Wales, in order to oblige the English to focus on warfare there rather than in French territories or those of her continental allies. By probing areas the enemy was obliged to defend, the French demonstrated age-old military wisdom. However, it is also worth considering that having been victorious on the continent, the French might have perceived an opportunity to press their power onto the British Isles. Owain Lawgoch appears to have been a routier of some distinction and had declared himself for France some time in 1369. Other Welshmen came to serve with him in France, most of whom defected from service in English armies in France, occasionally turning over castles in their keeping to the French. At some point, Lawgoch revived his ancestral claim to the title of ‘Prince of Wales’.

By 1369, as the French became increasingly confident and successful in the conflict with England, they appear to have sought to broaden that action by engaging with the Welsh and Scots. They ordered Lawgoch and his lieutenant, Ieuan Wyn, to muster in Harfleur in December 1369 and embark with an army apparently intended for Wales. French records reveal that a small force of an indeterminable size but composed of French knights, Welshmen, men-at-arms, archers, crossbowmen and French criminals set sail for Wales shortly before the end of December that year. Unsurprisingly, the fleet was defeated by bad winter weather in the Channel and returned to port after almost two weeks at sea. Aside from the failure of the expedition, the English authorities had been made aware of the venture and immediately set about strengthening defences and garrisons to resist that and future

34 Allmand, _The Hundred Years War_, 20-1; Carr, _Owen of Wales_, 21; Gaillou and Jones, _The Bretons_, 220-9; Fowler, _The Great Companies_, 271-5; Villalon, and Kagay, _The Hundred Years’ War: A Wider Focus_, 3-177.
35 Shibling, _Sun Tzu: The Art of War_, 65 ‘attack where the enemy will surely come to its own rescue.’; Minford, _The Art of War_, 116 ‘Attack where he is unprepared; appear where you are unexpected, this is victory in warfare’, 179-80, 187.
invasions. Also, Lawgoch’s supporters in Wales were hunted and one man was convicted of treason over the matter.³⁹

The 1369 mission was an extraordinary move on the part of Charles V. Viewed from a modern perspective, Wales had been part of England’s dominion since 1283 and therefore this appears to be an unprecedented effort to wrest it from England’s grasp. The closer examination of the relevant events of the fourteenth-century rendered above shows that England’s hold on Wales was not necessarily perceived as firm or legitimate by contemporaries. This mission also proves that the French were willing and able to muster and despatch forces for such operations with relative ease. This is not just a statement of logistical fact, but one of flexibility in their strategic thinking. Wales had probably not featured on their diplomatic agenda to any profound degree since the reign of Philip Augustus, so to move on an opportunity presented by Owain Lawgoch demonstrates the ability to adapt and exploit such occasions; such abilities are critical features of a successful military.⁴⁰ Therefore, it might be reasonable to consider that under more favourable conditions, future initiatives might fare better. This expedition also demonstrates the faith that Charles V had in Lawgoch, that he would put forces under his command so readily. This must indicate therefore that Owain had earned the resources spent on this venture not only in the field but with his personal comportment among the nobles of the French court with whom he was familiar.⁴¹

Had he not been regarded as worthy, it seems unlikely that this proposed invasion would have been entertained at the highest court circles necessary to enact it. This also demonstrated to the French that they had an asset in Lawgoch who was willing and able to be a thorn in England's side. Finally, this event illuminates the notion that the French were willing to explore and, potentially, build a relationship with native elements in Wales. This was no doubt because it might prove politically and strategically favourable for them to do so, rather than for the benefit of any Welsh yearning for independence; nonetheless this was a notable

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³⁹ Fœdera, vol 6, 642-3; Calendar of Close Rolls, 1369-1374, 61-2, 158; E. Owen, ‘Owain Lawgoch – Yeuain de Galles: Some facts and suggestions’, 9, 59-60; Davies, Age of Conquest, 437-8; Carr, Owen of Wales, 24-5; Shibing, Sun Tzu: The Art of War, 56, 65 ‘attack where the enemy will surely come to its own rescue’, 92; Minford, The Art of War, 173 ‘The warrior skilled at stirring the enemy provides a visible form and the enemy is sure to come. He proffers the bait, and the enemy is sure to come’, 187 ‘Weakness stems from preparing against attack, Strength stems from obliging the enemy to prepare against an attack.’

⁴⁰ Shibing, Sun Tzu: The Art of War, 23, 56, 94 ‘Analyze the enemy’s plans so that you will know his shortcomings as well as his strong points. Agitate him in order to ascertain the pattern of his movement. Lure him out to reveal his dispositions and ascertain his position. Launch a probing attack in order to learn where his strength is abundant and where deficient.’; Minford, The Art of War, 99-118, 186-91.

⁴¹ Owen, ‘Owain Lawgoch – Yeuain de Galles’, 13-5, 59, 77-8; Davies, Age of Conquest, 438; Carr, Owen of Wales, 19, 22. (Citing contemporary sources of French opinion of Owain: Froissart and Christine de Pisan, Vie de Charles V, no page number given by Carr, this has not been possible to track down in the original).
military and psychological step. Although its failure to cross the channel was no doubt a setback, though hardly unexpected for a fleet sailing in late December, another expedition was prepared three years later.

The 1372.
Another fleet was mustered under Owain’s command in 1372, and this second of Lawgoch’s invasion attempts began with a bold, clear declaration of intent. The document is remarkable for the virulence of the language used and the originality of the claim. This appears to be the first occasion since the time of Gruffudd ap Cynan, that anyone had made a claim on Wales from exile. Perhaps exile is incorrect; there is no evidence that Owain Lawgoch had ever been to Wales. While Crown forces had fought to overcome native rule and then suppress revolts in Wales for perhaps three centuries, this presented a distinctly new challenge; preventing a Welsh revolt ignited by an overseas invasion.

Evain de Gales, to all those whom these letters shall come, Greeting. The kings of England in past times having treacherously and covetously, tortuously and without cause and by deliberate treasons, slain or caused to be slain my ancestors, kings of Wales, and others of them have put out of their country, and that country have by force and power appropriated and have submitted its people to divers services, the which country is and should be mine by right of succession, by kindred, by heritage and by right of decent from my ancestors the kings of that country, and in order to obtain help and succour to recover that country which is my heritage, I have visited several Christian kings, princes and noble lords, and have clearly declared and shown unto them my rights therein and have requested and supplicated their aid, and have latterly come unto the most puissant and renowned sovereign Charles, by the grace of God king of France, dauphin of Vienne, and have shown unto him my right in the aforesaid country and have made unto him the aforesaid requests and supplications, and he having had compassion upon my state and understanding the great wrong that the kings of England have done unto my ancestors in former times, and that the present king of England has done unto me, and of his beneficent and accustomed clemency in which he is the singular mirror and example amongst Christians of justice, grace and mercy to all those that are oppressed and require comforting, has granted me his aid and the assistance of his men-at-arms and fleet in order to recover the said realm, which is my rightful heritage, as has been said; know all ye, therefore, that in return for the great love that my said lord the king of France has shown unto me, and is truly showing by his expenditure of three hundred thousand francs of gold, and more, as well in the pay of men-at-arms, archers and arbalesters as in [the provision of] ships and the pay and expenses of the sailors, in harness and other matters in various expenses, the which sum I am at the present time not able to furnish, I promise

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42 See Appendix C 1.1 below for the original French text.
43 Carr, Medieval Wales, 106.
loyally and by my faith and oath upon the holy evangelists, touched corporeally by me, and for my heirs and successors for ever, and the aforesaid sum of three hundred thousand francs of gold I will return and wholly repay, or my heirs and successors or those who may claim through them (ou ceul qui auront cause d'eulx), or by their will or command, without any other terms; and I herewith have made and entered into, for me my heirs and successors and for all my country and subjects for ever, with my said lord the king of France for him and his successors and for all their country and subjects, a good and firm treaty, union and alliance, by which I will aid and assist them by my person, my subjects and my country, to the utmost power and loyalty against all persons alive or dead (contre toutes personnes qui povent vivre et mourir). In witness of which I have sealed these letters with mine own seal Given at Paris the 10th day of May, the year of grace one thousand three hundred and seventy-two.44

This declaration requires only brief analysis here; its stated intentions are clear. It seems reasonable to assert that this challenge for Wales was concocted under the aegis of the French. Owain could not have made such a statement without prior discussions with them and they must have agreed, and perhaps even dictated its clauses. Within it, Owain used the devices of nationality and oppression by the English to justify his claim. He also made a case for his lineage being legitimate, rather than that of the king of England, whose forebears he accused of unjust, treasonous killings of the true rulers of Wales. The fact that he opened with a discussion of legitimacy and lineage hints at French influences in the document’s composition. In establishing an issue over succession and legitimacy, there is an obvious parallel with the English claim to the French throne. Once Owain’s heritage was proclaimed, the French could more easily offer open support to a usurped, true, noble claimant rather than to a dubious pretender. As a consequence, England was obliged to make military preparations to repel this announced attack and also to later move against Owain in France, all of which diverted men, energy and resources from campaigns against the French.45 This declaration also allowed Charles to signal his intent to take the war to the English through a third party. According to Owain, this demonstrated that the French were showing the ‘compassion ... justice, grace and mercy to all those that are oppressed and requiring comfort’. He also alluded to wrongs ‘that the present king of England has done unto me’, referring to the

45 Owen, ‘Owain Lawgoch – Yeuain de Galles’, 13-5, 80-1; Davies, Age of Conquest, 438; Walker, Medieval Wales, 165-6; Carr, Owen of Wales, 23, 27, 53-6; Shibing, Sun Tzu: The Art of War, 65 ‘attack where the enemy will surely come to its own rescue.’; Minford, The Art of War, 116 ‘Attack where he is unprepared; appear where you are unexpected, this is victory in warfare’, 179-80, 187.
seizure of his lands in 1369. The possible reasons for Owain’s defection are discussed elsewhere.46

Other key clauses concern Owain’s ornate flattery of Charles and statement that, having discussed the matter with a number of leaders, he intended to invade with French forces. Clearly, he had acquired French support for this venture and he swore fealty to France for himself, his heirs, his subjects and his country. The next clause appears problematic: he acknowledged that he owed the French 300,000 gold francs and he would make good that debt once he had reclaimed Wales. It is worth speculating over potential reasons for including mention of this amount of money. For any Welsh audience, the knowledge that they would owe the French a large sum of money, that presumably they would have to pay, might prove counter-productive to Owain’s cause. It should be borne in mind that despite a few examples accusing cross-channel correspondence and a poem of unsure date that invited him to Wales, he had no power base or influence there, and there is no evidence of any noteworthy measure of support for him there at this time.47 At a glance, this might appear a large sum, however when the English became aware of this declaration they are likely to have first considered what size force this would have afforded Owain. Therefore, it is worth giving air to the idea that this declaration aimed to provoke a defensive reaction in Britain, perhaps little more. Moreover, it seems clear that this declaration was intended for a French and English audience, rather than a Welsh one.

This second invasion force did not reach Wales either. Lawgoch’s fleet left Harfleur in June 1372 and attacked Guernsey, where Owain probably earned his nom de guerre. There, the event left notable traces in local sources and folklore.48 However, it appears that Owain received orders from Charles to go to Castile to procure the Castilian and Genoese fleet the French had apparently arranged to join the invasion of Wales. These additional components to this grand armada to Wales did not materialise in 1372. However, in July Owain and the Castilians made for La Rochelle, where the fleet alleged for Lawgoch was mustering. Here, they won a substantial naval victory over the English and also fought for the French in the land-campaign in the region that summer.49 The 1372 campaign was a great

success for the French and their allies, with Owain Lawgoch leading the assault on Soubise that finally captured the town, its castle and two illustrious prisoners; Jean de Grailly, the Captal de Buch, and the seneschal of Poitou, Sir Thomas Percy. The latter would meet death as a prisoner after the battle of Shrewsbury in 1403, a rebel against the king of England during the revolt of Glyn Dŵr. Owain Lawgoch had played an important role in the recapture of Soubise and La Rochelle, and he was feted as a hero in French chronicles. However, the campaign drew to a close in late September, although the English captives were not handed over or dealt with by the crown until January 1373. The fighting season for that year had gone, and no further attempt was made to raise a fleet to invade Wales in 1372. It might be that the campaign in Aunis-Saintonge had always been the military plan for that year, and that letting slip news of an invasion of Wales would reach England, causing Edward to divert resources on the British mainland. While that position must be considered, so must the idea that the French made unexpectedly positive progress, then pressed and required support for their attacks under Bertrand du Guesclin around Niort and La Rochelle, reacting to the opportunities presented as the campaign unfolded. In brief, superficial analysis, the logistical difficulties of communicating campaign successes in mid-west France to Paris, then to a fleet at sea in order to radically divert it from its destination to a new theatre, appear to support the suggestion that the 1372 was an effective, elaborate deception. However, the sources offer conflicting but equally plausible versions of the events in question; either that the Spanish were delayed, and Owain assaulted Guernsey while awaiting them and then went to find them after plundering the island, or that having failed to finish off

51 E. Charrière, ed., *Chronique de Bertrand du Guesclin par Cuvelier* (Paris: Firmin Didot, 2 vols, 1836-9), vol 2, 186-7 (line 18760, has earl of Pembroke as prisoner and is with the Castilians), 273 (line 21330, goes to La Rochelle with a Castilian fleet), 293 (line 21925, at the battle of Chisey), 314 (line 22545, goes into Périgord), 316-7 (line 22601, defeating an English force) http://play.google.com/booksreader?id=nhYZAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&output=reader&hl=en&pg=GB S.PA315 [Accessed 04/05/2012]; Delisle, *Chronique des quatre premiers Valois*, 230-43; S. Luce, ed., *Chronique de J. Froissart* (Paris: Renouard, 1888), vol 8, 1370-1377, 44-9 (Guernsey and the voyage to Castile), 64-70 (the attack on Soubise and the La Rochelle campaign), 81-5 (heading to Paris in honour with the Captal de Buch as his prisoner), 239 (the prisoners of ‘Yeuain de Galles’, still in captivity in 1377), G. Reynaud, ed., *Chronique de J. Froissart* (Paris: Renouard, 1894), vol 9, 1377-1380, 74-9 (siege of Mortagne and the murder of ‘Yeuan de Gales’), 86-8 (how the the Poitevins, Bretons and ‘de Galois, des gens de Yeuwain de Gales’ fought on).
resistance within Cornet castle, Lawgoch sought the Spanish force to ask them to return there with him to help complete the task.⁵³

⁵³ Delisle, Chronique des Quatre Premiers Valois, 230-5; Luce, Froissart, vol 8, 1370-1377, 44-9 (Guernsey and the voyage to Castile); Owen, ‘Owain Lawgoch – Yeuain de Galles’, 63; Carr, Owen of Wales, 28, 30-3.
4.3. Impact and Aftermath

The launching of the 1369 fleet drew English resources to Wales to cover the invasion; the subsequent investigation revealed a certain level of collaboration within the native population. The redeployment of the army of 1372 in western France had an immediate impact securing substantial victories for the French king on sea and land; that impressive campaign was executed by French, Castilian and Welsh troops. However, the impact of its failure to reach Wales is perhaps impossible to assess; there are no French, English or Welsh references to the reactions of those involved, except for a Welsh lament. Also, to only attempt to assess the palpable results of these missions would be to miss their wider significance.

The repeated threats to invade Wales clearly demonstrate that the idea that it could serve French strategic interests had survived Edward I’s invasion. The fleets of 1369 and 1372 perhaps symbolise the zenith of this strategy prior to the revolt of Owain Glyn Dŵr. Lawgoch’s fleets also appear to further demonstrate the extent to which the French were willing to display their power blatantly to provoke trouble in fourteenth-century Britain. While it is tempting to view the repeatedly aborted missions as feints, it is noteworthy that this area of exploitation was further threatened by invasion forces borne by joint French-Castilian fleets in 1373 and 1377, despite an initial element of reluctance on the part of the Spanish. In light of the four proposed invasions of Wales between 1369 and 1377 it is little wonder that the English felt compelled to hire assassins to kill Lawgoch. A Scottish assault on Anglesey in 1381 was followed by alleged espionage activities by Castilian agents, reconnoitring the castles of south Wales in 1387-8. All these external threats were concurrent with a heightened state of tension and violence, including the murder of Crown officials in

54 Henken, National Redeemer, 50-1.
55 Charrière, ed., Chronique de Bertrand du Guesclin par Cuvelier, vol 2, 186-7 (line 18760, has earl of Pembroke as prisoner and is with the Castilians), 273 (line 21330, goes to La Rochelle with a Castilian fleet), 293 (line 21925, at the battle of Chisey), 314 (line 22545, goes into Périgord), 316-7 (line 22601, defeating an English force), http://play.google.com/books/reader?id=nhYZAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&output=reader&hl=en&pg=GBSP.A315 [Accessed 04/05/2012]; Delisle, Chronique des Quatre Premiers Valois, 230-43; Luce, Froissart, vol 8, 1370-1377, 44-9 (Guernsey and the voyage to Castile); Davies, Age of Conquest, 437-8; Carr, Owen of Wales, 33, 38-9, 50-1. Note: a Castilian force reportedly operated in concert with the Scots in Scotland in 1379, see Delisle, Chronique des Quatre Premiers Valois, 284, therefore the notion of actions involving the Welsh and any of the other three are highly credible for this period.
Wales in the 1380s and the levying of small private forces to settle scores with bloodshed.\textsuperscript{57} At the same time, a planned invasion of English territory also contained Welsh mercenaries raised in France.\textsuperscript{58} This multiplicity of attempts and threats to foment revolt in Wales, or to insert invasion forces into it, preferably with native support, demonstrate a clear strategy to project French power onto Britain, using Wales as a conduit and probably hoping to engage its people as active participants. Such a strategy is consistent with similar French ventures in Brittany, Castile, Scotland and Flanders; the Welsh examples offer another branch to that policy.\textsuperscript{59}

The Lawgoch expeditions demonstrate that when such a viable opportunity presented itself then the French were flexible enough to react and adapt such circumstances to their ends. Far from being a defensive or supine enemy, these missions offer an insight into the swift reactivity of the fourteenth-century French government that underpinned a strategy that explored all possible points of weakness in its English enemy, from the Iberian Peninsula to Scotland, and from Wales to Flanders.\textsuperscript{60} Fortune had provided the French with a Welsh noble of legitimate royal lineage, they appeared determined to use that connection to its fullest extent. This suggests that Owain Lawgoch and his growing corps of Welsh mercenaries was a credible force that France could deploy in its own interests and did so in more than one theatre. It is also reasonable to identify here the overt use of a ‘cultivate’ policy, with Lawgoch’s standing being enhanced to its greatest potential by the French. It seems reasonable to suggest that without French development of his claim, Owain ap Thomas ap Rhodri might have remained obscure.

However, this is not to represent the Welsh solely as pawns, much of the contemporary Welsh poetry called for a saviour to liberate them.\textsuperscript{61} It is worth questioning the notion that Wales was therefore ‘conquered’ in Edward I’s time. This is not founded on any emotional or nostalgic attachment to an independently-ruled entity in Wales, but on the cold, hard reality of the military environment in Wales after 1283. It is indisputable that Edward I defeated Gwynedd and destroyed native rule throughout Wales. However, defeating an

\textsuperscript{57} Davies, \textit{Age of Conquest}, 436-43; Carr, \textit{Medieval Wales}, 105-6; Davies, \textit{Revolt}, 83-8.
\textsuperscript{58} Davies, \textit{Age of Conquest}, 438; Carr, \textit{Owen of Wales}, 62-3.
\textsuperscript{60} Shibing, \textit{Sun Tzu: The Art of War}, 56, 65, 94; Minford, \textit{The Art of War}, 99-118 ‘Attack where he is unprepared; appear where you are unexpected, this is victory in warfare’, 179-80, 187.
enemy and conquering it are entirely different cases. The Welsh revolted repeatedly from 1283 onwards, as illustrated above, and clearly did not accept that they were conquered. On the English side, the military environment of immense fortifications and permanent garrisons of varying sizes denotes one of occupation not conquest and settlement. The primary role of English castles in Wales was to suppress the natives by dominating the landscape and conducting operations from them.\textsuperscript{62} This is not a situation equivalent to a conquered territory, but one of occupation. The administrative, legal and economic regimes that were initially introduced into Wales by Edward I’s government were clearly not equitable to a transition to peace and settlement. Legally and economically privileged, the settlers brought in by the Crown remained armed and behind town walls on a war footing, protected and reinforced by castles and garrisons. Again, this reflects a state of occupation and suppression, rather than denoting the final conquest attributed to Edward that might be supposed without consideration.

This also shows that not only did the French understand the value of the manpower they had in their armies, but that their potential to raise a serious revolt in Wales promised strategic benefits for France. As such, it was a venture worth pursuing, irrespective of the ultimate outcome. It is noteworthy therefore that the French repeatedly selected Wales for exploration rather than Ireland or any of the outlying troublesome English counties, for example. In addition, this demonstrates that the earlier French-Welsh relationships had evolved beyond diplomatic manoeuvring or a participating in a multi-factional alliance, but had grown to one of active military collaboration. It is perhaps striking also that implicit in the 1372 declaration is the statement that the Welsh were still considered a distinct people, despite ninety years of English rule. Momentary consideration should also be given to the notion that this mission was solely a deception to unbalance the English that summer. Although unlikely, it would prove the French shrewd adversaries and worthy victors of the fighting that summer. It would be an unwise misuse of their power over small nations were it simply a ruse, and, were that revealed to have been truly their intention, they might have lost \textit{Yvain de Galles} and his contingents from their service, as well as losing Wales as an area to exploit in the future. Other allies would surely have taken note had such mistreatment occurred. In addition, the French replayed their intentions to invade on several occasions throughout the fourteenth-century. A bluff, once called or covered, ceases to have the same value, yet the missions to Wales became more viable and more frequent as the French

\textsuperscript{62} Davies, \textit{Age of Conquest}, 360, 368, 372-3.
regained power through the maturing century. On balance, it seems probable that the French hoped to develop their options to invade Wales, but in 1372 a closer, higher-value opportunity arose that summer that they could not ignore.\(^{63}\)

However, to pursue the above supposition of this being an elaborate French ruse to a fuller extent, this alliance might therefore have offered two main possibilities. Firstly, that it was a genuine plan to prise Wales from English clutches – and with perhaps four thousand troops as an initial impact force, with more troops being provided by the Welsh propelled into rebellion, it was a credible effort.\(^{64}\) There can be little doubt that the French would have liked to invade Wales and thereby deprived England of its resources, taxes and soldiery. Perhaps such an achievement might have permitted a French thrust into England’s western flank, visiting the French experience of the Hundred Years’ War on English soil; the destruction of fields and towns as well as the terror and disruption such conflict brought. This might have been desirable if, realistically, unlikely.

However, the ongoing policy including Wales might have held other value to the French; as an element of a diplomatic ploy or a strategy of deception and reaction.\(^{65}\) With the former in mind, it would not be inconceivable to envisage the French using this latent threat as a bargaining point at a peace conference with the English, with the end-state of agreeing to leave Wales to the English Crown in return for concessions on the continent. A strong possibility though, is that this entire enterprise was an elaborate deception designed to divert and stretch English resources. For it to be a threat sufficient enough to divert English manpower, attention and resources, the ploy would have to be convincing. In Lawgoch’s case, a second fleet and army under a war captain with a legitimate and, perhaps not coincidentally, a recently revived and declared claim to the princely title certainly posed a plausible danger. The fact that the English reacted administratively and militarily in Wales to both of Lawgoch’s fleets demonstrates the success of the deception, were it so.\(^{66}\) It seems

\(^{63}\) Shibing, *Sun Tzu: The Art of War*, 48, 65 ‘attack where the enemy will surely come to its own rescue’, 94; Minford, *The Art of War*, 116 ‘Attack where he is unprepared; appear where you are unexpected, this is victory in warfare’, 112 ‘the way of war is a way of deception’, 173, 177, 179-80, 186-91, 202 ‘War is founded on deception.’


\(^{65}\) Shibing, *Sun Tzu: The Art of War*, 56, 65 ‘attack where the enemy will surely come to its own rescue.’, 94; Minford, *The Art of War*, 99-118, 179-80, 187. This underpins a similar point raised above on p. 171 n. 60.

credible to suggest that having been mustered and seen leaving port for England, attacking her interests en route and then sailing west down the Channel, that this fleet was intended to be reported to the English Crown, and never destined to turn north at Finisterre. Such suppositions cannot be proven however, and the overarching strategy to deprive England of possession of its closest neighbour appears compelling in the light of France’s repeated efforts in the west.

These two unsuccessful missions to Wales were notable parts of Lawgoch’s story. His whole career was of notable interest in French-Welsh medieval relations, perhaps a high point from the French perspective. The fact that he was of noble lineage and through his actions he was given command and named as a ‘captain-general’ of Charles V’s armies elevates him beyond being a mere mercenary leader. Critically, Owain Lawgoch’s career in France and claims to the principality were of great value to Owain Glyn Dŵr. Lawgoch’s attempts to reclaim Wales, best exemplified by the stirring 1372 declaration and the two abortive invasions, created a precedent for French courtly involvement in ‘post-1283’ Wales. Without that, it would have been much more difficult for Glyn Dŵr to attract French support, examined in the following chapter. Although Glyn Dŵr’s rebellion proved more successful militarily; his claim to the title of ‘Prince of Wales’ was far leaner than that of Lawgoch. It is notable that French chroniclers, particularly le religieux de Saint-Denys, recalled Yvain de Galles with fondness and felt that the French still owed him and the Welsh a debt. Owain Glyn Dŵr was able to draw on that sentiment to win French support. Without French involvement in Wales, the Glyn Dŵr revolt would have been markedly different. It would certainly be going too far to infer that without Lawgoch there would not have been Glyn Dŵr; however it is reasonable to say that the nature of Glyn Dŵr’s relationship with France would have been different, and might not have produced the documents or events discussed in the subsequent chapter.

Finally, as referenced above, Owain Lawgoch’s military exploits in France brought him, Wales and the Welsh into some of the great French chronicles of the time: those of the French kings, Froissart, the Valois dukes, du Guesclin and other royal chronicles and sources such as the writings of Christine de Pisan, where they had never previously featured with such honour. He was clearly included among the French war-leaders of the time in a treatise

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67 Carr, Owen of Wales, 24.
68 Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 3, 164-5; Owen, ‘Owain Lawgoch – Yeuain de Galles’, 16-7; Carr, Owen of Wales, 66.
on chivalry. In terms of reviving medieval France’s interest in Wales, the relationship between Charles V and Owain Lawgoch was inestimable. Throughout this period, there remained a constant fear of native revolt in Wales and, in the closing decades of the century, the Welsh also seem to have been anticipating large-scale rebellion. This stands in contrast to Davies’s image of a relatively settled peace descending on Wales during the century, although he also identified gathering storm clouds as the fourteenth-century drew to a close. In the early years of the fifteenth century, Owain Glyn Dŵr became the leader of a widespread revolt which touched all parts of Wales. During those years, the Welsh leader sought French aid. Once persuaded of the potential offered by Glyn Dŵr, the French again explored the possibilities offered by this latest Welsh rebellion, to the exceptional point of landing an expeditionary army in Wales in 1405. The diplomatic exchange between Owain Glyn Dŵr and the court of King Charles VI forms the focus of the next chapter.

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69 N. Grèvy-Pons et al, *Jean de Montreuil, Opera*, vol 2, 113 (Traité ‘A Toute La Chevalerie’), ‘Une belle grande la ou il morut sur la place de .iii. a .v’. Anglois, che dit et (recite) messire Jehan Froissart, et en fu chief pour lez François messire Yvain de Gales.’
# 5: Charles VI and Owain Glyn Dŵr

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5.1: Introduction

‘The diplomatic history of this period is as well-known as it is confused …’

The considerable series of contacts between Charles VI and Owain Glyn Dŵr took place during the Hundred Years’ War and therefore its backdrop was painted by a number of wider influences. The three most important were the ongoing conflicts between the crowns of England, France and those within their influence or amity, the ecclesiastical schism that began in 1378, and the factional struggles within the French court during the debilitating illness of the incumbent, Charles VI.

Neither the course of the struggle between France and England, nor the story of the split within the western Church need detailed elaboration here, although elements of both are clearly embedded within this discussion. The rupture within the western Church created an additional dimension to the conflicts of the time. The existence of two continent-wide papal adherences largely deprived the Church of its role as European arbiter and peacemaker. To some degree, the schism encouraged competition between all sides which in turn fuelled several violent campaigns across Europe. There is no place here for the wider story of the schism and the ebb and flow of its related debates. At certain points however, the effects of those religious movements within Europe are fundamental to France’s connection to Wales in the early fifteenth century. These are developed where appropriate to this discussion.


In addition to the military and ecclesiastical dimensions, there is a strongly political element to this last contact studied between medieval France and Wales. The mental infirmity of Charles VI created opportunities for nobles seeking to promote their own positions.\(^4\) The government of France had, by the close of the fourteenth century, become a tug-of-war between factions led by the dukes of court, particularly those of Burgundy and Orleans.\(^5\) Their vying was critical to the events that generated and sustained this Welsh alliance, and ultimately sought to revive it several years after its supposed demise.\(^6\)

While the above establishes the broader backdrop, this chapter will examine a number of documents and events. In 1404, a treaty between Charles VI and Owain Glyn Dŵr was negotiated, officially acknowledging that the two courts were openly communicating and allied. In addition, a military venture was launched that year, with the aim of invading Wales.\(^7\) The following year saw the arrival in Wales of a French-Breton expeditionary army, which joined and campaigned with Welsh forces.\(^8\) It appears that their joint venture also intended to encompass a simultaneous rising of English rebels.\(^9\) When the French-Breton army left Wales, perhaps as late as April 1406, it is possible that they carried with them a document from Owain, in which he stated his regime’s position on the schism.\(^10\)

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\(^6\) The discussion of Welsh churchmen within the French nation at the Council of Constance and the representation they made there which included Wales can be consulted in Appendix D 9.


Having attempted that, this chapter will challenge the notion that the Glyn Dŵr revolt simply withered on the vine. A good deal of evidence demonstrates that it did not. Its eventual demise was primarily due to circumstances on the continent which denied it the foreign support Glyn Dŵr’s forces came to need to make a sustained military impact against an enemy as powerful as England. However, a key factor in the asphyxiating of Glyn Dŵr’s Wales was a series of previously unappreciated English diplomatic missions to the continent from 1403 onwards. Those missions are examined below. Glyn Dŵr’s adherents proved remarkably resilient, however, and their cause evidently reignedit in Wales in 1417, at the same moment that French ambassadors evoked the Welsh cause in debates at the Council of Constance.

This remarkable series of events, particularly those in 1404-6, gives flesh to arguably the most fertile of the four French-Welsh alliances studied. It seems evident that, given the depth of the French-Welsh alliance forged here, and the level of involvement of those two nations, their allies and their enemies, this final and most prolific alliance merits inclusion within the broader study of the Hundred Years’ War.

The sharper focus of this study necessarily concentrates on the revolt in Wales which began in 1399, from which developed the alliance with France. While the violence in Wales arose during a period of truce between England and France, it is evident that other, similar, conflicts also started during similar periods of studied peace between the powers, yet those crowns, notionally observing a truce, contributed to the denouement and resolution of each

11 Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 118-21; Williams, The Welsh Church from Conquest to Reformation 222-5; Walker, Medieval Wales, 176-7; Carr, Medieval Wales, 114-5; Davies, Revolt, 121, 172, 195, 214.
12 Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 126-46; Davies, Revolt, 124-6, 195, 293. See Part 5 Below.
struggle. While campaigns in Brittany and Castile are recognised as additional theatres forming part of the broader conflict, this episode involving Wales, to date, is not.\textsuperscript{15} The revolution which transformed Henry Bolingbroke from duke of Hereford into King Henry IV of England requires only this passing reference.\textsuperscript{16} Perhaps the two main points of note connecting that event to this research are the effects Bolingbroke’s revolt had on English relations with the French and the Welsh. Regarding the former, it led to the gradual erosion of the twenty-eight year truce that Richard II had concluded with Charles VI in 1396, and eventually culminated with Henry V’s invasion of Normandy in 1415.\textsuperscript{17} In the immediate aftermath of Henry IV’s accession, Anglo-French relations took a severe downturn, nominally over the perceived mistreatment of Princess Isabella, Richard’s widow, however, other factors were also at play.\textsuperscript{18} It is perhaps little wonder that English nobles associated with Richard’s regime were to turn rebellious against their new king who had Richard killed and replaced them with his supporters and kinsmen.\textsuperscript{19} Henry’s actions however turned Louis, duke of Orleans, a former ally at the French court, into a sworn enemy who challenged Henry to a duel over the treatment of his niece.\textsuperscript{20}

French government policy was mediated by the chiaroscuro within the factional struggles of the French court; these have been simplistically portrayed globally as the dispute


between Burgundy and Orleans.21 The latter became better known as the Armagnacs during the ensuing civil war. The environment in which their well-known dispute grew was far more complex and replete with the subtle consideration and balancing of myriad concerns than a simple duel between the heads of two dominant factions. The more relevant factors of this are developed in the appropriate places below; however, the dynamics of the power relations of the time have largely been passed off as Burgundian or Orleanist which, at this early stage of the power struggle, is one-dimensional. It is worth briefly highlighting the profound depths of this matter here. The dominant movement of the time is therefore identified as the struggle between the dukes of Orleans and Burgundy, whereas in fact they were simply the most overt protagonists. The struggle was for power, and therefore all elements of the court and government were engaged. In the first place, while present and alert, the king, Charles VI, was the undisputed head of state from 1388. His position went unchallenged and his pronouncements were enacted.22 However, he was accessible to the influence and advice of those closest to him; the dukes of court. To define that group; his uncles, the dukes of Anjou, Berry and Burgundy, his maternal uncle, the duke of Bourbon, and his younger brother whom he made duke of Orleans in 1392 at the age of twenty-one.23 Within these groups there was a generally accepted, though little exposed, hierarchy. For example, Bourbon looked to Anjou as their suzerain below the king.24 The other great magnates; the duke of Brittany, the king of Navarre or the southern counts of Armagnac or Foix, along with other notable families, were less powerful or engaged in this struggle than the royal dukes named here. Although all were interconnected in a variety of ways, the lesser families escape further elaboration here. The governing dukes inevitably sought to secure the king’s commands in their favour, which naturally caused competition between them.25 However, the nature of Charles’s illness caused intermittent, unpredictable periods where the king slipped in and out of lucidity, each time for indeterminable periods. This created the innately unstable ground on which the rest of these


24 Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 5, 163-5.

issues played out. During periods of the kings illness, euphemistically referred to as his ‘absences’, the dukes directed affairs. Since none had a dominant claim to rule, they competed. Initially, the dukes of Burgundy and Berry ran affairs as they had done in the decade of Charles’s minority, with Louis, duke of Bourbon also playing a role in government. Of these, Philip the Bold, duke of Burgundy, was dominant despite being younger than John of Berry. Although this was perhaps primarily due to his force of character, it was certainly aided by the influence granted by the immense wealth earned from his territorial possessions in Flanders and Burgundy. In theory, Philip also governed Brittany for a period during the minority of Duke Jean V, which ended on 24 December 1403.

The elevation of the king’s brother, Louis, to the duchy of Orleans in 1392, and regent designate from 1393, plainly posed a challenge to the contemporary established order. This royally-proclaimed ‘right’ to rule, as well as Louis’s ambitious personality, made inevitable a conflict for power with those who governed in the king’s stead. For the best part of two decades, Duke Philip was the major force in France’s government. He was able to overcome the ‘Marmousets’, the government of Charles V’s royal councillors summoned to rule by Charles VI in 1388, and for much of the next decade he was able to counter and contain the rising influence of the duke of Orleans. By 1398 perhaps, Louis had become a match for his aged uncle, and his attempts to wrest power from Philip form the basis of the power struggle described below which, at a certain point, saw the reach of French influence extend to Glyn Dŵr’s Wales.

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27 d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 13-4; Vaughan, Philip the Bold, 39-42; Knecht, The Valois, 41-4; Schnerb, Armagnacs et Bourguinons, 20.
28 Vaughan, Philip the Bold, 40-1; Knecht, The Valois, 41-2; Schnerb, Armagnacs et Bourguinons, 20, 27-9.
29 A. de la Borderie, Chronique de Bretagne de Jean de Saint-Paul, Chambellan du duc Francois II (Nantes: Societe des Bibliophiles Bretons, 1881), 52, 127; R. Vaughan, Valois Burgundy (London : Allen Lane, 1975), 78 (Philip was regent of Brittany, Savoy and Luxembourg at one stage).
30 Jarry, La Vie Politique de Louis de France, 102; d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons: 26-8; Vaughan, Philip the Bold, 44; Knecht, The Valois, 46; Schnerb, Armagnacs et Bourguinons, 26-7, 29, 33.
31 Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 3, 738-45; Darwin, Louis d’Orléans, 132-3, 139-41; Vaughan, Philip the Bold, 44; Schnerb, Armagnacs et Bourguinons, 26-7, 29.
However, as the maps below demonstrate, the landscape was not simply made up of two power blocks. This shows the jigsaw of territories held in eastern and northern France by the dukes of Orleans and Burgundy by 1407. The unmarked lands on this map were held by the French crown and other nobles, all of whom had their own interests and ambitions, and were not simply pawns of the two warring houses. Vaughan’s map reveals the proximity, even interconnectivity of the lands of Berry, Bourbon, Normandy and Milan, to these areas of focal interest to Burgundy and Orleans. The adherence of territories and nobles was still fluid, even those thought to belong to one faction or another. Certain of these acquisitions were either new, such as Louis’s purchase of Luxemburg in 1402, or were frequently rebellious and required military suppression, such as Burgundian Flanders. Such territories were at risk of being lost to native elements or prised away by an enemy in a conflict. Equally, since they had their own interests to preserve, allies could not always be counted on. With their own priorities and survival as paramount concerns, they were potentially susceptible to reducing the vigour of their factional support, becoming neutral or perhaps changing allegiance, when faced with seduction or destruction by a larger faction. These maps therefore show a snapshot of alliances and power relations at a given time, in a given region, and little more stable can be presumed.

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33 Vaughan, Valois Burgundy, viii; Schnerb, Armagnacs et Les Bourguignons, 18.
34 Darwin, Louis d’Orléans, 27, 60; d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons: 48, 52; Vaughan, Philip the Bold, 24-31, 103-4; Vaughan, John the Fearless, 43-4; Vaughan, Valois Burgundy, 16, 71, 138-41, 150; Knecht, The Valois, 41-3.
This mosaic of territorial adherences and unstable amities could be redrawn across the whole of France, illuminating the difficulties faced by the contemporary protagonists and those who have later sought to describe these events. These shifting allegiances can be characterised by the actions of the other great ducal factions. To take the example of Bourbon and Berry, they can be seen to withdraw amity from the Burgundians for a time after 1407, but then as Philip’s heir, Jean sans Peur, seized and controlled the government, and normal governmental processes resumed, for a short period thereafter they can be seen engaging with the crown policies, guided by Jean.\(^{35}\) In addition, there were positive military connections between these princes of the blood. Jacques de Bourbon had accompanied Jean sans Peur on the disastrous crusade that was crushed at Nicopolis in 1396 and remained within his amity.

his whole life. In 1405, to some degree, the forces of Bourbon and Berry interposed their own troops between those of Orleans and Burgundy to prevent further internecine bloodshed. In so doing, they held the gates of Paris against a feared attack by Orleanist armies, by consequence protecting the Burgundians inside. After Louis’s murder by Burgundian agents in 1407, most sided with the Orleanist faction. However, during the later government of Jean sans Peur, 1418-1419, elements of both ducal branches benefitted from his patronage, and both parties were also ‘rebels’ against his rule, as Burgundian records described them. When the civil war erupted anew with the murder of Jean, and his successor allied himself with England, the dukes can plainly be identified in opposition to Burgundian policy and evidently took the side of the loyalist forces led by the Armagnacs. Therefore, identifying Berry and Bourbon as necessarily adhering to one faction or the other seems simplistic. It should be acknowledged that these families controlled states of their own within France; they held their own ducal courts, run by their own administrations. Their priorities were firstly to act in their own interests and in those which they perceived most benefitted the government of France. Where their interests conformed to those of the protagonists apparently intent on warring with one another, they are viewed as aligned with that faction. As the conflict played out, the larger part of both families can be identified within the Armagnac camp. However individual figures still made choices; Jacques de Bourbon certainly remained close to Burgundy. To blur the boundaries yet further, military commanders and clerics easily identifiable as adhering to one of the two main factions also

36 Jarry, La Vie Politique de Louis de France, 184-97; Vaughan, Philip the Bold, 66 (here Jacques is described as not of Jean’s company); J. D. le Roux, La France en Orient au XIVe Siècle, Expéditions du Maréchal Boucicaut (Boston: Elibron, 2006, orig. Paris : Thorin, 1886), 235, 284.
40 Pocquet du Haut-Jussé, La France gouvernée par Jean Sans Peur, 18, 53, 237; d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 152; Vaughan, Valois Burgundy, 62.
42 C. Lannette-Claverie, Collection Joursanvault, Sous-Série 6 J (Orléans: Archives Départementales du Loiret, 1976), (this work demonstrates the court of Orleans at work, their ranks and departments are listed as are their transactions, for example, 222-3, 249-50, 321-7 et al). Richard Vaughan’s works on Valois Burgundy (especially Valois Burgundy 48-50, 95-122 and 162-93) and Pocquet du Haut-Jussé, La France gouvernée par Jean Sans Peur, do the same for Burgundian administration.

worked together on government projects. Good examples of this are given below in regards to the diplomatic agreements and military cooperation with Owain Glyn Dŵr. Therefore, the opposing factions still functioned together for much of the period studied here although the dramatic rupture in their relations in November 1407 held serious consequences for the Welsh as well as for the governance of France.44

The interests of the other estates can also be seen within this spectrum of nobles vying for dominance. The French Church and universities actively debated a remedy to the ecclesiastical trauma of the time, the Great Schism, and advanced its preferred solution. Consensus proved difficult to achieve and maintain, and so that choice changed throughout the period as the Church factions also sought supremacy within the ecclesiastical sphere. At times, the opinions of the leading Church personalities concurred with those of the temporal princes, which has led to them being labelled as being of one faction or another. To a degree, this is accurate, but as with the dukes of Bourbon and Berry, the Church and the universities can also be seen to act in the interests of the French Church and government, as they perceived it at that time. Those who held administrative posts within the ducal governments can more safely be issued a firm factional adherence, but it seems reasonable to suggest that the majority of clergymen put the Church and the king before their other, lesser, temporal patrons. The ebb and flow of the ecclesiastical arguments at this time gave rise to Gallicanism, an ideology which privileged the needs of the French Church and state above papal demands.45 The merchant classes, particularly in Paris, also made their desires and feelings known, whether through parliamentary protest or violent urban revolt.46

Other political currents also affected contemporary government, notably the ‘Marmousets’ so despised by nobles such as Philip of Burgundy. The aegis of government by often low-born councillors was an anathema to Duke Philip.47 Nevertheless, this regime of

44 Tuetey, Journal de Nicolas de Baye, vol 2, 206-8; Darwin, Louis d’Orléans, 111-26; d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 83; Lannette-Claverie, Collection Joursanvaut, (evidence of the court of Orleans paying leaders of other factions) 31-2 (sending golden cloth to Charles de Hangest, 1392), 45 (Jehan le Maingre, ‘Boucicaut’, 1393), 47, 60 (Charles de Savoisy, 1397-8), 59 (Charles de Labret, 1397), 64 (Jehan de Bourbon, ‘fils aîné du duc de Bourbon’, 1398), and perhaps most telling, 66 (Jehan, ‘fils aîné de Bourgogne, comte de Nevers’, 1398); Schnerb, Armagnacs et Bourguinons, 91-101.


46 Pocquet du Haut-Jussé, La France gouvernée par Jean Sans Peur, 7, 9, 15; Vaughan, John the Fearless, 99-100, 193, 202, 204, 210; Schnerb, Armagnacs et Bourguinons, 168-73.

47 Jarry, La Vie Politique de Louis de France, 97; Darwin, Louis d’Orléans, 19; d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons: 14-5; Vaughan, Philip the Bold, 42-3; Knecht, The Valois, 44-8; Schnerb, Armagnacs et Bourguinons, 20-1.
rational men directing affairs for the benefit of the state, especially its finances, won popularity in some quarters and represented a seismic event in the gradual evolution from whimsical, corrupt governance by the nobility toward the impersonal rule of a modern state run by professional administrators.\textsuperscript{48}

In addition, there were two extra-national elements to the factional interplay of the dukes of court. The first involved those matters in which the French actively sought and could clearly influence; the second was the movements of the time touching many nations. French ducal families married into the equivalent lines of neighbouring countries and so adopted the issues and alignments of their spouses. In some cases these issues were imported right to the heart of French government. Charles VI’s bride, Isabeau of Bavaria, was grateful to Philip of Burgundy for arranging their marriage. This is forwarded in places as the reason for their sharing certain political aims.\textsuperscript{49} Isabeau’s Bavarian family, the Wittelsbach, also held a firm connection to Bernabò Visconti, who was her grandfather and had been the ruler of Milan.\textsuperscript{50} Bernabò’s nephew, Giangaleazzo Visconti, tricked, seized and deposed Bernabò in 1385 in a coup d’état. The new count of Milan, who was eventually made duke, had Bernabò imprisoned where he died shortly after; many of his supporters and sons soon followed him to the grave.\textsuperscript{51} In 1389, Louis of Orleans married Giangaleazzo’s daughter, Valentina, thereby creating a conflict at the highest level of French society, even though none of the French had been directly involved in the affair’s denouement.\textsuperscript{52} Further strata comprising a highly complex web of alliances, friendships and mutual interests also affected all of the factions and figures involved. Perhaps the simplest examples to advance here involve Burgundy. As the ruler of Flanders since 1384, the duke of Burgundy’s financial interests were inextricably linked to the region’s wool trade with England.\textsuperscript{53} War between France and England was

\textsuperscript{48} d’Avout, \textit{La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons}: 14-5; Knecht, \textit{The Valois}, 44-8; Schnerb, \textit{Armagnacs et Bourguignons}, 20-1, 27, 57-61.


\textsuperscript{50} Darwin, \textit{Louis d’Orléans}, 19-21, 30-1; Bueno de Mesquita, \textit{Giangaleazzo Visconti}, 63; Chamberlin, \textit{The Count of Virtue}, 89, 176-7.

\textsuperscript{51} Bueno de Mesquita, \textit{Giangaleazzo Visconti}, 31-6; Chamberlin, \textit{The Count of Virtue}, 70-83.


\textsuperscript{53} Darwin, \textit{Louis d’Orléans}, 24; Vaughan, \textit{Philip the Bold}, 16-38; Saul, \textit{Richard II}, 54; 155-86; (Generic importance of English trade in this period: W. M. Ormrod, ‘Finance and Trade under Richard II’ in A. Goodman,
likely to be financially detrimental to the Burgundians therefore. By 1402, Louis of Orleans acquired Luxemburg and forged alliances with Guelders and Juliers, effectively imposing a territorial block between Burgundian estates in Flanders and Brabant to the north and Burgundy and Lorraine to the south. While this might well have been perceived by the Burgundians as aggressive, and relevant to their adversarial relationship within France, it also gave both factions a stake in Imperial matters. Each supported opposing imperial candidates, Wenceslas or Rupert, during the early years of the fifteenth century. Their choice of allies can in turn be seen to be mirrored in this struggle, where each faction created alliances with the higher nobility across Europe to their own benefit.\textsuperscript{54} These widespread alliances were also relevant to relations between Charles’s government and Glyn Dŵr.

Of wider import, of course, were the great issues and events of their period. Power relations between nations and neighbours were naturally part of the ongoing challenges of the time. Therefore the usual issues of economics, security and alliances shaped the political decisions of all nations. The issue of the Great Schism further strained relations across Europe. As powerful magnates in their own right, as well as being involved in the direction of the French government, the dukes of court were touched by all of these affairs.

Therefore, to represent this conflict as one between Orleans and Burgundy seems facile, but nevertheless convenient, bearing in mind this proviso. While those dukes headed the most aggressively engaged factions, they appear to have held sway when able to sufficiently influence the other parties mentioned here. It is the shifting pattern of dominance in the struggle between the leading French dukes, supported by a range of political, economic, ecclesiastical and continental concerns that formed French government policy during the years in question. Where relevant to this French-Welsh alliance, those relations are developed in the appropriate places below.

Of course, these events in England and France helped propel to wider prominence Owain Glyn Dŵr who, prior to 1399, had led a relatively respectable, though largely unremarkable life.\textsuperscript{55} His early years can be characterised for the purposes of this study as having been raised

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in north-east Wales, educated at the Inns of Court in London with other young noblemen, and
loyally serving in English armies on at least three occasions before retiring from public life
by 1388, while probably still in his late twenties.\(^5^6\) Although lauded in certain poems in the
final decade of the fourteenth century for his lineage, wealth and courage in battle, at least
one appears to criticise him for his lack of leadership in a time the poet Gruffudd Llwyd
perceived as one of dire Welsh need.\(^5^7\) When revolt in Wales erupted in the summer of
1399 Glyn Dŵr does not appear to have been involved.\(^5^8\) In fact, his name does not appear in
the records until the close of the following year, and even then, he is listed as one among
many. Blanket terms litter the first records of the government reaction to investigate, suppress
and pardon ‘treasons in North and South Wales’ committed by ‘divers evildoers in South
Wales’ and ‘divers men in North Wales (who) have risen in insurrection’.\(^5^9\) It appears that as
Crown intelligence on the violence grew, the names of the most evident culprits emerged
before that of Owain Glyn Dŵr. Only one north Wales rebel, ‘Rhys Kiffyn’, was sought
through the issue of a commission of arrest, even though he was named at the same time as
Glyn Dŵr.\(^6^0\) Another arrest warrant was made for two rebels in the south, ‘John Filz Pieres
and Maurice ap Meweryk’.\(^6^1\) The fact that none was issued for Owain Glyn Dŵr suggests that
he was not initially the most prominent rebel, even in his home region. Owain first appeared
in the records on 7 October 1400, and even then he is associated with ‘others of North
Wales’.\(^6^2\) Although Glyn Dŵr, among others, was clearly implicated in the attack on Ruthin
in September 1400, there is no connection between him and early acts of rebellion in south-
west Wales in 1399, north-west Wales in 1400 or south-east Wales in 1401.\(^6^3\) Even

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\(^{5^6}\) National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2008,
\(^{5^7}\) Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 18-27; Davies, Revolt, 144-50; Ll. Smith, ‘Glyn Dŵr, Owain (c.1359–c.1416)’, ODNB.
\(^{5^8}\) R. Loomis, and D. Johnston, Medieval Welsh Poems, An Anthology (Binghampton: Center for Medieval and
\(^{5^9}\) J. Webb, ed. and trans., ‘Translation of a French metrical history of the deposition of King Richard the
Second with a copy of the original’, by J. Creton’, Archaeologia, 20 (1824), 1-433, specifically 104- 6, 113;
Williams, Chronique de la Traison et Mort de Richard Deux roy Dengleterre, 211-2; Clarke and Galbraith, ‘The
Deposition of Richard II’, 125-81; Given-Wilson, Chronicles of the Revolution, 137-52, 155; Bennett, ‘Richard II
\(^{6^0}\) CPR 1399-1401, 357, 470, 518, 554, 555.
\(^{6^1}\) CPR 1399-1401, 555.
\(^{6^2}\) CPR 1399-1401, 520.
\(^{6^3}\) CPR 1399-1401, 555.
considering those rebels named in his home region for ‘treasons’, ‘insurrections’ or ‘rebellion’ in north-east and central north Wales, Owain is but one name among dozens.\footnote{CPR 1399-1401, 370, 396, 447, 451, 466, 470, 475, 476, 554, 555.}

In light of that, it is worth momentarily pondering whether there were political motives behind the land forfeiture of the leading Welsh nobles, Glyn Dŵr and the Tudor brothers, for a new English monarch in need of gifts with which to reward those who supported his apparently unforeseen accession to the throne the previous year. That denunciation took place without recourse to appeal or a hearing for any of the accused. Moreover, the subsequent, rapid award of Glyn Dŵr’s territories to Henry IV’s recently legitimised half-brother, John Beaufort, then earl of Somerset, as early as 8 November 1400, suggests more a case of identifying a convenient scapegoat than one of recognition of Owain’s role as a leader of rebels.\footnote{Faëdæra, vol 8, 167, 181-2; CPR, 1399-1401, 386, 392, 396, 451, 475; H. T. Riley, ed., Ypodiðma Neustriæ A Thoma Walsingham (London: Longman et al, 1876), 373-4; Douglas and Myers, English Historical Documents, vol 4, 169; Saul, Richard II, 382.} The gifting of territories to Beaufort was shrewd on Henry’s part; this made him the distributor of patronage to his father’s other family, and therefore the senior noble in that relationship. Henry’s legitimacy to accede to the throne was questioned within Britain and France; the grant of Glyn Dŵr’s estates to Beaufort neutralised one potential rival for the throne at the expense of a retired Welsh squire.\footnote{Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 3, 428-31; Williams, Chronicque de la Traison et Mort, 299-302; Davies, Revolt, 176-80; Given-Wilson, Adam Usk, 40-9 Joliffe, Froissart, 413-4, 419-20, 422; M. J. Bennett, ‘Henry of Bolingbroke and the Revolution of 1399’, Dodds and Biggs, Henry IV, The Establishment of the Regime, 19-29. See Appendix D 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3: Charles VI’s Letter to the English Nation, 1406.} The other Welsh leaders exempted from the pardons of November 1400, the Tudors, took firm military action against the crown. In April 1401, Gwilym ap Tudor led a force that took and held the fortress at Conwy from where he negotiated a pardon, while his brother Rhys appears to have joined Glyn Dŵr in the wilds. Henry Percy junior was commissioned to treat with both Tudors ‘and others’ in north Wales, but pardons were only issued to ‘Willym ap Tudor’ and thirty four others, presumably his force at Conwy.\footnote{Faëdæra, vol 8, 209; POPCE, vol 1, 147 (‘Willam ap Tudire q qst en le chastell de Conway’), 150 (‘Rees q est en lez montayns’); CPR 1399-1401, 396, 447, 470, 475; Lloyd Owen Glendower, 37-9 (Lloyd also places Rhys outside Conwy); Davies, Revolt, 52, 103-4. Note, Rhys ap Tudor was also offered a pardon in April 1401 (CPR, 475) but only ‘Willym ap Tudor’ and 34 others were named in the subsequent pardon (CPR, 447). It is unclear whether Glyn Dŵr might have been included in the ‘others’ mentioned in Percy’s commission.}

Faced with the unappealing options of a hard and probably short life in hiding, surrendering and most likely being executed or mounting a seemingly impossible campaign
against the crown and government of England, Owain Glyn Dŵr chose the latter, to the eternal benefit of his reputation. His successes proved to be the most surprising and unforeseen element of the first years of fifteenth-century Britain. Nevertheless, French ambitions for the English throne coincided with and eventually abetted Owain’s campaign, and their joint aspirations led to the diplomatic and military contacts which culminate this thesis.
5.2: Treaty of Alliance, 1404

Any examination of this first overt documentary exchange must address the reasons behind the two sides seeking one another’s support. In the case of the 1404 alliance treaty between Charles VI and Owain Glyn Dŵr, its origins are to be found in the currents within French elites; the Church, university and courtly factions. Although their historic manoeuvrings are interconnected with events that shaped their relations over decades, for this example it seems sufficient to isolate events related to the schism of 1378 and, bearing in mind the proviso raised earlier regarding the complexity of the courtly struggle, the adversarial relations which will be reluctantly characterised as those between the houses of Orleans and Burgundy.

The establishment and maintenance of the papacy in Avignon from 1305 onwards provided a root cause of the schism of 1378. Principally, the relocation of the Curia was forced by the threat to the papacy posed by violent instability within the Italian city states, along with intermittent conflicts which saw German armies overrun parts of northern Italy as well as further difficulties emanating from Naples.68 While in Avignon, the papacy enjoyed physical security for much of the rest of the fourteenth century. This stability enabled it to reform its governmental procedures and construct an efficient administration that transformed papal finances.69 Another factor was that during the second half of the thirteenth century, France and the papacy had developed increasingly close ties. This resulted in a rise in French influence in the Curia which, perhaps inevitably, led to a succession of Frenchmen ascending the papal throne. While it might be incorrect to claim that France controlled the papacy for three-quarters of the fourteenth century, its preponderant influence over it is undeniable. Naturally, given the papal role as arbiter, its bestowal of official appointments across Europe and its emergence as a growing financial entity, other powers came to resent France’s hold on the papacy.70 Although several popes based in Avignon attempted to return to Italy during the fourteenth century, endemic political instability and periodic warfare prevented the realisation of those desires. This came to a head in 1378 when the Pope Gregory XI died in the process of returning the papacy to Rome, under threat from the Italians that they would

elect a pope of their own if he did not restore the Holy See to Rome. In what might have been a temporary measure to appease the Roman mob, the subsequent conclave elected the archbishop of Bari, Bartolomeo Prignano – not even a cardinal – as Pope Urban VI. One faction of the Cardinalate returned to Avignon and duly elected Robert of Geneva, connected by blood to the French royal house, as Pope Clement VII. The schism was born, with a Roman and an Avignonese pontiff, and Europe’s states aligned themselves into the Urbanist or Clementist factions. Largely, this can be defined as France, her Spanish allies and Scotland falling into Clement’s obedience, while England, the Italian states north of Naples and much of the empire supported Urban. These powers encouraged others to support their candidate, and the issue of papal adherence became a factor cited when seeking allies or denouncing enemies. Many of the geo-political alliances and amities existed prior to 1378, so it would be an overstatement to suggest that these loose continent-wide alliances began to form because of the schism; nevertheless it became an evident factor in political considerations. While the issue of the papal candidates was overtly relevant to the Pennal Declaration of 1406, it can also be tied to other French expansions, such as into Flanders and Castile in the 1380s, but perhaps more particularly into Italy. The clearest examples of this were Savona in 1394 and Genoa in 1396, where a condition of French support was Genoese allegiance to the French papal candidate. Although this issue appeared to be an ecclesiastical matter, its use in France’s efforts to extend its power, into Genoa and Wales for example, demonstrate that the schism was undeniably linked to the politics of the day.

It was the personalities within the French courtly factions, their conflicts, drives and machinations which were of primary importance in the evolution of this Welsh alliance. Although the proclamations and debates within university and church circles supported or undercut the struggles of the noble factions, as well as influencing the crown’s position on the schism, the leading role in this Welsh alliance appears to fall to the temporal princes.

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actions clearly comprise an expansionist military and diplomatic foreign policy. This drive saw French influence spread into Flanders, Scotland, and throughout Italy. It also enaged the forces of nations supporting rival popes and saw conflict brought to the heart of the French court, caused by the marriages of Charles VI and Louis of Orleans whose spouses brought their families’ rivalries to Paris.

The divisions between the French hierarchy ran deep on foreign policy matters and even on the issue of the church; the Orleanists favoured the via facti, the Burgundians the via cessionis, while the French Church and the influential University of Paris tended towards the via cessionis as a first step towards the via concilii, although the clergy oscillated between positions. These rivalries can be seen to be played out in the directions taken by the French government, notably in its stance over the schism and its relationship with England. When Duke Philip inherited Flanders in 1384 his attitude towards England was strongly mediated by his economic interests which were then firmly connected to the Anglo-Flemish wool trade. While France and England discussed peace, and Richard II in particular sought a rapprochement with Paris, the French nobles’ positions on England were less of a point of friction. Nevertheless, the disputes over the schism and the governance of the kingdom during the king’s illness were sufficient to accentuate the rift between Burgundy and Orleans. The course of these disputes can be mapped out in line with the preferences of the head of the government.

73 Creighton, History of the Papacy, vol. 1, 161-2; Vaughan, Philip the Bold, 55; Barraclough, The Medieval Papacy, 168, 174-7; Renouard, trans., Bethell, The Avignon Papacy, 55-8, 70-5; Morrall, Gerson and the Great Schism, 2, 10-6, 30-4; Crowder, Unity, Heresy and Reform, 3, 6-8, 10, 31; Fryde, ‘King John and the Empire’, 336.
74 See Appendix D 6.1
75 Creighton, History of the Papacy, vol. 1, 108-11, 140-9, 151-7, 175-81; L. Mirot, La Politique Française en Italie de 1380 à 1422 (Paris: Picard, 1934), 28, 35; Darwin, Louis d’Orléans, 50; Bueno de Mesquita, Giangaleazzo Visconti, 155-8; Morrall, Gerson and the Great Schism, 6-75; Chamberlin, Count of Virtue, 150; Barraclough, The Medieval Papacy, 168, 173-7; Renouard, trans., Bethell, The Avignon Papacy, 72-9; Crowder, Unity, Heresy and Reform, 3. Note on the contemporary solutions to the schism. The via facti was the movement which aimed to resolve the schism by violent means until one side had finally triumphed. The via cessionis was the solution which desired to see both candidates resign their crowns in order to allow normal order to be restored. The via concilii, was the proposal which would have sought a resolution through conciliar debate between all of the ecclesiastical parties.
The schism of 1378 provoked a wide range of problems, not the least of which were reactions against the orthodoxy dictated by the two papal factions. In England, John Wyclif’s works became increasingly popular and gave rise to the Lollard movement, and consequently encouraged the rise of the Hussites in Bohemia. In France, most of the French nobility, led by Louis of Anjou, king of Naples, Louis of Orleans and the French king, when lucid, demonstrated a firm adherence to Clement VII and, initially, to his successor Benedict XIII. In contrast, the French clergy appeared determined to show a measure of independence by debating the matter. Royal commands suppressing ecclesiastical debate were relaxed in time, and the notion of subtracting allegiance from the Avignon pope gained prominence. Benedict was from Aragon and a seemingly abrasive character, and friction soon arose between him and the French, aiding the campaign to abandon him in the pursuit of healing the rift in the church. In tandem, Philip of Burgundy controlled the government; he envisaged a different path for France. In 1398 therefore the French withdrew their allegiance and sent troops to besiege Benedict at Avignon. The fact that the besieging army was commanded by Geoffrey de Boucicaut, the marshal’s brother, stands as another indication of the party directing the French court at that time. Perhaps to underline this Burgundian domination of court, rebellious vassals across the southern lands most often associated with Louis of Orleans’s hegemony were brought to heel by royal armies lead by Marshal

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However, by 1402 Louis had assumed lead of the government, during which time he and his ally, Waleran, comte de St Pol, issued personal challenges to Henry IV, and a more aggressive policy towards England was defined. Consequently, the crown’s position on the schism also changed; the siege of Avignon was eased and finally lifted in 1403 after Benedict’s escape into the hands of Robert de Braquemont, a Norman Orleanist, was effected in March of that year. French obedience to Benedict XIII resumed in May 1403 while court and government were directed by Louis. Although he never returned to Avignon, Benedict retained staunch Orleanist support, which benefitted his cause while they remained in control in Paris. Although Louis’s dominance only lasted a few short years, this provided the window of opportunity exploited by both sides in this French-Welsh alliance. The Orleanist ascendancy forms the critical backdrop to the connection with Owain Glyn Dŵr and they appear to have wasted no time in undertaking joint actions.

However, this is not to represent Owain Glyn Dŵr as an Orleanist creation; he had come to wider prominence by virtue of his military successes and diplomatic efforts. By the end of 1402, Owain had won small but notable military successes at Hyddgen and Radnor in June and August 1401, as well as at Ruthin in April the following year, where he defeated and took prisoner his local enemy, Lord Grey. Shortly after, Henry IV paid a substantial ransom to secure Grey’s release. On 22 June 1402, Owain’s forces defeated an English army in open battle at Bryn Glas. Its commander, Edmund Mortimer, acting earl of March, was

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83 Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 2, 654-7; Jarry, La Vie Politique de Louis de France, 221; Creighton, History of the Papacy, vol. 1, 157-9, 176; d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 66; Pillement, Pedro de Luna, 94-113; Vaughan, Philip the Bold, 47; Renouard, trans., Bethell, The Avignon Papacy, 76-8. (Note: Geoffroy would later find himself among both the Orleanists and the Burgundians, underlining the shifting adherences of the French nobility.)


85 Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 3, 71-6; Jarry, La Vie Politique de Louis de France, 221, 282; Creighton, History of the Papacy, vol. 1, 159, 175-7; Pillement, Pedro de Luna, 114-26; Vaughan, Philip the Bold, 47; Morrall, Gerson and the Great Schism, 63-4.

86 Creighton, History of the Papacy, vol. 1, 159, 177-9; Pillement, Pedro de Luna, 112-3; Vaughan, Philip the Bold, 47; Morrall, Gerson and the Great Schism, 63-4; Grèvy-Pons, Ornano and Ouy, eds., Jean de Montreuil, Opera, vol 1, 79-82, 86-8, 93-102; Renouard, trans., Bethell, The Avignon Papacy, 78.

87 Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 39-40, 48-9, 150-1; Davies, Revolt, 107, 266, 333.

88 CPR 1401-5, 155-6, 171; Davies, Revolt, 233.
Possibly due to the theoretically superior Mortimer claim to the English throne, Henry refused to pay the earl’s ransom, which offended certain nobles, such as Henry Percy junior, Edmund’s brother-in-law. Inevitably, this caused Mortimer to turn rebel, altering the value of Bryn Glas beyond simply a fine military victory – the largest English force between Bristol and Chester had been brutally massacred – and making it a success with a more profound potential. Mortimer’s ancestry entitled him to a more direct claim to the English throne than the incumbent Henry, although Edmund’s two nephews, who were minors, were senior to him in that respect. The adherence of a senior English noble, in genealogical terms at least, offered the possibility of recruiting those loyal to him and those opposed to Henry, but unwilling to side with any non-English power. In time, it might also offer an opportunity to the French to acquire and advance a legitimate candidate to oppose Henry. A few months after capture, Mortimer appealed to his tenants and the border gentry to support his cause, which he couched in pro-Ricardian terms. Bryn Glas also proved to be one of the key triggers for the collapse of the English administration of Wales; tax revenues and judicial functions withered in its aftermath. Although the English hold over Wales was not entirely relinquished, it was reduced to near irrelevance at that time. Although not all coastal and border castles were taken or besieged, they no longer functioned in their designated purposes. Their military roles of controlling their locality or conducting punitive operations against the Welsh clearly ceased. A number of them were taken by assault or the towns in their lee were destroyed, demonstrating that even their basic protective function was compromised by Glyn Dŵr. Simultaneously, their administrative uses declined rapidly; legal and tax roles were no longer fulfilled. It might be fair to conclude that by 1404, the castles represented only a financially draining presence within Wales.

88 Riley, Ypodigma Neustriæ, 394; POPCE, vol 1, 185-6; Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 50-2, 152-3; Davies, Revolt, 107-8, 179-80.
92 F.C. Hingeston, Royal and Historical Letters during the reign of Henry IV (London: Longman et al, 1860), vol 1, 138-40 (Llandovery), 141-3 (Builth, Cantref Selyf and Bryn Llys), 144-5 (Brecon under attack), 146-8 (Brecon again), 149-51 (Llandeilo, Newtown and fighting at Carmarthen), 152-4 (news from Abergavenny), 155-9 (Welsh invade Herefordshire), 160-2 (Welsh, French and Bretons at Kidwelly).
French sources identified revolts against Bolingbroke’s accession as being pro-Ricardian counter-revolutions. While that was the case with the Epiphany rising in 1400, and the Percy revolt of 1403 evoked Richard’s name, it would be incorrect to label the violence in Wales as such. The repeated revolts of senior nobles opposed to Henry demonstrated significant points of discontent among England’s elite.

Before Glyn Dŵr had clearly established his noble credentials and openly demonstrated his military worth, initial contacts between him and Charles VI were understandably clandestine. No record of direct diplomatic initiatives between the two has come to light in any known source pre-dating 1404. Evidence describing their early military co-ordination emerges from English sources; it therefore seems possible that other related evidence lies undisturbed in French archives. Letters written by Owain prior to 1404 show that he was actively seeking overseas aid, as well as communicating with influential men in Wales. Although this evidence shows Owain sought Scots and Irish help as early as 1401, cross-Channel connections are more elusive, yet evident. Four good examples stand out from the years 1401–3. The first, from late 1401, details the capture of a Welsh crusader taken at sea, allegedly acting as an envoy sent by the French court to Scotland to press a case for supporting Owain. This appears to be corroborated by an entry in the Chancery Rolls.

Moreover, excellent first-hand evidence from 1401 describes a 500-strong force of Welshmen in the personal service of Louis of Orleans around Paris.

‘One could already perceive the warning signs of the civil war. An undisciplined band of around five hundred Welshmen, without order or leader, who had abandoned the keep of several places in Guyenne under the pretext that they had not been paid their wages, had lived off pillage for a year and a half in the diocese of Paris without meeting any


96 Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 103-6 (Latin), 111-4 (English); Adam Usk, 148-53.

97 CPR, 1401 – 1405, 22 (for these acts of rebellion against England lands were seized in Pembroke belonging to ‘Gruffudd Goz ap David ap Yevan ap Gruffuth’; a name similar to that of the crusader named by Adam Usk, ‘Dauvit ap Ieuan Goz’ or ‘Dafydd ap Ieuan Goz’); C. Given-Wilson, ed. and trans., The Chronicle of Adam Usk, 1377-1421 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 148-9, n. 2.
opposition because these scoundrels claimed they were authorised by the duke of Orléans’. 98

Intriguingly, in 1403, Breton and French troops landed near Kidwelly and joined with Welsh rebels led by Henry Don assaulting the castle there. 99 Glyn Dŵr had written to Henry Don inviting him to join his cause. 100 This multi-national force cannot conceivably have been raised, joined and brought to the same battlefield in west Wales without prior agreement. This extension of the conflict to Britain’s coastline matched the martial success the French had enjoyed against English possessions in France, such as the capture of Mortagne and several places in the Limousin such as Corbefin. 101

Within a similar timeframe, throughout 1403 and early 1404, French, Breton and Castilian forces were particularly aggressive in the Channel region. During these ventures Dartmouth was taken and burned by the Bretons in early 1404, where one of their most renowned leaders, Guillaume du Châtel, fell in battle on English soil. Significantly, English sources recorded Welshmen among the captured Breton troops and crews. 102 Concurrently, a France-based sea captain named Jean d’Espagne attacked Caernarfon and Harlech from the sea in late 1403 and early 1404, landing French troops to assist the Welsh who were laying sieges there. 103 These highly significant events, although noted elsewhere, have passed largely without comment or contextualisation. As with the attack on Kidwelly, such cooperation cannot have happened without prior discussion, agreement and possibly

98 Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 3, 14-5, my translation of ‘On pouvait déjà remarquer des signes précursors de la guerre civile. Une bande indisciplinée d’environ cinq cents Gallois, sans ordre et sans chef, qui avaient abandonné la garde de quelques places en Guienne sous prétexte qu’on ne leur payait point leur solde, vivait de pillage depuis un an et demi dans le diocèse de Paris, sans rencontrer d’opposition, parce que ces misérables se disaient autorisés par le duc d’Orléans.’ Or ‘Jam quasi guerrarum imminencium signam quedam acephala vilis concio et inepta Wallensium fere quingentorum que, relicta custodia quorumdam municipiorium Guienne, sub pretextu non persoluti stipendii, in Parisiensi episcopatu per annum et dimidium victualia hinc inde rapuerat, nemine contradicente, quoniam auctoritate ducus Aurelianis fungebantur.’ Note: There is no mention of these deserters in any secondary source, but the recruitment and retention of such a force in Louis’s service is significant. Previously unrevealed, no more has yet been discovered about them; however, it seems probable that these men provided connections and intelligence vital to French relations with Glyn Dŵr.

99 Hingeston, RHL, vol 1, 160-2; CPR, 1401-5, 319; Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 76; Davies, Revolt, 192, 274-5.

100 Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 105-6, 113-4.


reconnoitring, and most probably with guidance from men familiar with those waters and lands. Later evidence showed that seafarers from Wales had almost certainly acted as pilots and guides for the French fleets. In riposte, English fleets took reprisals on Brittany’s coastal villages.

Although they bore no official endorsement, it seems highly unlikely that they sailed without official awareness or covert sanction. Indeed, these missions, when viewed as an ensemble, suggest that a campaign to wrest Wales from Henry was already being implemented. Given the strength of the French and the Bretons it would obviously be beneficial for Glyn Dŵr to win their friendship. Teasingly suggestive traces of other men, probably Welshmen serving in Brittany, surface in the ducal financial accounts during this period.

Jean d’Espagne’s voyages would certainly have imparted to the French important logistical information on the scale of the tasks faced in Wales. They would then have been precisely aware of the distances and hazards between their home ports and possible target areas. In addition they had experienced the speed and size of the English naval response to threats in the west. It is notable that ships from Bristol had unsuccessfully hounded Jean d’Espagne; for his flotilla appears to have remained in the waters around north Wales for months after, possibly into 1405. It was probably these troops who jointly cleared Anglesey of English forces in perhaps just one bloody encounter. The substantial intelligence gained from these joint campaigns would have been of notable value for French fleet preparations in subsequent years.

Therefore, the French, Bretons and Castilians were demonstrably engaged with the Welsh rebels after Louis of Orleans came to prominence at court and prior to signing the treaty in

104 Davies, Revolt, 231.
105 Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 3, 197-201; Riley, Ypodigma Neustriae, 403 ; Preest, Chronica Maiora, 349, 361.
107 POPCE, vol 1, 221, vol 2, 83-4.
108 RHL Henry IV, vol 2, 15-17, 22-4; Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 80-2; Davies, Revolt, 193. Note: Lloyd and Davies disagree on the year of these events in Anglesey. Lloyd suggested 1404, Davies 1405; the latter seems most likely.
summer 1404. It might be accurate to view the revolt led by Glyn Dŵr, by this point, as escalating beyond a peasant movement based in the Welsh uplands, and becoming part of a wider conflict involving several nations fighting at sea, as well as seeing combats on English, French, Breton and Welsh lands. So, even prior to making the treaty in 1404, these missions clearly demonstrate overt endeavours to project French power onto Britain, and they evidently sought to engage the Welsh as partners. In addition, it might be reasonable to view this example of France seeking a range of allies of varying power and location as being consistent with the policies of Louis VII, Philip Augustus and Charles V, as demonstrated in previous chapters. This therefore identifies an enduring, well-developed practice or, perhaps in other terms, a long-term strategy or ‘French method’. Also, on a point of analysis, the gifts of wine, weaponry and advice offered to Glyn Dŵr, combined with the enticement of a military alliance with France also suggest a further demonstration of the French wisely, seductively, deploying Nye’s ‘soft power’ in the first years of the fifteenth century.109 Consequently, the French perceptibly invested resources into this refound connection. In order to give their union a conception of legitimacy, and to enable the French to consider overtly fuelling the revolt, this growing relationship required the mechanism of an alliance.

Treaty Documents.

The three relevant, extant documents that comprise the 1404 ‘Treaty of Alliance’ between Charles VI and Owain Glyn Dŵr are the commission to Owain’s ambassadors, Gruffydd Yonge and John Hanmer, dated 10 May (J392. 27.), the treaty document was completed in two stages on 14 June and 14 July (J623. 96 bis) and Owain’s ratification of the alliance on 12 January 1405 (J623. 96.). Although the first document shows Owain’s ambassadors travelled to Paris, the text of the commission they bore strongly suggests that the French had begun proceedings, expressing affection for Owain and acting in a manner beneficial to him prior to May 1404.110

Image 1: J392. 27. Owain’s commission to Gruffydd Yonge and John Hanmer.111

110 Rymer, Fœdera, vol 8, 356 (Commission), 365-8 (Treaty), 382 (ratification); Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, J392.27. (Commission) 23-4 (Latin), J623. 96 bis (Treaty) 25-31 (Latin), and J623. 96. (Ratification) 32-9 (Latin), all of which are translated in one tangled, non-chronological document, 75-82 (English). Note: I have consulted the originals at the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris (now in the Archives Nationales though). Although the modern re-edition of Matthews’s work contains recently-collated information on him, it is otherwise a facsimile reprint of the original. The page numbers are therefore identical for either edition, although I used Matthews’s original. D. Rees and J. G. Jones, eds., Thomas Matthews’s Welsh Records in Paris (Cardiff: UWP, 2010). I have also consulted J516B.40 (Pennal pre-amble) and J516.29 (Pennal Declaration) but not that of the Tripartite Indenture (Sloan ms. 1776; Reg. Ms. 13), for which I rely on Matthews, 108-10 (Latin), 116-7 (English).

The first document of the 1404 treaty is a commission to Owain’s ambassadors to act in his place during these negotiations. The leaders of that embassy were named as Gruffydd Yonge, Owain’s Chancellor, Doctor of Canon Law and acting bishop of Bangor, and John Hanmer, Owain’s brother-in-law, a minor English noble, although ranked in the treaty as ‘scutifer consanguinei’ (sic). However, it is clear that they led a larger party, since one clerk, a legally-trained notary, named himself in the document and indicated that others were also present. He was ‘Benedict Comme, clerk of the diocese of St Asaph, notary public by apostolic authority’, who also noted that he had delegated the document to be written by another since he was busy elsewhere.

These fragments concerning the embassy clearly demonstrate that the Welsh were able to constitute a party of envoys that conformed to the norms of the day. The more important ambassadorial missions of the period comprised a leading noble, preferably one of the royal blood, and a cleric of equivalent rank. Fowler identified the latter as ‘a bishop or archbishop, often the keeper of the king’s privy seal or chancellor’ who acted as the principal spokesman. In addition, late medieval embassies comprised a number of legal specialists to conduct and conclude the important diplomatic business at hand. It is therefore noteworthy that the Welsh, although apparently excluded from such high-ranking affairs since the fall of Gwynedd in 1282, clearly knew the requirements for diplomatic parties of the time. It is perhaps more striking that they were able to assemble a team capable of treating with and, by consequence, impressing the French sufficiently to conclude the alliance. It seems probable that by 1404 the French also wished this alliance to come into being. Nevertheless, this is one element of the Glyn Dŵr story that has not been previously considered and intimates that the Welsh were perhaps less isolated than has been be presumed. Gruffydd Yonge, it should be

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112 Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 23, 25, 27-31 (Latin), 75, 78 (English). Note: I am grateful to Professor Coss for pointing out that it should read ‘consanguinus’ however the transcription reads as above. Throughout this thesis I remain faithful to the versions presented in the original sources.
113 Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 31 (Latin), 81-2 (English).
114 Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 31, (Latin), ‘Benedictus Comme, clericus Assaviensis diocesis, publicus apostolica auctoritate notarius’ ... ‘presens intereful eaque sic fiery vidi et audivi et ideo hoc presens publicum instrumentum per alium me aliunde occupato fideliter scriptorium ad requisicionem et de consensus eorumdem dominorum procuratorum duplicatum publicavi’ 81-2 (English), ‘clerk of the diocese of St Asaph, notary public by apostolic authority ... caused this present public instrument to be faithfully written by another, as I was occupied in another manner, and with the consent of the same lords ambassadors duplicated.’
115 Fowler, Hundred Years War, 186-7; Cuttino, English Medieval Diplomacy, 8-10, 18; D. Waley, The Italian City Republics (London: Longman, 1988), 93-7.
116 Fowler, Hundred Years War, 186; Cuttino, English Medieval Diplomacy, 94.
noted, was valued enough by the French to serve not only at the Council of Constance, 1414-1418, but also as an ambassador for the French and the Scots. Regarding the 1404 embassy, the treaty text reveals that Yonge and Hanmer were empowered to discuss, agree and confirm a treaty with the French. They were also given leave to write any necessary documents required and to act in Owain’s stead in the case of any special circumstances arising during negotiations. Remarkably, the commission appears to reveal the French as the instigators of the alliance; it mentions the ongoing affection shown by the French towards Owain and the Welsh, before declaring Glyn Dŵr’s desire for union with Charles. This infers that there was already a positive relationship between the two rulers, or their representatives. Also noteworthy is that the connection between Owain Lawgoch, the well-remembered Yvain de Galles to the French, and Owain Glyn Dŵr was evoked at this time. The same chronicle that recalled that previous Welsh-French link also revealed that Glyn Dŵr’s ambassadors made two requests when given an audience. These were to purchase as many arms as the French were willing to sell and transport to Wales, as well as seeking military support for their cause. Although the chronicler dressed the embassy in terms that stressed the bravery of the French, he also included mention that Glyn Dŵr lacked troops; a point he first raised with the Scots and the Irish in 1401. The tenor of the commission and the resultant treaty appear in keeping with the expected form of the time. Considering Glyn Dŵr’s earlier approaches to Henry Don of Kidwelly, which can be read as a veiled threat, also the letters to unknown Irish lords and the hopeful missive sent to Robert III, king of Scots, the documents of 1404 represent a notable improvement in the diplomatic standards of Owain’s regime. This correct tenor is perhaps most easily postulated as an accumulation of


118 Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 23-4 (Latin), 79-80, ‘Owynus, Dei gratia princeps Wallie, universis has litteras nostras inspecturis salutem. Noveritis quod propter affectionem et sinceram dilectionem quas erga nos et subdictos nostros illustriissimus princeps dominus Karolus eadem gratia Francorum rex hactenus gessit et sui gratia in dies gerit, sibi et suis, prout merito ad hoc tenemur, adherere desideramus.’ (English), ‘Owen, by the grace of God, Prince of Wales, to all who will examine these our letters, greeting. Know ye that on account of the affection and sincere regard which the illustrious prince, the lord Charles by the same grace, King of the French, has up to the present time borne towards us and our subjects, and of his grace bears daily, we desire to cleave to him and to his subjects, as by merit we are held to this purpose’.

119 Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 3, 164-5.

120 Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 3, 164-5.

121 Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 3, 164-5; Adam Usk, 148-53.

122 Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 103-6 (Latin), 111-4 (English); Adam Usk, 148-53.
experience, the acquisition of higher-level clerics in 1404 and, probably, the result of guiding discussions with agents of the French Crown.123 Perhaps to emphasize his legitimacy and confidence, the 1404 exchange also marks the first overt record of Owain presenting himself as ‘Prince of Wales’.124 Simultaneously, Owain decried those claims of ‘Henry of Lancaster’.125 Although the case of legitimacy need not be investigated at any length here, it might suffice to recall that it was an issue at the heart of the dispute which began the Hundred Years’ War. Any claimant who might detract from the Plantagenet assertion of legitimacy might hope to meet a favourable hearing at the French court.126

The French signatories present an intriguing picture of strained unity at the French court in summer 1404. However, close examination of the traceable personalities suggests Orleanist motivations played a hand in making this alliance and drove subsequent events.127 Assuming Fowler is correct in his assertion that it was recognised and accepted that French embassies were often without noble representation but were commonly led by a senior ecclesiastic, the rank and eminence of the French party conducting negotiations with Yonge and Hanmer either show that the French took Glyn Dŵr very seriously indeed or that they were intent on impressing that idea upon the Welsh with a substantial charm offensive.128

The first stage of the main treaty document was dated 14 June 1404 and confirmed the parameters of Glyn Dŵr’s ambassadors’ commission from the previous month and, more importantly, defined the terms of the alliance, discussed below. It also named Jacques de Bourbon, comte de la Marche, and Jean, bishop of Chartres as the principal negotiators on the French side.129 This agreement was copied and ratified in the French chancellor’s house in

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123 Riley, Ypodigma Neustriæ, 406; Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 16-8, 123-5; Davies, Revolt, 211-4.
125 Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 25, 26, 27 (Latin), 76 (English).
127 Jarry, La Vie Politique de Louis de France, Duc d’Orleans, 308-9.
128 Fowler, The Hundred Years War, 187.
129 Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 25, 28 (Latin), Jacobus/i de Borbonio, comitis Marchie, Johannis episcopi Carnotensis, 75, 78 (English) ‘James de Bourbon’.
Paris on 14 July. Present at this final concord were Arnaud de Corbie, chancellor, and three bishops, Jean of Arras, Philippe of Noyon and Pierre of Meaux, as well as Charles VI’s secretary and notary, ‘Johannes de Sanctis’, who completed the named ecclesiastical contingent. As Benedict Comme alluded, others were present but remained anonymous. Representing the nobility were Louis de Bourbon, comte de Vendôme, and lords Robert de Braquemont and Robert d’Amilly, both ‘knights of the chamber’.

Two of the four bishops involved have been easily traced. They represented the two adversarial parties within the French court. Jean Montagu, bishop of Chartres, was an illegitimate son of Charles V, and therefore half-brother to the king and Louis of Orleans. He was an opponent of Jean sans Peur, who had him beheaded in 1409. Jean Canard, bishop of Arras, was the long-serving chancellor of Philip the Bold’s court and a lifelong Burgundian. The other clergymen are not easily traceable, so their allegiance cannot be verified. Despite the fact that they all sat in dioceses north-east of Paris, this does not guarantee they were necessarily Burgundians. To underline that point, Jean Gerson was sponsored and paid a pension by Duke Philip yet he opposed the duke’s ecclesiastical policy. Among the knights, Arnaud de Corbie and Robert de Braquemont are easily identifiable. The latter was the Orleanist lord who received Benedict XIII on his escape from

131 Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 30-1 (Latin), ‘Ernaud/i de Corbeya, militis, cancellarii Francie, Phillippo Noviomensi, Petro Meldensi, Johanne Atrebatensi episcopis, Johannes de sanctis, Ludovico de Borbonio, Comite Vindocienssi, Roberto de Braquemont, Roberto d’Amilly, militibus dicti serenissimi principis regis Francorum cambellanis’, 81 (English), Matthews unhelpfully translated part of this as ‘and the reverend fathers and lords in Christ’, which it clearly does not say, rather ‘episcopis’ which would simply translate as ‘bishops’. The following is a selection of mentions of these men: Jarry, La Vie Politique de Louis de France, 282; d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 159 (all Braquemont); J. D. le Roux, La France en Orient au XIVe siècle: Expéditions du Maréchal Boucicaut, (Paris: Elibron, 2005, orig. 1886), 360 (Note: no trace of a ‘Robert d’Amilly’, could be found, ‘Robert de Milly’ was a faithful Burgundian), 362 (Braquemont, a devout Orleanist); H. Courteault, ed., Les Chroniques Du Roi Charles VII Par Gilles Le Bouvier, Dit Le Héraut Berry (Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1979), 36 n. 4. In addition, Lloyd identified these three as bishops, OG, 85, n 5. Therefore, the French party composed of three bishops would have constituted a very impressive embassy indeed. In addition, the notary ‘Jehan de Saints’ appears in many diplomatic negotiations of this period, see the below section titled ‘The Men Who ‘Killed’ Owain Glyn Dŵr’ for further examples.
132 Tuetey, Journal d’un Bourgeois de Paris, 6; Tuetey, Journal de Nicolas de Baye, vol 1, 65-7, 290-3; Jarry, La Vie Politique de Louis de France, Duc d’Orleans, 50; Courteault, Les Chroniques Du Roi Charles VII Par Gilles Le Bouvier, Dit Le Héraut Berry, 40-1; Knecht, The Valois, 44, 54-5. Note: ‘Montagu’ also appears as ‘Montaigu’ in sources, although there are others by that name around at this time.)
133 Mirot, La Politique Française en Italie de 1380 à 1422, 17 n. 35; Vaughan, Philip the Bold, 37, 71, 139-41, 143, 185, 199, 213, 223; Grévy-Pons, Ornato and Ouy, Jean de Montreuil, Opera, vol 1, 206; Vaughan, Valois Burgundy, 16, 83.
134 Morrall, Gerson and the Great Schism, 1-16; Vaughan, Philip the Bold, 201.
the siege of Avignon the previous year, and whose family long served the dukes of Orleans. While the chancellor can initially be placed loosely in royal obedience, since he served as the king’s chancellor, he later revealed himself as committed to the Burgundian cause, which was probably the case all along. However, the imposing presence of two counts of Bourbon is noteworthy. As princes of the blood, the Bourbons were connected to the crown itself, and the houses of Orleans and Burgundy alike. Duke Louis of Bourbon, these counts’ uncle, along with John, duke of Berry, openly acted as a counter to the ambitions of both houses, intervening militarily to block open conflict between them. Therefore, the French ambassadorial party balanced the interests of the two ascendant ducal factions; Burgundy and Orleans, as well as the crown, represented through the officials and the counterweight of the Bourbon counts. This group might have presented a vision of a united court, or ensured that each faction had a stake in all ongoing negotiations. Although Jacques de Bourbon openly held Burgundian sympathies throughout his life, Louis de Bourbon’s principal territory, the comté de Vendôme, was an appanage held of the duke of Orleans. However, in view of its innate aggressive stance against Henry and England, this alliance must be considered Orleanist in founding and interest. As a further measure of this being an Orleanist drive, it is noteworthy that France made no such overtly hostile moves against England while Philip the Bold was alive. His death in April 1404 allowed Louis of Orleans to acquire more control over the government. The alliance with Glyn Dŵr was a

135 Bellaguet, Saint-Denis, vol 3, 70-1; Creighton, History of the Papacy, vol. 1, 177; Renouard, trans., Bethell, The Avignon Papacy, 78; le Roux, La France en Orient au XIVe siècle, 362; Lannette-Claverie, Collection Joursanvault, 9, (Guillaume de Braquemont, 1392) 13, 35, (Guillaume de Braquemont, 1394), 66, (Lyonnet alias Lyonnel de Braquemont, 1398), 213-4 (Richard de Braquemont, 1431).
136 Tuetey, Journal de Nicolas de Baye, vol 1, 65-7, vol 2, 30 (Chancellor again under Burgundian domination in 1411); Jarry, La Vie Politique de Louis de France, Duc d’Orléans, 405; Mirot, La Politique Francaise en Italie de 1380 à 1422, 5 (Chancellor of France 1388-98, 1400-5, 1409-12. The latter is noteworthy since this falls in the period of Jean sans Peur’s brutal regime that mounted a bloody persecution of Orleanists in Paris); d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 66 (opposed to Benedict XIII); Vaughan, Philip the Bold, 57; H. Courteault, Les Chroniques Du Roi Charles VII Par Gilles Le Bouvier, Dit Le Héraut Berry, 48; Schnerb, L’Etat Bourguignon, 153.
137 See Appendix D 6: Genealogical Tables of the French Royal Princes. d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, also contains and impressive all-connecting family tree.
138 Bellaguet, Saint-Denis, vol 3, 16-9; Vaughan, Philip the Bold, 56; Schnerb, L’Etat Bourguignon, 153.
139 Tuetey, Journal de Nicolas de Baye, 264, 306; d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 138; Vaughan, Philip the Bold, 66, 68 (Nicopolis); Vaughan, John the Fearless, 33-4; Lannette-Claverie, Collection Joursanvault, 311-2; Courteault, Les Chroniques Du Roi Charles VII Par Gilles Le Bouvier, Dit Le Héraut Berry, 48; Schnerb, L’Etat Bourguignon, 153.
140 Jarry, La Vie Politique de Louis de France, 226-34, 308-9, 318-9; Darwin, Louis d’Orléans, 58-9; d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 54-5, 74, 76.
clear statement of his intent to make war on Henry IV. In addition, Louis demonstrated a personal connection to this mission by sending along men from his own household, paying for their equipment from his own accounts.\footnote{Lannette-Claverie, \textit{Collection Joursanvault}, 77, (1404) : ‘Mandement de Louis, duc d’Orléans, à son conseiller Jehan Le Flament de faire payer par son trésorier général Jehan Poulain à Jehan de Rouvroy, son échanson, et à George de Helencourt, son panetier, la somme totale de 100 Francs pour les aider à s’équiper en vue du voyage que fait en Galles le comte de La Marche.’}

It is noteworthy that in spite of the disparity in the allies’ power and their apparently long absence from international diplomacy, the composition of Glyn Dŵr’s embassy mirrored the form, if not the size and eminence, of that of the French by containing men of the blood and the cloth, as well as legal specialists.\footnote{Fowler, \textit{The Hundred Years War}, 186-7.} Nevertheless, these documents paint a scene of several meetings between the envoys, to discuss the direction of the alliance, attended all the while by numerous scribes, whose identities are lost. In the treaty, the ambassadors exchanged promises, swearing for their masters on the holy gospels of God.\footnote{Matthews, \textit{Welsh Records in Paris}, 27-8 (Latin), 78 (English), ‘ad sancta Dei envagelia per nos et utrumque nostrum tacta bene et fideliter tenere, attendere et complere ac eciam firmiter et inviolabiter observare’, ‘...each of us, each article well and faithfully to hold, keep, comply, and even inviolably observe.’} The alliance was then born in principle; and its details defined its nature and limits.
1404 Treaty Clauses

Following the usual politesses, in which the French generously addressed ‘the illustrious and most dreaded lord’ and ‘the magnificent and powerful Owen, Prince of the Cymry’, the treaty comprised eleven clauses to bind the rulers of France and Wales.  

Although all will be briefly touched upon, a few require slightly more in-depth examination because of their overall or later relevance. For example, the first gives the reason for this alliance:

In the first place, that the said lords the king and the prince shall be mutually joined, confederated, united, and leagued by the bond of a true covenant and real friendship, and of a sure, good, and most powerful union against Henry of Lancaster, and (sic: ‘an’) adversary and enemy of both parties, and his adherents and supporters.

This reveals the unambiguous motivation for the treaty; it specifically targeted Henry and his adherents. Although this is unsurprising, it is noteworthy for two reasons. Treaties of this period studied appear to be most frequently made for specific, immediate reasons, and not at times when there is no threat or need for mutual protection. This treaty, however, does not promise a permanent alliance as might be understood by other contemporary treaties which bound the signatories, their heirs and successors. The reason for Owain’s hostility towards Henry requires no expansion here, but it suggests that the French were intent on removing Henry from the throne. Clearly, this demonstrates an effort to assert their will over British politics and military affairs, using the Welsh as partners. One factor was French ire over Henry’s treatment of Charles’s daughter Isabella. His treatment of her, Richard II’s bride and still a teenager in 1404, had caused her uncle, Louis of Orleans, to challenge Henry to a duel. Louis’s ally, Waleran, comte de St Pol, also issued a similar defiance to Henry. The second and probably main reason was perhaps a perception that the new king’s tenure on the crown was weak enough to challenge. It is significant that, in signing this treaty with

\[\text{Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 25, 28 (Latin), 75, 78 (English,) ‘illustris et metuendissimi domini’} \]
\[\text{‘magnifici et potentis Owini principis Walliarum’. Note: Matthews’s use of ‘Cymry’ appears noteworthy, when ‘Welsh’ would have been equally appropriate.} \]
\[\text{Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 25 (Latin), 76 (English). ‘Primo quod ipsi domino rex et princeps erunt amodo ad invicem conjuncti, confedere, uniti et ligati vinculo vere federis et vere amicicie certeque et bone unionis, potissime contra Henricum de Lencastria utriusque ipsorum adversarium et hostem suosque adherentes et fautores.’} \]
\[\text{Cuttino, English Medieval Diplomacy, 13-8. No continuity appears in these French-Welsh documents until the Pennal Declaration, discussed below, in which Owain vows to continue to fight Henry, his heirs and successors, Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 23-54, 75-99.} \]
\[\text{Johnes, Monstrelet, 55-83; Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 3, 55-61; Douët-d’Arco, Monstrelet, 43-69; Given-Wilson, ‘The Quarrels of Old Women’ 28-47.} \]
\[\text{Johnes, Monstrelet, 84-6; Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 3, 116-21; Douët-d’Arco, Monstrelet, 67-9.} \]

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Owain, the French were preparing to openly breach the twenty-eight year truce with England signed in 1396. This shows a different policy direction within the French administration at that time and clearly underlines the Orleanist influence in government. It also suggests that they envisaged an opportunity to damage or remove Henry and that they recognised Owain as a suitable ally with whom to intrigue. Also of import is that the treaty does not mention England or its people anywhere. Henry and his adherents are identified as the enemy, and therefore this was not necessarily intended to start a war against the English in general, but rather an aspiration to decapitate the English regime. Nevertheless, this personal approach and aggressive new direction were indisputably Orleanist in flavour.

The next three articles of the treaty covered predictable promises that they would help one another against Henry, that they would act as ‘true and faithful friends’ toward one another, that they would warn the other if they became aware of Henry plotting against them and also act to hinder those plans.\(^{149}\) This perhaps reveals an intention to move against the Burgundians, rather than being of relevance to Owain. Next, the terms of the treaty made clear that each lord would ‘punish in such manner that shall give an example to the others’ any of their people who aided Henry in any way, even if either leader were brought to peace.\(^{150}\) Although the latter might appear at first glance to have been aimed more specifically at the Welsh, who had recently served in numbers in English armies, this notion should also be balanced against the knowledge that Frenchmen in English territories also served, and French princes of the blood, notably Louis, had recently sought Henry’s friendship.\(^{151}\) Perhaps, then, this also reveals an Orleanist drive to the treaty and as an instrument to sever ties to England, whereas Burgundian financial interests were firmly connected to English trade with Flanders.\(^{152}\)

The sixth clause determined that each party would discuss any peace moves and give the other one month to respond. Clearly, this insists that the French and the Welsh were to represent one another or include the other in any peace negotiation with the English. This

\(^{149}\) Matthews, *Welsh Records in Paris*, 26 (Latin), 76 (English) ‘verum et fidum amicum bono’ (the ending of ‘bono’ is noted, but faithfully presented in accordance with the transcription here), Matthews translated this as ‘good and faithful friends’, however ‘true’ seems better.


notion has precedence in a number of other alliances, perhaps most obviously that between France and Scotland.\footnote{Riley, Ypogdma Neustriæ, 359; Cuttino, English Medieval Diplomacy, 84; Preest, Chronica Maiora, 291.} This apparently formulaic but bonding clause becomes significant at a critical point later and will be revisited below.

Again, that one of the lords, the king and the prince aforesaid, shall not make or take truce nor make peace with the aforesaid Henry of Lancaster, but that the other might be included if he had wished in the same truce or peace, unless he is united or did not wish to be included in the same truce or peace, and he shall determine, concerning such refusal or rejection, who wished to treat for the said truce or peace, within a month after the one shall have signified the said truce or peace, by his letters patent, sealed by his seal.\footnote{Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 26 (Latin), 76-7 (English).} Next, the French agreed to seize shipping in their ports which did not carry letters of testimony from either lord. Although this might have been motivated by a French desire to easily acquire mercantile goods and shipping, it was also of military importance and might give them the upper hand in the channel. Shipping was most probably used to spy on the other side’s ports, coasts and particularly on other shipping, such as the gathering of invasion fleets. This was evident in late 1404 when the English were able to send ample warning of the gathering fleet in Sluys and Harfleur intended to invade Wales that year.\footnote{Fœdera, vol 8, 374; Hingeston, RHL Henry IV, vol 1, 281-2, 329-34, 367-70, 376-80, 384-5.} Therefore, controlling movements from ports was another way of controlling the flow of information and logistical necessities, as well as weakening the enemy’s commerce. Without such intelligence, England's coastal defence depended on ships from its own ports and shore-based watches giving news. A purely reactive defence such as this is less efficient and would put England at a disadvantage.

The next two clauses appear formulaic; the first is a promise of redress, stating that should the two lords or their subjects fall out, then this should be resolved amicably and their quarrel ended peacefully, and next that this covenant was binding and sealed with promises, and both parties were reminded of that.\footnote{Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 26-7 (Latin), 77 (English).} The penultimate clause empowered the ambassadors to make promises and vows in their lord’s place and, having touched holy relics,
the union was final and binding. Then followed a clause which seemed to absolve all men, no matter of their ‘race or subjection’, of previous pledges to Henry.158

This can be construed as touching both parties and those friendly to them; since the Welshmen, Frenchmen and others they hoped to then engage had served the English crown in a variety of roles. This clause served as a release from any oath and legitimised actions henceforth taken against Henry. There were two obvious benefactors of this. Louis, who had been Henry’s ally during his exile at the French court; this served as an official renunciation of that tie had the duel challenges not reached a wider audience. Also, the Bretons, many of whom had served the English crown prior to its withdrawal from Brittany in 1397.159 By this time, apart from supporting French, Castilian and Welsh attacks, the Bretons were clearly in conflict with England at sea and on land.160 England had finally relinquished its last stronghold in Brittany in 1397, leaving a bitter legacy.161 Although their candidate, Jean de Montfort, had triumphed over the French-supported duke, Charles de Blois, in 1364, English captains in situ had exacted a heavy financial toll from the Bretons since that victory.162 Jean de Montfort died in 1399 and his son Jean, the new duke, owed England less than his father. Henry machinated to prolong English influence in Brittany by marrying the Jean V’s mother in 1403.163 The Bretons showed active opposition to this and a maritime conflict began between them and the English. While largely a spectacle of coastal raids and counter-attacks, there were a few incidents of note, mentioned above.164

158 Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 27 (Latin), 77 (English). ‘Ab istis autem confederacionibus et ligis excipuntur pro parte dictorum dominorum nostrorum Regis et principis omnes illi qui racione generis seu subjectionis, dumtamen subditi prefati Henrici Lancastrie non existant aut pretextu ligarum precedencium erant sibi antea federati.’ ‘However, all those who by reason of their race or subjection, while subjects of the aforesaid Henry of Lancaster, shall not appear, or by pretext of former treaties previously federated, shall be excepted from these covenants and leagues.’
159 Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 2, 675-7, 701-3; Douët-d’Arcaq, Choix De Pièces Inédite, vol 1, 157-60; M. Jones, Ducal Brittany, 1364-1399 (Oxford: OUP, 1970), 114-42.
160 Fœdera, vol 8, 358 (Tanguy du Chastel with Breton and Welsh prisoners); Bellaguet, Chronique du Religieux de Saint-Denys, vol 3, 171-81; History of the Royal Navy, vol 2, 351-4, 355-8, 361-6; Jones, Ducal Brittany, 1364-1399, 103-6, 158-60, 165.
162 Jones, Ducal Brittany, 1364-1399, 143-71; Cassard, ‘Anglais et Bretons dans le duché sous Jean IV’, 21-42.
163 Riley, Ypodigma Neustriæ, 397; Bouchart, Les Grandes Chroniques de Bretaigne, composées en l’an 1514, 172; Jarry, La Vie Politique de Louis de France, 278; Darwin, Louis d’Orléans, 60-1; Vaughan, Philip theBold, 52-3, Preest, Chronica Maiora, 325.
164 Fœdera, vol 8, 358 (Tanguy du Chastel with Breton and Welsh prisoners); Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 3, 171-81; Nicolas, History of the Royal Navy, vol 2, 351-4, 355-8, 361-6; Courteault, Les Chroniques Du Roi Charles VII Par Gilles Le Bouvier, Dit Le Héraut Berry, 12.
Since legality and legitimacy were highly important matters to establish prior to military action, this clause releasing them from oaths is significant. The allies were then free to engage others in this contest. In light of this, it is probably significant that Breton fleets and soldiers were involved in the conduct of attacks on English interests in Wales, England and at sea at this time. The Bretons comprised notable elements of the force assembled following the conclusion of this treaty, as well as being instrumental in the 1405 invasion, discussed below. It might also be that the previous clause pertaining to the seizure of shipping would also particularly appeal to the Bretons whose naval power might be augmented by the removal of English vessels from the Channel. However, even before the second signing of the alliance document in Paris on 14 July 1404, the French demonstrated their intentions to engage their allies in this venture by seeking Castilian support. On 7 July 1404, the senior Bourbon, Duke Louis, wrote to the king of Castile and Leon requesting ships for the mission to Wales while the French simultaneously gathered their own fleet in Channel ports. The letter began with a warm, friendly passage which showed that Louis de Bourbon knew the king and his relations well. He then asked for forty armed ships because ‘the king has ordered my very dear and well-beloved cousin, the Count of March, to proceed shortly to Wales with one thousand lances and five hundred crossbowmen; who will set out shortly to embark in Brittany, and from thence to Wales.’ The French requested the Castilians to rendez-vous with the comte de la Marche in Brittany on 15 August that year and then to accompany him to Wales. There, Louis revealed the force ‘will find a good entry aided and assisted, in order to attack, harass, and injure the English, our enemies.’ Seemingly, Louis then threatened the Castilians, ‘And in this may you not fail us.’ Louis then finished with an amicable flourish. Nevertheless, this letter demonstrates French diplomatic style in action; far from being a jumble of polite, inconclusive phrases, the expedition organisers expected Castilian support and showed no timidity in making that plain.

The contemporary Castilian account eulogising one of its noblemen, Pero Niño, records the arrival of a letter from France that largely replicates the intentions declared by

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166 Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 107 (French), 115 (English). The above is Matthews’s imperfect translation of ‘le Roy a ordonné mon très cher et très amé cousin le comte de la Marche d’aller briefvement às parties de Galles atout mil lances et V.C. arbale striers ; lequel se partira prouchainement pour monter en mer ès parties de Bretaine et d’illec de Galles.’
Louis de Bourbon. The account of the Castilian expedition renders a beautiful description of the journey, from the Spanish court to that of France, detailing their camaraderie, giving tales of battles, victories and repulsion by local forces during the mission which ravaged England’s southern coast. During one descent onto English soil they discovered that the land had been emptied of men by Henry IV who summoned them to go and fight Owain in Wales. In a noteworthy addition, Pero Niño’s tale recalled how the duke of Orleans was in charge of the government at that time and paid the Castilians to become his men and wear his livery. Moreover, Pero was recruited by Louis of Orleans to replace the fallen Guillaume du Châtel and stand with six of Louis’s men in a combat between them and seven Englishmen, in a reproduction of a previous fight between seven of Louis’s men and seven of Henry’s. At that point, the Castilian biographer recalled how Niño’s bloodline and heraldic devices were also those of the French royal house.

The final document directly connected to the 1404 treaty, Owain’s ratification, appears to add little to the thrust of the alliance established in the previous documents and contributes no discernibly new commentary for analysis. He signed it at Llanbadarn (Aberystwyth) on 12 January 1405 and returned his assent to France.

However, the French did not wait for Owain’s accord; the alliance came to life in summer 1404 with the French mustering of an invasion force led by Jacques de Bourbon, who had also signed the treaty. Its resounding failure, blamed squarely on Jacques de Bourbon, comte de la Marche, found scathing criticism in France. The fleet gathered slowly,

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168 Evans, The Unconquered Knight, 100-1; Carriazo, El Victorial, 139-40. Note: There is a slight uncertainty over the date, since the reprinted Spanish original bears no date, and the selected English translation incorrectly places the mission in 1405. Other events and personalities corroborate the notion that the Castilian expedition sailed in 1404. Furthermore, there is no known letter to Henry of Castile on any equivalent matter in 1405, and no records suggest any Castilian involvement in the Channel or the expeditionary force which landed in Wales in 1405. Moreover, the Spanish account describes how Guillaume du Châtel had been killed prior to the Castilian expedition. The English accounts from May 1404 detail their custody of his brother, Tanguy, among Breton and Welsh prisoners who were taken during Guillaume’s final attack: Johnes, Monstrelet, 102; Fœdera, vol 8, 356-8 (358 has ‘Tange de Chastell’ with Breton and Welsh, ‘Walensum armigerum’); Bellaguet, Saint-Denis, vol 3, 170-81; Evans, The Unconquered Knight, 117, 150-1; Carriazo, El Victorial, 195-6. In addition, Pero Niño’s mission was conducted with Charles de Savoisy, whose mission with the Castilians is clearly dated to 1404. Therefore, this French-Castilian attack must have fallen between Guillaume’s death in spring 1404 and before the successful landing in Wales by French-Breton forces in 1405. St Denys, vol 3, 158-61; Evans, The Unconquered Knight, 107-32; Carriazo, El Victorial, 186-215.

169 Evans, The Unconquered Knight, 100-34; Carriazo, El Victorial, 186-215.

170 Evans, The Unconquered Knight, 128; Carriazo, El Victorial, 211. See Appendix D 3.

171 Jarry, La Vie Politique de Louis de France, 285 ; d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 54-5; Evans, The Unconquered Knight, 141-2, 148-52; Carriazo, El Victorial, 223.

172 J623. 96. (Ratification); Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 32-9 (Latin), 75-82 (English).
so slowly that the English had the opportunity to attempt to burn those vessels idling in Brest harbour. The troops summoned were left waiting while Jacques de Bourbon vainly pursued some apparent love affair in Paris. When he finally arrived in port in mid-November, he proclaimed he could not go to Wales and so took to the sea in pursuit of merchant vessels. He made an ineffective landing near Dartmouth and swiftly withdrew. The affair wasted an opportunity; the weather had been fair, the troops assembled and prepared, and the Castilians had arrived. The shameful failure of Jacques de Bourbon was described venomously by the St Denis chronicler:

I am ashamed to have recounted the crossing of the French to Wales; by the fault of the count of March, the course and end of the expedition, far from appearing as it did at the beginning, became dismal for them... this retreat covered the count with infamy and left an indelible stain on his name. The princes of the fleur de lys did not forgive him for having forgotten that he was the issue of royal blood, and of having sullied his honour by his culpable negligence.

Nevertheless, an alliance between Charles VI and Owain Glyn Dŵr was given life and, according to the chronicler of St Denys, Owain received the gift of arms and armour subsequently sent by Charles thus:

The king [Charles VI], in order to give pleasure to the Prince of Wales [Glyn Dŵr], gave to the ambassador, at the moment of his departure, an all gold royal helmet, a cuirass and a sword, and charged him with delivering them from him to his brother. I learned from the Frenchmen who found themselves there when these presents were given to him, that he humbly received them on his knees covering them with kisses, as if he had received the king in person.

173 Johnes, Monstrelet, 88-9; Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 3, 164-8, 198-201, 222-7; Doué-d’Arcq, Monstrelet, 69-70; POPCE, vol 1, 264-6.
174 Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 3, 222-7, my translation of ‘J’ai quelque honte d’avoir annoncé le passage des Français dans le pays de Galles ; car par la faute du comte de la Marche, la suite et la fin de l’expédition, loin de répondre au commencement, leur devinrent très funestes (222-3) ... Cette retraite couvrit le comte d’infamie et imprima une tache ineffaçable à son nom. Les princes des fleurs de lis ne lui pardonnerent pas d’avoir oublié qu’il était issu du sang royal, et d’avoir souillé son honneur par son coupable négligence(226-7)’ or ‘Pudet me in Walliam Francorum transitum tetigisse cum exordio eorum laudabili procesus et finis non respondente, duce eorum comite Marchie occasionem prebente, et revera in eorum intollerabile nocuentum ... Sic eciam comes cum probo perpetuo recessit, et perhenem acquisivit infamiam dolueruntque lilia aurea jure cognacionis vexilis deferentes, quod sic, non memor regii sanguinis, proprium honorem tanta culpa funestaverat.’
175 Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol. 3, 167, my translation of ‘Le roi [Charles VI], pour faire plaisir au prince de Galles [Glyn Dŵr], donna à l’ambassadeur, au moment de son départ, un casque royal tout doré, une cuirasse, et une épée, et le chargea de les offrir de sa part à son frère. J’ai su par les Français qui se trouvèrent là lorsque ces présents lui furent remis, qu’il les reçut humblement à genoux en les couvrant de baisers, comme s’il eût reçu le roi en personne’ or ‘ipsi interroganti que fratri inter caduca omnia plus placerent, repondisset arma bellica, eidem sic statuit complacere. Nuncio namque vale dicens, cassidem regiam deauratam, loricam et ensem loco enciourum principi presentandam nomine suo misit, que quidem, prout a Francis qui tunc interfuerunt didici,
cum tanta genuum flectione humili totque devotis osculis hoc gratum donum recepit, ac si regem personaliter recepisset”.

176 L. Deutsch, *Metronome Illustre* (Neuilly-sur-Seine: Michel Lafon, 2010), 6. This gives an idea of the level of skill and detail of French helmets contemporary to the one gifted to Glyn Dŵr.

Image 2: A golden parade helmet from the reign of Charles VI.¹⁷⁶
5.3: 1405: An Orleanist coup?

Item vii die Septembris, anno Domini ut supra receptum mandatum domini Thome, Dei gracia Cantuariensis archiepiscopi ad faciendum prossecionem singulis quartis et sextis feris pro expedicione domini regis et exercitus sui contra ducem Aurelianum qui cum cxliii navibus armatorum in portu de Milford applicuit in consolamen et refugium rebellium parcium Wallie.177

This opinion, expressed by the bishop of Hereford at the time, clearly identified the French invasion of west Wales as the duke of Orleans’s enterprise. It is worth considering here whether this expedition formed one integral part of a broader strategy, with this element enacted in 1405. The government, under Louis’s direction as regent, undertook other external diplomatic and military endeavours before and during that year. Therefore this section will consider the other events which might connect to the French incursion into Wales in 1405, as well as considering certain elements of that mission.

It is worth exploring the *modus operandi* of one of the principal protagonists, Louis of Orleans. This research has revealed that he was a practiced exponent of a strategy prevalent in this period: the construction of alliances prior to military action and territorial acquisition. The French expedition might therefore be largely attributable to his development and deployment of this policy common in medieval France, illustrated in previous chapters, probably motivated by his personal hatred of Henry IV. Throughout his political career, Louis was a propagator of alliances with noteworthy noble leaders of all ranks. Early in his quest for territory he appears to have solely cast his eye southwards, to Italy, perhaps to emulate the deeds of his uncle, Louis of Anjou. He acquired a Milanese alliance when he married Valentina Visconti in 1389.178 With that came the formation of an axis of power between Louis and the duke of Milan which, after his ascension in 1394, also included Benedict XIII in Avignon. While he was not averse to coercing obedience, as witnessed in

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177 J. H. Parry, ed., *Registrum Roberti Mascall. The Register of Robert Mascall, Bishop of Hereford (A.D. 1404-1416)* (Hereford: Cantilupe Society, 1916), 6. There is no official translation of this, however a summary of the relevant section above reveals that the bishop of Hereford recorded that a procession was ordered by Thomas, archbishop of Canterbury, for the expedition of the king against the duke of Orleans who had sent one hundred and forty-four armed vessels to Milford to support the rebels in Wales.

the submission of Savona in 1394, he evidently enjoyed diplomacy and intrigue. The coup by Philip of Burgundy and Queen Isabeau that thwarted Louis’s Italian ambitions forced him to look elsewhere for territory. He chose to look northwards, taking action against those who had revealed their hands in the south. There, between 1398 and 1407, Louis invested his energies and fortune in forging alliances among the lords of north-eastern France and the adjacent regions of the empire. Strikingly, in 1398, he held a number of closed meetings with the emperor, Wenceslas, and agreed an alliance with him. During this period he also attained the homage of the princes of Baden, Cleves, Guelders, Hainault, Lorraine, Nassau, Pont-à-Moussons, Saar, Saarwerden, Salm, as well as buying Luxemburg and the great lordship of Coucy, from whom he also attained homage. During Henry Bolingbroke’s exile in France from 1398-9, Louis and he became allies too.

Louis showed he was an advocate of classic bracketing strategy, splitting and encompassing Philip of Burgundy’s estates in northern and eastern France. He also remained faithful to Wenceslas in Bohemia and his wife’s family in Milan, bracketing in three directions the new emperor, Rupert, who had ousted Wenceslas and was allied to Philip and Isabeau. Effectively, this second, eastern, axis of power offered Louis the possibility of moving against his imperial adversaries and gave him a stake in imperial affairs; there is evidence to suggest he harboured ambitions towards the imperial crown. These coalitions were no paper tigers. The partners acted in military concert during 1402-5, and thereafter,

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179 Jarry, La Vie Politique de Louis de France, 134-63, 301-3, 438-9; Mirot, La Politique Française en Italie de 1380 à 1422, 42-5; Darwin, Louis d’Orléans, 21-2; d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 74; Pillement, Pedro de Luna, 108, 111, 131-2; Schnerb, Armagnacs et Bourguignons, 34-5, 49-50.

180 Darwin, Louis d’Orléans, 47-8 Schnerb, Armagnacs et Bourguignons, 55-6.

181 Doué-d’Arcq, Choix De Pièces Inédites, vol 1, 140-1; Darwin, Louis d’Orléans, 24-8, 48; d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 48; Pillement, Pedro de Luna, 89; Schnerb, Armagnacs et Bourguignons, 56.

182 des Ursins, Histoire de Charles VI, 409, 412; Jarry, La Vie Politique de Louis de France, 203-4, 272-5; Darwin, Louis d’Orléans, 24-8, 48; d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 74, 83; Courteault, Les Chroniques Du Roi Charles VII Par Gilles Le Bouvier, Dit Le Héraut Berry, 13-4, 17; Schnerb, Armagnacs et Bourguignons, 55-61.

183 des Ursins, Histoire de Charles VI, 407; Doué-d’Arcq, Choix De Pièces Inédites, vol 1, 157-60; Jarry, La Vie Politique de Louis de France, 228; d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 54.

184 Jarry, La Vie Politique de Louis de France, 272; Darwin, Louis d’Orléans, 19-21, 24-8, 30-3, 35-9, 48-9; d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 50-2; Pillement, Pedro de Luna, 112-3.

185 d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 74; Pillement, Pedro de Luna, 124-6; Courteault, Les Chroniques Du Roi Charles VII Par Gilles Le Bouvier, Dit Le Héraut Berry, 13-4.
pressing their joint interests from Italy to Luxemburg.\textsuperscript{186} Within this period, Louis also connected with the Scots and the Welsh, and it is tempting to view these, and possible links to Ricardian English rebels, as an effort to build another league of friendly powers linking Orleans with willing leaders in Britain.\textsuperscript{187} If Louis were following such a method outlined here, an alliance would be followed by an attack shortly afterwards.

As has been previously related, the striking failure of the de Bourbon mission in 1404 slighted the honour of France. Therefore, apart from fulfilling promises of assistance made to their new ally and consequently taking the war to the king of England, a mission in 1405 would redress the self-inflicted insult to the considerable honour of France. This was certainly the mood of the moment among the lay chroniclers:

\begin{quote}
Marshal de Rieux and the lord of Hugueville, considering the great dishonour there would be to the king if we did not go and help the Welsh, seeing as though the king had promised it, deliberated and decided to go there, and in fact they went there. In going they had a series of encounters at sea, as well as when they arrived in Wales, from where they returned with honour.\textsuperscript{188}
\end{quote}

The religious commentators too appeared to be of the same mind: ‘My lords the dukes of France, who controlled the government, wished to keep the promise of aid made to the prince of Wales, and at the same time repair the shameful failure of the comte de la Marche by some notable feat of arms.’\textsuperscript{189} Therefore, with their pride wounded, the French determined to send an army to Wales during the 1405 campaigning season. However, there were other diplomatic stages which preceded the arrival of the French fleet. Firstly, in January, Glyn Dŵr ratified the alliance treaty of the previous year and returned it to France.\textsuperscript{190} In addition,
combined Welsh-French troops overran Anglesey and won at least one bloody victory over crown forces.191 The French were probably those still acting under the aegis of the freebooter, Jean d’Espagne.192 February 1405 witnessed the drafting of another alliance, probably by proxy, known as the ‘Tripartite Indenture’.193 This leagued Glyn Dŵr, Edmund Mortimer and Henry Percy, earl of Northumberland. The aim was to form a military alliance purposed to dethrone Henry and crown the Mortimer heir, giving Percy control of the northern English counties, Mortimer the south and overall rule, and an expanded realm of Wales. An additional point of interest emerges from the indenture, which bound all three to defend the kingdom against ‘all men’. Dispensation was made exempting Glyn Dŵr from fighting ‘lord Charles, by the Grace of God, King of the French, in the league and the covenant made and completed between them’.194 Glyn Dŵr was then publically, Charles’s ally in ‘Greater Britain’, as the indenture termed it. Some have questioned this document’s authenticity.195 However, the lack of a convincing refutation, combined with subsequent events, make it appear valid. This treaty is the first indicator of an alliance between Glyn Dŵr and the Percys. No evidence other than tarnishing rumour has ever emerged regarding a union prior to Hotspur’s fateful revolt in July 1403.196 In fact, the contemporary evidence plainly demonstrates that Glyn Dŵr and his forces were campaigning in south-west Wales. The plethora of extant letters demonstrated the panic of local commanders at the size and destructive force of his army of June and early July 1403.197 From those letters it is clear that Glyn Dŵr was moving towards the south west, exactly the opposite direction from Percy at Shrewsbury and therefore it would have been impossible for their forces to have combined at that time. The letters from the garrison commanders to Henry and his council pre-date Hotspur’s revolt and passed through many pairs of hands en route to the king, making it perhaps inevitable that news of the Welsh attacks would spread before Hotspur announced his defiance.

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191 Hingeston, *RHL Henry IV*, vol 2, 15-17, 22-4; Lloyd, *Owen Glendower*, 80-2; Davies, *Revolt*, 193. Note: Lloyd and Davies disagree on the year of these events in Anglesey. Lloyd suggested 1404, Davies 1405; the latter seems most likely.
194 ‘domino Karolo Dei gratia Francorum Regi, in ligea et confederatio inter ipsos initis et factis praestito.’
195 Davies, *Revolt*, 166, 168.
196 Riley, *Ypodigma Neustriæ*, 399; Preest, *Chronica Maiora*, 327.
197 Hingeston, *RHL Henry IV*, vol 1, 138-40, 141-3, 144-5, 146-8, 149-51, 152-4, 155-9, 160-2. (Separate reports from crown commanders in south west Wales).
Constance, Lady Despencer, widow of the earl of Gloucester killed in the 1400 Epiphany Rising and sister of the duke of York, attempted to kidnap the Mortimer heirs, Edmund’s nephews, from Windsor and deliver them into Glyn Dŵr’s hands in February 1405. It seems unlikely that this was undertaken without conspiratorial premeditation. The attempt was thwarted at Cheltenham and the Mortimer minors were returned to the king for safe keeping. The Crown’s investigation into the matter revealed that Thomas Mowbray, Earl Marshal, had known about the plot but played no active part in it, and was therefore pardoned. The duke of York was sent to the Tower for his alleged but peripheral involvement, but was released after a few months and restored in 1406. Nevertheless, the plot is indicative of unseen connections between Glyn Dŵr and the very highest echelons of the English nobility. The movements of the earl of Northumberland are difficult to ascertain through these months. However, while the French were mustering and making preparations to set sail for Wales, Henry Percy was a major force behind an uprising centred on York which took place in early June 1405.

This large-scale, wide-spread northern revolt was nominally led by Richard Scrope, the archbishop of York, Thomas Mowbray, Earl Marshal and earl of Norfolk, Henry Percy, earl of Northumberland and Lord Bardolf. Scrope and Mowbray appear to have risen too early and were isolated from the alleged commanders of the movement and their additional troops. Duped into a parley with Ralph Neville, earl of Westmoreland, they were seized and executed a few days later. The extraordinary deed of executing an archbishop was roundly criticised, the Roman Pope, Innocent VII, vented his fury on the English ambassadors who related the event to him. The majority of rebels dispersed, returned home and were eventually pardoned, according to Adam of Usk, after removing their trousers, prostrating


199 Given-Wilson, Adam Usk, xxix-xxxi. An email exchange with Professor Given-Wilson on this matter in 2007 confirmed the difficulties and the overall uncertainty of the earl’s whereabouts during this time. The contemporary connection between Percy and the French is also alluded to by Walker, ‘The Yorkshire Risings of 1405: Texts and Contexts’, 165.


themselves on the ground and humbly begging. Others resisted militarily and held towns such as Berwick against Henry, eventually meeting brutal execution as traitors. Percy and Bardolf retreated to Scotland. The following year they were tried for treason in their absence. The articles are damning, but also very helpful for this research. Although it is difficult to ascertain to what extent the treason charges contain general defamations and slanders against the accused, there are several articles of note. They recounted the actions and movements of the York rebels in May and June 1405, justifying the execution of many of them for treason, and used the same evidence against Percy and Bardolf in absentia. Articles seven and eight categorically connect Percy to the Scots and French ambassadors in alliance, presenting hand-written evidence in Percy’s name and bearing his seal. Article nine is particularly compelling: a letter from Henry Percy to Louis of Orleans, whom Percy addressed as ‘tres haut & tres puissant Prince le Duc d’Orlions.’ The letter tells how Percy’s ambassadors had approached the king of France’s envoys in Scotland to discuss an alliance between them. The letter announced Percy’s intention and will, along with his allies, to continue the fight for King Richard, if still alive, and to avenge him if dead. Percy also said that he intended to continue the ‘just quarrel’ of the queen of England, ‘v[ot]re niece’, and to make war on Henry of Lancaster. Percy then acknowledged that Louis had sustained this quarrel and others against Henry, so he requested aid in this conflict and offered his support to the king of France. The letter is not dated within its text and, being situated among other evidence from summer 1405, it is tempting to assume it was written at that point. However it seems perhaps axiomatic that such an approach would pre-date the moment when the rebels found themselves in the field and therefore too committed for Louis to assist in their enterprise. Irrespective of the unsure dating, this letter demonstrates that Percy’s connection to France was not solely and vicariously through the Welsh. In addition, treason trial articles twelve and thirteen explicitly connected Percy to the rebels in Wales, in adherence, counsel

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206 *Rotuli Parliamentorum*, vol 3, 605.
207 *Rotuli Parliamentorum*, vol 3, 605.
and alliance. This therefore suggests that the Tripartite Indenture was more widely known than is currently conceived. It is not known whether any bond was formed at that point between Louis and Henry Percy. Northumberland’s apparently key role in the betrayal and capture of Richard II might have gravely damaged his chances of attaining instant or profound amity within the French court. Nevertheless, this letter showed that an alliance between Percy and Orleans was at least in the air at the time.

The York revolt stands out for two reasons, the first being the unusual fact that the leaders issued a manifesto, which was read out by the archbishop to the assembled thousands on Shipton Moor. The second is the brutal fate suffered by the archbishop of York and the Earl Marshal. The intriguing factor is that several manifesto articles were connected to the Welsh rebels, despite there being no overt link between Scrope and Glyn Dŵr, but through Northumberland. Without that connection, there seems no reason to include mention of the Welsh within the interest of a northern rebellion seemingly centred on York and the Percy-held border towns and fortresses, such as Berwick. As a document, the manifesto read by Scrope appears a fiery, rebel-rousing defiance. It made ten accusations against Henry. After each one he was thunderously excommunicated for his crimes. He and his adherents were charged with treason for which they suffered the archbishop’s excommunication. The articles described Henry’s proposed duel with the duke of Norfolk, the Earl Marshal’s late father, and subsequent exile in 1398. The consequence was his return under arms to reclaim his inheritance, having gained substantial support, he contravened his promises and seized the crown. He was also accused of robbing and killing nobles, clergy, merchants and members of virtually all other strata in the kingdom. His false seizure, deposition and murder of King Richard, son of the noble Edward, also earned him Scrope’s excommunication.

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208 Rotuli Parliamentorum, vol 3, 606, ‘notoirement adherdant & de conseil & covyn ovec les rebelles Œre Sr le Roy en Gales.’
209 Kirby, Henry IV, 58; Tuck, Richard II and the English Nobility, 219; Saul, Richard II, 413-6; Given-Wilson, Adam Usk, 58-9; Preest, Chronica Maiora, 307-9.
211 Riley, Ypodigma Neustriæ, 413-5; Raine, The Historians of the Church of York and its Archbishops, vol 2, 308-9; Kirby, Henry IV, 187; Given-Wilson, Adam Usk, 202-3; Preest, Chronica Maiora, 336-8.
212 Riley, Ypodigma Neustriæ, 381; Kirby, Henry IV, 46-51; Given-Wilson, Adam Usk, 48-51; Preest, Chronica Maiora, 303.
213 Raine, Historians of the Church of York, 298-9. This article also contains mention of the Welsh rebels: ‘Surge igitur, Anglia, in causam, sanguinem, injuriam, et mortem regis tui, in tua persona celeriter vindicare! Quod si non feceris, scito quod Deus verus et Justus per alienas gentes et exteras nations, puta Wallicanas, Scoticanas et Hibernicanas, destruet tuam linguam et gentem; et sic in ira Sua vindicabit Se de te pro hac nefanda re.’
The next treason charge elaborated Henry’s brutal treatment and slaughter of many clergymen, which proves a recurrent accusation throughout his reign. Then, he was condemned for his execution without trial of the earls of the Epiphany Revolt of 1400, and of the Percys, brother and son of the apparently approaching earl. He was also charged with crimes against the Church, Rome and the universities. Scrope then criticised the military expeditions and harm caused during Henry’s reign up to that point, which had damaged and impoverished the kingdom through intolerable exactions. The final article of the manifesto reassured the audience that the rebels did not seek to bring widespread changes, but had three specific aims. The first was to put the ‘rightful heir’ on the throne. Although no name is offered here, bearing in mind the context of the time and the Tripartite Indenture, the Mortimer heir is the only credible candidate. Secondly, the rebels wished to make peace with the Welsh, Irish and other enemies of the kingdom. The general pacific appeal might echo sentiments common towards the end of Richard’s reign. It is noteworthy that the Welsh were mentioned in first place, and the Scots and the French not named at all, but covered by a blanket term referring to other enemies of the kingdom. The final intention, perhaps inserted tactically here to guarantee a rousing cheer at the end of the reading, vowed to do away with exactions and promised the grant of an indulgence.

Although this revolt was swiftly crushed at York, and the remainder chased over the border or besieged within northern castles, the timing and connectivity with the Welsh in particular is noteworthy. It is unlikely that reports of its defeat and dispersal reached France before the fleet set sail for Wales. Preparations for the 1405 expedition would have been too

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216 Raine, *Historians of the Church of York*, 302. This ninth article specifically complains that ‘generosa terra Aquitania, nobilis terra Wallia et fertilis terra Hibernia, suo tempore sunt totaliter perdita et reversa; et quod pejus est, terra nostra quasi tota in semetipsa est divisa et destructa, cum exactiones et destructiones plurimae, innumerabiles collectiones pecuniae in clero et in populo ...’


far advanced to halt for any reason save adverse weather or royal command; the French were about to invade Henry’s domain.\textsuperscript{219}

\textsuperscript{219} An examination of the financial outlay made by the French government to raise an army and a fleet to invade Wales is given in Appendix D 8. It clearly demonstrates that the 1405 expedition was a significant affair, underlining the importance the French placed on the alliance.
The 1405 Expedition: Deeds

‘And so the Bretons served and took the deeds of France’s war to all of the other nations’.220

The deeds performed by the expeditionary force are difficult to ascertain categorically. English sources are all suspiciously quiet about the matter; only Thomas Walsingham mentioned it.221 This might suggest it was a minor event of little relevance and so failed to be included at length in the records. This is possible, though extremely unlikely for a number of simple reasons. The insertion of hostile land forces by the French adversary into a region of mainland Britain claimed by the English crown can only be an event of note. Added to this is the fact that the territory in question was held militarily by a large spread of garrisoned castles designated as the appanage of the heir to the throne. In addition, Henry’s reaction on learning of the French landing demonstrated the gravity the king attributed to the event. The 1405 expedition seems to be an important event worthy of informed commentary. It seems reasonable to raise the idea that this news was deliberately downplayed or suppressed within English sources. Therefore, it is essential to turn to French sources to expand the story of this significant event. To modern writers, the landing in Pembrokeshire confirmed that the alliance had ‘borne full fruit’ and that Owain’s ‘dream had at last come true.’222

The two main sources, which appear to be the root of all other accounts, offer somewhat different tales of the mission. Both offer seemingly credible, detailed accounts, and both discernibly contain errors. The monk of Saint-Denys recorded a short campaign that demonstrated its superiority over a small number of castles and towns in south-west Wales.223 The anonymous monks who wrote the chronicle identified that leadership of the expedition had been given to three men: Marshal Jehan de Rieux, along with Jean de Hangest, lord of Hugueville and Grand-Master of the Crossbows of France, and Robert de la Heuse, also known as ‘le Borgne’ or ‘Strabo’.224 These men figured consistently in contemporary

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220 de la Borderie, Chronique de Bretagne de Jean de Saint-Paul, Chambellan du duc Francois II 53. ‘Et servirent les Bretons et portèrent le faiz de la guerre de France sur toutes les aultres nations.’
221 Davies, Revolt, 193-4; Preest, Chronica Maiora, 339-41.
222 Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 102; Davies, Revolt, 193.
224 Douét-d’Arcq, Choix de Pièces Inédites, vol 1, 164 (list of knights of the realm, Hangest, de Rieux and de la Heuse); Tuetey, Journal de Nicolas de Baye, vol 1, 153, 188-9, 209, vol 2, 10, 88-9, 209 (all Robert de la Heuse); C. de Robillard de Beaurepaire, Chronique normande de Pierre Cochon, notaire apostolique à Rouen (Rouen: A. Le Brument, 1870), 211, n.4 (Hangest), n.5 (de la Heuse); le Roulx, La France en Orient, 171, 286 (Hangest); Courteault, Les Chroniques du Roi Charles VII par Gilles le Bouvier, dit le Heraut Berry, 22 n. 2 (the de Rieux
chronicles and documents; they clearly ranked among the highest echelons of French military leadership of their day, indicative of the importance the crown placed on this mission. It is also noteworthy that these leaders demonstrate a range of loyalties. Jehan de Hangest could rightly be considered, at that stage, a Burgundian. His presence was consistent with the statement of support for war efforts against England read out in parliament by Jean sans Peur’s spokesman in late summer 1405, who drew attention to England’s ‘redoubtable enemies, the Scots and the Welsh.’ The Saint-Denys chronicle detailed the size of the army; eight hundred elite men, six hundred crossbowmen and twelve hundred lightly-armoured troops in a fleet composed of two large warships and thirty medium-sized vessels. It added that these troops were raised in Brittany and Normandy which, at the time, were certainly lands under Orleanist influence. The army size is worthy of comment here; the better-known army sent to Scotland in 1385 under Jean de Vienne comprised one thousand three hundred men-at-arms and two hundred and fifty crossbows. Campbell described this force as ‘a major French army’, yet at perhaps only two-thirds the size of that sent to Wales, the relative obscurity of the Welsh expedition seems curious. The French waited for a favourable wind and set sail before the end of July, the timing of which might be relevant had a mid-summer rising been plotted with Northumberland. When they arrived at ‘Willeforde’, or Milford, they were allegedly greeted by a Welsh force of ten thousand sent by the ‘principi Wallie’, Glyn Dŵr. The chronicle then related how the French and Welsh devastated the country in their path, and marched on ‘Heleford’. Saint-Denys then described a battle in

family served as Marshals to Duke Louis); Lannette-Claverie, Collection Joursanvault, 41 (Jehan de Hangest), 82 (‘Jehan de Reux’); Archives Départementales de l'Hérault, A 1, folios 279 v° à 283 r°. Auteur de la transcription: Jean-Claude Toureille, seen here: http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/french/bousico.htm (Hangest and de la Heuse appear in the king’s council here) [Accessed 25/03/2010].

225 Following the murder of Louis of Orleans at Duke John’s command in 1407, de Hangest clearly placed himself in the Orleanist camp, and was involved in the defence of Orleanist castles against John of Burgundy in November 1411, suffering imprisonment at John’s hands after their fall. Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 4, 571; d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 150-3; Courteault, Les Chroniques du Roi Charles VII par Gilles le Bouvier, dit le Heraut Berry, 46-9.

226 Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 3, 302-3; ‘redoutables ennemis, les Écossais et les Gallois’; le Roulx, La France en Orient, 171, 286 (Hangest).

227 Jarry, La Vie Politique de Louis de France, 450-1; d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 76; Vaughan, John the Fearless, 30; Cassard, Le Trémaçan des Du Chastel, 83-104.


230 Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 3, 324-5. The French term ‘à feu et à sang’ used by Bellaguet is highly evocative, but not a faithful translation. In geographic context, ‘Heleford’ appears an easy confusion with ‘Haverford’, but might also acknowledge that this army also went to Hereford in England, as alleged by Monstrelet, but that
front of Haverford, followed by a siege supported by artillery. Although the French and Welsh allegedly inflicted scores of casualties on the enemy, they failed to take the castle. The casualties caused, forty in the battle and seventy in the assault, seem perhaps realistically low. There, the French lost a famous knight, ‘Patroullart de Trya’.\textsuperscript{231} From there, French foragers took ‘Picot’ or Picton, in a swift first assault. They ravaged the countryside as far as ‘Canneby’ or Tenby, once again putting all to fire and sword. Here, they prepared to assault the town, encircling it with crossbowmen and bringing up the artillery. The operation was disrupted when French scouts reported a thirty-strong fleet, packed with English soldiers, coming to relieve the town. This apparently caused an uncontrollable panic among the French who abandoned the siege and their artillery. Realising that their ships were stranded, they unloaded and torched them in order to deny the enemy. The French then fled in terror, despite the fact that there was no-one in pursuit and they were accompanied by two thousand Welsh horsemen.\textsuperscript{232} Almost twenty years after the event, Walsingham reported that ‘Lord Thomas Berkeley and Henry Pay burnt fifteen of their ships while they were in harbour.’\textsuperscript{233} However, Walsingham does not mention the allied army in flight, or offer any other information on the French fleet which, at well over a hundred strong, should have attracted further description or attack. Having recomposed themselves, and attacking villages in their path, the allies prepared to attack ‘Sancti Clari’ or Saint-Clears, whose residents promised to surrender if the French took ‘Callemardin’ or Carmarthen.\textsuperscript{234} When the allied force arrived there, Glyn Dŵr, described as ‘princeps (Walensibus)’, swore not to leave until he was master of the place. The chronicle then described a four-day siege of the well-garrisoned, strongly-walled town. The French sapped the walls, forming a breach that would allow them to fight hand-to-hand.\textsuperscript{235} The first assault inflicted numerous casualties on the defenders and, as the French prepared a second assault, the inhabitants sought parley. They offered terms that the French could enter the town unopposed and remove all the booty that they could carry, as long as they allowed the inhabitants to live and to remain in the town.\textsuperscript{236} The Welsh also agreed to these terms, ransacking the town of all portable booty. However, they also set fire to the streets and

\textsuperscript{232} Bellaguet, \textit{Saint-Denys}, vol 3, 326-7, ‘duo mille equestres Walenses.’
\textsuperscript{233} Kirby, \textit{Henry IV}, 188; Davies, \textit{Revolt}, 194; Preest, \textit{Chronica Maiora}, 339-41.
\textsuperscript{234} Bellaguet, \textit{Saint-Denys}, vol 3, 326-7, ‘cum more suo’.
\textsuperscript{235} Bellaguet, \textit{Saint-Denys}, vol 3, 326-7, ‘manutentim pugnare’.
\textsuperscript{236} Bellaguet, \textit{Saint-Denys}, vol 3, 326-7.
suburbs, and destroyed most of the town walls. From there the allied army marched to ‘Cardinguan’ or Cardigan which, fearing the same fate, capitulated. According to the Saint-Denys chronicle, the expedition then appears to have wound down its military activities after having covered an estimated sixty leagues. The French asked the Welsh prince to station them in three different areas, in order not to suffer privation until they could return to France. Glyn Dŵr did this, and the French remained in Wales until All Saints, when six vessels arrived and returned the knights and squires to France. Saint-Denys tells us that they left the twelve hundred troops and five hundred crossbowmen under the command of a Picard squire named ‘Blesum de Belay’ or ‘le Bègue de Bellay’ in French, until further ships could be sent to them. The chronicle commented, in its frequently scathing tone: ‘We strongly criticised those who came back to France having so abandoned the men who had fought for their glory, who had always been first in the assaults and who had saved them from more than one danger.’ However, it reassured the reader that the nobles remained true to their word though, and brought them back to France towards Lent.

The contingent commander has proved difficult to track, and, from a list of the knights and squires of the realm from 1400 emerge two clear candidates: Monseigneur le Besgue de Villaines and Monseigneur de Bellauges. Surprisingly, there is a third candidate who, despite seeming to have the correct name, only comes to prominence after 1415 and does not appear to have the same martial pedigree or Orleanist connections as the two mentioned previously. Therefore, Jean de Bellay, while still a possibility, is probably ruled out.

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238 Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 3, 328-9, ‘sexaginta leucas’; Y. Darcy-Bertuletti, Tableau Des Mesures Les Plus Courantes En Usage Dans Le Pays Beunois, 9, http://www.beaune.fr/IMG/pdf/Metrologie.pdf [Accessed: 06/02/2012]. A league here is described as equivalent to 3 Roman Miles or 4419 metres. A journey of 60 leagues is therefore $4419 \times 60 = 265140$ metres or 265.14 kilometres or 164 miles, 1320.6 yards, http://www.metric-conversions.org/length/kilometers-to-miles.htm [Accessed: 06/02/2012]. This is a curious figure, since it is too far to represent the described campaign around Pembrokeshire, and too short to cover a return trip to the English border. This figure offered by the chronicler, therefore, appears to be incorrect.
239 Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 3, 326-7, ‘quemdam armigerum nomine Blesum de Belay Picardum statuentes’.
240 Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 3, 326-7, My translation of ‘Hoc in dedecus redeuncium versum fuit, cum sic relinquissent qui propter eorum gloriari dimicantes in assultibus fuerant simper primi, eos ex multis periculis sepius eruentes.’ Or ‘On blâma fort ceux qui revinrent en France d’avoir ainsi abandonné des gens qui avaient combattu pour leur gloire, qui avaient toujours été les premiers dans les assaults et qui les avaient sauvés de plus d’un danger.’
242 Douët-d’Arco, Choix de Pièces Inédites, vol 1, 164.
243 Tuetey, Journal de Nicolas de Baye, vol 2, 218 (Snr. De Besloy [de Bellay]); Bouchart, Les Grandes Chroniques de Bretaigne, 183 (Jehan de Bellay); Pocquet du Haut-Jussé, La France gouvernée par Jean Sans Peur, 111 (Jean de Bellay).
Guelders in 1388. Although ‘Monseigneur de Bellauges’, and variations of that name, remained active around court during the relevant period, he also seems less likely than the final possibility. The only candidate bearing the nickname ‘le Bègue’, or ‘the stammerer’, is Pierre de Villaines, commonly referred to in a variety of sources as ‘le Bègue de Villaines.’ Due to the rarity of that nickname, this man was probably more memorable than most. In addition, there were two Pierre de Villaines, father and son, who, like the lord of Bellenges, fought for the Orleanist cause throughout this period. The father was connected to the Marmouset government favoured by Charles and Louis, and escaped the worst persecution of Philip of Burgundy when he regained power, suffering imprisonment rather than execution. He had campaigned with Bertrand du Guesclin, losing an eye fighting the English, and perhaps notably is mentioned within the same frame of reference as ‘messire Yvain de Gales.’ He was also associated with known Orleanists such as Jean Montagu and he served in the government of Touraine, Louis’s first duchy. Moreover, ‘le Bègue’ can be found in Brittany and La Rochelle during the relevant period, in the company of Robert de la Heuse, and so appears to be in the right place and with the right people to have Partaken in the expedition to Wales. Perhaps the final point to make concerning ‘le Bègue’ is that, if marooned in Wales, he returned and can be traced in records after the expedition’s return. He appeared near Malicorne along the Breton border in 1406, later served as governor of La Rochelle in the Orleanist west and was militarily active until 1410. The cautious conclusion is, therefore that the mysterious leader left behind with the troops in Saint-Denis’s account, was this man or his namesake son. As a staunch Orleanist, he might be exactly the sort of dependable servant to charge with such a commission.

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244 Jarry, La vie politique de Louis de France, 414-5.
245 Evans, The Unconquered Knight, 149 (‘Bellengues’); Carriazo, El Victoria, 222, 246 (‘Belengas’).
246 Douët-d’Arcq, Choix de Pièces Inédites, vol 1, 164. Note, mispellings are common in these sources, also a latinate velar ‘b’ and ‘v’ are easily confused.
247 Jarry, La vie politique de Louis de France, 97; d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 14-5; Knecht, The Valois, 48.
248 Grévy-Pons et al, Jean de Montreuil, Opera, vol 2, 111, 113 (Traité ‘À Toute La Chevalerie’).
249 Tuquet, Journal de Nicolas de Baye, vol 1, 181-2, 209; Jarry, La vie politique de Louis de France, 50, 59, 97, 417-9; Courteault, Les Chroniques du Roi Charles VII par Gilles le Bouvier, dit le Heraut Berry, 7 n. 4.
250 Tuquet, Journal de Nicolas de Baye, vol 1, 181-2, 209; Courteault, Les Chroniques Du Roi Charles VII Par Gilles Le Bouvier, Dit Le Héraut Berry, 7 n. 4; Lannette-Claverie, Collection Joursanvault, 250, (Pierre de Villaines, ‘chambellan du roi’, 1395), 252 (Pierre de Villamée, ‘seigneur de Malicorne’, 1397); Note: a difficulty is posed by the fact that the father was probably too high a rank to easily mistaken, but it is not known whether the son also stammered. Malicornes-sur-Sarthe lies in the Pays de la Loire between Angers and Le Mans, also in the vicinity of Laval and Chateaubriant. However, all of these men were in the pay and influence of Louis of Orleans.
There is another possible reason for an Orleanist-inspired mission to attack south-west Wales; that of personal vendetta. These lands had been given to ‘Isabel, the king’s consort’ as part of her dower in 1396.\textsuperscript{251} Shortly after his coronation, Henry distributed these lands among his supporters and rewarded others with the profits therefrom.\textsuperscript{252} A French mission there could well have been intended to deny Henry lands they possibly perceived as part of Isabelle’s right. It is possible that they considered settlement there, as certain intelligence suggested, or that they were assessing the locality for support against Henry. The personal element to relations between Henry and Louis makes this notion worthy of consideration.\textsuperscript{253}

The second main contemporary account appeared in the usually less-well regarded chronicle of the Burgundian nobleman, Enguerrand de Monstrelet which, although it ends in 1444, appears to have been begun as early as 1413, and the first book, from which this evidence comes, probably dates to 1422, the same year the Saint-Denis chronicle ends.\textsuperscript{254} There are several different editions of this manuscript which have surfaced over the centuries, although none is recorded as diverging noticeably from another.\textsuperscript{255} Perhaps surprisingly, this account, which makes far grander claims, has found favour among modern British writers such as Lloyd, Kirby and Davies, despite a paucity of conclusive evidence to substantiate its expansive claims.\textsuperscript{256}

The Monstrelet account differs from that of Saint-Denis in a few critical details, although in places the two accounts largely tally. The first difference is the date. Monstrelet wrongly assigns this to 1403. The second is the named leaders of the mission. Although both

\textsuperscript{251} Williams, *Chronique de la Traison et Mort*, 168; Wylie, *History of England under Henry the Fourth*, vol 1, 121; *CPR, 1396-1399*, 40, ‘Grant for life to Isabel, the king’s consort as part of her dower, the castle, county and lordship of Pembroke, castle and town of Tyneby, and lordship of Kilgarren and commotes of Ostrelowe, Seintclere and Trahayn …’ (8 December, 1396).

\textsuperscript{252} *CPR, 1399-1401*, 140 (William Beauchamp, 29 November 1399), 249, 265, 426 (Francis de Court, 7 February, 1401), 526 (John Norbury, 28 June, 1401, and Thomas Percy, earl of Worcester ‘and his heirs male’, 5 July 1401).

\textsuperscript{253} Hingeston, *RHL Henry IV*, vol 1, 384-5, (intelligence from 1404), ‘XV millium armatorum ac equitum … ad occupandum et reaédificandum castra in Wallia destructa et ad omnia mala ac damna possibilia nobis inferenda.’


\textsuperscript{256} Lloyd, *Owen Glendower*, 104; Kirby, *Henry IV*, 188; Davies, *Revolt*, 194. Note: Davies is clearly cautious about this, apparently preferring the Saint-Denis account, but nevertheless presents the evidence from the Monstrelet account as part of the event. Of these accounts he wrote: ‘Of French chroniclers the garrulous author known as the monk of St Denis gave the most detailed and credible account; far less reliable and much more fanciful is the narrative of the invasion provided by the later chronicler Enguerrand de Monstrelet.’ Davies is incorrect here on two counts, both chronicles date to 1422, and the evidence presented here bears out that Monstrelet appears to be the more accurate account.
chronicles agree on the master of crossbows, Monstrelet identified the marshal of France as the other commander. The figure of twelve hundred soldiers is agreed in both, but no number of knights or crossbowmen is offered here, this therefore constitutes Monstrelet’s entire force. The fleet size is radically different, at six score sailed vessels, as opposed to the thirty or so suggested by Saint-Denys.\textsuperscript{257} The bishop of Hereford’s evidence strongly favours Monstrelet’s figure.\textsuperscript{258} Both agree that the fleet was delayed by the wind, whether by force, lack or direction is unclear. The fleet is credited as leaving from Brest and arriving in ‘Harfort’ where the French slew the inhabitants and made for the castle. Monstrelet incorrectly claimed that the earl of Arundel was inside the castle, but made no mention of taking it, only of the burning of the suburbs and putting all around to fire and sword. Next, Monstrelet also said that the French went to ‘Tenebi’, cited as eighteen leagues from ‘Harfort’.\textsuperscript{259} This was where the French found the ‘prince de Gales’ and ten thousand of his fighters waiting for them. That high number of Welsh is consistent in both accounts. There is no tale of the fear and flight related by Saint-Denys; instead the two armies headed directly for the regional capital, ‘Calemarchin’ or Carmarthen, given as twelve leagues from Tenby. No account of an attack here is given, and instead the armies then entered ‘pays de Morgnie’ or Glamorgan, and went to ‘l’abbaye noble’ associated with ‘la Table ronde’, which has been presumed as being Caerleon, although Monstrelet gave no names or details.\textsuperscript{260} From there, they are said to have taken the road to ‘Vincestre’, a clear confusion with Worcester. In order to approach Worcester from this direction, they would necessarily have had to approach Hereford, which might go some way to explaining the confusion between ‘Heleford’ and ‘Hereford’ in the Saint-Denys chronicle, ‘Harford’ in Monstrelet and the modern interpretation of Haverford.\textsuperscript{261} Here they burned the suburbs and the surrounding countryside before meeting, three leagues from the town of Worcester, the king of England.\textsuperscript{262} Here, Monstrelet recounted how the two armies adopted battle formations, each on a hillside with a large valley between them. This stand-off was said to have lasted eight days, during which

\textsuperscript{257} Johnes, Monstrelet, 103; Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 3, 322-3 ; Douët-d’Arcaq, Monstrelet, 82. Even if Saint-Denys’s ‘treginta’ meant ‘three score’ (trois vingts) it would still be half the size of the fleet mentioned by Monstrelet.

\textsuperscript{258} Parry, The Register of Robert Mascall, 6, ‘144 armed ships’.

\textsuperscript{259} Johnes, Monstrelet, 104; Douët-d’Arcaq, Monstrelet, 82. The French says ‘dix huit lieues’ not ‘eighteen miles’ as Johnes translated it in 1810.

\textsuperscript{260} Johnes, Monstrelet, 104, n.; Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 104 n.1.

\textsuperscript{261} Johnes, Monstrelet, 104; Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 3, 324-5; Douët-d’Arcaq, Monstrelet, 82; Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 103; Davies, Revolt, 194.

\textsuperscript{262} Johnes, Monstrelet, 104; Douët-d’Arcaq, Monstrelet, 82-3.
there were many skirmishes between the two sides. These were said to have resulted in over two hundred dead, among them ‘Patroullart de Troies’, along with ‘monsieur de Mathelonne’ and ‘monsieur de La Ville’, and many wounded. ‘Patroullart’ is identified as the brother of the marshal leading this expedition. This would make ‘the marshal’ Renaud de Tries who was in fact admiral of France until he retired sometime in 1405 or early 1406, in the wake of this expedition. Ducal records show that their family were servants of the dukes of Orleans throughout this period. It is possible that an admiral would lead such an expedition, just as the mission to Scotland in 1385 had been commanded by an admiral, Jean de Vienne. This alleged stalemate outside Worcester was ended when the king of England withdrew behind the town’s walls one evening when he perceived that the French and the Welsh, hard pressed by hunger, would not attack. As he retired, some French and Welsh are said to have taken eighteen carts laden with food. The loss of baggage from Henry’s army is vaguely corroborated by Lloyd, although the number is higher at forty, and swollen rivers were the supposed cause. They then returned to Wales and the French embarked on the ships that, according to Monstrelet, had been at sea during this time, guarded by men at arms, and went to a port where they had been directed. This last point correlates with evidence from the Saint-Denis chronicle that Glyn Dŵr had provided the French with a map of Wales’s accessible ports. The French returned to Saint-Pol de Léon without incident and the two leaders went to Paris where they were feted by the king and the princes of the blood. Other French sources on the matter depend on these two accounts. For example, Jean Juvenal des Ursins rehashed that of Saint-Denis. Pierre Cochon’s chronicle added nothing.

263 Johnes, Monstrelet, 104 (sir Patroullars de Tries, lord de Martelonne, lord de La Valle); Douët-D’arqc, Monstrelet, 82-3 (Patroullart de Trie, le seigneur de Martelonne, le seigneur de Laval), Douët-d’Arccq, Choix De Pièces Inédites, vol 1, 164 (Patroullart de Tries); Blanchard, Lettres et Mandements de Jean V, duc de Bretagne, vol 4, 31-2 (correspondence from Jean concerning ‘sire (Guy) de Laval’, also mentioned is ‘seigneur de Matignon’).
264 Johnes, Monstrelet, 105, n.; Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 3, 322-5; des Ursins, Histoire de Charles VI, 430; Evans, The Unconquered Knight, 134-9 (The death of Renaud de Trie); Carriazo, El Victorial, 219-22.
266 Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 1, 385-91; Brown, The Black Douglases, 212-3; Laidlaw, The Auld Alliance, 41-2; Macdougall, An Antidote to the English, 49-50; Joliffe, Froissart’s Chronicles, 263-77.
267 Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 106. (Lloyd cited untraceable English records in his footnotes ‘Cal. Pat. Rolls, iii, 80, 84, 147, 148, 149; Proc. P. Counc. i, 278.’ Research into these references do not relate to Lloyd’s suggestions.)
269 Johnes, Monstrelet, 106; Douët-d’Arcc, Monstrelet, 84.
new, repeating that they returned at ‘Toussains’, but the implication is that none were left behind, which therefore slightly favours Monstrelet’s account.\textsuperscript{271} This is unsurprising, as des Ursins wrote his work in Paris and apparently copied large tracts directly from Saint-Denys, whereas Monstrelet’s and Cochon’s chronicles were both composed in Burgundy.\textsuperscript{272} Both the French chronicle accounts contain errors and, no doubt, truths; distinguishing these from one another appears impossible at this time. As shown above, both versions of this event were probably completed in or around 1422, as was that of Thomas Walsingham.\textsuperscript{273} The proximity of Saint-Denys to the court in Paris is no guarantee of accuracy, particularly considering that the chronicler frequently and blatantly had an axe to grind against the behaviour of the nobility. The fact that one of the commanders, Jehan de Hangest, was perhaps of Burgundian adherence, as was Monstrelet, could have given him access to details unavailable to the perhaps more isolated monks of Saint-Denys. Therefore, while clear proof for either limiting the expedition to Pembrokeshire or placing it at the gates of Worcester has yet to be discovered, even without a more profound examination of the sources, there are indicators favouring the Worcester theory.

The passage of armies almost always leaves traces; primarily physical and sometimes cultural. Although the French-Welsh army of 1405 appears to have left an imprint on vernacular folk-tales and places names of western Worcestershire, due to its inherent unreliability and susceptibility to manipulation over time, this aspect will not be investigated further here.\textsuperscript{274} Any army of the estimated size of the allied force, or even a forward contingent, might leave traces on the landscape and historical record of the area as it foraged for food and suppressed opposition. This appears to be the case with the southern and northern approaches to Hereford and Worcester; this theory is founded on the taxation records for the border, as well as other supporting evidence.\textsuperscript{275} The tax records give snapshots of the economic state of the Welsh border shires during the revolt, detailing how much

\textsuperscript{271} Robillard de Beaurepaire, \textit{Chronique normande} 211.


\textsuperscript{273} Preest, \textit{Chronica Maiora}, 1, 7, 10-22.


\textsuperscript{275} J. L. Kirby, ed., \textit{Calendar of Signet Letters of Henry IV and Henry V (1399-1422)}, (London: HMSO, 1978), 100-1, (entries 438 and 441 concern damaged buildings), 105 (entry 466 concerns the effects of the rebellion); H. Watt, ‘On account of the frequent attacks and invasions of the Welsh’: The Effect of the Glyn Dŵr Rebellion on Tax Collection in England’, in Dodd and Biggs, \textit{The Reign of Henry IV, Rebellion and Survival, 1403-1413}, 48-81. Note: I collaborated in part with Dr Watt during the creation of her chapter, and I am mentioned in footnotes on pages 48, 56, 64 and 71.
money was raised and which places were granted exemptions from paying. Of primary import­ance to this research is that the records detail the situation in 1404 and again in late 1406 and 1407. The first observation is that, supported by contemporary letters, the marches had sustained considerable destruction and impoverishment by warfare up to the first measuring point in December 1404. The extent of this damage has yet to be sufficiently expressed in any extant publication, although Helen Watt’s study is an excellent start-point. The evidence presented by the appeals for exemption and tax collection demonstrates a noteworthy surge in claims between 1404 and the next tally in 1407, strongly suggesting that the area experienced an event to cause this rise. Allowing for natural occurrences of poverty, a declining economy perhaps and other unrecorded rebel attacks on the area, the level of successful claims still rose more steeply than the prior rate of attrition caused by Welsh troops. Although this number is noticeably higher than previously, as Watt clarifies, these figures probably mask a more extensive record of damage since people had returned to the area by 1407 and some areas were not deemed to have sustained sufficient damage to warrant exemption. Therefore, at some point between 1404 and the next occasion exemptions are permitted, 1407, the border region of Herefordshire and southern and western Shropshire endured an event that caused destruction and depopulation. The only candidate for this activity, outside the other possible economic and unrecorded military factors, is the passage of the allied army of 1405. The presence of the French in the area was specifically mentioned by a letter from the inhabitants of Shropshire to the king. The letter clearly reveals a fear that the ‘rebels and the French’ were aware that there were fewer troops defending the county than elsewhere along the Welsh border. It is also evident that the plaintiffs expected them to overrun and waste the county unless the king sent military aid.

277 Hingeston, RHL Henry IV, vol 1, 155-9; POPCE, vol 1, 223-4, 229-30; Watt, ‘On account of the frequent attacks and invasions of the Welsh’, 59-70.
279 Watt, ‘On account of the frequent attacks and invasions of the Welsh’ 58, 60, 78-9.
280 Watt, ‘On account of the frequent attacks and invasions of the Welsh’, 63-4.
281 POPCE, vol 2, 77-8, ‘xxi, jour Dapprill’. ‘Considerant ... voz rebelles avanditz (e)t lez Fraunces ore de nouvel a eux venuz aount plein notice q(ue) nullez est’unges souldio’s attend.... countee a p/sent come ils fount en autres voz countees ajoynantz a voz marches de Gales (e)t outrement sont en ...sumez pleinement enfо mez de surchivacher (e)t outrement degaster vre dit countee devant la venu de nre dit Sr .... le meschief t/spuissant Sr voz ditz lieges vous suppliont de eux ordeigner ent remedie ...’ ; See also RHL Henry IV, vol. 2, 76-9, reproduced in See Appendix D 4: Letter from John de Stanley to Henry IV, 30th July, 1405, which shows the Welsh and the French purposing to come to speak with Henry in summer 1405. Note: there is no consensus between any French-speakers or historians consulted on the important phrase ‘ore de nouvel’. Those
Elsewhere, the letter also claimed that a third of the county had been destroyed by the rebels and that the inhabitants had fled ‘to gain their meat and sustenance elsewhere’. It bears the date of 21 April but no year is given, although the *Proceedings* editors placed it ‘probably’ in 1403. It seems exceedingly unlikely that a third of the county had been destroyed by the close of the campaigning season 1402 and that the inhabitants feared a French invasion of the western Shropshire border at that point, notably prior to the Welsh-French alliance. Damage to that extent only appears to have been recorded by 1404 at the earliest and the only occasion of a possible French presence near the Shropshire border is late summer 1405. August and September would be good months for incursions into the border regions; the harvests would be ripening and would help feed a foraging army. Therefore, this letter should be considered for 1406 at the earliest; particularly if the Saint-Denys chronicle were correct about the French staying the winter. Ongoing rumours concerning them might well have been in the air in spring the following year.
The allies appear to have left the border before October; a letter from the countess of Hereford revealed that although they were expected to appear at Worcester, there were only rumours of them in the area by 28 October. Information furnished by Bishop Mascall’s register, plotted onto a map, further corroborates this theory. The places there named form

Map 12: Tax exemptions in the borders.

Map 12: The map shows places that requested tax exemption due to war damage, including those acknowledged as being sufficiently damaged to be exempted. Source: Watt, ‘On account of the frequent attacks and invasions of the Welsh’, 57. Although roads ran north-south along the border and between settlements, this map provides evidence for the matter in hand. It clearly demonstrates a high volume of damaged settlements along the ingresses and egresses to and from Hereford and towards Worcester. The settlements that feature here can be found on modern maps along modern roads, suggesting that modern transport links largely mirror those existing during this conflict. In the south, roads run between Monmouth and Hereford, and Hay to Hereford. In the north, routes run from Shrewsbury, Caus, Montgomery and Clun, south-east through Ludlow and Leominster towards Worcester. This incontrovertibly shows that the rebels had advanced to and beyond Hereford, and can be tracked heading towards and away from Worcester.

282 Map 12: The map shows places that requested tax exemption due to war damage, including those acknowledged as being sufficiently damaged to be exempted. Source: Watt, ‘On account of the frequent attacks and invasions of the Welsh’, 57. Although roads ran north-south along the border and between settlements, this map provides evidence for the matter in hand. It clearly demonstrates a high volume of damaged settlements along the ingresses and egresses to and from Hereford and towards Worcester. The settlements that feature here can be found on modern maps along modern roads, suggesting that modern transport links largely mirror those existing during this conflict. In the south, roads run between Monmouth and Hereford, and Hay to Hereford. In the north, routes run from Shrewsbury, Caus, Montgomery and Clun, south-east through Ludlow and Leominster towards Worcester. This incontrovertibly shows that the rebels had advanced to and beyond Hereford, and can be tracked heading towards and away from Worcester.

283 Legge, Anglo-Norman Letters and Petitions, 399-400.

two clear streams, one on a southerly approach from Gwent to Hereford, the other heading north-west through southern Shropshire and into Wales. This is worthy of mention in that it might demonstrate the army’s ingress and egress; it would probably not return the same way it came if it needed to forage; Monstrelet suggested this army needed food, and this would be common among contemporary campaigns. On this evidence then, although uncertain, Monstrelet’s account seems more credible.

So, crown and local sources demonstrate that there was a notable volume of destruction wrought upon the area at the right time, the French were clearly identified by local inhabitants and there are no noticeably large-scale attacks recorded anywhere in this region afterwards. In fact, opinion currently holds that things began to sour for Glyn Dŵr from 1405 and, if this analysis is correct, this again isolates 1405 as the only candidate year for the destruction that befell the March between 1404 and 1407. Although the theory of decline seems incorrect for reasons discussed below, the physical evidence demonstrating the presence of a hostile force in the region appears compelling.

However, there is a further suggestive source; the movements of King Henry. The king had suppressed the York revolt and was demonstrably present at Pontefract between 6 and 12 August 1405. On 7 August, still at Pontefract, Henry learned of the French landing, writing orders to the sheriffs of sixteen counties, indicative of a large threat, to the following effect:

To the sheriff of Hereford. Order, as he loves the king and his honour and desires the safety and defence of the realm and the marches thereof, upon sight etc. to cause proclamation to be made that all knights, esquires, yeomen and other fencible men of the sheriff’s bailiwick upon their allegiance and under pain of forfeiture shall make ready, array and furnish themselves with arms, every man as his estate requires, and hasten to draw to the city of Hereford, to march with the king and manfully resist the malice of his enemies; as now newly it has come to the king’s ears that the seigneur de Huguevyle and great number of other his enemies of France with a fleet of ships have landed in Milforde haven to reinforce the Welsh rebels, and with them are purposing to invade the realm and the marches of Wales, and to do what mischief they may to the king and his lieges; and his will is to resist their malice, and take order for defence of the realm and marches and of the said lieges.

The surprise and fear at this bold French move seem palpable within this and subsequent messages that season. Henry’s surprise seems out of line with the intelligence at his disposal.

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285 Johnes, Monstrelet, 105; Douët-d’Arquy, Monstrelet, 83.
286 Davies, Revolt, 119-21.
287 CCR, 1402-5, 460, 468-9.
288 CCR, 1402-5, 527-8.
In July, commissions were issued to raise troops to counter the French who were going to attack English interests in Picardy and then ‘to go to Wales to strengthen the rebels there.’ In the same month, Thomas de Berkeley was commissioned to raise troops in Gloucester, Bristol and Somerset because it was said that the Welsh were going to invade that area ‘with a great force.’

Henry can then be tracked with reasonable certainty across the country, moving through Nottingham to Leicester, arriving there by 16 August at the latest. Records place him at Leicester until 19 August. Henry then proceeded to Worcester by 23 August, from where he ordered the sheriffs of seven counties ‘under pain of the king’s wrath’ to meet him at Worcester the following Monday. These messages exude tones of fear and threat – highly suggestive of an urgent and sizeable danger. Henry can be shown to be present at Worcester until 31 August. Although Enguerrand de Monstrelet gave no precise dates, this evidence places Henry in the area and within the timeframe declared by Monstrelet, and for precisely the right amount of time, eight days, during which the supposed stand-off between the armies was alleged to have occurred. While there, Henry summoned more troops, binding named individuals as well as reissuing the orders of array to seven surrounding counties to meet with him at Hereford, because ‘his enemies of France have landed in Wales with no small power to reinforce the Welsh rebels.’

The French and Welsh allies are plainly identified by Henry and the threat seems credible and large enough to warrant this further, urgent call for more troops. By 4 September Henry had advanced to Hereford where he tried to raise a loan and recorded his intent to march against the French in Wales. Here, Bishop Maccall celebrated the expedition the

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289 CPR, 1405-8, 61.
290 CPR 1405-8, 45, 48 (16, 17, 18 August, Leicester).
291 CPR, 1405-8, 43, 44. (19 August, Leicester, 28, 29 August, Worcester).
292 CPR, 1405-8, 64 (23 August, Worcester) (p 36, shows orders by ‘p.s.’ but not by ‘K’ at Worcester on 22 August); CCR, 1402-5, 460 (29 August, Worcester), 529 (24 August, Worcester).
293 Johnes, Monstrelet, 104; Douët-d’Arcq, Monstrelet, 83; CPR, 1405-8, 37, 42, 47 (24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31 August, Worcester); CCR, 1402-5, 529 (24, 28 August).
294 CCR, 1402-5, 460 (29 August, Worcester), ‘Strict order, in consideration of the peril which threatens, and the damage which may happen to the king and the whole realm by insufficient resistance, and of the king’s high confidence in the estates and persons of that county, to cause all knights, esquires and other fencible men thereof able in body to travail to come to the king’s presence, so that they shall be with him at Hereforde on Friday next furnished and arrayed, every man as his estate requires, to march with the king to resist his enemies, bidding them upon their allegiance not to delay, refuse or omit to do so; as the king has particular information that his enemies of France have landed in Wales with no small power to reinforce the Welsh rebels’.
king was about to launch against the duke of Orleans in Milford. His trail of orders shows that the king remained at Hereford at least until 10 September after which point, though it is unclear when, he seems to have retired east, resurfacing at Worcester on 28 September. This offers another window of opportunity for the alleged stand-off to have occurred. It is possible that Henry made some effort to advance west but, failing to find the enemy or being prevented from doing so by adverse weather conditions, not mentioned by the French or any other English source, he returned to Worcester. Both of these seem extremely unlikely; thousands of men and horses are easy to track and there is a lack of evidence berating the weather conditions. It is also possible of course, that he did not attempt to attack, track or harass the allies. Records reveal he remained at Worcester for the first week of October, from where he returned to Westminster, arriving there by 14 October at the latest. It must also be concluded that Henry was clearly in the place indicated by Monstrelet at the appropriate time and, most compellingly, for the amount of time claimed. Apart from accepting that there is a good deal of truth in Monstrelet’s account, there seems no other means of explaining his strikingly accurate claims on this matter. Therefore, despite Rees Davies’s belief that in its unsupported form it savoured of ‘a flight of chivalric literary fancy’, Monstrelet’s chronicle appears to reflect what the physical evidence independently suggests; the presence of two opposing armies in the same region at the same time.

According to the Saint-Denys evidence, the major noble leaders did not return to France until All Saints, and so were available for battle until November, and the rest of their sizeable army which was left to overwinter in Wales was, equally, present and therefore theoretically

296 Parry, The Register of Robert Mascall, 6, ‘Item vii die Septembris, anno Domini ut supra receptum mandatum domini Thome, Dei gracia Cantuariensis archiepiscopi ad faciendum possessionem singulis quartis et sextis feris pro expedizione domini regis et exercitus sui contra ducem Aurelianum qui cum cxiii navibus armatorum in portu de Milford applicuit in consolamen et refugium rebellium parciun Walliae.’
297 CPR, 1405-8, 35, 36, 41, 49, (4, 7, 8, 9, 29, September, Hereford), 57 (28, September, Worcester, this appears to be an anomaly given the other dates); CCR, 1402-5, 525 (28 September, Worcester). Note: 12 September, Coventry, CPR, 1405-8, 58 also appears to be an anomaly, the mileage is probably too great and the need to be in the west too great, and this carries no ‘by K’. Similarly, his apparent presence in Hereford might indicate a slightly confused date, but only by a day, CPR, 1405-8, 35, (29 September) CCR, 1402-5, 525, (28 September).
298 Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 105-6. Lloyd suggests Henry was denied by rain, but does not say where this evidence comes from, and offers no explanation for the lack of such difficult conditions in either French chronicle.
299 CPR, 1405-82, 55, 80; CCR, 1405-9, 1; CFR 1405-1413, 4.
300 Davies, Revolt, 194.
occupying part of the domain claimed by Henry until Lent 1406. If this account is correct, then having been divided into three sections around Cardigan, roughly twenty miles over easy terrain from the damaged English position at Carmarthen, it seems reasonable to suggest that they would have been easier for Henry to engage and destroy, had he the will.

This poses a problem. Henry clearly knew that the French were in Wales, yet he appears to have done nothing to confront them at the time, nor journeyed there the following year to reassert his power. The conclusion that Henry shied away from battle is troubling; one of the signal features of Henry’s reign is that he readily and hastily rushed to battle, as the suppression of the Percy revolts of 1403 and 1405 clearly demonstrated. Not only this, but Henry appears to have deliberately projected an image of being a king who would deal with dissent resolutely, either in face-to-face dispute or in mobilising troops and hastening to a confrontation. It is feasible that in this case he decided not to risk himself in combat, although this runs against the record of his reign and fails to explain why he did not send an army under a subordinate. There is also the curious story of the English of Pembrokeshire paying off the Welsh with the significant sum of £200 of silver around November 1405. This is suggestively but not explicitly supported by Privy Council records, and might indicate the extent to which the Welsh were dominant in the west at that time. It might also have secured a truce in that area. Henry’s lack of activity in Wales might be indicative of either an acceptance of a loss of control there, or reflect that the French army had returned to France in the uneventful manner described by Monstrelet, leaving only the Welsh to attack, although this explanation seems unsatisfactory and incomplete. Henry’s refusal to pursue in September or to show the flag in the west the following year supports a conclusion that he accepted that he no longer controlled the region. After the Welsh sacked Carmarthen in 1403, Henry journeyed there in person and reasserted his authority around west Wales. However, he did not do so in 1405 or the following year. In addition, there is a notable flurry of evidence concerning hostage exchanges, exemplified by a curious paper trail regarding Thomas Roche, constable of Pembroke castle. He was captured by the Welsh sometime during the latter half of 1405 and was eventually exchanged for four Welsh prisoners. It is also noteworthy that

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301 Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 106, 126; Davies, Revolt, 195.
303 POPCE, vol 1, 278-9; Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 106-7, n.1; Davies, Revolt, 117, 194-5.
305 CPR, 1399-1401, 117, 145 (the grant of the office of constable of Pembroke castle to Roche); CPR, 1405-8, 80, 181 (also, 168, example of other hostage negotiations and the king issuing licence to talk to the rebels and safe-conduct to travel to Wales); CCR, 1405-9, 20; Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 107; Davies, Revolt, 234.
Roche was rewarded with legal protection by Henry in regard to his custody of Carmarthen, which possibly identifies why and when he was taken by the Welsh. However, Roche’s liberty does not appear to have been easily arranged. Henry issued a firm command to Reginald, Lord Grey, to see to it that a number of rebels were released so that Roche could be freed. The negotiations for Roche’s release dragged on until the following summer. The process of negotiation with the rebels might be dismissible as a locally-worked solution had the king not been consistently involved. His personal hand in the matter could be taken as a legitimisation of the rebels’ territorial claims, just as the English would exchange prisoners with the French, for example, during times of truce. Perhaps herein lies the key. It should be borne in mind that, according to the English spy at Glyn Dŵr’s parliament in July 1405, Glyn Dŵr intended to present himself before Henry with the French behind him and discuss peace. No-one has yet suggested that this might be what happened, yet truces between the Welsh and the border communities were relatively frequent. From the Welsh side, following profound research on Owain Glyn Dŵr, it seems probable that he would do what he promised. To examine this suggestion from the crown’s perspective, a truce would explain several ambiguities. If Henry made such an agreement, no matter how insincerely, that would explain why the sizeable army he frantically gathered at Hereford in September made no clear move into Wales, that season or the following year, suggesting the agreement of a year-long truce, for example. Evidence from March the following year implies that the king had not managed to resupply Coity castle in the Vale of Glamorgan, when he ‘was last in Wales.’ This clearly implies that Henry was thought to have entered Wales in 1405, but did not even go the short distance from Hereford to Coity in the gentle coastal landscape of Glamorgan. The military activities arranged shortly before Henry’s departure for London

306 CPR, 1405-8, 42.
307 CCR, 1405-9, 20.
308 CPR, 1405-8, 181.
309 Hingeston, RHL Henry IV, vol 2, 76-9; Davies, Revolt, 117-8. See Appendix D 4: Letter from John de Stanley to Henry IV, 30th July, 1405.
310 Hingeston, RHL Henry IV, vol 1, 155-9; POPCE, vol 1, 236, 278-9; Davies, Revolt, 234-6, 297-8.
311 CPR, 1405-8, 163. Note: This also shows that the inland castles were supplied via the nearest coastal port, not across the land, in this case by a crayer at Ogmore. (Note: other references given by Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 89, 105-6 [POPCE, vol 1, 278-9 and CPR 1405-9, 80, 84, 147, 148, 149] are appointments and commissions for Richard, Lord Grey and Thomas, earl of Arundel, to hold commissions of ‘Oyer and Terminer’ for Brecon, Gloucester and Hereford, as well as the latter to Shrewsbury and Shropshire, Oct-Nov 1405. Within these they are orders to muster troops for the care and keep of the castles of the region, but nowhere is there mention of the rebels or offensive action) and Davies, Revolt, 246, regarding the rescue and revictualling of Coity date to November and December 1404, CPR, 1401-5, 475 (23 Nov. 1404); CCR 1402-5, 478-9 (13 Nov. 1404).
were not indicative of mounting a campaign westwards. In that first week of October 1405, he ordered ‘Richard, Lord of Grey’, to hold a commission of ‘oyer and terminer’ in the king’s own lordship of Brecon, and Henry appointed Thomas, earl of Arundel, keeper of Shrewsbury, and empowered him to do whatever was required to secure the county of Shropshire.\textsuperscript{312} These two measures are clearly security measures designed to stabilise and secure the border. This not only implies a threat to penetrate the border, but also supports the re-dating to 1406 of the letter from the tenants of Shropshire who feared that the French would return.\textsuperscript{313} On 7 October, local officials were appointed to raise a force of 200 men-at-arms and 600 archers to muster in November – so in no apparent hurry.\textsuperscript{314} Their task was to accompany Lord Grey ‘for the safe-keeping of the castles and fortresses of those parts (South Wales) and the counties of Gloucester and Hereford adjoining.’ A comparable force was to be raised to assist Arundel also. While this intends an advance into ‘South Wales’, judging by the letter of the orders, this force was raised to secure and stabilise the English side of the border and bolster nearby castles on the Welsh side. It is questionable whether they would have ventured too deeply into Wales if there were no truce in force, since this army is smaller than either the Welsh or French force individually and would logically be at great risk of destruction. Later that month, Lord Grey was appointed as the king’s lieutenant in Brecon and Hereford for a period of forty-nine days.\textsuperscript{315} Again, this seems unhurried and short-term; hardly indicative of a counter-strike by crown forces. Finally, the force ordered to be raised in October was, on 24 November 1405, commissioned to serve Lord Grey until 1 February.\textsuperscript{316} At the same time, Henry ordered another session of ‘oyer and terminer’ to be held in Gloucester and Hereford as people there had been supplying the rebels with ‘victuals, armour and other harness.’\textsuperscript{317} The sum of these actions appears to be a re-imposition of law, order and the king’s authority over Hereford, Gloucester, Shropshire and Brecon. These are clearly defensive security measures, carried out at will, rather than under the threat of an immediate attack. They stand stark in comparison with Henry’s hurried summoning of troops from so many counties during the late summer and early autumn. Once more, these later measures imply the existence of a truce, rather than a state of war and invasion.

\textsuperscript{312} CPR, 1405-9, 80, 148 (Richard, Lord Grey of Codnor); Davies, Revolt, 39, 43.
\textsuperscript{313} POPCE, vol 2, 77-8.
\textsuperscript{314} CPR, 1405-9, 80, 147.
\textsuperscript{315} CPR, 1405-9, 84.
\textsuperscript{316} CPR, 1405-9, 149.
\textsuperscript{317} CPR, 1405-9, 149.
The following year, parliament debated a strategy for the Welsh war and demanded action; it voted funds for Prince Henry to raise a sizeable army of five thousand men that year; yet they did not enter Wales at all.\footnote{Rot. Parl. vol 3, 569, 574-6; Griffiths, ‘Prince Henry, Wales, and the Royal Exchequer, 1400-1413’, 214; Davies, Revolt, 122.} The fighting that occurred in 1406 was peripheral; indeed it might be just to limit the count of military operations that year to the English landing on Anglesey.\footnote{Davies, Revolt, 254. Note, the recapturing of Anglesey was probably connected to the June 1405 raid there by English troops based in Ireland, rather than a grand strategy of Henry or his council. Having conducted the mission there and left with booty, the lack of defence of the island might have exposed a weakness to exploit. See Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 99; Davies, Revolt, 188-9.} It is difficult to dismiss Henry’s passivity otherwise, given his martial career up to that point and the extraordinary challenge posed to any king of England of a French army, combined with rebel forces, on lands he claimed and were held in the name of the royal heir. The notion of a truce would also perhaps explain hostage negotiations such as those mentioned above, such arrangements being common following truces. It should be remembered that by summer 1405 Henry held Glyn Dŵr’s heir, Gruffydd, and others close to the Welsh leader, and therefore this might have proven a good time to conduct peace negotiations probably aimed at securing their release.\footnote{Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 96-8; Davies, Revolt, 311. Note: There is some confusion over who was held; Lloyd discussed the possibility of Gruffydd Yonge’s capture and release that year (Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 98, n.3), but dismissed it inconclusively, giving untraced sources (CCR, 12, 21 March; Ann. Hen. IV, 399). There might be a confusion with the English cleric and diplomat Richard Young who was taken by the Welsh around this time, perhaps slightly earlier (for which, see Gabriel, ‘Wales and the Avignon Papacy’, 76). Also, Lloyd and Davies said that a number of peripheral areas such as Gower and Flint submitted to the crown during 1406 (Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 129; Davies, Revolt, 124). However this is based on ‘Annals of Owen Glyn Dŵr’ (see Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 149-54), written between 1556 and 1564, and therefore is unreliable.}

The notion of a truce is not far-fetched. Quite the contrary, it is precisely what Glyn Dŵr said he would do; the decline in military activity after the 1405 campaign and subsequent prisoner exchange are suggestive of this end. This might also explain French actions following the campaign in Wales. Assuming the Saint-Denys chronicler was correct, the return of the French nobles was legitimate, and possibly a term of the truce. The army left behind would have been safe from attack from the English, or acted as a powerful guarantee of opposition should Henry return too soon. Assuming Monstrelet was right, the unmolested departure of all of the French was entirely feasible and in keeping with a truce being in force. If either scenario were true, then the French had recovered their honour, tarnished by the comte de la Marche in 1404. They had either invaded and ravaged one corner of their enemy’s domain, or they had confronted him and shown him their colours on his own soil, possibly assisting in negotiating a truce for their ally. Their shame erased, they were free to...
return home to be feted. Glyn Dŵr’s actions in seeking a truce seem merited for several reasons. Firstly, this would seem to be a normal human reaction of a father whose son and several close friends had been captured that summer. Next, as recorded by a good independent contemporary source, that was exactly what Glyn Dŵr said he would do when the French arrived. Also, the manner in which this appears to have been done seems to fit with the normal contemporary native cultural and diplomatic practices in terms of conflict resolution. Meetings at border points to settle disputes and to seek redress are documented throughout the medieval period. The form and typical clauses used in such ‘agreement meetings’ appear consistently in examples from 1354 to 1498. These meetings were often followed by a period of truce during which the different sides sought to fulfil the obligations to which they had committed themselves. Such an agreement might explain why Henry IV became personally involved in pursuing the release of seemingly unknown Welsh hostages detailed above. These ‘agreement meetings’ were not solely native practices, but were adopted by the Normans and the English in their dealings with the Welsh. Recognising the protagonists acting within the cultural customs of their day appears to ground their actions in a more realistic way. Finally, had the French assisted in winning peace for Glyn Dŵr, it might help explain the clauses of the Pennal Declaration of March 1406. It has been viewed as a document detailing the blue-print of a future state; such a proclamation would be an illogical thing to produce during a war, which some believe was in decline for the Welsh after 1405. It clearly makes more sense to plan ahead during a truce and appears to give an idea of Glyn Dŵr’s peacetime intentions. The extent of the campaign’s reach and the reasons why Henry declined to face the allied army in combat remain, for now, uncertain. However, the above offers a plausible, even probable, solution, if people’s actions reveal the true course of events.

The expedition to Wales should be considered within the context of other French activities beyond its borders that year. In a similar time frame, Charles de Savoisy commanded a force that launched from Saint-Mathieu in Brittany in late August and conducted an apparently successful, bloody attack between Portland and the Isle of Wight in the company of Bretons

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321 Smith, ‘Cydfodau o’r Bumthegfed Ganrif’, 309-24, particularly 313-5 (I am grateful to Dr. Alun Williams of Cardiff University for his assistance with this article).
322 Smith, ‘Cydfodau o’r Bumthegfed Ganrif’, 313-5 (‘agreement meetings’ seems a reasonable translation of ‘cydfodau’).
and Castilians. In addition, from spring to mid-summer 1405, there was a plan to forcibly install Benedict XIII into Rome. Although this is discussed in more detail below, its existence and because so many of the great French magnates contributed towards it merits reference here. Although it ultimately foundered before completion, the fact that France was able to articulate its external power so forcefully in 1405 demonstrates not only its perhaps unexpected military capability, but also its less frequently discussed political and strategic will to do so.

Robert Mascall, bishop of Hereford, had little doubt that the French expedition was sent by the duke of Orleans, as the opening quotation reveals. This appears accurate in the context of Louis’s domination of the French court from 1402 onwards, but notably from 1404 to early 1406 when he ran affairs. Considering the previous year’s alliance, the failed mission of 1404 and Louis’s military strategy of alliance and action, Mascall’s assertion is entirely credible. In addition, the project that same year to insert Benedict XIII into Rome under arms was plainly supported, perhaps even driven, by Orleans. The following quote from King Charles’s letter of 1406, following the earl of Northumberland’s visit to Paris, also associated the English rebels with the French invasion of Wales. This establishes some grounds to tie the York rebellion and the allied campaign in Wales to part of an attempted coup, fuelled by Louis of Orleans, all of which aimed at dethroning Henry IV. While this appears to read as a rebuke, the letter undeniably offered aid to those English rebels who sought to overthrow Henry. In light of this and Louis’s other efforts against Henry, it seems plausible to forward the notion that 1405 saw an unsuccessful attempted Orleanist coup.

They should know that, if recently, when we sent an army to Wales, we had been sure that the partisans of the just cause and the friends of the legitimate heirs to the throne would welcome our people favourably and hasten to join them, we would have had at our disposal far greater forces, but we are still ready to help them in the aforementioned cases.

323 Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 3, 316-23. (It is noteworthy that de Savoisy is said to have spared the Genoese they found in England on the grounds that they were subjects of the French king, 320-1); Evans, The Unconquered Knight, 107-32; Carriazo, El Victorial, 186-215.
324 Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 3, 262-7, 290-7; Jarry, La Vie Politique de Louis de France, 337-41; Creighton, History of the Papacy, vol 1, 188-95; d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 47; Pillement, Pedro de Luna, 124-6, 131-6 (Pillement says Benedict withdrew in August, Creighton says October, 195, the latter seems the more reliable); Morrall, Gerson and the Great Schism, 68; Lalande, Jean II le Meingre, 130-9.
325 Parry, The Register of Robert Mascall, 6.
326 Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 3, 428, 430 (Latin), 429, 431 (French); Williams, Chronique de la Traison et Mort, 299-302, My translation of: ‘indubitanter scientes quod, cum ad Walliam novissime armatum transmisimus, si securi duissemus gentem nostram ab amicis veritatis et heredum Anglie sequacibus recipi debere gratulanter, et cum effectu, ut decebat, cosiari, majorem multo potenciam misissemus, mitterque semper parati sumus,
The ‘Pennal Declaration’, was a letter sent by Owain Glyn Dŵr to Charles VI concerning Wales’s position on papal allegiance during the Schism. It comprised two documents; a short preamble on a separate parchment and the main document which discussed two principal subjects on one large parchment. The latter acknowledged receipt of a French letter received on 8 March 1406, while the preamble and the declaration were both dated as complete in the same year but on the last day of March. The original letter from France was brought to Owain by ‘Hugh Eddowyer, of the Order of Predicants, and Maurice Kery, our friends and envoys.’ The existence of a member of the Dominican Order is noteworthy due to their influential role in Pope Benedict XIII’s personal council, including the position of the pope’s confessor. Little has been revealed of these two envoys except through the incarceration of a Dominican friar named Hywel Edwere in north Wales in 1410. The evidence for this also illuminates the probability of Scots’ involvement in transporting messengers and provision of victuals to the rebels. Additionally, the fluid nature of loyalties of castle commanders is unveiled; some retained Percy sympathies, some changed stance according to the local strength of the protagonists or as immediate financial opportunities arose. There is no record of the French original letter to Owain, although its contents are clearly rewritten within this reply. Frustratingly, no precise composition date for the French document is included, although the text leaves clues, discussed below. This is relevant in terms of establishing the identity of the French hand guiding this policy. The documents

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327 BNF JS16B. 40, and JS16. 29; Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, JS16B.40 (preamble) 40-1 (Latin), 83-4 (English) and JS16.29 (Declaration) 42-54 (Latin), 85-99 (English) (Note: Matthews dated it ‘31st day of March, A.D. 1406, and in the sixth year of our rule’ rather than ‘the last day of March in the year of the birth of Our Lord one thousand four-hundred and six, and in the sixth of our principate’ as a more faithful translation of the Latin). This letter is referred to by Lloyd as ‘the Pennal policy’ (Owen Glendower, 118-121), repeated by Williams, The Welsh Church From Conquest to Reformation, 222-3, also by R. Griffiths, ‘The Glyndwr Rebellion In North Wales Through The Eyes Of An Englishman’, BBCS, 1966-8, (22), 158-9, and described by Davies as a ‘policy’ (Revolt, 121, 169-73). However it seems axiomatic to call it ‘the Pennal Declaration’ because it declares Owain’s vision for a future Welsh state as well as his pledge to support Benedict XIII’s papal claim.

328 BNF JS16B. 40, and JS16. 29; Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, JS16B.40 (preamble) 40-1 (Latin), ‘vii die marci anno Nativitate Domini millesimo quadrtringentesimo sexto’, 83-4 (English) and JS16.29 (Declaration) 42-54 (Latin), ‘ultimo die marci’, 85-99 (English); Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 118-25; Davies, Revolt, 169-73.

329 Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 42 (Latin), 85 (English) ‘Hugonem Eddouyer, ordinis predicatorium et Mauricium Kery, familiares et nuncios nostris nobis’.


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plainly show that it came from Charles VI’s court; however this appears to fall during a period of regency under the queen and Orleans during one of the king’s absences, but one denoted by Louis’s weakening grip.\textsuperscript{332}

It is telling that the Welsh were invited to declare their allegiance for the pope commonly, though not entirely accurately, regarded as the French candidate. This demonstrates that the element that dominated the French court at that point regarded them as a legitimate power and a desirable ally. This could be more simply characterised; before 1406 the Welsh had sufficiently demonstrated their liberty from England to conduct their own political, military and diplomatic affairs, and were therefore legitimate to induce into French influence. The 1404 alliance transferred Wales’s temporal allegiance to France.\textsuperscript{333} One of the stated aims of the French initiative that arrived in Wales in March 1406 was to secure Wales’s spiritual allegiance to the French king also.\textsuperscript{334} This overt acquisition of the allegiance one of England’s British dominions was a significant and aggressive measure by the French. It clearly proves an effort to expand their power and influence into Britain.

According to the Saint-Denys chronicle, the bulk of the French-Breton expeditionary force overwintered in Wales and returned to France around Lent 1406.\textsuperscript{335} If correct, then it is possible that the Pennal documents were taken to France with that returning army.

\textsuperscript{332} Bellaguet, \textit{Saint-Denys}, vol 3, 266-75, 284-9; Schnerb, \textit{Armagnacs et Bourguignons}, 75-83.
\textsuperscript{334} Matthews, \textit{Welsh Records in Paris}, 42 (Latin), 85-6 (English).
\textsuperscript{335} Bellaguet, \textit{Saint-Denys}, vol. 3, 328-9; Lloyd, \textit{Owen Glendower}, 126; Davies \textit{Revolt}, 121, 195.
The Documents

The Preamble

This relatively brief note, in diplomatic terms, gave a précis of the longer document it accompanied. It is valuable for a number of reasons, perhaps most notably for the use of the first person which strongly suggests that Owain Glyn Dŵr dictated this part of the declaration. It seems unlikely that Owain wrote it. The document gives an example of Owain Glyn Dŵr’s voice; an apparently angry one that used repetition and colourful, violent phraseology. To illustrate that point, he referred to English barbarism three times in this short note: ‘fury of the barbarous Saxons’, ‘barbarous fury of those reigning in this country’ and ‘barbarians’. The description of an enemy as barbarian is far from unique. However, it appears to recount the unwarranted destruction of something innocent, perhaps holy. Italian writers of the period refer to descending German armies in the same manner.

The Pennal voice speaks of the violence and oppression suffered by the Church in Wales as well as by ‘my nation’, ‘whence because they had government over us, and indeed, on account of that fact itself, it seemed reasonable with them to trample on us’, ‘the metropolitan church of St. David’s was, as it appears, violently compelled, by the barbarous fury of those reigning in this country, to obey the church of Canterbury, and de facto still remains in this subjection’ and ‘similarly you will wish to extirpate and remove violence and oppression from the church and my subjects.’ These denunciations of Henry and his violent methods were not simply Glyn Dŵr venting against injustice. The original French approach, contained within Owain’s


337 Its authorship is uncertain; the only information of note comes from a palaeography expert, Dr Susan Davies of Aberystwyth University. She was researching the same document from a style perspective and I had the opportunity to meet her at a Palaeography Training session, ‘Medieval Manuscripts’, at the University of Wales Conference Centre at Gregynog Hall, Newtown, Powys, 17-20 March 2006. It was her opinion that it was written in an Anglicana hand that came into fashion in Bordeaux in the last quarter of the fourteenth century. If correct, that eliminates Owain Glyn Dŵr as its scribe.

338 J 516B. 40; Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 40 (Latin), ‘rabiem barbarorum Saxonum’, ‘rabie barbarica ... hic regnante’ and ‘barbaros’, 83 (English). Note: this suggests that Owain Glyn Dŵr, in spite of his education and professional and family connections, possibly used Welsh as his mother-tongue; he described the English as ‘Saxonum’ here and again in the main declaration (53, 98). This might be founded from the Welsh-language term, ‘Saes’ or ‘Saesneg’, whereas the French were perhaps more likely to have used and recognised variations of ‘Anglie’ or ‘Anglais’. However, other examples of contemporary use of the term outside Wales have emerged and are included in a discussion below.

339 Chamberlin, Count of Virtue, 71.


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longer reply, regaled him with the pro-Avignon account of the Schism, using certain phrases to list the efforts Clement and Benedict had made to heal the rift, and sought Owain’s declaration of support for the preferred French-backed pontiff. The language of the French letter described in detail the mob violence that had forced the election of Urban VI on the grounds that he was Italian, and how the Roman pontiffs had usurped the Holy See. Owain appropriated the same terms and, by mirroring that language, appears to have been attempting not only to relate to the issue in hand and demonstrate his fervour in this important matter, but also to reflect the similarities between Henry’s and Urban’s conduct. Moreover, his condemnation of Henry and his allegedly unjust, unchristian and barbarous ways would likely have been music to the ears of those French nobles who bore Henry ill will. It should be recalled here that Louis of Orleans detested Henry personally for his treatment of his niece, Isabella, and his subsequent refusal to engage in a duel with the duke. In addition, it should be remembered that Louis was Benedict’s most fervent advocate at court. In writing this, perhaps, Owain was speaking directly to Louis. In a period where personal relations played a major role in high-level politics, Owain appears to have been addressing his audience wisely.

In this short letter, Owain appears humble and addressed the French king with the correct words of esteem. Perhaps most importantly to the French faction whose support he hoped to elicit, he made plain his answer regarding Benedict: ‘confident indeed in his right, and intending for me to agree with you as far as is possible for me, I recognize him as the true Vicar of Christ, on my own behalf and on behalf of my subjects by these letters patent, foreseeing them by the bearer of their communications in your majesty’s presence.’ For the Welsh rebels, his expressed wish to retain French support and to seek their aid in simultaneously resurrecting and liberating the Welsh Church from Canterbury’s yoke were paramount. He closed by requesting the French to present the letter to Benedict XIII and to support their cause. However, within this document, which differs from the other more ecclesiastically-flavoured or diplomatically formulaic letters, Owain also showed a more

342 Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 2, 700-1; Johnes, Monstrelet, 55-83; Vaughan, Philip the Bold, 47; Morrall, Gerson and the Great Schism, 63-4; Renouard, trans., Bethell, The Avignon Papacy, 78; Davies, Revolt, 191-2; Given-Wilson, ‘The Quarrels of Old Women’, 29-47; Schnerb, L’Etat Bourguignon, 167.
343 J 516B. 40; Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 40 (Latin), 83 (English). ‘confidens eciam in jure ejusdem et vobiscum, quantum mihi est possibile concordare intendens, ipsum pro vero Christi vicario pro me et subditis meis per litteras meas patentes hac vice majestati vestre per latorem presencium presentandas recognosco.’
subtle, emotive side to his language, ‘as you deemed us worthy to raise us out of darkness into light’, and from this short letter his intelligence seems perceptible.  

The Declaration
The main document comprises two sections. By far the greater part discussed the Schism and justified Benedict as the true pope, while a short final section presented a number of points and requests Owain wished to make in order to revive the Welsh church.

To date, the greater part of the document has been largely passed over in preference to discussions of the Welsh issues. Rees Davies, the only writer to comment on this first section,

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344 J 516B. 40; Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 40 (Latin), 83 (English), ‘ut sicut nos a tenebris in lucem erigere dignati estis’.

345 J 516. 29; Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 42-54 (Latin), ‘Littera Per Quam Owynus Reduxit Se Et Terras Ad Obedienciam Domini Nostri Pape xiii’m, 85-99 (English) which is unfaithfully translated as ‘Owen, Prince of Wales, To Charles VI., King of France, Promising Obedience To Pope Benedict XIII’, it would more accurately read ‘Letter By Which Owain Submits Himself And His Lands To The Obedience Of Our Pope 13th’.

346 Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 42-51 (Defence of Benedict, Latin), 85-95, (Defence of Benedict, English), 51-4 (Welsh Church clauses, Latin), 96-9 (Welsh Church clauses, English)
brushed past it in two sentences. However, a more thorough treatment of it reveals more noteworthy points. The main theme of the message is valuable; that of Wales’s desire to strengthen ties to France and offering its spiritual allegiance to French guidance. However, there are other points of substance and style that demand exposure.

In the first instance, the document reveals the names of the two envoys, ‘Hugh Eddowyer’ and ‘Morris Kery’, who returned from France with the French letter. In addition, this document firmly dates Owain’s 1406 parliament, which must have been held between the arrival of the French request, 8 March 1406, and the completion of the reply, 31 March 1406. Within the body of this main document, Owain explicitly says as much.

Although the date of this third assembly has proved elusive, most writers have assumed it was convened at the place named on the document, Pennal. On reflection, while possible, this seems unlikely. Owain held his 1404 parliament at Machynlleth, and that of the following year at Harlech. Given that Pennal is just outside Machynlleth, it seems reasonable to suggest that Owain was varying his councils between southern and northern strongholds. Within the clauses of most interest to Welsh writers, Owain recognised the need to establish northern and southern colleges in Wales. Equally, the following year, when Prince Henry’s army advanced to Aberystwyth, Owain was in the north, which might support a notion that he alternated his council venue on a yearly basis.

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347 Davies, Revolt, 170. ‘Much the greater part of the document is concerned to rehearse at length the reasons for the schism in the Church and why the Avignonese cause was to be preferred to the Roman one. The section no doubt repeats verbatim the arguments rehearsed by the French in their diplomatic messages to Owain.’ Note: It seems likely that this response simply regurgitated the case put forward in the original letter to a number of potential allies, but that this example to Owain has survived.

348 Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 42 (Latin), 85 (English).
349 Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 52 (Latin), 96 (English), ‘Following the advice of our council, we have called together the nobles of our race, the prelates of our Principality and others called for this purpose, and, at length, after diligent examination and discussion of the foregoing articles and their contents being thoroughly made by the prelates and the clergy, it is agreed and determined that we, trusting in the rights of the lord Benedict, the holy Roman and supreme pontiff of the universal church.’ ‘Et subsequentur ex deliberacione consilii nostri convocari fecimus procesces de prosapia nostra et prelatos principatus nostri ac alios in hac parte evocandos et tandem post diligentem examinacionem et disputacionem articulorum premissorum et materie eorumdem per prelatos et clerum sufficienter factas, concordatum et conclusum existit quod nos, confidentes in jure domini Benedicti, sacrosancte Romane ac universalis ecclesie summi pontifices ...’

350 Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 119, 121; Davies, Revolt, 169-70.
351 Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 82, 101, 118; Davies, Revolt, 116-7, 163-4.
352 Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 54 (Latin), 98 (English).
353 Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 132-3; Davies, Revolt, 124-5.
That short passage also reveals the composition of Owain’s parliament; clergy, nobles and the most prominent men of each commote.\(^{355}\) In contrast to Lloyd’s assessment therefore that Owain held ‘a house of lords rather than a house of commons’, it seems unequivocal that Owain’s parliament contained the appropriate leaders of the three estates – entirely in keeping with the notions and norms of his time.\(^{356}\)

The main thrust of the French letter described the events which, ‘violently and through an infamous riot’ raised ‘Bartholomew de Prinhano’ to the highest Christian office.\(^{357}\) The description of the election, the aggression of the Roman mob and the withdrawal of the cardinals from Rome is unremarkable fare.\(^{358}\) It does, however, neatly exemplify Italian opposition to the French dominance, even possession, of the papacy during much of the fourteenth century. The Pennal text then renders a largely routine justification of the deliberation over the rightful election of Clement VII and subsequently that of Benedict XIII. Within this part of the letter there is also a defence of the efforts made by Clement and Benedict to heal the schism, and contrasting revelations are made of the actions of the *intrusi*, the intruder or anti-pope, to deepen the crisis.\(^{359}\) This section also contains a notable tactic of French persuasion; the listing of all those temporal princes who freely supported Benedict.\(^{360}\) They were all lords of French territories, or rulers connected to the French crown by blood, marriage or alliance. Superficially, this resembles a weak list of pro-French puppets and relations. It is worth considering however, that this might have been proposed as a subtle, seductive invitation to join that club. The lure of accepting would be to stand in liberty in a similar manner to Scotland, Cyprus and Genoa, whose political independence against larger, aggressively acquisitive neighbours was powerfully upheld by France. Viewed in that light, the French approach to Owain should be perceived in a different manner, one which is substantially underpinned by the previous examples of intelligent French diplomatic

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\(^{355}\) Ellis, *Original Letters*, 43; Hingeston, *RHL Henry IV*, vol 2, 76-9, Matthews, *Welsh Records in Paris*, 52 (Latin), 96 (English), ‘Following the advice of our council, we have called together the nobles of our race, the prelates of our Principality and others called for this purpose, and, at length, after diligent examination and discussion of the foregoing articles and their contents being thoroughly made by the prelates and the clergy, it is agreed and determined that we, trusting in the rights of the lord Benedict, the holy Roman and supreme pontiff of the universal church.’; Lloyd, *Owen Glendower*, 101, 119; Davies, *Revolt*, 164, 220.


This manifestly promised that that Charles would have a greater obligation towards Glyn Dŵr and detailed those things that he would initially secure from Benedict on Owain’s behalf. The fact that these offers originally came from the French has only been partially alluded to by Rees Davies, but appears in no other secondary work consulted. Although Davies recognised many of the Welsh demands as ‘utterly unexceptional’ he appears to diminish the French role in this key part of the document, instead highlighting the ‘amplitude of his (Owain’s) vision and the bravado of his approach.’ Lloyd also saw the brilliance and originality of the Pennal demands; ‘one cannot doubt, upon a review of this long list of

361 Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 51-2 (Latin), 95-6 (English). ‘Et videtur dicto domini nostro regi quod hoc erit ad salutem anime sue, subditorum suorum, conservacionem status sui; et de hoc idem dominus rex qui sincere zelatur salutem suam, prosperitatem et conservacionem honoris et status sui ipsum visceraliter et sub vinculo ac federe amicicie et dilectionis singularis, quam ad eum habet, rogat et requirit signifcando sibi quod si premissa deducat ad executionem, faciet eodem domino regi maximam complacenciam et se repputabit ad sua beneplacita peramplius obligatum; et si forte dictus dominus princeps, prelati et ali vii ecclesiasticii terrarum sibi subditarum formidarent quod ex hujusmodi reductione possent certa prelaturas et alia beneficia ab intruso et suis predecessoreibus obtenta et alias gracias cujuscumque condicionis subditis suis concessis pro tempore futuro turbari vel quod dominus Benedictus vellet aliquid innovare, dominus noster rex offert se procuraturum erga dictum dominum Benedictum quod omnes prelati et benificiati confirmabuntur, omnesque gracias, dispensaciones et alie etc. ratificabuntur et concedentur in forma eis grata et secura ; quodque dictus dominus Benedictus providetib de prelaturis et aliis beneficis ibidem vacantibus et vacaturis personis sufficientibus dicto domino principi fidis et gratis et non sibi emulsi aut suspectis.’

362 Davies, Revolt, 170.
demands, that the Welsh leader was an excellent hand at driving a bargain and fully understood how much might be extracted from Avignon in return for the promise of his support. However, in pressing the originality and breadth of his vision, these two respected historians seem to have utterly missed the point; the strength and intelligence of the Pennal Declaration lies in the fact that there is nothing entirely new or visionary in it, but that all can be related to other events either in Wales or contemporary Europe, and therefore all of the Welsh articles were theoretically grantable on the grounds of precedence.

Although Lloyd, Davies and Williams have offered good descriptions of the Welsh-interest clauses of the Pennal Declaration, they are worth discussing here. In the final section, that of primary interest to Welsh writers, the same aggressive voice identified in the preamble again becomes apparent. There is the curious reference to the English as ‘barbarorum Saxonum’, yet the letter discusses ‘monasteriis et collegiis anglicorum’, and the ‘regni Anglie’. This suggests that a specific point was being made about the English being ‘Saxons’, yet Owain’s intended point now seems lost. Intriguingly, a similar term to describe the English as ‘Sesnes’, temptingly close to the Welsh term for English, ‘Saesneg’, appears in contemporary French treatises which also included friendly reference to the Welsh. They were written between 1406 and 1409, and described as ‘traité’; notably one titled “A Toute La Chevalerie” which was connected to the longer, multi-part ‘Traité Contre Les Anglais’. On the grounds of the use of those uncommon phrases, it is tempting to imagine collusion between the writers of the ‘traités’ and the Pennal Declaration. In addition, as the French letter to Owain identified the Roman pope as intrusi, so, in a repetition of the preamble’s appropriation of French terms, Owain’s declaration refers to ‘Henricum Lencastrie

Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 121.
Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 118-21; Williams, Welsh Church from Conquest to Reformation, 222-5; Davies, Revolt, 169-73.
Grèvy-Pons et al, Jean de Montreuil, Opera, vol 2, 12 (dating), 89-149 (one version of the traité ‘A Toute La Chevalerie’, plus notes), 96, lines 150-6 (three mentions of the ‘Sesnes’), 105, (‘Qui de glaive [usera] de glaive [morra]’, the murderous behaviour of the English towards their neighbours, ‘facent [continuellement] guerre mortelle … ou ilz n’ayent esté cause d’espandre, et espandu plus de sang humain, bouté feux, violé femmes, destruit eglises, hospitalx et autres lieux sains que (toutes aultres nations crestiennes), tesmoing France, Espaingne, Escoce, Gales et Yrlande …’), 113, lines 703-5 (honourable mention to ‘Yvain de Gales’ for leading a French army against the English and killing more than 500 ‘Angloiz’ in one place), also in the Traité Contre Les Anglais (étape I), 159-218, particularly 201-2, lines 1267-1273, dealing with a point over who asserted their sovereignty overbearingly towards their subjects and neighbours, ‘se poeut evidanment jugier le contraire, et se les Escoz et lez Galois, les Espaignos et cheux d’Irlande en estoient interrogiéz, voire tous les aultres voisins desdiz Angloiz, ilz tesmoigneroient lesdiz Angloiz ester gens intollerables, rigoreux et hays de leurs voisins.’
It appears that Owain was trying to communicate with his interlocutors with the same terms they used, applying them to his circumstances and embellishing them emotively.

Demands made by Glyn Dŵr in the Pennal Declaration have been identified as political as well as ecclesiastical, and likened to a civil programme for an independent church within an independent state. The Welsh clauses then, are the following:

First, that all ecclesiastical censures against us, our subjects, or our land, by the aforesaid lord Benedict or Clement his predecessor, at present existing, the same shall by the said Benedict be removed.

The simple request for the lifting of any censures made by the Avignon pope against Owain, his subjects and lands would be simple to achieve. The French promised that they could procure this as well as many of the other subsequent requests.

‘Again, that whatsoever vows and of whatsoever nature given by us or whomsoever of our principality, to those who called themselves Urban or Boniface, lately deceased, or to their adherents, shall be absolved.’

This second clause acts in tandem with the first, annulling the obedience to Benedict’s papal adversary. This too, would have been simple to grant.

Again, that he shall confirm and ratify the orders, collations, titles of prelates, dispensations, notorial documents, and all things whatsoever, from the time of Gregory XI., from which, any danger to the souls, or prejudice to us, or our subjects, may occur, or may be engendered.

The next clause appears as a cautious next step, following the removal of censures by Avignon and the annulment of vows to the Roman pope, returning to the established state of

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Gabriel, ‘Wales and the Avignon Papacy’, 70-86; Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 118-21; Williams, The Welsh Church from Conquest to Reformation, 222-5; Davies, Revolt, 169-73.

Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 52 (Latin), 97 (English). ‘Et primo si sensure ecclesiastice contra nos et subditos nostros seu terram nostram per pretatum dominum Benedictum aut Clementem predecessorem suum late existant, quod ipse Benedictus easdem relaxet.’

Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 52 (Latin), 97 (English), ‘Item quod quaecumque et qualiacumque juramenta per nos seu quosqumque alios principatus nostri illis qui se nominaverunt Vrbanum et Bonificium nuper defunctos seu eisdem adherentibus qualitercumque prestita relaxat.’

Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 52-3 (Latin), 97 (English). ‘Item quod confirmet et ratificet ordines collatos, titulos prelatorum, dispensacionesque et officia tabellionum ac alia quaecumque in quibus periculum animarum aut prejudicium nobis et subditis nostris in ea parte evinire seu generari possent a tempore Gregorii xi.’
affairs immediately prior to the schism. This also would be simple enough to decree in writing or in a public audience.

Again, that the Church of St David, archbishop and confessor, was a metropolitan church, and after his death, twenty-four archbishops succeeded him in the same place, as their names are contained in the chronicles and ancient books of the church of Menevia, and we cause these to be stated as the chief evidence, namely, Eliud, Ceneu, Morfael, Mynyw, Haerwnen, Elwaed, Gwrnwen, Llewdwyd, Gwrwyd, Gwganw, Clydâwg, Aman, Elias, Maelswyd, Sadwrnwen, Cadell, Alaethwy, Novis, Sadwrnwen, Drochwel, Asser, Arthwael, David II., and Samson; and that as a metropolitan church it had and ought to have the undermentioned suffragan churches, namely, Exeter, Bath, Hereford, Worcester, Leicester, which is now translated to the churches of Coventry and Lichfield, St Asaph, Bangor, and Llandaff. For being crushed by the fury of the barbarous Saxons, who usurped to themselves the land of Wales, they trampled upon the aforesaid church of St. David’s, and made her a handmaid to the church of Canterbury.  

This is perhaps the first clause of any local significance. The reason for presenting these twenty-four names, established through the proper consultation of chronicles and books, proves a precedent for native control of the church and a long Christian heritage. The broader claims to ecclesiastical sovereignty over those English dioceses named was also founded on established precedent and a belief, supported by manuscript and myth, that St David’s had once counted those parts of England within its influence. This clause also allows for that angry voice, railing against the ‘barbarous Saxons’ to once again be heard. However, it should also be borne in mind that the terms of the Tripartite Indenture had also laid a Welsh claim to areas of England, and that this 1406 declaration might be viewed as a continuation of that assertion. If there were still plans afoot to invade England and combine with English rebels to dethrone Henry, as King Charles’s letter of the same year blatantly stated, then this statement by Owain appears to connect with desires expressed in England and France.

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372 Davies, Revolt, 172.

373 Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 93-5, 100, 120; Davies, Revolt, 166-9. See Appendices 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3: Charles VI’s Letter to the English Nation, 1406.
Again that the same lord Benedict shall provide for the metropolitan church of St David’s, and the other cathedral churches of our principality, prelates, dignitaries and beneficed clergy and curates, who know our language.\textsuperscript{374}

The next clause has drawn particular interest from writers whose mother-tongues were Welsh, Lloyd and Davies.\textsuperscript{375} However, as shown above, the notion of selecting clergy favoured by Owain was proposed by the French. Equally, the call for priests able to freely commune with their flocks was neither new, since Gerald of Wales raised the same issue in a letter to the pope in 1201 and again by others on several occasions thereafter, nor was it a uniquely Welsh issue, as other peoples such as the Bretons and the Flemish had raised similar complaints.\textsuperscript{376} This should also have been simple enough to agree, although anointing an entire national clergy, however small, would have required considerable effort.

Again, that the same lord Benedict shall revoke and annul all incorporations, unions, annexions, appropriations of parochial churches of our principality made so far, by any authority whatsoever with English monasteries and colleges. That the true patrons of these churches shall have the power to present to the ordinaries of those places suitable persons to the same or appoint others.\textsuperscript{377}

Equally, the transfer of the oaths of allegiance away from English institutions in lands under Owain’s influence would have been easily announced, but harder to enforce. The second part of this, regarding locally-appointed candidates, would also have been an easy clause with which to concur, and would have granted Owain’s church a measure of control over its personnel. In theory, the pope might not have wished this, since pontiffs traditionally played a role in candidate selection; to lose this would be to lose a measure of power. However, this and the following clause mirrored movements within the French church in particular at that moment; the appropriation of control over the national church by the secular authorities. This ‘Gallican’ attitude appears entirely appropriate considering the recent conflict between the French government and Benedict over appointments and taxes. In making this and the

\textsuperscript{374} Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 53 (Latin), 98 (English). ‘Item quod idem dominus Benedictus provideat de metropolitano Menevensi ecclesie et aliis ecclesiis cathedralibus principatus nostri, prelaturis, dignitatis et beneficiis ecclesiasticis, curatis scientibus linguam nostram dumtaxat.’

\textsuperscript{375} Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 120; Davies, Revolt, 170.

\textsuperscript{376} W. H. Bliss, ed., Calendar of entries in the Papal registers relating to Great Britain and Ireland, Petitions to the Pope. Papal Register, A. D. 1342-1419, (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1896), 48 (1344), 367 (1361), 516, 519 (both 1366); Vaughan, Valois Burgundy, 112-3; Galliou and Jones, The Bretons, 278; Abse, Letters From Wales, 14 (1201).

\textsuperscript{377} Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 53 (Latin), 98 (English). ‘Item quod dominus Benedictus in corporaciones, uniones annexiones et appropriaciones ecclesiarum parochialium principatus nostri, monasteriis et collegiis anglicorum quorumcumque auctoritate hac tenus factas revocet et annulet et quod veri patroni earumdem ecclesiarum lorum ordinariis ydoneas personas representare valeant ad easdem seu alias conferre.’
following point, it seems that Owain was shrewdly relating his state of affairs to those of his audience; this was after all, a letter to the French king, or those acting in his stead, not one to the pope.

Again, that the lord Benedict shall concede to us and our heirs, the princes of Wales, that our chapels, etc., shall be free, and shall rejoice in the privileges, exemptions, and immunities in which they rejoiced in the times in the times of our forefathers the princes of Wales.\(^{378}\)

As described above, this request over the control over the garnering of ecclesiastical taxes in Wales would have been resonant to the French court. It made a claim to rights similar to those then in the air in France and, once again, it was loosely attributed to historical precedence. This would certainly benefit Owain and clergy loyal to him. As with all of the preceding clauses, this would have been easily, though theoretically, granted by papal decree, with the harder task, the practical application, being left to those in situ.

Again, that we shall have two universities or places of general study, namely, one in North Wales and the other in South Wales, in cities, towns, or places to be hereafter decided and determined by our ambassadors and nuncios for that purpose.\(^{379}\)

This ‘well-known request’, as Lloyd described it, does demonstrate vision, as Davies said, but hardly seems to qualify as ‘bravado’.\(^{380}\) As Davies also pointed out, many places were petitioning for and acquiring universities; so, this is only original in the Welsh context, but not so in a contemporary British or continental one.\(^{381}\) It does however signal Glyn Dŵr’s intentions to train an independent administration for which universities played a key role in producing the essential personnel. So, this is a sensible and constructive measure, but considering the number of other such institutions inaugurated around the same time, it is hardly a revolutionary proposal. It is perhaps noteworthy that this is aired as a future intention, their locations seemingly undecided. In addition, the fact that there were to be two might indicate that divisions between north and south forced Owain’s hand on this matter, rather than there being a wealth of candidates in both regions.

\(^{378}\) Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 53-4 (Latin), 98 (English). ‘Item quod dominus Benedictus concedat nobis et heredibus nostris principibus Wallie quod capella nostra de cetero sit libera et gaudeat privilegiis, exempcionibus et immunitatis quibibus gaudebat temporibus progenitorum nostrum principum Wallie.’

\(^{379}\) Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 54 (Latin), 98 (English). ‘Item quod habeamus duas universitates sive studia generalia, videlicet unum in Northwallie et alium in Swthwallie, in civitatibus, villis seu locis per ambaxiatores et nuncios nostros un hac parte specifiendi et declarandis.’

\(^{380}\) Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 121; Davies, Revolt, 170-1.

\(^{381}\) R. N. Swanson, Universities, Academics and The Great Schism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 216-7; Davies, Revolt, 171. This included Turin, Rome and St Andrews in Scotland, for example.
Again, that the lord Benedict shall brand as heretics and cause to be tortured in the usual manner, Henry of Lancaster, the intruder of the kingdom of England, and the usurper of the crown of the same kingdom, and his adherents, in that of their own free will they have burnt or have caused to be burnt so many cathedrals, convents and parish churches; that they have savagely hung, beheaded, and quartered archbishops, bishops, prelates, priests, religious men, as madmen or beggars, or caused the same to be done.  

This penultimate clause and that which followed were certainly connected. The above demanded, in perhaps the rich colourful language attributable to the document’s originator, how the enemy should be declared heretics and be tortured, in riposte to their many violent crimes against clergymen. Indeed, this call would certainly have been presentable as valid at the time; up to 1406, Henry IV’s reign had produced a staggering body-count of society’s upper echelons. Among the nobility, these included a king, the earls of Gloucester, Huntingdon, Kent, Salisbury, Wiltshire, Worcester, the Earl Marshal who was also earl of Norfolk, along with dozens of knights and an unknown number of lower-born men. His large-scale killing of clergymen has been described as a ‘peculiar characteristic of Henry IV’s retributive policies’, only surpassed by Henry VIII. Although a precise figure has proven impossible to calculate, Henry’s regime presided over the often brutal despatch of considerable numbers of all ranks of cleric, from friars through to the archbishop of York. So, to return to the declaration, in the same fashion that the first Welsh clauses acted as stepping stones for those that followed, so the penultimate article prepared the ground for the subsequent demand for a crusade against Henry.

That the same Lord Benedict shall grant to us, our heirs, subjects, and adherents, of whatsoever nation they may be, who wage war against the aforesaid invader and intruder, as long as they hold the orthodox faith, full remission of our sins, and that the remission

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382 Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 54 (Latin), 98 (English). ‘Item quod dominus Benedictus contra Henricum Lancastrie intrusorem regni Anglie et usurpatorem corone ejusdem regni et sibi adherentes, eo quod ecclesias tam cathedrales quam conventuales et parochiales voluntarie combusit et comburi procuravit, archiepiscopos, episcopos, prelatos, prebyteros, religiosos tam possessionatos quam mendicantes inhumaniter suspendi, decapitari et quartirizari fecit et fieri mandavit et quod scismaticus existit, cruciatam concedere dignetur in forma consuenta.’


385 Riley, Ypodigma Neustriæ, 393-4, 413-5; Kirby, Henry IV, 187; Grèvy-Pons et al, Jean de Montreuil, Opera, vol 2, 196-7 (Traité Contre Les Anglais, étape 1); Dunn, ‘Henry IV and the Politics of Resistance’, 5-23; See Appendices 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3: Charles VI’s Letter to the English Nation, 1406, which also refers to Henry’s killings.
should continue as long as the war between us, our heirs, and our subjects, and the aforesaid Henry, his heirs and subjects shall endure.\textsuperscript{386}

This evocative call for a crusade against Henry has also been identified elsewhere.\textsuperscript{387} There seems no doubt that these last two clauses establish the justifiable grounds and make a call for holy war against Henry, his heirs and his supporters – not against England, it should be noted. This undisguised call to arms seems to repeat Owain’s request for foreign troops made during 1401, perhaps revealing his true weakness, having insufficient men to effectively and universally oppose crown forces.\textsuperscript{388} This promised a long war, an unending war perhaps, against the common enemy. Given Orleanist control of court at the time of the approach to Owain, and powerful presence even when not directly at the helm, it seems reasonable to suggest that these last two articles might appear to be a counter-seduction on Owain’s part. In so doing, using the same terms written originally by the French throughout his text, and by using a similar ploy, Glyn Dŵr emerges as engaging and intelligent. However, apart from being appealing to the faction controlling the French government, this call too was based on recent precedent. Gregory XI had called for a crusade against Milan in 1372, Urban VI had declared crusades against the French Clementists in 1373 and 1384; the former induced the attack by English forces under the bishop of Norwich in 1373, while the latter caused conflict with Louis of Anjou.\textsuperscript{389} All of these targets were connected to the duke of Orleans. Therefore, in this time of personality politics, a crusade call might not only have been personally appealing but also based on just, retributive precedent. There might be another, more elusive, example of a holy war being called at this time; allegedly by Archbishop Arundel against the Welsh from 1404.\textsuperscript{390}

This clause in Owain’s reply might be in response to that, as well as engaging with the intense personality politics of the moment between Louis and Henry. In addressing an appeal for a holy war to the Avignon papacy, Owain was not issuing a desperate call for help

\textsuperscript{386} Matthews, \textit{Welsh Records in Paris}, 54 (Latin), 98-9 (English). ‘Item quod idem dominus Benedictus concedat nobis et heredibus nostris, subditis et adherentibus nobis cujuscumque nacionis fuerint dumtamen fidem teneant orthodoxam, qui guerram contra prefatum intrusorem sustinamus plenam remissionem omnium peccatorum et quod remissio hujusmodi duret guerra inter nos, heredes, et subditos nostros et prefatum Henricum, heredes et subditos suos durante.’

\textsuperscript{387} Lloyd, \textit{Owen Glendower}, 121; Davies, \textit{Revolt}, 170.

\textsuperscript{388} Matthews, \textit{Welsh Records in Paris}, 103-5 (Latin), 111-3 (English); \textit{Adam Usk}, 148-53.


\textsuperscript{390} Gabriel, ‘Wales and the Avignon Papacy’, 73; repeated in Davies, \textit{Revolt}, 173. Note: this claim has been difficult to track elsewhere or substantiate.
or attaching a seemingly over-blown religious appeal to an otherwise regional feud between temporal princes; he was displaying his knowledge of his interlocutor. Norman Housley’s key study clearly relates how aggressive the papacy had been since its translation to Avignon. As he revealed, ‘Crusades against Christian lay rulers were thus an important feature of the crusading movement in the Avignonese period.’ In seeking such a campaign against Henry, Glyn Dŵr again appeared therefore to be using the correct language to the correct audience. The Avignonese papacy had sought to flex its muscles at the beginning of the fourteenth century, by supporting campaigns throughout the eastern Mediterranean, aimed at those Christian princes requiring correction in the region, as well as the faith’s Muslim enemies. Many of the proposed crusades were to support embattled Christian allies, particularly Armenia, as well as to reclaim or expand the territories of nobles favoured by the Curia, and the French ranked highly among them. However, crusades were not solely sent east. Grand campaigns in Spain not only supported the Reconquista of the peninsula from the Moors of Granada, but the papacy also lent its weight to the political and dynastic struggles between Castile and Aragon, allies of England and France. Although the papacy also encouraged often large-scale campaigns against pagans in Eastern Europe during this period, it also conducted a notable number of smaller, political actions too, particularly in Italy. Certain of the crusades called against Christian rulers appeared to contain a strong element of personality politics between the pope and the noble or region in question. Perhaps the most convenient example of that was Bernabò Visconti’s designation as a heretic by Urban V in 1363, followed by a military campaign against Milan. Despite the enduring Anglo-French conflict and the terrifying mortality caused by the century’s plagues, it seems that most of the calls for crusades were made during the second half of the fourteenth century, and therefore during the lifetimes of Glyn Dŵr, his friends and allies. As Housley’s work shows, the Avignon popes were practiced exponents of crusades against European lay rulers, deemed heretics beforehand, whether on a grand or small scale; by recruiting troops or mercenaries locally or from nations uninvolved or adjacent to the conflict area. This is easily

demonstrated by campaigns against the Serbian king, Italian territories and in the numerous Spanish conflicts.\textsuperscript{400} The fear of drawing papal sanction is exemplified by the thoughts of Jean Gerson, who was aware of an increased possibility of English attack should the French be branded as heretics: ‘since they might attack us all the more freely [considering us] to be on a par with schismatics, heretics and Saracens’.\textsuperscript{401} This suggests therefore that the Welsh authors of these clauses were well aware of the political form and uses of crusades, as well as the willingness of the Avignon popes to use them as a mechanism to attain their goals. So, these two, final, more aggressive requests in the Pennal Declaration had demonstrable foundation on recent events and were justified, if required, as counter-strikes to the belligerence of the Roman adversary and his heretical adherents. In that light, they seem far from being unlikely or extreme, but entirely within the known actions of the Avignon popes, and therefore an astute request.

Perhaps the last pieces of information revealed by the Pennal Declaration, relevant to this study at least, concern the timing of the drafting of the original French letter to Owain which arrived in the hands of Kery and Eddouwyer. The text gives clues, clearly identifying that Benedict had been to Italy and that he was still in Genoa at the time it was written.\textsuperscript{402} This correlates with the campaign that had been openly building since April that year which aimed to advance on Rome. Once the Holy See had been seized, Benedict would be installed, where he would name one of the French dukes, either Orleans or Anjou, as Emperor.\textsuperscript{403}

Although statements supporting the campaign were issued in the king’s name, the plan clearly favoured Benedict’s cause, which, for some time, had also been that of the duke of Orleans. The idea was for French troops under Louis of Bourbon and Louis II of Anjou, claimant to the kingdom of Naples, to advance through the French-allied states of the Ligurian coast to Pisa and from there to strike for Rome. The rival pope, Innocent VII fled the chaotic revolt in Rome that summer. The moment had arrived, Rome was to be taken, and the court despatched Louis of Anjou for Genoa with significant forces. With the court focussed on the south, Jean sans Peur chose that moment to attempt a coup d’état of sorts, or

\textsuperscript{400} Housley, The Avignon Papacy, 39, 42, 61, 63, 73, 75, 77.
\textsuperscript{401} Morrall, Gerson and the Great Schism, 59.
\textsuperscript{402} Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 50 (Latin), ‘non parcens senile etati sue ... intravit Ytaliam et est nunc in civitate Januensi’, 94 (English), ‘Not sparing his old age ... he entered Italy ... he is now in the state of Genoa.’ Pillement, Pedro de Luna, 131-6; d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 47.
\textsuperscript{403} Jarry, La Vie Politique de Louis de France, 337-41; d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 47; Pillement, Pedro de Luna, 124-6, 131-6; Morrall, Gerson and the Great Schism, 68; Courteault, Les Chroniques Du Roi Charles VII Par Gilles Le Bouvier, Dit Le Héraut Berry, 13-4; Lalande, Jean II le Meingre, 130-1.
at least to gain control of the government by verbally attacking the policies of the government under the regent, Louis of Orleans. In light of the deepening dispute between the ducal factions, Louis of Anjou was recalled before he reached Genoa, and the duke of Bourbon was not permitted to leave Paris for the Italian campaign, his influence being required at court. The two adversarial dukes issued a series of condemnations of one another and, with their respective allies, gathered thousands of troops around Paris from August onwards. Amid the spiralling tension and manoeuvring forces, the government effectively ground to a halt. After a time, Burgundy was obliged to withdraw his appeals to parliament, in the knowledge that his actions had pushed the Queen and the duke of Berry into the Orleanist camp, making a tripartite alliance in December that year. Perhaps in shock, most of the other great magnates appeared to retain positions of indecisive neutrality. Benedict had arrived in Genoa in May, but in July his army was ravaged by plague which erupted throughout the region, even as Marshal Boucicaut was attempting to negotiate alliances and secure routes for an advance. This bold initiative to take Rome withered as the toll of plague victims rose. Benedict had retired from Italy to Nice by October, where he heard that Innocent VII had died; France’s decisive opportunity had been lost through squabbling in Paris and failure to advance when the chance to do so arose. However, the possible dates for the composition of the French letter to Owain therefore fall between May and October 1405, with some leeway allowing for the failure of news of Benedict’s withdrawal to reach the author and their masters. The drive behind the letter to Owain clearly influenced its composition. A strategy to take Rome and end the schism was in favour and forces to achieve that were being assembled. Simultaneously unbalancing England by causing trouble in Wales might gain additional time to press the main offensive or end the even longer conflict with England by inserting a weaker or French-supported king on the English throne. Mid-late summer 1405 was no doubt an exciting time at court in Paris; with the desirable prospect that a victory in either theatre would hugely favour French interests.

404 Tuetey, Journal de Nicolas de Baye, vol 1, 138-9; Darwin, Louis d’Orléans, 74-84; d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 77-82; Vaughan, John the Fearless, 33-7; Courteault, Les Chroniques Du Roi Charles VII Par Gilles Le Bouvier, Dit Le Héraut Berry, 15-20; Schnerb, Armagnacs et Bourguignons, 75-83. 405 Bellaguet, Saint-Denis, vol 3, 262-7, 290-7; Jarry, La Vie Politique de Louis de France, 337-41; Creighton, History of the Papacy, vol 1, 188-95; d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 47, 77-82; Pillement, Pedro de Luna, 124-6, 131-6 (Note: Pillement says Benedict withdrew in August, Creighton says October, 195, the latter seems the more reliable); Morrall, Gerson and the Great Schism, 68; Lalande, Jean II le Meingre, 130-9.
In summary, therefore, nothing found in the Pennal Declaration is radical in any sense, saving perhaps its application to a Welsh context. All points had precedence, often very recent, or were simple administrative requests easily permitted by decree. Davies described the programme announced in this document as ‘visionary’, ‘extraordinary’ and ‘breath-taking’.

It would be incorrect and ungenerous to deny this, it is such a document, but not for the reasons assumed by Davies. It seems obvious, though entirely original, to conclude that the Pennal Declaration does not stand out as unusual in the time in which it was written. All of its requests were possible to achieve, it was a balanced and arguably realistic document, entirely in keeping with the mores of its time; this is its true visionary aspect, that it was created not with a wistful eye on history, but on the cold, hard present in which it was created. In its time, in its context, it was a realistic, achievable project. It is extraordinary perhaps because despite having no obvious connections to the apparatus of state construction and the channels of international diplomacy, Glyn Dŵr and his council were able to create such a credible programme. Perhaps further, the fact that it has survived to this day and, perhaps, that it has escaped being analysed and contextualised for so long also seems remarkable. It could also be considered extraordinary in the way in which the document appears to reveal the mind and voice of Owain Glyn Dŵr. It is a rare example of such a document, its complexity, the development of ideas and compelling linguistic manoeuvres overshadow the articles it presents. It would also be fair to give it a negative connotation; perhaps this would constitute its most breath-taking point. The very act of growing the Avignon allegiance widened the schism by one degree. In so doing, and also by seeking to expand the conflict further through continuous warfare or new crusades, the universally lamented state of continent-wide conflict would be further increased. While the duke of Orleans consistently demonstrated his enthusiasm to attack Henry of England by all means, such a goal would likely lack wider popularity.

The broader significance and impact of the Pennal declaration are difficult to measure. This is partly because of the paucity of surviving documentation on connected matters; it was clearly important, for funding, mustering, inserting and extracting a sizeable royal army overseas is no irrelevant undertaking. However, the matter is further confused by hindsight of the civil war which was about to erupt in France, which obscures or corrupts as complicit.

406 Davies, Revolt, 171-2.
all which happened before it. There is no incontrovertible proof that Benedict ever saw the letter, although he certainly knew of its contents and of Welsh allegiance to him. This is evidenced by his provision of Welshmen from June 1406 including Gruffydd Yonge, bishop of Bangor, Adam Usk, Benedictine bishop of Llandaff and a grant to Maredudd, Glyn Dŵr’s son.407 In the church records there is one key mention that proves Benedict’s awareness of at least part of its message, for he appears to have designated St David’s as a metropolitan church.408 Without the Pennal Declaration, it seems unlikely that he would have been aware of that desire at that time. Which other requests made in the document Benedict also allowed are lost at this time.

However, perhaps the primary significance of the exchange has so far been missed. Superficially, it declares Owain’s desire to support one of the papal candidates. Within the text, it is plainly stated that the French king wished to be bound closer to Owain, and in riposte the Welsh leader expressed a reciprocal sentiment.409 However, this is an Orleanist initiative, though one with shifting degrees of royal and ducal backing. Therefore, this is an alliance document further binding Glyn Dŵr to France, but more specifically to the Orleanist cause which backed Benedict XIII. However, by the time Owain’s letter reached Paris, the mood at court was shifting again. King Charles recovered his senses in December 1405 and reviewed the alarming escalation of hostile posturing between Orleans and Burgundy of that autumn. On 27 January 1406, Charles decreed that the government was to be a council of the princes, and not one commanded by a regent alone. By July, 1406, a new council was formed, albeit dominated by Orleanists for the moment, but no longer with Louis at the

407 C. Eubel, ed., Hierarchia Catholica Medii Aevi (Rome: No identifiable publisher, 1898), Vol 1, 112, Joannes Trevor (Trevaur) 1394 oct 21 Bon IX 1410 Julii 16 (replace), 127, Ludovicus 14 aug 1404, Boniface IX, Griffinus 14 feb 1407 n3, Decr. Doctor. Ben XIII (Av. T. 49 f. 57) 1407 Apr. 25 ei dedit facultatem absolvendi Owinum principem Walliae et alias personas eccl. Et relig. Ac etiam laicas eidem principi subjectas, redeuntes ad obedientam suam, atque mandavit, et se informaret et referret de exaltanda eccl. Meneven, in metropolitanam. (1418 hic Giffinusa Mart. V ad eccl. Rossen. in Scotia translates est.) 292, n8, 26 apr 1407 Benedict XIII appointed Adam Usk bishop of Llandaff, 336, n10, A 23 maii 1408 ei a Gre XII data est facultas absolvendi scismaticos et rebelles in partibus Walliae ad unionem Ecclesiae redituros, all listed as ‘suffr. Cantuarien’ (note: this is a collation of all of the traceable appointments made to Glyn Dŵr’s clergy during the period of his reign. The mention of ‘Meneven, in metropolitanam’ suggests that Benedict was aware of the Welsh desire written in the Pennal Declaration for St David’s to be the metropolitan church); Gabriel, ‘Wales and the Avignon Papacy’, 73, 78. 80; Williams, The Welsh Church From Conquest to Reformation, 224; Given-Wilson, Adam Usk, xxiii, xxxv. Note: other references cited by Gabriel were untraceable.


409 Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 42-3 (Latin), 85-6 (English). Note: in the opening salutation, ‘princeps Wallie’ has not been included in the English translation.
Thus, Louis, who had held power firmly up to mid-summer and retained it but slowly, decreasingly by degrees thereafter, lost clear, personal control of the government at that point. Although he remained a powerful, instrumental member of the council, his decline in power would also affect his allies and their causes.

Therefore, by the time Glyn Dŵr’s reply reached Paris, perhaps at the end of April 1406 at the earliest, it arrived in an altered environment to that in which the question was first posed. This of course would have been impossible for him to gauge or affect. However, military preparations were under way for offensives in the south-west and the north-east. Burgundy was to reduce Picardy, while Orleans was to take key areas of Aquitaine. En route south, Louis, consistent with his policy of alliances, made a treaty with Jean V, duke of Brittany. While the two rivals were blatantly sent to the opposite ends of France, a calmer environment was restored to the capital. With that, came renewed debate on the most effective means of ending the schism, which favoured another withdrawal of obedience and proposed a plan for the mutual cession of both popes. The court referred the debates to parliament which discussed the matter through the summer and autumn of 1406 and proposed to once again withdraw obedience.

Louis’s efforts before Bourg were wholly ineffective, earning him the acidic criticism of chroniclers. Likewise, John appears to have achieved less in Picardy, and may not have even moved his troops out of their quarters. Henry Percy, earl of

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Northumberland, appeared in Paris during the year looking for support in the fight against King Henry.\textsuperscript{417} King Charles replied by letter, giving an answer which could be viewed as a response of sorts to the Pennal Declaration.\textsuperscript{418} While calling on the English to overthrow Henry and giving an ongoing assurance of French support to that end, this letter also appears to rebuke them for not turning up to support their army when it arrived in Wales. Percy left with no army, and went to raise one in Scotland, with no material, but probably verbal, French and Welsh support.\textsuperscript{419} By the time Louis of Orleans returned to Paris in early 1407 his star appeared to have waned.\textsuperscript{420} While this was unlikely to remain the case for long, this moment perhaps offered his enemies a transient window of opportunity in which to move against him.

\textsuperscript{418} See Appendices 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3: Charles VI’s Letter to the English Nation, 1406.
\textsuperscript{419} Riley, \textit{Ypodigma Neustriae}, 423-4; Gabriel, ‘Wales and the Avignon Papacy’, 78; Kirby, \textit{Henry IV}, 218-9; Davies, \textit{Revolt}, 186.
\textsuperscript{420} Jarry, \textit{La Vie Politique de Louis de France}, 348; Darwin, \textit{Louis d’Orléans}, 49; Schnerb, \textit{Armagnacs et Bourguignons}, 90.
5.5: The Men Who ‘Killed’ Owain Glyn Dŵr.

‘Very many said that he died; the seers maintain he did not’.\textsuperscript{421} Clearly, while the Welsh and the French government were conducting business in their own interests, their opponents were not inactive. While it is well-known that Owain was not ultimately triumphant, to date there is no comprehensive or even compelling explanation for this. Lloyd described a scene where Glyn Dŵr’s principate had reached its zenith by 1405, adding ‘during 1406 it was brought to a standstill; no further successes were won’.\textsuperscript{422} No proven defeats were suffered that year either; in fact there was negligible military activity in Wales bar on Anglesey, which was reinvested gradually by English forces from Chester and Ireland, without apparently engaging in battle. This clear lack of aggression on both sides supports the notion of a truce, proposed above. However, Lloyd then wrote of ‘the inevitable collapse’, which appears somewhat tainted by hindsight, and then constructed a story where all relevant factors contributed to this conclusion.\textsuperscript{423} Rees Davies recognised this issue, commenting on the dangers of hindsight, but then claimed that the revolt was ‘an unconscionably long time a-dying.’\textsuperscript{424} Perhaps creating an image of a revolt as being something which can die is incorrect in the first place. Since it was the violent expression of a cause founded on ideas and opinions, it could end and at any time be revived by people adhering to similar beliefs. Once the idea of it ‘dying’ is settled upon, however, it can only die – since all living things die, and therefore Davies’s view is also tainted by this imagery and hindsight. Davies delivered a tale of painful, slow, unavoidable decline.\textsuperscript{425} Both these conclusions are unsatisfactory since they both select the factors that align with the eventual outcome, rather than exposing and developing balancing points that underpinned Welsh successes or furthered the French alliance in the years after 1405. During the period that appears to be marked by the slide to defeat, Welsh ambassadors were in the courts of France and Scotland, the French raised further forces for Wales which fought English captains who blocked their path at sea, while magnates and communities in the English border counties were reprimanded for making truces with the Welsh for some time after the fall of Harlech in

\textsuperscript{421} Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 154, citing Gruffydd Hiraethog from 1556-64, ‘rrann vawr a ddywaid i varw y brudwyr a ddywedant na bv.’
\textsuperscript{422} Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 126.
\textsuperscript{423} Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 126-46;
\textsuperscript{424} Davies, Revolt, 293.
\textsuperscript{425} Davies, Revolt, 293-309.
Had the revolt been doomed at that point or had the Welsh been a spent force, then none of these actions would have taken place. In light of these factors, this research offers a broader, more profound explanation, but principally focuses on events outside Wales.

There is no suggestion or evidence that anyone physically killed Owain, but his regime decreased in power and his reign came to an end. Therefore his fall is attributable to the actions of men, whether engaged in politics often seemingly unrelated to Wales or in military operations against Owain or his allies. This section discusses those men and their actions. It does so by scrutinising the relevant diplomatic missions and contemporary ecclesiastical and political movements, as well as the sharper, more violent means of achieving victory.

English military efforts in the first five years of the fifteenth century had largely proved unimpressive across a number of theatres. Successive, serious internal revolts such as those of 1400, 1403 and 1405 describe an environment in which the king’s enemies dared to tread. Although Henry’s brutality against his opponents increased throughout his reign, this was clearly insufficiently fearsome or effective enough to regain control of the kingdom.427 As shown above, from the advent of Louis’s more aggressive position towards England from 1402, the French had enjoyed successes against English possessions in France, such as the capture of Mortagne, Corbefin and several places in the Limousin.428 In addition, Breton, French and Castilian fleets had carried the war directly onto English soil and appeared to narrowly hold the balance of power in the Channel during these years. Although the Scots had been comprehensively beaten in September 1402 at Homildon, near Durham, and therefore in England, they continued to harass English interests on sea and land, and appear to have provided logistical support in the form of sea-going transport for the Welsh and French.429 More embarrassingly, Henry IV had personally derided the Welsh as a people ‘de petit reputacion’ and parliament scorned them as ‘bare-footed idiots’, yet in the long years of

their damaging, costly and to some degree humiliating revolt, Henry and his forces met with successive defeats. Whether on the battlefield, as at Hyddgen, Ruthin or Bryn Glas, or in the storming of great fortresses such as Carmarthen, Harlech and Aberystwyth, crown forces were consistently inferior to those of Glyn Dŵr. Although the English won a victory at Usk near the border in May 1405, notable for the quality of the casualties rather than their number, this was negligible return for the scale of their military efforts and financial outlay to that point. Wales had been lost to the natives. In addition, the revolt exposed the feebleness of those castles that remained nominally under crown control. Their assault and seizure does not appear to have been part of the rebel strategy and there is no evidence of a concerted effort to seize any but a key few. This is understandable since the rebels would need to commit men to garrison them, losing all mobility advantages. In addition, decades of experience in France meant that crown forces were well-able to conduct a series of sieges; however, they were demonstrably less effective in the wilderness of fifteenth-century Wales. Those crown commanders who retained keep of castles in Wales conducted few operations against the rebels during the revolt, and their allegiance appears to have moved towards a position of neutrality, or perhaps self-interest, in certain cases. Although crown control of a number of locations in Glyn Dŵr’s Wales was still extant, in some cases it appears to have been largely notional. The parlous state of English fortunes in Wales at that time provides perhaps the best example of a seemingly dire general situation for English power. However, ‘military conquest was a traditional means of acquiring new territory, although it was seldom used on its own.’ So, while England’s military efforts lacked success, diplomatic ventures proved more fruitful, in time.

It has been possible to chart many of the English diplomatic missions to the continent during this part of Henry IV’s reign. The actions and skills of these largely unsung servants of the crown improved England’s fortunes where armies had proven inadequate. While many of the ambassadors’ letters are of limited value individually, as a whole they help construct a useful corpus showing the form and style of the time. From these letters, two additional

434 Vaughan, *Valois Burgundy*, 130.
points emerge; the grindingly slow pace of medieval diplomatic processes and also the frequency and extent to which the ambassadors denigrated their counterparts in letters to the Privy Council or the king, then greeted them in person with blustering pleasantries. From the mass of these discussions the intriguing and critical evidence emerges of a diplomatic strategy that assisted, perhaps even saved, England's cause. The names of England's ambassadors are largely unfamiliar, but appear to follow the seemingly typical composition for ambassadorial parties of the time, with nobles, clergy and clerks. The nobility was represented throughout by these knights; Richard Aston, John Croft, William Hoo, Hugh Lutrell, William Lyle, Thomas Swynford and Thomas Swynborne, of whom the latter is most easily traced in other military activities. The only clergyman who featured in the critical meetings was Nicholas de Ryssheton, Doctor of Laws. John Urban seemed to be a permanent member of these embassies, although his designation is unclear. At times he had no defined title, at others he was described as an ambassador or the ‘Lieutenant du Maire de l’Estaple [a Calais]’.

Lutrell, Croft, Ryssheton and Urban made representation to Philip of Burgundy in December 1403, addressing complaints to him and France’s Great Council against the aggressive actions of the duke of Orleans and Waleran of St. Pol. These were no doubt legitimately felt, and referred to the various probing attacks which England had suffered along the entirety of its south coast and, as noted above, had reached as far west as Kidwelly. This approach might have had a wider purpose, as subsequent discussions would reinforce. The English were no doubt conscious of the divisions and struggles within the French court during the king’s illness. Philip of Burgundy was therefore the right choice for them; as demonstrated previously, he had consistently been the senior noble at court since the death of Charles V in 1380, he enjoyed a commercial relationship with England, and Orleans was his adversary. Shortly after, the same ambassadorial team opened discussions with the Flemish deputies as well as with Duke Philip regarding Anglo-Flemish trade. The stratagem seems to have borne fruit immediately; the comte de St. Pol was summoned to Paris to account for

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436 Fowler, *Hundred Years War*, 186-7; Cuttino, *English Medieval Diplomacy*, 8-10, 18, 94.
440 Hingeston, *RHL Henry IV*, vol 1, 177-85.
his actions. A number of letters passed between Henry, his ambassadors at Calais and the Privy Council. These dispatches reported on progress, but also showed Henry’s will to support and encourage the ambassadors in their tasks. The English made an intelligent concession during winter 1403-4. The previous summer was remarkable for the level of maritime violence witnessed, as well as coastal attacks. Repaying such violence in kind would have seemed justified and perhaps expected. In contrast, the English offered to extend the previously agreed safeguard to French and Flemish fishermen. This was a significant gesture, not just of goodwill but one which few, if any, of their opponents could attack. Gesture, goodwill, adherence to notions of good conduct and apparent good faith appear to have been essential to the art of successful diplomacy at the time. From this point, early 1404, Henry’s ambassadors can be seen raising and addressing grievances regarding the seizures of goods and vessels, commercial advantages and talks on peace. These were undertaken with the Flemings, therefore the house of Burgundy also, along with separate missions to the Hanseatic League. There is no need to further develop the undulating course of all such commercial negotiations, but solely to acknowledge the strategy of Henry’s diplomats; engaging partners and adversaries alike in discussions encompassing hostility and redress, peace and trade, with a view to achieving mutually beneficial commerce, which strongly advanced England’s interests at that time.

Aston and Ryssheton delivered a strong complaint to Philip of Burgundy in March 1404. Their French ambassadorial counterparts included the bishop of Chartres and Jehan de Sanctis, who would be so closely involved with the Welsh alliance negotiations in May of the same year, as well as with the Pennal Declaration. The noble envoy was the lord of ‘Hengueville’, Jehan de Hangest, one of the 1405 expedition leaders. The letter is an excellent example of the English strategy towards the French court. Aston and Ryssheton recognised, but disputed the degree to which outrages and reprisals had been committed by the English side, noting that they were contrary to the extant truce. They countered de Hangest’s accusations regarding English actions in Picardy and Boulogne citing murders and

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441 Hingeston, *RHL Henry IV*, vol 1, 186-8.
443 Hingeston, *RHL Henry IV*, vol 1, 188-90.
robberies committed on Alderney. They furthered this with an attack on de Hanges for profiting from these activities and inferred French meddling in Anglo-Scots’ affairs. They furthered this with an attack on de Hanges for profiting from these activities and inferred French meddling in Anglo-Scots’ affairs.448 Henry’s ambassadors also recalled the actions of the Bretons who they identified as subjects of the French crown in the obedience of the Admiral of France who had landed in England, burned and plundered Plymouth, where they robbed, murdered and carried off the people of the area. All of this had been done contrary to the oaths they had sworn and the responsibility for adherence to these promises lay with the French court. Not only that, the Bretons had also attacked Jersey and Guernsey where they committed similar atrocities.449 Henry’s representatives then complained that the comte de St. Pol had maintained fleets on a war footing in Flanders. While this ran contrary to the spirit of the truce and oaths sworn by him and others of the royal blood, they went on to point out that these fleets had been used to attack all kinds of vessels, during which the cowardly practice of hurling projectiles at those trying to save themselves by swimming away had been witnessed. Not only that, these ships had been involved in landings on the Isle of Wight where they had molested poor fishermen and overrun sheep pens.450 While clearly a slight against the nobility and behaviour of those involved, the English repetition of the importance of the sworn oaths, the truce and the responsibility of the French court to control its subjects, reinforced their position. In short, they expected better from the French. They went on to make that very point, with recognition that the correction and punishment of the ‘Duc d’Olens’ who was making war in contravention of the oaths made by his king, fell to the French court. They did not ask for reparations, and cited the formulaic but relevant phrase about avoiding the spilling of Christian blood, but asked that the court obliged Louis to remain faithful to the oaths of peace all the French nobles had sworn.451 In a parting shot, Henry’s men added that they were unaccustomed to such behaviour from the French, and could not recall previous reigns where the king had such disobedient subjects.452 The letter is an excellent example of shrewd diplomacy; it made clear England’s complaint in black and white, but at the same time sought to isolate the activities of Orleans and St. Pol from those of the rest of the French nobles. In asking the French court to set its house in order, it showed that Henry did not blame Charles’s

448 Hingeston, RHL Henry IV, vol 1, 216-9, Alderney is referred to as ‘the territory of Orne’.
450 Hingeston, RHL Henry IV, vol 1, 220-2, ‘les autres du roial sanc’.
452 Hingeston, RHL Henry IV, vol 1, 224.
court as a whole – and the implication here regarding war is clear – but identified the unfaithful, disobedient Louis as the malefactor by whose actions France’s collective honour was tarnished. Asking the French to settle the matter was a masterstroke, since it helped set the factions further against one another, and by deploying the arguments of precedent, norm, honour and standards, Aston and Ryssheton had appealed to factors consistent with the time and familiar to the target audience. This letter probably also assisted Louis’s opponents at court, the Burgundians, in pointing out the abnormality of his behaviour, and the advantages of removing him from power in order to pursue a course of peace and commerce.

The death of Philip of Burgundy the following month weakened Henry’s cause in the French court. With Louis in control, hostility to England increased rapidly. The ambassadors at Calais continued to play vital roles however, maintaining a level of discourse with all elements and monitoring enemy activity in France. In the first case, they continued negotiations with Margaret, duchess of Burgundy, who continued to run many of the duchy’s commercial affairs in the months following her husband’s death. She in turn influenced the Flemings to maintain peace with the English and, over the summer months, it appeared as if a new treaty between England and Flanders would be signed. As Louis of Orleans took up the reins of government, peace negotiations with the French ambassadors, usually led by Jehan de Hangest, visibly stalled. English relations with the Burgundians and Flemings also soured and then turned hostile, probably in adherence to the leaning of the court’s dominant faction, and their previously hopeful discussions ground to a halt. The English diplomatic style of the time did not simply rely on the fine intellects of the king’s envoys. They sought to quicken the prospects of a truce by conducting an attack on Sluys that year. On this occasion, underpinning the truce offer with the threat and use of force utterly failed.

Henry’s diplomats were crucial in passing on intelligence of the build up of the 1404 fleet. In September they wrote that the French were stalling due to the likelihood of a diversionary attack to assist the Welsh rebels, and next they learned that the forces were instead intending to invade Wales. They also identified Louis and Waleran as active obstacles to the peace process. By 6 October, Ryssheton wrote that the fleet for Wales had

453 Hingeston, RHL Henry IV, vol 1, 232-5, 235-8, 245-8, 249-50, 256-7, 266-9, 294-9
454 Hingeston, RHL Henry IV, vol 1, 329-30, 331-5, 381.
455 Hingeston, RHL Henry IV, vol 1, 335-7, 345-7, 348-9, 356-60.
456 Vaughan, John the Fearless, 21-2; Vaughan, Valois Burgundy, 41.
457 Hingeston, RHL Henry IV, vol 1, 329-30, 331-5.
458 Hingeston, RHL Henry IV, vol 1, 338-40, ‘Ducem Aurelianum’ and ‘Comitem Sancti-Pauli’. 278
mustered but still not moved. Five days later he and Croft wrote to Henry confirming that troops from France, Flanders and elsewhere were assembled in Sluys in order to make the journey to Wales. Then, on 14 October, Ryssheton wrote to the mayor of London, William Askham, informing him that Wales, Sandwich and Calais were threatened. The attack fleet then appeared to be at Harfleur, and Ryssheton included troop numbers and the opinion that this force intended to occupy Wales, rebuild the castles and do as much harm there as possible. As Anglo-French relations appeared to be sliding to war, Henry’s ambassadors tried a new tack; threatening to withdraw from discussions. This appeared to provoke a reaction from the French who immediately dispatched a full ambassadorial party composed of Jehan, bishop of Chartres, Jehan de Hangeset, Guillaume Boisratier and Jean de Sains, who proposed a venue for discussions with the English. As the mission under Jacques de Bourbon, comte de la Marche, launched, faltered and slunk back to port, the French returned to the idea of negotiations with Calais, allowing Swynford and Ryssheton their opportunity to stall in turn. The French threat in 1404 had evaporated, and discussions on where or whether to meet went on throughout the winter. Others joined Henry’s men in Calais, adding their names to the documents describing their exchanges with the French. Their meetings were to no avail and the diplomatic stalemate between the royal courts remained throughout 1405. This lean period in relations coincided with Louis’s brief domination of government. Within that time, the missions led by Jean d’Espagne took place. Operations in Wales in 1405 began in early winter, resulting in the allied capture of Anglesey after killing the sheriff and all of his men in one fight, and culminated in the expedition to Wales detailed above. Henry’s diplomatic service was still active during this time, however, demonstrating how when one source of opportunity ran dry, others were devoted more time and occasionally bore fruit, such as relations with the Hanseatic cities, the Prussians and Portugal.

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460 Hingeston, *RHL Henry IV*, vol 1, 376-80, ‘armigeris Gallicorum ac Flandrensium, et allarum nationum diversarium’ ... ‘se dirigere versus partes Walliæ.’ Note, the ‘other nations’ were later identified as Prussians (392).
461 Hingeston, *RHL Henry IV*, vol 1, 384-5, ‘XV millium armatorum ac equitum ... ad occupandum et reædificandum castra in Wallia destructa et ad omnia mala ac damna possibilia nobis inferenda.’.
463 Hingeston, *RHL Henry IV*, vol 1, 395-6. Note: ‘Jehan de Sanctis’ and ‘Jean de Sains’, sometimes ‘Jehan of Sains’ are obviously the same person. I include the French spelling here to acknowledge that.
464 Hingeston, *RHL Henry IV*, vol 1, 397-9, 402-4, 404-5.
correspondence also suggested the latter was a nation split between factions, similarly to France. While the powerful duke of Albany maintained publically cordial relations with Henry, James of Douglas clearly did not, and troops under the earl of Orkney accompanied Lord Bardolf into Berwick as the York rebellion flared in June.468

Diplomatic contacts with the French were not entirely abandoned during 1405 however, and connections with Flanders and the Burgundians in particular, can be followed from May onwards.469 News of the comte de St. Pol’s ineffective attack on Marck was passed on, and his failure was recorded with scorn in French records.470 Then, Henry’s ambassadors reported the breakthrough that had appeared long in coming. News from Calais brought by John Urban revealed that the knights Richard Aston and William Hoo, and squires Perin Lorraine and Richard Oldington, had brokered a trade treaty with the duke of Burgundy on 6 March 1406.471 While this was good news from a financial perspective, it also demonstrates the successful exploitation of a factional fissure in the French court. Jean sans Peur, the new duke of Burgundy, was rising in power and clearly engaged in mounting a challenge to Louis of Orleans. Strengthening the Burgundian cause would assist England, and simultaneously weaken Louis, in turn harming Glyn Dŵr. That a major court party had established links to England demonstrates that control of the direction of the French government had partly slipped from Louis’s grasp at that point. While this change in position might have been temporary, with Jean’s friendship and Louis’s weakness transient, the English took advantage of this opportunity. The records demonstrate highly lucrative trade between England and Flanders during the rest of 1406.472 Louis and his allies were far from beaten though; the Bretons put two thousand troops onto Alderney in July that year. However, the English now had a supporting role within one of the courtly factions and therefore a role in the French power struggle.473 This subtle but significant victory had been won by Henry’s ambassadors alone.

Another arena where English diplomacy eventually fared well, perhaps unexpectedly, was in Brittany. English successes here can be identified as openly bearing fruit during and after 1406. In 1402, Philip of Burgundy gained the tenure of the duchy during the last year of

468 Hingeston, _RHL Henry IV_, vol 2, 59-61, 61-3, 72, 73-6, 103-6.
469 Hingeston, _RHL Henry IV_, vol 2, 55-6, 57-9, 67-71.
470 Johnes, _Monstrelet_, 126-35; Bellaguet, _Saint-Denys_, vol 3, 258-63; Douët-d’Arcq, _Monstrelet_, 100-8;
471 Hingeston, _RHL Henry IV_, vol 2, 107-9 (‘traittie de la commune merchandise’).
473 Hingeston _RHL Henry IV_, vol 2, 115-6.
Jean V’s minority, and entered into alliance with him. With Philip’s aid, Henry IV married Jean de Montfort’s wife, Jeanne, in 1403; a move which provoked resentment among much of the duchy’s nobility. That anger was vented in the attacks on English interests detailed previously. Openly, Anglo-Breton relations from 1406 onwards witnessed a remarkable transition from hostility to truce in little over a year. Breton involvement in the aggressions against England was undeniable; from its greatest lords, such as the du Châtel, to the common soldiery and mariners. In the wake of these years of attacks, Henry IV acted against them. While there were military efforts, such as the previously noted attack on Saint Mathieu, his main effort appears to have been economic and diplomatic. Jean V’s records reveal notable diplomatic traffic between the duke and his mother, ‘la reyne d’Angleterre’, between December 1405 and March 1406. The contents of these letters are not revealed; however it seems reasonable to believe that Henry would engage his new queen in assisting discussions; peace and commerce worked in their mutual interests, while war between her husband and her son only benefitted their adversaries. These letters appear to coincide with a slight thaw in relations; the duke assented to the collection and payment of ransoms for notable Bretons held by the English. The fine balancing act played by the Breton dukes was never a simple task, and equally, Jean V was obliged to engage with both crowns without rousing either. The young duke maintained excellent relations with the French court, sending embassies to discuss marriage with Charles VI’s daughter, Jeanne, although other matters of import were no doubt debated on these occasions. England’s treaty with Flanders had been brokered by March 1406 and commercial intercourse followed swiftly after. In May that year, Henry ordered the expulsion of the Bretons and the French from London, and the seizure of their ships and merchandise soon after. In riposte, the Bretons initially maintained their hostile stance, attacking Alderney for example, and the duke also entered into a personal alliance with Duke Louis as well as sending a fleet and troops south to Bordeaux to aid the king of

474 Blanchard, Lettres et Mandements de Jean V, duc de Bretagne, vol 4, 1-2; Darwin, Louis d’Orléans, 60-1; d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 71; Vaughan, Philip the Bold, 53; Kirby, Henry IV, 135, 149-51.
475 des Ursins, Histoire de Charles VI, 413; Bouchart, Les Grandes Chroniques de Bretaigne, 172; Darwin, Louis d’Orléans, 60-1; Courteault, Les Chroniques Du Roi Charles VII Par Gilles Le Bouvier, Dit Le Héraut Berry, 12.
476 Blanchard, Lettres et Mandements de Jean V, duc de Bretagne, vol 4, 69, 70, 87.
478 Blanchard, Lettres et Mandements de Jean V, duc de Bretagne, vol 4, 59, 61, 63, 76, 77, 78
479 Jarry, La Vie Politique de Louis de France, 344.
France. The latter act, of November 1406, was most likely related to the treaty between Jean and Louis of September that year, and intended to support the attack on Bourg ordered by Paris. Nevertheless, during 1406 Anglo-Breton relations had shifted from a position close to open warfare to one of reduced, though ongoing, hostility, but now with dialogue.

The early months of 1407 saw Louis return discredited from campaigning in the south-west. Perhaps in consequence to his loss of prestige, the Anglo-Breton rapprochement gained pace. The ducal records reveal significant numbers of cross-channel prisoner exchanges from March to May 1407. These ransoms and exchanges involved sizeable numbers of men on each side, the largest being the trade of 120 English prisoners for ‘Hugues de Kaerenmanach’ who was held by ‘sieur de Becquelay ‘, probably Thomas, Lord Berkeley. It is impossible to distinguish whether these men were seized on land, at sea or in port, and therefore claims such as those made by Walsingham about the English disrupting military convoys to Wales are impossible to prove or refute. However, these exchanges and a general decline in fighting appear to be indicative of a truce being held. English records mention truce talks at the end of May. Jean V declared a guarantee of safety for English merchants in June 1407. It is noteworthy, but perhaps coincidental, that ducal military officials were ordered to ascertain the obligations of Jean, son of Jean d’Espagne, around that time. Peace appeared to be in the air. This careful process appearing to lead towards one conclusion cannot have been accidental or undertaken without mutual contact. These documents appear to have been lost, were they ever written, but seem to begin with Queen Jeanne’s letters to Jean V. The final result of this unseen discourse was achieved on 11 July 1407, when Jean V signed a full year-long truce with England. The terms of the agreement probably betray the instigation alluded to above. Within it, Jean named his mother first, the queen or ‘royne d’angleterre’, disclosing that he accepted a year-long truce and in so doing

481 Blanchard, Lettres et Mandements de Jean V, duc de Bretagne, vol 5, 12, 16, 17. 44, 45, 47.
482 Blanchard, Lettres et Mandements de Jean V, duc de Bretagne, vol 5, 45.
483 Preest, Chronica Maiora, 340-1;
484 Fœdera, vol 8, 483-4.
485 Blanchard, Lettres et Mandements de Jean V, duc de Bretagne, vol 5, 69.
487 Fœdera, vol 8, 490; Blanchard, Lettres et Mandements de Jean V, duc de Bretagne, vol 5, 75.
ordered his officers and all others to respect the agreement. The Bretons, therefore, were lost to the Welsh cause until at least mid-summer 1408, but had probably been disentangling themselves for some time prior to the truce. Without the use of Breton ports, ships and manpower, an expedition to Wales suddenly became a far less realistic proposition, and presented the English with a smaller front on which to concentrate. The diplomatic prising of Brittany from hostilities effectively cut off French-Welsh connections while the terms of that truce were honoured. This provided Henry and his government an opportunity to press their cause in Wales.

A further good example of Henry’s envoys causing division between the French factions was seen in 1407. By June, Aston and his colleagues had concluded with the duke of Burgundy a ‘general security’ on sea and land which was to last three years. The peace agreement’s publication throughout Burgundy was confirmed in another letter to Henry. A major court faction had therefore made peace with England, and concluded a treaty ensuring a degree of co-operation. As a classic element of a ‘cultivate and eradicate’ strategy, the English exploited this further still over those months, giving favourable trading conditions to the Flemings alone, while insisting on excluding the French from any measure of benefit in any form from their peace and trade. This ploy of favouring one partner to the detriment of other less friendly parties was used elsewhere by England during the middle ages. In bolstering their ally, they not only strengthened him, but this strategy outlined the attraction of amicable relations with England, and discredited the policies of hostile parties. As such, this is a deployment of Nye’s ‘soft power’ by Henry’s government. With the Burgundians apparently positively disposed to England, and the Bretons assuming a neutral posture, the English position was much improved. To some degree, it could be suggested that with France’s eastern and western Channel regions neutralised, an attack on the centre of the enemy’s coast, Normandy, became a considerable possibility.

488 Fædera, vol 8, 490; Blanchard, Lettres et Mandements de Jean V, duc de Bretagne, vol 5, 75, ‘treves, souffrances et abstinences de guerre, jusques a la terme d’un an prochain venant’, ‘son amiral, a ses marechaux, capitaines, connetables, gardes de passage et a tous autres de se conformer aux presents.’
489 Hingeston, RHL Henry IV, vol 2, 167-9, 176-8, ‘la generale seurte ... tant par terre, que par mer’.
490 Hingeston, RHL Henry IV, vol 2, 171-5.
492 Cuttino, English Medieval Diplomacy, 19, 99 (‘most favoured nation’).
While this diplomatic intercourse was ongoing, the University of Paris returned to the question of healing the schism in the church towards the end of 1405. With Benedict’s strongest ally, Louis, weakened following the events of late 1405 and the king’s insistence on rule by council from January 1406 onwards, the matter of another withdrawal of obedience resurfaced.\(^{494}\) The debates quickly led to an abandonment of the *via facti* and moved in favour of the *via cessionis*.\(^{495}\) These sessions took place throughout the year and by November 1406 it was generally, though not unanimously, agreed that action was required. Although mutual cession was preferable, action against Benedict was deemed necessary by those loud voices opposed to him in council. While unilateral cession might prove potentially harmful to France, its appeal was improved by the plan to seize ecclesiastical taxes, tithes and benefices for the French state. Perhaps with that lucrative incentive in mind, a partial withdrawal of obedience was projected to follow.\(^{496}\) When Innocent VII died on 6 November 1406, one proposal by Gerson was for the Roman cardinals to recognise Benedict and thus heal the schism, giving hope to the cause of the Orleanists and their allies.\(^{497}\) However, the idea was overborne by turbulent arguments in council and, in March 1407, the French sent ecclesiastical ambassadors to Rome where they realised that, despite his encouraging words, another recently elected Roman pope, Gregory XII, had no intention of resigning the papal crown unilaterally or mutually, thereby bringing union to western Christianity.\(^{498}\) Although the University of Paris dominated the discussions in the capital, Benedict XIII was able to outmanoeuvre those ambassadors sent to hold talks with him. The University had required them to pronounce France’s intention to declare neutrality, should Benedict fail to publish Bulls on the steps he would take to resolve the division in the church. He did not do so, but apparently conducted himself with such skill and diplomacy that, at the end of discussions in May 1407, he was able to stall the declaration of neutrality.\(^{499}\) An agreement for both popes


to meet at Savona was agreed by both parties, with differing levels of enthusiasm. Roman politics once again disrupted the already troubled course of events. Ladislas of Durazzo chose that moment, June 1407, to attempt to seize Rome. Although ambassadors and other churchmen continued with the projected meeting at Savona, and Benedict duly obliged and presented himself there in good time, Gregory proved most reluctant and concocted a series of excuses and stalling tactics, and ultimately failed to attend. The focus and energies of France’s ruling elements were therefore engaged and, from a Welsh perspective, distracted from all but the most critical matters of the Schism, internal squabbles and trade relations. While inadvertent, the French church’s overriding interest in its own affairs over the needs and desires of the temporal government and its allies also harmed Glyn Dŵr’s regime.

Henry’s diplomats had, to a certain degree therefore, secured England’s finances and overseas trade. This not only calmed and then improved relations with England’s partners, raising its standing, but more importantly assured a flow of finance critical to any government. Linked with these agreements was the liberty for its fishing fleets to ply their trade which, in their unofficial capacity as coastal sentinels, bolstered England’s actual and imagined security. This equally benefitted the continental fleets. However, the potential threat posed by a recovering England overshadowed that of all of its neighbours except France. As the country’s strength returned, it would enable Henry’s government to investigate other opportunities to improve England’s position by interfering with its neighbours’ politics; the treaty with Burgundy in March 1406 and the truce with Brittany the following year were crucial to this. A further significant step in England's drive to disrupt its hostile neighbours came later that month, when a stroke of luck brought the heir to the Scots’ throne, James, into English hands. His ship had been captured by English seamen en route to France. His capture and the death of King Robert III the following month obliged the Scots to appoint a regent. The duke of Albany took that role and maintained a passive stance towards England. This guaranteed that the ongoing hospitality to James and Albany’s son, Murdach, taken at Homildon in 1402, would be sufficient to keep them alive. However, this also

503 Rymer, *Fædera*, vol 8, 452.
effectively made Albany king in James’s absence. A truce between England and Scotland was remade, and subsequently renewed over the following years of relevance.

This period of recovery and largely peaceful relations with Flanders and the Hanseatic League continued into 1407 and assisted England to make a move against its enemies in Wales. There is a lack of compelling evidence that the crown made any advances into Wales during 1406. The source that made such a claim – that certain border areas submitted to the crown during the year – can only be dated to 1556 at the earliest, and therefore must be treated with extreme caution. While it is therefore manifestly unreliable evidence, the submissions, if correct, were still non-aggressive means of advancing Henry’s cause in Wales. This further suggests the existence of an unpublicised truce. This sort of nibbling around the fringes of an area under a truce appears consistent with behaviour typical of the period. The move against Anglesey, notably not part of mainland Wales, was conducted throughout 1406 and only early the next year was the crown able to install a military commander there with a personal guard of a hundred men. While there was apparently no English-Welsh combat during 1406, a truce would have benefitted Henry’s efforts to improve his position with continental partners and rebuild his strength at home. Crown strategists had determined that a strike against Llanbadarn (Aberystwyth) would be the most productive way of ending the revolt. The attack was led by Prince Henry, then nearly twenty, at the head of an army of 600 men-at-arms and 1,800 archers, equipped with numerous siege engines and even cannon. They began the siege of Llanbadarn in May, where at least one of the siege

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504 Rymer, Fœdera, vol 8, 368-9, 371-2; Riley, Ypodigma Neustriae, 413; CPR 1405-8, 168, (30 April 1406); Bean, ‘Henry IV and The Percies’, 212-27; Macdonald, ‘Crossing the Border’, 149-55; Preest, Chronica Maiora, 323-4, 341, 341; Laidlaw, The Auld Alliance, 49; Macdougall, An Antidote to the English, 58; Brown, The Black Douglases, 105-9.


506 Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 152; Henken, National Redeemer, 13, 64-5; Note, Lloyd, 149-50, dates these sources to Hiraethog’s version from 1556 to 1564 and another to 1776. Henken favoured the notion that Hiraethog’s text of 1553 was based on a text from 1422. No original exists, therefore it cannot be conclusively shown that this is correct or even that Hiraethog’s was a faithful copy. Even if it were, it is still solely the opinion of a chronicler which is uncorroborated by any other document. The opinion of Cardiff University’s expert on this material, Dr. Dylan Foster-Evans, is that the text could date from either period, since the styles were similar, or have been written in a style attempting to emulate early fifteenth-century Welsh language texts. However there is nothing that conclusively dates it to 1422. An instruction in, Fœdera, vol 8, 436, allows for rebels to be admitted into the king’s grace on the payment of fines and certain other conditions. However, this obviously does not denote the submission of an area.


508 CPR, 1405-8, 361-2; Davies, Revolt, 293.

509 Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 131; Griffiths, ‘Prince Henry, Wales, and the Royal Exchequer, 1400-1413’, 211; Davies, Revolt, 124, 252-3.
guns exploded, and the prince’s troops gave a poor account of their martial prowess. As the siege progressed, and evidently proved more difficult to prosecute than expected, Prince Henry issued orders to Thomas, lord Berkeley, to attain timber for siege engines, much of it to be acquired from the lands of former English rebels. A truce was negotiated for the crown by Richard Courtney, the chancellor of Oxford University, and came into effect on 24 September 1407. Owain refused to recognise or honour it, however, and fighting recommenced shortly after. The siege of Aberystwyth would continue for another year but other events, propitious to England’s causes, occurred in Paris in November that year.

The conflict between the dukes of Burgundy and Orleans had largely been a bloodless political feud over government control, finance and territory. As noted above, the house of Anjou, Berry and Bourbon also manoeuvred and machinated to improve their respective positions, and this often required them to ally or to neglect to support one faction or another. Their allegiances were not fixed, making the political picture a complex, multi-factional one of shifting positions. However, Philip of Burgundy had largely, but not entirely, dominated the government since the death of Charles V, his brother. During the 1390s his nephew Louis, brother of Charles VI, had risen to prominence, as duke of Touraine and then Orleans, and challenged Philip’s supremacy. During the king’s illness, the two leading dukes had enriched themselves on the wealth of the kingdom and it seems that their conflict grew over

510 Rot. Parl., vol 3, 611-2; Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 131; Davies, Revolt, 124-5, 252-3.
511 CPR, 1405-8, 362.
512 CPR, 1405-8, 359; Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 132; Davies, Revolt, 253; Preest, Chronica Maiora, 356-8. (This also appears in Rymer, Fœdera, vol 8, 419, incorrectly dated).
513 Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 133, 153; Davies, Revolt, 124-5, 151; Preest, Chronica Maiora, 358. It seems likely that by this point Prince Henry at least had left the siege, along with an unknown proportion of his army. Owain Glyn Dŵr descended from the north with his host and lifted the siege in October, issuing a famous threat to decapitate his garrison commander should he seek to hand the fortress over to the English. If Prince Henry were present, this would show that Owain had defeated him before Llanbadarn. However, since there is no evidence to suggest, refute or corroborate this, it seems reasonable to assume his absence. Were the prince present, then he was therefore defeated; this might give credence to the otherwise sourceless claim that he had earned ‘extensive siege warfare experience’ in Wales, M. Bennett, ‘The Battle’ in Curry, Agincourt, 1415. Henry V, Sir Thomas Erpingham and the triumph of the English archers, 21.
514 Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 131-2, 136-7; Davies, Revolt, 253, 293.
515 Darwin, Louis d’Orléans, 19; Vaughan, Philip the Bold, 40-1; Knecht, The Valois, 41-2; Schnerb, Armagnacs et Bourguinons, 20, 27-9.
the size of their claim to that resource.\textsuperscript{517} With that as its origin, their conflict took on political and territorial dimensions, incorporating allies and other factions into their competition for control of France’s wealth. The best example of their alliances comes in the form of the Visconti; Philip supported that branch that included Bernabò, and by consequence Queen Isabeau and the Wittelsbach dynasty, while Louis married into Giangaleazzo’s side of the Visconti, and naturally leaned towards the other German factions.\textsuperscript{518} Their political manoeuvring had resulted in Philip and Isabeau investing their candidate in Genoa when the king required Louis to sell his stake in the territory.\textsuperscript{519} It was their obstruction of his Italian ambitions that obliged Louis to look elsewhere for expansion. Therefore he began acquiring territory and allies in north-eastern France from 1398 onwards, but with impetus from 1401.\textsuperscript{520} It seems probable that this drive was personally motivated by Philip’s thwarting of his ambitions to the south. The clearest sign of this was his alliance with Philip’s local enemy, the duke of Guelders, and Louis’s acquisition of Luxemburg in 1402.\textsuperscript{521} Philip’s death in April 1404 appeared to aid Louis’s cause.\textsuperscript{522} From September that year, Louis and the league of German princelings he had recently cultivated, moved against Lorraine, Metz and the surrounding regions. The city recognised Rupert as Emperor, obliging him to defend it.\textsuperscript{523} In the late summer of 1405, the forces of Louis and Jean sans Peur gathered around Paris causing great fear, although no fighting actually took place.\textsuperscript{524} Although both sides were pacified at conference by the other dukes and the queen, a notable secret alliance was formed.

\textsuperscript{517} Darwin, Louis d’Orléans, 51-3; Vaughan, Philip the Bold, 44-5, 52, 56-8; Vaughan, John the Fearless, 41-3; Schnerb, Armagnacs et Bourguignons, 27-8, 64.
\textsuperscript{518} Darwin, Louis d’Orléans, 12, 19-21, 23-4, 30-1; d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 32-43; Bueno de Mesquita, Giangaleazzo Visconti, 12, 63, 66-7, 203-4; Vaughan, Philip the Bold, 56; Chamberlin, Count of Virtue, 89-93, 109-13, 175-80.
\textsuperscript{520} Jarry, La Vie Politique de Louis de France, Duc d’Orléans, 203-4, 272-5; Darwin, Louis d’Orléans, 21-4, 28, 35-6, 47-8; d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 48-53.
\textsuperscript{521} Darwin, Louis d’Orléans, 24-8, 48; d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 52; Courteault, Les Chroniques Du Roi Charles VII Par Gilles Le Bouvier, Dit Le Héraut Berry, 13-4; Schnerb, Armagnacs et Bourguignons, 57.
\textsuperscript{522} Darwin, Louis d’Orléans, 64; Vaughan, John the Fearless, 30-1; Schnerb, Armagnacs et Bourguignons, 76.
\textsuperscript{523} Jarry, La Vie Politique de Louis de France, 353; Darwin, Louis d’Orléans, 24-8, 37-9, 48-9.
\textsuperscript{524} Tuetey, Journal de Nicolas de Baye, vol 1, 138-9; Darwin, Louis d’Orléans, 74-90; d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 77-82; Vaughan, John the Fearless, 33-7; Courteault, Les Chroniques Du Roi Charles VII Par Gilles Le Bouvier, Dit Le Héraut Berry, 15-20; Schnerb, Armagnacs et Bourguignons, 75-83.

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thereafter, between Louis, the Queen and John of Berry.\textsuperscript{525} The conflict in the north-eastern border region was indecisive during 1405 and gave way to negotiation and posturing throughout the following year.\textsuperscript{526} By May 1407, Louis’s allies had reformed their league and again threatened Metz and Lorraine. In July they were decisively crushed at Champigneul, with most of the German nobles and Louis’s general, Guillaume de Braquemont, being captured.\textsuperscript{527} The duke of Lorraine and the Messines went to Paris to submit to arbitration; however, nothing was satisfactorily resolved and Louis prepared a new solution the following month in alliance with the marquis of Pont-à-Moussons.\textsuperscript{528} The fear of a wider conflagration engulfing the region, dragging with it the German Imperial parties and the French ducal factions, was palpable during the late summer and early autumn.\textsuperscript{529} The conflict between Burgundy and Orleans had finally been brought to the battlefield at Champigneul. The defeat of Louis’s allies there handed the initiative to his enemies. The use of their otherwise temporary advantage was swift and surprising.

Louis, duke of Orleans, was assassinated on 23 November 1407 by a gang led by Raoul d’Anquetonville acting under the orders of Jean sans Peur.\textsuperscript{530} This murder should primarily be viewed as a significant event within the struggles of the French courtly factions. It also acted as the trigger event for France’s slide into civil war. While there is no evidence directly connecting Henry’s government to the orders to kill Louis, this news would have undoubtedly been welcomed at Westminster. Although Louis’s aggressive opposition to Henry has been noted elsewhere, Glyn Dŵr’s close connection to the duke has not.\textsuperscript{531} Given that Owain had allied himself to France under Louis’s leadership, effectively to Louis’s faction, and agreed to adhere to his papal ally, the duke’s assassination would evidently damage Glyn Dŵr’s power and standing in France. This dramatic step by the duke of Burgundy offered England an opportunity to press its interests in the ensuing turmoil. This is proved by the orders issued at the Privy Council in December 1407 to Henry’s latest team of

\textsuperscript{525} Darwin, Louis d’Orléans, 78-90; d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 82; Schnerb, Armagnacs et Bourguignons, 82.
\textsuperscript{526} Jarry, La Vie Politique de Louis de France, Duc d’Orléans, 333-7; Darwin, Louis d’Orléans, 28, 35-6.
\textsuperscript{527} Jarry, La Vie Politique de Louis de France, Duc d’Orléans, 353-4; Darwin, Louis d’Orléans, 39-40, 49.
\textsuperscript{528} Jarry, La Vie Politique de Louis de France, Duc d’Orléans, 333-7; Darwin, Louis d’Orléans, 39-40.
\textsuperscript{529} Jarry, La Vie Politique de Louis de France, Duc d’Orléans, 353-4; Darwin, Louis d’Orléans, 40, 49.
\textsuperscript{530} Jarry, La Vie Politique de Louis de France, Duc d’Orléans, 354-5; Darwin, Louis d’Orléans, 111-26; d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons 83; Morrall, Gerson and the Great Schism, 13; Vaughan, John the Fearless, 44-8; Courteault, Les Chroniques Du Roi Charles VII Par Gilles Le Bouvier, Dit Le Héraut Berry, 21-2; Preest, Chronica Maiora, 361; Schnerb, Armagnacs et Bourguignons, 91-101.
\textsuperscript{531} Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 133; Davies, Revolt, 192, 195.
ambassadors; Thomas, bishop of Durham, Sir Thomas Erpingham, Hugh Mortimer, squire, and legal expert John Cateryk.\textsuperscript{532} These men were empowered to treat with France regarding a truce and a royal marriage between the two crowns. Within these orders were critical clauses. While the usual formula regarding the inclusion of allies was mentioned, the instructions explicitly required that the French agreed that Owain was not an ally and the truce should be made specifically excluding Owain.\textsuperscript{533} The ambassadors’ line threateningly maintained that Owain must be subject to the Crown.\textsuperscript{534} The treaty documents contain no mention of these machinations, of course, but spoke airily of France being entitled to include their ‘allies, friends, confederates, kingdoms, subjects, lands and lordships or their people’ within the terms of a perpetual peace.\textsuperscript{535} The resultant treaty terms appear to allow France to represent the Welsh, in keeping with the clauses of the 1404 alliance. The Franco-English treaty of late 1407 explicitly stated that the French could declare and discuss for its allies on all questions, quarrels and wars, irrespective of their circumstances and dependency.\textsuperscript{536}

Theoretically, Owain stood close to inclusion in a treaty of perpetual peace – how long that would have lasted in reality is another matter. However, the fact that the subject of Wales was not even permitted to be discussed demonstrated two critical points. The Crown was determined to defeat Owain and retain Wales as a territory; and therefore, the conflict with Wales would continue until one side had been defeated.

During the same negotiations, peace was also agreed for Aquitaine and other areas of France through negotiation with the duke of Berry.\textsuperscript{537} The only named French negotiators participated in the negotiations concerning Aquitaine and cannot be linked with certainty to the discussions relevant to Wales. However, there is no mention anywhere that the French negotiators argued for Glyn Dŵr’s inclusion in peace negotiations with the English. It is quite

\textsuperscript{532} POPCE, vol 1, 302-3. The inclusion of Hugh Mortimer, a kinsman of Edmund Mortimer, is unlikely to be a coincidence here.

\textsuperscript{533} POPCE, vol 1, 302, ‘sans ce q le dit Oweyn soit compris en icelles’, ‘le dit Oweyn nest pas nomez’.

\textsuperscript{534} POPCE, vol 1, 302, ‘doit estre soubgiz de la C[ouronne].’

\textsuperscript{535} Fœdera, vol 8, 504-5, ‘leurs Amys, Alliez, Confederez, leurs Royaumes, Subgiz, Terres & Seignuries queconque, ou leurs Gens, Procureurs ou Messages, aiantz a ce sufficeant Poair, de & sur bone, ferme & perpetuelle Paix entre Nous...’.

\textsuperscript{536} Fœdera, vol 8, 484-5 (Latin, 11 June 1407), 505-6 (French, 1 December 1407), ‘Oyer et entendre diligeaument toutes les Choses qui ceux de la dite Partie de France, pour eux & leur ditz Alliez, vouldront dire, declarer, ouvrir, & parlamenter, de & sur toutes les questions, debats, quereles, demandes, guerres, & descours, queconques leur Circumstances, Dependences, Incidences, Adjacences & Connexes, qui unques fuert en temps passez, sont & poenent estre, entre Nous & la dite Partie de France, les Alliez, Royaumes, Seignuries, & Subgies d’une partie & d’autre.’

\textsuperscript{537} Fœdera, vol 8, 506-7, 507-8, 508-9, 508-13. The French ambassadors were Gerard de Puy, bishop of Saint Flore, Guillaume de Morevyll, known as l’Ermitte de la Faye, Casyne de Seremuller, squire and chamberlain of the duke of Berry, and Master Johan Hue, secretary.
conceivable that by the end of 1407 Charles’s negotiators were sympathetic to Burgundy or were even his adherents. Even if they were non-aligned, the probable goal of the French ambassadors was to swiftly and simply remove any threat England could pose to a France in disarray. If they were those who concluded the additional treaty for Aquitaine, then they appear to have been under the aegis of the aged duke of Berry. It seems just to suggest that the concession over Owain might not have sat comfortably with the French, but circumstances dictated that their security considerations were paramount. The French abandonment of their ally, though an entirely disreputable act, is perhaps understandable within its context. By being able to record terms which, under scrutiny, put the French in a wholly disreputable light, it appears that England was momentarily ascendant. Nevertheless, this stood in plain, direct breach of their treaty of alliance with Glyn Dŵr.

Again, that one of the lords, the king and the prince aforesaid, shall not make or take truce nor make peace with the aforesaid Henry of Lancaster, but that the other might be included if he had wished in the same truce or peace, unless he is united or did not wish to be included in the same truce or peace, and he shall determine, concerning such refusal or rejection, who wished to treat for the said truce or peace, within a month after the one shall have signified the said truce or peace, by his letters patent, sealed by his seal.\(^{538}\)

Considering the grand, binding terms of the 1404 treaty, and the barely noticed discarding of Glyn Dŵr during these negotiations, it seems difficult to conceive other that Owain was bargained away as a point to safeguard France.

Duke Louis’s murder caused grave problems in France, not only among the nobles, but also the clergy. When Jean Petit delivered a speech defending the act, he justified it by portraying Louis as a tyrant and therefore, the killing of a tyrant was beneficial to France.\(^{539}\) This caused revulsion in many, notably in Jean Gerson who, although a Burgundian-sponsored cleric for so long, fully transferred his allegiance to the house of Orleans and harangued Petit for the few remaining years of his life.\(^{540}\) While apparently abhorred by political assassination out of principle, Petit’s discourse was also political and marked a

\(^{538}\) Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 26 (Latin), 76-7 (English). ‘Item quod aliquis dominorum regis et principis predictorum non faciet seu capiet treugas nec faciet pacem cum dicto Henrico Lencastrie quin alter, si voluerit, comprehendatur in Ipsis treugis sive pace, nisi in eisdem treugis vel pace renuerit sive noluerit comprehendi et de qua noluntate seu recusacione constabit illi qui dictas treugas sive pacem tractare voluerit infra mensem postquam alteri treugas seu pacem predictas significaverit per suas patentes litteras suo sigillo sigillatas.’

\(^{539}\) Darwin, Louis d’Orléans, 157-72; d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 98-9; Morrall, Gerson and the Great Schism, 13, 74; Schnerb, Armagnacs et Bourguignons, 103-15.

\(^{540}\) Darwin, Louis d’Orléans, 155-72; d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons 98; Morrall, Gerson and the Great Schism, 13, 74.
proximity between Burgundy and Queen Isabeau. Giangaleazzo Visconti deposed Isabeau’s grandfather, Bernabò, in order to take possession of Milan. At the time it was justified by the claim that Bernabò was a tyrant, and removing him was legal, legitimate and even a duty. In addition, his fragmentation of Milan – among his sons – weakened it and benefitted her enemies; therefore his downfall was essential to maintain Milan’s power. The closeness between the defences of both overthrows, considering the family connections, is unlikely to be coincidental. The embroiling of the French clergy in political assassination by cousins who had often sworn themselves to peace and with Italian and Imperial feuds and machinations was a significant concern.

While the projected papal conference at Savona had failed, the issue of the schism dragged exhaustingly on. Benedict had increased in credibility from his presence at Savona and Genoa during 1407, and by April 1408 he had regained a modicum of French support. It had become evident that the Roman papacy had lost credibility the previous year and therefore it might be ripe for invasion. Benedict plotted with Marshal Boucicaut for Genoese galleys to assault the papal seat, and had some degree of amity with Paolo Orsini, leader of the papal guard in Rome. They moved to muster in late April 1408, but Rome’s vulnerability had been noticed by Ladislas in Naples, who attacked and took the city just as Boucicaut’s fleet was putting to sea. Just as in 1405, Benedict’s military plans for Rome had been thwarted by circumstances beyond his control. However, Gregory’s papacy was in chaos, largely due to disaffection spawned by his failure to live up to his promises regarding the schism, and most of his cardinals abandoned him, fleeing to Pisa. Although this presented an opportunity to win those cardinals to Benedict’s cause or to advance on chaotic Rome, the murder of Louis had robbed Benedict of his most powerful support in the French court. Since then, his opponents in Paris had worked assiduously to promote their solution to the schism; a pronouncement of France’s intention to declare neutrality by Ascension Day in May. Although Charles VI wrote to Benedict on 12 January 1408, he did not receive the letter until

541 Chamberlin, Count of Virtue, 81-2. A similar point of friction came with the accusation that Valentina Visconti poisoned Charles VI. This almost certainly alluded to the accusation that Giangaleazzo had poisoned Bernabo (81, 178).
542 Creighton, History of the Papacy, 217; Lalande, le Livre des Faits, 370-8; Lalande, Jean II le Meingre, 146-8.
543 Creighton, History of the Papacy, 208-9, 214-6; Pillement, Pedro de Luna, 152.
544 Creighton, History of the Papacy, 218-20;
545 Bellaguet, Saint-Denis, vol 3, 511-20, 583-625; Creighton, History of the Papacy, 201-7, 220; Pillement, Pedro de Luna, 145-8; Morrall, Gerson and the Great Schism, 68-9.
mid-April. At the same time, truces were signed between England and other regional powers such as the Breton and Burgundian dukes, as well as the Scots. Events appeared to be turning towards a restoration of peace in the north. However, Benedict countered the French court’s letter by sending a Bull written in May 1407. The papal order would excommunicate any who threatened withdrawal from the pope, challenged papal decisions or hampered the healing of the schism. This policy had possibly been concocted with the connivance or at least knowledge of those ambassadors sent to Benedict in 1407, though they now risked falling foul of it; excommunication was to be followed by interdict. With hindsight, this appears a rash course of action. However, Benedict’s previous contests of brinkmanship with the French court had ultimately proved successful, and the prior subtraction of obedience had been fully reversed. Benedict still had friends at court, and although Louis was no longer alive, he had been the strongest individual there since at least 1404, and the possibility of his friends and faction regaining control remained. With those salient points in mind, there seems little reason to suppose that Benedict’s methods and obstinacy would fail to return France to his cause once again. However, the University of Paris was leading the debates at court, Benedict’s letter was denounced and his supporters jailed or hounded out of France. Marshal Boucicaut was commissioned to seize Benedict, who fled to Perpignan, where he held council, and thereafter he retired to safety in Aragon. France declared neutrality in May 1408. The articles of the Pennal Declaration thereby became not only irrelevant, but a threat to Welsh-French relations. It might be appropriate to ponder whether the Pennal Declaration finally resulted in a bitter-sweet moment; some of the requests appear to have been agreed by Benedict, such as making St David’s a metropolitan, but following that pope’s path would tear Owain from the French, which he could not afford.

It is unknown which actions were taken in Wales concerning France’s withdrawal of obedience. However, to retain French support Glyn Dŵr would have to jettison Benedict

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547 *Faëdera*, vol 8., 490 (Brittany), 511-2 (Burgundy), 514-5 (Scotland), 521-5 (France).
550 Pillement, *Pedro de Luna*, 140.
and adhere to the crown. Militarily, the cause does not appear lost in France; Jean V of Brittany formed an alliance with the Orleanists in May 1408, and theoretically therefore, the western sea lanes were open again.\textsuperscript{555} Also, the French do not seem to have entirely abandoned the Welsh, despite their moment of weakness during the negotiations in December 1407. Monstrelet detailed the raising of a force to go to Wales to assist, in the same year Walsingham described combat at sea during which English fleets defeated troop ships bound for Wales. This evidence, though cautiously discounted by Lloyd may therefore have been fact.\textsuperscript{556} Glyn Dŵr’s ambassadors, probably Yonge and Trevor initially, were certainly in Paris in 1408, and Yonge repeatedly appears in records for a decade thereafter, and during this time some aid was forthcoming.\textsuperscript{557} Charles VI certainly said that he would send more military aid to Wales and to English rebels, and there is no overriding reason to dismiss this promise.\textsuperscript{558} However, on the continent, both popes lost their obedience; the European powers hoped that the conference soon to be held in Pisa would finally end the schism.\textsuperscript{559}

The diplomatic victory ensuring a truce with France enabled the English to press their sudden ascendancy in Wales, placing another siege under Gilbert, Lord Talbot, before Harlech, Owain’s northern capital in early 1408.\textsuperscript{560} The winter of 1407-8 was noted across Europe as a hard one; ‘the worst for five hundred years’ according to the chronicler at Saint-Denis, causing many animals to die and water sources to freeze solid for months.\textsuperscript{561} Shortly after Louis’s murder, in February 1408 the Percy threat was finally extinguished when Northumberland and Bardolf were slain attempting to regain their northern estates. Lewis Byford, one of Glyn Dŵr’s bishops, was captured in their company in this brief fight at Bramham Moor.\textsuperscript{562} In little over six months the landscape of the revolt had dramatically changed from a picture of apparently settled native rule under a popular, skilled leader with a

\textsuperscript{555} Douët-d’Arca, Choix De Pièces Inédites Relatives, 309.

\textsuperscript{556} Douët-d’Arca, Monstrelet, 259; Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 136, n. 5; Preest, Chronica Maiora, 341.

\textsuperscript{557} Gabriel, ‘Wales and the Avignon Papacy’, 82-3, n; Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 143; Davies, Revolt, 190.

\textsuperscript{558} Williams, Chronique de la traison et mort de Richard deux roy Dangleterre, 299-302; Hingeston, RHL Henry IV, vol. 2, 61-3; Bellaguet, Saint-Denis, vol. 3, 431.

\textsuperscript{559} Creighton, History of the Papacy, 224-7; Pillement, Pedro de Luna, 156-72.

\textsuperscript{560} Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 130-7; Griffiths, ‘Prince Henry, Wales, and the Royal Exchequer, 1400-1413’, 211; Davies, Revolt, 125, 253, 293.

\textsuperscript{561} Bellaguet, Saint-Denis, vol 3, 745-9; Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 133-4; Vaughan, John the Fearless, 69; Preest, Chronica Maiora, 359.

\textsuperscript{562} CPR 1408-13, 82 (Byford’s pardon); Kingsford, English Historical Literature in the Fifteenth Century, 283 (The Northern Chronicle); Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 134; Kirby, Henry IV, 218-9; Davies, Revolt, 186; Preest, Chronica Maiora, 359-60.
progressive plan for a stable state, with notable foreign allies, to the nightmarish vista of complete isolation, articulated by two seemingly decisive strangleholds firmly placed around Glyn Dŵr’s urban centres. Without these, Glyn Dŵr might lack legitimacy internationally, and be more easily cast as one of a number of rebels or pretenders that plagued Europe’s thrones throughout the period. In addition, parliaments held in the woods perhaps lacked the required majesty or appeal for envoys of foreign crowns, whereas safely held ports and castles told those powers that they would be able to extract their forces when required. Without them, Glyn Dŵr lacked a measure of the grandeur and credibility required by successful leaders, as well as a basic requirement of any ruler: an identified capital. The sieges continued however, with Aberystwyth falling towards the end of 1408, perhaps in September.563

Another winter was enough for the trapped garrison at Harlech, which capitulated in February 1409.564 Edmund Mortimer died in the siege, while his wife and children, Owain’s daughter and grandchildren, as well as Owain’s wife, were captured at its fall. They were taken to London and eventually starved to death along with his heir, Gruffudd.565 However, shortly after the capitulation of Harlech, two French carracks, the ‘Sancta Maria’ and the ‘Sancta Brigida’ were seized off Milford. Other than being connected to the revolt, there is no credible explanation why these two, probably with support vessels, were at the 1405 expedition’s point of entry into Wales. It is tempting therefore to link their presence to continued French efforts to engage with Glyn Dŵr’s revolt.566 Moreover, the Welsh were still a notable military force within Wales; in 1409, English border communities were still making truces with them, and they were well able to mount attacks east of the border.567 Although such operations were less frequent or damaging during these years, were the Welsh an insignificant force, then such actions and agreements would not have occurred. Letters recently re-dated to the summer of 1412 suggest a new Welsh leader was in command.568

563 Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 136-7; Kirby, Henry IV, 220-1; Griffiths, ‘Prince Henry, Wales, and the Royal Exchequer, 1400-1413’, 211; Davies, Revolt, 253, 293.
564 Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 136-7(137, n. 3, an English garrison was in place in Harlech in March 1409); Griffiths, ‘Prince Henry, Wales, and the Royal Exchequer, 1400-1413’, 211; Davies, Revolt, 253, 293.
565 F. Devon, ed., Issues of the Exchequer, (London: Record Commission, 1837) 321, 326-7; Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 137; Kirby, Henry IV, 220-1; Hodges, Owain Glyn Dŵr and the War of Independence in the Welsh Border, 150; Davies, Revolt, 326.
566 CCR, 1409-1413, 10-1; Friel, The Good Ship, 159.
567 Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 140-2; Davies, Revolt, 234-6, 310-1.

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It seems noteworthy that Glyn Dŵr’s family were kept alive for so many years, Gruffudd is thought to have died in 1411 and the other captives in 1413. Yet had they not been required by Henry for some purpose, such as for bargaining with Owain, then there seems no reason for the king to sustain them. Henry had, after all, shown no timidity in despatching a large number of people, whether on the scaffold or in prison. Therefore their continued existence raised a question, that being whether they were held as a check on Owain, being allowed to die when his power had sufficiently dwindled. Despite the seeming completeness of the defeat assumed by the loss of Harlech, the Welsh did not give up. However, events far away would pull victory further from them and closer to the English crown.

A general council was agreed across Europe, and convened at Pisa in 1409. Although the Roman and Avignon popes were declared deposed and an alternative candidate elected, it proved a disaster. Neither of the two schismatic popes – or indeed their supporters – in reality accepted their depositions, so there were now three popes rather than two. The schism went on, in some respects worse than before.

In France, conflict began between the ducal parties in the years following Louis’s murder and Jean sans Peur’s subsequent seizure of control of the government in 1409. Jean actively sought to keep the agreement with England, personally intervening in restoration disputes in Normandy and Picardy in summer 1408, as well as dealing with a serious revolt against him in the Low Countries that year. His consolidation of power in Paris was a bloody affair; he set about persecuting his opponents, many being killed while others fled. Jehan Montagu, the bishop of Chartres, a notable Orleanist and former Marmouset so hated by the duke’s father, was publicly beheaded. Such was Jean’s grip on power that some adherents of his

569 Creighton, History of the Papacy, 234-52; Morrall, Gerson and the Great Schism, 13, 93; Kirby, Henry IV, 221-2; Crowder, Unity, Heresy and Reform, 41-64.
570 d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 105-28; Vaughan, John the Fearless, 75-87; Courteault, Les Chroniques Du Roi Charles VII Par Gilles Le Bouvier, Dit Le Héraut Berry, 40-1; Knecht, The Valois, 54.
571 Darwin, Louis d’Orléans, 184-7; Hingeston, RHL Henry IV, vol 2, 247-53, 254-6; Courteault, Les Chroniques Du Roi Charles VII Par Gilles Le Bouvier, Dit Le Héraut Berry, 26-30; Vaughan, John the Fearless, 49-66; Schnerb, Armagnacs et Bourguignons, 115-23.
572 d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 105-28; Morrall, Gerson and the Great Schism, 13-5; Courteault, Les Chroniques Du Roi Charles VII Par Gilles Le Bouvier, Dit Le Héraut Berry, 40-5;
573 Tuetey, Journal d’un Bourgeois de Paris, 6; Tuetey, Journal de Nicolas de Baye, vol 1, 65-7, 290-3; Jarry, La Vie Politique de Louis de France, Duc d’Orleans, 50; d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 296
enemies sought his amity. The perfect example of this is his treaty of alliance with the duke of Brittany in July 1410, who had made a series of alliances with those princes of the Orleanist cause shortly prior to the Burgundian coup. The duke of Berry, the count of Alençon and others who had been unengaged if not neutral, appalled by John of Burgundy’s excesses, declared themselves Orleanists, making a larger conflict inevitable. By mid-1410, France’s slide to civil war was inexorable.

Meanwhile, Henry’s ambassadors in Calais announced that the peace with the Burgundians was still holding in May 1410, and that negotiations for its prorogation were due. Elsewhere that summer, mutual safe conducts were agreed for Castilian and English ships. In November that year, Henry IV approached Albany, the regent of Scotland, with a view to negotiating a final peace or a long truce between the kingdoms. While all of these agreements and understandings could be reversed by one act or declaration, they are indicative of a trend supporting England’s diplomatic ascendency at that time.

In 1411, circumstances dealt the English another fortuitous hand, which they played well. In the north, two armies of Scots fought each other, distracting them for the rest of the year. More importantly, probably as a consequence of French factional warfare that year, the duke of Burgundy approached the English at Calais and requested military aid. Henry responded swiftly, despatching a force of three hundred lances and a thousand archers under the command of the earl of Arundel. While a coup for Jean, who could show he had the powerful military support of England at his back, this was clearly a more significant development for the English. The friendship with Burgundy had worked a fissure in the edifice of the French court. This new, military alliance had turned into a breach through

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574 Blanchard, Lettres et Mandements de Jean V, duc de Bretagne, vol 5, 103 (Orleans), 105 (Alencon), 107-8 (Armagnac), 136-7 (Burgundy).
575 d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 105-28; Courteault, Les Chroniques Du Roi Charles VII Par Gilles Le Bouvier, Dit Le Héraut Berry, 41-5; Vaughan, John the Fearless, 82; Schnerb, Armagnacs et Bourguignons, 136-42.
576 Hingeston, RHL Henry IV, vol 2, 278-83.
577 Hingeston, RHL Henry IV, vol 2, 287-90. Note: the King of Castile’s mother was Henry IV’s sister.
578 Hingeston, RHL Henry IV, vol 2, 291-4, ‘pur traiter de pees finale, ou de longes trieves, d’entre les deux roiaumes.’
580 Bellaguet, Saint-Denis, vol 4, 475-9; d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 134, 142-5; Vaughan, John the Fearless, 91-2; Courteault, Les Chroniques Du Roi Charles VII Par Gilles Le Bouvier, Dit Le Héraut Berry, 45-6; Schnerb, Armagnacs et Bourguignons, 153.
which they could push troops into France. The Burgundians and their allies closed on Paris in September, fighting an action at the bridge of Saint-Cloud on Paris’s western boundary in early October. The Orleanists were forced to give up the bridge; they fell back on Paris and fled south. The Burgundians and their allies took the capital shortly after. Jean sans Peur and the earl of Arundel dined with Charles VI at the Louvre. Perhaps in reaction to this development, the duke of Brittany agreed to a ten-year continuation of his truce with England at the end of October, again closing the door on possible French exploits in Wales. The Burgundian leader took control of the king and his children at that point, and in the last action of the season, led them to the siege of Etampes, which his impressive array of troops took before returning to their quarters for winter. With the fighting season over, his English contingent retired to Calais. With the passage of English troops through Paris and their alliance to the de facto leader of France, cemented in agreement and on campaign, Glyn Dŵr’s cause was no longer of interest to those then leading France. Internationally at least, Owain Glyn Dŵr died as a figure of significance at the fall of Saint-Cloud.

In Wales, however, Owain Glyn Dŵr was still a force to be considered. He demonstrated as much by capturing and ransoming Henry’s main stalwart in Wales, Dafydd Gam, in April 1412. Although Owain seems to have faded after that final public act of defiance, it appears likely that he passed on the mantle of leadership to his son Maredudd, so the struggle could go on.

581 Bellaguet, Saint-Denis, vol 4, 509-13; Tuetey, Journal de Nicolas de Baye, vol 2, 30; d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 146-51; Vaughan, John the Fearless, 92-3; Courteault, Gilles Le Bouvier, Dit Le Héraut Berry, 46-7; Schnerb, Armagnacs et Bourguignons, 152-6.
582 Bellaguet, Saint-Denis, vol 4, 523-9 (includes a noteworthy anti-English rant by the chronicler); d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 152.
583 Bellaguet, Lettres et Mandements de Jean V, duc de Bretagne, vol 5, 155, 166-7.
584 Bellaguet, Saint-Denis, vol 4, 569-79; Vaughan, John the Fearless, 139-41; Courteault, Gilles Le Bouvier, Dit Le Héraut Berry, 48-9. It is noteworthy that the Welsh adherence to the Orleanist cause survived the death of Duke Louis. Welsh troops still appear in the ducal accounts from 1410-2, the most notable example of which follows: Lannette-Claverie, Collection Joursanvaut, 209 (1410-2), ‘Mandement de Pierre Renier, trésorier général du duc d’Orléans [then Charles, son of Louis], au receveur du domaine du duc dans le comté de Dunois, d’accomplir les instructions du duc en payant régulièrement ses 30 l. t. de gages annuels à Madoc Hoel (alias Houel), établi par le duc d’Orléans à la garde de son château de châteaudun sous le commandement du capitaine de château.’
585 Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 142; Davies, Revolt, 227, 302; Preest, Chronica Maiora, 383.
586 Lloyd, Owen Glendower, 154, citing Gruffydd Hiraethog from 1556-1564. Note, ‘1415 - Owain went into hiding on St Matthew’s Day in Harvest (21 September), and thereafter his hiding place was unknown. Very many said that he (Owain Glyn Dŵr) died; the seers maintain he did not.’ If this entry from the annals has any credibility it might denote that the ‘seers’ knew Owain was still alive, and might have lived for another fifteen years. See I. Bowen, The Statutes of Wales (London: Unwin, 1908), 41.
The actions of 1412 saw the final defeat of French ambitions in Britain for decades to come. During the winter, the Orleanists approached the English and tried to persuade Henry to support them militarily rather than the Burgundians.\textsuperscript{587} This request marks the complete opening of France to the English. When both warring factions solicited England’s aid it handed the balance of power to Henry. This demonstrated that England had recovered to the extent that it was strong enough to influence the outcome of the French civil war. It also allowed the English the opportunity to play both factions, thereby understanding their weaknesses before prosecuting an invasion of their territory. The Orleanists offered Henry all that England had ceded at Brétigny in 1360, as well as Poitou on the death of the duke of Berry, and also Périgord and Angoulême on the death of the young duke of Orleans, in return for a thousand men-at-arms and three thousand archers.\textsuperscript{588} In contrast, the Burgundians discussed a marriage alliance between Prince Henry and one of Jean sans Peur’s daughters.\textsuperscript{589} Having helped the Burgundians drive their opponents from the north the previous year, in 1412 England supported the Orleanists. In June, Thomas, duke of Clarence, and Sir John Cornwall landed in Normandy with an army of at least four thousand and pressed inland.

\textsuperscript{587} Courteault, Les Chroniques Du Roi Charles VII Par Gilles Le Bouvier, Dit Le Héraut Berry, 49; Knecht, The Valois, 56; Schnerb, Armagnacs et Bourguignons, 156-8. Note: A defamatory passage describes the desperation with which the Armagnacs sought English support, in which it was claimed that the dukes of Berry, Orleans and Bourbon, as well as the count d’Alençon, agreed to go in person with Henry against the duke of Burgundy, but also against the Welsh and the Irish. While it demonstrates their desperation and treachery to their Welsh allies, it seems likely to be a Burgundian invention to tarnish the names of their rivals. (‘c’estassavoir que ceulx de Berry, d’Orléans, de Bourbon et d’Alencon Youioient du tout en tout son bien et son honneur et eulx aller avecques lui, le aider et conforter contre le duc de Bourgongne et ses allez, et aussi contre ceulx de Gales et d’Irlande.’) Their justification for seeking Henry’s aid was apparently to seek justice for Louis and to avenge his ignoble murder (Et lui deissent encore comment, par defaut de justice, ilz venoient devers lui pour avoir raison de la mort du duc d’Orléans, et comment à roy, par le nom qu’il porte, lui appartient de faire et aider justice, et que ce serait à lui et aux siens ung très grant bien et honneur perpétuel, à lui faire et bailler aide, mesmement de tant noble sang comme estoit le duc d’Orléans.’) While it reads as a beautiful piece of betrayal, it ignores the obvious point that Henry was Louis’s implacable enemy and was most likely highly satisfied at his death, especially considering Louis’s support for the Welsh rebels. This appears in Johnes, Monstrelet, vol 2, 240-1; repeated in Jean de Wavrin, trans., W. Hardy and E. Hardy, Chronique (London: HMSO, 1887), vol 4, book 6, ch 26, 147-8 and presented as fact by Wylie, History of England under Henry the Fourth, vol 4, 67.

\textsuperscript{588} d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 154-5, 159; Schnerb, Armagnacs et Bourguignons, 156-8.

\textsuperscript{589} d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 134; Vaughan, John the Fearless, 91-2; Knecht, The Valois, 56.
prospecting to advance towards the conflict near Bourges. While this may well be viewed as a cynical move to confuse and weaken the French factions, in reality it was a political trump card. Meanwhile, the French warring parties held talks and agreed peaceful terms, and renounced all foreign alliances. Peace was brokered, largely at the intercession of Louis, duke of Guyenne, Charles VI’s heir, as the king slipped back into illness. After being bribed 150,000 crowns, the English departed, having played a role in cleaving the loyalties of France’s magnates. In November, a treaty was made at Buzançais, which obliged all of the dukes to write to Henry and renounce all and any agreements with him. The fact that this was a necessity carried out by royal command demonstrates the depth of the fractures within the French court and how far the English had been able to invest them. So, the dukes duly sent their honourable renunciations to Henry. It is noteworthy, though, that Clarence rejected them, and secretly Charles of Orleans made another agreement with the English in contravention of his king’s orders. The close of 1412 did not bring an end to the conflict, therefore, but just the conclusion of that particular phase. However, England had held the balance of power between the warring French factions and received ambassadors from both parties. Neither French faction would then have been able or probably willing to support a conflict in Wales in any form. Although the Welsh cause experienced one final swansong at Constance in 1417, Owain had therefore finally been abandoned by the French. As a figurehead or representative of Wales in Europe, Owain Glyn Dŵr’s moment appears to have disappeared at that point, for reasons entirely beyond his control.

Therefore in summary, many men had a hand in Owain Glyn Dŵr’s ‘death’, advertingly or otherwise. Those troops who besieged Aberystwyth and Harlech certainly played a role, although their involvement had been facilitated by the steady work of Henry’s ambassadors

590 Darwin, Louis d’Orléans, 223; d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 159; Vaughan, John the Fearless, 97; Vaughan, Valois Burgundy, 153-4; Courteault, ed., Les Chroniques Du Roi Charles VII Par Gilles Le Bouvier, Dit Le Héraut Berry, 49; Knecht, The Valois, 56; Schnerb, Armagnacs et Bourguignons, 161.
591 Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 4, 691-702; Courteault, ed., Les Chroniques Du Roi Charles VII Par Gilles Le Bouvier, Dit Le Héraut Berry, 49-51; Vaughan, John the Fearless, 97; Schnerb, Armagnacs et Bourguignons, 161.
592 Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 4, 693-7; d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 156; Schnerb, Armagnacs et Bourguignons, 159-60.
593 Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 4, 705-23; Douët-d’Arca, Choix De Pièces Inédites, 352; d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 159; RHL Henry IV, vol 2, 322-5; Vaughan, John the Fearless, 97; Courteault, ed., Les Chroniques Du Roi Charles VII Par Gilles Le Bouvier, Dit Le Héraut Berry, 51; Schnerb, Armagnacs et Bourguignons, 160-1.
594 Douët-d’Arca, Choix De Pièces Inédites, 359; Hingeston, RHL Henry IV, vol 2, 328-32.
595 See Appendix D 9, ‘Constance, 1417 – A Last Stand for Wales?’
on the continent. The other men of violence, the armies that fought in eastern France and those which faced one another before Paris, deepened the crisis at the French court, allowing Louis’s position to be challenged. This sparked the reorganisation of power that cost Louis his hold on government, weakening Owain’s chief supporter in France, and also made the duke vulnerable to assassins’ hands. The debates of the French clergy and the wise men of the University of Paris resulted in the implosion of Benedict XIII’s relevance and consequently his power. They, too, unknowingly contributed to Owain’s demise. Benedict’s confrontational behaviour and unyielding obstinacy aided his political isolation which eventually ended in physical seclusion in Aragon. All of these men played significant, but as yet unrecognised, roles in Owain’s downfall, and perhaps the ambassadors at Calais should be attributed the largest share of the credit for that. Their skill in maintaining relations, then working and exploiting the few opportunities that presented themselves were critical in weakening England’s adversaries, broadening the extant fractures in the French court to an extent that would eventually facilitate the invasion of the next king of England.
6: Conclusion

This thesis has demonstrated French diplomatic initiatives and military campaigns which attempted to extend their power into Britain during the medieval period. This study examined four instances of association with the Welsh. Each chapter illustrated appropriate contemporary examples delineating elements of medieval France’s foreign policy and practice. Their development of a network of allies of differing strength across the continent emerges as a notable central feature of this ultimately successful strategy. The careful close reading of the treaty documents enabled an evaluation of the form and style of the time and, where an abundance of sources allowed, an investigation of the minutiae of these hard-nosed negotiations. Moreover, this research reveals that these examples of French-Welsh interaction are plainly too numerous and too well-structured to be the result of opportunism.

Among the numerous conclusions and considerations this research has generated, one of the most unanticipated yet evident is the continuity of France’s strategic appreciation of Wales throughout the period studied. This recognises Wales’s relevance to England’s power and war effort during the medieval period. Although it was in France’s interests to move the conflict to Britain, one strategy to achieve this was by denying the enemy Welsh troops, taxes or a peaceful western flank by nurturing amities there. The evolution of this ploy evidently brought the Welsh and French into common conflict against the English, as evidenced during the reigns of Philip Augustus and Charles VI. England therefore was not only denuded of Wales’s resources of men, money and the stability offered by peace, but it was required to deploy its own finite assets in attempts to defend its west. This obviously reduced its ability to act as forcefully or in a prolonged manner elsewhere; this plainly benefitted France and to some extent Scotland. When Owain Lawgoch appeared to offer the chance of launching a Welsh-French force against Wales, the French acted positively at that moment, or at least, convinced the English government of that intention. Whether those years saw the French play two sophisticated, successful ruses, or whether they were simply unable to execute their apparent campaign plan, remains in the realms of opinion and the preference of the reader. To some extent, this demonstrates the skill of the plan; that even now both possibilities seem equally compelling. The benefits were plain to see, England’s resources were expended by rushing troops to Wales, investigating possible Lawgoch sympathisers and rebuilding castles there. The final development of this relationship saw the insertion of an expeditionary force into Wales, no small feat for the time. This happened once the Welsh had effectively defeated crown forces on the ground and begun to re-establish their government as a recognisable
entity once more, rather than simply appearing as a permanently restive province. The alliance of 1404 and the mission of 1405 were possible due to the strength of both parties; Glyn Dŵr was a competent commander with popular support, while Louis of Orleans was resolute in his antipathy towards Henry IV and actively courted allies in his foreign ventures. Their intriguing and the opportunities presented by the political-military circumstances of the moment saw the arrival of a French army on lands Henry claimed, but which he had lost to Owain. Depending on which chronicler most accurately described the 1405 expedition, that force stayed in Britain for either a three- or a nine-month campaign, and did so without being harassed or confronted by the hastily amassed thousands under the command of a warlike king. Although that fact alone supports the notion of an unpublicised truce, the story of the 1405 invasion represents an extraordinary episode in British and French history. It is perhaps all the more surprising that it has still not attracted broader scholarly attention. In addition, and in contrast to France’s alliance with the Scots, two of these unions offered the prospect of campaigning against the king of England in person, on English battlefields. While Scotland might have represented a relatively friendly, stable redoubt at one end of Britain, these joint ventures with the Welsh offered direct opportunities to decapitate the English monarchy. While those openings were slim in reality, they were clearly alluring and feasible enough to the French to generate treaties, expenditure and troop deployments.

The cases examined within this research describe the potent articulation of French power across the Channel which has not been previously explored to any significant extent. In that way, this work challenges any notion of English dominance during much of the medieval period. While such a perception is increasingly under review, presenting a counter case for French power evidently offers a new viewpoint. The range of examples offered within the background of an ongoing but developing strategy designed to extend the reach of French influence beyond its borders visibly shows the remarkable intelligence, flexibility and reactivity of medieval French doctrine; traits essential to a successful military. It is noteworthy that they repeatedly sought to attract and maintain a range of allies as a policy over the span of numerous generations. Given that France was victorious in the medieval phase of the enduring struggle with England, French methods and practices demand more profound consideration than they have previously received. It is therefore instructive that the French placed such significance on the Welsh; their recurrent efforts to ally themselves with the natives are unmistakeable and undeniable.
It seems important to illuminate the lack of continuity in their relations and to dispute modern efforts to imply that similar alliances were permanent, when the facts demonstrate the contrary. Medieval alliances commonly appear to lack permanence; relations were played out in an interrupted fashion through the movements of changing military, economic, governmental and religious pressures.\(^1\) Also, the fact that official French-Welsh connections pre-date those of the Franco-Scots ‘Auld Alliance’ has not yet attracted the attention it is perhaps due. The two examples of union from the later Middle Ages reaffirm the renewed connection between Welsh and French leaders, and consequently acknowledge French recognition of Wales’s ongoing usefulness a century after ‘conquest’, but there appear to be no permanent connections between any of the contemporary partners. Their repetition and renewal suggest that they have a broader significance within the context of the long-lived dispute between France, England and their respective allies. In that regard, French-Welsh relations merit further and wider consideration, in the first instance, inclusion of the Glyn Dŵr conflict within broader studies of the Hundred Years’ War would seem to be perhaps appropriate recognition of that.

Throughout these events, it is clear that the Welsh were not simply pawns. In fact, neither party appears beholden to the other in any of these studies, despite the florid language employed by both sides. The continuous appeal of the Welsh to a major power, combined with their role in some of the notable events of their continental region, elevates them beyond the fringe to which many general studies relegate them. This study also shows that the Welsh were able to communicate appropriately within the means and norms of their time, and to organise themselves along similar lines to their contemporaries. Although this seems a basic, even axiomatic, observation, it does not appear to have been noted anywhere else.

It is worth briefly considering whether, in each case, the Welsh were hostages to the whims of French political desire. Certainly, Owain Gwynedd could not be described as a French proxy. He successfully courted the attention and support of Louis VII after twice defeating Henry II on the battlefield. The course and the evolution of Owain’s diplomatic efforts mark an impressive first in Welsh history; however, his defiance of Henry preceded contact with Louis. The description of the conference at La Ferté-Bernard and the

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denouement of part of the feudal conflict between Louis and Henry offer an entirely new vista on their well-known relations. That realignment appears to resolve a number of long-standing problems concerning the interrelations of all those represented at the meeting in July 1168. Although it is not suggested that Louis specifically articulated French power within Britain, he did exercise his authority over Henry and the plaintiffs at La Ferté-Bernard. In that way, the French king clearly projected himself over his vassal, Henry II.

When Philip Augustus proposed an alliance with Llywelyn ap Iorwerth, the prince of Gwynedd accepted and reacted to benefit his interests, without jeopardising his position. He formed one part of a multi-factional alliance forged to support and protect Prince Louis’s attempt to claim the throne of England. It is remarkable that, from the perspective of several centuries, the measure of Llywelyn’s power has been largely forgotten. However, he stood as an equal among others in the coalition; the French heir, the rebel English barons and the Scots. The recognition of his issues before those of Malcolm of Scotland within the first drafts of Magna Carta denotes his high standing. This chapter illustrated a powerful diplomatic campaign by the French, creating an excellent opportunity to utterly defeat their enemy and take the throne of England. Military stalemate, growing baronial unease and the shifting sands of the political and religious affairs of the moment thwarted that attempt and subsequently definitively severed the union between Philip and Llywelyn. Nevertheless, each entered the agreement as relative equals; Philip was globally stronger, but in Britain, where he was about to send his heir, Llywelyn was clearly the more potent. Both benefitted from that period of association. Llywelyn campaigned successfully against the kings of England before and after his alliance with Philip during his five decade reign, showing that he did not enter the alliance or the conflict on another’s command.

Owain Lawgoch could be depicted as an agent of French polity; although that is perhaps unfair. The 1372 declaration makes intriguing reading; teasingly posing the question whether the venture was a well-developed ruse. This chapter provides a new picture of Wales post-1282, challenging the notion of ‘conquest’ while demonstrating that, in reality, Wales was far from being a peaceful province. Whether a deception or a genuine effort to probe Wales with a view to conquering it, the Lawgoch invasion projects illustrate the sophistication and success of France’s foreign policy at that time. Although the result does not determine the intent, it is noteworthy that England reacted to cover Wales, while Lawgoch and du Guesclin retook La Rochelle and much of western France.
In 1404, the French court formally approached Owain Glyn Dŵr in a bid to promote the growing conflict with Henry IV. This chapter mapped the complexities and undulations of the factional warfare within France at the time. The degree to which the French were able to exert themselves across their borders into Italy, Spain, Brittany, the Empire and Britain during this short period is remarkable. This clearly reveals the extent to which they had recovered or even advanced their former might by the beginning of the fifteenth century. This too is not remarked upon in any publication consulted, perhaps because of the gravity of their rapid decline in the first quarter of that century. However, the diplomatic exchanges also appear to allow a glimpse into the mind of Glyn Dŵr; angry but highly intelligent, replete with linguistic ploys to engage and persuade his new ally. This alliance saw a French army enter Henry’s domain and campaign there for several months, not simply land for a hasty coastal skirmish. The work of the French, Welsh and English diplomats was investigated and presented. Through those difficult moments, perhaps the English envoys emerged as the most worthy, though unsung, heroes of that phase of the conflict. This chapter also showed how French factional warfare caused both major courtly parties to turn to their enemy for aid. This rarely exposed fact gave England a supporting role in the struggle for the governance of France, which evidently allowed them to influence the outcome of that conflict. This sudden rise enabled England to encourage splits in the French court, and weaken its factions, facilitating the invasions which followed less than five years later. Once again, the French-Welsh alliance waned, largely through external factors. However, the abundant details available for this area of research enabled a thorough investigation, producing another fresh vision of an otherwise frequently described period. It cannot be said that Glyn Dŵr was a French pawn; the rebellion he came to lead was unconnected to the French, although their distraction through civil war assisted his fall. Even without French encouragement or material support, resistance in Wales continued in some form for years after.

This work is intended as a contribution to the field of international relations and studies of power and diplomacy. In these discussions of medieval diplomacy in practice, the leaders and their interpersonal dynamics have been examined or re-investigated, revealing a number of fresh perspectives. This work proposes a broader view, demonstrating the continent-wide connectivity of medieval Europe’s factions and movements. Therefore, not only is the subject-matter new, but so are the methods used and conclusions drawn. It also goes some way to credibly portraying and discussing this barely-researched area of medieval history.
and, in so doing, shows a number of research and publication opportunities. These, the author wishes to investigate in the coming years, hopefully engaging in collaborations with others interested in these matters, from prosopographies and warfare, to works on broader subject areas such as foreign policy. These observations demonstrate the existence of several ample research niches to fill. In addition, studies on smaller, now disappeared, entities such as Wales are few and far between, and perhaps this should change. The application of theories and writers uncommonly associated with medieval history, such as soft power and Sun Tzu, is intended to demonstrate their broader conceptual potential as well as the contemporary relevance of the medieval world.

Finally, although the French-Welsh connection was intermittent due to the undulating financial, military, political and religious pressures of the periods in which they occurred, their recurrence is incontrovertible. In establishing that as the case, this represents an evolution in current thinking on French policy and ability during the period, as well as the role and the skill of the Welsh with whom they sought these alliances. These studies are therefore original and contribute to a number of academic fields.

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2 There are few works on foreign policy; the most frequently consulted was Mirot, *La Politique Française en Italie de 1380 à 1422* in 1934, while work on Louis and the Armagnacs was last done in English in Darwin’s *Louis d’Orléans* in 1936.
## Appendices

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Appendix A 1.1: Owain Gwynedd’s first letter to the court of Louis VII, between October 1163 and July 1165 (Latin).

L. gloriosissimo Francor(um) regi Owin(us) rex Walie salute et devotissimum obsequium. Ex quo vestre virtutis magnificentiam et amplissimam vestre dignitatis ac nobilitatatis excellantiam fama nuntiante et veridical multorum relatione accepi, in vestre celsitutinis notitiam venire, et dulcissimam vestram amicitiam habere, summon desiderio a multis temporibus desideravi. Sed quod hactenus, commeantium raritate impediente et locorum distantia, obtinere non potui, decetero ut obtineam tam scripto quam nuntio diligenter laborabo. Me igitur et mea, si qua vobis placent, vestre voluntati ad nuntum exponens, summa precum instantia deposco quatinus me, hucusque multimode discretion vestre incognitum, inter vestros fideles et devotos amicos amodo habere dignemini. Quid autem carissime vestre dilectioni super petitone proposita placuerit, per presidentium latorem michi significare non differatis. Valeant qui vos feliciter et diu regnare desiderant. Valete.¹


To Louis, very glorious king of the French, Owain, king of Wales, greeting and very devoted service. Since I have heard of the magnificence of your virtue and the very eminent excellence of your dignity and nobility from the announcement of rumour and the truthful report of many, I have for a long time desired with the greatest desire to come to the notice of your highness and have your very delightful friendship. But that which up to now I have not obtained, having been prevented by the rarity of travellers coming and going and the distances of places [between us], from now on I shall endeavour diligently to obtain by both writing and messenger. Placing myself and my possessions, if by any chance they are pleasing to you, at the command of your will, I ask with the greatest perseverance of prayers that you may now deign from now to consider me, largely unknown up to now to your discretion, amongst your faithful and devoted friends. Do not delay to inform me through the bearer of the present letter what it shall please your dearest amiability concerning the proposed petition. May they fare well who desire that you reign happily and long. Farewell.²

Appendix A 2.1: Owain Gwynedd’s second letter to the court of Louis VII, between November 1163 and July 1165 (Latin).

Ow’ rex Walie, suus amicus devotissimus H. Suessionensi episcopo et regis Francie cancellario, suo patri in Cristo et amico dilectissimo, debitam ac voluntariam cum salute amicitiam. Deo patri, mi venerande, et vestre discretion gratias refero, de hoc quod mihiper nuntium meum Moysen litteris vestries mandastis, ut scilicet si meum nuntium iterum mitterem domino regi Francie, per vos divertere facerem, ut vestro suffragio efficacius suum propositum effectui mancipare valeret. Unde et nunc istum M’. nunteum meum vobis mittimus consulendum de suo negotio, vos obnixe deprecando quatinus eum versus regem foveatis, et partem nostrum pro Dei amore et nostro iuvertis. Valete.³

Appendix A 2.2: Its English Translation.

Owain, king of Wales, his very devoted friend, [sends] due and voluntary friendship with [his] greeting to his very beloved friend and father in Christ, Hugh, bishop of Soissons and chancellor to the king of France. I give thanks to God the Father, my venerable one, and to your discretion concerning that which you committed to writing in your letter to me through my messenger Moses, namely that if I should again send my messenger to the lord king of France, I should make him come through you, so that with your help his purpose might be accomplished more effectively. Whence we are now sending this Moses as my messenger to consult with you concerning his business, and vigorously entreat you to support him vis-à-vis the king and to assist our side for the love of God and us. Farewell.⁴

Appendix A 3.1: Owain Gwynedd’s third letter to the court of Louis VII, between September 1165 and 24 April 1166 (Latin).

Excellentissimo dei gratia L. Francor(um) regi Owin(us) Waliarum princeps, suus homo et amicus fidelis, devotissimum cum salute servitum. Cum universorum relation, serenissime rex, te conspicuum predicit, in quo omnes possunt et debent confidere, clementia tamen mihi experiment nota et mansuetudo erga subjectos et in te confidentes, fecit me eligere te solum consultorem, ad quem in angustiis meam conqueror necessitate. Quamtotiens enim de me esse et mea sollicitudine litterarum inscription vobis nuntiavi, non tam litteras quam earum latores benevole recepisti et eos clementer tractasti. Mihi etiam per illos, Dei gratias et vobis, consuluisti prout pius rex confidensi in eo debuit. Cum itaque angustie ad presens mihi undique sint, nolo te clementem consultorem latere. Werra quam rex Anglie per multos dies, ut vobis notum est, severitate sue tyrannidis mihi excogitavit, in preterita estate, nullis malis meis precedentibus, contra me surrexit. Sed cum in conflict quinque partis nostri exercitus convenirent, Deo gratias et vobis, ex suis plures ceciderunt quam ex meis. Sed, quia non hominis propositi sed nutu Dei omnia disponuntur, movit exercitum versus Anglia(m), non nostris fortasse meritis sed humilium oration ad sanctos et sanctorum intercession ad Deum, usque adeo tamen me dubium reliquens, quod nec pacem nec indutias nobiscum composuit. Iratus itaque pro eventu non prospero, alienigenis et omnibus quos ad nostrum detrimentum congregaverat, in diessu mandavit ut post futuram Pascha contra nos iterum cum eo venirent. Proinde vestrarum clementiam obnixe deprecor quatinus per presentium latorem mihi nuntietis si animum werrandi contra eum habetis, ut in illa werra et vobis serviam nocendo ei secundum consilium vestrarum et illata mihi ab eo vindicem. Quod si hoc proponis, quid consulas, quod auditorium mihi largiri vis, per hunc latorem mihi nuntietis. Nullam enim viam evadendi eius insidias habeo, nisi te largiente mihi consilium et adiutorium. Privatum etiam et familiarum clericum meum Guiardum et consanguineum vobis commendo, quatinus pro Dei amore et nostro ei necessaria provideatis. Misi enim eum ante in vestrarum presentiam cum litteris meis, quibus non credidistis, ut nobis dictum est, quod essent mee. Sed sunt he, Deum testum induco, qui per illas eum intimo corde vobis commendavi. De hoc etiam vestrarum clementiam obnixe deprecor, ut sicut incipistis prelates ecclesie, videlicet apostolicum et archiepiscopum Cantuariensem, michi pacificos redder, sic et adhucreddeatis. Valete.  

To the very excellent Louis, by the grace of God king of the French, Owain, prince of Wales, his very faithful man and friend, [sends] very devoted service with [his] greeting. Although the report of all, most serene king, proclaims you to be conspicuous as one in whom all can and should have complete trust, the clemency known to me by experience, and the kindness towards subjects and those having complete trust in you, make me choose you as the sole adviser to whom in difficulties I may complain loudly of my necessity. For as often as I have informed you about myself and my cares by the writing of letters, you have received not only the letters but their bearers benevolently and treated them kindly. Through the latter you have counselled me, thanks be to God and you, as a pious king should counsel someone having complete trust in him. Now that, therefore, difficulties are all around me at present, I do not wish my kind adviser to be ignorant of the situation. Preceded by no evil deeds of mine, in the past summer the king of England has waged against me the war which, as is known to you, he has planned for many days with the harshness of his tyranny. But when in the conflict the five armies of our side came together, thanks be to God and you, more of his men fell than mine. Having seen this, he wrongfully and harmfully mutilated my hostages, although he had not presented them previously for the keeping of peace. But, because all things are disposed of not by the wishes of man but by the will of God, he moved the army towards England, not through our merits, perhaps, but through the prayers of the humble to the saints, and by the saints’ intercession to God; however, he left me uncertain of the outcome to the end, because he arranged neither a peace nor a truce with us. Angered therefore because the result had not turned out as he had hoped, on his departure he ordered the foreigners and all whom he gathered together to defeat us to come with him against us again after next Easter. On that account I vigorously entreat your clemency that you will inform me through the bearer of this present letter whether you are resolved to wage war against him, so that in that war I may both serve you by harming him according to your advice and take vengeance for the war he waged against me. But if you do not propose this, inform me by this bearer what you advise, what help you wish to bestow on me. I have no way of evading his snares unless you grant me advice and help. I commend to you moreover my private and familiar cleric and kinsman, Guiardus, that you may provide him with necessities for the love of God and us. I sent him before into your presence with my letters, which you did not believe were mine, so we were told. But they were mine, I bring in God as my witness, and through them I commended him to you from the depths of my heart. I vigorously entreat your clemency
concerning this as well, that just as you have begun to render peaceful towards me the prelates of the Church, namely the pope and the archbishop of Canterbury, so you will continue to do so. Farewell.⁶

Appendix B 1.1: Llywelyn ap Iorwerth’s reply to Philip Augustus, c. 1215-1216 (Latin).

Excellentissimo domino suo Ph(ilippo) Dei gracia illustri Francorum regi Loelin(us) princeps Norwallie fidelis suus salute et tam devotum quam debitum fidelitatis et reverentie famulatum. Quid retribuam excellentie nobilitatis vestre pro singulari honore et dono inpreciabili quo vos rex Francor(um), imo princeps regum terre, me fidelum vestrum non tam munifice quam magnifice prevenientes, litteras vestras sigillo aureo impressas in testimonium federis regni Francor(um) et Norwallie principatus michi militi vestro delegastis, quas ego in armariis ecclesiasticis tanquam sacrosanctas relliquias conservavi facio, ut sint memoriale perpetuum et testimonium inviolabile quod ego et heredes mei, vobis vestrisque hereditibus inseparabiliter adherentes, vestris amicis amici erimus et inimici inimicis, idipsim a vestra regia dignitate erga me et meos amicos regaliter observavi modis omnibus expecto postulans et expecto? Quod ut inviolabiliter observetur, congregato procerum meorum concilio et communi cunctorum Wallie principum assensu, quos omnes vobiscum in huius federis amicicia colligavi, sigilli mei testimonio me vobis fidelem inperpetuum promitto, et sicut fideliter promitto fidelius promissum adimplebo. Preterea, ex quo vestre sullimitatis litteras suscepi, nec treugas nec pacem nec etiam colloquium aliquod cum Anglicis feci, set per Dei gratiam ego et omnes Wallie principes unanimiter confederati, inimicis nostris imo munitissima, que ipsi per fraudes et dolos occupaverant, per auxilium domini in manu forti recuperavimus, recuperata in domino Deo potenter possidemus. Unde postulantes expectimus universi Wallie principes quod sine nobis nec treugas nec pacem cum Anglicis faciatis, scituri quod nos nullo pacto vel precio, nisi precognita voluntatis vestre benivolencia, eis aliquo pacis seu federis vinculo copulabimur.  

To our most excellent lord Philip, by the grace of God, the illustrious King of the French, Llywelyn, Prince of North Wales, his friend, sends greeting and such devotion as the debt of fealty and respectful service, which I will repay the excellency of your nobility, on account of the singular and priceless gifts, which you, King of the French, even prince of that country of kings, outstripping me, your friend, not more munificently than magnificently, have sent me by your knight, your letters, impressed by your golden seal in witness of the alliance of the kingdom of the French and the principality of North Wales, which I, before an assembly of clergy, even on the sacrosanct relics swear to observe as they will be a perpetual memorial and an inviolable testimony, that I and my heirs, cleaving inseparably to you and your heirs, shall be your friends’ friends, to your enemies’ enemies. This itself therefore stipulating, I expect and ask from your kingly dignity to be royally observed in every manner towards me and towards my friends, and in order that it may be inviolably observed, having called together a council of my chieftains, and with the common consent of all the princes of Wales all of whom I have joined with you in the friendship of this treaty promise you, under witness of my seal, fidelity in perpetuity, and as I thus faithfully promise I will carry out my promise more faithfully. Moreover, since I received letters of your excellency, I have made neither truce, nor peace, nor any negotiation whatever with the English. But, by the grace of God, I and all the princes of Wales, unitedly confederated, will manfully resist our enemies, even yours, and by the help of God and with a strong hand, we will recover from the yoke of the tyrants themselves the great part of the land and the strongly fortified castles, which they by fraud and guile have occupied. And being recovered, we will powerfully hold [them] in the Lord God, whence stipulating, we, the princes of all Wales, desire that without us, neither truce nor peace will ye make with the English, [for] let it be decreed, that by no pact or reward, unless by the foreknown kindness of your wish, will we be joined to them in any peace or treaty.

Endorsement – The Covenant of Llywelyn, Prince of North Wales, with the Lord King of France.\(^8\)

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\(^8\) Matthews, *Welsh Records in Paris*, 3-4 (Latin), 57-8 (English).
Appendix B 1.3: The Translation from *English Historical Documents*.

To his most excellent lord, Philip, by God’s grace the illustrious king of the French, Llywelyn prince of North Wales his faithful subject greeting and devoted and due service of fealty and reverence. How am I to repay the excellence of your nobility for the singular honour and priceless gift with which you the king of the French, nay foremost of kings on earth, anticipated me, not so much munificently as magnificently, in sending me, your knight, your letter sealed with the seal of gold in testimony of the treaty between the kingdom of the French and the principality of North Wales – which letter I will have kept in the aumbreys of the church as if it were a sacred relic, to be a perpetual memorial and an inviolable witness that I and my heirs, adhering inseparably to you and your heirs, will be friends to your friends and enemies to your enemies and I confidently ask and request that the very same be observed in all respects by your royal dignity in royal fashion towards me and my friends. That it may be inviolably observed, by the testimony of my seal, having summoned the council of my chief men and having obtained the common assent of all the princes of Wales, all of whom I have bound to you in the friendship of this treaty, I promise that I will be faithful to you for ever and just as I faithfully promise I will most faithfully fulfil my promise. Furthermore, from the time I received your highness’s letter, I have made neither truce nor peace, nor even parley, with the English, but, by God’s grace, I and all the princes of Wales, unanimously leagued together have manfully resisted our – and your – enemies, and with God’s help we have by force of arms recovered from the yoke of their tyranny a large part of the land and the strongly defended castles which they by fraud and deceit had occupied and having recovered them we hold them strongly in the might of the Lord. Hence we, all the princes of Wales, ask and request that you make no truce with the English without us, knowing that we will not for any terms or price bind ourselves to them by any peace or treaty unless we know in advance we have your approval.9

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Letter, thanking Philip, king of the French, prince of the kings of the earth, for sending Llywelyn, Philip’s faithful man, his letter sealed with his gold seal in testimony of the treaty between the kingdom of the French and the principality of North Wales, which Llywelyn will have kept in the aumbreys of the church as if it were a sacred relic, so that it may be a perpetual memorial and an inviolable testimony that he and his heirs, adhering inseparably to Philip and his heirs, will be friends to Philip’s friends and enemies of his enemies; Llywelyn asks that the same will be observed by Philip towards Llywelyn and his friends. In order that this be kept inviolably, having summoned the council of his leading men and with the consent of all the princes of Wales, all of whom he has bound together in the friendship of this treaty, Llywelyn promises by the testimony of his seal to be faithful to Philip for ever, and just as he promises so he will more faithfully fulfil his promise. From the time he has received Philip’s letter Llywelyn has not made truce, peace or even parley with the English, but by the grace of God he and all the princes of Wales in unanimous confederation have manfully resisted their – and Philip’s – enemies, and with the Lord’s help have recovered from the yoke of their tyranny a great part of the land and the strongest castles which they have occupied by deceit, and hold mightily in God that which has been recovered. Therefore all the princes of Wales request that Philip make neither truce nor peace with the English without them, knowing that the princes will not bind themselves by any agreement or price to the English in any peace or treaty, unless they have advanced knowledge of his approval.10

Appendix B 1.5: Notes on differences between these translations

The differences between the translations produce some points of contention. Structurally, the principal difference is that Treharne’s text uses longer sentences than that of Matthews. This gives the translation a different flow to the Latin original and thus, it reads slightly differently overall. In remaining faithful to the original, Matthews’ work is more difficult to piece together as one coherent message, and some of the variations between the two versions arise from these different redactions of the sentence form, structure and implication. Treharne appears to have isolated two notable translation errors in Matthews’s work. The first centres on the word ‘militi’, knight, in line seven of the Latin original. Matthews understood that Philip had ‘sent me by your knight, your letters’, suggesting that one of Philip’s nobles had carried the treaty to Gwynedd. In contrast, Treharne phrased it thus, ‘sending me, your knight, your letter’ implying that Llywelyn was describing himself as Philip’s knight. The second translational issue focuses on the ‘armariis ecclesiasticis’, as Treharne and Pryce have it and consequently as it appears on line seven of their transcriptions. Matthews believed it to be ‘armatiis ecclesiasticis’, so this issue is one of transcription firstly, then translation. The difference in meaning is stark however, Matthews’ version described a meeting of the clergy and Treharne’s a cupboard in a church. Treharne appears to have accurately argued that this difference arose from a palaeographical error by Matthews. The two versions induce different visions of Philip’s diplomatic mission to the Welsh; Matthews’s grander military mission to Wales being ratified by a clergy council contrasts with Treharne’s anonymous messenger who bears Llywelyn’s response promising to guard the letter safely and swearing fealty as Philip’s knight. Although Treharne appears correct on these two textual differences, the treaty clearly shows that Llywelyn summoned councils and debated the matter before he replied. Llywelyn attained agreement from those in his affinity, although his letter does not say whether this encompassed the nobles and the clergy. However, this letter was written with the connivance of Llywelyn’s clergy; it was to be kept in a church and, in keeping with common practice of the time, the author of the reply was almost certainly a cleric. This would have been more difficult to promise in 1212 when the papal interdict was in force throughout England and Wales. Although the interdict was relaxed in Wales during that year, as is discussed below, it is unclear precisely when that happened. Prior to that event, Llywelyn’s confident assumption of church cooperation is unlikely. In addition, the mention of Llywelyn summoning councils is noteworthy; Brut y Tywysogion refers to gatherings of Welsh clergy in 1215 and 1216, but no source mentions a meeting of the Welsh clergy in
1212. This evidence places both Welsh groups necessary to enact the alliance in council with Llywelyn after 1215, but not in 1212.
Appendix B 1.6: Constructing a primary case for 1212

In an attempt to construct a case for 1212, apart from the inconclusive entry in the Brut which makes no reference to any French-Welsh alliance, the contemporary evidence which might aid that theory can only be viewed as circumstantial, at best. Although the following sources were not presented by Treharne, they seem to be the only references upon which such a case can be built. Amid entries for 1213, one French chronicler, Guillaume le Breton, referred to Philip’s desire to intervene in England. The editor’s footnote backdated this project to 1209, combining ‘Jean de Lascy’, Roger the constable of Chester who was loyal to John, and the king of France.11 This referred to Philip’s pledge made between March 1209 and April 1210 to accept ‘J. de Latiaco’ or John de Lacy, into his service if he made good his promise to make war on King John in England and Ireland.12 The de Lacy family held lands in Herefordshire, Ireland and Normandy, and therefore could form an indirect connection between Wales and France through the March. However, more recent scholarship on the matter assists in establishing that this was a minimal threat, if any, and resulted in no attempt to overthrow John.13 This might, perhaps, be combined with John’s brutal treatment of another noble family who, like the de Lacys, were landowners in the Welsh Marches, but also had firm connections with Ireland, Scotland and France. In 1210, the king hounded William de Braose out of Wales and Ireland, capturing and killing his wife and heir.14 De Braose fled to France and might have machinated with the authorities, although there is no obvious proof of that. Several sources linked the de Braose and de Lacy families in these times, one of which identified ‘Walterus de Lacy’ agitating in exile in France in 1211.15 However, the fact that Guillaume le Breton wrote of Philip’s project in 1213 most probably connects it to the plan to attack England formulated in the same year following the receipt of Innocent III’s letters to the French king.

11 Delaborde, Œuvres de Rigord et de Guillaume le Breton, vol 1, 245-6.
12 Samaran et al, Recueil des Actes de Philippe Auguste, tome 3 (1966), 161-2 (entry 1079). Note: A. A. M. Duncan believes that this is not ‘John’ de Lacy, who was a minor at the time, but another member of the family, probably ‘Walter’, Duncan, ‘John King of England and the Kings of Scots’, 258-9, this view is shared by Professor D. Power (Swansea University), revealed in conversation in 2010.
Therefore, the strongest primary source connecting Philip to discontented English nobles, with no mention of the Welsh, comes from Wendover.\textsuperscript{16} This source has some notable detractors however; Cheney dismissed it, while Bradbury described it as an exaggeration.\textsuperscript{17} It is impossible to discount Wendover’s chronicle however, due to the fact that seemingly every secondary source consulted includes it. Although Wendover’s evidence falls among entries for 1212, it appears to refer to events more commonly and reliably ascribed to 1213 and perhaps 1215.\textsuperscript{18} Such dating inconsistencies are quite common in medieval sources.

The treatment of William de Braose and his family might have been another factor that provoked baronial discontent with John which resulted in the alleged 1212 plot to kill him in Wales or to hand him over to the Welsh. More concrete reasons for English disloyalty include John’s intentions to impose higher taxes, to demand more service from his nobles and his heavy-handed, sometimes murderous methods of control.\textsuperscript{19} Any friendship between the French king and the de Lacy family appears short-lived; records show Philip Augustus redistributing the Norman estates of ‘Jean’ and ‘Gilbert de Lacy’ shortly after ‘Walter de Lacey’ was absolved and returned to the obedience of the king of England.\textsuperscript{20} Taken as a whole, contemporary evidence linking France and Wales in 1212 is tenuous, particularly when compared to the weight of clear, reliable, independently corroborating sources for 1215-16. It appears therefore that no sound case for 1212 can be constructed using primary sources.

\textsuperscript{16} Giles, \textit{Wendover}, 259-60.
\textsuperscript{17} Cheney, \textit{Innocent III}, 338-9, ‘unsupported ... circumstantial ... and mostly unacceptable’; Bradbury, \textit{Philip Augustus}, 318.
\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Fœdera}, vol 1, 216; Samaran et al, \textit{Recueil des Actes de Philippe Auguste}, tome 4, 191-2 (entry 1556 and n.1).
A tous ceux qui ces lettres verront Evain de Gales, salut. Comme les roys d’Angleterre, qui ont esté ès temps passez, meuz de mauvais courage et de convoitise dampnée, à tort et sanz cause et par traisons appensees, aient occis ou fait occire aucuns de mes prédecesseurs roys de Gales et yceulx mis hors et deboutez du dit royaume, et ycellui royaume par force et puissance appliqiu a eulx et detenu et ycellui soubzemiz avec les subgiez du pais à plusieurs servitudes, lequel est et doit estre appartenir à moi par la succession et comme plus prochain de sanc et de lignage et en droict ligne descendant d’iceulx mes prédecesseurs roys d’icelui royaume, et pour avoir secours et aide à recouvrir le dit royaume, qui est mon héritage, me soye transportez devers pluseurs roys, princes et seigneurs chrestiens, et leur aye clairié et monstré clerelement le droit que je y ay, en leur requerant et suppliant humblement que a ce me voulusissent aydier, et derrainement me soies traiz devers mon très puissant et très redoubté seigneur Charles, par la grace de Dieu roy de France, dauphin de Viennoys, et lui ay monstré mon droit que j’ay ou dit royaume et fait les requestes et supplicacions dessus dictes, et ycellui seigneur ayant compassion de mon estat, actendu le grant tort que les diz roys d’Angleterre ont eu en leur temps envers mes diz prédecesseurs et encore a le roy d’Angleterre qui est à present envers moy, et consideré toute la matiere de mon fait de sa benign et accoustumée clémence, qui est le mirouer singulier et exemple entiere les chrestiens de toute justice et de toute grace et miséricorde pour touz opprimez relever et conforter, m’ayt octroyé son ayde et confort de gens d’armes er de navire pour recouvrer le dit royaume, qui est mon droit héritage, comme dit est; sachent tuit que je, en recongoissant la grant amour que mon dit seigneur le roy de France m’a monstrée et monstre par vray effect en ce fait, ou quel et pour le quel mectre sus a mis et exposé du sien trois cens mil francs d’or et plus, tant en gaiges de gens d’armes, d’archiers et d’arbalestriers comme en navire et en gaiges et despens de marigniers, en hernoiz et en autres fraiz, missions et despens pluseurs, la quake somme je ne lui puis pas présentement rendre, promet loyaument et par la foy de mon corps et jure aux sains Euvangiles de Dieu, touchées corporelement pour moy et pour mes hoirs et successeurs à tousjoursmaiz, que la dicte somme de troiz cens mil francs d’or je lui rendray et payeray entièrement ou à ses diz hoirs et successeurs ou ceulx qui auront cause d’eulx, ou à leur commandement à leur voulené, sanz autre terme, et dès maintenant ay fait et accordé pour moy, pour mes hoirs et successeurs et pour tout mon pais et subgiez perpetuelement avec mon dit seigneur le roy de France, pour lui, pour ses hoirs et successeurs roys, pour tout son pais et ses subgiez bonnes et fermes amities, confédéracions et aliances, si
que je les ayderay et conforteray de ma personne, de mes subgiez et pays, de tout mon povoir, loyaument, contre toutes personnes qui pevent vivre et mourir. En tesmoing de ce, j’ay seellé ces lectres de mon seel. Donne à Paris, le Xe jour de May, l’an de grace mil CCC soixante douze.21

21 The original is A. N. Jlc 27, f. 55, (which is held in the Archives Nationales in Paris, a request to view it was denied). This transcription appears in A. Thierry, Histoire de la Conquête de l’Angleterre par les Normands (Paris: Panthéon, 1851), vol 4, Appendix no. 7, 299-300.
Appendix C 1.2: Its English Translation.

Evain de Gales, to all those whom these letters shall come, Greeting. The kings of England in past times having treacherously and covetously, tortuously and without cause and by deliberate treasons, slain or caused to be slain my ancestors, kings of Wales, and others of them have put out of their country, and that country have by force and power appropriated and have submitted its people to divers services, the which country is and should be mine by right of succession, by kindred, by heritage and by right of decent from my ancestors the kings of that country, and in order to obtain help and succour to recover that country which is my heritage, I have visited several Christian kings, princes and noble lords, and have clearly declared and shown unto them my rights therein and have requested and supplicated their aid, and have latterly come unto the most puissant and renowned sovereign Charles, by the grace of God king of France, dauphin of Vienne, and have shown unto him my right in the aforesaid country and have made unto him the aforenamed requests and supplications, and he having had compassion upon my state and understanding the great wrong that the kings of England have done unto my ancestors in former times, and that the present king of England has done unto me, and of his beneficent and accustomed clemency in which he is the singular mirror and example amongst Christians of justice, grace and mercy to all those that are oppressed and require comforting, has granted me his aid and the assistance of his men-at-arms and fleet in order to recover the said realm, which is my rightful heritage, as has been said; know all ye, therefore, that in return for the great love that my said lord the king of France has shown unto me, and is truly showing by his expenditure of three hundred thousand francs of gold, and more, as well in the pay of men-at-arms, archers and arbalesters as in [the provision of] ships and the pay and expenses of the sailors, in harness and other matters in various expenses, the which sum I am at the present time not able to furnish, I promise loyally and by my faith and oath upon the holy evangelists, touched corporeally by me, and for my heirs and successors for ever, and the aforesaid sum of three hundred thousand francs of gold I will return and wholly repay, or my heirs and successors or those who may claim through them (ou ceul qui auront cause d’eulx), or by their will or command, without any other terms; and I herewith have made and entered into, for me my heirs an successors and for all my country and subjects for ever, with my said lord the king of France for him and his successors and for all their country and subjects, a good and firm treaty, union and alliance, by which I will aid and assist them by my person, my subjects and my country, to the utmost power and loyalty against all persons alive or dead (contre toutes
personnes qui povent vivre et mourir). In witness of which I have sealed these letters with mine own seal Given at Paris the 10th day of May, the year of grace one thousand three hundred and seventy-two. 22

Appendix C 2:  A map of Paris circa 1383, familiar to Owain Lawgoch and the envoys of Owain Glyn Dŵr.

Image: A Map showing Paris in 1383 under Charles VI, including the city boundary under Charles V in 1367 and Philip Augustus in 1180. Deutsch, Metronome illustré, 152.
Appendix D 1: The relevant section of the Pennal Declaration, 1406, Latin.²⁴

‘Et videtur dicto domino nostro regi quod hoc erit ad salute anime sue, subditorum suorum, conservacionem status sui; et de hoc idem dominus rex qui sincere zelatur salutem suam, prosperitatem et conservacionem honoris et status sui ipsum visceraliter et sub vinculo ac federe amicicie et dilectionis singularis, quam ad eum habet, rogat et requirit significando sibi quod si premissa deducat ad executionem, faciet eidem domino regi maximam complacenciam et se repputabit ad sua beneplacita perampluis obligatum; et si forte dictus dominus princeps, prefati et aliis viri ecclesiastici terrarium sibi subditarum formidarent quod ex hujusmodi reductione possent certa prelaturas et alia beneficia ab intruso et suis predecessoris obtenta et alias gracias cujuscumque condicionis subditis suis concessis pro tempore futuro turbati vel quod dominus Benedictus vellet aliquid innovare, dominus noster rex offert se procuraturo erga dictum dominum Benedictum quod omnes prelati et beneficiati confirmabuntur, omnes gracias, dispensaciones et alie etc, ratificabuntur et concedentur in forma eius grata et secura; quodque dictus dominus Benedictus providebit de prelaturis et aliis beneficiis ibidem vacantibus et vacaturis personis sufficientibus dicto domino principi fidis et gratis et non sibi emulis aut suspectis. Et subsequentur ex deliberacione consilii nostri convocari fecimus proceres de prosapia nostra et prelatus principatus nostri ac alios in hac parte evacandos et tandem post diligentem examinacionem et disputacionem articulorum premissorum et matierie eurumdem per prelatos et clerus sufficienter factas, concordatum et conclusum existit quod nos, confidentes in jure domini Benedicti, sacrosancte Romane et universalis ecclesie summi pontifices, presertim eo quod pro pace et unione ecclesie proseqtus est et in dies, ut intelleximus, prosequitur, considerantesque duram servitiem, adversarii ejusdem Benedicti tunicam Christi inconsutilem dillacerantis ac ob sinceram dilectionem quam erga vestram excellenciam gerimus specialem, predictum dominum Benedictum ut verum Christi vicarium in terris a nobis et subditis nostris recognoscendum fore duximus et recognoscimus per presentes. Et quia, illustissime princeps, infrascripti articuli statum nostram et ecclesie Wallie reformationem et ultimitatem notorie concernunt, vestram regiam humilime rogamus quatinus expedicionem eorumdem graciose penes prefatum dominum Benedictum sumnum pontificem promovere dignemini. Et primo si censure ecclesiastice contra nos et subditos nostros seu terram nostram per prefatum dominum Benedictum aut Clementem predecessorum suum late existant, quod ipse Benedictus relaxet. Item quod quecumque et

qualiacumque juramenta per nos seu quoscumque alios principatus nostri illis qui se dominaverunt Urbam et Bonifacium nuper deffunctos seu eisdem adherentibus qualitercumque prestita relaxat. Item quod confirmet et ratificet ordines collatos, titulos prelatorum, dispensacionesque et officia tabellionum ac alia qucumque in quibus periculum animarum aut prejudicium nobis et subditis nostris in ea parte evinire seu generari possent e tempore Gregorii xi. Item quod ecclesia Menevensis que a tempore sancti David archiepiscopi et confessoris fuit metropolitana et post obitum ejusdem successerunt eidem archiepiscopi ibidem xxiii, prout in cronicis et antiquis libris ecclesie Menevensis nomina eorumdem continentur et hic pro majori evidencia eadem exprimi fecimus, videlicet, Eliud, Heneu, Morwal, Menevie, Haerunen, Elwayd, Gvrnuen, Llevdiwyt, Gvrgwst, Gvgavn, Cledavc, Ainam, Elave, Maelyswyd, Sadernuen, Catullus, Alathvy, Nousis, Sadernuen, Diochwael, Asser, Arthuel, David secundus, et Sampson, pristina satui restituatur; quequidem ecclesia metropolitana infrascriptas habuit et habere debet ecclesias suffraganeas, videlicet, Exoniensem, Battoniensem, Herefordensem, Wygorniensem, Legicestrensem, cujus sedes jam translatata est ad ecclesias Coventrensem et Lichfeldensem, Assavensem, Bangorensem, et Landavensem; nam ingruente rabie barbarorum Saxonum qui terram Wallie eisdem usurparunt, ecclesiam Menevensem predictam suppeditarunt et eam ancillam ecclesia Cantuariensis de facto ordinare. Item quod idem dominus Benedictus provideat de metropolitano Menevensi ecclesie et aliis ecclesiis cathedralibus principatus nostri, prelaturis, dignitatibus et beneficiis ecclesiasticis, curatis scientibus linguam nostram dumtaxat. Item quod dominus Benedictus in corporaciones, uniones, annexiones et appropriaciones ecclesiarum parrochialium principatus nostri, monasteriis et collegiis anglicorum quorumcumque auctoritate factus revocet et annulet et quod veri patroni earumdem ecclesiarum locorum ordinarii ydoneas personas presentare valeant ad easdem seualias seu alias conferre. Item quod dominus Benedictus concedat nobis et heredibus nostris principibus Wallie quod capella nostra et cetero sit libera et gaudeat privilegiis, exempcionibus et immunitatibus quibus gaudebat temporibus progenitorum nostrorum principum Wallie. Item quod habeamus duas universitates sive studia generalia, videlicet unum in Northwallie et alium in Swthwallie, in civitatibus, villis seu locis per ambaxiatores et nuncios nostros in hac parte specifiendis et declarandis. Item quod dominus Benedictus contra Henricum Lencastrie intrusorum regni Anglie et usurpatorem corone ejusdem regni et sibi adherentes, eo quod ecclesias tam cathedrales quam conventuales et parochiales voluntarie combusit et comburi procuravit, archiepiscopos, episcopos, prelatos, presbyteros, religiosos tam possessionatos quam mendicantes inhumaniter suspendi, decaitari et quartirizari fecit et fieri mandavit et
quod scismaticus existit, cruciatam conceder dignetur in forma consuenta. Item quod idem dominus Benedictus concedat nobis et hereditibus nostris, subditis et adherentibus nobis cujuscumque nationis fuerint dumtamen fidem teneant orthodoxam, qui guerram contra prefatum intrusorem sustenimus plenam remissionem omnium peccatorum et quod remissio hujusmodi duret guerra inter nos, heredes, et subditos nostros et prefatum Henricum, heredes et subditos suos durante.

In cujus rei testimonium, has litteras nostras fieri fecimus patentes. Data apud Pennal ultimo die macii anno a Navitate Domini millesimo quadringentesimo sexto et principatus nostri sexto.

In dorso. – Littera per quam Owynus, princeps Wallie reduxit se et terras et domina sua ad obedienciam domini mostri pape xxiii ma.
Appendix D 2: The English translation of the relevant section of the 1406 ‘Pennal Declaration’.25

‘It seems to our said lord the king that this shall be to the safety of his soul, of his subjects and of the safe-keeping of his realm. Concerning this, the same lord the king, who sincerely zealous, prays heartily for his safety, the prosperity and conservation of his honour, his state and himself, under the bond and treaty of friendship, and of a singular love which he has for him. He requests that he indicate this himself, because if he puts the aforesaid into action, he will the same lord, the king, great satisfaction, and he will consider himself very well pleased and to his greater obligation. If, by chance the said lord prince, the prelates, the other ecclesiastics of his land, and his subjects dread, because from this kind of restoration, that certain prelates and beneficed clergy, appointed by the anti-pope and his predecessors, and other favours of whatsoever nature granted on behalf of future occasions to his subjects may be unsettled, or that the lord Benedict may wish to change anything. On that account, our lord the king offers that he will, procure from the said lord Benedict that all the prelates and beneficed clergy shall be confirmed, and all favours, dispensations, &c, shall be ratified and conceded to them in secure and proper form. Also, the said lord Benedict shall provide, that when prelacies and other benefices are vacant, or shall be vacant, those persons only who are sufficiently in the faith and good will of the said lord the prince shall be appointed, and not rivals or suspects.

Following the advice of our council, we have called together the nobles of our race, the prelates of our Principality and others called for this purpose, and, at length, after diligent examination and discussion of the foregoing articles and their contents being thoroughly made by the prelates and the clergy, it is agreed and determined that we, trusting in the rights of the lord Benedict, the holy Roman and supreme pontiff of the universal church, especially because he sought the peace and unity of the church, and as we understood daily seeks it, considering the hard service of the adversary of the same Benedict, tearing the seamless coat of Christ, and on account of the sincere love we specially bear towards your excellency, we have determined that the said lord Benedict shall be recognized as the true Vicar of Christ in our lands, by us and our subjects, and we recognize him by these presents.

Whereas, most illustrious prince, the underwritten articles especially concern our state and the reformation and usefulness of the Church of Wales, we humbly pray your royal

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majesty that you will graciously consider it worthy to advance their object, even in the court of the said lord Benedict:

First, that all ecclesiastical censures against us, our subjects, or our land, by the aforesaid Benedict or Clement his predecessor, at present existing, the same by the said Benedict be removed.

Again, that whatsoever vows and of whatsoever nature given by us or whomsoever of our principality, to those who called themselves Urban or Boniface, lately deceased, or to their adherents, shall be absolved.

Again, that he shall confirm and ratify the orders, collations, titles of prelates, dispensations, notorial documents, and all things whatsoever, from the time of Gregory XI., from which, any danger to the souls, or prejudice to us, or our subjects, may occur, or may be engendered.

Again, that the Church of St. David’s shall be restored to its original dignity, from which time of St. David, archbishop and confessor, was a metropolitan church, and after his death, twenty-four archbishops succeeded him in the same place, as their names are contained in the chronicles and ancient books of the church of Menevia, and we cause these to be stated as the chief evidence, namely, Eliud, Ceneu, Morfael, Mynyw, Haerwnen, Elwaed, Gwrnwen, Llewddwyd, Gwrwyst, Gwgawn, Clydawg, Aman, Elias, Maelyswyd, Sadwrnwen, Cadell, Alaethwy, Novis, Sadwrnwen, Drochwel, Asser, Arthwael, David II., and Samson; and that as a metropolitan church it had and ought to have the undermentioned suffragan churches, namely, Exeter, Bath, Hereford, Worcester, Leicester, which is now translated to the churches of Coventry and Lichfield, St. Asaph, Bangor, and Llandaf. For being crushed by the fury of the barbarous Saxons, who usurped to themselves the land of Wales, they trampled upon the aforesaid church of St. David’s, and made her a handmaiden to the church of Canterbury.

Again, that the same lord Benedict shall provide for the metropolitan church of St. David’s, and the other cathedral churches of our principality, prelates, dignitaries, and beneficed clergy and curates who know our language.

Again, that the lord Benedict shall revoke and annul all incorporations, unions, annexations, appropriations of parochial churches of our principality made so far, by any authority whatsoever with English monasteries and colleges. That the true patrons of these churches shall have the power to present to the ordinaries of those places suitable persons to the same or appoint others.
Again, that the said lord Benedict shall concede to us and to our heirs, the princes of Wales, that our chapels, &c., shall be free, and shall rejoice in the privileges, exemptions, and immunities in which they rejoiced in the times of our forefathers the princes of Wales.

Again, that we shall have two universities or places of general study, namely one in North Wales and the other in South Wales, in cities, towns, or places to be hereafter decided and determined by our ambassadors and nuncios for that purpose.

Again, that the lord Benedict shall brand as heretics and cause to be tortured in the usual manner, Henry of Lancaster, the intruder of the kingdom of England, and the usurper of the crown of the same kingdom, and his adherents, in that of their own free will they have burnt or have caused to be burnt so many cathedrals, convents, and parish churches; that they have savagely hung, beheaded, and quartered archbishops, bishops, prelates, priests, religious men, as madmen or beggars, or caused the same to be done.

Again, that the same lord Benedict shall grant to us, our heirs, subjects, and adherents, of whatsoever nation they may be, who wage war against the aforesaid intruder and usurper, as long as they hold the orthodox faith, full remission of all our sins, and that the remission shall continue as long as the war between us, our heirs, and our subjects, and the aforesaid Henry, his heirs, and subjects shall endure.

In testimony whereof we make these our letters patent. Given at Pennal on the thirty-first day of March, A.D. 1406, and in the sixth year of our rule.

Endorsement. – The letter by which Owen, Prince of Wales, reduces himself, his lands, and his dominions to the obedience of our lord the Pope Benedict XIII.
Appendix D 3: Translations from El Victorial.

The fifteenth-century chronicle, El Victorial, Crónica de Don Pero Niño, Conde de Buelna, Por Su Alférez, Gutierre Díez de Games, which is a contemporary record of the life and deeds of a Castilian nobleman, was compiled and reproduced in Spain in 1940 by Juan de Mata Carriazo.26 There are several extracts within it that are directly relevant to the case of Owain Glyn Dŵr. Although a compilation of El Victorial was translated into English prior to Carriazo’s publication, it missed all but one reference to Wales.27 To my knowledge, apart from the Evans entry below, this work has never been translated into English anywhere, nor has it been reproduced anywhere in any secondary source consulted.28 The relevant entries and attendant difficulties have been included here:

Capítulo LXI

E Bruto pasó en Yrlanda, e en Frisia, e en Escotelanda. E avn heran pobladas, fizo grandes villas e fortalezas, e puso en ellas reyes que fizo él de grandes hombres de su naçon. E dióles leyes por donde se governasen, e tornó en Anglia. E él e Dorotea fuéronse al grand puerto, donde estaua el estor, e fizo allí vna muy grand çivdad que agora llaman Longis, e ennobleçiola mucho. E fizo en los reynos duques, prínçipes condes de las provinçias. E el cabuallero de vos dixe que veniera con él de Galizia, fízolo príncipe de vna grand provincia, e pússole nombre de las Galías, e que agora llaman Galció; e es la que agora llaman Gales, en Anglia.29

Chapter 61

And Brutus crossed to Ireland, and Frisia, and Scotland. And even though30 they were populated, he made large towns and fortresses, and he put in them kings and he made them great men of their nations. And he gave them laws with which they governed themselves, and he returned to England. And he and Dorotea took themselves to the large port where the fleet was, and there made a very large town that they now call Longis,31 and he honoured it

26 Carriazo, El Victorial.
27 Evans, The Unconquered Knight.
28 I acknowledge Valerie Brown and Edgar Miranda who gave helpful advice on the original text of chapter 74, below.
29 Carriazo, El Victorial, 176. Also, this is an early example of the use of ‘England’ to refer to the British Isles.
30 I have translated ‘avn’ (‘even’ or ‘yet’) as ‘aunque’ (even though).
31 This could either mean London or be a confusion with ‘Logres’, Brutus’ eldest son, according to the myth, as well as being the British—Celtic word for ‘England’, ‘Lloegr’ in modern Welsh. The Brutus myth was in common circulation during this period. Henry IV used it to justify his claim to homage from the Scots in 1400, see
And he made in the kingdoms dukes, princes and earls of the provinces. And the knight that you say that came with him from Galicia, he made him prince of a great province, and he gave it the name of the Gauls and that they now call Galicia, and this is the one they now call Wales, in England.  

**Capítulo LXXIII**

Allí supo el capitán cómo el rey de Yngalaterra avía juntado grand hueste, e avía llevado mucha gente de aquella tierra, e hera ydo contra Jván, prínçipe de Gales, que estaua alzado contra él.

Evans included this portion of *El Victorial*, in her translation, which falls at the very end of the chapter. This is the only mention of Owain and the Welsh revolt to be found in the English version. The two English renditions presented here are Evans’ firstly, followed by my independent translation.

**Chapter 73**

The captain there learnt that the King of England had brought together a great army, and had taken many folk from that part to march against Owen, Prince of Wales, who had rebelled against him.

There the captain learned how the king of England had assembled a great host, and had taken many people from that land and had gone against Owain, Prince of Wales, who had risen against him.

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32 There is an issue with the word 'ennobleciola'; a strict translation would render it as 'ennobled', which means little in this case, so I have used 'honoured'.

33 The relevance of repeating the Brutus myth in a Spanish chronicle seems unclear, however, it seems reasonable to suggest that this passage not only establishes the noble ancestry of the British, it quite clearly forms a connection between the British, i.e. Welsh, of that period with the Spanish in Galicia. Noble lineage and ancient connections were often used to confirm a precedent and give good grounds to legitimise Spanish, in this case Castilian, involvement in wars in Wales against England.

34 Carriazo, *El Victorial*, 211.

35 Evans, *The Unconquered Knight*, 128. I readily concede Evans’ superior Spanish and translation accomplishments. However, I have attempted to remain more faithful to the original text in an effort to better recreate the style and sentiment of Games’ work without necessarily rewriting it in modern English.
Capítulo LXXIV

Cómo Jván, prínçipe de Gales, estaua alzado e non quiso ouedeçer al conde Arvi, que los yngleses fiçieron rey.\textsuperscript{36}

Segúnd que suso vos he contado que los yngleses despusieron al rey Richarte de Angliaterra, Jván, prínçipe de Gales, hera su pariente vien çercano. Este non quiso ovedeçer por rey al conde Arvi como los otros del reyno; ante, con el gran pesar que ovo de su mal, hazía grand guerra al rey e a Londres, donde él hera comarcano.

Gales es vna tierra apartada\textsuperscript{37}, al cavo del reyno, ver al Norte. Es muy fuerte tierra, e montañosa; es bien poblada e de buenas fortalezas. Están a las entradas unos puertos que llaman las Marcas\textsuperscript{38}; non ay otra entrada si non aquélla. El prínçipe vió que tenía luenga guerra con el rey: derrocó todas las fortalezas de su tierra, e non dexó sinó cinco castillos, que están en lo mas fuerte de la tierra, unos cerca de otros, e fizo yr todos morar la gente de su tierra al derredor de aquellos castillos.

Diçen que es vna tierra muy sana e frutífera, e fermosa gente. E tenía allí consigo muchos cavalleros de los del rey Richarte, e otras muchas gentes, e pelean todos a cavallo. E traya cada vno su bozina ; e tan vsado lo an, que quando les faze menester, tan bien se entienden vnos a otras en la tocar, como por voz de hombre o palabra. E quando el rey venía a su tierra, daxávalle entrar las Marcas, e poníase en otros lugares donde non le podía empreçer, e defendíale otros pasos. E quando se derramavan por su tierra, aquella hera su ganancia; que el prínçipe e los suyos heran tan guerreros, que de noche prendían e matauan muchas de las gentes del rey. E después, quando el rey se volvía para se yr, el duque ývale todavía a las espaldas, faciendoles gran daño. Si el rey se arredraua de Londres, saltá él pasava las Marcas al llano, e rovava la tierra: e volvíase, e pasava las Marcas. E ya el rey auía ydo tres o quatro vezes al pays de Gales.

\textsuperscript{36} Carriazo, El Victorial, 211-2. Literally ‘non quiso ouedeçer’ could translate as ‘did not want to obey the earl of Derby as king’, but this feels weak and clumsy. Therefore, in this case, ‘refused to recognise’ seems more appropriate.

\textsuperscript{37} I acknowledge that this can be taken as ‘faraway’ as well as ‘separate’; however, after deliberation and viewed in context, the former seems more appropriate.

\textsuperscript{38} This appears to be problematic; there is no port called ‘las Marcas’, or anything even resembling it in any language. It seems reasonable to assume that Games was referring to the overland point of entry into Wales, ‘the Marches’. In this instance, ‘puertos’ therefore must mean something similar to ‘(mountain) passes’ or ‘valley entrances’. Even a brief survey of a modern map of the Pyrenees reveals the word ‘puerto’ and ‘porto’ in use in the mountains where there is no coastal connection. For example, Puerto Otxondo, Puerto Ibañeta, and cognates Portillo Eraice, Port de Lers, Port d’Envalira and Port de Puymorens were simply found consulting this page, and no doubt others exist: http://www.veloloco.com/map/pyreneen-cols.php [Accessed 25 / 08 / 2012].
El rey envióle sus enbajadores, diciendo que mantenía grand loqura, e que no le podría durar; e que se dexase de aquella opinión, e que le faría muchas merçedes. E respondióle, que fiçiese como mejor pudiese, que de tres nobles que se labrasen en Londres, que suyo hera el vno. Enviábale siempre ayuda el rey de Franzia de ballesteros, e armas, e vino que lo non ay en Yngalaterra.

E si el capitán de las naoes de castilla vieniera a Yngalaterra en conserva\textsuperscript{39} de Pero Niño, segúnd aquella costa estaua menguada de gente aquella sazón, ellos ganaran lugares, e fizieran muchos rescates, e otras muchas buenas cosas; e vinieran de allá honrrados, e asaz cavdalosos. E por el capitán Pero Niño non aver más gentes de su naçión, le es e deve ser mas loado e mejor contado quantas buenas cosas él fizo; ca él non auia más de tres galeras e dos valleneres que le aconpañauan. E si él llevara veynte galeras, como los otros llevaran ante e después, es de creer que fiçiera maravillosas cosas.

\textsuperscript{39} This could mean ‘sail in the convoy or fleet of’ (‘navegar en la conserva de’) or come from ‘conservar’ to imply support, keep, preserve or retain, so it could be ‘in support of Pero Niño’. In the absence of expert opinion I currently lean towards my translation above.
Chapter 74

How Owain, prince of Wales, rose and refused to recognise the earl of Derby, who the English had made king.

As I have recounted above, that the English had deposed King Richard of England, Owain, Prince of Wales, was his close relative.\textsuperscript{40} He refused to recognise the earl of Derby as king like the rest of the kingdom; before, although it grieved him, he declared a great war against the king and London, where he was residing.

Wales is a faraway land, on the fringe of the kingdom, to the north. It is a very strong land, and mountainous, it is well-populated and has good fortresses. There are at the borders some passes they call the Marches; there is no other way to enter than that. The prince saw that there would be a long war with the king: he threw down all of the fortresses of his land, and left only five castles, that are in the strongest part of the land, near each other, and he made all of the people of his land live around those castles.

They say it is a very healthy and fertile land, of beautiful people. And he had there many of King Richard’s knights, and many other people, and they all fought on horseback.\textsuperscript{41} And each one had his horn; and so they used that, when it became necessary, they understood one another so well upon using it, it was like a man’s voice or word. And when the king came to his land, he allowed him to enter the Marches, and he put himself in other places where he could not be found, and he defended other passes. And when they overran his land, that was his advantage; that the prince and his men were such warriors, that at night they captured and killed many of the king’s people. And afterwards, when the king turned to leave, the duke\textsuperscript{42} still went at him with swords, causing him great harm. If the king retreated to London, he would leave and pass the Marches to the plain, and robbed the land: and returned, and passed the Marches. And the king had already gone to the country of Wales three or four times.

The king sent his ambassadors, saying that it was great madness, and that it could not last; and that he desist from that opinion, and that he would grant him mercy. And he responded, that he would do the best he could, that of three noblemen that would be

\textsuperscript{40} This is incorrect, Owain and Richard were not related. However, this borrows from a contemporary idea that the Welsh rose in support of Richard. For further contemporary evidence on this notion, see Jean Creton’s metrical account of the deposition in J. Webb, ‘A Translation of a French Metrical History of the deposition of King Richard the Second by Jehan Creton’, 1-433; Given-Wilson, Chronicles of the Revolution, 137-52.

\textsuperscript{41} The probable implication here is that the Welsh are all knights, or horsemen at least, therefore chivalrous and worthy of assistance. Connecting events to Richard might also serve to render actions against Henry legitimate in the eyes of the French and Spanish.

\textsuperscript{42} This should read ‘prince’ since no duke is mentioned and contextually it can only refer to Owain.
appointed in London, one of them would be his. The king of France always sent him help in
the form of crossbowmen, weapons, and wine of which there is none in England.43

And if the captain of the Castilian ships had come to England in the fleet of Pero Niño,
because that coast had very few people at that time, they would have captured places, and
made many rescues, and many other good things; and come back from those places with
honour, and also with much booty. And because captain Pero Niño did not have more of his
countrymen, he should be lauded even more and all the good things he did be more widely
recounted; since there were no more than three galleys and two ballingers in his company.
And if he took twenty galleys, as others had taken before and since, it can be believed that he
would have done remarkable things.44

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43 At first glance this appears unclear. However, this must refer to the French-supported Tripartite Indenture
between Owain, Edmund Mortimer and Henry Percy senior, which sought to remove Henry and divide England
and Wales into three parts; northern and southern England and an enlarged Wales. Whoever took the throne
would be Owain’s ally. It is well-known that Charles VI sent Owain an army which included Jean de Hangest,
Grand Master of Crossbows, and his troops, as well as wine on at least one occasion, see Lloyd, OG, 78, 93-5,
102 and Davies, Revolt, 166-9, 193. Games’ account tallies with the known facts, probably due to Games’ and
Pero Niño’s involvement in the aborted 1404 mission for which the French requested Spanish shipping and
brought Pero Niño’s ships to the English coast.

44 Pero Niño’s compatriot and adversary, Martin Ruiz, was given twenty galleys for this mission in 1404. He
combined forces with James, duke of Bourbon and accomplished very little, despite the size and power of the
French-Spanish fleet. In 1405 the French sent an army on campaign with Owain, most probably to enact the
Tripartite Indenture, which could explain ‘before and since’ reference in the text. See Davies, Revolt, 115-21,
193-5 and Evans, The Unconquered Knight, 100-1, 105, 131.
Most excellent, most mighty, and most dread liege Lord,

I commend myself to your royal Majesty as far as I know how or dare, thanking you as humbly, and as far as I am capable, for your honourable letters, to me now recently sent by your said Majesty; by the news contained in which all your lieges in these parts and myself are greatly comforted, and your rebels in these Marches surprised, that is to say, as well on account of your honourable and speedy coming towards these said Marches, as for your gracious doing in the parts of the North, as in your said letters appears more fully. The which letters reached me last week, as I was lying ill of the ague at my house in Lathom.

And on the same day, as fortune would have it, one David Whitmore and Yevan ap Meredith, two of the more influential persons in the county of Flint, were come thither to talk to me concerning their governance, their estate, and the news from Wales, that is to say, how the said county is still in good peace, looking for and awaiting always the gracious succour, comfort, and arrival at the said Marches of you, most dread Lord; and willing to be at all times your humble and faithful lieges and subjects, as soon as they shall be able to be succoured and safely guarded from the malice of your other Welsh rebels in those parts surrounding them, by the same gracious and speedy arrival in the Marches above mentioned.

And also they have also told me how that Owen Glyndwr has summoned a Parliament at the present time, being held at Harlech, where there will be four of the more influential persons of each commote throughout all Wales, being in his obedience.

And also, most dread Lord, the said David and Yevan have informed me that, as far as they have been able to learn up to this time, the said Owen, provided that he can be assured at his said Parliament of having a very great force and considerable aid out of France, doth propose to send to you, most mighty Lord, after this his Parliament above mentioned, for a treaty; and the same David and Yevan are gone to the said Parliament for to know therein all the purposes and results thereof, and to meet me again at the County Court to be held on Tuesday next in Chester, to certify me as to all the truth thereon, and the purpose of the said Parliament.

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45 Hingeston, *RHL Henry IV*, vol 2, 76-9
Concerning which most dread Lord, may it please your aforesaid Majesty to send me back your gracious pleasure, by your honourable letters, by the bearer of this; whether I shall send your Highness the purport of the said treaty, if anything of the kind shall reach me, together with the other news of the said Parliament, if it be your pleasure that I should do, as well as touching the said County of Flint, and all your other Marches surrounding it, as for the accomplishment of all your other pleasures in these parts up to this present, together with the comfortable news that has come for you from these parts, so if it be a pleasure to your above-mentioned Highness, until your coming to these said Marches, which He Who is Almighty send speedily, to your own high honour. And may He grant you gracious life and very long to endure in all honours, joy and prosperity; together with the sovereign victory over all your enemies, and gracious accomplishment of all your desires.

Written at the Abbey of Valleroial, the 30th day of July.

Your simple Bachelor, if it please you,

John de Stanley
Appendix D 5.1: Charles VI’s Letter to the English Nation, 1406 (Latin). 46

Quas ob res, incolas omnes Anglie et subditos qualescunque deprecamur, in quantum suum honorem caripendunt, veritatemque sequi volunt et suam fidelitatem demonstrare, quatinus ponentes ante suarum consideracionum oculos as eorum memorie reducentes mortes principum, prelatorumque et aliorum virorum sancte mentis, nec non procerum Anglie tam multorum, crudelitatesque et offensas eorum impensas domino naturali atque regi et juri corone, ut prefertur, manus imponant ad forcia, et illum sepefati Anglie regni magnanimiter expellant invasorem. Nec dedecorantem evidenter ac pervertentem notorie regni Angli successiones hereditarias consuetas a cetero paciantur, aut dissimulent ulterius fideles anteditci, quod tantum ac tale regnum, in quo tot vigent animi et supersunt viri fortes, tante subiciatur tyrannidi et impressione insolle, et que decet pusillanimes, non viriles. Quin pocius faciant et procurent ac alias possetenues, operentur, ut strenui ac fideles, quod corona Anglie anteditcia, quo debet reponatur loco ac veris reddatur heredibus et eis restituatur, ut est justum. Et nos, dummodo de firme stabique proposito nobis constet, offerimus libenti ac volenti animo, quandocunque idem Anglie habitantes volent se in libertatem vindicare, et ad justum verumque dominum redire, nosque debite duxerint requirendum et in auxilium advocare, si efficaciter et potenter juavaturos, ut tememur, quod eis cedet ad gaudium et nos nostrum fecisse debitum magnopere fatebuntur ; indubitantly scientes quod, cum ad Walliam novissime armatum transmisimus, si securi duissemus gentem nostram ab amicis veritatis et heredum Anglie sequacibus recipi debere gratulanter, et cum effectu, ut decebat, cosiari, majorem muito potenciam misissemus, mitterque semper parati sumus, casibus anteditcis.

46 The Latin text (Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 3, 428, 430, also in Williams, Chronicque de la Traïson et Mort, 299-302, as well as N. Grèvy(-Pons), E. Ornato and G. Ouy, Jean de Montreuil, Opera, vol 1, Epistolario, 280-2, the first of which was translated into French (Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 3, 429, 431), from which comes the English translation. The passage break-up into the paragraphs in the English version below is my creation, where as the Latin and the French are reproduced as they appear in the printed sources.
Appendix D 5.2: Charles VI’s Letter to the English Nation, 1406 (French).

A ces causes, nous conjurons tous les habitants et sujets du royaume d’Angleterre, quels qu’ils soient, en tant qu’ils ont quelque souci de leur honneur et qu’ils tiennent à suivre la bonne cause et à faire éclater leur fidélité, de rappeler en leur mémoire et de remettre sous les yeux les morts tragiques de tant de princes, de prélats, d’hommes vertueux et de nobles personnages d’Angleterre, les cruautés commises envers leur seigneur naturel et roi, enfin les atteintes portées, comme il a été dit, aux droits de la couronne ; nous les supplions de s’armer d’une généreuse résolution et de travailler à chasser l’usurpateur dudit trône d’Angleterre. Il est de leur fidélité de ne pas souffrir plus long-temps un tyran qui bouleverse insolemment tous les droits de succession, et de ne point laisser gémir sous le joug d’une honteuse oppression ce beau royaume, si fécond en hommes courageux et intrépides. Un tel abaissement conviendrait à des lâches, et non à des gens de cœur. Ils doivent au contraire faire tous leurs efforts et mettre tout en œuvre, comme de braves et loyaux Anglais, pour rendre ladite couronne à qui de droit et la replacer sur la tête des véritables et légitimes héritiers. Quant à nous, pourvu que nous soyons assuré de leur ferme et immuable résolution, nous offrions volontiers et de bon cœur d’aider les Anglais, quand ils le voudront, à recouvrer leur liberté et à revenir à leur véritable et légitime souverain, de les seconder puissamment et efficacement, comme nous y sommes tenu, dès qu’ils croiront devoir requérir dûment notre assistance et nous appeler à leur secours; nous ferons en sorte qu’ils n’aient qu’à se louer de nous, et qu’ils et qu’ils avouent hautement que nous avons fait notre devoir. Qu’ils sachent que, si naguère, en envoyant une armée dans le pays de Galles, nous avions eu la certitude que les partisans de la bonne cause et les amis des légitimes héritiers du trône accueilleraient nos gens avec faveur et s’empresseraient de se joindre à eux, nous aurions disposé de forces beaucoup plus considérables ; mais nous sommes toujours prêts à les assister dans les cas susdits.
Appendix D 5.3: Charles VI’s Letter to the English Nation, 1406 (English).

To these causes, we entreat all the inhabitants and subjects of the kingdom of England, whoever they might be, as they have some concern about their honour and that they aim to follow the just cause and let their loyalty shine forth, to recall to their memory and to put before their eyes the tragic deaths of so many princes, prelates, virtuous men and noble people of England, the cruelties committed towards their natural lord and king, in short, the attacks carried out, as has been said, against the rights of the crown.

We beseech them to arm themselves with strong resolve and to strive to drive out the usurper of the said throne of England. It is upon their loyalty to no longer suffer a tyrant who brazenly upturns the rights of succession, and not to leave groaning beneath the yoke of this shameful oppression, this beautiful kingdom, so bountiful in courageous and intrepid men. Such an abasement would suit cowards, but not men of stout heart. On the contrary, they must make every effort and do all in their power as brave and loyal Englishmen, to give the said crown to whom it belongs and place it on the head of the true and legitimate heirs. As for us, provided that we are assured of their firm and unstinting resolution, we voluntarily and in good heart offer to help the English, when they desire it, to recover their freedom and to return to their true and rightful king, to powerfully and effectively support them, as we are bound. As soon as they believe it necessary to ask duly for our help and call us to their aid, we will act in such a way that they shall have nothing but praise for us, and they will openly acknowledge that we have done our duty.

They should know that, if recently, when we sent an army to Wales, we had been sure that the partisans of the just cause and the friends of the legitimate heirs to the throne would welcome our people favourably and would hasten to join them, we would have had at our disposal far greater forces, but we are still ready to help them in the aforementioned cases.

47 I am grateful to Stephen David, Université Paris XIII, for his thoughts on this text.
Appendix D 6: Genealogical Tables of the French Royal Princes.

Valois:

![Genealogical Table of the French Royal Princes: Valois]

Burgundy:

![Genealogical Table of the French Royal Princes: Burgundy]

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LA MAISON D'ANJOU

Jean II le Bon, roi de France 1364

Louis Ier, duc d'Anjou 1356
 ép. : Marie de Blois 1404

Louis II, duc d'Anjou 1417
 ép. : Yolande d'Anjou 1441

Charles d'Anjou, prince de Tarascon 1404

Louis III, duc d'Anjou 1434
 ép. : Marguerite de Savoie 1489

René Ier, duc d'Anjou, de Lorrain et de Bar, roi de Sicile 1480
 ép. : Isabelle de Loraine 1453

Charles, comte du Maine, 1472

Marie d'Anjou 1442
 ép. : Charles VII, roi de France 1461

LA MAISON DE BOURBON

Louis XIV, roi de France 1726

Robert, comte de Clermont 1291

Louis Ier, duc de Bourbon 1334

Pierre Ier, duc de Bourbon 1336

Louis II, duc de Bourbon 1354
 ép. : Anne d'Auvergne 1417

Jeanne de Bourbon 1385
 ép. : Charles V, roi de France 1399

Jean II, comte de Clermont, pât de duc de Bourbon 1454
 ép. : Marie de Berry 1424

Charles Ier, duc de Bourbon 1454
 ép. : Nicolas de Bourgogne 1474

Louis, comte de Fleurbaix 1466
Appendix D 6.1: French Expansion Activities, 1382-1396.

A survey of French activities beyond their borders during this period reveals the wide extent of their territorial ambitions, which encompassed Flanders, Italy, Scotland among others which brought the French into conflict with temporal as well as spiritual powers. Flanders was ambiguously connected to both France and England through trade and marriage. Flemish ambassadors had recognised Richard as their overlord, evidently with their economic and physical security in mind, then France occupied it under the pretext of suppressing a rebellion there in 1382.49 The Roman pope Urban VI’s papal bull of 1383 legitimised the bishop of Norwich’s vain Flanders crusade against the Clementists. Perhaps in riposte, the Avignon pope, Clement VII, proclaimed Duke Louis of Anjou king of Naples and, in a counterstroke relevant to Glyn Dŵr’s later Pennal Declaration, Urban VI declared the new French king in Italy a schismatic and a heretic and proclaimed a crusade against him in January 1384.50 These actions should be viewed as an articulation of the regional struggle between France and England, expressed through the pretext of papal legitimacy.

Simultaneously, and for the rest of the 1380s, France pressed its interests in Naples through Louis of Anjou, and then his namesake son, which resulted in open warfare with Charles of Durazzo, Ladislas his son, and Urban VI’s forces and allies. The central and southern Italian states were consumed with this conflict for the rest of the decade and for some time into the next, although ultimately French ambitions in the south were thwarted.51 It is also significant that while this struggle was ongoing, the French were also able to invest a sizeable expeditionary force into Scotland during 1384-5, as well as assembling a vast fleet in preparation to invade England the following year.52 Despite the Crown’s other

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51 Creighton, History of the Papacy, vol. 1, 77-105, 111, 133-6, 160-5, 173-5; Chamberlin, Count of Virtue, 70-1; Vaughan, Philip the Bold, 40, 45-6, 55; Barraclough, The Medieval Papacy, 166; Renouard, trans., Bethell, The Avignon Papacy, 72-3; Ainsworth and Diller, Chroniques, 838-42, 985-6, 993-4, 999; Preest, Chronica Maiora, 183.
preoccupations, such as the schism and rule by noble council during the king’s minority and later due to his illness, the dukes were still able to implement an expansive foreign policy. However, it is worth considering that these two major distractions and the subsequent devolution of power constituted a series of events that permitted the ducal factions to sponsor such expeditions in an effort to extend overseas their, and their king’s, power.

Although the French had a historic involvement in southern Italy, Scotland and Castile, a post-schism policy with ambitions in northern Italy is identifiable and its impetus to some extent can be attributed to Louis, duke of Orleans. He has been clearly identified as a proponent of the via facti, seeking a forceful, military solution to the schism and appears to be the driving force behind France’s entente with Glyn Dŵr; the diplomatic and military contacts took place while his party was ascendant in government. Louis’s Italian ambitions stemmed from the ongoing French interests in Sicily, Naples and Provence. These had been further advanced by his marriage to Valentina, daughter of Giangaleazzo Visconti, the powerful duke of Milan. The French drive to gain territories in Italy has also been identified as an extension of the factional struggle between Orleans and Burgundy, although this should be considered alongside the better-established claims in the peninsula of the house of Anjou. The see-sawing of France’s Italian policy, if it can justifiably be identified as such a consistent enterprise, demonstrates the rapidity with which power changed hands in Paris and the uncertainty that this struggle created. The duke of Milan courted French support and involvement in the region in 1392; this resulted in Genoa being designated to the duke’s son-in-law, Louis of Orleans, in November 1394. Louis also made an alliance with neighbouring Montferrat that year. Giangaleazzo, too, appeared content to see his son-in-law settle in Genoa or possibly carve out another kingdom for himself within northern Italy. It has been described as a disappointment to Milan when Louis sold his rights to the territory early the following year. Genoa was then held by the French government, over which the queen was

53 Creighton, History of the Papacy, vol. 1, 74-85, 161-2; Chamberlin, Count of Virtue, 150, 177; Vaughan, Philip the Bold, 55-6; Morrall, Gerson and the Great Schism, 7; Barraclough, The Medieval Papacy, 164-6, 173-5; Renouard, trans., Bethell, The Avignon Papacy, 72-5; Crowder, Unity, Heresy and Reform, 3, 6-8, 10, 31; Donaldson, Auld Alliance, 4-5, 24; Laidlaw, The Auld Alliance (the entire work); Macdougall, An Antidote to the English, 18-20; Villalon, and Kagay, The Hundred Years’ War: A Wider Focus, 3-175; Villalon, and Kagay, eds., The Hundred Years War (Part II): Different Vistas, 153-210.

54 Creighton, History of the Papacy, vol. 1, 172-3; Mirot, La Politique Francaise en Italie de 1380 à 1422, 35, 42; Bueno de Mesquita, Giangaleazzo Visconti, 12, 63, 66-7, 125, 155-8; Chamberlin, Count of Virtue, 89-93, 109-13; Vaughan, Philip the Bold, 43-4, 55-6; Morrall, Gerson and the Great Schism, 6-7, 10; Renouard, trans., Bethell, The Avignon Papacy, 72-5.

55 Jarry, La Vie Politique de Louis de France, 107-14; Mirot, La Politique Francaise en Italie de 1380 à 1422, 5-41; Darwin, Louis d’Orléans, 18-40; Bueno de Mesquita, Giangaleazzo Visconti, 267.
beginning to exert an increasing influence. Louis had no option but to obey the king’s command to sell. As the queen and Burgundy exercised their power over the direction of the government, a French alliance was formed with Milan’s enemies and a number of indecisive conflicts broke out with Florence, Mantua and other states nominally supported by the French from 1395 onwards. Burgundy was frequently politically connected to Isabeau of Bavaria, Charles VI’s queen, whose family bore an enmity towards Valentina’s branch of the Visconti. The queen therefore had contrasting transalpine interests to Louis of Orleans, despite the rumours or truth of amorous liaisons between them. Before the end of 1396, the queen had Valentina banished on false charges and continued to assist Florence against its enemy, Milan. Nevertheless, in the aftermath of Nicopolis, the French sought Giangaleazzo’s aid in securing the return of the French hostages held by the Turks. In the remaining years of the century, a vista of squabbling at the French court can be presented; with the anti-Milanese schemes of Burgundy and the queen being thwarted by Louis and his allies. Nevertheless, the appointment of Marshal Boucicaut as governor of Genoa in 1401 can be viewed as a coup for Burgundy over Orleans, since the marshal’s allegiance was firmly tied to Jean sans Peur, who as count of Nevers, had saved him from execution after Nicopolis. This act demonstrates that Philip, duke of Burgundy, headed the French government at that time. The peace with England described above in chapter 5, and acquisition of Genoa demonstrated the success of the court’s diplomatic talents. Due to the fact that Genoa was drawn into the orbit of French power without threat or war, it might also be possible to identify this as another use of Nye’s ‘soft power’ by medieval France, similarly to Louis VII’s relationship with the French nobles and Henry II, discussed in chapter two.

56 Darwin, Louis d’Orléans, 23-4; Bueno de Mesquita, Giangaleazzo Visconti, 155-8, 203-4, 324; Chamberlin, Count of Virtue, 152-5.
57 d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 32-43; Darwin, Louis d’Orléans, 19-24; Bueno de Mesquita, Giangaleazzo Visconti, 206-23, 322-5; Chamberlin, Count of Virtue, 180-8.
58 d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 12, 19-21, 28; Bueno de Mesquita, Giangaleazzo Visconti, 203, 267; Chamberlin, Count of Virtue, 175-9; Vaughan, Philip the Bold, 44, 55-6, 109; Morrall, Gerson and the Great Schism, 6-11; Vaughan, John the Fearless, 30-1.
59 Bueno de Mesquita, Giangaleazzo Visconti, 212.
60 Mirot, La Politique Française en Italie de 1380 à 1422, 23-41; d’Avout, La Querelle des Armagnacs et des Bourguignons, 23-4, 30-1; Bueno de Mesquita, Giangaleazzo Visconti, 215, 267.
Doubtless, pragmatic security considerations underpinned Genoa’s decision; nevertheless France was their prime choice over any other regional or continental power, spiritual or temporal. Although the Marmouset-controlled government sponsored a crusade to North Africa under the Bourbons in 1390, by the middle of the decade another such mission was raised by the French, but driven by the house of Burgundy. In 1396, it demonstrated its power and religious zeal by raising, sponsoring and, with the blessing of the Roman pope, sending the crusade that ended in disaster at Nicopolis in 1396. At that point no other noble faction could execute such a bold initiative. It is little wonder therefore that Duke Philip dominated the government and the solutions favoured by those clerics he patronised, such as Jean Gerson, came to prominence during these years.

The Fading of Scotland’s star: At the same moment, it is worth considering the plight of contemporary Scotland. Within this period of foreign exertion, the French-Scots alliance stalled in 1385 following the disastrous expedition led by Jean de Vienne. By 1400, it had not fully recovered to being an operational military alliance in the manner it had been prior to de Vienne’s mission. In an attempt to rectify this, French troops campaigned with the Scots at sea in 1401-2, and on land in 1402. In September 1402 the Scots were crushed by the English at the battle of Homildon Hill, where notable numbers of Scottish nobles and some French knights were captured or killed. Louis of Orleans has been connected to this initiative in Scotland. The enormity of this English victory, masterminded and prosecuted by the Percys, effectively removed the Scots as land-fighting force of any external military worth for approximately a decade. King Robert III was declining physically and his rule was weak. Also, he appears to have been pursuing peace with England in this period. A definitive end to any prospect of Scots

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63 le Roux, La France en Orient au XIV° Siècle, 166-200; Knecht, The Valois, 46.
64 Vaughan, Philip the Bold, 59-78; Morrall, Gerson and the Great Schism, 10; Vaughan, John the Fearless, 4, 120; Renouard, trans., Bethell, The Avignon Papacy, 77-8; Vaughan, Valois Burgundy, 78, 157-9; Lalande, Jean II le Meingre, 57-9; J. Magee, ‘Le temps de la croisade bouguignonne: l’expedition de Nicopolis’ in Paviot and Chauney-Bouillot, Nicopolis, 1396-1996, 49-58.
66 Riley, Ypodigma Neustriæ, 341; Alastair Macdonald, ‘Crossing the Border’, 85-9; Joliffe, Fraissart’s Chronicles, 263-77.
involvement with this Franco-Welsh alliance came with the capture at sea of Robert III’s heir, James, in 1406. He remained a captive of the English crown until 1424. Although considerably weakened by the Homildon defeat and loss of men of the calibre of those captured there, the Scots were still able to mount occasional harassing attacks around the border area, as well as establishing a visible presence on the sea, and conducting some more ambitious ground operations under the direction of certain nobles. However, due to Scotland’s weakness, it appears that any hope of forming an axis of power involving France, Wales and Scotland was not possible at the moment of the inception of the French-Welsh alliance.

69 Fœdera, vol 8, 368-9, 371-2; Riley, Ypodigma Neustriae, 413; Bean, ‘Henry IV and The Percies’, 212-27; Macdonald, ‘Crossing the Border’, 149-55; Barrell, Medieval Scotland, 150-3; Preest, Chronica Maiora, 323-4, 341.
70 POPCE, vol 1, 153; RHL Henry IV, vol 2, 61-3; W. Rees, ed., Calendar of Ancient Petitions relating to Wales (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1975), 457; Macdonald, ‘Crossing the Border’, 119-64.
Appendix D 6.2: Possible Composition of Owain Glyn Dŵr’s Court in 1404.

A further point on the Welsh group is that no effort has been made to determine who might have comprised Owain’s council. Since there is proof that Owain’s policy over decisions concerning relations with France and England were debated in parliaments convened by Owain, it seems likely that, in keeping with his contemporaries, he also maintained a council.71 Such a council need not contain a large number of advisors; studies of contemporary Burgundy provide a significant perspective on the size and functions of such an organisation. During the period in question Burgundy rose to become a power that figured among some of the most important events of the fifteenth century. It has been characterised as powerful beyond its size and having a well-structured government.72 Although the duchy of Burgundy was far wealthier than Wales and was composed of a number of different administrative bodies, the number of members sitting at the ducal council and parliaments summoned can be shown to be relatively compact. The duke’s ‘grand conseil’ was made up of just ten members in 1426. The council of Charles the Bold in 1469, when Burgundy was approaching its zenith in terms of its wealth, size and power, only contained a bishop as chancellor, another suitable to stand in his absence, four leading knights, eight ‘maîtres des requêtes’ and fifteen secretaries and other aides; effectively the duke, fourteen council members and administrative staff. The ‘maîtres des requêtes’ were legal specialists empowered to deputise for the chancellor, determine the ruler’s rights and powers on issues, as well as to clarify and execute legal matters. Such highly skilled administrators were essential to the legal and governmental machinery of any medieval parliament. Charles’s 1473 parliament at Malines, founded on the French parliamentary model, was attended by a total of forty-five people, among whom were two presidents, four knights of the grand council, six ‘maîtres des requêtes’ and twenty other councillors.73 There was no connection between Glyn Dŵr and Burgundy, and little possibility of either directly influencing the other. Small states did not require the relatively heavily-populated parliaments of England or France, for example, and the ambition of Glyn Dŵr’s diplomatic efforts strongly implies the existence of such a government council, and Owain even wrote of such an institution’s existence.74 Yonge and Hanmer, as chancellor and blood-relation, can be safely included as

71 Ellis, Original Letters, 43; Hingeston, RHL Henry IV, vol 2, 76-9; Lloyd, OG, 101; Davies, Revolt, 164, 220.
72 Vaughan, Valois Burgundy, 3-13, 48-161, particularly 95-122.
74 Ellis, Original Letters, 43; Hingeston, RHL Henry IV, vol 2, 76-9, Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 52 (Latin), 96 (English); Lloyd, OG, 101, 119; Davies, Revolt, 163-4, 220.
part of Owain’s equivalent to Burgundy’s grand council, although the other members could only be tentatively suggested. That will only be attempted in part here, but this appears to show that Glyn Dŵr was conducting his affairs in the appropriate manner for his time and in keeping with other contemporary leaders. Other known ecclesiastical adherents to Owain’s cause were two bishops, John Trefor and Lewis Byford, also Hywel Kyffin, dean of St Asaph, Hugh Eddouyer of the Order of Predicants, as well as his court bard or ‘prophet’, Crach Ffinant. The identities of the lower orders of administrative staff remain elusive, although the names of the clerk, Benedict Comme, and Glyn Dŵr’s secretary, Owain ap Gruffydd ap Rhisiart are known. There are also several prominent candidates to stand as military representatives within Glyn Dŵr’s council. Rhys ap Tudor, Henry Don, Rhys Gethin, Hywel Coetmor and Rhys ap Gruffudd were the most obvious soldiers to consistently figure throughout the revolt. Since this was an age where promotion of blood connections and nepotism were the normal order, it seems likely that Owain’s sons Gruffudd and Maredudd, his brother Tudor, as well as members of the Hanmer and the Pulesdon families also had roles, not forgetting Edmund Mortimer, acting earl of March. However, as the evidence provided by David Whitmore’s deception showed, an unknown number of local leaders from across Wales also attended Owain’s parliaments rendering impossible a complete assessment of those responsible for governance in Wales under Glyn Dŵr. Nevertheless, this provides a fuller picture than has been presented previously.


\[76\] POPCE, vol 1, 304; Lloyd, OG, 98.


\[78\] Matthews, Welsh Records in Paris, 110; Lloyd, OG, 23-7, 31, 34-5, 53, 58-9, 92, 137, 140, 143 n. 5; Davies, Revolt, 137-43, 146-7, 174-96, 244, 293, 326.

\[79\] Ellis, Original Letters, 43; Hingeston, RHL Henry IV, vol 2, 76-9; Lloyd, OG, 101; Davies, Revolt, 164, 220. See letter in Appendix D 4.
De hiis que marescalos de Ryeux in Wallia gessit.

Ut quod principi Wallie (promiserat) domini duces Francie, in regni regimine principales, de subsidio mittendo adimperent, et ut quodam notabili facto comitis Marchie, quem antea miserant, ignominia tegetetur, inclitos milites dominum marescallum de Rieux, dominum de Hugevilla, magistrum ballistariorum Francie, et dominum Strabonem de Laheuse capitanos elegerunt pugnatorum mittendorum. Ex Britania igitur et Normania, mandatis obtemperantes, cum sexcentis balistariis, mille ducentis servientibus levis armature, octingentos electos pugiles collegerunt, qui cum classe duarum magnarum et rostratarum navium ac tringinta mediocrium in Walliam transmearent. Et hii omnes, circa finem jullii navigium ascendentes, cum per mensem mare placidum ex aspero factum expectassent, tandem portum de Willeforde, situm in comitatu de Pennebroc, attingentes, mox decem mille Wallenses missos a principe repererunt, quorum ope libere principatum intrarent, et si impedimentum occurrerent, eos potenter juvarent.

Et tunc Gallici cum ipsis Walensibus campestrem patriam ceperunt destruere, et flamma voraci consumere, recte tendentes ad villam de Heleford, que Castro munitissimo subjacebat, unde protinus exierunt cum multis sagittariis fere trecenti homines ad unguem omnes loricati et ad resistendum prompti; cum quibus initio prelio, mox victi sunt, et ex eis sexdecim captis et quadraginta interfecit, ceteros fugere compulerunt. Inde ad villam tendentes, insultus multos fecerunt; sed ex castris septuaginta interfecit, cum propter fortitudinem loci illum capere nequirent et obsidionalia instrumenta per mare ducere ad loca alia ordinassent, mox obsidionem relinquerunt. In hiis tamen assultibus quamvis perpauci ex Franciis ceziderint, ibi tamen quidam miles famosus, nomine Patroullart de Trya, occubuit, cujus interitum graviter omnes Gallici tulerunt.

Eadem eciam die ad castrum nomine Picot ad custodiam pabulatorum deputati perrexerunt, quod primo assultu ad dedicacionem venire coegerunt. Loco igitur, onusti preda, cedentes, et per adjacentem patriam, nulla incoluntu relicta re, cui ferro aut igni noceri posset, ad villam maritimam et muratum nomine Canneby pervientes, ipsam de communi consilio omnium et assensu obdione cingere et capere viribus decreverunt, per circuitum balistarios et obdionalia instrumenta commode collocantes. Cum autem ad id diligentissime

Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 3, 322, 324, 326, 328.
instarent, nundum primo assultu inchoato, a longe classem triginta navium appropinquare viderunt, armatis viris et victualibus munitam, que ad succurrendum incolis mittebatur.

Quod cum per exploratores veraciter didicissent, subito tants pavor et formido super eos irruit, ac si omnes interitum sentirent imminere, et quia majorem partem navigii hæbabant super arenam, quam et nequibant ad mare impellere, cum non (possent) navigio se salvare, mox evacuates vasis, illa igne combusserunt, ne ad manus hostium devenirent. Moxque adhuc nemine persequente, sic contabuerunt eorum corda pre timoris angustia, et fugere sic inordinate et cum tanta celeritate decreverunt, ut obsidionalia instrumenta et maximam missilium partem cum sarcinis hostibus distrahenda relinquerent, quamvis tunc secum haberent duo mille equestres Walenses.

Post hanc ignominiosam fugam, cum more suo villagia comburendo ad castrum Sancti Clari fortissimum pervenissent, illud obsidione cingere statuerunt. Sed tandem ad dedicionem venire promiserunt, si bona villa propinqua vocata Callemardin ad eorum odedienciam veniret. Ex hac villa populosa, quam et muri fortissimi ambiebant, rex Anglie multa percipiebat commoda, et ex ea sagitarii cum cohortibus armatis sepium erumpentes Walensibus multa dampna inferebant. Quapropter princeps jurejurando firmavit se inde non discessurum, donec viribus caperetur. Ibi in una parte Francigenis et altera Walensibus locatis, cum dies quatuor in obsidione exegissent, Gallici cum fossoriis et celtibus ferreis muros ilico suffoderunt, ut sic plane possent et manutentim pugnare. Ibique multis ex hostibus sauciatis et occisis, secundo reiterato assultu, cum jam Franci murorum altitudinem occupare conarentur, oppidani pro tractu pacifico componendo mutuo consuluerunt. Obtulerunt siquidem ut, salvis armis et quantum quisque posset de mobilibus secum ferre, in urbe manerent salva vita, ut sic juramentum principis completeretur, et sibi atque Gallicis liber daretur ingressus. Quam oblacionem princeps et Walenses, qui nundum pedum murorum attingerent, acceptantes, et Gallicorum laudantes strenuitatem, sicut condictum fuerat, villam princedes cum suis libere est ingressus. Ex tunc villa predalis Walensibus effecta, cum se spoliis uberrimis onerassent, muros per circuitum in parte maxima destruxerunt, in cunctis compitis ville et in suburbiis flammam voracem ponentes. Inde ambo exercitus ad Cardinguan castrum vallidum tendentes, ex eventu vicinorum infausto territi oppidani dedicionem mox acceptaverunt imperatam.

Et tandem Gallici, cum fere per sexaginta leucas per regionem grassati fuissent hostiliter, principi requisierunt ut ab invicem divisi ob sterilitatem patrie loca eis assignarentur ad habitandum opportuna, donec classe conquisita repatriare valerent. In tribus igitur locis usque ad festum omnium Sanctorum remanserunt; et tunc sex parvis navibus
milites et armigeri disposuerunt redire, in Wallia mille ducentos levis armature servientes et quingentos balistaros relinquentes, quemdam armigerum nomine Blesum de Belay Picardum statuentes, cui omnes obedirent, donec navigium ad redeundum transmisissent.

Hoc in dedecus redeuncium versum fuit, cum sic relinquissent qui propter eorum gloriám dimicantes in assultibus fuerant semper primi, eos ex multis periculis sepíus eruientes. Quibus tamen recommendati fuerant nobiles cum eisdem remanserunt fideliter, et necessitatibus eorum benigne succurrerunt, et eos undecunque collectis navibus circa carnisprivium reduxerunt.
Expédition du maréchal de Rieux dans le pays de Galles.

Messeigneurs les ducs de France, qui avaient la direction des affaires, voulant accomplir la promesse de secours faite au prince de Galles, et réparer en même temps par quelque notable fait d’armes le honteux échec du comte de la Marche, qui avaient jadis chargé de cette mission, résolurent d’envoyer dans ce pays des troupes auxiliaires sous la conduite d’illustres chevaliers, du maréchal de Rieux, de messire de Hugueville, grand-maître des arbalétriers de France, et de messire le Borgne de la Heuse. Ces trois capitaines, conformément aux ordres qu’ils avaient reçus, levèrent en Bretagne et en Normandie huit cents hommes d’élite, six cents arbalétriers et douze cents hommes de troupes légères, et se disposèrent à passer dans le pays de Galles avec une flotte composée de deux grands vaisseaux de guerre et de trente petits navires. Ils s’embarquèrent tous vers la fin de juillet. Après avoir attendu pendant un mois un vent favorable, ils arrivèrent enfin au port de Milford, dans le comté de Pembroke. Ils y trouvèrent dix mille Gallois que le prince de Galles avait envoyés pour leur faciliter l’entrée de ses terres et leur prêter appui, s’ils rencontraient quelque obstacle.


Le même jour, ceux qui avaient été détachés pour protéger les fourrageurs poussèrent jusqu’au château de Picot, et le forcèrent à se rendre dès le premier assaut. Les Français partirent de là chargés de butin pour ravager le pays d’alentour, y mirent tout à feu et à sang, et arrivèrent devant un port fortifié, appelé Kenneby. Ayant résolu d’un commun accord d’assiéger et de prendre cette ville, ils placèrent tout à l’entour leurs arbalétriers et dressèrent

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81 Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 3, 323, 325, 327, 329.
82 ‘siége’ in the text.
leurs machines de siège. Ils poussaient leurs préparatifs avec activité, et étaient sur le point de livrer le premier assaut, lorsqu’ils aperçurent de loin une flotte de trente vaisseaux bien approvisionnés et munis de gens de guerre, qui venaient au secours des habitants. Les rapports de leurs éclaireurs ne leur laissant aucun doute sur les intentions de l’ennemi, ils furent tous saisis de frayeur et d’épouvante et se crurent perdus sans ressource. Comme la plupart de leurs vaisseaux se trouvaient sur la grève, et qu’ils ne pouvaient le remettre à flot, ni par conséquent se sauver par mer, ils en retirèrent leurs bagages et y mirent le feu, afin de les soustraire à l’ennemi. Bientôt la terreur s’accrut encore parmi eux, et leur effroi devint tel, que même sans être poursuivis ils s’enfuirent en toute hâte dans le plus grand désordre, et abandonnèrent leurs machines de siège ainsi que la plus grande partie de leur artillerie et de leurs bagages, quoiqu’ils eussent avec eux deux mille cavaliers gallois.

Après cette fuite honteuse, ils arrivèrent, tout en brûlant suivant leur coutume les villages qu’ils rencontraient sur leur route, devant le château fort de Saint-Clair et se disposèrent à l’assiéger. Les habitants promirent de se rendre, si la ville de Caërmarthen, située dans le voisinage, se soumettait à eux. Cette ville, qui était bien peuplée et garnie de bonnes murailles, offrait de grands avantages au roi d’Angleterre. Les archers et les hommes d’armes, qui en formaient la garnison, faisaient de fréquentes sorties et incommodaient fort les Gallois. Aussi le prince de Galles jura-t-il de ne point s’éloigner sans s’être rendu maître de la place. Les Français se postèrent d’un côté, les Gallois de l’autre. Après quatre jours de siège, les Français sapèrent si bien les murs avec des pioches et des hoyaux, qu’ils firent une brèche et purent combattre corps à corps. Les ennemis eurent beaucoup de blessés et de morts au premier assaut. Quand ils virent que les Français se préparaient à en donner un second et à escalader les murs, ils se décidèrent à entrer en pourparler, et offrirent, pour dégager le prince de son serment, de le recevoir lui et les Français et de leur abandonner leurs armes et tout ce que chacun d’eux pourrait emporter du pillage, à condition qu’ils auraient la vie sauve et resteraient dans la ville. Le prince et les Gallois, qui n’avaient pas encore atteint le pied des murs, acceptèrent cette offre, louèrent les Français de leur vaillance, et entrèrent librement dans la ville, ainsi qu’il avait été convenu. Les Gallois la livrèrent aussitôt au pillage ; après s’être gorgés de butin, ils rasèrent la plus grande partie des murs, et mirent le feu dans toutes les rues et les faubourgs. De là les deux armées marchèrent vers un château.
fort nommé Cardigan, dont les habitants, effrayés par le sort de leurs voisins, s’empressèrent de capituler.

Les Français, après avoir couru le pays l’espace de soixante lieues environ, craignant d’avoir à souffrir de la disette à cause de la stérilité, prièrent le prince de Galles de les cantonner dans des lieux différents, jusqu’à ce qu’ils pussent avoir une flotte pour retourner dans leur patrie. On leur assigna trois quartiers séparés, où ils restèrent jusqu’à la fête de la Toussaint. Alors chevaliers et écuyers s’embarquèrent sur six petits vaisseaux, laissant dans le pays de Galles douze cents hommes de troupes légères et cinq cents arbalétriers sous les ordres d’un écuyer picard, nommé le Bègue de Belay, jusqu’à ce qu’ils leur eussent envoyé des vaisseaux pour leur retour.

On blâma fort ceux qui revinrent en France d’avoir ainsi abandonné des gens qui avaient combattu pour leur gloire, qui avaient toujours été les premiers dans les assauts et qui les avaient sauvés de plus d’un danger. Cependant les nobles, sous la conduite desquels ces hommes d’armes avaient été placés, restèrent fidèlement avec eux ; ils pourvurent généreusement à leurs besoins, rassemblèrent des vaisseaux de toutes parts et les ramenèrent en France vers le carême.
The Deeds of Marshal de Rieux in Wales.  

My lords the dukes of France, who were the principal governors of the kingdom, wished to fulfil the promise of aid made to the prince of Wales and, at the same time, to repair the shameful failure of the comte de la Marche, who had previously been commissioned with this operation, by some notable feat of arms. They resolved to send to that country soldiers under the renowned knights, Marshal de Rieux, lord de Hugueville, the Grand-Master of the Crossbows of France, and the lord Borgne de la Heuse. Consequently, following their orders, from Brittany and Normandy, they mustered with six hundred crossbowmen, one thousand two hundred lightly armoured sergeants and eight hundred chosen fighting men, who were to be transported to Wales in two large warships and thirty medium-sized vessels.

And, after a month waiting for the sea to turn calm, they all embarked around the end of July and finally arrived in the port of ‘Willeforde’ (Milford), in the county of ‘Pennebroc’ (Pembroke). There, ten thousand Welshmen sent by the prince carefully emerged, to help the army freely enter the principality, and if any obstacle were met, they could help them.

Then, the French with the Welsh captured and destroyed the fields of the country, and the fire voraciously consumed them, and went straight to the town of ‘Heleford’ (Haverford), from whose heavily fortified castle, immediately sallied many archers closely followed by three hundred men armoured from head to toe, resolved to make a stand and began fighting. Soon, many were vanquished, and they captured sixteen, killed forty and compelled the rest to flee. Thereafter, they reached the town and made many assaults, and indeed seventy of the garrison were killed, but because of the strength of that place they were unable to take it and having ordered their siege engines to be transported by sea to another place, they

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87 My Translation.
88 I have attempted to translate this as faithfully as possible to the Latin original. I note that there appear to be gaps in the original text and a number of shortcomings in Bellaguet’s French translation. Therefore it is inevitably imperfect and I accept that other interpretations are possible. I am grateful to Professor Peter Coss for his thoughts on this text.
89 The original Latin text describes the soldiers as ‘pugnatorum’ – I find no reference or inference to them being ‘troupes auxiliaires’ as translated by Bellaguet.
90 The original says ‘tringinta mediocrium (navium)’ not ‘trente petits navires’. I find the description of the warships being ‘rostratum’ (literally ‘long-beaked birds’) evocative.
91 ‘cum per mensem mare placidum ex aspero factum expectassent’ has not been translated in the French version.
92 I find no mention of Bellaguet’s claim that ‘Les Français eurent l’avantage’ in the Latin.
93 The line ‘insultus multos fecerunt’ should be read as ‘assaults’.

360
abandoned the siege. However, although ever so few of the French fell in these assaults, nevertheless a famous knight called ‘Patrouillart de Tries’ went to his grave, whose loss was solemnly suffered by all of the French.

The same day, the selected scouts hastened to the castle called ‘Picot’ (Picton), which was in the custody of the foragers, who acted together to surrender at the first assault. Consequently from this place, laden with plunder, they withdrew, and through the surrounding countryside, leaving none unhurt by this event, with fire and sword harmed all that they could, and arrived at a walled coastal town called ‘Canneby’ (Tenby), the army, by common agreement assented to besiege, encircle and manfully take it by surrounding it with archers and the assembled siege engines. However, although they industriously pressed, they had not yet started the first assault, when in the distance they saw a fleet of thirty ships approaching, with armed men and well-provisioned, that had been launched to come to the aid of the inhabitants.

When they learned the truth from their scouts, so much fear and terror rushed over them, and death seemed imminent, and because most of the boats they had were on the sand, and they were not able to push them to the sea, having no means of saving themselves in their boats, soon they had evacuated the beaches and consumed the ships with fire, so they did not fall into the enemy’s hands. Next, with no-one as yet in pursuit, they completely lost heart, choked by fear and fled in such confusion and with such speed that they abandoned their siege engines and most of their ammunition, and scattered their baggage, although at that time, they had with them two thousand Welsh horsemen.

After this shameful flight, they burned villages, as was their way, until they reached the very strong castle of ‘Sancti Clari’ (Saint-Clears), where they established a siege. But at last they promised to come to terms if the inhabitants of the good town of ‘Callemardin’ (Carmarthen), nearby, came to their obedience. From this well-populated town, surrounded by a strong wall, the king of England perceived many opportunities and from here archers with armed forces often made sorties causing the Welsh much harm.

Wherefore, the prince firmly swore not to depart from there, until his men had captured it. There, the French positioned themselves in one place and the Welsh in another,

94 This is a difficult passage, the ‘pabulatores’ (foragers) appears to refer to the garrison.
95 ‘sarcinis hostibus distrahenda relinquerent’ – ‘scattered their baggage’ or ‘their packs divided among their enemies’?
after spending four days besieging it, with spades and picks\textsuperscript{96} made of iron they undermined the walls in that place, so that they could fight hand-to-hand in the open. There, many of the enemy were wounded and killed, a second assault was repeated, when the French attempted to take possession of the tops of the walls, the townsfolk requested a mutual peace treaty to be arranged.

There they entreated that, save weapons\textsuperscript{97} and allowing as much as each could carry by himself, that they could remain safely alive in the town, thus releasing the prince of his oath, and that they and the French should have free entry. Then the prince and the Welsh, who had not yet reached the foot of the walls, accepted this offer, and praised the vigour of the French and, as was agreed, the prince and his men freely entered the town. From that town the Welsh brought out plunder, with a bountiful burden of loot, the surrounding walls having been for the most part destroyed, and set fire to every street in the town and the suburbs. Thereafter both armies reached the ramparts of the fort of ‘Cardinguan’ (Cardigan), and due to the inauspicious outcome for their neighbours, the terrified townsfolk swiftly surrendered.

And finally, the French, who had advanced sixty leagues across hostile territory, requested of the prince to divide them on account of the sterility of the surrounding countryside, and to allocate them to suitable places to inhabit, while a fleet was sought to repatriate them. And therefore in three\textsuperscript{98} places they remained until the feast of All Saints, and then the knights and squires arranged to return in six small ships, leaving behind one thousand two hundred lightly armoured sergeants and five hundred archers in Wales, over whom a Picard squire named ‘Blesum de Belay’ was put in charge (lit, was established or elevated), who all obeyed, until ships to return them would be sent.

They returned in dishonour, on account of how they thus abandoned those who had fought for their glory and were always first in the assaults, and who had frequently pulled them out of many dangers.\textsuperscript{99} However, those nobles were praised who faithfully remained with them, kindly helped them and saw to their needs, and gathered ships from wheresoever at their own costs and brought them back around Lent.

\textsuperscript{96} The original text has ‘cum fossorius et celtibus’. The French translation has ‘avec des pioches et des hoyaux’ so ‘picks and hoes’. The original seems to say, literally, ‘diggers’ or ‘spades’ and ‘celtibus’ – chisels? As they sapped the wall, spades and picks seem the most likely implements and loosely fit the Latin.

\textsuperscript{97} ‘salvis armis’ is troublesome, except their weapons (hence ‘save weapons’ in the text)

\textsuperscript{98} ‘tribus’ – is this dative, ie, three, or genitive, ie, divide?

\textsuperscript{99} Also I find no Latin for Bellaguet’s ‘On blâma fort ...’
Appendix D 8: The 1405 Expedition: Fleet, Army and Costs.

This mission inaugurated a new stage in French-Welsh relations; the landing of a royal army in Wales to support a Welsh leader against the king of England. Although French forces had already effected short-lived landings around Kidwelly and Caernarvon in the prelude, this larger mission was discussed and sanctioned at court as well as being legitimised by the previous year’s treaty. Although the deeds of the mission are discussed in Chapter 5, and have been partly analysed elsewhere, no known research considers the composition and costs involved in this expedition. Due to a severe paucity of relevant record evidence, it has proven impossible to produce perfect results in the analysis of possible costs. Nevertheless, the following research should give an impression of the scale of the task and commitment undertaken by the French in mounting this expedition. No detailed analysis of the chronicles describing the expedition appears elsewhere, nor has any thought been given to this French fleet; these two crucial subjects are therefore dealt with here.

The Fleet

There have been significant difficulties in attempting to calculate the composition, speed and size of the 1405 fleet. In the first instance there was no formal, regular navy and no record detailing ships, their size, complement, tonnage or the costs incurred in hiring and equipping ships for specific voyages or paying for the ships’ crews. This appears, from the records consulted, to portray a state of non-standardised even irregular construction, and whimsical record-keeping. Nevertheless, it seems a worthwhile exercise to construct a picture of the fleet using the available evidence, supplementing the lacunae with the more abundant yet still incomplete information on contemporary English fleets. This should help to give a more complete, if still imperfect assessment. Although battles and campaigns between the French and the English could be won by better led, motivated and positioned forces, these victories ebbed and flowed from one side to another with neither side establishing lasting

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100 Lloyd OG, 101-8; Davies, Revolt, 193-5.
dominance. This suggests that England and France were relatively equal in naval strength during the last quarter of the fourteenth, and the first decade of the fifteenth centuries. With that in mind, an assessment of a French-Breton fleet, borrowing information from English records is still credible, worthwhile and realistic.

It should firstly be stated that French records are few and almost entirely inadequate for this task and therefore borrowing similar information from elsewhere has been essential. There is no list stating the final number of ships that formed this fleet, no suggestion of the size, speed or carrying capacity of any French warship of this period, nor any similarly detailed account of a contemporary French fleet from which to glean details to aid calculations for the 1405 mission. While it is possible to establish the cost of constructing a French warship of this period, there appears to be no full account showing contemporary French recruitment costs, nor how many troops the different ship types commonly carried. Undeterred by these ultimately insurmountable problems in gaining absolutely accurate figures for the fleet, evidence from English sources has been useful in progressing this study. Information concerning the details of English shipping is more plentiful and thus can be used to approximate the size and cost of such a fleet had it been English, using English costs and sizes.

Determining the size of ships should give an indication of the number of crew and soldiers they could carry. However, estimating the size of late fourteenth- and early fifteenth-century ships poses a problem. Ships are understood in terms of being a certain number of ‘tons’. Modern ships are measured by the volume of water they displace, but this was not the case in the medieval period. The unit of measurement, ‘ton’, refers to the medieval wine container which held 252 gallons or 554.4 litres. Therefore ships were measured in terms of the burden they were capable of carrying. However, there was no standardisation and thus, no common means of calculating ship burdens. Also, the amount of water, food and other equipment such as weapons, spares or material for repairs carried was not included in the overall tonnage of the vessel although, clearly, room had to be found for such essential items.

In 1405 there were no permanent navies in the modern sense. There were a small number of ‘royal ships’ but in times of military need, merchant ships were ‘impressed’ or forced into crown service, sometimes requiring conversion to be fit for military purpose. This was particularly the case in England, but less often practiced in France.

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102 C. F. Richmond, ‘The War at Sea’ in Fowler, The Hundred Years War, 96-121.
103 Friel, The Good Ship, 116-7 (tonnage count).
fourteenth century, recompense for impressment was made by the English government to the ship’s owners at a rate of 3s 4d per ton, although this rate was reduced to 2s per ton in 1385. Therefore, the authorities estimated the ship’s carrying capacity as low in order to limit the amount paid out by the treasury when forming a navy. In contrast, owners would register their ships as being of high tonnage to make as a large a claim as possible from the government. This disparity between claims renders it impossible to determine the true size and carrying capacity of ships of that period. However, the different tonnages recorded do suggest ship sizes, whether small, medium or large for the time. Therefore, the problems relating to calculating a ship’s burden are the same for any medieval fleet.

In order to be suitable for military purposes, a ship needed to be above a certain size to be effective. While fishing and transport vessels could be small, military vessels needed to be above 50 tons. Records show that between the years 1400–1412, three-quarters of ships in English ports were below 100 tons. This means that relatively few ships were fit for impressment into the English navy, and such a navy would likely be composed of a large number of small ships, since they were the most common variety found in port. The royal flagship, the ‘Dieulagarde’, was 300 tons, there were four other royal ships of 200 tons and a further eleven of between 100 and 180 tons. Since it was uncommon for English ships to be over 200 tons, these ships, the core of the English royal fleet prior to 1375 would have been visibly impressive when measured against other English ships. By 1402, among the largest of the English ships was the ‘Trinity’, which was described as 300 tons. The true picture of the size, weight and carrying capacity for ships of this period is therefore impossible to determine, as is an accurate breakdown of the ship numbers and types which comprised the French-Breton fleet in question. One notable difference between these nations’ naval forces was that instead of impressing their merchant vessels into military service, as was the common custom in England, the French preferred to hire foreign warships to supplement their navies. The English occasionally hired foreign vessels too; notably Dutch ships for


107 Friel, The Good Ship., 34 (the ratio of small tonnage vessels in English ports), 77-8 (Trinity); Sherborne, ‘The Hundred Years’ War: The English Navy’, 166 (English royal fleet).
transport duties, but for the French, the inclusion of foreign warships, whether allies or mercenaries, was commonplace in this period.\footnote{Richmond, ‘The War at Sea’ in Fowler, \textit{The Hundred Years War}, 106; Friel, \textit{The Good Ship}, 149; Runyan, \textit{Ships and Mariners in Later Medieval England}, 9-10 (the French hiring foreign ships and privateering).}

Although there is no scope in this study for minutely detailing the different types of vessel of the period and their capabilities, a brief summary of terms used below might prove helpful. Although there were many types of smaller ships, from fishing boats to ‘pinnaces’ and ‘passagers’ which supported warships, this study focuses on the warships which might have comprised the French-Breton fleet that transported an army to Wales in support of Owain Glyn Dŵr in 1405.

‘Balingers’ appear among the naval forces of both France and England and were common, multi-purpose vessels. As the name suggests, balingers were fishing vessels large enough to use for whaling while also being of a size suitable for cross-channel commerce. Sometimes called ‘barks’, balingers usually came equipped with between forty and fifty oars as well as sails, but were occasionally larger. ‘Barges’ were also vessels which used both sail and oar, but were usually larger than balingers, often having between eighty and a hundred and forty oars. French and Italian oared-warships are usually called ‘galleys’ in contemporary manuscripts. It is these oar and sail warships which formed the backbone of the English navy in this period and they also appear in abundance in French maritime forces. Although the fourteenth century saw the rise to prominence of the sailing ship, particularly in French fleets, balingers and barges were still in large-scale use in the channel.

There were numerous types of large vessel afloat in 1405, such as ‘cogs’ and ‘hulks’. However, the largest type of warship described in the manuscripts which concern this event is the ‘carrack’; a three-masted, high-sided warship commonly weighing several hundred tons. The size varied greatly from ship to ship, but it is commonly acknowledged that until the reign of Henry V, French and Italian carracks dwarfed their English contemporaries, making even the smallest of them upwards of 300 tons.\footnote{N. H. Nicolas, \textit{History of the Royal Navy}, (London: Bentley, 1847), vol 2, 156-257, 441-63 (types of vessel); Sherborne, \textit{The Hundred Years’ War: The English Navy}, 166 – 9; Friel, \textit{The Good Ship}, 112- 4, 147-8.}

The French preference for larger warships at this time is noteworthy.\footnote{Friel, \textit{The Good Ship}, 149; This is also the opinion of Graham Russell Cushway unpublished PhD thesis ‘The Lord of the Sea – The English Navy in the Reign of Edward III’.} It seems reasonable to propose that they would not have developed such large, expensive vessels if it did not serve their military purposes. A tale from this period exemplifies the value of larger vessels over smaller ones. Recounted as a tale of English derring-do from 1416, a skirmish
took place involving a single French carrack and more than six English vessels. On 24 August, 1416, the earl of Warwick, acting captain of Calais, attacked a French carrack with his fleet of six balingers and an unstated number of support vessels called ‘passagers’. Although one balinger was separated from the rest during the night, the rest of Warwick’s force mounted a prolonged attack on the French vessel. The story is recounted in terms of English courage, harrying the enemy and leaving many wounded among the carrack’s crew.\textsuperscript{111} The attack, though led by an experienced soldier commanding a force which outnumbered the French, was unsuccessful in sinking, capturing, stopping or even inflicting notable damage on the carrack, despite repeated assaults. Heroism aside, this failure by at least five English warships to outmanoeuvre and take a larger, slower, seemingly less manoeuvrable, lone French vessel demonstrates that there was solid reasoning behind the French preference for large warships. This notion is further supported by the actions of Henry V who built a strong navy, including four of the largest vessels of the era. They were the 540 ton ‘Trinity Royal’ with five cannons, the 760 ton ‘Holigost’ with seven cannons, the 1000 ton ‘Jesus’, all three recorded in 1416, and the huge, 1400 ton ‘Grace Dieu’ in 1418. An investment of this scale was unlikely to have been undertaken without clear military necessity founded on valid conclusions learned from recent war experience.\textsuperscript{112}

**Speed of the fleet**

Another area of difficulty concerns the calculation of the speed of the 1405 fleet. Little work appears to have been done on this subject. However, one study of the London to Bordeaux trade route allows an overall average speed of merchant fleets of less than one knot per hour. This calculation does not allow for stopovers and thus the figure is inaccurate for a continuously moving fleet such as that of 1405, which clearly could not stop in England. Therefore, it offers limited information to this study. However, it is the only such study seen so far.\textsuperscript{113} Moreover, Friel’s assessment of the trade route does not provide a means of determining whether a war fleet would have moved at a different rate of knots. Equally, there are the elements to consider: wind, weather, tide and currents all affect nautical transport and fleets encountering different conditions would record accordingly different average speeds. The state of the elements in 1405 and how they affected this fleet are impossible to


\textsuperscript{113} Friel, *The Good Ship*, 84 – 6.
determine. Given that the facts concerning the correct travel dates, the precise route taken, and thus the distance travelled, or whether they anchored at night or sailed continuously, are not recorded, the time taken is unknown. However, this effort to give a general idea of the distance and timescale proposes the following estimation:

This conservative route from Brest where the army embarked, travelling as directly towards Milford as possibly but, for the sake of this exercise west of the Isles of Scilly and then straight to Milford, measured 258 nautical miles. Henry learned of the French invasion on 7 August while at Pontefract castle, just over two hundred miles from Milford Haven as the crow flies. Considering land movement rates of the time, it seems reasonable to allow five days for the message from Milford to find Henry. Using the unreliably low speed of 1 knot per hour, this journey would have taken ten days and eighteen hours to achieve if the fleet sailed through the night. This is doubled to an implausibly slow three weeks if daylight-only travel is assumed. Therefore it seems fair to conclude that the fleet probably sailed at night

\[114\] *Fœdera*, vol 8, 405-6; *CCR*, 1402-5, 527-8. Brest to Milford Haven, 258 nautical miles; Milford to Pontefract Castle, 207.82 miles, 47.21 degrees, according to Google Earth (24/03/10).
and generally moved faster than has so far been shown. This therefore exposes a gap in current knowledge in this area. Even the most modern and detailed work in this field is unable to offer further insight; Lambert offered a 1 knot per hour standard measurement and then guessed at journey times while using an estimated speed of 4 knots. Calculating this voyage at a speed of three knots, which roughly equates to a reasonable human swimming speed, gives a journey time of three and a half days of continuous travel or seven days during daylight hours. This suggestion is borne out in part by the record evidence. French and English records suggest that the fleet left Brittany in late July and arrived in Wales in at the beginning of August. The chronicler Thomas Walsingham claimed that almost all the horses perished from ‘lack of fresh water’, although no other sources mention this and it is unclear how Walsingham learned of it; the short journey time established here makes this unlikely. Around the same period Walsingham described French ships en route to Wales being defeated and captured at sea by English captains. While noteworthy, these two points lack corroboration and might be an attempt to denigrate the French as poor campaign planners and inferior in combat against English ships. Research on this matter has not yielded evidence of the place of Walsingham’s reported confrontation, nor, tellingly, have records emerged of captured crews or any noticeable number of prize ships that year.

**Size of the fleet**

Evidence suggests that the numbers of sailors required to man a fleet designed to transport an army were approximately the same as the number of soldiers it carried; this will help estimate the size of the 1405 fleet. It is suggested that any noticeable disparity of numbers was made up by those not included in the stated personnel totals, such as pages, grooms, attendants and other camp followers. Examples of contemporary fleets also mention that there were uncounted numbers of support ships in attendance to warships. In September 1372, Edward III assembled a force comprising 6000 troops carried by 5000 sailors. Similarly, the English fleet of 1377–1378 sailed with twenty retinues totalling 4000 men at arms and archers in 100 ships manned by 3600 mariners. In 1385, a fleet of 43 vessels under

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116 Bellaguet, *Saint-Denis*, vol. 3, 323; Parry, *Registrum Roberti Mascal*, 6; Lloyd, *Owen Glendower*, 101-2 (according to whom, the fleet departed 22nd July 1405 and arrived at the beginning of August).
117 Preest, *Chronica Maiora*, 399-400.
118 M. M. Postan, ‘The Costs of the Hundred Years’ War’, *Past and Present*, 1964, (27), 34-6 (similar numbers of soldiers and sailors); Sherborne, ‘The Hundred Years’ War: The English Navy’, 170 – 1, (soldier/mariner numbers equal), 174 (Arundel’s fleet had unknown number of victualling ships); Friel, *The Good Ship*, 149 (Warwick’s fleet had unnamed support vessels); Lambert, *Shipping the Medieval Military*, 108, 140, 207 (et al).
Sir Thomas Percy and Sir Baldwin Raddlington took to sea with approximately 2000 soldiers and the same number of sailors. The figures for the fleet used by the earl of Arundel in 1387, in which Owain Glyn Dŵr served, are also available. It comprised a total of 2381 soldiers, of which there were 1091 men at arms and 1290 archers, and 2600 sailors in 51 vessels, of which there were 31 sailed ships, 19 barges and 1 balinger. A small fleet of ten ships was also mustered in the Cinque Ports in 1387. It was manned by 580 sailors and intended to carry 600 troops. The ports were to pay for the ships and sailors while the crown covered the cost of the soldiers.\textsuperscript{119} Since these statistics also state the number of ships used to carry these soldiers and mariners, it is possible to calculate an average compliment per ship and per fleet: that of 1377-8 averaged 40 soldiers per vessel, Sir Thomas Percy’s fleet carried just over 46.5 soldiers in each vessel; while Arundel’s 1387 fleet averaged 47 troops per vessel and the ten-ship fleet of 1387 averaged 60 fighting men per vessel. Lambert’s recent study offers numerous similar examples where English fleets listed a highest average of 45 soldiers per ship in large war fleets, to a low of fewer than 15 troops per vessel on other occasions, including the fleets for Sluys in 1340 and the army bound for France in 1355.\textsuperscript{120} This number only tells part of the story of course, each ship carrying a similar number of mariners, so the effective human burden should be considered double those figures stated above. These numbers do not include horses which clearly took up space. It is unknown how many, if any, horses the French transported in 1405 and therefore no allowance for them has been made excepting this comment. Also, it needs to be reiterated that these rough calculations consider English figures, whereas French ships have been shown to be larger, and consequently might have carried more troops on average. However, these averages might prove useful in comparison when attempting to construct a picture of the 1405 fleet. Accepting these numbers as probably relating to seaworthiness rather than expense, and being equally applicable to the French-Breton fleet, assists the tentative proposal of a formula to help calculate the size of the 1405 fleet. It seems likely that force integrity issues were also considered; losing ships packed with many troops would affect the combat ability of a force once it reached its destination, whereas it could afford to lose a few sparsely-populated vessels.

The evidence from the chronicle of Saint-Denys says the fleet consisted of two large warships and thirty medium-sized ships, the ‘Chronique Normande’ says there were sixteen


\textsuperscript{120} Lambert, Shipping the Medieval Military, 113, 125-6, 128-9, 154.
large ships and two carracks, Monstrelet gives a figure of ‘six score’ ships, whereas English records claim the French put into Milford with either a hundred and forty or a hundred and forty-four ships. Considering the army figures below, this enables reasonable, although admittedly imperfect and inaccurate calculations. This aims to show that the 1405 invasion was no mere undertaking by the French.

The Army
The Saint-Denys chronicle gave figures for the size of the 1404 army as eight hundred men-at-arms and an unspecified but large number of crossbowmen. The same authority described the 1405 force as eight hundred ‘élite fighting men’, six hundred crossbowmen and one thousand two hundred lightly-armoured troops. This force had arguably four leaders and was said to have been transported in two large warships and thirty medium-sized vessels. Enguerrand de Monstrelet gave a figure of twelve hundred soldiers for each expedition bound for Wales.

Therefore, if the Saint-Denys chronicler were correct, his total army of 2600 soldiers (and no mention of the extra room required for the horses) and the same number of sailors fitting into 32 ships, this gives a less credible average of 81.25 soldiers per vessel or a combined human compliment of 162.5 men per ship – almost double the highest figure of any recorded contemporary English fleet. By contrast, Monstrelet’s fleet of 120 ships carrying an army of 1200 men, plus the same number of sailors, gives an average of 20 men per ship, or 10 soldiers, leaving ample room for horses for the elite troops present, and the numerous uncounted attendants and others. Considering the range of statistics consulted, Saint-Denys’s figures seem unrealistically high and the loss of even one ship would gravely dent the force’s fighting capabilities, whereas those of Monstrelet appear to fit with the smaller figures given for English fleets that sailed a few decades previously. The statistics from Saint-Denys cause most concern, however, particularly as Monstrelet claimed that the total campaign casualties among the French numbered around sixty. The loss of just one ship of Saint-Denys’s fleet would notably impact on the army’s capabilities, whereas it would not with a fleet composed with Monstrelet’s information. If Saint-Denys’s army were put aboard Monstrelet’s fleet, the average equates to a palatable 22 soldiers per ship, or combined compliment of 43.3. If Saint-

121 Johnes, Monstrelet, 103; Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 3, 323; Douët-d’Arcq, Monstrelet, 82; La Chronique Normande, 211; Parry, The Register of Robert Mascall, 6; Preest, Chronica Maiora, 399-400.
122 Bellaguet, Saint-Denys, vol 3, 166-7, 222-4 (1404), 322-3 (1405), ‘electos pugiles’
123 Johnes, Monstrelet, 87 (1404), 103 (1405); Douët-d’Arcq, Monstrelet, 69 (1404), 81-2(1405).
124 Johnes, Monstrelet, 106; Douët-d’Arcq, Monstrelet, 84.
Denys’s fleet carried Monstrelet’s army, this still leads to higher figures of 37.5 soldiers per vessel or 75 men combined on each ship. The fact that French and English sources suggest fleet sizes of well over a hundred ships, combined with these suggestive calculations here, gives credence to Monstrelet’s account being the more reliable, though still probably not entirely accurate.

**Possible Costs of the Fleet and Army**

In order to establish a picture, though imperfect, of the financial outlay on the part of the French crown, the following is an attempt to indicate the extreme minimum costs incurred for the 1405 expedition. Although it has ultimately proved impossible to render a complete break-down, since there is no explicitly accurate price, fleet or muster list, the following research has produced valuable, original information.

The calculations below are wage indications only. No account has been made, or can be made, of the costs incurred in equipping, arming, armouring or feeding the men. Nor has it been possible to produce a formula for hiring, running or equipping vessels, or for purchasing stores such as food or repair materials because the required amounts are unknown.

Statistics for certain fleets are available; three months’ service by ten Genoese galleys cost England £ 9550 in 1373 and twenty Castilian galleys cost the French 50,000 francs in 1380, but there appears to be no standard rate, nor any description of this fleet’s composition.

While some information is available, such as long lists of campaigning equipment such as artillery, gunpowder, ropes, nails, winches, comestibles and so on, there is no indication of how much this force and fleet could have and should have carried on this mission. It has also been impossible to consider the amount earned in pillage and booty, or prisoners and ransoms, although both featured in the campaign and are detailed within the account rendered in Chapter 5.

This estimation will give an indication of the resources France invested in the expedition. In turn, this will reveal the importance France placed on the alliance, and the opportunities it offered to make war on English soil. Nicolas’s assertion that wage rates at the time were equal to those of Edward III’s reign helps calculate a relatively accurate figure.

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126 Fowler, *The Hundred Years War*, 102.
127 Allmand, *Society at War*, 63-71. See also Merlin-Chazelas, *Clos des Galées*.
for the cost of this expedition’s troops and mariners, since these sums are known.\textsuperscript{129} These costs can be compared to a similar sized English force, although it was raised to serve for a shorter period. Henry’s second son, Thomas, was commissioned to proceed against the French in February 1405. The army comprised the prince, two earls, twelve bannerets, eighty knights and six hundred and five esquires, therefore seven hundred men-at-arms, and fourteen hundred archers, all carried in a fleet of twenty large ships with castles, twenty barges and twenty balingers. It cost 8243 l. 17 s. 4 d.\textsuperscript{130}

There are some useful notes on the structure and practices of the French army of the time however. Firstly, commanders of the highest rank are identified as the (king’s) lieutenants, Constable, Marshal and the Master of Crossbowmen.\textsuperscript{131} Two of these appear in the 1405 force, and they were entitled to command any number of troops. Charles V’s army ordinances from 1369 show that his forces were divided into bodies of one hundred men, each of which was required to have a captain.\textsuperscript{132} This has been done with the troop calculations below, and the captain has been awarded a rate of pay concurrent with the pay band one place above that of the men he commanded. Whether there were sub-commanders between them and the overall expedition leaders is unknown. Although it is probable, no provision is made for it in the statistics below. In addition, for the sake of this exercise, captains of warships have also been assumed as high rank, and those of smaller ships have been classed at a higher rate of pay than the average fighting man. Although most ships appear to have constables, not all do, and so this is impossible to calculate. It has been assumed therefore that these constables were either men retained from the land army component or were part of the ship’s crew, so no extra allowance has been made for them. Equally, all ships appear to carry apprentice boys. No rate of pay for these appears anywhere,

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[129]{\textit{POPCE}, vol. 1, 327-8, 346-7; Allmand, \textit{Society at War}, 78-9 (costs for troops in 1424); H. J. Hewitt, \textit{The Organisation of War under Edward III}, (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2004, orig. 1966), 36 (costs for 1355 in which he also distinguishes between a mounted archer at 6d and a foot archer at 3d, Allmand’s more recent statistics, which are also closer in time terms, are more appropriate.) Note, Nicolas’s claim that wages between 1377 and 1422 were the same as they were in Edward III’s time is largely borne out, Nicolas, \textit{History of the Royal Navy}, vol 2, 451.}
\footnotetext[130]{\textit{Fœdera}, vol. 8, 389. This is the equivalent of £ 3, 791, 601. 60 in 2005 prices, according to the National Archives: http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/currency/results.asp#mid when the above sum was entered as a 1410 value [Accessed: 04/ 02 / 2012]. This fleet averages at 35 soldiers per vessel.}
\footnotetext[131]{Allmand, \textit{Society at War}, 45-51.}
\footnotetext[132]{Allmand, \textit{Society at War}, 49. Other problems and issues to consider in regards to captains, retinues and other attendant difficulties are raised in Ayton, unpublished PhD thesis, ‘The Warhorse and Military Service under Edward III’, 302-31.}
\end{footnotes}
yet they seem omnipresent, therefore they have been included at an approximated ratio of one apprentice per ten mariners, as some statistics appear to suggest.\textsuperscript{133}

French rates of pay prove problematic. While figures are given for bannerets, knights, esquires and varlets, there are no equivalents for the high ranks within the 1405 force, or for the lightly-armoured troops or crossbowmen which comprised the bulk of this army.\textsuperscript{134} Since fully detailed French rates of pay are not available, English equivalent daily rates are used instead. Expert opinion suggests English rates of pay were less than those of their French adversaries.\textsuperscript{135} An earl drew 6s 8d a day, a banneret 4s, a knight 2s, man-at-arms or spearman 1s, an archer 6d.\textsuperscript{136} Ships’ crews were paid 3d per day, although apprentices were paid less, and ship’s masters probably more.\textsuperscript{137} Each ship had a master, many had constables, and the number of apprentice boys varied apparently at random.\textsuperscript{138}

Finally, the figures below show the daily rates of each force described by the chroniclers. The 1405 force mustered in July and in both versions at least part of it returned to France at All Saints. Therefore, the costs for the minimum campaign period of 92 days, 1 July to 1 November, are also included here to demonstrate the scale of investment by the French. The National Archives have developed software which calculated old money rates to modern equivalents. The statistics provided below equate to payments from 1410 being converted to an equivalent value in 2005.\textsuperscript{139} It should be noted here that this system produces small disparities throughout, so both figures are included within the calculations.\textsuperscript{140} The totals provided are the additions of their contemporary currency.

Therefore, using the French army organisation and the above English rates of pay and currency system of twelve deniers to a shilling, or two hundred and forty deniers to one

\textsuperscript{133} Hewitt, \textit{The Organisation of War}, 182-6.
\textsuperscript{134} Allmand, \textit{Society at War}, 45. Their rates of pay are, respectively, 40, 20, 10 and 5 shillings tournois per day. The calculation is impossible because of the omission of the relevant troop types. In addition, the calculation from tournois into sterling and then into a modern equivalent seems laborious and unnecessary given that this exercise can only establish a rough estimate, as well as a principle.
\textsuperscript{136} See footnote 129 on p 373 above for validation of these costs.
\textsuperscript{137} Hewitt, \textit{The Organisation of War}, 77-8.
\textsuperscript{138} Hewitt, \textit{The Organisation of War}, 182-6.
\textsuperscript{139} http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/currency/results.asp#mid
\textsuperscript{140} For example, mariners were paid 3 d. or £5.75 in 2005, while apprentices were paid 1 d. or £1.92. Evidently £1.92 x 3 is £5.76, indicative of the small discrepancies mentioned. The difference between the daily rates totals is therefore small, but when these are played out through the hundreds and thousands of troops and sailors participating in a three month campaign, the differences in totals are marked.
pound sterling, and twenty shillings to a pound sterling, a rough estimate of the daily costs of this force can be calculated as follows:\textsuperscript{141}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
No. & Name & Equivalent Rank & Daily Rate of Pay & Daily cost per unit (Daily rate x unit size) & Modern equivalent (Daily rate x unit size) & Minimum campaign cost (Daily unit cost x 92) & Modern equivalent (Daily unit cost x 92) \\
\hline
1 & Renaud de Tries & Earl & 6 s. 8 d. & 6 s. 8 d. & £153.31 & 6 s. 8 d. x 92 = 30 l. 13 s. 4 d. & £153.31 x 92 = £14, 104.52 \\
1 & Jean de Hangest & Earl & 6 s. 8 d. & 6 s. 8 d. & £153.31 & 6 s. 8 d. x 92 = 30 l. 13 s. 4 d. & £14, 104.52 \\
12 & Contingent captains & Banneret & 4 s. & 4 x 12 = 48 s. or 2 l. 8 s. & £91.99 x 12 = £1103.88 & 2 l. 8 s. x 92 = 220 l. 16 s. & £1103.88 x 92 = £101, 556.96 \\
1200 & ‘fighting men’ & Knights & 2 s. & 2 x 1200 = 2400 s. or 120 l. & £45.99 x 1200 = £55, 188 & 120 l. X 92 = 11040 l. & £55, 188 x 92 = £5, 077, 296 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Monstrelet’s Army}
\end{table}

Total Daily Rate for Monstrelet’s army
\begin{align*}
\text{124 l.}
1 \text{ s 4 d.}
\end{align*}

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
\text{Modern Equivalent}\textsuperscript{145} & £ 56, 598.50 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

Cost of minimum known service from 1 July to 1 November, 1405 (92 days)
\begin{align*}
\text{11322 l.}
2 \text{ s 8 d.}
\end{align*}

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|}
\hline
\text{Modern Equivalent}\textsuperscript{146} & £ 5, 207, 062 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{141} P. Spufford, \textit{Handbook of Medieval Exchange}, (London: Offices of the Royal Historical Society, 1986), provides an excellent account of the high number of currencies in circulation at this time. The Map on page xxv shows that there were more than half a dozen currencies in France alone, and so using one currency for this calculation helps simplify this already complicated process.

\textsuperscript{142} Admiral of France

\textsuperscript{143} Since only three of the fallen were named (Patroullart de Troies, de Martelonne and de Laval), it assumed that they were from this category, rather than creating another category for other named survivors, as with de Bellay, in Saint-Denys’s army above.

\textsuperscript{144} These have been classed as knights due to the mention of ‘twelve hundred knights and esquires’ (Johnes, \textit{Monstrelet}, 87; Douêt-d’Arco, \textit{Monstrelet}, 69) hired for the 1404 force under the comte de la Marche. Since it is impossible to distinguish their differing numbers and separate rates of pay, one standard rate is used. It also seems reasonable to assume that a fifteenth century chronicler writing ‘fighting men’ implied that they were drawn from the second estate.

\textsuperscript{145} The National Archives currency converter (NACC) gives a figure of £57, 061.98. This includes fractional difference described above.

\textsuperscript{146} NACC £5,207,388.78
\end{flushright}
Monstrelet’s naval force: ‘Six score ships.’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Equivalent Rank</th>
<th>Daily Rate of Pay</th>
<th>Daily cost per unit (Daily rate x unit size)</th>
<th>Modern equivalent (Daily rate x unit size)</th>
<th>Minimum campaign cost (Daily unit cost x 92)</th>
<th>Modern equivalent (Daily unit cost x 92)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>Ship’s Masters</td>
<td>Knights</td>
<td>2 s.</td>
<td>2 x 120 = 240 s. or 12 l.</td>
<td>£45.99 x 120 = £5, 518.80</td>
<td>12 l. X 92 = 1104 l.</td>
<td>£5, 518.8 x 92 = £ 507, 729.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1200</td>
<td>Mariners</td>
<td>Mariner</td>
<td>3 d.</td>
<td>3 x 1200 = 3600 d. or 300 s. or 15 l.</td>
<td>£5.75 x 1200 = £ 6, 900</td>
<td>15 l. X 92 = 1380 l.</td>
<td>£ 6, 900 x 92 = £ 634, 800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Apprentice Boys</td>
<td>Apprentice</td>
<td>1 d.</td>
<td>120 d. or 10 s.</td>
<td>£1.92 x 120 = £ 230.40</td>
<td>10 s. x 92 = 920 s. or 46 l.</td>
<td>£ 230.4 x 92 = £ 21, 196.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Daily Rate for Monstrelet’s naval force**

27 l. 10 s.

Modern Equivalent \(^{147}\) £ 12, 649.20

Cost of minimum known service from 1 July to 1 November, 1405 (92 days)

2530 l.

Modern Equivalent \(^{148}\) £ 1, 163, 726.40

The Totals for Monstrelet’s forces:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Workings</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daily Rate for both forces</td>
<td>124 l. 1 s. 4 d. + 27 l. 10 s. =</td>
<td>151 l. 11 s. 4 d. =</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The modern equivalent (^{149})</td>
<td>£56, 598.50 + £12, 649.20 =</td>
<td>£69, 247.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total campaign costs for both forces over 92 days</td>
<td>11322 l. 2 s. 8 d. + 2530 l. =</td>
<td>13852 l. 2 s. 8 d. =</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The modern equivalent (^{150})</td>
<td>£5, 207, 062 + £1, 163, 726.40 =</td>
<td>£6, 370, 788.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Saint-Denys’s army:

\(^{147}\) NACC £12,648.08

\(^{148}\) NACC £1,163,622.90

\(^{149}\) NACC £69,710.06

\(^{150}\) NACC £6,371,011.68
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Equivalent Rank</th>
<th>Daily Rate of Pay</th>
<th>Daily cost per unit (Daily rate x unit size)</th>
<th>Modern equivalent (Daily rate x unit size)</th>
<th>Minimum campaign cost (Daily unit cost x 92)</th>
<th>Modern equivalent (Daily unit cost x 92)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Jean de Rieux</td>
<td>Earl</td>
<td>6 s. 8 d.</td>
<td>£153.31</td>
<td>£153.31 x 92 = £14, 104.52</td>
<td>£153.31 x 92 = £14, 104.52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Jean de Hanglest</td>
<td>Earl</td>
<td>6 s. 8 d.</td>
<td>£153.31</td>
<td>£153.31 x 92 = £14, 104.52</td>
<td>£153.31 x 92 = £14, 104.52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Robert de la Heuse</td>
<td>Bannerman</td>
<td>4 s.</td>
<td>£91.99</td>
<td>£91.99 x 92 = £8,463.08</td>
<td>£91.99 x 92 = £8,463.08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Le Bègue de Bellay</td>
<td>Bannerman</td>
<td>4 s.</td>
<td>£91.99</td>
<td>£91.99 x 92 = £8,463.08</td>
<td>£91.99 x 92 = £8,463.08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>800</td>
<td>‘elite fighting men’</td>
<td>Knights</td>
<td>2 s.</td>
<td>£45.99 x 800 = £36792</td>
<td>£36792 x 92 = £3,384,864</td>
<td>£36792 x 92 = £3,384,864</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Contingent captains</td>
<td>Bannerman</td>
<td>4 s.</td>
<td>£23 x 1200 = £27600</td>
<td>£27,600 x 92 = £2,539,200</td>
<td>£27,600 x 92 = £2,539,200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1200</td>
<td>lightly armoured troops</td>
<td>Spearmen</td>
<td>1 s.</td>
<td>£23 x 1200 = £27600</td>
<td>£27,600 x 92 = £2,539,200</td>
<td>£27,600 x 92 = £2,539,200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Contingent captains</td>
<td>Knights</td>
<td>2 s.</td>
<td>£45.99 x 12 = £551.88</td>
<td>£551.88 x 92 = £50,772.96</td>
<td>£551.88 x 92 = £50,772.96</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>600</td>
<td>Crossbow men</td>
<td>Archers</td>
<td>6 d.</td>
<td>£11.50 x 600 = £6900</td>
<td>£6900 x 92 = £634,800</td>
<td>£6900 x 92 = £634,800</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Contingent captains</td>
<td>Knights</td>
<td>2 s.</td>
<td>£45.99 x 6 = £275.94</td>
<td>£275.94 x 92 = £25,386.48</td>
<td>£275.94 x 92 = £25,386.48</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total Daily Rate for Saint-Denis’s army</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>159 l. 9 s. 4 d.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Modern Equivalent £73,343.50</strong></td>
<td><strong>Cost of minimum known service from 1 July to 1 November, 1405 (92 days)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Modern Equivalent £6,747,863.28</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Saint-Denis’s naval force:** 2 large warships and thirty medium-sized vessels.

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151 Marshal of France  
152 This equates to £153.31 per day, roughly equivalent to that of a modern Lieutenant Colonel, an appropriate level rank to command such an expedition.  
153 lord of Hugueville and Grand-Master of the Crossbows of France  
154 The modern equivalent is £91.99, slightly above that of a modern army captain. The higher ranks’ pay appears to equate favourably with their approximate modern counterparts, all of the lower ranks here, do not. Perhaps indicative of the comparatively higher pay awarded to the lower ranks in modern society.  
155 Although de Bellay was described as an esquire, the fact that he was said to have been left in command of over a thousand men has led to this notional higher pay claim.  
156 NACC £73,343.50  
157 NACC £8,032,186.86
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Equivalent Rank</th>
<th>Daily Rate of Pay</th>
<th>Daily cost per unit (Daily rate x unit size)</th>
<th>Modern equivalent (Daily rate x unit size)</th>
<th>Minimum campaign cost (Daily unit cost x 92)</th>
<th>Modern equivalent (Daily unit cost x 92)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Warship Masters</td>
<td>Banneret</td>
<td>4 s.</td>
<td>£91.99 x 2 = £183.98</td>
<td>8 s. x 92 = 36 l. 16 s.</td>
<td>£183.98 x 92 = £12,786.16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Ship’s Masters</td>
<td>Knights</td>
<td>2 s.</td>
<td>£45.99 x 30 = £1379.70</td>
<td>3 l. x 92 = 276 l.</td>
<td>£1379.70 x 92 = £126,932.40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2600</td>
<td>Mariners</td>
<td>Mariner</td>
<td>3 d.</td>
<td>£5.75 x 2600 = £14950</td>
<td>32 l. 10 s x 92 = 2990 l.</td>
<td>£14950 x 92 = £1,375,400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>Apprentice Boys</td>
<td>Apprentice</td>
<td>1 d.</td>
<td>£1.92 x 260 = £499.20</td>
<td>1 l. 1 s. 8 d. x 92 = 98 l. 8 s. 16 d.</td>
<td>£499.20 x 92 = £45,926.40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Daily Rate for Saint-Denys’s naval force**

36 l. 19 s. 8 d.

Modern Equivalent\(^{158}\) £17,012.88

Cost of minimum known service from 1 July to 1 November, 1405 (92 days)

3401 l. 5 s. 4 d.

Modern Equivalent\(^{159}\) £1,515,118.56

The Totals for Saint-Denys’s forces:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Workings</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Daily Rate for both forces</td>
<td>159 l. 9 s. 4 d. + 36 l. 19 s. 8 d. =</td>
<td>196 l. 9 s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The modern equivalent(^{160})</td>
<td>£ 73, 343.50 + £ 17, 012.88 =</td>
<td>£90, 356.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total campaign costs for both forces over 92 days</td>
<td>17463 l. 18 s. 8 d. + 3401 l. 5 s. 4 d. =</td>
<td>20,866 l. 4 s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The modern equivalent(^{161})</td>
<td>£ 6, 747, 234 .42 + £1,515, 118.56 =</td>
<td>£8,262,352.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{158}\) NACC £17,009.74

\(^{159}\) NACC £1,564,344.58

\(^{160}\) NACC £90,353.25

\(^{161}\) NACC £9,596,991.37
Appendix D 9: Constance, 1417 – A Last Stand for Wales?

The state of France between 1412 and 1417 requires little expansion here. Despite the restoration of peace and fine words of amity uttered and committed to writing at Buzançais, factional warfare continued in France during these years. The citizens of Paris revolted in 1413, but were crushed and their preferred leader, the duke of Burgundy, was swept from power, allowing the Orleanists to regain control. Duke Jean attempted to make a treasonable compact with Henry V in 1414, promising to act against France in England’s favour. Irrespective of his stated intention to the other French princes, he made no effort to assist them or advance against Henry V’s invasion the following year. Burgundy was not entirely alone in this; the duke of Brittany failed to reach Agincourt either, the truce with England probably influencing his actions too. The scale of the French defeat in that battle requires no more description here other than to observe that Agincourt did not bring Henry V the campaign success he sought – his armies returned to England in the immediate aftermath without pressing their advantage. The heaviest cost to France was the scale of leaders lost that day. In addition, Louis of Guyenne, the heir-designate, died of illness in December 1415. The Orleanists, now more commonly referred to as the Armagnacs, assumed control of the government for the majority of the remaining period of interest.

In an effort to finally heal the schism, the European powers determined to hold another ecclesiastical conference to make amends for that of Pisa in 1409. The Council of Constance met in a number of sessions between 1414 and 1418. There is neither space nor any reason for a description of the origins, debates or the findings of the Council here. It was populated by delegations from western and central European states. Although its purpose was to seek a solution to the schism, a number of other issues were also debated there. Arguably, the best-known event saw Church authorities renege on their promises of safe conduct to Jan Hus who was imprisoned, tried and then executed on 6 July 1415. During the course of the

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163 Vaughan, John the Fearless, 205-7; Allmand, Lancastrian Normandy, 11-2; Schnerb, Armagnacs et Bourguignons, 211-4.
164 Vaughan, John the Fearless, 207-8; Schnerb, Armagnacs et Bourguignons, 217.
165 Vaughan, John the Fearless, 207-8; Galliou and Jones, The Bretons, 237.
166 Vaughan, John the Fearless, 209, 213; M. G. A. Vale, Charles VII, (London: Eyre Methuen, 1974), 21; Knecht, The Valois, 58-9; Schnerb, Armagnacs et Bourguignons, 226.
167 Vaughan, John the Fearless, 209-10; Allmand, Lancastrian Normandy, 2-8; Schnerb, Armagnacs et Bourguignons, 224-31.
168 Creighton, A History of The Papacy, vol 2, 3-50; Pillement, Pedro de Luna, 228-34; Vaughan, John the Fearless, 210-2; Leff, Heresy in the Later Middle Ages, vol 2, 606-708 (Hussites); Peters, Heresy and Authority in Medieval Europe, 277-97, (Hus); Lambert, Medieval Heresy. Popular Movements from the Gregorian Reform to
council, English diplomacy, perhaps combined with a poor approach by their French counterparts, managed to win an alliance with the host, the Emperor Sigismund in August 1416.\(^\text{169}\) However one argument at Constance encompassed French-Welsh relations. The debate of interest here took place between the French and English delegations during the 28\(^{\text{th}}\) and 31\(^{\text{st}}\) sessions of the Council, held on the 3 and 31 March 1417. Although it constituted only a minor feature of the proceedings at Constance and had no bearing on the outcome of the Council, it nonetheless marks the final public assertion by the French, speaking in their own interests, naturally, but also in those of a rebel Wales. However, by 1417, the French ambassadorial party was engaged in its own conflict between the envoys of Armagnac or Burgundian adherence.\(^\text{170}\)

The French raised the issue of sovereignty with the English at Constance, and within the context of that evoked the plight of the Welsh and others, and demanded their ecclesiastical liberty.\(^\text{171}\) However, from the riposte offered by Thomas Polton, Henry V’s ambassador, to the French protest of 3 March, 1417, the tenor of the original French claim is revealed.\(^\text{172}\)

When the French delegation tried to deliver their *protestatio* in the 28\(^{\text{th}}\) session on 3 March 1417, their representative, Jean Campagne, delivered a few lines before being jeered

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\(^{171}\) Creighton, *History of The Papacy*, vol 2, 76-81; Gabriel, ‘Wales and the Avignon Papacy’, 70-86; Loomis, ‘Nationality at the Council of Constance. An Anglo-French Dispute’, 508-27; Gwynn, ‘Ireland and the English Nation at the Council of Constance.’ 183-233; Jarman, ‘Wales and the Council of Constance’, 220-2; Vaughan, *John the Fearless*, 210-2; Crowder, *Unity, Heresy and Reform*, 24-8. Note: Tracing the original text has proved impossible. The secondary sources here cite the following: H. von der Hardt, *Magnum Oecumenicum Constantiense Concilium*, (6 volumes published in 4 tomes, Frankfurt, 1700), vol 5, 56-75; H. Finke, *Acta Concilii Constantiensis* (3 volumes, Munster, 1896-1928), in particular Fillastre, *Gesta Concilii Constantiensis*, vol 2, 1923, 86-90. The former has not been consulted since it could not be located by Cardiff University library or the British Library in London. The latter is a summary of the exchange and excludes mention of the Welsh, focussing instead on the core points of the dispute between England and France. In addition, the English ambassadors were apparently lauded for their efforts by Henry Chicheley’s unpublished letter of 23 April 1417, listed as: King’s Mss., 10.b., IX, f. 59, a-b. This document was unknown to the British Library, the British Museum and the Public Record Office, it has therefore not been consulted.

\(^{172}\) Crowder, *Unity, Heresy and Reform*, 109-26. This section uses Crowder’s translation of the English defence against the French claim, called ‘Gallicae nationis solemnis protestatio contra Anglos.’
and booed into silence by other delegates. Their protest was then formally submitted in writing. The aim of the protest, discussed below, appears to have been to reduce the size and weaken the influence of England’s representation within the Church council. Within that argument, the French sought ecclesiastical independence for Wales. The English response was delivered in writing by Thomas Polton at the 31st session on 31 March 1417. Polton’s response listed and then rebuffed at length three principal French arguments. The English reply was a skilful but exhaustively long rebuttal, combining a variety of apparently well-researched, incisive points, with verbose, misleading statements and humorous comments denigrating the French, to produce a compelling defence against the protestatio. From this reply, the detail of the French argument is discernable.

The first French point was founded on a papal decree, ‘Extravagans, Vas electionis’, made during the reign of Pope Benedict XII (1334 – 1342).173 Their argument was that the decree divided Catholic obedience into four groups known as ‘nations’. The four primary nations were France, Germany, Castile and Italy. Other nations were classed beneath these four and thus came into their obedience ecclesiastically, for example, Navarre to France, Portugal to Spain, the eastern Mediterranean Latin possessions to Italy and England to Germany. Europe’s universities divided their students into those groups also, for administrative, teaching and logistical purposes such as accommodation. The Council of Constance had followed that arrangement. However, in the absence of the Spanish delegation, the English had assumed the Spanish position and voting rights. The French asserted that since England came within Germany’s obedience it was not an ecclesiastical nation in its own right. Just as other nations such as such as Wales, Scotland or Hungary had no individual representation at the Council, then England did not deserve the level of representation it enjoyed at that time, which put it on an equal footing to the four principal nations mentioned.

The second French argument further detailed the divisions agreed during Benedict XII’s reign.174 He divided the papal obedience into thirty six parts and counted York and Canterbury as just one province. The French underlined the fact that since Benedict was born in Bordeaux, and therefore under English influence, he was in essence favourable towards England. The fact that he determined England to be just one thirty-sixth of the papal obedience should therefore stand and be applied to their level of representation at the council.

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173 Crowder, Unity, Heresy and Reform, 112-6.
174 Crowder, Unity, Heresy and Reform, 112-6.
The third main French point challenged England’s geographical size and made a comparison of the two nations’ ecclesiastical provinces, concluding that England was far smaller than France and therefore should not have equal representation on the Council.\textsuperscript{175} England only had two provinces, York and Canterbury, whereas France had eleven provinces and ‘one hundred and one wide and spacious dioceses.’\textsuperscript{176} Moreover, the French claimed that their Christian pedigree, in terms of the length of time they had been obedient, and to whom they had been obedient, made them superior to the English.\textsuperscript{177} Also, that the kingdom of France was composed of several duchies and counties, each being larger and richer in terms of ‘lands, cities, castles and walled towns than the kingdom of England.’\textsuperscript{178} Therefore, they argued, that it was ‘ridiculous and unreasonable’ that England should enjoy an equal number of delegates as France on the council, and that the French should have at least six times England’s representation.\textsuperscript{179}

The French made a number of demands to accompany their three points of protest.\textsuperscript{180} The first was that the council should await the absent Spanish delegation before continuing with its business. Within that demand they added that England, the fifth nation, should simply return to being part of the German nation, as established by Benedict XII’s decree. Their second demand offered an alternative to this too; that if the English were to retain their representation, then the other nations be divided also, creating new nations in the same manner that England had acquired its position within the council. The French insisted that failing to do so would be insulting to them because of the justifications present in the three points of their protest.\textsuperscript{181} The third French point reiterated that if the other delegations did not agree to an expansion of the nations represented, then they should reinstate the original arrangement of four nations; Italy, France, Spain and Germany.\textsuperscript{182}

To a certain degree their points appear fair and balanced. Certainly, the call to await the return of their political allies, the Spanish, seems wholly reasonable. The absence of such a major faction due to domestic matters certainly disrupted the business of the Council. The French questioned England’s right to the same level of representation on apparently reasonable grounds; historical precedence, ecclesiastical tradition based on papal decree, as

\textsuperscript{175} Crowder, Unity, Heresy and Reform, 116-7.  
\textsuperscript{176} Crowder, Unity, Heresy and Reform, 112.  
\textsuperscript{177} Crowder, Unity, Heresy and Reform, 112.  
\textsuperscript{178} Crowder, Unity, Heresy and Reform, 112-3.  
\textsuperscript{179} Crowder, Unity, Heresy and Reform, 112-3.  
\textsuperscript{180} Crowder, Unity, Heresy and Reform, 113-9.  
\textsuperscript{181} Crowder, Unity, Heresy and Reform, 113.  
\textsuperscript{182} Crowder, Unity, Heresy and Reform, 113.
well as on a practical comparison of size, population and wealth. Their inference was that with the future of the Church at stake, it seemed important that the right people were leading the debate towards resolution. Superficially the French stance seemed generous to those without a voice and appeared designed to promote a fairness of representation at the Council called to heal the schism. French success in this ecclesiastical forum to elicit support for its causes would certainly have benefited many nations such as the Scots, Irish and Welsh.

Thomas Polton’s reply appears to take the air of an experienced school master rebutting one of his less capable students, and in so doing it makes comical, yet impressive reading. The French position was utterly demolished by the lengthy English reply. In the first case, it seems evident that Henry’s representatives had an intimate knowledge of ‘Extravagans, Vas electionis’, and used that in-depth knowledge to deny that its author intended it to be a map of the divisions and obediences as the French claimed. They gave examples to illustrate their points, citing passages from the papal decree that put holes in the French case. One example is that the English provinces of York and Canterbury were listed among Occitan provinces, proving that England was not viewed as part of Germany and that the document was a convenient list of groupings, rather than a firm decree. On the point that England comprised only one province in the kingdom of England, and therefore should only have one place in council, Poulton replied: ‘It is the worst sort of argument. For in much of what they have written they argue from the kingdom of England alone to the whole English nation. These chaps write a lot of stuff like this.’ The riposte then built a case regarding the peoples of ‘the English or British nation’. Polton frequently repeated that phrase, cleverly blurring the edges of the terms in use to an audience which was probably unsure and largely disinterested in determining the precise details of these definitions. The reply qualified how the English nation was composed of eight kingdoms; England, Scotland Wales were those of ‘greater Britain’, Man and the four Irish kingdoms. The English argument demolished that of the French, minutely picking apart the French argument which seems, in contrast, to have been airily composed on matters of general principle and with inadequate knowledge of the documents they cited. As the response dealt with the French points in a detailed way, it also took the opportunity to ridicule the authors of the protest and

183 Crowder, Unity, Heresy and Reform, 113-8.
184 Crowder, Unity, Heresy and Reform, 114.
185 Crowder, Unity, Heresy and Reform, 115.
186 Crowder, Unity, Heresy and Reform, 115, 116, 121, 122, 125, 126.
187 Crowder, Unity, Heresy and Reform, 116.
their argument, using terms such as ‘feeble’ and denigrating their points ‘as these scribblers pretend.’

So the argument ran, skilfully infusing well-made points with references, comparisons and ridicule, but also with flagrant untruths which broadened the argument to a degree that to pursue would be fruitless, pointless and demand a great deal of energy. For example, the French decried the size of England and its various regions. In a list of those places which belonged to the English nation, they said ‘and there is the famous principality of John, prince of the Orkneys and about forty other islands. Even these islands are equal to or larger than the kingdom of France.’ While of course, they were not, to pick on every English point and respond to the high number of deliberate inaccuracies would be exhausting, which was probably their point. This discourse of stylish equivocation and solidly-made points easily bettered the French protest. The passage of interest responding to the French protest about Wales is riven with ambiguity, misdirection, fact and insult. On the whole it is an excellent sample of the tenor of the English reply:

These people claim that Wales and the prelates and clergy of those parts do not pay any attention to the king of England, nor do they want to be part of the English nation, as is manifest here in this council. Always remembering the earlier disclaimer, the answer is that they can blush for putting out such a flagrant untruth. For the whole of Wales is obedient to the archbishop of Canterbury, as its primate, in spiritual matters and to the most serene king of England in temporal matters, peacefully and as a matter of routine. That is evident on the spot and in this council, where many venerable doctors and other graduates and clerks from Wales are participating in this famous English nation. Similarly, they are just as clearly mistaken about Ireland, which embraces four provinces and sixty spacious dioceses. It is well known and undoubted that these provinces are recognized parts of the English nation.

When they go on to propose that the suffragan bishops of Scotland are not and have no wish to be in the English nation, always with the same disclaimer, the answer is that they are undoubtedly, and ought to be, part of the English nation, since they have no way of denying that Scotland is a part of Britain, though not so large a part. The whole world knows that. Also they have the same language as the English. It is really remarkable that such educated men would want to write that Wales, Ireland or even Scotland are not part of the English nation.

Crowder, Unity, Heresy and Reform, 116, 123.
Crowder, Unity, Heresy and Reform, 116-9.
Crowder, Unity, Heresy and Reform, 116.
Crowder, Unity, Heresy and Reform, 116.
Crowder, Unity, Heresy and Reform, 116.

This intriguing statement suggests that Welsh clergy were present at Constance and made demonstration of their opposition to England. The inclusion of Welshmen in the English party was probably not a coincidence.
several other territories, which have nothing to do with the adversary of France and yet are included in the French or Gallican nation? And it is the same with other nations.\footnote{Crowder, Unity, Heresy and Reform, 117.}

Another point including Wales appears to convincingly triumph the original French protest:

Where the French nation, for the most part, has one vernacular which is wholly or in part understandable in every part of the nation, within the famous English or British nation, however, there are five languages, you might say, one of which does not understand another. These are English, which English and Scots have in common, Welsh, Irish, Gascon and Cornish. It could be claimed with every right that there should be representation for as many nations as there are distinct languages. By even stronger right ought they, as a principal nation, to represent a fourth or fifth part of the papal obedience in a general council and elsewhere ... It should not be overlooked how these scribblers are working towards inequality between nations.\footnote{Crowder, Unity, Heresy and Reform, 121.}

In this manner, each point of the French protest was taken to task and demolished. The righteousness of the principles involved seems to have been buried in the form and style of the exchange. There would be no ecclesiastical debate over the fate of Wales; the argument was lost in the avalanche of other, dominating matters and no thanks to a loquacious, dissembling reply by Thomas Poulton.

Meanwhile, Wales was still problematic to the English crown; the revolt was still ongoing.\footnote{G. A. Sayles, ed., Coram Rege Roll, no. 560 (Easter 1401), m. 18 (crown),. Publications for the Selden Society, Vol 88, . ‘Select Cases in the Court of the King’s Bench under Richard II, Henry IV and Henry V’, (London: Selden Society, 1971), 113-5; Davies, Revolt, 299-304.}
The notion that the revolt withered after 1405 and died in February 1409 is incorrect. Undeniably, the tenor and tempo of the conflict had changed following the English capture of Aberystwyth and Harlech. It seems as if the Welsh had a new leader, Maredudd, Owain’s son. The first evidence linking him to some form of power comes from June 1412, where men wishing to hold discussions were obliged to operate under his protection, which reveals that they required his permission.\footnote{Ellis, Original Letters, vol 1, 1-8; Hingeston, RHL Henry IV, vol 1, 35-8; Smith, ‘The Last Phase of the Glyndŵr Rebellion’, 250-60.} This was made explicit in letters written to English officials in Wales where it was claimed that a particular man was able to come to parley because he was ‘under the protexion of Mered’ ap Owein’.\footnote{Smith, ‘The Last Phase of the Glyndŵr Rebellion’, 251, 257.} Despite Harlech falling in February 1409, the king realised that the Welsh were not finished and in November that year ordered the earl of Arundel, Roger le Strange, Edward Charlton, and Lord Grey of Ruthin to go in person and make war on the rebels.\footnote{CCR, 1409-13, 15; Smith, ‘The Last Phase of the Glyndŵr Rebellion’, 252.} Orders for the castles to be repaired and
garrisons maintained within them run throughout the period 1409-1417.\textsuperscript{198} Even at that stage, after two sizeable armies had assaulted and eventually taken the two principal Welsh fortresses, these English commanders complained that ‘this centur of North Wales shall neve have peese’, and a joint Franco-Scots attack on Wales was predicted for summer 1409.\textsuperscript{199} The capture of the two French carracks, the ‘Sancta Maria’ and the ‘Sancta Brigida’, off Milford in 1409, lends credence to this notion.\textsuperscript{200}

In due course, rents had begun to be paid in the more anglicised lordships such as Brecon, Chirkland and on recaptured Anglesey. However, by 1409, even these areas they were only garnering approximately a third of the pre-revolt yield.\textsuperscript{201} There were negligible returns from some areas such as Merioneth, Caernarvon and northern Cardigan into the 1420s; this should be considered as linked to ongoing rebellion in the form of hostile non-cooperation, as opposed to the open warfare experienced previously. Crown authority, in the sense that the population was not consistently in arms and some revenue was raised from the area, returned across Wales asymmetrically, with each region offering a different challenge to crown officers.\textsuperscript{202} In 1412, parleys for submissions were still ongoing and the king’s chief stalwart in Wales, Dafydd Gam, was seized by Glyn Dŵr himself, presenting a curious landscape of neither outright warfare nor peace or submission. At the same time, a 180-strong force was posted to Bala to attempt to suppress rebel activity in the area.\textsuperscript{203} In this respect the conflict in Wales bears certain of the classic hallmarks of an insurgency and therefore, in contrast to Davies’s image of it being something that could die, this was a quarrel that could run for years in some form.\textsuperscript{204} In 1414, the Lollard leader, Sir John Oldcastle raised a revolt drawing thousands of soldiers to his banner. However, over the next three years his forces withered, rose again, then dispersed causing Oldcastle to go into hiding. By 1417, he was known to be in the Welsh borders, where it was believed that he had gone to those parts to hold talks with Maredudd ab Owain.\textsuperscript{205} English officials fell foul of their new king for holding discussions with rebels without permit, and troops were hurriedly sent to the south

\textsuperscript{198} Davies, Revolt, 303-4.
\textsuperscript{199} Smith, ‘The Last Phase of the Glyndŵr Rebellion’, 256; Davies, Revolt, 300.
\textsuperscript{200} CCRs, 1409-1413, 10-1; Friel, The Good Ship, 159.
\textsuperscript{201} Smith, ‘The Last Phase of the Glyndŵr Rebellion’, 254-5; Davies, Revolt, 299.
\textsuperscript{202} Smith, ‘The Last Phase of the Glyndŵr Rebellion’, 250-60; Davies, Revolt, 299-304.
\textsuperscript{203} Smith, ‘The Last Phase of the Glyndŵr Rebellion’, 251; Davies, Revolt, 300, 302.
\textsuperscript{204} Davies, Revolt, 293-4.
\textsuperscript{205} Smith, ‘The Last Phase of the Glyndŵr Rebellion’, 254-5; Myers, English Historical Documents, vol 4, 862-3; Taylor and Roskell, GestaHenrici Quinti, 3-11, 183-5; Harriss, Henry V, The Practice of Kingship, 34, 61-2, 97, 100-2, 106, 111-3; P. Corbin and D. Sedge, The Oldcastle Controversy, (Manchester: MUP, 1991) 1-8; Davies, Revolt, 300-1.
while messengers called garrisons to alert.\textsuperscript{206} Despite oaths being sworn to English officials and fines being paid by communities in certain parts, more proved recalcitrant than submissive; threats and murders of Englishmen and crown administrators took place.\textsuperscript{207} Even as Henry V launched the first stages of his great French adventure, Wales appeared to be smouldering towards ignition once more. Officials held discussions with rebels in local initiatives, and were fined for so doing by the king. Gilbert Talbot was commissioned to locate and discuss peace with Owain: ‘Appointment of Gilbert Talbot, ‘chivaler’, to treat with Owin Glendourdy of Wales on certain matters declared to him by the king and to receive Owin and other Welsh rebels to the king’s obedience and grace if they seek them.’\textsuperscript{208} The entire parameters of Talbot’s brief are unknown, but he was unsuccessful in his efforts to persuade Owain to submit. Talbot was again appointed ‘to treat with Meredith ap Owyn, son of Owyn de Glendourdy, on certain matters declared to him by the king and to admit the said Owin and other Welsh rebels to the king’s obedience and grace if they offer.’\textsuperscript{209} This shows that the authorities were attempting to use Maredudd as a conduit to Owain, to mediate his ongoing intractability. However, this also demonstrates that Owain was believed to be alive in February 1416. If this is correct, he did not die on the feast of Saint Matthew, 20 September, 1415, as pedalled by Gruffydd Hiraethog.\textsuperscript{210}

Although Sir John Oldcastle was captured, tried and brutally executed in 1417, thus eliminating that potential foe, the Welsh appeared to be ready to rise again.\textsuperscript{211} The constable of Harlech wrote to the chamberlain of North Wales warning him that an alliance had been forged between Maredudd ab Owain, the Scots and the men of the Outer Isles. A landing was expected between Mawddwy and Dyfi and the Welsh were preparing to meet it.\textsuperscript{212}

This is the credence by mouth that is to say howe John Salghall constable of Harglagh certeified and warned by lettre to the chamberleyn of Carnarvane howe that a gentell man of Walys that most knewe and pryueist was with Mereduth ap Owyn in grete especialte warned hym of an accorde made betwene the same Mereduth and men of the owt yles and of Scotland throgh lettres in and owt as he enfourmed hym that they sholden come a lond and aryve at Abermowth and Eve betwix this and midsommer

\textsuperscript{207} \textit{CPR, 1413-16}, 137, 195; Smith, ‘The Last Phase of the Glyndŵr Rebellion’, 253-5; Davies, \textit{Revolt}, 301.
\textsuperscript{208} \textit{CPR 1413-16}, 342, (5 July 1415, from Porchester Castle, as Henry V prepared to attack France); Smith, ‘The Last Phase of the Glyndŵr Rebellion’, 254; Davies, \textit{Revolt}, 244.
\textsuperscript{209} \textit{CPR 1413-16}, 404 (24 February 1416, Westminster).
\textsuperscript{210} Lloyd, \textit{OG}, 154.
neghst with her power and that the same Mereduth shold priuely do warne his ffrendes to make hym redy with hors and harneyes again the same tyme, for which warnyng the same gentell man dar noght passe the toune of Harglagh etc. And likest hit semeth to be soth be cause of the gouvernance of the Walsh peple, for they selleth her catell and byeth hem hors and harneyes. And sume of hem stellet hors and sume robbeth hors and purveyen hem of sadles, bowes and arowes and other harneyes etc. And other recheles men of many dyuers cuntries voidem her groundes and her thrifty gouvernance and assemblen hem in dissolate places and wilde and maken many duers congregaciones and mee[t]ynges pruely, thogh her counsale be holden yit secrete fro us, wherthogh yong peple ar the more wilde in gouvernance.  

Henry V’s government sought to defeat this by offering Maredudd ab Owain a pardon in 1417, which he refused. This offer by the Crown should be seen as an effort to neutralise any threat in west and perhaps an effort to prise the son from the father, rather than a demonstration of even-handedness and magnanimity, albeit calculated, as Davies infers. Perhaps in light of this, in May 1417, absentee lords were ordered to return to their Welsh estates, to fortify and prepare to defend them with Englishmen. Smith believed that the Welsh rebellion had been ‘revitalised with external alliances’ in 1417. Discounting the extinguished Lollards, this is a credible assertion. The Scots, revived after a number of bleak years following Homildon, had begun to again act beyond their borders. While small numbers of Scots mercenaries had earlier found their way into continental retinues, notably those of Jean sans Peur, by 1417 the government was able to deploy Scots forces further afield. Traditional northern targets such as Penrith, Roxburgh and Berwick were assaulted with no success during 1415. The hope or fear of a Scots landing in Wales in 1417 was entirely credible. However, it never materialised. While it remains possible that the French mention of Wales at Constance coincidentally occurred two months before a security crisis there, with apparent Scots connivance, amid a background of ongoing revolt, the notion of this being accidental seems improbable. While there are no proven written connections between the Welsh, French and Scots at this time, the links are probable. Perhaps the most obvious conduit for these three powers was Gruffudd Yonge, whose career enjoyed a measure of elevation even as the Glyn Dŵr regime dwindled. He had been with the French

214 CPR 1416-22, 89 (‘30 April 1417: Pardon to Meredith ap Owain of Wales for all treasons, insurrections, rebellions, felonies, trespasses, misprisions, extortions, offences, conspiracies, confederacies, congregations, negligences, contempts, concealments and deceptions.’); Smith, ‘The Last Phase of the Glyndŵr Rebellion’, 255; Davies, Revolt, 244, 326.
215 Davies, Revolt, 307-8.
218 Vaughan, John the Fearless, 55, 58n, 87, 141, 260; Brown, The Black Douglases, 214-5.
delegation at Constance, and was translated to the bishopric of Ross in Scotland in 1418, and this position is likely to have been initially supported by the French and the Scots.\textsuperscript{220} He appears in the detailed accounts of Jean sans Peur’s government of 1418-9 as a bishop and an ambassador, but could easily have figured during the previous years of more chaotic governance.\textsuperscript{221} Certainly by 1418, the dauphin Charles was openly casting about for foreign allies, traceably approaching the Scots and Castilians, as well as others such as the Lombards and the Savoyards.\textsuperscript{222} Within the context of these diplomatic initiatives, it is entirely possible that these and earlier discreet efforts included sending messengers to Wales.

However, the view of continental events from Wales would probably have caused great concern. After the heavy defeat sustained at Agincourt, Henry V re-invaded France in August 1417 and then pressed further inland than the largely coastal sortie of 1415.\textsuperscript{223} Jean sans Peur’s troops won a grand sweep of towns and castles that year, although no field battles were fought and the final military picture remained unclear, though apparently favourable to him.\textsuperscript{224} The diplomatic scene clearly boded well for him though; Jean made alliances with Brittany and the Emperor that year, and another with the Queen early in 1418.\textsuperscript{225} That same year, the Burgundians seized Paris and many of the Armagnacs, including the dauphin Charles, fled.\textsuperscript{226} The duke then proceeded to massacre perhaps two thousand Armagnacs in Paris.\textsuperscript{227} In a calculated counter-stroke, the Armagnacs murdered Jean sans Peur at Montereau in September 1419, causing a further descent into bitter civil strife in France.\textsuperscript{228} More


\textsuperscript{221} Pocquet du Haut-Jussé, \textit{La France gouvernée par Jean Sans Peur}, 48-50, 102, 104, 141, 142, 145, 238.


\textsuperscript{223} Allmand, \textit{Lancastrian Normandy}, 8-19; Knecht, \textit{The Valois}, 59; Schnerb, \textit{Armagnacs et Bourguignons}, 233-5..

\textsuperscript{224} Vaughan, \textit{John the Fearless}, 215-21; Allmand, \textit{Lancastrian Normandy}, 11-2; Schnerb, \textit{Armagnacs et Bourguignons}, 235-7.

\textsuperscript{225} Pocquet du Haut-Jussé, \textit{La France gouvernée par Jean Sans Peur}, 8-9; Schnerb, \textit{Armagnacs et Bourguignons}, 233, 237-43.


\textsuperscript{227} Morrall, \textit{Gerson and the Great Schism}, 15; Schnerb, \textit{Armagnacs et Bourguignons}, 246-55.

notably, the event proved to be the catalyst for a full Anglo-Burgundian alliance. The resulting treaty of Troyes in May 1420 promised the French crown to Henry V. On 9 January 1420, John, duke of Bedford, was commissioned to persuade Maredudd ab Owain to serve the king in Normandy, in the company of the many other Welshmen already fighting in crown forces. The fact that a man of such esteem and rank as John of Bedford was sent to treat with Maredudd demonstrates the respect and gravity with which the government treated the rebels and the situation. In July the same year, the king authorised the sheriffs of Caernarvon and Merioneth, as well as Thomas Walton, the chamberlain of North Wales, to treat with the Welsh rebels. The rebels were clearly still a force worthy enough to be approached by the local administrators as well as Bedford, one of the most respected English nobles of the age. While Maredudd and his supporters maintained their resistance, Henry V might have been satisfied with his progress in France. His forces held perhaps as much as the northern quarter of the country, his alliance with Burgundy had great potential and the Breton truce was still in force. With this view dominating the horizon, with the English seemingly triumphant in France and the French retreating further south, deep into central France, a reconsideration of the Welsh position seems natural. The end of this second ‘Glyn Dŵr’ revolt, under Maredudd, came in early 1421. This conclusion seems to have been in part caused from below, rather than solely an action decided by the leader. Evidence suggests that the Welsh communities determined how they should be organised and led, and more importantly, how they should be brought to peace. It seems probable that the opinions of the native communities served as a mediating influence on his thinking, at least, and possibly that they forced Maredudd’s hand. Certainly, the native culture in which he lived was one which engaged numerous elements of society in the decision making processes, particularly those involving war, peace and the laws of the land. Whatever his motivations, letters patent to receive the rebel leader date from April; Maredudd ab Owain submitted and was granted a pardon on 8 May 1421.

229 Vaughan, Philip the Good, 4; Allmand, Lancastrian Normandy, 18-22; Knecht, The Valois, 62-3; Schnerb, Armagnacs et Bourguignons, 275-82, 295-301.
231 CPR 1416-22, 254 (‘Commission to the king’s brother John, duke of Bedford, of authority to treat with Meredith ap Owein to cross the seas to the king’s person in Normandy to serve the king there and to promise security to him.’); Smith, ‘The Last Phase of the Glyndŵr Rebellion’, 255; Courteault, Les Chroniques Du Roi Charles VII Par Gilles Le Bouvier, Dit Le Héraut Berry, 305-6; Allmand, Lancastrian Normandy, 63, 80n, 197-8, 281 (et al); H. T. Evans, Wales and the Wars of the Roses, (Stroud: Sutton, 1998, orig. 1905), 27-40.
Pardon to Meredyth son of Owyn de Glendordy of Wales for all reasons, felonies, insurrections, adherences to the king’s enemies, trespasses, rebellions, contempts, deceptions, misprisions, ignorances, concealments, and other offences; as on the testimony of holy writ the son shall not bear the iniquity of his father nor for the offence of one is another to be punished but each shall bear his own burden and receive reward as he has done, whether it be good or evil, and although Owyn rebelled against the king and the crown, prodigal of his honour and forgetful of his due fealty, nevertheless Meredyth after his father’s death did not follow his malice but having it in hatred dwelt peaceably among the king’s subjects and came as soon as he could to the king’s presence in spirit of humility and demeanour of a penitent, and the king has inclined ears of pity to his supplication on that account.234

Epilogue to ‘Constance, 1417’
This French-English exchange at Constance seems significant because it appears to demonstrate that the French were committed to honouring their promises to support Wales, among others. Also, this debate opened another, different forum for the conflict between England and France. It appears that this is perhaps the only occasion during the Middle Ages where the Welsh were represented by a major power in multi-lateral discussions on the grander, continental stage. Under the veil of the ecclesiastical discourse put forward by the French, it seems likely that the real reason was to disrupt the English effort in northern France. However, it is noteworthy that this unique approach to resolving France’s problems sought to include Wales as a part of the solution. Moreover, the French faction then in power, the Armagnacs, included Wales as one of the focal points of their protest, seeking for them independent representation within the Church. While this recalls in part the terms of the Pennal Declaration, it also envisaged a continuation, perhaps even a blossoming of the French-Welsh relationship. In some ways therefore, this protest could be seen as an effort by the Armagnacs to honour their union with the Welsh. This ongoing consideration suggests that the military and diplomatic relations between Wales and France in the first decade of the fifteenth century were more than an exchange of brave verbiage. It is perhaps irrelevant whether those words of friendship were genuine, although there is no reason to doubt that they were; the facts are that both parties wanted to see Wales wrested from English dominion and ruled by its native princes and allied to France. It would be simplistic and incorrect to view the Welsh as little more than agents of French polity; the Welsh rebellion was not precipitated by the French, and the Welsh were not doing their bidding. Their friendship

234 CPR 1416-22, 335; (Note: the first line says ‘reasons’ but perhaps should read ‘treasons’, also, this evidence clearly shows that the authorities believed Owain had died by this point.); Smith, ‘The Last Phase of the Glyndŵr Rebellion’, 255-6; Davies, Revolt, 2, 293, 310.
seems genuine then and the French representation of a Welsh cause at Constance showed that they saw merit in continuing their relationship.

Therefore, the ultimate failure of the alliance to secure a pro-French independent Wales was not through a lack of desire, planning or effort on either part. Unfavourable circumstances and unfortunate events on the rough seas of politics and war prevailed over them. From a Welsh perspective, the French move at Constance saw the final appearance of any mention or remnant of Glyn Dŵr’s Wales on an international stage, whether in a military, diplomatic or any other context. This event therefore effectively marks the closure of contacts between the kings of France and Welsh leaders striving for independence. From this point until Henry Tudor’s exile to Brittany in 1471, the French only encountered the Welsh as contingents of English armies, mostly in northern France. Although some of those Welshmen changed sides and willingly surrendered to the French the towns and castles placed in their charge by the English, these seem to have been largely individual acts and not due to adherence to any Welsh political goals. Therefore, not only does this quarrel at Constance represent the final flourish of the alliance between Charles VI’s government and Owain Glyn Dŵr on a wider, continental stage, but it is the last such contact between the Welsh and the French, drawing to a close more than two hundred and fifty years of intermittent diplomatic contact. Therefore, no matter how unsuccessful Jean Campagne’s protestatio, it remains a significant part of French–Welsh relations.

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235 Evans, *Wales and the Wars of the Roses*, 35-6 (Welshmen ceding English castles in Normandy to the French), 115 (Henry Tudor to Brittany).
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