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Still waiting for a plausible Humean theory of reasons

Shackel, Nicholas 2014. Still waiting for a plausible Humean theory of reasons. Philosophical Studies 167 (3) , pp. 607-633. 10.1007/s11098-013-0117-7

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Abstract

In his important recent book Schroeder proposes a Humean theory of reasons that he calls hypotheticalism. His rigourous account of the weight of reasons is crucial to his theory, both as an element of the theory and constituting his defence to powerful standard objections to Humean theories of reasons. In this paper I examine that rigourous account and show it to face problems of vacuity and consonance. There are technical resources that may be brought to bear on the problem of vacuity but implementation is not simple and philosophical motivation a further difficulty. Even supposing vacuity is fixed, the problems of consonance bring to light a different obstruction lying in Schroeder’s path. There is a difference between the general weighing of reasons and the context specificity of the correct placing of weight on them in deliberation and this difference cannot be fixed by the resources in the account. For these reasons we are still waiting for a plausible Humean theory of reasons.

Item Type: Article
Date Type: Publication
Status: Published
Schools: English, Communication and Philosophy
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Uncontrolled Keywords: Reasons, Weight, Weighing, Humean, Normative, Hypotheticalism
Additional Information: Online publication date: 30 March 2013.
Publisher: Springer
ISSN: 0031-8116
Date of First Compliant Deposit: 30 March 2016
Last Modified: 21 Feb 2019 14:55
URI: http://orca.cf.ac.uk/id/eprint/45510

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