Cinema and Control

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Summary

This thesis explores the political implications of Gilles Deleuze’s two-volume work on the cinema (Cinema 1: The Movement-Image [2005a] and Cinema 2: The Time-Image [2005b]). I argue that counter to the common reading of these works as being primarily concerned with aesthetics and philosophy, Deleuze’s cinema books should be understood as a political critique of the operations of cinema. I outline the main arguments set out by these works as a political formulation and argue that they should be directly related to Deleuze’s more explicitly political writings. In particular, I argue that these books should be read alongside Deleuze’s later ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control’ (1992), which re-addresses some of the most significant aspects of his earlier work on cinema following a transformation in media technologies and social organisation.

I argue that Deleuze’s time-image and his later conceptualisation of control should be understood as forming the two poles of his theorisation of cinema and visual culture. When addressed as connected concepts, a significant political dimension emerges in this area of Deleuze’s thought, focusing on a time-image that opens a range of possibilities for the future ordering of the world and a system of control that will recurrently close and eliminate these possibilities. Through a series of studies of film texts I will develop the political implications of Deleuze’s thinking on cinema and visual culture in order to show how the forces of control and the time-image operate and how these concepts can be systematised and further integrated into Deleuze’s wider political thought.
# Contents

Acknowledgements v

Introduction: Deleuze’s Cinema Project is Politically Motivated 1

Chapter 1: Control and the Time-Image 32

* (Hour of the Wolf, Germany Year Zero and Tokyo Story)

Chapter 2: Cinema and Territoriality 78

* (Jaws and The Searchers)

Chapter 3: Jean-Luc Godard and the Cinema of Cliché 125

* (Je Vous Salue, Sarajevo, Histoire(s) du Cinéma and Une Femme Mariée)

Chapter 4: Glauber Rocha and the People to Come 170

* (Deus e o Diabo na Terra do Sol and Antônio das Mortes)

Conclusion: The Limits of the World 229

Bibliography 236

Filmography 250
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Introduction:

Deleuze’s Cinema Project is Politically Motivated

This thesis will focus on Cinema 1: The Movement-Image (2005a) and Cinema 2: The Time-Image (2005b), Gilles Deleuze’s landmark philosophical enquiry into the status of cinematic art in the history of thought in the twentieth century. In these books Deleuze advances a relatively simple thesis: that the history of cinema is made up of movement-images, the pre-war classical conception of cinema that makes the time of a film subordinate to the movements that fill it, and time-images, the modern post-war conception of cinema that allows time to be seen for itself. Deleuze draws this basic proposition from Henri Bergson and develops it into a broader meditation on time and thought.

Deleuze’s cinema project argues that it is not until after the emergence of the time-image that the supposedly temporal medium of cinema is able to grasp time fully.¹ The audiences of the classical movement-image cinema had never had cause to take notice of time, as it was chopped up and shortened, obscured and enslaved to the narrative drive of a motion picture. But as cinema came of age and entered into its modern era, time would gradually be called forth by the image, allowing audiences to perceive its

¹ The main points of Deleuze’s cinema books as they relate to my own argument will be covered in some detail throughout this thesis. For a more general explanation and overview of Deleuze’s work on cinema see Deleuze on Cinema (2003) by Ronald Bogue, which offers a clear discussion of the main points of Deleuze’s cinema project, and Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine (2003) by David Rodowick, which connects the books to both Deleuze’s wider work and visual theory and philosophy more broadly.
own passing. In cinema’s modern age the time of the shot lengthens, the narrative 
exoskeleton that held each element of a film in place is removed, characterisation, the 
establishment of location and the actions and gestures of characters are weakened so as 
to become all but insignificant. Deleuze shows how the departures from the classical 
cinema schema made by Roberto Rossellini, Michelangelo Antonioni, Ozu Yasujirō, 
Jean-Luc Godard, Federico Fellini, Robert Bresson and many others have changed 
something in cinema. The result of such film-makers, Deleuze shows, is not exactly a 
new time-image schema, but a new way of thinking about what cinema is and what 
cinema can do.

Deleuze praises the new cinema on both of these points. He argues that the construction 
of a cinema-world (and as I will explain in Chapter 2, all films are in the business of 
building a world of some sort) changes in cinema’s modern age, bringing us closer to 
the poverty and misery that permeates existence for so many, making visible a world 
that is not romantic or exciting or comedic or intriguing, as it was in the old cinema, but 
that is intolerable. Poverty and misery had often been the topic of films long before the 
emergence of the time-image, but the new aesthetic offers a strikingly different 
depiction of these things. No longer are these simple plot details or narrative settings; no 
longer do we simply see a poor neighbourhood or a hungry character. The time-image 
opens film up to its outside, drawing us closer to a world beyond the motion-picture 
theatre and the invisible forces that circulate there. The new cinema offers poverty or

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2 Deleuze’s motivation for dividing the history of cinema into classical and modern cinema (Deleuze 
says movement-image and time-image) should be understood in philosophical rather than historical 
terms, and as forming two interrelating aesthetics rather than a strict binary. Whilst the two forms are 
both formally and philosophically distinct from one another, there are likely to be elements of both in 
many films. Whilst Deleuze highlights 1945 as marking a shift in cinematic thought, we cannot posit a 
simple break between pre- and post-war cinema due to the continuing quantitative dominance of the 
movement-image in post-war cinema and the existence of a number of pioneers who had developed an 
aesthetic something like the modern time-image in the pre-war years. I will address this point in more 
detail in chapter 1.
misery or any number of other forces as something that is felt as well as seen, and strips back the formal grammar and organisation of cinema that had for so long offered ways of coping with such things – individualising characterisation to cope with hopeless poverty, cut-away editing to cope with unspeakable horror, narrative resolution to cope with unthinkable suffering. By stripping cinema of the chains that had shackled every part of a film to narrative movement and sequential action, the time-image makes these forces directly visible, like time, in and of themselves, and builds a very different world to that of the closed romantic worlds of the classical cinema. The new cinema, in Rossellini and Bresson and Youssef Cahine and Wai, offers a world in which suffering or sorrow is made to confront the spectator directly.

For Deleuze the time-image marks a monumental shift in the manner in which cinema (and visual culture more generally) is thought. The modern cinema offers an image that is not anchored in the formal and narrative construction of film, giving an often indiscernible image as obscure and contradictory as the world in which it circulates. The time-image is irrationally organised and not subject to any strict formal logic. It offers a world of difference and mutation that is without any centre, and through which images and actions can be organised. In classical narrative cinema an organising principle would typically be a significant plot device, a main character, or some other formal foundation upon which to develop the film. The time-image has no need of any formal anchoring, instead offering a changing and contradictory world without centre.

A similar series of analyses of the changing nature of the world can be seen across Deleuze’s later works, particularly in his books on Michel Foucault (2006a) and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (2006b), his work with Félix Guattari (2004a, 2008, 2004b
and 1994), and the short essay ‘Postscript on the Society of Control’ (1992). What Deleuze’s analysis of the time-image shows, and in very different ways, what each of his later works show, is the dissolution of the world – the world made fluid and shifting, gradually confirming the displacement of a Hegelian conception of the world based on ‘truth’ and ‘being’ by a Nietzschean conception of the world as fabulation. Deleuze explores the time-image as a cinema of endless variation in which the old certainties of good and evil, of morality and judgement, are no longer available, and in doing so he finds a cinema in which the depiction of the world is not formed in reference to the unchanging certainties of the classical cinematic regime. The movement-image offers a world where we can say that we understand morality or love or beauty and know what they each look like. Removing these crutches opens the image towards the possibility of change and towards an image where all life is not already pre-ordered through reference to some constant universal. This is Deleuze’s challenge to the logic of the classical cinema. The time-image opens the image towards other worlds not organised around the constant principles that haunt the old cinema. By finding ways to make visible the miseries and injustices that permeate the world it has already made the world of cinema into something it was not.

I will argue that there is an important and too often neglected political dimension to Deleuze’s cinema project. Whilst these texts are most often read as an aesthetic or philosophic meditation on cinema, I argue that Deleuze’s cinema books offer an analysis of cinema as a political medium. That these books press a political position is not often

3 This reading of the cinema books is proposed by Rodowick in Reading the Figural (2001: 170-202), where he argues that the time-image marks a shift from one regime of the visual to another, and that this movement is charted across Deleuze’s work. Rodowick shows how this shift towards a new ungrounded and inexplicable regime of visual culture throws into question notions of truth and being, representation and history, and should be seen as a significant shift in the history of thought itself. Deleuze tackles the Nietzschean dimensions of his cinema work most explicitly in Cinema 2’s ‘Powers of the False’ chapter (2005b: 122-150).
argued in the extensive body of work that makes up Deleuzian film theory. However, as I will argue, when we read the cinema books through the ideas and concepts presented in Deleuze’s other works from the same period, and, in particular, through his essay on the control society, they can be properly understood as significant political works. The books are concerned with both the opening of thought and thought’s own struggles in a social field of habitual actions and gestures and a global network of images, often politically vacuous or else dangerously regressive, but only very rarely, as Deleuze’s work argues, expressing the power of thought to create something new. I argue that the control essay should be understood as having ‘completed’ Deleuze’s cinema project. In its concern with the movement of bodies in space and the manipulation of information and images in computer networks, in short, with what is and is not possible in a particular situation, this essay feeds back into the cinema books, offering a newly politicised understanding of a project that has, for the most part, been read with little political interest. The control essay will enable me to re-read the cinema books, expanding on Deleuze’s project as a whole and scrutinising several key sections, in order to draw out the political implications that become clear in light of the control essay. These implications focus on the conditions by which images (in cinema and in visual culture more broadly) enable individuals to think of themselves and the world around them. I will argue that Deleuze’s work on cinema addresses the possibilities of thought that emerge in an individual’s relation to the images of the world. Through Deleuze, we can understand the importance of images in providing the tools to think the world, in determining the limits of what can be thought, and subsequently in dictating what new orders of thought can emerge. At its most significant, Deleuze’s cinema

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4 The significance of the control essay in Deleuze’s later works is also argued by Alexander Galloway in ‘Computer and the Superfold’ (2012). Galloway argues that the control essay helps us to readdress many of his other works in a more explicitly political frame (2012: 513-514). Galloway does not note the important links between this essay and the cinema books, which in my reading is crucial for understanding the political thrust of Deleuze’s late work.
philosophy should be understood as questioning what makes ‘a world’ (as I will highlight, this term will have a very particular meaning for Deleuze) and what other points of emergence can arise from any such world.

Whilst Deleuze scholars have not understood the cinema books as politically motivated texts, there are a handful of exceptions that demonstrate a slowly increasing acceptance that Deleuze’s thought on cinema might be put to work on more directly political problems. David Rodowick’s work suggests a political concern in Reading the Figural (2001) and Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine (2003), expanding the cinema books into a broader critical discourse on visual culture and the philosophy of time. Rodowick draws ideas from both Deleuze’s wider work and from the philosophers and thinkers who are important to his project (particularly, for Rodowick, Friedrich Nietzsche). In Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine he puts this quite clearly, arguing that ‘Deleuze’s Nietzschean approach to art […] is profoundly political in all its dimensions’ (2003: xiv). ‘A Genealogy of Time’, the sixth chapter of Reading the Figural (2001: 170-202) more directly invokes the political dimension of the two books by inserting them into a wider discourse on Deleuze and Foucault’s conceptualisation of history and what he calls their ‘new Nietzscheanism’ (2001: 183) – the reappraisal and recovery of the philosophical writings of Nietzsche that began with the publication of Deleuze’s Nietzsche and Philosophy (2006c) in 1962. Rodowick argues that Deleuze’s cinema books should be read in light of the ‘reassertion of the force of History’ that would come with this reappraisal of Nietzsche. Rodowick says:

The logic of the time-image itself can be revaluated in the Nietzschean sense as the emergence of a historical dispositif that pre-supposes not only a
rearticulation of time in relation to space but also the expression of a new ‘historical sense’ and the anticipation of a new subject. (2001: 186)

Rodowick inserts the books into a broader historical discourse in order to show where the cinema books sit with respect to a repositioning of thought. In doing so he gestures towards the political power of the cinema books, developing Deleuze’s thesis away from marking a simple shift in cinema aesthetics into something that takes account of far greater developments in philosophical thought.

More explicit are the arguments of Julian Reid and Nathan Jun, who make a case for the reading of the cinema books as being directly concerned with politics. Reid’s ‘A People of Seers’ (2011) argues that Deleuze’s project is concerned with the construction and reconstruction of what he calls ‘a people’ (drawn from Deleuze’s declaration that ‘the people are missing’ in Cinema 2 [2005b: 207-215]). Reid draws from the work on national cinemas by David Martin-Jones (2006) and Bill Marshall (2001), as well as his own writings on ‘post-national politics’ (2010a and 2010b), in order to argue that the political interest of Deleuze’s books is not in the struggle between nationhood and minority (what Reid considers to be the common misreading of Deleuze’s few pages on minor cinemas), but in the account Deleuze provides of ‘a people of seers’. Similarly, in ‘Toward an Anarchist Film Theory’ (2010) Jun makes Deleuze (alongside Foucault) a central part of his ‘anarchist film theory’ project, arguing that Deleuze’s work can be utilised to mark a ‘third way’ in film theory that is different to the ideological studies inherited from the Frankfurt School (and presumably also Althusserian film theory) and what he calls the ‘bottom up’ approach of cultural studies (2010: 158). Whilst both Reid and Jun are quite explicit in their respective arguments towards the political
applicability of Deleuze’s film project, neither demonstrate their claims with the conviction of Rodowick’s positioning of the cinema books within Deleuze’s broader Nietzscheanism and both fail to explain where their arguments fit within Deleuze’s wider political thought.  

My own position on the political value of the cinema books follows Ian Buchanan, who, in two articles on the relationship between the cinema books and Deleuze and Guattari’s schizoanalysis project (2008 and 2010) argues that Deleuze’s work must be taken as a whole (2008: 4), and suggests that we can make connections between any one text and another in order to address questions that remain unanswered in Deleuze’s work. Buchanan argues that the questions that have always concerned film theory – questions of technical development, of technological and industrial processes, of audience reception and, as I argue elsewhere (2011: 151-153), we might also add politics to this list – are hardly alien to Anti-Oedipus (2004a) or A Thousand Plateaus (2004b), and despite Deleuze’s philosophical concerns with respect to cinema, there is nothing to stop us connecting the cinema and schizoanalysis projects in order to find ways of dealing with politics and cinema in light of a wider body of work that is quite evidently political.

In addition to these critics, there are also arguments for the political dimensions of the cinema books in Paola Marrati’s Gilles Deleuze: Cinema and Philosophy (2008: x), Patricia Pisters’ The Neuro-Image (2012: 217-242 and 243-270) and Laura Marks’ The Skin of the Film (2000). Marks’ position is the most explicit of these, appropriating Deleuze’s cinema project in order to analyse the political discourses developed by what she calls ‘intercultural cinema’, a dispersed group of largely independent minority and transnational film-makers that occupy positions in-between cultural groups and that are ignored or otherwise unrepresented by the various discursive practices used to unify ‘a culture’. Marks argues that her staged encounter between Deleuze’s work and intercultural cinema draws out the political implications of his theory of cinema (2000: 26). Intercultural cinema as a ‘minor’ film-making practice concerns the use of cinema (and often video) to provide a voice to the vast amounts of people not addressed by the hegemonic ‘official’ media systems of the western world. Marks’ position on Deleuze’s cinema politics coincides with my own on several points (particularly in my analysis of Brazilian cinema in chapter 4); however given the specificity of her study of intercultural film practice, I am regrettably unable to offer more than a cursory discussion of her work. I will address Pisters’ work in more detail in chapter 2.
By way of support for the few critics who have attempted, in various ways, to demonstrate the political force of the cinema books, Deleuze even devotes a fairly large amount of space to questions regarding the political forces of cinema – the study of minor cinema towards the end of *Cinema 2* (2005b: 207-215); the discussion of fascism and Hollywood in the ‘Thought and Cinema’ chapter (2005b: 159-167); the conceptualisation of cliché-images (2005b: 17-23); the reading of Nietzsche and the powers of the false (2005b: 122-150); the meditation on the emptiness of everyday life in Ozu’s films (2005b: 13-17). I argue that the cinema books are completely oriented by politics throughout because of their concern with the creative potential of cinema to offer something new.

**An Outline of this Thesis**

I intend to analyse the political position that Deleuze adopts in the cinema books in order to show how his conceptual shift towards the regime of the time-image should be understood as part of a wider analysis of the operations of society as a distributed system that is pursued across Deleuze’s later works. Deleuze’s analysis of this shift eventually culminates in the short essay on control societies in which he shows how a modulating system of control has emerged in place of the disciplinary formation analysed in Foucault’s work. The ungrounding of cinematic representation that Deleuze finds in the time-image coincides with the systemic reorganisation that he discusses in the control essay and, as I will show, should be read in accordance with it. If, as Deleuze

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6 In ‘Control and Becoming’ (1995), a conversation between Deleuze and Antonio Negri, the latter is insistent that the arguments developed in each of these sections directly connect with a politics developed across Deleuze’s work. Negri says: ‘When I follow your descriptions in *The Time-Image* of the rise of revolutionary cinema in third world countries, and with you grasp the passage from image into fabulation, into political praxis, I almost feel I’ve found an answer’ (1995: 173).
argues, the new control society has engineered a system whereby order is maintained despite this system being constantly mutating, then we must also conceive of this system of control as reorganising the forces that had emerged as part of the time-image. I will show that when read through the conceptualisation of control, Deleuze’s cinema project becomes political in two ways: as a study of the possibility of cinema to show new worlds and as a study of cinema as part of a mechanism that orders society despite its fluidity and groundlessness. Deleuze’s thought positions contemporary film and visual culture between the influence of Cinema 2 and the control essay and in this way understands the image as fluctuating between a deterritorialising time-image and a reterritorialising control. I intend to trace these lines in order to show how Deleuze’s cinema-politics works and how this is expressed in relation to his wider thought.

In order to demonstrate my contention that Deleuze’s cinema books are political I will use the rest of this introduction to highlight the affinities that Deleuze’s work shares with earlier and in many cases more explicitly political, cinema theorists of the 1970s and 1980s. The two propositions that I will highlight in Deleuze’s thought, that the time-image makes the intolerable visible, and that it operates in line with the system of control that Deleuze was to theorise later, coincide with contemporaneous theoretical positions. Despite significant divergence between these positions I hope to demonstrate that Deleuze’s work remains consistent with many of the aims and interests of the film theory that had immediately preceded the publication of his own cinema books.

Following this initial exploration and confirmation of Deleuze’s political focus, I will address the connections between the cinema books and other parts of Deleuze’s work. In Chapter 1, I will examine the links between the conceptualisations of control and the
time-image, exploring Deleuze’s essay on control in order to show that there are similar concerns with modulation and indiscernibility in the cinema books. It will be necessary to sketch out initial definitions of both the time-image and control and to develop the similarities that exist between them, before finally concluding that when read through Deleuze’s theorisation of control, the time-image should be understood as simultaneously opening and closing new worlds and orders of thought.

Chapter 2 will develop this conclusion further, asking what Deleuze means when he speaks of ‘a world’ in the cinema books, and utilising his work on territoriality in *A Thousand Plateaus*, as well as his book on Leibniz, in order to demonstrate how these cinema-worlds might be opened or closed, and how discursive systems or images of the world might be made to speak or keep silent. My exploration of control will have already shown that Deleuze’s politics of cinema is concerned with the ways in which a sprawling and chaotic system of images is organised – how cinema is extracted from an expansive field of visual culture – and it will be necessary to demonstrate how this takes place and how the world that cinema constructs is always a series of multiple worlds. We must ask what kind of world is to be made visible by the images of cinema, as well as what other worlds might be suppressed or hidden by these images.

Chapter 3 will focus on this more directly, utilising the work of Godard in order to explore the confrontation of these multiple cinema-worlds. Much of Godard’s work is concerned with a conflict between commercial and artistic images and I intend to develop this basic position through Deleuze’s work. Deleuze speaks of clichés that give us an empty image in place of thought and of minor peoples that are missing in the face of the movement-images of mass-produced cinema and television. Godard shows that
the many conflicting worlds of the cinema, the opening or closing of worlds, the minorities and intolerabilities that are absent before a system of clichés, are a matter of visibility. Deleuze’s work is clear that the little images of exception that punctuate the cinema (images of minority and difference, unspoken injustices, unheard sufferings) are no less real for being invisible within the clichés – that such images are possible, that they can be even thought, is enough for them to be fully real. The concept of visibility is central to Deleuze’s cinema politics.

Chapter 4 will focus on this aspect of Deleuze’s work, utilising his book on Foucault in order to argue that the opening or closing of cinema-worlds, the showing or silencing of the intolerable in the image, and the construction of minor-cinemas are concerned with what is and is not visible. That the regime of the time-image operates in accordance with a modular and shifting system of control should be read through the concept of visibility that Deleuze develops in *Foucault*. Using this concept, I will develop a study of the films of Brazilian director Glauber Rocha, a figure who is highlighted towards the end of *Cinema 2* (2005b: 210-214), but only given a cursory analysis by Deleuze. I will show that with the endless mutations of the field of visual culture there arises a potential for new cinema-worlds and new orders of thought. That the time-image could escape the striated regimes of the classical conception of cinema had been cause for optimism for Deleuze in *Cinema 2*. It offers new images of the world that can grow and change and that are no longer tied to concrete notions of certainty about what the world is and how it works. We see this, as Deleuze highlights in *Cinema 2*, in the work of many filmmakers and in many cycles – Rocha had tried to offer an aesthetics of an intolerable hunger beneath the visibilities of cinematic Brazil; the British Kitchen Sink films had offered a new industrial working-class frame to contrast to the mythic cine-Britain of
the 1950s and 1960s; Imamura Shôhei and Ousmane Sembène and Melvin Van Peebles had all, in different ways, tried to offer new visibilities. But with this offer comes the danger of the most fearsome control mechanisms that might reintegrate us into systems of thought or images of the world that are no less oppressive than before. Deleuze questions what images and systems of thought can be made visible – what new peoples can be formed, what new territories can be staked out, what intolerabilities can be made to shout before they are silenced. Deleuze’s cinema project is directly concerned with all of these questions and I hope to offer an outline of how they are systematised across his work.

**Political Film Theory and Deleuze’s Cinema Project**

Deleuze is usually understood as having broken with the trajectory of film studies in the 1980s, and certainly his work at first does seem to owe more to the history of philosophy than to the work of any contemporaneous film theorists. However, in the terms through which I have attempted to position Deleuze’s cinema work as a political project, we can begin to see how his thought starts to fit with the concerns of film theory more generally, and in particular with the numerous political theorists that dominated film studies in the years leading up to the publication of *Cinema 1*. Rodowick’s work is concerned with the position that Deleuze’s work assumes in a wider field of critical theory on film and visual culture, relating Deleuze to a broader philosophical body of work in *Reading the Figural* and considering the evolution of film theory and the place of Deleuze within it in ‘An Elegy for Theory’ (2007a). Both texts show a clear concern with Deleuze’s overall position with respect to the field of
film criticism and relate his work more or less explicitly to political film theory.

Following 1968, and dominating the theoretical discourses on film in the 1970s and early 1980s, cinema theorists such as, amongst many others, Peter Wollen, Stephen Heath, Colin MacCabe, Jean Narboni and Jean-Louis Comolli would launch a series of theoretical investigations into a range of significant political problems concerning the manifestation of power and ideology in the production, reception, form and industrial apparatus of cinema. Despite the apparent diversity of their critical focus, many of these critics share Deleuze’s concern with cinema as a machine that can show, but most often does not show, the invisible miseries of the world. This positions these film theorists close to Deleuze’s own interest in the cinematic depiction of the intolerable.

In ‘Whose Brecht? Memories for the Eighties’ (1982) Sylvia Harvey addresses this politicised film theory as ‘political modernism’, a term Rodowick will later utilise in The Crisis of Political Modernism (1994), which traces the history and reception of this important lineage of film criticism. Over the course of two decades, political modernist theory will develop a number of theoretical studies that take account of a range of critical discourses including Althusserian Marxism, Saussurean linguistics, Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis, apparatus theory, feminism, gender studies, cultural studies, avant-garde aesthetics and post-colonial thought.

‘Cinema / Ideology / Criticism’ (1976), Jean-Louis Comolli and Jean Narboni’s editorial for the October 1969 edition of Cahiers du Cinéma, highlights a series of proposals for how to conduct a politically informed study of cinema. Following the events of May and June 1968, a broad redefinition of purpose confronted the institutions of academic
cinema criticism, resulting in a series of questions concerning the political motivations of film theory. The central point of the Cahiers manifesto is that any analysis of cinema must acknowledge the place of film within a commercial economic system and its corresponding place within an ideological system. Every film is political, say Comolli and Narboni, in so much as every film is determined by the economic and ideological terrain within which it is produced (1976: 24). Peter Wollen’s treatise on counter-cinema says essentially the same thing. In ‘Godard and Counter-Cinema’ (1985: 500-509) Wollen sets out the aims of a new ‘revolutionary cinema’ that should be read as challenging the values of classical cinema (1985: 501). Wollen argues that this ‘counter-cinema’ and its corresponding cinema criticism are suspicious of the power of film to capture its audience (1985: 505-506). The ‘old cinema’, by which he means Hollywood, cinematic formations derived from or allied to Hollywood, or Socialist Realist film and its offshoots, sets out a coherent and integrated form in which everything takes place within a single diegetic world, in which audiences are encouraged to form identifications with on-screen characters and spaces, and in which a cinematic fiction is presented and sold as a direct representation of the world. Like Comolli and Narboni, Wollen presents this form of cinema as the manifestation of a dominant ideology. His discussion of the organisation of stable cinematic systems coincides with Comolli and Narboni’s argument that cinema should be understood as being like a language through which the capitalist world communicates itself to itself and through which it constitutes a world as it is experienced when filtered through ideology (1976: 25). Both texts are concerned with the powers of cinematic ideology to circulate and perpetuate images of itself in place of a cinema that is conducive to thought or change.

Comolli expresses corresponding sentiments in ‘Machines of the Visible’ (1980), in
which he argues that the ‘apparatuses of representation’ are participating in ‘the delegation of power (political representation), the ceaseless working-up of social imaginaries (historical, ideological representations), and a large part, even, of the modes of relational behaviour (balances of power, confrontations, manoeuvres of seduction, strategies of defence, marking of differences or affiliations)’ (1980: 121). Comolli’s reading of cinema centres on the position of the cinematic image in a social fabric of representations. For Comolli, cinema is political in that it is involved in both the delegation of power and in the rendering of society as something that can be seen and spoken in line with a dominant capitalist discourse. ‘The social machine manufactures representations’, Comolli says, and ‘also manufactures itself from representations’ (1980: 121, author’s emphasis). This means that the status of the cinema apparatus and the cinema image as ideological (that cinema is an ideological medium is something that all of the major political modernist texts seem to agree on) leads to the structuring of the social as something in line with the mechanisms of the capitalist political machine.

These theorists all agree that cinema serves an ideological function and that through this function can have an impact on the wider social world by defining popular discourse, influencing the behaviour and attitudes of everyday life, or by setting the terms for political thought. There is something intolerable about the world and the cinema is doing nothing to improve a political situation that perpetuates the images and discourses of this intolerability for the majority of people. What political modernism poses is the question of the cinema’s place within the world and its political influence upon society. There is a tacit agreement across the cinematic theoretical studies from the late sixties through to the early eighties that cinema as a medium and as an apparatus is complicit
in the perpetuation of an intolerable social and political situation and that any attempt made to analyse its operation must respond to this.

I argue that despite the seeming absence of this form of film criticism from Deleuze’s own studies of cinema, there is an important but neglected affinity that he shares with the writers, theorists, film makers and critics exploring the functions of politics in cinema and visual culture immediately prior to the publication of his cinema books (Cinema 1 was published in French in 1983 and Cinema 2 in 1985). Across his work Deleuze develops an analysis of the mechanisms for the capture and control of people within a political and social field. This is developed most clearly in Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus and is also evident in much of his later work, particularly in Foucault (2006a) and The Fold (2006b). We should see an important political position maintained by Deleuze’s commitment to judging cinema by what it can do (as well as by the related question of what it should do).

However, whilst there is a commitment to political questions in Deleuze’s cinema books, this is not pursued in the same terms as in the wider field of film theory. These theoretical texts, through their focus on ideological discourse, are critical of the dominant cinema culture for the way in which it peddles illusion as reality and ideological discourses as self-evident truths – they are critical of the cinema’s unwillingness to show the intolerable as it actually exists and of cinema’s own role in the continuation of a number of politically regressive situations. Deleuze does not engage with cinema ideology, and despite developing a theorisation of classical and

7 Rodowick’s ‘An Elegy for Theory’ explores Deleuze’s cinema books in light of film theory more broadly (including film theory from this period) and is one of the few texts to suggest this. Richard Rushton also makes use of film theory from this period in order to test the applicability of Deleuze’s work to questions concerning cinema spectatorship. See ‘Passions and Actions: Deleuze’s Cinematic Cogito’ (2008), ‘Deleuzian Spectatorship’ (2009) and ‘A Deleuzian Imaginary’ (2011).
modern cinema that is in many ways sympathetic to the concerns of political modernism, he comes to a slightly different conclusion. Deleuze presents cinema itself (rather than cinema criticism) as providing its own challenge to the forces of an intolerable world that is ignored and perpetuated at one stroke. He finds a cinema where thought and change can be made possible in the time-image.

This is the reason for Deleuze’s much-maligned cinephilia. We should not understand his focus on European art and Hollywood auteur film as a reflection of the tastes of a Parisian film snob but as being intimately tied to his philosophical project. In Deleuze’s work there is a subtle agreement with the earlier political film theorists that, for the most part, the cinema does not bring about a platform upon which it is possible to think freely, and it is this suspicion that leads him to his cine-philosophical studies as a search for a kind of film that can make thought possible in the face of the bland and politically suspect machinery of cinema culture. What Deleuze shares with a film theorist such as Wollen is an understanding of cinema that contrasts an art cinema with a dominant form of film-making that can only serve to reinforce the intolerable state of a world in which thought and creation are secondary to a politics of sameness. There is much disagreement between the two thinkers over what kind of film might operate otherwise; however, in both (and in many other key film theorists) it is possible to work backwards from the work on time-images and counter-cinemas in order to determine exactly what this cinema of intolerability might look like and how it might operate. I argue that Deleuze’s understanding of cinema culture offers a continuation and development of one of the key projects of political film theory.

There is a page midway through Cinema 2 where Deleuze hazards an explanation of
sorts for his choice of examples. He says: ‘We can always say that cinema has drowned in the nullity of its own productions’ (2005b: 159). There is a similar condemnation a few lines later when Deleuze surmises that the cinema is dying from its own ‘quantitative mediocrity’ (2005b: 159). Cinema as mass art, the great forms of the movement-image now taken up by poor film-makers, is hopelessly marked by what Deleuze calls here a ‘mediocrity of products’ and a ‘fascism of production’ (2005b: 159). The movement-image made Hollywood mass product will only, Deleuze says, peddle representation in place of cerebral stimulation. It will deteriorate into propaganda and manipulation, offer clichés in place of thought and lead only to the organisation of the forces of capital, state and war (2005b: 159).

These themes are of obvious importance to any discussion of politics in Deleuze’s cinema books and demonstrate one of a handful of explicit entry points into his articulation of cinema as a political medium. For readers of the ideological critiques offered by the political modernists, much of what Deleuze says here will sound familiar. To go so far as to suggest that this form of cinema might mobilise a kind of ‘ordinary fascism’ (2005b: 159) is evidence of a consideration of the cinema entertainment industry as political and goes further than a simple dislike or elitist dismissal.

In ‘Machines of the Visible’ Comolli elaborates on some of the points raised here. Comolli argues that the camera stands in for the domination of the visible. The camera does not produce the image but is metonymically brought forward as the visible part of the whole of the ‘technics’ of cinema (1980: 124) at the expense of co-present cinematic technologies in projection, film stock, photochemical development, sound recording equipment, lenses, and in the economic and industrial organisation of cinema itself. The
The reading of Bergson that Deleuze provides at the start of Cinema 1 takes this position further still, arguing that the cinema arrangement extracts an image from the world that is separate from both its social and technical organisation. Like Comolli, Deleuze does not consider the camera as having produced the image, but rather that an image exists in the world even before it is captured or perceived. Images are images in themselves; they are not for anyone and are not addressed to anyone. An image exists, Deleuze explains, always and already there as part of a plane of immanence that the cinema apparatus serves to make visible (2005a: 61).

Comolli’s argument develops along the same lines as Deleuze’s understanding of the organisation of cinema in that he considers the cinema arrangement as existing apart from its technological evolution. However, he uses this to develop a political critique of cinema arrangement is primarily a social organisation through which the cinematic technologies will be utilised. Comolli says that there is an organisation of cinematic vision quite apart from the various technologies of photographic reproduction: ‘The hundreds of little machines in the nineteenth century destined for a more or less clumsy reproduction of the image and the movement of life are picked up in this ‘phylum’ of the great representative machine’ (1980: 122). For Comolli the industrial cinematic apparatus is only the latest stage in a social arrangement of visibility and spectacle that precedes the accepted birth of cinema.

Unlike the majority of the other theorists of his age, Comolli would recognise the relevance of Deleuze’s work to his own critical project (bearing in mind that Comolli’s article appeared three years before the French publication of Cinema 1) and references Deleuze directly with a lengthy quotation from Dialogues (1987): “‘Never”, say Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet “is an arrangement combination technological, indeed it is always to the contrary. The tools always presuppose a machine, and the machine is always social before it is technical. There is always a social machine which selects or assigns the technical elements used. A tool, an instrument, remains marginal or little used for so long as the social machine or the collective arrangement-combination capable of taking it in its phylum does not exist’” (1980: 122, author’s emphasis).
its operation. That the camera and the eye still form the dominant poles of the cinematic technics, Comolli argues, marks the dominance of the ideology of the visible: ‘The reduction of the hidden part of technics to its visible part brings with it the risk of renewing the domination of the visible’ (1980: 125). To this Comolli also adds in parenthesis: ‘[…] and what it implies: masking, effacement of work’ (1980: 125). This directs us towards the real significance of his argument. What Comolli is pressing throughout the article is that the cinema as a social and technological ordering has confused and is continuing to confuse what is real with what is visible. The ‘masking’ or ‘effacement’ that he suggests is implied within the ideology of the visible makes up, he says, ‘[cinema’s] “invisible” part (black between frames, chemical processing, baths and laboratory work, negative film, cuts and joins of editing, sound track, projector, etc.) […] generally relegated to the unthought, the “unconscious” of cinema’ (1980: 125, author’s emphasis). Moreover, we should say that there is also an unthought of the cinema’s social arrangement that is effaced by its visible part.

If an image is that which exists as part of a plane that is not the same as the cinema apparatus and that the apparatus only serves to make visible, then the images that are offered to us by the cinema are not the only images that exist. The images offered by the cinema are only actual images that should be distinguished from the virtual images that exist on the plane of immanence that Deleuze discusses. These images are no less real than their actual counterparts. They are images that are possible but yet to be actualised. This is to say, they are images that exist in the world but have not been made visible. The movement-image cinema gives us the world as it exists within the actualised images that it is constantly spitting out. The virtual images that might offer us ways of thinking apart from our everyday windows onto the world are ignored and thus remain
invisible. Consequently our means of seeing the world, and for Deleuze this soon becomes our way of thinking the world, are limited to these same images. Reading Deleuze’s cinema project as a continuation of the political project of film theory leads us to this problem.

**Political Modernism**

Peter Wollen’s work in the late 1960s and 1970s was extremely influential in helping to formalise the aims and interests of the political modernist project in film theory, and whilst it does not represent the full range and complexity of a political film theory that utilised work from many diverse fields, it should serve as an exemplary starting-point through which I can demonstrate some of the concerns that will inform both this cycle of film theory and my own reading of Deleuze’s film project. I will return to Wollen’s work shortly, but must first take a detour through Rodowick’s account of political modernism, which will help to contextualise Wollen’s work.

In *The Crisis of Political Modernism* Rodowick defines political modernism as a discursive practice that encompasses theoretical analyses, critical appraisals of films and discourses developed by films themselves. For Rodowick, political modernism is not a theory as such but a critical tendency that existed within a range of academic and critical contexts. Rodowick explains:

> There is no singular ‘theory’ of political modernism whose system or structure can be reconstructed, critiqued, and transcended. [...] Despite the variety of their
ideas and positions, the writers and filmmakers [of political modernism] share a mode of expression complexly derived from linked institutional contexts, ways of formulating concepts and questions, and kinds of rhetorical strategies. This does not mean that there was, or is, some larger unity or consensus that writers and filmmakers are striving to reach in this period. Rather, in tracing out the patterns of recurring themes, concepts and rhetorical strategies of political modernism, [it is possible to] map the geography of the conceptual borders wherein political modernism said all that it was possible for it to say. (1994: xii)

Political film theory forms a shifting constellation of ideas and approaches to a specific set of problems in film, rather than a critical school of thought. We could say that it is a conceptual frame, as Bill Nichols says in ‘Film Theory and the Revolt Against Master Narratives’ (2000), a certain approach to the problems of film criticism that is both historically situated within the discourses of a particular era and subject to mutation. It is not the master narrative of film theory but a critical tendency that encompasses a range of different concepts and approaches.

Rodowick argues that is not so much a theory as a response to a particular problematic, defining both the problems assumed by the critical discourse and the range of possible solutions (1994: 7). Whilst the range of critical approaches may vary to a great degree, the commitment to a political problem in cinema is consistent throughout, and, I argue, is consistent with the position that Deleuze himself adopts in the cinema books. Rodowick explains:

Although these problems may not be formulated in a systematic or continuous
fashion, they nonetheless define both the limits and the continuities of ‘knowledges’ produced. The structure of a given problematic therefore determines what is visible and eloquent within the purview of the discourse it produces and what must be silent or rendered invisible in order to maintain the continuity and self-identity of its conceptual system. (1994: 7)

What remains the task of the rest of this introduction is to outline the ‘limits and continuities’ of this political discourse on film – to show what operational and political structures it makes visible in cinema as well as what is rendered invisible within the discursive territories that it maps out. To this end I would like to propose two minor adjustments to Rodowick’s understanding of political film criticism. First, as I have suggested, the problematic that organises the discourse of political modernism is a commitment to the political operations of film and a shared belief in cinema’s complicity in the perpetuation of an intolerable world. Whilst Rodowick’s definition of political modernism focuses on the counter-cinema analyses of avant-garde texts propagated by Wollen, I will consider political modernist criticism as also encompassing Marxist film analyses, psychoanalysis, feminism, semiology and structuralism and almost any other form of film criticism where the critical task is to confront the political problems posed by the operations of cinema. Second, where Rodowick speaks of political modernism as being primarily concerned with the promotion and analysis of cinematic counter-strategies that can lead to forms of cinema that can operate outside of the dominant ideological formations of Hollywood and western capitalism, I will consider political modernist criticism in a wider sense, as organised around a direct concern with the operations of cinema culture in all of its forms. This opens the conceptual frame of political modernism to studies of the political
operation of mainstream films and the industrial apparatus that, whilst being concerned with a very different type of text to the critical studies of the avant-garde, have nonetheless very similar aims and political interests.

It is in Peter Wollen’s work that the political modernist frame first clearly emerges. In *Signs and Meaning in the Cinema* (1972) and a handful of influential articles (1975, 1976 and 1985), Peter Wollen draws out two key positions that anchor political modernism in the wider concerns of modernist art and structuralist theory. Wollen argues that the cinema avant-garde in the late 1960s follows the formal experimentations previously explored as part of literary and painterly modernism, utilising aesthetic strategies to attack the production of meaning in cinematic and cultural texts. Wollen explains that films can be understood as semiotic systems that provide the conditions for the production of meaning, and as part of this process of production the mainstream film text offers itself as an apparent naturalness that must be opened by the avant-garde or modernist text (1972: 116-154). Wollen articulates what Rodowick understands as the first declaration of political modernism: ‘the possibility of a radical political text is conditioned by the necessity of an avant-garde representational strategy’ (1994: 12). Political modernism’s confrontation with the politics of film is determined by an overlapping concern with semiotics and the cinematic avant-garde.

In ‘The Two Avant-Gardes’ (1975) Wollen places his critical work on the American and European avant-gardes in a modernist discourse concerned with the problem of representation. Modernist painting represents what Wollen calls a ‘critical semiotic shift’:

a changed concept and practice of sign and signification, which we can now see to have been the opening-up of a space, a disjunction between signifier and signified and a change of emphasis from the problem of signified and reference, the classic problem of realism, to that of signifier and signified within the sign itself. (1975)

The two forms of the film avant-garde that Wollen discusses (the American co-op movement on the one hand and a loosely organised European style on the other) would critique the questions of realism and representation that had preoccupied film and film criticism in the years following the Second World War as being concerned with the effacement of cinematic codes into an apparently self-evident image of the world. Wollen locates this critique in a wider modernist discourse, briefly tracing the problem of cinematic, cultural and literary signs through modernist painting, literature, Soviet montage and up to the then contemporary avant-garde.

For Wollen, this position highlighted the ‘bourgeois communication’ of the cinema as ‘a discourse gaining its power from its apparent naturalness, the impression of necessity which seems to bind a signifier to a signified, a sound to an image, in order to provide a convincing representation of the world’ (1975). The false realisms of the illusionary cinema (as well as equivalent forms in painting and literature) are stripped away by an avant-garde practice that introduces a break between the signifier and signified, between the codified structure of film and the world it makes visible. Wollen’s work anchors the basic concerns of political film criticism in the legacy of modernism, suggesting, as Rodowick points out, that the cinema avant-garde in the 1960s constitutes cinema’s
delayed contact with modernism (1994: 56). Rodowick explains:

Here, finally, is the point of Wollen’s rewriting of the history of modernism: to restore the intelligibility of modernist aesthetics as a counter-ideological practice through the theoretical context of semiology as the attempted recovery of film’s theoretical or epistemological heritage. (1994: 56)

Wollen’s earlier work on counter-cinema, in ‘Cinema and Semiology’ and Signs and Meaning in the Cinema had already, by introducing the question of signs and signification into the modernist frame, shifted the terms of his reading of the modernist project towards a more broadly structuralist one, and significantly, had also foregrounded the political concerns of the cinematic avant-garde. The main point of reference for Wollen is Godard’s avant-garde film-making in the late 1960s and early 1970s, which he uses as the basis for his article on counter-cinema. In this article, Wollen frames Godard’s work as a counter-cinema that presents a radical challenge to the closed romantic realist films that dominate Hollywood cinema.¹⁰ For Wollen, the counter-cinematic strategies of the avant-garde break apart the closed narrative continuity of the mainstream cinema, opposing closure with aperture, identification with estrangement, single diegesis with multiple and overlapping episodic worlds (1985: 501). Whereas romantic realism seeks closure – narrative resolution, recognisable and non-contradictory characterisation, formal coherence, clearly defined screen space – counter-cinema offers narrative multiplicity, formal disunity, illogical editing, non-synchronisation of sound and image, and a series of other technical and formal

¹⁰ Godard’s political films have been studied comprehensively by the political modernists. See James Roy MacBean’s ‘Vent D’est or Godard and Rocha at the Crossroads’ (1976), Siew Hwa Beh’s ‘Vivre Sa Vie’ (1976), Brian Henderson’s ‘Towards a Non-Bourgeois Camera Style’ (1976) and MacCabe’s Godard: Images, Sounds, Politics (1980).
techniques supposed to open the film to obscured systems of ideological discourse. Counter-cinema will attempt to foreground the political and economic position of the cinematic text, displaying the markers of its own construction and the unseen networks of money and power that envelop it. Wollen explains:

Classical aesthetics always posited an essential unity and coherence to every work, which permitted a uniform and exhaustive decoding. Modernism disrupts this unity; it opens the work up, both internally and externally, outwards. Thus there are no longer separate works, monads, each enclosed in its own individuality, a perfect globe, a whole. It produces works which are no longer centripetal, held together by their own centres, but centrifugal, throwing the reader out of the work to other works. (1972: 162)

It is important to highlight an attitude that is expressed towards the structures of cinema in general. As Wollen’s words above show, the cinematic text can be understood as constructing a certain way of seeing the world. The cinema produces a world as a specific order of visibility, and it is this process of production that Wollen argues can be interrupted or mutated by a counter-cinema. The classical Hollywood aesthetic posits an essential unity and coherence to every work and as a result the world made visible by the Hollywood text is a world of stasis and internal continuity, presenting us with, as Wollen says, a uniform and exhaustive decoding – in which everything that is possible to say or think is already said and already thought. Wollen’s Hollywood is a world of empty visibilities where appearances already express every aspect of the world. The counter-cinematic text is centrifugal, throwing the reader outwards towards other possible worlds that might allow us to see or speak or think otherwise.
Wollen’s basic position on cinema is that a critical discourse needs to construct the conditions where it is possible (and likely) for film to find new ways of speaking, seeing and thinking, and this is something that his work has in common with Deleuze’s cinema studies. In the final pages of *Cinema 1* (2005a: 212-215) Deleuze briefly outlines the physical, optical, sound and psychic clichés that characterise a cinema of the intolerable (2005a: 213). These are the current clichés of an epoch, sound and visual slogans that have come to dominate the cinema of a lacunary everyday. The position that Deleuze assumes in relation to political modernism is difficult, seeming to support a reading of cinema as reproducing systems of fictions through the dissemination of clichés and also problematizing this reading by insisting that these clichés are most effectively developed by a new post-classical cinema. Deleuze cites Altman, Scorsese, Antonioni, Rossellini and Godard as examples of this new cinema, in which the internal coherence of a diegetic world has been replaced by a cinema of the wanderer. This shift proves difficult to integrate into a wider discourse of film criticism, not least because Deleuze does not directly attack classical Hollywood for the production and circulation of such clichés. Deleuze’s point is not to judge a given form of cinema as more or less positive or negative in its representation of the world, but to argue that this new cinema was able to make visible the systems of floating images and the constant repetition of clichés that characterise cinema’s regimes of images. The two forms of cinema simply have different aims. What the modern cinema shows, Deleuze argues, is the world reduced to a shifting matrix of indiscernible images, in which spaces become more or less interchangeable any-spaces-whatever. The modern cinema reveals a system of images ‘as organisation of Power, [that] was to take on a new aspect in the modern world, that the cinema would endeavour to follow and to show’ (2005a: 214). This enters the
cinema books into a wider discourse on power relations and cinema and further raises the spectre of a politics in Deleuze’s cinematic studies.

Deleuze praises the modern cinema because it is able (in part and amongst other functions) to make visible the organisation of clichés that the cinema has always circulated, and in doing so make visible this intolerability at the heart of the visible world. Comolli’s closing remarks in ‘Machines of the Visible’ might echo Deleuze here, expressing his hope that in certain rare flashes cinema might be able to ‘produce in our sight the very blindness at the heart of the visible’ (1980: 141). If the cinema can only serve to circulate clichés at the expense of a world of images and forces, and can only reinforce a politics of sameness by always offering us the same images and the same terms through which to see and think the world, then a political study of cinema must ask how this circulation operates and what its implications are.

This is my task in this thesis – to question how the images of the cinema are organised, how they offer us only a limited or dogmatic capacity for thinking the world and how the cinema arrangement organises the visible such that visibilities give rise to visibilities and the invisible remains so. One of the foremost tasks of political film theory, as can be seen in both Comolli and Wollen’s work, has been to ask how the invisible may be made visible. By this I mean the invisible operations and functioning of society, the invisible forces that exist within the world, the invisibility of ignored or oppressed peoples, of new ways of thinking and understanding the world, the virtual potential for change and creation in the world and for a new relation to society. This was a task shared by Deleuze. He had developed his studies of the time-image as a way of showing how new capacities for thought might be made possible by the cinema, but for the most part he is
much less optimistic about the operation of the commercial entertainment cinema. To study the cinema in the age of the control society we must ask how the invisible can be controlled so as to remain invisible, and how a general state of intolerability that exists across the planet is obscured by the operations of the cinema apparatus.

The answers to these questions can be found in fragments scattered across Deleuze’s later writings, following *A Thousand Plateaus* and encompassing the two cinema books, his books Foucault and Leibniz, and culminating in the ‘Postscript on the Society of Control’. These answers concern both the operations of the cinema specifically and the more general organisation of images in the world and, I argue, offer a new reading of Deleuze’s cinema books as a politically committed project. For film theory to retain a political motivation, and for us not to lose sight of the aims expressed by the political film theorists of the past, is as important today as it ever was. Following developments in the organisation and transmission of images, the digitisation of our contact and communication with the world, and a string of transformations in the political and social field that separate us from the political film theory boom of the 1970s and early 1980s, we need a critical discourse that can respond to the new regime of the visible in which we live today. I argue that this can be found in Deleuze’s work.
Chapter 1:

Control and the Time-Image

In ‘Postscript on the Society of Control’ Deleuze charts a shift in the organisation of the world, arguing that the disciplinary organisations that had structured society in the early and mid-twentieth century have given way to an open and variable system of control. In Cinema 2 Deleuze had already established the time-image as part of a new and distinct audio-visual regime. This is developed further in the control essay to demonstrate a new formation of control that is tied up with the formation of images that the new regime mobilises. In the control essay Deleuze expands on the political implications of his thesis in Cinema 2 to outline a system of control that will organise and maintain a social and political order in a fluctuating and mobile field.¹

The explosion of images and information that characterises the contemporary state of society exists as a shifting system that mobilises and reproduces both the movement-images and time-images of Deleuze’s cinema project. The actual images of the movement-image are as present as ever amidst an endless stream of virtual images that correspond to the formation of the time-image. We cannot say that one has replaced the other, but rather that our way of thinking the image has changed, which is to say, in

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¹ Deleuze himself has already suggested the continuity between his cinema books and the control article. In ‘Having an Idea in Cinema’ (1998) Deleuze schematically relates his thoughts on control to the question of what it means to ‘have an idea’. For Deleuze, having an idea is not the same as communication or as information (which are the concerns of the control society) (1998: 17). We should say that for Deleuze, thought in cinema does not concern information but a cerebral shaking beyond information. In this short piece Deleuze suggests that all of the information distribution in the control society will not amount to thought, or even an ‘idea’. This will relate to the media circulations of control that serve to arrest the powers of thought in cinema.
Deleuze’s words, that the time-image now characterises the contemporary image of thought. A mobilisation of the virtual characterises a contemporary audio-visual regime of flux and mutation and accordingly Deleuze will offer an explanation of the mechanisms by which order will be maintained as ultrarapid forms of free-floating control (1992: 4). I intend to develop Deleuze’s conceptualisation of control in this chapter in order to show how Deleuze’s control offers a political position that we can use to develop his conceptualisation of the regime of the time-image and through which we can take account of the circulation of images in the contemporary information society. In Cinema 2 Deleuze shows how the time-image might give us a glimpse of the secret sufferings that are scattered across visual culture, but it is not until the essay on control that he explores the groundlessness and fluidity of this new regime and offers the tools to understand the concurrent deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation of the time-image – the simultaneous mechanisms of capture and possibilities for escape that the new regime brings.

Deleuze does not develop his conceptualisation of the time-image to account for a change in visual culture beyond cinema, but as Rodowick argues, Deleuze’s position on the time-image is that it marks a more general shift in the image of thought that occurs between the end of the Second World War and the dawn of the information and mass-media age. Whilst the time-image does not preclude the movement-image from being produced, and indeed, whilst the movement-image may continue to dominate cinematic production, there has been a change in our understanding of how cinema and visual culture are circulated and organised. What has changed with the time-image is that there is no longer a stable point from which to pose the questions of identity and ideology that had concerned the earlier film theorists.
At the beginning of *Cinema 2* Deleuze says of the shift in cinema: ‘we no longer know what is imaginary or real, physical or mental, in this situation, not because they are confused, but because we do not have to know and there is no longer even a place from which to ask’ (2005b: 7). The modulating field of images and information that Deleuze would later describe as constituting the society of control captures the degrees of indiscernibility and irrationality that Deleuze attributes to the time-image. In this chapter I will demonstrate the continuity that is evident from the one concept to the other, as well as the useful revisions provided in the control societies article that can help to pull the time-image towards a theorisation of the visual more generally, and show the implications that this has for the new world of images.

**What is a Time-Image?**

(Hour of the Wolf, Germany Year Zero and Tokyo Story)

In a scene in Ingmar Bergman’s *Hour of the Wolf* (*Vargtimmen*, 1968), Max Von Sydow sits at the edge of a table in a darkened room, his face in side profile and extreme close-up. He fixes his eyes on a wristwatch and says ‘a minute can seem like an eternity’ and begins to count out a minute in his head. Occasionally he punctuates the silence with some inane pronouncement, ‘oh, these seconds’ or ‘how long they last’, but he is otherwise silent, leaving us to wait for the minute to pass with only the sound of his

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2 Whilst I will offer an explanation of what Deleuze means by time-image in this section, I will do so primarily with respect to my own argument concerning the political implications of Deleuze’s work, the production and circulation of visibilities and the continuities between this aspect of Deleuze’s work and his later conceptualisation of control. There are numerous complex and significant arguments set out by Deleuze with respect to the time-image and I am unable in the space afforded to cover every one of these. I direct readers to the many excellent and fascinating explanatory texts on Deleuze’s cinema project. Rodowick’s *Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine* is perhaps the best book written on Deleuze and cinema, but also worthwhile are Ronald Bogue’s *Deleuze on Cinema*, Paola Marrati’s *Gilles Deleuze: Cinema and Philosophy*, Barbara Kennedy’s *Deleuze and Cinema: The Aesthetics of Sensation* (2002) and Richard Rushton’s *Cinema After Deleuze* (2012a).
breathing and the barely audible ticking of the watch. In the standard narrative movement-image that Deleuze describes in *Cinema 1* the passage of time would never be presented in this way – never foregrounded as an evident component of the scene or stretched to its fullest extent and left to pass by slowly and without incident. In the movement-image time is compressed by continuity editing and made subject to the needs of a causal linear narrative. Whole days, weeks or even months and years are compressed and squeezed into the space of a few hours. Actions that we would usually expect to take hours to perform are shown in a moment through quick editing. Characters can travel vast distances through a single fade-out or become experts in kung-fu by the end of a two-minute training montage.

The passage of time, as David Martin-Jones has said, typically condenses around the body of the film’s protagonist, organising the film not around the experience of time itself but around the movements required to advance the film’s narrative (2006: 21). Actions and gestures are strung together through the use of rational continuity editing, reducing the passage of time to narrative continuity and the movement of a protagonist through space. Martin-Jones explains:

No matter how disjointed the spaces are through which they travel, or how elliptical the narrative’s movement between them, the physical actions of the protagonist provides the logical link. [...] Thus in the action-image there is always a causal, linear progression to the narrative. The protagonist’s ability to act evidences an unbroken sensory-motor continuum, and the passage of time is rendered subordinate to a character’s movement through space. (2006: 21)
Hour of the Wolf does not do this. Rather than witnessing a movement through which to perceive the passage of time, Bergman offers a minute of time experienced directly.

Sydow plays an artist who cannot sleep for fear of demons. He sits in the darkness waiting for the sun to come up. Liv Ullmann, who plays the artist’s partner, also sits at the table, a little further back and towards the right of the frame. When the minute begins she is looking downwards at some clothes she is busy mending with a needle and thread, but soon stops and lifts her head to watch Sydow’s concentrated gaze fixed on his wristwatch. Half of her face is in shadow and the other half is brightly lit. We watch her as she gazes intently across the frame. She breathes laboriously and we think we can glimpse something like worry or fear in the half-light that flashes across her face.

Bergman has already shown snatches of Sydow’s madness in earlier scenes. A moment before, he presented a sketchbook where he had drawn his demons and talks through them one by one. Sydow’s face melts in and out of the darkness as he bobs forwards and back and we are made to look at Ullmann’s face, part-lit and motionless at the centre-right of the frame. Her eyes close and open again slowly, she wipes her brow with her hand. Bergman is using Sydow’s delirious ramblings to part-anchor our reading of the subsequent one-minute break in the film. In both sequences, we watch Ullmann’s face and whilst she is for the most part still, for a moment we think we can read something in it.

The typical Hollywood film would offer her face in a concise shot / reaction-shot format and an audience would be left in no doubt as to what they were supposed to read there. In Marnie (1964) the madness of Tippi Hedren is shown by using shot / counter-shot to
juxtapose her expressionless face with an advancing extreme close-up of Sean Connery’s eyes bearing menacingly down on her. In *Jaws* (1975) Roy Scheider’s shock upon seeing a boy eaten by the shark is expressed through a shot in which the camera tracks and zooms at the same time. We see a small black mass roll over a flashing band of red in the centre of the screen and cut to Schneider’s reaction, his face held still whilst the edges of the screen seem to rush away from him. In both cases the supposed inside of a character’s experience is expressed through the formal organisation of the film, leaving us in no doubt as to what we are to read in the faces on screen. Bergman refuses this and we are made to gaze at Ullmann as she remains still, sometimes twitching slightly or moving her lips for a moment. The character is opaque and in the long minute that Sydow counts out, the audience is left to itself with all formal signposting removed.

In the first chapter of *Cinema 2* Deleuze says that the direct image of time presents us with an image of indiscernibility (2005b: 1-23). The time-image removes the rational organisation of space and action that dominates the movement-image and replaces it with a series of disconnected sequences and gestures. Deleuze takes Italian Neorealist cinema as his first example, which offers, as he says through film critic André Bazin, a new form of reality that was no longer constructed in the way of the pre-war movement-image, but made out of disconnected passages of time that were dispersive, errant or wavering, and with deliberately weak connections and meaningless floating events (2005b: 1). With this new kind of cinema, the superficial and closely ordered relation between parts within a film is no longer possible: ‘Instead of representing an already deciphered real, Neorealism aimed at an always ambiguous to be deciphered real’ (Deleuze, 2005b: 1). The new image that Neorealism offered had no discernible real or
truth. It must be understood as a non-visible ordering, meaning that it must be read in accordance with what it does not show – an opaque depth in the image, a connection with the world outside the film or a flash that says that the world might be otherwise than is shown.

A scene from Rossellini’s *Germany Year Zero* (*Germania Anno Zero*, 1947) will provide a useful example to show what I mean by this. Towards the end of the film a young boy is wandering aimlessly through the ruins of a city. Rossellini filmed on the streets of post-war Berlin, and in this sequence we follow the boy as he makes his way through the city’s semi-demolished buildings and deserted streets. The boy starts out on a relatively populous street and the camera tracks alongside him as he walks. The sun shines on his face, making him squint slightly. All we see of the destroyed city is a rolling uniform grey wall behind him, as he walks past buildings in varying states of disrepair. Sometimes an entire building will fall away and a gap will appear in the space behind him where a house has been destroyed completely, but we are not shown enough to survey our surroundings. The boy turns a corner and meets some children playing with a ball, the camera swings around behind him, keeping all of the figures in the foreground of the shot. He tries to join in but the children are all smaller than him and want to play alone. His tatty, square-shouldered jacket makes him look much older than he is and the other children run off-screen and away. He continues walking and the camera pans upwards and provides, almost for the first time in the film, a sustained shot of the city. The skeletons of buildings rise up on either side of the street, the earth is potholed and overgrown and stretching backwards into the frame. The camera holds steady and the boy slowly walks onwards into the empty ruined landscape. The camera cuts backwards for a moment and the boy takes a second look at the children playing in
the distance before stumbling onwards.

This sequence takes around five minutes and has no meaningful dialogue of any sort. The children shout and there are snatches of speech – ‘give me the ball’ and ‘no, we want to play by ourselves’ – but a flutter of bodies and half-gestures is enough for us to understand this thirty-second encounter with the other children. A close-up of the boy’s face during the early tracking shot shows a muted expression. Edmund Moeschke, the young actor who plays the boy, might have been tempted to look sad and weepy-eyed or lonely, but the sun shining on his face prevents him from making any easily-readable expression. He instead squints his eyes as he walks and once flicks his hair backwards. A tiny smile flashes across his face as he runs towards the camera to collect the children’s ball, but this melts away when they run from him, leaving him still and heavy-limbed. Rossellini offers little in the way of editing. There are only two cuts in the entire sequence and we only get a close-up of the boy’s face at the start and the end when he moves past the camera. There are no reaction shots and no point of view shots. The audience cannot use the boy’s gestures or expressions as foundations in the scene, showing where to look or how to react. The boy himself barely reacts to what he sees – he simply looks tired.

At the start of Cinema 2 Deleuze describes this kind of scene as a pure optical situation (2005b: 2), which he contrasts to the sensory-motor situation of the movement-image. This is a sequence in which gestures and actions are made insignificant or unreadable. The boy flicks his hair or stumbles over a rock and we are unable to discern any meaningful position for the action to occupy in the overall structure of the film. The meeting with the children shows us how tired the boy looks by contrast, but does
nothing to advance the narrative nor develop a characterisation nor even make a simple point that had not already been made. It is an encounter in a film of numerous fragmentary, meaningless, ephemeral encounters (Deleuze, 2005b: 2). The film follows the boy throughout the city as he tries to scrape enough food or cigarettes to help his family survive from day to day. He tries to find work digging graves but is moved on because of his age. He tries selling goods given to him by the man living next door, but he is taken advantage of and given two tins of food in exchange for expensive-looking weighing scales. Each scene marks an encounter that serves not to develop any discernible narrative but to wipe away a little bit more of the boy’s faith in the everyday world. Each encounter only very loosely connects with the one before and with the film as a whole. Characters recur and actions seen in earlier sequences reappear, but there is little justification for the order that they are presented in and nothing but the most basic continuity from one scene to the next. As Deleuze explains, the sequences and actions are only simple occurrences in which characters are helpless to respond. The boy is repeatedly defeated by the situations he finds himself in, pushed away by exploitative salesmen, chased off by teenagers, ignored by adults. He is unable to respond to situations and as a consequence becomes a figure through which the audience sees the world, rather than, as is the case in the cinemas of the movement-image, through which an audience can act upon the world. Deleuze says: ‘In an ordinary or every-day situation, in the course of a series of gestures, which are insignificant but all the more obedient to simple sensory-motor schemata, what has suddenly been brought about is a pure optical situation’ (2005b: 2, author’s emphasis). Rossellini shows us a world that can only be seen and not acted upon – a cinema of the seer and not of the agent.

In *Hour of the Wolf* Bergman locates Max Von Sydow’s madness in a netherworld that is
neither strictly real nor simply in his mind and as such Liv Ullmann can observe his night-terrors but cannot respond to them. The demons of *Hour of the Wolf* can be neither cured nor exorcised nor destroyed. The demons are not, for much of the film, even strictly visible. Instead we watch the markers of them – Sydow’s descriptions, the contortions in his voice and the opaque gaze in the eyes of Ullmann.³ The weakened connections between sequences means that we cannot locate our understanding of a particular sequence in what we have already seen. We cannot anchor our understandings of what we see in our knowledge of a particular character, particularly in *Germany Year Zero*, because characters are insufficiently characterised. We cannot anchor our understandings of what we see in the anticipation of decisive or even irrational actions or sensory-motor responses, because characters lack the capacity to respond to what they see. We cannot even make sense of what we see by way of the rational ordering and editing of the film because in Bergman and Rossellini the formal organisation of the film is confused or irrational, neglected (in Rossellini’s case) due to financial and production constraints or reliance on the long-take as a way of showing the world, or (in Bergman’s case) due to the use of long-takes and stationary cameras, lighting techniques and the acting methods he prefers his actors to adopt. In both cases, and in many other film-makers that emerge after the war, cinema becomes an unreadable artefact, leaving spectators with nothing to help them make sense of what they are

³ This reading is counter to that provided by Frank Gado in *The Passion of Ingmar Bergman* (1996: 344-356) who suggests that the artist’s demons are explicitly shown in the other human characters living on the island. This is true to an extent (in Bergman’s script much more so than in the film itself), but Gado’s reading makes these characters, the events concerning them and, by extension, much of the film, into a psychological delirium that takes place solely in the artist’s mind. I argue that *Hour of the Wolf* is much more ambiguous in its visualisation of the artist’s demons. These other figures are not simply projections of one character’s delirium. They are both human and demonic, and constantly are flitting from one to the other. They are at times other human inhabitants and at others are visual manifestations of the artist’s night-terrors. We should say that they are concrete human figures becoming abstract demonic forces, just as the artist’s ramblings are abstract systems of ideas becoming concrete on-screen effects – manifested in his agitation, nervous shaking, stammers, cries, etc. In Bergman’s cinema the human world cannot be fully separated from an invisible world of demons and spirits and imagined visions. This is a recurrent theme in his work that goes back to *Prison (Fångelse)*, 1949, one of his earliest films, in which an old man declares that the Earth belongs to the Devil and that God has already abandoned it.
seeing. The cinema is made to present a world of indiscernibility. Deleuze summarises:

A purely optical and sound situation does not extend into action, any more than it is induced by an action. It makes us grasp, it is supposed to make us grasp, something intolerable and unbearable. Not a brutality as nervous aggression, an exaggerated violence that can always be extracted from the sensory-motor relations in the action-image. Nor is it a matter of scenes of terror, although there are sometimes corpses and blood. It is a matter of something too powerful, or too unjust, but sometimes also too beautiful, and which henceforth outstrips our sensory motor-capacities. (2005b: 17)

The modern cinema that Deleuze describes shows a world that is too much for the sensory-motor connections of the action-image. The terrors of Sydow’s demons outstrip both Bergman’s capacities to display them and the characters’ capacities to respond or act upon them. The weariness of the boy in Germany Year Zero and the empty pointlessness of the world in which he moves outstrip both the film’s capacities for narrative resolution and the capacities of the characters for action. The closed romantic formal organisation of the movement-image can only give us terror or hunger within the confines of character motivation or narrative development and by severing the actual formal connections internal to the film itself, the time-image can trace a line outwards into an external world that exceeds the cinematic image. This is the task that Deleuze suggests the post-war cinema had set for itself: ‘Grasping the intolerable or the unbearable, the empire of poverty, and therefore becoming visionary, to produce a means of knowledge and action out of pure vision’ (2005b: 18).
I have already argued that one of the general positions of political film theory is that it understands the cinema as circulating an intolerable image of the world, but Deleuze’s argument is a little more complex here. The position of Wollen and the political modernists is that film shows a world made into illusion. They argue that there is another world of poverty and hatred and diversity and difference that is obscured by the mass entertainment industry. They argue that the world of the cinema is intolerable because it is a lie, or rather because it is ideological mystification. Deleuze might even agree with this position to a certain extent, but his argument here is that the modern cinema of the time-image is bringing us into contact with this obscure world made invisible by the entertainment industry and that this world is intolerable. Deleuze says that ‘it is not in the name of a better or truer world that thought captures the intolerable in this world, but, on the contrary, it is because the world is intolerable that it can no longer think a world or think itself’ (2005b: 164). What is important is not that the modern cinema should contrast a ‘true’ image of the world to the intolerable lies or illusions of the entertainment industry, but that by showing the experiences of intolerability that exist in the world the modern cinema might make it possible to think a new world that is closed off by the unchanging certainties of the movement-image.

Deleuze says that cinema can reveal beneath the faces, movements and gestures of the everyday another ‘subterranean or extra-terrestrial world’ (2005b: 18) that allows us to apprehend the unbearable that permeates what we see. We find this extra-terrestrial world beneath the images in *Germany Year Zero* and *Hour of the Wolf*, but Deleuze also cites the films of Ozu as further examples of an unbearable world flickering behind the images of the cinematic everyday. Ozu’s films are about the everyday life of Japanese families as the country transforms around them. His characters move around empty or
meaningless spaces, inanely chattering amongst themselves. We follow a series of variously tedious and isolated sub-plots rather than a single coherent narrative and are often made to witness sequences of little importance or to gaze at empty spaces.\footnote{All of this characterises Ozu as part of Deleuze’s time-image, but Ozu is a particularly difficult director to integrate into Deleuze’s cine-philosophy, as, despite bearing many of the formal and stylistic features of Rossellini, Antonioni and the other time-image directors that Deleuze cites, Ozu’s films come many years earlier (Ozu began directing in the 1920s) and as such present a problem to the suggestion that the time-image was a post-war invention. This throws considerable doubt on the value of Deleuze’s project as a historical study and raises questions, as Martin-Jones has argued in Deleuze and World Cinemas (2011), concerning the Eurocentric nature of the books. These and other questions should be asked of Deleuze but lie outside of my focus. Whilst there is a case to be raised with respect to the quasi-historical lineage that Deleuze suggests, I would insist that this is far from his chosen field of interest and follow Ian Buchanan’s argument that Deleuze had simply avoided many questions that fall outside of the philosophical framework he had set for himself (2008: 2). This is not to say that such things are of no importance or that they should not be asked, only that they were beyond the initial scope of Deleuze’s project. Martin-Jones’ recent work, both alone and with William Brown, has begun to address such gaps in Deleuze’s work on cinema. See Deleuze and World Cinema and ‘Deleuze’s World Tour of Cinema’ (with Brown, 2012a).} Tokyo Story (Tokyo Monogatari, 1953) offers a particularly clear example. Towards the end of the film a family’s mother has died and so her adult children, too busy to spend time with her and her ageing husband when she was alive, have returned to the family home to mourn. Ozu communicates the family’s grief in the most remarkable way. We are presented with a shot of the woman’s body in side-profile, covered with blankets and partly obscured by the figures of her husband (played by Ryu Chishu) and three of her children. The figures are shot from a straight angle at a very low height, as is usual in Ozu’s films, so that they appear kneeling in the direct centre of the frame. A small light hovers some way above their heads, silhouetting the two figures with their backs to us and lighting the faces of the two sitting furthest away. A series of square frames encloses them, positioning the figures in the centre of a geometrical composition made out of the room’s ceiling, floor, walls, furniture and two sliding doors to the rear of the shot. The frame is still but for a hand-held fan, which flutters back and forth. Ozu holds this shot for a few moments before cutting to a close-up of the father. Ozu again has him framed in the centre of the shot. His face is lit from the right and above, casting heavy shadows on one side of his face and blackening his eyes and the line of his mouth. His neck
twitches as he swallows slightly, his eyelids blink heavily, but he is otherwise still. The film cuts away to an unrelated exterior shot: a small pier with canopy, a thin strip of water and declining hill slope visible in the background. The shot is still for a few moments and we cut to a second exterior shot: a small ornamental stone lantern slightly raised, the pier from the previous shot visible below. The water ripples a little and a small boat drifts past slowly. Again the shot is held for a few moments before we cut to a third shot: the hulls of three boats shot from below, their rigging breaking the pale block of sky at the top of the frame. We cut again to a small school building shot at an angle, the ground slightly damp from rain. The shot is held for a moment before cutting again to an aerial shot of an empty length of railway track, slicing through the frame at a diagonal. The shot is held for a moment and we cut back to the family kneeling at their mother’s feet.

This sequence is remarkable for the way that Ozu uses this series of disconnected exterior shots to intersperse the actions of the mourning family. As I have also suggested of characters in *Hour of the Wolf* and *Germany Year Zero*, the faces of the figures in *Tokyo Story* are shown as opaque and unreadable. Their postures suggest sadness, but faces and gestures are kept still and darkened by shadows. Ozu arranges and lights his films in a way that focuses on the overall composition of each shot rather than on any single character or action. We see Ryu’s face part-obscured by darkness and this obscuring, rendering his eyes invisible in the shadow of his face, prevents us from reading any clearly discernible expression. Ozu presents this as a shot of still contemplation that extends out of the house and into the protracted series of exteriors.

The following few shots show the world carrying the stillness of the mourning
household across locations that are variously recognisable (we have seen the railway and the school building before) and new (the pier and boats are shown for the first time). In doing so, the film brings us into contact with a world that exceeds the actions and gestures of the film’s characters – a world that people are only a part of and within which they are reduced to constituent parts of a wider composition or eliminated from the screen entirely in a shot which halts the narrative drive of the film, adding a pause in which to contemplate the relative meaninglessness of the earlier depictions of daily life. Deleuze explains that Ozu ‘picks out the intolerable from the insignificant itself, provided that he can extend the force of a contemplation that is full of sympathy or pity across everyday life’ (2005b: 18). For Ozu the everyday is a force that exceeds the actions and gestures of people. It is a non-human world of stillness where the habitual gestures and polite chatter of characters, the robotic niceties and meaningless worries of everyday family life, simply cover the emptiness of Ozu’s world. Deleuze says that ‘the intolerable is no longer a serious injustice, but the permanent state of a daily banality’ (2005b: 164). We can see this clearly in the early part of *Tokyo Story*, and again in almost all of Ozu’s mature films.

In each of the above films the motivated actions of characters have been replaced by empty gestures and meaningless actions that are dwarfed by the full expanse of the world. The terrors of *Hour of the Wolf* far exceed the characters’ capacities to challenge them; the sorrows unleashed by the war in *Germany Year Zero* far outstrip the young boy’s capacities to improve his social situation; even the everyday life of *Tokyo Story* shows the smallness of human gestures before the emptiness of the world. In each case, and in the great number of film-makers that gradually emerge in the post-war period, a politics of the seer or visionary becomes apparent – the new cinema gives us figures
who must watch over the world rather than act upon it.\(^5\) This is a cinema made to perceive the hidden depths of the world – the imperceptible suffering and hatred that lurks behind the images of the old movement-image cinema, but had for the most part remained invisible. The time-image opens cinema to the forces of the outside world. By laying bare the presence of time within the film and by the discontinuity of its internal organisation it makes us draw out other connections to worlds and forces that lurk beyond the edges of the frame and in the depths of the screen itself. This shows, Deleuze says, that with the advent of the time-image ‘it is not the cinema that turns away from politics, it becomes completely political, but in another way’ (2005b: 19).

**The Regime of the Time-Image**

The time-image offers a way of grasping the intolerable that lies at the heart of the visible. But what of the continued life of the movement image and the ‘quantitative mediocrity’ (2005b: 159) that Deleuze suggests still characterises cinema culture? Deleuze argues that the time-image begins to emerge in the years following 1945. However, just as we can identify various features of the time-image appearing in the films of Ozu and others in the pre-war period, it is important to note that the movement-image is not done away with entirely after the war. Indeed, the cinema of the movement-image would remain as quantitatively dominant as it ever was and will become increasingly so in the decades that follow. Whilst film-makers in Italy and France were working to rebuild their cinema cultures after the war, and developing new ways of orienting their images of the world, Hollywood continued to produce its

\(^5\) See Reid’s ‘A People of Seers’ for a detailed explanation of Deleuze’s concept of the seer in post-war cinema.
entertainment films throughout the gradual decline of the studio system and would not produce anything we can consider modern for another 15 years, and even then the subsequent return of the Hollywood blockbuster in the 1970s made the New Hollywood renaissance short-lived.\textsuperscript{6} In Britain also, the immediate post-war period would offer little that fits Deleuze’s schema until the British social realist films of the late 1950s and 1960s. In Indian cinema, as Martin-Jones argues, the break occurring around 1945 that Deleuze proposes is called into question most profoundly, as Indian cinema neglects to make any significant stylistic changes in the post-war period and continues to produce films that exhibit a completely different way of organising images than Deleuze’s time / movement break will allow.\textsuperscript{7} The movement-image has not been replaced by the new cinema that Deleuze identifies, but rather the limit point of what cinema can do has shifted. The time-image shows that at its limit the concerns of cinema aesthetics have changed.

As the problems posed by Ozu’s pre-war films, popular Indian cinema, and the continued and increasing financial dominance of the movement-image in the post-war years clearly show, Deleuze’s movement / time schema should be read only as a conceptual break between one way of thinking about cinema and another. This position is counter to that argued by András Kovács in ‘The History of Film Thought’ (2000), who suggests that Deleuze’s work does mark a historical shift of sorts, in which the time-image should be understood as the eventual goal and perfection of the cinematic

\textsuperscript{6} Peter Biskind’s \textit{Easy Riders, Raging Bulls} (1999) offers a historical account of the New Hollywood cinema that emerged after the fall of the studio system.

\textsuperscript{7} Martin-Jones uses Indian cinema to critique Deleuze’s over-simple and neat distinction between one kind of cinema (classical movement-image) and the other (modern time-image) in the final chapter of \textit{Deleuze and World Cinemas} (2011: 201-233), calling into question the suitability of Deleuze’s project to study non-western cinema cultures. Richard Rushton has also posed similar problems to the distinctions between the two regimes in his study of the films of Baz Lurhman in ‘The Rebirth of the World’ (2012b). See also the ‘Persistence of the Movement-Image’ chapter in \textit{Cinema After Deleuze} (2012a: 119-138), in which Rushton addresses Deleuze’s work through the lens of several contemporary film-makers.
form. Deleuze himself suggests otherwise, stating in the preface to *Cinema 1* that his books do not attempt to set out a history of the cinema (2005a: xi). In this regard I would argue that the value of Deleuze’s project as a chronological or historical classification of cinematic form is negligible.\(^8\) Counter to the historically consistent Deleuze that is invoked in Kovács’s article, and as Rodowick has argued, the break between the two conceptions of the image is a conceptual distinction between two different ways of thinking the image. In *Reading the Figural* Rodowick explains:

The transition described from *The Movement-Image* to *The Time-Image* also effects a more general displacement in the philosophy of history, indeed a shifting relationship between history and thought marked by confrontations in the post-war *episteme* between existentialism – with its Hegelian conception of history and politics – and the post-structuralism of Deleuze and Foucault, with their Nietzschean and genealogical concepts of history and thought. (2001: 173, author’s emphasis)

Rodowick argues that the aesthetic and formal distinctions that I have so far described are part of a wider philosophical distinction that concerns the history of thought in the twentieth century. That is to say, the emergence of the time-image marks a distinction between one regime of thought and another. Rodowick again:

When Deleuze refers to the organic movement-image as ‘classic’ and the crystalline time-image as ‘modern’, this means neither that the latter flows from the former as natural progression or teleology nor that the modern form

\(^8\) This position is also argued by Angelo Revisto in ‘Into the Breach’ (2000: 171) and Martin-Jones, who offers a short summary of several scholars’ position on this issue in *Deleuze and World Cinemas* (2011: 203).
necessarily opposes the classic as negation or critique. Instead, this transition represents a distinct, if gradual, transformation in the nature of belief and the possibilities of thought. […] For Deleuze, the history of cinema is in no way a progression toward an ever more perfect representation of time. Rather, the relation between time and thought is imagined differently in the post-war period, as represented in the signs produced by the time-image and by changes in the image of thought occurring in postwar science, art and philosophy. (Rodowick, 2001: 176)

Rodowick posits an epistemic shift in the nature of thought and its relation to the world in place of a causal historical lineage. With respect to the cinema of the movement-image this means not that the classical aesthetic is impossible or unimportant but that this form of cinema can no longer be taken as the limit point of the medium.

In the control essay Deleuze develops this epistemic shift further, arguing that an organisation of control has supplanted the ordering of society as disciplinary formation. Control, he says, is a constantly shifting system of territories that shows the dual processes of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation can be integrated as a normal part of the ordering of the capitalist social form. Control organises itself as mobile and without centre – the territorial ordering of the everyday social field as the constant struggle between smoothing and striating forces. This is similar to the position outlined in *Cinema 2*. The time-image is a regime of images in which the coherent narrative organisation of the movement-image has given way to a cinema of indiscernibility. The time-image offers a direct image of time in place of a compressed or edited narrative time, unreadable images in place of established locations and causal actions, and images
of intolerable political situations external to cinema itself in place of closed-world fantasy narratives. Cinema uses its formal and stylistic tools to construct a world and in doing so should be considered as an organisation of a specific set of ‘territories’. Cinema solidifies the endless plane of virtual images (in the terms that Deleuze borrows from Bergson, the virtually existing spectrum of all possible images) into a territory that makes visible a particular ordering of the world.

Through this indiscernibility, the time-image gives us an open and mutating territorial formation. We can say that the world of a film, when it is actualised in shapes on the screen, forms a stable set of interrelating territories (in the movement-image), jumping from one territorial formation to the other according to a causal narrative logic. The time-image serves to disrupt this, exerting a deterritorialising force that opens the film-world to its outside. In the sense that a given film, as Martin-Jones argues, will always contain elements of both time-image and movement-image (2006: 27), the territorial and deterritorialising forces of film are always in conflict. We can say that the movement-image is the actual territory of film and the time-image is the process of deterritorialisation that opens film onto its virtual outside. However, this is an outside that can never definitely be reached because of the necessary reterritorialisation that returns the film to its actual territorial foundation. The films of the time-image show a world in which this struggle is played out and in which we catch a glimpse of an invisible outside made visible.

9 The territorial organisation of film is explored in Tom Conley’s work. Conley’s cartographic studies of cinema, particularly in the monograph Cartographic Cinema (2007a) and a series of recent articles (see Conley 2007a, 2010 and 2011), demonstrate that our understanding of particular films can be understood as a process of mental mapping. In Deleuzian terms Conley’s work shows that cinema can be productively studied as an ordering of territories, in the real world (the actual formation of the cinematic apparatus, the circulation of film-commodities, the economic status of cinema, etc.), in the mental world of a spectator’s mind (the discourses issued by film, the systems of thought that cinema will or will not give rise to), and in an invisible world of affective sensations and virtual potentialities that cinema mobilises. I will explore the territorial construction of cinema in greater detail in Chapter 2.
Deleuze says in the control essay that the social formation has found ways of integrating this territorial mutation into its own political operation, confronting a deterritorialising capital with a reterritorialisation that sucks it back into a world of concrete forms and relations.\textsuperscript{10} The time-image takes us to the limit of the actual territorial forms of the movement-image where it is confronted with a reterritorialising control that returns us to an actual world of concrete images and cinematic forms. We should not think of the time-image as a regime that replaces the previous order, but as a force that brings it into contact with its own dissolution. The movement-image does not disappear with the emergence of the new regime, it simply addresses its own formal limits. Through an understanding of the processes by which the movement-image is dissolved and the time-image actualised again, it will be possible to address how the invisible worlds of the intolerable might be made visible and how cinema might function as part of the new system of control that Deleuze will later outline.

**What is Control?**

In the control essay Deleuze posits that the disciplinary societies of enclosed and unchanging carceral environments are being superseded by a system of control that organises the social field as a variable system in which forces are mobile, mutating and

\textsuperscript{10} This point has been developed by Richard Dienst in *The Bonds of Debt* (2011: 119-136) with respect to capital and indebtedness and by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in *Empire* (2001: 325-350). Both directly address Deleuze’s conceptualisation of control in order to show the organisation of the capitalist formation as a smooth space. Hardt’s ‘The Global Society of Control’ (1998) also acts as a useful prelude to his work with Negri in *Empire*, taking Deleuze’s essay as its starting point and developing its claims with reference to other significant thinkers (Jameson, Debord, Fukuyama and Balibar).
Deleuze argues that the disciplinary societies that had dominated social organisation throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and had reached their height in the early part of the twentieth century, are being replaced by this new ordering of the forces of control (as with the time-image, Deleuze sees the forces of control as accelerating after the Second World War [1992: 3]).

Control is the name that Deleuze applies to the fluid organisation of social forces in an open and changing environment. Whereas discipline had organised itself around multiple different internments or disciplinary enclosures to organise a particular aspect of life (family, school, factory, prison), control is an ordering that is non-located and distributed – not restricted to any particular space but encompassing the entire social

11 Deleuze says that the concept of control is taken from the work of William Burroughs (1992: 4), who had used the term in his writings to link an oppressive control system utilised by the ancient Mayan priesthood to what he thought were similar systems at work in the contemporary world. Deleuze develops his conceptualisation of control significantly further than any of Burroughs’ own work, but there is nevertheless much to be done in determining exactly what Deleuze has taken from Burroughs that I am, regrettably, unable to undertake in this thesis. For examples of Burroughs’ writing on control systems see ‘Control’ (2010a) and ‘The Limits of Control’ (2010b), as well as ‘The Invisible Generation’ section in The Ticket That Exploded (2010d: 159-168) and the ‘Benway’ routine in Naked Lunch (2005: 19-38). For overviews of Burroughs’ thinking on control from a Deleuzian perspective, see Nathan Moore’s ‘Nova Law’ (2007) and Christopher Land’s ‘Apomorphine Silence’ (2005). Burroughs also made two films with Ian Sommerville and Anthony Balch, Towers Open Fire (1964) and The Cut-Ups (1966), which utilise a cinematic variant of his literary cut-up techniques and explore his thinking on the control machine. Wollen provides a short study of these films in ‘Guerilla Conditions’ (2002a).

12 It is important to highlight that Deleuze says in 1990 that control is ‘in the process of replacing the disciplinary societies’ (1992: 4, my emphasis). Like the transition from the movement-image to the time-image, we cannot say that the one form has replaced the other, as evidently the forces of discipline continue to live on into the new world of control and information capital. Both Rodowick (2001: 203-234) and Hardt and Negri (2001: 325-350) explore the actual operations of control within the rapidly developing discourse on digital culture and information capitalism, but in neither of these works is it supposed that this should mean that the disciplinary form has disappeared, only that it has mutated in line with the operations of control. David Savat’s article on control and modulation explicitly argues that the control form does not do away with discipline: ‘If there is, then, an antagonism produced by way of the simultaneous operation of the two machines [discipline and control], this does not necessarily mean that one cancels out the other, nor that one necessarily overrides the other’ (2009: 58).

13 Maurizio Lazzarato’s ‘The Concepts of Life and Living in the Societies of Control’ (2006) and Saul Newman’s ‘Politics in the Age of Control’ (2009) both offer excellent outlines of Deleuze’s conceptualisation of control, providing a short summary of Deleuze’s control article and exploring its themes through reference to wider critical and philosophical work (Foucault and Gabriel Tarde in Lazzarato’s article and Foucault, Rancière and Agamben in Newman’s).
field without restrictions. Deleuze explains that control forms a system of variable geometry (1992: 4), an arrangement of forces as a flexible and mutating map of power. Deleuze says that ‘enclosures are molds, distinct castings, but controls are a modulation, like a self-deforming cast that will continuously change from one moment to the other’ (1992: 4, author’s emphasis). This means that with the gradual evolution of industrial to information capitalism, disciplinary power no longer needs to enclose the individual. The disciplinary form had concentrated force by enclosure (in labour or school or prison environment for set durations), by wage exploitation (the highest possible value-production for the lowest possible wages), or by alienation (reducing the individual to his or her position in an undifferentiated mass). This concentration of force does not disappear with control but is made variable and non-located; employment or education can be accomplished just as well as immaterial labour and endlessly deferred vocational training; prison internment can be circumvented by electronic tagging and surveillance; income need not be wages set according to actual production, but may become a salary set in perpetual metastability according to its relation to financial markets and exchange rates (1992: 4); the individual’s administrative numeration as part of a mass is replaced by digital coding that expresses the location of each of us in a bank of data or information (1992: 5).

Deleuze highlights the differences between the new regime of control and the old disciplinary formation by analogising the two forms as being something like the coils of a serpent (control) and the burrows of a molehill (discipline) (1992: 5), and as William 14 In Protocol (2004) Alexander Galloway usefully distinguishes between centralisation, decentralisation and distribution. Centralised and decentralised networks respectively consist of a single central power point or multiple distinct centralising points. A distributed network has no central point, but is made up of many points that can connect and communicate with any other point as both transmitter and receiver. According to Galloway, centralisation and decentralisation are organisations integral to earlier sovereign and disciplinary models of society, whereas distribution is the organisational logic of control (2004: 11-12 and 30-35).
Bogard explains this is something more than a playful use of terms. Bogard asserts that the “coils of the serpent” is not a metaphor for Deleuze. Control societies are not coils in name only but literally (2007, author’s emphasis). What Deleuze describes as coils are the control mechanisms involved in the ordering of the new regime. Bogard argues:

[Disciplinary and control mechanisms] are not analogues, but isomorphs of each other. They do not resemble each other, nor is one a model for the other. They are different concrete assemblages with different contents, but they are assembled and work in the same ways. (2007, author’s emphasis)

Deleuze had chosen to describe these mechanisms as coils because they operate like meshes – what Bogard describes as ‘a more flexible form of enclosure than burrows, [because] they adjust to the body as it moves and wherever it moves’ (2007, author’s emphasis). This encapsulates the operations of control because each of the mechanisms noted above is a modulating system, ordering with respect to relative informational parameters.

Rodowick addresses Deleuze’s conceptualisation of control in the final chapter of Reading the Figural, locating control in a wider discourse on digital culture, free-market capitalism and virtuality (2001: 203-234). He explains that control presupposes a new conception of force:

15 It is likely that Deleuze takes his serpent comparison from Nietzsche, who had contrasted the serpent to the eagle as an animal that derives its strength from its cunning. In Nietzsche and Philosophy, Deleuze highlights the serpent as part of a discussion of strength and forces: ‘Zarathustra’s two animals are the eagle and the serpent. The eagle is strong and proud, but the serpent being crafty and charming is no less strong’ (2010: 56). The reason that Deleuze returns to the serpent in his outline of control is to note the complexity and efficiency of the new regime that lacks nothing in strength despite a relative withdrawal from the concentrated application of force in the disciplinary formation – control operates by way of cunning.
Industrial or disciplinary societies are based on an energetic and mechanistic conception of movement, effort, and resistance. Bodies apply pressure or are themselves the origin of movement, and the machines that replace physical functions are based on this principle. But in control societies, force withdraws from substance, becoming more gaseous or liquid. (2001: 208)

Deleuze describes the withdrawal of the concentrated force of power from the actual organisation of the social field, making control into a gaseous ordering that should be opposed to the solid forms of disciplinary power. The question that the essay raises is just this: how does this system of control order the social field having withdrawn from the actual and isolated spaces of the disciplinary institutions and having withdrawn from the concentrated application of force upon individuals and the spaces they inhabit?

If even the most direct subject of political power, who under the disciplinary form would surely have been incarcerated, need no longer be restricted to a given institution or space then how is it that the infinite possibilities of the world are not available to all? Discipline engages in the administration of the individual so that the possibilities of the world, for liberty, mobility, or the creation of wealth, are reduced to a manageable set of limited options that are conducive with the operations of the industrial capitalism system. Yet the withdrawal of this system does not open to low-skilled employees, paroled convicts or migrant workers the full extent of possible life-chances as they exist in the world. The operations of control serve to limit this set of possibilities, like discipline, reducing the endless possible ways of living in the world to a limited few.

16 Deleuze says that this withdrawal of force leads to what he calls a form of ‘surfing’ (1992: 5), where, as Rodowick explains, ‘the idea of waves or currents becomes the dominant conception of force, [and] relations of force involve knowing how to insert oneself into a pre-existing current’ (2001: 208). See also Bent Meier Sørensen’s ‘How to Surf: Technologies at Work in the Societies of Control’ (2009).
However, unlike discipline, control can do this without the concentration of force in the way of enclosure, segmentation or repression.

Deleuze explains that the mechanisms through which this occurs are varied, but identifies three key transformations through which the new regime departs from the disciplinary regime. These are outlined with particular clarity by William Walters in ‘Border / Control’:

According to Deleuze, the control society can be characterised in terms of certain key transformations. […] First, there is the shift in the spatiality of power: from forms of governance which privilege particular institutional sites of confinement to open networks of power which operate through variable combinations and productions of desire, lifestyle, anxiety and fear, and which have the market as their paradigm. […] Second, there is the transformation in the dominant mechanisms and images of social order. If discipline nurtured the impossible dream of governing the state in the image of the well-ordered city (Foucault, 1991a), control privileges the figure of communication, finding in information technology and computers its ‘machine’ (Deleuze, 1992: 6). Control Societies implicate their constituent institutions and subjects in regimes of modulation and feedback. All fixed standards and norms are made to float […] Third, there is a shift in assumptions about the subject of power, concerning what we might call subject-effects of strategies of governance. […] Whereas discipline set up a productive tension between masses and individuals, with control we witness a world of ‘dividuals’ whose context is not the mass or society, but proliferating databanks, samples, profiles and markets. (2006: 191,
These three transformations – in the spatiality of power, in the dominant mechanisms and images of the social order and in the subject of power – distinguish the new regime of control and serve to organise the social as a fluid and open environment. The first concerns the withdrawal from the disciplinary environments and entry into a wider modulating network of forces. This is Deleuze’s most simple point in the control essay, as he argues that the various environments of enclosure (prison, hospital, factory, school, family, etc.) are in a generalised crisis (1992: 3) that will lead to their eventual dissolution and integration into a dispersed system of control that encompasses the entire social field.

The second transformation is rather more complex and concerns the organisation of the social and, as Walters highlights, the images of social order (2006: 191). Whereas the disciplinary society was organised around static and enclosed territories (which may be the sites of enclosure we have mentioned but also the rationally ordered state or city), the territories of control are constantly shifting. As Steven Shaviro argues in ‘The “Bitter Necessity” of Debt’, the two regimes are organised around two different sorts of technologies and the shift from one to the other is a significant aspect of Deleuze’s proposed transformation (2010: 75). Deleuze says that control makes use of the computer network and operates not by application of force, as the disciplinary machines had, but as Shaviro notes, by ‘abstracting bodies and objects into data’ (2010: 75). This computerised control relates to the third transformation as well, but with respect to the ordering of the social we can see how control withdraws from the actual territorial spaces that discipline had utilised and instead focuses on the non-spaces of free-floating
images, information and capital.

The relationship between control and the computer is analysed in Protocol (2004) by Alexander Galloway, who argues that a ‘protocological’ control mechanism has succeeded in structuring the smooth spaces of distributed computer networks. Galloway explains that the internet is not an uncontrollable mass of data, as is often thought, but makes use of a range of protocols that govern the use of computer technologies (2004: 8 and 61-64). Galloway says that a protocol is ‘a set of recommendations and rules that outline specific technical standards (2004: 6), a generally adopted and implemented set of routines and practices that computers adopt in order to communicate and share information in a distributed network. Internet protocols are only voluntary standards, but are almost universally followed as they ensure that commands can be understood by any networked computer. Not to follow one of the dominant protocols that Galloway outlines (2004: 29-53) means that a computer will be unable to connect with another networked computer efficiently. These are, as Golloway says, ‘conventional rules that govern the set of possible behaviour patterns within a heterogeneous system’ (2004: 7). These protocols have achieved universality by structuring the conditions of possibility in computer networks – not to follow will make certain tasks and commands impossible. I argue that control operates as a kind of protocol. Organisation of the social is no longer achieved by the concentrated application of force but by reorganising what is and is not possible. Control has no need to enforce adherence to any given standard. At its most efficient, it simply makes any alternative literally unthinkable. We can think of financial networks or electricity grids as being protocological – there is no requirement for people to connect to either, but in each case there is almost no sensible alternative. The difficulties of managing one’s finances or utilising technologies without
making use of banks or electricity companies are so vast that each form is almost universal. Galloway explains that ‘the limits of a protocological system and the limits of possibility are synonymous. To follow a protocol means that everything that is possible within that protocol is at one’s fingertips. Not to follow means no possibility.’ (2004: 52, author's emphasis). In Galloway’s analysis, the network protocols that govern internet use are the organisational forms of the control society and expand outwards from the computer network into a formal apparatus of protocols – ‘the totality of techniques and conventions that affect protocol at a social level, not simply a technical one’ (2004: 55).

As I will show, the protocological mechanisms of control are what will lead to it being understood as a system of risk management, which is to say, as a system of mechanisms for the control and manipulation of future possibilities.

The third transformation that Walters notes is related to the second. The transformation from an ordering of actual territorial spaces and towards an ordering of virtual systems of finance, images and information coincides with a similar transformation in the subject of power (2006: 191). Whereas discipline had addressed each person as a unique and stable moulding or individual subject, control addresses each of us as what Deleuze calls a ‘dividual’: ‘We no longer find ourselves dealing with the mass / individual pair. Individuals have become dividuals, and masses, samples, data, markets, or banks’ (1992: 5, author’s emphasis). The subject of control is withdrawn from the actual body of the individual into an abstracted information-identity.17 Shaviro summarises:

   Our identities are multiple, and they are continually being decomposed and recomposed, on various levels, through the modulation of numerous parameters.

There’s my credit rating, and my medical record, and the databases that track my Visa card use and my web browsing habits. Each of these identifies me separately, for particular purposes. (2010: 74)

Rodowick describes this codification of people as a kind of ‘dataveillance’, ‘wherein all identity is comprised of “data images” rather than the implied surveillance of physical bodies’ (2001: 222). For Rodowick this is the result of the system of control on the relationship between subjectivity and multinational capital, reducing the individual to a code that designates access to credit, capital and labour power – social identity ‘increasingly replaced by the accumulation of passwords and codes that define location and access’ (2001: 223). Control addresses people as numerical and informational abstractions whereby each of us is recomposed in the elements through which the respective control system operates (electronic signatures, credit ratings, access to capital, etc.). William Bogard concludes:

Instead of enclosing you, your body, they enclose your information. Your information does not flow serially between discreet spaces of control but is redistributed simultaneously and selectively across multiple networks, each protected by slightly modified controls, effecting a continuous modulation of control independent of location. (Bogard, 2009: 21)

The control society has withdrawn from the institutionalised application of force and the direct address of the individual subject, instead governing access and rights to abstract formations of finance, information and images. Like Deleuze’s conceptualisation of the time-image, control operates as a groundless and fluctuating system that should be
contrasted to the relatively stable and concentrated formation of discipline. Both control and the time-image operate as part of the same regime that Deleuze postulates as emerging in the post-war period. I will offer an account of the mutual operations of both in the remainder of this chapter and conclude by explaining how this confirms Deleuze’s political position in relation to cinema and visual culture.

**Actualisation / Virtualisation (Hour of the Wolf)**

In ‘Regimes, Pathways, Subjects’, Guattari attempts to trace the functioning of control in what he calls ‘the age of planetary computerisation’ (1996a: 103). This third age (following on from the age of European Christianity and the age of capitalist deterritorialisation) places the human subject into relation with a global technological network composed of media and telecommunications, microprocessing of data, biological engineering and the proliferation of a range of synthetic, chemically produced materials (1996a: 103-107). Guattari argues that in this third age a new kind of machinic subjectivity has come to constitute a new politics. The problem Guattari poses is as follows:

> The burning question, then, becomes this: Why have the immense processional potentials brought forth by the revolutions in information processing, telematics, robotics, office automation, biotechnology and so on up to now led only to a monstrous reinforcement of earlier systems of alienation, an oppressive mass-

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18 Verena Andermatt Conley’s article ‘Of Rhizomes, Smooth Space, War Machines and New Media’ (2009) usefully develops the links between Deleuze’s concept of control and Guattari’s writings in the same period. Simon O’Sullivan also offers an excellent commentary on Guattari’s writings in ‘Guattari’s Aesthetic Paradigm’ (2010), outlining a tripartite structure in Guattari’s thought as what he calls ‘the three assemblages’.

I have already posed a similar question with respect to the operations of control, and although Guattari provides no satisfactory answer, we might find his notion of the age of planetary computerisation a useful supplement to Deleuze’s society of control.19

Guattari questions the impact of the information and image society on human subjectivity, arguing that the information and communication machines, the data-banks and telematics that characterise the new age ‘contribute to the fabrication of new assemblages of enunciation, individual and collective’ (1996a: 96, author’s emphasis). He goes on to distinguish three important ‘paths / voices’ that a history of collective apparatuses of subjectification have produced:

1. Paths / voices of power circumscribing and circumventing human groupings from the outside, either through direct coercion of, and panoptic grip on, bodies, or through imaginary capture of minds.

2. Paths / voices of knowledge articulating themselves with technoscientific and economic pragmatics from within subjectivity.

3. Paths / voices of self-reference developing a processual subjectivity that defines its own coordinates and is self-consistent […] but can nevertheless establish transversal relations to mental and social

19 In ‘Culture as Existential Territory’ (2012) Janell Watson explores the implications of Guattari’s work in a contemporary society of ‘extreme deterritorialisation’, arguing that an ‘existential territory’ formed of music or poetry might take the place of territorial organisations based on place or ethnicity. Watson argues that social organisation in Guattari’s projected post-media age (equivalent to his age of planetary computerisation) will have to contend with such deterritorialisations in everyday systems of thought that a new means of organisation will likely intercede. There are clear parallels here with Deleuze’s control thesis, which suggests that social organisation will have to contend with an accelerating virtualisation of communication and interaction, and Watson’s focus on non-material territorialisations also relates to the importance of groundless and shifting territorial orderings that I will develop in Chapter 2.
Guattari argues that these three paths characterise different organisations of subjectivity. The first is a territorialised power and corresponds to the formation of imperial or sovereign power; the second is the organisation of deterritorialised knowledge and corresponds to the organisation of capitalist modes of knowledge; the third is the organisation of a machinic subjectivity, in which the individual is located as part of a mutating system of organisation. This triad informs Guattari’s short history of subjectivity and social organisation, and is, I argue, a helpful way of locating Deleuze’s formulation of control in relation to his own and Guattari’s wider systems of thought. Guattari’s third pathway relates to what he sees as the most recent historical shift in subjectivity and coincides with the similar rearticulation of the individual as dividual, rendering each of us as arrangements of information or electronic signatures in numerical systems or databanks. This latest transformation inserts us into a machinic organisation of information and images in which the earlier pathways of territorialised power and deterritorialised knowledge are reintegrated into a modulating system of social relations.

The organisation of control has expanded beyond the limited institutional boundaries that discipline had relied on, in order to touch upon every aspect of social organisation. The forces of power and the discursive utterances of knowledge that make up the other two paths of Guattari’s triad engage with the system of control as organisations of assemblages. Power and knowledge are unformed elements of the social strata which are to be organised into territorial systems. This is why Guattari says that it is important to situate the third self-referential path of his triad in relation to the other two (1996a: ____)
97), as this machinic subjectivity entails the organisation of these modes of power and knowledge into territorial assemblages that will encircle and overlay the dividual subject.

In the new regime, as I have argued with respect to the transformation in the subject of power, subjectivity should be seen as the internalisation of these assemblages, or rather as the manifestation of these forms on a plane of consistency (opposed to the plane of organisation where the assemblages are to be physically ordered). This plane is abstract rather than concrete, extracting modes of virtual organisation from pragmatic and semiotic systems – finding, as Deleuze and Guattari would say, ‘smooth spaces, composed from within striated space’ (2004b: 558, authors’ emphasis). This is why Deleuze will argue that control is a smooth or mutating system – not because the forces of power and knowledge have altered from their disciplinary formations, but because the organisation of control depends on virtual formations on the plane of consistency. Guattari had also seen this. The machinic subjectivity that he argues is constituted through his third self-referential pathway is framed as ‘the figureless and foundationless Body without Organs of self-reference’ (1996a: 98).\textsuperscript{20} Control operates by way of this plane of consistency, extracting virtual elements from concrete assemblages. For example, the identification of a particular person as a company employee depends on a number of actual conditions – their being located at a particular time in a particular place, their engagement in some concrete tasks (even if they are engaged in immaterial labour, manipulating computer data or suchlike, their employment will still depend on some form of physical interaction with a workplace and computer interface). But that

\textsuperscript{20} The Body without Organs is another name that Deleuze and Guattari give to the plane of consistency in \textit{A Thousand Plateaus}. In the conclusion to that work they ask (without answer) ‘are the Body without Organs and the Plane the same thing?’ (2004b: 559) and elsewhere: ‘The plane of consistency is the body without organs’ (2005b: 297).
same person will also form a composite of information on a company database, a payroll record, and a tax and national insurance file, all of which are immaterial but nonetheless very real and for which the employee can be held accountable. Thus the digital formation of the control society extracts virtual elements from concrete assemblages, entering the dividual subject into a virtual apparatus of capture despite the apparent withdrawal of concentrated force.

This is the crux of Deleuze’s conceptualisation of control – organisation is no longer administered by means of actual application of force through capture and enclosure. It is no longer dependent on military oppression (Guattari’s first path of power) or ideological coercion (Guattari’s second path of knowledge), but can organise by way of a fully virtual control that can be extracted from and related to the concrete spaces and discursive utterances of these other two paths. This is evident in the films I have discussed above, which position our viewing in reference to an absent or invisible set of images. The scene described from Bergman’s *Hour of the Wolf* is powerful for the skill by which it refers the viewer to the demons supposedly alive within Max Von Sydow’s artist. We should not say that these demonic forces are left to the audience’s imagination, because they are not imagined so much as constructed by Bergman’s manipulation of the visible scene. Sydow’s demons cannot be considered as imagined (neither for the character nor the audience) as they would be an expected encounter upon every viewing of the film. The film simply does not make sense without them. Sydow’s terrors are evoked by use of lighting and cinematography, reducing the visible component of the film towards the indiscernible so as to draw the demons out of the image on screen. Sydow’s demons should themselves be thought of as images in that Bergman manipulates them as a coherent part of the film. The difference here is that
these demon-images are variable. They are not self-evident orderings but on the contrary made to mutate throughout the film. The demon-images are extracted from the visible but more or less indiscernible images on screen and as these images change, they fluctuate and re-position themselves in relation to the actual characters, becoming more or less fearsome throughout the film.\textsuperscript{21}

When looking through Sydow’s sketchbook the demon-images are rendered semi-visible – they are named and we assign scribbled outlines to their shapes. They are made more obscure in the following scene, slipping out of our grasp and hiding behind Ullmann’s face. The blackness in the frame and the sounds of Sydow’s anxious breathing evoke the presence of the demons but allow no outline or weight to the invisible images. As the film progresses the demons are made to mutate, becoming more or less visible, more or less powerful – the old lady is once rendered briefly as an on-screen figure, but disappears again and later only hints at her presence as a symptom of Sydow’s delirious ramblings. In \textit{Hour of the Wolf} the line between real and imagined is meaningless, as even those images that are not visible are made to impact on the visible world, integrating and manipulating force and discourse through a modulating set of virtual images.

Deleuze and Guattari had already made a similar argument in \textit{A Thousand Plateaus},

\textsuperscript{21} There is a recurrent concern with a series of other invisible worlds and forces across Bergman’s films. As well as the visible and supposedly self-evident human world, Bergman will repeatedly invoke demonic forces, characters’ psychological states, god and the devil, death, fear and memories that all form abstract but fully real components of his films. Across his work these forces are widely discussed and philosophised by characters and will often combine – such as in the malevolent ‘spider-god’ in \textit{Through a Glass Darkly} (\textit{Såsom i en Spegel}, 1961) – or slip over into the visible components of the film – making death a physical entity in \textit{The Seventh Seal} (\textit{Det Sjunde Inseglet}, 1957) or making memory overlay the spaces of the present in \textit{Wild Strawberries} (\textit{Smultronstället}, 1957). For Bergman all of these forces are simply ways of discussing or visualising – of making visible – an unbearable emptiness at the heart of the world. See Gado 1996 for a study of these recurring themes in Bergman’s work.
explaining how every assemblage has two poles, the one discursive, the collective assemblage of enunciation (images, language, statements, regimes of signs), and the other concrete, the machinic assemblage of bodies, actions and materials (2004b: 97-98). These are the two poles of content and expression, or, to follow Guattari’s conceptual triad, of power and knowledge. So, for example, we might think of a legal-machine of spaces and bodies (court room, police station, judge and inspector) and a legal-discourse of utterances (sentences, declarations of law, arrest warrants). This is the arrangement of an assemblage as two complementary poles, one non-discursive, ‘with its own intermingled pieces, gears, processes, and bodies contained in one another’ (2004b: 98), the other discursive, ‘the regime of signs or of enunciation: each regime with its incorporeal transformations, acts, death sentences and judgements’ (2004b: 98). These poles of the assemblage mark systems of concrete and discursive arrangements, orderings of power and knowledge, and are part of a plane of organisation that is opposed to the plane of consistency (what Guattari calls the Body without Organs of self-reference).

We can say that a cinema-assemblage is a composite of images, not simply a scene but a significant figure, action or element (of which there may be many overlapping within a scene and across different scenes). Sydow’s artist is an assemblage – a construct of various different images and sounds and actions – as is Ullmann’s character and the house in which they live. The island itself is an assemblage, as is the dinner party group that torments the artist, and the invisible demons. Every film is made up of series of cinema-assemblages stitched together and every assemblage is variable and changing, allowed to grow or collapse, increasing in importance or dispersing and disappearing as the film progresses. Each of these assemblages is made up of concrete and discursive
poles. This does not simply mean what is seen and what is said, because even silent images communicate something. The two poles distinguish what is communicated (content) and the way in which it is communicated (expression). In the scene discussed from *Hour of the Wolf*, the assemblage that forms Sydow’s character is made up of a pole that designates a fearful madness (content) and a pole that renders him trembling, agitated, rambling, rocking back and forth through the light of his table lamp. These poles form the artist’s actual formation from a composite of images and sounds – it is the cinema assemblage as it is positioned on the plane of organisation.

The actual plane is contrasted by Deleuze and Guattari to a virtual plane of consistency. The two planes are inseparable from one another. The plane of organisation is always at work stratifying the plane of consistency, actualising the virtual elements that cling to it, whilst the plane of consistency is at all times extracting virtualities from the concrete forms of the plane of organisation. We can say that the plane of consistency is the domain of the possible. Everything that can exist, that can be seen or can be said, is on this plane but remains unformed – the plane of consistency is the virtual system of unformed elements. The plane of organisation constantly fixes this virtual system in actual forms, extracting from forces or utterances that can make what is possible into something that is actual. Deleuze and Guattari explain:

The plane of organisation is constantly working away on the plane of consistency, always trying to plug the lines of flight, stop or interrupt the movements of deterritorialisation, weigh them down, restratify them, reconstitute forms and subjects in a dimension of depth. Conversely, the plane of consistency is constantly extricating itself from the plane of organisation,
causing particles to spin off the strata, scrambling forms by dint of speed or slowness, breaking down functions by means of assemblages. (2004b: 297)

This is to say that each of the two planes is tied to the other – one territorialising the unformed elements, making actual what is only possible, the other deterritorialising stratified forms, inferring from what is only actual what might be possible.

Again, the operation of these two planes is evident in Hour of the Wolf. The demon-images are immaterial, meaning that they exist as part of the non-material plane of consistency, but are continually pulled towards the plane of organisation through their invocation as part of the actual images on screen. The demons are virtual but always in the process of being made actual. The demons are forced to enter into the actual component of the film, actualised by speech, by the artist’s scrawled images, by the visible contortions of his body, his trembling, Ullmann’s nervous watching. The on-screen images solidify the virtual component of the film, making them assume a form that the viewer can understand. We should not say that the demons invoked by the film are strictly visible (except of course, for the scene in which the old lady appears on screen) but that they are in the process of being made visible. Likewise, as the plane of organisation is in the process of actualising what is virtual in the film, the opposite is also true as the demon-images are again made to disappear from our conscious understanding of them – Sydow’s fearfulness will become too great for our earlier solidification of the demons, and they will again become too great for the actual images to express and accordingly will slip back into the plane of consistency’s virtual spectrum. All films, to varying degrees, will make use of the actual / virtual organisation of images, making a world expressed as more or less visible or non-visible.
It is the time-image, however, that best makes use of the cinematic virtual. The classical movement-image had, for the most part, developed a narrative form that goes from confusion to knowledge, which is to say, from an unknown virtual state to a fully visible and actual narrative resolution. The time-image utilises the virtual forces of the image by removing the formal anchoring of the image and multiplying its indiscernible states. The time-image replaces the coherent logic of the movement-image with a variable cinematic system that allows cinema-assemblages to fluctuate from a state of known actual forms to a state of unknown virtualities.

**Actual worlds / Virtual worlds**

There is an evident similarity between Deleuze’s conceptualisations of control and the time-image. I have argued that the time-image makes the image indiscernible and in doing so opens a rationally constructed world of cinema to a chaotic virtual outside, offering a cinematic world that is unreadable due to the intervention of unformed forces in the cinema image. The time-image does away with the stable formal construction of the cinema-world and allows the viewer to glimpse a world that makes visible the injustices and terrors of the world experienced by millions of people, but also the forces of creativity and difference that might open the striated movement-image cinema towards a new world of immanent possibilities. Similarly, the operations of control do away with the isolated and unchanging sites of power that had dominated the disciplinary formation in favour of a virtual network of variable or modulating relations. Both control and the time-image operate by way of the plane of consistency outlined in
A Thousand Plateaus and both, having not replaced but simply reformed the respective formations of discipline and the movement-image, are engaged in a continual process of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation. Control manipulates dividual data-images that have been deterritorialised from actual concrete assemblages. Control organises and manipulates the dividual in relation to virtual banks of data or computer networks. This is then reterritorialised as a data-image superimposed onto the actual body of the individual, determining life-chances and access rights in actual space. The time-image offers direct images of time that give us a world stripped of the formal mechanisms that codify the correct rational reading of images. It deterritorialises the striated constructions of the movement-image cinema, opening the image to an indiscernibility that is virtual in that it has no presupposed relation to the actual discourses of cinema. But this again enters into a corresponding reterritorialisation as the visible movement of bodies through space re-engages the actual component of the film and returns it to the world of formed matters.

However, the evident similarities that exist with regards to control and the time-image do not mean that they are the same thing, nor even that they work in the same way. Control and the time-image are not functional equivalents in Deleuze’s thought and as such it will be necessary to highlight how they relate to one another. The time-image opens the cinema image onto the plane of consistency and a series of possible variations that had been excluded by the movement-image cinema. A movement-image like Hitchcock’s Lifeboat (1943), for instance, knows exactly what kind of a world it has built – characters are stable and their behaviour is consistent with this stability, editing is rational, political motivations are obvious and narrative is resolved in line with audience expectations. The movement-image presents a grounded and self-evident
image of a world that is known or knowable. In various different ways, Ozu and Bergman and Rossellini all made films that challenged the sensory-motor schema of the movement-image in order to offer us a cinema-world that is not reducible to a single set of unalterable truths (in *Lifeboat*, that German soldiers are not to be trusted, that good [America / Britain] will win out over evil [Germany / Nazism], amongst many others). Rodowick’s elaboration of Deleuze’s Nietzscheanism in *Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine* develops this point:

For the world to be true, or to be subject to a truthful description, it would have to be static and unchanging. Both Nietzsche and Bergson oppose this mechanistic world to a world of continual change composed of a multiplicity of forces in and a constant becoming where relations of identity are unstable and in flux. In this respect, Deleuze argues that ‘the ‘true world’ does not exist, and, if it did, would be inaccessible, impossible to describe, and, if it could be described, would be useless, superfluous’ (2005b: 133). If a replete description of this world were possible, life itself would disappear into static, lifeless signs. (2001: 134)

By way of contrast, *Tokyo Story* offers a world that is not so much unknowable as meaningless, *Hour of the Wolf* offers a world of invisible terrors that are neither imagined nor strictly real, and *Germany Year Zero* offers a world somewhere between suffering and a tiredness that exceeds cinema’s capacities to show it. These are films that, in Deleuze’s words, ‘create vacuoles of noncommunication’ (1995: 175), that break with the striated cinematic forms of the old cinema of discursive knowledge and communicable truths and enter into a virtual plane of endless variation – a living
universe of unformed forces and potential new worlds.

When control withdraws from actualised forms and engages in a virtual plane of information and electronic signatures, the force of deterritorialisation works in a very different way. The virtual spectrum within which control operates is not, as Deleuze had suggested of the time-image, an entry into a plane of unformed and creative potentialities, but rather a set of virtualities that are always in the process of hardening and returning to the concrete plane of actual forms. The digital information and images of the control society are in a tight and contracting circuit with their actual relations—numerical data drawn alongside its actualised reflection in a computer display or rendered as actual force in the corresponding actions that are provoked by financial systems.\(^\text{22}\) As numerous commentators have noted (Bogard 2009: 26-27, Savat 2009: 48-51, Rose 2004: 235-240), control is engaged in a sort of risk management that seeks to regulate the future, reducing the projected variations of the network to a predictable and manageable limit. It is in the process of reterritorialisation that control is most apparent, as it acts to arrest the deterritorialising force of becoming. Michal Herer describes this as ‘a system for the overall neutralisation of creativity’ and the most profound problem that art must face in the society of control (2009: 1).

The question that control ultimately poses is this: in a social field that is organised by way of its virtual relations, what processes are in operation to manage and manipulate the virtual potentialities of the future? We can pose this same question with respect to cinema as well, as the continued life of a striated form of representation in the age of the

\(^{22}\) Deleuze discusses the actual and virtual being drawn into its smallest possible circuit in ‘The Actual and the Virtual’: ‘[...] as the circles contract the virtual draws closer to the actual, both become less and less distinct. You get to an inner circuit which links only the actual object and its virtual image: an actual particle has its virtual double which barely diverges from it at all’ (2002: 150).
time-image suggests that a similar system of control is at work in the cinema, sucking the images of indiscernibility back into a landscape of stable forms and rational relations. By appealing to a non-formal and non-visible order of representation, the time-image brings us into contact with a cinema-world that is more like the world of intolerability that much of the planet experiences everyday. In order to find ways of seeing and thinking the world that are truly new or creative we must engage with this control as Deleuze has conceptualised it. I argue that control needs to be at the heart of any political reading of cinema and is central to understanding the position that Deleuze adopts in the cinema books.

Cinema is not simply an image-making apparatus but a technological and social organisation that produces a set of images through which people learn to see and think about the world. The images that play out on celluloid, television and computer screens offer a world abstracted and fragmented into billions of little dioramas that provide unique and isolated angles onto our own world. Cinema is a vision-machine in the sense that it offers us an infinite spectrum of little worlds that are not taken for this world (the cinema as illusory myth in Wollen’s reading) but as a position from which to view or think this world. In order for control to be maintained, the multiplicity of virtual worlds that the time-image might call forth and that exist on the plane of consistency must be rendered inaccessible (we might say, as Deleuze had in *The Fold*, that they must be made ‘incompossible’ with the everyday world or worlds that we each inhabit).

The virtual potentialities that are immanent to the cinema are controlled by a simple process of disappearance. Cinema should be understood as an apparatus for the production of visibilities in the sense that it offers a window (or more accurately,
billions of little windows) through which to perceive a given ordering of the world. Every possible image and ordering of the world already exists. Images are immanent within the world itself, as Deleuze explains through Bergson, in an unformed state on the plane of consistency, until they are brought forward by perception or captured by a technological apparatus. The cinema does not create images, it only makes them visible, which is to say that it enters into a discursive and visual system that organises the world in a particular way.

What Deleuze’s cinema politics finally asks is a two-fold question: how can the normally invisible sufferings that permeate the world, and the endless variation of possible virtual worlds, be made visible? And how are these virtual images closed off by the operations of control? Deleuze’s cinema project offers both a study of the possibility of cinema to show new worlds and the invisible forces of the intolerable, and also a study of cinema as part of a mechanism that orders society despite its fluidity and groundlessness. Both studies are inherently and unavoidably political.

To ask that the cinema offers a world that resembles the actual intolerability of existence or that it offers a world that is radically new or diverse, is to ask that it makes a new world visible – that the statements and images that it circulates might offer something else. The reason that Deleuze so celebrates the emergence of the time-image is because it opens up the possibility of a new set of visibilities. In Chapter 2, I will explore the ways in which cinema might order visibilities further, focusing on the territorial formation of these visibilities and showing, through Deleuze’s work on Leibniz and Foucault and the study of territoriality in A Thousand Plateaus, how cinema can make visible new territorial assemblages and how the operations of control might conversely
engage in closing them off.
Chapter 2:

Cinema and Territoriality

Deleuze’s analysis of modern cinema demonstrates how the time-image films that emerged in the second half of the century make visible a world of suffering and intolerability that lies hidden and obscured beneath the images of the old movement-image films, and offer a new kind of cinema of infinite variation. Deleuze’s work shows how the time-image is concerned with a groundlessness in the image – an ungrounding that opens cinema onto its outside. This groundlessness is also present in the world beyond the cinema, and Deleuze’s later article on control outlines how an ungrounding of the social field itself has meant that the orderings of the earlier disciplinary formations are in the process of being superseded by a new formation of control. I have argued that Deleuze’s conceptualisation of control follows similar lines to the work already done in Cinema 2 and that the two texts should be read alongside one another. The process of ungrounding that the modern time-image is engaged in is continually undone by the control formation, which is engaged in a process of re-locating the mobile and variable forces of the social. Control is the other side of the time-image cinema, continually reterritorialising the modern cinema’s deterritorialisation. In political terms, what concerns the cinema project is the struggle between difference and sameness. Deleuze spends the books searching film for that invisible mark of poverty or suffering, for stammers and breakdowns or something that says that the world might be otherwise.
Deleuze argues that control forms a system of ‘variable geometry’ (1992: 4) organised around a series of shifting territorial formations. In this chapter I will show how we can also think of cinema as a series of mobile and modulating territories. I will look at the work of two contemporary Deleuze scholars, Patricia Pisters and Tom Conley, who both develop arguments that express certain aspects of my own work quite clearly. Pisters’ recent work (2009, 2010, 2011a, 2011b and 2012) explores the links between Deleuze’s cinema books, neuroscience and contemporary media culture, and will help support my own contention that the control society should be understood as an important extension of his cinema thesis. Conley has argued that cinema can be understood as a cartographic organisation where spectators order images into complex mental territories (2007a, 2010 and 2011). Both scholars will help me to expand on the links that I have already drawn between Deleuze’s work on cinema and his later position on contemporary culture and the control society. The theorisation of territoriality that Deleuze had explored with Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus has an important influence on his subsequent works, and as I will show, we can begin to think about cinema as forming a complex set of territorial formations. As he had himself shown in The Fold, it is the theorisation of territoriality that Deleuze is invoking when he speaks of a “world”.

Cinema and the Computer Network

The connections I have charted between Deleuze’s theorisations of control and the time-image have already noted that the shift towards a new formation of control coincides with wider social shifts towards information capital and digital culture (see Sørensen 2009 and Bogard 2009). The mechanisms by which control orders the individual and the
social field operate in part by way of the new information technologies that were emerging when Deleuze first published the control essay. Rather than confining the individual, delineating spaces or standardizing discourse in the way that had characterised the disciplinary formation, control operates by abstracting concrete forms and bodies into data-formations (see Rodowick 2001: 203-234 and Shaviro 2010). Through the use of information technologies and data management, control engages in a kind of risk management, reducing the complex and variable possibilities of the future to a limited set of predictable and manageable probabilities (see Bogard 2009: 26-27 and Savat 2009: 48-51). We should say that the reterritorialising force of control is engaged in the continuous neutralisation of the modern cinema’s creativity (Herer 2009: 1) – control is in the process of limiting the infinite variations of the time-image.

It is the very groundlessness of the new regime that connects both the time-image and the control formation. It is because the world is already in the process of being abstracted into the new digital information technologies that these shifts with respect to the operations of control have occurred, and so we can see an alignment whereby the virtual force of the time-image cinema is doubled in the digital architectures of the control society. Pisters makes a similar point in her recent work. In ‘Flashforward: The Future is Now’ (2011b) Pisters argues that cinema has entered into the ‘database logic’ of the contemporary media age (2011b: 108-110, see also 2012: 10-11 and 146-148). She explains that this database logic is a typical characteristic of digital culture:

Contemporary culture is driven by databases, from which time and again, new selections are made, new narratives can be constructed, in endless series. […] With the seemingly endless storage and retrieval possibilities of digital
technology, the database seems to become the dominant cultural form. (2011b: 109)

The shift into a new technological formation positions cinema as part of a wider network of images and information, the cinema screen itself becoming no longer a window onto the world but a table of information or a surface inscribed with data (2010: 236-237). Pisters argues that the information age changes how cinema is thought so that we can no longer say that images are seen so much as processed.

The uncoupling of the sensory-motor schemata in the time-image and the ensuing images of indiscernibility insert the modern cinema into a virtual aesthetic where an invisible world of intolerability emerges from beneath the actual images on screen. The time-image allows cinema to float, no longer offering stable concrete worlds or rational systems of morality, but instead an image that is variable because it is incomplete and half-gesturing towards its virtual double. The time-image draws us into a matrix of unthought virtualities that exist outside the image, opening cinema from a stable internal system towards a wider network of scrambled information and incomplete shifting worlds. The time-image is aligned with digital media culture because both are concerned with the construction of mobile territories from fragments of information and images. Between *Cinema 2* and the control essay Deleuze identifies a change in the cinematic apparatus and in the formation of society more generally. It is not that the one change caused the other but that both are the result of a more profound change in the history of thought.

Pisters posits two further arguments: that a further shift has taken place in which the
time-image itself has been superseded by a third image and that Deleuze’s thesis regarding cinema and visual culture is replicated in contemporary discourses on neuroscience (see also William Connolly’s *Neuropolitics* [2002]). These arguments are necessarily interrelated in Pisters’ work and lead to the theorisation of what she calls a ‘neuro-image’ (see especially Pisters 2011a, 2011b and 2012). Pisters argues that the neuro-image coincides with the increasing dominance of digital technology in the contemporary world, suggesting that the database logic of digital culture reproduces the image infinitely until our every experience of the world is overloaded and the world of images become too much (too much to bear, too much to organise, too much to understand). For Pisters, the neuro-image characterises a cinema regime in which characters and spectators are no longer so much struck by the intolerable in the world as lost in a vortex of screens and information (2010: 235). This explosion of images and information, Pisters argues, can be understood as being like an overloaded brain and consequently should be understood through contemporary discourses on neuroscience. Pisters explains:

Contemporary digital and media culture seem to form an intrinsic part of the new image because it makes the chaos into which all images plunge very palpable and sensible. Neuro-images relate to chaos and complexity theory and to all kinds of neuroscientific findings on the workings of the brain. (2010: 236)¹

The connection between Deleuze’s thinking on cinema and the brain is suggested by

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¹ Pisters’ thoughts on cinema and neuroscience are most explicitly developed in her writing on the neuro-image (2011a, 2011b and 2012: 37-124), as well as in the earlier essays ‘The Spiritual Dimension of the Brain as Screen Zigzagging from Cosmos to Earth (and Back)’ (2006a) and ‘Illusionary Perception and Cinema’ (2009). The two earlier articles can be seen as a sort of working notebook for Pisters’ thought, featuring several ideas that would later be expanded upon by her more recent work.
Deleuze himself in ‘The Brain is the Screen’ (2000: 366) and in the conclusion to *Cinema 2*, where he says that computer technology is making the image ‘less like an eye than an overloaded brain endlessly absorbing information’ (2005b: 256, see also Lambert 2008). Deleuze relates the brain to the image analogically, suggesting that the technologies that were arising at the time of *Cinema 2*’s publication are dispersing images into communication networks. Pisters develops Deleuze’s analogy to argue that digital technology and the brain are connected. The digitisation of the image remakes cinema as pure information, uncoupling cinema from its concrete and chemical techno-industrial base. The computerisation of the image changes the ontological status of cinema, making the image formless and floating and the object of a perpetual reorganisation (2005b: 254) in the communications networks of the digital world.

Pisters concludes that the development of technology has had a significant impact on the status of the image (see also Rodowick 2007b: 90-189). She argues that new technologies within cinema and visual culture have ungrounded the image so that it enters into a mobile network of communications technologies. By relating this un grounding to the brain and to neuroscientific discourses, Pisters aims to show how cinema and visual culture is becoming schizophrenic in the sense developed by Deleuze and Guattari in the schizoanalysis books (see especially Pisters 2008, 2011a and 2012: 37-72). In ‘Synaptic Signals’ she highlights a note from *Cinema 2* by way of summary (2011a: 262). Here Deleuze directly relates the brain to the image technologies of the modern world:

> Neurosis is thus not the consequence of the modern world, but rather of our separation from this world, of our lack of adaptation to this world. […] The
brain, in contrast, is adequate to the modern world, including its possibilities of
the expansion of electronic or chemical brains. (2005b: 307 n.20)

The schizophrenic brain, Pisters argues, provides a model for our contemporary
existence in relation to digital and electronic images (2011a: 261). The connections
between cinema and the brain in Deleuze’s thought is summarised succinctly by Ronald
Bogue in Deleuze on Cinema:

The circuits of the brain form a […] paradoxical topological space, connections
following no single, centralized grid of Euclidean paths, but instead tracing
dispersed, multiple and probabilistic passages, such that the inner and outer
surface of the brain’s folds, its proximate and distant sites, communicate with
each other in seemingly impossible ways. […] If in the modern cinema mind is
immanent within the images, and if the images constitute a world, then that
world is a topological brain world. (2003: 178)

There are numerous connections between Deleuze’s cinema project and his
schizoanalytic work with Guattari (see Buchanan 2008 and 2010), and my own
argument that the time-image constitutes an opening of cinema onto a mobile and
mutating field of images is doubled in the studies of open and ungrounded systems in A
Thousand Plateaus (2004b: 523-551). The dissolution of the material cinema image into
a digital image (see Rodowick 2007b) is concurrent with the similar dissolution of the
individual into an informational data-image and of commerce into global financial
markets, and relates to the control formation I have explored in Chapter 1. What Pisters’
exploration of the status of the cinematic image in the digital age shows is quite simply
this shift towards a technocratic regime of control. Her suggestion that this also highlights a change having taken place in cinema as well would seem to support my own argument that the becoming-groundless of control is present in the time-image as well.

**There is no Third Image**

Whilst there is a general agreement in Pisters’ work that cinema and visual culture have entered into a new regime, her additional assertion that this coincides with a further shift into a third kind of image-category is incompatible with my own argument that control and the time-image are related in Deleuze’s thought. I argue that Pisters’ neuro-image is an unnecessary concept as its features are already outlined perfectly well in Deleuze’s work on the time-image and control, both of which show the ungrounding of the image-world and the complementary play of forces of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation. I will suggest that the difficulty in Pisters’ work is in the connections drawn between Deleuze’s movement and time-images and the three passive syntheses of time in *Difference and Repetition* (2001). These problems need not negate the basis of Pisters’ argument – that Deleuze’s thought on cinema is changed by the advances in digital and cybernetic technologies and that we might find a useful ally in contemporary discourses on neuroscience. However, in order to demonstrate the

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2 Pisters concedes this point in *The Neuro-Image*: ‘There is perhaps no need for a third type of image, a “neuro-image” as I propose in this book. Indeed, there are many instances that justify a view of the neuro-image as simply an extension or intensification of the time-image’ (2012: 136). I argue that this is exactly the case. What Pisters understands as the neuro-image is already present in Deleuze’s conceptualisation of the time-image, and its novel features, concerning the transformation of the image in contemporary digital media, are a result of the time-image’s more recent contact with the mechanisms of control. The time-image in contemporary visual culture has not been supplanted by a new kind of image, but many of the features that Deleuze had already identified have been intensified through an encounter with new image and information technologies.
efficacy of my own argument regarding cinema and control it will be necessary to do away with this third category of image entirely and demonstrate that it is the time-image that best expresses this new regime.

Pisters directly relates the image-categories that Deleuze develops in the cinema books to the three passive syntheses of time outlined in *Difference and Repetition* (2012: 133-140). She argues that the first synthesis of time can be recognised as the movement-image and that the second synthesis can be related to the dominant form of time in the time-image (2011a: 267 and 2012: 138). The first synthesis of time is that of habit, formed of our anticipation or passive assumption that something will occur – it is the foundation of time as the continually passing present and relates, according to Pisters, to the movement-image because we can understand the classical cinema as being concerned with an objective present:

The first synthesis of time as the living or passing present relates to the past and the future as dimensions of the present. In this way, the flashback (and flashforward) in cinema can be seen as the past and future of the movement-image that is based in the present. In the movement-image, we always return to the present. (2011a: 267)

The second synthesis of time, by contrast, should be understood as a sort of archiving – the passive sense of the present passing away into the past. The second synthesis is the
domain of memory and concerns the sense of a passing present. Pisters argues that this is the form in which the time-image operates because of its utilisation of the images of a crystalline past, where, as Pisters says, the past becomes more important than the cinematic present and the ground of time manifests itself directly (2011b: 103):

In the second synthesis of time, the past becomes the ground, the time within which time operates, and thus the present and the future become dimensions of the past. So, instead of the synthesis of a particular stretch of duration, the present now becomes the most contracted degree of all of the past, the ‘pure past’. (2011a: 267)

This means that in Pisters’ reading there is need for a third category of image that corresponds to the third synthesis of time; in which present and past become dimensions of the future (2011a: 268-269 and 2012: 138-140). The third synthesis is inserted into Pisters’ argument as a proposed third category of image – the neuro-image. Here, the third synthesis of time opens the first and second syntheses onto a future variation that is neither grounded in the stable present nor in the repeating past. Pisters argues that in cinema, it must overcome the movement-image present and the time-image past and give rise to a neuro-image that can take account of a variable and groundless digital media culture. Pisters summarises:

In this third synthesis, the foundation of habit in the present and the ground of the past are ‘superseded by a groundlessness, a universal ungrounding which turns upon itself and causes only the yet-to-come to return’ (Deleuze 2004: 114). In this third synthesis the present and the past are dimensions of the future.
The notion of a universal ungrounding in cinema is in line with my own arguments with regard to the operations of the time-image and the concurrent manifestations of control in contemporary visual culture. However, Pisters suggests that the era of the time-image has already passed and that we have moved into a new image-regime characterised by the neuro-image. I would argue in contrast that the features of what Pisters designates as neuro-images are already expressed with exceptional clarity in *Cinema 2*. As I will explain, there is simply no need for a third image.

In ‘Flashforward: The Future is Now’, the distinction that Pisters makes between her three categories of image is based on an observation that they orient themselves in

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4 There are a number of Deleuzian film scholars using the three syntheses of time to help understand Deleuze’s conception of the movement-image and time-image, most coming up with different conclusions. In *Deleuze, Cinema and National Identity*, Martin-Jones similarly argues that the three syntheses of time can be used to clarify some aspects of Deleuze’s thought in *Cinema 2* and posits that following the first (habit) and second (memory) syntheses, the third synthesis of time can be seen as operating in line with Deleuze’s conceptualisation of the crystal-image, as a common expression of ‘the hidden ground of time’ (2006: 60-62). In ‘Passions and Actions’ Rushton argues that the three syntheses relate to Deleuze’s image categories in the same way as Pisters does, but argues that the time-image should be read as the third synthesis of time and that the first and second syntheses are the actual and virtual components of the movement-image. In ‘Schizoanalysis and the Phenomenology of Cinema’ (2008), Joe Hughes argues for a different sort of conceptual equivalence in which each of the three syntheses relate to distinct parts of the movement-image – the first passive synthesis relating to the perception-image, the second to the affection-image and the third to the action-image, with the crisis of the action-image demonstrating a failure of the third synthesis prior to a departure into the pure thought of empty time (2008: 25). David Deamer’s ‘A Deleuzian Cineosis’ (2011), goes further still, arguing against each of the earlier cited texts and postulating a more incisive break whereby the entire passive synthesis relates to the time-image, with nine distinct aspects of the syntheses corresponding to the nine proper signs of the time-image. It is not my intention to engage in this debate beyond my own contention that Pisters’ neuro-image is an unnecessary formation. Respecting each of the above readings of the relationship between *Difference and Repetition* and the cinema books, I see no reason why the three syntheses of time should directly equate to any one or other of Deleuze’s image types. There is certainly a case to be made for the connection of the time-image to certain aspects of one or more syntheses (following the above critics, most likely the second and third), but it is quite unnecessary to stabilise these connections when we can usefully explore more specific features of each of the three syntheses, the movement-image and the time-image (that the time-image might relate to the pure past of the second synthesis or the future of the third does not mean that it directly equates to either). Quite apart from the disparities between Pisters’ argument and the three others given above, the neuro-image categorisation eliminates the functional similarities that I argue exist between the operations of the time-image and control and make the digitisation of contemporary visual culture seem like a departure from Deleuze’s thought, when in fact it follows a trajectory that is well-charted in his later works and on which he has much to say.
different ways with respect to their cinematic pasts, presents and futures (this is also how she relates the images to the three syntheses). Pisters posits that the movement-image is presented as a dimension of the present in the sense that characters, locales and actions are presented as taking place in a concrete now. It is, as we would say of habit, a unidimensional present of actions and motor responses. This is contrasted to the time-image which is presented as a dimension of an event in the past. Pisters says that the time-image is ‘less an anticipation of an action, but the expectation of a repetition of an event whose outcome is based in the past’ (2011b: 104) – from movement-image to time-image there is a movement away from a concrete present to a projected past in which everything is oriented towards the memory of some past event. In the neuro-image, the grounded present and past give way to an ungrounded future-image that causes only the yet-to-come to occur.

The account of the future given by Pisters is largely of a narrative future. The ‘about to happen’ or ‘point of view of the future’ that Pisters discusses are narrative constructions of the future and do not concern time in any meaningful sense (beyond a simple impression of film-time). What should, on the contrary, distinguish image regimes in Deleuze’s thought is not a distinction with respect to narrative time, but rather with respect to the relative rationality or indiscernibility of times and images. What makes a movement-image is the ordering of a film such that it produces a rational and consistent image of the world and correspondingly what makes a time-image is the muddling of this image, the ungrounding of the image so that a logic of indiscernibility governs the film. The three films I have discussed in the previous chapter, Hour of the Wolf, Germany Year Zero and Tokyo Story, are all time-images, but none of them speaks to us, as Pisters might expect, from a dimension of the past. They each construct a series of
virtual images that are complex and variable. They offer us images from which we can read no single master-discourse or evident meaning. This is the case in Resnais’ films as well, which Pisters cites as examples of time-images (2012: 140-148, 2011b: 100-102 and 104-109). Even when his films are projected from a point in the past, such as in *Je t’aime, Je t’aime* (1968) or *Hiroshima Mon Amour* (1959), it is not this projection that distinguishes them from the classical movement-image film, but rather the form in which the film presents the past as indistinguishable from the present. Deleuze says that *Je t’aime, Je t’aime* is a crystal image (2005b: 80), which means that the film enters actual and virtual images into the smallest possible circuit, drawing both the visible image and its unseen double together. *Je t’aime, Je t’aime* is set in a narrative present but thrusts us into an actualised memory of the past. When we (spectator, character, film-world) return to the present we are changed. The film’s memory-machine does not consist of recollecting but of *reliving* a precise moment of the past (2005b: 113) and once relived the memory forces tiny virtual mutations in the film and our perception of the film, and when we again relive the past it too is changed. The narrative positioning of past, present and future is irrelevant. *Je t’aime, Je t’aime* is a time-image because it constructs part of a variable loop in which the repetition of actions mutates their further repetitions. We should say that the time-image is based on a process of ungrounding the image.

I do not mean to say that Pisters is simply incorrect. Her argument that there has been a change in the way that we understand cinema in contemporary media culture is correct and coincides with my own argument. It is only the contention that this culture is marked by a neuro-image with which I take issue. Pisters describes this new image as being concerned with a groundless future and as making only the yet-to-come to return.
However, as my own study of the time-image in Chapter 1 shows, this groundlessness is something that Deleuze himself is already talking about and attributing to the time-image. It is the future that is invoked when Deleuze says that electronic images will be based on yet unknown aspects of the time-image (2005b: 255) – not, as Pisters argues, on a new kind of image but on a time-image that is yet-to-come. The time-image is an image always in the process of becoming. This means that to speak of the future or of a yet-to-come in the image is to ask what the image might become or what new worlds it might show us.

**The Formation of Territories (Jaws)**

I argue that cinema can be thought of as a territorial ordering. When I say that the time-image and control are groundless or that they are in a process of continuous variation, I mean to say that the distinct territorial formations that make up cinema and society are in constant mutation. The cinema of the time-image is a cinema based upon a set of mobile territories – a cinema of images becoming something else. Control is likewise ordered upon sets of mobile territories, but we should say in contrast that it is a territorial formation in the process of hardening and arresting the ungrounded becoming of the time-image. When we speak of a future-image it is this territorial mutation that is being invoked – the becoming of the image or the yet-to-come. In *Cinema 2* Deleuze speaks of a people to come (2005b: 207-215) and similarly in *Hour of the Wolf* or *Germany Year Zero* we glimpse an unseen suffering, or more properly a thought that is yet-to-come. These are, in both cases, becomings in thought beneath the actual images of cinema.
It will be necessary first of all to express exactly what I mean when I speak of a cinema-territory and to show how territories are extracted from the chaos of images in contemporary visual culture. Deleuze and Guattari provide a working explanation of territoriality in the refrain section of *A Thousand Plateaus* (2004b: 342-386), which will provide a useful explanation of how cinema can organise a territorial formation. For Deleuze and Guattari a territory is a home or a domain within a plane of speeds and intensities. A territory is an assemblage that must be built and which is always on the point of collapsing and entering into a new territorial formation.

In cinema we can think of a chaos within the disorganised flickering of light on screen, the cosmos of unformed potential images and the matrix of circulating images external to our perceptual experiences of the cinematic apparatus. In each case an image must be extracted from the chaos and the question then becomes: how can an image be formed from patterns of light? How can a virtual image be made visible? How can an image be isolated in the vortex of media information? When these images emerge in series a territory can be organised from them, which is to say that they can form a comprehensible sequence to sketch out a schematic significance in the head of the spectator. A film is formed from flickers of light and shadow on screen and a spectator builds a map of spaces and durations in their head. This map is what we can call a territory. The emergence of a territory formed of images should be understood as a becoming – a process by which cinema imprints its spaces into our heads and through which an image comes to express something.

By way of example, in the early sequences of *Jaws* there is a kind of signposting that
takes place and from this process the audience is encouraged to orient their understandings of the film (their expectations, identifications, fears, etc.). In the first few scenes the film constructs the formal mechanisms upon which the rest of the film will operate – the audience learns the rules of the film in these early minutes, and throughout the rest of the film will consistently filter their readings of events and images through these rules. The very first shot follows a slow camera tracking along an underwater seabed. There is little anchoring with which to interpret this shot, but the gradual movement of the camera, coupled with the superimposition of the film’s title and the rumblings of John Williams’ signature two-note motif, suggest that there is something menacing on the way. The subsequent cut to a group of teenagers drinking on a beach will attempt to re-position this first shot into the concerns of the film’s narrative, but even before *Jaws* offers a character or a locale, it gives a tone. The early overture introduces us to Williams’ soundtrack and offers, not yet a territory but an initial impression.\(^5\) The following scene, beginning with the film’s second shot of teenagers around a fire and ending with the death of the girl, serves to flesh out this early impression, providing an immediate example of the principal mechanism around which the rest of the film is going to be structured – the shark attack.

The build-up to the first attack tells us nothing much about our setting but quite successfully feeds the audience a number of minor details that will serve to offer a more nuanced impression of what is to be expected. A glimpse of two figures sharing cannabis, some trendy 1970s haircuts and a foregrounded couple playfully kissing in the initial tracking shot give a hint of the film’s intended demographic. *Jaws* has no

\(^5\) Linda Maria Koldau’s ‘Of Submarines and Sharks’ (2010) addresses the importance of sound in *Jaws* and other marine environment films. Exploring the use of musical and other audio techniques in communicating the expanse of the ocean, Koldau argues that in *Jaws* the soundtrack is designed to exploit a fear of the unknown water.
problem with an early flash of implied drug use and the first people we meet are young
and hip. A little more detail has been filled out in the spectator’s head and an impression
 stil l suggesting only an abstract tone for the film) begins to solidify into a semi-opaque
idea – we think we know who the film is for at least, and have a general value system
being introduced.

Two of the teenagers cast glances at each other through a quick shot / counter-shot
sequence from boy to girl. The girl, who quickly introduces herself as Chrissie, sits
isolated from the main group. There is a brief chat between the couple (which remains
absent from the audio track) and then the pair rush away to swim in the sea, quickly
shedding their clothes as they go. Chrissie is quickly naked and into the water, whilst
the boy, drunk, stumbles as he undresses, then tumbles down a sand dune and passes out
at the edge of the water. This sequence is built out of a succession of medium length
tracking shots that follow the couple running across sand dunes towards the water. The
film offers little of significance around which to orient the film-world.

The sequence acts mostly as a prelude to the attack but there are some small
confirmations of themes already set in the earlier shots. The girl is quick to remove her
clothes and the boy is drunk to the point of collapse, re-establishing the values of a
young liberal America. The quick shot of the boy tripping and rolling down a sand dune
(accompanied by an overdubbed wooden comedy ‘Whoops!’), has him moving from
left to right, whereas earlier shots had tracked the pair from right to left. The effect is
jarring, and the shot introduces a comic sensibility that will become one of Spielberg’s
trademarks. Without learning very much at all about our setting or any of our characters,
these first few shots have established a tone for the film to follow (that will repeatedly
skip back and forth between menace and light-heartedness) as well as a provisional value system and a brief pause in the narrative. The boy lies helpless at the water’s edge and Chrissie swims off into the darkness.

The remainder of the scene is taken up by the first shark attack sequence. After following Chrissie out to sea and watching her quietly swim around for a few moments, the camera cuts to an underwater shot looking upwards at her swimming horizontally from right to left across the screen, accompanied by a soft twinkling musical motif. The music carries over onto two more above water shots, before the main *Jaws* theme emerges with the next underwater shot, the camera now advancing upwards towards the defenceless swimmer. The film cuts back to her head above water and there is a momentary pause before she jerks downwards into the water. The quickly intercut shots that follow show Chrissie, mostly from just above water level, thrashing about and screaming, sometimes jerking quickly back and forth from one side to the other, sometimes shifting her entire body to one side in a quick and unnatural-looking movement. There is one brief pause in the sequence – a cut to the now-sleeping boy on the beach before cutting back again to Chrissie momentarily clinging to a buoy floating to the right of the screen – but the attack is otherwise unrelenting. A minute of screen time is saturated by an almost uninterrupted sequence of wails and thrashing and stammered pleas that contrast violently with the previously silent ocean, the inane background chatter around the beach camp-fire, and the relative quiet of the subsequent shark attacks. In under four minutes *Jaws* has built an engine around which to structure the spectator’s viewing, tracing out a schematic position through which to filter subsequent images. This preview attack offers the audience an example of what the shark (and by extension the mechanics of the film) is capable of. It acts as an anchor to
the extrapolation of the shark myth that concerns most of the film, filtering all shark-related information through a primordial shark attack.

In *Cinema 1* Deleuze provides an explanation of how a film is organised into what he calls a set (2005a: 13-29). A set is a relatively closed system that includes everything that is present in the image (2005a: 13). Deleuze says that the cinematic image is made up of numerous elements that produce a set or a grouping of similarly expressive elements. Data-elements are grouped and ordered on screen, captured in series of small frames and bands within the on-screen image. Deleuze explains:

Framing is the art of choosing the parts of all kinds which became part of a set. This set is a closed system, relatively and artificially closed. The closed system determined by the frame can be considered in relation to the data that it communicates to the spectators: it is ‘informatic’. (2005a: 19)

The elements already outlined from *Jaws* provide the spectator with a visual as well as thematic organisation. The early lateral tracking shot across the figures of the teenagers sitting grouped around the fire follows a band across the middle of the screen. The fire acts as a solitary light source. The silhouetted bodies pass by the camera as if forming a periphery that separates the visible fireside from the invisible and unknown darkness at the edges of the screen. The kissing youths, the drug users, the guitar and harmonica players not only introduce the beginnings of a value system but also come to form a sort of home in the image – a visible domain beyond which lies an invisible darkness. The image is thinly framed between two bands of blackness at the upper and lower portions of the screen.
Other visual framings occur throughout the scene. The rapidly moving bodies of the couple running towards the waterline are interspersed with a snaking line of beach fences, intermittently falling behind and passing in front of the bodies, receding into the background or breaking the runners’ trajectories. The camera moves horizontally and frames both figures in a band at the centre of the screen. As Chrissie enters the water the shot is again organised into horizontal bands, breaking beach and sea spaces into clearly distinguished and isolated zones. The boy must stop at the furthest extreme of the beach and ends up marooned on a thin strip of sand in front of a sea that dominates the upper portion of the screen. Chrissie breaks the partition of visible beach space (now formed into a set that encompasses all the elements we have identified) and non-visible water space, within which she is subsequently swallowed.

For Deleuze, these sets constitute the information system of the cinema screen that organises the discrete units of data in a given shot so that they may be interpreted by a spectator. These sets in turn open onto a whole which encompasses the totality of all sets and marks their succession and gradual shifting. In *Jaws* the sets that constitute our early interactions with the teenagers and the first contact with the shark open onto a whole that constitutes the entirety of the audience’s means of thinking about the shark and its relationship with the water and the land. In a four-minute sequence that takes the film from sets that establish a human world to sets that demonstrate the film’s principal shark attack spectacle, the whole is first established and then changes to form a new organisation of shark-data. In four minutes *Jaws* traces out the shark as non-signifying force of nature, as a silence that contrasts to the noisy world of the beach and the unbearable shrieks of the above-surface victim, and as a cinematic machine that is all
but absent and serves as a fictive manifestation of the film’s own fairground thrills.

This is not to say that a film is generally so easily understood (even the movement-image film) nor that these sets and their evocation of a cinematic whole is absolute. Sets are unstable. As a film progresses, the organised data expands and takes on new significance. Each set opens onto another as the film progresses towards its conclusion and early sets disappear into insignificance. In the scene immediately following this opening in *Jaws* we are given a more conventional establishing shot of Amity Island (the film’s locale) and are introduced to Roy Scheider. This scene shows the investigation that follows the first shark attack and substitutes a system of values revolving around small-town community life and family interaction for the liberal teenage values we had adopted in the opening sequence. These values are not mutually exclusive and some of the elements previously introduced in this first sequence carry over into the concerns of the latter part of the film (the separation between land and water, the non-signifying opaqueness of the shark), but a series of new sets is instituted and becomes increasingly important as the film develops (images of white-picket suburbia, Scheider’s escape from New York into seaside anonymity, mayoral bureaucracy, a conflicting reliance on and aversion to outsiders). This development replaces already established sets with new ones and correspondingly changes the whole.

Furthermore, the whole itself is not limited to the confines of the film-world but stretches beyond the film, taking in an external field of images and discourses. In her book on the film (2002), Antonia Quirke explains that part of the appeal of *Jaws* comes from its utilisation of older shark narratives and myths. Many images in the film are by no means new to spectators familiar with other forms of discourse on sharks – the
isolated fin as visible indicator of the shark’s presence, the wall of shark skeletons that adorns Robert Shaw’s home, the triumphant fishermen’s photograph around the dead tiger shark – each evoking a discourse that stretches beyond the film and which is drawn upon to enhance its scope and significance. An evocation of a larger shark mythology is present throughout the film but becomes particularly prevalent in a latter scene when Shaw’s ageing sea-captain, already playing a semi-parody of a shark hunter, tells the story of a tiger shark attack after the sinking of the USS Indianapolis at the end of the Second World War (Quirke transcribes the entire monologue [2002: 71-72]). Shaw’s speech plays on the pre-existence of the shark myth in popular culture, expanding the film into a more extensive field of discourse that encompasses an already formed idea of the shark as unknown predatory figure and non-anthropomorphic abstract force. The whole, Deleuze says, is open (2005a: 10) and extends the rapid accumulation of data-sets towards larger and more complex fields of information. Therein lies part of Jaws’s effectiveness in that it is able to capture a whole network of myths and subsequently install itself in popular culture as the pre-eminent shark narrative.

Deleuze posits an open whole specific to the movement-image (and therefore Jaws) that will change with the time-image into an outside whole (2005b: 173). In Cinema 2 Deleuze says:

> There does not seem to be a great difference between what we are saying now, *the whole is the outside*, and what we were saying about classical cinema, *the whole was the open*. But the open merged with the indirect representation of time: everywhere where there was movement, there was a changing whole open somewhere, in time. This was why the cinematic image essentially had an out-
of-field which referred on the one hand to an external world that was actualizable in other images, on the other hand to a changing whole which was expressed in the set of associated images. [...] The whole was thus being continually made, in cinema, by internalizing the images and externalizing itself in the images, following a double attraction. This was the process of an always open totalization, which defined montage or the power of thought. (2005b: 173, author’s emphasis)

The open whole of the movement-image is made of a territoriality in constant movement but which is artificially closed by means of a reterritorialisation. Thus the out-of-field in Hitchcock’s Rope (1948), an utterly non-existent space (due to the studio set literally ending at the door of the apartment), can be re-inscribed into the terms of the film by presenting the apparent movement of the characters through an unseen but contextually real space. The whole of the movement-image is open in that it can vary in its relation to the visible component of the film, but it is not an unformed outside that resists integration into this component. What is remarkable about Jaws is that, whilst remaining a movement-image film, it offers a space external to the visible film that is not re-inscribed as an off-screen locale, as is usual in the movement-image. The marine environments of Jaws remain unknowable spaces external to the suburban interior of Amity Island. The water is linked to the shark so that both appear as frightening and empty spaces at the heart of Spielberg’s filmic system. These are only reintegrated into the actual component of the film gradually, as Scheider develops his understanding of the shark (through books, diagrams, encounters with men of science and old sharking professionals) and the series of shark and maritime iconography start to fill out the audience’s understanding of the film’s territorial world.
The whole is therefore not simply a territory that a given film will build, but a way of orienting perceptions of the entire world – the means by which a film organises the forces and images of the world into a coherent and readable information-landscape. The whole forms a territory in which the entirety of the world moves and is organised about a momentarily stable point formed of images containing data-sets of readable elements. A film-territory is both sets and whole, and forms a map of information in the spectator’s head that traces out basic information (intra-territorial) and extends into a wider field (extra-territorial). Following Bergson, Deleuze describes a person as comprising a whole as a point from which the entirety of the world is perceived or understood – the whole is a point of perception onto the world:

For, if the living being is a whole and, therefore, comparable to the whole of the universe, this is not because it is a microcosm as closed as the whole is supposed to be, but, on the contrary, because it is open upon a world, and the world, the universe, is itself the Open. (2005a: 10)

For Deleuze, a whole is formed as part of a continuous becoming in which smaller elements and multiplicities enforce a gradual and endless reforming of the world. The territorial ordering that cinema enacts is a means by which this whole is rendered sensible in relation to a particular position or perception. In movement-images like *Jaws*, this creates a territorial formation that is in a state of continual change in that it is involved in the continual opening of closed data-sets that extend outwards as a means of ordering an entire world in relation to a mythic shark formation. However, this change ultimately only returns to where it began, as even taking into account the variability of
sets and the openness of the whole, the movement-image forms a territory that artificially closes itself and falls back on a semi-stable sense or set of values that will be outmoded by the indiscernible time-image film.

The Outside of Film

I have argued that cinema can be understood as forming a territorial system in which all of the various ideas and little pieces of information that are important in viewing a film are mapped out in a spectator’s head. The world of a film is carefully plotted out by means of its formal construction, organising sets of significant elements and reaching towards a larger world of media systems, connecting our cine-territories to other ways of seeing and thinking in the outside world.

A similar approach to the study of cinema is developed by Conley, who argues that cinema develops a kind of cartographic thinking (2007a, 2010 and 2011). Conley does not offer a single overview of his conceptual methodology, but I argue that across his work there is something of a Deleuzian method for analysing film that is consistent with the concept of territoriality. In order to provide an explanation of some of the key ideas in Conley’s more recent work it will be necessary to take a short detour through the work of André Bazin, whose writing on cinema provides an important influence on Deleuze’s cinematic studies. Bazin develops a position on cinema and its relationship with an outside that will help to assess the importance of Conley’s argument.

In ‘Cinema and Painting’ (2005a) Bazin discusses the edges of the cinema screen as the
frontier at which the cinematic image touches the world. In contrast to the frame of a painting, which marks the break between the microcosm of the picture and the macrocosm of the natural world, the screen’s edge implies an external landscape. Bazin says:

The outer edges of the screen are not, as the technical jargon would seem to imply, the frame of the film image. They are the edges of a piece of masking that shows only a portion of reality. (2005a: 166)

What Bazin means when he says ‘reality’ is less concrete than we may be tempted to think. There is a world outside of the frame but this is not simply some material real external to the film-world. There are implied or constructed spaces, but also external political systems and ideological spaces, such as the spectre of the civilising east and the mythic landscape of the west in the classical Hollywood western. There are historical systems and orders of knowledge, fictions, memories, even the dark occult spaces seen in the horror film – the invisible witch-infested Serbia in Cat People (1942) or the ghostly Japanese past in Ringu (1998). Bazin posits an outside of cinema that is at once spatial, historical, political, ideological and spiritual. Cinema is inscribed by each of these external systems and forms what Bazin would elsewhere describe as ‘a mental landscape at once as objective as a straight photograph and as subjective as pure personal consciousness’ (1971b: 98). It is reality refracted through the lens of each of the systems that border the edges of the cinematic image.

It is this aspect of Bazin’s work that Tom Conley draws upon to analyse cinema as a cartographic system. His thinking will help to develop a way of mapping the territorial
Conley thinks of the systems of images, both in a single film and in audiovisual culture at large, as being like a map and takes various points where maps are shown in films as the starting point of his analysis. A map, he argues, ‘is an element at once foreign to the film, but also, paradoxically, of the same essence as film’ (2007a: 2). In depicting a territory that is not explicitly shown within the film frame, in the war rooms and headquarters of military films, or shown on travel agents’ walls or via locational tracking equipment, this territory is established as a space that is external to the film itself. Even when the entire cinema screen is seized by a map, we read the inscriptions of a territory that is essential to the film yet remains elsewhere. Conley explains:

The person who gazes upon a map works through a welter of impressions about the geographical information it puts forward – along with his or her own fantasies and pieces of past or anticipated memory in dialogue with the names, places, and forms on the map. (2007a: 2)

Conley’s work shows that like a map, viewing a film is not simply an act of seeing but of inferring an imagined territory that corresponds to depicted shapes and inscriptions. Both maps and films are mediums that are read rather than simply seen. Cinema viewers can interpret codes, markers, hieroglyphs and cryptograms. Conley says that spectators ‘see moving images on a screen [and] mix and sift through souvenirs and images of other films and personal memories’ (2007a: 2). Spectators read the inscriptions of external systems upon a film and determine, as if reading a map, the political or ideological territory in which it is located. To ask what is external to a film,
that is, to question how cinema is arranged as a cartography of different marks and inscriptions, codes, signposts, circulating systems and overlapping territories, is to engage with cinema as an exercise in mapping.

Conley argues that Bazin’s writing betrays a focus on the cartographic principles of cinema, noting Bazin’s interest in the study of the construction of space in cinema, as well as his frequent allusions to geography and geology (2007a: 6-10). Conley explains that ‘Bazin sketches a historical stratigraphy, a geological map that inheres at once in his notion of the fortunes of film language and film genres and in his predilection for deep-focus photography’ (2007a: 6). In order to read his work as an exercise in mapping the cinematic image, Conley argues that we need to note what Bazin calls ‘the regime of the image-fact’, as this is where he reveals his cartographic disposition most clearly. Conley explains: ‘For Bazin the fact can be understood as a landscape comprising a paradoxically lacunary totality of elements’ (2007a: 8) – that is, as forming a totality that is paradoxically empty. Each image-fact, not simply the shot but a moment or ‘event’ in a film, is always complete as it is, but can only be read in relation to an outside.  

This outside can be the implied spaces that extend beyond the frame, other moments shown within a film, as with continuity editing and montage, or the complex spiralling circuits and systems beyond the frame. Bazin describes these image-facts as ‘a fragment of concrete reality in itself multiple and full of ambiguity’ (1971a: 37) – not the world in its entirety, but rather a particular ordering or perception of the world. Bazin’s shot is an image-fact ‘whose meaning emerges only after the fact, thanks to other imposed facts between which the mind establishes certain relationships’ (1971a: 37). Conley argues:

6 Deleuze describes the event in a section of The Fold titled ‘What is an Event?’ (2006b: 86-93). Here he explains that an event is not just an occurrence but a point in space and time around which a perception of the world, and consequently a world-view, is organised.
Bazin is close in spirit to the first sentence of Ptolemy’s *Geography* [1991] in which cosmography is likened to the construction of a world map in the way a painter executes the portrait of a sitter, while topography is seen as a local view (of a city) in the way that the same painter depicts an isolated or detached piece, such as an eye or an ear. (2007a: 8)

This in turn echoes Deleuze’s words in *Cinema 2*:

The inside is psychology, the past, involution, a whole psychology of depths which excavate the brain. The outside is the cosmology of galaxies, the future, evolution, a whole supernatural which makes the world explode. (2005b: 198)

Conley means that Bazin’s work distinguishes a topography, an arrangement of elements in an image-fact, from a cosmography, an arrangement of multiple image-facts into an organised totality and within further spaces, systems and worlds that exist external to the frames of the film but are essential in its constitution. Bazin’s work should be read as an exercise in mapping, and through Conley we can relate his words directly to Deleuze’s thoughts on territoriality and cinema, drawing from the intersection of the two projects a theorisation of an inside (internal to film, internal to brain, topography, psychology, sets) and an outside (external to arrangements of film and individual, cosmography, whole, open). The arrangement of these two forms into a legible cinematic mapping is what we can understand as a territorial formation. Conley summarises in ‘Border Incidence’:
Film can be said to be a ‘mapped’ and, indeed, territorial medium par excellence: its narratives create imaginary spaces in which viewers at once locate themselves and, for much of the duration of its projection, seek to get lost and encounter new or other mental spaces. (2007b: 102)

That Conley would say ‘territorial’ rather than simply cartographic (as he generally does in Cartographic Cinema) is instructive. The mental or imaginary spaces of cinema are part of a cinematic assemblage that extracts a territory from the chaos of systems within and outside of the cinema frame. Every assemblage is basically territorial, say Deleuze and Guattari (2004b: 554), and each will pull a territory out of the milieu that surrounds the cinematic assemblage but must be actualised within it in order for it to be made visible. The occult spaces in Cat People, for example, are actualised in the statue of King John and the dialogue with psychoanalyst Dr Judd. Ringu will make visible a hidden past through the costume and stop-motion movements of Sadako. In each case the iconographic and discursive constructs within the image-facts that make up the film serve to extract a territory that is at once of the film and external to it. These territories are not even properly constructed by film as viewers are never provided with enough knowledge to get any concrete sense of them. They are rather implied and the viewer is required to fill in the blanks by plugging other systems of knowledge into them, drawing from other recognisable narratives, as Jaws does with the popular shark myth, in order to make these territorial spaces manifest. A film like Cat People simultaneously mobilises a code of morality, Hollywood xenophobia, psychoanalytic discourses, and fears of the dark, using a range of signs, inscriptions, icons and discourses to extract a territory from an invisible milieu that circles the cinematic image. Thus we find within Conley’s cinematic topography the collective and machinic assemblages that the film
constructs, a cosmography made visible – that is, an identifiable territory within a wider matrix of systems.

**Archive and Diagram / What is a World?**

In ‘The Strategist and the Stratigrapher’ (2010) Conley orients his cartographic study of cinema around the concepts of the archive and the diagram. He defines the two concepts as linked to the two interrelating planes of organisation and consistency. Conley explains that the plane of organisation pertains to the (actual) archive and the plane of consistency to the (virtual) diagram. This means that a cinematic archive will structure itself around actual images and discursive formations – spaces that are (or were) visible within the film itself, thematic organisations or narrative (2010: 196). Diagrams are mappings of forces that are not derived from the structure of a film itself but to which it may relate. Archive and diagram together constitute two interrelated poles of territoriality. The actual archive is formed from legible and fully visible elements and data-sets within a film and contrasts with a virtual diagram of inferred but nonetheless invisible domains. We can say that a cinema archive deals in shots whilst a cinema diagram is concerned with Bazin’s image-fact – not simply an image but a force of becoming that can only be read in relation to an outside.

In ‘Deleuze and the Filmic Diagram’ (2011) Conley focuses his interest on the diagram and how it can address the outside of cinema. Following ‘Image or Time?’ (2010), Ropars-Wuilleumier’s article on Deleuze and Blanchot, Conley addresses the outside of film as ‘a space beyond meaning or that cannot be put in words or that resists all
ideation’ (2011: 164). This is an outside of thought that is manifested in the unthought sensations that cinema can engage with. Conley argues that Deleuze’s work discerns ‘a visibility of the invisible’ (2011: 165), in which ‘an open ended play of force emerges from the circumscriptions of form’ (2011: 166, author’s emphasis). From the movement-image to the time-image a cinematic diagram of forces eclipses an archival narrative form.

Martin-Jones highlights this same distinction in the shift from movement-image to time-image, likening each to the two interrelating planes of (archival) organisation and (diagrammatic) consistency. Martin-Jones argues that ‘the movement-image and the time-image can now be seen to exist in an oscillating movement between the plane of consistency of the time-image and the plane of organisation of the movement-image’ (2006: 26, author’s emphasis). In the interplay of the two planes a territorial archival inside is constantly broken and expanded into a deterritorialising diagrammatic outside. This outside is folded around film and spectator into a cinema / spectator assemblage.

Cinema becomes a double mapping in which the spaces within and external to the film are superimposed onto spaces within the spectator. Deleuze says that the living being is comparable to the whole of the universe (2005a: 10), forming a cinema-spectator diagram onto which the outside is folded, that is mapped not simply as a sequence of shots or closed narrative but as a shifting system of knowledge and ideas and unthought sensations. Bazin had said that this is ‘the screen prolonged indefinitely into the universe’ (2005b: 166). In Cinema 2, anticipating his subsequent book on Leibniz,

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7 This position is adopted by Rushton in “Deleuzian Spectatorship”, in which he argues that Deleuze posits an interrelation between film and viewer rather than a primacy of one over the other. For Deleuze, Rushton argues, the spectator is created almost entirely by the film as a complex assemblage of image and perception (2009: 48).
Deleuze will describe this as a world.  

Deleuze had discussed the notion of the art work as the creation of a world in Proust and Signs (2008: 26-33), arguing that the essence of art is to express a particular understanding of a world. Deleuze quotes Proust:

‘Only by art can we emerge from ourselves, can we know what another sees of this universe that is not the same as ours and whose landscapes would have remained as unknown to us as those that might be on the moon. Thanks to art, instead of seeing a single world, our own, we see it multiply, and as many original artists as there are, so many worlds will we have at our disposal.’ (2008: 28)

Deleuze argues that Proust is Leibnizian in this regard, and that the worlds that an art work is able to create correspond to Leibniz’s conception of the monad. The work of art opens a particular point of view onto the world. This viewpoint forms a territorial mapping around which a world will organise itself. An art work forms an assemblage that encompasses the work, the spectator, and the connections that the two form with each other and their outsides. Deleuze explains that ‘each subject expresses the world from a certain viewpoint […] Each subject therefore expresses an absolutely different world. And doubtless the world expressed does not exist outside the subject expressing it’ (2008: 28). The formal organisation of a film, its relational organisation with respect to the forces of its outside, and its mapping onto the spectator will all serve to reveal a

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8 Deleuze describes a film as composing a world in line with his later analysis of worlds and monads in The Fold. Nelson Goodman and Daniel Frampton both analyse the means by which a world is created and thought about, focusing on what they would respectively call ‘worldmaking’ and ‘filmworlds’. See Daniel Yacavone’s ‘Towards a Theory of Film Worlds’ (2008) for an account of both writers’ work, as well as Goodman’s Ways of Worldmaking (1978) and Frampton’s Filmosophy (2006).
specific viewpoint onto the world, which is to say, following Deleuze’s terminology, that they reveal a territorial formation that is distinct from all other formations and a specific world that is distinct from all other possible worlds.

This understanding of the work of art as the emergence of a world informs both Deleuze’s cinema books and Conley’s cartographic studies of cinema. A film becomes a grid of comprehension that overlays the visual markers and inscriptions that makes it intelligible (both in itself and in relation to a wider field of visual culture), and forms the point which the individual spectator-film-assemblage will occupy within a universe of images and information. It is the point at which a specific territorial ordering of this universe is made visible. It is a cinematic map folded around the individual so as to form a world that will contain all possible ways of thinking this world within it. Deleuze remarks in an interview with Robert Maggiori:

Leibniz’s most famous proposition is that every soul or subject (monad) is completely closed, windowless and doorless, and contains the whole world in its darkest depths, while also illuminating some little portion of that world, each monad, a different portion. So the world is enfolded in each soul, but differently, because each illuminates only one little aspect of the overall folding. (1995: 157)

We can think of the internal territory of a film as structuring our perception in this way. Cinematic elements are organised so as to form a coherent (sometimes only semi-coherent) ordering of narrative and internal discourse. These are the things that a film organises within itself – action, movement, discourse, sound, geography. These fold
around the individual so as to form the horizon of their view of the world. This engulfs the individual in a world that is without opening and that, as Deleuze says, ‘contains the whole world in its darkest depths’ (1995: 157). We have now shifted from a framed image, from which the world spirals away into the universe at its edges, to an image (or a map of images) folded around us and that encompasses our world in its entirety. The systems of forces and spaces that made up the outside of this map are now contained inside this world, organised as a virtual centre that contains this world as a depth that exists within the film and is no longer really external to it in any sense (although Deleuze will persist with the term ‘outside’).

We should say that this world is a specific visibility. All points of view onto the world exist within it, and all other possible organisations of the world are closed off. The endless possibilities that make up the virtual outside of film are closed to the folded cinema-world that encompasses only those systems and forces to which it attaches itself. Whilst other foldings may be possible and other monads may present different worlds or points onto the entirety of the field of images and information, they are unavailable to the individual at the point when they form a specific assemblage and constitute a specific world within the possibilities offered by cinema. In The Fold, Deleuze argues that such worlds, that are each virtually real but cannot be constituted as part of one and the same world, are each ‘incompossible’ with the other (2006b: 67-84). As every monad contains an organisation of the world then all other possible organisations of the world must necessarily be excluded from this specific arrangement. Deleuze explains that there is a world in which Adam sinned and one in which Adam is a nonsinner which is in no way contradictory with the first (2006b: 67). They are, rather, incompossible with one another, which means that the particular territorial arrangement
of one is excluded from the other. Each monad contains a perception of the world in its entirety folded within it. Each offers a specific set of possibilities and excludes others. We can say that each orders a specific set of visibilities.\(^9\)

We should not think of these as being individual sub-worlds of a larger absolute existence. Deleuze explains:

> By positing an infinity of possible worlds, Leibniz in no way reintroduces a duality that would turn our relative world into the reflection of a more profound, absolute world: to the contrary, he turns our relative world into the only existing world, a world that rejects all other possible worlds. (2006b: 68)

Each folded world is a limit at which only those outside forces that are related to the individual remain compossible with a specific organisation. If a particular organisation of the world excludes a series of other possible organisations then we must determine precisely what other organisations are being excluded and how this situation is maintained. To put it another way, I am to question what orders of visibility are contained within a given filmic system and what orders of visibility are excluded by it.

This is what Deleuze shows in his summary discussion of the fold towards the end of *Foucault*:

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\(^9\) Goodman's writing on worldmaking similarly emphasises that there cannot be a single absolute or rational world but a plurality of different worlds (1978: 2-5). Yacavone explains that in Goodman’s work, worlds ‘are made of symbols that function together within larger systems, each of which presents a different, and potentially true or “right”, version of “reality”, or “the way things are”’ (Goodman, 1978: 3). Worlds are in principle incommensurable’ (2008: 86). Deleuze's exposition of Leibniz's philosophy shows that this incommensurability is more properly an incompossibility, and that, in contrast to Goodman's focus on conflicting ‘true realities’, it is in no way contradictory for there to be multiple monad-worlds that express different and utterly opposed orderings of the world and have each of these as a simultaneously existing potential (see 2006b: 67-85).
The world is made up of superimposed surfaces, archives or strata. The world is thus knowledge. But the strata are crossed by a central fissure that separates on the one hand the visual scenes, and on the other the sound curves: the articulable and the visible on each stratum, the two irreducible forms of knowledge, light and language, two vast environments of exterior where visibilities are respectively deposited. (2006a: 98)

A film contains a cinematic system of actual images and sounds on the plane of organisation, and virtual forces of sensation on the plane of consistency. Every film is a machine made up of light and sound that orders a series of superimposed maps through which knowledge, vision and discourse (what the film thinks, what it sees and what it says) are ordered and according to which a specific world is folded. Deleuze continues:

We immerse ourselves from stratum to stratum, from band to band; we cross the surfaces, scenes and curves; we follow the fissure, in order to reach an interior of the world: as Melville says, we look for a central chamber, afraid that there will be no one there and that man’s soul will reach nothing but an immense and terrifying void. (2006a: 99)

Within this interior there is only the outside of the world folded inwards. In cinema the inscriptions and markers of image and sound connect to an ordering of the universe, which is to say that it realises a particular way of thinking the world that will exclude a series of others. The virtual is no longer chaos nor is it strictly infinite, as a universe of possible worlds is folded into a single world that contains within it its own series of
latent and possible orderings while excluding a universe of others. Deleuze again:

The informal outside is a battle, a turbulent, stormy zone where particular points and the relations of forces between those points are tossed about. Strata merely collected and solidified the visual dust and the sonic echo of the battle raging above them. But, up above, the particular features have no form and are neither bodies nor speaking persons. We enter into a domain of uncertain double and partial deaths. Where things continually emerge and fade […]. This is a micro-politics. (2006a: 99)

There are evident links here both to Deleuze’s thesis on control and the concept of territoriality developed in *A Thousand Plateaus*, where the emergence of a territory from the chaos of the outside serves to limit the possible orderings of the world. A film is a territory in which the visual dust and sonic echo that exist as the raw materials of cinema spectatorship are organised into an ordering of the world as a specific territory within a wider visual culture. Every film is an organisation of sight and sound, of inscriptions and codes that compose the material of the film itself. Every film spirals away at the edges of its actual composition into a universe of virtual systems that relate it to circuits of knowledge and ideologies, histories, memories, fashions, markets, economies and sexual relations. Every film, already a film-spectator assemblage, folds these systems into a point of view onto the world that will form, in Deleuze’s parlance, a particular world. Finally, every film-as-world produces a certain ordering of visibilities that will determine what can be seen of a universal matrix of visual culture, and accordingly, what cannot be seen as part of this world.
The Incompossibility of Worlds (*The Searchers*)

I have explored how Deleuze’s thought conceives of the cinema as a territorial formation. Utilising Conley’s work, I have argued that every film charts out a kind of mental cartography in the mind of the spectator, extracting from the images and spaces on screen a series of territories that correspond to the fields of knowledge and discourse that a film must rely on for its narrative and thematic legibility. These territories can be variously complex or contradictory, and even within a single film they are never at rest. A cinematic territory is always in the process of becoming. As the images on screen shift and mutate so too will the mental cartography that the formal and thematic elements of a film have charted. I have shown this in a very simple fashion in Spielberg’s *Jaws*, where the early territorial orderings established in the film’s initial sequence give way to mutations and reterritorialisations later in the film.

I have also argued, in line with the study of the time-image cinema in Chapter 1, that this internal territorial mapping can extend beyond the frame of the film. All films refer to their outside to a certain extent, as we can see in *Jaws*’s utilisation of popular shark myths, but the time-image cinema takes this further still by charting escapes from the actualised territorial mappings into an outside of thought. We have seen this already in Bergman’s *Hour of the Wolf*, in which a series of virtual images are made visible in the darkness and on the faces within the film. The deterritorialisation that characterises the regime of the time-image expands the cinematic cartographies towards an outside of unformed virtual forces. In the time-image a domain of extra-territorial forces is mobilised to express the billion tiny injustices and intolerable states that cannot be
adequately shown by the internal formal logic of the movement-image.

Territorial mappings (both actual territory and virtual outside) constitute a means of ordering the world. Deleuze says that a film designates a whole, by which he means a territorial lens through which to understand the universe. But this is no longer, as in the classical movement-image cinema, a closed totality. The time-image entails an escape by which cinema can express a virtual outside of thought. In Deleuze’s terms, a cinematic territorial formation can be understood as forming a world; not a closed and self-contained organisation, as the world is sometimes assumed to be, but a single world amongst others that constitutes a unique ordering of ideas and images. Every film can be thought of as constituting a world that is more accurately a specific perception of the world. Looking again at my earlier study of *Jaws*, we should say that Spielberg’s film filters the world in its entirety through a territorial ordering of shark myths and narratives. A handful of mythic systems sit at the heart of a range of other networks of values and ideas and function as a kind of filtering arrangement that distorts and repositions the viewer’s understanding of the world so that it fits a particular set of values, prejudices and privileged territorial positions. To say that *Jaws* is a world does not mean that it has no outside or that it constitutes *the* world in its entirety, it simply means that it establishes a territorial formation through which an experience of the world is filtered.

This means that for cinema there is a vast array of different worlds, each offering a specific perspective derived from a unique territorial mapping. The history of cinema provides a variety of worlds from which to draw – grotesque worlds in Fellini, empty worlds in Antonioni, mythic worlds in Ford – each of which reorders the world to fit a
specific territorial mapping and excludes the formations offered by those other worlds and orderings. Each film (and even distinct worlds that exist within some films) is a world that is incompossible with all others.

In *The Fold* Deleuze explains that any given world that should be considered as separate from another, and which effectively contradicts these other worlds, can be understood as being incompossible with them. The world ordered from a particular perspective in one film can negate the world offered from another perspective. A film-world can negate the perspectives offered by other possible worlds, by which I mean other ways of understanding our situation and position in relation to the world. The particular ordering of film-world in *The Searchers* (1956), which shows Native Americans as bloodthirsty savages and western masculinity as over-violent and revengeful, is incompossible with the orderings of other ways of thinking. Brian Henderson says as much in ‘*The Searchers*: An American Dilemma’ (1985), arguing that there are a range of anthropological issues at stake in the film, most significantly concerning the segmentation of white and Indian racial groups and the problems posed by the positions of certain characters and objects, which resist segmentation and enter into an uneasy exchange system between the two racial groups (1985: 434). *The Searchers* sets up two territorial systems which continually open into one another as the film progresses and the spectator learns that there are no self-evident anthropological distinctions to be made and no easy allegiances to be had. Characters continually cross the territorial boundaries that the early part of the film had set up between white settler and Indian savage.

The film positions Martin Pawlie (Jeffrey Hunter) as symbolically Indian yet living as a
white settler, and Debbie (Natalie Wood) as white yet living as a Comanche Indian. Both characters resist easy territorial determination and as the film progresses, and as Ethan Edwards (John Wayne’s archetypal western hero) attempts to police the border between the two racial territories, both adapt and re-adapt to suit relative and fluctuating statuses in the film – at one time civilised and attempting to repress a latent savagery, at another nomadic and attempting to anchor themselves in the trappings of civility. Debbie also occupies an important place in the film as a kind of sexual exchange between the two groups. Henderson explains that *The Searchers* utilises Debbie as an object of exchange and in doing so, produces a particular ordering of sexual relations that further challenges the film’s racial dynamics. Henderson argues:

Debbie is equated with her sexuality, by Ethan and Laurie at least, so that ‘contaminated’ by [Comanche chief] Scar, she can only be disposed of. All this is overdetermined by the system of sexual identity and the system of subject formation of which it is a foundation. This system has a negative dimension – how men and women may not be portrayed – as well as a positive one. It is inconceivable that a man may be cast in the Debbie role or a woman in the Martin role. In classical cinema, aside from some ‘women’s pictures’, named and produced as a distinct genre, a special case, a man cannot be the object of value except briefly, e.g. Dean Martin’s capture in *Rio Bravo* [1959], from which, however, he delivers himself. And a woman cannot except briefly be a seeker, a searcher, cannot be put in the place of performances, of proving herself through action, as Martin is. Nor can she serve apprenticeships which make her the object of a becoming. She is defined and valued always in herself not for herself, that is as object. This means, among other things, that she cannot change.
her social or racial allegiance by her own choice – they are not hers to change.

(1985: 435)

Henderson places Debbie in a unique position with regard to the other characters that cross the film’s strict racial segregation, opening a new sexual dynamic within the formation of a strictly racial and tribal classification of difference, which can only be reintegrated into the concerns of the narrative by objectifying her. This means that a film-world concerned primarily with race and tribal warfare contains within it a particular ordering of sexual relations as well; except that, being part of a film-world oriented around a racialised territorial formation, these sexual relations are also understood by the film through this racial segmentation. We can say that this film-world contains within it a way of thinking about the world in which every discourse and every way of seeing is filtered through this same territorial system.

_The Searchers_ also distinguishes itself from other possible worlds which may form other possible ways of thinking. Henderson highlights a ‘negative dimension’ of this film-world – ‘how men and women may not be portrayed’ (1985: 435). The consequence of the territorial system set up by the film, in which racial segregation is aligned with male violence, is the reduction of Debbie to an objectified and peripheral role. There are world-views that are incompossible with the way of thinking set out in _The Searchers_, that will not frame racial integration as transgression, a woman as an object to be stolen or recovered, or violent masculinity as the founding law of the west. Such ways of thinking are precisely the negative dimensions that Henderson invokes and form a handful of the infinite multiplicity of worlds that are fully possible, yet incompossible with the world of _The Searchers_. A film’s territorial formation offers an
ordering of the world that excludes a multiplicity of other orderings. The endless territorial variation of cinema is arrested by denying access to these other worlds and ways of thinking. In *The Searchers* there are orderings that are literally impossible in the terms set out by the film and these orderings can be considered incompossible variations of the world.

Herein lies the importance of Deleuze’s thoughts on cinema as a political project. When I speak of a world or way of thinking as being incompossible with another ordering of the world I am invoking a system of control. The operations of the control society are founded upon a relative withdrawal from the application of force so that ideological coercion, policing and incarceration are all replaced by a risk management where order is maintained by the removal of certain possibilities, such that the potential variations of a system are reduced to a minimum. This means that rather than thinking of the cinema apparatus as a means of ideological mystification, Deleuze’s work understands image-systems as engaged in the elimination or the reduction of different ways of thinking. Deleuze shows that the apparatuses of visual culture order the world into a discrete set of self-evident images, which composes a relatively stable set of image-worlds. The visible world is an organisation of clichés and striated mappings that mark accepted ways of seeing and understanding the world. An invisible world of experiential forces and new possibilities is closed off by this system, so that the images of a world counter to that given by a striated set of possibilities remain imperceptible.

Deleuze offers a way of analysing the conditions of the incompossibility of thought in cinema and we can use his conceptual tools to map the territorial formations of his cine-thought, to determine what kind of world is ordered by the cinema and ask what other
worlds it buries. I argue that the imperatives set by the political modernist theorists still remain, that cinema is as dangerous as it ever was and that Deleuze’s work offers the tools to study it as a cartographic medium. Cinema is an exercise in making a world, which is to say, in mapping the conditions of thought in contemporary society. As Deleuze’s work shows, this leads to a series of directly political questions: what kind of a world does cinema express? What other worlds are rendered incompossible with it?

But Deleuze’s cinema project goes further still. In Cinema 2 the conceptualisation of the time-image outlines a modern cinema that can overcome the stasis that gripped the movement-image in the middle of the twentieth century. The time-image offers a cinema in the process of deterritorialisation. Its world is always in the process of opening, escaping into an undetermined territorial outside. Deleuze says that it captures an outside of thought, and this is of the greatest importance for his political project. If the movement-image orders a stable rational world that renders all other possible worlds incompossible with it, the time-image offers a world forever in the process of forming, in which a universe of possible future worlds is not yet closed. If the movement-image orders a static world of actual images as perfectly self-evident, the time-image offers a world in which an unseen hunger and inescapable poverty can be made visible.

But cinema in the age of control has already entered a virtual spectrum of continuous variation. In the control society images are made to float and join a global system of deterritorialised information. The movement-image and time-image collapse into a general time-image regime, where circuits of deterritorialising time-images and reterritorialising movement-images are in constant fluctuation. The control society is no longer static or self-evident, yet it cannot do away with the striations of the old regime.
In order to manage the risks of a world in continuous variation, the range of possible future worlds must be reduced by the mechanisms of control such that a momentary striation can close the circuit of virtual worlds or re-enter an information loop that can be predicted and controlled. Control is perpetually shifting from a deterritorialisation to a returning reterritorialisation in a billion places at once. The cinema-media apparatus is in the process of constructing a billion simultaneous territorial worlds that lurch from dissolution to reassembly, forever hardening and falling apart, caught in an infinite feedback loop between possibility and sameness.

What remains to be seen is how this system operates. In the final two chapters I will give a more detailed account of these forces, focusing on the movement-image and reterritorialisation in the work of Godard in Chapter 3, and on the time-image and its deterritorialisation in the films of Rocha in Chapter 4. I have argued that there is a far too often unacknowledged political implication to Deleuze’s cinema project and looked at how his work invokes a virtual future-world and an often obscured image of the yet-to-come. I have developed this position by relating Deleuze’s cinema project to the later essay on control, which shows that a circuit of deterritorialising and reterritorialising forces has superseded the former static worlds of the movement-image and the disciplinary regime. Finally, I have shown that there is a recurring interest in territoriality in Deleuze’s cinema books and across his later work on Foucault and Leibniz, and that this can provide the tools to analyse cinema as a form of cartographic mapping, where the means by which the world is thought and seen is extracted from images and information and organised into a territorial formation that, in line with my study of control, must continually dissolve and reform as an apparatus for the capture of thought and its escape. In the next two chapters I will look at these two territorial
functions in detail so as to determine how they operate and their implications for Deleuze’s cinema politics.
I have argued that in order to confront the political implications of Deleuze’s cinema project, we must take account of two key positions in his work. The movement-image cinema is engaged in closing potential worlds and the time-image acts counter to this closing and opens a cinema-world of continuous variation – a cinema of unformed potential worlds and possible becomings that are rendered incompossible with the striated worlds of the movement-image cinema. This simple proposition is explored in detail in the two volumes of Deleuze’s cinema project, developed in the monographs on Foucault and Leibniz and further reformed into an explicitly political thesis in the essay on control.

In the previous chapters I have charted the connections between the formations of control and the time-image, suggesting that both concepts together constitute a new image regime in which the actual formations of discipline and the movement-image are superseded by an immaterial regime of organisation. Both the societies of control and the cinemas of the time-image enter into a regime of disappearances, in which images lose their material ontological basis, organisation loses the concentrated application of physical force, and the world is doubled by a virtual spectrum of information. I have argued that film should be considered a cartographic medium in the sense that all films, in their process of becoming intelligible, chart out a territorial formation and in the age of the time-image constitute a groundless territorial formation on the point of dissolution.
– a mental cartography always pointing to an extra-territorial outside. The time-image follows a trajectory that takes it into a universe of unformed virtual worlds, multiple potential orderings of the world that are invoked by the actual components of the cinematic image and made coexistent with the actual worlds on-screen. What constitutes the political dimension of the time-image is that it simultaneously maintains a multitude of possible orderings of the world without closing into a whole that is to constitute the world. In contrast to the rational movement-image formations, the time-image allows for a cinematic life that is wild and contradictory and open to change. It is a cinema of becoming.

However, the movement-image does not disappear in the age of the time-image. With the onset of the control society a corresponding reterritorialisation engages the images of the world and reduces a plurality of possible worlds to a limited and predictable few. Control is engaged in a process of risk management, whereby infinite possible futures are reduced to a manageable limit, rendering the future of visual culture as a continual conflict between the forces of smoothing and of striation – a ceaseless territorial dissolution always counteracted by a re-assembly that hardens the unformed forces of the future into a solid form. This can be understood as a significant political issue because it concerns the means by which it becomes possible to think the world. I have argued that to reduce a universe of possible worlds (each world containing a distinct ordering or perception of the entirety of the world – in Deleuze’s terms, a monad) to a single static formation is to render it incompossible with a range of other virtual formations and as such reduce the possibilities for thought to the limit contained in this single monad-world. For it to be possible to think a new thought, as Deleuze says, to ‘have an idea in cinema’, the multiplicity of possible orderings of the world must remain
open and must be constantly in the process of opening, such that the limits of what it is possible to say and think are not already defined by the conditions set by a territorial formation constantly being mapped out by the images and information that circulate around us.

In these final two chapters I will develop the political implications of this theoretical framework and analyse how control and the time-image engage in processes of reterritorialisation and deterritorialisation. I will explore these territorial functions through two case studies, respectively focusing on the work of Godard and the images of culture and consumerism, and on the cinema of poverty assembled by Glauber Rocha in Brazil.1 By tracing these specific examples I will demonstrate the political implications of Deleuze’s cinema project with respect to these two significant filmmakers, who both show the co-present conceptualisation of the apparatuses of capture and the conditions of escape that occur in Deleuze’s thought.

Godard’s recent work, which will be my object of study in this chapter, is remarkable in that it offers a direct consideration of many of the problems that define my own reading of Deleuze’s cinema project. Since the broadcast of the first part of Histoire(s) du Cinéma (1988-1998) in 1989, Godard’s career has focused on the means by which cinema has come to form a sort of image-history of the twentieth century and has utilised his own cinema and video work to map out the intersection between images, history and politics. The political implications of the cinematic machine have been at

1 In Tropical Multiculturalism Robert Stam addresses the functioning of a system of racial stereotyping in Brazilian cinema (1997: 330-338), suggesting a closer conceptual and thematic relation between these two parts of my work than I have been able to develop. As Stam suggests in his study of Brazilian film, cinema’s reliance on clichés as shorthand for events, locales and people is endemic in the medium and constitutes an important political problem. Whilst my own study of cliché in Godard’s films can only address an isolated cinematic treatment of the phenomena, I hope that the application of Deleuze’s conceptualisation to a whole range of other cinematic forms and problems will be evident to the reader.
the forefront of Godard’s work for much of his career, but this recent cycle of films directly addresses the history of cinema as a catalogue of images from which the conditions for the perception of the world are extracted and assembled. I argue that Godard’s films show a fixation with the images of an aggressive and cannibalistic culture, and as with Deleuze’s own work, he questions the conditions whereby these culture-images might give way to a new image-formation (Godard would call this ‘art’, whilst Deleuze might say thought or simply ‘an idea’). Serge Daney makes a similar point in ‘The Godard Paradox’ (2004), arguing that Godard’s passion for cinema ‘wants cinema to become something else, it even longs for the horizon where cinema risks being absorbed by dint of metamorphosis, it opens up its focus onto the unknown’ (2004: 68). Daney understands Godard’s love of cinema as a transformative passion through which the cinema apparatus might be ruptured or done away with entirely for something new. This also produces a recurring interest across his work in those images of culture that might serve to inhibit the transformative potential of cinema.

To focus on the images of everyday commercial visual culture in Godard’s work may seem counter-intuitive given his position as one of the leading exponents of post-war European art cinema, but I argue that the images of the everyday consumerist world have always been of the greatest significance to Godard’s work. This paradox is addressed by Wollen, who argues that Hollywood, modernism and the relationship between art and culture form three recurring threads that run throughout Godard’s career (2002b: 75-78). For Wollen, Godard’s interests in the images of Hollywood, commerce and art are all interpreted through a series of modernist strategies that make his films into ‘a consumerist version of Malraux’s “imaginary museum”, a society full of posters and postcards of great paintings, records of great music, shelves of paperback
classics and people who can quote instant lines of poetry to each other’ (2002b: 77). Godard’s ‘art’ is a transformative potential, as Daney says, an opening up of forces to the unknown, but as with Deleuze’s understanding of the time-image, this gives only a potential rather than, in most cases, an actuality. It is far more likely that these great artworks will be re-inscribed into an endlessly reproducible consumerist matrix. These images (of culture, of Hollywood, of art becoming commerce) define the conditions for the organisation of the world into a distinct image-formation and determine the possibilities of thought in the worlds that we inhabit. I argue that Godard’s work is concerned with the formation of cinema-worlds and the means by which these worlds are founded upon an endlessly re-circulating spectrum of culture-images, Godard’s term for what Deleuze would call a cliché (2005b: 19). These endlessly repeating cliché-images form the locus of Godard’s most significant work and position him in line with the political concerns of Deleuze’s cinema project. Godard’s work is a territorial system formed from overlapping and shifting circuits of images and is concerned with how a network of cliché-images can suppress the possible emergence of new orders of thought.

A Thought That Forms / A Form That Thinks (Je Vous Salue, Sarajevo)

Je Vous Salue, Sarajevo (1993) is a 3-minute photo-montage in which a photograph from the Yugoslav war is broken into smaller images and edited so that we see segments of the photo, one by one, before the whole is revealed. In a voice-over track Godard contrasts a sphere of culture to a sphere of art. He says that culture (‘cigarette, T-shirt, TV, tourism, war’) is the rule, and art (‘Flaubert, Dostoevsky, Gershwin, Mozart,
Cézanne, Vermeer’) is the exception. Everyone speaks the rule, but no one speaks the exception; it is written, composed, painted or filmed, but never spoken. This binary poses a problem that is specifically cinematic and concerns the relationship of the great film-makers with ‘cinema culture’ and the position that each might assume within the other. In Godard’s work we can see a recurring interest in both, for Godard does not simply make ‘art cinema’, he questions what art becomes in the age of culture. Commercial cinema has always been an uneasy constant in Godard’s films – so that Belmondo will impersonate Humphrey Bogart and Fritz Lang and Jack Palance will form two rival faces of the Hollywood aesthetic – and for all of Godard’s auteur status and reputation, it is not art but culture that his work revolves around. There is a constantly repeating network of culture-images that float throughout Godard’s cinema.²

Deleuze’s cinema books betray a similar problematic. Whilst they are, for the most part, concerned with the great film-makers that Godard would call art, the shadow of commercial cinema is ever present. Deleuze asks: ‘What becomes of Hitchcock’s suspense, Eisenstein’s shock and Gance’s sublimity when they are taken up by mediocre authors?’ (2005b: 159). Deleuze is often criticised for being overly elitist in his work on film; however, as I have shown, and as in Godard’s work, this question takes on a crucial political importance. Like Deleuze, Godard is not simply contrasting these two cinemas on qualitative grounds, but considers them specific political forms. Je Vous Salue, Sarajevo asserts that ‘it is the rule to want the death of the exception’, and similarly, when Deleuze says that cinema is dying (2005b: 159), even when there is

² Godard develops similar themes to those explored in Je Vous Salue, Sarajevo in For Ever Mozart (1996), which presents, as Leslie Hill notes, ‘a series of variations on the theme of culture and barbarism and the impossibility and necessity of art, mediated at a number of different levels by a manifold of explicit and implicit quotations’ (2004: 402). Hill also addresses the role that Maurice Blanchot occupies in Godard’s work. Blanchot, as Conley (2011) and Ropars-Wuilleumier (2010) both show, plays an important part in Deleuze’s cinema books, influencing his notion of the ‘thought of the outside’.
more cinema than ever before, this is not to express a critical prejudice. Deleuze says: ‘There is a still more important reason: the mass art […] has degenerated into state propaganda and manipulation, into a kind of fascism which brought together Hitler and Hollywood’ (2005b: 159). For Deleuze, as for Godard, this cinematic break constitutes two different political image- formations.

Deleuze’s movement-image is a system of organisation in which the present is ordered into specific systems of thought internal to a film itself. A film organises a system of thought, a moral code, a politics, and a point from which a whole world of images is organised. In the regime of the time-image, as Rodowick argues, cinema shifts from one audiovisual regime to another and consequently towards a new image of thought (2001: 170-202). The shift from the regime of movement to that of the time-image also marks a shift in the relationship between image and thought. The movement-image is characterised by a Hegelian logic where images are organised as organic representation and marked by a ‘will to truth’. As this regime comes to an end, the time-image will impose a Nietzschean aesthetic whose images are defined not by representation but by simulacra – asking not ‘what is true?’ but ‘who wants the truth and what do they will in wanting it?’ (Rodowick, 2001: 172). No longer does cinema form closed systems in which a model of truth is imposed on the spectator, as each system comes to form a constellation of points in a wider field of audiovisual culture. There is no longer an isolated cinematic system but a matrix of visual culture – no longer a closed and knowable world, but a universe of multiple possible worlds.

I have argued that Deleuze takes the time-image as a limit. It is not a regime in which all films become time-images, but rather, it acts as a potential of what cinema can do.
Even after the Second World War, cinema continues to be quantitatively dominated by the movement-image. I have shown how films organise themselves into particular territorial formations, and due to gradual changes in the distribution of cinema images viewers can no longer relate to films as closed cinematic systems. The systems of thought that surround a film become only one system amongst others.

It is on this distinction that Godard bases his binary opposition. ‘Culture’ is not a movement-image, but movement-image under the regime of the time-image. This is Godard’s problem: not ‘how does the movement-image differ from the time-image?’, but ‘how do these images operate when the time-image is the limit of cinema?’ Deleuze asks a similar question: ‘what maintains a set in this world without totality or linkage?’ (2005a: 212). By this he means to ask how movement-images maintain a discrete system of thought in an open field of visual culture. ‘The answer is simple: what forms the set are clichés and nothing else’ (2005a: 212, author’s emphasis). These same clichés are visible in Godard’s work – cigarettes and TVs, empty lovers’ talk, sunglasses and trench-coats. Deleuze says:

They are these floating images, these anonymous clichés, which circulate in the external world, but which also penetrate each of us and constitute his internal world, so that everyone possesses only psychic clichés by which he thinks and feels, is thought and is felt, being himself a cliché among the others in the world which surrounds him. (2005a: 213)

These are clichés through which, even in an open system of visual culture, thought is organised into the same systems as ever.
So what is art for Godard? And what is this Sarajevo that he chooses to illustrate it? For Godard, Sarajevo is neither a place nor a historical occurrence, but a cinematic system. This is to say that in *Je Vous Salue, Sarajevo*, as also in *Histoire(s) du Cinema* and later in *Notre Musique* (2004), Godard is interested in tracing the images of Sarajevo to see what kind of territories they form. These cinema systems are present across Godard’s work – he traces a Hollywood territory in *Le Mépris* (1963), a factory labour territory in *British Sounds* (1970) and a diagram of consumerism in *Tout Va Bien* (1972) – but Sarajevo offers Godard something more. In this war at the heart of Europe Godard sees the systems of thought that circulate between the culture-signs of Europe become scrambled and indiscernible, no longer producing an image of thought but a thought without image. The Sarajevo system enters into a becoming where the conditions for thought are no longer determined by the cultural conditions of expression founded upon cliché.

The images of Sarajevo that fill Godard’s recent work are given as unreadable signs that do not organise a consistent system of thought and do not maintain the sets that Deleuze attributes to the movement-image. This is most evident in *Notre Musique*. There is no narrative continuity. Instead there are memories of the war written into a man’s face or a library with Sarajevo’s history inscribed into the stone walls. These are histories that are not spoken. They are painted or otherwise evoked within a virtual elsewhere in Godard’s images – the history of Sarajevo as affective sensation that cannot be spoken but which hangs over Godard’s work. There is no depth or detail, nothing to speak about a people or their world, but only images.
Godard’s problem is that even those images that lean towards exception can be reterritorialised into a system of clichés. What happens when Sarajevo is reassembled as another point on the map of cultural Europe, as just another cliché amongst all the others? And therein also lies the political problem that is addressed by Deleuze’s cinema project. The potential of the time-image to order new worlds that take account of the actually felt poverty and hunger of existence also contains within it a potential reterritorialisation, in which a hunger that is felt is re-ordered as a hunger that is merely seen or spoken – hunger as affective sensation remade as a cliché-image of the poor.

**Hitler and Hollywood (Histoire(s) du Cinéma)**

In the opening chapter of *Histoire(s) du Cinéma* (‘1a: Toutes les Histoires’), Godard introduces his project as an exploration of ‘history in the plural’ and asserts that this concerns not just the cinemas that were, but also ‘those that could be’. He argues, via a series of textual superimpositions, that the pre-war cinema apparatuses (he cites Hollywood, the Soviet Union, Weimar Republic, Nazi Germany, etc.) claim to offer ‘a world that matches our desires’, but accuses this cinema of manufacturing sterile images of glamour or heroism in place of any productive desire. A series of images intercuts the Hollywood dream factory with shots of actual factory conditions, a tired and smoking Charles Chaplin, a dancing Rita Hayworth, Eisenstein, Lenin’s dead body, the three stone lions from *Battleship Potemkin* (*Bronenosets Potyomkin*, 1925), Howard Hughes, and Hitler with his eye pressed to a camera. For Godard these are images of a cinematic dream world behind which a hateful underside is ever present. *Histoire(s)* presents images of pretty girls and rich men with the gradually building sound of a military
aircraft. A terrified figure from Dreyer’s *Ordet* (1955) bellows his lost son’s name (‘Johannes!’) over a montage of the classics of German expressionism, Soviet montage and the Hollywood studio system.

Godard questions what kind of worlds the pre-war entertainment cinema had made, and what had nullified those worlds that could have been but were sold away for the expansion of a sterile dream factory. Through this montage-history of the pre-war cinema Godard shows a steady movement whereby these fantasy images become the images of fascism. Movie stars are cut with military newsreel footage of fighter planes and soldiers; black and white gives way to a dazzling colour staging of the Third Reich; Hitler changes from director (with his face to a camera) to spectator to ghostlike entertainer (in an image that recalls Murnau’s *Nosferatu* [1922]), his white skin glowing against a black background, his voice becoming audible above a military marching song that runs over a line of police officers from Fritz Lang’s *M* (1931). Gradually the dreams of cinema are replaced by the images of war. This sequence explicitly relates the pre-war entertainment cinemas (particularly in Weimar and Nazi Germany) to the increasing militarisation of Europe and recalls Siegfried Kracauer’s thesis in *From Caligari to Hitler* (2004), which discovers the psychological conditions for the rise of Nazism prefigured in the German cinema of the 1920s and 1930s.

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3 The role of war and the Holocaust in *Histoire(s) du Cinéma* is examined by Libby Saxton in ‘Anamnesis and Bearing Witness’ (2004). Saxton explores the relationship between Godard’s position on the Holocaust and that given by Claude Lanzmann’s *Shoah* (1985), which appears briefly in the first chapter of *Histoire(s)* but is absent from the rest of the film. Saxton argues that there is a fundamental disagreement between the two film-makers on the relationship between the Holocaust and the cinematographic image, with Godard criticising Lanzman for his failure to confront the Holocaust directly and thus ‘sacralising’ the non-discourse that remains due to the failure of images of suffering to escape the camps (2004: 369). For Godard the failure of cinema was its refusal to do justice to the real horror of the war.

4 Kracauer provides an idiosyncratic (and not entirely accurate) study of Weimar and pre-war German cinema. For a better historical account of this period see Lotte Eisner’s *The Haunted Screen* (1973). For information on wartime cinema and the role of the Nazis in cinema production see Susan Tegel’s *Nazis and the Cinema* (2007).
Kracauer’s book is an important influence on Godard’s argument in this section of *Histoire(s)*. This can be seen most clearly in the repeated use of images from *Nosferatu* as, Hill says, ‘a kind of cinematic shorthand for the powers of darkness that were to engulp Germany 11 short years after the making of Murnau’s film’ (2004: 410). Godard attests that cinema will film the war in newsreels and dramatic fiction but will say nothing of importance because it is already complicit. As an industrial medium the cinema apparatus grew up with the military-industrial complex.\(^5\)

When read through Deleuze’s writing on the cinema, it is evident that Godard is raising two main arguments. The transformative shock of art continues to be nullified by a network of infinitely reproducible images of culture (which Deleuze refers to throughout the cinema books as cliché) and the pre-war cinema composes a socio-political apparatus that, at its most extreme, allies itself with the fascist regime in Nazi Germany (which Deleuze touches upon briefly in a few passages on Hitler and Hollywood [2005b: 159]). These arguments are connected and of crucial importance to the political implications of Deleuze’s thinking on the cinema.

The second of these two points is borrowed from work by Serge Daney (1983) and Paul Virilio (1989), and appears in Deleuze’s work in a very simple form. He says in the chapter on ‘Thought and Cinema’:

> As Serge Daney says, what has brought the whole cinema of the movement-

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5 This is also the thesis of Paul Virilio’s *War and Cinema* (1989), which argues that the technological mechanisms of the cinematograph have always been utilised as part of the military apparatus. Virilio demonstrates that cinema and the military are inextricably linked and show no signs of separating in the contemporary age of digital imagery and electronic warfare. I will make substantial use of Virilio’s work in the remainder of this chapter. See Armitage’s *Virilio and the Media* (2012: 47-70) for a summary of Virilio’s theorisation of the media apparatus.
image into question are the ‘great political mise-en-scène, state propaganda turned tableaux vivants, the first handlings of masses of humans’ (1983: 172), and their backdrop, the camps. This was the death-knell for the ambitions of ‘the old cinema’: not, or not only, the mediocrity and vulgarity of current production but rather Leni Riefenstahl, who was not mediocre. And the situation is still worse if we accept Virilio’s thesis: there has been no diversion or alienation in an art of the masses initially founded by the movement-image; on the contrary the movement-image was from the beginning linked to the organisation of war, state propaganda, ordinary fascism, historically and essentially. (2005b: 159, author’s emphasis)

This position is explored by Virilio in War and Cinema (first published in French in 1984, a year before Deleuze’s Cinema 2), in which he explains that cinema has played an important part in the development of the technology of warfare in the twentieth century. As the limits of war rapidly expanded from localised battlefields to total-warfare in the early twentieth century, cinema and other media and image-making technologies assumed a vital strategic role. Commanders could no longer understand and manipulate troops’ movements and attacks in the real world as battlefields stretched beyond the field of vision and composed multiple fronts and millions of troops. Cinematic technologies assume strategic importance as a means of communicating the organisation of warfare to its participants. Virilio explains:

6 I focus mostly on the position developed by Virilio in War and Cinema concerning the interrelation of military and cinematic technologies. For an overview of Virilio’s thought more generally, readers should consult one of Armitage’s outlines of Virilio’s work. See ‘Paul Virilio: An Introduction’ (2000a) and ‘Paul Virilio: A Critical Overview’ (2011a). Anne Freidberg also provides a summary of Virilio’s writings on cinema and media technologies in ‘Virilio’s Screen’ (2004), as does Armitage’s more recent Virilio and the Media, which addresses Virilio’s contributions to media theory, focusing on the contributions he makes to the field in The Aesthetics of Disappearance (1991). Pisters also makes use of Virilio’s work in The Neuro-Image (2012: 271-280) but fails to note the evident connections between his and Deleuze’s work on cinema and the control society, instead aligning his thought with Jean Baudrillard’s thesis on simulation.
To grasp the objective truth of a great battle, the camera eye (of Napoleon or Griffith) could not have been that of the general or director. Rather, a monitor would have had to have recorded and analysed a number of facts and events incomparably greater than what the human eye and brain can perceive at a given place and time, and then to have inscribed the processed data onto the battlefield itself. (1989: 59)

The cinema becomes a part of a military-industrial complex that replaces a single commanding figure with an apparatus of images and data and multiple overlapping strategic and decision-making functions.

The military cinema engages in the construction of a readable world from the discrete shots and recordings of military manoeuvres and (through its own cartographic functions and in support of more traditional mapping techniques) battlefield geography and landscapes. Furthermore, at the mid-point of the twentieth century both cinema and warfare engage in a double encroachment on the social itself so that both assume a total capture of life. Virilio explores the use of cinema as the mechanism of this new kind of warfare in Nazi Germany in the fifth chapter of War and Cinema (1989: 52-60), noting that from the onset of total-war, following Goebbels’ speech at the Berlin Sports Palace, ‘war now spread not just territorially, but to the whole of reality, with neither limits nor purpose’ (1989: 57). In order for every aspect of reality to be captured by the Nazi war machine, it was necessary for cinema to assume a function that is extensive with the entire life of the nation, no longer operating within the confines of studios and theatres but as a network of images that stretches across the social and attaches itself to a
political machine founded on a vast array of spectacular devices.

Kracauer explores the operations of Nazi wartime propaganda in the 1942 pamphlet ‘Propaganda and the Nazi War Film’ (included as a supplement to From Caligari to Hitler, 2004: 271-307). Alongside a study of Triumph of the Will (Triumph des Willens, 1934) and two feature-length campaign films, Kracauer details the production and circulation of weekly newsreels, highlighting the speed and organisation of a newsreel distribution that was to assume a strategic role in the circulation of Nazi discourse both within Germany and in occupied and neutral territories. Kracauer explains: ‘In 1940, Goebbels said that films must address people of all strata. Following his instructions, the Nazis managed to impose their propaganda films upon the entire German population, with the result that within Germany proper no one could possibly escape them’ (2004: 277). The newsreel became one mechanism through which the entirety of social reality would be colonised by fragments of images and sounds.

Virilio further re-imagines the Nazi Lebensraum project as ‘the transformation of Europe into a cinema screen’ (1989: 53), a mass-fantasy made of numerous fragments of images and discourses through which the idea of a mythic future could be envisioned – a case of the apparatuses of visual culture attempting to organise a future-world conducive to Nazi ideology. Similarly, the use of cinematic techniques in the staging and recording of the 1934 Nuremberg Party Convention creates an artificial universe that mirrored a world endorsed by this same ideology (1989: 54-55), making the grand mythic world of Fritz Lang’s Die Nibelungen (1924) recur in Triumph of the Will, now stretching beyond the limits of the film itself due to the expansion of cinema into a

7 The two campaign films studied by Kracauer are Baptism of Fire (Feuertaufe, 1940), an extended newsreel documenting the German military campaign in Poland, and Victory in the West (Sieg im Westen, 1941), which similarly deals with the campaign in France. See Kracauer 2004: 275-307.
contemporary mythology supposed to echo in every sphere of life. The cinema apparatus becomes a universal spectacle that stages a world that confirms the prejudices of the state.

Thus in Deleuze’s work, the attitude towards what he calls ‘mediocre’ cinema (2005b: 159) poses a specific political problem. For these are not simply bad films, they are ‘disgraceful works’ (2005b: 159) – disgraceful for political rather than aesthetic reasons. Here is a situation where all the image-making technologies of the cinema apparatus have been assembled to produce a closed mythic world that is anathema to Deleuze’s understanding of the potentialities of cinema.

Deleuze’s indictment of the cinema is particularly damning when read alongside Virilio’s thesis on the interrelation of the technologies of cinema and warfare. But Deleuze very quickly offers ‘a subtle way out’ through the work of Antonin Artaud. He explains that Artaud was at first captivated by the cinema but quickly renounced it. Deleuze quotes Artaud:

‘The imbecile world of images caught as if by glue in millions of retinas will never perfect the image that has been made of it. The poetry which can emerge from it all is only a possible poetry, the poetry of what might be, and it is not from the cinema that we should expect …’ (2005b: 160)

Deleuze takes this passage from Artaud’s ‘The Premature Old Age of the Cinema’ (1976a), which marks his abandonment of the cinema in 1933. However, Deleuze says

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8 This point is also raised by Kracauer who provides a short study of Lang’s film, likening the Nazi regime’s ‘strong ornamental inclinations in organising the masses’ with the mythic staging of Die Nibelungen (2004: 91-95).
that this is not Artaud’s last contribution to our understanding of the medium. There is another reason given by Artaud that Deleuze says is ‘oddly capable of restoring hope in a possibility of thinking in cinema through cinema’ (2005b: 160). He argues that at its limit cinema can reveal a certain powerlessness to think that exists at the heart of thought itself (2005b: 161). For Deleuze the modern cinema confirms Artaud’s insight. There is no longer an image-universe that delineates a stable whole even as it is in the process of changing, as with the Nazi image-apparatus, constructing an eternal national mythology from the newsreel fragments of warfare and contemporary life. Modern cinema can highlight an emptiness in thought that dissolves the whole or enters into it a fissure or crack (2005b: 162). Deleuze explains:

As long as he believes in cinema, [Artaud] credits it, not with the power of making us think the whole, but on the contrary, with a ‘dissociative force’ which would introduce a ‘figure of nothingness’, a ‘hole in appearances’. As long as he believes in cinema, he credits it not with the power of returning to images, and linking them according to the demands of an internal monologue and the rhythm of metaphors, but of ‘un-linking’ them, according to multiple voices, internal dialogues, always a voice in another voice. In short, it is the totality of cinema-thought relations that Artaud overturns: on the one hand there is no longer a whole thinkable through montage, on the other hand there is no longer an internal monologue utterable through image. It might be said that Artaud turns round Eisenstein’s argument: if it is true that thought depends on a shock to give birth to it (the nerve, the brain matter), it can only think one thing, the fact that we are not yet thinking, the powerlessness to think the whole and to think oneself, thought which is always fossilized, dislocated, collapsed. (2005b: 162,
I have already addressed this position to an extent through the ‘thought of the outside’ in Chapter 2, and likewise several of the films already discussed give ample support to Deleuze’s notion of there being a powerlessness of thought emerging in the modern cinemas. *Hour of the Wolf* shows an indiscernibility in thought through obscure visions and an aesthetics of madness that sweeps beyond characters and into the entirety of the world. *Germany Year Zero* gives a tiredness so powerful that neither the young boy nor even the form of the film itself are able to confront it. *Tokyo Story* gives a world that is indifferent to human miseries and their pointless gestures. All three, along with a wave of films that emerge in the second half of the century, give not a thought equal to the extent of the world, as Eisenstein had wanted, but an indiscernible emptiness at the heart of thought – as Deleuze says, ‘what does not let itself be thought in thought’ (2005b: 163).

**Paul Virilio and the Media Apparatus**

But this does not at all resolve the issue. Deleuze’s analysis of the innovations of modern cinema addresses only part of the problem. The advent of the time-image does not do away with the movement-image and it is rarely enough for art to exist for it to arrest the infinitely reproducible images of culture. The other side of the time-image is the continuing life of the movement-image and some of its most regressive qualities into the post-war years and beyond. The apparatus that he attacks in these few passages (2005b: 159) survives the end of the Nazi regime in Germany and the breakdown of the
Hollywood studio system in America. The post-war years give rise to numerous New Wave movements around the world, including a wave of young New Hollywood filmmakers such as Francis Ford Coppolla, Robert Altman, Martin Scorsese, Sidney Lumet and Peter Bogdanovitch (many of whom are addressed by Deleuze at the end of Cinema I [2005a: 209-215]). However, this New Wave at the heart of America will only very briefly form a cycle of films comparable to those Deleuze finds in Europe, as the overwhelming success of the blockbuster films in the early 1970s succeeds in reterritorialising the American film industry into a kind of second studio system (see Biskind 1999: 255-285 and 316-345). Eventually, following the gradual takeover of the Hollywood studios by multimedia conglomerates, Hollywood will enter into a global network of images and information that far surpasses the apparatus formed in wartime Germany. This is not addressed by Deleuze.

Much more significantly, Deleuze also ignores the greater significance of Virilio’s thesis, which does not conclude with the fall of the Third Reich. Virilio argues that cinema and warfare continue to develop in tandem and that neither the end of the war (as Kracauer seems to suggest, [2004: 272]) nor the development of the time-image (as Deleuze suggests) will be sufficient to stop this.9

The concluding chapter of War and Cinema (1989: 68-89) divides Virilio’s thesis on the interrelation of cinematic technologies and military techniques into three main parts, respectively focusing on the First World War, the Second World War and the Cold War.

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9 To be fair to Deleuze, the implications of Virilio’s work were not entirely clear at the time of Cinema 2’s publication. At the time of writing, Deleuze had read Speed and Politics (2006) and War and Cinema, (the former addressed in A Thousand Plateaus with reference to deterritorialisation [2004b: 529-530], the latter in Cinema 2) and probably also The Aesthetics of Disappearance. However he did not have access to The Vision Machine (1994), Polar Inertia (1999) or Desert Screen (2002), through which Virilio will further explore the deterritorialisation of the Earth and the militarization of perception.
(which includes military actions in Vietnam, the Malvinas, Lebanon and elsewhere). In the first section (1989: 68-74), Virilio explains how the development of aerial photography responded to the needs for accurate reconnaissance and visualisation of a terrain in perpetual variation due to an artillery bombardment that destroyed landmarks and reduced the theatre of operations to a gradually evolving network of temporary positions, tunnels, trenches, supply lines and railway networks. Virilio explains: ‘as the front settled into positional warfare, aviation took over the cavalry’s function and reconnaissance planes became the eyes of the high command, […] illuminating a terrain that was constantly being turned upside down by high explosives’ (1989: 70). The constant repetition of aerial photography replaces the now defunct ordnance survey maps which conceive of battlefields and supply routes as relatively stable geographies, changing only at long intervals – a military apparatus of observation is required to document and navigate a new kind of warfare in constant flux. Virilio summarises:

In the wars of old, strategy mainly consisted in choosing and marking out a theatre of operations, a battlefield, with the best visual conditions and the greatest scope for movement. In the Great War, however, the main task was to grasp the opposite tendency: to narrow down targets and to create a picture of battle for troops blinded by the massive reach of artillery units, themselves firing blind, and by the ceaseless upheaval of their environment. (1989: 70)

Warfare thus has to contend with the dissolution of static territories and develop an effective apparatus for making sense of the rapidly changing landscape of battle. Virilio develops this further in his account of the Second World War (1989: 74-81), in which he adds a crucial temporal dimension. With the blitzkrieg assaults of the newly motorized
German army, warfare will become a motorised apparatus of speed (1989: 74). The rapidity of battle now requires a new set of technologies that can document an accelerated warfare taking place thousands of miles apart on multiple fronts. The cinema apparatus is utilised as a means of documenting the changing state of the war in Europe for both strategic and propagandistic purposes. Warfare has expanded to include the full extent of a society in a state of total-war, being constantly fed by the rapid circulation of images and discourses that encompass the full extent of the world. This is where Virilio’s work intersects with Deleuze and Kracauer.

But whereas Deleuze will take his investigation elsewhere and Kracauer will conclude at the end of the war, Virilio goes further still and in a third section (1989: 81-89) begins to outline the subsequent development of military-cinematic technologies in the post-war years, through the Vietnam war and up until Israel’s war in Lebanon in the early 1980s. Whereas Deleuze’s position on the propaganda machine in wartime Germany is that it marks the culmination and failure of the movement-image, Virilio takes this apparatus as a single stage in a longer evolution that both pre-dates and outlasts the war.¹⁰ In the post-war years the military-cinema apparatus expands to include new image and data-processing technologies. With the increasing speed and range of weapons systems, human perception is unable to provide a reliable picture of a theatre of operations and must make use of an increasingly sophisticated apparatus of image and information collection devices to relay a complex set of actions and terrains into a

¹⁰ Deleuze says that the movement-image (and not the cinema) was from the beginning linked to the organisation of war (2004b: 159). This is a slight but significant misreading of Virilio’s argument that leaves space in Deleuze’s work for a more progressive modern cinema that can overcome such ‘fascism of production’. Virilio is more inclusive and means to connect the technological capabilities of cinema itself with the military-industrial complex. Virilio is unconcerned with specific cycles or particular films, but sees the development of warfare in the basic mechanisms of cinema production. This has important implications with respect to Deleuze’s work, as Virilio’s subsequent writing and his focus on the deterritorialisation of warfare will intersect with Deleuze’s work on the time-image more closely than is suggested in the few references made to Virilio in Cinema 2.
network of readable maps, charts and commands. Virilio explains how a process that began with the mapping of battlefields many decades earlier culminates in the cockpit of the fighter pilot, whose every perception of the world is filtered through a system of information and image processing devices and organised into a digital display that interprets the world at hyper-speed and over vast distances (1989: 84). The extent of the world has become, for military purposes, a network of images and information provided by planetary-wide satellite systems and data-processors. Virilio calls this ‘a final image of the world, a world in the throes of dematerialization and eventual total disintegration’ (1989: 73, author’s emphasis).

Scott McQuire outlines this aspect of Virilio’s thesis in ‘Virilio’s Media as Philosophy’, arguing that Virilio’s most significant conclusion in War and Cinema ‘was less his analysis of the growing role of photography and film in military observation, but his connection of this process to the general informationalization of warfare’ (2011: 103, author’s emphasis). This is important because it testifies to the expansion of cinema production into a more generalised network of information and images that stretches beyond the confines of the movie theatre and into every realm of life. As McQuire suggests, Virilio’s argument addresses a ‘gradual conversion of warfare to a problem of data management’ (2011: 104, author’s emphasis). The primary problem of the modern military becomes, as Virilio himself contends, ‘a problem of ubiquitousness, of handling simultaneous data in a global but unstable environment’ (1989: 71). Much like the system of control I have explored, warfare becomes an exercise in the management and interpretation of information. The ‘informationalization of warfare’ will expand further still in the age of planetary computerisation. As McQuire explains ‘by the 1990s this is not simply a matter of the military’s growing use of sophisticated weapons systems
incorporating real time surveillance, but the growing strategic need to manage the data flows of civilian media’ (2011: 104). Virilio announces a planetary warfare that encroaches on every aspect of the world in the mass media age, utilising the cinema apparatus and multiple other image-making and data-processing technologies to organise and administer a worldwide information network. From the perspective of Virilio’s work, Deleuze simply cannot conclude his remarks on the fascist cinema apparatus at the end of the war and the inception of the time-image. The militarisation of the cinema will only accelerate after the war and eventually absorb a series of computer technologies that will result in the deterritorialisation of the world into a global network of information flows and digital images.

Herein lies the significance of Deleuze’s conceptualisation of control. Whereas Deleuze’s cinema project only briefly addresses Virilio’s thesis, his eventual confrontation with the information society in the control essay shows a more direct appraisal of the intersection between Virilio’s work and his own, and more importantly, it theorises the deterritorialisation of images in general and not simply of the time-image. Virilio notes his own influence on Deleuze’s conceptualisation of the control society in an interview with John Armitage, in which he claims to have introduced Deleuze to the concept of control (2011: 30). Deleuze himself notes the importance of Virilio’s work in the control article, praising him for his analysis of the ultrarapid forms of free-floating control (1992: 4). In a most interesting note, Deleuze even provides an overview of Virilio’s work in Cinema 2. This reads:

11 Virilio states: ‘The only person to have had any interest in my work in this area was Gilles Deleuze, who, in his book Foucault, demonstrated that he understood the geographical dimension of ‘control societies’. It was my work that inspired Deleuze in this area, given that we had meetings where I introduced him to the concept of ‘control societies’ (2011: 30).
Paul Virilio shows how the system of war mobilizes perception as much as arms and actions: thus photo and cinema pass through war, and are coupled together with arms (for example, the machine gun). There will increasingly be a *mise-en-scène* of the battlefield, to which the enemy replies, not now by camouflage, but by a counter-*mise-en-scène* (simulations, trickery, or giant illuminations of the air defence). But it is the whole of civil life which passes into the mode of the *mise-en-scène*, in the fascist system: ‘real power is henceforth shared between the logistics of arms and that of images and sounds’; and, to the very end, Goebbels dreamt of going beyond Hollywood, which was the modern cinema-city in contrast to the ancient theatre-city. Cinema in turn goes beyond itself towards the electronic image, civil as well as military in a military-industrial complex. (2005b: 300 n.16)

Given such a concise summary of Virilio’s thesis in *War and Cinema*, it is surprising that we find so little consideration of the implications of Virilio’s work on Deleuze’s cinema project. Deleuze does offer some thought on the development of the electronic image in the latter pages of the book, but chooses not to expand on his encounter with *War and Cinema*. However, there is some continuity between the two thinkers that will eventually lead to the remarkable outline of information systems in the control essay.

**Deleuze and Cliché**

It is through Godard’s work that it is possible to connect these two thinkers in a more systematic fashion and make use of Virilio’s thinking on visual culture so as to draw out
the political implications of the cinema books. I have already shown that the control essay contributes a crucial missing element to Deleuze’s work on cinema and visual culture, as it takes account of a global deterritorialisation occurring alongside the rapid computerisation of culture and the development of a range of data-processing and digital technologies. I have also argued that such developments are in line with the theorisation of territoriality developed in *A Thousand Plateaus*, which asserts that neither a deterritorialisation nor a reterritorialisation is absolute and that both functions are necessarily interrelated. The cartographic tendency of *A Thousand Plateaus* is also perfectly consistent with the work on control. Control transforms the organisation of the social so that the concentrated application of force and the segmentation or incarceration of people is supplanted by a form of risk management concerned with the administration of the future. This is to say that in the control society order is maintained by the organisation of the virtual so that the infinite possibilities or potential orderings of the world are reduced to a manageable limit. Cinema is directly involved in this process through its construction of multiple conflicting worlds which contain within each a specific ordering of a multitude of other future worlds, each making possible, but also excluding and as such rendering incompossible, a new world and a new order of thought.

In the final part of this chapter, I will explore the mechanisms of control in order to show the political implications of this theorisation. I have addressed the continuities that this aspect of Deleuze’s thought has with Virilio’s writings on cinema and the media, arguing that the brief evocation of the fascist cinema apparatus in wartime Germany should be developed to encompass a more extensive regime of images that arises later in the control essay and in Virilio’s work. Through Godard’s films, I intend to connect
this network of arguments with the conceptualisation of cliché in the cinema books, which constitutes a more obviously political dimension of Deleuze’s cinema work and will allow me to provide a final account of the surreptitious appearance of control in these earlier books. This will help me to outline the means through which Deleuze offers a counter to the mechanisms of control in cinema and visual culture in Chapter 4, where I will explore the potential for a liberatory politics of the image as it appears in Deleuze’s work.

I suggested earlier that Godard’s work raises two significant arguments with respect to Deleuze’s cinema project, one of these concerning cinema’s colonisation by the fascist war machine during the Second World War. Tracing this argument through Virilio’s work I have shown that the cinema-military apparatus expands further in the latter half of the century to form an extensive media-apparatus. Godard’s second argument contends that this apparatus is involved in the production of a network of infinitely reproducible images of culture that, as he argues in Je Vous Salue, Sarajevo, negates the transformative potential of art. In Godard’s understanding the images of culture are parasitic and reduce ‘the art of living’ to a ready-made perception of the world. I argue that we can understand this position through Deleuze’s conceptualisation of cliché, and that this will help to account for the full political importance of Deleuze’s cinema project.

Deleuze offers an account of what he understands to be the role of the cliché in cinema in the final chapter of Cinema 1 (2005a: 212-215). The cliché emerges as one of ‘the five apparent characteristics of the new image’ (2005a: 214), which, Deleuze argues,
mark the crisis of the action image in post-war Hollywood cinema.\textsuperscript{12} In the modern cinemas of the post-war era the rationally ordered and artificially closed worlds of the classical cinema give way to a new conception of the image open to its outside and in constant variation. Classical cinema had offered a film-world composed of isolated sets that organise what is seen into on-screen groupings and thematic cartographies. The new regime of images opens these sets onto an indiscernible outside that breaks apart these sets and inserts an unreadable elsewhere into the on-screen spaces that are to become fleeting and undefinable any-space-whatevers. Deleuze says that this shift constitutes the crisis of the action-image (the dominant form of the movement-image in the Hollywood studio system), and also, in American cinema, the crisis of the American dream (2005b: 214). The new cinema no longer believes in the ability of the medium to provide an image of the world. After the total-cinemas of the wartime apparatuses, that circulate a network of images supposed to make up the entirety of a reality structured in line with the ideologies of fascism, socialism or American capitalism, cinema is understood for what it has always been. Not an image of the world, an objective image of reality or an apparatus to reform or reveal the world in line with some enduring historical or religious principle (Eisenstein’s socialism, Ford’s American dream, Chaplin’s humanism), but on the contrary an image of a world – a single ordering of the world amongst others.

In a cinema that no longer believes in its own images, the elements that had formed the sets of these previous formations become clichés. Clichés are sound and visual slogans, the iconography of an era or moment shown through photos, recordings, television, the consciousness of clichés and the condemnation of plot (2005a: 214), all of which become key features in the modern cinema, and constitute a significant reassessment of the static and closed world systems of the classical cinema.

\textsuperscript{12} These five characteristics are dispersive situations, deliberately weak links, the voyage form, the consciousness of clichés and the condemnation of plot (2005a: 214), all of which become key features in the modern cinema, and constitute a significant reassessment of the static and closed world systems of the classical cinema.
symbols and consumer objects that map out a little angle on the world without saying anything about it. The universe of clichés is made visible in a modern Hollywood film like Lumet’s *Dog Day Afternoon* (1975), where the clichés of the cinema bank robbery are constantly overtaken by the clichés of 1970s America, such that the narrative is repeatedly halted by interjections foreign to the closed-world organisation of the Hollywood bank caper.\(^{13}\) The film moves in fits and starts because the genre conventions that it borrows from classical Hollywood are no longer sufficient before an expanded universe of images. In *Dog Day Afternoon* the concerns of the film expand to include a panorama of current affairs and media clichés – news cameras and television broadcasters line the streets to capture the robbery and call the bank for interviews with the culprits; spectators protest against police brutality; the local LGBT community emerge with banners in support of Sonny’s marriage to pre-op transvestite Leon; anti-gay protests spark up in opposition. The limits of the robbery expand far beyond the event itself to encompass the significant socio-political discourses of the era (poverty and welfare, racial tensions, gay and transgender rights, low-wage employment and exploitation, police violence, etc.), repeatedly breaking open the territorial limits of the film and only moving forward in breaks and stammerings.\(^{14}\)

In *Cinema 2* Deleuze expands his conceptualisation of cliché by relating it to Henri Bergson’s work. Deleuze says:

\(^{13}\) Lumet is one of the modern American directors that Deleuze addresses in this section of *Cinema 1* and whose work, along with that of Altman and Scorsese, Deleuze considers as symptomatic of the crisis of the action-image in American cinema (see 2005a: 209-215).

\(^{14}\) Fredric Jameson considers the interruptions of these socio-political discourses as evidence of the film’s political concerns in ‘Class and Allegory in Contemporary Mass Culture’ (1992a: 47-74), in which he uses a Marxist analysis of film and popular culture to argue that the film reveals a figuration of class contradiction in the relationship between Sonny, the FBI agent and the local police chief. Jameson suggests that the relative mechanics of power (and especially the position of Sonny’s character) constantly shift as circumstances develop and further discourses overlap the film’s main event and repeatedly change the terms by which the robbery is understood.
Now this is what a cliché is. A cliché is a sensory-motor image of the thing. As Bergson says, we do not perceive the thing or the image in its entirety, we always perceive less of it, we perceive only what we are interested in perceiving, or rather what it is in our interest to perceive, by virtue of economic interests, ideological beliefs and psychological demands. We therefore normally perceive only clichés. (2005b: 19)

Understood in this way, a cliché is an image that reveals only part of its object. A cliché is an event or an object that is filmed and presented in a familiar way, such that it will elicit a familiar response from the spectator. This may include the various formal rules that the classical cinema had established – shot / counter-shot for conversations, soft focus for dreamy gazing at Hollywood starlets, close-up for reactions, fast edits to create excitement, etc. – but also those images that will recur again and again and require each time the same response – the leading-lady’s close-up scream upon sighting the monster, the after-sex cigarette, the ticking clock, the trickle of blood from the corner of the hero’s mouth. These are images that are intended only to elicit a motor response from the audience (a familiar shock or swoon or steely resolve) and cannot have anything new to say about a situation. In these images the viewer will only perceive a familiar and isolated segment of the image, which may be the twitch that indicates that a character is ‘psychotic’ (as so many Hollywood melodramas would put it) or the tattered clothes that indicate a character is homeless, but never the specific experiences, fears or sufferings of mental illness, nor the hunger or cold of living in the streets, and absolutely never the social or political conditions that might give rise to either situation. In each case an audience perceives only what the film requires it to perceive, determined, as Deleuze suggests above, by virtue of economic interest,
ideological beliefs and psychological demands (2005b: 19).

Deleuze says that the universe of clichés that comprises the networks of cinema and visual culture is engaged in this way ‘in hiding images from us, not necessarily in hiding the same thing from us, but in hiding something in the image’ (2005b: 20). But this is where Lumet does nowhere near enough. While Deleuze praises his work for its success in bringing to light the organisation of cliché in a world of expanding visual media and communication, he is also critical of an American cinema that is content only to circulate an empty image of the world through parody or eclecticism – content to reveal the network of clichés but not what is hidden in the cliché. *Dog Day Afternoon*, as Fredric Jameson shows in ‘Class and Allegory in Contemporary Mass Culture’ (1992a), is an exceptional satire on the media landscape of 1970s America but it is content to reduce the socio-political content of the staged event to a series of visual and audio slogans. Al Pacino’s ‘Attica!’ cry is effective to an extent, but reduces a police massacre and all its implications to a catchphrase that arises more because of the character’s appearance in front of the television cameras than any real political anger, and likewise a whole discourse on gay and transgender rights is reduced to the chanting of a few street protesters. The film is an exercise in media-cliché but offers little else, rendering a series of significant political discourses only as shorthand events staged for the television cameras, and as such devoid of any real political content and quickly forgotten in favour of the gradually increasing narrative thrust of the failed bank robbery. This, Deleuze argues, is where the modern American cinema reaches its limit: ‘All the aesthetic or even political qualities that it can have remain narrowly critical and in this way even less “dangerous” than if they were being made use of in a project of
positive creation’ (2005a: 215). It is for such a project that Deleuze looks to the European time-image cinemas in Cinema 2.

Deleuze addresses Rossellini’s work at the beginning of this book, finding in Stromboli (1950) not only a critique of post-war Europe but also a grasping of the intolerable or the unbearable beauty of the world (2005b: 17). He also explores Ozu’s films, finding a network of clichés and behaviour patterns that govern the whole spectrum of life, ranging from meaningless chattering and small-talk in Good Morning (1959) to the codes governing marriage and family relations that structure the lives of the unmarried daughters in Brothers and Sisters of the Toda Family (Toda-ke no Kyōdai, 1941) and Late Spring (Banshun, 1949). The time-image film, as exhibited in Rossellini and Ozu, makes visible the network of clichés that crosses daily life and also overcomes it, offering a series of disconnected events and situations that no longer make use of the cliché, as the movement-images had, to prompt a familiar reaction or act as a shorthand for a familiar situation. Instead, it uses a canvas of obvious clichés as the backdrop for a more significant encounter with beauty and tiredness (in Rossellini) or loneliness and sorrow (in Ozu), which each goes further than the images that make up the film-world.

This becomes one of Deleuze’s main tasks in the second volume of his cinema project, as he attempts to determine how cinema can extract an image from all the clichés and set it up against them (2005a: 214).

15 Deleuze goes on to highlight some problems specific to the films of Lumet and Altman: ‘Either the critique swerves abruptly and attacks only a misuse of apparatuses and institutions, in striving to save the remains of the American Dream, as in Lumet; or it extends itself, but becomes empty and starts to grate, as in Altman, content to parody the cliché instead of giving birth to a new image’ (2005a: 215).
Godard and Cliché (Une Femme Mariée)

The question of how to tear an image from the clichés is a problem that is present across Godard’s career. Deleuze says:

We will find in Godard formulas which express the problem: if images have become clichés, internally as well as externally, how can an image be extracted from all these clichés, ‘just an image’, an autonomous mental image? An image must emerge from the set of clichés. … with what politics and what consequences? What is an image which would not be a cliché? Where does the cliché end and the image begin? (2005a: 219, author’s emphasis)

Godard offers his entire career as an answer to this question. His films show a continual engagement of the role of the cliché-image in the political conception of his films, and not only in the latter works discussed above. Deleuze addresses the use of clichés in Une Femme Mariée (1964), in which Macha Méril plays Charlotte, a rich married woman whose life is explored through the presentation of a series of advertisements for women’s underwear, cosmetics and commercial goods (the film stages the main action in the style of a fashion or beauty commercial and intercuts this with a large number of actual billboard and glossy magazine advertisements).

Deleuze argues that the film is significant because of the way in which it discards the distinction between objective and subjective cinema, organising its images in line with neither an impartial and omniscient view of the camera looking upon the world nor a subjective interior view that presents the film as the internal monologue of an on-screen
character. In both cases there would be a postulated unity of the world and a clear
distinction between an objective view of the camera / spectator (what Daniel Dayan had
described as the formally constructed gaze of the ‘absent one’ [1976: 448-450]) and the
subjective view of a character’s gaze, or in certain films, of the internal monologue of
the character’s supposed thoughts. For Deleuze this would be a classical conception of
cinema as a ‘direct discourse’, which can be distinguished from the ‘free indirect
discourse’ of modern cinema.16 For Deleuze, Charlotte’s internal monologue and
external gaze have ‘shattered into anonymous debris: stereotypes, clichés, ready-made
visions and formulas [taking] away the outside world and the interiority of characters in
the same decomposition’ (2005b: 176). In Une Femme Mariée, we do not see
Charlotte’s gaze but a montage of magazine adverts that are not definitively attributed to
either a character or to the impartial camera. One sequence begins with a shot / counter-
shot that identifies the next shot as being Charlotte’s gaze but ends with a billboard
advert that she then walks past in long-shot – it is not clear at which point in the
sequence the perspective of the film switches from subjective to objective. It would be
more accurate, as Deleuze implies, to consider the sequence as being neither objective
nor subjective, but as a form of free indirect discourse that is not formally attached to
any particular imagined perspective.

What is significant about the indirect organisation of the images in Une Femme Mariée
is that both characterisation and the construction of space is achieved not through a
tightly ordered sequence of shots (that would typically include, for example,
establishing shots for space and reaction-shots to help build knowledge of specific

16 For a more detailed account of Deleuze’s thoughts on ‘free indirect discourse’ than I can provide here
see Pisters’ ‘Arresting the Flux of Images and Sounds’ (2006b) or for excellent explanatory accounts
of Deleuze’s use of the term see Bogue 2003: 72-73, Rodowick 2001: 61-62 and Rushton 2012a: 111-
113.
characters and their relation to space), but as a stream of disconnected images shown mostly at 180-degree angles in medium close-up. The opening sequence, for example, does not offer an establishment of a film-world as might be expected, but a series of disparate shots that introduce us to Charlotte and her lover Robert (played by Bernard Noël) in fragments.\textsuperscript{17} The film begins with an empty white screen into which two hands enter from the edges. One of the hands (a man’s) grasps the other (a woman’s) at the wrist. The shot fades and is followed by a series of shots showing two lovers (who we will later identify as Charlotte and Robert) lying around an apartment naked. Each shot, rather than establishing a space or introducing characters, shows only part of the lovers’ naked bodies (mostly Charlotte’s) in close-up in front of an empty, shallow background (variously the white walls of the apartment, grey bookcases, white bedsheets, etc.). The film presents, in a series of shots, Charlotte’s back being caressed by one of Robert’s hands, her stomach with two of his hands across it, his head with her arms around it, and the pair’s legs lying next to each other. Each image shows only fragments of the couple’s bodies and only a small piece of an implied wider off-screen space, each broken by a fade-out that emphasises the time between each shot. The repeating fades serve to insert a break between each shot that disrupts the rhythm of the sequence. The film opens with a staggered set of images that serve as a number of autonomous compositions (punctuated by a black frame) as much as they constitute a continuous sequence of images leading from one to the next (as would be the case had Godard cut rather than faded). This form of staccato editing will recur at various points in the film to disrupt the identification of shots with given characters or an objective gaze of the camera, such that the images will become attributed to neither an objective nor a subjective position, but rather to both simultaneously.

\textsuperscript{17} Such fragmentation of bodies, spaces and objects is common throughout Une Femme Mariée and explains the film’s subtitle Fragments d’un Film Tourné en 1964 en Noir et Blanc (Fragments of a Film Shot in 1964 in Black and White).
This is clear in the sequence depicting the adverts mentioned above – these shots are neither Charlotte’s perspective nor simply an impersonal image, but both at once so that the organisation of the world in Une Femme Mariée becomes a state of confusion in which there is no longer a distinction between the two perspectives. Charlotte’s consciousness is absolutely invaded by the commercialised images of the world so that she cannot even think herself except in terms of these images. Consequently, the film does not characterise Charlotte except in terms of these images of commerce, which predetermine the film’s images to the extent that practically every shot gives an advertisement or a signpost or a symbol or one of the film’s characters shot so that they resemble a poster or billboard or magazine spread. This is why Godard films so many of the shots in such shallow focus as to obliterate the background – the shots are without depth so as to look as much like a glossy magazine photograph as possible.

Deleuze would say that this is an example of the cinema revealed as a medium for automata. For Deleuze, thought is not something that humans are able to produce from nothing. A thought can only arise from somewhere external to the mind, arising as the mind comes into contact with events and objects in the world. It is in this sense that Deleuze would consider the cinema a thought-machine, in that it produces images that impose themselves upon the mind of the spectator, creating cinematic territories that organise the world of the spectator into discrete mappings of images and ideas. Deleuze explains that this is ‘the material automatism of images which produces from the outside a thought which it imposes’ (2005b: 173). This is evident in Une Femme Mariée as Godard forgoes proper characterisation in favour of a merging of character and

18 For more detailed accounts of Deleuze’s use of the term ‘automata’ in the cinema books and his debt in this regard to the philosophies of Spinoza and Hume see Rushton 2012a: 9-11 and Bogue 2003: 177-182.
consumer object, reducing Charlotte to a commercial mapping that overlays the entire film and giving rise to a territorial ordering that corresponds to this as well – a world that is thought only as cliché-image and consumer object.

The entire world of *Une Femme Mariée* is built from clichés so that even the shots of people are staged so as to resemble advertisements. These images construct a world out of the signs and objects of consumerism, eliciting only familiar reactions and giving rise to familiar discourses and behaviour patterns. However, unlike *Dog Day Afternoon* and the films of the New Hollywood cinema, which Deleuze suggests are content to parody the cliché, *Une Femme Mariée* provokes this only in the on-screen characters and not in the spectator, who, by virtue of the film’s atypical framing and editing techniques, will assume a different position with respect to the film’s commercial images. Charlotte is utterly immersed in the consumerist world – she talks in marketing jargon, thinks in magazine adverts, lounges as would a swimwear model – yet the techniques used in the construction of the film will serve to make visible the commercialised, and correspondingly sexualised, conditions of her world.

MacCabe and Mulvey address this point in their study of women and sexuality in Godard’s films, arguing that the organisation of images in *Une Femme Mariée* ‘allows Godard to confront the way that consumer society moulds woman’s image so that it conforms to a given concept of female sexual appeal’ (1980: 90). The familiar modes of behaviour that Charlotte adopts in relation to these cliché-images are the conditions of the capitalist consumer society. The film uses brassier adverts and fashion spreads

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19 ‘Images of Woman, Images of Sexuality’ (1980: 79-104) is the fourth chapter of MacCabe’s book *Godard: Images, Sounds, Politics*, and is co-written by MacCabe and Laura Mulvey, whilst, similarly, ‘Technology’ (1980: 105-136), the fifth chapter, is co-written by MacCabe and Mike Eaton. The book itself is attributed to MacCabe.
and make-up and clothes to construct what MacCabe and Mulvey call a ‘mask of visibility’ (1980: 91). The set of images that are used to assemble Charlotte’s character form the image of a woman in a specific social formation, which ultimately determines Charlotte only in terms of her erotic potential and consumption habits (and both in terms of the other). What these images of sex and commerce are hiding, for Deleuze asserts that there is always something being hidden in the cliché (2005b: 20), is the structural relations that determine and sustain the commercial world that she inhabits. MacCabe and Mulvey summarise:

[Charlotte’s] mask of visibility conceals behind it the diverse and complex nature of woman’s place in the social and economic order, where sexual difference is a matter of division of labour, a difference and a division which has no image, no form. The invisible women in factories, homes, schools, hospitals, are formless and unrepresentable. (1980: 91)

The images through which Charlotte’s world is built ignore their own economic and ideological foundations, and also necessarily exclude a range of other possible images, as MacCabe and Mulvey suggest, of factory workers and domestic labourers (and doubtless many others besides), whilst still presenting Charlotte as the only logical image of a woman in the modern consumer society.

Both the silent conditions of the commercial image in Une Femme Mariée and those other orderings not evident in Charlotte’s world are subsequently addressed by Godard in later works. Two or Three Things I know About Her (Deux ou Trois Choses Que Je Sais d’Elle, 1967) develops similar themes from a working-class perspective, as the film
charts the lives of working women turning to prostitution in order to fund a consumerist lifestyle. In *Tout Va Bien* the systemic injustices of the consumerist world and the ideological conditions of film-making itself are analysed, and similarly, in *Week End* (1967), Godard emphasises the violence inherent in the capitalist world as apocalyptic satire.

*Two or Three Things I Know About Her* offers some particularly striking examples of Godard’s examination of the conditions of modern life. As in *Une Femme Mariée*, Godard engages in a study of the lives of women (now many more than in the earlier film) in 1960s Paris. However, unlike the earlier film, which had separated out each shot so as to reduce all life to the circuit of consumerist images, *Two or Three Things I Know About Her* is much more concerned with the relationship of people to the spaces they inhabit. Godard shows numerous shots of the Parisian landscape unattached to the various main sequences of the film, no longer the stereotypical landscape of the city (the Eiffel Tower or Champs Élysées, as in earlier Godard films), but the building sites and modern concrete apartment blocks that had dominated whole portions of the city upon filming. In one sequence Godard (through voice over) questions the way in which images are organised in his own films. He asks how images can be used to depict events, how to use them to say that at 4.10pm Juliette and Marianne came to the garage where Juliette’s husband works, and more importantly, whether the images and words he uses are the right images and words – ‘are there no others?’ For Deleuze, of course, there are always other images to be used. Every image given on-screen is only an actualised rendering of an image that was already there in virtual form – it is only a potential image of the world that has been made visible through cinema.
The question to be asked is what kind of world this image makes visible, and whether, through repeatedly visualising a particular kind of world through a series of constantly recurring cliché-images, this world might eliminate another kind of world that remains possible (in so much as the images to make it visible exist in a virtual state) but is yet to be actualised. This new kind of world is concealed every day behind a billion clichés, be it a radically new organisation of society or simply, as many of Godard’s films call for, the current system visualised such that the social and economic injustices of the world are made apparent. This is what Deleuze’s understanding of cinema politics offers. Like the political modernist theorists before him, Deleuze’s project asks for an image that can make visible the structural conditions of the world. Much more significantly, he calls for a cinema that can make visible a new world of complex changes and becomings, of unseen powers and forces, and new and creative thoughts. This is the kind of cinema he expects of the time-image, and which I will explore in Chapter 4.

**Control**

But what of control? The control essay changes Deleuze’s cinema books in two significant ways. It allows us to account for the political terms of these earlier books by more closely aligning Deleuze’s thoughts on the cinematic image with his work on politics and territoriality in *A Thousand Plateaus* (as I have shown, this is something that *The Fold* had achieved as well). The control article also addresses the rise in computer technology and mass communications, opening the cinema books onto a broader field of images and visual culture (see Pisters 2011b and 2012). By considering the new society of image technologies in territorial terms we can begin to question the
conditions by which these image technologies construct and circulate images of the world – no longer a single image but a territorial formation of many images made to produce and reproduce a specific ordering of the world.

Virilio traces similar ground again in ‘Indirect Light’ (2000), in which he details how video technology can make visible or ‘light up’ a space or event.\(^{20}\) He calls this kind of ‘lighting up’ through recording and broadcast an ‘indirect light’ that contrasts to the direct lighting of a series of earlier illumination technologies (2000: 64). An indirect lighting through video recording no longer reveals a localised city space (as had the limited and direct lighting of the street lamp), but now a distributed image of the world as what Virilio calls ‘ideography’ (2000: 59) – a presentation of places and milieux through the recording and circulation of vision technologies. We should think of this in the same terms as the mental geographies addressed in Conley’s work on territoriality as a cartographic understanding of the world. For Virilio, the vision technologies of an indirect lighting are ways of capturing and circulating (of making visible) a given ordering of the world – a particular angle on the world that is illuminated by a network of image technologies.

Virilio gives the 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations as example (2000: 65-67). What the demonstrators wanted, according to Virilio, was that the occupation of the square be shown live around the world, and more importantly, to the rest of China – to make the students’ demonstration visible on screens around the world (in Shanghai, Canton and Beijing as much as on TV in America and Europe). After the massacre of the students by the military, Chinese TV began to broadcast recorded material of what

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\(^{20}\) ‘Indirect Light’ is a chapter from *Polar Inertia*. It also appears in translation in Armitage’s *Paul Virilio: From Modernism to Hypermodernism and Beyond* (2000b).
Virilio calls ‘certain excesses against isolated vehicles and soldiers’ (2000: 67) – violence committed by demonstrators captured on police surveillance cameras – but always withholding footage of both the peaceful occupation of the square and the subsequent military violence. Thus there is a selection of images that is supposed to determine a current political reality – an instant chosen to speak for an event and a place and time. Virilio says that there is a decision to obscure the immediate event and that the key element in this concealment is not just a censorship that prevents the disclosure of certain events, but the replaying of recorded material so as to substitute one image of the world for another – the indirect light of recorded footage for the living light of events (2000: 67).

Virilio details a process of substitution in which the circulation of a media event destroys the traces of an event in real space (eventually, of course, a different set of images will come to visualise the Tiananmen Square demonstrations), and recalls the similar position argued by Godard in *Je Vous Salue, Sarajevo* that a circuit of images might destroy the ‘art of living’ in favour of an always visible network of culture-images. In Deleuze’s work this substitution is not all that is at stake. As Conley’s work on the cartographic and hieroglyphic tendencies of the cinematic image shows (2007a and 1991 respectively), the territorial mappings that coincide with such media events have long been provided by older forms of cartographic and image-forming media (maps and charts, literature, diagrams, drawings, carvings, tapestries, etc.). The formation of these virtual territories is significant not because they replace a ‘real’ event in the actual spaces of the city, but because they are always in competition with other conflicting territorial formations and can have crucial political importance in the ways in which the actual world and its events are thought.
Such is the significance of Deleuze’s conceptualisation of cliché. For Deleuze, a cliché is a means of reducing the possibilities of the world to a single stable image supposed to constitute the extent of a territorial world – it is a means by which a virtually existing spectrum of possible images is reterritorialised into an already determined set of actual images. So while we may know that the life of a woman in Paris may amount to a great many things, to billions of possible encounters and events, and that any one image cannot possibly be expected to ‘sum up’ or stand for the whole of a life, there is still, in the contemporary media as much as in Godard’s film, a surprisingly small number of images – of brassieres and lingerie, of make-up and fashionable clothing – that are expected to do just that. The world is an enormous composite of images mined from an almost infinite plane of virtually existing (which is to say possible) images, as well as containing images of the world actually existing elsewhere in space and time but not registering on the screens of a technology-driven media society. That a world with so many different ways of revealing itself can so often reproduce the same images to stand in for the same things is frankly preposterous. That media culture will so often give the outline of a cartoon heart (that looks so little like the organ itself) to stand in for love is not simply a lack of invention in the image-making industries but a serious political problem that manifests itself in many more troubling images – sexually predatory black males and buffoonish Uncle Toms, heterosexual family units, camp gay men and butch lesbians, and many more quite common images besides. That a cliché can stand for a world is a significant political issue because it suffices to announce that this is the way the world is – stable, knowable and instantly recognisable in its very obviousness.

Lazzarato touches upon this point in ‘The Concepts of Life and Living in the Societies
of Control’, where he explains that a multiplicity can be controlled by a process of grouping. Lazzarato says:

Binary groupings, like sexes and classes, must capture, codify and control virtualities, the possible variations of molecular assemblages, the probabilities of interaction of neo-monadological cooperation. Classes carry out the reduction of multiplicity to dualisms and to a collective whole which totalises and unifies irreducible singularities. The concept of working-class designates a collective whole and not a distributive whole.

Dualisms of sex also function as a dispositif of capture and coding of the multiple combinations that bring into play not just the masculine and the feminine, but also a thousand tiny sexes, the thousand tiny possible becomings of sexuality. These thousand sexes must be disciplined and codified in order to be related back to the men / women dualism. Social classes are literally carved out from the multiplicity of activities, crystallising possible interactions in the form of a dualism. In the same way, the opposition men / women is carved from the becoming-possible of the thousand sexes, crystallising them in the dualism of the heterosexual norm. (2006: 174)

Lazzarato is concerned with the way in which these multiplicities are thought, and as with the cinematic cartographies that I have been tracing, this serves to visualise a mental image of the world. The binary groupings of class and sex that he describes here, like the cliché images that Deleuze describes, extract a simple dualism from more complex multiplicities, and as Lazzarato argues, act as forms of control that determine
how it is possible to think a relationship to other people. Lazzarato explains that the more varied and complex potential sexes are reduced to a male / female binary that contains within it a predetermined set of conditions for interpreting how all sex and gender is thought. These terms are necessarily fixed and already presuppose (not simply through this binary, but in the associated territorial formations and images) the conditions of having a sex, in contrast to Deleuze’s own preferred understanding of sex and gender as, rather, a condition of becoming.

That the world is reterritorialised into these stable and rational orderings is to do away with the potential force of a becoming in the world, which is to say that a virtual plane of images is rendered incompossible with the actual forms of the world. Lazzarato says that this is a process of ‘confinement in thought’ that is similar in kind to the disciplinary society. He argues: ‘To confine the outside, to confine the virtual, means neutralising the power of invention and codifying repetition so as to drain it of all power of variation, thereby reducing it to a simple reproduction’ (2006: 176). This is the same outside that I have argued is present in the cinemas of the time-image, introducing the spectre of a virtual elsewhere that maps out a multitude of possible new orderings of the world – no longer a world that is but a world that can become.

Lazzarato goes further:

Disciplinary societies operate like Leibniz’s God. They allow only one world to pass into reality. From this point of view, they can be regarded as productive – they constitute the monads for the world of disciplinary societies and this world is included in each monad through the
techniques of confinement and biopower. But they brutally prevent the infinity of possible worlds from passing into reality. They block and control becoming and difference. (2006: 177)

With the advent of the control society, as Lazzarato subsequently explains (2006: 178-180), this single disciplinary world gives way to a multiplicity of other worlds that form within and around each other in the now radically distributed universe of images and information. The disciplinary form does not disappear, but is integrated into the functioning of the control system as a reterritorialising limit that operates to reduce these infinite possible worlds, not to a single ‘correct’ world, as before, but to a manageable limit. This is the process of risk management that the control system enacts – whilst there are many more monad-worlds that exist and continue to multiply and expand, the new society continues to be regulated and limited by the networks of images and the techniques that I have outlined.

In the terms set out in Deleuze’s cinema project we can say that the continued life of the movement-image cinema continues to restrict the virtual life of the time-image, and it is on these terms that Deleuze will lament cinema’s quantitative mediocrity (2005b: 159). But this lamentation (coming only part way through Cinema 2) does not prevent Deleuze from further exploring the potentials offered by the time-image to make possible a series of new virtual worlds, and it is this that I will address in Chapter 4.
Chapter 4:

Glauber Rocha and the People to Come

The significance of Deleuze’s position on political cinema is most explicitly addressed in a short section towards the end of *Cinema 2* on ‘the people to come’ (2005b: 207-215). The main argument of this section concerns the invention of a new form of political cinema and is, I argue, further clarified in *Foucault*, where Deleuze sets out his most developed conceptualisation of the visible. In this chapter I will provide a more fully developed study of visibilities and their significance for the cinema project, exploring this concept as it intersects between *Foucault* and *Cinema 2* through a study of the films of Glauber Rocha, one of the great directors of the Brazilian Cinema Novo.

The Cinema Novo was constituted by a number of young Brazilian film-makers in the late 1950s and became something of a Brazilian New Wave. Understood more as a loose collective of film-makers than an organised movement, the Cinema Novo developed off the back of a wider transformation in Brazilian society and culture in the 1950s and was committed to making use of the cinema as a tool for positive social change. Through Rocha’s films I will show how the limits of the time-image can offer a new ordering of the world, both in the construction of a radically different position from which to think and also in the bringing to light of an intolerable state of living.

In *Cinema 2* Deleuze argues that the modern political cinema posits that ‘the people’ are

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not a pre-existing population that need only be brought to consciousness, as the political film-makers of the movement-image had assumed, but on the contrary, that the people do not yet exist (2005b: 208). This is not to deny their existence, but to declare that the images given of ‘a people’ are poor substitutes for a living people.

For Deleuze, the modern political film-maker must invent a ‘people to come’ (2005b: 215), which means that they must give an image of a people that is not already stripped of life so as to form a cliché, and then constantly re-articulate this image to create the conditions for the continual reinvention of a people founded on a force of becoming. This does not mean that these peoples will only exist in the future (that they are only ‘to come’, and so forever deferred), for Deleuze speaks of Rocha’s Brazil and Sembene’s Senegal, both of which actually exist. Rather, this means that political cinema can construct a space where a people, already made up of many different groups (Deleuze says there are ‘always several peoples, an infinity of peoples’ who remain to be united [2005b: 212]), can be complex and variable and not confined to an enduring categorisation. Rodowick explains: ‘That “the people are missing” means that they require an enabling image that can summon them into existence as identity becoming other’ (2003: 141). It is this ‘enabling image’ that a political cinema must create.

What is required is a cinema that can make visible the life of a people. This is what is offered by the film-makers addressed by Deleuze in this short section on political cinema – images that can make visible the concrete experience of living, which is to say, of the million daily becomings of a people. These film-makers offer images for a

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2 This position is developed by Deleuze from the study of ‘minor literature’ in *Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature* (1986: 16-27). For more information on Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptualisation of minor literature see Aidan Tynan 2012: 153-172 and O’Sullivan 2006: 69-97. For an account of Deleuze’s position on minor cinema see Rodowick 2003: 139-169 and Martin-Jones 2008: 51-64
new people that will never fully emerge, but continually reaffirm the possibility of a multitude of future worlds – worlds that might be different to the everyday fears and hungers experienced by so many, and that might exist if only the limits of the present are not closed by a regressive network of images that dictates the extent of a ‘normal’ life and what can be expected of it.

In *Kafka*, Deleuze and Guattari note what they call ‘the three characteristics of minor literature’ (1986: 16-25). These are ‘the deterritorialisation of language, the connection of the individual to a political immediacy, and the collective assemblage of enunciation’ (1986: 18). They argue that these three characteristics are the essential conditions for Kafka’s opening up of the dominant German language to a position of minority. Kafka’s work utilises German in order to express something new – a becoming at the heart of his experience of life and language. The first condition, the deterritorialisation of language, is most significant in this regard as Kafka’s writings make use of the particular situation of the German language in Kafka’s Prague in order to transform its expressive potential (1986: 22-23). The transformation of a major language in Kafka’s work, along with his continual expression of the political and collective experiences of living as a minority, allow him to engage in a becoming-other that exists at the heart of his use of German – his writing creatively modifies a language that he must use but that is not his own.

That Deleuze will re-visit these ideas in *Cinema 2* suggests the applicability of this idea to cinema (see Rodowick 2003: 139-169 and Martin-Jones 2008: 51-64). However, it is not simply a case of transferring the concept to a new medium and looking for filmmakers that are in some way like Kafka. The conditions of minor literature in Kafka’s
work are not self-evidently transferable to cinematic works. For Deleuze, cinema cannot be understood as a kind of language (2005b: 25-29), and we must therefore concern ourselves with the specific fashion in which deterritorialisation may occur in cinema, rather than simply repeat his and Guattari’s analysis of Kafka in a new medium. Furthermore, the second and third characteristics, concerning the politicisation and collectivisation of an individual literary voice must be altered due to the political and collaborative situation of the cinema. As a primarily industrial medium, film has a more explicit relationship with both the political and the collective. As Comolli and Narboni argue, every film is political in that it speaks of the ideological, commercial and industrial conditions from which it is created (1976: 24). Every film contributes to a system of images through which a world is made visible. Similarly, the largely industrial and commercial status of film-making necessitates that almost every film is already a collective expression. Even when speaking of the great film-makers, cinema is a collaborative endeavour.

I would amend Deleuze and Guattari’s argument slightly by connecting these two characteristics more explicitly with the first. Any potential ‘minor cinema’ should enter its already political and collective voice into a deterritorialisation. Such films will open the major form of political expression given by, for example, normative power relations and sexual expectations to a deterritorialisation that re-makes these political positions as something new and variable. Likewise, they will open the major form of collective production given by industrialised studio practices to new forms of collaborative film-making that attempts to address a specific audience rather than mask its own modes of production in an effort to adopt a ‘universal’ position.
The concerns presented in Deleuze’s conceptualisation of minor cinema are central to much of Rocha’s film-making and, as Carlos Diegues explains in ‘Cinema Novo’ (1995), the construction of a cinema for a Brazilian people is a significant aim of the Cinema Novo more generally. Diegues says:

[Cinema Novo’s] goal was to study in depth the social relations of each city and region as a way of critically exposing, as if in miniature, the socio-cultural structure of the country as a whole. To take the people as theme, to give human form to fundamental conflicts, to make the people the centre and master of the cinematic instrument. (1995: 66)

Such conditions are at the forefront of Rocha’s films and are crucial to understanding Deleuze’s thinking on the political potential of the time-image and its challenge to the operations of control. The Brazilian Cinema Novo provides an exceptional example of Deleuze’s position on political cinema and the people to come due to recurring concerns with ‘the people’. The movement emerged with the intent of restoring an image of the different peoples of Brazil, long neglected by a Brazilian film industry dominated by American cinema and flooded by commercial and politically vacuous entertainment films. Diegues again:

Without slothful theorizing, but rather technically rationalizing the practical questions of cinema, Brazilian filmmakers (principally in Rio, Bahia and São Paulo) have taken their cameras and gone out into the streets, the country, and the beaches in search of the Brazilian people, the peasant, the worker, the fisherman, the slum dweller. (1995: 66).
Cinema Novo declares the search for a people as its foremost aim.

Visibility

Deleuze explains in *Foucault* that the visible is a system of light that reveals a social organisation (2006a: 28). The prison, he says by way of example, is made up of materials and mechanisms (concrete and confinement) that channel light so as to reveal a visual assemblage of convicts (2006a: 28). This relates to the concept of the diagram, which also constitutes an important part of Deleuze’s reading of Foucault. For Deleuze, a diagram is a map of forces or an organisation of possibilities. A diagram is a cluster of potential forces which may produce a range of possible futures, which is to say that it expresses the virtual conditions of possibility for an actual concrete machine. In order that a diagram can actualise the forms that will constitute a concrete machine, they must be revealed through a process of seeing and speaking.

Laura Marks addresses similar concerns in *The Skin of the Film*. She argues that discourse and the visible ‘do not embrace the world, but only encapsulate what can be known at a given time’ (2000: 30). They are orders of communication that construct a perspective from which to think the world. I have shown how the images and sounds of a film are used to organise a given territorial ordering through which the (supposed) entirety of the world is organised. All films construct a world, but this is not simply the construction of a particular setting, but rather a perspective from which to perceive the whole world. The construction of a film-world necessitates the construction of an order
of knowledge – a perspective that says that the world is like this.

Marks argues that such territorial ordering of one world amongst many other (existing and possible) worlds is concerned with the encapsulation of a certain way of ‘knowing’ that will often exclude many groups and individuals that are of little concern to a standardised and hegemonic media discourse. Many groups may even have counter-memories and alternative histories that contradict or conflict with ‘official’ discourses (such as indigenous and post-colonial peoples, whose historical suffering can challenge or negate historical discourses). Marks finds a number of alternative discourses and silenced memories in intercultural film and video. Most are marginalised or ignored, with many rendered utterly incompossible with the dominant orders of knowledge given by mainstream cinema and television.

A visibility is a territorial ordering, whereas vision is that which organises (seeing is not the same thing as what is seen). Likewise a statement is both a speech-act and a thing that is spoken (both expression and content). Deleuze explains, ‘at the beginning of the nineteenth century masses and populations become visible, and emerge into the light of day’ (2006a: 28). This is not because these masses were absent, but because the conditions for their emergence in thought had not been fulfilled – they had not yet been made visible. Visibility organises both knowledge and a new order of power, which is subsequently given as a new diagram of potential forces and possible future orderings.

The first stage in the actualisation of a future-world is its inclusion in a diagram. Not yet as a fully formalised territory, but as part of a cluster of forces that can render its emergence possible. The conditions for the emergence of possible futures must be made

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visible. If a world can only be visualised in a set number of ways then the political action required to reform this world will be limited. We need to see the world through new images so that the territories given by visibility can be opened at the most possible points of emergence. In cinema, this will require a wide range of filmic strategies. There are time-images that can make visible the intolerable hungers and fears of existence and the repressions in place to control us, as well as those that can visualise new political situations or offer new ways of confronting the current ones. In Rocha’s films there are techniques and ideas that serve, as Deleuze says in *Cinema 2*, to invent a new mythic cinema, and it is in this sense of ‘invention’ that Deleuze will speak of a ‘people to come’. Rocha re-articulates the myths of the Brazilian *nordeste* into a ‘people’ of his own invention. This is a people that postulates the emergence of new ways of living. Rocha’s cinema becomes a kind of strategy for living (or at least coping) in a specific social organisation – a way of scrambling the images and discourses of his milieu in order to produce a new diagram. Deleuze says:

> Every diagram is intersocial and constantly evolving. It never functions in order to represent a persisting world but produces a new kind of reality, a new model of truth. It is neither the subject of history, nor does it survey history. It makes history by unmaking preceding realities and significations, constituting hundreds of points of emergence or creativity, unexpected conjunctions or improbable continuums. It doubles history with a sense of continual evolution. (2006a: 30)

That a political cinema should ‘invent’ a people is essential, as it is this process of invention that constitutes the political film-maker’s intervention into the current operations of a social organisation. Film-makers must introduce a new violence or a
new mythology, as Rocha does (2005b: 210), an indiscernible outside, as in Bergman, or a gap in the human experience of the world, as in Ozu. They must use stammers and repetitions, confusions and fabrications (as in Welles’ remarkable *F For Fake* [1973]), long takes and montage and all manner of strategies to scramble their filmic diagrams and reorganise them as the expression of a new kind of world.

**The Aesthetics of Hunger**

In ‘The Aesthetics of Hunger’ (1983) Rocha outlines an alarming novelty in Brazilian cinema. For Rocha, the most significant distinction between the life experience of the Brazilian people and of the ‘civilised European observer’ is that the Brazilian feels a misery, and more significantly, a hunger, that is essential to their understanding of the world (1983: 13). Rocha explains:

> While Latin America laments its general misery, the foreign observer cultivates a taste for that misery, not as a tragic *symptom*, but merely as a formal element in his field of interest. The Latin American neither communicates his real misery to the ‘civilised’ man, nor does the ‘civilised’ man truly comprehend the misery of the Latin American. (1983: 13, author’s emphasis)

Rocha argues that the tragic misery of Latin American experience has been poorly expressed in cinema, which requires a radical new aesthetic in order to express a hunger that is felt but rarely glimpsed in a visual culture that would sooner perpetuate the myth
of Brazil as tropical paradise or musical playground. Rocha continues:

Hunger in Latin American is not simply an alarming symptom; it is the essence of our society. Herein lies the tragic originality of Cinema Novo in relation to world cinema. Our originality is our hunger and our greatest misery is that this hunger is felt but not intellectually understood.

We understand the hunger that Europeans and the majority of Brazilians have failed to understand. For the European, it is a strange tropical surrealism. For the Brazilian, it is a national shame. He does not eat, but is ashamed to say so; and yet, he does not know where this hunger comes from. We know – since we made those ugly, sad films, those screaming desperate films in which reason has not always prevailed – that this hunger will not be assuaged by moderate government reforms and that the cloak of technicolor cannot hide, but only aggravates, its tumours. Therefore, only a culture of hunger can qualitatively surpass its own structures by undermining and destroying them. The most noble cultural manifestation of hunger is violence. (1983: 13)

Rocha argues that hunger is the most significant manifestation of ‘the misery of the Latin American’, but does not attribute a privileged understanding of the condition of hunger to the Brazilian people. This hunger is neither a ‘strange tropical surrealism’, an intellectual distancing that deprives it of any actually felt significance, nor is it a ‘national shame’, which displaces the political conditions of hunger onto a failing of the

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3 See Sérgio Augusto’s ‘Hollywood Looks at Brazil’ (1995) for an outline of the variously inaccurate and racist ways in which Hollywood film-makers have imagined Brazil and the political implications of these imaginings. See also Maite Conde and Lisa Shaw’s ‘Brazil through Hollywood’s Gaze’ (2005) for a more comprehensive study of Hollywood’s visualisation of Brazil and its political causes and implications.
individual. Rocha calls for a national discourse on the conditions of hunger and recognises the need for a cinema culture that can produce the images of a commonly felt but too often invisible condition of life in Brazil and Latin America. For the hunger of a people to be addressed as a concrete political problem, it must first be visible – it must be seen as often as it is felt, so that in a cinematic visualisation of hunger, a hungry person can see their own experience of the world. Rocha contends that this is the most significant task of the Cinema Novo and cites the creation of a series of ‘ugly, sad films’ (such as *Ganga Zumba* [1963] or *Vidas Secas* [1963]) as evidence of the movement’s early successes in the formation of a new aesthetic – the first tentative steps towards a cinematic ‘violence of the starving’ (1983: 13).

That Rocha will frame his aesthetic practices as a kind of violence is important, both as a means of emphasising Cinema Novo’s break with Hollywood and European art cinema, and also as a way of inserting his film-making into a tradition of colonial and revolutionary struggle. For Rocha, an ‘aesthetic of violence’ is required to make the coloniser aware of the colonised for the first time (he considers the USA’s relations with Brazil to be neo-colonial [1983: 13]), for ‘only when he is confronted with violence can the colonizer understand, through horror, the strength of the culture he exploits’ (1983: 13). Such violence would be necessary to make a Brazilian people (already made up of many peoples) visible to the world, and through the visualisation of a hunger that Rocha sees as one of the most significant aspects of Brazilian life, to make the actual lived experience of the Brazilian people visible to the people themselves. However, given the polemical nature of much of Rocha’s writing we should bear in mind his partly rhetorical use of the term violence. Rocha would likely have considered himself a ‘militant film-maker’, but even in this article, in which he calls for oppressed peoples to
take up arms (1983: 13), he will define the term ‘violence’ as counter to its most common understanding. Rocha says:

In moral terms, this violence is not filled with hatred; nor is it linked to the old colonising humanism. The love that this violence encompasses is as brutal as violence itself, because it is not the kind of love which derives from complacency or contemplation, but rather a love of action and transformation. (1983: 13).

This is a violence of transformation that is central to the cinematic strategies of the Cinema Novo. It is for this reason that Rocha (alongside Sembene) will form such a significant part of Deleuze’s argument concerning political cinema and the invention of a people.⁴ Deleuze’s basic argument concerning Rocha’s work is that it attempts to construct a collective utterance for a people to come (2005b: 214), and according to Deleuze, does this by developing a number of themes. These focus for the most part on Rocha’s critique of myth but also relate this critique to further concerns with violence, the intolerable, and states of trance (2005b: 210-211). Such points made by Deleuze refer back to the argument set out by Rocha himself in ‘The Aesthetics of Hunger’, particularly in his discussion of a violent aesthetic and an intolerable hunger. However, Deleuze does not offer any detailed analysis of Rocha’s film-making in order to demonstrate the handful of points he makes, preferring instead to offer Rocha as a successful instance of a modern political film-maker and (alongside Chahine and Sembene) as emblematic of ‘Third World’ film-making in general. Whilst it is quite

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⁴ Rodowick considerably develops Deleuze’s reading of Sembene’s films in Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine (2001: 162-169). Dudley Andrew’s ‘The Roots of the Nomadic’ (2000) also expands on Deleuze’s account of Sembene, discussing his work in the context of a larger West African cinema and connecting Deleuze’s reading to his conceptualisation of nomadism in A Thousand Plateaus. There is no secondary work on Rocha’s position in Deleuze’s thought.
correct that Rocha would consider himself a ‘Third World’ or, as he says, a ‘tricontinental’ film-maker (see Rocha 1983 and 1995), I argue that we risk misreading his films if we do not consider them as part of a specific historical moment in Brazil. Deleuze does not mention the Cinema Novo itself, any other contemporaneous Brazilian film-makers or any scholarship on this period of Brazilian film, in order to shed light on the strategies that Rocha employs in his films and the political problems with which his films engage. I argue that Deleuze’s reading of Rocha’s films is by no means incorrect, but requires a more careful study of some of his films than he provides in Cinema 2.

I will offer a further elaboration of the main themes identified by Deleuze through a study of Deus e o Diabo na Terra do sol (1964) and Antônio das Mortes (1969). Both of these films are set in the same region of the Brazilian nordeste and deal with similar themes. I will address Deleuze’s main points, focusing on the construction of mythic systems in each film and the strategies Rocha uses to make visible the structures of life entangling his cast of characters. This will enable me to express the force of Deleuze’s political cinema project and demonstrate the greater significance of his declarations concerning the ‘people to come’.

5 The first of these films literally translates to “God and the Devil in the Land of the Sun”, but is commonly titled ‘Black God, White Devil” for distribution in English-speaking countries. I have retained the original Portuguese title throughout this chapter as the English version seems to suggest a racial binary between the black prophet and white bandit that is not addressed in the film itself. See Stam 1997: 349-350.

6 I will not have space to elaborate on Deleuze’s thoughts regarding ‘trance’ in Rocha’s work. Although the films I am to address can both, to some extent, be said to ‘put everything in a trance’ (as Deleuze says), it is most likely that Deleuze had Terra em Transe (1967) in mind when making this point. There is much to say on this film in relation to Deleuze’s work, but I am unable to address it in much detail. My reading of Rocha’s films will focus on the above mentioned films which seem to tackle similar problems and share a larger number of themes and strategies. For analyses of Terra em Transe see Stam’s ‘Land in Anguish’ (1995), which explores the film in light of Rocha’s commitment to political cinema, and Julianne Burton’s ‘The Intellectual in Anguish’ (1983), which focuses on the film’s use of modernist strategies to address the problem of the ‘intellectual’ in political debate.
The Sertão is the World (Deus e o Diabo na Terra do sol)

Cinema Novo emerged in the 1950s, alongside similar movements in music and theatre, coinciding with Juscelino Kubitschek de Oliviera’s 1956 election and the resulting developmentalist ideologies and policies of the era. Johnson and Stam argue that a ‘prepatoratory period’ in Cinema Novo’s evolution begins around 1954, before the first phase of the movement itself begins in 1960, lasting until the 1964 coup d’état (1995a: 30, see also Stam 1997: 157-166). São Paulo’s Vera Cruz studio had collapsed in 1954, leaving the Brazilian film industry, much as before this short-lived experiment in industrial film-making, as a dispersed network of independent and regionally-based producers. In the 1950s (partly by choice and partly by circumstance) independent and anti-industrial film-making became a common choice for politically conscious directors and producers. Film-makers began to follow the example set by Italian Neorealism, shifting their cameras towards poor and rural areas and focusing increasingly on socially and politically aware subject matters. Alex Viany’s Needle in the Haystack (Agulha no Palheiro, 1953), was Brazil’s first gesture towards a European-style New Wave. This was followed by Santos’s Rio Queranta Graus (1955) and Rio Zona Norte (1957), both early masterpieces of Brazil’s developing political cinema in their critiques of social formations and commitment to the depiction of the lives of an urban poor rarely addressed by commercial Brazilian cinema.8

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7 Vera Cruz was a Hollywood-style studio set up in São Paulo in the late 1940s by a group of middle-class industrialists. It is the most famous of Brazil’s experiments in studio film-making, following Cinédia in the 1930s and Atlântida in the early 1940s. The studio produced eighteen features (including Lima Barreto’s successful O Cangaceiro [1953, see Breixo Viejo 2004]) before its eventual bankruptcy. See Johnson and Stam 1995a: 27-29, Stam 1997: 133-156 and Maria Rita Galvão’s ‘Vera Cruz: A Very Brazilian Hollywood’ (1995).

By the first period of the Cinema Novo proper (1960-1964, during which, as Johnson and Stam say, it ‘cohered as a movement’ [1995a: 32, see also Stam 1997: 179-231]), a significant number of young film-makers, including Rocha and Santos, Diegues, Paulo César Saraceni and Rui Guerra, were making similarly focused, aesthetically challenging films with low budgets and non-professional actors in a range of non-studio locations. However, despite some of the stylistic and strategic debts that the new movement owed to the European New Waves in France and Italy, the Cinema Novo would direct its efforts to confronting a set of specifically Brazilian social problems that had been ignored by film-makers. Johnson and Stam explain:

Rather than exploit the tropical paradise conviviality of chanchada, or the just-like Europe classiness of Vera Cruz, the Cinema Novo directors searched out the dark corners of Brazilian life – its favelas and its sertão – the places where Brazil’s social contradictions appeared most dramatically. (1995a: 33)

Such commitments are evident in Rocha’s manifesto on hunger, which notes not only the significance of the experience of hunger in Brazilian life, but also Brazil’s own reluctance to address hunger as a political problem. For Rocha, this would necessitate the confrontation of the dominant myths of the Brazilian film industry (consisting for so long of tropical sensationalism and political conservatism) with a new order of visibility. Moreover, due to the continuing domination of the Brazilian market by North American films, this new visibility would have to contend with a visualisation of Brazilian life (and of what constitutes a ‘normal’ image of life in general) extracted from a visual culture with no interest in a Brazilian audience’s conditions of existence.
(such as widespread poverty and hunger). Rocha addresses the North American cinematic influence in ‘Beginning at Zero’ (1970):

It is impossible to speak of the cinema in its Brazilian context without referring to North American film, whose influence and aggressiveness distributes North American culture throughout the world so that audiences now expect from all films only those images they are accustomed to seeing in Hollywood cinema.

The Brazilian public, which is economically and culturally much closer to the United States than to Europe, has also based its images of life on North American films. (1970: 144)

To suggest that a Brazilian public might base its ‘images of life’ on films imported from North America is much more serious than a simple concern with the over-abundance of foreign products. Rocha sees the dominance of North American (primarily Hollywood) films as a significant political problem that ties into the discourse on the colonisation of Brazil by external economic and cultural forces raised in ‘The Aesthetics of Hunger’. That the dominant images of Brazil are given by external films means that the territorial orderings of Brazilian life are constructed from images that have nothing to say about

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9 The domination of Brazilian distribution by Hollywood was cemented early in the evolution of Brazilian cinema, following the entry of North American films into the market in 1911, an event which would subsequently end the great Bela Época of early Brazilian cinema. From then on, as Johnson and Stam explain, ‘forced to choose between the guaranteed profit of inexpensive foreign films that covered costs easily in their home market, and the risks involved in dealing with the national product, exhibitors tended to opt for the foreign film. The Brazilian market became a tropical appendage of the North American market’ (1995a: 22). In the 1920s, given the lack of exposure at a national level, Brazilian film evolved in various regional cycles in Rio Grande do Sul, Recife, Manaus, Cataguases and Campinas, and would score some minor successes in Brazilian versions of popular foreign films, ranging from exceptional transformations of European film form, such as the city symphony film in São Paulo: Sinfonia de uma Metrópole (1929) and French and Soviet avant-garde in Limite (1930; see José Carlos Avellar 2003), to less creative revisions of other films (such as O Babão [1930], a popular parody of a Portuguese film). Brazil would make do with only the occasional glimmer of a national cinema until the emergence of Cinema Novo in the 1950s. See Johnson and Stam 1995a: 19-30 and Gomes 1995: 245-251.
the actual conditions of existence in South America. If such cinematic colonisation also extends to other cultural discourses (as Rocha suggests), then the systems set in place for people to see themselves and think about their own relation to the world are impoverished. This is the heart of Rocha’s critique of the conditions of hunger in Brazilian society. The greatest misery of a people is that a hunger is felt but not understood because the images and discourses from which such understanding must be built are not equal to it.

Rocha will employ a number of strategies in order to confront these problems – raising hunger to a specific aesthetic in order to offer it as an actually felt experience, setting his characters into a kind of trance in order to critique a national silence on the political realities of Brazilian life, and re-staging the myths of the Brazilian nordeste to invent a specifically Brazilian system of images. In each case it is the task of Rocha’s film-making to make visible a new ordering of the world for a people poorly expressed by a dominant network of images with so little to say about their own lives. It is in this sense that Deleuze speaks of the invention of a people. Cinema Novo will look to construct a new order of visibility in order to allow a people to look upon itself for the first time.

_Deus e o Diabo na Terra do Sol_ is the film that best expresses the concerns set out in ‘The Aesthetics of Hunger’, as well as the politics of intolerability that are integral to Deleuze’s reading of modern political cinema. The opening shots of the film demonstrate its position quite well. The first image is of the sertão, the arid backland region in the Brazilian nordeste, shot from above and tracking from left to right as the first part of the credits roll. This is followed by a cut to two subsequent shots of a rotting ox’s head in the sand (one of its mouth, another, in close-up, of its eye), and then again
to Manuel’s bowed head (Manuel is the film’s male lead who, along with his wife Rosa, viewers will follow throughout the film). Already the difficulty of life in this region is clear. The land looks harsh and in the cut from the dead ox to Manuel’s troubled face, the audience can discern the resignation that already structures Manuel’s relationship with the world around him. With the shot of Manuel the camera remains fixed as he rises and then follows him to his waiting horse. He mounts and the film cuts to a high-angle shot of the sertão (the same as in the first shot, but now much closer) as he rides away. Due to the high volume of light, the earth offers very little detail so as to emphasise the inhospitableness of the sertão. At two minutes thirty seconds the film cuts to an empty pale sky and the initial orchestral overtures give way to the film’s singer-narrator.

Rocha chooses the sertão as the setting for his film for a number of reasons. The sertão occupies an important position in popular Brazilian mythology. It was the region inhabited by bands of cangaceiros, bandits or outlaws prominent between 1870 and 1940, and site of popular beatismo movements, messianic groups who would follow self-declared prophets distinguishing themselves from organised religions (both of which feature in Deus e o Diabo na Terra do Sol). The region is regularly struck by extreme drought, consequently occupying an important place in Brazil’s discourses on poverty, and featured a number of peasant leagues in the 1950s that had attempted to resist the economic and political dominance of the coronéis, the region’s powerful landholders. The sertão is important for Rocha as it forms a specifically Brazilian site of political conflict that is difficult to abstract into a universal allegory for enduring and non-cultural human experience. Moreover, in Rocha’s films the sertão itself, as is evident in the opening few minutes of Deus e o Diabo na Terra do sol, becomes an
empty landscape upon which a range of different struggles can occur – a unique place
where Rocha can stage his mythic events after the withdrawal of all the universal
cultural systems and cinematic clichés that he sees as typical of the Americanised form
of Brazilian cinema (see Rocha 1987: 10-12). Ivana Bentes addresses the use of the
sertão in her study of the film:

Rocha borrows from history and from realism but transcends them, transforming
the sertão into a metaphysical territory. […] For Rocha, ‘the sertão is the world’,
a place of possible utopias and radical transformations, a place at once outside of
time and permeated by the struggles of our days. (2003: 90)

The region becomes a place empty of signification (in Deleuze’s words an any-space-
whatever), but not so as to render it universally explicable. The sertão is a site of real
historical struggles and holds a significance for the Brazilian audience that cannot be
easily translated into foreign cultural registers. The sertão speaks directly to Rocha’s
own experience as a Latin American film-maker – an artist who cannot communicate
through the images offered by the cinema and who must withdraw into a culturally
specific ‘elsewhere’.

The region is an empty stage upon which the lines traced by a number of different
political systems can cross. Rocha populates the sertão with a range of different
character-types that form a series of different territorial systems. Deus e o Diabo na
Terra do sol reinvents several distinct cycles of the nordeste. The myths and discourses
of the cangaço and beatismo movements, the coronolismo economic system and the
poverty of the sertanejo peasant are all utilised by Rocha with little regard for historical
accuracy so as to become social tendencies rather than specific psychologically-driven characters. What each of the dominant character-types in the film share is that they exist outside of the normal functioning of modern society (either above the law, like the church and the *coronéis*, or apart from it, like the *beato*, *cangaceiro* or impoverished *sertanejo*). This is why the film provides such little motivation for Manuel and Rosa’s flight into the *sertão*. From the shot of the empty sky and the start of the singer-narrator’s ballad, the film will create the conditions for Manuel to murder his employer, and in doing so, will not so much offer a setting as introduce a number of character traits. We are not given images of Manuel and Rosa’s poverty directly, but discern it from a series of gestures and repetitive movements – Manuel’s languorous walk and resigned posture, Rosa’s silence, her straining face, her sweating brow. Their home is sparse and seems run-down, but we are not provided with a close enough look to determine an economic situation from their living arrangements alone. It is their ponderous actions and chores that establish the fact of their poverty – a poverty derived from the repetitive gestures of living that traverse the empty landscape.

The film does not provide an image of the world but rather a way of living in the world. Rocha does not ‘show’ poverty, but offers an impoverished way of life as a way of responding to the world and that is distinct from the other systems of response given by the film. We are not surprised by Manuel’s violence, even though he will require relatively little provocation to kill the exploitative *coronéis*, because his way of living provides no other way of responding to his exploitation. Manuel is faced with an act of violence or further resigned poverty. After 16 minutes, Manuel has killed three men and his mother is dead. The film pauses after a series of rapidly-cut events in a close-up of Manuel looking over what he has done, seemingly unable to understand how his life has
led to this point. In ‘Black God, White Devil: The Representation of History’, Ismail Xavier explains that the events depicted in the film’s prologue (both Manuel’s violence and the couple’s resigned poverty) are given as ‘emblematic of a mode of existence’ (1995: 136), which means that the characters’ actions are not rooted in psychological realism or any logical character development. This is also noted by René Gardies, who similarly argues that Rocha’s characters are generally ‘posed in terms of functions’, rather than as psychologically consistent figures, and that such functions will be variously articulated through ‘the dramatic, mythic and politico-ideological facts’ of each of his films (1974: 13). Characters behave in certain ways because their emblematic ‘type’ requires them to do so – the poor are resigned to their poverty and killers know only how to kill. The film uses a non-realist style as a way of ‘condensing’ the events of the film into a gesture towards the experience of living. As Xavier suggests, it offers a ‘synthetic representation of social existence’ (1995: 136). Xavier explains:

Although the film speaks of historical struggles, it never reproduces those events through naturalistic spectacle. The film is not preoccupied with the reconstitution of appearances, or with showing events as they actually transpired. Unlike spectacular, expensive, dominant cinema, it does not seek ‘legitimacy’ in the illusory transfer of the ‘real’ life of another epoch to the imaginary universe of the screen. In its refusal of the dominant industrial aesthetic, Black God, White Devil [Deus e o Diabo na Terra do Sol] affirms the basic principles of ‘The Aesthetic of Hunger’. The film attunes its style to its own conditions of production and thus marks its aesthetic and ideological opposition to the colonizing discourse of the film industry. (1995: 138)
Rocha’s treatment of characters as mere types, emblematic of a particular mode of existence, and his compression of a number of different historical cycles separate this work from the spectacular cinema of North America and the Brazilian films (of the *O Cangaceiro* [1953] style) that would seek to emulate it. But if, as Xavier says, Rocha’s film wishes for no legitimacy in its transfer of life to the screen, if it refuses any notion of realism in its aesthetic strategies, then how can it affirm the basic principles of ‘The Aesthetics of Hunger’? That is to say, how does *Deus e o Diabo na Terra do Sol* bring the Brazilian spectator into confrontation with their own hunger? How can an audience be made to look upon their own conditions of existence if Rocha offers it as part of a non-realist aesthetic?

**Systems of Living**

I argue that by providing character-systems in place of psychologically consistent characters, Rocha makes his film into what Deleuze calls a ‘system of luminosity’. In Deleuze’s understanding, a visibility does not simply express what is shown, but is a way of revealing – it is not the object itself but the light that makes the object visible. Deleuze says:

> Visibilities are not forms of objects, nor even forms that would show up under light, but rather forms of luminosity which are created by the light itself and allow a thing or object to exist only as a flash, sparkle or shimmer. (2006a: 45)
By constructing a number of differing systems for responding to the world Rocha provides not simply a gaze onto the *sertão*, but a number of conflicting ways of seeing the same *sertão*. In ‘History of Cinema Novo’ (1987) Rocha criticises the closed romantic realism of the North American film, arguing that the audience, in almost all cases, will have nothing in common with what it sees onscreen: ‘it feels only the stimulus which enables it to obtain some of the physical attributes of the hero or the heroine’ (1987: 20). A technologically less advanced cinema does not have the luxuries of glossy visuals or glamorous stars, nor the global exposure and economic dominance to ‘normalise’ its image of the world. Subsequently, a cinematic realism is more difficult to deploy, as Rocha argues elsewhere, because it does not confirm the Brazilian audience’s expected ‘images of life’ (1970: 144). Rocha argues:

> In a revealed, developed society, it is a lot easier to conceive of and practice a dramatic realism than, as we have already seen, it is in a society which lacks any information. Our filmmaker takes part in the discovery of the consciousness of what is Brazilian, through his wish to record direct images, and his wish to discuss of what he knows (or thinks he knows) of man, ourselves, and others’. (1987: 21, author’s emphasis)

It is this sense of ‘discovering’ Brazil that is key to understanding Rocha’s film-making and which will lead Deleuze to understand his work as the invention of a people to come. Rocha is unable to present images of his country as an already established fact because any image he provides will be filtered through a non-Brazilian territorial organisation. It is necessary instead to invent a new set of stimuli through which his audience can understand what they see.
*Deus e o Diabo na Terra do Sol* shows not simply an image of poverty, but an impoverished way of life – no longer an image of the world but a world-system, a set of specific responses and gestures that will visualise a world. Rocha’s film negates the movement-image conception of the world as already formed and provides instead a multitude of cinematic-systems to govern a world in process. An aesthetics of hunger does not only require an image that can designate a hungry person, but the specific actions and gestures to which hunger gives rise. More significantly, Rocha will question what actions and life-chances such an experience of life can provide.

Visibilities are systems of light that organise what is seen and not seen (not simply objects that are seen). I argue that the task of the Cinema Novo in terms of visibility, is not simply to reveal the images of Brazil, but to construct new visibilities themselves. In order to show Brazil as it is and as it can be, the Cinema Novo must construct new visual machines, in the particular sense that Deleuze would express in *Foucault*, as ‘an assembly of organs and functions that make something visible and conspicuous’ (2006a: 50). Deleuze reminds us of one of Foucault’s most important lessons, ‘that everything is always said in every age’ (2006a: 47). The images of an intolerable hunger already exist. There are already hungry people everywhere in the world and on our screens everyday. It is not only important that these images are shown; political cinemas require systems of expression that can interpret what these images have to say.

The realities of Rocha’s hunger differ from the sensations addressed in Marks’ *The Skin of the Film*. Whilst Marks’ analysis of intercultural film is similarly concerned with ways of living that are absent from the dominant systems of visual culture, and whilst
these films also attempt to make visible a different mode of existence, her focus on non-visual forms of knowledge leads to different conclusions. Hunger is not ‘felt’ in the terms that Marks discusses (see 2000: 127-193). It is not a sense in line with her focus on touch as part of a ‘sensual cinema’, but a bodily aching. Hunger is part of a system that restricts. It limits the hungry person to a lower degree of freedom, making eating the only viable response to the world. As in the poverty that forms part of Rocha’s _sertanejo_ character-system, hunger is a cultural form that traps the sufferer into a repeating pattern of living. What Rocha’s aesthetics of hunger will ultimately attempt to do is to insert a greater number of responses into such systems, in order to give a greater number of different ways of seeing and understanding hunger and poverty.

In order to maintain the distinction between the numerous conflicting character-types he invents, Rocha orders each as a distinct aesthetic system through which Manuel and Rosa, the peasant characters, will pass. The prologue shows their impoverished world as governed by repeating gestures, physical labour and silent resignation. But once Manuel murders the landowner and the couple flee into the _sertão_, the dominant aesthetic changes and they come under the control of Sebastião, the self-declared prophet and leader of the _beatos_. Manuel and Rosa flee because they must, not because they wish to. Their world is unjust and Manuel’s rebellion only succeeds in destroying the things that connect their lives to a wider economic system. In this act of rebellion the couple lose both their subsistence and the tiny chores and gestures that had structured their world. They head deeper into the _sertão_ because it bears no connection to the organised world of humans (from which they are now stranded) and join the _beatos_ in the hope of substituting their system of empty routines for one of deferred miracles, adopting, as Xavier says, the prophet’s ‘interpretative system’ (1995: 143).
The changing interpretative system is evident in the film’s style, as Rocha institutes a new aesthetic in order to express the world of the film differently. In the *beato* episode the earth is no longer flattened and empty, as it was in the prologue, but shown in sweeping panoramic shots from the top of Sebastião’s mountain camp. An early sequence of shots shows the *beatos* huddled around a preaching Sebastião, arms aloft, flags fluttering behind him to show the wind, seemingly fertile land stretching away into the distance beneath the mountain. The contrast between this landscape and the washed-out landscapes of the prologue is striking. The camera, which had quite often been fixed in the earlier episode, is now largely mobile, closely studying the huddling crowd, looking upon faces and isolating body parts such that the film often loses its sense of spatial continuity. The film’s pacing has also changed, replacing the rapid sequence of events in the prologue with a quiet contemplation in the interim between Sebastião’s speeches.

From this point on, a number of competing stylistic systems are discernible. The prologue is a system that corresponds to the lives of the *sertanjo* peasants, but which is destroyed in their subsequent flight. As the pair come under the influence of the prophet Sebastião another set of conventions takes hold which changes Rocha’s aesthetic strategies and makes the viewer read the images of the world differently – the land is no longer barren but potentially bountiful, life is no longer a struggle but a penance. Later in the film, further systems are set in place in the *cangaceiro* episode and in the scenes showing Antônio das Mortes.

Several of the Antônio das Mortes scenes are intercut with those of Sebastião and the
beatos which make the distinctions of each system particularly apparent. In these sequences, the camera relates to Sebastião and Antônio quite differently. Antônio is always locatable on-screen. He generally assumes the centre of the frame as a point about which the other characters, indeed the world itself, will seem to revolve. Upon accepting a contract to kill Sebastião and the beatos from representatives of the landowners and the organised Catholic Church, Antônio will assume the centre of each successive shot, positioned so that he will always take up the largest part of the frame, towering over the other characters who, in contrast to Antônio’s massive figure, seem slight and diminutive. Maurício do Valle, who plays Antônio, is a large man, and his size is accentuated through framing and positioning as well as by dressing him in a heavy coat, scarf and a broad-brimmed hat. In one scene two characters speak to Antônio from different ends of a room. Antônio is placed in the centre of the shot and the camera tracks left and right to include each of the other characters in shot when speaking, keeping Antônio in view at all times, but regularly cutting off the other two figures or reducing them to minor positions at the edge of the frame.

In contrast, Sebastião generally appears larger than the screen itself and is shot in fragments so that only a part of his face or body will loom into shot. Often the camera will leave Sebastião to roam along the mountain path and look upon the beatos or the view of the land below. Sebastião governs the entirety of his domain. As Xavier says, he dominates the expressive system that makes up this part of the film and as such need not be present on screen for his power to be apparent (his influence is discernible in Manuel’s physical trials or the stillness of the other beatos). Antônio is not master of his domain but an outside element in a world that is not his own. His power does not reside in his control of a particular world but his separation from it and disregard for its rules.
After Sebastião is killed the film leaves his world and sets in place a new stylistic system, as Corisco and the *cangaceiros* assume control of the final segment of the film. Rocha introduces a number of original aesthetic strategies. The land now dominates the sky. In contrast to the earlier episodes, where the sky takes up the largest portion of the screen (in the prologue) or where the camera gazes over the land from above (in the *beatismo* episode), the landscape is framed so that the earth takes up the largest part of the screen, with a horizon-line significantly higher than in any previous shot. We discern significant detail in the surrounding plants and scenery (unlike in the prologue’s featureless landscapes) and seem to have returned to a more arid *sertão* that appears not at all like the fertile landscapes viewed from Sebastião’s mountaintop. Corisco, the leader of the *cangaceiros*, assumes command of the film’s aesthetic. For much of the sequence that follows, Corisco speaks at length. Character monologues have not been used in the film up until this point, nor has a peculiar staging that places Corisco at 180 degrees to the camera, such that he appears to talk directly to the audience. His monologues are generally framed in medium-shot in a stage-like clearing surrounded by thick plants to the rear and side, so as to emphasise the theatricality of the *cangaceiro* episode and distinguish it from the competing aesthetics given in the violent prologue, the contemplative *beatismo* episode and the quiet aggression of the Antônio das Mortes scenes.

Rocha eschews the normal world-building format of the closed-realist aesthetic, which would generally construct a single consistent world to be populated by a number of supportive or conflicting characters, instead offering a number of different world-systems, each with distinct cinematic styles and organising principles. In contextual
terms the *sertão* remains the same but is interpreted differently in each section of the
film – making it a barren inhospitable place in line with the peasant’s experience of life
or a world of potential miracles and deliverance in line with Sebastião’s prophecies. As
Manuel and Rosa move from system to system their way of thinking the world changes
and in each there is a new stylistic system that visualises the world in different ways.
Each episode forms a new system of luminosity that will make the world appear
differently.

**The Figural**

Xavier argues that *Deus e o Diabo na Terra do Sol* makes use of a ‘figural’ method to
transform history into ‘a referential matrix covered with layers of imaginary
constructions’ (1995: 139). That he would use the term ‘figural’ here is most insightful,
and will help us to understand Rocha’s aesthetic strategies and explain exactly how they
can invent a people. Rodowick defines the figural as a concept that challenges the
distinction between text and figure (or discourse and vision), entering into each a
‘depth’ where the unsaid or unseen becomes apparent (2001: 4-19). For Rodowick, the
figural invokes a kind of unconscious or virtual register within expression where
transformative forces can operate (2001: 16-17). The figural opens an inexpressible
realm of unthought possibilities that exists within discourse and vision, so that vision
may ask ‘what can be said of this?’, and discourse may ask ‘what can be seen of this?’,
and each be confronted by a universe of potential new forms that will transform its
functions absolutely. To say that something is figural is to suggest that it is emblematic
of something; neither an image of a thing, nor a signifier for it, the figural points
towards an ‘elsewhere’ within expression. The figural is a ‘hieroglyph’, in Conley’s understanding of the term (1991: xxviii-xxix), a form of expression that scatters rather than fixes meaning by invoking a range of possible transformations.

*Deus e o Diabo na Terra do Sol* sets up a range of competing character-types as emblematic or figural organisations of a particular life. Gardies addresses this point in ‘Structural Analysis of a Textual System’, similarly arguing that Rocha’s style eliminates his characters’ existence as individuals: ‘They retain only what reveals the real nature of the society, those subterranean and open antagonisms which constitute the social fabric and ensure its organic evolution’ (1974: 13). The characters are only intelligible as figures that allow the apprehension of historical, political and social powers. As Gardies says, ‘the question is therefore not one of destinies, but of forces’ (1974: 13). It is from this perspective that Gardies divides up Rocha’s character-types into categories that repeat across all of his films (these are the possessors, the dispossessed, the revolutionaries and absent powers of the explint [1974: 13]) and outline seven relational forms that connect each character-type to the other (these are exploitation, utopian response, reformist action, revolutionary action, rivalry, alliance and betrayal [1974: 21]).

Gardies transposes each of the character-types and relational forms into a series of tables that, despite their usefulness in noting some formations that recur across Rocha’s work, cannot determine how such formations are utilised or what their importance is for Rocha’s political strategies. I argue that in each case the various character-types become figural systems in that they make visible the specific political and social forces that traverse Rocha’s *sertão*. The significance of Manuel’s actions in the prologue is not what he feels or his motivation for killing his employer, but that his

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10 The final category of character-types is not as self-evident as the first three. Gardies explains: ‘The explint designates that alien occult force (American, obviously) which holds the strings of power somewhere in the shadows, thanks to the formidable pressures it is able to wield’ (1974: 14).
actions make visible the exploitative relation between himself and the landholder and
the intolerability of his way of living. Similarly, in the beatismo episode, what matters is
that messianic utopianism emerges as a system through which to interpret the social and
political forces that structure the lives of the characters. Sebastião’s interpretative
system offers a set of solutions to the problems of exploitation and hunger by rejecting
the exploitative system of capital and embracing hunger as a kind of spiritual
atonement. The system itself is not revolutionary (in Rocha’s films there are
surprisingly few credible programmes for revolution), but offers a range of possible
reactions to the sertanejo’s intolerable situation (as does the cangaceiro’s nihilism and
Antônio’s proclamations of ‘a great war to come’).

The point is not to judge any system as offering the correct set of actions and responses
– they are all equally futile. Rocha is building a range of potential systems, opening as
many responses to the intolerable as possible. Each interpretative system is figural in
that it structures a continual mapping of the world. Each system continually makes the
world visible; revealing and re-revealing the invisible structures of life, each time
through a new system of visibility that will reveal the world in some new light. It does
not matter that each system will produce only failed revolutions as each will create its
own distinct realm of virtual potentials. Each system offers a series of virtual worlds
that should not be understood as an ‘ideal’ world, but as a new possible world that is
different to the current Sertanejo way of living. Rodowick explains that ‘virtuality
unfolds as an unlimited reserve of future acts, each of which is equally possible in itself,
yet incompossible with all the others’ (2001: 200). Rocha attempts to bring to light this
reserve of future acts in each interpretative system and, beyond his films, in the many
ways of living in the real world. For a change to an intolerable way of life to be
possible, it must first be possible to think of change. In each system, solutions to the problem of living (messianic utopianism, nihilism, violence) are obvious to the characters (and they will each remain ‘solutions’ regardless of what spectators might think of them), but they remain obvious for only so long as the specific discursive and visual systems allow them to be thought. The difficulty that is also ultimately given in the film is that there are also many systems of repression in place to negate the possibilities of thought given by each.

I argue that these interpretative systems are diagrams that articulate what is possible in a given situation. Rodowick would seem to agree as well, as in *Reading the Figural* he will align figural expression with Deleuze’s conceptualisation of the diagram (2001: 52). Returning to Deleuze’s words in the latter sections of *Foucault* (2006a 59-77 and 78-101), a diagram is a mapping of forces. It should be understood as gesturing towards one or many virtual futures that are made possible by the scrambled forces constituting the diagram. Deleuze says:

> No doubt the diagram communicates with the stratified formation stabilizing or fixing it, but following another axis it also communicates with the other diagram, the other unstable diagrammatic states, through which forces pursue their mutant emergence. This is why the diagram always represents the outside of the strata. (2006a: 71)

Despite being rooted in stratified forms, the diagram constitutes an arrangement of purely virtual forces that make possible the emergence of another world. Recall, for example, the virtual outsides given in Bergman’s films. Bergman invokes an absent
world of gods and demons and intolerable madness that exceeds the visible component of the images, as in *Hour of the Wolf*, reconstituting the island of Fâro as a new world in which madness or fear, usually only visible through symptomatic markers of their presence, are tangible things and in which psychology is not contained within the supposed inside of a character’s head but extends outwards into the entirety of the film-world. This is why it does not matter if the people on the island are real or imagined – they are both real and imagined because the island itself (and the images that constitute it) acts as a kind of geopsychology for the artist.

In Rocha’s films a similar diagrammatic formation takes place, but unlike Bergman, he engages in an explicitly political strategy (this is why Rocha will play such a prominent role in the concluding stages of *Cinema 2*). Rocha is not content to offer a world in the process of slipping, but must offer a diagram for the invention of a people. To explain how his films can visualise a people, I will now address *Antônio das Mortes*, the second of Rocha’s sertão films, which takes up the themes of *Deus e o Diabo na Terra do Sol* and further develops their political implications. Most significantly, this second film attempts to resolve the political ambiguities of Antônio himself, a mere killer and pawn of the Church and landowning classes in the first film, but transformed in the latter into a revolutionary figure.

**Music and Colour in the Sertão (Antônio das Mortes)**

*Antônio das Mortes* was released in 1969, by which time the landscape of Brazilian cinema had transformed following the 1964 *coup d'état*, and the second *coup* in 1968
that consolidated political power within the military. Following Johnson and Stam’s account of Brazilian film history, these dates mark the beginning and end of the second phase of Cinema Novo (1995a: 34-37, see also Stam 1997: 233-237), in which the optimism of the first phase is replaced by a general disillusionment with the failure of developmentalism (the dominant ideology of the Kubitschek years). The films of this period, which included Rocha’s Terra em Transe, Santos’ Fome de Amor (1968), Deigues’ A Grande Cidade (1966) and Leon Hirszman’s The Girl From Ipanema (Garota de Ipanema, 1967), attempted to come to terms with the new authoritarian military rule of Brazil and unravel the events that had led to the coup.

After 1968, Cinema Novo enters into a third phase (see Johnson and Stam 1995a: 37-40, see also Stam 1997: 238-253), during which its principal film-makers attempted to build a sustained popular audience (The Girl From Ipanema was an early example of a new ‘popular’ approach). In this phase Cinema Novo begins to fragment into smaller film-cycles, as ‘Tropicalism’ (a kind of Brazilian grotesque) takes hold as a cinematic (and wider cultural) aesthetic. Films from this period include Antônio das Mortes and the successful Macunaíma [1969], as well as Diegues’ The Heirs (Os Herdeiros, 1969) and Santos’ cannibal-allegory How Tasty Was My Little Frenchman (Como Era Gostoso Meu Francês, 1970). Cinema Novo’s political aims and formal strategies diverge in this period as new directors and influences became prevalent. Censorship laws became more repressive under the military government, causing leading directors from the first two phases (such as Rocha, Diegues and Guerra) to leave Brazil in the early 1970s. As Johnson and Stam say: ‘After 1972, it becomes increasingly difficult to speak of Cinema Novo; one must speak, rather, of Brazilian Cinema’ (1995a: 32).
Falling within this third period, *Antônio das Mortes* is Rocha’s attempt to re-address the earlier two periods, so as to resolve *Deus e o Diabo na Terra do Sol*’s contradictions and *Terra em Transe*’s pessimism, whilst dealing with problems concerning collective filmmaking and political transformation that he had never addressed as explicitly. As in the earlier film, *Antônio das Mortes* rejects psychological consistency in favour of a number of character-types. This is noted by Gardies, whose essay on Rocha’s stylistic system covers the extent of his career, and also by Terence Carlson (1995), who explores the interrelationships of the various character-types. Rather than simply re-staging the systemic ordering of the earlier *sertão* film, Rocha utilised a new set of techniques and aesthetic strategies in order to attack the mythic form of the American western (and American-inspired Brazilian ‘north-eastern’). *Deus e o Diabo na Terra do Sol* had been content to make visible the hunger of the *seranejo* experience of life and offer a series of conflicting interpretative systems to respond to such hunger, none of which could be said to resolve it nor even satisfactorily account for the experience of hunger as a political question. *Antônio das Mortes* will take up these problems and offer a system of myths suitable for the *nordeste* (which will account for its far greater success) and connect these various systems in a more complex fashion than the simple episodic structure of the earlier film.

The structure of *Antônio das Mortes* cannot be broken into episodic territorial systems, as in *Deus e o Diabo na Terra do Sol*. Each of the characters (of which there are now many more) will form a kind of territory in themselves, as before, making each figure emblematic of a particular mode of existence. In *Antônio das Mortes*, character-systems do not extend to the spaces about them and are not located in a single episode which they (stylistically and ideologically) dominate. The style of the film is more or less
consistent throughout, or at least does not seem to follow any strict stylistic system, regardless of which characters are depicted in each scene. Two further changes most obviously distinguish this film from the earlier film: it is Rocha’s first to be filmed in colour and is arranged as a musical, utilising a number of musical forms appropriate to the nordeste.11 The use of music is particularly important in this film as it is used to distinguish between differing character-systems in the absence of any strict stylistic organisation.

The sertanejo peasants who had assumed the lead roles in Deus e o Diabo na Terra do Sol have vanished entirely. Whereas Manuel and Rosa’s wandering from one system to another had structured that earlier film, here there are no ordering characters at all. The result is that the film becomes even further distanced from psychological realism, making each figure a re-staging of the myths of the sertão, and depriving the audience of any place in which to ground their viewing of the film. The removal of the peasant characters and the marginalisation of the intellectual (the closest character to the hero of Terra em Transe), deprives the audience of a surrogate and forces the spectator’s allegiances to migrate between each of the presented mythic types. The film assumes a certain groundlessness as each figure’s connection to the filmic system changes – Coirana shifts from imposter to cangaceiro to revolutionary as the film progresses, whilst Antônio is at first a romantic wandering gunfighter, before transforming, becoming a hired murderer and eventually a revolutionary fighter. Characters are no

11 Antônio das Mortes is Rocha’s most complex film in musical terms, although all of his films utilise musical forms to some degree. The closest of his other films to Antônio das Mortes in its use of music is Barravento (1962), which depicts a fishing community that sings a candomblé chorus throughout the film. In his early work music is used as a framing device that encompasses an entire film (the cordel narrator-ballad in Deus e o Diabo na Terra do Sol or the candomblé chorus in Barravento) or, as in Terra em Transe, to distinguish a particular political form (offering differing musical styles for elitism, populism or revolutionary action). Antônio das Mortes uses a larger range of musical forms, each specific to a given character or way of life and repeating throughout the film (rather than as framing particular episodes or segments). See Graham Bruce’s ‘Alma Brasileira: Music in the Films of Glauber Rocha’ (1995).
longer emblematic of a repeating and unchangeable way of living, but of a way of living in relation to a fluid and changeable system of relations.

In place of the now absent stylistic unity Antônio das Mortes uses a variety of musical forms to isolate and distinguish each mythic system (Bruce 1995: 301-305). The beatos, Antão and the santa, for example, perform a recurring batucada, an Afro-Brazilian percussion and chorus song derived from macumba practices. Macumba is an amalgamated religion, derived from African Bantu religions and European Catholicism, that Rocha invokes in his films as a way of expressing Brazil’s African and European ancestry. The mixed religious practices of the beatos are emphasised by giving them two different prophets: the Catholic santa and the African Antão. Similarly, Coirana and the cangecieros are associated with the cordel ballad, most prominently performed by Coirana himself as a musical tale to recount his life. Later in the film, another ballad tells the tale of Lampião (Brazil’s most famous cangaceiro) ransacking hell after his death, accompanying a number of scenes depicting characters preparing for a final showdown. Other musical forms include a lyrically melancholy but melodically cheerful samba to express the professor’s internal political conflict, a poppy bourgeois ditty sung by Laura and Mattos to show the hollowness of their love, a piece for piano, contralto and soprano by Marlos Nobre to give a grotesque tropicalist quality to the scene in which Coirana’s body is abandoned in the sertão (see Bruce 1995: 304-305), and a violent xaxado dance, in which Mata Vaca and his men prepare to massacre the beatos (see Delahaye et al. 1987: 44). In each case the music describes how each character relates to the wider filmic system. That the cangecieros are connected to the cordel ballad shows their privileged place in the myths of the region, whereas the batucada chorus emphasises the double heritage of Brazilian mysticism. That Mattos
the politician will recount his love in a vacuous Bossa Nova (*Carinhosa* by Pixinguinha and João de Barro) will likewise serve to distance him from the cultural forms of the *sertão*, as well as showing that his allegiances will ultimately only lie with money.

The increased significance of music is a result of the film’s lack of stylistic organisation, which, in turn, is a result of a new set of formal strategies that Rocha adopted during filming. *Antônio das Mortes* is a product of collective activity between Rocha, his crew, actors and extras. In order for such collective film-making to be possible, in which events were staged according to an openly discussed set of criteria and movements of characters and crowds were choreographed on set, Rocha and his crew needed to relinquish a degree of control over the aesthetics of the film. As a result the stylistic order of *Deus e o Diabo na Terra do Sol* is no longer possible. In ‘Envisioning Popular Form’ (Delahaye et al. 1987) Rocha explains that much of the film is based on improvisation by both actors and camera crew in order to avoid what he calls ‘the limitations of traditional dramatic fiction films’ and ‘the dogmatism of revolutionary films’ (Delahaye et al. 1987: 34). In order to free the film from a structured and static conception of the world it was necessary to allow the film to take shape in a less systematic fashion than had been the case in previous films. Despite the scenario being Rocha’s own creation, the methods employed in filming would allow the film to drift towards something rooted in the experiments of the actors or the cultural heritage of the Bahian extras (the film was made in Milagres and features many of the town’s residents).  

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12 Rocha would likely consider that even the scenario was not entirely his own work, being based on a number of events and characters from the *nordeste*. The *beato* pilgrimages are taken from several well-known messianic movements, whilst Lampião and Mata Vaca were real people (the latter, Rocha claims, had murdered a relative of his and was eventually killed by one of his cousins [Delahaye et al. 1987: 32]). Antônio was modelled on Jose Rufino, a cangacerio hunter who Rocha and Mauricio do Valle spoke with as part of the research for *Deus e o Diabo na Terra do Sol*. Rocha claims that parts of
The duel between Antônio and Coirana, for example, is composed in line with a local tradition in which a duel becomes a ritual battle between the two combatants, each gripping a length of scarf between their teeth. In ‘Cinema Novo and the Dialectics of Popular Culture’ Rocha says: ‘The positioning of the actors, the music, the dancing were practically all the work of the local people. I explained what I wanted to do, they discussed it among themselves and set it up, and then I filmed it’ (1986: 111). This is the reason for the scarf and the circular movements of the two combatants. Rocha explains that none of the scene’s mise-en-scène is created by him, but by the group as a whole:

I discussed it with the cast and crew, and there was one old lady who said, ‘wait, I know a song’. The moment she began to sing, we all took up positions for the battle. At the same time, some actors began to move in time to the music and I realized how to shoot the scene. I was spectator and participant at the same time. They all found their positions very naturally, we shot it all in one take and it was very real, even at the point where Antônio wounds the cangaceiro; they decided it was to be like that, no spontaneity, but work linked to profound representational roots. (Delahaye et al. 1987: 39).

That Rocha would ‘realise how to shoot the scene’ does not mean that he would impose anything on the framing or shooting of the scene, as it was not ‘composed’ in the usual manner. The camera was rarely set up in a pre-established position so as to compose each frame, but rather, was set at a particular point at random or allowed to roam freely about each scene as a participant in its own right (Carlson calls this a ‘searching camera’

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Antônio das Mortes were conceived when he learned that a new cangaceiro, called Ze Crispin had appeared and that Rufino had set out to capture him (Delahaye et al. 1987: 31).
Rocha explains his use of the camera in *Antônio das Mortes*:

I did several takes with actors behind the camera who could enter the action at any time. Nothing was planned, but things were already determined by the mood which had been created. We shot, restricted each time because it was impossible to repeat. The sequence was born of the state of the actors and not planned in the ‘mise en scène’. I have an assistant called Calmon and I give him complete freedom. […] I always work a lot with the crew and with Beato, the camera operator, as well. I explain various principles to him, I choose the colours and only two or three lenses are used in this film. I show him the distance from the camera, but I rarely lined up the camera in order to avoid composing the shot. As the ‘mise en scène’ was already sophisticated, although concerned with primitive things, I preferred to avoid composition at the level of the frame. The operator was a very good technician, but a very simple type, not an aesthete of the cinema. It was my assistant that did all of work analysing the characters, but at every level there was discussion. (Delahaye et al. 1987: 41)

As a result *Antônio das Mortes* more closely resembles a film made in Milagres than it resembles a film made by Glauber Rocha. Despite being a sort of sequel to *Deus e o Diabo na Terra do Sol*, this film makes a number of stylistic departures from Rocha’s earlier films, and those features that do resemble his other films are a result of those features already being culturally appropriate to the particular place and historical milieu in which *Antônio das Mortes* is located. The film uses very particular musical forms and dances, is populated by regionally specific character-types and appeals to local myths and customs – Antônio’s clothes are derived from popular theatrical tradition (Rocha
the distinctive colours are those of the town itself and are not extenuated by filters or artificial illumination (Rocha 1986: 111). The film is an unstructured act of creation, allowing the images and colours and stories of Milagres and the surrounding *sertão* to organise themselves into an absolutely specific film born of a concrete time and place. Rocha says: ‘I wanted to display the wealth of popular culture as a kind of challenge to oppressive cultural forms, since I’m also interested in showing how the economically and politically oppressed have great creative strength in their music, clothing, and choreography’ (1986: 111).

Through such film-making strategies, Rocha attempts to construct a platform upon which the myths and cultural formations of the region can be understood in their own specificity. It is not that Rocha must invent any myths himself, nor even the cinematic worlds that his film assembles, for such things already exist. Rocha invents, rather, a new set of territories through which the images of the *sertão* are organised. The reason that such invention can be considered an important political act, and the corresponding reasons for Rocha’s significance to any political reading of Deleuze’s cinema project, will be addressed in the concluding sections.

**The Diagram of a People to Come**

I have argued that through a number of film-making strategies Rocha had attempted to assemble a new order of visibility appropriate to the particular historical situation in which he was working. His films provide an image of Brazil and a Brazilian people that is radically different to the cliché-images circulating in the North American-dominated
distribution networks that had made up the vast majority of Brazil’s cinema market. But more than this, in his films Rocha orders a vast series of conflicting images of peasants and gunfighters and wealthy landowners that make up the political imagination of the Brazilian nordeste. His films do not assemble a world but a large number of different worlds.

But how can Rocha have ‘invented’ a people when the figures that populate his films actually exist? The images that Rocha offers in Antônio das Mortes are not inventions in the usual understanding of the term, but drawn from an existing archive of popular imagery. Deleuze suggests as much in his focus on the mythic content of Rocha’s films (2005b: 210-214). I argue that Rocha’s success is twofold. He has made visible a series of images of a place, and of many different people, that was actually existing but ignored by the world’s cameras and obscured in the minds of the world’s media-spectators. Milagres, Bahia and the sertão are all real, but in a global image-network they are all but invisible. Even if a spectator should stumble upon Lima Barreto’s O Cangaceiro, these images can be easily reintegrated into an international cultural register that makes the cangaceiro derivative of the American western. Even images of the region itself are not sufficient to provide a visibility of the life of a people, and are easily reproduced as cliché. Such is the importance of Rocha’s second great success, which had organised the already-existing images of the sertão through a new set of cinematic strategies. The form of Rocha’s films owes nothing to the templates of Hollywood-inflected commercial cinema. The cangaceiro cannot be understood in the same terms as the American outlaw or European bandit, and likewise the sertanejo peasant is incomparable to the poor of the Earth – Rocha shows that each way of life is the product of a particular historical and political situation. To transform a Brazilian
experience of life into an image of violence or poverty as a generalised phenomenon is to make it a cliché.

Rocha has created the conditions where such images can be made visible. He has constructed a diagram for this purpose. A diagram, as I have said, is a map of forces that overlays the actualised territories of the world and designates the immanent potentials for a territory’s mutation. A diagram is a cluster of virtual forces that designate a potential transformation in the world, a point at which the actual can dissolve into a new universe of possibilities. It is through this diagram that Rocha’s film-making constitutes an invention. The new formations that are inscribed in Rocha’s cinematic diagrams are not actualised but remain one of a number of active potentials present within each work. The characters that populate his films are derived from an existing historical and political situation – they are markers of a particular way of relating to the world – but these characters are not timeless or unalterable figures, as the romanticised gunfighter was in the most regressive Hollywood westerns. They are systems of living in an active sense. They are lives in a state of becoming and neither the point of transformation nor the point at which they will emerge as something else is already determined. Characters are not always being made into revolutionaries or attaining states of grace, but they are always changing, all the while ignorant of the forces that drive them compulsively toward the sea (in Deus e o Diabo na Terra do Sol) or of the political systems that make them kill (Antônio das Mortes). Such becoming constitutes Rocha’s particular kind of invention. It is not for Rocha to determine the world that the sertão will become – to say that this is the kind of life that is best and this is the revolution that is needed to bring it into being. Such programmes, Deleuze argues, are residues of an older political cinema still characterised by the movement-image. Rocha will instead offer a plurality of virtual
worlds, each already immanent in the territories that structure the present. This is why Deleuze will not speak of ‘the people’, even if there are peoples that actually exist, but of a people to come.

Reading Rocha’s films in this way, it is easier to take account of criticisms of his work. The most famous of these is presented by Ernest Callenbach in ‘Comparative Anatomy of Folk-Myth Films’ (1969). The basis of this critique is that Antônio das Mortes cannot be understood as a properly ‘revolutionary film’. According to Callenbach the film is ‘fundamentally conservative, and constitute[s] (like most folk art) diversions of thought and feeling from tender political questions’ (1969: 42). Callenbach argues that Rocha is a film-maker of ‘the grand agonized moment’ (1969: 44) and that due to his preference for operatic spectacle over psychological or political development his films are devoid of any serious political content. Callenbach claims that Rocha is interested ‘in the wave breaking, but not in the wave building up’ (1968: 45), that is, in the spectacular moment of crisis rather than the socio-political conditions that produced such a crisis. This critique is also argued by Hans Proppe and Susan Tarr in ‘Pitfalls of Cultural Nationalism in Cinema Novo’ (1976), who take up Callenbach’s exceptions to Antônio das Mortes, further expand on some of its assertions and attempt to apply it to the Cinema Novo more generally. In addition to Callenbach’s basic criticism, Proppe and Tarr also challenge the use of the cangaceiro and the suffering peasant character-types, arguing that neither are utilised in Rocha’s films in a manner conducive to ‘revolutionary film-making’. For Proppe and Tarr, cangaceiros are reactionary figures due to their historically apolitical forms of rebellion, generally focusing more on individual gain and indiscriminate violence than any legitimate political struggle (they cite Eric Hobsbawm’s discussion of Lampião and the ‘avenger bandit’ in Bandits [1981:
According to Proppe and Tarr, Rocha’s peasant characters are similarly counterproductive due to their generally defeated and miserable existence. They claim that the hopelessness of the lives of the poor, as much as their depiction as inert and uncomprehending, removes the possibility of positive revolutionary action arising from their direct political struggle. Where any revolutionary action occurs in Rocha’s films, it is invariably the result of some other agent, the cangaceiro or wandering prophet, around which the poor must faithfully gather.

These readings are credible to a degree. Many may agree with Proppe and Tarr’s suggestion that the Cinema Novo could make better use of the various uprisings in the nordeste, such as the Peasant League revolts or the Palmares rebellion (although similar events occur in Os Fuzis [1964] and Ganga Zumba), yet such points do not amount to a sufficient critique of Rocha’s films. Certainly, his films are not ‘revolutionary’ in terms of having incited revolution or in contributing to direct revolutionary activity, but this does not prevent his work from addressing a range of significant political issues (hunger, violence, political oppression, landownership, populism, religious mysticism, etc.). I argue that Rocha’s films are quite evidently political when understood in the terms that I have outlined and that such critiques have misunderstood his films in several important ways.

These misreadings are the result of expectations concerning political film form that are overturned by Rocha’s culturally and historically specific strategies. Both articles presume that political activity in Rocha’s films should be Marxist-inflected and require a certain didacticism that will demonstrate the sociopolitical causes of depicted events, a credible programme for political struggle and a concrete account of what new political
systems should be constructed. The problem with such presumptions is that they ignore the particular strategies that Rocha employs. *Antônio das Mortes* is the product of a specific milieu and as a result owes more to religious mysticism, which is a very real force in the *sertão* region, than to any sensible conception of revolutionary politics. That *Antônio das Mortes* is spectacular rather than didactic is dictated by the conditions of thought in the Brazilian *nordeste*, the actually existing discourses and images, myths and political relationships that govern the region.

Rocha responds directly to Callenbach’s critique in ‘The Way to Make a Future’ (Hitchens 1970), refuting many of the conclusions that Callenbach had drawn. Rocha defends his use of grand spectacle in place of coherent theoretical arguments as part of the necessary conditions for making a political film in a South American context. According to Rocha, the situations he depicts in his films are close to despair because ‘Latin American reality is not theoretical but tragic’ (Hitchens 1970: 29). *Antônio das Mortes* resists a totalising conception of what constitutes a political film, utilising a series of strategies that must necessarily be framed in terms of tragedy and mysticism. This is because such forces are more closely connected to the experience of living in the *nordeste* than the Marxist and psychoanalytic discourses that Callenbach applies.

The real relevance of these critiques is in their identification of Rocha’s deviation from what they understand as ‘revolutionary film-making’. Proppe and Tarr are correct that Rocha had often spoken of his films in terms of their ‘revolutionary’ or political content. But this content is irreducible to any universal template for political film-making. Such is the importance of Rocha’s work for Deleuze. Both Callenbach and Proppe and Tarr refer to a very different kind of political film-making that had aimed to elucidate real
socio-historical situations and provide a programme for concrete revolutionary action. These are the film-makers of revolutionary action, whose work had aimed to bring a clearly defined group of people to political consciousness, and who, according to Deleuze, would become outmoded following the crisis in cinema that he identifies (2006b: 208). For Deleuze, Rocha exemplifies a new kind of political film-maker, whose work begins from the realization that the people themselves (unlike in Eisenstein or Riefenstahl or King Vidor) are missing – that there is no pre-established platform upon which to construct a political cinema. There are certainly people living in the nordeste but they are not ‘a people’ in the sense that Eisenstein had understood the Soviet masses. They are, rather, a people forced to look at themselves through the terms set by foreign discourses, whose images of life are not of their own making, provided not by Brazilian film and media but by a Hollywood picture of exotic Brazil. This will determine Rocha’s task, as Deleuze says:

not that of addressing a people, which is presupposed already there, but of contributing to the invention of a people. The moment the master, or the colonizer, proclaims ‘There have never been a people here’, the missing people are a becoming, they invent themselves, in shanty towns and camps, or in ghettos, in new conditions of struggle to which necessarily political art must contribute. (2005b: 209)

While Rocha may be using the images and characters that he finds already composed in the nordeste, his visualisation of them constitutes an invention. He is not inventing images themselves but the frameworks that will allow existing people to connect to images as their own – images of a world drawn from a way of living that a people can
recognise and take as their own, even as that people might not yet exist. Rocha’s films are political in that they visualise a people as a complex becoming made up of many ways of living and many difficult relationships – all of which retain the possibility of changing from one moment to the next.

It is within this state of becoming that two conflicting tones will come to dominate *Antônio das Mortes* – one hopeful, constituting the progressive character of the film as the becoming of a people and the construction of a desired future-world and the other inherently tragic and mournful, as the film frames its battles as the end of an historical period, as a modern Brazil emerges and overturns the old ways of living. *Antônio das Mortes* is an exemplary political film in that it organises a complex social field made up of many different ways of life, each in the process of changing and re-aligning itself. 

Counter to Callenbach and Proppe and Tarr’s expectations, the film will not be used to provide a concrete picture of what kind of change is needed or any programme to reach such a point, but will serve to organise a number of immanent virtual worlds that remain possible within the different fluctuating worlds that Rocha has created. The future-worlds of *Antônio das Mortes* are diagrammatic in the sense that they are constituted by clusters of forces which might serve to drive the actual worlds depicted in the film (and of others existing externally to it) in particular directions, to change a world in some small way or scramble it so that it functions differently. It is not Rocha’s point to prescribe what kind of world a becoming might eventually result in. His films simply show that a world can change, and moreover, as it belongs to a people and not to the Earth’s media centres, that it is theirs to change. The final result of such change (in so far as a ‘final result’ can exist in a plane of continual becoming) cannot be based on any existing template as any such future-world will not be new at all, but derived from
systems of thought and life that exist elsewhere and that are not adequate for the people of a specific place and historical context. A future-world must constitute a radically new and evolving political situation and cannot be already known.

Bogue’s ‘Deleuze and Guattari and the Future of Politics’ (2011) addresses this aspect of Deleuze’s conceptualisation of the people to come. Bogue explains that the people to come will constitute a form of resistance ‘that initiates group becoming towards an unknowable future’ (2011: 84). A people to come is the thought of a people not yet fully formed but in a state of becoming, constantly emerging, struggling to solidify, to graft itself onto an actually existing people that it can mutate and in turn change itself. Bogue explains that the people to come is an act of creation:

The invention of a people to come entails an engagement with a chaotic plane of consistency, and when viewed exclusively in terms of movement towards the new, it seems anarchic. But just as thought aims at creating concepts, so the invention of a people to come is directed towards something that is not absolutely chaotic and anarchic, toward some form of collectivity that is simultaneously metastable and temporarily stable, always engaged in processes of negotiation, dissolution and reformation. (2011: 87)

The people to come are a virtual collectivity that is at once unformed, continually deferred as the future-emergence of a people, and absolutely real. A people to come is at once both actual and virtual. It is a future-world but also a collectivity that must be derived from a real people. The diagram of a people can be superimposed onto an actual collective organisation and become, briefly, a real people. This superimposition will
change both diagram and people alike, as the one doubles the other and mutates its vision of the world, as Bogue says, making it engage in a process of negotiation, dissolution and reformation.

The dissolution and reformation of territorial worlds will always couple the force of deterritorialisation with a corresponding reterritorialisation, connecting, in Deleuze’s work, the analysis of cinematic creation in *Cinema 2* to his later conceptualisation of the control system. This too is evident in *Antônio das Mortes* and characterises the strange melancholy that permeates the film. Antônio’s conversion from hired killer to revolutionary fighter is provoked by the death of Coirana. As Proppe and Tarr note, his conversion is not motivated by any compassion towards his victim or solidarity with the poor, whose suffering he has seen at close hand without any such feelings being evoked. However, the conversion is not caused, as Proppe and Tarr claim, by religious feelings that arise during his meeting with the Santa, but rather from a realisation of his having killed the last *cangaceiro* – that is, of having destroyed the *cangaceiro* as a way of living. This is the most significant departure that the latter film makes from *Deus e o Diabo na Terra do Sol*, which betrays a fascination with Antônio the hired killer despite his atrocities. In *Antônio das Mortes* the death throes of the *cangaceiro* are long and emotive and given a tragic edge during Antônio’s wanderings around the streets of Milagres, transformed in this scene from the archaic streets shown during the rest of the film into a modern town. The scene shows streets wide enough for passing freight-trucks, bordered by lines of run-down neon-lit bars and populated no longer by dancing people, but by tired-looking men who sit drinking on doorsteps. The scene gives a glimpse of the modern *nordeste*, a future that awaits the characters that populate the old myths. This scene raises the significance of Coirana’s death into a melancholic
realisation that his death marks the end of the *cangaceiro*-system, and later, that the massacre of the *beatos* will see the end of the millennial cult, all to be eventually swept up in the new world of multinational capital. It is the realisation of his own complicity in the destruction of a world that provokes Antônio’s political conversion.

That the film will so mourn Coirana’s death is one of the reasons why Proppe and Tarr presume that Rocha’s political allegiances reside with the *cangaceiro*, which they criticise as politically vacuous (as the *cangaceiro* has no viable revolutionary programme) and morally questionable (as the *cangaceiro* is more interested in indiscriminate terror than defending the destitute [see Hobsbawm 1981: 58-62]). However, it is important to understand the significance of the *cangaceiro* in Rocha’s mythic universe. What provides the *cangaceiros* with a degree of legitimacy is their rejection of all other forms of social organisation. For Rocha, the bandits are significant for what they negate more than what they propose – responding to the oppressive social systems of the *sertão* by refusing to abide by them.

Despite their utilisation of his work, Proppe and Tarr fail to give account of Hobsbawm’s discussion of the motivations of what he calls ‘the avenger’ (a class of amoral bandit of which the *cangaceiro* is an example). According to Hobsbawm the terrors committed by the *cangaceiros* are part of a system of vengeance that seeks to make the oppressor pay for the miseries inflicted upon them (the victims of such oppression are generally the *cangaceiros* themselves or their families, they are rarely, Hobsbawm says, an oppressed people more generally). Due to the disparity in power and resources it is impossible for vengeance to be enacted using the same systems of violence (which may, for the oppressor, be economic or military in nature or derived
from a political or justice system). They cannot, Hobsbawm says, make the oppressor pay ‘in their own coin’, as they often operate within ‘a framework of accepted wealth, power and social superiority which the victim cannot use’ (1981: 63). The avenging cangaceiro must translate his own oppression into the private resources available, of which violence and terror are the most visible and effective (1981: 63). The cangaceiro rejects the position of victim. Their violence is not part of a realistic political programme (either in real life or in Rocha’s films) but constitutes an indiscriminate rage at a world that could inflict such misery upon them.

Rocha’s cangaceiros will direct towards some conclusions regarding Deleuze’s position on the becoming of new ways of life, both in Rocha’s films and in his cinema books, which will concern his account of ‘the powers of the false’.

The Powers of the False

In the ‘Powers of the False’ chapter in Cinema 2 (2005b: 122-150) Deleuze most clearly addresses the cinema project’s debt to Nietzsche and Leibniz. Deleuze argues here (as elsewhere) that the time-image puts the notion of truth into crisis, throwing up a series of undecidable virtual worlds in the face of any stable notion of the world as bearing an inherent ‘truth’. He explains that this crisis is part of a ‘paradox of contingent futures’ that Leibniz had already addressed and for which he would forge the notion of incompossibility (2005b: 126-127, see also 2006b: 67-85). The incompossibility of

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13 It is Nietzsche, far more than Leibniz, who dominates Deleuze’s philosophy here. There are several excellent accounts of Deleuze’s utilisation of Nietzsche’s thought in his cinema books. See Rodowick’s ‘The World, Time’ (2010b) and Bogue’s ‘To Choose to Choose—to Believe in This World’ (2010).
worlds gives rise to a different conception of time where time itself can no longer be thought of as a succession of presents proceeding in a straight line towards the future, but becomes an infinite splitting into different futures. A plane of virtual worlds arises from this labyrinthine form of time, as the future becomes less something that the unfurling forces of history might stumble upon by chance, than a formation in a universe of many simultaneous but incompossible worlds. The political commitments of Deleuze’s work require strategies to preserve a plane of immanent contingent futures before a powerful network of control that will reduce an unimaginable unfolding of virtual worlds to as few as is required for an efficient system of risk-management.

This is why Deleuze will consider a cliché so dangerous – by reproducing a world in as little detail as possible, offering an image to stand for a life or a stereotype for a people, the cliché can quite literally eliminate the possibilities of the future. If a cliché is made of a woman, if a woman is seen and thought about only as a cliché of herself, then the future possibilities open to her are necessarily limited. If a woman can only be a cliché of a woman then how can a different future emerge that is not subject to the often hateful and rarely sufficient images that can arrest the possibilities of a woman’s life?

Deleuze offers incompossibility as a labyrinthine model of time in place of its conception as singular historical moment He challenges the notion of truth itself, replacing the notions of the real and the imagined, of possibility and impossibility, with the concepts of the actual and the virtual. The question of ‘truth’ in cinema becomes unimportant for Deleuze as we no longer ask if the world given by a film is ‘real’ or ‘true’, but rather: what kind of world is this and what kind of ‘truth’ does it offer? Deleuze explains:
A new status of narration follows from this: narration ceases to be truthful, that is, to claim to be true, and becomes fundamentally falsifying. This is not a case of ‘each has its own truth’, a variability of content. It is a power of the false which replaces and supersedes the form of the true, because it poses the simultaneity of incompossible presents, or the existence of not-necessarily true pasts. [...] The truthful man dies, every model of truth collapses, in favour of the new narration. (2005b: 127)

That this new narration is a power of the false means that it is no longer judged in relation to a truth imposed upon the world. To falsify is to reject truth in favour of the invention of a world that is your own. Like the cangaceiro, whose violence is judged from the position of a universal morality and a legal system built to serve the powerful, but who is no less oppressed for being violent. Without violence the cangaceiro is merely a poor sertanejo, crushed by political and economic forces that are too powerful for their way of living (and this is why Rocha’s peasants are so hopeless). The cangaceiro’s violence is a rejection of such systems in favour of falsity as a way of life. That the cangaceiros have no political programme does not diminish their rejection of the dominant orders of truth – the anger of the poor is legitimate even if it has no programme.

Deleuze finds an exemplary instance of falsity as invention in the films of Orson Welles, whose characters, much as in the confrontation between Rocha’s cangaceiros and the political and religious orders, confront a ‘truthful world’ with a falsifying life. Deleuze argues that ‘the true world implies a “truthful man”’, a man who wants the truth, but
such a man has strange motives, as if he were hiding another man in him, a revenge’ (2005b: 133). Welles’ truthful men betray a hatefulness that seeks to hold life against their systems of judgement, whilst the monsters that they confront, for all their crimes, are nevertheless handled quite sympathetically. Rocha will ultimately love the prophet Sebastião less than the Cangaceiro, whose rebellion will at least allow him to live in this world and not passively look towards the next for deliverance. Deleuze explains:

The truthful man in the end wants nothing other than to judge life; he holds up a superior value, the good, in the name of which he will be able to judge, he is craving to judge, he sees in life an evil, a fault which is to be atoned for. (2005b: 133)

The circulating clichés will not simply impose an incorrect image of the world, but an image of the world that thinks itself ‘correct’. If Brazil is thought to look like a tropical playground then any images to the contrary, even if offered up by life itself, by living Brazilian people, are inauthentic – adjudged to be false. Rocha counters the systems of thought given in such images and conceptions of a truthful world with an indulgence in the falsity of his cinematic worlds. Even if he uses images that are actually found in the Brazilian nordeste, his films can only be an invention, can only be false in their negation of the circulating ‘truths’ of the global media system.

The ideological analyses developed by the political modernists, in which discrete ideological frameworks are thought to act as models for the images of the world, are no longer sufficient. Certain images of thought still persist, and with them a number of particularly regressive ways of thinking, but this is now due to a saturation of certain
types of images and their endless circulation. For cinema in the age of control, resistance requires that new images are invented to combat a global image network of clichés that still reproduces fictions (all images are now fictions) that are mistaken for truths.

Rocha’s work shows that it is not sufficient for images to depict a life less seen (as that of the *sertão*). A film-maker must invent frameworks for relating to these images in new ways, which is to say, they must invent a new cinematic diagram. Rocha’s diagram will open and continually re-open a series of virtual future-worlds that might offer different ways of living. Ultimately, this is all the *cangaceiro* and the *beato* and the gunfighter-turned-revolutionary offer; not a programme for liberation, but a new mode of response to the forces that traverse the *sertão*. They become methods for scrambling forces so that they can produce something new. The *cangaceiro* transforms oppression into infinite violence, whilst Antônio, who knows only how to kill, who had for so long judged life against an abstract notion of ‘duty’, will finally awaken. Of all the character-systems that Rocha offers, it is Antônio who will finally uphold becoming as a way of life. He rejects his earlier role, overcoming the *cangaceiro* as force of violence and the *beato* as force of deferral, and Horacio the *coreneis* as pathetic, exhausted force that knows only how to perpetuate its own position and is no longer able to transform itself. Antônio’s final choice upholds the possibility of transformation – of the future as something that can be made and not as something that is imposed from elsewhere.

Antônio’s choice at the conclusion of the film coincides with Deleuze’s Nietzschean reading of cinema (and this must surely account for his attraction to Rocha). Antônio’s choice should be understood as affirming choice itself as the possibility of
transformation. This is significant for Deleuze’s politics in that transformation becomes the condition for the invention of new ways of living and thinking. How can a new world be made possible? By transforming your own world; by thinking your world differently and by choosing that your world should be different. Such transformations are by no means a case of simply declaring yourself transformed, as the most powerful systems of control are set in place to close thought, as every deterritorialisation, every transformation in thought is recurrently arrested. It is not the role of a single director or political genius to make it otherwise. It is certain that Rocha’s work will not, as if by magic, produce a Brazilian or *sertanejo* people that think of themselves in some new light, who can conceive of their relation to the world as transformed and set about re-making it for themselves. Rocha alone cannot create revolution in Brazil, but through the engagement of many artists and thinkers and political activists, his work can contribute to the gradual transformation of the conditions of thought in Brazil and help a people, help many divergent peoples, emerge from the networks of images and systems of ideas that sweep across the country.

This is something that Rocha himself had seen, stressing in his interviews and writings that he was no leader for Cinema Novo, but one of many artists working to similar ends (1986: 109). In his response to Callenbach, Rocha will conclude his discussion on this point:

I think that nowadays, in struggling for a theory of cinema that can be of political value, we must be able to conceive of people all over making films in any form, in any shape, in any manner, in 16mm and 8mm, in every different way, so that true revolutionary cinema must develop in many different ways all
over the world, so that political liberation can take place. (Delahaye et al, 1970: 30)

This can also explain the huge number of different film-makers that Deleuze will address in his cinema books, with each of his different kinds of image becoming a possible but very different means of responding to a crisis in thought. Each is but one of a universe of possible time-images, and given the continually expanding state of Deleuzian cinema studies, there is no reason to think that there should not be many more than are given in his own writing.

This should be the point of any political reading of Deleuze’s cinema project. In order to make a new world, to transform an intolerable way of life, thought must first be made to function differently – there must be a transformation in the conditions of thought from which a world will arise. This will require more images. Even in a universe of endlessly proliferating images, there need to be more images and fewer clichés, so that people can see the world in new and unimaginable ways. We need to provide images for a multitude of real, living peoples, images as complex and contradictory as a people themselves, and not ask that an entire planet should draw its understanding of the world, of the possibilities open to life and living, from a surprisingly limited sequence of pictures.

These are the conclusions that can be drawn from my study of Deleuze’s thought. There are systems in place to perpetuate the existing conditions of life. These are relatively new formations but as harsh as the most aggressive systems of the disciplinary machine. Before these control mechanisms we must invent new ways of thinking the world and
require new images to make such thought possible. These can be anything, and should be drawn from across the globe, from places and people that exist but remain unseen on our screens or half-obscured in our minds. Further than this, these new images must be complex. They must be derived from different histories and philosophical traditions, from worlds that conceive of images in utterly dissimilar ways to the media-systems of information capitalism. We require an image of the world that can be drawn from as many differing images as possible, so that from a scattered network of billions of different views upon the world, we can assemble the conditions for its transformation, breaking open in a billion different places, emerging from an infinity of possible futures that remain virtually existent – which is to say, not a single truthful world but a multitude of worlds in a state of becoming, always opening and recurrently re-opening, everywhere at once.
Conclusion:

The Limits of the World

The political dimension of Deleuze’s cinema project should now be apparent. I have argued that in the gap that separates the work on control and the time-image, in the exposition of territoriality with Félix Guattari, and in the conceptualisations of cliché and the people to come in the cinema books, there is a quite evident political position in Deleuze’s thinking on cinema and visual culture. This position attests that the greater significance of the time-image is in opening thought towards a virtual outside that stretches beyond the immediate actual experience of the concrete world. The virtual images created as part of the time-image regime relate to a world that stretches beyond the visible immediacy of daily experience to touch upon an invisible world of silent hungers and hatreds, intolerable states of living not shown by the apparatuses of visual culture, or shown but stripped of any felt significance, becoming only a cliché-image of an impoverished life. More significantly, such virtual images can provide an image of a world that is yet to be realised, an image of a gestating virtual world that might be better than a multitude of actual lived ones, of a life or a people that need not be confined to the world as it is, but can make visible, if only, at first, in their minds and in their words, a new world that may be better.

There are numerous systems in place to prevent this from occurring. I argued in Chapter 1 that the political dimensions of Deleuze’s account of the time-image become evident when read through his later conceptualisation of control. Whilst control and the time-
image are by no means the same thing, or even functional equivalents, they both occur as part of the new image of thought that Deleuze sees as emerging in the latter half of the twentieth century. They are part of a new way of thinking about the world as a distributed system of forces. The time-image can be understood as an image-regime that, in Deleuze’s words, deterritorialises the stable aesthetic of the movement-image. It inserts a spectre of indiscernibility into our images of the world that attests to the existence of more than can be seen in the image – an extra-territorial outside of unthought possibilities and unseen worlds that exists as the virtual inverse of the concrete and knowable movement-image worlds of the classical cinema. Control inserts a similar spectre into the disciplinary systems of the early twentieth century, reorganising society following a series of computer and digital-technology revolutions. In the society of control the dominant forms of social organisation occur not, as before, in the actual concrete spaces of discipline (the factory, the school, the prison, etc.), but in the virtual spaces of the computer-network. Like the time-image, control sets in place the deterritorialisation of the world such that order is maintained through a system of data-management that assembles and disperses a digitised set of numerical codes that replace the individual in a global network of information and capital. However, unlike the time-image, control does not engage deterritorialisation in order to re-make the world or reveal a world that is ignored or effaced by concrete images and actual forms. Control is a kind of risk-management system that makes use of the deterritorialising capabilities of the new technologies to restrict the virtual potentials of the world to a manageable limit. It does this by re-connecting the various abstracted digital and numerical codes that have come to mark the individual’s place in the world back onto a concrete body and an actual experience – financial information is re-inscribed back into the concrete world by defining real-world access to services and goods; passport and
visa information dictates borders that can be crossed; information in criminal records can lead to incarceration in real space. In each case a primarily virtual organisation of information has a very real impact on the experiences and life-chances of an individual. So while control and the time-image both operate as part of a similar shift in the image of thought of their age, they operate in different ways. The time-image is a deterritorialisation towards a new way of thinking the world as continual becoming. Control is a deterritorialisation that must ultimately cycle back and re-inscribe its codes onto the concrete world. I would say that both carry thought in different directions. In the time-image we follow a deterritorialisation from actual image to virtual world; in the control society we follow a reterritorialisation from virtual system to actual world.

This reading of Deleuze’s work has huge significance for understanding the cinema books and should help to express their political implications. In order to bring out this significance I related these two positions in Deleuze’s thought to his earlier study of territoriality in *A Thousand Plateaus*. In Chapter 2, following the work of Tom Conley, I argued that Deleuze’s peculiar study of cinema can be understood as a cartographic reading, which is to say that it conceives of the film text as forming a territorial system. I argued that every film, in the construction of a certain set of images and discourses, forms a cine-territory through which a particular kind of world is expressed. Moreover, reading this development in Deleuze’s cinema project back again through the control article and his interim book on Leibniz, I explained that in its construction of such a territory, each film expresses a world in its entirety. Deleuze has a very particular understanding of the term ‘world’, as seen in *Cinema 1, Cinema 2* and *The Fold*, in which a world is potentially multiple. That is, there is not one single world that everyone inhabits, but a multitude of minutely different worlds that are created by
particular images and discourses, the powers and forces that every individual encounters. For Deleuze, a world is one ordering of a wider plane of existence that cannot be grasped in its entirety but is necessarily cut and re-assembled into one of a universe of possible virtual worlds, each differing slightly from the next, and many utterly incompossible with a multitude of other worlds. Each world expresses a single life, a single set of possible life-chances and a single (but often inconsistent and contradictory) way of understanding the universe. Control, as a risk-management system, reconnects the virtual codes of the digital world back to an individual’s daily concrete experiences, using non-concrete digital signatures as a way of structuring the concrete world. A person with a low credit rating or with no access to capital has a very literally diminished set of opportunities and life-chances. Although an individual may only be ‘virtually poor’ (as a billionaire share-holder is only really ‘virtually rich’) a diminishing number of life-chances can very concretely serve to limit the vastness of their world. There are many worlds and many ways of living that may be inaccessible, and as such, incompossible with their own.

This has a significant impact on Deleuze’s cinema project. As every film, and indeed every image, is used to express a world, it is important to understand how a certain set of images might also serve to limit the world. The extent of the world as expressed by the images and discourses of cinema and visual culture does not show even a fraction of the many potential images of the world, nor even a small number of the billions of ways of living that exist in it. What is expressed in the images of a visual culture largely dominated by a quite small number of constantly repeating aesthetics is a world that is really very limited in its commitment to a small number of ways of living, and that is quite often the same western capitalist image of a white and rich world (actually or
aspirationally so). Such has long been standard in the images of visual culture, even given the massive number of people whose lives do not even remotely resemble such images. Moreover, given the continuing quantitative dominance of the movement-image in cinemas and on televisions, these images mistakenly offer themselves up as the only logical world that can exist. At its limit, the movement-image offers a world as stable and knowable, stripping away all the markers of a world that stretches beyond its own limits, and in doing so, it reproduces the world as a cliché-image that reduces all of the tiny inflections that colour perception to a kind of slogan or catch-phrase. For Deleuze, a cliché is an image that resembles the world but bears none of its force. This was the focus of Chapter 3, where I developed Deleuze’s thinking on the cliché through the work of Godard and Paul Virilio in order to show how the cliché can be understood as an exemplary instance of the reterritorialising power of the control society, which creates and circulates the cliché endlessly.

Cinema and visual culture have an important role in constructing an individual’s image of the world – they are crucial (alongside a series of other visual, discursive and world-making cultural practices) in helping to define the extent of a person’s knowledge of what exists and what can be done. Deleuze’s cinema project, intersecting with a number of his other key works, has much to say on the world-making capacities of the media apparatus. In Chapter 4 I further explored the political dimensions of Deleuze’s study of the time-image in order to highlight the various strategies used by an explicitly political time-image cinema in action, using the Brazilian Cinema Novo and the films of Glauber Rocha to demonstrate the deterritorialising potential of the time-image in the construction of a new cinema-world. Deleuze makes use of Rocha’s work towards the end of Cinema 2 as an example of a cinema that invents a people to come. I argue that
this is not a people exactly, but rather a set of images that can construct a particular ordering of the world in which a new people can be made possible. This is of great significance in Brazilian and Latin American cinema, as the writings of the Cinema Novo film-makers show, because people living in countries dominated by North American media practices lack the images to express themselves and their own world. They consume images that give only the cine-territories of another people and which have little to say about their own experiences of living, the intolerabilities and injustices of their own lives. Rocha’s work offers an example (which may be added to the numerous other contemporaneous examples from Cinema Novo and New Latin American Cinema) of the ordering of a new world – a diagram of a people to come.

Rocha’s work is only a single instance of the numerous cinematic strategies set in place by time-image directors, and represents only a tiny fragment of the larger body of films Deleuze will address in the cinema books, and the even greater number of films, movements and directors that continue to be explored by many excellent Deleuzian film scholars. The strategies I have outlined are by no means exhaustive of what the time-image can do; they merely serve as indicators of the significant political force of Deleuze’s thought. I have, through necessity, neglected many aspects of Deleuze’s account of the time-image – Welles’ Nietzscheanism, Resnais’ crystal-images, Kubrick’s cerebral cinema – not to mention the even greater array of film-makers not covered by Deleuze himself but which may offer just as rich examples – Imamura’s scrambling of the classical Japanese aesthetic, the British social realist cinema’s images of the industrial poor, or Wong’s memory-images. All of these would doubtless present very different studies of Deleuze’s project, but should be understood only as different strategies for building a new image of the world. Rocha’s work is useful for the
explicitly political terms through which he articulates everything he does, but any number of film-makers might serve just as well to demonstrate the truly political character of Deleuze’s work. All time-images are political in that they are concerned with the transformation of the world, and all, by making use of a widely divergent set of techniques and concerns, can help to extend cinema beyond the boundaries of the image itself and into a virtual world of the unseen lives of people and potential new social organisations. In an age of the most fearsome systems of capture and control, the time-image offers an aesthetic to express the world differently, even if, ultimately, many of these attempts will be closed by the operations of a controlling media network and reduced to emptiness.
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**Le Mépris** (1963, dir. Jean-Luc Godard, France / Italy: Compagnia / Concordia / Rome-Paris / Studio Canal DVD)

**Needle in the Haystack / Agulha no Palheiro** (1953, dir. Alex Viany, Brazil: Flama Filmes / Cine Produções Moacyr Fenelon)

**Nosferatu / Nosferatu, Eine Symphonie des Grauens** (1922, dir. FW Murnau, Germany: Jofa-Atelier Berlin-Johannisthal / Prana-Film / BFI DVD)

**Notre Musique** (2004, dir. Jean-Luc Godard, Switzerland / France: Avventura Films / Périphéria / France 3 / Vega Film / Canal Plus / TSR Regio DFI / Optimum DVD)

**O Babão** (1930, dir. Luiz de Barros, Brazil: Synchrocinex)
O Cangaciero (1953, dir. Lima Barreto, Brazil: Vera Cruz / Columbia Pictures)

Ordet (1955, dir. Carl Theodor Dreyer, Denmark: Palladium / BFI DVD)

Os Fuzis (1964, dir. Rui Gerra, Brazil: Copacabana Filmes / Daga Filmes / Inbracine Filmes / Sagres Filmes)

Persona (1966, dir. Ingmar Bergman, Sweden: Svensk Filmin industri / Tartan DVD)

Prison / Fängelse (1949, dir. Ingmar Bergman, Sweden: Terraproduktion / Terrafilm / Tartan DVD)

Rio Bravo (1959, dir. Howard Hawks, USA: Armada / Warner Home Video DVD)

Rio Quarenta Graus (1955, dir. Nelson Pereira dos Santos, Brazil: Equipe Moacyr Fenelon / Sagres Filmes)

Rio Zona Norte (1957, dir. Nelson Pereira dos Santos, Brazil: Nelson Pereira dos Santos Produções / Santos / Sagres Filmes)


Rope (1948, dir. Alfred Hitchcock, USA: Transatlantic / Warner Bros. / Universal DVD)

São Paulo: Sinfonia de uma Metrópole (1929, dir. Adalberto Kemeny and Rudolfo Lustig, Brazil: Rex Filmes / Columbia Pictures)


Stromboli (1950, dir. Roberto Rossellini, Italy / USA: Berit Films / RKO)

Terra em Transe (1967, dir. Glauber Rocha, Brazil: Mapa Filmes / Mr Bongo DVD)

The Cut-Ups (1966, dir. Anthony Balch, UK: Anthony Balch Films)

The Girl From Ipanema / Garota de Ipanema (1967, dir. Leon Hirszman, Brazil: Saga Filmes / CPS Produções Cinematográficas / Difilm)

The Heirs / Os Herdeiros (1969, dir. Carlos Diegues, Brazil: Luiz Carlos Barreto Produções / JB Produções Cinematográficas / INC / Novocine / Difilm)

The Searchers (1956, dir. John Ford, USA: Whitney / Warner Bros. / Warner Home Video DVD)

The Seventh Seal / Det Sjunde Inseglet (1957, dir. Ingmar Bergman, Sweden: Svensk Filmin industri / Tartan DVD)


Tokyo Story / Tokyo Monogatari (1953, dir. Ozu Yasuji rō, Japan: Shochiku / BFI dual format DVD)
Tout Va Bien (1972, dir. Jean-Luc Godard and Jean-Pierre Gorin, France: Anouchka Films / Vicco Films / Empire / Gaumont / Arrow DVD)

Towers Open Fire (1964, dir. Anthony Balch, UK: Anthony Balch Films)

Triumph of the Will / Triumph des Willens (1934, dir. Leni Reifenstahl, Germany: NSDAP-Reichsleitung)

Two or Three Things I know About Her / Deux ou Trois Choses Que Je Sais d'Elle (1967, dir. Jean-Luc Godard, France: Anouchka Films / Argos Film / Carrosse / Parc / Nouveaux Pictures DVD)

Une Femme Mariée: Fragments d'un Film Tourné en 1964 en Noir et Blanc (1964, dir. Jean-Luc Godard, France: Anouchka Films / Orsay Films / Masters of Cinema dual format DVD)

Victory in the West / Der Sieg im Westen (1941, dir. Fritz Brunsch, Werner Kortwich, Svend Nolan and Edmund Smith, Germany: Oberkommando der Wehrmacht Wehrpropaganda / UFA)

Vidas Secas (1963, dir. Nelson Pereira dos Santos, Brazil: Sino Filmes / Luiz Carlos Barreto Produções / Manchete Video)

Week End (1967, dir. Jean-Luc Godard, France / Italy: Ascot / Lira / Copernic / Comacico / Artificial Eye DVD)

Wild Strawberries / Smultronstället (1957, dir. Ingmar Bergman, Sweden: Svensk Filminindustri / Tartan DVD)