Talents, abilities and virtues

Attfield, Robin 1971. Talents, abilities and virtues. Philosophy: The Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy 46 (177) , pp. 255-258. 10.1017/S0031819100019008

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Abstract

Hume Regards it as a mere “Verbal Dispute” whether or not various “natural abilities” should be regarded as moral virtues. In his Treatise he complains that “good sense and judgment”, “parts and understanding” are classed in all systems of ethics of the day with bodily endowments and ascribed no “merit or moral worth”. Yet if compared with the received virtues, they fell short in no material respect, both sets being “mental qualities” and each equally tending to procure “the love and esteem of mankind’.

Item Type:	Article
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	English, Communication and Philosophy Sustainable Places Research Institute (PLACES)
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Uncontrolled Keywords:	David Hume, virtues, vices, voluntariness, moral psychology, ethics, dispositions, non-voluntary traits, talents, natural abilities, approval, distinctive human endowment, personal beauty, merit, demerit
Additional Information:	Copyright Cambridge University Press
Publisher:	Cambridge University Press
ISSN:	0031-8191
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	30 March 2016
Last Modified:	09 May 2023 04:27
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/48960

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