
by

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DOCTOR IN PHILOSOPHY

February 2011
This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.

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There are many people to thank for their participation in, and support of this research.

Firstly, thank you to the police force at the centre of this study. Thank you for providing me with exceptional access from the beginning and the enthusiasm and support for the research throughout; support that continued well after I 'left the field'.

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Abstract

An influential body of research into policing and security has suggested that routine policing in Western European democracies has been subject to a process of 'securitisation'. Securitisation refers to the identification of 'existential threats' which require emergency powers and extraordinary counter-measures outwith 'normal', democratically accountable, government (Weaver, 1996). Such is the preoccupation with the threat posed by transnational terrorism that it is argued routine policing is increasingly driven by this logic of securitisation (King and Sharp, 2006; Virta, 2008).

However, the extent to which routine policing is actually being securitised remains a moot empirical point. This is due in part to the fact that such arguments are based primarily on textual analyses which tend to impute action from talk, by inferring policy impact on the frontline from policy rhetoric and exhortation. This thesis contends that research needs to move beyond a concern with policy elites – and the 'textual footprints' of their talk and decisions – and focus on the action of everyday, local police routines, in order to establish the extent, nature and impact of 'securitisation'.

This research study employs a single, embedded case study approach to examine the extent and nature of 'securitisation' of routine policing in one British police force area. The research design facilitates the opportunity to move beyond the corroboration/falsification of the securitisation thesis in relation to empirical findings about actual police routines and practices. It draws on Pollitt's (2001) propositions about the policy process and the implementation gaps between policy 'talk', 'decisions' and 'actions' to generate empirical findings, and adapts the securitisation thesis in order to build theory about the relationship between securitisation and routine practice.

The research found that empirical evidence of securitisation varies across the three policy levels and decreases as the empirical focus moves from policy 'talk' and 'decision' to the level of police practice or 'action'. It is argued that this study has developed a robust methodological approach to the empirical capture of routine policing that can be replicated in other research sites as a basis for comparison in future research.
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACPO</td>
<td>Association of Chief Police Officers</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACPO TAM</td>
<td>Association of Chief Police Officers: Terrorism and Allied Matters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFSJ</td>
<td>Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (EU)</td>
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<tr>
<td>APA</td>
<td>Association of Police Authorities</td>
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<td>APACS</td>
<td>Assessment of Police and Community Safety</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASB</td>
<td>Anti-Social Behaviour</td>
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<td>BCU</td>
<td>Basic Command Unit (Level 1 Policing)</td>
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<td>BDW</td>
<td>Burglary Dwelling</td>
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<tr>
<td>BME</td>
<td>Black and Minority Ethnic (communities)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAPI</td>
<td>Computer Assisted Personal Interviewing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAQDAS</td>
<td>Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (Weapons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDRP</td>
<td>Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships</td>
</tr>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>CHIS</td>
<td>Covert Human Intelligence Source</td>
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<tr>
<td>CID</td>
<td>Criminal Investigation Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJS</td>
<td>Criminal Justice Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMPSTAT</td>
<td>Computer Statistics (assessment of police performance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSP</td>
<td>Community Safety Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSR</td>
<td>Comprehensive Spending Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>Counter Terrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTIO</td>
<td>Counter Terrorism Intelligence Officer</td>
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<td>CTSA</td>
<td>Counter Terrorism Security Advisor</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTU</td>
<td>Counter Terrorism Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>CTIU</td>
<td>Counter Terrorism Intelligence Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>DMSU</td>
<td>Dedicated Source Management Unit</td>
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<td>DPP</td>
<td>Director of Public Prosecutions</td>
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<td>DSP</td>
<td>Designated Security Post</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAW</td>
<td>European Arrest Warrant</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>EJC</td>
<td>European Court of Justice</td>
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<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCS</td>
<td>Force Control Strategy</td>
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<td>FSA</td>
<td>Force Strategic Assessment</td>
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<td>FTA</td>
<td>Fortnightly Tasking Action Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>HMIC</td>
<td>Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary</td>
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<td>HO</td>
<td>Home Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarters</td>
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<td>ICE</td>
<td>Intelligence and Community Engagement</td>
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<td>IRA</td>
<td>Irish Republican Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information Communication Technologies</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILP</td>
<td>Intelligence-led Policing</td>
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<tr>
<td>JHA</td>
<td>Justice of Home Affairs (EU)</td>
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<td>JTAC</td>
<td>Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KIN</td>
<td>Key Information Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>KPI</td>
<td>Key Performance Indicator</td>
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<tr>
<td>LSN</td>
<td>Local Security Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>LSP</td>
<td>Local Strategic Partnerships</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAPPA</td>
<td>Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARAC</td>
<td>Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conferences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPS</td>
<td>Metropolitan Police Service</td>
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<td>MSU</td>
<td>Minority Support Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>NI</td>
<td>National Indicator</td>
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<td>NIM</td>
<td>National Intelligence Model</td>
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<td>NMN</td>
<td>Neighbourhood Management Networks</td>
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<td>NMT</td>
<td>Neighbourhood Management Teams</td>
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<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>Neighbourhood Policing</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPM</td>
<td>New Public Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPP</td>
<td>Neighbourhood Policing Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPT</td>
<td>Neighbourhood Policing Teams</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTE</td>
<td>Night-time Economy</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCTA</td>
<td>Organised Crime Threat Assessment (EU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMU</td>
<td>Offender Management Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCT</td>
<td>Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACE</td>
<td>Police and Criminal Evidence Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACT</td>
<td>Police and Communities Together</td>
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<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>Police Constable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCSO</td>
<td>Police Community Support Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>PJCC</td>
<td>Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSA</td>
<td>Public Service Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTA</td>
<td>Prevention of Terrorism Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVE</td>
<td>Preventing Violent Extremism</td>
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<tr>
<td>QCA</td>
<td>Quantitative Content Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RUC</td>
<td>Royal Ulster Constabulary</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAC</td>
<td>Serious and Acquisitive Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>Security Clearance</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIS</td>
<td>Secret Intelligence Service (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOCA</td>
<td>Serious and Organised Crime Agency (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCG</td>
<td>Tasking and Coordinating Group (NIM)</td>
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<tr>
<td>tTCG</td>
<td>tactical Tasking and Coordinating Group (NIM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TE-SAT</td>
<td>Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (EU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFMV</td>
<td>Theft from a Motor Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOMV</td>
<td>Theft of a Motor Vehicle</td>
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<tr>
<td>YOT</td>
<td>Youth Offending Team</td>
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Chapter One: Introduction

1.0 The Securitisation of Routine Policing?

This research study provides a critical examination of theoretical propositions about the securitisation of routine policing. The concept of securitisation was first used by the Copenhagen School of International Relations to rethink the re-orientation of European Integration around notions of security, in terms of threats to the very existence of the European Union (EU) as a working political economy. However, the concept has increasingly been applied to wider socio-political contexts. It is now commonly argued that recent terrorist events have served as catalysts for shifts in both political imperative and public expectation in relation to security policy-making generally and policing policy more specifically. In recent criminological thought these shifts have been conceptualised in terms of the securitisation of routine policing. Securitisation refers to the identification of existential threats which, by definition, imply emergency powers and extraordinary counter-measures outwith normal, democratically accountable, government (Waever, 1996). Such is the preoccupation with the threat posed by transnational terrorism post-11 September 2001, the Madrid bombings of 2004 and the 7 July bombings in London in 2005, that it is argued routine policing is increasingly driven by this logic of securitisation (King and Sharp, 2006), and recent research has focused particularly on the increased securitisation of community policing (Virta, 2002; 2008). Critics suggest this increasingly securitised logic unnecessarily threatens important civil liberties and safeguards of democratic oversight of policing in liberal democracies (Loader and Walker, 2001).

The securitisation theory has made important conceptual and normative contributions to debates about the governance of security. Waever (1996) highlights the role of security actors and referent objects in the securitisation process. The concept of security actor relates to the political elites or dominant policy makers of any given security setting. The referent objects are alternatively viewed as the object or site that is threatened (e.g. the individual or the state) or, the sites or units where security or 'securitising' needs to be carried out. Securitisation theorists reference a diverging
range of referent objects of security which are seen to operate at the ‘human, state and
global level’ (Waever, 1996: 104). The securitisation thesis as grand theoretical
narrative has been applied to a range of socio-political contexts, most notably
migration and asylum (Bigo, 1994; Huysmans, 2000) but there is also an increasing
body of work that applies the securitisation thesis to the arena of EU policing (Bigo,
2000; Loader, 2004) and within the UK (King and Sharp, 2006).

The interesting question for empirical research is what securitisation could actually
mean in terms of routine policing? Securitisation theorists have identified exemplars
of securitised policing at both the European and national (UK) level. In the EU,
terrorism has become increasingly identified as an external threat to the internal
security of Member States (Bigo, 2000; Loader, 2004). The police responses to such
threats have manifested themselves in developments such as the enhanced cooperation
between the police forces of member states, and increased emphasis on information
exchange and intelligence gathering. Some academics who draw on the securitisation
thesis have noted that the EU’s increasing preoccupation with terrorism and
associated security concerns is visible in the development of a threat assessment
industry (Virta, 2008). This observation is informed by the creation and annual
publication of EU intelligence products such as the Organised Crime Threat
Assessment (OCTA) and EU Terrorism and Threat Assessment (TE-SAT) Reports1.

There is relatively little evidence of empirical research that examines the impact of
securitisation within the context of contemporary policing in the UK beyond an
examination of counter terrorism legislation and the development and application of
special police powers. King and Sharp (2006) focus on the changing police
environment in England and Wales to illustrate the ways in which security concerns
are challenging and extending definitions of the proper role of the police and other
agencies in public security. They identify four possible drivers of securitisation
within UK policing; the growing police role of the Security Services; the security road
to the development of Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA); government moves
towards force amalgamation, and a return to local policing but with central direction.

1 These documents are analysed in detail in Chapter Four.
There is a limited amount of empirical research that has been undertaken on the impact of increased security concerns at the frontline of local policing delivery and thus readily identifiable exemplars of securitised policing become less tangible as one moves from national to local, community policing levels. However, there is an important body of work that focuses on the impact of recent discursive and policy shifts in the nature of the control of crime, disorder and insecurity at the local, community level. This work focuses on the increasing convergence of policing and partnership work at the local level, and in particular the rise and impact of community safety partnerships (Hughes and Rowe, 2007), and the increased emphasis placed on the use of community intelligence in the policing of insecurity (Innes, 2006; Innes et al, 2009). The issues raised within the UK also resonate within an international, and specifically a European context. Virta (2002; 2008) observes the development of local security networks and the use of intelligence-led approaches to community policing in Finland and Terpstra (2008) notes the emergence of local security networks in The Netherlands. Such work highlights the importance of ‘community’, and in particular, the gradual reformulation of the notion of community policing and community safety in light of heightened concerns around issues of both national and personal security.

This thesis makes a number of observations on the securitisation thesis and its previous application within the context of routine policing. The securitisation thesis is generated through a methodological approach that focuses on the discourse-analytic study of policy rhetoric and various legislative and executive decisions. There is a lack of empirical scrutiny of the actions that constitute routine police practice. As a consequence there is a tendency to impute action from talk; to infer policy impact on the operational frontline from security policy rhetoric and exhortation. The securitisation thesis is sustained by a macro-theory that has a tendency to homogenise research settings, or, at least generalise and thereby de-contextualise security. This necessarily precludes recognition of the pluralistic narratives that frame different geopolitical security spaces and limits accommodation of the ‘empirical particulars’ (Garland, 2001: vii) at play within such settings, which are often evident in the form of political, organisational and cultural challenges to the implementation of national counter policy-making at the level of routine practice. It is suggested that a reliance
on such a methodological approach has a number of implications for conceptualising changes to police practice in terms of securitisation.

1.1 The Research Design

This research study argues that there is a lack of empirical research that interrogates suppositions about the securitisation of policing by examining tangible changes to routine police practice on the ground. Therefore it is argued that the extent to which routine policing is actually being securitised remains a moot empirical point. This research seeks to move the empirical debate forward by highlighting how traditional approaches to research design and methodological strategies can be applied – and indeed innovated – in order to explore critically the issue of securitisation within routine policing. In doing so, the research study puts forward two propositions. Firstly, that it is important to distinguish analytically between different levels of policy-making for the purposes of empirical enquiry. Secondly, that academics and researchers need to move beyond a concern with policy elites and the 'textual footprints' of their talk and decisions, to a concern with the action of everyday, local police routines.

The aim of this research is to undertake a critical examination of a number of important theoretical propositions suggested by securitisation theorists; in particular that routine policing is, in fact, becoming securitised in a number of ways. The research strategy is adaptive in nature and the research design is underpinned by a single case study approach which facilitates the opportunity to both provide a critical test of the existing theoretical suppositions, and expand and develop the theoretical framework if appropriate. The main research question that drives this thesis is:

To what extent is routine policing becoming increasingly securitised?

In order to operationalise this question for the purposes of empirical enquiry it was necessary to devise an appropriate analytical framework. This research draws on Christopher Pollitt's (2001) conceptual framework of policy convergence within the arena of public administration, and the three 'levels' that according to him, are inherent to policy-making and implementation – 'talk', 'decision' and 'action'. Pollitt
(2001: 938) suggests that in order to make sense of the complexities of the public policy-making process it is important to consider and separate out the analytically distinct levels of ‘talk’ identified as policy rhetoric and symbolism; ‘decisions’ in the form of written policy statements, specific legislation and national programmes, and ‘action’ conceptualised as policy implementation ‘on the ground’.

Within this research study the conceptual distinctions identified by Pollitt (2001) are re-formulated in order to examine the nature of counter terrorism policy within and across three empirically distinct research sites – the EU, the UK and a case study of local, routine policing. In general terms policy talk is identified as political or policing ideas, symbolism or rhetoric and exhortation; policy decisions are understood as concrete manifestations of policy in the form of legislation and/or executive programmes and strategies, and policy action is conceptualised as tangible changes to routine policing practice. However, a key challenge for this thesis was to find a viable, empirical way to operationalise Pollitt’s (2001) conceptual framework within a complex and multi-faceted research setting such as operational policing. The analytical framework devised for this research study facilitates the re-formulation of the main research question into an operational question which in turn can be used to falsify or corroborate arguments that routine policing is being securitised. Thus, the main question is operationalised as:

_to what extent does security ‘talk’, and ‘decisions’ made within the arena of counter terrorism policy actually translate into ‘action’ on the ground in the form of tangible changes to local policing practice?_

The analytical framework facilitates the opportunity to measure empirically the two concepts at the centre of this research, namely securitisation and routine policing. The research identifies a number of exemplars of securitised ‘talk’, ‘decision’ and ‘action’ within the context of counter terrorism policy across the three distinct geopolitical spaces or security ‘sites’. These spaces are identified as referent objects of security which retain a specific ‘security identity’ (Waever, 1996: 108). In devising the analytical framework for this thesis it was important to make two sets of conceptual distinctions. Firstly, it was imperative to make a clear and coherent distinction between policy ‘talk’ and ‘decision’. Secondly, it was vital to link the
analytical framework with the theoretical framework that underpins the thesis. Therefore, it was important to make clear the distinction between these generic conceptualisations and 'securitised' talk, decision and action. It was particularly important to make a coherent distinction between routine police action and 'securitised police action'.

This research study considers relevant 'talk' (in the form of rhetoric, exhortation or symbolic policy) to be securitised - or at least demonstrate a tendency towards being securitised - if it represents discourse pertaining to an identified existential threat and the discussion or debate of the use of extraordinary, emergency measures to counter the threat. This thesis proposes that policy 'talk' can be distinguished from policy 'decision' by the presence of tangible mechanisms of enforcement which necessitate some form of organisational and/or institutional compliance. Such powers of enforcement might be characterised as government legislation, financial incentive for implementation (or conversely, financial penalty for non-implementation) and/or organisational compliance mechanisms. Within the context of this thesis such enforcement mechanisms are exemplified by concrete 'legislative decisions' in the form of legally-bestowed powers for the police; concrete 'institutional decisions' characterised by compliance mechanisms such as ring-fenced, national funding (with mandatory evaluation of implementation progress at the end), or the introduction of new and specific frameworks of performance assessment in the area of counter-terrorism and extremism.

A number of examples of securitised decisions are highlighted within this research, and most notably at the national, UK level of policy-making. Within the context of this research such legislative and executive decisions are considered 'securitised' because they were created as a direct response to, or strategy for, countering the existential threat posed by terrorism or radicalisation. A number of cross-government, executive strategies are also conceptualised as securitised decisions, for example, the UK's CONTEST strategy and in particular the Prevent strand of this strategy. The Prevent Strategy serves as the primary empirical focus of the research, in part, because local, routine policing is responsible for its delivery on the ground.
The analytical concept of 'action' within this study expands on Pollitt's (2001) interpretation to facilitate an exploration of tangible changes to routine police practice. Within this thesis the two concepts - action and routine practice - are synonymous with each other and together they serve as one of the empirical cornerstones of the research. The concept of routine policing within this thesis has been generated by carrying out a quantitative content analysis (QCA) of fortnightly tasking action plans within the case study force. However, it is important at this point to highlight key distinctions between routine policing and securitised policing as it is integral to the empirical integrity of this thesis focused as it is on the impact of national counter terrorism policies on routine police activity. The research draws in part on Brodeur’s (1983) conceptualisations of high and low policing to differentiate between the two policing paradigms. Routine policing can be equated to 'low' policing in that it is commonly associated with traditional notions of protecting the public from everyday volume crime and maintaining public order. It can be argued that routine policing becomes 'securitised' in some way when it adopts some of the 'high' policing characteristics traditionally associated with specialist units such as Special Branch and the Security Services.

The empirical data pertaining to security 'talk' and 'decision' is generated across the three security sites within this research study. However, the main empirical aim of this research is to test the theoretical propositions regarding the securitisation of routine policing by undertaking an empirical examination of the extent and nature of securitisation in one British police force area, including an exploration of the factors that shape routine policing. Therefore, the research design is framed around the use of a UK police force as a single, embedded case study of policing in practice. There are a number of reasons why it determined possible to generalise from the case study force to the theoretical propositions about the securitisation of routine policing. The force was prioritised as one of twenty-four forces responsible for policing areas with higher levels of risk across England and Wales to receive Prevent funding. Moreover, the case study Basic Command Unit (BCU) was identified as a Pathfinder BCU. As a prioritised, pathfinder area the BCU receives funding for Prevent-related training and designated security posts (DSPs). The fact that the case study force and BCU have

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2 These conceptualisations are discussed in detail in Chapter Three.
been prioritised by HM Government as areas that are vulnerable to terrorism-related phenomena such as extremism and radicalisation suggest that it is reasonable to expect to find the securitisation of routine policing.

1.3 Methodological Approaches

The research study incorporates a mixed methodological approach to data generation and incorporates both qualitative and quantitative strategies into the research design.

The quantitative data was generated through:

- quantitative content analysis (QCA) of fortnightly tasking ‘Action Plans’.

These action plans were drawn up following the fortnightly tasking meetings that took place in the case study BCU during the six months of fieldwork for this research (June – November 2008). The aim of the QCA was to:

1. formulate an empirical measure of routine policing practice at the BCU level;
2. ascertain the extent to which counter terrorism policing features in BCU operational tasking and routine policing activity.

By undertaking these two objectives it was possible to examine the extent to which counter terrorism policy ‘talk’ and ‘decision’ is evident within routine police activity in the case study BCU. This in turn contributes to an examination of the extent to which routine policing at the local (neighbourhood) level is becoming increasingly ‘securitised’.

The qualitative data was generated through:

- semi-structured interviews with police officers across all ranks within the case study force;
- documentary analysis of relevant counter terrorism policy text across the three geo-political research sites,
non-participant observation of case study meetings, primarily at the BCU level.

It is acknowledged that the inclusion of such 'discursive' data in a thesis consciously designed to advocate the importance of moving beyond 'talk' and into the realm of tangible 'decision' and 'action' may, for some, raise questions about the conceptual logic of this thesis. However, it was considered important to ask those doing police work about the rhetorical impact of securitised 'talk' and 'decisions' on their routine practice. In this way the interview research relates to reflections on 'real' processes and experiences. Moreover, it is argued that the qualitative data included in this research study is not simply discourse, but can be interpreted as accounts of decisions that have been taken, or evidence in support of including a particular policy within the category of 'decision' as conceptualised within this thesis. The mixed method approach to data generation and analysis was adopted for a number of reasons. Firstly, the quantitative content analysis provided one way to understand empirically the constituent parts of routine policing and the extent to which counter terrorism policing is embedded in routine practice. The qualitative research provides the opportunity to highlight the enduring challenges to counter terrorism policy implementation and delivery at both the level of police strategic decision-making, and at the operational, 'action' level.

1.4 Thesis Structure

Chapter Two reviews the existing literature on the securitisation thesis that serves as the theoretical framework that underpins the research. The chapter charts the origins and application of the concept of securitisation within an EU context. The chapter then focuses on the existing arguments made about the securitisation of policing within the EU, the UK (and Northern Ireland) and the level of community policing. The main aims of this chapter are to identify exemplars of securitised policing, or at least tendencies towards securitisation and to highlight the methodological approaches used to explore the relationship between security and routine policing.

Chapter Three describes the research design and methodological strategies that were employed in order to operationalise the critical test of the securitisation thesis within
the context of routine policing. It focuses on four key areas: 1) the analytical framework that underpins the research, 2) the use of a UK police force as a single, embedded case study of routine policing in practice, 3) the methodological strategies employed to generate the data, and in particular the use of quantitative content analysis (QCA) in the formulation of an empirical measure of routine policing, and finally, 4) the access issues and ethical considerations inherent to conducting research within a setting such as operational policing.

Chapters Four to Six present the results of detailed analyses of the empirical data collected during the research study. Chapter Four examines the nature of counter terrorism policy 'talk' across the three geo-political security settings at the centre of the research. Chapter Five examines the 'decisions' that have been made within the arena of UK counter terrorism policy and the extent to which these national decisions are evident within the strategic, decision-making frameworks of the case study police force. The specific, empirical focus is on the Prevent strategy which forms an integral part of the government's CONTEST Programme. The aim is to explore the extent to which local routine policing is becoming increasingly securitised as a consequence of the policy 'decisions' made within the arena of counter-terrorism. Chapter Six consolidates the work of the previous two empirical chapters and focuses on the operational research question that drives this thesis, namely to what extent does security 'talk', and 'decisions' made within the arena of counter terrorism policy actually translate into 'action' on the ground in the form of tangible changes to local policing practice? The chapter presents the findings from the QCA of the case study BCU tasking action plans. The chapter also includes a detailed, qualitative analysis of the three main QCA findings. The mixed methodological interrogation of routine policing and the inherent challenges to implementing national policy at the operational frontline generate a number of implications for conceptualising policing change in terms of securitisation.

Chapter Seven presents a discussion of the key findings within the context of the securitisation thesis and offers some concluding remarks. One of the aims of the chapter is to debate the relative usefulness of applying the securitisation thesis to policing in light of the findings generated from the current research. In other words, to what extent can securitisation theory adequately account for the policing policy
making and implementation processes identified within this case study research? In light of this critical evaluation the chapter also considers the extent to which alternative theoretical perspectives might more effectively account for the findings of this research. The work of Garland (2001), and in particular his work on adaptive problem-solving is highlighted as a potentially fruitful source of theoretical explanation for some of the research findings. The chapter concludes with some final reflections on the methodological approaches to researching routine policing and a discussion of the ways in which such empirical work can develop in the future.
Chapter Two: The Securitisation Thesis and its Application to Policing

2.0 Introduction

This chapter reviews the existing literature on ‘securitisation’ – as both a grand theoretical narrative and as a thesis applied within the context of routine policing. The chapter begins by charting the origins and application of the concept of securitisation within an EU context. The chapter is then dedicated to an examination of existing arguments made about the securitisation of policing within three empirically-distinct settings – the EU, the UK (and Northern Ireland) and routine, community policing. The main aims of this chapter are to identify exemplars of securitised policing within each of these empirical settings and to highlight the methodological approaches used to generate the suppositions made about the nature of routine policing. Therefore, the chapter addresses two key questions. Firstly, to what extent have prominent theorists limited their discussions of securitisation to elite policy rhetoric and government text? Secondly, what evidence is presented by advocates of the securitisation thesis that such policy rhetoric and decisions are actually re-shaping policing practice on the ground? By focusing on these types of questions it is possible to ascertain the methodological approaches to the generation of the securitisation theory, and identify gaps in the current research on securitisation within the context of routine policing. This in turn provides justification for the research questions and allied methodological approaches that drive the current research study.

2.1 Securitisation Theory within a European Context

The development of the securitisation thesis is inherently bound up with the new security landscape that evolved within Europe following the end of the Cold War, and much of the existing research in this area focuses on the relationship between securitisation and asylum and migration policy. It is important to outline briefly this security setting before discussing the key facets of the securitisation theory and highlighting the empirical data and analytical approaches upon which securitisation theorists base their claims.
Bigo (1994) suggests that the end of the Cold War opened up new fields of security linking free movement of persons and abolition of internal borders with police activities, strengthening external border controls, and control of migratory flows. As a consequence a new internal security field emerged which has been characterised by two inter-linked developments:

i) The merging of internal and external security;

ii) The development of a security continuum.

A number of prominent theorists (Zedner, 2003; Flyghed, 2005) suggest that the new security landscape altered irrevocably through the erosion of distinctions between external and internal threat and the development of a ‘security continuum’ (Bigo, 1994: 164) which, connected internal and external issues such as border control, terrorism, international crime and migration. In other words, activities previously dealt with in isolation were brought together under the auspices of ‘internal security’ issues culminating in a situation whereby:

...the issue was no longer, on the one hand, terrorism, drugs and other serious organised crime, and on the other, rights of asylum and clandestine immigration, but they came to be treated together in the attempt to gain an overall view of the interrelation between these problems and the free movement of persons within Europe’.  

(Bigo, 1994: 164)

Such issues came to be treated together; increasingly prevalent activities now seen as ‘criminogenic consequences of a world made up of flows and networks rather than boundaries and fixed points’ (Loader, 2004: 49). It is argued that such a continuum leads to the transfer of illegitimacy from one to the other allowing for extra-control measures to be taken against designated problem populations in the name of counter-terrorism and anti-drug trafficking. In other words, the collective threat is greater than its individual parts as too are the counter-measures devised by security policymakers as legitimate power holders. It can be argued that such fundamental shifts in

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3 This observation resonates within academic work associated with the securitisation of policing in Northern Ireland and the consequential normalisation of special police powers within routine policing. This issue is discussed in detail in the next section of this chapter.
the conceptualisation of security served as the basis for the development of the securitisation theory within Europe.

Waever (1996) observes security as a practice, a specific way of framing an issue; security discourse is characterised by dramatising an issue as having absolute priority. The notion of securitisation incorporates a number of facets. It is widely understood as a process that comprises two component parts, namely the identification of an 'existential threat' which in and of itself provides the justification for the development of 'extraordinary means to handle the threat' (Waever, 1996: 107). The first part of the process involves the identification of an activity or socio-political issue that is subsequently deconstructed and reformulated as an existential danger or 'threat' to security, social order and/or control. For Waever (1996:106), something presents as an existential threat in so far as if it is not 'tackled, then everything else will be irrelevant (because we will not be here, or not be free to deal with future challenges in our own way'). This process of identification and re-conceptualisation in turn justifies the development of extraordinary, emergency powers of executive action to deal with the threat. Waever (1996: 107) suggests that the 'necessity of an existential quality (survival) comes from the function of security discourse as lifting issues to an urgency and necessity above normal politics. At this point it is observed that 'governing slips into emergency management' (de Lindt and Virta, 2004: 471). Thus, the securitisation thesis is often characterised by its reference to the suspension of normal standards of due process and democratic oversight within security policy-making. Securitisation theorists argue that:

‘by labelling something as a security issue, the security ‘actor’ has claimed the right to deal with it by extraordinary means, to break the normal political rules of the game (for example, in the form of secrecy, levying taxes, or conscripts, limitations on otherwise inviolable rights)’.

(Waever, 1996: 106)

Waever (1996: 107) observes security as a ‘self-referential’ practice in that it is the process of ‘securitising’ an issue that in turn makes it an issue of concern. Therefore, by reconceptualising issues such as asylum and migration into existential threats and submitting them to the process of securitisation, they become threats (to social order and control). In this way, securitisation is identified as a performative speech act
(Austin, 1975) whereby in the act of 'speaking something is done' (Waever, 1996: 107). This study interrogates the conceptualisation of security as a 'speech act' by examining the extent to which security 'talk' translates into security 'decision' and 'action'. Within this context, securitisation theorists highlight the role of security actors and referent objects in a given securitisation process. Waever (1996) identifies security actors as the political elites or dominant policy makers within a specific security setting or unit. In earlier work, Waever (1995) suggests that power holders can try to use the instrument of securitisation of an issue to gain control over it or at least manage the threat posed by the socio-political issue. This research study argues that the securitisation process can also be used by those in (political) power as a tool to demonstrate, or least to give the impression, that something is being 'done' to counter an existential threat. The 'referent objects' are conceptualised within the securitisation thesis by posing questions such as 'security for whom?' and 'in whose name is a designated security operation conducted?' The referent objects are alternatively viewed as the object or site that is threatened by the existential threat, for example, the individual or the state or, the 'sites' or 'units' where security or 'securitising' needs to be carried out, for example, asylum, migration or now – at least within this research – the policing of terrorism and radicalisation.

Waever (1996) references a diverging range of referent objects of security which are seen to operate at the human, state and global level. Waever (1996: 104) references Europe as a 'referent object in a truly original way' because it can simultaneously be viewed as a referent object in its own right, and as a site that incorporates a number of discrete referent objects for example the individual, the nation and the state – all of which are tied up in a specific security narrative. Indeed, a number of proponents of the securitisation thesis highlight notions of identity as integral aspects of any securitising process and as such identity becomes a referent object in its own right. Huysmans (2000: 757) refers to security policy, or perhaps more accurately the process of securitisation, as a way to 'mediate belonging' and that, 'in security practices the political and social identification of a community and its way of life develop in response to an existential threat'. Huysmans (2000) explores this notion within the context of migration and its conceptualisation as a challenge to the protection of national identity and welfare provisions.
However, securitisation theorists acknowledge that 'security' might not mean the same thing to all referent objects and that interpretations of security are often contingent on the narratives and consequentially, the identities that frame specific settings. It is suggested that the security narratives that frame a specific geo-political unit are informed by diverging security concerns, experiences and thus priorities. For example, Waever (1996) suggests that Europe retains a unique security identity due to the diverse range of Member State security priorities and experiences that must be negotiated and accommodated into policy-making frameworks. Waever (1996) argues that Europe’s ‘identity’ is framed around a security narrative that emphasises the need for integration and cohesion; within such a narrative, security is achieved through ‘togetherness’, and insecurity is courted through fragmentation. It is observed that state identity, for example the UK, might be framed around notions of sovereignty. The notion of sovereignty is integral to the current thesis as it is associated with notions of policy control, and the power to enforce policy compliance.

The securitisation thesis has been applied to a number of socio-political contexts, most notably asylum and migration within the context of the EU (Bigo, 1994; Huysmans, 2000). It is argued (Mitsilegas, 2003) that the effect of the securitisation of issues such as organised crime and illegal immigration and the consequential EU response to it has led in part to the legitimisation of the EU. Bigo (1994) suggests that it is asylum and migration discourse that lies at the heart of securitisation processes in Europe. Huysmans (2000) undertakes discourse analysis of EU migration policy instruments such as Council Regulations, Resolutions, Agreements and Action Programmes to examine how migration has developed into a security issue in Western Europe. Through this analysis Huysmans (2000) notes the ways in which the European integration process has been implicit in the process of securitisation. Huysmans (2000) outlines the securitisation of migration due to its identification as a danger to public order, cultural identity and domestic and labour market stability which, has in turn led to the creation of control-orientated, restrictive migration policies:

‘the construction of the internal security field, the restrictive migration policy, the privileging of nationals of Member States in the internal market...and the idea of cultural homogeneity as a stabilizing factor feed into the negative
Bigo (1994: 161) indicates that Europe’s internal security field represents a ‘European work site’ for research. He highlights the role of political science research and the use of a number of methodologies including the discourse-analytic study of legal texts concerning freedom of movement and European integration. However, Bigo also notes work done on the sociology of organisation in relation to the growing links between police agencies across Europe and the subsequent development of a transnational network of police officials. In researching the European internal security setting Bigo (1994) adopts two main hypotheses, one of which is particularly pertinent to the current research study. Bigo (1994: 162) proposes, ‘there is a relative lack of relationship between terrorism and European reaction against terrorism; neither Euro-terrorism nor Middle Eastern threats are at the origin of the creation of European structures’. Moreover, he suggests that the answer to increasingly transnational acts of terrorism lies at the European level rather than beyond the EU borders. Bigo’s (1994: 162) work indicates that the majority of ‘agents involved in anti-terrorism agree that the answer to increasingly transnational acts of terrorism lies at the European level’ [but] to call this into question would undermine the practical justification of the European-level arrangements’. He highlights the development of the ‘security continuum’ as a key factor in this situation. According to Bigo (1994) the continuum led to a transfer of illegitimacy, which in the name of anti-terrorism and anti-drug action allowed for the adoption of measures mainly concerning asylum policy and migratory flows.

A dominant theme to emerge from more recent European security research is the extent to which the EU and particularly the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), is now being governed by security. Securitisation theorists (Balzaczq and Carrera, 2005: 5) have noted a discernible shift in the balance between ‘freedom’ and ‘security’ and observed a security-led approach to meeting the ‘central concerns of the peoples of the States’ in so much as the ‘security of the State predates the freedom of
Whilst there remains a general consensus that issues such as the single market, consumer rights, and the Euro still dominate European debate, threats such as illegal migration, the international drugs trade and terrorism ensure that security discourses are coming to the forefront of European politics.

The CHALLENGE Project explores the implications of new security practices for civil liberties, human rights and social cohesion in an enlarged European Union. CHALLENGE research has undertaken discourse analysis of EU policy frameworks and texts such as The Hague Programme (2005-2010) and associated Action Plans to examine mechanisms underpinning the transformation of the EU Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Such mechanisms reflect the securitisation process and include the discursive construction of threats and the development of technical tools to respond to the threat (Guild et al, 2008). The research suggests that the development of a ‘security continuum’ as outlined by Bigo (1994) has legitimised the development of ‘normative responses that go beyond traditional configurations and raise fundamental dilemmas for the security and liberty of the individual’ (Guild et al, 2008: 1). The research reinforces existing work (Balzacq and Carrera, 2005) by observing that The Hague Programme ‘advocates an expansion, predominance and strengthening of the security dimension over the other two rationalities [freedom and justice]’ (Guild et al, 2008: 7).

Furthermore, CHALLENGE research notes the increasing ‘externalisation or extra-territorialisation’ of AFSJ-related policies (Guild et al, 2008: 14). The CHALLENGE research identifies the joint operations of FRONTEX and extraordinary rendition as two salient case studies of the increasing ‘externalisation’ of AFSJ policy. The research suggests that such policies carry significant implications for individual

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4 This is even illustrated in the ‘freedom’ area of JHA where it can be seen the primary targets of border management and visa policy are illegal migration, terrorism, human and drug trafficking – all of which are widely observed as operating on a ‘security continuum’ (Bigo 1994).

5 The CHALLENGE (Changing Landscape of European Liberty and Security) Programme is an FP6-funded project that seeks to facilitate a more responsive and responsible assessment of the rules and practices of security, and is examining the implications of these practices for civil liberties, human rights and social cohesion in an enlarged Europe.


6 FRONTEX is an EU agency that was created to coordinate the operational cooperation between Member States in the field of border security (http://www.frontex.europa.eu).
human rights. In this way the research mirrors work carried out by the IN:EX Project which focuses on the relationship between the EU’s external relations (in terms of foreign policy objectives) and the threats to the internal security of the EU. The IN:EX programme is beginning to develop a critique of foreign and security policies adopted by EU Member States, particularly in the Middle East, and the role of these polices in the generation of security problems in the EU. It is interesting to note the dissonance between academic research that alludes to the role of the EU as part-author of the security threats it confronts and EU security policy ‘talk’ as identified within this thesis which is dominated by an external threat narrative on security problems. This relationship is further explored in Chapter Four.

2.1.2 The securitisation of policing at the EU level

Waever (1996: 103) suggests that ‘Europe, security, integration and identity have been tied together in a specific narrative’. He argues that within a European context security is synonymous with integration and cohesion. It is possible to see that this narrative informs European policing policy characterised as it is by the desire for increased cooperation between national police forces leading to a transnational network of police officials. However, the move towards increased coordination of police agencies across Europe is not a new phenomenon. Bigo (2000: 69) observes the 1970s as a ‘watershed for the process of Europeanisation of crime and police issues’. It was during this time that TREVI, an intergovernmental framework for policing terrorism, was created. It is argued that subsequent EU policing policies were informed by the reconceptualised notions of security initiated by the end of the Cold War and previously highlighted in this chapter. Loader (2004) highlights the intended impact of key policy agreements on policing within the EU, in particular the Schengen Agreement (1990) which was primarily set up to compensate for the removal of frontier controls by allowing cross-border ‘hot pursuit’ by police forces. The Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam in 1992 and 1997 respectively reflected a period in EU history that served to further strengthen Brussels-based authority over issues pertaining to the free movement of persons (activities including asylum, visa

7 IN:EX Project is funded by the European Union. It examines the social, cultural and political challenges produced by the evolving continuum between internal and external security within the EU.
9 TREVI expanded into T2 in 1980; T3 in 1985 and T3 1992 in 1988 (Bigo, 2000)
application and migration). In addition, it is important to note the significance of the EU’s increasing preoccupation with ‘Justice and Home Affairs’ culminating in the establishment of the ‘Third Pillar’ of freedom, security and justice, during this period. One of the primary aims of this ‘third pillar’ focusing on freedom, security and justice, was to enhance cooperation between EU Member State police forces, harmonise criminal proceedings, restrict asylum and other forms of migration and combat serious organised crime and terrorism (Loader, 2004).

However, when examining the extent to which policing across Europe is subject to increased securitisation, it is important to note the nature of European policing. More recent policing developments within the EU have been characterised by the drive for increased information-brokering and intelligence exchange (Sheptycki, 1998). Moreover, the increasingly prominent role of Europol is a further example of the increasing importance of enhanced cooperation between EU Member State police forces. This organisation, instituted by the Maastricht Treaty (1992) operates as the European Union law enforcement organisation. Its aim is to improve the effectiveness and cooperation between the competent authorities of the Member States in preventing and combating serious international organised crime and terrorism, and it coordinates criminal intelligence exchange through an EU-wide network of officers\(^\text{10}\). Further evidence to suggest a definitive move towards long-term international police force cooperation includes the creation of an Operational Task Group of European Chief Police Officers; the establishment of a European Police College, and increased efforts to improve police officer language skills and transfer expertise. It is suggested that these developments are part of an EU enlargement programme, couched by Europe’s political elite very much in security terms, and with the primary aim of enhancing the working relations between EU member state police forces (Loader, 2004). According to Loader (2004: 57) such ‘developments in both security policy and police practice are powered by a group of European executive bodies driving the formation of stronger ties between Europe’s policing forces, and also a transnational policing elite orientated to forging ‘common solutions to common security problems’.

\(^{10}\) http://www.europol.europa.eu
However, there are examples of empirical research that cautions a reliance on 'grand causes, corresponding to grand effects' (Bigo, 2000: 67) within the context of European policing developments. Bigo (2000: 67) examines the changing nature of policing within the European security field, and specifically focuses on the 'liaison officer...who maintains flow of information between policing agencies'. He moves beyond the discourse-analytic study of text traditionally associated with the work of securitisation theorists to examine the sociology of the practices of small groups and address themes such as the rationalities for solidarity between the different national police forces and security agencies. Bigo (2000: 72) interviewed over one hundred police liaison officers across European member states in order to move beyond the study of 'grand causes and effects' behind police liaison practice and consider what the actors say in a serious way...because it is their most ordinary work, that which they do everyday...that we note tangible marks of crucial transformations'. The research explores a range of analytical themes such as the relationship between liaison officers' experience with their home country police cultures and the practical application of intelligence and information-sharing frameworks across a bilateral and multilateral police setting. The research concludes that these types of security actors can be defined as professionals of threat management and are producers of knowledge-power based on (in)security.

A number of theorists (Loader, 2004: 67) have observed European policing as a predominantly informationalised activity rather than a practice orientated to the on-the-ground delivery of police functions such as arrest, patrol, and public order, but towards supporting such practices through the storage and dissemination of information'. This has led to observations that European policing is somehow peripheral, non-operational, and even largely 'mythical' (ibid). However, it is argued that there are salient counter-points to such observations. A primary example in this regard is the implementation of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) in 2003. It is argued that the introduction of the EAW exemplifies a number of the discursive themes that have been highlighted in this Chapter thus far. The EAW is a tangible example of the logic of securitisation observed within Europe in that it represents the widely-noted shift in the nature of EU policy-making – from an emphasis on freedom to an increasingly securitised political agenda and approach to policy-setting. It is observed that events such as 11 September 2001, the Madrid bombings in 2004 and
the London bombings on 7 July 2005 provided the justification to adopt as a matter of urgency security tools such as the EAW. It can be seen as an example of the perceived need for extraordinary measures to counter both internal and external threats to the collective security of EU Members. The EAW seeks to abolish the traditional extradition procedures between Member States and replace them with a system of surrender between judicial authorities for acts categorised as serious offences. It intends to overcome the existing national frontiers in judicial matters, which often undermine judicial cooperation, by bypassing the political aspect of extradition and establishing a process which is wholly controlled by the judiciary. A report on the progress of the implementation of the EU Counter Terrorism Action Plan reveals frequent and effective use of the European Arrest Warrant in the fight against terrorism and other forms of major crime (European Council, 2005c). However, concerns have been raised regarding the presence of legal loopholes which may undermine the effective functioning of the EAW. Seven years after its formal adoption within the EU, and despite its direct impact on the status of each individual, there is still no parallel judicial framework for protecting the rights of suspects and defendants in criminal proceedings in the EU.

In more general terms there are concerns that in the pursuit of terrorists across national borders there is a not inconceivable danger that other criminals could be pulled into the securitised web of the EAW. Such concerns resonate within longstanding debates relating to the use of extraordinary measures to address existential threats and the potential ‘normalisation’ of police special powers in times of perceived threat to national or in this case European security. Furthermore, there have been enduring challenges to the implementation of the EAW at the national level which have necessarily undermined its efficiency and credibility as one of the first legal instruments implementing the principle of mutual recognition of decisions in criminal matters formally adopted by the European Council\(^\text{11}\). Although the EAW has been adopted by the majority of Member States the EU does not retain the power to compel EU countries to adopt the EAW and there are no formal structures in place to penalise Member States for failing to issue and execute a European Arrest Warrant.

\(^\text{11}\) In 2005 Germany and Poland launched a legal challenge questioning the compatibility of the EAW with existing constitutional frameworks. Eventually, the act of incorporating the EAW into German law was deemed to be void.
However, the EAW has been seen to have clear and tangible effects, and represents a significant development in the nature of European policing.

2.2 Securitised Policing within a UK Context

2.2.1 The Legacy of the Past

This research study argues that an important aspect of a critical exploration of the pronouncements made about the increased securitisation of routine policing in the UK is an examination of the relationship between current counter terrorism policy and the historical evolution of counter terrorism policy-making within the context of the ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland (1969 – 1998\textsuperscript{12}). It is acknowledged that the socio-political context within which the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) operated differs significantly from the contemporary setting. Moreover, the cultural and organisational features that characterised the RUC are inherently different to those that shape contemporary policing in England and Wales. Furthermore, the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century has witnessed a discernable shift in the nature and motivations behind terrorist activity over the last 30 years. The events of 11 September 2001 and 7 July 2005, which some have argued initiated a reversal of the political threat posed by the IRA (Levi, 2007), have altered the terrain on which many of these debates concerning police powers and state security take place. However, it is argued that the legacy of policing political and sectarian unrest during this period is pertinent to this thesis for a number of reasons. Firstly, it highlights debates regarding the ‘normalisation’ of emergency policy measures and special police powers within mainstream crime control and criminal justice process in the UK. Secondly, existing work in this area states that the focus of police work has increasingly been on policing ‘people’ rather than ‘crime’, and that the contemporary focus has shifted away from suspicion of a criminal ‘act’ to the monitoring of suspected individuals or populations (Hillyard, 1993). This observation is pertinent to debates around securitisation, particularly in light of the emphasis placed on ‘referent objects’ of security (Waever, 1996).

\textsuperscript{12} This time period covers the first IRA ceasefire in 1994 and the Good Friday Agreement in 1998.
The policing responses to terrorism remain relatively under studied by academics. This is unsurprising in such a sensitive arena where the activities of state agencies are shrouded in secrecy (Lustgarten and Leigh, 1994). Nevertheless, within the UK there is an important body of work on the policing of terrorism, largely because of experiences in Northern Ireland. When documenting the structure and role of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), Brewer et al (1988) noted that 'the general threat that terrorism in a wider international context appeared to pose to society necessarily changed the definition of the tasks expected of police throughout the UK' (1988: 9). Moreover, it has been widely observed that Northern Ireland 'served as a testing ground for the development of repressive policy measures that eventually would transfer elsewhere' (Mulcahy, 2005: 89). Such a perspective has been sustained for many years and is widely recognised as the 'contagion thesis' (Hillyard, 1987).

The political dimension of security policy in Northern Ireland during the 'Troubles' was reflected in the RUC’s oscillation between civilian and military methods of policing. It is widely observed that the emergency situation in Northern Ireland blurred the line between normal and counter-insurgency policing which in turn offered the potential for extraordinary powers to gradually 'creep' into mainstream policing. It is suggested that the situation in Northern Ireland at the time epitomised the dichotomous quality inherent to most security policy; the protection of civil liberties on the one hand and the perceived need to allow deviations from 'normal' policing to cope with political violence and terrorism on the other. This disjuncture can be seen to account for the diverging opinions of the police – on the one hand seen as a political tool in the war against terror, and as implementing a repressive security policy under the guise of normal policing on the other hand (Brewer et al, 1988).

In terms of the legislation in operation at the time, the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) 1974 extended many of the powers introduced in the NI (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973. It has been observed that these Acts illustrated the paradox of policing Northern Ireland; the official desire to ‘normalise’ political violence while introducing special powers implicitly recognising the apparent ‘abnormality’ of the situation. During the Troubles, a wide range of executive and police powers were executed in order to counter the widespread paramilitary activity. Indeed, the anti-terrorist legislation of the 1970s had fundamental implications for the Criminal Justice
System, particularly in Northern Ireland. According to Hillyard (1993) the introduction of the PTA in 1974 created a dual system of Criminal Justice in Great Britain whereby there were existing powers to deal with the traditional serious crimes (reflected later in the form of PACE), and those connected to what was determined to be terrorism. During the Troubles myriad strategies were used and included internment without trial; the abolition of trial by jury; proscription; interrogation; supergrasses; accusations of a 'shoot to kill' policy for terrorist suspects, and alleged abuse of army and police powers of arrest and stop and search. Some argue that such tactics undermined normal police practice and further exacerbated existing divisions within a divided society' (Hillyard, 1997).

Perhaps the most defining yet controversial features of security policy in Northern Ireland, particularly during the ‘Militarization Phase’ (1971-1975) was the practice of Internment and Detention. The extension of police powers to stop, search and arrest granted by the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973, were extended by the PTA 1974, and the Diplock Commission (1972/1973). The new system established under the anti-terrorist legislation also had the potential to bring into custody and interrogate anyone whether there was evidence against them or not because the principal arrest required no reasonable suspicion of an offence. Hillyard (1993) states that such special police powers were used for the purposes of intelligence gathering, and this is corroborated by work highlighting the development of intelligence work during this period, for example, the use of technology and Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Kitson, 2005). Ultimately, Hillyard (1993: 7) determined that a very different culture developed around PTA arrests leading to observations that ‘people drawn into the CJS via PTA were not suspects in the normal sense of the word’...and that the counter-insurgency strategies spread into ‘normal’ policing in NI and resulted in the systematic oppression of the Northern Irish population and ultimately to the construction of the Irish as a ‘suspect community’.

It has been argued that Northern Ireland provided the British state with an arena in which new policing strategies and tactics could be deployed and tested first on political violence and then on everyday crimes (Hillyard, 1993; 1997). This section goes on to explore the legitimacy of this claim by examining the extent to which such exemplars of securitised policing are evident within the police service in England and
Wales. The extent to which policing policies implemented in Northern Ireland transferred to mainland Britain is widely contested. However, there is a cogent argument to suggest that Northern Ireland was used as a testing ground for a range of new technologies and operational tactics that are evident within UK policing. For example, there has been increasing emphasis placed on the use of technology to prevent terrorism in recent years, particularly in the City of London (Walker and McGuiness, 2002). In addition, Geraghty (1998) notes that Britain’s move towards intelligence-led policing resonates with the covert surveillance techniques that characterised policing strategy in Northern Ireland during the period known as ‘police primacy’ (1975-1980). Furthermore, Hillyard (1993) indicates a number of similarities which provide a strong argument to suggest that a significant degree of policing policy transfer did take place between Northern Ireland and the UK with regards to policing and the administration of justice. The first area of similarity is in the form of policing. Hillyard observes that British policing has become increasingly militarized in practice with the use of crowd control tools (plastic bullets) and stop and search strategies. The contemporary application of police force, firearms and riot-control remains the subject of continued debate in Britain (Waddington and Wright, 2008).

Although Mulcahy (2005) acknowledges the compelling facets of the ‘contagion thesis’ propagated by Hillyard (1987), he states that there are a number of important issues to take into account when assessing the influence that Northern Ireland policing policy has had in Britain. Firstly, and significant in terms of the underlying debate concerning policy transfer, the imposition of Direct Rule and subsequent introduction of legislation on Northern Ireland by the British Government, indicates that policy transfer, particularly during the initial period of political unrest, unequivocally flowed from Britain to Northern Ireland. Secondly, by focusing on Northern Ireland as the sole source of ‘contagion’ the debate ignores the controversial policing strategies endemic to Britain. Thirdly, the ‘thesis’ proposed by Hillyard (1987) assumes that all practices ‘admired’ by British forces were actually implemented on the mainland. It must be noted that the scale of the conflict and the controversies often associated with policing in the province (including aggressive interrogations and miscarriages of justice) would have generated significant distrust and opposition in Britain which would in turn have inhibited the unequivocal transfer of counter insurgency strategies.
to the mainland. Finally, it is important to note that cross-national security policy transfer has proliferated post-11 September 2002 and therefore current British policing strategies 'may well have been influenced by counter terrorist policies from significantly further afield than Northern Ireland' (Mulcahy, 2005: 191-193).

However, it can be argued that many of the fundamental political and societal issues confronted by policing during the Northern Ireland 'Troubles' are inherent to the challenges faced by those responsible for confronting the contemporary terrorist threat. The following review provides a clear exposition of how government 'decisions' about policing terrorism have shaped recent legislation and reviews the impact such decisions have had on the nature of routine policing.

2.2.2 Contemporary Police Powers: Learning the Lessons of the Past?

Since Labour came to power in 1997 there have been five major pieces of security legislation: the Terrorism Act 2000 (TA 2000); the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001; the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005; the Terrorism Act 2006, and the Counter Terrorism Act 2008. The government also passed more wide-ranging legislation that, while not aimed explicitly at countering terrorism, has nevertheless had a significant impact on the powers available to the police and security services. The definition of terrorism has been systematically expanded with the introduction of new Acts. This in turn has provided the police and security services with a more permissive mandate in terms of the prevention and investigation of acts deemed to be associated with terrorism. The Terrorism Act 2000 (TA 2000) includes the current, legislative definition of terrorism in the UK. It significantly broadens the definition of terrorism whilst retaining many of the emergency provisions of its predecessors. The Terrorism Act 2006 extends the range of terrorism offences, and the issue that has arguably initiated the most political and public debate is the inclusion of the reference to preaching and the glorification of terrorism.

The proportionality of many of these pieces of legislation is a source of significant opposition from many areas, most notably from human rights organisations such as Liberty and Amnesty International. It can be seen that the use of broad definitions of terrorism risks the possible arrest, charge and ultimately the prosecution of people
participating in legitimate social movements or political protests. Moreover, a wide-ranging definition runs the risk of enveloping non-terrorist crimes into the realm of 'extraordinary' powers granted to the Criminal Justice System when faced with acts of a terrorist nature. Thus two salient points emerge when assessing legal definitions of terrorism – both of which apply directly to the police – the special powers legislation bestows on the Criminal Justice System, and the role of discretion in applying these powers. The (then) Minister of State, Tony McNulty stated:

‘it is a long-standing policy to prosecute terrorist activity using general offences wherever possible and the terrorism specific offences, preventative measures and powers are used either where no comparable general offence exists or where specific powers or measures are needed to enable them to investigate or prevent this special category of crime’.

[cited by Lord Carlile in a lecture at Cardiff University, 29 March 2007]

However, secondary data analysis of statistics compiled from police records by the offices of the National Coordinator for Terrorist Investigations appears to challenge such assertions. The findings from subsequent analysis appear to lend support to academics who contend that certain aspects of policy decision-making are increasingly driven by a logic of securitisation (Virta, 2008) and that this logic unnecessarily threatens important civil liberties and safeguards of democratic oversight of policing in liberal democracies (Loader and Walker, 2001). During the period 11 Sept 2001 to 31 March 2008\(^\text{13}\), 1471 terrorism arrests were carried out – 1286 under S41 of the TA 2000, and 185 under other legislation e.g. PACE. Of the 1471 terrorism arrests, 521 (35%) resulted in a charge. Of those charged 340 (65%) were considered to be terrorism-related. The proportion of those arrested (35%) who were eventually charged is similar to that for other criminal offences with 31% of those aged 18 and over arrested for indictable offences prosecuted. For a further 9% of terrorism arrests some alternative action was taken (e.g. transfer to the immigration authorities).

\(^{13}\) Source: Home Office Statistical Bulletin (2010).
Table 2.1 illustrates the outcomes for those arrested under terrorism legislation but eventually dealt with by means of alternative action (N=950).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>Number (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cautioned</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transferred to Immigration Authorities</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transferred to Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealt with under the Mental Health Legislation</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Released without Charge</td>
<td>819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>950</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.1: Method of alternative action for terrorism-related arrest

Table 2.1 shows that 819 (56%) of the total number of individuals arrested for terrorism-related offences (N=1471) were ultimately released without any charges being brought against them. Overall, over 65% of those arrested were either dealt with via alternative action or released without charge. Although the charge rate is comparable with that of other indictable offences these statistics do raise questions as to the appropriate use of terrorism legislation.

An examination of the historical evolution of legislative decisions pertaining to counter terrorism, and the subsequent expansion of police powers, appear to reinforce notions that policing is subject to increased securitisation. Since the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1974 the police have been granted wider and more intrusive powers of investigation in terrorist cases; in many cases these powers exceed significantly those that apply to the prevention and investigation of ‘normal’ crimes. Those relevant to this thesis include powers of arrest, search and seizure\(^ {14}\); powers of detention; powers of stop and search and public order powers.

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\(^{14}\) The PTA 1974 extended police powers to stop, search and arrest which had originally been granted by the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973. The power to arrest and search without the need for reasonable suspicion remains on the statute books in myriad forms and is broadened with the passing of successive legislation despite the supposed ‘temporary’ status of the power.
Powers of Detention

One of the most defining and yet controversial aspects of security policy in Northern Ireland, particularly during the 'Militarization Phase' (1971-1975) was that of Internment and Detention. The PTA 1974 facilitated the detention of suspects without warrant where there was reasonable suspicion that they were involved in the commission, preparation or instigation of terrorism. The power of detention now manifests in two key forms: pre-charge questioning15 and control orders. Control orders were introduced in the Prevention of Terrorism Act 200516. These civil orders allow the government to restrict the activities of individuals – either British citizens or foreign nationals – it suspects of involvement in terrorist-related activity, but for whom there is not sufficient evidence to charge. The control orders allow a range of restrictions from house arrest and electronic tagging to rules on who individuals may contact. Other measures may prohibit individuals from using a mobile phone or the internet and impose limitations on their movements. The Terrorism Act 2008 further extends the police powers that can be exerted over individuals subject to control orders. The Act enables police officers to enter – by force if necessary – and search the premises of individuals subject to control orders who are reasonably suspected of having absconded or of failing to grant access. It also enables a constable to take fingerprints and DNA samples from those under control orders, and ensures that full use can be made of them in terrorism investigations.

Extended Stop and Search Powers

The power to stop and search has a long yet varied tradition in British policing. It was originally a power bestowed on the Metropolitan Police which the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984 extended to all forces. The use of this power has been the subject of considerable empirical research, predominantly because it is widely seen as the epitome of the exercise of police discretionary power particularly on the policing frontline (Waddington et al, 2004; Miller et al, 2000). However, it has taken on renewed significance due in part to the implementation of recent counter-terrorism legislative decisions, the most notable of which is Section 44 of the

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15 This debate has been conceptualised as an exemplar of securitised 'talk' within this thesis and therefore detailed analysis can be found in Chapter 5.
16 At the time of writing the new Coalition Government proposes to abolish Control Orders. We wait to see what will take their place and whether this marks a discernible reversal of the securitisation process, for example the removal of house arrest, the removal of constraints on mobile phone use, and a reduction in the period of detention without trial among other things.
Terrorism Act 2000. Section 44 grants the police the power to stop and search a person or a vehicle without suspicion if the police are operating in a designated area under special authorisation from a senior police officer.

The Section 44 power may only be used for the purpose of searching for articles of a kind which could be used in connection with terrorism, but there is no need for the officer who conducts the search to have grounds to suspect the presence of such articles. It is an offence to fail to stop (or to stop a vehicle) when required to by an officer exercising powers under Section 44. Such an offence carries a maximum penalty of 6 months imprisonment. The Home Secretary must be notified if a senior police officer grants an authorization under Section 44 for more than 48 hours. Following Home Secretary approval, it can remain in place for up to 28 days. There is widespread criticism of this particular police power, and a dominant political and public perception that police officers exercise the power to stop and search in a discriminatory manner, and disproportionately target members of minority ethnic communities (Guardian: 2 June, 2010). More recently, Lord Carlile, QC (2006: 28), in his capacity as the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, referenced the use of Section 44 of the Terrorism Act and stated that, 'it could be used less and [I] expect it to be used less'. Lord Carlile’s observations are indicative of widespread concerns regarding the normalisation of special police powers, and the occurrence of incidents such as those noted below have been used as evidence to indicate a gradual creep of security policing into the policing of routine crime and disorder.

Public Order Powers

The introduction of the policy of police primacy in Northern Ireland (1975-1980), and consequential subordination of the army saw the creation of a number of specialist police units to deal with both maintaining public order and combating terrorism (DMSUs). Although policing tactics have changed since the ‘Troubles’, some of the same criticisms have been levelled at contemporary methods of policing public order. The more recent counter terrorism Acts (and those associated with counter terrorism) have imposed serious limitations on the public’s right to protest and partake in demonstrations. The Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (Section 132) made it an offence to organise, take part in or carry on a demonstration in a public place in a designated area unless authorisation has been sought and obtained in
advance of the event. The Act effectively banned demonstrations from taking place in Parliament Square, London without prior police approval. To organise a demonstration without notice carries a maximum sentence of 51 weeks imprisonment and/or a fine. The controversy over the policing of protests continues to grow in the UK, and the recent furore surrounding events at the G20 protests in London in 2009 and the controversial use of the police tactic of containment or ‘kettling’ as it is more commonly known ensures that the policing of public order is once again under scrutiny.

It can be argued that in some instances the legitimate right to demonstrate and to protest, which has traditionally been viewed by some as threats to public order, are increasingly re-conceptualised as threats to security. This in turn – if one subscribes to the securitisation thesis as applied to policing – justifies extraordinary, emergency powers of executive action with which normal standards of due process and democratic oversight can be dispensed. The counter terrorism legislation introduced in Northern Ireland and the UK from 1974 to the present day serve as exemplars of the concept of ‘decision’ as defined within this thesis. The special powers granted to the Criminal Justice System generally, and the police more specifically are irrefutable methods of policy enforcement which in turn necessitate compliance from the public. Moreover, the suppositions made about the securitisation of policing do appear to be borne out in light of the significant expansion of police powers under successive legislative decisions made in the realm of counter terrorism.

Ultimately it is important to balance the use of special powers with the specific risks posed by terrorist activity, and to ascertain whether the nature of the crime necessitates proportional special laws to assist prevention, disruption and detection. However, debates concerning the extent to which special powers have become normalised within everyday policing have endured since the political violence in Northern Ireland. It can be argued that they take on renewed pertinence as British policing confronts the myriad issues associated with the changing nature of the

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17 This police tactic is used as a crowd control measure and consists of cordonning off or temporarily restricting exit from a designated area.


18 See Chapter Three for a detailed explanation of the analytical distinctions made between policy ‘talk’, ‘decision’ and ‘action’ in this thesis.
terrorist threat. The reaction to the State’s role in countering terrorism is often mixed as due consideration should be given to the preservation of human rights, and the more pragmatic issue of neutralising the threat. It is widely argued that the ‘legal response to the outbreak of terrorist activity should be limited to measures that will enable the security services and the police to intervene to prevent terrorist attacks and to bring criminal charges against those involved with as few derogations from ordinary criminal procedures as possible’ (Hadden as cited in Carlile Lecture, 2007:10).

Lord Carlile (2007: 13), states that ‘authorities should always treat suspects within the normal rather than special criminal laws unless their threat and structure operationally requires that they should be regarded formally as terrorists’. He goes on to highlight the importance of exercising discretion ‘to prosecute or use special powers available only against suspected terrorists’ (2007: 19). This is particularly salient as it is possible that non-terrorist activities could fall within the definition of terrorism currently in operation. The use of any such powers requires significant discretion and strict accountability frameworks to be put in place. As such there are a number of serious offences, including under the Terrorism Act 2000, which require the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) before a prosecution may take place.

2.3 The Securitisation of UK Policing: A Wider Perspective

There is relatively little empirical research that examines specifically the impact of securitisation within the context of contemporary policing in the UK beyond the development and application of special powers. However, it is argued that the enduring debate regarding police governance in England and Wales serves as a useful site for exploring notions of securitisation within routine policing. This section references a number of recent analyses of police governance in England and Wales and in particular, focuses on the emergence of ‘new localism’ within a broader framework of centralisation.

King and Sharp (2006) focus on the changing police environment in England and Wales to illustrate the ways in which security concerns are challenging and extending definitions of the proper role of the police and other agencies in public security. They
identify four possible drivers of securitisation within UK policing; the growing police role of the Security and Intelligence Service (SIS); the 'security' road to the development of SOCA; government moves towards force amalgamation, and a return to local policing but with central direction. These findings draw heavily on European notions of security and securitisation as outlined in the previous section, particularly in relation to the last two observations regarding shifts in the independence of police forces (Walker, 2000; DeFlem, 2002). It is the final two 'exemplars' of securitisation that resonate most saliently within this research.

King and Sharp (2006: 387) argue that a series of legislative and policy shifts over the past fifteen years have ensured a discernible 'move from local decision-making to a centrally proscribed agenda' which sees all forces required to produce an annual force plan that must incorporate the national policing plan formulated by the Home Secretary alongside the local police priorities. The suggestion here is that local concerns have gradually been replaced by national priorities determined against an increasingly securitised and politicised crime agenda. King and Sharp (2006) highlight the introduction of the National Intelligence Model (NIM) in the UK as a pivotal step in recent police policy reform. The NIM classified policing into three distinct levels\(^{19}\) which in turn enabled police forces to prioritise and manage their activities more effectively (Tregidga, 2003).

In recent years there have been official concerns raised as to the ability of some forces in England and Wales to adequately deal with Level 2 crime issues. This issue is commonly termed the Level 2 'gap' (HMIC, 2005). In 2005 the Home Office commissioned Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) to review the current structure and organisation of the police forces in England and Wales. The report by former Chief Constable Denis O’Connor and entitled *Closing the Gap* (HMIC, 2005: 6) identified a changing policing environment characterised by 'widespread enterprising organised criminality, proliferating international terrorism and domestic extremism; a premium on intelligence, expertise and smart use of capacity; and an increasingly risk concerned public'. The O’Connor report

\(^{19}\) Level 1 – policing within Basic Command Unit (BCU) boundaries; Level 2 – policing across BCU and often force boundaries; Level 3 – policing of national and often international serious and organised crime issues.
recommended a change to the current structure of policing in light of the examination of the ‘capacity’ and ‘capability’ of individual forces to adequately deliver protective services\(^{20}\). One of the reform proposals was the amalgamation of police forces (Tregidga, 2005).

Although, these fundamental police reform proposals were eventually shelved, it is clear that successive legislation and government policies have been implemented that reflect a long term, strategic trend towards centralisation of the organisation of policing in England and Wales. All of the police forces currently existing in England and Wales (with the exception of the City of London) have been subject to amalgamations and border change over the years. Some took place following the Police Acts of 1946 and 1964, and in 1974 the Home Office then consolidated the existing forces into 41 area forces. These, with the addition of the City of London and the Metropolitan Police make up the 43 Home Office forces currently in operation today (Mawby and Wright, 2008). It must also be noted that the debate as to whether there should be further force amalgamations has been ongoing for a number of years. In 2003 it was argued that there was a need for enhanced performance, and adjustment to the challenges of 21\(^{st}\) Century criminality and a case was put forward for options such as a national police force with regional commanders, and the creation of between 10 and 25 ‘super forces’ (Hancock, 2003). Jones (2008) provides further examples of the growing moves towards central control. The Police and Magistrates Act 1994 allowed the Home Office to set national policing objectives, and the Police Reform Act 2002 extends these powers through the creation of a National Policing Plan (Jones, 2008). Jones indicates that an expansion of central control has occurred alongside an increase in the importance and frequency of the inspection process – in which the HMIC undoubtedly plays an integral role – and a reduction in the influence of local police authorities.

However the establishment of the national Association of Police Authorities (APA) and the creation of local Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs)\(^{21}\) indicates that there is still at least the potential for local police authorities and

\(^{20}\) Protective Services are placed into seven discrete categories – one of which is defined as counter terrorism and domestic extremism.

\(^{21}\) These are termed Community Safety Partnerships in Wales.
agencies to provide active input into policy making (Jones, 2008). McLaughlin (2007) discusses the 'new localism' that has emerged within the broader framework of centralisation in England and Wales. McLaughlin (2007: 189) suggests that a decade of centrally-imposed managerial reforms had in effect closed off the policy-making process to locally expressed policing priorities and references a series of speeches made by Home Office Ministers in which it is recognised that 'effective solutions to crime and disorder must be made locally' and that effective local policing is now viewed as 'central to the success or failure of the cross-governmental initiatives on neighbourhood regeneration, civil renewal...community cohesion and combating violent extremism'. This is further emphasised in the citizen engagement agenda pursued by the previous New Labour administration (Casey, 2008), including the major reform associated with 'Neighbourhood Policing' (2007a), and in the Coalition Government's proposals for 'Policing in the 21st Century' (Home Office, 2010) 22.

Although policing in England and Wales has managed to retain, at least in part, a decentralised, local structure, it is clear that tensions remain between local and central control of policing. The current situation is widely seen as a compromise with large regionally organised forces alongside a series of national police organisations 23 that are intended to provide both national and international capabilities. The majority of these services were established by the Police Act 1997 (Jones, 2008). However recent developments such as the enhanced terrorist threat since 7 July 2005 and the Soham murders in 2002 have brought this structure into question, in particular the capability of small forces to deal with major incidents and provide sustained counter terrorist capability. King and Sharp (2006: 387-388) corroborate these observations by stating that the post-11 September 2001 security landscape has simply intensified already existing processes that reflect a move from local decision-making to a centrally prescribed agenda. However, it is pertinent to note that, in line with the work of securitisation theorists within Europe, King and Sharp's (2006) pronouncements are generated through the discourse-analytic study of policy text. The methodological

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22 At the time of writing the Coalition Government had put forward proposals for locally-oriented and accountable Police and Crime Commissioners which if successful will impact significantly on the organisation of policing.

23 These include the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS), the National Crime Squad (NCS), and SOCA (Serious and Organised Crime Agency)
focus of such research does not allow for an empirical interrogation of the impact of securitisation on routine police practice.

The final section of this chapter reviews work that examines the impact of recent policing policy developments on community policing, both within the UK and across Europe. The review focuses on the ways in which neighbourhood policing and community safety partnerships are increasingly seen as central to the delivery and maintenance of security at the local level.

2.4 The Securitisation of Routine Police Practice: An Empirical Lacuna

There is a discernible lack of empirical work that focuses on the impact of security discourse and policies at the local frontline of crime control. There is even less evidence of research that investigates the potential impact by shifting the empirical focus away from the discourse-analytic study of policy talk and text, to an examination of tangible changes to local, operational practice. However, there is an important body of work that focuses on the impact of recent discursive and policy shifts in the nature of crime control, disorder and insecurity at the community level. This work focuses on the increasing convergence of policing and partnership work, and in particular the rise and impact of community safety partnerships (Hughes and Rowe, 2007), and the increased emphasis placed on the use of community intelligence in the policing of insecurity (Innes, 2006; Innes et al, 2009). The issues raised within the UK also resonate within an international, and specifically a European context. Virta (2008) observes the use of intelligence-led approaches to community policing in Finland and Terpstra (2008) notes the emergence of local security networks in The Netherlands. Such work highlights the importance of 'community', and in particular, the gradual reformulation of the notion of community policing and community safety in light of heightened concerns around issues of both national and personal security.

In recent years there has been considerable international focus on the effectiveness of community-based policing. As Clarke (2006:15) states, 'community policing can be seen as a central vehicle for the development of future operational and strategic policing initiatives'. The current research indicates that this is indeed the case within a security policy context. In the UK there has been increased political emphasis
placed on the value of community policing, and the Government’s recent Neighbourhood Policing Programme (NPP) (2007a) is an integral facet of the long term plan to reform the police service. The policy paper *Building Communities, Beating Crime* (2004a) originally set out the plans for a new neighbourhood policing fund to support the development of dedicated neighbourhood teams across the country. This paper reflected a discernable attempt by the Government to bring the police and partner agencies closer to communities. The policy emphasised the need for dedicated, visible neighbourhood police teams, and advocated a ‘citizen focus’ which allows for residents to have a say in identifying local problems and setting local policing priorities. The overriding aim was to enhance community engagement with the police by increasing visibility and contact and by seeking to involve residents in policy decisions. Ultimately residents are seen as ‘customers’ or ‘consumers of police services’ and the White Paper emphasises the need to increase public satisfaction and police responsiveness and accountability. The Government’s plan to ‘revitalise neighbourhood and community policing for the 21st Century’ (2004b: 4) is one of a number of initiatives that have emerged in the UK over the last few years in response to issues such as fear of crime, anti-social behaviour and ‘a lack of trust or engagement with the police and other community-based agencies (Tilley, 2008: 311).

The Neighbourhood Policing Programme (NPP) (2006-2008) represents a highly localised policing system in which local people are given the opportunity to vote on their priorities for police action. In many ways this process amounts to constructing a knowledge base about the drivers of insecurity in the neighbourhoods where officers are working and providing the opportunity for local people to democratically influence how they are policed. This policy marks a significant departure from the traditional (tripartite) modes of police governance in the UK and – in theory at least – moves the mechanisms of accountability far closer to the public. In this way the NPP represents the emergence of a ‘new localism’ within the broader framework of centralisation (McLaughlin, 2007). Moreover, further research in this area highlights the increasing ‘bifurcation’ between centralised national policing units dealing with serious crime, cross border issues (including terrorism) and local policing partnerships dealing with volume crime and disorder (Savage, 2007). Alongside the NPP (2006), the Home Office implemented the Crime and Disorder Partnership Reform Programme (2007b). The two reform programmes brought together the two agencies
that remain at the forefront of community safety: the police and local authorities. There is now a very developed body of literature on policing and community safety in England and Wales (see for example, Hughes and Edwards, 2002) and within an international context (Crawford, 2009).

Hughes and Rowe (2007) examine the impact of NPP (2007a) and the Crime and Disorder Partnership Reform Programme (2007b), and in particular the consequential relationship between Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs) and routine policing. Hughes and Rowe (2007: 325) note that it is ‘increasingly common practice to have police officers seconded to work with local authority community safety teams...reflecting the duopoly of the local authority and the police in almost all CDRPs’. Hughes and Rowe (2007: 325) carried out interviews with CSP actors and textual analysis of relevant policy documents to explore the potential outcomes of the ‘new liaisons resulting from local public policing meeting multi-agency community safety partnership processes’. Their research indicates a possible disjuncture between programme implementation and actual delivery at the local level. It highlights a number of reasons for this including the local political circumstances that characterise individual community areas and the pressure to meet national minimum standards. Such research resonates within the current study and contributes to pertinent debates regarding the extent to which partnerships are conduits for processes of social control, such as securitisation and responsibilisation, or whether they are sites of power dependence and political competition about what constitutes secure, safer communities and how security can be accomplished.

The themes and issues highlighted in UK-based research resonate within an international, and specifically a European context. Virta (2002; 2008) examines the impact of recent EU security policy developments on community policing in Finland. Virta (2008) argues that a number of recent developments at the local community level have been motivated by an obligation to serve higher policing purposes and national security. Virta (2002; 2008) suggests that community policing has become an effective tool for national security and certainly vital for local, neighbourhood counter terrorism. She supports this assertion through reference to two main

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24 This research article forms part of a Special Issue of Criminology and Criminal Justice on Policing Diversity/Policing Communities (2007).
developments. Firstly, the increased use of intelligence-led, policing strategies within routine activity such as the collection and application of community intelligence, and secondly, the development of local safety planning networks.

Virta’s (2002) qualitative assessment of the implementation of community policing in Finland is based on documentary analysis and interviews with senior police officials in charge of implementation. The research (2002: 194) examines the implementation of community policing at the operational level and although a number of changes to operational strategies and tactics were identified so too were a number of challenges to effective policy delivery. These include ‘the lack of crime prevention measures’ and ‘few efforts at organisational reforms (decentralisation)’. However Virta (2002: 195) notes a shift in the systematic, strategic approach to local policing, and in particular the development of ‘local security networks’. The developments identified by Virta (2002) in Finland reflect the community safety arrangements both in the UK and in other European countries (see Terpstra, 2008). Virta (2002: 196) examines the construction of the local security networks in Tampere and observes the efforts for individuals and agencies to ‘identify themselves as actors in the security field’ and the process of negotiation that takes places in terms of establishing security priorities and resolutions.

Virta’s later work (2008) more explicitly draws on the securitisation thesis as advocated by theorists such as Waever (1996); Bigo (1994) and Huysmans (2000). Virta (2008) depicts an EU security landscape characterised by a reconfiguring of the concepts of internal/external security; the development of a security continuum, and a growing preoccupation with countering terrorism and combating radicalisation and recruitment. She identifies a number of exemplars of the securitisation process at the local community level, the foremost of which is the integration of national security concerns within local policing and community safety frameworks and processes. Virta (2008: 37) discusses the increased application of intelligence-led strategies within the community policing context, and in particular the emphasis placed on ‘community intelligence’. It is suggested that more effective use of information and intelligence may lead to more effective prevention and better results in crime reduction. However, Virta (2008: 36) asserts that such a development is contingent on two main factors. The first is that the whole intelligence management process
needs to be well organised and functioning effectively so that street level information and intelligence is assimilated into the production of intelligence products for the police and the wider community safety partnership network. The second factor is that there needs to be a re-assessment of the imperatives associated with security intelligence, and in particular a move away from ‘secrecy’ towards ‘openness and transparency’ in order to foster trust and confidence within communities. This is especially important within the context of preventing radicalisation and recruitment and links into the need for clear and coherent democratic accountability structures.

The debates about the security implications of CSPs also resonate within work that has been carried out on local security networks in The Netherlands (Terpstra, 2008). Such work supports King and Sharp’s (2006: 213) assertions that there has been a gradual shift ‘from government to governance in the control of crime, disorder and insecurity’. According to Terpstra (2008) this has resulted, at the local level, in the growth of multi-agency networks. The work of Garland (2001; 1996) and his observations on the relationship between increased concerns about crime and insecurity and the public’s expectations of politicians and the criminal justice system resonate throughout Terpstra’s work. Terpstra (2008) highlights many of the strategic, ‘adaptive’ responses undertaken by governments and criminal justice agencies in order to counter the perceived erosion of States’ sovereign power. Terpstra (2008) emphasises the strategy of ‘responsibilisation’ (Garland, 1996). This strategy attempts to promote the involvement of other agencies in the prevention and control of crime and insecurity. Terpstra suggests that this shift from ‘government to governance’ is accompanied by a new discourse that focuses around the concepts of community, prevention and partnerships. Terpstra argues that such discursive shifts have manifested themselves in tangible changes to practice at the local level in the form of the construction of local security networks (LSNs). One of the inherent challenges to the development of the local security networks is the often conflicted nature of the police role within communities. Terpstra (2008: 223) highlights the competing demands placed on the police and in particular their attempts to cooperate with the other agencies in the networks whilst simultaneously concentrating on their ‘core business’ and thus the need to retreat from active participation in the networks.

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25 See Chapter Seven for a more extended discussion of Garland’s work.
However, in line with the previously referenced work on the changing nature of local police and partnership activity such observations are not generated through the empirical interrogation of action and practice on the frontline.

In addition to the research on CSPs there are clear examples of empirical investigations of the impact of security discourse and decisions on police practice in the UK. Innes (2006) outlines how counter terrorism strategies and practices in the UK have changed in light of recent terrorist events, and explores empirically the relative merits of enhancing the role of community policing, and in particular community intelligence within existing approaches to counter terrorism. Innes (2006: 2) suggests that ‘terrorist events can embody both a symbolic and signalling logic whereby the violence is directed towards a symbol of social or cultural order and the impact of the violence has a direct impact on the ways in which citizens think, feel or act in relation to security’. However, Innes also suggests that recent terrorist events have had an additional effect relating to concerns as to whether existing methodologies for generating intelligence associated with terrorism are suitable in light of the risk posed by the contemporary nature of the threat. It is suggested that one way to counter this operational uncertainty is to integrate a system of neighbourhood policing into the counter terrorism apparatus. Innes (2006) argues that such a move would enhance the levels of trust that is often required between police and local communities to facilitate the communication of relevant information. This in turn has the potential to prove less damaging to democratic institutions than the systematic expansion of covert policing strategies through reactionary legislation.

Innes (2006: 3) presents an ‘empirically grounded exploration of some innovative police approaches that relate to counter terrorism activity’, and in particular the collection and handling of community intelligence. The analysis is informed by interviews with police officers involved in intelligence and counter terrorism work in three UK police forces – at both central and local levels. According to Innes (2006) all agencies across the policing and security sector make use of intelligence, although they define, understand and use it in a variety of ways according to their organisational imperatives and concerns. However, community intelligence is different in a number of ways when compared to more traditional kinds of crime and criminal intelligence. It tends to be open-source rather than acquired from covert
human sources and is often provided by ordinary members of the public rather than those who have connections with criminal activity. Furthermore, whereas criminal intelligence tends to target particular individuals, and crime intelligence particular incident types, community intelligence covers a range of issues, frequently being used by police to build a picture of the contextual risks that a particular community group feels concerned about. Indeed, in some ways Innes’ work reinforces the importance of ‘belonging’ and ‘identity’ as outlined by securitisation theorists such as Waever (1996) and Huysmans (2000). These theorists highlighted both as potential ‘referent objects’ of security within the securitisation process. Innes’ (2006) research reveals that community intelligence can be used to facilitate a better understanding of the increasing complexities of collective identity and the intricacies of community relations. Thus, according to Innes (2006: 9) community intelligence applied to counter terrorism is precisely the type of data that might help police to ‘circumvent the intelligence gaps and blind spots that seemingly inhere in their established methods’. The current research explores both the nature and role of community intelligence within the routine practices inherent to the case study police force.

More recently, Innes et al (2009: 102) have examined empirically the benefits of community-generated intelligence by adopting an ‘innovative community engagement methodology designed to provide police with a rich community intelligence picture of the drivers of insecurity in neighbourhoods’. A face to face interview schedule was designed to capture information and knowledge about local events, together with information on the dynamics of social reaction to the events. The interviews were originally conducted by academic researchers but the process was subsequently re-developed into a computer-assisted personal interviewing software program (CAPI) which enabled police staff to carry out the interviews. The Signal Crimes Perspective (2004) provides the theoretical framework for understanding the ways in which certain incidents tend to initiate changes in how people think or act in relation to their individual or collective security. It is interesting to note that in one research setting the most important ‘signal’ events revolved around anti-social behaviour and incidents traditionally identified as council issues. According to Innes et al (2009), the methodological approach has the potential to yield a rich community intelligence picture that can be used by officers to better understand the multi-faceted nature of the neighbourhoods they police. It is an approach – operating at the level of practice –
through which police organisations can better direct their routine activities in ways that are more likely to meet the needs of the communities and neighbourhoods they police. It addresses the perceived, antithetical nature of the relationship between intelligence-led policing and community policing. It seeks to establish a synthesis between the two policing paradigms through the construction of what Innes et al. (2009: 113) term 'community intelligence-led policing'. Such research argues that the creation of such 'conceptual bridges' is an effective response to an increasingly prevalent and pervasive sense of insecurity that has come to function as one of the defining social problems of our age.

2.5 Conclusion

Ultimately, Mythen and Walklate (2005: 380) observe that little coherent attention has been paid to the question of terrorism and moreover, highlight the absence of 'empirical precision' in the research that has been carried out thus far. This review of existing — and limited — literature corroborates both points. There is a lack of empirical research that interrogates suppositions about the securitisation of policing by examining tangible changes to routine practice on the ground. Furthermore, the work that has been done focuses predominantly on the discourse-analytic study of text which precludes an empirical interrogation of the impact of the securitisation process on the action of everyday police routines. However, the review of literature that examines the relationship between security, policing and community safety highlights a number of themes and issues that are pertinent to the current research. In particular, the debates around police governance resonate within both the theoretical and methodological frameworks that underpin this research study. For example, insofar as localisation as well as centralisation can be used as a conduit for securitisation, to what extent does either tendency help us understand the actual content of police practice? To this extent, the notion of 'routine' is more helpful as it shifts analytical attention to the actual substance of policing. This also implies a research strategy that can access this substance. Moreover, it is important to note the impact of CSPs on routine policing, and in particular the strategic assessments undertaken by CSPs which are important drivers of routine policing. This research examines the

26 This is suggested by the Quantitative Content Analysis of the Fortnightly Tasking Meetings and Action Plans of the case study force which are discussed in Chapters Four to Six.
prevalence and pertinence of such issues in the examination of the ways in which the case study force as security ‘actor’ negotiates social, political and cultural pressures in the quest for community security and safety.

Nevertheless, the current research argues that securitisation theorists’ propensity to focus predominantly on the discourse-analytic study of text which, precludes an empirical interrogation of the impact of the securitisation process on the action of everyday police routines, generates a number of implications. In particular, there is a tendency to impute or infer changes to practice from policy rhetoric and exhortation. It is argued that this has fundamental implications for theoretical suppositions regarding the increasingly securitised nature of routine policing. Notwithstanding the work of Innes et al (2009) and Virta (2002) much of the research on the securitisation of policing leaves a series of questions to address. Such work suggests that an increased preoccupation with security and safety in light of recent socio-political shifts and terrorist attacks has had a profound impact on routine policing. Yet, where is the empirical evidence to support propositions about concrete shifts in policing practice? Where is the empirical data to indicate how far new policies have been implemented and the extent to which they have become embedded in routine activity? The current research seeks to address the empirical ‘gap’ and examine these questions by reversing the research focus from a concern with policy elites and the textual footprints of their talk and decisions to a concern with the impact on the organisations primarily tasked with implementing and delivering the policy responses on the ground.
Chapter Three: Operationalising a Critical Test

3.0 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to provide a detailed description of the methodological approach that was used to carry out the critical analysis of the securitisation thesis within the context of routine policing. The research design and the methodological approach to data generation are guided by specific research questions that derive from existing theoretical assertions, namely that routine policing is becoming increasingly securitised. The research study takes the form of a 'critical test' of the securitisation thesis within the context of routine policing. However, the theory-research relationship that underpins this study is considered to be adaptive rather than deductive in nature. A fundamental issue for this research is how to operationalise a critical examination of a grand theoretical narrative such as the securitisation thesis within the context of a research setting such as routine policing. The main research question that drives this thesis is:

*To what extent is routine policing becoming increasingly securitised?*

However, it was necessary to devise an analytical framework within which to operationalise this question for the purposes of empirical enquiry. This research draws on Christopher Pollitt’s (2001) conceptual framework of policy convergence within the arena of public administration, and the three ‘levels’ that according to him are inherent to policy-making and implementation – ‘talk’, ‘decision’ and ‘action’. The analytical framework devised for this research study facilitates the re-formulation of the above research question into an operational question, which in turn can be used to adapt arguments that routine policing is being securitised. Thus the main research question is operationalised as:

*To what extent does security ‘talk’, and ‘decisions’ made within the arena of counter terrorism policy actually translate into ‘action’ on the ground in the form of tangible changes to local policing practice?*
The propositions of the securitisation thesis in relation to routine policing are examined through a case study of the extent and nature of 'securitisation' in one British police force area, including an exploration of the factors that shape routine policing. Qualitative methodologies are used to explore the nature and extent of securitisation within the context of counter terrorism policing, and quantitative methods are employed to construct an empirical measure of 'routine' policing. The chapter is structured around four key methodological aspects of the research design:

i) The analytical framework that underpins the research;

ii) The use of a UK police force as a single-embedded case study of routine policing in practice;

iii) The methodological strategies employed to generate the data, and particularly those used to generate an empirical measure of routine policing,

iv) The access issues and ethical considerations inherent to researching within a challenging research setting such as operational policing.

3.1 An Overview of the Research Strategy

The empirical research within this thesis is theoretically-driven rather than inductive. However, the overarching research strategy is considered to be *adaptive* rather than deductive in nature. The study takes the form of a critical test of the securitisation thesis within the context of routine policing. However, the research design facilitates the opportunity to move beyond the corroboration and/or falsification of the securitisation thesis in relation to empirical findings about actual police routines and practices. The analytical framework, which draws on Pollitt’s (2001) propositions about the policy process and the implementation gaps between talk, decisions and actions to generate these empirical findings enables the adaptation (Layder, 1998) of the securitisation thesis, in order to build theory about:
The securitisation thesis constructs a rather homogenised narrative of security which takes insufficient account of resistance. Securitisation can thus appear to be presented as an external fact that is beyond the reach or influence of its target audience; that which is subject to the process of securitisation. However, the research design of this study is structured around a mixed-methodological approach to data generation. This in turn impacts upon the epistemological and ontological assumptions that underpin the study. This research study draws upon critical realist approaches to understanding the social world. It is argued that there is a reality of routine policing that is separate from officers' description of it; the reality of what officers 'do' differs from what they 'say' they do. It is proposed that routine policing can only be truly understood by empirically examining the structures and practices that inform it. It is only at this point that we can begin to generate an assessment of the extent to which it is, or can be 'securitised'. Therefore, it is also argued that there is an objective reality to routine policing that can be measured through the quantitative content analysis of operational documents. It is acknowledged that the conceptual distinctions that inform the analytical framework of the thesis, and the methodological choice to content analyse police documents in order to formulate an empirical measure of routine policing will be subject to critical enquiry. It is further acknowledged that this research design and the methodological strategies employed within it are but one way in which to generate an understanding of concepts such as securitisation and routine policing. However, these methods are employed – and indeed innovated – in order to advance the empirical debates surrounding the relationship between securitisation and routine policing.

3.2. A Case Study Approach to Empirical Enquiry

The overarching aim of this research is to analyse empirically the extent to which policy 'talk' and 'decision' within the arena of counter terrorism translates into action in the form of tangible changes to routine police practice. The research explores the nature and impact of policy talk and decisions across three analytically distinct
security settings – the EU, the UK and one police force in England and Wales. However, it is the mid-size police force that serves as a single, embedded case study of ‘action’ in the form of routine police practice. A number of different types of case study have been identified; these include the unique or extreme case; the ‘typical’ case and the longitudinal case study (Yin, 2009). The current research exemplifies the ‘critical’ case as it comprises an identifiable theoretical framework and the case is chosen on the grounds that it can be used to determine whether a theory’s propositions are correct or whether some alternative set of explanations might be more relevant in the circumstances. This, in turn, facilitates the opportunity to both provide a critical test of the existing theoretical suppositions that underpin the securitisation thesis, and expand and develop the theoretical framework if appropriate. A number of design principles should be addressed when conducting case study research, namely, how well do the data support or challenge the theoretical arguments put forward, and is the theoretical analysis incisive? In short, does the theoretical analysis demonstrate connections between different conceptual ideas that are developing out of the data?

This study implements a single, embedded case study design and draws on Robert Yin’s (2009) case study work and the five core components he identifies as integral to this type of research. These include i) the study’s questions; ii) the study’s propositions; iii) the study’s unit(s) of analysis; iv) the logic linking the data to the propositions, and v) the criteria for interpreting the findings (2009: 27).

3.2.1 The study’s questions

According to Yin (2009), it is important to classify the type of research question being asked, and he indicates that what and how questions are best suited to case study research. Such an observation is reflected in the main research questions of this study which support the aim of the thesis; namely to analyse critically the theoretical supposition that policing is becoming increasingly securitised at the local level. The main research question that underpins this thesis is:

To what extent is routine policing becoming increasingly securitised?
The analytical framework devised for this research study facilitates the re-formulation of this question. The main research question is operationalised as:

*To what extent does security 'talk', and 'decisions' made within the arena of counter terrorism policy actually translate into 'action' on the ground in the form of tangible changes to local policing practice?*

By re-formulating the main research question it was also possible to address additional empirical and theoretical questions such as:

- How has the securitisation thesis been applied to policing to date, and what distinctions have been drawn between routine and securitised policing?
- What are some of the challenges facing the implementation and delivery of national counter terrorism policies and strategies at the local policing level?
- What are the implications of policy implementation and delivery 'gaps' for conceptualising policing change in terms of securitisation?

### 3.2.2 The Study’s Propositions: Applying Pollitt’s (2001) Conceptual Framework

It is argued that a study’s propositions direct the researcher towards something that should be examined within the research (Yin, 2009: 28). Moreover, it is argued that a critical case study is closely associated with testing pre-existing theoretical propositions rather than the construction of original propositions for the purpose of research. This research study is concerned with testing the existing theoretical proposition that routine policing is becoming increasingly securitised within the context of European and UK counter terrorism policy. The research design facilitates the critical ‘test’ of this proposition. Moreover, the analytical framework embodies the adaptive nature of the relationship between theory and research throughout this thesis. The analytical framework draws on Pollitt’s (2001) propositions about the policy process and the implementation gaps between talk, decisions and actions in order to a) falsify and/or corroborate the proposition that routine policing is being securitised, and b) to adapt such theoretical propositions in light of empirical findings regarding the nuanced relationship between securitisation and routine practice. In short the analytical framework facilitates the ability to:
- Establish a conceptual interpretation of counter terrorism policy 'talk', 'decision' and 'action';
- Identify the presence of each analytically distinct concept within the three security sites;
- Analyse the impact of each policy component on the nature of routine policing;
- Examine the challenges facing the implementation of national policing policies and strategies at the local level;
- Assess the implications of policy implementation gaps for conceptualising policing change in terms of securitisation.

This section now goes on to detail the core components of the analytical framework that underpins this thesis and highlights the importance of separating out analytically-distinct levels of policy for the purpose of empirical investigations into the relationship between securitisation and routine policing.

Political scientists have conducted a considerable amount of research in the area of public policy-making, and the focus of such work includes, but is not limited to, the provision of a general theory of public policy-making (Kingdon, 1995), and the uncertainties of the public policy-making process (Stone, 1988). However, little research has focused on crime control policy, and certainly even less on security and policing policy, specifically in relation to terrorism. Moreover, it is clear that there is a lack of empirical research that examines the outcomes of policies once they have been operationalised 'on the ground'. Jones and Newburn (2007: 23) highlight the complex and multi-faceted nature of public policy-making by stating that it is important to distinguish between different levels of policy, and in particular to draw distinctions between policy process and policy substance in order to examine a range of different levels 'ranging from the more symbolic elements such as ideas and rhetoric on the one hand to the more concrete manifestations such as policy instruments and practices on the other'. An examination of previous research into policy formation and policy implementation reveals a tendency to focus on the more concrete manifestations of policy in the form of policy statements, legislation and regulations. This is perhaps in part because such manifestations of policy are seen to
capture the 'actual choices of government' (Bernstein and Cashore, 2000: 70). Jones and Newburn (2007) make a number of points that are pertinent to this thesis, particularly in relation to notions of policy convergence and transfer. They argue that domestic policy making is increasingly open to the influence of institutions, economic forces and political/sociological issues operating beyond the borders of nation states. This observation resonates within this research due to the empirical focus on three conceptually distinct geo-political security spaces – the EU, the UK and the case study police force at the centre of the investigation.

However, this research draws on Christopher Pollitt's (2001) conceptual framework of policy convergence within the arena of public administration, and the three levels that according to him, are inherent to policy-making and implementation – talk, decision and action. Pollitt suggests that in order to make sense of the complexities of the public policy-making process it is important to consider and separate out the analytically distinct levels of ‘talk’ identified as policy rhetoric and symbolism; ‘decisions’ in the form of written policy statements, specific legislation and national programmes, and ‘action’ conceptualised as policy implementation ‘on the ground’. Pollitt (2001) argues that each of the three policy categories is important in its own right, and requires separate analysis, although he acknowledges that studies of reform talk, as distinct from decision and action, are limited. This observation is corroborated in Chapter Two of this thesis which reveals that most of the research associated with security policy and policing has focused on the discourse analysis of policy talk and decisions. Moreover, the chapter demonstrates the lack of empirical work that explores the impact of such securitised talk and decision on routine police practice or action. Pollitt’s (2001) conceptual framework facilitates an appreciation of the complexities of public policy making, and more importantly, it provides the opportunity to investigate empirically the impact of such talk and decision-making on the frontline of operational practice.

Pollitt (2001) argues that, in the realm of public sector management at least, convergence has been more visible in the spheres of ‘talk’, and to a certain extent in ‘decisions’ than in terms of ‘action’ in the form of substantive policy practices or outcomes. Moreover, he observes, that in practice, there are often significant gaps between these different levels of policy. Pollitt (2001: 934) also notes that ‘a great
deal of talk can develop around concepts such as New Public Management without that signifying an equal amount of action in the same direction’. This observation reinforces the work of Brunsson (1989: 231) who suggests that ‘observers of organisations are prone to make the mistake of supposing that organisational statements and decisions agree with organisational actions’. Both policy theorists consider such a divergence between talk, decision and action to be the norm within organisational life. However, this point is particularly pertinent within the context of policing because the implementation gap is arguably greater than in any other sphere of public policy. This is primarily on account of what is known about the institution, namely that it is identified as a rational, top down organisation and is characterised by significant levels of front-line discretion and an enduring and influential occupational culture. Thus, a legitimate hypothesis could be that the distance between ‘talk’ on the one hand, and ‘action’ on the other is likely to be greater than in other areas of public policy. The analytical framework of this research facilitates both the recognition and examination of the extent to which such a proposition resonates within the relationship between securitisation and routine policing.

Adapting Pollitt’s Conceptual Distinctions to Counter-Terrorism Policy

It is clear that many of the observations outlined above resonate strongly within the criminal justice policy-making process. This research adopts and expands Pollitt’s conceptual distinctions between policy talk, decision and action in order to examine the extent to which security ‘talk’, and ‘decisions’ made within the arena of counter terrorism policy are actually translated into ‘action’ on the ground in the form of tangible changes to local policing practice. In general terms policy talk is identified as political or policing ideas, symbolism or rhetoric and exhortation; policy decisions are understood as concrete manifestations of policy in the form of legislation and/or executive agreements and instruments, and policy action is conceptualised as tangible changes to routine policing practice.

However, the challenge for this thesis was to find a viable, empirical way to operationalise Pollitt’s (2001) conceptual framework within a complex and multifaceted research setting. In particular, it was important to distinguish between talk, decision and action in order to establish what is routine about policing and from there examine the grounds on which it can be considered ‘securitised’. The research
identifies a number of exemplars of securitised ‘talk’, decision and ‘action’ within the context of counter terrorism policy across three distinct geo-political spaces or security ‘sites’ – the EU, the UK and the case study police Force. Drawing on Waever’s (1996: 108) security concepts these three spaces are identified as referent objects of security which retain a specific ‘security identity’.

In devising the analytical framework for this thesis it was important to make two sets of conceptual distinctions. Firstly, it was important to make a clear and coherent distinction between policy ‘talk’ and ‘decision’. Secondly, it was vital to link the analytical framework with the theoretical framework that underpins the thesis. Therefore, it was important to make clear the distinction between these generic conceptualisations and ‘securitised’ talk, decision and action. It was particularly important to make a coherent distinction between routine police action and ‘securitised police action’. Ultimately, the analytical framework of this research facilitates a nuanced examination of the nature of counter-terrorism policy-making at the levels of talk, decision and action, and the inherent challenges to implementation and delivery ‘on the ground’.

**Distinguishing between Security Policy Talk and Security Policy Decisions**

This research study considers relevant talk (in the form of rhetoric, exhortation or symbolic policy) to be securitised – or at least demonstrate a tendency towards being securitised – if it represents discourse pertaining to an identified existential threat and the discussion or debate of the use of extraordinary, emergency measures to counter the threat. Within the context of this research the identified existential threat or the issue(s) lifted ‘to an ‘urgency and necessity above normal politics’ (Waever, 1996: 107) – both within Europe and the UK – is terrorism and/or radicalisation. Such talk can manifest itself within the case study force as verbal or textual reference to the changing nature of the terrorist threat, key policy aims and objectives and observations on the role of routine policing in countering terrorism and violent extremism. Having established a conceptual understanding of policy talk it was crucial to construct a coherent, analytical, distinction between policy talk and policy decision. In short, it was important to identify the unique elements of a ‘concrete policy instrument’ that take it beyond the level of ‘talk’ and into the realm of a tangible ‘decision’.
This thesis proposes that policy 'talk' can be distinguished from policy 'decision' by the presence of tangible mechanisms of enforcement which necessitate some form of organisational and/or institutional compliance. Such powers of enforcement might be characterised as government legislation, financial incentive for implementation (or conversely financial penalty for non-implementation) and/or organisational compliance mechanisms. Within the context of this thesis such enforcement mechanisms are exemplified by concrete 'legislative decisions' in the form of legally-bestowed powers for the police; concrete 'institutional decisions' characterised by compliance mechanisms such as ring-fenced, national funding (with mandatory evaluation of implementation progress at the end), or the introduction of new and specific frameworks of performance assessment in the area of counter terrorism and extremism. An applied distinction between policy talk and decision can be made within the context of security policy through reference to the EU’s counter terrorism policy framework. Security policies about counter terrorism and radicalisation – at both the international and national level – incorporate a range of strategies, objectives and intervention activities. However, if one applies the analytical framework of this thesis to the various programmes and agreements pertaining to counter terrorism and radicalisation within an EU context, they remain little more than rhetoric and exhortation because they do not have a legally-binding framework for compliance attached to them.

They are not 'decisions' by virtue of the legal standing of EU level pronouncements on Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). JHA issues were not formally recognised as an area of common interest for Member States until the 'Maastricht Treaty' in 1992. Moreover, and due in part to Member State interests and associated political sensitivities, JHA matters were not brought within the normal decision-making process (First Pillar) but were subject to inter-governmental cooperation under the Third pillar of the European Union\(^\text{27}\). The First Pillar is based on the 'community' method with Member States sharing their sovereignty and working together through the EU Institutions. Each EU Institution plays a role in the decision-making process whereby the Commission proposes, the Council and Parliament adopt and the Court of Justice ensures compliance with Community law. The Second and Third Pillars

\(^{27}\) Although the Treaty of Amsterdam incorporated some aspects of JHA into the First Pillar including asylum and immigration policy and issues concerning judicial cooperation (Focus, 2006)
comprise a decision-making process based on intergovernmental cooperation, usually requiring unanimity. The Second Pillar deals with the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Third Pillar revolves around Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCC), and pertinent to this research this includes issues around counter terrorism and extremism. The Court of Justice has no role and the Commission and Parliament have only limited involvement with these two Pillars. Balzacq (2006: 3) identifies the existing policy ‘tools’ under the EC first pillar as regulations, directives and decisions whereas, the EU third pillar policies are characterised as conventions, positions and frameworks. This observation is consistent with the conceptualisation of policy levels within this thesis as the absence of a role for the Court of Justice within the Third Pillar ensures that there are no mechanisms for compliance with the strategies and initiatives that are introduced under the auspices of the PJCC. Notwithstanding developments under the Lisbon Treaty the key point to be made here – particularly in terms of attempts to analyse critically the securitisation thesis in the context of routine policing – is that to treat all decisions as simply alternative discourses consequently undermines an understanding of the variegated relations of power associated with different kinds of decision, the scope for discretion in terms of their interpretation and implementation, and therefore, capacities for resistance. This latter point will be discussed in the final section of Chapter Five which discusses the implementation of counter-terrorism policy ‘decisions’ within the case study force, and the extent to which such decisions play an integral role in the conceptualisation of contemporary routine policing.

A number of examples of securitised decisions are highlighted within this research, and most notably at the national, UK level of policy-making. Within the context of this research such legislative and executive decisions are considered ‘securitised’ because they were created as a direct response to, or strategy for, countering the existential threat posed by terrorism or radicalisation. Securitised decisions are evident in the form of counter terrorism legislation that bestows emergency and

28 This also has a number of implications in terms of democratic accountability as the European Court of Justice (ECJ) also does not have full competence to review and interpret the policy agreements associated with judicial co-operation in criminal matters and police cooperation.

29 It is acknowledged that the Treaty of Lisbon has altered this situation by removing the pillarised structure of the EU. However, the pillarised structure still existed during the period of empirical research for this thesis and it remains to be seen whether post-Lisbon Treaty policy-making in the EU results in equipping the Court of Justice with powers to ensure Member State compliance.
extraordinary powers on routine police officers such as the power to stop and search
individuals without reasonable suspicion\(^3\). A number of cross-government, executive
strategies are also conceptualised as securitised decisions, for example, the UK’s
CONTEST strategy (2003 and 2009) and, in particular the Prevent strand of this
strategy. It is conceptualised as a securitised decision because it was devised as a
concrete policy response to the existential threat perceived to be posed by radicalism
and domestic extremism. Furthermore, it retains a number of compliance
mechanisms such as ring-fenced, national funding (with mandatory evaluation of
implementation progress at the end), and the introduction of new and specific
frameworks of performance assessment in the area of counter-terrorism and
extremism. This study examines the extent to which such decisions are evident within
the case study force by analysing discernible shifts in the focus of performance
assessment or operational tasking priorities at the local (BCU level).

Such analytical distinctions are applied to the analysis of the empirical work
undertaken for this research and presented in Chapters Four and Five. However, an
important point to highlight is that this thesis is not suggesting that talk and rhetoric
are by any means unimportant. Rather, the argument here is that the different
dimensions of policy are distinct from each other, and it is often misleading and
unhelpful to conflate them. It is duly acknowledged that talk does indeed have real
consequences as demonstrated in the influential work on ‘moral panics’ (Cohen,
1987). Moreover, the levels of policy ‘talk’ and ‘decision’ often share a symbiotic
relationship as demonstrated in numerous areas of crime control policy transfer
between the States and the UK. These include the ‘privatizing punishment’ prisons
policy; ‘zero-tolerance’ policing policy and ‘three strikes’ sentencing policy (Jones
and Newburn, 2005; 2007). More specifically, these distinctions are necessary to
investigate security ‘in action’ (rather than the imputation of security from text) and
are implied not just in Pollitt’s framework but in political science research
emphasising the implementation gap between policy formulation and outcomes
(Barrett and Fudge, 1981).

\(^3\) Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000.
Action as 'Routine' Police Practice

The analytical concept of 'action' within this study expands on Pollitt’s interpretation; that of, 'practical application of policy on the ground' to facilitate an exploration of tangible changes to routine police practice. In order to investigate evidence of such possible change it is important to retain a clear understanding of how routine policing is conceptualised within the thesis. Within this thesis the two concepts – action and routine practice – are synonymous with each other and together they serve as one of the empirical cornerstones of the study. The concept of routine policing within this thesis has been generated by carrying out a quantitative content analysis (QCA) of fortnightly tasking action plans within the case study force. A more detailed examination of the methodological approach to conceptualising routine policing for the purposes of empirical enquiry is provided later in this chapter. However, it is important at this point to highlight key distinctions between routine policing and securitised policing as it is integral to the empirical integrity of this thesis focused as it is on the impact of national counter terrorism policies on routine police activity. Ultimately, it is argued that an effective way to distinguish between routine policing and 'securitised' routine policing is to separate out 'crimes' and (perceived) 'threats'. Traditionally, there has been a social assumption that citizens will not come to the attention of the police unless they are involved in a criminal act either as offender, victim or witness. The notion that there has to be a crime involved appears constant for certain (routine) offences, for example, theft of a motor vehicle (TOMV), burglary dwelling (BDW) or some form of assault. These are collectively referred to as serious and acquisitive crimes (SAC) and serve as the predominant performance priorities for routine policing (at both the response and neighbourhood policing teams (NPTs) levels). However, in some instances, it appears that a demonstrable criminal act is no longer a precondition of raising the awareness of the police; in some cases a perceived threat, risk or sense of insecurity may now be sufficient. In this way securitised policing reflects proactive, intelligence-led methods of policing.

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31 The relationship between national performance priorities and the strategic assessments undertaken by community safety partnerships as drivers of routine policing are discussed in Chapter Two and Chapter Five.
Furthermore, the research draws in part on Brodeur's (1983) conceptualisations of high and low policing to differentiate between the two policing paradigms32. Routine policing can be equated to 'low' policing in that it is commonly associated with traditional notions of protecting the public from everyday volume crime and maintaining public order. It can be argued that routine policing becomes 'securitised' in some way when it adopts some of the 'high' policing characteristics traditionally associated with 'specialist' units such as Special Branch and the Security Services. These include a strategic and tactical emphasis on intelligence collection on individuals and groups deemed to be involved in more 'macro' crimes that threaten national security and thus pose an existential threat to society. There are a number of securitised decisions and strategies that offer up the potential for the securitisation of routine policing. One of the foremost of these is the Prevent strategy and the emphasis it places on the role of neighbourhood policing in developing Key Individual Networks (KINS); community profiles; the identification of individuals who may be vulnerable to radicalisation (Channel Project) all of which reflect the increased emphasis placed on intelligence gathering at the local policing level, and in particular the gathering of community intelligence at the neighbourhood policing level (Innes, 2006).

3.2.3 The Study's Unit of Analysis: A Police Force as Single Case Study

This component is related to the fundamental issue of defining the 'case' in case study research. The term has associations with a single community, family, person event or as in this thesis – and much notable research before it – a single organisation (Bryman, 2008). As Yin (2009) notes, theoretical sampling (rather than representative sampling) has been key to justifying the case study approach to empirical enquiry. There are a number of reasons for choosing a single, embedded case study research design. The police force is considered a 'referent object of security' (Waever, 1996) in its own right, and the aim of the research is to provide a

32 It is duly acknowledged that Brodeur’s (1983) conceptualisations have been applied to a policing environment that the theorist would historically consider to be characteristic of 'low' policing. However, Brodeur (2007) has revised his theoretical perspective in light of the events of 11 Sept 2001, acknowledging that the resulting police response to the changed nature of the threat has necessarily blurred the boundaries between high and low policing. It for this reason that the conceptualisations can be usefully – and, it is argued legitimately – applied to the routine/securitised policing distinction debate.
detailed elucidation of it within the context of EU and UK counter terrorism agreements and policies. The research is interested in the unique features of the force and does not seek to generalise to the wider UK policing community. In this regard the research is idiographic in nature, contrasting with nomothetic research which is concerned with generating statements that apply regardless of time and place (Edwards and Hughes, 2005). The empirical aspects of this current research are wholly situational and it is acknowledged that the findings are contingent on timing; if the research had been undertaken at another point in time in another force – or indeed in the same force – it is likely that different insights into the impact of counter terrorism policy at the local level would have arisen during the course of the research. This section details the formulation of a viable, single case study examination of routine policing and highlights a number of reasons why it is possible to generalise from an investigation of the case study force to the theoretical propositions about the securitisation of routine policing.

In April 2008 the Government’s Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) incorporated the allocation of £180 million to fund ‘ring-fenced’ posts within the police service to coordinate the implementation and delivery of the Prevent phase of Contest over a three-year period. The case study Force was prioritised as one of twenty-four forces responsible for policing areas with higher levels of ‘risk’ across England and Wales to receive Prevent funding in the first year. The funding was allocated according to assessments of population, vulnerability and the evaluation of intelligence available at the time. It was recognised that the implementation of Prevent would be phased throughout the priority forces and that initial investment would be targeted at priority BCUs. The case study BCU at the centre of this research study was identified as a Pathfinder BCU. As a prioritised, pathfinder area the BCU receives funding for Prevent-related training and designated security posts (DSPs). Furthermore, the Prevent funding facilitates the development of a Prevent Board at the Force level and there is BCU representation on that board. The board also comprises membership from local authorities and the Police Authority. There is a

33 See Prevent, Progress and Prospects (HMIC, 2008a).
34 However, the flexibility given to forces in relation to the establishment of DSPs has made it difficult to identify specific posts within the case study BCU. In general, the BCU often tasked an officer to provide strategic or tactical briefings and training updates to officers in addition to regular, routine duties.
clearly identified Prevent Delivery Manager within the BCU. In addition, the case study BCU was one of ten BCUs across England and Wales to receive funds to pilot the Channel Project. The Channel Project is a police-led, community-based, multi-agency partnership initiative designed to provide support for people who are identified as vulnerable to radicalisation and violent extremism in particular. It is based on a hybrid of multi-agency risk management projects that have been successfully used to manage other risks impacting upon people within communities\textsuperscript{35}. The fact that the case study force and BCU have been prioritised by HM Government as areas that are vulnerable to terrorism-related phenomena such as extremism and radicalisation suggest that it is reasonable to expect to find the securitisation of routine policing here.

The case study force is considered a mid-size police force within England and Wales and includes both large rural areas and a number of urban centres which include major governmental institutions, sporting arenas, and international transport links. The force covers an area of 812 square miles and is made up of a mixture of densely populated urban areas, coastal areas and rural communities. At the time of writing the force employed 3252 police officers, supported by 1769 police support staff; 328 PCSOs and 334 special constables. The force is a member of 7 community safety partnerships (CSPs) which cover the force area. The force comprises 6 divisions or basic command units (BCUs) and, with the exception of one, each BCU is coterminous with its unitary authority and community safety partnership. At the time of writing the case study force comprises 70 Neighbourhood Policing Teams (NPTs) which equates to 456 officers and 327 Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) dedicated to Neighbourhood Policing\textsuperscript{36}. Every identified neighbourhood within the force has a named police contact. In most cases this is a PCSO as they are less likely to be abstracted from neighbourhood roles to perform other duties. At the time of writing the case study BCU was in the process of developing from Neighbourhood Policing to the next stage of combined neighbourhood management, which involves the local authority devolving a number of services under a community manager to work at a local police sector level.

\textsuperscript{35} These include Multi Agency Risk Assessment Conferences (MARACs) for domestic abuse and Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPAs).

\textsuperscript{36} http://www.hmic.gov.uk/SiteCollectionDocuments/South%20Wales/P2B_SOW_20080831.pdf
However, it is important to acknowledge that a single police force is not a homogenous case study setting. The data for this research was generated at a number of different research sites throughout the force, and at different organisational levels. This had a fundamental impact on the nature (and number) of the study’s units of analysis. The nature of the research aims inherent to this study necessitated the identification and exploration of multiple units of analysis. The overarching unit of analysis for this research is identified as counter terrorism policy, and in particular the implementation of the Prevent strand of the UK’s counter terrorism strategy, CONTEST (2003; 2009).

However, this analytical unit was explored across different research sites which in turn constituted different organisational levels of the case study force. One of the key methodological aims of the research was to move beyond the strategic, often rhetorical data that is traditionally associated with research into policy implementation (i.e. policy ‘talk’). In short I wanted to reverse the empirical focus from a concern with policy elites and the ‘textual footprints’ of their talk and decisions, to a concern with the action of everyday, local police routines. In order to ascertain the nature of counter terrorism policy and its implementation and impact at the sharp end of local police practice I had to ‘drill down’ metaphorically through the force – to collect data from within a number of embedded, analytical ‘sub-units’. Diagram 3.1 below presents an overview of the different sub-units.
At this point it is possible to further develop Yin’s (2009) observations on single, embedded case study design by focusing on the empirical work undertaken in each analytical sub-unit in order to achieve research aims. In order to explore the extent to which evidence of ‘securitisation’ was visible within these analytical sites a number of ‘empirical pinch-points’ were identified which operate at a more micro-level within the case study force. These are counter terrorism policy ‘talk’, ‘decision’ and ‘action’, which in turn reflect the conceptual framework of the research. The identification of the three analytically-distinct aspects of counter terrorism policy and ‘what counts’ in terms of the empirical pinch-points is discussed in detail in Section 3.1 of this chapter. However it is pertinent to reiterate at this point that these empirical pinch-points served simultaneously to narrow the focus of my research and in turn ensure that I collected data relevant to my key research questions.

The process of identifying a valid unit of analysis (and indeed related empirical pinch-points) incorporates a number of additional considerations.
i) Variations in the understanding and awareness of the overarching unit of analysis within each of the analytical sub-units

It is conceivable (and perhaps should be assumed) that within a single, embedded case study setting there is going to be variations in the knowledge of key concepts, strategic policies and operational strategies. For example, different aspects of current UK counter terrorism policy are going to be understood (and perhaps prioritised) in different ways and to varying degrees based on the different areas of responsibility and accountability officers and support staff hold within the Force. In other words, the nature of the data is contingent on whether the emphasis within each sub-unit revolves around policy creation, implementation or delivery. This in turn might have an impact on the data generated in terms of the prevalence of the study’s empirical pinch-points. For example, evidence of ‘talk’ and ‘decision’ may be more prevalent at the Force HQ or senior management level where priority is given to policy implementation whereas ‘action’ may be more identifiable at the frontline of police practice where, policy delivery is (perhaps) most tangible.

ii) Time boundaries: when to start and finish data collection

The identification of a national policy as a case study unit of analysis necessitates an awareness of and capacity to account for a number of inherent issues, and one of the most salient for this research was that policy-making and implementation are dynamic processes rather than ‘events’. It is important to acknowledge the limitations placed on case study research that has a finite timescale; both in terms of data collection and the nature of data analysis and subsequent discussion of the implications of findings. There will always be pre-existing aspects of policy in place in the analytical sub-units prior to the commencement of data collection. This can be either understood as policy preparation in anticipation of changes to aspects of organisational structure, or phased implementation across a range of departments. Moreover, it is often the case that policy implementation and delivery will continue to develop after the researcher has left the fieldwork setting. These considerations were particularly pertinent to this research; it became clear that the implementation and delivery of Prevent was an ongoing phenomenon within the case study force, and it would continue apace after I left the fieldwork setting. Given that the primary aim of
my research was to explore the extent to which local policing is becoming increasingly securitised, how important was it that I seek to establish change over time? I have come to the conclusion that the aims of my research study – to analyse the nature and impact of current policing policy responses to the evolving phenomenon such as transnational terrorism – can be addressed effectively by the single case study design. It is acknowledged that the terrorism threat has ratcheted up since data was collected. Equally, however, the UK now has a new government with a new set of political perspectives on the legitimate nature of responses to terrorism. It is the nature of social science research to operate within the parameters of a world that does not stand still, and that must often also accommodate the contingent nature of policy-making and implementation.

3.2.4 Linking Data to Propositions and Criteria for Interpreting the Findings

Yin (2009) suggests that the fourth and fifth components of case study research foreshadow the data analysis stages of research. He suggests that an effective way of linking the data generated to the research propositions is through a process of ‘pattern matching’ whereby several pieces of information from the same case (identified in this research as key thematic areas) are related to the theoretical propositions inherent to research (2009: 34). So one of the main analytical aims of this research is to identify empirical evidence to support or contest the theoretical assertion that routine policing is becoming increasingly driven by a logic of securitisation. The issue of what counts as evidence in this regard has already been addressed by the analytical framework of the thesis, which in turn has been reiterated through the above discussion of the chosen units of analysis and ‘empirical pinch-points’.

The notion of ‘pattern matching’ is manifest throughout data analysis and the subsequent discussion of key findings which, highlight cogent relationships between increased securitisation and the analytically distinct levels of counter terrorism policy-making, implementation and delivery. As understood within the conceptual framework of this case study research, there is evidence of a significant increase in securitised ‘talk’ (understood as rhetoric and exhortation), and some evidence of securitised ‘decision-making (identified as concrete policy instruments with some form of compliance mechanism attached to them) operating within the case study
police force. However, there is discernibly less empirical evidence of securitised ‘action’ (identified as counter terrorism related change to routine police practice). The possible reasons for this, identified as challenges to national policy implementation and delivery are the focus of Chapters Five and Six. However, from a methodological perspective, the analytical framework of this thesis, articulated within the context of case study research design provides identifiable ways to link the data to the research propositions, and clear criteria for interpreting the findings that emerge from the study.

3.2.5 Summary

The aim of this research is to test the predominantly discourse-based pronouncements regarding securitisation of local policing by undertaking a mixed methodological exploration of the extent and nature of ‘securitisation’ in one British police force area, including an exploration of the factors that shape routine policing. The research also aims to produce a different kind of study to those that have dominated the field to date; a more focused study that attempts to distinguish between different 'levels' of policy (talk, decisions, action), and highlight the dangers in conflating them when carrying out empirical research. This section has provided a coherent overview of the research strategy and provides sound justification for the research design that drives the thesis. In doing so it addresses issues of external validity, generalisibility and representativeness. The research strategy is characterised by an adaptive approach to the theory-research relationship. Furthermore, in adopting a single, embedded case study research approach the thesis recognises the fundamental distinctions between ‘statistical’ generalisation and ‘analytic’ generalisation (Yin, 2009: 38). This research makes no attempt to generalise findings in an empirical sense to the wider policing population. The research is interested in how the empirical findings can be generalised to existing and relevant theory, not the wider policing community in England and Wales. Moreover, the research does not make claims to representativeness about the extent of securitisation of routine policing in different countries or indeed across other UK forces. The decision to use a single police force as a case study of routine police practice is justified on the grounds that the case study force and BCU have been prioritised by HM Government as areas that are vulnerable to terrorism-related phenomena such as extremism and radicalisation and as such is in
receipt of funding to implement and delivery Prevent-specific initiatives. Therefore, it is considered reasonable to expect to find the securitisation of routine policing here. Ultimately the decision to carry out a single case study test of the securitisation thesis was based on a combination of pragmatic and analytical factors. However, what is perhaps lost in breadth through carrying out a comparative case study is gained in depth of insight and analysis. The single case study design provided the opportunity to ‘drill down’ through a police force in order to analyse the dynamics and processes of securitisation, including the resistance and re-shaping of it in as far as it exists.

3.3 Research Methods

I adopted a mixed methodological approach to data generation and incorporated both qualitative and quantitative strategies into the research design.

The quantitative data was generated through:

- quantitative content analysis (QCA) of fortnightly tasking ‘Action Plans’.

These action plans were drawn up following the fortnightly tasking meetings that took place in the case study BCU during the six months of fieldwork for this research (June – November 2008). The aim of the QCA was to:

i) formulate an empirical measure of ‘routine’ policing practice at the BCU level;

ii) ascertain the extent to which counter terrorism policing features in BCU operational tasking and routine policing activity.

By undertaking these two objectives it was possible to examine the extent to which counter terrorism policy ‘talk’ and ‘decision’ manifest themselves within routine police activity in the case study BCU. This in turn contributes to an exploration of the extent to which routine policing at the local (neighbourhood) level is becoming increasingly ‘securitised’ within the case study BCU.
The qualitative data was generated through:

- semi-structured interviews with police officers across all ranks within the case study force;
- documentary analysis of relevant counter terrorism policy text across three geo-political regions: the EU, the UK and the case study police force,
- non-participant observation of force meetings, primarily at the BCU level.

Fielding and Innes (2006: 138) argue that a characteristic of qualitative research is that when it seeks to understand a professional practice it attends at least as much to the process involved as to the outcomes. They suggest that qualitative and quantitative approaches are complementary and both are needed to get a fuller picture (2006: 133). It is argued that the methodological approach employed within this study offers the potential to provide a more nuanced and detailed understanding of the analytically distinct levels inherent to security policy-making. It also facilitates a more meaningful evaluation of the processes inherent to the creation and implementation of such policy and in particular the impact of counter terrorism policy on routine police practice, which in turn contributes to a critical test of the extent to which policing is becoming increasingly securitised.

3.3.1 Qualitative Research Strategies

There is widespread rejection of the idea that researchers can be completely neutral collectors of information about the social world. They are instead seen to be ‘actively constructing knowledge about that world according to certain principles and using certain methods derived from, or which express, their epistemological position’ (Mason 2002: 52). However it is important to note that the two qualitative methods used for this research originate from different epistemological perspectives. Semi-structured interviewing and documentary analysis generate different forms of knowledge and therefore generate different types of data for analysis. Furthermore it is widely acknowledged that different methods provide researchers with different lenses on the world. The lens of the interview is verbal – what people say and mean – but its temporal range is ‘biographical’ (Warren 2001: 85). Interviews depend on
participants being able to recollect past circumstances or contemplate future possibilities. In contrast, the emphasis of documentary analysis is predominantly textual. Furthermore, consideration must be given to the language, the ‘intertextual’ nature of documents and the author and reader whether they be implied or actual (Coffey and Atkinson, 2004). However, it is important to note that no method whether it is used in isolation or as part of a collective approach can be said to reveal the ‘real truth’. I sought to analyse my interview data with documentary sources where possible in order to enhance the legitimacy of the findings. Lilleker (2003) and Davies (2001: 75) discuss the usefulness of employing a ‘sociological triangulation strategy of multi-methodological research’ when conducting elite interviews. However it has also been argued that this analytical approach can increase the complexity of analysis. The use of different standpoints for qualitative research means that one not only sees the same thing from a different angle, one sees entirely different facets of that thing. So, an interviewee may provide additional information to that found in a documentary record. Therefore the technique of triangulation when used by a qualitative researcher can be seen to be ‘additive as well as corroborative’ (Davies, 2001: 75).

3.3.1.1 Semi-structured Interviewing

One of the foremost aims of the semi-structured interviews was to discover the various ways in which police officers ‘talk’ about their work and thus provide narrative accounts of the ways in which they interpret their role as routine police practitioners. It was made clear to research participants at the outset of data collection with the case study force that the focus of the research was the nature of routine policing, rather than an explicit focus upon the role of counter terrorism policing at the local level. In this way it was possible to generate a comprehensive knowledge of the core component parts of routine policing according to those working at the different ranks within the police force. By taking the discursive focus away from terrorism per se but noting down the time it took for interviewees to reference terrorism or counter terrorism in some form it was possible to begin to generate an objective understanding of the extent to which counter terrorism policies and operational strategies play a part in routine police activity. The semi-structured
interviews were carried out in order to provide a ‘thickly descriptive knowledge’ of routine police work.

The use of semi-structured interviews was deemed appropriate for this purpose because they retain a ‘complexity-capturing ability’ and thereby facilitate the opportunity to look for ‘patterns of interrelationship between many categories rather than the sharply delineated relationship between a limited set of them’ (Fielding and Innes, 2006: 136). These observations were highly relevant to this study because existing research reveals routine policing to be a highly complex aspect of police practice characterised by pluralistic narratives of competing demands in the form of external, political pressures and internal, organisational imperatives. The notion of competing demand resonates within the context of neighbourhood policing where officers must negotiate the twin masters of national performance targets and community-set priority actions.

**Sampling Issues**

There were important issues to consider when deciding on the sample for the project. There had to be sufficient diversity within the sample to effectively cover all of the research objectives. Although I entered the field with a clear idea of the substantive areas I intended to cover in the interviews, it was not until I became familiar with my research setting that the criteria for selection of the interview sample were finalised. As my presence in the research environment increased, the more interview opportunities presented themselves. I believe that this in itself reveals that securing access to some institutions in some instances, is less about providing information and more about establishing relationships with individuals within an institution. The research sample also benefited from sustained contact with senior members of the Force Command Team and they were in a position to ‘open doors’ and direct me to individuals within relevant areas of expertise. It is acknowledged that one of the benefits of researching within a hierarchical institution such as the police is that when a senior officer permits access to lower ranking members of a team or department it is determined that personal accountability for the information provided in interviews lies with the commanding officer.
I carried out 39 interviews across the ranking spectrum of the case study policy force; from Chief constable to PCSO. I decided to ‘drill down’ through the ranks of the force in order to move beyond the strategic, and often rhetorical data I was generating at the level of Force Command to access the perceptions of the lowest ranks, where quite uniquely within a hierarchical institution there are the highest levels of discretion. It also offered the potential to generate narrative accounts of the impact that national policies were having at the sharp end of local police practice. The status of my respondents influenced the preparation before each interview, the construction of the interview schedule, and the strategies that were employed during the interviews. It was important to remember the dynamic nature of the environment I was entering when conducting these interviews, and acknowledge both the benefits and potential obstacles that such a setting can present to a researcher. Many of the interviews provided insights into activities that take place out of the public gaze, particularly when I was interviewing those responsible for operational decisions. As Berry (2002: 681) observes ‘open-ended questions have the virtue of allowing the subjects to tell the interviewer what’s relevant and what’s important rather than being restricted by the researcher’s preconceived notions about what is important’. By adopting a semi structured, thematic approach to the interviews I was able to draw upon the very detailed knowledge that the informants typically possessed in relation to routine policing activity. As far as possible I researched the background of each informant, or, at the very least made sure that I was aware of their areas of responsibility. This ensured that the questions I posed were relevant to their areas of expertise. This was crucial given the limited time I usually faced in terms of interview length. On occasion, I found that a pre-arranged one hour interview was shortened to twenty minutes upon arrival. This occurred both during interviews with Force Command officers and frontline staff. In addition I was always aware that I would probably have only one chance to interview each individual. For all of these reasons it was necessary to be well briefed, develop an expansive interview agenda but to be very clear about topic priorities.
Interview Schedule\footnote{37}

Gerson and Horowitz (2002) believe that successful interviews depend on the prior construction of a theoretically informed and user friendly interview schedule. The construction of the interview schedule reflects the myriad issues that must be taken into consideration when preparing to enter the research setting. Although it was intended that each interview would be similar in structure, it was acknowledged that they would always differ in terms of content, depending on the rank and functional specialism of the interviewee. This was taken into consideration when preparing the thematic question areas, and it was acknowledged that no two interviews would reveal the same information. The main thematic areas covered during interviews enabled the opportunity to explore two of the main research objectives:

1) To ascertain the nature of routine policing within the case study force

- Demographic nature of the BCU/Sector
- Specific crime and disorder issues facing the BCU/Sector
- BCU/Sector priorities
- Degree of discretion/autonomy retained by BCU/Sector Inspectors in relation to priority setting/tasking
- Nature of performance assessment and tasking at the BCU/Sector level
- Structure of Neighbourhood Policing Teams and core aspects of neighbourhood policing

2) To examine the role of counter terrorism within routine policing

- Extent to which general concerns about terrorism have filtered down to the BCU/Sector level
- Awareness of counter terrorism policies and operational strategies
- Counter terrorism training
- Extent to which counter terrorism affects running of the BCU/Sector or the operational conduct of officers
- Individual thoughts/observations on counter terrorism policing

\footnote{37 See Appendix A for interview schedule.}
The construction of the interview schedule highlights the complexities of interviewing within dynamic research settings. Many of the questions I asked either referred to operationally sensitive or politically contested issues. I was always conscious of when and how to ask the sensitive questions. I often began each interview with a ‘grand tour question’ (Spradley 1979) such as, can you tell me about the sector area that you police? The responses to such questions often provided a good platform from which to move onto more specific topic areas. The use of prompts or probes often became useful and served several purposes. They were particularly helpful if an informant seemed unwilling or simply unable to comprehensively answer certain questions. They were also effective in ensuring that issues pertinent to the research questions were alluded to if it appeared that interviewees were moving away from the focus of the questions. The questions that specifically related to counter terrorism were always asked at the end of interviews.

One of the key advantages of the semi structured interview is its versatility; it is possible to retain a degree of flexibility whilst also operating from within a standard framework. It is often said that a structured approach may be the most beneficial if the responses from informants are to be compared during subsequent analysis. However I argue that a semi-structured interviewing technique provides some semblance of standardisation which in turn permits a degree of comparability between interviews. As Fielding observes when using semi-structured interviews to research the police, ‘they were semi-structured by a thematic guide with probes and invitations to expand on issues raised’ (cited in May, 2001: 123). I adopted a similar approach which facilitated the identification of key themes. This in turn contributed to the presentation of my data as I had opted for a thematic approach to data analysis and the use of ‘probes’ often proved useful in obtaining ‘codeable’ answers.

Analysis of Interviews

I decided that a thematic and iterative approach to data analysis was most suitable for this research study. I conducted a total of 39 semi-structured interviews and each interview was completely transcribed. This in turn generated a richly-detailed yet admittedly, at times, rather cumbersome dataset. The thematic analysis was underpinned by a two-stage coding process. Stage 1 was characterised by a manual coding process which involved printing out all transcriptions and coding the interview
data according to broad reference to the analytically distinct concepts that underpin this thesis namely, policy ‘talk’, ‘decision’ and ‘action’. Ultimately, Stage 1 facilitated an examination of the extent to which examples of counter terrorism policy ‘talk’ were evident within the case study force and the ways in which aspects of the interview data could be interpreted as accounts of national policy ‘decisions’ and the impact they had on routine policing ‘action’.

Interview data was coded in terms of policy ‘talk’ when reference was made to international or national policy rhetoric, exhortation or debate. The aspects of interview data that focused on how officers articulate their routine roles and how terrorism and counter terrorism was understood by individual officers was also coded as ‘talk’. Interview data was coded in terms of policy ‘decision’ when reference was made to national legislative or executive decisions such as special police powers or the Prevent strand of the CONTEST strategy and the enforcement mechanisms that are attached to such policy decisions. Interview data was also coded in terms of policy decision when reference was made to force or BCU-specific strategic frameworks and priorities and the impact these have on local decision-making and the direction of operational policing activity. Finally, interview data was coded as policy ‘action’ if it served as a qualitative account of tangible changes to routine policing practice as identified through the quantitative content analysis (QCA).

Stage 2 involved the use of the qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) package, NVivo. The structure of the interview schedule facilitated both the identification of a number of key analytic themes or codes prior to the start of data collection and the emergence of unanticipated themes during the process of data collection. All of these themes or codes were recorded in NVivo during the course of the data collection period. Following the completion of Stage 1 all interview transcripts were uploaded to NVivo. At this point the transcripts underwent a rigorous coding process. In the first instance, the manual application of the three codes ‘talk’, ‘decision’ and ‘action’ to each printed transcript was replicated electronically in NVivo. Then, all transcripts were analysed systematically according to the pre-determined set of codes identified during the data collection period. This coding process revealed a number of analytic issues that ultimately helped to shape decisions about the analytic focus of the empirical chapters within the thesis. The
coding process facilitated an appraisal of the prevalence of themes across the dataset and the identification of key, substantive themes within each of the analytically distinct areas of policy ‘talk’, ‘decision’ and ‘action’. Moreover, the coding process highlighted thematic overlaps within the dataset which in turn prompted the development of new codes and thus new and relevant themes for analysis and discussion in the three empirical chapters of the thesis (Chapters Four to Six). Ultimately, the code and retrieve facility within NVivo proved helpful in identifying the prevalence and salience of analytic themes within what is a relatively large-scale dataset.

The salient, analytic themes within policy ‘talk’ were identified as:

- The different ways in which officers articulated and understood their routine work and primary responsibilities;
- The length of time it took to reference terrorism/counter terrorism;
- The different ways in which terrorism and counter terrorism are articulated and understood across police ranks.

The salient, analytic themes within policy ‘decision’ included:

- The nature and focus of performance assessment,
- The tension between national and local priorities.

The salient, analytic themes within policy ‘action’ were identified as:

- The role of intelligence work;
- The role of the National Intelligence Model (NIM) at the local level;
- The relationship between Special Branch and routine police officers;
- The nature of partnership working and community safety structures at the local level.

This research duly acknowledges the potential limitations of a coding approach to qualitative data analysis, particularly the criticism levelled at CAQDAS that the process of fragmenting data risks the loss of both context (Fielding and Lee, 1998) and narrative flow (Weaver and Atkinson, 1995). However, it is argued that the rigorous coding process facilitates an examination and subsequent depiction of the complex nature of both routine policing and counter terrorism policy-making and
implementation. The interview participants originated from a range of strategic and operational departments within the case study force. Therefore, the situational contexts, and thus the experiential nature of the data would often differ from interview to interview. By adopting a thematic approach to both interviewing and analysis I was able to compare and contrast responses and illustrate the key issues that emerged from the research setting. However it is important to note the complex and multifaceted nature of both the research topic and the empirical research setting. There are a significant number of themes that were necessarily passed over due to the practical constraints placed on the research. There are a number of specific considerations to note when analysing interview data and two are particularly pertinent to this research. They are the issues of validity (that data measures what it says it measures) and reliability (that results are stable over time). It is important that 'interviewers must always keep in mind that it is not the obligation of a subject to be objective and to tell us the truth' (Berry 2002: 680; Dexter 1970). I was aware that the majority of informants would be operating within an atmosphere where they constantly had to justify what they were doing. I was therefore very aware of the power of rhetoric.

Ultimately, it is acknowledged that an interview is 'a social encounter like any other, and that it tells the social researcher little about a reality that is 'external' to the interview' (May, 2001: 143). It seems more productive to view interview data not as 'accurate' or distorted' but as a means to discover how people perceive their surroundings, or react to events. I acknowledged early on that interviews alone may not be an adequate tool for understanding the impact of national counter terrorism policy on routine police practice. I therefore anticipated the benefit of corroborating the interview data that I generated with documentary analysis. Indeed, mid-way through the data analysis stages of this study it became apparent that it was appropriate to subordinate the interview data to both the documentary analysis and more pertinently, the QCA data. In this way the interview data was often interpreted as narrative accounts of policy decisions that have been taken and the ways they have impacted upon routine police practice.
3.3.1.2 Documentary Analysis

There are a number of observations on the role of documentary analysis within empirical research that are relevant to this study. It has been suggested that documentary analysis is, at worst, often overlooked as a methodological technique and, at best, perceived as secondary data inferior to that of 'oral' data gathered through interviews for example (May 2001; Prior, 2004; Coffey and Atkinson, 2004). This is certainly not an accusation that can be levelled at advocates of the securitisation thesis. Indeed, it is their reliance on the discourse-analytic study of text as a methodological approach to the generation of theoretical suppositions that serves as the basis for empirical critique throughout this study. It is widely observed that there are inherent risks to a heavy reliance on documentary sources. As Silverman (2001) highlights it is important that researchers adopt a realistic approach to the 'type' of documents that are used, and the volume that can be realistically analysed within a given timeframe. Furthermore, it must be acknowledged that documentary sources are not 'surrogates' for other kinds of data, and we 'cannot learn through written records alone how an organisation actually operates day by day (Coffey and Atkinson: 2004: 58). Moreover, it is crucial that documentary sources are not viewed as accurate reflections of any given situation. Rather, they construct their own kinds of reality and therefore it is important to treat them as 'texts' to be broken down and interpreted. As Coffey and Atkinson observe (2004: 61):

‘when organisations generate documentary records they transform diverse circumstances and people into documentary forms that can be processed in relatively predictable and standardised ways. They can then be used to do the sort of work that is currently popular among policy makers: setting achievement targets and measuring outcomes. Such political and organisational work is impossible without the construction of documentary facts and realities’ (2004: 61 emphasis mine).

This observation is undoubtedly pertinent to this research. Specifically, it resonates within both the documentary analysis and the quantitative content analysis (QCA) undertaken within the case study police force. However, this opening methodological critique is in no way intended to suggest that the study of elite policy text is unimportant. It merely contributes to the argument put forward by this research; that it is important to move beyond a focus on policy elites and the textual footprints of
their talk and decision in order to interrogate empirically the action of everyday, operational routines. This is particularly important when making suppositions about the increasingly securitised nature of local police practice.

The documentary analysis undertaken for this research has proven helpful in a number of ways. Noaks and Wincup (2004) observe that documentary analysis can be particularly useful in tracking trends or shifts in policy. This observation resonates strongly within the research study that focuses on security and securitisation. It is a discursive arena characterised by a dynamic policy-making framework and current scholarship on the concept of securitisation is rapidly evolving at the moment. In the absence of existing empirical investigation that focuses on the impact of national counter terrorism policy on routine police practice, the analysis of relevance political and organisational documents provided an effective starting point from which to ascertain key issues and priorities which could be addressed in both the interviews and the quantitative content analysis.

The management and analysis of the chosen documents is consistent with the approach adopted for the case study interview dataset. The documents were analysed thematically and this was informed by a multi-stage selection and coding process. Stage 1 involves the selection of documents that covered the three conceptually distinct geo-political security settings analysed within this research study – the EU, the UK and the case study police force. The key sampling criterion that guided Stage 1 was that the chosen documents were published or in operation during the period of fieldwork (May – December 2008). The selected documents (see below) were then coded in line with the analytically distinct concepts that underpin this thesis namely, policy ‘talk’, ‘decision’ and ‘action’. It is important to note that the choice of documents was based on the same sampling criterion as that guiding the selection of the case study force. Therefore, I selected documents within which one might most expect to find evidence of securitisation. The sampling criterion is considered an important aspect of operationalising a critical test of the securitisation thesis within routine policing. If it was discovered that that in fact the policy talk was not as ‘securitised’ as sometimes is presented, this would already bring into question some of the securitisation theorists’ propositions regarding the nature of routine policing even before one began to analyse the nature of policy decision and action.
The documents analysed within this research study are listed below according to their identification as exemplars of policy ‘talk’, ‘decision’ or ‘action’. The documents identified as exemplars of policy ‘talk’ are:

- The EU Counter Terrorism Strategy (Hague Programme 2005 – 2010)
- The EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment (Hague Programme 2005 - 2010)
- The European Security Strategy (2008)
- The EU TE-SAT Report (2008)
- The EU OCTA Report (2008)
- The UK’s National Security Strategy (2008)
- The UK’s National Community Safety Plan (2008 – 2011)
- UK Government Green Papers38
- UK House of Commons (Hansard) Debates in 2008
- UK Home Affairs Select Committee Minutes of Evidence (October 2008)39

The explicit and selective choice of documents identified as examples of policy ‘talk’ reflects the aim of this element of the research. The intention was not to attempt a detailed and comprehensive analysis of policy ‘talk’ in counter terrorism policing policy. As discussed in the literature review, these kinds of analyses have already been undertaken in a rigorous and expert way by a number of securitisation theorists and there is little point in replicating such analyses here. As outlined earlier, the primary empirical focus is upon the ‘decision’ and ‘action’ dimensions of policy. Thus, the analysis of policy ‘talk’ here is intentionally more modest, focusing on a selected number of policy texts and documents as exemplars of the kinds of shifts discussed by securitisation theorists which can then be a basis for further empirical examination in later chapters on ‘decision’ and ‘action’.

38 These include From the Neighbourhood to the National (Home Office, 2008a).
39 These include debates on the pre-charge detention of terrorist suspects and the identity card scheme.
The documents identified as exemplars of policy ‘decision’ are:

- The UK’s CONTEST strategy and in particular the Prevent Strategy (2003 and 2009)
- The case study Force Strategic Assessment (November 2007 – May 2008)
- The case study BCU Strategic Assessment (January – June 2008)
- The case study BCU Control Strategy (2008)
- COMPSTAT (May – December 2008)
- HMIC Reports

Finally, the documents identified as exemplars of policy ‘action’ are:

- The case study BCU Fortnightly Tasking and Co-ordinating Group Action Plans (June – November 2008)

These documents serve as the basis of the QCA that formulates the empirical measure of routine policing throughout this thesis.

The final stage of the coding process was informed by Stage 2 of the interview data analysis process. The key, substantive themes identified within each of the analytically distinct areas of policy ‘talk’, ‘decision’ and ‘action’ within the interview data were applied to the selected documents. In this way it was possible to compare and contrast the empirical data generated from both qualitative methodologies and gain a more detailed insight into the relative resonance or dissonance in the nature of counter terrorism policy talk, decision and action across the three geo-political security settings at the centre of the research study.

Scott (1990) distinguishes between four criteria when undertaking documentary analysis. The first of these focuses on authenticity; is the evidence genuine? The second point relates to credibility; is the evidence an accurate account, free from

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41 These include Prevent: Progress and Prospects (HMIC, 2008a).
distortion? The third criterion is representativeness, and the fourth focuses on meaning; is the evidence clear and comprehensible? Scott (1990: 35) stresses that quality appraisal is a 'never-ending process...which must be constantly in need of revision as new discoveries and new problems force the researcher to reappraise the evidence'. It has been my experience that working with documents is not without its methodological and analytical challenges, particularly when working within a research setting that is politically sensitive, 'policy dynamic' and subject to rapid theoretical evolution. It is important for the researcher to draw on their existing knowledge of the social context in which documents are compiled when ascertaining compliance with the above criteria.

It is equally important that the same methodological rigour is applied to the analysis of documentary evidence. As such it is advised that researchers make explicit the particular theoretical approach that informs their work (Silverman 2001) and 'establish a methodological framework for the analysis of documentary realities' (Coffey and Atkinson 2004: 58). It is clear that documents do not exist in isolation; they interact with other documents to generate meaning and any analysis must acknowledge such relationships. I therefore embarked on a paper trail in order to ascertain the extent of 'intertextuality' between the documentary sources (Coffey and Atkinson, 2004). This analytical technique proved particularly effective in ascertaining the resonance or dissonance within the levels of policy 'talk', 'decision' and action across the three geo-political security settings within the research study. By following an 'organisational decision, an innovation or a problem through a series of documents' (Coffey and Atkinson 2004: 68) I was able to gain an insight into the pluralistic narratives about counter terrorism policy and policing at the EU, UK and case study force levels and examine the extent to which such narratives actually impact on routine policing in the form of tangible changes to practice on the ground.

3.3.2 Quantitative Content Analysis: An Empirical Measure of Routine Policing

An empirical understanding of the nature of routine policing is fundamental to the central argument of this research. This research provides an empirical measure of routine police practice by carrying out quantitative content analysis (QCA) of the 'action plans' drawn up following the fortnightly tasking meetings that took place in
the case study BCU during the six months of fieldwork (June – November 2008). This section contextualises the fortnightly tasking action plans (FTAs) within the wider strategic and operational framework at the BCU level before detailing the processes inherent to the application of QCA.

The tasking procedures within the Force (and the BCU) are framed around the National Intelligence Model (NIM) which is essentially a comprehensive business process to rationalise and systematise the ways in which the police service handles information and makes key decisions about the deployment of resources. Two of the core components of the NIM are the creation and use of intelligence products and, the tasking and coordinating groups which are operational at both Force (Level 2) and BCU (Level 1) levels. One of the key intelligence products – at both Force and BCU levels – is the Tactical Assessment. These documents comprise intelligence retrieved and collated by the in-house intelligence databases such as NICHE to provide a clear indication of the nature and prevalence of crime and disorder at the BCU level. The BCU Tactical Assessment is updated every two weeks and is used to inform decisions on the prioritisation of problems and targets, to allocate ownership of problems to particular staff or operational departments, and as the basis for the planning of operational/tactical responses (Tregidga, 2003: Maguire and John, 2006).

The main users of these Tactical Assessments are the tasking and coordinating groups (TCGs) that meet every fortnight to discuss both ongoing and emerging issues at the BCU level (i.e. across divisional sectors); undertake informed assessments and prioritisation of problems, namely categorised crime and disorder occurrences, and plan, coordinate and manage the tactical police response. The meetings also serve as an opportunity to review the status of previously allocated operational responses (tasks) to certain crime or disorder occurrences. The outcome of these meetings is the creation of the fortnightly tasking action plans (FTAs). Those present at the meetings represent the core units, departments and teams that comprise operational policing at the BCU level. These include the BCU Superintendent (Chair); Neighbourhood Police Inspectors42; Bronze (Response) Inspectors, and departments such as Community Safety and CID.

42 Sector or Neighbourhood Inspectors are responsible for the delivery of neighbourhood policing.
The action plans reflect the tactical resolutions devised to counter the fortnightly priorities identified within the BCU. They provide information on (among other things) the:

- type of crime and disorder occurrence;
- nature of the task (tactical resolution) to be carried out;
- timeframe for completion of the task,
- officer/department responsible for carrying out the task.

It is possible to categorise the tactical resolutions (tasks) in terms of the three areas of priority that are integral to the NIM framework: prevention, intelligence and enforcement (CENTREX, 2005). The fortnightly ‘action plans’ were chosen as the focus of the QCA because they provide a breakdown of BCU operational activity – predominantly at the neighbourhood level. They are ‘dynamic’ documents in that they reflect dominant, up to date operational concerns and priorities, and highlight the tactics and actions agreed to reduce or prevent the highlighted occurrences. Therefore it is argued that they have the capacity to provide a coherent, empirical understanding of the nature of routine police activity at the local level. The structural framework of each plan is identical which facilitates a comparison of data content over the data collection period\(^4\). There are 12 FTAs in total: 2 per fortnight over a 6 month period.

Data, Processes and Limitations of the Dataset

The overarching aims of the QCA are to:

i) formulate an empirical measure of ‘routine’ policing practice;

ii) ascertain the extent to which counter-terrorism policing features in BCU operational tasking and routine policing activity.

By undertaking these two objectives it was possible to examine the extent to which counter terrorism policy ‘talk’ and ‘decision’ is evident within routine police activity in the case study BCU. This in turn contributes to an exploration of the extent to

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\(^4\) See Appendix B for an anonymised version of a Fortnightly Tasking Action Plan.
which routine policing at the local (neighbourhood) level is becoming increasingly 'securitised' within the case study BCU.

Each fortnightly tasking ‘action plan’ (FTA) was systematically coded using 10 pre-determined variables⁴⁴:

1. The date of the FTA
2. The type of crime and disorder occurrence (e.g. autocrime, burglary dwelling)

The crime and disorder occurrences were pre-categorised by the case study BCU and the terms were used both on the Fortnightly Tasking Action Plans and the corresponding Fortnightly Tactical Assessments. They reflect the BCU priority areas during a given fortnightly period.

3. The type of task (e.g. intelligence, prevention, enforcement, administrative)
4. The task number (e.g. 1 of 3 tasks for an occurrence in a fortnight)
5. The total number of tasks per occurrence per fortnight
6. The department/officer assigned to oversee each task
7. The status of task (e.g. ongoing or discharged)
8. Was additional money allocated to the task?
9. How much additional money was allocated?

In relation to variables 8 and 9, each action plan indicates when and where additional money had been successfully secured by a particular neighbourhood sector following a bidding process overseen by a member of the police management board. The allocation of additional money translates as police officer overtime on a particular task. This variable proved useful in assessing the level of operational priority afforded to each occurrence category.

10. Any additional (qualitative) comments

⁴⁴ See Appendix C for QCA (SPSS) Codebook.
The data from each action plan was coded and analysed with the use of SPSS. During the analysis stages it was deemed necessary to re-code variables 3 and 6. This was undertaken in order to reduce the number of code options within these variables. In relation to variable 3 the tasks were originally coded according to the specific nature of the task carried out, for example ‘operation implementation’, ‘arrest-related’, ‘hotspot targeting’). Ultimately, the types of task were re-coded in line with the National Intelligence Model (NIM) framework. The NIM identifies prevention, intelligence, and enforcement as priority factors associated with the tactical resolution of an isolated or ongoing occurrence. The same reduction rationale was employed for variable 6; the re-coding process minimised overlap and streamlined both the analysis and presentation of results.

The dataset is comprised of 209 ‘cases’ (n=209) that reflect the 209 ‘tasks’ that were allocated across the 8 crime and disorder occurrence categories over the 6 month data collection period. It is acknowledged that the size and nature of the sample places limitations on the type of analysis that can be carried out – especially as an initial examination of the data revealed 88 of the 209 ‘cases’ or ‘tasks’ to be repeat tasks or more accurately, updates on ongoing tasks rather than completely new tasks. This raises both analytical and substantive implications. On the one hand it serves as a finding in itself by indicating that a large proportion of tasks operate over a protracted period of time and are subject to regular review. In analytical terms the reduction to an already small sample necessarily limits the analysis to univariate or bivariate analysis levels. It is important to reiterate that this small-scale QCA is solely designed to achieve the objectives as outlined above; the emphasis is on highlighting patterns and relationships within the BCU data, rather than identifying correlations or causality within the dataset, and there is no intention to generalise the findings from this QCA to the wider policing population. Ultimately, it was deemed appropriate to undertake the QCA on the total number of tasks referenced throughout the data collection period because it gives a comprehensive insight into the multi-layered nature of routine level policing by highlighting the range of tasks (immediate impact/longer term strategies) identified as the most effective response to a diverging range of issues.
QCA Research Questions

There were a number of areas of enquiry inherent to each of the two QCA aims and these have been translated into two quantitative ‘research questions’:

RQ.1. What are the main components of ‘routine’ policing in the case-study BCU?

The empirical conceptualisation of routine policing within this thesis has two main empirical components:

1) The type of crime and disorder occurrences (criminal/civil) included in the fortnightly tasking action plans and;

2) The nature of the tasks (policing activity) identified as the most effective response to these occurrences within the fortnightly tasking action plans.

RQ.2. What aspects of routine policing appear to be given the greatest level of priority within BCU tasking and operational policing?

To address this question it was first necessary to determine how to quantify the notion of ‘priority’, and importantly, how to distinguish it from the generic term used by the government, and in turn, police forces to reflect strategic areas of concern. In the quantitative section of this research the term ‘priority’ is replaced with the term, ‘status’. Three variables within the dataset are identified as ‘proxy measures’ of status in an attempt to ascertain the level of importance attached to crime and disorder occurrences by routine police managers and frontline officers. The three variables are the:

- Number of tasks allocated to each occurrence per action plan;
- Allocation of additional money/resources to facilitate the tasks,
- Amount of money allocated to occurrences.
The final variable was analysed to find out the average spend on occurrence concerns, and to discover which occurrences received the greatest amount of additional financial support. These proxy measures of status provide one way of interpreting empirically the level of priority certain occurrences are granted within the BCU.

The nature of counter terrorism policing, and the extent of the role that it plays in routine policing activity forms a specific aspect of the discussion of research questions 1 and 2. However, the QCA reveals a number of additional findings pertinent to this thesis and outwith of the remit of the first two research questions. The QCA dataset facilitates an examination of issues such as the point in time in which counter terrorism first became a (regular) feature of fortnightly tasking meetings and the action plans generated from them, and whether the role of counter terrorism-related activities has increased over time (in this instance over a six month period). This data can be analysed in relation to the time at which the Prevent Strategy was implemented in Force to ascertain the extent to which policy ‘decision’ is manifest within the operational framework of the BCU. Ultimately, the variate analysis reveals a series of implicit indications regarding the role of counter terrorism policing at the local routine level, and thus can be seen to contribute to an assessment of the extent to which routine policing is becoming increasingly securitised.

It is acknowledged that these research questions constitute just one way of interpreting the data. The QCA could include a focus on who carries out the tasks, what is done in terms of specific activity, and the length of time taken to complete tasks. Ultimately, the most notable findings from the QCA are further explored through the thematic analysis of the interviews carried out with police officers and support staff across the case study force. The mixed method approach to data analysis facilitates a rigorous examination of both the evidence of counter terrorism policing at the local level, and the enduring challenges to counter terrorism policy implementation and delivery at the strategic and frontline (operational) level. Ultimately, it is argued that the study has developed a robust methodological approach to capturing empirically ‘routine policing’ that can be replicated in other research sites as a basis for comparison in future research.
3.3.3 Methodological Limitations

It is noted that some of the methodological choices within this research study may elicit a degree of criticism. It is recognised that ethnography has been the method of choice for investigating policing action in the past (Grimshaw and Jefferson, 1987; Holdaway, 1983; Smith and Gray, 1985; Waddington, 1999). The decision to carry out qualitative and in particular quantitative content analysis was informed by the main empirical proposition that underpins this thesis, namely that it is important to distinguish between different levels of policy for the purposes of empirical enquiry. The mixed-method approach to data collection and analysis facilitated an examination of each of these analytically distinct areas. However, it is acknowledged that the quantitative content analysis (QCA) is only one way of generating a measurement of routine policing. An alternative understanding of routine policing could have been obtained solely through the use of semi-structured interviews which would have focused on what officers say they do. Alternatively, routine policing could have been conceptualised through non-participant observation of tasking meetings at the BCU level, or indeed through the observation of what officers do on shift. In some ways the methodological choices were contingent on practicalities such as access. Ultimately, however, this research emphasises the need to move from the policy talk dimension to an examination of tangible decisions and operational practice. Therefore, it was decided that a quantitative analysis of documented crime and disorder occurrences and the operational tasks devised to address them provided the most appropriate means by which to understand routine practice.

3.4 Access and Ethics

The issue of access is a central concern for all empirical researchers and the challenges of securing it vary according to the nature of the research setting (formal-informal), and the degree of control exercised by the actors within that setting. Many of those who conduct police research reflect on the implications of being an ‘outsider’. Reiner (2000) makes reference to the work of Brown (1996) who has written extensively on the potential obstacles to securing access when researching within the Criminal Justice System. Reiner distinguishes between four possible
permutations. The first he terms the 'insider insider'. These individuals would most likely be police officers conducting police research (see for example, Holdaway 1983). Such researchers would normally have an advantage in overcoming the initial hurdle of formal access. The second typology are deemed 'outsider insiders' and could be officers who decide to conduct police research after deciding to leave the service. In effect they are 'covert participant observers'. Thirdly, 'insider outsiders' are non-police researchers who have official roles within police forces or other governmental organisations. They may overcome issues of formal access but will possibly find it difficult to secure the trust and cooperation of participants. The fourth permutation of 'outsider outsider' is where I anticipated finding myself. It is suggested that academics as 'outside outsiders' face the greatest barrier in gaining formal access to police forces for the purpose of research. However, according to Reiner (2000), such research has proliferated over the last thirty years and may come to dominate in the future so clearly the obstacles are not insurmountable.

Silverman (2001) highlights the importance of the initial conduct of a researcher, and the consequential impression that is given to prospective 'gatekeepers' in securing access to research opportunities. I adopted a number of strategies in order to secure access, the first of which was a formal letter to the Chief Constable. This letter secured a face to face meeting and gave me the opportunity to discuss the feasibility of conducting my research within the police force. I was conscious that the sensitive nature of my research agenda may have implications for the level of access that I would be granted. Although the time and resource concerns that governed the scope of the research were clearly outlined, I stated that I would retain a degree of flexibility in terms of the substantive research areas in order to incorporate specific areas of interest for the force. Although conscious of the need to maintain control of the research, I hoped that the end product would prove of some interest and benefit to the force. This meeting proved invaluable to both the immediate and longer term access to the research setting and I duly acknowledge the considerable support I have received from the Force in question.

However, in my experience there are often multiple points of entry into an institution and I also benefited from the professional relationships I had previously cultivated as both an MSc student and a Research Associate within the Cardiff Centre for Crime,
Law and Justice (CCLJ). I was fortunate to have a series of informal conversations with officers who were in a position to progress my research both ‘on the ground’ and by supporting my letter to the Chief Constable. I completed a number of forms outlining my project aims and practical requirements, and secured a meeting with the Director of Business Development to discuss access to key informants, and negotiate access to certain documents. As part of the process of securing access to the case study police force I was obliged to undergo security vetting by MI5. I acquiesced to this willingly and received ‘SC Level’ clearance with no security objection some months following the submission of comprehensive documentary evidence.

**Ethical Considerations**

The responsibilities that come with the level of access that was granted in order to complete this research study are duly acknowledged. A comprehensive ethical framework was devised in order to carry out this research which passed rigorous assessment by the Cardiff School of Social Sciences Ethics Committee. Moreover, the research abides by the ethical guidelines of the British Society of Criminology. It was made clear that participation in all stages of the research process, particularly the interviews, was voluntary, and I obtained informed consent prior to all interviews. Both the British Society of Criminology (BSC) and the Social Research Association (SRA) delineate clearly between written and informed consent. Whilst neither Establishment stipulate that written consent must be attained, they both offer a framework of principles within which a researcher must operate. I assessed the relative merits of these when considering the ethical implications of my research.

It is acknowledged that informed consent must be secured at every stage of the fieldwork. However, following consultation with my supervisors it was agreed to approach consent as a process and not a specific ‘event’, so that it was negotiated in an ongoing way. Where possible, I obtained written consent but there were occasions when this was not possible. Indeed, there were some instances where requiring written consent were ultimately counter-productive and an obstacle to participation. In such cases I relied on the process of ‘informed consent’. In all cases research

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45 See [www.britsoccrim.org/codeofethics.htm](http://www.britsoccrim.org/codeofethics.htm).
participants were provided with full information – both written and verbal – regarding issues such as:

- The role of the researcher and the title of research;
- The independent and impartial nature of the research;
- The level of security clearance obtained by the researcher;
- The aims and objectives of the research;
- How the information was to be used;
- The voluntary nature of participation;
- The use of interview transcriptions;
- Those who will have access to interview transcriptions;
- The treatment of all transcriptions and documents as anonymous and confidential;
- The secure storage of all transcripts and operational documents,
- Contact information for questions and queries.

Moreover I assured all gatekeepers and participants of the confidential nature of the research, and throughout the duration of the time spent collecting data it was made clear that both the privacy of individuals and that of the police force within the project would be fully observed and respected. It is acknowledged that it is often difficult to disguise the identity of senior level people within certain organisations. However, the privacy of individuals and confidential nature of the findings of the research has been honoured by implementing standard social science techniques in order to remove the identities of participants and places in the writing up of the study. Therefore the Force in question has been anonymised, and the research participants are referred to by rank or department alone.

In addition, it is understood that operational policing by its very nature is sensitive. The sensitivities were undoubtedly exacerbated by the nature of my empirical enquiries into the implementation and delivery of counter terrorism policy within the case study police force. The access that was granted to confidential documents and the meetings attended during the time in the research setting contributed to an understanding of some of the specific issues that confront the police on a day to day basis. However, a condition of access was that all operationally sensitive data be
removed prior to submission. Therefore the information contained within the
documents and any field notes, although helpful to the structure of the research, have
not been directly referred to, or presented within this study. It has also been ensured
that all recordings and transcripts of interviews and operational documents have been
stored securely in a locked cabinet.

3.5 Conclusion

This thesis suggests that the extent to which routine policing is actually being
securitised remains a moot empirical point. This research seeks to move the empirical
debate forward in a number of ways by highlighting how traditional approaches to
research design and methodological strategies can be applied – and indeed innovated
– in order to explore critically the issue of securitisation within routine policing. The
conceptual framework that underpins the study facilitates an empirically rigorous
examination of the impact of security policy on frontline police activity by
analytically distinguishing between the policy levels of ‘talk’, ‘decision’ and ‘action’.
In this way it is possible to ascertain the extent to which security ‘talk’, and
‘decisions’ made within the arena of counter terrorism policy are actually translated
into ‘action’ on the ground in the form of tangible changes to local policing routines
and practice. It also offers the potential to recognise and accommodate the pluralistic
narratives about counter terrorism within and across the three geo-political security
sites at the centre of this study – the EU, the UK and the case study police force. The
methodological approach that drives this research challenges the homogenising
narrative that characterises much security and securitisation discourse by exploring
the concepts of security ‘actor’ and the ‘referent object of security’ beyond the macro
levels of Europe, nation and state that serves as the focus for securitisation theorists.
Chapters Four to Six present the results generated by the methodological approaches
to data collection and analysis that underpin this research. It is argued that the
findings included in these chapters legitimise the two propositions put forward by this
research study. Firstly, that it is important to distinguish analytically between
different levels of policy-making for the purposes of empirical enquiry. Secondly,
that academics and researchers need to move beyond a concern with policy elites and
the ‘textual footprints’ of their talk and decisions, to a concern with the action of
everyday, local police routines.
Chapter Four: The Changing Nature of the Talk

'As for counter terrorism...it's right in the middle of it all...the needle has shifted across to prevent and it's a much greater priority'.

[Force Command Team]

4.0: Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to examine the role and nature of the policy ‘talk’ associated with both terrorism and counter terrorism, and explore the extent to which such talk can be seen to have undergone, or is subject to a process of securitisation as understood within the theoretical framework of this thesis. At this stage it is pertinent to briefly revisit the conceptual framework of this research in order to consolidate an understanding of what constitutes policy ‘talk’ and how one can analytically distinguish it from concrete policy ‘decision’46. Within this research policy ‘talk’ is conceptualised as political or policing rhetoric and exhortation which is identified in the form of EU policy documents; national policy statements and debates or consultations and interview data generated within the case study police force. Some of these policy instruments are seen to operate at the level of rhetoric and exhortation, rather than concrete policy ‘decisions’ on the basis that they lack tangible mechanisms of enforcement which, if present, would necessitate some degree of organisational or public compliance as a consequence. The ‘powers of enforcement’ identified within this research include legislation, financial incentive or penalty and organisational compliance mechanisms such as specific frameworks of performance assessment and measurement.

The empirical enquiry into the nature of policy talk and the extent to which it can be considered ‘securitised’ focuses on the three geo-political areas at the centre of this research – the EU, the UK and the case study Force. The chapter predominantly focuses on policy ‘talk’ at the European level, due in large part to the conceptualisation of all European counter terrorism policy instruments as talk or exhortation rather than policy ‘decision’ within this research. The first section provides justification for this empirical conceptualisation and explores the theoretical,

46 See Chapter Three for a more detailed explanation of the conceptual framework that underpins this research.
political and societal motivations for the increased securitisation of the EU policy landscape in recent years. The second section focuses on the nature of the policy talk at the national level in the UK. It examines the political and societal influences on security policy-making in the UK and provides a sense of how debates around security and, more specifically, terrorism played out at the national level during the period of research. The documentary analysis also provides an opportunity to explore whether any discernible shifts in the nature of the talk reflects a ‘securitised discourse’ at the level of national security policy debate in the UK or whether it merely reinforces the contingent nature of public policy-making more generally. The final section examines the nature of both the policy and policing ‘talk’ within the case study force. It presents relevant findings from the analysis of selected, publically-available force documents and the interviews carried out with police officers across the force and within the case study BCU. The nature of the talk generated within the case study force is examined in light of the rhetoric and exhortation that characterises national policy talk around terrorism and radicalisation. This in turn facilitates an assessment of the extent to which national policy talk might be seen to resonate within the policing discourse at the routine policing level and thereby whether it can be considered to be ‘securitised’ as per the theoretical propositions put forward by advocates of the securitisation thesis.

The data presented in the sections on EU and UK policy ‘talk’ are generated from a range of policy programmes and agreements that were in operation during the period in which fieldwork was undertaken for this research. The list of documents identified as policy ‘talk’ and an explanation of the sampling logic that informed the choice of documents for analysis is provided in Chapter Three. However, within the context of this empirical chapter, it is important to reiterate that the analysis of policy talk is intentionally explicit and selective in due acknowledgement of the extensive textual analysis that has already been undertaken by a number of prominent securitisation theorists. It is argued that there is little utility in replicating such analyses in empirical research that focuses on an empirical examination of the extent to which such talk resonates within the more concrete dimensions of policy decision and action. Thus, the analysis of policy ‘talk’ here is consciously more modest, focusing on a selected number of policy texts as exemplars of the kinds of shifts discussed by securitisation theorists which, can then be used as a basis for further empirical examination in later
chapters on 'decision' and 'action'. However, this sampling logic should not be taken as an indication that policy talk is merely empty rhetoric and that it has no relationship with policy decisions and actions. Indeed, this chapter highlights a number of ways in which securitised talk, within the context of counter terrorism policy, is important. Moreover, it is clear from other areas of criminal justice policy such as policing and sentencing, and the widespread and influential work on moral panics (Cohen, 1987) that talk does have real consequences. Indeed, it is noted that tough political rhetoric contributes to a general climate of opinion which places sentencers under pressure and may, even in the absence of concrete policy mechanisms, result in harsher sentencing practice (Jones and Newburn, 2005). This current research study argues that there are different dimensions of policy that are analytically distinct from each other and it can be misleading to conflate them as this can often lead to the imputation of action from policy rhetoric and exhortation.

4.1: The European Road (map) to Security

This section charts the development and gradual evolution of policy-setting at the EU level. It provides instances and justifications of conceptualising EU policy as talk or 'exhortation'. However, more than this, it illustrates the discernible shifts in the nature of the 'talk' – from an emphasis on freedom to a preoccupation with security – and indicates the ways in which, increasingly, securitised talk impacts on the policy agreements established within the EU, and the very real potential it has to influence policy in light of the decision-making reform proposals inherent to the Lisbon Treaty. Balzacq (2008: 76) suggests that given the volume of EU programmes relating to counter terrorism and radicalisation in which discourse and ideology are increasingly entangled, 'a focus on the nature and function of policy tools may contribute to an understanding of securitisation'. Such a shift in focus could serve a number of useful purposes, one of the most pertinent – to this thesis particularly – that it can reveal how policy-makers translate intentions into concrete actions [italics mine]. This thesis agrees with the first point but contests the latter. Balzacq (2008) observes that there are four main strands to the EU's policies on counter terrorism: i) the prevention of

47 It is significant to note that the political rhetoric associated with migration and asylum contributed to a gradual incorporation of migration policy into the constitutional structure of the EU (Huysmans, 2000: 755).
radicalisation; ii) information-sharing; iii) border management, and iv) the protection of critical infrastructure. According to Balzacq (2008: 77), in order to ‘render these polices concrete, the EU utilises distinct instruments which can be categorised in the following ways: regulatory (action plans), incentive (development aid), and capacity instruments (information exchange)’. However, if one applies the analytical framework of this thesis to the various programmes and agreements pertaining to counter terrorism and radicalisation, they remain little more than rhetoric and exhortation because they do not have a tangible, legally-binding framework for compliance attached to them.

They are not ‘decisions’ by virtue of the legal standing of EU level pronouncements on Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) which fall within the Third Pillar of the EU and in this case Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCC). Any decisions (in the generic sense) that are made under this inter-governmental, third pillar are not binding on Member States. Rather the adoption and application of EU provisions under this pillar is left to the discretion of Member States. This is in salient contrast to the first pillar of the EU which is subject to ‘Community’ law which enforces compliance with regulations, directives and decisions. Such a distinction is integral to any discussion of the nature of security policy-making because different powers of command accompany such decisions. If a member state is not in compliance with a regulation or directive issued under EC law, it will be taken to the European Court of Justice and penalised. However, if a Member State does not adhere to an agreement reached in the inter-governmental pillars, they will be subject to no such stringent sanctions. Thus, certain types of decision at the EU level can be distinguished in terms of the powers of enforcement that decision-makers have at their disposal. However, the broader issue here is that ‘talk’ remains important for the way in which it ‘frames’ policy, and how it defines and problematises the objects of policy – in this case ‘counter terrorism’. Thus, the analysis of policy talk is important for establishing what is included and excluded (but could have been included given what is already known about a policy problem) through the definition of governing problems, such as counter-terrorism. This type of analytical work has been undertaken on the

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48 It is acknowledged that the Treaty of Lisbon has altered this situation by removing the pillarised structure of the EU. However, the pillarised structure still existed during the period of empirical research for this thesis and it remains to be seen whether post-Lisbon Treaty policy-making in the EU results in equipping the Court of Justice with powers to ensure Member State compliance.
problematisation of transnational organised crime (Edwards and Gill, 2002) and the framing of ‘organised crime’ (Edwards and Levi, 2008). And yet, whilst the analysis of ‘framing’ sets the parameters to a problem, it cannot explain the relationship between routine action and the problem. This in turn validates the importance of distinguishing analytically between the talk, the decisions and the action for the purposes of empirical enquiry.

The EU field of security and counter terrorism policy is characterised by political complexity and ideological uncertainty. The post-cold war landscape, framed by increasingly open borders and a consequential concern with both the internal and external threats posed by asylum and migration has necessarily altered to reflect the enduring threats of organised crime and terrorism. The EU strategies and action plans devised to counter these threats provide significant insight into the role of the EU as a security ‘actor’ or self-titled ‘producer of security’ (European Council, 2007). The EU was founded on the principles of Freedom, Security and Justice firmly rooted in a shared commitment to freedom based on human rights, democratic institutions and the rule of law (European Council 2005a). However, a significant shift has been noted in the balance between these values, specifically in the form of a gradual increase in the emphasis placed on issues of security – particularly in relation to migration and asylum policy – but increasingly in terms of organised crime and terrorism (Guild et al, 2010; Balzacq and Carrera, 2006). As Balzacq and Carrera (2006: 5) argue, the Hague Programme is dominated by a security-led approach to meeting the ‘central concerns of the peoples of the States’ in so much as the ‘security of the State predates the freedom of the individual’49. This section presents relevant findings from an analysis of relevant policy measures introduced within the EU in the last 10 years with a particular focus on the policy programmes and frameworks in operation during the period of fieldwork for this current research in 2008. The aim of the documentary analysis is to generate insights into the ways in which terrorism and counter terrorism are framed and understood within an EU context. The analysis of the selected EU documents – identified as policy ‘talk’ – is focused on two discursive themes, 1) the nature of the terrorism threat, and 2) the nature of the response to that threat.

49 This is even illustrated in the ‘freedom’ area of JHA where it can be seen the primary targets of border management and visa policy are illegal migration, terrorism, human and drug trafficking – all of which are widely observed as operating on a ‘security continuum’ (Bigo 1994).
4.1.1 The Nature of the Terrorism Threat from an EU Perspective

A number of the discursive themes that underpin the securitisation thesis resonate within key EU security policy talk. These include references to the end of the Cold War and the consequential reconfiguration of notions of security and security ‘actors’. The European Security Strategy (ESS, 2003: 2) references the end of the Cold War as a significant turning point for European conceptions of security:

‘The post Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked. Flows of trade and investment, the development of technology and the spread of democracy have brought freedom and prosperity to many people. Others have perceived globalisation as a cause of frustrations and injustice. These developments have also increased the scope for non-state actors to play a part in international affairs. In much of the developing world, poverty and disease cause untold suffering and give rise to pressing security concerns. In many cases, economic failure is linked to political problems and violent conflict’.

It is seen to be the burgeoning frustration and insecurity in countries beyond the EU borders that characterise the challenges and threats to the EU. The ESS (2003: 3) highlights terrorism as the primary threat to the European Union; a threat that has evolved in the face of the political and social transformations inherent to globalisation to be ‘more diverse, less visible and less predictable’. Moreover, within a European context terrorism is framed as both an internal and external threat to security. This is exemplified through reference to violent religious extremism...within our own society and the connections made with organised crime which retains an important external dimension (ESS, 2003: 3-4). In many ways the ‘openness’ of the EU environment is observed as the source of its vulnerability to external threats and challenges.

4.1.2 The Response to the Terrorism Threat

The evolution in the nature of the terrorist threat has ensured a reframing of the response to the threat. In the post-Cold War era traditional notions of ‘self-defence...based on the threat of invasion’ (ESS, 2003: 7) have been replaced by an emphasis on multi-lateral cooperation, pre-emption and prevention:
‘Our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective, multilateral system. The response to terrorism requires a mixture of intelligence, police, judicial and military instruments. We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and when necessary robust intervention. We are stronger when we act together’.

The ESS (2003) articulates the need for collective responsibility and mutual solidarity in the face of international threats. The strategy references a number of policy implications including the need for a robust strategic framework for countering threats such as terrorism. Such a framework includes the development of mechanisms for improved intelligence sharing between Member States and common threat assessments which are in turn seen as the basis for common action.

The Hague Programme (2005-2010) incorporates a detailed ‘Action Plan’ for the continued development of Freedom, Security and Justice as set out in the Tampere Programme (1999-2004). The Hague Programme retains ten core objectives. The majority of these objectives revolve around migration, asylum and rights and citizenship. However, the second core objective focuses ‘the fight against terrorism: working towards a global response’. It has been suggested that the ten objectives that form the cornerstone of the Hague Programme successfully translate into ‘concrete policy instruments’ due to the inclusion of key actions and measures that are to be taken in order to ensure their adoption and application (Balzacq 2008). However, this is contested within the conceptual framework of this thesis. It is acknowledged that the objectives focused around asylum and migration management translate into concrete policy ‘decisions’ on account of the transfer of policies on immigration, asylum and free movement of persons to the realm of Community competence under the EC first pillar as part of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999. However, EU counterterrorism and policing policy ‘agreements’ remained within the remit of the inter-governmental EU third pillar and thus function at the level of policy ‘talk’.

*The EU Strategy on Combating Terrorism* (European Council, 2005b) reflects the policy talk that underpins the European Security Strategy (2003). It highlights the increased openness of the European environment as a conduit for freedom and prosperity but also as a site for exploitation. Moreover, the response to terrorism is framed in similar terms and it is noted that, ‘concerted and collective European action,
in the spirit of solidarity, is indispensible to combat terrorism’ (2005b: 2). The EU Action Plan on Combating Terrorism covers four work strands – Prevent, Protect, Pursue and Respond – which are articulated as a ‘comprehensive and proportionate response to the international terrorist threat’ (EU Council, 2005b: 3). The Protect strand aims to protect citizens and infrastructures and reduce vulnerability to terrorist attacks through the development of threat and risk assessments and the protection of critical infrastructure, transport security and border control. The Pursue work-stream seeks to investigate and impede terrorist activity through information gathering, analysis and exchange, undermining terrorists’ movement and activities, and enhancing police and judicial cooperation. The Respond work area focuses on minimising the consequences of a terrorist attack by increasing the capacity and capability to deal with the aftermath of a terrorist incident. The Prevent strand of the EU counter terrorism strategy focuses on tackling the issues associated with radicalisation and recruitment within and beyond the EU. The measures to be undertaken as part of Prevent fall into a range of categories which include focusing on environments conducive to incitement and recruitment for example prisons, and places of religious training and worship.

The Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment (EU Council, 2005d) was devised alongside the counter terrorism strategy. This strategy emphasises the importance of developing a more sophisticated understanding of radicalisation; the process of indoctrination and recruitment. This Strategy provides clear empirical examples of the ways in which the notion of terrorism and radicalisation ‘prevention’ is framed within an EU context. The Strategy (2005) emphasises the need to disrupt behaviour, limit activities, prevent access and establish a strong legal framework (EU Council, 2005). Although the Strategy alludes to the role of community policing in preventing radicalisation (but provides no details of its role in such work) there is no mention of the role of local communities in the prevention of radicalisation. Ultimately, the EU policy documents referenced thus far serve as key exemplars of the ways in which both terrorism and counter terrorism are framed within an EU context. The policy acknowledges that the immediate challenge of combating radicalisation and recruitment lies with the Member States at a national, regional and particularly the local level. However, it stresses that ‘work at the pan-European level can provide an important framework to help coordinate national policies’ (EU
In correspondence between the Presidency and the European Council (November, 2005), it is made clear that the EU can contribute in four main ways that cut across the four counter terrorism work-streams. The EU retains a strategic commitment to:

1. **Strengthening national capabilities**
   This involves using best practice and sharing knowledge in relation to the collection and analysis of information and intelligence.

2. **Facilitating European cooperation**
   This involves developing and evaluating mechanisms to enhance cooperation between the police and judicial authorities across Member States.

3. **Developing collective capability**
   This centres on maintaining EU level capacity to make collective policy responses in relation to the terrorist threat and to make full use of EU bodies such as Europol, Eurojust and Frontex.

4. **Promoting international partnership**
   This includes working with agencies and institutional bodies beyond the EU to further develop the international consensus in relation to terrorism counter terrorism.


1. To deepen the international consensus and enhance international efforts to combat terrorism;
2. To reduce the access of terrorists to financial and economic resources;

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50 FRONTEX is an EU agency that was created to coordinate the operational cooperation between Member States in the field of border security (http://www.frontex.europa.eu).
3. To maximise the capacity within EU bodies and member States to detect, investigate and prosecute terrorists and to prevent terrorist attacks;

4. To protect the security of international transport and ensure effective systems of border control;

5. To enhance the capability of the European Union and of member States to deal with the consequences of a terrorist attack;

6. To address the factors which contribute to support for, and recruitment into, terrorism,

7. To target actions under EU external relations towards priority Third Countries where counter-terrorist capacity or commitment to combating terrorism needs to be enhanced.

The Action Plan (2006) includes a list of measures to be addressed within the four work-streams of the Strategy on Combating Terrorism (Objectives 3 – 6). This enabled the progress to be monitored on a regular basis by the Committee of Permanent Representatives, with regular follow-up and updates from the Counter Terrorism Coordinator and the European Commission (European Council, 2005). Ultimately it is designed to be a ‘living document providing a snapshot of the progress made towards the realisation of the targets established’ (EU Council, 2006). The Action Plan also includes information on the competent body responsible for delivery of the measure, the deadline for completion of the measure and the progress made on completing the measure. The analysis within this thesis focuses on Objectives 3 and 6 which retain a focus on the Pursue and Prevent strands of the EU Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2005). There are a number of consistent themes that emerge from an analysis of these two objectives which in turn provide an insight into how the notion of counter terrorism is framed within an EU context. The priority measures within Objective 3 revolve around the development and implementation of framework decisions on issues such as the European Arrest Warrant (EAW), money laundering and the freezing and confiscation of assets from crime, and measures dedicated to promoting and ensuring the use of existing EU bodies such as Europol and Eurojust. Furthermore, priority emphasis is placed on:

"Improving mechanisms for cooperation for the sharing of expertise on protective, investigative and preventative security policies between police and
security services...[reaching a] decision on the implementation of specific measures for police and judicial cooperation to combat terrorism [and] ensuring that law enforcement agencies (security services, police, customs etc.) cooperate with each other and exchange all information relevant to combating terrorism as extensively as possible.'

[Measures 3.3 – 3.32: EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism, 2006].

The measures within Objective 6 emphasise the need to:

‘develop long term strategies to address the issues which contribute to recruitment including 'extreme religious or political belief and socio-economic status...[and] promote cross-cultural and inter-religious understanding between Europe and the Islamic World’.

[Measures 6.2 – 6.4: EU Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism, 2006].

It is clear that within an EU context effective counter terrorism is synonymous with international dialogue, a robust legislative framework and a coordinated national police response characterised by tangible mechanisms for intelligence exchange and cross-border cooperation. In this way the counter terrorism strategies and action plans remain much more a strategic commitment to developing an integrated and coherent approach to tackling terrorism and extremism. There is no mention of the role of local policing in achieving any of the priority objectives and no reference to how progress or performance within the four work-streams – Prevent, Protect, Pursue and Respond – is to be measured by the European Council. The European security policies stress the crucial role of the police in relation to counter terrorism, but, as some observe, ‘the expected role of local policing and community policing in particular in the implementation of such policies is not very clear’ (Virta, 2008: 33). For example, there are no guidelines about how the police should include European internal security issues in local strategies, practices and daily police work. It is observed that progress in this area will remain slow due to the subsidiary principle which dictates that the EU cannot intervene in the arena of local politics and policing, which is the area where local routine policing practices can be most beneficial to the prevention of radicalisation and recruitment (Virta, 2008). Indeed, some EU-based academics observe that there are ‘still no coherent and ranked set of policy objectives or agreement at which level action should be taken in various policy areas and through what kind of co-ordination mechanism’ (Edwards and Meyer, 2008:10). This was most readily identified in the area of community policing where cooperation was
seen to remain limited to exchange of information on a limited scale. In this way it is interesting to note the extent to which the EU approach to prevention and the priority attached to it contrasts with the strategies that underpin the UK approach to countering radicalisation and extremism (see Chapter Five).

4.1.3 The Impact of ‘Talk’ on Threat Assessment

Notwithstanding the lack of tangible progress in relation to the implementation of action plan measures across the EU, it is argued that the nature of the talk around terrorism and counter terrorism emanating from within the EU at this time contributed to a proliferation in the ‘threat assessment industry’ (Virta, 2008: 24). During the time the Hague Programme (2005 – 2010) was in operation, new intelligence products were developed to inform framework decisions in relation to countering terrorism. Arguably the most significant intelligence products are the EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) and the EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA) which are viewed as, ‘important awareness tools for decision makers at European Level’ (TE-SAT Report, 2008: 5). It is clear that the policy talk inherent to EU counter terrorism strategies and action plans resonates within intelligence products such as TE-SAT. In the introduction to TE-SAT 2008, the Director of Europol observes that:

‘the transnational nature of the [terrorism] threat requires an EU-wide response. In order to effectively meet the challenges of counter terrorism in the EU, the member states must continue to develop robust cooperation and coordination mechanisms to facilitate information exchange and to assist in our understanding of the challenges that face us’.

[TE-SAT 2008: 5]

The TE-SAT report was established as a reporting mechanism from the Terrorism Working Party (TWP) to the European Parliament in the aftermath of the 11 September attacks in 2001. The report is generated by Europol51 on an annual basis and provides an overview of terrorism and terrorist activity across the EU. An analysis of the aims of the TE-SAT report (2008) and the nature of the data it collects

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51 The TE-SAT 2007 is the first official ‘Europol’ TE-SAT as it is the first report to be published after the European Union delegated to Europol the power to approve the final version of the report.
reveals much about the ways in which terrorism and counter terrorism are framed and understood within an EU context. It is a situational, trend report in that it describes the outward manifestations of terrorism and provides information on how terrorism or more specifically, terrorist attacks are changing and developing. However, it is as significant to note the areas not included in the reports. TE-SAT (2008) does not attempt to analyse the root causes of terrorism or assess the effectiveness of counter terrorism measures adopted across the EU despite the admission that ‘they form an important part of the phenomenon’ (TE-SAT 2008: 6). Furthermore, although data is collected on activities identified as extremism, there is no reference to radicalisation or recruitment.

It is made clear that TE-SAT (2008: 6) ‘is an EU report and as such aims at providing an overview of the situation in the EU rather than describing the situation in individual member states’. However, the report reinforces the lack of an EU-wide definition of terrorism by relying on individual Member States’ definitions of terrorism offences. This renders the report unable to distinguish between national and transnational terrorism as ‘it is often difficult to determine whether such typology is appropriate in all cases’ (TE-SAT, 2008: 6). It is argued that this culminates in a rather disparate and subjective account of terrorism across the EU and in turn undermines the long-term intention to achieve a coordinated approach to counter terrorism. The lack of a coherent conceptual understanding of terrorism also renders the TE-SAT description of terrorism and terrorist groups rather broad and opaque as exemplified by the reference in TE-SAT 2008 to:

- Islamist terrorism
- Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist groups
- Left-wing terrorist groups
- Ring-wing terrorist groups
- Single issue terrorism

Furthermore, the emphasis placed on certain ‘types’ of terrorism activity within the TE-SAT report also provides insight into the way in which terrorism is framed within

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52 This term incorporates violence committed to change a specific policy or practice and includes animal rights and environmentalist groups.
an EU context. In some ways the TE-SAT report reflects the securitised discourse underpinning the work of Waever (1996), Bigo (1994) and Huysmans (2000). The report alludes to notions of internal and external security in relation to the origins and consequences of transnational terrorism. This is exemplified in the predominant focus on Islamist terrorism within TE-SAT reports. Although the TE-SAT reports highlight only one successful Islamist terrorist attack in the EU between 2006 and 2008, and that the number of arrests for Islamist terrorism is decreasing year on year, it is still articulated as the ‘biggest threat worldwide’ (TE-SAT, 2009). Moreover, despite the absence of a successful Islamist terrorist attack within the EU in 2008 much of the ‘talk’ in this report focuses around transnational, Islamist terrorism and the threat that it poses to many EU Member States. However, it is perhaps most significant to note that the TE-SAT report (2008: 6):

‘discusses terrorism from a law enforcement point of view i.e. as a “crime”, although terrorism is fundamentally a political phenomenon driven by political motives and orientated towards political ends’.

The TE-SAT report prioritises the collection of quantitative data from law enforcement agencies within the EU regarding recent terrorist attacks, arrests and any subsequent prosecutions and convictions. It is suggested that this has a number of implications for the ways in which terrorism and counter terrorism are framed and understood within the EU. In particular, it presupposes that counter terrorism is purely a reactive, criminal justice activity. This point is exacerbated by the exclusion of data on radicalisation and recruitment as terrorism-related activities and the absence of attempts to assess effective counter terrorism across the EU which would inevitably highlight the role of community-based prevention initiatives. This in turn provides a rather one-dimensional presentation of terrorism and a narrow understanding of counter terrorism activity.

Furthermore, it is evident that the quantity and quality of data varies considerably across the EU. Europol collect data on the basis of the Council Decision 2005/671/JHA which relates to the exchange of information and cooperation concerning terrorist offences. However, due to the status of the EU policy-making

53 There is evidence of failed attacks in Germany, the UK (Airplane Plot, 2006: Glasgow Airport, 2007) and Denmark in both 2006 and 2007 and a perpetrated attack in the UK in 2008.
process there are no enforcement mechanisms to compel Member States to communicate standardised information to Europol. This has a number of implications for the quality of the dataset that is generated on an annual basis. It precludes a comprehensive and rigorous assessment of the nature and amount of terrorism within the EU. Furthermore, the inconsistent submission of data from year to year prevents meaningful trend analysis. However, it is important to note that this type of methodological critique is not intended to undermine the role of law enforcement agencies in counter-terrorism activity. It is merely designed to generate insights into the ways in which terrorism and counter-terrorism are framed and understood at the EU level.

This section has highlighted the complex landscape of policy-setting within the EU. In particular, it has revealed how the decision-making structures within the area of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (PJCC) pose enduring challenges to the effective creation of common counter-terrorism policy measures and, in turn, their adoption and application by individual Member States. Moreover, the inherent diversity that characterises the national legal and judicial systems within EU Member States represents a major challenge to the transfer or convergence of PJCC policies within the EU. It can be argued that even with a successful translation of EU policy ‘talk’ to policy ‘decision’, the current legal and judicial divergences across Member States would prevent the adoption and application of common policy ‘action’ within individual countries. However, the section has also revealed that European policy talk, far from being unimportant and meaningless, is both resilient and flexible in that it has the capacity to accommodate significant discursive shifts. This is exemplified in the widely-acknowledged shift in the balance between ‘freedom’ and ‘security’, and the now, increasingly securitised nature of policy talk at the EU level due to the growing preoccupation with terrorism and other associated security concerns. The similarities between the EU and UK policies on the policing of terrorism and extremism are striking, both in terms of the perception of the threat, and the strategies that should be implemented in order to counter the threat posed by such activities. However, where do the similarities end? Can the criticisms regarding the issues of legitimacy and accountability also be levelled at UK legislation and security policies associated with counter-terrorism? The next section examines the nature of security policy talk at the national (UK) level and explores the extent to which European talk
has transferred or at least resonates within the ideas and policy rhetoric that characterise security discourse in the UK.

4.2 The Evolving Nature of Security ‘Talk’ in the UK

The events of 11 September 2001 and subsequent terrorist incidents in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 changed forever the nature of policy-making within the context of security and counter terrorism. However, it is only by analytically distinguishing the levels of policy that one can explore both the intricacies of policy transfer and the extent to which one ‘level’ might impact upon another. This argument is exemplified through an examination of the development of the UK security and policing policy-making process in recent years. While policy ‘decisions’ made in the UK reflect the structure and substance of many of the policy agreements that characterise the EU response to terrorism and extremism, the tone of UK counter terrorism policy ‘talk’ remained resolutely ‘American’ at least in the period immediately following 11 September 2001.

The US counter terrorism rhetoric retained a clear, militaristic tone epitomised by President Bush’s frequent reference to the ‘war on terror’ (CNN, 2003). The phrase became quickly synonymous with combat; a rallying call to arms in the face of an act of war by Al Qaeda and the wider Muslim world. In the US, the nature of the policy talk was evident in both legislative and executive policy ‘decision’ with the passing of the USA PATRIOT Act in 2001 and the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security respectively. In the months that followed it was evident that the rhetoric adopted by the US had transferred to the UK political arena with Prime Minister Tony Blair often drawing on the ‘talk’ emanating from the States. In a speech given in his Sedgefield constituency in March 2004, Blair referred to the nature of the global threat as ‘real and existential’ and promised to ‘wage war relentlessly on those who would exploit racial and religious division to bring catastrophe to the world’ (Guardian, 2004).

However, in 2007 the UK government formally distanced itself from the use of such inflammatory rhetoric with a number of high profile cabinet ministers and government affiliates denouncing the use of the phrase ‘war on terror’ as misleading.
and damaging. Such a move simultaneously indicated a political desire to 'resist the language of warfare' (BBC, 2007), and an acknowledgement of the power of policy 'talk'. As Hilary Benn the then International Development Secretary observed in a visit to New York in 2007, 'words do count and that is why, since this is not something we can overcome by military means alone, we need to find other ways of describing what the challenge is' (Independent, 2007). The government's stance has remained consistent reflected in the then Foreign Secretary's observation that the phrase 'war on terror' was misleading and 'gave the impression of a unified, transnational enemy, embodied in the figure of Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaeda when the situation was far more complex' (BBC, 2009). In recent times both UK political and policing rhetoric has drawn on an emerging discourse of 'new terrorism' exemplified by phrases such as the 'changing nature of the threat'. The political and policing reference to this term is framed around the same two discursive themes identified within EU policy 'talk' – the nature of the threat and the nature of the response.

4.2.1 The Nature of the Terrorism Threat from a UK Perspective

The evolution in the nature of the threat has necessarily prompted a re-assessment of both the international security landscape and the understanding of the concept of national security. Such re-assessment has in turn changed the nature of the policy 'talk' in relation to security issues such as counter terrorism and radicalisation. The National Security Strategy (NSS, 2008c), identified as an example of UK security policy 'talk' and exhortation within this thesis, reflects the political assessment of the current security threats facing the UK and outlines the strategic response to these threats. First published in 2003, the NSS was updated in 2008. It is this latter publication that forms the basis of the discussion in this chapter. Significantly, the nature of the policy 'talk' contained within the most recent National Security Strategy (Home Office, 2008c: 3) reflects much of the same rhetoric and exhortation that contextualises EU policy-setting:

'Since the end of the Cold War the international landscape has been transformed. The opposition between two power blocs has been replaced by a more complex and unpredictable set of relationships. Economic trends, including more open global markets have strengthened the connections
between individuals, societies and communities. All those are positive changes...but they also create new challenges. The Cold War has been replaced by a diverse but interconnected set of threats and risks, which have the potential to undermine wider international stability'.

In line with recent developments within the EU, the UK’s NSS (2008c: 16) reflects an increasingly securitised discourse with particular emphasis placed on a rapidly changing global security landscape which has evolved since the end of the Cold War and is now characterised by an 'interconnected set of threats and risks that require an integrated and multilateral response'. As a result the idea of national security has been reconceptualised to incorporate the potential impact of a diverse range of external yet often interconnected drivers of security and insecurity such as poverty, inequality and poor governance; transnational crime, pandemics and climate change; global trends such as globalisation and terrorism. The reference to the interconnected nature of many of these drivers of insecurity mirror EU policy ‘talk’ which reflects academic observations that many of the issues outlined above have come to operate on a security continuum (Bigo, 1994). This research argues that policy documents such as the NSS (2008) reflect the first phase of the securitisation process – the identification of (existential) threats to security. This in turn sets the scene (alternatively viewed as the justification) for the introduction of extraordinary measures to counter the threats to national security. This latter stage of the securitisation process is identified as the ‘response to the threat’ and this is discussed in more detail in due course.

The predominant security challenge emphasised in the NSS is terrorism with many of the developments in national security strategy, structures, resources and legislation since 2001 focusing on or around terrorism. Many of the reform measures referenced in the NSS 2008 are conceptualised as policy ‘decisions’ within this thesis because they are imbued with compliance mechanisms in the form of legislation, ring-fenced funding, or performance – or at least ‘progress’ – assessment frameworks. In terms of counter terrorism specifically the NSS references the introduction of the cross-government strategy, CONTEST; the establishment of the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC); an increase in funding for counter terrorism from £1 billion in 2001 to £2.5 billion in 2008 and rising to £3.5 billion in 2010/11, and the introduction of new
powers to tackle terrorism and secure successful prosecutions in terrorism-related cases (NSS, 2008c).

The nature and scale of the terrorist threat outlined in the NSS reflects much of the political and policing discourse associated with 'new terrorism' in recent years (see Mythen and Walklate, 2005: 379)\textsuperscript{54}. The threat is described as greater in scale and ambition than the terrorist threats faced in the past. The published threat level has remained at severe, the second highest level since August 2006\textsuperscript{55}. The NSS (2008c) states that at any one time the police and security services are contending with around 30 plots, 200 groups or networks and 2000 individuals who are judged to pose a terrorist threat. Many of these perceived threats share an ambition to cause mass casualties through the use of suicide attacks, and aspirations to use chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. Although the level of organisation among these groups and networks may vary it is often complex; they often work together exploiting information communication technologies (ICTs) to share information, personnel and to spread a common ideology (NSS, 2008c: 10-11). The NSS also makes clear the potential links between burgeoning trans-national organised crime and the financing of terrorism. The contemporary situation is in stark contrast to the UK's historical experience of terrorism emanating from the political violence in Northern Ireland. Such a shift in the nature of the threat is articulated by the former Metropolitan Police Commissioner, Sir Ian Blair:

\begin{quote}
'The IRA, with very few exceptions, did not want to die, they did not want to cause mass casualties and they gave warnings. None of the three apply to the group of people with whom we are now in opposition. The circumstances have changed. The quality and quantity of the threat has changed'.
\end{quote}

[Home Affairs Select Committee Minutes of Evidence (Qu. 4), 9 October 2007]

\textsuperscript{54} This includes the speech made by the then Director General of the Security Service, Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller in November 2006. See: http://www.mi5.gov.uk/print/Page568.html.

\textsuperscript{55} The exception to this is two short periods during August 2006 and June/July 2007 when it was raised to 'critical'.

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4.2.2 The Nature of the Response

While the previous section outlined the first phase of a ‘securitisation process’ at the level of policy ‘talk’, this current section provides evidence of the second phase at the level of policy ‘talk’; justification for the introduction of extraordinary measures to counter the identified, existential threats to national security. It is important to note that some aspects of UK policy ‘talk’ often culminate in concrete policy responses, identified as policy decisions within this thesis. In relation to countering terrorism these include the introduction of CONTEST, in particular the Prevent strand of the strategy; recent counter terrorism legislation which provide the police and other criminal justice agencies with a wide range of powers to minimise the threat of terrorism and the publication of the government’s Public Service Agreements (PSAs) to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from international terrorism. The transfer of policy talk to policy decision is also reflected in the emphasis placed on the role of local, routine policing. This theme is integral to this thesis, and although it is explored in greater detail in the next chapter it is pertinent to reference it here as an example of the influence different levels of policy-making can exert upon each other and thus the importance of distinguishing between levels of policy development for the purposes of empirical enquiry.

The political drive to enhance the role of neighbourhood policing within the public police service is nothing new. The policy paper Building Communities, Beating Crime (2004) promoted the development of dedicated Neighbourhood Policing Teams (NPTs) across England and Wales. The eventual policy ‘decision’, which introduced the PCSO and the Police and Communities Together (PACT) meeting to the UK, was a key driver in attempts to make the police more accessible, visible and accountable and, in turn, to increase public satisfaction (Home Office, 2004b). At this point there was very little evidence of attempts to align neighbourhood policing with a discernible role in countering terrorism. It is interesting to note the context to this police reform proposal (and ultimate policy decision), and in particular the nature of the policing policy talk during this period. The consultation document references a ‘changing world, technologies that have removed borders and barriers and a growing

56 Such powers include Section 44 Police Stop and Search and the use of Control Orders which are often used to tackle the threat to national security by suspected terrorists whom the UK is unable to prosecute or deport.
consumer culture [which] has led to rising expectations of customer service’ (Home Office, 2004b). Such rhetoric contrasts sharply with the increasingly securitised talk that accompanied the publication of subsequent Green Papers promoting the importance of routine, neighbourhood policing (Home Office, 2008a).

The Green Paper, From the Neighbourhood to the National (2008a) represents the next step in policing reform at the local, routine level. This document overviews the development of Neighbourhood Policing in the UK and the attempts to improve the connection between the public and the police. This came at the same time as the publication of the National Community Safety Plan 2008-2011 which outlined the government’s overarching priority objectives as set out in the Public Service Agreements (PSAs). However it is argued that documents such as these, conceptualised as policy ‘talk’ within this thesis, represent an increasingly securitised approach to policing reform and community safety, and this is demonstrable in two key areas. Firstly, by placing a stronger focus on the need to reflect the increased risk posed by terrorism and in particular violent extremists and role of neighbourhood policing teams in the prevention and detecting of these potential threats (Home Office, 2008a), and, secondly, through references to the relationship between national priorities and local concerns. The first area of emphasis reinforces the rhetoric that has been emanating from the senior police ranks for a number of years and epitomised by Sir Ian Blair’s observation in the Dimbleby Lecture (BBC, 2005):

’It will not be a Special Branch officer at Scotland Yard who first confronts a terrorist but a local cop or a local community support officer...it is not the police and the intelligence agencies who will defeat crime and terror; it is communities’.

The nature of both the political and policing rhetoric emerging around terrorism and other associated security concerns such as extremism and radicalisation really set the tone and unequivocally thrust community policing or more accurately Neighbourhood Policing into the counter terrorism sphere where traditional approaches had focused around the security services, Regional Counter Terrorism Units and police Special Branch. The second point that emphasises the increased connection between national priorities and local concerns – and indeed which is also indicated in the title of the Green Paper – can be seen as evidence of increased securitisation because it epitomises observations made by advocates of the securitisation theorists who note
that changes at the local policing level are seen to be occurring at the same time as an increasing preoccupation with national and international security priorities (King and Sharp, 2006).

However, much of the securitised policy talk around the response to terrorism has remained very much at the level of rhetoric and debate and has not translated into concrete policy ‘decisions’. Two of the most salient examples of this are the much-maligned National Identity Scheme and the enduring political debates surrounding the extension to the pre-charge detention of terrorist suspects in the UK. The National Identity Card Scheme is conceptualised as an example of security ‘talk’ within the framework of this thesis because, although it was incorporated into legislation in 2006 in the form of the National Identity Cards Act, ultimately this policy ‘decision’ did not retain the legislative power to compel all UK citizens to carry an identity card. However, both of these debated issues reflect one of the central themes that characterise the nature of policy ‘talk’ in relation to counter terrorism in the UK: the enduring tension between national security and the maintenance of societal values and individual civil liberties. Moreover, they both reflect the politically turbulent and contingent nature of public policy-making in the UK. This research focuses on one of these areas; the enduring debates surrounding pre-charge detention of terrorist suspects.

The length of time a terrorist suspect can be held without charge has dominated much of the policy debates around counter terrorism in the UK from 2000 to the present day. During this period the policy ‘talk’ has often translated into policy ‘decision’ in the form of significant and frequent legislative changes. The overhaul of counter terrorism legislation in 2000 introduced the basic 48 hour detention, extendable to seven days with court permission. In 2003 this doubled to fourteen days, and subsequently the Terrorism Act 2006 took this to 28 days. The latter timeframe was introduced after Tony Blair’s attempts to secure a significant extension – to 90 days – resulted in his first House of Commons defeat as Prime Minister in November 2005. The current pre-charge detention limit remains at 28 days but there have been a number of attempts to extend this timeframe, and it remains a hugely contested issue. In 2007, the debate was reignited by Gordon Brown’s publicly stated intention to make the issue a priority for his Premiership within days of replacing Tony Blair
Guardian, 2006). The former Home Secretary, Jacqui Smith signalled her support by indicating she would use the upcoming Terrorism Bill to extend the detention timeframe to 42 days. The government’s rationale for pre-charge extension has remained steadfast, that it is an imperative response to the scale and complexity of the threat and guided by the objective and professional assessment of the facts as provided by the Security Services, ACPO and Metropolitan Police Service. In March 2008, the then Metropolitan Assistant Commissioner for Special Operations and Chair of ACPO TAM wrote to the Home Secretary outlining the police perspective (ACPO, 2008b):

‘The changing nature of the threat and the intent to cause mass casualties without warning and without consideration to personal risk has meant that a decision to arrest is often made earlier than in previous counter terrorism investigations. Operations against violent extremists are characterised by the risk of having to take pre-emptive action on public safety grounds before evidential opportunities have been fully exploited. This sets such investigations apart from almost all others and when the complexity is considered they become unique. This requirement to take pre-emptive action denies the senior investigating officer the opportunity to secure available evidence prior to arrest. In my view there is an obvious correlation between the increased risk (necessitating early intervention), the increased evidential, technical and cross jurisdictional complexity and the risk that a greater period of pre-charge detention might be required within the foreseeable future’.

This perspective was corroborated by both the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Lord Carlile of Berriew, who stated, ‘I anticipate that there may well be a very small number of cases, albeit possibly cases of the utmost importance, in which 28 days may prove to be insufficient’ [Home Affairs Select Committee Minutes of Evidence (Qu. 59), 9 October 2007], and perhaps most notably, the former Metropolitan Commissioner Sir Ian Blair who commented:

‘The number of conspiracies, the number of conspirators within those conspiracies and the magnitude of the ambition in terms of destruction and loss of life is mounting, has continued to mount, is increasing year by year and a pragmatic inference can be drawn that at some stage 28 days is not going to be sufficient’.

[Home Affairs Select Committee Minutes of Evidence (Qu. 1), 9 October 2007]

Although both indicated the possibility of the need to detain suspects for longer than 28 days in some cases, it is important to note that both stopped short of proposing a set timeframe and therefore supporting overtly the government’s plan to increase the
detention period to 42 days. The debates on this topic are contentious and enduring, and the names and number of individuals in opposition to an extension distinguished and increasing – all of whom remain unconvinced ‘by the evidence put forward for increasing the period [of detention]’ (BBC, 2007). Such opposition to an extension to 42 days was reinforced by the fact that powers already exist to extend detention for up to 30 days under emergency powers dealing with grave threats such as war57. Unsurprisingly the most vociferous opposition to the planned policy changes emanated from the then opposition political parties who maintained that the government’s policy talk was a ‘symbolic assault on our liberty that is unnecessary’ and is tantamount to ‘ineffective authoritarianism’ (Damien Green: House of Commons Hansard Debates, 2008). In December 2007 MPs on the Home Affairs Select Committee, following extensive enquiry, found that there was no evidence to suggest it was necessary to extend the 28 day limit.

An analysis of key debates around pre-charge detention reveals a focus on two recurring themes. Firstly, that an extension to pre-charge detention might signal the return of the internment practices that characterised such policy during the Troubles in Northern Ireland. And secondly, that such a shift in policy would have a disproportionate and therefore negative effect on Muslim communities, commonly perceived as the primary recipient of such ‘extraordinary’ police power. The first issue was raised consistently by both political opponents and human rights organisations such as Liberty who observed advocates of an extension to pre-charge detention as public champions for internment (Director of Liberty, 2007). In response to fears regarding the return of internment practices the then Labour leadership proposed a series of safeguards which, it believed, would guarantee proper checks and balances against arbitrary treatment. Lord Carlile supported such moves stating that:

‘What we are talking about here is using the system of checks and balances, which is our everyday stock-in-trade in the courts, in a way that is proportionate to the threat and the risk’.

[Home Affairs Select Committee Minutes of Evidence (Qu. 65), 9 October 2007]

57 This is the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, and its application is dependent on the declaration of an emergency and it is subject to Parliamentary scrutiny after seven days.
The second theme inherent to pre-charge detention debates is the perceived disproportionate impact on Muslim communities. Lord Carlile stated:

there is no evidence to suggest longer detention would harm relations between Muslims and the police and indeed, observed foreign policy was 'more likely to radicalise young people'.

[Home Affairs Select Committee Minutes of Evidence (Qu. 76), 9 October 2007]

Sir Ian Blair, in his evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee on 9 October 2007 (Qu. 17) was more reticent in his observations on the issue indicating that extending detention beyond 28 days would not ‘ease relations between the police and Muslim communities’. He identified a need to reconsider the nature of the policy ‘talk’ associated with counter terrorism practices such as pre-charge detention, ‘to recast this language to be the language of community safety rather than criminal investigation then I think we help’. Ultimately the debates around an extension to pre-charge detention culminated in a defeat for Brown’s government following rejection of the plans in the House of Lords in October 2008.

The Liberal Democrat leader, Nick Clegg observed Labour’s policy ‘talk’ as ‘more about ministers posturing and looking tough than it ever was about fighting terrorism’ (BBC, 2008). Furthermore the defeat of the Counter Terrorism Bill in the House of Lords in October 2008 was met with condemnation of the supposed, Labour assumption that ‘the tougher we [politicians] sound, the more effective we are in fighting terrorism’ (Damian Green, Conservative MP: Parliamentary Debates, November 2008). Such an observation links in with recent academic discourse associated with ‘new terrorism’ and in particular the widely-held opinion that it is important for the government to be seen to be ‘acting tough’ within an environment that is increasingly out of the government’s power to control (Mythen and Walklate, 2005). Moreover, the ability to swiftly undermine policy ‘talk’ and its potential development into policy ‘decision’ following a change to national, political party control effectively reinforces the contingent nature of public policy-making generally and certainly within such a politically and publically contested area such as security and terrorism. In light of this perhaps it is more accurate to view some aspects of counter terrorism ‘talk’ as examples of politicised talk rather than securitised talk. All
of these issues are integral to the theoretical and empirical frameworks that underpin this research and will be revisited in the discussion in Chapter Seven.

4.3. The Nature of the ‘Talk’ within the Case Study Force

This section examines the nature of both the policy and policing ‘talk’ at the Force and BCU level. The section incorporates selected findings from the analysis of both relevant documentary sources and the interviews carried out with police officers across the ranks of the case study Force and BCU. The textual ‘talk’ is identified as such for a number of reasons. Firstly, it comprises publicly-available information relating to the Force’s overall vision, core values, and key objectives. And secondly, although it provides a link with the Force’s strategic aims, and key elements of the National Intelligence Model (CENTREX, 2005) are referenced to reflect various operational requirements, it does not incorporate any tangible mechanisms of compliance and only references pre-existing performance assessments and targets. However, both the textual and verbal talk provide an empirical opportunity to explore the extent to which national policy ‘talk’ around terrorism and radicalisation is visible at the individual Force level, which in turn facilitates an examination of the extent to which policy talk at the local policing level has become increasingly securitised.

The Force Annual Plan (2007-2008) in operation at the time of data collection provides an empirical opportunity to explore these types of theoretical debates, and the analysis of such ‘textual talk’ generates interesting information. Ultimately, the extent to which Force level policy talk reflects the ‘securitised’ rhetoric emanating from the national level is questionable. In some respects there is evidence of this as key Force documents highlight an overt commitment to achieve national priorities set by the Home Office (HO) in documents such as the National Community Safety Plan (2008-2011) as well as the local priorities identified by communities at PACT meetings. The reference to national priorities in a Force-specific document reflects aspects of a process of increased securitisation as identified by theorists such as King and Sharp (2006) who observe the gradual creep of national preoccupations into local policing priorities. The case study Force Annual Plan references the six community safety themes outlined in the National Community Safety Plan (2008-2011), one of
which is 'preventing extremism and countering terrorism'. The Annual Plan also incorporates the government’s Key Strategic Priorities for the Police Service (2007-2008), which includes ‘protecting the country from terrorism and domestic extremism’. However the nature of the talk at the Force level in respect to these issues differs markedly from that espoused at the national level. Whereas the national ‘security talk’ can be seen to some degree to reflect the EU’s preoccupation with risk perception and its ‘entailing emergency discourse’ (Edwards and Meyer, 2008: 18), the talk around counter terrorism and associated security concerns is rather subordinate to other operational priorities. This is perhaps unsurprising given the need for individual Forces to respond to the diverging environments that they police.

However, it is a significant to note that the amount of securitised talk decreases as one ‘drills down from the national to the local, particularly as the role of routine, neighbourhood policing is often at the forefront of policing and political rhetoric associated with counter-terror and extremism. The case study Force identified counter-terror and extremism as a Force priority but the references to what must be done and how it will be achieved within the Force are somewhat ambiguous. The operational activities in relation to terrorism and extremism included reducing the climate of fear; promoting good community relationships; gathering intelligence from communities, and engaging with partner agencies. The document does not indicate how these activities will be carried out in practice and there is no direct reference to the government’s CONTEST Strategy (2003; 2009) or to the Prevent strand. Moreover, the references to performance assessment and review appear to corroborate this observation. The Annual Plan 2007-2008 includes an overview of activity-based costing (ABC) that seeks to place an accurate cost on what an organisation

58 The other national community safety priorities are: making communities stronger and more effective; reducing crime and Anti-Social Behaviour (ASB) and building a culture of respect; creating safer environments; protecting the public and building confidence, and improving people’s lives so they are less likely to commit offences or re-offend.

59 The other national strategic priorities are to: reduce overall crime by 15%; enable people to feel safer in their communities; bring more offenders to justice, and strengthen public protection (particularly in relation to increasing capacity and capability for dealing with widespread threats such as serious and organised crime.

60 The other force priorities in 2007-2008 are identified as the need to: tackle drug-related crime; reduce distraction burglaries; combat ASB and disorder; identify areas affected by town and city disorder; reduce, detect and prevent violent crime; establish drug intervention programme (DIP), and enhance technology (for example, intelligence/incident databases)
produces'. In order to measure the activities undertaken by police officers at a Divisional (BCU) level each BCU undertakes a 2-week study that requires all officers to record their activities at 15 minute intervals according to a standard Home Office list of codes. The HMIC Baseline Assessments cover a range of areas which include: reducing crime (volume crime); investigating crime (including serious and organised crime, and promoting safety. Within the Force Annual Plan there is no reference to performance in relation to countering terrorism and preventing violent extremism. There is reference to measurement in relation to stop and searches under PACE legislation but not to stop and searches under S44 of the Terrorism Act 2000. These findings appear to suggest that the inclusion of 'countering terrorism and preventing extremism' as a force priority is little more than a general, strategic objective that pays lip service to national requirements.

4.3.1 The Changing Nature of the 'Talk': From Headquarters to Neighbourhoods

This section examines the extent to which national talk associated with terrorism and other security concerns such as extremism and radicalisation were observed within the case study Force, and particularly within the case study BCU. By analysing empirically the nature of the talk emanating from different police ranks it is possible to begin to ascertain whether there is evidence of a process of securitisation at work within routine policing in the UK. An effective way to assess the securitised nature of the talk – at all levels within the case study force – was to take account of the length of time it took for officers or policing support staff to make reference to terrorism or other associated security concerns. During the process of setting up and subsequently carrying out the interviews, it was made clear that one of the primary aims of the research was to examine the nature of routine policing at the BCU and Neighbourhood Policing Team levels. One of the most significant findings from an initial analysis of all of the semi-structured interviews carried out for this research revealed that it took a longer period of time (if at all) for terrorism to be referenced the further one 'drilled down' through the police ranks of the case study Force. Furthermore, where terrorism or associated security concerns were referenced the nature of that 'talk' differed markedly according to policing rank and responsibility. The terrorism talk espoused by chief officers (at both the HQ and BCU levels) more closely reflected the policy talk emanating from within the political and policing
arenas at the national level. This includes clear reference to the need to embed counter terrorism strategies into established neighbourhood frameworks and processes and the integral role of local, neighbourhood policing in effective counter terrorism work. This is epitomised by the following observation made by a member of Force Command, ‘as for counter terrorism...it’s right in the middle of it all [officer tasking]’ (Force Command2).

The more limited observations associated with terrorism within Neighbourhood Policing Teams were characterised by references to terrorism as a general, macro occurrence in other ‘policing areas’ and countries, and, when reference was made to counter terrorism strategies and activity ‘in-Force’ it was the work of Special Branch and designated counter terrorism and radicalisation teams such as Channel Project that were highlighted rather than the role of routine officers on the frontline. As one PCSO states, ‘I don’t really think of it [counter terrorism] as being part of my job’ (BCU PCSO1).

Much of the policy talk or rhetoric that emanates from the upper echelons of the case study Force reflects aspects of the securitised talk and decisions\(^6\)\(^1\) identified at the national level. This includes reference to the change in operational emphasis from ‘pursuing terrorists’ to ‘preventing radicalisation’, and the fundamental importance of embedding counter terrorism work in both the strategic framework and operational activity of routine, neighbourhood police officers. This is reflected in the follow observations:

‘I think when Gordon Brown took over, he kind of took a look at it [counter terrorism strategy] and said ‘this isn’t right...we’re spending 99% of our money on pursue and nothing on prevent...since then the needle has shifted across to prevent and it’s a much greater priority’.

[Force Command2]

Prevent must be embedded in neighbourhood policing. That structure is well trodden; our Neighbourhood Policing Teams are in place, out local partners are in place...eyes and ears, hearts and minds...everything is there.

[BCU Lead for Counter Terrorism]

\(^6\)\(^1\) Such decisions include the cross-government CONTEST strategy and in particular the Prevent strand.
It is widely observed at the senior, strategic policing levels that the role of routine police officers in counter terrorism work should be made more explicit to those on the frontline. This appears crucial to the effective implementation and longer term establishment of security strategies such as Prevent which are contingent on local officer understanding and application. The Case Study BCU Lead for Counter Terrorism acknowledges the need to promote the role of counter terrorism work at the routine policing level, ‘what we’ve got to do now is to make sure that the Prevent ethos is moved from the unconscious to the conscious...’.

Such rhetoric takes on increased relevance following the analysis of interviews carried out with senior BCU officers and those at the frontline of neighbourhood policing. The findings suggest that very often counter terrorism work is an unconscious practice:

‘If you were to say to one of our PCs what are you doing about terrorism, they’d probably say ‘well, nothing’. They might get someone in custody with a multitude of credit cards in different names; they might not immediately link that with terrorism. They might think ‘I’m just dealing with a big fraud scam’. But they refer it on because they’re suspicious. So, often they are doing something about it, they just don’t realise that they’re doing anything about it’.

[Neighbourhood Inspector4]

It is significant to note that such observations are reinforced through interviews with the aforementioned PCs. It became quickly apparent that police officers based within the case study Neighbourhood Policing Teams did not voluntarily ‘talk’ about terrorism or other associated security concerns when asked about their day to day routine activity. Out of 14 interviews62 carried out with members of Neighbourhood Policing Teams only 3 referenced terrorism or any form of counter terrorism work of their own volition. This is an interesting finding given the selection of the case study Force and BCU as a HM Government prioritised, Pathfinder police area. More specifically, this finding demonstrates the dissonance between policy ‘talk’ at the level of the EU, the UK and the BCU policing. The EU action plans and UK strategies highlight terrorism as an external threat but in terms of routine policing this

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62 This number refers to the ranks of Sergeant, PC and PCSO and excludes interviews undertaken with NPT Inspectors.
detailed, high-political, talk has no resonance. The overwhelming majority of NPT officers talk about their job in relation to the nature of criminality in policing areas, tasking priorities, PACT commitments and the role of NPT officers to provide 'high visibility reassurance to the public'.

The majority of references to terrorism and associated security concerns were only made following direct questions pertaining to this theme towards the end of the research interview. When prompted to offer observations on the role of counter terrorism work within routine, local police practice, the nature of the 'talk' is generalised and abstract. In many instances reference is made to historical 'complacency' and 'living in a world where terrorism is more prevalent'. The generalised nature of such terrorism talk is perhaps unsurprising in light of the fact that police officers also indicate that they get a lot of their information about terrorism from 'reading the papers' [BCU Neighbourhood Sgt2] and 'watching the news like everyone else' [BCU Neighbourhood PC4].

Although it is widely acknowledged that there has been an increase in general talk about counter terrorism within the BCU the overwhelming number of NPT officers talk about counter terrorism work as a specialism that is noticeably removed from the day to day operational practice of routine police officers:

"For me I still think, right there are people there doing that and it's a little bit more secretive and stuff. Plus, you're a bit wrapped up in who got burgled where last night".

[Neighbourhood PC1]

"When I think counter terrorism policing I think specialism. I don't really think of it as my job to prevent it; it's not like I ignore it, it would be more for me to know about it if it was happening and to pass on anything that I do have".

[Neighbourhood PCSO2]

These observations demonstrate effectively that the counter terrorism rhetoric at the national level appears to have got 'lost in translation' at the local policing level. The national preoccupation with terrorism and associated security concerns, and the vital role of local police officers in addressing these concerns does not resonate to any
significant degree at the neighbourhood level, at least not in terms of the way in which officers ‘talk’ about their work. Counter terrorism work is still regarded as a ‘specialism’, far removed from the working practices of routine officers. It is a stark contrast from the contemporary policing landscape articulated through national text and talk. Moreover, the observations highlight the importance of the public service agreements (PSAs), performance targets and strategic assessments associated with community safety partnerships for understanding routine policing. Such comments also go some way to explaining the relative marginality of securitised issues like counter terrorism to these routines. In short, securitised issues remain specialised rather than routine. Hence the significant limits placed on their ‘contagion’ (Hillyard, 1987) of policing in England and Wales (as contrasted with West Belfast in Northern Ireland).

However, it is also important to note that the majority of interviews reveal that the success of Prevent and in particular, embedding the strategy’s central structures and processes into the strategic and operational framework of routine policing has yet to be realised. This is a pertinent finding in light of the central aim of this thesis to explore empirically observations that routine policing is becoming increasingly ‘securitised’. These types of findings reinforce one of the central conclusions arising from this research, that ‘securitisation’ is first and foremost a process which is seen to be evident to a greater or lesser degree at different levels of policy-making and implementation.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter presents a number of pertinent findings to the theoretical and conceptual debates that underpin this thesis. It provides an account of how EU, UK and police force levels frame the problem of both terrorism and counter terrorism. The documentary analysis reveals that counter terrorism talk is dominated by an external threat narrative and therefore counter terrorism is articulated as a coordinated response to that threat. More generally, the chapter identifies the vital role of rhetoric and exhortation in the policy-making process; the ways in which it initiates and sustains public and political debate and acts as a rhetorical platform for public policy-making in the UK. Moreover, it reveals the fluid and diverging nature of counter
terrorism talk across international, national and Force settings according to various political and societal preoccupations and the consequential conceptualisations of security. Finally, while findings do identify evidence of a process of increased securitisation, they also demonstrate that the extent of such securitisation varies and indeed diminishes as the empirical examination moves from the national to the local policing level.

Crucially, the findings presented in this chapter are the first stage in building an increased understanding of the nature of securitisation as applied to counter terrorism policing policy. It sets the scene for the identification of securitisation as a ‘process’ and that various stages of this are visible at different levels of policy-making. It is possible to break down the process of securitisation into three component parts, 1) the identification of an existential threat, 2) the development of tangible mechanisms to respond to the identified threat, and 3) the adoption and utilisation of these mechanisms ‘on the ground’. This chapter has demonstrated that, quite uniquely, all three parts of the securitisation process can take place at the level of policy ‘talk’ and debate. These observations will be further developed in the following chapters which focus on policy ‘decisions’ and ‘action’, and the relationship each policy level shares with the process of securitisation as applied to counter terrorism policing.
Chapter Five: 'What Gets Measured Gets Done': National Policy at the Local Level

Being brutally honest? If you judged me on my performance in relation to counter terrorism issues it would become more mainstreamed. If I’m judged on it, I’ll get it done. That’s the way it is.

[BCU Commander3]

5.0 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to explore the extent to which local routine policing is becoming increasingly securitised as a consequence of the policy ‘decisions’ made within the arena of counter terrorism. In order to achieve this aim empirically it is important to retain a clear understanding of what counts as a policy ‘decision’ within the analytical framework of this thesis. In particular, how does one distinguish empirically between policy ‘talk’ and policy ‘decision’ when conducting a critical test of the securitisation thesis? The chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section outlines the executive ‘decisions’ made about counter terrorism policy at the national level in the UK, and focuses particularly on the CONTEST Strategy (Home Office 2009). The second section examines the Prevent strand of CONTEST (ACPO, 2008a), which, it is argued, reflects an explicit attempt to embed counter terrorism work into routine policing. The final section interrogates the extent to which national counter terrorism policy ‘decisions’ are incorporated into the strategic framework of local, routine policing. This is achieved through a systematic analysis of case-study documentation and interview data pertaining to the strategic framework of the Force. The overarching intention is to articulate why a focus on decisions made about counter terrorism policy helps to conceptualise routine policing for the purposes of critiquing the Securitisation Thesis.

The distinctions made between levels of policy-making, and the terminology used when conceptualising policy instruments or ‘decisions’ in particular are all-important. An examination of previous research into policy formation and policy implementation reveals a tendency to focus on the more concrete manifestations of policy in the form of policy statements, legislation and regulations. This is perhaps in part because such
manifestations of policy are seen to capture the 'actual choices of government' (Bernstein and Cashore, 2000: 70). The work of Jones and Newburn (2007) draws similar distinctions between two key dimensions of policy concerned with 'process' and 'substance' respectively. They suggest that policy can be considered substantively through an examination of the more concrete manifestations of policy in terms of policy content and instruments. Balzacq (2008) highlights the importance of focusing on policy instruments, and examines the policy tools directly associated with securitisation in the arena of EU responses to terrorism. Drawing on the 'new governance' literature, Balzacq (2008: 76) suggests that it is important to shift the study of securitisation away from discourse and towards the functions and implications of the 'empirical referents of policy – policy tools or instruments – that are used to alleviate public problems defined as threats'.

Chapter Three provides a detailed discussion of the analytical distinctions made between the different levels of policy within this thesis. However, the key point to reiterate here is the distinction between the various dimensions of policy 'substance' (Jones and Newburn, 2007) and that one should beware of conflating the different levels – from expressive policy rhetoric to concrete action. Security policies about counter terrorism and radicalisation – at both the international and national level – incorporate a range of strategies, objectives and intervention activities. This thesis proposes the extent to which policy responses function as policy 'decisions' is dependent on a number of fundamental criteria. A policy response to terrorism or extremism is categorised as a policy 'decision' if it has some form of enforcement mechanism attached to it which would in turn necessitate some degree of 'organisational or public compliance' as a consequence. Such powers of enforcement might be characterised by legislation, financial incentive and/or organisational compliance mechanisms. The UK’s CONTEST Strategy is identified as a security policy 'decision'. The Pursue strand is imbued with compliance mechanisms in the form of legislative 'decisions' which provide police officers with special powers. Moreover, the implementation and delivery of the Prevent strand is subject to a number of progress inspections and a series of performance assessments at both the local police and community safety partnership levels. However, the key issue to be explored is the extent to which such compliance mechanisms are evident at the local policing level. In other words, to what extent do national security policy 'decisions'
inform strategic decision-making at the BCU policing level? Such issues have implications for a critical test of the suppositions that routine policing is subject to increased securitisation.

5.1 The CONTEST Strategy: securitised policy decisions in the UK

The following section focuses on the UK’s current counter terrorism ‘CONTEST’ strategy as it provides the context for the empirical research undertaken for this thesis and the institutional setting for alleged securitisation in the UK. The collective, cross-party effort on tackling terrorism is taken forward by the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) which provides strategic direction for counter terrorism in support of Ministers, including through CONTEST programme boards. The strategy, first published in 2003 and subsequently re-launched in 2009 comprises four work-streams — Pursue, Prepare, Protect and Prevent. It is important to note that whilst CONTEST is not a statutory instrument, the authority of the strategy (and thus its inclusion as a policy ‘decision’ within this thesis) rests on a number of key factors. Firstly, significant funding has been allocated to the implementation of the strategy and money is ring-fenced for the development of associated roles, functions and initiatives — particularly within the Prevent strand at the level of local, routine policing. Furthermore, the strategy — again particularly in the area of Prevent — is subject to HM Inspection and progress and performance is monitored through the development of new Public Service Agreements (PSAs) for countering terrorism and performance measures for local authorities and the police (APACS).

The CONTEST strategy is the current, executive policy instrument for countering terrorism in the UK. It was first launched in 2003 motivated in large part by the tangible shift in the nature of the threat and the perpetration of terrorist acts so starkly exemplified by the 11 September attacks in the US in 2001. Up until this point the UK’s experience of terrorism had very much focused on the threats and actions of the IRA (1969 — 1998) and the counter terrorism policies of the time reflected the

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63 See Diagram 5.1.
64 The extent to which such performance assessment mechanisms are evident at police Force and local BCU levels will be examined in the next section of the Chapter.
political and sectarian nature of this activity\textsuperscript{65}. The 'new terrorism' landscape that emerged following 11 September 2001 was imbued with an international dimension characterised by religious justification and a wide-ranging political and religious agenda far beyond traditional concerns with single, 'regional' issues. The consequential change in the nature of the threat prompted a swift and dynamic shift in policy-making and policing practice.

CONTEST (Home Office, 2009) sets out a comprehensive plan for dealing with the terrorist threat with the four key elements reflecting the breadth of the counter terrorism network in the UK. These 'work strands' incorporate a range of 'high' and 'low' policing strategies (Brodeur, 1983), statutory, voluntary and community partnership working and community-generated initiatives. The primary aim of the Pursue strand is the disruption of terrorist activity through a focus on Security Service and police investigation and criminal justice prosecution. This policy strand serves as a clear and contemporary example of securitised decision-making in the UK as it works to strengthen the policing and legal frameworks by facilitating the use of deportation, proscription, and the exclusion of 'dangerous individuals' where appropriate. The Protect strand seeks to reduce the vulnerability of the UK and its interests overseas. It incorporates a number of strategies to enhance the resilience of the critical national infrastructure and external border security. It also aims to provide enhanced protection within crowded places by working with architects and local council partners to 'design-in' safe areas, and uses cutting edge biometric technology for monitoring air, sea and rail travel (Home Office, 2009). The Prepare work-stream focuses on maximising the response to a terrorist incident whilst simultaneously minimising its effects. Those in receipt of counter terrorism training include city centre retail outlet managers, and particularly those who operate within the night-time economy (NTE).

It is the Prevent strand of CONTEST that is the central focus of this research. It represents a notable departure from the other work-streams in a number of ways. The primary aim is to prevent support for violent extremism by identifying and supporting vulnerable individuals who may be susceptible to radicalisation. It serves as the

\textsuperscript{65} See Chapter Two for more detailed discussion.
central empirical focus of this research because local, routine policing has primary responsibility for its implementation on the ground. In addition, and pertinent to the theoretical framework of this thesis, the Prevent strategy constitutes a tangible manifestation of the re-conceptualisation of national security that has taken place in the UK in recent years. In the past national security has focused on the protection of the state and its interests from attack by other states. The security landscape created by both the Troubles in Northern Ireland and the end of the Cold War signalled an emergence of both internal and external security threats. The terrorist incident in London on 7 July 2005 thrust the internal/external security dynamic to the forefront of policy-making in the UK. This is evident within the Prevent strategy and its focus on ensuring communities are resilient enough to counter radicalisation and extremism and crucially, the extent to which they are prepared to cooperate with policing authorities to offer information and assistance to counter such a domestic threat.

However, the disproportionate focus of the Prevent strategy on Muslim communities has generated wide-ranging and enduring criticism. The government re-launched CONTEST in March 2009 following the publication of ‘Prevent: Progress and Prospects’ (HMIC, 2008). Officially the launch of CONTEST 2 reflected an opportunity to take account of the evolving threat, and incorporate lessons learned and the new challenges faced by the UK from international terrorism (Home Office, 2009). However, it is unofficially (yet widely) considered that the re-launch was prompted by recognition of the failure to progress the Prevent strand, a strategy observed recently and unequivocally as ‘failed and friendless’ (Thomas, 2010: 442). Indeed, the main changes to the strategy are focused on the Prevent strand66 which, the HMIC (2009: 3) observes, needs to ‘improve understanding about what can be done to prevent vulnerable people becoming terrorists’. The motivations for radicalisation and extremism are beyond the remit of this thesis. However, in terms of this research, the decision to re-launch CONTEST following rigorous inspection of the Prevent strand has implications for debates around the increased securitisation of routine policing.

66 Notwithstanding changes to the Prepare work strand which reflect technological advancement in the detection and response to chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) terrorist incidents.
5.2 The Prevent Strand of CONTEST

On a conceptual level Prevent is an important empirical example of the transferral of security policy ‘talk’ into security policy ‘decision’. It is a tangible manifestation of the rhetorical drive away from the traditional hard-edged, and covert approach to counter terrorism towards a softer, community-based approach to countering terrorism and associated security concerns such as radicalisation and extremism. Furthermore, the aim is for these operational initiatives to be undertaken by police officers at the BCU level and more specifically the Neighbourhood Policing Team (NPT) level. All of these operational developments are subject to financial incentive, regular inspection and comprehensive performance assessment. This in turn has implications for a critical examination of the securitisation thesis as applied to counter terrorism policing in that it represents discernible attempts to embed counter terrorism policing into mainstream, routine policing. This is demonstrated both in the rhetoric (‘talk’) as reflected in statements such as, ‘the overall vision will be to mainstream counter terrorism Prevent functions into everyday policing’ (ACPO, 2008: 8) and the concrete strategies devised to achieve this. This section outlines the key objectives and methods of delivering the Prevent policy before examining the mechanisms of compliance which denote its conceptualisation as a policy decision within this thesis.

The primary aim of Prevent is to undermine support for violent extremism by identifying and engaging with groups or individuals within communities who may be vulnerable or susceptible to radicalisation. The strategy highlights the need for multi-agency partnership working, and the promotion of community-based policing principles in order to work with communities to reduce the opportunity for radicalisation. These principles are reflected in the strategy’s seven key objectives.

These are to:

1. Undermine extremist ideology by helping to support mainstream voices and narratives;

67 At the time of the completion of this thesis the Home Office announced it was to undertake a review of the Prevent strand of CONTEST, with a clear separation between Prevent (Home Office lead) and integration (Communities and Local Government lead).
2. Disrupt those who promote violent extremism by helping to strengthen vulnerable institutions;
3. Support individuals who are vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremists by encouraging them to follow positive and compelling alternatives;
4. Increase the resilience of communities to engage with and resist violent extremists,
5. Effectively address grievances.

These are supported by two cross-cutting work streams:

6. Develop PREVENT-related intelligence, analysis and research,
7. Enhance strategic communications

[ACPO, 2008:6]

5.2.1 The Role of Local Routine Policing

One of the foremost defining aspects of Prevent within the context of this thesis is the overriding emphasis it places on the role of routine policing in the effective delivery of its operational initiatives. Moreover, the strategy reflects the shift from a reliance on covert tactics and legislative enforcement to the promotion of community ‘engagement’ and ‘intervention’. The drivers for the adoption of a preventative strategy at the local policing level are understood in terms of the need to address increasing concerns over community cohesion, and consequently, the need for enhanced community engagement. A key distinction between the Prevent strand and its CONTEST policy counterparts is the emphasis placed on local authority agencies and community organisations in taking a lead in the implementation and delivery of the policy agenda. As such it reflects much of the policy ‘talk’ that increasingly informs contemporary counter terrorism policy in the UK. As Spalek (2008a) suggests, Prevent represents a softer, bottom-up, approach to counter terrorism and highlights the need to implement community-based policing principles in order to work with communities to reduce the opportunity for radicalisation. The utilisation of

68 Conceptually, routine policing can be usefully divided into two operational categories: response and neighbourhood policing. The conceptual understanding of routine policing within this thesis is examined in greater detail in Chapters Three and Six.
community-based policing methods within a counter terrorism context represents a tangible transfer of security policy ‘talk’ (the shift from ‘pursue’ to ‘prevent’) to the security policy ‘decision’ arena.

An increasing preoccupation with community cohesion and engagement ensures that these issues have gradually become core areas of routine police ‘business’, and have increased the emphasis placed on community policing, more latterly re-conceptualised as Neighbourhood Policing. Increasingly, community engagement strategies are operationalised through Neighbourhood Policing Teams (NPTs). The NPTs are an example of the implementation of a policy decision and subsequent translation into policy action in the form of tangible change to police practice. The principles of Neighbourhood Policing were established following implementation of the National Policing Programme (see 2007a). These include:

1. Every community should have accessibility to, and familiarity with a dedicated team;
2. Teams should have influence through partners and key networks,
3. Teams should develop successful intervention plans to address local priorities and achieve impact. [italics mine]

These three principles and the Neighbourhood Policing Teams that embody them are integral to the successful delivery of the Prevent Strategy as it is acknowledged that ‘the bedrock of Prevent is to be found within the principles of neighbourhood policing’ (ACPO, 2008: 22). Diagram 5.1 below outlines the structure of Prevent, specifically highlighting the activity at the local policing and partnership levels.
Diagram 5.1: Prevent Delivery Structure

NATIONAL - ACPO (TAM)
Development & Co-ordination

REGIONAL
Prevent Delivery Manager & Team

LOCAL
BCU Prevent and Delivery Team
Community Intelligence and Engagement

- Special Branch CTUS & CTIUs
- Crime & Disorder Reduction Partnerships
- Safer Schools Partnerships
- Safeguarding Boards
- Neighbourhood Management Areas
- Neighbourhood Policing Teams
5.2.2 Structure, Roles and Responsibilities

The local delivery of Prevent work – to be embedded into mainstream routine activity – is widely acknowledged to be the most critical area of operation (ACPO, 2008: 32). The local Prevent work is designed to take place within BCUs and will deliver the services at the most local level. The resources for carrying out this work are to be found from the officers and staff already located within BCUs and focus around work already in place (i.e. Neighbourhood Policing Teams). The exception to this is the Counter Terrorism Security Advisors (CTSAs) who are funded directly from Westminster and are a Force-wide resource.

The Prevent agenda delineates between two main roles at the BCU level; Community Engagement and Counter Terrorism Intelligence, although it is thought in some cases, the roles may be performed by the same group of staff.

The roles and responsibilities associated with Community Engagement include:

- engaging with neighbourhood policing teams and associated partners to develop and deliver briefings and communication;
- carrying out neighbourhood mapping;
- facilitating the work of school liaison officers with regard to Prevent activity, particularly around vulnerable sites;
- supporting and facilitating Channel Project interventions,
- acting as the lead point of contact for the local consequence management of any counter terrorism activity (links with the Prepare strand of CONTEST).

[ACPO, 2008: 37-38]

The overarching role for counter terrorism intelligence (officers) is to provide the link between Prevent and Pursue by enabling appropriately graded intelligence from Special Branch and Counter Terrorism Intelligence Units to be effectively disseminated within BCUs. It is intended that this will ensure a greater understanding of the counter terrorism issues within a BCU and consequently, a higher prominence to be given to Prevent-related tasks. The more specific tasks include:
• contributing to the development of neighbourhood mapping and community intelligence by working alongside neighbourhood policing teams;
• providing appropriate and relevant briefing material on counter terrorism-related issues for BCU staff and officers,
• liaise with the local Channel Project team to facilitate the development of appropriate assessments of locally identified, vulnerable individuals or groups.

There is evidence to be found in terms of the transfer of such 'talk' to the level of 'decision' through an assessment of key Prevent strategies and the methods of application at the level of local, neighbourhood policing.

5.2.3 Operationalising Prevent: The Focus on 'Community'

It is argued that the notion of 'community' is the most fundamental aspect of the Prevent strategy as it is the prefix to the effective delivery of its most central component parts – 'policing', 'engagement', 'intelligence', 'knowledge' and ultimately, 'safety'. Although the Prevent strategy delineates between areas of police practice for example, community engagement and intelligence gathering [ACPO, 2008: 33-34], it demands simultaneously an operational interplay between the component parts outlined above. As a result it can be challenging to distinguish analytically between the different elements of police work. Indeed the findings from this research indicate that community engagement and community intelligence gathering often operate on a continuum on the policing front-line, and often culminate in the production of 'community knowledge'. It is acknowledged that intelligence gathering in the context of counter terrorism work is traditionally undertaken by Special Branch and Counter Terrorism Units (ACPO, 2008: 9). The PREVENT programme refers explicitly to intelligence as a pre-requisite for effective 'intervention', and incorporates a number of intelligence gathering strategies specifically designed to be carried out by routine police officers to enhance the more covert practices. These include the establishment of:

'mechanisms for the effective collection of community intelligence at the local level to help build the 'Rich Picture' to enhance the understanding of threats

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from violent extremism, and thereby identify vulnerable individuals and enable effective interventions to take place$^{69}$.

[ACPO, 2008: 20]

The Prevent tasks designed to enhance police awareness and knowledge of local neighbourhoods include neighbourhood mapping$^{70}$ and the development of Key Individual Networks (KINs). These are policing strategies first highlighted as generic, operational tasks in the Green Paper *Building Communities, Beating Crime* (2004a) which aimed to initiate debate on government proposals to introduce dedicated Neighbourhood Policing Teams across England and Wales. However, it is the Prevent strategy that directly links these routine operational tasks to counter terrorism. In an attempt to undermine extremist ideology, local policing teams must improve knowledge of the communities they police, increase understanding of how they function both in a social and religious context, and ensure that grievances emanating from communities can be addressed effectively. These are already core requirements of neighbourhood policing, but the Prevent agenda aims to provide more focused support for this by providing Intelligence and Community Engagement (ICE) training, and develop police-led exercises designed to explore community concerns regarding terrorism, and the local police response to it. The intention is that this type of counter terrorism police ‘work’ should become increasingly embedded in routine policing at the local level in an attempt to assist in the identification of individuals and institutions who may be susceptible to violent extremists and their support networks.

*Intervention over Enforcement: The Channel Project*

The development of effective multi-agency collaboration and information sharing is also considered central to Prevent’s success. The partnership network links across statutory, voluntary and community$^{71}$ sectors. On one level it can be seen that this move provides some evidence at the level of ‘decision’ about the securitisation of other areas of policy, for example, youth policy and community safety. The level of

$^{69}$ This research suggests that intelligence work is a predominant aspect of routine police activity. However the same findings highlight clear distinctions between criminal and community intelligence and in turn, cast doubt on the extent to which information gathering within communities is motivated by increased concerns around terrorism and radicalisation. This theme is examined in Chapter Six.

$^{70}$ Neighbourhood mapping was developed by the Neighbourhood Policing Programme (2007a) in 2004/2005.

$^{71}$ Community partners include community centres, youth clubs, mosques and other sites through which potentially vulnerable individuals may be targeted and influenced by violent extremists.
potential 'securitisation' is arguably heightened when attention focuses on the Channel Project which is identified as one of Prevent's foremost multi-agency initiatives to address issues around radicalisation and extremism. The Channel Project is promoted as a multi-agency approach to support individuals vulnerable to radicalisation. It is a local and community-based initiative which utilises existing partnership working between the police, local authority and the local community. It is centred on the identification of those individuals at risk, devising a partnership intervention strategy and then delivering the intervention. In many ways the Project's structures and procedures reflect the multi-agency risk assessment conferences (MARACS) set up to address domestic violence, and the multi-agency public protection arrangements (MAPPAs) in place for dangerous offenders.

The Channel Project receives referrals from a number of sources including police, schools, and equality and diversity organisations regarding individuals identified as potentially vulnerable to radicalisation. A joint risk assessment of each individual case is then made; the elements of concern are identified and addressed, and an appropriate programme of intervention is put together. This intervention programme is then implemented by a designated lead agency or community contact and subject to regular progress reviews. However, the Channel Project has elicited criticism from within black minority ethnic (BME) communities, and in particular Muslim community leaders due to the predominant focus on Muslim youth. Indeed, in terms of the theoretical propositions that underpin this thesis it can be argued that the Channel Project exhibits elements of 'securitisation' in its most fundamental form through the re-conceptualisation of a social problem such as youth exclusion into an (existential) security risk identified as radicalism or extremism. Furthermore if one extends the theoretical perspective beyond the bounds of policing to incorporate the realm of race, religion and belief one is perhaps facing the possible 'securitisation of faith' in order to justify executive and police 'intervention'.

5.2.4 Mechanisms of Policy Compliance and Enforcement

One of the central concerns for this thesis is the extent to which executive strategies and initiatives can be conceptualised as executive 'decisions'. Essentially, what enforcement mechanisms are in place to ensure policy implementation and delivery at
the local policing level? Moreover, in what ways are the impact criteria going to be assessed and measured? Whilst Prevent is not a statutory instrument, its authority - or capacity to facilitate compliance – within police Forces appears to rest in two areas: financial incentive and performance measurement and inspection. There are financial resources ring-fenced for the new roles and functions, and it is intended that developments in these areas will be subject to performance assessment and external inspection from Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC).

Compliance Mechanism 1: Funding
The renewed emphasis placed on the importance of community-focused counter terrorism work as exemplified by the Prevent agenda is reinforced by the allocation of £140 million to fund programmes and initiatives in 2008/2009 (HMIC, 2009). In April 2008 the Government announced the allocation of investment to fund ‘ring-fenced’ posts, specifically within the Police Service, to support delivery of the Prevent strategy. Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) funding was allocated to 24 ‘priority’ forces responsible for policing areas with higher levels of ‘risk’. This funding was allocated according to assessments of population, vulnerability and evaluated intelligence. Within the 2008/2009 CSR, £7,239,000 was allocated to the Police Service; sufficient funding for 64 Prevent posts with the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), and 137 posts within the 23 ‘priority’ forces outside of the London Metropolitan area. Each of the 3 regional Counter Terrorism Units (CTUs) received funding for 7 Prevent posts, and 8 posts were created in ACPO Terrorism and Allied Matters (ACPO TAM) for regional and national coordination.

Compliance Mechanism 2: Performance Measurement
The Police Prevent Strategy and Delivery Plan (ACPO, 2008) is designed to support delivery of the overarching government Prevent strategy and objectives. These include:

- increased police ability to identify and prevent violent extremism;
- improved quality and quantity of intelligence information within the police and partner organisations, and in relation to the identification of areas of high risk,
- enhanced coordination of operational activity in support of the Prevent agenda.
Three years following the initial launch of Prevent (2003) it was anticipated there would be:

- neighbourhood teams with established relationships with Muslim communities;
- comprehensive neighbourhood mapping;
- well developed and maintained Key Individual Networks (KINs) within communities;
- individual police officers and PCSOs trained in intelligence and community engagement (ICE);
- effective partnership working across a range of agencies and the promotion of open dialogue in relation to radicalisation and extremism;
- a clear and systematic process for gathering community intelligence,
- further development and implementation of the Channel Project

[ACPO, 2008: 39]

The measurement of performance can be seen as one of the primary mechanisms by which to ensure that police forces comply with the implementation of policy decisions. It is intended that counter terrorism capability should be reflected within individual force’s wider performance framework. At the national level, there is evidence of Prevent-specific mechanisms for inspection and performance assessment, but they remain ambiguous. This is perhaps unsurprising given the relatively recent emergence of counter terrorism work as a strategic and operational concern within the realm of routine policing. In 2008, the government’s Public Service Agreement (PSA) scheme introduced a measure on countering terrorism (PSA 26)\(^{72}\). However, this agreement did not include a police measurement *per se*; rather, it includes a note that police performance will be highlighted through the Assessments of Policing and Community Safety (APACS). Thus performance assessment of counter terrorism practice is under continued development.

\(^{72}\) A number of other PSAs are also relevant to counter terrorism. These include PSA (Increase the number of young people on the path to success) and PSA 21 (Build more cohesive, empowered and active communities).
Nevertheless, at the national level it is anticipated that performance information derived from the following three areas could conceivably contribute to an assessment of police capability in support of the Prevent strategy.

1. NI35 ‘Building resilience to violent extremism’ in respect of the police contribution to Local Strategic Partnership (LSP) self-assessment;
2. An assessment of each police force’s contribution to Rich Picture understanding included within APACS,
3. A force by force HMIC assessment of progress made against the Policing Prevent Delivery Plan

[ACPO, 2008: 40-41]

The aim of indicator NI35 is to assess the contribution of local partners in developing programmes in support of the seven Prevent objectives and in particular, the objectives that focus on building resilience to violent extremism and identifying and supporting individuals vulnerable to recruitment. The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) envisaged that assessment would focus on the standard of local areas’ arrangements against a number of processes, rather than outcomes, which are inherently difficult to measure in this area. At the time of the fieldwork, NI35 was being adopted in some Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) as a key priority and negotiations continue between forces, police authorities and local authorities. However, all partnerships, and the local police commitment, were to be assessed through a self-assessment process as part of the national indicator (NI) set.

In terms of HMIC inspection, the focus of assessment is on the progress made by Forces in implementing aspects of the Prevent strategy – prioritising as appropriate – against the seven strategic objectives and the specific activities set out in the ACPO plan. HMIC Inspections were carried out on Prevent implementation progress in the 24 ‘priority’ forces between November 2008 and February 200973. The ACPO ‘Prevent Implementation Plan’ had been published shortly before HMIC fieldwork in forces began and therefore rigorous assessment in terms of force comparison and

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73 It should be noted that this HMIC Inspection was carried out after the fieldwork period for this research.
force grading against a standard was deemed impracticable. Therefore, the inspections were focused on identifying the stages to which forces had reached in their development of capabilities to deliver the government Prevent strategy. HMIC identified 5 key areas of capability:

- Assessing vulnerability – understanding where to focus interventions;
- Leadership, Governance and Structures;
- Information Sharing;
- Community Engagement and Interventions,
- Assessing Success

[ACPO, 2008: 41]

It is important to note that both of these compliance mechanisms – ring-fenced funding and performance assessment – have been examined within a national context. The Prevent Strategy is an explicit attempt to ‘mainstream’ counter terrorism functions into routine policing, and so if you were to find evidence of ‘securitisation’ anywhere, it would be here. The final section of this chapter examines the extent to which the two aforementioned mechanisms of enforcement are embedded within the strategic framework of local, routine policing in the case-study force. This in turn provides a means by which to critically test the predominantly discoursed-based arguments regarding the increasingly securitised nature of routine policing at the local level.

5.3 National Counter Terrorism Policy at the Force Level

This final section examines the extent to which national security policy decisions have transferred to the case study force by examining whether compliance mechanisms – in the form of funding and performance assessment – are evident within the case-study Force. Furthermore, if there is evidence of such enforcement mechanisms, to what extent are they embedded in the Force’s strategic decision-making processes? This is explored specifically in relation to the establishment of BCU-level operational priorities and the assessment frameworks in place to monitor performance in these priority areas. The qualitative findings referenced within this section are generated
through documentary analysis of Force and BCU level material\textsuperscript{74} and the analysis of interviews with senior police officers who have responsibility for strategic decision-making, and tactical priority-setting within the case-study Force. It is acknowledged that the inclusion of such ‘discursive’ data in a chapter consciously designed to advocate the importance of moving beyond ‘talk’ may, for some, raise questions about the conceptual logic of this thesis. However, it is argued that the data included in this section is not simply discourse, but can be interpreted as accounts of decisions that have been taken, or evidence in support of including a particular policy (in this case the Prevent strategy) within the category of ‘decision’ as conceptualised within this thesis.

5.3.1 Evidence of Compliance Mechanisms

1: Prevent Funding in the Case Study Force

The interviews with members of the Force Command Team, although often reinforcing much of the rhetoric surrounding the national shift in emphasis from Pursue to Prevent, also provide important insight into the level of funding that is allocated to the implementation and delivery of national, counter-terrorism policies within individual police forces. As a member of the Force Command Team observed:

> The majority of effort to date – or until the middle of last year – was in ‘pursue’. There was huge money being piled into pursue, and I think when Gordon Brown took over, he took a look at it and said ‘this isn’t right...we’re spending 99% of our money on pursue and nothing on prevent’, and since then the needle has shifted across to ‘prevent’ and it is a much greater priority.  

[Force Command2]

There are considerable funds allocated to the establishment of the specialist roles and functions inherent to the Prevent Strategy. During the period of fieldwork for this research, the national Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) had just been announced with £180 million ring-fenced for the Prevent phase of Contest over the next 3 years. The case study force was chosen as one of the twenty-four priority forces to qualify for funding in the first year and the case study BCU was designated a

\textsuperscript{74} These documents constitute both the strategic decision-making and performance assessment frameworks at the Force and BCU levels.
Pathfinder BCU\textsuperscript{75} which means that is was recognised nationally as an area potentially vulnerable to extremism, and it is active in obtaining the funding available to confront such vulnerability. The police Prevent document (ACPO, 2008: 17) outlines the 'developing architecture of counter-terrorism assets' which include Counter-Terrorism Units (CTUs), Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Units (CTIUs) and Counter-Terrorism Security Advisors (CTSAs). Indeed, there is some evidence of financial incentive to implement Prevent at the local policing level. The case study BCU was one of ten local policing areas in the UK highlighted for the piloting of the Channel project which is a project with Objective 3 funding to prevent violent extremism and target vulnerable groups. Such financial incentives can be seen as a key lever of influence in terms of local implementation in such budget-conscious times.

There are currently no designated counter-terrorism (security) positions (DSPs) at the BCU level in the case-study Force. At the moment they remain centrally-based at HQ. However, it is perhaps significant to note that these DSPs, functioning as Counter Terrorism Security Advisors (CTSAs), operate within the Protect strand of CONTEST and are not formally attached to the Prevent strategy. At the time of writing the only police officers who were officially associated with Prevent work were those heading up the Channel Project. However, these were officers seconded from pre-existing BCU resources. Each BCU has a Minority Support Unit (MSU) which operates within a BCU Community Safety Department. This unit will include hate crime officers whose specific role is to liaise with BME communities in the BCU area. As part of that role – although they are not tasked directly in this area – they are in a position to monitor any tensions which might emerge within communities in the form of offences of racial hatred for example. The issues of hate crime and radicalisation were often conflated during BCU Commander interviews and although this is a valid observation, the response to this situation appeared to fall under the remit of hate crime officers within the Minority Support Unit, rather than through intervention strategies outlined in the Prevent strategy.

\textsuperscript{75} See Chapter Three for a detailed discussion of the case study force.
However, it was revealed by the BCU lead for Counter Terrorism (CT) that funding for BCU-based CT posts was imminent, and it was expected that these positions would become a permanent fixture within force budget considerations when the external funding comes to an end:

'We will be allocated £180000 to create three CTIOs (Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Officers) supported by a number of community engagement officers. The funding is coming from central government because they recognise that there’s no blood left in the stone [the force budget]. The funding is 3 years, then it will be daily business, the positions will be mainstreamed and underpin the work at Level 1' [BCU policing].

[BCU Lead for Counter Terrorism]

The interviews conducted with members of the Force Command Team corroborate the final statement above.

[Interviewer]

'Could it be said that ring-fencing means that policing around counter terrorism is moving towards becoming more mainstreamed on a Force or a BCU level’?

[Force Command2]

‘Yes, absolutely’.

2: Performance Assessment in the Case Study Force
The previous section outlined the various performance assessment structures through which police Forces (and their partners) can be measured on Prevent implementation and development. The analysis of relevant strategic and operational documents, and the interviews carried out with senior management officers within the case study Force revealed a notable absence of compliance mechanisms in relation to the implementation of national counter terrorism policy decisions. This in turn undermines suppositions pertaining to the increased securitisation of routine policing.
The one area where there appears to be any evidence of policy enforcement with respect to the case-study’s implementation of the CONTEST strands is at the level of HMIC inspection. However, there is widespread frustration with the nature of the inspection. As the case study BCU Lead for Counter Terrorism observes:

‘The twenty-three Forces [not including the MPS] that are the subject of Year 1 spending from the comprehensive spending review are going to be HMIC-inspected. So we’re either going to have an inspection before or after Jan 2009. This inspection will be around CONTEST but that’s the national inspection; local inspection? No, we won’t have one. And you would think it should be bottom up, not top-down. That needs to happen because how are you going to get the [counter-terrorism] picture if you assume you’ve already got it’?

However, it is significant to note that none of the compliance mechanisms attached to the Prevent strategy in the form of police or partner performance assessment are fully operational in the Force area at the centre of this study. In particular, neither the Public Service Agreements (PSAs) nor National Indicators (NIs) are operational in the Force area. Moreover, at the time of writing the APACS framework was only partially established in the Force area and many Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs) were reluctant to adopt the performance assessments. The interviews carried out with senior police officers operating out of Force Headquarters highlighted the situation with respect to the role of APACS in the Force area:

‘[The Force] will come off negatively and in fairness the HMIC have already said that. We’ve said, ‘well look we haven’t got any of these APACs structures in place here’, and they said ‘well you’ll fail the inspection then’. Not all of the CSPs are keen on the APACs. I mean, some of the CSPs have agreed to use them but it’s almost a bottom-up as opposed to a top-down decision making process’.

[Force Command3]

‘If you consider that these two [PSAs and NIs] don’t apply in [Force BCU areas], and APACS are provisional in [Force area] then as a service it’s difficult to assess our progress in this area. In addition, if our partners are not assessed on performance in this area – notwithstanding that you’re going to get some Chief Execs saying in some parts, ‘well terrorism is a London issue’ – so it’s going to be a bit on the difficult side in some circumstances’...

[Force Command4]
The final comment made by the Force Command officer undermines some of the assertions put forward by advocates of the securitisation thesis as applied to routine policing. King and Sharp (2006: 387) argue that a series of legislative and policy shifts over the past fifteen years have ensured a discernible 'move from local decision-making to a centrally-proscribed agenda' which sees all forces required to produce an annual force plan which must incorporate the national policing plan formulated by the Home Secretary alongside the local police priorities. The suggestion here is that local concerns have gradually been replaced by national priorities determined against an increasingly securitised and politicised crime agenda. However, the comments from within Force Command appear to suggest that power and discretion with regards to the implementation of national policy and frameworks still operates at the local level. It is clear that considerable funds have been ring-fenced for the implementation and delivery of some of the central aspects of the Prevent strategy in the case study Force. However, at the time of research it was also evident that the lack of a discernible and enforceable framework for measuring performance in the area of preventing terrorism and violent extremism had the potential to undermine both the depth and breadth of strategic implementation as one moves from the 'centre' to the level of local policing. It will be seen that the nature of the performance assessment frameworks within the case study force has a profound effect on 'what gets done' at the level of local policing.

5.3.2 The Nature of Strategic Decision-Making within the Case Study Force

One area of empirical interest for this research is the extent to which national priorities within the area of crime and justice, and more specifically counter terrorism are reflected in the strategic decision-making frameworks at both Force and BCU policing levels. A number of strategic documents are identified as policy decisions consistent with the conceptual understandings that frame this research. Each police Force in the UK uses the National Intelligence Model (NIM) to prioritise resource distribution; key intelligence products inform decision-making at both the force and divisional (BCU) level. The primary examples of concrete policy documents within the case study Force – at both the force and BCU levels – are the Control Strategy and the Strategic Assessment. The Strategic Assessments provide an overview of current and long-term risks faced by the force as a whole, and at the level of local policing.
The Control Strategy sets the long term priorities for crime prevention, intelligence and enforcement opportunities. It is developed following a critical examination of the broad areas of criminality, public disorder and other unlawful acts affecting a BCU, local force or region as set out in the strategic assessment. It provides senior management with a framework in which decisions can be made about the issues that should take precedence when allocating resources. These force documents are identified as concrete policy decisions because they retain compliance mechanisms which ensure each level of policing must deliver against at least some of the priority areas highlighted within them. However, it is important to note that the notion of decision when transferred from the policy sphere to the policing arena takes on an additional dimension: ‘decision’ also relates to strategic assessments on the most effective ways to police, and the construction of priorities which are seen as examples of applied decision-making because they have some form of accountability framework at the local (neighbourhood) policing level in terms of performance assessment.

**Force Level Strategic Decisions**

‘it is intended that CT capability should be reflected within a force’s wider performance framework, recognising it as a key priority for forces and mainstreaming it within day to day force planning and governance’.

[ACPO, 2008: 4]

The Force Strategic Assessment (FSA) in operation during the fieldwork period covered the period November 2007 – 2008. The FSA is a comprehensive document and its purpose is to provide an accurate and realistic evaluation of the significant crime, disorder and organisational issues that may face the force over a 12 month period. It also reviews the impact of the current crime and disorder control strategy against Force priorities and identifies any required changes to these priorities for the future. The data for the FSA is generated from a variety of sources which include performance information across the Force and information from BCU-level Strategic Assessments. The Strategic Leads Group meets shortly before the publication of the FSA to finalise the crime and disorder priorities that underpin the strategic direction of the Force for the year in question.

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76 BCU Strategic Assessments are updated every 6 months.
The FSA in 2007-2008 highlighted four thematic areas as Crime and Disorder Priorities. These were Serious and Organised Crime; Community Safety; Volume Crime, and Public Protection. The four priority areas focus on the following crime and disorder issues:

- Serious and Organised Crime: Class A drugs; Gun Crime; Immigration Crime; Terrorism;
- Community Safety: Anti-social Behaviour; Alcohol-related Street Violence;
- Volume Crime: Volume Crime; Distraction Burglary,
- Public Protection: Domestic Abuse

These are the same crime and disorder priority areas that underpin the Force Control Strategy (FCS) 2007-2008. The FSA reviews progress made against the control strategies outlined in the FCS, highlights emerging trends and strategic threats and ultimately makes recommendations as to whether such crime and disorder issues should remain as force priorities. Through an analysis of the FSA it is possible to identify the strategic emphasis in relation to two of the crime and disorder areas most pertinent to this research – community safety and counter terrorism. In order to tackle the community safety priority areas (outlined above) the FSA highlighted the importance of neighbourhood priorities (generated from PACT meetings) and community intelligence. In relation to the latter, the FSA recommends that the ‘strategic and successful integration of community intelligence with normal business, in terms of both process and intelligence, will impact positively on dealing with both neighbourhood priorities and BCU/Force priorities [and that] the training, confidence and briefing of frontline staff will be important in bridging this gap’ (FSA, 2007: 2).

Although counter terrorism is included as a strategic force priority, it is significant to note that the strategic overview in relation to terrorism remains wholly national in

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7 Following a mid-year review of the Strategic Assessment in 2007-2008 it was determined that the following crime and disorder issues should be removed as force priorities: immigration crime; street robbery and interestingly, vehicle crime. The rationale for removing vehicle crime as a force priority is that levels have stabilised or decreased in many force areas. It is acknowledged that the difficulty with prioritising any type of acquisitive crime is that successful enforcement activity in one area might lead to functional displacement to other types of acquisitive crime. In addition, the removal of vehicle crime as a force priority might lead to a subsequent increase in occurrence levels. However, it is observed that vehicle crime remains a priority in many of the BCU areas and any local level concerns will register at the force level at Force Tasking and Coordinating (TCG) meetings.
tone and distinctly removed from the ‘local setting’. The FSA references the revised ACPO (TAM) three year strategic plan which sets out the national response to the threat from international terrorism. It also illustrates the current, national threat levels and the risks posed by Al-Qaida and its preferred methods of perpetration. Significantly, the only reference to a local, strategic response is the need for clear and measureable BCU ownership of the counter terrorism seven-point programme to be achieved and incorporated into local control strategies to evidence strategic delivery of counter terrorism.

Furthermore, the FSA includes a detailed examination of emerging issues and strategic threats in relation to all of the crime and disorder priority areas EXCEPT counter terrorism. There is reference to counter terrorism within the context of the development of the government’s Counter Terrorism Bill (2008). However, notwithstanding the fact that such a ‘bill’ remains policy ‘talk’, the possible strategic implications focus around ‘legislative enforcement’ in the form of Special Branch investigation and resources in Custody Service (in anticipation of an extension to pre-charge detention). Overall, the references to counter terrorism remain national in tone; there is little attempt to contextualise the information within the strategic framework of the case study force. Where reference is made to counter terrorism policies it remains at the level of legislative decision and the strategic focus is on enforcement rather than prevention. In short, the FSA provides little empirical evidence to suggest that national security policies have had a discernible impact on the strategic, decision-making framework of the case study force. This in itself is significant in terms of the theoretical propositions that underpin this research.

The Force Control Strategy (FCS) provides a detailed overview of the strategic response to each of the nine crime and disorder priority areas outlined in the Force Strategic Assessment. Terrorism is the final crime area to be considered in the FCS. In line with NIM requirements each of the occurrences are categorised into three

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78 This includes an examination of strategic threats in relation to fraud/forgery and money laundering but no attempt to highlight the widely acknowledged, potential links with terrorism and the financing of terrorism.

79 The FSA 2007 – 2008 makes no reference to the Prevent Strategy. Perhaps more significantly, there is no reference to Prevent in the updated version of the FSA (Nov 2008 – Nov 2009), which was introduced after the completion of the fieldwork for this research. This is highly significant given the considerable policy drive to embed counter terrorism strategies into routine, neighbourhood policing.
strategic areas: intelligence, prevention and enforcement. The content of each of the three strategic requirement areas have been quantified in order to ascertain the strategic emphasis placed on each of the nine crime areas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crime Category</th>
<th>Intelligence Priorities (^8^0) (N=)</th>
<th>Prevention Priorities (N=)</th>
<th>Enforcement Priorities (N=)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gun Crime</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class A Drugs</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration Crime</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distraction Burglary</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volume Crime</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Safety - ASB (^8^1)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Safety - ARSV (^8^2)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Protection</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter Terrorism</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1: Force Strategic Priorities (2007-2008)

As Table 5.1 indicates, strategic requirements for volume crime and community safety issues considerably outweigh those for counter terrorism. This is perhaps unsurprising given the emphasis placed on serious and acquisitive crime (SAC) within routine police performance assessment frameworks. However, and in contrast to the Force Strategic Assessment, the Control Strategy makes direct reference to the CONTEST strategy. Interestingly though the predominant focus is on Pursue (within

\(^8^0\) The Intelligence Priorities are outlined in further detail in the Strategic Intelligence Requirement (SIR) which is a Force policy document updated every six months. The document includes the same nine crime categories as the Force Control Strategy. In the document that covers the period Nov 2007 – May 2008 information regarding Counter-Terrorism moves from 9\(^{th}\) to 7\(^{th}\) in the list, and is framed around the CONTEST priority to improve levels of ownership of counter-terrorism at the local level.

The Intelligence Requirements cover four distinct priority areas: International Terrorism, Domestic Extremism, Irish-related Terrorism and Extremism, and Serious and Organised Crime (Crime/Terror Nexus).

\(^8^1\) Community Safety – Anti-social behaviour

\(^8^2\) Community Safety – Alcohol-Related Street Violence
the intelligence priorities) and Prepare (within the prevention priorities). The Prevent strand of the executive ‘decision’ is only alluded to briefly and the aims of which are referred to ambiguously as ‘preventing terrorism by tackling underlying causes’ (FCS, 2007). Furthermore, although the risk from terrorism and violent extremism was considered within all aspects of force strategic decision-making, there is an absence of general links between national and force perceptions of risk, and how such risks are to be mitigated at a force level. However, such findings – from within key force strategic planning frameworks – appear to suggest that the inclusion of ‘countering terrorism and preventing extremism’ as a force priority is little more than a general, strategic objective that pays lip service to national requirements.

**BCU-Level Strategic Decisions**

The processes in place for strategic decision-making in relation to the establishment of crime and disorder priorities at the BCU level is the same as the strategic framework at the Force level. Moreover, the lack of tangible detail in relation to countering terrorism and preventing violent extremism are similarly reflected in the BCU-level strategic documents. The BCU Strategic Assessment (BCU SA)\(^{83}\) in circulation during the period of fieldwork for this research prioritised the following areas:

**Serious and Acquisitive Crime**

1. Autocrime - Vehicle Crime: theft of motor vehicle, theft from motor vehicle
2. Dwelling Burglary

**Neighbourhood Management**

1. PACT Engagement
2. Anti-social behaviour
3. Criminal Damage

**Counter Terrorism**

1. Awareness, consideration and response

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\(^{83}\) The BCU SA came out in July 2008 but covers the period Jan-June 2008.
Serious and Organised Crime

1. Class ‘A’ Drugs
2. Gun Crime
3. Cannabis Plantations
4. Organised Crime Groups

The rationale for adopting these priorities areas is that they represent the most pressing issues affecting the case study BCU and will therefore also serve as the main focus in the fortnightly Tactical Tasking and Coordinating (tTCG) meetings. Although it is clear that counter terrorism is identified as a local priority in its own right, the BCU Strategic Assessment only makes cursory reference to developments and requirements in this area. Such references include general pronouncements on the dissemination of terrorism-related information to staff, and the presence of Special Branch officers at Fortnightly tTCG meetings. There is no provision of information on strategic objectives or methods of delivery in relation to counter terrorism or preventing extremism. All of this is in stark contrast to the information provided on the other BCU priority areas such as Serious and Acquisitive Crime which includes progress made on strategic objectives and reference to emerging issues and threats.

The same priorities – reflecting the majority of issues affecting the BCU – were also outlined in the case-study’s BCU Control Strategy (BCU CS). This document adopts the same structure as the Force Control Strategy, and therefore incorporates a focus on the three strategic areas, intelligence, prevention and enforcement in each of the crime categories. The content of each of the three strategic requirement areas at the BCU level have been quantified in the same way as that undertaken at the Force level. This time the aim was not only to ascertain the strategic emphasis placed on each of the crime areas, but to identify whether the strategic emphasis altered to any degree at the local policing level.

84 These meetings generate Fortnightly Tasking Action Plans (FTAs). The FTAs generated within the fieldwork timeframe of this thesis have undergone quantitative content analysis (QCA) in order to generate an empirical understanding of routine policing. The findings from this QCA are presented in Chapter Six.

85 The exception to this is reference to a major sporting event that was anticipated and the potential ‘terrorism implications’ this may have for the Force area (BCU SA: 20).
Table 5.2: BCU Strategic Crime and Disorder Priorities

Table 5.2 reveals that strategic emphasis on counter terrorism is considerably less than at Force level (Intelligence: 5; Prevention: 7; Enforcement: 8), and that it generates less strategic attention at the BCU level than the other five crime categories. However, this is perhaps unsurprising given the emphasis placed on serious and acquisitive crime (SAC) within routine police performance assessment frameworks, particularly at the neighbourhood (sector) levels. Moreover, not one of the requirements under each of the three strategic priority areas refers explicitly to the Prevent Programme. In terms of intelligence requirements, broad reference is made to raising awareness of terrorism-related Operations in-BCU, and increasing the flow of intelligence. From an enforcement perspective reference is made to taking the ‘necessary steps’ when arresting suspects and searching property. Finally, in terms of prevention, all staff must remain ‘vigilant’, encourage the local community to report suspicious incidents, and maintain contacts with all members of the public, especially with the minority communities to accurately gauge tensions.

Significantly, the Force Strategic Assessment states that there is a lack of ‘clear and measureable’ ownership at BCU level for counter terrorism, and that there is a need to ensure that counter terrorism is reflected within BCU control strategies. The findings from this research appear to go further; the lack of any coherent integration of
national counter terrorism or preventing extremism ‘decisions’ into the strategic framework of force or divisional level policing could be indicative of a number of things. It may well be a result of deficient channels of communication or ‘tasking’ from Force to BCU level. Certainly interview data appears to highlight a disjuncture between expectations of strategic requirements coming from the ‘centre’ (HQ) and operational understanding at the divisional (BCU) level:

‘I was at Force Tasking yesterday: I think for the actual tasking element of it the counter-terrorism bit has it honed down best of all. It’s about saying to divisions, we want you to be doing this, this and this. We want you to be referring your credit card stuff, go and check all of your lost/stolen passports. So they’ve got some very clear intelligence requirements and tasking that comes out of that’.

[Force Command 1]

However, interviews with BCU Commanders reveal that counter-terrorism policing, and the Prevent Strategy in particular, does not impact significantly on the strategic management of some of the divisions. In some cases counter terrorism does not feature in the BCU Control Strategy or the Strategic Assessments, and where it is present it appears it is only to pay lip service to Force priorities. There is certainly no indication of strategic awareness of the links between ‘routine crimes’ such as credit card fraud and money laundering, and the financing of terrorism:

‘It is [counter terrorism] in our Control Strategy and will remain as it has to be an agenda item. But if you say to me do I think about what I’m going to do about it on a daily basis – perhaps the community cohesion side of things, sometimes – but in terms of target hardening and patrolling vulnerable areas, no’.

[BCU Commander 5]

5.3.3 ‘What Gets Measured Gets Done’

Furthermore, it is when attention turns to the nature of the performance assessment frameworks in place at the local BCU policing level that one begins to gain an important insight into the level of priority afforded to counter terrorism policing on the routine, operational frontline. The systematic analysis of relevant BCU documentary sources and the analysis of officer interviews – interpreted as accounts
of the impact of policy decisions that are in operation within the case study BCU – reveal that BCU level policing is not held to account for performance in relation to counter terrorism policing. This is corroborated in one way by the COMPSTAT process which serves as an example of a tangible policy compliance mechanism and is a process for ensuring the enforcement of Force and BCU priorities through the systematic analysis of operational performance at both the divisional (BCU) and sector levels. COMPSTAT reports are produced by performance analysts on a monthly basis, and provide a comprehensive review of BCU operational activity. They are structured uniformly and review the same generic areas each month. They provide a reliable, empirical indication of the core areas of performance measurement for local (BCU) policing. The top three performance assessment areas are occurrence analysis, recorded crime and detected crime. Within these three performance areas there is an overwhelming focus on Serious and Acquisitive Crime (SAC) which comprises robbery; autocrime (TOMV and TFMV); burglary dwelling and violent crime (most serious violence against a person and assault with injury). One can confidently assume that the areas targeted for performance analysis are consequentially the areas of policing priority at the local, operational level. Therefore, it is significant to note that the only reference to counter terrorism and extremism is the replication of the Force’s strategic priorities as set out by APACS targets/requirements.

The findings from an analysis of COMPSTAT output are corroborated by the interviews with BCU Commanders across the case study Force with one stating that:

‘in terms of performance the emphasis remains on volume crime or serious and acquisitive crime (SAC) – violent crime, autocrime...’.

[BCU Commander2]

Although BCUs are assessed on their strategic capacity and capability in relation to counter terrorism policing by the HMIC, BCU Commanders are not held to account for counter terrorism policing in terms of operational performance – either in relation to enforcement (specific operations around counter terrorism) or prevention in the form of community engagement and other Prevent ‘intervention strategies’. The

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86 The others areas are quality of service (victim satisfaction); NCRS compliance; NPT activity; ISU performance; staff sickness; stop searches; warrants, and ASB referrals.
following observation provides a comprehensive assessment of contemporary policing and echoes many of the observations emanating from senior police officers within the case study Force.

‘In this organisation one of the adages is ‘what can be measured gets done’. Everyone works, because we are such a performance-based culture, on that ethic. So whilst everyone may understand where and what [our counter-terrorism ops] are, how do we quantify it? Who measures it? How can we justify our actions in supporting these strategies when there are so many other things to do, so many other things that are measurable, that are performance-driven, and that are relevant? You get COMPSTAT’ed on those, all the APACS stuff but it’s difficult to measure our impact on counter terrorism because it’s a case of if I go out and visit all the [Operation sites] today – or I don’t – what difference am I making and how are my efforts being measured, how are they being recognised? So it’s an area that everyone is cited on and conscious of, but in terms of terrorism it almost becomes – as a juggler – you’re juggling 6 balls it’s almost the 7th ball and you keep dropping it’.

[BCU Commander1]

A number of BCU Commanders indicated that counter terrorism-related activity would become more embedded in everyday policing activity if it became a Key Performance Indicator (KPI).

‘Being brutally honest? If you judged me on my performance in relation to counter terrorism issues it would become more mainstreamed. If I’m judged on it, I’ll get it done. That’s the way it is’.

[BCU Commander3]

Both of the above observations indicate that the lack of tangible mechanisms for performance assessment in relation to counter terrorism has a number of implications for the nature of policing at the local level. One of the foremost of these is that any activity in relation to counter terrorism is often reactive rather than proactive and, therefore, an episodic and specialised, rather than routine form of policing. It is acknowledged that the implementation and/or delivery of CT and Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) strategies such as Prevent is often proportionate to the perceived level of risk facing a BCU. It is commonly acknowledged that 2 of the 6 BCUs in the case-study Force area are considered to be at greater risk of terrorism than the other more rural divisional areas. Therefore it is expected that those BCUs facing the highest levels of risk should be further forward in the implementation of aspects of
counter terrorism-related policies and strategies. Nevertheless, it is anticipated that all BCUs should be on the road to establishing minimum capabilities proportionate to their levels of risk. However, the majority of BCU Commanders – significantly, in areas deemed to be of both high and low risk – state that the extent to which increased concerns around terrorism impact at the divisional level is minimal. Moreover, where there is an impact it tends to be reactive rather than proactive:

'I have to say it's all quite reactive. If we've got a planned event, for example a Royal Visit we make sure all officers are briefed; we put together an intelligence package...'

[BCU Commander3]

'In terms of operational policing I tend to focus my officers in on crime not on counter terrorism. It's only when we get a bombing in London or another big city do we think, what are we doing in relation to this'?

[BCU Commander4]

'Activity occurs on a reactive level – post event, pre-Royal visit. It's risk-initiated rather than it is normal policing. When something does happen then they'll ask. Then we'll scurry around and fill some gaps'.

[BCU Commander5]

There is little evidence – from interviews or strategic documentation – to suggest that any proactive structures are in place to carry out the intervention strategies outlined in the Prevent policy document; this is significant in light of the fact that Level 1 policing has primary responsibility for implementing and delivering on the Prevent policy. As one BCU Commander observes:

'We have a number of very good CTSAs (Counter Terrorism Security Advisors) in the Centre (HQ) who are very good at pushing things out [e.g. Prevent strategies]. But if those individuals hadn't done it would I? The answer's no to be honest. They did [Prevent initiative] here; they instigated it and we supported it'.

[BCU Commander5]

In fact, in 4 of the 6 BCU Commanders interviews there was no direct reference made to Contest or the Prevent strategy. When ultimately asked to comment on the

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87 These interviews took place in BCUs commonly acknowledged to be at less risk in terms of terrorism.
impact of counter terrorism or preventing violent extremism strategies on BCU strategic management the responses were often ambiguous:

‘My answer will be vague...our intelligence unit is fed information centrally and I am given information personally. When it comes to me I will action that in ways deemed suitable. This has happened only a handful of times in the last six months’

[BCU Commander4]

There is little evidence of any of the Prevent intervention strategies becoming established at the BCU strategic level. The majority of BCUs (5 out of 6) do not have designated counter terrorism staff or Designated Security Posts (DSPs). Each BCU has a Minority Support Unit (MSU) which operates within a BCU Community Safety Department. This unit will include hate crime officers whose specific role is to liaise with BME communities in the BCU area. As part of that role – although they are not tasked directly in this area – they are in a position to monitor any tensions which might manifest within communities in the form of offences of racial hatred for example. The issues of hate crime and radicalisation were often conflated during BCU Command interviews, and although this is a valid observation, the response to such situations appeared to fall under the remit of hate crime officers within the Minority Support Unit, rather than through intervention strategies outlined in the Prevent strategy. Only a small number of the BCU Commanders referred to the role played by neighbourhood policing teams (NPTs) in delivering aspects of the Prevent strategy but again references were often non-committal:

If I’m honest we haven’t really developed that area...(pause)...we have one Mosque and one of our PCSOs is designated to be there every Friday – eyes and ears etc but I’m not pushing that too hard because I don’t want to be seen to be going down there saying there’s a problem in the Mosque’.

[BCU Commander4]

The analysis of BCU strategic documents and interviews with officers in charge of the strategic management of policing at the BCU level reveals significant gaps in the transfer of counter terrorism talk and decision to the strategic, decision-making frameworks within the case study force. These findings do not provide a great deal of support for emerging concerns that routine policing is becoming increasingly ‘securitised’. Ultimately, the Police Service is an overwhelmingly performance-
driven organisation. Senior officers at both the BCU Command level and Sector (Neighbourhood) policing levels are rigorously held to account for the crime rates in their area. They are tasked to ensure that offences are reduced and detection rates are increased. As a result time and resources inevitable go in that direction. Although the majority of sector (neighbourhood) inspectors state that there has been increased ‘talk’ about countering terrorism and preventing violent extremism and they are aware of strategies, they are not measured on it and therefore there is no incentive to implement policies or initiate activity in this area. Although this is not to suggest that work is not undertaken in this regard, it is not a priority and ultimately it is the notion of priority that guides police officers, certainly those that are held to account for policing performance.

These observations link to another analytical theme which emerges from the data. The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) acknowledge that measuring counter terrorism within the context of the Prevent strategy ‘presents some particular challenges in terms of measuring appropriate outcomes’ (ACPO, 2008: 40). The question to be addressed is if local policing was measured on performance in this area, what would assessment look like? In short, how do you measure prevention? Fielding and Innes (2006: 129) suggest that there is a ‘shortage of imagination in present measures of performance’ and it is particularly acute ‘when it comes to monitoring and measuring informal, community-orientated interventions. Community policing’s appeal relates more to its iconic status and homely name-tag than to the clarity of the concept or unambiguously demonstrable effects’. A number of police officers reinforce this observation:

‘I’ve been saying for many years that we don’t understand performance. Do I get measured on some of the work I’m doing in schools because I think that’s also where you’ve got problems? No, I don’t. Whilst the Chief Constable supports it, I’m not getting any…there’s no let up on my car crime. People will like to talk about it, the government like to talk about how we engage with young people and diversity, communities etc. They like to talk about it but I won’t get measured on it’.

[Case Study BCU Commander]
Fielding and Innes (2006) examine the effectiveness of current, predominantly quantitative police performance measures. They argue that a more qualitative approach to police performance offers the potential for a more meaningful understanding of police work. The methodological approach to measuring police performance is somewhat outwith the remit of this thesis. However, the current research supports this assertion particularly when the empirical focus is on the ‘prevention’ aspects of local police work. It is a salient reference point within the context of a critical assessment of the extent to which counter terrorism policy talk and decision impacts on routine police action. The lack of tangible and coherent mechanisms for measuring prevention have a discernible impact on the delivery of counter terrorism strategies at the local policing level which, in turn undermines the extent to which routine policing is becoming increasingly securitised.

5.4 Conclusion

This chapter presents the findings from a detailed analysis of the CONTEST Strategy and in particular the Prevent Strategy which is identified as an exemplar of a securitised decision within the analytical framework of this thesis. The findings reveal that the Prevent Strategy represents clear and discernible attempts to embed counter terrorism work into routine policing. The research examines the extent to which such decisions are afforded the same level of priority at the local level as they appear to be at the level of national policy talk and decision-making. An analysis of the content of strategic documents within the case study force and case study BCU suggests that national counter terrorism policy implementation at the individual force and BCU level faces a number of challenges. The findings indicate that there is some form of policy compliance at play in the form of ring-fenced funding for the implementation of certain aspects of the Prevent Strategy. However, there is a discernible absence of detailed reference to national counter terrorism policy decisions within the strategic framework and the formal mechanisms of performance assessment of the case study at both the Force and BCU levels. This in turn has implications for the ‘mainstreaming’ of counter terrorism work into routine policing - at least at the level of strategic decision-making and priority setting. Pollitt (2001: 88)
934) echoes the observations made by Niels Brunsson (1989), when he suggests that 'observers of organisations – perhaps especially public sector organisations – are prone to make the mistake of supposing that organisational statements and decisions agree with organisational actions'. This observation resonates throughout this research and the final empirical chapter interrogates the extent to which national security policy 'decisions' translate into policy 'action' in the form of tangible changes to routine policing practice on the ground.
Chapter Six: Do Actions Speak Louder than Words?

The challenge [for me] is converting the Prevent strategy from document into ‘action’

[BCU Lead for Terrorism]

6.0 Introduction

This chapter focuses on one of the most fundamental questions for this research, namely to what extent do security ‘talk’, and ‘decisions’ made within the arena of counter terrorism policy actually translate into ‘action’ on the ground in the form of tangible changes to routine police practice at the local level? Therefore, the empirical data presented in this chapter focuses exclusively on the ‘action’ or operational practice within the BCU at the heart of this case study research. At the outset it is important to reiterate how ‘action’ is conceptualised within the analytical framework of this thesis. Drawing on Pollitt’s (2001) conceptualisation of ‘action’ as the practical application of policy on the ground, this study conceptualises ‘action’ as routine, operational policing practice.

Ultimately the chapter retains two core functions and is therefore divided into two main sections. The first section presents an empirical measure for routine policing and in turn highlights the extent to which counter terrorism policing is represented at the level of local tasking and operational practice. This conceptualisation of routine policing is formulated through the quantitative content analysis (QCA) of fortnightly tasking action plans generated from tasking and coordinating group (TCG) meetings that took place in the case study BCU during the six months of fieldwork for this research (June – November 2008). The remit of these meetings is to identify prominent and up to date operational issues within the BCU (at a sector-specific, neighbourhood level) and agree effective tactical measures to resolve them. The second section provides a qualitative examination of three key analytical themes that emerge from the quantitative appraisal of routine policing; 1) the impact of national priority concerns, and the role and nature of 2) intelligence gathering and 3) partnership working at the local level. This section presents analysis of data

89 See Chapter Three for a detailed explanation of the quantitative content analysis (QCA) that was undertaken for this research including reference to data source, coding process and limitations of the dataset.
generated from non-participant observation of relevant meetings at the BCU level and the semi-structured interviews carried out with police officers across all ranks within the case study force. The mixed method approach to data analysis facilitates a rigorous examination of both the evidence of counter terrorism policing at the local level (indicating a degree of securitisation), and the enduring challenges to counter terrorism policy implementation and delivery at the strategic and frontline (operational) level.

6.1 Routine Policing at the BCU Level: An Empirical Measure

In order to carry out this alternative, empirical enquiry into routine policing at the local level it was necessary to devise two quantitative research questions and these provide the framework for the first section of this chapter. These questions are:

RQ.1: What are the main components of 'routine' policing in the case-study BCU?

RQ.2: What aspects of routine policing appear to be given the greatest level of priority within BCU tasking and operational policing?

The nature of counter terrorism policing, and the extent of the role that it plays in routine policing activity forms a specific aspect of the discussion of research questions 1 and 2. However, it is pertinent to reiterate one key point at this stage of the thesis. The emphasis is on highlighting patterns and relationships within the BCU data. As a result the QCA reveals a series of implicit indications regarding the role of counter terrorism policing at the local routine level and which, in turn, can be seen as evidence of tendencies towards securitisation (or not). The QCA dataset does not retain the capacity to explore and identify correlations or causality, and there is no intention to generalise the findings from this QCA to the wider policing population.
6.1.1. *What are the main components of 'routine' policing at BCU level?*

Table 6.1 contains a significant amount of data, which provides the basis for the discussion of the findings associated with the first quantitative research question. It shows the type of crime and disorder occurrences that regularly feature in the fortnightly tasking action plans. It also shows the number of times each *occurrence* category featured within the data collection period (i.e. how many of the 209 tasks were attributed to each occurrence category). It also shows the type of *tasks* that were implemented to respond tactically to each occurrence, and the number of times each task type was implemented across the data collection period. Table 6.1 also highlights the percentage distribution of tasks across each occurrence category, and conversely, the percentage amount of each occurrence category that comprise the total number of tasks (n=209).
<table>
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<tr>
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<th>Burglary Dwelling</th>
<th>Drugs</th>
<th>Anti Social Behaviour</th>
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Table 6.1: Types of Occurrence and Types of Task (Count and Percentage)
The following figures highlight some of the key findings from Table 6.1 in more detail. Figure 6.1 shows there are 7 main crime and disorder occurrence categories that regularly feature in the fortnightly tasking action plans. The 'general' occurrence category primarily refers to administrative concerns such as ensuring attendance at BCU level meetings. Each occurrence category has been interpreted within this thesis as a composite element of local routine policing in the case study BCU.

**Figure 6.1: Types and Frequency of Occurrence Categories over a 6-month Period**

The frequencies count included in Figure 6.1 denotes the number of times that an occurrence category was included in the 12 tasking action plans included in this dataset. The number of times an occurrence is mentioned in a tasking action plan equates to the number of tasks assigned to each occurrence category over the 6 month data collection period. However, it is important to reiterate that many of the tasks were present on fortnightly action plans as repeat tasks (reflecting the ongoing nature of some tasks) or as prompts for a review of progress on some tasks.
Figure 6.2 depicts the frequency distribution of new tasks across the occurrence categories.

![Pie chart showing frequency distribution of new tasks by occurrence category]

Figure 6.2: Frequency distribution of new tasks by occurrence category

However, it was deemed appropriate to undertake the QCA on the total number of tasks referenced throughout the data collection period because it gives a comprehensive insight into the multi-layered nature of routine level policing by highlighting the range of tasks (immediate impact/longer term strategies) identified as the most effective response to a diverging range of issues. The findings reveal that 105 out of 209 tasks (50%) relate to autocrime, violent crime and burglary dwelling. Collectively these crime categories are referred to as serious and acquisitive crime (SAC), and serve as the overwhelming focus of performance assessment at all levels of policing (national, force, BCU and sector). Out of the 209 tasks allocated at the sector (neighbourhood) level over the 6 month data collection period, only 11 (5%) were related to counter terrorism.

In addition to the types of occurrences that comprise the primary focus of routine policing it is also important to ascertain the range of police ranks and departments that are integral to routine policing at the local level. Table 2 gives an indication of the range of ranks and departments inherent to BCU policing and the frequency with which they feature in the assignment and completion of occurrence tasks.
Table 6.2: Frequency of task allocation according to police rank / department

Table 6.2 reveals that Neighbourhood Policing officers (PCSO – Inspector), Response officers (PC- Bronze Inspector) and CID constitute almost 70% of the areas of routine police work targeted for the successful completion of fortnightly occurrence tasks. Neighbourhood Policing retains the greatest responsibility for carrying out occurrence tasks. This is perhaps unsurprising given that response officers are ‘radio-led’ and their foremost responsibility is to respond to emergency calls.

90 The burglary team could be included in these statistics as a branch of CID. However, it was deemed important to separate out these departments as it gives a clear indication of the resources put into occurrences of burglary dwelling which is an occurrence type in its own right on fortnightly tasking action plans (FTAs).
Figure 6.3 below shows the distribution of officer ranks and departments across the seven occurrence categories highlighted on the FTAs during the 6 month data collection period.

![Figure 6.3: Distribution of officer ranks and departments by occurrence category](image)

If one looks at Neighbourhood Policing officers - the primary focus of this research given the emphasis placed on Neighbourhood Policing within securitised ‘talk’ and decisions’ – it is possible to see that the largest proportion of the tasks (action) assigned to officers revolve around autocrime and anti-social behaviour (which was latterly renamed ‘neighbourhood management’ in the fortnightly tasking action plans (FTAs). This finding reflects the two diverging modes of performance measurement that governs Neighbourhood Policing – centrally-set performance indicators on serious and acquisitive crime (autocrime, violent crime and burglary dwelling), and efficient and effective response to concerns raised by community residents (in the form of PACT priorities).

The data in Figure 6.3 indicates that the primary responsibility for counter terrorism tasks falls to Neighbourhood Policing Teams, the Community Safety Department and the Channel Project which is arguably the most tangible evidence of the implementation of securitised ‘decision’ (as a key aspect of the Prevent strategy) at
the local policing level. It can be argued that this type of data provide some evidence of the translation of securitised talk and decision to the action level of routine policing. Figure 6.4 shows the different types of tasks assigned to the crime and disorder occurrences included in the fortnightly tasking action plans. There are 5 main task types implemented as a tactical response to the occurrence categories. It was deemed valid to include the task category ‘none’ in the analysis because it demonstrates when occurrence categories were present on fortnightly tasking action plans but had no actions/tasks assigned to them. The implicit indication in these instances is that occurrence categories were included in tasking action plans merely because they were BCU priorities during that fortnightly period.

![Figure 6.4: Types of task implemented as a response to occurrences](image)

The findings show that the majority of tasks were either intelligence-related (54/209 or 26%) or prevention-related (52/209 or 25%). Operation-based responses accounted for 21% (44/209) of tasks. An operation-based task is categorised independently from the other types of task because, although it might incorporate elements of ‘intelligence’, ‘prevention’ and ‘enforcement’ work, it has one uniquely defining feature: often these tasks have additional money allocated to them to facilitate implementation and delivery. This becomes significant when exploring the second
quantitative research question which focuses on the level of priority attached to occurrence categories within the BCU.

Figure 6.5 shows the frequency with which tasks are implemented as a tactical response to each of the occurrences shown in Figure 6.1.

![Bar chart showing the frequency of tasks assigned to different occurrence categories.](image)

**Figure 6.5: Types and frequency of tasks implemented in tactical response to occurrence categories**

The results show that 96% (42/44) of operation-based tasks were assigned to autocrime, violent crime and burglary dwelling (serious and acquisitive crime). The only other occurrence category to receive this type of task was anti-social behaviour. In terms of intelligence tasks, serious and acquisitive crime received 48% (27/54) of the allocation. Anti-social behaviour was assigned the largest number of prevention-related tasks (20/52 or 39%). Serious and acquisitive crime received 78% of all enforcement tasks allocated over the six month period. This is perhaps unsurprising given the emphasis placed on operational performance in this area. However, it is important to note that only 23 out of 209 tasks were determined to be enforcement-

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91 The category ‘operation-based task’ refers to both the implementation of a specific operation to tackle an occurrence and any verbal updates that may have been given in subsequent tasking meetings (and consequently included as a task on subsequent action plans).
specific which equates to just 1% of the total number of tasks allocated during the data collection period.

The role of counter terrorism within routine policing

The QCA data indicates that counter terrorism became a regular feature of fortnightly tasking action plans in July 2008; this was two months into the fieldwork period. As an occurrence category, counter terrorism was allocated 11 tasks in total (8 of which were identified as ‘new’ tasks); 6 intelligence-based tasks, 1 prevention-related task and 4 in-house administrative tasks. The 6 intelligence tasks constitute 55% of the total number of tasks allocated to counter terrorism and these tasks focused on gathering intelligence within communities or more precisely the designated neighbourhood policing team areas. On the surface this finding appears to provide support for advocates of the securitisation thesis, particularly King and Sharp (2006: 380) who believe a key exemplar of securitisation within policing is ‘increasing government directives to police forces to enhance contact with and gather intelligence within the local communities or neighbourhood areas’.

However, it is important to note that although the 6 intelligence tasks represent 55% of counter terrorism tasks this only represents 11% of the total number of intelligence-related tasks implemented during the data collection period. Counter terrorism was assigned only 1 prevention-related task which constitutes only 9% of the total number of tasks allocated to counter terrorism, and only reflects 2% of all prevention-specific tasks carried out during the six-month fieldwork period. The nature of prevention tasks were somewhat ambiguous and involved liaison with local clothing companies. The implicit indication here is that tasks related to pre-determined intelligence gathered in relation to an ongoing illicit collaboration. These findings are significant given the emphasis placed on the implementation and delivery of the Prevent strategy within the pre-existing neighbourhood policing structures at the local level.

Nevertheless, the QCA finding does reveal evidence of some form of discernible implementation of counter terrorism policy ‘decision’ (in the form of the Prevent strategy) at the action level of routine policing. One of the seven objectives of the Prevent strategy – from a police perspective – is to ‘develop Prevent-related intelligence, analysis and research’ in order to improve knowledge about violent
extremism and the factors that drive it (ACPO, 2008: 9). The strategy acknowledges
that to date, the intelligence role has largely been carried out by Security Services and
Special Branch, but there is a discernible emphasis placed on the need to enhance
links between national security intelligence and ‘local community information’
(ACPO, 2008). As the then Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Sir Ian Blair
observed, ‘national security depends on neighbourhood security’ (BBC, 2005). The
Prevent strategy states ‘local community information’ is to be obtained through
processes of neighbourhood ‘mapping’ and the development of Key Individual
Networks (KINs), and that this work is to be the primary responsibility of
neighbourhood officers. The specific nature of the counter terrorism intelligence
tasks allocated within the case study BCU related to profiling the size and
characteristics of the Muslim population in sector/neighbourhood areas, and later to
begin to identify and locate Key Individual Networks (KINs); Community Contact
Points and Places of Significance where BME groups may be vulnerable to extremist
influence. This supports existing empirical work on the nature of counter terrorism
activity at the local policing level (Innes, 2006). Moreover, 7 of the 11 tasks are
assigned to either the community safety department within the BCU or the
sector/neighbourhood inspectors for tasking within their teams. This finding is
significant for several reasons; it provides evidence of a transferral of securitised
policy ‘decision’ to the routine police ‘action’ level, and provides emerging
indications that counter terrorism policing – at least to some degree – is being
embedded into the framework of routine policing at the neighbourhood level.

6.1.2 What aspects of routine policing appear to be given the greatest level of priority
within BCU tasking and operational policing?

A number of proxy measures of ‘status’ were identified in order to assess the level of
priority attached to the crime and disorder occurrence categories which form the main
focus of routine policing in the case study BCU. Two variables within the dataset
have been interpreted as proxy measures of status:

Proxy Measure 1: Number of tasks assigned to each occurrence per action sheet.

Proxy Measure 2: Additional money allocated to carry out a specific occurrence task.
Figure 6.6 shows the number of tasks that each occurrence category was assigned within each individual Action Plan. This provides a clear indication of the proportion of routine police activity that is directed towards each occurrence category.

![Bar chart showing the number of tasks assigned to each occurrence category per fortnightly tasking action sheet.](chart.png)

**Figure 6.6: Number of tasks assigned to each occurrence category per fortnightly tasking action sheet**

Figure 6.6 shows that autocrime, anti-social behaviour and general (administrative) issues consistently received the greatest number of tasks within each fortnightly action plan. An outlier in this regard is anti-social behaviour which received 8 tasks in one action plan. Autocrime was assigned a minimum of 3 tasks in 11 of the 12 action plans. This occurrence category received 5 tasks on two occasions and 6 tasks on one occasion. Although counter terrorism remained a regular feature of Action Plans from July 2008, the amount of counter terrorism-related tasks remained consistently low; 1 task on 4 occasions and 2 tasks on 3 occasions. However, it was evident that often, where there were two tasks, one of them was a replication of a task from a preceding Action Plan. Perhaps it is more significant that, on one occasion, counter terrorism was included on an Action Plan as an occurrence category but received no tasks. This was also the case for the drugs occurrence category (which
received no tasks on 5 occasions). The implicit indication here is that these occurrences were only present on tasking plans to satisfy BCU strategic priorities during these periods.

Figure 6.7 highlights the frequency with which additional money was allocated to support the implementation and delivery of tasks. There is no information included on action plans as to how the additional money was used, although following periodic observation of tasking meetings, it was determined that additional money facilitated police officer overtime. It was decided that it was more valid to apply the code ‘not mentioned’ rather than ‘no’ on the basis that just because additional funding had not been noted in relation to tasks on action plans it could not be assumed that it had not been made available in some form. The code ‘not applicable’ was applied to tasks that were deemed wholly administrative in nature, or which constituted updates on ongoing tasks. However, this analysis is primarily concerned with the instances in which additional money was provided to carry out occurrence tasks. Therefore subsequent discussion focuses on the instances where additional money was allocated in order to enhance task implementation and delivery.
It can be seen from Figure 6.7 that additional money was allocated to tasks on 23 occasions. This equates to 11% of all tasks over the six month period.

The only occurrences to secure additional money/resources — with the exception of anti-social behaviour on one occasion — were autocrime, violent crime and burglary dwelling (i.e. serious and acquisitive crime). Autocrime tasks were provided the greatest amount of financial assistance, receiving additional funds on 14 of the 23 occasions it was provided. Again, this is unsurprising given the emphasis placed on serious and acquisitive crime in terms of performance assessment across the BCU. Both counter terrorism and drugs-related occurrences did not receive any additional funding. Only two types of tasks were in receipt of additional funding — those that were operation-based and intelligence-related. The operation-based tasks received the greatest frequency of funds — 21 out of 23 cases of additional financial provision. These findings are consistent with those relating to the first research question which revealed a notable relationship between autocrime and the implementation of operation-based tasks.

Figure 6.8 shows the amounts of money allocated to tasks and the frequency with which it was distributed across occurrence categories. In total, £14,300 was allocated
to support the implementation and delivery of tactical responses to occurrences over the 6-month period between June and November 2008. In terms of funding distribution, the mean amount was £621 and the modal value was £500 (allocated on 9 occasions).

![Graph showing frequency of money allocation by occurrence category]

**Figure 6.8: Frequency of money allocation by occurrence category**

Of the £14,300 allocated in total, £9250 was directed towards autocrime occurrences; £3370 to burglary dwelling; £1080 to anti-social behaviour, and £600 to violent crime. So although serious and acquisitive crime (SAC) received 92% of the total amount of money, it was autocrime that secured the greatest amount of money overall — almost 3 times as much as the other two SAC occurrences put together.

6.1.3. Summary

Ultimately, the QCA reveals a considerable amount in relation to the composition of routine policing at the BCU level, particularly in terms of the types of crime and disorder occurrences prevalent within local policing activity, the nature of the tasks implemented in response to each of the occurrence categories, and the department most commonly responsible for the implementation of the tasks. The data indicate that issues pertaining to serious and acquisitive crime (SAC) dominate the activity of...
police officers at the routine action level (or at least at the routine tasking level) and that it is Neighbourhood Policing Teams who bear most of the responsibility for carrying out the tasks assigned to address the SAC issues. Furthermore, through an assessment of the two proxy measures of 'status' it is determined that serious and acquisitive crime constitutes the greatest proportion of routine policing at the BCU level and in turn retain the greatest priority at the operational level. Moreover, the QCA has provided a number of empirical insights into the nature and role of counter terrorism within routine policing activity in the case study BCU. It is evident that counter terrorism has a proportionately minor role to play in routine policing at the operational tasking level. The QCA indicates that counter terrorism became a regular feature of fortnightly tasking action plans during the period of fieldwork, which could prompt the not unreasonable assumption that this would remain the case post-fieldwork. However, by highlighting the number and nature of tasks directly assigned to counter terrorism at the local level – in addition to the lack of financial support for the implementation and delivery of these tasks – it is possible to cast doubt on the level of importance it retains as an operational policing priority area.

Nevertheless, the QCA does reveal that counter terrorism has become a tangible presence in the routine tasking of local police officers, and there is every reason to suggest that this will continue if not increase following the completion of the fieldwork for this research. Such evidence can be used to suggest that counter terrorism policing is becoming increasingly embedded into routine police activity to some extent, which in turn can be used as empirical evidence to suggest that routine policing is indeed becoming more securitised. However, the quantitative findings are not without shortcomings and it is important to reiterate the aim of the QCA was to provide an empirical measure of routine policing rather than to identify correlations within the data and modes of generalising the findings to the wider policing population. Indeed, two of the analytic themes arising from the QCA – the role of intelligence and the nature of community safety partnership working are examined from a more in-depth, qualitative perspective in the following section and the findings generated from this analysis can be seen to show the QCA findings as a series of implicit indications with regards to the role of counter terrorism within routine policing. However, it is important to highlight that this in itself does not negate the QCA data from providing valuable empirical evidence with which to assess critically
the extent to which policing is becoming securitised at the local, routine level. In effect, a test of the securitisation version of the ‘contagion’ hypothesis (Hillyard, 1989) which would argue that even though routine police involvement in counter terrorism-related activities as explicitly defined in their tasking measures does not appear to have increased, it may be the case that more everyday policing tasks are becoming suffused with the mentalities and methods of counter terrorism policing – in effect infecting ‘low policing’ with ‘high policing’ attitudes and technologies. By looking at the two thematic areas identified in the QCA in a more detailed qualitative way it is possible to further assess such propositions.

6.2: A Qualitative Exploration of Key QCA Themes

This section provides a qualitative examination of three key analytical themes that emerged from the quantitative appraisal of routine policing, and includes an analysis of data generated from non-participant observation of relevant meetings at the BCU level and semi-structured interviews carried out with police officers across all ranks within the case study force. The three themes under examination at the routine policing level are:

1. The impact of national priority concerns;
2. The role of intelligence work,
3. The nature of partnership working and ‘community safety’ structures.

These analytic themes are examined in relation to routine policing in general and then more specifically in relation to counter terrorism and other securitised concerns, such as radicalisation and extremism. The latter exploration is undertaken because all of these elements of police practice have been identified by securitisation theorists as key exemplars of increased securitisation of local policing (see Chapter Two). Therefore, the extent to which each are informed by concerns around terrorism and radicalisation (reflected in securitised ‘talk’ or ‘decision’) can be used to either lend strength to, or undermine the assertions that policing is subject to increased securitisation.
6.2.1. National Priority: Local Ambivalence?

The QCA of the fortnightly tasking action plans raises a number of qualitative questions. One of the foremost of these is why do certain occurrences come under closer scrutiny than others, as reflected in their inclusion in the action plans? There are perhaps two possible reasons for this. One is that each occurrence is a significant issue for the BCU as reflected in the regularly published performance statistics, for example COMPSTAT. This would certainly account for the presence of occurrences such as violent crime, autocrime and burglary dwelling (serious and acquisitive crimes) which are rigorously audited at all policing levels. It would also account for the presence of anti-social behaviour (latterly titled neighbourhood management on FTAs) because Neighbourhood Policing Team response to the issues of concern raised from within local communities are also monitored at the BCU and force levels. However, this would not account for the presence of counter terrorism because, as discussed in Chapter Five, BCUs are not held to account for the performance in relation to counter terrorism. The other possible reason for the presence of certain occurrences on fortnightly tasking action (FTA) plans is that they are national priorities that have necessarily been adopted as force and local BCU priorities. It is indeed possible this is the case with counter terrorism, particularly in light of the fact that it only became a BCU strategic priority (and thus present on the fortnightly action plans) in the fourth month of the six month fieldwork period. This in turn ties in with the publication and subsequent implementation of the Prevent strand of the government’s CONTEST strategy (2003 and re-launch in 2008).

King and Sharp (2006: 387) argue that a series of legislative and policy shifts over the past fifteen years have ensured a discernible ‘move from local decision-making to a centrally proscribed agenda’ which sees all forces required to produce an annual force plan which must incorporate the national policing plan formulated by the Home Secretary alongside the local police priorities. The suggestion here is that local concerns have gradually been replaced by national priorities determined against an increasingly securitised and politicised crime agenda. Such observations are arguably borne out by the apparently anomalous inclusion of counter terrorism on FTA plans. King and Sharp’s (2006) assertions also chime with researcher observations generated at the fortnightly tasking meetings which were attended during the fieldwork period of
this thesis. Such observations include an initial uncertainty from officers over the origin of counter terrorism tasks given that they were not driven by the same motivations that prompt the allocation of tasks to the other types of occurrences, for example as a result of the performance (reporting/detection) figures during the preceding weeks.

The Prevent agenda states that ‘neighbourhood mapping’ was developed by the Neighbourhood Policing Programme, and the ‘development of standards on the composition, completion, content and use of mapping information will be completed by September 2008’ (ACPO, 2008: 25). The findings from the observational data generated during this research reveal that the provision of this type of documentary guidance will be of critical importance. The observations of fortnightly tasking meetings identified a lack of information and clarity in relation to what was required to fulfil counter terrorism tasks, and in some cases a reluctance to carry them out for fear of appearing to target certain members of communities. In general terms, questions were raised in relation to the validity of using the current census data which, at the time of writing had not been updated since 2001. If this was indeed used then the (out of date) numbers would only reflect the resident population and not the transient population – a key issue for case study sectors that house a large number of students during the academic year. Moreover, it was observed that there is a need to clarify the terms used within the task, for example, ‘Muslim’ is a reference to religion and not to ethnicity. A more specific issue arising from fortnightly tasking meetings is a lack of operational information regarding the manner in which such sensitive ‘counter terrorism’ tasks are carried out within communities. Although it was commonly acknowledged that the motivation for such task was to counter radicalisation in the long run, it was noted by one Neighbourhood Policing Inspector that the Muslim community is not the only source of terrorism in the UK, and that any approach to ‘mapping’ communities and establishing key contact had to be thought out strategically in order to avoid accusations of ‘just focusing on the Muslim community’ [Neighbourhood Inspector3].

The following quotation was typical of Neighbourhood Policing team inspectors: if a specific task came ‘from the Centre (Force HQ) or from central government then more time, and clarity of information was required’ in order to effectively carry out
this task [Neighbourhood Inspector]. This situation in itself prompts a more detailed analysis as there can be seen to be a number of inherent implications for an examination of ‘securitisation’ at the local policing level not least in relation to the nature of the formal frameworks in place for the implementation of national security policy (in this case Prevent) within police forces, and particularly at the BCU level. The uncertainty and caution exhibited in relation to the origin and undertaking of counter terrorism tasks may reveal a case study BCU-specific, strategically underdeveloped tasking process for counter terrorism-related work. However, it is important to reiterate that counter terrorism was introduced as a new area of tasking with no additional funding and as highlighted, little guidance on the origin of the occurrence as a priority concern or how to carry out the tasks in practice.

However it might also reflect the observations put forward by securitisation theorists such as King and Sharp (2006) and others whose work is arguably closely associated with the securitisation thesis. It can be argued that there are aspects of the case study scenario which serve as exemplars of a post-11 September 7 July 2005 security climate which some theorists see to be characterised by changes at the local policing level occurring at the same time as an increasing preoccupation with national and international security priorities, and the state’s increasing influence over the public police alternatively observed as ‘constitutionalisation’ (Walker, 2002) and the ‘retreat of police institutions from [the position of real power-holders in relation to policy decisions] back to the political powers of nation states’ (DeFlem, 2002: 229).

According to advocates of the securitisation thesis within the context of policing such a preoccupation has prompted certain legislative and policy shifts (interpreted as examples of securitised decisions within this thesis) which have gradually seeped into the practice of everyday police ‘work’. Such examples of securitisation include an increase in government directives to public police forces to enhance contact with and gather intelligence concerning the local community through the (re)establishment of community safety initiatives (Home Office, 2007a). This statement resonates within two of the analytical themes emerging from the QCA and which are further explored from a qualitative perspective in the following section.
6.2.2. The role of ‘intelligence’ at the local policing level

Community Intelligence: it’s one of the hardest things to define, and one of the hardest things to record.

[BCU Commander1]

It is clear from the QCA that the types of task most consistently implemented across all occurrence categories during the six month data collection period were intelligence-related. One of the most significant points of interest is the delineation in the nature of the intelligence gathering ‘work’. For occurrences that constitute serious and acquisitive crime (SAC) the intelligence gathered was primarily criminal in nature. However, for the counter terrorism tasks the intelligence gathering work was wholly community-orientated with the emphasis placed on profiling the size and characteristics of the Muslim population in sector/neighbourhood areas, and later to begin to identify and locate Key Individual Networks (KINs); Community Contact Points and Places of Significance where BME groups may be vulnerable to extremist influence. Although the QCA findings clearly indicate a degree of securitised action in relation to intelligence gathering, an in-depth qualitative examination of this routine policing activity – particularly when emphasis is placed on community intelligence gathering – reveals a somewhat ambiguous situation.

The term ‘community intelligence’ is not new and was widely referenced in the government’s drive to enhance the role of neighbourhood policing with the public service. In the government’s consultation paper, Building Communities, Beating Crime (Home Office, 2004a) community intelligence was highlighted as a key operational priority. This policy paper indicated the importance of ascertaining how community intelligence was going to be ‘gathered, managed, measured and employed’ at the BCU policing level (Home Office, 2004a: 3). The term remains widely used in political and public discourse and can be seen to have taken on renewed significance when applied to terrorism and associated security concerns such as extremism and radicalisation. However, despite the government’s attempts to outline the role of community intelligence and the processes inherent to its collection,
analysis and employment⁹² there remains no commonly agreed definition. As a result this research argues that the term has become a ‘free-floating signifier’ (Innes, 2006: 4). In short, the term has been applied to a range of policing circumstances but in particular those that aim to provide ‘valid and reliable insights into the principal drivers of insecurity across different neighbourhoods and communities. Innes et al’ s (2009: 102) field experiments in ‘community intelligence-led policing’ conceptualised community intelligence as ‘information that when analysed provides insights into the risks posed by or to a group sharing some common conception of self-identity’. However, this research seeks to develop the conceptual parameters of this definition by suggesting that the meaning or at least the operational understanding of the term is seen to narrow when applied to terrorism and associated security threats such as radicalisation and extremism. Community intelligence has gradually become synonymous with providing insights primarily into the risks posed by certain groups within community or neighbourhood areas.

There is a significant amount of securitised ‘talk’ surrounding the nature and role of community intelligence, and this is primarily focused on the role of BCU-level, and in particular the role of neighbourhood policing in the successful collation of such information. Moreover, there is discernible evidence of securitised decisions associated with the collection and dissemination of community intelligence as it is emphasised within the seven key Prevent objectives for policing at the national level, force and BCU levels. Advocates of the securitisation thesis as applied to policing identify the increased emphasis on gathering intelligence within local neighbourhoods and communities as an exemplar of the increased securitisation of routine policing (King and Sharp, 2006). The findings from the QCA reveal evidence to suggest that community intelligence gathering or at least gathering information on communities (which appears to be the activity most closely associated with counter terrorism at the level of local policing practice) is occurring at the Neighbourhood Policing level.

Crucially however – and in some contrast to the developments anticipated by HMIC (2005) – the qualitative interviews with officers of all ranks indicate that the extent to

⁹² Building Communities, Beating Crime (2004a: 4) states that BCUs should provide evidence that information from the community is routinely gathered, risk assessed and should be ‘valued as highly as criminal intelligence’.
which neighbourhood policing teams actively seek out information and intelligence concerning security threats through the collation of community intelligence is minimal. Moreover, the interview data reveal an ambiguous approach to community intelligence in general. The following section examines the possible reasons for this, and the implications for suppositions regarding the increased securitisation of routine policing. These include the lack of an operational definition for community intelligence and an absence of formal mechanisms for the collection, storage, analysis and ultimately the dissemination of relevant data.

All officers – from BCU Commanders to Neighbourhood PCSOs – were asked what they understood by the term ‘community intelligence’, and whether they were aware of an operational definition of the term. The responses across the ranks were consistent:

[Laughs]
‘It’s a very very good question. I’ve never read an actual definition of what CI [community intelligence] is’.
[Neighbourhood Inspector2]

‘I’ve never read a definition on any document or force policy. I don’t think people know what it means, what it consists of or what they have to do with it. I think if you asked anybody they couldn’t give you a hard and fast answer as to what CI means’.
[Neighbourhood Sergeant1]

‘Hmmmm, it’s different things, knowing your area, knowing where crack houses are, mosques, schools...and then you get to know the people - the crims; sometimes they’ll tell you stuff. What do you mean by community intelligence’?
[Neighbourhood PCSO]

All of the responses – made by different ranks within one NPT – demonstrate the lack of awareness of a working definition of community intelligence. Moreover the final comments, made by a Neighbourhood PCSO – commonly acknowledged within the force to be the most effective conduit for information from within communities due to the nature of their daily work practices – highlights a common inability to delineate between community and criminal intelligence. This is further explored later in this Chapter. The lack of an operational definition is exacerbated by the apparent absence
of formal mechanisms for the collation, storage, analysis and dissemination of community intelligence generated from within Neighbourhood Policing areas:

‘I think probably everybody could give you a fair stab of what it is but then the issue is what they actually do with it because we don’t have a system to capture it, or analyse it. So it would almost be at the discretion of the person receiving it as to what they do with it’.

[BCU Commander2, emphasis added]

There are a number of inherent implications to the above observations regarding the lack of an operational definition and the absence of tangible mechanisms for collating and disseminating community intelligence. Perhaps the foremost of these is the emphasis this places on discretion, at all levels of routine policing – BCU, sector and individual officer. It appears to be left to the discretion of BCUs and their individual Neighbourhood Policing Teams to decide the importance placed on information generated within the community and how such community intelligence should be utilised – if at all. This in turn raises the profile of officer discretion across all ranks working within Neighbourhood Policing teams, and not just at the frontline where it is commonly acknowledged there is the greatest amount of discretion within the police service. It is evident that a lack of tangible mechanisms for the collation of community intelligence places significant emphasis on the importance Neighbourhood Policing Team sergeants and inspectors attach to the concept of community intelligence. In Neighbourhood Policing Teams that prioritise the collection and use of community intelligence there is often evidence of proactive initiatives to set up mechanisms for its storage and analysis, and this is often evident in the form of a sector-wide intelligence blog.

‘It’s something that we’ve led on in this sector. All the staff have been briefed - have you seen the internal sector blog? That is where we capture any CI that comes in because it doesn’t fit the format for our intelligence submissions. [There are] daily reports on the blog so that officers can update themselves. We weren’t told to do it; we set it up here as a sector initiative and we’ve had 500 entries since March 08. It’s seen as best practice’.

[Neighbourhood Inspector2]

It is also clear that the absence of clear operational guidelines for the collection, analysis and dissemination of community intelligence has a profound impact on the
way in which police officers conceptualise it as an operational practice. The below observations from a PC working in one of the case study BCU Neighbourhood Policing Teams provides an interesting insight into the conceptions of community intelligence at the local policing level.

‘You can have criminal intelligence on the computer and that’s fine but I think the community stuff is sometimes more informal. We might discuss things amongst ourselves and sometimes that’s more useful than the stuff on the computer. You may sometimes think, oh maybe I should have put that on the computer...sometimes you think, well I won’t put it on there because it’s obviously sterilised on there whereas if we’re just talking amongst ourselves then you don’t need to worry about any of that - who’s told you what etc.

And there are certain times where I think, I won’t bother to put that on there because actually it’s really minor, it’s not worth going to all the effort. It might just be a stop somewhere but if I tell one of my colleagues oh I saw x walking down x they might say oh there was a vehicle crime that happened...because it’s your colleagues and you trust your colleagues. When you put something on the computer, you’re opened up to criticism etc and I think some might not realise that it’s useful because they’re worried about getting judged. There are so many variables as to how you write things, and whether you even do write it’.

[Neighbourhood PC, emphasis added]

The observations of this Neighbourhood PC were common within the case-study BCU and raise a number of salient points with regards the use of community intelligence as an effective tool to counter terrorism and extremism. One of the consequences of a lack of operational mechanisms for the submission of community intelligence is that such information is often seen as an informal aspect of police work. The Prevent strategy incorporates an Intelligence and Community Engagement (ICE) training package aimed at increasing the confidence and ability of staff to engage with communities and to gain community intelligence (ACPO, 2008). This training was due to ‘embedded’ in national police training towards the end of 2008/09. It is clear that the absence of formal guidelines on conduct in this area often renders officers uncertain and fearful of criticism for submitting information deemed to be ‘useless’ because it carries no evidence of criminal intent or act. This can culminate in the adoption of a rather perfunctory approach to this aspect of police practice which often culminates in localised discussion within the Neighbourhood Policing team rather than following a process of formal submission akin to that in
place for criminal intelligence.

Indeed, the often ambiguous relationship between criminal and community intelligence is a fundamental aspect of contemporary routine policing. The Neighbourhood PC alludes to this by stating that you have criminal intelligence on the computer and that’s fine. Such observations are reinforced from within the management ranks of the case-study BCU:

'It depends if we get criminal intelligence or community intelligence [from the public] because criminal intelligence is fed into our NICHE system. If it’s community intelligence it’s a bit more of a tricky subject and we haven’t really got to grips yet on how that can be properly stored and analysed and so forth'.

[BCU Commander1]

Such observations corroborate existing research that observes community intelligence as a ‘dust-bin concept’ used whenever police want to refer to a form of information that does not fit into their more firmly established conceptions of ‘crime’ and ‘criminal’ intelligence (Innes et al., 2009: 102). This contrasts sharply with the national policy ‘talk’ associated with community intelligence which states that community intelligence should be analysed, prioritised...acted upon where actionable and valued as highly as criminal intelligence’ (Home Office, 2004a: 4).

Reasons for gaps in the transfer/implementation of policy

This research identifies a number of possible reasons for the gaps in the transfer and subsequent implementation of counter terrorism policing policy between the levels of talk, decision and action. This chapter focuses on two in particular, 1) the application and understanding of the National Intelligence Model within the case study force, and 2) the cultural and operational relationship between Special Branch and routine police officers. These thematic areas are broadly characterised as organisational and cultural ‘challenges’ to implementation respectively.

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93 The Force Strategic Assessment states that a Community Intelligence Pilot commenced in August 2007 in one of the divisional areas other than the case study BCU within this research. If it was deemed to be successful (following evaluation) the intention was to roll out the ‘good practice’ across the force in January 2008. There was no evidence of such a ‘roll-out’ during the fieldwork phase of this research. Moreover, the decision not to implement a community intelligence pilot in the case study BCU – which was designated a pathfinder BCU under the auspices of Prevent – is questionable.
1. The Role of the National Intelligence Model

The processes in place for the submission of criminal intelligence are clear, systematic and compulsory. The formal mechanisms negate the need for discretion and as a result officers appear clear and confident in their operational duties. In terms of intelligence gathering, police practice or 'action' traditionally revolves around that which is 'criminal' in nature. The structures and systems in place to capture, analyse and disseminate intelligence reinforce this traditional, cultural practice. This is exemplified by the introduction of the National Intelligence Model (NIM) in 2004. At the time the NIM represented the most significant manifestation of intelligence-led policing (ILP) and characterised a concerted shift towards a more focused, prioritised, and intelligence-led approach to crime control (Tregidga, 2003). A raft of new phrases entered the policing vernacular such as 'managing problems' and a 'targeted approach' to crime control, and gradually replaced the traditional concepts of reactive, case based approach to criminal investigation (Maguire, 2004). The shifts in both thought and action that the NIM represents had profound implications for public policing at all levels in England and Wales. The NIM was introduced to provide a national framework for how police agencies acquire and process intelligence data. As Maguire and John (2006) observe, in principle if not always in practice, the NIM was intended to connect information flows and exchange between high and low policing agencies. However, existing research (Tregidga, 2003) reveals widespread criticism of the NIM at the time of its introduction, particularly in terms of how it was 'marketed' to officers as a business management tool. This together with a perceived disproportionate focus on the 'intelligence' aspect of the Model left many officers feeling isolated from aspects of the NIM and therefore struggled to see the relevance of it within the context of their own policing activity.

Nevertheless, the NIM remains the overarching management framework for policing in terms of both strategic decision-making and the tactical deployment of resources at the BCU policing level. The Intelligence Products generated from NIM include the Tactical Assessments that inform the fortnightly tasking and coordinating groups (TCGs) which in turn generate the fortnightly tasking plans which served as the focus of the quantitative content analysis (QCA) of this research. However, criticisms of the NIM appear to have evolved into frustration with its monolithic nature and
inability to incorporate the different forms of intelligence that now characterise the modern policing landscape at the BCU level:

‘If we could revisit NIM as an information management model rather than an intelligence management model...because ‘intelligence’ suggests criminal intelligence and community intelligence is actually community information. We’ve made progress in this area in small pockets...over the last decade community policing has gained strength, we used to be very response focused, crime focused and investigative focused and that didn’t help’...

[Force Command4]

Innes (2006), states that community intelligence is different from criminal intelligence in a number of ways. Firstly, it tends to be open source rather than acquired from covert human intelligence sources (CHIS), and secondly it is often provided by members of the public. The inability to capture information generated from within local communities and neighbourhood areas has profound implications for the implementation of national counter terrorism policies such as Prevent at the local level. Notably, the Prevent strategy states that the ‘National Intelligence Model creates opportunities for linking community intelligence and the shared data from partners’ (ACPO, 2008: 22). The observations made by the Force Head of Community Safety appear to undermine this assertion.

‘I think we’ve read NIM as a crime management model and we’re now having to revisit how we manage our community intelligence because if there is information that a member of a Muslim community is acting suspiciously, is that criminal intelligence or community intelligence? What do we do with it’?

[Force Command4]

Innes et al (2009) suggests that the conceptual framing of intelligence-led policing has served to cast it as the antithesis of community policing, operating more recently under the auspices of Neighbourhood Policing. This research further suggests that the traditional and continued emphasis placed on criminal intelligence at the routine policing level has compounded the notion that ILP and NP are competing police paradigms; that the two methods of policing practice are operationally incompatible. However further research counters such assertions (Maguire and John, 2006) and
suggests that the development of a more structured approach to the submission and analysis of community intelligence had the potential to 'bridge the gap' between ILP and NP (Tregidga, 2006). However the current research reveals no such developments within the case study BCU.

2. The relationship between routine police officers and Special Branch

The operational distinctions between Special Branch and routine policing provide a tangible, empirical example of the conceptualisations of high and low policing (Brodeur, 1983). The work of Special Branch and comparable ‘specialist’ units reflects the high policing work in that ‘intelligence-gathering is all-encompassing; it is not ‘uniquely bound to enforce the law and regulations as they are made by an independent legislator; protecting the community from law violators is not an end in itself, and it strives to maintain a low operational visibility’ (1983: 513-514). This is in salient contrast to traditional conceptions of low, routine policing which is concerned with protecting the public, maintaining public order and solving volume, ‘micro’ crimes such as serious and acquisitive crime. Moreover, the veil of secrecy that has traditionally shrouded the work of specialist units such as Special Branch has helped to cultivate and maintain cultural divisions and as a consequence, an operational disjuncture between generalist and specialist police practice. It is increasingly acknowledged, even by key proponents of high and low policing such as Brodeur (2007) that events such as the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 have instigated a blurring of the boundaries between the two policing domains (Innes and Thiel, 2010). This current research indicates that the cultural and organisational legacy remains intact and continues to inform (mis)conceptions of such ‘specialist’ work.

This observation is reinforced through the interviews carried out across the ranks and divisions within the case study Force with references made to a ‘sneaky deaky world’ [Response Sgt1]; ‘James Bond stuff’ and on one occasion the place for ‘the sick, the lame and the lazy’ [Neighbourhood PC4]. Although it is commonly acknowledged that the secretive doors of Special Branch have opened slightly and it is important that this takes place, it is also apparent that clear distinctions remain which, very often, have negative implications on the operational working relationship. More pertinently, it can be seen that the often contentious relationship poses a tangible challenge to the
implementation and effective delivery of some counter terrorism strategies at the frontline of policing. An examination of the relationship between special branch and routine police officers reveals a significant disjuncture between counter terrorism ‘talk’ and counter terrorism ‘action’ on the ground. A number of the Force Command Team indicate the importance of mainstreaming counter terrorism policing within routine practice and highlight the need to, ‘lift the lid’ and make it relevant…lift the cloak off what’s going on [Force Command2].

The strategic rhetoric espoused by Force Command is reflected to a degree in the tactical tasking framework of divisional policing. The now regular presence of Special Branch officers at BCU-level Fortnightly Tasking meetings represents a discernible change in the operational practices of both Special Branch and routine policing:

‘There is an input from Special Branch at fortnightly tasking. They’ll brief us on activity if appropriate, and that’s the extent of input with regards counter terrorism’.

[BCU Commander1]

However, it is clear that there remains an enduring operational distinction between ‘generalist’ and ‘specialist’ police practice:

‘The generalists will be responsible for restoring order; the specialists will carry out the investigations, forensics etc. It’s the frontline bobbies who are there initially but the investigation and subsequent trace back will always be a specialism’.

[BCU Commander1]

As this quotation illuminates, even within the context of counter terrorism routine police work is framed around the restoration of order and public reassurance. It is observed that such operational gaps can have negative implications, particularly when judged within the context of an increasingly prominent role for neighbourhood policing in the response to the terrorist threat as indicated in contemporary security ‘talk’ and ‘decision’ in the UK:

‘We need to find ways to normalise issues around counter terrorism. There
are gaps and probably quite significant gaps in terms of what we do on a day to day basis and what specialists are doing on a day to day basis. There isn’t a great knowledge amongst the officers on the ground. And if the importance is on the officers out there now - community officers and more so than anybody else - then maybe they [specialists] need to open their doors even more’.

[Neighbourhood Inspector2]

‘It won’t be a member of Special Branch that comes across a suspect package; it’ll be a copper going about his everyday activity. That police officer needs to be at least aware that in those circumstances, he shouldn’t go up with his fingers in his ears and kick the package. I think there should be input from Special Branch to say this is what you should do and definitely what you shouldn’t do. That briefing should be given to all officers, and then consistently reinforced. People become complacent and they forget’.

[Neighbourhood Inspector4]

The observations put forward by Sector/Neighbourhood Policing Team (NPT) Inspectors are validated by the interviews carried out with the frontline officers operating within these NPTs. There is a clear and consistent distinction made between ‘specialist’ and ‘routine’ police practice within the context of counter terrorism policing and this distinction often informs the officers’ perceptions of their roles and responsibilities:

‘I don’t really think of it as my job to prevent it [terrorism]. When I think counter terrorism policing I think specialism. It’s not like I ignore it; I’d pass things on’...

[Neighbourhood PCSO2]

‘Obviously you are a bit more aware now but for me I still think, right there are people there doing that and it’s a little bit more secretive and stuff’.

[Neighbourhood PC2]

The clear delineation between specialist and routine police practice is often viewed as positive and reassuring particularly on the frontline of neighbourhood policing:
‘I think we have a bit of a buffer because Special Branch does come in behind us and I think they pick up on certain things... but would we culturally? Yes, but because of the risk, or because they’d [officers] had a briefing lately’.

[BCU Commander1]

There is general acknowledgement that contemporary, routine police officers are more aware of counter terrorism work, and that the working relationship with specialist units has slightly improved in some areas as a result. However, there is also an acknowledgement that the operational distinctions are important, that the secret element to the work is essential and furthermore, it is widely assumed that specialist departments such as Special Branch will remain the ‘experts’ in relation to counter terrorism work:

‘There’s a couple of things that they do that are very secret for very good reasons and it’s important to protect those and important to know the difference. We don’t get a huge amount of information but understandably so; most things are classified to a level that we don’t get involved in’.

[Neighbourhood Inspector3]

However, in some cases the cultural and organisational separation between specialist and generalist police work culminates in operational ambiguity and frustration. This is particularly salient within the context of intelligence gathering and dissemination:

‘The officers do their bit and then it all gets pushed over to Special Branch or [Counter terrorism unit]. It would be nice if all that information came back to us because we don’t get to know about any links etc... it would give PCs a more informed decision as to what they’re looking for, what they need to pay attention to. It’s one way information, they deal with it all and job done. You never hear of it again’.

[Neighbourhood Sgt1]

It is argued that, ‘secrecy gives the person enshrouded by it an exceptional position... out of this secrecy, which throws a shadow over all that is deep and significant grows the logically fallacious, but typical error, that everything secret is something essential and significant’ (Georg Simmel, 1906 as cited in Innes and Thiel, 2010: 464-5). Such an observation can be attributed equally to both the ‘terrorist’ in the process of planning incidents and subsequently evading capture or, the ‘counter
terrorist’ tasked to prevent, detect and disrupt such acts and actors (Innes and Thiel, 2010: 553). In both cases ‘secrecy’ can be seen as both vital and effective. However, within the context of counter terrorism policing it can also be seen to act as a barrier to success. This is particularly the case when strategies and methodologies for countering such acts begin to evolve and incorporate aspects of policing traditionally extraneous to counter terrorism work. The increased strategic and operational emphasis placed on the role of local neighbourhood policing in counter terrorism work necessitates both a cultural and organisational shift away from a ‘need to know’ mentality towards a ‘lifting of the lid’ approach to intelligence work.

An acknowledgement of this need resonates within contemporary academic debate and indeed within counter terrorism policy ‘talk’ and ‘decision’. However, it is clear that enduring cultural and organisational tensions between Special Branch and routine police officers pose a potential challenge to the implementation and effective delivery of some counter terrorism policy decisions at the operational frontline. This is particularly the case for policies and strategies focused around intelligence work. The presence of such challenges can be seen to undermine some of the suppositions made about the increasingly securitised state of routine policing.

It is noted throughout this thesis that an increased emphasis on gathering intelligence on local communities is perceived by some as an exemplar of the securitisation of routine policing (Virta, 2008; King and Sharp, 2006). The findings from the quantitative content analysis (QCA) appear to support such assertions to some degree, particularly those that highlight operational tasks focused around neighbourhood mapping and establishing key informant networks (KINs) particularly within areas with a high density BME population. However, a qualitative examination of the nature of intelligence work at the routine policing level renders the ‘evidence’ to support notions of increased securitisation somewhat ambiguous as findings suggest that the securitised ‘talk’ and ‘decisions’ pertaining to intelligence gathering do not translate into tangible changes to routine policing on the ground. This argument is strengthened when attention focuses on community intelligence. The cultural and organisational police preoccupation with criminal intelligence as reflected in the organisational mechanisms in place within the police service have a number of profound implications for intelligence work in general and the potential to embed
counter terrorism work in routine policing ‘action’ more specifically. The lack of an operational definition for community intelligence and an absence of formal mechanisms for its collection, storage, analysis and dissemination render the collation and utility of such information rather inconsistent across BCUs, and certainly within the Neighbourhood Policing Teams at the centre of the case study BCU. This situation, coupled with the consequential emphasis placed on officer discretion rather undermines securitisation theorists’ suppositions that local concerns have gradually been replaced by national priorities, which in turn ensures a discernible ‘move from local decision-making to a centrally proscribed, increasingly securitised and politicised crime agenda’ (King and Sharp, 2006: 387).

6.2.3 Partnership Working

‘Also our role is to work with our partners - we can’t do this job on our own anymore.’

[Neighbourhood Sgt]

Another key exemplar of securitisation at the routine policing level, alternatively viewed as another product of an increasingly securitised and politicised crime agenda (King and Sharp, 2006: 387) is realignment in the responsibility for crime control. It is commonly observed that it is no longer the sole responsibility of the police but instead comes under the auspices of ‘community safety’ which is a shared responsibility necessitating both effective local partnership working and community engagement. A number of community safety initiatives designed to increase public confidence have been introduced under the banner of Neighbourhood Policing. Such initiatives can be seen to include the introduction of Police and Communities Together (PACT) meetings which play an important role in determining neighbourhood policing team priorities, and can – in theory – serve as an important source of community intelligence for police officers.

Virta (2002: 195) observes the establishment of strategic partnerships and initiatives as a form of local security management, and that such multi-agency cooperation facilitates the ‘co-production of security’. This section examines the extent to which such partnership working is evident at the local level, both in relation to routine
policing in general and then, more specifically, in relation to counter terrorism and other ‘securitised’ concerns, for example, extremism and radicalisation. The QCA revealed that the Community Safety Department had a role to play in carrying out counter terrorism tasks within the BCU. Moreover, the opportunity to sit in on tasking meetings revealed that a number of Neighbourhood Policing team (NPT) leaders (inspectors) who have primary responsibility for carrying out counter terrorism tasks felt that it was necessary for some form of community safety involvement in the undertaking and completion of tasks. This was particularly the case when tasks involved gathering information on key informant networks (KINs) and neighbourhood mapping. However the qualitative examination of partnership working in this regard provided a somewhat mixed picture. Again all officers – from BCU Commander to Neighbourhood PCSO – were asked about the prevalence and nature of partnership working at the local level. The interviews revealed that, in general, partnership working is an important and indeed fundamental aspect of routine police work which often occurs in some form on a daily basis. Yet, the extent to which concerns around terrorism and radicalisation informed this operational practice was minimal.

Community Safety at the BCU Level

The concept of ‘community safety’ at the level of routine policing within the case study BCU is characterised by a three-tiered structure of governance and is, interestingly, a rare example of bottom-up decision-making and implementation. The three-tiered setup incorporates grass-roots neighbourhood resident participation (PACT meetings); a sector-level multi-agency response to the issues emanating from the PACT meetings, and strategic BCU-wide oversight of the sector-level activities undertaken to enhance the safety or perhaps more accurately, the quality of life within local communities. The ‘inverted’ nature of community safety at the BCU level prompts a brief diversion from the analytical approach adopted for much of the thesis: away from the ‘drilling down’ through the force and the ranks to an ‘informing up’ from community to strategy.

This approach helps to highlight one of the dominant themes underpinning this research, namely the notion of power relations within policy-making and implementation. On one level aspects of the community safety arrangements at the
local policing level appear to signal a departure from the more traditional approach to crime control whereby ‘the police tended to retain the power to define which situations and incidents [were] deserving of police action’ (Innes et al, 2009:99). The community safety arrangements within the case study BCU which, in turn reflect the policies outlined within the Neighbourhood Policing Plan, empower local residents; they help to set the tone and determine the priorities addressed by Neighbourhood Management Teams (NMT) and the strategic Neighbourhood Management Network (NMN). It is acknowledged that centralised directives ensure counter terrorism is a priority at the BCU policing level but at the neighbourhood level it simply does not register with local residents who increasingly hold a degree of power in relation to police decision making and priority setting. This could have significant implications for the implementation of national security policy at the local level, and in turn those who seek to interpret policing change in terms of securitisation.

The three-tiered nature of community safety at the BCU level ensured that the interpretation of ‘partnership working’ varied depending on the rank of the officer. Neighbourhood PCs and PCSOs would refer to Police and Communities Together (PACT) meetings and the priorities arising from them as an integral aspect of their routine activities. Neighbourhood Inspectors highlight the role of Neighbourhood Management Teams which are multi-agency meetings primarily designed to address the issues raised at PACT meetings. The BCU Commander and Superintendent Lead for Counter Terrorism referred to the overarching Neighbourhood Management Network which oversees the community safety work carried out across the seven neighbourhood policing areas that make up the case study BCU. There is a discernible community safety network in operation within the case study BCU. The following section outlines the structures and priorities inherent to partnership working and community safety at the routine level, and in turn the implications these findings have for a discussion of local police practice in terms of securitisation.

Problem identification

One of the most fundamental and ‘concrete policy decisions’ arising from the Neighbourhood Policing Plan is the establishment of Police and Communities Together (PACT) meetings. These meetings take place on a monthly basis and are in essence an opportunity for local communities to highlight the issues they perceive to
be a concern in their area. The onus is on Neighbourhood PCs and PCSOs to encourage local residents to attend these meetings as a means of becoming involved in the statutory decisions that are taken on how their neighbourhoods are policed. Ideally the police act as ‘facilitators’ taking note of the priority concerns raised by local residents and using them as a guide for the activities carried out by Neighbourhood Policing Teams.

Interestingly, the findings from this research reveal that interpretations of crime and disorder vary markedly between the police and local communities which, supports a wide body of research on local police accountability (Jones, 2008). The priority concerns raised by local residents are rarely criminal in nature, and tend much more towards low level disorder and issues traditionally dealt with by local councils:

‘You go to a PACT meeting and people aren’t interested in burglary dwelling or drug dealing. They don’t see it as a priority. They want to go to the SPAR without feeling intimidated by the hoodies’.

[BCU Commander3]

This type of observation emerged consistently from interviews with police officers and raises an interesting point for further discussion (in Chapter Seven). The notion of security means different things to different groups of people. From a police perspective it is often signified by a reduction in crime; for local residents it is often less about freedom from crime and more about an increase in quality of life. This is corroborated by previous research conducted by Innes et al (2009: 105) that demonstrated that local residents in a given neighbourhood area were most concerned about ‘signal events’ such as fly-tipping, litter and dog fouling and rather less concerned with issues more commonly aligned with a police response such as youth-related disorder and speeding. This type of empirical evidence ensures that a broad definition of ‘security’ is necessary when applied to the aims and intended outcomes of community safety at the local policing level.

The processes inherent to community safety partnership working at the BCU level are transparent and include problem identification (through PACT meetings) and problem solving (at the Neighbourhood Management Team meetings):
‘In theory, the problems are identified at PACT and then you look at the tactics you can use to resolve the problem. You then see whether needs to come up to a Neighbourhood Management Team [NMT] meeting for those individuals to influence others, or, can it be left at a lower level’.

[Neighbourhood Inspector2]

It is clear that PACT priorities feature heavily in the routine work of Neighbourhood officers. The observations of neighbourhood officers on the relationship between PACT meetings and the newly-established Neighbourhood Management Teams (NMTs) reflect the policy intentions of the Neighbourhood Policing Plan by appearing to suggest a departure from previously noted police conduct that actively dismissed problems and concerns routinely brought to them by the public as falling outside the police remit or not serious enough to warrant much operational attention (Innes et al, 2009). It is noted that a primary motivation for this in the past was the pre-dominance of centrally-set performance targets focused around serious and acquisitive crime. This ‘performance monopoly’ has been undermined to some degree by the introduction of the Neighbourhood Policing Plan and its focus on ensuring satisfaction and reduced fear of crime within communities. This development has prompted a sea change in conceptions of what police work on the ground really is (Fielding and Innes, 2006).

The findings of this study show that PACTs are an integral aspect of community safety at level of BCU policing, and an effective starting point for the development of problem profiles within neighbourhoods. Moreover, as the above quotation suggests, the PACT meetings and NMTs operate on a ‘continuum’ of community safety within the BCU. The PACT meetings act as both the community consultation process within Neighbourhood Policing and as a forum for identifying community problems that might be more effectively addressed at the more strategic Neighbourhood Management Network level. Significantly, they are not referred to as an effective forum within which to generate information on certain groups within the community even in high density BME communities.

The multi-agency response

The establishment of Neighbourhood Management Teams (NMTs) across the case study BCU was commonly acknowledged as a work in process during the data
collection phase of this research. Thus, progress in this regard was observed as uneven and it was unclear (unlikely) whether the implementation of the NMTs was assessed in any way at BCU or Force level. Despite this Neighbourhood Inspectors noted that increasing emphasis was being placed on efforts to consolidate work in this area:

‘There seems to be a greater emphasis coming in on NMTs being set up. I think people are still working on their structure. Mine is still in its infancy and there is still a lot of work to do’.

[Neighbourhood Inspector3]

The membership of each NMT varies according to the size and demographic makeup of each neighbourhood area but commonly comprises representatives from the local council, police, housing association, the fire service, health and education. The main aims of the NMTs are to address ‘quality of life’ issues within the neighbourhood areas and they rarely focus on issues of a specifically criminal nature as these remain largely within the remit of the police. The quality of life issues addressed by NMTs are usually informed by the issues that arise from the PACT meetings that take place in the area. In turn, the NMTs identify three priority tasks to be undertaken within the community. The following statement typifies an NMT response to issues identified at PACT meetings:

‘We have given ourselves the task of improving the quality of life for three different areas of our sector [neighbourhood policing remit]. We deluge the area with a high-visibility presence, anti-social behaviour referrals...the council to remove litter and the fire service to give all houses a free safety check’.

[Neighbourhood Inspector3]

Strategic oversight
The main drivers behind the Neighbourhood Management Network (NMN) which retains strategic oversight of the activities undertaken across the BCU are the BCU Commander and a representative from the council at management level. The non-participant observation of a Neighbourhood Management Network meeting highlighted the core areas of priority for this network that oversees the community safety/neighbourhood management work that is carried out in each of the six sector areas with the case study BCU. The ethos of the NMN is to promote multi-agency
partnership working, enhanced information sharing and the formulation of long term strategies to address local neighbourhood concerns.

The meeting included feedback from the six neighbourhood NMTs which served to highlight both the types of issues that were arising in the sectors, and the extent of progress made in establishing the NMTs as consistent and effective community safety structures within the neighbourhood areas. The neighbourhood issues arising within neighbourhood communities included youth annoyance, localised flooding, fly-tipping, dog fouling and graffiti. However, not all of the NMT leads were present, and those present reported inconsistent agency attendance at the meetings.

The counter terrorism role in partnership working and community safety

The National Community Safety Plan (Home Office, 2008b: 14) states that ‘those community groups and local partnerships that have a role in delivering community safety equally have an essential role to play in delivering counter terrorism measures’. It is clear that partnership working is a fundamental aspect of routine policing activity at the BCU level. However, none of the officers interviewed within the case study BCU referred to concerns around terrorism or other ‘securitised’ issues such as radicalisation or extremism. In light of the issues raised as concerns at local PACT meetings (low level disorder) it is perhaps unsurprising that concerns around terrorism or other ‘securitised’ issues such as extremism or radicalisation do not feature in the priorities identified at PACT meetings. A number of police officers across the BCU corroborated this:

‘If I went to a PACT meeting and started talking about counter terrorism issues they’d just switch off because it has no relevance’.

[BCU Commander2]

‘If I said counter terrorism to the PACT attendees last night they wouldn’t have a clue. There’s no relevance; crime doesn’t have any relevance either. They worry about dog fouling, noisy neighbours; what is significant to them’.

[BCU Commander1]

All Neighbourhood Inspectors were asked about the main objectives of the NMT in their area and none of them identified terrorism or associated security issues such as
radicalisation as an ‘area of business’. When asked whether counter terrorism concerns had ever played a role in Neighbourhood Management Team discussions replies were swift and consistent: ‘no it hasn’t come up and people haven’t phoned up with concerns around that’ (Neighbourhood Inspector) was a quotation that typified this view. Notably, this was the response whether the NMT was based in the city centre area or the most rural sectors in the BCU. As a consequence there was no evidence to suggest that any securitised ‘decisions’ – in particular pertinent aspects of the Prevent strategy – were implemented within the BCU and Neighbourhood Policing teams. Indeed, the Prevent strategy was not referenced by any officer during this section of the interviews.

It was only as a result of non-participant observation of one of the strategic, Neighbourhood Management Network meetings that counter terrorism and in particular the Prevent strategy was referenced in relation to routine, local level policing. The NMN meeting concluded with a presentation on the Prevent strategy by the BCU Lead for Counter Terrorism. The primary aim was to promote the relevance of counter terrorism concerns to Neighbourhood Management Teams by highlighting the need to embed strategies into pre-existing structures for example mainstream neighbourhood policing teams. Following this meeting the BCU Lead for Counter Terrorism acknowledged the enduring challenges to raising the profile of terrorism and associated concerns with police partners such as the Local Authority, education and housing. It was the only interview conducted in this research in which reference was made to any form of securitised concerns when discussing the nature of partnership working at the routine policing level:

‘It’s a sensitive area of business. You speak to an MP or politician, a councillor and you mention that you’re in the business of preventing violent extremism and radicalisation and the first thing they’ll say is that we don’t have a problem [here]because they don’t understand the threat. In the meeting I’ve just come out of, I’ve actioned for a PREVENT briefing to our partners – local authority, youth justice board, magistrates’ court, education, health, welfare. They need to understand the threat without frightening them and telling them they’ve got a problem. Sometimes it’s very hard - even with the local authority - we have a good relationship but they won’t look at it as a local priority either to be honest’.

[BCU Lead on Counter Terrorism]
Virta (2002: 191) suggests that local policing is being ‘increasingly enmeshed in complex networks of relationships and interests’. The observations made by the BCU Lead for Counter Terrorism corroborate this statement. However, such observations and other findings within this section demonstrate that the extent to which those partnerships and network are increasingly governed by securitised concerns (defined as existential threats) remains questionable. It appears that within this aspect of routine police and partnership work concerns around terrorism remain at the level of securitised talk. It remains an enduring challenge to move beyond the talk to implement some form of tangible change to practice – be it at the policing or local council level.

6.3 Conclusion

The findings within this section have profound implications for the theoretical suppositions put forward by advocates of the securitisation of policing, particularly at the local, neighbourhood level. The QCA reveals a considerable amount in relation to the composition of routine policing at the BCU level, particularly in terms of the types of crime and disorder occurrences prevalent within local policing activity, and the nature of the tasks implemented in response to each of the occurrence categories. It is clear from the QCA data that serious and acquisitive crime (SAC) issues dominate routine police work at the local level and as shown through the analysis of the two proxy measures of ‘status’, these occurrences retain operational priority within the case study BCU. The QCA also indicates that counter terrorism has a tangible albeit proportionately minor role to play in routine policing at the operational tasking level. This in turn suggests that securitised talk and decision pertaining to counter terrorism policing is having a discernible, albeit minimal impact on local policing practice or ‘action’ in the case study BCU. However, a qualitative examination of two of the main analytic themes emerging from the QCA indicate that any notions of securitisation are at present more observable at the analytically distinct levels of policy ‘talk’ and ‘decision’ than they are at the level of policy ‘action’ in the form of tangible changes to routine police action. Although it is clear that intelligence gathering, and partnership working and community engagement are fundamental aspects of routine police practice, concerns around terrorism and associated security issues play a very minor role in the community safety setup at the BCU level. The
long term success of Prevent is wholly contingent on its integration into routine policing, in particular Neighbourhood Policing. However, Prevent was not referenced directly within BCU fortnightly action plans (FTAs) and was very rarely highlighted within interviews with Neighbourhood Policing officers. It is only at the strategic management level that terrorism and more specifically the Prevent counter terrorism strategy is identified as an important area of business. And at this level it is more accurately defined as yet more evidence of securitised ‘talk’ rather than ‘action’. The next chapter refers to such fundamental debates when further exploring the implications these findings have for both the theoretical and conceptual framework of this thesis.
Chapter Seven: Discussion and Conclusions

7.0 Introduction

The overarching aim of this research is to provide a critical test of the extent to which routine policing in the UK is becoming increasingly securitised. The main findings arising from this empirical test can be summarised as follows:

i) Securitisation is a process that is evident across three analytically distinct levels of policy – ‘talk’, ‘decision’ and ‘action’.

ii) The nature of ‘securitisation’ differs within each of the individual policy levels according to the geo-political region within which it originates.

iii) The amount of empirical evidence to suggest a tendency towards securitisation is not consistent across the three policy levels and indeed decreases as the empirical focus moves from policy talk – decision – action.

iv) The ‘gaps’ identified between the policy levels are indicative of a number of inherent challenges to the transfer, implementation and delivery of national counter terrorism policy at the local policing level. These challenges arise as a consequence of a range of political, organisational and cultural imperatives at play within the three geo-political spaces examined within this research.

These findings have a number of fundamental implications for both the analytical and theoretical frameworks that underpin this research. They address directly the core problem of discourse-analytic studies of security as identified within this research study, namely that there is a tendency to impute ‘action’ from ‘talk’; to infer policy impact on the frontline from rhetoric and exhortation. The findings provide justification for the methodological claim that it is important to distinguish analytically between different levels of policy for the purposes of empirical enquiry. They also contribute to debates regarding the validity of conceptualising policing change in terms of securitisation, particularly in relation to the propositions put forward about the increased securitisation of routine policing.
This chapter is framed around a discussion of these findings within the context of the securitisation thesis. In this way it consolidates the critical assessment of the securitisation thesis that is woven into the preceding empirical chapters. The chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section reviews each of the key findings in more detail and revisits key terms and concepts where appropriate. The second section discusses the relative usefulness of applying the securitisation thesis to policing in light of the empirical findings generated from this current research. In other words, to what extent can securitisation theory adequately account for the policing policy-making and implementation processes identified within this case study research? In doing so it considers the limitations of inferring policing change from discourse-analytic studies of texts. This section also highlights the ways in which the ‘adaptive’ nature of the research strategy employed within the study facilitates further development of the securitisation thesis as a theoretical perspective. In light of this critical evaluation, the third section considers the merits of moving beyond the securitisation thesis as a viable theoretical framework for debating policing change at the local level by considering alternative theoretical frameworks for exploring counter terrorism policy implementation in the UK. The work of Garland and in particular his work on ‘policy predicament: adaptation, denial and acting out’ (2001), is highlighted as a potentially fruitful source of theoretical explanation for some of the research findings. The chapter concludes with some final reflections on the methodological approaches to researching counter terrorism policing and a discussion of the ways in which such empirical work can develop in the future.

7.1 Overview of Research Findings

i) Securitisation is a process that is evident across three analytically distinct levels of policy – ‘talk’, ‘decision’ and ‘action’.

This research reinforces existing conceptions of ‘securitisation’ as a process which retains at least two salient facets, namely the identification of an existential threat and the consequential justification for and development of ‘extraordinary means to handle the threat’ (Waever, 1996: 107). However, the analytical framework of this research facilitates a more nuanced, empirical investigation of the process of securitisation than
that undertaken by existing work which has predominantly emphasised the discourseanalytic study of security talk and policy decisions. The research indicates that the securitisation process is visible at three conceptually distinct levels of security (policing) policy making and implementation, namely the levels of policy ‘talk’, ‘decision’ and ‘action’. Therefore, the research suggests that there are three core component parts to the securitisation process, 1) the identification of an existential threat, 2) the development of tangible and extraordinary mechanisms to respond to the identified threat, and 3) the adoption and utilisation of these mechanisms ‘on the ground’. In general terms the identification of an existential threat takes place at the level of policy ‘talk’; the development of tangible responses to the threat manifest themselves in the form of securitised policy ‘decisions’, and the adoption and utilisation of such decisions must take place at the frontline action level in order to complete the securitisation process.

However, it is also pertinent to note that all three component parts of the securitisation process resonate within the level of policy ‘talk’ in the form of rhetoric and exhortation which emphasises the 1) nature of the threat, 2) the instrumental response to the threat and 3) the identification of those responsible (at least in theory) for operationalising the policy decision on the ground. This in and of itself reinforces how integral ‘talk’ (in the form of rhetoric, exhortation or symbolism) is to the policy-making process. Moreover, this finding supports the assertion made throughout this thesis that a realignment of the empirical focus – away from an exclusive concentration on discourse-analytic studies of text and towards a more comprehensive examination of concrete examples of practice – is in no way intended to suggest that policy ‘talk’ is an unimportant aspect of public policy-making or that it has no relationship with decisions or action. Indeed, it is suggested that in terms of counter terrorism policy, ‘securitised talk’ can be used as a discursive tool with which to attempt to extend the powers of dominant institutions and security actors such as the state, politicians, security experts and the media (Mythen and Walklate, 2005: 389). This is exemplified in Chapter Four through reference to UK terrorism and counter terrorism political debates and the potential for such forums to be used as a means to ratchet up the fear of terrorism and associated concerns and thereby increase public anxiety and support for the hardening of domestic security in the form of increased stop and search powers, detention without charge, and various forms of surveillance.
including phone tapping. Furthermore, it is argued that counter-terrorism ‘talk’ has the potential to contribute to the construction of suspect populations as argued by Hillyard (1993) in relation to Catholic communities during the Troubles in Northern Ireland and more recently in association with Muslim communities following the events of 11 September 2001 Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009).

ii) The nature and extent of ‘securitisation’ differs within each of the individual policy levels according to the geo-political region within which it originates.

The nature of the security ‘talk’ differs markedly across the EU, the UK and the case-study police force, and the nature and transfer of security ‘decisions’ is seen to vary across these geo-political spaces. This is particularly noticeable when focusing on the extent to which national security decisions are incorporated into the strategic decision-making frameworks of the case study police force. The findings inherent to this research reveal that a dominant discourse of security around terrorism is increasingly shaping policy talk and decisions in the UK. However, this same discourse does not resonate to the same degree within routine police practice.

iii) The amount of empirical evidence to suggest a tendency towards securitisation is not consistent across the three policy levels and indeed decreases as the empirical focus moves from policy talk – decision – action.

This observation is linked inherently to arguably the most significant research finding, at least in terms of the overarching aim of the thesis. Although findings reveal tendencies towards securitisation at all three policy levels the amount of evidence is not consistent across the three levels. Indeed, the amount of empirical evidence to suggest that the process of securitisation is at work decreases as the focus shifts from the realm of policy talk and decision to the arena of policing action. In general terms, this research reveals significant evidence of securitised ‘talk’, some evidence of securitised ‘decision’ in the form of both legislative and executive instruments but minimal evidence of securitised action at the local, BCU policing level and particularly the local, neighbourhood policing level.
iv) The 'gaps' identified between the policy levels are indicative of a number of inherent challenges to the transfer, implementation and delivery of national counter terrorism policy at the local policing level.

The diverging nature of securitisation within the three policy levels and the decreasing amount of securitisation across the three policy levels is indicative of 'gaps' in the transfer and implementation of national counter terrorism policies to the frontline of police action. These implementation gaps are the product of a series of diverse yet enduring challenges to policy implementation and delivery of counter terrorism policy on the frontline. This research indicates that the relative influence or 'power' of the securitising process is wholly contingent on the type of political, organisational and cultural imperatives in operation within the three geo-political units. Moreover, these challenges manifest themselves to a greater or lesser degree within and across all three policy levels, and can be seen to constrain the process of counter terrorism policy transfer and implementation. Moreover, it is suggested that unless certain challenges are addressed there is a possibility that, rather than embedding counter terrorism work into mainstream policing, the UK will end up with a bifurcation between counter terrorism policing and conventional routine practice.

Political Challenges
This research reveals that political challenges most commonly arise within and across the levels of policy talk and decision. At the EU level political challenges emerge as a consequence of the diverse range of national identities and sovereign interests that constitute the policy-making process in this region. As Waever (1996: 105) observes each Member State has a 'specific security identity', which must be accommodated and negotiated in the pursuit of coherent and enforceable policy decisions. It can be argued that the pillarised structure of policy-making in the EU has enhanced the security identity of each Member State because it does not retain the power to enforce the adoption of key policy frameworks. It is clear that the notion of policing, in its myriad forms, has become increasingly politicised in the UK in recent years. However, it can be argued that since the events of 11 September 2001 and particularly, 7 July 2005 the policing of terrorism has dominated national political debates in the UK. It can be argued that both the nature of the terrorist threat and the nature of the response to that threat have been used by political parties – those in
power and those in opposition – to demonstrate or undermine political strength and legitimacy. This is exemplified in the UK through the contentious debates around pre-charge detention of terrorist suspects, the national identity card scheme, and the inherent association of both to the enduring tension between national security and civil liberties. The research also indicates that political challenges manifest in the UK as a result of the national governance structures in place within England and Wales. The issue of 'policy relevance' was consistently raised within the interviews with officers within the case study force, and most notably those within the Senior Command Team. The notion of relevance resonates at the level of talk and decision where it is often determined that counter terrorism rhetoric and strategies are 'Westminster-centric' and that there is a misguided assumption that 'one size fits all'.

Organisational and Cultural Challenges

There are a number of organisational imperatives that serve to undermine the implementation of national counter terrorism policies at the frontline policing level. One of the foremost of these is the emphasis placed on measuring police performance and meeting strategic and operational targets. This results in the widely-adopted – and much quoted mantra – 'what gets measured gets done'. This research indicates that police forces dedicate human and technical resources to priority performance areas. At the time this research was conducted the priority areas were serious and acquisitive crime (SAC) and the case-study BCU was not measured on its counter terrorism activity. This research also indicates that the implementation of counter terrorism policy and particularly its operational delivery on the operational frontline is undermined by a number of enduring cultural imperatives at play within UK police forces. One of the most pertinent to this research is the cultural and operational distinctions that have historically been drawn between 'generalist' and 'specialist' police work, particularly in relation to 'intelligence work'. It is evident within the case study force that a prolonged operational separation ensured that interactions between Special Branch and routine police officers were often characterised by suspicion and frustration. Although it is acknowledged that the operational relationship is gradually improving it is clear that the legacy of the cultural and operational division of labour has the potential to undermine the effective delivery of counter terrorism policies that necessitate a more prominent role for routine policing. These types of organisational and cultural imperatives – which are seen to inform and
indeed sustain one another — have fundamental implications for the amount of counter terrorism activity undertaken at a local level and the longer term potential for it to become increasingly embedded in mainstream, routine practice.

All of these findings have a number of fundamental implications for inferring policing change in terms of securitisation. The following section discusses the key findings within the context of the securitisation thesis as understood by theorists such as Waever (1996); Bigo (1994) and Huysmans (2000). One of the key issues to address here is the extent to which the securitisation thesis as grand theoretical narrative can account for the ‘empirical particulars’ (Garland, 2001: vii) at play within the distinct levels of counter terrorism policy in the UK. The findings are also discussed in relation to existing work that applies the securitisation thesis to routine policing and which suggests that routine policing is subject to increased securitisation.

7.2: A Critical Assessment of the Securitisation Thesis within the Context of Routine Policing

The core aspects of the securitisation thesis as understood by some of its most notable proponents are detailed in Chapter Two. This final chapter examines the extent to which dominant themes resonate within the findings of this research study. These include the role of, and relationship between security ‘actor’ and ‘referent object’, and the importance of security narratives and notions of identity (Waever, 1996). It has been noted that the police are not ‘simply bystanders’ but often ‘active participants’ in the changes that arise as a result of the securitisation process of change. There is an increasing body of work that applies the securitisation thesis to the arena of policing. This has occurred within a European context through the work of Bigo (2000), Loader (2004) and within the UK specifically (King and Sharp, 2006). However, there is an important body of work that focuses on the impact of recent discursive and policy shifts in the nature of crime control, disorder and insecurity at the local, community level. This work focuses on the increasing convergence of policing and partnership work at the local level, and in particular the rise and impact of community safety partnerships (Hughes and Rowe, 2007), and the increased emphasis placed on the use of community intelligence in the policing of insecurity (Innes, 2006; Innes et al, 2009). The issues raised within the UK also resonate within an international, and
specifically a European context. Virta (2002; 2008) observes the development of local security networks in Finland and the use of intelligence-led approaches to community policing in Finland and Terpstra (2008) notes the emergence of local security networks in The Netherlands. Such work highlights the importance of ‘community’, and in particular, the gradual reformulation of the notion of community policing and community safety in light of heightened concerns around issues of both national and personal security.

However, the key point, at least in terms of this research is that the securitisation thesis is characterised by a methodological approach that focuses on the discourse-analytic study of policy rhetoric and various legislative and executive decisions. There is a lack of empirical scrutiny of the actions that constitute routine police practice. The securitisation thesis is sustained by a macro-theory which has a tendency to ‘homogenise’ research settings, or, at least generalise and thereby de-contextualise security. This necessarily precludes recognition of the pluralistic narratives that frame different geo-political security spaces. Moreover, it is argued that the adoption of a discourse-analytic approach to data generation elicits a tendency to infer or impute ‘action’ from ‘talk’ which consequentially leads to questions regarding the validity of conceptualising any changes to routine police practice in terms of securitisation. It is argued that the development of a methodology for investigating policing routines is better placed to establish security ‘in action’. This section explores the extent to which the core aspects of the securitisation thesis resonate within the main findings arising from this research. This includes the key facets that serve as the basis for the grand theoretical narrative as articulated by the likes of Waever (1996), Bigo (1994) and Huysmans (2000) but also exemplars that have been identified through the application of the theory to the field of policing (King and Sharp, 2006; Virta, 2002; 2008). The ultimate aim is to assess the extent to which the securitisation thesis as grand narrative can account for the empirical particulars that manifest within this research. In order to achieve this each main finding is discussed in turn.
i) Securitisation is a process that is evident across three analytically distinct levels of policy – ‘talk’, ‘decision’ and ‘action’.

This research provides empirical evidence to support existing observations that securitisation is a process which retains two inherent facets, namely the identification of an existential threat, which in and of itself provides the justification for the development of ‘extraordinary means to handle the threat’ (Waever, 1996: 107). However, it is argued that the analytical framework devised for this research facilitates the opportunity for a more nuanced, empirical investigation of the process of securitisation. This research indicates that the securitisation process is evident within three conceptually distinct levels of security (policing) policy making and implementation, namely the levels of policy ‘talk’, ‘decision’ and ‘action’. Therefore, the research suggests that there are three core component parts to the securitisation process, 1) the identification of an existential threat, 2) the development of tangible and extraordinary mechanisms to respond to the identified threat, and 3) the adoption and utilisation of these mechanisms ‘on the ground’. In general terms the identification of an existential threat takes place at the level of policy ‘talk’; the development of tangible responses to the threat are visible in the form of securitised policy ‘decisions’, and the adoption and utilisation of such decisions must take place at the frontline action level in order to complete the securitisation process.

It is clear from the traditional references to securitisation as a two-stage process that any empirical examination of it predominantly focuses on policy ‘talk’ in the form of rhetoric and exhortation and concrete policy decisions. Waever (1996: 104) states, it is important to ‘survey basic shifts in European security practices in order to contribute to security debate and policy’. However, this research suggests that it is important to identify which ‘practices’ are surveyed and how they are to be defined or conceptualised in order to gain an informed understanding of the nature and impact of the securitisation process. It is argued that a predominant, methodological focus on policy elites and the ‘textual footprints’ of their talk and decisions necessarily precludes the opportunity to acquire knowledge relating to the culmination of the securitisation process and how it manifests at the ‘sharp end’ of policy-making. What are some of the implications of the development of extraordinary measures to counter the existential threat? The limitations of the securitisation thesis with regard to these
types of empirical issues sets the tone for the rest of the discussion that focuses more specifically on the extent to which changes to routine policing practice can be conceptualised in terms of securitisation.

ii) The nature of ‘securitisation’ differs within each of the analytically distinct levels of policy-making

The research reveals that the nature of securitisation differs within each of the levels of policy talk, decision and action. Furthermore, the research indicates that the diverging nature of securitisation is contingent on the unique narratives and identities that characterise the different geo-political spaces within which it is originates and develops. This finding relates in large part to the policy levels of talk and decision in that it is generated from an analysis of the diverging nature of counter terrorism policy talk and the extent to which national policy decisions are transferred and incorporated into the strategic decision-making frameworks of the case study force. Ultimately this finding indicates the existence of various security ‘narratives’ within the EU, UK and case study force. These narratives are informed by a range of issues, the most notable of which within the realms of policy talk and decision include political imperative (at the EU and UK level) and notions of organisational priority (at the case study police force level). This research reveals that the extent of securitisation is often contingent on the relative dominance of these types of issues and imperatives.

This research examined the nature of counter terrorism talk within each of the three geo-political units that served as the focus of this research. There are a number of ways in which the securitisation thesis resonates with this finding. It is clear that the securitisation thesis can in some ways account for the multi-faceted nature of counter terrorism policy making and implementation because it acknowledges the existence of different security ‘narratives’ and ‘identities’ within distinct security ‘sites’ (Waever, 1996; Huysmans, 2000). Moreover, the application of theoretical concepts such as security ‘actor’ and ‘reference object’ has been an effective means by which to explore the relative resonance or dissonance of counter terrorism talk, decision and action across officials networks within the EU and the UK. However, it is when empirical attention turns to the case study force and thus the level of routine police practice that some of the limitations of applying a grand theoretical narrative to
certain research settings begin to emerge. This observation manifests more strongly as one ‘drills down’ through the force to the level of neighbourhood policing.

This examination revealed that there are significant disparities in both the nature and ‘amount’ of counter terrorism talk within the three units. The amount of empirical evidence to suggest securitised ‘talk’ is significant at both the EU and UK levels. This is reflected in the reference to both terrorism and radicalisation as existential threats to the security of these ‘units’ and the rhetorical justification for the development of extraordinary, emergency measures to counter these threats. However this research reveals a significant contrast in the nature of the talk within these two security units in terms of how the ‘problem or threat’ of terrorism and radicalisation is framed and in terms of how the threats will be addressed. This reveals that there are a number of diverging security ‘narratives’ at play within the various research settings.

Within the context of this research the nature of the talk at the EU level is judged to be conceptually different from that of the UK. Both the talk in the form of debate, rhetoric and exhortation and the counter terrorism policy agreements and directives that result are determined to constitute policy talk within the analytical framework of this thesis. This is because the EU policies do not contain any tangible enforcement mechanisms and therefore do not have the power to compel Member States to adopt and implement the policy measures. However, this is not to suggest that there is not a clear and discernible security identity within the EU. This is comprised of a security narrative that has undergone a fundamental shift since the end of the Cold War and is now seen to be characterised by a growing emphasis on the desire for integration and cohesion. This is epitomised within counter terrorism policy through the creation of policy agreements that seek to enhance the information-sharing networks across Member States.

In the UK, the tone of the counter terrorism ‘talk’ has shifted noticeably away from the war-oriented rhetoric of U.S. security discourse, and more towards an emphasis on
the changing nature of the threat\textsuperscript{94} and the need to preserve national security. The nature of counter terrorism 'talk' in the form of political and policing debate is framed around the need for emergency responses to the identified existential threats and has most recently focused around the enduring and contentious issues of extension to pre-charge detention for terrorist suspects and the national identity card scheme. Political and policing rhetoric also focuses around the increasingly important role of community-based, counter terrorism strategies which necessarily enhance the role of routine policing in counter terrorism activity.

However, the nature of the counter terrorism talk is demonstrably different within the case study force, and this is particularly evident as one 'drills down' through the various policing levels and ranks. The strategic rhetoric emanating from the case study Force Command Team and the publicly available Annual Plans reflects national priorities and concerns around terrorism. However, there is discernibly less evidence of securitised talk at the lower levels of the case study police force. The research reveals that the resonance of national counter terrorism rhetoric within the highest levels of the force is replaced with a degree of ambivalence at the operational frontline and counter terrorism policy and policing is referenced sporadically and often in discernibly abstract terms. The policy 'talk' on the frontline is framed around references to local BCU priorities and performance targets. In short the police officer talk reflects tactical, operational concerns. There is no empirical evidence to indicate that the case study BCU is measured on performance in relation to counter terrorism activity and therefore the level of securitised 'talk' is very low.

The examination of securitised decisions focused on both the nature of such concrete policy instruments but more specifically the extent to which national policy decisions are evident within the strategic decision-making frameworks of the case study police force. This research reveals a rather inconsistent and ambiguous transfer and integration of national counter terrorism policy within the case study Force, and more pertinently, the BCU at the centre of this study. This conclusion emerges from a systematic analysis of relevant case study-specific text which was undertaken in order

\textsuperscript{94} From the sectarian, political violence associated with the 'Troubles' in Northern Ireland (1969-1994) to the terrorist attacks perpetrated by more globalised yet loosely-coalesced cells of organisations such as Al-Qaeda.
to ascertain the extent to which national security policy decisions such as the Prevent strategy and its inherent enforcement mechanisms are embedded in the strategic decision-making frameworks of the force, particularly the strategic processes in place at the BCU level. The research reveals that the Force is in receipt of funding in order to implement aspects of the Prevent strategy and that counter terrorism is present as both a Force and BCU strategic priority. However, a number of key compliance mechanisms necessary for a securitised policy 'decision' are not in operation within the case-study force, in particular the targeted measurement of performance in relation to counter terrorism activity.

The dissonance in the nature of the talk across the three security sites and the apparent disconnect in the transfer and integration of national counter terrorism policy decision into the strategic, decision-making frameworks of the case study force have a number of implications for the application of the securitisation thesis within the context of routine policing. The findings of this research reveal the complexities of counter terrorism policy by revealing the pluralistic narratives that comprise its construction, development and implementation across diverging security sites or spaces. Furthermore, these narratives are informed by a range of different security motivations, experiences and priorities which manifest themselves in the form of enduring political, organisational and cultural imperatives. However, the securitisation thesis in its current form emphasises diverging security priorities and experiences at an abstract and macro level, for example at the level of 'Europe', 'state' or 'nation' (Waever, 1996). Therefore it cannot account for findings that reveal policy disconnect or dissonance below these levels, for example at the level of individual police forces. Moreover, the methodological preoccupation with the discourse-analytic study of elite security actors and the textual footprints of their talk and decisions precludes an examination of a key area of security policy, namely, in this instance, the impact of counter terrorism talk and decisions on the frontline of policy application. This observation is reinforced unequivocally through a critical assessment of the next finding which focuses on the nature of routine policing practice within the case study force.
iii) The amount of empirical evidence to suggest a tendency towards securitisation is not consistent across the three policy levels and indeed decreases as the empirical focus moves from policy talk and decision to the level of action.

This is arguably the most significant finding in terms of the research question that was formulated in order to operationalise the critical exploration of the securitisation thesis, namely, to what extent do security ‘talk’ and ‘decisions’ made within the arena of counter terrorism policy actually translate into ‘action’ on the ground in the form of tangible changes to local policing practice. Although findings reveal tendencies towards securitisation at all three policy levels the amount of evidence is not consistent across the three levels. Indeed, the amount of empirical evidence to suggest that the process of securitisation is at work decreases as the focus shifts from the realm of policy talk and decision to the arena of policing action. In general terms, this research reveals significant evidence of securitised ‘talk’, some evidence of securitised ‘decision’ in the form of both legislative and executive response but minimal evidence of securitised action at the BCU level of policing and in particular the level of local, neighbourhood policing. This indicates that there are salient gaps in the transfer and implementation of national counter terrorism policies at the local policing level. This policy ‘disconnect’ across the levels of policy talk and decision and frontline action can be seen to have arisen as a consequence of a range of political, organisational and cultural imperatives at play at the national and local policing levels. The findings from the empirical examination of routine police action are arguably the most crucial to a critical examination of the validity of a) applying a grand, theoretical narrative such as the securitisation thesis to certain research settings, but more specifically, b) arguments made about the increasingly securitised nature of routine policing. The discussion of this finding within the context of the securitisation thesis focuses on the lack of securitised action in the form of tangible changes to police practice.

The Quantitative Content Analysis (QCA) undertaken to explore the nature of routine policing within the case study police force reveals a number of salient findings. It indicates that routine policing is characterised by an operational focus on autocrime, violent crime and burglary dwelling; the crime types collectively known as ‘serious
and acquisitive crime’ (SAC). However, the QCA did reveal some evidence to suggest that counter terrorism policing has a role within routine policing in the case study BCU. This is evident in the introduction of counter terrorism as a regular tasking priority mid-way through the data collection period of the research. It is determined that this development constitutes a tendency towards securitised action on account of the nature of the terrorism tasks. They reflect some of the operational strategies outlined in the Prevent strategy, for example, the development of Key Individual Networks (KINs); the importance of neighbourhood mapping, and the increased role of community-based initiatives to counter terrorism and radicalisation. However, it is important to note the QCA reveals that the level of operational priority afforded to counter terrorism remains notably small in comparison to the other occurrence types that comprise routine policing within the case study force. This is identified through an analysis of the percentage amount of tasks allocated to counter terrorism across the data collection period (12%) and the absence of additional funding at the tasking level to support the delivery of counter terrorism tasks.

Moreover, the qualitative examination of some of the analytical findings that emerged from the QCA reveals a rather more nuanced account of the extent to which counter terrorism activity is becoming gradually more embedded in the structure of routine policing at the local, neighbourhood level. King and Sharp (2006: 384) emphasise the importance of examining the ‘way in which securitisation is translated into policing policy and practice’ and identify a number of drivers of securitisation within the context of UK policing one of which is described as a return to a local policing dimension, but with central direction. However, there is no empirical interrogation of the extent to which this assertion is evident on the ground within local routine police practice. The findings from the current research indicate that although national priorities are visible at the operational tasking level of the case study BCU there is often a degree of uncertainty as to how such tasks should be carried out and indeed who (which department) is best placed to undertake them. There is widespread concern that certain counter terrorism tasks have the potential to be received negatively by some sections of neighbourhood policing communities, and it is commonly agreed that there should be clearer direction from Westminster or Force Command on the delivery of counter terrorism tasks.
The qualitative analysis also assesses the extent to which intelligence gathering at the routine policing level is becoming increasingly securitised. The findings in this regard indicate that the policy talk and decisions that emphasise the importance of community intelligence as a tool by which to counter terrorism do not resonate to the same degree at the level of police action. Indeed, findings suggest an ambiguous approach to community intelligence gathering. It appears that this is due to a number of reasons including the lack of an operational definition for community intelligence and the absence of formal mechanisms for its collation and dissemination. This in turn can elicit the adoption of a rather informal and perfunctory approach to community intelligence within the case study BCU. The findings also reveal a number of more fundamental, cultural imperatives at play within the case study force, which may adversely impact on the extent to which community intelligence work is becoming increasingly embedded within routine policing. These include the commonly agreed observation that routine policing practice or ‘action’ traditionally revolves around that which is criminal in nature. The organisational structures and processes in place within police forces, currently exemplified by the National Intelligence Model (NIM) reinforce this cultural perspective. In addition, the cultural distinctions made between ‘generalist’ and ‘specialist’ police practice, particularly in relation to intelligence gathering, has the potential to adversely impact upon the integration of ‘new’ forms of intelligence work into the realm of routine or ‘low’ police work. These findings support existing work that suggests the police have to merge national security aims with local policing objectives. However they question the extent to which the police are managing to merge national security intelligence with criminal intelligence (Virta, 2008).

Furthermore, the qualitative analysis of key QCA findings reveals that partnership working and community engagement are fundamental aspects of routine police practice. They also support the observations made by existing research that policing policies to counter terrorism and radicalisation require the involvement of key partners such as local authorities, the police, local communities, and the education and health sectors (Virta, 2008). However this study reveals that concerns around terrorism and associated security issues play a very minor role in the community safety setup within the BCU at the centre of this research. The findings from this research indicate that the community priorities emanating from the community and
subsequently addressed by the local Neighbourhood Management Teams and Networks revolve around issues that more commonly come under the auspices of anti-social behaviour. Moreover, the qualitative data reveals that priority concerns are rarely associated with criminal activity, let alone terrorism and other associated security concerns.

The critical assessment of the extent to which the securitisation thesis can account for the findings generated through this research highlights one fundamental and overarching issue. It is evident that the securitisation thesis and associated, applied work resonates within findings that focus on counter terrorism ‘talk’ and ‘decisions’. It is significant to note that securitisation research is unable to speak to the findings generated from the empirical interrogation of police action in the form of routine police practice. The theorists who assert the securitisation of routine policing adopt the same methodological approach as grand theoretical narrators such as Waever (1996), Bigo (1994) and Huysmans (2000) by focusing on the security ‘actors’ and the textual footprints of policy talk and decisions. A discourse-analytic study of counter terrorism policy precludes the opportunity to empirically interrogate the nature of routine police practice. As a result there is a tendency to infer action from policy talk and decisions. The predominant focus on the identification of an existential threat and the subsequent development of (justified) extraordinary responses to that threat necessarily limits an examination of the impact of designated responses on the agencies or organisations tasked with the implementation and delivery of those responses.

The findings from this research reveal that it is important to distinguish analytically between different levels of policy for the purposes of empirical enquiry, and in particular to focus in on the ‘action’ level in order to scrutinise the ‘empirical particulars’ that constitute routine police practice. Moreover, it is argued that shifting the empirical focus onto action or practice offers the potential to build on the conceptualisations of securitisation. An empirical interrogation of the nature of

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95 It is also important to note that this also precludes an examination of the impact of any extraordinary measures on the ‘referent objects’ of such responses; the objects that need to be secured or ‘securitised’, for example, local communities or those identified as potentially vulnerable to becoming involved in the existential threat. This is an observation that is outwith the remit of this current research but may serve as an area for fruitful research in the future.
routine policing within the case study BCU provides the opportunity for this, particularly when the investigation focuses on the structure and processes inherent to neighbourhood policing. In organisational terms neighbourhood policing is characterised by the need to negotiate and meet the demands of two masters; the state and the local community. The demands from each come in the form of nationally-set performance targets and community-generated PACT priorities. This research reveals that although Neighbourhood Policing Team officers are subject to the same performance pressures as their response colleagues, the nature of their routine activity is increasingly driven by the 'quality of life' issues that are raised by the communities they patrol and police. Thus, notions of community safety and community priority are prominent aspects of neighbourhood policing. The point to be made here it that neighbourhood policing as 'research site' exemplifies the existence of pluralistic narratives that are informed by a range of political, organisational and public imperatives and expectations. It is a research setting that both defies the homogeneity of the securitisation thesis and facilitates the opportunity for a more nuanced and detailed understanding of 'securitisation' and in particular the theoretical concepts of security 'actor' and referent 'object'. It does this by demonstrating two things in particular:

1) Conceptions of 'security' can vary according to the 'referent object'

This research indicates that the notion of security is understood and therefore prioritised differently according to the 'referent object' of security. This is acknowledged to some extent by securitisation theorists who observe that 'the concept of security as we know it from security policy has no basic meaning independent of its referent object, the state' (Waever, 1996: 105). At the European level security is often understood in terms of integration and cohesion; at a nation state level security may be synonymous with the preservation of sovereign power and cultural values. However, securitisation discourse fails to account for notions of security beyond these macro entities. This research reveals that from a police perspective security is often signified by a reduction in crime; for local residents it is often less about freedom from crime and more about an increase in quality of life. This is corroborated by previous research conducted by Innes et al (2009: 105) that demonstrated that local residents in a given neighbourhood area were most concerned about 'signal events
such as fly-tipping, littering and dog fouling and rather less concerned with issues more commonly aligned with a police response such as youth-related disorder and speeding'. This type of empirical evidence ensures that security discourse needs to recognise and accommodate myriad narratives about security which are motivated by diverging experiences and thus priority and relevance. Certainly, a broad(er) definition of 'security' needs to be considered when exploring the nature of routine policing and the extent to which it is subject to a process of increased securitisation.

2) The 'referent object' of security can become security 'actor'

This research suggests that traditional conceptualisations of security 'actor' as the political elite or dominant policy maker are limiting and should be broadened to acknowledge the potential for the referent object to become security actor. The three-tiered structure of community safety governance identified at the neighbourhood policing level reflects a bottom-up approach to decision-making and implementation. This relatively anomalous setup also contributes to one of the dominant themes underpinning this research, namely the notion of power relations within policy-making and implementation. On one level aspects of the community safety arrangements at the local policing level appear to signal a departure from the more traditional approach to crime control whereby 'the police tended to retain the power to define which situations and incidents [were] deserving of police action' (Innes, 2009: 99). The community safety arrangements within the case study BCU provide local residents with the opportunity to contribute to priority-setting and the actions undertaken by Neighbourhood Management Teams and the strategic Neighbourhood Management Network. It is acknowledged that centralised directives ensure counter terrorism is a priority at the BCU policing level but at the neighbourhood level it simply does not register at the community level where there is now a semblance of decision-making power. This could have significant implications for the implementation of national security policy at the local level.

It is suggested that these two, interlinked points offer the potential for the development of the securitisation theory, specifically through the emphasis they place on the relationship between priority and power. This research reveals that the question of who ultimately retains the power to set the crime control agenda and the
priorities that inform routine policing at the local level is becoming increasingly complex. Quite uniquely within the Police Service, Neighbourhood Policing Teams find themselves at the mercy of two power-holders; central government and the communities they serve. In recent decades it has been the centralised policy-making machine that has sought to dictate police action on the ground – whether the priorities be relevant or not at the local level. Yet increasingly, it is communities that have come to influence local routine police activities (McLaughlin, 2007). The ‘inverted’ policy-making and implementation structures within the case study BCU reflect this development.

Moreover the examination of the nature of routine policing reveals that crimes and criminal activity are rarely raised as community concerns at PACT meetings. And, if it remains the case that communities retain a semblance of power over local police activity then it can be confidently assumed that those ‘quality of life’ issues – historically dismissed by the police as lacking in seriousness – will continue to inform routine police work96. All of this provokes a broader analytical discussion about the extent to which routine policing is indifferent to, and insulated from, community safety partnerships and their priorities. The concern with crime and disorder occurrences such as anti-social behaviour and criminal damage suggests that they are not insulated and that routine policing has to accommodate the priorities of other partners such as local authorities. This is especially true where local authority services such as youth work and housing departments are critical to helping the police respond to, and ‘reassure’ communities about their priorities, which this and other research suggests is more about anti-social behaviour and vandalism rather than terrorism. This, alongside the prioritisation of serious and acquisitive crimes, can act as a major counter-tendency to that of securitisation in driving routine policing. This in turn has significant implications for any executive intentions (which resonate within security talk and decisions) to embed counter terrorism work into mainstream, routine policing because, as has been highlighted, concerns around terrorism (and indeed other conventional crimes) are often contingent on notions of perceived threat, experience and general feelings of ‘relevance’.

96 This observation took on renewed significance towards the completion of this thesis as debates around the introduction of elected police commissioners intensified.
In light of this critical evaluation, the next section considers the merits of moving beyond the securitisation thesis as a viable theoretical framework for debating policing change at the local level by considering alternative theoretical frameworks for exploring counter terrorism policy implementation in the UK. In particular, is there a theoretical perspective that could more effectively account for the accomplishment of security through everyday police routines?

7.3 An Alternative Theoretical Perspective: Garland’s ‘Culture of Control’

Mythen and Walklate (2005: 382) note that ‘little coherent attention has been paid to the question of terrorism in the past [although] since the events of 9/11 the social sciences have belatedly declared an interest’. Such ‘attention’ includes the development of risk (Beck, 1992) and governmentality (Foucault, 1991) which serve as the theoretical foundations of the securitisation thesis. This thesis suggests that aspects of Garland’s (2001) work on *policy predicament: adaptation, denial and acting-out* provide some useful insights into the construction and implementation of counter terrorism policy. However, this thesis duly recognises the theoretical and methodological criticisms that have been levelled at Garland’s work. Moreover, it is acknowledged that a number of the key empirical criticisms that underpin this research study can be similarly applied to Garland’s (2001) theoretical perspective. Firstly, it is noted that Garland has attracted criticism for developing a grand narrative that dismisses the role of ‘empirical particulars’ within research settings. However, it is argued that Garland’s (2001) work on *policy predicament* resonates within this research study through the emphasis it places on the ‘administrative actor’, and its recognition of the potential impact of policy on those agencies and institutions tasked with the responsibility for implementing the policies.

It is similarly acknowledged that Garland’s (2001: 106) observations on two social facts: 1) the normality of high crime rates and, 2) the acknowledged limitations of the criminal justice state may not transfer effectively from the generalised context of ‘crime control’ to the specific field of terrorism and counter terrorism. This observation alludes to that fact that Garland has been criticised for providing too generalised an account of cultures of control ‘in the US’ and in ‘Britain’ and therefore
in ‘late-modernity’, when differences in cultures of control within the US and UK are often greater than between them and other ‘late-modern’ societies (Newburn, 2006). However, it is argued that although recent terrorist events such as 11 September 2001 and 7 July 2005 may not have elicited similar notions of ‘prominent social facts’ they have ensured that terrorism has become a ‘routine part of modern consciousness’ (Garland, 2001: 106) and this in turn has generated two burgeoning socio-political beliefs: 1) the nature of the terrorist threat has significantly changed post-11 September and particularly in the UK since 7 July 2005, and 2) the government – if not the criminal justice system – is unable to respond effectively to the evolving terrorist threat. This is reflected in academic observations that, ‘terrorist acts disrobe the liberal myth that the state is capable of providing order and control over its territory’ (Mythen and Walklate, 2005: 382).

Moreover, there is little doubt that an increased preoccupation with terrorism and associated security concerns such as extremism and radicalism has prompted attempts to reform aspects of the criminal justice system in the UK. Garland (2001: 103) argues that this has left a ‘patchwork of repairs and interim solutions rather than well thought out re-construction. This observation resonates within some of the executive decisions that have been made in the UK in recent years in response to the changing nature of the terrorist threat. In particular, the Prevent strand of the CONTEST strategy that was re-launched in 2009 following widespread condemnation of the ‘targeted’ nature of some of its initiatives. Garland acknowledges that any substantial challenge to society’s institutional arrangements creates practical problems and uncertainties – for the publics served by the institutions as well as the institutions, for example, the police. Although there is no suggestion that the threat from terrorism has brought about the prospect of institutional collapse, the changing landscape of security has facilitated the fostering of new policy ideas. These have emerged in the form of new debates around the preservation of national security and protection of the public. The perceived threat from terrorism and the associated change in the nature of the talk has contributed to a range of new programmes and policy initiatives which in turn have the potential to impact upon institutional aims and objectives.

Some of this terrorism talk and decision has come to form enduring aspects of counter terrorism policing such as counter terrorism legislation and the special powers
inherent to such legislation. Yet, within Garland’s theoretical framework some have left their mark only as ‘emblems’ of policy, for example, the compulsory identity card scheme and the proposals to extend pre-charge detention of terrorist suspects to 90 days. In short, they have remained at the level of policy ‘talk’ and therefore not had a tangible impact of routine police practice. This current research indicates that although there is some evidence to suggest that key executive decisions such as the Prevent strategy do form a part of routine policing activity, the full impact of such national initiatives has yet to be widely evaluated. However, the key questions here are, 1) why do some aspects of policy get taken up and have an impact on the ground and others do not, and 2) to what extent can this framework account for the impact of such policies on the ‘administrative actors’ tasked with implementing and delivering them? To understand why this is the case we have to examine the analytically distinct levels of talk, decision, action and in particular the political, organisational and cultural contexts that characterise each level.

Garland (2001: 112) suggests that a policy predicament has different implications for different kinds of actors and he references two in particular; the political actor and the administrative actor. Garland views the impact on political actors from within the context of electoral competition, and indicates that policy choices are often contingent on how positively they will be received by the voting public. It is imperative that policy measures are seen to be strong, credible, effective and in line with public sentiment. Often the extent to which a policy proposal or concrete policy instrument is well received is dependent upon the political rhetoric that accompanies it. However, it is the role of the administrative actors, for example those working within criminal justice organisations, that is most pertinent to the current research. Garland suggests that political initiatives are ‘often reactive, triggered by specific events...they tend to be urgent and built around atypical cases, and more concerned to accord with political ideology and popular perception than with expert knowledge or the proven capacities of institutions’ [whereas] the administrative actor must focus upon the interests of a single organisation in terms of statistical reasoning and resource management’. The police service is included as administrative actor within Garland’s conceptual framework and many of the observations he makes resonate within the findings of this current research.
It is suggested that the policy talk in the form of exhortation and rhetoric, can act as an ‘external constraint’ upon decisions within organisations such as the police. This is evident within the context of this research through the gaps identified in the transfer of counter terrorism policy talk to decisions in some instances, and in the uneven implementation of national counter terrorism policy decisions at the individual force level. These implementation gaps often arise as a result of the political imperatives at play within different geo-political settings. However, Garland also observes that such political imperatives are not the primary consideration for administrative actors. Such actors are predominantly driven by the need to maintain the integrity of internal organisational processes and the need to target resources on priority policy areas. This observation resonates within the findings of this research as it is evident that both strategic decision-making and operational activity is directed in the areas that are subject to the most stringent performance assessment. This is epitomised by the much referenced statement ‘what gets measured gets done’. In short, the administrative actor’s first priority is the core business of the organisation. However, as Garland (2001: 111) says ‘it is the administrators’ job to pursue their organisational tasks in ways that at least appear to accord with the concerns of their political masters’. There is need to negotiate both external and internal pressures. This situation is reflected within the current research through the evidence that suggests national priorities are included in policing strategic and operational tasking frameworks as ‘lip service’ to national, political concerns. As Garland observes, the political and administrative discourses are driven by different rationalities, values and interests and this in turn can be seen to account in some ways for the disjuncture between counter terrorism policy talk, decision and action identified within this research.

7.3.1. Counter Terrorism Policy: An ‘Adaptive Response?’

There are a number of exemplars of policy ‘acting out’ in the context of UK counter terrorism ‘talk’. These include political debates around the extension to the pre-charge detention of terrorist suspects and the identity card scheme. However, it is Garland’s work on policy ‘adaptation’ that resonates most strongly with this current research. Within Garland’s framework adaptive responses recognise the predicament as previously outlined and are characterised by ‘a high level of administrative
rationality and creativity to accommodate the predicament'. As such it can be argued that the empirical emphasis is on the 'administrative actor', namely within the context of this research, routine policing. It is possible to identify examples of adaptive responses within all three levels of counter terrorism policy talk, decision and action. The adaptive responses that are evident within policing policy 'decisions' and 'action' are referenced here.

i) The commercialisation of justice

It is argued that the increased drive towards economy, efficiency and effectiveness that has been witnessed within policing policy for the last twenty years has introduced new systems of accountability and impacted on the patterns of decision-making and thus discretionary powers of police forces. The introduction of key performance indicators as a statistical measure of policing success across all police forces ensures that routine policing is increasingly subject to state-imposed standards and guidelines. Moreover, forces are closely monitored and inspected to ensure they comply with these sanctions. The relationship between these policy developments and counter terrorism policing is interesting. It is significant to note that the police force at the centre of this case study is not measured on its counter terrorism activity in any form. This in turn accounts in some way for the gaps in the implementation of national counter terrorism policy decisions at the individual police force level. It is suggested within this current thesis that one of the conceptual criteria that sets counter terrorism policy decisions apart from counter terrorism talk is the enforceable compliance mechanisms that are attached to them. The counter terrorism policy decisions highlighted in this research retain mechanisms for performance measurement in this area. However, the extent to which the key performance indicators relating to counter terrorism are embedded in the strategic, decision-making frameworks of the case study force remains ambiguous. This is evident in the relative autonomy retained by BCU Commanders and Neighbourhood Policing Inspectors in relation to the amount of routine police practice that focuses on counter terrorism activity.

ii) Relocating and redefining responsibilities

This type of adaptation alludes to the need to embrace the realisation that there is crime control – or within the context of this research – terrorism prevention
mechanisms operating ‘beyond the state’. Garland (2001: 123) suggests that attempts to ‘mobilise and harness non-state mechanisms has been the basis of the most innovative policies of the recent period’. One such policy innovation that is clearly visible within the context of this current research is the ‘community as solution’. This research identifies a range of policy initiatives that promote the role of the ‘community’ within counter terrorism strategies. These emerge in the form of community ‘policing’; ‘intelligence’; ‘safety’; ‘cohesion’ and ‘engagement’ amongst others. They can be seen to originate in part as an attempt to illustrate the move away from the pursuit and enforcement aspects of counter terrorism policing towards the more proactive, prevention-style approaches characterised by the Prevent strand of the CONTEST strategy. This research has examined the role of community-based meetings (PACTs) and the community safety initiatives within routine policing in the case study force. Although it is clear that both have increased in prominence and form an integral aspect of routine policing activity, the extent to which they are driven by concerns about terrorism and associated security problems such as radicalisation is minimal. However, this is not to suggest that the government and the police are not willing to work with partner agencies in an attempt to counter terrorism. The current research indicates that it is often difficult to get non-state agencies to take the lead in community-based initiatives, and the relative prominence of terrorism within communities is often based on experience and thus relevance. In this way the research findings contrast with the securitisation thesis which identifies increasing state control over police policy (Flyghed, 2005; Walker, 2000; King and Sharp, 2006). Indeed the current research is more in line with Garland’s (2001: 126) observations that ‘the state’s new strategy is not to command and control but rather to persuade and align’. In this way the findings within this research do appear to perhaps suggests that the increased role for non-state actors within routine policing is not so much indicative of increased ‘securitisation’ (King and Sharp, 2005; Virta, 2008); rather, it is symptomatic of increased ‘responsibilisation’ (Garland, 2001).

It can be argued that in contrast to the securitisation theory, Garland’s theoretical framework acknowledges the complex relationship between political actors and administrative actors and the influential role of political, organisational and cultural imperatives on policy development and implementation. Thus, Garland’s (2001) work on ‘policy predicament; adaptation, denial and acting out’ can be applied
usefully to key aspects of this current research. This is primarily because of its recognition of the administrative actor and the range of adaptive responses that are made by criminal justice institutions such as the police in light of the development and implementation of national counter terrorism policy. In this way it moves beyond a focus on policy elites and the textual footprints of their talk and decisions to a concern for the impact of such policy on those tasked to implement and delivery such policies. It acknowledges a range of competing discourses between different actors and across different organisations. In this way it can, to some degree, account for the pluralistic narratives that inform the public policy making process in the UK by recognising the ways in which the transfer and implementation of national policies within and across the levels of policy talk, decision and action can be problematized by politicisation, organisational constraints and public scrutiny. However, it is acknowledged that Garland’s theoretical perspective draws on the same methodological approach to empirical research as the securitisation theory and those who advocate the thesis. And, it is argued that a discourse-analytic study of policy talk and decision precludes an empirical investigation of the impact of these policy components on action in the form of tangible changes to practice.

7.4. Conclusions and Implications for Future Research

This research argues that there are two core problems with the discourse-analytic study of security, as exemplified by the securitisation thesis. First and foremost there is the problem of imputation; there is a tendency to read action from talk, to infer policy impact on the operational frontline from security policy rhetoric and exhortation. Secondly, grand theoretical narratives such as the securitisation thesis tend to ‘homogenise’ research settings or at least generalise and thereby de-contextualise empirical concepts such as security. It is argued that both of these problems arise as a consequence of the conceptual and methodological approach to security studies advanced by advocates of the securitisation thesis such as Waever (1996); Bigo (1994) and Huysmans (2000). Moreover, this theoretical and methodological approach to research precludes the recognition and accommodation of the pluralistic narratives around security that reveal it to be an ongoing process that is
accomplished by actors subject to competing pressures in particular socio-political contexts.

This research study puts forward two propositions, firstly that academic research needs to move beyond a concern with policy elites and the 'textual footprints' of their talk and decisions to a concern with the action of everyday, local police routines. Secondly, it is proposed that it is important to distinguish analytically between different levels of policy-making for the purposes of empirical enquiry. Thus, one of the main aims of this study is to re-orient the empirical focus onto routine practice on the ground by innovating traditional approaches to research design and methodologies in order to explore the issue of securitisation within routine policing. It is argued that the application of a single, embedded case study method and techniques of qualitative and quantitative content analyses of routine policing facilitate the empirical investigation of security at the analytically distinct levels of policy talk, decision and action. This in turn, facilitates recognition and accommodation of the pluralistic narratives around security within different geo-political security settings. It is argued that the development of a methodology for investigating policing routines is better placed to establish security 'in action'. This in turn provides a viable way to address the problem of imputation. In this way the research aims to produce a different kind of study to those that have dominated the field to date; a more focused study that attempts to distinguish between different 'levels' of policy (talk, decisions, action), and highlight the dangers in conflating them when carrying out empirical research.

The research design that underpins this study generates a number of possibilities for fruitful research in the future. It is argued that the nature of the research strategy offers the potential to move beyond the corroboration or falsification of the securitisation thesis in relation to empirical findings about actual police routines and practices. The research design enables the adaptation of the securitisation thesis in order to build on specific knowledge of the process of securitisation within the context of policing. Furthermore, the knowledge generated from this research study can be applied to investigations of the relationship between securitisation and routines more generally. However, a discussion of the implications for further research is confined to the substantive focus of this current research.
It is suggested that this robust methodological approach to capturing empirically 'routine' policing can be replicated in other research sites as a basis for comparison in future research. The research design could be used to underpin research within other police forces across England and Wales – both in areas of high risk and low risk of terrorism and vulnerability to associated security concerns such as radicalisation and extremism. In more general terms, it would be interesting to further explore the implications of security talk within the context of counter terrorism policy. The findings in this research study highlight a number of ways in which counter terrorism talk is important. This includes the relationship between talk and public anxieties around terrorism and the role of security talk in the construction of 'suspect populations'. Further investigations of the latter would draw on previous work done by Hillyard (1993) and consolidate existing work in this area in the UK (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009). Furthermore, it would be interesting to develop the methodological approach in order to further explore the relationship between security decisions and actions. Future research could focus solely on the neighbourhood policing aspect of routine policing (rather than neighbourhood policing and response policing) in light of continued developments within counter terrorism policy-making. In particular, it would be interesting to examine security decision developments around the prevention of radicalisation and extremism and the ways in which they impact on how local police officers work with communities in order to counter threats of terrorism and extremism (Spalek, 2008). It would also be interesting to explore further the implications of the political, cultural and organisational challenges that are highlighted in this research. This study suggests that unless such challenges are addressed there is a possibility that, rather than embedding counter terrorism work into mainstream policing, the UK will end up with a bifurcation between counter terrorism policing and conventional routine practice. Such findings contrast with existing observations that evolutions in counter terrorism methodologies are 'blurring the boundaries' between high and low policing (Innes and Thiel, 2010; Brodeur, 2007).

It is clear that counter terrorism is a dynamic area of policy-making both within the EU and the UK. The ever-changing policy landscape was reflected in the case study force at the centre of this study where the implementation and delivery of counter terrorism strategies was very much a phased process rather than a discrete event. It
would be very interesting to conduct the same critical test of the securitisation in light of these new developments. The limitations placed on the research study in terms of timescale for data generation inevitably had implications for the nature of the findings. It was clear that the delivery of Prevent was gaining momentum at the time that fieldwork was completed; if fieldwork had continued the critical test of the securitisation thesis may well have produced very different findings. In particular, it was interesting to note the early implementation and development of the Channel Project within the case study BCU. However, the CONTEST Strategy is currently under review by the coalition Government which has diverging perspectives on the legitimate nature of responses to terrorism. Ultimately, it is the nature of social science research to operate within the parameters of a world that does not stand still, and that must often also accommodate the contingent nature of policy-making and implementation. This research study is no exception. Notwithstanding these important notes of limitation, the study met its central research aims successfully and has provided some important steps forward in the study of securitisation and routine policing.
Bibliography


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[Accessed: September 2010].


[Accessed on: 23 October 2010].


[Accessed on 2 November 2009].


Appendix A
Full Interview Schedule

Interviewee Name:
Role/Remit:
Time in Post:

Section 1: BCU/Sector Information

Could you describe a typical (!) day?

Can you tell me about the set-up of the BCU/Sector?

Prompts:
Personnel
Resources
Response/NPTs

What is the demographic nature of the BCU/Sector?

What are some of the specific issues facing your Sector?
Prompts:
Crime and Disorder Issues
Vulnerable Areas
Council Issues

What would you say are your BCU/Sector Priorities?
Prompts:
Crime
PACTS

How much autonomy do you have in your position?
Prompts:
Setting priorities/tasks

Section 2: Key Research Themes from a Sector/BCU Perspective

Measurement/Performance Assessment

How are you measured at the Sector level?
Prompts:
Issues around performance
APACS
Specific benefits/challenges
Tasking

How does Tasking work within the BCU/Sector?
How does tasking work at the Sector level?
What are the key areas of tasking at present?
Has this changed in recent times?

Neighbourhood Policing Teams

How are they set up?
What is the specific aim/objective of NPTs?
What resources/personnel are dedicated to them?
How important is the role of your NPTs?
Has the role changed/has there been a shift in emphasis recently?
How so?
Has the resource/personnel allocation to NPT increased to any degree?
Why?

Role of PCSOs

How many do you have?
What is their remite?
Has this changed to any degree?

Community Intelligence
What do you understand by Community Intelligence?
How is it operationally defined?
How much training do officers have on collecting it, recording it, storing it, disseminating it?
What happens to ‘intelligence’ collected by officers?

Partnership Working/Cooperation
To what extent do you liaise with local authority/partners at the sector level?
Who do you work with, with what aim?

Section 3: Counter Terrorism Policing/Security-Specific Issues

In what ways have general concerns about terrorism filtered down to the BCU/Sector level?
How is counter terrorism present at the BCU/Sector level?
Prompts:
Tasking priorities/operations/Prevent?

What role do they play in day to day running of your sector?

In what ways does CTP feature in the policing of your sector?

How aware are you of counter terrorism operations/policies?

How aware do you need to be of Ops/Policies?

To what extent are they part of daily business at the sector level?

Do officers receive specific training on CTP?

In your opinion and from your experience do you believe that routine operational policing is becoming more concerned with security/counter terrorism policing?

OR

Are there any ways in which you can see that counter terrorism policing or increased concerns around security have become more mainstreamed/embedded into routine, operational policing?

What does the concept of ‘security’ or ‘CTP’ mean to you in the context of your job?

Do you have any additional thoughts or comments about anything we’ve discussed?
## Appendix B
Anonymised Fortnightly Tasking Action Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Review/Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AUTO CRIME</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspector X</td>
<td>Implement Operation [NAME] in [SECTOR] £500 allocated. – Evaluation submitted – Discharged.</td>
<td>30/07/08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspector X</td>
<td>Implement Operation [NAME] - £750 allocated. Evaluation submitted – discharged.</td>
<td>30/07/08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detective Inspector X</td>
<td>Handler Package re Cash Converters – update required. Intelligence picture to be reviewed and referral to IDG. <em>Carried forward – referral to IDG.</em></td>
<td>30/07/08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>VIOLENT CRIME</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Inspector</td>
<td>City Centre Alcohol related crime and bladed weapons – prepare referral to FT&amp;CG.</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DWELLING BURGLARY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMU.</td>
<td>[SUSPECT NAME] - Investigate possible breach of Supervision Order. Arrested – OMU now dealing.</td>
<td>30/07/08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detective Inspector X</td>
<td>Implement Operation [NAME] £500 allocated. Carried forward, closed briefing.</td>
<td>30/07/08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detective Sgt</td>
<td>Implement Operation [NAME]. Update by DI [NAME] – ongoing and carried forward</td>
<td>30/07/08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ANTI-SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR / CRIMINAL DAMAGE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Inspector</td>
<td>Confer with NPT Insp’s/Bronze re targeting of ASB Hotspots by Response units. <em>Carried forward</em></td>
<td>30/07/08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspector</td>
<td>Develop initiative in respect of Street Prostitution in [NAME] St. Operation [NAME] to be implemented – <em>Carried forward.</em></td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CLASS A DRUGS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GENERAL ACTIONS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Insp’s.</td>
<td>Ensure representative attends T&amp;CG meetings</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronze Insp’s.</td>
<td>To confer and identify their priorities/patrol strategies. – <em>Carried forward</em></td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Sectors.</td>
<td>To target NAW’s o/s for more than 12 months. Carried forward. New Operation to be implemented.</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix C
### QCA (SPSS) Codebook

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Values</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date of the FTA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Crime and Disorder Occurrence</td>
<td>1. Autocrime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Violent Crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Burglary Dwelling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Drugs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Anti Social Behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Neighbourhood Policing</td>
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<td></td>
<td>7. Counter Terrorism</td>
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<td>8. General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Task</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Prevention</td>
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<tr>
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<td>4. Enforcement</td>
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<td>6. Victim Contact</td>
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<td>7. None</td>
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<td>2. 1-4</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3. 5-8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dept/Rank Assigned to Tasks</td>
<td>1. CID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Channel Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Management Rank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. OMU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. YOT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Burglary Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. Community Safety</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8. Intelligence Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9. All Sectors/Depts</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>10. NA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Task Status</td>
<td>1. Update at Next FT</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2. Ongoing</td>
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<td>3. Discharged</td>
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<td>4. ASAP</td>
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<td>5. NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was Additional Money Allocated?</td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>1. yes</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>2. not applicable</td>
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<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</table>

**How Much Money?**

**Additional Comments**