How Neighbourhood Governance Entities are Located within Broader Networks of Governance: a Cross-National Comparison

by

MADELEINE PILL

THESIS

Submitted to the School of City and Regional Planning, Cardiff University

in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

School of City and Regional Planning
CARDIFF UNIVERSITY

October 2009
DECLARATION

This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.

Signed ............................................................. (candidate) Date..............................

STATEMENT 1

This thesis is being submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of ........................................ (insert MCh, MD, MPhil, PhD etc, as appropriate)

Signed ............................................................. (candidate) Date..............................

STATEMENT 2

This thesis is the result of my own independent work/investigation, except where otherwise stated. Other sources are acknowledged by explicit references.

Signed ............................................................. (candidate) Date..............................

STATEMENT 3

I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available for photocopying and for inter-library loan, and for the title and summary to be made available to outside organisations.

Signed ............................................................. (candidate) Date..............................

STATEMENT 4: PREVIOUSLY APPROVED BAR ON ACCESS

I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available for photocopying and for inter-library loans after expiry of a bar on access previously approved by the Graduate Development Committee.

Signed ............................................................. (candidate) Date..............................
This research considers how neighbourhood-based governance entities are located in broader networks of governance, by undertaking an international comparative investigation in two cities (Baltimore, Maryland in the US and Bristol in England). It uses an empirically-grounded approach to ascertain the function of such governance forms according to the way they are structured and operate. It assesses the governance context, focused at the urban level, within which these entities are located, considering the key actors and their relative power and the focus on deprived neighbourhoods versus broader strategies. This leads to consideration of how these strategies and actors shape the functions of neighbourhood governance and the implications in terms of the relative power vested at the neighbourhood level. The research demonstrates the localist and privatist nature of Baltimore’s urban governance context, and the centrist and managerial nature of Bristol’s. Within both networks a policy subsystem is evident with regard to neighbourhood approaches, but it is the broader governance network which determines the state and market imperatives pursued. In Baltimore and latterly in Bristol, tackling deprivation is a subservient agenda to the predominant imperative of growth. This highlights the importance of the two cities’ shared neo-liberal context despite their different governmental systems. In Baltimore, neighbourhoods do not gain resource from the city-level governance network if they lack the assets this network seeks. The function of neighbourhood governance which results is self-help, as long as neighbourhoods have the capacity to do so. In Bristol, neighbourhood governance is steered by central government via its funding regimes and policy approaches. Changes in these have heralded a shift from the targeting of deprived areas via area-based initiatives to seeking to link deprived neighbourhoods to the benefits of broader growth. Neighbourhood governance entities are being steered to adopt self-help strategies, irrespective of their capacity to do so.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Theoretical Framework</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1. Introduction</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2. The Rise of Neighbourhood and Neighbourhood-Based Governance</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3. Government and Governance Context</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4. Defining the units of study</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4.1. Neighbourhood</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4.2. Neighbourhood-based initiative governance</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4.3. Urban governance context</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5. Interpretations of the function of neighbourhood-based governance</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5.1. Democratisation and devolution</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5.2. Competence and Co-ordination</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5.3. Self-help</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5.4. Tokenism</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5.5. Steering</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6. Neighbourhood-based initiative governance entities: Expected</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Characteristics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7. Urban governance context for neighbourhood-based governance</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7.1. UK Forms of Network Governance</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7.2. US Forms of Network Governance</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.8. Urban network governance: Expected Characteristics</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.9. Why this research?</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.10. Research Aims</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Data and Methodology</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1. Introduction</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2. Comparative International Case Study Approach</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.1. International Comparison</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.2. Case Study Approach</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3. Ascertaining the Functions of Neighbourhood Governance Entities</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.1. Identification of functions</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.2. Development of typology of 'ideal-type' entity characteristics</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.3. Neighbourhood-based initiative governance entity case studies</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.4. Entity-Level Respondent Interview Guide</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4. Assessing the Urban Governance Context</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.1. City-Level Elite Respondent Interview Guide</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5. Empirical Phase</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.1. City selection</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.2. Case study entity selection</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.3. Respondent selection</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.4. Interviews</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.5. Analysis</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.6. Validation</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6. Conclusion</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. Conclusion................................................................................................ 196
7.1. Introduction.......................................................................................... 196
7.2. The Value of the Research Approach................................................... 197
7.2.1. Multi-Level Governance Context ...................................................... 198
7.2.2. Effects on Neighbourhood Governance .......................................... 204
7.3. Reflections on the Governance Literature........................................... 207
7.4. Future Lines of Enquiry......................................................................... 211
7.4.1. Further Development of the Frameworks ......................................... 211
7.4.2. Key Themes....................................................................................... 212

Appendices
Appendix 1: Sample City-Level Elite Interview Guide........................... 215
Appendix 2: Sample Entity-Level Elite Interview Guide ....................... 217

Bibliography ............................................................................................. 219

Tables
2.1 Typology of Characteristics of Neighbourhood-based Governance
  Entities by Function.................................................................................. 34
2.2 Urban Governance Context for Neighbourhood-Based Governance.... 43
3.1 Overview of Research Stages................................................................. 49
3.2 Elite Respondents.................................................................................. 66
3.3 Case Study Entity Respondents.............................................................. 67
5.1 OROSW: 'Ideal-Type' Entity Characteristics Evident........................ 107
5.2 CVCBD: 'Ideal-Type' Entity Characteristics Evident.......................... 115
5.3 Baltimore Urban Governance Characteristics ...................................... 141
6.1 CaH: 'Ideal-Type' Entity Characteristics Evident.................................. 149
6.2 HWCP: 'Ideal-Type' Entity Characteristics Evident............................ 160
6.3 Succession of Neighbourhood Funding Regimes/ Approaches............. 173
6.4 Bristol Urban Governance Characteristics.......................................... 192

Figures
1 Location of Baltimore Case Study Entities............................................ 105
2 Baltimore Neighbourhood Governance Network.................................. 124
3 Location of Bristol Case Study Entities............................................... 147
4 Bristol Neighbourhood Governance Network...................................... 172
My interest in neighbourhood governance stems from my previous professional experiences. I was regeneration manager for a local authority, where I was responsible for area-based government programmes and worked with neighbourhood stakeholders. I was thus very aware of the effects of government policies at neighbourhood level and wondered how and why such initiatives were formulated. I then went to study urban social policy in the US, where I learnt about varied neighbourhood initiatives and became more aware of how England has tended to look across the Atlantic for policy ideas. On my return I went into central government. The 'double devolution' agenda was at its height, and I was interested in the political motivations lying behind the resurgence of the neighbourhood as a spatial scale for policy focus and action while an understanding of the realities of neighbourhood-based efforts was lacking. How is neighbourhood governance being used, by whom and why? How do the realities compare to the policy rhetoric? Overall, what is on offer to neighbourhoods?

These experiences, combined with the opportunity that a PhD provided to draw from and reflect upon these, resulted in this comparative research into how neighbourhood governance is being used in the US and England.
Firstly thank you to the ESRC for funding my PhD research, and also for awarding me a Library of Congress scholarship.

I owe particular thanks to my supervisors, Dr Gillian Bristow, who has supported me in embarking upon a career transition and in seeing it through, and Dr Tom Entwistle for equipping me with a new perspective. I have been incredibly fortunate to work with them and have benefited enormously from their patient and constant support and encouragement.

Thanks to my colleagues at the Centre for Local and Regional Government Research, and especially Professor Steve Martin and Dr Richard Cowell for offering me the studentship and being on my PhD Panel. Also many thanks to Dr Karen Morgan for her friendship and wisdom.

Many thanks to CPlan for hosting me, and especially to the stalwart friends I have found in Dr Nerys Owens and Anna Lermon, who have made Cardiff feel like home again. Thanks also to Jonathan Radcliffe for his help in preparing the maps.

Of course thanks to all those in Bristol and Baltimore who took part in my research. Particular thanks to Mary-Lou Reker and all at the John W. Kluge Center at the Library of Congress, who were such great US hosts. Also thanks to Associate Professor Bob Stoker and Professor Clarence Stone at George Washington University for sharing their work and commenting on mine, and Professor Howell Baum at the University of Maryland. And finally love to Kristin and Camille Smith who have truly made Baltimore my home from home and one to which I shall regularly return.

In Bristol particular thanks to the University of the West of England’s Cities Research Centre, especially Professor Robin Hambleton for helping me to roll the snowball in the US, and to Eileen Lepine and Dr Derrick Purdue for doing the same in Bristol.

I also want to thank my academic mentors Dr Viv Milligan at the University of New South Wales, and Professor Nick Bailey at the University of Westminster. Thanks to Dr Jonathan Davies at Warwick University for his comments on my work. Also thanks to the staff and patrons of Chapter Arts Centre who plied me with coffee and smiles while I was glued to my laptop.

Finally love to my mum and dad, who continue to support me in every way; my lifelong friends Dr Tina Coast and Dr Alex Morgan for showing how it can be done; and to Peter Young for reminding me about the need to strike that elusive balance.
This research seeks to further understanding regarding how, why and by whom neighbourhood governance is used in England and the US. These are important questions given that emphasis on the neighbourhood as a spatial scale for intervention, and forms of neighbourhood governance associated with this, have been evident in the US and England as part of efforts to tackle deprivation for the past forty years. Most recently the English emphasis on the neighbourhood forms a crucial part of policy debates regarding ‘new localism’, ‘double devolution’, and changing approaches to regeneration.

Despite a broad literature of relevance to the field, there is general agreement that significant gaps in research and understanding remain, with a “paucity of well-designed, sceptical investigations” (Klijn & Skelcher, 2007). Questions remain about the underlying purposes and priorities of such governance, which can be interpreted as part of a devolutionary, empowerment strategy, as a way of co-opting communities, or as a discharge strategy passing responsibility to them. This research, drawing on theories of network governance, aims to further understanding of the political co-ordination of governance and the realities of the use of the neighbourhood as a spatial scale for policy focus and action. It seeks to ground the various interpretations of the use of neighbourhood governance, looking beyond the espoused objectives. Neighbourhood governance initiatives tend to be accompanied by a flourish of policy rhetoric which makes claims regarding their ability to increase citizen participation and revitalise local democracy, to make service delivery more responsive, and to alleviate deprivation.

A unique aspect of the research is that it provides an international comparison of the use of such governance forms, enabling consideration of what is distinctive and what is similar, and how this relates to expectations of a managerial and centrist England and a privatist and localist US. This comparison is innovative and justified not only given the longstanding history of policy transfer between the two countries (particularly from the US to England), but given the potential of international
comparative research to enhance understanding of urban change and urban policymaking.

To consider the role of neighbourhood governance by locating it within the multi-level, multi-actor governance context within which it operates, the research first attempts to ascertain the role of neighbourhood governance entities. This is informed by a series of accounts contained in the literature which can be divided into two broad groups. The first interprets neighbourhood governance as a practical endeavour (to improve democracy and services), and places emphasis on building the capacity of communities to help themselves. The second set of accounts interprets such efforts as a tokenistic way of dealing with deprived neighbourhoods without addressing the need for systemic reform, or as a way to enable dominant interests to realise their priorities. This range of accounts informed development of a framework of 'ideal-type' characteristics against which the structure and operations of neighbourhood governance bodies could be assessed to improve understanding of their role.

All of these interpretations emphasise the inherently political nature of such endeavours. Therefore, the research considers how the context of neighbourhood governance entities affects their role. Using a framework of expected characteristics for urban governance developed from the key literature, the network governance context is assessed in terms of its focus on deprived neighbourhoods versus broader strategies, and its key actors, such as central/ federal and local/ city government and non-governmental stakeholders, and their relative dominance. This enables consideration of how these strategies and actors shape the role of neighbourhood governance, and the implications of this in terms of the relative power of governance at the neighbourhood level within its broader governance context.

In sum, the research places the same phenomenon (defined specifically as neighbourhood-based initiative governance) in two different city/ national contexts to enable a comparison of how its role is affected by these contexts. It seeks to clarify the basis of the differences between these two contexts for neighbourhood governance and to consider how this is manifested in the way in which neighbourhood governance is used.
Overall, the research found that in both cities studied (Baltimore, Maryland in the US and Bristol in England) deprived neighbourhoods receive varying attention. The ability of neighbourhood entities to improve their areas relates to the context in which they are located and their ability to draw resource and power from this context. This is determined to a large extent by the attitudes of the actors in this context to deprived neighbourhoods in general, to the specific neighbourhood in particular, and to the entity concerned.

Baltimore’s national context, particularly since significant federal disengagement from concerns with urban deprivation in the 1980s, has meant that any approaches to neighbourhoods are formulated by key actors at the city-level in light of the city’s severe lack of resource. If they are able to, neighbourhood governance entities tend to ‘go it alone’. Entities that do have ‘assets’, such as the presence of a committed institution, fare better in their efforts to help themselves. In Bristol, central government plays a much more significant role in determining neighbourhood-level efforts, including the creation of neighbourhood governance entities. These efforts are framed by changing policies and approaches. Neighbourhood entities need to ‘buy in’ to these approaches to gain access to resource and limited influence.

The chapters which follow explain the research’s approach and findings in much greater detail:

Chapter 2 explains the rise of the neighbourhood as a spatial scale for intervention, and the associated rise of neighbourhood governance. It presents the key governance literature which has informed the research’s approach, and sets out the theoretical framework which underpins it, with clarification of the research’s central propositions. Finally the chapter explains the research’s contribution to the field and sets out the research’s aims in detail.

Chapter 3 clarifies the nature of the evidence sought and how this relates to the research questions. It explains development of the theoretical framework and how this was applied in the empirical work and analysis. It sets out the comparative international case study approach used, how the functions of neighbourhood governance entities are ascertained according to the way they are structured and
operate, and how the urban governance context of these entities is assessed. Following detail about the research’s empirical phase, it explains how the data were analysed and validated.

Chapter 4 serves to ‘set the scene’ in both cities, enabling a detailed contextual understanding to assist in locating neighbourhood governance in its broader governance context. It does this by considering the cities’ respective post-war national policy contexts. It then sets out each city’s neighbourhood-relevant history and the city/local government’s changing orientation to neighbourhoods. It subsequently explores the policies developed at both city and higher levels of government and governance which frame neighbourhood approaches.

Chapters 5 and 6 present analysis of the detailed findings from the empirical work in both cities. Each chapter first considers the roles revealed by the study of two neighbourhood governance entities in the city. The chapters then consider the city’s urban governance system. Finally the implications of the governance network’s strategies and actions are considered in terms of the relative power of the neighbourhood level within its governance context.

Chapter 7 concludes by considering the value of the research approach used by assessing and contrasting the findings in both cities. It then reflects on the literature in light of these, and presents some key themes which are indicative of future policy direction. It ends with the identification of possible future lines of enquiry.
2.1 Introduction

This chapter explains the rise of the neighbourhood as a spatial scale for intervention, and the associated rise of neighbourhood-based initiative governance. The key governance literature which has informed the research's approach is then presented, which addresses the broader governance context for neighbourhood-based governance and the relative dominance of different actors within it, including government. The chapter then sets out the theoretical framework which underpins the empirical research, including different interpretations of the functions of these initiatives. Finally the research's central propositions are clarified.

The research's overall aim is to use an empirically-grounded approach to consider how neighbourhood-based governance entities are located in broader networks of governance. A key tenet underpinning the research is that governance is inherently political given its concern with the "interplay of stakeholders in seeking to exercise power over each other to further their own interests" (Bovaird and Loffler, 2002: 16). To understand the function of neighbourhood-based initiative governance it is necessary to both assess its structure and operations, and to locate it within its broader multi-level governance context. Here 'function' refers to the actual role played by neighbourhood-based initiative governance rather than to such bodies' stated remit or the rhetoric of their existence. The actual function of such entities indicates the position of the neighbourhood within its multi-level governance context and the power relations between institutions of governance and government at different spatial scales.

Following clarification of the research's two principal units of study, neighbourhood-based initiative governance entities and their urban governance context, the chapter sets out the range of principal interpretations used to explain the function of such bodies. A typology of characteristics which could be expected for such bodies according to these interpretations is then presented. This heuristic framework
provides a basis against which the structure and operations of the case study entities
analysed in the empirical work are assessed. To understand the context in which
neighbourhood-based governance operates and how this affects its functions, the
forms of urban governance which could be expected in the UK and US within which
such initiatives operate are then considered, as well as the relative dominance of
governance network members. The functions of neighbourhood-based governance
likely to arise are then posited given the state and market imperatives associated with
these urban governance forms. Finally the chapter explains the research’s
contribution to the field, and sets out the research’s aims in detail.

The research explores the balance in power between the urban and neighbourhood
levels within multi-level governance systems, or the ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’
forces on the neighbourhood as a level of governance, and what this implies about the
use of neighbourhood-based governance. It reflects Whitehead’s (2003: 13)
contention that “the dialectics of horizontal and vertical political co-ordination should
be a central consideration in contemporary work on political and economic devolution
in Britain and other countries”.

2.2 The Rise of Neighbourhood and Neighbourhood-Based Governance

Neighbourhoods and neighbourhood-based governance have been features of urban
policy and academic discourse in the US and UK since the 1960s. The prominence of
neighbourhood-based governance can be related to the fact that it fulfils many of what
Cochrane (2007: 24) identifies as the main features of urban policy developed in the
US in the 1960s (which have been subsequently adopted in the UK). These include a
commitment to co-ordination; a belief that communities should take responsibility for
their own ‘well-being’; a conviction that existing public service structures are
bureaucratic and self-serving; and a belief that current local electoral structures are
unrepresentative and exclusionary (Cochrane, 2007).

Neighbourhood-based governance is underpinned by the assumption that the relative
proximity of interaction between citizens, service providers and decision-makers
possible at the neighbourhood level enables improved participation, greater
responsiveness, and enhanced democracy (as identified by Dahl and Tufte, 1973).
The overall aim of neighbourhood-based governance initiatives is generally stated as being to enhance the 'well-being' of neighbourhood residents, via service provision more tailored to their needs and priorities, and increased participation and engagement in the local political process.

In the context of a "re-scaling of governance arenas", urban areas down to "the micro-scale... [of] deprived neighbourhoods" are gaining more importance as levels of governance (Hohn and Neuer, 2006). This "rescaling" is seen as locating "the appropriate administrative scale at which to formulate and implement... policies" (Gordon and Buck, 2005: 13). Neighbourhoods have become recognised as a valid scale at which governance can operate and where the "practice of empowerment" (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2008: 53) can be undertaken. This reflects increased recognition of the neighbourhood "as an important setting for many of the processes which supposedly shape social identity and life chances" (Forrest and Kearns, 2001: 2125). Recognition of the value of the neighbourhood as a spatial scale for policy intervention is particularly evident in attempts to tackle deprivation.

The growing focus on neighbourhoods in Europe is seen as closely related to a concern with social exclusion and recognition that it is taking distinct spatial forms (Atkinson and Carmichael, 2007). In England, the principal means for identifying areas of deprivation is the government-defined Indices of Deprivation, and the communities of these areas are often referred to as 'socially excluded'. In the US, the principal way of identifying areas of deprivation (or 'distressed communities') is the concentration of poverty (Katz, 2004: 6). The notion of social exclusion is not used explicitly but is indirectly expressed by Wilson (1987) in describing jobless neighbourhoods that are isolated from wealth, mainstream institutions, and social networks that provide mobility and status attainment opportunities. The resultant 'area effects' literature concludes that neighbourhoods of concentrated poverty have a negative effect on the health and life opportunities of low-income families (see for example, Ellen and Turner, 1997). This literature in turn influenced British research (for example, Atkinson and Kintrea, 2001) and policies regarding area-based initiatives. The literature explains that the neighbourhood setting can have negative consequences, such as the creation of communities with high levels of social disorder; or positive consequences, providing the social networks which give a basis for
improvement (as discussed in terms of social capital by Putnam, 1993 and Halpern, 1999).

This has led to a belief generally shared amongst policy and academic communities of the value of basing interventions on "guided community-led approaches" (Robson et al., 2000: 25-26). It should be noted that the notions of neighbourhood-based and community-based initiatives tend to be used interchangeably. This is because as Cochrane (2007: 48) explains, "in urban policy practice a community is generally simply understood to incorporate those who live in a particular locality". Thus while communities can be 'of interest' or 'of place', in this context the latter meaning predominates.

The technical and political response has been to institute a range of 'place and people-based' regeneration or 'community building' initiatives in deprived neighbourhoods. These tend to have been instituted and supported (or 'sponsored') by government in the UK, and by government, philanthropic foundations and the nationally-operating non-profit intermediaries in the US (these are defined in chapter 4). The initiatives are envisaged as tackling what have been characterised as complex, inter-related problems that are spatially concentrated. This in turn reflects a belief that neighbourhood renewal should be a holistic and integrated process that attempts to comprehensively address the needs and circumstances of residents (White et al., 2006: 260).

Approaches that make use of neighbourhood-based decision-making processes have led to the creation of initiative governance entities which form a key unit of study for this research. The 'sponsors' of the initiatives may seek to create a new body, or may identify an existing organisation that can perform this role for the initiative (Chaskin and Peters, 2000: 2). The entities incorporate a diverse range of stakeholders (Bovaird and Loffler, 2002), including residents, and the public, private, voluntary, non-profit and community sectors, enabling what has been termed "descriptive representation" to incorporate diverse participation in a formal decision-making process (Chaskin and Peters, 2000: 18). This composition is seen as vital to enabling citizen participation along with professionals in planning and implementation (Chaskin, 2005: 408). However, these different stakeholders have different interests
in “what neighbourhoods mean for a variety of purposes” (Fraser; 2004: 438). This raises questions about which stakeholder interests predominate.

However, a key stakeholder is (local and federal/central) government, which supervises and checks the autonomy of neighbourhood-based entities. In the federal US, Chaskin and Garg’s (1997: 642) case study selection reveals a spectrum of (local) government involvement with neighbourhood-based governance bodies, from those that are government-sponsored, to government having no explicit, direct involvement. However, in the absence of government, foundations or non-profit intermediaries do tend to be a sponsor, and such bodies operate in a context in which local government plays a formative role. In the UK, central and local government is a more consistent and obvious presence in the processes and structures of neighbourhood-based governance. This is explored further in chapter 4.

The relative power vested in neighbourhood-based governance is a function of the extent to which higher levels of governance and government have delegated their powers and responsibilities to the neighbourhood-based governance entity (Pratchett, 2004: 362). Even if higher-level authorities are keen, the most extreme conceptual form of neighbourhood-based governance - community independence or self-determination (as depicted in the film “Passport to Pimlico”) - cannot be expected to occur in actuality (Somerville, 2005b). At base, neighbourhoods cannot expect to enjoy high levels of autonomy due to their size. Neighbourhood-based governance needs to be integrated vertically into wider economic, social and political governance structures, or multi-level governance, to enable delivery of community priorities, to whatever extent, while taking responsibilities to the wider community into account (Fagotto and Fung: 2006: 653). This indicates that neighbourhood-based governance initiatives are likely to seek to strengthen neighbourhoods by linking ‘top down’ support (expressed via the resources and remit provided by their sponsors) with ‘bottom up’ mechanisms (enabled by initiative governance structures, such as procedures that enable community participation) (Chaskin and Garg, 1997: 641). This raises questions about the balance between these ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’ forces in terms of the relative power of the neighbourhood level in its multi-level governance context.
2.3 Government and Governance Context

The governance literature informs consideration of the broader context for
neighbourhood-based governance and the relative dominance of actors within it,
including government.

Whereas ‘government’ can be defined as the activity of the formal governmental
system, involving statutory relationships and the exercise of powers and duties by
formally elected or appointed bodies (Stewart, 2003: 76), ‘governance’ is a much
looser, contested and malleable notion. It is used as a process-orientated conception
which captures institutional change, and to describe the structures (institutional
arrangements) which result. The term tends not to be as widely used in the US
academic literature. However, Pierre and Peters (2000: 7) explain that while the
European debate on governance has been more dynamic, governance is just as
common in the US as in the UK. In the US, the term ‘governance’ has traditionally
been used to describe political authority (Pierre and Peters, 2000: 23). But there is
increasing recognition of governance in terms of both the structures and processes
(reflecting the European literature) that define relations between ‘society’ (including
the private and community sectors) and the state (Chaskin, 2003: 162).

Overall, governance is associated with a network, rather than a market or hierarchical
mode of co-ordination of political and economic activity, to “overcome the limitations
of anarchic market exchange and top-down planning in an increasingly complex and
global world” (Jessop, 2003: 101-102). The rise of network governance is seen as
reflecting the need for networked forms of co-ordination as political power has
increasingly fragmented (Davies, 2009). The empirical and normative stance is that
there has been (and should be) a move from government to governance. Government
should “steer” rather than “row”, a sentiment initially expressed in the US by Osborne
and Gaebler, 1992, and expressed in the UK in terms of the development of a “centrist
urban policy with space for local initiative” (Cochrane, 2007: 40). This has resulted
in governance structures which comprise the institutions of social co-ordination and
guidance in society (Kooiman, 1993; Rhodes, 1996). Along with government, these
structures incorporate a range of interests drawn from the private sector and civil
society (Whitehead, 2003) to negotiate, formulate and implement policy. Such network governance forms tend to be informal rather than formally constituted.

This proliferation of actors in the policy process has led to debates about the declining power of government, or the “hollowing out of the state” (Rhodes, 1994, 1996). The concept of metagovernance, or “the governance of governance” (Jessop, 2004), is potentially useful in terms of considering government’s degree of dominance over governance. It is also a rather woolly notion which requires more analysis and research. There remains ambiguity in the metagovernance literature regarding the role of the state and its relative power in the multi-actor structures and processes of governance. At one extreme is the notion of governance “in the shadow of hierarchical authority” (Scharpf, 1994: 41); at the other is the notion that the state becomes, at best, “first among equals” in a “pluralistic guidance system” (Jessop 2004). This is explored further in section 2.5.5 below.

In turn, some of the governance literature emphasises that the shift from government to governance should be seen in political terms as an expression of the changes in the state’s form and function resulting from neo-liberalism, rather than as an empirical process (Geddes, 2006; Whitehead, 2003). Governance, especially in the European literature, is associated with Harvey’s (1989) description of a transformation from the “managerialism” of a bureaucratised, hierarchical state to the “entrepreneurialism”, or neo-liberal orientation, more suited to the economic pressures of globalisation. The empirically evident rise of the “competitive city” in the US and UK supports the rise of a neo-liberal orientation at the urban level, where the explicit focus of policy is on capitalist production (Cochrane, 2007: 13).

The literature’s focus on the relationship between government and the “new institutional spaces” (Cochrane, 2007: 61) of governance raises important questions about government’s role in urban- and neighbourhood-level governance systems. Such analyses emphasise the importance and complexity of the institutional arrangements “within, between and around particular organisations” which are part of the shift between government and governance (Geddes, 2006). At the urban level, further consideration is needed of the “structuration” (Giddens, 1984) between urban governance structures and the “external structuring processes” (op cit) of political and
economic forces. This is also a function of the extent to which at the urban level, diverse actors can create the collective capacity to act and whether the forms of governance which result are episodic or can become embedded (Healey, 2006). This capacity is influenced by the extent to which the urban governance form has built intellectual, social and political capital (Amin and Thrift, 1995; Cars et al., 2002 and Healey, 1998), which is partially path dependent (as shown by Putnam's 1993 study of social capital in Italy).

There are also unanswered questions regarding where power lies amongst an urban governance form’s cross-sectoral members, in terms of which members dominate deliberations and how this is expressed in terms of what is prioritised. This may affect the extent to which urban governance forms include and enable a focus on ameliorating neighbourhood deprivation as expressed in the ability of different members to influence policy-making and practice with regard to deprived neighbourhoods, such as the use of initiative governance. This is what Goetz and Sidney (1997) would describe as a “policy subsystem” (of the urban governance form). A subsystem is a bounded policy domain largely controlled by a network of actors who share understanding regarding policy problems (such as neighbourhood deprivation) and promote and attempt to institutionalise solutions to these (op cit).

Considering governance in this way enables a richer and less prescriptive analysis than would be achieved by ascribing a purely neo-liberal content to the objectives sought by urban governance for the urban area as a whole and its constituent neighbourhoods. Some (such as Hohn and Neuer, 2006; and Keil, 2006) talk of a “double-tracked politics” or “two-speed city”. Here competitive and growth-orientated politics in accordance with a (neo-liberal) entrepreneurial urban development policy are associated with the urban level, as formulated by its network governance structure. Partnership planning and control processes combining the state and civil society are associated with the (disadvantaged) sub-urban level, as reflected in the tendency of neighbourhood-based governance initiatives to be focused on deprived areas. Such approaches may be championed by a policy subsystem of the urban governance structure. This ‘twin-track’ notion is in line with Jessop’s (2002: 464) contention that neo-liberal strategies are likely to dominate at the national and city-wide level. But what he describes as “neo-communitarian” strategies, or
arrangements to encourage neighbourhood solutions” and “revalorise neighbourhood support mechanisms as a means of tackling social exclusion” are described at the deprived neighbourhood level, “even in the most neo-liberal cases” (Jessop, 2002: 464). Such initiatives which attempt to tackle social problems are justified as a necessary step in enabling economic competitiveness, providing the “non-market conditions of economic growth” (Mayer, 2003: 111) and enabling such initiatives in a neo-liberal context. This highlights the power relations between the urban and neighbourhood levels within governance systems and tensions between competing imperatives at different spatial scales.

Jessop (2002) points out that the state retains the right to open, close, and change governance arrangements in terms of political advantage. This raises questions about where this political advantage lies on the continuum between the extremes of a neo-liberal, pro-capital position, which may be focused at the urban level, or a new localist ideal of local determination, which may be manifested at the neighbourhood level. This ‘twin-track’ notion of different approaches at the urban and neighbourhood levels suggests the need for greater critical interrogation of the key institutions and their strategies at both of these spatial scales and tensions between the two.

2.4 Defining the units of study

There are two levels at which analysis is conducted in this research – neighbourhood-based initiative governance, and the urban governance context for such entities. Definitions of these units of study are set out below. But to consider neighbourhood-based governance it is first necessary to consider meanings of ‘neighbourhood’.

2.4.1. Neighbourhood

Neighbourhoods can be defined on different but linked scales (drawing from Kearns and Parkinson, 2001: 2104; and Power, 2004: 2). Firstly, the “home area” of the home and immediate neighbours, (seen as enabling “psycho-social benefits” via familiarity and community); secondly, the “neighbourhood environment” or locality (such as a housing estate), that provides residential activities, social status and a basis for service provision, shops and schools; and thirdly, the urban district or region, that
provides broader social and economic opportunities, via employment connections, leisure services and social networks.

Power (2004: 2) states that "a neighbourhood is a delineated area within physical boundaries where people identify their home and where they live out and organise their private lives". This definition sees a neighbourhood as "socially constructed" (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2008: 56). Such discussions point to the need to accommodate the pre-existence of neighbourhoods founded upon "place-orientated social processes" (Kearns and Parkinson, 2001: 2107) into the identification of the area to be subject to neighbourhood-based governance. While Galster (2001: 2112) highlights the dilemmas of "spatially bounding" neighbourhoods, he also suggests that residents "perceive clusters of neighbourhood attributes... across roughly congruent spaces" (op cit: 2114) which indicates the possibility of such a mode of definition.

However, neighbourhood-based governance initiatives, the focus of this research, are subject to the priorities of initiative sponsors. This leads to tensions between defining the neighbourhood in terms of citizens' self-identification, or in terms of the administrative boundaries associated with service delivery, which may be regarded as more technically and managerially efficient. The 'locality' scale of neighbourhood described above tends to be the scale to which neighbourhood-based governance initiatives are applied, which reflects the neighbourhood level's role as a significant locus for service provision (Power, 2004; Chaskin and Garg, 1997). Practical considerations for neighbourhood definition are evident in the US, where initiatives such as the Minneapolis Neighborhood Revitalization Program have 'neighbourhoods' of between 1,000 to 4,000 households, while "small, natural neighbourhoods" of between 2,000 to 5,000 residents were cited as a factor in the success of participatory governance structures in a review of initiatives in five cities (Berry et al., 1993). In the UK, this 'practical' scale also coincides most closely with the ward as a political administrative unit. Indeed, a "recognisable urban neighbourhood for social and management purposes is rarely more than 5,000 households (the size of a large ward)" (Power, 2004: 2).
This demonstrates that defining the neighbourhood area for the purposes of neighbourhood-based initiative governance is regarded as an inherently political (as well as practical in terms of service delivery) undertaking. Martin et al. (2003: 116) identify a key aspect of the politics of urban governance as to “temporarily fix the limits of governable urban space for certain political purposes”. As Fraser (2004: 438) states, “neighbourhood space and identity are shaped by the agendas of a broader set of stakeholders”. The definition of the areas to be subject to neighbourhood-based governance will stem from the political, technical and managerial considerations of sponsors and their notions of convenience as well as from citizens’ identification.

For the purposes of this research, the bounded area (‘neighbourhood’) covered by the initiatives under consideration needs to be accepted (as indeed do the definitions of ‘deprivation’ used which are also inherently political and tend to be set by government). But this suggests the need to be reflective about how and by whom neighbourhood boundaries are defined.

2.4.2. Neighbourhood-based initiative governance

The first unit of study can be described as ‘neighbourhood-based initiative governance’. Paralleling the broader governance literature, this can be defined as a structure that enhances the degree of decision-making authority vested in the neighbourhood. It can also be defined as a process by which neighbourhood residents are involved in making decisions about what is to be done in their neighbourhood (Somerville, 2005b: 2). Taken together, neighbourhood-based governance comprises the neighbourhood-level structures and processes used to “guide civic participation, planning, decision-making, co-ordination, and implementation of activities within the neighbourhood, to represent neighbourhood interests to actors beyond it, and to identify and organise accountability and responsibility for action undertaken” (Chaskin, 2003: 162).

Crucially in this research, neighbourhood-based initiative governance structures are defined as formally constituted neighbourhood-based governance entities in deprived neighbourhoods in which agents outside the neighbourhood (such as government, and particularly in the US, philanthropic foundations and non-profit intermediaries) have played a catalytic role as ‘sponsors’ of the initiative. Chaskin and Peters (2000: 8)
define "initiative governance" as "neighbourhood-based mechanisms developed to guide planning and implementation for particular social change initiatives". These formally constituted neighbourhood-based governance entities are able to undertake formal and accountable decision-making (Chaskin and Abunimah, 1999: 59) and perform neighbourhood-based governance functions and processes. Such bodies endeavour to be comprehensive, in terms of the issues addressed and in terms of trying to represent all groups within the neighbourhood.

This form of neighbourhood-based governance does not include processes that may be undertaken by other bodies that function or deliver services within the neighbourhood and lack a neighbourhood-based decision-making remit. It also excludes consideration of activities which are purely 'self-help' in nature, informal governance structures, such as residents' associations, and activities in prosperous communities.

2.4.3. Urban governance context

The other level at which analysis is conducted is the broader context, at urban level, within which such neighbourhood-based entities are established and operate. In addition to local/city government, this "multi-level, multi-actor" (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2008: 53) context comprises a mix of other public, private and third sector and non-profit institutions which operate at multi-neighbourhood and urban-wide levels (Martin, 2004; Chaskin, 2003; and Pierre and Peters, 2000). This can be thought of as 'neighbourhood governance' in the sense of how such neighbourhood-based efforts are governed at the urban level. However, this governance system in turn is affected by its broader regional, national and indeed (especially in the case of the European context for the UK) supra-national context (Bache, 1999; Sullivan, 2001; Geddes, 2006; Healey, 2006). This establishes that the governance context can be "institutionally thick" (Amin and Thrift, 1995) but also raises questions about the potentially congested (Skelcher, 2000) landscape in which neighbourhood bodies may be operating. This has implications in terms of the ability to engender co-ordination and co-operation amongst different actors at different scales.
2.5 Interpretations of the function of neighbourhood-based governance

To consider how neighbourhood-based governance is located in broader networks of governance, it is both necessary to ascertain its function and to consider how the broader multi-level governance context in which it operates shapes this. ‘Function’ refers to the actual role played by these entities, rather than to their stated remit or the initial intent behind their establishment. It is ascertained via an assessment of how the bodies are structured and how they operate.

The literature provides a series of alternative accounts of the functions of neighbourhood-based initiative governance. The five principal explanations are set out below at a conceptual level (an explanation of the establishment of the relevant literatures to identify and define these accounts is included in chapter 3). Some are supported by a greater amount of empirical work than others. In reality, arrangements are likely to comprise elements of these different accounts and the literature cited cannot always be discretely allocated. The reason for undertaking this review is to provide a framework to enable a systematic approach for the empirical research. However, it is not intended to overly constrain it or be prescriptive.

Each interpretation of the function of neighbourhood-based governance is value-laden and ideological, reflecting the variety of approaches taken, and accordingly differences in how the empirical state of affairs is interpreted and in the criteria used to make judgements regarding it. The most significant division in these interpretations is between the first three, which interpret the function of neighbourhood-based governance as a practical endeavour, to an extent in accord with the policy rhetoric, and the latter two, which locate neighbourhood-based governance in its broader context, interpreting such efforts as symptomatic of the political environment (drawing from a neo-liberal critique). However, all of the interpretations have implications regarding the relative power of governance at the neighbourhood level within its multi-level governance context. The interpretations thus also indicate the state and market imperatives which inform the priorities and approaches of the governance system within which neighbourhood-based governance is embedded.
Generally, the function of neighbourhood-based initiative governance is stated as being to improve democracy (increase the level of decision-making vested in neighbourhood) and to improve services (tailor service provision to neighbourhood needs and priorities), with the overall aim of improving the community’s ‘well-being’. Chaskin and Garg (1997: 633) describe the “twin rationale” of democracy (“local rights”) and competence (“local knowledge and power”). Johnson and Osborne (2003: 147) describe the “co-ordination of local services*, and their co-governance with the local community”. Combined, these interpretations reflect the perceived importance of neighbourhoods as “units of identity and action” (Chaskin and Abunimah, 1999: 60). They reflect an attempt, via the establishment of neighbourhood-based governance entities, “to build on neighbourhood strengths and participation while simultaneously attempting to make government more responsive to these entities” (Chaskin and Garg, 1997: 641). Value is placed on local knowledge and the enhanced legitimacy associated with a wider sense of ownership. This draws from the communitarian view that the development of governance arrangements requires consideration of citizens’ rights and responsibilities, with the state’s role conceptualised as developing devolved and responsive governing and service delivery structures and processes (Lepine et al., 2007: 10).

However, in this research, the dual elements of the ‘twin rationale’ are considered separately. They tend to be conflated due to the conception that democracy is a means as well as an end. Meaningful and sustainable community involvement is sought not only due to its perceived intrinsic value but to enable more responsive service delivery. Considering the elements separately enables consideration of how much the focus for neighbourhood-based governance is on aspirations of democracy rather than on improving services, ideally revealing any imbalance in emphasis between the two.

2.5.1. Democratisation and devolution

Democracy and devolution are regarded in the literature as essential ingredients for neighbourhood-based governance as well as an outcome that provides a reason for its inception. This interpretation is founded on the perceived intrinsic value of the devolution of authority to the local level (Chaskin, 2003). It is also founded on the ethical view of the fundamental right and responsibilities of citizens to have some
control over policies that will affect them, regarded in the US as a "basic tenet of democracy" (Chaskin and Garg, 1997: 634). In the UK in particular, policy rhetoric places much emphasis on the value of neighbourhood governance to revitalise local democracy, or what Lowndes and Sullivan (2008: 57) term "the civic rationale". The use of partnership forms of governance is seen as having intrinsic social value given their perceived role in the creation of a vibrant civil society, the provision of a more pluralistic and democratic process of policymaking, and in tackling social exclusion by achieving community cohesion (Geddes, 2006; Lowndes and Sullivan, 2008). However, "the theoretical underpinnings of politicians' commitment [to community involvement]... remain somewhat ambiguous" (Foley and Martin, 2000: 484). In the US such emphasis in the stated purposes of neighbourhood-based initiatives is less evident, though it could be suggested that this is because the conception is so widely held that it goes unstated.

The democratic advantages of neighbourhood-based governance posited in theory are that given such entities' closeness to residents, their decisions are more likely to be representative of and responsive to residents' needs and aspirations (Somerville, 2005a). It is also asserted that these bodies can be more easily held to account, because resident representatives who are accessible to other residents participate in decision-making (Somerville, 2005b). Governance is perceived as contributing to democracy (Fung and Wright, 2001). Klijn and Skelcher (2007: 587) term this perceived relationship the "complementarity conjecture", where governance enables greater participation in the policy process and sensitivity in programme implementation, with participatory democracy complementing representative democracy.

The neighbourhood is thus regarded as a "unit of identity" (Chaskin and Garg, 1997: 636) for residents. It is seen as the level at which more accessible, responsive and accountable decision-making is possible as it is the level at which citizens can most easily access governance and understand the issues at stake (what Jessop, 2005, would term the "lifeworld" of civic society). Citizens have incentives to engage because it is at the neighbourhood level that they consume many of the most important public services. In the US, Berry et al. (1993) describe the neighbourhood level as that at which residents encounter the most tangible consequences of public decisions and
have the motivation and knowledge to get engaged. In Europe, Cars et al. (2001: 4) see it is the level at which “welfare state arrangements become concrete for citizens”, and citizens experience the issues most likely to mobilise them.

The neighbourhood is perceived as the foundation for other levels of governance (Docherty et al., 2001). It is assumed that participatory governance structures will operate as de Tocquevillian ‘schools of democracy’, with the increased participation and new form of accountability enabled by them in turn leading to greater awareness of and interest in policymaking and increasing turnout in local elections (Pratchett, 2004). Kathi and Cooper (2005: 559) add an instrumental argument for the US, viewing some level of participation as necessary to “maintain stability in a political community”. This presents neighbourhood-based governance entities as a potential counterbalance to power at the local (in the US generally municipal) level (along the lines of the ‘urban regimes’ identified in the US, such as by Stone, 1989). In the UK context, Somerville (2005a: 127) similarly sees the potential for sub-local neighbourhood-based governance structures to counter the reproduction of what he terms the UK’s “steering centralism” at the local level.

However, much of the literature of relevance lacks consideration of the extent to which realisation of the democratic function of neighbourhood-based governance is bounded by its context. As explained above, neighbourhood-based governance bodies cannot be the single decision-making authority for that territory but are nested within a system of multi-level governance (Somerville, 2005b). Some decisions, for example about public good provision, need to be taken at a higher geographical scale, albeit ideally informed by priorities set at lower levels. Neighbourhoods could conceivably have considerable power, but in a bounded range of core areas dictated by subsidiarity, the principle which states that matters ought to be handled by the lowest competent authority (Carley, 2000: 290). From a practical perspective, governance can also be said to require government to ensure that governance does not serve the private interests of a few powerful players or become too parochial (Hohn and Neuer, 2006: 297).

The benefits predicted in theory as set out above do not appear to be clearly evident in practice, as indicated by a review of empirical work summarised below. This
suggests the need to explore whether the ostensible purpose of democratic renewal and empowerment ascribed to many neighbourhood-based initiatives plays out in reality. Overall, the empirical work reviewed suggests a managerialist rather than democratic emphasis to governance, where communities “become substitute managers rather than empowered citizens” (Sullivan, 2001: 34).

Research points to the problems faced by structures in the UK and US in delivering democratic outcomes, in particular given the difficulties of establishing legitimate and accountable community representation (Skelcher, 2007; Chaskin, 2003). Concerns are expressed that such initiatives shift power to self-appointed community representatives (Foley and Martin, 2000: 487) or that leaders may adopt parochial viewpoints (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2008: 68). Broader problems of accountability are also identified, which may be direct to partners in or sponsors of the initiative but remote from citizens. In the UK, Skelcher (2000: 13) identifies the frequent concentration of power with one agency and a variability in the “downwards accountability relationships” to the local community, which may be negated by the development of performance-orientated “upwards” accountability to the ‘sponsor’ of the initiative. This is interpreted by Klijn and Skelcher (2007: 597) as implying a paradox as those who institute citizen engagement via governance structures may at the same time be reluctant for it to inform their own decision-making.

Geddes (2006) has assessed the democratic legitimacy of New Deal for Communities (NDC) partnerships in the UK (which are explained in chapter 4). He too found that partnerships can “appear to open up new approaches to legitimacy” (2006: 76) [emphasis added]. But he concludes that such partnerships are actually “more likely to undermine democracy and accountability” (op cit: 76). He justifies this by explaining that the lack of experience of many resident board members, in the context of the powerful control exercised by government, contributes to a “naïve localism”, with a narrow focus on public services (op cit: 87). He states that the structures and processes of the partnerships “incorporate [local residents] within the apparatus of the state at least as much… as they open up the state to citizens” (op cit: 89). Taylor (2003) in turn found in a case study of a neighbourhood renewal partnership that community representatives can be exposed to accusations of being unrepresentative by their partnership colleagues, or of having been “captured by the state” (Foley and
Martin, 2000: 486). This fits with the notion that accountability in the UK remains largely functional and upwards to central government (Sullivan, 2004: 198), explored in section 2.5.5 below.

2.5.2. Competence and Co-ordination

This is a second, but often closely related, account of the function of neighbourhood-based initiative governance. ‘Competence’ refers to the notion that residents’ knowledge can inform and improve service delivery. This interpretation takes an instrumental line, seeing neighbourhoods as an effective and efficient level for service delivery and as a level at which citizens can hold services to account. Service users are not conceptualised as “the clamourous public” or “demanding consumers” but as experts whose knowledge and experience can make an important contribution to policy and practice (Newman et al., 2004: 221). The focus on ‘local knowledge’ stems from the belief that local people understand the needs, opportunities, priorities and dynamics at work in their neighbourhood in ways that professional non-residents may not (Chaskin and Garg, 1997: 634). Involving citizens in planning and implementing practices that affect them is seen as promoting better (as in more connected, co-ordinated and responsive) policies and programmes tailored to their needs and priorities (op cit: 633). This interpretation also has an ethical basis, in that if public policies are set to satisfy societal values, then service deliverers should involve citizens in the planning and delivery of services (Kathi and Cooper, 2005: 562).

Such involvement is seen as instrumental at the neighbourhood level as it is the level that is the point of provision for many goods and services. The neighbourhood is seen, as Berger and Neuhaus (1977) suggest, as a “mediating institution” operating between individuals and the larger society, with neighbourhood-based governance entities providing mechanisms to guide planning and promote the co-ordination and delivery of services (Chaskin and Garg, 1997: 635).

The ‘co-ordination’ element of the interpretation reflects the fact that a commitment to co-ordination in policy and practice has remained a key feature of urban policy in the US and UK since the 1960s (Cochrane, 2007), which is explored in chapter 4. Neighbourhood-based governance is often perceived as offering the best opportunity
for ‘joining up’ action, linking residents and service decisions (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2008), as well as providing opportunities for the co-production of public goods. The neighbourhood is regarded as the “unit of action” (Chaskin and Garg, 1997: 636) and the locus for programmes and funding streams. Neighbourhood governance is presented as offering an opportunity to co-ordinate action between public service providers and the private and voluntary sectors to address local priorities (Foley and Martin, 2000: 482). The argument is that a range of stakeholders enables access to a range of expertise, experience and resources within and outside the neighbourhood, helping to “break down categorical thinking” and combine professional approaches with “grassroots intent” (Chaskin and Garg, 1997: 648). This argument has been used in the policy literature to underpin development of such approaches.

In the UK, the rhetoric of urban policy has combined the identification of areas for targeted attention with the search for co-ordination (Cochrane, 2007: 32). Here the co-ordination interpretation draws from the pragmatic view that centralised approaches to service provision have failed, and that engaging core mainstream service providers within neighbourhood-based governance structures is the preferred mechanism for getting resources to deprived neighbourhoods and tailoring service delivery to their needs. However, it should be stressed that in the UK, central government remains the principal driver of such initiatives even as it pursues policies that encourage neighbourhood-based governance.

In the US, attempts at comprehensive area-based strategies with associated governance mechanisms date from the 1960s when they served to counter the perceived shortcomings of centralised responses to poverty. The devolution of decision-making and strategic action to the local level (Chaskin and Garg, 1997: 637) was reinforced by the ‘federal retrenchment’ of the 1980s. However, the fragmentation of local government in the US is identified as a block to effective policy action, hindering co-ordination not only with other sectors but also within and across local government agencies (Wolman and Goldsmith, 1990).

It should be noted that the governance form most readily associated with the competence and co-ordination account is an urban-wide system of neighbourhood-based governance entities, or what Chaskin and Peters (2000: 8) describe as “public-
sector approaches to structuring ongoing neighbourhood-local governmental relationships”. These initiatives are based on the assumption that the creation of collaborative institutions will enable neighbourhoods to define their own priorities and needs, leading to more responsive services (Kathi and Cooper, 2005). In the US, several cities have attempted to establish such urban-wide forms (as documented in Berry et al., 1993). Similar urban-wide approaches have been attempted in the UK (some are detailed in Burns et al., 1994). Such efforts contrast with the initiative governance structures targeted at particular deprived neighbourhoods which form the focus of this research. But competence and co-ordination are readily cited in much of the literature as a justification for such deprived neighbourhood-based governance entities.

Such approaches emphasise not only community competence, in terms of residents’ knowledge and experience, but the competence of government to develop policies and practices which are responsive to the needs and priorities expressed by residents. Here neighbourhood-based governance initiatives are interpreted as a way of enhancing government’s ability to adapt, being an example of “new ways of working which will enhance the learning capacity” (Hambleton, 2000: 931) of local government.

The benefits posited in theory regarding this account of the function of neighbourhood-based initiative governance are not clearly evident in practice as assessed in empirical research. This suggests that there is a need to examine whether the apparent purpose of competence and co-ordination ascribed to many neighbourhood-based initiatives in the policy and academic literatures actually occurs. The competence perspective relates to the notion that communities have tacit local knowledge that representatives may bring to policy debates (Foley and Martin, 2000: 485). But such expectations of community may assume that communities are more willing to engage than they actually are. Residents may become frustrated if neighbourhood-based entities are unable to exert influence over all the issues in which residents seek a say (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2008: 68). Even when the structure does seem to have influence, Purdue (2001) found that community leaders found it difficult to create a collaborative relationship with their statutory partners. He found that
community leaders were expected to "trust their powerful partners without reciprocation" (op cit: 2222).

Realisation of the benefits of the competence perspective attributed to neighbourhood-based governance not only requires the capacity building of residents to get involved, but also fundamental changes on the part of service providers to engage with residents effectively and to put in place the processes that will make services responsive to residents' priorities and needs. In his research on New Deal for Communities (NDC) partnerships in the UK, Geddes (2006) has considered their capacity and effectiveness to identify communities' priorities and needs and work to provide them. He explains that the incentives vary for different sectoral actors and for some an NDC neighbourhood "is but one among many such areas" (op cit: 89). Service providers face the conflict between national objectives and targets and local priorities, as well as "bureaucratic resistance to organisational change and resource constraints" (op cit: 90). This is reflected by the findings of Rich et al. (2001), who undertook a US nation-wide survey of collaboration between community-based organisations and municipal governments. A "thin" version of collaboration was reported, but thought unlikely to produce the "beneficial outcomes" suggested by collaboration’s proponents (op cit: 184).

In the context of the ‘twin rationale’ of democracy and competence, the literature reviewed suggests that initiatives have a greater emphasis on the competence element. Somerville (2005a: 124) interprets the shift towards neighbourhood-based governance as primarily involving emphasis on responsiveness rather than representativeness, indicating a focus on co-ordination to improve neighbourhood services rather than participatory democracy “giving real power to communities”.

2.5.3. Self-help

The third interpretation of the function of neighbourhood-based initiative governance is self-help, or neighbourhoods tackling their own problems. Though related, this interpretation is discrete from those of democracy and competence. It differs from the democracy perspective as devolution is founded on the notion of powers being devolved to the right level (the subsidiarity principle). Here, adaptation to external pressures (such as economic restructuring) is seen as the task of communities (of
place, or neighbourhoods) themselves, and not necessarily as a responsibility of higher levels of government or governance. This notion also differs from the competence perspective, which focuses on collaboration between neighbourhood residents and service providers to enable improved and responsive services. Here, the emphasis is on "self-management and responsibilisation" (Cochrane, 2007: 52).

The notion of self-help has strong normative and cultural associations in the US, as evidenced by its rich heritage of community activism. In their review of US urban policy, Barnekov et al. (1989: 114) exemplify this notion by citing an espoused outcome of the withdrawal of federal funds in the 1980s as being to "stimulate community-self reliance and unleash a massive increase in voluntarism and private philanthropy". Reduced federal assistance was rationalised on the basis of local control of policy decisions and implementation. This 'federal retrenchment' is cited as an important factor in assisting the shift from government to more privatist forms of governance, including the initiative governance forms which are the focus of this research.

Neighbourhood-based initiative governance, this research's principal unit of study, is by definition not about communities 'helping themselves' in the absence of the involvement of actors ('sponsors') beyond the neighbourhood. However, sponsors do make use of this conception as a justification for initiative governance approaches, despite the implication that neighbourhoods should 'go it alone'. This interpretation is expressed in initiative governance in terms of 'building the capacity' of communities which lack the skills or resources to be able to help themselves. It reflects Sen's (1999) notion of the "change resources" of communities, seen as contributing to developing their resilience and capability for self-help. It also draws on the notion of social capital, which refers to "features of social organisation such as networks, norms and trust that facilitate co-ordination and co-operation for mutual benefit" (Putnam, 1993: 35). Sponsors state the intention that the initiative will equip the community with the ability and skills to be able to help themselves beyond the initiative lifetime, when sponsors are no longer directly involved.

Key determinants of whether this can be achieved relate to the extent to which such 'capacity' can be generated by a "territorial collective actor" and whether this body
can become “institutionally embedded” (Healey, 2006), or move beyond “initiative governance” (Chaskin and Abunimah, 1999). However, the ability of initiative governance entities to become ‘embedded’ is likely to be hampered given the time-limited nature of many of these approaches, especially in the UK. Such bodies’ capacity to help their communities is also a function of the extent of their power and resource to address the wider structural causes of decline. While asking particular deprived or excluded communities to “take responsibility for their own future and well-being” (Atkinson, 2003: 118) is appealing given its congruence with the notion of more participatory governance, notions of self-help are regarded as tokenistic by many commentators given such entities’ separation from broader processes, as explored in the next interpretation.

2.5.4. Tokenism

This fourth interpretation of neighbourhood-based initiative governance differs from the first three as it would not be cited by the sponsors of an initiative as a reason for its instigation. Rather, it is an interpretation of what such endeavours represent or amount to within their broader governance context. This, and the subsequent interpretation, comprise those which draw from a neo-liberal critique to interpret such efforts as symptomatic of their broader political environment. As such, they hark bark to the radical structural analysis of the UK’s Community Development Projects in the 1970s (explained in chapter 4).

The tokenism interpretation is related to the self-help perspective. However, rather than the ‘building local capacity’ ethos, this account perceives the creation of such entities as a tokenistic response to deprivation. It is summed up by Lepine et al.’s (2007: 13) term a “strategy of containment”, defined as managing poverty and inequality through programmes that are separate and distinct from the mainstream. Many perceive this differing treatment of deprived neighbourhoods as unjust, captured by the concern found in the US and UK literature that deprived neighbourhood-based governance entities may become “the institutional expressions of the ‘parallel lives’” of different communities (Lowndes and Sullivan, 2008: 70). This perspective on the use of neighbourhood-based governance leads to identification of the ‘twin-track’ city (for example, Keil, 2006; Healey, 2006)
explored above, which highlights the potential tensions between the different strategies adopted at different spatial scales.

According to this perspective, neighbourhood-based governance obscures the need for systemic reform. Initiatives are seen as focusing on “palliative measures rather than on the underlying structural causes of deprivation” (Foley and Martin, 2000: 486), with the increased emphasis on deprived neighbourhood-level governance making such neighbourhoods “decoupled from the wider community” while “absolving the wider community of its responsibilities” (Taylor, 2003: 192). In the UK, Stoker (1998: 39) goes so far as to describe such governance initiatives as “the acceptable face of spending cuts”. In the US, Fraser et al. (2003: 421) echo this, seeing such initiatives as “calling upon neighbourhood residents to change their social and spatial situation without providing full access to the processes that contribute to neighbourhood change”. They state that the ‘community building’ approach should be subject to greater criticism given its assumptions about the resultant benefits in terms of ameliorating poverty (op cit).

Hohn and Neuer (2006: 296) suggest that deprived neighbourhood-based approaches are “initiated at the government level within the framework of a discharge strategy [the function] and declared as an empowerment strategy [the rhetoric]”. This implies a tokenistic use of neighbourhood-based governance where initiatives are implemented out of political expediency. Such initiatives are perceived as not being linked to broader political, economic and social processes, and in the extreme form can be seen as leaving neighbourhoods to ‘sink or swim’ based on their capacity for self-help. As Atkinson (2003: 118) terms it, “any failure will be their failure”.

This interpretation places the use of neighbourhood-based governance in deprived areas in the context of the neo-liberal restructuring of the economy, where the state is seen as agent, rather than regulator, of the market (Smith, 2002). Jessop (2002: 454-55) explains that neo-liberalism “tends to promote ‘community’ as a compensatory mechanism for the inadequacies of the market mechanism”. Mayer (2003: 126) sees policy discourse as suggesting that “a judicious combination of mobilisation from below and capacity building from above can solve the problems of uneven development and marginalisation”. In the US, Fraser (2004: 454) argues that given
the retrenchment of the state, “civil society is expected to play a larger role in
eighbourhood governance and the provision of social welfare”. Levitas (2000: 194)
goes even further, seeing the role of community as being “to mop up the ill-effects of
the market and to provide the conditions for its continued operation”.

This demonstrates that neo-liberal and competitive ideologies are capable of co-opting
approaches that seem to be in opposition to meet their objectives. The (neo-liberal)
argument that deprivation undermines economic competitiveness is used to justify
social policy interventions (such as area-based initiatives) in such areas (Fraser,
2004). Such co-option is reflected in the perception that Community Development
Corporations (CDCs) in the US are able to “make neighbourhoods better in ways that
are recognised by the market” (Walker, 2002: 8-9). Katz (2004: 26) in turn explicitly
states that neighbourhood change should be market-driven rather than community-
controlled. In the UK, the social and environmental dimensions of regeneration are
often justified as a necessary step in encouraging economic regeneration and some
perceive the “economic imperative” as underpinning the entire regeneration agenda
(Jones and Evans, 2008: 57).

However, though neighbourhood-based governance in deprived areas may not be
tackling the sources of structural inequality, the arguments in support of the previous
self-help interpretation are recognised by some of those commentators who also
critique the perceived tokenism of such approaches. Hohn and Neuer (2006:296)
state that even if governance entities in deprived neighbourhoods are initiated as a
“discharge strategy”, the resultant building of governance capacities may make it
more difficult for government to subsequently continue to “hold all the strings”.

2.5.5. Steering

This final interpretation, along with the previous one, differs from the first three as it
relates to perceptions of what such approaches represent within their broader political
environment, rather than being a reason which would be cited by an initiative’s
sponsor for its establishment.

The ‘steering’ interpretation of neighbourhood-based initiative governance perceives
it as a political tool, providing “a powerful means through which dominant interests
can achieve their goals” (Klijn and Skelcher, 2007: 587). This perspective critiques the pluralist position taken by those who perceive governance as a way of increasing and broadening participation in policy deliberation. It emphasises governance’s managerial character rather than its democratic intent (or the competence rather than democracy element of the ‘twin rationale’). The apparent devolution of power to neighbourhoods is seen as a new form of control whereby the sponsors of neighbourhood-based governance initiatives seek to realise their priorities by ‘steering’ the governance entity’s structure, processes and desired outcomes. The aims of the sponsors of initiative governance dominate, with entities being or becoming dependent on sponsor funding and being vulnerable to being ‘captured’, by having their core interests shifted in line with the sponsor’s priorities.

This interpretation locates neighbourhood-based governance entities in their context. From a ‘top-down’ perspective, sponsors provide the “institutional framework” (Lowndes and Wilson, 2003) within which such entities operate. From a ‘bottom up’ perspective, the question is the extent to which this context prescribes the neighbourhood-based governance body’s structure and operations. Jessop’s (2004) broad concept of metagovernance (‘the governance of governance’) is relevant here. It leads to questions about the extent to which government seeks to control what powers go to what “institutionalised scale” and to enhance its capacity to realise political priorities or provide “direction to society” (Pierre and Peters, 2000: 4) by “steering” an array of actors and organisations (Somerville, 2005a: 118).

In the UK, neighbourhood-based initiative governance tends to be largely a central government policy-led endeavour and much analysis has focused on central government’s hand in the process (for example, Jessop, 2004 and Geddes, 2006). Some interpret this apparent decentralisation of power from government to neighbourhoods as a new form of centralisation (Hoggett, 1996; Taylor, 2003) to achieve government priorities and also enable central government to bypass local government (Skelcher, 2004: 40). Tension between “national prescription and local flexibility” is emphasised, and the actual extent of discretion and involvement on offer to local communities is typically questioned (Foley and Martin, 2000: 487).
The empirical research does indicate that neighbourhood-based governance is subject to ‘steering’ by central government. Key is that, as Skelcher et al. (2005) found, governance forms arise directly as a result of central government policy, largely in compliance with the measures necessary to obtain additional funding. Investigations of neighbourhood-based governance entities have led to the identification of metagovernance relationships in the mechanisms for their control and management (Whitehead, 2003 and Geddes, 2006). Klijn and Skelcher’s (2007: 600) research has found that the majority of governance structures studied are integrated into “vertical performance management systems that connect them to regulation by national government”. In addition to the constraints imposed by national targets and priorities, Geddes identifies “new institutional norms, incentives and sanctions” (2006: 91) designed by central government, concluding that partnerships “limit... local policy options to those consistent with New Labour’s neo-liberal policy agenda” (2006: 76). Similarly, Cochrane (2007: 39) describes the “controls and measures against which the newly ‘empowered’ must be evaluated”, whilst Taylor (2003) describes neighbourhood-based governance as a “new arena for social control” where “the rules of the game [are] still very much dictated by government” (2003: 190).

In the US, Martin (2004) highlights the “increasing privatism” of the “neighbourhood policy regime” (op cit: 394). National and local philanthropic foundations and non-profit intermediaries as well as local, rather than federal, government are the sponsors of neighbourhood-based governance initiatives. This indicates the non-state nature of some of the dominant interests which may ‘steer’ such entities. Little research has been conducted in this regard, reflecting the lack of a metagovernance lens in US academic work. This is unsurprising given its decentralised federal governmental system, but there is scope for investigation of the extent to which sponsors of initiative governance steer the associated entities. One notable study is that conducted by Chaskin (2005), who assessed a four city-wide programme sponsored by the Ford Foundation. He identified tensions within the programme between the ideology of collective, consensual decision-making and pressure for efficient progress towards particular outcomes (op cit: 416). He emphasises that bureaucracy dominates the “organisational landscape” and that organisations shape their activities to meet the demands of funders (op cit: 410).
The steering interpretation explicitly places neighbourhood-based initiative governance in the context of state forces. It is therefore further explored below when considering the urban network governance context for neighbourhood-based governance, as urban governance not only to an extent constitutes but in turn is affected by these forces.

2.6 Neighbourhood-based initiative governance entities: Expected Characteristics

In sum, a review of the literature has identified the following principal accounts of the function of neighbourhood-based governance initiatives:

- **Democracy** - founded on the normative value of the devolution of authority to the local level and also the ethical view of the fundamental right and responsibilities of citizens to have some control over policies that will affect them.

- **Competence** - the notion that residents' knowledge can inform and improve service delivery, a practical line seeing neighbourhoods as an effective and efficient level for service delivery and as a level at which citizens can hold services to account, as well as a level at which service providers can co-ordinate action to address local priorities.

- **Self-help** - based on the notion that communities should take responsibility for their problems and expressed in initiative governance in terms of building the capacity of communities to help themselves.

- **Tokenism** - a ‘strategy of containment’ where deprived areas are subject to programmes separate and distinct from the mainstream, contributing to a ‘twin-track’ that obscures the need for systemic reform.

- **Steering** - where sponsors (such as government or philanthropic foundations) of neighbourhood-based governance initiatives are dominant interests that seek to realise their priorities by ‘steering’ the governance structure’s processes and the outcomes that are sought.

The analyses reviewed above indicate that the function of neighbourhood-based initiative governance is related to the way an entity operates as well as the way it is structured. This realisation has informed design of the ‘revealed preference’ approach.
underpinning the empirical work, which is explained in chapter 3. A typology of characteristics of neighbourhood-based governance bodies’ structure and operations which could be expected if entities fulfilled the five (non-exclusive) accounts is set out in Table 2.1 below. This ‘ideal-type’ heuristic framework provides a basis against which the case study entities analysed in the empirical work were assessed to consider which combination of these accounts is most evident in their structuring and operations. It constitutes a “criteria-based instrument” (Mathur and Skelcher, 2007: 229) to “expose contradictions between the ‘ideal’ and the practice” (op cit: 236).

To develop the typology, the ‘ideal-type’ characteristics associated with each function were derived, principally drawing from the key neighbourhood governance literature (as cited in Table 2.1). The characteristics without an associated citation derive from the researcher’s a priori reasoning as well as some iteration with the initial empirical findings, though the majority of the typology was developed during the research’s conceptual phase. Further explanation of the development of the typology is contained in chapter 3. It should be stressed here that the tokenism interpretation is distinctive. This account will only be evident in the entity’s operations in terms of its integration with broader strategies and networks, rather than in its structure, which is likely to share some of the characteristics associated with the other functions (though those associated with the self-help function are less likely to be evident).
Table 2.1: Typology of Characteristics of Neighbourhood-based Governance Entities by Function

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democracy</strong></td>
<td>• Majority resident representation on board ([Somerville, 2005a]; [Chaskin, 2003])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Elected resident board representation by sub-area ([Skelcher, 2006]; [Somerville 2005a])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Resident quorum for decision-making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Resident representative-led board sub-committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Board-determined funding allocation over devolved budgets ([Fagotto and Fung, 2006]; [Burns et al., 1994])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Initiated following resident consultation ([Fung and Wright, 2001])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Broad resident engagement in identifying needs and priorities (surveys/ community planning processes) ([Bovaird and Loffler, 2002]; [Kathi and Cooper, 2003])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Resident representatives’ voice heard on board ([Chaskin and Peters, 2000]; [Chaskin 2003]; [Somerville, 2005b])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Consensus sought across constituent neighbourhoods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Capacity building of residents ([Fung and Wright, 2001]; [Newman et al., 2004]; [Sullivan, 2001])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Emphasis on activism/ advocacy in board deliberations ([Chaskin and Abunimah, 1999]; [Chaskin, 2001, 2003])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Competence</strong></td>
<td>• Resident board representation ([Somerville, 2005a])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Statutory service provider representation (possibly including council members) ([White et al., 2006]; [Somerville, 2005a, 2005b])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Non-profit/ third sector service provider board representation ([Chaskin and Peters, 2000])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Broad resident engagement in identifying needs and priorities (surveys/ community planning processes) ([Chaskin and Garg, 1997]; [Martin and Pentel, 2002])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Significant service provider involvement (eg senior representative board attendance) ([Fagotto and Fung, 2006]; [Kathi and Cooper, 2005])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Entity influences service providers/ service delivery (eg service agreements) ([Fagotto and Fung, 2006]; [Chaskin and Garg, 1997]; [Chaskin 2003])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Service providers responsive (eg service provision tailored to entity’s area/ sub-areas) ([White et al., 2006]; [Sullivan, 2001])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Monitoring and review of services and resident satisfaction ([Bovaird and Loffler, 2002])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Innovation evident ([Bovaird and Loffler, 2002])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self-help</strong></td>
<td>• Instigated by residents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Majority resident representation on board ([Somerville, 2005a])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Self-generated funding streams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Open-ended timeframe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Sponsor emphasis on capacity building of entity and residents ([Chaskin and Garg, 1997]; [Chaskin, 2001, 2003])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Expectation of residents ‘doing their share’ ([Fraser, 2004])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Devolved budgets ([Chaskin, 2001])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Entity able to determine/ alter its mission/ operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Emphasis on activism/ advocacy in board deliberations ([Chaskin and Abunimah, 1999]; [Chaskin, 2001, 2003])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Extensive resident volunteer engagement in delivering projects ([Fraser, 2004])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Able to develop, appraise and fund own projects ([Bovaird and Loffler, 2002])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Able to design and engage in supplemental service delivery ([Chaskin, 2001]; [Somerville, 2005a])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Asset base development (eg property portfolio)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Development and maintenance of an income stream (eg social enterprise approaches)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Resourced capacity building activities ([Chaskin and Garg, 1997]; [Chaskin 2001, 2003])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Entity able to continue in absence of sponsor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2.1: continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tokenism</strong></td>
<td>• Entity’s responsibilities not resourced/ lack of ongoing support (Chaskin, 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Not applicable as the entity’s structure may share some of the characteristics associated with the other functions. This account would become evident in the entity’s operations.</td>
<td>• Lack of engagement from statutory service providers/ government (Fagotto and Fung, 2006; Klijn and Skelcher, 2007; Chaskin, 2003; Geddes, 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Not a priority/ not linked to urban governance network/ plans (Lepine et al., 2007; Hohn and Neuer, 2006; Fraser et al., 2003; Atkinson, 2003)</td>
<td>• Not a priority/ not linked to urban governance network/ plans (Lepine et al., 2007; Hohn and Neuer, 2006; Fraser et al., 2003; Atkinson, 2003)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Steering</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Instigated by initiative sponsor (Skelcher et al., 2005)</td>
<td>• Sponsor determines entity operations (eg programme themes) (Geddes, 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sponsor specifies structure (eg board membership, geographic area covered) (Lowndes and Wilson, 2003; Davies, 2003)</td>
<td>• Entity heavily reliant on sponsor funding (Martin, 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sponsor represented on board (Chaskin, 2005)</td>
<td>• Sponsor leads on implementation of projects (eg professional staff managing projects, co-ordinating themes) (Chaskin, 2005; Martin, 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sponsor employs entity staff</td>
<td>• Sponsor leads board deliberations (eg staff responsible for servicing meetings) (Chaskin, 2005; Martin, 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Time-limited lifetime (Geddes, 2006)</td>
<td>• Emphasis on consensus in board deliberations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Close monitoring against targets (White et al., 2006; Chaskin 2003, 2005; Skelcher, 2000; Newman et al., 2004; Geddes, 2006)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.7 **Urban governance context for neighbourhood-based governance**

To consider how neighbourhood-based initiative governance is located in broader networks of governance, it is necessary not only to ascertain its functions in terms of entities’ structure and operations, but to consider how the broader multi-level governance context in which it operates shapes these functions. The research therefore sites such entities in their multi-level governance context, with a particular focus on the urban level given the methodology employed (explained in chapter 3).

This section draws from the literature to consider the forms of urban governance which could be expected in the UK and US within which neighbourhood-based governance entities are instigated, operate and are supported. It reflects on urban governance’s characteristics, such as the focus on deprived neighbourhoods versus broader strategies, its key actors such as central/ federal and local government and non-governmental stakeholders, and their relative dominance. This is important as the characteristics of these urban governance forms, in terms of the actors involved
and their relative power, will influence the state and market imperatives which are
pursued, in turn influencing the functions of neighbourhood-based governance.
Therefore, in light of the expected characteristics of urban governance forms
identified in both countries from the literature, the associated functions of
neighbourhood-based initiative governance are then posited. The functions envisaged
have implications regarding the relative power of the neighbourhood level within its
multi-level governance context.

2.7.1. UK Forms of Network Governance
It is noteworthy that in the UK, the principal visible form of urban governance
network is actually prescribed by central government. More policy detail is provided
in chapter 4. Here discussion focuses on academic critiques of the manifestation of
this form of urban network governance.

In the UK, ‘partnership’ is the prevailing form of governing network, becoming the
“ubiquitous vehicle for organising governmental and non-governmental interactions,
particularly at the urban scale” (Davies, 2009: 18). Since the late 1990s in particular,
development of governance processes, with an espoused focus on democratic renewal,
have placed emphasis on statutory agencies and the private and voluntary sectors to
work with communities to address local priorities. This is evidenced by central
government instigation of neighbourhood-based governance initiatives.

At the urban level, the form of urban governance most relevant to neighbourhood-
based initiative governance is the Local Strategic Partnership (LSP). This is a non-
statutory partnership at local government level (and therefore municipal level in the
case of urban unitary authorities). Membership comprises representatives of state and
non-state actors. LSPs are ostensibly the locus for current policies of relevance to
deprived neighbourhoods as they co-ordinate efforts to achieve neighbourhood
renewal (Geddes, 2006; Cochrane, 2007). However, local government’s strategies
regarding growth and regeneration frame the approaches determined by the LSP
(Stewart, 2003). These local government strategies are framed in turn by policies and
strategies determined at higher levels, particularly by central government. LSPs can
therefore be regarded as the ‘policy subsystem’ for deprived neighbourhoods.
In network governance theory governing networks are accorded the role of forging a productive, consensus-based relationship between governmental and non-governmental actors, including community activists (Sorensen and Torfing, 2005). The UK’s “new urban governance” or network governance described by Stewart (2003: 76) “establishes shared objectives and common purpose, operates through inter-organisational bargaining and negotiation, and pursues joint planning and delivery through shared resources”. This draws on a “value system of mutual interest, trust and reciprocity” (op cit) shared between the state, market and citizen activists (Rhodes, 1996, 1997).

However, the UK’s government-led urban network governance has been subject to extensive critique. This reflects the steering interpretation of the function of neighbourhood-based governance. Marsh et al. (2003: 316-7) critique the restructuring of the governance system and the emergence of networks as not devolving power, but giving the state additional leverage at sub-national scales. Hoggett (1996) echoes this, arguing that the shift to governance has allowed the introduction of new techniques of hierarchical control, with devolution occurring within the bounds set by centrally-driven policies and priorities. While a variety of different state and non-state actors are required to be involved, the state is identified as the dominant partner. This is borne out by the partnership form of network governance mandated by government, described by Webb (1991) as “imperative co-ordination”, exemplified by LSPs. Somerville (2005a: 124) sees cross-sectoral governance structures as spreading “responsibility for meeting the government’s strategic targets as widely as possible among citizens and communities”. Some have even stated that cross-sectoral governing institutions often more closely resemble hierarchies than networks (Skelcher et al., 2005; Wright et al., 2006; Entwistle et al., 2007).

Several commentators argue that power relations between network actors within an LSP are radically unequal (Davies, 2007; Marsh, 2008). Research suggests that where governing networks begin with a degree of openness and plurality, there is a trend towards elite closure, managerialisation and de-politicisation (Lawless, 2004; Skelcher et al., 2005; Davies, 2007). When citizens become involved in network governance, a tendency has been identified for them to experience these arrangements
as alienating and even disempowering (Jones, 2003; Davies, 2007; Perrons and Skyer, 2003; Wright et al., 2006). Alternatively, they may be “captured” and estranged from the constituencies they purport to represent (Richardson and Mumford, 2002: 224).

However, as Skelcher (2000) explains, though central government has stimulated development of these partnership forms of network governance, and there are “accountability and regulatory relationships back to the centre” (2000: 16), some discretion is available. This chimes with Hohn and Neuer’s (2006: 296) notion that the building of governance capacities makes it more difficult for government to “hold all the strings”. Indeed, Somerville (2005a: 127) contends that the power of national elites can be counteracted to some extent by building power at the municipal scale.

Several commentators have considered the relative predominance of central and local government in the UK with regard to urban governance. Healey, in her study of Newcastle’s urban governance, found that the development of such processes is “strongly dependent on the central-local government power dynamic” (Healey, 2006: 316), with power at the local level constrained by the “regulatory and resource allocation power” of national government (op cit). Jones and Ward (2002: 485) chart a “process of centrally orchestrated localism” of functions in the UK to bypass the existing structures of local government. Davies (2002: 319) states that central government holds local government in “elite contempt” despite the rhetoric of decentralisation, encouraging “collaborative tokenism” by seeking to ensure that partnerships fulfil central objectives. Lowndes (2002: 146) describes the increasing “de-democratisation and de-statisation of local governance” as governance functions are transferred to “local partnership bodies and a variety of front-line service-delivery institutions”. However, Gibbs et al.’s (2001) case study evidence suggests that arguments about the declining influence of the local state in the UK, in particular that local authorities have ceded power to other actors and institutions, are over-stated. They find a significant and continuing role for local government, not least because of its ability to facilitate or hamper central government direction. It gains power from its functions, authority and legitimacy, reinforced by the expectations that residents still have of “the Council” (Healey, 2006: 316), and the duty of well-being placed on it by central government. Indeed, local government is the ‘lead partner’ in LSPs, tasked with establishing these governance structures.
Overall, this raises questions about how the urban governance context shapes the functions of neighbourhood-based initiative governance. What is the relative dominance of governance network members, especially local and central government? What is the relative power of the LSP as the policy subsystem for deprived neighbourhoods? And what is the relative dominance of relevant actors within it, such as local government? How does this governance context affect the state and market imperatives which arise and the strategies which are pursued at city-wide and neighbourhood levels? What does this indicate about the relative power of the neighbourhood level within its multi-level governance context and the power relations between institutions of governance and government at different spatial scales?

2.7.2. US Forms of Network Governance

The lack of application of theories of networked governance in the US literature harks to differences in terminology rather than a lack of such networked arrangements. The predominant governance theory alluded to in the US literature is that of the ‘urban regime’, which stems from Stone’s (1989) work on Atlanta. Stone (1989: 6) defines regimes as “the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions”, following what Peck (1998: 28) would describe as a “local elitist mode of policy formation”. A regime describes a long-term relationship between the local state (city government) and business interests to promote the city’s economic development (Jones and Evans, 2008: 37). It reflects the capacity of this local leadership to develop a strategic vision and co-ordinate their own and other stakeholders’ actions.

The development of regimes is linked to the highly devolved and privatist nature of the US governmental system. DiGaetano and Strom (2003) explain that the locus of authority and responsibility for urban governance sits at the local, city government, level, particularly since the “de facto devolution” of “federal retrenchment” in the 1980s (op cit: 369). As illustrated by urban regime theory, such devolution has led to more privatist governance forms with a neo-liberal policy orientation to try and ensure a city’s ability to compete in the wider global economy (Martin et al., 2003: 115). Stone (1993) argues that the alliance of urban state and market elites makes it extremely difficult for “lower class” groups to gain access to the governing coalition, leading Davies (2009) to classify this as a “governance by exclusion or domination”
form of networked governance. In contrast, UK network governance arrangements as exemplified by LSPs do seek to engage citizens.

It should be noted that there have been various attempts to apply the idea of urban regimes to the UK (for example, Stewart, 1996; and Peck and Tickell, 1995). However, consensus has emerged that the model is not generally applicable to UK cities given the significant differences between the two countries’ governmental systems as expressed in relations between the central and local state (Stewart, 2003; Davies, 2003). Relationships between the local state and local businesses also differ in the UK, with the involvement of non-state actors tending to be on a medium-term basis focused on specific projects rather than the same kind of long-term strategic overview involving the private sector which could be characterised as forming a regime-type relationship (Jones and Evans, 2008: 37).

The increasing privatism of forms of urban governance is linked in the US literature to the shift in neighbourhood renewal from being a local government responsibility to one supported by national and local foundations and non-profit intermediaries. The research will consider the extent to which a “policy subsystem” (Goetz and Sidney, 1997) exists, within the prevailing urban regime, that is focused on developing approaches for deprived neighbourhoods. This would be characterised by a network of actors with shared understanding regarding policy problems which promotes and attempts to institutionalise solutions to these. In this regard Martin (2004) describes the rise of the “neighbourhood policy regime” comprising foundations and community organisations as well as the local state (op cit: 394). Chaskin (2003:185) in turn describes a system of “neighbourhood governance”, comprising organisations, local government and “outsider” foundations, but explains that these interact in “highly improvised ways”. He found that in such systems “power dynamics are pervasive” (Chaskin, 2005: 418), with more effective action arising from efforts led by professionals (planners, government officials, foundations) rather than the “grassroots”.

In Stone’s (1989) model, regimes operate at the urban level, focused on broad policies rather than neighbourhood-specific detail, with activity focused on landownership and development. Urban regime theory’s “restrictive localistic empirical focus” (Gibbs et
al., 2001: 104) has been criticised as it is thought to underestimate the role of the state above or the sub-local scale below. This research's approach ameliorates this criticism. While using urban regime theory to inform consideration of the expected characteristics of urban network governance, it also considers the impact of the state 'above' by applying the lens of metagovernance. In the US federal system, the same 'metagovernor' role cannot be attributed to federal government as that which is attributed by some commentators to UK central government. As local government only has a direct constitutional relationship with state, and not federal, government, it is understandable that the notion of metagovernance is lacking in the US literature. But there is recognition of conflict over "autonomy among nested government hierarchies" (Martin et al., 2003: 119) and this research considers the effect of the federal and state levels 'above' the urban governance form.

In turn, the research considers the sub-local scale 'below' in terms of neighbourhood-based governance's relationships with its urban context. This is in line with Fagotto and Fung's (2006:641) recognition that "even the most local of participatory programs... involves many layers of supra-local and centralised institutional machinery". In the US literature, there has been some consideration of the relationships between neighbourhood-based governance and city government (for example, Fagotto and Fung, 2006; and Kathi and Cooper, 2005) though an explicit focus on the relationship with forms of urban network governance is absent.

As in the case of the UK, this consideration of urban governance forms in the US raises questions about how the urban governance context shapes the functions of neighbourhood-based initiative governance. Is an urban regime evident between city government and private interests? What is the relative dominance of city, state and federal government and non-governmental stakeholders? Is a policy subsystem for deprived neighbourhoods evident, and if so, what is its relative power? And what is the relative dominance of relevant actors within it, such as city government, and the philanthropic and non-profit sectors? Overall, how does this governance context affect the state and market imperatives which arise and the strategies which are pursued at city-wide and neighbourhood levels? What does this indicate about the relative power of the neighbourhood level within its multi-level governance context?
and the power relations between institutions of governance and government at different spatial scales?

2.8 **Urban network governance: Expected Characteristics**

To understand the context in which neighbourhood-based governance operates and how this affects its functions, the forms and characteristics of urban governance which could be expected in the UK and US within which such initiatives are instigated and operate have been considered, drawing from the literature. In light of the discussion above, the key characteristics of the urban governance context for neighbourhood-based initiative governance are posited below and summarised in Table 2.2. The functions of neighbourhood-based governance likely to arise are then set out, given the state and market imperatives associated with these urban governance forms. The functions envisaged have implications regarding the relative power of the neighbourhood level within its multi-level governance context.

In considering the urban governance context for neighbourhood-based governance initiatives, it can be expected that in the centrist UK activities will be framed by central government policies, as postulated in metagovernance theory and reflected in the notion of 'steering centralism'. In the federal US, the urban level can be expected to be more crucial in framing the context in which such initiatives operate, as reflected in urban regime theory. Local 'metagovernors' may be identified in the form of local state and private actors, including business interests at the urban level, and philanthropic interests which may form part of a policy subsystem for deprived neighbourhoods.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urban Governance Characteristics</th>
<th>Associated Neighbourhood-based Governance Functions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Locus of authority</td>
<td>Urban level lead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Central govt level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>Urban level</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the UK, the locus of authority remains at the central government level, with local government taking the lead at the local, urban level. Central government strategies are prioritised, reflecting the steering perspective, though accounts of democracy and competence and to a lesser extent self-help may receive emphasis. The most obvious expression of urban network governance takes a partnership form as represented by the LSP, but this is the policy subsystem for deprived neighbourhoods. Other strategies which shape the subsystem's approaches are framed by central government priorities, regarding for example economic growth. This implies some tokenistic use of neighbourhood-based governance forms.

Overall, the predominant function of neighbourhood-based governance associated with the form of urban governance expected in the UK is likely to reflect the steering interpretation.

In the US, the locus of authority is at the city-level, with city government and private interests taking the lead. Neo-liberal strategies of economic growth are prioritised. There may be a linked emphasis on self-help for deprived neighbourhoods with the rhetoric that they can benefit from this growth, with associated use of accounts of democracy and competence to a lesser extent. There may be a policy subsystem...
regarding deprived neighbourhoods, in which private actors such as philanthropies as well as the non-profit sector will be engaged along with city government, indicating some steering of entities, but its efforts will be framed by the strategies of the prevailing urban regime. This implies some tokenistic use of neighbourhood-based governance forms.

Overall, the predominant function of neighbourhood-based governance associated with the form of urban governance expected in the US is likely to reflect the self-help interpretation.

2.9 Why this research?

The formation and activities of neighbourhood-based governance entities have become increasingly important areas of enquiry. Though there is a broad literature of relevance to the field, there is general agreement among commentators that significant gaps in research and understanding remain. While some academic literature does take a more contextual approach to the use of neighbourhood-based governance, often with a neo-liberal critique, there is a “paucity of well-designed, sceptical investigations” (Klijn & Skelcher, 2007: 601) and a lack of rigorous and systematic research grounded in empirical evidence. Questions remain about the underlying function of such governance. Addressing this gap will add value in terms of considering the role of neighbourhood-based governance structures in relation to state and market forces, such as government co-ordination (fleshing out theoretical conceptions of metagovernance); and adaptation to economic restructuring (exploring neo-liberal critiques of neighbourhood-based approaches, such as the perceived tokenism of area-based responses to deprivation).

Consideration and critical review of the functions attributed to neighbourhood-based governance aids in understanding and theorising contemporary sub-local governance, and assists in framing discussions not in technical or managerial terms, nor in a simplistic ‘best practice’ approach, but in terms of the political context they reflect. An examination of the reality of how entities are structured and operate, rather than the rhetoric of their existence, assists establishment of the “stakeholder groups who seek to govern neighbourhood space” (Fraser, 2004: 439). This enables consideration
of the vertical relationships of neighbourhood-based governance structures back to citizens or up to higher levels of government and governance, particularly at the urban and central/federal government level. There is an identified need for research regarding these “dialectics of horizontal and vertical political co-ordination” (Whitehead, 2003: 13).

There is a lack of research which has empirically grounded theories of network governance and sited the neighbourhood level within its multi-level governance context in the US. This research adds to the literature by addressing regime theory’s “restrictive localistic empirical focus” (Gibbs et al., 2001: 104). The research’s approach refines regime theory by enabling consideration of the influence of higher levels of government and governance on the urban regime, and of the relationships of this regime with any policy subsystem regarding deprived neighbourhoods. In turn it enables examination of the relationships of these forms of network governance with neighbourhood-based governance entities. Of particular interest is the role of non-state actors, for example as the sponsors of neighbourhood initiatives, given the privatist nature of US governance. In the UK, the research adds particular value given its identification of the ostensible form of urban network governance (the LSP) as a policy subsystem for deprived neighbourhoods, and not the forum where strategies, for example regarding growth, are formulated. The research enables consideration of the extent to which these strategies frame the subsystem’s policies and actions and how this affects neighbourhood-based initiative governance.

In addition to addressing the lack of empirical evidence regarding the function of neighbourhood-based governance in deprived areas, a unique element of this research is its provision of an international comparison of the role of such governance forms. The need for caution in making comparisons is recognised, particularly given the different governmental systems of the two countries. But there is considerable validity in conducting cross-national research on this topic, not least to counter Cochrane’s (2007: 13) use of the term “national boxes” to describe how urban policy tends to be compared. Its validity is reinforced by the history of policy transfer between the two countries (explored in chapter 4). While bearing in mind Halsey’s (1978) observation that “ideas drift casually across the Atlantic, soggy on arrival and of dubious utility”, policies have developed in an (albeit intermittently) intertwined
rather than separate ways in the UK and US in the post-war period, with the US proving to be a source of policy lessons and as "a vision of (positive and negative) urban futures" for the UK (Cochrane, 2007: 14).

Governance is also regarded as subject matter which lends itself to international comparisons as it "enables consideration of how governments have developed new ways of engaging with society while seeking to strengthen their role through alternative modes of governance and attempts to co-ordinate action" (Pierre and Peters, 2000: 30). Comparing the function of neighbourhood-based governance in both countries should point to the different ways in which these countries have coped with changes in state and market forces. What is distinctive and what is similar? How does this relate to expectations, related to perceptions of a managerial/centrist UK and a privatist/localist US, especially given the history of policy transfer?

To clarify, for the purposes of this research, the UK refers to England rather than the devolved administrations, given the difficulty of incorporating the variety of different policy approaches pursued since devolution.

2.10 Research Aims

This research is an international comparative investigation of neighbourhood-based initiative governance in England and the US. Using an empirically-grounded approach informed by theories of network governance, the research considers the function of such governance forms, in order to locate neighbourhood-based initiative governance in the context of broader networks of governance. The research aims to:

• Ascertain the functions of neighbourhood-based initiative governance entities according to the way they are structured and the way they operate.

• Assess the urban governance context within which these entities are instigated, operate and are supported, in terms of the focus on deprived neighbourhoods versus broader strategies, key actors and their relative power, and how these strategies and actors shape the functions of neighbourhood-based initiative governance.
• Consider what this implies about the use of neighbourhood-based initiative governance in the context of broader networks of governance.

• Identify similarities and differences between the two countries, and consider these in light of expectations of similarities (for example, resulting from the history of policy transfer) and differences (for example, related to perceptions of a managerial/centrist UK and a privatist/localist US).

• Identify possible avenues for future research.
3.1 Introduction

This chapter clarifies the nature of the evidence sought and how this relates to the research questions. It explains how the theoretical framework set out in chapter 2 was developed and then applied in the empirical work and analysis, through the design of a rigorous and systematic mixed-method research approach. A key strength of the research is that it places the same phenomenon (neighbourhood-based initiative governance) in two different city/national contexts to enable a rich and rigorous comparison of how its functions are affected by its context.

The chapter first sets out the use of a comparative international case study approach to consider how neighbourhood-based governance is located within broader networks of governance, and explains how the methodology used has addressed the challenges posed by this approach to enable robust identification of the similarities and differences between the two countries in terms of the research questions.

The chapter then explains how the functions of neighbourhood-based initiative governance entities are ascertained according to the way they are structured and operate. The approach is founded on an examination of how entities are actually structured and how they operate day-to-day, rather than taking “the rhetoric of their existence” (Fraser, 2004: 439) at face value. It draws on Mathur and Skelcher’s (2007) notion of a body’s “hardware and software” by combining an assessment of the entities’ structure with their day-to-day operations, with data sources comprising documentary review and interviews with case study entity respondents. This analysis of four initiative governance entities, two in each of the two cities under consideration, was informed by the heuristic framework of ‘ideal-type’ characteristics according to the functions identified in the academic and policy literatures.

How the urban governance context of these entities is assessed is then explained. The approach draws from the ‘bottom up’ insights gained from the case study entities and
interviews with a purposive sampling of elite respondents to ensure cross-sectoral representation in each of the two cities. This interpretative approach, combined with documentary review, enabled identification of the form taken by the urban governance network, and its characteristics, including its key actors and their relative dominance, and its focus on deprived neighbourhoods versus broader strategies.

Following explanation of how the methodology was developed, the chapter then explains how this was applied in the field, detailing the research's empirical phase, including city and case study entity selection, elite and case study respondent selection, and how and what data were gathered. The chapter finally explains how these data were analysed and validated.

Overall, the modes of enquiry used are analytic given the conceptual phase which saw development of the theoretical framework and descriptive given the compilation of case study entity narratives. However, key to the research's contribution to the field is that it is also comparative. Table 3.1 presents an overview of the stages of the research.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.1: Overview of Research Stages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Theory development/ conceptual phase:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Initial literature review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Identification of functions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Development of initial 'ideal-type' typology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Development of interview guides drawing on 'ideal-type' typology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Empirical phase:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o US national elite interviews – piloting of interview guide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o City selection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Baltimore elite interviews/ documentary review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Case study entity selection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Case study entity interviews/ documentary review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Bristol elite interviews/ documentary review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Case study entity selection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Case study entity interviews/ documentary review.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Analysis:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Full transcription of interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Development of analytic scheme using interview guide/ 'ideal-type' typology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Coding of transcripts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Documentary review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Initial write up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Validation at presentations in respective cities/ circulation to respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Rewrite.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.2 Comparative International Case Study Approach

3.2.1. International Comparison

While the broad methodological approach, combining semi-structured interviews with secondary data analysis, has been employed in several previous studies in the US and UK (for example Fagotto and Fung, 2006; Chaskin and Abunimah, 1999; Mathur and Skelcher, 2007) it appears to be the first time such an approach has been applied to neighbourhood-based initiative governance in a cross-national setting.

As Hantrais and Mangen (1996: 1) explain, for a study to be cross-national and comparative, the researcher should set out to study particular issues in two or more countries to compare their manifestations in different socio-cultural settings, using the same research instruments. The expectation is that the researchers gather data about the object of study within different contexts and, by making comparisons, gain a greater awareness and a deeper understanding of social reality (Hantrais and Mangen, 1996: 2).

The literature details several benefits to comparative research which May (2001) divides into four categories. The potential for theoretical development and the identification of avenues for future research is a strong component of comparative research. This potential for theoretical development is also stated as an advantage for the case study method. Lisle (1985: 26) argues that those undertaking cross-national comparisons are forced to attempt to adopt a different cultural perspective, while also reconsidering their own country. May (2001: 208) describes this as the “import-mirror view”, whereby in producing findings on the practices of other countries, researchers are better able to see the basis of their own country’s practices. The “difference view” cited by May (2001) suggests that comparative analysis is undertaken to explain and understand differences and similarities. It places “a clearer perspective on the peculiarities of local experiences and the forms and consequences of general processes” (Harding, 1996: 193). Finally, the “foresight view” (May, 2001) sees comparative work as enabling understanding of the potential for success of particular policies, systems or practices in a given society. The approach leads to questions about the extent to which policies formulated in one national context could be applied elsewhere (Hantrais and Mangen, 1996: 3).
However, there are problems in undertaking such comparative research. This approach "by its very nature demands greater compromises in methods than a single country focus" (Hantrais and Mangen, 1996: 10). The key problems are the ability of researchers to understand adequately different cultures and societies, and more specifically, to try to compare "like with like" (May, 2001: 214). These problems are expressed as "appropriateness and equivalence" (May, 2001). 'Appropriateness' refers to the methods employed and the conceptualisation of issues when undertaking comparative research. A sensitivity and understanding of cultural context are required, tackling the influence of the researcher's own cultural value system and assumptions (Hantrais and Mangen, 1996: 9). 'Equivalence' is a related issue. "A... major methodological task in comparative research is to devise and select theoretical problems, conceptual schemes, samples and measurement and analysis strategies that are comparable or equivalent across the societies involved in a particular study" (Armer, 1973: 51, quoted in May, 2001). Practical problems that arise in cross-national comparisons include the availability and access to comparable datasets; the definition of the research parameters (units of comparison); and achieving functional equivalence of concepts and terms (Hantrais and Mangen, 1996: 5-9).

The approach taken for this research is described as the "safari" method (Hantrais and Mangen, 1996: 4). This entails research into a "well-defined issue" (op cit), using replication of the experimental design and concepts, with the systematic collection of the same information across research units. The safari method is regarded as suitable for comparison between a small number of countries where the researchers have knowledge of the countries under study. This research comparison is between two countries of which the researcher has considerable knowledge and experience (derived from being a UK native and three years spent studying and working in the US). As Harding (1996) explains, another advantage of research being carried out by one researcher is that the methodology is applied consistently, and if mistakes are made they are made consistently.

The challenge here is in ensuring functional equivalence of concepts and terms at the outset. This is why the research is founded on clear definitions of the units of comparison, neighbourhood-based initiative governance entities and their urban governance context. The urban governance context is bounded at city-level, 'city'
defined as the area bounded by the relevant local government unit, these being the City of Baltimore and the City of Bristol. These comprise what in the UK would be described as the urban unitary authority, and in the US as municipal or city government. Hantrais and Mangen (1996: 9) explain that researchers have attempted to address the problem of the influence of the researcher’s own cultural value system and assumptions by refining typologies in advance. The framework of functions and the expected characteristics of urban network governance forms also aids in ensuring functional equivalence.

Overall, this chapter demonstrates that the methodology adopted has enabled comparative empirical work which has avoided what Harding (1996: 194) describes as “tendencies towards ethnocentricity” or an “overly simplistic approach”. Clear definition of the units of study and development of the theoretical framework, derived from a synthesis of the respective countries’ relevant literatures, has generated a consistent set of research questions against which empirical observations can be tested. It has thus enabled a structured and well-grounded cross-national comparison which enables a robust identification of the similarities and differences between the two countries. The design enables the “structured approach to data collection” (Lewis, 2003: 51) required for comparative research, to “understand difference” (op cit: 50).

3.2.2. Case Study Approach
A case study is defined as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2003: 13). Lewis (2003: 52) clarifies that what makes the case study approach distinctive is that it enables “a multiplicity of perspectives which are rooted in a specific context”. The approach “can build up very detailed in-depth understanding... where understanding needs to be holistic, comprehensive and contextualised” (op cit) as “the context is critical to understanding the researched phenomena” (op cit: 76). Indeed, as Hammersley and Gomm (2000: 6) explain, “it is often argued that analysis of a case always presumes some wider context”. They add that when case studies are used to develop theoretical ideas, the task of theory is to “locate and explain what goes on within a case in terms of its wider societal context” (op cit). Therefore, as the case study method suits
situations where contextual conditions are believed to be highly pertinent to the unit of study, it was an ideal approach given this research's focus on placing neighbourhood-based initiative governance entities in their context and exploring how this context affects the strategies pursued.

Given the dearth of contextual information on many cities, Bendikat (1996: 132) identifies one of the advantages of the case study method as its provision of a large amount of information and description. It can deal with "a full variety of evidence" (Yin, 2003: 8) such as that gathered in the course of this research (deriving from semi-structured in-depth interviews with a range of respondents and documentary evidence). The "thick descriptions" of case studies (Geertz, 1973) are regarded as a "rigorous and fair presentation of empirical data" (Yin, 2003: 2). Case studies are regarded as an especially suitable approach when the research is posing explanatory 'why' questions, such as regarding the functions of neighbourhood-based governance, as such questions deal with operational links that need to be traced over time (Yin, 2003: 6). The method also suits examination of contemporary events when the relevant behaviours cannot be manipulated by the researcher, as the researcher can interview the people involved and make direct observations (Yin 2003: 9).

The case study approach may be criticised due to its perceived lack of rigor and the scope for equivocal evidence or biased views to influence the directions of the findings and conclusions. These criticisms can be addressed if systematic procedures are followed. The method therefore "benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis" (Yin, 2003: 13) as is the case with this research given the framework of functions and expected characteristics of urban network governance forms set out in chapter 2. All evidence also needs to be reported fairly and without bias (Yin, 2003: 10), realised in this research via the full transcription and coding of all interviews.

The case study may also be criticised as it provides little basis for generalisation given the potential scope for drawing misleading conclusions from the study of a few cases (Gomm et al., 2000). Care has been taken that the entities selected are reasonably illustrative of the range of such bodies (explained in section 3.5.2 below), given the importance of the selection of cases for study (Platt, 1988). However, the
contribution of the case study approach to theory generation is broadly recognised. It is seen as allowing for a considered exploration of the issues which can help to articulate hypotheses (Yin, 2003: 10). Eckstein (2000), in discussing the use of the case study approach in political science, stresses its value in building theories, or arriving at "statements of regularity about the structure, behaviour and interaction of phenomena" (2000: 126). Mitchell (2000), taking a social science approach, echoes Eckstein by recognising the ability of the case study approach to draw inferences about general, abstract theoretical principles which the case is taken to exemplify. Such theories may ultimately be tested more systematically (Yin, 2003: 10). A broader outcome of this research is the identification of avenues for future research.

3.3 Ascertaining the Functions of Neighbourhood Governance Entities

3.3.1. Identification of functions

Five principal candidate accounts of the functions (or roles) of neighbourhood-based initiative governance were identified in the literature (as set out in chapter 2). The relevant literatures used to identify and define these accounts were established by undertaking a comprehensive search of US, UK and European academic literatures:

- Initially a word search was undertaken using the Ingenta Connect and ISI Web of Knowledge search engines for journal articles containing either 'neighbourhood governance' or 'neighborhood (sic) governance' in the title, keyword listing or abstract. All of these articles were reviewed.

- During the research period ongoing journal article alerts were received by e-mail from ProQuest and from Ingenta Connect InTouch, drawing from multiple databases, for articles including the search terms. Newly-posted content from the most relevant journals (such as the Journal of Urban Affairs, Urban Affairs Review, Public Administration, Public Administration Review, Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy and Urban Studies) was also received by e-mail.

- Key authors were identified and their publications were reviewed. Books were identified using key author and key word search terms. These searches were conducted initially on Cardiff University's Voyager system.
Five months of the research period were spent based at the Library of Congress in Washington DC where these searches were replicated. This enabled excellent access to the relevant US literature, thus ensuring that any possible disadvantages of the researcher being UK-based were circumvented.

It should be noted that though the basic set of accounts of the functions of neighbourhood governance has remained constant during the research, the accounts now described as 'self-help' and 'tokenism' were subject to the most reconsideration during the research period due to iteration between the initial set of accounts and feedback gained regarding it. Initially these functions were combined, and described rather uncomfortably as 'discharge/ double re-scaling'. 'Discharge' referred to the "strategy of containment" (Lepine et al., 2007: 13), whereby deprived neighbourhoods are perceived as being treated tokenistically and separately from the mainstream. "Double re-scaling" (Healey, 2006) referred to the "twin track" (Hohn and Neuer, 2006) cities notion, with the adoption of different strategies at different spatial scales. This combined account was then re-named 'containment'. However, a combination of feedback garnered on presentation of the initial set of accounts at an international conference1, and comments from initial US national elite respondents at the outset of the research’s empirical stage (prior to the Baltimore fieldwork), led to recognition of the importance of capacity building as a function of initiative governance on the part of its sponsors. Thus the function was renamed 'self-help'. Subsequently and finally this was split into two: 'self-help', encapsulating the normative value of capacity building in the context of initiative governance; and 'tokenism', to encapsulate the "strategy of containment" (op cit) notion.

3.3.2. Development of typology of 'ideal-type' entity characteristics
These (non-exclusive) accounts of the functions formed the basis of the heuristic framework (table 2.1) that posits characteristics for the structure and operations of 'ideal-type' neighbourhood governance entities. This typology was developed to enable a systematic approach for the empirical research, providing a set of testable propositions to enable greater insight into the functions of the four case study bodies.

It was not intended to overly constrain the empirical research, but rather to enable a robust, methodical and comparable assessment of the relative strength of the functions in each case study entity in both cities.

To develop the typology, the 'ideal-type' characteristics associated with each function were derived, principally drawing from the key neighbourhood governance literature (as cited in table 2.1). Much of the relevant literature (for example, Chaskin and Garg, 1997; Fagotto and Fung, 2006, and Somerville, 2005a, 2005b) combines theoretical with empirical work and concludes with what can be regarded as 'success factors' for neighbourhood-based governance. Such factors constitute a good basis for identifying 'ideal-type' characteristics. The characteristics without an associated citation derive from a priori reasoning. For example, characteristics of the self-help 'ideal-type' refer to the entity's ability to "move beyond initiative governance" (Chaskin and Abunimah, 1999) by becoming a self-sustaining entity independent of its initial sponsor. Crucial characteristics emphasised in the literature were also refined and expanded, for example detail about the nature of resident board representation was surmised (such as the requirement for a resident quorum). This was in part informed by some iteration with the initial empirical findings, though the majority of the typology was developed during the conceptual phase of the research, prior to its empirical phase. The framework was also amended given the change from a four- to five-fold set of accounts of the functions, as explained above.

3.3.3. Neighbourhood-based initiative governance entity case studies

Overall, the research approach for the case study entities comprised a review of documentation, such as meeting papers, reports, evaluations, and policy papers, including those of sponsor organisations and partners where possible; in-depth semi-structured individual interviews; and observation of meetings where possible. The methodology used therefore combines the use of documentary data such as information on structures with interview data (as has been used in several previous studies, for example Fagotto and Fung, 2006; Chaskin and Abunimah, 1999; Chaskin, 2003; and Mathur and Skelcher, 2007).

However, key is that the approach taken is informed by previous research which has recognised that neighbourhood-based governance depends on the "structuring of
relationships and the ongoing negotiation of connections; responsibilities, expectations and lines of accountability, rather than on a particular organisational structure or a particular, formally acknowledged set of roles and relationships" (Chaskin and Abunimah, 1999: 77). As Mathur and Skelcher (2007) explain, assessing a body's "hardware" (such as its formal structure) does not reveal how it operates (its "software", or informal relationships and practices).

The research approach is designed to place neighbourhood governance entities in their context. With regard to the entities, this involves ascertaining the functions that they perform, before considering how these are affected by the context in which they are embedded. The bodies' functions are ascertained by using what can be regarded as a form of "revealed preference" (Samuelson, 1938), the theory which states that preferences are revealed by behaviour rather than by statements of intent. In this research, conclusions about the functions of an initiative governance entity are derived from an assessment not only of its structure, but also of its day-to-day operations. This enables a more systematic assessment of the existence and operation of the entities, rather than taking any formal statements (for example, the terms of reference for the entity, or policy and programme documents) or informal opinion (for example, of a board member) at face value.

Detailed investigations of the structures and operations of two neighbourhood-based initiative governance bodies operating in each city were carried out. This focus encompassed 'formal' characteristics, such as their organisational structure, legal status, and stated mission (informed by documentary review as well as interview data). In addition, the approach included 'informal' characteristics, such as inter-organisational interactions between the entity and its sponsors and other bodies (principally informed by interview data). This is what Mathur and Skelcher (2007: 236) refer to as "the day-to-day behaviour of actors in a network governance system". This combined approach enabled greater insight into the functions of neighbourhood-based initiative governance, as well as 'bottom up' insight into how these bodies are nested within and affected by the context in which they are operating.

The entity research approach is founded on the typology of 'ideal-type' characteristics explained above. This constitutes a "criteria-based instrument" (Mathur and Skelcher,
2007: 229) which can “expose contradictions between the ‘ideal’ and the practice” (op cit: 236) by establishing the attributes and enabling an assessment of the extent to which they are evident in “the design of the entity and its day-to-day practices” (Skelcher, 2006: 68). The typology enables a criteria-based assessment of the entities’ structure and operations by ‘ideal-type’ and thus enables conclusions to be drawn about the combination of functions evidenced by the entities according to the extent to which the attributes are evident in their actual structures and practices. The typologies were used as an instrument to assess the bodies’ structures, with data including documentary evidence about the entity (entity directors were asked to provide background information on the entity’s structure). The typologies were also applied in a way that exposed the entities’ informal practices, by informing design of a semi-structured interview guide for in-depth interviewing of respondents engaged in the entities to gather data about actors’ practices. This enabled a systematic and consistent way of assessing the extent to which each entity was designed and operated in a way that reflected each ‘ideal-type’ as posited in the theoretical framework.

The approach was particularly inspired by Mathur and Skelcher (2007), who developed the “Governance Assessment Tool” (see also Skelcher et al., 2005), a criteria-based tool used to assess a governance body’s “hardware”, but also used to inform development of a semi-structured interview topic guide. This guide was used to investigate with respondents how the entities studied worked in practice and what their informal procedures were. This assessment method thus can be used to assess the formal attributes of entities but also to “gain access to tacit knowledge” (Mathur and Skelcher, 2007: 229).

It should be made clear that the research does not try to evaluate the success of the neighbourhood-based governance entities under consideration. Finding objective measures for successful neighbourhood-based governance is complicated by the need for success to be measured in terms of outcomes, or what Chaskin and Garg (1997: 654) would term the entity’s “proven capacity to effect change”, or “the ability... to have an independent impact on the well-being of their citizens” (Wolman and Goldsmith, 1990: 24). The factors that affect well-being are many and varied, including income and public services, physical environment, family life and personal relationships, connectedness to institutions (social capital), accessibility, self-esteem,
physical health, and safety and security (op cit: 16-18). This research does not attempt to measure these outcomes and attribute changes to the activities of neighbourhood-based governance entities.

3.3.4. Entity-Level Respondent Interview Guide

The guide (example at Appendix 2) for those directly engaged in the case study governance entities was tailored to ask respondents about both the way the entity was structured and its operations, drawing on the ‘ideal-type’ characteristics framework. The interview guide probed the background to the initiative, how and why it came about, the contributions of the various partners and the reasons they were made, the decision-making structures developed for realising the project, and its day-to-day operations. These questions were designed to enable insight into the functions of the bodies studied. Respondents were also asked to discuss the role, work and relationships engaged in by their own organisations, which enabled ‘bottom up’ insight into how these bodies are nested within and affected by the context in which they are operating. In turn, elite respondents were also asked about their knowledge of and any engagement with the case study entities.

3.4 Assessing the Urban Governance Context

In addition to ascertaining the functions that entities perform, the research aims to consider how these functions are affected by the multi-level governance context in which the entities are embedded. The need to complement examination of individual entities with investigation of the wider body of relationships in which such entities are engaged has been recognised in previous studies (for example, Stoker and Stone, 2008; and Chaskin, 2003). The research approach adopted therefore locates the entities examined in their context, providing an analysis of the “broader ecology of organisations and processes that constitute neighbourhood governance systems” (Chaskin, 2003). Within this broader context, there is a particular focus on the urban level given the city-based methodology employed. In terms of the units of study, this broader context bounded at the city-level is defined as the area governed by the relevant city/local government (the City of Baltimore and the City of Bristol).
However, it should be stressed that the need for a detailed contextual understanding not only in terms of the case study entities within the city, but also of the city in its regional and national policy context, is also understood. This is reflected in chapter 4, in which the relevant policies and approaches at higher levels which frame the city-level are set out, as well as in the analysis (chapters 5 and 6). As Ungerson (1996) explains, this enables at least to an extent, differentiation between national differences and local specificities, rather than assuming that differences are "predetermined by national systems" (Bendikat, 1996: 130). This enables some subsequent consideration of the extent to which extrapolation of the city findings to the national level would be valid.

This methodology recognises governance as a process as well as a set of formal institutional arrangements, emphasising that governance is not so much about structures but the interactions between structures (Pierre and Peters, 2000: 22). It makes explicit the systemic nature of the relations between neighbourhood governance bodies and the context in which they are established and operate. From the perspective of the case study entities, the research identifies the relationships in which the entity is engaged, not only with its constituent communities, but also its vertical relationships with other actors at higher levels of government and governance. From the city-level perspective, the research identifies the relationships in which the organisations of elite respondents are engaged. As explained above, given the importance of considering the informal as well as formal aspects of these relationships, the use of a qualitative, semi-structured interview-based methodology, combined with documentary review of secondary data, is appropriate.

The approach used to identify and define the network governance context in the cities investigated was thus largely based on the ways in which respondents view and interpret its membership and structure and assess its functioning, including its modes of resource allocation. This interpretative approach, which relied on extensive interviewing with key actors (such as that used by Sweeting et al., 2004; and Chaskin, 2003) was combined with documentary review of secondary data. The data analysed included policy documents (the key documents are considered in chapter 4) and reports and evaluations (which are cited in analytical chapters 5 and 6). This combined approach enabled identification of the form taken by the urban governance
network, and its characteristics, including its key actors and their relative dominance, and its focus on deprived neighbourhoods versus broader strategies.

Establishment of the form and characteristics of the urban governance network in both cities in the empirical phase enabled subsequent analysis (as detailed in chapters 5 and 6) of how this governance context affects the state and market imperatives which arise and the strategies which are pursued at city-wide and neighbourhood levels, thus determining the functions of neighbourhood governance, and what this indicates about the relative power of the neighbourhood level within its multi-level governance context. It also enabled comparison of the urban governance network identified with the expected characteristics of US and English urban governance considered in the research’s conceptual phase (as set out in chapter 2, table 2.2). This enabled an assessment of “conceptual antecedents” (Harding, 1996: 189) such as DiGaetano and Strom’s (2003) notion of a privatist and localist US and a managerial and centrist UK.

3.4.1. City-Level Elite Respondent Interview Guide

The guide (example at Appendix 1) for city-level elite respondents was tailored to enable an assessment of the context within which neighbourhood-based governance is established and operates in the city. Elites were asked why the neighbourhood is regarded as a basis for action, and how and why neighbourhood-based governance structures are instigated or supported. They were asked to discuss the role, work and relationships engaged in by their own organisations, and for their perspectives on the work of others and how, if at all, this was co-ordinated or led. Elite respondents were also asked about their knowledge of and any engagement with the case study entities.

3.5 Empirical Phase

Prior to commencing the empirical phase, approval was gained from Cardiff University School of City and Regional Planning’s Ethics Committee for the proposed research and associated fieldwork/ interviews.

Detailed analyses were undertaken of the City of Baltimore, Maryland (between October 2007 and February 2008) and the City of Bristol, England (between June and September 2008). The empirical work entailed detailed investigations of the
structures and operations of four neighbourhood-based governance entities (two in each city), and an assessment of the city-level context within which such entities are established and operate. It comprised a total of 54 in-depth interviews (32 in Baltimore, 22 in Bristol), and documentary review of secondary data (which included policy documents, plans, demographic and socio-economic data, and reports and evaluations).

3.5.1. City selection
The cities selected were chosen to balance the ideal in terms of comparison with pragmatic ‘deliverability’ criteria, enabling “convenient cases without sacrifice of disciplinary conscience” (Eckstein, 2000: 162). The ‘deliverability’ criteria included making use of the researcher’s existing (academic and practitioner) contacts in each of the countries. The researcher’s contacts led to relatively large cities in both countries, which aided in achieving comparability. Such cities are also more likely to be of sufficient scale to represent a range of approaches to neighbourhood-based governance and have a history of neighbourhood-based activity. Further background on both cities is set out in chapter 4.

The City of Baltimore (population 631,000) was selected due its well-defined neighbourhoods, varied mechanisms for neighbourhood decision-making and action, and its long tradition of political activism, local organising and heritage of neighbourhood-based working. Interviews with key informants at the national level, including federal government, philanthropic foundations, and non-profit and research institutions, informed and facilitated selection of Baltimore, enabling awareness of existing initiatives and the identification of and access to initial respondents in the city, where some of the national elites operate. Baltimore was also selected for reasons of practicality, given both its proximity to Washington DC where the researcher was based at the Library of Congress during the US empirical phase of the research, and also given the researcher’s previous experience in the city and contacts there (in the City of Baltimore’s Department of Planning).

The City of Bristol (population 416,000) was selected given its history of voluntary activity and community activism. The national elite interviewing undertaken in the US was not replicated in England given the researcher’s greater knowledge of the
country's policy context and as the city-and neighbourhood-level approach had been consolidated as a result of the US empirical work. Bristol's selection also related to practical considerations, given its proximity to Cardiff, where the researcher was based for the research, and also as an English city was sought given the researcher's background working in central government and her familiarity with relevant English policy. Bristol is not as extreme in terms of the scale of deprivation compared to Baltimore, but certainly does have deprived pockets. Interestingly both cities also share a port heritage though this was not a deciding factor in their selection.

3.5.2. Case study entity selection

Two case study entities were identified in each city. Such a limited number of cases fulfils Bendikat's (1996: 132) advice that for a "qualitative comparative researcher, numbers should be kept small", as this enables "control over the frame of comparison". Examining two entities closely enables sufficient depth by allowing a considered exploration of the issues (Chaskin and Abunimah, 1999) but also makes the research feasible. Key to such "small-n" studies (Lieberson, 2000: 217) is the choice of cases. No set of case studies can be strictly representative of the field as a whole in a statistical sense, but care was taken that the entities selected were reasonably illustrative of the range of neighbourhood-based governance entities, and had in common a set of characteristics as per the unit of study definition.

In Baltimore and Bristol the entities were selected based on the criteria for neighbourhood-based initiative governance; recommendations from elite respondents; and that they were sufficiently long-established to be a rich source of insight into the field. In Baltimore, entity selection was also influenced by the two entities' contrasts in terms of being a non-profit and a public entity respectively. While the public entity is notably atypical given its sectoral status, it was felt to be a valuable case study selection given its "potential for learning", used as a criterion for selection in this case over notions of representativeness (Stake, 2005: 451).

It should be noted that several elite respondents mentioned the East Baltimore Development Initiative (EBDI) as a potential case study. However, after consideration this was rejected given that it was relatively recently established and thus would not have perhaps enabled sufficient insight into the field. As a significant
element of the initiative is the relocation of residents, it was also felt to be atypical as an example.

The initial intention when seeking case study entities in Bristol was that two different entity sector types would also be sought. However, this was not realised as it became clear that there was a dearth of suitable entities that also met the unit of study definition in Bristol. However, a key difference between the two Bristol entities emphasised in the initial elite interviews in the city was that one was perceived to have stemmed from the 'grassroots', albeit having become formalised via a government programme, whereas the other was regarded as having arisen from a government programme. This apparent contrast between the two informed their selection as case studies.

However, it should be stressed that the scope of the research was not confined to the two neighbourhood-based entities selected as case studies in each of the cities. Elite respondents were asked questions to elicit information about the governance of neighbourhood-based governance in the city, not just in terms of the case study entities.

3.5.3. Respondent selection

Elite respondents

For the US empirical research, an initial set of interviews was conducted of national elite respondents. The two key initial contacts were gained from an academic contact who has worked in the US and UK, who the researcher met at an international conference in the UK. Using the 'snowballing' approach, these contacts led to contacts with other national elite respondents, including an official at the federal government Department of Housing and Urban Development. These interviews assisted in confirming Baltimore as the city for detailed research.

The empirical phase in both cities commenced with interviews with a set of key informants. These were identified following preliminary interviews with national elites in the case of Baltimore. In the case of Bristol, initial contacts were identified via academic contacts at the University of the West of England gained at an
international conference. These “knowledgeable contacts” (Harding, 1996: 192) aided the researcher in identifying and gaining access to other elite respondents quickly and often helped with introductions. These interviews also assisted the researcher in becoming more informed about relevant initiatives/ potential case study entities in the cities.

In Baltimore and Bristol a combined sampling strategy was used to identify the elite city-level respondents. Respondents were identified using a combination of desk analysis to establish the key organisations and institutions, and recommendations from respondents. Respondent identification comprised purposive sampling to ensure cross-sectoral representation of those engaged in the governance of neighbourhood-based governance, including city/ local government officials and elected members, regional tiers of government, philanthropic and community foundations, and non-profit/ third sector organisations. This was combined with a snowballing strategy drawing from recommendations from respondents, which was augmented with desk research about potential respondents’ organisations, primarily drawing from the organisation’s website. Table 3.2 below sets out the elite respondents’ organisations in both cities. This “subjective form of network analysis” (Harding 1996: 192) worked by asking initial interviewees to name key individuals regarded as active with regard to neighbourhood-based governance, arranging further interviews, repeating the questions and so generating the ‘snowball effect’. In the case of Baltimore, the researcher’s use of a Library of Congress US government e-mail address to contact potential respondents also aided in ensuring responses.

More respondents were interviewed in Baltimore than in Bristol. This was due in part to the Baltimore empirical work being undertaken first, and greater exploration was needed which then provided a broad template for how to undertake the Bristol empirical research. It also relates to the initially greater difficulty in identifying the key network governance members in Baltimore, given the network’s informal nature compared with the easier initial identification of key actors in Bristol (resulting from central government’s requirement for a Local Strategic Partnership which ostensibly constitutes the urban governance form for neighbourhood-based initiative governance). Elite respondent identification in Bristol was informed in part by an attempt to replicate, to the extent possible, the respondent selection in Baltimore.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.2: Elite Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>City Council</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Officers</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Planning</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Housing</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Members</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Formal City-wide Partnership</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Higher Tiers of Govt/ Governance</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Philanthropic Foundations/ National Intermediaries</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community Foundations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-profit/ third sector</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Universities</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Case Study Entity Respondents**

Elite respondents assisted in recommending contacts in the entity case studies, in some cases providing introductions. Respondents were selected based on gaining the viewpoints of different sectors involved in the structure, including its sponsors, professional staff and members of its board, including residents and member organisations. The analysis does not include the perspectives of unaffiliated organisations or the "community at large". Table 3.3 below sets out the case study entity respondents in both cities. It should be noted that the elite respondents were also asked about the case study entities. The respondents set out below are case study entity-specific.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.3: Case Study Entity Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Baltimore</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operation Reach Out South West</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Entity Staff</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local Government</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-profit/Third sector</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Residents</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Charles Village Community Benefits District</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Entity Staff</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local Government</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-profit/Third sector</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Residents</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.5.4. **Interviews**

Informed consent for participation in the research was gained by contacting each potential respondent in advance by e-mail or telephone, explaining the research and
requesting an interview with them. If the potential respondent agreed to be interviewed by the researcher this was taken as informed consent for participation. Those contacted by e-mail were provided with an interview guide, which included a brief summary of the research, a request that the interview be recorded, and contact information for the researcher. Those contacted by telephone were asked for an e-mail or postal address to which this could be sent in advance of the interview. A hard copy was also provided at the interview for the respondent to keep. Oral consent to being recorded was also obtained prior to commencement of the interview.

As explained above, an interview guide was prepared for the semi-structured qualitative interviews (examples are appended). The guide was piloted (in the initial US interviews) and these initial respondents were asked for their comments and feedback on the guide and the interview process. All respondents were provided with the interview guide in advance (which included a brief explanation of the research and contact information for the researcher).

The guide was tailored for different categories of respondents (city-level elites and entity-level respondents) but incorporated a core set of open-ended questions to be asked of all respondents, which allowed for both specific responses and the drawing out of broad themes and interpretations. The 'semi-structured' nature of the interview meant that though the guide had a list of questions to be covered, the interviewee did have a great deal of leeway in how to reply. This enabled the interviewee's point of view to emerge. Such "detailed and open-ended" (Hammersley and Gomm, 2000: 5) approaches assists in the development of theoretical ideas, a benefit of the case study approach.

Questions did not necessarily follow exactly those included in the guide, and questions not included in the guide were asked by the researcher as a result of the respondent's responses. Earlier findings were also reflected in later guides. This was aided by the maintenance of a detailed field notebook following each interview, including notes of impressions, problems, refinements needed, and issues to pursue. This provided an aide memoir for subsequent interviews, especially useful when there had not been sufficient time to transcribe previous interviews. However, generally all
of the questions were asked and a similar wording was used from interviewee to interviewee.

3.5.5. Analysis
Each interview was recorded with the permission of the respondent and fully transcribed by the researcher. Transcriptions were subsequently coded for analysis. Consideration was given to using software (such as NVivo) to provide "analytic support" (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996) but in discussion with her PhD Panel, the researcher decided that this would not add significant value to the analysis given the framework for coding and analysis provided by the interview guide and the 'ideal-type' characteristics heuristic. In addition to development of an initial analytic scheme based on these, issues were defined deductively as they arose in the course of the analysis and used to refine the analytic scheme. The data were also sorted so that patterns of common or differing perspectives among different types of respondents could be ascertained. Such patterns are discussed in the analysis where notable.

Reflecting White et al.'s (2003: 306) recognition of the value of the case study approach in terms of "displaying verbatim text within a well-defined context", presentation of the analysis (in chapters 5 and 6) includes significant use of respondent quotes. This assists in rendering tacit knowledge communicable (Donmoyer, 2000).

Analysis also drew from secondary data sources. Additional data were gathered to inform respondent identification and to research their organisations prior to interview. This was primarily gathered from the organisation's websites, and included key city/local government policy documents (which are considered in chapter 4). Some elite respondents also provided data either during or following interview. Such secondary data comprised policy documents, plans, demographic and socio-economic data, reports and evaluations, lists of funding recipients, maps, information leaflets and newspaper articles. Some of this material was internal to the respondents' organisations and not available to the general public. In addition, following interviews the researcher gathered pertinent documents mentioned by respondents which had not been reviewed prior.
With regard to the case study entities, a review of available documentary evidence, such as meeting papers, reports and evaluations, and policy papers, including those of sponsor organisations and partners where possible, was carried out. This informed the case study narratives in terms of the entity's background, how and why they came about, the contributions of the various partners and the reasons they were made, and the decision-making structures developed. Entity directors were asked to provide background information on the entity's structure, including its board membership and that of its constituent committees; selection or election procedures; and terms of reference and bylaws, which informed analysis of the entity's structure.

3.5.6. Validation

Validation of the researcher's interpretation has been sought where possible. Avenues for this have included presentation of the initial analyses in the cities under consideration. The initial Baltimore analysis was presented at the Urban Affairs Association annual meeting (held in Baltimore)\(^2\); and a detailed presentation of the initial Bristol and Baltimore analysis was made at the invitation of the University of the West of England's City Research Centre as part of the Centre's seminar series\(^3\), to which Bristol respondents were invited and which one entity staff member attended. The research has also been presented in other locations\(^4\).

In addition, each respondent was also e-mailed the initial analysis for their city including the case study entity findings. Only one Bristol entity-level staff respondent responded with comments, which resulted in minor factual amendments.


3.6 Conclusion

The strength of the research approach is that it places the same phenomenon (neighbourhood-based initiative governance) in two different city/national contexts to enable rigorous exploration and comparison of how its functions are affected by these contexts. Use of the “safari” method (Hantrais and Mangen, 1996) addresses many of the challenges posed by international comparative case study research. Grounding in a criteria-based assessment of governance entities enables a systematic assessment of the reality rather than rhetoric of their role, and assessment of their urban governance context links the two units of study to enable consideration of the interaction and relative power of the key actors and their strategies at these levels.

However, the research approach does lead to potential criticisms. For example, while the city-level provided a useful bounding of the research approach, enabling ‘deliverability’, the research seeks to locate neighbourhood governance in its multi-level governance context. It thus would have benefited from broader elite respondent selection from higher tiers of government and governance, as well as the documentary review of relevant policy documents produced by these higher tiers which did take place. In addition, while the heuristic framework of ‘ideal-type’ characteristics provides a good basis for bringing empirical rigour to the research, the value of further development of the framework prior to being applied empirically is recognised, though time constraints did not permit this. For example, the framework would have benefited from conceptual refinement regarding how the different functions combine and complement or conflict with each other, and which actors in the governance network are likely to champion and pursue which combinations of functions.

These weaknesses also demonstrate the strength of comparative research in its potential for theoretical development and the identification of avenues for future research. These are set out in chapter 7.
4.1 Introduction

This chapter serves to 'set the scene' in both cities prior to their detailed analysis in light of the findings of the empirical research in the following two chapters. It first considers the respective post-war national policy contexts for both cities. This demonstrates the validity of undertaking cross-national US and England comparative research given their ongoing, if intermittent, policy transfer. The chapter then takes each city in turn and sets out the city's neighbourhood-relevant history and the city/local government's changing orientation to neighbourhoods. It subsequently explores the relevant policies (identified and subject to documentary review in the course of the empirical research) developed at both city and higher levels of government and governance which frame neighbourhood approaches in both cities. This enables a detailed contextual understanding of the city in its regional and national policy context and thus assists in placing neighbourhood-level governance in its multi-level, multi-actor governance context.

National policies frame cities' practices and experiences, but do not completely dictate these. Given England's centrist governmental system, central government policy history can be tracked more readily at the city level, and indeed central government has played a consistently more direct role in relevant urban policy compared to the US's federal government. Therefore there is a need for greater consideration of national trends to provide the context for Bristol, and of city-level trends to provide the context for Baltimore. At the city level, similarities and differences are clear. Some relate to the different governmental systems of the two countries, and some relate to the path dependence of neighbourhood governance given distinctive local characteristics and history.
4.2 US and English Context

As explained in chapter 2, urban policies have developed in an intertwined way in the US and England in the post-war period, with English government’s “strong Atlantic focus” (Raco, 2003: 243) leading to the transfer of US policy lessons. In turn, urban policy responses in both countries derive from the negative consequences of deindustrialisation arising from the restructuring of the global economy. These responses have been framed by the rise of neo-liberalism, with a shift from bureaucratised to more entrepreneurial modes of governance (Harvey, 1989).

Neighbourhood governance-relevant developments can be divided into two broad categories. The first, which is of most relevance to this research, comprises area-based initiatives, a generic term for efforts which in England may be characterised as ‘place- and people-based regeneration’, and in the US as ‘community building’ initiatives targeted on deprived neighbourhoods. These have been deployed since the 1960s in successive waves in both countries. In the US, federal government policy in the past has taken the area-based initiative approach, though subsequently such initiatives have primarily been instigated at city government level with private foundations and intermediaries playing a key role. In England, central government has retained a key role in such approaches, whether directly or indirectly via local government. The second development is the efforts in both countries to devolve from the local to sub-local levels, with neighbourhood governance structures established to create a further layer of accountability particularly with regard to public service provision. Such efforts, which are often city-wide rather than being deprived neighbourhood-targeted, have been led for the most part by city/local governments, but latterly are being encouraged by central government in England.

4.2.1. National Policy History

1960s: Urban Renewal Leading to Neighbourhood Initiatives
In the US in the 1950s the largely federal government-funded ‘urban renewal’ efforts and expressway development led to the restructuring of urban areas. Drastic suburbanisation and comprehensive redevelopment led to displacement and disruption in city neighbourhoods. Mounting criticism of such approaches led to a shift to
poverty alleviation and neighbourhood revitalisation approaches. In the mid-1960s limited federal funds were directed to neighbourhood initiatives to provide support for neighbourhood organisations seeking to bring about “social reconstruction” (Stoker et al., 2009: 5). The Community Action Programme (CAP) and Model Cities programme focused on the notions of co-ordination of services and maximum feasible participation of the poor residents of targeted neighbourhoods (and were thus precursors of the area-based initiative approach). The CAP was resisted by municipal government, as community action agencies were organised by federal mandate (Chaskin and Garg, 1997: 639). The programme was then restructured to shift control to mayors, while Model Cities was placed under the aegis of municipal government from the outset. Neighbourhood-based governance of these initiatives was limited, and dominated by city-wide representatives. Where neighbourhood boards were created (as in Model Cities), their role was generally advisory and subject to municipal control.

England’s version of ‘urban renewal’, comprehensive redevelopment, saw the demolition of urban areas and the construction of public housing in the 1950s and 1960s. Between 1969 and 1972 twelve Community Development Projects (CDPs), inspired by the US’s area-based CAP, were in operation. They are still regarded as the “high water mark” of local involvement in area-based initiatives (Foley and Martin, 2000: 480). CDPs set up local teams of community workers and researchers. The resultant highly political analysis challenged the assumption that local action alone could tackle problems related to the economy (Taylor, 1995). This influential neo-Marxist critique of the “social pathology” approach (Cochrane, 2007: 50) saw deprivation as structural (Taylor, 1995). CDPs operated alongside the main urban policy initiative of the time, the Urban Programme, founded by central government in 1968 (which ran until the early 1990s). It funded social and welfare provision-focused initiatives in partnership with local authorities, though central government remained in control.

1970s: Bottom Up and Top Down

In the US grassroots political activism and new approaches to community organising led to a “backyard revolution” (Chaskin and Abunimah, 1999: 61). The early history of interaction between neighbourhood organisations and city agencies was
adversarial, given assumptions that their interests would invariably be at odds (Kathi and Cooper, 2005: 562). But many of these groups subsequently developed into formal community-based organisations that focused on one activity or a combination of service delivery, housing and economic development activities as well as, or instead of, community organising and advocacy. At the same time, a broad policy focus on decentralisation led many municipalities to seek to incorporate neighbourhoods into the structure of local government through the creation or recognition of various forms of neighbourhood councils. At the federal level, the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) took effect in 1975. It is still in existence and provides annual, formula-based grants to ‘entitled’ cities, urban counties and states for economic and community development.

Given fears following English local government reform that local authorities would become remote from the local population, several local authorities attempted to develop organisational arrangements to strengthen local accountability. However, ultimately the initiatives were seen as ‘add-ons’ to the highly centralised local authority decision-making structures (Burns et al., 1994). The Urban Programme remained the principal source of relevant central government funding.

1980s: the Rise of Neo-Liberalism

This period saw a policy shift in both countries from people and community-based approaches to an economic and property-led focus with an emphasis on enabling cities to compete economically. The philosophy was one of market forces guiding the private sector to invest, with the state intervening only as far as it created the conditions for the private sector to get involved (Jones and Evans, 2008: 9).

In the US this was reinforced by a significant reduction in federal aid, which necessitated cities becoming more self-reliant. Insofar as there was ‘urban policy’, it was expressed at the city rather than federal level (Cochrane, 2007: 90). Though in some cities ‘urban populism’ prevailed, where mayors and community activists focused on creating participatory mechanisms that allowed for grassroots mobilisation in the governing process (DiGaetano and Strom, 2003: 389), the general trend was to more corporatist modes of governance in cities. This is reflected in Stone’s (1989) notion of an “urban regime” (explored in chapter 2). Emphasis was placed on the
need for cities to position themselves so they could work with the private sector more effectively to meet their needs (Barnekov et al., 1989: 107). Some federal "policy leverage" (Cochrane, 2007: 91) was gained via the introduction of the competitively-allocated Urban Development Action Grant, which sought to stimulate private investment in distressed communities by providing a capital subsidy for economic development projects. This approach was later adopted in England.

In England, the perception that the local authority bureaucracy had become remote and unaccountable remained. New mechanisms were sought to make local government responsive. The right championed the individual consumer, with the rise of a managerial response to public service reform. The left advocated such strategies as the creation of sub-municipal forms of political decision-making (including area and neighbourhood committees), with the aim of giving local people a voice in decision-making (some are described by Burns et al., 1994).

By the late 1980s, the view that the state was an inefficient means of delivering services was reflected in the emergence of a business-led agenda for area-based regeneration, which was put in place by central government. The model of partnership was driven by the belief that the private sector, through the regulating mechanism of the market, could deliver what was best for it and therefore the aims of government. This is seen by Davies (2001) as a shift from "governance by government" to "governance by partnership". Enterprise Zones, the Urban Development Grant programme (transferred from the US), and Urban Development Corporations were created. Interestingly, proposed federal legislation to introduce Enterprise Zones in the US was never enacted (Cochrane, 2007: 95), a rare example of east-west policy transfer.

The rise of public-private partnership during the 1980s in both countries can be related to what Cochrane (2007: 89) calls the "shared philosophical [neo-liberal] understanding" of Reagan and Thatcher. At core was the view that welfare could only be delivered through economic success. However, this logic was carried further in the US. The "de facto devolution" brought about by "federal retrenchment" (DiGaetano and Strom, 2003: 369) led to the development of city-level 'urban regimes'. In contrast in England, while this period can be regarded as the high point
of the “hollowing out of the state” (Rhodes, 1994; Skelcher, 2000) given the turn to partnerships with the private sector, it can be argued that the strength of central government was reinforced during this period, certainly in relation to local government. Urban policy was directed towards greatly reducing the power of local authorities as part of a broader assault on the political left (Jones and Evans, 2008: 10). Central government took much more control of managing area-based initiatives at the local level, involving private partners to ‘lever in’ finance, and bypassing local authorities with governance mechanisms that were ‘parachuted in’. The focus on private property investment alienated local communities and failed to utilise the skills and commitment of local people (Robson et al., 1994). Increasing concerns about the uneven distributional effects of these policies gradually led to concern about ‘social exclusion’.

1990s to date: the Rise of Self-Help

In the US some modest time-limited federal programmes of relevance were introduced but these were very much based on levering the market. Most notable (continuing the enterprise zone metaphor transferred from England) the Empowerment Zone and Enterprise Communities ten-year programme was introduced in 1993. This provided tax incentives and additional resources for areas which could demonstrate pursuance of “economic opportunity, sustainable community development, community-based partnerships, and strategic vision for change” (Wallace, 2004: 597). The HOPE VI programme, instigated in 1992, focused on public housing improvement with a mixed-income ethos. More recently in 2000, the New Markets Tax Credit programme was established to incentivise investment to “spur revitalisation efforts of low-income and impoverished communities” (op cit).

This period’s main developments continued to occur at city level. Attempts were made to establish city-wide neighbourhood governance structures to incorporate neighbourhoods in local government (such as those in Minneapolis investigated by Fagotto and Fung, 2006). Chaskin and Garg (1997: 641) describe such approaches as enabling citizens to participate and represent their interests in services delivered by city agencies, while simultaneously attempting to make government more responsive to these entities. However, for the most part such neighbourhood bodies only have advisory relationships with city government (Chaskin and Abunimah, 1999: 61).
The other significant development was that deprived neighbourhoods were specifically targeted by 'community building' initiatives, intended to promote comprehensive neighbourhood change through the development of increased neighbourhood capacity for planning, advocacy, service delivery, and implementation of development strategies (Chaskin and Abunimah, 1999: 58). Such initiatives tended to be sponsored by philanthropic foundations (such as the Ford Foundation and the Annie E. Casey Foundation) or the national intermediaries (the Local Initiatives Support Corporation and Enterprise Community Partners) rather than government. Chaskin and Abunimah (1999) explain that these initiatives differ from local government-driven attempts to create mechanisms for neighbourhood participation and governance. This is because they target particular, deprived, neighbourhoods, are independent from formal structures of representative government, and rather than being advisory bodies, community-building initiatives are regarded as 'change agents' in themselves.

Most recently, the creation by President Obama in 2009 of a White House Office of Urban Affairs, "in order to take a co-ordinated and comprehensive approach to developing and implementing an effective strategy concerning urban America", has raised expectations of greater federal attention and resource for deprived urban neighbourhoods (The White House Office of the Press Secretary, 2009).

In England recognition increased during this period that the partnership model had not tackled some of the more intractable social problems. The role of local government in regeneration efforts was reinstated, with acceptance that local authorities had considerable expertise and local knowledge which made them well-placed to coordinate locally-based regeneration programmes (Jones and Evans, 2008: 12). The programmes introduced can be seen as the equivalent of 'community building' initiatives in the US, but these were nearly always controlled by central government.

---

5 Philanthropic foundations are private entities that have a philanthropic mission. Some may be operating foundations, delivering programmes directly, but most operate via intermediaries. Some operate nationally, some more locally, focusing on a city or metro area.

6 'Intermediaries' refer to non-profit sector entities which may operate nationally or locally (including at city-wide, multi-neighbourhood and single neighbourhood levels). Neighbourhood-based governance structures that have been established in deprived neighbourhoods in the US tend to be non-profit entities (these are often referred to as "501(c)(3)s", the tax designation for non-profit status).
City Challenge, introduced in 1991, was an attempt at a comprehensive and strategic approach to social as well as economic and physical regeneration. It provided £37.5 million over a five year period to designated areas. The Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) scheme, introduced in 1994, extended the area-based initiative approach, enabling greater variance in the types and duration of initiatives which could be funded (Jones and Evans, 2008: 12). Central government funds for both programmes were allocated on a competitive bidding basis, echoing use of this form of allocation for US federal programmes. However, while City Challenge bids were required to have been developed by a cross-sectoral partnership with plans reflecting local circumstances, the initiatives were found to be highly managerialist (Stewart, 1994). The competitive format penalised local authorities that were unable to develop comprehensive plans and demonstrate an ability to deliver (Malpass, 1994). In turn, the bureaucratic process of bidding for SRB funds effectively restricted the leadership of bids to local authorities and well-funded third sector organisations. Indeed, local government was generally the ‘lead partner’ as well as being the ‘accountable body’ to central government for the funds (via the Government Offices for the Regions, the regional presence of central government). The SRB regime ended in 2001 (though existing funding commitments were honoured).

While an increased emphasis on community involvement was empirically evident, community voices were felt to have been marginalised (Atkinson, 1999). In practice the community was often the weakest partner, “given a mere presence rather than a voice” (Cameron and Davoudi, 1998: 250). Such challenge programmes had little “impact on the levels of alienation felt by communities in the most deprived urban areas” (Foley and Martin, 2000: 481).

7 The Government defines the ‘third sector’ as “non-governmental organisations that are value driven and which principally reinvest their surpluses to further social, environmental or cultural objectives. It includes voluntary and community organisations, charities, social enterprises, cooperatives and mutuals”. http://www.communities.gov.uk/communities/thirdsector/
Other funding sources also became important during this period. The availability of European Union Structural Funds for areas experiencing deindustrialisation is regarded by some as evidence of the “hollowing out of the state” (Rhodes, 1994). But bids for these funds were co-ordinated by Government Offices for the Regions demonstrating significant central government control. In addition, the National Lottery, which commenced in 1994, became a significant funding source for third sector organisations.

The election of a Labour government in 1997 saw a further “turn to community” with moves to create conditions in which communities have a stronger role in developing regeneration strategies and monitoring local services (Foley and Martin, 2000: 480). Mechanisms included local participation in service delivery and design under Best Value, the creation of Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs), and the requirement for Local Area Agreements (LAAs), under the aegis of a new ‘community leadership’ role for local government (following the Local Government Act, 2000).

This seemingly heralded a different approach to deprived neighbourhoods, with the reliance on short-term, special initiatives replaced by a more ‘strategic’ approach. Evidence had emerged that area-based initiatives were having only limited success in addressing neighbourhood disadvantage (for example, Hall, 1997; and Stewart, 2002); that they displaced rather than resolved problems (Hastings, 2003: 86); and that “partnership fatigue” (op cit) had set in, with large demands on agencies potentially deflecting them from their mainstream operations. Crucially, it was felt that area-based initiatives were masking significant problems regarding the quality and appropriateness of public sector provision in disadvantaged neighbourhoods (Social Exclusion Unit, 2001). The practice of ‘bending’ mainstream spending programmes became a core component of the government’s approach to tackling disadvantage and deprivation (Imrie and Raco, 2003: 13). This emphasis on appropriate and responsive local service provision for deprived areas was later reflected in the establishment of three-year Neighbourhood Management Pathfinders focused on the three percent most disadvantaged areas in England in 2005. These were funded through the government’s Safer and Stronger Communities Fund (SSCF).
However, it is noteworthy that the emphasis on mainstreaming did not supplant the staple area-based initiative approach to the alleviation of neighbourhood deprivation. The most significant initiative was New Deal for Communities (NDC), established in 1998 to produce a local response to five indicators of social deprivation (unemployment, crime, educational underachievement, poor health, and problems with housing and the physical environment). It had a total budget of £2 billion over a longer, ten-year lifetime, for programmes in 39 neighbourhoods of between 1,000 and 4,000 households. Designation combined a needs-based approach (based on the central government-determined Indices of Deprivation) with a bid for ‘pathfinder’ status. Each scheme comprised a local partnership involving residents, community organisations, local authorities and local businesses. Particular emphasis was placed on the capacity building of communities to provide them with “the skills and knowledge to become active in eradicating (their) deprivation” (Imrie and Raco, 2003: 21), indicating an increased emphasis on the self-help account of neighbourhood governance.

However, the NDC has been subject to much criticism. Though the intention was that targets and actions should be set locally, there was initially considerable underspend of resources as locally-agreed targets were rejected at national level. This indicates that such initiatives are driven by a “policy of inclusion but on terms which have already been defined and set outside the community” (Diamond, 2001: 277). The NDC has been dominated by central government directives over the form and character of local community-based regeneration programmes (Diamond, 2001; Audit Commission, 2002). It demonstrates that “communities are often ‘shoehorned’ on to local policy initiatives according to central government guidelines” (Imrie and Raco, 2003: 27).

Creation of the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit (operating from 2001 until 2008) stemmed from the National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal (Social Exclusion Unit, 2001). The unit oversaw a £800 million Neighbourhood Renewal Fund (NRF) (operating from 2000 until 2008). This provided funds to eighty-eight of the most deprived local authorities in England. ‘Community Chests’ (operating from 2002 until 2006) in turn provided small grants to community groups in these areas. NRF recipient authorities were required to allocate funds via a Local Strategic Partnership
(LSP), comprising representatives of state and non-state actors, most notably the local authority, local police authority, and the health and education sectors. These partnerships operate under central government control and guidance (Imrie and Raco, 2003: 17), and require accreditation by the regional Government Office. Despite being non-statutory, these arrangements quickly spread across local authorities in England. LSPs are now responsible for developing and driving the implementation of Sustainable Community Strategies (SCS) and LAAs, both of which require government approval. Community Strategies are described as an "overarching plan for promoting and improving the well-being of an area" (DCLG, 2008: 28). LAAs are three-year agreements between central government (represented by the Government Office) and local authorities and their partners (represented by the LSP) with the aim of enabling 'local solutions to local circumstances'. The LAA is "a shorter-term delivery mechanism for the SCS" (DCLG, 2008: 34) as it frames the allocation of funding according to local priorities as identified in the SCS.

Overall, LSPs are apparently the locus for current policies of relevance to deprived neighbourhoods. Rather than working at neighbourhood level, LSPs are responsible for co-ordinating efforts to achieve neighbourhood renewal at the local authority spatial scale, with an emphasis on mainstream services rather than area-based initiatives. While this seems to signal a shift away from a focus on the internal problems of deprived neighbourhoods, the approach does "remain disengaged in terms of the broader societal and structural processes that shape neighbourhoods" (Hastings, 2003: 100). In turn, Diamond (2004) finds that LSP managers perceive the community as a weak, dependent partner in the process.

Despite these policy shifts, it is still not evident that central government is willing to trust communities and local service providers with "policy space, resources and greater autonomy" (Foley and Martin, 2000: 488). The government remains strongly centralised and retains a strong emphasis on performance management, leading to questions regarding the extent to which local variation is really gaining precedence over central goals (Pratchett, 2004: 370). For example, the target-driven nature of government's management of LSPs, initially via 'floor targets' which set minimum standards on a variety of social indicators for deprived areas, and latterly via LAAs, has meant they have remained 'top-down'. With the introduction of a simplified
performance framework for LAAs in 2006, including the ability to set ‘local improvement targets’, scope for greater local flexibility is evident, but it remains within a framework set by central government.

Therefore, as reflected in the steering interpretation of neighbourhood governance explained in chapter 2, despite the repeated assertion that urban policy is now community-focused, and orientated towards the involvement and activation of local knowledge in the policy process, the practices of urban governance remain highly centralised and output-focused. Indeed, commentators argue that these policies represent “a pragmatic evolution rather than radical change” (Tiesdell and Allmendinger, 2001). For others, the changes are no more than procedural with the rescaling of government undertaken in ways that do not effectively reduce the powers of the central state (Jones and Ward, 2002). The tension in English policy between the rhetoric of community empowerment and centrally-driven priorities is ongoing.

Since 2006 there has been a transition in central government policy approaches from those of area-based neighbourhood renewal, as set out in the national strategy (Social Exclusion Unit, 2001) to a broader ‘neighbourhoods agenda’. This more amorphous suite of policies includes those regarding neighbourhood management, community empowerment, and development of a more self-reliant third sector. For example, most recently, the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act (2007) devolved the power to create community governance structures to local authorities, harking back to previous attempts in cities in the 1970s and 1980s. This fulfils the ‘double devolution’ agenda which sought some delegation of powers from central to local government, and then from local government to neighbourhoods (Smith et al., 2007: 224). The Act’s introduction of ‘community calls for action’, whereby councillors can involve overview and scrutiny committees in resolving constituents’ concerns, is an attempt to improve representative democracy. In terms of participative democracy, participatory budgeting and ‘community contracts’ have been piloted, whereby local councils, agencies and communities agree actions. This, along with other recent policy changes, demonstrates the increased emphasis in recent English policy on the need “to harness the knowledge and energy of local people” (Social Exclusion Unit, 2000: 7).
This demonstrates that the policy agenda under New Labour since the late 1990s has increasingly drawn on the tradition of communitarianism, which is concerned with the revival of social structures to enable strong bonds to be forged between individuals and broader collectives (Imrie and Raco, 2003: 7). This reflects the self-help interpretation of the function of neighbourhood governance, further borne out by recent central government encouragement of community management and ownership of assets (investigated by the Quirk Review, 2007). This is reflective of US approaches. However, in this agenda, the 'community' is something to be defined and empowered in the pursuit of policy objectives (Imrie and Raco, 2003: 9). Such “responsibilisation” (Cochrane, 2007: 52) of communities is undertaken by central government as part of its attempt to realise its political imperatives.

4.2.2. Comparison of the US and England

In comparing the use of neighbourhood governance in the two countries, certain similarities can be expected given the history of (particularly US to England) policy transfer and their shared neo-liberal context, and certain differences can be expected given their different governmental systems.

This review of policy history highlights that policy relevant to neighbourhood governance in England has tended to follow trends from the US (Jones and Evans, 2008: 167; Hambleton and Taylor, 1994) from the 1960s onwards. While the links between the two countries given the shared ethos of Reagan and Thatcher and the rise of neo-liberalism were particularly close in the 1980s, it is in the localist and privatist US that this ethos has been most fully realised. English central government has subsequently continued to both intervene directly and maintain policy emphasis on the neighbourhood level. However, more recently England appears to be mirroring the US given central government’s growing emphasis on community ‘self-help’. Local action is emphasised in what can be seen as a neo-liberal discourse of self-help and community ownership. This highlights that similarities in neighbourhood-relevant policy and practice do relate to policy transfer, but that this is encouraged by the two countries’ shared neo-liberal context, with the associated changing role of the state. This change in role is underpinned by the notion that the state “should exercise only limited powers of its own, steering and regulating rather than rowing and providing” (Rose, 2000: 323-24).
Despite this, however, it is evident that in England central government policies of relevance to the neighbourhood level are subject to almost constant change which in turn affects the forms of governance which arise at different spatial scales. Skelcher’s (2000) description of the “congested state” which arose in the late 1990s is appropriate. This term describes the “dense, multi-layered” nature of governance which has arisen from “a complex of networked relationships between public, private, voluntary and community actors” (Skelcher, 2000: 4). Even when government seeks to devolve powers it does so in a prescriptive manner, which is in significant contrast to the US.

As explored in terms of the forms of urban governance in chapter 2, the crucial difference which frames neighbourhood governance activity is that the US is a devolved and privatist governmental system, with limited government intervention in social and economic problems (DiGaetano and Strom, 2003: 370). England has a much stronger tradition of direct government intervention, exemplified by the post-war welfare state, and while this has reduced with the rise of governance, government frames such arrangements. Therefore the English urban governance system is centralised. In both countries central/federal government has devolved powers to lower levels, but the “downward shift of governing responsibility played out differently in the decentralised US state, [than in] the far more centralised authority of the UK” (DiGaetano and Strom, 2003: 387). In the English unitary system there is no intermediate, state, level of government, so local government is a “creature of central government” (Wolman and Goldsmith, 1990: 23) and can only do what has been specifically authorised by parliament. As explained previously, debates are ongoing about the real extent of devolution given the deep-seated tension between national prescription and local flexibility (Foley and Martin, 2000: 487). In the US federal system, local government is a creature of state government. But as many states grant their local governments varying degrees of general competencies through ‘home rule’ provisions (‘home rule’ being the principle or practice of self-government by localities), the locus of authority and responsibility for urban governance sits at the local level.

In both countries therefore, the extent of local government’s power is subject to limitations prescribed by state or central government. The degree of autonomy at the
sub-local, neighbourhood, level is not only a function of the level of delegation of powers from the local level, but the level of delegation to that level from higher levels such as the state or central government. Thus in both countries, the autonomy of neighbourhood-based entities is supervised and checked by government. This is described by Fung (2004) in the US as “accountable autonomy” (in the federal system this is to local government). In England it is described by Stoker (2004) as “constrained discretion”, whereby devolution occurs within the bounds set by central government’s policies and priorities.

It is therefore unsurprising given the federal versus centrist governmental systems that more commentary is required regarding English rather than US national government policies relevant to neighbourhoods, particularly when considering the period since the “de facto devolution” of “federal retrenchment” in the 1980s (DiGaetano and Strom, 2003: 369). The subsequent privatist urban regime-type arrangements which have been identified at the US city level indicate constraints on the ability of higher levels of government to set bounds on local arrangements in which lower levels of government are not the only actors. However, the potential for local autonomy varies not only relating to the limits imposed by higher levels of government but also to differences in local economic and social conditions and processes and local government institutional characteristics (Wolman and Goldsmith, 1990).

While national policies to an extent frame cities’ practices and experiences, and can particularly be expected to do so in the context of England’s centrist governmental system, the use of neighbourhood governance will also be affected by a city’s distinctive problems, local government institutional characteristics, civic society traditions, economic conditions, and histories. Such path dependence becomes apparent in the next section which sets out the policies and approaches relevant to neighbourhood governance in the two cities in which empirical research was conducted. This is particularly the case in Baltimore given the greater importance of city-level conditions in a federal governmental system.
4.3 City of Baltimore

4.3.1. Population and Deprivation

The city’s population is 631,000 (US Census Bureau, 2006 estimate), a 30% decline since its peak in 1950. The city has a majority of African American residents at 64% of the total population (US Census, 2000), compared to 12.8% for the US as a whole (US Census Bureau, 2008 estimate).

In 1999, Baltimore’s median household income was $30,000 and 23% of its residents were below the (federal government-defined) poverty threshold (US Census Bureau). This compares to a national median household income of $51,000 and a 13% national rate of persons below the poverty threshold (US Census Bureau, 2007 estimate). 20% of the city’s 300,000 housing units are vacant (US Census Bureau American Community Survey, 2006).

4.3.2. History

Baltimore is a ‘city of neighbourhoods’, with a strong neighbourhood awareness among residents that derives historically from geographic boundaries and ethnic identities. Before the second world war neighbourhoods had a degree of stability (Crenson, 1983). The post-war period saw sustained decline of the city as a port and an accelerating loss of manufacturing jobs. The city’s major businesses and government coalesced around the restructuring of the central business district, paying little attention to the effects on neighbourhoods. The combination of federally-funded expressway development and urban renewal, federally-guaranteed housing loans which enabled drastic suburbanisation, and in-migration of African Americans, led to widespread displacement and disruption and a concentration of deprivation. This left a legacy of distrust of government actions among the city’s deprived population (Stoker et al., 2008).

With the rapid demographic change and racial succession of the post-war period the voluntary sector was eroded, and neighbourhoods had “left only a shell of civic life” (Stoker et al., 2009: 4). In the 1960s neighbourhood residents mobilised to resist the disruption of redevelopment, but with mixed success. Federal funding via the Community Action and Model Cities programmes did assist in the rise of advocacy.
neighbourhood organisations. "Umbrella organisations" were formed which brought
neighbourhoods together for political purposes (Crenson, 1983: 138). These tended to
have a board comprising neighbourhood and cross-sectoral institutional
representatives, but did not include representatives from city government. However,
neighbourhood disruption continued, with federal aid failing to match
neighbourhoods' escalating needs, and state and city funding providing no alternative
support. A focus on redevelopment continued, such as that of the Inner Harbor,
completed in 1980 (Stoker, 1987), which became an international model for physical
regeneration (Raco, 2003: 243).

In the 1980s the policy agenda that gave priority to economic development with
limited attention to increasingly distressed neighbourhood conditions was challenged
locally. The business sector's Greater Baltimore Committee repositioned itself as a
regional organisation as the city's corporate presence shrunk, while its philanthropic
sector began to play an expanded role in neighbourhood-based efforts. This coincided
with the end of Mayor Schaefer's 15-year tenure and the election of Mayor Schmoke
(the city's first elected black mayor), who had come into office on a platform of
addressing the city's long-neglected neighbourhoods, including an emphasis on
community policing.

Baltimore was selected as a federal Empowerment Zone in 1994, which enabled
provision of a variety of services to targeted neighbourhoods, including a focus on
community capacity building. In the philanthropic sector, concerns about neglected
urban neighbourhoods and persisting social problems gave rise to 'community
building' efforts. The Sandtown-Winchester initiative was undertaken by a
partnership between the Enterprise Foundation (founded by James Rouse, developer
of the Inner Harbor), the city and the community. However, only marginal
improvements were achieved and though the area was included in the Empowerment
Zone, it did not achieve constructive and sustained community engagement. The
initiative came to be regarded as a lesson in how intractable neighbourhood problems
can be (Brown et al., 2001). At the same time, and reflecting national trends, CDCs
emerged as more professional structures which combined property development and
service provision with community outreach and participation to varying degrees.
Stoker et al. (2009: 6) describe such bodies as "lack[ing] the indigenous volunteer
character" of the earlier period, which in turn reflects the greater "role of government and other external actors in constituting the character of a neighbourhood's civic life" (op cit).

While Baltimore continued to gain modest federal funds, for example Hope VI funds for public housing redevelopment, and also for community policing, it was not significant or sustained. No major new federal programmes have been instigated since the city's ten-year Empowerment Zone designation, which expired in 2004. There has been a continuing decline in the city's annual allocation of CDBG funds, which currently stands at $21 million. One project (explored below) is currently benefiting from significant federal and state government funding support via 'earmarks' (ad hoc appropriations in federal and state budgets) and New Market Tax Credits, but this is a notable exception.

With the realisation that tackling deprived neighbourhoods needs a huge commitment of public funds, limited by the city's shrinking tax base and reductions in federal aid, a shift occurred to a "greater realism" (Stoker et al., 2009: 10) which has framed the city's current policy approaches.

4.3.3. City Government Orientation to Neighbourhoods

Baltimore has a fifteen-member city council, fourteen members elected by district and a president separately elected city-wide. However, power is vested in the city's mayor.

The city government has attempted to become more responsive to neighbourhood needs and priorities. With the rise of the neighbourhoods movement in the 1960s some city services were reorientated away from city council districts towards neighbourhoods. In 1970 the Department of Planning introduced district planners to work with neighbourhood groups, and Mayor's Representatives theoretically enabled direct contact with the Mayor. More recently city functions have continued to restructure operations in ways that in theory enable better neighbourhood communication and service co-ordination. The city has designated 270 Neighborhood Statistical Areas (NSAs), for which the US Census Bureau prepares data. Planning now has nine community planning areas, which are coterminous with housing
inspection boundaries and largely match police districts. The community planners act as the interface between neighbourhood groups, developers, elected officials and the city, but also attempt to play a proactive role in working with neighbourhood organisations to achieve common goals.

The Mayor’s Office of Neighborhoods was created in 2001. The original intent of the Mayor’s Transition Task Force that recommended the office’s formation was that it would co-ordinate action within neighbourhoods, not just in terms of city services, which has happened to some extent, but in terms of realisation of the neighbourhood action plans (explained below) which would have involved a much broader set of stakeholders, including the philanthropic and non-profit sectors. However, the office is a reactive rather than proactive structure which is geared to troubleshoot city services. Initiatives have followed the classic ‘crime and grime’ model of community clean ups and public safety initiatives, with community engagement in ‘walk-throughs’ with agency representatives. City government’s emphasis on service responsiveness is also illustrated by the 311 phone number for residents’ issues, ‘one call to City Hall’. Call data are analysed as part of the CitiStat system, a management tool:

The following policies and approaches were identified and subject to documentary review in the course of the empirical research. These have been developed at both city and higher levels of government and governance and frame the city’s approaches to neighbourhoods.

4.3.4. Relevant Policies and Approaches

**Strategic Neighborhood Action Planning (SNAP)**

In 2001 the Department of Planning undertook the SNAP initiative. This recognised the need for more localisation of planning but at a sufficient scale to provide a useful strategic product which would enable neighbourhood priorities to inform city agency resource allocation. Neighbourhoods which were able to form self-defined coalitions of a population range of 10,000 to 30,000 residents were offered technical assistance in preparing plans for their areas for approval by the Planning Commission. The process was well-received and the action plans prepared allocated responsibility for
action not only to city agencies but to the coalitions themselves. However, the
process is generally regarded as being in abeyance, due largely to the lack of city
agency commitment and ability to deliver, and lack of resource, which, despite the
Department of Planning being responsible for the city’s capital budget, offers only
“limited leverage” (Stoker and Stone, 2008: 5) given the city’s weak tax base.

City Master Plan
The first comprehensive master plan for the city since 1971 was adopted in 2006. The
plan is described as and takes the format of “a business plan for a world-class city”
(City of Baltimore, 2006), implying a strong neo-liberal orientation. The extent to
which the plan contains a neighbourhood policy is reflected in the following extract:

“As part of its larger, city-wide response to market forces, Baltimore will
work with individual neighbourhoods to stabilize local real estate markets. This will
focus City residents and services on retaining existing residents while attracting new
residents. Tailoring City action to the particular needs of each community will
efficiently and effectively cut the constraints which can hinder neighbourhood
stability, allowing more Baltimore neighbourhoods to compete with their suburban
alternatives” (City of Baltimore, 2006: 70).

The plan includes policies and approaches very relevant to neighbourhoods – the
housing typology and the city’s economic growth strategy.

Housing Typology
The market-driven ethos for public resource allocation identified above reflects the
shift, in 2001, in the basis for city government resource allocation from being needs to
asset-based. The housing typology (City of Baltimore, 2006: 220-24) provides the
ostensible framework for this. The typology is a housing market classification
scheme that uses housing market value at block level as a proxy for assets. The
variables in the 2005 classification include the median value of home sales, along
with the proportions of home ownership and public housing, vacancies and
foreclosures.

The typology has five categories (op cit). “Distressed” areas are defined as such
given the scale of disinvestment, population loss and abandonment, and the principal
“housing market intervention” identified is demolition, ideally clustered to create
potential for land assembly. However, recognition is given to the additional need for
more holistic approaches including “social service interventions”. In what are commonly referred to as the ‘middle’ categories, interventions identified include supporting homeownership in the “transitional” areas, marketing vacant homes in the “stable” areas, and providing additional incentives for development and investment in the “emerging” areas. The final category is “competitive” areas, regarded as not requiring direct market interventions (City of Baltimore, 2006: 220-24).

**Economic Growth Strategy**

Economic development policies since Mayor O’Malley’s tenure (1999-2007) have sought to exploit strategic assets in the city’s education and medical (‘ed and med’) institutions (in contrast to the earlier focus on the central business district). The economic growth strategy is included in the city master plan. This identifies “bioscience” as a “new industry that has demonstrated potential for growth” (City of Baltimore, 2006: 93) and is described as a “growth sector as a focus for targeted intervention” (op cit: 100). This targeted strategy is reflected in the current “mega-project” (Stoker and Stone, 2008: 17) underway in the city, the East Baltimore Development Initiative (EBDI), which is anchored by Johns Hopkins University, the largest private employer in the State of Maryland. The planning and execution of this project has “occupied a significant place in the macro-politics of the city” (Stoker et al., 2009: 11). It is receiving critical support from state and federal government, being slated to receive $42 million from the state government and $38 million from federal government via programmes and special ‘earmarks’. The project’s feasibility is also assisted through its allocation of $47 million in New Market Tax Credits (op cit).

**Consolidated Plan**

Baltimore Housing combines the city’s Housing Authority and its Department for Housing and Community Development. It is responsible for disbursing federal CDBG funds, as well as other housing entitlements, that the city receives as an ‘entitlement community’. This is a core source of support for the city’s non-profit sector. CDBG allocation is essentially at the jurisdiction’s discretion within very broad guidelines that it should benefit ‘low and moderate income’ communities, which comprise the majority of the city.
The housing typology is included in the "Consolidated Plan" (Baltimore Housing, 2005) required by the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development for CDBG 'entitlement jurisdictions'. The intent is that entitlement jurisdictions consolidate their plans for CDBG funds with other strategic planning efforts. Baltimore Housing’s Plan sets out major redevelopment areas across the city for which it seeks to pump prime development, and a "community development" section that purports to guide smaller-scale developments and approaches across broader areas of the city (op cit).

Healthy Neighbourhoods Initiative
The city-based Goldseker Foundation sponsored a series of surveys in the late 1990s that suggested that neighbourhoods that are neither distressed nor privileged were being overlooked by policymakers and the philanthropic sector (Stoker et al., 2008). This led to development of a ‘market-orientated’ approach to neighbourhood revitalisation which culminated in the Healthy Neighborhoods initiative (launched in 2001). This was subsequently branded as a mayoral initiative and is now an independent non-profit organisation which receives a modest amount of funding from city government. Its “limited revitalisation agenda” (Stoker et al., 2009: 19) targets neighbourhoods ‘in the middle’ which are regarded as at risk of disinvestment. It aims to stimulate real estate markets and enhance housing values though a combination of community development, marketing, housing subsidies, and physical improvements in the housing stock. It has targeted neighbourhoods which have the capacity to carry out the required community mobilisation and marketing functions. The approach’s ‘market orientation’ focused on property values, rather than ‘deficit orientation’, which would identify problems and seek support from government or the philanthropic community to redress these, can be seen as influencing the city’s adoption of the housing market typology in its master and consolidated plans.

Smart Growth
In line with ‘home rule’, the State of Maryland does not play a large role in neighbourhood approaches in Baltimore. Its CDBG allocation is significantly smaller than the city’s entitlement funds. However, the state’s smart growth policies (as contained in the State of Maryland’s Smart Growth Priority Funding Areas Act, 1997) frame efforts to both contain greenfield development and revitalise urban areas, with
Baltimore City defined as a “Smart Growth Area” (op cit). As a result, there is an Office of Neighborhood Reinvestment in the state’s Department of Housing and Community Development which administers a number of programmes which seek neighbourhood outcomes, a level of targeting atypical for state agencies. However, the state partners with the city to identify and deliver projects, and programmes require a local government resolution of support.

4.4 City of Bristol

4.4.1. Population and Deprivation

In 2007, Bristol’s population was 416,000 (Office of National Statistics Population Estimates Unit, 2007). Of this, 11.2% comprised black and minority ethnic residents (ONS Experimental Statistics, 2006), compared to 7.9% of the UK population (ONS, Census 2001). Median annual earnings are £22,900 compared to £20,000 for the UK (ONS Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings, 2007).

Bristol has some of the most deprived areas in England (Bristol City Council, 2007). The city has 39 Lower Super Output Areas (LSOAs) in the most deprived 10% nationally (as measured by the Indices of Deprivation). Of these, 14 LSOAs are in the most deprived 3%, and four are in the most deprived 1% nationally. The number of people living in the most deprived 10% of LSOAs is about 65,000, or 16% of all Bristol residents.

Of those areas within the most deprived 10% nationally, Lawrence Hill ward (covered by the Community at Heart case study governance entity), Knowle West, Hartcliffe (covered by the Hartcliffe and Withywood Community Partnership, HWCP, case study entity) and Southmead experience more extreme levels of deprivation than the others. These others are Lockleaze, Lawrence Weston, Henbury and Withywood (which is also covered by the HWCP case study structure). These most deprived areas all comprise either peripheral social housing estates or inner city areas and have been identified as recipients of central government regeneration funding.
4.4.2 History

In the post-war period Bristol’s economy was founded on its port functions and associated manufacturing industries. During the 1970s and 1980s the city lost almost half of its manufacturing jobs (Boddy et al., 2004: 53) but its economy proved resilient in the face of restructuring given the growth of service industries, particularly finance and business, and a growth in public sector employment (op cit). Overall, the city saw a reduction in jobs in the 1970s and in population in the 1970s and 1980s. In the 1980s private sector interests established the Bristol Initiative as “a local force for change” (Stewart, 2003: 77), and the Bristol Chamber of Commerce and Initiative (BCCI) developed a private sector view regarding how the city should develop.

However, from the mid-1990s there was growing resistance to further development to the north of the city adjacent to the M4 and M5 motorways (Boddy et al., 2004: 56). The resultant focus on development within the city led to a rapid expansion of new housing development and conversion of former commercial and industrial premises. While this was in line with the government’s vision of ‘urban renaissance’, much of this comprised high-cost development, and wider benefits in terms of the provision of low-cost housing were limited (op cit: 57). A series of prestigious publicly-subsidised developments also resulted in the city centre and the harbourside.

Despite its overall economic success, the city’s experiences emphasise that this does not counteract what are by national standards marked concentrations of deprivation (Boddy et al., 2004: 62). Given these, the city has been the recipient of a succession of central government neighbourhood-targeted initiatives which track national policy history. These start with the Urban Programme, continue through the physical regeneration-focused Urban Task Force and Urban Development Corporation approaches (introduced in the city’s harbourside in the 1980s), to the more holistic, community-centred programmes of the last fifteen years. However, attempts to gain programmatic regeneration funds from central government have had varied success. The unsuccessful City Challenge bids of the early 1990s were followed with greater success under later SRB funding rounds (with eight schemes in total), as well as the city gaining an NDC pathfinder. The ranking in the Indices of Deprivation was used as the basis to identify ten NRF areas in the city in 2001 and three Neighbourhood Management pilot areas in 2005. These areas have overlapped with previous SRB
and NDC designations. The city also benefited from EU URBAN and Objective 2 programmes. All of these designations have now ended or are about to end. At the time of the research the effects of the ‘funding cliff’ precipitated by the end of the NRF in March 2008 were still reverberating in the city, which had received two years’ ‘transition funding’ from central government.

In the mid-1990s the council formed the Bristol Regeneration Partnership (BRP), envisaged as a more independent and suitable body than the council to manage regeneration programmes, though the council remained as ‘accountable body’ to central government. The BRP was essentially a forerunner of the Bristol Partnership, which came into being to fulfil the requirement for a LSP for the local government area when the city gained access to NRF resource in 2001. In its early stages, the LSP struggled to establish the conditions under which the partnership could become effective and receive central government endorsement and what Stewart (2003: 86) calls the “politics of accreditation” began to dominate. There were concerns about the capacity of the LSP to undertake strategic decision-making, expedite action, the extent of community and voluntary sector engagement, and about the culture of partnership working. In 2002, these tensions were reflected in proposals for the LSP’s reformulation, put into practice with the creation of a smaller membership. However, at the time of the research in 2008 the LSP was in the process of being ‘re-launched’ in its third iteration since its creation. This followed an independent peer review which found that it lacked a strategic role and had lost the engagement of statutory service providers (Warwick Business School et al., 2007).

Prevalent third (voluntary and community) sector support organisations, or ‘core infrastructure organisations’, in the city include specialised/thematic organisations such as the Black Development Agency and the Care Forum, and Voscur (Voluntary Organisations Standing Conference on Urban Regeneration), which is the Council for Voluntary Service body in the city and the general umbrella organisation for the sector. Various government initiatives have fostered attempts at formal co-ordination amongst the city’s third sector, including the now defunct Community Empowerment Network (to ensure resident engagement in NRF efforts). The ChangeUp Consortium was established in 2004 (comprising five of the city’s third sector support organisations) as a result of a Home Office initiative to improve the support available...
to third sector organisations. As required by central government, a ‘compact’ is also in place between the city’s public agencies and the third sector. This “defines and strengthens positive working relationships… particularly within the Bristol Partnership and in the delivery of the Local Area Agreement” (The Bristol Partnership, 2008a). The council has an associated third sector commissioning agenda.

Bristol’s history of governance forms and neighbourhood-based initiatives mirrors changes in central government urban policies. The city has experienced a succession of policy instruments, a fragmentation of institutions as the traditional responsibilities and powers of the local authority have been dispersed, and a proliferation of initiatives. Stewart (2003: 76) identifies the emergence of “new urban governance” in Bristol as a culmination of “the fragmentation and initiative proliferation of the past 50 years”. He characterises the city as one with “a long history both of complacency and conflict as well as a more recent history of positive partnership working” (Stewart, 2003: 86).

4.4.3. Local Government Orientation to Neighbourhoods

In 1974 the local authority’s loss to the new County of Avon of strategic planning and key service powers resulted in 20 years of “civic sulking” (Stewart, 2003: 77). With the national policy shift to public-private partnership in the 1980s, the council engaged with the private sector. However, some ambivalence to the partnership approach given perceptions of its imposition by central government remained. This was reflected in the bitterness of two rejected bids for City Challenge initiatives in 1991 and 1992 (Malpass, 1994). The period 1992-96 was one of “gradual movement into joint working” (Stewart, 2003: 78). Traditionally highly departmentalised, the council began to develop a more corporate structure and sought unitary status, which it gained in 1996. Gradually “a grudging city council” realised the necessity of competing against other localities for central government and European resources (Stewart, 2003: 85) as well as Lottery Funds which could be targeted at its deprived neighbourhoods.

An increasing neighbourhood sensitivity is illustrated by the council asking the BRP to convene a community conference in 1998 to identify the area to be put forward to
central government for NDC designation. The genesis of both case study structures as formal initiative governance bodies lay in this event. Barton Hill was selected, and the ‘consolation prize’ for the area that came second in the vote, Hartcliffe, was development of a bid to round five of the SRB regime.

Following New Labour’s local government modernisation, the council adopted the executive scrutiny model with a cabinet. The city is divided into 35 wards and has 70 councillors. In 2008, the council gained a new chief executive and at the time of research was undergoing an extensive restructure with an emphasis on an orientation to neighbourhoods. This reflects an attempt to change its ‘silo’ mode of working to enable better ‘bending’ of mainstream spending. A set of strategic directors had been identified against functions rather than departments, including the post of Strategic Director of Neighbourhoods (yet to be filled during the research period). Cabinet posts reflect this shift, including a new post of Executive Member for Neighbourhoods and Involvement.

The following policies and approaches were identified and subject to documentary review in the course of the empirical research. These have been developed at both city and higher levels of government and governance and frame the city’s approaches to neighbourhoods.

4.4.4. Relevant Policies and Approaches

*Corporate Plan*

The council’s new Corporate Plan (Bristol City Council, 2008a) contains a commitment to tackle deprivation, “by unlocking the potential of areas of deprivation, the whole city will benefit. We are committed to transformational change” (op cit: 4) but this lacks policy detail. More emphasis is placed on neighbourhoods in general, with one of the plan’s four priorities being to “ensure that Bristol residents experience significant change in the physical quality of their neighbourhoods and have opportunities to shape improvements at this level” (op cit: 21-22).
**Neighbourhood Partnerships**

To this end, the council is in the process of establishing a city-wide set of
neighbourhood partnerships (fourteen in total), each covering two to three wards:

“All communities must be empowered to influence their neighbourhoods and
how services are delivered. We are committed to listening and responding to
residents, through the development of Neighbourhood Partnerships across the city,
creating a real opportunity to improve the quality of life in all neighbourhoods”
(Bristol City Council, 2008a: 4).

The partnerships are envisaged by the council as an equitable mechanism which re­
engages councillors with their areas, along with the representation of statutory
agencies, local third sector groups and residents (Voscur, 2008). The approach has an
ethos of building on what is already there in neighbourhoods, referring to the
structures already present in deprived areas which have been consolidated and
formalised due to programmatic government funding under NDC, SRB and the NRF
regimes. Areas less deprived, and therefore not the target of initiatives, tend not to
have such formalised structures in place. The partnerships are expected to develop a
list of local priorities and develop a local action plan to “make the connections
between neighbourhood and city-wide priorities” by enabling the partnerships to
inform service delivery and financial allocation (op cit). The partnerships will not
have control over devolved budgets, though they will have a small budget (of £10,000
per ward) for their own allocation (op cit).

**Sustainable Community Strategy**

At the time of the research, an ‘interim’ SCS was in place, given the need for it to
accompany the ‘refreshed’ LAA which central government required to be agreed by
June 2008. While attributed to the Bristol Partnership, the statement had been
prepared by council officers as the partnership was in the process of being
reformulated. While the SCS is envisaged as setting out the strategic priorities for the
city, the interim statement was only one page in length. The framing statement of the
interim SCS is:

“In the next twenty years, we want to ensure that the city’s prosperity
strengthens and grows. As an essential part of achieving this, we will unlock the
potential of our disadvantaged communities to contribute to long term sustainable
economic growth and shared prosperity” (The Bristol Partnership, 2008b).
Local Area Agreement

The LAA is regarded as the delivery plan for the SCS. The current LAA covers the period 2008 to 2011. In addition to targets from the pre-existing LAA (agreed in 2007), and statutory education indicators, it contains indicators agreed between GOSW and the council and its partners (though this was hampered given that the Bristol Partnership was in abeyance). These 'local' indicators are based on the priorities set out in the interim SCS. One indicator, 'the percentage of people who feel they can influence decisions in their locality', relates to the creation of neighbourhood partnerships.

Local Development Framework

The LDF core strategy is the “spatial expression of the SCS” (Bristol City Council, 2008b: 8), guiding physical growth and change in the city until 2026. In January 2008 a ‘preferred options’ paper for the LDF core strategy proposed a “spatial vision”:

“For our city to be a prosperous, cohesive and sustainable city... The aims are to prioritise better outcomes for children, younger and older people, sharing prosperity, growth and regeneration, and to create a safe and healthy city made up of thriving neighbourhoods with a high quality of life” (Bristol City Council, 2008b: 8).

The key strategic objectives in the core strategy are to achieve “mixed, balanced and sustainable communities” (op cit: 10) and “ambitious and sustainable economic growth... ensuring continued competitiveness” (op cit: 11). In line with the RSS (below) the strategy emphasises the “economic, social and physical regeneration of South Bristol” (op cit: 15), delivered via “an increase in the number of new homes and jobs” (op cit: 19). The strategy also emphasises the “continued growth of the city centre” (op cit: 15) which is seen as entailing “ensuring that those in the disadvantaged communities close to the city centre can contribute to and benefit from city centre growth” (op cit: 21).

Regional Spatial Strategy

The draft RSS (South West Regional Assembly, 2006) identifies Bristol, the largest urban area in the region, as a ‘strategically significant city’, which accordingly will accommodate “an increased proportion of new development, particularly housing” (op cit: 34). It also establishes a “spatial prioritisation for economic activity” (op cit:
and recognises the “challenge to ensure that growth strategies for these places achieve wider benefits, including linking successful areas with less successful ones” (op cit).

The RSS frames the West of England Spatial Strategy, which covers the four unitary authorities which used to constitute the County of Avon. Combined, these are regarded as the Bristol city-region and the “economic hub” of the south west (op cit: 55). The RSS states that for these authorities, “realising their economic potential… is not only critical to their future success, but also to the success of the regional/ national economy” (op cit). The strategy requires that these authorities work together. To this end, in 2006 the authorities were successful in their combined bid to central government for designation as a ‘growth point’. The growth strategy proposed, in line with the RSS, involves the envisaged creation of 100,000 new jobs and 92,500 new homes by 2026, with major development concentrated in Bristol city centre and South Bristol.

4.5 Conclusion

Policy transfer is evident, especially from the US to England, but overall, more recent policy changes in both countries are framed by the rise of neo-liberalism with an associated “responsibilisation” (Cochrane, 2007: 52) of communities.

Both cities have experienced the significant loss of manufacturing jobs and the decline of their port functions heralding a shift to a post-industrial economy with the restructuring of the global economy. This has affected their policy legacy, which has included attempts to tackle neighbourhood deprivation, though this is much more severe in Baltimore. Indeed, while Bristol is described as “affluent with pockets of deprivation” (Purdue et al., 2004: 278), Baltimore is ‘deprived with pockets of affluence’.

Similarities are evident between both cities, such as their pursuance of neo-liberal strategies exemplified by their respective ‘flagship developments’ (such as Baltimore’s influential Inner Harbor redevelopment, and Bristol’s harbourside redevelopment). Differences are also clear. These can be related both to the two
countries' different governmental systems but also to the path dependence of city-level governance systems and policy responses. These issues are explored in the analysis of the empirical work in the next two chapters.
Chapter 5
Baltimore Findings and Analysis

5.1 Introduction

This chapter sets out the findings and analysis of the empirical work in Baltimore, Maryland, applying the theoretical framework set out in chapter 2 and using the methodological approach set out in chapter 3. Chapter 4 sets the scene for this chapter by detailing the relevant national, state and local policies and approaches.

The chapter first presents application of the ‘ideal-type’ characteristics framework to two neighbourhood governance entities. While the principal interpretation of the entities’ roles revealed in light of the analysis are steering for one body and self-help for the other, overall self-help is predominant and relates to how the entities are anchored within their neighbourhoods. Competence is also particularly emphasised in terms of both entities’ emphasis on community input into their operations. Concerns about democracy are subservient to this account. Steering is clear given the relationship of one of the bodies to its sponsor, and given government involvement in the establishment of the other. Given that the bodies do not comprise a focus for the broader urban governance network, tokenism is also implicit to the predominant account of self-help. The bodies’ most important relationships are their horizontal links to their anchors/ sponsors. Given their lack of ‘market-levering’ assets which are sought by the network, the bodies are not vertically linked to it. Both are open-ended, ongoing endeavours, but this relates to their anchoring in their local areas, due to an anchor institution and a surtax mechanism respectively. The bodies are operating in spite of, rather than because of, the city-level network context.

The chapter then considers Baltimore’s urban governance system and applies the framework of expected characteristics for the US to the city. Analysis reveals that Baltimore does fulfil many of the attributes which can be expected in this localist and privatist governmental system. The relatively simple structure of the governance network is focused at city-level despite some funding flows from higher levels. Its operations are determined at city-level by the city government and private interests.
The network prioritises neo-liberal strategies of growth. But there is also some divergence from the model, particularly as a governance network rather than urban regime is in operation, in which private interests actually comprise private philanthropies, who have a significant role as ‘policy-setters’ in the city, and the city’s major anchor institution. The network has been stable since the key shift in 2001 to a shared ‘logic’ of asset-based resource allocation. Neighbourhoods with sufficient (generally housing) assets may gain network resource. In these cases, the self-help account is clear given the emphasis on homeowners increasing the value of their homes.

Finally the implications of the urban governance network’s strategies and actions are considered. This focuses on the relative power of the neighbourhood level within its governance context. The city’s lack of resource and huge need have dictated a pragmatic, market-driven and opportunistic ethos influenced by its neo-liberal context in which neighbourhood approaches are subservient to the economic imperative. The network focuses its attention on neighbourhoods which have the assets it prioritises which are regarded as having the ability to lever market forces. The relative power of the neighbourhood level is determined by the presence of these assets. Any ‘power’ gained at the neighbourhood level is enabled by the network in the pursuit of its imperatives. In this localist and privatist governance system, neighbourhoods that have the capacity for self-help are more likely to do so.

5.2 Neighbourhood-based Initiative Governance Entities

To assess the extent to which each of the five functions identified for neighbourhood-based initiative governance entities is evident in reality, the structures and operations of the two case study entities are assessed against the attributes as set out in the heuristic framework of ‘ideal-type’ entities by function (as set out in Table 2.1). A sample entity-level interview guide is appended (at Appendix 2).

For each case study below, a brief history of the entity precedes assessment against the framework of characteristics of ‘ideal-type’ entities according to function. This, set out in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, includes only those typology characteristics which are evidenced by the entity. Detailed consideration of each entity’s structure and
operations by function, including representative quotes from respondents, is then presented. Figure 1 shows the location of the two case study entities within the city.

Figure 1: Location of Baltimore Case Study Entities
5.2.1: Operation Reach Out South West (OROSW)

OROSW is the neighbourhood-based governance entity for a coalition of eight neighbourhoods located in south west Baltimore, with a combined population of 21,000. The area is extremely deprived\textsuperscript{8} and is classified as 'distressed' in the city's housing typology. The entity originated in 1997 from the community planning efforts of Bon Secours Hospital, the anchor institution which the eight neighbourhoods surround. In 2002 OROSW became a formal non-profit entity and a board was appointed comprising community representatives and partners, including its main sponsor, the Bon Secours of Maryland Foundation. In 2002 its area became the pilot for the city's Strategic Neighborhood Action Plan (SNAP) programme (explained in chapter 4). OROSW's goal is "to make south west Baltimore a desirable place to live, work, and play" (OROSW SNAP, 2002: 3). The SNAP programme is now generally regarded as being in abeyance in city government, but the OROSW SNAP plan continues to guide the entity's activities. The entity survives due to its sponsor's ongoing support. It has reached a plateau, reflected in respondents citing of the need for a new community planning process and a reinvigoration of the entity and resident engagement within it.

OROSW predominantly reflects the steering interpretation of neighbourhood-based initiative governance, which is presented first in Table 5.1 below. OROSW's role is to ensure that its sponsoring foundation remains connected to the community, and it thus acts as the foundation's community outreach arm, while the foundation runs the programmes that are implemented within OROSW's constituent neighbourhoods. The entity's structure and operations also allude to the democracy and competence functions, particularly due to the entity's community planning processes. Self-help is evident in the emphasis on voluntary activities and capacity building, though the difficulties of realising this are clear. Tokenism is evident given the area's 'distressed' designation and its reliance on its local anchor institution.

\textsuperscript{8} The extent of deprivation in the OROSW area is well-documented. The area contains 'The Corner', the intersection of Fayette and Monroe Streets, the focus of the 1997 book by David Simon and Edward Burns, which gave an account of a year in a drug market neighbourhood. The authors subsequently made the area the focus of series one of 'The Wire', the HBO series which uses Baltimore to present the problems of urban America.
Table 5.1: OROSW: 'Ideal-Type' Entity Characteristics Evident

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Steering</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Instigated by initiative sponsor</td>
<td>• Sponsor determines entity operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sponsor specifies structure (including board membership and geographic area covered)</td>
<td>• Entity heavily reliant on sponsor funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sponsor represented on board – Foundation executive director a voting member and secretary</td>
<td>• Sponsor leads on implementation of projects (Foundation’s 30 staff manage projects &amp; co-ordinate programmes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sponsor employs the entity’s 2 staff – Executive Director &amp; Leadership Coordinator</td>
<td>• Sponsor leads board deliberations (staff responsible for servicing board and sub-committee meetings)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Emphasis on consensus in board deliberations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democracy</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Majority resident representation on board (in terms of voting members)</td>
<td>• Initiated following resident consultation by anchor institution, Bon Secours Hospital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 6 resident representative-led board sub-committees</td>
<td>• Broad (300 residents) engagement in identifying needs and priorities (via an 18-month community planning process, subsequently SNAP pilot)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Some capacity building of residents, with a new ‘Leadership Co-ordinator’ staff member, but availability of capacity building resource from city-wide intermediaries has declined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Competence</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Resident board representation (voting)</td>
<td>• Broad resident engagement in identifying needs and priorities (community planning process)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Non-profit service provider board representation (non-voting)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Self-help</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Open-ended timeframe</td>
<td>• Extensive resident volunteer engagement in delivering projects - but has waned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sponsor emphasis on capacity building of entity and residents</td>
<td>• Some resource for capacity building activities as reflected in ‘Leadership Co-ordinator’ staff member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Expectation of residents ‘doing their share’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tokenism</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Not applicable</em></td>
<td>• Lack of engagement from statutory service providers/ government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Not a priority for urban governance network given ‘distressed’ neighbourhood designation, lack of ‘assets’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Steering**

The steering interpretation is uppermost with regard to OROSW. The body would not exist in the absence of the Foundation. The Foundation funds the entity, its staff manage the programmes which the entity oversees and service the entity’s committees, and all programme resources are managed by the Foundation, and provided or raised by it. The entity is the community outreach arm of the anchor institution and the entity’s processes are controlled by the anchor’s Foundation.
That the entity predominantly fulfils the steering account is evidenced in Foundation respondents’ recognition of the “capacity imbalance” between the Foundation (with thirty staff) and OROSW (two staff):

“One of the unintended consequences... is a real kind of capacity imbalance between the Foundation and neighbourhood residents... it ends up that we are in fact controlling the process...” [Anchor Foundation].

Foundation staff also recognise that the Foundation’s relative strength in both implementation of programmes and the operation of the entity is likely to sway community input:

“We have a lot of the staff here, we have the expertise and background... to implement stuff. Which aren’t necessarily skills that would be in the community, I mean there has to be some staffed organisation that propels the priorities of the community” [Anchor Foundation].

OROSW is now generally perceived as ‘ticking over’. It continues given the ongoing support it receives from its anchor. That the entity has reached a plateau was recognised by Foundation and entity-level respondents, who cited the need for a new planning process and a reinvigoration of the entity and resident engagement with it:

“I think it’s time for another OROSW planning process, to say it’s 10 years later, what do we need to look like now? How do we need to behave? What should be our purpose? Let’s tighten up the relationship and make it more explicit and clear between OROSW and Bon Secours” [Anchor Foundation].

**Democracy**

This function is to an extent evident in the way OROSW is structured, but the professionalised nature of its operations and the role of the Foundation confirm the predominance of the steering account for this neighbourhood governance body.

Residents comprise a majority of voting members of the board, but resident representatives are not elected, and resident members do not represent each of the area’s constituent neighbourhoods. Residents can ask to be considered or invited to be board members. This reflects a model often followed by non-profit intermediaries, where board selection can be based on the perceived commitment, skills or indeed the ‘fit’ of potential members with other board members, but it does lead to questions about the accountability of the board to the area’s residents. The other voting member of the board is the Foundation’s executive director, who also has the role of secretary.
Respondents consistently stress the democracy function and cited broader recognition among elites of the Foundation and entity’s relationship and their positive reputation for resident involvement, expressed in its selection as the SNAP pilot area:

"When we first started people just thought, oh, that depressed neighbourhood, things will never change, but for me OROSW proved that people who lived in depressed neighbourhoods do want change" [Entity staff].

The Foundation’s commitment to being community-sanctioned and also community-led to some degree is evidenced by the entity’s six sub-committees, which are led by resident representatives. These constituent committees each oversee one of the SNAP plan’s priority areas and the associated programmes which are run by Foundation staff, though budgets are not devolved to the entity. However, it is evident that the Foundation, albeit unintentionally, is steering the programmes and the entity sub-committees that oversee these:

"After you develop a plan or whatever you develop a staffed organisation to implement it. There is a dynamic that happens where it ends up being staff-driven, one way or another" [Anchor Foundation].

Respondents also explain the difficulties of retaining and extending resident engagement now that the plan and its associated programmes are regarded as routine. This is compounded by an expectation that the Foundation or OROSW staff are responsible for delivery of these. OROSW staff are focused on increasing community participation in the coalition, particularly from younger people given the concentration of older leadership in the entity and the neighbourhood associations. This is regarded as a priority for secession and innovation. The staff were also concerned about a decline in capacity building resource available in the city:

"We don't have any resources for first time leaders in this city anymore... I know how I was... I went to a neighbourhood meeting... there's some old broads running their mouths. Now, I'm the old broad that's running my mouth, trying to get young people involved" [Entity staff].
The competence function is clear in OROSW’s operations, particularly with regard to the implementation of Foundation programmes, much less so in relation to city service provision. It is not evident in its structuring. This also confirms the predominance of the steering account.

OROSW is regarded as instrumental in bringing the various neighbourhoods around the hospital together, despite racial divisions, and identifying shared concerns:

“With Reach Out, it brought the white population that was separate, the same negative indicators as the black community, together to see that the concerns they have, we have. It was a shared concern. So we got to work together, and started talking together” [Entity staff].

“[The entity’s] role is...setting standards of quality and expectation for residents” [Anchor Foundation].

This ability to prioritise across differing constituent neighbourhoods and their varying needs was recognised in the area’s selection as the SNAP pilot as it enabled, in theory, effective joint working with city agencies by identifying priorities to inform city agency resource allocation:

“From the city’s perspective, it's always best to work with coalitions in broader networks just because when you're trying to deal with all of the issues that a particular neighbourhood or area has, it's... If you've got a coalition they pretty much prioritise what it is that's important to them” [Baltimore Housing Office of Development].

The SNAP process was the pinnacle of OROSW’s relations with the city, when the Foundation and OROSW received most recognition for the credibility of their community planning efforts. It is generally recognised that the city lacks clear mechanisms for the implementation of SNAP plans and that the programme is now in abeyance. This, combined with the seemingly ad hoc nature of current relations with city agencies, which are not represented on the entity’s board, does not imply that residents’ input into city service delivery is of high priority. The entity relies on and assists constituent neighbourhood associations in demanding improved service provision, but with limited success:

“I have begged them to please brighten the lights... I was told, they're on wrong, they need washing or something. So I mean, if they had people to come around to do that, maybe things would brighten up, but it's, to me, it's the city, it's holding up” [Entity Neighbourhood Association Board Member].
The sponsor sees OROSW’s role as ensuring that the Foundation remains connected to the community. This to an extent recognises residents’ competence in identifying their needs and priorities. The initial plan’s focus was broadened from housing to a more holistic revitalisation approach following community consultation. This recognition is also clear given the Foundation’s efforts to seek resident input into programme development via the entity’s committees:

“I went in with a very middle-class bias about cheque-cashers, me as the staff person... And it was through the work of the community [that project design was changed], where people said actually, we like our cheque-casher better than our bank... they meet our needs” [Anchor Foundation].

The planning process’s identification of shared priorities does not mean that each constituent OROSW neighbourhood is witnessing the same levels of programme implementation, despite their own perceived needs. This has led to some resentment on the part of the entity’s constituent neighbourhood associations, particularly those further away from the Foundation’s efforts to develop affordable housing near the hospital, who feel that their particular priorities are not being addressed:

“We're grateful for what Bon Secours started, but every community that is involved in OROSW wants to see things happening in their communities, not just up there near Bon Secours” [Entity Neighbourhood Association Board Member].

**Self-help**

The self-help function is evident, particularly given the emphasis on resident capacity building. But the role of the Foundation in both establishing and continuing the entity’s operations, and indeed potentially in displacing voluntary efforts, again asserts the predominance of the steering account of its role.

The self-help function is not evidenced by the entity’s origins, as it was established by the local anchor institution, in part given its pastoral mission and in part because the hospital realised that if it was to stay in the area, it had to address the area’s problems. Amongst Baltimore elites there is general agreement that in the absence of Bon Secours, a neighbourhood body would not exist in the area:

“Bon Secours, when they first stepped out of their front door, they had to do what they did to survive as an institution because the neighbourhood was crumbling around them. And because of their interest and commitment there... they have been an amazing force for renewal. Without them, there would be none, I believe” [City Councilperson].
This function is evident in the way that the entity’s staff encourage and attempt to build the capacity of constituent neighbourhood associations to undertake their own activities rather than rely on the entity to undertake initiatives:

"When people call me and say this is what my problem is... I say, we’re going to work on this together... my role... is to find out where the resources are, and develop a way or create a mechanism to get those responsible, or get those resources... but it’s also your role not to drop it on me. Your role is to follow it through, because I have other residents, and I can’t take care of every resident’s needs" [Entity staff].

This chimes with the SNAP programme, the action plan for which tasked not only city agencies but communities themselves to contribute to the plan’s realisation. Indeed, unlike some of the subsequent areas which participated in the SNAP programme, the OROSW area is extremely deprived. The fact that the OROSW area was selected as the pilot for the programme is testament to the entity’s ability to build neighbourhood capacity sufficiently to engage, unlike other significantly deprived areas within the city.

However, realisation of this self-help ethos has been hampered, given the loss of impetus now the plan is ten years’ old and programmes are not being designed, but routinely implemented. This is expressed in the increasing difficulty of gaining resident engagement as volunteers, for example in maintaining vacant lots, also partly felt to reflect the expectation that this task will be performed by programme staff:

"Now we’ve got to pick up trash and mow grass, and how interesting is that? You know, I’d love to come to the table and say make my neighbourhood beautiful, but am I going to... get behind a lawnmower to keep it that way?" [Anchor Foundation].

Tokenism

The tokenism account is very evident when OROSW is located in its broader city context as it does not receive the attentions of the urban governance network or of city service providers. This further asserts the predominance of the steering interpretation of its role.

The entity is hampered by the scale of the area’s problems and its lack of links with the ‘asset-based’ approach which guides city government and the broader urban governance network’s resource allocation decisions. The activities and resource
commitments of the urban governance network indicate that its attention is focused elsewhere, on areas which are more asset-rich:

"They'll choose projects based on politics. And then you've got smaller neighbourhoods like some of those I represent where you've got to fight so hard to get our share" [City Councilperson].

That the area is not a priority is also indicated by it not qualifying for a range of designations, including the federal Empowerment Zone (in operation 1994 to 2004), and the Healthy Neighborhoods Initiative. This is because the area is designated as 'distressed' (rather than being 'in the middle') in the housing typology.

Despite efforts in the SNAP plan to frame the area's case in line with the 'asset-based' ethos, detailing "assets" such as its location and the hospital (OROSW SNAP, 2002: 4-5), the area has a needs rather than asset-based claim. It is classified as 'distressed' in the housing market typology, and is not connected to key development areas such as the waterfront/ Central Business District or to thriving neighbourhoods. OROSW's anchor, Bon Secours Hospital, is the area's most significant asset, which is crucial to its instigation and ongoing operation:

"Baltimore funders are so cliqueish, that right now, until we get enough underneath our belts, then we going to have to rely on the strength of Bon Secours, you know, of our partner" [Entity staff].

However, the hospital has a local role, rather than the international role played by other of the city's anchor institutions, particularly Johns Hopkins. Attention (as expressed in the city's CDBG allocation, and major foundation support from the Annie E. Casey Foundation) is focused on initiatives such as the Johns Hopkins-anchored East Baltimore Development Initiative. Indeed, Stoker et al. (2009: 18) describe OROSW as running the risk of becoming a "forgotten child".

5.2.2. Charles Village Community Benefits District (CVCBD)

The District is a public sector neighbourhood-based governance entity. It covers an area of four neighbourhoods to the north of Baltimore’s Central Business District, with a population of 14,000. Its existence stems from community calls for district designation by state and city government following a local murder in 1992. This was unsuccessful given concerns that the area proposed was relatively wealthy. Following another murder, a further application for a larger area including more deprived
neighbourhoods was successful. The legislation also enabled a broader set of
neighbourhood revitalisation purposes for the entity. The entity and its associated
Management Authority were established in 1994 following a referendum of the area’s
residential and commercial property owners. The legislation allows a surcharge tax
(‘surtax’) to be levied on residential and business properties in the District to fund its
operations. The city government votes on whether to renew the relevant ordinance
every four years.

The entity’s “mission statement” is “to provide Charles Village with sanitation and
safety services, while empowering the community and educating residents on ways to
keep the neighbourhoods safe and clean” (CVCBD Management Authority Mission
Statement, no date). While the District’s core remit is thus to provide supplemental
safety and sanitation services, the board did gradually broaden its focus, as enabled by
the legislation, to include neighbourhood revitalisation efforts (such as addressing
blighted properties). Since 2005, this perceived ‘mission creep’ resulted in agreement
that the District would refocus back to its core mission of ‘crime and grime’.

However, there is general understanding that the size of the area to be served and its
weak resource base challenge the District’s capacity to deliver its core mission. The
District is an ongoing endeavour as its anchoring by legislation ensures an income
stream from its taxation mechanism. Continued renewal of the District’s ordinance
by the city council, most recently in 2006, indicates that the entity will continue to
operate. However, the District is contentious and has been subject to several
unsuccessful law suits brought by a ‘detractor’ group.

The District is distinctive due to its public entity status. Given the source of its
income stream, the entity’s ‘sponsors’ are the residential and commercial property
owners within the District. The city and state governments constitute the entity’s
‘enablers’ rather than ‘sponsors’ given the legislation required to enable levying of the
‘surtax’.

The District predominantly fulfils the self-help account given its emphasis on the area
funding and managing its own response to its problems by supplementing service
 provision and encouraging voluntary efforts. This function is addressed first in Table
5.2 below. The competence and democracy accounts are evident given attempts to
structure the entity to enable community engagement. Steering by state and city government of the entity’s structure and remit at its outset is also clear, which has had significant effects upon the entity’s subsequent operations. Some tokenism is also evident given that the body is not subject to the attentions of the broader urban governance network.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.2: CVCBD: ‘Ideal-Type’ Entity Characteristics Evident</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structure</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Instigated by residents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Majority resident representation on board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Self-generated funding stream (the ‘surtax’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Open-ended timeframe (though subject to city council ratification every 4 years)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Expectation of residents ‘doing their share’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Devolved budgets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Majority resident representation on board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Elected resident board representation by sub-area (‘quad’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Resident quorum for decision-making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 5 resident representative-led board sub-committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Board-determined funding allocation over devolved budgets</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Self-help**

The self-help function is uppermost with regard to CVCBD. It is strongly discernible in the entity’s origins. But the disjuncture between the intent to self-help and the body’s ability to realise this is clear.
Rather than seek to improve city services, the emphasis in creating the District was on the area funding and managing its own response to its problems, albeit as a supplement. The District can be viewed, ironically as it is a public entity, as a privatist response to the inability of city government to deliver the services which residents expected:

“So community engagement... that's what got us started... in terms of there were people that were just appalled at just, you know, the provision of city services and particularly I guess around safety when there was a murder” [Resident Board Member, also community activist involved in lobbying for the District’s creation].

The self-help account is also evident given the intent in the creation of the District to draw on rather than supplant existing voluntary community activities, as well as to supplement city service provision:

“The point of this whole thing was not to do what you're supposed to do as a responsible citizen, but it was to respond to those jobs that were bigger than what any one or two or three people could do” [Resident Board Member].

“We as volunteers were maxed out... and the concept was an organisation that would leverage the energy and support of people but who could systematically address some of these issues full-time” [Resident Board Member].

However, in terms of the entity’s operations, respondents felt that the community is not particularly engaged, and indeed cite the apparent supplanting of voluntary efforts in the area, indicating that the intention that the District would supplement these has not been realised:

“People complained ‘we’re paying our dues to have people walking round protecting us, not to have somebody telling us we ought to get out and protect ourselves’...” [Non-profit Partner].

The District cannot determine or alter its mission, which is contained in the enabling legislation. But this mission does allow the entity sufficient latitude to alter its operations, as evidenced by the broadening and later narrowing of its functions regarding neighbourhood revitalisation. Therefore, technically the entity is able to develop, appraise and fund its own projects and engage in supplemental service delivery. This did occur prior to its ‘refocus’, when funding from sources other than the surtax (such as local foundations) was sought to undertake such efforts (for example to fund a post dealing with housing and economic revitalisation). But such activities are no longer undertaken.
A key characteristic of the 'ideal-type' self-help entity is that it can continue in the absence of its sponsor. The District could not continue in the absence of its 'sponsor' in the form of surtax income, nor indeed without its 'enabler' in terms of the requirement for periodical city council ratification of its ordinance. However, indications are that it is an ongoing endeavour.

**Democracy**

This function is extremely evident in the way CVCBD is structured, but is not realised in its operations. This confirms the predominance of the self-help function.

Voting members of the Management Board include eight neighbourhood representatives (two from each constituent neighbourhood association), business association representatives, four resident representatives elected by area ('quadrant'), and a representative of the Mayor. Non-voting members appointed by the board comprise city councilpersons and non-profit representatives. The structure resulted from the state's democratic intentions in specifying the legislation to enable comprehensive (by sub-area and neighbourhood and business association) surtax payers' input. The entity also has three professional staff, plus administrative support.

However, entity-level respondents criticise the realisation of these intentions when describing the operations of the entity. The extent and quality of 'sponsor' influence via the representatives of the District property owners on the board is widely critiqued, and there are concerns that while their voice is heard, members may not be representative of their constituencies:

"The people that seek out these offices have axes to grind. It's very hard to get people to participate, the kind of people you would really like to have that are thoughtful and positive. It's usually the disgruntled that get elected" [Non-profit Partner].

However, the role of a small group of board members in refocusing the entity to its core remit, and bringing a 'business orientation' to its operations, is latterly evident, indicating that while the representativeness of the board may be questioned, it is able to influence the operations of the entity.
Some respondents state that the perceived rigidity of its structure has hampered gaining the extent and quality of engagement needed in the entity:

"One of the things that is really difficult for an organisation like ours is that we do not have the capacity to perform as a city organisation, or a state or a national organisation, and to be held accountable to some of those requirements is very challenging" ['Quad' Resident Board Member].

However, atypically for initiative governance bodies, and reflecting the fact that the entity’s sponsors are not agencies outside the area but the property owners within it, the entity came into existence following a referendum. It can therefore be unequivocally stated that the District was supported at least at its outset by the majority of the community. It has an unambiguous mandate to operate which is subject to renewal (albeit not by referendum) every four years.

The fact that the District is a public entity and therefore subject to transparency and accountability requirements also makes it differ from the non-profit sector status of ‘typical’ initiative governance bodies. So despite respondents’ concerns regarding the way it is structured hampering its operations, the way it came into being and its structuring do illustrate the democracy function in a very clear manner, though the challenges of operating in such a way are clearly recognised:

"The organisation sort of had to make its way in understanding what its obligations were in terms of open meetings and closed meetings... There was a lot of things that we had to learn along the way and definitely missteps were made" [Resident Board Member].

**Competence**

The competence function is evident given the District’s main role as a service deliverer, and attempts to structure it to draw on resident input to inform this. In terms of the entity’s operations, however, realisation of this is hampered, particularly regarding the responsiveness of the city services it is seeking to supplement. This also confirms the predominance of the self-help account.

Residents are not regarded as being particularly engaged in the effort, thus curtailing their expression of priorities to inform service delivery:

"The way it was set up was to get a lot of input from all corners. Whether we're actually getting the input we had hoped for right now, I don't think so" [Resident Board Member].
There are notable exceptions with regard to engagement given the considerable effort and input from the board’s community members, and from its critics, though many question how representative these individuals are of majority opinion given concerns of parochialism, lack of connections between representatives and their nominating organisations, and perhaps a degree of paranoia on the part of the District’s ‘detractor group’:

"There are individuals who consistently only represent their immediate constituency... there are other members who... don't do any work outside the organisation" [Non-profit Board Member].

"This is not a business community, but we do have some business, and they really need to be on the board, otherwise what tends to happen is you get a skewed voice, you get only residential voices..." [Entity Staff].

It is also not clear that the entity is capable of being especially responsive to community priorities when expressed. Its responsiveness appears to be curtailed by the equity requirements to which it is subject given its public entity status:

"In concept the leadership of this organisation, being very grassroots oriented, and dictated by bylaws about who was on and who can be on it, it's kind of good... but it's a very weak board...its capacity to run an organisation is very limited" [Non-profit Board Member].

Therefore the way the entity is structured can be seen as hampering realisation of the competence account in the sense of community priorities informing service delivery. This is compounded by the generally regarded unrealistic combination of too large a service delivery area and insufficient resource for the District to perform even its core functions regarding 'crime and grime', let alone tailoring service delivery in these areas:

"One of the problems with the organisation is... the resources available are no way adequate to deliver safety and sanitation to a hundred square block area" [Non-profit Board Member].

Ironically, despite the entity’s remit to supplement city agency ‘crime and grime’ service provision, significant statutory service provider involvement is not in evidence. The relevant statutory service providers are not represented on the entity’s management board. Despite the requirement for a baseline agreement on service provision between the entity and city services, one was not in effect at the time of the research. This lack of a baseline agreement with the city regarding the services the District is supplementing, despite entity-level respondent recognition of recent
improvements in the working relationships between city and entity staff, is the most palpable indication that the competence account is not being realised in terms of the entity's operations:

"I'm glad it's improved, but in some ways you're dealing with... some brokens [sic] when you're trying to deal with the city" [Resident Board Member].

"There has to be a baseline agreement [with the city]... you cannot doubly tax people and then have them end up with no more than what they had... because otherwise, what have you done? You haven't supplemented, you've supplanted" [City Councilperson and Board Member].

Services provided by the District are monitored and reviewed, but resident satisfaction is not measured except indirectly via board representation.

**Tokenism**

The tokenism account is very evident when CVCBD is located in its broader city context as it does not receive the attentions of the urban governance network. This further asserts the predominance of the self-help interpretation of its role, as it is 'left to get on with it'.

The District is not a priority for the urban governance network. Its activities and resource commitments are focused elsewhere. This is related in part to the very fact of the District's existence and its guaranteed income stream via the surtax, as well as the area arguably not having the intense needs of other areas in the city. It is also related to the District's refocus back to its 'core' mission meaning it has stopped seeking support from the network for supplemental activities:

"The District has a specific and narrow focus... [prior to the refocus] they were trying to do far too many things with inadequate staff, inadequate support, inadequate financial support but also a community that was very contentiously divided about what its role should be. I don't expect to be a continuing supporter of the District now that it's sort of found it's actual, what it should be doing. And it's guaranteed an income stream" [Local Foundation].

**Steering**

While steering is clear in relation to the entity's enabling legislation and structuring, its origins and ongoing operations assert the self-help rather than steering account of its role.
Though the District is a public sector entity ‘enabled’, rather than sponsored, by state and city government legislation, it was subject to governmental steering at its outset, particularly by state government. Respondents regard this as having significantly affected not only the entity’s structure but also its operations. Steering of its operations is evident in state government’s insistence that the entity’s remit be broadened to enable scope for activities in addition to ‘crime and grime’ service provision. Steering of its structure is evident in the state government’s insistence that the District was extended to include poorer areas, from the original focus on its relatively wealthy northern section; and in the requirements that the entity was structured with the intent that it fulfil the democratic expectations incumbent upon a public entity:

“[The District] was expanded because they didn’t want it to be perceived as a wealthier or whiter area that was able to pay for additional services at the expense of other areas that were not...” [Resident Board Member].

“We spent an inordinate, way too much time as a board phutzing around with the technicalities that should be addressed in the spirit of things...” [Non-profit Board Member].

These requirements were attributed by respondents with: creating an unrealistically large service delivery area without a sufficient tax base, particularly deriving from business properties, to enable it to perform its core functions adequately; the propensity for ‘mission creep’; and the inability of the entity to gain sufficiently engaged and skilled board members:

“The bottom line is I think that by expanding the area the way it was, you also did not pick up a lot more businesses which have a higher base, you picked up more residential so you diluted the per capita that you were raising, and you were trying to put sanitation and safety workers I mean, all over the place and you couldn’t” [City Councilperson and Board Member].

“Part of the reason why it didn’t perform is in part the way it’s established... there’s a difficulty in getting qualified people to serve and there’s a difficulty in removing unqualified people” [‘Quad’ Resident Board Member].

“There’s huge deficiencies in our legislation that have troubled this organisation all through its existence” [Resident Board Member].

Such steering can be interpreted as the addition of a public perspective to a privatist, self-help response by the District’s instigators. That the outcomes of this steering are regarded as the source of some of the District’s problems demonstrates the unintended consequences of such interventions, but also reflect the pilot nature of the District, not
least because its surtax base includes residences as well as businesses. This approach has not been replicated elsewhere in the city.

5.2.3. Functions of Neighbourhood Governance Revealed by the Entities

All five of the functions set out in the theoretical framework are evident to a greater or lesser extent in the structure and operations of both case study entities examined in Baltimore. Both the democracy and competence functions are clearly evident in the way that the entities are structured and operate, particularly in OROSW’s case due to its community planning processes, and in CVCBD’s case given attempts to structure the entity to enable community engagement. Steering is the predominant account in the case of OROSW due to it constituting the community outreach arm of its sponsoring foundation. But this account is also of relevance to CVCBD given state and city government influence on its structure and remit which has affected its subsequent operations. Self-help is the predominant function in the case of CVCBD, given its community-instigated, funded and managed approach. But this function is also of relevance to OROSW given its emphasis on voluntary activities and capacity building. In both cases the difficulties of realising this are clear. Tokenism is also manifested in neither body being a focus for the city’s governance network.

Indeed, key to the international comparative context of this research is that the two entities can be said to be operating in spite of rather than because of government (even though CVCBD was enabled via government legislation). They stem from the efforts of a local anchor or community activism respectively. Both entities can be regarded as ongoing and open-ended endeavours, given that they are both ‘anchored’, either by an institution or by being enshrined in legislation and thus having a guaranteed funding stream.

The variance in the relative manifestation of each account of the function of neighbourhood governance in each entity illustrates their differences. This also demonstrates the variety of forms that initiative governance entities can take which meet the unit of study definition in Baltimore. This variance can in turn be linked to the decentralised and more privatist context for neighbourhood-based initiative governance in the city, explored in the next section which assesses the city’s governance context.
5.3 City Governance Context

This section explores the city-level urban governance context for neighbourhood-based initiative entities. It sets out application of the theoretical framework of the expected characteristics of US urban governance and the likely associated function of neighbourhood-based initiative governance (as set out in Table 2.2) to Baltimore.

The research focuses on what can be termed Baltimore’s ‘neighbourhood governance network’ – that is, the network which governs neighbourhood-based governance. The network’s structure and membership, key network members, and the existence of a policy subsystem for deprived neighbourhoods, are determined. The effects of the broader urban governance system on this network are then explained, in terms of the state and market imperatives which are evident. Finally, the implications of this regarding the relative power of the neighbourhood level within its multi-level governance context are considered.

Further background, on the city’s neighbourhood-relevant history, city government’s orientation to neighbourhoods, and relevant plans, policies and approaches including the city master plan and economic growth strategy, the SNAP programme, the housing typology and the Healthy Neighborhoods Initiative, is included in chapter 4.

5.3.1. Neighbourhood Governance Network

Each Baltimore elite respondent was asked a core set of questions designed to elicit their understanding of the structures and processes of neighbourhood governance, that is, how neighbourhood-based governance is governed. Elite respondents were asked to discuss the role, work and relationships engaged in by their own organisations and for their perspectives on the work of others. Furthermore, they were also asked how, if at all, this is co-ordinated or led. A sample elite interview guide is appended (at Appendix 1).

The network identified in the course of the research is presented in Figure 2. Analysis of responses reveals the existence of what some Baltimore respondents term the ‘community development system’. This can be regarded as the ‘neighbourhood governance network’ that governs neighbourhood-level activities, including initiative
governance, in the city. It comprises a range of actors which operate at different levels and perform different roles. Its structure and membership are detailed below, followed by examination of its key members and their relative power.

Figure 2: Baltimore Neighbourhood Governance Network

5.3.2. Structure and membership of the governance network

Baltimore’s neighbourhood-based governance entities are embedded in a broader network that comprises a cross-sectoral mix of public bodies (for example, the city government and its agencies), private organisations (the philanthropic foundations) and non-profit institutions (the umbrella organisations and intermediaries) as well as anchor institutions. Different members of this network operate at different levels - multi-neighbourhood, city-wide, and higher, in the case of state government and some of the philanthropic foundations, as well as federal government via its funding regimes.
As is clear from Figure 2, the multi-level context for neighbourhood governance in Baltimore appears relatively straightforward. It is also relatively stable. The structure depicted has largely been in place since 2001 following Mayor O'Malley's election and a shift in the basis for resource allocation from being needs- to asset-based. Indeed, the most recent additions in terms of principal actors are the Mayor's Office of Neighborhoods and the Healthy Neighborhoods Initiative, both established in 2001. The next most recent addition is the Office of Neighborhood Reinvestment in the state's Department of Housing and Community Development, created in 1997.

In terms of the plans and approaches (shaded in blue in Figure 2 and detailed in chapter 4), SNAP was also instigated in 2001 (though is now widely regarded as being in abeyance). The Comprehensive Master Plan (which includes the Economic Growth Strategy) was adopted in 2006, but draws on the housing typology, which was initially developed in the late 1990s. The five-year Consolidated Plan, which also draws on the housing typology, is required by federal government for CDBG 'entitlement jurisdictions'. This funding regime has been in place since 1975.

It is now useful to consider the network's structure in terms of the actors and approaches of relevance at each spatial scale, as depicted in Figure 2.

**Neighbourhood level**

At the smallest scale, neighbourhood associations tend to cover a single neighbourhood and are small and weak. More affluent neighbourhoods may have formally constituted associations, whilst less affluent neighbourhoods may have associations but these are less likely to be formally constituted. All associations tend to be heavily reliant on voluntary involvement though some have professional staff. Currently there are about 900 neighbourhood associations in existence. Respondents recognised the difficulties of attracting and retaining community participation, and problems of representativeness, felt to be compounded by the tendency of neighbourhood leadership to stay in place and the difficulties of engaging younger people. Several spoke of the city's 'small leadership class' which has been reduced by population decline.
Elite respondents stated that the most distressed neighbourhoods are more likely to be fragmented and to lack a neighbourhood association with the capacity to be an effective partner in informing deliberations about the area's needs and priorities:

"Where you get these weak areas... where you'd had huge population loss... the matriarchs that used to run those neighbourhoods are no longer there and they're not being replaced, it becomes a real problem because there is no 'there' to go to in terms of a social... They're people with needs but they're not organised" [Baltimore Housing].

This is further complicated by the demolition/redevelopment policy prescription as set out in the housing typology for such neighbourhoods (particularly those anchored by an institution with growth needs). The capacity of neighbourhood actors to gain power, for example in negotiating for community benefits from the redevelopment, is likely to be limited. The Annie E. Casey Foundation’s work with residents in the EBDI area (discussed below) recognises this. However, in order to gain any leverage, neighbourhood actors do need to accept the plans developed by the relevant elites, which could be regarded as co-option. Distressed neighbourhoods not subject to anchored redevelopment efforts tend to be excluded from the network’s attentions.

The capacity of neighbourhoods can be regarded as an ‘asset’ that sponsors seek to utilise. Neighbourhoods that have existing capacity (such as stable, effective leadership; active associations; and indeed connections to effective non-profits which cover multi-neighbourhood areas) are more likely to gain support. When the Healthy Neighborhoods initiative was piloted by the Goldseker Foundation, neighbourhoods were sought which had demonstrable organisational capacity to undertake the initiative:

"So it's about selecting a small handful of neighbourhoods where there is some resident leadership, there's some people we know, who we feel comfortable investing in" [Local Foundation].

**Multi-neighbourhood level**

The multi-neighbourhood level is the scale at which the key unit of study - neighbourhood-based initiative governance - rests (‘neighbourhood-based coalitions/entities’ in Figure 2). ‘Sponsor’ respondents stress that they depend on formal non-profit multi-neighbourhood-based bodies to be partners in ‘neighbourhood change’. They describe the benefits in terms of such entities’ ability to prioritise needs across a
broader geographical area and as a way of ensuring that activities are in line with community priorities:

"Things that because you don't live there you're not aware of... So those are the things that residents make aware to you, because they have to live through it... that you will not find statistically" [National Foundation].

There is no standard structure for the city’s multi-neighbourhood-based entities, which include Community Development Corporations and the ‘umbrella’ organisations. The commonality is that the entities have some form of board structure. But the extent of board member neighbourhood affiliation varies, dependent on the extent to which members are sought with a variety of skills irrespective of neighbourhood affiliation. Entities therefore vary in the extent to which a board represents the neighbourhood, or represents what the entity is trying to achieve. In the case of CVCBD, representation from the constituent neighbourhood associations was required, but this is not the case with OROSW. The Healthy Neighborhoods Initiative is distinctive as although it is multi-neighbourhood-based, these neighbourhoods are not contiguous, though all are ‘in the middle’ of the housing typology.

Some multi-neighbourhood areas are ‘anchored’ by education and medical (‘ed and med’) institutions of which Baltimore has several, including the Johns Hopkins and University of Maryland universities and medical systems. These vary in scale, resource and in the extent to which they are engaged in their surrounding neighbourhoods. In turn, the presence of such anchors may act as an asset which encourages other potential sponsors to support initiatives in the anchor’s surrounding neighbourhoods:

"We wanted to work in neighbourhoods... where there was strong resident leadership, where there were anchor institutions, you know, that we could partner with" [Local Foundation].

"There's more benefit to working with a coalition than there is with an individual neighbourhood association. Especially when that coalition is tied to a Bon Secours of Maryland Foundation, or they're tied to maybe a local non-profit that has resources and staff... that had a track record and had a good reputation in the city" [Baltimore Housing Office of Development].
**City level**

At the city level, both the federal and state government are a funding mechanism, while city government provides the implementation mechanism within very broad funding guidelines (especially when compared to the UK’s funding regimes). However, at the sub-city level, city government, particularly its agency, Baltimore Housing, is a funding mechanism (particularly using CDBG resource), and non-profit intermediaries are the implementers. This allocation is ostensibly framed by the Consolidated Plan and the housing typology. Other funders who support multi-neighbourhood-level initiatives, such as Baltimore’s small, city-based foundations, tend to focus on the typology’s ‘middle’ neighbourhoods, mirroring the approach of the Healthy Neighborhoods initiative, which was ‘incubated’ by a local foundation in the late 1990s and formally established in 2001.

Respondents explain that such neighbourhoods are regarded as places where there is scope for smaller-scale efforts, and where the relatively low level of foundation funding can improve market conditions, in contrast with areas classified in the typology as ‘distressed’:

"We wanted to work in neighbourhoods where we thought we could accomplish things, create stronger real estate" [Local Foundation].

"It's very, very hard for philanthropy and small dollars to do catalytic change in devastated places. Working in transitional places, in places that are threatened with spot vacancy, or that are neighbourhoods that are sort of challenged or facing, heading for closure activity, is something that you might be able to catch it before it tips this way" [National Foundation].

"The vast majority of the grants have targeted investments I would say in the middle neighbourhoods. Healthy Neighborhoods, you have neighbourhoods that tended to be on the decline, but it's not in places where there's a lot of abandonment, it's more then how do you improve the market conditions by having people improve their properties and get a lot of community activities going on the ground. So a lot of our grantmaking has stayed closely aligned with the Healthy Neighborhoods organisation" [Local Foundation].

Local foundations may have long-term relationships with the organisations they fund. The foundations regard themselves as having an impact beyond grant-making, not only providing financial resources but expertise and technical assistance and networking, and also political clout and leadership:

"The main way a foundation can have impact with its grantmaking is to support people that are going to accomplish the results that you say you care about... A foundation can have impact through our leadership, through our convening,"
through how we get involved in things. A foundation has to figure out ways to have impact beyond grant-making” [Local Foundation].

Such committed support from one or several foundations can be regarded as a proxy anchor institution for the organisation where its area lacks such infrastructure:

“It’s a lot harder for the neighbourhoods where you don’t have an anchor, right. And there what to some extent, not a complete substitute, but to some extent provides the stability is that you’ve got maybe a core set of funders who’ve all decided this is a priority area” [Local Foundation].

City-wide non-profits such as the Citizens Planning and Housing Association, the Community Law Center and the Neighborhood Design Center act as intermediary supports or provide specific expertise to multi- or single neighbourhood-based organisations. These bodies are heavily dependent on foundation support, which has declined in recent times for community organising and capacity building. This has particularly affected OROSW’s operations.

One consistent complaint from Baltimore’s foundations is the lack of co-ordination amongst themselves and with city government. The foundations have increasingly tried to co-operate in targeting their resources and actions. But while the value of the Baltimore Neighbourhood Collaborative is broadly recognised, some criticise its lack of leadership and that it does not provide significant strategic input into the neighbourhood governance network. Foundation respondents also point to a lack of strategy and leadership on the part of city government. The city is not regarded as a strong partner, a view reinforced by respondents who had experience of working in other cities:

“We've got to look around and say, we're in twenty cities, here's what we get for our investment, here's the traction we're getting with city government, why would we stay?... For the amount of money we've been bringing here, we're not getting what we're getting from other cities by way of outcomes, because the city is not willing to engage and partner with us” [National non-profit intermediary].

“Part of our next challenge... is growing the understanding that the funding community here is not just philanthropy, it is the city government, it is the state government, and they are funding partners as well”' [National Foundation].

Foundations express concern that city government’s strategic priorities are neither explicit nor sufficiently detailed. The city government’s strategy, as expressed in the Consolidated Plan, is regarded as incomplete given its emphasis on comprehensive
redevelopment initiatives, and not the ‘community development’ work in the ‘middle
neighbourhoods’ where much non-public sector effort is concentrated and where a
concerted, cross-sectoral strategic effort is felt to be lacking:

“I've always felt like I wished there was a more cohesive vision coming out of
the city government, it would be nice to feel like we had a stronger partner there. I
don't get a sense that we have a clear vision for how to allocate resources to follow
up on statements like, you know, we want to have mixed-income communities” [Local
Foundation].

Frustration is also expressed by foundations and the non-profit sector that the SNAP
planning effort (explained in chapter 4) is in abeyance and a lack of political
commitment and leadership is blamed:

“I think one way in which SNAP might have been frustrating to the
neighbourhoods is that there wasn't a really substantial commitment of city support to
come after the priorities identified in SNAP. It felt like it was a city-originated
process... and it felt like, OK, if you do the SNAP then will the city come in behind the
priorities that you've identified. And that just didn't seem to happen” [Local
Foundation].

“People thought that process was actually pretty good. However, as they say
about plans, they sit on the shelf, because there's not leadership. And I'm not saying
that's the planning department's fault, it's because the mayors haven't cared about it,
right?” [National non-profit intermediary].

Respondents in the city government express support for foundation efforts and cite
Healthy Neighbourhoods as an example of an initiative incubated by a philanthropy
which has been fostered by city government. But these respondents stress that whilst
government and foundation priorities may align in some cases, such as with Healthy
Neighbourhoods and EBDI, they diverge in others given the government’s range of
responsibilities:

“Government-based efforts, you're responsible for the whole city, and so you
can't say, well, we're not going to deal with this area because it doesn't meet certain
criteria. Foundations have the luxury of pursuing what they're interested in at a
given time... There's a tendency... some of the foundations, what I call 'this year's
model', you know, they'll say it's economic development's the answer, and the next
year it's child social service. As a government entity there's certain basic things you
have to do” [Baltimore Housing].

However, at staff level the scope for improving joint working between city
government and the foundations and non-profit sector is recognised, particularly in
the 'middle' neighbourhoods:
There's a disconnect between foundation and sort of broader non-profit work that's happening and what the city is doing. I don't think that they're in sync, I don't think that their resources are matched up where they could be... Healthy Neighborhoods, the city can do more, not just financially, to support that organisation, but... you know... support the idea and the programmes itself in a particular neighbourhood” [Baltimore Housing Office of Development].

Regional Level
The regional level is not included in Figure 2 as it lacks significant network actors. However, the regional context does affect the network’s activities to some degree. In the 1980s the business sector’s Greater Baltimore Committee shifted from having a city to regional focus, reflecting the city’s loss of corporate functions to neighbouring, more prosperous, counties. This lack of corporate presence contributes to the lack of an explicit urban regime in the city, discussed below.

The regional perspective is reflected in some policy efforts regarding housing and public transport. Given the city’s high concentrations of poverty, some policy actors seek some form of regional dispersion of residents to reduce neighbourhood distress. Indeed, Maryland ACLU (American Civil Liberties Union) is managing a small programme of relocating low-income households from the city into suburban “communities of opportunity” (Stoker et al., 2008: 12). The State’s Smart Growth policies also frame Baltimore in a regional perspective, wherein the city is regarded as a source of affordable housing for the wider region. Regional transportation initiatives may also have an effect on some city neighbourhoods. For example, the OROSW area includes the West Baltimore MARC (commuter rail) station which is currently subject to redevelopment plans.

However, another significant way in which the city interacts with its region is perhaps not fully acknowledged by network members. This is the connection between the city’s persistent poverty and the drugs trade, sustained in part by suburban buyers from outside the city limits (Moskos, 2008).

State and National level
Over time assistance from federal government to Baltimore has included a changing array of explicit policies. These have included time-limited categorical grants linked to Empowerment Zone designation and Hope VI programmes for public housing.
(both instigated in the 1990s). CDBG funds (available for over thirty years) comprise the most consistent form of federal resource for the city. The federal governmental system means that funds are devolved, emphasising that the locus of authority for urban governance is at the city level:

"The principle initially when CDBG came along, that all this urban renewal, all this urban planning, and stuff, as well as other categorical grants that were largely federally-controlled, that we'd completely devolve that, as we here at HUD don't know what's going on in Seattle let alone Baltimore, and we'll let the locals do it, they're the ones that have a stake in it, so we'll give them the money and let them have the freedom to do with it what you will" [Federal Department of Housing and Urban Development].

However, there has been a long-running decline in CDBG allocations. Funding for particular projects is spasmodically gained from ‘earmarks’. The state also offers various forms of modest assistance, such as the programmes run by its Office of Neighborhood Reinvestment.

Baltimore hosts some nationally significant non-governmental actors. Enterprise Community Partners, a national non-profit intermediary, has an office in the city, though it has not embarked upon any significant neighbourhood initiatives since that of Sandtown-Winchester (discussed in chapter 4). The Annie E. Casey Foundation is the most significant nationally-operating non-governmental body in Baltimore, and is a key partner in the city’s current most significant redevelopment, EBDI (described below).

5.3.3. Key network members
The key network members - neighbourhood-based governance entities, city government, foundations, and anchor institutions - have differential ability to influence neighbourhood-based governance given their stores of power and resource. These stores vary, in absolute terms and regarding where they seek to expend these, given the type of endeavour or geographic area favoured. These network members shall be considered in turn.

Neighbourhood-based governance entities
It is evident that such entities' relationships with their sponsors are at least as important to their continued functioning and operations as their relationships to
citizens. Sponsors give a clear relative advantage to their entities, not only directly, but by potentially linking them into this broader network. The involvement of a sponsor indicates an opportunity for investment to other network members. This can be regarded as an extension of the asset-based allocation ethos, with network member sponsorship of a neighbourhood-based governance entity making other network members regard the entity as a neighbourhood asset upon which ‘due diligence’ for investment has been carried out. The resultant longevity of neighbourhood-based entities in turn imbues them with legitimacy from the network perspective, irrespective of (or in the absence of an assessment of) resident opinion:

"We try to leverage each others' investments and deepen the investments, and stay with them over time" [Local Foundation].

"One of the more successful Healthy Neighborhoods, benefited a huge amount from our support... in fact we supported the process that helped them become a Healthy Neighborhood. Goldseker has been a very consistent support for them, so we've got Goldseker, Healthy Neighborhoods, and us for at least 8 years now, all committed" [Local Foundation].

In the case of OROSW, its sponsor and anchor, the Bon Secours Foundation, has partnerships with other foundations and non-profit intermediaries according to shared areas of interest regarding programmes that are run in the OROSW area. These partners are not represented on the OROSW board. Their relationships are direct with the entity's foundation sponsor.

City government

The city’s policy discourse is characterised by a strategy of harnessing market forces. This approach originated from the foundation and ‘ed and med’ sectors as well as city government, highlighting that it is not city government alone that sets the imperatives which frame the network’s approaches to neighbourhoods. Joint working between these key network members on developing the asset-based approach clearly influenced Mayor O’Malley when he came into office in 1999. O’Malley then branded Healthy Neighborhoods as a mayoral initiative in 2001, and subsequently enabled the Department of Planning and Baltimore Housing to develop and adopt the housing typology as the apparent basis for the allocation of public resources in the city (as reflected in the city’s master and consolidated plans). The current mayor, Mayor Dixon, has continued this asset-based resource allocation approach, which is shared by the network:
"What happened over time was we went from a needs-based approach to an asset-based approach. The model really wasn't working. We had unlimited need but fairly limited resources. So, it basically became an issue, well, how do we target our resources? And that change was from 2000 on in the O'Malley administration" [Baltimore Housing].

"When you look at the big picture, everything is driven by resources, and building upon assets... that's where we see that we can plug in best, you know, to put dollars and/or resources to support that. We see that there is a growing market, so we will invest more money or shift our efforts .... because in the end the market is stronger there" [Baltimore Housing Office of Development].

These policy shifts emphasise the strength of the city's office of mayor. However, the mayoralty does not command resources sufficient to operationalise the policy prescriptions set out in the housing typology, especially given the decline in federal assistance. Nor does the mayoralty have sufficient power to align a concerted effort across the neighbourhood governance network, as indicated by the abeyance of the SNAP process, the intent of which was to co-ordinate action on the part of all network members. Indeed, the case study bodies' experiences show that even the services provided directly by the city are not responsive. This demonstrates what Stoker and Stone (2008: 18) describe as the city government's "limited and disjointed approach to neighbourhoods".

**Philanthropic Foundations**

Since the 1990s foundations have played an increasingly large role in the network, not only as initiative sponsors but also in developing policy. This demonstrates Martin's (2004: 394) description of foundations as an increasingly important player in US urban governance as it has become more privatist in orientation.

A consistent theme is a focus on leveraging opportunities, echoing and in fact presaging the asset-based rationale for resource allocation cited by city government. That foundations see themselves as sources of innovation is exemplified with their formative role in development of the Healthy Neighborhoods initiative which foreshadowed the broader network shift to an asset-based ethos. But the resource limitations of locally-based foundations and the scale of the need within the city both serve to limit what foundations can do, especially in the distressed neighbourhoods. It is therefore unsurprising that the foundations have gravitated towards tackling more tractable problems in neighbourhoods 'in the middle'.
Foundations vary regarding how prescriptive they perceive themselves to be with regard to their conditions of support to an entity or initiative. However, the steering interpretation is evident in the conditions of grant-making and the types of organisations and initiative supported and the ‘assets’, such as capacity, sought. Such steering is also confirmed given the experiences of OROSW.

The nationally-operating, privately endowed Annie E. Casey Foundation, headquartered in Baltimore since 1994, is the city’s most significant philanthropic foundation and a key actor in the neighbourhood governance network. The foundation classifies Baltimore as a “civic site”:

“Civic Sites are, they’re our home towns... We have no intent on leaving them, we are in here for the long haul, and so our investments and our thinking about this is a little deeper, a little more grounded here, than they might be in other places” [National Foundation].

The foundation’s main geographical focus is East Baltimore Development Initiative (EBDI), the most significant of the city government-defined ‘redevelopment areas’, anchored by Johns Hopkins. Given the history of past antagonism related to Johns Hopkins, “courting of good will has fallen largely to the Annie E. Casey Foundation and its efforts to pioneer a multifaceted ‘responsible redevelopment’” (Stoker and Stone, 2008: 17). The foundation has sufficient resource to be a major facilitator and has affected the way in which the initiative has proceeded. Initially the foundation rejected involvement in the initiative as it was viewed primarily as an economic development project. It then agreed to become engaged, albeit on the condition of enlarging the project’s focus to include an emphasis on the well-being of current residents, many of whom would be displaced and relocated. The foundation became a key partner and has committed substantial resources to augmenting the basic statutory relocation package, among other services such as a workforce development programme. A baseline residents’ survey was conducted to determine residents’ concerns and inform the development of appropriate services:

“We’ve absolutely tried... to change programmes and organisations’ orientation to listening to residents. What voice do residents have... at every step, someone has to fight for that space for them, because they don’t have the power of the developer, the mayor, and everyone else. So the foundation is trying to make sure that they have skills to come to the table, have a presence at the table, and that they have some authority and some decision-making, they’re participating” [National Foundation].
‘Ed and med’ anchor institutions

With the decline of the corporate sector, relatively immobile universities and hospitals have assumed an increasingly prominent role in Baltimore. The investment decisions of such anchor institutions can have significant effects on their surrounding neighbourhoods, as demonstrated by OROSW. The most prominent example of this in the city at the time of the research was EBDI, anchored by Johns Hopkins University and its associated science and technology park.

Johns Hopkins University, “the number one health care and biotechnology research institution in the nation” (City of Baltimore, 2006: 102), enables Baltimore to be an “important locus in the biomedical field” (Stoker et al., 2008: 48). It is the city’s most significant anchor institution and a key member of the neighbourhood governance network:

“Hopkins has a lot of self-interest going on, and I don't say that in a negative way, I mean, if it weren't for Hopkins I don't know who'd have a job” [City Councilperson].

EBDI’s planning and execution has “occupied a significant place in the macro-politics of the city” (Stoker et al., 2009: 11). Johns Hopkins’ levering power within the neighbourhood governance network is clear given the support being received from state and federal policies and resources as well as city government and the philanthropic sector. In terms of the network’s broadly shared market discourse, Johns Hopkins is seen by other network members as being able to lever market forces in a way that public and foundation investments on their own would not:

“The advantage is that there's an economic engine to sort of attach yourself to and to feed on the energy of, which is Johns Hopkins. So part of the reason that we've gone over there is that we're able to build on and work with an economic engine” [National Foundation].

Johns Hopkins is regarded as a particularly advantaged actor in the network:

“It's a fight. I mean, it's political. Basically, any administration - any - needs to put its capital where the people are or where the sympathies are... Or where Hopkins is [laughs], right?” [City Councilperson].

5.3.4. Baltimore Urban Governance

Investigation of Baltimore thus reveals that neighbourhood-based governance entities are located within, but are to a large extent separate from, a broader network which
has determined a market-driven approach to the city’s neighbourhoods. This network comprises a cross-sectoral mix of public, private and non-profit actors as well as anchor institutions.

The ‘separateness’ of neighbourhood-based bodies is made clear given the experiences of the case study entities. Their most important relationships are their horizontal links to their anchors/sponsors. In the lack of the ‘market-levering’ assets sought by the network within the areas covered by the entities, the entities are not vertically linked up to the network. They are open-ended, ongoing endeavours, but this does not relate to the network’s support, or indeed to the network’s policy approach. Their ongoing existence relates to their anchoring in their local areas, due to an anchor institution and a surtax mechanism respectively. Indeed, the bodies are operating in spite of, rather than because of, the network. In the absence of the entities’ horizontal links to their anchors they would cease to exist. As it is, they have both reached a ‘plateau’ of resident engagement and have both recognised the need to consider ways of refreshing their role moving forward.

Therefore, while all of the accounts of the role of neighbourhood-based governance are evident to some degree in both case study bodies, it is the self-help account which is predominant. This is particularly the case with CVCBD. However, if OROSW is regarded as the community outreach arm of the Bon Secours Foundation, then it is clearly also an endeavour which is primarily motivated by and reflects the self-help interpretation. This is because the hospital anchor institution, albeit clearly motivated by its pastoral mission, has a vested interest in improving and stabilising the neighbourhoods which surround it. The hospital and its foundation are certainly actors within the broader urban governance network, but they are not principal members who form part of the policy subsystem determining the broad approaches to neighbourhoods. Their interests are at the sub-city, multi-neighbourhood level at which they – and their associated entity, OROSW – operate. This is why it is the horizontal (rather than vertical) nature of the links between the entity and its sponsor/anchor which are crucial.

In terms of the other functions, it is competence that is most clearly demonstrated. OROSW acts as the conduit for community input into the foundation’s programmes,
and CVDBD in turn seeks community input into the services it delivers. Allusions to the democracy function are inherent in both bodies (indeed, CVDBD was steered by the state to a more democratic structure given its public entity status), but democracy is subservient to the competence account. That competence in the sense of the entities’ ability to influence mainstream city service provision is not being realised reflects the lack of vertical links from the entities up to the network, as well as the city’s precarious financial position affecting its ability to provide adequate services.

Steering is evident, and indeed is the predominant interpretation of OROSW when it is regarded as a body separate from its sponsoring foundation, though again this can be regarded as a set of horizontal rather than vertical links. The steering which CVDBD experienced at its outset does relate to ‘top down’ relationships with key actors in the broader network, but these relationships have not been significant subsequently. That CVDBD has been ‘left to get on with it’ since the initial success of community activism in gaining key network member support for the approach emphasises its separateness from the network and reasserts the self-help account. Tokenism is therefore also implicit within the experiences of the entities, in the sense that they operate to a large extent separate from the ‘mainstream’ in terms of the main concerns of the broader city-level governance network.

The relatively simple structure of this broader network and its operations are determined at city-level. Funding does flow from higher levels, notably federal CDBG monies, as well as state resource given its ‘Smart Growth’-related designation of Baltimore as a location for housing growth, but disbursement of these resources is ascertained at city-level. The network has been stable since the key shift in 2001 to a shared ‘logic’ of asset-based resource allocation.

Within this network a “policy subsystem” (Goetz and Sidney, 1997) or “neighbourhood policy regime” (Martin, 2004) is evident with regard to neighbourhood-based approaches. Members of this subsystem, notably philanthropic and non-profit sector actors as well as city government, have significantly influenced this ‘neighbourhood policy’ as expressed in the housing typology, which sets out strategies and investment approaches deemed appropriate for different market characteristics amongst all of the city’s neighbourhoods. This asset-based, market-driven discourse evidences the subsystem’s neo-liberal orientation, which echoes
Katz's (2004: 26) view that neighbourhood change should be market-driven rather than community-controlled. It also emphasises the increasing role of private philanthropies as 'policy-setters' in the city. This can be related to the increasingly privatist orientation of urban governance given 'federal retrenchment'. In the absence of significant federal funds and in light of the city's own lack of resource, foundation actors alighted upon what can be regarded as a pragmatic response, which was perhaps easier for them to promote than the city government, given concerns of equity. Their success was in gaining Mayor O'Malley's support, who then ensured that this approach was institutionalised via the city's plans and approaches.

However, Chaskin's (2003:185) description of a system of neighbourhood governance comprising organisations, local government and foundations interacting in "highly improvised ways" is also apposite. While in theory the housing typology provides a geographic framework for different forms of cross-sectoral intervention and investment across the city's neighbourhoods, its strategies are not applied consistently and an opportunistic approach is evident. As can be expected given the nature of multi-level governance, the policy subsystem has not "carved out an autonomous sphere of action" (Stoker et al., 2009: 7), rather its actions are framed by broader market imperatives.

The network focuses on significant opportunities, as exemplified by EBDI, which can lever market forces in terms of gaining bioscience investment capital. The most routine of its operations is the Healthy Neighbourhoods Initiative and replication of such targeting of neighbourhoods 'in the middle' by the local, much less well-resourced, foundations. Such neighbourhoods do gain some vertical links into the network given their market-relevant assets. Neighbourhoods which lack the assets sought may undertake self-help endeavours, as demonstrated by the case studies, if they have the capacity (which in the case of the entities is provided by their being anchored) to do so.

This is why Baltimore can be described as a 'multi-track' city. This is expressed in terms of the different categories of the housing typology. It is clear that distressed communities are treated differently to neighbourhoods 'in the middle'. But the research reveals that there are refinements which can be made to the 'distressed'
category, which can be divided into three sub-categories. The first is distressed communities which lack assets of any sort. Such neighbourhoods do not receive any network attention. The second is distressed communities which have a (locally operating) anchor institution which can provide sufficient horizontal linkages to enable the sustenance of some locally-based efforts, as is the case with OROSW (though its foundation anchor does in turn gain support from other network members for its programmes). The third category is distressed neighbourhoods which are subject to the redevelopment plans of a major anchor institution, which fulfils the city's broader agenda driven by imperatives of economic development and growth. In this case neighbourhood-based bodies will rapidly gain vertical linkages to the network, but in engaging can be regarded as being co-opted into the network's agenda. EBDI at present can be regarded as 'the game in town' for the network.

The neighbourhood governance network therefore fulfils Chaskin's (2005: 418) observation that in such systems, "power dynamics are pervasive" with the most pervasive actions coming from the key network actors rather than the 'grassroots' neighbourhood-based governance entities. It is these actors who have determined the imperatives which frame neighbourhood approaches in the city. In Baltimore these actors, or 'local metagovernors', comprise philanthropic foundations, particularly the Casey Foundation, and anchor institutions, notably Johns Hopkins University, as well as city government. This evidences the privatist nature of Baltimore's urban governance.

However, these private interests differ from the business interests described in regime theory (explained in chapter 2). In Baltimore's case the most significant 'private' actors, following the decline of the city's corporate functions, comprise a private philanthropic foundation and Johns Hopkins University. The latter is technically a non-profit institution but as the city's largest employer, and given its significance to the city's economy in the lack of a significant corporate presence, it can be said to have a 'quasi-corporate' character. Johns Hopkins constitutes the basis upon which the network, with the other principals, is attempting to consolidate Baltimore's role as a locus for the bioscience sector. As a globally-recognised anchor institution, it is also anchoring the network's agenda.
Localist and Privatist Urban Governance

In sum, Baltimore does fulfil many of the expected characteristics of a localist and privatist system of urban governance in the US, as set out in Table 5.3. The locus of authority is at the city-level, with city government and private interests taking the lead. However, a governance network rather than urban regime is evident given the nature of its membership. This network prioritises neo-liberal strategies of growth. These strategies are particularly linked to the housing market in terms of neighbourhoods, with job attraction focused on the efforts to consolidate the city's role as a bioscience cluster. There is a linked emphasis on self-help for deprived neighbourhoods if they have the assets which can be levered by the market. A policy subsystem for neighbourhood-based approaches is evident, as expressed in the housing typology. The subsystem’s efforts are framed by the neo-liberal strategies of the prevailing governance network. Tokenistic treatment of neighbourhood-based governance forms in the city is apparent (demonstrated by the experiences of the case study entities), especially if their areas lack the assets that are perceived as able to lever market forces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.3: Baltimore Urban Governance Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Urban Governance Characteristics</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Associated Neighbourhood-based Governance Functions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locus of authority</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Baltimore’s urban governance network sets the state and market imperatives which are pursued at city-wide and neighbourhood levels. State imperatives are subservient to market imperatives given the ethos of leveraging the market in the city. The most significant ‘market strengths’ or assets which determine the urban governance’s approach to the neighbourhood-level are the state of the neighbourhood housing
market, and the presence of anchor institutions with growth needs which underpin development of the bioscience sector. This results in what can be characterised as an ad hoc set of attempts, influenced by its neo-liberal context, where neighbourhood initiatives are favoured when they relate to the predominant policy driver of economic development.

5.4 Conclusion

To conclude it is important to consider the implications of the urban governance network's strategies and actions in terms of the relative power of the neighbourhood level within its multi-level governance context.

Unlike the (intent at least of the) requirement for an LSP in England, Baltimore’s network structure lacks a means of routinely including neighbourhood-level actors in deliberations regarding neighbourhood-level activities and approaches. This is a strong indicator of the lack of power at neighbourhood level.

The network constructs neighbourhoods in terms of the state of their housing market, institutionalised as a policy approach in the housing typology. The typology can be regarded as a proxy for levels of neighbourhood distress in which a distinction is made between neighbourhoods that are 'salvageable' in light of the resources available, and those that are not. This pragmatic approach resulted from a growing realisation, originating in the foundation community, of Baltimore's huge extent of need and lack of resource. It is unsurprising that such an approach originated in the private philanthropic community as it is not subject to the equity requirements to which the city government must pay heed. It evidences what Stoker et al. (2009: 14) describe as "a triage approach to policymaking".

Baltimore can therefore be described as not just a 'twin' but a 'multi-track' city. The typology's 'middle' neighbourhoods provide the focus for some network members, particularly the local foundations and intermediaries, where interventions may be able to 'improve market conditions'. The paradox of having a market-oriented policy in Baltimore is most apparent in the 'distressed' neighbourhoods. While some network members address the 'distressed' areas, this is not routine, but where these areas
intersect with anchored opportunities for redevelopment. Therefore, the
neighbourhoods most in need – those that are distressed and lack an asset in terms of
an ‘ed and med’ anchor – tend to be excluded from the network’s activity. These
neighbourhoods are further penalised in terms of network attention as they are most
likely to lack the neighbourhood capacity sought by initiative sponsors. There is
significant competition between neighbourhoods for limited resources and many
needs are unmet.

In the context of this research’s cross-national comparison, Baltimore evidences the
experiences of a city within a federal governmental system. This system has weak
fiscal equalisation, and lacks significant and consistent national funding for
neighbourhood initiatives, which compounds the city’s own weak tax base. Lack of
resource makes it much harder for the network to maintain a coherent approach, even
though the housing typology provides a framework for targeting neighbourhoods. In
this context network members are driven towards an opportunistic approach, best
expressed in terms of the network’s focus on EBDI, where tackling neighbourhood
distress is a subservient policy domain to economic development policy concerns.

Therefore network attention focuses at the neighbourhood level when the
neighbourhood has assets which the network regards as a priority to ‘lever’. EBDI
gains its high profile given the perceived ability of the ‘ed and med’ sector to lever
private investment, thus encouraging network resource. Links with such projects can
elevate neighbourhood concerns and neighbourhood actors may be able to mobilise to
negotiate community benefits, particularly if they have the capacity to do so (and in
this example the Casey Foundation are supporting neighbourhood capacity building).
But by engaging, neighbourhood actors can be said to have been co-opted into sharing
the network’s vision of their future development. So any ‘power’ gained is that
enabled by the network in the pursuit of its imperatives and is clearly circumscribed
by the network.

In this localist and privatist governance system, neighbourhoods that have the
capacity to self-help are more likely to do so. This is demonstrated by the experiences
of the case study entities. Key in the international comparative context of this
research is that the two entities can be said to be operating in spite of rather than
Because of, not only government, but the urban governance network as a whole. While this could be regarded as evidence of power accruing at the neighbourhood level, it is really a reflection of the localist and privatist nature of the governance network, in which neighbourhoods can be said to be empowered to 'go it alone' given the network's lack of steering and its opportunistic approach. However, such 'power', which relates to the internal capacities of the neighbourhoods to help themselves, is extremely limited. The case study entities are ongoing due to their being anchored in horizontal relationships. When neighbourhoods lack the assets sought by the key members of the urban governance network, and also lack such anchoring, initiatives to alleviate their deprivation will not occur.
6.1 Introduction

This chapter sets out the findings and analysis of the empirical work in Bristol, England, applying the theoretical framework set out in chapter 2 and using the methodological approach set out in chapter 3. Chapter 4 sets the scene for this chapter by detailing the relevant national, regional and local policies and approaches.

The chapter first presents application of the 'ideal-type' characteristics framework to two neighbourhood governance entities. Steering is revealed as the principal function of both entities, as their creation, structuring and operations have been steered by central government. The other functions of such governance are also evident to differing degrees. The democracy function is clear in the way the bodies are structured, which reflects the resident-led emphasis in their respective government funding regimes. Competence is also expressed given the bodies’ engagement in service provision, and latterly has received more emphasis given government’s shift to service-influencing neighbourhood management approaches. Self-help is apparent in some of the approaches enabled by the well-resourced government programmes and in both entities’ attempts to sustain operations after these. Given that the bodies are now no longer a focus for the broader urban governance network, tokenism is also implicit to the predominant account of steering. Both bodies are struggling to adapt given the context of churn in government policies and funding sources.

The chapter then considers Bristol’s urban governance system and applies the framework of expected characteristics for England to the city. Analysis reveals that Bristol does display the attributes which can be expected in this centrist and managerial governmental system. The network is truly multi- rather than city-level. The structure of this network and the relationships within it are shaped by central government, which directs which actors are engaged, their level of resource and power, and the plans and strategies which frame the approaches taken, at regional, city and neighbourhood level. Central government control is evident in the priorities
which are pursued, and manifested in the network’s structure, which is crowded, and in its operations, which are subject to significant churn and instability given changes in central government policies.

Finally, the implications of the multi-level governance network’s strategies and actions are considered. The relative power of the neighbourhood level, and indeed the urban level, within this multi-level governance context is determined by central government. In this centrist and managerial governance system, any power at neighbourhood level derives from the attentions of government funding regimes and policy approaches. Central government sets the imperatives which are pursued at city-wide and neighbourhood levels. Changes at these levels mirror central government policy shifts from the explicit targeting of deprived areas via area-based initiatives to a broader emphasis on neighbourhood engagement in and influence on service delivery. But the agenda of tackling deprivation is secondary to the predominant imperative of economic and housing growth. The needs of deprived neighbourhoods are subservient to this market imperative, with policies seeking to link such neighbourhoods to this growth. This highlights that government attempts to tackle neighbourhood deprivation are undertaken within and influenced by the neoliberal context. Without dedicated resource, the formal governance entities which may exist given earlier governmental initiatives are increasingly having to rely on notions of self-help, irrespective of their capacity to do so.

6.2 Neighbourhood-based Initiative Governance Entities

To assess the extent to which each of the five functions identified for neighbourhood-based initiative governance entities is evident in reality, the structures and operations of the two case study entities are assessed against the attributes as set out in the heuristic framework of ‘ideal-type’ entities by function (as set out in Table 2.1). A sample entity-level interview guide is appended (at Appendix 2).

For each case study below, a brief history of the entity precedes assessment against the framework of characteristics of ‘ideal-type’ entities according to function. This, set out in Tables 6.1 and 6.2, includes only those typology characteristics which are evidenced by the entity. Detailed consideration of each entity’s structure and
operations by function, including representative quotes from respondents, is then presented. Figure 3 shows the location of the two case study entities within the city.

Figure 3: Location of Bristol Case Study Entities

City of Bristol

Community at Heart (CaH)

Hartcliffe & Withywood Community Partnership (HWCP)
Community at Heart (CaH)

Community at Heart is the body created to oversee delivery of the government’s New Deal for Communities (NDC) ten-year, £50 million programme in Bristol which commenced in July 2000 (more detail about the NDC regime is provided in chapter 4). The area covered by CaH (generally known as Barton Hill) is located in inner east Bristol and has a total population of 5,500, significantly smaller than that of the other case study entities.

CaH is a company limited by guarantee with charitable status. Its “vision” is to “create a strong and responsible community that has the ability to understand, engage and overcome its problems, enabling residents to build a safe environment that fulfils local needs, inspires and provides opportunities for all” (CaH Revised Strategic Plan, 2005: 7). In 2001 the area was designated as one of Bristol’s ten Neighbourhood Renewal Fund (NRF) ‘priority neighbourhoods’. This funding stream was in place until 2008. It was also a neighbourhood management pilot from 2006 until 2008. It is now gaining transitional funding until 2010. Most recently the entity has been commissioned by the council to lead on development of a neighbourhood partnership (explained in chapter 4) for its broader two-ward area.

At its inception the NDC was a ‘flagship’ government programme. CaH has subsequently been buffeted by changes in policy approaches, compounded by a decline in resource as the programme comes to its end. The scope of its operations has accordingly shrunk. The entity predominantly reflects the steering interpretation of neighbourhood-based initiative governance, which is presented first in Table 6.1 below. This is despite the emphasis placed on community engagement in the NDC programme and latterly in neighbourhood management approaches, though this is reflected in the allusions to the democracy and competence functions evident in the entity’s structure and operations. Some characteristics of the self-help ‘ideal-type’ entity are evident, but this relates to the government’s programme and the entity will be unable to sustain the extent of these operations after the programme ends.

Tokenism is also evident as the entity is no longer a focus for the broader urban governance network given its declining resource and a shift away from such area-based approaches. Indeed, the tokenism account of the function of neighbourhood governance is intrinsic to the predominant account of steering.
Table 6.1: CaH: ‘Ideal-Type’ Entity Characteristics Evident

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Steering</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Instigated by central government</td>
<td>• Sponsor determines some of entity operations (defining 5 out of 10 programme themes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sponsor specifies structure in terms of population size covered</td>
<td>• Entity heavily reliant on sponsor funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sponsor(s) represented on board (GOW and Bristol City Council)</td>
<td>• Emphasis on consensus in board deliberations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sponsor funds (though does not employ) entity staff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 10-year programme lifetime</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Close monitoring against targets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democracy</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Majority (10 out of 17 voting members) resident representation on board</td>
<td>• Broad resident engagement in identifying needs and priorities (MORI-conducted residents’ survey)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Elected resident board representation by four sub-areas</td>
<td>• Capacity building of resident members with leadership training and support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Resident quorum of 3 residents for decision-making</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Resident representative-led board sub-committees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Board-determined funding allocation over devolved budgets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Competence</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Resident board representation</td>
<td>• Broad resident engagement in identifying needs and priorities (MORI-conducted residents’ survey)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Statutory service provider representation (including a local councillor)</td>
<td>• Significant though waning service provider involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Third sector service provider board representation</td>
<td>• Monitoring and review of services and resident satisfaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self-help</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Majority resident representation on board</td>
<td>• Entity able to determine some of its operations (defining 5 out of 10 programme themes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Small self-generated funding streams</td>
<td>• Able to develop, appraise and fund own projects during programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sponsor emphasis on capacity building of entity and residents</td>
<td>• Able to design and engage in supplemental service delivery during programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Devolved budgets during NDC programme</td>
<td>• Small property asset base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Small self-generated income stream</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Resourced capacity building activities during programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Entity able to continue for at least a limited period in absence of sponsor but with greatly reduced operations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Structure</strong></th>
<th><strong>Operations</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tokenism</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Not applicable</em></td>
<td>• Lack of ongoing support for entity after programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lack of engagement from statutory service providers/government as programme comes to an end</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• No longer a priority/ links reduced to urban governance network</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Steering**

The steering interpretation is uppermost with regard to CaH. The body would not exist in the absence of central government’s NDC programme. Its programmatic origins are evident in the way it is structured. Its central (and local) government sponsors are represented on the entity’s board (as ‘non-voting’ members). The requirements of the NDC programme have affected the entity’s structuring in terms of the type of neighbourhoods sought and the population covered. The entity also displays the steering ‘ideal-type’ characteristics of a delimited programme timeframe and is subject to close monitoring against targets:

"It’s been a flagship programme for [GOSW], and the advice and guidance and input that they’ve given there, and particularly during the times when there was a fractious relationship between CaH and the council, they were invaluable" [Council Officer].

"[The Board has] got a government person because it’s government money" [GOSW Official].

"In many respects, particularly early on in the programme, many responsibilities and actions were taken by say, the Government Office or the accountable body [Bristol City Council] which could have been actions and decisions taken by the CaH board. But for whatever reason, of power, of a desire for control, of an inexperience in the resident members, certain decisions or actions were taken which would not necessarily I would say show that the residents were leading the process” [Entity staff].

The steering interpretation is central to the entity’s operations. Central government defined five thematic priorities that the entity had to pursue (albeit in areas which did correlate with residents’ concerns). While the board does have devolved budgets, any investment over £250,000 requires GOSW approval, and projects (those related to drugs are cited) can be ‘called in’ for review by GOSW if they are deemed contentious:

"[The project appraisal process] is a bit bureaucratic, we did have this really, really quite firm guidance from the government as to what needs to be in it” [Resident Board Member].

"What happens repeatedly right the way through the process is the government wanted to influence what it is we did... they’ve been very, very difficult about for instance how assets are built up and things like that. They’ve been very, constantly obsessed with their own processes around spend targets” [Resident Board Member].

"It was a real experiment, unfortunately the scientist has interfered so much with the experiment that they’re not going to learn very much from it because they didn’t let it run” [Resident Board Member].
The entity, as a company limited by guarantee with charitable status, employs its own professional staff rather than these being employed by the sponsors, though the sponsors provide the funding for these posts. However, it is evident that staff, who act as theme co-ordinators, project deliverers, and prepare meeting papers, do steer deliberations and decisions, which undermines the purported 'resident-led' ethos of the entity. Entity staff numbers culminated at a peak of about 65 at the height of the programme:

"When it comes to the actual board discussions... it's already been steered in whatever direction they want it to go in, so odds on it probably will do" [Resident Board Member].

"I think people have wanted to reach consensus and I think in general people have hung back a little on occasions in expressing their view, in the hope of achieving a consensus" [Entity staff].

"It was total, this is the major plan [for public housing regeneration], this is what we're going to do, tough basically, is how it felt. And I still think there's a feeling of that now. So it was very much 'done to' and it went against all of what CaH's literature and let's talk about resident-led" [Third sector representative Board Member].

The steering account is also more subtly evident in the entity's efforts to sustain itself after the programme lifetime. The board decision that its succession strategy be reliant on development of a neighbourhood management approach and an asset-base can be interpreted as the entity's attempt to adapt in the context of government policy shifts as bundled under the 'neighbourhoods agenda' banner:

"But again, I think that's just a government initiative, or a council initiative, whatever, pushing you. So you don't have no choice, but I think possibly we'll make the best of a bad job if you like..." [Resident Board Member].

"I really do feel it's resident-led, I also think there's sometimes a push in the background to where it should be going, and where they want you to go. As in [the council's introduction of neighbourhood partnerships]... it wouldn't necessarily be probably what people would want here, but it's something that the council, government, want, so therefore it's sort of happened" [Resident Board Member].

The entity's origins, development and its shifts in operations have been absolutely interdependent with the government's time-limited NDC programme that has not only resourced but framed these processes.
Democracy

This function is particularly evident in the way CaH is structured, but the professionalised nature of its operations confirm the predominance of the steering account for this neighbourhood governance body.

Voting board members comprise a majority of elected local residents, as well as representatives of young people, local business, a school, churches, third sector organisations and a local councillor. Resident majorities are also in place on the various formal decision-making board sub-groups, as well as project task groups:

“"I can say it's democracy, I'm not saying I speak for every resident, I don't, because I'm only an employee, but my board are accountable, they were elected”” [Entity staff].

“The quorum is... how we build in that sort of resident power” [Resident Board Member].

However, respondents recognise that it is only in the entity's operations that a resident-led ethos can be realised:

“"Structures can help, they enshrine things in law... it provides a kind of solid mooring... but almost more important than that is that there's somehow, whether through natural ability or through training, or indeed through the way in which the executive report to and support those various groups, they are... empowered to take leadership”” [Entity Staff].

“But I feel that unless a resident feels that their voice is being heard, whether it actually is or it isn't [laughs], they just give up if they know damn well it's not being heard. So... yeah, I think you've always got to have that belief that it's happening. And I think once you lose that, you just give up really” [Resident Board Member].

Respondents share a belief that not only that the way in which the entity is structured reflects its resident-led ethos, but that its operations attempt to deliver this. Capacity building of resident board members via training programmes and support is undertaken:

“"For every board meeting we have, we do have a pre-board meeting... because some of the papers are difficult to understand. I mean, we are only sort of, at the end of the day, we are only residents doing ordinary jobs, you know. We are not trained to do particular things”” [Resident Board Member].

“There are issues about culture and mindset which are probably most important in terms of whether the structural aspect of resident leadership then flows through to a real leadership”” [Entity staff].
However, overall the role of entity staff – including as theme co-ordinators, project deliverers, in preparing papers – indicates a professionalised mode of operation and raises queries about the extent to which the voice of resident representatives is heard:

"I stay here 24/7, and I think we got very fed up of people at CaH, all their employees, none of them lived in the area, so they had this sort of weird take on it, you know, I’m going home now... regeneration is about skilling people up so that they can deal with their own stuff, you know" [Third sector representative Board Member].

"When it comes to the actual board discussions... it’s already been steered in whatever direction they want it to go in, so odds on it probably will do” [Resident Board Member].

The classic concern regarding the ‘usual suspects’ being engaged and a parochialism and insularity developing is echoed by some respondents. It was also felt that now the NDC programme is coming to its end it will be harder to refresh resident representation on the board:

"You always get people in an area like this, you either engage them... or you don’t... Some people don’t want to be engaged in all of this, it’s just they just want to get on with their own lives. I’m not one of those [laughs], obviously” [Third sector representative board member].

In 2007 the board consulted residents on its structure, cited in itself as an example of the resident-led ethos in practice. This resulted in continuation of the same model for board membership of locally elected residents and service providers.

**Competence**

The competence function is also evident in the way CaH is structured, but CaH’s ability to engage in direct service delivery during the programme, combined with a waning in service provider engagement now that dedicated resource has declined, show that it is not operating in accord with this function. This also confirms the predominance of the steering account.

Respondents stress the importance of residents’ knowledge and experience of living in the area to inform the entity and its operations:

"You don’t need a board place for someone who can read a profit and loss account, those are easy skills to get actually... what we really want is people who have an experience of living here” [Entity Staff].
This emphasises the entity’s neighbourhood management role, also evident in the board’s ‘non-voting’ membership, which comprises representatives of Bristol Primary Care Trust, Avon and Somerset Police and Bristol City Council. Other partners, from agencies and the third sector, are involved in the relevant programme theme groups. However, respondents recognise that at its outset, the entity was under pressure to quickly expend the NDC grant funds. This led to a tendency for projects to be delivered by the entity rather than mainstream services and partners, inhibiting its ability to influence service delivery and encourage responsiveness on the part of service providers. As the programme progressed the strategic lead for some themes was moved to partner agencies. In 2006, the entity adopted an ethos of not duplicating existing services and not providing services for which suitable providers could be identified and funded. In all, about 40% of the NDC programme’s projects have been delivered by the entity itself rather than third parties.

The entity’s large resource and resultant power earlier in the programme, expressed via the entity’s direct delivery of services, is perceived by council respondents as duplicating provision as well as leading to dysfunction and ineffectiveness in the entity’s relationships with the council:

“At one point [CaH] had grown to the point of having 70, 80 staff delivering programmes across a range of activity, were actively jousting with the council at every opportunity, rather than looking at ways of how they can engage and work with us to deliver what they wanted to do. And they were in a, at one point an extreme example of sort of appearing to want to try and go it alone, and do things without having to involve us… whatever you think of the local authority as a neighbourhood-based entity, you’ve got to work with them” [Council Officer].

“It was quite a combative approach… an extreme gap-filling exercise that in some cases was starting to duplicate what the council, and other agencies, could also provide…” [Council Officer].

“CaH came out of the same mentality as Neighbourhood Renewal and they were all supposed to be about influencing the mainstream to do things, and here’s a bit of extra money to sort of fast-track things and test things out. I think the flaw… was that that pump-priming money became the programme, and it got, the mainstreaming agenda took second place” [Council Officer].

Entity staff cite the need for CaH to fill gaps in provision and deliver what residents want:

“We took a pragmatic approach and tried to develop partnerships with the council and use the NDC money to lever things to happen that might not have happened, or might not have happened as quickly. And then you get criticism…but, then you wouldn’t have it otherwise, you’d still be waiting” [Entity Staff].
"We would be constantly under scrutiny from some of our residents... we want better lampposts, or a better school. Well... we're here to respond to what they want. But frankly, the city council ought to be providing adequate learning facilities and adequate street lighting, so what do we do?" [Entity Staff].

Respondents report the variable engagement of the various board members as the programme has progressed. Early on, attendance of all partners was felt to be good, but attendance from non-resident board members has declined over time which respondents relate to the decline in funding available:

"Going back in the early days, I think there was every partner there was around the table, all quite keen because there was a lot of money to be had. In later, this last year or two, now that the money's spent, you don't see the partners. Which is quite sad really because they've had the money, and it just seems as though they're not interested" [Resident Board Member].

In the latter stages of the programme the competence account is receiving more emphasis given a shift to influencing mainstream service provision given its decline in resource. However, the true challenge of influencing service provision lies ahead in the absence of the level of dedicated resource which respondents state is likely to have encouraged agencies to engage.

**Self-help**

While the self-help function features strongly in the programme’s ‘vision’, it is less evident in CaH’s operations. This again asserts the predominance of the steering account of its role.

The programme’s “vision”, describing the creation of a “responsible community” and talking of “enabling residents” (CaH Revised Strategic Plan, 2005: 7) reflects central government’s rhetoric regarding the NDC regime. Some operationalisation of this is implied with recognition of a growth in voluntary activity:

"I think if Barton Hill started off now, in this process, they'd have been better placed... there is a bottom-up activity going on there that's been nurtured through NDC" [Third Sector Support Organisation].

However, the extent to which these operations actually represent resident self-help is not clear, especially given the professionally staffed nature of the entity. It is also not evident that sufficient capacity has been built during the programme to sustain the voluntary activity which has been levered by funded projects. The entity’s effects on
longstanding community supports such as the Barton Hill Settlement, which at one stage was dependent on CaH for about 80% of its funding, are also unclear.

The NDC programme did enable the entity to fulfil many of the 'ideal-type' self-help characteristics. At the programme's outset there was scope for the identification of area-specific concerns and provision of funding allocations for these. An example is the 'Tackling Dealing' fund, created as a response to residents' identification of drug dealing as a priority in the initial MORI-conducted residents' survey. When the programme was at its height, the entity had sufficient resource to develop, appraise and fund its own projects, and engage in supplemental service delivery. During the programme the entity has also developed limited self-generated funding streams derived from capital assets, which are managed by a committee that deals with 'non-NDC' business:

"It's almost like we're in the Republic of New Deal, you know, you've got your own money, you get on with it" [Entity Staff].

"Over the years we've developed a bit of a life of our own so we have a company that does have its own business to conduct, you know, it has money that isn't NDC money" [Resident Board Member].

The entity's development of a small asset portfolio during the programme lifetime, and its planned use of these assets to generate income, forms part of the basis of its "succession strategy" (as set out in the CaH Revised Strategic Plan, 2005). This implies continued realisation of some of the self-help 'ideal-type' characteristics after the programme ends. But the entity has a relatively small asset portfolio:

"We don't actually have a very big asset portfolio. Some of the NDCs have got massive ones, they spent loads of their money on that. We decided to go for the social programmes and not build up big capital portfolios... probably with hindsight I wish we'd built a bit more of an asset base” [Resident Board Member].

The entity's succession strategy is to pursue a neighbourhood management model until 2013, with a small staff team funded by the entity's capital assets, and council funding for neighbourhood management and neighbourhood partnership work (explained in chapter 4). Respondents had varied responses to this strategy:

"We are definitely going to a neighbourhood management structure that will be slightly different... what I expect is that we will keep the same sort of democratic ideas, concepts" [Resident Board Member].

"If NDC just came to an end full stop, all these projects... would just finish, and that would be an absolute shame...and if it was all finished, would it go back to
what it was? And all that money would be just wasted. So I feel that a
eighbourhood management model is a good succession plan for us to continue on.
Not in the same format as CaH, because it won’t have the money” [Resident Board
Member].

“I think it needs a completely fresh approach, with new people and new
ideas... CaH has done its thing. And we worked out, it was £8,000 per person, that
£50 million. So I don’t know whether you’d have been better off giving £8,000 to
each of us and giving us a co-operative to work with, say, put 10 of us together, that’s
£80,000, yeah, OK we can do something with that” [Third sector representative Board
Member].

While the entity does plan to continue in the absence of its sponsor (in the form of
central government programmatic resource), these plans only extend for three years
after the programme lifetime and its operations will be significantly scaled back. It
will therefore not be fulfilling the self-help ‘ideal-type’ characteristics to the extent
that it has been enabled to do by the programme. Indeed, it is unclear that the
programme has built capacity sufficient to enable the community to ‘help itself’ as
expressed in the self-help interpretation, in terms of CaH’s ability to sustain itself in
an open-ended way.

Tokenism

The tokenism account of neighbourhood-based initiative governance is evident in
CaH’s operations, though this relates to the overall steering of the entity by
government, asserting the predominance of the steering interpretation of CaH’s role.

Tokenism is evident in the declining engagement of statutory service providers which
respondents relate to the decline in funding available. It is also obvious in the lack of
ongoing support for the entity, related to the NDC programme coming to an end and
the shift in the entity’s operations necessitated by this. This shift in turn can be
interpreted as being tokenistic - a way of glossing over the ‘special case’ that can be
made for deprived areas (and the resource commitments entailed in this):

“NDC £50 million, 5,500 residents; neighbourhood management up to say
20,000 residents costs running at £200-400,000 per annum; neighbourhood
partnerships, over 30,000 residents, £30,000 per annum... Yes of course, let’s get
more efficient, let’s accept the real world, but at some point you have to go, frankly
that’s not going to make much difference” [Entity Staff].

“There is certainly less for local people in areas of disadvantage to be
responsible for now. What we are endeavouring to achieve here at CaH is that they
continue to have influence, and access to influence, that we provide them with some
independence” [Entity Staff].
"I've got little alarm bells going on about the NDC area... the move from having megabucks to just having your normal bog standard amounts of money" [Council Officer].

The tokenism interpretation is also evident when CaH is located in its broader context. For example, prior to its relaunch, CaH was represented on the Bristol Partnership as a ‘community-accountable body’, described as “enabling us to influence change at a city-wide strategic level” (CaH Revised Strategic Plan, 2005: 30). The entity’s lack of representation indicates that it is no longer regarded as a priority by, and certainly is not as explicitly linked into, the urban governance network (explored later in the chapter). At its inception, the NDC was central government’s ‘flagship’ programme and CaH was the subject of much attention. The entity has subsequently been subsumed by changing policies and approaches and is attempting to adapt to these.

6.2.2. Hartcliffe and Withywood Community Partnership (HWCP)

Hartcliffe and Withywood Community Partnership (HWCP) was established in 1998 by local residents and organisations, with the support of the Bristol Regeneration Partnership. The area comprises two post-war housing estates on the periphery of South Bristol with a total population of 18,700. At its outset HWCP was an informal steering group of local organisations and residents which prepared a bid for round five of central government’s Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) funding (more detail about the SRB regime is provided in chapter 4). The bid, ‘Working Together for Change’ was approved in 1999, with a final award of £12.15 million over seven years. The entity became a limited company in 2001 and a registered charity in 2002.

“The vision” set out in the SRB bid was to “create a safe, healthy, learning, working, locally owned, balanced and inclusive community” (HWCP, 2007: 8). The SRB programme ended in 2007. The entity also received NRF funds as a ‘priority neighbourhood’ from 2001 until 2008, and was a neighbourhood management pilot from 2006 until 2008. It is now gaining transitional funding until 2010. The entity has most recently been commissioned by the council to lead on development of a neighbourhood partnership (explained in chapter 4) for its broader three-ward area.

HWCP has had to adapt in the context of changing policies and funding sources. As its resource has declined it now plays a less direct role and the need for the entity to
reconsider the scope of its operations and also its structure moving forward is recognised. HWCP predominantly reflects the steering interpretation of neighbourhood-based initiative governance, which is presented first in Table 6.2 below. This is despite the emphasis placed on community engagement in the SRB programme and latterly in neighbourhood management approaches, though this is reflected in the democracy and competence 'ideal-type' characteristics evident in the entity's structure and operations. Some characteristics of the self-help 'ideal-type' entity are evident, but these were at their height during the SRB programme and the entity has been unable to sustain these operations at the same level now the programme has ended. Tokenism is also evident as the entity is not a focus for the broader urban governance network given its declining resource and a shift away from such area-based approaches.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Steering</strong></td>
<td><strong>Sponsor determines some of entity operations (defining programme themes)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Instigated by central government</td>
<td>• Resident representatives' voice heard on board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sponsor broadly specifies structure</td>
<td>• Capacity building of resident members with an induction programme, training and mentoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• (A) sponsor represented on board (Bristol City Council)</td>
<td>• Significant though waning service provider involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sponsor funds (though does not employ) entity staff</td>
<td>• Entity has had some influence on service provision (especially policing and community safety)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 7-year programme lifetime</td>
<td>• Some service providers responsive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Close monitoring against targets</td>
<td>• Innovation evident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democracy</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Majority (10 out of 19) resident representation on board</td>
<td>• Entity able to determine some of its operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Elected resident board representation by 5 sub-areas</td>
<td>• Able to develop, appraise and fund own projects during programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Board-determined funding allocation over devolved budgets during SRB programme</td>
<td>• Able to design and engage in supplemental service delivery during programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Competence</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Resident board representation</td>
<td>• Small property asset base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Statutory service provider representation (including a local councillor)</td>
<td>• Small self-generated income stream</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Third sector service provider board representation</td>
<td>• Resourced capacity building activities during programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Entity able to continue for at least a limited period in absence of sponsor but with greatly reduced operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Self-help</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Majority resident representation on board</td>
<td>• Lack of ongoing support for entity after programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Small self-generated funding streams</td>
<td>• Lack of engagement from statutory service providers/government as programme ended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sponsor emphasis on capacity building of entity and residents</td>
<td>• No longer a priority/links reduced to urban governance network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Devolved budgets during SRB programme</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tokenism</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Not applicable</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Steering

Like CaH, HWCP would not exist in the absence of a central government funding regime, in this case the SRB programme. Its programmatic origins are evident in the way it is structured, with its sponsor (the council) represented on the entity’s board. Unlike CaH, however, central government in the form of GOSW is not represented. But the requirements of the SRB programme have bounded the entity’s broad structure in terms of the types of neighbourhoods sought and the population covered. The entity also displays some steering ‘ideal-type’ characteristics given the delimited SRB programme timeframe and its monitoring requirements.

The steering interpretation is central to the entity’s operations given the major effects that changes in its various funding streams have had upon it. HWCP has moved from a direct role, with the ability to appraise and fund projects as well as provide services, to a facilitating or influencing role as a “neighbourhood management delivery agent” (HWCP, 2008: 5). Via the SRB programme’s high level of funding, government encouraged as well as enabled the entity to have a community-led regeneration ethos. Latterly, the much reduced resource associated with the neighbourhood management pilot funded by government and then the council’s neighbourhood management/ neighbourhood partnership funding streams have necessitated the entity’s shift to a community-influencing neighbourhood management ethos. The government’s NRF, given the level of resource and the role of the Bristol Partnership/ council within it, can be seen as a transition between the two approaches. These changes in funding regime and their associated requirements are reflected in changes in HWCP’s programme themes. During the SRB programme seven ‘theme groups’ were established which matched the SRB programme’s ‘strategic objectives’. These were reduced to five with the shift from SRB to NRF, reflecting neighbourhood renewal floor targets. The structure now comprises six ‘neighbourhood management task groups’, in line with Local Area Agreement outcomes.

While respondents reiterate the entity’s resident-led ethos, they see the necessity of adapting in light of their changing funding context:

"The core’s always been about community involvement and listening to the voice of the community and the residents that are actually here. But to actually qualify for these pots of money you have to have a little bit of negotiation... if we wouldn’t agree how they would like this money spent, then we wouldn’t get it... it’s
funny because we've always said it's not about the money, but it's really difficult to separate... But we do know the reality is that eventually pots of money will dwindle, we have to think about, OK, if we want to be here to stay, how do we make that actually happen?" [Resident Board Member].

"[The neighbourhood management plans required as a pilot area] were nigh on unworkable. No one ever looked at it, once you'd got the damn thing signed off... I don't think they were intended to be so cumbersome, but in reality it was hell" [Entity staff].

"I think the neighbourhood partnership stuff... if we didn't do that, city council would come in and do it anyway, you know. And we didn't see the point in actually having two doing very similar things in the same area, it's a waste of time and resources. And actually it's also a way of us still being able to keep our finger in the pie" [Resident Board Member].

"What's been the issue with all these pots of money, SRB, OK fine, we knew that there was seven years, but you know, neighbourhood renewal, neighbourhood management, two year slots. It's been an absolute flipping nightmare" [Resident Board Member].

HWCP, as a company limited by guarantee with charitable status, employs its own professional staff, albeit funded by sponsors. It is not evident that the staff undermine HWCP's resident-led ethos and respondents regarded HWCP's ability to employ staff as a positive aspect of the entity, despite the difficulty of dealing with redundancies necessitated by a decline in funding, particularly with the end of NRF in 2008.

The shift in HWCP's operations, as well as its existence, cannot be separated from the funding regimes from which it has gained resource. Respondents typically recognise that HWCP now faces the challenge, in the absence of significant funding, of reconsidering its structure and role:

"We had to redefine what the organisational role is. Which is a bit of a challenge. The board are used to allocating money, millions. How do we find a board where you say, you know, wouldn't you like some influence? You know, it's a different game" [Entity Staff].

"I think they're going to struggle for an identity and a focus... it's also knowing what you're there for" [Third sector representative former Board Member].

**Democracy**

This function is emphasised in the HWCP's 'vision' and in the way that it is structured, but while democratic intent is clear, the way in which changing funding regimes have affected the ability of the entity to have a say in its operations confirm the predominance of the steering account for this neighbourhood governance body.
Like CaH, HWCP’s board has a majority of locally elected residents from the entity’s five constituent sub-areas. Capacity building of resident members is undertaken, including training and an induction programme, the provision of a computer and internet access, and a mentor if required. Some of the other board places are held by representatives of priority issue areas, including local youth projects and the area housing committee, and advisors on race and disability from third sector groups. These structural characteristics do reflect that HWCP was established as a “community-led partnership” to “lead on the regeneration of the area”. This contrasted with the model used in previous rounds of SRB of a council-led programme:

“That local control... that also happened to be in tune with the government as well in the sense that NDC was meant to be resident-led... the local community partnership was set up to lead on the regeneration of the area. SRB was a means of doing that, it wasn’t set up to manage an SRB programme. So that was always a benefit, that it had this wider vision, it wasn’t just seen as a vehicle to run the SRB programme, the SRB was a way of delivering that broader vision” [Former Entity Staff].

In its “vision statement”, the entity describes itself as “a powerful voice for Hartcliffe and Withywood. It brings views together... and encourages active participation in the democratic process” (HWCP, 2008: 6). Its democratic credentials gain credence from its ‘grassroots’ origins. Respondents state that HWCP operates according to its ethos of being a community-led entity:

“We’ve felt actually that there’s been a lot of local input and it has been community-led” [Third sector representative former Board Member].

“I think one of the things we achieved about it was I think we sorted out and dealt with all that bureaucracy of all those different funding streams, we took that on and sorted it all out, without restraining the residents’ decisions about what they wanted to do” [Former Entity Staff].

“SRB 5, we were the ones... OK, the city council was holding the money but in the end we were the ones that were making the decisions” [Resident Board Member].

However, resident member respondents were very aware of the effect that changes in funding streams have had upon the entity in terms of its operations. During the SRB programme, project proposals were considered by the entity’s relevant theme group composed of voluntary and statutory partners and resident members. Proposals were then considered by an appraisal panel before being referred to the board. However, the project appraisal function regarding NRF allocations was held by the Bristol
Partnership (with the council as ‘accountable body’ to government, as it had been for SRB funds) rather than the entity:

"Not being able to appraise, our panels... we took really hard. And I think there were a number of local residents that felt as if we were selling out, to be quite honest, because we’ve got the skills, we can prove that we could actually do it. So there was that feeling that we were selling out to the council because they’d thrown a wobbly and we were giving them back their dummy" [Resident Board Member].

"The change from SRB5 to neighbourhood renewal, neighbourhood management. I think going from being an organisation that made decisions about projects... was quite difficult... the effect it had on us was that we felt that some of the controls and the powers had actually been taken away from us" [Resident Board Member].

The end of NRF funding in 2008 is regarded as an especially challenging period for HWCP, but respondents agree that it had clarified the board’s role and built its members’ capacity, though partner board member engagement has declined. However, the difficulty of sustaining and extending resident involvement in the absence of funding is also recognised:

"It was a very difficult period for the Partnership... some of the issues around cuts in funding, and staffing issues that came up in terms of making people redundant... it made some of the board have a stronger sense of ownership because they actually realised it was up to them, that potentially they could have walked away and said this is all so horrible, and that would have been the end of it, but in fact they kept in and worked through... so I think there’s a challenge and a strength that came out of it as they took on that and gained the experience, not a very nice experience, but gained the experience and skills to do that" [Former Entity Staff].

"We do have advisors, but we hardly ever see them. Even when we’ve asked them on odd occasions they don’t always come, and it’s been quite difficult... we’re quite happy with the core that we’ve got... as long as we have a majority of residents actually at board meetings then I think we’re pretty happy" [Resident Board Member].

"I know this is the wrong thing, but if there’s no budgets and no money, I find that impossible to think about. I am a resident. What’s the point?" [Resident Board Member].

Respondents typically recognise the challenges now faced by HWCP as funding streams have dwindled and many of the projects are complete or have had to end. While several stress the need for a reconsideration of the entity’s structure and role moving forward, some emphasise the need not only for resident representation but for board members with appropriate skills:

"You probably want to review the nature of the board of HWCP... HWCP comes through clearly for the community and residents... I think the agencies on the HWCP have not always been clear about their role... maybe they’re better..."
represented on the neighbourhood partnership and HWCP Board is predominantly residents” [Former Entity Staff].

“Actually you’re now managing a building worth about £2 million, probably now a turnover of £0.5 million... I’d still keep obviously that resident, community ethos but maybe it’s more important that you get those skills I think to support that” [Former Entity Staff].

“The main emphasis has been about community involvement and actually getting it, and getting the voice out there. But we do know the reality is that eventually pots of money will dwindle, we have to think about, OK, if we want to be here to stay, how do we make that actually happen?” [Resident Board Member].

**Competence**

The competence function is also evident in the way that HWCP is structured, and was evident in HWCP’s ability to influence and innovate in service provision during the SRB programme. However, the reduced ability to engage in service delivery and a waning in service provider engagement now that dedicated resource has declined, show that it is not operating in accord with this function. This also confirms the predominance of the steering account.

The entity is structured to engage local residents along with agencies in how the dedicated programmatic funds from SRB and NRF were used in the area, as reflected in the board’s composition. This includes ‘nominated directors’ from mainstream partner organisations including the council, the police, and the Primary Care Trust:

“Our structures were set up to sort of manage and engage local residents and citizens... put in the same room, local residents and council officers or health and police, and discuss the issues. And then that's spilled into more broader things” [Former Entity Staff].

“The resident involvement was about defining appropriate local solutions where services were failing. And then maybe assisting in the development of projects to try and plug those holes” [Entity Staff].

More notably than CaH, HWCP has had some successes in influencing service provision, with innovation evident in its NRF-funded introduction of Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs), and an SRB-funded childcare advice service, both since introduced city-wide. However, the downside of ‘mainstreaming’ is recognised as the entity area has seen its three member community safety team reduced to one person when the initiative was more widely adopted. Respondents recognise that it is in operations and relationships that influence is realised. Some respondents also posit the possibility that the entity had a broader impact on modes of
working and policy, facilitated by professional peer exchange as part of the SRB programme, and subsequently via the National Neighbourhood Management Network:

"I think [HWCP] was founded at that stage where SRB was starting to be a little bit less about concrete and a little bit more about actually how do we engage mainstream services, but I think it was largely... how [HWCP staff] and others developed the partnership. Thinking along the lines of neighbourhood renewal, national strategy and all those kinds of things, and actually to an extent they've probably been more successful, even than NDC which is explicitly founded on the idea that you have a relationship with the service providers and they then vary what they do so you can tackle deprivation more effectively based on resident involvement... But in a way [HWCP staff] did that more effectively with less money, just by muscling through the right doors" [GOSW Official].

"It was about getting our way of thinking, yeah, influencing other people's budgets, not necessarily our own. And that is really difficult because you don't have control over that" [Resident Board Member].

Increased emphasis on the competence function is evident given an increased reliance on neighbourhood management approaches. Respondents also recognise, however, that it is only now that HWCP is really facing the challenge of influencing service provision, with its forward strategy emphasis on a neighbourhood management model and the new neighbourhood partnership, in the absence of its own secure funding streams. During the funding programmes, agencies were felt to engage in the entity given the money available. Indeed, several entity-level respondents comment that some of the agencies represented on the board, and advisors co-opted to it, now often do not attend meetings. Moving forward, while the new neighbourhood partnership is regarded as providing an opportunity for HWCP to maintain its role in relationships between residents and service providers, concern is also expressed regarding whether it will constrain scope for innovation in service provision:

"But, with the neighbourhood management, that was more about influencing rather than having control, and I think it's just getting into people's heads that OK, we've got a hell of a lot of experience of actually living in the area" [Resident Board Member].

"[Neighbourhood partnership meetings] are fundamentally reactive meetings... is there also a level of proactivity in this, where you have 6 councillors around the table on a regular basis, and you can tackle things in a different way?" [Entity staff].

**Self-help**

While the self-help function is evident in HWCP's origins, it is less evident in its operations, again asserting the predominance of the steering account of its role.
HWCP’s ‘grassroots’ origins imply a greater realisation of the self-help function than that evidenced by CaH. However, the entity’s existence can largely be attributed to the SRB programme, as the entity’s inception as an informal steering group was promulgated by the opportunity of bidding for SRB funds. In turn, limits on the entity’s ability to determine its operations, exemplified by the changing structure of its ‘theme groups’ in response to its changing funding sources, evidence how it is constrained in fully realising self-help’s ‘ideal-type’ attributes. But the SRB programme in particular did enable the entity to at least partially fulfil many of these attributes, giving HWCP sufficient resource to develop, appraise and fund its own projects, and engage in supplemental service delivery. A further spur to HWCP’s partial fulfilment of the self-help account is that, in contrast with the focus on CaH given its ‘flagship’ status, respondents stress that they had been left to ‘get on with it’:

“In a sense it feels like we’ve been left alone. I’m surprised that the councillors haven’t got more engaged, more involved... I had expected to have had more interference from the council. Now, when we needed to be with them they did support us generally. I don’t know whether they just sort of felt, well, let them get on with it” [Former Entity Staff].

However, the tension between resident self-help and the entity’s professional staffing is recognised:

“The downside of having all that money meant in a sense there were people like me... And you’d often be in meetings and board members, would say the Partnership should do this or do that, and you’d say, wait a minute, you’re the Partnership. And what they really meant was they were going to get the staff to do that. There was a little bit of what was HWCP? Was HWCP the local residents on the Board, or was HWCP the staff?” [Former Entity Staff].

While HWCP has continued in the absence of its principal sponsor (in the form of central government SRB and NRF programmatic resource), its operations have been scaled back significantly and it is therefore not fulfilling the self-help ‘ideal-type’ characteristics to the extent to which it was enabled previously. Its continued existence to date beyond the end of the SRB programme in 2007 does indicate some success in terms of HWCP building sufficient capacity during the programme to sustain itself, but it is unclear how long the entity will remain in existence or the extent to which voluntary activity will still be levered given the reduced number of funded projects. The area does benefit from some longstanding community supports, such as Hartcliffe and Withywood Ventures (a training provider), and a relatively
strong heritage of community-based activities, augmented during the SRB programme with capacity building initiatives.

HWCP does have an asset in the form of the ‘@Symes’ community building, realised as part of a supermarket-anchored redevelopment, and regarded as a major achievement. The building, along with neighbourhood management/ neighbourhood partnership income from the council, forms the basis of HWCP’s ‘forward strategy’. It is seen as providing a base for the entity from which services can be delivered, and as generating an income stream for HWCP to invest in what are determined as priorities for the area. While this implies continued realisation of some of the self-help ‘ideal-type’ characteristics moving forward, it will not provide a level of resource comparable to that provided by its previous programmes:

"Really enjoyed being involved in that... I think in that group there was a lot of give and take in relation to council, Morrison’s, to the community, there was a bit of give and take. So we were able to put the community’s perspective which was really, really good" [Resident Board Member].

“You’ve got the core, sometimes you might just go down back to that core... But in the end, that’s the idea that we’ve got, we could in a sense ride it out, depending on what the council wants or what the government does” [Entity Staff].

“One of the things we need to look at is our future. Because funding is getting smaller, we have to think of other ways of being able to generate pennies to be able to do some of the things that we want to do, and Symes was one of those ways of doing it, this building was one” [Resident Board Member].

“I think they’re going to struggle for an identity and a focus... Yes, they’ve got the building, the building is not the thing, it’s what you do in it, very much so” [Third sector representative former Board Member].

**Tokenism**

The tokenism account of neighbourhood-based initiative governance is evident in HWCP’s operations, though this relates to the overall steering of the entity by government, asserting the predominance of the steering interpretation of its role.

Tokenism is evident in the decline of statutory service provider engagement related by respondents to its greatly reduced funds now the SRB programme has ended. It is also obvious in the lack of ongoing support for the entity, and the shift in the entity’s operations necessitated by this. This shift in itself is tokenistic as it discounts deprived areas’ ‘special case’ (and the resource commitments that would be entailed):

"The board, and kind of how much control that has, has actually changed. And I think throughout this last process of neighbourhood renewal, neighbourhood
management, I'm sure that we've lost local residents through that, because they saw
the power and the control that they could actually have with the SRB, and then it
taken away because of the other sort of pots” [Resident Board Member].

“We're still considered deprived... I think there still needs to be that focus.
And I think it's going to be, in the future, it's just going to have to kind of look at how
we can do that, without it sort of being completely forgotten. Because it can be, with
the neighbourhood partnership going, and the councillors taking the lead in that, I
think it could very easily get mislaid” [Resident Board Member].

The tokenism interpretation is also evident when HWCP is located in its broader
context. For example, prior to its relaunch, HWCP, along with CaH, was represented
on the Bristol Partnership as a ‘community-accountable body’. The entity’s lack of
representation indicates that it is no longer regarded as a priority by, and certainly is
not as explicitly linked into, the urban governance network (explored next in the
chapter). Indeed, HWCP has never been subject to the levels of attention from the
network experienced by the ‘flagship’ CaH. While this is regarded as positive in
terms of less interference, respondents are also clear that the entity is not a priority:

“There is a geographic feeling, we're isolated, we're stuck out on the edge of
Bristol. There's a barrier... Certainly when I started the feeling was it wasn't a
council priority. Not on the doorstep, whereas CaH was right next to the city centre
so the council's more interested... officer representation for HWCP was second or
third tier. We weren't considered as important or as a priority there” [Former Entity
Staff].

“It feels like we're out of the loop a little bit because we're not as involved as
we were... the city council are kind of getting their head around all their stuff... they
just haven't remembered that there are other people out there that aren't just city
council staff” [Entity Staff].

6.2.3. Functions of Neighbourhood Governance Revealed by the Entities
All five of the functions set out in the theoretical framework are evident to a greater or
lesser extent in the structure and operations of the case study entities examined in
Bristol. Both the democracy and competence functions are evident in the way the
entities are structured and operate. The emphasis on competence has been heightened
given the shift to neighbourhood management. However, the extent to which the
entities will be able to influence service provision in the absence of the level of
dedicated resource likely to have encouraged agencies to engage is not yet clear.
Self-help is evident in some of the approaches, albeit bounded, taken by the entities
that were enabled by the well-resourced government programmes. It is also apparent
in both entities’ attempts to develop assets to support their intention to sustain
operation. But the disjuncture between the intent to self-help and the bodies’ ability
to realise this is clear. Tokenism is also evident as the entities are no longer the focus for the broader urban governance network given their declining resources and a shift away from such area-based approaches.

Unsurprisingly given that both entities were formalised via government programmes, they share many similarities in both structure and operations. Both entities are now undergoing the transition from the relative security of a long-term and substantive government funding regime, to a more vulnerable set of circumstances where attempts at some self-reliance are evident in attempts to develop a potential resource-generating asset base. However, the main plank of both entities’ forward strategies can be regarded as part and parcel of broader policy shifts to neighbourhood management.

Steering is the predominant function of both entities, which constitute a microcosm of government policy over their lifetime to date as they have struggled to adapt to the context of churn in both government policies and funding sources. While this is unsurprising given the programmatic nature of the case studies selected, it should be stressed that in the English context, examples that meet the unit of study definition are almost invariably government-sponsored forms of initiative governance, which are thus steered in light of government policy priorities.

This is a key finding in the international comparative context of this research. It is also reflective of the centrist and managerial context for neighbourhood-based initiative governance in the city, explored in the next section which assesses the city’s governance context.

6.3 City Governance Context

This section explores the city-level urban governance context for neighbourhood-based initiative entities. It sets out application of the theoretical framework of the expected characteristics of English urban governance and the likely associated function of neighbourhood-based initiative governance (as set out in Table 2.2) to Bristol.
The research focuses on what can be termed Bristol’s ‘neighbourhood governance network’ – that is, the network which governs neighbourhood-based governance. The network’s structure and membership, key network members, and the existence of a policy subsystem for deprived neighbourhoods, are determined. The effects of the broader urban governance system on this network are then explained, in terms of the state and market imperatives which are evident. Finally, the implications of this regarding the relative power of the neighbourhood level within its multi-level governance context are considered.

Further background, on the city’s neighbourhood-relevant history, local government’s orientation to neighbourhoods, and relevant plans, policies and approaches including the council’s Corporate Strategy, the Sustainable Community Strategy (SCS), the Local Development Framework (LDF), the Local Area Agreement (LAA), and the Regional Spatial Strategy (RSS), is included in chapter 4.

6.3.1. Neighbourhood Governance Network

Each Bristol elite respondent was asked a core set of questions designed to elicit their understanding of the structures and processes of neighbourhood governance, that is, how neighbourhood-based governance is governed. Elite respondents were asked to discuss the role, work and relationships engaged in by their own organisations and for their perspectives on the work of others. Furthermore, they were also asked how, if at all, this is co-ordinated or led. A sample elite interview guide is appended (at Appendix 1).

The network identified in the course of the research is presented in Figure 4. Some form of network which provides a city-level context for neighbourhood-based governance can be expected in Bristol given central government’s requirements (initially due to the award of NRF resources to the city) for a Local Strategic Partnership. However, analysis of responses reveals that Bristol’s network does not operate as neatly or in as co-ordinated a fashion as would be expected if its representation in ‘the logic’ as described by public sector elite respondents was taken at face value. The research reveals that the neighbourhood governance network that governs initiative governance in Bristol, while including the LSP, does not match it in
terms of membership or operations. Its structure and membership are detailed below, followed by examination of its key members and their relative power.

Figure 4: Bristol Neighbourhood Governance Network

6.3.2. Structure and membership of the governance network

Bristol’s neighbourhood-based governance entities are embedded in a complex network that comprises public sector bodies (for example, local government and GOSW), and third sector bodies (such as the community foundation, and various voluntary and community sector support organisations). The private sector is not evident. Different members of this network operate at different levels - multi-neighbourhood, city-wide, regionally and nationally.

As is clear from Figure 4, the multi-level context for neighbourhood governance in Bristol is extremely complex and congested. This reflects Stewart’s (2003: 79) description of the Bristol city-region as “institutionally crowded with both regional,
sub-regional and neighbourhood/area-based structures pressing in on the more longstanding mechanisms for the government of the city”.

It is also subject to significant churn over time. This is illustrated by the rapid change in central government neighbourhood-targeted funding regimes and approaches (shaded in blue in Figure 4). These are detailed in chapter 4 and summarised in Table 6.3. When these regimes change, so do the network’s structure and operations. One example in terms of peer networks (shaded in orange in Figure 4) is the replacement of the Neighbourhood Renewal Residents Forum targeted at deprived areas to the (city-wide) Neighbourhood Partnerships Residents Forum. When these regimes change, so does the level of central government resource specifically targeted at deprived neighbourhoods in the form of area-based initiatives. This is demonstrated by the case study bodies, who given the end of their programmes now have a small amount of central government NRF ‘transition’ funds, and £10,000 per ward allocated by local government for the Neighbourhood Partnerships approach.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.3: Succession of Neighbourhood Funding Regimes/Approaches</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Lifetime</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRF ‘Transition Funding’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City-wide Neighbourhood Partnerships</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The network’s instability is also illustrated by changes in central government requirements for local authority-level strategies (also shaded blue in Figure 4, with further detail in chapter 4). For example, a Community Strategy was required to be developed in 2001 given the city’s designation for NRF resource. This had to be reworked in 2008 (as a ‘Sustainable Community Strategy’, for which new government guidance had been issued) to align with the requirement for a ‘refreshed’ LAA to have...
been agreed by June 2008 (though the city’s initial LAA had only been agreed in 2007). The new LAA also meant that the council needed to develop a new Corporate Strategy in 2008. Such instability due to constantly changing central government requirements is compounded by instability in the key city-level institutions, with changes in majority party control of Bristol City Council and the LSP’s reformulation. This is explored below.

It is now useful to consider the network’s structure in terms of the actors and approaches of relevance at each spatial scale, as depicted in Figure 4.

**Neighbourhood level**

Here informal associations predominate, such as residents’ associations. Such informal associations are not directly represented on initiative governance entities which reside at the multi-neighbourhood level, though an entity’s elected resident representatives may also be involved in their local association. Third sector support organisation respondents value the competence of such small informal groups, which can access small grants from Quartet Community Foundation:

"A lot of people’s community sense is probably limited to a few streets actually” [Councillor].

"Our residents’ groups that we have involvement with, we know that they are very close to the ground, they can respond to issues quickly, they know what goes on in their neighbourhoods” [Third sector support organisation].

"Our underlying thing has always been that we are targeting relatively small amounts of money to locally-based organisations, small, locally-based organisations where a small amount will make a difference” [Community Foundation].

Attempts to link this smallest scale into the broader network focus on direct resident participation, rather than representative participation by any resident organisations that exist. An exception is the Bristol Neighbourhood Planning Network, a coalition of neighbourhood-based resident groups (as well as some city-wide groups), focused solely on planning issues such as development of the city’s LDF and specific planning applications. Voscur, the ‘generic’ (rather than community of interest-related) support group for third sector organisations, has been contracted by the city council to support resident participation. Its efforts between 2000 and 2008 were focused on deprived areas targeted by the NRF, but with the end of this regime have latterly shifted city-wide with the establishment in 2008 of the Neighbourhood Partnerships.
Residents Forum. At the time of the research, it was unclear how the forum would link with the LSP, which was in the process of being ‘relaunched’. Specifically, links were not clear with the LSP’s proposed ‘neighbourhoods’ sub-partnership board, though it is intended that a “community conference” will be convened. Non-public sector respondents stress that the most effective mechanism for resident engagement is ensuring that they directly inform spending decisions:

"Twice a year there’ll be a big community conference, and the idea is that, this is exemplifying that you don’t have to hierarchically go through, it’s a permeable structure and process, people at the grassroots can influence the [LSP] Exec Board” [Council Senior Officer].

"The good things are it’s the whole city and there’s often been a tension with areas that are not neighbourhood renewal areas that they want to do things... if you want to empower those communities... then it’s not about consulting them and asking them how they might like the money spent, it’s actually giving them a direct say... there's no stronger way of getting people engaged than giving them a chance to say how you spend money" [Third sector support organisation].

"A small grants programme... it really brought people together, it made the community think about what they were doing and felt as if they were being noticed and actually had a voice... because you’ve got a big government machine going on, you can’t turn it and so actually getting access to money and being able to do something was quite empowering for people” [Community Foundation].

Individual neighbourhood residents associations therefore tend not to be represented directly on initiative governance structures, nor indeed on the new neighbourhood partnerships introduced in 2008. Instead resident participation is sought in the case of initiative governance entities via resident elections for sub-areas of the broader multi-neighbourhood area covered by the initiative. Neighbourhoods have been selected for inclusion in area-based initiatives given their levels of deprivation, irrespective of the existence of residents’ associations.

Multi-neighbourhood level

The neighbourhood-based initiative governance structures that form the key unit of study for this research operate at this spatial scale (marked as ‘initiative entities’ in Figure 4). As typified by CaH and HWCP, these entities tend to stem from time-limited central government initiatives (the SRB and NDC regimes) focused on the city’s entrenched areas of deprivation, as defined according to the central government-determined indices of deprivation. However, Southmead Development Trust was cited as one example of a ‘bottom up’ formal entity in the city. Given the deprivation case, the areas covered by the case study entities became eligible for NRF
resource in 2000 (targeted at the areas amongst the 10% most deprived nationally) and also for neighbourhood management approaches (within the 3% most deprived nationally) in 2006. Other areas in the city also qualified for NRF and neighbourhood management funds, but these resources were not managed by formally-constituted governance entities. This demonstrates that previous government programmes have left a heritage of entities which then need to adapt in light of changing funding regimes and policies for deprived areas, though these subsequent policies did not require the establishment of formal structures:

"Bristol... has got these kind of entrenched areas of deprivation which have attracted funding. there was quite a lot to build on, whether it was NDC, neighbourhood renewal, SRB, some of the European funding like URBAN and so on, all of which fuel that neighbourhood level" [GOSW Official].

The case study entities had previously been linked into the city’s neighbourhood governance network, evidenced by their representation on the former incarnation of the LSP as ‘community-accountable bodies’ due to their elected resident board membership. In 2008 these bodies, at the request of local government as part of its response to central government’s ‘double devolution’ agenda, are now forming the basis of the new neighbourhood partnerships which cover a much larger area. However, these entities are not represented on the newly-restructured LSP’s executive board. At the time of the research it was unclear how and to what extent the entities will link with the LSP’s ‘neighbourhoods’ sub-partnership. With the advent of neighbourhood partnerships, the explicit emphasis of multi-neighbourhood-based governance in the city has shifted from its deprived areas to a city-wide sub-local form of governance, dominated by councillors. This indicates increased emphasis on representative rather than participative democracy:

"I think one of the drivers with neighbourhood partnerships... that we had all these neighbourhood structures set up that were divorced from the council and had a degree of decision-making power over what happened locally, divorced from elected accountability. And OK, they all say well, we run our local elections, the people say we've got as much legitimacy as the council, but it's a different set up, really. So one of the drivers early on was to bring the council much more into, or re-engage the ward members more specifically into being the champions for their communities... But also give us a sub-city structure where we could more formally engage with neighbourhoods and hear their concerns and try and react to them" [Council Officer].

"We're relaunching that, the LSP, with a different structure. And one of the underpinning parts of the structure is the neighbourhood, if you like, theme group, I would call it partnership, which has got to be ready built up and developed. And it
will be there that we get the linkages in from neighbourhood governance” [Councillor].

Case study entity staff respondents explain that the peer network for the NRF programme in operation until March 2008 had enabled them to have some influence when meeting with city council officers and other statutory service providers. It is unclear how, if at all, such professional networking will continue or be facilitated via the restructured LSP.

**City level**

At the city-level, Bristol City Council, the Bristol Partnership, Quartet Community Foundation and the city-wide third sector support organisations emerge as key members of the neighbourhood governance network.

Local government officer explanations of how the network ‘works’, in terms of how approaches to tackling deprivation are developed and put into practice, echo central government policy shifts from an area-based initiative approach to one which seeks to link deprived areas to housing and economic growth. The shared ‘logic’ amongst public sector respondents about how this will be operationalised in policy is via the council’s corporate plan, and the SCS, for which the LAA is described as the delivery strategy, and the LDF as its spatial expression. Except for the LDF (still being developed), each of these strategies had been reformulated in 2008:

“We’ve got a corporate commitment to tackle deprivation in the Corporate Plan, and that will run through to the SCS. We’ve got an LDF core strategy which highlights the need to focus on deprived communities, and that picks up on what we’re doing around wanting to influence the housing and economic growth agenda to tackle deprivation...” [Council Officer].

“Looking at deprivation quite strategically, as opposed to attempting, on its own, to resolve issues of deprivation, on a neighbourhood basis” [Councillor].

“The sort of things we are talking about, in terms of planning and development for transformational change, combined with the sort of things we were talking about in terms of neighbourhoods and the sort of things we were talking about in terms of tackling deprivation, all of that should join together and link together in a seamless way, and if we get the Bristol Partnership right in its latest grouping, that will be the vehicle for getting our partners and communities engaged in that” [Council Officer].

“On paper, you can find it’s all nice and neat and tidy” [Council Officer].
The challenge is recognised of the council changing its modes of working so that the city-wide neighbourhood partnerships system (introduced as its interpretation of central government’s ‘double devolution’) can influence service delivery. It is not clear how neighbourhood-level concerns will be related to city-wide strategies:

"The council as an organisation has been set up on a service basis and on a city-wide basis, and the scale of change to have a neighbourhood focus is actually quite large, and there is a resistance because it's moving people out of their comfort zones" [Senior Council Officer].

"It's about a mindset sometimes, to be enabling. Rather than stuck in we must do this because it's always been done like that" [Third sector support organisation].

"We're undergoing a big process of business transformation as well and reshaping how we do, how we're structured as well as how we deliver services... removing silos" [Council Officer].

"Some people see a contradiction between city-wide strategic direction and locality. Yes, there is, there will always be potentially that tension, but I'm not sure that if we get the participatory agenda right that there'll be necessarily that ostensible contradiction" [Councillor].

However, non-public sector elite respondents do not espouse ‘the logic’ and express frustration regarding the lack of clarity about how the special needs of deprived areas will be expressed and dealt with in light of the shifting policy context for neighbourhood-based governance deriving from central and local government’s ‘neighbourhoods agenda’. This is echoed by CaH and HWCP given their concerns regarding the introduction of the much larger, and significantly less resourced, neighbourhood partnership areas:

"Bristol's LAA feels like a backwards step because there's virtually nothing in it about neighbourhood targets and it almost feels like they've done what they needed to do to have an LAA which the council and GOSW can sign off and met the requirements with its minimum targets it has to have" [Former Entity Staff].

Respondents also cite the political ‘flip-flopping’ between Labour and Liberal Democrat city council control as creating a great deal of uncertainty and inconsistency across the network, as exemplified by the waxing and waning of approaches to sub-city forms of neighbourhood governance. It is recognised that to an extent the third sector gains power from this instability but is frustrated by it:

"The political history of Bristol in recent years as well and the chopping and changes but it has been destabilising for neighbourhood governance... we'd rather we were supporting [voluntary and community groups] to be able to do work rather than have to cope with an ever-changing political situation... [Third sector support organisation].
"I'm surprised I get so many residents coming along to the meetings we organise really, given... or maybe we're the only stable organisation in the city, they're never sure what the council's going to do next, it's why they come to us" [Third sector support organisation].

"You've got quite a strong third sector... and because the political leadership generally, whichever party, is quite weak... then it's quite prone to saying, oh well, we must sort of do what the third sector thinks is right" [GOSW Official].

All recognise the Bristol Partnership’s apparent role in formulating the relevant policies, most notably the SCS, which, in ‘the logic’ espoused by public sector elite respondents, frames action regarding deprived neighbourhoods in the city. But the LSP is not generally well-regarded, by public sector respondents in terms of its ability to act strategically, and by non-public sector respondents in terms of being able to take neighbourhood needs and priorities into account, hindered in turn by its reformulation:

"The Bristol Partnership wasn't a coherent body at all... wasn't very good, very effective" [GOSW Official].

"I think at the moment because of the restructure that's going on... it does kind of feel as if we're out of the loop some times" [Entity Resident Board Member].

The council is the most significant funder for the third sector, directly and via the schemes it has contracted out to be managed by Quartet Community Foundation. Indeed, Quartet’s importance in the network derives in large part from its management of government funds according to government criteria rather than from its limited discretionary resources. However, it is not represented on the LSP. Voscur emerges as the predominant third sector support organisation in the city, reflected in its continuous representation on the Bristol Partnership. However, it needs to strike a balance between partnership working with the council and an advocacy role, and does suffer from accusations of co-option. Respondents emphasise the need for the capacity of sector support organisations to be developed to be able to participate in city-level policy-making, particularly given the council’s ‘commissioning agenda’ with the voluntary and community (VCS or third) sector:

"I think that overall [the council and the third sector] have got a good, constructive relationship... Bristol is unusual, it's got a very large, and I say large in terms of number of organisations in the VCS. And that's historic, because we've actually encouraged, either formally or informally, development of the voluntary and community sector. And it's not surprising because for a lot of politicians, it's where we came from in the first place" [Councillor].
"We sometimes get accused of being in the council’s pockets... most VCS need supporting, and we’re not embarrassed to stick our head above the parapet and be unpopular" [Third sector support organisation].

"There’s obviously some tension in the voluntary sector where some people who don’t want to move away from grant funding to commissioned services, but it’s clearly the way that we’re going... you need to be very clear and transparent about how you’re commissioning services and working with the voluntary sector groups as well to ensure that they have the capacity to be commissioned for services... if genuine neighbourhood governance was happening, that was being directed by residents, there would probably be a much stronger role for voluntary and community groups to be commissioned to do services” [Third sector support organisation].

**Sub-regional level**

The West of England Partnership comprises the four unitary authorities that from 1974 until 1996 constituted the County of Avon. The Partnership has a planning, housing and communities programme board, but this has a deliberation rather than decision-making function to ensure co-ordination prior to decisions being taken by the unitary authorities’ respective cabinets. The area, which essentially comprises the Bristol city-region, was designated a ‘growth point’ for additional economic and housing development by central government in 2006, in line with the draft RSS which was released for consultation in 2006.

At the time of the research, the four unitaries were engaged in developing a ‘Multi-Area Agreement’ (which was agreed in September 2009) in partnership with GOSW. This is also presented as part of ‘the logic’:

"It’s about how you connect those three [neighbourhood, city, region] and in fact how you work... and that followed on from the sub-national review which is all part and parcel of this double devolution thing... So, that MAA is saying... so transport is a big issue that you should look at at that level, city-region level, employment and skills... housing... the area you should be looking for effective policymaking is much wider than the City of Bristol itself, so let’s get the MAA to do those things” [GOSW Official].

**Regional Level**

GOSW is the most relevant of the regional-level institutions to the neighbourhood governance network, as reflected in its ongoing non-voting membership of the LSP in its various iterations. It explicitly operates at lower spatial scales, being engaged in developing the MAA, and its ‘Locality Manager’ for Bristol has been very engaged in the development of the initial LAA in 2007 and its ‘refreshed’ version in 2008. GOSW is also involved directly in CaH as a central government ‘flagship’
However, regional governance in the form of the Regional Assembly (created in 1999), and the Regional Development Agency are also relevant actors in the neighbourhood governance network given their role, following government’s reform of the planning system in 2004, in developing the Regional Spatial Strategy for the south-west. This 2006 draft strategy targets Bristol as a focus for increased housing and jobs growth which is framing secondary efforts to tackle deprivation, as set out in various newly-adopted or emergent city-level strategies, such as the SCS and LDF.

National level

Central government, as represented by Communities and Local Government (CLG) and its previous incarnations (for example, ODPM from 2002 until 2006), can be regarded as the neighbourhood governance network member of most relevance to the case study initiative governance entities. The zenith of central government’s area-based initiative approach, as reflected in the advent of the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit in ODPM in 2001, was paralleled in Bristol with the instigation of CaH and the availability of NRF. CLG’s subsequent shift, particularly since 2006, to a broader (and less targeted and resourced) ‘neighbourhoods agenda’, provides the key policy context for current network activity. However, the policies of other Whitehall departments are also evident at the city-level, highlighting that central government cannot be regarded as a monolith. The Home Office’s policies regarding third sector empowerment (as reflected in the ChangeUp Consortium for the city’s third sector support organisations, introduced in 2004) are one example.

The role of the Audit Commission in operationalising ‘the logic’ is only mentioned by a GOSW (and therefore central government) respondent. The Commission, at central government’s behest, is replacing the previous assessment regime for local services with the ‘Comprehensive Area Assessment’ in 2009:

"One of the reasons it’s becoming local again is because you have a framework of national standards... what the Audit Commission do...it’s the logic across the new performance management framework... But policy is going in the right direction, you’ve just got to follow it through now really. But what the Audit Commission is doing, on Comprehensive Area Assessment will help to reinforce it too" [GOSW Official].
The National Lottery (established in 1994) comprises a source of resource for
neighbourhood-based entities in the city which is essentially separate from the
network. Its conditions of funding in terms of monitoring and evaluation
requirements are less stringent than those of the council:

"One issue that comes up for VCS groups a lot in Bristol is around monitoring
and evaluation of grant funding, and they get relatively small amounts of grants from
the council, but the monitoring and evaluation requirement is quarterly. Big Lottery
who gives them £2m don't ask for that kind of monitoring" [Third sector support
organisation].

It should be added that the supra-national context is also relevant, with European
funding, from the URBAN and former Objective 2 programmes (in operation until
2006), expended in Bristol. However, while the value of these resources is
recognised, some public sector respondents comment that such programmes have not
been integrated into the network's operations, given the alternative requirements of
such programmes compared to the funding regimes of central government:

"There was some European things that had their own life, and I would say
that was not a very good model at all, they were sort of a bit orphaned" [Former
Bristol Regeneration Partnership Staff].

"It hasn't always been attractive to joint the two together because you've then
saddled the neighbourhood renewal-type activities with all the bureaucracy of that
European money if you like. So it's not... it's doubled our money in some cases, but
in others they have been running in parallel really. Which is a flaw that's been
passed down from the top-down" [Council Officer].

6.3.3. Key network members

The key network members - neighbourhood-based governance entities, the Local
Strategic Partnership, local government, and central government - have differential
ability to influence neighbourhood-based governance given their stores of power and
resource. These network members shall be considered in turn.

Neighbourhood-based governance entities

While the case study entities intend to retain their emphasis on resident-led decision-
making, the scope of such decision-making enabled at initiative governance level has
narrowed as government policy regarding deprived neighbourhoods has shifted. This
is irrespective of the entities' capacity. The more recent shift in approach, given
central government's 'double devolution' agenda, to the city-wide system of
neighbourhood partnerships draws on the competence interpretation of the functions
of neighbourhood-based governance. There was broad agreement that there was a consistency and predictability in what a neighbourhood's priorities were likely to be:

"It's obvious what they're going to come up with... if you say like reducing graffiti and flytipping, gosh, I wonder if that might be in a local neighbourhood partnership plan? I think it might well be" [Senior Council Officer].

"The clean and green stuff is, tends to be at the forefront of communities' minds in terms of identifying issues, and is also the stuff that is perhaps easier to deliver on the ground in a neighbourhood management governance sense" [Council Officer].

It is statutory service provision that is now 'on the table' for neighbourhood-based forms of governance to influence, which comprises a small element of the broad suite of factors affecting the lives of residents. Respondents do recognise that some issues are best dealt with at the neighbourhood level and some at higher levels. However, avenues in which neighbourhood bodies can inform the neighbourhood governance network's formulation of strategies which frame neighbourhood-level efforts, such as those regarding housing and economic growth, are not evident:

"Some themes you can make a real significant, dramatic improvement on a geographic basis. Crime and environment... But when you come to things like worklessness and health outcomes, it's just a lot harder" [Entity Staff].

"The biggest thing that has an impact on the 20,000 people in Hartcliffe and Withywood would be just about the level of taxing and benefits" [Former Entity Staff].

"I think there's got to be a balance between the high rhetoric and the reality on the ground, and that's what this is about [the neighbourhood partnerships], it's trying to get that balance, it's not an independent, setting up a republic in one of the neighbourhoods. That's just nonsense. They don't have solutions... But there are things that can be influenced at a local level, and it should be, but you've got to be able to distinguish what it is" [Senior Council Officer].

Local Strategic Partnership

While the Bristol Partnership (created in 2001) ostensibly constitutes the network for neighbourhood-based governance in the city, particularly given its formulation of the SCS, central government influence on policy formulation is explicit:

"The Bristol Partnership took the decision to bring forward their review of the SCS a year because of the new model LAA... we play a part in it... primarily about the key things that needed to be thought about from an LAA point of view. So there was quite a lot of involvement in the SCS review and how it was done" [GOSW Official].

"Because of the LAA, we're reviewing the SCS, the council's corporate plan, as a basis for developing the LAA, so we're doing it together. So I just tweaked [the SCS] slightly so that it was completely lined up with the corporate plan and the LAA. 
Now, I wouldn't say that to members, but it's made it a hell of a lot easier from an officer structure, that it's now all completely lined up” [Senior Council Officer].

"[The council] hurriedly tried to set out what they wanted the SCS to do, while at the same time tried to get people to say what LAA targets they wanted, which seemed a little bit odd to me. Because you should say what you want to do and then decide which are the targets that best fit that, and they didn't, they went side-by-side, and it was all very rushed. And I'm more sympathetic to the council, because the government set these ridiculous timescales... And of course that has an impact on how VCS groups and residents see it, because they see it as a bit of a sham, really” [Third sector support organisation].

That the Bristol Partnership does not provide a stable context for neighbourhood-based initiative governance in the city is demonstrated by the fact that at the time of the research it was in the process of being relaunched in its third iteration. All respondents are critical of the LSP, expressing what Sweeting et al. (2004) would term “partnership fatigue”. Public sector respondents do not view it as a strategic forum. Third sector respondents criticise the lack of community engagement.

Moving forward there is a lack of clarity about how neighbourhood partnerships, in themselves open to question about representativeness and mandate, will link into the strategic deliberations of the relaunched LSP:

"[The LSP] it's brought with it ownership of this is the way to get money out of a central pot rather than these are the strategic objectives that we've got” [Council Officer].

"What was absolutely missing in the last 2 years was business and higher and further education, but the people from the police and the PCT were sending very junior people, and it just... there was a complete vacuum” [Senior Council Officer].

"The Bristol Partnership has been an absolute bugger up really, since the minute it started. Yes, it has. But we still recognise that it was a structure that should have been influential and whatever else, and that therefore we wanted to be a part of. It's been totally useless. I don't think it was properly resourced, and then I don't think they have any power over anything” [Third sector organisation].

"Let's get the LAA to do things which are about what you do at local authority level, but also where that connects up to neighbourhoods, let's get the LSP, which is responsible for delivering it, to connect up to neighbourhoods” [GOSW Official].

That local government has a dominant role, framing the Bristol Partnership’s existence and operations, is made evident by the council’s instigation of its relaunch, related by council respondents to the council’s own restructure. Some non-public sector respondents view the two bodies as interchangeable:

"There is this thing between this is the Bristol Partnership and it shouldn't be the council, but then it is seen as the council, and everybody else is a bit of an also-ran” [Third sector organisation].
"What is really difficult is that people don’t seem to separate city council with Bristol Partnership" [Entity Resident Board Member].

"There’s a bit of a chicken and egg thing here with the LSP and the council" [Council Officer].

However, in turn the Bristol Partnership’s existence results from the central government requirement for an LSP when the city gained access to NRF resource in 2001. While it does have some flexibility (for example, when it allocated NRF resource within the city), its operations are very prescribed by central government. This is clear given GOSW’s ‘accreditation’ role for the LSP as well as its role in the development of the LAA and the SCS.

Local Government

It is evident that the council’s leadership and ability to provide a consistent context for collaborative action is significantly hampered by what Stewart (2003: 83) describes as "the centrality of political survival and control on collaboration and conflict in the city". This is reflected in the ‘flip-flopping’ between majority party control in the city council. But in turn, the network’s inconsistency and instability derives from changes in central government policies and funding regimes.

Relationships with the council emerge as key to the functioning of the case study entities, particularly with their latter shift in emphasis to service-influencing neighbourhood management. The role of councillors within the new neighbourhood partnerships which the entities are engaged in developing also reasserts representative forms of democracy in the city. However, the shift in governance forms from initiative governance bodies in deprived areas to a city-wide neighbourhood management model via the neighbourhood partnerships cannot be regarded as an active policy choice by the council. While council respondents are defensive about central government ‘steering’, city-level shifts are a pragmatic response to the loss of specific regeneration funds for the city:

“These broader approaches to tackling deprivation should start to deliver and fill the gap that this loss of funding and structures has created” [Council Officer].

“Are we doing it because ODPM or CLG is telling us to do it? No, we’re not actually. It’s something that we’ve decided, that we’ve looked at, and we’ve decided we’re going to do. As it happen, it runs in, very much, broadly in parallel with what the government is encouraging us and facilitating for us to do... So there’s a parallel
process running here as opposed to one that attempts to if you like mirror what the government is doing” [Councillor].

“How we use the resources other than government grants to deliver transformational change in our deprived communities. Because we knew these programmes were going to come to an end. And so what we were thinking and planning locally mirrors what’s been going on nationally... saying these things have been all well and good, but they’ve been semi-detached, they’ve not tackled the fundamental economic challenges that these areas face” [Council Officer].

At broader level, the emergent city-level policies such as the LDF indicate a shift from an explicit set of policies drawing on an area-based initiative approach for deprived neighbourhoods, to an approach which ostensibly seeks to link the city’s deprived neighbourhoods to its growth agenda. These policies of necessity reflect central government policy:

“The mixed communities agenda. We’ve certainly embraced that... and that’s certainly our big idea in terms of transformational change, but delivering that through the opportunities afforded through being a growth point area, and having to deliver X thousand houses and making sure that we’re not just bolting them on as an oasis somewhere on the outskirts of the city... looking at how we can put those houses and amenities in our deprived communities. And delivering that alongside our neighbourhood agenda, which builds on the good work around neighbourhood governance that neighbourhood programmes have sort of trialled” [Council Officer].

“Regeneration shouldn’t just be happening on a micro level, we need to be aligning need with opportunity. So rather than just saying there’s a red line around this deprived area, we’re doing everything in there, we need to be looking at that, but more strategically... looking at how those neighbourhoods interact with the rest of the city and the rest of the sub-region” [Council Officer].

Central Government

Central government’s predominance is very evident at both the city and neighbourhood levels in Bristol. It was evident at the height of the area-based initiative approach to tackling neighbourhood deprivation, with the government’s instigation of initiatives as explored in the case study entities. It was also evident in the, albeit more empowering to local government level, NRF approach, exemplified by GOSW’s accreditation role for the LSP. The more recent ‘double devolution’ agenda apparently delegates authority for developing neighbourhood governance to local government. Irony is inherent in this less centrist approach to neighbourhood-based governance being mandated centrally. It is also ironic that the GOSW respondent expresses concerns about the way in which the council is proceeding, regarding for example the city-wide model as inappropriate given that wealthy areas
have adequate public service provision, while the council see this model as fulfilling a need for city-wide equity:

"Because our role is not just let's negotiate the targets and step back, our role is also well, what are they planning to do? And are they planning to do it in the right way, are they involving communities for example?" [GOSW Official].

"Clifton [wealthy area] doesn't have much in the way of neighbourhood governance, but it doesn't really matter, because the people who are living there are not major beneficiaries of public services as such, or rather the public services that they've got, like schools, are working excellently, so there isn't a [need]" [GOSW Official].

However, discussion with local government respondents about how central government requirements, as set out in 'the logic', are put into practice reveals a pragmatic approach. This is clear in the development of an 'interim' SCS so that it could align with the new LAA which was required by central government in June 2008. It is stressed that such pragmatic responses are necessary:

"I think there's got to be a balance between the high rhetoric and the reality on the ground" [Senior Council Officer].

"It's all very well to sit up there and make grand statements! There's an enormous kind of resource capacity problem. There's just kind of the capacity to do these things... even the neighbourhood partnership network is ridiculously under-funded if you really want to make it work the way people will want it to work. And it's just the time, the time that these kinds of processes take, are never properly factored in" [Council Officer].

Local government's recent policy statements about harnessing the growth agenda to the benefit of the city's deprived communities also reflects central government policy change. This is encapsulated in the Bristol city-region's central government designation as a 'growth point' area. It indicates the predominance of economic growth as a policy driver despite a rhetoric of 'building sustainable neighbourhoods'.

6.3.4. Bristol Urban Governance

Investigation of Bristol thus reveals that neighbourhood-based governance entities are embedded in a multi-level governance context. The entities and their context are steered by central government. This is evident in the priorities which are pursued, and manifested in the network’s structure, which is crowded, and in its operations, which are subject to significant churn and instability given changes in central government policies.
It is clear that the case study entities' predominant function of steering is due to how the governance network is structured and operates and the imperatives which arise as a result. These processes are shaped by central government. A contextual view reveals that both bodies’ creation, structuring and operations have been steered by central government and latterly their local government sponsors (though the council’s approaches are in turn framed by central government).

A shift is clear in both bodies’ operations from direct service provision and funding of projects to the influencing of service provision. This represents a change in ethos from one of community-led regeneration (enabled by the large resource of their respective principal funding programmes) to one of community-influenced neighbourhood management (necessitated by the intention to continue with reduced funding in a changed policy context which is emphasising responsive service provision). These shifts are interdependent with central government’s successive time-limited funding regimes which have had different approaches and requirements. The area-based funding regimes under which the bodies’ were instigated were augmented and then replaced, firstly by NRF, then neighbourhood management pathfinders, and now local government-instigated (but as a response to central government policy direction) neighbourhood partnerships. Therefore both bodies are subject to their sponsor – central government - seeking to realise its priorities. These priorities initially included resident engagement in neighbourhood renewal, as expressed in the stated aims of the NDC and SRB programmes; and latterly the lesser-resourced resident influencing of service provision, which draws on the competence account but can be interpreted as rather tokenistic given the greater resource needs of these deprived areas. Indeed, the tokenism account of the function of neighbourhood governance is intrinsic to the predominant account of steering. Both entities are having to recourse to attempts at self-help, but their efforts to sustain operations are at best severely curtailed and it is not clear that they will be able to continue. The disjuncture between the intent to self-help and the bodies’ ability to realise this is clear.

The complexity of the entities’ network governance context (which is demonstrated in Figure 4) echoes Stewart’s (2003: 79) description of the Bristol city-region as “institutionally crowded”. Given its “dense, multi-layered” nature, it conforms with
Skelcher’s (2006) description of the “congested state”. The structure of this network and the relationships within it are shaped by central government, which directs the actors engaged and their level of resource and power. Indeed, central government has instigated the existence of many of the institutions within the multilevel network (for example, the RDA, the Regional Assembly and the LSP). It is also clear given central government requirements regarding the existence, content and timing of review of the relevant strategies required at these different levels (such as the RSS, the SCS, and the LAA). ‘The logic’ of how this operates in theory is pervasive, certainly across the public sector, and to an extent persuasive as it appeals to the notion of subsidiarity in the sense of the devolution of policy to the lowest level at which it can be formulated. However, it is also very prescribed and proscribed in terms of tightly bounding scope for local (and indeed, sub-local, neighbourhood) responses.

What becomes very clear is the extent to which the network is subject to central government-induced churn and instability. The case study entities are both struggling to adapt given their churning context of changing government policies and funding sources. But all actors at all levels in the network are affected by changes in central government policies and approaches. The network’s institutional architecture represents a complex mix of old and new initiatives and approaches which tend to overlay one another. This clearly affects the relative stability of the context within which relationships have to be forged and helps reinforce the ultimate supremacy of central government in relation to efforts at the neighbourhood level.

When policies shift, the entire network is subject to the resultant upheaval. The methodological approach adopted provides a snapshot of a set period in the city. This period transpired to be a particularly interesting one as it coincided with a phase of transition of policy approaches from the programmatic approaches of deprived area-targeted neighbourhood renewal, to the amorphous suite of policies that comprises the ‘neighbourhoods agenda’. As such, this particular period shed a strong light on the effect of national policies on local government policies and operations relevant to neighbourhood-based governance (as captured in the ‘double devolution’ agenda). It is evident that city-level leadership, as represented by the council and the LSP, is strongly bounded by the centre, not least due to imposition of ‘the logic’. Despite the
relative instability of both the council and the LSP, the greatest cause of churn at the city-level is due to changes in central government policies and funding regimes, which frame the council’s leadership of the city-level neighbourhood governance network.

This network does not solely comprise the Bristol Partnership, though, as the LSP, this body is explicitly tasked with developing policies of relevance to deprived neighbourhoods via the SCS. The LSP in fact comprises the “policy subsystem” (Goetz and Sidney, 1997) for neighbourhood-based approaches. The LSP does not act separately from, but is interwoven with, Bristol’s broader urban governance context. It is the broader governance network which determines the imperatives which frame the approaches developed by the neighbourhood policy subsystem. But this broader network is not contained at urban level. Understanding of Bristol’s urban governance cannot be bounded at city-level but requires consideration of its multi-level governance context, and particularly the policy lead of central government. It is central government which frames regional policymaking, which in turn frames policymaking at the local, city, level and finally sets the bounds for neighbourhood level approaches. Thus hierarchical modes of co-ordination are consistently evident with the “continuing downwards pressure from central government on localities” (Stewart, 2003: 89).

These neighbourhood-level approaches therefore mirror central government’s policy transition from the explicit targeting of deprived areas (as defined in the Indices of Deprivation) to a broader emphasis on neighbourhood engagement in and influence on service delivery. This shift in approaches comprises a move away from programmatic regeneration funding which made use of neighbourhood-based initiative governance, to an emphasis on ‘bending the spend’ or ‘mainstreaming’, whereby it is envisaged that communities inform the spending and delivery priorities of local government and other statutory agencies. The transition has apparently marked a shift to a greater neighbourhood or spatial sensitivity in decision-making regarding funding allocations and service delivery. This is reflected in Bristol with the council’s roll out of a version of neighbourhood management which relies on influencing mainstream providers rather than providing dedicated resource. It is bundled with the development of neighbourhood partnerships to ‘govern’ this, though
these partnerships are multi-ward rather than neighbourhood-based and are not the formal entities which comprise the unit of study in this research. It is not evident how the resource case for deprived areas will be made in the context of this rather woolly (at least at the time of the research) conception of neighbourhood management/governance. It can therefore be regarded as rather tokenistic.

These neighbourhood policies are framed at city-level by the emergent LDF which in turn illustrates the shift from an explicit set of policies for deprived neighbourhoods, to an approach which seeks to link the city’s deprived neighbourhoods to its plans for growth. This indicates a subsuming of the tackling deprivation agenda by a pro-growth (or at least managed growth) agenda. These emerging LDF policies in turn are framed by the Bristol city-region’s designation as a ‘growth point’. City-level policies to tackle deprivation are secondary to the primary policy imperative, set at regional level, of growth. But all of these imperatives derive in turn from central government’s policy direction. In the region and at city-level, GOSW ensures that regional and local policies ‘fit’ central government policy direction. While at city-level, the key network governance actor is local government, it is central government which not only sets the parameters in terms of the imperatives pursued, but also broadly bounds how these are pursued (despite the ‘double devolution’ rhetoric with regard to neighbourhoods).

The shifts in policy orientation to deprived neighbourhoods signal the predominance of the neo-liberal context in framing attempts to tackle neighbourhood deprivation. The policy approaches within this context are not set by the private sector but by central government. Therefore, despite its pro-growth agenda, investigation of Bristol does not reveal a US-style urban regime in operation in the city, though Stewart (1996) identified what he termed an “incipient regime” in the mid-1990s. Private sector interests are absent (reflected by the lack of private sector engagement in the LSP). This finding is supported by previous research conducted by Boddy et al. (2004: 62), who conclude that “a governing elite or public-private coalition of interests, a local ‘growth regime’ as such, seeking to mould and marshal the overall business assets of the city-region” is not evident.
Centrist and Managerial Urban Governance

In sum, Bristol does fulfil the expected characteristics of a centrist and managerial system of urban governance in the UK, as set out in Table 6.4. Activities at the city and in turn neighbourhood levels are framed by central government policies, as postulated in metagovernance theory and reflected in the notion of "steering centralism" (Somerville, 2005a). The locus of authority remains at the central government level, with local government taking the lead at the local, urban level. Central government strategies are prioritised, reflecting the steering perspective, though accounts of democracy and competence and to a lesser extent self-help do receive emphasis as demonstrated by the case study entities. The most obvious expression of urban network governance takes a partnership form as represented by the LSP, but this is the policy subsystem for deprived neighbourhoods and is dominated by local government. Other strategies which shape the subsystem's approaches are framed by central government priorities, regarding housing and economic growth, with a rhetoric of linking deprived neighbourhoods to the benefits of this growth. This implies some tokenistic use of neighbourhood-based governance forms. Tokenism is also implicit given emphasis in the policy rhetoric on the functions of democracy, competence and self-help despite the predominant function of neighbourhood-based governance being that of steering.

Table 6.4: Bristol Urban Governance Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urban Governance Characteristics</th>
<th>Associated Neighbourhood-based Governance Functions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Locus of authority</td>
<td>Urban level lead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central govt level</td>
<td>Local govt</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Bristol, central government has set the imperatives which are pursued at city-wide and neighbourhood levels. The predominant imperative is of economic and housing growth. The needs of deprived neighbourhoods are subservient to this market.
imperative, with policies seeking to link such neighbourhoods to this growth, or what one council respondent terms “aligning need with opportunity”. Therefore, Bristol illustrates Jessop’s (2002: 464) notion that at the national and city-level, neo-liberal market imperatives take precedence. However, the move from specific resource for deprived neighbourhoods to a city-wide neighbourhood management/ neighbourhood partnership model does not fulfil Jessop’s (op cit) proposition that neo-communitarian strategies will take precedence at the neighbourhood level.

6.4 Conclusion

To conclude it is important to consider the implications in terms of the relative power of the neighbourhood level within its multi-level governance context.

Neighbourhoods used to be conceptualised according to their ranking in the Indices of Deprivation, with programmatic resource allocated accordingly. Such designations did bring a measure of power to the constituent neighbourhoods covered by these area-based initiatives. Now, however, the greater resource needs of deprived areas have been subsumed within an amorphous approach as represented by the roll out of neighbourhood partnerships, accompanied by a broader rhetoric about deprived communities being expected to link to market-related growth in the city. This is despite the general “competitive success” of the Bristol city-region not having served previously to combat the persistent concentrations of deprivation in its inner city and peripheral public housing estates (Boddy et al., 2004: 62), as evidenced by the areas covered by the case study entities.

The former programmatic area-based interventions, which made use of a resident-led rhetoric, can be said to have obscured the reality of government ‘containing’ deprived areas, seeking to treat them separately from the mainstream. However, government’s shift to more generally-applied notions of neighbourhood management/ governance and ‘mainstreaming’, making use of a rhetoric of resident influence, can equally be criticised via this lens. While public sector respondents espoused ‘the logic’ of how neighbourhoods and their needs will fit into the way the city is governed via the LSP, it is not clear how this will be put into practice. Indeed, both approaches can be interpreted as a tokenistic response, with government seeking to obscure the ‘special’
The neighbourhood-based governance entities which arose out of earlier programmatic interventions are now struggling to survive in a new context. This is already reflected in their operations and is likely to become reflected in the way they are structured if they are able to continue. Without dedicated resource, the formal governance entities which may exist given earlier initiatives are increasingly having to rely on notions of self-help, irrespective of their capacity to do so. The disjuncture between the rhetoric of programmatic interventions building the capacity of communities to help themselves following the initiative lifetime and outcomes in practice is clear.

The case study bodies illustrate the neighbourhood-level ramifications of government policy changes and demonstrate that their existence and continued operations are framed not only by their vertical relationships up to the city-level network, but in turn by the central government policy context in which this network operates. These vertical relationships are at least as important to their continued functioning, and what and how activities are carried out, as their relationships back to citizens. Despite the policy rhetoric about inclusion and community participation, the communities covered by the initiatives are weak actors in the network. Bristol’s neighbourhood governance network in turn illustrates the continuing predominance of vertical links up to Whitehall, rather than back to neighbourhoods. The research also illustrates the difficulties of realising the public sector espoused ‘logic’ in practice, given the path dependency of local responses to central government’s framework (illustrated by the LSP being on its third iteration, and a lack of consistent leadership from local government due to its own political churn and instability). As Boddy et al. (2004: 62) state, “political and administrative fragmentation have inhibited strategic initiative and leadership”.

In the context of this research’s cross-national comparison, Bristol evidences that its approaches to neighbourhood-based governance are framed by the actions of the key actor, central government. The urban level comprises only one, and not the predominant steering, layer in the context which governs neighbourhood-based governance. Shifting central government policy results in significant churn not only for neighbourhood-based entities, but for agencies and organisations at the city, sub-regional and regional levels. Such churn relates to a seemingly constant need for
'new' policy approaches and initiatives which does not enable sufficient time for approaches and the associated institutional arrangements to become embedded and in turn build capacity. These shifts particularly affect the neighbourhood as it is the level at which community engagement is sought and expectations of change hinder such engagement and development of capacity. Overall, the research supports the notion that though partnership as a mode of governance brings non-state actors into the process, the aims of the state are still dominant.
7.1 Introduction

The purpose of this research was to consider how neighbourhood-based governance entities are located in broader networks of governance. It did this by undertaking an international comparative investigation of neighbourhood governance in two cities, Baltimore, Maryland in the US and Bristol in England. This made use of an empirically-grounded approach to ascertain the function of such governance forms according to the way they are structured and the way they operate. It then assessed the governance context, particularly focused at the urban level, within which these entities are located. The assessment entailed consideration of the key actors and their relative power and the focus on deprived neighbourhoods versus broader strategies. This enabled consideration of how these strategies and actors shape the functions of neighbourhood-based initiative governance and the implications in terms of the relative power vested at the neighbourhood level. In so doing the research addressed questions concerning the “paucity of well-designed, sceptical investigations” (Klijn & Skelcher, 2007: 601) of governance networks, and the need for “rigorous comparative studies” of these (Davies, 2002: 301).

The governance networks identified in Baltimore and Bristol fulfil Chaskin’s (2005: 418) observation that in such systems, “power dynamics are pervasive”, with the dominant actions coming from the key network actors rather than the ‘grassroots’. Identification of the key network members and the locus of authority demonstrates the localist and privatist nature of Baltimore’s urban governance context, and the centrist and managerial nature of Bristol’s. Within both networks a policy subsystem is evident with regard to neighbourhood-based approaches, but it is the broader governance network which determines the state and market imperatives which are pursued which frame neighbourhood approaches. In Baltimore and latterly in Bristol, tackling deprivation is a subservient agenda to the predominant neo-liberal imperative of growth. This highlights the important similarity of the two cities’ shared neo-liberal context despite their different governmental systems.
In Baltimore, the localist and privatist system of governance at city-level is replicated at the neighbourhood level. Neighbourhoods do not gain resource from the city-level governance network if they lack the assets this network seeks. The function of neighbourhood governance which results is self-help, as long as neighbourhoods have the capacity to do so. In turn in Bristol, the centrist and managerial governance system, steered by central government at city-level, is also replicated at the neighbourhood level. Neighbourhood governance is steered by central government, via its funding regimes and policy approaches. Changes in these have heralded a shift from the explicit targeting of deprived areas via area-based initiatives to seeking to link deprived neighbourhoods to the benefits of broader economic and housing growth. This indicates that neighbourhood governance entities are being steered to adopt self-help strategies, such as those identified in Baltimore, irrespective of their capacity to do so. Overall, it is clear that in both cities the neighbourhood and its governance continues to be a contested domain between different actors and as a scale for intervention it is subject to competing imperatives.

This chapter considers the value of the approach used in the research by considering and contrasting the findings in Baltimore and Bristol. It then reflects back on the literature in light of the research findings, and concludes with some key themes which have emerged which are indicative of future policy direction. These have informed identification of possible future lines of enquiry.

7.2 The Value of the Research Approach

The approach used attempted to address the challenge identified by Klijn and Skelcher (2007: 606) of developing “a more rigorous and systematic assessment of the governance network literature in order to build theoretical propositions that can form the basis of research programmes”. This attempt is reflected in the development and application of the frameworks of expected characteristics of both ‘ideal-type’ neighbourhood governance bodies and of urban governance forms. There is of course significant scope for their further testing and refinement (addressed in section 7.4.1 below).
The research sought to locate neighbourhood governance in its multi-level governance context to consider the "governance of governance" (Jessop, 2004). This entailed analysis of what Chaskin (2003: 163) terms "the broader ecology of organisations and processes that constitute neighbourhood governance systems". Network governance theory has been criticised as being "merely descriptive and lacking a perspective on power" (Stewart, 2003: 85), and US regime theory in turn has been criticised for its "restrictive localistic empirical focus" (Gibbs et al., 2001: 104). The approach used tried to temper these criticisms by attempting to empirically ground neighbourhood-based governance within its multi-level, multi-actor governance context. The intention was to undertake a finer-grained and less prescriptive analysis which attempted to consider the effects of this multi-level context on neighbourhood-level approaches.

In so doing, the research touched on debates about the applicability of notions of regime and network governance in the US and England. The evidence in Bristol indicates that England is not moving towards the US model of urban regimes (as stated by Davies, 2002; and Jones and Evans, 2008), given the lack of private sector engagement and the supreme role of the state. Research findings in Baltimore, however, do indicate that network theories of governance are applicable in the US despite the greater predominance of non-state actors in setting city-level imperatives. But it should be stressed that this applicability can only be indicated rather than confirmed given the US sample size of only one city. Given its federal governmental system, extrapolation regarding the US drawing from the Baltimore research would not be robust. For example, the lack of an urban regime in Baltimore is linked in large part to the city's lack of corporate entities. Regimes may indeed be in place in other cities. In contrast, it can be argued that such extrapolation from the Bristol empirical research to England as a whole would be to a degree robust given that the relevant policies are set in large part by central government and thus also frame the activities in other cities.

7.2.1. Multi-Level Governance Context

Overall, the research has contributed to knowledge regarding the underlying function of neighbourhood-based governance and how this relates to broader governance networks. The research's innovative international comparative approach has enabled
exploration of the similarities and differences engendered by different governmental systems. The value of this comparative study is demonstrated when each spatial scale within the multi-level governance context in both cities is compared (with particular emphasis on the spatial scales of the two units of study – neighbourhood-based initiative governance entities, and the city-level governance network in which they are embedded). This is set out below. What is clear is that in both countries the neighbourhood level, and indeed particularly the aggregated neighbourhood level, has resonance as a site and scale with which governments and other governance network actors can work. However, at the city-level very different power dynamics emerge between the two cities/ countries in terms of the localist and privatist character of Baltimore and the centrist and managerial character of Bristol. This results in different emphases in terms of the functions of neighbourhood governance, though signs of convergence are evident which can be linked to the two cities’ shared neo-liberal context.

**Neighbourhood level**

In both cities the neighbourhood as a spatial scale emerged as the building block for the higher spatial scale of aggregated neighbourhoods at which initiative governance exists. The informal groups that exist at this spatial scale do not have particular leverage or power at higher spatial scales in either city. In Baltimore, neighbourhoods with ‘capacity’ are more likely to be targeted by initiatives, a quality which the most deprived neighbourhoods are likely to lack. While neighbourhoods can gain leverage when their area is targeted for strategic reasons, this requires that they accept the proposals and work within the framework dictated by the sponsors of redevelopment. In Bristol, the existence of such informal groups and their capacity is not a relevant consideration. Neighbourhoods were selected for inclusion in initiatives given their levels of deprivation and work within the bounds of the government programme to which they are subject.

In both cities therefore the conception of ‘neighbourhood’ reflects Cochrane’s contention about the creation of “new institutional spaces” (2007: 61) with which government can work. In Baltimore, the network constructs neighbourhoods in terms of the state of their housing market, institutionalised as a policy approach in the housing typology. The typology can be regarded as a proxy for levels of
neighbourhood distress in which a distinction is made between neighbourhoods that are ‘salvageable’ in light of the resources available, and those that are not. In Bristol, neighbourhoods were similarly constructed with use of the Indices of Deprivation, which was the principal means of identifying the target areas for initiatives. A notable difference is that in Bristol, initiatives were focused on the most deprived, not the most ‘salvageable’, areas. With the decline of area-based initiatives, and the creation of the “new institutional space” (op cit) of neighbourhood partnerships in the city, it is not yet clear how, if at all, deprived neighbourhoods will be ‘constructed’ in terms of how their ‘special case’ will be made.

Multi-neighbourhood level

The multi-neighbourhood level is the scale at which neighbourhood-based initiative governance is located. This demonstrates that in both cities, it is aggregated neighbourhoods that are regarded by government and other governance network members as a valuable scale with which to work. In Baltimore, elite respondents emphasised the value of working with aggregated neighbourhood entities given their perceived ability to be able to prioritise needs. Such entities tend to have formal non-profit status, and their links into the broader governance network tend to be via their sponsors. In Bristol, previous government programmes, which required establishment of an initiative governance structure, have left a heritage of such entities which have had to adapt in light of changed funding regimes and policies for deprived areas. Such bodies, including the case study entities, had previously been linked into the broader network via direct representation on the LSP. However, the advent of neighbourhood partnerships has meant that the explicit emphasis of multi-neighbourhood-based governance in the city has shifted from its deprived areas to a city-wide sub-local form of governance of neighbourhood management. This shift reasserts representative rather than participative governance and emphasises that the multi-neighbourhood level is perceived as the level suitable for linking with statutory service provision. That these partnerships actually cover multi-ward areas much larger than the areas covered by previous initiatives does not indicate that service provision will be particularly tailored to community priorities.

The research reveals similarities regarding neighbourhood-based initiative governance bodies in the two cities. These include the form the bodies take, generally with a
board with resident and partner organisation representatives, and topic-based sub-committees. Respondents in both cities stressed the difficulties of ‘operationalising democracy’, emphasising the need to build resident capacity to not only be ‘at the table’ but to participate and be heard. Concerns about the ‘usual suspects’ being engaged and a parochialism and insularity developing were also consistently expressed. Other common issues regarded the professionalisation of entities, and the role of residents as representatives, versus scope for bringing needed skills to the board. In both cities respondents also recognised that certain types of activity were better suited to neighbourhood-based working, particularly what Baltimore respondents term ‘crime and grime’, and that such issues were consistently identified as priorities by communities.

However, significant differences were also apparent. The Bristol entities arose from time-limited programmatic approaches, and there was accordingly a much greater emphasis on their ‘forward strategies’ as they tried to adapt to a context in which they lacked a significant (government) sponsor. In Baltimore, both entities were anchored and were open-ended endeavours, though both had reached a plateau of resident engagement and were endeavouring to reinvigorate their operations. Though the entities undoubtedly had funding concerns, they were not subject to the ‘funding cliffs’ of their Bristol counterparts. Indeed, it can be posited that in Bristol, central government had acted as the temporary ‘anchor’ for these entities.

City level
The broader governance network is focused at this level, as represented by the bounds of city/local government. In Baltimore it is at this scale that network members considered ways to classify sub-city patterns of deprivation and ways of addressing this, as captured in the housing typology. Federal and state government act as a funding mechanism to the city level, with city government providing the implementation mechanism within very broad funding guidelines. At the sub-city level, city government acts as a funding mechanism to non-profit intermediaries, apparently guided by the Consolidated Plan and the housing typology. To an extent foundation sponsors of multi-neighbourhood-level initiatives follow this pattern with their focus on the ‘middle’ neighbourhoods.
The Baltimore community development system' is not formally stated and had to be identified during the course of the research. Its approach or guiding principles are more stable than those of Bristol, the last major change occurring with the shift to asset-based allocation in 2001 during the O'Malley administration. The network is also more diffuse, with neighbourhood-based governance entities sponsored by a greater number of different network members, from different sectors (such as private philanthropies and anchor institutions). Baltimore's diffuse neighbourhood policy mix also derives from the important policy-setting role of philanthropic foundations as well as city government. But despite this framework, the major activities of the network are opportunistic given the lack of resource.

In Bristol, the city level is also ostensibly the level at which the network, represented by the Bristol Partnership (LSP), formulates policies for deprived neighbourhoods in the city (as contained in the Sustainable Community Strategy, or SCS). As such, the city-level context for neighbourhood governance in terms of the relevant actors and policies is more explicit in Bristol. However, central government policy steers these approaches via such mechanisms as the definition of deprivation, GOSW's accreditation of the LSP, and GOSW's engagement in development of the Local Area Agreement, which frames formulation of the SCS. In contrast to the relative stability in Baltimore, and despite 'the logic' espoused by government respondents, the network is chaotic, and is subject to rapid change, disruption and insecurity related to shifting central government policy, which affects all actors at all spatial scales.

The city is adjusting to a changing central government approach to neighbourhood deprivation, with a commensurate shift from deprived area-targeted initiatives towards a sub-city-wide neighbourhood partnership/ neighbourhood management model. A commitment to tackling deprivation remains, but approaches hinge on a purportedly more strategic approach which will attempt to link deprived neighbourhoods to the benefits of the city's growth, rather than trying to resolve deprivation at a neighbourhood level. These shifts herald a decline in formal neighbourhood-based governance entities. Those that remain as a heritage of previous approaches are having to adapt or will cease to exist.
It is at this spatial scale that the most significant differences between the two cities emerged. These in large part can be related to the two countries' different governmental systems (expanded in section 7.2.2). However, the research did reveal some similarities between the two cities at this scale. Tensions were evident between the non-profit/third sectors and city/local government with a call for greater leadership from city/local government and frustration over the lack of consistency and commitment over a timeframe regarded as commensurate with effecting change. That relations between the sectors affect efforts at greater collaboration illustrates some of the path dependency of network and neighbourhood governance given distinctive local characteristics and history. In Baltimore of particular note is the philanthropic community's 'policy-setting' role given their ability to influence the mayor, which has set the approaches taken by the network. In Bristol, the 'flip-flopping' of city council control has further destabilised the network governance context for neighbourhood governance and increased the importance of third sector support organisations.

**Regional level**

At this level broader policy considerations which frame city-level imperatives are determined. The State of Maryland has prioritised Baltimore as a focus for housing provision, aligning with its 'smart growth' policies. Bristol in turn is designated the focus for housing and economic growth in the south-west region as expressed in the draft Regional Spatial Strategy.

**National level**

In Baltimore CDBG funds comprise the most consistent form of federal resource for the city and constitute the main public funding stream for the city's neighbourhood-based organisations, though there has been a long-running decline in allocations. CDBG funds are subject to very broad federal government guidelines and disbursed by the City of Baltimore as an entitlement community according to its own criteria, as influenced by the network's deliberations. In Bristol, central government's award of NRF, for which decision about dispersal within the city's deprived areas was at the LSP's discretion, can be regarded as being the closest equivalent to CDBG. But this funding regime was in place for only seven years, compared to CDBG's continued existence since 1975. In Bristol, the criteria for government funding are much more
stringent than in Baltimore and indeed central government essentially directly funded the initiative governance bodies (via local government as ‘accountable body’) and had extensive monitoring requirements for these funding regimes. Later shifts in central government policy away from area-based initiatives, combined with the introduction of ‘greater local flexibility’ with LAAs, still evidence a strong central government hand in the process.

7.2.2. Effects on Neighbourhood Governance

This comparison of the two cities by spatial scale confirms the characteristics of urban governance which can be expected in the US and England. Different power dynamics exist in these different contexts, with power focused at the city-level in Baltimore and in Whitehall in the case of Bristol. The likely predominant interpretations of the role of neighbourhood governance, of self-help in the localist and privatist US, and steering in centrist and managerial England, are also confirmed. However, despite these differences with regard to the network governance context and the resultant role of neighbourhood governance, what both cities have in common is that significant power does not accrue at the neighbourhood level, and especially not with neighbourhood governance bodies in deprived areas, compared to institutions at higher spatial scales. This is explored below.

Baltimore

In Baltimore the locus of authority is at the city-level, with city government and private interests taking the lead. In contrast with Bristol, there is no prescribed ‘logic’ for the network in terms of its structure, and it does not seek to include neighbourhood-level actors in its deliberations. The governance network’s (rather than urban regime) private interests comprise private philanthropies, who have a significant role as ‘policy-setters’ in the city, and the city’s major anchor institution.

However, there is a pervasive and pragmatic ‘logic’ about the network’s asset-based approach, adopted in 2001. This approach, which Stoker et al. (2009: 14) described as “a triage approach to policymaking”, is rooted in Baltimore’s huge extent of deprivation and its lack of resource. This contrasts with Bristol, which is “affluent with pockets of deprivation” (Purdue et al., 2004: 278). The weak fiscal equalisation of the federal governmental system compounds the city’s own weak tax base and the
city does not have sufficient resources for a concerted and systematic effort to alleviate deprivation in its neighbourhoods. Network actors are driven towards a market-driven, opportunistic approach influenced by the neo-liberal context which attempts to lever private capital.

The needs of deprived areas are therefore subservient to the market imperative. The network focuses its attention on neighbourhoods which have the assets it prioritises which are regarded as having the ability to lever market forces. The ‘middle’ neighbourhoods provide the focus for some network actors where interventions are perceived as being able to ‘improve market conditions’. Focus on ‘distressed’ areas is not routine, but where these areas intersect with anchored opportunities for redevelopment which boost the city’s standing in the bioscience sector. Network attention accrues at the neighbourhood level when the neighbourhood has assets which the network regards as a priority to ‘lever’. Any ‘power’ gained is that enabled by the network in the pursuit of its imperatives and neighbourhood actors can be said to have been co-opted into the network’s vision of their future development. In this context, neighbourhoods that have the capacity to self-help are more likely to do so.

In Baltimore’s localist and privatist governance system, self-help is the predominant function of neighbourhood governance. These localist and privatist characteristics of the city-level governance network are replicated at neighbourhood level where self-help predominates if neighbourhoods have sufficient capacity to undertake such efforts. This is demonstrated by the two case study entities, which are operating in spite of rather than because of government or the governance network. They are both ongoing, open-ended endeavours. This is not because they have the assets capable of leveraging the market which the governance network seeks, but because they are ‘anchored’, either by an institution or by being enshrined in legislation and having a guaranteed funding stream.

**Bristol**

In Bristol, the locus of authority is at central government level, with local government taking the lead at the city-level. Central government prescribes the ‘logic’ which determines the structure of the network and the relationships within it. This contrasts with the city-level determination of the network and its approaches in Baltimore,
despite increasing calls in central government policy to enable ‘space’ for ‘local responses to local problems’. This indicates severe limitations on central government’s ‘competence’ or ability to learn from and adapt in light of the needs of local government and of the neighbourhood structures it has instigated, despite the policy rhetoric of devolution. Network structuring includes the provision, via the Bristol Partnership, of an institutional structure which includes neighbourhood-level actors in its deliberations, though it is unclear how this will be operationalised in the new LSP. Central government directs which actors are engaged, their level of resource and power, and the plans and strategies which frame the approaches taken, at regional, city and neighbourhood levels. This direction is evident in the priorities which are pursued, and manifested in the network’s structure, which is crowded, and in its operations, which are subject to significant churn and instability given changes in central government policies. This is in contrast to the relative stability of Baltimore’s network.

The relative power of the city and neighbourhood levels within this multi-level governance context is determined by central government which sets the imperatives pursued. Any power at neighbourhood level derives from the attentions of government funding regimes and policy approaches. In Bristol programmatic resource used to be allocated to neighbourhoods according to their ranking in the Indices of Deprivation. Such designations did bring a measure of power to the constituent neighbourhoods covered by the initiatives, despite the “twin-track” (Hohn and Neuer, 2006) critique. The greater resource needs of deprived areas have since been subsumed by the comprehensive introduction of much less resourced neighbourhood partnerships, accompanied by a rhetoric about deprived communities being expected to link to market-related growth in the city. The needs of deprived neighbourhoods are therefore secondary to the predominant imperative of economic and housing growth. This highlights that government attempts to tackle neighbourhood deprivation are undertaken within and influenced by the neo-liberal context.

In Bristol’s centrist and managerial governance system, the predominant interpretation of the role of neighbourhood-based governance is steering. Bristol’s two entities, typical in terms of entities that meet the unit of study definition, are
operating because of government. The case study narratives form a microcosm of changes in the relevant government policies. Their transition from the security of a government funding regime to a more vulnerable set of circumstances has necessitated the entities to rethink their operations and perhaps the way they are structured. Such neighbourhood-based governance entities which arose out of earlier programmatic interventions are now struggling to survive in their new context, which continues to be steered by central government. Without dedicated resource, the formal governance entities which may exist given earlier governmental initiatives increasingly have to rely on notions of self-help, irrespective of their capacity to do so. These recent shifts in government policies, with a reduction in dedicated resource for deprived neighbourhoods and emphasis on the need to link deprived areas to the benefits of growth, indicate a convergence with the approaches evident in Baltimore as captured in the self-help ethos.

In sum, the predominant interpretations of the role of neighbourhood governance identified, of self-help in the localist and privatist US, and steering in the centrist and managerial England, are unsurprising. What is noteworthy is that there are signs of convergence between England and the US. In both cities neighbourhood-based initiatives to tackle deprivation are a secondary concern to the neo-liberal strategies of growth of the prevailing governance networks. Emergent English policies, which draw on notions of communitarianism, promulgate self-help and demonstrate that the US continues to provide policy inspiration. This is explored in section 7.4.2 below.

7.3 Reflections on the Governance Literature

To conclude, it is important to reflect back on the literature which informed development of the research approach, and consider its applicability in terms of what has been confirmed in the empirical research.

Within this literature, governance is described both as a process, and as an expression of political change. As a process, governance is associated with a network, rather than a market or hierarchical mode of co-ordination of political and economic activity. But the empirical research evidences that hierarchy is very evident in the
networks studied, given the way power is vested in and wielded by the key network actors.

This is particularly evident in Bristol given central government's steering role, which adds validity to Davies' (2002) critique of the 'governing without government' thesis. What can be termed a 'hierarchical network' is evident, or what Scharpf (1994) would term governance 'in the shadow of hierarchy'. The findings confirm the assertions of previous research that cross-sectoral governing institutions often more closely resemble hierarchies than networks (Skelcher et al., 2005; Wright et al., 2006; Entwistle et al., 2007). The research demonstrates that while a variety of different state and non-state actors are required to be involved (for example, in the LSP), the state in the form of central government dominates.

In Baltimore, what can be termed 'local metagovernors' are evident with regard to the governance of neighbourhood governance, in the form of city government, Johns Hopkins University and the Casey Foundation. The latter two actors can be regarded as private sector institutions which have combined with and influenced the state's imperatives. These private interests have gained power in the network in the absence of powerful corporate interests in the city, therefore substituting for the corporate involvement which Stone (1989) predicts in regime theory. They are also involved in the neighbourhood policy subsystem (or "neighbourhood policy regime" as described by Martin, 2004) and are engaged in neighbourhood-specific detail. This also counters Stone's regime model, which is envisaged as taking a broad policy overview at the urban level.

In considering the two interpretations of governance in the literature, the research has confirmed governance's inherently political nature. It asserts the validity of regarding the shift from government to governance in political terms as an expression of the changes in the state's form and function resulting from neo-liberalism, rather than as an empirical process (as posited by Geddes, 2006 and Whitehead, 2003). The shifts in policy orientation to deprived neighbourhoods signal the predominance of neo-liberal approaches, which "believe markets provide the best solution to social problems" (Jones and Evans, 2008: 171). The neo-liberal imperatives which frame neighbourhood approaches in both cities echo Katz's (2004: 26) view that
neighbourhood change should be market-driven rather than community-controlled. That state imperatives are subservient to those of the market is evident given that policies are predicated on the ability of the market to deliver change and resultant social as well as economic benefits, global recession notwithstanding.

The findings bear out Jessop’s (2002: 464) contention that neo-liberal strategies dominate at the city level. He adds that “neo-communitarian” strategies are emphasised at the deprived neighbourhood level (op cit). Emphasis on such “arrangements to encourage neighbourhood solutions” (Jessop, 2002: 464) is certainly clear in the research findings, which in turn indicates the rise of a neo-liberal discourse of self-help and community ownership (discussed in 7.4.2. below). However, the research refines Jessop’s assertion by making the links between these different strategies at different spatial scales more clear. Where neighbourhoods explicitly intersect with the growth strategies of city elites, such as EBDI in Baltimore, the neighbourhoods concerned are co-opted into the neo-liberal imperatives of growth. Where neighbourhoods do not intersect with these broader growth strategies, such as OROSW, “neo-communitarian” strategies are prevalent. The neighbourhood is thus a more contested domain than Jessop perhaps suggests, according to the extent to which it contains the opportunities sought by the city-level in pursuing its neo-liberal imperatives.

Therefore, overall the research findings emphasise how crucial the network within which neighbourhood governance bodies are embedded is to their existence and ongoing operations. This context structures “the possibilities and limitations of local empowerment and action” (Fagotto and Fung, 2006: 642). To sustain operations, a neighbourhood governance body should not solely “look internally… to set its agenda and implement its programmes” (Katz, 2004: 26). It is more likely to “foster cooperation with the organisations and agencies from which it must draw its jurisdiction and funds” (Chaskin and Garg, 1997) if it operates in a way “that is at least superficially in harmony with dominant political and policy discourses” (Atkinson, 2003: 118). The findings confirm Atkinson’s (2003: 118) contention that “in order to gain access to limited resources, communities are expected to internalise a series of policy narratives and demonstrate adherence to particular programmes of government".
This is evidenced in Baltimore, where, though distressed neighbourhoods are empowered to a certain extent when they are selected as redevelopment targets, their concerns are secondary and they can only hope to negotiate benefits if they concur with the overall initiative and thus the network's emphasis on development of the 'ed and med' sector. In Bristol this was particularly evident given the government programmatic nature of the initiatives and the subsequent need for entities to adapt in light of changing government policies. But in England in particular, the lack of what Katz (2004: 36) describes as "sustainable, dependable, and predictable policies", which give neighbourhood bodies the "ability to reach a plateau of participation before encountering financial or political reversals" (Berry et al., 1993: 51) further complicates the ability of neighbourhood governance bodies to remain connected to the network which governs them.

The growth imperatives which frame efforts at the deprived neighbourhoods level in both cities reflect aspects of "the global common sense of neo-liberal competitiveness" (Cochrane, 2007: 136). These aspects, summarised by Peck and Tickell (2002: 394-5), include "a 'growth first' approach to urban development", a "naturalisation" of the market as the model for decision-making; and an external focus orientated towards the identification of potential competitors rather than the welfare of residents. These aspects are extremely evident in Baltimore, and becoming increasingly evident in Bristol given its policy shifts regarding deprived neighbourhoods.

It is unsurprising that neo-liberal imperatives dominate in both cities given the "broadly shared global economic policy context" (Cochrane, 2007: 136). Indeed, within this shared neo-liberal context, policy shifts in Bristol can be taken as evidence that England continues to look to the US as a "source of policy lessons" (Cochrane, 2007: 14), particularly given the rise of the 'asset-based' and 'self-help' discourses. Such policy lessons are attractive given their "limited inputs of state resources" (Raco, 2003: 243).

Despite this tendency for urban policy transfer from the US, "the UK central state remains heavily involved in the details of local decision-making, to an extent that would be unthinkable in the US" (Hambleton and Sweeting, 2004: 474). This raises
questions about the value of England looking more broadly for approaches as there are other countries, not least in continental Europe, from which lessons can perhaps be as, if not more so, usefully learned. This harks back to Halsey’s (1978) assertion that “ideas drift casually across the Atlantic, soggy on arrival and of dubious utility”.

7.4 **Future Lines of Enquiry**

Avenues for further research derive both from a critique of the approach utilised and from the key themes which have emerged which are indicative of future policy direction. These will be taken in turn.

7.4.1. **Further Development of the Frameworks**

The frameworks developed and applied in the research have demonstrated the benefit of the case study approach in terms of allowing a considered exploration of the issues which can help to articulate hypotheses that may ultimately be tested more systematically (Yin, 2003: 10). While the framework of ‘ideal-type’ characteristics has provided a good basis to bring empirical rigour to considerations of the role of neighbourhood-based governance, it would benefit from further empirical grounding. In both cities all five of the functions set out in the theoretical framework are evident in the structure and operations of the case study entities. Further work would enable more definitive assertions and stronger conceptual conclusions about the functions posited. The value of further testing of the framework is also indicated in terms of understanding how the different functions combine and complement or conflict with each other, and which actors in the governance network are likely to champion and pursue which combinations of functions.

Also, each function posited reflects a different ideological interpretation and thus prescription about the value of neighbourhoods as a spatial scale for action. Depending on the functional assumption made, neighbourhood governance may be regarded as ‘working’. There is scope to develop the ‘ideal-type’ framework further to consider the transferability of different forms of neighbourhood governance. This research has not attempted to undertake a best practice assessment of such approaches. But it has established self-help and steering as being the principal interpretations of the role of neighbourhood governance in the US and England.
respectively. This leads to questions about whether self-help can be realised in England unless the way in which initiatives are structured and operate are altered, which may be unlikely given the ways in which the broader governance context is steered in this centrist governmental system. Further consideration is needed of the extent to which the framework could be developed to develop more robust and applicable policy prescriptions, or more context-specific 'success factors' for neighbourhood-based governance.

In terms of the network governance context for neighbourhood governance, it would be useful to select a broader range of respondents to enable a thorough investigation of the city’s governance system, particularly regarding the development of economic strategies. This would extend understanding of the development of the imperatives which frame the functions of neighbourhood governance, as well as adding to comparative understanding of forms of urban governance. In turn, it would be of benefit to extend the research approach to other US cities to ascertain the applicability of network theories of governance in this localist governmental system.

Also, while the city-level provided a useful bounding of the research approach which enabled 'deliverability', the location of neighbourhood governance in its multi-level governance context would benefit from further research entailing broader elite respondent selection from higher tiers of government and governance so that documentary review would be complemented by elite respondent perspectives.

7.4.2. Key Themes

Two key themes emerged from the research which relate to the current and seeming future policy emphases of relevance to neighbourhoods which thus constitute potentially rich avenues for further research. They also evidence that England continues to look to the US for policy direction, despite the difficulties of transplanting approaches to a different institutional and social context. These themes highlight the benefit of international comparative research in terms of what May (2001) terms the “foresight view”, whereby comparative work enables understanding of the potential for success of particular policies, systems or practices in a given society.
Asset-based resource allocation

The research revealed that the resource allocation ethos of the Baltimore network is 'asset-based', whether this be in terms of housing market conditions, non-profit organisations with capacity, or an anchor institution, particularly if it is seeking redevelopment of its adjacent neighbourhoods. While in Bristol this ethos has been needs-based, the rise of an asset-based sensibility is evident with a shift away from an area-based programmatic approach for deprived neighbourhoods to a rhetoric of harnessing the benefits of (housing and economic development) growth to these areas' benefit. It is also evident in central government encouragement of community management and ownership of assets (investigated by the Quirk Review, 2007).

Self-help

The research also revealed the associated rise of a self-help ethos in Bristol, which in turn harks to the more long-established US discourse in this regard. Its rise is inherent in the sub-city neighbourhood management approach's emphasis on communities becoming more demanding of statutory service providers. It is reflected in local government's move from a grant-giving to service-commissioning model and greater emphasis on social enterprise approaches for the third sector. It is also evident in the case study entities' emphasis on developing their asset base and social enterprise approaches to develop their own income sources to sustain their continued operation after their programme lifetimes.

The rise of a neo-liberal discourse of self-help and community ownership can be linked to a decline in specific resource for such communities combined with their "responsibilisation" (Cochrane, 2007: 52), particularly as they are now expected to link to the benefits of growth. This emphasis also indicates the continuing influence of "broader international, particularly US, discourses of communitarianism, capacity building and empowerment" (Raco, 2003: 245) on English policies. The tokenism of such approaches can be criticised, as the "political narrative of community and individual responsibility is one that deliberately deflects attention from the causes of poverty" (Imrie and Raco, 2003: 30).

The rise of the 'asset-based' and 'self-help' discourses and approaches provides scope to deepen and extend the key findings of the research. In particular, it would be
useful to consider the rise of the 'asset-based' discourse and the implications of this for neighbourhood-based efforts to alleviate deprivation and inequality in England. It would also be of benefit to explore the rise of the 'self-help' discourse, the validity of this notion and the viability of communities' ability to pursue such strategies in England, particularly given its centrist rather than localist form of government.

Overall, the research has emphasised the value of neighbourhoods as a site and scale for governance research. The neighbourhood and multi-neighbourhood scales continue to be used by others (particularly central and local government in England, and city government and private interests including philanthropic foundations in the US, as indicated by Baltimore). Associated governance forms continue to be created, reach the end of their lifetime or adapt into a different form. What is clear is that the neighbourhood and its governance continues to be a contested domain between different actors and as a scale for intervention it is subject to competing imperatives.

The potential of the research agenda is clear as it is an ever-changing and dynamic field of study and one which is likely to continue to be rich for both academic enquiry and of broader relevance, not least because of the continued evolution of policy interventions and governance forms in a more austere climate for public sector and private philanthropic funding. The research has also emphasised the value of comparative research in this field, not least given the unsettling context of continual change in England which has been brought sharply into focus by the US comparison.
Main question: why neighborhood governance?

Preamble
Ask about being taped.
I am looking at neighborhood governance structures - that is, bodies that are based in a neighborhood, and involve residents along with other stakeholders in decisions about the neighborhood. By doing case studies of neighborhood governance initiatives in deprived urban neighborhoods, I want to look at what is happening on the ground. What are these structures being used for? By whom? Why?

I am particularly interested in investigating the strengths of neighborhood governance, especially from the point of view of bodies that support such initiatives, such as non-profit organizations, philanthropic foundations, intermediaries and government. I am also focusing on how initiatives are designed, and why they are designed this way.

About you:
- Can you tell me how you came to be involved with the Goldseker Foundation? How long have you been involved?

About the Goldseker Foundation:
- Can you explain how the Goldseker Foundation works in Baltimore City? I am particularly interested in the Foundation’s community development priority grant area, including the priority neighborhoods and involvement in city-wide community development efforts such as the BNC and Healthy Neighborhoods.
- How are opportunities for Foundation involvement in neighborhood-based work in Baltimore identified?
- Can you explain when and how the Foundation works with other local and national foundations and intermediaries, public sector agencies, non-profits and neighborhood-based organizations in Baltimore?

Speaking generally:
- Why do things at the neighborhood level rather than at higher levels?
- Why do neighborhood governance structures exist?
- What role do neighborhood governance structures play? What is their unique selling point?

About particular initiatives: [the potential Baltimore case studies]:
- How is the Foundation involved in these initiatives?
- How did the Foundation get involved? How was it decided that these were targeted areas and appropriate approaches?
- Can you describe how the initiatives came about, why they were set up? What was hoped they would achieve?
- To who or what would you say that the initiatives are accountable, if anyone or anything?
• Do the initiatives play any part in making services in the neighborhoods responsive to the needs and priorities of residents?
• Would you say that the initiatives can do what they want?
• What can they not do? Why is this? Who or what sets the remit for what the initiatives can do? How is it set? Is the Foundation involved?
• Would you say that the initiatives are left to “get on with it”?

Structure
Talking about how the initiatives are designed and why this is so:
• What has determined how these initiatives are structured? Has the Foundation had any involvement in this?
• Do you think what the initiatives are trying to do is reflected in the way that they are structured?
• How are local partners engaged or represented within the initiative? Is the Foundation represented at the level of the initiative?

Process
Thinking about how things actually work at the initiatives:
• How is it decided what the initiative does? Who is involved in making these decisions? Does the Foundation have any involvement in this?
• Who is actually responsible for what happens? If there’s a problem, how is it resolved? By who? Is the Foundation involved?
• Do you think what the initiatives are trying to do is reflected in the way that they (or their stakeholders) operate day-to-day?

Overall
• Do you think these arrangements are delivering what the initiatives set out to deliver?

Frustrations/ Problems/ Challenges/ Obstacles
• Is there anything that has been particularly frustrating or problematic? Anything you see as a particular obstacle to these initiatives doing what they set out to do? What is the one thing you would change if you could?

Finally
• Could you recommend any contacts?
• Is there anything else you would like to add?
• Do you have any questions about the research/ next steps/ how the material will be used?

Thank you
Madeleine Pill, Resident Scholar
John W Kluge Center, The Library of Congress
mpil@loc.gov
202-215-7159
Until 26th February 2008
Thereafter, pillmc@cardiff.ac.uk
Main question: why neighbourhood-based governance?

Preamble
Ask about being taped.
I am looking at neighbourhood governance structures - that is, bodies that are based in a neighbourhood, and involve residents along with other stakeholders, such as local government and other service providers, in decisions about the neighbourhood. By doing case studies of neighbourhood governance initiatives in deprived urban neighbourhoods, I want to look at what is happening on the ground. What are these structures being used for? By whom? Why? I am also interested in how and why these structures are designed and operate.

Questions

About you:
• Can you tell me how you came to be involved with HWCP?

About the initiative:
• Can you describe how HWCP came about, why it was set up?
• To who or what would you say that HWCP is accountable?
• Does HWCP play any part in making services in the neighborhoods responsive to the needs and priorities of residents?
• To what extent would you say that HWCP can do what it wants/ is left to “get on with it”?

Structure
Talking about how HWCP is structured and why this is so:
• Can you explain how things are organised? What is the structure?
• Who is involved? How are they involved? Is there a hierarchy?
• How has this changed over time (for example, managing the SRB scheme/becoming a Neighbourhood Renewal area/moving to transition funding)?
• Can you explain the division of labor between HWCP as an entity and its partners, such as the Council, PCT, and Hartcliffe and Withywood Ventures?
• Why is HWCP set up like this? What has determined how it is structured?
• Do you think what HWCP is trying to do is reflected in the way that it is structured?

Process
Thinking about how things actually work:
• How are neighbourhood needs and priorities identified? How are these taken into account when planning and implementing HWCP’s work?
• How is it decided what HWCP does/what its remit is? Who is involved in making these decisions?
• Who is actually responsible for what happens? If there’s a problem, how is it resolved? By who?
• How do different stakeholders work together? I am particularly interested in relationships with the Council (with regard to HWCP’s core work but also HWCP’s involvement in development of the neighbourhood partnership).
• Do the constituent neighbourhoods that make up the HWCP area vary in terms of their engagement? If so, why do you think this is the case?
• Do you think what HWCP is trying to do is reflected in the way that it (or its stakeholders) operate day-to-day?

Overall
• Do you think these arrangements – structure and process - are delivering what HWCP set out to deliver?
• Have there been any changes? Why? What difference have they made?
• What are the plans for HWCP’s future?

Levels of Government and Governance
• In your opinion, how is HWCP influenced by the policies and programmes/ funds of the Bristol Partnership and of Bristol City Council?
• In turn, do you think that HWCP has affected Bristol Partnership or City Council policymaking and how things are done? If so, when, how, and at what level?
• Speaking generally, what, in your opinion, are the best ways to support and fund neighbourhood-based governance entities in deprived areas?

Frustrations/ Problems/ Challenges/ Obstacles
• Is there anything that you regard as a particular obstacle to HWCP’s work towards its vision? What is the one thing you would change if you could?

Finally
• Could you recommend any particular contacts involved in HWCP’s work?
• Are there any papers that you think may be useful (for example, the local action plan)?
• Is there anything else you would like to add?
• Do you have any questions about the research/ how the material will be used?

Thank you

Madeleine Pill
PhD Researcher
Centre for Local and Regional Government Research
Cardiff University School of City and Regional Planning
pillmc@cardiff.ac.uk
07791-662140.


Bovaird, T. and Loffler, E. (2002). 'Moving from excellence models of local service
delivery to benchmarking 'good local governance'”. International Review of

Bristol City Council (2007). Deprivation in Bristol. Bristol: Bristol City Council.

Bristol City Council (2008a). Corporate Plan 2008-2011. Bristol: Bristol City
Council.

Bristol City Council (2008b). Bristol Development Framework – Core Strategy
Preferred Options. Bristol: Bristol City Council.

Partnership.

The Bristol Partnership (2008b). Bristol’s Sustainable Community Strategy 2008-28:

Neighborhood Transformation Initiative: Lessons Learned about Community


In: Madanipour, A.; Cars, G. and Allen, J. (eds). Social Exclusion in European


Governance: Capacity for Social Integration. European Commission DG

Institutional Capacity and Social Milieux. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Charles Village Community Benefits District (CVCBD) Management Authority

Chaskin, R.J. (2001). ‘Building Community Capacity: A Definitional Framework and
Case Studies from a Comprehensive Community Initiative’. Urban Affairs
Review. 36(3): 291-323.


