GOVERNING A REGIONAL CAPITAL IN RUSSIA.
THE PURSUIT OF COMPETITIVENESS AND
IDENTITY: A CASE STUDY OF KAZAN

Nadir V. Kinossian

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

School of City and Regional Planning
Cardiff University
June 2010
DECLARATION

This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.

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SUMMARY

The thesis is focused on the transformation of Kazan – the capital city of the Republic of Tatarstan in the Russian Federation. The research uses two case studies, namely the Resurrection of the Kul-Sharif Mosque in Kazan Kremlin (1995-2005) and the Special Federal Programme for the Preservation and Development of the Kazan Historic Centre (2000-2005) to analyse the emerging nature and character of urban governance in Kazan. The research is based on the analysis of policy documents, statistical data and interviews with policy-makers in the city of Kazan in Russia.

The analysis of urban transformation helps to understand the underlying political, economic and social processes that Russia has experienced since the late 1980s. The research has critically evaluated the theories of globalisation, post-socialist transition and governance and demonstrated that many of these theories are western-centric and have been developed and evolved with little engagement with Russian urban experience.

The research also reveals the limitations of western urban theory in explaining the urban transformation of Kazan where the elites pay homage to globalisation and neoliberalism in principle, but in practice use old-fashioned methods of administrative coercion and political bargaining to attract development funding from the state-controlled industries and the federal government. The research has revealed the importance of pre-existing institutions, practices and cultures that form “hybrid” institutional arrangements that diverge from the entrepreneurial governance model.
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<td>Autonomous Oblast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSR</td>
<td>Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPSU</td>
<td>The Communist Party of the Soviet Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSU</td>
<td>Former Soviet Union</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
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<td>GULAG</td>
<td>Central administration of camps</td>
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<td>JSC</td>
<td>Joint stock company</td>
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<tr>
<td>KSND</td>
<td>Kazan Soviet of People’s Deputies</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEC</td>
<td>Training and enterprise council</td>
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<tr>
<td>RF</td>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
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<td>RT</td>
<td>Republic of Tatarstan</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEC</td>
<td>Training and enterprise council</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDC</td>
<td>Urban development corporation</td>
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<td>UDP</td>
<td>Urban development project</td>
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1.1 The significance of the topic

This study is inspired by observations of the transformation of the city of Kazan, the capital of the Republic of Tatarstan in Russia. This transformation has been connected to the implementation of large government-led urban redevelopment projects, including the construction of one of the largest in Europe Kul-Sharif Mosque (1995-2005) and the Special Federal Programme for the Preservation and Development of Kazan Historic Centre (2000-2005). Large urban development projects are interesting not only because they transform the image of the city and its habitual environment, but also because they represent changing patterns of political and economic power and display societal processes and identities (Swyngedouw and Moulaert 2003c; Lefebvre 2003/1977). The analysis of urban development projects in Kazan will contribute to our understanding of the post-socialist city, post-socialist transition, urban governance and its political, economic and social context.

The post-socialist transition has been a subject of academic debates since the early 1990s. The initial idealism of such concepts as the “end of history” (Fukuyama 1989) and the “third wave of democratisation” (Huntington 1991) has been gradually replaced by more sceptical views of the ability of many post-socialist countries to make a complete transition to democracy and a market economy as the actual path of transition has been complicated by various political, institutional and social “legacies” (Lowenhardt 1995; McFaul 2001). The two decades of a patchy and protracted democratic consolidation have led to questions about the usefulness and explanatory power of the post-socialist paradigm itself (Carothers 2002; Young 2007).

The historical disjuncture between the West and non-West theoretical debates hinders the development of theoretical alternatives to the dominant post-socialist transition theory. This disjuncture stems from the reinforced during the Cold War division between the East and West which still shapes the western perception of the post-
socialist region and inhibits the effective implementation of cross-cultural and trans-national perspective and channels of exchange (Flynn and Oldfield 2006, p. 5). The historical conceptual division between the developed and less developed countries also fails to incorporate the peculiarities of Russia's situation and makes it difficult to "pigeonhole Russia" (Oldfield 2001, p. 102). As a result the development of post-communist Russia is very rarely mentioned in the mainstream globalisation literature (McCann 2004a, p. 1). The studies of Russian cities represent a very modest section of western literature as compared to voluminous studies of cities in China and Central and Eastern Europe. The need for international collaboration and expanding the geographical horizons of western debates has been realised in the West as well. For instance, there have been recent calls to develop more comparative research aimed at testing western concepts of state rescaling in diverse global regions (see, Brenner 2009, pp. 133-34).

Another problem of the dominant transition theory is that it focuses primarily at the macro level and tends to overlook geographical contingencies and regional variations within the country. In a country like Russia such an approach proves to be inadequate because globalisation is in practice tempered by more local processes which makes the impact of globalisation fragmented and often contradictory (Sakwa 2004, p. 211).

This research attempts to address these problems by analysing urban transformation and urban governance in post-socialist Russia. The significance of cities for the post-socialist transition has long been acknowledged (Andrusz et al 1996). According to Wu (2003) transitional cities are becoming such an important subject of inquiry because they are located at the frontier of globalisation and becoming the gateway linking the global economy and transitional economies (p. 1337). Nevertheless, research on urban governance in Eastern Europe still remains under-theorised (Feldman 2000, p. 829). To date, there has been little systematic work done to apply Western concepts and debates to Russian cities (exceptions include Golubchikov 2010; Badyina and Golubchikov 2005). It remains unclear how urban transformation in post-socialist countries relates to wider theoretical debates of globalisation, competitiveness, neo-liberalism and governance.
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The analysis of large urban development projects will also contribute to our understanding of the connections between the social and the spatial by looking at how political, social and economic transition unfolds in the context of a regional capital in Russia. The spatial aspect of urban governance has gained prominence in the light of the recent critical geographical debates on the spatial dimension of state power, geography of power and rescaling of state (see, Allen 2003; Brenner 1998; 2003; 2004; Jessop 2008). The organisational, spatial and cultural aspect of urban governance embodied in large urban development projects have been rarely discussed in the Russian context which makes it an interesting area of analysis.

1.2 Post-socialist urban governance in Russia

In a centrally planned system the lines of command pierced through administrative tiers from the centre down to the socialist enterprise level. According to Lappo (1992) socialist cities were first of all sites of industrial production, hence urban development served the aim of increasing industrial output (p. 530). There was no clear division between the roles of local authorities and industrial ministries in executing urban development tasks. It was a common practice when local and regional authorities negotiated with powerful all-Union ministries the location choices for new industrial developments trying to secure the inflow of central government investment in their regions. The major benefits of having a new industrial development were not only new jobs, the enhanced tax base and improved infrastructure but also new housing, hospitals, schools and other urban services required to create good living conditions for workers (Osborn 1970). Governance as a system of flexible multi-level institutional arrangements and managerial practices was not alien to the Soviet system and, in fact, was essential for urban development (see, Hough 1969; Taubman 1973).

Since the beginning of the economic and political reforms in the early 1990s Russian cities have undergone a dramatic transformation in their economic base, urban development, planning and governance. In 1990 the system of local government in Russia was “reinvented” with the first democratic (i.e. multi-party) local, regional and
Chapter 1 Introduction

republican elections (Campbell 1996, p. 142). In 1992 the centralised planning system collapsed and the city authorities “picked up” some powers that used to belong to the Communist party, the central government and industrial ministers. Subsequently, the control of economic production and exchange has started shifting to the regional and local levels (Stoner-Weiss 1997, p. 88; Shleifer and Treisman 2000, p. 30).

However, assuming control over economic issues came at a price. According to Shvetsov (2002) cities were immediately affected by the restructuring that worsened the pre-existing problems and caused avalanche-like growth of new urban problems (p. 7). In this situation city authorities in Russia lacked sufficient institutional capacity to govern (Friedgut 1994), suffered from poor inter-government coordination (Young 1994) and experienced growing pressure on municipal budgets from fulfilling central mandates not always supported by budget funding (Mitchneck 1997). Russian cities faced unprecedented situation when the number of urgent tasks was rapidly growing while the amount of available financial and material recourses not simply remained the same, but much more often contracted (Shvetsov 2002, p. 10). The problems of early years of transition persisted into the present. With municipal budgets being under the strain, city authorities in Russia lack own resources to cover the unfunded mandates of the central government and run urban services and therefore remain highly dependent on “handouts” from regional and federal level budgets (Evans 2000, p. 125; Slider 2004, p. 155; Young 2004, p. 137).

Russian cities remain restrained in terms of both economic and political resources available for providing adequate support of local services and the implementation of development plans. While local governments are dealing with the increasing number of more complex issues, they undergo the process of reform and modernisation. The processes of privatisation and commercialisation of land, infrastructure and social services have moved the issues of social justice and equality to the fore of political agenda. This leads to a series of questions about the policy choices available to the post-socialist city under the conditions of economic restructuring, growing competition and budgetary instability. The Western theories suggest that economic restructuring leads to the transformation of the traditional government and proliferation of governance,
competitiveness, urban entrepreneurialism and public-private partnerships, where both sectors work together in order to achieve socially significant results (see, Harvey 1989; Stone 1989). Under the conditions of growing economic complexity and uncertainty governments borrow approaches that have been developed in the business sector and are aimed at enhancing efficiency and effectiveness public sector administration.

The research addresses the question whether the post-socialist city is likely to adopt entrepreneurial and marketing strategies aimed at the enhancing its competitiveness on open markets, or alternatively, is the post-socialist city more likely to use traditional and well-proven during the socialist period strategies to secure development funding based on such methods as political bargaining and administrative coercion. This research attempts to approach these questions by looking at the design and implementation of large urban development projects.

Recent studies on Moscow show that the city government has been successfully using its administrative power and the availability of private capital to commercialise urban space and mobilise financial resources needed for the implementation of large urban development projects (Pagonis and Thornley 2000; Valletta 2005). Although there is evidence of the convergence of urban planning and governance in Russian cities with western examples (see, Shove and Anderson 1997; Trutnev et al 2004), other studies suggest that traditional institutional arrangements, cultures and practices still play a decisive role in shaping the contemporary Russian urban governance (see, Campbell 2006; Hahn 2004). Taking into account significant economic disparities between Russia’s regions it is plausible to expect that only few Russian cities would be able to adopt a neo-liberal urban governance model similar to one set up by Moscow government. Less prosperous cities may rely on the traditional methods of mobilising resources for urban development, as detailed in Evans (2000, p. 115) and Mitchneck (1994, p. 93). That makes the analysis of the socialist ‘legacies’ important for the understanding of contemporary Russian urban transition.

All these issues provoke numerous questions about the nature of urban governance in Russia’s cities and the role of large urban development projects in working out the new governance model. Urban transformation in post-socialist Russia raises
questions about the mechanisms that lie behind these urban development projects and to what extent they can be explained with reference to Western concepts of urban governance and development. An analysis of the interaction between the actors and governing mechanisms involved in the urban transformation can help to understand wider social dynamics in post-socialist countries.

1.3 Urban redevelopment projects in the post-socialist city

The socialist system implied standardisation of building technology across the country and led to “urban uniformity” (Fisher 1967, pp. 1080-1082). The post-socialist transition has brought about the great diversity of new types of urban development projects as well as the actors involved in their planning and implementation. The post-socialist city has witnessed the proliferation of commercial urban development projects. Strong efforts have also been made to replace the grim imagery of the socialist industrial past with more “marketable” images capable of attracting external investment (Young and Kaczmarek 1999). The post-socialist transition has affected buildings and urban spaces as bearers of “collective memory” and “symbolic ownership” (Colomb 2007). Some legacies associated with former repressive regimes have become unacceptable and had to be “erased” (Leach 2002), other legacies have become highly desirable and hence had to be recreated (Graney 2007).

In the countries of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) capital cities have undergone transformation aimed at representing newly revived statehood and national identity. For example, in Turkmenistan architecture and monumental art have been used to consolidate the rule of the President by creating myths about the decisive role he played in the history of the country (Sir 2008, p. 215). In a similar way Anacker (2004, pp. 530-531) shows that the new capital city of Kazakhstan, Astana is being constructed with the purpose of representing both the external and the internal legitimacy of the current political regime. Adams (2008, p. 287) describes the centuries-old Russian tradition of the ruling elites using monumentality in urban design to shape the society, strengthen the nation’s unity and legitimise the political rule. The existing literature on urban development typically
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presents urban development as a ‘snapshot’ of political, economic, social and cultural transformations in the society that reflects societal changes in the most visible and lasting form but does not systematically connect these aspects.

The resurrection of old and the construction of new places of worship have become one of the symbols of post-socialist urban transformation. Some projects, such as the resurrection of the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow in 2000, have been given a national significance (Sidorov 2000). Andrusz (2006) describes the same project as linking tourism and religion - “a place to which visitors come either to search for their spiritual selves or to consume religion as spectacle” (p. 87). Hoffman (2007) gives an account of the same project from a completely different perspective. He argues that the multi-million dollar project of the Cathedral resurrection actively supported by the Mayor of Moscow Luzhkov, has become the testing site for the new political and economic mechanisms that eventually formed a new urban governance model for Moscow. According to Hoffman, in order to establish a good relationship with the Moscow government, businesses donated money to the construction of the Cathedral, which was patronised personally by the Mayor of Moscow. The Mayor Luzhkov has rebuilt not merely the destroyed by Stalin temple and created not only a shiny symbol of Russia’s post-socialist renaissance. The temple has become the materialisation of the new model of capitalism, which Luzhkov was introducing in Russia in the 1990s, the model that combined money and power... with a single central figure, Luzhkov himself, at the steering wheel (Hoffman 2007, p. 272).

More recently urban development projects have taken a new direction, suggesting that new influences and priorities such as nationalism and nostalgia for the Soviet past are being brought to bear on urban development in Russia. Since 2000, the new era of Putin’s rule has been associated with the growing use of patriotic rhetoric in political discourses, identity debates and subsequently in architecture and urban design. Largely, these discourses have been based on the glorification of the Soviet past and the achievements of the socialist system. Baker and Glasser (2005), for example, observe that
Moscow developers of the 1990s had built great towers of glass, hoisted dizzying neon signs along once-grey avenues, and invested millions of dollars in shimmering new buildings whose main architectural style was best described as late Las Vegas. Anything Soviet was out, and anything that smacked of Western-style modernism, no matter how tacky, was in. But in Putin’s Moscow, political slogan of stability and restoration of Soviet-era symbols were mirrored in the changing landscape. Architects called the design concept of the moment neo-Stalinism, in homage to the style decreed by Stalin (Baker and Glasser 2005, pp. 148-149).

At the regional level, after the Soviet Union collapsed and the subsequent reconfiguration of Russia’s federal system gave more powers to its provinces, regional authorities especially those in ethnic provinces made efforts to revive regional cultures with the aim to achieve greater political and economic autonomy from Moscow. Large urban development projects became an important element of newly constructed regional identities. The expectation of political and symbolic significance of new urban development has had an impact on the type and visual characteristics of the projects as explained by Demchuk (2002):

The ruling regional elites invested a substantial part of their energy and efforts into a struggle for political ‘dissociation’ from Moscow, rather than into economic policies. This led to a paradoxical situation: real economic needs of regions were taken into account less than positive image of the region and its international relations. Instead of refurbishing schools, kindergartens and hospitals, local budgets allocated enormous funds for restoration of historical monuments and famous architectural sites, or facades of the houses on the main streets of regional capitals. In cities of the Volga region, for instance, local leaders were concerned about the view of the cities from the river, presuming that travellers would make their judgements about the well-being of the region and about the independence of the regional authorities y appearance of the buildings. Due to lack of finance, regional elites used all their opportunities to accumulate symbolic and administrative resources hoping to ‘convert’ them into material ones one day (p. 112).

These examples demonstrate that the boundaries between the commercial, symbolic and political motivations for urban projects are rather blurred. A religious project plays a central role in constructing power and capital accumulation schemes; a commercial project has little economic rationality and has a mainly symbolic role. Both economic and political “rationality” seems to be losing their traditional meanings in the
process of forming a new cultural landscape and a political economy of urban space. In that sense traditional interpretations of urban projects and urban images as 'products' of political and economic processes lack certain dynamism, as they tend not to pay sufficient attention to such important aspects of urban development as the contingencies of the process, the role of the actors involved and the necessary relationships between the actors.

The mainstream literature on post-socialist transition assumes that under conditions of globalisation there must some uniformity in the ways cities are planned and governed. At the same time, many studies show that the real situation is much more complex and involves political and cultural contingencies. In that sense traditional interpretations of urban transition as a 'response' to challenges fails to pay sufficient attention to the local contingencies of the process, the role of the actors involved and the necessary relationships between the actors. The discussion leaves many unanswered questions about political processes, governance practices and institutional conditions which lie behind the implementation of large urban development projects in the post-socialist city.

1.4 Problems in the existing literature on post-socialist urban transition

The post-socialist transition and its impact on cities and the way cities are planned and governed has been well documented in the literature (Andrusz et al 1996; Hamilton et al 2005; Tsenkova and Nedovic-Budic 2006). Nevertheless the existing literature on urban transition has some theoretical limitations and weaknesses which present a challenge of conducting research on urban governance in post-socialist cities. In addition to the disjuncture between the West and non-West debates and limitations of theoretical transfer, there are other theoretical problems.

First, the dominant concept of post-socialist transition implies a passage from one set of political and economic rules to another and a subsequent 'pre-written' reshaping of the regulatory environment and government institutions inherited from socialism into some 'normal' market configuration. This approach has been criticised as "naïve" and
unable to take into account the "power of the past" (Hamilton et al. 2005, p. 11). The concept of 'legacy' seems to overshadow more fundamental question about alternatives to neo-liberalism, its local variations and the role of pre-existing factors that may substantially alter its development. In policy terms the uncritical use of theories and discourses creates a danger of mechanical translation of certain governing practices across national borders assuming that what worked in the West would work in the East. In practice the actual 'transition' is never as neat and straightforward as the theory might imply (Herrschel 2007). Too much seems to be taken for granted in adopting neo-liberalist restructuring as the only way of solving economic problems.

Second, despite the fact that post-socialist transition has led to the dramatic political and economic restructuring and the proliferation of western concepts of urban competitiveness, entrepreneurialism and urban governance in political discourses, urban management practice and urban planning, theoretical reflection on these processes may still lag behind. The urban transformation of the post-socialist city has been partly explained by various concepts including economic restructuring, local government reform (Campbell 2006), place promotion (Ren 2008), place identity (Leach 2002), landscape (Colomb 2007) but little efforts have been made to attempt to theorise the change outside the dominant concept of post-socialist transition. Little is known how political, economic and cultural values and discourses interact at the urban development level. Disciplinary barriers seem to complicate the understanding of complex and dynamic transformation of urban space in Russian cities and indicate the need to ground research in a wider theoretical context and use the existing theories more critically.

Third, despite the significance of cities for defining the actual configuration of post-socialism in socio-spatial and economic terms, few attempts have been made to analyse the mechanism and driving forces of transition at the city level. According to Musil (1993) a reliable theory to explain post-socialist urban transition was non-existent (p. 899). Since then there has been a significant growth in research on post-socialist cities, but still, according to Feldman (2000):
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research on urban development and governance in Eastern Europe is chiefly empirical. Post-socialist transformations are not conceptualised in the light of the theoretical frameworks commonly employed to explain regeneration and governance (in ‘the West’) and, conversely, these frameworks do not incorporate evidence from Eastern Europe (p. 829).

While attempts to theorise urban transition remain rare, researchers focus on more localised tasks. According to Axenov et al (2006) if searching for a “comprehensive explanation” is an impossible task, “individual phenomena that characterise the transformation” should be studied (p. 19). In Russia, scholars demonstrate low interest in studying urban politics and dedicate more efforts to municipal law and management studies (Gel’man 2002, pp. 19-20). While most of the literature remains descriptive and focuses on spatial and institutional transformations in post-socialist cities, the studies on the emerging model of urban governance and the implications of neoliberal transition in the post-socialist context remain rare (see Badyina and Golubchikov 2005).

Fourth, the existing urban literature seems to describe urban transformation within a dualistic model of the “driving force” and the “reaction” (see, Tsenkova and Nedovic-Budic 2006). This approach conceptually separates the urban space and the social process by portraying the former as a ‘receiver’ of influences generated elsewhere. That approach locks the debate within the disciplinary boundaries of economics and political science on one side, and urban studies on other. As a result, the narratives of institutional, spatial, political development appear somewhat separated. This separation limits the opportunities to conceptually link economic aspects with physical, social and mental aspects of space as proposed by Lefebvre (2003/1977, p. 88).

Finally, the collapse of the communist system and the following transformation of political and governing mechanisms gave rise to several interesting studies of the emerging patterns of urban governance in Russian cities (see Ruble 1995), but overall,

1 Axenov et al (2006) continues, “at the moment, it is impossible to provide a comprehensive explanation of the interconnections and relationships between the various social processes that are currently taking place throughout Central and Eastern Europe. It is however, realistic and possible to undertake an assessment of individual phenomena that characterise the transformation phase and the current state of urban development in the post-socialist countries” (Axenov et al 2006, p. 19).
the area receives modest research attention. The analysis of post-socialist urban governance occupies a marginal section in urban literature. While there is growing literature on urban transformation of capital cities in Central and Eastern Europe (Stanilov 2007), in the case of Russia the debate focuses mainly on the country's two largest and most globalised cities: Moscow and St. Petersburg (Evans 2000, p. 115). With few exceptions (Stenning 1999; Alexandrova et al 2004; Graney 2007; 2009) Russia's regional capitals have received practically little research attention.

1.5 Developing a framework for analysis

The discussion demonstrates that post-socialist urban transformation is a complex phenomenon that needs further analysis. To overcome the limitations of the existing theory that considers post-socialism as 'eastern wing' of the global process of neo-liberal restructuring, the research will critically review the modern western theoretical debates. The contemporary debates on neo-liberalism, the socio-spatial organisation of state, transformation of state power examine a contested, heterogeneous and restless process which gives a rise to new governing models and constellations of power (Swyngedouw 2000). Cities and regions occupy central position those processes as the sites where new relationships of power are formed (Brenner 2004).

Large urban development projects play a central role in shaping new social practices and work as testing sites of new governing models (Swyngedouw et al. 2002; Brenner 2004). Cities and their spatial form are inter-related with the economic, social, cultural, and political structures of the society within which they exist (Marcuse and van Kempen 2000, p. 5). Urban space is seen in a dialectical connection with social, economic and political processes, and within the context of urban governance, economic and political restructuring and state realignment (see Amin and Thrift 2006; Soja 2000). The role of large urban development projects in constructing new economic, political and social relations in the city receives growing research attention in various geographical contexts. The role of the visual in the planning and implementation of large urban development projects becomes increasingly significant as the image of new development
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reflect the patterns of domination and power in society (Broudehoux 2004; Lovering 2007). The visual component of urban projects reflects a combination of societal forces including political, economic and cultural influences. Cities and urban spaces are thought to be fundamentally important for reproduction and restructuring of the relationship of economic, political and social power. Therefore, specific urban projects have to be understood and interpreted as a result and a testing site of the particular historical form of urban governance that is built into the system of social, economic and political relations in the society.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the complex nature of urban transformation using large urban development projects as case studies. This approach will help to understand the mechanisms of urban development and the role of a wider set factors influencing development including the post-socialist economic restructuring, the emerging patterns of governance, the construction of new political and ethnic identities, the new 'geometry' of centre-periphery relationship in Russia and the prime role of the visual component in shaping development strategies. This shows the need for deeper and more dialectical interpretation of the relationship between them.

1.6 Research questions

This research aims to overcome the limitation of the existing literature and contribute to our understanding of urban transformation in the post-socialist city. The complexity of urban transformation in Russia and related processes of political and economic restructuring requires a critical use of the existing theories. The research attempts to avoid the interpretation of urban change within narrow disciplinary boundaries of transition theory by looking at a wider spectrum of western debates that so far have not been widely used to analyse Russian urban transition.

The central question of this research is to what extent Western theories of globalisation, neo-liberalism and competitiveness can explain urban transformation of the post-socialist city, or the transformation is more local in its nature and is shaped mainly by the local actors, legacies and pre-existing institutions. This is an interesting question as
it can help not only to shed light on urban governance in Kazan, but critically evaluate western debates by expanding the geographical horizons to the region that has not been sufficiently studied yet. The broadening of geographical horizons will help to test the applicability of western debates in a new research context and evaluate the scope of generalisation the debates can provide.

The current study has started as an enquiry into large urban development projects that were implemented in Kazan and made a strong impact on the image for the city. Urban development projects do not exist independently from the political and socio-economic realities, moreover, they are seen as laboratories whereby new forms of urban governance are worked out and new social relationships are constructed. The urban project is used as a lens to understand the process and structure of urban governance in its concrete historical form.

The aim of the current study is to analyse large urban development projects in the context of Russia's regional capital and more specifically the current study seeks to answer the following questions:

1) What are the underlying mechanisms of urban re-development projects in post-socialist cities, specifically regional capitals such as Kazan?

2) To what extent are these projects aimed at creating new urban images to re-invent the city for external audience?

3) Who is responsible for delivering these projects and what forms of urban governance are being formed?

4) What is the relative importance in these projects of enhanced urban and regional competitiveness (for economic success and external investment and development) and more internally orientated political motivation?

1.7 The case studies

Both case studies are based in Kazan - the capital city of Tatarstan Republic located in the European part of Russia. Similar to other post-socialist capital cities, over the last two
decades the city of Kazan has undergone a remarkable urban transformation including the resurrection of the Kul-Sharif Mosque in Kazan Kremlin (1995-2005) and the implementation of the Federal Programme for the Preservation and Development of the Kazan Historic Centre (2001-2005). These two case studies have been selected because different levels government including federal, regional and local, as well as the non-government sector have been involved in their design and implementation. The selected projects have also made a profound impact on the city landscape and the image which distinguishes them from other urban development projects implemented in Kazan during the same period.

The city of Kazan is a good case study because its urban development strategies have been played out within a complex institutional environment formed by processes of state restructuring, neo-liberalisation and establishing new patterns of power. In Kazan the interests of the federal, regional and local ruling elites collide; the old scores between the colonised and the colonisers were settled; here was staged the project of Tatarstani sovereignty; and implemented one of the most radical urban renewal and image remaking programmes in Russia’s regional capitals. All these make Kazan an interesting case study where question of urban development and governance can be explored.

1.8 The structure of this thesis

The rest of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 will discuss the theoretical sources of research with the purpose of identifying the gap in knowledge and constructing a framework for analysis. Chapter 3 will discuss the research design and methodology. Chapter 4 will discuss the political, economic and social context of the research at three structural levels: national, regional and city and will specific governance and development challenges in the city of Kazan. The empirical work is done in Chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 7 discusses the findings and the final Chapter 8 summarises the research.
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW

To analyse urban transformation in the post-socialist city it is necessary to bring together several strands of research. The mainstream debates on post-socialist cities cover the areas of social, political, economic, institutional and spatial change but at the same time seem not to be well connected with the contemporary western literature on urban governance, neo-liberal urbanisation and competitiveness. To date, little systematic work has been done to apply these concepts to cities in Russia. Therefore, broadening the western debates into new regions and exploring links with the literature on post-socialist transition represents an interesting research task. The literature review chapter has the following aims: 1) to discuss relevant literature sources, 2) to identify the gap in knowledge, and 3) to produce a framework for analysis. The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.1 reviews the literature on post-socialist transition and its implications for cities. Section 2.2 reviews the literature on neo-liberal shift and its implications for cities. Sections 2.3 compares the debates and discusses the relevance of western literature for post-socialist cases. Urban governance is discussed in Section 2.4, and finally, the theoretical framework for the study is outlined in Section 2.5.

2.1 Post-socialist transition and cities

Many studies (see Campbell 1995; 1996; 2006; Evans 2000; Evans and Gel'man 2004; French 1995; Gel'man 2002b; 2004b; Ruble 1995) have shown that pre-existing institutional arrangements, practices and cultural norms still influence politics and urban governance in post-socialist Russia. Therefore, an overview of the socialist urban planning system is important for understanding the contemporary stage of urban transition in Russia. Are ‘legacies’ elements of the previous institutional order that play residual role before they disappear completely once the post-socialist transition is finished, or are they essential elements of the system of urban governance?
2.1.1 The socialist planning system and cities

The government system of the USSR comprised the Communist party, government authorities (ministries and agencies) and soviets inserted into four administrative tiers including i) the all-union level, ii) union-republic, iii) province and iv) local levels. The lines of command operated across the administrative tiers from all-union ministries and planning authorities down to local production units (Nove 1986, p. 9). The central planning committee (Gosplan) ordered various plans from a sophisticated system of national economic planning, to the plans and programmes of industrial complexes large and small (Alden et al. 1998, p. 362).

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) according to the Soviet Constitution (1977) was the “guiding force of the society” (Konstitutsia 1977/1990) and in fact was the core of the political system of the Soviet Union. Party organs formed a separate hierarchy of power that acted at all administrative levels, functional and geographic (Reiner and Wilson 1979, p. 58). Although the Party did not have formal powers its political control was pervasive because

the Party and government personnel interlocked at all levels – from the top, where the prime minister and other top state officials were members of the Party Politburo or Central Committee, down to the cities, where the Mayor usually sit in the Party committee’s bureau (Taubman 1973, p. 14).

Whilst the Party played the leading role in decision making the soviets were fulfilling “the myth of participatory democracy by serving as an intermediary between constituent, politicians, and bureaucrats” (Frolic 1970, p. 688). Amalrik (1970) explained the weakness of soviets as elected government bodies by Russian historical traditions and the fact that “the idea of self government, of equality before the law and of personal freedom – and the responsibility that goes with these – are almost completely incomprehensible to the Russian people” (p. 31).

Although the socialist centralised planning system is often perceived as that based on clearly defined areas of responsibility, detailed plans and rational administrative logic, numerous studies pointed out to the opposite: the actual implementation of plans depended on institutional contingencies and bargaining between actors which often
involved personal connections and informal relations (Frolic 1971; Artobolevsky 1997). The centralised planning system had to deal with institutional deficiencies and lack of enforcement capabilities (Bater 1977), suffered from uncertainties about the availability of funding, lack of clarity in administrative responsibilities (Nove 1986, p. 50) and the lack of decision making power at the local level (Osborn 1970, p. 224). According to Vorozheikina (1994) the inefficiencies of the centrally planned economy required “necessary lubrication” in the form of patrol-client relationship, personal ties and corruption in order to allow the system function (p. 109).

Hough (1969) argues that those deviations from the principles of classical bureaucracy were not small ‘fixes’ that help the system to run. To the contrary, the “rampant particularism and irrationality” were, in fact, essential for the performance of the administrative-planning system as they allowed for flexibility and discretion needed for the system to function in a non-routine situation and under conditions of insufficient information (pp. 3-7). According to Hough (1969) if in the administrative-planning system all duties were taken literally and rules were obeyed rigidly the production units would not be able to operate effectively (p. 213). The Communist Party organs were institutions that exercised discretion “by compelling administrators to break the law or to violate some directive or plan indicator” that could slow the performance down. Other managerial responsibilities of the Party regional and local organs, according to Hough, included identifying priorities, coordinating the performance of the production units while acting across organisational boundaries, resolving interdepartmental conflicts, using administrative power to allocate resources and discretionary powers in cases of ambiguity in order to ensure the fulfilment of a common goal (pp. 253-255). Other responsibilities included the mobilisation of popular support for government initiatives such as increased industrial production (p. 126), the selection and appointment of personnel (p. 149) and of no small importance, the support of political values, the cultivation of the sense of loyalty and dedication (p. 297). Hough’s study demonstrates that the Soviet system was not as rigid and monolithic as it is often thought to have been but actually needed a lot of discretion exercised by the Party authorities, which stood
above the government and industrial management and could intervene at any level when it was needed.

Several other studies reveal the complex political nature of decision-making in the socialist system. For example, in his study of bureaucratic politics in urban development in the USSR Taubman (1973) argues that Soviet government was permeated with politics because “the Soviet political system is a huge bureaucratic arena in which bureaus compete, bargain and negotiate to such a degree that although all are officially subordinate to one central leadership that are virtually no sphere of administration immune from bureaucratic politics” (pp. 5-6). Artobolevsky (1997) argues that regional policies in the USSR were not the pure result of centralised planning as regions and cities were competing for resources of the centre and the actual decision upon the location of development projects depended on subjective factors such as personal connections, effective lobbying and the status of a territory in the USSR political hierarchy.

The proliferation of administrative bargaining between USSR republics and the centre suggests that the level of centralisation in the USSR government was not as high as it is often portrayed. Valentey (2008) argues that in the Soviet system the actual decision-making powers belonged to local groups that were formed of representatives from the Party, state bureaucracy and industrial management (p. 102). Local groups actively participated in formulating the economic development policy:

Development of republics and regions of USSR depended on the resources which ministries (whose industrial enterprises were located in the republic and regions) were able to receive from the state in a struggle with other ministries. The result of this bargaining was predictable. Gradually republics and regions formed their own integrated state-economic and party-bureaucratic structures, which had a monopoly on accurate information as well as economic and political power, which made them responsible for real decision making at the subnational level (Valentey and Glichich-Zolotoreva 2008, p. 52).

1 In Azerbaijan in the 1990s, for example, a number of industrial enterprises were created because of the strong position of the leader of the republic's Communist party, Aliev, in Moscow (Artobolevsky 1997, p. 136).
While regional governments and industrial management played an important role in organising regional and local industrial production and economic development, the city level authorities had less leverage to manage economic activities or even to plan urban development. While the official view claimed that “only in socialist countries urban development is done according to a plan, regulated effectively and managed according to the interests of the whole society” (Vol'skiy et al 1987, p. 5), in contrast to the official rhetoric, the socialist city was described as completely dominated by the tasks of industrial production (Lappo 1992, p. 530). The balance of power between the central planning authorities and industrial ministries on the one hand and the local authorities on the other, was not in favour of the latter. Large industries and the ministries “determined not only the amount and type of housing, but also the level of services and the fate of urban planning and zoning, the level of cultural life” (Osborn 1970, p. 222). As Andrusz (1984) explained, “many enterprises and organisations of union and republican subordination did not present the city planning committees with their draft development plans and other data which would be crucial for devising a co-ordinated city-wide plan” (p. 155). When development plans were prepared, the task was often performed in design institutes located in large cities and “no attempts were made to gather local support for them because it was neither appropriate nor necessary. Planning was done for the city rather than with the city” (Shove and Anderson 1997, p. 214).

The actual development outcome in Soviet cities was a result of a complicated bargaining process between territorial authorities and industrial ministries. For example, Taubman (1973) pointed out that development of a socialist city was a result of a conflictual political process of urban governance in which power groups represented by the party apparatchiks, soviet bureaucrats and socialist enterprise directors tried to gain control over scarce resources in order to achieve their goals. Using Leningrad as a case study, Ruble (1990) shows how the interaction between the local, regional and central authorities with regional level leader playing a role of political brokers between the centre and the periphery shaped the city. These studies show that a competitive and pluralist urban governance model is not a new phenomenon for Russia’s cities and that urban development has been a contested process run by various powerful groups.
These legacies of the Soviet state as the source of investment, the organiser of economic development, the owner of means of production and controller of property rights is particularly important for understanding political and economic regimes in the contemporary Russian city. This topic will be explored further in the empirical part of the research. The significance of pre-existing institutional arrangements at the regional level for understanding modern urban governance will be discussed in more detail in the Research Context chapter using the Tatarstan and the city of Kazan as examples.

2.1.2 Post-socialist transition debates

This section will discuss the theoretical aspects of the post-Socialist transition including political, economic, social, spatial and cultural. The timeframe of the Russian reforms and other aspects of the policy process will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.

Political aspects

The early literature on post-Socialist transition saw the events in Eastern Europe and Russia in the late 1980s and early 1990s as a part of the chain of events marking the “end of history” era predicted by Fukuyama (1989). The events were seen as a part of the “Third wave” of democratisation that started in countries of Southern Europe and spread across countries of Latin America in the late twentieth century (Huntington 1991). For example, Schmitter and Karl (1994) claimed that events in “in Eastern Europe or the former Soviet Union should be considered... analogous to events or processes happening elsewhere” (p. 178). It was assumed that in a universal historical process of “democratisation, liberalisation and privatisation” the collapse of authoritarian regimes was seen as natural and inevitable (Kamiński 1996, p. 3). Other scholars took more critical approach and argued that while a comparative analysis the democratisation process in the USSR and political change previously manifested in other parts of the world could be useful, the was little certainty about the outcomes of the process of post-socialist transition (Bova 1991, p. 137).
Chapter 2 Literature review

The doctrine of democratic transition has informed a number of comparative studies focused on the analysis of similarities and differences between Russia and the rest of the western world with the aim to identify the "abnormalities" that impede transition to democracy and market. According to Lowenhardt (1995) those abnormalities include various mental and institutional "legacies" of the Communist rule, the structure of the Soviet economy, multiethnic national composition, the instability of borders and the great-power status (pp. 48-52). McFaul (2001) sees Russia's transition to liberal democracy as a complicated path "littered with impediments" (p. 369), which included both structural elements and actor-related aspects. According to McFaul (2001) Russia's new leaders could not... bulldoze old institutions and erect new ones. The use of force was considered, but Russia's revolutionaries wisely refrained from using violence to achieve their goal of political, economic and state transformation. This strategic decision allowed many Soviet institutions as well as the organisations created and privileged by these institutions to linger in the post-Soviet era. Historical legacies influence all revolutions, but the shadow of the past was especially long (and dark) in this transition because the strategy of co-option rather than confrontation allowed institutions and individuals from the ancient regime to persist (p. 125).

Both authors have assumed that while the political processes in Russia of the early 1990s represented transition from authoritarian rule to a 'normal' liberal democracy, these processes were severely impeded by legacies of the previous regime. Such legacies included the weakness of the party system, the concentration of power within the executive branch, a lack of respect to the rule of law, a weak press, and the absence of civil society – all of which demonstrated strong resilience under transitional political regime (McFaul 2001, pp. 310-337). The important questions of institutional continuity and adaptation in the new conditions and the role of old institutions in forming the "actually existing" neo-liberalism have almost completely escaped the researchers' attention.
Economic aspects

To understand why the reforms took a particular direction it has to be taken into account that in the early 1990s the state of the Russian economy was the main concern and urgent measures were sought to restore economic life severely affected by the stagnation and subsequent disintegration of the centralised planning system. The successful examples of economic restructuring policies implemented in the 1980s in the UK and the US looked very pertinent to the Russian leadership and a similar approach to tackling crisis was adopted (Nesvetailova 2005, p 239). In Eastern Europe, Anglo-American policy product with a liberal brand name quickly established “a virtual monopoly on policy advice in most target states in the region” (Gowan 1999, p. 187). Eventually, Yeltsin’s cabinet fully embraced the vision of a liberal economy integrated into the global system and invited foreign advisors to engineer the reforms (Aslund 2007).

In policy terms, the post-socialist transition was aimed at fixing the abnormalities and market distortions inherited from the socialist system. According to one of the western advisors to the Yeltsin’s cabinet, the core reforms included six elements: 1) open international trade; 2) currency convertibility; 3) private ownership as the main engine of economic growth; 4) corporate ownership as the main dominant organizational form for large enterprises; 5) openness to foreign investment; and 6) membership in key international economic institutions (Sacks 1995, p. 51). ‘Capitalism by design’ was to be built through trade liberalisation reform, macroeconomic stabilisation, internal liberalisation (the abandonment of price control) and extensive privatisation all of which were deemed to constitute the reform package necessary for ‘institutional harmonisation’ with the advanced market economies (Sachs and Warner 1995, p. 57; Sachs 1992). Those economic transition policies fit under the umbrella of the Washington consensus, which refers to a set of supposedly uncontroversial theoretical and political assumptions about the composition and sequence of market-oriented reforms for economic growth (Herrschel 2007, p. 64). The analysis of Russia’s economic transformation also became dominated by neo-liberal ‘transition’ theories (McCann 2004a, p. 1).
Social aspects

The post-socialist transition was seen as mainly a political and economic process with little attention paid to understanding as to how the reforms could be internalised socially. The social organisation, traditional institutions and culture were not seen as significant aspect as compared to economic rationality. While the main emphasis was made on reforming socialist economies according to the principles of neoclassical economics, a wider societal context of reforms was ignored both theoretically and practically (McCann and Schwartz 2007, p. 1340). The dominant economic view of transition neglected history and had a perception of reforms that begins at the end-point, an idealised market, phrasing everything in those terms, ignoring the crucial question of how reforms engage existing society. The project of the economist is to grasp the tabula rasa and design a new system, to match events against the yardstick of that design, and to diagnose as failure any deviation from design (Murrell 1995, p. 177).

The transition doctrines prioritised economic rationality, while socio-political systems were perceived as unimportant, “getting in the way of sensible economics” (Murrell 1995, p. 164). The current research attempts to explore the wider arena of policy process that involves not only economic rationality but other politically, socially and culturally embedded factors that are all important for understanding the policy outcome.

The universalist approach has been criticised for using historically and geographically specific societal and political conditions and Western values based on Protestant ethics to model reforms in post-socialist countries. When mechanically transferred to the Russian context, these doctrines and policies have produced unexpected results. For instance, according to Artobolevsky (1997) the Western advisors and Russian decision makers simply assumed that “what worked in the West would also work in the East” (p. 130) which often happened without taking into account the national specificity (Mushtuk 2007, p. 41). The ‘unwarranted faith’ in the inevitability of a transformation to a capitalist society has been criticised for its simplified linear approach, according to which “if the correct procedure is followed, the desired outcome can be assumed” (Bridger and Pine 1998, p. 3). According to Nesvetailova (2004) the architects of the reforms did not take into account the fact that
Economic systems are products of long-term historical developments. They reflect the nation’s traditions and beliefs, the evolution of property relations and the mechanisms of distribution: in short – the structure of political power. In this instance, it is important to remember that, throughout history, the ruler in Russia was above any legal norms and laws (p. 50).

Despite the enormous cost the reforms have inflicted on society, they were continued which led to dramatic decline in economic well-being, social fragmentation, growing social and geographical disparities.

Spatial aspects

The dominant approach to theorising transition focuses overtly on the macroeconomic, country-wide level and pays little attention to the regional variations of transition. Neoliberal reforms were designed and introduced for the national scale and were considered as a process informingly affecting all spatial scales and levels from national to local. Seen through the prism of economic rationality, economic restructuring programmes did not take into account pre-existing spatial conditions. The recently published volume *Global geographies of post-socialist transition* by Herrschel (2007) catalogues the variations of transition across countries in different regions of the world. Most of the contributions ignore the geographical aspects of transition within a country, conceptualising transition as a national-level phenomenon with very little attention paid to regional differences and the role of cities. Young (2007) argues that it is naïve to assume that transition leads to one version of capitalism, as “what emerged in CEE was a complex mix of hybrid economic arrangements that synthesised in a complex way the new influences of the emergent globalised flexible capitalism with the legacies of the communist system” (p. 86).

As discussed in more detail in the research context chapter, Russia’s regions vary dramatically in the level of economic development, industrial and natural resource base, population size, ethnic characteristics and constitutional status and political influence vis-à-vis the federal centre. Therefore, regions are likely to adapt different strategies to economic and political reform. According to Smith (1995):
there is the issue of at what level - the central, the local state or the macro-regional - politicians can most effectively secure for the localities the successful transition to the market. For its part, the centre has provided little in the way of effective economic policies for the regions, including policies that minimise disruption in the supply and demand for commodities between the regions... The chaos of this transition to market exchange has meant that the centre has been singled out by the ethno-republics and regions for failing to provide effective leadership in order to minimise the scale of economic disruption (p. 29).

The investigation into the reasons behind large differences in regional growth performance for the period from 1991 to 1998 has demonstrated that the economic performance of Russian regions depends much more on the pre-existing factors rather than on the progress of reforms or regulatory environment. Ahrend (2005) claims that

First, neither differences in the depth of economic reform nor politico-institutional variables explain much of the variation in regional performance. Second, we find that the initial structure and competitiveness of a region's industry or a region's human capital and natural resource endowments, are an important determinant of a region's economic performance (p. 290). The initial situation in which region found itself at the start of transition seems to explain its relative economic success of failure much better (p. 311).

This analysis challenges the fundamental assumptions of transitional theory about the significance of market oriented regulatory environment for improving economic performance of countries in transition. As Ahrend’s research claims, the economic performance of Russia’s regions depends more on the initial economic conditions.

Cultural aspects

The departure from the totalitarian rule has liberated society from a dogmatic ideology and introduced political freedom, pluralism and created opportunities for growing ethnic and religious awareness and national self-determination (Peterson 2001). National

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2 The dependent variable is economic growth rate; the independent variables are placed in three groups: 1) politico-institutional features (governors' political orientation, measures of institutional efficiency and risk of violent conflict); 2) indicators of economic reforms (degree of privatisation, price liberalisation and level of subsidies); 3) initial conditions (economic, geographical and structural features) (Ahrend 2005).
identity projects have sprung up in post-socialist countries as a reaction to the “ideological vacuum” left after the break-up of the USSR (Beyme 1996; Lynn and Bogorov 1997) and as a reaction to colonial rule (Johnson 2005, p. 22). The growth of national awareness has had serious implications for the political development of many post-socialist countries. Some former federalist states (e.g. Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and USSR) have disintegrated and gone through painful process of the readjustment national borders and restructuring of national identities. In many post-socialist countries construction of a new national identity has required dealing with the “unwanted past” would that be the Communist, Russian or Nazi past (Leach 2002).

The sources of identity construction include ethnicity (Smith 1991) and religion (Johnson 2005; Matsuzato 2006). The analysis of identity construction by Castells (2004) is based on an approach relating to power and domination, which implies that national identities are socially and politically constructed to serve interests of certain groups (Castells 2004, p. 7). Even if identities are formed, transformed and adopted as instruments of social mobilisation and struggle, they cannot be constructed from ‘scratch’ as they are based on powerful ideas of nation, ethnicity and language. Heritage plays an important role in the construction of a national identity. Graham et al (2000) conceptualise heritage as contemporary use of the past. The meaning of the past for the present contemporary politics seems to be crucial for understanding heritage. Heritage and identity are mutually reinforcing concepts both playing an active role in contemporary politics. Unpacking the concept of heritage requires an analysis of political forces and interests because they would need particular histories, identities and heritages to justify political claims over territory, resources and power.

In Russia, transition sparked decentralisation tendencies among the provinces. Regional elites used identities strengthen claims of larger autonomy. Constructed identities are being used by political elites to help them to achieve their rational goals. Emergence and development of political identity is a result of "performance of political actors, who want to use those phenomena in their interests" (Gelman and Popova 2004, p. 254). Kolossov (1999) refers to the practice of "identity manipulation" permeating the following areas: language policy, creation of national information space, the intention of
Chapter 2 Literature review

national myths and stereotypes shaping territorial identities (Kolossov 1999, p. 75). National identity was a crucial component in making separatist threats to Moscow. According to Castells and Kiselyova (2000) national identity may be used “as a rallying banner to claim autonomy and threaten with separatism in order to obtain special status and additional resources from Moscow. These aspects will be discussed in more detail in the context and empirical chapters using the construction of national identity in Tatarstan and its use in federalism politics as an example.

Criticism of the dominant approach to post-socialist transition

The actual course the post-socialist transition has led to a realisation that transition does not necessarily comply with idealised models. A somewhat simplified understanding of transition as a passage from one point to another has significant limitations as it overlooks the complex and contradictory nature of the process (Young 2007). The following issues have been discussed in the literature.

The understanding of transition as ‘a predetermined route from state socialism to capitalism’ has serious limitations (Lane 1995). In the West, the collapse of socialism was seen as a natural victory of a superior system over inferior non-western-style state-societal regimes, which then had to adopt the western paradigm of state-social organisation, summarised in democratic market economy (Herrschel 2007, p. 46). This approach to transition has been also described as a “transition as imitation” by Stark and Bruszt (1998), meaning that post-socialist countries were expected to imitate the political and economic models already present in the West:

approaches the postsocialist economies from the standpoint of a future that has already been designated. As the science of the not yet, designer capitalism studies postsocialism in terms of what it will or must become, not simply gazing into the crystal ball of the future but also examining the present through that distorting lens (Stark and Bruszt 1998, p. 5).

Evaluations of democracies in transition often use the ‘yardstick’ based on an idealised view of the established democracies to measure the progress of ‘transitional’ countries towards democratic institutionalisation. Those cases that have not “arrived” at
full institutionalisation or that do not seem to be moving in this direction, are seen as stunted, frozen, protractedly unconsolidated. The fact that some of those cases have been in a state of “protracted unconsolidation” for some 20 years suggests that there is something extremely odd about this way of thinking (O’Donnell 1996, p. 38). To some extent this stems from a somewhat simplified understanding of the role of democratic institutions that maintains that once the institutions are in place they will “naturally impose a deepening of democracy over time” (Gazibo 2005, p. 170).

In contrast to the idealised models, Russia’s transition has been more complex than previously experienced transitions in other countries, because in addition to marketisation and democratisation it has involved the transformation of state borders and national identities (Kuzio 2001, p. 169). In the modern literature on transition, the initial idealism has been replaced by growing scepticism as demonstrated by McFaul et al (2004) who claim that “transition from autocracy can lead to democracy as well as to new forms of autocracy” (p. 12). Herrschel (2007) argues that “democratisation and transition have occurred in many different shades of grey” (p. 6). Several studies have described various forms of semi-democratic regimes including “competitive authoritarianism” (Levitsky and Way 2002), “partial democracy” (Robinson 2003), “Potemkin democracy” (Clark 2004) and other forms of compromised or hybrid democracies. The actual outcome of transition is no longer taken as ‘natural’ and a successful transition is believed to require a decisive power advantage in hands of hegemonic democrats (McFaul 2002, p. 214). Other argue that that it is precisely the democratic deficits that has allowed Russian democracy to sustain as under certain conditions a compromised democracy can be more durable (Bunce 2003, pp. 187-88). This demonstrates the ambiguity of the democratic transition paradigm and deficiency of a simplistic approach to transition.

In the 1990s it was believed that the liberalisation would automatically, through ‘the invisible hand of the market’ transform Russia’s economy (Rutkevich 1996, p. 86). Later more scepticism developed in transition debates, and some even have claimed that the transition paradigm has outlived its usefulness because it does not account for important underlying conditions, such as “the economic level, political history,
institutional legacies, ethnic make-up, socio-cultural traditions or other “structural” features” (Carothers 2002, p. 8).

The programmes and policies adopted by the Russian government to proceed with transition to a market economy were influenced by a group of academics associated with Harvard or MIT, which led to “an emphasis on top-down reforms designed by economists, using similar policies across countries, since market systems are pretty much the same everywhere whether in Russia in 1913 or the OECD of 1994” (Murrell 1995, p. 173). Not only were the reforms based on very specific assumptions about the functioning of markets and the role of the state, the policies that were introduced were inappropriate for the case of Eastern Europe because

the policies of the Washington consensus were tailored to the problems of economic instability and associated indebtedness in developing countries, particularly Latin America. They were thus aimed at economies that were, more or less, following market principles... The Consensus was aimed at distorted market economies, and not those with a completely different approach to, and operation of, resource allocation (Herrschel 2007 pp. 64).

McCann and Schwartz (2007) argue that reforms based on the neoclassical paradigm pay little or no attention to the vital question of the embeddedness of the economy within much broader societal structures. To the contrast, new institutionalism emphasises “the complexity of pressures on organizations and how these are not reducible solely to following market signals” (p. 1340). A new wave of literature has emerged that started explaining the failure of transition. Interestingly, some of the experts who were involved in the initial reforms became their critics. According to Aslund (2007) liberalisation has transformed Russia’s economy but in a particular way: while the market reforms have succeeded, the democratic transition has failed (p. 296). The former chief economist from the World Bank has acknowledged that “seldom has the gap between expectations and reality been greater than in the case of the transition from communism to the market” (Stiglitz 2002, p. 151).
Beyond transitology?

The review of the debates on post-socialist transition has revealed the complex and contradictory nature of the process as well as the ambiguity of the post-socialist transition theory. The unproblematic vision of inefficient command-administrative system being ‘naturally’ replaced by a more efficient market economy is seen as simplified (Burawoy 2001; Marcuse 1996). Transitology should overcome the universalism and ‘teleological’ bias that characterise the dominant concept of transition. According to McCann (2004a) countries may “possess different forms of local dynamics and processes which refuse to meld into a globalized homogeneity of forms” (p. 3).

To solve this problem, more attention should be paid to understanding the role of pre-existing institutions. According to Young (2007) the Washington Consensus and related approaches to post-communist change underestimated the legacies of state socialism and their impact on economic and political processes:

Rather than just being swept away at the ‘end of history’ to leave a tabula rasa upon which Western models of democracy and capitalism could be instantly established, the networks and socio-economic relations of state socialism have continued to impact on post-communist change in the region (p. 76)

Legacies not only ‘continued to impact’ on post-communist change, “partial ruins” of communism provide “institutional building blocks for political, economic and social reconstruction” (Stark and Bruszt 1998, pp. 5-6). The elements of the old system may ‘remain in place, albeit suitably modified to incorporate elements of liberal market economy, operating within a framework defined by many checks and balances in order to protect society from the unbridled impact of a wholesale systemic change (Herrschel 2007, pp. 57-58). As discussed in subsequent chapters, Tatarstan has adopted a soft strategy of introducing market that distinguishes the region from other Russia’s provinces that used a wholesale approach towards marketisation. Taking into account variations in transition, processes in post-socialist countries should be analysed not in terms of the compliance with transition blueprints but by studying ongoing social conflicts and alliances that are shaping the multiple possible futures (Stark and Bruszt 1998).
To understand the complexity of ‘transition’, the complex interactions between social groups, ‘old elites’ and ‘new elites’, state institutions, economic production and distribution modes have to be taken into account. Burawoy (2001) argues that the main reason for the particular outcome of Russia’s transition is the emerging structure of class power, which has produced disastrous societal effects. The decline of production mechanisms and their replacement with the mechanisms of exchange disempowered labour and empowered the new business class:

With the disintegration of the administrative economy and the transition from a nomenklatura to a merchant financial bourgeoisie, centred on banks, trading, mafia, and exploitation of natural resources, industry collapsed and the working class became mere residue of the past”. Under these conditions, “the liberal creed of the New Russians... became a thin veil of justification and legitimating for pursuing narrow economic interests (Burawoy 2001, p. 286).

Burawoy (2001) analyses the dynamic interaction of interrelated social, economic and political conditions and blames the structure of Russia’s economy which is less unsuitable for the market (too centralised and monopolistic) and the strategy of the reform’s implementation (too rapid compared, for example, to Chinese reforms) for the involution. Burawoy draws his analysis of Russia’s transformation on Polanyi’s framework and argues that Russia has missed all three elements of the “great transformation”, namely, transformation of production, of society and of the state and has undergone “transition without transformation”. This discussion raises further questions about the capacity of transitional theory to describe, explain and processes in post-socialist countries. The role of institutionalism in explaining the process will be discussed in Section 2.3.

3 The economy undergoes neither a neoliberal revolution nor an institutional evolution but rather an economic involution, a market that sucks resources out of production, sending it into a spiralling contraction. Instead of a vibrant synergy between civil society and the state, we find their mutual repulsion in which society turn in on itself – societal involution – and the federal state turns outwards to the global economy, unable to contain the tendency toward regional autonomy – political involution (Burawoy 2001, p. 276).
2.1.3 Post-socialist urban transition debates

This section seeks to introduce the urban transition debate and connect it with wider post-socialist transition debate reviewed in the previous sections. It has been acknowledged that cities are important for the very process of transition (Andruzs et al 1996; Kostinskiy 2001), that “cities have been the main arenas of change, showing the newly emerging socio-economic differences in detail, and acting as the main foci of economic transaction between the country and the outside world” (Herrschel 2007, p. 133) and that cities function as gateways to the global economy (Wu 2003, p. 1337).

Despite the significance of urban areas for understanding transition, many studies on post-socialist cities remain quite descriptive in nature. The transition literature sees cities at the receiving end of changes occurring at the societal level. Little research has been done so far to explore what role large urban development projects play in creating new governance regime and practices and what are possible connections between large urban development projects and wider socio-economic transformations in post-socialist countries. This section seeks to critically review the current debate on urban post-socialist transition in order to explain large urban development projects in the post-socialist city. The mainstream literature on post-socialist urban transition can be characterised as follows.

First, the literature on post-socialist urban transition has been informed by the dominant concept of transition as a linear, pre-defined passage from a totalitarian communist state to democracy and a market economy built in compliance with western standards. As discussed previously, this dogmatic approach to transition has been influenced by a teleological (predefined path of transition) and policy biases (“making the institutions “right”). It has also used somewhat simplified reading of institutional theory that emphasises the significance of design of formal institutional. The reality of the political transition seems to be more complex and contradictory.

For example, in post-reform China there has been no intention to democratise the political system (Ma 2002). The political discourses and governance practices related to the remodelling of Beijing, the political, economic and cultural elements intertwine in a
rather unexpected way. In the 1990s the Chinese state faced a serious legitimacy crisis and needed to construct a new national identity to sustain its rule: "the state sought to regain public support and hold the country together during this turbulent period by nurturing a nationalist revival, thereby substituting patriotism for Marxism" (Broudehoux 2004, p. 10). Although the Chinese modernization is still measured against the yardstick of international achievements,

in its efforts to forge a modern identity 'with Chinese characteristics' China thus remains divided between its desire to set itself apart by developing its own brand of modernity - one that distinctly differs from that of the liberal capitalist democracies of the West - and the pressure to conform to international ideas about modernity (Broudehoux 2004, p. 15).

Apart from an economic logic, urban image construction and city marketing also serve ideological purposes. Urban image construction has long fulfilled political ends, serving as a tool of social control, as a means of popular pacification, and as an instrument of state legitimisation. Decision-makers use the built environment to manipulate consciousness, and disguise this manipulation in order to reproduce their political ideology and naturalize their power. Urban images must therefore be read as ideological and historical products, as behind those unified appearance lie struggles between various organised groups and contestation over use and design (ibid, p. 27).

Second, the literature often portrays the relationship between the state and the market in a rather simplistic manner, with the state representing forms of centralised control, public interest and coercion and the market representing the private initiative, investment and growth. Both are portrayed and mutually antagonistic forces engaged in a zero-sum game:

Given the inherent tension between those two rationalities, planning as their product either facilitates or restrains market forces as the balance between them shifts. Therefore, underlying any planning system is the balance established between the role of government and the role of the market in urban development (Vujosevic and Nedovic-Budic 2006, p. 277).

This simplistic view overlooks the emerging role of state in putting in place new neoliberal regime and does not seem to take into account the growing significance of
state planning in promoting urban transformation under the conditions of entrepreneurial local state, which is becoming common in urban China (detailed in Wu 2005). According to Ma (2002): “despite the presence of other forces in China’s socioeconomic change, such as globalisation with which the state must interact, the state remains the leading actor in the unfolding drama of economic transformation” (p. 1549).

The mainstream urban transition literature places a strong emphasis on transformation of the regulatory environment as the core of transition process. The theorising of post-socialist transition as transformation of institutions is inseparable from a strong policy component centred around the following areas: privatisation and development of the property rights system (Struyk 1996), development of land markets (Bertaud 2006, p. 108), the “harmonisation” of planning legislation with the western standards (Golubchikov 2004; Trutnev et al 2004; Iyer 2003), introduction of a housing market (Buckley and Tsenkova 2006; Kim 2006).

The post-socialist transition implies a radical departure from the old institutions, which have to give way to new, progressive ones. Since pre-existing institutions, governing practices, uses of space and socio-spatial constellations cannot be replaced overnight with the ‘right’ ones, the ‘inherited’ institutions continue working under the new conditions, influencing the outcome of ‘transition’. Pre-existing institutions can be seen as “legacies” that slow the progress in the right direction down (French 1995) or as integrate components of the emerging actually existing politico-institutional forms of Neoliberal urban governance. With few exceptions the literature on the neoliberalisation of urban governance remains extremely scarce, which indicates an opportunity for new research to be done to address this gap in knowledge.

The economic liberalisation and the “harmonisation” of institutional conditions in post-socialist cities have led to a radical reconfiguration of the relationship between the state and the market in post-socialist societies, for example, Tosic (2006) notes that
in the centralised planning system, the public sector determined the urban development process from a dominant position, but now its task is to regulate the dominating market processes from a subordinate position. It clearly has not been easy for the public sector to perform competently in this new role, for several reasons: a limited capacity to deal with urban issues under market conditions, constrained authority and power relations, increased responsibilities, and persisting financial problems (Tosic 2006, p. 145).

This reconfiguration of the relations between the state and the market in post-socialist countries has been far more than a mere technical change and has led to the development of new forms of urban governance (Feldman 2000; Wu 2002; Wu et al 2007), urban and regional competitiveness, growing spatial disparities between and within urban regions (Wu 2005), proliferation of particular urban and architectural forms that are often oriented on international consumption (Ren 2008; Temelova 2007).

Factors, external to cities, such as globalisation, competitiveness and neoliberalism, have become a powerful way of conceptualising post-socialist urban transition and framing the debate on the emerging post-socialist urban governance. This approach conceptualises the urban processes as shaped largely by external “drivers of change” include, among other things,

[T]he transitions to democracy (systemic political change), to market economies (systemic economic change), and to decentralised systems of local governance. These transitions are major drivers of change at the city level in four domains: 1) economic change; 2) social change; 3) changes in urban governance; and 4) spatial change (transformation of production and consumption spaces) (Tsenkova 2006, p. 45)

The external forces make cities adopt new policies and create new governing institutions ostensibly more “suitable” to face new challenges. For example, Tasan-Kok (2006) shows how under the pressure of international developers on one side and the budget constraints on the other local authorities in Hungary and Poland are “impelled to reinvent their role” according to the neoliberal conditions:
As the property market became the major source of income for urban governments and they met increasing pressure by private-sector investors, the planning regulations were relaxed and the planning regime became ad-hoc, opportunity led corrective mechanism. The power to coordinate development in cities was eroded through incomplete planning regulations and a predominance of informal decision-making. ...the government lost most of its control over urban development and planning was considered an old habit of the communist regime (Tasan-Kok 2006, p. 68).

These policy measures and institutional adjustments legitimise certain patterns of resource allocation and lead to material consequences for urban residents. The emerging model of urban governance will be discussed in more detail in the following sections. These policy measures and institutional adjustments legitimise certain patterns of resource allocation and lead to material consequences for urban residents. The emerging model of urban governance will be discussed in more detail in the following sections.

Third, many studies on post-socialist urban transition tend to consider cities as rather static politico-geographical units enclosed within the administrative boundaries. The current debates show little attempts to look beyond the fixed spatial organisation defined by administrative boundaries and explore the emerging socio-spatial patterns – cross border cooperation, growing disparities, competition between regions and spatial selectivity in implementation of the federal government development programmes.

The main literature sources show how the political and socio-economic 'transition' has affected cities in terms of their physical form, economic base, urban identity and the way cities are planned and governed (see Tsenkova and Nedovic-Budic eds. 2006; Hamilton et al 2005; Andrusz et al 1996). The transformations of urban space are presented as theoretically unproblematic, “natural” consequences of transition, occurring in different sectors e.g. residential zones (Hirt and Kovachev 2006), urban retail (Axenov et al 2006; Garb and Dybicz 2006).

Fourth, the dramatic social transformations that many post-socialist countries have gone through have affected the image of their cities and first of all the capitals. The analysis of the image of the post-socialist city occupies a marginal section of the literature. The post socialist change has transformed the urban imagery in post-socialist
countries from “socialist camp to global village” (Shevchenko and Schukin 2004, p. 89) and from “the Wall with the Mall” (Andrusz 2006, p. 83). The understanding of the cultural transformation undergoing in the post-socialist city needs to be developed beyond these rather poetic metaphors. As this section will demonstrate, the image of the post-socialist city has been formed as a result of various forces including the search of a new national identity, dealing with the “unwanted past” and promoting the place in the light of the city competitiveness doctrine.

The analysis of identity construction by Castells (2004) is based on power and domination approach. Even if identities are being formed, transformed and adopted as instruments of social mobilisation and struggle, they cannot be constructed from “scratch” as they are based on powerful ideas of nation, ethnicity and language. The symbolic representation literature studies the expressions of the ideas of power, domination, ethnic and religious belonging in architectural form, monumental art and urban design. There are different ways to reflect the national (and nationalistic) theme in architecture. One is object-specific and uses style and decoration. Another can be described as the transformation of the political geography of urban space, which includes the saturation of urban space with “cult objects” and the use of symbolically important sites to locate specific objects.

Post-socialist countries represent a special case of a dramatic change of national identities and the perception of culture and history (Beyme 1996; Gelman & Popova 2004). That affects how the identity and culture are translated into urban space (Chibireva 2002; Sidorov 2000). Examples from Moscow and St. Petersburg show that urban development projects have been informed by a dual logic of internationalisation and nationalisation where the desire to present the city on the global “marketplace” coincided with the need to reconstruct the national identity (Gritsai and Wusten 2000, p. 42). The transformations of the image of Kazan pursued the goal of strengthening the Tatar national identity and positioning the city on the Russian and global mental map (Graney 2007). The construction of Kazakhstan’s new capital – Astana has been aimed on constructing a new national identity of the Kazakh people and creating an image of a modern city (Anacker 2004).
To summarise the discussion on post-socialist transition and its implication for cities this section will overview the main points made. Table 2.1 “Post-socialist transition and urban transformation” connects transition at macro level with transformation in cities across several policy areas including political, economic, social, spatial and cultural. The table distinguishes between the mainstream transition theory expectation (e.g. “from totalitarian to democratic state”) and the critique of the wholesale approach (e.g. “many different shades of grey”).

Understanding the functioning of the socialist planned economy and the position of the local state within the administrative hierarchy is important for the analysis of modern urban governance as governing institutions are characterised by continuity and inertia in their development and adaptation. The perception of the transitional route as linear and per-defined forms the teleological bias of transitology (O’Donnell 1996). Transitology might overestimate the role of institutional design and formal rules (Gazibo 2005). The policy bias constitutes a serious weakness of transitional theories as it allows a lot of universalism and treats the political question as unproblematic and resolved (by the act of departing from the authoritarian rule) and focuses on tackling the legacies of the previous regime. That is why critical views suggest that the transition theory has too much universality and may overlook the political process and diversity of the ‘actually existing’ transition. It evades the question as to how institutions develop under concrete social, cultural and political conditions. To contextualise the “actually existing transition” it is important to understand how the old and new elites share power and how influential groups compete for control over economic assets.

The debates on post-socialist urban transition are informed by the dominant approach to transition. It has become conventional to conceptualise urban process in post-socialist cities by separating quite clearly the change at the social level and a spatial ‘response’ and distinguishing between the “external environment” and the “internal environment” of urban transformations (see Tsenkova 2006, p. 23). This approach conceptualises the transformation of built environment and urban space is a “product” of societal transformations, e.g. the transition from socialism “produces” new urban spaces.
### Table 2.1 Post-socialist transition and urban transformation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspects of transition</th>
<th>Post-socialist transition</th>
<th>Urban transformation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political</strong></td>
<td>From totalitarian to democratic state.</td>
<td>Democratic, accountable urban government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Many different shades of grey&quot; (Herrschel 2007).</td>
<td>Local authoritarianism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic / state vs. market</strong></td>
<td>From state controlled economy to market economy. Washington Consensus. The main role of the state is to create a good business climate.</td>
<td>Private property rights. Private return oriented investment. Pro-market regulatory framework.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Limitations of uncritical borrowing from the west.</td>
<td>Commercialisation of urban space, growing disparities,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social</strong></td>
<td>Liberation from political, economic and cultural suppression.</td>
<td>Liberation of the city from the dominance of its production role, and development of social and cultural role.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Severely underestimated role of the pre-existing institutions, social tradition and norms. Social cost of reforms.</td>
<td>Social segregation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spatial</strong></td>
<td>Main focus on macro-economic level. Growth of regionalism.</td>
<td>Cities and regions are considered as static geographical units.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rescaling of state.</td>
<td>Economic segregation, uneven development, gentrification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cultural</strong></td>
<td>From a totalitarian to a pluralist society. Construction of new national identities.</td>
<td>Construction of new urban and regional identities. Expression of new values in urban form. Internationalisation of architecture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethnic, religious and language conflicts. Disputes over borders and rights of minority groups.</td>
<td>Disputes over heritage, symbolically important urban sites.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** compiled by the author.
While the mainstream literature on post-socialist transition interprets urban change as a response to external impact, it pays little attention to the political economy of the 'response'. The mainstream literature also separates changes in the social sphere and their spatial implications. This approach can constitute a potential problem while analysing urban development projects as it implies quite a rigid analytical framework, which may obscure complex patterns of interaction between the urban and the social. While focusing on describing changing land use patterns and emerging built forms, they pay little attention to conceptualising links between societal transformations and spatial developments.

Transformations of the image represent diverse and complex social processes such as the search of national identity, the representation of ideas of social power, the establishment of ethnic and religious domination. All these ideas and processes have little or no place in the current local economic development literature. The latter tend to analyse development processes as if they are going on in some kind of abstract space operated according to rational essentially economistic logic. While the literature describes how powerful ideas dominating social life find their way into the image of the city, it fails to pay attention to unpack and critically analyse these ideas. Political, economic or military power seems to be a static thing that 'belongs' to different groups who express it through the means of architecture. The symbolic representation literature misses the question of the mechanisms of empowerment, power transfer and contestation.
2.2 Neo-liberal transition and cities

The previous section has discussed the post-socialist transition and the implications for urban areas. So far, the debates on the post-socialist city have been quite disconnected from contemporary western debates on neo-liberalism, urban governance and competitiveness. It has been claimed that neo-liberalism has become a framework of disciplinary political authority acting on a global level (Brenner and Theodore 2002) and governance and competitiveness have become new imperatives economic and political life (Gordon and Buck 2005, p. 6). The connection between post-socialism and neo-liberalism remain contentious: while post-socialist reforms have been inspired by western neo-liberal doctrines, the political processes leading to the installation of the neo-liberal ideology have been different in the West and in the East. Harvey (2005) claims that although the outcomes may be similar, it would be misleading to subsume post-socialist transition to the Neoliberal shift as the former implies creating a market economy, the latter implies restoration of the class power within the existing market economy (Harvey 2005).

2.2.1 The neo-liberal shift

The recent transformations of state power in the western countries are often described in terms of a neo-liberal shift. Neo-liberalism started as an intellectual movement, then in the late 1970s was vigorously introduced into government practices in USA and UK and now has become a pervasive ideological framework adopted worldwide (Peck and Tickell 2002, p. 380). The advance of Neo-liberalism has been facilitated by powerful rhetoric that claims the necessity of economic liberalisation, and de-politicises and naturalises the neo-liberal doctrines (Munck 2003). The free market is often presented as ‘natural’ and the only possible way of organising economic life (see Shaikh 2005, p. 41; Ohmae 1993, p. 83). Both neo-liberalism and globalism have been associated with a mode of exogenized thinking that presents them as a naturalised, external force “linked to alleged tendencies towards homogenisation, levelling out, and convergence (Peck and Tickell 2002, p. 383). That is why the globalisation and neo-liberalism discourses are
very closely entwined, since a defining feature of neoliberalism is its necessitarian, there-is-no-alternative character and its invocation of a ‘politics of inevitability’ based on a deference to (global) economic forces”… As an economic discourse, neoliberalism seeks to establish market deference as a necessary (pre)condition, attempting to renaturalize - and therefore insulate from earthly politics – those economic relations that Keynesian and development economics so fatefully politicized. Discursively sequestering these economic relations at the global scale and refashioning them as unbending imperatives is, of course, one very obvious way of placing the economic beyond political reach; economic politics are becoming reconstituted around the need to adjust and accommodate to ‘out there’ market realities (Peck 2004, p. 394).

Post-socialist transition also takes a narrow view of political and economic transition as “harmonisation” of institutional settings with the western examples and treats the political question as resolved by abolishing authoritarianism. The neo-liberalist ‘policy package’ includes the following elements:

[D]eregulation of financial markets, privatisation, weakening of institutions of social protection, weakening of labour unions and labour market protections, shrinking of government, cutting of top tax rates, opening up of international goods and capital markets, and abandonment of full employment under the guise of the natural rate. International economic policy has been dominated by the ‘Washington consensus’, which advocates privatisation, free trade, export-led growth, financial capital mobility, deregulated labour markets, and policies of macroeconomic austerity (Palley 2005, p. 25).

As discussed in Chapter 4 reforms implemented in Russia in the early 1990s were based on neo-liberal principles. The reforms are often understood as aimed almost solely at dismantling the mechanisms of centralised planning and government intervention which created various economic ‘distortions’ and ‘abnormalities’ and suppressed entrepreneurial freedom. However, this represents only part of the story, namely the “roll-back” stage of the neo-liberalist project. The “roll-out” stage implies an active construction of the new governing regime designed to secure private property rights, competition and to promote entrepreneurialism.
Although the revival of neo-liberalism is associated with the decline of Keynesianism and the rejection of active involvement of government in economic life for a more pro-market policy, the neo-liberal shift does not imply a weak government model. On the contrary, it is characterised by a “dramatic intensification of coercive, disciplinary forms of state intervention” (Brenner and Theodore 2002, p. 352) and “the systemic use of state power to impose (financial) market imperatives” (Saad-Filho and Johnston 2005, p. 3), because “‘privatised’ or ‘deregulated’ markets still have to be managed and policed... and because, more fundamentally, ‘markets’ themselves are not, never have been and cannot be spontaneously occurring and naturally self-regulating” (Peck 2004, p. 394).

It is argued that neo-liberalism has been first and foremost political project aimed at i) re-establishing the conditions of capital accumulation; and ii) the restoration of class power (Harvey 2006, 149). According to Harvey, while neo-liberalism has failed to secure economic growth, it has succeeded in empowering elites: “it has either restored class power to ruling elites (as in the US and Britain) or created conditions for capitalist class formation (as in China, India, Russia and elsewhere)” (ibid., p. 152).

Neo-liberalism is far from being monolithic in form and the term is used to label a series of political projects associated with a minimalist state (Larner 2000, p. 5). These projects are historically and geographically contingent and “open to institutional frictions and resistances of a path-dependant trajectory”, and may vary substantially in “conception, specific motivation, means, and consequences” (McGuirk 2005, p. 61). neo-liberalist strategies are being superimposed on pre-existing institutional settings to produce a unique combination of global and local factors.

The concept of ‘actually existing neo-liberalism’ has been proposed to understand neo-liberalism through a prism of local conditions, to analyse local embodiments of the broader global or national projects of neo-liberal restructuring, and establish links between the ideology and concrete government practices, policies and institutional arrangements of the neo-liberalist project. The concept interprets neo-liberalism as contextually specific and path-dependant and claims it is a locally constructed phenomenon:
in contrast to neo-liberal ideology, in which market forces are assumed to operate according to immutable laws no matter where they are “unleashed”, we emphasise the contextual embeddedness of neoliberal restructuring projects insofar they as they have been produced within national, regional and local contexts defined by the legacies of inherited institutional frameworks, policy regimes, regulatory practices, and political struggles. An understanding of actually existing neoliberalism must therefore explore the path-dependent, contextually specific interactions between inherited regulatory landscapes and emergent neoliberal, market-oriented restructuring projects at a broad range of geographical scales (Brenner and Theodore 2002, p. 351).

2.2.2 Implications for cities

Capitalist development unfolds “through a production of historically specific patterns of socio-spatial organisation in which particular territories, places and scales are mobilized as productive forces” (Brenner and Theodore 2002, p. 354). It has re-positioned them in economic and political or power hierarchies; it has produced new relationships of power at the local level, and brought into being new forms of governance (entrepreneurial, flexible, etc) and new planning approaches and strategies (mega-projects, culture-led regeneration, etc). It has also introduced the pursuit of competitiveness as a modern imperative.

Literature on the social production of space conceptualises space as an important element of economic production and reproduction of social and political relations (Hirst 2005; Soja 2000). Institutions, social practices, and modes of economic production are reproduced in spaces and through spaces (Lefebvre 2003/1978, p. 87). The spatial divisions are a product of both market and state forces as the market “produces and reproduces these divisions, but the state is deeply involved in their creation and perpetuation” (Marcuse and van Kempen 2000, p. 4). Contemporary capitalism is thus characterised by the pervasiveness of neo-liberalism as a framework of political authority that acts across the geographical and political levels (Peck and Tickell 2002).
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Capitalism in order to secure sustained capital accumulation produces different socio-spatial forms that are characterised by continuity and transition from one form to another. This is described as a ‘spatial fix’ (Jessop 1998). According to Hackworth (2005)

If the Keynesian managerialist city was characterised by outward growth, inner city decline, regulated development, and public investment in infrastructure, the neoliberal city is increasingly characterised by a curious combination of inner city and exurban private investment, disinvestment in the inner suburbs, the relaxation of land use controls, and the reduction of public investment that is not likely to lead to an immediate profit. If public housing and middle-class suburban housing were icons of the Keynesian managerialist city, then gentrified neighbourhoods and downtown commercial mega-projects are the icons of the neoliberal city (Hackworth 2005, p. 78).

Brenner argues that the contemporary sociospatial transformations of western societies are characterised by a complex interaction of different geographical scales with the primacy of the national scale:

The contemporary round of globalisation arguably represents a major new wave of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation in which global socioeconomic interdependencies are being significantly extended in close conjunction with the established, or restructuring, of relatively fixed forms of capitalist socio-spatial organisation at diverse, subglobal geographical scales. ...the political-economic geographies of this dynamics of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation are today being fundamentally rescaled relative to the nationally configured patterns... Whereas previous rounds of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation occurred largely within the geographical framework of national state territoriality, the current round of socio-spatial restructuring has significantly decentred the role of the national scale as the primary institutional arena for the territorialisation of capital (Brenner 2004, p. 44-45).

The transition from managerial to entrepreneurial urban governance implies that the primarily role of the government changes from that of tackling ‘market failures’ to creating regimes for capital accumulation (Harvey 1989). Politically, the transition to governance is a process of shifting the centre of power away from the public sector to the private sector and non-government sector, “governance refers to the development of governing styles in which boundaries between and within public and private sectors have
become blurred. The essence of governance is its focus on governing mechanisms which
do not rest on recourse to the authorities and sanctions of government” (Stoker 1998, p.
17). The “roll-back” phase is characterised by the dismantling of the artefacts of the
Keynesian state such as social housing though privatisation and/or demolition
(Hackworth 2005). The “roll-out” phase is characterised by urban regeneration projects in
existing city centres, the construction of gated communities at the periphery and the
pursuit of proactive policies aimed at the (re)construction of the city image.

It has been recognised that under the conditions of neo-liberalism, large urban
development projects have become seen “as essential mechanisms for restructuring urban
areas to meet the new demands for capital; and as important devices in the competition
between urban centres for scarce central government recourses and globally mobile
inward investment” (Loftman and Nevin 1995, p. 302).

It is argued that the neo-liberalist project has not been “imposed” on cities, but has
been actively constructed in cities. As such cities “have become increasingly central to
the reproduction, mutation, and continual reconstitution of neo-liberalism itself” and have
become “incubators for many of the major political and ideological strategies through
which the dominance of neo-liberalism is being maintained” (Brenner and Theodore
2002, pp. 375-376). The transition to the neo-liberal city should not therefore be seen as a
linear process, rather as “a contested, trial and error searching process in which neo-
liberal strategies are being mobilised in place specific forms and combinations” (Brenner

2.2.3 Competitiveness, entrepreneurial governance and city marketing

It is argued that globalisation and the neo-liberal hegemony have created the imperative
of urban competitiveness, which then has been adopted into urban and regional governing
practices (Turok 2004, p. 1070). Despite the fact that competitiveness remains a confused
concept, it has secured a seemingly hegemonic status in the discourse of urban
development.
The competitiveness theory portrays regions and cities as competing similarly to commercial firms for the ends such as "mobile investment, population, tourism, public funds and hallmark event" through "assembling a skilled and educated labour force, efficient modern infrastructure, a responsive system of modern governance, a flexible land and property market, high environmental standards and a high quality of life" (Lever and Turok 1999, p. 791). On both urban and regional levels of governance policies aimed on enhancing competitiveness have gained increasing popularity among policy-making elites who see the role of competitiveness as instrumental for achieving economic development (Duffy 1995; Turok 2005, 2004; Turok et al 2004).

Neo-liberalism has been crucial for creating the institutional forms and rules of interurban competition (Jones and Ward 2002, p. 484). Nevertheless,

this regime of accelerated interurban competition was not simply a product of neo-liberalism, nor can it be reduced entirely to its logic, but the parallel ascendancy of neo-liberalism has been crucial in reinforcing, extending, and normalizing these transurban tendencies towards reflexive and entrepreneurial city governance (Peck and Tickell 2002, p. 394).

In the UK the institutional framework\(^1\) of interurban competition has been the result of the central government initiatives aimed at managing the urban crisis. The state established parameters and conditions of granting access to regeneration funding based on competitive bidding procedures. This "process through which issues/places are identified as needing state funds and how this expenditure is then evaluated has been realigned through neoliberalisation\(^2\). This change in how resources are allocated reflect the new logic that underscores the state’s financing of urban development (Jones and Ward 2002, p. 485). Swyngedouw et al (2002) point out that competitive bidding for nationally and EU-funded urban development projects favours projects that have a sound

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\(^1\) For example, new institutions such as urban development corporations (UDCs) and training and enterprise councils (TECs) “were created to bypass the perceived bureaucratic modes of intervention associated with locally embedded and scale-dependent structure of the local government. Through this strategy, the assumptions of how and for whom urban policy should be delivered were challenged. Put another way, the rules of the rationality game were rewritten” (Jones and Ward 2002, pp. 482-483).

\(^2\) The process includes: 1) the introduction of the market into the funding and delivery of local services; 2) the incorporation into the state apparatus of members of local business communities; 3) the redesign of the internal structure of the state through the formation of public-private partnerships; 4) and the creation of new institutions, combining business representatives with state officials to oversee and to deliver all forms of economic and social policy (Jones and Ward 2002, p. 485).
organisational and financial basis which is not available for weaker social groups and areas in the city (Swyngedouw et al 2002, p. 565).

There was a criticism of the narrow interpretations of urban competitiveness based on a single all-encompassing notion or measure of urban competitiveness and the overstating of the importance of international trade and explicit competition between city authorities (Turok et al 2004, pp. 14-15). According to Bristow (2005) “competitiveness is portrayed as the means by which regional economies are externally validated in the era of globalisation, such that there can be no principled objection to policies and strategies deemed to be competitiveness-enhancing, whatever their indirect consequences” (p. 285). The exclusive selection of competitiveness-related variables (such as the share of exports in GDP) may limit the understanding of real economic processes.

Radical critics claim that the idea of urban and regional competitiveness is a myth that has been legitimised and sold to public by the elite-dominated media which claim that territories fail because they are not competitive enough, therefore more neoliberal reforms are needed (Harvey 2006, p. 42). Urban competitiveness, according to Peck and Tickell (2002)

turns cities into accomplices in their own subordination, a process driven – and legitimised – by tales of municipal turnaround and urban renaissances, by little victories and fleeting accomplishments, and ultimately also by the apparent paucity of “realistic” urban alternatives. Thus, elite partnerships, mega-events, and corporate seduction become, in effect, both the only game in town and the basis of urban subjugation. The public subsidy of zero-sum competition at the interurban scale rests on the economic fallacy that every city can win, shored up by the political reality that no city can afford principled non-involvement in the game (Peck and Tickell 2002, p. 393).

2.2.4 Critical reflections on neo-liberal urbanisation debates

The neo-liberal doctrines are based on the ideas of the necessity of on-going capital accumulation and economic expansion. This assumption has been scrutinised as in practice neo-liberalism often fails to create a stable and equal accumulation of capital. To the contrary the geography of neo-liberal urbanisation is characterised by growing inequalities and spatial selectivity. According to Harvey (2006b) “the volatility of uneven
geographical development has accelerated permitting certain territories to advance spectacularly (at least for a time) at the expense of others (p. 42). The stability of neo-liberalism as a political regime remains a highly debated topic. Although neo-liberalism has been seen as a remedy to the economic slowdown and recession, it remains "an unstable and evolving regime of accumulation rather than a fixed and harmoniously functional configuration of political economic power" and "might well not be the answer to the capitalists' prayers" (ibid, p. 29-30).

In institutional terms neo-liberalism remains an elusive concept difficult to "pin down" and translate into the language of institutional design and policies. It has been claimed that the "actually existing" forms are always a mixture of the globally acting forces, policies, ideologies and, on the other side, pre-existing institutions and practices; that the "virus" of neo-liberalism can produce an infinite number of locally found mutations (Peck and Tickell 2002; 2007). According to Brenner and Theodore (2002) "neo-liberal programs of capitalist restructuring are rarely, if ever, imposed in a pure form, for they are always introduced within politico-institutional context that have been moulded by earlier regulatory arrangements, institutionalised practices and political compromises" (Brenner and Theodore 2002, p. 361). One might question the usefulness of this concept if it allows such vagueness.

The critique of the neo-liberal city emphasises its growing polarisation, inequality and revanchist nature (Hubbard 2004). Swyngedouw et al (2002) refer to large UDPs as "elite playing fields" because while they reflect the interests and aspirations of the society's powerful segments, they exclude those less privileged (Swyngedouw et al 2002, p. 563). In general, "despite its language of innovation, learning, and openness, neoliberalism is associated with an extremely narrow urban-policy repertoire based on capital subsidies, place promotion, central-city makeovers, and local boosterism" (Peck and Tickell 2002, p. 395).
2.3 Connecting the debates

Whether and how connections can be made between the debates on post-socialist transition and the debates on neo-liberalism remains an open question. The debates lead to the question as to whether the process of post-socialist urban transition is part of the “mainstream” urban transition or whether instead these processes are qualitatively different. This section attempts to establish links between the two debates that to date appear to be quite disconnected. This will help to address the question of how relevant the debates in the west can be to the transformation ongoing in post-socialist cities.

First, the question of defining the post-socialist transition is connected to the globalisation debate and the claims made about the “end of history” (Fukuyama 1989). While many adopt globalisation as a base analytical framework for the study of post-socialist transition in terms of institutional adjustments and ‘catching up’ with the west that countries in transition are expected to do, others maintain that the development processes in post-socialist countries are much more endogenous in their nature. For example, Friedman (2005) claims that urbanisation in China is driven more by the evolutionary processes in the Chinese society, than by globalisation and international capital (pp. 38-51).

The growing integration of post-socialist countries into the global economy raises questions about the impact of “external forces” such as globalisation and the increasing imperative of international competitiveness in the processes of urban transformations (Hamilton 2005, p. 79). It remains largely unknown whether the submission to the neo-liberal order represents a new global ‘imperative’ or indicates an uncritical assertion of the globalisation and neo-liberalism discourses and leads to certain policy consequences across cities in the post-socialist world. It has to be acknowledged that attempts to broaden western debates into new regions and find theoretical links between the literature on post-socialist transition and western literature remain rare (exceptions include Golubchikov 2010).

Second, the role of the state in development is another area where possible connections between the debates can be found. A neo-liberal transition needs a strong state to remove old regulations, tackle possible resistance and introduce new institutional
design, financial regulations and managerial techniques. As demonstrated by the
development of a neo-liberal state in Latin America, the neo-liberal shift required
authoritarian government. This poses a question about the role of ‘residual’
authoritarianism in post-socialist states in installing a new neo-liberal order in place. For
example, Zhang (2000) argues that in China ‘pro-business authoritarianism’ has replaced
an ‘anti-market totalitarian state’:

China’s economic reform has largely destroyed the economic and
institutional basis of totalitarianism that had once prevailed the country,
and has transformed significantly the nature of China’s economy, state and
society: a transformation from a rigidly planned economy into an
increasingly market-oriented one; from an anti-market totalitarian state
into a largely pro-business authoritarian one; and from a rigid and
administratively ‘mechanic’ society in a fast-changing, informally
liberalized and increasingly ‘organic’ society (cited in Wu at al 2007, p. 4)

Although the evaluation of the post-totalitarian transition to pro-business authoritarianism
is a research task that lies beyond the limits of the current research, the role of
authoritarian government in countries like China and Russia is very important for the
theoretical exploration of neo-liberalism and, more specifically, the role of
authoritarianism in putting the neo-liberal order in place.

In Russia, the “first wave” literature on post-socialist transition tended to describe
authoritarianism as a ‘legacy’ of the socialist past that is yet to be eradicated
(Loewenhardt 1995). Modern literature tends to describe Russia’s authoritarianism as a
necessary element of the newly emerging neo-liberal order that is historically conditioned
by the path of the reforms and the balance of power between different groups. For
example, Bedirhanoglu (2004) claims that Yeltsin-led shock therapy

has helped the former communist nomenklatura to consolidate around the
capitalist project, the immediately available alternative in the early
1990s... It created the most appropriate conditions for the former
nomenklatura to transform itself into Russia’s new capitalist class (p. 22).

Along the same lines Sakwa (2004) argues that “the failure to take a more cautious
approach that would have allowed institutions and the rule of law to have developed at
the same pace as the development of the market allowed a criminalized neo-
nomenklatura elite to consolidate its power and undermine genuine liberalism and
democracy" (p. 218). Does that mean that authoritarianism is an organic element of neo-liberalism as claimed by its radical critics, or does that mean that transitional countries represent rather an extreme version of "actually existing neo-liberalism" where a new economic order has conveniently been juxtaposed onto the pre-existing authoritarian legacies?

The question of 'inherited' versus 'emergent' authoritarianism seems to be particularly interesting for the context of the current research. How, in the context of a Russian region, can one distinguish between inherited authoritarianism and the authoritarian state forms acquired to serve the interest of capital accumulation? Is it a legacy of the socialist regime or a form of neo-liberalism that used the fertile soil of "post-socialism" to flourish?

A third issue is the institutional dimension. Some students of post-Socialist transition agree that Russia has adopted neo-liberalism (Aslund 2007) but the actual implementation is still far from completion. For example, Nesvetailova (2005) states that the central elements of Neoliberalism – private property, liberalisation and a minimalist state – have been imported into Russia, they did not facilitate a comprehensive transition from planned to market economy. Neither did they induce Russia’s transformation into a modern ‘competition’ state. Not only was the actual implementation of neoliberal restructuring hampered by Russia’s structural and political crisis; the perils of building capitalism aggravated by institutional failures, power conflicts and global economic volatility (p. 248).

This leaves an open question whether Russia’s protracted transition is still to be fully implemented or whether Russia may remain in some ‘grey’ transitional area of institutional development in which elements of market will continue to coexist with the inherited from the socialist past elements of state intervention.

Fourth, Russia’s neo-liberalism faces a similar critique as elsewhere inasmuch as it is an internally unstable regime of accumulation that fails to secure long term growth and prosperity. According to Burawoy (2001) in post-reform Russia market forces suck resources out of production, sending the economy into a downward spiral of contraction (p. 276). It has been suggested that the Chinese city generally complies with the emerging model of the neo-liberal city, and should not be seen as “an idiosyncratic and irrelevant
case” in a broad picture of contemporary urban changes (Wu 2003; 2005). The place of Russian cities in relation to global urban processes still remains an open research question. The rest of this section will address this issue.

Table 2.2 The comparison of neo-liberal and post-socialist city

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political regime</th>
<th>Neo-liberal city</th>
<th>Post-socialist city</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Role of the local state in development</td>
<td>State creates conditions for investment and capital accumulation. Public-private partnerships.</td>
<td>Government leads development. State and state-controlled industries are an important source of investment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulatory environment</td>
<td>Pro-market and pro-investment regulations. Zones with special planning regime. Speculative investment.</td>
<td>Regulation based on western models. Land and infrastructures are being privatised. Property rights often established administratively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Space/scale</td>
<td>City-region</td>
<td>Growing inter and intra regional disparities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban imagery</td>
<td>Globalising city. Image represents city on the “global marketplace”.</td>
<td>Cities have opened to internationalisation. Urban development projects represent national identity and position in the “global hierarchy”.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: compiled by the author.

Table 2.2 summarises the comparison of the neo-liberal and the post-socialist city. The is no universal agreement as to whether post-socialist transition should be treated as a part of the global neo-liberal shift with evidence indicating indication to both neo-liberal design of the reforms and the post-communist legacies preventing the reforms from successful implementation. The role of ‘legacies’ in constructing new governing regimes still remains unclear, especially the pre-existing mechanisms of economic management and the involvement of state in economic development affairs. If Russia has
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witnessed the conversion of former 'apparatchiks' into 'entrepreneurchiks' exploiting their experience and connections for personal gain (Stoner-Weiss 2006), in China, the government officials have not directly engaged in business (Herrschel 2007).

The literature on the 'western' and the 'post-socialist' city also remain quite disconnected. The latter pays strong attention to the analysis of the impact of political, economic and social transition on urban areas, but overlooks the role of cities in constructing new political and economic regimes, reconfiguring the relations between the state and the private sector and between the government and society. In that sense, cities are seen at the receiving end of societal processes but not as an important part of them. This problem can be addressed by trying to engage the debate on post-socialist urban transition with the contemporary debates on globalisation, urban entrepreneurialism, governance and urban and regional competitiveness.

As discussed in this chapter, globalisation is often presented as an external, exterritorial force, that impacts on cities in a single directed, top-down manner. The literature on city marketing shows the significance of the visual in place promotion, but the question as to why and how urban images are being produced in specific ways under the conditions of contemporary capitalism (or transition) remains a new research area. Similarly, the linkages between mega-projects and nation-building practices in globalising cities remain a new research topic (Ren 2008a, p. 176). Therefore, any attempt to join together different stories on urban imagery requires grounding the research in the existing debates.

The discussion poses the question as to whether the conventional approaches captured by transitional theory can provide a solid foundation for an enquiry into urban governance in post-socialist cities, or whether its theses have to be taken more critically and possibly reviewed in the light of the modern western debates. The subsequent sections will put these questions in a wider context of the current urban governance debates.

The literature on symbolic representation and visual transformations of post-socialist cities deal with highly politicised issues of power, identity and belonging. Identities and constructed and deconstructed and are expressed by the means of
architecture and monumental art. Transformation of the image represent diverse and complex social processes such as the search of national identity, the representation of ideas of social power, the establishment of ethnic and religious domination. All these ideas and processes have little or no place in the current local economic development literature. The latter tend to analyse development processes as if they are going on in some kind of abstract space operated according to rational and an essentially economistic logic.

While the literature describes how powerful ideas dominating social life find their way into the image of the city, it fails to pay attention to unpack and critically analyse these ideas. Political, economic or military power seems to be a static thing that ‘belongs’ to different groups who express it through the means of architecture. The symbolic representation literature misses the question of the mechanisms of empowerment, power transfer and contestation.

The literature on city marketing shows the significance of the visual in place promotion, but the question as to why and how urban images are being produced in specific ways under the conditions of contemporary capitalism (or transition) remains a new research area. Similarly, the linkages between mega-projects and nation-building practices in globalising cities remain a new research topic (Ren, 2008a, 176). Therefore, any attempt to join together different stories on urban imagery requires grounding the research in the existing debates.
2.4 Urban governance

This section focuses on urban governance as a framework to analyse urban transformation in the post-socialist city and place promotion activities of the local state. In western literature, the concept of urban governance is widely used to analyse the relationship between state and non-state actors working jointly to achieve socially significant results. Tsenkova (2006) has reported the transition to urban governance in post-socialist countries, but the novelty and nature of this phenomenon have not yet been thoroughly investigated. As Section 2.1 has demonstrated, while the existing literature is focused on the aspects of institutional transformation, the political economy aspects of urban development in post-socialist cities have received relatively modest attention (Feldman 2000; Gel'man 2002). Therefore, the current section aims to introduce the concept of urban governance and to identify the elements of urban governance related to place promotion and realisation of large urban development projects.

2.4.1 Who Governs?

According to Dahl (1961) while the elites govern, they do so not a straightforward political setting: in a pluralist democracy, various social groups influence the decision making process. The elites do not merely impose their will onto the masses: in order to be legitimate they have to attune policies to the general societal mood: “If the leaders lead they are also led” (p. 102). At the same time, democratically controlled government is not a handmaiden of its constituency. That is why the main characteristic of political power in a pluralist democracy is its ambiguity. To “govern” means to successfully translate the aspirations into policies. Those who are able to push decisions through “govern” the city. This is a competitive process because different social groups tend to have conflicting goals and may compete for the same scarce resources. That is why in order to compete more successfully social groups need various resources, such as money, number of members, organisations, knowledge, information and etc.

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1 Dahl completes the historical analysis of elites evolution as follows: “an elite no longer rules New Haven. But in the strict democratic sense, the disappearance of the elite rule has not led to the emergence of rule by the people. Who, then, rules in a pluralist democracy?” (Dahl 1961, p. 86).
Dahl's argument can be summarised as follows. First, this is the elites who govern. Second, the relations of power are ambiguous and reciprocal: a leader, in order to rule legitimately has to look over his shoulder at the sub leaders and the constituents to secure their support or tolerance. The idea of pluralism implies that all political options are open for discussion and challenge. Third, relations of power are competitive: the more resources a group has and the more efficient they are used, the more influence on a particular area of decision-making does the group have. Resources as the independent variable vary from tangible (e.g. money, number of rank and file members) to intangible (e.g. connections, social standing). Political influence as the dependent variable is understood the influence upon policies in different areas.

2.4.2 State vs. market

Economic deregulation and globalisation of economic activities led to the emergence of a new form of urban governance that perceives the attraction of capital as its main task (Harvey 1989). The emergence of entrepreneurial governance stems from the transition of the capitalist state, described as the collapse of the Keynesian state and transition from the Fordist to the Post-Fordist mode of production (Jessop 1998). Stoker describes the transition to governance as a process of shifting the centre of power away from the public sector to the private sector and non-government sector: “governance refers to the development of governing styles in which boundaries between and within public and private sectors have become blurred. The essence of governance is its focus on governing mechanisms which do not rest on recourse to the authorities and sanctions of government” (Stoker 1998, p. 17).

Urban governance crosses the traditional organisational lines of urban government and means much more that urban “government”, because the real power lies “within a broader coalition of forces within which urban government and administration have only a facilitative and coordinating role to play. The power to organise space derives from a whole complex of forces mobilised by diverse social agents” (Harvey 1989, p. 6). Harvey (1989) characterises the new urban entrepreneurialism using the following three characteristics: i) it uses public-private partnerships as the source of employment and development; ii) it is entrepreneurial
because it is speculative in execution and design; iii) it focuses on the political economy of place rather than territory (Harvey 1989, p. 7).

To follow the discussion in Section 2.2, neo-liberalisation of urban governance has made the public sector increasingly dependent on the private sector involvement in urban development projects. The institutional arrangements at the local level which allow actors to work together under conditions of ‘limited and dispersed authority’ and achieve publicly significant results have become known as urban regimes (Stone 1989, p. 9). A regime is

the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to make and carry out governing decisions. There are three elements of this definition: 1) a capacity to do something; 2) a set of actors to do it; and 3) a relationship among the actors that enables them to work together” (ibid, p. 179).

According to Stone, in the absence of any centralised coordination, it is important to achieve consensus and cooperation between the private and public sector, especially among “a select few who are strategically placed (ibid, p. 230).

Logan and Molotch (1987) conceptualise the city as a product of interaction of two main conflicting values: those of use and those of exchange (Logan and Molotch 1987, p. 2). Progrowth forces build a coalition that makes a city a “growth machine”, which is defined by the authors as “an apparatus of interlocking progrowth associations and governmental units” (ibid, p. 32). The rhetoric used by promoters claim that any development is good as it allegedly benefits everybody. The popularity of growth machines stems from the fact that both entrepreneurs and politicians easily find an agreement no matter how they split on other issues on the issue of growth itself regardless the nature of proposed development, externalities and consequences: communities “invite capital to make virtually anything – whether buttons or bombs, toasters or tanks – in their own backyards” (ibid, p. 33). Disagreements within the growth coalitions relate to details, leaving the belief in growth unchallenged (ibid, p. 65). In comparison, urban regime theories focus on the processes of coalition building and deal-making, with less attention paid to the wider context of urban governance including the influences of globalisation and new ‘imperatives’ of urban development such as entrepreneurialism and competitiveness.
Chapter 2 Literature review

The theory of ‘bargaining urban governance’ by Savitch and Kantor (2002) places urban regimes in the context of the international marketplace. In order to maximise the potential benefits, cities have to learn how to bargain successfully with private capital and skilfully use the bargaining advantages that they have:

Our perspective suggests that local governments compete for private capital in the international marketplace and that they adopt policy strategies to influence the terms of their participation. City governments draw upon a variety of bargaining advantages or resources in support of these strategies. The more bargaining advantages held by the city, the greater its ability to shape urban development. Variation in outcomes is a product of four variables – market conditions, intergovernmental support, popular control, and local culture (Savitch and Kantor 2002, p. 46).

While urban development policies are formulated at the juncture of local and international forces, “urban choices are not immutable, but capable of expansion, construction, and modification. ...cities are not mere leaves in the wind of internationalisation, but political entities that in many different ways shape economic outcomes” (Savitch and Kantor 2002, p. 347).

The application of regime-based frameworks for studying the post-socialist city in Shanghai illustrate the difference in the fundamental assumptions upon which the system of urban governance acts:

Shanghai’s current urban restructuring has been driven by a unique pro-growth coalition with Chinese characteristics: implicit, informal, and project-based, different from American-style growth machine politics. The formation of this pro-growth coalition is mainly attributed to China’s asymmetrical reform - while the developmental aspects of the state has changed, the political aspects of the state remained intact” (Fu 2002, p. 120).

According to Ma (2002) the development regime in Chinese cities is shaped unilaterally by the state: “the state is not only the ultimate policymaker but also the controller which evaluates and approves major project applications and oversees their implementation” (p. 1549).

The classical regime theory portrays governance as a process of interaction between main groups of actors who may or may not have equal power to influence the decision making process. Regime theory suggests that the mechanism of interaction between the state and market forces is more complex than the post-socialist transition
literature often suggests, i.e. the state and market being almost mutually excluding forces (as discussed in Section 2.1.3). Therefore, the current research aims to analyse the reality of the post-socialist city governance.

2.4.3 Organisation of urban governance

The adjustment to the requirements of the international marketplace, real or perceived, stimulates the proliferation of new organisational forms of governance, including flexible urban governance that has “bent and stretched” established planning practices, altered exiting organizational arrangements and embraces flexibility of collective bargaining, flexibility of workforce, flexibility in organizational design, etc (Desfor and Jorgensen 2004, p. 487). According to Swyngedouw et al (2002) the ‘pluralistic governance’ model implies that in the name of greater flexibility and efficiency in the implementation of large urban development projects, formal government structures become subordinated to quasi-private and highly autonomous organisations and agencies that “compete with and often supersede local and regional authorities as protagonists and managers of urban renewal” (Swyngedouw et al 2002, p. 556). These organisational arrangements are created to implement project-focused and market-led initiatives and “have replaced statutory planning as the primary means of intervention in the cities” (ibid, p. 562) and have led to “redistribution of policy-making powers, competences and responsibilities” and ultimately led to the “privatisation of urban governance” (ibid, p. 573).

In post-socialist countries, entrepreneurial urban regimes are far from being complete, coherent or even functional. A case study from Tallinn by Feldman (2000) shows that the success of its waterfront regeneration project has been seriously hampered by institutional deficiencies, namely the constantly changing structure of land ownership between the public and the private sectors in conjunction with the slow progress of land reform. Laws are frequently modelled on Scandinavian examples and are not well adapted to the Estonian context or form a coherent framework. All these factors typically “fuel mistrust and communication failure as most of the actors participating in the development process are uncertain about their roles in the decision-making process” (Feldman 2000, p. 844).
Chapter 2 Literature review

In the current literature on post socialist transition only limited attention has been paid to analysing the role of the local state in urban development, place promotion and implementation of large urban development projects. A number of case studies demonstrate that Moscow’s ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ does not neatly fit into any ‘pure’ model of neoliberal urban governance (Badyina and Golubchikov 2005; Pagonis and Thornley 2000). The gentrification of the central blocks, which in Soviet times were occupied by factories and working class residents, does not represent a vision of gentrification being a result of the government withdrawal from or deregulation of the housing market. On the contrary, the case study shows that “the role of the Moscow administration has been paramount” (Badyina and Golubchikov 2005, p. 126). The government intervention is not an act of an abstract government, but an act of a concrete political figure, the Mayor of Moscow: "Luzhkov's 'authoritarian neoliberalism' has successfully mobilised the property market, delivered large-scale renovation and perked up the look and order of his 'city empire'" (ibid, p. 127).

2.4.4 Entrepreneurial urban governance and place promotion

As discussed in Section 2.2 on neo-liberal urbanisation, under the new ‘imperatives’ of globalisation and competitiveness, entrepreneurialism has become one of the main rationale of urban governance. Entrepreneurialism is a rather eclectic concept that embraces different activities that city authorities become engaged in. These activities range from economic development policies, stimulation of local industries to place promotion and enhancing the positive image of the city. According to Hall and Hubbard (1996):

urban entrepreneurialism has ushered in a whole range of changes in the way in which the city operates at all levels, changes that can only be comprehended with reference to the changing nature of social, economic and political process which are operating at both the global and local level. These changes are being felt at the level of experience, as the new urban politics forge a new cultural politics of identity at the urban level, changing the ways in which the people of the city see themselves and others (Hall and Hubbard 1996, p. 169).
Wu (2003) argues that the Shanghai entrepreneurial strategy has been a project of the central state looking to restore its legitimacy in response to the globalization process:

Whereas the state’s legitimacy embedded in the means of production has been eroded through marketisation, the entrepreneurial project allows the state to tap the market to restore its role as the promoter of economic development. This imperative, both real and perceived, is derived from globalization, which is regarded both as a threat and as an opportunity for national survival (Wu 2003, p. 1694).

In the era of globalisation and interurban competition, architecture and urban design become important elements of the strategies aimed on strengthening international competitiveness (Ren 2008; Sklair 2006; Gospodini 2002). The use of “city branding” (Kavaratzis and Ashworth 2005) and local “identity by design” (Watson and Bentley 2007) is aimed on forming a positive reputation of a nation (region, city) among the wide audience of policy makers, businessmen, visitors and creative people (Anholt 2007). Image construction is associated with the attempts made by governments to lure mobile global capital to a specific location through creating favourable political, institutional and physical conditions – described as a process of neo-liberalisation of cities (Brenner 1998; Jessop 2002).

Those projects emphasise the “imagery” aspects of entrepreneurial urban governance and the use of images in promoting, legitimising and implementing development, schemes and policies in place promotion. The western literature on city marketing and place promotion presents image as being instrumental to the purposes of local economic development (Short et al 1993). At the local level architecture helps to advertise urban development projects and promote speculative investment (Crilley 1993, p. 231). Smyth (1994) considers the preparation of a marketing strategy for a building project, development area or the city as isomorphic processes (Smyth 1994, p. 2).

The construction of new urban imagery is aligned with the postmodernist culture that juxtaposes, blends and repeats images and ideas and postmodern society “with its eclectic conformity, its fragmented palimpsest of past times and distant spaces, its commodified ethnic culture and sanitised classlessness” (Holcomb 1993, p. 142). The postmodern cultural framework allows the use of historical references in the
modern context of selling places, especially through various "culture-led" regeneration projects. According to Philo and Kearns (1993) "urban bourgeoisies are seeking to mobilise segments of culture, history and locality in the competitive selling of their places both to outsiders (to attract capital) and to insiders (to legitimise redevelopment)" (Philo and Kearns 1993, p. 29).

The research draws on the idea that the production of imagery is deeply embedded into the socio-economic relations and economic production, investment and culture (see Soja 2000; Goodwin 1993; Harvey 1990). Apart from the economic logic behind the production and use of a new image of the city described in city marketing literature, there is also a strong social logic as place promotion activities may be "designed to convince local people, many of whom will be disadvantaged and potentially disaffected, that they are important cogs in a successful community and that all sorts of ‘good things’ are really being done on their behalf" (Philo and Kearns 1993, p. 3). Lovering (2007) argues that the ‘performative turn’ in urban governance has been a result of the diminishing capacity of urban governance actors to deliver qualitative change in economic growth and attempts to “present themselves as if there is something that they can actually be seen to achieve” (Lovering 2007, p. 360).

The power of imagery is defined by its ability to legitimise political choices and mobilise people for action. According to Massey (2007) geographical imaginations are

powerful elements in the armoury of legitimisation of political strategies. They are part of the scaffolding from which hang grand political visions; they are integral to understanding of such things as globalisation and development; they are embedded too in the assumptions that underpin the most apparently mundane of government documents, or the research reports of private hired consultants (Massey 2007, p. 23).

Entrepreneurialism implies economic innovation as an imperative for economic development, whereas economic development in post-socialist cities can be achieved through different channels e.g. natural resource or government rent, etc. Competition may be within the political sphere and regulated by a different system of incentives. Competitiveness assumes too much universality in the conditions of competition and implies quite a narrow and rigid route to development success, which may not be the case in the post-socialist conditions.
2.4.5 Spatial dimension urban governance

In cities the adoption of the neo-liberal governance model has led to the growing attention to the central areas as sites of urban regeneration and various sorts of iconic and flagship urban development projects. Urban competitiveness thinking has affected urban and regional development strategies and practices across the world. In western cities competitiveness thinking has led to the proliferation of various ‘culture-led’ regeneration projects which aim to commercialise the elements of history, heritage and place identity attempting to create an attractive image for visitors and business partners. According to Keating and Frantz (2004)

by making external circumstances such as globalisation pressures, urban competition, or institutional restraints by state authorities responsible for their failure, they [the city authorities] can justify their claims for urban autonomy and thus increase their own power base. Therefore we should rather see the theme of urban competition, and the associated neomercantilist vision of cities vying for limited opportunities, as constructed by political and economic elites in order to mobilise support behind particular policy stances (Keating and Frantz 2004, p. 188).

The intertwining of both nationalistic and competitiveness rhetoric in urban development projects is not a uniquely post-socialist phenomenon. The question is important not only in the countries undergoing “transition”, hence understanding of urban transformation should take into account cultural aspects too. According to Ren (2008a):

The generic and noncontextual global architecture has a wide appeal among the territorial elites eager to construct a globally oriented image for their nations and cities. In Europe, it might be the uncertainty and anxiety about economic globalisation felt by political elites that account for the construction of monumental architectural projects. While in China, it is the rising nationalism, along with global consumerist ideology, that drives the production of architectural mega projects (Ren 2008a, p. 187).

The literature on the spatiality of post-socialist urban governance remains modest and fragmented however. The transition to a market oriented urban governance is characterised by the following processes: marketisation of urban development and growing inequalities (Wu 2005, p. 102), commercialisation and

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2 See for example, the cases of Bilbao (Keating and Frantz 2004; McNeil 2000) and Cardiff (McNeil and Tewdwr-Jones 2003).
privatisation of urban space, the introduction of new regimes of policing, and the redirection of public investment from social programmes to commercially oriented projects. There are other interesting areas where debates on post-socialist transition and neo-liberal urbanisation interface, for example, the rationale, organisational and political support behind large urban development projects.

Table 2.3 Urban governance from post-socialist transition and neo-liberal perspective.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation structure</th>
<th>Post-socialist urban governance</th>
<th>Neo-liberal urban governance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legacy of a centralised and vertically integrated administrative structure. Weak municipal self-governance. Emergence of public-private partnerships.</td>
<td>Public-private partnerships. Quick adaptation to the changing economic conjuncture. Avoids public accountability through &quot;special regimes&quot; and &quot;special development zones&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policies</td>
<td>Privatisation of state property. Monetisation of services.</td>
<td>Promotion of economic development by creating good economic climate and through direct support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spatial dimension</td>
<td>Locked up within the existing administrative boundaries. Spatial inequalities. Gentrification.</td>
<td>Transforms and bends the pre-existing administrative boundaries. Selective in spatial choices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visual representation</td>
<td>The need to erase the memories of the &quot;unwanted past&quot;. New imagery contributes to the construction of new national identities, promotes market values.</td>
<td>Imagery relates to the positioning of the city on the &quot;global map&quot;. Employs international &quot;starchitects&quot; to do design work according to international standards.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: compiled by the author.

Table 2.3 “Urban governance from post-socialist transition and neo-liberal perspective” compares post-socialist and neo-liberal urban governance. It is argued that the focus on the visual and the nature of urban development projects being
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implemented in western cities can help drawing some conclusions about the emerging politico-economic regime of the neo-liberal city. The following section will discuss urban governance in post-socialist context and the implications for urban space and the image of the city.

2.5 Framework for analysis

The concluding section of the literature review chapter attempts to summarise the discussion, and to integrate its different themes to establish the framework for analysis. As discussed in the previous sections, the transitional urban literature often sees cities at the receiving end of societal processes and economic transformations i.e. as somewhat passive recipients of change. This approach can potentially impede the opportunities to analyse urban change in post-socialist cities and the complexity of interaction between the urban and social, and the role of key actors and agents of governance. Moreover, the dogmatic views of both the post-socialist and neo-liberal transformation of urban governance suggest that there is a ‘pre-written’ script that cities have to follow. However, there are grounds for questioning this. This study attempts to address the question by studying urban development projects as ‘laboratories’ of emerging forms of urban governance and hence re-connect the project level with transformation on higher level.

2.5.1 Urban development projects as a research lens

This section aims to discuss the role of large government-led urban development projects in the creating new urban governance. This research does not analyse how architectural monuments convey their meaning through visual characteristics and architectural detail (questions that theory of architecture deals with). Instead of focusing on architectural morphology and the language of architecture, this research analyses the emergence of urban development projects in the context of political, economic, social conditions and the interaction of powerful actors.

Architecture has always reflected the structure of power in society and cannot be analysed independently from social and political factors affecting its production and use (Vale 2008, p. viii). The “carved in stone” societal processes make cities, public places and buildings essential for understanding history and political, economic
and social changes. Grand projects and monumental art have always played an important role in constructing and legitimising important political and social ideas (Sudjic 2006). Buildings, as “the visible embodiment of the invisible” manifest and represent certain values and identities (Leach 2002).

During the socialist period, architecture and urban design were used for the purpose of socialist propaganda. Stalin used architecture and urban design for political purposes as analysed by Paperny (1996) and Ikonnikov (2006). Khmelnitskiy (2007) acknowledges that “the construction of the Palace of Soviets would become the main USSR propaganda campaign and the main policy of ideological consolidation of the population around new Stalin’s leadership” (p. 85) and also suggests that Stalin used design contests for the Palace as a laboratory of new socialist architecture: “he [Stalin – N.K.] was looking not for a concrete design, but for the direction and aesthetic system which would be used and developed further” (ibid, p. 122). The aim was to test the mechanisms of power upon the architectural and planning community in order to attune them for using on the political opponents and the wider social audience (ibid, p. 124-125).

The dramatic political, economic and social transformations in post-socialist countries have created demand for new types of buildings and urban spaces and introduced new organisational and economic mechanisms of urban development. The current literature identifies several tendencies in post-socialist urban development including the emergence of commercial spaces, new spaces of worship, new symbolic meanings conveyed by urban space, the transformation of place identity and the emergence of new governing mechanisms that facilitate the production of new architecture and urban design.

The 1990s witnessed the emergence of large commercial urban development projects in post-Socialist cities (Temelova 2007; Sailer-Fliege 1999; Sýkora 1999). New commercial urban development projects often enjoyed direct political and

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3 The 1930s were the time of an acute housing crisis both in Moscow and in all other USSR cities... It was impossible to rationally justify the construction of a gigantic prestige building-monument that would detract much needed resources from satisfying the social needs. Nevertheless, the very possibility of the implementation of such a project had to instill into minds belief in strength of the societal order and the building itself had to represent in reality the idea of bright future, which could justify any hardship and exertion today. In other words, the Palace of Soviets was conceived as implemented utopia, the materialisation of Stalin’s myth, which was actively instilled into the mass consciousness by the propaganda apparatus (Ikonnikov 2006, p. 328).
financial government support, but at the same time lacked a coherent economic rationale:

in the absence of economic development, social and profitability arguments, what remains as the justification behind public involvement in Manezh4 is the political motive... The argument presented here is that it was a political act drawing on the image of the 'market'. However the employment of this term did not result in greater effectiveness and efficiency in operational management or reconfiguration of interests groups involved in decision-making. In a paradoxical manner the 'market' was used for its symbolic importance but was excluded from the way the project was carried out. Planning procedures were bypassed, opposing views were ignored and important laws were violated to promote an unprofitable investment that 'the market' would never have made (Pagonis and Thornley 2000, pp. 755-757).

Swyngedouw (2003a; 2003c) suggests that urban development projects play a more important role than a mere instrumental one in attracting investment, and has conceptualised urban development projects as a laboratory and testing site of urban governance. There is a growing literature that examines the role of urban development projects in the formation of urban governance models (see: Moulaur et al 2003; MacLeod 2002; Smith 1996). According to Swyngedouw et al (2003c) large-scale urban development projects (UDPs) have become

a sort of new urban policy that actively produces, enacts, embodies, and shapes the new political and economic regimes that are operative at the local, regional, national and global scales. They are the material expression of a developmental logic that views mega-projects and place marketing as major leverages for generating future growth and for waging a competitive struggle to attract investment capital. Urban projects of this kind are, therefore, neither mere result or response, nor the consequence of political and economic change enacted elsewhere. On the contrary, we argue that such UDPs are the very catalysts of urban and political change; UDPs incorporate processes that are felt locally, but regionally, nationally, and internationally as well (pp. 2-3).

Here urban development projects are analysed in the light of globalisation process and specifically within the interaction of the global and the local ("glocal"). Urban development projects play an important role in the processes of social, economic and political restructuring are used as "the lens through which we can begin

4 Underground shopping mall near the Red Square in Moscow.
to excavate the myriad processes of socio-spatial change that have reshaped... the co-
ordinates of everyday life" (Swyngedouw et al 2003a, p.11). Thus, urban development
projects are not only the final result or product of governance, they are the process
through which governance is performed and patterns of power are constructed. The
actors involved in urban development projects exercise governing power through
these projects.

2.5.2 Framework for analysis

The discussion in Section 2.1 has suggested that, the orthodox view of the post
socialist transition implies the use of a ‘pre-written script’ of urban transformation. As
the real ‘transition’ often deviates from the expected route, doubts arise concerning
the validity of the transitional theory assumptions. The attempt of transitional theory
to analyse the present on the basis of the “future that has already happened” indicates
a major ontological problem of transitional frameworks, namely its attempt to analyse
transforming social phenomena within a rigid theoretical framework. The rest of the
section is dedicated to designing a framework for analysis that may better meet the
challenge of analysing the post-socialist urban transformation.

Organisational structure and funding

The actual transition always occurs in a ‘hybrid form’ where the ‘partial ruins’ of the
past become engaged with new political and economic arrangements (Herrschel
2007). For example, in recent projects of gentrification of the city centre blocks
Moscow city Government has played not just regulatory role but led the whole
process (Badyina and Golubchikov 2005). It has become a normal practice in Moscow
that the local state instead of relying exclusively on the mechanisms of formal
taxation makes individual deals with developers, which specify the obligation of the
developer to transfer a share of the residential or commercial stock to the city in
exchange of getting guaranteed access to municipal infrastructure and trouble-free
review of the planning application (Valletta 2005).

These case studies show that urban governance in Moscow does not neatly fit
into a ‘pure’ model, either authoritarian or neo-liberal but rather represents a ‘hybrid’
form very similar to those described by Ma (2002) and Wu et al (2007) in which the

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authoritarian executive authority of the local state is used to create a regulatory environment for the market, intervene in the market and give the local authorities power to act as an initiator and business partner in discretionally selected urban development projects.

Even if the design of the formal institutions is done in compliance with the requirements of an advanced market economy, the actual performance of the actors may be conditioned by other factors, such as habits and cultural norms. While formal institutions have been adjusted to western norms, a lack of trust and cooperation between actors has seriously hampered the success of urban redevelopment projects in Tallinn (Feldman 2000, p. 844). Since the zoning system was introduced in 1998 in Kazan the functional designation and development parameters have been constantly changed to adjust to the demands of the private and state developers that required higher development density (Personal conversation in Kazan Planning Department 2009).

This discussion illustrates the difficulties of using the analysis of formal institutions as the actual processes and actors may 'bypass' them. The 'hybrid' forms of governance do not fit into any 'pure' model form. The emergent in post-socialist cities urban governance is not about deregulation, greater efficiency, advanced capital accumulation and seem to combine elements of neo-liberal regime with traditional developmental state. The concept of “actually existing neo-liberalism” can be potentially useful instrument to analyse the dissemination of neo-liberal regimes over localities. However, it is unclear how to connect the ‘model’ form and the ‘actually existing form’ or a ‘marginal’ form of neo-liberalism, as many claims made in the debates on neo-liberal urbanisation are too broad and speculative and hence difficult to apply to a practical research situation. To what extent have post-socialist cities become “entrepreneurial”? How entrepreneurialism is progressing in relation to the post-socialist transition?

Rationale of urban governance

The current literature discusses various links between globalisation and urban governance and cities spatial structure. These debates are fundamentally important for understanding urban governance in post-socialist countries since they became open to
global influences. However the degree to which the “global” affects the “local” remains unclear. Under conditions of globalisation and weakening of the national state the local state has to become more “entrepreneurial” and business oriented, its main role has shifted from providing local services to creating a good business environment for business and investing (Harvey 1989). In the new globalising regulatory environment cities achieve different degree of success: some manage to secure places in the top league of the global hierarchy, other become marginalised as ‘losers’ of the global competition. Much depends on the ability of the city authorities to use the assets and secure deals with the private sector (Savitch and Kantor 2002). The discourse of urban and regional competitiveness implies certain universality in the nature of the challenge that cities across the world face which requires a standard “response” in terms of government strategies, institutional design and action aimed at strengthening local competitiveness.

The degree and the scope of the universality remains an open question. Competitiveness assumes too much universality in the conditions of competition (i.e. economic competition according to rational rules), which may not be the case in post-socialist conditions. As the discussion in previous chapters has demonstrated, there are limits to the competitiveness thesis in terms of the geographical scale, as not all cases of interurban competition are global, and limits in other conditions as competition can be observed in the political sphere where it is regulated by a different system of incentives. The conditions of competition also vary as while some cities compete on the global market, other opt to compete on national and regional markets. Different conditions of competition require different strategies. While the global competition implies meeting economic, institutional and cultural standards set up at the global level, competition at other scales may occur according to different rules.

As the literature review has demonstrated architecture and urban design have been an important component of local and regional competitiveness strategies. Global ambitions require meeting international design standards, selection of specific architectural ‘brands’ that are globally recognised and meeting the level of ‘iconic architecture’ (Sklair 2006; Ren 2008a). In the post-socialist world architecture and urban design have face more urgent tasks related to expressing the ideas of newly established or regained national identity (Graney 2007). This does not mean that there is a clear-cut division in the task assigned to the imagery urban projects. Urban
development projects in post-socialist countries often serve both goals, contributing to the construction of the national identity and searching for enhancing local competitiveness on the national or global scale (Anacker 2004; Broudehoux 2004). Project is western countries are not exclusively focused on perusing a position in the global hierarch either. Regions with strong ethnic characteristics may use architecture and urban design for promoting their identity similar to post-socialist states (Keating and Frantz 2004).

Imagery projects are addressing two outcomes: i) reconstructing the identity, and ii) promoting economic growth. How do these components mix and what are the mechanisms that bring them to being? Can the literature on identity construction and symbolic representation in post-socialist countries offer a plausible explanation of the emerging city imagery? Is the competitiveness theory capable of explaining the mechanisms of the city image production? In that sense, neither pure economic logic not the logic of symbolic representation can provide a full explanation.

Spatial dimension

As the literature review has demonstrated, the geographical dimension plays an important role in urban governance debates. Debates on neo-liberal urban governance and competitiveness are closely connected with globalisation and imply a large degree of uniformity in the establishment of global regulatory orders. The literature on global cities indicates towards the interconnectedness of places through the globalisation processes (Massey 2007). The post-socialist transition debate is described as “the east wing” of globalisation debate dealing specifically with the issue of adaptation of the post-socialist countries to the regulatory regimes adopted in the west. In this respect the literature remains country-specific and analyses transition as a process of the national level paying little attention to regional variations and differences.

At the national level, the processes of state rescaling lead to the emergence of new governing practices and urban spaces (Brenner 2004). For example, Russian government has become more selective in terms of choosing geographic locations for investment projects. Although, these policies have not been formulated in a coherent form, there are signs that indicate that the resources of the central government in future will be focused on particular geographic locations, including regions, cities or
cross-boundary geographical entities selected according to criteria of economic rationality and efficiency.

At the city level the new state role and governing regimes have led to various consequences. While the state of the old neighbourhoods continued to decline the new islands of prosperity have started to emerge where the new well-off social groups found comfortable, western-style urban living. Many neighbourhoods emerged in the suburban belts of large cities, some built as fortified fortresses for the new rich. **Table 2.4** “Large urban development projects - framework for analysis” summarises the discussion in the literature review chapter.

### Table 2.4 Large urban development projects - framework for analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Post-socialist</th>
<th>Neo-liberal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organisational structure / Funding</td>
<td>Government acts as the main promoter and mobilises support from public and private companies. Funding from government sources with private support.</td>
<td>Public-private partnership. Funding from private sources with government support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rationale</td>
<td>To strengthen a new national identity by promoting new values and erasing the traces of the unwanted past.</td>
<td>To strengthen competitiveness, promote the place, attract investment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spatial dimension / Location choices</td>
<td>Symbolically important sites.</td>
<td>Profit-driven location choices.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** compiled by the author.

### 2.6 Conclusions

This chapter has reviewed relevant literature sources that can help to understand urban change in post-socialist countries. The complex and dynamic transformation ongoing in these cities raises question concerning the theoretical interpretation of these changes. While the existing literature offers some tools to analyse urban transformation in the post-socialist world, it also has certain limitations that are discussed below.
Chapter 2 Literature review

The mainstream literature conceptualises post-socialist transition in terms of democratisation and marketisation. In practical policy terms, “transition” has been about harmonising the regulatory base with that established in the west and creating the institutional conditions to allow markets to work “properly”. Transitional theories propose that changes on the ground are to be achieved through changing the institutions, which is why the literature on urban transition focuses on privatisation, the introduction of property rights, market land allocation mechanisms and planning techniques. Transitional theory focuses on the eliminating ‘distortions’ caused by state regulation and the introduction of market regulation.

The main limitation of this approach is that changes are perceived as inevitable and predefined by the ‘course of history’ and ‘global waves of democratisation’. This dogmatic view largely treats the political question as resolved (by the act of departing from a dictatorial rule) and focuses on tackling the legacies of the previous regime. It overlooks institutional continuity, the role of pre-existing institutions or the “partial ruins” of communism as institutional building blocks for reconstruction (Stark and Bruszt 1998). This observation questions the usefulness of the approaches based on a ‘tick-box’ analysis of formal institutions as institutions such as planning and property right legislation may be in place but the actual performance of actors may be governed by traditional relations of power.

The concept of “actually existing neo-liberalism” implies that neo-liberal shift occurs through locally based institutions and governing practices which is why there are many “mutations” contingent on local conditions. This concept creates an opportunity for a more critical analysis of urban transformation in post-socialist countries based not on the orthodox ‘wholesale’ approach to transition, but on a more context-specific analysis. This approach is not unproblematic. The following aspects remain under-researched and under-explained. If the ‘genetic code’ of neo-liberalism is known, how are the variations being constructed? Is it already full-fledged neo-liberalism or proto-neo-liberalism? What is the relationship between other discourses such as Statism, nationalism and post-socialism? Does the former represent alternatives to neo-liberalism, or do they form the entourage of the neo-liberalist revolution? The concept of “actually existing neo-liberalism” can help to ground the neo-liberalisation debate into the local context but for that purposes it has to be operationalised.
This research proposes that urban transformation in post-socialist cities should be analysed using the concept of urban governance. Although many elements of post-socialist urban governance organisation come about as a direct borrowing of ideas from the West, the real ‘product’ of this borrowing seems to deviate from a democratic and market city described in the ‘cookbooks’ of post-socialist transition. This leads to a question as to whether and how the ‘imperatives’ of post-socialist transition or neo-liberal shift actually pre-define the outcome of urban governance transformations that can be observed in Russian cities? Do urban governments ‘adapt’ to new imperatives (e.g. a market economy and competitiveness) according to a blueprint?

The dominant approach in post-socialist urban studies implies that urban space is a mere “product” of social change. This is not an intrinsic problem of the post-socialist urban theory, for example, Marcuse and van Kempen (2000) and Soja (2000) show that the role of the space in producing social changes is sometimes underestimated in western urban theories as well, although the post-socialist urban literature reiterates it due to its normative bias. The lack of attention to the spatial dimension of urban governance simplifies the analysis, not only in terms of the regional geographical and cultural differences but also in terms of questions of the spatiality of power, territorial scale, geographical inequalities, without which the question of urban governance cannot be fully understood. The critical reflections help to connect the debate to the local context but it has to be translated into the language of concrete case studies, institutions and policies as many claims are broad and are difficult to apply in a practical research situation.
CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

3.1 The significance of the research

This research aims to analyse large urban development projects in Kazan - the capital city of the Republic of Tatarstan (Russia). The political, economic and social changes in post-socialist countries have led to the dramatic transformation of urban areas (Andrusz et al. 1996; Hamilton et al. 2005; Tsenkova and Nedovic-Budic 2006). At the same time, cities have been fundamentally important for the construction of political frameworks and governance regimes including neo-liberalism (Brenner and Theodore 2002) and post-socialism (Herrschel 2007; Kostinski 2001). The relations between urban development projects, emerging forms of urban governance and wider societal dynamics remain a relatively unexplored area of post-socialist urban studies. This makes the analysis of urban development projects an interesting way of understanding wider societal transformations in post-socialist societies.

3.2 Problems of the existing literature

The contemporary literature on post-socialist cities shows gaps in knowledge relating to urban governance and more specifically the role and rationale for causes and mechanisms of large urban redevelopment projects. Western literature emphasises the role of such factors as globalisation and neo-liberalism that ‘force’ cities to ‘respond’ to the imperatives they create by making deliberate efforts to strengthen their competitiveness, position themselves on the ‘global mental map’ and build up an internationally recognisable image using different techniques, not the least of them architecture and urban design. The literature on post-socialist urban transition is, by definition, geographically confined and explains urban transformation in former socialist countries by the societal transformations including democratisation, marketisation and liberalisation.
Chapter 3 Research design and methodology

Although western and post-socialist debates remain quite separated (Ma 2002), both literatures share some similarities, for example, the globalisation inspired literature as well as the post-socialist transition urban literature often analyse urban change within a dualistic model of ‘societal context’ and ‘urban response’ which portrays cities as being at the receiving end of societal processes (see Tsenkova and Nedovic-Budic eds. 2006). Both explanatory routes seem to conceptualise urban change as a consequence of pre-defined transition based on economic neoliberalisation and democratisation (in case of post-socialist countries). This approach underestimates the role of cities and urban governance in transforming the power of the state and governing mechanisms and misses out the nuances and the complexity of possible connections between the ‘global’ and the ‘local’ intersecting at the city level, which forms an interesting area of study (see Brenner 2004). The literature on urban governance in post-socialist countries remains rather limited and fragmented. As Section 2.1 demonstrates, while the existing literature is focused on institutional transformation, the questions of policy making and the political economy of urban development in post-socialist cities so far have received relatively modest attention (Feldman 2000; Gel’man 2002). In particular, the aspects of the interaction between political and economic forces, institutional transformations and the implications for cities remain poorly analysed.

At the same time, the use of western theories may be severely constrained by the limitations of theoretical transfer. As suggested by Artobolevsky (1997) “it might initially seem that that the transition to a market economy would provide significant scope for the exploration of western experience, but in practice this has been far from the case” (p. 130). The problems of theoretical transfer can be linked to the fundamental differences in the initial conditions in the west and in Russia where the traditions of authoritarianism, institutional ‘legacies’ of communism (McFaul 2001; Stark and Bruszt 1998), the country’s economic structure (Aslund 2007) and socio-political conditions (Burawoy 2001) all have made the direct transfer of western theories difficult. Also the speed of the post-socialist reforms has quickly outpaced the advance of theory (Murrell 1995, p. 165). This requires a more critical approach to the existing theory. There is thus a need to explore some alternatives to the traditional view of post-socialist urban transition.
3.3 Research aim and tasks

The aim of the study is to analyse urban development projects that shape the image of Russia's regional capital cities, Kazan, specifically the connections between urban redevelopment projects and programmes and wider social, economic and political structures and trends.

In order to realise the aim of the study the following tasks have to be solved:

1) To identify and analyse urban development projects and programmes that can best represent the nature of urban transformation in the present context;

2) To analyse the governing mechanisms responsible for the implementation of the projects and how projects and programmes are conceived, designed and implemented; to identify the factors and forces that are most important for understanding the policymaking process and processes of urban transformation;

3) To reflect back on the theory in order to understand the relative usefulness of different theoretical frameworks.

3.4 Research focus

The focus of the study is the process of urban governance associated with large urban development projects. Such projects require large government investment, involve different actors from both state and non-state sectors and produce a strong impact on the city landscape and its image. The research will focus on the following elements of urban governance: governing mechanisms and institutions, the policymaking process and the development rationale and political rhetoric used to justify the action which brings urban redevelopment projects into being. It is argued that studying the governing mechanisms can help to understand both urban redevelopment projects in post-socialist cities, and the social, economic and political structures lying behind them.

In order to understand wider political, economic and social transformation the research focuses on large urban development projects as laboratories of political and institutional change (Swyngedouw et al. 2003a). The research uses the concepts of urban
Chapter 3 Research design and methodology

governance and social production of space to link a discrete and fixed (in time and space) phenomenon such as large urban development projects to continuous processes in society. The concept of urban governance reveals main actors, regimes and institutions that facilitate the emergence of projects. The selection of projects has been justified by considering the particular types of space that are most likely to be affected by macro forces (Marcuse and van Kempen 2000, pp. 252-253). If urban development is a result of social relations, the analysis of specific projects could contribute to our understanding of those relations therefore the selection of case studies has to be justified.

3.5 Research questions

The current study started as an enquiry into urban redevelopment projects and programmes that cause the transformation of Kazan’s image and urban structure. Urban governance is related to various aspects of social, economic and political life of the society. To understand what shapes a particular model of urban governance in the current context it is necessary to address the following questions.

The main question of this study is as follows: what are the main driving forces behind the urban redevelopment projects (UDPs) and programmes in a regional capital of post-socialist Russia, and more specifically:

1) Would it be sufficient to consider UDPs as fixed discrete tasks performed by a well-defined number of actors as suggested in literature on urban development in post-socialist capitals (Anacker 2004; Sir 2008); or do instead urban development projects need to be analysed within a wider research framework that treats them as ‘laboratories of urban change’ (Swyngedouw et al. 2003a) and analyses projects in terms of their governing mechanisms, strategically located actors and project rationale?

2) Are UDPs largely shaped by the search to enhance urban competitiveness and to position the city on the “international marketplace” (Savitch and Kantor 2002) governed by universal rational economic laws, as suggested in the mainstream
western literature on globalisation, urban governance and competitiveness and literature on post-socialist transition?

3) Are urban development projects a result of the actions of predominantly local forces, political struggles and regulatory regimes that do not necessarily represent a consistent and coherent 'transition' towards a pre-defined institutional form or regime, but represent the process of ad hoc institutional adjustment, messy adaptation of pre-existing institutions to new conditions, as suggested in the critical reading of post-socialist transition literature and 'actually existing neoliberalism' literature (Brenner and Theodore 2002)?

3.6 Research epistemology

The current study is based on the realist philosophy, which asserts that the material world exists independently from what people think about it. Modern natural science is based on the realist philosophy that clearly separates the researcher from the object of study and uses research methods that involve data collection (including experimental data), data analysis, revealing the recurrence and regularities of events and patterns and drawing conclusions that have the status of a 'natural law', i.e. a law that under similar conditions will recur in infinite number of cases. In the social sciences the situation is more complex as the researcher cannot be separated from the object of study. The way we conceptualise social phenomenon, processes and relationship between them affects them, influence their structure and performance. The scope for experimenting is severely limited especially in research of large socio-economic systems such as cities and regions.

The realist tradition in social science maintains the independence of the world from our knowledge but there are different philosophies within this tradition. Marx has claimed that human society develops according to societal laws that act independently of people’s knowledge and that are similar to the laws acting in the natural world. These objective societal laws, according to Marx, predetermine the succession of socio-economic formations through the cyclical process of development of the relations of production and exchange in society. Popper (1992/1966) has criticised the historicist
approach to society and introduced the concept of the “open society” that denies any historical necessity that is advocated by its ‘prophets’ that often have material interests in propagating certain views of society and its ‘destiny’ (p. 31-33). Another important contribution made by Popper into theory of social science is the method of falsification as an alternative to the principle of verification. According to the principle of falsification, Science does not prove anything by conducting experiments, no matter how numerous, for the very reason that no matter how often the theory is tested there is always the possibility that it can be falsified (Delanty 2000, p.31).

To avoid social determinism and to reveal the actual societal processes and actors this research uses the realist philosophy in a critical way. According to Sayer (2000) critical realism is focused on “necessity and contingency rather than regularity, on open rather than closed systems, on the ways in which casual processes could produce quite different results in different context” (p. 5). Instead of deriving causation from regular succession of events, realists build their explanation on “identifying causal mechanisms and how they work, and discovering if they have been activated and under what conditions”. Repeated occurrences of events (that positivists would register) are not significant as “what causes something to happen has nothing to do with the number of times we have observed it happening” (ibid, p. 14). Consistent regularities are significant for explaining the processes occurring in “closed systems”, i.e. those that have controlled conditions and limited influence from the outside world. Social systems are all open systems in which conditions are not controlled, the number of factors is infinite and their duration and impact are difficult to measure. In open systems, “same mechanisms can produce different outcomes according to context, or more precisely, according to its spatio-temporal relations with other objects, having their own casual powers and liabilities, which may trigger, block or modify its action” (ibid, p. 15). As social systems are complex, there is a risk of attributing to one mechanism effects which are actually due to another. According to Sayer (2000) the problem of identifying casual responsibility in complex open systems can be dealt with by asking a series of characteristically realist questions:
Chapter 3 Research design and methodology

- What does the existence of this object/practice presuppose? What are its preconditions?
- Can/could object A exist without B?
- What is it about this object which enables it to do certain things? (p. 16)

The use of these questions allows to reveal necessity, not regularity, to trace main casual relationship and understand what makes things happen in specific cases (ibid, p. 20).

The choice of critical realism was informed by the specificity of the current phase of the Russian society development. The collapse of the USSR, the dramatic processes of political and economic restructuring have demonstrated similarity with Popper's (1992/1966) model of “open society” that at any moment moves towards the unknown as opposed to a pre-determined future. Critical realism also claims that “events are not pre-defined before they happen but depend on contingent conditions, the future is open – things could go in many different ways (Sayer 2000, p. 15).

In parallel to the fundamental processes of economic and political restructuring, other social transformations have occurred, such as the reassessment of national, ethnic and religious identities. Although the question of national and ethnic identity is an important element of political mobilisation and action, these themes should be treated as elements of the ‘superstructure’ and hence considered as subordinated in their significance to more fundamental questions of economic and political power. Those have been the processes that defined the “transition” that can be best captured within a realist theoretical framework.

3.7 The role of institutions

The analysis of institutional transformation is crucial for understanding the policy process and exploring possible theoretical links between the debates on post-socialist urban transition and Neoliberal urbanisation. The use of the institutional approach (North 1997) can offer an alternative to the single-sided approach based on the principles of neoclassical economics that dominates the transition doctrines. The institutional approach implies that changes on the ground can be explained (and in fact instigated) by changes in
a wide set of institutions including pre-existing institutions, cultural norm and history. The institutional approach can help to advance both theory and practice of transition by avoiding a narrow focus on market conditions and institutional arrangements required for markets to function but by looking at wider set of circumstances that include cultural norms, historic traditions, inherited institutional constellations and practices.

Gazibo (2005) argues that the new institutionalist ontology including the understanding of the role of institutions and their stability, and new institutional explanatory models for institutional genesis and change have influenced transitology in the way that narrows its explanatory power. Here the main theoretical problems are related to formalism and the overestimation of the role of institutional design, formal rules and ‘standard measurements’ in transition (pp. 156-58). In relation to explaining institutional change¹ the main problem is an apparent incompatibility between the institutionalist ontology (understanding of the structuralist influence of institutions and their continuity) and the nature of the challenge of explaining rapid institutional transformations such as democratic change (p. 163).

Lecours (2005b) argues that new institutionalism rejects two perspectives on institutions i) institutions seen “as ‘neutral’, adjusting mechanically to changes in society so as to continually embody the current balance of power or cultural-ideological landscape and as always being solely at the receiving end of social change”; ii) institutions seen as “purely instruments that can readily be manipulated by actors”. Instead new institutionalism “puts forward the idea that institutions represent an autonomous force in politics, that their weight is felt on action and outcomes. It is suggested that political analysis is best served by taking institutions as the starting point” (p. 8). According to Lecours:

¹ The question of institutional continuity has been actively debated in the literature (see Kingdon 1995; Lecours 2005; Sabatier 1999). New institutionalism has been challenged on two counts: first, critics argue that it should explain better institutional genesis and change without relying on references to exogenous forces; second, institutions might not be as stable and permanent as it is claimed (Harty 2005, p. 53). To address these problems it has been proposed that endogenous institutional change has two preconditions: i) loss of legitimacy, ii) cost calculation; and can be explained with the use of two independent variables: i) window of opportunity (the timing of change), ii) resources (the means of change) which can be of non-material or material nature (ibid, pp. 67-68).
New institutionalists typically suggest that actors adapt their behaviour to existing institutional frameworks, thereby legitimising institutions and favouring institutional continuity. As a consequence, the possibilities for change may be limited because this institutional continuity produces repetitive behaviour on the part of actors. From this perspective, institutional change becomes a precondition for political change (2005b, p. 11).

3.8 The selection of case studies

There are several reasons why Kazan has been selected as a case study. First, the available literature on Russia’s urban transition focuses mainly on the country’s two largest and most globalised cities: Moscow and St. Petersburg (Evans 2000). Not only are they the largest cities in terms of population size and economic strength, but they also have a constitutional status of a federal city-region which no other Russian cities have. Russia’s second group of large cities with a population of one million people and above is called the millionniki\(^2\). With a few exceptions\(^3\) the millionniki have received quite modest research attention which makes a study of urban transformation in Kazan a relevant and intriguing task. In many ways Kazan is similar to its counterparts. All of them have undergone a transition from socialist industrial centres to self-governed municipal entities, but the level of political and economic authority the municipalities in Russia are enjoying remains a debated topic (see Campbell 2006; Gelman 2002a).

Second, unlike other regional capitals located in predominantly Russian regions, Kazan is a capital city of an ethnic region that in 1990 declared its ‘sovereignty’ from Russia. The special status of Kazan makes the city and the region a good site for studying two aspects of urban governance which may not be as observable in other regions. First, Tatarstan and Kazan seem to be an ideal place to study the issues of the regional aspects of Russia’s culture (Nougmanova 2003, p. 3). The authorities have used urban redevelopment projects to “Tatarize the landscape” looking for people’s political support and trust (Hughes 2007, p. 124). The transformation of its image has been aimed at

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\(^2\) These include Novosibirsk, Yekaterinburg, Nizhniy Novgorod, Samara, Omsk, Kazan, Cheliabinsk, Rostov-on-Don and Ufa (Goskomstat RF 2010).

\(^3\) For example, a study of Tomsk housing sector by Alexandrova et al (2004), a study of Novosibirsk by Stenning (1999).
reflecting the modernity and wealth of Tatarstan as a sovereign state (Graney 2007). Second, the politics of federalism and centre-periphery relations and proactive position of Tatarstani leadership in modernising Russia's federalist system have influenced governance mechanisms and the design and implementation of regional policies of the central government.

Third, Kazan has undergone a remarkable urban transformation including the renovation of the city centre. Over the last two decades the authorities of Kazan and Tatarstan managed to attract significant resources into urban development projects which created material evidence of economic and political change. These projects represent good case studies to analyse the emerging model of urban governance which involves actors from federal, regional and local authorities. Because of the size, the length and complexity of the projects they may help to reveal the mechanisms of urban governance. These aspects make Kazan is a good case study to analyse the interplay between the 'global' and 'local' discourses in urban redevelopment projects given its distinctive cultural tradition and recent policy efforts to create a more entrepreneurial urban governance. These policies have also been "packaged" in the discourse of city competitiveness theme.

The research methodology is a case study embracing two major urban development projects implemented in Kazan between 1995 and 2005:

1) The resurrection of the Kul-Sharif Mosque in the Kazan Kremlin (1995-2005);


The resurrection of the Kul-Sharif Mosque in Kazan Kremlin (1995-2005) has been a result of the search of a new image of the city as the capital of a 'sovereign' nation. In the 1990s the aspirations for sovereignty from Russia and growing national and religious awareness required relevant material symbols of admiration and worship. The Mosque ideally fitted to this goal because Tatarstani statehood was always linked to Islam. The original structure was destroyed in 1552 when the Russians conquered the capital of then Kazan Khanate. Since then the Mosque has been a symbol of both heroic
Chapter 3 Research design and methodology

resistance to the invaders and lost Tatarstani statehood. These observations provoke interesting questions about the expression of political and economic processes in architecture and urban planning. How might one explain the emergence of ‘iconic’ projects like the Kul-Sharif mosque? What does the project represent or symbolise?

The political economy of heritage is also an intriguing topic. The Special Federal Programme for the Preservation and Development of the Kazan Historic Centre (2001-2005) was recently implemented in Kazan. The Programme was linked with Kazan’s Millennium celebrations in 2005 and was a result of successful bargaining with the federal centre over the constitutional status of Tatarstan. The programme reveals the connection between competitiveness thinking and heritage. Competitiveness is conceptualised and materialised as a set of policies developed and implemented in order to compete successfully for the federal grants and private capital. Local identity is being actively constructed through iconic design building among other things (historiography, literature and language) also plays an important role in making claims based on the national peculiarity of Tatarstan (compared to “pure” Russian regions). In this sense, image production started a self-perpetuating cycle of reproducing heritage objects and new iconic design aimed at attracting more funds into (re)constructing iconic buildings.

3.9 The boundaries of the research

This research analyses large urban development projects implemented in Kazan from 1995 to 2005. During this period the city has made a transition from a socialist manufacturing centre into the capital of a semi-sovereign state governed by regional and city authorities. In addition to economic and political transformations that affected cities during the researched period, Russia’s federal politics also changed from over-centralised during the socialist period to a loose federation during Yeltsin’s period, back to the recentralisation introduced by Putin’s administration in 2000.

Kazan is an interesting case study because the regional and the city authorities not only used the old distributive mechanisms inherited from the socialist state to secure development funding, but made systematic attempts to pursue economic opportunities on
the emerging markets, trying to secure direct links with foreign countries and positioning Tatarstan as a (semi)independent state. Large urban development projects that have been selected as case studies for this research can illustrate the emerging structures of urban governance and are well connected to wider political, economic and institutional transformations in post-socialist Russia.

3.10 Data collection

The author has become familiar with the projects analysed in this research whilst working in Kazan, firstly in journalism and later working in Kazan City Administration. The experience gained in other Russian cities has allowed the author to reflect back on projects in Kazan, compare experiences in different regions, contemplate similarities and differences, and generalise on the political, institutional and economic conditions of Russian urban planning and governance.

Data has been collected from both primary and secondary sources. The former includes semi-structured interviews with experts representing different reference groups. According to May (1997) the semi-structured interview technique is used to avoid the rigidity of the structured interviews approach and allow “the interviewer to have more latitude to probe beyond the answers and thus enter into a dialogue with the interviewee” (p. 111). Allowing a degree of flexibility during interviews has been particularly important because of the multidisciplinary nature of the research which is based on debates on governance, competitiveness, neoliberalism, federalism and nationalism. Experts (no matter how professional in their own field) may struggle integrating different disciplines under the umbrella of urban planning and development or, in fact, may not be familiar with some western debates at all, therefore interviews have been set up more as a dialogue to facilitate better interaction which would not be attainable if questionnaires were used.

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4 In journalism the author worked as an editor of a published in Kazan architectural design magazine ‘DINA’ (1997-2000). Work in the Administration was first in the Mayor’s office as a special advisor on architecture and urban planning (2002-2003), then at the JSC ‘Urban Development Directorate’ (2003).

5 The subsequent employment as an urban planner a large international consultancy has been a good opportunity to become familiar and actively participate in urban development projects proposed by both the private and the public sectors in other Russia’s regions.
Chapter 3 Research design and methodology

The main disadvantages of using this method were as follows. Each interview required getting access to the interviewee, which proved to be difficult in a number of cases when experts were not available or did not want to cooperate. For example, neither the Mayor of the city nor the City Manager was available for the interview despite the fact that both had previously given consent to participate. That is why the highest official interviewed in the City Administration was the First Deputy to the City Manager for economic development. Similarly, the highest rank public officials interviewed in the President’s Office were the Political Advisor to the President and the Chief of Foreign Relations. The chair of the Russian cultural society in Kazan refused to be interviewed despite several attempts to meet. As a result the interview has been conducted with his deputy (who refused to have it recorded). The Muslim Religious Board of the Republic of Tatarstan and did not respond to enquiries about the possibility of an interview. It was impossible to involve managers of some large industrial enterprises who did not seem to have any interest in urban research. Therefore, where possible, the missing information had to be obtained from alternative sources. Arranging each interview and transcribing the records required a considerable time input especially when the translation from Russian to English was required. Finally, no interviews (structured or unstructured) could provide a good source of numeric data on project design and implementation and as such, this data had to be collected from other (primarily secondary) sources.

In total, 33 interviews were held during three field trips to Kazan conducted in January 2007, May-June 2007 and January 2008. Each interview lasted between 10 minutes to 2 hours. The questions used during interviews are attached in the Appendix 1. Many experts were drawn from the old connections established during the years of work in Kazan, but the majority of experts were entirely new contacts established during the research. The interviewees were selected with the purpose to achieve the most balanced representation across the professional groups that were involved in the policy making process or might have valuable knowledge of governing practices in Kazan and Tatarstan. Also it was important to achieve representation from different tiers of government including the federal, regional and city authorities; different sectors including state and non-state; different ethnic groups including Russian, Tatar and other.
The distribution of interviewees among reference groups is shown in **Table 3.1** "The distribution of the interviewees among reference groups" and **Table 3.2** "The distribution of the interviewees among reference groups".

### Table 3.1 The distribution of the interviewees among reference groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference group</th>
<th>Number of interviews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 The administration of Kazan and its subsidiaries</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 The administration of President of Tatarstan, Government of Tatarstan and its subsidiaries</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 The Government of the Russian Federation</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Commercial firms</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Education and Research Institutions</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 NGOs</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Design institutes and private architectural design practices</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Total</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** compiled by the author

### Table 3.2 The distribution of the interviewees among reference groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic groups</th>
<th>Number of interviews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Russian</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Tatar</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Other</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Total</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** compiled by the author

Since the interviews alone were not capable of providing all necessary data, especially data on city economic performance and project-specific data on budgeting, planning and evaluation, the research had to rely substantially on secondary sources of data which included official statistics, policy reports and government documents. In most cases the information was found in open sources such as government publications,
statistical reports and policy documents. Additional information was found in articles published in national, regional and local press and the Internet.

The main advantage of using secondary data was easy access to statistical data on the city and regional level. On the other hand, it was not always relevant to the topic or had sufficient level of detail. For example, few reliable reports on the *Special Federal Programme for the Preservation and Development of the Kazan Historic Centre (2001-2005)* were published and all were quite modest in terms of the level of detail and quality of data provided. The Programme has never been formally evaluated, in that sense the current study is the first exercise. Policy reports in many cases provided limited information on selected projects and programmes. Therefore data received from different sources had to be cross checked to find the best approximation to the truth.

Conducting research in Tatarstan has faced some additional challenges. It is acknowledged by western researchers that in republics of Bashkortostan and Tatarstan people are afraid to speak critically of the government because their regions are two of the most authoritarian in Russia*" (Dininio and Orttung 2005, p. 518). According to Carnegie Moscow Centre Tatarstan’s democracy rating among other 88 Russia’s regions is as low as 69 (Petrov 2004a, p. 247). The growth of authoritarian government in Tatarstan was also reported by Matsuzato (2004a). People rarely allow critical comments about the government, especially during recorded interviews. Those who dare to criticise government officials may face both legal and illegal prosecution6.

2.11 Ethical considerations

Ethical considerations become increasingly important in planning this research. Interviews may be specifically sensitive to ethical issues relating to research technique because of the issues of privacy, use of data and protection of both the interviewee and interviewer (Piccolo and Thomas 2009). In this respect the following rules have been

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6 In 2009, one of the interviewees, the former press-secretary for the Tatarstani President Shaimiev, later the outspoken critic of Shaimiev, was brutally attacked near the entrance to his apartment block. After the recovery he faced criminal charges for interfering with President's private life and disseminating libel upon the president in his book and on-line blog. The interviewee’s wife was sacked from work. In December 2009 he was sentenced to 1 year and 9 moths in custody for “rousing hatred towards authorities". 
used in the research: 1) to make a disclaimer about the purpose of the research and use of
data obtained; 2) to use a voice-recorder with permission; and 3) to give the respondent a
right to refuse to answer questions but to retain a right to rephrase the question so as to
make sure the question is understood. Apart from those general rules two specific areas
need to be discussed in more detail.

A discussion on the Tatar national identity and its relationship with the Russian
national identity can be one of the most potentially sensitive areas to deal with because
views of the colonisation and subsequent Russification and Christianisation of the Tatars
may vary among the respondents. On the other side the issue of loyalty to the central
power may have various interpretations as well. Luckily the Tatarstan Republic has
avoided any clashes between different ethnic and confessional groups, which some other
post-soviet regions have witnessed. The Tatarstani government has been very persistent
in preventing the development of political extremism or religious fundamentalism and
hostile attitudes in society. In that respect Tatarstan is not a society where politics is
constructed along religious and ethnic divides.

Another aspect relates to the researcher’s involvement in journalism which has
resulted in a number of articles, published between in 1998-2006 in professional
magazines on urban design and architecture published in Kazan, Moscow and Samara. A
number of critical articles on development policies in Kazan were published in local
newspapers. The researcher’s active civic position has helped to establish professional
connections as well as build a reputation of a critic of development polities in Kazan.
Conducting interview has required making clear the difference between a scientific
investigation and work of a journalist.

3.12 Approbation

During the course of the research its different aspects have been presented and discussed
with various academic and professional audiences in Estonia, Poland, UK, Sweden and
Russia (St. Petersburg and Kazan) which has helped to provide feedback on the work and
its findings.
Figure 1. The administrative division of Russia in 1993. Source: University of Texas Libraries.
4.1 Introduction

This chapter will discuss the political and economic context of the study and specific issues and development challenges facing the city of Kazan. From 1990 to 2005 Russia has completed a transition from state socialism to a primitive market economy and eventually to state capitalism and authoritarian political system. Russia's regions adopted different strategies to shape their relationship with the centre and international community and manage their own territory and urban centres. The Republic of Tatarstan in many ways has been a leader among other regions in defining new configurations of Russian federalism. The city of Kazan, in political and economic terms has been subordinated to the region but as the capital city played an important role in materialising the ideas of regional identity and competitiveness. The chapter is structured as follows. First, the discussion will address trends at the national and regional level and then will narrow down to the specific issues that influence Kazan urban governance and urban development policies. The chapter seeks to explore the interplay between the multi-dimensional and complex issues that influence mechanisms of urban governance.

4.2 Russia

This section will provide an introduction to Russia's modern political and economic conditions. Due to a historically high level of political and economic centralisation present in Russia, the development of Russia’s cities is dependent on the resources available at the national and regional levels. At the same time, it is interesting to explore how key developments and new regimes at the national level are shaped by local political conditions. Figure 1 (p. 93) shows the administrative division of Russia.
4.2.1 Chronology (1990-2005)

In order to understand developments in Russia, it is critical to acknowledge the scale and pace of political change and upheaval related to the transformation of the political system in recent years. Since Russia proclaimed independence from the USSR (1990)\(^1\), its political development can be divided in several periods, used here to outline the general timeline of Russia’s political development in recent decades.

The first period lasted from Russia’s Declaration of Independence in June 1990 to December 1991 when the USSR collapsed. This period is characterised by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) losing control, growing democratisation and increasing competition for control of the state resources between the leadership of the USSR and Russia. In August 1991 a military coup organised by the conservative part of the Soviet leadership attempted to re-establish the power of the USSR government. After the coup failed and the influence of the Communist party and the government reached the lowest level, Yeltsin won the power struggle between the leadership of the USSR and Russia. The way Yeltsin seized power in Russia (effectively by dismantling the USSR) “had fatally weakened the political, juridical, economic and administrative mechanisms through which they [the new government] could exercise that power” (Clarke and Kabalina 1995, p. 145). The growing separatism of Russia’s provinces was described as the “parade of sovereignties” (Castells and Kiselyova 2000, p. 177).

The second period lasted from December 1991 to October 1993. This period is characterised by the process of dismantling the elements of the command-administrative system, the economic liberalisation that started in 1992 and building of the institutions of the new Russian state. With the help of the IMF and other Western advisors the government launched a ‘shock therapy’ reform programme, which according to some commentators amounted to the ‘shock without a therapy’ (Rutkevich 1996, p. 86). The

\(^1\) On June the 12\(^{th}\) 1990 Russia declared its state sovereignty (S’ezd Narodnikh Deputatov RSFSR 1990), which effectively meant political independence from the Union government and control over resources. The leaders of USSR and Russia became engaged in fierce competition for control over the country. To undermine Russia’s sovereignty project the Soviet Union leadership proposed a new Union Treaty, which would have given all ethno-republics equal political rights. This proposal was accepted enthusiastically by many regional leaders. In August 1990 during his visit to Kazan in his turn Yeltsin proposed to Russia’s ethno-republics to “take as much sovereignty as they could swallow” (Respublica Tatarstan, 2008).
position of the central government was weakening due to the economic crisis, budget deficit and the on-going conflict between the President Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet. Regions used the weakening central control as an opportunity to expand their spheres of influence. The federal government tackled the threat of growing separatism by giving various concessions to regions.

The third period dates from October 1993 when the standoff between the reform-minded President and the dominated by the conservative forces Supreme Soviet was resolved with a use of military force against the latter. The new government initiated mass privatisation of the state property which led to the emergence of crony capitalism and so called "oligarchs" (Hoffman 2007). The practice of bargaining federalism continued but the centre retained the capacity to punish an explicit disobedience and launched a military action against a break-away republic of Chechnya in 1994.

The fourth period began in December 1999 when Putin became acting President and continues until now. During this period Moscow has strengthened the power of the central state and introduced several policies aimed to curtail regional autonomy. Putin’s reforms of 2004 have resulted in a greater formalisation of the centre-periphery relations, the suspension of political bargaining between the centre and regions and finally the centralisation of political power and budgetary subordination of regions to the centre.

4.2.2 Economic conditions

The USSR economy was characterised by a large heavy industry, small light industry, consumer goods and services sector, state subsidies and the presence of extensive social welfare system (Sachs and Woo 1994, p. 104). In the 1990s the Russian economy suffered a sharp decline caused by various interrelated factors including the disintegration of the USSR and its centralised planning system, collapse of the financial system, decreasing revenues from the sales of raw materials, as well as the decline of domestic production and investment. In 1996 GDP was 59.4% of its 1990 value. Expenditure on final consumption fell by 31.1% between 1990 and 1996 while Gross accumulation fell 78.2% over the same period. Overall between 1990 and 1996 the economy suffered from
negative GDP growth between -14.5% (1992) and -3.9% (1995). Table 4.1 shows Russia’s GDP as compared to other countries.

Table 4.1 Russia’s GDP in billion EUR compared to other countries (1995-2005)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>277.8</td>
<td>359.3</td>
<td>345.7</td>
<td>385.3</td>
<td>475.0</td>
<td>624.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-25</td>
<td>6,950.2</td>
<td>9,095.9</td>
<td>9,464.7</td>
<td>9,816.5</td>
<td>9,970.3</td>
<td>10,450.0</td>
<td>10,848.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>320.5</td>
<td>418.0</td>
<td>447.7</td>
<td>465.2</td>
<td>476.9</td>
<td>489.8</td>
<td>505.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>106.4</td>
<td>185.8</td>
<td>212.2</td>
<td>209.4</td>
<td>191.4</td>
<td>203.9</td>
<td>243.8</td>
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Source: Goskomstat RF and Eurostat (2007).

In 2006 Russia’s GDP originated from the following sources: agriculture – 4.9%, industry – 39.3% and services – 55.8% (Economist, 2007). Although over the last 6 years the Russian economy has been growing at an average annual rate of between 7% and 8%, growth has remained short-term and investment concentrated in a few sectors due to the limited diversification of Russia’s economy (World Bank 2008, 5). The Russian economy depends too much on the revenues received from exports of natural resources which account for more than 80% of exports and 30% of government revenues, leaving the country vulnerable to swings in world commodity prices (CIA 2008). The high gains in the energy and raw material sectors, plus continuing degradation of high added value and technologically advanced manufacturing sectors created a specific production model based on extraction of natural resources and a limited ability to innovate and modernise. Integration into the global economy made the extraction of raw materials one of the most profitable sectors of Russia’s economy (McCann and Schwartz 2007, pp. 1341-2).

There are huge disparities among Russia’s regions in terms of political, economic and social development and geographical conditions. Polarisation has tended to increase over time (Fedorov 2002, p. 453). According to Carluer (2005) “the gap between the richest and the poorest regions has grown sharply and the intermediate clubs have nearly
disappeared” (Carluer 2005, p. 714). Ahrend (2005) has stated that the economic performance of Russia’s regions depends on their pre-reform economic structure, human capital and natural resource endowments (p. 290). The latter has also been an important variable in explaining the distribution of foreign direct investment (FDI) among the Russia’s regions (Iwasaki and Saganuma 2005). Economic restructuring has also led to disparities between large cities with diversified economy and medium size and small urban centres with mono-functional industrial structure (Shvetsov 2002, p. 8).

Depopulation has become a serious problem. In 2005, Russia’s population was 142.8 million people, which represents a drop from 148.3 million in 1995. The population decline during those years was 840,000 in 1995 and 846,500 in 2005 (Goskomstat 2009). The negative demographic dynamic was caused by the coincidence of a low birth rate and hyper-mortality among the adults, unprecedented in a developed country (L’vov 2004; Shkolnikov 1998). According to the World Bank classification Russia is now categorised as an upper-middle-income country. The latest official statistics show that the number of people living below the subsistence level decreased from 29 percent in 2000 to 20.4 percent in 2003, and to below 14 percent (estimate) in 2007 (World Bank 2008). In Russian society wealth is distributed very unequally: the richest 20% earn 8.4 times more than the poorest 20% of the population, while for instance in the EU-25 zone this indicator is half this proportion - 4.6 (???????????? and Eurostat 2007, p. 80).

4.2.3 Political conditions

According to the Constitution (1993), the Russian Federation - Russia is a democratic federative law-governed state with a republican form of government. Executive power is exercised by the President as head of state, and the government headed by the Prime

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2 For instance, in terms of the population size Moscow is 443 times larger than the Evenk AO. Peripheral regions also demonstrate striking disparities in their wealth: in terms of its GDP per capita the Yamalo-Nenetskiy AO is 36 times richer than the Republic of Ingushetia, but in terms of its budget revenues per capita it is richer 178 times (Arinin and Marchenko 1999, p. 139, sited in Mamsourov and Kesel’brener 2004, p. 8). There are regions “practically thrown back to a natural economy alongside with Moscow that lives in the information age” (Mamsourov and Kesel’brener 2004, p. 26).
Minister, who is appointed by the President with the Parliament’s approval. The Parliament (called the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation) consists of two chambers: the lower house is called the State Duma, the upper house – the Federation Council. The Duma has 450 members who are known as people’s deputies. The Federation Council has 168 members who are known as senators. Each of the 84 federal subjects of Russia sends two members to the Council. The Constitutional Court consists of 19 judges who are appointed by the President with the consent of the Federation Council. The Court is authorised to rule on violations of constitutional rights, arbitrate disputes between the executive and legislative branches and between the federal and the regional and local governments.

As discussed previously in Section 2.1.2 transition to democracy was not a straightforward process. Although Russia seems to have all formal attributes of a democratic state, the elections have preordained outcomes (Baker and Glasser 2005, p. 376) are affected by coercion and fraud (McFaul and Petrov 2004, p. 51); and democracy remains “partial” (Robinson 2003). According to Urnov (2007) the Russian political regime has “lost the fundamental characteristics of democracy and become a ‘soft’ authoritarian regime” (p. 87). This is explained by institutional weakness (Poushkareva 2007, p. 53) and the violation of the principle of separation of power (Sheinis 2004, p. 68). Other argue, that under the conditions of weak state a compromised democracy can be more sustainable and deficiency of Russian democracy has been the reason why the democratic experiment has continued (Bunce 2003, p. 187). According to Krasin (2007) Russia’s political system has the following characteristics:

The principle of separation of power has been replaced by the domination of the executive branch subordinated to head of the state. The Parliament has been deprived of both real power leverages and control functions. Political parties lack either deep roots in the society, or effective channels of influencing public politics. Mass media is under control of the oligarchic groups and state bureaucracy is being used to manipulate public opinion. The system of free elections is deformed, human and citizen rights are violated in all parts including by the state (Krasin 2007, pp. 24-25).
4.2.4 Political process (1990-2005)

In the late 1980s the new leadership of the USSR started reforms aimed at the democratisation of its political system and the liberalisation of the socialist economy (Castells 1998, pp 47-56). Soon the reforms came out of the Communist Party control and the entire Soviet political system disintegrated (Gill 1994). Russia appeared from the debris of the USSR as a country with fatally weakened political, juridical, economic and administrative mechanisms (Clarke and Kabalina 1995, p. 145). The government institutions and legal mechanisms had to be rebuilt, as well as the "ideological vacuum" (Beyme 1996) left after the collapse of communism had to be filled with new a social ideology.

While in other post-socialist countries new political elites used the ideology of nationalism based on an anti-Russian slant (Anacker 2004; Sir 2008), the political elites in Russia could not rely on the ideology of Russian nationalism because of the diverse ethnic structure of the country. With neither socialism nor ethno-nationalism being politically acceptable, liberalism became the only feasible option (Timofeyev 2007, pp. 110-113). The choice in favour of liberalism was made with limited analysis of the practicalities and implications. According to Urov (2007) "the liberals came to power on the high tide of hatred to the Communist party and a naive believe that its removal from power would make Russia a high-income country with flourishing economy and abundance of goods and services in 2-3 years" (p. 96). In that sense, ideas of liberalism contributed to the construction of "a negative identity that was based on negation of the Soviet identity" (Timofeyev 2007, p. 113).

The choice in favour of a liberal ideology was also influenced by the contingencies of a power struggle between Gorbachev and Yeltsin which continued between June 1990 when Russia declared independence from the USSR and December 1991 when the USSR disintegrated. While Gorbachev relied on the old cadres recruited from the Communist and Soviet nomenklatura, Yeltsin decided to form a counter-elite that differed from their opponents in Gorbachev's team. To form his cabinet Yeltsin used new type of people who had not worked in government structures and hence had a completely different perspective: "the ‘new men’ did not occupy even lowly positions in
the apparatus of the Party or government. They were recruited largely from academic institutions, particularly research institutes” (Lane and Ross 1995, p. 75).

In order to secure economic recovery Yeltsin and his new cabinet decided to proceed with radial market reforms using a neo-liberal approach. According to Nesvetailova (2005) “Russian policymakers strived to emulate the experience of advanced capitalist countries, namely the US and the UK. The success of the Anglo-American model in overcoming a deep structural recession and inflation in the 1980s seemed pertinent to the challenges facing the new Russian government in 1991-1992” (p. 239). According to Aslund (2007) Yeltsin “invited the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, which obtained extensive access from the beginning. He accepted that a sizable group of foreign economic advisors assisted the government” (p. 95). The advisors delivered economic doctrines of the World Bank and IMF and developed programmes aimed to exercise transition from the command-administrative to the market economy. These doctrines put a special emphasis on the integration of Russian economy with the global economic system. Trade liberalisation reform, macroeconomic stabilisation, internal liberalisation (the abandonment of price control) and extensive privatisation all constitute the reform package necessary for ‘institutional harmonisation’ with the advanced market economies (Sachs and Warner 1995, p. 57). Despite the fact that the key elements of Neoliberalism have been introduced, transition from a planned to market economy and modern ‘competition’ state is not complete (Nesvetailova 2005, p. 248).

Later Yeltsin realised that a split in the ruling elite between the conservative and the liberal parts posed a threat to his presidency, he consolidated the elite by accelerating the integration of the conservative wings of the old party and Soviet upper crust into a free market system. He did this primarily through a privatisation policy that drew a large section of the former managerial elite – ‘red directors’ of industrial and agricultural enterprises – into the process of dividing up public property. By getting the red directors involved in the privatisation process, Yeltsin helped level off the difference in economic potential between the reform minded and conservative groups of the emergent Russian elite (Ryabov 2004, pp. 97).
Chapter 4 Research context

The ‘romantic’ period of liberalism ended in the late 1990s. It was noted that "having just emerged, the democratic institutions became prisoners of state-bureaucratic, oligarchic and criminal structures. Behind the democratic façade hid clan interests of the ruling elite caring not about the public well-being but its own gains" (Krasin 2007, p. 27). The new elite had different values and motivation. People with more a pragmatic understanding of public policy and government affairs came to power. They treated both economic liberalism and political liberalism (i.e. in Russian case, street democracy, populism and separatism in provinces) as a weakness, a manifestation of liberalist ‘romantic prejudices’ that had to be removed from the agenda. The representatives of the new pragmatic elite thought that

the concentration of power in single hands is the main condition of public policy... That is why the representatives of state power share common ideology, or rather, mythology about the model of totalitarian modernisation: from the rightist myth about Pinochet, to the leftist myth about ‘China’s development model’ to the nationally unique, ‘Russia’s special Christian Orthodox way’. The single element that makes all these different doctrines related is the fundamental idea about the ‘blessed’, ‘single and undivided’ dominant power, i.e. power that has no system of checks and balances and is not bothered by strong competitors (Umov 2007, p. 97).

The concepts of the ‘special way’ and ‘blessed power’ can be observed on many occasions in the contemporary Russian political discourse. These discourses spill over from political life and become visible in architecture. The reconstruction of the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour as a symbol of statehood was discussed in the Introduction. Chapter 6 will discuss how the Tatarstani elites used ideas of religious identity to build up political support and strengthen the political authority.

4.3 Russian federalism

This section will discuss the politics of centre-periphery relations in the Russian Federation between 1990 and 2005. This period can be quite clearly divided in two parts: i) the period of bargaining federalism associated with Yeltsin’s rule; 2) the period of recentralisation associated with the rule of Putin. During the 1990s Russia thus
experienced a process of political and economic space fragmentation. Many regions made steps towards autonomy as they could benefit from greater control of local resources (e.g. Tatarstan would establish control over the oil industry). The need to elevate the political status implied the construction of a new national identity and its material symbols including building and spaces. Recentralisation put an end to the separatist claims and created new incentives for regions and cities.

4.3.1 Characteristics of Russian federalism

Russia is a federal state with a high degree of centralisation that can be traced back to the birth of the Soviet state. After the 1917 revolution the Bolsheviks were forced to appeal to federalism in order to eliminate the threat of the disintegration of Russia posed by the rise of nationalism in its provinces. Lenin accepted federalism as a temporary arrangement as long as it helped to unite the proletariat of different ethnic backgrounds in a joint the fight for the Soviet state (Valentey and Glichich-Zolotoreva 2008, p. 33). Later Stalin implemented the model of the state which envisaged different levels of autonomy granted to different ethnic groups depending on the “level of development of their national self-consciousness” (ibid, p. 42). These levels included the following: a union republic, an autonomous republic, an autonomous oblast within a territory and an autonomous district. Such a division was seen as unfair by the less privileged ethnic groups.

Gorbachev’s perestroika (restructuring) and especially the policy of glasnost (openness) introduced in 1985 opened up debates on the country’s history as well as histories of other nations populating the USSR. Intellectuals both in mainland Russia and in its provinces enjoyed the emerging opportunity to openly discuss issues of national identity, self-determination, Russification and all other topics, which had previously been banned. Russia itself experienced a rise in national and ethnic self-consciousness. While

3 The Stalinist system of ranks was the main obstacle for the cultural development of those ethnic provinces that were not granted a union republic status. For example, while a union republic was entitled to have the Academy of sciences, to receive more funds to develop national culture and have its own TV channels and newspapers published in national languages, autonomous republics were deprived of these rights (Mouhametdinov 2006, p. 55). The “national question” was the source of the state instability during the Soviet time but after the weakening of the central state power structure in the early 1990s it developed into full-fledged national-liberation movements across the Soviet Union.
the USSR’s economic and technological conditions were deteriorating further, the resurgence of national identity, according to Castells (1998) first challenged and ultimately destroyed the Soviet state (p. 38).

Although the Constitution declares that all subjects are equal (Konstitutsia RF, 1993/2009), in reality they have different constitutional rights and political influence on the political process in the country. The state structure that formed in Russia was described as “federation without federalism” (Ross 2002, p. 7) and “quasi-federalism: federalism according to the letter of the law, unitarism according to the nature of political dominance” (Fedosov 2001, p. 16). Another expert on federalism claims that “today’s federal system is a unitary state wearing a mask of federalism” (Blankenagel 2001, p. 49). That happens because “behind the legal facade of the Russia’s federalism are hidden institutional factors that have undermined the construction of a federal model from the beginning” (Valenty 2008, p. 88).

As discussed in Section 3.2.3 Russia’s regions vary substantially in terms of their level of economic development. Russia’s regional diversity, according to many experts, challenges the stability of the Russian state (Fedorov 2002; Heinemann-Gruder 2002). Those regions with lower levels of economic and institutional development can hardly sustain themselves without external support and need constant help from the central government. The centralised model of federalism has been criticised because it creates incentives for the poor regions to remain poor and continue receiving transfers from the central government. Khamidoullin et al (2004) propose an alternative polycentric model, in which stronger regions would become centres of economic growth and key elements of a new state territorial and economic organisation in which horizontal links between regions would play the main role (Khamidoullin et al 2004, pp. 23-25). Cities remain dependent politically and financially on the regions they are located in. As a result of the

\[p. 104\]

\[\text{104}\]
municipal reform cities assumed more powers in managing local affairs, the local self-governance in Russia remains in “embryonic state” (Lavrov 2007).

4.3.2 The contemporary politics of Russia’s federalism

The configuration of the Russian state has historically been defined through a contested process of delegation of sovereignty between the centre and periphery. In the early 1990s “the war of sovereignties that started in the Soviet Union now has spread over Russia” (Valentey 2008a, p. 315). The main drivers behind the decentralisation movement were questions of political power, control of natural resources and fiscal aspects of centre-periphery relationships. In that period regions and the federal centre were engaged in a complex negotiation process arranged on a one-to-one basis and aimed on defining the mutually acceptable conditions (first of all fiscal) of federalist relations (Castells and Kiselyova 2000; Dowley 1998).

The politics of Russia’s federalism has been defined by the relationship between the centre and several economically powerful and politically significant regions. The reconfiguring of the state power continued through a complicated and contested process of establishing the centre-periphery relations or the “battle for power” between the Kremlin and provinces (Tolz and Busygina 1997). To tackle the separatist movements, the centre had to adopt a flexible and largely ad hoc approach towards dealing with separatist claims to prevent the disintegration of the country. The development of bargaining practices to a large extent was predetermined by the asymmetrical federal structure inherited from the Soviet Union in which different units had different rights depending on their ethnic profile.

*The period of bargaining federalism*

To avoid the disintegration of the country the federal centre adopted the model of bargaining federalism (Solnick 1998). When the political and military powers of the centre are not sufficient to confront secessionist movements effectively (as it was in the
1990s), the centre had to engage in a complicated process of bargaining with the majority of provinces, reserving military action only for punishing the instances of an explicit disobedience (e.g. Chechnya). At the same time, loyalty could be rewarded by selective fiscal concessions, development funding and the partial recognition of political claims made by leaders of some regions. Those regional leaders in turn provided the centre with electoral support and compliance with fiscal and other norms. The bargaining practices continued during the late 1990s when “regional leaders were increasingly using the country’s economic decline and subsequent erosion of Moscow’s authority to gain leverage” (Petkov and Shklyar 1999, p. 536). The relationships between the centre and the periphery were actively reconfigured in a search for reconciling political, fiscal and funding issues. Redistributing resources during economic stagnation and the weakened executive power of the central government became an especially difficult task because both the donors and recipients needed to be satisfied. That gave a rise to bilateral asymmetric deals with the units (Filippov and Shvetsova, 1999). The actual deal each region was getting (e.g. the size of the budgetary transfers from the federal to the regional budget) depended on the bargaining capacity of the regional leaders. According to experts on the subject, the actual deals depended on

the go-getting capacity of the regional leadership and the assessment by the centre of the significance of the region, first of all from the political point of view, but not economic rationality. As far as force played such an important role and brought real money, regions and the centre demonstrated each other their force, real or imaginary (Mamsourov and Kesel'Brener 2004, pp. 75-76).

As such factors as political bargaining and negotiation skills received priority over economic considerations, the distribution of aid normally benefited those regions the most able to bargain with the centre, and not necessarily those in greater need:

those ethno-republics who under federal arrangements are allowed to retain a larger proportion of their locally collected taxes, are also receiving the largest subsidies from the centre. Thus only 10 per cent of federal transfers in 1992-93 were being directed to the poorer ethno-republics and regions, whereas the remaining 90 per cent were being allocated to the richer and potentially more geo-politically problematic republics, notably Sakha, Bashkortostan and Tatarstan (Smith 1995, p. 31)
Regions used various techniques to secure more advantageous positions vis-à-vis the federal centre. Not surprisingly, the separatist regions exploited their position to get greater benefits. According to Mamsourov and Kesel'brener (2004) "opposition regions" i.e. those that voted against Yeltsin in 1991 and those that adopted declaration of sovereignty earlier than other managed to receive more generous financial transfers from the federal treasury... Separatism in fact became a means of survival (p. 151). Shleifer and Treisman (2000) came to similar conclusion:

The federal government appeased regions that threatened political or economic stability – by declaring sovereignty, staging strikes, or voting for the opposition in elections – by allocating them larger transfers or tolerating their tax withholding (p. 110).

From 1992 to 1996 three such ‘separatist’ regions (Bashkortostan, Sakha and Tatarstan) paid federal taxes at a significantly lower rate than average ‘subjects’ of the federation. For example, the Sakha Republic practically paid no taxes to the federal government over this period of time, while Bashkortostan and Tatarstan paid no taxes until 1994. Then after the Federal Treaty was signed, both republics resumed payments but still at lower rates than regions on average. Table 4.2 shows the proportion of tax, retained by republics of Bashkortostan, Sakha and Tatarstan in 1992-1996 in percent.

Table 4.2 Proportion of tax, retained by republics of Bashkortostan, Sakha and Tatarstan in 1992-1996 (%).

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bashkortostan</td>
<td>99.9</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>71.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sakha</td>
<td>98.8</td>
<td>99.8</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>99.5</td>
<td>70.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatarstan</td>
<td>99.9</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>83.8</td>
<td>77.3</td>
<td>80.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average among constituent parts of the RF</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>57.3</td>
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Russia’s ethnic republics used their religious and ethnic differences as an additional argument in the bargaining over fiscal arrangements and development funding. Indeed, the ‘ethnic factor’ played an important role in reconfiguring the centre-periphery relationships in modern Russia. In ethnically distinct provinces, economic and political claims were accompanied by demands of wider opportunities for development of national cultures, using national languages and opportunities for religious practices. Ethnicity was used in the bargaining process to justify claims for economic benefits and political rights. According to Dowley (1998)

state elites with populations that have been able to maintain a strong separate national identity are more likely to continue to push for the maximum amount of autonomy from the centre as possible, and for continuation of their privileged status in the federation as separate "ethnic" nations... But as powerful a predictor of demands for autonomy as having a strong, separate and distant identity is, it is not sufficient... Possession of natural resources of value on the world market is positively and significantly related to a state elite's position on the autonomy index... Among the Relative Deprivation indicators, being publicly declared as a Critically Depressed Region by the Centre significantly increases the probability that a state's elite will demand autonomy from the Centre, as does the previous administrative status of the region, which speaks to the resources of the elite (Dowley 1998, pp. 377-378).

From the political point of view, the model provided a useful mechanism for reconciling conflicting interests in centre-region relationships. This model was an effective mechanism of preventing the disintegration of the country: "the extreme diversity of administrative situations was in fact the most efficient mechanism of federal control under the conditions of a relatively weak federal state, because regions usually competed for centrally distributed resources, rather than presenting a unified front against Moscow" (Castells & Kiselyova 2000, p. 180). According to Sheinis “during the period of institutional decay after the collapse of the Soviet regime and state, these agreements played a stabilising role” (Sheinis 2004, p. 71). On the other hand, the use of ethnic cleavages in political and economic practices was criticised for supporting the formation of "ethno-clan regimes" republics like Tatarstan and Bashkortostan (Tishkov 2001, p. 30) and the "feudalisation of the societal relationships" (Buhval’d et al 2008, p. 65).
Chapter 4 Research context

The transformation of the Russian state during the 1990s had several important characteristics. Regions were not only “picking up” powers “dropped” by the centre, as explained by Petrov (2004, p. 216) they actively explored any opportunity to establish more control over the local resources using different techniques ranging from the wholesale declaration of sovereignty to the negotiation of specific deals with the centre. In that sense, regions were not simply “reacting” to the regime changes, they actively constructed new regimes of interacting between the centre and provinces. For instance, Tatarstan was in the vanguard of the separatism movement and created a model for pursuing sovereignty for other regions (Hanauer 1996; Matsuzato 2004). This aspect of centre-periphery relations will be discussed in more detail in Section 3.3.

The recentralisation of power

Putin’s reforms put an end to the bargaining federalism practices. He strengthened central power through building a top-down ‘ruling vertical’ and imposing more control over the provinces. A number of policies were introduced to recentralise Russia. These policies included the following: the introduction of 7 sub-national super-regions headed by the president’s personal envoys, the abandonment of the regional leaders elections, the removal of governors from the upper chamber of the Russian Parliament and hence depriving them of legal immunity (Nelson and Kuzes 2003; Orttung 2004).

Putin’s reforms dramatically changed the nature of the centre – periphery relationships. Previously, under the weak regime of Yeltsin, both sides acted as more or less equal partners and actively used diplomacy and bargaining to solve political and economic issues. Regions used different strategies in making deals with the centre, including the use of threats of secessionism by republican leaders to put pressure on the centre (Tolz and Busygina 1997, p. 407). According to Iskhakov, “recently we have witnessed a serious retreat from what was achieved as the result of a struggle for rights of the Tatar nation in the late 80s and mid-90s. Without any doubt now the federal centre has adopted a policy aimed at the extermination of the national character of the republics, including Tatarstan” (Ishakov 2006).
The abolishment of regional elections has significantly transformed the politics at the regional level. Previously, the success of the regional governors' election campaign depended on the administrative and financial resources available to the candidates. The abolition of elections moved the power struggle into the arena of bureaucratic approvals and clans' interaction (Gribanova 2007, p. 200). Regional leaderships had to adjust their strategies to the new conditions. As always, access to the president played a key role in making deals with the centre (McAuley 1997, p. 440; Medvedev 2005, p. 328; Orttung and Reddaway 2004, p. 281). According to one Russian commentator, after the reestablishment of a top-down administrative structure and readjustment of fiscal mechanisms in favour of the centre, regions lost the incentive for economic development. The main task of the regional leader thus became one of having a good relationship with Moscow in order to receive financial help for their region (Kovalyev 2007, p. 241).

4.3.3 The emerging role of state and funding opportunities for regional projects

Perestroika has brought about fundamental shifts of the role of the state in political and economic life. During the turbulent 1990s the state suffered political disintegration, tearing up the lines of command and the weakening government control to such an extent that the centre was not able any longer to perform its governing functions. According to Smith (1995):

For its part, the centre has provided little in the way of effective economic policies for the regions, including policies that minimise disruption in the supply and demand for commodities between the regions... The chaos of this transition to market exchange has meant that the centre has been singled out by the ethno-republics and regions for failing to provide effective leadership in order to minimise the scale of economic disruption (Smith 1995, p. 29).

After the collapse of the USSR, regions and cities took over the responsibilities that the centralised command-administrative system used to fulfil in order to support economic production and distribution within their territories. Using closer geographic proximities and more effective control, regions emerged as the most suitable
administrative level to perform state functions in the fragmented post-socialist political and economic space. Working out the new governing mechanisms was a highly contested process with the central government, regional political elites and businesses involved (Kirkow 1994, p. 1184). The devolution of economic powers to the regional level while the Russian economy entered a free-fall decline, required new mechanisms of political control. The redistributing of control over ex-state property created new centres of power associated with business, industrial and regional elites (Clarke and Kabalina, 1995). Often regional leaders capitalised on the fact that institutional arrangements in Russian centre-periphery relations remained blurred, administrative competences were not clearly defined and that Moscow did not draw a clear line between central and provincial/local property and taxes, which left the struggle for control over economic resource open-ended. Most important, there were a number of contentious constitutional issues in which shared functions between the centre and provinces (ownership of territorial resources, foreign trade) were not clearly defined (Kirkow 1995, p. 941).

The regionalisation of Russia in the early 1990s led to the formation of semi-independent political regimes that controlled the process of privatisation and the distribution of gains from foreign trade. In Moscow from the early stage of reforms “the city authority has amalgamated with the Moscow business community” (Moukhin 2005, p. 6). In some cases regional leaders gained so much control over the political appointments, the law enforcement agencies, and economic life generally, they could effectively oppose any attempts of the central government to intervene. This phenomenon was described as “regional warlordism” (Kirkow 1995, p. 923). Regional and city authorities in Russia’s provinces made all efforts to establish control over economic assets that fell into their jurisdiction (Mitchneck 1995). According to Haukkla (2002) this shows a fundamental difference in the origins of Russian regionalism as compared to Western regionalism. While the latter originated in networking and integration, the former is originated from disintegration of the previous political system and focused on protection of the interests of regions vis-à-vis the centre (pp. 127-129).
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State capitalism

The new Putin administration has become determined to put an end to the ‘chaos’ of the 1990s and according to Orttung (2004a) “deprivatize the government so that its agencies would no longer be under the direct control of specific business figures” (p. 48). The re-centralisation of power has become routinely characterised as a new authoritarianism\(^5\). The abundant journalistic accounts of new role of the state in regulating market in Russia are not yet matched by academic analysis. While some commentators argue that Putin has “strengthened the state” (Migranian 2005), others argue that he has “created a different state” (Rizhkov 2005, p. 34). These debates pose new questions as to what kind of a ‘new state’ has been created in Russia as a result of the Neoliberal reforms, how is the new governing regime different from the previous one and what are the spatial characteristics and implications of the new model of governance.

According to the former economic advisor to the Russian president, the political leadership of the country have made a choice in favour of a “corporative state” model aimed essentially at the redistribution of resources in favour of the “corporation members” (i.e. the ruling elites) using economic selectivity, discrimination and political oppression as the main tools (Illarionov 2005). These policies aimed at the creation of state-controlled super corporations in the energy sector put the government at risk of “committing huge resources to a number of projects that may have a negligible impact on its competitive positions in higher-technology activities” (Connolly 2008, p. 602). While the ability of the authoritarian model to stimulate economic growth is described by some as one of the central myths of the Putinism (McFaul and Stoner-Weiss 2008), other experts argue that economic authoritarianism is ‘natural’ for Russia because of the general “incompatibility” of its geography and the level of infrastructure development with a liberal market economy (Lynch 2002, p. 39). According to Urnov (2007) the model of state capitalism that Russia is adopting is characterised by key economic assets being divided between several groups or clans - a trend that can be identified both at the national and the regional level (Unov 2007, p. 87).

\(^5\) The following labels have been used to characterize Russia’s state capitalism: Kremlin Inc. (Kramer and Myers 2006), KGB Inc. (Kasparov 2007)
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The emergence of public-private partnership projects (PPPs)

Public-private partnership projects have become a preferred organisation form to implement projects funded from the Investment Fund of the Russian government established in 2006. These projects usually aimed to provide infrastructure at the national and interregional level. The central government imposes PPPs as an organisational form by offering regions funding for development projects and playing the role of a co-investor in projects which the private sector would not implement otherwise\(^6\). The establishment of the Investment Fund of Russia is an important benchmark in federal government regional policy. It demonstrates that: i) the central government decided to accumulate resources from higher taxes and better fiscal discipline and then fund regional projects, rather than devote more economic powers to regions; ii) in theory the procedures would be more transparent as compared to the absolutely non-transparent procedures between the centre and regions so common in the 1990s which have been discussed in Section 3.3.

Although federal subsidies are still distributed on a largely ad hoc basis with no clear rules (Khamidullin et al 2004, p. 36), the federal government introduced new more formalised methods of funding development projects in regions. Public-private partnerships became the official ideology of the Investment Fund of the Russian Federation set up in 2005 to co-fund large development projects (Pravitel’stvo RF 2005). The formalised bidding process requires project promoters to submit their bids to the Russian Ministry of Regional Development for an appraisal as well as the submission of short-listed projects to the Government Commission for Investment Projects for the final review (Pravitel’stvo RF 2005?)\(^7\).

\(^6\) Regional development projects organized in a form of a PPP and funded from the Investment Fund of the Russian Federation is a relatively new thing that is yet to be studied. The role of the Investment Fund in regional development is an interesting research area that lies beyond the scope and the time limits of the current research.

\(^7\) The subsequent section of the current chapter and the empirical Chapters 5 and 6 will show how the modern formalised procedures of bidding for the financial support from the federal government is different from informal political bargaining that many ethnic republics of Russia successfully used in the 1990s to receive large budgetary transfers. Tatarstan was extremely successful in informal political bargaining but not so in formal bids for funding.
Opportunities for regional development

In the USSR the implementation of development projects was carried out through ministries responsible for particular economic sectors. According to Artobolevsky (1997) the ministries “acquired competences for the construction of economic units, infrastructure and housing, population services (e.g. shops, hotels, country homes), transport capacities etc. They were able to provide fully – albeit at a minimum level – for the areas within their remit” (Artobolevsky 1997, p. 134).

The transition to a market economy significantly has reduced the opportunities for new capital investment and severely hampered the capacity of industries to support 'non-productive' assets. The federal government uses various redistributive mechanisms to support social programmes in regions (through budgetary transfers) to fund development projects (through various ad hoc aid programmes). The main problem of all regional development programmes has been partial and irregular funding of adopted policies. According to Shvetsov (2002) ‘Despite all attempts to attract cash from all possible sources of funding, investment projects are being implemented inefficiently and the majority of them never become realised” (p. 137). The problem of matching the government funding with finding from other sources will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6 dedicated to analysis of implementation the Special Federal Programme for the Preservation and Development of the Kazan Historic Centre (2001-2005).

There has been considerable debate about the best strategy to tackle existing regional disparities. One approach is premised upon economic logic and suggests that resources should be directed to the most productive regions to maximise their benefits which will presumably then trickle-down to ultimately benefit all other regions (see Pereligyn 2005). Another approach is based upon the logic of equality. According to Artobolevsky, “the territorial scale and diversity of Russia's territory will not allow the state to completely abandon the "levelling out" policy (Artobolevsky 2005) which means redistribution mechanisms should to some extent remain.
After Putin came to power in 1999, separatism was eliminated but the practice of ad hoc funding remained. According to *Nezavisimaia Gazeta* (2008) governors of Russia's regions have become involved in a competition for the central government's financial support for the most ambitious regional projects, which may be used as a smoke screen for getting access to funding with little prospect for the projects to be completed (Kulikov and Egorov 2008).

To summarise the processes of Russia's regionalisation, it is important to note that Russia's political and economic structure suffered substantial fragmentation. Regional political elites gained control over local resources and developed political, social and cultural mechanisms (nationalist ideology, architecture, etc) to strengthen their control. Nevertheless, since the centre had sufficient power to punish any explicit disobedience (e.g. Chechnya), the regional leaders had to engage in a negotiation process with the centre over important questions of economic ownership and taxes.

The discussion on the transformation of Russia's federalism is important to understand urban governance in Russian cities for a number of reasons. First, previously, when regions had more power, they positioned themselves as if they were sovereign states (especially ethnic republics) and their capital cities had to be planned accordingly. Second, when regional leaders were elected, they were more concerned with their constituencies. The appointment system changed the incentives behind mega urban development projects. Now current regional leaders looking for reappointment and leadership aspirants looking for their first appointment had to prove to the Russian president that they were qualified for the position of a regional leader by showing their managerial skills including the skills to manage impressive urban development projects (this aspect will be discussed in empirical chapters). Third, the new funding opportunities associated with the establishment of the Investment Fund of the Russian Federation (2006) indicate that the federal government is planning to replace an ad hoc method of aid distribution to a transparent and formalisation method based on competitive bidding process.
The relationship between the centre and periphery could be characterised as a constant trial and error process, with the possibility of re-integration occurring through rescaling the configuration of the socio-spatial organisation of the state with losers and winners among the regions. All these processes are far from a neat transitional path prescribed in the literature. The subsequent section will show how these processes played out in the Tatarstan Republic between 1990 and 2005. The empirical chapters discuss the ambitions of the Tatarstan republic to become a cultural centre for other post-socialist Turkic nations as well as a centre of crystallisation of emerging economic links with neighbouring regions, which would bypass the central government (see Chapter 4 and 5).

4.4 Tatarstan Republic

The Republic of Tatarstan is located in the centre of the European part of Russia and is one of its most economically developed regions. As discussed in Section 3.3 Tatarstan was among the group of regions most actively participating in the ‘bargaining games’ with the centre during the 1990s.

4.4.1 Chronology

In August 1990 the Supreme Soviet of TASSR declared ‘sovereignty’ of republic. The state institutions including Constitutional court, President, a State Council (Parliament) and Cabinet of Ministers replaced old socialist government and Party organs. On 21 March 1992 a referendum was held on the constitutional status of Tatastan in relation to the Russian Federation. State sovereignty gained 61.4% of votes. After the bombardment of the Russian parliament a new Constitution was adopted in December 1993 which gave strong executive authorities to the President. Yeltsin’s administration started reinforcing a unitary state. After negotiations, political, legal and fiscal tensions between Russia and Tatarstan were resolved in February 1994 by the Treaty ‘On the Division of Policy Areas
between Russia and Tatarstan (Đogovor 1994)⁸. In March 2000 Putin became Russian President. The new leadership is determined to eliminate the ‘provincial separatism’ and distortions of the constitutional order in break-away republics.

4.4.2 Political conditions

Tatarstan is one of the so-called ‘ethnic’ republics within the Russian Federation (or “internal colonies” according to Artobolevsky 1997) which has a distinct position among Russia’s regions both culturally and ethnically. Ethnic diversity plays an important role in regional politics. In January 2008 the total population was 3,762.8 thousand people, which makes Tatarstan the eighth most populous of Russia’s regions (Goskomstat, 2008). In Russia itself the Tatars represent the second largest ethnic group after the Russians and account for 5,669 thousand people (Ishakov 2007, p. 17). According to the 2002 Census, ethnic Tatars represented 52.9% while the Russian represented 39.5% of the total population Tatarstan (Goskomstat 2002). Tatars have progressively become assimilated into the Russian language environment: in 1999 only 65.1% of Tatars were fluent in the Tatar language (as compared to 1.2% of Russians), whereas the proportion of Tatars fluent in Russian was 84.9% (Ishakov, 2007, 40). That tendency can partly be explained by the fact that the number of Tatars born to mixed families (i.e. where the father was non-Tatar) has been growing from 14.1% (1990) to 24.0% (2005) (ibid, p. 30).

While there is no official data on the number of believers, according to some assessments the number of Muslim communities has grown from 18 in 1986 to 1,163 in 2007 (Ishakov 2007, p. 81). According to some accounts 60% of Tatars in Tatarstan describe themselves as believers, but only 6% see the mullah regularly; 51% of Russians describe themselves as believers, but only 1% see the priest regularly (Kääriäinen 2000, p. 214, cited in Radvaryi 2005, p. 89). According to the official website of the republic,

⁸ Many Tatars thought that the Treaty effectively “ended Tatarstan’s three-year period of de facto political independence” (Smith 1995, p. 32). According to Mukhamedinov, “all nationalist organizations condemned the Treaty of 1994 as an act of treason because it failed to state the status of Tatarstan as a sovereign state and a subject of international law. In exchange of Russia’s signature on the Treaty Tatarstan allowed holding elections to the Russia’s Parliament on its territory. That finally turned Tatarstan’s status from that of an independent state into one of Russia’s provinces” (Mukhametdinov 2006, p. 101).
as of 1 January 2008, 1,398 religious organizations had been registered in Tatarstan, comprising the following faiths: Muslim, 1,055; Orthodox Christian under the Moscow Patriarchate, 255; Real-Orthodox Church, 5; Old Believers’ Church, 2; Catholics, 2; Jews, 4; Protestant communities of different doctrines, 71; and others (Tatarstan Republic, 2008). According to Moukhametshin (2005) from 1988 Islam in Tatarstan has gone through processes of legalisation, institutionalisation and internal mobilisation and now “ceased to be an exclusively family of congregation based self-consciousness, it has become the most significant element of ethnic self-consciousness and ideological comprehension of reality” (pp. 122-124).

The elites have played a central role in Russia’s political transformations (Kryshtanovskaya 2004; Kryshtanovskaya and White 1996). In Tatarstan the succession of power from the communist to the post-communist elites has been smooth. As discussed in the previous section on Russia’s politico-economic transformations, the former Party and Soviet state elite have been most likely to stay in power and form the new elite. At the regional level the former members of the Party and government elite or the apparatchiks actively participated in the privatisation processes to such a degree that a new term was invented to refer to their entrepreneurial talents – “entrepreneurchiki” (Stoner-Weiss 2006, p. 33). These emerging groups defined the new balance of economic power and the pattern of ownership needed for a new political and territorial form to accommodate their new powers. According to Kryshtanovskaya and White (1996) “formerly the privileges of the Nomenklatura had been largely in kind, reflected in the granting of state property for private use, in money and special services; now they have begun to acquire an increasingly 'monetary' character, with its members allowed to engage in activities that were prohibited for others and to make profit from such activities” (Kryshtanovskaya and White 1996, p. 717).

The ethnic cleavage of the ruling elite plays an important role in regional politics. In 1988 members of staff of the CPSU regional committee represented 46.5% Tatars and 44.7% Russians. During the same time, the ethnic cleavage of the republican nomenklatura was as follows: Tatars represented 64.6% while Russians represented 29.9% (Ishakov, 2007, 81). According to Faroukshin by 1994 the proportion of Tatars in
the ruling elite had risen to 78.1%. The majority of the elite members came from rural areas (74.7%) and from small towns (11.6%). Elements of a specific village culture, which include traditional forms of reverence to authority, internal rejection of the opposition and dissidence, goodwill towards those from a similar background (better to fellow-villagers), suspicion towards aliens, especially those from urban and educated groups, expressions of self-impeccability and narcissism – all these cultural features were brought by the ruling elite in the relationships of power (Faroukshin 1994).

The Tatarstani authorities promote the idea of a multiethnic Tatarstani nation that embraces citizens of all ethnic backgrounds and not the Tatars only (Yuzeev 2005, p. 99). The doctrine of the ‘Tatarstani citizen’ is similar to the doctrine of the ‘Russian citizen’ (the ‘rossiyanin’) used to describe any Russian passport holder not only to the ethnic Russian. Those citizenship-based political identities are supposed to secure inter-ethnic peace and stability in multiethnic countries. In Tatarstan despite the efforts of the authorities, the idea faces scepticism and “is being repudiated equally by both the Russians and the Tatars” (Interview 2, 2007).

Not dissimilar to Russia as a whole, the Tatarstani political regime is characterised by “the monopolisation of a region’s political power and resources by one political figure in a winner takes all fashion. In such a system, the local parliament has no independent voice and is compelled to serve as a vehicle for implementing executive policy” (Ryabov 2004, p. 101). A comparative study of the ‘Level of democracy’ in Russia’s regions completed by Carnegie Moscow Centre on the basis of 1995-2002 data shows that Tatarstan’s rating among other 88 Russia’s regions is as low as 69 (Petrov 2004a, p. 247). A similar study called ‘the Index of Democracy in Russian Regions’ completed on the basis of 1999-2002 election analysis showed Tatarstan’s index as low as 80 out of 88 (ibid, p. 259).

Dininio and Orttung (2005) have used David Kang’s (2002) concept of ‘crony capitalism’ to analyse business-government relations in Russia’s regions and have characterised Tatarstan as a “predatory state” in which business is dispersed, the state is coherent and political leaders have full control over their political organisation (Dininio and Orttung 2005, p. 508). The republic’s authorities exercise control over principal
management decisions in large Tatarstani companies. According to Khamidoullin et al (2004) large industries often subsidise the regional economy by constructing roads, housing, monuments, sports facilities, etc. As an act of reciprocity from the authorities the companies would receive clear or hidden fiscal benefits, assistance in debts restructuring, protection from bankruptcy and competition (p. 37).

The companies would also offer support of various initiatives of the ruling elites ranging from electoral support to granting funding to large urban development projects. That created opportunities to implement various development projects that dramatically changed the image of Kazan, e.g. the resurrection of the Kul-Sharif Mosque in Kazan Kremlin discussed in Chapter 4.

4.4.3 Economic conditions

Tatarstan remains one of the powerhouses of Russia’s economy. According to regional data, in 2006 the republic’s GDP reached 620 billion roubles – the equivalent of 23.55 billion US dollars (Salihov 2007, p. 27). That suggests that GDP per capita is approximately 6,200 US dollars. In 2006 in Tatarstan the structure of the GDP was as follows: extraction of mineral resources (30.6%), manufacturing (16.7%), retail and wholesale trade (11.7%), construction (10.3%), agriculture, hunting and forestry (7.3%), transport and communication (6.9%), real estate operation, leasing and services provision (4.3%), education (2.6%), health and social services (2.3%), provision of other public utilities, social and personal services (1.4%), hotels and restaurants (0.6%) and finance (0.5%) (Goskomstat, 2006a). The Russian sources provide slightly different lower figures, but still Tatarstan emerges as the sixth more prosperous Russian region in terms of its GDP. The Table 4.3 “Top 10 Russia’s regions by the size of the GDP (2006)” show the GDP of Tatarstan as compared to 10 other most prosperous regions.
Table 4.3 Top 10 Russia’s regions by the size of the GDP (2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>GDP, million of RUB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Moscow</td>
<td>5,145,873.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Tyumen Region</td>
<td>2,608,786.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Moscow Region (without Moscow)</td>
<td>938,432.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 St. Petersburg</td>
<td>811,704.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Sverdlovsk Region</td>
<td>655,026.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Tatarstan Republic (inc. Kazan)</td>
<td>605,575.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Krasnoyarsk Territory</td>
<td>585,879.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Yamalo-Nenetsky AO</td>
<td>543,383.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Bashkortostan Republic</td>
<td>505,717.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Samara Region</td>
<td>490,197.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Goskomstat (2006a).

The region’s diverse economic base does not match the structure of its foreign trade which is heavily dominated by exports of raw materials. For example, in 2007 exports of oil and oil refinery products contributed to 77% (or 11 billion US dollar) of total export revenues (16 billion US dollar). Manufacturing goods (machines, equipment, lorries, aircrafts, etc) contributed only 7.2% of total export revenues (1.04 billion US dollars). The structure of imports is dominated by machines and equipment (74.8%), petrochemical and chemical products (9.5%), metals and metal products (6.7%) (Ministerstvo 2008, p. 41). The table below gives more detail on the dynamics of foreign trade of the Tatarstan Republic from 2000 to 2007. Quite remarkably the size of the foreign trade balance has been growing consistently, reaching 11.7 billion US dollars in 2007. The core of the Tatarstani economy is represented by several large companies, which have strategic significance for the republic’s economy. These include Kazan Helicopter Plant, OAO ‘Kamaz’ (heavy lorry manufacturing), OAO ‘Nizhnekamskheftekhim’ (oil refinery, tyre manufacturing), JSC ‘Tataspirtprom’ (monopolist distillery), OAO ‘Tatneft’ (oil production) and others.
McCann (2005) argues that “the nature of Tatarstan capitalism remains highly localised and has little to do with the neoliberal ideology of global market forces” (McCann, 2005, 10). This can be illustrated by the structure of foreign trade, investment and the number of foreign companies represented in Tatarstan. The few available studies on Tatarstani political situation suggest that informal political networking is deeply embedded into the regional cultural tradition and this has a decisive significance.

4.4.4 Political process (1990-2005)

As discussed in Section 3.3, during the Soviet period the ‘autonomous’ ethnic republics of Russia envied the political status of the USSR union republics. From the first years of Soviet Russia, Tatarstan attempted to establish its constitutional status as a union republic but succeeded only in obtaining the status of an autonomous republic (Tagirov 2004, p. 22). During the Soviet times the Tatarstani national movement activists continued their attempts to ‘upgrade’ Tatarstan’s status to that of a union republic, but all attempts were effectively brought to a halt by the Communist Party authorities and the KGB, sometimes with severe consequences for the activists (Moukhamtdinov 2006, pp. 53-57). Under these circumstances the main nationalist claims were reduced to highlighting the need for better opportunities for the development of national Tatar culture, mainly through allowing greater use of the Tatar language in education and public and cultural life (ibid, 55).
The beginning of the reforms in 1985 opened opportunities for public debates in history, language, national identity and other topics previously tightly controlled by the Communist party. During the Soviet Union period the nationalist movement used political, social, language and ecological issues to challenge the Soviet regime and initiate further debates about the fate of the Tatar nation (Mirsiyapov 2004, p. 72). The debates did not challenge the territorial integrity of the USSR but emphasises possible benefits of a wider autonomy for the Tatars in terms of economic and cultural development (see Khakimov 1989/2007, p. 9; Ishakov 2005, pp. 138).

The collapse of the USSR opened a ‘window of opportunity’ for ethnic republics to achieve greater independence from Russia. In 1990 the Declaration of the State Sovereignty of the Tatar Soviet Socialist Republic was adopted and independence finally became legally established (Verkhovnii Soviet RT 1990). During the ‘roll-out’ stage of the sovereignty project (1990-1993) Shaimiev actively used the nationalist movement to strengthen his bargaining powers with Moscow by presenting himself as a nationalist leader and trying to obtain the greatest preferences for the republic. At the same time he was aware of a potential danger that the nationalist movement could pose for his own authority. Finally he managed to subdue the nationalist movement and push the nationalist aside (Ponarin and Sagitova 2005, pp. 112-113).

According to Faroukshin (1994) the political process in post-socialist Tatarstan has been shaped by the attempts of the local elites to a gain wider autonomy from the federal centre. The sovereignty project was designed and implemented in order to position the local elite unilaterally in charge of the economy and incomes, especially raised from oil. All speeches and many hollow declarations and decrees about the nation and the national culture were just the means for achieving the above mentioned ends (Faroukshin 2005, p. 226).

Many Tatar intellectuals share the view that the emerging Tatar state is not sustainable long-term because of the growing disparities between the rich and the poor, the pervasive corruption, and that fact that the ideas of sovereignty have started serving a narrow circle of the ruling class (Gataullin and Yunosov 2006, p. 45). For instance,
Moukhametdinov (2006a) argues that the sweetest fruits of the sovereignty have fallen into the hands of the ruling elite (p. 75). Some commentators argue that the Tatarstani political leadership lacked any coherent programme of action and essentially was opportunistic and motivated mainly by self-interest. As Moukhametdinov points out, “the ruling political elite have never had any sort of a coherent and elaborate strategic ideology. Although they had to react in a also tactical way to the actions of the federal centre or the Tatar nationalist movement, or to the changes in the economic situation” (Moukhametdinov 2006, p. 64). Along the same lines Faroukshin points out that, “the main line of behaviour of the local elite in Tatarstan consists in a constant adaptation to the objective situation having the main goal self-preservation that allows controlling the redistributive mechanisms” (Faroukshin 1994).

4.5 Kazan

Kazan is a large industrial, commercial and scientific centre located in the centre of the western part of Russia, about 900 km east of Moscow. Kazan is also a regional centre, the capital of Tatarstan Republic. From 1995 to 2005 a number of urban development projects was adopted that made a strong impact on the development of the city. The following section 4.5.1 introduces the major planning policies and projects adopted in the city of Kazan from 1995 to 2005.

4.5.1 Chronology

In 1995 the Programme for Slum Clearance and the Modernisation of Slum Blocks in Kazan was started. By 2005 the Programme was completed and 33,372 families were relocated from slums to new flats. To accommodate about 100 thousand people, 315 high-rise blocks of flats with the total living space of 2.07 million sq m were built (KSND 2005). Altogether as much as $759.4 US million were collected from 35,000 enterprises. As a result of the program thousands of families were relocated from central historic areas to peripheral locations which were lacking jobs and services. That policy created a need for workers to travel longer distances and created enormous pressure on the transportation system. The regional politicians strongly backed the Programme but
poor institutional cooperation between levels of government and the desire to build as fast and as cheap as possible resulted in massive spatial expansion as opposed to redevelopment of the blighted slum areas in the central city.

The authorities were also concerned with creating a new image of Kazan as the capital of a ‘sovereign’ state. This task implied the construction of new architectural projects that could symbolise the Tatarstani history and ethnic and religious characteristics. On 13 November 1995 the President of Tatarstan issued a decree ‘On the Concept of Preservation, Development and Use of the Ensemble of Kazan Kremlin’ which envisaged the resurrection of the Mosque. The Mosque was opened in 2005 as a part of Kazan Kremlin heritage site. The Special Federal Programme for the Preservation and Development of Kazan Historic Centre (2001-2005) was adopted by the Federal Government in March 2000. It played a central role in the preparation for Kazan Millennial celebrations and envisaged a number of large urban development projects that formed a new image of Kazan. The Programme was a result of successful bargaining between the authorities of the Tatarstan Republic and the federal centre over the federal government funding.

In 2002 Kazan City Centre Comprehensive Masterplan was prepared by a Kazan-based design institute with a commission from the Kazan Planning Department. The project has been prepared under the pressure of the Tatarstani President’s Administration. The latter attempted to introduce more design control and transparency in the allocation of land and granting planning permits in Kazan central areas to prevent uncoordinated development and speculative land privatisation. Although the Masterplan has been prepared, it has not been presented to the City Soviet for a review and therefore has not been formally approved.

In 2003 the Kazan Strategy for 2015 was adopted by the Kazan City Soviet. The Strategy was prepared by the Leontief Centre (St. Petersburg based think-tank) in cooperation with some local experts from the city Administration and academia. The Strategy identifies the city’s Mission and goals and offers a series of practical objectives
and tasks necessary to reach the goals. It is a comprehensive strategic document designed
to provide a holistic vision of the city’s socio-economic and spatial development and
bridge together the policy areas traditionally separated by administrative lines. Although
it has proved to be rather difficult to actualise many of its aspirations, the Strategy has
been an important consideration for international financial institutions such as the World
Bank that granted a 125 million dollar loan to Kazan.

4.5.1 Political conditions

City politics in Russia lacks deep roots in democracy and accountability. In the USSR the
main function of the Soviets was to fulfil “the myth of participatory democracy by
serving as an intermediary between constituent, politicians, and bureaucrats” (Frolic
1970, p. 688). In reality the “Soviet government structure has been highly centralised
with the Communist Party in control of all strategic positions. Parallel hierarchies of
government and Party interact at all levels, functional and geographic” (Reiner and
Wilson 1979, p. 58). In the system of hierarchical subordination, local agencies were
accountable to sectoral ministries “for even the smallest decisions” (Evans 2000, p. 135).
The post-socialist reforms once again brought the issues of local self-governance to the
top of political agenda (Campbell 2006; Evans and Gel’man 2004).

The political transformation has led to the formation of a political regime that
stems from old authoritarian power structures, inherited from much of the soviet
organisational principles but it used liberal rhetoric for political purposes. In that sense
pre-existing social, economic and political structures, inherited practices and institutions
have influenced the present. This influence has been strong because of a strong continuity
of the local government personnel. As enthusiastic leaders who came to power during the
first wave of democratic reforms demonstrated lack of knowledge and experience, the
veteran administrators

were the ones who knew the ins and outs of all the localities, understood
the budgeting and implementation processes, and had the local and central
contacts that were needed for the successful management of their cities

\footnote{In 2003 the author was a part of the team of experts responsible for the “Built Environment” chapter of
the Strategy.}
and regions. Their replacements, who enjoyed none of these advantages, often found themselves handicapped by their excessive enthusiasm and surrounded by a multitude of hostilities as local notables, numerous elected representatives, and superior authorities all frustrated their programs (Freidgut 1994, p.9).

During the period covered by the current research the political organization of the city was as follows. Kazan city had a unitary authority, which means a single jurisdiction, government and budget. The city is divided into seven districts, which is not of any political significance but is due to managerial and historical reasons. The city is divided into 50 electoral wards. The legislative branch was represented by the Kazan’s Soviet of People’s Deputies comprised of 120 persons elected at the ward level. The Chair, who was elected from among the deputies presided over the Soviet. The executive branch was represented by the Kazan City Administration which was led by the Head (or City Mayor). The Mayor was appointed by the President of Tatarstan Republic.

De jure, Kazan City Administration was subordinated to the Soviet and was responsible for implementing the Soviet’s decisions. De facto, the Administration dominated the decision-making process, while the Soviet played the more a ceremonial role of a voting machine that legalised documents produced by the bureaucrats. While the members of the Soviet were political volunteers and “amateurs” in city management, the Administration was organised on the civil service principle and recruited professional bureaucrats. The Administration’s institutional capacity, if measured by the number of staff, offices, equipment, and funds, by far exceeded that of the Soviet.

After the Kazan city Communist Party Committee ceased to exist along with the Party, the executive committee of Kazan Soviet naturally expanded its role from instrumental to political and became a real decision-making centre and subsequently changed its name into that of the Kazan City Administration. The Administration managed the city on a day-to-day basis, controlled the budget, controlled access to land and infrastructure and provided services to the city residents. Similar to the socialist period, the Soviet did not manage to gain much political influence and remained rather a ceremonial body. Mr Kamil Iskhakov, the former Communist party official,
Chapter 4 Research context

simultaneously served as Chair of the Soviet and Head of the Administration (or Mayor). This created a Kafkaesque situation where Iskhakov as Chair of the Kazan Soviet adopted directives for the Administration and then as the Administration’s Head promised to the Soviet to carry them out.

Despite on-going debates on the need for greater municipal self-governance Russia’s cities have never had a high political profile. On the contrary, the regional leaders have been very keen to control cities economic resources and benefit from the votes collected in urban areas. The attempts launched in some cities to gain political and economic autonomy from the region ended in a harsh conflict between the mayor and the governor. In Tatarstan cities are subordinated to the regional administration. Until 2006 the Mayor of Kazan was appointed directly by the President of the republic. The political and budgetary dependence from the region made Kazan a mere subdivision of the republican administrative system. The fiscal arrangements were such that in terms of tax revenue Kazan gained relatively little from the industrial enterprises located in its jurisdiction. At the same time, it was responsible for substantial budgetary expenditures not supported sufficiently by revenues, which made Kazan very dependent on revenue transfers from the upper levels of government.

According to Sheinis (2004), the development of local self-government in Russia is still at the “embryonic state”. It is hampered in three ways: 1) by lack of material and financial resources in the face of large responsibilities; 2) by pressure from state bodies; and 3) by low prestige (Sheinis 2004, p. 73). Election turnout is quite low; many people are sceptical about prospects for their influence on appointments and decision making. This gives the government enormous and virtually unchallenged power to plan and implement changes. Lack of civic traditions is explained by the fact that the Soviet industrialisation caused a massive influx of the former peasantry into the city. The flood of rural migrants over a short period of time contributed to the marginal character of Russia’s the urban population. The newcomers had difficulties adapting to the new environment with its new rules and new system of values (Pivovarov 2003, p. 50).
4.5.3 Socio-economic conditions

The dismantling of the administrative-planning system with guaranteed state orders exposed former-socialist enterprises to the global markets and had a significant impact on Russian cities. Many state enterprises that were protected for decades by subsidies and an artificial non-competitive environment faced enormous difficulties surviving in the conditions of the global market. As the result of fiscal decentralisation and the inability of industrial enterprises to support the communal and social facilities that they used to own and maintain during the socialist period, regional and local authorities received new expenditure responsibilities that they struggled to fulfil without increased revenues and access to capital. Painful impacts have been triggered by rising fuel and raw material prices. The cost of maintenance and development of all urban services and infrastructure has become too high for limited city budgets. Under these conditions “some expenditures are reimbursed by the federal budget. Some central mandates, however, are not reimbursed to the local level” (Mitchneck 1997, p. 1003). At the period of economic crisis local governments were unable to “focus effectively on planning the future of the local economies and envisioning urban development needs while attempting to prevent fiscal and economic disaster” (Mitchneck 1997, p. 1010).

During Soviet times, Kazan experienced rapid industrialisation and population growth. Soviet planning considered cities as production centres and the population as a labour resource (Lappo 1992, p. 530). At the brink of the collapse of the USSR 47% of total employment in Kazan was in manufacturing, of which 25-35% was in the military industrial sector (Melo de et al 1999, p. 584). The economic restructuring of the 1990s made many industries redundant and by 2004, the proportion of industrial employment had fallen to 26.2% (Department 2005, p. 18). Nevertheless, through the 1990s Kazan restructured much of its military industries and re-emerged as a city with more diverse economy. In 2004 the largest contributors to the city’s GDP were industrial production – 25.9%; wholesale trade, retail and public catering – 19.6%; transport and communication – 12.4%; construction – 9.5% (Administratsia 2005).

Many Russian cities suffered from a significant shrinking of their economic base caused by the crisis of the national economy and the collapse of the financial system.
Large cities suffered population losses caused by economic restructuring. The crisis enlarged the gap between few successful centres and extensive peripheries, many of which faced heavy impoverishment and neo-ruralisation (Nefedova and Treivish, 2000, 76). As Table 4.11 shows, only two of Russia’s millionniki (with exception to the two Russia’s capitals) sustained their population size.

Table 4.11 Population dynamics in large Russian cities (1989-2005).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Population in thousands</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moscow</td>
<td>8,677</td>
<td>10,407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Petersburg</td>
<td>4,435</td>
<td>4,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novosibirsk</td>
<td>1,436</td>
<td>1,406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yekaterinburg</td>
<td>1,363</td>
<td>1,304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nizhniy Nogorod</td>
<td>1,435</td>
<td>1,289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omsk</td>
<td>1,149</td>
<td>1,143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samara</td>
<td>1,257</td>
<td>1,133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kazan</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,085</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,110</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chelyabinsk</td>
<td>1,142</td>
<td>1,095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rostov-on-Don</td>
<td>1,008</td>
<td>1,058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ufa</td>
<td>1,080</td>
<td>1,036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perm</td>
<td>1,092</td>
<td>989</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Goskomstat (2008).

In 2002 Kazan’s population was 1,105,289 residents (Goskomstat, 2002). The population has been slowly growing due to the influx of newcomers from other parts of Tatarstan, Russia and the CIS countries. In 2002 the majority of residents were Russians - 538,874 people or 48.8% (down from 593,839 or 54.7% in 1989). Tatars represented a second largest ethnic group - 524,724 people or 47.5% (up from 439,811 or 40.5%) (Gataullin 2005, p. 9).

**Current trends**

The GDP nearly doubled between 2000 and 2004 which can be partially explained by the influx of development funding linked with the Millennium Programme. As Table 4.12
“Kazan gross territorial product (2000-2004)” shows, the production of services grew faster than the production of goods which can also be explained by the large volume of construction work.

Table 4.12 Kazan gross territorial product (2000-2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GTP in million US dollars</td>
<td>2,024.1</td>
<td>2,043.9</td>
<td>2,527.1</td>
<td>3,262.6</td>
<td>3,982.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inc. production of goods</td>
<td>783</td>
<td>906.7</td>
<td>980.2</td>
<td>1,116.5</td>
<td>1,631.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inc. production of services</td>
<td>873.4</td>
<td>1,043.6</td>
<td>1,379.7</td>
<td>1,883.1</td>
<td>2,205.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTP per capita in US dollars</td>
<td>1,838.7</td>
<td>1,875</td>
<td>2,143.5</td>
<td>2,948.6</td>
<td>3,826.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The growth of GDP was accompanied by a persistently high proportion of unprofitable enterprises. Many of them are military industries struggling in new economic conditions and subsidised by the government.

Table 4.13 The proportion of loss-making enterprises located in Kazan by sectors (2000-2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% of unprofitable enterprises in different sectors</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>39,0</td>
<td>34,4</td>
<td>37,3</td>
<td>35,8</td>
<td>32,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>36,9</td>
<td>33,1</td>
<td>38,8</td>
<td>35,9</td>
<td>33,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport, communication, mail</td>
<td>42,3</td>
<td>41,9</td>
<td>32,9</td>
<td>35,4</td>
<td>31,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>39,7</td>
<td>33,8</td>
<td>37,3</td>
<td>36,2</td>
<td>31,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>40,9</td>
<td>40,6</td>
<td>44,8</td>
<td>30,1</td>
<td>25,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail and catering</td>
<td>41,1</td>
<td>33,6</td>
<td>36,9</td>
<td>36,4</td>
<td>32,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communal services</td>
<td>40,7</td>
<td>50,5</td>
<td>32,6</td>
<td>31,4</td>
<td>34,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit, financing, pension funds</td>
<td>29,3</td>
<td>41,3</td>
<td>29,5</td>
<td>25,3</td>
<td>28,4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gataullin (2005, p. 64).
Kazan also remains a very industrial city with a very significant number of jobs located in heavy manufacturing, chemical, petrochemical and construction industries. This is a legacy of the heavily militarised economy of the USSR of which Kazan was one of the leading centres.

Table 4.14 Structure of Kazan employment (2000-2004).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jobs in thousands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>457.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial Manufacturing</td>
<td>155.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Construction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail, Public Catering</td>
<td>41.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing Services and</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communal Services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health, Social Security, Education, Culture, Science</td>
<td>123.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance and Pension Funds</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gataullin (2005, p. 18).

The structure of capital investment in large and medium size enterprises registered in Kazan shows that foreign direct investment (mainly arriving in the form of credit) represent only a small part of the total volume of investment. In 2006 Kazan had the highest proportion of budget investment as a share of total capital investment (35.7%) among other cities of similar size (Bashkortostanstat 2007).
Table 4.15 Capital investment in Kazan (2000-2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capital investment in millions of US dollar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total capital investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which own funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which budget funds (federal, regional and local)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI as a share of total capital investment (%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gataullin (2005, p. 89).

A very limited integration of Kazan into the global market can also be seen from when foreign trade is compared to the Gross territorial product (GTP). The table 2 shows foreign trade as a percentage of GTP.

Table 4.16 Foreign trade as a percentage of the GTP in Kazan (2000-2004).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic activities in millions of $US</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gross territorial product (GTP)</td>
<td>2,024.1</td>
<td>2,043.9</td>
<td>2,527.1</td>
<td>3,262.7</td>
<td>4,241.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign trade</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>107.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign trade as a percentage of the GTP</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gataullin (2005, pp. 89-94).

The public sector has remained a very important player in development issues sector and often is a direct provider of housing and services. At the same time, cities have more fluid sources of funding at their disposal to finance development projects. The cities
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entered an era of competition for federal grants, private investments, credits and financial assistance projects provided by international lending organisations. Also cities have become responsible for their development policies. The role of urban managers changed dramatically from mostly instrumental to entrepreneurial. At the same time the city government organisational structures have been almost entirely inherited from socialist times.

Kazan remained a wealthy city due to the economic potential of both the city itself and the fact that it is an oil-rich region, which can fund various development programmes using the positive 'foreign' trade balance. With the growing division between the 'winners' and 'losers' among Russia's cities (Lappo and Polian, 1999, p. 41), city leaders increasingly adopted entrepreneurial strategies and techniques to compete for development funding. Politically the disintegration of the USSR and subsequent devolution of economic and political powers to the regions and cities opened up new opportunities for the wealthiest regions to undertake ambitious urban regeneration programmes.

4.6 Conclusions

Over the last two decades Russia has gone through several periods of instability associated with the collapse of the socialist state, the establishment of new governing mechanisms, the complex processes of reconfiguring the relationship between the centre and provinces, before adopting the model of a highly centralised federation and market economy dominated by large state corporations. All these factors have had a profound impact on its cities. The choice in favour of liberal reforms and the subsequent growth of authoritarian tendencies have been based upon the circumstances of the political moment. The literature leaves a number of questions open, such as whether the 'transitional' project was 'inevitable' or contingent. Some episodes of Russia's transition show that the use of liberal ideology was instrumental in the power struggle between elite groups. At the same time, the elites had a choice of different ideologies and rhetoric to be used against the political opponents that leave the question whether the choice was premised upon any structural reason or was instead intrinsically contingent.
Dysfunctional democratic institutions, lack of experience of active participation and general scepticism among the citizens about their role in politics, plus increasingly oppressive policies against the political opponents made the executive branch of power the single most important political player. Political debates practically disappeared and decision making shifted from the arena of public politics to that of bureaucratic government. Under such circumstances, accountability became unnecessary as political appointments are made within the bureaucratic system. That transforms the politics itself and creates a system of loyalties, incentives and behavioural patterns.

Russia has inherited its complicated administrative-territorial structure from the USSR. The “subjects” of the federation not only have different constitutional status and authority, but also vary substantially in geographical, economic and social terms. Historically more powers have been devoted to the ethnic republics of Russia (e.g. Tatar and other ethnically distinct provinces) than to other “subjects” of the Federation. Taking into account the diversity of Russia’s territories, regional politics has always played an important role in the political development of the country. There are visible signs of the reconfiguration of the state power – new ‘unconstitutional’ forms such as federal districts and agglomerations as an attempt to rationalise the economic space.

In the early 1990s, during the period of a weakened central control, some regions (many of which were ethnic republics) saw an opportunity to gain more control over their resources. In order to strengthen their political claims vis-à-vis the central government, nationalist leaders actively used rhetoric based on ethnic, language and religions arguments. In that respect ethnic regions were in more advantageous position than ‘ordinary’ Russian regions, which were not able to exploit nationalist arguments. However, there is no direct correlation between the status of an ethnic republic and its separatist behaviour (Treisman 1997). The federal centre had to satisfy the demands for more autonomy in exchange for the regional leadership’s commitment to the territorial integrity of Russia.

From 1990 to 1994, Tatarstan achieved a high degree of autonomy from Russia. To raise social mobilisation around the separatist slogan the political elite appealed to the popular feelings of Tatar national identity and strengthened those feelings by promoting
the national language and culture including architectural design. Cultural, political and economic claims were made to mutually reinforce each other and to achieve greater results in implementing the sovereignty project. Tatarstan led the practice of signing one-to-one treaties with the federal centre, through which the republic secured economic benefits and political autonomy. The years of bargaining during the period of declared sovereignty helped Tatarstan to develop the necessary skills and institutional base that continued to be effectively used during Putin’s presidency.

Under the new regime (1999-onwards) the regional leaders were keen to demonstrate their loyalty, their dedication to the goal of protecting the country’s territorial integrity and their managerial efficiency (including by managing large urban development projects). The change of political regime associated with Putin’s presidency made separatist claims impractical. The central government introduced new legislation that effectively eliminated the political (by appointing regional leaders), legal (by bringing regional legislation in line with federal) and budgetary (by reconfiguring the taxation system in favour of the centre) foundations of separatism. Regions adjusted their political strategies to the new regime of federal politics to maximise their potential benefits from the central sources. If during the 1990s greater benefits could be achieved through power bargaining with centre and the use of separatist threats, after 2000 benefits became available through the support of the centre initiatives and demonstration of loyalty. The change of regime significantly changed the system of incentives and behaviour of regional politicians.

The implications for urban development have been as follows: the city enjoyed funding available from the republican budget or non-budget sources and federal funding received through the republican channels as the result of negotiations with the central government. Due to the nature of the funding available from the external sources, urban development projects reflected the views and served the interests of the regional ruling elites. The role of the city politicians was limited to the task of management of projects. The main incentive of the city leadership was the hope to get more funding from similar sources and the hope for personal promotions received as a result of successful completion of the managerial task.
With Putin’s administration pursuing the recentralisation agenda more aggressively the scope for political bargaining between the centre and periphery reduced to a minimum. In the political field president Putin first distanced himself from the regional leaders by introducing seven super-regions - a new tier of government between the federal and the regional level. Then in 2004 the gubernatorial elections were abandoned and regional governors lost much of their political legitimacy. Both Kremlin’s initiatives severely hampered the ability of regional leaders to negotiate deals with Kremlin. In economic terms the relationship between the centre and periphery changed became more formalised and with harsh budgetary and fiscal discipline introduced by the federal government throughout the country. The practice of ad hoc deals between political leaders that Tatarstan was so good at became rare. Instead of ad hoc grants the federal government set up the Investment Fund of the Russian Federation which (presumably) distributed grants on the basis of clear criteria. These developments might indicate that the policy initiatives similar to the Programme would not be repeated in the future and regions would be competing for federal grants on the basis of clear criteria.
CHAPTER 5 CASE STUDY 1:
THE RESURRECTION OF THE KUL-SHARIF MOSQUE

This chapter analyses the resurrection of the Kul-Sharif Mosque in the Kazan Kremlin (1995-2005) as an important element in the new image of Kazan and the Tatarstan Republic. The chapter seeks to conceptualise the links between the project, the wider social, economic and political context and the formation of a new urban governance model in Kazan. The chapter is organised as follows. Sections 5.1 through 5.3 discuss the context, the history and the origins of the project. Section 5.4 discusses the process of the project design. Section 5.5 is dedicated to the analysis of the project including the organisational and financial arrangements, the rationale and the choice to locate the Mosque inside the Kazan Kremlin. The case study will explore the urban governance mechanisms during the period when the federal centre was weak and republics were strong. The project illustrates how Tatarstani authorities reinforced the position of power in relation to the centre and influential groups within the republic and projected Tatarstani sovereignty abroad.

5.1 The chronology

The Kul-Sharif Mosque in Kazan Kremlin has a long history that dates back to the pre-Russian period (pre-1552). According to the latest archaeological findings Kazan emerged between the end of the X and the beginning of XI century as a frontier fortress of the Volga Boulgaria to control and protect the merchant ships sailing along the River Volga (Khoozin and Sitdikov 2005, p. 8). In 1445 Kazan became the capital of the Kazan Khanate (1445-1552) which was one of the khanates that emerged from the disintegration of the Golden Horde. During the period of the Kazan Khanate the Tatar civilisation flourished and many grand structures were built in the Kremlin such as the Khan’s

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Palace, the fortifications and several mosques, including the Kul-Sharif Mosque (ibid, p.84).

On 16 October 1552 Kazan was conquered by the Russian Tsar Ivan the Terrible. During and after the siege, the Kazan Kremlin was ruined and most of the defenders and civilians killed. Kazan became a city divided between the Russian and the Tatar parts. The Tatars were treated as an occupied nation, were deprived of rights and subjected to forced Christianisation and Russification (Khairoolin 2007; Zagidoullin 1997). The context chapter has briefly discuss the positions of the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in the USSR, the suppression of the right for national self-determination, the restrictions on the use of the Tatar language and limited opportunities for the development on the national culture.

On 30 August 1990 all changed when the Declaration of the state sovereignty was adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the Tatarstan Republic. On 13 November 1995 the President of Tatarstan Republic issued a decree ‘On the Concept of Preservation, Development and Use of the Ensemble of Kazan Kremlin’ which envisaged the resurrection of the Mosque. On 21 February 1996 a memorial stone was erected on the development site and subsequently an architectural design competition was announced by the government. The construction of the Mosque started in 1996 and the grand opening of the Kul-Sharif Mosque was held in June 2005.

5.2 Historic background of the project
The plans to build the Mosque emerged at a very special moment in Tatarstan’s political history. As the chapter will show the resurrection of the Kul-Sharif Mosque was widely seen as an important symbol of the restoration of the Tatarstani statehood and the revival of the Tatar culture. The chapter explores the role of the Mosque in the region’s modern politics and the formation of a new governance regime in Kazan.

The USSR had a complex administrative structure in which provinces had different ranks. While the union republics were the most privileged and had the highest degree of self-governance which was possible within a centralised state, so called ‘autonomous republics’ of Russia formed the second tier. Such a division was considered as inherently unfair towards the less privileged nations. Initially, the supporters of
Tatarstani sovereignty were inspired by the ideas of national cultural development, which emphasised the themes of healing scars of the colonisation, forced Russification and Christianisation (Taimasov 2007, p. 137; Ishakov 1997, p. 25; Zagidoullin 1997, p. 47). Later the nationalist movement became increasingly concerned with establishing regional control over political and economic issues. Eventually the state institutions fully adopted nationalist ideology and made systematic efforts to elevate the constitutional status of the republic, establish Tatarstani sovereignty and to become independent from the Russian Federation (Faroukshin 1994). In the early 1990s Tatarstan developed many features of a ‘sovereign’ state, including the development of a Constitution and an independent political system. Furthermore, Tatarstani authorities regulated economic processes within the region, exercised social and educational policies and unilaterally defined the format of fiscal relationships with the federal government. However, a successful execution of the Tatarstani sovereignty project required additional efforts in areas of culture national identity and symbolic representation.

According to Graney (2009), in order to successfully implement the Tatarstani sovereignty project the elites needed to develop not only the formal state institutions but symbols of sovereignty as well. For example, at interview a senior lecturer in Kazan School of Architecture revealed that the Mosque was an easy to understand symbol and accessible for the masses “cultural packaging” of political ideas of sovereignty and national self-determination (Interview 31, 2008). The new image of Kazan as the capital city played an important role in projecting Tatarstani sovereignty. The capital city of Tatarstan, Kazan ‘has also become a significant symbol, employed by the republic’s leaders as one of the most visible manifestations of Tatarstan’s fifteen-year campaign to upgrade its political status and to remake the Russian Federation as a truly federal and a multicultural entity” (Graney 2007, p. 17). That is why the city of Kazan “has undergone a remarkable transformation and ‘repackaging’ to serve the republic’s goal of extending its sovereignty and institutionalising greater ethno-cultural pluralism in the Russian Federation” (ibid, p. 18).
5.3 The origins of the project

5.3.1 Debates around the Monument to the “Fallen Defenders of Kazan”

In the 1990s Russia experienced dramatic political, economic and cultural transformations. Similar processes in Tatarstan coincided with the active search of a new national identity. According to the director of a Kazan-based museum,

in the early 1990s people in Tatarstan stopped considering themselves as being a part of Russia. Self-consciousness transformed dramatically. People became increasingly interested in national culture and history and started sponsoring development of arts. When Shaimiev came to power he started supporting cultural and scientific developments. Naturally (emphasised by the author) emerged the plan to resurrect the Kul-Sharif Mosque (Interview 9, 2008).

One of the first accounts of public debate about the new post-Soviet image of Kazan appeared in May 1990 when a candidate for the chief architect position (interestingly Russian by ethnic origin) stated that one of the best ways to initiate the process of re-creating the national theme in the image of Kazan would be to hold a design contest for a monument in “memories of the defenders of Kazan who fell in 1552” (Sanachin 1990).

It took nine years until the authorities first design contest was announced in June 1999 (Kabinet Minisrov RT 1999; Glava Administratsii 1999). The contest failed to produce any preferred design option. Subsequently, the second (April 2000) and the third (October 2000) tours were held with the intention to “create the image of a monument that would reflect the spirit of the Tatar people who carefully safeguard the heritage of their great and ancient civilisation” (Glava 2000d). Again no decision was taken. As a member of the design review committee reflected during interview, many project bids had been received, some quite primitive, other hyperbolised, nevertheless none was capable of adequately communicating the idea of commemorating the fallen defenders of Kazan (Interview 9, 2008). A senior planner in a Kazan based design institute explained during interview that any monument would have been too small for the planned purpose: “no monument would have had sufficient size comparable with the size of a building and Tatars like physical size” (Interview 29, 2007). A chief research fellow in the Tatarstan
Republic Academy of Science suggested that the relationships with Russian authorities were at a delicate stage, therefore the authorities tried to avoid any additional controversies that the monument could have caused (Interview 2, 2007).

As the idea of the monument failed to get necessary support, a new and more radical idea emerged to build a mosque in Kazan Kremlin. Khalitov (1997a) claimed authorship of this idea. A former chief of a department in the Kazan Planning Department made similar claims (Interview 13, 2008). First the idea of resurrecting a mosque was received ambiguously, but later it gained numerous supporters (Khalitov 1997a, p. 234). Graney (2007) cites an open letter published in November 1992 by a group of Tatar nationalists and Muslim activists to the President Shaimiev reminding him that “the churches in the Kazan Kremlin had been built “on the graves of Tatars and foundations of their mosques” and demanding that his government provide a more “national face” for Kazan by rebuilding the mosques inside the Kremlin walls” (Graney 2007, p. 21). The proposals to rebuild mosques in the Kremlin converged with the earlier proposals to erect a monument and eventually it was recognised by more people that a mosque could be the best monument to the fallen defenders of Kazan because

for Tatars the mosque is the centre of spirituality and cultural life. The mosque embraces everything a real Tatar worships. At the same time Kul-Sharif is such a ‘brand’… It symbolises the return to the very best that our people have had, to the sources of wisdom … What would have possibly been better than the Kul-Sharif Mosque? It has been built in commemoration of our people, the defenders of Kazan, who were the last representatives of the free Tatar people on Earth (emphasised by the author) (Interview 9, 2008).

The Muslim clergy also accepted the idea that a mosque could fulfil the role of monument to the defenders of Kazan. The Muslim Religious Board of Tatarstan describe the main ideas laid in the foundation of the Mosque as follows: “the revival of the statehood, the commemoration of the fallen defenders of the Fatherland … The new Kul-Sharif Mosque is not simply the main mosque of Kazan and the state. This is a new symbol of Kazan and Tatarstan and the centre of gravity for the Tatars of the world” (Muslim Religious Board 2009).
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5.3.2 Political support of the project

The plans to build a mosque in Kazan Kremlin finally received official recognition. On 13 November 1995 the President of Tatarstan Republic issued a decree ‘On the Concept of Preservation, Development and Use of the Ensemble of Kazan Kremlin’. The concept enlisted the resurrection of the Mosque as a part of the comprehensive Kazan Kremlin heritage preservation programme that also included plans to restore some Christian heritage sites. This approach appeared to be more politically appropriate as compared to the plans to erect a monument dedicated specifically to the Tatar defenders of Kazan that could have caused controversies. The President Shaimiev stated that “the destiny of the Mosque is the destiny of the people” implying that the resurrection of the Mosque represents the restoration of the spiritual, cultural and political status of the Tatars (President RT 2001). According to a chief research fellow in the Tatarstan Republic Academy of Science, the President Shaimiev as a former communist supported the resurrection of the Mosque for purely ideological reasons:

> after the Communist ideology ceased to exist it was replaced by religion but religion understood in a peculiar way, as a communist and post-communist political leader and an atheist at heart would understand it – as a symbol only but without any religious or spiritual contents (Interview 2, 2007).

The Mosque was named after Kul-Sharif who was the legendary Seid of the Khanate’s main mosque and one of the heroic defenders of Kazan during the siege. The director of the Kul-Sharif Fund gave the following account of the role of the Mosque in restoring the historical succession of the Tatar state:

> in November 1995 the President of Tatarstan Republic signed a decree in which he announced the resurrection of Kul-Sharif Mosque ... Before long the idea of revival of Kul-Sharif Mosque, the age-old hope, the dream of the whole Tatar nation began to make a reality ... The resurrection of Kul-Sharif Mosque by its significance, by the scale of what is being done, stands along with the adoption of the Declaration of state sovereignty of Tatarstan Republic, enriching it and filling it with substance (Safin 1996).

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2 For example the Complex of the Annunciation Cathedral built between 1556 and 1562 (Khoozin and Sitdikov 2005, p 140).
While this statement suggests that the role of the Mosque was to legitimise the new political regime emerging in the post-Soviet semi-sovereign Tatarstan, during interviews some respondents denied the political role of the Mosque and insisted that the resurrection of the Mosque was a cultural phenomenon. For instance, a senior member of staff in the Tatarstani President Administration gave the following account of the Mosque resurrection projects:

Mosque is the house of Allah. It cannot symbolise statehood, but can symbolise the power of the state or the spirituality of a country. If nobody attends mosques, there is no spirituality in the country. If the mosque and church buildings stay abandoned, there is no economic base in the country. It indicates the stability of the state as well (Interview 27, 2007).

Another senior member of staff in the Tatarstani President Administration suggested that although the new building represented the mosques that had been destroyed by the Russians in 1552, was linked with the modern political tasks:

It is a historical symbol. There was a mosque and it was called Kul-Sharif Mosque. So the context of the project was historical but the task was political (Interview 33, 2007).

The fact that the Mosque has received different assessments even within one institutional environment (i.e. top regional state bureaucracy) may suggest that the Mosque resurrection project and related debates on its location and shape as well as the process of implementation have been a laboratory that the authorities have used to experiment with the limits of sovereignty in the politics of Russian federalism and domestic politics in Tatarstan, testing different “recipes” for the regional state.

5.3.3 The role of the Muslin clergy

In the Muslim states of Central Asia as well as in Russia’s regions with a majority Muslim population, the state used religious identities to gain political support (Laruelle and Peyrouse 2005, p. 7). In Tatarstan, Islam was both a survival mechanism in the hostile environment of Russia and the instrument of constructing new socio-political
relations (Moukhametshin 2005, p. 221). According to a chief research fellow in the Tatarstan Republic Academy of Science,

studying on the history of Islam in Volga region was a legal way to study and discuss the Tatarstani statehood because the Kazan Khanate and Islam were inseparable ... They [Russian authorities – N.K.] could take away the statehood, ban Tatar television and newspapers but they could not take the religion away. Nowadays Tatarstan has surrendered all positions in language, education and culture. Religion remains the only area that is still independent. We have our own Mufti despite the Moscow’s hard attempts to impose a single Mufti for all of Russia. Here we are still completely independent (Interview 2, 2007).

As was discussed in Section 4.3, the Tatarstani authorities fully realised the significance of religion in constructing a new post-socialist identity and promoted the role of religion in public life. Although, the support was not granted to any religious organisation or movement but only to those that collaborated with the authorities.

According to Ponarin (2007) the Tatarstani authorities initially needed support of the nationalist and religious leaders to raise the stakes in the negotiation table with Moscow. Once the Russia – Tatarstan Treaty was signed in 1994, the authorities started prosecuting the independent organisations and their leaders (Ponarin 2007, p. 203). According to Mouhametdinov (2006) while the authorities did everything to ruin the nationalist movement, they decided “to organise the spiritual life of the wide Tatar masses on the basis of the Islamic values ... That is linked to the state support for the construction of mosques and establishing of the Russia’s Islamic university” (p. 84). The authorities considered the mass mobilisation around Islam to be more acceptable than that around the nationalist ideology because religious organisations were easier to control than political organisations. For instance, religious organisations would not become directly involved in political struggles due the legal restrictions on such involvement (e.g. legal ban on religious or ethnic political parties).

The state supported Muslim religious organisations because of the special role Islam played in constructing the Tatar national identity. Whilst the Muslim Religious Board of the Republic of Tatarstan was settled in a refurbished building in the centre of the city, the offices of The Kazan Diocese of Russian Orthodox Church were located in a
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remote city area near to the North industrial zone. Although president Shaimiev denies that the Tatarstani state gives Islam a special priority, according to some commentators "with no doubt president Shaimiev should be given credit of having so many mosques constructed during such a short period of time" (Yakupov 2006, p. 97). The support was also given to the construction of educational institutions such as the Russia's Islamic university (Mouhametdinov 2006, p. 84).

Another reason why the Tatarstani authorities were involved in religious affairs was the threat the radial Wahhabism version of Islam could pose to the political regime and stability in Tatarstan (Ponarin 2007). The state offered the Muslim clergy of Tatarstan the approved version of Islam. The political advisor to the president actively theorised on the specifically Tatar version of Islam – Djadidisme or Euroislam (see Khakimov 2003a; 2003b; 2005a). Euroislam was thought to be fundamentally important for securing inter ethnic peace in the region. The political leadership promoted Tatarstan as a model region where peoples of different nationalities and religious beliefs could peacefully coexist. This concept has appeared on many occasions during the interview stage, with the most popular illustration being a proximate location of the newly built Kul-Sharif Mosque and the historical Annunciation Cathedral the Kazan Kremlin.

While the construction of mosques in Tatarstan was on the rise, the Muslim communities were not able to provide sufficient economic support to the clergy, religious educational institutions, to build and maintain their mosques and medreses (Moukhametshin 2005, p. 123). According to Poranin (2007) during the period of intensive construction of mosques3 too many mosques had been built, sometimes for too small communities, which subsequently became unable to support the imams (p. 210). In this situation the clergy could obtain economic support only from the state or businesses. That is why Shaimiev’s presidential administration created “strong incentives” for local businessmen to support mosques, congregations and the Muslim Religious Board of Tatarstan which received a new headquarter in the centre of Kazan and direct state budget subsidies (Ponarin 2007, p. 214). The Muslim clergy accepted the help which resulted in “an unambiguously paternalistic” attitude of the Tatarstani authorities towards the clergy.

3 In the post-Soviet period the number of mosques has increased dramatically from 22 in the Soviet period to more than one thousand by 2006 (figures given in Section 4.4.2).
and put the clergy in a dependent position in front of the state (Moukharliamov 2006, p. 57). During interview a Kazan-based journalist and a former press-secretary to the president Shaimiev stated that in Tatarstan

religion was used as an instrument of political marginalisation of people and sacralisation of the authorities. That is why the authorities were ‘making advances’ to the religious leaders. Long ago religious leaders had been co-opted into the system of power. Both Gusman Hazrat (the chair of the Muslim Religious Board of the Republic of Tatarstan – N.K.) and the Archbishop of Kazan Anastasiy were driven in cars with special registration plates that only top government officials had been issued. They had been incorporated into the power structure and served the power. Effectively they had become government ministers. One for the Muslim religion, another one for the Russian Orthodox religion (Interview 14, 2007).

In exchange for economic support, religious leaders offered loyalty to the political regime. According to Moukhametshin (2005), one of the leaders of the Tatar Muslim clergy officially opposed any involvement of Muslim religious organisations in politics but at the same time urged the believers to support the political authorities in their regions. He stated that political leaders, especially the presidents of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, had to be granted a lifelong term in the office and also called to prevent the alien ideas of democracy from penetrating our public and political life (pp. 190-191).

Despite the explicit expression of loyalty and a powerful convergence of interests of politicians and the Muslim clergy, the former carefully measured out the level of political influence the latter could gain, especially in relation to the construction of a mosque in Kazan Kremlin – the historical centre and a symbolic site of political power in the region. There is no surprise that precautious measures were taken to limit such influence.

For example, the potential influence of the clergy has been clearly restricted by the decision to keep the Mosque building as a part of the civic institution – the Museum-which is the preserve of the Kazan Kremlin and which implies it has full operational control and the need to authorise major events. To emphasise the cultural role of the Mosque a small museum of Islam was organised in its basement. The chief research
fellow in the Tatarstan Republic Academy of Science complained that 99% of the items were new pieces having no historical value. Most interesting thing was that beside a Koran was displayed a Bible – definitely not an appropriate item in a museum of Islam (Interview 2, 2007). According to Kazanskie Vedomosti the Muslim Religious Board of the Republic of Tatarstan tried to oppose the idea of locating a museum in the Mosque building on the grounds that visitors to the museum might consume tobacco and champagne at public receptions. The chief architect responded that the presidential decree made provisions for museum that is why the museum would be built and would be accessible through a separate entrance (Ivanicheva 1997b, p. 4). The idea of providing a separate entrance was never implemented and now both tourists and believers enter the Mosque through a single entrance equipped with a metal detector.

According to the government decree the use of the mosque for mass religious services was restricted to two religious festivals per year: Uraza Bayram and Kurban Bayram. The rest of the year the mosque would be mainly used as a museum (Kabinet Minisrov RT 1995). This decision received different evaluations revealed during the interview stage. For example, a journalist and the former press-secretary to the Tatarstani president revealed that the decision to keep the Mosque a part of the museum complex was caused by a lack of clarity about the possible outcome of the Islamisation of Tatarstan:

There was no confidence, that the Islamic leaders would be successfully co-opted into the power structure. What if the Islamisation of Tatarstan would have taken wrong direction? What if the political power in the republic changed hands in favour of the religious leaders? Now everything is normal and manageable but then the situation was different (Interview 14, 2007).

The opening of a ‘normal’ mosque in the Kremlin could have also caused a negative reaction from the ethnic minorities, first and foremost the Russians. In the opinion of a senior planner in a Kazan-based design institute had Kul-Sharif Mosque opened as a mosque, the ‘sleeping’ Russian population (not even from Kazan, the Russians in Kazan would have swallowed that) from other Russia’s regions would have been made indignant (Interview 29, 2007). The special advisor to the president of Tatarstan Republic
explained the use of the Mosque as a museum as follows: “the Kremlin is a secular site and the state in Tatarstan is separate from religion” (Interview 32, 2007). The chief architect of a state-owned design institute has offered a more prosaic explanation:

the reason is the proximity of the president’s administration offices. The flow of people attending the ceremonies would be difficult to control, and only devil knows who could penetrate the Kremlin blending in the crowd of believers... That would become a constant headache for the president’s security service (Interview 3, 2007).

The analysis reveals that the project of Mosque resurrection was used by the authorities as a laboratory to search for the most appropriate format of the relations between the secular and religious authorities. The Muslim clergy received support from the authorities and other ‘gifts’ such as religious buildings (formerly occupied by various users), new office premises and buildings for schools. In exchange the clergy played their role in national mobilisation but in a way that would not represent a challenge to the dominant position of the political leaders. They were effectively placated and appeased and the threat of separatism or unrest significantly reduced.

5.4 The design process

The construction of a new mosque in the Kremlin was a demanding task and had to be carefully thought through. There were many practical obstacles to the project such as the fact that the preferred site was occupied by the Russian military garrison that had to be removed (Interview 13, 2008). There were various professional considerations that made the project difficult: the absence of sufficient data on the original mosque that was destroyed during the siege to inform the “resurrection” as well as the lack of design skills among the architects who must have had only a limited opportunity to design anything in “national style” during the Soviet period. From the ethical point of view difficult choices had to be made about incorporating a Tatar and Muslim structure into the urban landscape dominated by Russian Orthodox churches or associated with Russian Imperialism buildings (government offices) without damaging any material (foundations and graves) or perceived (legend and myths) heritage. Also, from the planning point of
view the Kremlin was governed by various preservation policies that had to be amended to allow new development. Finally, the political considerations were equally important as it was not clear what reaction the construction of a mosque on the site of the Russian material and symbolic heritage could cause from the federal centre and among the Russian population. All these issues will be discussed in the chapter.

5.4.1 Reconstruction of Kazan Kremlin: the politics of heritage

After the conquest of the Kazan Khanate in 1552 the Russians rebuilt the Kazan Kremlin in the Russian architectural tradition, which is why now the Kremlin is perceived by many Tatars as a symbol of Russian colonisation. The Kremlin became a prime site on which the new political realities of semi-sovereign Tatarstan were staged. The Tatarstani state which had been restored after more than four centuries of Russian domination urgently needed a new symbol of statehood and power. That task immediately posed an additional set of problems as to how a ‘Tatar design’ could be integrated into the predominantly Russian context.

The movement for sovereignty fuelled interest in discovering the ‘genuine’ cultural roots of the region (Interview 9, 2008). The Kazan Kremlin as the historic core of the city became the site of exploration of the city’s historical roots and at the same time the place that witnessed the construction of a new history. Since all structures from the pre-Russian period were destroyed during and after the siege and the existing Kazan Kremlin was built entirely during the Russian period, the task to discover sufficient material evidence from the pre-Russian period was problematic. Archaeologists and historians started looking for the Boulgar and Tatar origins of the Kremlin in order to challenge the traditional interpretation of the Kremlin being a result of work of Russian craftsmen acting under the order of Ivan the Terrible and to substantiate the claim that Kazan had been a successive capital of the Tatar state. The Tatarstani scientists Khalitov (1997), Aidarova (2000), Khouzin and Sitdikov (2005) argued that Kazan’s planning structure and material heritage was the result of a consecutive superimposition of the Boulgar, Tatar and Russian civilisation layers on the site of Kazan Kremlin:
there are more grounds to see the Kremlin as a monument of the medieval town-planning art of Boulgars-Tatars, which was reconstructed under Russian period with preservation of the most important parameters (location, function, bases of planning and composition) that take root in the earliest stages of the town's existence (Khouzin and Sitdikov 2005, p. 114).

the Kazan Kremlin is a unique complex of monument of history, archaeology, and architecture, and symbolises the thousand year-old history of the capital of Tatarstan, the glorious past of the multimillion Tatar people, the uniqueness of the monument is manifested, first of all, in the fact that it is the only Russian-Tatar fortress of the XV-XVI century in our country, which preserved in its main parts the more ancient Boulgar town-planning tradition (ibid, p. 171).

The argument that Kazan Kremlin is "Russia's only surviving Tatar fortress" the history of which could be traced a thousand years back to Boulgar, Golden Horde, Kazan Khanate, Italian, Russian and modern Tatar periods has been in the Kazan Kremlin documentation for World Heritage List (see World Heritage Committee 2000, p. 123).

The first step to transform the Kremlin was the creation in January 1994 of the State History, Architecture and Arts Museum-Preserve 'Kazan Kremlin' with the "purpose of preservation and development of historical and cultural heritage of the peoples of Tatarstan and revitalisation of Kazan Kremlin as the historical, cultural and administrative centre of Tatarstan Republic" (President RT 1994). During 1993-1994 two leading Tatarstani architectural history academics Aidarov and Khalikov drafted The Scientific Concept of Reconstruction, Development and Use of the Ensemble of Kazan Kremlin (1994) that essentially envisaged the restoration of the Kremlin based on conservation principles. The document received a negative review by the Tatarstani Academy of Science because it aligned with the Soviet historiography tradition that saw the Kremlin first of all as an example of the Russian architecture.

The deputy director of the Museum-Preserve Administration criticised the authors for "ignoring completely the idea of a complex reconstruction of the Kremlin and the possibilities of new construction on its territory" (Khalitov 1997?, p. 235). According to Khalitov the conservation approach adopted in the Concept (1994) inevitably raised the
question as to what exactly had to be preserved? (ibid p. 235). Two methodological approaches had clashed here according to Khalitov. One called “Russian” and based on conservation principles; another called “Tatar” and based on reconstruction principles. Essentially, Khalitov’s argument can be summarised as follows: the former approach implied restoration of only those buildings which did not contradict with the historical context and could be verified by valid historic evidence. If we followed this logic, argued Khalitov, we would have to reconstruct Russian churches and monasteries, which had formed the silhouette of the Kremlin in the past. However that would be inappropriate on political and moral grounds because the reconstructed churches would have become “monuments to the barbaric demolition of the sacred for the Muslim part of Kazani population buildings: mosques, tombs of khans and the saints” (Khalitov 1997?, p. 237; 1996). To avoid the deadlock situation, Khalitov suggested that the whole concept of historical heritage had to be critically reviewed (ibid, p. 238). Khalitov continued that the Kazan Kremlin

is the most significant architectural dominant in the city centre visible from everywhere and shaping the city silhouette... the Kremlin as the hearth of the Tatar statehood must an adequate architectural development and be subjected to a radical... Reconstruction of the Kremlin as a stronghold of the state power and a symbol of its state history today is not a mere architectural task but also a political act and its necessity can not be doubted (ibid, p. 239).

The first and foremost step of the Kremlin rehabilitation was, according to Khalitov, the construction of a new mosque (ibid, p. 240). That could not be just a replica of the medieval mosque that had existed in the Kremlin before the Russian invasion; the new project had a very different role:

the idea of the recreation of a mosque in the Kazan Kremlin marked a radical turn in our people’s consciousness, it finished forever 450 years of slavery inside the Christian Empire. After almost half a millennium since the Bulgar state fell, having fought with the Moscow predator for its freedom; ancient Kazan became the centre of a restoring state and the place of residence of its president... its architecture once again gains the Tatar flavour. Hence, Kul-Sharif is not a mere mosque, and not even the main mosque of Kazan and the state. It is the new symbol of Kazan and Tatarstan, the centre of attraction of the entire Tatar Diaspora (ibid, pp. 242-243).
Eventually the Tatar political leadership acknowledged Khalitov's argument. As a professor in the Kazan school of architecture explained during an interview, president Shaimiev liked the idea of creating the new image of Kazan and did not like too much the idea of preserving the heritage most of which would be Russian and alien to him:

it became clear that in the new social realities we could not adopt the traditional conservationist approach and preserve ruins converting a modern city into ruins... President Shaimiev specifically mentioned that when he visited Rome he did not like that the city was full of ruins: “ruins all over the place, this cannot suit the city”. That is why the decision was made to locate the new mosque on a completely different site... to ensure that the structure could be seen from the River Volga and the image of the Kremlin corresponds with its status of both Russian and Tatar heritage site. Therefore the reconstruction of the Kremlin was carried out with consideration of the new social realities.

It was expected that the Kremlin reflected truthfully its historic nature. The Kremlin had existed before Kazan Khanate was annexed by the Russian state ... there were the walls, towers, the Khan’s palace and mosques. Because Kazan was the capital of a national republic, the interests of the local ‘aborigines’ had to be met justly and they had a right to have them met (Interview 23, 2007).

In 1995 the President Shaimiev issued another decree on the Kazan Kremlin entitled On the Concept of Preservation, Development and Use of the Ensemble of Kazan Kremlin (1995) which envisaged the construction of a new mosque. Indeed, the decree first referred to restoration of the Blagoveschenskii (Annunciation) Cathedral (built 1556-1562) and then to the recreation of the Kul-Sharif mosque with the purpose of “preserving the historical succession” (President RT, 1995). This was not accidental: although Tatar leadership was eager to “Tatarise the Kremlin” (Interview 14, 2008), they were also cautious about the possible reaction from both Moscow and the Russian part of the Tatarstani population on the decision to build a mosque in the Kazan Kremlin constructed by Russians (Interview 29, 2007). That is why the subtle language of “preservation” and “restoration” of Kazan Kremlin” was used which would imply the restoration of Orthodox churches and monasteries as well and the “resurrection” of the Mosque.
5.4.2 The design of the Mosque

On 19 December 1995 the Tatarstan Republic government announced a design contest “for the best project for the revival of the mosque on the basis of combining the traditions of national architecture with modern developments in architecture with the purpose of rehabilitation of the Kazan Kremlin and preservation of its historical succession” (Kabinet Minisrov RT 1995). The design brief was very concise which created a lot of opportunities for design teams and politicians to interpret what ought to be built but at the same time gave no clarity on what the actual design would look like and offered no information on possible sources of knowledge that might be used to collect information.
about the legendary mosque. That was a particularly difficult part because according to archaeological surveys, not only there was no data on the mosque’s form or appearance, but even its location in the Kremlin was yet to be found (Sitdikov 2006, pp. 110-111).

That was left up to the contestants to decide whether to align with the conservation approach and consider the Kremlin as predominantly Russian architectural ensemble or to align with the reconstruction approach more oriented towards recreating the Kremlin as the centre of the capital of Tatarstan Republic. The former approach would be difficult due to the absence of sufficient data, the latter approach would also be problematic due to the lack of skills and expertise in creating Tatar national architecture. During the Soviet period nothing apart from few mundane utilitarian structures had been built in the Kremlin (e.g. garages and a dining hall) so the architects had no experience in designing anything on the Kazan’s number one site. During the Soviet period the expression of nationalism in monumental art and architecture was restricted. The architects did not have experience in designing Islamic architecture either. According to Khalitov, it turned out that “we did not know anything about Tatar traditions and knew even less about the Islamic traditions” (Khalitov 1996). Galiamova (1997) argues that during the Soviet period Tatar creative intelligentsia was “enslaved” by the Communist party and lost any national pride (p. 202). That is why the task the architects were charged with i.e. to create a symbol of Tatar nationalism was completely new to them and neither the politicians, nor planner knew little about the practical implication of the project.

The design context brief gave some general aspirations about the project mission and the architects fully embraced the idea of political symbolism in their submissions. One team, for example, stated the mission of the project as follows: “the planning solution of the project matches the significance of Tatarstani capital and Kazan Kremlin and also the desire of the Tatar people to immortalise the memories of its glorious predecessors” (Sattarov 1996). Another design team states in its competition entry that the mosque would become “one of the Muslim sacred places in the most northern region of the Muslim culture expansion comparable with and similar to Mecca and Medina” (Kompleks 1996). The search continued through a second tour which was announced to “further develop the ideas discovered during the first tour”. The design brief stated that
the Mosque in the Kazan Kremlin will be erected in commemoration of the revival of culture and statehood of Tatarstan. This idea is connected with the construction of the new mosque in memory of the historical Kul-Sharif Mosque – the symbol of freedom and independence in the memory of the Tatar people (Kabinet Ministrov RT, 1996).

Similar to the first tour the aspirations about the project were quite clear, but there was very little clarity about how to proceed with “reconstruction” of a historical building that had no valid records (only a few vague descriptions), leave alone plans or drawing. It was not explained what went wrong with the project that had been nominated originally and no clear directions were given as to what needed to be done in the new design. On 26 June 1996 the design team lead by Sattarov finally won the context and the winning project was described as follows:

the authors managed to create the image of the building that manifests triumph, festiveness, integrity and artistic expressiveness... A design solution was found that combines the modern language of expression of both Muslim traditions and typological links with Boulgar religious structures”. At the same time, “the traditional motives of Tatar architecture and monumental decorative art received little expression in the decoration of facades (Khalitov et al 1997).

Although the winning project was nominated, the continuation of work at the design stage faced unexpected difficulties. As was previously mentioned the expertise in doing design in complex conditions of Kremlin was limited as was the capacity to deliver the task architects were charged with. These circumstances caused certain problems when the project developed into the technical stage. According to Khalitov the winning team led by Sattarov produced an attractive concept design that was liked by the president Shaimiev but later failed to develop the project to the sufficient level of detail (1997b p. 2). Kazanskie Vedomosti reported that the winning team altered the concept design that had been selected during the architectural contest and failed to communicate effectively with the design institute that was commissioned the technical design and the planning department that tried to influence the design process (Ivanicheva 1997a p. 4). The chief architect shared with Kazanskie Vedomosti that the winning team had failed to take on board the recommendations produced by the planning department (Ivanicheva 1997b p.

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4). On 17 February 1997 the chief architect of the city took a decision to organise another design context in attempt to “help” the winning team (Glavnoe upravlenie gradostroitels′tva 1997).

As a result a new conceptual design was adopted that looked differently from the original scheme prepared by the team lead by Sattarov. Instead of vertical walls that formed traditional in Islamic architecture cubic composition, in the new scheme prepared by Saifoullin the building envelope was formed by a series of crossing lancet arches which supported the dome. The deputy chief architect Loginov speaking for the Planning department of the city denied that that new project was substantially different from the original project prepared by the team lead by Sattarov and argued that the new scheme was built upon the basic principles the previously selected scheme (Loginov 1997).

The apparent ‘substitution’ of a new scheme for one that had been officially nominated as a design context winner caused a heated public debate. Sattarov responded in Kazanskie Vedomosti that it had nothing to do with the original project and that the new project “did not look like a Muslim mosque but looked like a Christian Gothic church” (Ivanicheva, 1997c, p. 4). Local political commentator reported that the clash was between two concepts of the Mosque: “national” and “international” (Akhmetov 1997b, p. 1).

The Muslim Religious Board of Russia commented that the facades of the new scheme associated with the neo-Gothic motives in Russian architecture of the XVII-XIX centuries as did the colours chosen which were based on a combination of the blue dome and the white walls common in the Russian churches (Sabitov 1997). Vremya i Den′gi made a similar point that the new scheme broke away from the Muslim architectural tradition and bore distinct features of the Christian culture. Moreover its character failed to match the expectations about the republic’s main mosque which was intended to symbolise the revival of Tatarstani statehood (Saiganova 1997). Akhmetov reported that according to academician Aidarov, lancet arches were element of western architecture, but not Tatar (Akhmetov, 1997a). Argumenti i Facti suggested that the arches would be appropriate especially in the era of religious tolerance (Valiullina 1997).
approaches towards Kazan Kremlin development discussed in Section 5.4.1. **Molodezh’ Tatarstana** reported that according to a member of staff of the Tatar Academy of Science Valeeva-Suleimanova, once again the question clashes between the Russian and the Tatar heritages came to the fore. It had to be decided whether “to preserve the “colonial” image of the Kremlin or develop Kremlin as a centre of the capital of Tatarsan Republic that embodied the traditions of Tatar culture”. According to Valeeva-Suleimanova the new scheme would have suited the Kremlin’s Russian architecture especially if the conservation approach had been adopted. But the Mosque would have never fitted the Kremlin “stuffed with churches, as Islam and Orthodox Christianity were the two radically different religions as were Russian and Tatar cultures” (Sitdikova 1997, p. 6).

To resolve the issue, on the 1 July 1997 a conference was held at the Institute of History of the Tatar Academy of Science. Khakimov, the director of the institute and the political advisor to the president of Tatarsatn chaired the meeting. The author was present at the meeting and it was noticeable from how the discussion was structured that the presidential administration acted in favour of the new scheme prepared by Saifullin’s team. No definite decision was made to give either team exclusive rights to continue work so the task was split as follows: while the design team led by Sattarov became responsible for designing the interiors of the Mosque, the design team lead by Saifullin was authorised to develop further the scheme based on the use of arches and finalise the exterior of the Mosque. Eventually the Mosque was built as a symmetrical composition based on “a square within a square” plan symbolising the **Bismillah**. The central dome was supported by a series of crossing lancet arches which formed a dynamic composition of the facades.

5.4.3 Public debates about the project

The resurrection of the Mosque gained public support because for “many centuries the mosque lived in the memories of the people symbolising freedom and happiness” (Valiullina 1997). In relation to the construction of the mosque, one of the Tatarstani people’s deputies wrote: “the Tatar intelligentsia always saw the Kremlin as a symbol of colonisation, as a symbol of the empire. Today we can change the situation” (Kharisov
1997). The head of a Tatar noble society stated that the Mosque was a sign of Renaissance of the Tatar culture and Tatar nation (Interview 16, 2008). During the interview stage this opinion has emerged on many other occasions.

While the resurrection of the Mosque was very popular among the Tatar element of the population, the decision to construct a mosque in the heart of the historic city was not received unanimously. Questions were raised as to whether the construction of a new building (although presented as the “resurrection” of something previously in existence) could be justified: “if the Mosque is being constructed while the only thing known about it is the number of minarets, why not to restore the ancient Spassky Cathedral of XVI century has a perfectly preserved basement as well as necessary archival data” (Zhooravskiy 1995). Concerns were also raised about the fact that the site of one of the oldest buildings in Kazan, the Spaso-Preobrazhensky (Saviour-Transfiguration) Monastery located in the Kremlin next to the Kul-Sharif Mosque construction site, was converted into little more than a dumping ground, to which demolition debris and waste was shipped from other construction sites including those located right next to the Kul Sharif mosque construction site (Frolov 1997).

That implied a fundamental conflict between the Russian and the Tatar heritage located in a close proximity. The decision to construct a new mosque in the heart of the historic city was not received unanimously. Questions were raised as to whether the construction of a new building (although presented as ‘resurrection’) could be justified:

if the Mosque is being constructed while the only thing known about it is the number of minarets, why not to restore the ancient Saviour-Transfiguration Cathedral of XVI century has a perfectly preserved basement as well as necessary archival data (Zhooravskiy 1995).

The Deputy chair of the Russian Cultural Society revealed during interview that the Society sent several letters to the Administration of the Tatarstan President about the need to reconstruct the Spaso-Preobrazhensky Monastery in the Kremlin but received no response. That was not a single episode when rights of the Russian residents of Kazan were ignored. When the Russian Cultural Society approached the Ministry of Culture of Tatarstan requesting the transfer of the bell tower of the church of Epiphany back to the
church in order to form a single property with other buildings that had been transferred back previously, the Tatarstani Minister of culture responded that “as a Tatar he would prevent this from happening” (Interview 4, 2008). There have been other similar cases reported in press when authorities in Kazan refused to facilitate the transfer of the former church structures back to Russian Orthodox communities.

5.5 Analysis and discussion

5.5.1 Organisational structure and funding arrangements

A special Kul-Sharif Mosque Fund was established by the government to accumulate donations and manage the construction process. Funds for construction were collected from various sources. Although no official information was given on the construction cost, the Tatarstani authorities maintained that voluntary donations were the only source of funding. In the interview the special advisor to the president of Tatarstan revealed that

There was mass support from the population of Tatarstan and sometimes agricultural workers even donated grain. The Kul-Sharif Fund would then sell the grain and use the money for construction. Foreign donations were very modest. The Iranians donated the carpets; 120,000 US dollars came from Kuwait... What was it? Just some small change, good for putting up one crescent only (Interview 32, 2007).

The main bulk of the required funding came from large industries that played the main role in supporting the construction. The Tatarstani president Shaimiev explained the origin of funding as follows (cited in Yakupov 2006):

The oil-industry workers⁴ have helped to construct the Mosque. Although Islamic states offered money to build the Mosque, we said⁵ that the Mosque was significant for the republic and would be built by ourselves. We did a God pleasing thing when we decided to do so... It happened that there was a good harvest that year. I called together the heads of district administrations and told them: God sent us rain in time and we have collected two extra centners of grain from a hectare, which we otherwise would have not collected” Then, according to Yakoupov, meetings were

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⁴ In Tatarstan the top-management of oil companies is often referred to as ‘oil-industry workers’ – no doubts that for the president they are no more than that.
⁵ The royal ‘we’ often used by Shaimiev.
held in villages where people voluntary decided to transfer surplus grain as a donation to the Kul Sharif Fund (2006, p. 181).

In Tatarstan the mechanism of ‘voluntary donations’ by businesses worked in a peculiar way. As the deputy chair of the Russian cultural society revealed during interview, the society approached several businessmen asking for charitable donations for the cultural and educational projects the society run. Although the businesses would not reject the idea of giving money to a Russian charity on any principle grounds, they would refuse to donate because they had been ordered by the authorities to support numerous Tatar cultural projects and they would not be able to afford supporting both Tatar and Russian projects. The businessmen said that if there had been an order from the authorities to support the Russian charities as well they would have done so (Interview 4, 2008).

Other methods used by the authorities were even more controversial. For example, in July 1996 the mayor of Kazan issued a decree that established the size of the donation that each administrative district of Kazan was obliged to contribute to the construction of the Kul-Sharif Mosque. The total amount of money that Kazan had to spare was defined as an equivalent of 308,442.20 US dollars or about $0.39 from each adult. Heads of district administrations were made responsible for the fulfilment of the assignments in time for that purpose “they had to conduct necessary consultation work in support of the construction of Kul-Sharif Mosque among the enterprise management, peoples’ deputies and the population”. To ensure that the voluntary contributions were coming in on time, all seven district heads, all eight mayor’s deputies as well as the heads of the economic and financial departments were made responsible for collecting money (Glava administratsii 1996).

5.5.2 The rationale behind the project

It is argued in this chapter that Kul-Sharif Mosque as a project not only symbolised the restoration of the Tatarstani statehood but also helped the Tatarstani authorities to work out the format of Tatarstani sovereignty and its specific dimensions: Tatarstan’s
relationship with the international community and the federal centre; the relationship between the secular and religious authorities; the relationship between the authorities, large businesses and the nationalist movements.

**International dimension**

The processes of state building at the domestic level and that of projecting sovereignty internationally were seen as interconnected and mutually reinforcing. For instance, behaving ‘like a state’ on the international area helped to elevate the Tatarstani positions within Russia. In a similar way, strengthening the Tatarstani state and creating the attributes of state power domestically elevated the region’s position on the international arena (Graney 1999; 2009). On the global level the construction of the Mosque helped to project the Tatarstani sovereignty internationally by aligning Tatarstan with the Muslim world. According to Khakimov, *Euroislam* could also help Tatarstan integrate into Europe:

> We need to make a definite choice in favour of Europe, but in that case a natural question arises: what can we bring to Europe? The only real contribution is *Euroislam*, i.e. a system of beliefs that bring together liberal ideas with the Islamic values. This is an orientation of public thoughts which takes Tatars beyond the national boundaries and at the same time builds bridges between the East and the West (Khakimov 2005, p. 291).

According to the head of a Tatar noble society, Islam for the Tatars was the way of both preserving their national identity and integrating into the wider Muslim community. During the interview he revealed that

> The Mosque symbolised links with Islamic countries ... The chairman of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) attended the opening ceremony in Kazan Kremlin. It is important for Russia’s geopolitical interests to join the OIC... Tatarstan as a Muslim country inside Russia could play an important role in Russia’s foreign policy and its relations with the OIC (Interview 16, 2008).
The idea of the Mosque as aimed at the international audience was reflected in its architecture. A then senior member of staff of the Kazan Planning Department explained the influence of the Tatar version of Islam on the design of the Mosque as follows:

The Mosque is a symbol of cultural identification in the globalising world. It was designed in such a way to reflect the global tendencies... It is not a traditional Tatar type of mosque where the minaret stood above an ordinary wooden house, and was easy to pull down in case the Russians arrived with to check. In Kazan the historical mosque had eight minarets and stood next to the Khan’s palace and was visited by foreign guests. The modern mosque also combines international motives: Central Asian architecture, Tatar ornaments, Mauritanian elements... The design is not specifically Tatar – it combines global Muslim principles. Importantly, Zufar-Hazrat (the Imam of the Mosque – N.K.) says to visitors from outside Tatarstan: ‘Here we have the names of all prophets: Isa (Jesus), Mussa (Moses), Ibrahim (Abraham) inscribed in the ornaments. They are your prophets too, and we all respect them. One God – different faiths’. It was important to reflect in the design that Islam is a part of the global culture... They wanted to bring into design all best achievements and show the tolerant and open character of Islam (Interview 13, 2007).

**Russia’s federalism dimension**

The idea to reconstruct the legendary mosque worked out well in the political context. Politicians saw the role of the project in emphasising the new political status of the republic as a sovereign state as opposed to that of a ‘subject’ of the Russian Federation. The Mosque helped to strengthen Tatarstan’s positions of a semi-sovereign republic within Russia by emphasising its unique ethnic and religious composition and its significance for preserving the peace in a multiethnic country. These public discourses rolled out to full extent in connection to the Mosque. The presidential decree dedicated to the opening of the Mosque emphasised the balance of Islam and Christianity:

due to finishing the resurrection of Kul-Sharif Mosque and restoration of Annunciation Cathedral; with the purpose of revival of the architectural-historic complex of the Kazan Kremlin as a UNESCO site of world cultural and natural heritage; in order to create conditions for holding solemn religious ceremonies and strengthening inter-national and inter-confessional accord in the Republic of Tatarstan (President RT, 2005).
Chapter 5 Case study 1

It is an interesting that the argument made for the UNESCO attribution used a slightly different logic. During an interview then a senior member of staff of the Kazan Planning Department revealed that

When we submitted our application, the construction was under way. People thought that we would have no chance. The UNESCO expert also had doubts about the eligibility of our claim. We explained to him that Kul-Sharif Mosque was one of the five mosques destroyed in the XVI century and the resurrection was very important because it was better to restore a mosque in the Kremlin than to have a new Chechnya here. The deputy prime minister and the advisor to the President explained that the project had a great political importance in terms of tolerant and peaceful co-existence of all religions and balance of cultures and confessions. The expert liked this idea (Interview 13, 2007).

These two passages show that depending on the situation, Tatarstan appears in the political discourse either as a model-region of stability and tolerance, or as a potentially inflammable ethnic region similar to Chechnya. President Shaimiev’s biographers argue that the ostensibly fragile peace could only be preserved because a balanced political course and wisdom of the Tatarstani president (Bukharaev 1999, p. 111). The government controlled media made those discourses so dominant, that hardly any interviewee avoided references to “religious tolerance” and “balance of culture”.

The director of a Kazan government-owned company explained that that was the “game plan” Tatarstani authorities offered to Russia’s authorities: to present the region as nationalist and potentially inflammable, but always counterbalance the threat by the arguments of peaceful coexistence and religious tolerance (Interview 11, 2008). The federal centre seemed to accept the “game plan” offered by Tatarstan. According to a professor of history in Kazan State University,

Tatarstan and Kazan were the quintessence of the ideas of multi-nationalism, multi-culturalism and multi-confessionalism promoted by the federal centre. In this respect Tatarstan became a showcase of Russia’s national policy, the most successful project of coexistence of different nations and cultures. Russia would put that on show when an example of successful coexistence of different ethnic groups was needed. Kazan was convenient when the centre needed a region where the declarations and
dreams materialise because there were always problems in the outlying provinces: either everybody would live peacefully on the basis of common poverty or separate rich clans would endlessly fight with each other (Interview 25, 2007).

**Domestic politics**

Kul-Sharif Mosque played a significant role in substantiating the Tatarstani statehood with national and cultural identity. The resurrection of the Kul-Sharif Mosque was an interesting example of inventing heritage as a part of the wider process of constructing a new Tatar identity. In the 1990s in Tatarstan the aspirations for sovereignty from Russia and growing national and religious awareness required relevant material symbols of admiration and worship. According to the local commentator, the cultural, spiritual and ethnic national identification were important conditions for the consolidation and proper “functioning” of the Tatar nation in the federal state and globalising world as a whole (Zakirov 2006, pp. 204-205). As a symbol of the Tatar state the Mosque has helped the Tatars to “straighten their shoulders” (Interview 29, 2007).

As was previously discussed, the project helped the authorities to refine the format of the relationship with the religious organisations. The project of the Mosque resurrection showed that the political authorities of Tatarstan clearly took the lead and made all the significant decision during the design and implementation process such as the decisions on the function of the Mosque as a museum and control of the building operation by the administration of the Museum-preserve “Kazan Kremlin”. The execution of the project gives a good illustration of the established Tatarstan model of the relationship between the clergy and the civil authorities, where the former exchange their loyalty for economic support provided by the authorities.

The rhetoric of historical justice, national revival and cultural renaissance that surrounded the project served the goal of internal political legitimisation. That is why flagship projects such as the Kul-Sharif Mosque became a part of the regional sovereignty experiment. While the mosque had its important mission to satisfy the expectations of the Tatar part of the population, it did not symbolise a creation of an
Islamist state. In Kazan the Kul-Sharif Mosque was praised as the most vivid representation of the Tatarstani statehood restoration and the nation’s spiritual renaissance. The Mosque worked as “cultural packaging” of the ideas of sovereignty that helped to communicate the message of Tatarstan’s special status domestically, to the Russian authorities and beyond in the most effective and long lasting way.

The state supported the project using the government controlled industries as financial donors. In the way similar to the relationship between the authorities and the Muslim clergy, a quid pro quo model of relationship formed between large industries and authorities. The businesses supported various projects initiated by the authorities and received protection in exchange. Both the state and the industries benefited from Tatarstan’s special fiscal arrangements with Russia’s central authorities as a result of Tatarstani sovereignty.

Regional competitiveness in Russia

The special status of the republic created certain ‘competitive advantages’ in regards to other republics. These advantages existed in a form of direct aid or privileges granted by the Russian government. According to Valoooyev (2007): gaining certain privileges (taxation benefits, free economic zone status, etc.) could make significant impact on international and foreign trade links of the region, as they strengthened competitiveness and attractiveness of the region as compared to other regions of the Russian Federation (Valoooyev 2007).

Competing for the resources of the federal centre required the deployment of various techniques including negotiation, bargaining and making secessionist threats. The Mosque has helped to substantiate those claims and threats using its powerful image. During the interview the director of a Kazan government-owned company explained the fact that the authorities decided to build one huge mosque in the capital instead of many smaller mosques in rural communities as follows:
Because the Mosque in the Kremlin was not about faith... The Mosque was not selected as a symbol that could represent the stronger competitive position of the region... It was selected as a symbol of threat, hostile threat... They exploited weakness of the central state; they did not develop competitiveness. Kazan used the possible disintegration of Russia as an opportunity to take advantage in the competition for federal financial flows. They created the Tatar civic Centre, introduced the republican own privatisation voucher, organised the rallies... It was all about frightening and blackmailing a weak Russia... (Interview 11, 2008).

Although the interviews have not suggested that any direct connection between the resurrection of the Mosque and the competitive strength of Tatarstan on the international market is in place, the Tatarstani diplomacy skilfully used the regional ethnic and cultural characteristics to promote foreign trade and international relations. As a senior member of the Presidential administration has stated during interview:

"We produce a lot of goods but they will be impossible to sell in the UK. That is why we are looking at the Asian and Turkic markets... The Tatar language helps to work on those markets. It is easier for us to work with the Muslims because they understand us better. But we use Orthodox Christianity as well when visiting Greece for instance - we say here are our Christian traditions, when dealing with an Islamic country – here are our Muslim traditions. Little tricks... (Interview 32, 2007)."

A lecturer in the Kazan school of architecture and one of the architects of the Mosque noticed that after the opening

the Mosque became a kind of brand that represents the image of the city of Kazan on the world map. It is a festive mosque. It is full of people... There is an endless stream of tourists who come from all over Russia. It has become a centre of pilgrimage. Not even religious but cultural. For visitors the first thing to do is to look at the mosque (Interview 21, 2007).

Additionally the image of the Mosque became publicised and reproduced in all promotional materials about Tatarstan and Kazan (see, Figure 4). The Investment Guide to Kazan called “Kazan – the third capital of Russia”, described the Mosque as “magnificent” and the “biggest in Europe”. According to the guide, the Mosque was built as “a symbol of revival of the national and religious traditions of the Tatar people and their desire to have equal relationship with other peoples” (Merya Kazani 2007). The
Mosque was also mentioned in the investment guide for the Tatarstan Republic along with other ‘grand projects’ (Ministerstvo Torgovli 2007). The guides are published on an annual basis and distributed at foreign investment forums and are presented to visiting Tatarstan delegations.

**Figure 4.** The front cover of *Finanzen* magazine special issue (June 2007) distributed to the participants of the EBRD Annual meeting in Kazan. Photo: N. Kinossian (2007).
5.5.3 Spatial dimension

In post-socialist countries urban planning and architecture have played an important role in symbolic representation of new political regimes by providing new urban spaces, government offices as well as monuments representing the ideas of nation, ethnic belonging and history (see Adams 2008; Anacker 2004; Šir 2008). In Russia a number of economically strong and politically ambitions regions used urban development projects to strengthen their economic positions and political ambitions (Pagonis and Thornley 2000).

For centuries the Kazan Kremlin was perceived as a symbolic seat of power. Different groups fought for the right to control the site which implied control over the existing heritage and the right to place new monuments on the site. A chief research fellow in the Tatarstan Republic Academy of Science revealed during interview that the Kremlin had always been a symbol of alien power because of the Russian garrison and Governor's palace. That is why it was so important to demonstrate that the Tatarstani authorities had the political power and economic strength to build such an ambitious project in the Kremlin. The symbol of the Tatarstani statehood revival re-emerged exactly where the statehood was lost (Interview 2, 2007).

During the Tatarstani sovereignty the Kremlin once again became a site for symbolically important projects (Khalit 1996). Tatarstan “behaved like a state” and its authorities made deliberate efforts to substantiate the political claims with the cultural component including efforts to work out the ‘proper’ Tatar architecture and create the new image of the capital city Kazan (Graney 2009; 2007). The resurrection of the Kul-Sharif Mosque represents a good example of how urban space can be used to express political visions as well as to position the city of the national and international mental maps.

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter analyses the resurrection of the Kul-Sharif Mosque in the Kazan Kremlin (1995-2005) as a central element of the new image of Kazan as the capital of ‘sovereign’ Tatarstan Republic. The chapter has also revealed the links between the project and the
formation of a new urban governance model in Kazan in the context of wider social, economic and political transformation and the relationship between Russia’s federal centre and one of its provinces.

The resurrection of the Kul Sharif Mosque was embedded into political, economic and social conditions in Tatarstan which were different from those in Russia’s non-ethnic provinces. The analysis demonstrates that the Tatarstani leadership used the resurrection of the Mosque to raise public awareness, to mobilise supporters of the state sovereignty movement and to build a new national identity for Tatarstan. Acting within a centralised federal state, the Tatarstani leadership skilfully used the combination of political and economic claims in order to secure Tatarstan’s special position within the federation to allow various concessions and benefits that other parts of the federation could only dream of. The new image of Kazan and the visual impact of the Mosque helped to reinforce the political and economic claims and substantiate them with a strong cultural and national identity component.

While the resurrection of the Mosque was deeply rooted in the history of the region and the politics of centre periphery relations, it was also built to respond to the modern challenges of the globalising world. The new political and economic realities of globalisation and regionalisation were reflected in the construction of a new image of the city. As the analysis of the debates and the contest documentation demonstrates, one of the roles of the project has been to help position Kazan and Tatarstan on the global map as an economically prosperous and politically stable region, an attractive location for investment and a model region for peaceful coexistence of people of different religious backgrounds and ethnic origin.

Although the resurrection of the Mosque seems to be the materialisation of the political and social processes that Tatarstan went through in the 1990s, the role of the project in feeding back into those processes cannot be ignored. It is argued that as much as the Tatarstani sovereignty made the resurrection of the Kul-Sharif Mosque possible, the public debate around the Mosque, the search for its design and the implementation process, all helped to shape the Tatar national identity and ultimately the Tatarstani statehood. Not only did the project represent complex social processes movements, but it
also became an important factor in the identity construction and crystallisation of emerging political order in Tatarstan and emerging configuration of centre-periphery relations.

The resurrection of the Mosque was highlighted by a very special moment in the modern history of Russia. In the 1990s many Russia’s regions were experimenting with the limits of self-governance and some regions such as Tatarstan and Chechnya took it to the extreme of declaring the independence from Russia. The claims for extended economic and political rights always went hand-in-hand with the claims for cultural revival of the region. The two processes were reciprocal: while cultural uniqueness of the region was used to justify claims for more political and economic autonomy, the latter stimulated development of national culture.

The resurrection of the Mosque has facilitated the formation of a new model of urban governance led by government initiatives, reliant on the financial support from the government and government-controlled industries and aimed to serve the ambitions of the political leadership. The emerging governance model has produced a large, highly visible flagship project connected with current debates in politics and national identity. The Kazan Kremlin has become the central site where the political transformation in Tatarstan was staged. During times of political transformation the questions of power and national identity are in a constant state of flux. Heritage projects which were implemented in cities reflected ideas of historical destiny, belonging, while new ‘grand projects’ represented the ideas of economic strength and progress.

The Mosque was not a mere ‘product’, but also an important creative element of the sovereignty project. It did not simply show the return to ‘the cultural roots’ but gave the federal government in Moscow a clear message that Tatarstan was different from the rest of Russia and was looking for more independence. The mosque was called to demonstrate to the federal centre the capacity of the Tatars to mobilise and see themselves as a nation with symbolic attributes of a nation (e.g. the state and Presidency, monumental art and architecture). That potential was skilfully used to negotiate benefits which would not be available to Russian regions.
Chapter 5 Case study 1

The following chapter will show how the policies of image construction transformed during the Putin’s administration. With the increasing recentralisation of power, Tatarstan withdrew most of its sovereignty claims. The case study on the preparation to the Millennial celebrations will show how Kazan received federal funding as a form of “settlement” for abandoning the sovereignty project. Both types of design were aimed to distinguish cities from their counterparts, advertise themselves and help to secure a better position on the market. Increasingly, important commercial and public buildings are built according to the ‘international design standards’ with the idea of holding the test of the ‘international competition’.
CHAPTER 6. CASE STUDY 2: THE PRESERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE KAZAN HISTORIC CENTRE

6.1 Introduction
This chapter will analyse the government policies aimed at the preparation of the city for the Kazan Millennial celebrations in 2005. The *Special Federal Programme for the Preservation and Development of the Kazan Historic Centre* (2001-2005) played a central role in the preparation for Kazan Millennial celebrations and included a number of large urban development projects to help form a new image for Kazan. The programme was the result of successful bargaining between the authorities of the Tatarstan Republic and the federal centre over federal government funding. The Programme was the largest investment in urban projects in Kazan’s post-socialist history and made a significant impact on the development of Kazan. The preparation for the Millennium represents a good case study because it demonstrates how urban development policies in Kazan are adopted and implemented, illustrates the relationship between different levels of government (federal, regional and city) and other important actors involved in the process of governing the post-socialist city. The pursuit of development with visual impact influenced the design and implementation of the programme and became especially observable towards the final part of the implementation when painful decisions on the selection of projects had to be made due to budget cuts and delays.

This chapter is organised as follows. The first four sections document and explain the genesis of the Programme including the rationale behind the programme, the organisational structure and the programme design. Section 6.5 documents the process of the Programme implementation including delivery steps, the interactions between institutions and the selection of priorities. The final section places the analysis of the

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1 Some findings presented in the current chapter have been previously published in N.Kinossian 2006. Urban redevelopment programmes in Kazan (Russia). In: Sasha Tsenkova and Zorica Nedovic-Budic eds. *The urban mosaic of post-Socialist Europe: space, institutions and policy*, New York: Springer, pp. 319-337.
Programme in the context of the centre-periphery relationship and the search for city and regional competitiveness and, finally outlines the emerging model of urban governance. The Table 6.1 below shows the benchmark events of the programme design and implementation.

Table 6.1 The Programme timeline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Sept 1999</td>
<td>The Russian and the Tatarstani Presidents issue decrees of the same name: On Celebration of the 1000-years Anniversary of the Foundation of Kazan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Sept 1999</td>
<td>Kazan Commission for preparation to celebration of the 1000-years anniversary of the foundation of Kazan is set up by Kazan Administration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 Jan 2000</td>
<td>The State Commission for preparation to celebration of the 1000-years anniversary of the foundation of Kazan is set up by the Russian Government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 March 2000</td>
<td>The State Commission for preparation to celebration of the 1000-years anniversary of the foundation of Kazan is set up by the Tatarstani Government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 March 2001</td>
<td>The Programme for the Preparation for Celebrations of the 1000-year Anniversary of the Foundation of Kazan is adopted by a resolution of the Russian Government (Pravitel'stvo RF 2001b).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Feb 2002</td>
<td>President Putin states that all necessary programme documents had been adopted at the federal level and now on main responsibilities moved down to the local level.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 March 2002</td>
<td>The Kazan Soviet of people’s deputies approves a package of policies aimed at the preparation for the Millennium.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 the Complex Programme for preparation for celebrations of the 1000-year anniversary of foundation of Kazan, including the following sub-policies: i) the Programme for preparation for celebrations of the 1000-year anniversary of foundation of Kazan; ii) the Special federal programme for preservation and development of Kazan historic centre (2001-2005); iii) the Republican plan for preparation for the 1000-year anniversary of foundation of Kazan; iv) draft of the City plan for preparation and holding the 1000-year anniversary of foundation of Kazan; v) draft of the Special programme for improvement of living conditions of population of Kazan.
12 Sept 2002  The Russian Deputy Prime Minister announces that not all projects originally included in the programme would be finished by the Jubilee.

Sept 2003  The Kazan City revises the original list of projects and reduces the total number from 131 to 106.

30 June 2005  Kazan City Soviet reports on 8 completed projects and 21 in various degrees of completion. According to the report, the overall completion of the Programme estimated in monetary terms is 51.4% (KSND 2005c, p. 2).

26-30 Aug 2005  The Millennial celebrations are held in Kazan and include the CIS Summit, the grand openings of the 1000-year anniversary of Kazan Park, the Metro, the Ice Rink, the Horse Racing track and other events.

Source: compiled by the author.

6.2 The origins of the Programme

According to Khousin and Sidiakov (2003) the question of Kazan’s age has been debated since the XVII century. Although Kazan’s 700-year anniversary was celebrated in 1979, some archaeological evidence suggested that Kazan might have been 300 years older than it was previously thought. The excavations in the Kazan Kremlin led in 1976-1978 by Khalikov revealed the evidence of Kazan’s pre-Mongolian age (i.e. pre-1236), although they were not conclusive. In the new context of the centre-periphery relationship and the growing competition between Russia’s regions, the ability to demonstrate a rich history became a political issue. The excavations resumed in 1994 as a part of the government efforts to preserve the Kazan Kremlin. In 1997 the discovery of a medieval Czech coin issued presumably in 930 sparked off debates about the possible 1000-year age of Kazan which finally led to further investigations aimed at establishing the true age of Kazan which eventually confirmed the hypothesis of the city’s 1000-year history (Khousin and Sidiakov 2003, pp. 19-30). The Tatarstan Republic’s authorities used the discovery to justify the need for the federal government funding to support the preservation works on Kazan heritage sites first and foremost the Kremlin.
Success in competing for federal funds was politicised and depended primarily on the ability of Tatarstani authorities to make good bargaining deals with the federal authorities (Shleifer and Treisman 2000). As was discussed in the Chapter 4, the weak Yeltsin administration put up with regional separatism as long as the region did not take explicit acts to break away (Hanauer 1996; Dowley 1998; Solnick 1998). Since 2000, the new Russian leadership3 started the process of the recentralisation of power. The Tatarstani leadership was forced to curtail the sovereignty project, but continued to use the mechanisms of negotiation to make direct deals with the new administration. The support of the Russian government became possible as a result of personal negotiation between two presidents and demonstrated the federal government’s recognition of Tatarstan’s political and economic significance.

There is clear evidence to suggest that Tatarstan used its ‘special status’ to negotiate substantial financial benefits received from the federal centre through the bargaining process. A senior member of staff of the Tatarstani Presidential Administration explained how Tatarstan had secured funding through the Special Federal Programme for Socio-economic Development of Tatarstan Republic as follows:

We had a different taxation system and strong taxation benefits. We invested the money in infrastructure projects... Something that the federation should have dealt with, we did. We agreed that gradually Tatarstan would return to the common taxation system. Although if we were to lose benefits too quickly, it would make it uncertain how people vote at the next elections, and Tatarstan gives a lot of votes. Not only because of the size of our population, but because of an accurate turn up. That is why those votes were needed. So we agreed, that Tatarstan would turn to the common taxation regime, and Russia would return what we were to lose (Interview 33, June 2007).

In 2004 in the address to the Kazan Soviet President Shaimiev described the process of bargaining as follows:

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3 Putin was elected President of Russia on March 26 and inaugurated on May 7, 2000. Between December 31, 1999 (date of Yeltsin’s resignation) and May 7, 2000 Putin was acting President.
Before V. Putin was elected for the first term, we worked out the terms for Tatarstan to enter the Russia's common legal framework. We had a serious discussion. The ultimate result of our discussion was as follows: is Tatarstan was to enter the Russia's common legal and fiscal framework, a special federal programme for social and economic development of Tatarstan till 2006 needed to be adopted. If we had not had such a programme, and within the programme, the capital investment projects for Kazan Millennium, it would have been very difficult to accomplish the things that we are doing today. I am saying this to make sure that we all aware of the primary source of all our accomplishments. And we do achieve a lot especially in the capital city of the republic (President RT 2004a).

The Tatarstani President revealed that the funding received under the Special Federal Programme for the Socio-Economic Development of Tatarstan Republic for 2006 (Pravitel'stvo RF 2001a) of which the Special Federal Programme for the Preservation and Development of Kazan Historic Centre (Pravitel'stvo RF 2001c) was a part, was directly linked to Tatarstan re-entering the common political, legal and fiscal framework of the Russian Federation. The implication of this act was that Tatarstan had to pay more taxes to the federal centre. Hence the programme could be considered as 'compensation' that the federal government offered Tatarstan to renounce its sovereignty claims made in the early 1990s.

6.3 Setting the organisational structure

On 14 March, 2001 the Russian Government adopted the Special Federal Programme for the Preservation and Development of the Kazan Historic Centre (2001-2005) (hereafter – the Programme). It became the backbone of several other development programmes and schemes introduced by the Russian, Tatarstani and Kazan authorities, all dedicated to the preparation for the Millennium that was scheduled for August 2005. The Programme stemmed from two 'parent' presidential decrees by the Russian and Tatarstani presidents.

The decrees justified the celebration of the Millennium by referring to Kazan's history and economic significance. While the Russian President's decree refers to "the historical and cultural importance of Kazan as one the largest political, scientific, industrial and cultural centre of Russia, which contributed significantly to the treasure-
house of the world civilisation and the approaching in 2005 1000-year anniversary of the city” (President RF 1999). The Tatarstani President’s decree referred to

the results of the wide-scale scientific research on history of Kazan which were conducted by home and foreign researchers and the findings of the Academy of Science of the Republic of Tatarstan on the foundation of the city of Kazan, supported by the History Department of the Russian Academy of Science; special importance of the city of Kazan as the capital of the Tatarstan Republic and political, scientific, industrial and cultural centre (President RT 1999).

While the Russian President’s decree emphasised the role of Kazan as one of Russia’s urban centres, the Tatarstani President’s decree called attention to the history of Kazan, its capital status and the significance as a political, scientific, industrial and cultural centre, which represents two different visions of the position of Kazan on Russia’s mental map. The State Commission for the Preparation for Celebrations of the 1000-year Anniversary of the Foundation of Kazan (hereafter – the Russian State Commission) was formed on 28 January 2000 by a resolution of the Russian Government (Pravitel'stvo RF 2000). The State Commission for the Preparation for Celebrations of the 1000-year Anniversary of the Foundation of Kazan which was founded in Tatarstan (hereafter - the Tatarstani State commission) was formed on 13 March 2000 by a resolution of the Tatarstani Government (Kabinet Ministrov RT 2000).

The City of Kazan became involved in the decision making process after fundamental decisions were taken at higher political levels. On 4 September 1999 the Presidium of Kazan Soviet of People Deputies (hereafter – Kazan Soviet) passed a resolution On the Immediate Measures on the Preparations for Celebrations of the 1000-Year Anniversary of the Foundation of Kazan. The document referred to the presidential decrees adopted days earlier, replicated both passages which justified the Millennial celebrations in Kazan and founded the City commission for preparations for the

4 The Tatarstani President’s decree stated that the Cabinet of Ministers of the Tatarstan Republic by January 1, 2000 had to “prepare and approve the programme of measures on the preparation and holding the 1000-year anniversary of the foundation of Kazan” (President RT, 1999). The Russian President’s decree in its turn stated that in August 2000 The Russian State Commission had to prepare and submit to the Government of the Russian Federation a draft of the Programme for Preparations for the Celebration, having defined projects for construction and reconstruction and volumes and sources of funding (President RF 1999).
celebrations of the 1000-year anniversary of foundation of Kazan (hereafter – the City Commission). On 23 September 1999 on the Kazan Soviet passed a resolution *On the Immediate Measures on the Preparations for Celebrations of the 1000-year Anniversary of the Foundation of Kazan*. The resolution confirmed the foundation of the City commission and founded a special city administration *Department for the Preparation for Celebrations of the 1000-year Anniversary of the Foundation of Kazan* (hereafter – The City Department for Preparations). The Kazan Soviet bound the City administration to develop the concept of preparation for the Kazan Millennium including: the economic development strategy, the location scheme outlining areas where the celebration events would take place and the list of building projects and landscape improvements all to be approved after consultations with the public (KSND 1999).

Subsequently the Kazan Mayor Iskhakov finalised the organisational arrangements. On 26 June, 2000 the Special Department for Preparations was given the task of “the preparation and holding of the 1000-year anniversary of foundation of Kazan; coordination and control of implementation of policies; organisational, legal and informational support of the state Commissions” (Glava Administratsii 2000c). On 18 October 2000 the Mayor founded the City Special Fund “Kazan-1000” with the purpose of raising and spending funds of the federal, republican and city budgets; non-budget funds, funds of international organisations, twin cities, historic and other cities, judicial persons of Russia and foreign countries directed to the preparation for celebrations” (Glava Administratsii 2000b).

The representation of different social groups in each commission (in percentage terms) reflects the balance of power in the society and the influence different groups exercise on policymaking process. As the Table 6.2 shows, government bureaucrats had an overwhelming majority in both Russian (80%) and Tatarstani (77.4%) State Commissions. The Kazan Commission was more ‘democratic’ with bureaucrats representing only 45.1% on the total number of members. The second largest group was formed by the representatives of academic and research institutions, media and cultural organisations. Business community was not represented either in the Russian or the Tatarstani State Commissions and formed one fifths of the City Commission only.
Table 6.2. The representation structure of the three commissions for the preparations for celebration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Members representing</th>
<th>The Russian State Commission</th>
<th>The Tatarstani State Commission</th>
<th>The City Commission</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1  Government organisations</td>
<td>20 (80%)</td>
<td>24 (77.4%)</td>
<td>14 (45.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2  Business community</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>6 (19.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3  NGOs and local communities</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>1 (3.2%)</td>
<td>4 (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4  Academic and research institutions, media, cultural organisations</td>
<td>5 (20%)</td>
<td>6 (19.4%)</td>
<td>7 (22.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5  Total</td>
<td>25 (100%)</td>
<td>31 (100%)</td>
<td>31 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: compiled by the author using official government documents.

To summarise the first stage of preparation of the Programme (September – October 1999), the following organisational framework was established in order to coordinate works for preparation for Kazan Millennial preparations:

1) Commissions at three different administrative levels (national, republican and city);
2) The Organisational Committee at the city level (led by the Mayor Iskhakov);
3) The Special Department for preparation of the City administration (led by the Deputy Mayor Gusmanov);
4) The Special Fund “Kazan-1000” responsible for coordinating financial flows.

6.4 The Programme design

The previous section outlined the process of establishing the organisational structure of the Programme. The current section documents the process of the Programme planning and putting proposals for specific projects and sites together. The analysis of documents, statements and political rhetoric demonstrates how different actors used the process as a negotiating platform for pursuing their interests.
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The first meeting of the Russian State Commission took place on 22 March 2000 in the Kazan Kremlin. President Putin as chairman delivered a speech where he expressed his admiration of Kazan and its unique history as a place where the Oriental and Western cultures closely intertwined. The President referred to the Islamic and Orthodox traditions, mentioned the Mosque and the Cathedral both being reconstructed in Kazan Kremlin in connection to the history peaceful coexistence of peoples of different ethnic and religious background. At the same time, Putin repeatedly addressed the issue of federalism and centre-periphery relations. Putin noted the role of the Treaty\textsuperscript{5} of 1994 between Tatarstan and Russia in securing political stability both in the region and the relationship with Russia and noted that the modern policy of the federal centre must be consistent with previous policies. At the same time the President stated that:

The Russian Constitution has a norm about equality of all parts of the Federation. Gradually and incrementally we are pulling ourselves up to meet the requirements of the Constitution. This is not an easy task, but we have to solve it... It is important that regions, concentrating power in their hands could effectively solve state tasks, maintaining a single economic space of the country and securing stable economic growth. That has been achieved in Tatarstan... Building a federation is a very demanding daily task. I think that we have all reasons to believe that we will be moving forward in that direction... The plans which we have outlined in relation to 1000-years anniversary of Kazan will be the best confirmation and the best proof of us acting in a right way (President of Russia 2000).

Only a small part of the speech was dedicated to celebration itself. The President stated that “the 1000-years anniversary of Kazan is an event of not only all-Russia but of the international scale. That is why our common task is to make the jubilee celebrations a bright and remarkable event that will be worthy of the great city of Kazan, the Tatarstan Republic and whole Russia” \textit{(ibid)}. This statement reveals the President’s vision of the Programme as a significant joint undertaking of the Tatarstani and the Russian authorities that could help both to work out the format of centre-periphery relationship and a ‘proper’ model for Russia’s federalism.

\textsuperscript{5} The Treaty of 1994 gave Tatarstan large fiscal autonomy.
In 2000 the Mayor Iskhakov (Glava Administratsii 2000a) justified the need for Kazan’s centre redevelopment as follows. The Mayor described the archaeological findings which led a group of Russian and foreign scientists to new conclusions about Kazan’s age. According to Iskhakov, Kazan had 759 historical monuments and 4 thousand buildings of historic value: “to preserve and revitalise the monuments, including those that had been lost, is one of the main tasks and approaches towards the preparation for celebrations of the 1000-year anniversary of foundation of Kazan”. According to Iskhakov there were several reasons for the poor condition of many monuments. The first was associated with the twentieth century’s cataclysms: the Revolution and the WWII that brought thousands of the resettled residents to the city. The second reason was the construction of the hydro-electrical power station (1956), which had raised the water horizon and affected the building foundations in the lower parts of the historic centre. The third reason was that recourses were diverted from Kazan during the development of oil exploration in the republic and the construction of new petrochemical and automobile industries and new cities elsewhere which negatively affected investment in housing construction and maintenance in Kazan. Therefore celebrating the anniversary in such a shameful appearance was not appropriate.

Despite the fact that the current poor condition of Kazan’s heritage and infrastructure were predetermined by the historic circumstances largely external to the city, the Mayor stated that all citizens of Kazan were responsible for making their city ready for the Millennium. The Mayor explained that initiatives were brought up by anonymous Kazani families who allegedly were willing to donate up to a thousand hours of voluntary labour on the construction sites, in industries and on the streets of the city. “The image of a new Kazan is that of a city where every citizen is the master” – declared the Mayor. The industries also allegedly came with their own initiatives: “oil, lorries, petrochemical products, grain, farming products would be used for the good of the capital of Tatarstan” - concluded Iskhakov (Glava Administratsii 2000a). That might sound as a paradoxical conclusion, but in fact, similar “public initiatives” were widely used by the Communist party organs to mobilise support for the fulfilment of development goals, especially those that required the input of extra labour (see Hough 1969, p. 130).
It would be naive to expect that voluntary labour and donations of grain and trucks could solve the problems which had accumulated over decades of maintenance negligence and under-investment. That obviously was not the kind of funding anybody would expect to rely on to implement the grand plans to modernise the Kazan city centre. The main target must have been to receive a federal grant similar to that St. Petersburg had previously received for preparation of the city’s 300-years anniversary. The rhetoric of “voluntary labour” and “grain donations” were intended to create the impression of strong community support for the government initiatives and to urge the federal government to match ‘public initiatives’ with funding. The Mayor concluded that Kazan expected the federal centre to demonstrate a similar commitment as it had shown during the preparation to celebrations of St. Petersburg 300-years anniversary.

On 19 October, 2000 the Kazan Soviet passed a resolution on the Course of Implementation of the Immediate Measures on the Preparation for Celebrations of the 1000-year Anniversary of the Foundation of Kazan. The Deputy Mayor Gusmanov reported to the Kazan Soviet that the draft Programme for the Preparation for the 1000-year Anniversary of the Foundation of Kazan had been “finalised with the indication of sites for construction and reconstruction; the size and source of funding” (KSND 2000). According to the document “the proposed measures give hope that the Jubilee... will help to revitalise many glorious traditions of the peoples residing on the territory of the city and the republic; to contribute to the subsequent strengthening of the inter-confessional and inter-ethnic relationship and to attract the attention of the global community” (Italic-N.K.).

The second meeting of the Russian State Commission was held on 19 January 2001 in Moscow Kremlin. President Putin’s addressed the issue of the “ideology of celebrations”:

when celebrations are being discussed, it is meant to be not only some actions of superficial nature. It is desired that all measures that we are planning are focused not only on a visual effect – even though it is important to create the atmosphere of celebration and according feelings among the people. But the most important thing is to achieve a different goal – to make sure that the whole complex of policies that is being planned in that respect will form a serious socio-economic project. A
project, aimed not only on preservation and reconstruction of the historic centre and monuments of architecture and history, but aimed on making the life of people more comfortable, more modern and making the living environment that as it has to be in the XXI century (President RF 2001).

The President once again suggested that during the preparation the mechanisms of collaboration between different tiers of authority and administration, including regional and federal levels can be worked out and “rolled smooth” (Italic – N.K.). This is a significant comment as the federal government will use urban development projects in Kazan as a ‘testing site’ for administrative machinery again in 2009-2013. The President also stated that “it is necessary to proceed to the stage of approval of a specific list of projects which we have focused in the first place (Italic – N.K.). This is a significant comment as well because less than five years before the celebration it was made clear that some projects had to be prioritised. The rest of the chapter will analyse what was the main rationale behind short-listing some projects and abandoning other.

On 3 March 2001 the Russian Government passed a resolution on the Programme for the Preparation for the 1000-year Anniversary of the Foundation of Kazan. The textual part of the programme was as lengthy as three lines while the rest of the document was a list of events and development projects associated with celebrations of the Millennium. Those events embraced among other things the Rudolf Nureyev’s Ballet Festival, the Cultural days of Kazan in Japan, the all-Russia contest for dog trainers, the International Forum “Cultural heritage of Islamic cities”, the World hockey Championship and the photo exhibition on Kazan in Rio-de-Janeiro. The text of the programme also for the first time publicised a provisional list of sites of construction and reconstruction containing 54 projects divided in four groups:

1) 24 projects aimed at the preservation and reconstruction of the historic, cultural architectural and town planning art heritage;

2) 11 projects for traffic relief in the historic centre;

6 According to Deputy Prime-Minister of the Russian Federation Igor Schouvalov, the preparations for Student Olympics in Kazan in 2013 would allow the federal government to test the readiness of the whole administrative machinery for holding the Winter Olympic in Sochi in 2014 (see Abdoullin 2010). Kazan hence has become a site where the federal government tests pilot projects which can be replicated in other Russia’s regions.

7 The famous ballet dancer Nureyev was ethic Tatar.
3) 14 projects aimed at the modernisation and development of engineering infrastructure;
4) 7 projects aimed at the development of tourism, retail and communication services (Pravitel'stvo RF 2001b).

Eleven days later the Programme was adopted by the resolution of the Russian Government. The text of the Programme replicated the message of the presidential decrees and other political statements. According to the Programme, “celebrating the 1000-year anniversary of the foundation of Kazan in 2005 is significant not only for all people living in the Russian Federation, but has a big international significance for preserving historical and cultural links between European and Asiatic peoples” (Pravitel'stvo RF 2001c, p. 7). The next step was made on 24 August 2001 the Programme was inserted into the Special federal programme for socio-economic development of Tatarstan Republic for 2006 (Pravitel'stvo RF 2001a). Also a new programme was introduced: the City Complex Staged Programme for Preparations for the Celebration for 2005, “to include a scheme of the zones of celebrations, a list of sites for construction, reconstruction and beautification and to be discussed with the public after the Federal targeted Programme is adopted” (KSND 2000).

As the result of the planning stage four main programmes have been adopted, which included the following:

1) The Programme for the Preparation for the 1000-year Anniversary of the Foundation of Kazan (Resolution of the Russian Government No. 295-p, 3 March, 2001), of which the next programme in the list was “a mechanism of realisation”;
2) The Special Federal Programme for the Preservation and Development of the Kazan Historic Centre (2001-2005) (Resolution of the Russian Government No. 180, March 14, 2001), which was inserted in the next in the list programme as a “sub-programme”;
3) The Special Federal Programme for Social and Economic Development of Tatarstan Republic for 2006 (Resolution of the Russian Government No 625, August 24, 2001);
4) The City Complex Staged Programme for the Preparation for Celebrations in 2005 (KSND, 2000), which embraced the first two in the list as an overarching programme as well as other programmes adopted on the city level.
Although each programme was linked with the preparation to Kazan Millennial celebrations, only the Special Federal Programme for the Preservation and Development of the Kazan Historic Centre (2001-2005) listed the development projects and allocated funding to urban development projects in Kazan (and hence was the main focus of the current research).

The adoption of more than one programme aimed at one task reflects the involvement of different government bodies into a complex multi-level policy making process. The federal government does not normally offer funding to cities directly that is why funding for urban development projects in Kazan was ‘inserted’ into a regional development programme. Kazan, as a ‘sovereign’ political entity with its own budgeting and planning powers, replicated the federal and regional policies through its own policy-making mechanism. Such a complicated organisational scheme, on the one hand, could help to mobilise resources from state and non-state sources and channel them to specific issues in Kazan historic centre. On the other hand, the emergence of seventeen programmes out of one (that was initially announced) could lead to a dysfunctional and unaccountable managerial arrangement. Further analysis is needed to shed light on this complex issue.

The Programme’s goals and objectives

The main goal of the programme embraced three statements: “the restoration of the unique Eurasian culture-historical and architecture-planning heritage of the peoples inhabiting the Central European part of Russia; the modernisation of infrastructure of the...

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8 While the Programme (1) was designed to “further strengthen the image of Kazan on the international arena and, as a whole was aimed on adequate preparation for celebrations of the 1000-year anniversary of foundation of Kazan” (KSND, 2005. p. 2); the Special Federal Programme (2) embraced construction projects dedicated to the Jubilee; the Special Federal Programme for Social and Economic Development of Tatarstan Republic (3) was a comprehensive programme of federal aid; and, finally, the City Complex Staged Programme (4) which integrated both the construction projects and promotional events. Later on, a fifth programme was introduced called “The improvement of living conditions of the population of Kazan” (5) which embraced several other programmes which were being implemented in Kazan. Altogether the total number of programmes associated with preparations for the celebration reached 17 (KSND 2005?).

9 Exceptions are ‘closed’ towns where military bases and military related industries are based (see a study by Shvetsov 2002)
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city’s historical centre for its preservation and functioning; development of inter-regional and international historical, cultural and business links between European and Asian peoples” (Pravitel’stvo RF 2001c, p. 3). The goals were to be accomplished through a set of tasks including the following:

- to provide for preservation and efficient use of historical, cultural, architectural and town planning art heritage; to restore the most valuable monuments of history and culture;
- to restore the housing stock in the historical centre;
- to mitigate negative impact of industrial enterprises and communal facilities on the natural environment;
- to relieve the traffic load on the historic centre, and achieve more equal distribution of transport flows; to improve transport links between the areas of residential development, to redistribute transport flows to bypass the historic centre; to create modern transport infrastructure;
- to provide for flood defence and reliable supply of the historic centre with water, electricity and heat;
- to improve the sanitary-epidemiologic situation and solve the problem of waste utilisation;
- to provide for urban amenities in the historic centre in order to create comfortable conditions for living and recreation for city’s residents and visitors and enhancing the attractiveness of the image of the city as a whole;
- to improve the quality of life and culture of the historic centre residents;
- to strengthen the city’s tax base; to secure the supply of a wide range of locally produced goods and services for the city’s residents and visitors;
- to improve the level of retail and tourist services;
- to create new jobs.
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The Programme tasks were grouped into five major sections including the following 1) the preservation and restoration of historical, cultural, architectural and town building art heritage; 2) transport relief for the historic centre; 3) the modernisation of the city’s engineering infrastructures; 4) improvement of recreational areas and landscapes; 5) strengthening the city’s tax base through the development of inter-regional and international business and trade links, development of tourism and investment projects (Pravitel'stvo RF 2001c pp. 3-4). The first section was the most important and was supposed to contribute to the preservation of Kazan heritage which was a creation of many generations of Eastern and European architects... in terms of the number, diversity and quality of monuments of history, culture, architecture and urbanism art Kazan is one of the most recognised world historical centres... The Kazan Kremlin in 2000 was listed as the UNESCO heritage site and is a unique historical and cultural complex where the following structures are located: Blagoveschensky Cathedral (1562), some buildings of the Spaso-Preobrazhensky Monastery (1596), the Khan’s Palace, the Muraleva Mosque, the Suumbeki Tower, and the Bogoyavlenskaya Church (Pravitel'stvo RF 2001c, p. 8)10.

The parts of the Programme dedicated to the problems of the housing stock in the historic centre echoed the speech delivered by Iskhavov at the first meeting of the State Commission and also blamed the external factors for the poor state of housing. According to the Programme, since 1996 18,446 families had already been re-housed from the slums, but 18,077 were still waiting for new accommodation while living in sub-standard accommodation. The quality of public services, including the public transport, the heating, water, gas and electrical supply and sewage lines was described as appalling too. Practically all urban utility systems were worn out and acted carried loads above the capacity. The programme also addressed current problems in the retail industry (needed to be “civilised”), the tourism sector (the need to achieve “international industry standards”), external transport (envisaged the modernisation of the airport and the river

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10 Neither the Khan’s Palace nor the Muraleva Mosque were “located in the Kremlin” – there were only some remains of foundations which were thought to belong to those legendary buildings. The Suumbeki Tower was worshiped by some Tatars as the last standing structure of the Kazan Khanate, but, in fact, it was built by the Russians long after the old Tatar Kremlin had been ruined.
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port), the task of “supplying the city residents and guests with a wide range of locally produced goods” was also mentioned (Pravitel’stvo RF 2001c, pp. 10-11).

Selection of projects

The Programme enlisted 131 separate projects: 82 focused on heritage protection, 6 on transport infrastructure, 8 - on community facilities, 3 - on landscape and recreation amenities, and 32 - on tourist and business development. The anticipated results included the restoration of the historical, cultural and architectural heritage of Kazan’s historical centre on 13 sites; construction of a metro line and 30 km of new and improved ring and radial roads; improvements in the quality of life for the residents of the historical centre; restoration of the ecological balance; turning Kazan into an inter-regional business and tourist centre; and the creation of 15,000 new jobs (ibid, p. 5). All projects were to be completed by the Millennium celebration in August 2005.

The interviewees almost unanimously agreed that large urban development projects were an appropriate way of addressing the problems and preparing the city for the celebrations. As the Chief architect of a state-owned design institute stated:

What else could have the preparations for celebration of Kazan 1000-year anniversary been expressed by, if not by the improvement of the city image? Quite naturally, it was expresses in important for the residents and guests urban development projects... Our impressions of a capital city are always linked to some bright, interesting architectural projects, therefore preparation for the celebration was naturally associated with construction of image-orientated projects, which also happened because of the attraction of huge development funding...

At the same time, the same expert added that

There was a contradiction... The preparations for celebration of Kazan 1000-year anniversary did not do enough to emphasise the historical development of Kazan and focused instead on building the image of a future Kazan...generally the 1000-year anniversary was used as a pretext to modernise the city (Interview 3, 2008).

The modernisation of the city was perceived in a very peculiar way. According to the Director of a government-owned company the selection of projects was informed by
the Mayor’s understanding of the role of Kazan as the capital city and the role of development projects with a visual impact in strengthening this role:

Why was the construction of the Metro selected as the preferred option to solve the traffic problem? Because all projects in Kazan were image projects... They emphasised the status of the city, hence the status of the Mayor, because the Mayor was the master... They did not emphasise the status of the city residents... The image of the capital was not seen as based on the quality of education, culture, the openness of the city, the ability to improve the built environment... The ambitions of particular people decided everything. (Interview 11, January 2008).

These responses depict the rationale behind choosing projects: the main motivation of the Mayor was to complete those projects that could contribute to a new image of the city and apparently the image of the Mayor himself and his power.

Funding

The Programme was planned to have four sources of funding including federal (30.42%), republican (30.58%) and city (9.36%) budgets, and an off-budget source through private investments and credits (29.64%). The total projected budget was as high as 64.93 billion roubles (approximately $US 2.19 billion). The structure of funding (by sources) as it was envisaged by the programme document is shown in the Table 6.3. As the table demonstrates, over 70% of all funding were expected to be received from the state sources and only 10.60% from enterprises (including controlled by the state). The federal and republican budgets shared the expenses in equal proportion (over 30% each) while the city budget was expected to contribute over 9% of the expenses. The funding arrangements demonstrated that the Programme relied heavily of government funding provided mostly from the external to the city sources. The funds from the federal and the republican budgets plus foreign credits were intended to contribute up to 76%, taking into account credit from commercial banks and enterprises registered outside Kazan this figure would be even higher.
Table 6.3. Structure of the Programme total funding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of funding</th>
<th>In RU billion</th>
<th>In percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Federal budget, including</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Direct transfers</td>
<td>7.75</td>
<td>30.42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Credit guarantees</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Tatarstan republic budget</td>
<td>19.85</td>
<td>30.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Kazan city budget</td>
<td>6.08</td>
<td>9.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Funds of enterprises and organisations</td>
<td>6.88</td>
<td>10.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Credits from commercial banks</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>4.06%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Foreign credits</td>
<td>9.73</td>
<td>14.98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>64.93</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


6.5 Implementation

This section analyses the Programme implementation. The analysis of the Programme delivery steps is based on official documents, internal reports and the media coverage. The analysis demonstrates how a profound mismatch developed between what was planned and what was achieved over the course of the Programme implementation. The socially significant components were cut back, while visually prominent and symbolically important projects were pushed forward.

6.5.1 Delivery steps

During 2001 and 2002 the major efforts were paid to the preparation of the blue-prints and obtaining planning and building permissions, setting up the organisation structure and establishing links between various institutional players. Only a few practical steps were taken on the ground. While the politicians’ statements were saturated with an egalitarian rhetoric, the actual achievements pointed to the contrary.
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A week after the Federal Programme was adopted on 14 March 2001 the first meeting of The Tatarstani State Commission was held in the Kazani Kremlin on 22 March 2001. The Tatarstani President Shaimiev who chaired the meeting stated that:

the whole Republic is getting involved in the preparation process; all financial resources are being mobilised including the city budget and other sources of funding. The republic also relies on credits secured by the Russian government... We have a unique opportunity to restore Kazan, to learn how to build quickly and nicely, to make sure finally that people in the capital of Tatarstan feel comfortable (Tatnews 2001).

On 6 February 2002 at the third meeting of the Russian State Commission President Putin pointed out that all the necessary programme documents had been adopted and the main responsibilities moved down to the local level. Once again the President emphasised that the preparations first of all had to serve people’s interests: “behind the Jubilee we should not forget about the social wellbeing of people, about new housing and social services. In the course of the events people must feel a real difference in their lives” (President RF 2002b). Later that year Putin once again assured that:

The goal of celebrations is not simply to have a bright commemoration of the jubilee and have fun. We are facing a serious and multi-faceted socio-economic task. The task oriented on qualitative progress of the whole urban environment of Kazan, on the restoration of historical and cultural monuments, and ultimately on the formation of decent, more comfortable conditions for life and work for people”. The President also pointed out that “the development of city infrastructure, strengthening of interregional and international links – all works directly towards investment attractiveness, improving business environment and enlargement of the cultural space.

Nevertheless, right from its start the implementation of the Programme deviated from the plan. The delivery process chronically lagged behind the schedule due to the interruptions in funds transfers. For example, a regional newspaper reported in October 2001, that 250 million roubles were transferred from the centre and stuck on the city’s accounts like “dead weight” because the blue-prints for the construction were not ready (Izvestiya Tatarstan 2001). In April 2002 the Deputy Mayor announced that the
reconstruction was going slower than expected and that the deadlines could be missed (Pahomova, 2002). While the total budget was as high as 64.93 billion roubles, by May 2004 (after 37 month of programme implementation and 15 months before the completion) only 14 billion roubles, or 21% of what was planned has been materialised (Kommersant, 2004). In the end of June 2005 (or two months before its completion) the deputy head reported at the session of the Kazan Soviet of People’s Deputies that the Programme received only half of the expected funding (Intertat 2005).

The Administration of Kazan City delivered a series of reports on preparations for the celebration to the Kazan Soviet. The Administration’s internal reports were never published, only the resolutions of the Kazan Soviet were. Only one out of five resolutions was dedicated specifically to the evaluation of the Programme, the rest referred to “preparations for the celebration”. Analysis of the resolutions shows how the administration systematically slipped from a consistent and honest evaluation.

On 1 March 2002 The Kazan Soviet reported on the progress in preparation for Kazan Millennium from September 1999 to March 2002. The resolution acknowledged that during the period 2 years and 6 months “considerable preliminary work has been done and necessary conditions were created for drawing residents of Kazan and labour teams from other districts and cities of Tatarstan and the Russian Federation in celebrating the jubilee of Kazan by doing concrete deeds and labour presents” (KSND 2002). The Mayor Iskhakov reported on some aspects of the city economic development, although largely irrelevant to the topic of the resolution:

during the preparation to the 1000-anniversary the city acquired international recognition, became a full member of ten international organisations; Kazan attracted attention of such organisations as the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the Organisation of “Islam Conference”, UNESCO, the International Centre for Research in History, Culture and Art of Islam, the European Association of Historical Cities, the Organisation of World Heritage Cities under the aegis of which many events dedicated to the 1000-years anniversary of the foundation of Kazan (ibid).
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The Mayor continued that “one billion roubles was allocated from the federal budget and was “assimilated”. The 9.1 million dollars credit was obtained from the World Bank of Reconstruction and Development; 3.9 billion roubles were received from the Tatarstan Republic budget. The works were conducted on the reconstruction of the Kazan Kremlin and the Kazan State University; on construction of the smaller and the larger Ring roads, radial roads, the Metro; on the liquidation of the dilapidated housing stock; the reconstruction of the objects of culture, architecture of the historic centre (ibid). The progress was reported in very general terms, lacking details on a number of specific sites where construction works were conducted.

By the autumn of the year 2003 it became apparent that the Programme was running behind the timetable. At the forth meeting of the Russian State Commission held on 12 September 2003 the Russian Deputy Prime-Minister Kudrin stated that despite all efforts being made by the local authorities, not all projects assigned for completion would be finished by the Jubilee. The reason for this was given as inadequate funding, including funding from the federal centre. Nevertheless, it was asserted that everything that had been planned would be completed, if not by the Jubilee, a little later (Intertat.ru 2003).

The next report on the Course of Preparations for the Celebration of the 1000-year Anniversary of the Foundation of Kazan was delivered by the head of the Special Department to the Kazan Soviet on 26 December 2003. It sounded even more pitiful than the Head’s report delivered in March 2002. A two-page document contains three lines on the progress of the Special Federal Programme:

in the course of the implementation of the Programme for preservation and development of Kazan historic centre works were conducted on the most important Kazan sites of construction and reconstruction for the Jubilee of the city (KSND 2003).

The rest of the document contained data on industrial output, housing construction, wages, collected taxes as if all these activities were not part of government everyday management routine but special events dedicated to the preparation of the Jubilee. The document specifically reported on the events aimed at “the promotion of the international image of Kazan” - the World Congress of the Tatars, the International
theatrical festival of Turk countries, Kazan's Jubilee being enlisted as a UNESCO date of commemoration, establishing of the World Heritage City Organisation branch office in Kazan; and arrangements for the jubilee media coverage and other events, altogether 49 events, including 23 international ones. The composition of the report and the corresponding organisational structure served well the goal of concealing the real progress of the Programme by reporting on things of marginal significance or relevance, for example housing construction at the city edge.

The next report on the Course of preparations for celebration of the 1000-year anniversary of the foundation of Kazan was delivered to the Kazan Soviet on 30 March 2005. The report had a very similar structure to the previous report that was delivered 15 months previously. A two-page document contained three lines on the Programme implementation which copied word by word the previous report statement:

in the course of the implementation of the Programme for preservation and development of Kazan historic centre works were conducted on the most important Kazan sites of construction and reconstruction for the jubilee of the city (KSND 2005e, p. 1).

The rest of the document described the general economic performance of Kazan (largely irrelevant to the topic); commented on the implementation of other programmes and numerous international events 'the holding of which contributed to strengthening of the image of the Tatarstan Republic and the city of Kazan on the international arena and worked on international recognition of the 1000-year anniversary of Kazan' (KSND 2005e, p. 2).

On 30 June 2005 the Kazan Soviet passed three resolutions in relation to the Jubilee celebrations. Each of them was a two-page document summarising achievements of the preparation process. The main programme of the Millennial celebrations - the Programme did not deserve a separate evaluation and was reported on in few lines between paragraphs dedicated to housing construction and ballet festivals. Full figures on the programme financial evaluation have never been published, which is why we have to rely on what was available through alternative sources. One resolution reported on the deeds of Kazan's townspeople and labour collectives dedicated to the preparation to
celebrations. For instance, the pupils collected 78 tonnes of recyclable paper worth 50 thousand roubles; the school No. 122 rather mysteriously managed to donate 180 thousand roubles; the local food supermarket chain promised to plant 1,000 trees and donate 1,000 balls to sports schools (KSND 2005b). The second resolution summarised progress in preparation for the celebrations according to the Programme for Preparations for the 1000-year Anniversary of the Foundation of Kazan. It was reported that out of 114 events envisaged by the programme 101 have been held, including 39 international and 36 for all of Russia. Those included two international opera, ballet and music festivals; an international conference of the World Heritage Cities organisation; a regional UNESCO seminar and other events which all facilitated “the effective development of the city of Kazan; further improvement of the image of Kazan on the international arena, and as a whole were aimed at adequate preparations for the celebration of the 1000-year anniversary of the foundation of Kazan” (KSND 2005d). The third resolution was focused on the Complex Programme for Preparation for Celebrations of the 1000-year Anniversary of Foundation of Kazan. As was discussed earlier, the complex programme was a shell housing five other programmes associated with the Jubilee and, the most importantly, the Programme. As usual, much of the resolution was dedicated to events aimed at “the strengthening the image of Kazan on the international arena” (KSND, 2005c) as opposed to reconstruction and construction projects in Kazan historic centre. According to the resolution:

As a whole, the implementation of the Complex Programme for Preparation for Celebrations of the 1000-year Anniversary of Foundation of Kazan contributed to the improved living conditions and the quality of life of Kazan townspeople; to the improved image of Kazan on the international arena; and worked for effective development of our city. At the same time one of the sections of the Complex Programme – the Special Federal Programme for “Preservation and Development of the Historic Centre of Kazan” remains unrealised by 49.6% and requires additional measures (KSND 2005c).

As the report clearly indicated, the Programme received only half of the anticipated funding, which means even less in terms of implemented projects taking into account the inflation and appreciation of construction materials and labour. In order to smooth the bad impression that the drawbacks might have caused, the Programme was
presented as “one section” of the Complex Programme for Preparation – a shell-like arrangement of the City Administration which contained policies with various aims, deadlines and sources of funding all associated with the preparation for the Millennium. This arrangement could become a useful tool of misleading the public opinion and creating a false impression of accomplishment. While the core programme was not performing well, non-specialists could not detect the problem because the drawbacks were camouflaged by other policies all merged together in one programme.

From what was available from the official sources it is discernable that “from the beginning the Programme has been financed up to 32.52 billion roubles which makes up 50.4% of what was envisaged by the programme” (KSND 2005c, p. 1). Out of the total funding actually received (32.52 billion roubles) 7.1 billion roubles or 35.9% of what was initially excepted came from the federal budget; 18.07 billion roubles or 91% of what was initially expected came from Tatarstan Republic’s budget; and 7.51 billion roubles or 39% of what was initially expected came from off-budget sources, including credits and the participation of enterprises (including those controlled by the state). The data is summarised in the Table 6.4.

Despite the fact that the resolutions by the Soviet and the Mayor claimed “to take steps to attract non-budget funds to finance policies on preparation for the celebration of the 1000-year anniversary of foundation of Kazan; to support and develop initiatives of the citizens and labour collectives” (Glava Administratsii 2003) the commitment of the non-state sector was very weak. So-called “off-budget sources” formed 17.6% of the Programme’s 2004 budget. The contributions from non-state sector were even lower, as the “non-budget sources” included government borrowings from banks. The Tatarstani authorities encouraged the government controlled industries to participate in the Programme. The largest local distillery JSC ‘Tatsprtprom’ picked up the 2 billion roubles bill for the construction of the International Horse Racing Complex and the largest Tatarstani oil company OAO ‘Tatneft’ contributed 570 million roubles to the construction of a large housing estate (Figure 5) built to accommodate the Jubilee’s VIP guests (Choudodeyev 2005, p. 21). Officially these generous activities were described as
“business social responsibility” but practically they were compulsory donations arranged by the authorities.

Table 6.4 The financial evaluation of the Programme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Funds by sources</th>
<th>Envisaged – A</th>
<th>Obtained - B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in RU billions</td>
<td>Share of the total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Federal Budget, including</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Direct transfers</td>
<td>19.75</td>
<td>30.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Credit Guarantees</td>
<td>7.75</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Tatarstan Republic Budget</td>
<td>19.85</td>
<td>30.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Kazan City Budget</td>
<td>6.08</td>
<td>9.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Funds of enterprises and organisations</td>
<td>6.88</td>
<td>10.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Credits from commercial banks</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>4.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Foreign credits</td>
<td>9.73</td>
<td>14.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>64.93</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the author using various sources.

6.5.2 Progress on project sites

Constant delays with funding, preparing the blueprints and obtaining approvals and permissions had a significant effect on holding back effect the overall Programme delivery. Part of the problem was the poor coordination between the administrative tiers. For example, the Russian Minister of Finance explained that the delays in financing were partly caused by the fact that “the papers sat for a long time in the federal government office despite the fact they had been approved” (Tatarstan Republic 2004). The Deputy Mayor of Kazan blamed the insufficient institutional capacity that caused delays in the
preparation of plans which had a slowing-down effect on the design review process and as a result affected the payment schedule:

In some cases projects did not have blue-prints complete, in other cases blue-prints were complete but were not approved by the planning authorities. As a result the Russian Treasury withheld cash transfers to the local authorities (Vechernyaya Kazan' 2002).

This shows that delays in funding and design had a mutually aggravating effect. The implementation of some projects suffered from the lack of technical expertise. For instance, the contractors for the Metro received a new technical brief on electrical equipment just four months before the construction final deadline. For 15 months prior to that, construction works had been conducted according to the old brief which turned to be incorrect (Aksenov 2005). While the funds from budget sources were coming in more or less timely, foreign borrowings were hindered by the decision of the Russian government not to accept financial liabilities of municipalities. As Mayor Iskhakov acknowledged, out of 12 billion roubles that were expected earlier to receive in a form of credits the city managed to obtain only 4 billion roubles (Rossiyskaya Gazyeta 2004).

Eventually it became clear that only a fraction of what was planned could be realistically achieved by August 2005. In September 2003 it was announced that the problem was going to be solved by a substantial reduction in the number of projects to be supported (Korneyeva 2004). The local press reported that the Administration of the City decided to exclude 50 projects from the list, but add 26 new projects - making the new total of 106 instead of 131 (Tihonov 2003). In 2004 the Federal Audit Office reported that “due to insufficient funding the construction and restoration of 48 projects listed in the Programme had not been initiated, in 2002 there were no construction works on 62 sites and in 2003 this increased to 131 sites” (Schyetnaya Palata RF 2005).
Figure 5. The housing estate built to accommodate the Jubilee’s VIP guests. Photo: N. Kinossian

Figure 6. The State Pension Fund Offices in Kazan city centre. Photo: N. Kinossian (2007).
According to one of the few official documents available on the Programme evaluation, by the end of June 2005 (or two months before the Jubilee) eight projects were listed as completed\(^{11}\) and twenty one as to be finished\(^{12}\), which makes the total of 29. In July 2005 the Minister for Construction, Architecture and the Communal Services announced that by the end of August main projects 51 in number would be definitely completed. Among those were the City Hall, the Opera and Ballet Theatre, the Horse Racing Complex, the Ice Rink, the Local train station and the new bridge across Kazanka River. Also 200 facades would be painted (half of them along the so called “guests’ routs”\(^{13}\) and the obvious disgrace would be simply demolished, totally 500 structures (including 100 in the centre) (Leskova, 2005). The official web site for the Millennium Celebration listed 41 projects to be completed before the celebration, of which over 20 were finalised. Among the completed projects were 5 metro stations on a 7 km long line at a cost of 14.3 billion roubles (about $US 482 million), the Horse Racing Complex, the Ice Rink, and an up-scale housing development for the VIP guests attending the celebration. None of those projects had anything to do with heritage restoration.

The local expert who worked at the time of the implementation of the Programme in the Ministry for Construction of the Republic of Tatarstan interpreted the situation as follows:

As it often happens with state-funded development programme, in the beginning the budget was not clearly set up and people tried to squeeze in as many projects as possible... When the budget was finalised, it became clear that the list of the projects had to be revised and priorities changed during the course of the Programme... Some projects required larger budgets than it was originally expected, hence the number of projects had to be reduced. Another question was how was the original list revised and who established the priorities... (Interview 3, January 2007).

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\(^{11}\) Among them the Kazan State University (the East wing, West semi-circle building and engineering infrastructure); the Gubernatorial Palace: the Youth Theatre (first stage); the Basket-Hall; the Central market: Reconstructed 2,412.2 thousand sq m of roads; Built 1.5 km of roads of the Smaller Ring; Built 3.65 km of roads of the Larger Ring and other (KSND, 2005d).

\(^{12}\) Among them: the first Kazan Metro line; a bridge across the River Kazanka; the Ensemble of Kazan Kremlin; Kazan Rathaus; the Opera and Ballet Theatre; the Complex of the city Duma; the Marjani Mosque; the Peter and Paul Cathedral; the Alexander Passage; the local trains terminal; the hotel Soviet and other (KSND, 2005d).

\(^{13}\) The expression “guest routs” is commonly used in Kazan to describe major city transport arteries used by VIP guests such as the rout from the airport to the Presidential Palace for example.
Figure 7. Moskovskaya Street in Kazan city centre did not receive initially anticipated investment. Photo: N. Kinossian (2007).

Figure 8. Hotel Kazan in Kazan city centre did not receive initially anticipated investment. Photo: N. Kinossian (2007).
Despite the fact that the Programme was the largest public investment in Kazan urban development during the post-socialist period it was never formally evaluated which appeared to be a very common practice in Kazan (Interview 3, June 2007). The empirical study has revealed that what was actually achieved only partially met the initial goals of the Programme. The total number of projects represented only a fraction of the originally adopted list. The overall construction cost spent on the sites was about a half of what was planned. In many ways the Programme deviated from the original focus on the preservation of the Kazan historic centre.
6.6 Analysis and discussion

Following the analytical framework developed in the literature review chapter this section will discuss the organisation, funding arrangements, spatial choices and the rationale behind the large development projects implemented as a part of the preparation for Kazan’s Millennium celebrations in 2005.

6.6.1 Organisation structure and funding arrangements

The Programme was not the first occasion when Kazan attracted external funding for urban development projects. In previous years the city successfully attracted two smaller EBRD loans for urban infrastructure development. Although the Programme secured much larger funding, it was designed in line with the socialist tradition of government-led urban development. The budget funding was guaranteed and the government also secured the contribution of the state-controlled industries. The structure of funding inevitably influenced the type and selection of projects.

According to a senior planner in the Kazan-based design institute, the very mechanism of government funding required a tangible, manageable and easily verifiable set of tasks. Construction projects were ideal for that purpose as every line represented a concrete project which the Moscow authorities could easily single out and control in terms of budgeting and schedule (Interview 29, 2007). Once the budget funding was secured, the government officials who were in charge of the Programme design and implementation did not have to think about commercial feasibility of the projects and the need to meet the requirements of investment returns. With the emphasis on government funding, where economic feasibility was not an issue, the authorities failed to create conditions for businesses to invest and failed to use the government-led projects as triggers of business-led growth. The chief-architect of a state-owned design institute commented on the impact of the Programme on private investment as follows:

1 One loan to fund modern infrastructure on a site previously occupied by dilapidated housing for its commercial re-use. The second loan was used to modernise municipal heating facilities using energy efficient equipment. According to the requirements of the Bank both projects were commercially viable and returns were expected. Nevertheless the size of the loans (10 and 9 million US dollars respectively) was small as compared to the public investment into urban development projects.
Investors demonstrated interest, but there were no examples of significant investment in Kazan made... Many opportunities were lost because the city authorities demanded too much from the investors. Not everybody would meet high demands also the rules of the game are not clear... (Interview 3, 2007).

Even if the non-government sector was involved in project implementation, the authorities used the well-proven socialist practice of making big enterprises responsible for the implementation of large urban development projects. As a senior staff member of the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation revealed during interview:

Authorities in Tatarstan are very proud of the practice of using the private money to build public projects. This is a merge of public and private sector... They think why to make state-controlled enterprises pay more taxes when they could be asked to invest in something instead. Then it becomes unclear who controls what assets; the unpredictable demands (to support public projects – N.K.) make it difficult for the enterprises to do financial planning and creates an additional fiscal load. It creates a negative incentive for foreign investors who hesitate to invest in enterprises that are the pressure of uncertainty. But on the other side, state-controlled enterprises will always get some protection from the authorities... Tatarstan is the region of state-capitalism, it may have enough internal resources to achieve growth, and if the economy generates enough investment, why to attract external sources of funding? (Interview 10, 2007).

As a result of a lack of financial planning, large “landmark” projects turned into loss-making enterprises. For instance, the construction of the International Horse Racing Complex was funded by the Tatarstani government’s controlled distillery JSC ‘Tatspirtprom’ and remained on its balance sheets as a daughter company. One of the senior managers at the local distillery JSC “Tatspirtprom” described the Horse Racing Track as a “very expensive toy” not generating any profit (Interview 30, 2006).

The construction of the Ice Rink was funded by the Bank Zenith which belonged to the holding company OAO “Tatneft” controlled by the Tatarstani government. During the Millennium celebrations of 2005 the Rink was one of the main venues but later it failed to generate cash flow sufficient to cover even the operational cost. A management
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company JSC ‘LDS-1000’, also a part of the “Tatneft” holding, was established to operate the Ice Rink. The official annual reports of the JSC “LDS-1000” (the management company of the Ice Rink) repeatedly posted substantial annual losses made by the enterprise (JSC “LDS-1000” 2009; 2008; 2007; 2006). The financial results of the first year of operation revealed dead loss of 35.38 million Russian roubles (approx. 1.24 million USD) (JSC “LDS-1000” 2006). According to the annual report (2006), the JSC “LDS-1000” collected most of the revenues (up to 75%) from Bank Zenith and the Hockey club “Ak Bars” both of which were subsidiary companies of the holding company “Tatneft” that owns JSC “LDS-1000” as well. That means that most of costs were covered by the holding company “Tatneft” although paid through its subsidiaries. The revenues from advertising, ticket sales and commercial leases could only partially cover the annual operational cost of the Ice Rink that was as high as 138.66 million Russian roubles (approx 5.14 million USD). According to the Annual report, poor economic performance was due to low ticket sales which led to the cancellation of all events:

At the moment Kazan was oversaturated with entertainment events. Other venues with 1,000-1,500 seat capacity only managed to fill on average 40-50% of the seats. Under these circumstances it was unfeasible to hold any events in the Ice Rink (JSC “LDS-1000” 2006, p. 4).

As a result, the second year (2006) turned out to be worse with a loss of 76 million Russian roubles (approx. 2.81 million USD) (JSC “LDS-1000” 2006, p. 2). In 2007 the financial results improved with 48.28 million Roubles (approx. 1.86 million US$) in loss (JSC “LDS-1000” 2008, p. 12). While the ticket sales continued to be weak, the operational costs went up, especially the cost of energy, water, telecommunication services, the staff payroll and land taxes (JSC “LDS-1000” 2008, p. 12). The results for 2008 worsened again with 53.72 million Russian roubles (approx. 2.26 million USD) in losses (JSC “LDS-1000” 2009, p. 9). The situation with expenditures and revenues persisted. According to the annual report (2008) the cost of municipal services (heat supply, sewage disposal) and well as the cost of energy went up and monopolies did not negotiate the growth of tariffs. As the Ice Rink continued to physically expand, all running costs increased as well as did fiscal obligations and the payroll (JSC “LDS-1000” 2009, p. 9). In order to cover short-term cash shortage flow the JSC “LDS-1000” had to
borrow 30 million Russian roubles from the parent company the holding Tatneft at a soft rate of 0.01% and 15 million Russian roubles from the government agency “Tatgossnab” at 0.00%. The JSC “LDS-1000” also had financial liabilities up to 15 million Russian roubles to various contractors, including cleaning and building companies (ibid, p. 10).

The strong role of the government in planning and implementing urban development projects facilitated the formation of the urban governance model that had very limited interest in economic feasibility of projects. The authorities prioritised the material aspects of urban development: the attraction of funding, implementation and the celebration of achievements (expressed in visual form), but ignored other important aspects, such as long-term economic sustainability, environmental impact, the impact on other services and transport systems.

The implementation of the Programme was also affected by fraud and corruption. The local TV news channel reported that out of 10,000 fraud crimes recorded in the republic during the past 11 months the majority was related to the preparations for the Millennium. According to the channel “more than 2 billion roubles were misspent. The management of “Kazmetrostroy” (the government contractor for the construction of Kazan Metro – N.K.) and Central Stadium as well as some members of staff of district administrations were caught red-handed... Generally the wrongdoings were linked to theft, procurement fraud and unlawful transfer of funds to private accounts” (TK “Efir” 2005). As much as 400 million roubles2 received from the federal budget as a part of the preparation for Millennium funding simply disappeared after a group of private contractors had received advance payments and run away (Mel’nik 2007). The Head of the Capital Construction and Reconstruction Department of Kazan Administration was the only city official who actually faced criminal prosecution. On one count the defendant was accused of authorising the artificially inflated procurement bill. On another count he allegedly accepted half a million rouble “kickback” for authorising the procurement of lifts for the Central Stadium VIP suit that the president Putin would use while in Kazan (Mel’nik, 2006). Despite numerous allegations, only a few episodes were investigated by the Prosecutor’s office. During an interview, one local expert revealed that:

2 Approximately 8 million British pounds.
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The authorities would adopt dozens and hundreds of plans... but the reasons why they fail would not be properly scrutinised, because that would require naming people in charge, investigating where the funds were spent and this could spoil life of certain people (Interview 3, January 2007).

This illustrates a typical situation when authorities in Russia often enjoy immunity from investigation and prosecution and only rarely civil servants become prosecuted.

6.6.2 Rationale behind the projects

During interviews it appeared more than once, that the cost of publicly funded projects would be justified by their social significance and the need to make an initial investment into the image of the city which would bring fruits later in form of foreign investment. During interviews both arguments were discussed and challenged by the experts. For instance, the Executive Director of the association of foreign businesses which is based in Moscow gave the following evaluation of “landmark” projects:

They are not important to business people. They look good but to a great extent “landmark” projects are supporting the ego of those putting them up. If you are a foreign businessman you will not necessarily see a “flagship” project as something that will attract the market that you need or give a sign of stability that you want or the revival of the area that you want. These projects are state-led, not business-led. If they are business-led they might be a sign of something, if they are state led, they are signs of nothing (Interview 12, 2007).

A professor of economics and an advisor to the Tatarstani Government acknowledged the significance of a positive city image for strengthening regional competitiveness, but at the same time drew a clear division between commercial projects and projects described as “public goods”:

The imagery side can not be ignored. When we visit a region, we can immediately see the capital and the architectural component of the capital... Every businessman first notices the image, then the infrastructure, communications, the regulatory framework, the intellectual capital and the level of social development...

How can you evaluate the Horse Racing Track?
Is another matter. One thing is good conditions of public buildings or
organisations of hospitals; another thing - individual projects that are built
for political reasons, the projects that should generate commercial returns
but do not do so... Projects such as the Horse Racing Track, the Ice Rink
must be commercial... The state should not enter into projects with a
potential of commercial return. The state can promote development of
commercial projects by providing land and the private sector to kick off;
but when the state replaces the private sector and invests unsuccessfully,
then the private sector can also see that the project can not pay off... this
is the miscalculation of the state itself... Horse Racing Track is a
gambling project and should be regarded as a purely commercial project.
And the fact that the state stepped in and chose a wrong site and
miscalculated the returns and now it a pain for everybody – this is clearly
wrong (Interview 24, 2007).

During interview, the Deputy Head of the Kazan Executive Committee accepted that
some large urban development projects were not economically viable, but at the same
time argued that that was the price of promoting the image of Kazan internationally:

There two ways to look at them: from economic and from social
rationality point of view. Proper investments can give good results... The
Horse Racing Track most likely has no profitability at all, because it
occupies such a huge area and we do not have a huge number of people
ready to use it... At the same time we had races and people brought the
horses to Kazan even from America.

**Question:** What was the economic benefit of that?

The most important thing is that people have started visiting Kazan. The
money will follow and will bring economic results. There is no alternative
(Interview 7, 2007).

The pursuit of a competitive image of the city dramatically shifted the main focus
of the Programme. Initially the Programme was designed as a set of policies specifically
aimed on preservation and development of Kazan’s historic centre. The analysis has
demonstrated that over the course of the Programme implementation the focus almost
entirely shifted towards new construction. With a few exceptions, projects in heritage
protection and modernisation of the city centre which were initially listed in the
Programme were removed from the list and works continued predominantly on the sites
of new prominent buildings and transport infrastructure projects.
During interviews the shift in the Programme’s priorities received several explanations. The visual impression of the “old” as compared to the “new” would not satisfy the expectations of the city and republic authorities. According to the Chief Architect of a state-owned design institute, efforts in heritage protection would have been appreciated by experts in the field only, but the task was to articulate the economic strength of modern Kazan and Tatarstan:

History was not the most important element here... The Programme... emphasised not history but the future... The most important thing was to show the strength and the beauty of the city and the region. But how to show? By building projects such as the Horse Racing Track, the Ice Rink, the Metro... These prestigious projects immediately elevated the prestige of the city. It takes only seconds to visually perceive new projects. When we see the city and notice new projects within seconds we can form the opinion that the city is beautiful, the city is higher, better and is ahead of other cities... Funding could have been spent on the preservation of monuments which would have been appreciated by a narrow circle of specialists, but people... first need “bread and circus”. These “circuses” were the Horse Racing Track, the Ice Rink, the Metro... they all showed to the guests and the whole world that we were doing alright. Unfortunately, many transport projects... were not accomplished because they were not so visible... (Interview 3, 2007).

The visual impact made by historic monuments would have been less impressive as compared to that made by modern structures. Historical buildings even restored would have not provided such a visual impact compared to that of a large modern design. For instance, a senior planner in a Kazan-based design institute stated that:

Restored buildings could have been presented to the authorities as well. But they are not so visible... How to present the relocation of old warehouses and the sidings around Kazan Central Station? (the project that was listed originally but later dropped – N.K.) How Putin would have known that they had been there in the first place? Would Putin be shown old the photographs of the place? How would you show your achievements? (Interview 29, 2007).

This seems to be a naïve comment, but it reflects precisely the role of government-led urban development projects in Kazan – to make a strong visual impression of progress, development and growth; to demonstrate to the federal authorities the effectiveness of the
regional leadership and the ability of decision-makers to mobilise resources to successfully achieve tasks – in expectation of further development funding from the centre. The Director of a Kazan government-owned company pointed out:

Everything was tailored for Putin. It was a presentation of the place where the Mayor materialised his ambitions. The glamorous City Hall where he would bring visitors, a stunning Opera and Ballet theatre... These were all attributes of power. Why did they build it? Because the Opera Theatre was one of the venues for the CIS summit. They built projects that would be presented to the guests. They were all important: the Metro, the City Hall and the Theatre where they could all meet for banquets (Interview 11, 2008).

Identifying the Russian authorities and specifically the President of Russia as main “consumers” of a new image of Kazan has to be placed in the context of centre-periphery relations in modern Russia. During the 1990s many Russia’s regions and ethnic republics first of all, created regional identities, often based on the ideas of ethnic and religious uniqueness. In the early 1990s Tatarstan was on of the champions of Russia’s regionalisation. After 2000 the Putin administration initiated policies aimed at strengthening the role of the federal centre and reinforcing the “vertical of power”, effectively eliminating all attempts to pursue regional sovereignty. As a result, the Tatarstani authorities could not rely on nationalism as political doctrine and the core component of the regional identity project. Tatarstan’s national identity now had to adjust to the new format of centre-periphery relationships established by the Putin administration.

Kazan’s Millennium celebrations ideally fit the purpose: on the one hand, it used the politically neutral language of socio-economic development, competitiveness and heritage preservation which satisfied Moscow. On the other hand, it did not abandon completely the references to Tatar history, heritage and uniqueness which satisfied the Tatar nationalists. During an interview one informant pointed out that the theme of the Millennium was well received, but if there had been any reference to the history of hostilities between the Russians and the Tatars, the Programme would have not worked out (Interview 11, 2008).
Local leaders strove to demonstrate the image of a modern and economically viable region as their personal achievement. Their ability to attract federal funds and successfully prove the success by visual evidence materialised in large urban development projects, was perceived as a guarantee of obtaining more development funds from Moscow. According to several experts there was a strong personal dimension to the construction of new Kazan. A senior lecturer in Kazan School of Architecture revealed during interview that

power quite naturally expresses itself through monumental buildings. Politicians such as Mussolini always asserted themselves through architecture. In Russia any mayor uses architecture for self-assertion purpose... This is why no one attempts to assert himself though reconstruction of water-supply or sewage system (Interview 31, 2008).

Within the region, the decisions to choose some projects over others were often connected to the personal preferences of the leadership. As noted by Yakupov (2006) Shaimiev's Tatar background formed his passion to horses that are important in the Islamic culture and contributed to the fact that many hippodromes were built in Tatarstan (p. 25). As power in Russia is strongly associated with those in power, politicians used urban development to implement their “personal” projects. Those projects reflect the preferences of the politicians and reinforce their position in the hierarchy of power. A local expert pointed out during interview that

the projects that were implemented were image projects of the two leaders (the President of Tatarstan and the Mayor of Kazan – N.K.). The Horse Racing Track was the project of President Shaimiev who loved horses; the Ice Rink was built because both Shaimiev and Iskhakov wanted to promote ice hockey... The same story with the Central Football Stadium – Iskhakov wanted to show off on the Russian or even the international arena. These were purely personal ambitions which had nothing to do with the city community (Interview 28, 2008).

The Kazan Mayor Iskhakov so much impressed President Putin with his managerial skills that became appointed to the position of the president's personal envoy in Russia’s Far East federal district. Later Iskhakov was redeployment to the Middle East as Russia’s representative to the Organisation of Islamic Conference.
At the practical level, the reason for pushing aside the projects associated with historical preservation was the cost of research, survey and restoration work itself. As the owner of a Kazan-based private design practice explained:

Restoration and reconstruction are very expensive. That is why they tended to clear sites for new construction, demolishing the slums and all historical building along with the slums... Under budget constraints it was easier to knock down a building and build something new (Interview 22, 2008).

From the practical point of view old buildings also posed many hidden problems that can only be revealed after time-consuming and costly survey of the structure. Any heritage preservation project would pose more challenges than a new construction because of the extra costs, the need to comply with heritage protection requirements, the uncertainty of legal status, the need to relocate existing users and compensate the owners.

6.6.3 Spatial dimension

The city authorities could use the Programme to get access to large sources of funding that the city desperately needed to solve the accumulated over decades of neglect and under-finance problems. The analysis of the Programme design and implementation showed that during the initial stage of programme design and negotiation the city authorities actively used the rhetoric of heritage protection, improvement of living standards of the residents, economic development and job creation. Once the funding was secured and implementation began, the actual focus of the Programme shifted to visually significant, large urban development projects aimed at creating a new image of Kazan as the regional capital.

The empirical study has demonstrated that although the image of the city was seen as a high priority, practical steps did not match the rhetoric of developing business links and stimulating economic development. Similarly, as much as the preparations for the Millennium focused on symbolically important sites, as little they did to improve the actual living and working environment. According to a comprehensive study of Kazan
environment completed in 2005 by a team of Kazan State University experts, Kazan Central Park “has been significantly damaged by the construction of the new bridge as the approach road has crossed a large section of the Park (Mingazova, et al, 2005, p. 379). Many other environmental issues such as poor air quality, the discharge of untreated sewage waters into the river, the overloaded land fill sites remained unresolved (ibid, pp. 440-441).

While the contribution of the new projects to the strengthening of the city’s competitive positions did not make much practical impact, the main efforts were given to creating a positive visual impression among the city guests. This is described by the Russian word *pokazukha* – displays meant only for show (Baker and Glasser 2005, p. 5)3. As the following sections will demonstrate this *pokazukha* was not a meaningless exercise but was aimed on achieving specific outcomes. The real role of the landmark development projects might be found in different areas, not related to pure economic rationality.

According to the local news agency, city authorities designated 63 streets as top-priority projects. Those streets would form routes the important guests would be driven along from the airport to hotels and venues. The improvements included pavement replacement, installing new streetlights, planting new trees and shrubs and the erection of new passenger pavilions (Tatinfo.ru 2004). At the same time, in other places solid fences were built in a great hurry in order to hide “dilapidated houses and ruins left after the Slums liquidation programme” (Serova 2005). According to the former press-secretary to the President of Tatarstan, the approach to urban planning adopted in Kazan is focused on creating highly visible projects aimed to form a positive impression among the city’s important visitors:

3 In Moscow urban development projects also were used to make a good impression of federal government officials, most importantly the president. As Baker and Glasser (2005) report, the Moscow mayor Luzhkov decided that the era of kiosk capitalism over in Moscow, to be replaced by real stores like those in other world capitals. This was progress with an exclamation point, and where could be a better place to start than Kutuzovsky Prospekt, so Putin each day could see for himself evidence of the city’s beautification? One boulevard over, of course, the ramshackle kiosks remained, but Putin never travelled there (Baker and Glasser 2005, p. 142).
“Guest streets” – are streets “which they drove important guests along during the Millennial celebrations trying to impress them with magnificent new buildings, splendour of decoration and the quality of the road surface on the route. But there are ... streets where guests would have nothing to do, as there is nothing to be shown or nothing to be proud of. Precisely those are streets where the majority of Kazan townsfolk live ... The City Hall, the Tatneft-Arena, the Basket-Hall, the Horseracing complex, the Metro are all elements of the smart front facade of Kazan... but in the city’s “sleeping compartments” there are grim high-rise blocks of flats, dusty streets, wrecked sidewalks and roads, playing grounds converted into parking lots, schools and hospitals with cracked ceilings always in lack of money for repair (Mourtazin 2006b).

The programme has created a significant transformation in Kazan’s urban space. A Moscow architectura critic who visited Kazan in 2006 reported that while the elements of old Kazan were being ruined, the emerging architecture was a “Disneyland” or even “an architectural freak-show” The remains of the Old Tatar District would soon be finally cleared up. What remained - burned down houses, warped gates, all in all - live decorations for a film about occupation atrocities” (Zmeul 2006). In October 2005 the Evening Kazan reported that three popular sites, including the Kazan State University main campus, the former Governor’s Palace (now the President’s Palace) and the former Nobel Assembly (now the City Hall) that used to be visited by many people, after the renovation became policed spaces with restricted access, security control and CCTV surveillance. The people of Kazan “have been deprived of the history” as a result of preparations for the Millennium (Yudkevich 2005b).

Right from the beginning vague goals were linked with a number of projects, most of which where irrelevant for the title of the programme. For instance, a local journalist asks the following rhetorical questions:

What have the projects like hotels, restaurants, entertainment centres, the Ice Rink and the Basket-Hall to do with the “Euro-Asian cultural and historical heritage”? What have shopping malls like IKEA to do with Kazan historical centre? (Mourtazin 2006a).
While the official rhetoric emphasised the values of religious tolerance and social harmony, the way the Programme was designed and implemented revealed interesting facts about the existing and emerging patterns of social power which contradict the official rhetoric. During interview a Lecturer in the Kazan school of architecture stated that:

Among the population of Kazan there were people who knew the city. As a result of the recent transformations the built environment [of the centre] was destroyed and those groups were scattered over the peripheral urban areas, blended with people who had come to Kazan during the last decades. Effectively not only the traditional built environment was destroyed, but the community of intelligentsia of Kazan was broken too. This community was coherent, had a lifestyle and loved the city... Now these people do not live where they were born as those places disappeared along with the Kazan they grew up in. Here one could see the desire of the authorities to get rid of those city residents who could oppose the planned transformations of the city in order to have a free hand to act. The public that could have risen in opposition, found themselves dispersed... (Interview 19, 2007).

Not only the intelligentsia of Kazan who lived in the city centre was affected by the urban redevelopment programmes, the most vulnerable groups were affected too but in a much more negative way. A local newspaper reports that few days before the celebration about 200 homeless people were “evacuated” from Kazan to one of the abandoned Young Pioneers camping site. The homeless were washed, dressed in some odd second-hand clothes and medically examined. Some were sent straight to the psychiatric and tuberculosis hospitals. The site had been long abandoned and missed basic infrastructure so that the “guests” were forced to take an open-air baths while were kept warm by a big open fire. When several “guests” got suddenly stricken by drinking related psychoses, the police personnel on site was totally unprepared to cope with the situation and did not find a better solution as to handcuff the sick and tide them up to the trees. Residents of nearby villages later complained about inhuman yelling heard in the environs of the camp (Vyatkina 2005).

According to the local newspaper while the Ice Rink was being completed, the Kazan Oncologic Hospital where 10 patients were squeezed in each of its small wards did
not receive any funding for a new building (Machneva 2005). A similar episode was debated at the parliament session. One of the Communist deputies criticised the decision to fund prestige objects at the expense of socially important ones. She pointed out that horses at the new Horseracing Complex might enjoy better facilities than the patients in Kazan hospitals. The speaker of the Parliament responded that the Racing complex was a commercial project and it was not correct to contrast people and horses (Yudkevich, 2005a). As a result what was conceived and promoted as a heritage protection policy paradoxically led to massive losses in Kazan heritage. According to a senior member of staff at the Tatarstani Academy of Science,

Unfortunately as we all can now see, the city suffers irreplaceable losses. In front of our eyes whole blocks of historic urban fabric degrade and sometimes simply disappear. Buildings forming our priceless cultural heritage are being dismantled and are vanishing irrevocably. Instead of real history, in the streets of Kazan emerge structures imitating history, that are constructed to meet the taste of bureaucrats and the “new Russians and Tatars”. We may be acquiring some European gloss but we are losing irreversibly our ancient history and originality (Hayboullin 2003, p. 5).

Along the same lines the Tatarstani Deputy Minister of Culture commented on the implementation of two programmes: “the analysis of the situation shows that the implementation of those programmes often is being performed with violations of heritage laws, which ultimately can lead to the loss of historical and architectural uniqueness of the city centre that formed over centuries” (Valeyev 2003, p. 10). The local newspaper suggests that “Tatarstani authorities, having architected the 1000-year anniversary of Kazan, as a whole completed the task of raising the image of Kazan up to the level of Russia’s third capital and, accordingly demonstrated what Tatarstan was capable of achieving” (Alaev 2005b).

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4 Not quite so. The distillery that built the complex belongs to the government, so even if the project was built with a hope to make profit the funds were public.

5 The programme for slums demolition and reconstruction of dilapidated housing blocks (1995-2005) and the Programme of preservation and development of Kazan city centre (2000-2005):
6.7 Conclusions

The analysis of the Programme has focused on its genesis, design and implementation. The Programme was a product of many factors including the ability of the republican authorities to successfully bargain with the federal authorities and organise cooperation across several levels of governance.

The federal authorities used the Programme to negotiate the compliance of Tatarstan with federal laws and demonstrate to other more rebellious regions that loyalty could be handsomely rewarded. The Tatarstani authorities used the Programme to mobilise financial resources, elevate the image of Tatarstan and Kazan on the international arena and demonstrate to the electorate the benefits of the “Tatarstan model”. Within this new format of centre-periphery relations joint development initiatives had to be packaged into politically neutral rhetoric. That is why instead of deploying the language of Tatarstani sovereignty, the Programme emphasised the much more neutral language of historic preservation, economic development and competitiveness.

The Programme goals did not represent a coherent list of urban development and heritage protection policies, which the name would suggest. The list of projects continued changing over the course of the implementation depending on the availability of funding and the politicians’ preferences. The vague language of heritage protection, economic development, competitiveness and the need to improve the quality of life was used to mobilise funding and political support across administrative levels. In fact, the preservationist language was used to secure access to funding, but many of the construction projects actually implemented had little or no relevance to the preservation of Kazan’s unique heritage or to the modernisation of the city centre.

As the analysis has clearly demonstrated, the use of neutral language did not remove the inherently political nature of large urban development projects and their role in working out new governing mechanisms. Under conditions of weak democracy the authorities had unchallenged power to change the list of projects to be funded. As a result, most of the projects that have been actually completed for the Millennium celebration were large urban development projects that had little to do either with the
centre or heritage protection. Many socially important projects such as the new water
treatment plant or several hospitals were excluded from the final stages of the
programme. The authorities attempted to conceal the drawbacks in some projects by
reporting progress spectacular progress in organising events and festivals. For that
purpose inserting one programme within another and running ‘parallel’ programmes
could to be a useful technique to confuse the public about the real progress. The smoke­
screen of programmes and policies associated with celebrations effectively overtook the
projects originally aimed at the preservation and development of Kazan’s historic centre.
CHAPTER 7 FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

During the decade between 1995 and 2005 the city of Kazan witnessed the implementation of two large urban development projects that attracted large development funds and significantly influenced the image of the city. These projects were developed as a result of deliberate action by city and regional authorities and as such, the process of policymaking and governance has been the main focus of the current research. The chapter is organised as follows. The first part will report on the empirical data and the second part will discuss and interpret the findings in connection with the theoretical discussion in the previous chapters.

7.1 Results of the empirical study

The study of large urban development projects implemented in Kazan between 1995 and 2005 has put them in the wider context of social, political and economic change that the city and the region experienced during the post-socialist period. There have been several urban development projects implemented in Kazan during that period, but the two projects selected for this study have involved the collaboration of federal, regional and local authorities as well as some involvement of the private sector and have had the most profound impact on the image of the city.

7.1.1 The resurrection of the Kul-Sharif Mosque in the Kazan Kremlin (1995-2005)

The analysis of the resurrection of the Kul-Sharif Mosque in Kazan Kremlin has shown the complexity and ambiguity of the project and the role it has played in transforming the image of Kazan, crafting a new urban governance model, and reinforcing the position of Kazan as the capital of Russia’s largest ethnic republic. Within the limits of the current research which has been focused mainly on the policymaking element of Kazan’s transformation, limited attention could be paid to an analysis of the actual design and
planning solutions that the project was based upon. While there was no reliable evidence that would allow identifying either the location or the appearance of the old mosque where Seid Kul-Sharif used to preach, the planners and architects, in fact designed a new building. The research showed that neither the architects nor the authorities had a clear idea of the Mosque’s appearance, functional programme or size. The discussion of design options organised in a form of several design competitions inevitably led to more fundamental questions of Tatarstani statehood and identity that the Mosque was expected to reflect in its architecture, including the attitude towards the Russian heritage, the relations with the federal centre, other regions, a wider Islamic world, the Tatar Diaspora and the international community.

The empirical part of the research has revealed that initially the project was promoted by the public, but later gained support from the authorities of the Tatarstan Republic. With the sovereignty movement gaining strength, the Tatarstani leadership became increasingly supportive of the project and eventually secured the support of Russian President Yeltsin who endorsed the project by a presidential decree. Subsequently, the resurrection of the Mosque became institutionalised and started receiving government support including the allocation of a construction site at the most prominent city location - the Kazan Kremlin - and financial support from state-controlled industries.

The organisational structure and funding arrangements

The authorities took a full control of organising the design and implementation of the project and making funding arrangements. The Tatarstani President Shaimiev topped the organisation and established two special bodies responsible for the day-to-day operation of the project: 1) the State History, Architecture and Arts Museum-Preserve ‘Kazan Kremlin’ that commissioned the architectural project and related studies and controlled the construction process; and 2) the special Kul-Sharif Mosque Fund that accumulated donations from enterprises and citizens and funded the construction works. The Tatarstani Government announced design competitions, the city Planning Department ran
the competitions and a government-controlled design institute carried out the preparation of technical drawings. As the research has demonstrated, the public, the Muslim clergy or even the architects themselves had a very limited influence on the preparation of the project as all significant decisions were made by the republican leadership and personally by the President of Tatarstan. When the design team that had initially won the competition failed to meet the expectations of the President, it was replaced by another team that produced an alternative design.

Only fragmented information has become available about the funding arrangements behind the resurrection of the Mosque. The citizens of Tatarstan and the Tatars from other Russia's regions and abroad contributed money to the special Kul-Sharif Mosque Fund. The Mayor of Kazan issued a decree encouraging the collection of funds in each city district. Some foreign countries made small contributions which were not seen as very desirable as the resurrection of the Mosque was perceived primarily as a common cause of the Tatarstani fellow-citizens. The main financial responsibility for the construction was carried out by the Tatarstani industries including the republic's largest oil production company OAO ‘Tatneft’ and its numerous agricultural enterprises. The authorities used the old soviet mechanisms of collecting money from industries to fund socially significant projects. When contributions are made in-kind such as this and hence not taxed (e.g. donations of grain to the Fund), they helped to ‘keep’ capital inside the region as opposed to ‘losing’ it by paying taxes to the federal government. As a special advisor to the President of Tatarstan explained during interview, the ‘donations’ made by regional industries to various special funds should be seen as regional taxes, that the regional government can use for regional needs (Interview 32, 2007).

Equally important to the organisational arrangements of the project is the reason why the project was conceived in the first place. The interviews with decision-makers, planners and architects have revealed different opinions about the role of the Mosque in shaping a new image for the city. The resurrection of the Mosque is often placed in the context of historical rivalry between the Tatars and the Russians that has lasted for centuries. Finally the Tatars managed to achieve some sovereignty and commemorated the achievement by constructing a mosque in the heart of the former symbol of Russian
domination and oppression – the Kazan Kremlin. Several respondents have thus described the resurrection of the Mosque as an act of ‘historic justice’ for the Tatars who were subjected to forced Russification and Christianisation for centuries. It was important to locate the new Mosque in the Kremlin which was both the symbol of old Tatar statehood and the symbol of Russian oppression. In the view of the Tatar leadership, the new Mosque standing next to the Russian Orthodox Cathedral and churches symbolised not only the resurrection of the Mosques, but the revival of Tatarstan statehood as equal to that of Russia.

**The rationale behind the project**

Quite indicatively, most of the respondents have attempted to avoid discussing the political and economic aspects of the Mosque resurrection and emphasised the cultural side of the project, trying to explain the decision of the Tatarstani leadership to reconstruct the Mosque by referring to the history and spiritual needs and cultural peculiarities of the region. According to the majority of respondents, the authorities have simply “responded” to the spiritual needs of the electorate by offering a new place of worship to a large previously suppressed religious group. Those interpretations could be understood as an attempt to ‘de-contextualise’ the resurrection of the Mosque from political struggles with the federal centre’s and politics at the regional level. Although it appeared common that respondents downplayed the political significance of the project, its role in the regional identity and culture cannot be seen in isolation from the post-socialist economic and political restructuring.

The Mosque project also has to be understood in the context of wider political and economic processes. Once the Communist regime collapsed, the ‘ideological vacuum’ created has been replaced by more traditional forms of identity formed around the ‘essentialist’ ideas such as religious and ethnic belonging. Other respondents have argued that the process of identity transformation was a ‘natural’ replacement of communism with nationalism. The question of how ‘natural’ the collapse of a monolith communist ideology was and how effectively or neatly it has been replaced with the inherently
diverse regionally constructed identities remains debatable. In post-socialist Tatarstan the old communist elites found their legitimacy increasingly in question and resorted to use of Tatar nationalist rhetoric and Muslim religious symbols to retain power. Some respondents have indicated clearly that the use of religious rhetoric by the post-socialist politicians had nothing to do with their own religiousness. Instead it revealed a rather manipulative use of a seemingly apolitical but appealing rhetoric of religion, nationhood and ethnicity.

The analysis has demonstrated that the project can only partly be conceptualised as an attempt to strengthen the competitive positions of the city and region. The ability of the regional authorities to implement such an ambitious and costly project, which required the relocation of the Russian garrison from its Kremlin barracks, the mobilisation of significant financial resources and which, at the same time, faced no opposition from the Russian authorities or ethnic Russians in Tatarstan, has clearly demonstrated the economic and political strength of the Tatarstani authorities but has not necessarily created any advantages in terms of creating opportunities to invest or do business in Tatarstan. The Mosque has become a factor of political mobilisation necessary to support the struggle for more sovereignty which helped to devote more economic powers to the regional level. In this respect sovereignty helped to boost the economic development of Kazan and Tatarstan in a rather indirect manner, through keeping more taxes in the region, protecting regional industries from external competition and attracting more federal government subsidies than an average region could attract.

The spatial dimension

The choice to locate the Mosque inside the Kazan Kremlin was not accidental. Kazan Kremlin, the centre of the Kazan Khanate was conquered by the Russians, rebuilt in Russian architectural tradition and became a symbol of Russian colonisation. It was an ideal place to restore the Mosque as a symbol of the revival of the Tatarstani statehood. At the same time, the location of the Mosque inside the State History, Architecture and Arts Museum-Preserve ‘Kazan Kremlin’ allowed the authorities to declare the building a
part of the protected architectural ensemble that had to remain under control of the government and not the Muslim clergy. The control over the Mosque was also justified by the proximity of the government offices and the Presidential Palace that required security, constant policing and control of access to the site. As the result, the Mosque was very visible from outside the Kremlin but the use of the building was controlled by the government and access to it was closely watched by the Kremlin security. This made it a site for tourism but not religious gatherings.

The location of the Mosque in the Russian-built Kremlin and next to its churches and the Blagoveschensky Cathedral (1556), gave an opportunity to the authorities to promote ethnic and religious tolerance as a fundamental part of Tatarstani national identity. The resurrection of the Mosque in connection with the reconstruction of the Cathedral in the Kremlin was used as 'material evidence' of the harmonious coexistence of different peoples in Tatarstan. In order to strengthen their positions and rule out any possible accusations in Tatar nationalism, separatism or Islamic extremism the Tatarstani authorities praised the peaceful coexistence of different ethnic groups and religious confessions including by the means of architecture.

As the analysis has demonstrated the project, because of its complexity and significance cannot be fully explained using one theoretical framework such as nationalism, place identity, city marketing or competitiveness discussed in the literature review chapter. As many large urban development projects in other parts of the world, the design and implementation of the Mosque project combines different discourses and motivations. The research has shown that the very process of designing the Mosque became a laboratory whereby a trial and error method was used to shape the building and discuss some important characteristics of the Tatarstani sovereignty project and the relationship between Tatarstan, Russia and other countries. The project contributed to the debates on the destiny of the Kazan Kremlin as the main heritage site, help to formulate the regional identity in relation to other Muslim countries and to clarify the relationship between the state and the Muslim clergy. The project has help to reinforce the dominant position of Tatarstani authorities in relation to large industries that agreed to fund the construction. Therefore the project has showed the dominant position of the regional
authorities towards the religious leaders and the chiefs of large industries within the republic and the position of equality towards the Russian authorities. Hence, the main motivation behind the project was to clarify the issue of power relations within the republic and beyond. This has little to do with economic motivations such as city marketing or place promotion, except for an indirect influence of the Mosque on the image of the city as economic prosperous.

7.1.2 The preservation and development of the Kazan historic centre

The analysis of the Programme has been aimed at understanding the connection between a large development project and the wider political and economic processes in post-socialist Russia. The analysis of the Special Federal Programme of the Preservation and Development of the Kazan Historic Centre (2000-2005) has led to the following findings. The Programme was a product of successful bargaining between the leadership of Republic of Tatarstan and Russia over the position of Tatarstan in Russia's federal state. The analysis of the political statements and the interview with the political advisor to the Tatarstani President has revealed that funding for the Programme was secured as a result of a political bargaining between the Presidents of Tatarstan and Russia, which involved 'trading' some elements of the Tatarstan sovereignty for a large development grant from the federal government.

The organisational structure and funding arrangements

The analysis of the organisational arrangements of the Programme has demonstrated that from the inception stage to the implementation, the Programme was a government-led initiative, heavily reliant on government funding and the use of political power to secure cash contributions from government-controlled industries. Although the Programme was adopted and partly funded by the Russian Government, it would be an oversimplification to interpret it as a federal policy being filtered through the administrative tiers and implemented by bureaucrats in Kazan. The Programme was embedded into the centre-periphery relationship, was a result of interaction and bargaining between different tiers
of government and involved different actors. Political discourses and rhetoric used during the design and implementation of the Programme reflected the positions and interests of different political groups who used the policymaking process as a platform for gaining publicity, securing access to resources and achieving other goals.

Under this governance model, the federal government and the regional government appeared to be the main negotiators with the city administration responsible for the practical policy making and policy implementation role. That role was not of small importance as the actual selection of projects, development priorities and allocation of resources was made largely at the city level. The regional leadership secured support from large Tatarstani industries which were ‘allocated’ projects to sponsor. Under this scheme the Tatarstani state distillery JSC “Tatspirtprom” became responsible for the construction of the International Horse Racing Complex, the Bank Zenith became the sole investor for the Ice Rink, the Kazan Helicopter Plant was the main sponsor of the restoration of the Blagoveschensky Cathedral in the Kazan Kremlin.

Over the course of the implementation the original Programme for the Preservation and Development of the Kazan Historic Centre (2000-2005) gradually became discursively ‘dissolved’ in the policies aimed at the preparation for the Millennial celebrations. This shift of the policy focus and the public discourse from the originally stated goals of Kazan’s preservation and development to a vaguer collection of programmes and projects has allowed the authorities to detract public attention from the restoration of the Kazan city centre and effectively hide the backlogs and failures of the original Programme. As a deliberate tactic this worked to the extent that neither the public nor the City Soviet challenged the course of action taken by the City Administration.

Regular reports on the success in the preparation for the Jubilee made it possible to abandon many originally identified projects and implement those which were not directly relevant for the preservation and development of Kazan historic centre. The rhetoric around the ‘preparation for the Jubilee’ helped to legitimise important political choices as to what projects would receive priority funding under the budget and time constraints. The actual implementation process has shifted the focus from the restoration
of Kazan’s heritage and the delivery of new socially significant elements of urban infrastructure, to grand performance events aimed at making a positive impression among the city’s important guests including the political leaders of Russia and other countries. As a result larger symbolic projects received support while many other projects, arguably more beneficial for local residents, were removed from the list.

Not only did the authorities fail to introduce transparency into the policymaking process, but deliberate efforts were undertaken to complicate the organisational structure. Indeed some 17 simultaneous development programmes all connected with the Millennial celebrations were introduced in order to systematically confuse the public about the real state of affairs by slipping from a consistent evaluation of programme delivery to making references to other programmes and policies often irrelevant to context; by misrepresenting routing economic processes such as housing construction by wrapping them up as steps to the Millennial celebrations; by deliberate attempts to confuse the public about the scale of “voluntary” civic initiatives and so called “labour gifts”. One of the main problems that an investigation of urban transformation may face is that real political interests and motivations are likely to be hidden in carefully constructed rhetoric. The language used to present projects are legitimise policy making is often selected to conceal the real actor involved and their interests.

The rationale behind the project

While the design of the Programme has been strongly informed by the thinking on urban competitiveness, the actual investment arrangements have demonstrated that the construction of the image of an economically prosperous and competitive city has in fact sprinted ahead of market-generated investment as almost all investment was generated from the sources associated with government (budget and government-controlled businesses). Instead of targeting commercial return of investments, the projects were aimed at creating the image of prosperity and economic opportunity. Indeed, the research indicates that instead of generating profit, supported projects actually succeeded in taking value from the regional economy.
Although the Programme emphasised the need to develop international trade and cultural links and position the region and the city on the ‘global map’, the real competition seemed to happen between regional politicians trying to achieve two major goals: 1) to influence the federal centre and receive funding for development projects; 2) to demonstrate the managerial skills and capabilities needed for successful implementation of development projects. The political power structure, the system of economic and political incentives and the conditions of getting access to government funding influenced the design and the implementation of the Programme. In exchange for the funding received from the centre, the regional and city leaders had to demonstrate a visible material result as well as the capabilities as effective managers to secure more funding in the future. It was also a good opportunity for the city level politicians to leapfrog the regional level and interact directly with the federal government.

The spatial dimension

As all projects were designed within a very rigid timeframe with clear deadlines for separate projects and the entire Programme, there was no incentive to think beyond these limits both in terms of time and space. The government-controlled businesses and government agencies did not have to connect the projects with the surrounding areas or integrate them into any wider masterplan or investment scheme as it was clear that the 30 August 2005 would be the end of the Programme. That is why the opportunity to use state investment as a trigger of commercial urban development did not work out, projects remained discrete sites poorly connected with each other. At individual level projects became money-losing enterprises. If the negative profitability of such projects as the Metro can be well expected and justified (especially in the initial stage), other types of projects should have been commercially viable. However, as the research has demonstrated, they have been experience a gross mismatch between their revenues and expenditures. The gain is not monetary profit, but political power that can be used to achieve economic gains. The system of incentives is different too: economic feasibility or profitability may not play any role in the project justification. The approval of the upper tier of government becomes the main motivation.
7.1.3 The links between two cases

The two case studies used in the current research are also connected in the context of centre-periphery relationship. The project of the Kul-Sharif Mosque resurrection emerged during the turbulent roll-out stage of the Tatarstani sovereignty and represented ideas of nationalism, religious identity and revival of the Tatarstani state. The Programme emerged in the beginning of Russia’s recentralisation project initiated by the new Kremlin administration. It became a result of negotiation between the Russian and Tatarstani leaders over the terms of Tatarstan rejoining Russia’s common political and fiscal framework. Hence the Programme used politically more neural discourse of heritage projection, city marketing, local economic development, cultural and business links and the image of the city.

Urban competitiveness is conceptualised and materialised as a set of policies developed and implemented in order to compete successfully for the federal grants and private capital. To some extent, the city became a ‘prisoner’ of the competitiveness thinking during the stage of implementation when important decisions upon the final selection of the projects had to be made. While the priority was given to the most visible sites located along the city’s main transport arteries and central locations, less noticeable but still crucial projects were left behind. Unfortunately, socially important projects became excluded from the process as their contribution to regional competitiveness is far beyond a short time horizon of regional and city politicians whose main motivation was to impress the visitors from Moscow and other places during a short period of time associated with the Millennial celebrations.

The use of ‘competitiveness’ seems to embrace a number of rather disjointed policies all connected with the constructing the image of the city and strengthening the positions of Kazan and Tatarstan in the informal hierarchy of Russia’s regions. This can partly be explained by the vagueness of the competitiveness concept that allows many policies to be described as associated with ‘competitiveness building’. Again, the western literature on city marketing and place promotion fails to explain the design and the implementation of the Programme as the development project did not trigger private investment of create profitable enterprises. The Programme contributed to the city
competitiveness but in rather indirect way: by creating the image of prosperity (which does not necessarily correspond with viable local economy), and by reassuring the central authorities that development projects in Kazan can be quite successfully implemented, which UDPs became a tangible and visible evidence of.

7.2 Analysis

The empirical chapters have demonstrated that the emergence of large UDPs in Kazan has been informed by different ideas and discourses including heritage protection, competitiveness, city marketing, local economic development and other. The analysis has demonstrated that the political rhetoric changed quite quickly reflecting the conjunctures of relationship with the federal government in Moscow and economic opportunities available to the region and the city. Once ideas outlived their usefulness on the dynamic political arena, new ideas had to be invented in order to retain political control and secure access to new streams of funding. The continuity of ideas and coherence of policies was not the main concern of the authorities as they adjusted quite comfortably to the emerging opportunities. The preferred discourses always reflected the nature of the political moment and the opportunities to maximise the access to valuable recourses including political power and investment. For example, in the 1990s political rhetoric was saturated with the language of nationalism, self-rule and secession, but after Putin administration clamped down on separatism the language of nationalism and sovereignty disappeared from regional political discourses and was replaced by that of economic development and strong federal state.

7.2.1 Reflection on post-socialist transition debates

The ambition of the research has been to address the questions lie beyond the political discourses and planning practices in Kazan and find out how the findings relate to the theoretical discussion developed in previous chapters. The research had to address some limitations of the existing theory in order to fulfil the goal. The post-socialist transition theory represents social change and institutional development as a series of pre-defined
steps from a state-controlled economy to a market system and democracy (Huntington 1991; Sacks 1992; 1995). This has proven to be a too simplistic concept to produce a plausible analysis of the messy and often contradictory processes of urban transformation in post-socialist cities. The dominant post-socialist transition literature tends to explain the institutional ambiguity as a temporary state caused by transition from one system of social organisation to another when institutions have not yet fully adjusted to a new order (Lowenhardt 1995). When transition is not complete some ‘legacies’ of the past remain and continue influencing the performance of institutions. One of the main problems with this explanation is that transition is never complete and old institutions and practices may successfully adapt to new conditions and continue functioning forming a ‘hybrid’ form with new institutions (McFaul 2001). Another problem is that not only the actual transition is far from being a coherent move towards a homogeneous institutional environment but even its direction is sometimes unclear, as the case of Russia has demonstrated over the last decade (McFaul 2002; Robinson 2003). The mainstream literature on post-socialist transition while condemning the institutions and practices inherited from the socialist past as obstacles on the way to a market economy and democracy fails to acknowledge the role of pre-existing institutions as the ‘building blocks’ of new governing regimes. This limits the analytical power of post-socialist transition theories to explain the actual path of transition and diversion from the path prescribed by the theory.

7.2.2 Reflection on governance debates

The concept of urban governance can help to deal with complexity and ambiguity of urban transformation in the post-socialist context. The concept has been used to analyse the governing of socialist cities, focusing on political actors, institutions and their interaction in a complex multi-level environment. The research has referred to historical studies of socialist cities, including the key texts by Hough (1969), Ruble (1990) and Taubman (1973), which analyse the political and institutional arrangements through which the socialist city was governed. As governing mechanisms in the post-socialist period have become even more complex and multi-levelled the concept of governance
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did not lose it relevance in modern conditions. The research has shown that governing practices that worked in the socialist economy were adapted to the new post-socialist economic conditions. In order to analyse Kazan’s urban transformation and the interplay between different actors and tiers of government involved in the process, the research has focused on large urban development projects implemented in the city treating them as ‘laboratories’ of change, and has analysed the broader political and economic conditions of the city and the region (see Swyngedouw 2003a; 2003c).

Urban and regional competitiveness in the context of post-socialist Russia has proven to be different from the ‘model form’ described in the literature (Begg 2002; Duffy 1995; Loftman and Nevin 1995; Porter 1995; Smyth 1994; Turok et al 2004). The nature of both the ‘competitiveness challenge’ and the city and region ‘response’ appear to be different from what theory would prescribe. The current prosperity of Tatarstan and Kazan has very little to do with the ability of the city and the region to innovate, attract foreign investment or sell advanced products on the global markets. To the contrary, Tatarstan has continued to benefit from the profit created in traditional economic sectors. All major industrial exports including first of all oil, chemical and petrochemical products and heavy manufacturing goods, are produced using the facilities and technologies created during the Soviet Union period many decades ago. The limitations of the model of growth based on traditional exports have been realised by the leadership but as long as the traditional sectors can generate sufficient profit, there has been no pressing need for restructuring. In that respect Tatarstan is not different from any other industrially developed region of Russia where prosperity depends on traditional sectors, mineral endowment and the access to international transport networks.

What makes Tatarstan different is the history of successful political bargaining with the federal centre shown during the struggle for independence in 1990 and the Programme for the preservation and development of Kazan in 2000-2005. The analysis has shown that the Tatarstani authorities have successfully used the skills of bureaucratic bargaining developed during socialist times to negotiate various concessions and development funding with central government. In the bargaining with Moscow, Tatarstan has been better positioned than many ‘non-ethnic’ Russia’s regions because of the level
of political mobilisation around the sovereignty project and the strong economic and institutional capacity comparable to that of some former socialist republic (e.g. Baltic states). This allowed the regional elites to form a ‘united front’ against the central authorities and successfully claim political and economic concessions from the central government. Regional competitiveness of Tatarstan has proved to be its ability to attract funding from the central government. Local identity, constructed among other things by means of architecture has been used to make political claims based on national and religious peculiarity of the region as compared to other Russian regions.

Although the very concept of urban and regional competitiveness remains highly debatable (see, Bristow 2005), the fundamental aspect of the competition in post-socialist Russia is that it does not always occur on the ‘open’ market and in economic terms. Kazan has been engaged in competition that cannot be described as global, but rather restricted to the size of the Russian state. Inter-region and interurban competition has a strong political component and occurs along the bureaucratic lines of command between the federal centre and the periphery (McCann 2004). These policies required considerable institutional strength, negotiation skills and the ability to mobilise and deploy resources, which are characteristics of entrepreneurialism. At the same time Tatarstani entrepreneurialism can work best under particular conditions of bureaucratic competition. These conditions are different from ‘ideal’ market competition that post-socialist transition was meant to create. Instead of maximising the entrepreneurial freedom, the regional authorities effectively controlled it; instead of opening markets and promoting competition the authorities did everything to protect regional manufactures, the banking and the service sector from unwanted external competition.

Although the authorities in Kazan have used the language of entrepreneurialism and competitiveness and in fact, have done many of the things that entrepreneurial cities are expected to do, e.g. put systematic efforts into strengthening the city’s positive image, attracting international events, presenting the city investment opportunities globally and erecting landmark buildings (Wu 2000a), all these practices have occurred on the backdrop of post-socialist political restructuring, legacies of governing arrangements, institutional settings, the system of political power and loyalty, the heritage of territorial
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and ethnic disputes, all of which contradicted the model of transparent and rational economic competition. The new emerging form of urban governance has inherited many generic features of the old socialist model but at the same time, has adopted elements of entrepreneurial and competitive urban governance. This apparent discrepancy between the competitiveness theory and Kazan practices may lead to some important conclusions.

The studied case of Kazan does not support the claims of competitiveness theory, including the significance of international investment and innovative industries, but those claims are far from being universally supported by studies of cities in the West either. For example, as a recent study of Cardiff competitiveness strategies has demonstrated, while the city strategies actively use the language of competitiveness and entrepreneurialism, the actual economic performance is driven mostly by the public sector spending (Bristow and Lovering 2006). In that respect the orthodox vision of city and regional competitiveness is far from being universally applicable. The analysis suggests that the universal claims of the competitiveness theory may have serious limitations. Modernisation and entrepreneurialism may not be 'inevitable' responses to the global challenges and modern 'imperatives'. The 'actually existing' competition is influence by a wider range of factors, including those on the regional and city level. Depending on the local conditions and opportunities the actual policy may have a stronger 'global' or 'local' component. That makes competitiveness to a large extent a "hollow" concept – which is being filled up or materialised on an ad hoc basis in each locality. Competitiveness is a "floating signifier" that bears whatever meaning that is being attributed to it by the local political elites who use it in rhetorical purposes (i.e. to legitimise certain political decisions).

The popularity of competitiveness thinking is explained by its role in promoting the neo-liberal project both in the West and in the post-socialist countries. As suggested by Harvey (2006) the fundamental difference between neoliberalisation in the West and post-socialist countries is that in the former case neo-liberalism is aimed at restoring the class power of the capital, while in the latter case it is aimed at constructing an overwhelming class power (p. 157). As the initial conditions in the West and in Russia were very different, the 'actually existing' form of competitiveness and urban governance
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appeared to be different too. Kazan has learned how to use the visual element of competitiveness including the promotion of a positive image of the city, but due to structural reasons and contingencies of political process and geographical location has never managed to get engaged into real global economic competition. Despite the actual level of performance, the use of competitiveness rhetoric has helped to facilitate the transition from a socialist to a post-socialist city. The question how neo-liberal the city has become as a result of the change remains open as the ‘hybrid’ from of governance demonstrated elements of urban entrepreneurialism (not to be confused with ability to innovate) and an authoritarian state carefully controlling competition and patronising local economy.

The research has discovered that no ‘grand narrative’ such as post-socialist transition or neo-liberalism or a ‘ready-made’ theory such as urban regime or competitiveness can fully explain the transformation. Neither the transitional literature, nor the neoliberal urban governance literature can adequately conceptualise the actual configuration of urban governance emerging in Kazan. The actually exiting neo-liberalism debate (Brenner and Theodore 2002; Peck and Tickell 2002) perhaps comes closer to explaining the transformation of urban governance in Kazan but does not seem to acknowledge the whole complexity of the post-socialist dynamics. The question of the comparative significance of global versus local factors in shaping urban governance in the post-socialist city remains open. The concept of ‘actually existing neo-liberalism’ offers a valuable explanation of local governing regimes as a product of pre-existing institutional conditions and the global economic order. The research has demonstrated the significance of pre-existing institutions but serious doubts have emerged whether urban governance in Russian cities can be described as neo-liberal or not.

The research has revealed a trial and error process that eventually shaped a ‘hybrid’ model of urban governance that included elements inherited from the socialist and in fact pre-socialist past, as well as the newly acquired language of urban entrepreneurialism and competitive thinking. In this new urban governance model, political, economic and symbolic elements are closely intertwined. The elements of urban entrepreneurialism included the search for external funding and the use of funding to
produce buildings and spaces that create the image of a modern and economically viable place capable of attracting more external investment. This has started a self-perpetuating cycle of the reproduction of imagery and buildings aimed at attracting more funds into the process. The 'traditional' component of the model has been the role of the state as the main actor. The city and regional authorities have designed the development plans, implemented them, secured the participation of large state-controlled industries using traditional and well-proven during the socialist period methods based on administrative coercion and political leverage.
CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION

8.1 Introduction

The dramatic social, political and economic changes have led to the transformation of the city landscape and the emergence of new types of buildings and public spaces as well as new planning and governing mechanisms. Nevertheless, cities have not just been 'passive receivers' of the action of social and economic forces, as the dominant post-socialist transition theory often suggests (see, Nedovic-Budic et al 2006), instead they have been places where these new forces are shaped and social relations are actively constructed (Lefebvre 2003; Moulaert et al 2003; MacLeod 2002). The analysis of urban transformation in Kazan has helped to understand the underlying political, economic and social processes that the post-socialist countries have experienced since the late 1980s and critically evaluate the theories of post-socialist transition, neo-liberalism and governance.

The analysis of the transformation of the post-socialist city has faced several theoretical problems. Many studies of post-socialist cities put the analysis of urban change within the dominant framework of 'post-socialist transition' that conceptualises urban change as a passage from one fixed condition (i.e. state socialism) to another (market system). The dominant theory of post-socialist transition focuses mainly on institutional transformations and the introduction of new regulatory frameworks necessary for a market economy to function. This approach can hardly address the whole complexity and political dynamism of post-socialist transformation where the old and the new institutions and practices always coexist, forming 'hybrid' institutional arrangements which do not always represent a consistent progress towards a democratic and market society.

In order to deal with the complex and intrinsically political nature of urban transformation, the research has reviewed other theoretical frameworks and current debates. This has revealed another problem, namely that western theories of urban
governance, globalisation, entrepreneurialism, competitiveness with few exceptions have not been systematically applied to study urban transformation in post-socialist Russia. The West and non-West theoretical debates are still poorly connected. This has been caused by several factors, including the historical division between West and non-West (Flynn and Oldfield 2006), the dominance of the post-soviet transition paradigm, a certain intellectual isolation of Russian scholars from the mainstream western debates and little involvement of western scholars in the study of urban governance in the Russian context as compared to other post-socialist regions such as Central and Eastern Europe and China. Many studies remain descriptive in nature, the question of politics and governance of urban development in the post-socialist city has been poorly explored (Feldman 2000; Gel'man 2002b).

Although the post-socialist city are converging with the western city in some ways, many important aspects remain different which makes direct theoretical transfer difficult. Some cities in Central and Eastern Europe demonstrate the emergence of 'entrepreneurial' or neo-liberal urban governance regimes which converge more with western examples, while the cities in Russia and China are characterised by the state retaining greater control of urban development and still playing the role of a direct provider of urban development while behaving as an 'entrepreneurial state'. During the transition period, the state has continued to play a leading role in initiating urban transformation trying to promote cities and regions in the new conditions of inter-regional and international competition.

While city governments in Russia make deliberate efforts to create the image of a modern and economically successful place attractive for potential visitors and investors, their real engagement with international flows of capital, goods and people remains weak. The “world-city-entrepreneurialism” in the Russian governing practice remains more of a discourse than a reality (Golubchikov 2010, p. 640). While there is a proliferation of urban entrepreneurialism, competitive strategies and use of the image of the city for city marketing purposes in both western and eastern countries, the politics and governing arrangements behind these processes in post-socialist countries are quite different from those in western countries. The version of capitalism that Tatarstani authorities have built
is more about "ideological globalisation", the phraseology of neoliberalism and the glossy surface imagery of Western brands and logos" than about "material globalisation" (McCann 2005, p. 10).

The research has demonstrated that there is no 'grand narrative' or 'ready-made' theoretical framework that could be used to produce a plausible explanation of urban transformation in the context of Russia. The research has addressed the gap in knowledge by analysing the governance of large urban development projects (UDPs) and answering the question whether projects in Kazan have been aimed at creating the image for the international audience or for domestic actors. Recent UDPs in Kazan have been used as instruments of creating a new city image, attracting investment and stimulating economic development. The projects have become laboratories of urban change where new configurations of power and mechanisms of urban governance are being worked out.

The research has used the methodological approach based on a critical realist philosophy. The analysis has focused on actors, institutional constellations, policy making process and aimed at revealing necessary relationship of power and influence between the actors involved in the policy-making process. From a realist perspective, the image of the city, planning and architecture are the expressions of the dominant political and economic structures. The use of competitiveness and nationalism discourses in urban planning and governance help to legitimise political power by referring to exterritorial (global competitiveness) and historicist (nation) values. The research has adopted the "instrumentalist" approach to national identity and has interpreted the construction of national identity as an instrument of social mobilisation for centre-periphery relations. The study has used two case studies to produce an in-depth analysis of the governing mechanisms behind the design and implementation of two large urban development projects that had a profound impact on the image of the city. The empirical study has focused on the analysis of policy-making process that has led to transformation of Kazan. The data was collected from in-depth semi-structured interviews with policy-makers and experts, government documents, policy reports, statistical sources and press.
Tatarstan and Kazan have been good examples to analyse the emerging model of urban governance and the interplay of the global and local at the city level because recent policies implemented in the city show how the authorities of Tatarstan and Kazan tried energetically to break free from the localism and obscurity of the geographical and economic position by using political, economic and cultural means expressed among other means through a new image of the city and its projection to the international community. The transformation of its image was aimed at reflecting the modernity and the wealth of Tatarstan as a sovereign state (Graney 2007). One of the key differences between Kazan and many other Russia’s regional capitals is that Kazan is the capital city of an ethnic region that in 1990 declared its ‘sovereignty’ from Russia. This gave Tatarstan powerful leverage in bargaining games with the federal centre and added an additional dimension to the study. Local identity played an important role in making claims for more autonomy and funding based on national peculiarity of Tatarstan as compared to a “pure” Russian region which does not have such an advantage.

Two case studies have been used to analyse the transformation of the image of Kazan and its urban governance. The selection of case studies was informed by their significance (political, symbolic and economic) for the city and involvement of different tiers of government (federal, regional and local) as well as the private sector in the implementation. The Kul-Sharif Mosque has been the first mosque to be built in Kazan Kremlin since 1552. The Mosque has created a symbol of the regained statehood and cultural revival. The Special Federal Programme for the Preservation and Development of Kazan Historic Centre (2001-2005) was a result of successful bargaining with the federal centre over the region’s political status. The Programme was the largest investment in the city in terms of construction cost implemented in the post-socialist era. The Programme has helped to promote the city and the region in the informal hierarchy of Russia’s regions. Both projects have dramatically changed the image of Kazan and in many ways have actually transformed the city from ‘socialist’ to ‘post-socialist’.
8.2 The main findings

The research has discovered that despite the use of competitiveness rhetoric, the actual competition that Kazan is engaged in is aimed not at internationally footloose capital but at getting access to the specific resources available from the federal state, such as political power and development funding. The terms of such competition are fundamentally different from what the thinking around globalisation and competitiveness typically suggest. The research has put the claims of globalisation and competitiveness theories under scrutiny by questioning the necessity and universality of global competition between cities and regions.

UDPs implemented in Kazan between 1995-2005 were driven mainly by political rather than economic rationality. The ruling elite of Tatarstan used grand projects to strengthen their political legitimacy and power. Large UDPs became one of the ways political power is exercised, expanded, shaped and presented in a visual form to the political actors. In order to secure the support of the projects, the elites used powerful political rhetoric. The competitiveness rhetoric was used to legitimise their policy choices, to de-politicise and ex-territorise the decision-making process and eventually to disempower the local community and strengthen the positions in power of the elites. The ideas of competitiveness were especially seductive because they referred to external forces and the need to react to them in particular ways which were thought to be 'inevitable', politically neutral and seemingly acceptable for everybody. While serving the interests of the elites, those projects may have led to the misallocation of resources that could have been used elsewhere.

The authorities also sought to strengthen the legitimacy of power by 'responding' to social needs (e.g. religion and identity) and modern economic 'imperatives' (e.g. globalisation and competitiveness). The authorities designed their political mission around the need to find adequate responses to modern challenges such as the threat of ethnic violence and the loss of competitive position, and used development projects to prove their ability to tackle these threats effectively. For example, the Mosque was created to respond to the modern challenges of globalisation and loss of local traditional identities by creating a house of worship and a cultural centre for all the Tatars which was
supposed to preserve their ethnic, religions and religious identity but also help to position Kazan on the ‘global map’. The Programme used similar rhetoric of heritage preservation, cultural revival, but also that of modernisation and competitiveness.

More importantly, large UDPs have been used as evidence of political power, control and managerial capabilities of the city and regional elites which had to be shown to their counterparts and the higher tiers of government. When the central government was weak, the image of the city communicated a message of aggressive nationalism and threat of succession (via the Mosque). When the central government became stronger the message contained in development projects was that of loyalty and effective management of federal development funds (via the Programme). This required specific governing practices, planning and urban design approaches. Governing practices and their spatial implications have been intertwined and have become mutually reinforcing: as much as forms of governance instigate specific design solutions, the latter require certain institutional arrangements for their successful implementation. That is why the policies have led to the emergence of certain type of buildings and urban spaces: large monumental projects, closely monitored and policed and not always accessible for the public, and large infrastructural projects both oriented on specific external audiences and having a strong imagery component.

The research has addressed the question of the emerging form of urban governance in Kazan. The research has discovered that in Kazan the state controls the allocation of resources for urban development. This is not to gain market land value or to act as a ‘trigger’ effect for private investment, but rather the government-led UDPs are aiming to strengthen the position of political elites within the existing structure of power. The construction of a new city image started a self-perpetuating cycle of attracting funding into the reproduction of urban imagery aimed at attracting more funding. Although the emerging model of governance has borrowed some elements and techniques of entrepreneurial governance, it has not become innovative or business orientated. Under the surface and rhetoric of entrepreneurialism, competitiveness and internationalisation lie developed during the socialist period mechanisms of bureaucratic negotiation, political bargaining and coercion to implement the planned policies. The authorities in Kazan and
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Tatarstan have not simply ‘responded’ to economic and political challenges by trying to reproduce ‘best practice’ or adjust their institutional organisation according to the neoliberal reforms ‘cook-books’, they constructed a somewhat unique model that allowed to pursue the following goals:

1) To mobilise political and financial resources;
2) To work in collaboration with the federal government;
3) To invent new ways of attracting funding from external sources;
4) To position the city and the region nationally and internationally;

Therefore, the authorities actively participated in the construction of the new governing regime. The governing practices were aimed not only (and possibly not as much) at luring elusive international investments or national capital but more at legitimating the rule of the local elites who (under conditions of procedural or ‘controlled’ democracy) use ambitious urban development projects to convince both the federal centre (as the source of power) and the local electorate (source of passive approval) in the ‘rightness’ of their political course.

8.3 The main results

This research has led to the following main results. There are limits to which the existing theory can explain urban transformation in Russian cities. The research has made an attempt to overcome the limitations of the existing theory by applying the theory of urban governance to the post-socialist city and placing it into a wider theoretical context including politics, multi-level governance and the spatiality of urban transformation. The analysis of urban development projects in Kazan has helped to understand current transformation of urban environment in the post-socialist city and the political and economic context of urban governance. In theoretical development the research has helped to challenge the dominant position of the post-socialist transition theory and link the debates of post-socialist cities with western literature which so far have not been well
connected. The application of western theories to a study of post-socialist cities has also helped to test their validity beyond the traditional geographical region.

The research has established that urban transformation do not fit in a consistent pattern of “transition” from one ideal state to another. Urban transformation, although influenced, are not pre-defined by powerful forces which are external to cities, would they be identified as forces of post-socialist transition, globalisation or competitiveness. Neither do they represent a uniformed response to global “imperatives” as claimed by some experts on globalisation and urban competitiveness (Turok 2004, p. 1070). The urban process is far from being consistent more likely it can be described as a trial and error influenced by socially and historically contingent circumstances. Urban development projects are the testing sites at which urban regimes and governing models are being worked out.

The western concepts of urban competitiveness and entrepreneurialism (Begg 2002; Duffy 1995; Loftman and Nevin 1995; Porter 1995; Smyth 1994; Turok et al 2004) have limited usefulness in the post-socialist city because the whole politico-economic structure creates different incentives. The modern examples of urban development implemented in post-socialist cities may look like a ‘standard response’ to the ‘challenges of globalisation’ but this can be a very superficial answer to the question on how large urban development projects emerge and what forces are responsible for their implementation (for deeper analysis see, Pagonis and Thornley 2000). Political rhetoric can be used to legitimise choices and strengthen positions in power. Kazan case has demonstrated that development policies lack consistency or focus and are very contingent on the political and economic opportunities. The identity construction projects remain very opportunistic, contingent on political influences and the availability of funding. As soon as the recourse base for one theme has been exhausted, a new theme would be invented, which does not correspond very well with the previous one. During the sovereignty heydays Kazan was positioned as the capital of an independent state, then as a cultural centre of Russia (with the support of the federal funding) and then as a competitive city, Russia’s third capital and global destination. The research has looked at
the 'marginal' manifestation of competitiveness representing competition under largely 'non-competitive' conditions structured by the political conditions.

The relations between 'global' and 'local' at urban level are more complex than some simple models predict. The perception of 'global' has a lot to do with local political struggles, governing institutions and organisational structures. The case of Kazan case can be treated as a particular variation of neo-liberal urbanisation that 'mutated' under specific conditions of a post-socialist city, the capital of an ethnic republic in Russia. Inevitably this particular variation was influenced by the actual conditions, the most important of which are as follows: 1) the bargaining federalism; 2) nationalism; 3) undemocratic, unaccountable nature of the local government.

8.4 The novelty of the research

This research has contributed to the understanding of urban governance in the post-socialist city in several ways. First, the research has bridged the gap between the western urban debates and the debates on post-socialist urban transition. Second, the research has widened the theoretical boundaries of 'post-socialist' urban studies by using multidisciplinary approach and integrating different debates and has tested the western theories beyond their traditional geographical region. Third, the research has examined how large urban development projects (UDPs) contribute to the construction of the image of the city, which serves various political and social ends.

8.5 Further research

Over the course of the research, many intriguing and potentially fruitful areas of investigation have been identified but difficult decisions had to be made to keep the research within the limits and as focused as possible. This thesis provides a good base for further research on urban governance in post-socialist cities. Since urban governance in Russia has been poorly explored in contemporary literature, further research would focus on a range of topics and questions that have been identified here.
Firstly, western critical debates on socio-spatial transformation of state power and state rescaling in late capitalism (Brenner 2004; 2009; Moulaert et al 2003; Swyngedouw 2000) have been based exclusively on the examples from Western Europe and North America. In a recent article Brenner (2009) has urged that more systematic comparative studies could help to advance the research on state rescaling by looking at its trajectories and patterns in diverse global regions (p. 133). Applying these debates to analyse the new regional development strategies of the Russian federal government (discussed in Section 4.3.3) could offer a new interpretation of the role of the post-socialist state in development and offer a new analytical approach to post-socialism that so far has been almost exclusively focused on the institutional development issues, macro level formal indicators and have largely overlooked the spatial dimension of transition except for a mere acknowledgment of the fact that transition has reinforced spatial disparities between regions and cities. This could also help to tackle the problem of the intellectual separation between scholars in the West and the East and could test the validity of western theories in a new geographical context.

Secondly, there are signs that as the result of the pursuit of the competitiveness Kazan has become a ‘dual city’, one part of which forms a smart façade constructed according to the competitiveness rules; while the rest represents the less glossy side which is the living environment of the majority of people. There is little research on urban space and issues of political power and social control (see Hall and Hubbard 1998; MacLeod 2002) in relation to Russian cities. An empirical study of the transforming geography of Kazan (and possibly other cities) could shed some light on the socio-economic processes in the post-socialist city and help to develop further the concept of the ‘dual city’.

During the course of the research, new development programmes have been adopted in Kazan which creates new source of data and opportunity to extend the longitudinal study. The most significant achievement has been hosting the International Student Games in 2013. Once again the Tatarstan and Kazan authorities used their skills to receive federal funding for a number of large urban development projects for the Games infrastructure. This raises many questions about the development strategy adopted
by the city authorities that is based on competing for external investment and its limitations and possible dangers. The phenomenon of competing on occasional and unpredictable markets is worth further studying.

Overall, extending research to other Russia’s cities could help to test theoretical claims in other regions with no ethnic and religions differences from the Russian heartland. Using more case studies would help to generalise on the emerging model of urban governance in post-socialist Russia and identify the necessary elements of such a model.
APPENDIX 1

Semi-structured interviews will be based on the following questions.

Case Study 1:

1. Why was the mosque reconstructed?

2. If restoration of the religious consciousness was the major motivation behind the mosque reconstruction, why the funds were not spent on a number of mosques built within closer proximity to potential users?

3. What does the project represent or symbolise?

4. How could possibly the federal leadership perceive the project? Could they possibly see it as a threat for national unity?

5. Did it help Tatarstan to justify claims for sovereignty?

6. Did it give Tatarstan competitive advantage over other regions which did not have distinct ethnic or religious background?

7. Does the project and more generally the favourable attitude towards Islam in Tatarstan help the republic to establish closer economic links with the Islamic world countries?

Case Study 2:

1. What was the rationale behind the selection of sites and specific projects for the Programme?

2. Why do you think towards the end of the Programme projects which entertainment and representative functions survived; whereas socially oriented projects were sequestered?
3. Would you agree that while the Programme was being implemented the major concern shifted to creating an attractive image of the city rather than solving any significant problems?

4. How to explain the fact that a number the flagship projects implemented under the programme have had very little relevance to either city centre or historic preservation?

5. Do you think that the Programme gives an example of effective spending of public money?

6. What do the projects which received funding from the Programme represent or symbolise?

7. Did the Programme help Tatarstan and Kazan to enhance its competitiveness?
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Chair of a committee in the Kazan executive committee</td>
<td>January 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Chief research fellow in the Tatarstan Republic Academy of Science</td>
<td>January 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Chief architect of a state-owned design institute</td>
<td>January 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Deputy chair of Russian cultural society</td>
<td>May 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Deputy director of a Kazan-based tour operator</td>
<td>January 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Deputy director of a research centre in the Tatarstan Republic Academy of Science</td>
<td>May 2007</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Deputy head of the Kazan Executive committee</td>
<td>June 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Director of a transnational computer manufacturer represented in Kazan</td>
<td>May 2007</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Director of a museum in Kazan</td>
<td>January 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Director of a department in the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation</td>
<td>May 2007</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Director of a Kazan government-owned company</td>
<td>January 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Executive director of a business association based in Moscow</td>
<td>May 2007</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Former chief of a department in the Kazan Planning Department</td>
<td>June 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Journalist, former press-secretary to the president of Tatarstan Republic</td>
<td>June 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Head of a department in the Ministry for Architecture, Construction and Communal Services</td>
<td>May 2007</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Head of a Tatar noble society</td>
<td>June 2008</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>Head of a department in the Tatarstan Republic Academy of Science</td>
<td>June 2007</td>
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<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Head of a department in the Kazan executive committee</td>
<td>June 2007</td>
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<tr>
<td>No.</td>
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<td>June 2007</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>Lecturer in Kazan school of architecture, architect of the Mosque</td>
<td>January 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Lecturer in Kazan school of architecture, architect of the Mosque</td>
<td>January 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Owner of a Kazan-based private design practice</td>
<td>January 2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Professor in Kazan school of architecture</td>
<td>June 2007</td>
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<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Professor of economics, advisor to the Tatarstani Government</td>
<td>June 2007</td>
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<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Professor of History KSU</td>
<td>January 2007</td>
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<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Regional director of a large western retailer operating in Kazan</td>
<td>May 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Senior member of staff in the administration of the president of Tatarstan Republic</td>
<td>January 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Senior economist in a Kazan government-owned company</td>
<td>January 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Senior planner in a Kazan-based design institute</td>
<td>January 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Senior manager of a large industry</td>
<td>May 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Senior lecturer in Kazan School of Architecture and lead architect in a private design company</td>
<td>January 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Special advisor to the president of Tatarstan Republic</td>
<td>June 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Special advisor to the president of Tatarstan Republic</td>
<td>June 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Independent journalist and publisher</td>
<td>June 2008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX 3 THE USE OF THE RESEARCH RESULTS

The PhD has discussed the western theories of globalisation, neo-liberalism, governance and competitiveness in relation to urban transformation of the post-socialist city. In that sense the findings not only shed light on urban governance in the post-socialist city, but critically evaluate western debates by expanding the geographical horizons to the region that has not been sufficiently studied yet. The broadening of geographical horizons helps to test the applicability of western theories in a new research context and evaluate the scope of generalisation these theories can provide.

The research can benefit the following professional communities and groups. First of all, the academic community involved in research on policy, transition and urban and regional governance will benefit from theory transfer and critical evaluation of some western debates. Governance and public policy are becoming ever more complex multi-layered in which national and supra-national bodies set the macro framework for international security, trade, sustainable development and human rights, whereas sub-national actors like cities and regions are assuming more and more discretion in economic development, environmental and social policies. Cities and regions in both west and post-socialist countries are becoming laboratories of economic restructuring and new forms of governance. This creates opportunities for theoretical transfer and testing western theories and debates in a new geographical context. Therefore studying urban governance in the post-socialist city can advance western theories too.

The UK-based firms conducting business in Russia will benefit from a better understand of the policies of the central, regional and local government in the recourse allocation in development projects. This would help firms to adjust their business development strategies in the way that their operation on the Russian market is more competitive and secure.

Government agencies (e.g. DfID), intergovernmental organisations (e.g. the World Bank and EBRD) that offer funding for development projects in Russia will benefit from better understanding of the mechanisms of investment. International non-
governmental organisation involved in environmental protection and social development activities in Russia will benefit from better understanding of project governance which will help to evaluate the environmental and social impact, to design possible mitigation measures and design the communication strategies.
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