The Poetics of Politics
Narrative Production of National Identity in Galicia 1970-1989

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This thesis is submitted to Cardiff University in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Specimen layout for Thesis Summary and Declaration/Statements page to be included in a Thesis

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SUMMARY OF THESIS

This thesis investigates the appearance of two distinctive Galician political communities at the wake and aftermath of the pivotal conjuncture of the transition to democracy in Spain: 'the colony', first, and later 'the nation'. Taking the movement at its own word, it argues that nationalism was to a great extent sustained by a storied citation and (re)narrativization of the movement and the community from a hybrid 'colonized' and 'national-popular' identity to a purely nationalist 'popular' one. The main body of the thesis unravels the unstable logics, tensions and effects of the discourses of colonialism and sovereignty through an in-depth examination of their key enunciative strategy: their indexical and multilayered web of storytelling practices. The negotiation of Marxism and nationalism in the movement over time is here used as a theme to explore wider issues and mechanisms of national, collective identity construction, coherence and transformation.

The thesis is divided into three parts. Chapters 1 and 2 present the theoretical and methodological context of the study, which draws on post-structural theories of discourse and narrative analysis. The second part –chapters 3 to 6- introduces the socio-historical context of the case as well as the key storylines and strategies through which the 'colony' was performed. These narratives include the foundational myth of loss, the narratives of a modern colonization and the small tales of 'national-popular struggles'. The third part –chapters 7 to 9- examines the key narrative strategies of ventriloquism and metonymic displacement in the tales which de-ambiguated the movement towards nationalism and performed a new discourse of 'sovereignty', which ultimately allowed the radical movement to survive the transition.
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Introduction

This thesis presents an investigation of the discourses of Galician nationalism at the wake and aftermath of the key time of the transition to democracy in Spain. Seeing nationalism and national identity as discourse and performed in and through narratives, it zooms into the multiple, complex and often contradictory storytelling practices of the movement and its political effects. Interdisciplinary in approach, it draws theoretically on post-structural theories of discourse —mainly the work of Foucault, Laclau and Butler— and methodologically it uses narrative analysis to read the texts of the movement. The study traces the appearance of two differentiated political communities through storytelling and discursive practices: the colony and later, the nation. Examining in depth the discourse of colonialism, its conditions of possibility and power effects, the thesis demonstrates how this was a hybrid, ambivalent identity which refused choice between the Marxist and nationalist masternarratives it mobilised. Then it shows how the end of the uncertainty opened up by the transition period with the establishment of parliamentary democracy brought about a renarrativisation of the political community as ‘nation’ in the discourse and stories of ‘sovereignty’.

Galician nationalism has developed and gathered strength over time and it still locates itself firmly on the left of the political spectrum, but the question of its negotiation of different and contradictory masternarratives —Marxism and nationalism— mainly in its first decades of existence remains essentially unexplored. The theme of ‘doing’, narrating Marxism and nationalism is key to understanding all the movement’s ideological and material practices over those years, and it is also used in this study as an opportunity to tap into wider issues of national identity formation, continuity and change. Particularly, the study examines the role played by form, by storytelling as specific enunciative modality in the construction of national / collective identity from a political perspective which has not been fully developed.
The aim of this thesis is to provide a political account of the discursive and narrative construction of national identity through the examination of the Galician case as well as to complexify and further the understanding of the Galician movement. It is intended as a contribution to the fields of nationalism, Spanish politics and narrative analysis.

The thesis is structured in three parts. The first two chapters provide the framework of the study. Chapter one is a summary overview of the ‘sideways’ shifts that have taken place in the research on nationalism, with particular attention to the place of minority nationalism, in order to locate the thesis at the confluence of different disciplinary fields. It examines specifically the confluence of anti-essentialist theories of discourse with a narrative understanding of collective identity. Chapter 2 discusses the methodological decisions which underpin the research presented in the following data chapters, and combines a representation of ‘what actually happened’ in this study with a discussion of the particular theoretical and practical questions concerning method within discourse analysis, qualitative research and my case.

The second part, chapters 3 to 6, examines the narrative and discursive strategies of the discourse of colonialism. Chapter 3 sets the scene, presenting the historical context and examining the conditions of possibility of the story-lines. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 focus on the nuances and details of the ‘colonialism’ narrative through an analysis of its main episodes and tales. Chapter 4 explores the myth of loss as a ‘salvational’ narrative which founded the political community. Chapter 5 examines the second episode in the story-lines: ‘colonialism today’. This episode and the strategies it deploys constructed a hybrid identity which hardly contained its own tensions and contradictions. Chapter 6 looks into the small stories of the ‘national-popular struggles’ and their mobilisation of a sense of place which made political boundaries built up insisting on a social categorization of the nation more flexible.

Chapters 7, 8 and 9 form the third part of this study and together examine the narrative transformation of the discourse of colonialism, and the emergence of a new discourse of ‘sovereignty’. This discourse de-ambiguated the movement in the
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metonymical displacement of the discourse of colonialism towards the sphere of the
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new unity which at the time was not so much of an unity but a reorganization.
Reading on nation and narration.

1.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a summary overview of the ‘sideways’ shifts that have taken place in the research on nationalism, with particular attention to the place of minority nationalism, in order to locate the thesis at the confluence of different disciplinary fields. Firstly, it maps the opening up and fracturing of the field of nationalism where from an almost unrivalled dominance of the modernist paradigm in its very many forms, we arrive at a more diversified field where competing versions of nationalism coexist and where a post-structural framework of national identity as discourse—which maintains modernism under erasure—has gathered force. It then argues that national identity has come to be seen as a discursive formation. From discourse to narratives there is a short leap, and the chapter explains the confluence of anti-essentialist theories of discourse with a narrative understanding of collective identity. This study is located in this tradition. Finally, it introduces some general characteristics of the literature on Galician nationalism in relation to the topic of the study.

1.2. From ‘nation and nationalism’ to national identification.

Classic modernist theories spelled out the premises of any possible, rigorous consideration of nationalism and became the privileged interpretation, but had problems coming to terms with non nation-state nationalism. Although the different versions of modernism differ greatly, there is a common kernel of truth among them. This is a belief in the modernity of both nations and nationalisms. Within a modernist
interpretation both phenomena appeared in the last two centuries and are the product of 'specifically modern processes like capitalism, industrialism, the emergence of the bureaucratic state, urbanization and secularism' (Smith 1994:377 quoted in Özkimli 2000). Or as Eric Hobsbawm clearly puts it: 'nationalism comes before nations. Nations do not make states and nationalisms but the other way round' (Hobsbawm 1990: 10). Karl Deustch and 'nation-building' or 'diffusion' theories in the 1950s and 1960s were early exponents of modernist theories. Later Eric Hobsbawm and A.D. Smith (from an ethno-symbolist position) are important examples of the debates and the views on minority nationalism.

Hobsbawm contends that despite being seemingly old, nations and nationalism are products of 'social engineering'. The 'nation' comes about through an 'invention of tradition' which serves as a substitute for social cohesion (Hobsbawm 1983:1). Nationalism is then defined as a political programme 'and a recent one', that holds that groups defined as 'nations' have the right to, and therefore ought to, form territorial nation states (Hobsbawm 1996:256). He distinguishes three periods of nationalist mobilization, the first one being the period of the 'great nations' (French Revolution - 1914) and the second one the period of an 'apogee of nationalism' and of utopia (1918-1950). Both stages were 'unificatory as well as emancipatory' and central to historical transformation (Hobsbawm, 1990). In stark contrast to these, a third period of nationalism since the 1950s is 'functionally different... no longer a major vector of historical development' (Hobsbawm 1990:163). He is openly hostile in his characterization of minority nationalism: these are rejections of modern modes of political organisation, both national and supranational. Rather than nationalism these movements are about ethnicity, which is not 'a political concept' but 'a way of expressing a real sense of group identity which links the members of 'us' because it emphasizes their differences from 'them'" (Hobsbawm 1996: 257-58).

Ethno-symbolism accepted the core modernist premises of the modernity of both nations and nationalism but criticised the lack of attention to their 'ethnies'. In a nutshell, A. D. Smith's main theses were that modern nations cannot be understood without taking pre-existing ethnic components into account, the lack of which is likely
to create a serious impediment to nation-building\(^1\). Smith rarely theorised specifically about minority nationalism, but when he did we arrive at one of the most pervasive classifications of minority nationalism, that of 'ethnic nationalism' (Smith, 1979, 1991). Ethnic nationalisms really are a protest against the centralist, undemocratic policies of nation-states in which they are inserted, and these movements are to be considered as merely autonomist\(^2\). They are also different in their tendency towards economic planning and rationalising and in their context.

To sum up, different modernist theories had assumed, in the 1950s, 1960s and even in the 1970s, Western Europe either to be devoid of national minorities after successful processes of nation-state assimilation. As a result, they treated minority nationalisms as 'different', something other than what 'real' nationalism is or ought to be. The 'resurgence' of peripheral nationalisms in the 1970s made these theoretical premises unsustainable. The (deterministic) assumption of the nation-state as the only possible solution for nationalism was still upheld. Besides, minority nationalisms were labelled 'ethnic' / 'demotic'—i.e. with restrictive membership to the 'nation' based on common descent, cultural sameness or even blood— rather than political movements. Overall, even if the nation was seen as 'fabricated' it was still reified in their writings, and invariable 'cores' of ethnic soul were still being argued for. Modernization theories explained nationalism 'mechanically, seeking a cause that is outside any actual nationalist movement' (Finlayson, 1998: 105).

In relation to their thinking on minority nationalism, these theories sparked a series of critical theoretical reactions and corrections. In the 1970s, these reactions were mainly 'relative deprivation' theories and the 'new ethnicism'. Hechter, in 'Internal Colonialism', explained the revitalization of western nationalism in terms of a cultural division of labour—which presupposed movements as rational actors and a methodological individualism—and whose main shortcoming was not fitting the reality on the ground (McCrone, 1998). Connor, instead, put forward a political explanation based on the expansion of the principle of self-rule to non-dominant ethnicities (Connor, 1977).
Since the 1980s, scholars also aware of and sympathetic to minority nationalisms, took the lead. Michael Keating, David McCrone and Monserrat Guibernau, among others, set out to rethink and contest the characterisation of minority nationalism as 'non-nationalist' and 'ethnic' (Keating 1996, 2001b, 2002; McCrone 1998; Guibernau, 1996; 1999). They mainstreamed the analysis of these movements, seeing them as clearly nationalist. They performed the de-linking of the categories of the 'nation' and the 'state', a much needed step in order to better comprehend the phenomena. Claims needed to be 'political' in nature, that is, about degrees of self-determination or presenting a demand to 'the right to rule itself'. These writers explained that 'neo-nationalism' can exhibit a 'variable geometry' of goals because they have de-linked sovereignty from the nation-state, and so their nationalist character is not affected by settling for something different (Keating, 2001b, 2002). Definitions of nationalism hence dropped the nation-state as the only appropriate incarnation of the political community.

Besides, instead of 'ethnic' these movements are often defined as civic and democratic. The 'civic' version of nationalism is that which promotes positive values of shared commitment to public institutions of the state and civil society, and which poses a more open even voluntary membership to the nation. These commentators stressed minority nationalism's positive and modern features, in studies where Scotland and Catalonia were model cases. These nationalisms from the periphery stand for a 'discontent' with the quality of democracy or the distribution of economic resources but generally they conform fairly open and strong civil societies. The description of rather instrumentalist movements is, however, still present. Many of these scholars built upon the work of their forebears within modernist, ethno-symbolist and other frameworks, presenting mostly a form of inversion of their arguments.

Simultaneously, since the early 1990s, theoretical debates on nationalism shifted markedly as critical and deconstructive theories stemming from the linguistic turn in philosophy and the wider critique of the modern, 'centred' and sovereign concept of the subject flourished in literary, sociological and anthropological fields (Hall 1992,
‘Socio-constructive’ and discursive conceptions of the nation started to gain pace in the work of identity and nationhood undertaken by Stuart Hall, Michael Billig, Craig Calhoun, Rogers Brubaker or Nira Yuval-Davies.

Socio-constructivism was not particularly concerned with ‘minority nationalism’ per se, but posed the most serious challenge to the underlying assumptions of the modernist paradigm and associated developments. They disputed the reduction of nationalism to a phenomena of a narrow (political / ethnic) nature, dismantled the pervasive naturalisation and essentialization of the nation in the literature and its reliance on taxonomies and categorizations that re-created the fiction of homogeneous, monolithic and uncontested 'nation' and 'nationalism' for minority nationalisms and the 'nations' they create (Brubaker 1996, Billig 1995, Calhoun 1993, 1997, Hall 1990; Verdery, 1996). These critiques are varied in focus, but have in common the anti-essentialist understanding of nationalism as discourse. Two key studies in the 1990s were Rogers Brubaker ‘Nationalism Reframed’ and Michael Billig’s ‘Banal Nationalism’.

Rogers Brubaker in Nationalism Reframed called against the conventional reification of the category 'nation'. Nationalisms should be understood now 'without invoking nations as substantial entities' (Brubaker 1996:7). Instead we should focus on 'nationness' and 'nationhood' as 'nations' are primarily practical categories rather than analytical ones, institutionalized forms and contingent event’ (ibid). In Nationalism, Craig Calhoun insists that nationhood cannot exist prior to political processes, but also, that these processes do not occur in a vacuum, but within the particular discursive contexts and narratives that surround people (Calhoun, 1997). In Banal Nationalism discursive psychologist Michael Billig argues that national identity is not psychological accessory internal to the person, but exists externally in the myriad small material and language practices which incessantly and subtlety remind us of our ‘identity’ (Billig, 1995). It is in the common deployment of banal words such as ‘us’, ‘here’, ‘there’ or the routine practices of flags in sporting events which do the identity work.

It is important to note, however, that new understandings did not completely reject all previous conceptualisations of nationalism. Rather, they subjected their essentialist
concepts to a deconstructive critique. This means, as Stuart Hall explains, that these approaches put key concepts, such as 'nation', 'nationalism', 'identity', under erasure. They have not been superseded dialectically and have to be used, but in a new, deconstructed manner (Hall 1996:1). Therefore key truths of modernism are still upheld although now in a (truly) de-totalized form, no longer operating within the paradigm in which they were originally generated (Hall, 1996). The modernity of nationalism and nations, 'invention of tradition' (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983) and particularly the 'imagined communities' (Anderson, 1983) are going to be key ideas giving an impulse to new theories of nationalism as discourse.

1.3. From the discourse of nationalism to national narratives

Thinking of national identity and nationalism as discourse, in Foucault and Laclau's terms, is to think of them as the mobilization of particular signifiers (such as the 'nation') through the deployment of myriad objects, concepts (i.e. the 'national will' or desire, 'national interest', 'national self-determination' and so on) styles, themes and strategies forming systems —regularities in dispersion— mobilized in power strategies and in linking practices. These strategies and practices construct precarious but coherent wholes to diverse degrees: from a nation-state in all its banality (Billig, 1995) to radical, opposition movements from the peripheries in all their precariousness.

Michel Foucault theorised discourses as constituted of 'statements', which are not simply sentences, utterances or speech acts in a formal sense. Thus, a statement is not a mere linguistic category. Discourse, Young remarks, is a 'border' concept, at the edge between language and material reality (Young, 2001). Foucault's later writings as well as Laclau and Mouffe's placed the notion of discourse, as chapter 2 explains, firmly as encompassing the intricate embedding of both language and material practices (Foucault, 1976; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985).

Discourses, in Foucault's archaeological writing, are systems of heterogeneous and often contradictory statements or 'system of dispersion', formed within specific
conditions of existence. These conditions consist of rules which regulate the formation of objects about which statements are made; enunciative modalities or the discursive forms, sites and positions of enunciation; concepts involved in the discourse and strategies or the theories and themes developed. None of these elements individually necessarily provide for the unity of a group of statements (Foucault, 1969). The idea is rather to study their dispersion, in order to see whether it is possible to define certain orders, correlations, positions and functioning or transformations among the statements (Foucault, 1969:41). Such a system of dispersion and its regularities is a discursive formation. Discourses, then, are not homogeneous, are non-monolithic and they may have sub-groups —'it was possible for men within the same discursive formation to have different opinions, to make contradictory choices' (Foucault, 1969/1989:221)— they allow for an abundance of themes and representations. They are the clusters of semantic, structural and contextual meanings formed according to norms.

Being heterogeneous and contextual, discourses are not static entities but always changing. They are not timeless but historically, even conjuncturally, formed: ‘posing the problem of its own limits, its divisions, its transformations, the specific modes of its temporality rather than its sudden irruption in the midst of the complicities of time’ (1969:131). Thus the continuity of forms of knowledge, objects, strategies formed by discourse is contingent and contextual, potentially differing from period to period. Therefore, ‘the colony’ in Galician discourse could only appear as a meaningful or intelligible construct within a specific conjuncture and discursive formation in the late 1960s and 1970s.

In his later genealogical writings Foucault turned his attention to how discourses —now seen as ‘blocks’— form intricate connections of power and knowledges. Instead of monolithic or all-pervasive, Foucault talks of discourses as ‘discontinuous segments’ mobilized for a variety of purposes and with diverse tactical functions. That is:

‘we must not imagine a world of discourse divided between accepted and excluded discourse...but as a multiplicity of discursive elements that can come into play in various strategies’ (1976:100)
Hence, discourses are 'tactical elements' which might be mobilized, and even combined, by power strategies. Laclau and Mouffe firmly extended the idea of discourse to society as a whole (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). For Laclau discourses become the 'primary terrain of the constitution of objectivity' (Laclau, 2005:68). That is, the entire social space is discursive: it is a symbolic order or 'a vast argumentative texture through which people construct their reality' (Laclau, 1993:341). Lacalul’s theory of hegemony —stemming originally from Marxism, mainly developing as critique of Gramsci and Althusser— applies ideas of discourse and power to the social. Discourse becomes the linking and connecting politically of diverse groups or political demands, through contingent and precarious 'articulations', into a 'whole' or unity (i.e. a political project, an identity) in an attempt to achieve hegemony. The internal coherence of a discourse is —borrowing from Foucault— that of the 'regularity in dispersion' (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985:105). However, Laclau and Mouffe stressed the idea of regularity and thought of discourse as an ensemble of differential positions (ibid.:106). That is, in a discourse the identities of all the elements or groups linked are relational —constituted in that articulation, and difference with others. Laclau and Mouffe propose a series of interrelated concepts in order to think of society, mainly that of discourse (structure), hegemony (politics) and social antagonism (conflict) (Norval, 2000).

Discourses on nation are seen, besides, as the result of political practices which try to 'hegemonize', to determine the precise particular content of the universal 'nation', producing a concrete version of the nation. Nationalism's 'formal universality as a socio-cultural concept —everyone can, should, will 'have' a nationality, as he or she 'has' a gender— vs. the irremediably particularity of its concrete manifestations' is, indeed, one of the paradoxes of nationalism already noted by Anderson (Anderson, 1983:5). This is, nevertheless, less a paradox than the crux of the phenomena: what gives 'nation' its political effectiveness. As Alan Finlayson notes, nationalism is an ideological legitimation strategy 'revolving around the tension of universal and particular' where it works to build universals from the particular (Finlayson, 1998: 103). Or, in Anderson's third paradox: 'the political power of nationalism vs. its
philosophical poverty and even incoherence', there is an ‘emptiness’, a ‘thinness’ to nationalism discourse (ibid; Freeden, 1998).

For Ernesto Laclau there is in politics an irreducible gap between empty universals (i.e., principles such as nation, democracy, justice) and the particular (i.e. their contingent content) which needs the political operation of hegemony in order to lay the ideological glue which binds a particular society together (Laclau, 2005). Each universal notion is always ‘hegemonized’ by a particular content which ‘colours its universality and accounts for its efficiency’ (Žižek, 1999:204). These political strategies are achieved when a movement succeeds in the construction of ‘empty’ or floating signifiers –the ‘nodal points’, a particular notion which stands-in for the absent universal— in a discursive formation which becomes a rally for action, a myth and sometimes a political horizon6. This empty signifier or hegemonized universal becomes the point which ties a discourse, movement and eventually a society together. The discourses of nationalism would, then, be political struggles over the hegemonization of the universal ‘nation’ by particular, contingent meanings through the multiple articulation of groups or political demands. Nationalism operates by dividing 'us' from 'them', constituting commonalities and differences between self and others, via the drawing of political and symbolic boundaries (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Hall 1996; Yuval-Davies, 1997; Norval, 2000).

If nationalism is a particular kind of discourse (a certain ‘genre’) and each nation is the real / symbolic result of myriad particular practices, objects, concepts and strategies mobilized in its own name, then the particular ‘nationality’ which Anderson mentions or ‘national identity’ is not a given, objective fact but a reality constructed through discourse. Identity, Stuart Hall notes, or rather identification, is always a construction within discourse, among modalities of power and logics of inclusion and exclusion (Hall, 1996:4). In fact, Homi Bhabha remarks, the nation is the structure of exclusion par excellence (Bhabha, 1990). Identities are, Hall says, a ‘process never completed’ which does not eliminate difference. That is, identity needs an ‘Other’, what it leaves outside, to define itself (Hall, 1996:3). Hence, for him (national) identities are
fractured, multiple, constructed across difference, antagonisms and the criss-crossing of discourses which strive for unity and closure (ibid, 4).

In this anti-essentialist version of identity, national identities are constructed within discursive representations of the nation. Hence we arrive at the connection between identity and narrative: ‘identities arise from the narrativization of the self’ (ibid. 4).

That is, identity is not seen as being inside the person – the kernel of a nut — but exists only as narrative, for as Mark Currie explains, ‘the only way to explain who we are is to tell our own story’ and we learn how to tell our story from all other stories to which we listen (Currie, 1998:17). Or as Francesca Polletta notes, it is ‘[in] telling the story of our becoming as a nation, a people, we establish who we are’ (Polletta, 1998:422). This narrative, discursive character does not make identity any less real and material. As Homi Bhabha insists, material reality and metaphorical narrations are inseparable in the nation (Bhabha, 1990).

What are narratives?

Historically, Aristotle in his *Poetics* provides one of the first, and most enduring, definitions of narratives: these are a ‘whole’ which has a beginning, middle and an end.

Narratives then, are commonly understood as accounts of events chronologically connected (Czarniawska 2004:17). Nevertheless, most theorists would point out that narratives exhibit some other specific elements, chiefly causation and human interest (Cortazzi, 1993:85). Barthes suggests that practically all human forms of expression are narratives or at least can be treated as such:

"The narratives of the world are numberless. Narrative is first and foremost a prodigious variety of genres, themselves distributed amongst different substances — as though any material were fit to receive man’s stories. Able to be carried by articulated language, spoken or written, fixed or moving images, gestures, and the ordered mixture of all these substances; narrative is present in myth, legend, fable, tale, novella, epic, history, tragedy, drama, comedy, mime, painting, [...] news item, conversation. Moreover, under this almost infinite diversity of forms, narrative is present in every age, in every place, in every society..."(Barthes, 1996: 46)
Trans-national, trans-historical and trans-cultural; this is how structuralism defined narratives as they constitute one of the most important means of human sense-making. From a hermeneutic viewpoint, Ricoeur explained how we make sense of our reality through narratives because it is through them that human beings experience and humanize time (Ricoeur, 1984). This relevance of narratives for human understanding has been put forward in different ways: 'so natural is the impulse to narrate' Hayden White remarks, 'so inevitable is the form of narrative for any report on the way things really happened, that narrativity could appear problematic only in a culture in which it was absent' (White, 1987:1). Hayden White sees narratives as a way to 'fashioning human experience into a form assimilable to structures of meaning that are generally human' (White, 1987:1; my cursive). For Jerome Bruner narratives are a principle through which 'people organize their experience in, knowledge about, and transactions with the social world' (1990:35). Catherine K. Riessman notes simply and powerfully that story-telling is 'what we do to create order' (1993:1).

In reviewing contemporary problems of knowledge and information, Lyotard compared and contrasted narrative knowledge to scientific knowledge. For him narration is a kind of rationality, the 'quintessential form of traditional knowledge' (Lyotard, 1984:19). Contrary to scientific knowledge which is concerned with speaking the truth about a referent in verifiable or falsifiable statements, narratives allow the societies in which they grow to define 'criteria of competence' and to evaluate that competence (or in White's terms narratives moralize the world); they appear in a 'web of forms' with multiple functions; their transmission is often governed by rules and rights of telling and hearing, and they have rhythm (ibid. 19-22). The same comparison was later taken up by Jerome Bruner, who reminded us that we do not learn about social worlds by growing up as 'little logicians or mathematicians' (Bruner, 1991:4). Bruner distinguishes several features as the defining traits of narrative rationality, among them: diachronicity as it is an account of events over time, canonicity and breach of the canonical which warrant tellability; referentiality understood in terms of verisimilitude and readability; genericness or the recognizable kinds of narrative; normativeness as a breach presupposes a norm; and context sensitivity and negotiability (1991: 4-18).
Socio-narratology and (national) identity

The key theme in all views on narrative is that narratives construct (social) orders. Events, be they political, historical or fictional, acquire meaning through their connection to other events in a timeline through a theme (Polkinghorne, 1988). This key theme is the plot, where the end often explains the logical connections between episodes. Ordering takes place, Polkinghorne notes, because diverse events and elements are linked in a temporal line and their meanings are acquired through emplotment. Switching languages between narratology and discourse theories, the narratological concept of emplotment bears a remarkable similarity to discourse, where the plot would be the ‘empty’ signifier or ‘nodal point’ knotting the web of meanings into a system.

Indeed, although postmodernism is taken to mean the demise of metanarratives, the analysis of social narratives has bloomed in the social sciences, being called already the narrative turn (Lytard, 1984; Hinchman & Hinchman, 1997). This is partly as consequence of the linguistic turn and of post-structuralism in narratology, which provoked a major expansion of the scope of objects for narrative analysis (Currie, 1998). Moreover, even poststructuralist theories of discourse are starting to claim that rather than proclaiming the end of metanarratives we should think of them differently. Thus, there has been widespread interest in the narratives and metanarratives of history (White, 1987), sociology (Mumby, 1993; Plummer, 1995; among very many others) economics (McCloskey, 1985), feminism and gender (Davis, 1989), organizations (Czarniawska, 1998) or even science (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984). Within the field of politics, Walter Fisher proclaimed the narrative turn (1987) and narratives have been studied in social movements’ research (Andrews, 2002; Davis, 2002; Polletta, 1998), and nationalism (Mottier, 2000; Campbell, 1998, Bhabha 1990).

From a post-structural socio-narratology perspective (Currie, 1998), the relevance of the narrative form for human identity and understanding is also emphasized. However, rather than seeing narratives as somehow corresponding to, developing or perhaps
articulating a given 'pre-narrative identity', narratives are seen as an intrinsic social and political act which creates orders out of 'chaos'—disordered worlds (Hinchman and Hinchman, 1997; White, 1987). Narratives, however, are not mere fictions, inventions product of the imagination but political and ideological practices which are real and material. In Currie's words narratives are 'as much part of the material texture of reality as bombs and factories, wars and revolutions' (Currie, 1998:90). Besides, contrary to the rigidities of structuralism, and similarly to theories of discourse, socio-narratology stresses that the (social and political) orders built in narratives are always contingent and precarious, they might fail.

From a social sciences perspective, the discursive turn allows us to think of narratives as social representational practices and their performative nature (Austin, 1962). Narratives are also seen as not just expressing pre-given, natural identities in a mirror-like fashion, but functioning as speech acts which bring into being that which they name (ibid.; Mottier, 2000). In other words, narratives—as part of discourses—are about the world, but in their processes of representation they also build the world (Wetherell, 2001). Narratives are practices which both enact and perform the nation, accomplishing different functions (Davis, 2002; Atkinson and Coffey, 1996). Discourses, even though wider in scope than narratives, are reproduced and transformed to a great extent through individual and collective narratives which are practices that have effects on the social. One of the most important consequences of these conceptualisations is that narratives are seen now as the bases of identity and pathways to understanding culture. In Ken Plummer's words narratives are 'the key to creating communities' (Plummer, 1995:18). Key among the community created in narratives is the nation.

The study which undoubtedly brought this point to stark relief was Homi Bhabha's 'Nation and Narration'. Written in the field of post colonial criticism, Bhabha took Anderson's idea of the relevance of the novel in the imagination of the nation. Locating the nation as half way between a thing and an idea, he stressed is character as a strategy of totalization and structure of exclusion: any attempt to define it will necessarily marginalize those who are not seen as representative of whichever the
'nation' stands for (Bhabha, 1990). His edited volume explores the relation of nationhood and realist narrative and tries to dismantle the narrative homogenization of national time—telling a single story of a single thing—which 'smuggles' an origin and constructs the myth of a continuous community. Instead he calls for a 'double time': the attention to the tensions between nationalisms' 'pedagogical efforts' and their living present (Currie, 1998:93).

_Citationality and iterability: (re)producing nationhood_

Here and in the next section I would like to take up two important ideas about narratives deployed in the thesis. One is that the performative character of national narratives should be better seen within Judith Butler's concept of performativity, that is, as citation and iteration (Butler, 1990, 1993, 1997). The other is the role of power and narratives, the political deployment of counter-narratives as the power to resist and oppose.

'Everyone can, should, will 'have' a nationality, as he or she 'has' a gender' says Anderson (1983:5). I bring up this quote comparing nationality and gender as it is somewhat prescient of this discussion on performativity. Judith Butler's conception of performativity arose out of her deconstruction of gender identity in Gender Trouble (Butler, 1990). Butler took trouble with the essentialist construction of the category 'woman' as the necessary identity for feminist politics and 'the gender categories that support gender hierarchy and compulsory heterosexuality' (Butler, 1990: x-xi). Instead, she suggested that the categories of gender and sex are regulatory practices, norms instituted as result of what one does rather that what one is (ibid.; Culler, 2007:157). Gender identity is a constitutive effect of our practices, a performance. The notion of performance is refined in later writings, where she rejects the theatrical connotations of performance and the criticism of seeing 'gender as a choice' and stresses instead the notion of 'performativity'. Performativity 'must be understood not as a singular and deliberate act, but rather as the reiterative and citational practice by which discourse produces the effects that it names' (Butler, 1993: 2).
The key difference is that borrowing from Derrida Butler shifts Austin’s notion of ‘speech act’ from a single ‘sovereign’ and all-capable act of institution commanded by a subject, into ‘citationality’: a repetition and iteration of norms where the subject itself emerges. Gender/sex become a social construct – where construction is ‘a process of reiteration where by which both subjects and acts come to appear’ (Butler, 1993:9) – in which the very materiality of bodies is the effect of power, of regulatory norms, and performativity is understood as the ‘reiterative power of discourse to produce the phenomena that it regulates and constrains’ (Butler, 1993:2). In her emphasis on the importance of repetition of norms in producing performative effects Butler, Culler says, takes up a model of authoritative speech (2007:159). But, contrary to Austin, authority is not taken for granted as residing in the position of the subject (such as a judge or any other authority) but in the repetition itself: citation helps create authority9 (ibid.). In this sense, citation is also linked to Bakhtin’s notions of intertextuality and accent, in that instances of speech always echo similar ones in other times / contexts (Bakhtin, 1981).

Are national identity and nationality really equivalent to gender? It seems from a discursive perspective that the answer is a positive one. But, can we say that the power of citation and iteration of national norms writes the nation on the body, producing the body, as gender / sex categories produce gendered subjects? The nation as discourse and regulatory ideal can be seen as establishing norms that regulate in myriad ways our day to day living, who we are and who does not belong to ‘us’ often interpellating us in almost invisible ways – as Billig described in Banal Nationalism (Billig, 1995). Seeing it at a bodily level (as typically heard ‘s/he looks Welsh’) points to the connection between nationalism and racism. Nevertheless, the important idea to take from Butler’s concept of performativity is her insistence on citation and iteration.

Many social scientists already understand narratives as performatives. Atkinson and Delamont dedicated one of their four volume collection on narrative methods to ‘performance’ (Atkinson and Delamont, 2006b). In fact Atkinson and Delamont talk of a convergence between the ‘narrative’ and ‘performative’ turns (2006b: xxxv). However, most sociological and anthropological studies tend to rely on either Austin’s
notion of speech act or on sociological, 'theatrical' versions of the concept of 'performative' following the pioneering work of Goffman. This is partly because most studies are concerned with the study not of collective narratives but with individually produced or even singular ones. The idea of 'generic' narratives in Baynham conveys the notion of a singular narrative which relates a sequence of events which happen repeatedly over time (Baynham, 2005:16). Although genericness can be seen as a mechanism of citationality and the conveying of norms—in fact conveying typicality—it does not necessarily capture the idea of massive social repetition of narratives and norms which performativity does.

National narratives, we noted above, are social and political practices which build the nation, but they do not do so at one stroke or from a necessary a priori position of authority, but from their incessant repetition in which norms and authority are themselves created. This allows us a way to think of subversion and resistance to power, in this case to the nation-state, through the telling of oppositional stories or counter-narratives (Delgado, 1988-1989; Andrews, 2002).

Counter-narratives of the nation

Narratives, Hinchman and Hinchman remarked, 'emphasize the active, self-shaping quality of human thought, the power of stories to create and refashion [...] identity' (Hinchman and Hinchman, 2001). Telling 'our' story is always bound up with issues of power and questions of domination (Bennet and Royle, 1995). By 'telling their own story' groups select key events which they consider characterise them, leaving out others which might serve to question, for instance, the unity or coherence of their project. Events are organised according to the formal principles of a narrative. That is, stories do not simply mirror reality but 'involve selectivity, rearranging of elements, redescription and simplification' (Hinchman & Hinchman, 1997: xvi). Groups tell their version of reality by creating particular meanings through the way these events are linked among themselves—are emplotted—in a time and story-line.
Their connections and meanings, however, are not just invented or created out of thin air. Stories are grounded, Plummer says, in 'historically evolving communities of memory structured through age, class, gender' (Plummer, 1995: 22). That is, stories derive from accumulated dynamic social use in particular social contexts and historical conjunctures, from a dialogue and struggle with other (dominant) stories past and present, and with different purposes (Bakhtin, 2000).

Stories, then, are multiple and indexical. There are always competing stories in a dialogue (Bakhtin, 2000) which attempt to hegemonize the constitutive narrations of the nation. Nevertheless, not all social groups are equally able to tell their own story and even less to achieve ideological hegemony. Stories are, thus, sites of struggles and of difference (Vološinov, 1973). They are places where 'values and preconceptions, beliefs and prejudices, knowledge and social structure may be produced and transformed' (Bennet and Royle, 1995). Powerful groups’ hegemonizing stories will be de-contested and imposed as the common sense of a particular society, its ideology, while others struggle ‘to be heard’ (Plummer, 1995). There is a political economy of storytelling.

If telling a story is to exercise power (Chambers 1984 quoted in Bennett and Royle, 1995), then, stories are social weapons. And they are particularly useful ones for the constitution and maintenance of counter-identities (Andrews, 2002; Davis 2002, Polletta, 1998). Of course, similarly to social movements, (oppositional) nationalist groups 'do more than tell stories’ (Polletta, 1991:420). However, stories have also been widely used as oppositional practices: as practices of resistance used by the weak against the dominant. In the language of discourse theory stories can be seen as 'practico-theoretical efforts to modify the discursive field and deliberately open up political opportunities' (Bastow and Martin, 2005: 219).

Counter-narratives are always in a struggle with dominant master narratives. They work to expose the dominant stories' hidden boundaries, exclusions and hierarchies (Delgado, 1988-89) and aim to transform reality. Besides, narrative power might even be one of the few strategies left for subaltern groups, those who are dispossessed: at
the margins of the dominant nation, with no control of any ‘traditional’ centre of power (means of production, state apparatuses or alternative formal or informal power conduits). This is due to stories’ narrative power or ‘narrativity’: they grip us, keep us listening or reading, and interpellate us. Thus, they can constitute a means for resistance.

Narrativity tends to be based on the cultural readability or plausibility of a story, relying on well-known ways of emplotment (Czarniawska, 2005; Polletta 1998, Bennett and Royle 1995; White 1987). In the language of discourse theory, narrative power relies on the way stories are grounded on familiar discourses, articulating familiar elements around the key nodal point. Moreover, narrativity is also based on the gaps left by stories. Through their narratives subaltern groups bring alternative 'histories' into being which defy the master narratives or their time.

1.4. Literature on Galician nationalism: a critical note.

I draw extensively and engage critically with the literature on Galician nationalism in the body of this study, hence here I would only to bring up a few general traits relevant to the topic of the thesis which tend to characterize most of the accounts. This literature, mainly historical and political accounts of the origins and developments of nationalism and nationalist parties, is taken as a point of departure for the investigation of national narratives (Barreiro Rivas, 2003; Beramendi, 2007; Beramendi and Seixas, 1995; Beramendi and Mái 1991; Fernández Baz, 2003; Mái, 2001, 1984; Núñez Seixas, 2007, 2001b, 1994).

First of all, the character of the Galician movement in the 1970s as nationalist has not been seriously questioned. There is a certain neglect of the specificity of the ideological form which the movement took. As a result of that, even though the ‘break’ after the civil war and the ‘novelty’ of a Marxist nationalism is consistently noted (Núñez Seixas, 2007, 2001b; Beramendi, 2007; Mái, 2001), the contemporary movement is implicitly or explicitly plotted as the last moment in a timeline which
starts and descends—with notable hiccups nonetheless—from the provincialismo in the 1840s (Barreiro Rivas, 2003; Beramendi, 2007). As its nationalist character is established by definitional fiat, their Marxist language is seen often as no more than a superficial twitch.

Secondly, but related to this, the discourse of colonialism has not been examined in depth. Colonialism has been recognized as the underpinning of many practices of the movement. It is even commonly noted that nationalism in Galicia today still needs to ‘grapple’ with that past as this has supposedly never been done—even though I argue in this study, grappling with colonialism is precisely what nationalism did incessantly. Part of the problem is that, after the blank years of the dictatorship, there is still plenty of research to be done. As it is understandable and necessary, most studies of Galician nationalism had focused on pre-civil war nationalism. When contemporary nationalism is examined, it tends to be done as useful but general overview articles comprising two or three decades, which struggle to examine any epoch in detail or as the hurried last chapter of monographs telling the ‘full’ history of the nationalist movement in Galicia. The monographs dealing with particular times such as, for instance, Rubiralta Casas (1998) or Fernández Baz (2003) deal with the period just before the apogee of colonialism (1959-1974) or just after (1981-1982). The only study of nationalism as discourse is a contemporary analysis of the views of a few nationalists in the 1990s (Cabrera Varela, 1992). Cabrera’s study is affected by a reliance on a qualitative data collection method—twelve in depth interviews with key representatives of nationalism—which is later analysed largely in a quantitatively (and structuralist) manner. Although there is a wealth of short studies examining the international connections of the UPG in the 1970s and other specific themes, these are only partial studies.

The Marxism of the movement, the narratives of colonialism and their ultimate failure tend to be assessed within the framework of a ‘super-offer’ type of explanation (Beramendi, 2007; Máliz, 1996; 2001). That is, it is argued that nationalisms’ demands were characterized by being too radical, and therefore these ‘non podía ser asumida polo electorado, a pesar de que os inquéritos sociolóxicos dende a transición mostran
que o sentimento do que poderiamos chamar ‘identidade galega’ esta presente de forma notable en Galicia’ (Beramendi and Seixas, 1995: 253). There are several problems with this common explanation. Mainly it assumes the failure of nationalism to be a matter of degrees of radicalism (of an essentially correct position). Had nationalism made more moderate claims, it is implied, they would have succeeded as there was a ‘sentiment’ of Galicianness in the population. Implicitly then, it essentialises the Galician population as ‘conservative’ or ‘moderate’ as well as it establishes a link between a diffuse sentiment of identity and support for nationalism. It is difficult to understand, then, how in the first regional elections it was the radical nationalism not the moderate one which obtained relatively better results (or how present day very moderate nationalism keeps losing votes). Besides the ‘super-offer’ explanation, a common way to deal with the radicalism of the movement is to establish a clear divide between institutional and ideological practices. This divide prevents the examination of the interrelation between ideology and practices, as if what nationalism did, in parliament or in the streets, could be neatly disassociated from what they said and the stories they narrated. However, the material practices of the movement can hardly be understood without an examination of their language and their embedded-ness in stories and accounts. As historian Stedman-Jones clearly explained as regards explanations of the Chartist movement:

"An analysis of [a group's] ideology must start from what [a group] actually said or wrote, the terms in which they addressed each other or their opponents. It cannot simply be inferred — with the aid of decontextualized quotation— from the supposed exigencies, however plausible, of the material situation of a particular class or social group. Nor is it adequate, as an alternative, to adopt a more subjective approach and to treat [the group's] language as a more or less immediate rendition of experience into words. [...] It is argued that if the interpretation of language and politics is freed from a priori social inferences, it then becomes possible to establish a far closer and more precise relationship between ideology and activity than it is conveyed in the standard picture of the movement. [...]It is not a question of replacing a social interpretation by a linguistic interpretation, but rather it is how the two relate that must be rethought.” (1983:94-95)
1.5. Conclusion.

This chapter has mapped the shifts in the theories and conception of nation and nationalism. It has briefly presented the main challenge to the modernist paradigm in the form of socio-constructivist and post-structuralist theories of national identity as discourse and narrative. These ideas serve to locate the thesis and as a succinct introduction and discussion of concepts which will be drawn upon in the data chapters.
Methodology: a natural history of the thesis.

2.1. Introduction

This chapter discusses the methodological decisions which underpin the research presented in the following chapters containing the data used. I have called it a ‘natural history’, following Silverman, as this term combines a representation of ‘what actually happened’ in this study with a discussion of the particular theoretical and practical questions concerning method within discourse analysis, qualitative research and my case (Silverman, 2010). Each section includes descriptive details of how the research was conducted and developed together with a concise discussion of associated methodological and theoretical issues. My aim is not to provide a comprehensive account of the discourse, narrative analysis or qualitative research used, but to highlight the key issues that arise when applying them to the research of a nationalist movement which involves also a historical dimension.

2.2. Research Questions and Methodology.

Contrary to the canonical ‘lineal model’ conception of research design (Burnham et al., 2004), within qualitative research —the methodology in which this thesis is squarely inscribed— the choices of interpretive paradigm, theory, design, data, and analytic strategy are not isolated or consecutive but ‘knit together’, iterative decisions (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). Indeed, even though the choice of methodology should be attuned to the kind of questions we set out to investigate; it is generally acknowledged in qualitative and discursive approaches that methodological issues cannot be separated
from theoretical assumptions. In what follows, my research questions, theoretical and methodological choices can be seen to be intricately bound.

Research topic and questions

The choice of topic for my thesis stemmed from my MSc research dealing with minority nationalisms and the process of European integration, with a focus on the case of Galicia. While researching Galician nationalism I was intrigued by its participants’ strong, but shifting, identity related claims to both Marxism and nationalism. Despite the fact that a difficult relation or even incompatibility between Marxist and nationalist principles has been well established among both Marxist and non-Marxist scholars\(^\text{10}\) (Nairn, 1977; Anderson, 1983; Nimni, 1991; Löwi, 1998; etc.), participants of the nationalist movement did not seem to perceive it: ‘what contradiction?’ I often heard. As organizational sociologist Barbara Czarniawska notes, if an actor does not regard something as a contradiction and we do, then ‘it is our task to see how this is possible’ (1997:177).

I started then to ‘problematisе’ this question in a double sense. I found the dominant academic stories of nationalism told during the 1980s and 1990s problematic. These established a norm of the ‘good or correct’ nationalism and encouraged their audience to see alternative ‘performances’ of the ‘script’ as ‘incompetent performances’ or deviant cases\(^\text{11}\). Thus, it seemed to me that we were asking the wrong questions, and that a new model or story that allowed us to take fresh account of national identity and its processes of continuity and change was needed. Nevertheless, I also problematised the apparent coherence and seamlessness of the stories told by nationalists. Marxism and nationalism do manifest conflicting ways of structuring the social.

Hence, I decided to use a post-structural discursive framework as it is the emergent story that provided me with the assumptions, language and methodological tools to ask questions different to those concerning the origins and nature of ‘nations’ –
typically 'what is the nation?'— and to understand identity in its full complexity, as an (unfinished) process rather than an accomplished fact (Hall, 1996a). It allows me to see nationalism in a dynamic way as the discursive approach to nationalism places emphasis on exploring the connections between political identities, power and politics (Mottier, 2000). This framework has been steadily used in an increasing number of studies of nationalism concerned with diverse facets of the phenomena since the 1990s.12

My research questions became, then, geared towards examining the negotiation of Marxist and nationalist identities within the Galician movement. I meant to explore this negotiation by gaining an understanding of the specificity and variability of discourses and narrative practices in relation to the constitution of the political community and collective self set in place by the Galician movement, attending to their conditions of possibility, change and their political consequences. How do nationalists construct 'being nationalist' and 'being Marxist'? However, rather than taking these 'Marxist and nationalist' identities for granted, I decided to take a (analytical) step back in order to take a closer look at the movement. Asking: how is the political community discursively constructed and performed? What stories did nationalists tell? How are masternarratives articulated in discourse? Which ones take pre-eminence? When? What are the political effects of storytelling practices? My questions continued to be modified as I analysed my data and my focus started to move in the direction of narratives as meaning-making devices and political practices.

This step back allowed me to keep an open mind and remain alert to other possible ways in which nationhood and nationalism might have been built. The questions are also attuned to the discourse theoretical problem driven approach and to its focus on understanding and interpreting socially produced meanings, with an emphasis on asking how questions, as opposed to retrieving causal accounts to be empirically tested and confirmed or to retrieving the true underlying meanings of texts / actions (Howarth, 2000; 2005; Fairclough, 2001). In a similar way to Norval who, in her study of apartheid, 'rather than trying to penetrate below the surface [of apartheid]' took as its object of investigation the discourse itself in 'its multifarious practices and rituals', I
examine here the ‘surface’ of the discourse of nationalism (Norval, quoted in Howarth 2000:136). The distinctiveness of this discursive study resides, nevertheless, in its specific attention to the discourse’s narrative and storied dimension and practices, through which a certain sense of reality and understanding of society were constituted, performed, normalized, maintained and changed.

*Discourse and qualitative research: assumptions & underpinnings*

Ideas about how the world works, what people are like and others of a similar ilk are, then, already drawn upon and consolidated when asking questions within a qualitative methodology and interpretative approach to politics and they impinge on our research practices. Qualitative methodology is nevertheless plural, and as major commentators have noted, it has in recent years expanded, diversified and fragmented (Atkinson and Delamont, 2005). Theories of discourse and discourse analysis are among the different socio-constructivist approaches, research and analytical strategies which have had a great impact within the branches of qualitative research which embody such ideas. They originated within a philosophical paradigm shift in the twentieth century – the linguistic turn— when language ceased to be considered a transparent medium with a cognitive function and began to be thought of as social action constitutive of reality (Austin 1962). Moreover, language has also come to be seen as a material practice (Eagleton, 1995; Vološinov, 1979).

Social actions are, in turn, conceptualised as discursive. This is so because discourse is understood broadly as the study of 'human meaning-making'. Although there are many definitions of discourse—it is an umbrella term which refers to a variety of theoretical positions and analytical approaches— within post-structuralism it is commonly understood as not being simply a linguistic concept. Instead discourse is about language and practice (Hall, 2001). For Stuart Hall discourse is a system of representation which ‘comprises the languages, concepts, categories, imaginary of thought and practices put forward by groups to make sense of the way in which society works’ (Hall, 1996, my cursive). Foucault’s concept of dispositif would be very
close to this idea of discourse. The social space as a whole is seen as a 'vast argumentative texture through which people construct their reality' (Laclau, 1993:341). This inclusive understanding of discourse amounts to insisting that people attribute meanings to objects and practices, and do so always from inside of socially constructed frameworks of intelligibility\(^{14}\). Social actions are discursive as they are meaningful, that is, organized by human values, norms and 'representations of human needs and aesthetics' (Wetherell 2001).

The bottom line is a much fuzzier boundary between language, now seen as a material, social and constructive practice, and other social practices which are shaped and apprehended through systems of accounts and narrations. Accounts and narratives are social actions, as they are enacted and have a performative character. Conversely, actions and events are only intelligible because they can be narrated and talked about. Hence, Atkinson, Coffey and Delamont suggest that in qualitative research we should try to avoid the stark dualism between 'what people do' (as authentic) and 'what people say' (as fallible) as these are different types of social action (2003:106).

Assumptions about the world translate to assumptions about methods of undertaking research. To conceptualise 'what people say' and 'what they do' as different but enmeshed types of social action translates, in a research focus, into the social and political work done through them. As my research questions illustrate, discursive approaches regard 'discourse' itself as the focus of interest, rather than being treated as a resource to unearth 'information' about a particular topic. Besides, as Gilbert and Mulkay showed in their research on scientist repertoires, discursive variability is appreciated and examined instead of being seen as an anomaly the researcher has to eliminate in order to provide a coherent explanation (Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984).

*Research strategy: a case study.*

In terms of strategy, the thesis is an in-depth study of one case: the discourse—the stories and narratives of nationhood— of Galician nationalism. The choice for case
study research is consistent with the epistemological assumptions of the post-structural discursive theories and qualitative methodology that underpin the study. As David Howarth notes, most of the empirical research using discourse theory is case based. If case study research has sometimes been considered a 'limited tool' for research among some social scientists, it is an appropriate strategy in discourse theoretical research for epistemological as well as pragmatic reasons (Howarth, 2005: 329).

Criticism of case studies is generally based on the idea that they do not provide researchers with 'information' which is amenable to devising generalizations or to theory building. Nevertheless, the assumptions behind these ideas—that we ought to devise universal (context-independent) explanatory theories and generalisations—are not shared by discourse analysis nor by many other qualitative approaches, such as ethnography, nor approaches informed by the 'linguistic' or 'argumentative turn'. Instead, case studies are valued because they provide specific, contextual and well grounded, in-depth knowledge. The aim is akin to providing 'thick description' which tries to illuminate the overdetermined character of political practices, their multiple frames of reference and perspectives (Geertz, 1973). This is a more appropriate way for furthering understanding and for interpreting and explicating socially produced meanings and realities—which are explications of explications—which is the overall objective of interpretive and discourse theory (Bevir and Rhodes, 2006; Howarth 2000: 128).

The choice of Galicia was an obvious one as my curiosity about processes of identity formation had been aroused by previous research on this particular case. My familiarity with it also contributed to my choice for the simple reason that it would facilitate the research process. However, if I were to decide on this case it was because I was convinced that its value went much further than just that. I think it has an exemplary status as it brings insights into processes common to other nationalisms and social movements on the construction, maintenance and transformation of identity and its effects, offering a clear opportunity and potential for deep learning regarding nationalist ideology (Stake, 2000). Thus, my interest in the case is a
combination of its intrinsic value –through a thick description of nationalism and Marxism in Galicia— and an instrumental value—as Galician nationalism provides a means to further understanding processes common to many other nationalist movements (ibid.). Although my intention was not to trade in sweeping generalisations, I agree with Denzin and Lincoln when they suggest that no individual case is ever really just individual (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). This case was interesting because it points to the complexity of nationalism as ‘lived-ideology’.

More pragmatically, the case also made sense in terms of my personal, biographical experience. Being Galician, the case offers advantages for research as I am fluent in the Galician language. As fluency and ability to understand the nuances of the language in which research is conducted are indispensable requirements in order to implement a discursive/narrative analysis, the advantage was undeniable. Nevertheless, as I was to realise later on, being Galician was a double-edged sword. Difficulties arose when being viewed with characteristic suspicion at times in the field—as I explain later on. Moreover, the topic of the study was my own ‘national identity’ and I was unaware of how deeply entrenched some of the more ‘banal’ claims of nationalism and nationhood were in myself, even when I have always prided myself on having a critical outlook. I was native rather than ‘going native’, and the issue was not how to achieve familiarity with the case, but rather how to de-familiarise myself with it. Living and working many miles away in the setting of a British university was key to providing me with the necessary distance.

2.3 On data: collection methods, process, results and limits.

In trying to examine the discursive construction of national identity since the early 1970s I had to collect data appropriate to the study of discourses from the appropriate settings and sources. In a study with a historical dimension such as this archival research was the obvious choice. I navigated through the difficulties of composing it with the aid of narrative interviews. Later on, as I started to examine it, I realised my data had provided me with a goldmine of narratives.
Composing an ‘archive’

Although in discourse an ‘archive’ has a double meaning, in my case these ended up coinciding. In qualitative research an archive refers to a method of data collection based on the examination of documentary data often stored in large quantities in the same physical setting. In looking for discourses, however, Foucault defined an archive as the system of statements which formed ‘the law of what can be said, the system that governs the appearance of statements as unique events, ...which determines that all things said...are grouped together in distinct figures, composed together in accordance with multiple relations, maintained or blurred in accordance with specific regularities...’ (1969:145-146). These systems of statements are not necessarily ‘neatly packaged’ in particular settings, sites, nor fully embodied by determinate people or encapsulated in specific data forms –they can involve texts, a variety of artefacts, images and so on as appropriate data sets.

However, in my case—a minority nationalism which spent two thirds of its existence as an opposition movement with limited resources, very little access to institutions and ideological apparatuses— I found that the easiest way of getting at these groups’ discourses on collective identity was looking at their written words, the textual production of organised political sites. As Coffey and Atkinson explain, documentary data are key ways that groups and organizations have to represent themselves collectively to themselves and to wider audiences (1997: 45). The written documents produced by nationalists over the years also presented the advantage of being attuned to a discourse analytical ideal of ‘naturalness’, understood as using data which remains as uninfluenced by the researcher as possible (Taylor, 2001).

Besides, in order to investigate nationalist discourse over many decades, the use of documents saved me from dealing with issues of memory and ‘retrospective rationalizations’, which would have been an issue had I opted for interviews (Howarth, 2005). By collecting documents of the movement written since 1972 I had ‘direct’ access to discourses and narratives as they were produced, offering a rich source of self-representations as they were at the time of production, in which the political and
social contexts of the different political conjunctures was inscribed in the texts. As Homi Bhabha says ‘to encounter the nation as it is written displays a temporality of culture and social consciousness more in tune with the partial, overdetermined process by which textual meaning is produced through the articulation of difference in language’ (Bhabha, 1990:2). In other words, textual data helped me track the temporality and historicity of the discourse and stories of nationalism, seeing them as the partial results of dialogues (or struggles) with different others.

I sampled documentary materials through a combination of representativeness, choosing the key sites producing the discourses compounded later by trying to be exhaustive, to illuminate particular periods and ‘emblematic issues’ (Hajer, 1995). Although the movement comprised an important array of sites, it was soon apparent which ones could be producers of the systems of statements I was looking for. Initially, I read relevant secondary literature to become familiar with the groups and documents I should be looking for on the ground. I gathered documents mainly at the University of Santiago’s newspaper library in the Biblioteca Xeral, the party archives of the UPG and the Penzol archive. The BNG’s Fundación Galicia Sempre also helped me gather documents. Access to these sites was not an issue as I was allowed as part of my rights as a visiting researcher. A family friend—at the time a relevant ‘young’ member of the UPG who later occupied a high position in the PSOE-BNG coalition government—aided my access to the UPG archives. Nevertheless, even though I was allowed full access, and helpfully provided with copies, to all public documents, access was partially restricted to non-public documents (mainly the internal communications bulletin ‘Canle’).

My preliminary explorations revealed a variety of documentary data from parties, social and cultural associations and platforms, newspapers (such as *La Voz de Galicia* or *A Nosa Terra*) and magazines (*Tempos Novos*, *Grial*, etc). Political conditions may constrain particular events and stories from being narrated (Riessman, 1993), and initially I expected the written production of nationalists during their clandestine years to be sparse. A dictatorship is a political order in which there is only one possible narrative to be, lawfully, told. Dissent was explicitly prohibited and punished in Spain.
from 1939 and for decades nationalists who were other than Spanish were silenced. By 1964, however, economic, social and political conditions had changed enough to make this the starting point of the new stories told by contemporary Galician radical movements. Then, I found there was no shortage of storied production, quite the opposite: a bewildering array of types of texts that came from a bewildering diversity of small groups. This was, paradoxically, the first obstacle I found as I faced the worry of my choices on what/how much data to select might influence findings and be detrimental to reliability.

I had to narrow my data down, so I decided to rely on party periodicals and documents as it became clear that parties and their active members were the ‘founders of discursivity’ in the movement (Foucault, 1984:114). Also, there were strong hierarchical, top-down links between the parties and the myriad social organizations forming the movement, often described as the ‘transmission-belt’ for the parties in the literature. They were also the more stable sites; the UPG is in fact the only site which has had an uninterrupted existence since 1964. Thus, I focused on the public political language produced by the party political sites.

As a result, I do not claim that the study reflects the entirety of the language, narratives and strategies which the movement has deployed and performed. No doubt there is still public and private language and discourse used by the movement and organizations which remain to be examined and which contain their own specificities and bring to the fore different facets. In spite of the transmission-belt label, other sites had a life and dynamic of their own –this is particularly the case of the trade unions and green activism. However, I would suggest that even with their differences in emphasis and context—which might have produced different themes and subplots—they would all have been enmeshed in the story-lines and general strategies I describe in the data chapters.

Initially, I thought only having access to public data was a drawback. However, I soon realised that if it was, it was certainly only a minor one. It is to my advantage that discourse analysis does not try to get to the thoughts or motives of actors, their hidden
intentions or secret plans. Because of this, it became transparent that I had to concentrate on the ‘surface’: the movements’ representations of themselves and the country to themselves and significant others. The party magazines and congresses, actually any public documents, were ideal for these purposes. Ole Weaver and other analysts of discourse as well as historians such as Steadman-Jones have stressed the validity of this strategy (Waever, 2005; Stedman-Jones, 1983).

Composing my corpus was nevertheless a slow and painstaking process, reading and re-reading the documents, while photocopying and taking notes as appropriate, that lasted for around six months. Copying texts was necessary as I would need the originals to proceed later to a detailed (or micro) discursive analysis of some of them, when away from the field. This lengthy examination and familiarisation with an ample body of texts in order to build a corpus of data is quite common when looking at discourses from a post-structural, Foucauldian genealogical research standpoint (Carabine 2001; Howarth, 2000).

However, having narrowed down the number of sites, I was still looking at a variety of documents which spanned almost thirty years. I needed a clear focus which would allow me to attend to processes of identity formation and change whilst selecting further material. I decided that in order to effectively examine processes of identity formation or dissolution I should zoom in on the textual production at key moments of crisis and around emblematic issues (Hajer, 1995). The task was to identify these. Again, secondary literature was useful for this purpose, but I also decided to conduct some interviews with key actors as I was interested in obtaining an insiders’ insight. Thus, I carried out five exploratory unstructured interviews, each lasting around one and half hours, with actors chosen through a stratified purposive sampling.

This was the type of interview best suited for my purposes: firstly, examining the participants own accounts as to moments of crisis, when and why they had happened; secondly, and more generally, identifying analytical questions, picking up promising themes and leads that I could bring to bear or integrate, at the analytical stage, on the documents. In other words, I meant to use what has been called a ‘following the
thread’ type of approach to integrating different data modes (Moran-Ellis et al., 2006). This means that each data is analysed appropriately to find promising analytical questions—‘contributing data and findings from its own epistemological frame’—that may be ‘picked’ and followed through other data sets. (2006:3). This is important as within qualitative research different methods and data modes are not seen as simply adding up to a ‘fuller picture’ of reality, but as revealing different facets of the topic under study (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996).

Introduction to the data

I collected party periodicals, texts of congresses, pamphlets and key oeuvres. Not simply choosing the particular sections which had seemed to be more relevant, such as editorialis, I collected and later examined to different degrees each whole issue and text. The reason was to preserve their micro-context (Riessman, 2008). This context puts every theme, narrative and tale in relation to a whole, and is invaluable in discerning which stories were relevant (and how relevant) and the intertextual relations in different periods, adding reliability to the study. Below there is a general description of the most salient characteristics of the key data I collected:

Terra e Tempo (‘Land and Time’; henceforth T&T)

Audience: the UPG militancy, the radical movement, the wider public to a limited extent.

I collected all the issues between 1964 and 1998—with the exception of one missing issue in 1984. T&T was the voice of the central committee of the Unión do Pobo Galego (UPG) which had the rights of telling in the party. It was written by a group commissioned from the secretariat of the central committee. The second congress in 1979 informs us of its aims: ‘the party information.. must have as its key objective [to obtain people’s] adhesion and identification [with the party] on the basis of education, that is on the basis of [our] analysis and interpretations of particular political issues or those of a general subject matter, that provoke collective discussion’ (UPG, II congress,
pp 92-93). The distribution objective was ‘the streets and work places, but also at all levels, even commercial distribution’ (ibid.). Articles in T&T were not signed, being presented as the centripetal, authoritative voice /discourse of the UPG as a whole. Its written word aspires to be monological: the dialogues, double-voicedness and heteroglossia within it often take place in spite of the UPG. It tends to present generic narratives, where typicality and iterability are the point, rather than uniqueness (Baynham, 2005). It brims with a particular claim for narrative truth, that of representing not just the experience of the (collective self) but of the community as a whole.

T&T was published without interruption but irregularly: production varied between 3 and 6 or more issues per year initially, increasing sharply during the years of the transition (1975-1980) to a monthly output (with bimonthly issues interspersed). Between issues 84 in 1981 and 85 in 1982 there was a period of ten months silence which marked the end of one stage and the beginning of another. After that, during the 1980s, it was published around four times a year. The magazine set the UPG’s policies and political analysis in the editorial and dedicated most of the remaining space to the treatment of diverse topics, commenting on their own practice and their actuality.

**Galiza Socialista** ('Socialist Galicia'; henceforth GS)

Audience: as with T&T the PSG membership, the wider radical movement and limited social distribution.

I collected all issues of the *Partido Socialista Galego* (PSG) party periodicals between the years 1976 to 1982 –and some later issues in the 1980s whilst being already PSGEG. These issues comprise the second epoch of the PSG until it breaks away from the BNG. GS differs notably from T&T. Being also the voice of the party, this voice is highly heteroglot. The articles are signed (often under a pseudonym) reflecting a recognition of the individual voice as part of but different from the collective self. There are claims to truth and genericness but GS is altogether more dialogized: that is, relativized, aware of competing definitions for the same things, less authoritative. It
often presents modalized assertions and explicitly attributed quotes, which allow a view of different and opposed opinions to those of the party and its membership – hardly ever traceable in T&T. Besides, it often reported dissent and its own failures. T&T and GS were involved in a dialogue-struggle.

**Texts of the UPG Congresses.**

These were the canonical, normative texts of the party. The congresses usually took place every two years, with some extraordinary ones, until the late 1980s when they became more infrequent. The texts present the novelty of being bimodal, both speech and text based. The opening and closing speeches were incorporated into the approved texts. Between 1977 and 1983, comprising the first four congresses, they present the political situation in Galicia and Spain first, dealing later with world issues. This ordering changed from the fifth congress in 1986 onwards where the world, Spain, Galicia and the party’s policies were examined. This shift in topic order is not inconsequential; it reflects the discursive and narrative modulations and shifts in antagonisms. The speeches are a narrative goldmine as they explicitly recount the ‘life-story’ of the party in between congresses (Linde, 1993) They present a similar authoritative and un-dialogized voice to T&T.

**Assembly texts Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG)**

I collected all the BNG assembly texts from 1982 to the early 2000s. The BNG congresses are ‘pastiche’ texts, composed of different data modes (speech and text) stylistic unities, voices and accents. They reflect the plurality of groups and the complex power (in)balances and mechanisms in order to deal with them in the bloc.

Apart from these key data sources, I examined multiple oeuvres of organic intellectuals, co-authored texts, pamphlets, explicative booklets, biographies and DVDs as well as other organizations’ periodicals (ANPG). All this textual production was written in the Galician language —a political act of defiance and conscience raising in itself— presenting multiple orthographic vacillations. Some of these vacillations had clear ideological connotations: ‘Galicia’ in the 1970s will later on become ‘Galiza’. Unfortunately, I did not have access to the PSG’s congressional texts which were
absent from the public archives. I had to rely on private collections to access them. This was unlucky, because pursuing them became difficult, explained by the busy, demanding lives of my interlocutors. However, I realized that GS was all I needed as my corpus was already large and the periodical presented clearly the discourse, narratives and voices of the PSG to the point of saturation.

The reason why I collected materials up to the very late 1990s is that initially I thought of examining three decades of narrative production. As I will explain later on, it soon became obvious, during analysis, that I was obtaining a wealth of rich insights that would be lost had I chosen to expand the period under analysis. Thus, I decided to narrow the thesis down to the examination of one critical conjuncture: the transition to democracy and the construction of identity and its change before and after that. This was also the period when a most clear negotiation of Marxism and nationalism took place; when more creative discourses and practices where set and also one, particularly in the early 1980s, which has been studied less. Moreover, to my mind this is now a critical period as in the recent crisis resulting from losing the elections and government in 2008, it has been the period mythologized as a lost golden age.

2.4. Analysis: a discursive approach to narrative.

One of the momentous moments in this study came when, as I was reading and re-reading my data and starting to be familiar with it, I realised that the texts were incessantly telling stories: about the nation, the parties, the next demonstration or about other groups. This was the case in spite of the relentless claims to authority through science explicitly made in the texts —linked to a particular, Marxist vocabulary of motives (Mills, 1940). The more I read, the more I was aware of the storied nature of the texts. Narratives and stories were the preferred enunciative modality: not reasoning by analogy, deduction, images, statistical calculations or any other form of statement as Foucault had encountered in the discourse of nineteenth century doctors (1969:55). Hence, I decided to focus primarily on the narratives and
storytelling practices of the movement, understanding narratives as part of discourses (Mottier, 2000; Taylor, 2006).

Even if this had not been originally intended, the data, methods and even the research questions not only fitted very well with this focus, but had been conducive to it. The discourse analytic assumptions guiding the questions and data gathering are shared with narrative analysis—besides, the analysis of narratives is also a variegated field within qualitative research where post-structuralism and discourse theory have had a great impact (Atkinson and Delamont, 2006). In my interviews I had decided to ‘warm up’ by asking the interviewees to take a personal look before thinking about crises and ideology shifts, ‘tell me about how you got involved in the movement’, worked well and was an invitation to tell a story23. The study of identity has come to be seen as storytelling. Identities are created not by any action in itself, but by the narratives of self which are their ‘skimmer’, or as Currie says, ‘the only way to tell who we are is to tell our own story’ (Currie, 1998:17; Bruner, 1990; Hall, ). Social movements, Fine says, are ‘bundles of narratives’ (Fine, 2002:229).

I see narratives, then, as social, performative and political practices which contribute to the (re)production and transformation of discursive formations. Narratives are a particular kind of knowledge, rationality and of political practice which discourses entail (Lyotard, 1984; Plummer 1995). As well as being territories of knowledge, they are territories where power is effected (Foucault, 1977). They are also performative and citational practices which thread a thick web of constructions relating to the collective self which might become normative through iteration over time (Butler, 1993). By narrative I mean, in a very general sense, the accounts of events/actions (or a series of them) chronologically connected and evaluated or moralized through a plot (Czarniawska, 2004). Therefore, I am eschewing the contemporary usage of the term where, as Riessman puts it, ‘narrative has come to mean anything beyond a few bullet points’ used by everybody from news broadcasters to researchers as narrative gradually achieves popularity in politics (2008: 4). Contrary to much sociological, literary and narrative analysis my focus is on collective narratives instead of personal, individual tales.
Four analytical steps: highs and lows.

My next hurdle became apparent when deciding how to read systematically the narratives (indeed it began earlier than that, as I explain below). I wanted to use a ‘synthetic’ approach which combined the ‘macro’ discursive perspective characteristic of post-structuralism, with a ‘micro’ reading or close attention to the texts themselves which is often lacking in the former (Wetherell, 1998). Hence, I immersed myself in the literature on narratives, finding sociological and literary perspectives useful as, with exceptions, politics has cared little about the ‘narrative turn’ (Wetherell, 1998). However, the first step was disheartening: if the analysis of discourse is already commonly described as a ‘craft skill’, narrative analysis was referred to as an ‘ample bag of tricks’ (Wood and Kroger, 2000; Czarniawska, 2004). By this, Czarniawska means that narrative analysis does not have a single set of procedures to check the correctness of results (ibid). I had to adapt the concepts and strategies of discourse and narrative research creatively as tools appropriate for achieving my own goals and becoming a ‘bricoleur’, so characteristic of qualitative research (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005).

The first step had been reading and familiarizing myself with the texts, as well as with the transcriptions of the recorded interviews, to get a ‘sense’ of the main ideological themes and plots. Here, another issue soon arose: stories are often blurred, have fuzzy boundaries, or span for issues / years in serial-like types interspersed with non-narrative parts and other embedded tales. Indeed, as Riessman comments, it is generally acknowledged in the human sciences that the researcher ‘does not find narratives but instead participates in their creation’, which holds even for non-interview elicited texts (2008:21).

Nevertheless, I could soon identify and start classifying different types of tales. I identified story-lines and subplots. Among these, stories took different forms. ‘Story-line’ was a useful middle range concept which Maarten Hajer’s Foucauldian inspired analysis of environmental discourse took from Davis and Harré in another attempt at arriving at a ‘synthetic’ approach (Hajer, 1995; Davies and Harré, 1999). It is an
overarching plot, akin to what Foucault calls a discursive sub-group (1969:73). Hajer defines a story-line as ‘a generative sort of narrative which allows actors to draw upon various discourses to give meaning to specific physical or social phenomena’ (Hajer, 1995:57). Different story-lines coalesce to constitute a discursive formation, becoming its ‘sjuzet’: the literary concept which refers to the particular productions of the same play/story. Story-lines resembled in their form Linde’s description of a ‘life story’ in spite of their written character. That is, borrowing Linde’s definition, story-lines consist of ‘all the stories and associated non-storied units’ (such as explanations or chronicles) and ‘the connections between them’ (Linde, 1993:21). Where I differ with Linde is that story-lines were not told by just one group, but as Hajer says they are better seen as inherent in practices rather than groups (ibid.). This long and mixed form became an issue when writing the data in the chapters (particularly in chapters 5 and 8) as it was a complicated process to find the extracts which would encapsulate certain ideas to a readership unfamiliar with the whole story, which spanned documents and multiple issues and could not be presented in their entirety. Hence, I had to rely on plot summaries and trust, which I tried to enhance by presenting multiple extracts.

These overarching plots were densely populated by additional (smaller, partial or sectorial) subplots, not all of them living up to Labov’s canonical form (Labov and Waleztky, 1997). They were often contained in clusters of ‘small tales’—broken, imperfect, not fitting the canonical form (Georgakopoloulou, 2006) such as the stories of the ‘national-popular struggles’—which I do not see as opposed to big stories, but rather as contributing to a story-line’s unity as ‘regularities in dispersion’ (Tannen, 2008; Foucault, 1969). By this time, however, similar to Stanley, who had also applied narrative analysis to a large corpus, I had already abandoned a common neat distinction in the literature between narrative and story as unworkable (Stanley, 2008). Once I had identified story-lines and subplots I searched in the data for every instance of that type of tale. Basic quantitative methods were also useful as a preliminary tool: I counted stories to know which tales appeared more often and which ones were prevalent at particular times. I collected them and read them together.
The third analytical step (although here boundaries are fuzzy) was to look into the structural features of the tales. Labov's classic model of stories worked well to guide me through the functions and constitutive parts of the tales, aware that its de-contextualization of stories posed problems as to their political reading (De Fina, 2000; Whooley, 2006). I compared clusters of tales among themselves in a preliminary form: their orientations, evaluations, and so on which were often suffused throughout the stories, remaining mindful, nevertheless, of Riessman advice not to fracture narratives and lose context, which meant going back and forth between the tales and their parts (Baynham, 2006; Gwyn, 2006; Riessman, 1993). Even if the unpacking of structural features was not my ultimate goal, looking at how the tales were organized helped understand the points made and avoid focusing simply on content (Riessman, 2008). These comparisons gave me an insight into the function the stories were meant to perform. For instance, this strategy helped me see that the world-system stories described in chapter 7 were until 1985-1986 'success stories': whilst the themes of aggression and injustice were overwhelmingly present, their point was that the battle was still and could still be won. Indeed, the second congress of the UPG in 1979 complained that rather than analysis, T&T had been publishing articles that were no more than a 'simple narration with an ideological 'whip' at the beginning, in the middle or in the end most of the time' (UPG, second congress, pp 93). This structure forced the organization's aims without trying to convince and could easily backfire, positioning them as radical and intolerant. This preliminary stage revealed not only which themes were present, but what relevance or how relevant they were (Riessman, 2008: 88).

The steps this far amounted to a concern with the 'manifest level' (Con Davis, 1984): the presence of the nationalists' stories and narratives. Posts-structuralist approaches to identity and narrative insists, however, that the plots/orders built are inherently unstable and ultimately they fail (Currie, 1998). I had realised though that it was relatively easy to switch languages between discourse theory and narrative analysis. Therefore, implementing a double strategy was the next step. In reality, these steps overlapped to a great extent, being just a device to allow me to explain what I did. I had been 'coding' the stories theoretically with the concepts provided by Foucauldian
and Laclau’s theories of discourse. By which I mean I was sorting the stories by analytical/theoretically guided concepts broadly and relying on analytical memos written down in the relevant chunks of text/tales. I used coding software (Atlas.ti25) extensively relying on its ‘memo’ and ‘families’ feature. Having looked for plots I had a good idea of what ‘nodal points’ or ‘discursive strategies’—the narrative means by which a discourse is given meaning and force—were there. My next strategy was to read with an eye not just on plots, tales, ‘objects’ and strategies but on the gaps in the tales, the paradoxes, silences and generally where they failed to make sense—in spite of all efforts. Meanwhile, I had been going back and forth between the texts and secondary literature on the political conjunctures I was examining, in a ‘dialogical’ analytical strategy (Bakhtin, 1981; Riessman, 2008; Whooley, 2006) which located the tales not only in their textual micro-context but also in their local and historical contexts and in the dialogues in which they were enmeshed. This helped me locate the narrative practices in the movement’s wider discursive practices and attend to their ideological effects.

Overall, the main problem I faced was the wealth of information, stories and detail I was generating and how to transmit/transpose this into my writing of the chapters. I was frustrated at leaving interesting detail aside, and worried that having produced a very rich analysis I would end up simply presenting watered down, uninteresting data chapters. Liz Stanley had reported similar when applying narrative analysis to large-scale and complex phenomena problems in her article ‘Madness to the Method’ (Stanley, 2008). Partly, my solution to this was to opt for a ‘metonymic’ approach. As Gwyn notes, in discourse analysis ‘the part (the extract of the text) is seen to represent the whole (the wider discourse in the Foucauldian sense) and specific discursive practices cannot fail to throw light on the wider cultural practices in which they are embedded’ (Gwyn, 2002: 30). This was the rationale which guided me when choosing some small tales to explain important discursive strategies (as in chapter 6) but also of the overall analysis of narratives as parts of wider discourses.

A note should be made on the language, even though I cannot do justice to the debates in translation and research. I read and analysed narratives in Galician. This was
not a problem as I am a native speaker, but translating them as well as going back and forth between three languages (Galician, Spanish and English) was altogether more problematic. I found myself code switching often in my analytical notes, simply relying on the language which for different reasons better allowed me to quickly jot down my ideas, notes from which I later had to compose a standard English text. Moreover, I am aware my translations had already become different texts from those I had examined. As Temple suggests, researchers might ‘foreignize’ or ‘domesticate’ texts when they translate; and may choose words to produce rhetorical effects rather than simply moving meanings across languages (Temple, 2008).

Not being a professional translator, I tried to represent in the English text, as well as I could, the language features I encountered in the Galician text, mindful that changing Galician words into English might simply evoke different contexts of understanding. The nationalists’ texts were often cumbersome, complex, displayed strange grammatical patterns and vacillating orthography. They were often not easy to read, particularly those of the UPG. Part of this, I think, was simply due to a lack of normalization of Galician at that time²⁶. Part of it corresponded clearly to their ‘doing’, ‘living’ a particular repertoire: that of scientific Marxism. Indeed, the UPG relied on the supposed corrected-ness of their ‘analysis’ to self-attribute a vanguard position in the movement. Writing was an important means of conveying that and I wanted to preserve those meanings. Also, I had a responsibility for the ways in which I represented the discourse and groups in my translations. I tried to make up for losses in the texts by explanation of the extracts and mainly by making the original texts in Galician available in the appendix.
2.5. Conclusion.

Overall, in my view the research strategy produced rich data and the analysis did produce a 'thick' approach in relation to my questions, with plenty of insights and questions being left for further writing and future research to develop. I hope the chapters will further understanding and make for a more complex picture of Galician nationalism and the role of storytelling in politics. However, on the downside, it was also a very labour and time intensive process.
3

Intertextuality and the nation: resources, antagonism and dislocations

3.1. Introduction

In this and the following chapters I trace the overarching plots in the Galician nationalist stories from the early 1970s to the early 1980s, with a special focus on the years of the Transition to democracy and the story-lines of colonialism. I examine ‘big’ nationalist plots as well as small stories of nationhood and Marxism as they appeared in periodicals, congressual texts and oeuvres of organic intellectuals. These stories are always historically (conjuncturally) situated, located in space and time coordinates. These coordinates provide the conditions of possibility for the narratives: the dynamic historical, social and economic matrix inextricably linked to privileged frames of representation which provide the raw materials and symbolic resources for storytelling.

These chapters are, then, fundamentally concerned with intertextuality. This is, with the movement’s narratives ‘associated fields’ —the formulations within which they appeared, were referred to, opened up and whose status they share and take a place with (Foucault, 1969/1989:111). As Kristeva noted, ‘every text is from the outset under the jurisdiction of other discourses which impose a universe on it’ (cited in Culler, 1981:105). These other discourses are not mere ‘influences’ on a pre-existent nationalist narrative. The story-lines of colonialism were, rather, ‘a tissue of quotations’ of discourses and practices in which they were historically and locally inscribed. History is inserted into them. These stories and utterances are threads of
past and present dialogues and struggles. They connect with and disrupt other utterances and stories: past imaginings of nation, tales of oppression and resistance at a wider, 'world-historical' level and at the local level of power struggles for political spaces, for reconstituting norms and normalizing fields of resistance and nation anew at a time of social dislocation. These contexts show how living by Marxism(s) and nationalism simultaneously was not a highly unusual episode protagonized by a group of radicalized intelligentsia and petty bourgeoisie disassociated from the society they inhabited. It was, instead, a cultural space within the left opened up by a specific political conjuncture and the enmeshment of frames of intelligibility from the Third World, Europe and Spain in the late 1960s and 1970s.

3.2. Storied context: dislocation, symbolic resources and antagonisms.

If in order to understand what work political narratives do, we need to embed them in their local and historical contexts—that is attend to their argumentative contexts and arenas of struggle (Billig, 1987; Vološinov, 1973)—then I should start here by presenting the contexts of the Galician narratives of colonialism. These contexts form the conditions of possibility and symbolic resources of the nationalists' social constructions and narratives. These contexts were threefold. Firstly, the political conjuncture of organic crisis in late francoism and the transition which nationalism underwent. The transition to democracy was a terrain of political uncertainty and instability in which a plurality of political efforts and stories were mobilised, which aimed at hegemonizing the political space. But the transition did not simply consist of an empty time-space: old, inherited stories of nation as well as tales of resistance from abroad (often anti-colonial) populated it and contributed to its shaping. I examine here the three, starting with the earlier narratives of nation.
Early stories of ‘old nations’

Spanish and other related peripheral nationhoods developed as an ideological battle field of similar historicist and essentialist narratives which, nevertheless, supported different and sometimes opposite political strategies: the construction of either Spanish or peripheral national identities. This often, but by no means always, led to a reciprocal negation. Historians agree that tales of the Spanish nation first appeared around 1808 or 1812 (ignited by resistance to Napoleon) and since then there has been a continuous effort to narrativize and nationalize the country, either from a liberal, or, later, from a conservative perspective (Beramendi, 2007; Kamen, 2008; Saz Campos, 2003). Despite their often remarked-upon weaknesses, the result of these initial nationalizing efforts was that at least throughout the XIX century no political current seriously questioned the political unity and national identity of Spain (Beramendi, 2007; Riquer, 1996; Junco, 1996). Yet these nationalizing efforts also did not significantly erode alternative regional identities in the making. By the end of the century, however, a dislocatory event (the crisis of 1898) was to act as a catalyst for change.

Forever Celts: Galician nationalism’s tale

Peripheral movements that had been constructing particular ‘regional’ identities, among them Galician, came then to tell a ‘nation’ story of their own. Most analysts locate the starting point of political stories of peripheral nations in Spain in the ‘disaster’ of 1898, the crisis that simultaneously stimulated a conservative turn towards Spanish nationalism (Balfour, 1996; Beramendi, 2007; Fox, 1997; Saz Campos, 2003; Riquer, 1996). Nevertheless, the first tales of a differentiated Galician identity had already appeared in the 1840s, in the ‘provincialismo’ and ‘rexionalismo’ movements (Beramendi, 2001, 2007; Beramendi and Núñez Seixas, 1995). It was, then, historians and literary writers such as Murguía –in whom the boundaries between
those activities was blurred— who would become the early founders of discursive interest in the Galician nation (Foucault, 1984).

Manuel Murguía was the leading regionalist narrating the Galician nation (Máiz, 1984). Politically liberal and a progressive historian, for Ramón Máiz, Murguía’s ideas of the nation are a synthesis centrally informed by romantic German nationalism in the founding of difference and nationhood, and by Italian liberal nationalism in the political consequences deriving from this (ibid). Murguía drew upon the ideas on race expounded by the French and English romantic historiography (Thierry, Macaulay, Carlyle) and on theories of Aryanism. He founded the Galician nation on the intersection of two privileged elements: history (constructing an immemorial past) and ethnicity/race (Máiz, 1984). This race being the Celtic, a branch of the Aryan family, and foundational myth of Galician nationalism for almost a century.

The (hi)story of Galicia, then, is that of a people descended from a ‘superior race’ (the Celts) whose traits have essentially endured in culture, social organization, character – i.e. valour, intelligence, hate of alien domination, religiosity and love of land— and even physiognomy (Beramendi, 2007; Máiz, 1984). Galicians (that is, Celts and later also Swevians) staunchly resisted all invasions of the country by Roman, Visigoth or Arab conquerors in many a tragic-heroic episode such as the resistance of Mount Medulio. Then, during the middle ages, Galicia repeatedly struggled to constitute a kingdom. However, it failed due to Castile’s oppressive strategies and policies, which culminated with the successful centralisation perpetrated by the Catholic monarchs. Thus, despite its ‘higher dignity and nobility’ than the ‘Semitic-Spanish’ peoples, Galicia found itself the victim in a situation of oppression, under an alien and distorting political domination. Murguía, therefore, as well as other non-Spanish nationalists, saw Spain not as a nation but as a group of nations that, willingly or not, live together under the same state structure (Beramendi, 2007:191).
For Murguí, Máiz suggests, really tells a story of eternalization. Galicians not only were, but essentially are, Celts: once ethnically constituted, the character of peoples remains essentially immutable with all other influences being negligible, even though the Swevians, represented as another ‘Aryan race’, that settled in the territory of Gallaecia in 411 AD were also granted a space in the plot (Máiz, 1984; Villares, 1992). Celtism is then the nodal point of the nationalist discourse articulated by Murguí (ibid.). Here culture more or less transparently reflects biology. Murguí also adheres and reinforces the romantic idea –already present in the ‘provincialismos’ and which will be taken up by the Xeración Nós and later nationalisms (Beramendi and Seixas, 1995; Patterson, 2006)— of the peasant as the repository of the essence of Galicanness, however defined (Beramendi and Seixas, 1995). The enemy constructed in the story was the ‘Semitic race’, archetype of the anti-Galician, generally embodied by Castile-Spain (Máiz, 1984:166).

Unsurprisingly, by way of founding difference on biological-cultural elements, Murguí’s Celtism functions basically to ground the existence of the Galician nation independently of a state. The nation is for him the natural, objective result primarily of race, but also of land, character and language. This organic definition of nation legitimizes the claim for self-government despite the lack of self-consciousness or a history of state institutions in Galicia (Beramendi, 2007). However, Murguí does see national consciousness and political will as necessary in order to achieve his political goals. Thus, Máiz says, this racist foundation of the nation does not result in, as might be expected, in extreme political elitism or xenophobic aggressiveness towards the other, but in the idea of ‘national decision of recovery of own dignity’, for the idea of race is articulated within a wider liberal framework (1984:178-179). That is, a radical difference has given rise to a rather pragmatic politics.

Murguí’s Celtic myth provides the basic script for Galician nationalism for over a century. It is with the ‘Irmandades da Fala’ and later with the Xeración Nós that a Galician identity goes from being a cultural enterprise to a political movement (Beramendi, 2007). However, while always keeping its organic-culturalist basis, the
intelligentsia of the Xeración Nós and leaders of the Partido Galeguista in the 1920s and 1930s offer variations on the tale. Vicente Risco narrates a deeply conservative struggle of essences: a trans-historical opposition of ‘collective spirits’—‘atlanticist’, in the case of Galicia, versus the Spanish ‘mediterranean’—which are embodied in races or nationalities (Beramendi 2007:479). Risco and Otero Pedrayo construct the land (‘a Terra’, ‘a Nosa Terra’) as a key element of the nation, even though only in the case of Otero (influenced by Herder) to the point of displacing racist considerations (Patterson, 2006). For them, the essence of the Galician nation resides in the land as a rural and pre-capitalist self (Máiz, 2000). The same story is also taken up by Alfonso R. Castelao who, nevertheless, transforms it into a progressive tale. Adopting Stalin’s culturalist definition of nation as made up of land, language, traditions and ethnicity, race becomes for him ‘volksgeist’ (Máiz, 2000). In this way, Máiz remarks, the Celtic myth of origins also remains for Castelao the foundation of the Galician community (2000:33). The Partido Galeguista was, then, ideologically heterogeneous—internally divided into a conservative and a social-democrat wing. In spite of the mythical foundation of radical difference from Castile, the main efforts of the party were orientated towards the achievement of a statute of autonomy for Galicia—lobbying for it and legally bringing it into being—similar to those elaborated during the Second Republic for Catalunya or the Basque country.

**Castile, catholic and ‘castizo’: narrating Spanish identity**

Meanwhile—after the 1898 Spanish ‘disaster’, in the midst of the fin de siècle European crisis and reacting against the strengthening of peripheral identities which were perceived as a threat—a conservative Spanish nationalism was also gathering force. Formulated by the ‘regeneracionismo’ and the ‘noventayochos’ generation, that flagged the thinking of Unamuno, Maeztu and Ortega y Gasset, this nationalism questioned the efficacy of previous liberal nationalization efforts (Saz Campos, 2003). They mistrusted democratic institutions because they had built ‘states without a soul’ with their confidence in reason and the prescribed identity of individual and collective freedoms (ibid.). What was needed instead, they claimed, was a nation based on
'deeper' (irrational) structures of feeling: land and blood, death and resurrection and volksgeist. This new conservative discourse, which both drew on and contributed to the widespread narratives of Spanish decadence and myth of weak nationalization, gave rise to intolerant rightwing Spanish nationalisms which would culminate in the military uprising against the Second Republic and Franco's nationalist dictatorship. Indeed, Saz sees Franco's dictatorship as the last and most durable consequence of the noventyacha generation (Saz, 2003). After the civil war the triumph of Franco results in the crushing of peripheral nationalisms (Recalde, 1990).

Although initially the nationalist discourses and projects of francoism were complex and plural, soon 'nacionalcatolicismo' became the hegemonic force. The Francoist ambiguous amalgam of nationalist components gave rise to two interrelated stories of nationhood. One tale was that of traditionalist and reactionary 'national-catholicism' which represented the Spanish nation as formed by a mixture of trenchant catholicism, an immemorial past (as with peripheral identities, Spain also predated the Roman conquest), and a strong mysticism related to 'Castilian immutable essences' such as those reflected in the landscape, the language and volksgeist. The other story made use of the 'falangista' idea of 'unity of universal destiny' ('la unidad de destino en lo universal') that projected the 'indissoluble' unity of the nation from its immemorial past into the future. This tale became a solution to the 'regional problem', that is, the key to subordinating an acknowledged regional plurality of the country, to the idea of Spain as the only nation. Complementing this rhetoric of Spanish unity and superiority towards its internal constituent parts, was a myth of empire or 'Hispanidad': a rhetoric of cultural imperialism towards Latin America (Nuñez Seixas 2001:721; Saz Campos, 2003). Spain became during the dictatorship an ambiguous combination of a romantic tale of essences (Castile, Catholicism and, often, 'lo castizo') and of a fascist, forward-looking story of universal destiny and unity. What was unambiguous was that Spain was the only nationhood to be lawfully and safely narrated.

In the late 1960s and 1970s, the ideological and political projects of the regime (the 'fascist' Falange and the reactionary-technocratic Acción Española / Opus Dei) were
exhausted, if still locked in internal battles (Saz, 2007). The reactionary / technocratic project had imposed itself and aspired to transform Spain into an apolitical, demobilized and economically satisfied nation. This project nevertheless failed. The Catholic church—a pillar of francoism and central in shoring up Spanish national identity—had just held the Second Vatican council, virtually shattering the basis of the Catholic state and essence of the nation (ibid.). Internationally, however, the regime still saw the world split in a battle against ‘communist imperialism’ (Ysás, 2004; Viñas, 2007). Having defeated communism on its own soil, the regime hardliners thought, Spain was a key objective of this enemy (Ysás, 2004: 140). Hence, the rhetoric of the regime was often still that of war. Mobilization continued in order to legitimize francoist rule against internal enemies. The dictatorship identified these as ‘communism’, but also ‘masonry’, ‘separatism’ and ‘subversives’ in general—categories which were applied to any opposition. The long years in power were achieved at the cost of dire suppression of freedoms, as well as the social and economic rights of the majority of the population. Hence, by 1975, at the time of the transition to democracy, Spanish nationalism had lost all legitimacy as a result of this total identification with the dictatorship (Núñez Seixas, 2007).

Stories of Resistance: anti-colonialism and the popular front.

In Galicia by the late 1960s there was only a vague memory of past narratives of the nation—what the rather elitist enterprise of ‘culturalismo’ and the editorial policy of Galáxia had allowed—(Fernán Vello and Pillado Mayor, 1989; Núñez Seixas, 1994). However, there was at that time another powerful magma of symbolic resources available to resistance. Counter-narratives of the nation in Spain—from the periphery or radical left—were to be articulated not from the early discourses of romanticism, liberalism or imperialism, but in opposition to them and their perceived political consequences: colonial oppression and exploitation of nine-tenths of the world at colonialism’s high water mark. Thus, this time oppositional cultures (nationalisms and
far-left movements) were imbued in narratives of *resistance and liberation* articulating Marxist perspectives and 'other' situated local knowledges from the colonies. That is, they were re-articulating anti-colonialism and, at the same time, their own identity boundaries.

If nationalism in the Third World was ever merely 'modular' or derivative from Europe—a common, if implicit claim which Chatterjee rejects (Chatterjee, 1993) – the situation was to change as regards nationalist discourses in the 1960s and 1970s. During that period, it was the Third World which was exporting a model to Europe. Those were the times of the Cuban Revolution, the Chinese Cultural Revolution, the Vietnamese, Algerian and Angolan wars of independence (among many others) and of the writings of their socialist and communist leaders and intellectuals: Che Guevara, Frantz Fanon, Mao Tse Tung, Amilcar Cabral and Albert Memmi. Their ideas of the individual and social alienation of the colonized and of interclasist national liberation fronts, among others, became widespread throughout Europe. 'Tricontinental' knowledge and anti-colonial emancipatory politics began to infiltrate back to the West (Young, 2001). Indeed, they assaulted the West's new leftwing radical and nationalist expressions.

These influences led to fuzzy boundaries between radical groups: nationalizing the far-left and radicalizing and re-energising Europe's minority nationalisms. From the French May of 1968 and the Italian 'hot autumn' to the student unrests in Germany and the US —where the Black Nation movement was also emerging— radical activists were initiating new struggles either from (hybrid) Maoist positionings (such as *Gauche Prolétarienne*) or more or less diffusely inspired by anti-imperialist struggle in Asia and Latin America (Badiou, 2010; Bourg, 2007; Wright, 2002). Similarly, in the US black activists sought to emulate the success of third world independence movements – Black Power advocates clenched their fists and claimed a black nation36. Old peripheral nationalisms were experiencing a resurgence all over Europe in the 1960s (Connor, 1977; Smith, 1981; Tiryakian and Rogowski, 1985). These nationalisms (such as the Breton, Corsican or Flemish) had been in a long state of decay after their collaboration with fascism during World War II, their lack of electoral opportunities for consolidation
and lack of ideological renovation (Núñez Seixas, 2007:61). They were now reinvigorated. The Occitan writer Robert Lafont popularized the thesis of internal colonialism—which was to be applied to Galicia by the PCG. By 1974, fifty eight years after the Lausanne Conference, European peripheral nationalist movements had few bourgeois roots and tried to foster new solidarities, signing the Charter of Brest ‘on the struggle against colonialism in Occidental Europe’. Thus, as Young notes, European organic left / nationalist intellectuals were able to draw on the resources of the theoretical anti-colonial work being done and the political identities developed during the independence movements (Young, 2001:65).

Hybridizing Leninism and local knowledges

It was Vladimir I. Lenin who had paved the way for a third world synthesis of Marxism and local knowledges with his writings on imperialism, colonialism and national self-determination. For Lenin, at the beginning of the twentieth century capitalism was in the middle of its imperialist stage. In his narrative capital was already international and monopolist, that is, highly concentrated in the hands of ‘combines of the big capitalists’ presided over by banks. ‘Thus’, Lenin said, ‘the beginning of the twentieth century marks the turning point from the old capitalism to the new, from the domination of capital in general to the domination of finance capital’ (Lenin, 1997:46).

Monopolies virtually ended free competition through a division of the world made in order to ensure profits for those who dominated financial capital. This economic division was crucially ‘bound up’ with a territorial division of the world, in a struggle for what he called ‘economic territory’:

‘Colonial possession alone gives complete guarantee of success to the monopolies against all the risks of the struggle with competitors [...] The more capitalism is developed, the more the need for raw materials is felt, the more bitter competition becomes, and the more feverishly the hunt for raw materials proceeds throughout the world, the more desperate becomes the struggle for the acquisition of colonies’ (Lenin, 1997:82).

Thus, Lenin plotted the latest scramble for territory as being causally related to capital’s needs. Capitalist competition for colonial markets would transpose the class
struggle to the international arena, creating a world divided between ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’. He sketched a blueprint which was later developed and modified by many others.

Third World theorists mediated the translation of Marxism and Lenin’s theory of imperialism to the specificities of non-European economic, historic and cultural contexts. Mao, Fanon, Guevara, and others took Marxism as a point of departure and adapted it. Sultan Galiev had boldly reformulated Marxism-Leninism into Muslim national communism. He modelled Lenin’s dichotomy into a world made of oppressors and oppressed, shifting then the focus from classes to nations (Bennigsen and Enders, 1979). There were now proletarian and non-proletarian nations. Besides, theorists insisted on the revolutionary potential of the peasants and stressed cultural struggle – and the need for human change, the ‘new man’— against the alienation and inner, psychological, consequences of colonialism. Mao devised two concepts: ‘principal contradiction’ and ‘the principal aspect of the principal contradiction’ in order to ascertain which of the main societal cleavages (class or national) was more relevant at any given time. Thus, he effectively put national concerns on the same footing as class struggle for the Chinese communist party. He then elevated imperialism (the national cleavage) to the ‘principal contradiction’ to be tackled in China. These questions would not have been posed by classical Marxism. In Marxist theory it was simply axiomatic that class contradiction was ‘the motor of history’. Besides, Mao exhibited a voluntarism in which ‘man’s conscious action’ was viewed as an important historical force and viewed superstructures in some circumstances, as playing a leading role – even though Lenin’s ideas on the party had paved the way for this development (Schram, 1983:334).

After the second world war Paul Baran’s work served as hinge between Lenin’s theory of imperialism and dependency theory. Dependency theorists (Frank, Wallerstein, Emmanuel or Amin) explained how colonized societies were internally disarticulated and integrated externally into metropolitan economies and the world system. Their role was that of producers and exporters of raw materials and food which would be
processed and profited from by monopolies in advanced capitalist states. Capitalism was theorised as a world system characterized by an inherent duality (centre-periphery dichotomy) which determines two different developmental possibilities. The transfer of resources from the periphery to the centre through mechanisms of unequal exchange in the international market means that some countries develop because others underdevelop (Larrain, 1989). The function of this narrative was to turn on its head the west’s ideological justifications for colonialism of ‘bringing civilization’ and contributing to the ‘common good’ of the colonized societies (Meiksins Wood, 2002). Instead, uneven development or ‘dependency’ was intrinsic to the imperialist process rather than the result of backward, inept or corrupt societies and leaders. Thus, in a dialectic of the national with the international, the protagonists were not only oppressor and oppressed classes but also oppressor and oppressed nations, where ‘national wars [would be] waged against the international system of imperialism’ (Young, 2001:125). Therefore, as Marx had remarked regarding the situation of the Irish and British working classes, the demands in the colonies for national liberation were narrated as an intrinsic part of the fight of all the proletariat against capitalism.

These hybrid theoretical developments were translated into the praxis of the popular or national front politics. The policy of the Popular (or people’s) Front was inaugurated at the seventh world congress of the Comintern in 1935. Initially it was a policy brought about in Europe as a result of the rise of fascism: the broadest possible unity of democratic forces was now needed⁴⁰. Its political goals were governments which defended and extended the provisions of democracy. Soon it was adopted by Third World movements which rallied all possible forces around the unity of ‘the people’ against Imperialism.
The transition as dislocation

While anti-colonial discursive practices were at their height, and for thirty six years of the twentieth century (between 1939 and 1975) Spain endured an authoritarian rule stemming from a bloody civil war provoked by a military uprising against the legitimately established Second Republic. This period ended after the death of the dictator, the internal exhaustion of the francoist projects, their increasing contestation on a plurality of fronts and the pressures of international economic and regional integration processes leading to a profound crisis, to political uncertainty, and finally to a period of transition (Saz, 2007; Ysàs, 2004 and 2009; Viñas, 2007). The transition eventually gave rise to a new democratic system\textsuperscript{41}. However, the discursive construction of the transition by all political forces involved at the time was one of crisis and conflict as well as democracy and later consensus (Saz, 2007; Del Aguila and Montoro, 1984). The transition to democracy was, in fact, a dislocation of Spanish society, an organic crisis in all spheres, product of the severe contradictions and the complex play of political, social and economic forces at work during the last years of the Francoist regime (Saz, 2007; San Martin, 2002; Preston, 1986).

The concept of an ‘organic crisis’ (or social dislocation) originates in Gramsci’s thought and it refers to a long-lasting, general ‘rupture in the normalized order of things’ (Gramsci, 1971). A crisis may have ‘organic’ (deep) and ‘conjunctural’ (or passing and momentary) aspects which need to be grasped in their mutual relations (Gramsci, 1971:178; Boggs, 1976). Typical of organic crises are great social and political disruptions in the existing order. Gramsci defines it in the following terms:

"A crisis occurs, sometimes lasting for decades. This exceptional duration means that incurable structural contradictions have revealed themselves...and that, despite this, the political forces which are struggling to conserve and defend the existing structure itself are making efforts to cure them, with certain limits...These incessant and persistent
Indeed, the Spanish economic structure had been developing intensely and unevenly since 1959 whilst its political superstructure remained anchored in a deeply backward looking, authoritarian regime. Economic growth in the 1960s, Paul Preston notes, was ‘something of a political time-bomb’ (Preston, 1986:11): it created structural problems which the regime proved unable to solve. Spain had experienced an economic liberalization which changed its social structure. The number of peasants and land labourers diminished considerably while those occupied in industry and the service sector increased. Concomitant to industrialization was a process of urbanization and inter-regional migration (often from Andalucia and Galicia towards Madrid, Barcelona, Vizcaya or Guipuzcoa) compounded with a strong European migration. These factors contributed to the formation of a modest consumer society (the ‘desarrollismo’ years) with the first home appliances and automobiles making their appearance. There was also a key generational change: the Spaniards reaching adulthood in the 1960s had neither first-hand experience of the civil war nor of its bleak aftermath. Furthermore, young men and women’s migrant experiences not only brought a healthy flow of cash into the country, but also a new familiarity with European democracies, their values, freedoms and hegemonic discourses. This familiarity was enhanced by the new flourishing tourism industry, television and the general increase of travel abroad (Martín García et. al, 2009).

If development became a legitimizing device for the regime –the ideology of ‘desarrollismo’ presupposed that the state’s economic take off and the ensuing emergence of a modest consumer society would compensate for the lack of political freedoms—, it also provided the conditions of possibility for alternative socio-political responses. As social historians demonstrate, even though there was a considerable degree of acquiescence to francoism, the supposed apathy and passivity of Spanish society is a myth (Ortiz Heras, 2003; Ysàs, 2007, 2004; Martín García et. al, 2009). Workers, students, youth, the intelligentsia and the church, as well as peripheral
nationalisms were reorganizing in ways which resisted, contradicted and sometimes even openly defied the regime.

Economic development and the progressive incorporation of Spain into the international economy contributed to the erosion of the basis of the paternalism and corporatism designed by franquism to disarticulate the working class. Experiencing high levels of social conflict, businessmen found it more effective to deal with real trade unions, mainly the Comisiones Obreras (CCOO) —linked to the communist party (PCE)— than with the bureaucracy of state-controlled unions (Balfour, 1990; Preston, 1986). To be sure, the number of strikes after 1962 grew until it reached levels higher than those of European countries where there was a legal right to strike and they recrudesced from the early 1970s in the wake of the oil crisis and the later democratic transition (Balfour, 1990:13). These represented, nevertheless, a plurality of 'workers' movements rather than a unitary struggle (ibid.).

Francoism had also lost the ideological battle in the universities and amongst the youth. University students and staff showed their dissent as early as 1956 and continued to do so in the frequent revolts during the 1960s and 1970s. These conflicts need to be inscribed within the local conditions of resistance against censorship and repression and the international context of student discontent in the 1960s. Even though radicalized students at the forefront of student opposition were only a minority, they nevertheless tapped into the feelings of the majority. The university became a space of 'subversion' for the regime or 'a space of freedom' for the PCE (Ysàs, 2004). So, too, did the myriad local youth and parish centres often sponsored by progressive priests. These were networks of micro-spaces of dissidence, much-needed arenas of a socializing alternative to the stale francoist sponsored clubs, which helped disseminate alternative political views among the young (Martín García et. al, 2009:23). The intelligentsia also positioned itself against the regime: numerous public declarations, petitions, open letters and other expressions of discontent from professional organizations, artists and intellectuals publicly undermined its legitimacy. Neighbourhood protests had a base in the demands created by a chaotic urbanization
process and lackadaisical response to the most basic urban needs by francoist appointed mayors. Moreover, after the Second Vatican Council the Catholic church was progressively withdrawing support for the regime (particularly the Basque and Catalan churches) and drawing closer to the opposition (Fusi, 2000).

All these societal demands were compounded, in some of the Spanish peripheries, with the memory and organizations of past nationalisms and their territorial claims—particularly in the Basque country and Catalonia. The resurgence of peripheral nationalisms in Spain can also be seen as interlocked with their revival in Europe. Moreover, the relationship of the dictatorship with regional identities was nuanced. Indeed, subordinated regional identities were tolerated or even promoted as a way of acknowledging difference whilst buttressing a Spanish nation (San Martin, 2002; Saz Campos, 2003; Núñez Seixas, 2007). When, at this time, the Spanish national identity was suffering a powerful de-legitimization due to its appropriation by francoism, a variety of alternative identities found the needed space for their own communitarian myths (San Martin, 2002). Peripheral identity claims were widely seen as legitimate, and articulated by state wide organizations, in their demands—at least in terms of support for a federation. The key nationalist problem for the dictatorship was undoubtedly ETA (Fusi, 2000; Núñez Seixas, 2007). Political violence, however, was not restricted to ETA, but was also used by the extreme right and radical left.

Thus, the myth of ‘twenty-five years of peace’ laboriously threaded by the dictatorship was now undone by the high levels of repression unleashed to fight ‘chaos’ and ‘disorder’. The state of exception became a common occurrence. Thousands of detentions, military trials and prison sentences for workers, students and professionals were seen during that period (Ysàs, 2004; Viñas, 2007). Suppression of strikes was harsh, and there were several high profile show trials and executions. Curiously, as Ysàs shows, the regime’s response to regional nationalisms was more ambiguous. Francoist officials were more ambivalent about Basque and Catalan ‘separatism’—they were barely mentioned in official documents dealing with ‘subversion’. This ambivalence was not extended to the Basque nationalist organization ETA. However,
crucially, ETA was represented by the Francoist authorities as ‘an instrument of communist subversion’—communism being the regime’s enemy par excellence—rather than as ‘separatist’ (Ysás, 2004: 147).

What is relevant about all these struggles is that, even though their demands were often local, corporate and limited, the stringent conditions of the dictatorship forced virtually any collective action to transgress rigid francoist legality. Hence, any collective demand became potentially a struggle against the established authority, that is, questioned the legitimacy of the regime as a whole. Consequently, these struggles carried out by an ‘immense minority’ created a climate of intense conflict, eroding the viability of the dictatorship.

Yet, if the exhaustion of the different projects of francoism was evident even inside the ruling elite (Saz, 2007; Preston 1986), this does not mean that the future of the country was any clearer. As Paul Preston’s comments: ‘when Franco died on 20 November 1975, few Spanish politicians of either right or left could have predicted with any precision the country’s political development over the subsequent decade. [...] There was hope but not certainty’ (Preston, 1986:1). Neither does the modernization thesis hold: the socioeconomic structural changes in themselves did not automatically bring about democracy nor did they explain the adoption of a critical attitude towards the regime (Saz, 2007; Ysás, 2007; Ortiz Heras, 2003). The organic crisis provoked contradictions, uncertainty and instability, opening up social spaces of contestation at the conjunctural level. These spaces were taken up (with more or less success) by plural discourses, involving a multiplicity of social and political actors with diverse worldviews. These are what Stuart Hall calls the ‘formative efforts’ of creating a new balance of forces, productive attempts at reconstituting a new order, forging a new ‘historic bloc’ (1988:43).

The transition was such a time when left and right wing forces were immersed in ‘formative’ political efforts. The climate of conflict of late francoism was narrated by
the 'bunker' and many radical parties in the opposition as a 'pre-revolutionary situation'. For the former, there was a need for more repression. For the latter, it was a tipping point for 'democratic rupture' (Soto, 2005:449; Balfour, 1990:18). These formative efforts can be seen in the antagonisms and realignments within different groups. Initially, left opposition parties had established alliances such as the Junta and Tabla Democrática (around the PCE and PSOE) preparing for the end of the dictatorship through their strategy of rupture which included ideas of democracy, Marxism, anti-imperialism, federalism and autonomies (Soto, 2005:81). However, soon these parties were co-opted by the differential strategy of 'democratic reform' and 'consenso' and articulated themselves, and were transformed in the process, to former pillars of the dictatorship. In turn, some of those former pillars had moved towards reform, building up conservative parties which early on inherited the apparatuses of the state: the civil service, police and the army remained untouched. The opposition which from 1976 onwards still pushed for 'rupture' was eventually relegated to the margins of society.

This discourse of consensus achieved, paraphrasing Gramsci, a 'passive reform' (Gramsci, 1971). Franco died, but francoism outlived him by a few years (Fusi, 2000). The transition was dominated by the manoeuvres of a weakened elite fraught with tension provided by pressures from civil society in the form of waves of strikes promoted by trade unions and radical left parties particularly during the years 1976 and 1977 (Preston, 1986; Soto, 2005: 36-39). The reformist Suarez government formally initiated the political transformation of the regime whilst avoiding any vacuum of power. In a difficult move for reformists to accept, political parties were legalized in exchange for their recognition of the Monarchy and the reform process (Soto, 2005). Left wing parties (mainly the PCE) accepted, fearing their marginalization from the process otherwise and arguing the need for 'responsibility' on their own part and 'consolidation of liberties' (Soto, 2005; Del Aguila and Montero, 1984). A scramble for power among elites occurred in the form of the newly created Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD) and Alianza Popular (AP) conservative parties. The referendum on political reform in December 1976 was followed by elections in 1977 which was won.
by Suarez's party the UCD, and a new Constitution was drafted by conservatives as well as PSOE and PCE, Catalan nationalism and other minor parties (was approved in 1978) without Basque consent.

‘Consensus’ and ‘democracy’ became the hegemonic discursive practices of the transition. It was a reformist political strategy trying to co-opt as many forces as possible. It refers to narratives and practices of ‘reconciliation’ understood as political amnesia as regards responsibilities for the past: a *tabula rasa* was applied to everyone. This discourse provided brand new democratic credentials to all by way of ‘pacting’-pacts and transactions at the top: the *Pactos de la Moncloa*. These pacts implemented political, juridical, territorial and economic reform, and served towards the elaboration of a Constitution whilst demobilizing society. Soon ‘desencanto’ (disenchantment) became the byword in Spain referring to the process. The process of transition culminated, then, not with ‘rupture’ but, instead, with a reformist constitution in 1978 and territorially with the creation of the Autonomic system. Here, however, the former left wing rhetoric of federalism and demands for peripheral nationalism were substituted for a complex wording of ‘plural nationalities’ within the ‘Nation’. Moreover, the constitution enshrined the ‘indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation’.

Nevertheless, there were other, more marginal formative articulatory efforts trying to make sense of the renewal of radical energies symptomatic of this crisis. The international revolutionary climate and the renewal of social struggles in Spain had provided the symbolic resources which would be articulated by new opposition groups forming on the far-left that appeared in the 1960s. These forces opposed the dictatorship but were (for different reasons) also dissident from the PCE. Thus, a myriad of small communist parties mushroomed in the 1960s in the centre and at the periphery of the state, whether Leninist, Maoist, Trotskyites or Thirdworldist (Laiz, 1995).
They plotted out, in different ways, similar anti-colonial and Marxist discursive elements. They inherited (implicitly or explicitly) different narratives on nationhood: either Spanish or peripheral. Thus, their narratives (which often begin in medias res) variously constructed Spain as either ‘the people’ dominated by US Imperialism with help from the ruling class of the ‘fascist’ regime; or as a ‘weak link’ to capitalism and imperialism controlled by a bourgeoisie that was oppressing the proletariat; or Spain was itself a colonizer state of the peripheral nations aided by US imperialism. Thus, they sang to different heroes: the Spanish people, Spanish proletariat, or the Basque or Galician people. In all these stories there must be a class struggle led by the vanguard hero in the form, often, of popular fronts against US imperialism, ‘yanqui-franquismo’, the local oligarchy or the Spanish state. As their goal was to achieve national independence, democracy did not matter much, either goal being only a stopover before achieving socialism and communism (Laiz, 1995). These similar narratives where ‘Spain’ was constructed as colonizer or as colonized show in stark relief the strategical polyvalence of the anti-colonial discourses in Spain (Foucault, 1976).

*Galicia: uneven development and (dis)remembering*

Galicia, on the north-western periphery of Spain, was undergoing similar changes to those affecting Spanish society as a whole, with its own specific features. ‘Deagrarianization’, uneven industrialization, urbanization and mass migration marked the ‘desarrollismo’ years after 1959. The once overwhelmingly rural communities had started to lose their socio-economic centrality in the early 1970s due mainly to a rural exodus to Spanish cities and to other European countries as cheap male industrial and female household labour. Hence, as a result of its structural incapacity to absorb the sustained growth of its population, Galicia was socially and economically marked by migration. In contrast to this rural trend, city dwellers—the professional middle class, civil servants and workers—were growing fast. A process of ‘(rur)urbanization’ was slowly taking place: the expansion of a virtual urban space along the Atlantic
motorway, linking Ferrol, A Coruña, Santiago and Vigo which served to ‘urbanize’ smaller towns but not obliterate the rural (Leiceaga and López 2000:40).

Galicia’s social and physical landscape was indeed changing (Fdez Leiceaga and López Iglesias, 2000). However, change was highly uneven. There appeared some big industries, but investments were strongly concentrated in energy (electricity), transport (shipbuilding) and the food production sectors (milk, tinned fish). There was a relatively high presence of international companies (mainly French, such as the Citroën factory in Vigo or Pechiney) and national public companies (INI) but a relative absence of Spanish private capital (Fdez Leiceaga and López Iglesias, 2000). Besides, production was mainly geared towards export. Thus, big industries were islands in a sea of very small, artisan production and a dominant primary sector (ibid.). There was an industrial dualism where small, traditional companies coexisted with big enterprises in specific sectors only, without any real internal articulation between them (2000:499). Hence, the Galician economy was, during those years, a dependent economy.

Nevertheless, this process of island industrialization created in Galicia an incipient urban working class concentrated in the shipbuilding areas of Vigo and Ferrol where, similarly with the rest of Spain, the CCOO were protagonizing important strikes and conflicts —such as those of 1972. Besides workers, students at the University of Santiago were also organizing against francoism. In these early conflicts the relevance and prestige of the PCE (now PCG) acquired from the years of the guerrilla resistance was very important (Prada, no date). Moreover, these years were also marked by bitter agrarian conflicts, often between entire villages (such as Castrelo de Miño in 1965) which were threatened in their communal viability by powerful industrial interests. These conflicts galvanized Galician public opinion and attracted all round (oppositional) political support.
Nationalist activities in the interior of Galicia had nevertheless declined and retreated decades earlier, under the regime’s repression to a cultural policy (Balfour, 1988; Núñez Seixas, 1988; 1994). This strategy transmuted the nationalist party (Partido Galeguista) of the 1930s into the Galáxia publishing house in 1950. Moreover, under the auspices of intellectual Ramón Piñeiro, the nationalist strategy shifted to a culturalist essentialism and a desire to ‘galicianize’ the Galician political spectrum – i.e. imbuing all parties with a diffuse sentiment of Galicianness (Núñez Seixas, 2007; Beramendi, 2007).

However, there was now a generation of politically mobilized Galicians, even if only a minority, fully immersed in the culture and practice of resistance to francoism. They were located at the crossroads of the student and youth movements, to a lesser extent to worker and peasant struggle and generally, in the context of clandestine radical politics in Galicia. They often had direct experience of European liberties and the philosophical and radical currents of anticolonialism and Marxism through migration. Some were part of the PCG and other local branches of state wide radical parties – Movimiento Comunista, PTE, etc. Others had a closer but ambiguous relation to the former nationalism. Ambiguity existed due to there being scant memory of nationalism outside the restricted, elitist circles of ‘culturalism’, but also because Piñeiro’s strategies were rejected as dated and inappropriate. These strategies nevertheless managed to provide the source of narrative, symbolic and some organizational resources of pre and post-war nationalism for some Galician youth. The result was that most of these newly mobilized recruits did not look up to the ‘nationalist elders’ – Piñeiro’s ‘coffee table’ exerted both attraction and rejection. They were, nevertheless, familiar with pre-civil war nationalist narratives.

Hence, none of the new parties trying to articulate the national question actually took up Piñeiro and Galáxia’s project. Instead, they mostly performed a hybridization of international anti-colonialist, Marxist and local / nationalist symbolic resources in the context of anti-francoist conflict. This took the form of the Uniión do Pobo Galego (UPG) in 1964. A year earlier, much closer to socialist and federalist tradition and to
‘elder’ nationalists, the Partido Socialista Galego (PSG) was founded. The UPG was highly active in clandestine opposition and organized and controlled a plurality of organizations all over the country: myriad cultural associations, trade unions (for workers, teachers, students and peasants) or the slightly more pluralist (‘inter-classist’) assembly Asamblea Nacional-Popular Galega (AN-PG). Still illegal in 1977, the UPG and AN-PG formed the BN-PG in order to be able to legally participate in the elections.

The UPG and PSG coexisted with other radical parties (MCG, PTE, ORT) in their critique of the PCE/PCG and PSOE and disputed the same political space. The PCG never managed to fully adapt to the Galician situation, even though it had assumed (as did the PSOE) a great deal of the cultural and political demands of nationalism. Hence, the Galician democratic opposition did not manage to organize a unitary platform for the defence of autonomy at the state level. The UPG rejected autonomy as insufficient and organized the Consello de Forzas Políticas de Galicia together with the PSG, Partido Carlista, Movimiento Comunista de Galicia, and Partido Galego Social-Demócrata—demanding a federal pact. Meanwhile, the PCG, PSOE and the key trade unions eventually organized in the Táboa Democrática de Galicia supporting autonomy for Galicia.

3.3. Conclusion

To sum up, as they were located at the vortex of political and cultural communities of resistance to francoism, Spanish narratives of Marxism and nationalism flourished. This confluence of nationalism and Marxism—in the diverse forms of anti-colonialism, Leninism, Maoism—had international as well as national roots in the form of the International anti-colonialism movements and decolonization of third world. During this period, the left in Europe is also awash with Maoism and Leninism. It is the ‘red decade’, ‘ushered in by the fourfold circumstances of national liberation struggles [...]
the world-wide student and youth movement, the factory revolts, and the Cultural revolution in China’ (Badiou, 2010:1). Many peripheral nationalisms in Europe at that time were considered to have been colonized by their respective states. Nationally, from the early days of the dictatorship the only opposition to Franco came from the Spanish communist party, the PCE. This role gave their language and activities a prestige among those discontented with the dictatorship which no other narrative possessed. Subsequently, social and national struggles erupted citing the same norms and frameworks. Hence, doing resistance credibly meant relying on the language of anti-colonialism, Leninism and nation.
A new Attila in Galicia: the myth of loss

4.1. Introduction.

This chapter presents two clearly differentiated parts. First, I examine issues of authorship, production and circulation of the narratives of colonialism. Then, I examine the first episode of the story-line through the reading of the small tales which (re)narrativize the country’s fall from grace.

4.2. The new Attila: narrative economy and strategy

Who narrates?

This section focuses on the production and circulation of the narratives, answering the when, where and who questions of the new discursive formation and discussing issues of narrative authorship. The story-lines and discourses on colonialism were a new performance of nationhood which surfaced at the beginning of the 1970s. This is not to say that the idea of using ‘colonialism’ to make sense of the political and economic situation of the country was entirely new. The term ‘colony’ had been used to describe and qualify Galicia before, in the works of nineteenth-century nationalist romantic poets and historians and emerging on-and-off in the early texts of contemporary nationalist groups. For instance, Risco had said in 1930:

“...And the people which does not progress, which does not obtain a basis for economic independence, will necessarily become a victim of others. Pacifism is preached, the war against war, with weapons; the emancipation of the working classes is preached; their dictatorship is even admitted; but the principle of economic imperialism persists, the exploitation of some peoples by others, in the name of colonization or political dependence. What is forgotten is that, even if the
proletariat as a class is emancipated, there still are and will be exploited peoples and exploiter ones* (Risco, 1930; quoted in Beramendi, 2007: 493)

Risco relies here on the Leninist distinction between peoples as colonizers and colonized—a distinction amplified by the Lausanne Conference of 1916— in a way that seems to allude to Galicia, as a people without economic or political independence. However, the crucial difference between earlier nationalist discourses and those of the 1970s was in the structuring role that ‘colonialism’ as a metaphor for the nation would come to play. The formative time when the new story-line was emerging took place in the early years of the 1970s. It was during the dislocation resulting from the transition to democracy in Spain, that the story-line of colonialism crystallized and achieved primacy within the discourse of nationalism. Indeed, hardly any text written during the transition years by the UPG fails to be inscribed within the plot of colonization, though the same cannot be said of the PSG.

The new story-lines of ‘colonialism’ in Galicia sprung up in different sites and forms within the Galician movement in the early 1970s. They initially appeared mainly as economic, scientific narratives. One of these key sites where the narrative first appeared fully articulated was in Xosé Manuel Beiras’s treatise on the Galician economy ‘O atraso económico da Galiza’ (‘The economic backwardness of Galiza’; henceforth, AEdG), published in 1972. It is around this time that we can start talking of a discourse of colonialism in Galician nationalism. Beiras was a professor of economics at the University of Santiago with close personal ties to the Galáxia people. He was leader of the Partido Socialista Galego (Galician Socialist Party; henceforth PSG) a new socialist and nationalist party created in 1963 under the wing of old ‘galeguistas’ of Galáxia. With around six hundred affiliates (in ‘its better moments’ notes Beramendi) the PSG was a cadre party, originally meant to be a social-democratic strategy for Galicia in the accomplishment of Piñerio’s vision (2007:1086). In AEdG he constructed an economic narrative which enjoyed almost instant success amongst the nationalist community, offering a particular production of the story-line of the process of colonization of Galicia. Besides being a scholarly book on economics, AEdG is clearly a political intervention in the debates of the time, a performance that is even couched in
narrative/dramaturgical terms. However, this narrative, which was reflected in the party's new 'declaration of principles', radically cut the PSG off from the Galáxia design.

Simultaneously, and in a dialogue with the AEdG, other productions of the story-line were developed at the Unión do Pobo Galego. The UPG, however, was formed in an antagonistic relationship with the post-war galeguista tradition. Organized as a 'guide' party in the Leninist tradition, its membership was nevertheless mainly drawn from the intelligentsia and petty bourgeoisie. Its relations with the PSG were unstable and varied from fairly close collaboration at times to opposition. During the 1970s the UPG and its organic intellectuals (among them Mendez Ferrín, Ramón López-Suevos or Francisco Rodriguez) contributed to an enormous textual production in the form of scholarly and literary interventions. However, the key sites of the discourse were mainly the party periodical 'Terra e Tempo' ('Land and Time'; henceforth T&T), the congressual texts and their innumerable political pamphlets.

Some texts in this prolific production became 'canonical texts', narrating Galicia in terms which would become, as Beiras himself noted, 'the pillars for all the creation and practices of Galician nationalism in the next decades' (Fernán Vello and Pillado Maior, 1989). Hence, these authors are what Foucault calls the 'founders of discursivity' (Foucault, 1984:114). That is, the figures characterized not only for having produced their own work, but also because they created the conditions for the production of other texts and for the formation of certain rules which guided discussion, debate and the sense of the propositions.

Their narrative production was disseminated mainly at times to coincide with collective action, whose repertoire of protest was acquiring bolder and new forms in the late 1970s. These forms ranged from the distribution of pamphlets to graffiti, which served during the worse times of the dictatorship to spread alternative messages; from the selling or giving away of periodicals in demonstrations and street actions to chants and talks in 'lock ups', 'stops' to work and academic activity and social and political concentrations. The self-financing periodicals, T&T and Galicia
Socialista, were key instruments (as were the congressual texts). The readers were the various party memberships, the wider circles involved in radical politics in Galicia and generally those implicated in any in the organizations of the movement. This movement was able through the implications inherent in a variety of popular struggles and local-based social movements in the 1970s, such as As Encrobas, to connect with wider civil society and citizenship. Nationalist narratives were also spread from their literary, scientific production and teaching in the context of the university of Santiago, as well as in the common ‘formation’ seminars for members organized by the parties. What these narratives lacked was mass press support until 1980 when the UPG organized the ‘A Nosa Terra’ weekly, which was unable, however, to compete with dailies such as ‘La Voz de Galicia’.

Problematising collective authorship

If these were the authors and sites producing the discourse of colonialism, there is nevertheless a need to think critically about the complex issues of ‘authorial function’ (Foucault, 1984). The story-lines of colonialism are not, as Hajer remarks, ‘glued’ to specific actors (Hajer, 1995). Instead they are better seen as inherent to and enmeshed in certain social practices in which certain actors would be creatively involved at particular times (ibid.). We will see how the discourse of colonialism and the story-lines (re)producing it were displaced over time from the centre of nationalist discourse in Galicia to its margins. Hence, even today colonialism lives on as a discourse framing an understanding of the nation. It has survived and been sustained, although modified, both in the productions of fringe independence groups and other radical nationalisms outside the BNG since the late 1980s and within the margins of the BNG itself.

Moreover, specific collective actors have not necessarily been ‘monopolized’ by one discursive formation alone. Despite being the main locations producing the discourse of colonialism, neither the PSG nor the UPG were at any point unitary, homogeneous or monolithic discursive sites. It has often been remarked that the PSG was a split party, that is, it was notably heterogeneous or inhabited by distinct tendencies (Beramendi, 2008; Fernández Baz, 2003). For Baz, although clearly socialists, there
were differences within the PSG as regards the issue of nationhood, with one faction clearly being nationalists and another merely ‘galeguista’: subscribing to Piñeiro’s idea of ‘galicianizing’ the state-wide parties. For Beramendi the divergences were also along the left-right divide, with the party split between a ‘Marxist-nationalist’ wing and a ‘social-democrat’ one. I do not intend to resolve the character of the PSG’s split and identity here, merely to stress that it was a site producing and drawing on different and contradictory discourses, one of them being that of the nation as a colony.

But not even the UPG, despite their own rhetoric of unity and homogeneity, was ever such a homogeneous actor. In spite of their own ‘vanguard’ practices, the explicit prohibition of factions and the ethos of ‘identification’ of the membership with the leaders, the UPG was always a site of different discourses. Although colonialism gained and sustained the upper hand in the play of power/knowledge within the party for a long time, there were other important differences as to how to narrate this plot as well as other subplots relating to the party. It was the impossibility of resolving or admitting these tensions within a party organized by ‘democratic centralism’ which led to the common practice, which lasts to this day, of expelling from the party the minority positions –ones which did not carry the weight of the central committee at any given time. Thus, the party suffered numerous crises over time, many of them over the transition period when key party ‘routes’ and policies in the context of major political and social dislocation were being fought over and established. Only in 1977, the year of the first general elections after Franco’s death, did nationalist and communist groups whose understanding of class and nation was very different –such as the new UPG(l-p) (UPG proletarian-line) as well as the POG (Galician Workers Party, henceforth POG)— emerged from the same UPG matrix.

My point of departure here, therefore, is an understanding of Galician nationalism as a particular field of forces and forms of knowledge, of which the discourse of colonialism became hegemonic from 1972 until the early 1980s. These forms of knowledge and story-lines were inhabited, narrated, reproduced in and by a multiplicity of organizational sites, themselves the product and producers of these discourses: the PSG, UPG, AN-PG, trade unions, cultural associations, even the PCG and other non-
nationalist sites participated in the narrative of colonization. These sites drew upon a variety of metanarratives and often proffered contradictory political strategies, contributing their ‘unique’ or particularistic productions to the story-lines. Nationalism in Galicia during the late 1970s and early 1980s was an extremely complex and fluid field in which new groups were constantly emerging and disappearing in the form of new parties, a plurality of party dependent sectorial trade unions, cultural associations, an so on. It realised a multiplicity of precarious alliances whose purposes crossed, forming and dissolving: from the ‘Common Text’ to the ‘Consello’ and the ‘Bases Constitucionais’, from these to the AN-PG and BN-PG, from the ‘Consello’ to the socialist federation and ‘Unidade Galega’, from all these to the BNG, and so on. Thus, it is more fruitful to explore nationalism by focusing upon the different discourses and story-lines as opposed to individual party organizations as agents of point of departure.

The field of nationalism and some sites in particular, to paraphrase Foucault, acted as ‘specially dense transfer points for relations of power’ (1979: 103). The UPG is one such point where relations of power were played out: between us vis-à-vis them, friend versus enemy, ‘Galician people’ versus ‘Spanish imperialist state’, ‘nationalism’ versus ‘spanishism’ and ‘pseudo-nationalism’, vanguard versus followers, workers versus peasants, central committee versus membership, men versus women, to mention just a few.

The literary studies distinction between ‘sjuzet’ (or narrative discourse) and ‘story’ or ‘plot’ helps clarify thinking of the nationalist story-lines. Sjuzet is commonly defined as ‘the arrangement of incidents’ or ‘the ordering from a certain point of view’ of the story, the latter being the material, incidents or events presented which are inferred from the presentation (Prince, 2003; Culler, 1997). This basic concept of presentation or narrative discourse in the language of literary theory resembles that of story-lines. The story-lines formed at different nationalist sites contributed different productions or versions of the same ‘plot’, part of the discourse of colonialism, in a similar way in which there might be two stage versions of Hamlet or two films relying on a Cinderella plot.
There is, nevertheless, as Culler remarks, always a tension between the conception of
discourse (in the sense of narrative presentation) ‘as a representation of events which
must be thought of as independent’ of the story, and understanding that the ‘so-called
events’ (the story) ‘are thought of as the particular postulates or products of a
discourse’ (2000:108). In other words, as much as a story or the ‘reality’ of events
needs to be seen as independent and present in a variety of narrative presentations, it
is always also determined by a particular presentation. Thus, although the ‘common’
remainder or plot is a constitutive element of a discursive formation, it is difficult to
summarize the ‘plot’ of colonization without falling into one or another version of it,
one or another discursive sub-group. The UPG or PSG’s story-lines contributed to a
‘plot’, in the abstract, of colonialism, but constructed the discourse of colonialism not
as a unity, but as ‘regularities in dispersion’ (Foucault, 1969). In Vološinov’s terms, the
plot of colonialism was differently accentuated.

4.3. Myth debunking

The story-lines of colonialism were epic, romantic stories or even tragedies in
nationalistic representations of the nation. They narrated the lack of political and
economic development of Galicia, locating events in the xv century as the mythical
origin of all evils. This overarching narrative of Galicia was constructed in an
argumentative struggle with Spanish narratives of the nation, buttressed once again in
the dominant discourses of democracy and reform (Nuñez Seixas, 2007; Bastida
Freixedo, 2007). Nationalism’s first step in their reinvention of Galicia was to oppose
the traditional negative stereotypes and representations of the Galician people and
fight the ‘syndrome of the self-colonized’ (Fanon, 1963; Memmi, 1990). These
negative representations had been expounded by many of those who longed for the
‘progress’ of Galicia (such as the ‘provincialistas’ in the nineteenth century) by the
peasants themselves, as well as by powerful outsiders to Galicia. Typically, stereotypes
consisted of essentialised images of a passive and individualistic people: culturally
marginalised, degraded and disadvantaged. Even though Bauer’s interpretation of the images of self-denigration on the part of peasant communities as a strategic manipulation in their unwanted relations with state authorities—a view considerably more nuanced than the nationalist—he still acknowledges the endurance of negative self-portraits and the fact that these both reflected and fed back on higher ranking Spaniards appraisals of Galicians as ‘uncivilized’ and living in ‘primitive environments’ (1990:571). All ‘inner’, psychological character traits supposedly explained social and economic backwardness (Beramendi, 2007:128). That is, Galicians were made solely and collectively responsible of their own misfortunes partly through symbolic violence.

As a result, in true ‘anti-colonial’ form, the nationalist narrative was often explicitly orientated to the ‘debunking’ of assumed myths of Galicianness. ‘Myth debunking’ is a crucial strategy to undermine a pre-existing story, Ken Plummer notes, and a necessary step for the new story to take root (Plummer, 1995:67). Plummer found this strategy as the first to take place in the feminist movement’s construction in the 1970s of the story of rape (ibid.). Equally, Galician nationalists in late Francoism needed a major rhetorical ploy to destabilize received, oppressive forms of knowledge. Typically the Galician movement now claimed:

Extracts 4.1. On ‘myth debunking’.

[A] ‘Our party was born [...] as a product of the ideological struggle with the dominant crust of ‘spanishism’. [...] In this colonial situation it is not strange that the combat had to be initiated precisely by showing that our reality had a different set of coordinates from the rest of the state, and thus, a different political dynamic’

(‘The ideological combat’ in I Congress, UPG, 1977)

[B] “Things are exactly the other way round, whatever they say. A premature social frustration, a secular exodus, bourgeois rickets, lack of institutional solidarity, financial colonization: these are, perhaps, the key issues explaining the present economic backwardness of Galicia. The agrarianism, smallholding, ignorance, individualism, the state of communications [infrastructure], and so many other phenomena of relevance at first sight, are, if anything, symptoms of backward state, not its causes.”

(EBoG, X.M. Beiras, 1972)

In these extracts we can see how nationalists opposed the stereotypes which were part of the regime of representation of Galicianness that was available in the wider ideological domain inside and outside Galicia. In extract 4.1.a the origin of the party is
explicitly constructed as a consequence of the struggle against ‘Spanishim’. This is placed at the level of ideology, the second part of a key binary opposition in Galician nationalism, reality vs. ideology which works to discredit the ‘other’. Moreover, Galicia’s situation is already being represented as colonial, making it necessary (we are told) for the new party to undertake a pedagogical task: ‘the combat had to be initiated precisely by showing that our reality had a different set of coordinates from the rest of the state’. That is, their first ‘weapon’ against Spanishness was to tell a new story of Galicia.

Plummer explains that myth debunking often takes the form of a rhetorical inversion, whereby a reversal of the elements of the old tale provides the key elements for the new story (1995:68). We can see a version of this rhetorical stratagem in extract 4.1.b, where inversion takes the form of a transformation of ‘causes’ of backwardness into ‘symptoms’ of colonialism. Inversion and struggle are made explicit here: ‘things are exactly the other way round, whatever they say’. Then, in a contrasting structure the ‘real’ reasons or ‘causes’ of underdevelopment are opposed to the elements of the stereotype (agrarianism, individualism, etc) or mere ‘symptoms’ of a deeper problematic. This dichotomy between symptoms/causes implicitly positions others, again, as unable to see the ‘reality’ of backwardness –i.e. colonization. That is, it frames others’ diagnostic of the situation of the country as being, at best, the result of a ‘false consciousness’. This kind of ‘myth debunking’ is ubiquitously accomplished throughout the early texts of the story-line of colonialism.

Thus, the story-line of colonialism was a counter-narrative of the nation (Andrews, 2002) which forcefully opposed Spanish nationalism and the reform process. This story (together with other material practices) brought into being and validated an alternative history and political community for Galicia.
4.4. A First Episode: Galicia's fall from grace

The story-lines of colonialism tell us, to summarize the plot, how Galicia lost its economic and political autonomy to the Castilian monarchs, who set up the first policies that led to a process of colonization which has lasted to our day albeit in different forms: from feudalism to capitalism. Now, 'objectively' colonized and exploited, the Galician popular classes (i.e., workers, peasants and seamen) should follow the (vanguard / socialist) party and fight the colonial power, in either its fascist or bourgeois-democratic form, to achieve national liberation and a socialist or communist society—we are told. The narrative the nationalists constructed is, therefore, an incomplete narrative cycle (Todorov, 1990). It starts in medias res with the problem or situation which is already in some way deficient (the loss of freedom and of development) and narrates a prolonged state of 'disequilibrium' (five hundred years of colonialism, with a focus on the most recent decades) which ends with a political exhortation to the re-establishment of the implicit initial equilibrium of 'freedom' through a 'national-popular' struggle. Thus, as with most political narratives, the story-line does not have an end but proposes and projects alternative endings in the future depending on whether collective action is taken, even though there are preferred endings (Polletta, 1998; Shenhav, 2005). If stories, as Jerome Bruner claims, are told because they have to 'render the exceptional comprehensible' (Bruner, 1991) and by the same token establishing a norm, the 'exceptional' situations which the story-line of colonialism tries to make sense of are the backward economic situation of Galicia and its lack of political sovereignty.

It is important, nevertheless, to note an ambiguity in the status of these stories. On the one hand, the narrative space allocated to this episode is fairly small. This is significant. As Jeremy Tambling notes, an event's importance within a narrative is partly defined by the printed space given to it. That is, 'the narration assumes it knows what the important events are' (Tambling, 1991:14). We might deduce that the historiographic construction of national origins was not a major preoccupation for the movement at
this time. To a great extent, in fact, this work had already been accomplished by their predecessors, despite their ambivalent relation to it. On the other hand, Galician nationalists still grounded the origin of the economic condition and political situation of present-day Galicia (colonialism) on a series of events taking place in the fifteenth century, using history to legitimise their aims. Moreover, despite the few actual instances of telling, this story is typically evoked in nationalist discourse as a constituent part of the story-line of colonialism as well as often being metonymically invoked in many other nationalist narratives and stories60 (Polletta, 2006). It has become, as Barthes suggested of myths, a statement of fact (Barthes, 1957/2000). Thus, through a myriad of intertextual connections and citations this mythic moment of origin became ‘the bedrock for explanation’ of colonialism and the nation in Galician nationalism (Currie, 1998).

Inventing traditions

It has been often remarked that nationalism encourages the production of a set of pedagogical practices, invented traditions and historical accounts whose purpose is to establish continuity with a ‘suitable historical past’ of ‘the nation’ (Bhabha, 1990; Balibar, 1988; Calhoun, 1997; Chatterjee, 1993; Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983). As Etienne Balibar says, historical accounts are usually presented ‘in the form of a narrative which attributes to [nations] the continuities of a subject’ (1988:80). Although such perception is fictive, that does not undermine the power of myths of national origin to interpellate and mobilize audiences as ‘nationals’ (ibid.). These myths are the particular stories that tell us about the ‘founding event’ of the nation and its people, locating it either in much earlier ‘mythic’ times (the Galician Celts) or, alternatively, in recent ‘traditions’ that may correspond to ‘breaks’ with the past –the French Revolution (Hall, 1992; Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983). This kind of storytelling, Hobsbawm and Ranger noted, ‘help disenfranchised peoples to conceive and express their resentment and its contents in intelligible terms’ (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983:1). However, the underlying problem is not simply the ‘instrumental’ tendency of
nationalism to write ‘Whig’ histories but, as Hayden White noted, that any historical narrative is in fact a ‘verbal fiction’ whose contents are as much invented as found, ordered and moralised through emplotment (White, 1987, 1973). That is, all productions of knowledge involve a politics of representation and interpretation, are enmeshed in power relations—what Foucault called ‘power-knowledge’—and nationalisms do so in specific ways (Hall, 2001; Campbell, 1998; Foucault, 1976/1998).

The first episode in the story-line of colonialism was a social practice that attempted to found a new story for the nation. It is a paradigmatic example of the narrative mode of knowing, in Jerome Bruner’s words, in that it organizes experience with the help of a scheme assuming the intentionality of action, whether human or otherwise, and that it is especially viable for the negotiation of meanings (Bruner, 1986). This new story becomes a first step in the constitution of a new, alternative knowledge of Galicia, which was the main object of discourse. It established, in contrast to Spanish narratives, Galicia as the political community of reference. It represented the nation favourably, if tragically at points, understanding it within the productive tension of the negotiation of two ideological codes: Marxist and nationalist.

The myth(s) of loss

There are different renditions of the myth of origins in 1970s Galicia. I will examine here the UPG’s ‘Galiza as a colonized nation’ in the first congress (FC), comparing it to the Common Text for Galicia signed by UPG and PSG in 1973, and to X. M. Beiras’s tale of ‘A premature social frustration’ in AEdG as paradigmatic.


"Galicia as a colonized nation
The process of domination of Galicia by Spain was initiated very early and was consummated, mainly, when the Catholic monarchs began the construction of what will become the modern Spanish state; imperialist, and therefore, of a strongly authoritarian character. In an alliance with part of the Galician feudal nobility, which had to confront the social movement to supersede feudalism in our country (formed by the peasants that claimed the property of the land they worked, which was possessed by the lords; as well as by the embryonic urban commercial bourgeoisie strengthened by the pilgrimage route to
Santiago, and by the small rural landlords), they [the Catholic monarchs] consummated the ‘Taming and castration of the Kingdom of Galicia’.

Once the popular movement —the Irmandiños— was defeated, the Castilian monarchs decapitated Galicia politically forcing the Galician nobility to ‘delegate’ power to them. The nobility played their last card by supporting ‘the Beltraneja’ against Isabel the Catholic, in an alliance with the Portuguese nobility, but they lost. Ever since then any possibility of normal internal development from a feudal to a capitalist mode of production was shattered. This was because the normal ascendance of the bourgeoisie was brought to a halt as well as the [possibility] of an internally self-centred political process within Galician society, which remained politically dominated by Castile. A long colonization of our people begun. Peasants and fishermen had to suffer feudal taxes, taxes imposed by the monarchy, famines, fight corsairs [...] Colonial domination modified its form with the establishment of the capitalist mode of production in the Spanish State from the late 19th century, and it became worse during the last 20 years, with the acceleration of the process of capitalist accumulation and the rise of the state’s monopolist capital.” (UPG, ‘The UPG and the interpretive lines of Galician reality’ in First Congress, 1977)

The FC of 1977 recounted this tale which is a clear renarrativization of older stories of the nation. Benito Vicetto, novelist and historian, had rediscovered the (real) historical event of the Irmandiños revolts in the nineteenth century, and storied it as "la epopeya más grande y admirable" as well as a myth of the great Galician historical defeat. If the origin and essence of the nation was Celtic, the old narratives located the crux of the country’s decline in three interconnected events which allegedly occurred in the fifteenth century: the Irmandiños revolt, the decapitation of the ‘independentist’ noble count Pardo de Cela (absent in the first congress, CT and AEdG tales) and the final ‘taming and castration’ of the country by the Catholic monarchs. The Irmandiños revolt was often the background of the binary struggle between the Galician forces, represented by the nobility, and the Catholic monarchs in the latter’s desire to dominate the country.

The FC story, parts of which reproduce the earlier CT word by word, is a clear example of nationalism’s conservative nostalgia and pedagogical practices. Nationalism, Anderson notes, plays with memory (Anderson: 1983). National narratives involve a dialectic of remembering and forgetting historical events within the trope of ‘family’ affairs as a desired frame of intelligibility (1983:203). That is, inside the nation-state’s past societal cracks and conflicts are represented as ‘reassuringly fratricidal’, deaths which occurred centuries ago seen as ‘our own’ (ibid.). In the tale above, we catch a glimpse of this remembering and forgetting strategy. However, being not a state but an oppositional movement they needed to perform a double pedagogical task. The
foundational violence had to be narrated as ‘reassuringly foreign’ first, and only then as ‘reassuringly fratricidal’.

Indeed, the story’s main characters and events (‘Isabel la Católica’, the ‘Irmandiños’ or ‘the Beltraneja’) would have been ‘remembered’ by some, mainly educated Galicians, as heroes and villains in the stories of Spanish nationhood thanks to Spanish nationalizing efforts. For the old Galician nationalist narratives had been buried under pressure from the dictatorship. But these memories had to be subverted again, its events re-plotted, for nationalism to make its case. Unable to rely on a state apparatus to put a pedagogical industry to work –indeed functioning against one and in the other’s stead—, the tale invokes rather than narrates the events, focusing instead on providing a very explicit evaluation and moral world in order to educate new readers on who the national heroes and villains really were.

The FC tale, as well as the CT and AEdG, presents violence as ‘reassuringly foreign’. In all productions it was ‘Spain’ which (mainly) caused the trouble. All contemporary representations of this first episode present a remarkable narrowness and similarity of plot (re)telling only two events: the ‘Irmandiños’ revolt and the Castilian war of succession in the fifteenth century. However, there is dissimilarity in how these events are plotted. Whereas the FC equalizes them –roughly the same space is allocated to both— other tales such as CT and particularly AEdG, give more importance to the Irmandiños revolt and mention the Castilian war of succession almost in passing. This difference is not irrelevant. It is directly related to the different attributions of agency, praise and blame, which stories perform in spite of their overall externalization of responsibility.

FC makes the clearest delineation of heroes and villains similar to the mature Murguía’s structure of blaming. The FC insists on pointing to Spain / Castile / Catholic monarchy as deus ex machina causing almost single-handedly all the problems of the country. Depicted in a highly agentic manner, the Spanish monarchs seem to be in full control: ‘they consummated the process of domination’, ‘[they] decapitated Galicia politically’, the monarchy ‘castrated and tamed’ Galicians. FC quotes here the
masculinist representation of the nation in old narratives. The modern Spanish state is labelled ‘imperialist’ and ‘authoritarian’. It is the sum of these acts which has destroyed ‘ever since any possibility of internal development’. These epithets implicitly link a monarchy in fifteenth century Castile with their present situation of dictatorship, and connects the present of the nation with its past in a linear sequence, or ‘destiny’, which constructs the nation as that ‘solid community moving steadily down (or up) history’ (Anderson, 1983:26). Simultaneously, it essentialises the enemy, the authoritarian Spanish character, which remains the same despite historical changes over the 500 years in question. Thus, the tale in one stroke squarely blames Spain and displaces responsibility for the situation of backwardness away from Galicia(ns) — therefore externalizing the enemy— and eternalizes the consequences. In this eternalization FC is not alone: the AEdG tale insists that ‘four fifths of present Galician society live in the dead waters of the barren stage of our history opened five centuries ago’ when ‘historical time stopped’.

By giving so much weight to the war of succession the FC finds itself in a quandary. It must account for the feudal nobility’s liminal, ambiguous role and their responsibility for the loss of self-rule. Their alliance with the monarchs against the popular movement and their ‘delegation’ of power is simply carefully sidelined. Moreover, the nobility, it seems, redeemed itself historically by siding with the Portuguese pretender to the throne in the nationalist tales.

But this Manichean view of history, which correlates with a focus on the ‘external’ event of succession in Castile, is not rehearsed in all the narratives. While still blaming Castile/Spain for the present situation of the country, neither the AEdG nor the CT present such a stark black and white moral world. Crucially, they soften the responsibility of the Spanish monarchs. After narrating in detail the Irmandiña revolt, AEdG in its final moral simply states:

Extract 4.3. On blame

[a] “The frustration of the second Irmandiña revolt, followed by the defeat of the nobility which had taken sides with the Beltraneja, and by the consolidation of the absolutist monarchical Spanish state involved altogether the failure of a transition from feudalism as
well as the political death of Galicia, carefully embellished by the Catholic monarchy. Too many concatenated key events occurred to enable the recovery of the country [Galicia]" (AEdG, 1972)

[a] "The new Spanish monarchy found itself free in Galicia as, then, two decisive historical events have just happened." (CT, UPG&PSG, 1973).

In that only mention of the Castilian war of succession AEdG established a temporal contiguity between several complex factors which, taken together, explain the present situation of the country. The monarchy is represented as one more element in a fatalistic 'concatenation of events', even though responsible for 'embellishing' and taking advantage of the country's 'frustration' and 'failure'. So does the CT present the monarchs as finding an already weakened country, which they then exploit, as we see in extract 4.3. These productions of the tale then present a view of events characterized by complexity and fatalism, whilst the FC's tale established a more radical and simplistic duality and antagonism between Galicia and Castile / Spain. The overall significance of these two events, all the narratives unanimously conclude, is that taken together they mark the beginning of a colonization of Galicia which is said to continue up to the present day: 'a long colonization of our people begun'.

The attribution of blame to Spain which firstly marks violence as 'foreign' also works to implicitly perform the violence in the episode of the 'Irmandades' as Anderson's 'reassuring fratricide'. The two events are made sense of by embedding two different ideological codes: Marxist and nationalist. Classical Marxism provided a systematic account of history which had at its core the narrative whose plot is given by the 'laws of development of production'. At its core, this narrative relates different epochs of history ordered in terms of consecutive dominant modes of production —slavery, feudalism, capitalism. The change from one mode to the next happens when the material forces of production in a society come into conflict with the existing relations of production, and the social classes —the main characters of the narrative— struggle to achieve revolution (Himmelweit, 1991; Kiernan, 1991). The discourse of nationalism instead explains nationhood through a narrative whose plot typically attributes to the nation human characteristics and relates in different episodes its birth, golden age, period of recess or 'somnolence' and the coming of an 'awakening' hero who ends the
period of decadence (Özkirimli, 2000; Calhoun, 1997; Gellner, 1997). This neatly corresponds to the narration of Galician nationhood by Murguiña and earlier ‘galeguistas’: a Celtic origin, Swevian kingdom, its decline with arrival of the Catholic monarchs in Castile, and the period of ‘somnolence’ all the way up to the nineteenth century.

Whilst the war of succession is mostly told within a nationalist code, the Irmandiños revolt is often depicted within a clear Marxist narrative. It was an (inevitable) class struggle and within a theory of history as development of modes of production in Galicia. The FC normalizes the internal conflict by explicitly talking of a ‘normal internal evolution’ and ‘the normal ascendancy of the bourgeoisie’ even if only to remark on their failure. Indeed, it presents almost an ‘idyllic’ portrayal of Galicia. Idyllic because of the ‘normalcy’ it (implicitly) represents in the ‘original’ situation: an early example of a social movement in a thriving country, trying to supersede feudalism and making an early capitalist start. This mythologized golden age points to an alternative (national) history of Galicia, one in which it would have developed successfully, possibly into a socialist society and a nation-state, betraying an underlying teleology of history.

It is AEdG which attributes greater relevance to this event. It also normalizes it when describing it as ‘a European phenomena of class struggle in the process of social transformation since the end of the Middle ages’. CT confirms: ‘it was a struggle of the popular classes’. The AEdG dwells on the Irmandiños as a revolt at the expense of national antagonism. This was a struggle of ‘all the Galician social classes’ and of ‘the people’ against the ‘nobility’.

This presents the stories with the problem of defining who the nation is. Several contenders emerge: the ‘Galician feudal nobility’, ‘peasants’, the ‘small rural nobility’ and the ‘commercial urban bourgeoisie’. Galicia is not internally homogeneous but divided into social classes. This social division, however, is overcome in the FC by a common antagonism and in AEdG by fatalistic coincidence. Unlike the Spanish monarchy, none of these characters are represented as particularly active agents. The peasants and bourgeoisie are often portrayed as reluctant agents —‘the popular classes felt forced to unity in order to combat the dominant class’ (TC, UPG&PSG, 1972).
seem to be performing as an early attempt at a popular front: forming an ‘interclasist’ alliance. Nevertheless all of them are defeated and an ominous fate will await them for five hundred years: ‘peasants and fishermen had to suffer feudal taxes, monarchy taxes, famines, fight the corsairs...’. As a result, the foundational myth of the Galician movement in the 1970s paradoxically constructed Galicia as a centuries-long victim, forming a connection with the former nationalist theme of ‘aldraxe’ or affront (Beramendi, 2007).

But if social groups were immersed in class struggle then, was there any form of national unity? The answer is yes. Drawing on old nationalist narratives of nationhood, a differentiated Galician identity is simply assumed rather than explained in the stories. Galicia as a political unit predates social conflict, in what seems to be a implicit and unacknowledged reliance on Murguiá’s narrative of the primordial origins of Galician nationhood. The banal nationalist rhetoric of ‘us’ and ‘them’ and ‘here’ and ‘there’, as Billig remarked, is notoriously present throughout the tale, extract 4.2 (Billig, 1995). Invoking ‘Galicia’, ‘our country’ or ‘Spain’ brings these units into being as if they where already in the fifteenth century two fully formed ‘nations’, distinct political units, coextensive with present day Spain and Galicia. As explained above, the stories represent Galicia as on the brink of social success. However, the smooth meandering of (class-) history is broken when the trouble ensues in the form of foreign conquest, and from then on the tale constructs a different Galician family history.

4.5. Generic implications

Jerome Bruner counted canonicity and genericness among the key features of any narrative (Bruner, 1991:11). Genres are recognizable kinds of narrative which provide readers and writers with a ‘conventional model for limiting the hermeneutic task of making sense of human ‘happenings’ (ibid:14). The first congress of the UPG in 1977 mythologizes origins in one of these common plot forms: romance. Romance is a genre which has typically been deployed with a social, ideological function, Northrop Frye
described romance as marked by persistent nostalgia and a search for a golden era (Frye, 1957:186), which here takes the form of Galicia as a successful social formation in the middle ages. In romance the trouble that starts the action is attributed to a villain or outside force (i.e. the Castilian monarchs, Spanish capitalism). The heroes are separated from some object of desire (liberation, socialism) and characters are usually presented as starkly good or evil. The plot then typically unfolds as an adventure, in the form of the quest of the hero – in this case the popular classes, the party— in a sequence of a perilous journey followed by a crucial struggle leading to the final exaltation of the hero (Frye, 1957:187). The romance of the Galician nation is peculiar in that it starts in medias res, with the trouble: represented in the myth of loss, the time it all went wrong. Then, it rushes through five hundred years of history (or history simply stops) to bring us to a contemporary setting for the second episode. Even if this myth is allocated little overall space in the story world of these groups, it nevertheless underpins their sense of (collective) self, contemporary grievances and justifies the present day quest for liberation.

The romantic dualistic scheme of struggle of ‘essential virtue against a virulent vice’ is nevertheless ultimately transitory (White, 1973:150). For inscribed in all romance there is a salvational perspective, what Jameson calls a ‘utopian longing’ (Jameson, 1983). Jameson notes that Marxism provides a redemptive perspective of some secure future (Jameson, 1983:90). Romance, he continues, ‘seems to offer the possibility of sensing other historical rhythms, and of demonic or utopian transformations of the real now unshakably in place’ (1983:91). As with Marxism, nationalist visions of history encoded in the tale share this salvational plot structure. This salvational perspective will be inscribed in the next episode which, we will see, focuses on the present day’s crucial battle: the one which the movement and the country are carrying out against the Spanish Imperialist/centralist state for rupture and liberation.

Nevertheless, not all stories were romances. The AEdG’s plot more closely resembles a tragedy where the story begins with a problem significant to society originating in a ‘tragic flaw’ of the hero. This flaw is intimate and integral to our human identity and not sublimated in an external force. The action then, consists of discovering the truth
behind the problem, to absorb its consequences and restore justice. 'The Galician people' Beiras remarks in relation to mass migration in another episode in the story of colonization, 'is a biblical people: all the curses of the old testament seem to have fallen upon it' (Beiras, 1972:39).

These kind of generic implications are important because, as literary institutions—social contracts between a writer and a specific public (Jameson, 1983:92)—genres are forms that add something to the content they carry. The convey a certain expectation. The force of convention, the deeply carved patterns of reading in collective memory, might limit what can be credibly told. Conversely, as in stories of underdogs, canonicity might be socially and politically enabling. Francesca Polletta has seized on this idea of a salvational perspective to suggest that some stories offer 'fortifying myths' (Polletta, 1998). That is, they allow social movements to stir allegiances and hold on to the idea of future success in the face of defeat. The romance, as it suggests a happy ending for the country, functions this way.

4.6. Conclusion

These representations of the first episode in Galician nationalism construct a shared narrative for nationalism, but also bear different interpretations of the political. Whereas the FC constructs a centuries old colonization of the country through a clear antagonistic political frontier with Spain, the other stories, which cannot be simply traced back to particular actors, present a more nuanced policy of blaming.

The stories here already posses a mythical quality, as Barthes explained. They are a metalanguage or meta-story, a myth, with the intention of teaching us that there was an anomaly, an original loss of some precious possessions (freedom and class struggle), which created our problems today and, therefore, point already to their solution in a 'pedagogical' way—in their straightforward and explicit, even Manichean political and moral conclusions. They rely on signifiers (the Irmandiños revolt, the war
of succession), in Barthes’s sense of the word, which occurred five centuries ago to put forward a concept, in this case colonialism (Barthes, 1972). These stories construct, as Barthes put it, ‘a certain knowledge of reality’ (1972:119). That is, they are not arbitrary but ‘motivated’; there is always some fragmentary analogy between meaning and form, the events and the myth. The myth of colonialism is a story both true and unreal.

This first episode that does not focus on the origins of the nation, narrates the origin of the colonization of Galicia by Spain. It is a tale of loss. It tells the double failure of the implicit, ideal freedom of the ‘Kingdom of Galicia’ and of the ‘normal’ [economic] developmental evolution of the nation. This failure is accounted for in terms of foreign and fratricidal violence. This is a story about how Galicia became a colonized country: ‘colonialism’ is the plot and serves to make sense of the significance of the different events. Rather than founding nationness, nationalists founded a ‘lack’. Simultaneously, by remarking the moment of loss, nationalists were implicitly remarking both the antiquity and past success of Galicia as a people in class terms and as a nation. As Mark Currie notes, stories of origin underpin moments of purity and presence (1998:83). The myth of loss narrates this point of purity and presence as the idyllic situation of class struggle in the frame of the nation, two discursive moments which signal the success of Galicia as a ‘social formation’. What comes afterwards, the consequences of the events narrated, we are told, are the country’s complete fall from grace.

If the stories historicize the country by relying on elements of old nationalist narratives, they also meant as a radical shift of attention away from the stories of origins accomplished by nineteenth century historians in the form of myths of racial difference such as ‘Celtism’. Ethnicity, whether in the form of race, volk, language or land, was the key element of old nationalisms (Cabrera Varela, 1992; Máiz, 2000; Beramendi, 2007; Patterson, 2006). Yet it is absent as an element of the stories of loss written in the 1970s in spite of these stories’ essentialism. Contemporary nationalism was not preoccupied with founding the nation. Instead, it narrated the origin of the loss of nationhood, the events that led to it, in a moment mythically located in fifteenth century battles which, in their story-world, marked the beginning of the end of history for Galicia.
The differences between earlier and present narratives of Galicia are not negligible: the old nationalism had founded an ethnic nation which was asleep, in need of being reawakened. This trope of ‘awakening from sleep’ was common to European nationalisms of the nineteenth century. It suited diverse intelligentsias as it opened up, in Anderson’s words, an ‘immense antiquity behind that epochal sleep’ and it served to justify and legitimize the connection between statehood and vernacular languages which was absent in polyglot empires (1983:196). Contemporary nationalism’s narratives found, instead, a nation oppressed, the object/subject of domination and exploitation, in need of liberation. These narratives called for a different type of politics: whilst former forms of nationalism had demanded a statute of autonomy, in the 1970s the radical movement which demanded rupture with the system of oppression was mired with ambivalence as to their ultimate goals.

Framed within the narrative of colonialism, economic backwardness and political conservatism ceased to be seen in terms of ‘traits of Galician character’ or culture – part of the dominant archetype of Galicianness. Instead, they became a structural problem where Galicia and its (popular) classes were victims of Spain or the Spanish oppressors even if to varying extents. Victimization is, nevertheless, a double edged sword. It stems from the shifting of blame and is used as a rhetorical device for mobilization and struggle: as such it is empowering. However, it also implies a long lasting passivity and surrender of agency, which may work for contrary purposes. Colonialism calls, therefore, for a different type of collective action than ‘backwardness’. It is a veritable call to arms, as it is difficult to imagine any society passively acquiescing to its own colonization.
The new Attila (II): the modern colonization of the nation

5.1. Introduction.

My aim in this chapter is to present the main story-lines and discursive strategies – i.e. the particular themes, theories and devices through which knowledge about Galicia was developed and subjects constituted (Foucault, 1969) – employed by Galician nationalists during the years 1972-1980. I focus mainly, but not only, on the narrative practices of the UPG – the main discursive subsystem – and its small and big stories of ‘the colonization today’. I argue that the entire discursive formation drew systematically on alternative and competing versions of Marxist master-narratives as well as on local narratives of nationhood to negotiate hybrid and ambivalent ‘Galician Marxist’, ‘patriotic communist’ or ‘nationalist and socialist’ identities. However, these plots produced tensions and contradictions hardly contained in their narratives and practices. At the same time, they were forced to reckon with ‘others’ which posed clear limits to the level of their identification.

Contemporary narratives of Galicia were ordered and organized around the ideological themes of ‘colonialism’. These themes in fact displaced ‘nation’ as the key discursive object and plot of the narratives. Colonialism as such became what Ernesto Laclau calls a nodal point: the referent which binds together a diffuse set of themes, strategies and styles (Laclau, 2005). Colonialism functioned as a metaphor for the nation – as noted in chapter four – and it came to embody the movement’s liminal, ‘in-between’ and mimic goal of national and social liberation. The consequence of this ‘in-betweenness’ was an unsolvable ambiguity, aporia, and constant tension between the issues of class versus national struggle in the discursive practices of the nation.
The key discursive strategy by which the discourse of colonialism was established was the constitution of a fierce antagonistic relationship with Spain and ‘españolismo’. Then, it relied on notions of class to narrate the ‘people’. To solve problematic tensions and paradoxes the radical movement further developed complex discursive strategies involved in the drawing of political boundaries, such as the complex interlinking of Marxist masternarratives —the plot of the inexorable development of the modes of production and the anti-colonial plot— and the twin strategies of narrativization and identification of the paradox between nation and class (Czarniawska, 1997). These were common techniques utilised to talk about and represent the nation and the movement. However, it is important to bear in mind that not all story-lines of colonialism necessarily employ all of the above mentioned strategies.


I examine in this section the discursive constitution of colonialism as an ‘object’ of knowledge, in Foucault’s words ‘all that was said in all the statements’, the stories, ‘that named it, divided it up, described it, explained it’ (Foucault, 1972:32). However, it is important to note that objects of discourse are not stable, formed once and for all, but are subject to continuous transformations. It is noticeable how the idea of colonialism changed from story to story, in time, from site to site: all textual productions inflicting subtly different overdeterminations, responding to diverse local contexts, performing colonialism differently. I deal with the main themes and concepts that persist in constituting Galicia as a colony, discussing them as they appear embodied in particular texts and stories which became ‘beacons’ for the movement: were referred to, invoked, invested with canonical status and with normative power.
The colonialism story-lines

During the 1970s in Galicia ‘colonialism’ formed that ‘quilting point’ or ‘knot of meanings’ whose name brought about the unity of a new discursive formation resignifying Galician nationhood. It was the name which retroactively produced the Galician nation (Laclau, 2005:103). ‘Colonialism’ became the name which condensed everything that was wrong with Galicia at the time. It was the ‘stand in’ for the universal ‘liberation’ which had ‘national and social’ components. This connection was brought about by the new narrativization of the country, whose moral was that being a colony caused all the countries’ troubles and what was needed was liberation. As we will see, this rallying point eventually proved to be flawed. During the dislocatory time of the transition to democracy in Spain, the sites formed part of the new discourse which had as their first political task the telling of a new story of nation and exploitation. What was needed was a new terrain for action. Thus, in the discourse of colonialism Galicia was re-imagined as a colony.

The new story-lines comprised mainly two episodes: the original loss (examined in chapter 4) and the modern capitalist exploitation. This second episode’s plot revolved around the effects of capitalist oppression in a country already located under ‘foreign’ political domination. In the movement’s story-world, the arrival of the capitalist mode of production had changed the situation of Galicia for the worse. Colonial domination remains, but it is transformed from pre-capitalist relations of domination to a capitalist version of the same thing. Galicia was often portrayed as a nation rich in natural resources (i.e. with a clear economic potential) which was poor because it had been inserted into the international capitalist system as a provider of raw materials for Spain. All story-lines of colonialism correspond in these broad strokes but differ in some dimensions of the tale. Both UPG and PSG’s productions offer alternative endings: either ameliorative collective action is undertaken (‘national and social liberation’ understood either as rupture and the program of the
'Bases Constitucionais' or as a planned and democratically controlled socialist economy) or colonization will remain.

Extracts. 5.1. Colonialism as quilting point

"[A] A long colonization of our people has begun. [...] Colonial domination modified its form with the beginning of the capitalist mode of production in the Spanish State from the end of the XIX century, and this worsened over the last 20 years, with the acceleration of the process of capitalist accumulation and the ascendancy of the state's monopoly capital." (UPG, 'The UPG and the interpretive lines of Galician reality' in First Congress, 1977)

[a] "It is vital to distinguish national oppression from colonialism: colonialism is a form of national oppression but the inverse might not be true. [...] National subjugation on top of economic underdevelopment is already something qualitatively different: it is colonialism. The Galician problem is that of simultaneous national, economic, social and cultural subjugation and solving it rests on the decolonization of the country" (López-Suevos, Of Colonial Capitalism, 1979)

[c] "The backward economic state, the emigration, cultural negation, etc are phenomena that need to be considered globally, because they are the logical consequences of the colonial subjugation in which Imperialism keeps the working people of Galicia through the oppressive action of the Spanish state ('A party, for what?' Christmas 1977, PSG)

All these texts illustrate this re-inscription of Galicia as a colony. 'Colony' and 'colonialism' became recurring terms in the stories, forming a new semantic field to make sense of the country. There was a clear textual 'over-wording'. Galicia was in big and small tales represented as 'chained' (aferrrollada), 'dependent', 'subordinated', 'exploited', 'annexed', 'alienated', 'frustrated' among other similar terms. 'The problem is colonial, its solution political' became the litany of the movement. But this formula needs to be unpacked. For, as extract 5.1. b shows, what colonialism meant as regards the situation in Galicia was far from obvious. What did it mean to be a colony?

In the late 1960s and the 1970s many studies from Latin American dependency theories to European theorists -Lafont, Hetchter, etc- developed and adapted the theme of colonization to intranational circumstances in different ways. Sociologist Gonzalez Casanova, discussed the nature of a colony and argued that 'internal colonialism' was a new analytical category useful for the study of development, and he specifically applied it to the situation of the Indian population within the Mexican
nation-state (Casanova, 1965). For him, internal colonialism ‘corresponds to a structure of social relations based on domination and exploitation among culturally heterogeneous, distinct groups’ (1965:33). The Indians in Mexico were dominated and exploited by a structure modelled on relations of colonization. Typically, they suffered a distorted economic development accommodated to the needs of the ‘metropolis’; economic dependence on one single sector and product; the exploitation of (Indian) cheap labour; minimum wages and repression. Compounding this image was a racial and cultural discrimination. Taking up this theme, Robert Lafont wrote his influential ‘The regionalist revolution’ where he transposed the idea of colonization to the situation of the French regions. ‘Interior’ colonialism happened, he argued, even though the oppressed population had full civic rights. Nevertheless, compared with Casanova’s ‘internal’ colonialism, this was a narrower category. It referred purely to a series of capitalist economic processes which resulted in ‘regional underdevelopment’. For Lafont, the ‘regional man’ was without doubt already a Frenchman: that is, unlike with Casanova, cultural differences were not relevant in his analysis (Lafont, 1971:120).

Equally, ‘colonization’ was qualified in all Galician foundational narratives at some point. It was ‘internal’, ‘central’ —as opposed to taking place at the periphery of the capitalist system—, happening ‘between societies with different economic systems’ or ‘of fact, but not form’. Anti-colonialism was a powerful symbolic resource, but adjustments were needed. For there were also obvious differences between some markers of the Galician social experience —of underdevelopment, migration, diglossia and symbolic violence but within the boundaries of the same state, cultural and social proximity, and absence of civic rights discrimination- and the raw and variegated experiences of alien territorial invasion and colonization in third world countries as Lafont had also argued. Nevertheless, it was generally argued that despite the gap between the experience of Galicia and third world countries, ‘colonialism’ understood in its strongest terms still applied as the key category to make sense of Galician reality65. Myriad complex economic and cultural phenomena fell, in these story-lines, under a single global name as GS notes or López-Suevos explains in extracts 5.1.b and c. T& T made this point more explicitly: “the
mechanisms of imperialist exploitation are the same in a colony of [the] so-called 'third world' than in a colony denominated internal to the capitalist and imperialist states'. (T&T, n 38, 1976).

Although cultural discrimination was part of the colonial experience, 'colonialism' in these narratives was generally spoken of in economic and political terms. Indeed, it was commonly represented as a double system of oppression: not simply political domination of the nation, as happened, we are told, in Catalonia and the Basque country, and not merely economic or class exploitation as could be found in Andalusia. Instead, it is the combination and enmeshing of both which gives the phenomena of colonialism its defining traits (extract 5.1.b). Together, these also bring about the cultural, mainly linguistic, demise of the nation.

If the oppression to which Galicia was being subjected to was a multifarious one — 'backward economic estate, emigration, cultural negation, etc ...need to be considered globally' (extract 5.1.c) — the grievances narrated by the movement were overwhelmingly economic. Drawing on recurring binary oppositions, such as 'real vs. apparent' 'rational vs. irrational', drawn from theories of development, growth and development were said to be absent. The movement decried mainly the 'irrational industrialization' of the country: the location in the country of 'enclave' industries such as paper factories, opencast mining and power stations which were not designed to satisfy the material necessities of its inhabitants, polluted the environment and created few jobs. These industries were said to bring about 'mirroring' growth instead of 'real' development66. Capitalism was destroying the (pre-capitalist) peasant economy and 'natural' Galician way of life without providing much needed agricultural reform. Moreover, emigration was forced upon citizens of the nation as a result of all of the above. These injustices, which were the main grievances narrated in all the story-lines, were used to make explicit the link between economic backwardness and 'colonization'. A series of very real economic problems and state economic policies were signifiers transformed, through ordering them into a narration, into irrefutable symptoms of colonization. The consequence of this focus and vocabulary was that culture and ethnicity issues — the basis of
nationhood in the 1930s—were relegated to a secondary position in the concerns of the Galician radical movement at this time.\(^6\)

The main troubles and miseries faced by the country were ‘colonial’ according to the movement’s pedagogy. These \textit{mainly economic} evils were attributed, however, to a political source. The responsibility for the underdevelopment of Galicia lay on its lack of ‘decision-making powers’ or ‘self-determination’ rather than on economic processes like capitalist concentration and exploitation.

\textit{Extract 5.2. On the political solution to colonialism.}

\begin{itemize}
\item [a] “The Galician popular classes need political sovereignty in order to undertake agrarian and fishing reforms; to take on a rational industrialization of the country; to invest in Galicia the savings of our immigrants; to end emigration once and for all; to make Galician the sole official language in Galicia; to build a democracy without monopolies. Only a democratic and popular Galician state would be able to carry on these measures, necessary to start the material and cultural reconstruction of the country and to improve substantially the living conditions of our people…” (‘What is the UPG?’ (T&T, UPG, 1977)

\item [b] “These problems will only be solved when the Galician people can decide their own destiny by themselves, when we have collective ownership of the means of production, when the workers achieve a democratically constituted power. That is, in a free and socialist Galicia.” (‘A party, for what?’ Christmas 1977, PSG)
\end{itemize}

The story-lines of colonialism had the double goal of obtaining the ‘national and popular liberation’ and ‘a free and socialist Galicia’. Liberation is a liminal, ambivalent signifier in-between radical nationalism and Marxism. This in-betweenness is here emphasized by qualifying as simultaneously \textit{national and social}, even though, as we will see below, this seeming paradox will often be solved by a postpotment into the future of social liberation. Thus, although often conflated, as Young remarks, the emancipatory demand for ‘national liberation’ is different from nationalism as such\(^6\) (2001:171). As a result of this radical indeterminacy at the core of the movement’s aims, the proposed political solutions are also posed in imprecise terms—‘\textit{when the Galician people can decide their own destiny by themselves}’—from federation to independence. Sovereignty is sometimes narrated as the solution to the country’s woes as it will enable it ‘\textit{to undertake agrarian and fishing reforms, to take on a rational industrialization of the country, to invest in Galicia the savings of}’
our immigrants ...'. Most claimed ‘self-determination’ was paramount—in a Lenin inspired, sought for indeterminacy which was criticized by the ‘left-wing’ splits of the UPG—some a ‘Galician government’ or even a ‘Galician state’. Although in all cases a federation with other nations of the Spanish state and Portugal was considered an appropriate political arrangement. This has been particularly true for the PSG which clearly sees a federation as the solution to Galicia’s colonial problems.

The ‘Spanish crust’: constituting antagonism with Spain

Nationalism is an ideology of the third person plural. (National) identities are relational, systems of differences between self and other. In other words, the construction of the national ‘we’ is always done in relation to an ‘Other’. The constitution of identity is achieved through discursive work, the inscription of symbolic boundaries and production of ‘frontier-effects’ which serve to distinguish an ‘inside’ from an ‘outside’, a ‘self’ from an ‘Other’, a ‘domestic’ from a ‘foreign’ (Campbell, 1992; Hall, 1996a). Hence, identities are the result of the institution of political frontiers created through processes of ordering, othering and exclusion and, precisely because of always leaving something outside them—an overdetermination or lack, never a proper fit’, Hall remarked of processes of identification (Hall, 1996a:3)—they are always unstable, subject to possible rearticulations and change. This frontier-making process both requires that the ‘Other’ which is left outside constitute itself and it constitutes this ‘Other’ simultaneously, in a relationship which has been defined as one of ‘degrees of antagonism’ (Thomassen, 2005:290). It is in this sense that the orders created are political: they are always based on different kinds of exclusions, instituted through power (ibid.). Stories and narratives of the nation are some of these ordering and boundary-drawing practices and they iteratively perform and instantiate the identities in whose name they operate.

The story-lines of colonialism told repeatedly through the years between 1972 and 1981 represented the nation, ‘we’ being the Galician popular classes, as colonized by Spain: it is difficult to imagine a clearer antagonism and threat to the nation’s
existence. This enemy—which signifies a pure negativity and anti-community, being the ‘anti-Galicia’— was nevertheless represented in multiple, overlapping but ultimately also different ways in the story-lines which formed the discourse of colonialism. Whereas the anti-Galicia was represented by the ‘Spanish colonial state’, ‘spanishism’, ‘Spanish imperialist oligarchy’ in the UPG’s tales, the PSG’s narratives represented it as the ‘centralist state’. This different, if intersecting and related, representation of the enemy entails very different political consequences for nationalist groups similarly located within the discursive formation of colonialism. The main consequence is that it allows divergent and eventually conflicting political frontiers ‘friend’ vs. ‘enemy’ to be constructed. That is, the varied conceptualization of the enemy brings about a different system of social classification and political order. In fact, the incumbency of the very category ‘nationalism’ was vigorously fought over and the lines demarcating ‘us’ / ‘nationalists’ from ‘them’ / ‘Spanishists’ and ‘pseudo-nationalists’ were variously drawn and re-drawn—some, as we will see in the UPG’s narratives, in exceedingly exclusionary ways.

The UPG and linked sites

The construction of an antagonistic relation with Spain was the main discursive and narrative strategy to be found in the diverse productions of the discourse of colonialism. This was often explicitly posed in the narratives of the nation and the movement by the UPG:

Extracts 5.3. On antagonisms.

[A] “In countries like ours the first duty ...is the identification of the principal enemy. This principal enemy is the monopolist Spanish oligarchy, and its fundamental repressive means, at the service of its class interests, is the Spanish Imperialist State.” (‘Justification of the formation of the Galician national-popular bloc’, I Congress, UPG, 1977)

[B] “Our party was born [...] as a product of the ideological struggle with the dominant crust of ‘spanishism’ [españolismo]. Ideological ‘spanishism’ which was contaminating all the social sectors of the country, even the most politicized and concerned about their own reality’. (‘The ideological combat’, I Congress, UPG, 1977).
The UPG’s production of colonialism (as extract 5.3.a. shows) points in Maoist rhetoric to so-called ‘principal enemies’ of the Galician nation. This ‘principal enemy’ is said to be ‘the portion of the enemy which, if defeated, would bring about a qualitative change favourable to the interests of the people’ (AN-PG, Boletín n3, March 1976). The nationalists used, often interchangeably, a series of signifiers such as ‘monopolist Spanish oligarchy’, ‘Spanish monopoly bourgeoisie’, ‘Spanish Imperialist State’, ‘colonial state’, ‘monopoly capitalism’, ‘world imperialism’ as the names of the enemy. Two features can be noted here. First, the dominant leitmotiv of the UPG’s and AN-PG’s story-line is twofold: to situate the evils of Galician society mainly in relations inherent to an enmeshment of the economic system and the (inter)national system. Thus, this hybrid enemy is delineated by its exploitative and oppressive role in the relations of production and exchange, which prevent a ‘real’ development of the Galician social formation. The country is here imagined as dependent and exploited by a (foreign) class. Secondly, the stress lays not on ‘imperialism’ as an international system, even though it is present, but on Spain and the Spanish character of the exploitation and domination of Galicia. The enemy, even though posed at a ‘world-system’ level, remained at this time decidedly local.

But extracts 5.3 also manifest a series of slippages and tensions as regards the form that this antagonism ‘us’ / ‘them’, Galicia vis-à-vis Spain, takes in the UPG’s story-world. Whereas in the narratives of the nation—which abound in the text of the first congress and in the T&T magazine over the period 1976-1979— this antagonism is constructed repeatedly as one between the ‘Galician popular classes’ vs. ‘Spanish imperialist state’ or between ‘the people’ vs. ‘the oligarchy’ (extract 5.2.a), in the tales narrating the life story of the Galician national movement—appearing in the same texts—the antagonism is routinely represented as ‘nationalism’ vs. ‘spanishishm’ (extract 5.2.b). By the time of the UPG’s II congress in 1979, even though the former contradiction was present, the ‘contradiction’ nationalism vs. spanishishm was already all pervasive throughout the text71. In fact, both can be said to be ‘the’ main contradiction.
But 'the SIS' and 'spanishism' are by no means synonymous. On the one hand, by means of the first antagonistic formula, the main source of oppression and domination is represented as a series of economic forces originating at the level of international society but acting in and through Spain. This representation draws on a typical Marxist topographical metaphor by appearing to see the enemy as constituted at the 'base' of the social system: capitalism, colonialism, private and public companies or oligarchies are all related to the sphere of production or the name of an economic system. This economic oppression is sustained by the workings of a political system: Francoism and the new 'repressive' liberal democracy in the making. Thus, the 'SIS' was often very crudely constructed – in an economism typical of the orthodox narratives of Marxism— as a mere 'instrument' of capitalism and class domination (extract 5.2.a). These instrumental institutional positions were occupied institutionally by a variety of archetypes in the tales: the Spanish central government, the Galician local major and town council, the official trade union in Galicia, the police and even the authorities of local sporting clubs.

On the other hand, narratives of the movement and party construct the enemy as 'spanishism'. This is defined as a purely ideological form or 'superstructural' in terms of Marxist metaphor. The first congress defines it as 'the ideological aspect of the struggle popular classes / imperialism in our country' (UPG, I Congress, 1977). Hence, the antagonism that was constructed in the narratives of the nation between the 'Galician popular classes' vis-à-vis 'Spanish imperialism' was often re-narrativized under a second antagonism: 'nationalism' vs. 'spanishism'. Such re-narrativization was not inconsequential. From claiming that monopoly capitalism and its state 'instruments' were responsible for the frustration of the development and freedom of Galicia —a claim which carries with it the de-nationalization of the Galician bourgeoisie and much of the political class—, the nationalists proceeded to affirm that it was, in fact, a particular ideology and those who held it were responsible for 'sustaining' the workings of 'colonialism' in the country. Hence, the bearers of 'spanishist' thought were made responsible for the deficient situation in the country as a whole.
This slippage from ‘SIS’ to ‘spanishism’ functioned, then, to expand the category of the enemy—and consequently to restrict that of ‘friends’. Crucially, these enemies were not defined in class terms now as were the former ‘oligarchy’ and ‘monopoly companies’, but in national terms: as those ‘who sanctify the unitary structure of the Spanish State’ (I Congress, UPG, 1977). Who are these ‘those’? What does ‘sanctifying’ the unitary structure of Spain mean?

Extract 5.4. On spanishism

“The spanishism, in its right or left wing forms, is the ideological-political expression of imperialism; manifested either under colonial, neo-colonial or pseudo-liberatory forms. As much as they proclaim themselves democrats, socialists or even communists, the spanishists are objectively counter-revolutionary, for they do not assume the colonial oppression of Galicia with all its consequences” (The self-organization of the Galician popular classes in order to achieve the above mentioned objectives, I congress, UPG, 1977)

As seen in extract 5.4, the category of ‘spanishism’ was actually endowed with ample indeterminacy: it could be left or right wing, colonial or neo-colonial. Moreover, the enemy could also present itself disguised under ‘pseudo-liberatory’ forms. However, whatever they said, these forces ‘would be objectively counter-revolutionary’ for ‘they do not assume the colonial oppression of Galicia with all its consequences’. Being ‘spanishists’ seems in fact to hinge around this vague expression: ‘with all its consequences’. It does not clarify much. In fact, in principle it allows that virtually anyone, even those nationalists who think Galicia as a colony and pursue its liberation, might be denationalized if they do not follow this tenuous prescription. Thus, voicing the ‘incorrect’ viewpoint or pursuing the ‘wrong’ policy will potentially render anyone non-national (as the PSG soon discovered) and ‘real’ nationalism should ever remain watchful.

This shift of antagonism represented a major strategy of the ‘othering’ of the left in Galicia. In the UPG’s narrative world these enemy groups were mainly constructed as the left-wing state-wide parties —‘democrats, socialists or even communists’— and othered by positioning them as ‘spanishists’ and ‘branchists’72 (‘sucursalistas’). The othering of left-wing state wide parties was helped by another slippage: the
equation of 'popular classes' with 'nationalism'. That is, popular classes in these narratives become not the nation as such, but a particular political movement. This slippage collapsed the relation of representation that was being constructed – nationalism fighting for the interests of the Galician popular classes— for the representatives were said to be the represented. Now, membership of 'nationalism' was also being fought over and policed. Critically, the enemy could now at times be personified by Galician nationalist parties (such as the PSG or POG) who were othered as 'pseudo-nationalists'.

Nevertheless, there is a clear tension in the shift from excluding the 'monopoly oligarchy' from any concept of the people to the exclusion of left-wing, radical Spanish forces and other socialist Galician nationalist parties, such as the PSG, PCG, MCE, etc. In terms of the UPG's own narratives the shift was quite unwarranted. For it is difficult to see how the membership of Spanish-wide trade unions or the communist parties in Galicia, native workers and peasants themselves, had 'colonised' the country. They were certainly not the forces benefiting from unequal trade relations or exploitation at the level of production: colonization as narrated by the UPG. It was equally contentious to affirm that 'defeating' them would achieve that qualitative change so favourable to the Galician people, such as the defeat of the 'principal enemy' would supposedly do. At worst, these groups could be accused—in a move typical of anti-colonial struggles—of being 'self-colonized' or entrapped by a false consciousness and named as a problem. As we will see below, that is more or less the PSG's own attitude to many of these groups: othered as 'branchist' often, they nevertheless inhabited a liminal space for they were not radically excluded as enemies. For the PSG they could be attracted to the movement.

The displacement of one antagonism for another, thus, created tensions and contradictions. This shift implied an overdetermination and reduction of the social (class based) to the national. The overlapping of the frontier-effects of class and 'proper nationalism' meant a more restricted rule of belonging and nationhood. Class and nationhood principles stood in uneasy tension. This slippage of antagonisms was to have practical consequences for the movement, for it turned
their attention towards an inward, both intra-movement and intra-left, 'logic of self-assertion' (Howarth, 2000). It established the UPG's own practice of nationalism or populism as the norm to be followed; norms which could change as the party's practice changed. Thus, this norm would create paradoxes such as denationalizing those who had been their partners at different times —such as the PSG when writing the 'Common text' (1973) and forming the 'Consello de Forzas Politicas Galegas' (1976)- and directing major efforts to fighting the political left at the height of the transition process when it was the former Francoist elites in the form of the Suarez government that were still in power and directing the process of reform.

Hence, the UPG had embarked on a fierce, and highly visible, 'normalizing' narrative judgement (Foucault, 1975) of the field of Galician politics. Story-lines and discourses for Foucault have normalizing roles and regulatory outcomes (Foucault, 1979). We can see how these narratives explicitly convey messages about appropriate 'nationalism'. They 'qualify, classify and punish', they order and 'other' groups according to an underlying norm, which they also establish, of 'correct nationalism': the right national behaviour which was the true being of the popular classes. This norm, however, was effectively embodied by the party itself by — the tautological— virtue of its 'scientific' and vanguard character.

How was this shift accomplished? How was the antagonism of 'popular classes' versus 'Spanish imperialism' in the narratives of the nation made to coincide with that of 'nationalism' versus 'spanishism'? By virtue, I argue, of another key discursive strategy in the story-line of colonialism produced by the UPG, which I look into more in depth below: the narrativisation of the paradox nation-class. In other words, narrativisation was the strategy of classic anti-colonialism. It consisted on the doctrine that national struggle took precedence in time, for movements to then undertake social struggle (Abdel-Malek, 1981). This strategy brought about a concomitant prioritization of the realm of politics —understood narrowly as participation in the new electoral processes and to refrain from the use of violence— opened up since 1978.
The PSG and weak antagonisms

Whilst being possible to think of it as a location producing the discourse of colonialism, the PSG’s story-line and its effects were very different from those of the UPG. The PSG’s narratives articulated around the same term of ‘colonialism’ the same grievances decried by the UPG—the end of emigration, rational industrialization, defence of agriculture— with very different political demands—socialism, federalism and decentralization. Colonialism was then an unstable quilting point, whose meaning was being struggled over from within and remained indeterminate. Its flipside, ‘liberation’, was being articulated among distinct (often rival, at times allied) political projects and discursive subgroups.

Extract 5.5. On the enemy.

‘However, the unitary Spanish state constitutes in itself the negation of the Galician national reality. The existence of a unitary Spanish state constitutes the antithesis of the existence of Galicia. Galicia won’t be able to realise itself politically while it remains prisoner of the unitary structure of a Spanish state, whether it be totalitarian or not...’

(‘Position of the PSG in support of the Galician political alternative of the Consello before the unitary platforms of the Spanish state’, GS, n.1, 1976)

As can be seen from this extract, typical of the PSG’s statements at the time, their key discursive strategy is also an antagonism us / them. However, their central opposition ‘Galicia’ vis-à-vis the ‘unitary state’, despite similarities, is ultimately quite different from other productions of the discourse of colonialism. The discourse on ‘Galicia’ is similarly told in terms of ‘popular classes’ and ‘working classes’. But GS narrated the enemy in narrower terms: ‘the unitary Spanish state’, ‘centralist state’ or ‘centralism’ were the quilting points of a chain of equivalences which also included ‘imperialism’ ‘dominant classes of the Spanish state’, ‘government’ or the ‘capitalist system’. Although thoroughly resignified, it is possible to see the connections with the ‘xeración nós’ narrative of the nation where centralism occupied an important position in the blame structure. This antagonism brought about frontiers not as clear-cut and inflexible as the UPG’s, as extract 5.5 illustrates:
Extract 5.6. On alliances and frontiers.

“The dynamic impressed into the whole by the nationalist forces at the nuclei of the nationalist front —socialist and communist left-wing forces—should progressively occupy the terrain of the forces located in their external circle; it should attract and not repel; it should take them one after another into the realm of a Galician national politics...until exhausting the spectrum of forces that are able to enter into this process—leaving outside only those which are not assimilable to the strategy. Some of those will incarnate the irreducible class and national enemy.” (‘The problems of the Galician national front at this hour: a proposal for unity’, GS, n1, 1976)

Having narrated centralism as their enemy, the narratives allowed wider room for manoeuvre to build political alliances, for many left political forces inside and outside Galicia shared that enemy. Hence, their main antagonistic political frontier was criss-crossed by another co-opting strategy. Contrary to the UPG, the PSG tried, in their storytelling practices and at different points in time during the period 1975-1982, to articulate hegemonizing links between diverse radical groups in Galicia. The political ‘dynamic’ to be followed ‘should take them one after another into the realm of a Galician national politics’, they noted. ‘Them’ were a series of ‘others’ often called ‘branchists’. This was a liminal position, external as yet to nationalism but of the country, not the enemy. Although the PSG also constructed hierarchies and policed nationalism—for it is the ‘socialist and communist forces’, i.e. the PSG and UPG, who are located at the ‘inner circle’ of nationalism and should hegemonize it—these ‘others’ can and should be taken in, co-opted in order to constitute a fairly inclusive ‘us’ against what they termed the final ‘irreducible class and national enemy’. This expansive internal strategy was not the only one implemented at this time by the party. Ambiguously, the PSG was also performing a strategy of difference around a different quilting point: not colonialism and nationalism, but socialism. These were not contradictory strategies for the party, for they were proposing a federalist alliance of nationalist groups.
The story-lines of colonialism produce an illusion of unity and coherence in spite of weaving different masternarratives. Here I explore how this illusion of unity is achieved and the contradictions embedded within it. The story-lines of colonialism, as we have seen in the myth of loss, mobilised two particular ways of thinking the world and the nation, Marxism and nationalism, in order to make a political case. Thus, both a ‘free nation’ and communism or socialism are narrated as the desired goals of the movement—the absent fullness of Galician society. These goals were epitomized in the floating signifier of ‘liberation’ and the classic slogans of ‘Free Galicia, Popular Power’ or ‘Free and Socialist Galicia’ which ritually closed a great many of the narratives, stories and many other nationalist practices such as demonstrations—and constitute an example of the citational, iterative and performative quality of the national-popular (Butler, 1993).

Despite the unity and order achieved in the story-lines, calling upon these discourses does create difficulties and tensions for the movement. The masternarratives of class and nation construct differently, even in opposing ways, the political community. They establish contradictory norms of thinkable political subjectivities—vanguard party and workers versus interclassist party and peasants—and bring to the fore different elements to be articulated in projects—land, language and ethnicity versus class, domination or exploitation for instance. This is what Qadri Ismail defined as ‘sitting uneasily together at the political plane’ because, she briefly explains, ‘Marxism makes enemies of social groups that nationalism would rather see as allies, if not friends’ (Ismail, 2000: 247). Thus, whereas nationalism imagines a homogeneous people unified by a common ancestry, ethnicity, language or civic culture, Lenin—but also Stalin, Mao and others—had conceptualised the nation as fundamentally split and criss-crossed by class identities.
For Lenin, there were always not one but two national cultures: proletarian and bourgeois, in developed ‘nations’ (Lenin, 1920 / 1975; Nimni, 1991). Thus, in the framework of a Marxist theory of the social ‘who is the nation?’ becomes the question to ask par excellence74. This way Marxism problematises the homogeneity of the people, as opposed to Renan’s famous query ‘what is the nation?’ which works instead to naturalise and reify the community (Young, 2001). Story-tellers, the UPG and PSG, narrated the nation by drawing on communist and socialist discourses and, as a result, positioned themselves in ways –such as the ‘patriotic communist party’— which did not sit easily within dominant narratives of neither the nation or of socialism. They had to devise a range of discursive and narrative strategies that functioned to solve the paradoxes arising in their discourse; and to render dominant political norms of ‘struggle’ or ‘communist’ / ‘socialist’ identity problematic, in order to validate their hybrid production of the collective self. These strategies were mainly addressed to their ‘communists’ or ‘socialists’ counterparts in the hegemonic nation. They kept their conversations and vocabularies of motives within the radical or national left.

The question that arises is, then, how did nationalists actually argue and ‘do’ nationalism and socialism without being paralysed by contradiction or without even seeing the paradox? To a great extent the answer lies in Lenin’s theory of imperialism and the availability of tricontinental discourses of resistance to colonial powers as a symbolic resource, characterized from their early stages by a combination and hybridization of Marxism and nationalism (Young, 2001). However, not all anti-colonial discourses articulated the same discursive elements in similar order, and tricontinental narratives were not the only masternarratives of struggle at the disposal of Galician nationalisms. Classic Marxism, early Galician nationalism and the ‘hyper’-Leninism that was strong in the Spanish State among the radical-left were all available resources and limits to what nationalists could legitimately claim to be. Thus, available symbolic resources of resistance and present day institutional and political practices –whether hegemonic or counter-hegemonic- influenced what could be said and thought within Galician nationalisms.
It is important to note, however, that contrary themes, paradoxes or inconsistencies—what Billig calls 'ideological dilemmas'—are not errors to be rectified, but common features of lived ideologies despite the unity and closure which texts and projects strive to present (Billig, 1987; Hall, 1996). They allow the flexibility necessary to deal with a variety of social and political situations. This does not mean, as Czarniawska found, that there is not 'an urge' to dissolve paradoxes. The reason for this urge is not simply 'the aesthetic unpleasantness of a logical error' but the feeling that paradoxes 'may paralyze us' (Czarniawska 1997:174). They can constrain action. Therefore, typically conflicting elements are separated either in time or in space so that contradiction is dissolved. This is what Gilbert and Mulkay found as well in their study of scientists' talk. The tensions arising from scientists' intimately combined use of potentially contradictory repertoires was managed through the structure of their accounts, where each repertoire consistently applies to a particular type of action.

Also, by what they called the 'truth will out' device: the resource to temporality in order to establish the primacy of an empiricist account of science over the contingent one (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984). By disassociating the conflicting elements, such as nation and class or national and social liberation, from one another the conflict is left to be resolved in the future or in a different place.

Disassociation in time, what Czarniawska also calls 'temporization', refers to the re-ordering in time of conflicting elements. That is, articulating elements in a narrative form. A decoupling of class and national struggle in time is the main discursive strategy to be found in the story-lines of colonialism; but also in space, for there was a clear division of labour postulated between the party, as the site responsible for pushing for social liberation, and the front organizations in charge of the interclassist national struggle. Calling upon the metanarratives of anti-colonialism, the UPG's production of the story-line thus ubiquitously argued the need to achieve national liberation first as an initial stage, to them accomplishing social liberation.
Extract 5.7. On narrativization

[A] “The UPG knows that the proletarian revolution in Galicia and the construction of socialism, in this historical stage of global imperialism, has as its previous objective achieving the national liberation of our country.” (‘The UPG’s alternative: the national-popular struggle as a necessary step in the construction of socialism’, I Congress, 1977, UPG)

[B] “The UPG knows very well that the first phase of the socialist revolution in Galicia is the national-popular revolution, because the colonial oppression to which [Galicia] is subjected by the Spanish oligarchy –the dominant class in the state- situates the contradiction as that between the popular classes and imperialism. The national-popular revolution would mean the rupture with the unitary state; the destruction of colonialism; and the recovery of our political and economic sovereignty which would open the way to the construction of a socialist society in our Land.” (‘Consolidation of the MNPG’, II Congress, 1979, UPG)

After narrating the story of colonization of Galicia and the antagonisms faced by the people the text of the first congress progressed to propose the UPG’s solution to the colonization of the country, their ‘alternative’ was ‘the national-popular revolution as a necessary step for the construction of socialism’. Thus, in the title, their key strategy of narrativization was already delineated. The narrativization strategy was, nevertheless, ubiquitous in the canonical texts of the congresses in 1977 and 1979 and also in articles of T&T during this time. Extracts 5.7 [a] and [b] present the common structure of the story. Firstly, the ‘first narrative’ of development of modes of production is assumed, often in a highly explicit manner which involves various formulae such as the ‘struggle for socialism’ or the ‘Marxist-Leninist scientific analysis of concrete reality’. Secondly, an initial recourse to temporality situates the story in the historical time of colonialism and imperialism: ‘in this historical stage of global imperialism’, ‘the colonial oppression to which [Galicia] is subjected’, ‘the actual historical circumstances’, etc. Then, as a result of the particular circumstances imposed by colonialism, the socialist revolution becomes a journey split into two phases: firstly national struggle, and once that has been achieved, the end or strategic objective is social struggle.

What allows this split of struggles in time is the Maoist concept of the ‘principal contradiction’, invoked to assert the primacy in time of the antagonism between
‘the popular classes and imperialism’ within the story of colonialism and Leninist theory of imperialism (extract 5.7 b). The ‘principal contradiction’ was defined as ‘the antagonism which in a given moment determines the evolution of all other contradictions present in a complex phenomenon’ (Lopez-Suevos, 1979:39). Hence narrativity deferred the communist identity of the party in time and allowed the nation to be privileged.

However, unlike Gilbert and Mulkay who found that de-paradoxifying devices clearly served to sustain the primacy of the taken for granted, empiricist account, I argue that the narrativization of the paradox nation / class does not serve a primary purpose of legitimizing the first narrative—the one taken for granted—by invoking the nation. Instead, they legitimize the national struggle by bringing it firmly into line with the classic Marxist narrative. This is what Jerome Bruner referred to as the stories’ capacity to negotiate meanings (Bruner, 1991). The following story, typical of this time, illustrates this point:

Extract 5.8. On negotiating nation and class.

“As a workers’ party, the UPG fights for socialism, for the suppression of private property of means of production and against the exploitation of man by man, in the path towards a socialist society.

However, the proletariat is not the only exploited class, as colonial capitalism is suffered by all the Galician popular classes; this determines an objective convergence of interests in the struggle for the national and social liberation of our people. This is why the national-popular revolution is a necessary step in the path to socialism in Galicia; and why, in order to become a reality, it needs an ample interclasist front integrated by all the classes that assume the principal contradiction present today in Galicia: that which opposes the popular classes to the monopolist bourgeoisie of the Spanish State. [...] For all the above mentioned [factors], in the actual phase the UPG advocates the struggle for national and social liberation of Galicia, as a necessary step for the construction of socialism...” (‘What is the UPG?’, T&T, UPG, 1977)

The story in extract 5.8 is a typical example of the narrativization strategy. What is relevant for this discussion of the story concerned is that while it explicitly asserts the canonical story of Marxism (‘as a workers’ party’, ‘fights for socialism, for the suppression of the private property of the means of production and against the exploitation of man by man in the path towards a socialist society’), the moral of the tale is, in fact, the need for ‘a democratic and popular Galician state’. In other
words, the moral is suggested by a breach of the canonical Marxist tale which warrants the story’s tellability (Bruner, 1991): ‘however, the proletariat is not the only exploited class but colonial capitalism is suffered by all the Galician popular classes’. The point is the need for national liberation. Here the story negotiates nation and class. While it reinforces the norm of the classic Marxist masteernarrative which confers legitimacy to the story, it also legitimizes the exception, the anomaly or trouble—the nationalist task—which is given temporal primacy. This way the UPG is able to forcefully argue both for national and social liberation as a floating signifier bypassing contradiction.

Hence, while, as mentioned above, stories of the national-popular revolution tend to assert explicitly their Marxist character—the language of class is at its strongest then, including the only reference to a ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ in the texts—the need of this first stage of national liberation is also forcefully put. This is said to be the, ‘unavoidable’, ‘indispensable’, ‘necessary’, the ‘best guarantee’ of a social revolution which would ‘only be achieved’ as a journey. However, narrativization’s deferral in time of the communist identity for the party brought about a certain anxiety. Thus, the strategy of narrativization appeared in tension with an opposing way of conceptualising the relation nation-class, namely the identification of both struggles.

Extract 5.9. On identity

[A] “In these cases the struggle for national liberation and for class emancipation coincide”
(Class antagonism, UPG, I congress, 1977)

[b] “In the present historical situation class struggle and national liberation are one and indissoluble” (UPG, I congress, 1977)

[c] “The national liberation struggle of oppressed peoples is an expression of the combat of the proletariat for the world socialist revolution” (UPG, II Congress, 1979, my cursive)

The identification of class and nation, even though not as common as narrativization, still appeared profusely in the first congress. Although I am only quoting here short
illustrative examples (extracts 5.9), this identification almost always appeared intimately combined with passages of narrativization. Identification is a story which relies also on the first two steps of the narrativization story: the assumption of the first narrative and the anomaly, the situation in the time of colonialism. However, then, imperialism was said to have transformed class struggle in such a way to make it synonymous with national struggle. Thus, as seen in the extracts above, both struggles ‘coincide’, often ‘objectively’, ‘are one and indissoluble’, are an ‘expression’ of one another, etc. The temporal split brought about by narrativization is here collapsed. This strategy (popular since Sultan-Galiev’s formula of oppressed nations being proletarian nations), I argue, serves to counteract the possible de­legitimization which the deferral in time of a communist identity achieved through narrativization could potentially have brought about in radical circles to a party which was struggling to become ‘the’ communist party of Galicia.

**Narrating class, popular and national identities**

Nationalism, says Michael Billig, ‘is above all an ideology of the first person plural’: it constructs a collective identity, the national ‘we’, partly through the mobilization and ordering of a set of categories, systems of classification and clusters of meanings (Billig, 1995). These categories are often organised (in time and morally) through story-lines, tales and narratives (Davies and Harré, 1999). One of the key functions of story-lines and tales is the provision and iterative (re)elaboration of subject positions (or characters) which attempt to interpellate audiences (Davies and Harré, 1999, 1990; Hajer, 1995). Within the Galician movement’s story-lines these positions are fraught with tensions and ambivalence: between posing identities as politically articulated or as given and natural, constructing national identity in terms of class and territory, attributing primacy to workers or peasants, or constructing a heterogeneous and homogeneous national subjectivity, as we will see.

There is an idea that the main characters described in any narrative of the nation are necessarily ‘us’, the nationals and protagonists of national narratives; but this begs
the questions: who are these characters? who ‘is’ the nation?. Theories of narrative have not asked this question often, but rather ‘what is the nation?’ has been commonly posed (Özkirimli, 2005; Young, 2001; Renan, 1990) which already gives us a sense of an important trait of nationhood: its unitary character by definitional fiat. As Benedict Anderson notes, the ‘imagined political community’ is a ‘deep, horizontal comradeship’ (Anderson, 1983:6-7). Even if the political-cultural community called nation might be imagined in highly diverse styles, it has been overwhelmingly signified as creating a unitary social identity: a ‘Volk’. Such unity is itself variously posed as cultural, territorial, ethnic or civic bonds between nationals holding supreme—or constituting them as such—as the literature on nationalism has often noticed (Gellner, 1997; Smith, 1979, 1981).

Indeed, from Murgui'a to the later ‘xeración nós’ and the Partido Galeguista, nationalists had argued that Galician identity was sustained by a Celtic racial descent aided by language and a strong sense of place, described by Patterson as ‘a blurring of man and nature’, a love and devotion for land and landscape (Beramendi, 2007; Patterson 2006: 48; Máiz, 1984). Race and land, land and language had established that ‘comradeship’ and had made Galicians out of the inhabitants of the region. In contrast, in the new stories of nation, race was absent, culture and language were peripheral and territory, although still important, was very differently signified—as we will see in the next chapter.

Extracts 5.10. On class and nationhood

[A] “We use the term nationalism in the sense of a movement of the popular classes of a dominated country in pursuit of their national, and thus, social liberation. [...] Our concept of nation, relates to certain objective factors of an empirical character which are those that appear in Stalin’s definition, but adding that, at this moment of the evolution of capitalism, the popular classes are the nation because the nation acquires revolutionary status against the bourgeois power; not all the classes are the nation, only those that assume the national liberation struggle, which in the present circumstances, is a social liberation struggle. Thus, ours is not an essentialist or culturalist but a classist concept of the nation. [...] We, as nationalists, do not reject the primacy of the class concept against any other historical category...” (‘The nationalist movements’, T&T, n37, 1976)
Instead, as the above extracts illustrate, it is mainly class and economic categories—in an uncomfortable relation with an organicist and perennialist construction—which would become key to imagining the nation, delimiting ‘us’ and externalizing ‘others’. The weight of class can be sensed in the extracts. Nationalism is said to be the movement of the ‘popular classes’; in fact, the nation are the popular classes. These are commonly represented in the triad ‘obreiros, labregos e mariñeiros’ throughout the texts. Thus, nationalism’s ‘old stories’ are present in the UPG’s, and in contemporary nationalism generally, reworking of the ‘xeración Nós’ romantic idea of the Galician people. The ‘pobo labrego e mariñeiro’ was now re-narrativized as the ‘obreiros, labregos and mariñeiros’. But not all popular classes are the nation: in a voluntaristic and reductionist move the text affirms that only those ‘assuming the national liberation struggle’ are nationals. The process of attributing primacy to class-based categories began in the early years of the 1970s. However, this primacy wavered in the first half of the decade, and even though the UPG and PSG’s Common Text written in 1973 did narrate the country in terms of class, this was less clearly so in other texts from early in the decade. As has been amply discussed in the literature, these were the years, particularly after the shipbuilding strikes of 1972, in which the UPG first defined itself as a communist party and X.M. Beiras started to turn the PSG on a more clearly socialist—i.e. Marxist—path (Beramendi and Núñez Seixas, 1995; Rubiralta Casas, 1998).

Ambiguously, the stress on class did not result in national-popular story-lines rejecting the essentialist narration of nation: extracts 5.10 a and b show how objective traits—sensuous characters—are not an ‘exclusive’ definitional element, but a nation is still given objectively. As happened in the myth of loss—where the perennial vision of the nation was implicitly assumed side by side with the
development of the mode of production narrative— the radical movement invokes Stalin's a-historical and normative definition of nation whilst emphasising its class character. Alfonso R. Castelao, a key figure in Galician nationalism for over three decades, had already applied that definition to Galicia in 'Sempre en Galiza': the mythical text of Galician nationalism finished in 1947. By invoking the Soviet leader the movement is also implicitly connecting itself with his earlier nationalist narratives. Stalin drew upon Otto Bauer's theory of cultural autonomy to elaborate an essentialist definition of nation as 'a historically constituted community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make up manifested in a common culture' (Stalin, 1913). Nationalism in Galicia historically had defined nationhood objectively, and independently of the will of the people, for it could count on little popular support. At the time of the popular front alliance in the Second Republic, Castelao (a progressive element of the PG) had found Stalin’s definition useful. It is, nevertheless, not irrelevant that it is Stalin and not Castelao, who is explicitly invoked as an authority to provide a normative definition of nation which accounts for typical elements of nationalist narratives such as territory or language. The national-popular’s implicit audience — the radical movement in Galicia where they were trying to assert themselves as the ‘communist patriotic’ party— would hardly have listened otherwise.

In spite of this, such a ‘classist conception of nation’ is rooted only in a ‘non-essentialist’ concept of the state —which is clearly identified as historically constructed—but it rests on an implicit perennialist concept of the nation —as the myth of loss had established. Thus, the communist / nationalist narrator is able to affirm that ‘many nations were smothered by others’ in their process of state-building (extract 5.10.c). The existence of the nation before and as the basis of any state is thus implied. Nations, once again, are assumed and as are bourgeoisies, as part of such nations before statehood.

Nevertheless, class profoundly troubled the kind of ‘horizontal comradeships’ typical of national narratives by introducing a measure of ‘verticality’ and a great dose of heterogeneity to the nation, even though not without homogenising tensions. Now,
not every inhabitant of the dystopia called Galicia (the colony) would be ‘national’. The first congress of the UPG, the UPG and PSG’s CT, as well as many stories from both T&T and GS state that explicitly: the ‘national’ subjects are ‘Galician classes’ or ‘popular classes’ (‘clases populares’, ‘camadas populares’) in antagonism with ‘exploiter classes’, ‘monopolist and intermediary bourgeoisies’. Only those pertaining to the worker, peasant or seamen classes – the national triad par excellence, although a liminal space is also occupied in the stories by the ‘petty bourgeoisie’ – are nationals in the story-world of the UPG and PSG. Thus, one of the consequences of prioritizing the vocabulary of class is the implicit de-territorialization of nationhood and nationality. Groups traditionally seen as part of the nation, by reason of their birth, territory, language or culture, are now othered. Hence, the nation was significantly shrunk narratively. This ‘shrinking’ is the result of the nationalists drawing on anti-colonial and popular front inspired narratives.

**Heterogeneity and peoplehood**

If these social classes are the Galician nation, what kinds of bonds bind them ‘fraternally’? How are they constituted? In fact, there is no one answer to this. The concept of ‘the people’ is constituted both in terms of a rhetoric of heterogeneity, and simultaneously with a rhetoric of homogeneity, betraying a tension as they simultaneously draw upon Marxist, classic and Popular Front narratives.

Extract 5.11 On heterogeneity in the making of the nation.

[a] “This exploitation is suffered by all Galician classes. Thus, the surmounting of the weaknesses of the Galician workers’ movement, and their transformation in strength, depends on the union of all the Galician popular classes in the struggle to overthrow common exploitation.” (CT, PSG & UPG, 1973).

[b] “All the Galician people, [...], means the union in a compact bloc of workers, peasants, seamen and those petty-bourgeois (small merchants and industrialists who barely use any waged labour, liberal professionals, etc) who could become aware of their identity of interests with the popular classes and renounce, thus, their mimetic and suicidal identification with the bourgeois and anti-national culture that Spanish colonization imposes upon us. However, in any case, the proletariat has the historic duty and the mission of assuming the vanguard and direction of the national-popular revolution, as it is the most dynamic social class and it is objectively interested in
building socialism.” (‘The justification of the policy of forming the national-popular bloc’, I Congress, UPG, 1977)

The texts of nationalism accounted for the Galician ‘nation’ and its subjects by using a variety of categories and positions such as ‘all the Galician popular classes’, ‘all the Galician people’, the ‘working classes’, the ‘bloc of workers, peasants, seamen and those petty-bourgeois...’, ‘those objectively interested in finishing with the colonial state’, and as ‘those that assume the national liberation struggle’. They constructed a heterogeneous category of ‘the people’ drawing on narratives of anti-colonialism and ‘Popular Front’ politics. Heterogeneity and the category of the people derive from the discourse of the Popular Front and the limits the narrative of development of modes of production met in practice. In a nutshell, classic Marxism narrated that, after the bourgeoisie succeeded in its struggle for political and economic liberty against feudalism, it would develop capitalism’s productive forces and relations of production, proletarianizing society as a result. Then, the newly formed working class, whose identity is constituted in the relations of production, would struggle against the bourgeoisie to supersede capitalism and democracy and form a socialist society. Bourgeoisie and proletariat were seen as the fundamental historical agents to which particular tasks were attributed. However, historical and contextual circumstances often meant that a class could not carry out the tasks assigned to them in the plot. At times they were too weak: for instance during the rise of fascism bourgeoisies recoiled, in backward and colonized social formations the proletariat was a small fraction of the population. Then, the broadest possible unity of democratic forces was needed. The Popular Front strategy contingently enshrined ‘the people’ as the key political subjectivity in an attempt to break away from burdensome ‘task’ constraints (Beverley, 1999). For Dimitrov ‘the people’ designated the possible unity among different constituent parts (peasantry, artisans, (un)organized labour, the churches, the intelligentsia, etc), in a common identity (Beverley, 1999:89). From Dimitrov to Mao (through Connolly, Fanon or Cabral), ‘the people’ became the key revolutionary subject. It was a heterogeneous ensemble where peasants were often given a leading role. This people were conceived negatively against an ‘other’: fascism, colonizers, capitalists and landlords.
In keeping with this schema, all productions of colonialism took pains in differentiating social classes (as illustrated in extract 5.11.b) and narrativizing the particular reasons that each had in opposing capitalism—even though they did so differently. These reasons or ‘objective interests’ allowed the narrative formation of equivalences between the classes discursively articulated around the metaphor of colonialism and its goal of national and social liberation. Thus, the CT narrates a tale of forever oppressed peasants who are newly colonized by capitalism and threatened now with disappearance; of a weak and fragmented working class because of a lack of ‘rational industrialization’, and of a Galician bourgeoisie incapable of and uninterested in developing the country. The basic unifying theme in the stories is the common positioning of all the classes against the modern colonization of the country by capitalist forces. The moral is that of the need of workers and peasants to unite. This is clearly expressed in the evaluation of the tale of the working class as illustrated in extract 5.11.a and the union and ‘compact bloc’. These stories are retold in the I congress (UPG), where several pages are devoted to describing and storying the subject positions deemed national. However, there is now a re-plotting of the earlier stories to give a clear primacy and ‘leadership’ to the working class (extract 5.11.b), which was absent in the CT.

In order for these heterogeneous groups to unite a Maoist rhetoric of (lack of) ‘contradictions’ among the people is a prominently used resource, despite Mao himself being mostly absent as a figure of authority in the UPG texts, at least since 1970:

Extracts. 5.12. On lack of contradictions.

[a] “In general terms, the principal contradiction opposes the poor, medium and well-off peasants to monopolistic capitalism, ‘cacique’ elements and to the S.I.S.” (‘Galicia as a colonized nation’, I congress, UPG, 1977)

[a] “The absence of contradictions among the popular classes, in this historical moment, is, thus, determined by the colonial function and dependent development of our economy. A political project is viable which integrates popular struggle in common objectives.” (‘Class antagonism in this colonial situation’, I congress, UPG, 1977)
The unity of the people in popular front conceptions, Beverley explains, 'rests precisely on the recognition and tolerance of difference and incommensurability' (Beverley, 2001: 90). This is why Mao talked of 'contradictions among the people' whereas classic Marxism would think of the revolutionary agent as homogeneous: the workers whose life in factories provided them with similar interests, experiences and culture. Thus, this popular identity does not totally erase the fraternal bonding of the nation, even though it dissolves its unitary character, but bases it in a common experience of oppression.

The moment of unity of the nation / people, the revolutionary subject's unity, is displaced from the economic or racial / ethnic element to the political level. The main problem with this conception of the nation is that, if the external enemy or the principle which inflicts oppression disappears, so would the nation. This would be one of the problems that nationalists had during the transition, for the most obvious markers of oppression and main grievances in their discourse were being rapidly transformed. Besides, the class rule of membership of the nation seems ambivalent. Nationalists affirm both that membership is a matter of the different classes' 'objective interests' and a voluntaristic 'national consciousness'. Thus, they noted both that 'those who are objectively interested in finishing with the colonial State form the nation' and that 'the nation are [...] only those that assume the national liberation struggle'. This combination of objective and subjective criteria is also reminiscent of Maoism.

_Homogenising the people: the 'symbiotic worker'_

The particularization practices and the 'incommensurability' of the people were, nevertheless, in tension and precariously balanced with another key rhetorical strategy as regards the notion of a 'Galician people': the tendential identification and homogenization of class categories. If the nationalists were clearly drawing on the symbolic resources of anti-colonial narratives to discursively construct their opposition to Spain, there was also another plot, the Marxist 'first narrative',
present. This orthodox master-narrative predicted a gradual simplification of the social landscape due to the development of productive forces. Here, homogeneous society (in Bataille’s terms) would be reduced to a struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. All forces would converge towards one or the other and social classes like peasants would be condemned to disappear through proletarianization. In fact, the construction of ‘the people’ as an alliance of ‘oppressed classes’ in anti-colonial discourse came as a strategy to bridge the gap and neutralize the paradox between the reality of societies where the industrial proletariat hardly existed and the first narrative which posited this proletariat as the privileged political subjectivity. Nevertheless, this unitary subject tendentially resurfaces, in a similar (structural) location, but not identical form, in the creation of new discursive figures which would come to characterize the story-lines of colonialism in the canonical texts: the ‘symbiotic-peasant’ or ‘proletarian-proprietor’.

Extracts 5.13. On the new unitary figure

[a] “The big majority of the Galician proletariat is spread in small and medium size companies and to a great extent it continues to be personal proprietor in the primary sector, of the land, [situation which] originates the generalized and graphic denomination of ‘proletarian-proprietor’, corresponding humanly to the peasant who works extra hours...” (I congress, UPG, 1977)

[b] “the role of the peasant class is not secondary but primary: because they represent more than 50% of the active population in our Land; because of the exploitation they suffer inflicted by monopolist capital which extracts added value from them in the same way that it does from the working class [...] because many peasants are at the same time industrial workers; because all peasant families have migrants in the factories [...] For all this factors [...] the identification of peasant-worker relations is obvious and their struggle is very close...” (‘MAG’, T&T, February, 1976)

[c] “This incipient proletariat, [which is] in a period of formation, acquires progressively more relevance in our countryside due to the colonial-capitalist penetration. [...] these are peasants on the way to proletarianization, who still have the country as the axis of their lives, and still posses an agrarian community conscience’ [...]” (T&T, n35, 1976)

The ‘peasant’ as narrated in classical Marxism is the point of departure and the ‘proletariat’ a foreseeable point of arrival but, in this story, Galicians have been caught in medias res, somewhere ‘in-between’ these figures. The nationalist texts effect a constant slippage of the liminal categories ‘symbiotic-peasants’, ‘peasant-proletarians’ or ‘worker-proprietors’ which lead us to see them as a single
phenomenon. By labelling peasants as ‘workers of the land’ the UPG invokes a commonality of life-experiences between peasants and workers. By being positioned as ‘incipient proletarians’, peasants were narrated either as a class in transition (‘they are peasants on the way to proletarianization’) or as being already a ‘sector of our proletariat’ who peculiarly still lives in the countryside and keeps strong ties with peasant life. Conversely, the ‘majority or workers’ are positioned as being also owners (‘proletarios-proprietarios’) who work in factories but own and work the land. They have not been fully proletarianized and therefore their class consciousness is weak. We are then instructed to see the categories as tendentially homogeneous: “the proletarian-proprietor’ is said to ‘corresponding humanely to the peasant’; the peasants ‘are industrial workers at the same time’ (extracts 5.13. a and b).

Hence, the UPG tried to dissolve the gulf between their class identities. Classic Marxism, instead, had distinguished workers from peasants: ‘free’ waged labour with no ownership of the means of production as opposed to owners of land. Within the peasantry wage labourers and capitalist farmers could be distinguished, but their ownership of land and means of production—whether or not they also sold their labour power to others—would mark them as peasantry or maybe ‘poor peasantry’ (Byres, 1991:413). Through a series of rhetorical strategies an identity between Galician peasants and workers is established. The many—‘workers, peasants and fishermen’—are constituted, once again, as one, or in Homi Bhabha’s words as ‘the spatial expression of a unitary people’ (1990:294). These figures are said to correspond to ‘the majority of the workers’ and the peasant in Galicia.

Extract 5.14. On hybridity

"Symbiosis makes an atypical proletariat, but so it makes an atypical peasant; thus, the old consideration of peasants as owners needs to be qualified." (‘Peripheral capitalism, symbiosis and super-exploitation: the Galician case’, López-Suevos, 1975)

However, being neither fully peasants nor ‘traditional’ or ‘pure’ proletarians these are new, ‘atypical’ or hybrid positions, a result of the recent direct influence of the
new capitalist colonization of the country. The identities of ‘symbiotic workers’ are something ‘in-between’. These are liminal subject positions, where peasants really resemble / are workers: in the making, in transition, sharing conditions; and where workers are not ‘pure’ but ‘correspond’ to peasants. Hence, the new unitary subject of Galician politics is not the idealised peasantry, repository of ‘Galician values and identity’ as the literary and political tradition of Galician nationalism had established since Murguía and Rosalía; neither does it correspond to the Marxist proletarian. However, it does reinscribe within the story-lines of colonization a unitary revolutionary identity and a binary logic of antagonism. The need for which derives precisely from assuming a conception of history and development from those classic stories —not the ‘alliance’ ‘inter classist front’ or ‘popular bloc’ of anti-colonial narratives.

The figure of the ‘symbiotic worker’ effectively worked to erode the privileging of workers established, paradoxically, through the heterogeneization of the people. Thus, one of the conclusions of the predominance of the ‘symbiotic worker’ over any other position in the country is that the ‘industrial proletariat is not enough to force change’ (Lopez-Suevos, 1979). The production of a new subjectivity which erodes the leadership of the working class was typical of anti-colonial narratives. Mao attributed a major role to peasants and Fanon claimed a decisive one for the lumpen-proletariat (Schram, 1989; Fanon, 1967). However, Galician nationalism’s solution is different. Its discourse continuously oscillates between attributing leadership to the proletariat within recognition of plurality, and recognising the key status of symbiotic workers in narrowing down heterogeneity. This is not a ‘reclaiming’ strategy: the attribution of further tasks and attributes to already clearly constituted subjectivities, but rather, it is a hybrid. This newly reconstituted peasant-worker is a fusion of the older nationalist tales’ position of peasants as repositories of the nation and the Marxist worker as the unitary, privileged subject of struggle.

The heterogeneity of the nation, in stories of ‘blocs’ and the unity of groups, co-existed with this homogenising strategy. The people were, then, both pluralized and simplified in the narratives produced at this time. By relying on class as the rule of
membership, 'the people' were reduced from being all the inhabitants of the territory to (mainly) the 'popular classes', a distinction which expelled the bourgeoisie but left in a liminal remainder in the form of the 'petty bourgeoisie'. Simultaneously, it was heterogenised in Popular Front style narratives. Then, in tension with this move, the popular classes that had been carefully described, divided and hierarchized were simultaneously identified and homogenised as 'symbiotic workers'. Although this hybrid identity was said to be the very product that the workings of colonialism in the country had created, paradoxically it reduced the heterogeneity of the anti-colonial 'people' and mimicked both the unitary subject of the classic Marxist narrative, the proletariat, and the idealized peasant of nationalist classic tales.

5.3 Counter-narratives of Galician nationhood

But nationalism was not a homogeneous movement. Instead it was plural, complex and itself pervaded by antagonisms, what some would call the narcissism of minor differences. It was also heterogeneous, even though hegemonized by the discourse and story-line of colonialism, a hegemonic discourse which nevertheless did not itself suppress internal differences (it has been seen how different stories and strategies reveal a different conception of the political, even within the story-line of colonialism; discourses as regularities in dispersion). Moreover, there were other, alternative, story-lines of the Galician nation 'countering' colonialism, alive in sites such as the PSG (which was split between colonialism and those other stories) and the POG, a splinter group of the UPG—which was created as a reaction to the colonialism story-line. In these other narratives democracy becomes a nodal point, there is no myth of loss; autonomy is not rejected but worked upon.
5.4. Paradox & the disputed communist space: a discussion.

For Laclau and Mouffe, in the Leninist conception ‘hegemonic relations supplement class relations’ (1985:51). That is, the popular front narrative of alliances between classes and the hegemonization by one class (the proletariat) of the task proper of another (the bourgeoisie) which lies at the core of anti-colonialism is secondary, and serves to buttress that other classic narrative of the development of the laws of history and production which is the foundation of the discourse. Lenin relies on two plots, but one is, for Laclau and Mouffe, clearly supplementary to the other. This is because, they say, 1. ‘the order of appearance of the characters is not altered by the second narrative’ (the bourgeoisie appears first, even if its incapable of achieving its duty), 2. ‘the class nature of the task is not altered by the fact that it is assumed by another class’, 3. ‘the very identity of the social agents is determined by their position in the first narrative’. There is then, an unequal position between the narratives—in favour of the first narrative’. The same theme is brought up by Quadri Ismail: in the interlocking of class and nation in a social movement the only solution would be for one to take primacy over the other (Ismail, 2001)

However, it is quite difficult to see a clear narrative privilege among the Marxist plots interwoven by the Galician nationalists over this period 1972-1981. Even between the plots of Marxism and nationalism it is quite difficult to position either as a supplement, or ‘add on’, unless we attend to Derrida’s problematization of the idea of the supplement as secondary. A supplement is something that, allegedly secondarily, comes to serve as an aid to something ‘original’ or ‘natural’. For Derrida, in Of Grammatology, however, the status of the supplement itself is questioned, becoming a site of undecidability: an ambiguity that ensures that what is supplementary can always be interpreted in one of two ways: as accretion or as substitution (Royle, 2003). That is, which element, the ‘original’ or the ‘add on’, is primary becomes undecidable. Instead of a privileged narrative, the movement carefully crafted balances, contrasting dis-equilibriums and spreading imbalances,
they segregated and juxtaposed contradictions, so that the discourse of colonialism shifted its allegiances over time and space: local writing/written contexts. The narratives predominated in different spaces. The story-lines of colonialism both juxtaposed and segregated the following propositions:

- class defines ‘the people’, but territory buttresses ‘the nation’ (I will explore this point in the next chapter).
- the nation has temporal primacy, but socialism is the end point.
- nation and class struggle/socialism are the same struggle.
- workers are the privileged subjectivity, but they really are peasants
- peasants really are a peculiar form of proletariat.
- capitalism is the principal enemy, but so is ‘spanishism’
- ‘the working classes’ are the nation and then it will be ‘nationalism’

The stories were rife with paradox. This is not surprising as the movement was living by different plots, as it was contested, operating in paradoxical and uncertain times. Because of the quest to occupy the central political space in which they originated — the radical left — whilst becoming the real option of the ‘Galician people’ they were interpellating they had to meet and deal with diverse and outright conflicting aims and norms of intelligibility. The ‘nationalist’ space had been a vacuum relatively easy to fill and with no competition from old established parties and organizations, in spite of the tensions between some of the sites immersed in the colonialism story-lines as well as others stemming from them. But there were strong, well established and respected organizations on the radical left and in the anti-francoist space: mainly the PCE.

The UPG has been, nevertheless, represented as a Maoist party or an exponent of Maoism within the literature (Beramendi and Seixas, 1995, Rubiralta Casas, 1998). For Rubiralta Casas, from 1970 the UPG started to develop ‘openly’ Thirdworldist and Maoist thought, characterized by explicit references to Mao and to the fourth classes, colonialism, use of violence, etc. This presence of Mao in the UPG is certainly visible, mainly during those initial years of the discourse of colonization, being
explicitly invoked in documents such as ‘Galicia is a colony’ (1973) or in Lopez-Suevos’ writings such as in ‘Encol do colonialismo’, 1975. However, this ‘Maoism’ needs to be qualified. The overt references tend to disappear. In fact, apart from the above mentioned article, there is no T&T article or congress which mentions Mao. And there is uneasiness in the UPG about the label Maoism in spite of their obvious use of some Maoist formulae. Thus, whereas Lenin, Leninism or Marxism-Leninism was invoked sixteen times in the first congress of 1977 and is enshrined in article 2 of its statutes: ‘the UPG founds its theory and guide for action in Marxism-Leninism, applying historical materialism to the specific circumstances of Galicia’; Mao is not mentioned at all.

The question that arises here, continuing the idea of undecidability between narratives, is: why would such an important narrative influence be occluded? For Rubiralta Casas the answer lies in the mood of ‘hyperleninism’, in vogue after the antiauthoritarian critique of May 1968. However, as such this is an unsatisfactory answer, for there was also a mood of anti-colonialism in Spain throughout the decade – the Spanish ‘radical’ parties conceptualising Spain as a colony of US, ETA thinking of the Basque country as a colony of Spain and the UPG itself being the main site of Galician discourse of colonialism.

The answer could lay in the UPG’s need to establish authority over a political space. The fact that Mao’s thought was heretical for ‘classic’ European Marxism (Schram, 1989:6) did not help in that pursuit. The paradox here is that, while anti-colonialism provided the key metaphor and vocabulary to conceptualise Galicia and make sense of the social markers of underdevelopment, migration, etc, the intellectuals of anti-colonialism did not serve so well the purpose of establishing authority that the UPG was relentlessly pursuing vis-à-vis the PCE. The mood of ‘hyperleninism’ in Spain, noted also by Laiz, could itself be the result, not of May 68, but of ‘Euro-communism’ and what was seen as the abandonment of traditional revolutionary Marxism by the main communist parties throughout Europe (Laiz, 1995). The UPG was trying to establish its authority as communist, a move which was strongly objectionable since it also invoked the ideas of ‘nation’ and ‘national liberation’. And it was doing this
vis-à-vis a party which traditionally had embodied 'communism', the norm of 'being a communist party'—following the Soviet Union, democratic centralism, etc.—but who was, crucially, abandoning that norm. The retreat of the PCE from the norm of 'real communism' was the reason why so many small parties in Spain stressed their Leninism at that time. For Leninism still functioned as the normative, authoritative framework for 'being revolutionary'.

The UPG resorted to Lenin because his name carried weight and authority on the Spanish radical left, their audience all along. Even if this radical left was the site of a thoroughly hybrid anti-colonial discourse, such a discourse is, in inception, also derived from Lenin. This is not Maoism, but 'Leninism applied to Galician circumstances'. Performing a communist identity in Galicia was viewed as coming very close to identification with the authority figure of Lenin.

Hence, during the 1970s the sites producing the discourse of colonialism cannot unreservedly be called 'nationalist'. For most of the scholarship however, this issue is not even questioned and the nature of the movement as 'nationalist' remains firmly grounded. X. Beramendi assures us that the 'core tenets' of nationalism were still preserved. This is in spite of the movement having undergone, he notes, 'an ideological mutation without precedents' and being 'hybridized' (2007: 1087). But surely, if the movement was a 'hybrid' then it cannot simply be concluded that it was 'nationalist', unless its Marxist metanarratives are taken as being supplementary in the sense of secondary. However, in this chapter this has been shown not to be the case. Hybridity, Bakhtin noted, 'is the mixing, within a single concrete utterance, of any two or more linguistic consciousness, often widely separated in time and space' (Bakhtin, 1981:429). This 'double-voicedness', pervasive throughout the narratives of colonialism, is for Bakhtin, crucially, not meant to be resolved.

There are pervasive marks of tension between class and nation in the discourse of nationalism as a result of the relevance of archetypal class positions as the primary subjectivities or by not unambiguously having 'nation' as a nodal point, but class instead. There always remained a certain eliding of signifiers: class, people, nation,
country. Nevertheless, this eliding did not merge or collapse them. Instead, there was a strong tendency to rely upon compound categorization: 'the popular classes', 'the national-popular' struggles, the 'communist patriotic party' and symptomatically in the naming of many political organizations created during this time, such as the 'national-popular' Assembly, Bloc and so on. The stubborn use of the rhetoric of 'class and people', and of 'nation and people' in the story-lines speaks volumes of the ambivalence and undecidability of the discourse, its refusal to choose between these categories. Colonialism was a hyphenated story-line, its rallying point a signifier drawn from a narrative (anti-colonialism) which precariously articulated class and national conflicts. The relevance of this point of a hybridity of the voices in the narratives is that the demands and political struggles fought over during the decade can only be made sense of if we take this ambivalence seriously. Thus, the claim for a Galician government and the rejection of the autonomic process as the (political) solution to the (economic) grievances of 'irrational industrialization', 'emigration' and 'lack of agricultural reform'.

5.5 Conclusion

Naming one thing in terms of another thing produces a metaphor, a rhetorical trope key to understanding ideologies. This trope has two main characteristics: it systematically structure our ways of thinking, illuminating aspects of a situation or concept. As a result of this, it also systematically occlude others features. That is, nationalists were strongly arguing that Galicia's situation was best understood in terms of another experience, namely that of the third world and Latin American countries, as the result of their encounters with imperialism and colonization. The metaphor highlighted commonalities and occluded differences between these countries' experiences and the Galician situation.

By naming Galicia a colony the nationalists were not simply claiming to be a nation in the traditional nationalist sense—and demanding all political entitlements presumed to follow from that— they were claiming a specific way of being within the world of
nations (Billig, 1995). They were discursively performing the country as a nation suffering oppression and subjugation exercised by an alien power as part of an imperialist system. The story-lines were an accusation and levelled blame against the Spanish state for the economic situation in Galicia. The meaning of 'colony' was indeed loaded with connotations of violence and aggression. Hence, it also established an implicit cultural difference with Spain, out of mainly economic grievances.

In addition, they were constructing Galicia as another element in a chain of liberation struggles that had been taking place around the world, and therefore demanding the same legitimacy and solidarity from other left-wing parties inside and outside Spain. That communists were against all forms of oppression, and by necessity had to be against colonial domination, was the taken for granted tenet of Leninism which nationalists were invoking. Thus, Galicia was constructed as a victim (as seen in the myth of loss) but one which fights back.

Narratives of colonialism served the vigorous struggle against the images and stories of the integral territorial unity of Spain defended, implicitly or explicitly, by the hegemonic discourses of democracy and reform. Narrating colonialism was an utterly political practice (as important as, and totally inseparable from, the founding of parties and unions, the establishing of alliances or the drafting of bills which were to follow) directed at intervening and radically challenging the politics of reform and consensus during the transition in order to achieve particular goals. Colonization story-lines called for collective political action different from earlier nationalist narratives which founded the nation on ethnic/racial grounds.
Space and ‘self-organization’: heterotopias and the ‘national-popular’

Apart from fomenting antagonism with Spain and explicitly hybridizing class and nation as the true markers of Galician identity, nationalists also mobilized a sense of place. Their construction of the Galician nation relies on the citation and iteration of stories and concomitant discursive practices. These stories overwhelmingly represented the national space as dystopia (i.e. the colony) and intra-national (local) spaces as real counter-sites, spaces of resistance to colonization and of freedom or ‘heterotopias’ (Foucault, 1967 / 1984). Villages, city neighbourhoods and demonstrations were linked in an equivalence to form a web-like, micro spatial narration of the nation which worked against strict class boundaries. This linkage was performed in a narrative subplot of struggling localities prominent in the years of the transition. Here the spatial representations of nationhood as a narrative strategy made the political boundaries which were built up insisting on a social categorization of the nation more flexible.

For nationalism, after all, is never beyond geography (Billig, 1995). But its geography is never a mere physical setting, rather ‘the national place has to be imagined, just as much as the national community does’ (1995:74). That is, space is not natural but socially produced (Soja, 1996; Lefebvre, 1991; Harvey, 1990). Indeed, ‘nations’ are often imagined not only as social categories marking boundaries of belonging and exclusion among people, but as places: physical entities whose historical factuality ‘exceeds human membership’ (Wallwork and Dixon, 2004:22). The relevance of the social construction of space in narratives generally and in stories of the nation in particular has been, therefore, duly acknowledged in a variety of fields (Baynham and De Fina, 2005; Wallwork and Dixon, 2004; Deshpande, 2000; Soja, 1996; Billig, 1995; de Certeau, 1984). I examine in this chapter another key narrative strategy in
the construction of belonging: the narration of Galicia as a dystopia, the colony, and the construction of new heterotopias. Then, I discuss the social function of the narrative space of the nation created.

6.1. Introduction: the localities and local struggles.

As already explained, the transition was characterized by formative efforts to rearticulate new discourses and make sense of the situation. These took place in every social setting: from the core power nexus of Madrid to village-centred local capillaries. The local landscapes of Galicia in the 1970s were undergoing notable changes as well as continuities. Populated by a variety of subjectivities with extremely diverse life circumstances, worldviews and resources, all of them were subjected to the redrawing of political boundaries and power relations: pursuing, resisting, stirring and widening them.

Galician rural communities were on the wane. Socio-economic changes which diminished their relative weight in terms of the total population, less than half the total now for the first time in the century, also modified their physical space. As a result of practices of migration villages were suffering a distortion in their age, gender and occupational structures. It meant a disruption of communities' temporal and spatial patterns and life rhythms. Younger adults particularly were further increasing a direct and enduring involvement outside their local communities and with other sectors of Galician and Spanish society (Bauer, 1990:580). This involvement came through education, work mobility and participation in the new dialogues concerning their status within Spain—such as the story-lines of colonialism—exacerbated by provincial and state press as well as by direct intervention in village issues by new political associations. They were 'redefining their interests, hopes and obligations largely in terms of Spanish society as a whole' (Bauer, 1992:583). Hence, by the mid 1970s, there were some rural localities still close knit and strong: particularly those which due to specific local circumstances could still sustain their group solidarity with agricultural labour. However, a
considerable number of communities were now losing their traditionally solid interpersonal ties, and becoming places where a multiplicity of cultures and worldviews coexisted.

This does not mean that rural communities had ever been static or politically acquiescent. Contrary to the widely supposed idea that peasant communities were spaces of passive submission, recent research on Galician social history—as well as not so recent anthropological studies—has established that there was a tradition of resistances against francoism since the 1940s (Cabana Iglesias, 2006, 2010; Bauer, 1992). Communities often held the dictatorship responsible for the marked worsening of their material situation—such as the expropriation of villagers’ common forest land—but also for what they perceived as intolerable ruptures of the community’s moral codes and worldview. Small rural communities undertook myriad public and covert practices of active and passive subaltern resistance against francoist policies: from judicial processes and writing letters of complaint to gossip.

By the 1970s, then, there had been profound socio-economic changes affecting communities with a long established, if often muted, tradition of struggle in defence of their perceived rights and moral values. These did not remain marginal in the wave of social protest during late francoism (Cabana Iglesias and Lanero Taboas, 2008). Between the years 1960 and 1977 socio-economic struggles against agrarian taxes, for higher prices for milk and beef production and over the domination and control of space: i.e. against the expropriation of communal or privately owned land—proliferated. The issues that dominated these years were the battles against the francoist agrarian social security (‘cuota social agraria’), and against the building of dams and mines in search of diverse energy sources in multiple small localities.

As explained in chapter 3, incidences of local collective resistance for social/life improvement were unavoidably overdetermined by wider political struggles. New radical political subjectivities, such as radical Marxist, PCG or the national-popular movement, were going to tap into these traditions and intervene in the conflicts...
with direct tactics and new representations of the country. The key sites for this intervention were the agrarian trade unions organized by the ‘national-popular’ movement. These were the plural CALL organized by the PSG and the UPG. Eventually, the UPG created what would become the more active and stronger union: the Comisíones Labregas (‘peasant commissions’, henceforth called the CCLL). These were organized mainly by people of urban origin, who were connected with the countryside through their professional activities, such as rural school teachers, agricultural technicians and some rural priests, and who connected with young rural inhabitants (Lanero Taboas, 2008). Organically dependent on the UPG and overtly political, they tried to ‘slowly sow rebelliousness, politization and nationalist ideas in the countryside’ (Máiz Vazquez and Alonso, 2003:38). Often outsiders to communities, their relations and alliances were precarious. Nevertheless, the CCLL fought for ‘agrarian reform’ and focused their activities on concrete problems affecting the rural population, specifically articulating those within the colonialism discursive formation. These unions were themselves a product and producer of that story-line.

Continuity with old political practices at the local level was nevertheless strongly guaranteed by the reorganization of francoist, mainly rural, elites. These did so successfully: they maintained strong positions of power and patronage structures well into the 1990s (Marquez Cruz, 1993). These elites, mainly designated mayors or councillors of small towns and villages, were co-opted on the basis of direct personal relations by the provincial intermediaries of Madrid’s francoist elites which had been themselves co-opted on a similar personal basis (Lagares Diez, 1999). In 1976, intermediary provincial elites often opted for grouping in a multiplicity of political ‘parties’ and ‘associations’, synonyms for old clientelistic networks with a local ‘notable’ for leader, such as Meilán Gil’s Partido Gallego Independiente, in order to form a power base and negotiate a better position within the new conservative party structures in the making. From such positions of power, provincial elites and their ‘families’ coalesced around two conservative political options which made possible a continuity with the values of the regime: Unión de Centro Democrático under president Adolfo Suárez and Alianza Popular (later Partido
Popular) founded by ex-francoist minister Manuel Fraga\textsuperscript{86} (Márquez Cruz, 1993; Lagares Diez, 1999). Of the two parties it was the UCD, more widely identified with the political centre, which initially succeeded in organizing a local elite base in Galicia.

These parties were organised vertically, from Madrid decisions were handed down to the local leaders in the provinces, and lacked necessary horizontal coordination. Thus, their policies were subjected to constant reproach by nationalism. Their key territorial unit was, in fact, the province, not Galicia as a whole\textsuperscript{87} (Lagares Diez, 1999). This made their organization fit in with francoist institutional structures and crucially with the new electoral circumscriptions, which gave them a clear electoral advantage –through the mobilization of local clientele networks as well as through covering most of the territory\textsuperscript{88}. Both parties together, the AP and the UCD with Suárez commanding the process of political reform, obtained in the first democratic elections of 1977 68\% of the vote (Beramendi, 2007). The conservative dominance, and the continuity of old faces and systems of distribution of resources in the localities, was outstanding. Conservative elites were often to act as brokers between the rural communities and institutions and business in conflicts. Still part of the francoist machinery of state, they were not impartial. Mainly they worked to minimize business’ losses in any conflicts while satisfying, minimally, local demands\textsuperscript{89}.

If the countryside was alive so were the cities. As explained in chapter 3, the Galician incipient working class, particularly in Vigo and Ferrol, were also protagonizing labour conflicts. Although industrial unrest had started as early as 1946, it was during the 1960s that it clearly recrudesced –in 1959 there were strikes in the Tranvías Eléctricos Company and in the shipbuilding enterprises of Barreras, both in Vigo, followed by conflicts in Vigo and A Coruña in 1962. In 1966, Comisiones Obreras was formed in Ferrol. The illegal CCOO led many conflicts: in 1970 alone there were more than one thousand six hundred strikes in Galicia (Maiz Vazquez and Alonso, 2003:19). More dramatic were the strikes in shipbuilding at Bazán in Ferrol in 1972: a state of exception was declared, the factory was closed and militarized for
ten days and two workers were killed (ibid). The latter deaths were the trigger for the involvement of the national-popular movement in workers’ conflicts with the formation of the Sindicato Obreiro Galego (the Galician workers’ union, henceforth called the SOG).

6.2. Buttressing the nation through place

Foucault presented the concepts of utopia and heterotopia in his scattered thinking about spatiality (Soja, 1996). These concepts offer insights for theorising the national imagination of place, the discursive practices that link abstract spaces –the ‘nation’— to concrete places in politically productive ways. For Foucault ‘we do not live in an empty or homogeneous space’, rather in a heterogeneous one, ‘inside a set of relations that delineate sites which are irreducible to one another’ (Foucault 1986 quoted in Soja, 1996). These ‘curious sites’ might be unreal places or utopias —‘sites with no real place which present society itself in a perfected form’— or more real heterotopias: ‘counter-sites, a kind of effectively enacted utopia, real places that contain all other places, represented, contested, inverted’ (Soja, 1996:157-8; Foucault, 1967 / 1984). As Deshpande suggests, heterotopias reconcile utopias with subjects by enabling ‘people to see themselves reflected in some utopia’ (Deshpande, 2000:171). This construction of utopias and heterotopias —the junctions of abstract, imagined and concrete, lived spaces— was achieved through narrative practices, ways of storying spaces which are not merely additional and ancillary to ‘real’ spatial practices such as walking in demonstrations from here to there. Stories do not simply transmute ‘real’ spatial practices ‘into the field of language’ as de Certeau notes (de Certeau, 1988:116). Instead, he contends, stories organize spatial practices: ‘they make the journey before or during the time the feet perform it’ (ibid.). Stories work to transform the abstract place into concrete space and vice versa.
The nation as dystopia

The Galician nation was spatially fully re-imagined and re-narrativized by contemporary nationalists in ways that differed most starkly from the romanticised rural landscapes and fusion of man and nature of older stories of the nation (López-Sández, 2008; Patterson, 2006; Máiz, 2000). In the canonical narratives and small tales of nationhood there are no sentimental approximations to landscape: no verdant and blossoming mellow hills, running waters or general affirmations of the beauty of Galicia as in Rosalía (López-Sández, 2008); no lyrical descriptions of seasonal orders, agricultural activities or the ‘goodness of the labrego families’ as in Otero (Patterson, 2006:50-52); nor is the land seen as the permanent nursery of nationality as in Castelao (Máiz, 2000). Instead, contemporary story-lines of colonialism re-articulate the signifier ‘land’ ('a terra') from being a crucial discursive moment constructing an essential, history-less Galician nationhood in Risco, Otero or Castelao’s writings, into a much narrower economic category. Land in the story-lines of colonialism most often denotes material and concrete spaces to be owned, worked, distributed and defended:

Extract 6.1 On the construction of the land as economic space

[a] ‘...In 1550 only 10 per cent of the land was cultivated. Most of it was in the hands of the church or the nobility. The population increase, after the prosperous years at the beginning of the XVI century, made those lands insufficient to sustain the inhabitants of Galicia...” (CT, PSG & UPG, 1973)

[b] ‘...When the felow men of Cástrelo de Miño defend their lands from the arbitrary expropriation in 1965, all the popular sectors support their fight’ (CT, PSG & UPG, 1973)

[c] ‘But economic penetration in the countryside is part of the sphere of relations of exploitation that our people suffer; these companies extract the raw materials at low prices, send it outside Galicia to be transformed, usurp lands from peasants – their means of livelihood nowadays- ..” (‘The alliance of the working and peasant classes’, T& T, n35, Marzal 1976)
The extracts above are typical examples of the way ‘land’ and ‘lands’ are talked about in the Galician movement at the time under review. Whether viewed from a historical narrative perspective or dissecting the problems of the nation today, lands are mostly seen in relation to peasant penuries and livelihoods, as scarce and fought for economic resources or as potential instruments for development. Lands are cultivated, possessed and expropriated, productive or unproductive, rather than represented as nourishing idyllic ways of live. Nevertheless, the story-lines do make frequent use of the formula of ‘a nosa Terra’ (‘our Land’) which draws upon the old nationalist master-narrative, where it is constituted as a synonym for the ‘the nation’ in an elision of territorial and social categories. The maternal metaphor (‘a Terra Nai’), the old stories’ ‘shibboleth’ in the words of Patterson, is in contrast now practically absent (Patterson, 2006:49).

Galicia, instead, became primarily represented in the story-lines of the nationalism of the time not as rural idyll or utopia but as dystopia: the colony—a reversal, dream turned nightmare, a real/unreal site which presented an imperfect and immoral state of society. In the main spatial strategy of the story-lines Galicia was narrated as an economic space and the ‘polluting, enclave and irrational industries’ such as paper factories or open cast mines—sites of underdevelopment and exploitation—were its storied places par excellence. The story-lines, then, invited readers to see themselves mainly as ‘exploited workers’ and ‘peasants expropriated of their lands’. To a great extent, as a result, the dystopia reinforced the class-based view of membership to the nation. These classes inhabited a territory under attack, economically and inhumanely bled by alien economic interests. That is, the dystopia interpellated readers to see themselves reflected in the mirror of ‘colonization’.

Nationalism’s other spaces

However, there were also new nationalist heterotopias. These were constructed mainly in small stories (Georgakopoulos, 2006), as part of a subplot of ‘national-
popular revolts' embedded within the wider narrative of colonialism. Although there are well structured tales, some stories barely qualify as such: there were meta-stories with no clear action, others resemble chronicles of events with a simple sentence as the moral at the beginning or end, quite often they relied on a simple mimesis, picturing a particular scene, for their point. Their key ideological theme is 'struggle and resistance' and this is linked to a claim for 'self-organization' and mobilization. The moral is often the people's opposition to colonization and their support for the national popular movement.

However, it is these small stories' construction of space which is most relevant. Struggles and resistant subjectivities are intimately linked to public, male dominated places. This construction is achieved through their content and own spatial location within nationalism's textual production. The tales occupied an important and constant space in the periodicals T&T and GS, in which they would appear juxtaposed to one another. Even a cursory look into these tales shows that they deal with a variety of local spaces, as a sample of typical story titles reveals: 'As Encrobas: the struggle for the land', 'Monforte, the will to victory' or simply 'Cangas', 'Vigo', 'Teis'. The overall effect was the construction of a portrait of a struggling nation, reflected in counter-spaces of resistance to the dystopia. The tales represented at least two distinct kinds of heterotopias: those centred on places of exploitation and routes of struggle (adapted from Deshpande, 2000). The strategy based on these heterotopias was to be accomplished in tales of defensive and offensive struggles which promoted the 'self-organization' of the people—a key ideological principle for the movement.

**Places of exploitation I: villages**

This strategy involved mainly the narration of the resolute resistance of small villages against exploitation by economic capitalist forces or repressive state apparatuses. Typical locations in these stories of exploitation—such as tales of the conflict of 'As Encrobas'—are country villages, where the peasant population defend their lands against abusive expropriation by a 'monopoly capitalist' company in a David against
Goliath plot. These villages are standardized: the tales being generic narratives and the stories lack detailed descriptions of their unique features, people and customs. For what is remarkable for the national-popular movement is what all of them have in common: exploitation of their resources and resistance to this injustice. Hence, each village’s struggle is articulated in metaphorical equivalence with another: ‘Castrelo de Miño, Campobecerros, Xove, Loño... Selo (Baixo Miño)’. Each one of them stands metonymically for ‘the nation’ and ‘the people’ who heroically resist the aggression and might even succeed. Colonialism in these tales is resignified as the forceful expropriation of a neighbour’s lands. The stories delineate the geography of nationhood as a network of small places involved in active resistance against colonialism.

The small tales of As Encrobas, representing the emblematic rural struggle of these years for nationalism, are a key part of this enunciative strategy. The conflict had started in 1974, at the height of the world-wide oil and energy crisis, when the Spanish electric company Fenosa bought the rights to exploit an open cast lignite mine from a local brick factory owner in As Encrobas, a small village in the parish of Cerceda, in A Coruña. The coal was meant to feed the neighbouring thermal power station at Meirama, which was yet to be built. Soon, the francoist government declared the mine a ‘public utility’ and ‘preferential interest’. As a result, Fenosa’s sister company, Lignitos de Meirama, was allowed to expropriate by force as an urgent procedure the terrain necessary for its exploitation. It was part of an attempt by the regime to move from a situation of external energy dependence to one of an internal reliance on energy sources outlined in the “Concierto de la minería del Carbón” (Decreto 2485/74), which encouraged key energy companies to modernize in exchange for fiscal benefits (Cabana Iglesias and Lanero Taboas, 2008). The mining company planned, and achieved, the physical occupation of the entire valley of As Encrobas, all 2,199.24 acres. This policy laid at the heart of one of the strongest popular revolts in Galicia during the 1970s.

The conflict arose, not because of villagers’ resistance to their expropriation tout court—which would have been unimaginable for these communities even during late
Francoism— but due to the perceived low prices which the company offered to pay in compensation for the land. This perception, and the speed of events, created a strong sense of injustice and grievance among the villagers whose situations differed markedly: there were absent, emigrant, or well to do landowners, small proprietors working their own land as well as the poor peasantry who were renting. They forcefully resisted the physical occupation of their lands four times, confronting the company and the guardia civil (the rural police). There were demonstrations and hundreds of declarations of support and solidarity. These episodes were marked also by police violence and detentions which fed back more support for ‘As Encrobas’. Finally, after considering different solutions, such as moving all the inhabitants to alternative terrains, settlements were reached in 1977. For those renting land, a solution came earlier, consisting of a commitment by the company to provide them with alternative houses and plots (El País, 22/02/1977). For small proprietors, agreement came later, consisting of considerably higher prices than originally offered for the lands, pensions for elderly peasants and jobs for younger ones.

During its unfolding the conflict galvanized Galician civil society. The UPG, ANPG, CCLL, SO, the PSG, the nationalist student union ERGA as well as non-nationalist organizations such as CCOO, Movimiento Comunista de Galicia (MCG), Organización Revolucionaria de Trabajadores (ORT), and myriad neighbour and cultural associations, housewife associations and university colleges –many linked to nationalism- played a key role in the articulation of a Galician wide social movement of support for As Encrobas. Among them, it was undoubtedly the national-popular movement which was more deeply implicated in solidarity with the villagers, mainly the small rural proprietors. The CCLL worked with neighbours in the everyday management of the conflict. It was a very public affair where all implicated agents, as well as secondary ones, used the daily press, demonstrations and concentrations to voice their positions, stretching further the realm of legitimate political interventions at the end of francoism.

The villagers’ quarrel with the company on a concrete material level in relation to the price of the land was indistinguishable from a more abstract power struggle to
suture the meaning of their conflict in which many other sites where implicated. The government and the company told the story of the ‘social need’ for electricity. The Spanish left, in turn, told a tale of an instance of ‘social injustice’—perpetrated by a company too used to the ways of a dictatorship that were increasingly becoming socially unacceptable. Neither of them problematised the nature of the community or the spatial meaning of the affair. The UPG instead told the story of a small Galician locality resisting by all possible means the colonial exploitation of the nation by a monopoly capitalist enterprise, illustrating (and illuminating) their story-line of colonialism. In effect, it brought about a resisting community through ideological identification with their tales—and everyday involvement in the conflict. Nationalists wrote several stories narrating the struggle and their involvement in their own periodicals. The following tale, an example of one of these, was written early in the conflict:

Extract 6.2. The villages: As Encrobas

"As Encrobas. The people united against capital.
'We demand the movement of the population but with equal conditions. We want the same quality and quantity of land, same climate, same language, culture and traditions. We would accept anywhere in Galicia, as long as it has these characteristics'.
This is the demand of the neighbours of As Encrobas in the face of the meddling of Fenosa, which tries to expropriate their land and houses with the aim of exploiting a lignite mine to feed a thermal power station to be located there.
The neighbours of Encrobas, in spite of dividing manoeuvres, are willing to do anything to defend their interests. Thus, on the 29 August a demonstration was organized in A Coruña and 8000 people attended, among them the neighbours of As Encrobas, peasants from other areas of Galicia, as well as the Galician people in general, conscious that only the people united—and without caciques—can be victorious.
Shouting: ‘Our land is ours, not Fenosa’s’, ‘agrarian trade union’, ‘Galician agrarian reform’, ‘Free Galicia without emigration’ , ‘CCLL in every village’. ‘Free Galicia, popular power’ as well as the demand to move the population, all this [taking place] under the national flags with the five-pointed star, [the demonstration] affirmed the national-popular character of the anti-monopolistic demands. This meaning was not only understood by the participants but also by the governmental authority which ordered [the police] to charge against [the demonstration] when the Galician hymn started.

Days later the neighbours of Encrobas stopped the occupation of their lands, forcing the representatives of Lignitos de Meirama to negotiate directly with them.
The peasants of Encrobas have already said: ‘We want a pacific, negotiated solution to the problem, but if we are forced we are ready for anything...’
In Encrobas, as in Castrelo de Miño, Ponteceso, Quiroga, Xove...the peasants say: ‘No to monopolist capital!!! Galician agrarian reform!!!
(UPG, T&T, n 40 Autumn, 1976)

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The tale narrates the willingness of ‘the neighbours’ of As Encrobas to fight the unjust expropriation of their homes and lands and to force an unruly big company to negotiate with them. This ‘David against Goliath’ plot was typical of stories of places of exploitation. It assembles heterogeneous places and voices, delineating a geography of exploitation and resistance with its associated subjectivities: the village and the lands expropriated; the city of A Coruña where a demonstration takes place; other villages which suffer similarly and, implicitly, the nation, Galicia. These spaces appear populated by stereotypical collective characters: ‘neighbours’, ‘peasants’, the ‘people in general’ and by the ‘national-popular’ who are active in defence of the land / nation. Although sometimes interpellated as peasants —particularly in other tales— in a compound of class and spatial categories which are elided, often the main characters here seem to be simply the ‘inhabitants’ of As Encrobas. This interpellation produces the impression that everybody in that village was equally affected and effectively glosses over their internal class differences. The only enemy is the Spanish company and the local elites which represent them: ‘the people united without caciques’.

The tale begins by seemingly reporting directly the voice of ‘the villagers’ with whom the CCLL worked closely and who made public demands: ‘we demand the movement of the population but with equal conditions’. However, the tale actually works to blur the voices of the peasants and that of the national-popular. Discerning who they were was, in fact, difficult in the episode as a whole —contrary to Lanero Taboas, who tends to draw lines between the pre-formed ‘interests’ and identity of the ‘community’ and that of nationalists96 (2008). In the story, reported speech is always constructed speech, inflicted with different meanings and intentions, as its context has been modified (Vološinov, 1973; Tannen, 2007). The tale plays on this polyphony by juxtaposing ambiguous quotes and voices with others which should be more clearly attributed to particular subjectivities. In the chant in the demonstration of ‘our land is ours, not Fenosa’s’ its ambivalent collective identity ‘our’ could be read both as the voice of the ‘neighbours’ of As Encrobas claiming their village’s lands and as that of ‘the people’ railing against colonization and ‘irrational industrialization’ of the nation. Indeed, both are fused. These are then juxtaposed with claims for the
expansion of the nationalist trade union ('CCLL in every village'); and with demands born out of the story-line of colonialism ('free Galicia without emigration') which could be seen more as a demand of nationalism per se than necessarily that of the expropriated neighbours. This blurring is the point of the mimesis in the representation of the demonstration scene as the tale explicitly notes: not only do the narrators perceive the ‘national-popular’ character of the participant’s complaints (marked by the presence of five-pointed flags) but even the authorities noted it. Later on, the story represents the peasants of a plurality of villages experiencing conflicts: ‘in Encrobas, as in Castrelo de Miño, Ponteceso, Quiroga, Xove..’ as similarly making general claims about ‘the nation’ ('No to monopolist capital!!! Galician agrarian reform!!!'). Here, the tale ‘colonizes’ the voices of ‘the peasants’, making them a chorus of ventriloquists mouthing the movement’s grievances and demands. That is, the story strongly suggests that ‘the villagers’ adopted the national-popular representation of the conflict as ‘colonial’.

However, the villagers would not move just anywhere, the tale continued: ‘we want the same quality and quantity of land, same climate, same language, culture and traditions’. For longer than a year the dispute took many twists and turns around negotiations to move the community in its entirety to new alternative lands. Land here is a complex construction, both as a material resource which can be measured, compared and attributed economic value ('the same quantity and quality') and, also, as site supporting and allowing certain immaterial conditions which define a community: ‘same language and traditions’. This representation of land establishes geographical and communitarian boundaries inside/outside Galicia, as they must be looked for ‘anywhere in Galicia’. And yet, not all Galician lands are a priori equivalent. Land would be fine ‘as long as it has these characteristics’ in a tension which betrays an uneasiness regarding moving, and the neighbours’ own intimate connection with their locality as different from other, however close or similar, localities. If a communitarian boundary is territorially created in a distinction in/out of Galicia as its qualification, this would imply that not all Galician lands would be equally suitable for the community of As Encrobas to thrive. Then it is unclear that this community can be thought of as a national one. This trace of peasant voices
effectively undermines the tale implicit claim that peasants shared a colonial narrative.

The struggle for the lands was primarily defensive in nature: the company’s desire to acquire them threatened small owners’ properties, means and ways of life. This struggle takes place inside and outside of the village though: inside when stopping the physical occupation of lands; outside, in the city, A Coruña, a space temporarily taken by the ‘people in general’, ‘neighbours’ and ‘other peasants. Curiously, the story does not provide a description of the village, the valley, nor of the likely confrontation between neighbours and the Guardia Civil at the very site in dispute. This is briefly noted as ‘days later the neighbours of Encrobas stopped the occupation of their lands’. The weight of the action, in the form of mimesis, instead falls on the construction of the scene of the demonstration in A Coruña, where the nationalist organizations were heavily implicated and their presence likely to be more important than at the occupied lands themselves. We can deduct that the implicit readers of the tale were nationalists themselves, as this foregrounds nationalist participation over peasant action.

Finally, the events of As Encrobas are metaphorically condensed to diverse conflicts taking place in other localities: ‘In Encrobas, as in Castrelo de Miño, Ponteceso, Quiroga, Xove...the peasants say’, and the affected positioned similarly as peasants with one single voice. Through this abstraction of the unique features and characteristics of diverse concrete situations in quite distinct Galician villages, and the blurring of the voices of neighbours and nationalism, the national-popular movement builds alternative, real / unreal places where localities and subjectivities are reconciled with nationhood, represented as a geography of resistance and struggle against ‘colonialism’, mapping out the nation.

*Places of exploitation II: neighbourhoods*

Although the small peasant villages are the characteristic locations in the narratives of places of exploitation there are other, less familiar and typical tales based on sites
of resistance that perform a key function: they construct a Galician identity based on territory for non class-based groups. Mainly, these tales are centred on neighbourhoods. The following small story illustrates this:

Extract 6.3. The neighbourhoods: Teis.

"TEIS
Whilst millions and millions are spent in building work like the ‘scalestri’ —which go against the popular interest, to facilitate the drain of our money, our resources and our fellow countrymen to emigration, and to guarantee the colonial dependence of our people—any small investment in [solving] problems, that year after year the people of Vigo and particularly the neighbours of Teis vindicate, are denied. That is: traffic lights, pavements, puffin crossings, speed limits, covering pot holes, barriers in train crossings, affordable housing, schools, etc. All this is what the people ask for and it is ignored by Mr Picher and co.
The neighbours of Teis [we] are tired of passively watching the deaths of our neighbours—30 in less than two years; the last one that of the Bernardez Freaza’s and their 14 year old child Nando, while the younger brother Miguel, 7, fights for his life. The run overs continue, and if yesterday was this family’s turn in the level crossing of Animas, today was the turn of the three year old child Manoliño Saraman Martinez, in the Avenida de Galicia.
Enough of legal killings.
Enough of the clientelistic and imperialist politics of Picher and company.
Enough of enduring the institutions imposed by the Spanish Imperialist State. In its own benefit and against popular interests.
The people are willing to fight until victory. As we have shown in the demonstrations to denounce, reject and condemn which we have been protagonizing in these last few days.

Against colonial oppression.
The struggle continues!!!
The people will prevail!!!

('Cangas-Vigo-Teis', T&T, n 37, 1976)

These stories, which construct neighbourhoods as sites of struggle, differ from the village-places in their focus on everyday life and low-key issues as well as on ‘attacks’ by big capitalist enterprises. In this tale of ‘Teis’ in extract 6.3, a neighbourhood in the city of Vigo, the administration’s interest in a major construction project (the ‘scalestri’) was contrasted to the ‘real’ needs of neighbours. The ‘scalestri’ was an elevated motorway entrance / exit planned to connect the city with the other main city in Galicia (A Coruña) through the ‘Atlantic motorway’ which was being built at the time. It penetrated deep into the town centre, and its pillars and lanes plunged streets in the heart of town into darkness. The use of the ‘scalestri’ highlights the contrast between the interests of a powerful inimical administration—who spends
'millions and millions' in 'building work...contrary to the popular interest'- and those of 'the people'. This contrast serves to demarcate the boundaries of the city, creating a space inside / outside which, through a reference to 'fellow countrymen', 'emigration' and 'colonial dependence', comes to stand for the nation as a whole: i.e. drained 'of our money, of our resources and our fellow countrymen to emigration and to guarantee the colonial dependence of our people'.

The spatial demarcation is then focused on the more intimate, yet public, space of the neighbourhood ('The people of Vigo and particularly the neighbours of Teis', 'the neighbours of Teis we are tired of witnessing the death of our neighbours...'), and its everyday urban and safety needs: traffic lights, pedestrian crossings, train track crossings, pavements, schools, etc. The point of the story is to build a polarised confrontation between the 'reasonable' and 'just' needs of neighbours and the 'colonial' interests of an 'imposed' and 'imperialist' local administration. The story repeatedly interpellates the people as 'neighbours' —a spatially based category which glosses over their possible class differences— and incites them to rebel against the 'colonial' situation: 'it is enough'. Thus, the neighbourhood is resignified as a site of oppression and colonialism, as the lack of fulfilment of local urban grievances and everyday demands. In these stories, the abstract processes of 'colonial oppression' are embedded in concrete, local sites. Although low-key, the stories try to accomplish unrelenting ideological work orientated to the immediacy of local spaces and vicinities.

Routes of struggle

The heterotopias centred on 'routes of struggle' differ from the 'places of exploitation' in the way they construct struggles that are primarily offensive in nature and they construct 'the people' territorially and without, or with minimal, recourse to class categories. The typical route stories are those narrating demonstrations organised by nationalist organizations. Some heterotopias, Foucault suggested, are intersections of space and time achieved by either 'indefinitely accumulating time' —such as museums and libraries— or are, instead, 'fleeting,
transitory, precarious spaces of time' (Soja, 1996:160). The stories of routes of struggle, centred on public demonstrations where nationalists and 'the people' reclaim and regain transitory control of spaces in a dynamic way belong to the latter, fleeting heterochronies.

The narrated demonstrations in these stories operated on a city and town-wide scale and sometimes they took the form of journeys between localities, where streets, squares and roads become a theatre for the performance of nationhood. Routes in cities are often chosen for their geographical and symbolic centrality — the choice of Santiago and the Quintana square, an emblem for nationalism since the rallies held there by the PG in the 1930s, in the ritual demonstrations of the 'national day' — and inter-village journeys are often fused with places of exploitation. Violence is sometimes involved in the form of 'repression' of the demonstrators as the result of the defiant attitude of the people who stand their ground against the 'repressive forces'. For permission had to be asked of the francoist authorities to demonstrate and it was often denied, making the demonstrations illegal, and thus ideal as sites to display political courage and strength of resistance. In the following story, embedded with several other stories, it is as a protest against political events, police killings in the Basque Country and the trial against Captain Fortes and army cadres belonging to the Army Union for Democracy which triggers the demonstration.

**Extract 6.4 On routes of struggle**

"SOLIDARIDADE CO CAPITAN FORTES
The killings perpetrated by the Fraga police in Victoria and the trial against 9 members of the military, accused of belonging to the UMD and of inciting sedition, provoked a strong solidarity movement in all of Galicia.

PONTEVEDRA
On the 8 of March in response to the call made by the UPG and the ANPG, together with other political forces, the Galician people demonstrated their solidarity with Captain Fortes and his colleagues at the time of the trial in the streets. Although the demonstration called for 8 in the evening in Ferreira square did not take place there, at 8.30 pm 400 people carrying national flags and banners concentrated in Benito Corbal street. The GALICIAN HYMN was sung and there were chants of "VIVA GALICIA FREE AND SOCIALIST", "FORTES, OUR FRIEND, THE PEOPLE ARE WITH YOU", "GENERAL AMNISTY". Shortly after the police charged, and the demonstrators in commands continued to shout their chants all over the city."
Of course, the repression [a represibn) acted strongly and the result were people hurt, bruised, and a demonstrator was detained by the Guardia Civil, which kept him until 1 pm the next afternoon when he declared before the judge.

SANTIAGO [...] LUGO [...] VIGO [...] AS PONTES [...] A CRUÑA [...]”
('Solidarity with the Basque People', T&T, n35, 1976)

What is noticeable about this story is that the drama of the nation is performed through the equivalence of struggles in different localities ('in all of Galicia'). In one of the Galician cities, Pontevedra, the urban landscape of streets and squares becomes momentarily a space of loud and visible dissent and confrontation with the francoist regime. Also, those demonstrating, are interpellated directly as 'the Galician people', ‘400 people’, ‘the demonstrators’, again without recourse to economic or class based categories.

6.3. Space, struggle and the political.

The nationalists' imagination of place depicted in the small stories of 'national-popular struggles' overflowed the limits of class-based nationhood set up in canonical texts and small stories and stood in an uneasy tension with them. Whereas the canonical texts of nation and class had shrunk the nation narratively, these stories came to be a supplement: a spatial imagination of the nation. This imagining is nothing like the nationalists' old narratives. The national-popular sites performed a space-bound national membership where 'the people' is a struggling subjectivity allowing for a more inclusive rule of belonging to the nation, as they often interpellated a 'people' based on inhabitation rather than class. This resignification of the 'people' was enabled by particular sites and routes: villages mainly, but also towns, neighbourhoods, streets and public squares. Public, spaces of struggle are condensed in equivalential chains which implicitly bring about a nation-space. Yet the heterotopias were also the everyday realization of the antagonistic frontier effects of the discourse of colonialism as explained in chapter 5. Therefore, the tales allow us to have a glimpse of the implicit nationalist 'utopia' of the nation: a network
of localities forming a territory up in arms, fighting and struggling against national and social oppression.

The heterotopias created in the stories and the strategies of localities were politically very productive. They produced a struggling nation for the communities of nationalism utilising the plurality of local conflicts as raw materials. Indeed, a text written as late as April 1977 claimed that ‘at present, we believe that it is particularly important to strengthen the organizational and ideological mass line, as the political struggle moves to a first plane’ (What is the UPG?, T&T, UPG, 1977). The ‘mass line’ translated mainly into the reinforcement of ‘self-organization’ within ‘an anti-colonial’ perspective through sectorial organizations, strategies and struggles. That is, the refusal to engage in alliances or be a part of organizations which were susceptible to being seen as ‘Spanishist’ or part of the ‘Spanish Imperialist State’ and thus the corresponding need to create nationalisms very own sites. Hence, during its key years—between 1974 and 1978— the UPG created the Sindicato Obreiro Galego, the Comisíons Labregas, the ERGA and myriad neighbourhood associations and put in place a ‘cultural front’ through a network of local cultural associations. These new organizational sites embodied and reproduced the stories and strategies of local resistances and nationhood.

These narratives and practices constituted one of the euphoric political periods for the nationalist forces. They were attempting, with mixed success but with high visibility, to articulate their demands—for rational industries, an end to migration, agrarian reform—in relation to ongoing local grievances. Constructing these local struggles as an implicit utopia, they storied specific problems in somewhat less theoretical vocabularies. These tales resonated emotionally more widely, even though they still pointed to a ‘vanguard’ and elitist position in which the movement knew what ‘the Galician people’ felt and wanted.

The discursive efforts of the movement to ‘self-organize’ locally, embedding themselves in local problems, laid the basis for a considerable capacity for mobilization and a territorial expansion of their sites. This social growth has been
widely remarked upon in the literature (Núñez Seixas, 2001b, Beramendi, 2007; Prada, no date). By the time of the first municipal elections in 1979 the *Bloque Nacional-Popular Galego*—BNPG, the electoral brand of the UPG and ANPG—was able to put forward candidates in one hundred and sixty four of the total three hundred and twelve municipalities (i.e. in 52.5% of the territory) and had 262 counsellors elected (Marquez Cruz, 1993; Vilas Nogueira and Fernández Baz, 2004). By comparison, the PSOE, with much greater economic resources—but a slim local base—was able to present candidates in 55.1% of Galician municipalities. The electoral results achieved by nationalist candidates were slightly better in rural localities where they had been present in conflicts, and their trade unions progressively acquired a considerable representation—by 1980 the workers’ union accounted for 17.48% of union reps. The discourse of colonialism’s social presence and sturdiness was becoming, as a result, quite relevant despite what their scant electoral success would suggest.

However, if these narratives of success were productive they also hardened the national-popular stance towards change. The political context of the transition was fast moving. By March 1976 the PCE had already joined the PSOE to coordinate their pro-democracy efforts in the ‘platajunta’, which signalled the PCE’s willingness to negotiate with francoist elites. When Adolfo Suarez came to power—July 1976—the nationalists’ option for rupture was already looking like an illusion. Suarez’s political initiatives pushed the reform of the system from within and the discourse of democracy quickly gathered momentum. The approval in the referendum for political reform in December 1976 gave legitimacy to this project. This was further corroborated by the clear UCD victory in the first legislative elections of June 1977.

In spite of this rapid transformation of the political environment—and contrary to the volte face of many of the Spanish radical parties which had since 1976 already started to make efforts to adjust their discourse to the reform process (Laiz, 1995:214)—the national-popular movement did not waver in their support for rupture. ‘The UPG did not take any notice’ says Beramendi, of the transformations nor of their rather unimpressive results in these elections of 6% of the Galician vote.
all together (2007:1098). The citation and iteration of stories of success, of counter­
spaces to the colonized nation, which required strong material and emotional
investments, worked to reassure (part of) the Galician movement of the need to
continue pursuing political rupture and to resist any other alternative.

Although, in fact, they had taken notice of change, and it had caused serious internal
disputes, the official response was not a strategical u-turn but a tempered
measurement of the new circumstances inserted within the framework of
intelligibility of their colonialism and self-organization narratives. The movement’s
spatial narratives constituted a supplementary plot which justified the need for a
‘mass line’ strategy in the face of the diminishing chances of a democratic break
option: ‘the people’, notes a typical tale’s moral point, ‘gave their answer and
showed that every instant its conscience and organization grows’ (T&T, n40, 1976).

As a matter of fact, the social reality of local conflicts sustaining nationalism’s
heterotopias were at their height during the years between 1975 and 1978, as it was
with the heated political debate over ‘rupture’ versus ‘reform’. Thus, when the
nationalist parties decided to try to influence the process of Transition they refused
to participate in the state wide pro-democracy platforms and devised their own
platform which originated from the premise of the ‘self-organization’ of Galician
forces –the Consello de Forzas Políticas Galegas, in January 1976, which redacted the
Bases Constitucionais: a program for rupture and opposition to the autonomy
process. The Consello eventually imploded in November 1976, when the tight
frontiers of us/them were pressurized by the PSG’s contacts with the Spanish wide
Federación de Partidos Socialistas and the attempt to integrate the Movimento
Comunista de Galicia, also a Galician branch of a Spanish wide movement.

But even if the movement had taken notice of the change in the political climate, this
change was represented as being merely formal. As explained previously, democracy
and the autonomy process were explained away as ‘tricks’ to deceive and discredited
as a mere continuation of the dictatorship by other means. When the party assured
its membership that now ‘the political struggle’ had moved to ‘a first plane’ and that
there was a need to strengthen the electoral ‘field of action’, it was alluding to the
relegation of the brief and failed attempt at armed struggle97 whilst asserting that politics should still be seen in terms of mobilization. Politics was not straightforwardly and univocally associated to elections and party relations as the new democracy-in-the-making was trying to impel. Instead, political action, structured by a ‘politics is war’ metaphor, was broadly seen as centred on local popular mobilization: ‘from Castrelos to Encrobas; from the Galician Patria’s day to the recent construction strike in Lugo” ('What is the UPG?', T&T Abril 1977). ‘Formal parliamentary struggle’ was just one more side of a successful ‘global political struggle’, even though an important one as a ‘weapon of denunciation and mobilization’ ('The UPG and the struggle for legalization', T&T, April 1977).

The poor results obtained by the parties of nationalism in the 1977 elections were not enough to cause a shift away from this understanding as yet, even though it eventually led to internal fractures98. The results were also read and evaluated in terms of popular mobilization rather than in terms of votes. Moreover, when looking at votes these were qualitatively, rather than quantitatively interpreted99. Certainly, not long after the elections the UPG demanded to be legalized for being a party ‘of acknowledged popular support’ (T&T, n50, December 1977). Hence, on the 4th of December, when every other Galician force supported a pro-statute demonstration in Vigo —caused by the dilettante manoeuvres of the Suarez government as regards the Galician norm— the ‘national-popular’ ignored this, and called an alternative demonstration against the agrarian tax.

Nevertheless, this ‘official’ continuity was not unanimously accepted. Internal tensions and struggles clearly surfaced within the heterogeneous UPG. The relevance of the heterotopias representing the principle of ‘self-organization’ and its tension with class-based belonging had been productive, but also alienated the party’s base. These strategies came under criticism as ‘nationalist’ or ‘petty-bourgeois’ —de-linking, in practice, national from class objectives— by sections of its membership100. Those who left or were expelled formed, in 1977, two organizations: the UPG-liña proletaria and the Partido Obreiro Galego (POG). These new entities, which were very different but opposed equally to the national-popular strategies,
rejected what they saw as a lack of worker centred politics, pluralist trade union policy and (inflexibility of) the UPG’s exclusionary political frontiers of us / them. For the UPG-lp alliances and a popular bloc had to be maintained, and they counted on the PSG and others in spite of their nationalist vacillations. For the POG, the idea of ‘progressive control’ of the institutions was necessary, opening the way to support the autonomic process and reform.

6.4. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that the rural –and urban- unrest exemplified by a plurality of conflicts such as As Encrobas formed the conditions of possibility and symbolic resources which allowed the narration of heterotopias as marrying concrete localities to abstract nationhood. These heterotopias were the hinge between ‘inhabitants’ or national subjects and a moral identity struggling against colonialism. Nationalism storied, that is, organized, and tapped into well worn practices of resistance for the control of space. These specific localities were narratively condensed and stood for the nation as a whole, as an implicit utopia.

These stories had the virtue of making class based definitions of the nation more flexible and re-territorializing the nation –resignifying who we are— whilst remaining firmly located within the zone of the clear antagonism with Spain narrated in the stories of colonialism. The national-popular discursive successes provided an argument to continue pursuing a politics of rupture and to refuse the transition to democracy as it took place, even after the first signs of defeat and possible irrelevance surfaced. After all, if the country was struggling, how could the movement surrender? Hence, whilst being productive these successes also caused internal fractures and inflexibility towards change.
Epilogue part II: ‘os do non’.

Up to this point it has been argued that in the late 1960s and early 1970s in Spain, Marxism, especially anti-colonial Marxism, was the language par excellence, the regime of representation, to talk about and perform resistance and opposition to oppressive regimes. The conditions for such oppression in Spain were undoubtedly present under Franco’s dictatorship. The PCE had been for decades the referent of (radical) opposition to the regime—sublimated, paradoxically, by the dictatorship’s own regime of representation where communism was the ultimate enemy—from the post-war guerrilla resistance to the Comisiones Obreras in a way in which peripheral nationalisms, despite sharing oppositional space, never were—perhaps with the exception of the Basques. Hence, these factors contributed to opposition in the late 1960s and 1970s adopting this vocabulary of motives (Wright Mills, 1940): class struggle, oppressed nations, national-popular, colonialism, etc. This vocabulary gave a new inflection, rearticulated and resignified the nation within new parameters, even though without completely obliterating its traditional masternarratives, positioning nationalists in antagonistic opposition to the dominant economic and political powers.

The discourse of colonialism (re)produced in a plurality of party, trade union and cultural sites during the 1970s hybridized the Marxist narratives of modes of development with a National Front type of narrative and a perennialist ‘national’ theme. It constructed a new story of the country through an often implicit foundational myth (the loss) which heavily drew upon, whilst profoundly resignifying, Murguía’s blueprint. Then, they articulated a narrative of the country ‘nowadays’ as a colony. This was achieved through two key discursive strategies. Firstly, the strategy of antagonism with Spain performed in the compound and plural forms of ‘Spanish imperialism’, ‘unitary state’ or ‘Spanishism’. Secondly, the strategy of identification of a heterogeneous ‘people’ constructed as the ‘popular classes’ and their collapse in the key figure of colonialism narratives: the ‘symbiotic worker’. Along with the class re-narrativization of the people, we can find in the narratives of
colonialism a preoccupation with place—in the important subplot of ‘national-popular revolts’—which supplements and undermines the class rule of belonging it delimited. The new story-lines and practices were tremendously productive: a myriad of political and social organizations, sectorial trade unions, demonstrations, magazines, books, stories and forms of knowledge of the nation were developed.

As a practice of resistance the story-lines of colonialism were, nevertheless, also restrictive, highly conflictual and inflexible. The movement supposedly interpellated the popular classes, but in practice its key audience was located in the small space of radical opposition to Francoism. However, as David Howarth noted in respect to the Black Consciousness Movement in South Africa: ‘there is nothing particularly exceptional about the fact that radicalized and relatively disconnected students and intellectuals dominated [the BCM]; many collective social imaginaries are established from these ignoble origins’ (Howarth, 2000:173). If ignoble origins are, a priori, not an impediment to constituting successful imaginaries, then we must question why the discourse of colonialism hardly managed to transcend the limitations of its origins. In spite of its major efforts at re-narrativizing the nation it did not manage to become the surface of inscription of popular demands.

Several reasons internal to the discursive structure of colonialism help account for its failure to gel. Firstly, ‘colonialism’ was always a ‘floating’ rallying point. That is, its meaning and frontier effects were always plural and there were many points of dissension between story-lines. Moreover, even from within each of the different discursive subsystems ‘colonialism’ was a hybrid. Its ambivalence and ambiguities were therefore ubiquitous. The identities it produced were fitted onto different and even contradictory plots which prescribed different norms of being and acting politically. As a consequence, they were a breeding ground for internal dissent, exacerbated in some sites by authoritarian practices typical both of being clandestine and of Leninist ‘democracy’. Thus, within the discourse of colonialism not only sites as different as the UPG and PSG coexisted—even though they performed and policed very different lines of inclusion and exclusion in relation to the people with important implications for the conduct of resistance politics—but
each were subjected to ‘left’ and ‘rightwing’ splits. The POG, located outside the discourse of colonialism, and UPG-\textit{linha proletaria}, a more radical workerist reworking of colonialism, arising out of the UPG in 1977 being just one example.

Besides, there are good reasons why the ‘national-popular’ movement could not have attracted the social groups it tried to represent. For the discontents which the movement addressed were often only marginally, if at all, related to those of ‘real’ peasants and workers. The language and vocabularies mobilized by the radical movement to interpellate their audiences were on most occasions far too abstract, theoretical and remote from the everyday world and woes of peasants and workers. Often the movement seemed to be talking to itself. If grieving for the ‘lack of agrarian reform’, the location in Galicia of ‘irrational industries’ and ‘emigration’ were actual points of readability in the story-lines—and we should remember that, as Michael Keating noted ‘there is much here’, in Galician social conditions, ‘that is consistent with dependency theory or ‘internal colonialism’ (Keating, 2001) — this was so mainly from an ‘enlightened’, centralist position characteristic of vanguards and intelligentsias. The movements’ campaigns against industry and the like required considerable pedagogical efforts: ‘perhaps this country has never been nationalist’ is a thought voiced years later. They tended not to address sectorial and specific social and economic interests of these groups. Workers lived off the factory system however ‘irrational’, many Galicians saw emigration as a positive personal opportunity for upward social mobility. Nevertheless, through the constructions of heterotopias and ‘self-organization’, the movement did, at some point, tap into real demands.

Lastly, the movement presented its audience and membership with a profoundly negative, even victimizing, mythology, constructing a dystopia and dwelling on the wrongs inflicted on the country much more overtly than it presented utopian longings or addressed political desires for democracy and social betterment. This negative myth had as an effect—in some of the story-lines more than others—of building exclusionary borders which left outside the category of ‘the people’ virtually everyone: from fellow colonialist to the Spanish-wide left wing organizations in
Galicia, as well as the political right. Besides, the utopia of liberation would not be met by an autonomy which seemed a positive step to much of the political class and inhabitants of the country. The movement’s relentless protests won them the pejorative nickname of ‘os do non’: those who say no- which framed them as unfit for cooperation.

Moreover, at the conjunctural level, not only was colonialism struggling against a much more powerful imaginary of democracy in Spain which was implementing a strategy of co-optation of forces and groups; but the conditions making colonialism narratives possible (Francoism and the ‘red decade’) became the very conditions of its impossibility. The grievances and demands of the movement which had crystallized in the early 1970s had all but disappeared by the end of the decade. International economic crisis and the political transition to democracy soon ended the construction of new industries: its main effect being the actual deindustrialization of Galicia or ‘reconversión’. The EEC brought about considerable, if highly undesired, agrarian reforms. Moreover, emigration to Europe had been mostly a memory since the very beginning of the decade and the new democracy and autonomy brought about the promise of freedom, devolution, cultural renewal and linguistic co-officiality. In these new conditions plotting Galicia as a ‘colony’ became increasingly difficult and so did portraying ‘Spanish imperialism’ or centralism as an evil source of oppression. As a totalising critique which promoted national and social liberation as a minimum, the story-lines of colonialism were ill equipped to deal with the multifarious changes brought about by the transition, the 1978 Spanish constitution and the international crisis. Hence, the discourse of colonialism strongly opposed the dictatorship but, paradoxically, its narratives, demands, grievances and political strategies were made possible by the dictatorship itself. They were a reverse mirror image, a twisted effect of Francoism.

Once Francoism disappeared the state rapidly transformed and, whether they wanted to or not, the forces that made up the radical movement could not remain static. They did not acknowledge this in 1978, but rather in 1981: when the new institutional system started to develop and it looked and felt real. At this stage,
popular nationalism's own marginal status became painfully clear after the first elections. However, the Galician movement's fate was not to be that of other 'radical-left' groups during the Spanish transition as Consuelo Láiz noted. For, if the vocabulary of colonialism was in its originary form ill equipped to deal with change, it was also a hybrid. Colonialism was sustained also by a perennialist narrative of nation realised in the myth of loss, heterotopias, temporal primacy of national struggle. Nationhood turned out to be the demand that the State more strongly resisted to symbolically co-opt. Symbolically because in spite of the creation of the Autonomic system—which gave more powers to Spanish regions then than Wales or Scotland have today in the UK—this was seen as an attempt at devolving power without attributing it significant symbolic recognition. Thus, the way was open to a shift in and substitution of the actual content of the discourse, after bitter and painful internal conflict signalled in several crises and expulsions.

Colonialism, a discourse which demanded the investment of strong emotions, was to be slowly and quietly displaced. As Laclau suggests 'the people' did not disintegrate because there was another power which could still play the totalising role of the enemy: the Spanish constitution (Laclau, 2005:92). More weight started to be given to the 'nation' plot and language at the expense of other plots and the actual content of the discourse of nationalism was thus progressively substituted. As a result, its more radical language and contours could always be replayed if necessary. Moreover, these came to encapsulate the identity of the UPG, and so modifying them would suppose a real crisis for the organization as we will see in part III.
Narrating Sovereignty (I): colonialism in the world-system tales

7.1. Introduction: heteroglot terrains (I)

In the preceding chapters I showed the myriad tensions, contradictions and paradoxes that ‘living by’ Marxist and nationalist plots brought upon Galician ‘nationalism’ during the 1970s and how they dealt with them, examining the different stories and strategies which constructed a hybrid of ‘national-popular’ or ‘socialist and national’ identities. Now the focus of this and the following chapters will shift to other plots of nationalism, mainly those in which nationalism has been most commonly understood: liberal and republican narratives of ‘the people’. This, of course, is due to a discursive and narrative shift in the movement and the political conjuncture. The constitution and appearance of ‘the nation’, Qadri Ismail remarks, ‘changes from conjuncture to conjuncture’ and therefore it needs to be read dynamically and situationally (Ismail, 2000:215-16). Dynamically, because the nation is that entity which nationalism defines, addresses and mobilizes. As the goals of nationalism change, so does the nation. Situationally, because this conjunctural constitution of nation responds to ‘overdetermined contradictions’ (ibid.). Nationalism, nevertheless, not only acts in and is limited by each conjuncture, but constructs the political terrains in which it operates itself.

The beginning of the new conjuncture and narrative shift in Galician nationalism can be situated symptomatically in the serious crisis of identity and the dilemma of ‘adaptation’ suffered by the UPG in 1981. This crisis was ‘won’ over by a particular narrative of the nation, the party and the ‘unity of nationalism’ conceived as a ‘reconstituted’ front politics represented by the electoral coalition BNPG-PSG, which
a year later crystallized into the BNG. That is, for Galician nationalism the conjuncture of the transition did not end, and ‘democracy’ itself did not start, as some scholarly accounts suggest, with the promulgation of the Constitution in 1978. It was only after 1981, after the first steps towards autonomy had taken place, Colonel Tejero’s failed coup in 1981 and the landslide victory of the PSOE in the Spanish general elections of 1982, that a new conjuncture was narrated and a discursive shift away from colonialism began.

Here I read the texts, the story-lines and tales, produced in key nationalists sites between the years 1982 to 1987. These sites are now mainly from the UPG and the newly created BNG, between which correspond distinct but interlocking voices. The Riazor assembly of 1982 in A Coruña performed the coming together of the UPG, the PSG –for a year, after which the party splits and only a fraction, the ‘colectivo socialista’, remains in the front—; individual affiliates; ex-members of the extinct AN-PG; and a few sectorial and small local associations (Fernández Baz 2003:149). Thus, attention needs to be paid to three issues. Firstly, despite being part of the BNG, I am examining the UPG’s own narrative production in its vertical and horizontal intertextual relations, but not that of other members, as the UPG remained the only party, the most distinctive voice and the most ‘dense transfer point’ for, centripetal and centrifugal, relations of power (Foucault, 1979:103) within the front subsequently for many years. The UPG fiercely retained its own distinctive identity vis-à-vis the unitary organization which sheltered it and whose building it had contributed to.

Secondly, the texts examined mark crucial moments of internal struggle and turning points in the life-story of contemporary nationalism. The key texts I examine in this chapter are the UPG’s III congress (1982) and the BNG’s Riazor assembly (1982). These lay out the strategies and stories that will dominate the representation of the self and the nation over this period as well as (co)constituting the framework of intelligibility of all the other political practices of the movement. However, produced at a time of crisis, these strategies and stories themselves are a result of struggles for hegemony and are marks of power within nationalism. Moreover, these
struggles are also noticeable in loud silences and in intertextual relations with following texts, which amount to a series of narrative reversals—even though all (are) immersed in the same problematic and discourse of sovereignty. Thus, by 1983 a IV UPG congress will already follow and the BNG’s II assembly soon after that in 1984. Furthermore, two extraordinary meetings came about the next year: in December 1985 for the BNG and an extraordinary ‘national conference’, also in 1985, for the UPG. In the space of four years six ‘constituent’ texts were written. This textual proliferation can be understood by recognising the dilemmas that the political conjuncture presented to the hard-won identity of the movement, epitomized in the ‘parliamentarians’ affair’. The UPG’s V congress (1986), and the BNG’s Carballiño assembly (1987), mark the beginning of the end of the crisis and the transition period to a new story-line which would be in place by 1989.

Although these are times of instability which demand a fair amount of narrative production the conjuncture is, simultaneously, one made by silences and by gearing narrative production towards the inside. In fact, since Pierre Macherey’s work in this area, texts are generally seen as incomplete and contradictory in their meanings instead of as rounded and coherent wholes. Text are often brimming with gaps and silences despite efforts to present seamless unities. Significant silences are ideologically relevant in that they reveal the things a text is ‘forbidden’ to say (Eagleton, 1976/2002; Macherey 1966/2006; Martin, 1990). In trying to tell the truth in their way, popular nationalism is forced to reveal the limits of their ideology.

But if gaps and silences are generally to be found in texts, those produced by nationalist organisations were, however, strikingly forceful during these years. There is almost an entire year of total silence in T&T publications between issues 84 and 85. This gap occurred at the height of the UPG’s internal crisis105. This crisis was brought about by a loss of verisimilitude and readability in the story-line of colonialism. It began with the renunciation of the UPG’s secretary general Pedro Luaces, the expulsion of at least ten members from the central committee in 1981 (UPG, III congress) and the abandonment of the party by, in some estimates, almost 40% of its membership106 (Barreiro Rivas, 2003:145). It did not come to an end until
the BNG’s Carballiño Congress in 1987 and the formation and expulsion of the new UPG split Partido Comunista de Liberación Nacional—the National Liberation Communist Party, henceforth the PCLN—from the BNG later in 1987 into the field of those belonging to the ‘heterogeneous’ society (Stallybrass, 1990; Laclau, 2005; Thomassen, 2005). The UPG’s head, its central committee, was torn asunder and found itself without its characteristic united, authoritative voice in these early moments of the crisis. There was nothing to say as its own existence and identity were at stake. Hence, these were not years of popular mobilization, but times of retreat and self-fortification. After 1982, the T&T magazine’s output diminished considerably: from appearing monthly to barely being published three items a year107. Overall, the period 1981-1988 was governed by an inner-looking and self-assertive logic. It was a time of conflictive re-narrativizations in order to rebuild the identity of the movement and the nation in what was represented by this nationalism as a highly hostile political conjuncture.

Thirdly, the BNG—the ‘unitary organization of nationalism’ as it represented itself—did not by any means constitute the only form of nationalism in Galicia. In fact, the very form of the BNG signified a particular vision of unity which made impossible ‘national’ membership for many nationalist options. Hence, it needs to be noted that this ‘unity’ was fictitious. Other nationalist organizations existed, such as Esquerda Galega, Coalición Galega, etc, which were being forcefully ‘othered’ as ‘pseudonationalist’ and excluded from representation by the BNG and UPG by virtue of their acceptance of the autonomic settlement. Acquiescing to the new autonomy was a flagrant trespass of the latter parties’ key political frontier.

Thus, contrary to what has been said by some commentators who see little ideological change at this time because ‘maximalism’ was maintained (Beramendi, 2007; Máiz, 1996, 2001), and to others who have argued that change had started already by 1975 (Barreiro Rivas, 2003:141) I argue that a new story-line and discourse of ‘sovereignty’ distinct from ‘colonialism’ appeared in, and constructed, this new conjuncture. The new narratives, nevertheless, did not mean that the story-lines and discursive strategies of colonialism simply vanished in the wake of 1981. In
fact, there was an overlap and continuity for some time between some of these stories and strategies. This is a time of (re)construction of the political programme of nationalism without seemingly being so. Complex balances were crafted in the mist of strong internal and external resistances and struggles: between the necessary coherence of identity, continuity and normative authority and the needed transformations to adapt to the constitutional and autonomic system.

7.2. ‘These adverse circumstances’: the new democracy

If the 1970s had been dubbed ‘the red decade’ (Badiou, 2010), the 1980s should be thought of as the time of the new right. The dominance of a certain left wing and social-democrat consensus had given way, via a serious international crisis, to the international primacy of neoliberal and monetarist discourses. As David Harvey notes, the years 1978-80 might be seen as ‘a revolutionary turning-point in the world’s social and economic history’ (Harvey, 2005:1). Sweeping through the West was a neoliberal discourse that proposed that ‘human well being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms’ within an institutional framework with strong property rights, free market, free trade and a small state (ibid., 2). Hence, in the UK Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister with a mandate to curb trade union power and end inflationary stagnation. The tandem Volcker at the FED and Ronald Reagan in the presidency of the US started to ‘liberate’ finance. Social democrat governments, such as the French socialist party, were forced into abrupt policy changes. In the East, Den Xiaoping’s China began the liberalization of the Chinese socialist economy. The contrast could not have been starker: the power and euphoria of decolonization and socialism had past.

By 1982, most of the Spanish parties of the radical left had disappeared. For most parties, adjusting their programmes and adapting to the constitution and the new democratic system —renouncing the revolutionary edge of their ideology— meant losing their specificity and difference vis-à-vis the hegemonic forces of the left (Láiz,
1995). This eventually meant their complete dissolution and often their integration with the PSOE and PCE. Those who refused to make this adjustment either disappeared as independent parties and integrated with new social movements or fell into a spiral of violence with ever shrinking public support. Thus, Láiz identifies this period for the radical left as one of political ‘bankruptcy’ (1995:311). None of the groups obtained parliamentary representation after the 1979 general elections. This sketch of the evolution of the radical left exemplifies the manifold and extreme risks posed by identity related dilemmas for all radical, anti constitution parties in the new conjuncture.

This conjuncture congealed a new societal closure or new dispositif\(^8\), where, Balfour and Quiroga note, ‘the margins for departing from the basic principles of the new democracy were narrow’ (Foucault, 1977; Balfour and Quiroga, 2007:47). This new hegemony had at its centre the constitution of 1978, as the particularity which incarnated the democratic universal. The democratic suturing crystallizing at that time was based on a series of events and issues articulated very differently in the story-lines of right and left wing Spanish parties: parliamentary monarchy, commitment to a market economy, entry into NATO and the EEC, historical amnesia, the Spanish nation, (initial) political and social consensus, recognition of individual rights and liberties and a devolved territorial structure (Preston, 1986:204). Although peripheral nationalisms were still the ‘other’, not all of them were ‘enemies’: the main political frontier was the acceptance of the Constitution and the autonomic system.

Indeed, the constitution of 1978, as Nuñez Seixas, Bastida Freixedo and others have noted, would become, in time, the solid centre of a new Spanish nationalism (Balfour and Quiroga, 2007; Bastida Freixedo, 2007; Resina, 2002; Nuñez Seixas, 2007, 2001). After debate and confrontation, article 2 of the constitution declared the unity, indivisibility and indissolubility of the Spanish nation\(^9\). As Bastida notes, when the Constitution —the centre piece of the juridical and democratic system— is made to rest on the ‘indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation’, then the text itself presents the fiction of a ‘Spanish nation’ founding democracy and the political community
(2007:124). Civic and liberal versions of nationalism would reverse this relation. The constitutional text was premised on an organic, essentialist concept of a Spanish nation pre-dating and pre-empting any popular will (Bastida, 2007; Balfour and Quiroga, 2007). This indivisibility of Spain was, moreover, buttressed with force in article 8. This declared that ‘las Fuerzas Armadas, constituidas por el Ejército de Tierra la Armada y el Ejército del Aire, tienen como misión garantizar la soberanía e independencia de España, defender su integridad territorial y el ordenamiento constitucional’. This article was mainly interpreted as a defence of ‘territorial integrity’ from any possible internal secession than from an external attack.

The constitution acquired this relevance as traditional Spanish nationalism and its narratives had to go underground during the transition (Núñez Seixas, 2001; 2007). The reason was the substantial delegitimization it had suffered as a result of its close association with the Francoist dictatorship —when their form was that of Francoist nacional-catolicismo. There was reluctance in the Spanish progressive parties to brand their narratives of the nation and the state as nationalism at all. Instead, they labelled themselves ‘patriotic’ (ibid.). The resignification of Spanish national narratives encountered one major difficulty: their legitimacy could not be based upon a condemnation of the dictatorship as a common foundational myth, for roughly half of Spanish nationalism (the UCD, Alianza Popular) was an unrepentant heir to it. As Lacasta-Zabalza has explained, there was a need to forget the civil war and Francoism in order to renarrativize the Spanish nation (Lacasta-Zabalza, 1998).

The most pervasive version of Spanish nationalism that these conditions allowed developed as a ‘Constitutional patriotism’ (Bastida Freixedo, 2007; Núñez Seixas, 2001; 2007). This discourse was mainly promoted by the Gonzalez socialist government after 1982. As Núñez Seixas explains, this ‘incorporated postulates such an appeal to modernity, interregional solidarity, and a strong desire for integration in the European common project’ (2001:736). The core of this discourse is the dichotomy ‘political versus cultural’ nation. This distinction allowed Spain to be ‘a nation of nations’ where sovereignty and political legitimacy resided firmly in the Spanish nation. History, nevertheless, in the form of a supposedly Spanish nation which can be traced back to the pre-modern past still underpins this narrative.
The ‘constitution’ became the very name for democracy in Spain. Having acquired an overwhelming centrality, it displaced other understandings of democracy and a ‘democratic-track record’ which had dominated the deployment of the term and its discourses until then such as ‘peripheral nationalism’, ‘opposition to the francoist regime’ or ‘defence / struggle for rights and liberties’. In fact, Bastida Freixedo explains, ‘the connection between nationalism and democracy [had been] so strong that at the beginning and during the constituent period [the state wide left-wing parties] proposed as one of their demands the quasi federal structuration of the state’ (2007: 119). These connections and meanings were the basis of the impeccable democratic credentials of the left and peripheral nationalist parties. However, democracy now hinged mainly on ‘allegiance to the constitution’, and the constitution, as we have seen, was premised on an essentialist Spanish nation. This subtle shifting was an act premised, by way of a pact, on a ‘tabula rasa’ approach: a ‘wilful amnesia’, in Lacasta-Zabalza’s words, regarding the penal and political responsibilities of the Francoist elite.

Democracy was tangibly materialized, then, in a newly constructed text, a political artefact which, by this originary act of wilful forgetfulness and de-contextualization, spread democratic credentials to any willing to participate. However, its foundations were already the result of a struggle to define the very limits of the political community in which the ‘Spanish nation’ was victorious whilst others defeated. Democracy was not simply a set of procedural rights and liberties or the rule of law, but meant, at its core, the unity of the Spanish nation. This underlying, implicit principle which underpinned democracy allowed for the forgiveness of the sins of the dictatorship: for it kept the nation united as its principle of rationality – after all the civil war had been a nationalistic war (Saz Campos, 2003).

Yet, despite its Spanish essentialism, the constitution also recognized a plurality of ‘nationalities’ within Spain and projected a regional devolution – the system of autonomous communities— in an attempt to negotiate and articulate the demands of Basque and Catalan nationalisms. Spain became a nation of nationalities and
regions (Bastida, 2007; Balfour & Quiroga, 2007). ‘Nationalities’—a deliberately ambiguous term—and autonomous communities were accepted by the right-wing forces of Alianza Popular, UCD, and crucially, the military so long as they were devoid of symbolic recognition. Sovereignty and symbolic legitimacy, clearly, were held only by the Spanish nation (Núñez Seixas, 2001). However, the decentralization process then initiated also led to an extensive asymmetrical devolution of powers, with the creation of units with different levels of self-government, which has over time sparked a debate over the federal nature of the Spanish polity (Máiz et al, 2010).

Galicia was included among the ‘nationalities’ by virtue of having approved a statute of autonomy in 1936, and it aspired to obtain a statute with the same powers as Catalonia (Beramendi, 2007:1105). However, the process of devolution proceeded in an atmosphere of tension and hostility. The Suarez government tried, by 1979, to restrict the capacity of self-government for most autonomies and Galicia was the first to suffer: its first approved version in the Spanish parliament limited its powers severely (ibid). The conflict and protests that ensued throughout Galicia did not come to an end until September of 1980 when a new statute was passed which satisfied the original aspirations and defined Galicia as a ‘historic nationality’. These protests, nevertheless, did not prevent the statute being approved with a 71.73% abstention rate, if with a majority among those who voted, in the referendum of December 1980. An abstention rate which Galician ‘popular’ nationalism, opposed to the statute, welcomed.

Moreover, there was an attempted coup by a section of the Spanish military on the 23rd of February 1981; allegedly the response of the military to the devolution process and ETA’s actions. Its aftermath, despite being narrated by Spanish forces at the time as the redemption of Spanish democracy, brought with it tangible ‘harmonizing’ measures agreed by all Spanish parties (León Solís, 2007). These were measures to erode territorial claims to difference which curtailed the process of devolution. Thus, peripheral nationalisms narrated the events instead as the derailment of democracy, where the ‘Tejerazo’ triumphed in its political consequences, stopping short and denaturalizing the devolution of powers (ibid,
The most polemic 'harmonization' law, the LOAPA, a third of which would eventually be declared unconstitutional, was aimed at limiting and homogenising the competences of the different statutes in a policy of equalization of the regions and to 'stabilize and consolidate' the structure of the state (Ruiz Miguel, 1997).

The identitary dilemma

The constitution and new societal order, therefore, posed a dilemma for Galician nationalists: they were torn between the Scylla of retaining a narrative of colonialism or the Charybdis of 'adapting' to the new situation. On the one hand, the conditions which made nationalism’s narratives of a colony possible —on whose readability nationalism’s success as a movement depended— had all but melted and by 1982 it was hard to ignore. The overwhelming elite political consensus was establishing new social and political conditions based on a parliamentary democracy, a plural party system, civil liberties, territorial decentralization and devolution of powers which, what is more, actually coincided with the space of the nation. Besides, the social experiences of migration of the Galician population which had so strongly been present in the storytelling practices of nationalism had, in fact, been declining since the early 1970s and by 1980s were almost completely non-existent. In addition, the Francoist economic policy which gave rise to the ‘irrational industries’ which nationalism so strongly denounced had also come to an end. In its place the international economic crisis and entry into the EEC was bringing about a new policy of ‘reconversión’. Nationalists’ totalising critique of an evil system of colonial domination had the dictatorship as its condition of possibility, whether they acknowledged it or not. However, whereas it was plausible to elide Francoism with such an ‘imperialist state’ and hold it responsible for the lack of freedoms, territorial inequalities and migration, it became much harder to mobilize people to hold the new Constitution responsible for social ills which were also being profoundly transformed. Hence, the nationalists’ narratives of colonialism were being severely undermined: both the symptoms and causes of grievances narratively articulated
were disappearing. By trying to maintain the colonialism story-line they risked becoming a political anachronism.

On the other hand, giving up the narratives of colonialism in order to adapt to the new conjuncture risked shaking the foundations of their identity and untangling the national and social project. The signifier ‘colonialism’ had solidified as the myth of the movement: the hegemonizing project which constructed a ‘national-popular’ space of representation and objectivity, the colony. This was so in spite of the fact that this myth had certainly not succeeded in becoming a viable collective imaginary in Galicia. This myth had mobilised radical attachments and defined the very identity and self-understanding of the movement. ‘Colonialism’ embodied a narrative accrual: it made the myth of loss, the tales of national-popular struggles, stories of economic exploitation, tales of self-organization, and many others, into a complex discursive whole (Bruner, 1991). It sustained an ideological corpus in the form of interrelated and shared stories which in the early 1980s had just begun to crystallize while, simultaneously, unravelling.

Narrative accruals, Jerome Bruner reminds us, once shared culturally —within the movement’s culture— and achieving exteriority they also boast a power to constrain identity and future narrative practices (Bruner, 1991:18-19). Through the citation of stories and the cluster of terms which metonymically embodied them the identity of the movement and of the country was performed. In their repetition, iteration and ritualization in connection to other practices, the movement’s norms, boundaries and claims to authority were re-instantiated (Butler, 1990). Repetition and citational practices provided continuity and coherence to the movement and constrained it externally.

The new situation presented a dilemma for nationalism: retaining an identity they had fought for and risk becoming irrelevant, or surrendering their story-line and goals and risk disappearance. In spite of this, and unlike for the Spanish radical left, survival was easier for Galician radical nationalism. The reason for this was that national grievances and demands —hybridized with Marxism in the colonialism
tales—were those which the Spanish state found more difficult to co-opt and provide with symbolic recognition. As explained above, the Constitution of 1978, in spite of the construction of the autonomic state—which signified the end of the dictatorship and had ample legitimacy—made very few symbolic concessions to the distinct territories, essentialised a Spanish nation and was being 'harmonized'. Thus, the way was open for nationalism to instigate—through bitter internal conflict—a shift of stress, displacement and substitution of the key signifiers and plots of the discourse. However, 'the people' did not collapse; continuity of identity could be achieved, because there was still a power which could fulfil 'the totalising'/absolute role of the enemy: 'the Spanish unitary state' and, chiefly, 'the Spanish constitution'. More weight was given from the early 1980s on to 'nationhood' as plot and vocabularies at the expense of the Marxist plots and class language: although colonialism was never explicitly disavowed, and never truly absent, the discourse of national sovereignty and anti-imperialism was progressively substituted for colonialism, even though in an uneven manner, which betrays internal conflicts and struggles over identity. Neither fully present nor totally absent, colonialism was now to become a ghost.

7.3. Invoking and displacing colonialism: the world-system tales

In his archaeological work Foucault noted that 'there is no statement that does not presuppose others. [...] If one can speak of a statement it is because a sentence (a proposition) figures at a definite point, with a specific position, in an enunciative network that extends beyond it' (Foucault, 1969/1989:112). It is the transformation of the specific position, or the transposition, of the key statement of nationalism and its enunciative network that I examine here. 'Galicia is a colony' was the major 'statement' and quilting point knotting a whole fabric of stories and practices produced by nationalist sites for at least a decade. Its specific position in nationalism's ideological tapestry will be conspicuously modified from 1982 onwards. Colonialism as a nodal point was displaced to the periphery of nationalist
discourse. It became cited as ground and metonymically displaced by ‘imperialism’—a signifier contiguous to it in the story-world—and relegated to the new narratives and plots of a new space: the ‘world-system’. It was, therefore, also segregated with a particular type of story now produced in the nationalist sites: the tales of the world-system. However, it needs to be borne in mind that this displacement does not mean that the old discursive formation had vanished and, as Foucault remarked, ‘that a whole world of absolutely new objects, enunciations, concepts and theoretical choices emerges fully armed’ (1969/1989:191). Instead, concepts and enunciations were often repeated and returned to within new discursive and narrative orders. The function and meaning of colonialism and these narratives became highly ambivalent as a result of being intersected by different political conjunctures (Bakhtin, 1981). They underpinned the movement’s new story-line of ‘national sovereignty’ and were peripheral to it. Present and occluded, they signified continuity and renewal.

Colonialism as a ground.

Maarten Hajer suggests that narrative accruals function metonymically: story-lines need not be recounted in full. Thus, ‘by uttering a specific element’, one which is contiguous or part of the story, ‘one effectively reinvokes the story-line as a whole’ (Hajer, 1995:62). Metonymy is a rhetorical figure of speech in which one word is invoked for another on the basis of a relationship of contiguity and association between them. Metonymy was to be doubly at work in nationalist narratives. Firstly, as story-lines are themselves made of an interwoven fabric of embedded narratives and tales, writing ‘colonialism’ already metonymically invoked the entire bundle of interconnected plots and subplots to the knowledgeable reader or activist. Secondly, the narrative impasse and identity dilemma brought about by the changing conjuncture was to be overcome through two main narrative strategies: the ambivalent citing and metonymic displacement of colonialism by the idea of imperialism.
‘Imperialism’ had been a key element of the story-line of colonialism: source and site of antagonism and the archenemy of the country in its ‘local’ form of a ‘Spanish imperialist state’. There, imperialism had been transposed from available Leninist narratives of the international system. In Lenin’s blueprint, from which nationalism drew upon, imperialism was narrated as the highest stage of capitalist development and it explained the capitalist states’ impetus for colonization (Lenin, 1997; Larrain, 1989). Thus, an intimate connection and symbolic association between colonialism and imperialism was well established within and outside the movement’s discourse (Young, 2001).

Although the signifier ‘colonialism’ appeared relatively sparsely in the narratives now, compared to those written between 1975-1980, it was still being cited. As late as 1982 nationalist sites were still arguing:

Extract 7.1. On citing and invoking colonialism

[A] “The UPG considers that Galicia is a colony of the Spanish State. This markedly colonial function from an economic perspective, acquires a specific character vis-à-vis classic colonialism due to the cultural, historic and geo-political context in which the life of our country developed. The present bourgeois-democratic conditions reaffirm the characteristics of this context.” (‘The colonial function of Galicia in the Spanish State and aspects of our political line’, UPG, III congress, 1982)

[B] “GALICIA AND THE COLONIALISM: Taking the fact that Galicia is subjected to relations of colonial dependence as a point of departure, political activity will be directed to breaking that dependence.” (‘Ideological and Political Principles’, Alternative of BNG, 1982)

[C] “(BNG aspires to) socio-economic development able to break the colonial dependence of the Galician economy and to qualitatively change the life and working conditions and promote the welfare of all the people; returning to them decision-making powers over their own resources and their own economic activity, eliminating unemployment, and assuring them a dignified quality of life in their own land, with the recovery of emigrants” (‘Ideological and Political Principles’, Alternative of BNG, 1982)

As these extracts show colonialism is named—invoked, referred to—rather than fully narrativized again. The UPG text begins by stating they ‘consider that Galicia is a colony of the Spanish State’ (7.1.a). The BNG’s founding text deals very briefly with the issue of colonialism in its core ideological points of nationalism, in what is overall
a short programmatic text staging what was seen as the minimal demands for a union of nationalism. It presents colonialism 'as a fact' (7.1.b), an objective reality, which becomes not the main plot of their narratives but a starting point for new narrations: 'a point of departure'. Later on (7.1.c) the BNG text argues for development capable of ending 'the colonial dependence of Galician economy'. Colonialism and the cluster of meanings and tales associated with it, became a presupposition: reified, taken for granted and established as given. Colonialism ceased to be an object of discourse and became simply a ground.

However, this invoking, which cites the norms, authority and legitimacy of the colonialism story-line, simultaneously transformed it. Colonialism is clearly qualified: 'it acquires a specific character vis-à-vis classic colonialism'. In these extracts 'national sovereignty' becomes re-narrativized by being re-articulated to 'national sovereignty', markedly present in the first principle constituting the BNG's project: 'Galicia is a nation, and thus it has a right to political self-determination concretized in a national sovereignty alternative...'. It is also transformed into a regional category, subtly narrated as an economic issue, as opposed to the former complex political and economic understanding of the term. Hence, in these early examples it appears already represented as 'the colonial dependence of the Galician economy', 'this function markedly colonial from an economic perspective'. The repetition of the term in the new political and narrative context resulted, then, in its continuity with, yet difference from, colonialism as originally narrated.
Colonialism and its cluster of meanings, however, were more often called upon and performed through another metonymic strategy: its displacement and segregation in favour of the new narratives of the ‘world-system’. In the section above it was seen how the signifier ‘colonialism’ itself was cited to metonymically invoke and simultaneously transform the norms and identity of the movement. Here, we examine the working of another metonymy: how the dilemma of nationalism’s identity was tackled by replacing colonialism with ‘imperialism’, a secondary object – less charged, but equally well established — contiguous to it in the story-line.

The will to narrate the world has been a distinctive trait of nationalists’ storied production since 1982 which distinguishes the new story-line of sovereignty from the movement’s recent past. Nationalists produced new success tales and stories which connected events happening in distant locations around the world: Latin America, Africa, Eastern and Western Europe being the new privileged narrative spaces. This world is represented as a system where geographically remote political developments are interrelated. Thus, they are said to have a bearing on the nation. Nationalists recounted in their congresses and magazines mainly three types of ‘world-story’: tales of ‘imperialism and the world-system’ mapping the state of world and national resistances to imperialism; stories of ‘NATO and the EEC’ linking both organizations as ‘two sides of the imperialist coin’, and ‘monographic’ stories detailing the vicissitudes of struggle of any particular national liberation movement – Salvador, Corsica— or socialist country. These stories were plotted as an antagonistic battle between the forces of imperialism and those of sovereignty, where this are ultimately successful in their endeavours. It is important to note that, even though the story-line of colonialism had always assumed an international level of ‘imperialist’ forces and relations, its stories had nevertheless been overwhelmingly focused on the national and intra-national (local) spaces. The villages, city neighbourhoods, factories and demonstrations: these had been the equivalently
Extract 7.3. *On the new story world: the world-system*

“The present international situation is characterized by a sharp economic and ideological crisis in capitalist states of the imperialist camp, which brings about militaristic and aggressive programmes and practices against progressive countries and ideologies, which defend national sovereignty and the betterment of the popular classes. The threat to international [distension] became more obvious with the intensification of cold war mechanisms and the real possibilities of a generalized international conflict. Thus, it can be said that the major enemy of the peoples is imperialism, with the US as its head. The aim of achieving independence from imperialism, and the strengthening of revolutionary processes with this predicament, is achieving real conquests which weaken the hold of imperial domination in Latin America, Asia and Africa (Iran, Nicaragua, R.D. Sahara, Chad, Afghanistan...). Imperialism’s answer, particularly the US, is the continuous aggression, in different guises, against peoples and regimes that defend their [own] dignity, national independence and internationalist solidarity (Libya, Cuba, Angola, Mozambique, Salvador, Nicaragua...). Moreover, [imperialism] prepares and participates in military and repressive coup d’états, and [it is] anti-democratic and pro-occidental (Guinea Equatorial, Turkey...).

[...]” (‘the international political situation’, UPG, III Congress, 1982)

This fragment of a narrative, appearing in 1982 in the text of the UPG’s III congress, is a typical example of the stories of the ‘world-system’. There is an explicit ideological theme which plots these stories: ‘war and peace’ or the representation of the world as a (single) place immersed in a multiplicity of head-on struggles between the aggressive forces of imperialism / US and the peace-seeking forces of ‘sovereignty’ embodied by peoples and socialist countries. The narratives construct the US, NATO, the EEC and ‘social-democracy’ as equivalent to evil ‘imperialism’. These countries and political forces are said to represent the ‘anti-people’ in the world-space.119. Hence, one of the most prominent features of the stories is the continuity with the logic of antagonism which had characterized the discourse of colonialism. The tale effects an explicit division of the world-space into two starkly antagonistic camps accomplished through the ‘war and peace’ theme: ‘capitalist states of the imperialist camp’, ‘the imperialism, with the US as its head’ on the one hand, against ‘peoples’ or ‘progressive countries and ideologies which defend national sovereignty and the betterment of the popular classes’ (Extract 7.3) on the other hand. The orientation of another world-story narrated in the next congress neatly summarizes this ideological theme and the political and moral frontier it effects: ‘The question of war and peace, which nowadays affects the destiny of the...
peoples, is one of the most important dividing lines between the reactionary and progressive forces'. ('International', IV congress, UPG, 1983)

However, a re-narrativization is also effected. Although the stories still interweave Marxism and nationhood plots, they do not constitute a radical hybridity such as that in the colonialism story-line. 'National sovereignty' rather than 'liberation' becomes the empty signifier which over-determines the stories. Thus, national sovereignty is progressively constructed as the goal which all peoples / progressive forces naturally pursue (as narrated in extracts 7.2 and 7.3 ), in the moral evaluations of world-system stories:

Extract 7.4. On sovereignty as nodal point

[A] "Distension, neutrality, non-alignment, the struggle for world peace, demand this conduct from us [opposition to NATO], as a communist party which has its immediate reason d'etre in the dismantling of imperialism, essential to achieving our objective of national sovereignty for Galicia" ('The international political situation', UPG, III Congress, 1982)

[B] "To say that the BNG positions itself in favour of international solidarity, and that it appropriates the principles of militant anti-imperialism, is no more than underlining a fundamental facet of an organization which proclaims for Galiza the right of self-determination." (BNG, II assembly, 1984)

[C] "It is, thus, this adventurous and furious policy of the enemies of peace...which has brusquely increased the present danger of war ...and which tries to smother the aspirations of the peoples to peace, freedom, justice and, in sum, to sovereignty" ('Insurrection against the bellicose threat!!', T&T, n89, 1983)

The extracts 7.4. a, b and c illustrate how 'sovereignty' became the empty signifier, naming the 'fullness of the communit(ies)' which was blocked by the forces of imperialism. 'Sovereignty' condensed, in the world-space, a variety of ideas: 'distension, neutrality, non-alignment and world peace', 'peace, freedom, justice', the 'right to self-determination', 'opposition to NATO and EEC' and 'democratic conquests and rights', becoming what Laclau calls 'the signifier of the pure cancellation of all difference' (1996b:38). That is, its specificity was that it signalled a pure opposition to imperialism. This empty signifier was embodied by 'the peoples', the quilting point of the stories. Thus, as illustrated in the story extracts above 'the peoples' / sovereignty became the name of one of the two camps in which the world space is now split up: 'it can be said that the major enemy of the peoples is
imperialism’ (7.3) ‘[the BNG] supports all the struggles of the peoples of the state and of the World ...’ (7.2) or ‘the aspirations of the peoples ... to sovereignty’ (7.4.c).

The category of ‘the peoples’ is elided in the tales to the ‘progressive countries and ideologies’, ‘peoples and regimes which defend dignity and national independence and internationalist solidarity’, ‘the revolutionary processes’ (in Extract 7.3), ‘liberation movements’ or ‘socialist countries’. Thus, a symbolic equivalence is established between them which is condensed around ‘the peoples’ as the name of sovereignty and solidarity. In the world-system tales, then, resonates the identity effected in the colonialism story-line between ‘nationalism’ / ‘the people’ and ‘progressive forces’. But this ‘reactionary’ versus ‘progressive’ divide is not neatly equivalent to a left-right divide. In fact, it is overdetermined by the plot of ‘national sovereignty’: ‘reactionary’ are the forces against sovereignty and peace. This is how socialist countries might now also be categorized as part of Imperialism —‘the Chinese policy in the area perfectly coincides, nonetheless, with the objectives of the imperialist’ (International, IV congress, UPG, 1983). Here, the stories contrast with the colonialism story-line where ‘nation’ and ‘class’ categories were never fully elided but hybridized in a ‘national-popular’ identity.

‘War and peace’ is, nevertheless, itself an ambiguous theme. It implicitly cites colonialism —in a metonymic displacement which mobilizes its categories, strong political frontiers, plots— while re-signifying it by linking it to ‘sovereignty’. It knots the new ‘democracy and rights’ and ‘old’ imperialism master-narratives which the movement draws upon. Indeed, the theme of imperialism as a political phenomenon and its ideology of aggression was a well known claim of ‘classic’ theories of imperialism as narrated by Bukharin, Luxembourg, Lenin or Hilferding (Larrain, 1989). Classic narratives described imperialism as a complex political, economic and ideological phenomenon. However, they weighted these aspects differently: while Lenin stressed its economic nature —the concentration of capital with the rise of finance capital and its export through monopolies which eventually produces territorial plunder—, Luxembourg and Bukharin highlighted its political nature instead. In the latter accounts, imperialism is conceived mainly as a political process.
It is a struggle for territories with a racist and belligerent ideology, contrary to the liberal ideology of early capitalism (ibid.): 'competition is becoming increasingly a political power struggle...The ideal now is to secure for one's nation the dominance of the world...' (Hilferding; quoted in Larrain, 1989:64).

The latter account pervades the nationalist stories of the world-system, where the economic is relegated to a secondary place in favour of an understanding of imperialism as the struggle for control and domination; this time not just of 'territories' or 'empty' spaces (i.e. non-capitalist) but against the political principle of sovereignty represented by 'the people'. Thus, both the 'imperialism' and the 'sovereignty / rights' masternarratives are embodied in the 'war and peace' theme. In the tale quoted in Extract 7.3, imperialism is positioned as a repressive political force: 'bring[ing] about militaristic and aggressive programmes and practices against the progressive countries and ideologies, which defend national sovereignty...', 'the continuous aggression, in different guises, against the peoples and regimes...' as well as preparing and participating 'in military and repressive coup d'états' and being 'anti-democratic' (Extract 7.3)\(^{110}\).

The representation of imperialism, then, mainly as a political, even geo-strategical, force comes to the fore in another world-story: 'the wars...waged by imperialism, which have as an objective the appropriation of alien territories, the distribution of spheres of influence, etc' ('The struggle for peace. Our objectives', in IV congress, UPG, 1983). In fact, this overdetermination —and simplification— of 'imperialism' by the 'sovereignty' narrative\(^{121}\), results in some of these tales portraying 'imperialism' simply as an irrational force:

Extract 7.5. *On Imperialism as irrational political force.*

[A] "[...] Three are the main characteristics of Washington's world policy, which it imposes to their allies: 1) the struggle against peace; 2) the simplistic and troglodyte [cavernária] vision of international conflict and 3) the manic obsession of imposing their will on other states and peoples. [...]" ('Insurrection against the bellicose threat!!', T&T, n 89, 1983)

[B] "[the crisis is the circumstance which] characterizes the erosion and decomposition of the system; deprived of perspective, more and more based upon the pillars of
aggression, intimidation, xenophobia, racism ...where anti-progressiveness, a-criticism, anti-communism and pathological hate substitute ethical principles" ('Politic-ideological crisis and belligerence', International, IV congress, UPG, 1983)

With any economic understanding pushed towards the margins, the policies of Imperialism and the US are portrayed as irrationally and indiscriminatingly aggressive. This irrationality is, moreover, constructed through a psychologizing and pathologizing vocabulary exemplified in the expressions: 'manic obsession', 'pathological hate' (7.5a and b), 'mania to blame socialist countries', 'frenetic arms escalation', 'virulent anti-communism', etc ('The anti-war struggle', T&T, UPG, 1982).

The stories represented the enemy and its policies —the danger to the self— as affected by mental or 'viral' disease. This irrationality is a regulative strategy which names danger —imperialism, the US, the 'anti-people'— as aberrant or deviant from the inter-national norm of sovereignty which is said to be the pacific coexistence of (formally) equal political communities. This strategy also serves to remind us of the need for 'order' or sanitary measures122 (Douglas, 1966; Campbell, 1992). As Campbell notes of the use of medical metaphors, 'in such discourse, there are no grey areas, no complexities, no historicized understandings, no doubts about the self, and no qualms about the nature of the response' (1992:97). However, medical metaphors had often been used to justify and legitimize the use of force against perceived internal or external threats, in this case nationalists' vocabulary is part of a mimicking strategy —adapting Homi Bhabha's notion of colonial mimicry: '[a subject of] a difference which is almost the same but not quite' (1994:96). 'Almost the same' for these stories indeed worked to reinforce the extreme binary division of the world. 'But not quite' for, despite of the radical language of struggle, nationalists are certainly not calling to arms but to belonging —their aim of sovereignty is in fact made equivalent to peace. The construction of a world space divided into two camps of imperialism and sovereignty —peoples, socialist countries and liberation movements— works to secure the identity of the Galician movement as a 'people' and 'movement' fighting for liberation among others, precisely at the time when the nationalist story-line of colonialism was being silently sidelined, internal struggles had all but disappeared and the movement was in crisis and retreat123.
The definition of imperialism as a political phenomenon stems not only from the overdetermination of the stories by the 'sovereignty' nodal point and the modulation of Marxist narratives of imperialism to the theme of aggression. It was also achieved through the transmutation of these classic narratives of economic exploitation at the level of production to that of 'dependency' and 'unequal exchange'. The movement's story-lines in the past represented 'colonization' as a political and economic complex torn between stressing direct exploitation of Galician (symbiotic) workers at the level of production (the enclave industries) and unequal market exchanges (of raw materials and labour power). In contrast, the tales of the world-system tend to streamline this theme to simple 'dependency'. Unequal exchange or dependency narratives—as formulated since the 1960s by Baran, Sweezy, Frank or Emmanuel—refurbished the classic theme of the Marxist theory of imperialism of extraction of raw materials and cheap labour from the periphery and narrated a world-system characterized by an inherent duality, a centre / periphery dichotomy, which determines two radically different developmental possibilities. These different potentialities are caused by transfers of resources by mechanisms of unequal exchange in the international market. The core tenet of dependency became the assumption that backwardness was the product of the workings of capitalism: some countries develop because others underdevelop (Larrain, 1989). The theme of economic oppression as dependency is echoed throughout the tales:

Extract 7.6. On dependency

[A] "The unjust unequal exchange that presently exist between [underdeveloped] and developed countries becomes even worse because of [the crisis]; the [underdeveloped counties'] enormous external debt increases, their economic possibilities decrease, and their own already weak economic structures deepens its orientation towards the satisfaction of the needs of the monopolies of advanced countries..." (The unequal incidence of the economic crisis', IV congress, UPG, 1983)

[B] "In Latin America...where the extreme conditions of exploitation and dependency provoked the insurgency of the peoples of the area against the minority dominant economic groups and their external backers (the foreign monopolies) (International, III congress, UPG, 1983)
However, whilst dependency becomes the norm and substitutes for economic exploitation in the tales, this plot is segregated in the texts of nationalism to the world-system stories. Juxtaposed to this, a narrative thread of democracy and rights looms large in all other tales—forming the majority of the storied production of the movement in the 1980s; with the exception of the UPG’s IV congress. The binary opposition of developed / underdeveloped countries is elided into the tales main political division of imperialism / sovereignty, aggression / peace. The ‘peoples’ are underdeveloped as a result of the ‘unjust unequal exchange’ posited, which provokes the suffering of ‘the extreme conditions of exploitation and dependency’ (Extract 7.6.a and b). This suffering is, nevertheless, not based on class exploitation but constructed as national: external debt, an evil ‘external orientation’ of the (implicitly) national economy, decrease of economic capabilities (7.6.a). Thus, this dependency theme takes the nation / state as the primary subject and equates relations between countries with class relations—in a manner reminiscent of Sultan-Galiev’s dictum. Dependency theories were, in fact, often criticised for such assumptions by Marxist theorists, as within the dependency paradigm there is no clear understanding of capitalism. It ceases to be conceptualised as a mode of production with particular relations of production to be seen simply as a ‘system of production for the market’ (Larrain, 1989; Laclau 1971). Dependency paradigms assume instead that economic struggle happens between nations, leaving class relations and struggle subordinated to nationalist politics and policies. Hence, the reliance on the theme of dependency contributes, if implicitly, to further strengthening ‘the nation’ as the centre of the political discourse of ‘popular nationalism’ and to push surreptitiously to the margins formerly relevant in Marxist masterplots.
Temporally located in the present, the world-system tales are characterized by a simultaneous world-time. These are simultaneous narratives (Genette, 1980) as events or actions are seemingly taking place at the point of narration. However, their use of the present tense is often marked by a sense of temporal indefiniteness —i.e. as well as using present tense, gerunds, and many expressions conveying synchronicity the tales are full of infinitives, passive and other temporal forms that convey an imprecise temporality. Thus, the stories ambiguously express a sense of simultaneity but also a certain constancy, a permanency of duration, and a ‘facticity’ or ‘out-there-ness’ in the account (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984; Potter, 1996). Although produced in different sites and times, the tales present slices of a depthless present. Hence, the ‘real’ time in between stories seems akin to what Bakhtin, in a reference to the Greek adventure novel, called ‘an extratemporal hiatus between (...) adjacent moments of real time sequence’ (Bakhtin, 1981:111). Some stories explicitly remark on this hiatus —in a kind of inverted coda located at the beginning of the tales— noting that ‘nothing much’ happened in between their bi-annual productions: ‘there is nothing new to add to the analysis made in past congresses as regards the struggle for peace and disarmament’ (‘Struggle for peace’ UPG, V congress, 1986).

The effects of this a-temporality, unflinching present, are twofold. Firstly, it conveys a sense of the urgency and immediacy of the battles —they are going on now— and a transparency which perpetuates the myth of objectivity and works to encourage a more radical approach to the ‘internal’ policy making and politics of the movement — as we will see, these tales work as ‘fortifying myths’ (Polletta, 1998). Secondly, even though it is located in historical time it suppresses historicity, and therefore, contributes to naturalizing the duality imperialism / peoples and the represented state of affairs.

Time is intimately linked to space as the story world narrates ‘an event’, i.e. resistance, taking place simultaneously in a multiplicity of places which constitute
the narrative action: liberation movements, peoples and dependent countries are fighting imperialism at the same time in each country / nation. This synchronic multiplicity conveys unicity: they are all part of the same struggle for sovereignty, in different locations around the world. Moreover, the constant simultaneity of time — the freezing of time — and the correlative proliferation of struggles work to ‘map out’ the world, representing it in clear cut terms as a stable, knowable and narratable place. This map marks a fractured political space, as ‘there is no spatiality’, De Certeau notes, ‘that is not organized by the determination of frontiers’ (1984:123). It is made up of places of aggressive imperialism, those of peoples / socialist countries / progressive forces which suffer the action of imperialism and the knots / ‘spots’ of confrontation between them. The world is a landscape scarred by highly asymmetric relations of power, political domination and economic exploitation of (nations) by other nations / states: a space of force relations and aggression, but also of dogged resistances.

This storied ‘map’ of the world in which places are ‘located’ — as ‘a formal ensemble of abstract places’ (De Certeau, 1984:120) — is, then, (faintly) brought to life and equivalently inhabited through the narration of the ‘hot spots’ of struggle. These ‘hot spots’ are the movement’s new heterotopias. They signify a displacement of the inner spaces of nationhood — neighbourhood, factory, demonstration — narrated in the colonialism story-line:


“In the sphere of the international conjuncture, particular relevance is acquired by the so-called ‘areas of strategic interest’ or ‘hot spots’ of the planet. [These hotspots] become dangerous deoNATOrs of a global nuclear conflict by the action of imperialism. [They are] located in regions rich in natural resources — at the cross points of the main transport routes linking economically countries and continents, or in important strategic spots. In them the contradictions between the will of the peoples (orientated towards national liberation) and the aspirations of imperialism reach a climax point. Imperialism tries to exercise total control over the sovereignty of these [peoples] and their countries in the name of ‘vital interests’“ (‘The zones of strategic interest’, The international situation, IV congress, UPG, 1983)
Here the IV congress explicitly demarcates new heterotopias of struggle: the 'hot spots' of the planet. These are the counter-sites, the real places, in Foucault's words, 'which do exist ...in which all other real sites...are simultaneously represented, contested, inverted' (1986:25). The 'areas of strategic interest' or 'hot spots' are located in 'regions rich in natural resources', 'cross points' of transport routes which 'link economically countries and continents' or 'important strategic spots'. Thus, these are economic and political spaces which embody the 'contradictions' and antagonism between 'the will of the peoples' for liberation and sovereignty and the will of the enemy, 'imperialism', for a nebulous 'vital interests'. These real places — often named as 'countries of socialist communities', 'Occidental European peoples', 'Centre America' and 'the Arab countries of Middle East', 'Lebanon' — substitute the network of places of exploitation and routes of struggle narrated in the discourse of colonialism. The subplot represents these as successful sites, the spaces for victories of the peoples and progressive forces and of defeats for imperialism: where 'there is a recovery, in spite of repression, of the combativeness of the masses', 'heroic peoples such as Salvador and Guatemala are mobilized' or 'anti-imperialist popular processes' are developed which defeat the aggressions of imperialist forces.

The crucial point about these myths and new heterotopias is that now nationalists are not re-articulating the link between the imagined community and its own territorial domain — the implicit utopia in the colonialism narratives being a 'nation up in arms' — but they establish a link between the community and the world-space. They are displacing the 'national' utopia to the international sphere: imagining the world as 'up in arms'. The remoteness and geographical distance is a necessary attribute of these places to become heterotopias, in the story-line of sovereignty, in which nationalism can now see itself reflected. For this distance allows interpellation of nationalism / nation as 'struggling movement' among others, as nation with a right of self-determination, securing the narrators identity without necessarily much consequences in terms of every-day politics (for every struggling people has its own ways). These are what Foucault calls heterotopias of 'compensation' (1986), in this case, for the 'defeat' and retreat suffered by the 'national' collective self after the transition to democracy. Thus, the world-system tales function as a sort of storied
fetishism: the struggling world 'mirrors', projects the image of the movement as a struggling one too, fighting imperialism. They are fortifying myths securing a continuity of identity, keeping the flame of struggle alive at times of difficulty and defeat —where struggle still constitutes nationalism's understanding of the political (Polletta, 1998). The tales of world-system and the spaces constructed then cite the political ethos of the colonialism story-line, while thoroughly re-signifying it.

**Linking EEC to NATO: internationalising the dystopia**

In addition to the tales of 'Imperialism and the world-system', the most common world-stories were the stories of 'NATO and the EEC'. These are the starting point of a theme and character which will become progressively central to nationalism. Namely, this theme is the relation with the European Communities, which by 1989 will become the anti-community. The relation between Galician nationalism and the European integration process has not been thoroughly studied —Portas, 2003; Elias, 2009:13. There is, nevertheless, a well established reading of the nationalist attitude towards Europe which stresses their rejection to the integration process. Within the rejection thesis there are variations. The first and most pervasive claims that nationalist’s rejection of the European integration process was due to the perceived economic damages that it would cause to the key sectors of Galician economy. This is the ‘commonsense’ reading reflected, often merely in passing, in an amalgam of key scholarly writings on nationalism (Beramendi, 2007; Beramendi and Seixas,1995; Barreiro Rivas, 2003; Máiz, 1996; 2001). This reading coincides with the nationalist interpretation — what I dub the Cassandra myth— whereby Galician nationalism had always predicted and warned the country of the perils of integration ahead but was ignored (Fernán-Vello and Pillado, 1989). Secondly, Elias voices a slightly different thesis of this reading. She argues that Galician nationalisms' issued a totalizing critique of the integration process until 1998 on the basis of an amalgam of economic, but also moral and political reasons124 (Elias, 2009: 82-85).
Yet, even if nationalism’s rejection of the integration process for many years is undoubted, how and why this was the case needs to be rethought and contextualized. I argue that it is necessary to understand nationalist positioning as regards the EEC in the light of theiroverall storytelling practices over the years 1980 to 1985. More particularly, the narrations of the EEC are a subplot of the ‘world-system’ tales. Hence, during the period between 1980 to 1985 / 1987, nationalism rejected membership only ambiguously on economic grounds. Particularly, it did not reject membership through a narrative of ‘defence of productive sectors’ preoccupied with the everyday consequences of membership and spatially located in the nation, as has been overwhelmingly understood. Instead, popular nationalism constructed an alternative narrative strategy which linked the EEC to NATO as the economic side in a ‘twin strategy’ devised by the forces of ‘imperialism’. Hence, if the language of economic threat was there, it was squarely located within their own plot of imperialism, where imperialism was portrayed mainly as a political force of aggression of some countries over others. The EEC was located as part of the world-system story-world, made intelligible through the key antagonism sovereignty vs. imperialism. Thus, the ‘economic’ understanding and critique of the EEC is abstract and undermined by the story-line it cites.

This plot is presented in a nutshell in the BNG’s ‘anti-imperialism principle’ in their first assembly (extract 7.2), where the EEC and NATO are portrayed as ‘organizations which, on an economic and political-military level, represent the interests of the big monopolies and of European and American imperialism’. Despite later protests to the contrary, this ‘principle’ became the key form of emplotting the stories on those organizations from then on. It is overwhelmingly present in the stories written against NATO in nationalists’ public texts and appears, even though often in a more implicit form—conveyed through the imperialism metonymy—in the tales dealing with the EEC. Besides, in other kinds of non-storied narratives this strategy is also present. For instance, in its second assembly the BNG stated explicitly that ‘the links between the Atlantic military organization with the European Economic Community have been the axis of the analysis made by the BNG as regards this problem’ (BNG, II assembly, 1984). The early rejection of the integration process was, then, mainly
couchèd on a vocabulary of political motives, even when an alternative economic plot of ‘damages to our productive sectors’ coexisted, often embedded, with this—
‘the evidence that entrance in the European Community will represent a catastrophic ruin for our productive sectors’ (ibid.)—and progressively substituted the latter as the dominant emplotment—i.e. from 1986.

On NATO and EEC as strategies of Imperialism

In 1978 the Union de Centro Democratico’s (UCD) transition government in Spain started to negotiate full accession into the European communities. Three years later, right after the 23F attempted coup, the Calvo-Sotelo government and the UCD hastily sought accession to NATO in order to appease the military (Preston, 1986). If accession to the EEC was generally supported and sustained in Spain’s opposition parties by the desire to become a modern European democracy, these parties (mainly the PSOE) did contest NATO membership. Nonetheless, having reached government in 1982, the socialist policy performed an u-turn. A referendum for ‘permanence’ in NATO was scheduled by the socialists for 1986 and, despite the popular pacifist campaign against the Alliance, the socialist majority threw its weight on achieving a positive result. Simultaneously, the lengthy negotiations and stringent economic conditions imposed for accession into the European Communities were bearing fruit with a proposed date for accession set for 1986.125

Consequently, popular nationalism was facing the need to respond to both events simultaneously. In an international conjuncture which they were discursively constructing as a struggle between war and peace where imperialism was the enemy, linking NATO and EEC as international dystopias (i.e. places and processes of Imperialism) made sense for nationalism. It became an important sub-plot of the world-system tales. ‘Popular’ nationalism was involved in the organization of anti-Nato campaigns and demonstrations in Galicia during those early years of the 1980s. They portrayed their anti-Nato efforts as the Galician contribution to the peace movement gathering force all over Spain at the time. Indeed, the stories against permanence in Nato are as numerous and prominent between 1981-85 as the anti-
EEC tales —which only start to peak in the years 1985/86\textsuperscript{126}. Nonetheless, it is important to bear in mind that the narrative space allocated to the world-system tales, and within it, to the ‘Nato and EEC’ stories in popular nationalisms’ overall production these years is relatively small and rather marginal in their internal textual hierarchy, occupying, for instance, closing articles rather than editorials. Hence, against their own ‘Cassandra myth’, it is easy to conclude as Elias and others do, that the integration process was at the time not one of nationalism’s priorities (Elias 2009, Barreiro Rivas, 2003).

Linking the EEC to Nato was nationalism’s main narrative strategy as regards the EEC until at least 1985 —what they called the ‘strategic basis’ for rejection (II assembly, BNG, 1984). This strategy served to represent NATO and the EEC typically as the ‘twin’ instruments of ‘imperialism’. The main ideological theme, then, was narrating the EEC as representing imperialism and the power of monopolies.

Extract 7.8 On NATO.

[A] “Opposition to NATO can not be separated ...from opposition to the EEC, which is its political and economic support” (‘For peace and against NATO’, PSG, GS, 4 xeira, Autumn 1981)

[B] “In the context of so much confusion around the propagandistic phenomenon of the referendum called for by the PSOE and supported by the Spanish leftism (PCE, EE), we must re-examine the relations between that organization (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and this (the European Communities), and how each of them, on their own terrain, are no more than different expressions, different facets, of a same system: the imperialist system. The convergence of interests of monopoly capitalism at a global level reached such a degree that, in the issues of vital relevance for the system, the differences and clashes that might exist between the EEC and the US disappear: the defence of imperialist interests in the Third World, the agreements to support an international monetary system in crisis [...]. There is no room, then, to split, isolate Europe from NATO, the EEC from NATO, unless to participate in the manoeuvres to confuse that the leftist Spanishism shares with the pseudo-nationalism acting in Galiza” (‘Nato-EEC’, T&T, n96, 1986)

These extracts exemplify the most common way of narrativizing Nato and the EEC. It appears in almost all stories compounded as ‘NATO and the EEC’ in an attempt to construct them as being ‘the same’, establishing a natural bond between them. Thus, for instance, extract 7.8 b is taken from a tale written soon before the
referendum for the permanence in Nato which, in order to justify the nationalist policy of rejection of the Atlantic alliance invokes the common history of NATO and the EEC as historically and organically part of Imperialism. The equivalence between the organizations is clearly established as ‘each of them, on their own terrain, are no more than different expressions, different facets, of a same system: the imperialist system’. The difference between NATO and the EEC is thus, one of field of action, not of nature. Here CEE is narrativized as a necessity of the monopolist capitalist system, as a ‘fellow traveller’ for the US, both product of that imperialism –the evil force of nationalisms’ world-system tales. Thus, their interests are remarkably similar, we are told, in ‘all vital issues’: the ‘defence of imperialist interests in the Third World’, ‘support to the monetary system’, etc. Moreover, these tales are clearly located at the ‘global level’, told from an external, objective and detached point of view. In that, they are similar to the world-system tales. Hence, in the narrativization of the EEC as the economic agent of imperialism, popular nationalism is repeating the same narrative displacements and iterations they have performed in the world-system tales. As a result, the nation—and the impact of EEC membership upon it—is simply absent in most of the tales. Even the few tales located not in the world-system but in the nation, and dealing seemingly with the internal consequences of membership recurred to the imperialism plots and displacements. This tended to construct the Spanish state as the evil agentic force bringing the destruction of productive sectors through a policy of ‘reconversión industrial’, whilst the EEC is given the rather distant role of a lurking, dangerous setting in the background.

The economic critique of the EEC was nevertheless not completely absent in texts. It appeared as early as 1982 in a story by the PSG. However, these stories were, as yet, only fragmentary and peripheral—quantitatively and qualitatively marginal—to nationalism’s main way of thinking of and talking about the EEC. This way of talking about Europe was still firmly structured around plots of imperialism and the world-system, of war and peace. The ‘Cassandra myth’—nationalist’s reflection upon the own incessant and ‘futile’ warning to a country celebrating a union with Europe, of the perils ahead—became, nevertheless, itself a narrative device in many stories. These warnings came about as part of the congressional ‘reports’ which told short
stories of party, front and country in between congresses, or as part of tales on agrarian trade unions. These narratives which begin to emplot EEC membership in different terms and start slowly to make the EEC the main enemy of the country, are nevertheless a small minority between 1982 and 1985. Those are formative years of what would become a new story-line. It is really only from 1986 onwards that this plot takes precedence and starts quilting the diverse discursive elements of nationalism. This is not to say that at some point nationalists did not oppose the EEC. They were always opposed to it. But this opposition was differently emplotted: from ‘imperialist oppression’ to the ‘economic damages to the country’ and the narrative shift that takes place in these stories.

7.4. Conclusion

I have argued so far that the ‘triumph’ of the discourse of democracy was to be the starting point of a new conjuncture and discourse for the ‘national and popular / social’ movement. Confronted with a new, ‘highly hostile’ situation they were posed with a poignant identitary dilemma: they could maintain the tales and practices which gave them force, voice and identity but risk anachronism or they could try to adapt but risk disappearance.

This chapter explored in depth one narrative strategy, the citing, metonymic displacement and disavowing of colonialism, which served to shift the content of the discourse. This displacement was a key step in de-ambiguating the discourse and moving it firmly towards the nation—together, as we will see in chapter 8, with the ventriloquisation of discourses of democracy in Spain. Both worked towards maintaining, in spite of the shift in content, the strong antagonisms inherited from the narratives of colonialism.

Colonialism, for a decade the movement’s rallying point now became cited, invoked as a ground whilst being metonymically displaced by ‘imperialism’. This displacement
was effected within a new subplot: the ‘world system’ (success) stories. Colonialism and even ‘imperialism’ were now segregated to these tales away from, but juxtaposed to, the canonical narrative production at this time: the story-lines of sovereignty—which will be examined in the next chapter. Imperialism became the flipside of ‘sovereignty’. It was in these stories the key enemy of the ‘peoples’, equivalently linked to the US, NATO, EEC and to social-democracy. These stories were plotted within a ‘war and peace’ ideological theme which performed a world-system divided into two antagonistic camps, scarred by the struggles of peaceful ‘peoples’ in defence of their sovereignty which imperialism was trying to take away from them. ‘Imperialism’, contrary to ‘colonialism’, was then narrated as a purely political phenomenon, even as an irrational force of aggression, and all traces of economic grievances where subsumed into ‘dependency’ plots. The hotspots of the planet substituted former places of exploitation and routes of struggle for heterotopias. Besides, at this time, the force which from 1989 onwards would become the name for the ‘anti-community’, the EEC, was still firmly located within the imperialism plot.

Whilst thoroughly shifting the content of the discourse of colonialism, the tales of the world system maintained their highly exclusionary frontiers and antagonisms which had formerly given rise to very radical and isolationist politics in the movement. These tales, nevertheless, performed certain mimicry of antagonism. They displaced the implicit utopia towards the international sphere, allowing in this way the movement to secure their identity as ‘struggling’, mobilized and successful in their pursuits, precisely at a time in which peasant, neighbour and worker mobilization in Galicia had all but halted. They worked as a fortifying myth.

To sum up, the function of colonialism and the narratives of the world-system is highly ambivalent. Still iterated, cited, metonymically invoked whilst also disavowed, re-narrativized, transposed and reduced, colonialism and its storied accrual underpinned the movement’s new story-line of ‘national sovereignty’ and was simultaneously peripheral to it. Present and occluded, it signified both continuity and renewal of the movement’s identity.
8

Narrating ‘sovereignty’ (II): ventriloquism, equivocation and democracy

8.1 Introduction.

Chapter 7 explained how popular nationalism’s narrative practices since 1981 have worked to place their former main story-line and ideological theme of ‘colonialism’ toward the margins of their discourse by metonymically substituting imperialism for the colony. They did this through the telling and retelling of a new type of tale, the world-system story, which has effectively transformed and contained their former radical Marxist plots to the world-story sphere. This new sphere of representation has allowed popular nationalism to retain antagonistic political frontiers and their identity as a struggling movement against the forces of imperialism.

Hence, the displacement of colonialism was one of the key narrative and discursive strategies of the popular movement at this time in the transformation of their master signifier from ‘national and social liberation’ to ‘national sovereignty’. However, the metonymy was only one step in the process of the de-ambiguizing of the discourse of colonialism and moving it firmly towards nationhood. At a time of political defeat and retreat, nationalism’s main step in re-narrativizing the nation and the movement was to shift the contents of their antagonistic frontier with Spain from ‘nationalism vs. spanishism’ to ‘sovereignty vs. Constitution’. This was achieved mainly through the ventriloquizing of the Spanish hegemonic discourses of democracy (Bakhtin, 1981). The metaphor of ventriloquism in Mikhail Bakhtin’s work is useful to explain the narrative strategy of popular nationalism in the early 1980s127.
Ventriloquizing another’s voice, for Bakhtin, refers to the moment when a writer instead of speaking in a particular language ‘speaks, as it were, through language, a language that has somehow more or less materialized, become objectified’ (Bakhtin, 1981:299). The writer uses such a language ‘without wholly giving himself up to it’ (ibid.). This is not a way of posing an instrumental user but, rather, of noting the necessary transposition and ideological re-accentuation which this new use, citation and articulation will perform in a language already inhabited by other accents and intentions. Thus, ventriloquated discourse means resignified discourse refracting a plurality of authorial intentions, even ‘exhibiting’ reified functions and meanings. In Bakhtin’s words: ‘the writer makes use of words which are already populated with the social intentions of others and compels them to serve his own new intentions, to serve a second master’ (ibid: 300). This writing is therefore multiply accentuated and heteroglot.

I read ventriloquism and ventriloquating strategies in terms of what Michel Foucault calls ‘reverse discourse’ (Foucault, 1976/1998) and Judith Butler re-constructs and explains as questions of appropriation and subversion in the context of performativity (Butler, 1990; 1993). Among the discourses existing at a given time and space, Foucault stresses in his later writings, there are not binary distinctions between dominant and excluded discourse. Discourses are, on the contrary, discontinuous and their ‘tactical functions’ changeable. Hence, any one political strategy might mobilise a multiplicity of discursive elements (Foucault, 1976 / 1998:100). That is, there can be ‘different or even contradictory discourses within the same strategy’ and, conversely, the same discourse can be used, cited and put to work by different power strategies (ibid.:102). Any discourse might function as an instrument of hegemonic power but also as a site of resistance and of collective contestations. In Bakhtin’s sense, discourses can serve different masters or political agencies.

Judith Butler discusses this polyvalence in terms of performativity (Butler, 1993). Performativity she defines as reiterative and citational practice — and not, then, simply as a singular or deliberate act— by which discourse produces the effects that
it names (Butler, 1993:2). If the dominant discourses / vocabularies of motives are used with the purpose of resisting and opposing hegemonic strategies, this is what Foucault calls 'reverse discourse', Butler, on the other hand, problematises this notion. She notes that performativity does not need to be a 'reverse-discourse'. That is, a practice in which defiant affirmation of an abjected identity 'dialectically' reinforces the very norm it resists (Butler, 1993:21). Political practices of resistance do not need to be 'pure opposition' or transcendence to hegemonic discourses / languages / politics. Instead, Butler sees performativity as always already implicated in that which one opposes (ibid.:241). In her essay 'Critically queer', she describes agentic practices of resistance as practices of discursive resignification, the transposition and rearticulation of signifying practices through a repetition and iteration which is never the same.

If discourses might be put to work for different purposes by various strategies, if any language might be cited and resignified, re-appropriated in the process, then the role of the dominant normalizing strategies and hegemonic discourses of democracy in Spain to bring to life, shape and reproduce the phenomenon they tried to curb (Butler, 1993) – the strength of peripheral national identifications within Spain—needs to be noted. Hegemonic interpellations, both of a liberal democracy and a unitary Spain, created more than they ever meant to. Conversely, the inter-implication of resistance with that resisted needs to be problematised. Popular nationalism, at a time of difficulty, seized this very language, the same vocabulary and categories of democracy, rights and liberties used to discredit and marginalize it and 'reversed' it. In their narrative practices, nationalism ventriloquated the discourse of democracy, citing and resignifying the hegemonic categories for their own subversive purposes. Simultaneously, and as a result of this, their very identity and purposes were being transformed. That is, from the struggle to the 'national and popular liberation' of the hyphenated 'national-popular' movement, they became 'popular nationalism' in the pursuit of 'national sovereignty' for Galicia.

In this chapter I primarily examine part of what I have dubbed 'tales of sovereignty'. These are mainly 'big stories' of the country narrated in a series of constituent
texts. Among these, it was mainly the earlier texts, such as the III Congress of the UPG and I and II Assemblies of the BNG, which laid out the strategies and narratives which dominated the representation of the self and nation over this period. They (co)constituted the framework of intelligibility of all practices in the movement at this time. Hence, I look into these in more depth. Besides the constituent texts of popular nationalism, I also read these tales as they appear in the now considerably diminished production of party magazines: the T&T and GS issues and gaps between 1981 and 1987. These tales deal with the present situation of the nation.

Although there are a variety of storytelling themes, mainly three types of stories are typically told —excluding those of the ‘world-system’ already examined. These are the distinctive stories of the ‘cardboard parliament’ and related debates around the location of nationalism in the new system, the ‘tales of sovereignty’ and the ‘tales of unity’. The latter I will attend to in depth in the next chapter, as they form the key textual trace of a new strategy of difference —the war of position in Gramsci’s terms— initiated by the movement at this time.

8.2. Heteroglot terrains (II): autonomy and the ‘cardboard parliament’.

During the 1980s not only had the international situation considerably changed with the rise of neoliberalism but, crucially, Spain had already become a democratic and unitary nation-state with which peripheral nationalisms had to grapple. The Constitution of 1978 became, as explained in chapter 7, the very measure of democracy. This was almost physically materialized in this political text-artefact which essentialised a Spanish nation whilst recognising the existence of ambiguous ‘historic nationalities’ and an extensive regional devolution programme. The Spanish right-wing aestheticization of its Other in the demonized form of the ‘chaos’ in the streets of the (Spanish) nation, has often been blamed on this programme of devolution of powers as well as on the violence of ETA, GRAPO and other radical
groups (Preston, 1986). These fears culminated in Colonel Tejero’s attempted coup in February 1981. The failed coup gave further impetus to a homogenizing strategy as regards regional devolution.

In the periphery nationalisms reacted differently to these events. Catalan nationalists gave priority to the re-establishment of democracy over the issues of territory and self-determination and pragmatically welcomed autonomy (Núñez-Seixas, 2001; Muro and Quiroga, 2004). However, the Basque abertzales and the Christian democrat Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV) did not support the Constitution nor the Basque Statute of Autonomy. It has since become the cornerstone of political conflict in the Basque country (Mata, 2005). In 1980, the response of Galician nationalism to the Galician statute was twofold (Máiz, 1996; Beramendi, 2007; Quintana Garrido, 2008). On the one hand, some sites, such as the POG and the centre-right forces which did not participate in the colonialism storyline, narrated the Statute as an opportunity and tried to exploit its ambiguities. On the other hand, popular nationalism strongly and inflexibly opposed it, running a campaign against it.

What Galicians obtained was a statute which put forward an idea of the Galician political community. Elaborated through the ‘fast track’ procedure it was ratified in December 1980, after considerable controversy and homogenizing pressure from the central state. It constructed Galicia ambiguously as a ‘historic nationality’ which ‘constitutes itself into an autonomous community’ (AC) similarly to Catalonia and the Basque Country. However, the community’s powers were derived from the Constitution, instead of emanating from the ‘Galician people’. The Galician Statute of 1980 says:

"Article 1:

1. Galicia, historic nationality, constitutes herself in an Autonomous Community in order to access her self-government, in conformity with the Spanish Constitution and the present Statute, which is her basic institutional norm.
2. The Autonomous Community, through democratic institutions, assumes as its principal duty the defence of the identity of Galicia and of her interests, and the promotion of solidarity among all those who form the Galician people."
3. The powers of the Autonomous Community of Galicia emanate from the Constitution, from the present Statute and from the People."

"Article 3:

1. To the effects of the present Statute, they enjoy the political condition of Galician the Spanish citizens who, in accordance with the general laws of the State, have administrative neighbourhood in any of the councils in Galicia"

(Preliminary Title, Statute of Autonomy, 1980)

The AC is an ambiguous community. On the one hand, the statute implicitly creates a boundary between ‘us’ the ‘Galician people’, among whom a bond of solidarity should be fostered, and others. Thus, it constructs a Galician community naming it ‘a people’ and ‘historic nationality’. On the other hand, this community named as a people does not derive its power from the traditional sources such as history or a ‘volonté générale’, an autonomous political will. Instead, Galicia is allowed to become an AC first by the Spanish constitution, by the Statute itself –in a quintessential performative act- and, ambiguously from ‘the People’ –where it is unclear who this ‘people’ are. Moreover, if there is such thing as a ‘Galician people’ there is no Galician citizenship, there are only Spanish citizens—as explained in article three. Galicia or ‘the Galician people’ may form a community but this is not, strictly speaking, a political community. ‘Being Galician’—part of a people— is in the Statute a ‘political condition’ founded on an administrative decision. It is a condition potentially open to all Spanish citizens as long as their place of residence is the territory of Galicia. Here, culture, language, history, birth or class considerations are indifferent, only habitation matters. Conversely, inhabitants of the territory of Galicia are declared Spanish citizens, members of the Spanish political community / nation first, from which they derive their condition of being Galician – ‘in accord with the general laws of the State’- by virtue of residence.

The tensions inscribed in the text allowed some nationalists to see the statute as a viable first step towards self-determination—this was the case of the POG and those sites not inhabited by colonialism narratives. However, this community brought about by the statute fell short of those created in old narratives of nationhood and of contemporary nationalisms. In old nationalist narratives either race, ethnie, culture, territory—understood almost as communion with land, not as administrative
place of residence—sustained the imagining of the Galician people/nation. The discourse of colonialism had established unstable class boundaries. But their nation was imagined as different from Spain, not a contiguous part of it. The statute could not meet the claims for recognition and self-government demanded by radical nationalists in their story-lines and the *Bases Constitucionais*—the text-icon and demand for the sites of the colonialism story-lines. Hence, in the late 1970s national-popular groups had refused to participate and have a voice in the design of the architecture of the democratic political system. By 1981, the key issue was not anymore whether to participate, which was seen as unavoidable, but *how, in whose terms, and for what ends* should they participate in the new institutional life of Galicia.

The issue of how to be both inside and outside the new system soon became the emblematic issue in popular nationalist sites for almost a decade. It was often told as how not to ‘leave empty fields in the democratic-bourgeois context’ whilst ‘being in open contradiction with the values of the Constitution’. Popular nationalism was soon made aware that they would not be able to impose their own terms. Early on, between July and December of 1982, the ‘parliamentary affair’ took place. This was the (self inflicted) silencing, via internal regulation, of the voice of the three BNPG-PSG elected parliamentarians in the Galician assembly after they refused to swear allegiance to the Spanish Constitution. The refusal became the key event which gripped the imagination, affected the identity of and provoked action on the part of popular nationalisms in one way or another until at least 1988\textsuperscript{133}.

A run-down of the most important moments in this controversy would start in the year 1981, when popular nationalism was whirling in a process of re-narrativization of the self and struggling with an identitary dilemma—as narrated in the previous chapter\textsuperscript{134}. Whilst the new ‘unity of nationalism’ was precariously being built\textsuperscript{135} nationalist sites were immersed in a bitter struggle for the narrativization of the nation and its self-organization. Again, two story-lines were (trans)forming and competing for hegemony within nationalisms’ main sites. The received story accrual of Galicia as a colony of Spain to be defended in a national-popular front now faced
an alternative discourse of Galicia as an European, ‘complex’ social formation in need, as a consequence, of a mass democratic party. This crisis reached a height in different sites at different times. In the UPG the critical point was reached between July and October 1981 when the Secretary General Luaces, ten other member of the central committee and a considerable part of the membership of the party who had sustained the alternative narrative to colonialism were expelled. This group, called the Lugo Group, formed the Grupo de Nacionalistas de Esquerda and many of them joined Esquerda Galega (EG) later on –the new project of the POG (Fernández Baz, 2003: 127). The other key nationalist site, the PSG, was also narratively split and suffered membership losses when it broke its alliance with the coalition Unidade Galega in 1980 in order to join the UPG in the Mesa de Forzas Políticas Galegas (MFPG) project. Unidade Galega had been formed by the POG and the PG and was until then the main site of the European nation story-line.

Simultaneously, in October 1981, the first elections to the Galician Parliament took place. All nationalist parties achieved poor results: three seats for popular nationalism –the BNPG-PSG coalition hegemonized by radical narratives— and just one for the EG. The Galician vote was hegemonized by conservative, Spanish-wide parties: the UCD and Alianza Popular, followed by the socialist PSOE with 26, 24 and 16 seats respectively (Máiz, 1996). To make matters worse, this parliamentary majority passed by July 1982, in a display of force, an internal regulation which demanded the swearing of loyalty to the Constitution in order to take possession of seats. The regulation was part of myriad normalizing power strategies carried out by the hegemonic discourse of democracy after the failed coup. Lois Diéguez, Claudio López Garrido and Bautista Alvarez –the Bloque-PSG MPs— resisted, on 14 July of 1982, this normalizing step by refusing to swear allegiance. Instead, they performed a speech act: “I do not swear nor promise [to abide by the Constitution and Statute], because I am a democrat and I defend the national sovereignty of Galicia’. They repeated this recitation in November when given another chance to swear loyalty.

This intervention was part of a failed effort to reorganize the conjuncture. The statement tried to work towards reclaiming democracy for the marginal position of...
popular nationalism\textsuperscript{139}—in a struggle with the dominant discourses which labelled them as radical, irresponsible and antidemocratic. However, even though the three MPs were, as elected representatives of the people, located in a position of authority and accorded a right to speak, this singular oppositional speech act carried no citational nor institutional authority but rather interrupted it. The consequence of their resistance and opposition was the stripping of the right to voice and vote and to even have a physical presence\textsuperscript{140} in the Galician parliament of those nationalists involved. This event was constructed and presented by nationalists and (part of) the press alike as the ‘expelling’ of nationalists from Parliament (El País, 1982).

What followed were myriad protests, press conferences, open letters, demonstrations, claims in tribunals all through the year 1982 in the masculinist politics of ‘aldraxe’ and pride\textsuperscript{141}. The successful re-narrativization of colonialism into a sovereignty and imperialism discourse in the UPG and PSG sites, as well as the banishing of the alternative narrative of Galicia which allowed for a reading of the Statute as an opportunity to take advantage of to EG, authorised and legitimised—indeed, it demanded—this turn of affairs. However, this decision located popular nationalism outside the new key political institution of the country—as they themselves reflected in spite of and in tension with their conception of politics as ‘war’ and mass mobilization. Popular nationalism from this moment wrestled in their identity-related dilemma between ‘struggling for the democratic premises, for not giving legitimacy to a Regime which is a fraud against the nations ...and [our] right to existence’ (T&T, May 1982), which translated into a need to remain outside Parliament, and their increasing perception of their own marginalization and possible disappearance unless they continued to participate in the established institutions.

This situation lasted until the autonomic elections of 24\textsuperscript{th} November 1985, when the BNG elected MP, XM Beiras was finally—after plenty of dissent—allowed by the sites to swear allegiance. This shift was the result of a frantic decision-making process
marked by an extraordinary meeting of the UPG’s central committee and extraordinary BNG assembly. The tight majority for the decision to swear allegiance brought about a new split in the UPG, the Partido Comunista de Liberación Nacional headed by the, until then, UPG secretary general Mariano Abalo (PCLN).

Meanwhile, the story-lines of Galicia as a ‘complex European society’ which would benefit from the autonomic settlement enjoyed some success. Leaving the EG MP Camilo Nogueira as the only nationalist in parliament, bore this site some rewards. These were reaped in the form of a more successful electoral result in the next autonomic elections of 1985, when the ‘autonomist’ nationalist options –the PSG-EG and the centre right Coalición Galega- obtained 14 seats (3 and 11 respectively).

The affair marked and helped narrate the conjuncture for nationalism: its stages punctuated major identity-related decisions and discursive –political and strategical– shifts. It was a ‘power’ effect of the hegemonic discourse of democracy which came about precisely at the moment when popular nationalist sites were submerged in a deep crisis questioning the verisimilitude and effectiveness of their own discursive strategies and frontier effects. It signalled and contributed to the reinforcement and preservation of clear-cut antagonisms. This event was a symptom of, as well as a strengthening of, the prevalence of the stark rhetoric and antagonism ‘us’ / ‘them’. Its demise, by the end of the decade, coincided with –and was accomplished through- further re-narrativizations and shiftings of those antagonisms. The antagonistic frontier weakened and became more remote, moving upwards and forward to the EEC pushed by the movement’s expansive strategy of unity, which grew progressively, weakening antagonisms and articulating elements previously othered.
8.3. Re-plotting the nation: Sovereignty and ventriloquisation

The re-narrativization of the story-lines of colonialism which eradicated their ambiguity in relation to nationalism at this time, paradoxically brought about the blurring of the nation’s contours. As colonialism was qualified, cited but disavowed, its temporal orders and depths—the myth of loss, the achievement of liberation and then socialism—also became destabilized. At this point the movement barely looked, let alone narrated, into the past or into the future. The temporal orders lived by for more than a decade were pushed to the margins and storytelling took root deeply in the present. It was an implicit rupture with the romance form.

What came across was a concern with narrating the present moment, as remarked of the world-system stories. As a consequence, the nation is not storied per se. In comparison with the story-lines and small tales of colonialism which were explicitly bent on constructing a narrative of the nation, the main subplots interweaved at this time—the ‘swearing plot’, ‘world-system’ tales and stories of ‘autonomy’ and those of ‘unity’—only implicitly build a national myth. Of course, implicitly they considerably resignify the nation. This implicitness did not happen by chance. Firstly, the (hi)story of the nation had already been told—as the story-lines of colonialism were never squarely rejected. Then, as the myth of colonialism crumbled in the new conjuncture, the nation (hi)stories simply went underground. There develops instead an urgency to narrate the present political situation. As the forces of nationalism struggle to preserve the(ir) collective self and to transform without unravelling, bold statements and overt re-narrativizations of the nation were avoided. In fact, when they were attempted—i.e. Luaces and the Lugo Group—they brought about probably the worst crisis of popular nationalism so far (as explained above).

‘Sovereignty’ emerged clearly after 1981 as the main object of Galician nationalism’s discourse replacing the ‘colony’. However, it is important to bear in mind that this is not to say that a concern with ‘sovereignty’, ‘democracy’ or ‘rights’ was absent in the story-lines of colonialism. For instance, the ‘Bases Constitucionais’ was said to
project a blueprint that would be 'the only real democracy' in Galicia. But this 'democracy', articulated in relation to colonialism and the popular front, had entirely different connotations. Besides, whilst democracy per se was present, it was nevertheless relatively peripheral to the priorities of the movement and overdetermined by other goals. Indeed, it was precisely during the Transition that the 'national-popular' movement did not struggle to resignify and fix the meaning of democracy. They were not interested in delimiting the internal frontiers in Spanish society. Instead, nationalism presented an altogether alternative project for the creation of a political community. National-popular nationalism was trying to redefine the limits of its community, to establish a different one. Democracy then, was mainly elided to 'bourgeoisie', 'Spain', 'monopolies' and 'capital' and constructed as a 'repressive regime' (UPG, II Congress, 1979). In the context of the movement the democratic ideal was discussed mostly in terms of 'centralist democracy'—as part of internal organization of the party—or less often as 'popular democracy'. Similarly the vindication of civic rights was almost absent from the texts.

Yet democracy was an element of Leninist narratives of self-determination was drawn upon by nationalists. However, it was an element which, in the re-narrativization of Galician nationalists, would simply arrive, almost as a matter of course, to an already liberated Galicia under the leadership of the 'national-popular' movement. As the extract below shows, in which the UPG speculates about the form and organization of a Galician state, it is not (popular) democracy which secures the superseding of national oppression as Lenin had argued, but the other way round. In the nationalists' tales, an already liberated Galicia would organize as a popular democracy and only then could socialist measures for the working classes follow\textsuperscript{142}. Hence, Galician nationalists had reversed the primacy which Lenin conceded to democracy and democratization over national liberation:

"A foundation—a socialist production—is essential for the abolition of national oppression, but this foundation must carry a democratically organised state, a democratic army, etc. By transforming capitalism into socialism the proletariat creates the possibility of abolishing national oppression; the possibility becomes reality 'only'—only!—with the establishment of full democracy in all spheres, including the delimitation of state frontiers in accordance with the 'sympathies' of the population, including complete freedom to secede." (Lenin, 1908; quoted in Nimni 1991:81)
"The political form of the national-popular state organization would respond to the exercise of democracy by the working classes... Therefore, only within the framework of popular democracy in Galicia will it be possible to undertake agrarian and fisheries reforms with the participation of the workers and peasants and at the service of their interests..." (UPG, I congress, 1977)

Political liberation and power (statehood) must come first, democratic and social measures would follow. The discursive strategy of narrativization discussed in earlier chapters worked to naturalize this order of things. The relative disinterest, or straightforward opposition, of the movement to ‘democracy’ precisely at the time in which it is being defined at the Spanish level and their more offensive strategies and struggles of direct political action show the extent of their optimism —optimism of the will perhaps— as regards the possibilities of political rupture. Thus, the UPG and many others, though not the PSG, had refused to participate in the Spanish wide platforms which were negotiating a Spanish transition and Constitution and all, with the exception of the POG / EG, refused to be part of the process of drafting a statute of autonomy for Galicia. For an important part of Galician nationalism up until at least 1981 ‘liberation’, not ‘sovereignty’ nor ‘democracy’, was the universal value worth fighting for. With the progressive narrative centring of the signifier ‘sovereignty’ the process of de-ambiguation started.

Narratives of sovereignty: ‘Galicia nación frente a Constitución’

The main discursive strategy of popular nationalism at this time was the construction of an antagonism with ‘unitary Spain’ and its Constitution. This strategy was produced by a shift in emphasis of the language of colonialism and a different modulation of its themes. The voice of popular nationalism shifted from performing a hybrid Marxist-nationalist people towards a liberal, organic people / nation. Hence, in their ‘them’ and ‘us’ rhetoric, there was an idea of their own community now articulated more straightforwardly with the signifier ‘nation’ and with a newly centred universal value, ‘sovereignty’: a new rallying point of the narratives and practices of the movement.
The centring of ‘sovereignty’ (and of the liberal plots of nation which sustained it), was achieved, then, through a double movement: the ventriloquisation of the Spanish discourse of democracy and the simultaneous iteration and disavowal of colonialism. The ‘authorities of delimitation’ of this transformation were the UPG and the PSG, and crucially the newly formed BNG (Foucault, 1969/1989). These are the steps which begin undoing the hybridity of the ‘colonialism’ story while fully preserving its ambiguity – shifting the ‘problematic’ of all nationalism, in Chatterjee’s sense\textsuperscript{144}, for years to come (Chatterjee, 1986). However, as we will see, if the nation alone becomes the object of the discourse of ‘sovereignty, it also tends to become obscured in the narratives.

This shift in modulation brings about major differences in the narrative production of the movement after 1981. Contrary to the story-lines of colonialism, there is a startling absence of class language and plots in the quantitatively and qualitatively dominant stories of national sovereignty\textsuperscript{145} – the tales of autonomy, the parliamentary affair, or the stories of unity. The discursive strategies of narrativization – the temporal narrative split between national and social liberation – and the strategy of identity in tension with this seemed to have vanished. Along with these went also the main national categories and figures of discourse told in the colonialism story-lines: there is now hardly any mention of the ‘symbiotic worker’, the national triad par excellence, ‘the workers, peasants and fishermen’ and ‘the emigrants’. Instead, the story-line of sovereignty transformed the old themes into others more attuned to the conjuncture.

The enemy is a clear example, instead of ‘spanishism’ or ‘the imperialist Spanish state’ this position is linked now to ‘the unitary state’ – in fact, the enemy as narrated by the PSG for some time— and mainly to ‘the Constitution of 1978’. The centrality of the Constitution as the enemy of the nation is overwhelming in all the texts of popular nationalism, as the following extracts illustrate:

Extract 8. 1. \textit{On antagonism \& constitutional text as the anti-community.}
[A] "The Spanish constitutional text is not a simple formulation of formal and abstract liberties but an enunciate with threatening and interdictory intentions as regards the popular desires. To defend democratic liberties does not mean defending a text which allows their whimsical and interested restriction." (‘Party Thesis’, UPG, III congress, 1982)

[B] "Galician nationalism stands for the rupture with the present political Regime as it represents the explicit and aggressive negation of [our] principles and it gravely attempts against the fundamental liberties of the citizens and the Nations which integrate the Spanish State. [...] The Spanish constitution is the legal materialization of the negation of our national sovereignty and it also makes possible the restriction of the exercise of democratic liberties; for that we do not accept it." (‘The Political framework’, I Assembly, BNG, 1982)

[C] "We should not be mistaken: the Spanish constitution and the statutes of autonomy derived from it are the source of this bunch of repressive legislation and attitudes, as these are two belligerently anti-national, imperialist and anti-popular texts; moreover [they are ridden] with grave ambiguities or difficulties as regards the exercise of the bare minimum of democratic liberties. Hence the reason why is so important for us not to legitimize such texts. They deny our right to existence; they restrict our everyday life. They have to disappear for the national and popular desires to go forward." (‘BNG’s position before the autonomic elections’, II Assembly, BNG, 1984)

[D] "The present Spanish constitution denies our existence, the multinational character of the state and the right of self-determination of the nations. We have to continue a political battle which will not be realised nor won by deepening the autonomic alternative, but superseding and contradicting this alternative as a real opposition" (‘Unity of nationalism against the Constitution’, T&T, n. 86, 1982)

As the extracts above show, which are typical of the rhetoric of this time, the constitution was singled out as the name of anti-community in the textual production of popular nationalism. The constitution is said to ‘deny our right to existence’, that is, it is accused of quashing the anticipated community as well as of quashing nationalism. Thus, the political text setting the terms of a compromise democratic settlement in the state at large had become the archenemy of nationalism. For it is said to block the achievement of ‘sovereignty’ and bar the fulfilment of national desires. This move has to be seen in the context of the essentializing of the ‘Spanish nation’ by the text. It is, moreover, an ‘aggiornamento’ of nationalist thought to the conjuncture they are living in and trying to constitute, without, nevertheless, actually toning down their antagonistic political stance.
Ventriloquising democracy and rights.

One of the most striking features of the story-lines of sovereignty is that the quilting point of ‘sovereignty’ goes hand in hand with the theme of ‘democracy’. This connection is relentless in the representation of the Spanish constitution as nationalism’s antagonist (as seen in the above extracts 8.1). This linkage was sustained not by a Marxist narrative of ‘rights of nations to self determination’ or anti-colonialism, but by liberal and nationalist plots in its stead. The clearest illustration may be the declaration of ideological principles by the BNG’s Riazor assembly text:

Extract 8.2: Sovereignty & Democracy as key principles

“GALICIA IS A NATION, and as such it has a right of political self-determination which, in order to be real, must be specified in an alternative of national sovereignty [...] . DEMOCRACY: the democratic principle is fundamental as [it is] inherent to the exercise of power by the people, within conditions of real, and not just formal, equality and freedom” (‘Politico-ideological principles’, BNG, I Assembly, 1982).

This makes clear that nationalism argued its case for sovereignty in a language of defence of democracy, rights and freedoms. In fact, the conjuncture which the III congress of the UPG in 1982 and the first and second assemblies of the BNG in 1982 and 1984 —but also a plurality of other texts of popular nationalism— were trying to build was one in which democracy and Galician nationalism were made equivalent. As T&T explicitly remarked: ‘moreover, there is a perfect correlation between the defence of the democratic liberties and the defence of nationalist principles” (‘Unity of nationalism against the Constitution’, T&T, n. 86, 1982). Here, if clarification is still needed, the category ‘nationalism’ applied to ‘peripheral’ or minority claims —Catalan, Basque or Galician or those ‘peoples’ seeking freedom— and excluded Spanish, state-wide, nationalism. This is a construction of the term carried forward from the old tales of colonialism, where it was taken, in turn, from Lenin. The colonialism story-lines, as seen earlier, labelled state nationalism as ‘chauvinism’, i.e.
inherently regressive and oppressive, while ‘nationalism’ was constructed as inevitably progressive.

Moreover, extracts 8.1 a, b, and c above presented clear examples of the linkage between the stark rejection of the Spanish constitution in favour of a defence of democracy. The constitution is, nationalists explicitly affirm (as seen in extracts 8.1.a and b), the *enunciative force*, not only because of its ‘threatening and interdictory intentions as regards the popular desires’ but also because it ‘gravely attempts against the fundamental liberties of the citizens and the Nations which integrate the Spanish State’. The constant coordination of clauses points to a similar valorization of both issues as regards the language of rights and freedoms is fused to the tales of sovereignty.

Liberal narratives of (Spanish) nationhood –explicitly drawing upon German theorists such as Meinecke and Habermas— and the equation of democracy to the acceptance of the Constitution of 1978 had been some of the narrative weapons marshalled by the hegemonic narratives of the transition to democracy. The hegemonic discourses of Spanish nationalism after the transition, particularly those coming from left-wing sites, narrated their own rendering of ‘constitutional patriotism’. Relying on a transposition of Habermas’s universalist foundation of political community based on democracy and human rights, they hybridized it with historicist claims of pre-modern Spanish nationhood (Bastida Freixedo, 2007, Núñez Seixas, 2007). The new narratives of Spanish nationalism frequently storied a multicultural state and ‘a nation of nations’—i.e. one political nation composed of several ‘cultural nations’— and tried to interpellate the population to identify with the new political order and the constitutional principles. These principles and metonymically the text itself which enshrines them became synonymous with ‘political pluralism’, ‘living together’ or ‘tolerance’ (Bastida Freixedo, 2007). In short, there was a fetishization of the Constitution, which metonymically stood, and still stands, for democracy.
Now, for the first time since the end of the dictatorship, popular nationalism endeavours to deconstruct the 'biased' universalism of Spanish 'democracy'—built on the particular contents of constitutional settlement, the politics of consensus, autonomic system, parliamentary capitalism and membership of the EEC and Nato—which they claim, negates Galician popular desires. They were engaging with 'democracy' as opposed to simply ignoring it while proposing an altogether separate political arrangement. Popular nationalist narratives started to build their own universalism where democracy became another name for sovereignty and for, as will be seen later, nationalism.

In order to do this, nationalist texts at this time begin by questioning the assumption that 'to be a democrat' means necessarily to support the Spanish constitution. They rejected the so-called 'consecration' of the juridical text which embodied democracy. This questioning can be clearly seen in extract 8.1.a, where the III congress declares that 'to defend democratic liberties does not mean defending a text which allows their whimsical and interested restriction' or in T&T's affirmation that 'we are not willing to collaborate with the politics of confusion [o confusionismo] nor to make believe that the defence of the democratic tenets requires today the denial of our nationalist politics' (T&T, n84, 1981). In fact, this myth-debunking strategy is a reverse-discourse in which the Spanish political system is portrayed as profoundly undemocratic:

**Extract 8.3. Myth-debunking & reverse-discourse: undemocratic democracy**

[A] 'In the name of a defence of 'democracy' and 'liberty' laws are passed -such as those of the defence of the Constitution or the harmonization of the autonomies- which on top of the anti-terrorist laws make all traces of democratic purity in the Spanish state fade away' ('Political framework in the national day', T&T, n 84, 1981)

[B] "There is no doubt that this is a Regime lacking in democratic purity, which in feverish fascist manners promulgates laws aggressive to the minimal rights of citizens (anti-terrorist laws, law of defence of the constitution, Lohapa..). [...] One more among this is the requirement of subordination to a text such as the constitution, which represents: a) A particular political character: anti-nationalism, monarchism, market economy, privatization of public services...[\ldots]\)"

(‘The Spanish democracy and the siege of the nationalist opposition’, T&T, n 85, 1982)
The Constitution is not 'pure' in its democracy, instead it is represented as 'feverish' and 'fascist'—i.e. lacking in freedom, rationality and self-restraint—and its intentions are therefore repressive. The 'spurious' particularities to which the false universalism of the democracy embodied by the Constitution is attached—its 'particular political character'—are denounced as representing biased and oppressive interests: 'anti-nationalism, monarchism, market economy, privatization of public services'. Although by 1982 the socialist party had already come to power—the story was published in June—nationalists construct continuity with the Francoist regime in the new democratic settlement with this reference to fascism. Besides, this reverse discourse needs to be understood in the context of the parliamentary affair—'the requirement of subordination to a text such as the Constitution' refers to the pledge—when all state-wide parties coalesced to pass a norm which would eventually take popular nationalism out of the Galician parliament. The victims of all this repression are 'citizens'—as opposed to peoples, nations or popular classes—who, as we will see later, are the typical national subjectivity at this time.

However, even if Spanish democracy is denounced as 'false' or biased, democracy's central place as universal to materialize is not questioned. In this text, as in the congresses and assemblies of the UPG and BNG, it is not 'social and national liberation' that is needed anymore, but democracy. A democracy equated to sovereignty in its content. Or rather, the other way round, what Galicia needs is sovereignty, which means essentially an unblemished democracy. As noted above, a 'perfect correlation' was established between these two universal notions. By a sleight of hand, then, the quilting point of popular discourse—the notions of self-determination and sovereignty—was made synonymous with the universal 'democracy' which the movement enthrones at this point.

In this way, nationalists started to ventriloquise the hegemonic language of the Transition in order to justify and legitimize their own goals. They introduced a new voice, that of liberal democratic narratives on rights, as the most prominent justification for their goals in their story-line of 'sovereignty'. There was an ineradicable ambiguity as regards popular nationalism's goal, as sovereignty and
democracy were often interchanged. This liberal voice, and these tales, of course, are accentuated in a very different way from nationalism’s other voice—the Marxist and dependency narratives. This accent was also very different from that of the Spanish narratives on democracy.

It is possible to isolate two connected steps in this narrative strategy of ventriloquism of democracy. These comprise the construction of an opposition between ‘real’ and ‘repressive’ democracy and the ‘smuggling’ in of collective among individual rights. In fact, sovereignty was narrated as the exercise of the ‘essential democratic right’ of self-determination.

Extract 8.4. On ventriloquisation of democracy: 1. opposition real / repressive

[A] "Hence these are repressive, anti-democratic trices obsessed with the ‘unity of the homeland’ and with the principles of capitalist economy [...] These trices justify the discretionary, whimsical attacks of the executive power—that is, policial— to persecute and do away with dissidents [...] The elemental principles of a democratic regime are put in question, [...] freedom of expression, of demonstration, association, reunion or the right to strike” (Marco politico do dia da patria, T&T, n84, 1981)

[B] "In sum, they try to create a system where surveillance and control are assured, and then proceed to the repression of the citizens and the peoples. We do not live in a state whose principal preoccupation is to ensure the rights and liberties of citizens. On the contrary, one of its fundamental objectives is to know what every individual is doing at every moment [...] In the name of ‘citizen’s security’ they are justifying all their repressive and aggressive actions against the rights of citizens and peoples, and there is no intention of guaranteeing their rights to men and women...” (‘On rights’, BNG, II Assembly, 1984)

[c] ‘The defence of a programme of national sovereignty for the nations integrated [in Spain] is totally anti-constitutional, even though that programme is part of a fundamental democratic right, namely the right of self-determination. Our position against the content of the Spanish constitution stands in direct and proportional relation with the defence of a framework of real public liberties’ (‘The defence of a program of national sovereignty’, III Congress, UPG, 1982)

The first step in the construction of the equivalence between sovereignty and democracy—in the nationalist animation of their enemy’s voice—was achieved through the delegitimation of Spanish democracy accomplished in its construction as ‘repressive’. The grievances which justify and legitimize the rejection of the constitutional text were formulated in terms of a need for ‘democracy’ and for ‘fundamental rights and liberties’. As democratic systems are supposed to guarantee
‘the rights and liberties of citizens’ (as assumed in extract 8.3), nationalists often protested the ‘violation of democratic rights’, the ‘attacks on citizens’ freedoms’ or the ensuing ‘repressive legislation’ of the Spanish system. These grievances were often elided with sovereignty and self-determination. Extract 8.3.c does exactly that with the claim that defending national sovereignty is to defend a ‘fundamental democratic right’. Therefore, they position themselves as ‘in direct and proportional relation with the defence of a framework of real public liberties’. That is, to fight for sovereignty is to be a real democrat, whereas the constitution is an artefact which hinders democracy.

The ubiquitous ideological theme in the texts of a ‘repressive democracy’ was transposed from the narratives of colonialism mainly in the UPG’s II congress, and relies on a strategy of equation of the new democratic system inaugurated in 1978 to the former Francoist dictatorship. Extract 8.2 above is an example of this equalization where democracy is said to be ‘fascist’. However, the intensification of this theme has to be understood in the context of a series of key events—from the attempted coup of February 1981 and the deployment of the army in the streets of the Basque country to the expulsion of the BNPG-PSG parliamentarians.

The second interrelated step in ventriloquising plots of democracy and rights was the ‘smuggling’ in of collective rights among the individual democratic rights commonly enshrined by liberal narratives of citizenship. Albeit there are a variety of versions of liberal narratives, from classic liberalism to its social and cultural versions, all of them tend to stress both the importance of a panoply of universalist values—such as human rights, democracy, a commitment to the market in one way or another— together with *individualism* as their bedrock (Vincent, 2002). Individual rights must come first, even when some brands of liberalism also recognize the value of collective welfare goals or the intrinsic ‘worth’ of different cultures. Popular nationalism’s narratives of sovereignty work to legitimize their desire for national sovereignty by means of constructing it as a ‘fundamental right’ and by naturalizing a link between the individual and social rights of citizens and the generally more dubious—within the liberal tradition—collective rights. Furthermore, it is collective
rights, or even social rights, which are emphasized at the expense of individual rights.

Extract 8.5. Ventriloquism II: the 'smuggling' in of collective rights.

[a] "...the attitude of the PSOE Government as regards to the rights and liberties of the citizens and the peoples, brings to the fore the fight to avoid their further restriction. The actions which [...] are reaching scandalous levels are: the total contempt for the rights of the peoples and for the rights which the state should secure for its society. The right of self-determination went from being a tactical slogan contained in the programmes of the first years of post-Francoism to be almost indefensible and its defence persecuted in practice. The right to a job as a fundamental premise in order to be able to talk about any other right is today an unachievable illusion for rising numbers of citizens. [...]. The rights to health, education, to decent social services, to a dignified home are vetoed for many popular sectors. ('On rights', BNG, II assembly, 1984)

[b] "To sum up, nationalism is not compatible with a regime which, from the perspective of the defence of fundamental democratic liberties, is fraudulent (freedom of expression, conscience, opinion, demonstration, and respect for popular sovereignty)." (A new phase for a communist party, T&T, n90, 1984)

Linked to the theme of repression, the II assembly enumerates the 'rights and liberties of the citizens and the peoples' which were restricted (extract 8.5). Here, the main 'scandalous action' of the social democrat government in Spain was 'its total contempt' for the 'rights of the peoples' in the form of the absence of a right to self-determination. Accordingly, social rights —to employment, health, education, etc— are listed as absent too. In the second extract, another enumeration of 'fundamental democratic liberties' enumerates traditional liberal freedoms —of expression, reunion, opinion, conscience—and 'popular sovereignty'. This enumeration is not an innocent operation. It involves displacements of meanings. Thus, although nationalism draws upon liberal narratives of citizenship and a vocabulary of rights to legitimize their position they construct 'citizens rights' as collective and social rights.
Who is ‘us’, ‘the people’, in popular nationalism’s discourse of sovereignty? What are the new moral and political orders locked up in the category ‘the people’? As the contents of the antagonistic frontiers of the nation were modulated and transformed after 1981 so were the subjectivities which the narratives told as key elements of discourse. A quick rerun over the different extracts of the narratives of sovereignty presented above shows this transformation in the new narration of the people. Extract 8.5 is quite revealing of the kind of categories and subjectivities typically mobilized by popular nationalism in this conjuncture. In a quite short paragraph we find ‘the citizens and the peoples’, ‘the peoples’, ‘society’, ‘citizens’, ‘people in the country, the mines, factories, in the service sectors’, ‘the people that work’. The paragraph, hence, displays what would be the typical compound figure in the story-lines of sovereignty – the ‘citizen and the people’ as well as the re-narrativization of the old Marxist class categories into a more sociological, if economic, understanding of groups as ‘social sectors’.

This ‘people’ stands therefore in sharp contrast with that narrated in story-lines of colonialism which had boldly proclaimed the nation to be ‘the popular classes, because the nation acquires a revolutionary status against bourgeois power’ (T&T, 1976). The workers have not disappeared as a concern in the new story-lines, but the language of class has mostly gone. Now workers become a ‘social sector’ among others. If the people is still conceptualized in economic terms it is not collapsed to the Marxist privileged, chosen subjectivity. The former triad of social classes which formed the nation – ‘workers, peasants and seamen’— has been transformed into the less radical formula of ‘people in the countryside, the sea, the mines, the factories and the service sector’, ‘people that work’ or ‘popular sectors’. Moreover, the ‘symbiotic worker’ and the ‘emigrant’ which were key objects in the colonialism story-line have now virtually disappeared.
In the above extract, for example, ‘workers’ are constructed as ‘people’, implying that their economic position might not necessarily determine their identity as a whole. The radical sting of the old categorization and construction of the nation based on class struggle and the denationalization of the powerful was being progressively phased out. If the people was now being represented as formed by a variety of economic ‘sectors’ this internal heterogeneity shuns antagonisms other than those with the Constitution and the Spanish unitary state. Instead, their compatibility is implicitly assumed. The ‘people’ was already becoming a diverse but organic whole, where all social sectors could find their role in ‘Galician society’.

What is key to the understanding of these moves towards a more organic society is the new figure of discourse which now emerged and would come to define this period: ‘the citizen’, always linked to and complemented by 'the people'. The trouble with the composite category of ‘the citizen and the people’ lied in the tensions it inscribed in the narratives as a result of the dialogue and ventriloquisation of hegemonic discourses of democracy. The tensions show ventriloquism to be a doubled-edge sword. For if there are citizens in Spain—or rather in the Spanish state— these have been summoned up by the Constitution which nationalists insistently reject. This can be seen in the ‘political framework’ constructed by the BNG’s I assembly: ‘Galician nationalism stands for the rupture with the present political Regime as it represents the explicit and aggressive negation of [our] principles and it gravely attempts to oppose the fundamental liberties of the citizens and the Nations which integrate the Spanish State’. If the constitution is the anti-community —i.e. it denies and forbids the existence of Galician nationhood—, it also brings about a setting for nationalism’s space of representation, the site of citizenship. Nationalists are not Spanish nationals: but are they Spanish citizens? In their reliance on the category of ‘citizens’ popular nationalisms inscribed themselves in that which they rejected and which supposedly denies their existence. In spite of the anti-constitutional furore worsened by their ousting from the Galician parliament, nationalist narrative practices are profoundly enmeshed in the new constitutional order. Nationalists fiercely reject the new system while simultaneously subtlety undermining their own opposition to it.
Collective subjectivity and equivocation: performing the ‘democratic self’.

The pertinent context for understanding the narration of the BNG and popular nationalism as the embodiment of democracy was the parliamentary affair explained above. In the BNPG-PSG myth this event signified ‘the most shameless violation of the popular will and sovereignty’ (‘Letter from the BNPG-PSG parliamentarians to the public opinion’, T&T, November 1982). Whilst the short-circuit sovereignty-democracy-nationalism predated this event, (the III congress had started to perform it) the affair certainly strengthened the connection: ‘denouncing the violation about to be consummated does not only compete the parliamentarians directly affected by it. Not does it correspond exclusively to the sectors identified with the ideological programme represented by those parliamentarians. It is an exigency of the most elemental democratic principles. [...] No democrat [...] is legitimated to inhibit himself from a rejection of the attack on popular sovereignty about to be consummated’ (ibid.). Popular nationalism interpellated not just their supporters, but ‘democrats’ as a whole. In fact, it demanded from ‘democrats’ active support for their cause in the very name of democracy. The expulsions bodily fused the nationalists to universal ‘democracy’: the attack on them was an attack on all, an attack on democracy itself.

From the event of the expulsion of the parliamentarians followed a display of narrative anxiety in nationalist sites and texts around their principles, conditions of participation –and exclusion- in the new system which was not fully resolved until almost 1987. Whilst the III congress had opted for a ‘political way’ of conducting their political practice –meaning an implicit renunciation of violence— and negotiated their oppositional identity to the point of narrating their participation in the new institutional system as non contradictory with their principles –in spite of the Constitution being their arch-enemy- a line was traced, a clear frontier, between actual participation and the symbolic legitimisation of the system. The honorableness and integrity of the movement was not perceived as compromised by
participation itself—the alternative being ‘isolation’ and ‘irrelevance’—but the formula of swearing loyalty: ‘acatar y guardar fidelidad a la Constitución y al Estatuto de Galicia’ was represented as an intolerable humiliation.

The anxiety that ensued from their absence from Parliament further exacerbated a tendency already in place in nationalist sites: the double-voicedness and ambiguity in the narratives where ‘nós’ (‘us’) stood ambiguously for ‘the party’, ‘the nation’ and even for ‘democracy’. Nationalism constructed itself as the true democratic self. The stories of the parliamentary affair and of democracy are brimming with ambiguous language, elision and slippage of meanings. The II assembly of the BNG paradigmatically displays these elisions:

Extract 8. 6: On nationalism as democratic-self

“It is necessary to clarify and reaffirm within our social base and the people in general that, in the present political circumstances, the defence of the right to self-determination is a key objective of the BNG. It is NOT that the Regime [should] recognize a particular ‘alternative’ to lead in practice this [right] in each of the nations of the state; but that [the regime] should be forced to admit the legal existence, without repression or persecution, of the political forces who defend this right. This way our struggle is just a defence of the minimal democratic principles, of the rights of the peoples—violated constantly in practice and in the ‘constitutional’ legislation of the present Regime (Anti-terrorist law, Plan Zen, Local government law, electoral law). We should not be deceived: the Spanish constitution and its statutes of autonomy are the source from which all these bundles of repressive legislation and attitudes stem; as they are belligerently anti-national, imperialist and anti-popular texts; moreover [these are texts] pervaded with great ambiguities and limits as regards the exercise of minimal democratic liberties. This is the reason why it is so important for us not to legitimize nor accept those texts. They deny our right to existence; they condition out everyday life. They must disappear for the popular desire to be advanced.” (‘BNG’s position before the autonomic elections”, BNG, II Assembly, December 1984)

This passage shows the typical themes of nationalism during the conjuncture. The text reaffirms the BNG’s goal, ‘in the present political circumstances’, of a ‘consistent’ [consequent] political defence of the right of self-determination. Here the ‘circumstances’ and the ‘consistent’ refer, as explained above, to the parliamentary affair and their decision to refuse swearing loyalty to the Constitution. The aim is peculiar: not just that ‘the regime’ should ‘recognise a specific alternative that conducts it in each nation of the state’ but that the ‘regime’ should be forced to
admit the legal existence...of [we] political forces that defend this right’. The grammar and syntax are cumbersome. What the passage means by ‘alternative’ is unclear but, in the light of the second part of the sentence we could imagine they refer to some kind of legal disposition for example, as opposed to ‘alternative’ meaning a political party. For these parties are precisely what the text claims are not recognised ‘without repression and persecution’ – and the grievance hinges heavily upon this qualification for these forces were in fact already legal. This recognition – the recognition of popular nationalism’s positioning - is the very aim of the BNG.

This awkward expression might have stemmed as a response to the reasoning of the Constitutional Tribunal (henceforth TC) which had in January of 1984 sentenced against nationalism. Nationalism had argued to the TC that simply swearing to obey or ‘acatar’ was not an issue, but performing an oath of fidelity impinged on matters of conscience and ideological liberty. The tribunal responded that swearing ‘fidelity’ was to be interpreted as synonymous to swearing to comply with the authority of the Constitution – i.e. the negative obligation of not acting against it and the positive obligation of acting according to it. Moreover, the TC continued, swearing allegiance to the Constitution did not impinge in matters of conscience because the Constitution itself enshrined ideological freedom, political plurality and a procedure to be legally changed (TC 122/1983). Galician popular nationalism disagreed, and so decided not to so swear and risk the consequences.

Extract 8.6 above seems to be implicitly in a dialogue with the TC, rejecting its arguments. The freedoms and legal procedures enshrined by the Constitution were not conducive to the right of self-determination. Instead, the route to realising self-determination should have been more specific: ‘admitir a existencia legal, sen represions nen persecusions, das forzas politicas que estamos na defensa deste direito’ . In short, to allow the BNG’s MPs back into parliament without swearing the fidelity oath. ‘This way our struggle is simply a defence of the minimal democratic principles, of the rights of the people.’ continues the passage above. The connection was hereby made: a defence of self-determination is equivalent to a recognition of the BNG’s postulates and this is in turn made equivalent to defending ‘the minimal
democratic principles' and to 'the rights of the people'. This short circuit establishes, then, the defence of BNG mps' position not to swear fidelity to the constitution as the embodiment of 'minimal democracy' and rights of peoples. The BNG has, by a sleight of hand, become the particularity which stands in for the universals of democracy and self-determination. The front, and its vicissitudes, has become the yardstick of democracy.

The Constitution and autonomy were, on the other hand, the source of all repressive legislation and attitudes because they were, nationalists claimed, 'anti-nationalist', 'anti-popular', 'imperialist' and they erected barriers to liberties and freedoms. This was the argument that explicitly justified nationalism’s choice not to swear allegiance: 'the reason why it is so important for us not to legitimize nor accept these texts'. These reasons were that 'they deny our right to existence; they condition our everyday life. They must disappear for the national desires to be advanced'. Although 'us' in the text clearly refered to the BNG —those who have not sworn— it is vague who is implied by 'our' in the next sentence: is it the front or the people / nation who are denied a right to existence? Whose everyday life is conditioned by the constitution and the autonomy? The last sentence gives us a clue on how to read the passage: 'they must disappear for the national desires to be advanced'. Hence, 'us' is equivocally a reference to 'us' the front —whose everyday political life has clearly been affected by the texts— and 'us' the 'popular desires or nation. But if the 'popular desires' are the wishes of 'the people' as opposed to nationalisms' wishes, then this passage overall actually works to equivocate the front to democracy and even to 'the people'.

The trouble with these articulations and equivocations is not a question of faulty logic, but of their sheer irrelevance for a majority of the Galician people at the time. Therefore, the problem was the political consequences this sliding of terms brought upon nationalism. If political struggles are struggles to fix the particular content which would come to define a relevant universal concept —i.e. achieving a hegemony— then, As Slavoj Žižek argues, 'it is at the level of which particular content [of a universal notion] counts as typical that ideological battles are won or
lost’ (1999: 205). This (contingent) link between a ‘typical’ particular content —i.e. the epitome of a conjuncture— and an absent universal —sovereignty, democracy— was accomplished by popular nationalism through this counter-narrative of sovereignty which ventriloquises the Spanish hegemonic discourses of democracy and rights. But the typicality of the concrete, particular content of this counter-hegemonic democracy was more than questionable. A narrative of the decision to reject the oath and remain absent from parliament of a small party —which commanded then a tiny percentage of the vote even though it had a fairly wide mobilization capacity— may seem farfetched. It was particularly so in the context of the parliamentary conservative majority in Santiago and the euphoria reigning in the country’s progressive base as a result of the first socialist landslide in Madrid. And yet, this was what popular nationalism narrated.

Extracts 8.7: On policy choices

[A] “The expelling of the nationalist MPs will be the central axis of the struggle for democracy, in Galicia and the state, at least while the situation is normalized. We can assure that the final result in the battle for the democratization and sovereignty of Galicia depends to a great extent on the re-establishment of the rights which, by popular mandate, correspond to us in the institutions” (‘Protest actions against the expelling of the nationalist parliamentarians’, T&T, n88, 1983)

[B] “Our objective would be to convince the people that [nationalism’s] stance is essential if we want to, at least, achieve a minimal democratization of the political life of the institutions in the electoral struggle; and to force the Regime to accept our political existence (struggle for the right of self determination).” (‘BNG’s position before the autonomic elections’, BNG, II Assembly, December 1984)

These passages further illustrate how popular nationalism represented the issue of the expulsions as key for the movement. Extract 8.7.a presents ‘the reestablishment of rights’ as nationalism’s central political battle and equates it to the struggle for ‘democratization and sovereignty’.
8.4. Narrative inversion: the IV congress and the struggle from within

The representation of the expulsions as the key issue for nationalism and the consensus around which the non-swearing policy was maintained was being progressively eroded. As the second autonomic election approached, the voices in the BNG which desired a reconsideration of this position grew louder. The issue of not swearing allegiance had been narrated as a matter of life and death, where ‘the reason of our existence, the existence of Galician nationalism, in the quest for national sovereignty, in a political path, is at risk’ and ‘not to obey means the right to exist’ (T&T, n85, 1982). Yet, after 1985, survival was progressively narratively pinched on being able to participate in institutional life again. This shift was performed by the UPG as going back to their roots: that is, their need to truly comply with the mandate for political action and the policy of ‘no empty fields’ sketched out in the III congress. It was, as well, constructed as ‘partial defeat in the short term’: swearing meant ‘a step backwards in the positions we had conquered for power’. It became the story of a necessary evil, but not yet a willing acceptance of the constitutional order.

This shift, nevertheless, was the beginning of an internal struggle and crisis within popular nationalism sites. There was no unanimity around using electoral participation as the primary way forward. Part of this nationalism still considered popular mobilization to be the way to social and political conquests –and institutional participation simply one more tool. This ‘necessary evil’ tale was portrayed by some as the gateway to total surrender of the collective self. This sector –which eventually formed the ‘Manifesto Político 22 de Marzo’ and soon after the ‘Partido Comunista de Liberación Nacional’ (Communist Party for National Liberation, henceforth PCLN) — had partially hegemonized the UPG at the time of the IV congress.

The UPG’s IV congress performed both a continuation of the conjuncture –relying on similar stories, ideological themes and antagonisms and fully part of the problematic
of sovereignty- and simultaneously reversed and shifted its strategies. Contrary to textual strategies so far, which segregated the transposition of imperialism, the 'war and peace' theme, to the stories of the world-system and narrated most of their tales of the country and the state within the liberal plots of sovereignty, democracy and rights, the IV congress inverted this segregation. Here, the presence of the imperialism and the dependency plot was dominant throughout and liberal plots of democracy and rights were restricted to the tales of autonomy and the parliamentary affair. Thus, whilst dependency masternarratives still narrated a political enemy and equated relations between countries with class relations, these texts relied much more on class language and the transposition of colonialism. This reversion was to be undone, again, in the V congress.

The expulsion of the PCLN, and its joining with earlier expelled groups, from the BNG finally marked the end of the conjuncture of the 1980s for popular nationalism. It had split again into different story-lines and different fields of statements. Progressively the more radical antagonistic tales are othered from the main nationalist sites. The V congress of the UPG is telling in this respect. As a site of struggle on the need for swearing allegiance, it narrates both the antagonism with the constitution and the need for participation. However, this antagonism with the constitution and autonomy is here considerably more diffuse, less stark.

8.5. Conclusion

The narratives and stories of the nation, autonomy and the movement, and the tales of the world system were juxtaposed in the texts in striking ways. The former relied on liberal and individualist ethos and vocabularies of democracy and rights, the latter on citing and performing / transforming colonialism. These narratives, which were different, disjointed but adjacent, performed both continuity and change. They ensured the stability and continuity of identity and normative authority of the groups in a time of crisis while thoroughly re-signifying the movement. In fact, it is not surprising that the ambiguity of their positioning have led many scholars to suggest
contradictory theses: either there was no change or change had been significantly achieved. After all, the country’s forms were blurred –for citing and disavowing require lack of specification-, common themes were displaced but the radical antagonistic frontiers were kept.

However, if the existence in the common imaginary of a people of a shared antagonism is a requisite for the formation of a national community, then popular nationalism was seriously undermining itself during the 1980s. Although their antagonistic frontier responded to the new political terrain –that of the consolidation of the hegemony of democracy in Spain— it did so in a solipsistic fashion. Galicia’s inhabitants could hardly recognize and identify with nationalism’s demands or grievances as truly theirs. If the hyperbolic antagonism of the story-lines of colonialism had at root a kernel of viability in the verisimilitude of its grievances (‘polluting industries’ and ‘emigration’); now the antagonism narrated becomes unfeasible as a social imaginary. The Spanish constitution of 1978 was simply not seen as an evil force blocking a desire for nationhood as nationalists insisted. ‘Sovereignty’ was not of widespread concern; it lacked resonance in the wider society.

Moreover, the particularity standing in for ‘sovereignty’ was ‘nationalism’ itself. This only contributed to further isolate nationalism from the ‘people’ they were allegedly representing. This movement was only counterbalanced by their attempt to embody ‘democracy’ and the re-signification of the liberal narratives of citizenship. However, as will be shown in the next chapter, the problematic constitution of antagonisms which are not shared remains in these years, for the images and plots inscribed in the textual practices of popular nationalism are not true universals or even generalizations, but respond, mainly, to an extension to the nation as whole of the specific, contextual and particularistic experiences of antagonism suffered by the movement itself.
Narrating ‘self-organization’: the myth of unity and the BNG

Popular nationalism in Galicia—a fragmented field of Marxist and socialist sites which narrated Galicia as a colony of Spain—was first and foremost formed in a struggle with and opposition to Spain. A relation of antagonism between the forces of nationalism and ‘sovereignty’ against the Spanish constitution and the system of autonomous communities, which was said to simply regionalize the state, was the main discursive strategy of the movement. It externalized the enemy/other via the narrating of an equivalent political frontier. This antagonism was epitomized in the emblematic issue of these years (1981-1985), namely when three nationalist parliamentarians of the coalition BN-PG - PSG abandoned, or ‘were expelled from’, the Galician parliament in 1983 because of their refusal to swear allegiance to the Spanish constitution.

However, here I am mainly concerned with another discursive strategy of the movement in the ‘asphyxiating’ political conjuncture of the consolidation of democracy in Spain: the myth of unity and the foundation of the BNG. So far subordinated to the former, this strategy was an attempt at constructing a unity internal to the highly fragmented field of forces and forms of knowledge. Unity was to be achieved through the addition and combination of diverse sites and positionings in a single party/front structure. It meant opening up the possibility of new articulations of nationalist political forces. That is, it becomes important to deal with the internal and organizational responses to the identity dilemma which the political conjuncture of consolidation of democracy posed for nationalism. This is a case study of the formulation of ‘unity’: the tensions and paradoxes of the logic of equivalence and difference, openness and exclusionary tactics. This discursive strategy is more than a mere ‘organizational’ question. The organization reaches the
core of the ideological structure of the nationalist movement. Needless to say, both strategies, the strong antagonism towards the Constitution and the attempt at co-opting nationalist forces in a unitary front, worked simultaneously and were deeply entangled.


In September of 1982 a new nationalist site, the *Bloque Nacionalista Galego* (BNG), was formed. It was a new, ambitious, but also ambiguous political structure which proclaimed achieving the unity of nationalism as its main concern and accomplishment in the ‘difficult times’ of early Spanish democracy. The background to the formation of the BNG were two years of bitter struggles and in-fighting after the formation of the ‘*Mesa de Forzas Políticas Galegas*’ in 1980 as regards the narration of the nation and, consequently, the most appropriate organization for nationalism. That is, the way of organizing came to stand for the very identity of the movement, and also embodied the conception of the nation.

The new democratic hegemony had brought an autonomy which was, as Beramendi says, ‘perfectly able to function without nationalism’ (Beramendi, 2007:1112). During the initial three years of democracy three important electoral processes, which were a radical novelty for all the political actors involved, took place in Galicia: its statute of autonomy was voted on and approved in a referendum in December 1980; the first autonomic regional elections took place a year later (in October 1981); and the Spanish general elections in October 1982. These brought very poor results for ‘popular’ nationalism. It had opposed the statute and lost despite contrary expectations (Fernandez Baz, 2003). It obtained scant 9.6% of the vote in the autonomic Parliament which became dominated by the Spanish-nationalist conservatives of *Alianza Popular* (30.5%). The general elections in 1982 castigated them further: they obtained fewer than 5% of the vote and no representation in the Spanish Congress —where the PSOE had gained an absolute majority.
To make matters worse, their presence in the autonomic parliament soon run into trouble, as we saw in chapter 8, because in July 1982 the BN-PG-PSG, but not Esquerda Galega, refused to swear to abide by the Constitution — already narratively identified as their arch-enemy. As a result they were stripped of their rights to parliamentary initiative, only being allowed to keep the right to vote (Fernández Baz, 203:111). This episode was represented as proof of the ‘repressive’ character of the new democracy. Thus, after less than three years of democracy, popular nationalism had managed to keep itself on the outside of all relevant institutions with the exception of local corporations — where they were also facing normalizing pressures.

Unsurprisingly, the Marxist nationalism of the BN-PG and PSG was acutely feeling homogenizing pressures to adapt and was perceived to be ‘under attack’. The narrated attack on the country was also represented as an attack on them as they embodied the democratic and sovereignty universals. They were not the only ones. By 1982, most of the Spanish parties of the radical left had disappeared (Láiz, 1995). For most parties, adjusting their programmes and adapting to the constitution and the new democratic system — renouncing the revolutionary edge of their ideology — meant losing their specificity and difference vis-à-vis the hegemonic forces of the left. Even the PCE, which had been the major party in the opposition to Francoism for decades, was in deep crisis (Preston, 1986). This climate of ‘retreat’ and defeat — marked by their clear failure to obtain ‘rupture’ with the system and become a surface of inscription able to register the wider interests of the inhabitants of the region — caused a knotty dilemma regarding identity for the nationalist sites. They could retain their narratives of colonization in spite of their diminished readability and risk political marginalization, or they could adapt to the new democracy by loosening up their norms, boundaries and claims to authority and risk unravelling the movement.

The nationalist response to this challenge was ‘unity’. In June 1980, the ‘Mesa de Forzas Políticas Galegas’ crystallized. The ‘Mesa’ was a platform which coordinated action among the PSG, UPG and AN-PG. Its main agreement was to campaign against
the statute and then to contest the autonomic elections of 1981 together under the electoral coalition BN-PG-PSG. Later, after some preliminary meetings and discussions among the sites which responded to the unitary call made by the PSG\textsuperscript{151}, the Bloque Nacionalista Galego, which was a ‘patriotic’ front initially uniting several parties, social organizations and individuals, was formed.

**Rereading unity**

The birth of the BNG is commonly narrated, by nationalism and scholars alike, as a milestone in the construction of ‘unity’ (Beramendi, 2007; Baz, 2003; Fernan Vello and Pillado Mayor, 1989:225). In fact, the origins of the BNG are often traced as far back as the ‘Consello da Mocidade’, a platform of multiple nationalist sites created in 1963. Thus, the almost twenty years of history where no such unity existed are effaced. Moreover, unity is plotted as an immediate success story by popular nationalism or, in scholarly accounts, as a ‘progressive’ success story of the efforts and achievements of nationalism, dotted with disappointments, from the barren landscape of early 1960s to the present day. The main expounder of this thesis is Barreiro Rivas, who explicitly claims:

“Analyzed from today’s prespective, from the vantage point of someone who knows the end of the tale, the recent history of nationalism is far from that feeling of swing and rectification which accompanied the successive creation of the Consello da Mocidade, the UPG, the Consello de Forzas Políticas Galegas (CFPG), the AN-PG, o BN-PG and the BNG. It appears, on the contrary, as a logical process with a high degree of internal coherence taking place around the UPG, which would be able not only of catalyzing and unifying left-wing nationalism [...] In this sense it would be an error of interpretation to think the Riazor assembly as a break with former ideological and organizational models [...]” (Barreiro Rivas, 2003:115)

Rivas teleologically narrativizes the history of nationalism. He transforms a complex, fragmented and contradictory set of processes, goals and organizations into the single story of the rather smooth development of the UPG. That is, ‘with hindsight’ a plot can be constructed where the end builds logical connections between episodes and sense is made of what, if looked at closely, seemed quite disparate events.
Admittedly, other accounts are considerably more nuanced. However, even a judicious scholar such as J. Beramendi, in spite of noting the 'early failure' of the BNG, considers its foundation as a conscious turning point, 'the epiphanic moment' of nationalism (Beramendi, 2007). However, if an epiphany is a clear moment of revelation and insight, then it seems an overstatement to apply it to the highly tortuous first years of existence of the BNG which, as we will see, were fraught with exclusions.

These accounts tend to erase from view the subordination of any idea of 'unity' to the strong antagonistic frontier with the Constitution which the popular movement was following at the time and which had its emblematic issue in the 'expelling' of the nationalist MPs from the Galician parliament, in spite of the original othering of a multitude of political forces which this implied. Also, it is often occluded that important ideological shifts are needed to allow a serious consideration of a unified nationalist field. These shifts were in place only by 1989. From the early 1990s the BNG did start to grow both electorally and in terms of attracting nationalist parties to the front structure. Hence, it took almost a decade for the BNG to truly realize the 'additive' project and internal logic which was in 1982 just barely present.

Besides, most accounts either ignore or downplay the identity dilemma and the crisis it provokes in nationalist sites. But this crisis was, in fact, the condition of possibility for 'unity' and the BNG. The crisis opened up alternative stories of the nation and ways of organizing from inside popular nationalism: a complex European small nation, a mass party. The formation of the BNG took place in the midst of and as a result of the most serious dissensions within the fading discourse of colonialism. The front was the organizational project at the heart of the nation 'under attack' storyline, which demanded a continuity and (re)narrativization with the discourse of colonialism and the popular front, as explored in chapters 7 and 8. This storyline eventually won over others. However, nationalist explanations disassociate their internal struggles from the efforts to achieve 'unity' and reorganize the field. These are constructed often as nationalism's 'successful response to the attacks on the country'. Moreover, they limit and individualize responsibility for their crisis. It
becomes a problem to adapt, the result of ‘a chilled and relaxed attitude before the hostility of the times’, affecting some individuals who ‘did not want to fight costly conflicts’ or advocated an ‘electoral possibilism which would destroy the UPG’ (III congress, 1982). Some scholarly interpretations have followed suit. Fernández Baz, who provides a detailed description of the formation of the BNG, nevertheless discusses the crisis as a somehow adjacent but separate development, i.e. posing no distinct consequences or effects, from the building of unity (Fernández Baz, 2003).

Thus, I would like to argue for the necessary complexification of these explanations and against the historicist exercise of smoothing out the rough passages in the tale which severely underplay the heterogeneity, struggles and transformations that pervaded nationalism as a movement. The BNG was not the only and inevitable path for an articulation of nationalist forces at the time. Nor was ‘unity’ as a front the only possible direction, as it transpired. Although some of them were defeated and silenced, serious attempts were made at constructing a different nationalism in the early 1980s. Hence, on the one hand the POG –now reconstituted as *Esquerda Galega*— the *Partido Galeguista* (PG) and *Coalición Galega* remained outside the new platform, and gained considerable electoral support in the mid 1980s. On the other hand, as the Mesa de Forzas Polícticas Galegas formed and decided to create another electoral brand for the regional elections in 1981 (the BN-PG-PSG electoral coalition) its constituent sites were already in deep turmoil and were unravelling. What was at stake was the very conception of the nation and nationalism, the core identity of the movement.
9.2. The front, unity & disorder: origins of a new strategy of difference.

Nationalist sites in the early 1980s were tentatively starting to modulate and shift their own old systems of classification and boundaries of us and them: nationalism vs. ‘spanishism’ and ‘pseudo-nationalism’. In fact, barely mentioned anymore, some of these labels, particularly ‘spanishism’, were soon to disappear from these sites. The contours of nationalism were now being reorganized via changes of emphasis and metonymic displacements. Who is ‘us’ was therefore destabilized and became a little more uncertain in the context of their profound identity crisis. However, the fluidity was soon closed down and a new definition emerged which attempted to be more expansive and inclusive. Popular nationalism was threading a new hegemonic centre and renewal of their key oppositions: ‘sovereignty vis-à-vis the constitution’ progressively substituted ‘liberation vis-à-vis the Spanish imperialist state’.

Nevertheless, it was also initiating what would prove to be, in due time, a powerful discursive strategy and articulatory structure. On its own it was not based in oppositions, but in the building of alliances internal to the movement. That was the logic of difference through which the BNG originated.

Discursive formations are sustained by the effects of the political frontiers inscribed in and (re)inscribing them (Norval, 2000:220). These normative boundaries work to organize social space, through division and combinations of social and political groups. In trying to achieve a societal hegemony, a political project may divide the social into friends and enemies or it may work to construct sets of alliances as amply as possible —or a combination of both. The latter strategy is what Laclau and Mouffe called a ‘logic of difference’, that is, a political strategy which works to increase the number of differential positionings or groups which ‘can enter in combination and hence of continuity with one another’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 130). This strategy is similar to Gramsci's description of 'transformismo'. Transformism is the process of political cooptation which involves, Gramsci noted, a 'gradual but continuous absorption' and taming, 'of the active elements produced by allied groups and even
those which came from antagonistic groups and seemed irreconcilably hostile’ (Gramsci, 1971:59; Norval, 2000). Transformism tends to lessen antagonistic boundaries, or to blur ideological distinctions such as those between left and right, as it brings groups together. This strategy had been successfully put into practice by the discourse of democracy during the transition and its aftermath.

*Stories of unity: the transposition of colonialism and the popular front*

As a design, the ‘patriotic front’ –the solution given by the majority faction of nationalism to the dilemma of how to act in the context of democracy in Spain—was the institutional fixation and ‘material’ embodiment of the re-narrativization strategies put in place after 1981. It was the institutional form which embedded this renarrativization of the movement, the nation and its social practices\(^1\). The identity crisis and the consequent process of the re-articulation of forces which ended with the formation of the BNG in September 1982 was immersed in messianic tales of a seriously endangered country. This danger to the nation and the nationalist collective self justified a ‘desperate’ need for a nationalist unity –‘the unity of those for whom the fatherland comes first’ (GS, PSG, July 1982). The stories of ‘unity’ produced in different sites vary slightly but all share a basic but unfinished plot. This unfinished character of the tales, which is generally common to political stories, is the result of being caught in ‘the process of being made’, of composing its powerful image (Bhabha, 1990: 3; Shenhav, 2005).

At a simple level, the common elements in the plot of the generic tales of ‘unity’ are the terrible *situation of attack* and duress suffered by the country and its nationalist forces which is enforced by the constitution –the name of the enemy which condensed other grievances such as the devolution settlement, membership of the EEC and NATO, the economic crisis and so on. This situation is so dire that *something must be done*, the epiphanic moment as noted in the tales. What is to be done is the *unity of nationalism*, necessary to ‘organize the defence of the country’. There are,
however, variations of the plot and different subplots in the tales told by different nationalist sites. Thus, the PSG’s narratives have a salient subplot of the ‘responsible party’ which ‘seeks to articulate unity’ and the UPG’s a subplot of an ‘increasing repression of nationalism’.

Although these narratives are caught ‘in medias res’, unclear in terms of how the process ends, they dedicate considerable space to a re-narrativization of the nation which justifies the need for unity, characterized as these tales are by long descriptive settings and brief actions and exhortations to action (Labov and Waletzky, 1997). Not only plenty of narrative space in each tale is dedicated to descriptions of the present conjuncture, but between 1981 and 1982 sixteen stories of ‘unity’ appeared in the party periodicals GS and T&T. This is a considerable narrative production taking into account that the UPG’s magazine was silent for 10 months at this time. Curiously enough, if the tales of world-system and the narratives of sovereignty examined in chapters 7 and 8 implicitly reconstructed the representation of Galicia¹⁵⁴, it is during the discussions and narrations on how to build a new unity where the imaginings of the nation really came to the fore. These narrative spaces are interesting because the nation’s contours were at this juncture getting blurred: never directly told, one has to reconstruct them from the traces they leave in all tales woven at the time¹⁵⁵.

Now, in the descriptions of the country and in the new conjunctures appearing as long orientations¹⁵⁶ in the tales of unity, an iteration of colonialism and a resignification of the nation go hand in hand as constative claims. Such claims as these are always to some degree performative (Butler, 1993:11):

Extract 9.1. On citing ‘colonialism’ and re-signifying the nation.

"Galicia needs a platform of nationalist unity where we can all, [...] overcome the differences that separate us and where we can find a way for the construction of a sovereign Galicia. The political situation of our Nation demands this [unity] urgently. [...] In Galicia, the penetration of the monopolies and the exploitation of our riches has increased ...The Spanish constitution consecrates this situation. The persistence of an iron central administration; the lack of statutory competences and of adequate institutions; the antidemocratic and even ‘anti-constitutional’ way in which the
autonomous institutions are being implemented; the cultural and linguistic repression; the known hecatomb which Spanish membership of the EEC will mean for Galicia, characterize a dramatic situation before which the capacity of resistance of the Country has proved to be insufficient” (‘Organize the resistance’, GS, PSG, May 1982)

Extract 9.1. presents a powerful counter hegemonic account of the political and economic situation in Galicia. The tale —of which this is only an excerpt— is paradigmatic of the stories calling for unity. It enumerates the social and economic evils which Galicia faces and powerfully makes claims to truth through a series of non modalized, authoritative constative statements that provide an alternative to the hegemonic story. This dominant narrative was that of a successful democracy which had devolved power to the regions and of economic difficulties offset by membership of the EEC and access to its commerce, political stability and funds. By mentioning the increased presence of monopolies and the plunge in the country’s wealth, GS instead implicitly draws on the colonialism story-line to represent Galicia. This is not an anti-colonialism tale, however. Relying on religious imagery, it strongly blames the constitution for being devoted to furthering these economic and political evils with zeal. The use of term ‘consecrate’ brings about images of sacrosanct, inviolable norms and deeds which are above criticism or change and which could mobilize extreme punitive powers. The evils described are an irrelevant autonomy, an ‘antidemocratic’ (in an ironic stance marked by the inverted commas in the text) institutionalization process, cultural and linguistic demise and, worst of all, a ‘hecatomb’ in the form of membership of the EEC. Again religious imagery works to present membership as the public sacrifice of the Galicians to the EEC.

This enumeration of terrible evils works to build a climate of emergency and to mobilize a response —‘to organize resistance’— as the country, the story tells us, has proved as yet unable to do so. The enumeration justifies the moral of the tale presented at the very beginning: ‘Galicia needs a platform of nationalist unity’ and ‘the political situation of our Nation claims for this [unity] urgently’. The story then, positions nationalists as the only saviours of a defenceless nation under terrible attacks. It passivizes and feminizes the country as awaiting rescue, and seems to completely disregard the recent electoral results. However, this strong rhetoric can
also be seen as an attempt to respond to and redress their electoral insignificance. In the context of the identity crisis it might have been directed to an internal nationalist audience in an effort to overcome what was seen as a crippling weakness: their divisions.

*The meanings of ‘unity’*

This re-signification of the nation brought about a need for ‘unity’ and hence also a need to (re)define it. In the story-line of colonialism as told by the UPG, unity was an ideological theme intimately related to the organization of a successful ‘national-popular’ struggle for the national and social liberation of the popular classes. It was part of a vocabulary of motives constituting the Marxist—and hyper-masculinist—identity of membership of a party and of the working and popular classes as actively struggling against their common enemy. Unity was articulated to ideas of hard and parsimonious work and an ethos and practice of unflinching resistance, combativeness and permanent mobilization. Moreover, it was achieved though identification with the party (UPG) and the front (AN-PG): it should be ‘monolithic’, ‘disciplined’, ‘unanimous’, ‘lacking in fissures’, representing ‘one will’. Unity was, then, constructed simply as an internal homogeneity and identification with the central committee of the party. Thus, it was a theme strongly contributing to non democratic practices, which sustained ‘democratic centralism’, stifled dissent, mocked assembly principles and furthered the fragmentation of the movement as a whole.

In contrast to this, ‘unity’ in these tales is a hegemonizing strategy which pertains to the actions of the nationalist parties and groups. Nationalism should overcome its divisions and build unity for the sake of the welfare of the country. However, the pending issue was how it was going to be realized.
Unity is a front, a party, an organization, plurality.

[A] “In the questioning by some political forces of the necessity of a Patriotic Front in Galicia, it transpires not only their valorisation of the colonial reality, but also their position as regards the political process in the State, the constitutional framework and the Autonomy. In order to justify the lack of viability for a political front they argue that Galicia is located in Europe, that European societies are very ‘complex’ and have a degree of development which makes a front project, typical of third world countries, impossible. [...] It is true that Galicia is located in Europe...but the need for a patriotic front resides in the absence of national sovereignty and in the economic situation of many classes and social sectors that have an objective interest in breaking the colonization we suffer”
(The need for a patriotic front in Galicia’, T&T, UPG, 85, May-June 1982)

[B] “It is not a matter of repeating alien historic experiences both in time as in their political reality, but of finding a formula for the political articulation of the diverse sectors and currents which make up the nationalist left. It is a matter of constituting, within respect for ideological and organic plurality, a common field for militancy in order to push together the cart of our liberation” (‘Mulling over the nationalist unity’, PSG, GS, July 1982)

[C] “Due to the difficult situation of our country...it becomes necessary to create a new unitary organization of nationalists’ (‘Proposal for the definition of the unitary organization of nationalism’ PSG, GS, July 1982)

[D] “The concrete formulation of this unity must be materialized in the existence of a Patriotic Front. As a result of the conditionings signalled ... of our country as regards classic colonies, and of the experience amassed during the years in which we have been trying to promote a front alternative, it follows that the present organization must be reformulated. This reformulation [of the front] must be founded upon the following criteria:
- Achieving the widest possible unity in the Front.
- Formal recognition of the ideological, organizational and political existence of the diverse tendencies integrating it.
- Support for its democratic functioning within respect for its ideological principles.
- Defence of a programme of national sovereignty...”
(The policy of unity of nationalism’, UPG, Ill Congress, January 1982)

The form eventually taken, the Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG), was to a great extent a way of invoking and re-instantiating the story-line of colonialism which narrated the need for a ‘popular front’ as performed by the UPG in the AN-PG and BN-PG. Even the name, Bloque, had been maintained. However, the front had been a hotly contested option. It was one candidate among others: a mass socialist party and a more indeterminate ‘unitary organization’. The option of a mass party was founded on an alternative story-line of the nation as a complex European society – which meant a denial of the validity of the movement’s identity to date. Extract 9.1.b, presents a rare glimpse of this struggle when T&T pejoratively argues against
the UPG in the crisis of 1981. The so called Lugo Group kept working towards constituting this party and eventually joined EG. However, even among the sites producing the hegemonic narrative of a country under attack a front solution was still contested. The PSG called instead for an ambivalent ‘unitary organization’ and never mentioned a front. They insisted that unity was ‘not a matter of repeating alien historic experiences’ in a hardly veiled allusion to the UPG sponsored AN-PG and BN-PG which were seen to be modelled upon third world anti-colonial front strategies. At stake were a rejection of the UPG’s exclusionary practices and its understanding of unity as homogeneity.

These reservations were met by designing a new organization based on plurality157. The above extracts show clearly that the BNG’s unity is predicated upon the recognition of heterogeneity (‘the affirmation of specific identities’, the ‘formal recognition’ of diversity) and on being ample (the ‘widest possible’). Unity is narrated as the affirmation of the particularities to be integrated in the new organizational structure, on recognition of the heterogeneity of the field of nationalism and the attempt at expanding the front to incorporate new groups as an ‘alternative for national sovereignty’. As such, this unity begins a ‘logic of difference’ or cooptation strategy (Laclau, 2005; Howarth, 2000).

This ‘transformist’ project, the BNG, aimed at expanding and strengthening the field of popular nationalism in Galicia and its institutional presence through improved electoral results. It involved the co-optation of parties, collectives, groups and individuals working, presently or in the past, in the field of nationalism into a common organization premised on a nationalist ‘minimum common denominator’ agreement and structured in a reconfigured ‘patriotic front’. Unity translated first in the constitution of the Mesa de Forzas Politicas Galegas (MFPG, Table of Galician political forces), linking the UPG, AN-PG and PSG. The MFPG worked towards forming a new formal organization, the BNG. It joined the UPG, the ‘independents’ of the ANPG, the PSG, though only briefly, Galiza Ceive, Colectivo de Avance...
Nacionalista, Asamblea de Nacionalistas Galegos, Colectivo Libertario Arco da Vella, and various other local associations and individuals who did not belong to any collective or party (Vilas and Baz, 2004).

However, a cautionary note is needed here. This expansionary and unitary logic was clearly guarded, limited and constrained by the imperative of hegemonizing the field of nationhood to fight against a divisive 'common' enemy: the Spanish constitution of 1978. 'Unity' failed, unsurprisingly, to unite nationalisms. Its aim to respect ideological plurality was overdetermined by the sovereignty strategy which imposed strong dividing lines and foundational exclusions—for instance EG—and a strict policing of the 'nationalism' label. The heterogeneity internal to unity in fact only confirmed the equivalence of ideologically rather homogeneous small groups: the elements pertaining to it confirmed the order established by the plot of a nation under attack, being economically colonized.

Rearticulation of nationalism: originary exclusions

If the nation is, as Homi Bhabha has said, the structure of exclusion par excellence, popular nationalism has found in the 'patriotic front' a key exclusionary instrument (Bhabha, 1990) despite its advocacy of plurality, rhetoric of openness, unity and calls for 'joining in for all' common to the tales. In a nation and society conceived as colonized, however qualified, suffering severe external attacks and experiencing the denial of its 'fundamental' right to sovereignty there was no room in the organization for those other nationalists who accepted the constitution and the autonomy. The front constituted a small space of internal heterogeneity and a homogeneous collective self. Contrary to an ecumenical spirit needed at a time when the field of nationalism was criss-crossed by alternative stories, the minimal points in fact simply enshrined and normalized one particular narrative of nation to the exclusion of others. As Thomassen notes, in any particular symbolic space such as the one opened up by the tales of unity among all other stories which contribute
to producing the new story-line of sovereignty ‘there will always be persons or
groups whose points of views cannot be represented within the space... opened up –
but simultaneously closed- by the tendentially empty signifier’ (Thomassen,

These elements are what Ernesto Laclau, following Bataille, calls ‘the
heterogeneous’ (Laclau, 2005), an idea similar to what sociologist Mary Douglas
called ‘matter out of place’(Douglas, 1966): those who are an excess, a surplus, who
disrupt the orders being built, who bring disorder into the plot of ‘unity’ and the
front. This plot being the ‘harmonious vision of society’ as ‘us’ against ‘them’, the
forces of sovereignty against constitution and the Spanish forces in Galicia. If these
groups can not be absorbed, then, they should be contained, firmly pushed to
societal margins, banned from the spaces of representation. Only now those who
were self-propelled to the margins of Galician society were the members of the
BNG.

_Tension between unity and antagonism_

For Vilas and Baz, the BNG was ‘an organization where the only commonality among
its members was meant to be the defence of the national character of Galicia’ (Vilas
Nogueira and F. Baz, 2004:205). However, what nationalists really claimed to have in
common, as seen in the extracts above, was a ‘defence of a programme of national
sovereignty’ (extracts 9.1.b and 9.2. b and c). ‘National sovereignty’, as we have
seen, metonymically stood for something different than a simple recognition of
‘national character’. It was the plot, the knot tying the new story-lines and tales of a
nation under attack by the forces of the constitution, the autonomy and imperialism.
‘world peace’, ‘anti-Nato / EEC’. When the groups associated in the MFPG, mainly
the UPG and PSG, demanded the new organization to be based upon ‘minimal’ but
‘perfectly defined’ core principles (BNG, first assembly, September 1982) they were
putting in action a mechanism of ‘othering’ which forcibly disavowed and silenced
alternative stories of the nation and nationalist identity arising inside itself.
Extract 9.3. Tension between logics of ‘unity’ and antagonism.

[a] “Achieving the objective of national sovereignty involves the practical formulation of a policy of unity as wide as possible. This policy of unity hinges upon the following premises: own Galician political forces as participants; defence of the right of national self-organization at all levels; defence of the right of self-determination, specified in an alternative of national sovereignty. These axes mean not to accept neither the Spanish constitution nor the autonomic alternative. The practical formulation of this unity must be materialized in the existence of a Patriotic Front. (‘The policy of unity of nationalism’, UPG, III Congress, 1982)

[b] “...We agree that the organic formulation of the necessary unity should be achieved with respect for the ideological and political diversity which exists within real nationalism. Taking respect as the point of departure, a unity is possible which ...in order to be a useful instrument for our people, should be based upon minimal points, but perfectly defined and not to be renounced, without which we would be a political fraud.” (‘Political alternative of the BNG’, BNG, First Assembly, September 1982)

The mechanisms of exclusion were written in the calls for unity. As the extracts above show, these calls for ‘unity’ and the logic of attracting and adding up as many elements and sites as possible in the fragmented field of nationalism, were always limited by clear ‘premises’, ‘minimal points’ or ‘politico-ideological principles’. These principles in turn were based on the antagonism now narrated by the UPG and PSG: the opposition to the constitution and, of course, the autonomous settlement. This was the real dividing line between a project of ‘national sovereignty’ and any other ‘pseudo-nationalism’. The BNG text illustrates the paradox: while unity required ‘respect for the real ideological and political diversity of nationalism’ it nevertheless was to be ‘based upon minimal points’ which could not be surrendered. These minimal requirements for nationalism were precisely the issues of contention during the crisis. The core demand tying the different forces together was not any positive principle such as ‘self organization’ or ‘nation’ —claims to which many sites could have agreed upon— but the negative opposition to the anti-community, the ‘evil’ source of oppression of the nation embodied by the Spanish constitution of 1978. This unity, then, required the subordination of alternative projects to the rejection of the Constitution, the demand of ‘sovereignty’ and the stories and practices which underlay it. Thus, clearly Esquerda Galega, a left-wing nationalist party which had not been part of the story-line of colonialism, not to mention other centre-right
forces such as the Partido Nacionalista Galego or Coalición Galega, would not and could not have become part of the new organization. In fact, these heavy ‘minimal points’ even split the PSG in two, with the majority of the party abandoning the BNG as early as 1983. ‘Unity’ simply brought together the UPG with a few small social organizations and individuals. It effectively amounted to another repression of difference and plurality in the front ab initio.

The front was premised on an antagonism sovereignty / Constitution—the main discursive strategy of popular nationalism during this political juncture. The condition of possibility for the formation of the Front was the narration of a nation under attack and deprived of ‘sovereignty’, the nodal point in popular nationalism designating the blocked fullness of society (Laclau, 2005). That is, if the tales of unity and the front signified the inauguration of a logic of difference in the movement, the condition of any possibility of this ‘unity’ was, paradoxically, the antagonism which delimited the clear frontiers of us / them. Thus, the Front was rooted in an ambiguity and tension between the logics of difference and equivalence from the outset, where equivalence retained the upper hand at least up until 1988-89.

However, the sites othered by the narrative strategy of unity were bringing disorder to the plot of sovereignty and unity from the inside needed to be dealt with because of their insistence that a front was not an adequate strategy in a ‘complex European nation’ and that the autonomous community and its devolved powers could be a usable first step towards sovereignty. The stories of unity, even though allowed for and re-inscribing an antagonism with Spain, focused on containing and policing the excess. ‘Unity’ was premised on the expulsion from ‘nationalism’ of this surplus:

Extract 9.4: On policing of nationalism

“He does not have a right to call himself nationalist he who accepts legal texts which do not recognise him, not even symbolically. He does not have a right to name himself nationalist he who supports in practice, openly or with pharisaic ambiguity, the repressive, anti-democratic and anti-nationalist channels of the present Spanish regime, which sustains justifies and legitimates its policies on those legal texts (the Constitution and the statute of autonomy). We salute the unity of Galician nationalism, the
Thus, the sites which did not subordinate their practices and accounts to the new unity of nationalism were simply denationalized. As the extract above illustrates, they were stripped of 'the right to call themselves nationalists'. Later on, when the BNG was formed in a precarious 'unity' of forces, the labelling of excess continues: they are 'sectarians', 'testimonial', 'disappearing', and bear a 'diffuse' galeguismo (II BNG assembly, 1984) —which applies even to the PSG now, the leading voice calling for unity in 1982. Popular nationalism —and here particularly the UPG— adopts a highly authoritarian and pedagogical position from which it can police and ensure the purity of nationalism —its opposition to the Constitution— self-attributing the 'right' to the term Galicianness.

Unequal assembly principle

In its organizational principles the Riazor assembly text stated:

"ASSEMBLY CHARACTER: The organization, which would be plural, open and participative, would base its working dynamics and political decision-making in the assembly formula. Representatives would be subjected to an imperative mandate, and so, they could be recalled by those who elected them" (BNG, I Assembly, 1982)

Furthermore, the internal structure of the organization was territorial and not sectorial, as this was deemed harmful to the assembly principle. The BNG was initially composed of a 'National Assembly' (NA) made of the entire membership, a 'National council' and a 'Permanent' version of the council at the national level. This structure, with the exception of the 'permanent', was reproduced at the shire and local levels.

It was the composition of the National council (NC)—the most important decision—making body in the NA- which undid the implicit equality principle enshrined in the decision to organize as an assembly. For the BNG was made up of individuals, as represented in the National Assembly, which met only every two years, but also of political parties and other organizations. The recognition of this plurality meant that organizations were also recognized as actors with a voice and a vote within the
organization. In order to accomplish this, the NC was made up of 20 representatives elected by the NA, two representatives of each party or political organization and 1/3 of its total by comarcal representatives. Therefore, as J. Beramendi and others have remarked, there were in fact two kinds of militants: those affiliated to the BNG only, and those also affiliated to groups within it (Beramendi, 2007). The latter had considerably more weight as they had more opportunities to occupy positions of responsibility and influence decision-making. Vice-versa, the parties and organizations and their policies could be represented directly as organizations as well as through individual militants. This gave them a clear advantage when it came to occupying decision-making positions.

This arrangement clearly favoured the UPG. This was, until the early 1990s, the only party and the best organized group within the BNG. In fact, the BNG had inherited the local material resources and infrastructure from the AN-PG. As Vilas and Baz noted, the agenda of the BNG was initially set by the UPG — whose congresses were timed to take place a couple of months before those of the BNG — even though ‘the decisional process finalized in the BNG structures, its national assembly and national council’ (Vilas Nogueira and F. Baz, 2004). The UPG still saw itself as the vanguard of the front, but a vanguard which could not ‘base the role of leading force in the mechanistic satellization of ideological sectors which participate with us in a common struggle’ which would denote a ‘conceited’ attitude as well as a ‘deformed application of the front project’. It was to lead by the example of hard work and epistemological reasoning.
9.3. Conclusion: aporia unity / particularity.

This chapter has examined the construction of 'unity' and the nationalist party, the BNG, through some of their storytelling practices. An analysis of the stories in their contexts of production shows the front and the aim for unity to be ridden within power struggles. It was a much more complex and protracted issue, and less inclusive, than nationalists and some scholarship might lead us to imagine. The BNG appears as an ambiguous site where, at this time, the budding idea of opening up spaces for the combining of different political groups was still overdetermined by strong antagonisms and exclusions. However, both forms of logic were present. Hence, the BNG was a site torn by the tension between the establishment of 'plurality', maintaining the heterogeneous identities of the particularities integrated in the front, and the striving for hegemony and homogeneity imposed by its 'minimum' demands —i.e. the relation of antagonism with the Spanish Constitution and autonomy. This paradox, instituted at its origin in the very structure of the organization —and which bears the marks of history and the political conjuncture in the texts— has haunted the front ever since.

The BNG was not the inevitable or the only possible way forward, but the victorious contestant in a power struggle. The front was constructed at a cost. 'Real nationalism' marginalized itself and steadily lost support at a time in which its 'heterogeneous' other was experiencing success. The front was more than a mere 'organizational' question. Unity and rearticulation of nationalist sites happened along the frontier delimited by opposing narratives of nation. Thus, it was premised along identity-based lines. The BNG formation reached the core of the ideological structure of the nationalist movement, sustaining a vision of the nation and the collective self.
By way of conclusion and reflection.

Anthropologist Harry Wolcott asks the question which seems to be commonplace in qualitative research: ‘how do you conclude a qualitative study?’ (Wolcott, 2009:113). His answer is that you do not. By which he means that ‘the endings in qualitative studies do not have to be dramatic; they need only to be well suited for the occasion’ (ibid. 114). So he recommends a ‘conservative’ closing statement which reviews what the study attempted and learned. I am going to follow here this sensible recommendation. Writing a (short) conclusion makes special sense, after all, in a study dealing with narratives, for we know that we crave the closure which the ending brings to the tale.

Hence I am going back to the questions and intentions of the study to try to sum up what has been learned about Galician nationalism and national identity when examining them. I had been intrigued about the unseen and unnoticed contradictions which a Marxist and nationalist identity posed for a radical movement. I ‘problematised’ this question in a double sense, the unconvincing way of theorising nationalism which a priori rendered movements as the Galician as deviant, and the nationalists own response. I set out not to undertake a theoretical exegesis of Marxism and nationalism, but to examine how nationalists performed ‘nationalism’ and ‘Marxism’. In a study with a clear historical dimension, this could not be done but through the examination of the movement at its own word: how they textually represented the movement to themselves and to others. Narratives and stories are ways of ordering our worlds, of organizing experience, what we perceive as ‘reality’ (Bruner, 1991), and I found that the radical movement in the 1970s and the 1980s relied on intricate webs of story-lines, subplots, big and small tales and their resignification to struggle against Spain, struggle among themselves and hold themselves together at times of crisis. I asked:

- How do nationalists construct 'being nationalist' and 'being Marxist'?
- How was the political community discursively constructed and performed?
• What stories did nationalists tell?
• How are masternarratives articulated in discourse?
• Which ones take pre-eminence? When?
• What do stories tell us about nationalism?
• What are the political effects of storytelling practices?
• What do the stories in the movement, their organization and mechanisms, could tell about storytelling?

Stories—their citation, resignification and the myriad social practices embedded in them, such as demonstrating against paper factories or refusing to swear the Constitution—were the stuff that made up national identity. The movement relied on stories to put forward an alternative knowledge—and its power effects—of the country relying on versions of the past and the desirable futures.

The first thing I realised was that stories of anti-colonialism did not spring up in a vacuum but within a political and cultural space within the Spanish left at the time of the last breath of franquism, which was small but had been opened up by a specific political conjuncture and the enmeshment of frames of intelligibility from the Third World, Europe and Spain in the late 1960s and 1970s, mainly anti-colonial discourses, Lenin’s and Murguia’s blueprints, and mainly in an opposition to Spain. Located at the vortex of political and cultural communities of resistance to franquism, narratives of Marxism and nationalism flourished throughout Spain—and beyond. These were not just mobilized by minority nationalisms, but by all radical, resisting communities to different extents and in different emplotments. In Spain in particular, the visibility and prestige of the Spanish communist in the resistance to the dictatorship made their vocabularies of motives and political language the norm and authority to perform resistance. These norms were subsequently cited and used by many others. Doing resistance credibly meant relying on the language of Leninism, anti-colonialism, and nation. Combining Marxism and nationalism did not seem to be a minority nationalist peculiarity. Stories arise in particular social and historical conjunctures.
More surprising was to realise that in the articulation of masternarratives there was not a clear narrative pre-eminence but the opposite. The plurality of social contexts allowed—and constrained—the nationalists into performing a complex, hybrid and hyphenated identity which I argue refused to be defined simply as nationalist. The movement took Marxism seriously. They elaborated a complicated knowledge of the country as a colony. This started with the resignification of former stories of the nation. If the contemporary movement drew on nineteenth and earlier twentieth century nationalism, they also thoroughly transformed it. Nationalists, as we have seen in chapter 4, were not interested in narrating the origins of the nation but the loss of nationhood. They read former tales through new dominant masternarratives. They read and resignified past tales to fit present circumstances and their own ends. Framed within a narrative of five hundred years of colonialism, the socio-economic troubles of the country were simply an act of aggression and the stories called to struggle against it.

The political community constructed turned out not to be the nation as such. In fact, the movement displaced the nation per se, crucially decentring the claim to nationhood, in favour of a more theoretical, abstract and unknown rallying point: the colony. Centring the colony in the imaginary of those interpelated, ‘the popular classes’, required too extensive a pedagogical effort and was only partially readable in its grievances. Despite some successes, it failed to mobilise wide support outside radical circles familiar with its language. Their Marxism and nationalism was done through a logic of the supplement, where deciding which narrative was primary became undecidable. But what was a clear ideological effect of the institution of strong antagonistic frontiers (the alien oppressor and the victim theme evoked by colonialism) was that it made this ‘emancipatory’ discourse a highly exclusionary one, were—with differences among story-lines—almost every other political force, even those opposing Francoism, were denationalized and political action to manoeuvre in the transition, to obtain even partial results, became unthinkable.

Ultimately, the hybridity and ambiguity of colonialism as flawed rallying point, the abstract and theoretical languages which barely drew on folk meanings, the failure
to realistically address many of 'the people's concerns, the victimizing mythology and finally, the crumbling of the conditions of possibility of any readability of the colonialism narrative with the transition to democracy plunged the movement into an identity crisis. Nevertheless, the discourse of colonialism, with all its shortcomings, tensions, paradoxes and serious political and ethical failures of imagination, was also enabling. It had been a vortex of creativity, of knowledges, of political might and effort on the part of many forces within nationalism—and even of those outside of it—which was hardly matched in its later phase.

As Plummer remarked, certain stories can only be told at particular moments (1995). In Galicia end of the crisis and uncertainty opened up by Franco’s death with the establishment of a parliamentary democracy, did away with the possibility of narrating the colony as it had been done. By 1981 the movement was in disarray and the political community was conjuncturally re-narrativized, re-imagined.

If there is a clear discursive change at this time, it lacked the narrative power of the colonization discourse. The movement was now on the retreat, in the midst of an identity crisis. They de-ambiguated and resignified their discourse and identity towards nationalism mostly through coy moves: the narratives of colonialism established clear constraints to how the movement could refashion itself without unravelling. The shift was undertaken through a metonymic displacement of colonialism to the international sphere, the ventriloquism of democracy and the solipsistic equivocation of this universal and the movement per se. Ambivalently, the new conjuncture forces the beginning of a strategy of difference in the form of a new organization: the BNG. If these discursive re-narrativizations manifest the agency of the movement in their capacity for subverting and appropriating Spanish narratives, they also demonstrate the extent to which they had already lost their original battle for they had to resort to using the very dominant narratives they had opposed in order to be heard.

This study zoomed in the narrative and storied dimension and practices in the discourses of the contemporary Galician movement. It conceived narratives as
political practices 'iteratively doing things' within Butler's framework of performativity. These stories were not singular but collective and told over and over again in the texts, the sites, the movement and 'lived' in and through other practices. The myth of loss was a call to arms and an externalization of blame, the (buried) foundation of every other story told in the 1970s. The story-lines of colonialism constructed an alternative knowledge of society which was not purely 'national' and had astonishing power effects: opposing Spanish narratives of nationhood, othering groups, mobilizing membership at times of risky political action, building myriad organizations—a plethora of trade unions, parties, assemblies, social and cultural organizations and so on—reconstructing the country space as dystopia and building an utopia as a network of localities, fighting and struggling against national and social oppression. The world-system tales worked as fortifying myths at the time of crisis and allowed them to retain exclusionary frontiers, their identity as struggling and successful movement by safely containing the colonialism and imperialism theme. The narratives of democracy and sovereignty tried to gather support for the movement's decision of not swearing the Parliamentary regulation by narratively identifying nation, democracy and nationalism. The most startling effect was achieved here by their juxtaposition: the signification of continuity and renewal. These stories, in their plurality, juxtapositions, combinations and equilibriums were, to a great extent the Galician nation, the 'instruments' which performed, normalized, maintained and changed a certain sense of reality and understanding of society.
1 He distinguishes ethnic communities by a list of six attributes and poses that 'ethnies' can come about through different processes (Smith 1991:23-4). Smith insists that, although ethnies are not primordial entities, once formed, they are exceptionally durable. He accepts that certain events may profoundly change the cultural content of ethnies and so he specifies four mechanisms of self-renewal. These mechanisms, despite changes, could ensure the survival of an ethnic 'core' of a community across centuries. For Smith, the existence of ethnic communities helps reveal which groups would become nations. Then he establishes a typology of processes of emergence and formation of nations distinguishing between lateral/aristocratic and vertical/demotic, classifications that would correspond to the well known division between territorial/civic and ethnic nationalism.

2 They contend, Smith lists, that the state has unfair economic policies, that it is too over-centralised to 'meet man's social and political needs' and that it also tends towards cultural assimilation (Smith 1979: 154-56). Thus these nationalisms are different from nineteenth century nationalism primarily in their goals. At least, Smith admits that these 'latter-day autonomist movements' correspond nevertheless 'to the basic pattern of nationalisms' (ibid, 157).

3 The linguistic turn refers to a paradigm shift in philosophy which moves from seeing language as a medium through which the world and its qualities were expressed, to a focus on language and its properties as such, and 'how the world is made for us from the meaning that language expresses' (Carver, 2002:52). Raymond Williams characterises the subject of modernity as one who is 'indivisible — an entity which is unified within itself and cannot be further divided: is singular, distinctive, unique.' (Williams, 1996, quoted in Hall 1996:282). Modern notions of individuality posed a conception of the human person as fully-centred and endowed with the capacities of reason, consciousness and action, whose centre is an 'inner core' that emerges when the person is born and unfolds with it, remaining essentially the same. The de-centring of the Cartesian subjects occurs through several critiques, Hall explains. Marxism displaced the notion of individual agency, Freud 'discovered' the unconscious, Saussure posed language as a social not individual system, and meanings as relational; Foucault isolates a new 'disciplinary power'; and feminism questioned distinctions of 'private' and 'public' and the formation of gendered subjects (Hall, 1992:277-90).

4 The way ideologies become dominant is explained by Laclau and Mouffe through the concept of hegemony. In the situation where there are antagonistic forces (which reveal the insurmountable boundaries of 'political frontiers' between groups in a society) and the frontiers between them are unstable or the social order is 'dislocated', that is, is being shaken, there would probably be attempts by political forces at (re)constructing order. Antagonistic political forces would compete to give new content to the 'empty signifier' and (re)articulate differential elements, thus reinterpreting social order. These attempts or new political projects would be discourses posing a challenge to established ones, trying to become hegemonic in a Gramscian sense, that is, trying to structure political space by imposing closure on a new basis, naturalising their contingent articulations. These new articulations are 'myths' that would become an 'imaginary' or social horizon, that is, a new framework of intelligibility, if they become successful. Thus, as Norval points out, in discourse theory 'ideological struggles are struggles over the filling of empty signifiers to create a new myth and imaginary' (Norval 2000: 330).

5 Discourse theory emphasises, therefore, the 'ultimate contingency' of all social identity, but they also need to make room for 'fixations of meaning' or otherwise no identity or society could ever be possible. Thus, Laclau and Mouffe devise the concepts of nodal points and empty signifiers. Any discourse is a 'system of differential elements which attempts to arrest the flow of differences' (Laclau and Mouffe 1985), an attempt to organise society into a structured totality in order to give it meaning and stability. So any discourse constructs a centre around privileged discursive points that will partially fix social meaning. These points are no mere moments but 'nodal points'. The main characteristic of the nodal points is its condition of 'empty signifier', that is, a signifier which embodies 'the unity of a community which, nevertheless, cannot ever be fully achieved' (Norval 2000:330). This conceptualisation is similar, Norval suggests, to Freedens's 'ineliminable' and 'adjacent'
(or quasi-contingent) features of ideological concepts (Norval 2000). Several examples are given: 'justice', 'democracy' or 'the nation', for the discourse of nationalism. These signifiers implement the quintessential operation of ideology, Norval explains, as they bring about the illusion of (impossible) societal 'unity' and 'fullness'. Thus, Howarth explains, 'ideological discourses' are those which do not acknowledge their own contingent status (Howarth, 2000:123). Ideology for discourse theory is the attempt to de-contest central political concepts and relations of domination (even though, due to the impossibility of a final fixity of meaning, these attempts must eventually fail) (Norval 2000:326).

6 Slavoj Žižek gives an illuminating example of how a particularity stands in for the universal and its political efficacy (1999:204-214). 'In the rejection of the social welfare system by the New Right in the USA', he explains, 'the very universal notion of the present welfare system as inefficient is contaminated by the more concrete representation of the notorious single African-American mother, as if social welfare were, in the last resort, a programme for black single mothers – the particular case of the 'black single mother' is silently conceived of as 'typical' of the universal notion of social welfare, and what is wrong with it'. 'Single unemployed mother' becomes overdetermined or as he says a 'sinthome': 'a knot, a point at which all the lines of the predominant ideological argumentation (the return to family values, rejection of the welfare state and its 'uncontrollable' spending, etc) meet The sinthome is what holds together the thing itself'.

7 Czarniawska remarks on Lyotard's analysis, that the relation between narrative knowing and science is unbalanced because even though science needs narratives to legitimate itself it 'repays the favour in poor coin': denying narrative any legitimate claim to knowledge (Czarniawska, 2004:7; Lyotard, 1984).

8 Lichtmajer, 2006, personal conversation at Essex summer School.

9 The example Butler gives is that of conventional insults, where the force of 'fag!' or 'nigger!' is in being an invocation which binds the speaker to the practices and norms of homophobic / racist communities (1993:227).

10 This idea refers to the common belief that nationalism is the big gap of Marxist theory, that it was underestimated and misunderstood by Marx and Engels, or that nationalist movements cannot be explained from a Marxist viewpoint (Löwi, 1998). On the one hand, Marxism bases its analysis of social reality on class struggle. Marxist theory was conceived, primarily, as a critique of the political economy of capitalism from the standpoint of the working class. At its more basic, it posits a material conception of history for which the way that material production is carried on and it is organized is the determining factor in political organization and in the intellectual representation of an epoch. Society is divided in classes that are distinguished in terms of the ownership of the means of production, and their struggle is the driving force of history (Bottomore, 1991). On the other hand, nationalism does away with class struggle by unifying the social classes in the 'nation', and equalizing every member of the nation in a horizontal attachment. Nationalism has traditionally been considered as a political principle which 'holds that humanity is naturally divided into nations' (Kedourie, 1966:9) and that 'the political and the national should be congruent' (Gellner 1983:5), and as an ideology that 'places the nation at the centre of its concerns and seeks to promote the nation's well-being' (Smith 2001:9). It is a discourse that 'leads people...to think and frame their aspirations in terms of their idea of nation and national identity' (Calhoun 1997:6). Thus, Marx and Engels advised against nationalism in the belief that it could be an ideological instrument on the hands of the bourgeoisie to distract the working class from their 'objective' interests. Instead, a nationalist feeling would 'keep [the working class] in tether', persuading them to make a common front with the ruling classes to defend the latter interests against the working classes of other countries.

11 For a paradigmatic example of this treatment offered to so-called 'minority nationalisms' see Hobbsbawm, 1990.

12 To mention but a few see Hall, 1990; Brubaker, 1995; Calhoun, 1997; Billig, 1987; Yuval-Davies, 1996; Özkirimli, 2005.
13 Such as conversation analysis, critical discourse analysis or discursive psychology. See Schegloff, 1997; Fairclough, 2003; Billig, —; Potter and Wetherell, 1987.

14 Another definition would be Marteen Hajer's, for whom discourse is 'the ensemble of ideas, concepts, categories through meaning is given to phenomena and which is produced and reproduced through an identifiable set of practices' (Hajer, 1995:303).


16 Denzin and Lincoln note how the researcher’s biography permeates decision taking and writing in qualitative research: ‘the gendered, multiculturally situated researcher approaches the world with a set of ideas, a framework , that specifies a set of questions that then she examines in specific ways’ (2000). That is, as Atkinson et al. also remind us, researchers are biographically situated. Furthermore, in a reflexive mood the questions we ask are not so much ‘whose side are we on?’ anymore, but ‘who we are’, noting that ‘we might not feel able to choose sides’ (Atkinson et al., 2003:83).

17 There I negotiated a 'researcher from a foreign university' identity in an attempt to be perceived as having only a scholarly interest and stake—which in fact was the case. This was a delicate process as nationalists, particularly the UPG, have lived in a highly charged and conflictive atmosphere—among the different groups and from the outside—which compounded with a Leninist tradition and the fact that I am Galician could result in a total lack of trust towards me. While I do not claim that there was not a degree of mistrust —after all I had no access to some documents—being introduced by a respected member and ‘doing researcher’ did help.

18 Old issues of party periodicals, texts of congresses, video recordings and texts of speeches, biographies of prominent participants, etc.

19 The figures characterized not only for having produced their own work, but also because they created the conditions for the production of other texts and for the formation of certain rules which guided discussion, debate and the sense of the propositions.


21 I talked with three key representatives of UPG of different historical periods, and two from PSG and its ‘heir’ faction within the BNG, making sure that there was variation on gender —two women and three men- and age—from early twenties to sixties. Access to the participants was not very complicated. I negotiated the interviews either directly with the participants through e.mail—some are well-known academics at Galician universities, and so relatively easy to contact— or with the help of the BNG foundation —Galiza Sempre.

22 Chronicle, reports, arguments, lists, schedules, typologies etc.

23 Once taken up, I realised—to my initial distress— that often there was reluctance to abandon it and my other questions were also integrated on stories of the self.

24 There are notable exceptions to this from different traditions and perspectives —such as Bowden, 2008; Carver, 1997; Hajer, 1995; Mottier, 2000; Shenhav, 2004, 2005; Tilly, 2002— and it seems to be changing as interpretive approaches gather pace. However, as an illustration of this point, see the panels in the methods section of the ECPR annual conference 2011: Bayesian Methods for the Social Sciences, Causal Inference, Measuring Constituency Preferences, Mixed Methods, National Election Surveys: methodological challenges and solutions, Revisiting EITM, Social Network Analysis, Time Series and Cross-Sectional Panel Data.
The choice of software responded to theoretical and analytical needs. In discourse analysis atlas.ti is popular because it does not impose unwelcome hierarchies on the data nor constrictions for an iterative coding process which attends to different strategies and levels of generality.

However, when talking about normalization we might be jumping into another very thorny issue within nationalism: AGAL or ILGA? That is the battle about a norm akin to the Portuguese language favoured strongly by independentists but also by variegated groups, and the official norm akin to Spanish which the BNG supports —if only by not raising explicitly the issue.

They are, as Ken Plummer puts it, ‘lodged in specific (situational, economic, historical) social moments’ (Plummer, 1995:63). Hence, the political work of narratives and stories is deeply contextual.

For instance, Borja de Riquer proposes in a seminal essay —‘Nacionalidades y Regiones. Problemas y líneas de investigación en torno a la débil nacionalización española del siglo XIX’— the thesis of the ‘slow, superficial and weak’ nationalization process, due, among other factors, to a patrimonial, corrupt use of government and state institutions, and to the underdevelopment of the ideological state apparatuses —school system, army, administration, etc. These weaknesses, for Riquer, allowed peripheral nationalisms to consolidate (Riquer, 1996:77). In fact, the weakness, strengths and supposed failure of the liberal nationalization process has been widely debated during the 1980s and 1990s in Spain (see Martinez Quinteiro, 1996, for an informative explanation of the different positions). Firstly, liberalism in the XIX century was considered an economic failure (Nadal, Tortella) but a political success. This thesis has progressively been inverted: qualified the economic failures and questioned the political successes (Borja de Riquer, Fusi and others). The political and nationalizing weakness thesis is now commonly assumed, although it has been qualified from many perspectives, for instance as being itself a myth of the conservative nationalism that succeeded the liberal enterprise (Saz Campos, 2003).

The first bouts of nationalism in the periphery in Spain, the ‘provincialismos’ and ‘regionalismos’, that by the 1840s come to life —with the influence of romanticism, liberal administrative reform, incipient industrialization, etc— do not yet openly question the Spanish nation—even though a certain ambivalence of loyalties appears in particular individual figures (Beramendi, 2008; Beramendi and Seixas, 1995).

The ‘Nazon de Breogán’ as portrayed by poet Eduardo Pondal in his poem ‘Os pinos’, whose first four stanzas form the lyrics of the Galician national hymn.

The episode of the resistance of Mount Medulio refers to the battle between Roman army and the tribes of the north of the peninsula in the year 22 BC. In the face of defeat the tribes, Gallaecians amongst them, committed suicide rather than surrendering to the Roman army. The episode was narrated by roman historian Lucio Aneo Floro and was later mythologized by Galician nationalism.

It is important to note that this version of the story is, Beramendi says, that which appears in Murguia’s mature historical writings, where he reconstructs the history of Galicia in the basis of a Manichean antagonistic opposition between Galicia and Spain/Castile. However, this is a departure from his youthful writings were, most analysts agree, he shows a more complex view of Galician history where the role of some Galician forces, particularly the nobility, are also harshly judged (Beramendi, 2008:192-196; Máz, 1984).

The combination of racist principles and progressive politics is not that uncommon either. Veronique Mottier relates how the ‘Swiss dream of order’, the early narratives of Swiss nationhood, had Forel as founding father articulating notions of eugenics and socialism (Mottier, 2000).

Saz Campos explains how within Francoist ultra-nationalism diverse factions coexist which have different national projects for Spain: mainly ‘Falangismo’ and ‘national-catholicism’. Among their main differences are the initial laicism and a fascist discourse of Europeanism, revolution and of imperialism in the initial ‘Falangismo’ (as posited by J. A. Primo de Rivera, Pedro Lain or Dionisio Ridruejo) as opposed to the reactionary, ultra-catholic, capitalist, Castilian essentialist but regionalist
— in traditional sense — notions of ‘national-catholicism’ (as seen in the writings of Menendez-Pelayo and others). However, under pressure from the Church, the army, the traditionalist and monarchists — that is, the other pillars of francoism— as soon as 1941 the Falange had to begin the renunciation of their specific fascist national project and accept the ‘essential’ Catholicism of Spain among other national-catholic tenets (Saz Campos, 2003).

35The remains of the nationalist party, that is, those who were not killed, gone to exile or — in the case of the conservative wing — invited to remain quiet after the civil war, decided, following the lead of Ramón Piñeiro, to retreat to cultural action and so they founded a publishing house: Galáxia. Galáxia and its cultural policy came to substitute the nationalist party — the Partido Galeguista — and political action within Galicia — not in the Galicia without. This was perceived as the only possible course of action under the Francoist regime. However, culturalismo was understood in rather elitist terms: Galáxia concentrated its efforts in giving prestige to the language through high culture initiatives such as translations of German philosophers into Galician, etc (Núñez Seixas, 1994). Thus, their audiences were fairly limited.

36 The itineraries of resistant thought and practices are complex though, as Howarth shows that in turn, the South Black Consciousness of Steve Biko fed on Black Power movement ideology (Howarth, 1997).

37 The conflict in Northern Ireland escalated since 1972, and in the 1970s Welsh, Scottish or Corsican nationalisms acquired relevance.

38 Among the signatories were the Irish Republican Movement (IRA), Union Démocratique Breton (UDB), Su Populo Sardo, Lutte Occitane, Cumry Goch (CG), Esquerra Catalana dels Treballadors or the Unión do Povo Galego (UPG).

39 ‘Contradiction’ is a core concept in Marxist ontological dialectics. For Bhaskar in Marx’s writings it might either designate logical inconsistencies, oppositions of forces — supply and demand — or historical dialectical contradictions (1983:110).

40 As opposed to the perception, since the third period of the Comintern, that revolution was imminent on a world scale and thus social-democratic parties and other ‘reformist’ were seen as acting as a brake and therefore as the immediate enemies (Beverley, 1999).

41 The theorizing of the transition in Spain is a thorny ideological issue. In recent years there has been a historiographic revolt — often from the quarters of social history — against the ‘official’ narrative of the process of transition. See the debate in Ayer 68 (4) in 2007 coordinated by Saz which strives to recover the complexity of social, economic and political processes in late francoism and demystify the teleology of the transition (Saz, 2007; Ysàs, 2004 and 2007; Núñez Seixas, 2007; Viñas, 2007; Sánchez-Biosca, 2007). Equally the members of the Seminario de Estudios del Franquismo y la Transición have written extensively criticizing the dominant views (Ortiz Heras, 2003; Martin García et al., 2009). This official narrative reflects a consensus on portraying the transition as teleology — the necessary and inevitable outcome of the ‘modernization’ process during late francoism, for democracy is assumed to be simply a (by)product of development — or as ‘determinism of change’ — the implicit idea that the transition could only have happened as it did, for democracy was either the only option, the result of francoism’s own nature or worse, the end point of a process of voluntary self-reform. This consensus view — in spite of often providing carefully researched accounts — tends to construct top-down, elite driven and individualistic accounts of the transition as ‘high politics’ — that have Suarez, the king or even Carrillo as heroes— where the bulk of Spanish society figures as passive spectator of an inevitable process. The alternative perspectives criticise the modernization paradigm for reducing the complexity of events, mitigating the impact of popular subversion and dissent on the fate of the regime and almost presenting late francoism as a benign project (Saz, 2007).

42 After the initial autarchic economic policies of the dictatorship — in the 1940s and 1950s — were abandoned, the state became rapidly industrialized and opened up to the international economy.
(Tortella, 1994). The adhesion to the GATT materialized in 1963 and the regime had approached the EEC as regards the possibility of membership as early as 1962 (Viñas, 2007). This economic development, however, was monopolistic and characterized by great sectorial and regional disparities (Soto, 2005; Tortella, 1994). By 1973, 54 per cent of the gross domestic product was produced in 11 per cent of the territory of the state. Conversely, 53 per cent of the territory produced just 14 per cent of the total wealth (Soto, 2005:333).

Among those that still resonate are the general strike in Vizcaya in 1962, the state wide strike of November 1970 against the 'proceso de Burgos'—but also the 1.600 collective conflicts registered that year-, the strikes in 1972 with particular incidence among the incipient working class of Vigo and Ferrol; Sabadell and Vitoria in 1976, and many others.

The regime estimated these 'troublemakers' were no more than ten per cent (Ysàs, 2004).

There were state of exceptions in April 1967 in Vizcaya, August 1968 in Guipuzcoa, January till March 1969 in all Spain and again in 1970, and it was later maintained between the years 1974 and 1976.

Such as the process 1001 in 1973 against CCOO and the executions of the leader of the communist party Julián Grimau in 1963, of ETA militants in the Consejo de Guerra de Burgos in 1970, and in 1974 of young anarchist militant Salvador Puig Antich, and in the lapse of three weeks of five other people —members of ETA and the FRAP.

As these were seen to represent attitudes extended within the Basque and Catalan populations, which found outlet in cultural activities and were not necessarily transgressing Francoist legality (Ysàs, 2004:147).

At the time of the Burgos war council, Admiral Carrero Blanco addressed the Francoist Cortes to explain the governments' position before the crisis. Here he said that 'under the apparent political affiliation to Basque nationalism, [ETA] covers the reality of its true function as agents at the service of international communism' (quoted in Ysàs, 2004:140).

As Gramsci notes, economic crisis in themselves 'can simply create a terrain more favourable for the dissemination of certain modes of thought and certain ways of posing and resolving questions' (1971:184).

Before his death Franco designated Juan Carlos as successor within a monarchy system. After his death, the king chose reformist Adolfo Suarez as his prime minister after the wave of strikes in January and February 1976 promoted by rupturist options against the limited reform of continuist President Arias Navarro (Soto, 2005).

The PCE (marxista-leninista), PCE (internacional), Organización de Marxistas Leninistas Españoles (OMLE), Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), Organización Revolucionaria de Trabajadores (ORT), Movimiento Comunista Español (MCE), Liga Comunista Revolucionaria (LCR), and others.

Leiceaga and López Iglesias note that in 1971 the non agrarian active population in Galicia was higher than the agrarian population (2000:30) —and the process of urbanization will continue in the three last decades of the century. This contrasts with estimates that in the very early days of the twentieth century nine out of ten Galicians were peasants (or fishermen). The reality of agrarian life in Galicia was however a convulsed one: 'per each one hundred men working the land in 1900, there were eighty in 1930 but a hundred and twenty five in 1950' (ibid, 32). If the first world war encouraged a considerable development and abandoning of the countryside, the civil war meant a veritable return to the land. Nevertheless, what Eric Hobsbawm explained as one of the key processes of the twentieth century, the death of the peasantry, holds for Galicia, even though not in comparable numbers to those of Great Britain or Belgium (Hobsbawm, 1994).
Already in 1978 around 84.2 per cent of all the companies in Galiza employed less than 10 people and had a traditional character. (Fernández Leiceaga and López Iglesias, 2000).

Núñez Seixas notes that the first movements of the Francoist state in Galicia were the virulent repression of the nationalist and popular front sympathizers—key representatives of cultural and political nationalism were killed, the destruction of the strong associative and cooperative networks in the countryside and the subjection of the Galician language to a status of ‘dialect’ of Castilian and its ban from public use. Nevertheless, repression against Galician culture needed only be selective because the galeguista movement was considerably weaker and enjoyed less social support than their Catalan or Basque counterparts (Núñez Seixas, 1994:249).

The ‘coffee table’ refers to small reunions of people from or close to Galáxia, intellectuals and some ‘youngsters’ all sympathizers with nationalism who routinely gathered to talk invited by Piñeiro at his own house. These meetings allowed the older generation to meet with new people and exercise influence. However, not everyone was interested: “...because we had nothing from the previous generation. And Piñeiro, that everyone passed through his coffee table is radically false, some people did, but we did not pass” (Interview, member UPG remembering the early days of the party).

Most of the ‘monograph’ texts or articles written by the UPG to explain the phenomenon of colonialism either quoted and referred to Beiras’s work, were prologued by Beiras, or were written in direct collaboration with the PSG—for instance the ‘Texto Conxunto’, 1973.

The social composition of the UPG between 1964-1974 is, Beramendi and Seixas estimated, of around 27% civil servants, 20% teachers, 15% workers and students respectively, 12% from the liberal professions, 5% artists and writers, 3% artisans and 1% peasants (Beramendi and Núñez Seixas, 1995:223).

Both T&T and GS are sources of the instruments and methods of collective action used by nationalists in the 1970s. See also Lanero Taboas ((2008) and Cabana Iglesias and Lanero Taboas (2008).

This is not a point about geography, narratives of the Spanish nation or Spanish nationalism, and negative representations of Galicians were present in Galicia as much as in the rest of Spain.

In this case the object connected metonymically is a not a word but an entire story. Thus, for instance, López-Suevos claimed in an academic paper that Spain was not an economic unity but a heterogeneous country where development for some means underdevelopment for others—i.e. Galicia— and referred to: ‘...all this has a name: internal colonialism. And it is quite old: five hundred years.’ (López-Suevos, 1975). Here the myth of loss, the historical origin, is only metonymically alluded to as Galician underdevelopment or colonialism ‘being old’, ‘five hundred years’.

Refers to the Castilian war of succession in 1475-1479 between Juana of Trastamara, daughter of King Enrique IV and Juana of Portugal and married to Alfonso V King of Portugal, and her aunt Isabel. Juana, who lost the war, was nicknamed ‘the Beltraneja’ as her opponents claimed she was the illegitimate child of Beltran de Cueva, Duke of Alburquerque.

Thus, the Galician national hymn, written by poet Eduardo Pondal at the end of the nineteenth century, directly hails the nation: ‘esperta do teu soño nazón de Breogán’—‘wake up form your sleep nation of Breogán’.

For Cabrera Varela this translates into ‘axis of radicality’ where the history of Galicia as victim of external violence corresponds to the most radical nationalism (Cabrera Varela, 1992).

In the UPG’s production of the story-line capitalism also transforms the Galician people by bringing about a new hero-class—ostensibly the proletariat—which could lead the liberation of the country. The leading class’s objective interests are represented by the vanguard organisation, the ‘patriotic
The communist party. Other productions, such as EBoG and the PSG, coincided in many themes but stressed the peasants as victim-hero whose 'natural economy' is destroyed by capitalism.

Some writers argue that the sites were divided in this issue: where the UPG relied on a crude notion of third world colonialism the PSG mostly qualified it as 'internal' (Beramendi, 2007). In my examination of the textual productions of the sites I have not found such a clear cut division. In fact, in spite of the qualifications to the colonialism theme -present in texts produced by all sites, which served as disclaimers- all story-lines mostly represented Galicia as a colony in it strongest sense—with Beiras invoking dependency theorists Emmanuel and Amin when arguing, under a pseudonym in GS, against the leader of the Galician communist party Santiago Alvarez that if Galicia was an internal colony (Álvarez's argument) then it had to be first simply a 'colony'.

Although this is not the place to delve deeply into these arguments, I would like to note that they have been heavily criticized by Marxist and liberal theorists alike. The definition of development as 'self-sustained industrial growth' and underdevelopment as the lack of it leads to circular reasoning and is contradictory with the proposition that the underdevelopment of the periphery is the condition of the development of the centre (for then either the centre's growth is not autonomous or 'self-sustained' or the centre is not developed). Moreover, dependency theory was accused of being deterministic, static, assuming imperialism as a monolithic structure and of simply mirroring – inversing- the terms of modernization theories they were criticising with their dichotomous and simplistic pairings centre/periphery, dominant/dependent. These and other arguments are discussed in depth by Larraín (Larrain, 1989).

As an example we could mention one of the canonical texts of this time, the UPG's first congress, which in its sixty one pages includes just one paragraph of sustained discussion of cultural issues – when discussing its political programme for the 'popular-democratic' stage- under paragraph 'D-Medidas de tipo cultural i educativo'.

For Young rather than anti-colonialism being a major form of nationalism, it usually employs some form of nationalism strategically at the service of national liberation (2001:179).

In this sense, Chantal Mouffe has recently distinguished between 'agonism' –the recognition of the legitimacy of the 'other', or the 'other' as adversary- as well as 'antagonism' –the ever present possibility of seeing the 'other' as an enemy (Mouffe, 2005).

In translating the term 'españolismo' (highly common in the UPG texts) as 'spanishism' I am following R. Máiz (Máiz, 2003:27).

This could possibly be due to the fact that the second congress, in 1979, does not attempt to lay out 'the story' of the nation—which had already been presented in the first congress- but instead deals mainly with the here and now, the party and movement’s strategy at a time convulsed with the speed of political transformations—the triumph of reform, the constitution of 1978, legalization of parties, elections, the debate on the formation of the autonomous communities- which were mounting pressure on the party’s narrative strategies—becoming, in fact, their conditions of impossibility.

In a reference to their being territorial divisions of Spanish-wide parties and to their supposed lack of autonomy from the central party.

'Las causas del atraso económico estaban en el centralismo y en sus consecuencias que, entre otras, significaban una colonización regional' (Bobillo cited in Patterson, 2006 :298). The key difference between them is that, unlike the PSG story-line, earlier stories of nationhood typically considered that economic backwardness would simply disappear with the end of centralism (ibid.).

With the probable exception of Stalin's famous 'Marxism and the National Question', whose guiding question is precisely defining 'what is a nation?'
For instance, in ‘Galicia is a colony’, a document that narrated the economic function of Galicia as that exporting raw materials for ‘the metropolis’, written also in 1973, there is no mention of the working class or proletariat, only peasants are taken into account. Moreover, class conflict is here the conflict between ‘those living in the city’ and ‘villagers’, reflecting a nationalist frame of reference.

When the Great Depression did not lead to the collapse of capitalism and to revolution on a world scale as expected, the Comintern policies of ‘class against class’ –the perception of social-democratic parties as the main obstacle to revolution- had to change

Curiously, that is also the view nowadays of some nationalists who at the time were among the ‘founders of discursivity’ of the discourse of colonialism: “no fundamental, a Unión do Pobo Galego na miña opinión é o único nacionalismo (que estivo presente), eu creo que o demais é todo mentira. Na medida en que a Unión do Pobo Galego actual é unha minoría dentro do Bloque, i ademais tampouco mantén algunhas das cousas e practicas que mantiña, o nacionalismo galego desapareceu non.., un nacionalismo galego con intensidade suficiente.[...].’ Nevertheless, this person continued: ‘No que si meudei foi na perspectiva social do problema é dicir, a Unión do Pobo Galego era un partido comunista heterodoxo, mui heterodoxo, i eso é o que a salvou, no sentido quero dicir, de que foi o suficientemente heterodoxa coma para non ir con todo o derrubo do sistema, como foron as vellas esquerdas incluído o Partido Comunista de España.’

Compound categorization is a rhetorical strategy which makes explicit the ‘duality’ of discursive reliance on social, spatial and economic categories which may be commonly elided (Wallwork and Dixon 2004:33).

It is important to take into account that the concept of ‘the people’ does not necessarily belong to the repertoire of Marxism –it stems from ‘democratic-bourgeois’ discourses even though it is appropriated at times, such as in Marxist Popular Front politics. In fact Lenin, in ‘Theses on the national and colonial questions’ and Roy’s ‘Supplementary Theses’ which distinguished between oppressor and oppressed nations —a significant modification of the doctrine of overriding importance of class antagonism— also state that the communist party should clearly differentiate between the interests of ‘the oppressed classes’ and ‘the people—as this in practice means the interests of the ruling classes’ (Young, 2001).

For instance, the ‘time is money’ metaphor frames our understanding of time as a valuable commodity (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980).

Although this time not so much as in previous migrations for Galician women also migrated in considerable numbers to Europe or to the cities in order to become mainly household labourers.

It is important to bear in mind that, as Rainer Luzt Bauer notes, state institutions as well as the church had commonly been seen as negative and as having a predatory role in relation to the community —i.e. bent on extracting taxes and goods from the villagers (Bauer, 1992).

Judicial processes and letters of complaint were the most common vehicles for open collective protest but it was also common to refuse to pay taxes and even the organization of mutinies (Cabana Iglesias, 2006). Covertly, for fear of francoist repression, there was recourse to other strategies such as participation in the black economy —the estraperlo- early support for the hidden ‘guerrilleiros’, boycotts, gossip and other symbolic resistances. These were collective rather than individual practices (ibid).

The problem of the agrarian tax started in 1971 when all proprietors of agrarian exploitations became considered ‘agrarian entrepreneurs’ and their taxes in many cases trebled. In a country characterized by numerous small, even micro land exploitations this measure hit the rural populations disproportionately. This tax was rejected, not least because the system used to allocate it by francoist agrarian trade unions —the ‘jornadas teóricas’- was seen as discretionary, inexact and blatantly corrupt (Cabana Iglesias and Lanero Taboas, 2008).
Para el conjunto de Galicia la continuidad de las élites políticas neocensitarias en el periodo democrático adquiere una significación muy acusada. Con manifiesto mantenimiento de las estructuras sociales de poder y sus practicas caciquiles y clientelares (Márquez Cruz, 1993).

The constitution of these new conservative parties was a top-down, elitist project—in Galicia as well as in the rest of Spain—based on personal capital—friendships and personal loyalties—accumulated by relevant figures within the franquist establishment (Lagares-Diez, 1999). ‘Notable’ or ‘cadre’ parties, initially they drew social support from business groups and financial institutions—as business and political elites overlapped—rather than seeking mass memberships.

Thus, Lagares Diez suggests that, even though regional coordination acquired progressively more relevance as the autonomic space and institutions appeared, this provincial, personalist and vertical initial organization of AP profoundly marked the future development of the party in the form of powerful ‘baronias’(Lagares, 1999).

In the first democratic local elections of 1979 the UCD was able to present candidates in 295 out of a total of 312 municipalities (93.5%), AP in 208 (66.6 %) whilst the PSOE could only find candidates for 172 (55.1%) and the BNPG in 164 (52.5 %) (Márquez Cruz, 1993).

For instance, in the case of As Encrobas both the priest, Don Ricardo, and Fernando-García Agudín, secretary general of the newly formed Partido Popular Galego, acted as brokers. The priest commanded an unrepresentative commission of ‘notables’ to represent the community and agreed with Fenosa, the company implicated, very low prices for the lands. Fernando García-Agudín, in turn, was outraged by the peasant proposal of a mixed property enterprise with the company and opined that ‘it was absurd’ (El Pais, 27/02/1977; Lanero Taboas, 2008).

T&T allocated a whole section to the national-popular tales, named ‘national-popular struggles’, which often occupied one third its space. This section was at least one page long—but often two or three—in a publication which had on average seven/eight pages of length.

Generic narratives are characterized by the truth, and claim that they represent something typical and recurring (Baynham and De finna, 2005).

The economic compensation varied from 50.000 and 80.000 pesetas/ferrado, depending on the qualities of the plots (Lanero Taboas, 2008:2).

As Lanero Taboas has noted, the Guardia Civil’s behaviour at the times of the occupations was confused and dubitative, trying to act as intermediary between peasants and company (Lanero Taboas, 2008).

For a detailed account of the social movement of As Encrobas and other rural struggles see Lanero Taboas (2008), Lanero Taboas and López Romo (2010) and Cabanas Iglesia and Lanero Taboas (2008).

These tales concentrated on the narration of a series of episodes conformed by negotiations, proposal and counterproposals by peasants and company, and stressed divisions and weakness on either side, although still presenting the company as being in the wrong (El Pais, 1976).

Although represented in brackets as a quote—i.e. literally marking what villagers said—the CCLL and related organizations worked so closely with the peasants during the conflict that it becomes difficult to delimit a clear cut set of identities and interests. For instance, for the demonstration in A Coruña related in the tale, permission was formally requested by a group of eight members of the village, but organized fully by the AN-PG. After the violent police response which dispersed it, the organizers called the press where some of the neighbours complained with a rhetoric which Lanero Taboas notes ‘coincided exactly with the content of the statement read by the trade unionist right before the violent dispersion of the demonstrators’ (2008:14).
The UPG’s frustrated attempt at armed struggle, the most radical reading of the colonialism story-lines, lasted less than a year and ended with the death of Moncho Reboiras, one of the key militants of the party by the police in August 1975.

Nationalists parties in Galicia obtained in the 1977 legislative elections 73,489 votes whilst 606,726 votes went to the UCD. Nationalism’s result was a poor 6% of the vote (Fernández Baz, 2003; Beramendi, 2007).

The Bloque had more or less achieved its objectives in the elections -T&T decided- and these were: ‘to delimit the national-popular line versus spanishism, to widen our base, to demonstrate our legitimacy: the Bloque’s were the bigger meetings...Besides, these are very conscious votes, the majority of which were obtained where the movement has more organic influence, which demonstrates that the votes for the Bloque are the result of the work and presence of a political line which is not electoralist’ (‘Vote: colonialism, ambiguous reformism or popular nationalism’, T&T, n46, July 1977).

The ‘Documento dos Coroneis’, presenting the viewpoint of the UPG-Ip in 1977, called the UPG pejoratively the ‘party of the peasants, students, intellectuals and neighbours’.

The social and historical voices populating language, all its words and forms [...] are organized into a structured stylistic system that expresses the differentiated socio-ideological position of the author amid the heteroglossia of his epoch’ (Bakhtin, 1981:300).

The UPG was defined by Barreiro Rivas as the ‘veritable tutor of the first steps of the BNG’ (2003:150) and by Baz as ‘the main character in the BNG during the years 1983 to 1991’ (2003:153).

That is of course not to say that they mark crucial moments of the history of Galicia, despite what nationalists themselves tried to tell us.

I am not alone in noting the relevance of these texts. For Beramendi –even though he does not refer to the foundational text itself- the constitution of the BNG is the ‘authentic turning point’ for nationalism (2007: 1112). As regards the relevance of the UPG’s III congress, Fernandez Baz has already noted: ‘this is a congress with all the traits to be seen as extraordinary (or at least critical as it influence is determinant for the organization’s evolution): for the first time in a UPG congress three alternative texts are presented expression of the ideological fractioning present in the organization; the vote was secret as opposed to the habitual way of raising hands; 50% of the central committee was renovated..’ (2003:114). The text itself notes its own relevance: ‘o movemento nacional-popular galego e especialmente o noso partido esta nun momento crucial, xa que compre unha reconsideración da nosa practica en termos globais, unha clarificación ideoloxico-política...’ (III Congress, UPG, 1982). However, none examine the textual strategies and practices put in place by the texts themselves, these are either ignored or taken at face value.

Issue number 84 is dated ‘15 July-15 August 1981’ and the next issue, number 85, came out in ‘May-June 1982’. In them almost not a word is written about the disagreements which led, between mid 1981 and early 1982, to the resignation of the then secretary general of the party Pedro Luaces, the disaffection of around 40% of the membership (Barreiro, 2003) and almost half of the central committee. One article in issue 85, ‘The need for a patriotic front in Galicia’ –the key point of disagreement-, gives us some clues and justifications and it cryptically mentions ‘the questioning by political forces of the need for a front in Galicia’ in what might be an allusion to Esquerda Galega. The crisis will be briefly alluded to in the text of the III congress.

It is actually difficult to asses this estimate as Barreiro Rivas does not comment on how he arrived at the figure of 40% (Barreiro Rivas, 2003:145). Although the crisis is always signalled as a ‘very grave’ one, most other analysts do not specify any such figures. In fact, often the loss of rank-and-file membership is not mentioned at all, but speculation on the seriousness of the crisis is done just on the basis of number of central committee members expelled.
That is, textual production towards the outside of the movement diminishes clearly—the T&T—while production orientated towards the inside—the ‘constituent’ congresses and assemblies which are hierarchically superior and establish the ‘law’ of nationalism—continues and, in fact, expands. This expansion is partly due to the creation of the front as new site—although other sites simultaneously ‘disappear’—but mainly to dilemmas created by the new conjuncture which demand re-narrativizations and life stories.

“A thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble, consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative reforms, scientific statements, philosophical, moral, philanthropical propositions—in short, the said as much as the unsaid” is a dispositif in Foucault’s latter writings. (Foucault 1977, quoted in Howarth, 2000:78). This idea is akin to the use I give here to ‘discourse’

Bastida Freixedo affirms that the discussion of article 2 was marred by a secret notification which contained ‘un texto escrito en el que se especificaba cual debia ser la redaction del articulo 2. El texto propuesto—impuesto—decia ‘La Constitucidn española se fundamenta en la unidad de España como patria comun e indivisible de todos los españoles y reconoce el derecho a la autonomia de las nacionalidades y regiones que integran la indisoluble unidad de la nación española’. The final version of article 2 only changes in its last sentence: ‘...nacionalidades y regiones que la integran y la solidaridad entre todas ellas’. Bastida’s point is that the discussion on the recognition of the multinationality of the state was hijacked by the reactionary military forces which had possibly written that note (2007:121-122).


Coincidentally, as we had seen, Galician nationalism also denied them the character of ‘nationalism’. This label was appropriated for peripheral, progressive and popular liberation movements, whilst state and Spanish nationalism could only be labelled ‘chauvinism’ in the discourse of colonialism.

Núñez Seixas quotes Gregorio Peces-Barba a socialist representative in the constitutional debates of 1978 saying: ‘We [the Socialists] take for granted that Spain, as a nation, does exist before the Constitution [...]. To us, the nation as a relevant fact is a matter or right which precedes the Constitution’ (Núñez Seixas, 2001: 737).

In postcolonial societies this kind of understanding based on historical opposition to an unjust, authoritarian regime founded the legitimacy and power to the new national governments from Nehru, Nasser, to more recently South Africa.

The statute of autonomy for Galicia was drafted by the ‘Commission of the sixteenth’ composed of members of all parties in Galicia—with or without parliamentary representation in the region— with the exception of popular nationalism—the BNPG-PSG— which decided not to participate in the process (Beramendi, 2007). In this they were simply continuing their policy of opposition to the political ‘reform’ which had already led them to campaign for a negative vote in the referendum of the constitution in 1978 and which will lead them to do the same in the statute referendum of December 1980.

Moreover, 19.77% of voters rejected the statute. Beramendi notes that, of 2,172,898 potential voters only 450,556 actually voted in the referendum (Beramendi, 2007:1107). His explanation for this high abstention rate was the passive stance adopted by the major conservative Spanish parties, AP and UCD, which did not encourage their voters to vote for the statute at all (ibid.).
The myth of loss, stories of exploitation, of enclave industries, of national-popular struggles and others that were flesh of the story-lines of colonialism were no longer present in the narrative production of nationalists sites since 1982.

In fact, it comes in fifth place, after ‘Galicia is a nation’, ‘democracy’, ‘anti-monopolism and popular interests’ and ‘self-organization’. These are going to be the core new moments emplotted in the story-line of the movement, with ‘sovereignty’ and ‘self-determination’—key content of the first point—becoming the new centres overdetermining the narratives and stories.

A ground in the sense of foundation, colonialism underpins the new story-line of sovereignty while, at the same time, being ‘silenced’, ‘obscured’ or peripheral. In a different sense Ernesto Laclau talks about ‘the name becoming the ground of the thing’ (2005: 101). Naming works retroactively, guaranteeing the identity of an object—even through a change of all its descriptive features. The name, the signifier itself, supports the identity of the object (Žižek, 1989:94-95; cited in Laclau). The name—in this case the nodal point—does not describe but performatively brings something into being. Then, the unity of the object—the equivalence—is the retroactive effect of naming. In this sense, the name ‘colonialism’, the myth, guaranteed the identity of the country and that of the movement. However, this very name had become a problem in the new context. Thus, the moment of re-thinking it, of re-naming and re-narrating was critical because losing one’s name could unravel the movement as a whole. However, as we see, the name does not need to be renounced or dropped on the spot but can still be cited while re-narrativized, occluded while its orders invoked. That is, it might be simultaneously kept and abandoned, relied upon and disavowed, in different ways.

There is an unsolvable disjuncture in the naming of the anti-community at this time, as we will see in the following section. While imperialism/USA are the clear names of the ‘anti-people’ at the world-system space/tales, the narrations of the state and nation will forcefully name the constitution of 1978 as the negation of the community. The Constitution does not fully stand for imperialism—even though it does to a certain extent—neither imperialism stands for the constitution—a movement which would make no sense at all instead, what both have in common is naming the antagonism as the ‘anti-people’. That is, it is the empty signifier and nodal point of the community—sovereignty and self-determination of the people—which maintains the structural position of the enemy—even not so clearly its content—in its spatial disjuncture: enemy is the anti-people in different forms. It will be seen how the constitution is not explained—as the Spanish state was in the story-line of colonialism—as ‘bearer’, crystallization of imperialism and colonialism—collapsing the world-space with the nation-space—but it is emplotted mostly through a new masternarrative of democracy and rights which maintains a neat separation between the national and the international.

These disjunctures, ambivalences, citations and displacements are what makes difficult for most scholars of nationalism in Galicia to ‘classify’ this period as continuity or break—in that either or fashion. Why Máiz sees this time—up till 1989— as a simple continuity with the previous epoch of ‘colonialism’ but Beramendi locates the construction of the BNG in 1982 as the epiphanic moment of nationalization, while Barreiro sees this change as comprising already the years 1975-1982 (Barreiro, 2003:141). Nothing new happened or was it an epiphanic moment of change? This dilemma of interpretation cannot be solved by the usual strategy of splitting the answer into different domains—key organizational change but ideological continuity—for any organizational or institutional aspect of a movement is a dimension of their discourse, not independent of it—i.e. highly exclusionary and othering narratives such as those of colonialism would have not allowed for the formation of the BNG. While these exclusionary narratives dominated nationalism only the AN-PG was thinkable and could take place. It was the new nodal point of sovereignty, in the new conjuncture in which the discourse of nationalism was ‘de-ambiguated’ towards the nation-plot which permitted, made it thinkable, to build the new alliance of the BNG.

Imperialism, then, ‘does not surrender to accept the political and social transformations of Cuba, Nicaragua…” and thus launches new offensives, ‘the imperialist policies suffer new defeats…” (same tale).
With the coterminous privileging of the political at the expense of the economic. Privileging which, as noted above, was already built in in some of the Marxist narratives of imperialism.

The strategy of representing dangers to the social and political community in terms of disease – either individualized pathologies such as alcoholism, madness or collective ones of racial or sexual degeneration; and the ideal state of society as a 'healthy' body politic – the myth of 'pacific' republics as free from disease – has been common since the eighteenth century when the state was becoming the organizational form of the political community in Europe (Campbell, 1992:93). The representation of danger as disease – or dirt – is a typical strategy for groups, Mary Douglas told us, to manage difference and order their environment (Douglas, 1966). However, this representation, Campbell says, suggest a concern not simply with a necessary order or stability for the existence of political communities, but a extreme degree of tightness and strictness in the 'desire for purity' (Campbell, 1992:93). Medical metaphors are powerful political regulative strategies based on a 'bipolarity of normal/pathological' with serious performative effects: they establish the norm to be followed casting the danger as aberration to be eliminated through radical 'cleaning/sanitizing' interventions, and had framed eugenicist policies, ethnic cleansings, coup d'états or force population removals, etc (Campbell, 1992:92-95).

Moreover, this construction of imperialism as irrational aggressiveness against the peoples predominates in the texts of the IV congress of the UPG, II BNG assembly and the Terra & Tempo issues published in 1984 and 1985. This is the time when a new coalition within the UPG commanded by new secretary general Mariano Abalo was radicalizing the discursive production of the parties and implementing a kind of discursive reversal – this group will eventually form the Partido Comunista de Liberacion Nacional (PCLN) splintering off from the UPG and later expelled from the BNG as well. Paradoxically, the more radical 'Communist' identity within the UPG and the dependencist narratives privileged at this time where the ones more devoid of economic understanding of imperialism.

Anwen Elias argument is that Galician nationalisms' stand as regards the EU evolved from a clear, totalising critique and rejection to a more nuanced and complex 'euroscepticism' where the symbolic image of Europe of the Peoples was positively valorized in contrast with the 'reality' of the EU. What matters here now, of this study, is the explanation of why and how the integration process was rejected during those first 15 years of the BNG from 1982 until 1998.

Those years however, Elias lumped together as if there were no change in the understanding of the EEC and in the function it carried out in nationalisms' discourse. Hence, she offers a medley of 'reasons' why nationalism rejected the EU. She simply takes the nationalists' own words at face value and de-contextualizes those words – as she mixes quotes from different political conjunctures taking place over a 15 year period ignoring their local and historical contexts. Because the data extracts on the EEC are not examined in the light of the rest of nationalist's narratives and politics at each conjuncture the meaning of terms such as 'imperialism' or 'sovereignty' – how Galician nationalists themselves constructed this concept as opposed to a dictionary definition – is lost, as well the functions this rejection played in nationalism at each time. Thus, she explains that rejection was based: 'first of all, in the claim the Spanish governing authorities had deceived the Spanish people about the true nature of Spain's accession to the European club' (Elias, 2009:83). Followed by an economic rejection because 'Spanish membership of the EEC would compound Galicia's socio-economic underdevelopment...and would increase the region's dependency on the centre' (ibid). Then, 'the BNG also denounced the political manner in which the negotiations for Spanish accession to the EEC had been constructed. The deal struck ...portrayed as an institutional betrayal [...] of the interests of the [...] country's underdeveloped regions' (ibid.). Finally, 'Galicia's inability to participate in these negotiations reaffirmed the necessity for national self-determination' (Elias, 2009: 84) and she quotes to illustrate this point: 'our lack of sovereignty leaves in foreign hands the right to speculate with our vital interests...' (ANT, 1980; quoted in Elias 2009).

Here a variety of moral – political deception - economic and political grievances are signalled as causing rejection. The problem with this kind of explanation – apart from those methodological ones mentioned already – is that it is so wide and general as to clarify very little. The main problem is that
Elias ignores the structure of blaming in the accounts she reads which is key to making sense of the nationalists’ narratives. (and which a narrative analysis is particularly suited to illuminate). It is not the same to view the EEC as a potential danger lurking on the background of an ‘evil’ Spanish unitary state than to represent the EEC as being itself the embodiment of the anti-community which blocks Galicia’s national desires, even though both plots imply a steadfast rejection of the EEC. In fact, this is the change that takes place in the nationalist’s understanding of integration between the periods 1980-1985 and 1985-1995. In the first period the nationalists’ ‘strategic’ demands –and causes for rejection- are keenly political: sovereignty and their understanding of the EEC as twin strategy –together with NATO- of imperialism –itself understood as a political force for aggression towards the peoples and nations. In the second this rejection is emplotted differently: the EEC is a main character in a narrative of ‘defence of our productive sectors’. Here the EEC becomes the centre, the enemy and the rejection is mainly economic. This narrative shift might help explaining why rejection of the EEC brought nationalism some electoral gains from 1989 and not before: not because the constancy of the nationalist claims as opposed to a ‘deaf’ and indifferent country which eventually realises they had been right all along –the Cassandra myth-, but because of the shift in nationalism’s narratives which led them to represent the grievances of the country from 1985/86 in a way which now truly resonated with the experiences of the Galician population. (that is, despite what nationalism said, it is not that they firmly held their ground and position while the rest of the country moved from support to opposition, but that nationalisms’ way of understanding the ‘damages’ of membership actually changed, the narratives shifted, their plots, blaming, characters all varied in such way as to make them deal with what was a real concern for increasingly wider sectors of the population).

In fact, Elias bases her interpretation of economic rejection during those first four years (1980-84) on the examining of 6 articles published by ANT over that period. However, ANT is a weekly nationalist newspaper which must have published around 200 issues and hundreds of articles over those 4 years. Does it not strike as odd that of all those printed pages only six articles on the EEC’s future consequences were published?

125 Francoist technocrats had started the approximation to the European communities already in 1962, and applied for full adhesion in 1978, seeing in full integration to Western capitalism the solution to Spain’s economic problems (Preston, 1986)

126 Between the years 1980-1986 ‘popular nationalism’ produced 14 tales dealing with Nato and 15 on the EEC in their congresses and magazines.

127 Although the term is commonly attributed to Bakhtin, Tannen notes that in fact it was devised by Bakhtin’s translators (Tannen, 2007:197). Nevertheless, I will here maintain the attribution to the writer.

128 Agency, Butler said already in Gender Trouble, ‘is to be located within the possibility of a variation of that repetition’ instead of in any transcendental subject (1990: 199)


130 The Marxist, independentist community which in the 1980s sustained ETA.

131 In the words of the then PNV’s president Xavier Arzalluz as late as 1988, ‘if we obey it [the Constitution] is purely for reasons of living together. Because not to do it would unleash repression by virtue of the Constitution itself’ (Arzalluz, 1988 quoted in De la Granja, 1995:124).

132 The final wording of the statute was the result of the initial text written by the Comisión dos 16 – which included all parties, represented or not, which wished to take part- from which popular
nationalism excluded itself and of the amendments incurred in its passage through the Spanish Congreso and Senado.

133 Again, the imagination gripped was that of the nationalist collective self, not that of the country. If the Parliamentary affair became the emblematic issue for popular nationalism it was widely ignored by the population at large. Nationalists, struggling initially with their identitary dilemma, had to admit already in 1984, the II assembly already lamented ‘the degree of social repercussion achieved by the mobilizations organized’; by mid 1980s it was clear that their refusal to swear, expelling / abandonment of the Galician parliament had not given them the results expected in terms of de-legitimization of the Spanish democracy. They had severely miscalculated. In 1985, when the policy was still widely seen as the ‘moral high ground’ option, discussions began on the need to abandon it. An internal document of the central committee of the UPG argued then that ‘when we have not yet got the Galician people –and even ample sectors of our own collaborators- to understand the political meaning of our absence from the institutions due to our refusal to swear the Constitution, deserting now the electoral game with the same arguments would be a leap in the emptiness and a [fuxida cara adiante], a position hardly acceptable for our social base” (UPG, Central Committee communication, 1985). However, it was already 1987 when the ‘report’ to the UPG’s fifth congress affirmed that “ben e verdade que o conflicto non acadou a dimension popular que mereci’a que nos permitirta rentabilizar en profundidade a discrimination de que fomos obxecto. Os meios de comunicación entupiron escrupulosamente a polemica. Non obstante, a longo prazo, o deterioro do poder evidenciouse para sectores minoritarios de opinión.” That is, nationalism had at last resolutely come to terms with the fact that the affair have had no popular dimension, being ‘evident’ only for a ‘minority of popular opinion’, as late as 1987.

134 Although I separate, for analytical purposes, the Parliamentary Affair antagonistic frontier-effects and re-narrativization of the country in a new discourse of sovereignty, from the discursive strategy of ‘unity’, these themes and theories were nevertheless simultaneously debated, discussed and knotted together. Indeed, the transposition of the narratives of nation necessarily meant a re-narrativization of the collective self and collective action to be pursued. Unlike most commentators of Galician nationalism I suggest that ideological world-view and organizational strategy cannot be disassociated.

135 With the creation of the MFPG, the electoral alliance BNPG-PSG in 1981 an the Bloque Nacionalista Galego (henceforth BNG) in September 1982.

136 This, of course, was not the first time these two story-lines of the country inhabited the same site. In 1977 the POG had split from the UPG precisely to become one of the key nationalist sites which did not support the colonialism story-line which hegemonized the UPG, its satellites and the PSG then. In fact, these two stories of the nation might be seen as the key divide in contemporary Galician nationalism.

137 Secondly, soon after participating in the foundation of the BNG, the PSG will split again in two: a section forming the Colectivo Socialista to remain in the BNG and another to join EG.

138 Indeed, the general elections in 1982 castigated nationalism further: achieving under 5% of the vote and no representation in the Spanish Congress —where the PSOE had gained an absolute majority after a landslide victory.

139 As Galicia Socialista –the PSG’s magazine- claimed ‘only the Bloque-PSG promised to defend the democratic liberties and the national sovereignty of Galicia’139 (‘Galicia nation, against the Constitution, GS, July 1982). Something which, strictly speaking, they did not do.

140 Anxel Vence from the Spanish newspaper El Pais reported: ‘La suspension de derechos aprobada por el pleno de la Cámara incluye, precisamente, el de percibir la asignación mensual de 60.000 pesetas a la que tienen derecho todos los parlamentarios electos. Los tres sancionados -Bautista Álvarez, Lois Diéguez y Claudio López Garrido- no podrán tampoco asistir con voz y voto a las sesiones del Parlamento, formar parte de comisiones o utilizar los servicios generales de la Cámara, lo que, en
Suffused throughout the declarations and writings as regards this event, this masculinist and pride politics are perfectly exemplified in the MPs open letter where they declared the failure of the ‘autonomists’ to achieve ‘the acquiescence and taming of the nationalist lion though the humiliating formula of a swearing’. This claim, which quotes and summons the authority of the myth of loss and earlier nationalist writings which spoke of ‘the taming and castration of Galicia’, positions nationalists in the place of the country—as we will see above—and as resisting emasculation (Letter of the BNPG-PSG MPs, T&T, November 1982).

And from this extract of the I congress it is also clear the UPG’s elitism and the passivization of the working class/people they effect. Unlike in Lenin’s writings, the working classes are not the primary agency and subjectivity at work in this text. The working classes would not seize power, free the country from national oppression and implement socialist measures. Instead, they are said to be ‘participants’ in this process, a process which is carried out—by whom, we should ask, as this main political subjectivity remains hidden in the extract—‘for’ them, ‘with their interests’ in mind. But crucially not by them.

Opposition to the particular contents hegemonizing the universal ‘democracy’ in dominant Spanish discourses of the transition. That is: ‘the unitary state, the monarchy, the consensus’, the capitalist market economy and membership of regional organizations such as the EEC and Nato.

Partha Chatterjee distinguished between the problematic and the thematic of nationalist thought. The problematic, he explains, is ‘the object of study’, it consists of ‘the concrete statements about possibilities’ which are justified by reference to a ‘thematic’, that is, an epistemological and ethical system which ‘provides a framework of elements and rules for establishing relations between elements’ (Chatterjee, 1986:38).

The Marxist plots, as we have seen, are mainly segregated and confined to the world-system stories, and even there ‘sovereignty’ is the master signifier which hegemonizes the tales and shifts their content towards a political—as opposed to economic—understanding of imperialism.

Bastida Freixedo explains how Spanish constituents in their speeches misrepresented and distorted the thought of Meinecke for their own political purposes. Whilst, Bastida argues, Meinecke’s vision of ‘cultural nations’ is that of a first stage towards statehood, for Spanish nationalists, statehood was the very limit of a cultural nation (Bastida Freixedo, 2007:127).

Although the results of the referendum showed an overwhelming support for the autonomy (73.35%) which nationalists strongly opposed, these interpreted the result positively due to the 20% explicit rejection and, mainly, the massive abstention rate (72%).

This result translated into three MPs for the Bloque Nacional-Popular Galego (BN-PG) and the Partido Socialista Galego (PSG), the nationalist sites representative of ‘popular nationalism’, and one for Esquerda Galega (EG).

This political conjuncture congealed a new societal closure in Spain—a new episteme (Foucault, 1976)—where, Balfour and Quiroga note, ‘the margins for departing from the basic principles of the new democracy were narrow’ (Balfour and Quiroga, 2007:47). This new hegemony had at its centre the constitution of 1978—the particularity which incarnated the democratic universal. The democratic suturing crystallizing then was based on a series of moments differently articulated on the story-lines of right and left wing Spanish parties: parliamentary monarchy, historical amnesia, the Spanish nation, (initial) political and social consensus, recognition of individual rights and liberties, a devolved territorial structure and membership to Nato and the EEC. Although peripheral nationalisms were still the ‘other’, not all of them were ‘enemies’: the main political frontier was the acceptance of the Constitution and the autonomic system.
As Beramendi puts it: these nationalist sites were confronted by a choice: ‘ou persistir no seu sostenlla e non enmendalla e autocondenarse a condición de movimento sociopolítico marxinal e probablemente extraparlamentario, ou ser el quen se integrase no sistema para o que tiña que facer os cambios adaptativos pertinentes’ (Beramendi, 2007:1112).

The PSG documented the following: AN-PG, UPG, Galicia Ceibe, Colectivo Asamblea de Nacionalistas (which soon withdrew), Colectivo Libertario Arco da Vella, Colectivo Avance Nacionalista, various groups of independents from Vigo, Lugo, Santiago, Coruña and O Condado (GS, July 1982).

The Spanishism label and its exclusionary logic endures, nevertheless, in the discourse of other sites—mainly independentism—up to our day.

As Ernesto Laclau remarks, ‘discourse involves the articulation of words and actions, so that the quilting function is never a merely verbal operation but is embedded in material practices which can acquire institutional fixity’ (2005:106). Bhabha, referring to the nation more particularly had put it concisely: ‘material and metaphorical practices are inseparable in the nation’ (Bhabha, 1990).

That representation was, as a remainder, that of nation gravely attacked by the Spanish Constitution and the autonomy, both of which denied its right to existence in the form of sovereignty, rights of self-determination and real democracy; whilst also being part of an international struggle between the forces of peace and an imperialist political force of aggression against sovereignty.

In comparison with the story-line and small stories of colonialism which were explicitly bent on constructing a narrative of the nation, the main stories interwove at this time were the ‘swearing plot’, the ‘world-system’ tales and stories of ‘sovereignty’. Of course, this does not happen by chance. On the one hand, the nation has already been told. On the other, although the myth of colonialism accrued is crumbling in a new political conjuncture which became its condition of impossibility, or precisely because of that, the nation stories go underground. There is an urgency to narrate the present situation. Because nationalism struggles to keep their identity or to change without unravelling bold statements and overt re-narrativizations were avoided.

For a definition of narrative orientation see Labov and Walezski, 1997 and Baynham, 2006.

The founding text of the BNG, the Riazor assembly, is a collage text, a double-voiced and differently accentuated piece which is made of the uneasy linkage of fundamentally two previous texts: the ‘Proposal for the definition of Galician nationalism’s unitary organization’ written by the PSG which was reproduced—at parts verbatim but also with additions and amendments—in the introduction and ideological principles; and the proposal made by the UPG/ANPG. The result is that, whereas the political and organizational principles talked consistently about the ‘Organization’, the last part on the ‘bodies and competencies’ talks of ‘the front’.

Comarca is a territorial administrative division comprising a number of municipalities.
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Appendix

1. Run Down of Key Events in Galicia & Spain 1973-1986
2. Galician originals of translated texts
3. Acronyms
5. Table of narrative shifts
6. Maps of shifting political frontiers
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Events</th>
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| 1973 | • UPG launches the student association *Estudiantes Revolucionarios Galegos* (ERGA).  
• UPG launches *Comisións Labregas* (CCLL). |
| 1974 | • March 2nd, execution of Catalan anarchist militant S. Puig Antich and Pole H. Chez.  
• April 25th, Portuguese carnation revolution.  
• July, launching of the Spanish *Junta Democrática* (PCE) with a programme of 'democratic break'. |
| 1975 | • April, UPG launches the Asamblea Nacional-Popular Galega (AN-PG).  
• May, UPG launches the Sindicato Obreiro Galego (SOG).  
• State of exception Basque Country and Spain.  
• June, *Plataforma de Convergencia Democrática* (PSOE), open to reform.  
• August, M. Reboiras dies, end of short-lived UPG-sponsored armed struggle.  
• 27th September, Francoist executions FRAP & ETA members  
• 20th November, Franco dies.  
• November, coronation Juan Carlos I & Arias Navarro government.  
• November, mass amnesty demonstrations Vigo, Barcelona, Madrid, Seville. |
| 1976 | • January, UPG, PSG, PC, MCG and PGSD form the *Consello de Forzas Políticas de Galicia* for rupture & self-government (CFPG) which writes the *Bases Constitucionais*.  
• January-March, mass strikes for amnesty and labour unrest.  
• February, ANPG Monforte demonstration against paper paste factory.  
• February, conflict paper paste factory in Ponteceso, Bergantín.  
• February, conflict expropriation of lands in As Encrobas.  
• March, *Platajunta* state level common platform PSOE & PCE, signals end of 'democratic break' and beginning of 'pacted break' strategy. |
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Events</th>
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| 1977 | **January**, Meilán Gil launches the *Partido Gallego Independente*.  
**Founding of UPG-liña proletaria*, from UPG split.  
March, resolution conflict As Encrerras.  
April, still illegal, UPG & ANPG launch the electoral coalition BNPG.  
April, conflict nuclear station in Xove.  
April, legalization of PCE.  
June 15th, first legislative elections, results of 2.4% and 2% of vote for PSG and BNPG electoral platform (UPG & ANPG) respectively.  
Pactos de la Moncloa & start of ‘desencanto’ years.  
August, UPG first congress.  
October, crisis electoral results. UPG split & founding of Partido Obreiro Galego (POG).  
December, *A Nosa Terra* weekly founded by UPG.  
4th December, 500,000 Galicians demonstrate in favour of statute of autonomy.  
4th December, CCLL and UPG’s alternative demonstration against agrarian tax, the 20,000 strong ‘tractorada’. |
| 1978 | **February**, ‘Documento dos 19’ internal split PSG. Many join the PSOE.  
March, the **UPG-liña proletaria** becomes *Partido Galeguista do Proletariado (PGP)*.  
April, constitution of the Xunta de Galicia (Galician government). President A. Rosón (ex-falangista).  
June, formation of centre-right *Partido Galeguista*.  
July, legalization of UPG. |
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| 1979 | - 31st October, Spanish Constitution ratified by Chamber of Deputies and Senate.  
- 6th December, referendum Spanish Constitution.  
- January, *Commission of the 16*, all parties but UPG & PSG, write draft statute of autonomy for Galicia.  
- January, Unidade Galega (UG) coalition by POG, PSG and PG.  
- March, legislative elections: 5.35% and 5.87% of vote for UG and BNPG respectively.  
- April, municipal elections.  
- April, the PGP launches Galicia ceibe.  
- November, UCD's alternative project of statute for Galicia approved in Spanish Cortes. Minimal devolution. |
| 1980 | - June, PSG calls on Galician nationalist parties to unite.  
- 11th July, Constitution of the Mesa de Forzas Politicas Galegas (MFPG) by UPG, AN-PG, PSG.  
- PSG breaks from Unidade Galega. Split in the party  
- December, Galician Statute of Autonomy ratified by Chamber of Deputies. |
- 23rd February, Colonel Tejero's attempted coup d'état.  
- 7th March, detention of B. Álvarez, P. Rodriguez and X. Bahamonde in protest against prohibition to celebrate ERGA's congress.  
- 18th March, Spanish senate ratifies the Galician statute.  
- May, POG becomes Esquerda Galega (EG)  
- 30th June, Electoral alliance BN-PG-PSG for autonomic elections.  
- 5th July-October, crisis UPG (and AN-PG, INTG, etc). Renounce of general secretary Pedro Luaces, 10 members of the central committee and considerable numbers of membership. Francisco Rodriguez provisional secretary general.  
- July, T&T issue 84: Beginning of 10 month period of silence.  
- 17th October, first elections to the Galician Parliament. BN-PG-PSG: 3 seats; EG: 1 seat. Conservative majority.  
- 19th December, first Galician Parliament constituted, X. Fernández Albor (AP) president. |
<table>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>Events</th>
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| 1982 | - 8\textsuperscript{th}-10\textsuperscript{th} January, III congress UPG. P. Luaces leaves UPG. F. Rodriguez confirmed Secretary General.  
- February, A Nosa Terra publishes Grupo de Lugo’s article calling for a nationalist mass democratic party.  
- 23\textsuperscript{rd} March, X.M. Beiras, Head of School of Economics, detained in non-authorized demonstration in Santiago.  
- May-June, T&T issue 85 published. End of 10 month period of silence.  
- 14\textsuperscript{th} and 15\textsuperscript{th} July, BN-PG-PSG elected MPs refuse to swear allegiance to the Spanish Constitution to take possession of their seats in the Galician parliament. Use of alternative swearing formula.  
- September, Riazor assembly constitutes the Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG). BNG political programme.  
- 28\textsuperscript{th} October, Spanish general elections, PSOE’s landslide victory.  
- 2\textsuperscript{nd} November, ‘failed’ opportunity of swearing. Use of alternative formula.  
- 23\textsuperscript{rd} November, privation of the BN-PG-PSG elected MP’s rights takes place with votes from UCD, AP, PSOE.  
- 25\textsuperscript{th} November, nationalists chained themselves to Fonseca’s palace.  
- 2\textsuperscript{nd} December, nationalist MPs present a criminal cause against the President of the Xunta de Galicia for ‘expelling’.  
- 19\textsuperscript{th} December, 2000 strong demonstration against ‘expelling’ of nationalist MPs. |
| 1983 | - PSG abandons BNG. Split ‘Colectivo Socialista’ remains inside.  
- Spanish dirty war against ETA: GAL. Kidnap and torture of Lasa and Zabala.  
- December, UPG’s IV congress. Mariano Abalo new secretary general.  
- Launch of Coalición Galega, centre right nationalist party. |
| 1984 | - PSG joins EG to form PSG-EG.  
- 22\textsuperscript{nd} December, BNG II assembly. |
- 24\textsuperscript{th} November, Autonomic elections: PSG-EG and Coalición Galega obtained 14 seats (24%). BNG obtained one seat.  
- November, UPG’s central committee paper on need to swear constitution.  
- December, BNG’s extraordinary assembly to allow swearing after elections.  
- X. M. Beiras swears the Spanish constitution. |
<table>
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| • Membership European Communities.  
• BNG campaign against Nato.  
• Nato referendum.  
• Spanish general elections. PSOE's victory.  
• UPG's V congress  
• 25\textsuperscript{th} July, Colectivo Comunista 22 de marzo, later PCLN appears. Split from UPG, inside BNG |
Chapter 4. A new Attila in Galicia: the myth of loss

Extracts 4.1. On myth debunking

[A] “O noso Partido naceu [...] como produto do enfrentamento ideolóxico coa costra dominante do españolismo. [...] Nesta situación colonial nada ten de estranho que o combate tivera que iniciarse precisamente pola demostración de que a nosa realidade tiña unhas coordenadas diferentes as do resto do Estado e, polo tanto, unha dinámica política diferente.” (UPG, 1977, I congress)

[B] “As cousas son mesmamente ao revés, malia todo o que se diga. Unha frustración social prematura, esodo plurisecular, raquitismo burgués, insolidaridade institucional, colonización financeira: eis, se cadra, as chaves espricativas do actual atraso económico da Galiza. O ruralismo, o minifundio, os foros, a inhibición empresarial, o caos gandeiro, a inorancia, o individualismo, o estado das comunicacións, e tantos outros fenómenos tan sinificativos de primeiras, non son mais, cando son algo, que sintomas do atraso, e non causas.” (Beiras, EBG, 1972)

Extract 4.2. On the myth of loss

“Galicia como nación colonizada

O proceso de dominación de Galicia por España iniciase moi cedo e consumase en gran parte cando os Reises Católicos comenza a construción do que sera o Estado moderno español, imperialista, e, polo mesmo,
fortemente autoritario. Aliados cunha parte da nobleza feudal galega, que tina que enfrentarse co movemento social superador do feudalismo no noso pais (formado por labregos que reivindicaban a propiedade das terras que traballaban, e que eran posesión dos señoríos, pola embrionaria burguesía comercial vilega potenciada a consecuencia da ruta do Camiño de Santiago, e pola fidalguía rural), consuman a "Doma e castración do Reino de Galicia".

Unha vez derrotado militarmente 0 movemento popular, os Irmandiños, os reises castelans decapitan politicamente a Galicia forzando a que a nobleza galega "delegate" niles 0 poder. Esta xoga derradeiramente a carta de apoio a Beltranexa frente a Isabel "la Catolica", tarefa na que se alia aos nobles portugueses e da que saiu perdedora. Dende enton, queda coutada a posibilidade de evolución normal interna dun modo de produción feudal ao capitalista, xa que se impide 0 ascenso normal da burguesía e un proceso político autoxenerado internamente na propia sociedade galega que queda dominada politicamente por Castela. Comienza así unha longa esplotación colonial do nose pobo. Labregos e mariñeiros teñen que aturar as cargas feudais, as cargas reais, padecer as fames, combater aos corsarios, servir ao Rei en Flandes, Italia ou Portugal, manter aos exércitos que pasan, sofrir as "Justicias", ir facer a seitura a Castela, repoblar as Alpujarras, colonizar America e hasta morrer de peste. A dominación colonial modifica as súas formas coa implantación do modo de produción capitalista no Estado Español a partires do derradeiro tercio do século XIX, e agudizase especialmente nos últimos 20 anos coa aceleración do proceso de acumulación capitalista e 0 ascenso do capital monopolista do Estado." .”

(UPG, ‘The UPG and the interpretive lines of Galician reality’ in First Congress, 1977)

Extracts 4.3. On blame
Chapter 5. The new Attila (II): the modern colonization of the nation

Extracts. 5.1. Colonialism as quilting point.

[A] “Comenza así unha longa esplotación colonial do noso pobo. [...] A dominación colonial modifica as suas formas coa implantación do modo de producción capitalista no Estado Español a partir dos derradeiro tercio do século XIX, e agudizase especialmente nos últimos 20 anos coa aceleración do proceso de acumulación capitalista e o ascenso do capital monopolista do Estado.”

(UPG, ‘The UPG and the interpretive lines of Galician reality’ in First Congress, 1977)

[B] “Por iso é vital distinguir a opresión nacional do colonialismo: o colonialismo é unha forma de opresión nacional, pero a recíproca non é necesariamente certa [...] O asoballamento nacional superposto ao subdesenrolo economico é xa algo distinto: é o colonialismo. [...] O problema galego é un problema de asoballamento nacional, económico,
social e cultural á vez, e a súa resolución pasa pola descolonización do país" (Lopez-Suevos, Of Colonial Capitalism, pp 34-35, 1979)

[c] “O atraso económico, a emigración, a negación cultural, etc, son fenómenos que compro considerar globalmente, porque son a consecuencia lóxica do asoballamento nacional no que o imperialismo confinou ao pobo traballador de Galicia ao traveso da acción opresora do Estado Español.”

(‘A party, for what?’ Christmas 1977, PSG)

Extracts 5.2. On the political solution to colonialism.

[A] “As clases populares galegas necesitan soberanía política para acometer a reforma agraria e pesqueira, para facer unha industrialización racional do noso país, para investir na Galiza os aforros dos nosos emigrantes, para rematar dunha vez por todas coa emigración, pra convertir o galeo na única lingua oficial da Galiza, para construer unha Galiza sin monopolios. So un Estado galego democrático-popular será capaz de levar adiante estas medidas, imprescindíbeis para encetar a reconstrucción material e cultural do país, e mellorar substancialmente as condicións de vida do noso povo.

(‘What is the UPG?’, T&T, UPG, 1977)

[B] “Estes problemas somente serán resoltos cando o pobo galego poida decider por si mesmo o seu destino, cando a propiedade dos medios de producción sexa colectiva, cando os traballadores acaden o poder democráticamente constituído. Esto e, nunha Galicia ceibe e socialista.

(‘A party, for what?’ Christmas 1977, PSG)

Extracts 5.3. On antagonisms
[A] “Nos países como o noso ...a primeira tarefa [...] e a identificación do nemigo principal. Este nemigo principal e a oligarquía monopolista española, e o seu instrumento represivo fundamental ao servicio dos seus intreses de clase e O Estado Imperialista Español.”

(‘Justification of the formation of the Galician national-popular bloc’, I Congress, UPG, 1977)

[B] “O noso Partido naceu, [...], como produto do enfrentamento ideolóxico coa costura dominante do españolismo. Españolismo ideolóxico que contaminaba a todos os sectores sociais do pais, incluídos os mais politizados e preocupados pola súa realidade.”


Extract 5. 4. On ‘spanishism’

“O españolismo, tanto de dereitas como das denominadas ‘esquerdas’, é a expresión ideolóxica-política do imperialismo, manifestado tanto baixo formas coloniais como neocoloniais ou pseudos-liberadoras. Por máis que se proclame demócratas, socialistas ou mesmo comunistas, os españolistas son ouxetivamente contrarrevolucionarios, dende o intre en que non asumen a opresión colonial de Galicia con todas as súas consecuencias”

(‘The self-organization of the Galician popular classes in order to achieve the above mentioned objectives’, I congress, UPG, 1977)

Extract 5. 5. On the enemy

‘Agora ben, o estado español unitario constitúe en si mesmo a negación do feito nacional galego. A existencia do Estado Español unitario constitúe a antítese da existencia de Galicia. Galicia non poderá realizarse politicamente mentres esteara apreixada na estructura dun Estado Español unitario, sexa ou non sexa totalitario...”
('Position of the PSG in support of the Galician political alternative of the Consello before the unitary platforms of the Spanish state', GS, n.1, 1976)

Extract 5.6. On alliances and frontiers.

"A dinámica imprimida ao conxunto polas forzas situadas no núcleo do frente nacionalista, forzas de esquerda socialistas e comunistas, debe ser tal que lles coma o terreo progresivamente ás forzas situadas for a do circulo esterior, que atraia e non repela, que as leve unha tras outra ao rego dunha política nacional galega...deica esgotar o espectro das que poden entrar no proceso –de xeito que ao cabo queden for a somentes as que pola súa índole son inasimilables nesa estratexia. Unhas delas encarnara ao enemigo irreductible, de clase e nacional..."

('The problems of the Galician national front at this hour: a proposal for unity', GS, n1, 1976)

Extracts 5.7. On narrativization

[A] "A UPG sabe que a revolución proletaria en Galicia e a costrucción do socialismo e do comunismo, nesta etapa histórica do imperialismo mundial, ten coma ouxetivo previo a consecución da liberation nacional do noso país"

('The UPG’s alternative: the national-popular struggle as a necessary step in the construction of socialism’, I Congress, 1977, UPG)

[B] "A UPG ten moi claro que a primeira fase da revolución socialista en Galicia pasa pola revolución nacional-popular, xa que a opresión colonial a que esta sometida pola oligarquía española, clase dominante do Estado, sitúa a contradicción entre as clases populares galegas e o imperialismo. A revolución nacional-popular tradúcese no rachamento do Estado unitario, na destrucción do colonialismo, na recuperación da
soberanía política e económica que abra paso a construcción do socialismo na nosa Terra.

(‘Consolidation of the MNPG’, II Congress, 1979, UPG)

Extract 5.8. On negotiating nation and class.

“Como partido operario que e, a UPG loita polo socialismo, pola supresión da propiedade privada dos medios de producción, contra a exploración do home polo home no camino da sociedade comunista. Agora ben, o proletariado non e a unica clase esplotada senon que o capitalismo colonial padecen-o tamen todas as clases populares galegas, o que determina unha convergencia obxectiva de intereses na loita pola liberacion nacional e social do noso pobo. Por iso a revolución nacional-popular e un paso necesario no camino do socialismo na Galiza e precisa para ser realidade, da formación dunha frente interclasista integrada por todas aquelas clases que asumen a principal contradicción presente hoxe na Galiza: a que opon as camadas populares galegas a burguesía monopolisa do Estado español. [...] Por todo o anterior a UPG, na fase actual, preconiza a loita pola liberacion nacional e social da Galiza, como paso necesario para a construccon do socialismo...”

(‘What is the UPG?’ T&T, UPG, 1977)

Extracts 5.9. On identity.

[A] “Nistes casos a loita de liberación nacional e pola emancipación de clase coincide”
(Class antagonism, UPG, I congress, 1977)

[B] “Na situación histórica actual a loita de clase e a loita de liberación nacional son unha loita soa e indisoluble” (UPG, I congress, 1977)
Extracts 5.10. On class and nationhood.

[A] “O termo nacionalismo e empregado por nos no senso de MOVIMENTO DAS CLASES POPULARES DUN PAIS DOMINADO POLA SUA LIBERACION NACIONAL e xa que logo, SOCIAL. [...] o noso conceuto de nación, resposta a certos dados ouxectivos, de carácter empírico que son os que aparecen na definición de Stalin mais engadindo que neste intre da evolución do capitalismo a nación son as clases populares porque a nación adquire categoría revolucionaria contra o poder burgués, A NACION NON SON TODAS AS CLASES, SONNO SOIO AQUELAS QUE ASUMEN A LOITA DE LIBERACION NACIONAL que, nas circunstancias actuales, e unha loita de liberación social das clases oprimidas. Non e pois o noso conceto de nación un concepto ESENCIALISTA senón CLASISTA. [...] Nos, como nacionalistas, non refugamos da PRIMACIA DO CONCEUTO DE CLASE CONTRA CALQUERA OUTRA CATEGORIA HISTORICA...” (‘The nationalist movements’, T&T, n37, 1976)

[B] “…e evidente que a categoría de nación non esta, pra nos, ao marxen do contido de clase, ademais de que a nación non e unha categoría a-histórica que se poida definir esclusivamente por rasgos empíricos sensibeles (lingoa, cultura, xeografía). Polo contrario, pra nos as nacions teñen un sentido histórico e social preciso.”

(‘The class antagonism in this colonial situation’, I Congress, UPG, 1977)

[C] “Nestas argumentacions sempre se confunde Estado con Nacion. Porque si e certo que os estados modernos europeos foron creados pola burguesia, non e menos certo que moitas nacins foron abafadas polo espansionismo imperialista de outras.”
Extracts 5.11. On heterogeneity in the making of the nation

[A] “Esta esprotação sofrena tódalas clas populares. Empreso, a superación da debilidade do movimento obreiro galego, e, a súa conversión en fortaleza, pasa pola unión con tódalas clas populares galegas, na loita para derrubar a común esprotação.”

(CT, PSG & UPG, 1973).

[B] “Todo o pobo galego, como xa dixemos, sinifica a unión nun bloque compacto de obreiros, labregos, mariñeiro e aquiles pequeno-burgueses (pequeno comerciantes e industriais que apenas utilicen traballo asalariado, profesionais liberais, etc ... ) que tomen conciencia da súa identidade de intreses coas clases popu-lares e renuncien, xa que logo, a súa identificación mimética e suicida coa cultura burguesa e antinacional que a colonizaci6n española nos imp6n. Agora ben, en todo caso, 0 proletariado galego ten a obriga e a mision histórica de asumir a vangarda e a dirección da revolución nacional-popular galega, xa que e a classe mais dinamica da sociedade, intresada ouxetivamente na construción do socialismo.”

(‘The justification of the policy of forming the national-popular bloc’, I Congress, UPG, 1977)

Extracts. 5.12. On lack of contradictions

[A] “En liñas xerais, a contradición principal e a que opón aos labregos probes, medios ou acomo-dados ao capitalismo monopolista, aos elementos caciques e ao E.I.E.”

[B] "A inexistencia de contradíncias entre as clases populares galegas, niste intre histórico, ven, pois, determinada pola función colonial e o desenvolvemento dependente da nosa economía. E viábel un projecto político que in-tegre a loita popular cuns ouxetivos comúns."

('Class antagonism in this colonial situation', I congress, UPG, 1977).

Extracts 5.13. On the new unitary figure

[A] "A inmensa maioria do proletariado galego distribuíese por pequenas e me-dianas empresas i en grande parte mantense como propietario persoal no sector primario, no agro, dando lugar a xeneralizada e grafica denominación de "proletario-propietario" que corresponde humanmente ao labrego que fai horas estras...."

(I congress, UPG, 1977)

[B] "O papel da clase labrega non e secundario, senón preponderante: porque representan mais do 50% da poboación active da nosa Terra, porque a esplotación que sofre por parte do capital monopolista tiralle a plusvalía o mesmo que a clase obreira,[...]; porque moitos labregos son ao mesmo tempo obreiros industriais, porque tódalas familias labregas teñen emigrantes nas fabricas,[...]. Por todo isto [...] a identificación das relacións obreiro-labregas son evidentes e a súa loita moi intima."

('MAG', T&T, February, 1976)

[C] "Iste proletariado incipiente, en periodo de formacion, vai adquirindo cada vez mais importancia cuantitativa no noso agro en gracia da penetracion colonial-capitalista. [...] tratase de labregos en vias de proletarizacion, que siguen tendo como eixo de vida o agro, que tenen conciencia de comunidade agraria... (T&T, n35, 1976)

Extract 5.14. On hybridity
"...a simbiosis fai atipico ao proletariado, pro tamben ao campesinado, polo que aínda que compre matizar a vella consideración unilateral dos capesinos como propietarios."

('Peripheral capitalism, symbiosis and super-exploitation: the Galician case', López-Suevos, 1975)

Chapter 6. Space and 'self-organization': heterotopias and the 'national-popular'

Extracts 6.1. On the construction of the land as an economic space.

[A] ‘...En 1550 somentes o 10 por cento da terra estaba cultivada. A maioria da terra galega estaba en mans do senorio eclesiastico e nobiliario. O aumento da poboacion que ocorreu dempois dos anos de prosperidade de comensos do secuLo XVI, fixo que as terras, non foran suficientes pra soster os habitantes de Galicia, dado o desenrolo da teinica.’

(CT, PSG &UPG, 1973)

[B] “Empreso, cando os paisáns de Castrelo do Mino defenden as súas terras da espropiacion arbitraria en 1965 tódolos seitores populares apoian a súa loita”

(CT, PSG &UPG, 1973)

[C] “Pero a penetration capitalista no campo movese no ameto das relacións de esplotacion colonial que atura o noso pobo: estas empresas tiran a materia prima a baixo prezo, colócanla fora de Galicia pra ser transformada, usurpan as terras dos labregos -o seu meio de vida oxe por oxe- e danlle como alternativa a emigración”

('The alliance of the working and peasant classes', T&T, n35, Marzal 1976)
"As Encrobas. O pobo unido contra o capital.

"Pedimos o traslado de poboación pero en igualdade de condicións. Queremos a mesma calidade e cantidade de terra, igual clima, idioma, cultura e costumes. Válenos calquer lugar de Galicia, sempre que teña estas características"

Tal é a esixencia dos veciños das Encrobas frente a intromisión de Fenosa que pretende expropiarelles terras e casa co fin de explotar unhas minas de lignito pra alimentar unha central térmica que tamén pensa instalar allí.

Os veciños das Encrobas a pesares das maniobras divisionistas, están dispostos a todo en defensa dos seus intereses. Neste senso o día 29 de agosto organizouse na Cruña unha manifestación onde acudiron unhas 8000 persoas, entre elas, os veciños das Encrobas, labregos doutras zonas de Galicia, así como xentes do pobo en xeral, conscientes de que soio o pobo unido -e sen caciques o frente- conquere a victoria.

Os berros: 'A nosa terra e nosa e non de Fenosa', 'sindicato labrego galego', 'Reforma agraria galega', 'Galicia ceibe sin emigración', 'Comisións labregas en tódalas aldeas', 'Galicia ceibe, poder popular', xunto coa esixencia do traslado de poboación, todo baixo bandeiras nacionais coa estrela roxa de cinco puntas, afirmaron o contido nacional-popular das reivindicacións anti-monopolistas no noso país.

Este significado non foi entendido somente polos participantes, senón que a autoridade gubernativa asumiuno conscientemente e deu orde de cargar no mesmo momento en que se encetaba o Himno galego.

Días despois os veciños das Encrobas impedían a ocupación das súas terras, obrigando aos representantes da empresa Lignitos de Meirama, filial de Fenosa, a negociar directamente con eles.
Os labregos das Encrobas xa o teñen dito: ‘Estamos por unha solución pacífica, negociada do problema, pero si nos obrigan estamos dispostos a todo...’

Nas Encrobas como en Castrelo de Miño, Ponteceso, Quiroga, Xove...os labregos galegos din:

Non ao capital monopolista!!!
Reforma Agraria Galega !!!”

(UPG, T&T, n 40 Autumn, 1976)

Extract 6.3. The neighbourhoods: Teis.

“TEIS
Mentres se gastan millóns e millóns en facer obras como o ‘scalestri’, contrarias ao interés popular, pra facilitar a fuxida do noso diñeiro, dos nosos recursos e dos nosos paisanos pra emigración, e garantizar a dependencia colonial do noso pobo, negase por outra banda, a mais cativa inversión naqueles problemas que ano tras ano o pobo de Vigo e os veciños de Teis en particular vimos reivindicando decote, isto e: semáforos, aceras, pasos de cebra, limitador de velocidade, milloras do firme da estrada, barreirase e señales nos pasos a nivel, vivenda consoante coas nosas posibilidades, escolas, etc. Todo isto, que e o que o pobo pide e necesita e iñorado polo señor Picher e cía.

Os veciños de Teis estamos fartos de ollar cos brazos cruzados a morte dos nosos veciños -30 en menos de dous anos- sendo a derradeira a do matrimonio Bernardez Freaza e o seu fillo de 14 anos Nando, quedando o outro irman Miguel, de 7 anos, entre a vida e a morte. Os atropellos siguen e si onte foi esta familia no paso a nivel das Animas, hoxe foi o neno de tres anos Manoliño Saraman Martinez, na Avenida de Galicia. Abonda de asesiñatos legais. Abonda de aturar a política caciquil e imperialista de Picher e compañía.
Abonda de aturar os órgãos impostos polo Estado Imperialista Español. No seu beneficio e contra os intereses populares.

[c] O pobo esta disposto a loitar ate vencer. Como o demostramos nas mobilizacions de denuncia, repulsa e condea que vimos protagonizando nos derradeiros días.

Contra a Opresión Colonial
A loita continua!!!
O pobo vencera!!!”

('Cangas-Vigo-Teis', T&T, n 37, 1976)

Extract 6.4. On routes of struggle.

“SOLIDARIDADE CO CAPITAN FORTES
Os asesiñatos perpetrados polos policías de Fraga en Vitoria e o xuizo contra 9 militares acusados de pertencer a U.M.D. e de incitar a sedición, desencadenaron en toda Galicia un forte movimento de solidaridade.

PONTEVEDRA
O dia 8 de marzal i en resposta ao chamamento feito pola UPG e ANPG, xuntamente con outras forzas políticas, o pobo galego manifestou nas rúas a súa solidaridade co CAPITAN FORTES e os seus compañeiros, con motivo do xuicio.

Inda que a manifestación convocada pras 8h. do serán na plaza da Ferrería non callou nese lugar, as 8,30h. concentráronse na rua Benito Corbal unhas 400 persoas que portaban bandeiras nacionales galegas e pancartas. Cantouse o HIMNO GALEGO e déronse berros de “VIVA GALICIA CEIBE E SOCIALISTA”, “FORTES, AMIGO, O POBO ESTA CONTIGO”, “AMNISTIA XERAL”.

Dali a pouco a policía cargou e os manifestantes, en comandos, continuaron berrando as consiñas por toda a cidade.
Como non podía ser menos, a represión actuou duramente a resulta do que houbo varias personas feridas e outras con hematomas, sendo detido un manifestante pola Brigadilla da Guardia Civil que o retuvo hastra a 1 da mañán do día seguinte, pasando despois ao xuez onde prestou declaración.

SANTIAGO [...] LUGO [...] VIGO [...] AS PONTES [...] A CRUÑA [...]”

('Solidarity with the Basque People', T&T, n35, 1976)

Chapter 7. Narrating Sovereignty (I): the world-system tales and the citing and disavowing of colonialism

Extracts 7.1. On citing and invoking colonialism

[A] “A UPG considera que Galicia e unha colonia do Estado español. Esta función, marcadamente colonial desde a perspectiva economía, adquire un carácter específico respeito do colonialismo clásico debido ao contexto cultural, histórico e xeopolítico no que se desenvolveu a vida do noso país. Os condicionamentos democráticos-burgueses actuais virían reafirmar as características do devandito contexto.”

('The colonial function of Galicia in the Spanish State and aspects of our political line', UPG, III congress, 1982)

[B] “GALICIA E O COLONIALISMO: Partindo do feito de que Galicia esta sometida a unhas relacións de dependencia colonial, a actividade política encamiñase á tronzar esa dependencia.”

(Ideological and Political Principles, Alternative of BNG, 1982)

[C] “..O desenvolvimento socio-económico capaz de romper a dependencia colonial da economía galega e mudar cualitativamente as
condiciones de vida e de traballo para o benestar de todo o povo, devolver-lle o poder de decisión sobre os seus recursos e a sua actividade económica[...]O nacionalismo galego esta pola ruptura co actual rexime político por canto, representa a negación explícita e agresiva dos principios anteriores e atenta gravemente contra as libertades fundamentais para os cidadans e as Nacions que integran o Estado Español.

(Ideological and Political Principles, Alternative of BNG, 1982)

Extract 7.2. On displacement of colonialism

[A] “ANTI-IMPERIALISMO: Para a nosa política, dirixida a consecución de unha Galicia liberada, e clave o principio do anti-imperialismo militante, polo que a Organización se define pola solidaridade internacional e apoia todas as loitas dos pobos do Estado e do Mundo por conseguirán a sua liberación nacional. Xa que logo, somos contrarios a C.E.E. e a O.T.A.N. por seren Organizacions, a nivel económico, e político-militar que representan os intereses dos grandes monopolios e do imperialismo europeo-occidental e americano.”

(Ideological and Political Principles’, Alternative of BNG, 1982)

Extract 7.3. On the new story world: the world-system

“A actual situación internacional caracterizase por unha aguda crise económica e ideolóxica dos Estados capitalistas do campo imperialista, coa conseguinte xestación de plantexamentos e practicas militaristas e agresivas contra os países e ideoloxías progresistas, que defenden a soberanía nacional e a mellora da situación das clases populares. A ameaza a distensión internacional polos sectores mais reaccionarios do imperialismo fixose mais patente coa acentuación dos mecanismos da guerra fría e as posibilidades reais dun conflicto internacional
xeneralizado. Por iso, pode dicerase que o enemigo mais grande dos pobos e o imperialismo, capitaneado polos USA.

O obxectivo de independizarse do Imperialismo e o fortalecemento de procesos revolucionarios con este plantexamento está conseguindo conquistas reais, que enfeblecen o corsé do dominio imperial en América Latina, Asia e África (Iran, Nicaragua, R.D. Saharaui, Chad, Afganistán...). A resposta do imperialismo, especialmente USA, e a continúa agresión, baixo diversas formas, contra os pobos e réximes que defenden a dignidade e independencia nacionais e a solidaridade internacionalista (Libia, Cuba, Angola, Mozambique, Salvador, Nicaragua...). Asemade, prepara e participa en golpes de Estado militares repressivos e antidemocrática e pro-occidentalista (Guinea Ecuatorial, Turquía...).

[...]

(The international political situation’, UPG, III Congress, 1982)

Extracts 7.4. On sovereignty as nodal point.

[A] “A distension, a neutralidade o non alineamento, a loita pola PAZ MUNDIAL, esixen de nós esta conducta, como partido comunista que ten a súa razón inmediata de ser no desmantelamento do imperialismo, esencial para a consecución do noso obxectivo de soberania nacional para Galicia.”

(The international political situation’, UPG, III Congress, 1982)

[B] “Dicer que o BNG se define pola solidariedade internacional, e que fai seus os principios do anti-imperialismo militante, non é mais que pór de relevo a faciana fundamental dunha organización que proclama para a Galiza o dereito de autodeterminación.”

(BNG, II assembly, 1984)

[C] “E pois, esta política aventureira e enfurecida dos enemigos da paz...a que aumentou bruscamente o actual perigo bélico...a que tenta afogar a
aspiración dos pobos á paz, á liberdade, á xustiza, en definitiva, á soberanía.”

(‘Insurrection against the bellicose threat!!’, T&T, n89, 1983)

Extracts 7.5. On imperialism as irrational political force.

[A] “[...] Tres son os rasgos que caracterizan de xeito fundamental a política de Washington no mundo, imposta a os seus aliados: 1) a loita contra a paz; 2) a visión simplista e cavernaria dos conflitos internacionais e 3) a obsesión maniaca de impar a saa vontade a os outros Estados e povos[...] (‘Insurrection against the war threat!!’, T&T, n 89, 1983)

[B] “[Esta circunstancia] caracteriza a erosion e descomposition as que se ve sometido o sistema, privado de perspectiva, asentado cada vez máis nos piares da agresión, intimidación, xenofobia, racismo e discriminación profisional. No que os principios éticos sustituense polo anti-progresismo, acriticismo, anti-comunismo e odio patolóxico.”


Extracts 7.6. On dependency

[A] “Polos seus efeitos o inxusto intercambio desigual existente na actualidade entre eles e os países desenvolvidos vese ainda máis agravado, incrementase a sua xigantesca debeda exterior, minguanse as suas posibilidades economicas, e a sua xa debil estructura ve profundizada a sua orientacion destinada a satisfacer as necesidades dos monopolios dos países avanzados.”

(‘The unequal incidence of the economic crisis’, IV congress, UPG, 1983)
[B] "en América Latina..., onde as extremas condiciones de explotación e de dependencia provocaron a insurrección armada dos pobos da área contra os minoritarios grupos económicos dominantes e os seus valedores (os monopolios foráneos)."
(International, III congress, UPG, 1983)


"Particular importancia, no ámbito da coxuntura internacional, adquiren as denominadas "zonas de interés estratégico" ou "pontos quentes" do planeta. Convertidos en perigosos detonantes dun conflito nuclear mundial, pola acción do imperialismo e localizados en rexións ricas en recursos naturais, na encrucillada das principais vías de transporte que ligan economicamente países e continentes, ou en importantes puntos estratégicos, neles chegaron ao seu punto culminante as contradiccións entre a vontade dos pobos, orientada para a liberación nacional, e a aspiración do imperialismo que, en aras da defensa dos seus "intereses vitais", pretende exercer o control total sobre a soberanía destes e dos seus países."
('The zones of strategic interest', The international situation, IV congress, UPG, 1983)

Extracts7.8. On NATO.

[A] "A oposición á OTAN non pode ser separada ...da oposición a CEE que e o seu soporte económico e político"
('For peace and against NATO', PSG, GS, 4 xeira, Autumn 1981)

[B] "No entramado de tanta confusión arredor do fenómeno propagandístico do referendo convocado polo PSOE e apoiado polo esquerdiste español (PCE, EE), comprenos volver a examinar as relacions que aquela organizacion (Organización do Tratado do Atlántico
Norte) e esta (Comunidades Económicas Europeas) teñen, e como as dúas, cada unha no seu terreo, non son mais que expresións distintas, faces diferentes, dun mesmo sistema: O imperialista.

[...]A confluencia de intreses do capitalismo monopolista a nivel mundial, acadou tal degrau que nos asuntos de importancia vital para o sistema esvaense as diferencias ou enfrentamentos que poida haber entre a CEE e os EEUU: a defensa dos intreses imperialistas no Terceiro Mundo, os acordos para apuntalar un sistema monetario internacional en franca crise [...].Non cabe, polo tanto, separar, aíllar a Europa da OTAN, a CEE da OTAN, como non sexa para participaremos na propia manobra de confusión que comparte co españolismo de esquerdas co pseudonacionalismo actuante en Galiza”


Chapter 8. Narrating ‘sovereignty’: ventriloquism, equivocation and the discourse of democracy

Extracts 8.1. On antagonism & constitutional text as the anti-community.

[A] “O texto constitucional español non e unha sinxela formulación das liberdades formais abstractas senon un enunciado de intencions ameazadoras e proibitivas respeito dos anceios populares. Defender as liberdades democráticas nor pasa por defender un texto que permite a restrición caprichosa e interesada das mesmas.”


[B] “O nacionalismo galego está pola ruptura co actual Rexime político por canto representa a negación explícita e agresiva dos [nosos] principios anteriores e atenta gravemente contra as liberdades fundamentais para os cidadáns e as Nacións que integran o Estado español [...] A constitución española e a plasmación legal da negación da nossa soberanía popular, consagra un orden económico-social capitalista
e posibilita, ademais, o recorte do exercicio das libertades democráticas, feitos polas que non aceptamos. “
(The Political framework’, I Assembly, BNG, 1982)

[C] “Non cabe chamarnos a engano: a Constitución española e os Estatutos de Autonomía, dela derivados, son a fonte da que emana toda esta morea de lexislacion e actitudes represivas, xa que se trata de textos beligerantemente anti-nacionais, imperialistas e anti-populares, ainda enriba con graves ambigüedades ou cortapisas a respeito do exercicio das libertades democráticas mínimas. Velaí porque razón e tan importante para nos non lexitimar nen aceitar semellantes textos. Eles negan o noso dereito a existencia; eles condicionan a nosa vida cotidiana. Teñen que desaparecer para que os anceiros nacionais e populares vaian adiante.”
(BNG’s position before the autonomic elections’, II Assembly, BNG, 1984)

[D] “A actual Constitución Española nega a nosa existencia, o carácter plurinacional do Estado e o directo de autodeterminación das nacions. Nos temos que continuar unha batalla política que non se realiza nen se gana afondando na alternativa autonómica, senon superando e contradecindoa como verdadeira oposición.”
(‘Unity of nationalism against the Constitution’, T&T, n. 86, 1982)
Extract 8.2. Sovereignty & democracy as key principles.

“GALICIA E UNHA NACION, e polo tanto ten dereito a autodeterminación política que, de ser real, ha de concretarse nunha alternativa de Soberanía Nacional [...]. DEMOCRACIA: O principio democratico e fundamental como inerente ao exercicio do poder polo, en condicions de igualdade e libertade real non so formal.”
(‘Politico-ideological principles’, BNG, I Assembly, 1982).

Extracts 8.3. Myth debunking and reverse discourse: undemocratic democracy.
[A] "En nome da defensa da ‘democracia’ e mais da ‘liberdade’ elaboranse leis, como a da defensa da Constitución, a da Armonización das autonomías que, engadidas a lei anti-terrorista, fan palidecer todo rastro de pureza democrática do estado español’
(Marco político do dia da Patria, T&T, n 84, 1981)

[B] "Non cabe dubida, pois, que este e un Réxime falto de pureza democrática, enfebrecido por maneiras fascistas que chegan a promulgación de leis agresivas cos dereitos mínimos dos cidadáns (Lei Anti-terrorista, Lei en Defensa da Constitución, LOAPA, ...). [...] Unha mais de elas e a existencia de subordinación a un texto que, como a Constitución, representa:
a) Un carácter político determinado: anti-nacionalismo, monarquismo, economía de mercado, privatización dos servizos públicos...[
(The Spanish democracy and the siege of the nationalist opposition’, T&T, n 85, 1982)

Extracts 8.4. On ventriloquisation of democracy.

[A] “Son, pois, argalladas represivas anti-democráticas obsesionadas coa ‘unidade da patria’, cos principios da economía capitalista [...]. Argalladas que xustifican ...todos os atentados discrecionais, caprichosos, agosto do poder executivo; isto e policial, para perseguir e acabar cos discrepantes [...]. Os principios elementais dun réxime democrático formal fican en entredito, suspenso e bancarrota: a liberdade de expresión, manifestación, asociación, reunión e folga.”
(Marco político do dia da patria, T&T, n84, 1981)

[B] “En definitiva tratase de criar un sistema onde estea asegurada a xiligencia, o control, e se procede a represión para os cidadáns e os pobos. Non estamos nun estado onde a súa principal preocupación sexa
asegurar os dereitos e liberdade dos cidadáns senón que un dos seus obxectivos fundamentais e saber en cada momento o que fai cada individuo [...] En Nome de asegurar a seguridade cidadán están xustificando todas as súas actuacións represivas e agresivas para os dereitos dos cidadáns e dos pobos, non habendo pola contra a intención de garantirlle aos homes e as mulleres os dereitos...”

(‘On rights’, BNG, II Assembly, 1984)

[C] “A liña de defensa dun programa de soberanía nacional para as nacions integradas e totalmente anticonstitucional, ainda que forme parte dun dereito democrático fundamental, cal e o dereito de autodeterminación. A nosa posición, contraria ao contido da Constitución española esta en relación directa e proporcional coa defensa dun marco de liberdade publicas reais.”

(‘The defence of a program of national sovereignty’, III Congress, UPG, 1982)

Extracts 8.5. Ventriloquism II.

[A] “... a atitude do Goberno do PSOE a respeito dos dereitos e libertades dos cidadáns e dos pobos, que esta traendo a primeiro plano a loita por impedir que se restrinxan aínda mais. As características de actuación [...] acadando extremos escandalosos son: Desprecio total polos dereitos dos pobos e polo dereito que un estado tería que asegurarlle a sociedade. O dereito da autodeterminación pasou de ser un slogan táctico recollido nos programas nos primeiros anos do post-franquismo a ser prácticamente indefendible e perseguida a súa defensa practica. O dereito a posto de traballo como premisa fundamental para poder falar e calquera outro tipo de dereito e hoxe unha ilusión inalcanzable para un importante e crecente número de cidadáns. [...] Os dereitos a saúde, a educación, a uns servizos públicos
en condiciones, a unha vivenda digna, etc., están vetados para muitos sectores populares... “

(‘On rights’, BNG, II assembly, 1984)

[B] “En definitiva, o nacionalismo non e compatíbel cun réxime fraudulento desde a óptica da defensa das libertades democráticas fundamentais (liberdade de expresión, conciencia, opinión, manifestación, respeito pola soberania popular).”

(A new phase for a communist party, T&T, n90, 1984)

Extract 8. 6. On nationalism as democratic self.

“Compre esclarecer e reafirmar na nosa base social e ante o pobo en xeral que, nas actuais circunstancias políticas, e obxectivo prioritario do BNG a defensa politica consecuente do direito de autodeterminación. Non é que se trate de que o Réxime reconeza, na práctica, unha ‘alternativa’ concreta que o vehiculice en cada unha das nacións do Estado, senón que se vexe obrigado a admitir a existencia legal, sen represións nen persecucións, das forzas políticas que estamos na defensa deste direito. Desta maneira, a nosa loita e, sinxelamente, unha defensa dos principios democráticos mínimos, dos direitos dos pobos, violados insistentemente na práctica e mesmamente na lexislación "constitucional" do actual Réxime (Lei Anti-terrorista, Plan Zen, Lei de Réxime Local, Lei Eleitoral). Non cabe chamarnos a engano: a Constitución española e os Estatutos de Autonomía, dela derivados, son a fonte da que emana toda esta morea de lexislación e actitudes represivas, xa que se trata de textos belixerantemente antinacionais, imperialistas e anti-populares, ainda enriba con graves ambigüedades ou cortapisas a respeito do exercicio das libertades democráticas mínimas. Velaí por que razón e tan importante para nos non legitimar nen aceitar semellantes textos. Eles negan o noso direito a existencia; eles condicionan a
nosa vida cotidiana. Teñen que desaparecer para que os anceios nacionais e populares vaian adiante.”

(‘BNG’s position before the autonomic elections’, BNG, II Assembly, December 1984)

Extracts 8.7. On policy choices.

[A] “A expulsión dos parlamentarios nacionalistas será o eixo central da loita pola democracia en Galicia e no estado mentres a situación non se normalice. Podemos afirmar que do restabecimento dos dereitos que nos corresponden nas institucións por mandato popular depende, en grande medida, o resultado final da batalla pola democratización e soberanía de Galicia.”

(‘Protest actions against the expelling of the nationalist parliamentarians’, T&T, n88, 1983)

[B] "O nosos obxectivo consistiría en convencer ao pobo de que esta posición e esencial se queremos que a loita eleitoral sirva, cando menos, para conquistar unha mínima democratización da vida política das institucións, para obrigar ao Réxime a que teña que aceitar a nosa existencia política (loita polo dereito de autodeterminación).”

(‘BNG’s position before the autonomic elections’, BNG, II Assembly, December 1984)

Chapter 9: Narrating ‘self-organization’: the myth of unity and the BNG

Extract 9.1. On citing ‘colonialism’ and re-signifying the nation

“Galicia necesita unha plataforma de unidade nacionalista na que todos,..., superemos as diferencias que nos afastan e atopemos o camiño para a construción dunha Galicia soberana e o seu pleno desenvolvemento político social. A situación política da nosa Nación
reclama-o con urxencia. [...] En Galicia a penetración dos monopolios e a expoliación das nosas riquezas ten-se acentuado... A constitución española consagra esta situación. A persistencia dunha Administración Central férrea, a falla de competencias estatutarias e de institucións axeitadas, o xeito anti-democrático e mesmo ‘anticonstitucional’ con que se esta levando a posta en marchadas institucións autonómicas, a represión cultural e lingüística, a certa hecatombe económica que suporá para Galicia o ingreso do Estado Español no Mercado Común caracterizan unha dramática situación ante a que a capacidade de resistencia do País tense demostrado insuficiente.”

('Organize the resistance', GS, PSG, May 1982)

Extracts 9.2. Unity is a front, a party, an organization, plurality.

[A] “No cuestionamento que fan algunhas forzas políticas, da necesidade dun Frente Patriótico en Galicia, evidenciase non so a valoración que se ten do feito colonial, sinon tamen a posición con respeito ao proceso político do Estado, o marco constitucional e a autonomía. Para tentar xustificar a inxiabilidades dun proxecto frentista, escomenzase por dicer que Galicia esta situada en Europa e as sociedades europeas son moi complexas e teñen un grau de desenrolo que imposibilita un proxecto frentista propio dos países terceiromundistas, [...] a ninguén se lle oculta que Galicia esta en Europa..., pero a necesidade de un Frente Patriótico basease na ausencia de Soberanía Nacional e na situación económica de moitos sectores e clases sociais, que teñen un interés obxectivo en tronzar a colonización que padecemos.”

('The need for a patriotic front in Galicia’, T&T, UPG, 85, May-June 1982)

[B] “Non se trata de repetir experiencias históricas alleas tanto no tempo como de realidade política senón de atopar formulas de artelamento político dos diversos sectores e correntes que componen a esquerda nacionalista. Trata-se de constituir, no respeito da pluralidade ideolóxica
e orgánica un campo de militancia común para turrar xuntos do carro da nosa liberación nacional e social.”

(‘Mulling over the nationalist unity’, PSG, GS, July 1982)

[C] “Dada a situación do País... faise necesaria a criación dunha nova Organización Unitaria dos nacionalistas”

(‘Proposition for the definition of the unitary organization of nationalism’ PSG, GS, July 1982)

[D] “A formulación práctica desta unidade ten que plasmarse na existencia dun Frente Patriótico. Polos condicionantes sinalados no apartado primeiro que ten o noso país respeito das colonias clásicas, e pola experiencia recollida nos anos que levamos intentando potenciar unha política frentista, decídese que compre reformular a organización existente. Esta reformulación debe asentarse nos seguintes criterios:

a) Conseguir que o Frente abranga a amplitude maior posíbel.
b) Reconñecer formalmente a existencia organizativa e ideoloxico-política das diversas tendencias que o integran.
c) Apoio ao seu funcionamento democrático dentro do pleno respeto aos principios ideoloxico-políticos que o definen.
d) Defensa dun programa de soberanía nacional...”

(‘The policy of unity of nationalism’, UPG, III Congress, January 1982)

Extracts 9.3. Tension between the logics of unity and antagonism.

[A] “A consecución do obxectivo de soberanía nacional pasa pola formulación practica dunha política de unidade, o mais amplia posíbel. Esta política de unidade ten como eixos os seguintes: forzas políticas propias de Galicia como participantes; defensa da autoorganización nacional a todos os niveis; defensa do dereito de autodeterminación, concretado nunha alternativa de soberanía nacional. Estes eixos signifi-can non aceptar a Constitución española nen a alternativa
autonómica. A formulación practica desta unida-de ten que plasmar-se na existencia dun Frente Patriótico.“
(The policy of unity of nationalism’, UPG, III Congress, 1982)

[B] “...coincidimos en que a reformulación orgánica da unidade necesaria debe facerse a partir do respeto pola diversidade ideoloxico-política que constitúe o nacionalismo real. Partindo de este respeto, e posible unha unidade e a existencia dun campo definido e eficaz de militancia, non obstante, para ser ferramenta util e positiva para o noso pobo, ha de basearse en puntos mínimos, pero perfectamente definidos e irrenunciábeis, sen os casi estaríamos a constituir un fraude político.”
(Political alternative of the BNG’, BNG, First Assembly, September 1982)

Extract 9.4. On policing of nationalism.

“Non ten dereito a nomearse nacionalista quen aceita textos legais que non o recoñecen sequera simbolicamente. Non ten dereito a nomearse nacionalista quen avala na practica, con descaro ou ambiguedade farisaica, os canles represivos, antidemocráticos e anti-nacionalistas do actual réxime Español, que sustenta, xustifica e lexitima a súa política en base aos devanditos textos legais (Constitución e Estatuto de autonomía)”
(‘Unity of nationalism. Galicia nation against the Constitution’, n86, T&T, UPG, July-August 1982)
## Acronyms

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Galician Nationalism 1963-1983

Unión Pobo Galego (UPG) 1964

'Common Text'
PSG-UPG 1973

Partido Socialista Galego (PSG) 1963

CSG-PSG 1978

Asamblea Nacional-Popular Galega (AN-PG) 1977-1982

Mesa FPG 1980
UPG, AN-PG, PSG

Consello FPG
UPG, PSG, PSDG 1976-77
'Bases Constitucionais'

Unidade Galega (UG)
PSG, POG, PG 1979-1980

Partido Obreiro Galego (POG) 1977

PSG-EG 1983

Grupo de Lugo 1981

Esquerda Galega 1981

Bloque Nacionalista Galego
UPG, PSG → CS, 1983

PSG-EG 1983

Galiza-Ceibe-OLN 1979


Bloque Nacional-Popular Galego

(BN-PG) 1977-1982

Mesa FPG 1980
UPG, AN-PG, PSG

Consello FPG
UPG, PSG, PSDG 1976-77
'Bases Constitucionais'

Unidade Galega (UG)
PSG, POG, PG 1979-1980

Partido Obreiro Galego (POG) 1977

'Común Text'
PSG-UPG 1973
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Nodal Point / Plot: retroactively makes sense of &amp; links elements in a story.</th>
<th>Narration of the Nation</th>
<th>UPG political demands: <em>Plurality of links condensed</em></th>
<th>Representation/subjectivities</th>
<th>Enemy</th>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Colonialism <em>(The 'anti-fullness' of communitarian being. Not a demand but a protest)</em>&lt;br&gt;National and social liberation <em>(goal / floating signifier)</em></td>
<td>'The colony'- dystopia.&lt;br&gt;Myth of loss <em>(Diverse sites offer different productions)</em>&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;<em>Counter-story: POG, the European nation</em></td>
<td>Popular front – ‘Bases Constitucionais’/rupture with the Francoist system- end of emigration - rational industrialization - defence of agriculture-popular front</td>
<td>‘The People’ = ‘Workers, Peasants, Fishermen’ &amp; Petty Bourgeoisie</td>
<td>‘Spanish Imperialist State’/‘Oligarchy’/‘Spanishism’/‘Pseudo-nationalism’&lt;br&gt;‘centralist state’</td>
</tr>
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Map of nationalism's demands and political frontiers 1972-1981

Map of nationalism's demands and political frontiers 1982-1988