The Oxygen of Publicity and the Suffocation of Censorship:
British newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban
(1988-1994)

Max Pettigrew
School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies
Cardiff University

This thesis is submitted to Cardiff University in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

September 2011
Declaration

This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.

Signed

Date

Statement 1

This thesis is the result of my own independent work/investigation, except where otherwise stated. Other sources are acknowledged by explicit references.

Signed

Date

Statement 2

I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available for photocopying and for inter-library loan, and for the title and summary to be made available to outside organisations.

Signed

Date
Acknowledgments

First and foremost, I would like to thank my PhD supervisors, Dr Paul Mason and Professor Simon Cottle, for their continual support and feedback. I would also like to thank all the other brilliant members in the School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies at Cardiff University who helped me along the way, especially Dr David Machin for sharing his knowledge on analysing linguistics and discourse. There are two scholars outside of Cardiff University that I would also like to acknowledge and thank: Dr John E. Richardson for his kind and encouraging emails when I began to explore Critical Discourse Analysis and Mike Jempson for his useful recollections of the broadcasting ban and resistance to it. I would also like to thank my family, Maggie, Jon and Suzannah Pettigrew, my partner, Victoria Waters, and my great friends, Dr James Rosbrook-Thompson, Alastair Reid and Dr Lucy Bennett for all their encouragement.
Abstract

This thesis analyses British newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban during the periods the British government introduced and lifted it in 1988 and 1994. The orthodox position promoted by terrorism 'experts' in academia is critiqued for its propagandistic approach to the political violence of state and non-state combatants and its legacy of normalising media censorship. It is argued here that the position of orthodox scholars on the mass media and 'terrorism' is ultimately designed to encourage and legitimise pressure against the mass media during conflicts so as to increase state dominance of public perceptions. By suggesting the problem is the 'oxygen of publicity', it follows that the solution is the suffocation of censorship. The role of journalists in the propaganda war during the Northern Ireland conflict is scrutinised in this thesis to discover the extent to which media workers in the British print media supported and resisted British government direct censorship against the British broadcast media.

Combining content analysis and critical discourse analysis (CDA), journalistic constructions of the broadcasting ban in British newspaper articles are explored quantitatively and qualitatively. British newspaper articles representing the Northern Ireland conflict during the periods when the British government introduced and lifted the ban are analysed to reveal the newsworthiness of the broadcasting ban in both periods. The discursive composition of broadcasting ban newspaper articles is also analysed to reveal the discourses supporting and opposing the censorship that were circulating in the House of Commons as well as British newspapers and non-elite spheres of society when the British government introduced and lifted the broadcasting ban. A combination of textual analysis techniques are used to explain how these discourses functioned to build support and opposition to the ban, how journalists represented social actors expressing these discourses and how they were refracted by journalists through reported speech.

After analysing British newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban, discursive and social practices impacting British journalists during the periods the British government introduced and lifted the ban are considered. An important conclusion of this thesis is that British journalists largely perpetuated discourses supporting the broadcasting ban. However, this is explained by the allegiances of newspaper owners and editors with the Conservative Party, the generic conventions of newspapers and articles, the reliance of journalists on elite sources, the weakness of media workers after Wapping and the decades of pressure on media workers to report the Northern Ireland conflict in line with the British government perspective, rather than because journalists embraced British government censorship of the British broadcast media.
List of figures

Graph 4.1 – Subjects of Northern Ireland conflict newspaper articles 74
Graph 4.2 – Broadcasting ban newspaper articles in each newspaper 75
Graph 4.3 – Broadcasting ban mentions in each newspaper 75
Graph 4.4 – Broadcasting ban mentions in subject categories 76
Graph 4.5 – Images with broadcasting ban and total newspaper articles 77
Graph 4.6 – Genre of broadcasting ban and total newspaper articles 77
Graph 4.7 – Prominence of broadcasting ban and total newspaper articles 78
Graph 4.8 – Size of broadcasting ban and total newspaper articles 79
Table 4.1 – Discourses in broadcasting ban newspaper articles during 1988 81
Table 4.2 – Discourses in broadcasting ban newspaper articles during 1994 83
## Contents

**Introduction**  
1

**Chapter 1 – The mass media and ‘terrorism’**  
5

1.1 Defining terrorism – the orthodox position  
5

1.2 Defining terrorism – the critical position  
7

1.3 The Contagion Effect  
10

1.4 New media and ‘terrorism’  
11

1.5 Symbiosis – the propagandistic approach to terrorism  
12

1.6 Symbiosis – the literal approach to terrorism  
14

1.6.1 Degrees of dependence and exposure  
15

1.6.2 Not all publicity is good publicity  
17

1.6.3 Non-state terrorism sells  
18

1.7 The mass media and the suffocation of censorship  
19

1.8 The mass media and ‘counter-terrorism’  
21

1.9 The mass media and ‘terrorism’: summary  
23

**Chapter 2 – The British mass media and the Northern Ireland conflict**  
25

2.1 The silence before 1968  
25

2.2 The ‘reference upwards’ system after 1971  
29

2.2.1 Real Lives – At the Edge of the Union (1985)  
33

2.2.2 This Week – Death on the Rock (1988)  
35

2.3 The British mass media and British law  
36

2.4 The broadcasting ban (1988-1994)  
37

2.4.1 Contextualising the broadcasting ban  
37

2.4.2 The official line  
39

2.4.3 The impact of the broadcasting ban  
41

2.5 The peace process (1994-2007)  
43

2.6 The British mass media and the Northern Ireland conflict: summary  
47

**Chapter 3 – Methodological Approach**  
50

3.1 Research questions  
51

3.2 Sampling and data collection  
52

3.3 Northern Ireland conflict subject categories  
55

3.4 Combining research methods  
58

3.5 Content Analysis  
58

3.6 Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)  
59

3.6.1 The theory of CDA  
60

3.6.2 The practice of CDA in this research  
62

3.6.3 Analysing texts  
63

3.6.4 Analysing discursive and social practices  
65

3.6.5 The politics of CDA  
67

3.7 Methodological approach: summary  
71

**Chapter 4 – Content Analysis: Textual Analysis I**  
74

Content Analysis – textual analysis I: summary  
85
Introduction

The Northern Ireland conflict was conducted through a combination of war, words and silence (Rolston and Miller, 1996). Besides the obvious physical aspect of the conflict, mediatized discourses and censorship were inseparable aspects too. The thesis presented here examines a crucial period in which the Northern Ireland conflict shifted into the Northern Ireland peace process. It was also a period that saw direct censorship over the British broadcast media. The central focus of this research concerns the broadcasting ban (1988-1994) and how this direct censorship was represented by British newspapers. As the title of the legislation suggests, the broadcasting ban sought to control British broadcasters (particularly television). However, it is important to discover how the British print media represented the British government introducing (19th October, 1988) and lifting (16th September, 1994) the broadcasting ban. There are several reasons for this.

Although several studies have analysed the impact of the broadcasting ban on the British broadcast media (Henderson et al., 1990; Moloney, 1991; Lago, 1998), very little research has examined how it was represented by the British print media. Those subscribing to democratic principles would hope that if one section of the British media was being directly censored by the British government, the remaining sections of the British media would defend the ‘Fourth Estate’ and its independence from the government. By analysing British newspaper representations of the British government introducing and lifting the broadcasting ban, it is possible to discover the extent to which national newspapers supported and resisted the ban. This will also reveal the struggles within the British newspaper industry, which impacted what journalists and editors could and could not say about the broadcasting ban specifically and the Northern Ireland conflict more generally during this period.

The broadcasting ban was the most severe attack on the British mass media by the British government during the Northern Ireland conflict and amounted to the most stringent control of the broadcast media in Britain since World War II (Moloney, 1991). The United Nations made clear that the broadcasting ban amounted to official censorship, ‘causing self-censorship among journalists, which reduced knowledge and understanding of the conflict in Northern Ireland’ (Hussain, 2000: 7). Such practices contradicted the notion of Britain being an open and democratic society. Therefore, it is important to recount the history of the British mass media during the Northern
Ireland conflict by contextualising the British government starving the 'oxygen of publicity' from its enemies by introducing the suffocation of censorship. It is also important to explain the extent to which media workers resisted attempts by the British government to control the British mass media in this period.

The research questions of this thesis are threefold. Firstly, how much coverage of the broadcasting ban was there in British newspapers when the British government introduced and lifted the ban? Secondly, how was the broadcasting ban represented in British newspapers when the British government introduced and lifted the ban? Thirdly, how can newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban be explained by analysing facets of the production and consumption of the British mass media as well as power relations inside and outside the news room?

This thesis is presented in seven chapters. The first chapter reviews the already existing literature on the mass media and 'terrorism' to introduce and explore the debates in this research field. These range from the contentious issue of defining 'terrorism' to its relationship with the mass media and the repercussions this has on media freedom. This broad introduction to the literature on the subject of the mass media and 'terrorism' provides a good starting point for understanding the way in which the British mass media was impacted during the Northern Ireland conflict.

The second chapter looks at this more specific research field by reviewing the literature that traces the way in which the British mass media represented Northern Ireland following partition, through to the beginning and end of the conflict. This involves analysing the relationship between the British government and the British mass media and how the former consistently attempted to control the latter by various means. It was through exploring this history that the research questions were developed as it became clear how little research there had been on British newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban.

In the third chapter, the methodological approach of this research is outlined. The research questions of this thesis are rationalised on the basis of preceding reviews of literature, the method of sampling and data collection in this research is then explained, followed by an introduction of the Northern Ireland conflict subject categories used for coding relevant British newspaper articles. The rationale for combining content analysis and critical discourse analysis (CDA) in the methodological approach is then outlined and justified, explaining how content analysis and CDA are used to answer the three research questions of this thesis.
The fourth chapter presents the research findings of the content analysis of British newspapers representing the Northern Ireland conflict in the periods when the British government introduced and lifted the broadcasting ban. These reveal that broadcasting ban articles accounted for a small amount of British newspaper coverage of the Northern Ireland conflict. In addition, the findings reveal that there was considerably more newspaper coverage of the broadcasting ban in the 'quality' press and during the period in which the British government introduced the censorship compared to the period in which it was lifted. Such findings are briefly explained in this chapter, but are more vigorously addressed in subsequent chapters.

In the fifth chapter, CDA is used to deconstruct the most prevalent discourses present in broadcasting ban articles and explain how these discourses functioned to build support and opposition for the broadcasting ban. All the significant discourses are explored by deconstructing and contextualising them using a combination of textual analysis approaches that focus on lexical choices, as well as the foregrounding and backgrounding of social actors and discourses. Intertextual analysis is also used to explain the origins of the discourses and how they were refracted by journalists.

In the sixth chapter, CDA is used to explore a selection of individual newspaper articles representative of the 'popular', 'mid-market' and 'quality' newspaper genres. The textual analysis focuses on the most significant newspaper articles during the sample period in which the British government introduced the broadcasting ban and shifts from the general thematic analysis of the previous chapter to a meticulous sentence by sentence analysis. The way in which journalists represent social actors, their reported speech, and the discourses explored in the previous chapter is examined to explain how the choices made by journalists functioned to build support and opposition for the broadcasting ban.

The seventh chapter uses CDA to analyse and explain the discursive and social practices impacting British newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban. Beginning with the discursive practices involved in the production and consumption of newspaper journalism, this final chapter explores the processes in which the authors and audience of texts draw on already existing discourses that shape how texts are encoded and decoded. The analysis is then expanded in terms of social practices and the role of journalism in relation to wider society. This includes analysing and explaining government controls over the British mass media during the Northern Ireland conflict and the industrial disputes preceding the broadcasting ban.
There are three interrelated general conclusions about British newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban in this research. Firstly, the British newspaper industry did not consider the broadcasting ban particularly newsworthy. Secondly, elite social actors and discourses dominated newspaper articles representing the broadcasting ban. Thirdly, the majority of British newspapers overtly supported the broadcasting ban. Aside from these general conclusions, further conclusions are drawn from this research, which can assist in explaining such representations and the role of the mass media in society more generally.

For example, it is argued in this research that elite division and unity about the broadcasting ban impacted representations of the ban in British newspapers. When the British government introduced the ban, there was a broader range of discourses and more coverage of the ban because elite social actors were divided as to whether censorship in Britain was the best strategy for winning the war against the Republican Movement. In contrast, the British elite was united on the failure of this strategy by the time the British government lifted the broadcasting ban in 1994, which meant there was less coverage and a narrower range of discourses in newspaper articles.

Furthermore, it is argued that the broadcasting ban itself is indicative of two propagandistic propositions about the mass media, which originate from the British elite and their defenders in academia and the mass media itself. Firstly, that ‘terrorists’ thrive on the ‘oxygen of publicity’ and, secondly, that the broadcast media actually supply it. In the case of the Northern Ireland conflict, suggesting the ‘terrorists’ thrived on the ‘oxygen of publicity’ and the broadcast media supplied it, functioned to build support for the suffocation of censorship in Britain.

Although workers in both the broadcast and print media did attempt to resist the broadcasting ban, such bravery could not match the strength of the unity between the British government and the majority of British newspaper owners. Indeed, the struggle for meaning of the broadcasting ban newspaper articles representing this censorship was itself a refraction of the struggle between media workers and media owners. Another conclusion of this research then, is that whilst there is evidence of resistance by media workers within the newspaper articles representing the broadcasting ban, overall the power of the British elite to dominate the discourse was more apparent.
Understanding the conflicting perspectives on the relationship between the mass media and ‘terrorism’ is imperative for this research. It is important to recognise that the direct censorship of the broadcasting ban emerged after decades of indirect censorship of the British mass media by means of pressure from the British government. It is equally important to acknowledge that the main justifications for these actions during the Northern Ireland conflict were grounded in theories that suggested the mass media aids and abets ‘terrorism’. For this reason, it is important to critically analyse the theories that endorsed British government interference with the British mass media. By doing so, it will be possible to assess the credibility of such theories.

Before analysing the relationship between the mass media and ‘terrorism’, it is important to recognise the difficulty in defining ‘terrorism’. The concept itself is highly contested and is applied differently to similar acts of violence that induce terror and fear in civilian populations. Opinions on this contentious subject largely fall into two camps – ‘orthodox’ and ‘critical’. The definitions of ‘terrorism’ they subscribe to often influence the opinions expressed regarding the relationship between the mass media and ‘terrorism’. These conflicting positions are analysed here, followed by the views and research of orthodox and critical scholars about the ‘contagion effect’ theory, new media and ‘terrorism’, the symbiotic relationship between the mass media and ‘terrorism’, and the repercussions of such theories on media freedom.

Defining terrorism – the orthodox position

As the label implies, the ‘orthodox’ position represents the ‘conventional wisdom’ and ‘expert’ opinion about ‘terrorism’, which is largely shared by governments of ‘Western’ societies. Orthodox writers have often been involved in think-tanks that provide recommendations for government policy dealing with ‘disorder’ and ‘counter-insurgency’. Some orthodox writers were even British combatants themselves such as Major General Richard Clutterbuck (Royal Engineers) and Paul Wilkinson (Royal Air Force). In fact, both were made Commanders of the Order of the British Empire (CBE) by the British government (Clutterbuck, 1981; Rengger, 2011).
When it comes to defining terrorism, orthodox writers often appear neutral in their explanations. For example, Wilkinson (1974) argues there are different types of violent acts that induce terror in people, but it is the reasons behind them, which justify how they are labelled. Therefore he suggests those who intimidate through violence for personal gain can be considered ‘criminal terrorists’ and those that do the same for political ends are ‘political terrorists’. He also recognises in his typology of political terrorism that states (using ‘repressive terrorism’) and non-state organisations (using ‘revolutionary terrorism’ or ‘sub-revolutionary terrorism’) carry out ‘political terrorism’ (Wilkinson, 1974; Wilkinson 1977). His definitions are often compelling and impartial, but his applications are not.

Wilkinson (1990: 27) briefly defines ‘terrorism’ as ‘the systematic use of murder, injury, and destruction or threat of the same to create a climate of terror, to publicize a cause, and to coerce a wider target into submitting to its aims’. However, he does not apply such definitions equally to the actions of the British state and its opponents. Although Wilkinson (2006) concedes that the actions of the US and UK governments since the attacks on the US in 2001 are questionable and counter-productive, he does not consider Anglo-American bombings and shootings of civilians in the Middle East to be terrorism. The reason for this may be due to his emphasis on specific – media related – motivations when defining ‘terrorism’. By arguing that ‘terrorism’ is used ‘to publicise a cause’ (Wilkinson, 2006: 15) it implies that those lacking power to set agendas in society are the sole perpetrators of ‘terrorism’. This reserves the label of ‘terrorism’ for non-state organisations that lack the power to access the media in the way states do.

The emphasis on seeking media attention when defining ‘terrorism’ is also apparent in the work of other orthodox commentators. Alexander and Latter (1990: 2) argue ‘terrorism is essentially violence for effect’ and that ‘publicity via the media is central to the success of the strategy’. Crenshaw (1981: 386) suggests ‘the most basic reason for terrorism is to gain recognition or attention’ and Chalfont (1990: 18) maintains ‘terrorism would be impotent without publicity’. Morris and Hoe (1987) define ‘terrorism’ within the ‘propaganda by deed’ objective and Clutterbuck (1981: 141) contends ‘the primary aim of most political terrorist attacks is publicity’. Laqueur (1987: 143) argues ‘publicity is an essential factor in the terrorist strategy’ and that ‘terrorists’ need to be ‘innovative’ to ensure media attention, meaning they can be considered ‘the super-entertainers of our time’ (Laqueur, 1977: 23).
Nacos (1995; 2002) argues publicity for 'terrorists' is essential because without it, the acts of violence would not be communicated to a wider audience. She uses the phrase 'mass-mediated terrorism' to define 'terrorism' as violence for political ends against non-combatants intending to win publicity, which excludes the possibility of governments committing 'terrorism'. This is because it is in the interests of governments to keep quiet and suppress information that would lead to public knowledge of their violence for political ends against non-combatants. Whilst Nacos (1995; 2002) notes that there are different types of terrorism (domestic and international) and different perpetrators (states and autonomous/state-sponsored groups), the focus of her analyses reinforces the idea that 'terrorists' are those non-state organisations and individuals that kill civilians in or from 'Western' societies.

**Defining terrorism – the critical position**

The other school of thought, the 'critical' position, represents a radical critique of the orthodox position. When defining 'terrorism', critical scholars note the acts of political violence and outrages carried out by non-state organisations and individuals against civilians, but also highlight those of states, which invariably kill more civilians and are frequently carried out by 'Western' states (Miller, 1994; Carruthers, 2000; Abunimah, 2001; Collins, 2002; Zinn, 2002; Cottle, 2006a; Herman, 2006).

Critical writers also acknowledge that acts of terrorism by non-state organisations and individuals are often motivated by and connected to previous acts of terrorism committed by states. For example, Mathiesen (2002) argues the actions against the US on 11th September 2001 were terrible, but no more so than the actions committed by the US against other countries. As a result, 'there is a reservoir of possible terrorists among all those people in the world who have suffered as a result of U.S. foreign policy' (Zinn, 2002: 17). In essence then, critical writers acknowledge that 'violence begets violence' (Mandel, 2002: 83) and that it is almost always the case that ordinary people reap what their rulers sow. For example, the victims of the 7th July, 2005 attacks in London had little power over Britain's role in the illegal invasion and occupation of Iraq, yet they suffered the consequences nonetheless.

It is also worth noting that 'terrorists' target members of the 'security forces' and are not solely preoccupied with killing civilians. For example, the IRA carried out attacks against members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and the British
Army, as well as high-ranking members of the Conservative Party (Schmid and de Graaf, 1982). Critical writers recognise that not all violence by non-state organisations and individuals actually constitutes terrorism (Sproat, 1991; Hocking, 1992; Miller, 1994). Interestingly, Sproat (1991) argues it is theoretically impossible to label non-state combatants as ‘terrorist’ because it depends on each act of violence as to whether they constitute terrorism. Therefore, unless a non-state organisation or individual exclusively kills civilians for political purposes, they cannot be labelled as ‘terrorists’ in any real sense.

Returning to the example of the Northern Ireland conflict, it is therefore possible to argue that IRA members who attacked and killed civilians did commit acts of terrorism, but those who attacked and killed enemy combatants such as members of the RUC and British Army did not commit acts of terrorism. Therefore, the IRA as an organisation cannot be labelled a ‘terrorist’ organisation because IRA combatants mostly attacked and killed enemy combatants (Sutton, 1994). Likewise, the RUC and British Army cannot be labelled ‘terrorist’ organisations because, although their combatants did commit acts of terrorism when they attacked and killed civilians, they also attacked and killed enemy combatants such as the IRA, which is not terrorism.

Tuman (2003) distinguishes between the terrorism of states and non-state organisations by labelling the former ‘terror from above’ and the latter ‘terror from below’. But, unlike the orthodox writers he applies his definitions more vigorously, noting the use of terrorism by totalitarian and democratic states. He argues the outrages carried out by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, the Nazis in Germany, the Communist Party in the Soviet Union and China are no different from those carried out by the Americans in Vietnam or ‘any military conflict where innocent civilians are killed or injured’ (Tuman, 2003: 122) such as in Nicaragua, Iraq and Afghanistan.

The criterion for defining ‘terrorism’ is not on the use of killing civilians to gain publicity, but on the killing of civilians for political purposes itself. This means it is possible to view acts of violence against civilians for political ends by state and non-state entities as terrorism. To signify the difference in scale of state and non-state terrorism, Herman (2006) uses the terms ‘wholesale terrorism’ for the violence committed against civilians by states and ‘retail terrorism’ for the violence committed against civilians by non-state organisations and individuals:
Wholesale trade implies large scale business operations that deal with many smaller retail operators. The retailers have little capital and do business with a small set of local customers. State terrorists apply their violence over a wide terrain using the large resources of the state, and they can employ a broader and more cruel range of techniques of intimidation, including devastating weapons like napalm, phosphorus, depleted uranium munitions; cluster, thermobaric and 500-pound bombs; advanced delivery systems like helicopter gun-ships and cruise missiles; and torture. Retail terrorists operate more narrowly in space, with fewer personnel, limited resources, and working with relatively unsophisticated weaponry and delivery systems. (Herman, 2006: 45)

Critical writers also draw attention to the politics of labelling particular acts of violence as 'terrorism'. The pejorative label of 'terrorism' cannot be applied in a value-free manner as it carries 'an imputation of illegitimacy and outrage' (Hocking, 1992: 86). Hence, it is used by adversaries 'to demonize their enemies' (Lewis, 2005: 53). Constructing the IRA as a 'terrorist' organisation by representatives of the British government and the British mass media was central to the propaganda war during the Northern Ireland conflict. It functioned to de-politicise and de-legitimise the Republican Movement and convince the populations of England, Scotland and Wales that British involvement in the North of Ireland was a solution to 'terrorism' and not the cause of it (Curtis, 1984; Miller, 1994; Cottle, 1997).

Collins (2002), Chomsky (2003) and Herman (2006) argue convincingly that the label of 'terrorism' has been used by political and intellectual elites, particularly in the US, to describe and define acts of political violence against the US and its allies. Put simply, 'if somebody carries out terror against us or against our allies, it's terror, but if we carry out terror or our allies do, maybe much worse terror, against someone else, it's not terror, it's counter-terror or it's a just war' (Chomsky, 2003: 60).

It has long been understood that emperors do not like to be judged by the same standards they apply to others. Therefore, Chomsky (2002) identifies two ways to approach the study of terrorism. Either people can adopt a literal approach, where definitions of terrorism are applied consistently to similar acts of violence, or a propagandistic approach, where 'terrorism' is the sole responsibility of an officially designated enemy. He argues it is governments that generally adopt the latter approach and suggests the same is largely true of the mass media and academia in 'Western' societies. To begin exploring whether or not this is apparent, orthodox theories on the mass media and 'terrorism' will now be analysed. The literal approach to terrorism will then be employed to explain the flaws of such orthodox theories.
The Contagion Effect

When discussing the relationship between the mass media and ‘terrorism’, the ‘contagion effect’ is often mentioned. The contagion effect theory suggests media coverage of ‘terrorism’ is linked to increased incidences of it because ‘other individuals or groups join the violence’ (Paletz and Boiney, 1992: 7-8). Alexander and O’Day (1984: 146) suggest that ‘by providing extensive coverage of incidents the media give the impression that they sympathise with the terrorist cause, thereby creating a climate congenial to further violence’. He argues extensive media coverage of ‘terrorism’ leads to ‘the exportation of violent techniques which, in turn, often triggers similar extreme actions by other individuals and groups’ (Ibid.: 139). Similarly, Brosius and Weimann (1991) argue that there is some basis for suggesting that media coverage of ‘terrorism’, especially that provided by US television networks, significantly contributes to the reoccurrence of ‘international terrorism’.

Much has been written on this theory and to some extent there is still debate about it (Martin, 2006). However, few writers in the field seem to be convinced by the idea, including some in the orthodox camp. Jenkins (1983: 171) suggests ‘mass communication is responsible for terrorism to about the same extent that civil aviation is responsible for hijackings’. When discussing the notion that the media ‘cause’ non-state terrorism, Wilkinson (2006: 145) argues ‘it is well beyond the powers even of the modern mass media to create a terrorist movement or a terrorist state’. It has been suggested by writers in the critical camp that the ability of the mass media to act as a contagion and spread ‘terrorism’ is highly unlikely (Rodrigo, 1991).

Indeed, such a trend is certainly not confirmed by any significant evidence (Wardlaw, 1989; Biernatzki, 2002) and ‘support for the contagion hypothesis is anecdotal and speculative’ (Barnhurst, 1991: 117). Claims relating to the media causing ‘terrorism’, such as the ‘contagion effect’ theory, ‘are often invoked as part of a state propaganda war’ (Cottle, 2006b: 20). It is certainly one way for a government, police force or army to deflect charges that it is actually responsible for provoking non-state terrorism. Picard (1991) asserts no cause-effect relationship exists between the media and ‘terrorism’ and argues most of the contagion literature consists of ‘sweeping generalities, conjecture, supposition, anecdotal evidence based on dubious correlations, and endless repetition of equally weak arguments and non-scientific evidence offered by other writers on the subject of terrorism’ (Picard, 1991: 50).
It is unlikely that if the mass media did stop covering acts of non-state terrorism, the violence would suddenly stop. As critical writers point out, rather than the media causing 'terrorism', the reality is that the violence labelled as 'terrorism' is a form of resistance, which is often inspired by the violence and injustices carried out by totalitarian and democratic states. Picard (1991) suggests the mass media could actually reduce or prevent 'terrorism' if they allowed forums for oppressed, alienated and frustrated groups of people to voice their problems to the rest of the world.

Cottle (2006a: 165) revitalises this idea of the mass media 'giving vent to felt grievances and publicly examining the arguments and opposing interests and identities involved'. Whilst this is certainly a better option than waiting for violence to occur, states, their 'experts' and the mass media would be unwilling to allow such a forum (Picard, 1991). As will become clear in the next chapter, when British broadcasters allowed representatives of the Republican Movement to speak during the Northern Ireland conflict, they were criticised by representatives of the British government and by sections of the British newspaper industry for doing so.

New media and 'terrorism'

More recently, a new area of concern has emerged about the mass media and 'terrorism'. A few orthodox writers have started to focus on the threat that new media poses to the success of 'terrorism'. Wilkinson (2006: 148) argues the Al Qaeda network has exploited 'the enormous scope of the global Internet to disseminate their propaganda around the world'. Similarly, Klopfenstein (2006: 107-8) points out that 'for the first time in history, terrorists can take whatever message and images they decide straight to the online world, and that world is global in reach'. Weimann (2004) identifies eight ways in which perpetrators of non-state terrorism use the Internet: psychological warfare, publicity and propaganda, data mining, fund raising, recruitment and mobilization, networking, information sharing and planning and coordination. Conway (2006) reconstitutes these and those of other writers into five: information provision, financing, networking, recruitment and information gathering.

New media and technology have certainly allowed the world to communicate and find information more quickly and cheaply and this is just as true for non-state organisations and individuals that carry out acts of terrorism. The Internet with its anonymity has enabled non-state organisations and individuals operating covertly to
reach larger audiences and to circumvent traditional media forms (Klopfenstein, 2006). It has also been used to share knowledge of manufacturing bombs and detonation devices as well as to transmit and rapidly circulate footage of successful attacks and speeches from people like Osama bin Laden, which some news organisations have then broadcasted (Wolfsfeld, 2011).

Cottle (2006a) discusses the use of the Internet by non-state organisations and individuals in occupied Iraq as a means to fight the propaganda war with the American dominated coalition. He notes that whilst the US and its allies have the financial resources as well as frequent access to the mass media guaranteeing worldwide circulation of their propaganda, those in Iraq resisting the occupation do not, but have managed to produce some low budget, ‘DIY’ images. The preferred propaganda images of the US such as their initial bombing of Baghdad with explosions bursting across the night sky “like the fourth of July”, the stage-managed public relations coup of toppling Saddam’s statue when US troops entered Baghdad on 9th April, 2003, and Bush’s “Mission Accomplished” speech on 1st May, 2003 were obviously shown across the world and across various media forms (Rampton and Stauber, 2003).

However, the propaganda images of the other side were also shown, particularly the images of foreign hostages, which were ‘staged and choreographed to undermine US claims to victory, embolden opposition groups and sap the morale for continuing coalition occupation in Iraq’ (Cottle, 2006a: 157). Some of these images appeared on mainstream television news, such as Ken Bigley clothed in an orange boiler suit and caged like those other foreign hostages held indefinitely at Guantanamo Bay by the US (Nunn and Biressi, 2008).10 That said, the majority of images, including the actual beheadings of foreign hostages, were posted on the Internet. Again though, even if it was possible to stop ‘terrorists’ using the internet, as long as their political motivation for using violence remains, so will the violence.

Symbiosis – the propagandistic approach to terrorism

It has been argued by orthodox writers that a symbiotic relationship exists between the mass media and ‘terrorism’, whereby ‘terrorists’ use it to gain the ‘oxygen of publicity’ whilst supplying a story high in news value for the media. For example, Paul Wilkinson maintains:
As long as the mass media exist, terrorists will hunger for what former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher called ‘the oxygen of publicity’. And for as long as terrorists commit acts of violence the mass media will continue to scramble for coverage. (Wilkinson, 2006: 145)

Wilkinson (2006: 147) argues that although the media ‘clearly do not represent terrorist values’, they are coerced to cover attacks, not by the ‘terrorists’, but by the ‘fiercely competitive market for their audiences’ (Ibid.). The media are therefore certain ‘to respond to terrorist propaganda of the deed because it is dramatic bad news’ (Ibid.). Laqueur (2002: 44) expresses a similar view, stating that ‘terrorists need the media, and the media find in terrorism all the ingredients of an exciting story’. Miller (1982: 1) also suggests ‘terrorism and the media are intertwined in an almost inexorable, symbiotic relationship’ whereby ‘terrorism is capable of writing any drama – no matter how horrible – to compel the media’s attention’ (Ibid.).

As acknowledged by Wilkinson (2006) the idea that a symbiotic relationship exists between the mass media and ‘terrorism’ was popularised in Britain by Margaret Thatcher. In 1985, following the hijacking of Trans World Airlines Flight 847, she gave a speech at the American Bar Association in London arguing that ‘terrorists’ depend on the ‘oxygen of publicity’ and that they should be starved of it:

> For newspapers and television, acts of terrorism inevitably make good copy and compelling viewing. The hijacker and the terrorist thrive on publicity: without it, their activities and their influence are sharply curtailed. [W]e must try to find ways to starve the terrorist and the hijacker of the oxygen of publicity on which they depend. In our societies we do not believe in constraining the media, still less in censorship. But ought we not to ask the media to agree among themselves a voluntary code of conduct, a code under which they would not say or show anything which could assist the terrorists’ morale or their cause while the hijack lasted? (Thatcher, 1985)

The symbiotic relationship argument is persuasive in the sense that, to an extent, non-state organisations and individuals do need the media to further their objectives and the media do attract audiences by reporting shocking violence. However, it is not pervasive overall because the argument is based on several simplistic generalisations and flawed assumptions, which need examining. Turning to those scholars in the critical camp who have written about the relationship between the mass media and ‘terrorism’ will allow such an examination. This entails using the literal approach to terrorism that Chomsky (2002) recommends.
As critical writers point out, the assumption that all ‘terrorists’ crave publicity is misleading because it conveniently and, most probably, intentionally excludes the biggest (or wholesale) exporters of terrorism. Tuman (2003: 120) argues it is true that ‘terrorism and mass media share a symbiotic relationship’, but he also recognises this symbiosis is dependent on whether it is terrorism from above or from below. It is no surprise that the orthodox writers have focused their research on non-state terrorism and its relationship with the mass media rather than that of state terrorism. The consequence of this has been to produce narrow parameters in which the relationship between the mass media and terrorism is understood.

In a genuine, non-propagandistic discussion on this subject, the relationship between the terrorism of states as well as non-state organisations and individuals should be made apparent. Indeed, it should not be controversial to recognise that all social actors require the mass media to further political goals and often use similar publicity strategies, whether statements or interviews, briefings or press conferences, staged events or publications (Schmid and de Graaf, 1982; Cooke, 2003; McNair, 2003). The main difference is that, generally speaking – though not always – states wish to keep the atrocities they commit against civilians quiet, or at least away from mass media exposure (Carruthers, 2000; Knightley, 2003), whereas non-state organisations and individuals do not (Schmid and de Graaf, 1982; Gerrits, 1992).

This does not change the fact that non-state organisations and individuals as well as states need access to the media to communicate with their target audiences. As Lockyer (2003) suggests, both have just as much advantage to gain from using the media and therefore both attempt to do so. Compare, for example, Al Qaeda’s broadcasting network, Voice of Caliphate (Wilkinson, 2006) to the US government’s Al Hurra (‘the free one’) (Seib, 2008). Both were obviously created to inculcate the ‘righteousness’ of Al Qaeda and the Bush administration in Middle Eastern audiences. Wilkinson (1997; 2006) argues it is foolish to deny ‘terrorists’ thrive on the ‘oxygen of publicity’ and the symbiotic relationship that exists between the mass media and ‘terrorism’. This maybe so, but it is equally foolish to deny that states thrive on the same ‘oxygen of publicity’ and that between the mass media and the state – whether totalitarian or democratic – a symbiotic relationship also exists.
Quite simply, the state needs the media to amplify its message and the media needs the state because the public consume and rely on the media to inform them about the actions and policies of the state. The mass media often rely on centres of wealth and power for the 'information' that becomes 'news' (Herman and Chomsky, 2002). Therefore, government and business sources, which have the ability to produce a large volume of material on a regular basis, find their way into the media for the same reasons given by orthodox scholars: competition (maximising profit by minimising costs of acquiring 'news') and news values (elite actions have a high news value) (Harcup and O'Neill, 2001).

Therefore, it could be argued that there are already several flaws in the orthodox claim about a symbiotic relationship existing between the mass media and 'terrorism'. Firstly, the claim is based on the propagandist assumption that "terrorism is what somebody else does" (Herman, 2006). Secondly, it fails to recognise that states as well as non-state organisations and individuals have a symbiotic relationship with the mass media and require the 'oxygen of publicity' to further their objectives. The main difference is that when states bomb and shoot civilians they generally wish to cover it up through censorship or military euphemisms, whereas non-state organisations and individuals do not.

Degrees of dependence and exposure:

Another important point that should be made regarding the notion that there is a symbiotic relationship between the mass media and 'terrorism' is that non-state organisations and individuals depend on the media to varying degrees. Even if we pretend that 'Western' states are too civilised to carry out acts of terrorism and that only non-state organisations and individuals are capable of such barbarity, the assumption that all 'terrorists' crave publicity is still erroneous because it implies that all the smaller (or retail) exporters of terrorism are monolithic.

It has been suggested by some that non-state organisations and individuals actually have differing relationships with the media. Wieviorka (1993) argues their dependence on the mass media varies and characterises the relationship between 'terrorists' and the media into four categories: 1. Pure indifference (where the violence is intended neither to spread fear beyond the intended victims nor to realise a propaganda coup through their acts), 2. Relative indifference (where the non-state organisations and individuals commit violence, but not to capture headlines in the
mainstream media because means already exist to discuss and explain their positions),
3. Media-orientated strategy (where the violence is intended and designed to capture
mainstream media attention), 4. Total break (where the media are viewed as hostile
and therefore viewed as legitimate targets for physical attack).

This suggests the general rule that there is a symbiotic relationship between
the mass media and ‘terrorism’ is flawed because such a totalising claim overlooks the
possibility that different non-state organisations and individuals relate to, and depend
on, the mass media to varying degrees. Wilkinson (2006: 145-8) rejects Wieviorka’s
(1993) argument outright but it is clear that this is because Wilkinson defines
terrorism as intrinsically linked with the mass media. In this narrow definition of
terrorism, Wilkinson’s (2006) critique is accurate, but in an all-encompassing
definition of terrorism that includes “us” and “them”, states as well as non-state
organisations and individuals, it is not so helpful to say that there is a symbiotic
relationship between the mass media and ‘terrorism’. This is because the degrees of
dependence on the media differ not only between the perpetrators of state and non­
state terrorism but also between non-state organisations and individuals themselves.
In other words, the quantity of media coverage that ‘terrorists’ require is not the same,
making it difficult to predict and generalise about the ‘behaviour’ of non-state
organisations and individuals that attack and kill civilians.

Paletz and Boiney (1992) also assert that the extent to which non-state
organisations and individuals use and rely on the mass media is different and
dependent on many factors, including the media itself, which is not monolithic either.
They point out that the media is an all-encompassing term for many forms of
communication including television, radio, newspapers, the Internet and many others,
which can be owned by corporations, states or by the public. Therefore, the content
and format differs within and between countries. Furthermore, the degree of media
exposure depends on who is killing civilians for political purposes and whether
‘Western’ governments support the violence or not (Herman and Chomsky, 2002).

Biematzki (2002) suggests that while the media are undoubtedly an important
element and are factored into the strategy of those conducting non-state terrorism, the
media are neither the only element nor the only means to communicate the message of
non-state combatants to their target audiences. Biematzki (2002) also recognises that
media coverage can have a positive or negative effect on public perceptions. This
realisation highlights another factor that is not addressed in the contention that a
symbiotic relationship exists between the mass media and 'terrorism'. The simplicity of the theory overlooks the complexities of the media and of the different groups and individuals labelled as 'terrorists' by the orthodoxy and consequently begs several questions. For example, if all 'terrorists' crave publicity, what kind of publicity do they crave? Indeed, does any and all publicity satisfy all non-state organisations and individuals who engage in terrorism? These questions suggest that it is important to think about the quality of media coverage that 'terrorists' receive also.

Not all publicity is good publicity:

Several critical writers have pointed out that although the mass media do cover acts of non-state terrorism, the violence is rarely explained and always condemned. Despite anecdotal claims found in some of the orthodox literature, Paletz and Boiney (1991: 22) argue 'actual research evidence tends to support the argument that media coverage does not much help terrorists'. The 'all publicity is good publicity' ethos certainly (and unsurprisingly) does not apply when non-state organisations and individuals are killing civilians. Furthermore, while acts of non-state terrorism can hijack media attention, the perpetrators do not 'actually control the news agenda, or determine the way in which their activities are framed' (Carruthers, 2000: 191).

Cooke (2003) makes a similar point in his discussion on the relationship between the mass media and the Northern Ireland conflict. He argues that paramilitaries could generate publicity through violence, but the character of such publicity was not in their control and mass media coverage was routinely composed of condemnation from politicians, community leaders, the victims and paramilitary groups on the opposing side. Arguably, this enables the non-state organisations and individuals to spread fear, but not much else because media coverage typically focuses on the violence and 'fails to provide explanation, reason or political motive' (Cottle, 2006a: 145; original emphasis).

Schlesinger (1991) points out that the media are not open to anyone, especially non-state organisations and individuals who challenge the hegemony of states by using violence. Indeed, media representations of explosions, death and destruction are not the same as the media allowing those who created them to explain their motivations for them. Hall et al. (1978) suggest this is especially true because it is the authorities and other state representatives who often primarily define and dominate the discourse following violent attacks or disturbances.
Carruthers (2000) asserts that news reports in ‘Western’ societies not only frequently replicate, but sometimes exceed, the language of the state when stigmatizing ‘terrorist’ groups. Therefore, unless gaining publicity is the raison d’être, it could be argued that the mass media does not particularly benefit non-state organisations and individuals that carry out acts of terrorism. Indeed, she notes that ‘the gaining of publicity is rarely the ultimate end in its own right: publicity is useful only in so far as it furthers the rectification of deep-rooted political grievances’ (Carruthers, 2000: 190).

As media coverage concentrates almost exclusively on the violent dimension of non-state terrorism with little or no emphasis on the causes and context, it actually benefits the state being challenged far more. By creating the impression that the violence is not politically motivated and is merely ‘the senseless, inexplicable behaviour of lunatic extremists’ (Ibid.), the state is given an opportunity to ‘defend’ its ‘people’ by pursuing domestic and foreign policies that would be unacceptable to the population were they not living in fear.

This begs further questions about the symbiotic relationship that is alleged to exist between the mass media and ‘terrorism’ by orthodox writers. If mainstream media representations of non-state terrorism can actually benefit the state more than the perpetrators, does this apply to the priorities of news organisations also? It has already been suggested that not all publicity is good publicity for the perpetrators of non-state terrorism, but is all terrorism good terrorism for the media?

**Non-state terrorism sells:**

It is clear that non-state terrorism sells and can increase audiences and, therefore, profits for mass media corporations. Chermak and Gruenewald (2006) suggest researchers mostly agree that international and domestic terrorism carried out by non-state organisations and individuals is considered newsworthy because acts of non-state terrorism suit journalistic conventions regarding news values. Ben-Yehuda (2005) notes the abundance of coverage that the media around the world have dedicated to non-state terrorism in recent years and argues it has become the global topic par excellence. Undoubtedly, since the attacks on the US in 2001, media coverage of non-state terrorism has dramatically increased and reached “record levels” (Kern et al., 2003), despite actual occurrences of it decreasing (Lewis, 2004).
Debatin (2002: 163-4) suggests news values, or 'news selection criteria' as he calls them, can be understood as media attention rules which are based on 'sensationalism, violence, negativism, surprise, dynamics, identification, and spatial and cultural proximity'. As a result of these news values and selection practices, some occurrences in the world are magnified, whereas others are minimised and this arguably influences and shapes the issues of significance in societies (Chermak and Gruenewald, 2006). Indeed, 'often the most unusual and unrepresentative events can dominate media coverage for a long period of time [providing] an opportunity to reshape public thinking about an issue' (Chermak, 2003: 9).

The majority of people do not experience non-state terrorism directly because actual occurrences are rare, but rely on the media to provide them with 'experience' (Altheide, 1987). It has been argued above that more people in the world experience state terrorism directly than they do non-state terrorism, yet the mass media in 'Western' societies largely represent and define 'terrorism' in line with the propagandistic approach (Chomsky, 2002). Therefore, not all terrorism is good terrorism for the mass media. An obvious explanation for this is that the media of 'Western' societies have a symbiotic relationship with the state in which they are based and 'carry many of the culturally dominant assumptions' (Glasgow University Media Group, 1976: 1). But where do these arguments leave the orthodoxy?

The mass media and the suffocation of censorship

Orthodox writers stick to their position on the relationship between the mass media and 'terrorism', maintaining that 'terrorists' desperately seek the 'oxygen of publicity'. The orthodoxy generally regard television as the main supplier of the 'oxygen of publicity' to 'terrorists', perhaps because television is the most consumed means of communication (Alali and Eke, 1991) and the primary source of news in 'Western' societies (Schlesinger et al., 1983; Ruggiero and Glascock, 2002). Other reasons relate to television's immediacy and global reach (Martin, 2006).

Wilkinson (2006: 157) suggests that broadcasters in 'Western' societies should adopt principles of 'voluntary self-restraint to try to avoid the dangers of manipulation and exploitation by terrorist groups'. Although in the past, he has argued for state censorship of the media and stated 'it is not undemocratic in the least to ban murderers and apologists for terrorist crimes from the broadcasting services'
(Wilkinson, 1977: 169-70), he now recognises that it is undemocratic for the state to censor the media. This is a laudable volte-face because it is surely a huge contradiction to argue that it is wrong for non-state organisations and individuals to 'hijack' and 'manipulate' the media but right for states to do exactly the same.

Wilkinson (2006) still warns against what he calls the 'laissez faire' approach to media coverage of 'terrorism', which refers to the media taking no specific steps when reporting violence or the threat of violence no matter how serious it is. He argues that if the media adopt such an approach it is 'likely to encourage attacks which endanger life and limb and place property at risk' (Wilkinson, 2006: 155) and may even 'help to induce a situation of incipient or actual civil war with a concomitant threat to the stability and survival of the democracy in question' (Ibid.). Again though, this reasoning is based on spurious premises, whether it be that the 'Western' media are open to manipulation by 'terrorists' or that just by covering acts of 'terrorism' it glorifies and glamorizes the perpetrators. Although such arguments are far from convincing because of their simplicity, they still form a basis for legitimating some form of reproach against the mass media, which, in turn, can lead to measures that are undemocratic, yet beneficial to the state.

Indeed, some critical writers suggest that those who argue the media are in some way to blame for occurrences of 'terrorism' have an ulterior motive. For example, Picard (1991) highlights that it has been representatives of the state and orthodox academics that promote and defend such theories as the 'contagion effect' and the 'symbiotic relationship' between the mass media and 'terrorism'. Arguably, this is a strategy to justify efforts to alter media coverage by pressuring journalists and broadcasters to have 'restraint' or by normalising censorship laws. By using the media as scapegoats for, or accessories to, 'terrorism', governments and their 'experts' can divert attention away from actual motivations for political violence.

Paletz and Boiney (1992: 23) argue that the majority of the literature on the relationship between the mass media and 'terrorism' is dismaying, with some of it being 'blatantly propagandistic, consisting of shrill jeremiads, exhortations, tendentious examples, and undocumented assertions'. It is hard to disagree. The motivation for trying to prove such a relationship exists seems to be a way of persuading people to acknowledge and accept the 'threat' of the 'oxygen of publicity' in order to accept the more dangerous threat of the suffocation of censorship. Arguably, this does not protect the public, but it does protect the authorities.
The claim that there is a symbiotic relationship between the mass media and ‘terrorism’ functions in a similar way to the claims that there is a “liberal bias” in the media (see Alterman, 2003; McChesney, 2004; Kellner, 2005) or that “the media lost the Vietnam War” (see Hallin, 1986) because it functions to discredit the media and even justify state interference with it. If we accept that in ‘Western’ societies the media, particularly television, is vulnerable to the perpetrators of non-state terrorism, we are more likely to accept controls of it.

By focusing on the symbiotic relationship between the mass media (meaning broadcast media, particularly television) and ‘terrorism’ (not that of states, just that of non-state organisations and individuals) the orthodox writers serve their purpose by preparing the ground for state interference with the media. This is achieved by cutting the ‘oxygen of publicity’ through pressuring news organisations to ‘volunteer’ a formulation of guidelines that, effectively, censor themselves such as the ‘reference upwards’ system during the Northern Ireland conflict, or imposing some form of direct censorship such as the British broadcasting ban (1988-1994).

The mass media and ‘counter-terrorism’

It is clear in the literature of orthodox writers that they also agree mass media in ‘Western’ societies can and should be used as part of a ‘counter-terrorism’ strategy. Wilkinson (2006: 154) suggests the media ‘are a weapon that can be used as a major tool in the defeat of terrorism’. Clutterbuck (1975; 1981) argues that the television camera is like a weapon lying in the street, which either side can pick up and use. Chalfont (1990: 17-18) maintains that to fight ‘terrorism’ effectively ‘a sympathetic and supportive climate of public opinion’ must be established. He recommends the way to achieve this is to utilise the mass media.

Nacos (2002: 171-89) lists ten media-related recommendations to help what she calls the ‘terrorism response professionals’ and ‘crisis managers’ dealing with ‘anti-American terrorism’. These include the necessity of giving frequent communiqués to the media, remembering that most journalists and news organisations will assist the authorities in serious incidents, and encouraging guidelines for reporting acts of non-state terrorism. Wilkinson (2006: 152) argues the media can be ‘responsible’ by helping to shatter the myth that ‘terrorists’ are ‘champions of the oppressed and downtrodden’. He argues the way to do this is by revealing their
'savage cruelty [...] and the way in which they violate the rights of the innocent' (Ibid.). Hermon (1990: 39-40) contends that it is acceptable for the police to ask the media for support in combating 'terrorism' because 'both are part of the same democratic process and belief, and the basis for any discussion is the fact that they both should and indeed must have a commitment to its preservation'.

Of course, it is reasonable to argue that the mass media in a democratic society should not be used to encourage (or incite) non-state terrorism. However, the same principle should apply to state terrorism. Is it unreasonable to apply single standards and to argue that the mass media in a democratic society should also discourage and inhibit the government of such a society from sending its army to commit acts of terrorism? If the orthodox writers encouraged the 'Western' mass media to do both, their positions would be far more credible. Wilkinson could argue the media can be responsible by helping to shatter the myth that NATO combatants are champions of the oppressed and downtrodden. Indeed, if the 'Western' mass media revealed the savage cruelty of dropping bombs on Afghan villages, the occupation of Afghanistan might be over sooner and the lives of many civilians and combatants would be saved.

However, as critical writers suggest, orthodox writers are not concerned with the violence sanctioned by 'Western' governments. Instead, they focus on the violence conducted by the other side. 'We' can only be the victims of 'terrorism'; never the perpetrators (Chomsky, 2002). Whether or not the ideological narratives 'employed by the emperor and his loyal coterie' (Ibid.: vii) dominated British mass media representations of the Northern Ireland conflict generally and the broadcasting ban specifically will be revealed during this research.

To this end, it is important to ascertain whether the British mass media adopted a literal approach or a propagandistic approach to terrorism during the Northern Ireland conflict. If the literal approach was adopted, definitions of terrorism would have been applied consistently to similar acts of violence, whereas if the propagandistic approach was adopted, 'terrorism' would have been considered the sole responsibility of the Republican Movement. Furthermore, it is important to explore British broadcast media representations of Northern Ireland before, during and after the conflict. This will reveal the conflicts between the British government and the British broadcast media before the broadcasting ban was introduced as well as how the British broadcast media operated during and after the censorship was lifted as part of the peace process.
The mass media and 'terrorism': summary

The critical position and literal approach to the study of terrorism has been favoured here. It is clear that acts of non-state terrorism and state terrorism continue to cause suffering and death for civilians around the world, whether the means of destruction are triggered from a suicide bomber in a crowd or dropped from a stealth bomber in the sky. It is important to acknowledge that the way in which terrorism is defined determines how the relationship between the mass media and terrorism is understood. Orthodox writers define terrorism as violence to gain media attention (the 'oxygen of publicity'), whereas critical writers define terrorism as violence to gain political goals. The position people take on the relationship between the mass media and terrorism is guided by these initial assumptions.

The contagion effect theory seems to be a particularly archaic one. Even some of the orthodox writers admit such a theory is unhelpful (Jenkins, 1983; Wilkinson, 2006). The threat of new media being used to empower non-state organisations and individuals that conduct terrorism is real in the sense that new information and communication technologies (NICTs) are taken advantage of to strengthen the support for their cause. However, these technologies are also taken advantage of to strengthen the support for states conducting terrorism. As with most of the 'conventional wisdom' on the relationship between the mass media and terrorism, this supposed danger of new media empowering 'terrorists' is more of a smokescreen than anything else. The real way to contain non-state terrorism is to contain state terrorism.

The idea of a symbiotic relationship existing between the mass media and 'terrorism' is the most convincing, which explains the attention given to it in this chapter. As argued above, this theory is persuasive, but not pervasive (even if we pretend that the orthodox assumptions are correct). Whilst it is certainly true that some non-state organisations and individuals do receive and desire media exposure when they carry out acts of terrorism, the 'oxygen of publicity' is neither necessarily beneficial nor supplied. Non-state organisations and individuals will receive attention, but the character of this attention is not properly addressed by orthodox writers. In addition, not all non-state organisations and individuals depend on the media to the same extent. This is also overlooked by the orthodoxy. The media certainly increases audiences (and profits) by reporting 'terrorism', but this needs to be clarified to non-state terrorism as opposed to terrorism in general, which includes
acts of state terrorism. Acts of non-state terrorism do receive copious amounts of media coverage in ‘Western’ societies, but acts of state terrorism do not, unless it is a rival state of “ours” (Herman and Chomsky, 2002; Chomsky, 2002).

According to critical writers, media coverage of ‘terrorism’ can actually be far more beneficial to the state, which also has a symbiotic relationship with the mass media and is frequently given the ‘oxygen of publicity’. After a significant analysis and by using a non-propagandistic definition of terrorism a more accurate understanding of the symbiotic relationship between the mass media and ‘terrorism’ is established. This would suggest that such a relationship is less clear cut or even that, due to the aforementioned points, it is a myth that ‘terrorism depends for its success on media coverage’ (Hocking, 1992: 87-88). One obvious reason why this is the case is that state terrorism usually benefits from media secrecy and censorship. In addition, as long as the grievances of non-state organisations and individuals still exist, whether the media is there or not to cover the violence does not change the fact that non-state terrorism will continue until the political motivations of their violence have been addressed.

This should also be pointed out when the state and its ‘experts’ argue that undemocratic measures should be introduced in ‘Western’ societies to combat ‘terrorism’. Censorship, whether indirect or direct, whether in ‘peace’ or ‘war’, is not compatible with a genuine democracy because it prevents citizens from forming their own political opinions, therefore preventing informed voting decisions. Nevertheless, direct censorship existed in the “mother of democracies”, ‘Great’ Britain, for six years in the late twentieth century. The orthodox position on ‘terrorism’ was used by the British government to justify preventing Irish Republicans from being given the ‘oxygen of publicity’ by introducing the suffocation of censorship over the British broadcast media. Now that the relationship between the mass media and ‘terrorism’ has been examined, it is possible to explore how indirect and direct censorship of the British mass media operated during the Northern Ireland conflict.
Chapter 2 - The British mass media and the Northern Ireland conflict

The direct censorship of the British broadcasting ban (1988-1994) emerged after decades of indirect censorship of the British mass media by means of pressure from the British government. Bairner (1996) argues it is undeniable that the British government interfered, indirectly and directly, with British mass media reporting of the Northern Ireland conflict. The pressure against, and interference with, the British mass media is a clear indication of the perceived importance of this ideological battleground. Before analysing British newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban, it is important to explore British broadcast media representations of Northern Ireland before, during and after the conflict. This will reveal the conflicts between the British government and the broadcasters before the broadcasting ban was introduced as well as how the British broadcast media operated during and after the censorship was lifted as part of the peace process.

In this chapter, the history of British broadcasting is analysed to identify and explain British mass media representations of Northern Ireland from its inception in 1921 to the present. This includes a thorough investigation of the silent treatment that British broadcasters gave to Northern Ireland before 1968, the relationship between British broadcasters and the British government as well as the impact of the 'reference upwards' system. It also involves an analysis of the ramifications of British legislation on the British mass media, the impact of broadcasting ban (1988-1994) on British broadcast media and, finally, British mass media representations of the Northern Ireland peace process. Reviewing the literature on these subjects helps to contextualise the British government’s decision to introduce the broadcasting ban and informs the methodological and theoretical approach of this research, which explores representations of the broadcasting ban in the British print media.

The silence before 1968

The partition of Ireland on 3rd May, 1921 divided the thirty-two counties of Ireland and united the six counties of the north of Ireland with Britain (Hennessey, 1998). This created division amongst Nationalists in the south and north of Ireland, which led to the Irish War of Independence degenerating into a civil war between those supporting and opposing the Anglo-Irish Treaty (Ibid.). It also created division within
the new state of Northern Ireland where the permanent majority favouring the union with Britain — the Unionists — institutionalised sectarianism to secure their dominance (Ibid.). This was achieved by discriminating against the now minority Catholic population in Northern Ireland in terms of employment, education, housing, voting and ‘law and order’ policy.13

The divisions and discrimination in Northern Ireland received minimal attention from the national and international media before 1968. Schlesinger (1987: 206-7) argues it was only after the civil rights movement culminated in violent clashes that ‘the attention both of British and other news media became focused on Northern Ireland’. Smith (1972), Foot (1990) and Miller (1994) also contend that it was after 1968 that the national and international mass media really began to focus on what was happening in Northern Ireland. Butler (1995) argues the RUC attack against the civil rights demonstration in Derry on 5th October 1968 marks the precise start of the ‘Troubles’. He also argues it was the spurring event for ‘the beginning of television coverage of civil unrest in Northern Ireland’ (Butler, 1995: 1-2).

Butler (1995) recognizes, however, that there was some British broadcast coverage of the Northern Ireland situation before this, such as the This Week exposé of Paisleyism and the 24 Hours report on gerrymandering in 1967. Similarly, Miller (1994) points out that local and national news had reported the growing unrest in Northern Ireland following the Divis riots in 1964. Both point out that on balance though the broadcast media produced very few programmes that covered the political situation in Northern Ireland before 1968. So, while it is not correct that there was no mention of the discord in Northern Ireland by the broadcast media, it is correct that there was very little. Butler (1995) criticises some of the claims made by Curtis (1984), but points out that she is substantially correct. He suggests that her labelling of the period between the arrival of broadcasting to Northern Ireland in 1924 and the violent culmination of the civil rights movement in 1968 as the ‘silent years’ is valid.

It is important to note that the BBC had a monopoly on broadcasting in Northern Ireland until 1959 when ITV arrived in the shape of Ulster Television (UTV) (Curtis, 1984; Schlesinger, 1987).14 According to Richard Francis, former BBC Controller for Northern Ireland, the policy of the BBC in Northern Ireland involved a combination of highlighting the positive features over the negative, ignoring the contentious issue of partition and ‘the periodic denial of air time to people outspoken in their criticism of the status quo’ (Francis, 1977: 60). He also
argues it was as late as the 1950's and 1960's that programmes began to subtly hint that tensions existed in Northern Ireland. After 1968 though, 'there was no way in which the facts of unrest within the country could go uncovered' (Ibid.). Smith (1972) suggests the discrimination faced by the Catholic community in Northern Ireland was able to continue because of the silence of the broadcast media.

Although there is broad agreement in the literature concerning the silence before 1968, there are differing explanations reasoning why this was the case. Smith (1972) discusses the period following partition and the establishment of the BBC radio station – 2BE – in Belfast, 1924. He notes how this raised questions about the manner in which broadcasters should operate in a territory with such a divided population. Francis (1977: 60) concedes broadcasting was not expected to question ‘the fundamental premise on which the new State was built’. He argues this was understandable because of the possibility that broadcasting could affect public behaviour, provoking (potentially violent) events, rather than reflecting them. He notes the difficulty in exercising ‘control of a free, pluralistic system when editorial decisions could put lives and livelihoods at risk’ (Francis, 1977: 60-1). However, he does not mention how silence on the issue of partition was advantageous to the Unionists who ruled the new state of Northern Ireland.

Schlesinger (1987) argues that avoiding discussion on the legitimacy of partition and the Border’s permanence meant a crucial aspect contextualising the political divisions in Northern Ireland was excluded. The Border partitioned Ireland in a way that secured a permanent majority in the North favouring the union with Britain (Foot, 1988; Jempson, 1993; Darby, 1995). Omitting this fact from the British broadcast media would have certainly benefited the Unionist and British governments by concealing the undemocratic manner in which Ireland was partitioned by the Government of Ireland Act, 1920 (Magee, 2001). As Miller (1994) notes, the issue of partition is central to the case of Republicans because the last all-Irish elections before partition overwhelmingly returned a Sinn Féin government, who wanted complete independence from Britain. Magee (2001: 11-12) points out that in the ‘general election of December 1918, the last occasion on which the electorate made its choice on an all-Ireland basis, Sinn Féin won 73 out of the 105 seats, 69% of the votes cast’. Sinn Féin clearly had wide-spread support across Ireland before the British government (with the Irish treaty delegates and their pro-treaty supporters) partitioned the thirty-two counties on 3rd May, 1921 (Moloney, 2007).
Following partition then, it could be argued that the BBC’s ‘responsible’ and ‘consensual’ Northern Ireland coverage did help to keep the society together. However, it simultaneously perpetuated the dominance of the Unionists in Northern Ireland, which entailed discrimination and violence against Catholics. Smith (1972) argues that broadcasters were often concerned by public reaction to programming, which they feared would manifest on the streets or in complaints. He suggests ‘a glance at the history of broadcasting in Ireland will show how carefully over the years the problem was dealt with by avoidance and retreat’ (Smith, 1972: 24).

Perhaps the broadcasters had just as much, or maybe more, to fear from Stormont politicians. Curtis (1984) recalls the pressure and flak the BBC received from Unionist politicians, which certainly appears to have contributed to the media silence before 1968. She argues there was ‘indignant reaction’ towards the BBC if it dared to show ‘fleeting glimpses of another version of reality’ (Curtis, 1984: 20). For example, in 1959 the Northern Ireland Prime Minister, Lord Brookeborough, intervened himself and managed to censor the BBC, which dropped Ed Murrow’s second talk programme, See it Now, after the first episode featured a guest who referred to IRA internees in the South as ‘young idealists’ (Ibid.). Brookeborough also successfully censored the BBC on another occasion in the same year. After the first of eight current affairs programmes by Alan Whicker was broadcast, Stormont threatened to remove broadcasting from the BBC altogether and as a result the remaining seven reports were never shown. Following this, the BBC ‘did not attempt another programme on the Six Counties until several years later’ (Ibid.: 21).

Another, yet related, explanation for the silence of the broadcast media about the situation in Northern Ireland before 1968 concerns the intimate relationship between the BBC and the Ulster regime and the effect this had on broadcasting in the Province. Cathcart (1984) recognises how the first Director of 2BE, Sir Gerald Beadle, was absorbed, without much hesitation, into the Unionist establishment. Within a few months he attempted to form closer links with Stormont and wrote a letter to the BBC’s Managing Director, Lord Reith, inquiring into the exact form of relationship between the BBC’s Belfast station and Stormont while suggesting it would be advantageous for the BBC to be regarded by Stormont as its mouthpiece.\(^{15}\)

Schlesinger (1987: 207) also discusses the way in which the BBC’s hierarchy was tied into the Ulster regime, noting how the BBC ‘was subjected to pressure from the Unionists to broadcast in a manner which supported the status quo’. Smith (1972:
18) argues the BBC mainly 'spoke in tones of the Unionist establishment and worked in their interests'. Similarly, Curtis (1984: 19) discusses a BBC document from 1930, which states how the BBC Regional Service 'reflects the sentiments of the people who have always maintained unswerving loyalty to British ideals and to British culture'. In other words, the BBC reflected most of the Protestant community in Northern Ireland who favoured the union with Britain.\(^{16}\)

Butler (1995: 21) discusses the policy of successive British governments towards the question of Northern Ireland, which he summarises as keeping matters 'Irish at a safe distance from British politics'. He also suggests broadcasters in Northern Ireland were impacted by their relationship with the Unionist regime. It is clear that the lack of consensus in Northern Ireland led to a broadcasting system which was both fearful of the government and in many ways intimately linked with it. Such a relationship had ramifications for the content and 'pluralism' of the broadcast media and was obviously not conducive to all the people of Northern Ireland though it was for the government of the Unionists, by the Unionists and for the Unionists.

**The 'reference upwards' system after 1971**

Following 1968, the national and international media attention rapidly shifted to Northern Ireland and consequently Stormont could not be seen to be attacking 'its own people' just as the British government could no longer turn a blind-eye to it. Butler (1995: 21) suggests 'the crisis in NI triggered a crisis for the broadcast media which, in turn, gave rise to a crisis in their relations with government'. After the Unionist prime minister, Terence O'Neil resigned in April 1969, the BBC altered the directive that all reporting should be channelled via the Northern Ireland Controller to include a statement that coverage should not exacerbate the situation. Butler (1995: 61) suggests this was a result of the media-as-incendiary outlook of management and senior broadcasters and 'was an obvious recipe for ultra-cautiousness'.

This fear eventually manifested in the establishment of the 'reference upwards' system in 1971, which saw the BBC and ITV tighten up their rules for broadcasting programmes on Northern Ireland. It required 'reporters and editors to seek permission and advice from their superiors before embarking on stories connected with the North of Ireland' (Jempson, 1993: 9). That year had seen the first British soldier killed since the British Army had entered Northern Ireland in August
1969 (Moloney, 2007). This followed the RUC's failure to suppress riots sparked by Orange Order marches around the Catholic Bogside area of Derry as well as the introduction of internment without trial (Curtis, 1984; Butler, 1995). In addition, Schlesinger (1987: 209) recalls that by 1971, 'British troops, who had for a while been welcomed by the Northern Ireland Catholics, were regarded by them as the arm of the Unionist regime'. Although the British government did not like to admit it, Northern Ireland was rapidly becoming a war zone. Therefore, the flow of information, as is always the case in conflicts, was considered paramount.

Schlesinger (1987) argues the reporting of Northern Ireland was a form of war reporting and the 'reference upwards' system was an indication of this. In the 1967 edition of the BBC's Guide there was no mention of Northern Ireland, however the next edition, published in 1971, had its own section with five rules (the first four making 'reference upwards' a routine part of news production). According to Curtis (1984) the rules had two basic components. Firstly, all programme-makers were required to consult top management and obtain their approval for all programmes on Ireland. Writing at the time of the 'reference upwards' system, she discusses how every item on Northern Ireland, however minor, did not escape scrutiny and it was not only news and current affairs that were affected. In 1972, for example, Paul McCartney's song, 'Give Ireland Back to the Irish', was banned by the BBC (Curtis, 1984). Secondly, special restrictions applied to interviewing members of organisations that had been proscribed by the government. The main organisation that the government wished to silence was the IRA as it was the major organisation fighting the British army and challenging the legitimacy of the Unionist regime (Ibid.). As Smith (1972) suggests:

The system of reference upwards operated (more or less) as a means to ban interviews with the IRA altogether. Permission had always to be sought and therefore was requested less and less often – and when requested it was more and more frequently refused. (Smith, 1972: 31)

Curtis (1984) argues these restrictions on journalists and programme-makers were also largely the result of flak from Stormont and Westminster politicians as well as the British newspaper industry who heavily criticised broadcasters for giving a platform to Republicans and for publicising complaints about the security forces. Schlesinger (1987) recalls the BBC reporting of the British army using torture against
Catholics interned without trial at Ballykinler interrogation centre in the early 1970s. The BBC was pressurised by members of the British government to discredit the victims and thus their accounts of torture. Although the BBC complied with the government’s requests, the Compton Report (1971) and the European Commission of Human Rights (1976) later revealed that the internees were indeed subjected to torture by the British army (Schlesinger, 1987; Rolston, 2002).

Schlesinger (1987: 205) argues that the Northern Ireland conflict has illustrated the power of the British government to limit what is, and more importantly what is not, broadcast by the media to the people of Northern Ireland and indeed the people of England, Scotland and Wales. He suggests this has been achieved ‘not through overt censorship, but rather through a mediated intervention, in which spokesmen in the sphere of politics have defined the permissible limits’, which the mass media has then reproduced (Ibid.).

This was illustrated in late 1971 when Stormont and Westminster politicians with sections of the British newspaper industry put pressure on the BBC to censor The Question of Ulster, a current affairs programme about Northern Ireland. Schlesinger (1987: 214) discusses this episode at length and recalls how it emerged ‘at a time when the BBC [...] had just made clear its unequivocal support of the security forces’ efforts in Northern Ireland’. In a letter from the BBC chairman, Lord Hill, to British Home Secretary Reginald Maulding in November 1971, he had stated how one-sided the BBC was in its coverage of British and Republican combatants: ‘between the British Army and the gunmen, the BBC is not and cannot be impartial’ (cited in Smith, 1972: 24). This admission hints at the propagandistic approach to terrorism taken by the BBC during the Northern Ireland conflict and contradicts British government accusations of the broadcast media being ‘irresponsible’ when trying to justify the introduction of the broadcasting ban in 1988.

Smith (1972), Taylor (1978) and Schlesinger (1987) note how the BBC withstood the pressure from the Home Secretary and Northern Ireland Prime Minister Brian Faulkner (1971-2), eventually broadcasting The Question of Ulster. However, they also argue that whilst the BBC has championed this as demonstrative of their independence from the British state, the content of the programme was actually ‘straightforward, predictable and untroublesome’ (Smith, 1972: 31) and overall, ‘far from being exemplary this is, rather, a success story in the midst of a general defeat’ (Schlesinger, 1987: 242). Furthermore, Miller (1994) observes the fact that the
programme did not actually interview any IRA members. Schlesinger (1987: 219) argues this period was not a particularly independent one for the BBC and takes ‘the careful construction of that programme itself as a token of how gingerly the BBC was treading’. Taylor (1978: 69) adds, *The Question of Ulster* ‘was notable more for the fact of its transmission than its content’.

On the other hand, this example still shows how the BBC could resist pressure from the British government and it was not the first and last time it did so. Francis (1977) argues that the BBC had a steady flow of analytical current affairs programmes concerning Northern Ireland, putting the figure at 349 features of ranging duration between 1971 and 1977. Of course, numbers aside, it is the substance of the programmes produced in this period that matter. Curtis (1984) argues the ‘reference upwards’ system filtered out any ‘undesirable’ programmes from an early stage, which she argues amounts to self-censorship. The point being that no matter how many programmes are produced, if the investigative and challenging reports are weeded out, then there is no critical analysis of the conflict. It seems that Schlesinger (1987) presents a realistic view of broadcasting and Northern Ireland when he argues that the constraints on broadcasters since 1971 did limit representations of the conflict and deterred investigative journalism on television. Taylor (1978) argues:

> The deeper the crisis and the more controversial the methods used to meet it, the greater the strain on the institutions of broadcasting forced to choose between the journalist’s insistence on the public’s right to know everything and the government’s preference for it not to know much. (Taylor, 1978: 67-8)

It is not the case that broadcasters willingly produced insipid programmes. Rather it was the pressure from broadcast media management and the British government that led to the self-censorship of the British broadcast media workers. As will be illustrated in the following two examples of media interference, when the broadcast media did hold those in positions of power accountable, they were pressurised to desist by representatives of the British government. This illustrated how broadcasters did attempt to pursue their public service function and how ‘the restrictive rules [had] not closed off all the options for searching treatment’ (Schlesinger, 1987: xvii). However, it also revealed how the British government (and sections of the British newspaper industry) would put pressure on broadcasters to censor their own programmes if they did hold the powerful accountable.
Leapman (1986) and Viera (1991) document the Real Lives controversy, which occurred in 1985. This BBC documentary included interviews with Martin McGuinness of Sinn Féin and Gregory Campbell of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) who were both elected members of the Northern Ireland Assembly and advocated the use of violence for political ends. Several writers discuss the political climate and the tensions that existed between the British government and the broadcasters leading up to Real Lives. Miller (1994) recalls the two controversies in 1979 surrounding an Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) interview on the BBC’s Tonight programme and the BBC’s Panorama programme filming an IRA road block at Carrickmore.

Miller (1994: 35) also cites ‘the 1984 Brighton bombing (in which Mrs Thatcher herself narrowly escaped death)’ as well as ‘the major rows over the Falklands [in 1982] and the coverage of the miners’ strike in 1984/85’ as reasons for the hostile relationship between the British government and the broadcasters. In addition, Leapman (1986) recalls that in June 1985, as Real Lives was being edited, a Trans World Airlines (TWA) aircraft was hijacked by members of Hizbollah and held at Beirut for several weeks, while hostages were released in return for demands such as the release of hundreds of Lebanese Shias held in Israeli prisons. The hostage crisis was covered live in the United States and broadcast worldwide on CNN (Edgerton, 1996). After American broadcasters allowed the hijackers to state their political motivations through interviews and press releases, Margaret Thatcher gave a speech at the American Bar Association in London arguing ‘terrorists’ and hijackers should be starved of the ‘oxygen of publicity’ (Leapman, 1986).

As stated in the previous chapter, Margaret Thatcher articulated the orthodox perspective on the relationship between the mass media and terrorism in this speech by stating that a symbiotic relationship existed between the mass media and ‘terrorism’. She was careful to dismiss the possibility of introducing direct censorship against the media but rhetorically pondered the case for the media agreeing to ‘a voluntary code of conduct’ (Thatcher, 1985). Understandably, this was interpreted as an instruction for the British media to practice self-censorship during the Northern Ireland conflict. Edgerton (1996: 115) argues Thatcher’s statement was her most threatening yet and was largely perceived to be aimed at encouraging the British media to ‘initiate their own voluntary ban on reporting acts of terrorism’.
According to Leapman (1986), Paul Hamann, the producer of *Real Lives*, was worried by Thatcher's statement because he believed it would influence his superiors to decide his film-making technique of letting interviewees talk freely without hostile questions and interruptions was not 'responsible' enough. Furthermore, Hamann was fearful that by portraying the real lives of the two politicians such as them spending time with their families, he might be accused of humanising McGuinness and Campbell. Hamann was right to be fearful. Miller (1994) suggests the scene from the programme that most incensed the British establishment was one showing McGuinness at home with one of his children sitting on his knee. He argues that 'to portray McGuinness as a rational human being who lived in many deeply familiar and ordinary ways was beyond the pale of acceptable coverage' (Miller, 1994: 38).

Although the BBC Controller Northern Ireland, James Hawthorne, did not see this scene as problematic he did ask a section of *Real Lives* that used old news film showing the brutality of the RUC against Catholic civil rights marchers be shortened. Leapman (1986) recalls that there was no BBC fall out from Thatcher's 'oxygen of publicity' remark and the programme was scheduled for early August. However, Rupert Murdoch's newspaper, *The Sunday Times*, soon began to stir up controversy, alerting British politicians to the programme and collecting statements of their reactions to it 'giving space to terrorists' (Leapman, 1986: 100). This included asking Margaret Thatcher a hypothetical question about how she would react to an interview with the chief of the IRA (implying that McGuinness held this position). What followed was a request from the British Home Secretary, Leon Brittan, urging the governors of the BBC to censor the documentary despite the fact that he had not actually seen the programme (Viera, 1991). Leon Brittan echoed Thatcher's words that giving a platform to 'terrorists' would assist their objectives (Ibid.).

After viewing the documentary, the board of governors banned *Real Lives: At the Edge of the Union*. Schlesinger (1987) draws a parallel between *Real Lives* and *The Question of Ulster*, in that on both occasions a British Home Secretary intervened with a supposedly independent broadcaster. However, the difference was that this time the BBC crumbled under pressure from conservative newspapers and politicians. There was some resistance from media workers who organised a twenty-four-hour strike on the day the documentary was supposed to be broadcast.21 *Real Lives* was eventually transmitted two months after being banned (Leapman, 1986; Viera, 1991).
This Week – Death on the Rock (1988):

Another programme, which actually did question the British government and military, namely its ‘shoot-to-kill’ policy, was part of a series on ITV called This Week. Death on the Rock focused on the extra-judicial executions of three IRA members in Gibraltar on 7th March, 1988. As Bolton (1990) notes, the IRA had been planning to plant a large bomb in the British colony of Gibraltar and the documentary focused on the official version of events from the British government and the differing version of eye-witnesses who had been interviewed during the research stage of the documentary. As Bolton (1990) and Miller (1994) highlight, the official version as expressed by Sir Geoffrey Howe, the British Foreign Secretary, declared that the IRA volunteers had made threatening movements when challenged by the security forces. Such movements led them to consider that their own and other lives were in jeopardy so they shot and killed the IRA members. In contrast, eyewitnesses said they saw the IRA members clearly surrender, but the SAS combatants executed them regardless.

Bolton (1990), editor of This Week at the time, argues that the documentary team did not give a verdict on what they believed actually happened because they felt there was not enough evidence. However, the documentary did make clear that much of the official version was questionable, which he believes contributed to the subsequent anger expressed by the Thatcher administration and the British newspaper industry. According to Bolton (1990), Sir Geoffrey Howe phoned the Chairman of the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA), Lord Thomson, two days before the date of transmission requesting that the programme be postponed to prevent it prejudicing the inquest.

Two days later the IBA, after legal consultation, decided that This Week – Death on the Rock should be broadcast and Howe was informed. Howe then phoned back a second time but was again unsuccessful in pressuring the IBA to censor the programme. Bolton (1990) recalls how the issue actually reached the House of Commons where the phrase ‘trial by television’ was mentioned and later extended by Thatcher. Although, there had been pressure from the British government, the IBA had resisted and triumphed. This example illustrates the lengths the British government went to stop the public from being informed about Gibraltar, but it also illustrates the resilience of British broadcasters to government pressure.
Another element, which limited the ability of all British media workers to report the Northern Ireland conflict, concerns legislation. Miller (1994) argues that some legislation, especially 'anti-terrorist' legislation, was used to dilute and impede the flow of information about Northern Ireland, specifically 'the Official Secrets Act (and the associated 'D' Notice committee), the Prevention of Terrorism Act and the Emergency Provisions Act' (Miller, 1994: 30). For example, proscribing the IRA in Britain under the Prevention of Terrorism Act in 1974, made it difficult for journalists to interview IRA members, especially after the Act was amended in 1976 making it 'an offence [...] not to pass information to the police about any future act of terrorism or about people involved in terrorism without 'reasonable excuse'" (Ibid.: 31-2).

Curtis (1984) discusses the Criminal Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1967, which hindered the ability of journalists to interview members of the IRA because section 5 of the Act states it is an offence not to supply the police with any information relating to criminal activities. Hayes (2003) adds the 1981 Contempt of Court Act, which demanded journalists declare their sources in the interests of 'national security' or to prevent crime and disorder. He argues the subsidiary effect of such legislation 'was to control the output of relevant official information, inhibit the utilization of 'unofficial sources' and thereby impede genuine investigative journalism' (Hayes, 2003: 137).

Schlesinger (1987) and Miller (1994) discuss the possible ramifications of such legislation, recognising how after 1974 no more interviews with republican combatants took place in the British media until 1979, when a member of the INLA was interviewed on the BBC Tonight programme. After this interview was broadcast, Thatcher asked the Attorney-General, Sir Michael Havers, to consider taking legal action against the BBC. Schlesinger (1987) notes how Havers considered, but decided against, prosecuting under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (1976) for withholding information likely to lead to the apprehension of a terrorist.

Similar criticisms and threats were made by Thatcher after the IRA roadblock in Carrickmore was filmed by the BBC programme Panorama (Edgerton, 1996). Again, Thatcher and Havers decided against prosecuting the BBC, but it sent a clear enough message, which meant the BBC did not resist having the untransmitted material seized by the police under Section 11 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (1976). Thus, it is possible to see how British 'anti-terror' legislation often doubled
up as a method to restrict media freedom (Hussain, 2000). Significantly, this element of control of the British mass media impacted media workers in the broadcast media and the print media, whereas most censorship of the media was aimed at the broadcast media, especially television programmes concerning the Northern Ireland conflict. However, there was no legislation that controlled the British broadcast media as much as the broadcasting ban.

**The broadcasting ban (1988-1994)**

On 19th October 1988, Douglas Hurd, the British Home Secretary, announced a ban on broadcasting statements from eleven Northern Irish political and military organisations (Eldridge et al., 1997). This included interviews and direct statements from representatives of Sinn Féin as well as the IRA and Loyalist paramilitaries such as the UDA (Henderson et al., 1990). The ban, which applied to all British broadcasters, also prohibited sympathisers of these organisations from having their statements broadcast (McLaughlin and Baker, 2010). Moloney (1991) argues that although the British government preferred to play down the implications of the broadcasting ban as mere ‘restrictions’, they amounted to the most stringent controls on the broadcast media since World War II. He adds, ‘never again could the boast be made that Britain enjoyed complete freedom of speech’ (Moloney, 1991: 10).

One writer describes the ban as ‘the most serious and direct sanction imposed by a British government’ (Lago, 1998: 677) and Taylor (1999: 250) argues it was an ‘indication of how the [British] government attempted censorship as a weapon in the propaganda war’. Although more than 70 programmes are known to have been cut or delayed before the broadcasting ban was introduced (Rolston, 2002), the British government clearly believed it needed more control over the British broadcast media. The ban lasted for six years and was lifted following the IRA ceasefire (31st August, 1994) and the beginning of the peace process (Eldridge et al., 1997; McLaughlin and Baker, 2010).

**Contextualising the broadcasting ban:**

Henderson et al. (1990) and Moloney (1991) both contextualise the lead up to the broadcasting ban and list several factors which they argue encouraged the British government to introduce direct censorship. Henderson et al. (1990: 1) argue the
broadcasting ban followed 'a year of confrontations between the government and the media and a number of 'big' stories from Northern Ireland' such as the IRA bomb that killed 11 people at Enniskillen on 8th November, 1987. Moloney (1991) suggests the extra-judicial killings of three IRA members in Gibraltar on 7th March 1988 and its aftermath were critical, but he also recognises the continuing rise of Sinn Féin's support following the 1981 Hunger Strikes in Long Kesh certainly had an impact too.

Ten Republicans died for political prisoner status, resisting British government attempts to criminalise the Republican Movement (Jempson, 1993; Edgerton, 1996; Rolston, 2002; Hayes, 2003). Solidarity with the hunger strikers was expressed in the victory of Bobby Sands at the 1981 by-election and the success of the anti-H Block candidates in the council elections a month later (Miller, 1994). As Moloney (1991) notes, this success inspired the 'Armalite and ballot box' strategy and helped Gerry Adams win a seat (West Belfast) in the 1982 Westminster general elections. Jempson (1993: 10) draws a link between the growing electoral successes of Sinn Féin and the British government's introduction of 'the Elected Authorities (NI) Act of 1988, which banned anyone convicted of a criminal offence from holding elected office'.

Another factor that Moloney (1991) suggests was important was the Falklands/Malvinas conflict, which saw some British television programmes and individual journalists attacked for 'unpatriotic' coverage and questions. In addition, the neo-liberal assault on public services and attacks on trade unions by Thatcher extended to particular media institutions like the BBC and to trade unions representing newspaper workers. The Gibraltar controversy, Death on the Rock and the government's reaction to it undoubtedly played a crucial role in the British government's decision to introduce the broadcasting ban.

As Miller (1994) and Taylor (1999) note, the discovery of eye-witnesses to the executions of three surrendering IRA members by the programme-makers of Death on the Rock suggested a 'shoot-to-kill' policy was in operation and infuriated the British government. The failed attempt to censor the documentary through what Moloney (1991) calls the traditional 'nudge and wink' pressure revealed the limitations of this indirect approach. According to Henderson et al. (1990: 2), the British Foreign Secretary, Geoffrey Howe, also attempted 'to stop the BBC broadcasting a programme on the shootings made by BBC Northern Ireland's Spotlight team'. This attempted censorship was unsuccessful as well.
Furthermore, in Milltown cemetery on 16th March, 1988, during the funeral of the IRA members that were killed in Gibraltar, UDA member Michael Stone attacked mourners with grenades and pistol fire killing three (Miller, 1994). A few days later, two British soldiers were killed after driving into an IRA funeral procession travelling along Andersonstown Road towards Milltown Cemetery to bury those killed by Michael Stone. As Miller (1994) notes, the mourners feared another Loyalist attack was beginning, especially after one of the soldiers fired a shot from inside the surrounded car. The British soldiers were dragged out, beaten and carried away. All this was ‘captured on television and still cameras and broadcast around the world that night’ (Miller, 1994: 38-9). They were executed with their own weapons hours later by the IRA (Moloney, 1991). All this bloodshed had occurred in the nine days following the Gibraltar killings.

Moloney (1991) and Miller (1994) both discuss the aftermath of the killings of the British soldiers with regard to the media and its battle with the authorities. At first, television companies refused the RUC Chief Constable’s request to hand over untransmitted film of the events to the police. However, following Thatcher’s speech in the House of Commons that stated the media are either on the side of justice or on the side of terrorism, this changed (Butler, 1995). The police seized film from the BBC and ITN ‘quoting two pieces of anti-terrorism legislation, the Prevention of Terrorism Act and the Emergency Provisions Act’ (Moloney, 1991: 25).

The final series of events that Moloney (1991) argues laid the ground for the broadcasting ban related to the IRA summer offensive of 1988, which involved attacks on a British military base in Germany, as well as attacks against British military personnel in England and Northern Ireland. In May, Thatcher complained the media were giving the IRA too much publicity and ordered a high level security review. The broadcasting ban was favoured over internment because the latter had been a disaster for the British government in the 1970s.

The official line:

According to Henderson et al. (1990), the official reasoning for the broadcasting ban was based on two arguments. Firstly, Douglas Hurd, echoing Thatcher’s contention that broadcasters provide ‘terrorists’ with the ‘oxygen of publicity’, argued television had given an “easy platform” on which to “propagate terrorism”. Secondly, Hurd suggested that when members of the public watched
statements from or interviews with organisations like Sinn Féin and the IRA it caused
“offence”. Hurd’s first argument is critiqued by Henderson et al. (1990) who suggest
that the “easy platform”, in reality, never actually existed.

As Moloney (1991: 10) points out ‘TV and radio companies had long since
applied a voluntary prohibition on interviews with paramilitary groups, particularly
republican ones’. IRA members had not been interviewed by the BBC and ITV since
1974 and the INLA was last interviewed in 1979 following their assassination of
Airey Neave (Moloney, 1991). This limited access to the media was similar for the
legal political party, Sinn Féin. A study conducted by Henderson et al. (1990) of Sinn
Féin appearances on network television news twelve months before the broadcasting
ban highlights the limited access Sinn Féin had to the ‘terrorist propaganda platform’.

Sinn Féin representatives were interviewed on BBC news 17 times out of a
total of 633 interviews concerning Northern Ireland (Henderson et al., 1990).
Alternatively, representatives of the Conservative Party were interviewed on BBC
news 121 times (Ibid.). In addition, Sinn Féin members were not allotted any studio
interviews on British network television news in the year prior to the introduction of
the broadcasting ban. Henderson et al. (1990: 29) argue this is significant because
studio interviews ‘confer status’ to those interviewed.

According to Moloney (1991), the media rarely allowed Republican voices to
be heard and when they were interviewed it was often in a hostile manner. This
contention was supported by the Labour deputy leader, Roy Hattersley, who stated the
total length of interviews with Sinn Féin and its supporters on ITV in the whole of
1988 was a mere four minutes. ‘Three minutes and 59 seconds of that were, he
claimed, hostile to Sinn Féin. “How much assistance does the Home Secretary think
those four minutes gave the IRA?”, he asked’ (Moloney, 1991: 28-29). Similarly,
Independent Television News (ITN) provided evidence that suggested if the
broadcasting ban had been introduced a year earlier in 1987, it would only have
’affect ed 8 minutes and 20 seconds of over 1200 hours of ITN air time’ (Edgerton,
1996: 125). This indicates how effective the indirect censorship of government flak
and media self-censorship had already been in quelling the ‘oxygen of publicity’ prior
to the direct censorship of the broadcasting ban.

Hurd’s second argument for the broadcasting ban is also critiqued by
Henderson et al. (1990) who quote a BBC and IBA source saying there is little
evidence that audiences have been offended in the period before the ban. That said, it
is possible that some Republican statements could have offended some parts of the British public, but no more so than Loyalist, RUC or British Army statements could have offended other parts of the same 'British' public, especially because over a third of Northern Ireland's population is Catholic (many of whom identify themselves as Irish instead of British). It seems more likely that Hurd's totalising of public opinion was a method of justifying the ban and expressing British government distaste for Republican voices in the British mass media.

Another justification given by the British government for the broadcasting ban was related to the censorship regulations in the Irish Republic and Hurd actually remarked how the 'restrictions' followed closely that of the Irish Republic's in his speech on the day he introduced it (Henderson et al., 1990). It is true that the Irish Republic had used direct censorship against Republican voices since the early 1970s (Arthur, 1987; Bairner, 1996). In fact, the Irish broadcasting ban was harsher than the British broadcasting ban in a number of ways (Miller, 1990). The censorship in the Irish Republic was lifted in early 1994, which put pressure on the British government to lift its own broadcasting ban several months later on 16th September.

The impact of the broadcasting ban:

Moloney (1991) argues the vague language used in Hurd's directive left the interpretation of the broadcasting ban largely to the broadcasters, which led to an over-cautious interpretation of it. Rolston (2002) argues that it was far easier for broadcasters to simply not bother interviewing Sinn Féin representatives than to risk contravening the new censorship legislation. This meant that the number of interviews with Sinn Féin declined dramatically across the British broadcast media. There were 93 appearances of Sinn Féin on British television news during the year before the ban was introduced, but in the year immediately following the ban this number 'fell to 34, a drop of more than 63%' (Henderson et al., 1990: 37).

Consequently, Rolston (2002: 61-2) suggests 'the ban played a crucial role in containment by making the possibility of open debate difficult'. Another outcome of the ban was the difficulty documentary-makers faced in making serious in-depth factual programmes on Northern Ireland. After the ban was introduced such programmes were no longer produced (Henderson et al., 1990). Instead, programme-makers turned to 'docudramas' or 'faction' because these genres allowed more space to contest the official view (Ibid.).
There were opportunities for the broadcasters to circumvent the broadcasting ban. One strategy was to dub the broadcast statements of the banned organisations by using actors with Irish accents, which were often out of sync (Eldridge et al., 1997). Using subtitles was another strategy (Lago, 1998). For example, after the IBA banned The Pogues song about the Birmingham Six and Guildford Four, ‘ITN reported the IBA decision by showing footage of the Pogues in concert, rolling the words up on the screen and reciting them’ (Henderson et al., 1990: 45). Overall though, it would seem the broadcasting ban had a very serious impact on media output, encouraging self-censorship (Moloney, 1991) and ensuring the British government perspective dominated British broadcast media representations of the Northern Ireland conflict. The attacks on the broadcasters and individual journalists before the ban was introduced had weakened their ability to resist it and the NUJ could not manage to pull off a united strike like that of the Real Lives controversy (Ibid.).

The broadcasting ban was the clearest manifestation of how the British government sought to maintain its dominance in the Northern Ireland conflict by directly controlling the British broadcast media. As Lago (1998: 677) points out, such direct censorship meant the role of the media as the ‘Fourth Estate’ and as a watchdog on the powerful was limited because information about events and people in the North of Ireland was actively withheld. According to Bairner (1996), the logic behind this undemocratic course of action was a response to the orthodox view that the real winners of the media coverage of the conflict were the Republican Movement, rather than the British government. The literature and research reviewed so far in this chapter has largely suggested the opposite was the case.

Before the broadcasting ban came into force, the British government consistently pressurised British broadcasters to censor programmes that allowed Republican voices to be heard. Although British broadcasters successfully resisted this pressure on several occasions, on other occasions they gave in and altered or censored programmes about Northern Ireland. This was even more difficult after the introduction of the ‘reference upwards’ system, which institutionalised self-censorship in the British broadcast media. All these restrictions on media freedom in Britain can be traced back to orthodox scholarship on the mass media and ‘terrorism’. As was argued in the previous chapter, if the ‘oxygen of publicity’ argument is accepted and promoted by those in power (whether they believe it or not) then so will the ‘necessity’ of the ‘suffocation of censorship’.
Those subscribing to democratic principles would hope that if one section of the British mass media was being directly censored by the British government, the remaining sections of it would defend the independence of the 'Fourth Estate'. For this reason, this research analyses British newspaper representations of the British government introducing and lifting the broadcasting ban to discover the extent to which national newspapers supported and resisted such censorship.

The peace process (1994-2007)

The broadcasting ban ended and the peace process began (publicly) following the IRA ceasefire on 31st August, 1994. The peace process had been developing behind the scenes ever since Father Alec Reid approached Sinn Féin’s Gerry Adams and set up a secret dialogue with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Tom King, in 1987 (Murray and Tonge, 2005; Moloney, 2007). Gerry Adams also began secret meetings with SDLP leader John Hume in 1988 (Moloney, 2007). In essence, these secret meetings led Republicans away from the Armalite and the ballot box strategy to one purely based on the latter (Spencer, 2003).

The Joint (or, Downing Street) Declaration, signed on 15th December 1993, encouraged the IRA ceasefire. Spencer (2003) suggests the ability of the Irish government (with the support and clout of the US) to pressurise Britain into accepting the revised Republican demands, in turn encouraged Republicans to leave the path of political violence. The declaration stated that Britain recognised the right of the island of Ireland to self-determination, however, the consent principle was limited by the partitioned island voting separately (Darby, 2003; Spencer, 2003; 2005). Unsurprisingly then, the Declaration actually pleased many Unionists and angered the IRA grassroots because a united Ireland was now very unlikely (Moloney, 2007).

Decommissioning of the IRA was central to the peace process too. On 7th March, 1995, the Secretary of State, Sir Patrick Mayhew, demanded the decommissioning of the IRA as a precondition for Sinn Féin’s entry into talks. However, the IRA could not and would not be seen to surrender (Moloney, 2007). In an attempt to find some middle ground, George Mitchell, head of the International Body on Arms Decommissioning, recommended on 24th January, 1996 that arms decommissioning and all-party talks should begin in parallel, but this was rejected by the British government (Darby, 2003). Soon afterwards, the IRA bombing of the
London docklands area on 9th February, 1996 ended the ceasefire. The IRA argued they had resorted to such an action because of the lack of progress in negotiations resulting from Unionist and British intransigence (Spencer, 2005).

After several more attacks on cities in England and against the British Army and RUC in Northern Ireland, the IRA ceasefire was reinstated on 20th July, 1997, which was a couple of months after Tony Blair replaced John Major as Prime Minister. Spencer (2005) suggests this change of government was very important to the negotiations because New Labour was not as dependent on Unionist voters as the Conservative Party and therefore was more flexible. Importantly, by mid-June 1997 the new British government decided the IRA did not have to decommission before Sinn Féin could enter talks (Darby, 2003). However, decommissioning continued to be a demand of Unionists (particularly the DUP) who were opposed to the peace process and opposed to sharing power with Republicans.

There were other important factors that shaped the peace process. The election of the new Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern, on 6th June, 1997 as well as the ongoing support of the Clinton administration and the growth of Sinn Féin’s support in Northern Ireland also contributed to the progress in negotiations (Spencer, 2005). These negotiations culminated in the Good Friday Agreement on 10th April, 1998, which was based on three strands:

The first strand focuses on the formation of a new assembly which fully represents the different communities and parties. The second seeks to facilitate stronger liaison and co-operation between Northern Ireland and Dublin. And the third is concerned with tightening relations between all parts of Britain and Ireland. (Spencer, 2005: 123)

A referendum was held on 22nd May, 1998 to ratify the Good Friday Agreement and it proved to be very popular amongst the electorate in the North and South of Ireland (Darby, 2003). 71% voted in favour of the Agreement in Northern Ireland and 94% voted in favour in the Irish Republic (Darby, 2003). However, there still remained two contentious issues dividing Irish Republicans and British Unionists in Northern Ireland. Firstly, there was the reform of the police, which was demanded by Republicans and secondly, there was the decommissioning of the IRA, which was demanded by Unionists. After years of negotiations, damaging revelations, hostile exchanges and boycotts both were achieved.
On 4th November, 2001 the RUC became the Police Service of Northern Ireland and Sinn Féin members voted to support policing in Northern Ireland several years later on 28th January, 2007 (Moloney, 2007). On 26th September, 2005 General John de Chastelain, head of the Independent International Commission of Decommissioning, verified that the IRA had put all its weapons beyond use (Ibid.). Less than two years later, on 8th May, 2007, Ian Paisley of the DUP and Martin McGuinness of Sinn Féin were sworn in as first and deputy first minister of the new power-sharing government in Stormont (Coulter and Murray, 2008).

The peace process has had a significant impact on media representations of Northern Ireland. Hussain (2000) argues there has been a vast improvement regarding freedom of expression and that self-censorship has decreased in the British mass media, particularly since the broadcasting ban was lifted. An indication of this move away from indirect and direct censorship was the broadcasting of the first British television interview with IRA representatives since 1974, which occurred on 20th December, 1994 (see Miller, 1995a; 1995b). In addition, interviews with Republicans became less hostile as the peace process advanced, suggesting British mass media representations shifted in line with the changing position and approach of the British government (Miller, 2002). Indeed, Wolfsfeld (2001) argues that there was certainly elite consensus regarding the peace process in Northern Ireland, which was reflected in positive coverage of the negotiations.

Lago (1998: 679) conducted a comparative analysis of Sinn Féin interviews on British television and discovered that ‘with the start of the peace process there were significant changes both in the duration of the interviews and, perhaps more importantly, in the locations in which these took place’. In the year preceding the ban, Sinn Féin representatives appeared on television 93 times and were formally interviewed 29 times, but these interviews ‘were extremely short […] and were mostly carried out in the street or outside an office’ (Lago, 1998: 678-679). The significance of this relates to the suggestion that studio interviews ‘confer status’ to those interviewed (Henderson et al., 1990: 29), whereas street interviews do not.

During the first year of the broadcasting ban, Sinn Féin representatives were not given a single formal interview by the BBC, ITN or Channel 4 and television appearances decreased by 63 per cent (from 93 appearances to 34) (Henderson et al., 1990; Lago, 1998). However, between September 1993 and August 1994 Sinn Féin representatives were interviewed 67 times by these television channels (Lago, 1998).
Not only were the interviews more frequent, they lasted much longer and ‘became more formal, with settings moving from the street outside offices to within offices and studios’ (Ibid.: 679). In other words, Sinn Féin was literally brought in from the cold once the broadcasting ban was lifted and the peace process accelerated. Lago (1998) argues the themes of television news interviews with Sinn Féin representatives also shifted from being preoccupied with violence before the ban was introduced (Henderson et al., 1990) to focusing on broader themes, such as the IRA ceasefire, the peace process and Gerry Adams’ visit to the USA, after the ban was lifted.

The peace process enabled people labelled as ‘terrorists’ to articulate their positions openly after decades of being excluded from news reports. It also meant dominant articulations of the conflict were questioned for the first time in the British media (Spencer, 2003). Having said that, it has also been suggested that old media habits die hard (Miller, 2002). One example revealing continuing media hostility to republicanism occurred on 17th November, 1994 when Gerry Adams appeared on Newsnight (BBC2) and Jeremy Paxman asked, ‘How does it feel visiting a country where most people think you are an apologist for murder?’ (cited in Lago, 1998: 682). Miller (2002) argues this ‘reflex hostility’ can be explained by acknowledging that during the Northern Ireland conflict, ‘broadcasters stated unambiguously that they were on the side of the state. But now in the new circumstances of peace there has been no repudiation of such institutionalised bias’ (Miller (2002: 125).

Interestingly, Spencer (2005) argues media representations of Northern Ireland actually had an impact on the peace process too. He suggests that because television news broadcast the contestations between parties and publicized the dynamic and direction of talks, it actually became a participant in the peace process and produced ‘expectations and pressures which were absorbed into negotiations’ (Spencer, 2005: 127). He adds, ‘the political arena became subject to a broader range of discourses trying to contest various positions and interests which were emerging in debates and negotiations about peace’ (Ibid.).

Spencer (2005) also contends that television news was particularly influential because of its ability to reach more people and the fact that audiences are more diverse compared to that of newspapers. Unsurprisingly, there is evidence to suggest that British media freedom has greatly improved with the peace process and the lifting of the broadcasting ban. What becomes clear though is the lack of research that analyses British newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban and the peace
process. For legitimate reasons, scholars in the field analysing British mass media representations of the Northern Ireland conflict have mostly focused on British television representations of the conflict and the transition into the peace process. One major reason for this is the fact that most of the orthodox scholarship on the mass media and ‘terrorism’ has encouraged ‘Western’ governments to control the broadcast media, particularly television. In Britain, one of the few supposedly democratic societies to actually introduce direct censorship against this section of the mass media has meant therefore that scholars have analysed the impact of it on broadcasters.

Hence, researching British newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban will make an original contribution to the field of the British mass media and Northern Ireland conflict as well as to the field of the mass media and ‘terrorism’ more generally. In this thesis, three research questions are explored. Firstly, how much coverage of the broadcasting ban was there in British newspapers when the British government introduced and lifted the ban? Secondly, how was the broadcasting ban represented in British newspapers when the British government introduced and lifted the ban? Thirdly, how can newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban be explained by analysing facets of the production and consumption of the British mass media as well as power relations inside and outside the news room?

The British mass media and the Northern Ireland conflict: summary

The history of the British mass media and the Northern Ireland conflict reveals the antagonism between the British government and the British media. Contrary to orthodox writers’ claims, it was the British government, not the Republican Movement, which had the power to alter representations of the Northern Ireland conflict. On many occasions, the British government successfully pressured British broadcasters from offering another perspective. An obvious motivation for the British government restricting media freedom was to persuade people living in England, Scotland and Wales that the six counties of Northern Ireland should remain part of Britain instead of being reunited with Ireland as the Republican Movement desired.

There was little consensus in Northern Ireland after Ireland was partitioned, but the silent treatment the British mass media generally gave to Northern Ireland suggested there was. A significant body of research suggests that ever since the BBC was established there in 1924, it worked in the interests of the British government and
the Unionists in Northern Ireland, who became the majority following partition, but had been the minority before. For decades the BBC monopolised broadcasting, which made it easier to maintain the silence. Ostensibly the media silence was to prevent disorder, violence and lives being lost, but it also prevented debate on serious issues such as partition and the discrimination faced by Catholics. It was only after the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland gained momentum in the mid to late 1960s and was attacked by the RUC that the British and international mass media were compelled to cover Northern Ireland.

As Northern Ireland descended into a war zone in the late 1960s and early 1970s and the rest of the world became aware of what was happening there, the mass media became a central tool in the propaganda war. This explains why, after the pressure exerted by the British government, the ‘reference upwards’ system was introduced by the BBC and ITV in 1971. This system was a form of war reporting that operated to restrict what information could (and importantly, could not) be communicated by the British mass media. Unsurprisingly, it narrowed the parameters of debate in the British media (and therefore in British society), excluded Republican voices, encouraged journalists to engage in self-censorship and deterred investigative journalism. Essentially, despite resistance from some brave journalists and documentary makers working in the British mass media, it eroded media freedom.

Another tool the British government had at its disposal was the use of British law, which could be used to prevent the British mass media straying from the official narrative. Various sections in ‘anti-terrorist’ legislation made it difficult, if not illegal, to interview Republicans. In addition, on a few occasions the RUC used British legislation to seize journalistic material that was considered beneficial to the ‘enemy’. However, by far the most blatant piece of legislation used to control the British mass media—was the broadcasting ban. Interviews with Sinn Féin declined dramatically across the British broadcast media, self-censorship by journalists further increased, resulting in the British government perspective dominating British broadcast media representations of the Northern Ireland conflict.

The peace process paved the way for more media freedom and less censorship. The lifting of the broadcasting ban, the cessation of violence and the significant ideological compromises (Hayes and Bean, 2001) brought elite consensus, which was reflected in British mass media representations of the peace process (Wolfsfeld, 2001). As the British government accepted leading Republicans so did the British
mass media, which meant IRA representatives were interviewed on television for the first time in twenty years. Interviews with Sinn Féin representatives also increased and became less hostile as the peace process advanced. Not only were the interviews more frequent, they lasted much longer and took place in more formal settings such as television studios (Lago, 1998).

After exploring the relationship between the British government and the British mass media during the Northern Ireland conflict, it is hard to refute Bairner (1996). He argues it is undeniable that the British government interfered, indirectly and directly, with media coverage of Northern Ireland. Clearly, those in positions of power consider the mass media to be central to maintaining their control over society. This was illustrated by the many examples of indirect and direct censorship against mass media representations of the Northern Ireland conflict encouraged by representatives of Stormont and Westminster. Censorship during the Northern Ireland conflict was also encouraged by some mass media owners and managers as well as orthodox scholars. In this research, the extent to which the British newspaper industry covered the broadcasting ban and the way in which journalists represented such censorship are analysed to reveal how and why social actors from different sections of society attempted to build support for, and opposition to, such censorship.
Chapter 3 – Methodological Approach

In this chapter, the research questions of this thesis are outlined as well as the sampling and data collection method for analyzing British newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban. The two research methods used in this research are introduced with an explanation of why content analysis and critical discourse analysis (CDA) have been chosen and combined. The strengths and weaknesses of such methodological approaches will also be explored followed by an explanation of how they are used in this research.

The first two chapters of this research have suggested that much of the orthodox scholarship, which focuses on the supposed dependence of ‘terrorists’ on the mass media, has encouraged ‘Western’ governments to blame the mass media for giving ‘terrorists’ the ‘oxygen of publicity’. This has then been used as a justification to pressurise the mass media to represent conflicts in a way that is more favourable to ‘Western’ governments and the violence of their own combatants. In Britain this led to the suffocation of censorship being introduced by the British government in the form of the broadcasting ban. This followed many years of pressure against the British broadcast media, which encouraged self-censorship during the Northern Ireland conflict. It also led to the exclusion of Republican Movement representatives from the British mass media in general, which meant the British government’s perspective of the conflict dominated the coverage.

It has also been argued that orthodox writers and representatives of ‘Western’ governments adopt a propagandistic approach, where ‘terrorism’ is the sole responsibility of an officially designated enemy. Some critical writers such as Chomsky (2002) go so far as to argue that this is largely true of the mass media in ‘Western’ societies too. Whilst it is quite clear that orthodox writers and representatives of ‘Western’ governments apply double standards to acts of political violence against non-combatants, it is still not possible to make claims about whether the British mass media did during the Northern Ireland conflict. However, analysing British newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban will reveal whether or not the British print media adopted a propagandistic approach to terrorism during the Northern Ireland conflict. It will also reveal the extent to which British national newspapers supported and resisted the ban and the struggles that took place inside and outside the British newspaper industry.
Research questions

The research questions of this thesis are threefold. Firstly, how much coverage of the broadcasting ban was there in British newspapers when the British government introduced and lifted the ban? Secondly, how was the broadcasting ban represented in British newspapers when the British government introduced and lifted the ban? Thirdly, how can newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban be explained by analysing facets of the production and consumption of the British mass media as well as power relations inside and outside the news room?

Answering the first research question entails an analysis of the newsworthiness of the broadcasting ban in British newspapers by comparing broadcasting ban articles with other Northern Ireland conflict articles. Using content analysis, all newspaper articles relating to the Northern Ireland conflict are quantified and coded into subject categories and the imagery, genre, prominence and size of broadcasting ban articles and other Northern Ireland articles are contrasted. Newspaper articles representing and mentioning the broadcasting ban are also quantified within individual newspapers so that claims can be made about the newsworthiness of the broadcasting ban across the range of newspapers in Britain.

Answering the second research question entails an analysis of representations of the broadcasting ban in British newspapers. This involves exploring how the social actors that introduced and lifted the ban as well as those that supported and resisted it were represented. It also involves analysing how the discourses emanating from these social actors functioned to build support and opposition to the ban and how journalists refracted such discourses. Using content analysis, all the discourses in newspaper articles representing the British government introducing and lifting the broadcasting ban are quantified. The most frequently occurring discourses are then explored using critical discourse analysis (CDA) to explain how such discourses functioned to build support and opposition to the ban and why some discourses dominated over others.

Answering the third research question entails an analysis of the discursive and social practices impacting British newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban. Using CDA, the discursive practices involved in the production and consumption of newspaper journalism are explored by analysing the processes in which the authors encoded and the audience decoded newspaper articles representing the broadcasting ban. The social practices impacting newspaper journalism at the time the ban was
introduced and lifted are also explored such as preceding government controls over the British mass media, major industrial disputes such as Wapping, and the resistance of media workers to indirect pressure against the British broadcast media. These are analysed in terms of struggles within the media and in society at large.

**Sampling and data collection**

The sample of this research consists of six national newspapers representative of the British newspaper industry: *The Sun, Daily Mirror, Daily Mail, Daily Express, The Guardian*, and *The Daily Telegraph*. These newspapers constitute two ‘popular’ newspapers, two ‘mid-market’ newspapers and two ‘quality’ newspapers. They are also representative of the political sympathies within such genres and had the highest circulations for the years being sampled (Willings Press Guide, 1989-1995). The time period of these newspapers collected for analysis ranges from 1st October 1988 to 6th November 1988 and 29th August 1994 to 4th October 1994. These dates are rationalised according to the dates the British government introduced (19th October 1988) and lifted (16th September 1994) the broadcasting ban. The range of the two time periods is designed to capture any newspaper articles representing the Northern Ireland conflict and broadcasting ban in the eighteen days before and after the ban was introduced and lifted.

The unavailability of newspaper articles on the Nexis newspaper archive for all the newspapers and dates of the sample resulted in the data collection being carried out at the British Library’s Newspaper Archive at Colindale. As the only newspapers available on Nexis for the duration of the sample in this research were *The Guardian and The Times*, it was not considered feasible methodologically to analyse two out of the six-sampled newspapers with the Nexis format and the remaining four sampled newspapers in their original composition. Once it was clear that most of the newspapers would have to be accessed on microfilm, it was decided that all six newspapers would be researched in the same way for consistency. In addition, after researching the circulation figures for all national newspapers during the period of the sample, it was apparent that it was *The Daily Telegraph* not *The Times*, which had a larger circulation in these time periods. This is why the former was selected over the latter as the newspaper representative of both the conservative and ‘quality’ press.
Despite the haemorrhaging of time with such an old fashioned manual approach to data collection, the main advantage of acquiring data from the British Newspaper Archive was the original format of the newspaper articles. As the relevant newspaper articles collected for sampling were photocopied from microfilm reels of original newspapers, the format of them is the same as it was for members of the public that consumed them at the time of publication. This means the page layout is the same and the corresponding images are present as are the adjoining articles. All of which would not be available if Nexis could have been and was used. Deacon (2007) has underlined several weaknesses in using Nexis and has articulated the importance of the aforementioned point:

[The size and positioning of text and the use of photographs and illustrations are key mechanisms by which news-makers dramatize reports, assist readers’ comprehension, corroborate the ‘truth’ of a reported event and, sometimes, qualify, or even subvert, the linguistic substance of a related news item. (Deacon, 2007: 10)]

Other problems researchers may encounter when using Nexis are related to the reliance on key word searches, which can create ‘false positives’ (when a searched word has multiple uses and therefore creates many more results than is accurate) and, worse, ‘false negatives’ (when a searched word is too specific and therefore excludes significant amounts of relevant coverage) (Soothill and Grover, 1997; Deacon, 2007). Furthermore, whereas it is possible to identify ‘things’, it is not possible to identify ‘themes’ using key word searches (Deacon, 2007). This means ‘there are certain topics that may be readily analysed via manual content searches, but which can never be captured through exclusive dependence on key words’ (Ibid.: 8).

The way in which the data was collected was laborious yet thorough. Each microfilm was read page by page for any text that mentioned the Northern Ireland conflict. In order for a text to be selected, it had to concern this conflict or social actors involved with it as the news hook or at least feature as the majority of the story.29 Once a relevant text was identified a note was taken of the newspaper, date and page number and once the entire microfilm had been searched, the relevant newspaper articles were photocopied. This process was then repeated for the next microfilm. The microfilms were organised by newspaper title and each microfilm usually covered one month of newspaper output.
All newspaper microfilms, except *The Daily Telegraph*, did not cover Sunday editions. Once this became apparent, a decision was made to exclude Sunday editions of the sampled newspapers to save time. Sunday editions were printed on separate microfilms and the extra time it would have taken to order, receive and analyse them was not available. In the case of *The Daily Telegraph* microfilms, which did have the Sunday editions, the Sunday edition articles were omitted. Obviously, the fact that the Sunday editions of the sampled newspapers have not been analysed is a limitation of this research.

It would have been difficult to have approached the sample in a broader way. This research would have been more extensive if the sample covered newspaper representations of the Northern Ireland conflict and the broadcasting ban during its six year existence rather than just before and after the British government introduced and lifted the ban. However, the method of data collection would have necessitated reading every page of the six newspapers on micro film during the long existence of the broadcasting ban to locate such articles. These would then all need to be photocopied from the micro film, which would have taken too long and cost too much. This is clearly a limitation of the sampling and data collection because although the introduction and lifting of the broadcasting ban is well covered by the sample, the six year period during the broadcasting ban is not. Another major limitation resulting from the arduous nature of data collection is that whilst news articles, editorials and op-eds were all collected for coding, all supplements, letters to the editor and cartoons were not.30

As acknowledged above, the method of data collection in this research had several disadvantages, but also several advantages. Using such a method proved to be an advantage with regard to the development of the coding sheet for content analysis. Reading every page of the sampled newspapers to identify articles relating to the Northern Ireland conflict meant the subjects of the relevant newspaper articles soon became clear. Rough notes of potential subject categories were taken as the sample was collated and they were developed further once all the Northern Ireland conflict articles were photocopied. After drafting a coding sheet several times and then piloting it, ten Northern Ireland conflict subject categories were selected.31 These were used for coding all the newspaper articles in the sample of this research and will now be outlined.
The first subject category captures the 56 newspaper articles relating to the SAS executions of IRA members in Gibraltar and the subsequent inquiry. These executions as well as the following attack on mourners at the funeral of those IRA members by UDA/UFF member, Michael Stone, and the IRA executions of two British soldiers occurred in March 1988. However, the British government inquiry verdict that exonerated the SAS was published on 30th September 1988. As the sample period began on 1st October 1988, there was considerable attention to this subject in newspaper articles throughout the following days.

The second subject category covers the 22 newspaper articles relating to the attacking or killing of British combatants by the IRA. British combatants are considered to be British soldiers, RUC officers as well as prison officers. All of such articles occurred in the sample period covering the British government introducing the broadcasting ban. This is because the IRA had called a ceasefire on 31st August, 1994, meaning that IRA members did not attack or kill any British combatants in the sample period covering the British government’s lifting of the broadcasting ban.

The third subject category encompasses the 28 newspaper articles relating to the attacking or killing of civilians by the IRA. It was the IRA attack at Enniskillen on Remembrance Sunday (8th November, 1987) that was mentioned most often in 1988 newspaper articles. This IRA bombing killed eleven civilians (including Ronnie Hill who died after spending 13 years in a coma as a result of the attack), one RUC officer and injured sixty-three Protestant spectators. In 1994 newspaper articles, it was the IRA attack on Warrington city centre (20th March, 1993) that dominated, particularly one of the victims, Tim Parry, who was aged twelve when he was killed by the IRA attack. A three-year-old boy called Jonathan Ball was also killed in the bomb blasts at the Golden Square shopping mall and a further fifty-six were injured, but it was Tim Parry that received the vast majority of coverage.32

The fourth subject category captures the 24 newspaper articles relating to the attacking or killing of civilians by the UDA, UFF and UVF. Most of the articles covering this subject appeared in 1994 because Loyalist organisations attempted to provoke the IRA into breaking their ceasefire by carrying out sectarian attacks on Catholics in Northern Ireland, bombing the Belfast Sinn Féin headquarters on 4th September, 1994, and attempting, but failing, to bomb a train at Connolly train station
in Dublin on 12th September, 1994. The UFF shooting of 33-year-old John O’Hanlon was the first killing of a civilian by a loyalist organisation since the IRA ceasefire and was reported in several newspapers.

The fifth subject category focuses on newspaper articles relating to IRA suspect(s)/member(s) being arrested, imprisoned, released and extradited. It also covers IRA prisoner controversy such as IRA members escaping from prison, the discovery of IRA weapons in prison such as Semtex and the many newspaper articles that suggested IRA prisoners were given too many comforts such as free phone calls. There were 169 newspaper articles that covered such subjects.

The sixth subject category covers the 48 newspaper articles relating to the alleged Tom King assassination plot and trial. On 28th October 1988, three Irish citizens, Finbarr Cullen, Martina Shanahan, John McCann, were each given 25 year prison sentences for conspiring to murder Northern Ireland Secretary, Tom King. However, they were all released on 27th April 1990 after their convictions were overturned by the Court of Appeal.

The seventh subject category encompasses the 37 newspaper articles about the return of Margaret Thatcher and the Conservative Party to the Brighton Grand Hotel for the Conservative Party Conference on the fourth anniversary of the IRA attack there on 12th October 1984. Five prominent members of the Conservative Party were killed in the attack and a further thirty-four were injured. This anniversary of the bombing, frequently marked in the lead up to the British government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban recalled the horror of the attack in vivid and extensive detail, reminding the British public of the threat the IRA posed, but also underlining the alleged defiance and bravery of the British government by returning to the Grand Hotel four years after the IRA bombed it.

The book launch of Norman Tebbit’s memoirs, which coincided with the 1988 Conservative Party Conference, could explain the high number of articles reliving the IRA attack four years before. However, it would seem that the timing of the decision to introduce the broadcasting ban one week after the four year anniversary of the attack may have been motivated by reminding the British public of the IRA’s potential to commit atrocities and the British government’s resoluteness to this threat. This would certainly help to lay the foundations for building support for the broadcasting ban. Of course, this is only speculation and cannot be verified without conducting thorough analysis on the newspaper articles representing this anniversary.
The eighth subject category covers newspaper articles that focus on the British government’s introduction (19th October, 1988) and lifting (16th September, 1994) of the broadcasting ban. Obviously, it is this subject category that will be explored in extensive detail both quantitatively and qualitatively in this research. There were 101 newspaper articles concerning the broadcasting ban, plus 44 mentions of the broadcasting ban in newspaper articles which mainly focused on another subject relating to the Northern Ireland conflict.

The ninth subject category is the broadest because it covers everything relating to the Peace Process including the IRA ceasefire (31st August 1994), the UFF/UVF ceasefire (13th October 1994), Gerry Adams’ visit to the US as well as anything else relating to the Peace Process. There were 384 newspaper articles concerning the Peace Process as the main subject of story.

The tenth is the final subject category and covers any newspaper articles about the Northern Ireland conflict, which occurred twenty times or less. There were 119 articles that were categorised as ‘other’. These included articles referring to other attacks or killings of civilians by other combatants such as British soldiers and RUC officers (3 articles) or by unidentified combatants (4 articles). Articles about combatants attacking or killing combatants were also coded as ‘other’ such as UDA/UFF members being killed by other UDA/UFF members for suspected disloyalty (9 articles) and IRA members killing other IRA members for the same reason (2 articles). Also coded as ‘other’ were the 9 newspaper articles that referred to Ian Paisley’s ‘anti-christ’ outburst against the Pope on 11th October 1988 in the European Parliament, Strasbourg.

The two newspaper articles concerning acts of collusion between UDA members, the Force Research Unit (FRU) of the British Army and the RUC as well as the subsequent Stevens Inquiry were coded as ‘other’ too. Newspaper articles coded as ‘other’ also included those representing the debate over establishing a Conservative Party in Northern Ireland (6 articles), the British government ending suspects’ right to silence (12 articles) and forcing Northern Ireland local elections candidates to swear an oath renouncing violence (2 articles). Also coded as ‘other’ were newspaper articles that discussed reforms in the education system, electoral system or ‘law and order’ policies of Northern Ireland. There were 10 newspaper articles representing Northern Ireland reforms.
Combining research methods

Two research methods are combined in this analysis: content analysis and critical discourse analysis (CDA). Deacon et al. (1999: 114-5) argue that ‘too often, quantitative and qualitative approaches to the study of written texts have been regarded as mutually incompatible’. However, they suggest that when research methods are combined the weaknesses of each can be balanced out by the strengths of the other. Hansen et al. (1998) add weight to this notion of ‘eclectic methodological combination’ (Deacon et al., 1999: 162). They suggest the weaknesses of content analysis such as it’s fragmenting of textual wholes and ‘number crunching’ of narratives and its lack of a theory of meaning can be ‘enriched by the theoretical framework offered by other more qualitative approaches’ (Hansen et al., 1998: 91). At the same time, Hansen et al. (1998) argue content analysis brings ‘methodological rigour, prescriptions of use, and systematicity rarely found in many of the more qualitative approaches’ (Ibid.). These research methods will now be analysed in terms of their strengths and weaknesses and their application in this research.

Content Analysis

Content analysis is used in this research to quantify British newspaper representations of the Northern Ireland conflict during the periods when the British government introduced and lifted the broadcasting ban. The genre, size and prominence of all Northern Ireland articles are coded and counted as well as the dates of articles and occurrence of connecting images. Newspaper articles that did not focus on the broadcasting ban as the main subject of story, but did nonetheless mention it are also quantified. Finally, and most importantly, content analysis allowed the discourses present in the broadcasting ban articles from both time periods to be quantified. From this it was possible to discover which subjects dominated newspaper articles covering the Northern Ireland conflict and which discourses dominated newspaper articles representing the broadcasting ban.

Berelson (1952: 18) famously asserted that ‘content analysis is a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication’. It has long been accepted that content analysis is far from ‘objective’. The positivism of content analysis, which sought to ‘bring the rigour and
authority of ‘natural’ scientific inquiry to the study of human and social phenomena’ (Deacon et al., 1999: 115) is largely rejected today (McNabb, 2010). The main reason content analysis is not value-free is because ‘the findings of a particular content analysis are directly related to the definitions of the various content categories developed by the researcher’ (Dominick, 1978: 106–7). In other words, ‘the questions you ask of your material will influence the answers you get and the conclusions you reach’ (Deacon et al., 1999: 132).

Furthermore, as content analysis is concerned with the manifest content of communication, it overlooks the latent intentions of the text producer and the latent responses of the audience (Richardson, 2007). This also means ‘the recording of texts’ manifest content must necessarily ignore textual absences’ (Richardson, 2007: 20; original emphasis). Therefore, content analysis ‘is not well suited to studying ‘deep’ questions about textual and discursive forms’ (Deacon et al., 1999: 117).

Despite the weaknesses of content analysis, this methodology can be applied systematically. Even though the samples and variables are determined (unavoidably) by subjective decisions made by the researcher, it is still possible to apply them in a consistent manner and therefore ‘capture a sense of patterns or frequencies of meaning across a large sample of texts’ (Richardson, 2007: 21). Content analysis thus ‘ensure[s] a degree of rigour, precision and trustworthiness with respect to the resulting data’ (Deacon et al., 1999: 133). In addition, although content analysis does not account for textual absences, this is corrected by combining content analysis with CDA, which does focus on textual absence amongst many other things such as paradigmatic relations (relations of choice).

**Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)**

To begin with, it should be recognised that CDA is one of many forms of discourse analysis (Fairclough, 1994; 2002). Wetherell et al. (2004: 4-5) discuss six different discourse traditions, which are based on different theories of how ‘knowledge is built, subjectivity is constructed and society is managed’: (1) conversation analysis and ethnomethodology, (2) interactional sociolinguistics and the ethnography of communication, (3) discursive psychology, (4) critical discourse analysis and critical linguistics, (5) Bakhtinian research, and (6) Foucauldian research. It is also important to note that ‘there are many types of CDA, and these may be theoretically and
analytically quite diverse' (van Dijk, 2003). That said, 'given the common perspective and the general aims of CDA, we may also find overall conceptual and theoretical frameworks that are closely related' (Ibid.).

The theory of CDA:

Theoretical approaches in CDA 'come from an indefinite number of sources' (Bloor and Bloor, 2007: 4). Depending on the critical discourse analyst, there are several influences; from Vološinov and Bakhtin to Gramsci, Foucault and Baudrillard (Jones, 2004; Blommaert, 2005). Fairclough (2003: 2) argues that 'social analysis and research always has to take account of language' because it 'is an irreducible part of social life, dialectically interconnected with other elements of social life'. Clearly, 'language is a medium of power that can be used to sediment inequalities of power and legitimate iniquitous social relations' (Richardson, 2007: 14). Therefore, as Wodak (1995) argues, the purpose of CDA is to analyse 'opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language' (cited in Blommaert, 2005: 24-25).

'Texts' are viewed as a site of social struggle by critical discourse analysts (Fairclough, 1995; 2003). This notion follows the ideas of Vološinov and Bakhtin who positioned themselves against Saussure's view of language. Saussure (1986) suggested that meaning is created through a series of differences from an arbitrary system of signs. Instead, Vološinov and Bakhtin argued:

The meanings of words are derived [...] from the accumulated dynamic social use of particular forms of language in different contexts and for different and sometimes conflicting purposes. The nuances and connotations of words reflect this social and often contested history. (Maybin, 2004: 65)

Therefore, '[a] sign does not simply exist as a part of reality – it reflects and refracts another reality. Therefore, it may distort that reality or be true to it, or may perceive it from a special point of view, and so forth' (Vološinov, 1973: 10). Just as one person's terrorist is another's freedom fighter, one person's propaganda is another's candour. During the Northern Ireland conflict, representatives of the British elite would describe a man who kills another person (whether civilian or combatant) with an SA80 rifle as a 'soldier', but would describe a man who kills another person (whether civilian or combatant) with an AR-18 (ArmaLite) rifle as a 'terrorist'.
This ideological lexical choice may be accepted or rejected by ordinary English, Scottish, Welsh and Irish people, who would be subjected to the discourse through consumption of various media texts from newspaper articles to news broadcasts. The signs 'soldier' and 'terrorist' are obviously ideological and when applied in the above manner refract the reality from one group's perspective, giving different meaning to the same actions. Thus, '[e]verything ideological possesses semiotic value' (Ibid.; original emphasis) and '[t]he word is the ideological phenomenon par excellence' (Ibid.: 13; original emphasis).

Bakhtin referred to the authoritative, fixed and inflexible discourses as 'centripetal' forces and argued they were in constant tension with 'centrifugal' forces, which are alternative discourses based on differing views and experiences of the world that contradict the authoritative discourse (Maybin, 2004). Centripetal forces aim to unify and centralise discourse whereas the purpose of centrifugal forces is to decentralise discourse (Crowley, 1989). Bakhtin called this discursive conflict 'heteroglossia' and argued that the battle over meaning continues, widening and deepening, as language develops through time:

Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear. [...] Every utterance participates in the "unitary language" (in its centripetal forces and tendencies) and at the same time partakes of social and historical heteroglossia (the centrifugal, stratifying forces). (Bakhtin, 1981: 272)

Therefore, the 'contradiction-ridden, tension-filled unity of two embattled tendencies in the life of language' (Bakhtin, 1981: 272) must be exposed before it is possible to explain and analyse discourse. Bakhtin's (1981) approach is somewhat abstract, but it still identifies how the dominance of particular discourses in society reflect the balance of social forces at a given place and time. Texts are thus battlegrounds where the strengths and weaknesses of social forces are played out. Fairclough (1995) points out that all texts are constructed by part repetition and part creation and the degree of either depends upon the social conditions surrounding discursive events. Centripetal pressures on the production of texts arise from 'orders of discourse':

An order of discourse is a network of social practices in its language aspect. The elements of orders of discourse are not things like nouns and sentences (elements of linguistic structures), but discourses, genres and styles [...] . These elements select certain possibilities defined by languages and exclude
others — they control linguistic variability for particular areas of social life. So orders of discourse can be seen as the social organization and control of linguistic variation. (Fairclough, 2003: 24)

The emphasis on dominance in CDA surfaces here because whereas ‘some ways of making meaning are dominant or mainstream in a particular order of discourse, others are marginal, or oppositional, or ‘alternative’’ (Fairclough, 2002: 124). Centrifugal pressures on the production of texts arise from contradictions and conflicts in society which influence alternative discourses. CDA examines top-down relations of dominance, but it recognises the ability of, and encourages, the dominated to resist.

Van Dijk (1993: 300) defines dominance ‘as the exercise of social power by elites, institutions or groups, that results in social inequality, including political, cultural, class, ethnic, racial and gender inequality’. Power is seen as asymmetrical. The dominant in society have more power in actually creating and shaping texts as well as over how they are distributed and consumed. Very few people have enough money to set up a new national daily newspaper (Curran, 1996). Therefore, ‘freedom of the press is largely reserved for those that own one’ (Abbott Joseph Liebling cited in McChesney and Nichols, 2002: 26) and such wealthy people ‘have every motive to be dishonest on certain important topics’ (Orwell, 1945a: 307). In resistance to this, CDA provides an analytical framework for ‘studying language in its relation to power and ideology’ (Fairclough, 1995: 1). CDA can be regarded ‘as a resource for people who are struggling against domination and oppression in its linguistic forms’ (Ibid.).

The practice of CDA in this research:

This research follows the approach of Fairclough (1994; 1995; 2003) and Richardson (2004; 2007) for several reasons. Norman Fairclough founded the entire CDA programme (Blommaert, 2005) and has provided an accessible and applicable three-dimensional method of analysing discourse critically. John Richardson has reproduced this three-dimensional approach excellently and his actual CDA work often analyses British newspaper representations of conflicts waged by the British government, providing ideas and approaches for the methodology of this research.

The three dimensions in which Fairclough (1994; 1995; 2003) and Richardson (2004; 2007) analyse discourse are (1) textual analysis, (2) discursive practices and (3) social practices. In other words, CDA begins with textual analysis and gradually extends ‘outwards to include more complex discursive and social practices’
Discourse is approached as a circular process whereby social practices influence texts through shaping the way they are produced and texts help influence society through shaping the way they are consumed (Richardson, 2007).

**Analysing texts:**

Textual analysis, the first dimension of CDA, combines both content analysis and CDA. On its own, content analysis is inadequate because it only registers what is present in the text. However, in combination with CDA's more interpretative approach of examining texts in terms of 'what is included and what is excluded, what is made explicit or left implicit, what is foregrounded and what is backgrounded' (Fairclough, 1995: 104), it is possible 'to examine the role that journalism plays in maintaining and/or transforming social inequalities' (Richardson, 2007: 38). It is only possible to understand the choices made in constructing a text by analysing what discourses are present in the text and, crucially, what discourses are absent from the text. CDA examines the functions of these choices and the interests they serve.

There are many aspects to consider when analysing discourse in newspaper texts. Fairclough (1995) and Richardson (2007) argue textual analysis should commence with small-scale analysis by examining individual words and sentences, then gradually working towards large-scale analysis, which concludes with an explanation of how the narrative functions in the text. In light of the micro-analysis of individual words in texts, Richardson (2007) recognises that 'words convey the imprint of society and of value judgements in particular [...]'. All types of words, but particularly nouns, adjectives, verbs and adverbs carry connoted in addition to denoted meanings' (Richardson, 2007: 47). He also points out that:

THE words used to communicate the message(s) of a text – whether about an individual, a group of people, an event, a predicted or expected event, a process, a state of affairs or any of the other subjects and themes of newspaper texts – frame the story in direct and unavoidable ways. (Richardson, 2007: 47)

Therefore, it is clear why textual analysis must focus on lexical choice to begin with. Van Dijk’s (1998, 2006) ‘ideological square’ is a useful concept for describing the way in which lexical choice reflects the beliefs of a speaker or writer and their determination to fix particular meanings. His ideological square predicts that discourses referring to different racial or national groups (especially during conflicts)
will involve contrasting positive aspects about an imagined ‘us’ with negative aspects about an imagined ‘them’. Taking the example of the dominant discourses following the attacks against the World Trade Centre and Pentagon in 2001, it is clear that:

[N]ationalist, anti-terrorist, anti-Islam, anti-Arab and racist ideologies were rife, emphasizing the evil nature of terrorists, and the freedom and democratic principles of the ‘civilized’ nations. Thus, if Bush & Co. want to manipulate the politicians and/or the citizens in the USA into accepting going to war in Iraq, engaging in world-wide actions against terrorists and their protectors (beginning with Afghanistan), and adopting a bill that severely limits the civil rights of the citizens, such discourses would be massively ideological. That is, they do this by emphasizing ‘Our’ fundamental values (freedom, democracy, etc.) and contrast these with the ‘evil’ ones attributed to Others. (van Dijk, 2006: 374)

This positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation is attempted through text and talk by using referential and predicational strategies. Such strategies are used to assign particular meanings to people and can be seen as an attempt to construct a discourse for “us” (positive) and “them” (negative). Journalists have a choice of how they refer to, and describe, social actors or social events (as well as whether to include or exclude them altogether) and this choice will reflect their opinions or value judgements of such people and encourage the audience to view them either positively or negatively (Richardson, 2007). These subjective choices can be analysed by considering whether media texts constitute the four corners of the ideological square:

1. Express/emphasize information that is positive about us.
2. Express/emphasize information that is negative about them.
3. Suppress/de-emphasize information that is positive about them.
4. Suppress/de-emphasize information that is negative about us.

(Oktar, 2001: 319)

CDA is used in this research to deconstruct how the most prevalent discourses functioned to build support for, or opposition to, the broadcasting ban. The way in which journalists foregrounded and named the Republican Movement in broadcasting ban articles is explored to assess whether journalists used the propagandistic approach to terrorism and whether the ‘ideological square’ manifested as a result of their choices. The ways in which journalists expressed British government discourses justifying the broadcasting ban as well as additional discourses justifying and opposing the broadcasting ban emanating from other social actors are also analysed.
All significant discourses are explored by deconstructing and contextualising them using a combination of textual analysis approaches that focus on lexical choices, the foregrounding and backgrounding of social actors and discourses by journalists. Intertextual analysis is also used to explain the origins of the discourses and how they were refracted by journalists. For each discourse theme, the source of the discourse is explained before illustrating how it manifested in British newspapers articles from the time periods when the British government introduced and lifted the ban.

CDA is also used to explore a selection of individual newspaper articles representative of the ‘popular’, ‘mid-market’ and ‘quality’ newspaper genres. The textual analysis focuses on the most significant newspaper articles during the sample period in which the British government introduced the broadcasting ban, shifting from a general thematic analysis to a meticulous sentence by sentence analysis. This entails deconstructing each newspaper article from the headline through to the narrative of the entire article.

The naming and framing of social actors and their reported speech by journalists is examined as well as representations of the broadcasting ban discourses to explain how they operated interdiscursively in building support or opposition to the British government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban. To reveal the choices made by journalists in creating these newspaper articles, alternative constructions will be considered throughout as well as the potential impact of the actual representations compared to the alternative representations.

**Analysing discursive and social practices:**

The second dimension of CDA, discursive practices, ‘involves attention to processes of text production, distribution and consumption’ (Fairclough, 1995: 9). As Richardson (2007: 39) points out, ‘[i]t is at this stage that analysis becomes discourse analysis rather than textual analysis’. Discursive practices concern the processes in which the authors and audience of texts draw on already existing discourses for certain situations, which change through time and across societies and shape how texts are encoded and decoded. This entails not only analysing the newspaper article in its finished form, but explaining journalistic routines and processes involved in producing it as well as the circumstances and practices of newspaper readers (Fairclough, 1995). Richardson (2007: 40) acknowledges that ‘discursive practices are a two-way street’ between producer and text as well as text and consumer.
Regarding the relationship between producer and text, he suggests:

Clearly, and most obviously, the producer and the mode of production encode meaning into the text (choosing one story over another, choosing to foreground one view rather than another, choosing one word over another, etc.); but the text also acts on the producer, shaping the way that information is collected and presented due to the conventions of the text-genre under construction. (Ibid.)

Similarly, the relationship between text and consumer works both ways:

First, the messages of the text (which may or may not be ideological) attempt to shape the understandings of the reader [...]. When a text is consumed, [however,] this is done by readers who have perspectives, agendas and background knowledge that may differ radically from that encoded in the text. Hence, the reader of a newspaper may resist, subtly counter or directly misunderstand the encoded meaning of the report. (Ibid.: 40-41)

The third dimension of CDA, social practices, is where ‘discourse analysis becomes critical discourse analysis’ (Ibid.: 42). Analysis of social practices broadens the analysis of a text even further and situates it in society as a whole. This dimension goes one step further than the analysis of discursive practices by considering ‘the structures, the institutions and the values that, while residing outside of the newsroom, permeate and structure the activities and outputs of journalism’ (Ibid.: 114). It explains and expands the insights from the other two dimensions in relation to wider society by looking outside the text and examining ‘the relationships between journalism and the social formation as a whole’ (Ibid.).

Again, a dialectical relationship exists in sociocultural practice between society and discourse and between discourse and society: ‘the historic, economic, political and ideological features of society [...] forms a backdrop that both structures and enables the work of journalists’ (Ibid.: 43). Journalists, though limited by the structures of society, still have some power to act upon it because of their relative autonomy as workers. In other words, ‘reporting practices are not completely open, nor are they completely controlled by social circumstance’ (Ibid.: 115).

Indeed, from time to time, journalists have resisted the market and the state controlling the freedom of journalists to write and say what they want (Sparks, 2007). The resistance of broadcast media workers against the British government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban being a particularly relevant example here and
one that Sparks (2007) recalls. As journalists (with editorial approval) write the news and have the final say on what is included and excluded they can 'act upon the world, producing and reproducing social realities through either maintaining or transforming social beliefs' (Richardson, 2007: 115).

In this research, the second and third dimensions of CDA are used to analyse and explain the discursive and social practices impacting British newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban. The structuring influences within British journalism are analysed, including the generic conventions between and within newspapers as well as the political allegiances of newspapers. The impact of these structural influences on newspaper content is explained in terms of newspaper reader considerations, news values, source values and intertextuality. These aspects are then explored in terms of other significant factors existing outside the newsroom, which also impacted newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban.

Social practices such as the British government indirect pressure and 'anti-terrorism legislation' being used against the British mass media throughout the Northern Ireland conflict and the introduction of direct censorship during the latter years of it are analysed to explain how these, in turn, shaped discursive practices. Industrial disputes within the newspaper industry in the lead up to the broadcasting ban are also explored to explain the weakness of print media workers compared to broadcast media workers during that period. These government controls, industrial disputes, and the resistance of media workers are analysed in terms of struggles within the media and in society at large.

The politics of CDA:

Several criticisms are made of CDA. These range from the interpretive and ideological nature of research that is said to originate from the political stance taken by the critical discourse analyst (Widdowson, 1995; Schegloff, 1997) to the limited analysis of producers and consumers of texts (Widdowson, 2003; Philo, 2007). However, it is the explicit political stance taken by critical discourse analysts and the impact this is said to have on analyses, which provokes the most criticism (Wodak, 2002; Blommaert, 2005; Bloor and Bloor, 2007).

Widdowson (1995: 159) argues that the name 'critical discourse analysis' is a contradiction in terms because it is 'an exercise in interpretation' making it 'invalid as analysis'. He suggests that because critical discourse analysts take explicit position it
means texts are interpreted in ways that reinforce such positions. Fairclough (1996: 49) argues this is a misrepresentation of CDA resting 'upon a confusion between two senses of interpretation'. Revealing how discourse functions in texts is different to reading it in a subjective way and then presenting it as the only possible reading. CDA recognises that everyone interprets or makes meaning from texts differently depending on the context and interpreter and aims to 'show connections between both properties of texts and practices of interpretation' (Ibid.: 50).

Schegloff (1997: 183) argues CDA 'risks ending up merely ideological' by not closely analysing the conversations of ordinary people (presumably those who consume the texts under scrutiny in a particular CDA). Although he recognises CDA has a different project to conversation analysis (CA), he suggests that if critical discourse analysts were to analyse 'the local co-construction of interaction' (Ibid.), they would find that 'over and over again close examination of brief exchanges [...] yield rather more complex, and differently complexioned, understandings' (Ibid.: 180). He explicitly states that the reason this is not done by critical discourse analysts is due to 'the common impatience, and often intolerance, of close analysis' (Ibid.) as well as the fact that such analysis often yields results uncomfortably at variance with commonsense understanding or ideological predilections' (Ibid.). Unlike Widdowson (1995), Schegloff (1997) does not specify which particular approach or practitioner of CDA he is criticising (Wetherell, 1998; Billig, 1999a), but like Widdowson (1995), he does suggest CDA looks for what it wants to find.

Widdowson (1995) also criticises CDA for its vague use of the concept of discourse and the multiple meanings given to it within CDA. He argues 'discourse is something everybody is talking about but without knowing with any certainty just what it is: in vogue and vague' (Widdowson, 1995: 158). It is true that discourse is analysed by many in academia and has become popular in the fields of humanities and social sciences, however, differing definitions of discourse do not equate to ignorance. Instead, it illustrates that definitions of discourse are dependent on the differing theories of each discipline. Definitions of seemingly simple concepts are often contested and used differently by different people such as the concept of ideology (Fairclough, 1996). Therefore, trying to come up with a single definition for a concept used in various ways is a 'hopeless and fruitless task, unless one wishes to brick oneself up within the four walls of one's discipline' (Fairclough, 1996: 54). It is far more constructive to explain how you understand and use the concept of discourse.
In terms of CDA, Richardson (2007) contrasts the formalist definition of discourse with that of functionalists. He suggests that formalists ‘define discourse as a particular unit of language’ (Richardson, 2007: 22) whereas functionalists define discourse as more than a unit of language, connecting discourse with its linguistic form as well as its function in social relations (language in use). It is important to make this distinction because the functionalist definition of discourse recognises that ‘language is used to mean something and to do something [...] linked to the context of its usage [and] linked to wider inter-personal, institutional, socio-cultural and material contexts’ (Ibid.: 24).

The functionalist approach to discourse is used in this research to understand and explain how discourses relating to the broadcasting ban functioned to build support and opposition for British government censorship. Analysing text and talk in this way meant it was possible to reveal choices made by social actors, which appeared to be neutral statements of fact, but actually served ideological purposes. For example, when Home Secretary Douglas Hurd introduced the broadcasting ban on 19th October 1988, he stated that there was a similar ban in the Irish Republic. Whilst this was true, it was also a discursive choice that served his own side in the struggle over the meaning of the broadcasting ban. In contrast, opponents of the ban chose to underline that Ireland was the only country in Europe to practice such censorship and argued the ban made Britain similar to Apartheid South Africa and the Soviet Union.

Another criticism of CDA relates to its ‘text only’ analysis (Philo, 2007). Widdowson (2003: 366) states that ‘producers and consumers of texts are never consulted’ and Threadgold (2003) argues serious ethnographies are needed to strengthen any inferences made by CDA. Philo (2007) contrasts the approach of CDA to that of the Glasgow University Media Group (GUMG), arguing that the latter is more vigorous because it analyses processes of production and reception as well as conducting textual analyses. This criticism of CDA is certainly justified in general. GUMG analyses of textual production and consumption entail interviewing journalists, politicians and members of the general public, whereas practitioners of CDA often do not directly speak to such people. That said, as Philo (2007) recognises, some CDA does analyse the production and consumption of texts. In this research, although it would be interesting, it is not possible to analyse the production and consumption of Northern Ireland conflict newspaper articles as the time period of this research is too long past for such analysis. Nevertheless, it is a limitation.
In this research, it is argued the strengths of CDA outweigh its weaknesses. Being aware of, and explicitly stating, your own political perspective in research is beneficial because, firstly, those that do are more honest to their audience and to themselves. Secondly, exposing and criticising ‘the power elites that enact, sustain, legitimate, condone or ignore social inequality and injustice’ (van Dijk, 1993: 252), means that such practices can be resisted and changed. As Antonio Gramsci (1917) put it: ‘I am alive, therefore I take sides’ (cited in Young, 1998: 58).

It is hard to be impartial in a world of war, injustice and inequality. Therefore, it is hard to believe when some academics and journalists who write about aspects of that world claim to be objective. CDA seeks to show that text and talk is rarely neutral and that a particular discourse serves a particular interest. Discourses of impartiality often serve to perpetuate a particular interest in a more astute way as ‘the more one is aware of political bias the more one can be independent of it, and the more one claims to be impartial the more one is biased’ (Orwell, 1949: 505). Discourses of impartiality are similar to absent discourses altogether because ‘[a]ttimes to be silent is to lie. For silence can be interpreted as acquiescence’ (Miguel de Unamuno cited in Thomas, 2003: 487).

Indeed, a further strength of CDA concerns its acknowledgement of absent discourses. As was noted earlier, content analysis only analyses manifest content, but CDA analyses paradigmatic relations (relations of choice). This involves exploring ‘significant absences’ in texts (Fairclough, 2003). Texts are analysed in terms of ‘what is actually present and what might have been present but is not’ (Fairclough, 2003: 36) and this is done on different levels:

[The text includes certain grammatical structures and a certain vocabulary and certain semantic relations and certain discourses or genres; it might have included others, which were available and possible, but not selected. (Ibid)]

By focusing on what elements of social events and which social actors are excluded, it is possible to understand how texts work ideologically. For example, in the build up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Anglo-American mass media consistently failed to inform its audience about the CIA bringing the Ba’athists to power and Saddam Hussein being a Western ally for many years despite being a brutal dictator that gassed ‘his own people’ (Keeble, 2004). Similarly, the Anglo-American mass media generally excluded social actors who were opposed to invading Iraq (Kumar, 2006).
Methodological approach: summary

The sample of this research is representative of the British newspaper industry in terms of newspaper genre, political sympathy and circulation. However, the time period in which Northern Ireland conflict and broadcasting ban newspaper articles were collected is limited for two reasons. Firstly, the duration of the broadcasting ban is not covered by the sample. Secondly, Sunday editions of the sampled newspapers are not included in the time periods before and after the British government introduced and lifted the broadcasting ban.

Another major limitation resulting from the manual method of data collection is that whilst news articles, editorials and op-eds were all collected for coding, all supplements, letters to the editor and cartoons were not. That said the range of the two time periods used in this research capture relevant newspaper articles in the eighteen days before and after the ban was introduced and lifted. Therefore, these time periods are thorough and more than adequate for the purposes of this research, that is, discovering how the British government's broadcasting ban was represented by British newspapers and whether journalists supported or resisted such censorship.

Combining content analysis and critical discourse analysis (CDA) strengthens the methodological approach of this research because the weaknesses of such quantitative and qualitative research methods can be balanced out by the strengths of the other. Therefore, content analysis, which only captures manifest data, can be strengthened by CDA, which analyses what is absent as well as present in data. Likewise, CDA cannot be used to analyse large bodies of data, especially when they are collected manually as is the case in this research. However, content analysis can systematically quantify important aspects within all newspaper articles collected in this research, including the discourses, which CDA can then deconstruct in detail.

Content analysis is used in this research to quantify British newspaper representations of the Northern Ireland conflict during the periods when the British government introduced and lifted the broadcasting ban. This reveals which subjects dominated newspaper articles covering the Northern Ireland conflict. The genre, size and prominence of all Northern Ireland articles are coded and counted as well as the dates of articles and occurrence of connecting images. The discourses present in the broadcasting ban articles from both time periods are quantified also to reveal which discourses dominated newspaper articles representing the broadcasting ban.
Despite early positivist claims regarding the ‘objectivity’ of content analysis, it is now largely accepted that this is not the case because all the questions asked of the data are chosen by the researcher. This is unavoidable and should not be considered a limitation. Proponents of CDA actually embrace the inevitable choices made in research and encourage the taking of sides in social problems such as discrimination and abuse against people based on their ethnicity, nationality, gender, class, sexual preference, etc. Obviously, CDA practitioners should side with the oppressed and fight the oppressor by explaining how discourse functions to normalise such inequality in society so that it can be challenged and overcome in the material world as well as how it is normalised discursively.

Although criticisms of the explicit political stance taken by critical discourse analysts can easily be rebuffed, a genuine limitation of CDA is the lack of ethnographic and audience research. Analysing processes of production through ethnographies or interviews of journalists working for various newspapers and consumption of texts through audience research of newspaper readers provide much deeper insights into the circuit of communication. However, in this research, it is not possible to analyse the production and consumption of Northern Ireland conflict newspaper articles as the time period of this research is too long past for such methodologies. Nevertheless, it is a limitation of the methodological approach.

The approach to CDA in this research is modelled on the three-dimensional method of analysing discourse critically used by Norman Fairclough and John Richardson. This entails approaching newspaper articles in terms of (1) textual analysis, (2) discursive practices and (3) social practices. It is the textual analysis of newspaper articles representing the Northern Ireland conflict and broadcasting ban where content analysis and CDA are combined. The analysis of discursive and social practices involves examining the processes in which authors and audiences encode and decode texts based on already existing discourses and situates them in the structures, institutions and values of a society.

CDA is used in this research to deconstruct how the most prevalent discourses functioned to build support for, or opposition to, the broadcasting ban as well as how journalists represented them and the social actors involved in the Northern Ireland conflict. All the significant discourses are explored by deconstructing and contextualising them using a combination of textual analysis approaches that focus on lexical choices, the foregrounding and backgrounding of social actors and discourses
by journalists and intertextual analysis to explain the origins of the discourses and how they were refracted by journalists. A selection of individual newspaper articles representative of the 'popular', 'mid-market' and 'quality' newspaper genres are also explored to explain how they operated interdiscursively in building support or opposition to the British government's introduction of the broadcasting ban.

The discursive and social practices impacting British newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban are analysed in this research to explain the structuring influences within British journalism such as the generic conventions between and within newspapers as well as the political allegiances of newspapers. These aspects are then explored in terms of other significant factors existing outside the newsroom, which also impacted newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban. Social practices such as government controls, industrial disputes, and the resistance of media workers are analysed in terms of struggles within the media and in society at large. The content analysis and CDA findings of this research are outlined in the next four chapters.
Chapter 4 – Content Analysis: Textual Analysis I

In this chapter, the subject categories of all newspaper articles representing the Northern Ireland conflict during the sample periods of this research are quantified and presented. Following this, there is a focus on the newspaper articles representing the broadcasting ban, quantifying how many featured the ban as the main subject of story and how many referred to it in a different subject of story related to the Northern Ireland conflict. The generic composition, image presence, prominence and size of broadcasting ban newspaper articles are then explored before quantifying all the discourses present in the broadcasting ban newspaper articles from the time periods in which the British government introduced and lifted this censorship.

Graph 1 – Subjects of Northern Ireland conflict newspaper articles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A = SAS kill IRA members in Gibraltar</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B = IRA attack/kill British combatants</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C = IRA attack/kill civilians</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D = UDA/UFF/UVF attack/kill civilians</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E = IRA 'law and order'</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F = Tom King assassination plot/trial</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G = Brighton bomb fourth anniversary</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H = Broadcasting Ban</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I = Peace Process</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J = Other</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There were 101 broadcasting ban newspaper articles out of the total sample of 988 relating to the Northern Ireland conflict, which is 10.2%. As illustrated above in Graph 1, several subjects relating to the Northern Ireland conflict featured more than the subject of the broadcasting ban. The ‘Peace Process’ was the main subject of story for many newspaper articles with a total of 384 across the six newspapers in the sample, which is 39% of the total articles relating to the Northern Ireland conflict. There were also 169 articles (17%) covering IRA ‘law and order’ stories and 119 articles (12%) coded as ‘other’.
Graph 2 reveals that *The Guardian* featured the most broadcasting ban newspaper articles with 28 of the total 101 broadcasting ban articles, or 27.7%. In descending order, from the highest to the lowest number of broadcasting ban articles, the remaining newspapers were *The Daily Telegraph* with 23 broadcasting ban articles (22.8%), *Daily Express* with 17 (16.8%), *Daily Mirror* with 12 (11.9%), *Daily Mail* with 11 (10.9%) and *The Sun* with 10 (9.9%). Predictably, there were considerably more newspaper articles about the broadcasting ban when it was introduced by the British government. There were 73 newspaper articles in which the broadcasting ban was the main subject of story (72.28% of the total ban newspaper articles) in the sample period covering its introduction in 1988 and 28 newspaper articles representing its lifting in 1994 (27.72% of the total ban newspaper articles).
Although there were 101 broadcasting ban newspaper articles (10.2% of total Northern Ireland conflict articles) in the sample, the broadcasting ban was mentioned in a further 44 newspaper articles (4.5% of other Northern Ireland conflict articles) where the main subject of the story was something else related to the Northern Ireland conflict. As Graph 3 illustrates, *The Daily Telegraph* had the most mentions of the broadcasting ban in newspaper articles in which the ban was not the main subject of the story with 11 (25% of total Northern Ireland conflict articles that mentioned the ban). In descending order, from the highest to the lowest mentions of the broadcasting ban in Northern Ireland conflict articles, the remaining newspapers were *The Daily Mail* and *Daily Express*, which both had 9 articles (or 20.5% of total Northern Ireland conflict articles mentioning the ban), *The Guardian* had 8 articles (18.2%), *The Sun* had 4 (9.1%) and there were 3 in the *Daily Mirror* (6.8%).

**Graph 4 – Broadcasting ban mentions in subject categories**

![Graph 4 - Broadcasting ban mentions in subject categories](image)

Graph 4 reveals that the broadcasting ban was mentioned most often in newspaper articles where the main subject of story was the ‘Peace Process’. The broadcasting ban was mentioned in 31 ‘Peace Process’ articles (70.5% of total Northern Ireland conflict newspaper articles mentioning the ban). The next highest number of references to the broadcasting ban occurred in newspaper articles where the main subject of story was ‘Other’ with 12 (26.1%). There was one IRA ‘law and order’ newspaper article that mentioned the ban, which is 2.3% of the total Northern Ireland conflict articles mentioning the ban.
Most broadcasting ban articles did not feature corresponding images. Graph 5 illustrates that 23 broadcasting ban articles had corresponding images (22.8%) and 78 did not (77.2%). This is a very low amount compared to the total of Northern Ireland conflict articles which did (41%) and did not (59%) feature corresponding images. Tattersall (2008) argues it is images (as well as headlines) that act as ‘entry points’ and attract readers to particular newspaper articles. Therefore, it is an interesting find that so many broadcasting ban newspaper articles did not have corresponding images.
Graph 6 reveals the vast majority of broadcasting ban articles in the sample were news articles. From the 101 broadcasting ban articles, 77 were coded as news articles equating to 76.2%. There were 16 editorials (15.8%) and 8 op-eds (7.9%) concerning the broadcasting ban as the main subject of story. Comparing the genre of broadcasting ban and total Northern Ireland conflict newspaper articles, it is possible to see that the ratio between news articles, editorials and op-eds is consistent. Of the Northern Ireland conflict newspaper articles collected in the sample, there were 830 news articles (84%), 86 editorials (8.7%) and 72 op-eds (7.3%). The major difference between the genre of broadcasting ban articles and Northern Ireland conflict articles is the frequency of editorials, with the former having 6% more editorials than the latter.

Graph 7 – Prominence of broadcasting ban and total newspaper articles

The majority of broadcasting ban articles appeared between pages 2 and 10. There were 34 broadcasting ban articles on pages 4-10, which is 33.7% of all broadcasting ban articles. The next highest occurrence of broadcasting ban articles, with 33, appeared on pages 2-3 (32.7% of all broadcasting ban articles). Continuing in descending order, there were 13 broadcasting ban articles on pages 21+ (12.9%), 11 lead the front page (10.9%), there were 5 on pages 11-20 (5%) and 5 appeared on the front page (5%), but did not lead. Comparing the prominence of broadcasting ban articles to that of the total Northern Ireland conflict articles, it is possible to see that the occurrence of broadcasting ban articles and total Northern Ireland conflict articles are most consistent between pages 2 and 10. 35.4% of the total Northern Ireland conflict articles appeared on pages 4-10 and 31.8% of them were on pages 2-3.
However, Graph 7 also shows there is a difference between the prominence of broadcasting ban articles and total Northern Ireland conflict articles for the other page number categories. Considerably fewer Northern Ireland conflict articles lead the front page (6.4%) than broadcasting ban articles. This was also true for articles on pages 21+ (7.1%). However, the reverse was true for the non-leading front page articles (9.3%) as well as those on pages 11-20 (10%) with the total Northern Ireland conflict articles featuring considerably more articles in these page number categories than broadcasting ban articles.

Graph 8 – Size of broadcasting ban and total newspaper articles

Graph 8 illustrates that most broadcasting ban newspaper articles were smaller than an eighth of a page in size. There were 70 broadcasting ban articles of this size, or 69.3% of total broadcasting ban articles. The next smallest size of articles, between an eighth and a quarter of the page, had the next highest number of occurrences of broadcasting ban articles with 21 (20.8% of total broadcasting ban articles). Continuing this trend, there were 9 broadcasting ban articles that were between a quarter and a half of the page in size (9.2%) and one that was between half and a whole page (1%). The sizes of broadcasting ban articles were consistent with most other subject categories relating to Northern Ireland conflict. 618 (62.6%) of the total 988 Northern Ireland conflict articles were less than an eighth of a page in size, 225 (22.8%) were between an eighth and a quarter of a page, 91 (9.2%) were between a quarter and a half of a page, and 54 (5.5%) were between half and a whole page.
Thus far, the content analysis in this research has highlighted that there are few Northern Ireland conflict newspaper articles that focus on, or refer to, the broadcasting ban. This claim is based on three considerations: firstly, the time periods that were sampled, secondly, the newspapers that were sampled and, thirdly, the number of newspaper articles concerning other Northern Ireland conflict subjects. The time periods in which the broadcasting ban was introduced and lifted were meticulously searched for broadcasting ban articles and the sampled newspapers were representative of the British national newspaper industry. Every page of the news, editorial and op-ed sections of the sampled newspapers was studied for eighteen days (excluding Sundays) before and after the introduction and the lifting of the broadcasting ban. Despite this, there were only 101 newspaper articles in which the main subject of story concerned the broadcasting ban. In addition, more than half of these articles appeared in just two of the six sampled newspapers: *The Guardian* and *The Daily Telegraph* (the newspapers representative of the ‘quality’ press).

The comparatively high number of newspaper articles concerning other Northern Ireland conflict related subjects also strengthens the claim that there were few articles that focus on, or refer to, the broadcasting ban. Considering the sample of this research was designed to capture broadcasting ban newspaper articles, many more newspaper articles featuring other Northern Ireland conflict related subjects were present. The total number of newspaper articles collated in this research suggests that a lot of print media attention was given to the Northern Ireland conflict and the peace process generally, but there was little media attention given to the broadcasting ban.

References to the broadcasting ban were also few with just 44 mentions in all newspaper articles concerning the Northern Ireland conflict. Although these broadcasting ban mentions have been identified and acknowledged, there will be no further investigation of them as the main focus of this research regards newspaper articles in which the broadcasting ban was the main subject of story. Likewise, the generic composition, image presence, prominence and size of broadcasting ban articles have been explored and documented, but will no longer be discussed as it is now necessary to turn to the discursive composition of newspaper articles representing the introduction and lifting of the broadcasting ban.

When the British government introduced the broadcasting ban in 1988 British newspapers expressed discourses emanating from many social actors, including journalists (particularly those working in the British broadcast media), representatives
of some of the eleven banned organizations as well as British politicians. Although, there was a lot of opposition to the British government’s broadcasting ban, there was also a lot of support for it when it was introduced, including the overt support of several British newspaper editorials. However, this support declined once the ban was put into practice. By the time the British government lifted the broadcasting ban in 1994, British politicians and newspapers were unanimously against it. Every discourse that was present in the 101 newspaper articles representing the introduction and lifting of the broadcasting ban has been categorised and quantified, revealing which discourses were most prevalent in newspaper articles representing the broadcasting ban.

Table 1 – Discourses in broadcasting ban newspaper articles during 1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discourses</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IRA/SF are the main targets of the ban</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRA is a terrorist organisation/SF is an IRA front</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorists must be starved of the oxygen of publicity</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A similar ban already exists in Irish Republic</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban is beneficial to the IRA</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban just one of several anti-terrorism policies</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban is undemocratic/threat to civil liberties</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban is too vague/confusing for broadcasters to interpret</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadcasters are irresponsible (especially the BBC)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban is not enough, SF should be proscribed</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offence to public</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban is justified/right/sensible</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban is unjustified/wrong/foolish</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban will not stop the IRA or SF</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerry Adams is an elected MP/SF is a political party</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public capable of making own judgement</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban will make media reporting of NI incomplete</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRA/SF appearances harm themselves</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban is not censorship</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRA/SF media appearances give them respectability</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban makes Britain comparable to South Africa</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban makes Britain look repressive and ridiculous</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban sets a damaging precedent</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban is censorship</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRA/SF media appearances are rare/hostile already</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban is worthless in the real fight against terrorism</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>425</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1 reveals there was a broad range of discourses circulating in the newspaper articles representing the British government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban that functioned to build support and opposition to such censorship. This is understandable because there were a lot more newspaper articles representing the British government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban than there were when it was lifted. There was also a division amongst elite social actors as to whether media censorship was the best solution for dealing with the Northern Ireland conflict. In 1988, 26 discourses were expressed frequently enough to be considered worthy of their own category for quantification. Those discourses amounting to 1% or less of the total discourses were coded as other and together constituted 44 of the total 425 occasions on which all discourses were expressed, or 10.4%.

In descending order, from the highest to the lowest number, the ten most frequently expressed discourses in newspaper articles representing the British government introducing the broadcasting ban were as follows. The most frequently expressed individual discourse was one that constructed the IRA and Sinn Féin as the main targets of the broadcasting ban. This discourse was expressed on 51 occasions, or 12% of the total broadcasting ban discourses expressed during 1988. The next most frequently expressed discourse was one that represented the IRA as a terrorist organisation and Sinn Féin as an IRA front, which featured on 44 occasions (10.4%). The discourse arguing that ‘terrorists’ must be starved of the ‘oxygen of publicity’ was expressed on 34 occasions (8%). There was also a discourse acknowledging that a similar ban already exists in the Irish Republic, which was expressed 24 times (5.6%) and there was another expressed frequently that represented the broadcasting ban as a propaganda gift for the IRA with 20 occurrences (4.7%).

There were 18 occurrences (4.2%) of the discourse that represented the broadcasting ban as just one of several anti-terrorism policies being introduced (these policies, which included an end to suspects’ right to silence, were most often represented as a reaction to an upsurge in IRA violence during the summer of 1988, most notably the IRA attack on British soldiers in Ballygawley). The next most frequently expressed discourse, with 17 occurrences (4%) represented the broadcasting ban as undemocratic and/or a threat to civil liberties. There were 16 expressions (3.8%) of the following discourses that referred to broadcasters (albeit in completely different ways) with one discourse representing the ban as too vague/confusing for broadcasters to interpret and the other discourse representing
broadcasters as irresponsible (especially the BBC). The next most frequently expressed discourse, with 14 occurrences (3.3%) argued the broadcasting ban did not go far enough and that Sinn Féin should be proscribed. Although there are many more interesting discourses in newspaper articles representing the British government introducing the broadcasting ban, it is these ten discourses that were most frequently expressed and therefore can be considered most significant.

Table 2 – Discourses in broadcasting ban newspaper articles during 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discourses</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IRA/SF are the main targets of the ban</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban lifted as part of Ulster package</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban should be lifted now/Lifting the ban is welcomed</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban was a farce because of dubbing</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF/IRA must use peaceful methods now ban is lifted</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorists must be starved of the oxygen of publicity</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRA is a terrorist organisation/SF is an IRA front</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban stopped broadcasters questioning SF properly</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish actors improve the image of SF</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban made media reporting of NI incomplete</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban is propaganda gift for the IRA</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban introduced after Ballygawley</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban no longer serves its purpose</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irish ban has already been lifted</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban lifted too quickly</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban was counter-productive (no reason stated)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public capable of making own judgement</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As illustrated in Table 2, there was a narrower range of discourses circulating in the newspaper articles representing the British government lifting the broadcasting ban, which can be explained by elite social actors being united on the need to lift the broadcasting ban. By the time the British government lifted the ban in 1994, there was no support for such media censorship, which meant far fewer newspaper articles represented the British government lifting the broadcasting ban than when it was introduced. There were 16 discourses expressed frequently enough to be considered worthy of their own category for quantification. Those discourses amounting to 1% or less of the total discourses were coded as other and together constituted 16 of the total 215 occasions on which all discourses were expressed, or 7.4%.

83
Several of the discourses present in newspaper articles representing the British government introducing the broadcasting ban were also present in those representing its lifting. The joint-first most prevalent discourse expressed in newspaper articles representing the lifting of the broadcasting ban was also the one constructing the IRA and Sinn Féin as the main targets of it. This discourse was expressed on 28 occasions, or 13% of the total broadcasting ban discourses expressed during 1994. Interestingly, the discourse representing the IRA as a terrorist organisation and Sinn Féin as an IRA front as well as the discourse arguing terrorists must be starved of the 'oxygen of publicity' were expressed far less often in 1994 with only 12 occurrences (5.6%) each; making them the joint-seventh most frequently expressed discourses as opposed to 1988 when they were the second and third most prevalent discourses respectively.

The remaining most frequently expressed discourses in newspaper articles representing the British government lifting the broadcasting ban were as follows. One of the other joint-first most prevalent discourses, with 28 occurrences (13%), emphasised that the ban was lifted as part of a package for Ulster by the British government. The other argued that the broadcasting ban should be lifted (in newspaper articles before 16th September, 1994) or that its lifting is welcomed (in newspaper articles after 16th September, 1994). This discourse clearly supported the lifting of this censorship as did the next most prevalent discourse, expressed 21 times (9.8%), which argued the broadcasting ban was a farce because of Irish actors dubbing the voices of Sinn Féin representatives.

The next three most prevalent discourses also centred on the Republican Movement. The discourse calling for Sinn Féin and the IRA to commit to purely peaceful methods now that the ban had been lifted featured on 19 occasions (8.8%) in newspaper articles representing the British government lifting the broadcasting ban. As already mentioned the discourse representing the Republican Movement pejoratively and the discourse arguing terrorists must be starved of the 'oxygen of publicity' were expressed 12 times (5.6%). The remaining three discourses of the most prevalent ten discourses in newspaper articles representing the British government lifting the broadcasting ban were all expressed on 8 occasions (3.7%). These discourses argued the ban had stopped broadcasters questioning Sinn Féin properly (in other words holding them to account for IRA actions), that Irish actors had actually improved the image of Sinn Féin representatives, and that the broadcasting ban had made media reporting of Northern Ireland incomplete.

84
The content analysis findings reveal that broadcasting ban newspaper articles accounted for a small amount of British newspaper coverage of the Northern Ireland conflict. In addition to this there were few mentions of the broadcasting ban in newspaper articles where the main subject of the story was something else related to the Northern Ireland conflict. Considering the representative sample of newspapers and the specific focus of the time period as well as the number of newspaper articles concerning other Northern Ireland conflict related subjects within them, it can be said that the broadcasting ban was not considered newsworthy by the British newspaper industry in general. More specifically, the newsworthiness of the broadcasting ban is dependent on the sampling period and on the newspaper genre.

There were considerably more newspaper articles concerning the broadcasting ban when the British government introduced it, rather than when the British government lifted it. This is predictable because newspaper articles reflected the division amongst elite social actors over whether to support the broadcasting ban at the beginning. There were also considerably more newspaper articles concerning the broadcasting ban in newspapers representative of the ‘quality’ press, which accounted for more than half of the broadcasting ban newspaper articles. This can be explained by the assumed audience demographic of such a newspaper genre, that is, editors of The Guardian and the Daily Telegraph expect their readers to be more educated and more interested in serious news.

Another finding from the content analysis in this research concerning corresponding images of newspaper articles could also suggest the British newspaper industry did not consider the broadcasting ban to be particularly newsworthy in general. There were very few broadcasting ban articles that featured corresponding images compared to the total of Northern Ireland conflict articles that did. That said, the other findings from the content analysis in this research concerning the genre, prominence and size of newspaper articles were consistent for those concerning the broadcasting ban and the other Northern Ireland conflict subject categories.

The content analysis also revealed that there was a broader range of discourses circulating in the newspaper articles when the British government introduced the broadcasting ban in 1988 compared to when it was lifted in 1994. This is understandable because there were a lot more newspaper articles representing the
British government's introduction of the broadcasting ban than there were when it was lifted. There was also a division amongst elite social actors as to whether media censorship was the best solution for dealing with the Northern Ireland conflict at the beginning. By the time the British government lifted the ban, there was no support for such media censorship, which meant far fewer newspaper articles and a narrower range of discourses. Now that the discourses circulating in newspaper articles representing the British government introducing and lifting the broadcasting ban have been quantified, it is possible to explore them qualitatively by using CDA in the following three chapters.
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) has been used here to qualitatively explore British newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban in the periods when the British government introduced and lifted the ban. In the previous chapter, all the discourses present in broadcasting ban articles were quantified so now it is possible to deconstruct how the most prevalent discourses functioned to build support for, or opposition to, the broadcasting ban. In this chapter, the way in which journalists foregrounded and named the Republican Movement in broadcasting ban articles is explored as well as the way they expressed British government discourses justifying the broadcasting ban and other discourses justifying and opposing the broadcasting ban emanating from additional social actors.

All the significant discourses are explored by deconstructing and contextualising them using a combination of textual analysis approaches that focus on lexical choices, the foregrounding and backgrounding of social actors and discourses by journalists. Intertextual analysis is also used to explain the origins of the discourses and how they were refracted by journalists. For each discourse theme, the source of the discourse is explained before illustrating how it manifested in British newspapers articles from the time periods when the British government introduced and lifted the broadcasting ban.

Foregrounding and naming the Republican Movement

The most prevalent discourse and most likely to be articulated first in newspaper articles represented the ban as mainly targeting the IRA and/or Sinn Féin. In this section, the way in which such foregrounding operated interdiscursively with the pejorative naming of the Republican Movement is explored. Several scholars have already acknowledged that the British government attempted to de-politicise and de-legitimise the motivations of the Republican Movement by representing them as 'terrorists' and 'criminals' (Schlesinger et al., 1983; Curtis, 1984; Miller, 1994; Cottle, 1997; McGovern, 2010).

As a consequence of journalists’ reliance on elite social actors as sources, it is hardly surprising that newspaper articles also foregrounded and named the Republican Movement in ways that benefitted the British government. It is significant, however,
as it would have normalised the British government’s position on the conflict and the broadcasting ban. Using excerpts from newspaper articles representing the British government introducing and lifting the ban, the way in which journalists foregrounded and named the Republican Movement will now be analysed. The potential consequences of such representations on British newspaper readers will then be considered to suggest how these dominant discourses operated interdiscursively in both time periods to build support as well as opposition for the broadcasting ban.

Introducing the ban (1988):

Although foregrounding the Republican Movement was consistent across both sample periods, constructing members of the Republican Movement pejoratively was far more common during the British government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban. The discourse constructing the IRA and/or Sinn Féin as being the main targets of the broadcasting ban was expressed on 51 occasions (12%) in newspaper articles in this period. The next most prevalent discourse, with 44 occurrences (10.4%), represented the IRA as a ‘terrorist’ organisation and Sinn Féin or Gerry Adams as an IRA ‘front’, ‘mouthpiece’ or ‘apologist’. As the similar number of occurrences suggests, these discourses were often expressed together. Arguably, these discourses functioned to support the British government introducing the broadcasting ban because such foregrounding and naming singles out Republican organisations as the main threat to the public. A threat which, according to this discourse, the British government has responded to by banning representatives of Republican organisations from making direct television and radio broadcasts.

The IRA and Sinn Féin were consistently foregrounded as the main targets of the broadcasting ban and represented as ‘terrorist’ organisations either through collocation or direct naming. Significantly and in contrast to the representation of Loyalist organisations, it is often the journalists directly naming Republican organisations pejoratively as opposed to them reporting the speech of a social actor doing so. For example, the headline and opening sentence of the following *Daily Mirror* article, which was published a day after the British government introduced the broadcasting ban, identifies the IRA and its ‘front-men’ as the main targets of the ban as well as labelling them ‘Irish terrorists’: ‘A ban on TV and radio interviews with Irish terrorists and their supporters was announced by Home Secretary Douglas Hurd yesterday’ (*Daily Mirror*, IRA’S FRONT-MEN GAGGED BY HURD, 20.10.88).
Considering this newspaper was the least supportive of the British government's introduction of the broadcasting ban, it is interesting that the Daily Mirror journalist still perpetuates the discourse of the Republican Movement (the IRA and its 'front-men') as 'terrorists'. Indeed, it is this discourse that journalists could not and did not step outside of. Therefore, not one broadcasting ban article represented Irish Republican Army combatants as 'guerrillas', 'insurgents', 'freedom fighters' or 'soldiers'. Instead, IRA members were consistently represented as 'terrorists'. This suggests Chomsky's (2002) contention about the propagandistic approach to terrorism being adopted by governments, large sections of academia and the mass media in 'Western' societies is correct when considering the discourses expressed by the British government, orthodox academics and the British journalists during the Northern Ireland conflict.

The Guardian also perpetuated this dominant discourse that represented members of the Republican Movement as 'terrorists'. However, this occurred far less compared to newspapers that enthusiastically supported the ban and was mostly achieved through collocating the IRA and Sinn Féin with 'terrorism' as opposed to directly naming them as 'terrorists'. For example, Sinn Féin is represented as a 'terrorist organisation' through collocation in the first sentence of this Guardian newspaper article: 'The Home Secretary, Mr Douglas Hurd, defended his ban on television and radio interviews with Sinn Fein and other terrorist organisations' (The Guardian, HURD DEFIANT OVER TV BAN ON TERRORISTS, 03.11.88).

The IRA is also represented as a 'terrorist organisation' in the first sentence of this Daily Telegraph article: 'The Government is considering banning press and television interviews with the IRA and other terrorist organisations' (The Daily Telegraph, CABINET STUDIES BAN ON INTERVIEWS WITH TERRORISTS, 17.10.88). The headline of the following Guardian editorial foregrounds the IRA and then the first sentence of the editorial collocates the IRA (as opposed to Loyalist organisations) with 'terrorist outrages' and Northern Ireland's 'monstrous death toll':

Whenever a terrorist outrage occurs in Northern Ireland there is wide cross-party agreement that every measure which might conceivably impede the IRA and mitigate the province's monstrous death toll must be properly explored. (The Guardian, MR HURD'S BLANKET OF IRA SILENCE, 20.10.88)
In the following *Sun* article, the headline foregrounds the IRA as the main target of the ban and in the second sentence the IRA are referred to as a ‘terror group’: ‘Democrat Mr Dukakis criticised the Prime Minister for the Government’s ban on air time for terror groups like the IRA’ (*The Sun*, DUKAKIS IN IRA SWIPE AT MRS T, 27.10.88). In a *Sun* editorial that criticises BBC journalists resisting the British government’s broadcasting ban, it states: ‘The action is in protest at the Government’s ban on interviews with IRA terrorists’ (*The Sun*, TELLY BERKS, 28.10.88). Although the examples thus far have illustrated how the IRA were foregrounded and collocated or directly named as ‘terrorists’, on occasion they were also represented as ‘gangsters’, ‘terrorist Godfathers’ and ‘extremists’ in the *Daily Mail* as well as ‘bombers’ and ‘killers’ in the *Daily Express.*

Sinn Féin and Gerry Adams were also constructed pejoratively by journalists representing the British government introducing the broadcasting ban. Rather than being represented as a ‘terrorist organisation’ directly, Sinn Féin and Gerry Adams were more likely to be represented by journalists as an IRA ‘front’, ‘mouthpiece’ or ‘apologist’, which as illustrated above was considered to be a terrorist organisation by British journalists. For example, in the following *Daily Express* editorial, Sinn Féin is represented as both a ‘terrorist front organisation’ and ‘enemy mouthpiece’ because it is foregrounded as the main target of the ban in the first sentence:

> The long-overdue ban on broadcasts by Sinn Féin and other terrorist front organisations has provoked the predictable howls of anger and brought out the usual tired arguments. (*Daily Express*, CLOSING DOWN THE ENEMY MOUTHPIECE, 20.10.88)

In a newspaper article in *The Daily Telegraph*, Sinn Féin representatives are referred to as IRA apologists: ‘The “fawning apologies” of the IRA apologists after an outrage would not be broadcast’ (*The Daily Telegraph*, RIPPLE OF FEAR WAS SPREAD BY IRA ACCESS TO TV SAYS HURD, 03.11.88). In a *Daily Mail* editorial, Sinn Féin are represented as ‘front men for the IRA’ and ‘soft-voiced apologists for murder’ in an attempt by the newspaper’s editor to persuade *Daily Mail* readers to support the ‘muzzling’ of Sinn Féin:

> Front men for the IRA are not allowed to promote their politics of terror on television or radio in the Irish Republic. So why should they still get away with it here? Most decent men and women have never understood why the
soft-voiced apologists for murder should be invited by broadcasters to put terror’s point of view as if it were just another. (Daily Mail, MURDER’S VOICE TO BE MUZZLED, 20.10.88)

This ideological construction of the Republican Movement is evident on multiple levels, as is the attempt to persuade Daily Mail readers to support the British government introducing the broadcasting ban. The foregrounding and naming of the Republican Movement’s actions are essential to encourage support for British government censorship. It is only Republicans who possess a ‘politics of terror’ and are ‘apologists for murder’. It is only Republicans who need to be ‘muzzled’ with such treatment having obvious connotations of what is done to dangerous and aggressive dogs. Therefore, not only are the political motivations of Republicans reduced to a ‘politics of terror’, they are de-humanised by being represented as dangerous animals. The editorial also suggests those who fail to understand why Republicans should be ‘muzzled’ lack decency, which clearly functions to persuade readers to support the British government’s broadcasting ban. It could, however, be argued that there is nothing ‘decent’ about British newspapers encouraging the British public to support direct censorship of the British broadcast media.

‘Terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ labels clearly have negative connotations of inexcusable acts of violence against civilians that spread shock and fear amongst the wider civilian population. However, Sproat (1991) maintains it is theoretically impossible to label particular organisations and individuals as ‘terrorist’ because it is individual acts that constitute terrorism. IRA members that killed British civilians certainly did commit acts of terrorism, however, IRA members also killed British combatants, which arguably does not constitute an act of terrorism. This is because combatants on both sides of a conflict die by the sword as they have chosen to live by it; that is the risk they knowingly take.

For British journalists to apply ‘terrorist’ labels to combatants (the IRA) and non-combatants (Sinn Féin) alike in one side of the conflict is therefore not a neutral reflection of reality, but a propagandistic approach to terrorism (Chomsky, 2002). It is an ideological choice that builds nationalism and refracts reality in the interests of those supporting the continuing union of Northern Ireland and Britain. George Orwell (1945b) explains that double standards and indifference to reality are prerequisites of nationalism. His reference to India in the following excerpt could easily be replaced with Ireland in previous decades and Afghanistan today:
All nationalists have the power of not seeing resemblances between similar sets of facts. A British Tory will defend self-determination in Europe and oppose it in India with no feeling of inconsistency. Actions are held to be good or bad, not on their own merits, but according to who does them, and there is almost no kind of outraged — torture, the use of hostages, forced labour, mass deportations, imprisonment without trial, forgery, assassination, the bombing of civilians — which does not change its moral colour when it is committed by ‘our’ side. (Orwell, 1945b: 362-363).

Representing IRA members as ‘gangsters’ and ‘terrorist Godfathers’ conceals any political motivations they have and, at best, discredits their claims to have any. This is because such labels denote criminal activity. ‘Gangsters’ and ‘Godfathers’ connote a mafia lifestyle of violent mob wars motivated by securing monopolies on drug dealing and loan sharking. According to Curtis (1984) such mafia metaphors entered British media discourse in the 1970s and were used frequently by ‘Labour Northern Ireland Secretary Roy Mason, whose strategy was to deal with the IRA revolt as if it were purely a criminal matter’ (Curtis, 1984: 324). The British government’s naming strategy clearly functions to suppress the Republican Movement’s motivations for violence that were rooted in the historical injustices and tyranny of the British Empire when colonising, occupying and dividing Ireland.

Referring to members of the Republican Movement as ‘extremists’, ‘bombers’ and ‘killers’ also functions to detach their political and historical motivation from the knowledge of British newspaper readers. Representing people as ‘extremists’ immediately ‘others’ and alienates ‘them’ from ‘us’ because it suggests such people exist and behave outside of normality, that is, ‘they’ are too ‘extreme’ to accept the status quo ‘we’ apparently do. In this case, ‘they’ (members of the Republican Movement) do not accept Britain’s presence in the North of Ireland (just as they did not in the South of Ireland).

Labeling Republicans as ‘extremists’ suggests this political position is abnormal and therefore wrong. ‘Extremist’ is a propagandistic construction that relies on a more emotional and less rational appeal than ‘terrorist’ labels because at least ‘terrorism’, although subjectively applied, refers to an action. ‘Extremism’ on the other hand is harder to define and is a label often used merely to delegitimise a political position. Reducing IRA members to ‘bombers’ and ‘killers’ also encourages newspaper readers to think about their actions as opposed to their political motivation by turning verbs denoting attacking and killing into nouns.
Instead of choosing to construct Sinn Féin as the political wing of the Republican Movement, which had democratically elected representatives nationally and locally, the lexical choices that were used in the above newspaper representations connote concealment and duplicity. Describing Sinn Féin as a ‘front’, ‘mouthpiece’ or ‘apologist’ for the IRA suggests it is merely a façade created to legitimise and promote ‘terrorism’, or an instrument that just follows and echoes IRA orders as opposed to a political party serving and representing the will of its constituents. Such discourses foregrounding and naming the Republican Movement pejoratively dominated newspaper articles representing the British government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban and, arguably, functioned interdiscursively to support it.

Foregrounding members of the Republican Movement as the main targets of the ban whilst representing them as ‘terrorists’, ‘extremists’ ‘gangsters’, ‘godfathers’, ‘murderers’, ‘bombers’ and ‘killers’ (in other words, perpetrators of violent crime) hardly encourages British newspapers readers to view such a movement as anything other than bloodthirsty. Further still, continually emphasising the violence of the Republican Movement whilst representing Sinn Féin as nothing more than a ‘front’, ‘mouthpiece’ and ‘apologist’ hardly encourages British newspaper readers to view Sinn Féin as a legitimate and democratic political party that is a victim of British government censorship. It would appear that simultaneously emphasising the violence committed by one side of the conflict and suppressing the political motivations behind it functions to delegitimise the Republican Movement, thereby legitimising various actions against it such as the broadcasting ban.

Clearly, two corners of Van Dijk’s (1998, 2006) ‘ideological square’ have been revealed in this textual analysis of British newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban. The negative other-representation is achieved through emphasising the violence with referential and predicational strategies that construct the Republican Movement as criminal, bloodthirsty and irrational whilst suppressing their political motivations by excluding any reference to partition or the history of the British occupation of Ireland before and after partition. In contrast, Loyalist organisations were very rarely identified as being targeted by the ban and if they were it was only after the IRA and/or Sinn Féin had been identified as the main target first. As Elliott (1979) puts it in relation to the British side of the propaganda war, whereas the Loyalists are the ‘uglies’, it is the Republicans who are the ‘baddies’ and need to be singled out. Of course, the status of the ‘goodies’ is reserved for British combatants.
The other two corners of Van Dijk’s (1998, 2006) ‘ideological square’, which are constituted by emphasising information that is positive about ‘us’ and suppressing information that is negative about ‘us’ were not identifiable in British newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban. Instead, there was a general backgrounding of the ‘uglies’ and an almost complete absence of the ‘goodies’. The only reference to British combatants was in their capacity as victims of the ‘baddies’ such as the eight British soldiers killed by Republican combatants at Ballygawley in August 1988. Rather than an overt positive self-representation then, there was a suggestion that British combatants were on the sidelines of the battlefield rather than active participants, which is in itself a positive self-representation that fits the narrative of British soldiers as peace-keepers separating the ‘uglies’ and the ‘baddies’ in Northern Ireland. The absence of British combatants in any role other than victims of IRA violence meant it was impossible for them to be represented as anything other than respectable soldiers in British newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban. If a literal approach to the study of terrorism is applied to the actions of combatants on both sides of any conflict, it is plain to see it is never good versus evil, from the Northern Ireland conflict to the conflicts in Iraq or Afghanistan today.

If British journalists wanted to represent all the combatants who killed and died in the Northern Ireland conflict in a more neutral way they could have at least acknowledged that the ‘goodies’ colluded with the ‘uglies’ to kill the ‘baddies’ (whether it was Republican combatants or civilians being killed). However, to break the Manichean view of those fighting, killing and dying for a United Irish Republic and those fighting, killing and dying for a United British Kingdom would challenge the British nationalism of the British newspaper industry and the inevitable propagandistic approach to terrorism used to achieve it. The backgrounding of Loyalist organisations meant that the ‘uglies’ were rarely represented as ‘terrorists’ and if they were as in the final two sentences of the following Daily Mail article, it was not the journalist labelling members of Loyalist organisations as ‘terrorists’, it was the social actor whose words were used as reported speech by the journalist:

Labour’s Northern Ireland spokesman Mr Kevin McNamara, said he did not think a ban would affect opinion in Ulster. If the Government was even-handed, it would include Loyalist terrorists, as did RTE, the Republic’s broadcasting authority. (Daily Mail, HURD TO WIPE ADAMS OFF TV SCREEN, 19.10.88)
It is significant that the vast majority of newspaper articles representing the introduction of the ban immediately identified the IRA and Sinn Féin as the main targets of it even though it applied to both Republican and Loyalist organisations. However, there is a practical explanation for this foregrounding in some of the broadcasting ban articles. It is clear from the newspaper articles printed in the days before the British government introduced the broadcasting ban that journalists had assumed the ban would only apply to Republican organisations. They also seemed to believe that the British government was going to ban Republicans organisations from newspaper interviews as well as television and radio broadcasts. For example, two days before the British government introduced the ban, The Sun informs its readers:

Tough new measures against the IRA and its supporters are to be introduced in a major crackdown against terrorism. Ulster Secretary Tom King is poised to outlaw TV, radio and newspaper interviews with the IRA and Sinn Fein. (The Sun, IRA FACES THE BOOT FROM TV, 17.10.88)

This belief that the ban would target Republican organisations only and will apply to both print and broadcast media in Britain is unanimous across newspapers before the British government officially introduced it. Some of the newspapers attribute it to a television appearance on BBC’s ‘On the Record’ programme by Northern Ireland Secretary Tom King on 16th October, 1988 (Daily Mirror, ‘BAN KILLERS FROM TELLY’, 17.10.88). The following day, the Daily Mail writes:

The strongest signal yet that the Government is out to deny the terrorists publicity came yesterday from Ulster Secretary Tom King. Asked in a BBC TV interview whether a media ban was being considered, Mr King declared: ‘Nothing is excluded.’ He refused to comment further. (Daily Mail, MAGGIE TO STARVE IRA OF PUBLICITY, 17.10.88).

Tom King’s vague statement about forthcoming ‘anti-terrorism’ policies could explain why journalists made incorrect assumptions about the ban, which accounts for the foregrounding of the IRA and Sinn Féin in broadcasting ban newspaper articles before it was introduced. However, after the ban was introduced such foregrounding continued throughout newspaper articles. It could be argued that representing Republican organisations as being the main targets of the ban exposes the British government’s attempt to silence Republican voices, especially those democratically elected Sinn Féin candidates. However, the most prevalent discourses, which
interconnected most closely, were those that were hostile to Republican organisations. Indeed, there was only one example across all the British newspaper articles that represented the British government's introduction of the broadcasting ban as a planned and tactical method of reversing Sinn Féin electoral breakthroughs and that Margaret Thatcher's contention that the 'terrorists' had no support in Northern Ireland had been proven wrong. This discourse was expressed by Gerry Adams when he was allowed to speak in The Guardian, illustrating it was possible for journalists to do so:

Mr Gerry Adams, the president of Sinn Fein, said: “Eight years ago Mrs Thatcher claimed that the Republican Movement had no support. Now they are directly censoring a legal political party which has an electoral mandate. If they had an argument to counter the Sinn Fein view then they should be putting it instead of censoring us.” (The Guardian, BROADCAST BAN LEADS TERROR FIGHT, 20.10.88)

If this had been a prevalent discourse expressed by journalists or by them allowing Gerry Adams to, which consistently appeared with the discourse foregrounding the IRA and/or Sinn Féin as the main targets of the ban, then this would have changed the context to a discourse opposing the ban. However, the discourse foregrounding Republican organisations was most often expressed alongside discourses that constructed the Republican Movement pejoratively and other dominant discourses that supported the introduction of the broadcasting ban such as the next most prevalent discourse that argued terrorists must be starved of the 'oxygen of publicity'.

The common sense explanation of such foregrounding and naming would suggest it is hardly surprising that British newspapers identified the IRA and Sinn Féin as the main targets of the ban because it was Republican combatants that were a threat to British politicians, combatants and civilians. However, such a discourse is based on a particular definition of ‘Britain’ and a particular understanding of the Northern Ireland conflict, which reveals the “us” and “them” dichotomy as ideological narratives of the conflict itself.

It is important to acknowledge the normalisation of British nationalism in foregrounding those attacking “us” (anyone considered ‘British’) and backgrounding those who attack “them” (Catholics in Northern Ireland), whether that be combatants of the British Army (UDR), RUC, UDA/UFF and UVF. It is also important to remember that IRA attacks on “us” in the ‘mainland’ only took place in England (never in Scotland or Wales) and that British involvement in Ireland did not begin in
the late 1960s, nor was Britain a neutral arbiter separating the warring ‘tribes’ of Northern Ireland (Miller, 1998). In short, the Northern Ireland conflict was a legacy of the British Empire just as the Israeli occupation of Palestine is today.

Discourses which acknowledged the central grievance of the Republican Movement, which was not centuries old, but less than 50 years old when the Northern Ireland conflict began in 1968 were almost entirely absent. There was just one broadcasting ban newspaper article in which the centrality of partition to the conflict was acknowledged. The *Daily Mirror* was the only newspaper which took an overt editorial position against the British government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban and was also the only newspaper to acknowledge some of the historical context to the conflict (even if excluding British agency in partition and the undemocratic manner in which it was achieved):

\[\text{W}\text{hen we deal with the symptoms of the problems of Northern Ireland instead of the causes – which lie in the bizarre decision of nearly 60 years ago to divide the island artificially – then we demonstrate that we would best serve the future of Ireland by departing from it for ever. (Daily Mirror, BANKRUPT, BASE, BAD, 21.10.88).}\]

This single editorial illustrates that it was possible to inform newspaper readers as to why the Republican Movement existed and what motivated them. However, the vast majority of British newspaper articles representing the broadcasting ban did not mention any of the political and historical motivations of the Republican Movement. Arguably, the interdiscursive construction foregrounding and pejoratively naming the Republican Movement functioned to support the British government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban. Journalists could have foregrounded the Republican Movement alongside discourses emphasising their political and historical motivations or represented the British government’s broadcasting ban as a strategy to silence such crucial context. However, journalists did not express these discourses, which would have better informed British newspaper readers.

**Lifting the ban (1994):**

Newspaper articles representing the British government lifting the broadcasting ban also constructed the ban as mainly targeting the IRA and Sinn Féin. However, the discourse foregrounding Republican organisations was not consistently interconnected with the discourse representing the IRA as a ‘terrorist’ organisation.
and Sinn Féin or Gerry Adams as an IRA ‘front’, ‘mouthpiece’ or ‘apologist’. There were 28 occurrences (13%) of the discourse that represented the IRA and Sinn Féin as being the main targets of the broadcasting ban, yet there were only 12 expressions (5.6%) of the discourse that constructed the IRA as a ‘terrorist’ organisation and Sinn Féin or Gerry Adams as an IRA ‘front’, ‘mouthpiece’ or ‘apologist’. Again, this was done through collocation or direct naming. For example, in a *Guardian* article that foregrounds Sinn Féin and Gerry Adams as the main targets of the ban throughout, they are collocated with terrorism in the following two sentences:

> The ban was imposed by Government directive in October 1988, in an attempt to deny terrorists “the oxygen of publicity”. An exception is made for members of Sinn Fein at election time, but only when discussing issues unrelated to the violence. (*The Guardian*, BIRT CALLS FOR BROADCAST BAN TO BE LIFTED, 01.09.94)

There were a few occurrences of journalists directly naming the IRA or Sinn Féin pejoratively, but significantly less than when the British government introduced the broadcasting ban six years before. For example, a day after the ban was lifted, a *Daily Express* journalist refers to IRA members as ‘terrorists': ‘The historic breakthrough came on a day which began with Ministers alarmed at decisions on IRA terrorists by the U.S. and Irish authorities’ (*Daily Express*, ULSTER MOVE AS U.S. FREES IRA GUNMAN, 17.09.94). However, such constructions are exceptions in newspaper articles representing the British government lifting the ban as opposed to the norm in newspaper articles representing its introduction.

In addition, the most hostile constructions of the Republican Movement in newspaper articles representing the British government lifting the broadcasting ban are from the same newspapers that were most supportive of its introduction. For example, a *Daily Mail* editorial, which claims Irish actors ‘must love’ speaking the words of banned Sinn Féin representatives, also labels Gerry Adams as an apologist for murder: ‘They are regularly called in to repeat the words – and how sympathetically they do it – uttered by Adams and other apologists for murder’ (*Daily Mail*, TRUST THE PEOPLE, 16.09.94).

The discourse foregrounding the IRA and Sinn Féin in newspaper articles representing the British government lifting the broadcasting ban is not considered a supporting discourse because it did not interconnect with the discourse representing
such organisations in negative ways. Instead, it is considered an opposing discourse because the context of it was changed by it frequently appearing with prevalent opposing discourses. An example of this is the discourse that constructed the ban as being a farce and a disaster, mostly attributed to the use of actors to dub those banned from speaking in the broadcast media. This discourse is explored in more depth below, but before this, it is worth considering why British journalists largely backtracked from referring to members of the Republican Movement as 'terrorists'.

An obvious explanation is because the IRA declared a ceasefire on 31st August 1994, shortly before the broadcasting ban was lifted, which made it difficult (though not impossible as illustrated above) to continue labelling the Republican Movement pejoratively. That said, this does not sufficiently explain such labelling continuing because it was not a reflection of reality in the first place, it was an ideological refraction of reality emanating from the British government. Acknowledging this suggests a more likely explanation is that while elite social actors were united in their opposition to the Republican Movement and divided on the merits of the broadcasting ban in 1988, they were divided on the issue of publicly entering talks with the Republican Movement and united on the evident failures and shortcomings of the ban by 1994. In other words, it would appear that the discourses of elite social actors were most often expressed in newspaper articles during both sample periods.

**Starving the ‘terrorists’ of the ‘oxygen of publicity’**

The discourse that argued ‘terrorists’ must be starved of the ‘oxygen of publicity’ was expressed consistently as a justification for the British government introducing the broadcasting ban. This discourse can be traced back to the speech Margaret Thatcher made in 1985 at the American Bar Association in London following the hijacking of Trans World Airlines Flight 847. She argued that a symbiotic relationship existed between the media and ‘terrorism’ and that ‘terrorists’ should be starved of the ‘oxygen of publicity on which they depend’ (Thatcher, 1985). Although the meaning of this discourse is rarely explained or contextualised in the newspaper articles, it was often attributed to Margaret Thatcher. It was a dominant discourse in newspaper articles representing the British government introducing the ban and was also expressed as the main justification when newspaper articles representing the British government lifting the ban discussed the origins of the censorship.
Arguably, the ‘terrorists’ must be starved of the ‘oxygen of publicity’ discourse functions to support the introduction of the broadcasting ban because it perpetuates Margaret Thatcher’s contention that the British media had consistently given the Republican Movement a platform to express their views. As this discourse was dominant in newspaper articles and was mostly repeated without challenge by journalists, it stifled alternative discourses that emphasised the need to understand and alleviate the causes of the conflict. Interestingly, in the same speech at the American Bar Association, Margaret Thatcher said: ‘In our societies we do not believe in constraining the media, still less in censorship’ and, quoting Benjamin Franklin, ‘[t]hose who would give up essential liberty to preserve a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety’ (Ibid.). However, none of the journalists chose to acknowledge these points in the newspaper articles, which would have undermined the thrust of Margaret Thatcher’s argument and the legitimacy of the British government’s decision to introduce the broadcasting ban three years later.

In addition, by excluding the history of the British government indirectly censoring the British media throughout the Northern Ireland conflict, journalists failed to acknowledge and inform their readers that the direct censorship of the broadcasting ban was merely an extension of this policy. There was only one journalist that made this connection as well as listing examples of British government interference with the British media and the learned practice of self-censorship by journalists. Richard Norton-Taylor of *The Guardian* writes:

> For 17 years, television executives and editors have censored programmes about the IRA and Sinn Fein. They have been supported by large sections of the British press. (*The Guardian*, POLITICS CONFRONT PROGRAMME CHIEFS, 20.10.88)

He also acknowledges that some Labour politicians were not averse to government control of the British media during the Northern Ireland conflict:

> In 1976, Roy (now Lord) Mason, Labour’s new Northern Ireland Secretary, pressed for a total ban on the reporting of IRA activities. Echoing ministers’ traditional tendency to exaggerate, reflected in much of the press, he accused the BBC of providing a “daily platform” for the IRA. (Ibid.)
Interestingly, this journalist critiques the British newspaper industry itself for joining British politicians in claiming British broadcasters had been irresponsible or that they should censor particular programmes featuring Republican voices. Indeed, the discourse representing British broadcasters (especially the BBC) as irresponsible was expressed 16 times (3.8%) in newspaper articles covering the British government introducing the ban, which obviously compounds the discourse arguing the ‘terrorists’ must be starved of the ‘oxygen of publicity’. Although it was mostly journalists repeating social actors expressing the broadcasters (especially the BBC) are irresponsible discourse through reported speech, a Daily Express editorial did too:

[The BBC] rushed to give Adams a final platform before the broadcasting shutters went down. In an interview expressly to seek his reaction to the ban – and broadcast before it was officially announced in Parliament – the Sinn Fein leader was able to cock a snook at the Government. So much for the argument that the broadcasters can be trusted to see that they do not give the men of violence publicity. (Daily Express, CLOSING DOWN THE ENEMY MOUTHPIECE, 20.10.88)

This Daily Express excerpt certainly supports Norton-Taylor’s (1988) suggestion that some British newspapers would prefer to defend the British government than British broadcasters. In fact, the Daily Express, like the Daily Mail and The Sun, took an editorial position that was overtly supportive of the British government introducing the broadcasting ban and critical of any media workers resisting the censorship. This is hardly surprising considering the conservative allegiances of these newspapers, but it does further evidence their role in helping representatives of the British government to persuade British citizens to accept this form of direct censorship, which had not existed in Britain since World War II.

The ‘terrorists’ must be starved of the ‘oxygen of publicity’ discourse is also based on several ideological presuppositions. Arguably, this discourse builds on those foregrounding and naming the Republican Movement as possessing a monopoly on acts of ‘terrorism’ and being the threat to Northern Ireland and Britain. There is a presupposition that the reader knows and accepts the identity of the ‘terrorists’, the meaning of the ‘oxygen of publicity’ and that the former do indeed thrive on the latter. This discourse, therefore, further normalises the discourse of Republicans as ‘terrorists’. Representing the ‘terrorists’ as thriving on the ‘oxygen of publicity’ also operates on the false premise that those trying to maintain a British United Kingdom
do not. The British government and military thrived on the oxygen of publicity throughout the Northern Ireland conflict and it was constantly given to them by the British broadcast media.

**Introducing the ban (1988):**

The discourse arguing ‘terrorists’ must be starved of the ‘oxygen of publicity’ was the third most prevalent discourse in newspaper articles representing the British government introducing the broadcasting ban. It was expressed on 34 occasions (8%) in this time period. Interestingly, when the broadcasting ban was announced in the House of Commons on 19th October 1988, Douglas Hurd did not actually mention the ‘oxygen of publicity’, nor did any of the other speakers in the Commons debate that followed. Hurd did, however, attempt to justify introducing the ban by arguing:

\[\text{The terrorists themselves draw support and sustenance from access to radio and television—from addressing their views more directly to the population at large than is possible through the press. The Government have decided that the time has come to deny this easy platform to those who use it to propagate terrorism. (Hansard, 1988: 893)}\]

On an intertextual level, this connects with Margaret Thatcher’s symbiotic relationship argument between the media and ‘terrorism’ because it suggests that the ‘terrorists’ do thrive on the media and the media do provide an ‘easy platform’. The discourse based on Douglas Hurd’s above statement in broadcasting ban newspaper articles – the ban will take away the easy platform used to propagate terrorism – was still coded as the ‘terrorists’ must be starved of the ‘oxygen of publicity’ discourse in this analysis because it clearly derives from Margaret Thatcher’s argument. In the few times that the discourse based on Hurd’s statement was expressed by journalists, it appeared near to Margaret Thatcher’s statement, which simplified what Hurd had said in the Commons to the ‘oxygen of publicity’ catchphrase. In the following *Sun* article, for example, Hurd’s Commons statement expressing the ‘terrorists’ must be starved of the ‘oxygen of publicity’ discourse follows the journalist’s reduction of Margaret Thatcher’s discourse to the ‘oxygen of publicity’ catchphrase:

Mrs Thatcher insisted on the ban to deprive the IRA of the “oxygen of publicity.” Mr Hurd told MPs that TV appearances by terrorists justifying murder caused “grave offence.” He added: “The government has decided that
the time has now come to deny this easy platform to those who use it to propagate terrorism". (*The Sun*, FURY AS BBC BEAT HURD BAN ON IRA’S CLAPTRAP, 20.10.88)

It is interesting to note though that the discourse based on Hurd’s Commons statement was only expressed six times out of the 34 expressions of the ‘terrorists’ must be starved of the ‘oxygen of publicity’ discourse in newspaper articles representing the British government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban. This is significant because the discourse emanating from, and attributed to, Margaret Thatcher was expressed in newspaper articles much more often. This may have been a result of journalists being aware of editor preference for concision or because of the elevated status of Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister. It could also be due to the House of Lords debate on broadcasting and terrorism, which followed the Commons debate. In the Lords debate, the ‘terrorists’ must be starved of the ‘oxygen of publicity’ discourse was expressed on two occasions. However, this was only acknowledged in one newspaper (*The Daily Telegraph*) article as most articles discussed the Commons debate and not the Lords debate:

> In the Lords, Lord MASON of BARNSLEY said he believed it was defensible in a democratic society to stifle all outlets for terrorist groups bent on undermining the State and smashing our democratic institutions. If we cut off the oxygen of propaganda on television that should cover the other media as well. (*The Daily Telegraph*, TV AND RADIO BAN ON TERRORISTS HAS MIXED LABOUR RECEPTION, 20.10.88)

Another, more feasible, explanation for the dominance of this discourse is the high number of broadcasting ban articles written before the British government officially introduced the ban. This explains why most manifestations of the ‘terrorists’ must be starved of the ‘oxygen of publicity’ discourse were drawn from, and attributed to, Margaret Thatcher and Tom King. For example, a journalist in the *Daily Express* writes: ‘The measures are part of the Prime Minister’s plan to deprive the bombers of what she has called the “oxygen of publicity”’ (*Daily Express*, KING SET TO CURB REPORTS ON IRA, 17.10.88).

As acknowledged earlier, journalists had assumed the broadcasting ban would only apply to Republican organisations, which can explain the foregrounding of the IRA in the previous *Daily Express* article and in the following *Daily Mirror* article: ‘Premier Margaret Thatcher and Ulster Secretary Tom King believe the measures
would starve the terrorists of the "oxygen of publicity" (Daily Mirror, IRA TERROR GAG IS ON THE WAY, 19.10.88). However, after the ban was officially introduced by Douglas Hurd, this foregrounding continued as did expressions of the 'oxygen of publicity' catchphrase: 'The IRA, Sinn Fein and other outlawed Ulster groups and their supporters will be denied what Mrs Thatcher has described as the 'oxygen of publicity' (Daily Mail, TV AND RADIO IN ROW OVER GAG ON THE IRA, 20.10.88).

Journalists sometimes expressed Douglas Hurd's own version of the 'terrorists' must be starved of the 'oxygen of publicity' discourse after he had introduced the ban: 'Mr Hurd told the Commons the time had come to deny the "easy platform" of TV and radio to those who "propagate terrorism."' (Daily Express, ROW AS BBC FLOUT HURD TERROR BAN, 20.10.88). In most newspaper articles, journalists preferred to use the 'oxygen of publicity' catchphrase and mostly repeated the 'terrorists' must be starved of the 'oxygen of publicity' discourse without challenging its premise. This is illustrated in the above examples as well as in the following Daily Telegraph article:

The TV and radio ban is regarded by Ministers as an important way of starving the IRA of what Mrs Thatcher has described as the "oxygen of publicity". (The Daily Telegraph, BROADCAST BAN COVERS ELEVEN IRISH GROUPS, 20.10.88)

On one occasion, the 'terrorists' must be starved of the 'oxygen of publicity' discourse was challenged by Paul Foot in an op-ed piece for the Daily Mirror. He pointed out the double standards of the British government, which was holding talks with, and giving the 'oxygen of publicity' to, Adolfo Calero, leader of the Contras. This non-state organisation was 'waging violent war in an attempt to overthrow the Nicaraguan Government which was elected with 67 per cent of the vote' (Daily Mirror, CONTRA-DICTORY, 27.10.88). In contrast, the 'terrorists' must be starved of the 'oxygen of publicity' discourse was embellished by a Daily Mail editorial arguing the ban did not go far enough and that Sinn Féin should be banned altogether:

[A]s long as the laws of this land allow the likes of Gerry Adams a legitimate platform, they will gratefully gulp down the oxygen of publicity and spew out the propaganda of terror. (Daily Mail, DEPRIVE TERROR OF THIS MEGAPHONE, 17.10.88)
Such discursive practices illustrate the structuring influence of particular newspapers as well as text-genres within newspapers (Richardson, 2007). The owner and editor of the *Daily Mail* would not allow a journalist like Paul Foot to work for them because it is a staunchly right-wing newspaper. Acknowledging British government complicity with the Contras is impossible for the *Daily Mail* because it is a reactionary newspaper that has a long history of supporting undemocratic and even fascist forces when they are perceived to be beneficial for the economic interests of the British elite (Bingham, 1998; Simpson, 2010).

The generic conventions of news articles structure what the journalist can say too because news articles only allow the journalist to amplify what particular social actors have said, whereas the generic conventions of op-eds and editorials allow opinions of the authors to be expressed. Although journalists choose which social actors to include and exclude, the generic conventions of news articles do not allow them to overtly support or oppose these social actors other than by subtly framing reported speech through use of quoting verbs and the naming of social actors from which such reported speech originated.

Op-eds and editorials do, however, allow overt support and opposition to be expressed by the journalists and editors. Therefore, a revolutionary socialist journalist employed by the *Daily Mirror*, a then left-leaning tabloid, can express an alternative discourse that functions to oppose the broadcasting ban by drawing attention to the double standards of the British government. Likewise, the right-wing editor of the *Daily Mail* can embellish a dominant discourse to persuade its readers to support the broadcasting ban by using hyperbolic language to further demonise the Republican Movement whilst amplifying British government justifications for introducing the broadcasting ban and arguing the ban does not go far enough.

*Lifting the ban (1994):*

The discourse arguing ‘terrorists’ must be starved of the ‘oxygen of publicity’ was expressed less often in newspaper articles representing the British government lifting the broadcasting ban. It was expressed on 12 occasions (5.6%) during this time period. However, in 1994, when journalists recalled British government justifications for introducing the ban, the discourse that argued ‘terrorists’ must be starved of the ‘oxygen of publicity’ was expressed most frequently and was often attributed to Margaret Thatcher. For example, a *Daily Mail* editorial recalled that the ban ‘was
introduced by Margaret Thatcher six years ago in an attempt to deny terrorists 'the oxygen of publicity'” (Daily Mail, TRUST THE PEOPLE, 16.09.94). Another justification for the ban that was sometimes expressed alongside this discourse was the Ballygawley attack on British soldiers by IRA members:

It was imposed in October 1988, following the IRA’s murder of eight soldiers near Ballygawley, County Tyrone. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said she wanted to starve the terrorists of the ‘oxygen of publicity’. (Daily Mail, I WAS RUSTY. BUT NEVER MIND - THE ACTOR WILL CLEAN IT UP FOR ME, 17.09.94)

Similarly, The Guardian recalls the broadcasting ban was ‘introduced by Margaret Thatcher to deny terrorists the “oxygen of publicity” after the Ballygawley army bus bombing in 1988 which killed eight soldiers’ (The Guardian, GERRY ADAMS MAY SOON GET HIS VOICE BACK, 01.09.94). The collective memory of the British newspaper industry regarding the British government’s introduction of the ban is interesting because it includes Margaret Thatcher’s catchphrase, but excludes the history and context of its emergence. The closest any journalist comes to connecting the British government’s introduction of the ban’s direct censorship to the British government’s attempts to indirectly censor the British media throughout the Northern Ireland conflict appeared in The Guardian:

Behind the order lay the imprint of Margaret Thatcher who in 1985 tried to have a Real Lives documentary, On the Edge of the Union, banned on the grounds it indirectly furthered terrorism. In her famous phrase, she said: “We must not give them the oxygen of publicity.” (The Guardian, CONTRADICTIONS DUMPED IN THE DUSTBIN OF HISTORY, 17.09.94)

The absence of context to the ‘terrorists’ must be starved of the ‘oxygen of publicity’ discourse in newspaper articles representing the lifting of the broadcasting ban is significant because it excludes the long history of British government interference with the British media before the broadcasting ban. As mentioned earlier, there was a tendency to exclude this important context in newspaper articles representing the British government introducing the broadcasting ban too. This can be explained by the brevity of the majority of newspaper articles representing the British government introducing and lifting the broadcasting ban, especially in the ‘popular’ and ‘mid-
market' newspapers. As outlined above, one *Guardian* newspaper article did actually acknowledge this context of British government interference with the British media during the introduction of the ban illustrating it was possible for other journalists to do so *if* they were allowed to do so. However, it would have obviously depended on how much copy the editor granted to the journalist and how much the editor decided newspaper readers wanted to (or should) know about the ban.

It is also true that many of the explanations for the British government introducing the broadcasting ban were excluded in newspaper articles when the ban was *introduced*. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that journalists simplified explanations for the ban six years later when ‘remembering’ why it was first introduced. However, limiting explanations for the ban to discourses representing it as a solution to the ‘terrorists’ thriving on the ‘oxygen of publicity’ and, to a lesser extent, a reaction to an IRA attack on British soldiers at Ballygawley is misleading. By excluding alternative discourses, journalists simplified the circumstances in which the British government introduced the broadcasting ban.

Journalists could have explained the ban as the British government’s reaction to Sinn Féin electoral breakthroughs, or acknowledged that the British media rarely gave the Republican Movement a platform before the ban and if they did it was hostile. They could have also informed their readers that the British government had introduced the broadcasting ban after decades of indirectly pressuring the broadcast media to self-censor particular voices and programmes. However, journalists rarely expressed these discourses. Instead, British government discourses dominated newspaper articles such as the next discourse analysed here, which emphasised the similarity between the British broadcasting ban and the Irish broadcasting ban.

---

**There’s a similar ban in the Irish Republic**

Aside from the ‘terrorists’ must be starved of the ‘oxygen of publicity’ discourse, there were two other discourses expressed by the British government to justify introducing the broadcasting ban. When Douglas Hurd announced the introduction of the ban in the House of Commons on 19th October 1988, he also argued that ‘terrorist’ appearances in the media ‘caused widespread offence to viewers and listeners throughout the United Kingdom’ (Hansard, 1988: 893) whilst underlining that the Irish Republic had a similar ban:
These restrictions follow very closely the lines of similar provisions which have been operating in the Republic of Ireland for some years. Representatives of these organisations are prevented from appearing on Irish television, but because we have had no equivalent restrictions in the United Kingdom they can nevertheless be seen on BBC and ITV services in Northern Ireland, where their appearances cause the gravest offence, and in Great Britain. The Government's decision today means that both in the United Kingdom and in the Irish Republic such appearances will be prevented. (Ibid.)

Although both of these discourses were expressed in newspaper articles representing the British government introducing the ban, the discourse that featured most often is explored here. The discourse stating that the Irish Republic had a similar ban was expressed on 24 occasions (5.6%) in newspaper articles representing the introduction of the ban whereas the discourse arguing media appearances of 'terrorists' caused offence to the public was only expressed on 11 occasions (2.6%). Arguably, when Douglas Hurd underlined that the Irish Republic had a similar ban, he was attempting to normalise the British broadcasting ban by recognising that in another country with a comparatively reduced threat from 'terrorism' there was already a long standing media ban on the organisations proscribed in Northern Ireland.

It is clear from newspaper articles printed before the broadcasting ban was introduced that the discourse acknowledging there's a similar ban in the Irish Republic was already circulating, but it is hard to know when it entered the discursive economy and from which social actors it originated. There is a possibility that Tom King expressed it when being interviewed in a BBC interview on 16th October, which would explain why journalists did so during the next few days. However, there is no evidence for this and it could have been a comparison that journalists observed independently. Nonetheless, Douglas Hurd's statement in the House of Commons clearly resulted in this discourse being expressed by journalists in the days after the British government introduced the broadcasting ban.

Although Douglas Hurd was stating a fact in the House of Commons, there was a similar broadcasting ban in the Irish Republic, which had been in place since 1972, he was also choosing to exclude other facts. For example, he could have said that no other country in Europe practised direct censorship on the broadcast media, except for Ireland, or that the British broadcasting ban was the strictest form of censorship since World War II. Choosing to express these facts, however, would not have been conducive to persuading British politicians, journalists and citizens to
accept such media control. Clearly, by acknowledging the former and omitting the latter, Douglas Hurd was attempting to justify the ban. The discourse acknowledging there’s a similar ban in the Irish Republic functions to reassure the British public that ‘we’ are not the only ones to have such media ‘restrictions’ and that another democratic society, which actually shares a border with Northern Ireland also has a similar approach to fighting ‘terrorism’. Representations of this discourse in broadcasting ban newspaper articles will now be examined. This analysis also includes the ways in which the order of discourse was altered when centrifugal pressures from social actors opposed to the broadcasting ban produced alternative discourses that challenged and subverted dominant, centripetal discourses expressed by social actors supporting the ban.

**Introducing the ban (1988):**

The discourse acknowledging that there was a similar ban in the Irish Republic was the fourth most prevalent discourse expressed in newspaper articles representing the British government introducing the broadcasting ban. As most expressions of this discourse featured in news articles, this dominant discourse was largely perpetuated without critique. For example, a *Daily Mirror* journalist writes: ‘He [Douglas Hurd] said the move was similar to a ban imposed by the Irish government’ (*Daily Mirror*, IRA’S FRONT-MEN GAGGED BY HURD, 20.10.88). In this excerpt the discourse is attributed to the social actor from which it originated as it is in the following *Guardian* article, which states the British broadcasting ban ‘resembled the ban which has prevented the IRA and UDA appearing on television in the Republic of Ireland, he [Douglas Hurd] said’ (*The Guardian*, HURD DEFENDS BAN ON TERROR BROADCASTS, 20.10.88).

In the following *Daily Telegraph* excerpt the longevity of the Irish broadcasting ban is highlighted by the journalist, which arguably encourages the reader to think that not only has Ireland got a broadcasting ban, but it is longstanding, further building support for one in Britain: ‘Mr Hurd told the Commons that the restrictions followed closely a similar ban in the Irish Republic since the 1970s’ (*The Daily Telegraph*, BRO A DCAST BAN COVERS ELEVEN IRISH GROUPS, 20.10.88). In other newspaper articles, the discourse acknowledging that there was a similar ban in the Irish Republic was expressed without acknowledging its origin being the British government.
Arguably, this makes the discourse more persuasive in building support for the ban because it reassures newspaper readers that there was a precedent for such media control without mentioning it was the British government that had highlighted this. For example, a journalist in *The Guardian* writes: ‘A similar ban already applies in the Irish Republic’ (*The Guardian*, BROADCAST BAN LEADS TERROR FIGHT, 20.10.88). This followed the journalist quoting Douglas Hurd’s other justifications for the ban he expressed in the Commons the day before, which indicates the journalist is re-presenting his discourse acknowledging there is a similar ban in the Irish Republic. The absent agency of the discourse would make its expression appear to be a neutral fact to newspaper readers, rather than an ideological choice by Hurd to encourage support for the ban, which the journalist has then regurgitated.

Similarly, *The Sun* ends one article by simply writing: ‘Terror groups have been barred from Irish TV for 17 years’ (*The Sun*, FURY AS BBC BEAT HURD BAN ON IRA’S CLAPTRAP, 20.10.88). By excluding the social actor that expressed this discourse and by mentioning the duration of the broadcasting ban in the Irish Republic it implicitly suggests that it has been successful in Ireland and, therefore, could be in Britain. Foregrounding Republican organisations and collocating them with ‘terrorism’ operates interdiscursively in the above *Sun* article, which arguably helps to justify the ban by focusing on the organisations that attack ‘us’ and labelling ‘them’ pejoratively. A journalist in the *Daily Mail* also foregrounds Republican organisations as the main targets of the ban, representing them as ‘extremists’ rather than ‘terrorists’ through collocation:

Mr Hurd’s move, predictably, started a row last night but he is determined to starve the extremists of ‘the oxygen of publicity’. Sinn Fein and IRA spokesmen are already banned from radio and TV in the Irish Republic. (*Daily-Mail*, HURD TO WIPE ADAMS OFF TV SCREEN, 19.10.88)

Whilst many of the other examples foregrounded Republican organisations as being the main target of the ban in the headlines this *Daily Mail* excerpt does so in the discourse that acknowledges there is a similar ban in the Irish Republic too. The *Daily Mail* journalist may have still assumed the British broadcasting ban would only apply to Republican organisations because the article was written before the ban was announced. However, he would have known that the Irish broadcasting ban applied to all organisations (Republican and Loyalist) proscribed in Northern Ireland since 1976
when the Irish broadcasting ban was extended.\(^4\) It is interesting therefore that the *Daily Mail* journalist chooses to foreground Sinn Féin and the IRA as if they are the only organisations impacted by the Irish broadcasting ban.

Arguably, choosing to interdiscursively foreground and name the Republican Movement pejoratively whilst emphasising there is a similar ban in the Irish Republic is a corollary of the same discourses represented by the *Daily Mail*’s editor two days before. The *Daily Mail* editor also acknowledged there is a similar ban in the Irish Republic, but in a way that more obviously functions to persuade *Daily Mail* readers to support the broadcasting ban. Rather than stating there is a similar ban in the Irish Republic as a fact, which the journalist does, the editor actually asks *Daily Mail* readers to contemplate the following leading question: ‘If they can operate such a ban successfully in the Irish Republic, why not in the United Kingdom?’ (*Daily Mail*, DEPRIVE TERROR OF THIS MEGAPHONE, 17.10.88). The editorial overtly represents the Irish broadcasting ban as successful and illustrative that one could therefore also be successful in the UK. This type of rhetorical questioning is repeated in another *Daily Mail* editorial a day after the ban was introduced to persuade its readers to support the British government introducing the broadcasting ban:

Front men for the IRA are not allowed to promote their politics of terror on television or radio in the Irish Republic. So why should they still get away with it here? (*Daily Mail*, MURDER'S VOICE TO BE MUZZLED, 20.10.88)

The foregrounding and pejorative naming of Republican organisations and their actions is intensified here to further influence the reader to support the ban. As discussed earlier, collocating the Republican Movement (the IRA and its ‘front’, Sinn Féin) with negative actions such as terror and murder clearly functions to delegitimise and discredit them. With this, it is now possible to see how this discourse interacts with the ‘similar ban in the Irish Republic’ discourse. Without first delegitimizing the Republican Movement, it would be difficult to remind and persuade *Daily Mail* newspaper readers why they should support British government censorship. It would also be difficult to achieve this without reminding them that the Irish Republic has a similar ban, thus legitimising and normalising it in Britain.

A ban on abortion could be ‘legitimised’ using the same logic if the *Daily Mail* so wished; ‘there’s a similar ban in the Irish Republic so why not here?’ The state should not impinge on a woman’s right to choose what she does with her own
body as it should not impinge on the public’s right to an uncensored media is the glaringly obvious and civilised answer. Although, there were obvious attempts by sections of the British newspaper industry to persuade British newspaper readers to support the British government introducing the broadcasting ban by emphasising there was a similar ban in the Irish Republic, some journalists did challenge the censorship by subverting this discourse.

Subverting the discourse:

The order of discourse acknowledging there is a similar ban in the Irish Republic was subverted to oppose the British government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban in very interesting ways. For example, an op-ed in *The Guardian* does express the discourse that acknowledges there is a similar ban in the Irish Republic, but immediately afterwards also acknowledges that South Africa and the Soviet Union also use censorship:

We are talking, however, about a proposition entirely new to the British media. Ireland prohibits by law radio and television interviews with members of Sinn Fein. South Africa prohibits the quoting of all banned persons, now a massive group of people. The Soviet Union, even in the era of Glasnost, imposes well-policed limits on the voices of dissent. (*The Guardian, A GAG THAT CANNOT SILENCE EXPLOSIONS, 18.10.88*)

By 1988, Apartheid South Africa and the Soviet Union were well known for being undemocratic societies that crushed dissent. Therefore, comparing the British government controlling the media to them instead of the Irish Republic, quickly shifts the legitimacy of the broadcasting ban. As a result, the British government is represented as acting undemocratically, which functions to oppose the ban. Similarly, in a *Guardian* news article a journalist altered Hurd’s discourse that originally functioned to support the ban into a discourse opposing it by emphasising that out of all of Europe, *only* the UK and Ireland have media bans on dissident organisations:

The Spanish Embassy yesterday denied Home Office claims that its country had similar media restrictions on the political wing of Eta, the Basque terrorist organisation. The only other European country which has such restrictions appears to be the Irish Republic. (*The Guardian, JOURNALISTS PLAN ACTION AGAINST GAG, 21.10.88*)
The discourse that acknowledges there is a similar ban in the Irish Republic is completely turned on its head by doing this. The meaning of the discourse is reversed from one that represents the ban positively because another country has a similar ban to one that represents the ban negatively because the vast majority of European countries do not practice ‘such restrictions’. Importantly, this excerpt is taken from a news article, which illustrates that the ban could be challenged by journalists within this genre, not just in editorials and op-eds.

However, the ability of journalists to challenge the broadcasting ban in news articles would certainly be impacted by the stance of their employer and the newspaper’s editor chosen by that employer. The Guardian took an editorial position that was fairly ambivalent towards the ban itself, but clearly expressed support for media workers resisting it, which can account for this rare example of a journalist challenging dominant discourses in a news article. Another clear challenge to the discourse that acknowledged there was a similar ban in the Irish Republic was expressed in a Guardian op-ed. The journalist represents the Irish broadcasting ban as problematic for journalists:

The distinction between the illegal activity of broadcasting an interview with a spokesperson for Sinn Fein or the Ulster Defence Association and legally broadcasting a report of what they say has bedevilled journalists at RTE, the Irish state broadcasting service, who have been reporting under broadcasting restrictions for nearly 20 years. The experience of journalists in the Republic, working under section 31 of the Broadcasting Act, which bans interviews with the IRA and Sinn Fein, has not been happy. (The Guardian, JOURNALISTS WALK TIGHTROPE ON COVERAGE OF SINN FEIN, 20.10.88)

This directly counters the Daily Mail editorial above, which represents the Irish broadcasting ban as successful without mentioning the experience of journalists working in such conditions. Again, it is possible to observe the impact of a particular newspaper’s position on the ban and how this impacts the way discourses are refracted. It also illustrates how news articles are dominated by elite sources, which means alternative discourses are stifled. If Irish media workers had been called on to speak, then the British government discourse underlining that there is a similar ban in the Irish Republic could have been challenged by those directly impacted by it.
Lifting the ban (1994):

Just as the discourse recognising there was already a similar ban in the Irish Republic could function to support the British government’s introduction of the ban, acknowledging that the Irish Republic had already lifted its broadcasting ban functioned to support the British government’s lifting of the ban. Although there were only 4 occasions (1.9%) in which journalists expressed such a discourse in newspaper articles representing the British government’s lifting of the ban, it is still interesting to acknowledge how comparisons with the Irish Republic operated.

The day after the IRA ceasefire, for example, a Guardian journalist wrote: ‘The Irish government removed its reporting restrictions on Sinn Fein in January’ (The Guardian, GERRY ADAMS MAY SOON GET HIS VOICE BACK, 01.09.94). Although it is simply a fact, this sentence ends an article in which all discourses expressed are critical of the ban and support the lifting of it. The consequence of choosing to express this fact is that it adds to the other discourses supporting the lifting of the ban, suggesting that if the Irish Republic has already lifted its censorship, then so should Britain. It operates in the opposite way to expressions of the discourse acknowledging there was a similar ban in the Irish Republic, which functions to support the British government’s introduction of the ban in 1988.

Tactical opposition to the broadcasting ban

Opposition to the British government’s broadcasting ban was expressed in discourses that can be considered either ‘tactical’ or ‘principled’. Miller (1990) argues journalists tended to use two main arguments when discussing the ban: either the ban is a tactical mistake or that it limits understanding of the conflict in Ireland and is therefore wrong in principle. He explains that those journalists arguing the ban is a tactical mistake are not opposed to the ban because it is an attack on media freedom, but because the role of the British national(ist) media, as with all wars waged by the British government, is to discredit “the enemy”. Therefore, ‘they see the ban as a means of inhibiting the ‘exposure’ of Sinn Féin’ (Miller, 1990: 41-42).

Miller’s (1990) argument and opposition categorisation is persuasive and discourses expressed by non-journalist social actors can also be categorised in such a way. For example, most British politicians from rival parties of the government shared the same belief that it was in Britain’s ‘national interest’ to maintain Northern
Ireland as part of Britain and therefore those resisting this were "the enemy". They differed, however, on which particular policy would maintain the status quo and defeat, or at least appease, the Republican Movement. In contrast, some journalists, particularly those in the NUJ and the Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom, did not necessarily share the belief that Britain should maintain its presence in Ireland and instead wanted to defend the independence of the British media above all else. In other words, opposing discourses were refracted by the interests of particular social actors and groups. The most prevalent discourses illustrating this distinction between tactical and principled opposing discourse will now be examined.

The ban is beneficial to the IRA:

The most prevalent discourse tactically opposing the British government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban represented the ban as being beneficial to the IRA. This discourse was expressed throughout 1988, but it also manifested in newspaper articles representing the British government lifting the ban in 1994. Roy Hattersley, the Labour shadow Home Secretary, was most often acknowledged as the social actor expressing this discourse, but Hugh Dykes, a Tory backbencher, Paddy Ashdown, the Liberal Democrats leader, and Seamus Mallon, the deputy leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party, were also quoted expressing it.

It was Hugh Dykes that British newspaper articles attributed this discourse to first of all, which is based on a statement he made a day before Douglas Hurd officially introduced the broadcasting ban in the House of Commons. Although Hugh Dykes’ full, original statement is now unavailable because it was expressed in a press release instead of Parliament, Roy Hattersley, Paddy Ashdown and the Labour MP Ken Livingston expressed the discourse that argued the ban is beneficial to the IRA in speeches they made in the House of Commons on 19th October, 1998. Roy Hattersley said the following:

Has he [Douglas Hurd] considered the damaging way in which his proposal will be used at home and abroad, especially in the United States, to portray the Government as the enemy of free expression? Has he weighed that publicity coup for the IRA against the advantage of keeping its representatives off television? (Hansard, 1988: 894)
In this excerpt from Roy Hattersley's statement, he represents the ban as a 'publicity coup' for the IRA, which suggests the British government has handed over a propaganda victory to the IRA by introducing the ban. Although this may well be the case and this discourse does oppose the broadcasting ban, it does so tactically because it still suggests the British government is not 'the enemy of free expression', rather the ban will be *used* by the IRA to portray the government as such. Hattersley also emphasises the American dimension to the Northern Ireland conflict, implicitly acknowledging that the Republican Movement was heavily funded by sympathetic Irish Americans who connected Irish and American independence from Britain. Arguably, Roy Hattersley is also drawing attention to the First Amendment of the US Constitution that protects freedom of speech and the press and how this will further encourage already sympathetic Americans to donate to the Irish Northern Aid Committee (Noraid). In fact, Ken Livingstone explicitly made this argument in the House of Commons during the same debate:

> Before taking this decision, did the Home Secretary receive any briefing from the intelligence services on the likely impact of this decision on the flow of funding from Canada and North America for the IRA? If he did not, why not? (Hansard, 1988: 901)

He then makes the point that the IRA sustained itself before television even existed:

> How was it that the IRA managed to sustain itself, decade after decade, from the 1922 bombing campaign through into the 1930s and 1950s, without access to television? (Ibid.)

Interestingly though, he is not called on to speak in a single newspaper article, which means the discourse representing the ban as beneficial to the IRA never explains this with regard to the American dimension. Similarly, though Roy Hattersley was often called on to speak in newspaper articles, only once was this aspect of his statement acknowledged. This is significant because it is clearly a crucial aspect of the discourse when it was expressed in the House of Commons. Arguably, acknowledging the American dimension further functions to resist the British government introducing the ban because it suggests that some in the US, especially Irish Americans, who are already opposed to the British presence in Northern Ireland will be even more steadfast in their opposition.
Although the US media is not protected against corporate control, the First Amendment does protect it from direct government interference. The broadcasting ban was a direct attack on media freedom by the British government and so would be seen as such by Americans. Therefore, excluding this aspect of the discourse from newspaper representations would reduce the impact of this opposing discourse. In contrast to Ken Livingstone, Paddy Ashdown did not mention the American dimension when arguing the ban was beneficial to the IRA:

The Government seem to have taken the worst of all possible measures. They have given the IRA a propaganda coup. They have left it open to it to put its view through the newspapers; they have left Sinn Fein still a legal organisation which is denied the right of access to a free press; and they have established a dangerous precedent by using the Broadcasting Act in this manner. (Hansard, 1988: 895)

In his House of Commons statement Paddy Ashdown represents the broadcasting ban as a ‘propaganda coup’ for the IRA, which operates in a similar way to what Roy Hattersley said because it opposes the British government strategy whilst still connecting the Republican Movement with negative actions and attributes. A ‘coup’ has negative connotations and generally means an unpopular taking of power usually by combatants without the support of the citizenry. Likewise, ‘propaganda’ has negative connotations and generally means lying and deception.

Paddy Ashdown does not really express a clear reason as to why he believes the ban is a propaganda coup for the IRA, but he does show his opposition to the ban by saying the British government ‘seem to have taken the worst of all measures’ (Ibid.). That said, his rationale for this expresses the discourse that suggests the ban did not go far enough, that it should apply to the British print media and that Sinn Féin should be proscribed altogether. Seamus Mallon’s rationale for his expression of the discourse representing the ban as benefitting the IRA is much clearer because he argues it will lead to an increase in electoral support for the proscribed organisations:

Will the Secretary of State accept that the real damage will be done, not to the UDA or the Provisional IRA, but to the highest standards of judicial and legal practice in this country? Does he accept that he is doing exactly what the gangsters in the Provisional IRA and the UDA want him to do? Those organisations will be laughing all the way to the European election and the district council elections because they now have the street issue that they did not previously have. Would the Secretary of State care to speculate about how
many of the hard-line activists in west Belfast, South Armagh and Derry will lay down their guns because they cannot watch Gerry Adams on television? (Hansard, 1988: 897)

Although many social actors expressed the discourse representing the ban as beneficial to the IRA, all manifestations of this discourse can be considered tactical, rather than principled in their opposition to the British government’s broadcasting ban. Instead of suggesting the ban was a mistake because it is undemocratic to censor the media, this discourse suggests it was a mistake because rather than stopping the Republican Movement, it will bolster its support (whether from American citizens and politicians or from people living in Ireland or Britain). Broadcasting ban newspaper articles representing this discourse will now be explored with a more detailed explanation of how it functioned to oppose the broadcasting ban on a tactical level.

Introducing the ban (1988):

The discourse that represented the ban as beneficial to the IRA was the fifth most prevalent discourse expressed in newspaper articles representing the British government introducing the broadcasting ban. It was expressed 20 times (4.7%) in this time period and all occurrences except one featured in news articles. Although the meaning of this discourse remained similar throughout newspaper representations, it was expressed in different ways because the various social actors from which this discourse emanated constructed it in their own way. For example, a journalist in the Daily Mirror writes:

Rebel Tory MP Hugh Dykes has declared: “Banning IRA sympathisers from being broadcast would play into the IRA’s hands. It would look as if the Government fears the IRA can persuade people of their sick cause.” (Daily Mirror, IRA TERROR GAG IS ON THE WAY, 19.10.88)

The verbatim reported speech of Hugh Dyke expresses the discourse that suggests the ban will actually help the IRA rather than defeat them. This can be considered a tactical opposing discourse because although critical of the ban, it still represents the Republican Movement as having a “sick cause”. This emotional and propagandistic construction depoliticises and transforms any rational motivations the Republican Movement had into evil, sinister or insane ones. A Daily Mail journalist also represented Hugh Dykes’ comments, but included more of what he said:
The move was attacked by Hugh Dykes, the ‘wet’ Tory MP for Harrow East. He said: ‘It would play into the IRA’s hands and could increase support for them in Northern Ireland. It would look as if the Government fear the IRA can persuade people of their sick cause’. *(Daily Mail, HURD TO WIPE ADAMS OFF TV SCREEN, 19.10.88)*

By including the fuller statement of Hugh Dykes, the journalist in the *Daily Mail* explains how the ban would play into the IRA’s hands, whereas the *Daily Mirror* journalist does not. However, the way in which both journalists want their readers to interpret Hugh Dykes’ statement is revealed by the way in which he is named. Whereas he is represented as a rebel in the *Daily Mirror*, he is represented as ‘wet’ in the *Daily Mail*. A rebel generally has positive connotations of standing up to injustice (depending on the context in which it is used) and is therefore supportive of this social actor resisting the British government’s broadcasting ban.

Labelling Hugh Dykes as the ‘wet’ Tory MP for Harrow East in 1980s Britain suggests this social actor is considered to be a ‘moderate’ Tory ideologically positioned outside Thatcher’s close circle of Tory allies as opposed to being one of the ‘dries’ who shared her right-wing ideological convictions (Vinen, 2009). The inverted commas around ‘wet’ acknowledge the special political vocabulary derived from private school terminology that suggests a ‘weak’ and ‘pathetic’ politician who is not ‘strong’ or ‘brave’ enough to support British government censorship.

These contrasting representations of the same social actor saying the same thing can be explained by the position taken by the respective newspapers on the British government’s broadcasting ban. Whereas the *Daily Mirror* overtly opposed the ban, the *Daily Mail* overtly supported it. This was illustrated in a *Daily Mirror* editorial that endorsed the discourse representing the ban as benefitting the IRA by arguing ‘when we hand propaganda gifts to the IRA we should wonder what we are doing’ *(Daily Mirror, BANKRUPT, BASE, BAD, 21.10.88)*. The *Daily Mail*, on the other hand, did not express this discourse in any of its editorials.

Other newspaper manifestations of the discourse representing the ban as beneficial to the IRA were also refracted in interesting ways. As alluded to earlier, Roy Hattersley’s House of Commons statement was represented several times in broadcasting ban newspaper articles, but a crucial aspect of his reasoning for calling the ban a ‘publicity coup’ for the IRA was included in some articles, but excluded in
others. For example, a journalist in *The Guardian* quoted Roy Hattersley at length and therefore acknowledged the American dimension of IRA support may increase because of the broadcasting ban:

> The shadow Home Secretary, Mr Roy Hattersley, said the Government had handed the IRA a publicity coup which outweighed the advantage of keeping its representatives off the air. [...] Mr Hattersley said Labour shared the natural revulsion at the exhibition on television of support for terrorism, but did not believe the effect of the ban would be to help to defeat it. “Has the Home Secretary not considered the damaging way in which his proposals will be used, particularly in the US, to portray this Government as the enemy of free expression?” he asked. “Has he weighed that publicity coup for the IRA against the advantage of keeping its representatives off TV?” (*The Guardian*, HURD DEFENDS BAN ON TERROR BROADCASTS, 20.10.88)

In contrast, a *Daily Telegraph* journalist did not quote Roy Hattersley at length and excluded the American dimension from his expression of the discourse representing the ban as beneficial to the IRA: ‘Mr Hattersley said the ban would be used as a propaganda weapon to portray the Government as “the enemy of free expression”’ (*The Daily Telegraph*, TV AND RADIO BAN ON TERRORISTS HAS MIXED LABOUR RECEPTION, 20.10.88). As a result, readers of this *Daily Telegraph* article would be unaware as to who would ‘use’ the ban as a ‘propaganda weapon’.

Although these slight differences in representation are interesting, on a more general level, the discourse suggesting the ban is beneficial to the IRA and the above examples of newspaper representations of it can be considered more significant due its tactical nature. The social actors expressing the discourse and newspapers capturing it through reported speech largely continue the foregrounding and pejorative naming of the Republican Movement and its actions. They also suggest that the ban itself is not a legitimate grievance for those democratically elected people bound by it.

**Lifting the ban (1994):**

The discourse representing the ban as being beneficial to the IRA was expressed on 5 occasions (2.3%) in newspaper articles representing the British government lifting the broadcasting ban. Interestingly, the American dimension of IRA support is much more overtly discussed in these articles, whereas those representing the introduction of the ban largely excluded this despite Roy Hattersley and Ken Livingstone indirectly and directly expressing the American dimension in the
House of Commons. A *Daily Telegraph* journalist writes the following in an article representing the British government lifting the broadcasting ban: ‘Sinn Fein has also used the existence of the ban to damage Britain’s case abroad, particularly in the USA, claiming it is being denied free speech’ (*The Daily Telegraph*, SINN FEIN’S BROADCAST BAN TO END, 16.09.94). Similarly, an editorial in *The Guardian* wrote ‘American fundraisers for the IRA seized an issue which flouted all that the First Amendment held dear: a free helping of oxygen’ (*The Guardian*, THE VOICE RETURNS, THE VOTE AWAITS, 17.09.94).

There was another, more prevalent, discourse expressed in newspaper articles representing the British government lifting the broadcasting ban that can be considered tactical in its opposition. This discourse, which was expressed 8 times (3.7%), argued the Irish actors who dubbed the voices of Sinn Féin actually improved the image of Sinn Féin and is also based on the premise that the ban was beneficial to the Republican Movement, rather than the British government. In the following extended example of this discourse expressed by a *Daily Mail* journalist it is suggested that the ban improved the image of Sinn Féin in several ways:

Interviews in which Adams was left floundering by questions about IRA violence [...] were transformed into a coherent response by the actor doing the voice-over. When former Sinn Fein publicity director Danny Morrison was interviewed recently at the Maze prison, where he is serving an eight-year sentence for imprisoning an alleged informer, he said afterwards: ‘I was rusty. But never mind – the actor will clean it up.’ The small group of Northern Ireland actors who dub the interviews have also done Adams a valuable service, replacing his deep, dour West Belfast tones with softer, more appealing accents. (*Daily Mail*, ‘I WAS RUSTY. BUT NEVER MIND – THE ACTOR WILL CLEAN IT UP FOR ME’, 17.09.94)

This *Daily Mail* journalist suggests that the ban improved the image of Sinn Féin by allowing Gerry Adams to appear coherent when answering difficult questions about the legitimacy of IRA violence as well as making his accent more palatable for audiences. Danny Morrison is also directly quoted as expressing the discourse that Irish actors improved the image of Sinn Féin, which adds credibility to this discourse because apparently those most impacted by the ban admit it is beneficial to them. A *Daily Express* journalist chose to use this Danny Morrison statement too, albeit a slightly different version of it: ‘Sinn Fein publicity director Danny Morrison once pointed out the benefits of the ban. Asked how an interview had gone, he said:
"I was rusty, but the actor will clean it up." (Daily Express, ACTORS LOSE THEIR ROLE, 17.09.94). A Gerry Adams statement was also used to reinforce the credibility of the discourse representing the ban as improving the image of Sinn Féin:

In the early days voiceovers were crude. Sinn Fein leaders sounded as though they had speech impediments. […] Since then voices have grown more sophisticated. So much so that once when Mr Adams learned which actor was to speak his words, he said: "Dead on. He does it better than me." (The Guardian, CURTAIN FALLS ON ACTORS WHO HAD WAY WITH WORDS, 17.09.94)

Again, it is suggested that those most impacted by the ban actually benefit from it and this is admitted by Sinn Féin members such as Gerry Adams. However, it is more likely that leading Sinn Féin representatives such as Danny Morrison and Gerry Adams were posturing if and when they made such statements in an attempt to put a positive spin on being targeted by the broadcasting ban. The discourse representing the ban as improving the image of Sinn Féin and therefore benefitting the Republican Movement can be considered tactical because it suggests the main targets and victims of the ban are the beneficiaries as opposed to the British government. One Daily Telegraph editorial overtly expressed this:

[T]he broadcasters soon took to showing Sinn Fein spokesmen with their lips moving while Ulster-accented actors simultaneously spoke their words. The indignity of this spectacle has rebounded more on the broadcasters and the Government than on the interviewee, whose views may even be enhanced by the actor’s professionally modulated tones (The Daily Telegraph, POINTLESS BAN, 02.09.94).

Such a discourse excludes the possibility that Sinn Féin representatives may have been dehumanised as well as ridiculed by, and alienated from, the audience after having their voices dubbed (whether out of sync or not). Instead, it is the British government itself that apparently loses out from its own media censorship, which is not very likely when it is considered how Sinn Féin media appearances dropped once the ban had been introduced (Henderson et al., 1990; Moloney, 1991; Rolston, 2002; McLaughlin and Baker, 2010).
Principled opposition to the broadcasting ban

There were several discourses that opposed the broadcasting ban on a principled basis such as those recognising that Sinn Féin was a legal political party with democratically elected MPs and councillors, or that the broadcasting ban would make media coverage of the Northern Ireland conflict incomplete. However, the most prevalent discourse that can be considered principally opposed to the broadcasting ban rather than tactically opposed represented the ban as undemocratic and a threat to civil liberties. The tactical opposing discourse discussed in the previous section was mostly expressed by British politicians who shared the same belief that Northern Ireland should remain ‘British’, but differed on strategy as to how this would be achieved. In contrast, the most expressed principled opposing discourse mostly emanated from organised media workers and left-wing Labour MP, Tony Benn.

Although the original statements made by representatives of the NUJ and the Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom are not available, they were often cited in newspaper articles expressing the discourse that represented the ban as undemocratic and a threat to civil liberties. Tony Benn also expressed this discourse when he made the following statement in the House of Commons debate on 19th October 1988:

Is the Secretary of State aware that his statement will be seen as a massive extension of state control over the broadcasting authorities, and that it is precisely comparable to the ban on the Zircon film and the attempt to ban the Spycatcher book? Any attack on the rights of elected representatives has always historically been seen as an attack upon those who elect them, the people who have chosen to use the ballot to express their views. The powers that the right hon. Gentleman has used are so general that they could be extended to anybody. There is no limit to those powers. I once exercised them when I was Postmaster General. Is he also aware that, as Lord Scarman said on television, it is questionable whether broadcasters will be so timid as to obey the law? There is no moral obligation to obey an unjust law that attacks civil liberties and democracy. (Hansard, 1988; 899)

Tony Benn represents the broadcasting ban as undemocratic and a threat to civil liberties in several ways. Although suggesting it ‘will be seen as a massive extension of state control’ is less powerful than stating ‘it is a massive extension of state control’ as the former refers to an interpretation and the latter refers to a fact, this construction still functions to oppose the British government’s introduction of the ban.
Whereas other social actors such as Douglas Hurd attempted to downplay the seriousness of the ban by representing it as ‘restrictions’ instead of censorship and by expressing discourses underlining that there’s a similar ban in the Irish Republic, Tony Benn attempts to underline the seriousness of it. This is achieved by using lexical choices that represent the magnitude (‘massive’) of this action (‘extension of state control’) and by contextualising the ban in terms of previous cases of the British government attempting to censor the Zircon documentary44 and Spycatcher book.45

The strongest manifestation of the discourse representing the ban as undemocratic and a threat to civil liberties, however, is expressed by Tony Benn at the end of his statement when he says: ‘There is no moral obligation to obey an unjust law that attacks civil liberties and democracy’ (Ibid.). Representing the broadcasting ban as ‘unjust’ and an ‘attack’ on civil liberties and democracy clearly functions to build opposition to it as well as building support for those who would try to resist it such as media workers committed to a free media. Manifestations of this discourse in broadcasting ban newspapers articles in both time periods will now be explored.

Introducing the ban (1988):

The discourse that represented the ban as undemocratic and a threat to civil liberties was expressed 17 times (4%) in newspaper articles representing the British government introducing the broadcasting ban. Nearly all manifestations of this discourse occurred in newspapers representative of the ‘quality’ press. This can be explained by the generic conventions of such newspapers, which assume their more educated and affluent readers are more interested in serious news stories that are discussed in more depth. The increased size of articles means that more voices will be expressed, increasing the probability of more discourses opposing the ban. Tony Benn was only called on to speak once in each of the ‘quality’ newspapers.

A Daily Telegraph journalist represented his Commons statement concisely, excluding the most powerful expression of the discourse representing the ban as undemocratic and a threat to civil liberties: ‘Mr TONY BENN (Lab, Chesterfield) said the announcement would be seen “as a massive extension of State control over the broadcasting authorities.”’ (The Daily Telegraph, TV AND RADIO BAN ON TERRORISTS HAS MIXED LABOUR RECEPTION, 20.10.88). In contrast, a Guardian journalist represented Tony Benn’s Commons statement at length and included more (though not all) of his most overt articulation of the discourse:
Mr Tony Benn (Lab, Chesterfield) said the ban would be seen as a massive extension of state control on a par with the ban on the Zircon film and the attempted ban on Spycatcher. But he suggested that the BBC and IBA might refuse to implement the ban. "As Lord Scarman said on television it is questionable whether the broadcasters will be so timid as to obey and there is no moral obligation to obey an unjust law that attacks civil liberties," he said. (The Guardian, HURD DEFENDS BAN ON TERROR BROADCASTS, 20.10.88)

Although, this Guardian journalist includes more of Tony Benn’s statement, it is interesting that he (or The Guardian editor) has chosen to exclude the last two words of it. Guardian readers would understand Tony Benn believes the ban is an attack on civil liberties, but not on democracy generally, which is a significant difference. Clearly, the journalist representing this discourse in The Guardian allows the British public reading this article to experience more of what was said in the House of Commons against the ban than the Daily Telegraph journalist does. However, it is interesting that the last two words of Tony Benn’s statement have been excluded because it is hard to believe that this would be a result of concision. The Guardian took an ambivalent editorial position on the ban, which did not overtly support or oppose the British government introducing the ban. This might explain why these two words were excluded, perhaps by the editor as opposed to the journalist, to soften the power of Tony Benn’s statement, but it is impossible to know conclusively.

Organised media workers were also called on to speak in newspaper articles representing the British government introducing the broadcasting ban. Representatives of the NUJ and the Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom expressed discourses that also represented the ban as undemocratic and a threat to civil liberties. It was a Daily Telegraph journalist, which represented the most powerful expressions of this discourse, allowing an unnamed representative of the BBC’s NUJ branch and Mike Jempson, a representative of the Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom, to speak:

The BBC’s National Union of Journalists branch said: “In seeking to cut the oxygen of publicity from terrorists, the Government risks cutting off the oxygen of democracy – the normally free flow of information and views. [...] The Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom condemned the Government’s decision as a major attack on free speech, which set an alarming precedent. Mr Mike Jempson, Campaign spokesman, said: “Who will the next group of people the Government will seek to silence because it doesn’t like
their opinions and cannot deal in an open and democratic way with the challenge they pose? It is a sad day for media freedom and democracy. *(The Daily Telegraph, DAMAGING PRECEDENT SAYS BBC, 20.10.88)*

Both these expressions of the discourse representing the ban as undemocratic and a threat to civil liberties clearly function to oppose the British government's introduction of the broadcasting ban. The NUJ statement subverts the discourse that argued 'terrorists' must be starved of the 'oxygen of publicity' into one that represents the ban as a risk to the 'oxygen of democracy', which it explains is 'the normally free flow of information and views'. By shifting the order of discourse into another it suggests that the normally free flow of information and views are being stopped by the ban and this is therefore undemocratic and a threat to civil liberties. Organised media workers were rarely allowed to speak in newspaper articles representing the broadcasting ban, but this interesting challenge to the dominant discourse illustrates how the broadcasting ban could have been opposed if they were.

As texts reflect the balance of social forces at a given place and time, it is possible to see that members of the British elite (in this case, newspaper owners and British politicians) were hegemonic then as now. Although centrifugal pressures obviously existed in society as illustrated by the alternative discourses expressed by the representatives of the NUJ and the Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom, centripetal pressures overwhelmingly dominated in the battle over the meaning of the broadcasting ban. Social actors challenging dominant discourses (in this case, organised media workers) and the media workers actually producing the newspaper articles representing the broadcasting ban, must re-constitute already existing discourses expressed by the British government in order to justify introducing such censorship. This can be explained using a CDA perspective:

> Text producers have nothing except given conventions of language and orders of discourse as resources for dealing with centrifugal pressures, but they are able to use these resources in news ways, generating, for instance, new configurations of genres and discourses. *(Fairclough, 1995: 7-8)*

Mike Jempson's statement expressed in the *Daily Telegraph* newspaper article also represents the ban as undemocratic and a threat to civil liberties by suggesting that the British government 'cannot deal in an open and democratic way' with the challenge posed by those it is banning from the broadcast media. By saying 'it is a sad day for
media freedom and democracy’, he also reaffirms such a principled opposing discourse by suggesting those who care about media freedom and democracy will be saddened by the British government’s broadcasting ban. Although such expressions of this discourse are challenging to the British government’s broadcasting ban, they were very rare and this was the only occasion journalists allowed Mike Jempson to express such a statement. This is significant because it illustrates that the organisation he represented was trying to resist the British government introducing the broadcasting ban, but that British newspapers mostly stifled this voice and therefore the breadth of opposition to the broadcasting ban. That said, other expressions of the discourse that represented the broadcasting ban as undemocratic and a threat to civil liberties were frequent when compared to the lack of principled discourses opposing the ban in newspaper articles representing the British government lifting it.

**Lifting the ban (1994):**

The discourse that argued the ban was undemocratic and a threat to civil liberties did not feature in any newspaper articles representing the British government lifting the broadcasting ban. Although opposition to the ban was unanimous by the time it was lifted, there were very few *principled* opposing discourses. There was one, however, which argued the ban made media reporting of Northern Ireland incomplete. This discourse was expressed on 8 occasions in newspaper articles from both sample periods and will now be explored in the latter sample period for two reasons. Firstly, it was the only principled discourse expressed in newspaper articles representing the British government lifting the broadcasting ban. Secondly, the discourse arguing the ban made media reporting of Northern Ireland incomplete also constitutes a higher percentage of the total discourses expressed in newspaper articles in the sample period capturing newspaper articles representing the British government lifting the broadcasting ban (3.7%) than those introducing the ban (1.9%).

The discourse arguing the ban made media reporting of Northern Ireland incomplete originated from managerial representatives of the broadcast media as well as organised media workers, namely the NUJ. It was *Guardian* journalists who allowed such social actors to speak most often. For example, two weeks before the British government lifted the broadcasting ban a *Guardian* journalist acknowledged that (the managers of) ITN and Channel 4 as well as the general secretary of the NUJ believed the ban had made media reporting of Northern Ireland incomplete:

127
Independent Television News said: “We will not be able to do our job properly in the important months ahead unless this ban is lifted immediately.” Channel 4 also favoured a meeting with Mr Dorrell. John Foster, general secretary of the National Union of Journalists, said: “The ban stops our members from giving the public the full reports they deserve.” (The Guardian, GERRY ADAMS MAY SOON GET HIS VOICE BACK, 01.09.94)

Such principled opposition to the ban was not expressed in any other newspapers in this sample period until after the ban was lifted. In the same article quoted above, it is acknowledged that ‘[c]riticism of the ban reached fresh heights in February when Mr Adams was interviewed on American chat shows, while British broadcasters laboured under the restrictions’ (Ibid.). Similarly, it was only Guardian journalists who explained how the ban actually made media reporting of Northern Ireland incomplete:

In stark numeric terms the ban has had the effect Mrs Thatcher intended. In the first year, Sinn Fein’s appearances on British television plummeted by 63 per cent. On the second anniversary of the notice the Government and the republican movement reached uncharacteristic agreement on its evident impact. Sinn Fein’s Richard McAuley said: “In terms of minimising interest in Britain and denying people access to information about Ireland I think it has been successful.” (The Guardian, CONTRADICTIONS DUMPED IN THE DUSTBIN OF HISTORY, 17.09.94)

This is the only newspaper article that details the extent to which Sinn Féin was censored in the broadcast media as a result of the ban. It is also the only newspaper article to represent the ban as an attempt by the British government to reduce Sinn Féin appearances on television for purely political purposes as opposed to those stated by the British government such as needing to starve ‘terrorists’ of the ‘oxygen of publicity’ and because of the offence caused to the ‘British public’.

Quoting a Sinn Féin representative helps to construct this alternative discourse because Richard McAuley suggests only one side of the Northern Ireland story has been told to those living in England, Scotland and Wales as a result of the ban. This was clearly the purpose of the broadcasting ban, yet such a discourse was only expressed on this one occasion because Sinn Féin representatives were rarely allowed to speak by journalists. The only other occasions on which Sinn Féin representatives were called on to speak in this time period was when journalists tried to persuade their readers that the broadcasting ban had actually benefitted the Republican Movement by improving their image with the voices of Irish actors.
Other expressions of the discourse arguing the ban made media reporting of Northern Ireland incomplete directly quoted representatives of the BBC and Channel 4. A *Daily Express* journalist acknowledged the unpopularity of the ban amongst broadcasters when writing: ‘Broadcasters welcomed the lifting of the TV ban. Tony Hall, head of BBC news and current affairs, said: “It means we are now able to do our job properly.”’ (*Daily Express*, ULSTER MOVE AS US FREES IRA GUNMAN, 17.09.94). The social actor who is directly quoted expresses the discourse arguing the ban made media reporting on Northern Ireland complete by suggesting that only once the ban had been lifted could broadcasters report Northern Ireland properly. Journalists at *The Daily Telegraph* and *Daily Mail* both used the same reported speech of the chief executive of Channel 4 who expressed a statement very critical of the ban:

Mr Michael Grade, chief executive of Channel 4, who took a lead among broadcasters in calling for a revocation of the ban, said: “The lifting of the ban ends Britain’s most embarrassing attempt to censor coverage of the most important domestic political story of post-war years. Normal news reporting can now be resumed.” (*The Daily Telegraph*, BROADCASTERS RELIEVED BY LIFTING OF THE BAN, 17.09.94)

This social actor represents the broadcasting ban as Britain’s most embarrassing censorship attempt throughout the Northern Ireland conflict as well as expressing the discourse arguing the ban made media reporting of Northern Ireland incomplete by stating that only after the ban had been lifted could normal news reporting resume. Significantly, he also argues the Northern Ireland conflict was the most important domestic political story since World War II. Although credible, such a discourse was rarely expressed in newspaper articles representing the British government introducing and lifting the broadcasting ban.

More generally, it is interesting to discover that there was only one discourse that can be considered to principally oppose the broadcasting ban in newspaper articles representing the British government lifting it. Although the discourse arguing the ban made media reporting of Northern Ireland incomplete was expressed on 8 occasions in this latter time period, it is clearly the case that most journalists did not ‘remember’ it in this way as half of the expressions of this discourse appeared in just two *Guardian* articles. Moreover, the discourse representing the ban as undemocratic and a threat to civil liberties was totally absent from newspaper articles representing the British government lifting the ban.
This is significant because such a principled discourse was expressed frequently in newspaper articles representing the British government introducing the ban meaning there was some principled opposition to the ban in 1988. As will become clear in the next section, although opposition to the ban was unanimous by the time the ban was lifted, it was not rationalised by principled discourses such as the ban being undemocratic and a threat to civil liberties or because the ban made media reporting of Northern Ireland incomplete.

Ban was a farce because of dubbing

The discourse arguing that the ban was a farce because of Irish actors dubbing Sinn Féin representatives was most frequently expressed as to why the broadcasting ban should be lifted. This discourse featured 21 times (9.8%) in newspaper articles representing the British government lifting the broadcasting ban. There was another discourse expressed less often that also fixated on the use of dubbing and argued Irish actors actually improved the image of Sinn Féin representatives. Earlier, it was argued that this discourse can be considered an example of tactical opposition because it suggests the main targets and victims of the ban are actually the beneficiaries of it as opposed to the British government. Although both discourses fixate on the dubbing by Irish actors, they were categorised separately because they are considered to oppose the ban in slightly different, yet ideologically significant ways.

Whereas the discourse arguing the ban was a farce because of dubbing opposes the ban as an absurdity, failing to prevent the voices of those it intends to deny access from the broadcast media, the discourse arguing Irish actors improved the image of Sinn Féin representatives opposes the ban by suggesting that the ban was actually beneficial to the Republican Movement. Both discourses oppose the broadcasting ban, but the former does so by focusing on the absurdity of the ban, which although distracts attention from the seriousness of such censorship, it is at least a credible criticism of the ban and the British government for introducing it. The latter discourse, on the other hand, which argues the ban actually benefitted the Republican Movement by improving the image of Sinn Féin representatives, severely lacks credibility because it is more likely that such dubbing would hinder the image of Sinn Féin by identifying them as the enemy of, and distancing them from, the ‘British people’ as well as dehumanising and ridiculing them with altered, out-of-sync, voices.
Although the discourse arguing that the ban was a farce because of Irish actors dubbing Sinn Féin representatives was expressed in slightly different ways such as being ‘ridiculous’, ‘a disaster’, or ‘a joke’, the opposition to the ban was always rationalised by identifying the use of Irish actors. This is significant because the ban is frequently represented in ways that make it appear to be a ‘silly mistake’ rather than a serious erosion of British democracy and media freedom. It is interesting that newspaper articles representing the British government introducing the ban frequently expressed a discourse arguing the ban was undemocratic and a threat to civil liberties, yet there was no such discourse in newspaper articles representing the British government lifting the ban. The broadcasting ban was the most serious attempt to control the British broadcast media since World War II, clearly undemocratic (especially considering several Sinn Féin representatives had been elected in council and general elections) and an attack on the freedom of the broadcast media. However, it is mostly ‘remembered’ as being an absurdity instead. Arguably, fixating on the use of actors directs blame for the failure of the ban towards the British broadcasters instead of towards the British government, which actually introduced the censorship.

The British government lifted the broadcasting ban during the summer recess of Parliament in 1994. This means there are no Hansard records of the debates that took place in the months leading up to John Major announcing the end of the ban in Belfast on 16th September. The origins of the discourse representing the ban as a farce because of dubbing are therefore difficult to pinpoint. However, there were two MPs who did briefly mention the use of Irish actors when debating the broadcasting ban. In a House of Commons debate about Northern Ireland on 21st January, 1994, Labour MP Tony Benn argued the ban infringed his own civil liberties and was an absurdity for several reasons:

The ban on the President of Sinn Fein is a great mistake from the Government’s point of view. The ban on broadcasting is not only an outrage for my civil liberties but also an absurdity as one can sit in Belfast and listen to Gerry Adams broadcasting from Dublin now. [...] My solution, which I put to Sinn Fein the other day, would be that if Gerry Adams joined Equity he could broadcast and they could say "actor’s voice" on the television screen. What nonsense it is to deny us the right to hear from one of the participants who are being pleaded to come to the table. (Hansard, 1994: 1192)
Tony Benn is much more critical of the British government and although he mentions the use of actors in dubbing Sinn Féin representatives, he does not fixate on them as the reason for the ‘absurdity’ and ‘nonsense’ of the ban. Instead, he opposes the ban by underlining the contradictory behaviour of the British government maintaining a ban on Sinn Féin representatives whilst simultaneously trying to encourage them into talks. He also humorously opposes the ban by suggesting Gerry Adams should join Equity (the trade union representing workers from the arts and entertainment industry) so that Gerry Adams could speak on the broadcast media with his own voice. The other Member of Parliament that briefly mentioned the broadcasting ban and the use of Irish actors was Tory MP, Rupert Allason. In Prime Minister’s Question Time in the House of Commons on 24th May 1994, he asked the following:

Does my right hon. Friend agree that it is high time that the abuse of the broadcasting ban, which is so widely circumvented by all the broadcasting media, should be reviewed so as to prevent known terrorists from appearing on television and having their voices dubbed by out-of-work actors from Northern Ireland? (Hansard, 1994: 180)

In contrast to Tony Benn, Rupert Allason blames British broadcasters rather than the British government for the ‘abuse’ of the ban and calls for a review of it to prevent ‘terrorists’ from having their voices dubbed by Irish actors. The suggestion then is that the ban itself is not problematic, but the broadcasters who circumvent it by using actors to dub Sinn Féin representatives. John Major’s reply was very brief and vague:

I understand the frustration that my hon. Friend feels about that matter. A number of complex matters are involved, but I will certainly discuss them with my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for National Heritage. (Hansard, 1994: 180)

A possible explanation for the brevity and vagueness of John Major’s reply was that he had already decided to lift the broadcasting ban, but was waiting for the most strategic moment to publicly announce it. Rather than speculate any further, expressions of the discourse arguing the ban was a farce because of Irish actors dubbing Sinn Féin representatives will now be explored in newspaper articles representing the British government lifting the ban. As before with other discourses deconstructed in this chapter, the extent to which the order of discourse is altered depends on the genre of newspaper articles and the political sympathies of individual
newspapers, which refract the discourse in different ways. For example, the following excerpt from a *Daily Mail* editorial illustrates how editorials allow a newspaper to express views not necessarily emanating from the reported speech of particular social actors. It also shows how a ‘mid-market’, right-wing newspaper supportive of the British government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban is more critical of the actors trying to make a living and broadcasters trying to defend media freedom than the British government for introducing the ban in the first place:

It cannot be said too often: the ban is a disaster. [...] It has never worked. In practice it has become no more than a job creation scheme for Irish actors. They must love it. They are regularly called in to repeat the words – and how sympathetically they do it – uttered by Adams and other apologists for murder. The fee can top £1,000. Nice work if you can get it. But it doesn’t stop Adams and his kind getting their views across. Broadcasters enjoy thumbing their noses at the Government by using lip synchronisation and dubbing. (*Daily Mail*, TRUST THE PEOPLE, 16.09.94)

This *Daily Mail* editorial not only fixates on the use of actors as the reason for the ban failing to work, but their nationality too. It suggests Irish actors employed to dub the voices of Sinn Féin representatives are sympathetic to the ‘apologists for murder’ and actually enjoy dubbing ‘Adams and his kind’. The editorial also argues that broadcasters enjoy ‘thumbing their noses at the Government by using lip synchronisation and dubbing’. Instead of representing Irish actors as simply doing their job and broadcasters as merely trying to air the opinions of all parties in Northern Ireland, the *Daily Mail* chooses to portray them as ‘enemy’ sympathisers.

The hysteria and racism the *Daily Mail* editor seemingly intends to whip up is wrong in both principle and fact. Assuming actors support a certain political tendency because of their nationality is a racist idea because it is based on stereotyping, which in this case appears to be as a strategy to ‘other’ people in Ireland from people in Britain. It is also simply wrong in fact because the actors were from Northern Ireland, which the *Daily Mail* itself staunchly defends as ‘British’. The actors the *Daily Mail* encourages its readers to hate are acknowledged as being from Northern Ireland in a *Daily Mail* news article printed the following day (*Daily Mail*, I WAS RUSTY. BUT NEVER MIND - THE ACTOR WILL CLEAN IT UP FOR ME, 17.09.94).

Clearly, the hate appeal for such actors would not work as well for the *Daily Mail* and its readers if the ‘enemy’ of the ‘British people’ was represented as ‘British actors’ because it goes against the long crafted nationalism that such a newspaper
intends to inspire. The *Daily Mail* was the only newspaper to make such outlandish and racist claims, but the focus of the discourse arguing that the ban was a farce because of dubbing often meant broadcasters were blamed for the farce rather than the British government for introducing it in the first place, as this *Daily Mail* news article illustrates:

The restrictions backfired almost immediately. Broadcasters sidestepped it by using actors to dub the words of leading Sinn Fein members such as Adams and Martin McGuinness. (*Daily Mail, I WAS RUSTY. BUT NEVER MIND - THE ACTOR WILL CLEAN IT UP FOR ME, 17.09.94*)

The seriousness of the ban was also downplayed in expressions of the discourse arguing the ban was a farce because of dubbing. For example, a *Daily Mail* journalist quotes a Unionist politician fixating on the dubbing and then referring to it as ‘a joke’ and ‘comedy’:

Ulster Unionist general secretary Jim Wilson said there was no sense in continuing the use of voice-overs by actors. He said: ‘It is a joke, and most people will not be annoyed at the comedy being removed from the airwaves’. (*Daily Mail, MCGUINNESS DODGES KEY QUESTION OVER THE CEASEFIRE, 17.09.94*)

The theme of the ban as an absurdity rather than an attack on British democracy and civil liberties was continued in other expressions of the discourse arguing the ban was a farce because of dubbing. For example, a *Daily Express* editorial referred to the broadcasting ban as ‘nonsense’ whilst drawing attention to the use of ‘Irish’ actors who would apparently ‘mourn’ the ending of the ban: ‘With the peace process picking up speed this nonsense is now to end. It will not be mourned – except by Irish actors’. (*Daily Express, VOICE OF REASON, 17.09.94*). Although, like the *Daily Mail*, the *Daily Express* encourages its readers to be hostile to the ‘Irish’ actors employed to dub Sinn Féin representatives by suggesting they will ‘mourn’ the lifting of the ban, it does not overtly suggest they are sympathetic to the Republican Movement. Instead, the suggestion is that these actors will ‘mourn’ the loss of employment.

In *The Daily Telegraph*, John Major is also reported as referring to the ban as ‘nonsense’ because of dubbing, but in a way that blames the broadcasters rather than his predecessor, Margaret Thatcher: ‘Mr John Major expressed dismay at the broadcasters use of lip-synching, which he said was making a nonsense of the ban’
A few weeks before the British government lifted the broadcasting ban, the then head of Sky News, Ian Cooke, gave a concrete example of why the broadcasting ban was a farce, or ‘stupid’, as he describes it:

Mr Ian Cooke, head of Sky News, said: “Today Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness made major speeches in Belfast and we carried them live. But we had to get a translator sitting in the studio to translate from English to English as it went out. That just illustrates how stupid the whole thing is.”

Of course, there is no denying that the broadcasting ban had all the attributes ascribed to it in newspaper articles representing the British government’s lifting of the broadcasting ban. It was a farce, it was ridiculous and a disaster. It was a joke, nonsense and stupid. However, the dominance of those expressions of the discourse arguing it was a farce because of dubbing, which ‘remember’ the ban as an absurdity, massively downplay the seriousness of it. This discourse also fixates on the effects of the ban, rather than the cause of it. In other words, broadcasters resisting censorship by using actors to dub Sinn Féin’s democratically elected representatives are foregrounded, whereas British government representatives who actually enacted the ban are backgrounded. Therefore, the social actors responsible for the broadcasting ban who acted undemocratically in the “mother of democracies” are overshadowed whereas those resisting it and defending basic freedoms in Britain are attacked by sections of the British newspaper industry. The consequence of this is that the British government largely evades criticism by journalists.

Although not one single newspaper article representing the British government introducing or lifting the broadcasting ban did, it is worth acknowledging the first principle of the National Union of Journalists’ Code of Conduct. Since 1936, all journalists joining the NUJ agree to follow a series of principles that all journalists should strive towards. The first one states a journalist: ‘At all times upholds and defends the principle of media freedom, the right of freedom of expression and the right of the public to be informed’ (cited in Adams and Hicks, 2009: 194).

Broadcasters resisting the British government’s broadcasting ban could have and should have been celebrated in British newspaper articles, but rarely were. At the beginning of this section, it was acknowledged that the order of discourse can be
subverted depending on the genre of newspaper articles and the political sympathies of individual newspapers, which refract the same discourse in different ways. Most expressions of the discourse arguing the ban was a farce because of dubbing excluded the agency of the British government in that farce and suggested it was broadcasters who were to blame as well as Irish actors employed to assist in circumventing the ban and thus following a crucial principle of being a journalist: resisting censorship.

*The Guardian* was the only newspaper to contain an editorial remotely sympathetic to the broadcasters and acknowledging the agency of the British government in the farce of the broadcasting ban. In the opening sentences of this *Guardian* editorial it welcomes the lifting of the ban and represents the ban as 'wholly absurd', but crucially acknowledges the British government's agency in all this, which other newspapers did not:

The part of Gerry Adams in future episodes will henceforth be played by himself. Good news. The Government's radio and TV ban on the real voices of Sinn Fein has become wholly absurd. (*The Guardian*, THE VOICE RETURNS, THE VOTE AWAITS, 17.09.94)

One of the major reasons given for why the ban had become wholly absurd was the use of actors, but 'spatchcock legislation' is blamed for the farce instead of broadcasters:

As with all such spatchcock legislation, farce soon supervened. Out-of-work Irish actors grew rich, statesmanlike and perfect as broadcasters found a way through the prohibition. (*The Guardian*, THE VOICE RETURNS, THE VOTE AWAITS, 17.09.94)

Unlike the *Daily Mail* editorial discussed at the beginning of this section, this *Guardian* editorial does not attack the broadcasters for circumventing the ban. Similarly, a *Guardian* journalist writing in a news article comes close to actually celebrating broadcasters 'flouting' the spirit of the ban:

Though the broadcasters bowed to the censorship restrictions, in time they became more confident in flouting its spirit. Actors were brought in to speak the words of Sinn Fein leaders and their imitations grew more and more precise. By the end the ban had become all but superfluous. (*The Guardian*, CONTRADICTIONS DUMPED IN THE DUSTBIN OF HISTORY, 17.09.94)
The discourse arguing that the ban was a farce because of actors dubbing Sinn Féin representatives was altered by this journalist working for *The Guardian* towards a more positive and professional position that was supportive of broadcast media workers resisting government censorship. However, this commendable refraction of the order of discourse in *The Guardian* was an exception rather than the norm. Although most journalists acknowledged the ban was absurd and a farce because Sinn Féin representatives were dubbed by Northern Irish actors, instead of celebrating the refusal of British broadcasters to comply with British government censorship, there was a tendency to blame the effects rather than the cause of the absurdity.

Most newspapers in the sample were hostile to British broadcasters for circumventing the broadcasting ban rather than hostile to the British government for introducing it in the first place. Excluding the agency of the British government for introducing the ban is significant because when John Major lifted the ban he could be represented as responding to the ban having been made an absurdity because of the actions of British broadcasters rather than the design of the ban itself by his predecessors. Another interesting distraction chosen by some journalists and editors, particularly those at the *Daily Mail*, was the hostility directed towards the actors employed by British broadcasters to circumvent the censorship.

**Critical Discourse Analysis - textual analysis II: summary**

In this chapter, CDA has been used to analyse British newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban in the periods when the British government introduced and lifted the ban. The most significant discourses have been analysed to explain how they functioned to support or oppose the ban. During the period when the British government introduced the broadcasting ban, the most frequently expressed discourses in broadcasting ban newspaper articles foregrounded the Republican Movement as the main targets of the ban and represented them in pejorative ways. It has been argued here that these interdiscursive constructions functioned to support the British government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban. Foregrounding the Republican Movement as the main targets of the ban whilst representing them as perpetrators of, and apologists for, ‘terrorism’ encourages newspaper readers to fixate on the actions of the Republican Movement instead of the reasons for the IRA and Sinn Féin’s existence in the first place.
This is especially the case because newspaper journalists overwhelmingly chose to suppress the Republican Movement’s historical and political motivations. Only the Daily Mirror acknowledged that partition was a core grievance motivating the Republican Movement and that was on one occasion. This alternative discourse could have been expressed by all journalists and newspapers so that newspaper readers in England, Scotland and Wales could have understood why England was being targeted by the IRA other than their suggested ‘blood lust’, but doing so would not have served British nationalism, or the British elite that thrives on it.

Instead, Republican combatants were represented as ‘terrorists’, ‘extremists’ ‘gangsters’, ‘godfathers’, ‘murderers’, ‘bombers’ and ‘killers’ (in other words, perpetrators of violent crime) and Sinn Féin was represented as a ‘front’, ‘mouthpiece’ or ‘apologist’ for these crimes. Clearly then, Chomsky’s (2002) contention about the propagandists approach to terrorism being adopted by large sections of the mass media is correct when considering the naming of Republican Movement social actors by British journalists during the Northern Ireland conflict.

Van Dijk’s (1998, 2006) ideological square predicts that discourses referring to different racial or national groups (especially during conflicts) will involve contrasting positive aspects about an imagined ‘us’ with negative aspects about an imagined ‘them’. The referential and predicational strategies used by British journalists clearly functioned to construct a negative other-presentation for the Republican Movement. Interestingly though, there was a distinct absence of British combatants in newspaper articles representing the British government introducing and lifting the broadcasting ban, which meant a positive self-presentation of British combatants was achieved by representing them as the victims of IRA violence and never the perpetrators of violence against civilians.

Discourses emanating from the British government were frequently expressed in newspaper articles representing its introduction of the broadcasting ban. The discourse arguing that ‘terrorists’ must be starved of the ‘oxygen of publicity’, which considering the aforementioned discourses clearly referred to Republicans as being the ‘terrorists’ rather than Unionist combatants, suggested the British media had given the Republican Movement many opportunities to speak. However, as the review of literature in Chapter 2 made clear, this was not the case. This discourse and the discourse acknowledging there was already a similar ban in the Irish Republic suggested that introducing censorship was both necessary and acceptable in Britain.

138
Therefore, it has been argued in this chapter that such discourses, which were the next two most frequently expressed, also largely functioned to build support for the broadcasting ban. Although this is overwhelmingly the case and such discourses were often amplified by newspaper journalists, the orders of discourse were occasionally subverted by journalists and social actors opposed to the ban. Such challenges to dominant discourses illustrated how the ban could have been resisted if the social forces opposed to the British government were stronger.

Newspaper articles representing the British government lifting the broadcasting ban also constructed the ban as mainly targeting the IRA and Sinn Féin. However, the discourse foregrounding the Republican Movement was not consistently interconnected with the discourse representing them in pejorative ways. Instead, discourses that functioned to oppose the broadcasting ban were frequently expressed during 1994, shifting the context of such foregrounding from that focusing on the actions of the Republican Movement to the farce of the broadcasting ban itself and other discourses, which welcomed the end of such censorship.

The most frequently expressed discourse opposing the ban appeared exactly the same amount of times in newspaper articles as the discourse foregrounding the Republican Movement as the main targets of the ban. It simply argued that the ban should be lifted (in newspaper articles before 16th September, 1994) or that the lifting of the ban is welcomed (in newspaper articles after 16th September, 1994) without explaining why. It has been argued here that this interdiscursive shift in 1994 altered the meaning of such foregrounding and functioned to oppose the broadcasting ban.

This chapter, following Miller’s (1990) analysis, has also argued that opposition to the British government’s broadcasting ban was expressed in discourses that can be considered either ‘tactical’ or ‘principled’. In essence, opposing discourses were motivated and refracted by the interests of particular social actors and groups. The most prevalent discourse tactically opposing the British government’s introduction of the ban represented it as being beneficial to the IRA. Analysing this discourse revealed not only the differing ways in which the same discourse was expressed by politicians to reinforce their own party political and ideological allegiances, but also how journalists represented this discourse to reinforce their own newspaper’s party political and ideological allegiances. Social actors who emphasised US support for the IRA were either completely excluded by journalists or the parts of their statement acknowledging this were excluded in newspaper articles.
The discourse representing the ban as being beneficial to the IRA was expressed far less in newspaper articles representing the British government lifting the broadcasting ban, although the American dimension of IRA support was much more overtly discussed in these articles. The most prevalent discourse expressed in newspaper articles during this time period that can be considered tactical in its opposition to the broadcasting ban argued the Northern Irish actors who dubbed the voices of Sinn Féin actually improved the image of Sinn Féin and is also based on the premise that the ban was beneficial to the Republican Movement, rather than the British government.

The most prevalent discourse that can be considered principally opposed to the broadcasting ban during its introduction in 1988 represented the ban as undemocratic and a threat to civil liberties. This discourse was mostly expressed by organised media workers, but left-wing Labour MP, Tony Benn, was a rare voice in the House of Commons articulating it too. These social actors were more concerned with democracy and media freedom in Britain than Britain’s “national interest” in Ireland meaning that their opposition to the broadcasting ban could be based on the principle of censorship being undemocratic and a threat to civil liberties rather than just a tactical mistake of the British government in fighting “the enemy”.

Again, the extent to which journalists expressed this discourse in newspaper articles representing the broadcasting ban seemed to depend on the party political and ideological allegiances of the newspaper owner for which they worked, but also on generic conventions of newspapers themselves. Some expressions of the discourse representing the broadcasting ban as undemocratic and a threat to civil liberties in newspaper articles illustrated how it was possible to allow critical social actors to speak such as Mike Jempson of the Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom. However, most newspaper articles did not feature such voices. Whether this was the decision of journalists, or their editors, is unknown.

The discourse that argued the ban was undemocratic and a threat to civil liberties did not feature in any newspaper articles representing the British government lifting the broadcasting ban. Although opposition to the ban was unanimous by the time it was lifted, there were very few opposing discourses, which can be considered principled in their opposition. There was one, however, which argued the ban made media reporting of Northern Ireland incomplete. This discourse originated from managerial representatives of the broadcast media as well as organised media
workers, namely the NUJ. It was Guardian journalists who allowed such social actors to speak most often and once detailed the extent to which Sinn Féin was censored as a result of the ban. Such exceptions to the general pattern of British newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban reveal that it was possible for other journalists to do the same if they chose to or were allowed to by their editor.

The final discourse explored in this chapter represented the ban as a farce because of Irish actors dubbing Sinn Féin representatives and was the most frequently expressed reason for the British government lifting the broadcasting ban in 1994. This discourse, which fixated on (Northern) Irish actors, was an interesting journalistic trend because it meant British newspapers ‘remembered’ the ban as an absurdity rather than the worst censorship in Britain since World War II. The ban was represented as a farce because it failed to prevent the voices it intended to deny access to the broadcast media due to actors being used to circumvent it. The dubbing was often out of sync. Although a credible criticism of the ban, such a memory of it avoids acknowledging the seriousness of such government censorship. It also meant that broadcasters were blamed for the failure of the ban instead of the British government for introducing it in the first place.

Although one of the two politicians expressing this discourse clearly intended to blame the British government for the farce of the ban, most newspaper expressions of this discourse did not. As before with other discourses explored in this chapter, the extent to which the order of discourse was altered depended on the genre of newspaper articles and the political sympathies of individual newspapers, which refracted the discourse in different ways. So, whereas Daily Mail and Daily Express journalists (incorrectly) fixated on the ‘Irish’ nationality of the actors and criticised the broadcasters for daring to circumvent the ban, journalists from The Guardian chose to criticise the government for introducing censorship in the first place rather than the broadcasters for resisting it. Either way, the result was that when the British government lifted the broadcasting ban in 1994, the newspaper industry’s ‘collective memory’ mostly remembered it for being a farcical mistake rather than a serious erosion of British democracy and media freedom.
In this chapter CDA is used to explore a selection of individual newspaper articles representative of the ‘popular’, ‘mid-market’ and ‘quality’ newspaper genres. The textual analysis in the previous chapter analysed the most significant discourses across all newspaper articles representing the British government introducing and lifting the broadcasting ban. In this chapter, the textual analysis focuses on the most significant newspaper articles during the sample period in which the British government introduced the broadcasting ban instead of the one covering its lifting. The main reason for this is because the way in which the ban’s introduction was represented would impact whether it would be supported or opposed from the beginning and therefore impact how long the censorship lasted.

Another reason for analysing British newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban during the period covering the British government’s introduction of it is because there was division amongst elite social actors as to whether the broadcasting ban was the best strategy for stopping the Republican Movement. By the time the British government lifted the ban elite opposition to it was universal. As a result, newspapers were divided on whether to support or oppose the British government’s broadcasting ban when it was first announced, which makes it more interesting to analyse newspaper articles during this period.

The textual analysis in this chapter shifts from the general thematic analysis in the previous chapter to a meticulous sentence by sentence analysis here. This entails deconstructing each newspaper article from the headline through to the narrative of the entire article. The naming and framing of social actors and their reported speech by journalists is examined as well as the representations of the discourses explored in the previous chapter to explain how they operated interdiscursively in building support or opposition to the British government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban. To reveal the choices made by journalists in creating these newspaper articles, alternative constructions will be considered throughout as well as the potential impact of the actual representations compared to the alternative representations.
The Sun – ‘Fury as BBC beat Hurd ban on IRA’s claptrap’
by Carson Black, news article, 20th October, 1988, page 2

Fury as BBC beat Hurd ban on IRA’s claptrap

by Carson Black

BBC bosses stuck two fingers up at the Government yesterday, moments before Home Secretary Douglas Hurd banned them from interviewing people who back Irish terror groups.

They broadcast comments by Gerry Adams, head of Sinn Fein, political wing of the IRA, on Radio Four’s World at One programme.

As Mr Hurd put the final touches to his Commons announcement, Mr Adams warned: “We’re not going to go away.”

“Terrorists will not lose the interview wars,” Mr Adams said. “When you can’t rely on the media to behave responsibly by self-discipline, you have to rely on your own discipline.”

“Mrs Thatcher...insisted on the ban to deprive the IRA of the ‘oxygen of publicity.’”

Mr Hurd told MPs that TV appearances by terrorists justifying murder caused “grave offence.”

Attacked

He added: “The Government has decided that the time has come to deny this easy platform to those who use it to propagate terrorism.”

The ban, which will be lifted during elections, also covers Protestant paramilitary groups.

It was attacked last night by Labour deputy leader Roy Hattersley.

He said: “It will make the Government look restrictive and ridiculous.”

BBC and ITN claimed the ban would make reporting of Northern Ireland affairs incomplete.

Terror groups have been barred from Irish TV for 17 years.
The Sun

The most significant *Sun* newspaper article representing the British government introducing the broadcasting ban (above) was a news article printed on 20th October 1988. It was the most prominent, appearing on page 2, and was the largest being between an eighth and a quarter of a page in size. It was also the only *Sun* newspaper article representing the British government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban, which had corresponding imagery. There is one image of Gerry Adams above one of Douglas Hurd with the following captions written underneath the images: ‘Adams... ‘We won’t go away’” and ‘Hurd... interviews crackdown’. Both images are small and equal in size as well as being equally close-up, eye-level shots. Although both subjects are represented as speaking because their mouths are open, Gerry Adams is gazing into the camera whereas Douglas Hurd’s gaze is slightly to the left of the camera. This is significant because Gerry Adams is represented as addressing the newspaper reader, which arguably generalises the threat of the caption from being aimed at the British government to the British public.

The order in which the images appear counters the chronology of the British government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban, which is significant because it creates an ideological narrative. Positioning the image of Gerry Adams above that of Douglas Hurd with the respective captions creates a representation that suggests Gerry Adams has taunted the British government or British public more generally by saying ‘We won’t go away’ and then Douglas Hurd has reacted by introducing an ‘interviews crackdown’. In reality, however, the British government had made clear its intention several days before to introduce a media ban as *The Sun* itself briefly recognised on 17th October (*The Sun*, IRA FACES THE BOOT FROM TV, 17.10.88) and Gerry Adams was being defiant against this by saying ‘We won’t go away’.

This chronology would have been represented far more accurately if these images (and the article itself) had acknowledged this as opposed to representing the Gerry Adams statement being aired before the broadcast ban was officially introduced on 19th October. Whilst this representation decontextualises the British government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban by excluding this fact, it is perhaps more accurate to criticise the article itself because the images reflect the narrative of the article and would have been chosen to fit the article. The images have been explored first though because it is the imagery (and the headline) of a newspaper article that readers tend to
consume first. That is why it is still worth considering how the meaning would shift if the images and respective captions appeared with Douglas Hurd above Gerry Adams because the narrative would represent Douglas Hurd introducing an ‘interviews crackdown’ and Gerry Adams reacting by saying ‘We won’t go away’.

Choosing such images also individualises a complex conflict between many social actors and institutions including the British government, British media and eleven Republican and Loyalist organisations to just two social actors. This simplifies the narrative of the conflict and foregrounds Gerry Adams, therefore expressing the most prevalent discourse and most likely to be articulated first in newspaper articles, which represented the ban as mainly targeting the Republican Movement. This is further fixed by the headline and the article itself, which diverts attention from the seriousness of the British government introducing censorship to the alleged irresponsibility of the BBC instead. The headline of this Sun news article, ‘Fury as BBC beat Hurd ban on IRA’s claptrap’, suggests that the discourses representing British broadcasters (especially the BBC) as irresponsible and the ban as mainly targeting the IRA and/or Sinn Féin will be prominent in the newspaper article. This is achieved by foregrounding the BBC and the IRA and by making significant lexical choices to fix these discourses.

The headline suggests the BBC created ‘fury’ by beating Hurd’s ban. The noun ‘fury’ denotes anger, but, like the noun ‘rage’, connotes higher levels of hostility and emotion. If the headline read ‘Anger as BBC beat Hurd ban on IRA’s claptrap’ or ‘Criticism as BBC beat Hurd ban on IRA’s claptrap’ the signified meanings would be less dramatic. Using hyperbole to describe the BBC’s defiance against the ban arguably serves to attract the reader to the article and to exaggerate the seriousness of the BBC broadcasting a statement by Gerry Adams. The ‘fury’ is generalised because it is not attributed to a particular social group or social actor, which creates an enigma for the reader, but also suggests the ‘fury’ is more widespread than it actually is, perhaps inviting the reader to share the disdain for the BBC.

Using the verb ‘beat’ is another significant lexical choice as it also connotes the presence of a confrontation although the meaning of this signifier is more open to interpretation than ‘fury’. The context in which it is used suggests the verb ‘beat’ is used in the sense of defeating and overcoming something or surpassing or outdoing something, in this case the ban. There is also the possibility of this verb being chosen over others for the purpose of alliteration because ‘B-B-C beat Hurd ban’ certainly
constitutes a form of alliteration. The most significant lexical choice in the headline, however, is 'claptrap'. Constructing statements from representatives of the Republican Movement as 'claptrap' clearly functions to delegitimise their political motivations as it suggests whatever they say is at best, 'insincere' (in the formal sense of the noun), and at worst, 'nonsense' (in the informal sense of the noun). This is clearly ideological because it not only represents the 'enemy' unfavourably, but the corollary of casting doubt on the truthfulness of statements made by 'them' is that banning statements from the Republican Movement is more legitimate as a result.

It is important to recognise that the author of this Sun article has not only made a choice to begin with a particular discourse in its headline, but has also singled out a particular broadcaster: the BBC. The day before this news article was printed was the day the British government introduced the ban and the day in which both the BBC and ITN aired statements from Gerry Adams before the ban became law. Whether this was illustrative of 'irresponsible' broadcasters or of principled broadcasters defying government censorship is debatable, but it is a fact that both the BBC and ITN aired statements from Gerry Adams. By excluding ITN from this social action and including the BBC, it is clear The Sun intended to embroil the BBC in a scandal or at least to persuade its readers to be hostile to the BBC. Of course, there is a profit motive behind this. Since The Sun owner, Rupert Murdoch, bought Satellite Television UK (SATV) and renamed it Sky Channel in 1984, the BBC has been the main competitor of Sky (Tuccille, 2003). It is in the interests of Rupert Murdoch to encourage tirades against the BBC from journalists in his employ so as to discredit the BBC in the minds of British television audiences and British politicians.

This discourse is continued in the opening sentence of the article where it is said 'BBC bosses stuck two fingers up at the Government'. This use of a colloquial expression is a stylistic feature of The Sun and the 'popular' press generally, but representing the BBC resisting the British government's broadcasting ban this way arguably reduces the seriousness of both the introduction of censorship and the resistance to it within the media. Such a metaphor conjures imagery of defiance, but as there is no explanation for such defiance, it suggests it is a rebellion without a cause as if the BBC likes to taunt the government for no reason. By referring to 'BBC bosses' as the agents in this social action it suggests it is BBC institutional practice to behave in such a way as opposed to just a few trade unionist militants or 'bad apples' of some other description.
Such ‘irresponsibility’ is further pinned on the BBC when the Sun journalist ‘informs’ the reader that the BBC did this ‘moments before Home Secretary Douglas Hurd banned them from interviewing people who back Irish terror groups’. This emphasises that the BBC was ‘irresponsible’ right until the end as ‘moments’ do not specify measurement of time like seconds, minutes or hours do. The BBC’s irresponsibility is further ‘proven’ by defying government action against those who support ‘Irish terror groups’. Prefixing Irish nationality to ‘terror groups’ is particularly interesting because although the ‘terror groups’ being referred to are from Northern Ireland, part of Britain, it connects ‘Irishness’ to ‘terrorism’. Arguably, this identifies social actors fighting for an Irish United Republic as ‘terrorists’, rather than those fighting for a British United Kingdom. Such collocation between Irish Republicans and terrorism is further strengthened by the focus on Gerry Adams in the next sentence as well as the IRA in the headline and Gerry Adams in the first image.

He is directly quoted in the next sentence in what is the first occurrence of reported speech in the article: ‘As Mr Hurd put the final touches to his Commons announcement, Mr Adams warned: “We’re not going to go away”’. Although lacking a full transcript of Gerry Adam’s statement, it could be argued his reported speech is selectively taken out of context to represent him in a purely threatening way. To support this argument, there are two newspaper articles that represent different parts of the same Gerry Adams statement, which change the context and therefore meaning of what he said. A Daily Express newspaper article adds that Gerry Adams called the ban a denial of democracy before quoting the same part of his statement {Daily Express, ROW AS BBC FLOUT HURD TERROR BAN, 20.10.88). This context changes the meaning of Gerry Adams’s statement to an act of defiance against a denial of democracy, which is more legitimate. Similarly, another newspaper reported him saying: “We are not going to take this lying down. We don’t intend to go away and our support will not go away” (The Daily Telegraph, SINN FEIN MAY FIGHT UK POLLS, 20.10.88). Again, this changes the meaning because it recognises that Sinn Féin is defiant against the ban and that they have support. It’s also interesting that although these three newspaper articles represent Gerry Adams’s statement as verbatim reported speech, there are differences. Whereas The Sun and Daily Express quote him as saying “we’re/we are not going to go away”, The Daily Telegraph quotes him as saying “we don’t intend to go away”. This also changes the meaning of his statement as the former is more forceful and confident than the latter.
There is also a continuing emphasis on the closeness between the ban becoming law and the broadcasting of Gerry Adams in this sentence, which arguably is a device to build a more dramatic and thus entertaining narrative. Although collocating Gerry Adams with ‘terrorism’ in the first two sentences, the naming of him is balanced here because both he and Douglas Hurd are referred to formally and respectfully; as Mr Adams and Mr Hurd. However, the quoting verb (warned) attributed to Gerry Adams combined with the decontextualised statement frames his six quoted words in a threatening manner. That said, this sentence was coded as the discourse arguing the ban will not stop the IRA or Sinn Féin as it suggests the ban is flawed despite the hostile construction of Gerry Adams.

The ‘fury’ expressed in the headline against the BBC for ‘beating’ the ban is attributed in the fourth sentence: ‘Tories were furious the interview went out, MP Ivor Stanbrook said: “It shows you can’t rely on the media to behave responsibly by self-discipline”’. This makes it clearer that the fury against the BBC was not as widespread as the headline suggested, rather it was the Tories who were furious, which is less shocking because they generally share the Sun’s dislike of the BBC.47 The headline would have been more accurate if it read ‘Tory fury as BBC beat Hurd ban on IRA’s claptrap’, however, such a headline might not have attracted so many readers to the actual article because it would be more obvious that such ‘fury’ was not widespread after all. In addition, although The Sun enjoys using alliteration and rhyming structures, perhaps it would not when referring to the political party it endorses as such rhetorical stylistic devices often denigrate those social actors or subjects to which it is applied.

Returning to the fourth sentence, Ivor Stanbrook is used as the representative for the Tory fury. He is named formally and respectfully and the quoting verb attributing his reported speech is neutral, however the discourse he expresses clearly functions to support the introduction of the ban. This was coded as another manifestation of the ‘broadcasters are irresponsible (especially the BBC)’ discourse because although the BBC is not identified individually or even broadcasters generally, the context of the article and the discourses expressed beforehand work interdiscursively to suggest it. Expressing this discourse arguably functions to support the ban because Ivor Stanbrook suggests this instance of the BBC broadcasting a statement by Gerry Adams ‘proves’ that the media needs to be disciplined because they are too ‘irresponsible’ to discipline themselves.
This 'problem' leads perfectly to a 'solution' in the narrative structure of the newspaper article because dominant discourses supporting the introduction of the broadcasting ban are expressed in the next three sentences. The 'terrorists must be starved of the oxygen of publicity' discourse is expressed first: 'Mrs Thatcher insisted on the ban to deprive the IRA of the "oxygen of publicity"'. The "oxygen of publicity" concept is not explained, but the targets of it are identified as the IRA, which has previously been collocated with 'terrorism' in this article and is again in the next sentence. The dominant discourse expressed in the next sentence is the 'offence to public' discourse: 'Mr Hurd told MPs that TV appearances by terrorists justifying murder caused "grave offence"'. Considering the IRA was identified as being the target of the ban in the previous sentence, this sentence clearly suggests they are the 'terrorists' who use TV to justify 'murder'.

The power of dominant discourses are revealed here because in this article it is not the British government representatives who are constructing this discourse through verbatim reported speech, rather it is the journalist who, intentionally or not, has singled out the IRA as the 'terrorists' in the Northern Ireland conflict instead of any of the other combatants. Similarly, it is only the IRA that 'murder'. Such lexical choices are ideological constructions, which refract reality in the interests of the British government and its supporters. Loyalist combatants are not implicated with 'terrorism' or 'murdering' because they are backgrounded in this newspaper article despite loyalist organisations being covered by the ban too.

The dominant discourse expressed in the next sentence is the 'terrorists must be starved of the oxygen of publicity' discourse: 'He [Hurd] added: “The Government has decided that the time has now come to deny this easy platform to those who use it to propagate terrorism”'. Douglas Hurd's argument presupposes that there was actually an easy platform for (Republican) social actors to "propagate terrorism" whereas media scholarship on the subject of the Northern Ireland conflict (reviewed in Chapter 2) reveals such a platform was simply not provided. However, suggesting there was functions to support the introduction of a ban because such censorship would ensure that the phantom 'easy platform' is taken away from the 'terrorists'.

The narrative of this article is structured to suggest that the broadcasters do give those that "propagate terrorism" an easy platform because the 'broadcasters are irresponsible (especially the BBC)' discourse is the most prevalent discourse as well as being the first to be expressed in this article.
The next sentence softens the seriousness of the ban by recognising ‘it will be lifted during elections’. For the first time in the article, it is acknowledged that the ban also covers Loyalist organisations, although interestingly the *Sun* journalist chooses to refer to them as ‘Protestant paramilitary groups’. This is particularly interesting when this referential strategy is contrasted with the earlier representation of Sinn Féin and the IRA as ‘Irish terror groups’. There are suggestions of religious motivation to the conflict here with the Irish (Catholics) against the Protestants (British). Those sympathetic to the former are considered ‘terrorist groups’ whereas those sympathetic to the latter are considered ‘paramilitary groups’.

Arguably, this sentence functions to normalise the ban by emphasising ‘positive’ features of it, that is, it will be lifted during elections and it applies to loyalist and republican organisations, whilst suppressing negative features of it just before opposing discourses are expressed. An example of a negative feature of the ban that could have been expressed would be that direct media censorship of this nature had not been used by the British government since World War II. That is as much a fact as the ban being lifted during elections, but an ideological choice has been made about which fact reinforces the narrative in this *Sun* newspaper article. The meaning of this sentence would have been completely different, yet no more or less true, if it said: ‘The ban, which is the worst censorship since World War II, also covers Protestant paramilitary groups’. If single standards were applied to Republican and Protestant organisations, the journalist could have written: ‘The ban, which is the worst censorship since World War II, also covers Protestant terror groups’.

The next three sentences express two opposing discourses, namely the ‘ban makes Britain look repressive and ridiculous’ discourse and the ‘ban will make media reporting of Northern Ireland incomplete’ discourse. The next two sentences state: ‘It [the ban] was attacked last night by Labour deputy leader Roy Hattersley. He said: “It will make the Government look restrictive and ridiculous”’. Although the social actor is named formally, an interesting lexical choice is made to describe his opposition to the ban. The verb ‘attack’ is chosen to represent his opposition, which continues the dramatic narrative and arguably overemphasises the strength of such a discourse opposing the ban. Whilst Hattersley’s opposition to the ban was more critical than his representation in this *Sun* article, a lot of his arguments were based on tactical questions, which can be observed in his House of Commons statement on the day the British government introduced the broadcasting ban:
Why does the Home Secretary believe that the net effect of such a specific prohibition will be to damage terrorism and help in the defeat of terrorists? Has he considered the damaging way in which his proposal will be used at home and abroad, especially in the United States, to portray the Government as the enemy of free expression? Has he weighed that publicity coup for the IRA against the advantage of keeping its representatives off television? Does he not have enough faith in the British people to accept that such personal appearances only increase the revulsion and contempt felt by most British viewers for terrorism and terrorists? (Hansard, 1988: 894)

Returning to the representation of Roy Hattersley’s opposition in The Sun though, there is an interesting factual mistake. Although the statement used to illustrate Roy Hattersley’s opposition to the ban is reported as verbatim, manipulation is evident. Of the 443 words that he uttered in Parliament (Hansard, 1988: 893-895), the nine words chosen for the Sun newspaper article derive from the end of his first statement where he states the ban ‘will make the Government look simultaneously repressive and ridiculous’ (Ibid.). Not only does this mean his arguments against the ban outlined in his Commons statement are excluded, therefore changing the context of his statement, but one of the words has been changed. It is significant that the Sun journalist changes an adjective used by Roy Hattersley to describe the British government, ‘repressive’, to one that is more euphemistic, ‘restrictive’.

This is because the connotations of the former evoke negative images of authoritarian regimes crushing dissent, whereas the latter connotes a more civilised, legislated action. It cannot be proven whether this was a genuine mistake by the Sun journalist or not, but either way, it is a misrepresentation of what Roy Hattersley said. Furthermore, Roy Hattersley acknowledges who he thinks will be ‘using’ the broadcasting ban abroad to portray the British government as the enemy of free expression; sympathetic Americans. This is excluded by the Sun journalist, which is significant because acknowledging the US dimension to the Northern Ireland conflict means acknowledging that some American citizens and politicians considered the Republican Movement to have a legitimate cause.

The next sentence states: ‘BBC and ITN claimed the ban would make reporting of Northern Ireland affairs incomplete’. Metonymy is used to represent what the BBC Chairman, Marmaduke Hussey, said. Although BBC management was more critical of the ban than ITN management it still misrepresents opposition to the ban because even though the discourse expressed in this sentence is based on principles, rather than tactics, it excludes the opposition of organised BBC and ITN
workers to the ban. This is a significant choice because the *Sun* journalist marginalises alternative discourses that opposed the ban such as those expressed by the BBC’s NUJ branch and the Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom.

As with the other discourses (supporting and opposing the ban) in this *Sun* article, the opposing discourse in this sentence is not explained. Nonetheless, it is the first expression of a potential explanation of why the BBC (and ITN) broadcast a statement by Gerry Adams before the British government banned them from doing so (to make reporting of Northern Ireland affairs complete). That said, the verb attributing the BBC and ITN’s argument against the ban undermines the credibility of it because ‘to claim’ implies the *Sun* journalist doubts the truth of such a statement. Consider how the meaning of the sentence changes if ‘said’ or ‘suggested’ had replaced ‘claimed’.

This *Sun* article finishes with the ‘similar ban in the Irish Republic’ discourse with the last sentence stating: ‘Terror groups have been barred from Irish TV for 17 years’. Arguably, this discourse functions to normalise the introduction of the ban on broadcasters in Britain by suggesting that another society confronting ‘terrorism’, which is also geographically and politically close to Britain has not only introduced a similar ban, but it did so a long time ago. This discourse is not attributed to any social actor, which means it is represented as a statement of fact whereas it was actually a dominant discourse emanating from the British government.

*The Sun* editorial position:

In case any readers doubt the argument that the choices made in the construction of the above *Sun* news article function to support the British government introducing the broadcasting ban, it is worth briefly analysing a *Sun* editorial that mentions the ban. The brevity of this editorial analysis is due to the fact that only one of the sentences in the editorial addresses the ban, simply stating: ‘We support the ban on TV and radio interviews with terrorists’ (*The Sun*, WHAT’S A LIE, 21.10.88). No explanation is given for such support, but the sentence is underlined and written in bold font, which signifies the importance of this statement. The editorial’s focus is on the British government’s introduction of an oath renouncing violence for election candidates in Northern Ireland and the next sentence switches to questioning such an oath because, as *The Sun* says (again, in underlined, bold font): ‘If they are willing to murder, they would certainly be willing to lie’ (Ibid.).
The other Sun editorial, printed a week later, focuses on journalists resisting the ban (The Sun, TELLY BERKS, 28.10.88). Interestingly, as with the Sun news article analysed above, the tirade against the ‘irresponsible’ BBC is present in this latter editorial, beginning with the following question underlined and written in bold font: ‘ARE there more twits at the BBC than in any other organisation?’ (Ibid.). The editorial continues by attacking the BBC journalists calling for strike action against the broadcasting ban and ends with the following statement underlined and written in bold font again: ‘BBC must stand for British Berks Combined’ (Ibid.).

**The Sun Says**

What’s a lie?

We support the ban on TV and radio interviews with terrorists.

But what does Home Secretary Douglas Hurd believe it would achieve if election candidates in Ulster were made to swear an oath renouncing violence? If they are willing to murder, they would certainly be willing to lie.

[The Sun, ‘What’s a lie?’, 21.10.88, editorial, page 6]

Telly berks

ARE there more twits at the BBC than in any other organisation?

Their journalists are threatening a 24-hour news blackout next month. The action is in protest at the Government’s ban on interviews with IRA terrorists. They say they are defending freedom of speech. It is a strange way to do that by ensuring that no one speaks at all. And what about the victims of the IRA? They lost more than freedom of speech. BBC must stand for British Berks Combined.

[The Sun, ‘What’s a lie?’, 28.10.88, editorial, page 6]

Newspaper editorials should not be used to explain the position of news and op-ed articles because of the differing generic conventions and authors of such articles. However, newspaper editorials are still revealing of the party line of a newspaper owner and editor and will impact upon the ability of journalists to stray from such positions. For example, generic conventions dictate that news articles should not overtly contain the opinion of the journalists writing them, but choices have clearly been made by the Sun journalist. These choices include which social actors have been foregrounded, which social actors are called on to speak and in what order, resulting in which discourses are expressed and when, which words and sentences are used as reported speech and which social actors are named positively and negatively.
**The Sun – summary:**

Arguably, the *Sun* journalist has made particular choices in producing the *Sun* news article that function to support the British government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban such as foregrounding Sinn Féin and the IRA and the BBC whilst backgrounding loyalist organisations and ITV. The *Sun* journalist also overwhelmingly calls on social actors from the British elite to speak (the exception being Gerry Adams) resulting in dominant discourses being present and principled alternative discourses being absent. Explanations for this will be explored in the next chapter which analyses the discursive practices involved in British newspaper production, distribution and consumption as well as the social practices involved in British newspaper as one facet of the British social formation.

**Daily Mail**

The *Daily Mail* was another newspaper which had few articles representing the British government’s introduction of the ban; however, those that did were very supportive of it. There was one *Daily Mail* editorial about the ban before it was introduced (*Daily Mail*, DEPRIVE TERROR OF THIS MEGAPHONE, 17.10.88) and one after the ban was introduced (*Daily Mail*, MURDER’S VOICE TO BE MUZZLED, 20.10.88). These *Daily Mail* editorials, which can be seen on the next page, overtly supported the British government introducing the broadcasting ban.

The *Daily Express* also had few newspaper articles representing the introduction of the broadcasting ban and those that did were supportive of it. *Daily Express* editorials overtly supported the British government introducing the ban (*Daily Express*, CLOSING DOWN THE ENEMY MOUTHPIECE, 20.10.88; *Daily Express*, THE BEST MOVE, 29.10.88) and condemned BBC journalists resisting it (*Daily Express*, A SILLY STRIKE, 28.10.88). As the *Daily Mail* and *Daily Express* are both ‘mid-market’ newspapers and both overwhelmingly supported this censorship by the British government, it is only necessary to analyse one *Daily Mail* news article in this chapter.
Deprive terror of this megaphone

NEVER will the Prime Minister yield to terror. Never. Nor need it be doubted that the words of her unflinching conference speech will be taken in action.

Candidates for local office in Northern Ireland will in the future have to take an oath of allegiance. The Prevention of Terrorism Act is to be strengthened. And the Government is considering new laws which would ban interviews with IRA gangsters on television, radio or in the Press.

If it can operate such a ban successfully in the Irish Republic, why not in the United Kingdom?

But the IRA's loudest and most frequently used megaphone is Sinn Fein. Its political front.

In the Republic that, too, is a proscribed organisation.

So it should be here.

For, as long as the laws of this land allow the likes of Gerry Adams a legitimate platform, they will gratefully gulp down the oxygen of publicity and spew out the propaganda of terror.

---

Murder's voice to be muzzled

FRONT men for the IRA are not allowed to promote their politics of terror on television or radio in the Irish Republic. So why should they still get away with it here?

The Home Secretary is abundantly justified in banning forthwith from British TV and radio any statement by Sinn Fein or by anyone else doing a public relations job for the IRA. Sensibly, Douglas Hurd is also to deny Sinn Fein space and time to the Protestant paramilitary thugs and their mouthpieces.

Most decent men and women have never understood why the soft-voiced apologists for murder should be invited by broadcasters to put terror's point of view as if it were just another, if somewhat eccentric, part of our traditional political process.

Nevertheless, there are arguments against the ban. And they merit analysis.

It is said that, when Sinn Fein's Gerry Adams appears on television reeking of hypocrisy after the latest atrocity, his performance only serves to fan the flames of contempt which the majority of viewers feel for the IRA.

There is some truth in that. But it is by no means the whole truth.

Respectability is what the cameras and the microphones afford Sinn Fein. All the more so in a perverse kind of way, because many broadcasters are so conscientious about balance and responsibility in the making of their programmes. For this ambiance of worthy journalistic investigation is the very one in which the execrable Adams luxuriates. He is only too happy for some of that worthiness to rub off on himself.

The Prime Minister and the Home Secretary are determined to strip terror's propagandists of this spurious respectability by association.

But this brings us to the most telling riposte to Mr. Hurd's announcement. Broadcasters can protest that, in allowing Sinn Fein to make its case on the television, they are doing no more than reflecting that organisation's share of the popular vote in local and, to a lesser extent, national elections in Northern Ireland.

Does it not mock logic to remove Sinn Fein's TV platform, yet leave its electoral platform intact?

Indeed, it does.

Ideally, there should not be one law for the goggle box and another for the ballot box. Sinn Fein is terror with a political face. Its spokesmen should not appear on television. Its candidates should not be eligible for election.

The Government's considered view is that it would be impracticable to "muzzle" Sinn Fein as a party. Mr. Hurd's preferred method of making life more difficult for terror's PR men on the hustings is to demand of all candidates in Northern Ireland that they take an oath disavowing any commitment to violence. That might thin out the contingent of Sinn Fein councillors. But oath-taking would one day become contagious...a pledge to denounce Apartheid...a sworn allegiance to this...that...or the other...

That is why the Daily Mail advocates a complete ban on Sinn Fein.

Meanwhile, we are in no doubt that half a ban is better than no ban at all.
Hurd to wipe Adams off TV screen

By John Deans, news article, 19th October, 1988, page 1

Home Secretary Douglas Hurd will announce the crackdown, which also embraces the IRA, in a Commons statement.

Mr Hurd’s move, predictably, started a row last night but he is determined to starve the extremists of the oxygen of publicity.

Sinn Fein spokesmen are already banned from radio and TV in the Irish Republic.

Details of the workings of the ban are being kept secret until Mr Hurd’s statement.

Mrs Thatcher has become increasingly irritated at the way the IRA and its political wing, particularly Mr Adams, have exploited the broadcasting media.

But the move was attacked by Hugh Dykes, the ‘wet’ Tory MP for Harrow East. He said: ‘It would play into the IRA’s hands and could increase support for them in Northern Ireland. It would look as if the Government fear the IRA can persuade people of their sick cause.

‘In reality, the more they appear, the more they alienate the decent, moderate majority.’

Labour’s Northern Ireland spokesman Mr Kevin McNamara said he did not think a ban would affect opinion in Ulster. If the Government was even-handed, it would include Loyalist terrorists as did RTE, the Republic’s broadcasting authority.

The most prominent Daily Mail news article (above), printed on 19th October 1988, has been chosen for analysis here. Although this article was not the largest Daily Mail article and there was no corresponding imagery, it was the only Daily Mail article to appear on the front page. A Princess Diana story led the front page, but the news article representing the British government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban appeared in its entirety next to it between an eighth and a quarter of a page in size. This news article was also chosen because it is important to illustrate how Daily Mail news articles also functioned to persuade readers to support the ban, like the two Daily Mail editorials on the previous page, albeit in less overt ways.
The headline of the above *Daily Mail* news article foregrounds Gerry Adams and therefore the Republican Movement as the main targets of the ban: 'Hurd to wipe Adams off TV screen'. An interesting lexical choice has been made to describe Douglas Hurd’s action against Gerry Adams. The finite verb 'wipe' fixes Hurd’s action to either mean 'erasing' or 'cleaning' Adams off the television screen. Either way, using such a metaphor creates imagery of Hurd physically removing Adams from the television screen. Although 'wipe' could just denote removing Adams from television generally, culturally 'wipe' connotes a process of cleaning because it is used in this context most often. By using the adverb 'off' instead of 'from' and the object 'TV screen' instead of 'television', it further fixes this cleaning connotation, perhaps suggesting Gerry Adams is a piece of dirt or a stain that Hurd is cleaning off.

Obviously, different readers may decode this headline in differing ways, but considering alternative ways in which the headline could have been constructed illustrates the choices made by the journalist to fix a particular meaning. For example, the connotations of cleaning would be absent by changing the finite verb 'wipe' to 'take'. Or, if the headline was more accurate, it could have simply read 'Hurd to ban Adams from broadcast media', but it would be less dramatic and entertaining and therefore less attention-grabbing. The fact that this is a newspaper front page (although not the lead story) contributes to a slight generic difference in that it is, to use a fishing metaphor, bait for the reader, that is, a news hook.

Nevertheless, it is significant that Adams, the leader of Sinn Féin, is singled out, rather than any of the Loyalist organisations, suggesting to the reader that he is the main threat and therefore the main target of the ban. In this instance, such foregrounding can be attributed to journalists wrongly assuming the broadcasting ban would only apply to the Republican Movement as this *Daily Mail* news article was printed on the day the British government was introducing the ban. However mistaken, foregrounding the Republican Movement would encourage newspaper readers to see the IRA and Sinn Féin as the only threat in the Northern Ireland conflict. Furthermore, as illustrated in the previous chapter, such foregrounding by journalists continued once it was clear the broadcasting ban applied to Republican and Loyalist organisations anyway.

The focus on Sinn Féin and Gerry Adams continues in the first two sentences: 'Sinn Fein spokesmen are to be banned from TV and radio from today. One of the most prominent casualties will be the organisation's leader, West Belfast MP Gerry
Adams' (Ibid.). The lexical choices used to describe Sinn Féin and Gerry Adams are respectfully formal and neutral. Similarly, in the next sentence the IRA is foregrounded, but it is not labelled as a terrorist organisation: ‘Home Secretary Douglas Hurd will announce the crackdown, which also embraces the IRA, in a Commons statement’ (Ibid.). However, both Sinn Féin and the IRA are collocated with ‘extremism’ in the next sentence: ‘Mr Hurd’s move, predictably, started a row last night but he is determined to starve the extremists of ‘the oxygen of publicity’ (Ibid.). This sentence acknowledges there is opposition to the ban, but its seriousness and credibility is questioned by referring to it as a ‘row’ and by excluding the identity of important social actors concerned, how many of them there are, and the reasons for their opposition. Instead, there is a switch of focus to reasons for supporting the ban, that is, starving ‘the extremists’ of ‘the oxygen of publicity’.

As the narrative thus far has concerned the conflict between the British government and the Republican Movement, it is highly likely that ‘the extremists’ being starved of ‘the oxygen of publicity’ will be identified by the newspaper readers as either Sinn Féin or the IRA or both. Using such a pejorative label obviously connotes irrational, potentially violent, action and by collocating such action with particular organisations functions to delegitimise them and justify censoring them. The ‘terrorists must be starved of the oxygen of publicity’ discourse is clearly evoked here even though the label of ‘extremists’ is used instead of ‘terrorists’.

Another supporting discourse is circulated in the next sentence, the ‘similar ban in Irish Republic’ discourse: ‘Sinn Fein and IRA spokesmen are already banned from radio and TV in the Irish Republic’ (Ibid.). Again the emphasis is on the Republican Movement, which continues the collocation between Republicans and ‘extremism’ from the sentence before. By acknowledging that they are banned in the Irish Republic already, this dominant discourse functions to normalise the broadcasting ban in Britain.

Although it is a statement of fact, choosing to express this discourse over all others is ideological because it excludes information that would question introducing a similar ban in Britain. For example, there was an alternative discourse about the ban in the Irish Republic, which was rarely expressed, but nonetheless functioned to oppose the ban because it suggested the ban in the Irish Republic was flawed. If the Daily Mail journalist had acknowledged that discourse in the same sentence or in a following sentence the meaning would have completely altered from a discourse that
supported the ban to one that opposed it because if the ban in the Irish Republic is flawed and the British broadcasting ban is similar then the British one could be or would be flawed also.

Arguably, the next three sentences do not contain significant ideological features, nor do they express any supporting or opposing discourses. The first of these three sentences informs the reader that the full details of the ban are not available until Douglas Hurd officially introduces the ban: ‘Details of the workings of the ban are being kept secret until Mr Hurd’s statement’. The next sentence explains how the ban will be legislated: ‘However, new legislation has been ruled out and the Home Secretary, it is understood, will rely on his existing powers under the BBC charter and the law which set up the Independent Broadcasting Authority’. The last of these three sentences suggests why the ban will not apply to British newspapers: ‘The ban does not apply to newspapers because it would require a major change in the law and be extremely difficult to enforce’.

The remaining sentences do contain significant ideological features and express both supporting and opposing discourses. In the next sentence, the ‘terrorists must be starved of the oxygen of publicity’ discourse is circulated: ‘Mrs Thatcher has become increasingly irritated at the way the IRA and its political wing, particularly Mr Adams have exploited the broadcasting media’. This is considered a supporting discourse because by suggesting that Sinn Féin have exploited the broadcasting media, it functions to gain support for action to prevent it. The last six sentences in the Daily Mail news article feature opposing discourses, which are expressed through verbatim reported speech. A Tory MP’s opposition to the ban is represented in four of these sentences:

But the move was attacked by Hugh Dykes, the ‘wet’ Tory MP for Harrow East. He said: ‘It would play into the IRA’s hands and could increase support for them in Northern Ireland. It would look as if the Government fear the IRA can persuade people of their sick cause. In reality, the more they appear, the more they alienate the decent, moderate majority.’

The first interesting lexical choice in these sentences is the finite verb representing the social actor’s opposition to the ban. As with the representation of Roy Hattersley’s opposition in The Sun newspaper article, ‘attack’ is chosen to represent his opposition, which arguably exaggerates the depth of Hugh Dyke’s opposition in the following sentences. There is also another significant lexical choice in the naming of the social
actor, which arguably attempts to discredit him and therefore his opposition to the ban before he is allowed to express it. Labelling Hugh Dykes as the 'wet' Tory MP for Harrow East represents him as a 'weak' and 'pathetic' politician who is not 'strong' or 'brave' enough to support the British government introducing censorship. Even so, like Roy Hattersley again, Hugh Dyke’s opposition represented in the Daily Mail newspaper article is based on tactics, not principles. The opposing discourse he expresses first, which argues that the ban is beneficial to the IRA does oppose the ban, but only because of how it could make the government appear.

This discourse leads into another opposing discourse, which argues IRA and Sinn Féin media appearances harm themselves. This opposing discourse is also considered tactical because although it did oppose the ban it does so whilst attempting to discredit the Republican Movement. This is clearly the case in this instance as the IRA’s cause is described as ‘sick’, which suppresses the political motivations of Republicans and suggests they are driven by some kind of psychopathic or evil tendency. In addition, Hugh Dykes suggests that those who are alienated by IRA statements are ‘decent’, ‘moderate’ and the ‘majority’, which implies those who are not alienated by IRA statements must be ‘immoral’, ‘extreme’ and the ‘minority’.

The final two sentences in this Daily Mail news article feature opposing discourses from the Labour Party’s Northern Ireland spokesman, which are expressed through non-verbatim reported speech:

Labour’s Northern Ireland spokesman Mr Kevin McNamara, said he did not think a ban would affect opinion in Ulster. If the Government was even-handed, it would include Loyalist terrorists, as did RTE, the Republic’s broadcasting authority.

The social actor Kevin McNamara is named formally and respectfully, but it is the first occasion any social actor outside of the Conservative Party has been called on to speak and he was last to be called to speak, suggesting a lack of importance. His non-verbatim reported speech in the first sentence evokes the ‘public capable of making own judgement’ discourse. Arguably, this functions to suggest that the ban is not necessary because people have already chosen sides in the conflict, especially in Northern Ireland, and therefore banning particular organisations from the broadcast media will not change the outcome. The discourse present in the next sentence only appeared in newspaper articles before the broadcasting ban was officially introduced.
by Douglas Hurd in the House of Commons. This is because it was not clear whether the ban would only apply to Republican organisations or whether it would cover Loyalist organisations too. Kevin McNamara believed the ban would only apply to Republicans and so criticised the British government’s ban on these grounds.

**Daily Mail – summary:**

The *Daily Mail* journalist has made similar choices to the journalist employed by *The Sun*. He too has foregrounded Sinn Féin and the IRA as the main target of the ban although for a different reason, that is, the article was written before the British government officially introduced the broadcasting ban. Predicting that the ban will only apply to Republican organisations is a testimony to the dominant discourse that the Republican Movement is the ‘enemy’ and as such is a threat to ‘us’ that needs to be silenced rather than spoken with. The *Daily Mail* journalist only calls on elite social actors to speak resulting in dominant discourses being present and principled alternative discourses being absent.

**The Guardian**

Both newspapers representative of the ‘quality’ press featured considerably more articles than newspapers representative of the ‘popular’ press and the ‘mid-market’ press, but it was *The Guardian* that had the most. Although *The Guardian* did not support the ban, it certainly did not oppose it either. Its first editorial concerning the ban was, at best, ambivalent (*The Guardian*, MR HURD’S BLANKET OF IRA SILENCE, 20.10.88). That said, its editorial representing the BBC strike against the ban was supportive of their resistance (*The Guardian*, THIS STRIKE IS RIGHT, AND DEADLY SERIOUS, 04.11.88). These editorials can be seen on the next page.

A *Guardian* newspaper article has been chosen for analysis here rather than a *Telegraph* newspaper article for two reasons. Firstly, *Guardian* articles constituted more than a third of the total newspaper articles representing the British government introducing the broadcasting ban. Secondly, *The Guardian* is less conservative than *The Daily Telegraph*, which provides a break from the *The Sun* and *Daily Mail* textual analyses in terms of their overt support for the ban and an opportunity to explore how a liberal ‘quality’ newspaper represented the broadcasting ban.
Mr Hurd’s blanket of IRA silence

WHEREVER a territorial dispute occurs in Northern Ireland, the Government is wide-open to criticism from Ulster Catholics and other Nationalists, as well as from its own backbenchers. The situation is much more complex than that, however, and the Government is making a serious mistake in attempting to silence the IRA.

The Government’s policy of excluding the IRA from political debate has been widely condemned by political leaders, including the Prime Minister, Mr John Major, and the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, Mr Robert Centre. However, the Government’s stance is based on a fear of provoking a public backlash, and it has been widely condemned by political leaders, including the Prime Minister, Mr John Major, and the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, Mr Robert Centre.

The Government’s policy of excluding the IRA from political debate has been widely condemned by political leaders, including the Prime Minister, Mr John Major, and the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, Mr Robert Centre. However, the Government’s stance is based on a fear of provoking a public backlash, and it has been widely condemned by political leaders, including the Prime Minister, Mr John Major, and the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, Mr Robert Centre.

The Government’s policy of excluding the IRA from political debate has been widely condemned by political leaders, including the Prime Minister, Mr John Major, and the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, Mr Robert Centre. However, the Government’s stance is based on a fear of provoking a public backlash, and it has been widely condemned by political leaders, including the Prime Minister, Mr John Major, and the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, Mr Robert Centre.

The Government’s policy of excluding the IRA from political debate has been widely condemned by political leaders, including the Prime Minister, Mr John Major, and the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, Mr Robert Centre. However, the Government’s stance is based on a fear of provoking a public backlash, and it has been widely condemned by political leaders, including the Prime Minister, Mr John Major, and the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, Mr Robert Centre.

The Government’s policy of excluding the IRA from political debate has been widely condemned by political leaders, including the Prime Minister, Mr John Major, and the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, Mr Robert Centre. However, the Government’s stance is based on a fear of provoking a public backlash, and it has been widely condemned by political leaders, including the Prime Minister, Mr John Major, and the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, Mr Robert Centre.

The Government’s policy of excluding the IRA from political debate has been widely condemned by political leaders, including the Prime Minister, Mr John Major, and the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, Mr Robert Centre. However, the Government’s stance is based on a fear of provoking a public backlash, and it has been widely condemned by political leaders, including the Prime Minister, Mr John Major, and the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, Mr Robert Centre.

The Government’s policy of excluding the IRA from political debate has been widely condemned by political leaders, including the Prime Minister, Mr John Major, and the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, Mr Robert Centre. However, the Government’s stance is based on a fear of provoking a public backlash, and it has been widely condemned by political leaders, including the Prime Minister, Mr John Major, and the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, Mr Robert Centre.

The Government’s policy of excluding the IRA from political debate has been widely condemned by political leaders, including the Prime Minister, Mr John Major, and the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, Mr Robert Centre. However, the Government’s stance is based on a fear of provoking a public backlash, and it has been widely condemned by political leaders, including the Prime Minister, Mr John Major, and the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, Mr Robert Centre.

The Government’s policy of excluding the IRA from political debate has been widely condemned by political leaders, including the Prime Minister, Mr John Major, and the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, Mr Robert Centre. However, the Government’s stance is based on a fear of provoking a public backlash, and it has been widely condemned by political leaders, including the Prime Minister, Mr John Major, and the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, Mr Robert Centre.

The Government’s policy of excluding the IRA from political debate has been widely condemned by political leaders, including the Prime Minister, Mr John Major, and the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, Mr Robert Centre. However, the Government’s stance is based on a fear of provoking a public backlash, and it has been widely condemned by political leaders, including the Prime Minister, Mr John Major, and the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, Mr Robert Centre.

The Government’s policy of excluding the IRA from political debate has been widely condemned by political leaders, including the Prime Minister, Mr John Major, and the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, Mr Robert Centre. However, the Government’s stance is based on a fear of provoking a public backlash, and it has been widely condemned by political leaders, including the Prime Minister, Mr John Major, and the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, Mr Robert Centre.

The Government’s policy of excluding the IRA from political debate has been widely condemned by political leaders, including the Prime Minister, Mr John Major, and the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, Mr Robert Centre. However, the Government’s stance is based on a fear of provoking a public backlash, and it has been widely condemned by political leaders, including the Prime Minister, Mr John Major, and the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, Mr Robert Centre.

The Government’s policy of excluding the IRA from political debate has been widely condemned by political leaders, including the Prime Minister, Mr John Major, and the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, Mr Robert Centre. However, the Government’s stance is based on a fear of provoking a public backlash, and it has been widely condemned by political leaders, including the Prime Minister, Mr John Major, and the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, Mr Robert Centre.

The Government’s policy of excluding the IRA from political debate has been widely condemned by political leaders, including the Prime Minister, Mr John Major, and the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, Mr Robert Centre. However, the Government’s stance is based on a fear of provoking a public backlash, and it has been widely condemned by political leaders, including the Prime Minister, Mr John Major, and the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, Mr Robert Centre.

The Government’s policy of excluding the IRA from political debate has been widely condemned by political leaders, including the Prime Minister, Mr John Major, and the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, Mr Robert Centre. However, the Government’s stance is based on a fear of provoking a public backlash, and it has been widely condemned by political leaders, including the Prime Minister, Mr John Major, and the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, Mr Robert Centre.

The Government’s policy of excluding the IRA from political debate has been widely condemned by political leaders, including the Prime Minister, Mr John Major, and the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, Mr Robert Centre. However, the Government’s stance is based on a fear of provoking a public backlash, and it has been widely condemned by political leaders, including the Prime Minister, Mr John Major, and the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, Mr Robert Centre.

The Government’s policy of excluding the IRA from political debate has been widely condemned by political leaders, including the Prime Minister, Mr John Major, and the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, Mr Robert Centre. However, the Government’s stance is based on a fear of provoking a public backlash, and it has been widely condemned by political leaders, including the Prime Minister, Mr John Major, and the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, Mr Robert Centre.
The largest and most prominent Guardian news article (above) will now be explored. It was the only Guardian article that led the front page with a corresponding image and it was the largest of all Guardian articles; between a quarter of a page and half a page in size. Due to the size of this news article, each sentence will not be analysed as this would be too protracted, but the article will be studied in depth nonetheless.
The headline of this *Guardian* newspaper article is a three-deck headline with the largest font on the page, which signifies where the reader should enter the page but also that this particular news article covers the most important story of the day: ‘Broadcast ban leads terror fight’. Arguably, it begins with a series of presuppositions. Firstly, it suggests that a ‘terror fight’ is actually possible and that there is one taking place. This presupposes that readers will ‘know’ what a ‘terror fight’ is, which social actors are involved and whether this means all social actors involved in the conflict are using ‘terror’ to fight one another or that there is a fight against ‘terror’ being waged by some social actors who do not use ‘terror’ against other social actors that do use ‘terror’.

Secondly, it suggests that media control can not only be used in the ‘terror fight’, but that it can lead it. The corresponding image is of Douglas Hurd and appears with the following caption underneath it: ‘Mr Hurd addressing the Police Federation yesterday’. The image identifies Douglas Hurd as the social actor who has introduced the broadcasting ban because his gaze is directed towards the headline and article. The image also represents him speaking because his mouth is open and his left hand is gesticulating, which suggests it is an image of him introducing the broadcasting ban although the caption informs otherwise. The size of the image – which is the same size as the entire article – the headline, and the low angle shot arguably connote importance and authority, which leads to a strong and positive representation of Douglas Hurd.

Unlike the ‘popular’ and ‘mid-market’ newspaper articles analysed above, there is also a sub-head in the *Guardian* article. It is written in a much smaller font situated above the entry point of the headline making it less significant than the headline, but there are still interesting lexical choices: ‘Television curbs first of series of Ulster initiatives’. The ban along with other policies are represented as ‘initiatives’, which is a euphemistic label connoting a less serious meaning than, for example, ‘restrictions’ or ‘government restrictions’.

Similarly, the meaning of the sub-head would have been more critical if the ban was referred to as ‘television censorship’ instead of ‘television curbs’. In addition, these ‘initiatives’ are represented as ones applying to Ulster whereas the broadcasting ban applies to England, Scotland and Wales as well. This also downplays the seriousness of the ban and the other policies. The sub-head expresses the ‘ban just one of several anti-terrorism policies’ discourse, suggesting it will
feature in the introductory section of the newspaper article. Arguably, this discourse functions to support the introduction of the ban because it positions the ban as just one of several anti-terrorism policies, reducing its significance by cushioning its introduction. This is especially the case when the ban and the other policies are represented as being justified by the summer upsurge in IRA attacks because it suggests IRA violence is the reason for the ban as opposed to Sinn Féin electoral breakthroughs, for example.

The ‘ban just one of several anti-terrorism policies’ discourse is continued in the first sentence of the article meaning that whether the reader skips the sub-head or not, this discourse is the first to be expressed in this Guardian article:

Broadcast interviews with supporters of terrorists in Northern Ireland were banned yesterday by the Home Secretary, Mr Douglas Hurd, in what government sources confirmed was the start of a series of initiatives to be announced ‘over the next few days and weeks’.

Whereas The Sun and Daily Mail began by identifying Republican organisations as the main targets of the ban and collocating them with ‘terrorism’, this Guardian article does not. However, there is a presupposition that ‘terrorists’ do exist, that some of the social actors involved in the Northern Ireland are ‘terrorists’ and that some are not ‘terrorists’ themselves, but are supporters of ‘terrorists’. Interestingly, the ‘ban just one of several anti-terrorism policies’ discourse emanates from the government, but the reported speech is not attributed to an individual, just to ‘government sources’, which suggests an off-record conversation between one of the journalists and an official source has taken place. In the next sentence, another government source is called on to speak and is quoted at length expressing the ‘offence to public’ discourse to justify the introduction of the ban:

The Northern Ireland Secretary, Mr Tom King, welcomed the ban. ‘Anyone who knows Northern Ireland will know how deeply offensive it is to see the terrorists, the paramilitaries and their allies on both sides of the community appearing on radio and television,’ he said.

The social actor is named formally and respectfully and uses some interesting rhetorical devices to fix the discourse he is expressing. He uses the pronoun ‘anyone’ as a rhetorical trope to suggest all who are familiar with Northern Ireland know how offensive the ‘terrorists’, paramilitaries and their allies on both sides of the
community appearing on radio and TV. Therefore, the suggestion is that if you fail to recognize that you must be ignorant about Northern Ireland. Tom King also demarcates ‘the terrorists’ and ‘the paramilitaries’, which suggests he believes the combatants on one side of the conflict are ‘terrorists’ and the others are not. Although he does not say which organisations he deems to be ‘terrorists’, it is most likely the case that he means Republican combatants are ‘the terrorists’ and Loyalist combatants are ‘the paramilitaries’ because the dominant discourse of that decade was that the IRA are the main enemy of ‘Britain’ and are therefore a ‘terrorist’ organisation.

In the next four sentences the *Guardian* journalists speculate about other policies alluded to in the ‘ban just one of several anti-terrorism policies’ discourse before expressing the frequently used justification for them: ‘Mr King has been discussing new security measures with the rest of the Cabinet since the bus bomb attack in August in Ballygawley that killed eight soldiers’. Interestingly, the IRA’s agency in this action is excluded, although the IRA and Sinn Féin are foregrounded in the next sentence: ‘Mr Hurd’s ban on IRA, Sinn Fein and other paramilitary supporters was implemented immediately by directions to the broadcasting authorities’. This focus evokes the ‘IRA and Sinn Féin are the main targets of the ban’ discourse and contributes to the collocation between them and terrorism in the first sentence of the next paragraph, which introduces another dominant discourse, the ‘terrorists must be starved of the oxygen of publicity’ discourse:

He said it was time to deny ‘this easy platform for those who use it to propagate terrorism’. He denied that it amounted to censorship and claimed he was merely putting the broadcasters on the same footing as print journalists. A similar ban already applies in the Irish Republic.

The presupposition that there was actually an easy platform for (Republican) social actors to “propagate terrorism” helps to build support for the ban because it suggests the Republican Movement were given the ‘oxygen of publicity’. As already noted above and in previous chapters, media scholarship on the Northern Ireland conflict reveals this ‘easy platform’ never existed for the Republican Movement. Suggesting there was, however, functions to support the introduction of the ban because such censorship would ensure the ‘easy platform’ is taken away from the ‘terrorists’. This advantage for the British government in the propaganda war seems to have been the motivation behind the orthodox academics and British politicians making such claims.
The following two sentences by the *Guardian* journalists contain three more discourses that arguably function to support the introduction of the ban: the ‘ban is not censorship’ discourse, the ‘ban puts broadcasters on same footing as print journalists’ discourse and the ‘similar ban in Irish Republic’ discourse. Although these three discourses emanate from Douglas Hurd, none of them are verbatim reported speech. This allows the *Guardian* journalists to subtly imply some doubt in the credibility of Douglas Hurd’s remarks by using particular quoting verbs. For example, writing that Douglas Hurd ‘denied that it amounted to censorship’, suggests that there has been or will be an accusation that the broadcasting ban is censorship. It could also suggest that the ban is, in fact, censorship. Similarly, the quoting verb ‘claimed’ casts some doubt on the ‘ban puts broadcasters on same footing as print journalists’ discourse. The last sentence in this paragraph is interesting because the discourse underlining ‘there’s a similar ban in Irish Republic’ is not attributed to Douglas Hurd or other social actors from the British government. This is significant because constructing this discourse without agency of its origin naturalises such a supporting discourse.

It is important to note that all those called on to speak thus far have been members of the British cabinet, which has meant all the discourses have supported the introduction of the broadcasting ban. However, the *Guardian* journalists then introduce many more social actors that express opposing discourses as well as some more supporting discourses. Two social actors from the broadcast media provide reported speech in the next six sentences although the *Guardian* journalists give the impression that there are more by using metonymy.

In reality, the BBC and ITN cannot literally speak because they are institutions. Representatives of such institutions can speak, but representing the institutions as speaking suggests the discourses expressed by them are representative of all that work there, whereas it actually refers to the opinions of management. It is clear from a news article in another newspaper (*Daily Telegraph, DAMAGING PRECEDENT SAYS BBC, 20.10.88*) printed on the same day as the one written by the *Guardian* journalists that it was the BBC Chairman, Mr Marmaduke Hussey that expresses the two opposing discourses to the ban. These opposing discourses are: the ‘ban sets a damaging precedent’ discourse and the ‘ban will make media reporting of Northern Ireland incomplete’ in the first sentence of the Guardian news article being analysed in this chapter and it was ITN’s editor, Mr David Nicholas, that continued the latter discourse:
The BBC described the ban as a ‘dangerous precedent’ that would make Northern Ireland coverage incomplete, and Independent Television News said the public was determined to defeat terrorism precisely because broadcasting had been so full and free to date.

Although the two opposing discourses are legitimate and based on principles as opposed to tactics, there are several questionable presuppositions expressed by ‘ITN’, which arguably serve an ideological function. For example, to suggest the ‘public’ was determined to defeat ‘terrorism’ presupposes that ‘terrorism’ does exist and that the public are unanimously determined to defeat it. To suggest that this is precisely because broadcasting had been so full and free to date presupposes that the broadcast media had represented the Northern Ireland conflict in a full and free way until the broadcasting ban whereas the evidence cited in the review of literature in chapter 2 suggests this is a fallacy. Although the Guardian journalists do not acknowledge that the above ‘ITN’ statement is actually by David Nicholas, they do name him in the next sentence where he is quoted verbatim at length:

ITN’s editor, Mr David Nicholas, said: ‘I hope it won’t lead to further curtailment. The Government still accords legal status to the UDA and Sinn Fein. These restrictions would have been easier to understand if they had made those bodies illegal’.

David Nicholas states his hope that there will be no further curtailment of the media in the first sentence, but suggests the government should have banned the UDA and Sinn Féin to reduce the confusion when broadcasters interpret the censorship in the second and third sentences. His three sentence statement is somewhat contradictory as it expresses both libertarian and authoritarian positions. In other words, opposing discourses that recognise the ban is censorship and that direct government control of the media is a damaging precedent are evoked, but so are supporting discourses. Calling for the banning of Sinn Féin usually followed the discourse that argued the broadcasting ban did not go far enough, but David Nicholas does not make this argument yet implicitly calls for both the UDA and Sinn Féin to be banned.

Much clearer opposing discourses are represented in the next five sentences because non-elite social actors are called on to speak allowing alternative discourses to be expressed. This is a major difference between this Guardian article representing the ‘quality’ press and those representing the ‘popular’ and ‘mid-market’ press,
allowing many more critical voices to be heard. For example, the ‘ban makes Britain comparable to South Africa’ discourse is expressed by organised media workers: ‘The National Union of Journalists accused the Government of putting British broadcasters under much the same restrictions that applied in South Africa’. In addition, Gerry Adams is quoted verbatim at length, expressing opposing discourses such as the ‘ban is censorship’ and ‘Gerry Adams is an elected MP/SF is a political party’:

Mr Gerry Adams, the president of Sinn Fein, said: ‘Eight years ago Mrs Thatcher claimed that the Republican movement had no support. Now they are directly censoring a legal political party which has an electoral mandate. If they had an argument to counter the Sinn Fein view then they should be putting it instead of censoring us.’

Clearly, there is a significant difference between the *Guardian* and *Sun* articles in the choice of verbatim reported speech, which completely alters the representation of Gerry Adams. He is represented as a threat that is “not going to go away” in *The Sun* because of the few words chosen by the *Sun* journalist to express his opposition to the ban, whereas here he is allowed to justify his opposition to the ban with political arguments in the *Guardian* news article. This allows him to represent himself as a legitimate politician who is being censored by the British government.

Although this is a positive feature of the article because it allows both sides of the story to be expressed, the next sentence representing Gerry Adams discredits his previous statement somewhat: ‘Mr Adams, who is MP for West Belfast, said he would still not take his Westminster seat even though it would allow him a public voice through the Commons’. There is a major exclusion here as to why he refuses to take his seat, which is significant as it excludes a legitimate explanation for such an action. Irish Republicans pursued a policy of abstentionism because they refused to recognize the right of Westminster to govern Ireland (North or South). In addition, MPs have to swear an oath of allegiance to the Queen; Republicans could not do this.

The next social actors called on to speak represent other political parties in Britain and Northern Ireland, most of which express opposing discourses. The next sentence represents Roy Hattersley’s opposition through non-verbatim reported speech: ‘Mr Roy Hattersley, the shadow home secretary, condemned the move, telling Mr Hurd it would be used to portray the Government as the enemy of free expression’. This is taken from Roy Hattersley’s statement in the House of
Commons. The *Guardian* journalists exclude a few significant details such as the identity of social actors that would use the ban to portray the Government as the enemy of free expression. In his statement, Roy Hattersley referred to social actors 'at home and abroad, especially in the United States' (Hansard, 1988: 894). The focus on the US alludes to the funding of the Republican Movement by sympathetic Americans and is a point that Ken Livingstone overtly made in the same debate, but which is excluded too:

> Before taking this decision, did the Home Secretary receive any briefing from the intelligence services on the likely impact of this decision on the flow of funding from Canada and North America for the IRA? If he did not, why not? How was it that the IRA managed to sustain itself, decade after decade, from the 1922 bombing campaign through into the 1930s and 1950s, without access to television? Is this not simply a diversion in response to the increased level of violence in Northern Ireland during the summer? Has the Home Secretary not thrown this bauble into the House of Commons, where it will be debated at great length, and with which the media will be obsessed because it affects them, rather than deal with the real problem, which is to find the answer to the violence, either by defeating terrorism, or by negotiating a peace settlement? (Hansard, 1988: 901)

It is worth noting that in all the newspaper articles representing the introduction of the broadcasting ban, there is no mention of the fact that some Americans politically and financially supported the Republican Movement. Likewise, Ken Livingstone is never called on to speak, which reduces the parameters of debate in British newspapers and therefore amongst its readers. For example, there is no discourse in any newspaper article based on the last question he asks, which opens the possibility of a negotiated peace settlement being a much better solution to the Northern Ireland conflict than media censorship. Similarly, the discourse representing the ban as a diversion from increased levels of violence in Northern Ireland expressed by Ken Livingstone is completely absent from newspaper representations of the ban. Although such a discourse was expressed in the House of Commons, all journalists chose to exclude it from their own reportage of the debates for and against the broadcasting ban.

Another reason for the *Guardian* journalists excluding the US dimension from Roy Hattersley's statement could be that recognizing American support for the IRA would also evoke the corollary discourse that the 'ban is beneficial to the IRA'. This is clearly what Roy Hattersley was expressing in his original statement when the sentence following the one partially quoted by the *Guardian* journalists is examined:
Has he considered the damaging way in which his proposal will be used at home and abroad, especially in the United States, to portray the Government as the enemy of free expression? Has he weighed that publicity coup for the IRA against the advantage of keeping its representatives off television? (Hansard, 1988: 894)

Interestingly, a similar exclusion from the next social actor in the *Guardian* article excludes the ‘ban is beneficial to the IRA’ discourse too: ‘The Democrat leader, Mr Paddy Ashdown, said the Government’s own standing advisory committee on human rights had advised against the ban and the Government had taken the worst of all measures’. Again, when Paddy Ashdown’s full statement in the House of Common is examined, it is evident that he also opposed the ban on the same tactical grounds as Roy Hattersley:

> Have not the Government’s own standing advisory committee on human rights and Lord Colville advised against such bans? The Government seem to have taken the worst of all possible measures. They have given the IRA a propaganda coup. They have left it open to it to put its view through the newspapers; they have left Sinn Fein still a legal organisation which is denied the right of access to a free press; and they have established a dangerous precedent by using the Broadcasting Act in this manner. (Hansard, 1988: 895)

It appears these exclusions are related to the narrative of this *Guardian* article because it would be tedious to represent several social actors expressing the same opposing discourse. However, it could be argued that there is an ideological motive too because the social actor chosen to more overtly express the ‘ban is beneficial to the IRA’ discourse does so by naming the IRA (and the UDA) pejoratively unlike the other two social actors quoted above. A few sentences below those representing Roy Hattersley and Paddy Ashdown’s opposition, another social actor expresses the ‘ban is beneficial to the IRA’ discourse, but this time it is included in reported speech:

> The deputy leader of the Social Democratic Labour Party, Mr Seamus Mallon, warned: “You are doing exactly what the gangsters in the IRA and UDA want. They are now laughing all the way to the European and district council elections.”

Representing IRA and UDA members as ‘gangsters’ is significant because it discredits their political motivations. ‘Gangsterism’ denotes a particular kind of crime that is driven solely by making money and connotes a lifestyle of violent mob wars
motivated by securing monopolies on drug dealing and loan sharking as opposed to more principled historical and political motivations for violence. Interestingly, although Seamus Mallon's statement is represented as verbatim, it actually differs to what he said and how he said it in Parliament. He asked Hurd a series of questions, one of which is represented in this Guardian article, but as a statement rather than a question and several words are changed, which have been underlined below:

Will the Secretary of State accept that the real damage will be done, not to the UDA or the Provisional IRA, but to the highest standards of judicial and legal practice in this country? Does he accept that he is doing exactly what the gangsters in the Provisional IRA and the UDA want him to do? Those organisations will be laughing all the way to the European election and the district council elections because they now have the street issue that they did not previously have. (Hansard, 1988: 897)

Also of interest in Seamus Mallon's statement in the House of Commons is the question he asks, which the Guardian journalists chose to exclude from the reported speech they attribute to him. Arguably, this is also an ideological choice because if the Guardian journalists did want to turn that question into a statement they could have just as easily written:

The deputy leader of the Social Democratic Labour Party, Mr Seamus Mallon, warned: "The real damage will be done, not to the UDA or the Provisional IRA, but to the highest standards of judicial and legal practice in this country."

This would have expressed a more critical discourse, opposing the ban on a principled basis by arguing it would damage British legal standards. That would have also avoided having to exclude crucial aspects from what Roy Hattersley and Paddy Ashdown said a few sentences above. One possible explanation for all these choices is that the Guardian journalists wanted to represent the IRA and UDA in a hostile way, but wanted to use a social actor to do this because The Guardian is supposed to be a 'quality' newspaper and generic conventions prohibit use of such propagandistic terms in news articles where only the opinions of social actors can be conveyed.

The next social actors called on to speak in the Guardian news article are both Unionists who express discourses supporting the ban, which were coded as the 'ban is justified/right/sensible' discourse (for Ken Maginnis) and the 'ban is not enough, Sinn Féin should be proscribed' discourse (for Ian Paisley):
Unionist reaction was muted. Mr Ken Maginnis, the Official Unionist security spokesman, welcomed the ban, but the Reverend Ian Paisley, leader of the Democratic Unionists, said that nothing short of a total ban on Sinn Fein would satisfy them.

Although it is excluded in this Guardian article, Ken Maginnis did give a reason as to why he welcomed the ban, evoking the ‘ban will prevent Sinn Féin influencing young people’ discourse\(^{49}\) in his House of Commons statement (Hansard, 1988: 896). The remaining eleven sentences of the Guardian news article provide specific details about the broadcasting ban such as which Northern Irish organizations it applies to, what is and what is not allowed under the ban, how satellite television will be impacted by it and which aspect of laws are being used to allow the ban. Such information would help the reader understand the ban and allow better informed opinions. This is a major difference between this Guardian article and those newspaper articles representing the ‘popular’ and ‘mid-market’ press because such information is simply not available. Whilst there is little ideological significance in the remaining sentences, Douglas Hurd and a Home Office representative are used as sources. Clare Dyer, the legal editor of The Guardian, is also quoted.

**The Guardian – summary:**

This Guardian article clearly provides more information than the above articles representative of the ‘popular’ and ‘mid-market’ press and allows alternative discourses that are excluded by The Sun and Daily Mail to be expressed by calling on the NUJ and Gerry Adams to speak. It is the first time that the NUJ is allowed to speak, which means the alternative discourse that compares the British government to the South African government is expressed for the first time. Gerry Adams is called on to speak in The Sun article, but his reported speech is taken out of context to represent him in a threatening manner. In this Guardian article, however, his reported speech is far more extensive, which means he is represented in a much more positive way as it actually contains the legitimate political arguments he expressed.

Having said that, the Guardian journalists make several presuppositions about ‘terrorism’, foreground the IRA and Sinn Féin as the main targets of the ban and exclude particular social actors that express alternative discourses. For example, Ken Livingstone also participated in the House of Commons debate from which many of the social actors represented in this Guardian article are quoted, yet the discourses he
expressed are absent. Ken Livingstone expressed the fact that much of the Republican Movement's funding was donated by sympathetic American citizens. He also suggested one possible solution to the Northern Ireland conflict was a negotiated peace settlement. Excluding such alternative discourses from this *Guardian* article is a significant and ideological choice.

Many more social actors and discourses are absent in these news articles and editorials representative of the 'popular', 'mid-market' and 'quality' press. If the journalists and editors responsible for the above articles had included more critical voices, it would have given newspaper readers access to principled opposition to the broadcasting ban. The exception to this general pattern of excluding critical social actors and thereby their principled opposing discourses can be seen in the next newspaper, which was the only newspaper to take an editorial line that overtly opposed the British government introducing the broadcasting ban.

*Daily Mirror*

The *Daily Mirror* was the only newspaper with an editorial line that was overtly critical of the British government introducing the broadcasting ban. Although taking a brave and praiseworthy editorial position defending media freedom in Britain, *Daily Mirror* news articles representing the introduction of the broadcasting ban were similar to those of its 'popular' press rival, *The Sun*. There were few *Daily Mirror* articles representing the introduction of the ban and those that did were small and overwhelmingly featured elite social actors as sources. Another similarity between *Daily Mirror* articles and those of all the other newspapers sampled was that IRA members were represented as 'terrorists' and the Republican Movement, particularly Gerry Adams, was identified as the main target of the broadcasting ban.

That said, *Daily Mirror* journalists did try to persuade their readers to question the British government's introduction of the broadcasting ban by expressing discourses challenging the ban much earlier in the news articles and by giving such discourses and the social actors expressing them more copy space than newspapers supporting the broadcasting ban (see the *Daily Mirror* news articles below). As there were more similarities than differences between *Daily Mirror* news articles and those of other newspapers in the sample, especially *The Sun*, the *Daily Mirror* editorial that did differ from the editorials of the other newspapers will be explored here.
IRA terror gag is on the way

The news will outrage MPs who believe any ban could play into the hands of the terrorists.

Premier Margaret Thatcher and Ulster Secretary Tom King believe the measures would achieve the terrorists' goal of 'oxygen of publicity.'

But rebel Tory MP Hugh Dykes has declared: 'Banning IRA sympathisers from being broadcast would play into the IRA's hands.

'It would look as if the Government fears the IRA can persuade people of their sick cause.

"In reality, the more they alienate the decent moderate majority."

"I think authoritarian trends today are disturbing MPs in all parts of the House."

"More and more, we are seeing the IRA appear as a symbol... to resolve the problem..."

[Daily Mirror – 'IRA terror gag is on the way',
By Anon., 19.10.88 , news article, page 2]
The above *Daily Mirror* editorial was between a quarter of a page and half a page in size and was prominent because it appeared at the top of page 2. The headline immediately indicates the *Daily Mirror*’s overt opposition to the ban by using a pun combined with alliteration of negative adjectives to describe the ban: ‘Bankrupt, base, bad’. The pun is present in the first adjective ‘bankrupt’ as the first syllable is ‘ban’, which suggests the ban is bankrupt. This lexical choice clearly functions to oppose the introduction of the ban because bankrupt, although literally means financial ruin, can also be used to refer to ethical impoverishment as represented in the phrase ‘morally bankrupt’. Arguably, it is in this latter sense that the *Daily Mirror* editorial intends its use as the remainder of the headline and the content of the editorial attests.

The next lexical choice in the headline, ‘base’, continues this opposition because when this word is used as an adjective instead of a noun or verb, it suggests the ban is ‘dishonourable’, ‘corrupt’, ‘immoral’, etc. The last lexical choice, ‘bad’, is the most obvious and literal criticism of the ban and completes the alliteration of the three adjectives, which all begin with the same two letters: ‘Bankrupt, base, bad’. As with *The Sun*, the *Daily Mirror* uses linguistic devices that characterise the ‘popular’ press, but in this case they are used to criticise the government and its introduction of the broadcasting ban. Interestingly though, both *The Sun* and the *Daily Mirror* have chosen to use a very similar form of alliteration that stems from ‘ban’ with the former using ‘b’ sounds and the latter using ‘ba’ sounds.
The courage of the *Daily Mirror* editorial is further displayed by criticising all the newspapers it (correctly) perceives to have supported the British government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban. Although it begins by foregrounding Sinn Féin and the IRA as the main targets of the ban, it is one of the few occasions where they are not collocated with terrorism: ‘The British papers are in two minds about the ban on the BBC and ITV talking to Sinn Fein and the IRA’. The focus is mainly on how British newspapers responded to the ban rather than representing the Republican Movement in a hostile way.

This focus is continued in the next sentence and is a crucial part of the critical narrative in the editorial: ‘Some of them will swallow anything Mrs Thatcher says. They are not newspapers. They are Tory Party house newspapers’. This constructs particular British newspapers as little more than Tory propaganda platforms or ‘mouthpieces’ (to borrow a phrase from these newspapers themselves). Considering how *Sun, Mail, Express* and *Telegraph* editorials represented the British government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban, it is certainly a fair criticism.

That said, it could be argued there is a significant exclusion in this first sentence of this *Daily Mirror* editorial, which generalises the editorial positions of British newspapers to the actual news and op-ed articles of them. By not overtly recognising that this *Daily Mirror* editorial is referring to British newspaper *editorials* being divided on whether to support or oppose the British government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban, it misrepresents this crucial generic difference. As stated earlier, while there was a clear difference in British newspaper editorials on the ban, the majority of news articles had more features in common across all the British newspapers sampled, including the *Daily Mirror* itself.

In the next four sentences the *Daily Mirror* editorial singles out the *Daily Express, Daily Mail, The Times* and *The Daily Telegraph* as British newspapers that welcomed the British government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban. Although the *Daily Mirror* editorial suggests such newspapers discredit themselves for supporting government censorship over the broadcast media by quoting sections from their own editorials, it does this further by reminding its readers about historical examples of shameful editorial positions taken by these newspapers.

For example, the *Daily Mirror* editorial reminds its readers that the *Daily Mail* supported Oswald Mosley’s British Union of Fascists before quoting its support for the broadcasting ban: ‘The Daily Mail, with the enthusiasm which once led it to
embrace British Fascism, declared: “The Home Secretary is abundantly justified”.

Although the verbatim quote is obviously a small section from the Mail editorial, it is representative of its overt support, which advocates a complete ban on Sinn Féin and argues ‘half a ban is better than no ban at all’ (Daily Mail, MURDER’S VOICE TO BE MUZZLED, 20.10.88).

The following four sentences in the Daily Mirror editorial identify the Financial Times, Guardian, Independent and Today as British newspapers that opposed the ban or were ambivalent towards it in the case of The Guardian. As these newspapers did not support the British government's introduction of the broadcasting ban, they are represented much more positively, especially those which the Daily Mirror editorial suggests overtly opposed the ban. This is illustrated in the different ways in which Guardian and Independent editorials are represented: ‘The Guardian, as ever, wobbled but confessed it was all “alarming.”’ The Independent said stoutly: “Democracies do not best confound their enemies by silencing them.”

By representing The Guardian as wobbling on whether to support or oppose the ban, the Daily Mirror editorial suggests its editorial position was irresolute, vacillating between supporting and opposing it. However, by adding ‘as ever’ before ‘wobbled’ it fixes the meaning more towards representing The Guardian as ‘cowardly’ and ‘weak’ because it suggests this newspaper is always indecisive. Using the quoting verb ‘confessed’ further fixes this meaning because it suggests that in spite of its indecisiveness, it was still forced to concede or admit that the introduction of the ban was worrying or ‘alarming’. In contrast, the representation of The Independent editorial is much more positive using the adjective ‘stoutly’ to modify the quoting verb ‘said’. ‘Stoutly’ suggests resoluteness and represents The Independent as defiant and firmly opposed to the ban unlike The Guardian.

Although The Guardian editorial is ambivalent towards the ban, simultaneously expressing discourses that support and oppose the ban and only opposing the ban on tactical grounds, it is somewhat misrepresented by the Daily Mirror editorial. The only Guardian direct quote used in the Daily Mirror editorial, ‘alarming’, is taken out of context more than any other newspaper because it is the least quoted editorial of all with just one word whereas all the others are given a sentence or a meaningful part of a sentence at least. This oversimplifies the already complicated deliberation in the Guardian editorial, but it does still accurately represent the liberal cowardice of this particular Guardian editorial.
It is in the remaining five sentences in the *Daily Mirror* editorial where it expresses its own opposition to the British government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban. The opposing discourses represented are mostly principled and the most critical alternative discourse is not expressed in any other news article, editorial or op-ed analysed in the sample of this research. The first of the remaining four sentences evokes the ‘ban illustrates failure of British government policy in Northern Ireland’ discourse and links back to the headline of the editorial by fixing how it intends the adjective ‘bankrupt’ to be understood by the reader: ‘The Daily Mirror says that to end the freedom of reporting after 20 years of troubles in Ireland shows the bankruptcy of the Government’s policy for the province’.

Although this sentence expresses an alternative discourse that opposes the ban on principles, this construction is based on a significant presupposition that reporting the Northern Ireland conflict had been free until the British government introduced the broadcasting ban. It is true the ban was the first time direct censorship was used over the British media in the Northern Ireland conflict, but indirect government pressure which led to self-censorship was practiced since partition, increasing from the beginning of the conflict and continuing throughout. That said, this sentence clearly criticises the ban and the British government’s entire Northern Ireland policy as the former is represented as ending freedom of reporting and the latter as bankrupt.

Also of significance is the representation of the Northern Ireland conflict as ‘troubles in Ireland’. This construction simultaneously draws from dominant and alternative discourses. Referring to the conflict as ‘troubles’ rather than ‘insurgency’ or ‘war’ derives from the dominant representation of the Northern Ireland conflict, which functions to minimise the seriousness of it. Referring to the conflict as taking place in Ireland as opposed to ‘Northern Ireland’ or ‘Ulster’, however, originates from the alternative representation of the Northern Ireland conflict. Such a representation functions to oppose the British presence in Ireland by representing the island of Ireland in its totality, drawing attention to the partition of it that created the Irish Republic and Northern Ireland.

The discourse expressed by the *Daily Mirror* in the next sentence is also an alternative discourse that radically opposes the ban on principled grounds by representing such censorship as making the British government comparable to the South African government: ‘When we copy the behaviour of the South African Government then we should stop and think’. It is important to remember that the
South African government was internationally boycotted because of its racist Apartheid system. Although the British government opposed this boycott until Margaret Thatcher could no longer maintain her position that Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress (ANC) were ‘terrorists’, advocates of human and civil rights in Britain and across the world had always viewed the Apartheid regime as an authoritarian state built on racism.

To compare the British government to this for censoring its own opponents was therefore very radical with no other newspaper editorial making this comparison. In fact, the only newspaper editorial to mention Apartheid was the *Daily Mail*, but it did so in a very different, traditionally *Daily Mail* way. When arguing that the broadcasting ban was not enough and advocating a total ban on Sinn Féin, it criticised the British government’s policy of making Northern Ireland electoral candidates take an oath disavowing any commitment to violence:

That might thin out the contingent of Sinn Fein councillors. But oath-taking could one day become contagious...a pledge to denounce Apartheid...a sworn allegiance to this, that or the other. (*Daily Mail*, MURDER’S VOICE TO BE MUZZLED, 20.10.88)

Representing a pledge to denounce Apartheid as a negative action clearly illustrates the *Daily Mail*’s support for Apartheid in 1988 and is more evidence of that newspapers support for racism and fascism which the *Daily Mirror* editorial draws attention to earlier on. The ‘ban makes Britain comparable to South Africa’ discourse emanated from the NUJ, which illustrates how important media workers’ organisations were to opposing the broadcasting ban on principled grounds. No other organisation or social actors made this comparison and the NUJ were not called on to speak very often so it is a testimony to the *Daily Mirror*’s brave editorial position that it chose to express this discourse.

The next sentence of the *Daily Mirror* editorial also functions to oppose the British government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban by expressing the most frequently occurring opposing discourse: ‘When we hand propaganda gifts to the IRA we should wonder what we are doing’. As stated earlier, the ‘ban is beneficial to the IRA’ discourse clearly opposes the ban but on tactical, rather than principled, grounds. Nevertheless, this discourse still continues the critical position of the *Daily Mirror* editorial that challenges British government censorship.
In the next sentence the *Daily Mirror* editorial actually represents the broadcasting ban as a piece of censorship, which is significant because most newspapers chose to represent the ban as a British government ‘restriction’ or ‘initiative’. It also suggests such censorship should be seen as a warning for the kind of society Britain is becoming: ‘When the government reaches, yet again, for the censor, then we should fear for the society we are becoming’.

This clearly represents Britain as becoming a more authoritarian society especially because the editorial compared the British government to the South African government two sentences before. In addition, there is a presupposition that the British government has reached for the censor before by adding ‘yet again’ to the action of the British government. Arguably, this contradicts the earlier presupposition that there has been freedom of reporting for the 20 years of the Northern Ireland conflict, but it could also refer to something that Tony Benn said in the House of Commons two days before where he connects the broadcasting ban to other recent examples of censorship:

> Is the Secretary of State aware that his statement will be seen as a massive extension of state control over the broadcasting authorities, and that it is precisely comparable to the ban on the Zircon film and the attempt to ban the Spycatcher book? (Hansard, 1988: 899)

Either way the *Daily Mirror* editorial representation of the British government reaching for the censor ‘yet again’ clearly functions to fix a discourse that opposes the ban. The fifth and final sentence of the *Daily Mirror* editorial, however, expressed the most critical alternative discourse of all the newspaper articles representing the introduction of the broadcasting ban. It was the only time such an alternative discourse was expressed in the whole sample of this research:

> And when we deal with the symptoms of the problems of Northern Ireland instead of the causes – which lie in the bizarre decision of nearly 60 years ago to divide the island artificially – then we demonstrate that we would best serve the future of Ireland by departing from it forever.

This discourse expressed in the *Daily Mirror* editorial identifies partition as the cause of the ‘problems of Northern Ireland’ and functions to oppose the ban by representing it as a policy that only deals with the symptoms. The seriousness of the Northern
Ireland conflict is downplayed again by representing it as the ‘problems of Northern Ireland’ although the *Daily Mirror* editorial does recognise partition as the cause of such ‘problems’. It also criticises partition itself by representing it as a ‘bizarre decision’. Such a representation suggests partition was a mistake because adding the adjective ‘bizarre’ to the noun ‘decision’ suggests it was a strange or peculiar idea. Adding ‘artificially’ further fixes this representation, because it suggests partitioning Ireland was unnatural. That said, the agency of who partitioned the island of Ireland is excluded, resulting in ambiguity as to whether it was Irish or British people that divided Ireland. To include British agency in partitioning Ireland the *Daily Mirror* editorial could have replaced ‘the bizarre decision’ with ‘our bizarre decision’, ‘Britain’s bizarre decision’, or ‘the British government’s bizarre decision’.

The *Daily Mirror* editorial suggests a solution to end the Northern Ireland conflict, which matches the exceptionality of its criticism of the ban, by arguing that Britain should end its presence in Ireland to best serve Ireland’s future. The argument that Britain should depart from Ireland forever was so marginalised that this was the only time it was expressed in newspaper articles representing the introduction of the broadcasting ban. This discourse was expressed by the Troops Out Movement in Britain and the Republican Movement across Ireland, but the former were never called on to speak by journalists and the latter were very rarely called on to speak in newspaper articles during the sample of this research.

Inevitably, by excluding these social actors, alternative discourses were excluded from newspaper representations of the British government introducing and lifting the broadcasting ban too. Although the *Daily Mirror* editorial does not acknowledge the origins of the discourse expressing the centrality of partition to the Northern Ireland conflict, it illustrates such a discourse was circulating and therefore could have featured more in newspaper articles representing the ban.

- Journalists in other newspapers, especially the ‘quality’ press, could have explained this crucial grievance to explain why the Republican Movement existed and why its members were willing to take up arms against the British presence in Ireland, but this would not serve the interests of British nationalism, the bastion of the British elite. ‘Quality’ newspapers feature more articles representing serious news such as the British government introducing and lifting censorship and such articles are much larger in size and longer in length compared to those of the ‘popular’ and ‘mid-market’ press. This allows journalists to include more social actors as sources and
therefore a broader range of discourses, but no journalists working for The Guardian or The Daily Telegraph expressed the critical alternative discourse underlining partition as a major cause of the Northern Ireland conflict. This suggests a more ideological reason is motivating such a significant exclusion in all newspaper articles except the above Daily Mirror editorial.

Acknowledging Britain’s occupation of the entire island of Ireland and the British government’s role in the partition of it after the Irish Republican Army had fought the British Army out of most of Ireland would foreground the shameful practice of colonialism under the British Empire. Therefore, journalists excluded the centrality of partition to the Northern Ireland conflict and backgrounded the causes of the Northern Ireland conflict just as elite social actors did.

Another significant aspect of the Daily Mirror editorial is the frequent use of the personal pronoun ‘we’. Arguably, this is an important strategy of this editorial to persuade Daily Mirror readers to oppose the introduction of the broadcasting ban because ‘we’ unites and generalises British government action and Daily Mirror opposition to that action to include the ‘British’ people or at least the Daily Mirror readers. Representing such collectivity is often used as a rhetorical device to persuade people to believe something is beneficial to a majority when in reality it only is to a minority, but it is used in a positive way in this editorial because it is attempting to persuade its readers to oppose the British government’s introduction of direct censorship over the British broadcast media. By underlining every instance of ‘we’ in the last four sentences, it is possible to see how often this strategy is used to express the Daily Mirror’s opposition to the broadcasting ban:

When we copy the behaviour of the South African Government then we should stop and think. When we hand propaganda gifts to the IRA we should wonder what we are doing. When the government reaches, yet again, for the censor, then we should fear for the society we are becoming. And when we deal with the symptoms of the problems of Northern Ireland instead of the causes – which lie in the bizarre decision of nearly 60 years ago to divide the island artificially – then we demonstrate that we would best serve the future of Ireland by departing from it forever.

Also of significance is the lift-out quote at the bottom of the page written in type size half the size of the headline type size, but double that of the body type: "Time to stop and think about Ulster policy". Arguably, this serves two functions. Firstly, it
informs the reader what the headline is referring to by connecting the adjectives ‘bankrupt’, ‘base’, ‘bad’ of the headline to ‘Ulster policy’. Secondly, it summarises the *Daily Mirror* editorial position that not only is the broadcasting ban wrong, but so is the British government’s entire Northern Ireland policy. As such, the lift-out quote could be read twice. Once at the beginning to unravel the enigma in the headline as to what is bankrupt, base and bad and once after the last sentence of the actual editorial is read to reaffirm the editorial position that it’s time for ‘Britain’ to think about leaving Ireland.

*Daily Mirror – summary:*

Although this editorial is an anomaly in terms of other *Daily Mirror* articles and the other five sampled newspaper editorial positions and their articles more generally, it illustrates that newspapers could have represented the British government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban far more critically. More generally, it illustrates that it was possible for the Northern Ireland conflict to be explained by acknowledging major historical grievances. Considering the *Daily Mirror* editorial was the only article where the partition of Ireland is even mentioned, let alone suggested as being one of the root causes of the Northern Ireland conflict, it could be argued the British newspaper industry severely reduced its readers’ ability to understand the historical and political reasons motivating the Republican Movement.

The fact that this *Daily Mirror* editorial was an article from the ‘popular’ press illustrates that all newspapers could have expressed this discourse and that it is not a question of copy space that permits or inhibits a journalist or editor from discussing historical and political dimensions to a conflict. Newspapers representative of the ‘quality’ press had many more articles representing the British government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban than the *Daily Mirror* and dedicated far more copy space to discussing the ban yet at no point was the question of partition raised. Likewise, no other *Daily Mirror* article mentioned partition and that the British presence in Ireland may be the problem, not the solution.
CDA has been used in this chapter to explore a selection of individual newspaper articles representative of the ‘popular’, ‘mid-market’ and ‘quality’ newspaper genres. Some of the most significant newspaper articles representing the British government introducing the broadcasting ban have been analysed to reveal in detail the choices made by journalists to include and exclude particular social actors, name and frame them and their expressions of discourses supporting and opposing the broadcasting ban. The textual analyses here have illustrated how journalistic choices can dramatically shift representations of events, in this case the British government introducing the broadcasting ban.

The news article and both editorials printed in *The Sun* explored in this chapter illustrate how choices were made to simultaneously build support for British government censorship and embroil the BBC in a scandal. The editorials illustrate this without question with the first declaring its support for the British government ban on TV and radio interviews with ‘terrorists’ and the second attacking the BBC for resisting such censorship. The journalist writing the news article for *The Sun* fixates on the BBC resisting the broadcasting ban even though the BBC and ITN both allowed Gerry Adams to speak before the censorship became law. Indeed, those working for *The Sun* seem to find BBC ‘irresponsibility’ more shameful than the British government introducing censorship in the first place.

Although generic conventions of news articles dictate that the author cannot put their own opinions on the subject they are covering, there are a number of strategies used to persuade the readers to hold a particular position. In the *Sun* news article, there are many ideological devices used to single out the BBC and divert attention away from the British government introducing direct censorship and towards the ‘irresponsibility’ of the BBC. This includes reversing the chronology of the British government introducing the ban and Gerry Adams’ statement on television, generalising the ‘fury’ at the broadcasters for airing the statement, singling out the BBC as the only broadcaster airing the statement, and garbling Gerry Adams’s statement to represent his reported speech as a threat to the British public rather than a defence of Sinn Féin’s right to free speech. The social actors and discourses chosen by Black (1988) and the way they are framed also largely function to build support for the British government introducing the broadcasting ban.
After Gerry Adams' statement, the next three social actors chosen to provide reported speech are representatives of the British government and therefore express discourses supporting their decision to introduce the broadcasting ban. When Roy Hattersley, the Labour deputy leader, is called on to speak his statement is misrepresented in an ideological way, which reduces the seriousness of his tactical opposition to the ban. His statement acknowledging support for the Republican Movement from US citizens is excluded also. BBC and ITN managers are allowed to speak, but BBC and ITN workers are not, which means although some principled opposition to the ban is expressed, more critical alternative discourses are excluded.

The naming and foregrounding of Republican combatants and the naming and backgrounding of Loyalist combatants also reveal ideological choices made by the *Sun* journalist. Republican organisations and representatives are foregrounded from the beginning of the *Sun* news article and Irishness is connected with ‘terror groups’ whereas Protestantism is connected with ‘paramilitary groups’ suggesting it is only those combatants fighting for an Irish United Republic who are ‘terrorists’. This ideological representation was expressed consistently across the sample of newspapers in this research as acknowledged in the previous and present chapter. The only aspect that shifted was the level of hostility, which depended on how much each newspaper supported or opposed the British government introducing the broadcasting ban. Obviously, the more a newspaper owner supported the ban the more venomous its journalists and editors were towards members of the Republican Movement.

As with *The Sun* (and the *Daily Express*), the *Daily Mail* editorials overtly supported the British government introducing the broadcasting ban. It has been argued in this chapter that whereas *Daily Mail* editorials unquestionably supported British government censorship, *Daily Mail* news articles functioned to build support in a far more subtle way. Indeed, there was a marked difference between the *Sun* news article and that of the *Daily Mail* most likely due to the varying generic expectations of the ‘popular’ and ‘mid-market’ newspaper genres. Therefore, whilst foregrounding of the Republican Movement continued, naming them was less sensational and direct than *The Sun*.

That said, the social actors called on to speak by the *Daily Mail* journalist were all members of the Conservative Party except for the last social actor who was the Northern Ireland spokesperson for the Labour Party. As there were no representatives of the Republican Movement or the broadcast media (whether
managers or media workers), no principled discourses opposing the broadcasting ban were expressed in the *Daily Mail* news article. Instead, discourses emanating from the British government, which supported the ban dominated the *Daily Mail* news article until the last three paragraphs where a 'wet' Tory MP and the Labour representative expressed opposing discourses, which suggested the ban was wrong tactically rather than principally. Unsurprisingly, the dominance of elite sources meant dominant discourses proliferated, thus building support for the ban.

The two newspapers representative of the 'quality' genre printed more articles about the broadcasting ban than the other four newspapers in the sample combined. It was *The Guardian* that printed the most broadcasting ban articles and to which this summary now turns. Although the editorial position of *The Guardian* was ambivalent towards the British government introducing the broadcasting ban, it did defend journalists resisting such censorship, which was a stark difference from *The Sun*, *The Daily Mail*, *Daily Express* and *The Daily Telegraph*. The lead front-page news article in *The Guardian*, which has been analysed in this chapter, differed from news articles already summarised here, but there were more similarities than differences.

The major break from the composition of 'popular' and 'mid-market' newspapers was the size of *The Guardian* article, which meant a more diverse range of social actors were allowed to speak by the authors of the news article. Although the *Guardian* journalists chose to select British government representatives for the first seven paragraphs of the news article there was a much broader selection of social actors throughout the rest of the article. This included an NUJ representative, Gerry Adams as well as representatives of other Northern Irish and British political parties.

As a result there was a broader range of discourses opposing the broadcasting ban such as the NUJ comparing the British government to the South African government. Gerry Adams was also allowed to express principled discourses against the broadcasting ban. The reasons for these differences in 'quality' newspapers will be explored in depth in the following chapter, which explains the discursive and social practices involved in the production and consumption of British journalism.

Although there were differences between the *Sun* and *Daily Mail* news articles and that of *The Guardian*, many similarities remained. Presuppositions about 'terrorism' and 'terrorists' continued as if there really is an objective definition for certain acts of violence committed by particular individuals and organisations. In reality, of course, these labels are merely ideological refractions, which attempted to
delegitimise one side of the Northern Ireland conflict. The headline of the Guardian news article illustrates this by presupposing newspaper readers knew who was using ‘terror’ in this so-called ‘terror fight’. This reveals how some dominant discourses could not be escaped by journalists no matter the ‘quality’ of newspapers they were writing for because British nationalism cannot be challenged in the British media.

The Guardian journalists also made significant choices to exclude vital aspects of discourses opposing the British government introducing the broadcasting ban. As with the Sun news article explored in this chapter, it is interesting to note how Roy Hattersley’s opposition to the ban is represented. Again, the acknowledgment of US supporters of the Republican Movement in his House of Commons statement is excluded from the news article. This point was made by Ken Livingstone in the same debate too, but this social actor and his opposition is excluded the Guardian journalists, which suggests they have decided that allowing Guardian newspaper readers to know there were Americans sympathetic to the Republican Movement is beyond the pale. The vastly increased size of this news article in a ‘quality’ newspaper means this ideological choice cannot be excused as a result of concision as it could be in a ‘popular’ newspaper like The Sun.

However, it is not to say that The Guardian news article attempted to persuade its readers to support the ban as much as The Sun news article did. The difference of treatment of Gerry Adams by the Guardian journalists attests to this as they attribute reported speech that represents him in a rational, non-threatening manner and frame him respectfully and formally. He is allowed to express an alternative discourse that only manifested once in the entire sample, which represents the British government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban as a planned and tactical method of reversing Sinn Féin electoral breakthroughs, suggesting Margaret Thatcher’s contention that the ‘terrorists’ had no support in Northern Ireland had been proven wrong.

The last newspaper analysed in this chapter was the Daily Mirror. Although this newspaper printed similar news articles representing the British government introducing the ban, it took an editorial position that overtly opposed such censorship. The Daily Mirror, like its ‘popular’ newspaper genre rival, The Sun, printed few newspaper articles about the ban, which were small in size, colloquial and dramatic in style as well as overwhelmingly relying on elite social actors for sources. It also perpetuated the foregrounding and pejorative naming of the Republican Movement in its news articles like all the other newspapers in the sample of this research.
However, the *Daily Mirror* editorial on the British government introducing the broadcasting ban was scathing of all the newspapers that supported this censorship and the British government for introducing it in the first place, making it a very interesting anomaly. The choices made by the editor of the *Daily Mirror* all functioned to persuade the readers to oppose the broadcasting ban from the alliteration and pun of the headline to the lift-out quote at the end of the editorial. The candour of the *Daily Mirror* editor when representing the British newspapers that shamefully supported British government censorship was remarkable.

The alternative discourses that were expressed to oppose the British government’s broadcasting ban were more critical than all editorials, news articles and op-eds printed in every other newspaper in the sample of this research. Not only did the *Daily Mirror* editorial compare the British government to the Apartheid regime in South Africa, it acknowledged that the partition of Ireland was one of the main causes of the Northern Ireland conflict and argued that the British presence in Ireland was the problem, not the solution.

Alternative discourses that questioned the historical record of the British government and military in Ireland were completely absent from British newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban, despite circulating in the Republican Movement and Irish solidarity grass roots organisations such as the Troops Out Movement in Britain. It is therefore very interesting that one British newspaper on one occasion chose to express such discourses.

It has been argued in this chapter that a ‘popular’ newspaper like the *Daily Mirror* choosing to express these alternative discourses reveals how all newspapers could have chosen to challenge the dominant discourses emanating from elite social actors. However, they chose not to. These choices need to be explained to understand why this occurred. In the next chapter, the discursive and social practices involved in the production and consumption of British journalism are explored in order to explain and understand British newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban (1988-1994).
Chapter 7 – Critical Discourse Analysis: Discursive and Social Practices

In this final chapter, the second and third dimensions of CDA are used to analyse and explain the discursive and social practices impacting British newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban. Although these dimensions have been alluded to in previous CDA chapters exploring newspaper articles representing the British government introducing and lifting the broadcasting ban, they are analysed in more depth here. Beginning with the discursive practices involved in the production and consumption of newspaper journalism, this chapter explains the processes in which the authors and audience of texts draw on already existing discourses for certain situations, which change through time and across societies and shape how texts are encoded and decoded. This chapter ends by expanding the analysis in terms of social practices and the role of journalism in relation to wider society.

The structuring influences within British journalism are analysed, including the generic conventions between and within newspapers as well as the political allegiances of newspapers. The impact of these structural influences on newspaper content is explained in terms of newspaper reader considerations, news values, source values and intertextuality. These aspects are then explored in terms of other significant factors existing outside the newsroom, which also impacted newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban. Social practices such as the British government use of indirect pressure and ‘anti-terrorism legislation’ throughout the Northern Ireland conflict and the introduction of direct censorship during the latter years of it are analysed to explain how these, in turn, shaped discursive practices. Industrial disputes within the newspaper industry in the lead up to the broadcasting ban are also explored to explain the weakness of print media workers compared to broadcast media workers during that period. These government controls, industrial disputes, and the resistance of media workers are analysed in terms of struggles within the media and in society at large.

There are many factors that impact the way in which journalists construct newspaper articles. Like all workers, journalists sell their labour to live and have to work in a way that satisfies the manager (newspaper editor) and proprietor (newspaper owner) of their workplace. As workers, journalists produce a commodity (whether that be considered the actual newspaper, the audience of the newspaper, or both), which can be sold to make profit. They also share similar interests to other
journalists and media workers, meaning they are often unionised in order to safeguard their conditions and rights against the profit interests of their employers. There are many structuring influences impacting journalists before they even begin to work. Each newspaper owner has decided which section of the political system the newspaper supports and which section of the newspaper industry market it competes in, whether that be the ‘popular’ newspaper genre, ‘mid-market’ or ‘quality’. An editor is employed by the owner to ensure journalists remain within these boundaries.

**Generic conventions of newspapers**

A major structuring influence impacting journalists then are the political allegiances and generic conventions of the newspaper they are working for, neither of which can be separated from the economics of the newspaper. The different parts of the market to which newspapers cater are reflected in the different newspaper genres (Williams, 2010). As Tunstall (1996: 8) points out, newspapers in Britain are ‘split very much along social class lines’ and use different business models; ‘broadsheets rely primarily on advertising revenue, while tabloids rely primarily on sales or circulation revenue’ (Tunstall, 1996: 11). In the 1980s and 1990s, the audience of ‘popular’ newspapers like *The Sun* and the *Daily Mirror* was and is today mostly made up of skilled and unskilled manual workers and the unemployed (Richardson, 2007).

Whereas the *Daily Mirror* has traditionally targeted the left-leaning and Labour voting members of these social classes, *The Sun* has traditionally catered for those with more right-wing and conservative views. These realities make a big difference in what stories are ‘newsworthy’ in the first place and how they are reported as the ‘popular’ press needs to maintain large audiences. This is because these newspapers rely on sales revenue with *The Sun* selling over four million and the *Daily Mirror* selling over three million during the late 1980s and just below these figures during the early 1990s (Willings Press Guide, 1989-1995). ‘Popular’ newspapers assume readers are more interested in light, entertaining news, sport and gossip than more serious, in depth, news (Tunstall, 1996).

This helps to explain why journalists working for *The Sun* and *Daily Mirror* gave such limited coverage to the British government introducing and lifting the broadcasting ban. It also helps to explain why those articles that did focus on the ban were so short in length. Smaller news articles inevitably mean fewer social actors are
called on to speak by journalists, thus limiting the range of discourses expressed. It could be argued that these discursive practices restrict discourses opposing the broadcasting ban because the reliance on British government social actors as sources (discussed below) will result in a dominance of them with little copy space left for those social actors expressing alternative discourses.

Returning to the *Sun* news article analysed in the previous chapter (see page 143), it is possible to see this occurring. As the *Sun* journalist overwhelming relies on elite sources, discourses supporting the ban dominate the article. All the social actors, except Gerry Adams, who have been indirectly or directly quoted can be considered to represent the interests of the British elite because they all share a stake in maintaining the status quo in Britain. Sinn Féin President and MP, Gerry Adams, three Tory MPs (Ivor Stanbrook, Margaret Thatcher and Douglas Hurd), one Labour MP (Roy Hattersley) as well as BBC and ITN managers are used as sources.

Several social actors have been excluded who could have been included, such as Liberal Democrat MPs or other Labour MPs as well as, more importantly, organisations that represent media workers impacted by the ban such as the NUJ or the Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom. In addition, representatives of the Troops Out Movement could have been called on to speak. If the *Sun* journalist had included these social actors in the article, more discourses opposing the British government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban would have been expressed.

Although considerations regarding newsworthiness are certainly impacted by the generic conventions of newspapers, newspaper content is also influenced by the political allegiances of the newspaper owner. The *Sun* journalist as a worker employed by Rupert Murdoch would be aware that the editor expects the *Sun* news article to be as short, simplistic, entertaining and dramatic as possible, but it must also reinforce the political allegiances of the newspaper. This means excluding social actors considered too radical such as unionised media workers because trade unions interfere with the profit margins of the journalist’s employer.

Other excluded social actors would include socialist Labour MPs such as Tony Benn and Ken Livingstone as well as Irish solidarity activists from the Troops Out Movement because they questioned the entire presence of Britain in Ireland. Aside from Rupert Murdoch’s personal hatred of trade unions and his economic interests being served by the stability and maintenance of the British elite, his economic interests are also served by his employees undermining his media competition.
Some may argue that the *Sun* journalist has constructed the news article in a way that will be appreciated by the intended audience because *Sun* readers are assumed to be right-wing and supportive of tough ‘law and order’ policies. However, there is a discourse dominating the article, which suggests it is not the audience that is determining the representation of the British government introducing the broadcasting ban in *The Sun*: the ‘broadcasters are irresponsible (especially the BBC)’ discourse. *Sun* readers do not have an economic interest in attacking the BBC, but Rupert Murdoch does. Arguably, the *Sun* news article, which distracts the reader from the significance of the fact that the British government has just introduced a piece of censorship to the ‘irresponsibility’ of the BBC, is constructed with the political and economic interests of the journalist’s employer in mind. Instead of directing criticism towards the British government for introducing the broadcasting ban, the *Sun* journalist encourages his readers to criticise the BBC and support the government, which perfectly suits Rupert Murdoch’s economic interests and his political alliance with Margaret Thatcher during that period.

The *Daily Mail* and *Daily Express*, which are considered to be ‘mid-market’ newspapers, target an audience comprised of both working class and middle class readers (Tunstall, 1996; Richardson, 2007). As a result, the method of profit accumulation of these newspapers is also comprised of both sales and advertisement revenue. The circulation of these newspapers also hints at this because they stand somewhere in the middle of the ‘popular’ and ‘quality’ newspaper circulations with both the *Daily Mail* and *Daily Express* averaging between 1.5 and 2 million copies sold per day during the late 1980s and early 1990s (Willings Press Guide, 1989-1995). The political allegiances of these ‘mid-market’ newspapers were both conservative during the sample period of this research as they were before and afterwards (Williams, 2010).

This clearly manifested in the editorial position of both newspapers supporting the British government introducing the broadcasting ban. Needless to say journalists employed by the *Daily Mail* (Daily Mail and General Trust) and the *Daily Express* (United News and Media) were aware of this and constructed their news articles and op-eds accordingly. For example, the *Daily Mail* news article explored in the previous chapter (see page 156) overwhelmingly featured representatives of the Conservative Party. This meant that British government sources dominated discursively in this representation of the broadcasting ban.
Newspapers representative of the 'quality' press target an audience with a high disposable income such as those in managerial, administrative and professional positions (Tunstall, 1996; Richardson, 2007). This means these newspapers can afford to have far smaller circulations than the 'popular' and 'mid-market' press because the value of each reader of the 'quality' press is far higher in terms of advertising revenue. Therefore, throughout the sample period of this research, The Guardian never exceeded a circulation figure of 500,000 and The Daily Telegraph sold just over one million per day (Willings Press Guide, 1989-1995). Newspapers representative of the 'quality' press assume their readers are more interested in serious news stories and analysis (Tunstall, 1996).

This helps to explain why The Guardian and The Daily Telegraph featured so many more articles representing the British government's introduction of the broadcasting ban, which were of increased size and length, compared with those newspapers from the 'popular' and 'mid-market' press. The increased number of larger newspaper articles due to the generic conventions of 'quality' newspapers allows the journalist to include many more social actors in the articles, meaning a wider range of discourses can be expressed. This results in the readers of these newspapers being subject to the discourses that were being expressed in Britain to support and oppose the broadcasting ban.

This is illustrated in the Guardian news article analysed in the previous chapter (see page 163). The Guardian journalists feature numerous social actors, including all those chosen by the Sun journalist, plus an NUJ representative, Liberal Democrat leader Paddy Ashdown, Social Democratic and Labour Party deputy leader Seamus Mallon, Ulster Unionist Party MP Ken Maginnis and Democratic Unionist Party MP Ian Paisley. Including a bigger selection of social actors results in a broader selection of discourses opposing and supporting the introduction of the ban.

That said, the Guardian journalists like the Sun journalist also overwhelming called on elite sources to speak in the Guardian news article. The only added source that is not part of the British elite is the NUJ, meaning that while Guardian readers are presented with more discourses supporting and opposing the broadcasting ban, the diversity of opposition is still restricted by the exclusion of more critical social actors (other than the NUJ). This can be explained by the 'liberal bias' of The Guardian as a newspaper that is not right-wing in the way that The Sun, Daily Mail and Daily Express clearly are, but, nonetheless, is in the business of conserving the status quo.
and therefore conservative in that sense. During the 1980s as now, the political allegiances of the Guardian under ownership of the Scott Trust fluctuated between the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats as "a paper that will remain bourgeois to the last" (Ted Scott, cited in Ayerst, 1971: 471).

Therefore, whereas the Guardian journalists knew that their editor would allow social actors critical of the Conservative Party and those defending the British media from the censorship introduced by the Conservative government, they also knew that the interests of the elite could not be challenged in general. This means Guardian journalists could be critical of some of the tactics used by elite social actors in the Northern Ireland conflict, but not the overall presence of Britain in Ireland. Therefore, those social actors that were critical of this such as socialist Labour MPs and representatives of the Troops Out Movement were excluded by the Guardian journalists. Such discursive practices clearly limit other critical discourses that opposed the British government's broadcasting ban. However, the way in which journalists constructed newspaper articles went beyond the generic conventions and political allegiances of the newspapers they were working for.

**Generic conventions of news articles, editorials and op-eds**

Another structuring influence impacting journalists are the generic conventions of the actual newspaper articles. As acknowledged in previous chapters, the generic conventions of news articles, editorials and op-eds differ from each other and dictate the form and style of them, which the authors must follow. Returning to examples from the Daily Mirror and Daily Mail, it is possible to illustrate how the different political allegiances and text-genres of newspapers impact discursive practices of journalists, structuring what can and cannot be said as well as how. Whereas news articles in these two newspapers largely amplified dominant discourses expressed by elite social actors, op-eds and editorials altered the order of discourse.

As the Daily Mirror was a left-leaning newspaper supporting the Labour Party in the 1980s, its staff employed Paul Foot, a revolutionary socialist journalist, who could be critical of the Conservative Party, its introduction of censorship, and British government support for the Contras in his op-ed piece (*Daily Mirror*, CONTRA-DICTORY, 27.10.88). He subverted the order of discourse by highlighting the contradiction in the British government introducing censorship to starve the
'terrorists' of the 'oxygen of publicity' whilst meeting the leader of the Contras, a violent, right-wing, organisation which was trying to overthrow the democratically elected Nicaraguan government. It was during this war on democracy, that the US government was condemned by the World Court in the Hague for sponsoring international terrorism (Chomsky, 2002).

In contrast, the 'terrorists' must be starved of the 'oxygen of publicity' discourse was reinforced and embellished by a Daily Mail editorial to persuade its readers that the broadcasting ban did not go far enough and that Sinn Féin should be banned altogether because 'they will gratefully gulp down the oxygen of publicity and spew out the propaganda of terror' (Daily Mail, DEPRIVE TERROR OF THIS MEGAPHONE, 17.10.88). During the 1980s, as now, the Daily Mail was a right-wing newspaper supporting the Conservative Party, which meant its editor was employed to build support for Tory policies, in this case, introducing censorship.

The text-genres of these newspaper articles were equally important, if not more so, to the structuring of what Paul Foot and the Daily Mail editor could say. Both op-eds and editorials are very different in form and style compared to news articles. The generic conventions of op-eds dictate that journalists express personal views on a subject, which may differ from the editorial line of the newspaper one way or another. Similarly, the generic conventions of editorials dictate that the author writes the personal views of the newspaper proprietor and editor on a subject.

In contrast, the generic conventions of news articles dictate that the journalist must remain 'objective' and not express personal opinions on the subject they are writing about. Instead they must use the opinions of relevant social actors to inform and persuade their readers. It is the generic conventions of news articles, which give the impression that journalists are merely reporting the news whereas they are representing subjects like the broadcasting ban in ways that function to influence newspaper readers' understanding and opinions of them.

Arguably, it is op-eds that allow journalists the most freedom in constructing articles because, to some extent, they can veer away from the editorial position as well as provide their own views on subjects. A day after the British government introduced the broadcasting ban, a cluster of notable articles in the Comment and Analysis section of The Guardian were printed. Three Guardian journalists gave more information about the roots of the ban in the four op-eds printed on the next page than all the articles from the entire sample of newspapers in this research.
Journalists walk tightrope on coverage of Sinn Fein

How the media creates Republican myths

Politics confront programme chiefs

New policy looks back to sixties proclamations

Coverage of banned groups provokes media-government tension in both Ireland and Britain

David Fielder

In Ireland, North and South, the reporting of Sinn Fein to politicians in newspapers is restricted as part of the political process. In Britain, where Sinn Fein is not a legally registered political party, the BBC and other media have taken a more balanced stance, and a reporter makes a renewed appeal for a more equal voice.

This is the second in a series of articles on the political process in Ireland. In the first, we examined the role of the media in promoting and exposing Sinn Fein's activities. In this article, we will look at the media's role in creating Republican myths.

In Ireland, the media is controlled by a small number of wealthy owners, and there is little competition. This has led to a concentration of power, and the media often reflects the political attitudes of the owners.

In Britain, there is more competition, and the media is more independent. This has led to a more balanced reporting of Sinn Fein.

The media in Ireland is also subject to political pressure, and journalists are sometimes prevented from reporting on Sinn Fein.

In Britain, there is no such pressure, and journalists are able to report on Sinn Fein.

The media in Ireland is also subject to government pressure, and journalists are sometimes prevented from reporting on Sinn Fein.

In Britain, there is no such pressure, and journalists are able to report on Sinn Fein.

The media in Ireland is also subject to political pressure, and journalists are sometimes prevented from reporting on Sinn Fein.

In Britain, there is no such pressure, and journalists are able to report on Sinn Fein.

The media in Ireland is also subject to government pressure, and journalists are sometimes prevented from reporting on Sinn Fein.

In Britain, there is no such pressure, and journalists are able to report on Sinn Fein.

The media in Ireland is also subject to political pressure, and journalists are sometimes prevented from reporting on Sinn Fein.

In Britain, there is no such pressure, and journalists are able to report on Sinn Fein.

The media in Ireland is also subject to government pressure, and journalists are sometimes prevented from reporting on Sinn Fein.

In Britain, there is no such pressure, and journalists are able to report on Sinn Fein.

The media in Ireland is also subject to political pressure, and journalists are sometimes prevented from reporting on Sinn Fein.

In Britain, there is no such pressure, and journalists are able to report on Sinn Fein.

The media in Ireland is also subject to government pressure, and journalists are sometimes prevented from reporting on Sinn Fein.

In Britain, there is no such pressure, and journalists are able to report on Sinn Fein.

The media in Ireland is also subject to political pressure, and journalists are sometimes prevented from reporting on Sinn Fein.

In Britain, there is no such pressure, and journalists are able to report on Sinn Fein.

The media in Ireland is also subject to government pressure, and journalists are sometimes prevented from reporting on Sinn Fein.

In Britain, there is no such pressure, and journalists are able to report on Sinn Fein.

The media in Ireland is also subject to political pressure, and journalists are sometimes prevented from reporting on Sinn Fein.

In Britain, there is no such pressure, and journalists are able to report on Sinn Fein.

The media in Ireland is also subject to government pressure, and journalists are sometimes prevented from reporting on Sinn Fein.

In Britain, there is no such pressure, and journalists are able to report on Sinn Fein.

The media in Ireland is also subject to political pressure, and journalists are sometimes prevented from reporting on Sinn Fein.

In Britain, there is no such pressure, and journalists are able to report on Sinn Fein.

The media in Ireland is also subject to government pressure, and journalists are sometimes prevented from reporting on Sinn Fein.

In Britain, there is no such pressure, and journalists are able to report on Sinn Fein.

The media in Ireland is also subject to political pressure, and journalists are sometimes prevented from reporting on Sinn Fein.

In Britain, there is no such pressure, and journalists are able to report on Sinn Fein.

The media in Ireland is also subject to government pressure, and journalists are sometimes prevented from reporting on Sinn Fein.

In Britain, there is no such pressure, and journalists are able to report on Sinn Fein.

The media in Ireland is also subject to political pressure, and journalists are sometimes prevented from reporting on Sinn Fein.

In Britain, there is no such pressure, and journalists are able to report on Sinn Fein.

The media in Ireland is also subject to government pressure, and journalists are sometimes prevented from reporting on Sinn Fein.

In Britain, there is no such pressure, and journalists are able to report on Sinn Fein.

The media in Ireland is also subject to political pressure, and journalists are sometimes prevented from reporting on Sinn Fein.

In Britain, there is no such pressure, and journalists are able to report on Sinn Fein.

The media in Ireland is also subject to government pressure, and journalists are sometimes prevented from reporting on Sinn Fein.

In Britain, there is no such pressure, and journalists are able to report on Sinn Fein.

The media in Ireland is also subject to political pressure, and journalists are sometimes prevented from reporting on Sinn Fein.

In Britain, there is no such pressure, and journalists are able to report on Sinn Fein.

The media in Ireland is also subject to government pressure, and journalists are sometimes prevented from reporting on Sinn Fein.

In Britain, there is no such pressure, and journalists are able to report on Sinn Fein.

The media in Ireland is also subject to political pressure, and journalists are sometimes prevented from reporting on Sinn Fein.

In Britain, there is no such pressure, and journalists are able to report on Sinn Fein.

The media in Ireland is also subject to government pressure, and journalists are sometimes prevented from reporting on Sinn Fein.

In Britain, there is no such pressure, and journalists are able to report on Sinn Fein.

The media in Ireland is also subject to political pressure, and journalists are sometimes prevented from reporting on Sinn Fein.

In Britain, there is no such pressure, and journalists are able to report on Sinn Fein.

The media in Ireland is also subject to government pressure, and journalists are sometimes prevented from reporting on Sinn Fein.

In Britain, there is no such pressure, and journalists are able to report on Sinn Fein.

The media in Ireland is also subject to political pressure, and journalists are sometimes prevented from reporting on Sinn Fein.

In Britain, there is no such pressure, and journalists are able to report on Sinn Fein.

The media in Ireland is also subject to government pressure, and journalists are sometimes prevented from reporting on Sinn Fein.

In Britain, there is no such pressure, and journalists are able to report on Sinn Fein.

The media in Ireland is also subject to political pressure, and journalists are sometimes prevented from reporting on Sinn Fein.

In Britain, there is no such pressure, and journalists are able to report on Sinn Fein.

The media in Ireland is also subject to government pressure, and journalists are sometimes prevented from reporting on Sinn Fein.

In Britain, there is no such pressure, and journalists are able to report on Sinn Fein.

The media in Ireland is also subject to political pressure, and journalists are sometimes prevented from reporting on Sinn Fein.

In Britain, there is no such pressure, and journalists are able to report on Sinn Fein.

The media in Ireland is also subject to government pressure, and journalists are sometimes prevented from reporting on Sinn Fein.

In Britain, there is no such pressure, and journalists are able to report on Sinn Fein.

The media in Ireland is also subject to political pressure, and journalists are sometimes prevented from reporting on Sinn Fein.

In Britain, there is no such pressure, and journalists are able to report on Sinn Fein.

The media in Ireland is also subject to government pressure, and journalists are sometimes prevented from reporting on Sinn Fein.

In Britain, there is no such pressure, and journalists are able to report on Sinn Fein.

The media in Ireland is also subject to political pressure, and journalists are sometimes prevented from reporting on Sinn Fein.

In Britain, there is no such pressure, and journalists are able to report on Sinn Fein.

The media in Ireland is also subject to government pressure, and journalists are sometimes prevented from reporting on Sinn Fein.

In Britain, there is no such pressure, and journalists are able to report on Sinn Fein.

The media in Ireland is also subject to political pressure, and journalists are sometimes prevented from reporting on Sinn Fein.

In Britain, there is no such pressure, and journalists are able to report on Sinn Fein.

The media in Ireland is also subject to government pressure, and journals...
One *Guardian* journalist illustrated the problems of the Irish broadcasting ban and predicted how the British broadcasting ban would impact the British broadcast media (*The Guardian*, JOURNALISTS WALK TIGHTROPE ON COVERAGE OF SINN FEIN, 20.10.88). Another contextualised the ban by listing previous examples of censorship in the British media during the Northern Ireland conflict (*The Guardian*, POLITICS CONFRONT PROGRAMME CHIEFS, 20.10.88). The article begins by acknowledging that for many years, ‘television executives and editors have censored programmes about the IRA and Sinn Fein [who] have been supported by large sections of the British press’ (Ibid.).

The support for the Republican Movement in Northern Ireland was also acknowledged by a *Guardian* journalist (*The Guardian*, HOW THE MEDIA CREATES REPUBLICAN MYTHS, 20.10.88). Discussing the election of Bobby Sands to Westminster in 1981, he recalls that it was a shock to those working in the British media because they believed their own myths about Republicans. One of these myths being that the IRA had minimal support in Northern Ireland. The *Guardian* journalist argues the British media was largely responsible for such myths, conceding that ‘newspaper reporting of the IRA and its sympathisers has either been highly circumspect or outright hostile’ (Ibid.). This is attributed to journalists failing to investigate the feelings of the Irish nationalist community and not speaking to representatives of the Republican Movement. He explains:

> This is not because militants are inaccessible. Editors are simply not interested in purveying the views of those they see as common criminals. Self-censorship, and the inevitable ignorance that it engenders, has worked as effectively as any government ban. (Ibid.)

These excerpts from op-eds in *The Guardian* and *Daily Mirror* illustrate how journalists were more than willing to inform their readers about British media censorship throughout the Northern Ireland conflict when they were allowed to by their editors and by the generic conventions of particular newspaper articles. This illustrates the structuring influence of generic, political and, ultimately economic factors on the discursive practices of journalists. Unfortunately, the above excerpts that informed British newspaper readers about the roots of the broadcasting ban were exceptions to the general rule of news article representations of the ban, which occur more frequently and have much more restricting generic conventions than op-eds.
Elite public spheres

A crucial aspect of the discursive practices involved in the production of news articles in particular is the selection of social actors called on to speak by journalists. The textual analyses of newspaper articles representing the British government introducing and lifting the broadcasting ban illustrate the journalistic reliance on powerful social agents (Chomsky and Herman, 2002); what Hall et al. (1978) term primary definers. This is true of all the newspapers in the sample of this research although newspapers representative of the ‘quality’ press allowed a slightly more diverse range of social actors to speak. Where possible it has been illustrated in the two previous chapters how journalists representing the British government introducing and lifting largely relied on the statements of politicians in the House of Commons.

Despite its name, the House of Commons is an elite sphere, which is structured to allow very few genuinely representative ‘commoners’ to participate although a small number do occasionally get elected. In contrast non-elite social actors such as organised media workers from the NUJ or the Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom were very rarely called on to speak by journalists and organised Irish solidarity activists from the Troops Out Movement were never called on to speak. The impact of these discursive practices on British journalism has been briefly explored above and revealed in more detail during previous CDA chapters, but now the reasons for such exclusions can be explained.

Understandably, journalists are drawn into a symbiotic relationship with government and other powerful sources by the demand for a steady flow of news material that can be provided at little cost and in schedule with daily news demands (Herman and Chomsky, 2002; Davis, 2002; Franklin, 2004; Louw, 2005; Moloney, 2006; Lewis et al., 2008). As it was the British government that introduced the broadcasting ban, clearly journalists were expected to inform their readers of this newsworthy event by reporting British government justifications. One way to achieve this was by spending time in the press gallery at Westminster, which is where the accredited journalists of the British Lobby System are allowed to observe and report on the public debates and proceedings of Parliament as well as receive private unattributable briefings from senior politicians and press officers (Tunstall, 1970; Riddell, 1999; Franklin, 2004).
Although visiting such centres of power was essential for journalists representing the British government introducing and lifting the broadcasting ban, basing themselves there was problematic. Relying on the Opposition to provide arguments against the ban was not sufficient to provide the full spectrum of resistance to such censorship. Although some journalists did speak to representatives of Sinn Féin, the NUJ and the Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom thus allowing their voices to be heard, the majority did not. This can be explained by the British media being an elite public sphere in itself, meaning the plurality of views, values and, therefore, debate are bound by the need to maintain the status quo.

This necessitates the exclusion of those who could challenge the stability of British capitalism, whether that be representatives of the Republican Movement explaining why they used violence to end the British occupation of Ireland or socialist Labour MPs and Irish solidarity activists pointing out that the British elite were united on keeping British troops in Ireland when the majority of British citizens wanted them out (Guelke and Wright, 1990; Miller, 1993a). It is true that powerful social agents have more resources for PR and can thus bombard journalists with propaganda, but it appears the ‘source values’ of journalists is more determined by the elite values of the businesses for which they work. Journalists could always pick up a phone if they wanted to contact the organisations that were mostly or totally excluded, but ‘source values’ dictate that certain people are important and, therefore, worthy of being sources in news articles and others are not.

This discursive practice of ‘sourceworthiness’ obviously equates to enormous discursive power for elite social actors over the news media, shaping the parameters of what is included and excluded in texts. This can explain why particular discourses dominated newspaper representations of the British government introducing and lifting the broadcasting ban. In 1988, during the period the British government introduced the ban, discourses foregrounding and naming the Republican Movement pejoratively dominated newspaper articles alongside two of the three discourses expressed by the British government to justify the ban. The most prominent of these discourses argued the ‘terrorists’ must be starved of the ‘oxygen of publicity’. The other discourse underlined there was a similar ban in the Irish Republic.

The most frequently expressed discourse opposing the broadcasting ban (as a tactical mistake) also originated from elite social actors, that is, Tory back-benchers and politicians from the Opposition. However, principled opposition to the
broadcasting ban was represented in British newspapers too, which emanated from organised media workers and a socialist Labour MP. This illustrates that some journalists did speak and listen to non-elite sources on occasion. In 1994, during the period the British government lifted the ban, journalists also overwhelmingly expressed discourses emanating from elite social actors. The only difference was that in this period the British elite were united in its conclusion that the broadcasting ban should be lifted whereas they were split when the censorship was first introduced.

**Reporting speech ideologically**

It is not the ‘sourceworthiness’ alone that is significant to the way in which the broadcasting ban and those social actors for and against it were represented. Rather, it was the reported speech that journalists chose to attribute to particular social actors that is of crucial importance. Taking the news articles from *The Sun* (see page 143) and *The Guardian* (see page 163) explored in the previous chapter as examples again, it is possible to illustrate how the political allegiances and generic conventions of newspapers as well as the generic conventions of news articles in particular structure the way in which journalists use reported speech when constructing them.

Whilst the *Sun* journalist chose to include and exclude particular social actors thus limiting what discourses can and cannot be expressed, he has also chosen to include and exclude particular sections of what these social actors said in the reported speech attributed to them. For example, the *Sun* journalist misrepresents a statement by Gerry Adams to construct him in a threatening manner, taunting both the British government and *Sun* readers. Journalists in other newspapers expressed more of Gerry Adams’ statement through direct and indirect reported speech, revealing the context of what the Sinn Féin MP said. Although the choices made by the *Sun* journalist may be explained by the generic conventions of *The Sun* as a newspaper representative of the ‘popular’ press, there is another aspect of his article, which suggests they are more ideological.

Misrepresenting Gerry Adams’ statement through the use of supposedly verbatim reported speech was not the only example of the *Sun* journalist being selective with the reported speech of social actors. As acknowledged in the previous chapter, he not only reduced Roy Hattersley’s House of Commons statement to reported speech which fails to explain why this social actor believed the broadcasting
ban would make the government look repressive and ridiculous, he misquoted Roy Hattersley too. The few words that the *Sun* journalist does use for reported speech attributed to Roy Hattersley, which are represented as verbatim speech, are actually altered; significantly ‘repressive’ is changed to the more euphemistic adjective ‘restrictive’. This illustrates that journalists working for *The Sun*, and the editor who could have corrected it, are either careless or manipulative. It also reinforces the assertion that there is more to the discursive practices of journalists than who they quote. What they quote from these social actors’ statements are of vital importance to newspaper representations and therefore the audience’s understanding of important events such as the British government introducing the broadcasting ban.

The liberal political allegiance of *The Guardian* and the generic conventions of a ‘quality’ newspaper enable the journalist to include more social actors opposing the British government introducing the broadcasting ban and more extensive reported speech. However, there is a notable exclusion from the statement of one of the social actors chosen for reported speech by the *Guardian* journalists, which happens to be the same social actor who was misquoted in the above *Sun* news article. Roy Hattersley’s opposition to the broadcasting ban is represented through non-verbatim reported speech arguing the ban would be used to portray the Government as the enemy of free expression. By not directly quoting him, the journalists can exclude a few significant details such as the identity of social actors who would portray the British government in this way. In his House of Commons statement, Roy Hattersley referred to social actors ‘at home and abroad, especially in the United States’ (Hansard, 1988: 894).

The focus on the US alludes to the funding of the Republican Movement by sympathetic Americans, but this reality seems to be too uncomfortable for *The Guardian* to acknowledge. Arguably, this can be explained by the political allegiances of this newspaper allowing its employees to be critical of the Conservative Party, which *The Sun*, *Daily Mail*, *Daily Express* and *The Daily Telegraph* do not allow, but not of the British elite in general who were all committed to keeping Northern Ireland as part of ‘Britain’. This included the Labour and Liberal Democrat leaders. Americans sympathetic to the Irish Republican Movement were against the entire presence of Britain in Ireland and so acknowledging this in British newspaper articles was beyond the pale as it would allow British newspaper readers to know this, which would undermine the power of the British elite.
Winning and losing newspaper readers’ hearts and minds

Thus far, all the considerations of discursive practices have concerned the structuring influences on the production of newspaper articles representing the broadcasting ban, but the circuit of communication inevitably needs to consider the consumption of them too. Without audience research such as focus groups conducted during the time that these newspaper articles were printed and consumed, it cannot be discovered exactly how newspaper readers in Britain would have interpreted the newspaper articles explored in this research. However, some general inferences can be made from the content of these textual analyses, what is known about the differing ways in which media consumers deconstruct or decode texts as well as British public opinion polls relating to the Northern Ireland conflict.

The first inference that can be made from the newspaper articles analysed in this research is that the knowledge of newspaper readers concerning the broadcasting ban would have depended on which newspaper individuals read. The frequency and size of newspaper articles representing the British government introducing and lifting the broadcasting ban varied depending on whether newspapers were representative of the ‘popular’, ‘mid-market’, or ‘quality’ newspaper markets. As acknowledged above, ‘popular’ newspapers had fewer and smaller newspaper articles than ‘mid-market’ newspapers, which in turn, had fewer and small newspaper articles than ‘quality’ newspapers. Such differences would clearly impact how much newspaper readers would know about the broadcasting ban and how important (‘newsworthy’) they considered such censorship to be.

Whether or not newspaper readers were persuaded to support or oppose the broadcasting ban is another issue and is impossible to know without audience research. Clearly, the political allegiances of the newspapers explored in this research impacted what journalists could say about the broadcasting ban. However, whether or not they were successful in persuading individual newspaper readers to hold such opinions is dependent on several factors outside the control of the journalists. As Hall (1980) acknowledges, decoding media texts such as newspaper articles is an active discursive practice in which newspaper readers interpret newspaper articles in different ways, sometimes accepting the dominant meaning encoded by the producer, sometimes concluding a negotiated meaning and sometimes an alternative one where the meaning is rejected and resisted.
The ability of journalists to persuade newspaper readers to support the broadcasting ban would have depended on what newspaper readers already thought about the Northern Ireland conflict. It is important to remember that despite all the attempts by the British government to control the media during the Northern Ireland conflict, British public opinion polls conducted during the conflict revealed that the public increasingly wanted British troops out of Ireland:

Gallup first put the option that “we should begin to withdraw our troops” to respondents in November 1971. It attracted the support of 37% of those polled. This figure rose to 64% in December 1975. Support for troop withdrawal has stayed at roughly this level ever since, with occasional dips in response to particularly outrageous atrocities by the Provisional IRA. But it climbed to a new high at the time of the 20th anniversary of the dispatch of the troops to [...] Northern Ireland. In a telephone poll of over 5,000 people, 77% of callers answered yes to the question: “After 20 years, is it time to pull the troops out of Northern Ireland?” (Guelke and Wright, 1990: 55)

Then, as now with Afghanistan, the majority of English, Scottish and Welsh people were opposed to the conflict and again such ‘consistency of public support for withdrawal is remarkable in the light of the limited editorial backing the option of withdrawal has received in the national press’ (Ibid.). Therefore, despite all the media interference by the British government, which limited what could be said in British media representations of the broadcasting ban specifically and the Northern Ireland conflict generally, the majority of ordinary people were consistently anti-war. Of course, what people thought about Northern Ireland as with Afghanistan today is different to what people actually do to stop these conflicts. Indeed, maintaining hegemony is a constant battle and just because it is slipping on one front, it may be continually upheld on many others. To explore this it is important to look at the wider social relations in Britain and how the elite persuade ordinary people to accept, begrudgingly or wilfully, the status quo.

**Restricting British journalism during the Northern Ireland conflict**

Another crucial aspect impacting the production of British journalism was the social environment in which media workers had to operate during the Northern Ireland conflict. In Chapter 2, the review of research on media representations of the Northern Ireland conflict suggested the British news media mostly ignored the
discrimination and tensions in Northern Ireland until the civil rights movement culminated in the RUC attack on demonstrators in Derry on 5th October 1968. The contentious issue of partition was also excluded from British media representations before (and after) the Northern Ireland conflict began, which meant discourses expressing the political motivations of the Republican Movement were mostly unknown to the populations of England, Scotland and Wales.

As in all wars, the media was a crucial battleground and pressure from the British government increased over the British media once the Northern Ireland conflict started in 1968. This began with the ‘reference upwards’ system in 1971 and ended with the broadcasting ban from 1988 through to 1994. Although it was the broadcasters, especially the BBC, that experienced most British government pressure (Miller, 1994), newspaper journalists would have been well aware of the conflicts between the British government and the broadcast media. Although the ‘reference upwards’ system existed in the broadcast media it did not in the print media, which meant there was no formalised self-censorship for newspaper journalists. Similarly, the direct censorship of the broadcasting ban did not apply to the print media, which meant newspaper journalists could express statements from the banned organisations.

However, the print media was impacted by anti-terrorism legislation. As acknowledged in Chapter 2, the Official Secrets Act, the Prevention of Terrorism Act and the Emergency Provisions Act were used to limit the ability of British media workers to report on the Northern Ireland conflict (Miller, 1994; Hussain, 2000). For example, by making the IRA illegal in Britain under the Prevention of Terrorism Act in 1974, it made it very difficult for journalists to interview IRA members, especially after the Act was amended in 1976 making it ‘an offence under Section 11 not to pass information to the police about any future act of terrorism or about people involved in terrorism without ‘reasonable excuse’” (Miller, 1994: 31-2).

Clearly, such controls over the British media during the Northern Ireland conflict would have severely limited the capacity of journalists to report the conflict freely and encouraged self-censorship. Just as the British government intended, it also meant that access to representatives of the Republican Movement was very difficult, yet access to representatives of the British government was very easy. As Richardson (2007: 127) points out: ‘social and political actors outside the newsroom (social practices) can shape the content of reporting (text) via controlling the manner in which journalists produce the news (discursive practices)’. Of course, newspaper
journalists cannot be blamed for the authoritarian actions of the British government and British state, but it does explain how these controls impacted their ability to represent the broadcasting ban.

**Media workers' resistance**

Broadcast media workers represented by the NUJ did try to resist British government control of the British broadcast media by going on strike in 1985 following the censorship of the *Real Lives* programme and threatening to strike when the broadcasting ban was introduced in 1988. As a result of the latter, ITV and BBC executives were pressurised to broadcast 'health warnings' to indicate when reports on the Northern Ireland conflict were affected by the ban (Henderson et al., 1990). Sympathetic print media workers were unable to show support in news articles for the broadcast media workers resisting British government censorship of television and radio in 1988. This can be explained by their position as workers with managements and owners unsympathetic to workers' power, but also because of the structuring influence of the generic conventions of news articles, which do not allow the personal opinions of journalists to be expressed.

Unsurprisingly, when the British government introduced the broadcasting ban, newspaper editorial positions on the strikes were dependent on whether individual newspapers supported the ban or not. If the editorial staff supported the ban, they obviously opposed media workers resisting it and vice versa. The only newspaper with an editorial supporting the NUJ call for strike action against the broadcasting ban was *The Guardian* (*The Guardian*, THIS STRIKE IS RIGHT, AND DEADLY SERIOUS, 04.11.88).

The editorial staff of the other five newspapers either condemned it or did not mention this honourable attempt to resist direct censorship over the British broadcast media. That said, the *Daily Mirror* editorial staff, while not commenting on the NUJ strike, took the only editorial position that overtly opposed the broadcasting ban and even suggested that the British presence was the problem, not the solution in the Northern Ireland conflict. This exceptional editorial position and the fact that the *Daily Mirror* had taken this view since 1978 (Miller, 1993b) can be explained by it catering to its target audience of left-leaning working class readers and its support for the Labour Party; the only British newspaper to do so since 1945 (Humphreys, 1996).
Editorial staff aside, it was one Daily Mirror journalist and a sprinkling of Guardian journalists who most lived up to the first principle of the NUJ Code of Conduct, upholding and defending the principle of media freedom, the right of freedom of expression and the right of the public to be informed. As stated above, it was in op-eds that these journalists upheld their professional commitments, illustrating the structuring influence of generic conventions between and within newspapers. It is no coincidence either that these journalists worked for the two newspapers unsupportive of the Conservative Party and government, illustrating the structuring influence of the political allegiances of newspaper owners and managers.

Of course the way in which journalists represented the British government introducing and lifting the broadcasting ban cannot be separated from the way in which they represented the Northern Ireland conflict and the United Kingdom more generally. The social actors involved in the conflict were represented in different ways depending on whether they used violence to maintain Northern Ireland as part of Britain or whether they used violence to re-unite it as part of Ireland. Members of the Irish Republican Army were most often referred to as ‘terrorists’ in the British media whereas members of the British Army never were.

Although these discourses were dominant in British society, it is important to recognise how subjective and ideological they are, especially when it is recognised that the majority of those killed by the IRA were British combatants, not British civilians (Sutton, 1994). It is also important to recognise that these ruling ideas originated from British elite social actors in an attempt to legitimise and normalise the British presence in Ireland. The success in fixing a particular ‘order of discourse’ (Fairclough, 2002; 2003) where a particular way of making meaning became dominant and alternative ways of making meaning are marginalised obviously impacted the British media narrative of the Northern Ireland conflict generally and the introduction of the broadcasting ban specifically.

Although these discursive practices have been discussed at length in this research, it is important to explain the social practices of journalism more generally to situate it in the social structure of the British capitalist system. It has been argued here that the British newspaper industry on the whole represented the broadcasting ban in a way that largely served the British elite, reflecting and refracting orders of discourse emanating from them. Sometimes journalists did this creatively to challenge the broadcasting ban and by extension, the British government, but mostly,
they re-presented them in conventional ways amplifying the British government justifications and sometimes embellishing them in an attempt to build support for the broadcasting ban and the British government amongst British newspaper readers (Fairclough, 1994; 2003). Sometimes journalists allowed non-elite social actors to speak in newspaper articles, which allowed alternative discourses to be expressed against the broadcasting ban, but most excluded them and therefore their opposition.

Arguably, this is illustrative of conflict at two interconnected sites in the British social formation. The first is within the British media itself to which the British newspaper industry is an important part although not as important as the British broadcast media. This conflict is simultaneously between the British government and British media management as well as between British media management and British media workers. The second is between the British elite and the British public at large. The mass media is the most important battleground for ideological warfare and is essential for the maintenance of the status quo. The broadcast media is clearly seen to be the most influential part of the mass media as evidenced by it consistently being targeted by British government indirect and direct censorship during the Northern Ireland conflict.

Orthodox academics were central to normalising the suffocation of censorship in Britain. By focusing on the so-called symbiotic relationship between the mass media (meaning the British broadcast media, particularly television) and ‘terrorism’ (not that of British or Loyalist combatants, just that of Republican combatants), the orthodoxy prepared the ground for British government interference with the broadcast media. As a result, the British government was able to dominate media coverage of the Northern Ireland conflict by banning representatives of the Republican Movement from expressing themselves whilst representatives of the British government, who actually did have a symbiotic relationship with the British mass media could easily access the ‘oxygen of publicity’ on which they depended to promote their own perspective on the Northern Ireland conflict.

The pressure brought to bear on broadcast media executives and managers by the British government can be seen as a conflict waged over decades, which culminated in the broadcasting ban. This top-down pressure was met with bottom-up resistance from British broadcast media workers unwilling to have their working conditions and autonomy restricted by broadcast media executives and managers appeasing the British government. Sometimes this manifested in strike action as in
the case of the banning of the Real Lives – At the Edge of the Union documentary and other times in critical investigative journalism that exposed British government duplicity as in the case of This Week – Death on the Rock. Of course, while there was resistance from broadcast media workers, there were also many casualties in these battles with more than 70 programmes known to have been cut or delayed before the broadcasting ban was introduced in 1988 (Rolston, 2002).

The British newspaper industry had a very different relationship with the British government and as this research has illustrated, most newspapers supported the British government introducing the broadcasting ban. Some were even willing to support censorship of their own profession when it was believed the British government ban would apply to the entire British media. There were a few important industrial disputes in the years leading up to 1988, which can help to explain the relative weakness of British print media workers by the time the British government introduced the broadcasting ban. Ten years before, there was a major industrial dispute between workers and management at The Times and The Sunday Times.

As Greenslade (2004: 329) writes, ‘the unions rightly pointed out that they were being paid less than their Fleet Street colleagues’. However, the owners of these newspapers, the Thomson dynasty, were happy to follow the example of James Callaghan’s Labour Government, which had introduced public sector pay freezes. Following disruptions to production by the newspaper workers at The Times and The Sunday Times, which included wild-cat strikes (MacBride, 2003), management ‘set the unions an ultimatum: they must agree a productivity deal by November or the papers would be shut down’ (Greenslade, 2004: 329).

Both sides stood firm and the newspapers were closed for nearly a year, becoming part of the Winter of Discontent (1978-9), which contributed to the reactionary process of the British elite headed by Margaret Thatcher after she was elected to power in 1979. Two years later in 1981, contrary to anti-monopoly provisions and, therefore, presumably adding to Rupert Murdoch’s amazement of how easy it was for him to enter British newspapers, Margaret Thatcher allowed Rupert Murdoch to purchase The Times and The Sunday Times from the Thomson Company (Tunstall, 2004).55

Another important newspaper struggle between media workers and management occurred in 1984 when print workers refused to print attempts at smearing Arthur Scargill, the leader of the National Union of Miners (NUM), by the
Sun editor, Kelvin MacKenzie. Although several attempts by MacKenzie to attack Arthur Scargill and, by extension, all the miners on strike, were resisted by print workers the most desperate and famous propaganda attempt was to represent Scargill as Hitler. As Greenslade (2004) recalls:

[W]hile he was addressing a rally of strikers, a news agency photographer pictured him with his hand raised above his head. By deleting the background, and thereby removing the context, it could have been misconstrued as a fascist salute. Sun editor Kelvin MacKenzie schemed a front page around it with the headline ‘Mine Fuhrer’. Printers refused to work on the page, set the headline or make the block for the picture and, after another bitter row [...], the front page was published with a large typeface statement which said: ‘Members of all the Sun production chapels refused to handle the Arthur Scargill picture and our major headline on our lead story. The Sun decided reluctantly, to print the paper without either’. (Greenslade, 2004: 455)

Rupert Murdoch’s move to Wapping in 1986 was also critical because it shifted the ‘power and money away from the trade unionised labour force [to] owners, managers, and editors’ (Tunstall, 1996: 18). Just two years before the British government introduced the broadcasting ban, the print unions went on strike in Wapping. The subsequent defeat of the strikers broke the strength of the print workers, which increased Margaret Thatcher’s admiration for Rupert Murdoch (Tunstall, 2004). It also weakened the power of journalists because the impact of any future strike action they wished to take could be deflected by using news wire copy printed by the weakened print workers (Davies, 2008).

With all this in mind, it is apparent that British print media workers were in a weak position when the British government introduced the broadcasting ban in 1988. Although the majority of British newspaper owners and managers were supportive of the Conservative Party because of shared class interests, British journalists did not necessarily share this loyalty, but they had little power in their capacity as workers to challenge the ban. As texts reflect the balance of social forces at a given place and time, it is possible to see that the British elite (in this case, owners of newspapers and representatives of the British government) were clearly hegemonic then as now.

Centrifugal pressures obviously existed in society as illustrated by the alternative discourses expressed by representatives of the NUJ and the Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom, Sinn Féin, the Troops Out Movement as well as
individual socialist Labour MPs. However, centripetal pressures overwhelmingly dominated in the battle over the meaning of the broadcasting ban. Social actors challenging dominant discourses and the journalists actually producing the newspaper articles representing the ban, had to re-constitute already existing discourses expressed by the British government to justify the broadcasting ban, and did so against a backdrop of major attacks against trade unions by Margaret Thatcher.

Although there were some exceptions, journalists writing the newspaper articles representing the broadcasting ban mostly amplified dominant discourses supporting the British government introducing such censorship. Some journalists and one editor bravely challenged the worst form of censorship in Britain since World War II by subverting the order of discourses dominating British newspapers. Whilst it is important to highlight and celebrate these media workers defending media freedom, it is more important to recognise that these were exceptions to the rule.

**Critical Discourse Analysis — discursive and social practices: summary**

This chapter has explored the discursive and social practices impacting British newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban. There were many structuring influences upon journalists during the period that the British government introduced and lifted the broadcasting ban. It has been argued here that before journalists even begin to compose their articles there is a nexus of interconnecting pressures impacting them. These originate from the generic conventions between and within newspapers for which they work as well as the political allegiances of newspapers owners and managers from which journalists cannot stray too far if they wish to keep their job.

The generic conventions of ‘popular’, ‘mid-market’ and ‘quality’ and political allegiances of newspapers reflect the attempts to appeal to different sections of the newspaper audience, which are divided along class lines. These structure important considerations for newspaper editors, which in turn impact journalistic choices such as what is newsworthy in the first place. This determines how much copy space is given to particular news stories and therefore impacts who is called on to speak in the newspaper articles. Generic conventions of newspaper articles also structure the discursive practices of journalism depending on whether it is news articles, editorials or op-eds that are being written. In this chapter, it has been argued that different political allegiances and text-genres of newspapers impact the discursive practices of
journalists, structuring what can and cannot be said as well as how social events and social actors are framed and represented. Such discursive practices clearly impacted the way in which journalists represented the broadcasting ban.

This chapter also explored another crucial aspect of the discursive practices impacting journalists when writing news articles: the reliance on elite social actors as sources. The generic conventions of news articles dictate thatjournalist must remain ‘objective’ and not express personal opinions on the subject they are writing about. As such, journalists inform their readers of new events by quoting a range of social actors who are relevant to the news story being reported. There are several explanations for journalists overwhelmingly relying on British elite sources for news articles representing the broadcasting ban.

One reason is because journalists are drawn into a symbiotic relationship with government and other powerful sources by the demand for a steady flow of news material that can be provided at little cost and in schedule with daily news demands. Another is relying on the House of Commons for a diversity of views, which will rarely provide critical opposition, but the main reason is because the British media is itself, like the House of Commons, an elite public sphere. This means journalists could only call on social actors who opposed the broadcasting ban within the parameters needed to maintain the status quo. This is illustrated by the social actors included and excluded in newspaper articles representing the broadcasting ban, but also in the selective reported speech of those social actors included.

This chapter has acknowledged that without conducting audience research, it is impossible to know exactly how newspaper readers would have interpreted the newspaper articles representing the broadcasting ban. However, it has been argued that some inferences can be made. Firstly, the knowledge of newspaper readers concerning the broadcasting ban would have depended on which newspaper individuals read because the frequency and size of broadcasting ban newspaper articles varied depending on whether newspapers were representative of the ‘popular’, ‘mid-market’, or ‘quality’ newspaper markets.

Secondly, consuming newspaper articles is an active discursive practice in which newspaper readers interpret newspaper articles in different ways, sometimes accepting the dominant meaning encoded by the producer, sometimes concluding a negotiated meaning and sometimes an alternative one where the meaning is rejected and resisted. Thirdly, British public opinion polls conducted during the Northern
Ireland conflict consistently revealed the majority of people were anti-war. This suggests that despite all the attempts by the British government to control the British media during the Northern Ireland conflict, the people of England, Scotland and Wales were not persuaded to support the Northern Ireland conflict. It is therefore possible that there was little support for the broadcasting ban amongst ordinary people despite overt support for it in many of the newspapers read by them.

Another crucial aspect impacting the production of British journalism was the social environment in which media workers had to operate during the Northern Ireland conflict. There were a number of controls over the British media ranging from the indirect pressure of the British government to the direct censorship of the British government’s broadcasting ban. Most of this pressure and censorship targeted the broadcast media, but print media workers were impacted by anti-terrorism legislation. That said, it appears British print media workers were more restricted by their working conditions rather than British government interference. When British broadcast media workers resisted the British government introducing the broadcasting ban, sympathetic print media workers were unable to show support in news articles. This is because the management of newspapers mostly supported the British government and therefore its censorship, but also because the generic conventions of news articles do not allow the personal opinions of journalists to be expressed. It was in op-eds that journalists upheld their professional commitments.

This chapter has also argued that the way in which journalists represented the British government introducing and lifting the broadcasting ban cannot be separated from the way in which they represented the Northern Ireland conflict more generally. This, in turn, cannot be separated from struggles within the British social formation. The mass media is the most important battleground for ideological warfare and is essential for the maintenance of the status quo. The broadcast media was clearly seen to be the most influential part of the mass media as evidenced by it consistently being fixated on by orthodox academics and, therefore, targeted by the British government during the Northern Ireland conflict. The pressure brought to bear on broadcast media executives and managers by the British government can be seen as a conflict waged over decades, culminating in the broadcasting ban. This top-down pressure was met with bottom-up resistance from British broadcast media workers unwilling to have their working conditions and autonomy restricted by broadcast media executives and managers appeasing the British government.
In contrast, the British newspaper industry had a very different relationship with the British government with most newspapers supporting the British government introducing the broadcasting ban. Several important industrial disputes in the years leading up to 1988 can explain why British print media workers were in a weak position when the British government introduced the broadcasting ban in 1988. Although the majority of British newspaper owners and managers were supportive of the Conservative Party and therefore its censorship, British print media workers did not necessarily support the British government and its censorship, but they had little power to challenge it in their capacity as workers.

As texts reflect the balance of social forces at a given place and time, it is possible to see that the British elite were clearly hegemonic then as now. Although there were some exceptions, journalists mostly amplified dominant discourses supporting the British government introducing the broadcasting ban. Whilst it is important to highlight and celebrate these media workers defending media freedom, it is more important to recognise that these were exceptions to the rule.
Conclusion

The analysis of British newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban in this research has led to three interrelated general conclusions about the British newspaper industry during the latter stages of the Northern Ireland conflict. Firstly, the British newspaper industry did not consider the broadcasting ban particularly newsworthy. Secondly, elite social actors and discourses dominated newspaper articles representing the broadcasting ban. Thirdly, the majority of British newspapers overtly supported the British government when it introduced and lifted the broadcasting ban.

More than double the number of newspaper articles representing the broadcasting ban were printed when the British government introduced the broadcasting ban in 1988 than when it lifted the ban in 1994. In addition, more than double of these broadcasting ban articles featured in newspapers representative of the 'quality' press. This reveals the introduction of the broadcasting ban was considered more newsworthy than the lifting of it and more newsworthy in 'quality' newspapers than those representative of the 'mid-market' and 'popular' press. However, when the frequency of broadcasting ban newspaper articles are compared to other subjects related to the Northern Ireland conflict, it is possible to see how little coverage of the broadcasting ban there actually was in all British newspapers during both periods.

Understandably, the introduction of direct censorship was considered more newsworthy because it was a new policy pursued by the British government. It was also the first time since World War II that the British government had directly controlled the broadcast media although no journalists acknowledged that. However, another reason for this increased number of broadcasting ban articles during 1988 was that the British elite was divided on whether direct censorship was the best tactic for fighting the Republican Movement at the beginning, but united in opposition to this tactic by the end in 1994.

This relates to the second and third general conclusions because the British elite division in 1988 and unity in 1994 was reflected by journalists relying on elite social actors as sources for newspaper articles representing the broadcasting ban. Although there were exceptions where journalists called on non-elite social actors to speak, in general, elite social actors dominated the discursive composition of newspapers. Unsurprisingly, this resulted in alternative discourses being stifled whereas dominant discourses proliferated. This conclusion also relates to the support
for the ban amongst most of the British newspapers when the British government introduced the censorship because those that did were politically aligned with that section of the British elite: the Conservative Party. As this section of the British elite was lifting its own censorship in 1994, it is no surprise that the newspapers aligned with it supported the British government lifting the broadcasting ban too.

Aside from these three general conclusions regarding British newspaper representations of the broadcasting ban, there are further conclusions that can be drawn from this research. These can assist in explaining such representations and the role of the mass media in society more generally. The ban itself is indicative of two ideological propositions about the mass media, which originated from the British elite and their defenders in academia and the mass media itself. Firstly, that ‘terrorists’ thrive on the ‘oxygen of publicity’ and, secondly, that the broadcast media actually supply it. In the case of the Northern Ireland conflict, suggesting the ‘terrorists’ (the Republican Movement) thrived on the ‘oxygen of publicity’ and the broadcast media supplied it, functioned to build support for the suffocation of censorship in Britain.

When considering the symbiotic relationship between the mass media and ‘terrorism’, it is important to explain the significant omissions by orthodox writers such as the fact that all social actors require the mass media to further their political objectives. Indeed, recognising that representatives of states and non-state organisations both need the media to further their objectives in a military conflict should be as obvious as recognising that both sides use language and violence to achieve them. However, orthodox scholars focus on the mass media dependence, propaganda and terrorism of ‘them’ and never ‘us’ because orthodox writers reproduce the ideological position of the government and military to which they personally and subjectively identify with.

In this research, it has been argued that both sides (‘them’ and ‘us’) in the Northern Ireland conflict depended on the media (the ‘oxygen of publicity’) and used violence against civilians (‘terrorism’). For academics, politicians and journalists to claim otherwise merely illustrates their role in the propaganda war. Crucial to this discursive aspect of the Northern Ireland conflict was representing the Republican Movement as ‘terrorists’ who thrived on the ‘oxygen of publicity’ and representing the British broadcast media as providing them with an ‘easy platform’. Such claims were used to justify introducing the suffocation of censorship in the form of the broadcasting ban, which in turn ensured an advantage for the British government in
the propaganda war. The direct censorship of the broadcasting ban was an extension of indirect media control that had already been operating for many decades in Britain. Both forms of media control were designed to bring the British broadcast media in line with the British government's perspective on the Northern Ireland conflict.

Clearly, the mass media is itself a battleground because there are conflicts between media workers, employers and politicians in the production of news as well as struggles over interpretation of news content by media consumers. Although workers in both the British broadcast media and the British newspaper industry did attempt to resist the broadcasting ban, they could not match the strength of unity between the British government and the majority of British newspaper owners. Indeed, the struggle for meaning in the broadcasting ban newspaper articles representing this censorship was itself a refraction of the struggle between media workers and media owners, between those willing to defend the principle of media freedom, the right of freedom of expression and the right of the public to be informed versus those willing to defend the British government ending them.

Another conclusion of this research then, is that whilst there was evidence of resistance by media workers within the newspaper articles representing the broadcasting ban, overall the power of the British elite to dominate the discourse was more apparent. Media workers do not have control over their own labour even though they are essential to the production of media commodities such as newspapers. Instead, it is their employers and managers that largely control the editorial position of newspapers. Therefore, it would be unfair to blame journalists for newspaper content which reinforces and perpetuates the dominance of the British elite.

Responsibility for the erosion of media freedom in Britain during the Northern Ireland conflict ultimately rests with the British government representatives who pressured the British broadcast media indirectly, and legislated directly, the practice of censorship. Relying on the British newspaper industry to defend the British broadcast media from British government censorship is perhaps both an unfair and rather optimistic expectation. This is because newspaper owners are themselves members of the British elite and, in several cases, are opposed to the very existence of public service broadcasting due to a combination of political and economic reasons. That said, it does raise questions as to how notions of the 'Fourth Estate' need to be reassessed, especially when some 'watchdogs on the powerful' actually called for the censorship of themselves, not only their commercial rivals.
Indeed, as the Leveson Inquiry investigates phone-hacking and other criminal activities at the now defunct *News of the World*, some journalists, editors and others have warned against state regulation of the press as it could lead to an erosion of free speech and a free press. However, considering the record of the British newspaper industry during British government direct censorship of the broadcast media in the Northern Ireland conflict, the hypocrisy is evident. The broadcasting ban (1988-1994) eroded the free speech of democratically elected Sinn Féin representatives and prevented the British broadcast media from informing the public about the conflict. Yet, the majority of newspapers sampled in this research supported the British government introducing this direct censorship over the broadcast media.

They were not forced to support this censorship by the state, but the political and economic interests of the newspaper owners meant that they did. Some even supported direct censorship over the newspaper industry when it was believed the British government was going to introduce censorship across the entire British media. This reveals how opportunistic the British newspaper industry can be rather than illustrating its commitment to free speech and a free press. It also suggests the Leveson Inquiry may wish to ask how journalists can be committed to free speech, a free press and be watchdogs on the rich and powerful, when their employers are often more committed to their own private profit, which depends on the stability and dominance of the rich and powerful.
to Iran to fund the US government's proxy war against the Nicaraguan government, the US was not a
terrorist state even though it killed civilians for political purposes and broke its own arms embargo
against Iran (a state sponsor of international terrorism according to the US government itself).

Klopfenstein (2006: 107-8) defines new media as 'those mediated forms of communication that have
diffused throughout society more recently than the traditional media of newspapers, magazines, radio,
and television'. The examples of new media that he provides are 'any Internet-based communication
in any context that is not a newspaper, magazine, radio, or television broadcast'.

Chomsky (2002) recalls the double standards involved when the US carried out international
terrorism against civilians by arming and funding the Contras in the 1980s and compares
the different ways in which the US and Iran were treated in 'Western' political and media discourse:
'There are many terrorist states in the world, but the United States is unusual in that it
is officially committed to international terrorism, and on a scale that puts its rivals to shame. Thus Iran
is surely a terrorist state, as Western governments and media rightly proclaim. Its major known
contribution to international terrorism was revealed during the Iran-Contra inquiries: namely, Iran's
perhaps inadvertent involvement in the US proxy war against Nicaragua. This fact is unacceptable,
therefore unnoticed, though the Iranian connection in US-directed international terrorism was exposed
at a time of impassioned denunciation of Iranian terrorism' (Chomsky, 2002: 122).

Burnett and Whyte (2005) discuss the 'expert' network that exists in 'Western' societies and pay
particular attention to the Research And Development (RAND) Corporation, which they note 'is
regarded as the single most important think tank for the US military' (Burnett and Whyte, 2005: 8). It
was also an employer for several in the Bush administration, including Condoleezza Rice and Donald
Rumsfeld who were formerly administrators at RAND (Ibid.). Interestingly, it was actually Bruce
Hoffman (the editor of the RAND Corporation journal Studies in Conflict and Terrorism) who founded
the Centre for Studies in Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) at the University of St Andrews,
Edinburgh. The CSTPV was home to both Paul Wilkinson (former co-editor of the journal Terrorism
and Political Violence and Chairman of the Advisory Board for CSTPV) and Alex P. Schmid (former
co-editor of Terrorism and Political Violence and Director of CSTPV (Ibid.) and epitomises the
orthodox position on 'terrorism'.

Nacos (1995; 2002) has mostly written about non-state organisations such as the Irish Republican
Army, the Red Army Faction, the Red Brigades, Black September and Al Qaeda as well as non-state
individuals such as Timothy McVeigh and the Unabomber.

Chomsky (1991) acknowledges that in large parts of the world, the US is regarded as a leading
terrorist state and recalls the condemnation of the US by the World Court in 1986 for carrying out
prolonged acts of international terrorism against civilians in Nicaragua. At least one million Iraqi
villagers have been killed by the US and Britain through a combination of sanctions, bombings,
shootings and torture. Dennis Halliday, former United Nations (UN) coordinator of humanitarian aid
for Iraq, maintains that the 13 years of sanctions alone killed around one million Iraqi civilians, mostly
children (Lando, 2007). During the 'war on terror' thousands more Iraqi and Afghan civilians have
been killed by US and British combatants (Rogers, 2008).

As Chomsky (2002: vii) explains: 'St. Augustine tells the story of a pirate captured by Alexander the
Great, who asked him "how he dares molest the sea". "How dare you molest the whole world?" the
pirate replied: "Because I do it with a little ship only, I am called a thief; you, doing it with a great
navy, are called an Emperor". The pirate's answer was "elegant and excellent," St. Augustine relates.
[...] St. Augustine's tale illuminates the meaning of the concept of international terrorism in
currently being orchestrated, with supreme cynicism, as a cover for Western violence'.

Chomsky (2002) recalls the double standards involved when the US carried out international
terrorism against Nicaraguan civilians by arming and funding the Contras in the 1980s and compares
the different ways in which the US and Iran were treated in 'Western' political and media discourse:
'officially committed to international terrorism, and on a scale that puts its rivals to shame. Thus Iran
is surely a terrorist state, as Western governments and media rightly proclaim. Its major known
contribution to international terrorism was revealed during the Iran-Contra inquiries: namely, Iran's
perhaps inadvertent involvement in the US proxy war against Nicaragua. This fact is unacceptable,
therefore unnoticed, though the Iranian connection in US-directed international terrorism was exposed
at a time of impassioned denunciation of Iranian terrorism' (Chomsky, 2002: 122). In other words, the
propagandistic approach to terrorism dictated that when Iran was a threat to US government interests
and held US embassy staff hostage, it was a terrorist state, but when the US government sold weapons
to Iran to fund the US government's proxy war against the Nicaraguan government, the US was not a
terrorist state even though it killed civilians for political purposes and broke its own arms embargo
against Iran (a state sponsor of international terrorism according to the US government itself).

Klopfenstein (2006: 107-8) defines new media as 'those mediated forms of communication that have
diffused throughout society more recently than the traditional media of newspapers, magazines, radio,
and television'. The examples of new media that he provides are 'any Internet-based communication
...
medium (e.g., websites, streaming media, email, Internet telephony, chat rooms, Usenet groups, etc.), satellite telephony, and any other form of computer-mediated communication' (Ibid.: 108-9).

9 Al Qaeda is a militant Islamist organisation that emerged from the Afghan Mujahedeen fighters who resisted the 1979-89 Soviet Union invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. Armed, trained and financed by the CIA (Operation Cyclone), MI6, and Inter-Service Intelligence (Pakistan's intelligence agency) a large case of blowback occurred on 11th September 2001 when Al Qaeda attacked civilian and military targets in the US (Pilger, 2003; Saighal, 2003).

10 Ken Bigley was a British contractor working in Iraq who was kidnapped, held hostage and later beheaded in 2004 (Nunn and Biressi, 2008).

11 According to Carruthers (2000) Margaret Thatcher actually took the phrase from Britain's then Chief Rabbi, Lord Jakobovits.

12 For a more recent discussion on news values see Richardson (2007).


14 Rolston (2007: 346) notes that 'two television organizations [still] dominate in Northern Ireland: the publicly-funded British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), and the commercial Independent Television. Both are British-based organizations and both have local stations: BBC Northern Ireland (established in 1924) and Ulster Television (UTV, established in 1959) respectively'.

15 Cathcart (1984) believes Beadle’s absence during the General Strike brought about this proposition. The lesson the British government learnt in 1926 was that the BBC would serve the ‘national interest’ far better if the public perceived the BBC to be independent. Hence, the subsequent Charter converting the BBC into a public service institution and Reith rebuffing Beadle’s recommendations.

16 It is worth noting how in contrast to the BBC, the commercially orientated and Unionist owned UTV that arrived in 1959 was actually less prejudiced, partly because it had to cater to as many people as possible so as to make the maximum revenue from advertisers, and partly because it was legally committed to pursuing a balanced and impartial approach under the Television Act (1954, 1964). As a result it sometimes gave a platform to Republicans on its news programmes (Schlesinger, 1987).

17 Obviously, this was an accurate statement at the time Schlesinger (1987) was writing, but within a year it was not because the British government had introduced the broadcasting ban (1988-1994).

18 The INLA used a car bomb to assassinate Margaret Thatcher’s campaign chief and shadow Secretary for Northern Ireland, Airey Neave on 31st March, 1979. He was killed as he left the Commons underground car park. Several months later, on 7th July, 1979, the late-night BBC1 current affairs program Tonight featured a twelve and a half minute interview with an anonymous member of the INLA (Edgerton, 1996). Although the Tonight editor, Roger Bolton, had ‘rigorously followed the standardized “reference upwards” system of internal editorial control at the BBC’ (Edgerton, 1996: 117), the BBC was attacked by ‘scores of Conservative MPs and much of the print journalist establishment, accusing it of providing a forum for terrorists’ (Edgerton, 1996: 118).

19 The BBC1 current affairs programme, Panorama, had filmed an IRA road block at the small village of Carrickmore, South Tyrone, as part of a proposed programme on the strength of the IRA, which as Schlesinger (1987: xviii) notes was ‘a virtually taboo area’. He adds that although the programme had not been transmitted, the British parliament and press whipped up a frenzy and the police seized the film. Curtis (1984) argues the BBC tightened up its ‘reference upwards’ system even more afterwards.

20 Hizbollah is a Lebanese political and paramilitary organisation that was created to resist the 1982 Israeli invasion and subsequent occupation of Lebanon.

21 Altogether there were over 2,000 BBC journalists and technicians on strike, which stopped most television and radio newscasts in Britain (Viera, 1991). Members of the National Union of Journalists (NDTV) at the BBC were also supported by other unions as well as by journalists at Independent Television News and Channel 4 News (Leapman, 1986; Viera, 1991).

22 It is interesting to note, as Miller (1994) does, that just like with Real Lives, it was the Rupert Murdoch media (this time The Sun and The Sunday Times), which ‘were consistently to the fore in the attacks on ‘Death on the Rock’ and the attempt to shore up the official version of the Gibraltar shootings’ (Miller, 1994: 26). This included the character assassination of Carmen Proetta who was one of the key eye-witnesses to the murders in Gibraltar. The Sun claimed that Proetta used to be a prostitute, with one of its headlines referring to her as: ‘The Tart of Gib’ (see Miller, 1994). This was a complete fabrication. Although it was the Murdoch newspapers that led the smear campaign, other conservative British newspapers participated also (see Miller, 1994).

23 The eleven organizations covered by the broadcasting ban were the Irish Republican Army; the Irish National Liberation Army; Cumann Na Mban (IRA’s women’s movement); Na Fianna Eireann (IRA’s youth wing); Saor Eire; Sinn Féin; Republican Sinn Fein; as well as the Loyalist organizations such as

23 Bobby Sands was an elected MP for Fermanagh and South Tyrone. Those refusing to admit local support for the Republican Movement claimed people voted for him out of an emotional blackmail. The suggestion was that people only voted an IRA member into Parliament to prevent a young man’s death, but this did not explain why 100,000 people attended his funeral (Coogan, 2002).

25 On 1 Oct 1971, using Section 31 of the Broadcasting Authority Act 1960, the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, Gerry Collins, issued a directive to the Irish national broadcasting service, Raidió Teilifís Éireann (RTE). RTE was directed ‘to refrain from broadcasting any matter that could be calculated to promote the aims and activities of any organisation which engages in, encourages or advocates the attaining of any particular objective by violent means’ (cited in Fisher, 1987: 33). The vagueness of the directive led the RTE Authority to ask for clarification from the Irish government, but the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs refused. After several disputes regarding coverage of the Northern Ireland conflict in 1972, including an RTE interview with Seán Mac Stiofáin, then chief-of-staff of the Provisional IRA (Maillot, 2005), Gerry Collins dismissed the entire RTE Authority and appointed another in its place (Fisher, 1987). Another directive was issued in October 1976, which banned broadcasts or reports of interviews with members of a number of republican organisations and of organisations proscribed in Northern Ireland by the British government (Arthur, 1987).

26 Miller (1990) explains that in the Irish Republic the broadcast of interviews and reports of interviews with listed organisations were banned. It also prohibited Party Political Broadcasts, election coverage and reporting debates in the Houses of Parliament, which the British Ban did not, although it did prohibit reporting debates in the European Parliament. Miller (1990) also points out the one area where the British censorship was stricter than the Irish censorship: the ban on historical footage of listed organisations, which was prohibited under the former, but not the latter.

27 It is important to acknowledge that most of these Sinn Féin appearances were on news stories concerning violence and law enforcement rather than politics. The research conducted by Henderson et al. (1990) found that in the year before the broadcasting ban was introduced, 84 of the 93 British TV news stories in which Sinn Féin appeared were about violence. The same was true in the year after the ban was introduced, with 20 of the 34 Sinn Féin appearances being about violence.

28 Spencer (2004: 604) explains the significance and power of television news in more detail: ‘First, television news performs an expansive role in peace politics by broadcasting to all audiences at once. This makes it a valuable mechanism in the communication of change and highlights why, as a medium, it has useful implications for participants seeking to talk with opponents and their respective constituencies by indirect means. Second, television news has the potential to facilitate diplomacy and force movement in ways that are unattainable behind closed doors away from public scrutiny, and where intransigence might be less easily challenged. Third, the emotional and dramatic emphasis of television has a tendency to simplify and exaggerate problems in ways that can both directly and indirectly affect the flow of communications. And, fourth, the ability of television reporting to function instantaneously creates expectations for action which can pressure politicians to react and respond quickly, therefore speeding up the process of interaction and dialogue’.

29 A mention of the Northern Ireland conflict or a Northern Ireland social actor in a story about something else was not collected.

30 Op-ed is an abbreviation for the pages opposite the editorial, not opinion editorial. For an interesting brief history of this newspaper article genre see Wahl-Jorgensen (2008).

31 See Appendix for the final coding sheet used to analyse each newspaper article.

32 For example, the Daily Mail dedicated eleven full pages of its newspaper coverage to Tim Parry a day after the British government lifted the broadcasting ban, including many photos of him and excerpts from the diary in which his father documented the child’s life and death.

33 This became law with the Elected Authorities (Northern Ireland) Act 1989, but it was first proposed by the British government in October 1988.

34 When Fairclough (2003: 3) introduces his key terminology, he explains ‘[w]ritten and printed texts such as shopping lists and newspaper articles are ‘texts’, but so also are transcripts of (spoken) conversations and interviews, as well as television programmes and web-pages’. Essentially ‘texts’ refer to anything that carry meaning and textual analysis simply means the analysis of them.

35 Vološinov and Bakhtin are often discussed together because, firstly, they were both intellectuals in what became known as the Bakhtin Circle (Brandist, 2002) and, secondly, there is disagreement as to whether or not some of the publications attributed to Vološinov are indeed Bakhtin’s work (Clark and Holquist, 1994). For the purpose of clarity, such authors are cited here in the same way as they are attributed to particular publications.

organisation proscribed in Northern Ireland' (Ibid.). This included Loyalist organisations such as the member of the political wing of the Provisional I.R.A., the Provisional Sinn Fein, or members of any Provisional or Official I.R.A. spokesmen and sympathisers' (Wilkinson, 1977: 168). From October since ' 1972 to ban the state radio and television service (RTE) from carrying interviews with broadcasting ban, the Irish government had used Section 31 of the Broadcasting Authority Act (1960)

43 As Wilkinson (1977) pointed out over a decade before the British government introduced the KING SET TO CURB REPORTS ON IRA, 17.10.88; EXPRESS, THE ENEMY MOUTHPIECE, 20.10.88; This encompassed a referendum on any changes to Northern Ireland resulting from Peace Process talks, mainly to reassure Unionist politicians and voters as well as Loyalist combatants.

42 These pejorative labels appeared in the following newspaper articles: Daily Mail, DEPRIVE TERROR OF THIS MEGAPHONE, 17.10.88; Daily Mail, MAGGIE TO STARVE IRA OF PUBLICITY, 17.10.88; Daily Mail, HURD TO WIPE ADAMS OFF TV SCREEN, 19.10.88; Daily Express, KING SET TO CURB REPORTS ON IRA, 17.10.88; Daily Express, CLOSING DOWN THE ENEMY MOUTHPIECE, 20.10.88; Daily Express, A SILLY STRIKE, 28.10.88.

41 This encompassed a referendum on any changes to Northern Ireland resulting from Peace Process talks, mainly to reassure Unionist politicians and voters as well as Loyalist combatants.

40 There are several ways in which this data can be interpreted because of the subjective clustering of page numbers, which have differing ranges. Most importantly, if the data for 'front page lead' and 'front page other' where combined to simply 'front page' there would be 16 ban articles that appeared on the front page. This would mean there were more occurrences of broadcasting ban articles on the front page than there were on page 21+, which is very significant in terms of prominence. Therefore, although there were not many newspaper articles that focused on the broadcasting ban and few had corresponding images, the prominence of ban articles in terms of page number was high. However, there is a big difference between newspaper articles that lead the front page and those that appear on the front page, but do not lead. Newspaper articles that lead the front page are always much bigger and therefore prominent because it is the lead front page that is supposed to sell the newspaper. The front page lead image and headline act as the entry point for the whole newspaper (Tattersall, 2008). Non-leading front page articles are usually dwarfed by lead stories and are usually continued in the rest of the newspaper on less prominent pages.

39 Most of these 'Other' articles concerned the British government’s decision to end the right of silence of suspects in Northern Ireland, introduced on 20th October, 1988 (the day after the ban was introduced). This change in the law was designed to persuade members of proscribed organisations in Northern Ireland to give information about the activities of fellow members and their organisation more generally. If they did not, their silence could now be taken into account at trial, resulting in assumptions of guilt and therefore longer prison sentences. There is clearly a relation between introducing the broadcasting ban and ending the right to silence because the British government hoped such measures would give it an advantage in the Northern Ireland conflict, helping it to defeat the Republican Movement. As such, there is a clear explanation as to why the broadcasting ban was referred to in many newspaper articles covering the ending of suspects’ right to silence, which were coded as ‘Other’ because there were less than twenty articles with this subject being the main story.

38 Although there were many more references to the broadcasting ban in 'Peace Process' articles, it is important to recognise that this category differs from the rest. As it alludes to, this category refers to a ‘process’ and therefore has many more articles than any of the other coding categories, which refer to more specific aspects of the Northern Ireland conflict. That said, the lifting of the broadcasting ban was also a key part of the Peace Process because doing so acknowledged Sinn Fein was a legitimate political party that should be a part of the solution to the Northern Ireland conflict.

37 This is predictable for two interconnected reasons. Firstly, the British elite were divided over whether the broadcasting ban was the best strategy for stopping the Republican Movement as a physical and political force when the British government introduced the ban, but were united in their opposition to it by the time the British government lifted it. Secondly, the British government’s introduction of the broadcasting ban was far more newsworthy because of the element of surprise for opposition politicians and media workers alike. Both aspects created more controversy and therefore more newspaper articles reflecting this.

36 It has been pointed out (Meyer, 2002; Wetherell, 2004; Blommaert, 2005) that several debates took place between supporters and detractors of CDA in the 1990s. The first exchange was between Widdowson (1995) and Fairclough (1996), the second was between Schegloff (1997) and Wetherell (1998) and the third was between Schegloff (1999a; 1999b) and Billig (1999a; 1999b), which began after Billig (1999a) reviewed Schegloff’s (1997) criticisms.

35 As Wilkinson (1977) pointed out over a decade before the British government introduced the broadcasting ban, the Irish government had used Section 31 of the Broadcasting Authority Act (1960) to carry interviews with Provisional or Official I.R.A. spokesmen and sympathisers' (Wilkinson, 1977: 168). From October 1976, the Irish broadcasting ban was 'extended to cover interviews or reports of interviews with member of the political wing of the Provisional I.R.A., the Provisional Sinn Fein, or members of any organisation proscribed in Northern Ireland' (Ibid.). This included Loyalist organisations such as the Red Hand Commandos; Ulster Freedom Fighters; Ulster Volunteer Force, and the Ulster Defence Association (Edgerton, 1996).
In 1987, New Statesmen journalist, Duncan Campbell, exposed British government plans to launch a spy satellite into space – the Zircon Project – when working on a six-part documentary series for the BBC called Secret Societies (Eldridge, 1995; Franklin, 2004; Green and Karolides, 2005). In response, the British government ordered Special Branch to raid Campbell’s home as well as the New Statesmen offices in London and the BBC offices in Glasgow (Ibid.). The raid at BBC Scotland lasted for 28 hours and resulted in the removal of private files and programme notes (Ibid.). The documentary was screened two months later on BBC, but another part in the series exposing the operation of secret cabinet committees was censored by the BBC but later re-made by Channel 4 (Eldridge, 1995).

In 1988, former British MI5 Agent, Peter Wright, revealed in his auto-biography – Spycatcher – that MI6 had tried to assassinate Egyptian Prime Minister Gamar Abdel Nasser and that MI5 had collaborated with the CIA in spreading disinformation about British Prime Minister Harold Wilson being a Soviet agent (Human Rights Watch, 1991). The British government banned the book and attempted to censor British newspapers from covering the story, which many journalists boldly refused to accept. In October 1990, the European Commission on Human Rights held that the gagging orders against seven British newspapers in the Spycatcher case violated the European Convention on Human Rights (Ibid.).

The Daily Mail, for example, recognised that both the BBC and ITN broadcast statements from Gerry Adams (Daily Mail, TV AND RADIO IN ROW OVER GAG ON THE IRA, 20.10.88). The Daily Express, however, like The Sun, chose to exclude ITN’s broadcast and only focus on the BBC’s ‘irresponsibility’ (Daily Express, ROW AS BBC FLOUT HURD TERROR BAN, 20.10.88).

As Negrine (1994: 106) observes: ‘the Conservative Party’s obsession with the alleged excesses of the BBC is legendary; abhorrence of the BBC appears to be a litmus test for the Conservativeness of MPs’. This is largely because the BBC is a successful state institution, which contradicts Conservative beliefs about the free market system being the best way of running all aspects of society.

This discourse was categorised as ‘Other’ in Chapter 4 because it was expressed very rarely amounting to less than 1% of the total discourses during the period covering the British government introducing the broadcasting ban.

The Troops Out Movement (TOM) was founded in London by Irish solidarity activists in 1973 with two demands: ‘British Troops Out of Ireland’ and ‘Self Determination for the Irish People as a Whole’ (TOM, 2010).

McNair (2003: 160) acknowledges the origins of the The Lobby System and explains why it is labelled as such: ‘The Lobby was established in 1884 as a means of enabling parliamentary correspondents to gain access to authoritative information about political events and governmental business. [This system is called The Lobby] because journalists originally assembled in the lobby of the House of Commons, the system was institutionalised in 1921 and persists to the present day’.

This is also true of most British journalists being based in London rather than Belfast.

An opinion poll commissioned by the BBC found that in 2010, 65% of respondents thought the war in Afghanistan was unwinnable and 63% wanted all British forces to be withdrawn from Afghanistan as quickly as possible (BBC, 2010).

Speaking in 1973, four years after acquiring the Daily Herald, which he renamed as The Sun, Rupert Murdoch said ‘I am constantly amazed at the ease in which I entered British newspapers’ (cited in Chippindale and Horrie, 1999: 10).

Rupert Murdoch was rewarded for his service to the British government four years later. Following the 1990 Broadcasting Act, which was officially designed to stem the corporate concentration of the British media, Thatcher allowed Murdoch’s non-UK (as the Astra satellite was based in Luxembourg) Sky to take over the British Satellite Broadcasting (BSB), which became BSkyB (Tunstall, 2004). This resulted in Murdoch becoming ‘not only the biggest owner of national newspapers, but the chief owner of the sole direct satellite television platform and also the dominant supplier of premium content to cable television across Britain’ (Tunstall, 2004: 264).
References


Henderson, Lesley., Miller, David. & Reilly, Jaqueline. (1990) *Speak no evil: the British broadcasting ban, the media and the conflict in Ireland.*
Glasgow: Glasgow University Media Group.


London: Routledge.


Humphreys, Peter. (1996) *Mass media and media policy in Western Europe.*
Manchester: Manchester University Press.


229


232


Appendix – Final coding sheet

1. Identifier Number: _____________.

2. Newspaper: Sun Mirror Mail Express Guardian Telegraph

3. Image: Yes No

4. Date: _____/_____/______

5. Page: front page lead front page other pages 2-3 pages 4-10 pages 11-20 pages 21+

6. Size of text: < 1/8 of a page 1/8 to ¼ ¼ to ½ ½ to 1 page

7. Genre: news editorial op-ed

8. Mention of the broadcasting ban: Yes No

9. Subject:
   1) IRA members killed by SAS in Gibraltar/inquiry
   2) British soldier(s)/RUC/prison officer(s) attacked/killed by IRA member(s)
   3) Civilian(s) attacked/killed by IRA member(s)/anniversary of
   4) Civilian(s) attacked/killed by UDA/UFF/UVF member(s)
   5) IRA suspect(s)/member(s) arrest, imprisonment, release, extradition, prisoner controversy
   6) Tom King assassination plot/trial
   7) Fourth anniversary of Brighton bombing/Conservative Party returns to Grand Hotel
   8) Broadcasting Ban
   9) Peace Process
   10) Other