The Grammar of Hermeneutics
Anthony C. Thiselton and the Search for a Unified Theory

Thesis

By

Robert Knowles

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SIGNED DECLARATION AND STATEMENTS

DECLARATION
This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not being concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.

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STATEMENT 1
This thesis is the result of my own investigations, except where otherwise stated. Other sources are acknowledged by footnotes giving explicit references. A bibliography is appended.

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Abstract
A fresh engagement with the formative work of Anthony C. Thiselton demonstrates that this work constitutes a source of valuable insights for a programmatic construction towards a unified hermeneutical theory. This construction provides powerful keys for unlocking six contemporary problems in hermeneutics. First, it brings organisation to a disorganised discipline, identifying three distinct strata of hermeneutical reflection. Second, it brings clarification to a complex discipline, identifying seven distinct hermeneutical ‘conversations’ centred on ‘dialogue’, ‘history’, ‘epistemology’, ‘language’, (Western) ‘culture’, the human ‘self’, and ‘understanding’ (including the hermeneutical task). Third, it tackles the problem of abstraction in hermeneutics, bridging the gap between hermeneutical theory and practice. Fourth, it addresses the problem of disunity in hermeneutical theory on three levels: philosophical subtext, the removal of perennial philosophical and theological ‘dualisms’ or ‘dichotomies’, and the relative ontological priorities of ‘history’ and ‘language’. Fifth, it addresses inter-disciplinary polarisation in hermeneutics, clarifying the relationship between theological and philosophical hermeneutics. Sixth, it strikes at the heart of irresponsibility in interpretation, answering the question of what constitutes ‘responsible interpretation’. However, despite these six potential advances and Thiselton’s world-ranking stature, no thorough engagement with Thiselton’s work yet exists in the literature. What little engagement there has been manifests serious misunderstandings and misrepresentations of Thiselton’s thinking. Conversely, the criticisms emerging that can legitimately be made of Thiselton’s work are relatively minor. His critical stance towards the Continental hermeneutical tradition necessitates a clearer highlighting of the grammatical changes implicit in his continued use of Continental terminology. Minor problems appear in his appeals to Heidegger, Bultmann, Gadamer, and Wittgenstein. Thiselton needs to dialogue further with epistemological traditions, with philosophies and models of selfhood, with major ‘postmodern’ thinkers, with pastoral theology and with theological anthropology. Finally, a more sophisticated hermeneutic of fallen human relationships is required to improve understanding of historical conditioning.
This Work is Dedicated to My Mother, Dorothy Knowles,
And to the Memory of My Father, Francis Knowles
Stop judging by mere appearances, and make a right judgement.
-Jesus of Nazareth

Too often we attack or defend before we have genuinely understood.
-Athony C. Thiselton

Hostility to theory usually means an opposition to other people's theories and an oblivion of one's own.
-Terry Eagleton
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Robert Knowles
Cardiff, September 2005
Abbreviations

AmQ     American Quarterly
AmJTh   American Journal of Theology
AUSStud Andrews University Seminary Studies
Anv     Anvil
ARC     ARC
ArtC    Art Criticism
AThRev  Anglican Theological Review
Aum     Aumla: Journal of the Australasian Universities Language and Literature Association
Bib     Biblica
BibInter Biblical Interpretation
BibSac  Bibliotheca Sacra
BibZ    Biblische Zeitschrift
BibThB  Biblical Theology Bulletin
BC      Books and Culture
BJRULibM Bulletin of the John Rylands University Library of Manchester,
BrJRe   British Journal of Religious Education
CalThJ  Calvin Theological Journal
CBQ     Catholic Biblical Quarterly
CEN     Church of England Newspaper
CGrad   The Christian Graduate
ChLit   Christianity and Literature
Chman   The Churchman
ChTim   Church Times
Chn     The Christian
ChSRev  Christian Scholar's Review
CovQ    Covenant Quarterly
Ctday   Christianity Today
CqQ     Classical Quarterly
CrThRev  Criswell Theological Review
CRevBRel Critical Review of Books in Religion
Cruc    Crucible
CThm    Currents in Theology and Mission
Diac    Diacritics
Enc     Encounter
EpRev   Epworth Review
EssCrit  Essays in Criticism
Ety     Eternity
EtmJTh  European Journal of Theology
Evgl    Evangel
EvanQ   Evangelical Quarterly
ERevTh  Evangelical Review of Theology
ExA     Ex Auditu
ExTim   Expository Times
FThTh   Faith and Thought
FMn     Faith and Mission
FUly    Faith and Unity
Gly     Glyph
Greg    Gregorianum
Introduction.

Why Anthony C. Thiselton on Hermeneutics?

A. The Question
What is potentially gained from Anthony C. Thiselton’s hermeneutics? Or, what innovative contributions, or even potential milestones, could be made available to the discipline or theory of hermeneutics if Anthony C. Thiselton’s own formative hermeneutical reflections were pieced together systematically from his historical responses to other thinkers, and thereby made more visible? Would there be theoretical advances? What critical dialogues or engagements between a clearly explicated ‘Thiseltonian’ hermeneutic and other schools of thought would be made possible? What blind-spots would be uncovered?

But why ask ‘the question’ in the first place? That these questions should be asked or answered at all requires justification, as follows.

B. The Rationale
1. Reasons Stemming from Observations Related to Thiselton’s Work
On the one hand, a fresh engagement with Thiselton’s work is demonstrably necessary when several observations about Thiselton are juxtaposed.

First, Thiselton is widely regarded as a world authority in biblical hermeneutics (i.e. the discipline of interpreting biblical texts) - notably in relation to his most famous work, The Two Horizons.¹ Thus, amongst friendly commentators, G.R. Osborne views Thiselton as “the leading hermeneutical thinker of this generation”.² Conversely, one of Thiselton’s most vehement critics, A.K.M. Adam, names Thiselton “the most sophisticated hermeneutician of his school”.³ Indeed, The Two Horizons, was

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reviewed by over thirty writers, and Thiselton’s subsequent work *New Horizons in Hermeneutics* received only marginally less attention.4 Whether reviewers were friendly or not, regard for Thiselton’s stature was almost unanimous following the publication of *The Two Horizons* in 1980. Thus, according to D.S. Dockery, *The Two Horizons* constituted “the most comprehensive discussion of hermeneutical theory in print to date”.5 P.R. Keifert, who was by no means uncritical, agreed, writing, “The work is encyclopaedic in its scope and deserves John Macquarrie’s description of it as ‘the most comprehensive discussion of the hermeneutical question I have ever read’”.6 Sandra M. Schneiders noted that *The Two Horizons* was nominated as a “major contribution” to hermeneutics by “numerous eminent reviewers”; and Robert Morgan urged that the importance of the work could “scarcely be overstated”.8 Walter Wink called it “the one book to read” in relation to “the hermeneutical discussion”, a “monument to the conclusion of one stage in the hermeneutical debate”.9 More recently, writing of *New Horizons in Hermeneutics*, Walter Moerly speaks of Thiselton’s “astonishing breadth of reading... in theology... philosophy, social sciences, linguistics and literary theory”. Thus, “more than any other scholar in Britain”, Thiselton “has pioneered the rediscovery of the importance of hermeneutics in biblical and theological study”10 For Francis Watson, Thiselton’s expertise in hermeneutics is “probably unrivalled in... scope”11 whilst, for Stephen D. Moore, Thiselton’s “versatility is remarkable, his erudition extraordinary. He ranges effortlessly from pre-modern theories of biblical interpretation to postmodernist theories of textuality and reading”.12 Nor is Thiselton’s expertise merely theoretical. D.A. Carson predicts “that everyone will soon recognise that the best

commentary on 1 Corinthians is that of Anthony C. Thiselton", a view endorsed by N.T. Wright and others. Of course, Thiselton is not equally esteemed in every quarter. Thus whilst Linda Woodhead acknowledges Thiselton's "undeniable insights and critical power", she regards his work *Interpreting God and the Postmodern Self* as "triumphalist", bemoaning the book's "broad-brush characterisations of modernity" and "postmodernity", the latter point echoed by D.R. Stiver. M.W. Nicholson even accuses Thiselton of 'abusing' Wittgenstein, whilst S.E. Porter numbers among several who criticise Thiselton's responses to the work of Stanley Fish and, sometimes, Jacques Derrida. Mostly, though, Thiselton is highly esteemed, and where he is not, he is still controversial enough to warrant attention.

However, second, despite Thiselton's status as "one of the major contemporary Christian authorities on hermeneutics", C.G. Bartholomew remarks in 1996 that, "there has been surprisingly little thorough interaction" with Thiselton's work. More ominously, in 1994 A.K.M. Adam asserted that "Thiselton's overall premise" in *New Horizons in Hermeneutics* "is that hermeneutical debate since The


Two Horizons has not adequately understood the conceptual tools which that work made available". That is, Thiselton regarded himself as 'unheard' or 'misunderstood'. Bartholomew and Adam, then, hint at a problem with how Thiselton's work has been received. Further, digging into the archives, we find that Thiselton's paper, 'Understanding God's Word Today', presented at the second National Evangelical Anglican Congress in 1977 in Nottingham (NEAC '77), divided his audience. Thus, whilst John King rejoiced in "the drubbing given to that pretentious term 'hermeneutics'" at the congress, C. Buchanan describes Thiselton's address as a "sensation" of "apologetics" where, "deep down, at the gut-level, something shifted" so that we "cannot be quite the same again". Twenty-one years later, W.J. Lyons alludes to a lesser but parallel stir caused by Thiselton's paper, 'Signs of the Times', given at his inaugural presidential address at the 1999 meeting of the Society for the Study of Theology held in Edinburgh. Lyon's writes, Thiselton's "audience was informed of the use of" the work of Richard Rorty and Stanley Fish "by American theologians" but "encouraged to regard this as an inexplicable error... And in the ensuing discussion, nothing happened to alter that situation". Speaking to some Americans following Thiselton's address, it was not surprising that Thiselton later reassured us from the platform: "some of my best friends are American". Thus, there is clearly an unanswered question surrounding the issue of the reception of Thiselton's work, and even over whether Thiselton has been adequately heard at all.

Third, the question of Thiselton's reception only becomes more pertinent once comments about his style of writing are considered. S.W. Sykes, responding to The Two Horizons in 1982, asked Thiselton to "show us plainly the core of his argument". In 1983 D.S. Dockery warned that the work was "in one sense too detailed and comprehensive for anyone but the specialist to understand". J. Bowden, similarly, viewed The Two Horizons as "so crammed with 'A says X about C' that the actual issues never have room to breathe". J.B. Webster likened the work to "an over-stocked art-gallery: indigestible,

24. Lyons, 'Serious Man, Rhetorical Man, Straw Man: Just How Much of a Threat is Stanley Fish to Christian Theology?', 1.
tedious, with the attendant danger of passing over a pearl of great price”, 28 and M.J. Erickson added, “this is not a book for the novice”. 29 With respect to The Responsibility of Hermeneutics, which Thiselton co-authored with R. Lundin and C. Walhout in 1985, K. Snodgrass wrote of the “somewhat technical character of the presentation”.30 Similarly, M. Turner reported “compressed, jargon-filled and demanding writing”, 31 and G. Bray commented on a “very technical and hard to follow” style. 32 Of New Horizons in Hermeneutics, Colin Brown feared in 1995 that readers would be “baffled by the apparently circuitous path of the argument”. 33 Similarly, D.J. Moo bemoaned the book’s “technical” and “dense argument”, 34 whilst G.R. Osborne warned that “for those not steeped in hermeneutical theory and language, it will prove very difficult to follow”.35 S.D. Moore predicted that “those without some prior knowledge of theological and philosophical hermeneutics will tend to fall by the wayside”, 36 whilst R. Papaphilippopoulos described the book’s “dense style of presentation”, and G.J. Thomas recommended it to “the glutton for punishment”.37 Of The Promise of Hermeneutics, which Thiselton again co-authored with R. Lundin and C. Walhout in 1999 in revision of the earlier collaboration, S. Dray notes “the dense and often abstruse argument”.38 According to T.E. Pickett, Thiselton’s is “the most challenging chapter of the book”.39 Robin Parry and Walter Moberly concur,40 where K. Gruneberg warns of getting “bogged down in the learning and the detail”.41 Of course, others disagree. Thus, W.A. Dyrness found The Two Horizons “lucid” and “highly readable”; 42 whilst

Robert Morgan described it as “a model of clarity and fair-mindedness”, and V.S. Poythress spoke of Thiselton’s “remarkable clarity of expression”. Morgan also commented on the “wonderful lucidity” of *New Horizons in Hermeneutics*, whilst Moberly noted the book’s “clearly structured and powerfully developing argument”. Francis Watson found the “exposition... usually lucid enough to meet the needs of non-specialist readers”, whilst J.S. Reist Jr. spoke of “sustained argument that proceeds fluently and carefully”, and W. Russell of a “structured... logical flow” of argument. Nevertheless, a question remains: is the issue of Thiselton’s reception related to his style of writing? This question would be all the more pertinent if it emerged that those championing the clarity of Thiselton’s work had not, in fact, understood it.

So, Thiselton is a major thinker in hermeneutics. Yet there is a question mark over whether his contribution has been adequately received or understood. This question is doubly intensified given the lack of any extended engagement with Thiselton’s work in the literature and the issue of Thiselton’s style. Thus, whilst noting the briefer summaries by the likes of B.J. Walsh and C.G. Bartholomew, a more thorough and extended engagement with Thiselton’s work is justified.

2. Reasons Stemming from Observations Related to Hermeneutics as a Discipline

Indeed, on the other hand, a fresh engagement with the work of Anthony Thiselton seems even more necessary once several observations about hermeneutics are juxtaposed.

*First*, hermeneutics is a disorganised and confusing discipline, traditionally likened to entering labyrinths, encountering Gordian knots, or travelling endlessly on Morbius loops. Black humour is the standard coping strategy in response. Thus, Roger Lundin cites Steven Weinberg’s reminiscence that

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44. Poythress, V.S., ‘Review of A.C. Thiselton’s The Two Horizons’, *WThJ* 43 (Fall 1980), 179.
“a physicist friend of mine... in facing death... drew some consolation from the reflection that he would never again have to look up the word ‘hermeneutics’ in the dictionary”. Gerald L. Bruns, at the time a Professor of English, recalls Hans Kimmerle’s defence of “Schleiermacher’s conception of hermeneutics as a systematic, procedural approach to the texts of our cultural past against Hans-Georg Gadamer’s idea of hermeneutics as a discipline of reflection in which our own historicality is what is at issue”. Bruns then admits, “since that time, hermeneutics has been something I have been struggling to get clear about”. Brevard S. Childs writes,

“for at least a decade it has become commonplace to speak of a crisis in biblical interpretation. Almost everyone engaged in the study of the Bible is fully aware that the enterprise has run into real difficulty. The present crisis has been described in different ways: methodological impasse, conflicting private agenda, loss of clear direction, extreme fragmentation, unbridgeable diversity, and even a deep sense of resignation”.

K.J. Vanhoozer adds, “contemporary debates concerning theories of interpretation can be as intimidating to the lay-reader as discussions of non-Euclidean geometry or quantum mechanics”. And the problem is not new. J.P. Pritchard, writing in 1968, comments: “In this latter half of the twentieth century, students of literature may well feel bewildered in the maze of critical approaches that have been proposed. The problem lies not in a lack of value in many of the approaches presented; it is rather in the lack of a controlling over-all view”. Thus, there is real disorganisation and confusion. Is it a case of dread and resignation, or life-long struggles for clarity amongst experts, or crises in biblical interpretation (whether related to methodology, divided interests, directionlessness, fragmentation, or diversity), or intimidating complexity, or the lack of a ‘controlling’ overall paradigm? It makes sense to look and see if a potentially unheard ‘encyclopaedic’ thinker - namely Thiselton - can help bring order to the chaos.

Second, even without the issue of disorganisation hermeneutics is, theoretically, a complex discipline, involving more than one philosophical, or other kind of, conversation or discourse. Thus, Gadamer writes, "Our question... is how hermeneutics, once freed from the ontological obstructions of the scientific concept of objectivity, can do justice to the historicity of understanding". In other words, understanding has a historical character, presupposing an excursion into the philosophy of history. And the understanding of understanding itself (hermeneutics) is hindered by 'the scientific concept of objectivity', presupposing excursions into epistemology and into the history of epistemology. Gadamer also writes, "the linguisticity of understanding is the concretion of historically effected consciousness". In other words, understanding has a linguistic character shaped by how history has conditioned one's prior unconscious judgements, thoughts, or attitudes. This presupposes conversations about language that move beyond conversations about interpreting texts or about textuality. Jürgen Habermas writes, "hermeneutic inquiry lends methodological form to a process of arriving at mutual understanding (and self-understanding) which takes place on the pre-scientific level in the tradition-bound structure of symbolic interaction". In other words, mutual understanding and self-understanding occur at the level of everyday language conditioned by traditions, whereas hermeneutics reflects a more technical level of discourse that supposedly describes and facilitates mutual understanding and self-understanding. This introduces the notion of the close relationship between understanding and discourse or dialogue, a further conversation about self-understanding, or a 'hermeneutics of the self', and another about the role of traditions in the broader context of history. Habermas' link to the issue of methodology also hints at the practicalities of interpretation, though no single 'method' may be in mind. Elsewhere, Habermas writes, "I regard the hermeneutic paradox that vexes cultural anthropology as the methodological reflex of a failure to differentiate co-ordination of action by systemic means from co-ordination in terms of social integration". In other words, there are often clashes between the 'systems' societies use to direct or co-ordinate action, and the ways in which peoples' actual 'life-worlds' and social integration direct their action. Society's systems may hinder, and not help, social integration. 'System' is rent asunder from 'life-world', generating Habermas' 'hermeneutical paradox'. Hermeneutics, then, relates to 'cultural anthropology', or to a critical sociological 'hermeneutic of Western culture'. We could go on. But our point is that, whenever we quote sentences about hermeneutics written by hermeneutical theorists, several different kinds of

58. E.g., Jeanrond, W.G., Text and Interpretation as Categories of Theological Thinking (Dublin: Gill and MacMillan, 1988).
conversation seem to be presupposed, making hermeneutical language more opaque than most. Thus, in using the phrase 'in other words' several times, we have confirmed the need to somehow critique the opacity of hermeneutical discourse itself. It makes sense to 'look and see' if Thiselton's relatively untapped 'encyclopaedic' resources can help bring clarity to a complex discipline by explicating its various conversations.

Third, hermeneutics is often charged with, or even defined as, being abstracted from actual practical interpretation. Thus, Gerald Bruns, our longsuffering Professor of English, writes, "I thought hermeneutics might help me bring my professional and intellectual lives together. But it was many years before anything like this sort of reconciliation took place". Thus, for Bruns, hermeneutics seemed for a long time to be abstracted from historical-literary interpretation, such that "hermeneutics plods along, as if it belonged to other sorts of history". Bruns "leaves open... the question of whether ignorance of hermeneutics among literary critics is invincible or merely strategic". For some, hermeneutics actually seems to get in the way of practical interpretation. Thus, Stephen D. Moore criticises Thiselton's supposedly "interminable intellectual detour" between the Bible and its interpretation, and F. Watson asks whether Thiselton's hermeneutics can only serve interpretation "indirectly" and, crucially, what is the "relation of hermeneutical theory to interpretative practice"?

All this has implications for so-called 'ordinary readers' (we do not like this term but accept it for now) of the Bible. Does hermeneutics rob 'ordinary readers' of access to the biblical texts? Does hermeneutics create an 'elite' of experts - or a new hermeneutical 'magisterium' - who alone can know 'what the Bible says'? According to Paul Ricoeur "the aim of all hermeneutics is to struggle against cultural distance and historical alienation... This goal is attained only insofar as interpretation actualises the meaning of the text for the present reader". If this is so, then perhaps there should be a clear link between theory and practice. What we seem to find, however, is that texts on hermeneutics are so abstract, that talk of 'direct links' between theory and practice understandably generates ribald retort. It makes sense to 'look and see' if Thiselton's work can help us relate theory to practice.

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Fourth, hermeneutics is in disunity, and looking for a unifying framework in several senses. We have already seen this hinted at in Brevard S. Childs’ comments about “extreme fragmentation” and “unbridgeable diversity”, and in J.P. Pritchard’s less recent remarks about “the lack of a controlling over-all view” or paradigm (though we are cautious about the term ‘controlling’). This point has three or four aspects.

(a) Childs’ remarks appear, significantly, in the Forward to the first volume of the ‘Scripture and Hermeneutics Series’, produced annually by the Scripture and Hermeneutics Seminar held in Cheltenham, England. Thus, the seminar was established largely in response to the current crisis in biblical interpretation, part of which concerns the problem of finding a unifying framework for hermeneutics. Thus, in 2000, C.G. Bartholomew, the main editor of the ‘Scripture and Hermeneutics Series’, writes, “modernity is now in crisis, and through its rootage in modernity, biblical interpretation is unavoidably affected”. What is needed, then, is a ‘new rootage’ for biblical interpretation, a transformed philosophical or theological ‘paradigm’ in which biblical interpretation, or even interpretation more broadly, can find its co-ordinates. Thus, if “the philosophical subtext of”, say, “the historical-critical method” (though there is not just one ‘historical-critical method’) is “post-Enlightenment philosophies of history”, then what will the ‘transformed’ ‘philosophical subtext’ for historical and other dimensions of criticism look like?

(b) H.C. White, writing in 1988, argues that the reason “the work of Rudolf Bultmann has exerted a major influence on modern Biblical studies” is “primarily because he faced, and responded rigorously and imaginatively to the two horns of the twentieth century hermeneutical dilemma”. On the one hand, Bultmann “embraced the disciplines of the historical-critical method as a means of dealing with the text as an artefact of the past”. On the other hand, “he imaginatively drew upon the philosophy of

Martin Heidegger to provide an existential analysis in terms of which the message of the New Testament could be made understandable... in the cultural framework of the twentieth century”. Unfortunately, though, Bultmann “bequeathed to the subsequent generation a bifurcation between collective, objective history (Historie) and individual, existential history (Geschichte), which, in spite of numerous efforts, has not yet been overcome”.[71] That is, part of the crisis in contemporary interpretation is that of philosophical dualisms or dichotomies. Any transformed ‘paradigm’ or ‘philosophical subtext’ for interpretation, therefore, may no longer be ‘modern’, but it still needs to grapple with the problems bequeathed by ‘modernity’. This gives the contemporary search for a unifying framework for hermeneutics a second dimension - that of overcoming existing problematic dualisms or dichotomies.

(c) A third dimension of the problem of disunity concerns whether or not hermeneutics is unified through the philosophy of history, through the philosophy of language, or through theology. Which is ‘ontologically prior’ - history, language, or theology? J.C. McHann Jr. notes Gadamer’s stance that language is the ultimate ‘horizon of a hermeneutic ontology’, contrasting this with Pannenberg’s insistence that ‘universal history’ is more ultimate, provided that the most “ultimate ontological ground of hermeneutical understanding” is understood to be God.[72] Is hermeneutics, then, unified linguistically, historically, or theologically? The theological aspect of this question is perhaps best treated in the context of examining the relationship between philosophy and theology in hermeneutics, though this still leaves the question of the relative ‘ontological prioritisations’ of ‘history’ and ‘language’. It makes sense to ‘look and see’ if Thiselton’s work can help with this and the previous two issues to do with the unification of hermeneutics.

*Fifth*, hermeneutics also suffers from inter-disciplinary polarisation between ‘theological hermeneutics’ and ‘philosophical hermeneutics’, without agreement on how the two spheres inter-relate. Given the way in which theology and philosophy have been interwoven in the history of Western thinking, this problem seems in some ways artificial if, nevertheless, real. Thus, the problem of the unification of hermeneutics can be extended to include questions about unifying philosophy and theology. On the one hand, hermeneutical philosophers are forced to deal with theological questions because of the

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history of the discipline of hermeneutics. Thus, Gadamer recalls how "Heidegger's magnum opus, Being and Time", which focuses on the philosophical question of "the meaning of Being", "grew out of his... encounter with contemporary Protestant theology during his appointment at Marburg in 1923".73 Speaking of Marburg, on the other hand, Ernst Fuchs of the New Hermeneutic is, unlike Heidegger, a theologian. Fuchs writes, "The awkward difficulty in Bultmann's program... resides less in the New Testament manner of speech than in the New Testament compelling us to examine our self-understanding by learning... to inquire in principle as to our alternatives for understanding ourselves".74 In other words (sic), Bultmann was correct, in Fuchs' view, to highlight both the problem of interpreting so-called 'mythical' language and the problem of having to become self-critical. Hermeneutics, then, includes, and indeed the New Testament commands, 'appropriation'. Thus, for Fuchs, God's Word interprets us, as its object - hermeneutics concerns the theological or biblical interpretation of human selves. And yet this is not the agenda of Gadamer, whom Thiselton criticises for reducing the 'consciousness' of the self to a "mere flickering in the closed circuits of historical life".75 Bultmann, though, is famous for his theological interpretation of the self, specifically in relation to Pauline anthropology. Thus, in 1932 Bultmann asks, "What exactly is the split in man's existence under the law that is portrayed in Rom. 7:14f?"76 If, however, Walter Wink is correct to assert that Bultmann's work is "the foundation on which all subsequent interpretative theory must be built",77 then how can any study of hermeneutics avoid at least a knowledge of theological questions? It seems, then, that theological hermeneutics and philosophical hermeneutics are related together in the historical study of the discipline. But how are they related theoretically when providing answers to questions about 'history', or 'language', and so on? Wink talks about 'building' hermeneutical theory. But do we do this within a received theological framework that also 'warrants' contributions from philosophy? Thus, Thiselton asks, "Why should the interpreter of the New Testament concern himself with philosophy?"78 Or do we build hermeneutical theory within a received philosophical...

77. Wink, 'Review of The Two Horizons', 507.
78. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 3.
framework that also ‘warrants’ contributions from theology? C.G. Bartholomew and F. Watson ask questions of Thiselton at this point. Does Thiselton invoke theological and eschatological considerations, or what Bartholomew calls “hermeneutics from the other end”, only at ‘the end’ of philosophical discussions?\textsuperscript{79} Or, in Watson’s terms, does Thiselton leave theology to “the margins of the discussion”?\textsuperscript{80} Making a related point, David Tracy remarks, “since the general issues of hermeneutical and historical interpretation can be argued on extra-theological grounds, it seems imperative for each theologian to render explicit her/his general method of interpretation”\textsuperscript{81} According to Tracy, then, there is a question concerning at what point, if at all, theological considerations should be allowed to contribute to hermeneutical theory-construction. If a transformed ‘paradigm’ for hermeneutics is being sought, this question concerning the respective roles of theology and philosophy in any transformed paradigm is all the more urgent. If, as seems to be the case, a major thinker such as Thiselton has taken a stance on the matter that diverges from other contemporary stances, then it seems unwise not to find out what it is.

\textit{Sixth}, hermeneutics is split several ways over what actually happens, or should happen, during understanding or ‘responsible interpretation’. Robert W. Funk writes, “He who lays a violent hand on his tradition must beware of falling statuary. Knowledge of the imminent hazard goes hand in glove with the right grasp of the temporality, the historicality, of that tradition. And such knowledge makes one circumspective”. Thus, Funk reasons, there is a “responsibility for the past, which carries with it joint responsibility for the future”\textsuperscript{82} The term ‘responsibility’ here is important. For what we actually do in interpretation will be driven by what we think we ought to do in any given instance. That is, interpretative responsibility and practice are closely related. Having said this, in his ‘Introduction’ to his book \textit{Is There a Text in This Class?}, Stanley Fish admits, “I gave up the project of trying to identify the one true way of reading”. For Fish, the only sense in which there could be ‘the true’ way of reading would be if one were to come up with a way “others accepted”. And then it would only be ‘the true’ way “for a time”.\textsuperscript{83} What, then, becomes of interpretative responsibility? It becomes something relative to the norms of what constitutes ‘responsibility’ in any given ‘interpretative community’. But, if communities change, then norms change. If norms change, then ‘responsibility’

\textsuperscript{79} Bartholomew, ‘Three Horizons’, 131.
\textsuperscript{80} Watson, ‘Review of New Horizons in Hermeneutics’, 256.
\textsuperscript{83} Fish, S., ‘Introduction, or How I Stopped Worrying and Learned to Love Interpretation’, in \textit{Is There A Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretative Communities} (Cambridge, Ms.: Harvard University Press, 1980), 16.
changes, and then so does interpretative practice, which is different to what Funk is saying. For Funk, responsibility for the future is a function of responsibility for the past. Responsible interpretation and appropriation, which shape the future, presuppose ‘the right grasp of the temporality, the historicality, of [a] tradition’. Gadamer has said something related to this: “the general structure of understanding is concretised in historical understanding, in that the concrete bonds of custom and tradition and the corresponding possibilities of one’s own future become effective in understanding itself”. That is, understanding actualises future possibilities from within the constraints of tradition. The past lends shape to what could count as ‘responsibility’ in the present and future. Irresponsible interpretations and appropriations, then, could ‘trip over’ the past, just as robbing a bank ‘trips over’ a pre-existing law, and leads, to use Funk’s phrase, to the ‘imminent hazard’ of ‘falling statuary’ (we might substitute ‘statutory’). In short, is responsible interpretation conformity to an interpretative community’s present norms only? Or is it conformity to norms that emerge not only from the present community, but also from past traditions? This question leads to another one: can past traditions be accessed other than through the present interpretative community? Some, in Stanley Fish’s school, would say not. W.J. Lyons, for example, urges that the “important difference” between his stance and Thiselton’s is “the loss of the adjudicative text”. Conversely, F. Mussner, drawing on Gadamer, allows that texts can constitute “history as operative influence”. In this view texts, somehow, can ‘speak’ from the past, so as to actively contribute to the shape of, or ‘adjudicate’ over, ‘responsible’ interpretation. This leads to yet another question: given that an idea of ‘responsible interpretation’ could be formulated, what would then be actually done in interpretation? We noted earlier C.G. Bartholomew’s comments about unavoidable changes in the ‘philosophical subtext’ of ‘historical-critical method’. Does this mean that interpretation can no longer use any form of historical criticism, or that we need to use a new form of historical criticism? Peter Barry notes that the movement, the New Historicism, originating in the work of Stephen Greenblatt around 1980, “accepts Derrida’s view that there is nothing outside the text, in the special sense that everything about the past is only available to us in textualised form: it is ‘thrice processed’, first through the ideology, or outlook, or discursive practices of its own time, then through those of ours, and finally through the distorting web of language itself”. Is the ‘New Historicism’ part of what should now be done in interpretation, or are there other ‘new’ approaches to historical criticism? Thus, questions about hermeneutical practice raise issues about

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hermeneutical responsibility, textual accessibility, and ultimately about philosophical subtext. It makes sense to look and see if Thiselton's work can help with the question of what could count as 'responsible interpretation'.

To summarise, a fresh engagement with the work of Anthony Thiselton is necessary not only because of his stature as a hermeneutical theorist, his status as an 'unresearched' scholar, or his complexity as a writer, but also because of significant unsolved and overlapping difficulties in the discipline of hermeneutics itself. Hermeneutics is a disorganised discipline: can Thiselton's work help organise it? Hermeneutics is a complex discipline involving several kinds of conversation: can Thiselton's work resolve the chatter? Hermeneutics is often charged with abstraction from actual practical interpretation: can Thiselton help bridge the gap? Hermeneutics is in theoretical disunity and is looking for a unifying framework: can Thiselton's work provide a transformed philosophical and/or theological subtext that deals with old dualisms and dichotomies and correctly inter-relates 'history' and 'language'? Hermeneutics suffers from inter-disciplinary polarisation between philosophical and theological hermeneutics: can Thiselton's work bring harmony? Hermeneutics is in disarray over what constitutes 'responsible interpretation': can Thiselton's work yield any solutions?

C. The Approach

1. An Initial Research Focus on Thiselton's Later Work

It is one thing, however, to justify a fresh engagement with Thiselton's work, but it is quite another to actually do it. Early on in the PhD project, I prepared a 1275 page analysis of *New Horizons in Hermeneutics* because this book seemed to respond to nearly every school of thought in the discipline. Similarly, I prepared analyses of Thiselton's book *Interpreting God and the Postmodern Self*, and also of his contribution to *The Promise of Hermeneutics*. However, it became evident that Thiselton seemed to be responding to various schools of thought from a theoretical framework that he had already formulated. If our task was to outline Thiselton's own thinking then, by analogy with the construction industry, it seemed that the 'basic steelwork' of Thiselton's thinking was in place prior to *New Horizons in Hermeneutics*, indeed by the time of *The Two Horizons*. Since *The Two Horizons*, Thiselton may have hung things onto the 'basic steelwork', or even added a secondary level 'lean to' here and there. But the main 'theory construction' had been done by the time of *The Two Horizons* in 1980.
2. Why Research was Re-Centred on Thiselton’s Formative Work

At this point, therefore, attention was turned towards Thiselton’s ‘formative years’ as a thinker, a decision validated in two further ways. First, it aligned with key comments made by two other writers. On the one hand, there were A.K.M. Adam’s cryptic remarks that the “premise” behind New Horizons in Hermeneutics was that subsequent “hermeneutical debate” had “not adequately understood” The Two Horizons. On the other hand, M.G. Brett comments that New Horizons in Hermeneutics “builds on the philosophical foundations laid in the previous work”. Could it be, then, that New Horizons in Hermeneutics, as a critical engagement with almost the whole spectrum of schools of hermeneutics, began from the stance established by the time of The Two Horizons?

Second, the more of Thiselton’s work I understood, the more I began to realise that my own earlier responses to Thiselton’s thinking (contributing to the ‘thesis’ part of my taught Master’s degree) were mistaken. My critical framework had leant too heavily on responding to formulations of epistemological problems within the Kantian tradition, and was not sufficiently shaped by tradition since Hegel - I had simply not seen where Thiselton was coming from. It was necessary then, in the present study, to start off around the hermeneutical circle again and to try to understand Thiselton afresh. This has ultimately resulted - in the present work - in the reversal of my prior understanding and in a defence of Thiselton’s stance. My studies during the early part of the PhD project - of New Horizons in Hermeneutics, Interpreting God and the Postmodern Self, and The Promise of Hermeneutics - were not wasted. Rather, they constituted the recent end of the diachronic context of understanding required for a proper evaluation of Thiselton’s formative works. But the main focus of exhaustive study had become Thiselton’s writings published between 1965 and 1980.

The present study, then, is based on a consultation with the whole of Thiselton’s works (so far!), but provides an exhaustive analysis of Thiselton’s main formative ‘theory-construction’ period. The aim is to explicate Thiselton’s main positive contributions to hermeneutical theory. Some of his more recent negative contributions, for example his attack on the work of Richard Rorty in New Horizons in Hermeneutics, have not been expounded. This is deliberate because our interest is in what Thiselton affirms, the place from which he criticises the likes of Rorty. Having said this, The Two Horizons is so key to understanding Thiselton’s work as a whole that, as part of demonstrating this very point, we shall

seek to prove its crucial relevance for answering even Thiselton’s most recent critics, some of whom appeal to neo-pragmatic or post-structural sources.

3. Methodology: ‘Chronological-Thematic’ and ‘Historical-Structural’

On the question of methodology, we have employed a ‘chronological-thematic’ approach with a ‘historical-structural’ methodology. Hermeneutical-historical sensitivity means not aiming at an ‘idealistic’ or ‘formalist’ understanding of the issues, but at an historical understanding of developments in Thiselton’s thinking and in its context. Hermeneutical-historical sensitivity, however, demands an organisation of subject-matter into themes for communicative clarity. This organisation has two aspects. First, at the micro level of Thiselton’s responses to others, we use a structuralist methodology (not a structuralist ideology) to break these responses down into their component ‘semiotic elements’, and then to reorganise them so as to ‘gather together’ the ‘world’ of Thiselton’s own thought. Second, at the macro level, the resulting structures embodying ‘what Thiselton thinks’ are organised into chronologically developing ‘themes’.

4. Movement from a ‘Historical Focus’ to a ‘Theoretical Construction’

Thus, there was a need to keep ‘structure’ in mind without losing sight of ‘history’ or falling into linguistic formalism. Chapters 1 and 2, therefore, are more historically orientated, though by no means overlook theory, and look at Thiselton’s earliest work between 1959 and 1970, and at the historical context presupposed by his major formative development as a thinker between 1970 and 1980, respectively. Chapters 3 to 7 are more theoretically orientated, being divided into themes in a historically sensitive way. Thus, Chapter 3 focuses on eschatology and epistemology, Chapter 4 on language, Western culture, and the human self, Chapter 5 on understanding and the hermeneutical task, and Chapters 6 and 7 on dialogue, history, theology, and the unification of hermeneutics.

5. Movement from ‘Philosophical Description’, through ‘Construction’, to ‘Argument’

If there is a tension between ‘historical’ and ‘structural-thematic’ concerns, then there is also a tension between accurate explication of Thiselton’s thinking and critical engagement with his critics and with Thiselton himself in assessment and argument. None of the chapters of the present study are merely ‘descriptive’. Such an assessment would ignore the complexity of the structural work involved in making Thiselton’s thinking more visible and in building unified hermeneutical theory from what has been assembled. Nothing that has been said can simply be ‘read off the surface’ of Thiselton’s texts, but represents a departure from Thiselton’s own form of presentation. Nevertheless, ‘philosophical
description' lies at the heart of the hermeneutical task (though how ‘objective’ description can be is an issue we address in Chapter 7). As the later Wittgenstein remarked, “philosophy simply puts everything before us” - “we must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place”.90 Apart from ‘description’ in this sense, one describes only one’s own prior horizons. To move to ‘assessment’ and ‘argument’ is to have first ‘listened’ and ‘described’, as it is ludicrous to attack a viewpoint before hearing it. Thus, earlier on in the present study, ‘listening’, ‘philosophical description’, ‘historical observation’, and ‘theory construction’ are more dominant, as we focus most exclusively on Thiselton. However, as the study proceeds, ‘assessment’ and ‘argument’ become more prominent, as we focus increasingly on other thinkers as well. Chapter 1, then, is more ‘descriptive’ in the right, philosophical, sense, whereas Chapters 6 and 7 are very argumentative without losing ‘descriptive’ accuracy. Chapter 4 should not throw the reader, where attempts are made to begin to move towards a unified theory of language. This is not description, but theoretical-construction.

6. Allowing Four Major Thinkers to Reply to Thiselton & Our Use of the Term ‘Narrow’

Whilst aiming to explicate and evaluate Thiselton’s hermeneutical theory, we will allow Heidegger, Bultmann, Gadamer, and Wittgenstein to ‘reply’ to Thiselton’s reading and use of their work. R.E. Palmer asks if Thiselton is “equal to the thinking” of such classic writers but, whilst not always agreeing with Thiselton, acknowledges “the basis for his claims”.91 So we proceed with caution. When using the term ‘narrow’ in relation Continental thinkers, we do not mean ‘narrowly read’ but, after Thiselton, are commenting on the constitution of the critical filter through which a given thinker assimilates the thoughts of others at the level of his or her prior understanding or ‘pre-understanding’, which can remain unconscious.

7. Distinctions between ‘Hermeneutics’ and ‘Biblical Hermeneutics’

We will outline our specific uses of several terms that appear in this study when we begin ‘theoretical construction’ in Chapter 3. However, we should note here that by the term ‘hermeneutics’ we often simply mean ‘the discipline of interpretation as it occurs in university departments’. However, this is really shorthand for ‘the corporate and individual discipline and dialogic experience of interpretation, and of being interpreted, as both art and science, involving both theoretical and practical levels, as it occurs in university departments and in any other context’. Our phrase ‘the discipline of hermeneutics’

includes ‘theory’ and ‘practice’, departing from a common use in which ‘hermeneutics’ refers solely to ‘interpretative theory’. However, J. Grondin admits both definitions - and we use both. Further, the title of F. Watson’s latest book, *Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith* (2004), which largely contains biblical exegesis rather than interpretative theory, further suggests the acceptability of a practical connotation to the term ‘hermeneutics’. By our title, ‘The Grammar of Hermeneutics’, we are indicating that this study is about a suggested ‘internal structure’ for ‘hermeneutics’. If we say ‘Thiselton’s hermeneutics’, we mean ‘Thiselton’s approach to hermeneutics’. Ultimately, we will conclude that all ‘hermeneutics’ can be conceived of as ‘biblical interpretative events’ in the sense that the ‘philosophy’ that unifies theoretical hermeneutics is the ‘philosophy’ that resonates with Scripture. But this does not necessarily mean that it is the Bible that is being interpreted, which is why the term ‘biblical hermeneutics’ is coined. Even then, however, ‘biblical hermeneutics’, given our definition of ‘hermeneutics’ more broadly, could be ‘a biblical interpretative event of, or through, the Bible’. Normally however, by ‘biblical hermeneutics’, we simply mean ‘the discipline of interpreting the Bible as it occurs in university departments’, so long as this is understood in such a way as to acknowledge that it is God’s interpretation and transformation of those who read the Bible that is of paramount importance. The difficulty with generalisations is that historical particularity, we shall argue, should have a considerable shaping effect on precisely how interpretation proceeds. What ‘hermeneutics’ amounts to in practice will differ from case to case, even if there are what Wittgenstein calls ‘family resemblances’ between different acts of interpretation. Any single ‘paradigm’ at the level of ‘philosophical subtext’ should not lead to the monopolisation of any single ‘paradigm’ at the level of interpretative goals, strategies, critical tools, or models of texts or textuality. And even different philosophical subtexts should be in dialogue with one another, which is why we were unhappy with J.P. Pritchard’s notion of a ‘controlling over-all view’ or paradigm earlier.

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Part 1

The Historical Background and Character of A.C. Thiselton's Formative Work on Hermeneutics

1959-1978/80
Chapter 1.


A. Preliminary Comments: Where to Begin

Anthony C. Thiselton suggests his article, 'Thirty Years of Hermeneutics: Retrospect and Prospects' (1998), as the place to begin in order to understand his hermeneutical theory.¹ This "short summary" of his hermeneutical works outlines their content, and identifies the "developing context of ideas" in which they emerged as Thiselton's "teaching and research in hermeneutics" at the Universities of Bristol, Sheffield, Durham, and Nottingham.²

In this article, Thiselton divides his career into four periods. The 'first period', 1963-1970, is crowned by his article, 'The Parables as Language-Event' (1970).³ Yet, Thiselton published 58 more writings during this period than those noted in 'Thirty Years of Hermeneutics'. Thiselton's 'second period', 1971-1980, culminates with his most famous work, The Two Horizons (1980),⁴ which only slightly modifies his PhD Thesis (1977) submitted to Sheffield University.⁵ Yet, Thiselton published a further 106 writings during this time-span which, again, take us beyond his retrospective summaries. Similarly, Thiselton's 'third period', 1981-1992, culminates in the "systematic volume setting out my own hermeneutics", New Horizons in Hermeneutics (1992).⁶ Thiselton mentions two further publications in his summary,⁷ but this leaves another 46 writings from this period unmentioned. Finally, Thiselton's 'fourth period', 1993-1996, may now arguably be extended to its culmination in the publication of his

2. Thiselton, 'Thirty Years', 1559.
major commentary, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians* (2000). Whilst in ‘Thirty Years of Hermeneutics’ Thiselton makes special note of two major works, we count a further 57 published writings from this period, and over 40 either published or anticipated since the beginning of 2001 during what we may now call Thiselton’s ‘fifth period’. Including Thiselton’s Masters thesis from 1964, and with Thiselton’s kind assistance, we have now identified more than 320 of his writings.

Thus, whilst beginning with ‘Thirty Years of Hermeneutics’, comparison is immediately invited with many more writings, keeping the ‘whole’ and the ‘parts’ in view. Thiselton has not produced an ahistorical ‘system’ of thought, but has carried out a hermeneutical programme. This is not simply Thiselton’s own programme, but his contribution to a larger developing historical tradition of hermeneutical reflection that remains unfinished. Here, however, in Chapter 1, our aim is to chart the historical development of Thiselton’s own hermeneutical theory between 1959 and 1970 as part of the background to understanding his later work.

### B. Thiselton’s ‘First Period’ Hermeneutical Reflections, from 1959 to 1970

#### 1. 1959-1964: 1 Corinthians, Wittgenstein, and Austin

Anthony C. Thiselton (b. 1937) obtained his BD at London Bible College in 1959. John Dart, a contemporary, recalls that Thiselton scored 100% in a history exam at the time, being “frustrated” by the ease of the course. By 1960, Thiselton was a curate at Holy Trinity Church, Sydenham, indicating his early sense of call to the Anglican Church. After three years, he married and became a lecturer and chaplain at Tyndale Hall in Bristol University. He notes that “from 1963 I had become increasingly familiar with the work of Wittgenstein and J.L. Austin”. Already, then, Thiselton’s interests included the philosophy of language, pastoral theology, biblical theology and New Testament studies, particularly Pauline studies and 1 Corinthians, as the title of his Masters thesis (London, 1964).

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10. See the bibliography.
suggests.16 Thus, Thiselton’s studies in 1 Corinthians were synchronous with the development of his interest in Wittgenstein and Austin. Possibly, the turn to the philosophy of language was precipitated by his discontent with “more traditional textbooks on biblical interpretation”.17

2. 1965: Mixed Response to Continental Hermeneutics

In 1965, Thiselton became a Recognised Teacher in Theology at Bristol University,18 and his first publications appeared. His writings from 1965 indicate that he was interested in Continental European theology, philosophy, and hermeneutics by 1964, hinting that his discontent with traditional interpretation dates back to 1963. Thus, Thiselton’s explorations in Wittgenstein and Austin (1963) led to a further diversification by 1964 in his readings of Schleiermacher, Kierkegaard, De Chardin, Tillich, Ebeling and the New Hermeneutic. Published works reflecting this then appeared in 1965,19 alongside those relating to New Testament studies and biblical theology,20 to the biblical authority debate and to other faiths.21 Straight away we find a mixed response to Continental European hermeneutics, partly precipitated by Thiselton’s engagement with Wittgenstein and Austin. Thus, Kierkegaard rightly emphasised the “individual, personal, and subjective”, but at “the heavy price of the collective and objective”.22

3. 1966: Holding the Pre-Cognitive and the Cognitive Together

In 1966, Thiselton’s review of Billy Graham’s World Aflame may indicate an interest in Church mission, but Continental hermeneutical concerns are also evident. Graham’s work is “categorical disproof... that only radical theologians” consider ‘man’s’ “existential situation of despair”.23 On the subject of biblical authority, Thiselton attacks unfortunate “caricatures of conservative evangelicals” emerging from the Honest to God debate. Further, for Thiselton, there is no necessary antithesis


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between ‘personal’ categories and ‘propositional’ categories. Of significance for hermeneutics is Thiselton’s correction of M. Novak’s one-sided stress on pre-cognitive subjectivity by also stressing cognitive conceptualisation. Thiselton’s interest in biblical studies also acquires new breadth in his booklet, *Personal Suggestions about a Minister’s Library*, whilst his interest in 1 Corinthians re-emerges in his Tyndale Lecture, anticipating E. Küsemann’s conclusion that “Paul’s struggle at Corinth” was against “over-realised... eschatology”.

4. 1967: Tensions between Continental and Anglo-American Traditions

In 1967, Thiselton became a Senior Tutor at Tyndale Hall, Bristol University. He recalls that “a student asked my advice about English-language books on hermeneutics”, prompting an almost “fruitless literature search” in which only R. Funk’s *Language, Hermeneutic and the Word of God* (1966) and J.M. Robinson’s and J.B. Cobb Jr.’s *New Frontiers in Theology: II. The New Hermeneutic* (1964) stood out. By 1967, Thiselton had also begun to critique the work of H.-G. Gadamer and E. Fuchs. He writes, “I was entranced by the notion of projected ‘worlds’ into which the reader was drawn, especially where these ‘narrative worlds’ constituted pre-cognitive value-systems into which the reader was seduced, only to find the world and the reader’s expectations subverted and reversed”. Fuchs’ appeal to Heidegger led Thiselton to “explore ‘worldhood’ in Heidegger’s *Being and Time*” for himself, though he found problems “on the level of the philosophy of language”. Whereas “Austin’s ‘performatives’ presupposed institutional states of affairs and specific contextual conventions... Heidegger and Fuchs regarded assertions, propositions, and conventions as at best derivative and secondary to a kind of force... different from Austin’s illocutionary acts”. Thiselton thus experienced a “combination of appreciation and unease” with Continental hermeneutics, reflecting the tension between Continental and Anglo-American traditions.

27. Unpublished.
This tension is evident throughout Thiselton’s published writings from 1967, as is a hint of a critical appeal to Wittgenstein. Thus, Thiselton argues, G.W.H. Lampe and D.M. MacKinnon rightly hold “historical enquiry” and “existential impact” in tension, and rightly maintain that “historical, philosophical, and theological problems are inextricably intertwined”. Further, “existentialism”, in particular Bultmann’s “demythologisation”, with its “acute problems about criteria”, cannot substitute for historical enquiry into the “factual content of revelation”. Drawing on the later Wittgenstein, Thiselton affirms V.A. Harvey’s work for its “surprisingly few generalisations” and sensitivity to how theological terms are “variously used in differing circumstances”. In Thiselton’s view H. Gollwitzer rightly rejects the antithesis of existential function and ‘mythological’ or ‘objectifying’ language in the “existentialising talk of God” in Kant through Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Jaspers, and Heidegger. Christian language about God is not mythical, but “analogical”. Thiselton also notes the irony of E.J. Carnell’s alignment with Kierkegaard’s notion that “truth is subjectivity”: Carnell provides “the best descriptive treatment to date of Kierkegaard’s thought as a Christian”.

Still in 1967, Thiselton complains that the “relationship between myth and analogy in Bultmann” is problematic, as are Bultmann’s views of the ‘historical Jesus’, his “philosophy of history” generally, his exclusion of the Last Judgement as ‘mythological’, and his antitheses “nature versus history... cosmology versus anthropology”, and “being versus existence”. Thiselton also rejects Bultmann’s near Kierkegaardian notion of faith as bare decision, favouring a close connection between faith and knowledge. Thiselton declares Bultmann’s view of the resurrection false, Bultmann’s theology too exclusively kerygmatic, and his appeal to philosophy “too narrow”. Thus, Thiselton seeks a broader appeal to philosophical traditions, together with a more adequately eschatological theology. Finally,

in 1967, Thiselton’s publications indicate ongoing interest in biblical theology, Continental theology and philosophy, and theology generally.40

5. 1968: Pannenberg, Wittgenstein, and Dialogue Between Traditions

By 1968, Thiselton had begun to read Pannenberg, alerting him “to the problems left by the ‘devaluing’ of assertions in Heidegger and Gadamer”. Crucially, in 1998 Thiselton writes, “Pannenberg has always remained a major influence on my thinking”. By 1968, Thiselton is “concerned to draw equally on the Anglo-American tradition of philosophical analysis and on Continental European traditions”.41 Thus, Thiselton values both assertions and an existential emphasis, where even Calvin’s “practical concern” has a certain “existential” character.42 With M. Thornton, Thiselton holds ‘theology’ and ‘practice’ together.43 Contrary to J. Knox, “the biblical creation-narratives and accounts of the resurrection” also bring ‘factual’ and ‘existential’ truth together,44 and Thiselton questions the virtual absence of reference to J.L. Austin and P.F. Strawson in F.H. Cloeby’s work.45 Thiselton recalls that by 1968 he had come to view “Wittgenstein as a key figure who combined the incisiveness and rigour” of “British analytical philosophy with the Continental suspicion of exclusively rationalist method and with a deeper concern about human subjectivity and life-worlds”.46 Thiselton is thus drawing on Wittgenstein when he bemoans S. Lawton’s “questionable generalisations”.47 In 1968, Thiselton’s interests in biblical studies, biblical and practical theology, and theology more generally,48

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46. Thiselton, Thirty Years’, 1560-1561.


and Continental theology and philosophy are alive and well. Further, his interests in philosophical theology and the philosophy of language are coming to the fore. In mediating between Continental and Anglo-American thought, an alliance is forming in Thiselton’s thinking between Pannenberg and the later Wittgenstein.


Several developments in Thiselton’s thinking first appear in 1969 when Thiselton is still Senior Tutor at Tyndale Hall. First, Thiselton writes, “in 1969 my wife and I had the great privilege of entertaining Professor and Frau Pannenberg in our Bristol home for a few days”. Having already read “Pannenberg on Hermeneutics” by 1968, Thiselton was “convinced... further” by Pannenberg’s “incisive oral comments” on the ‘devaluing’ of assertions by Heidegger and Gadamer. This confirms our assumption of a 1967 date for Thiselton’s explorations into Heidegger and Gadamer. Thiselton’s praise for Pannenberg first appears in print in 1969 when Thiselton attacks H. Zahrnt’s “entirely one-sided discussion of Pannenberg” in which “he grossly underestimates [Pannenberg’s] significance.”

Drawing on Pannenberg and T.F. Torrance, Thiselton rejects both “old fashioned... language about God as Object” and “attacks on conceptualising” by the later Heidegger. Yet, “some of the points made by Kierkegaard, Bulmann, and Tillich” were still “justified”. Pannenberg (“with his impressive learning and his respect for rationality”) and Torrance promote a “right kind of objectification”. In Thiselton’s view, J. Macquarrie also rightly holds existentialist insights, linguistic philosophy, conceptualising, “biblical truth and Christian tradition” together. Thiselton approves Macquarrie’s “fascinating comparison between Rudolf Bulmann and R.B. Braithwaite, both of whom try to cash assertions about God as utterances about man, and... stress volition”.

Macquarrie, and Thiselton are thus alike in facilitating dialogue between existentialist insights, linguistic philosophy, biblical theology, and Christian tradition.

Second, in 1969, Thiselton's interest in Wittgenstein and the Anglo-American tradition of linguistic philosophy first becomes explicit in his writings. Thus, Thiselton approves "Wittgenstein's famous description of philosophy as 'a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language'". Thiselton also applauds H.H. Price's linguistic philosophy and W. Manson's "excellent linguistic analysis". For Thiselton, "linguistic philosophy offers not so much doctrines as techniques of investigation" that are "increasingly fruitful... in theology". Importantly, Thiselton applauds Cornelius de Deudg's "well-timed plea for a more comprehensive philosophy of language" (cf. Chapter 4). Crucially, Thiselton stresses the need for critical dialogue between Wittgenstein, the Anglo-American tradition of analytic linguistic philosophy and the Continental tradition of hermeneutical theory. This grounds his critique of H. W. Richardson's work, where the latter neglects "the language theory behind the New Hermeneutic", namely that of the later Heidegger, attention to whom would have been more fruitful than "well-worn debates about demythologisation". In later Wittgensteinian fashion, Thiselton bemoans the "breath-taking neatness" of Richardson's a priori "historical generalisations" across many disciplines, but approves of Richardson's dismissal of Bultmann's elimination of the symbol-myth-image complex. Symbols are required to reach beyond the cognitive plane to "Christian experience", though require testing at "the bar of discursive language" and "analytical... reasoning". Combining appeals to Wittgenstein, Austin, and P.F. Strawson, Thiselton criticises Richardson's "prescriptive views of language", and his neglect of Austin's distinction between 'logical' and 'grammatical' in actual language-uses and of Strawson's "careful account of the overlapping of M predicates and P predicates" in relation to a hermeneutic of the self.

64. Thiselton, 'Theology for a New World', 200-201.
65. Thiselton, 'Theology for a New World', 197.
Third, in 1969, Thiselton begins to appeal explicitly to the later Wittgenstein and Austin in widened dialogue with and critique of approaches related to positivism, existentialism, the New Hermeneutic, and even neo-pragmatism. Thus, for Thiselton, N. Smart rightly follows the later Wittgenstein’s shift away from positivistic aspects of his earlier thought, but wrongly misses Wittgenstein’s “parallel shift away from... the individual ego, to the givenness of life-in-community”.65 Similarly, for Thiselton, P. Van Buren rightly criticises H. Ott’s disparagement of conceptualising or “objectifying” language,66 but falsely applies contrasts between ‘facts’ and ‘stories’, ‘statistics’ and ‘stories’, and between ‘facts’ and ‘fiction’ to the “Christian story”. Thiselton suspects that Van Buren has followed R.B. Braithwaite and Bultmann and, drawing on J.L. Austin and D.D. Evans, prefers the contrasts “between concrete and abstract, and between the logic of (mere) description and the logic of self-involvement”.67 Van Buren has wrongly followed the “so-called open interpretation of the later Wittgenstein” despite the inconsistency between a “world of multiplicity and relativity” and one in which “it matters what we do”.68 This anticipates Thiselton’s later rejection of R. Rorty’s relativistic reading of the later Wittgenstein in which Rorty “stresses those aspects which are compatible with a pragmatic behaviourism and which” supposedly “encourage a consensus theory of truth”. Thus Thiselton writes, “W. Hordern, Paul van Buren, and Henry Staten write as if Wittgenstein’s language-games could be viewed as virtually self-contained contextual settings”.69 Van Buren is hovering between a neo-Kantian dualism between fact and value (cf. Bultmann’s “impossibly difficult middle-of-the-road position”70) and the pragmatic relativism into which this threatens to decay. Thiselton cites Van Buren’s own remark, “I fully expect to spend my life making up my mind” - i.e. between positivism, existentialism, and neo-pragmatism.71 This does not negate Thiselton’s cautious regard for Continental hermeneutics. Thus, J. Macquarrie makes “crucial comments on Schleiermacher and Otto, developing Tillich’s point that ‘religious feeling’ involves more than subjective emotion. In Heidegger’s language, it ‘discloses’ an awareness of that which evokes it”.72 Further, for Thiselton, P. Leon possesses a “wider insight than even Kierkegaard gained into the self-deceptions and intricate subtleties of human nature”. And yet,

66. Thiselton, A.C., Review of P. Van Buren’s Theological Explorations, Chman 83.3 (1969), 220-221.
68. Thiselton, ‘Review of Theological Explorations’, 220-221.

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Thiselton argues that D.T. Niles rightly stresses both “historical issues” and “practical contact and involvement”. That is, factual-historical and existential self-involving dimensions need to be held together.

In 1969, Thiselton also saw himself, in some senses, as a conservative evangelical drawing on non-conservative sources, widening dialogue between theology and philosophy. Thus, he writes, “it is possible to remain faithful to conservative principles, without losing the capacity to draw from many other sources”. He asks, “as evangelicals... can we learn to draw from... contemporary thought, so that we can present biblical truth in its rich variety and fullness both relevantly and imaginatively to our own generation?” Thus, Thiselton’s interests in the mission of the Church, New Testament studies, and biblical theology dialogue with his interests in Pannenberg, Continental theology, philosophy more generally, the philosophy of language, a hermeneutic of the self, and American theology and philosophy.

7. 1970: Thiselton’s Hermeneutical Programme Begins

Whilst remaining a Recognised Teacher in Theology at the University of Bristol until 1971, Thiselton moved to Sheffield University in 1970 where he became a Sir Henry Stephenson Fellow, also until 1971. However, his published works from 1970 still correspond to his time in Bristol.

In ‘Theology and the Future’ Thiselton argues, first, that the “hermeneutical problem” concerns, (i), “the complex relationship between language, meaning, understanding, and truth”, (ii), how “our own cultural environment conditions... our words and... thinking” and, (iii), the question, “What does the Bible actually say to our own generation?” The hermeneutical problem, however, “cannot be solved by a theory, but only by a prolonged programme”. Step one tested “the usefulness of existential

85. See bibliography.
categories” (cf. Thiselton’s interest in Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Bultmann). Step two applied “the results of hermeneutical philosophy” (cf. Thiselton’s interest in Gadamer, Fuchs, and Ebeling). And step three “is the appropriation... of the enormous advances in semantics, linguistics, and linguistic philosophy”. (cf. Thiselton’s interest in Wittgenstein, Austin, Saussure, and Barr. ‘Linguistics’ signifies language-study, and ‘semantics’ signifies ‘the study of meanings’). Step three requires “a step-by-step re-appraisal of the intended functions of language in specific biblical passages”, moving beyond “traditional... teaching on grammar and vocabulary”. Second, following Moltmann, Thiselton argues that eschatology can no longer be seen as a “department of study”. It “colours the whole of New Testament thought”, provides “a basis (together with other themes) for ethics”, and constitutes “a frame of reference” for Christology. Thus, third, Thiselton argues that the theologian’s ‘task’ is “relating Biblical exegesis to ‘systematic theology’”, and that pastors should keep up with “changing... contemporary theology”, since this affects “pastoral work” and makes “new demands” on theological training. Fresh insights emerge from “conservative” and non-conservative sources, where Thiselton also notes Bultmann’s work on Pauline anthropology and J. Barr’s critique of Kittel’s *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*.6 In particular, we should note here that a new widened dialogue is emerging in Thiselton between an eschatological hermeneutic of the New Testament and the next step of the philosophical ‘hermeneutical programme’ involving Wittgenstein, Austin, and Saussure.

Thus, if ‘Thirty Years of Hermeneutics’ mostly looks back on Thiselton’s hermeneutical programme from 1998, then ‘Theology and the Future’ largely looks forward to that programme from 1970. Pastoral, academic, and mission-related concerns still continue to frame Thiselton’s dialogue between New Testament studies, systematic theology, and hermeneutics today. In systematics, Thiselton still focuses on eschatology and Christology,7 but also on trinitarian theology.8 In hermeneutics, Thiselton still continues to dialogue between existentialism, hermeneutical philosophy, and the philosophy of

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language, introducing further dialogue partners as time passes.89 Finally, Thiselton still continues to investigate links between theology and hermeneutics - as recently, in his ‘hermeneutics of promise’.90

The crowning article of Thiselton's ‘first period' is, 'The Parables as Language-Event: Some Comments on Fuchs's Hermeneutics in the Light of Linguistic Philosophy'.91 We may re-organise this complex paper to explicate Thiselton's framework, showing it to move beyond dialogue between traditions towards critical synthesis. Formal introductions to Heidegger, Gadamer, and Wittgenstein are deferred until Chapters 3 and 4 to preserve our flow of argument.

First, aligning with Continental hermeneutics and the later Wittgenstein, Thiselton rejects the Platonic idealist reduction of words to ‘labels' or “imitations... of immaterial concepts” whose ‘truth’ is conveyed by propositions.92 Similarly, Thiselton rejects the Enlightenment-rationalist, ‘traditional', or ‘ideational’ reduction of language to ‘information’ that communicates a priori rational ideas.93 Thiselton also rejects the broadly ‘positivist' extension of this view and the early Wittgenstein's ‘picture theory' - both 'generalise' about propositions, reducing their function to 'description', and fragmenting reality into 'concepts' to be manipulated within 'formal' systems. For Thiselton, Gadamer rightly views such propositions as “isolating” “what comes reflectively to individual consciousness”,94 being “antithetical to... hermeneutical experience”.95 Thiselton also questions the Cartesian 'scientific’ epistemology of seeking 'knowledge' through 'observation', 'generalisation', induction, and deduction.96

Second, however, Thiselton also opposes the linguistic dualism of Heidegger, Gadamer, and Fuchs since it too generalises about propositions - devaluing them as only 'the reduction of language to tools for

90. Thiselton, 'Communicative Action', 133-239.
manipulating concepts, ideas, or information’ and, citing Heidegger, ‘not the primary ‘locus’ of truth’. Conversely, pre-cognitive ‘language-events’ are elevated as preceding and delimiting thought, permitting “being to be present... in time”. However, after the later Wittgenstein, Thiselton argues that propositions, like all language, are multi-functional and grounded in community life. Thus, all language “can be manipulated artificially” so as to ‘bewitch’ (citing Wittgenstein, “a misunderstanding makes it look... as if a proposition did something queer”). For Thiselton, “language without assertions... is a featureless waste, in which every meaning can be swallowed up by another”. Assertions should be reinstated, but without a return to linguistic formalism. Such formalism reduces ‘understanding’ to conscious logical inference and changes in ‘mental states’, or to the measuring of one set of concepts against another “from the same source” (Thiselton draws on Heidegger here). Understanding, however, involves practically “going on... independently”.97

Third, Thiselton appeals to the later Wittgenstein to reinstate the creative function of propositions. Thiselton agrees with Gadamer on the openness of horizons of understanding towards future experience, but rejects Gadamer’s view that assertions necessarily ‘close’, ‘fix’, or ‘reduce’ such horizons to abstractions,98 so as to fail to “attain the dimension of the linguistic experience of the world”.99 Rather, “what a proposition is is... determined by the rules of sentence formation... and... by the use of the sign in the language-game”.100 Thiselton follows Pannenberg’s criticism that Gadamer has abstracted statements from the ‘background’ horizons that statements alone can grasp. Further, drawing on the later Wittgenstein, ‘language’, ‘proposition’, and ‘parable’ are ‘concepts with blurred edges’ (i.e. context-modifiable). Some ‘propositions’ align with Gadamer’s stress on the openness of horizons towards future experience (cf. S. Ullmann’s notion of semantic ‘vagueness’). Others are

100. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 53.
“completely closed”. Similarly, there are “family-resemblances” between many kinds of parables. The problem is our “contempt for the particular case” and ‘craving’ for “easy generalisation”.101

Fourth, Thiselton thus critically assimilates (cf. ‘sublates’ - not used in Hegel’s idealist sense in the present study) Gadamer’s insights concerning ‘open horizons’ into his own critical synthesis that allies the later Wittgenstein and Pannenberg. ‘Horizons’, ‘language-events’, and ‘transformation’ now involve assertive language. Thus later, following Pannenberg, Thiselton retains a kind of ‘objectification’ that “transposes [the interpreter’s] horizon into an explicit statement”.102

Fifth, Thiselton also appeals to J.L. Austin in rejection of the Continental linguistic dichotomy. Following Austin, for ‘performatives’ utterances to operate effectively “certain statements have to be true”. Indeed, far from undermining parable-function, propositions attached to parables may both “constitute a condition of effective performative force” and function variably themselves - contradicting Fuchs’ work on parables.103 Assertions in parables, therefore, may not be the result of “unimaginative editing”, but part of a ‘language-family’.104 The issue is not the functioning of “appended logia... to add a related lesson or injunction...”105

Sixth, Thiselton nevertheless appeals positively to Continental hermeneutics. Heidegger to an extent rightly argues that language ‘gathers’ to establish ‘worlds’ - “the Being of beings is opened up in the structure of its gatheredness”.106 Gadamer rightly relates ‘understanding’ to “modes of experience in

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105. Querying, Blomberg, C.L., ‘Interpreting the Parables of Jesus: Where are We and Where Do We Go from Here?’, CBQ 53.1 (1991), 57.

which truth comes to light”. The ‘common world’ of language, or of art or games, is not a mere ‘object’ or ‘concept’ for thought to manipulate. It creatively seizes readers at the deepest dispositional level - a ‘player’ adopts its presuppositions, attitudes, or roles, and is not allowed “to behave toward play as... an object”. Thiselton parallels this with the later Wittgenstein’s contrast between interpreting ‘from outside’, stepping “from one level of thought to another”, and participation, where one does not ‘interpret’ but ‘feels at home’. Thiselton also adapts Gadamer’s notion of a hearer’s entering a new ‘world’. The hearer’s and the world’s horizons may interact, move, and “merge”, to form a new, enlarged, integrated horizon of understanding - through “fusion of... horizons”. With Fuchs, Thiselton accepts that Jesus uses familiar parable ‘imagery’ to draw his hearers into active participation in various ‘roles’ corresponding with their own varying self-understandings. But then, hearers are drawn by a parable’s logic into a ‘strange’ world (the parable ‘content’ or ‘truth’) that transcends or even reverses “conventional values and... criteria”. Hearers may then become outraged or joyful, depending on the roles adopted. They no longer ‘manipulate’ the parable as “an object of scrutiny”, but become the object of its scrutiny. Jesus, in ‘love’, uses “the artistic medium” to create a “sphere in which meeting takes place”. Some hearers may therefore be brought into the Christian ‘community’. “Self-involving” parable language, then, ‘striking home’ at a dispositional level to expose or reorientate attitudes, presuppositions, and “conscious thoughts”, is still distinct from purely cognitive language. Some parallels exist between Fuchs’ “linguistic acts” and J.L. Austin’s and D.D. Evan’s speech-acts. Yet, Thiselton prefers “the more precise and developed terminology of linguistic philosophy”, which avoids turning ‘distinction’ into ‘dichotomy’.  

Seventh, Thiselton thereby sublates Fuchs’ view of parable function into a new key by appeal to the philosophy of language and, further, to post-Saussurian general linguistics. Synchronically (at a given point in time), various parables form a family linked by complex “overlapping and criss-crossing”

similarities or ‘family resemblances’. Several ‘applications’ may emerge for a given parable, inter-linked by ‘secondary’ ‘logical connections’. Contrary to Fuchs’ generalisations, ‘all’ parables are not as ‘open-ended’, ‘vague’, or ‘non-cognitive’ as “a Zen Buddhist kōan” - mere “psychological stimulant[s]” designed to “propel the hearer in any or every direction”. Nor, contrary to “Jülicher’s ‘one point’” view, can parables be ‘flattened’ into single generalising assertions. Diachronically (over time), variable creative parable functions facilitate various possible applications linked by family resemblances, conferring some freedoms for hearers “going on independently”. Hearers are not asked to slavishly imitate set examples, but are repeatedly, though “freshly”, directed into “each new present” by “roughly” similar “paradigms” of appropriate kinds of attitude and conduct “within certain limits”. This gives a hearer “freedom to ‘go on’ for himself”. The notion of ‘family resemblances’ explains how language can “function creatively” without meanings expanding arbitrarily. Thiselton hopes linguistic philosophy may further benefit biblical studies.

Eighth, Thiselton’s appeal to K.-O. Apel’s reading of Wittgenstein in this paper may indicate an interest in socio-critical theory by 1970. Summarising: Thiselton appeals to a widened dialogue between linguistic philosophy, linguistics, and eschatology to form a critical-synthetic filter through which theory drawn from the Continental hermeneutical tradition is critically assimilated or sublated, corrected, extended, or rejected. Thus, in ‘Thirty Years of Hermeneutics’, Thiselton notes that his “combination of appreciation and unease” with Continental hermeneutics came to light by 1970.

In 1970 Thiselton’s appeals to linguistic philosophy as a critical-synthetic watershed and his mixed appeal to Continental hermeneutics emerge elsewhere. Thiselton rebukes E. Käsemann for neglecting “performative utterances, or illocutions” in his exegesis of blessing and cursing in 1 Corinthians. W.

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Nicholl for neglecting Wittgenstein and "Anglo-American achievements in linguistic philosophy", and affirms S.C. Brown for his thorough appeal to Wittgenstein. Conversely, J. Pelikan should have given "more urgent priority" to Ebeling on hermeneutics.

Continuing his emphasis on widened dialogue, Thiselton's interest in a hermeneutic of the self becomes clearer in 1970. Thus he writes, "the problem of selfhood has become increasingly important... for philosophers of religion" though, contrary to H.D. Lewis, he is unconvinced "that Strawson's Individuals is incompatible with Biblical views about man". Lewis's distinction "between the mental and the physical" fails to engage with the "post-Wittgenstein" dismissal of "dualism". Elsewhere, Thiselton approves "Bultmann's... accurate comments on Paul's understanding of man", particularly on "Paul's varied uses of 'flesh', and especially its particular use to mean 'man in his self-sufficiency'".

Returning to the theme of critical synthesis, then by 1970 Thiselton had produced a "completely revised and re-written version" of his handbook, Personal Suggestions about a Minister's Library (1966, possibly 1967). In it, Thiselton argues, first, that "grammatical and linguistic commentaries" "help to ensure faithfulness to the meanings of words and phrases in their literary setting", to the biblical message, preventing the "smuggling through" of "one's own ideas under the cover of an authoritative text". Second, "theological commentaries set words and phrases in the wider context of chapters and books", where "it can be seriously misleading to try to understand a word or concept in isolation from its linguistic and theological context". Third, there is also a need for "a faithful and imaginative historical reconstruction of events", actions, sayings, and their meaning "in their original setting in the ancient world", prior to cashing them accurately "into today's currency". However, "it is disastrous when historical information becomes an end in itself". Thus, fourth, there is a need for "guidance on

the legitimate range of application".\textsuperscript{125} That is, Thiselton's critical-synthetic hermeneutical theory also assimilates traditional hermeneutical concerns.

Hence, Thiselton displays wide-ranging interests in 1970. These include biblical studies,\textsuperscript{126} the application of the philosophy of language, speech-act theory, general linguistics and semantics, and Continental hermeneutics to parable studies,\textsuperscript{127} biblical theology,\textsuperscript{128} theology generally,\textsuperscript{129} and the Church's relationship to hermeneutics, eschatology, and the philosophy of language.\textsuperscript{130} He is also interested in Continental theology,\textsuperscript{131} and in philosophical theology with special reference to the philosophy of language and the human self.\textsuperscript{132} Thiselton's interest, however, is not merely in dialogue or even in widened dialogue, but in dialogue towards critical synthesis.

\textbf{C. Concluding Comments: Dialogue Towards Critical Synthesis as Implicit Hermeneutical Axiom}

Several points can now be made about the development of Thiselton's hermeneutical theory by 1970. To begin with, Anglican churchmanship, biblical studies, biblical theology, systematic theology, pastoral and practical theology, and the mission of the church constitute the background of interests against which Thiselton develops his hermeneutical programme. Further, certain foci emerge within this background of interests. Thiselton's biblical studies interests sharpen to a focus on New Testament interpretation, Pauline studies, parable research, and 1 Corinthians. Thiselton seeks to relate biblical studies to systematic theology, particularly to eschatology and Christology, where eschatology is a key theme in 1 Corinthians and in Pannenberg's work. Thiselton's conservatism helps sharpen his focus on the biblical authority debate.

This background contextualises and precipitates Thiselton's hermeneutical programme to solve the hermeneutical problem. The hermeneutical problem concerns the "relationship between language, meaning, understanding, and truth"; how our "cultural environment conditions" our language and thought; and what "the Bible actually says to our own generation". Thus, it faces everyone, and

\textsuperscript{125} Thiselton, 'New Testament Commentary Survey', 9-10.
\textsuperscript{127} Thiselton, 'The Parables as Language-Event', 437-468.
\textsuperscript{129} Thiselton, 'Theological Survey Has No Rival', 12.
\textsuperscript{130} Thiselton, 'Theology and the Future', 11.
\textsuperscript{131} Thiselton, 'Mixed Encyclopedia of Continental Theology', p. 8.
“cannot be solved by a [once for all] theory”. Thiselton's hermeneutical programme comes in after the testing of existential categories and “the results of hermeneutical philosophy”, drawing on “advances in semantics, linguistics, and linguistic philosophy”. Traditional approaches to grammar and vocabulary have been surpassed, though concern for content or message, grammar and linguistics, theological and linguistic context, historical reconstruction, and practical application today remain important.

Thiselton’s hermeneutical programme thus advances biblical hermeneutics in relation to appeals to the later Wittgenstein, J.L. Austin, broader Anglo-American approaches to language (and the self), and to general linguistics and semantics. Thiselton follows Wittgenstein’s stress on the particular case, his antipathy to a priori generalisation, his work on blurred conceptual and semantic boundaries, on the potential creative functioning of assertions, and on ‘family resemblances’. Thiselton also adopts J.L. Austin’s logic of self-involvement, linking performative function to true statements, and views P.F. Strawson’s hermeneutic of the self as compatible with the Bible.

Thiselton’s hermeneutical programme also builds on existing Continental testing of existentialist and philosophical hermeneutical categories in biblical studies. Thiselton’s appeal to Continental hermeneutics, however, is mixed since it is critically-synthetically sublated into the framework of his appeals to the philosophy of language, general linguistics, and semantics, and of his dialogue between biblical studies and systematic theology. For Thiselton, Continental hermeneutics rightly stresses individual subjectivity, personhood, ‘creative’ pre-cognitive linguistic function, projected narrative ‘worlds’, ‘horizons’, self-involvement, the subversion of horizons of expectation, ‘language-events’, transformation, faith, decision, and practice. However, Thiselton argues that the corporate dimension of inter-subjective communication, and performative utterances and illocutionary speech-acts - together with the institutional and conventional states of affairs that their operation presupposes - should also be emphasised. Further, for Thiselton, certain forms of objectification, cognitive or theoretical conceptualisation, objective knowledge, discursive argument, historical-factual investigations into background, truth-criteria, description, truth-claims, propositions, assertions, or statements, still have a place. Thus, Thiselton rejects Continental historical, epistemological, and linguistic dualisms. Finally, Thiselton criticises Bultmann in relation to myth and analogy, history and faith, eschatology, dualisms, and narrowness of appeal to philosophy.

133. Thiselton, 'Theology and the Future', 11.
Further, for Thiselton, the later Wittgenstein, Pannenberg, T.F. Torrance, J. Macquarrie, and K.-O. Apel perform a mediating (cf. critical synthetic) role between Anglo-American and Continental traditions. In particular, this begs the question of how Thiselton inter-relates his appeals to Pannenberg and Wittgenstein. However, caution is needed before calling Thiselton 'Pannenbergian' or 'Wittgensteinian'. Since biblical studies forms part of the background to his systematics and hermeneutics, it is not surprising that Thiselton later explicitly criticises Pannenberg on the basis of biblical exegesis that employs Wittgensteinian tools. Conversely, eschatology provides Thiselton with a frame of reference and criteria against which appeals to Wittgenstein are more "techniques of investigation" than doctrines.\textsuperscript{135}

Thiselton's hermeneutical programme presupposes the inadequacy of traditional approaches to biblical hermeneutics, knowledge, and language. Ideational theories of language and epistemologies grounded in Platonic, Cartesian, or positivist frameworks are rejected. Yet, Thiselton is not simply 'post-Gadamerian' or 'post-Wittgensteinian', where we noted his comment about remaining "faithful to conservative principles, without losing the capacity to draw from many other sources".\textsuperscript{136} Nevertheless, so-called 'traditional' approaches may sometimes actually be less faithful to genuine Christian tradition than so-called 'postmodern' thought. However, Thiselton did still retain some traditional emphases. In 1970 he writes, "the ideational theory is... a special offshoot of referential theories of meaning, and this can only apply, if at all, in a very limited number of language-uses".\textsuperscript{137} That is, something like 'referential theory' occasionally applies. Assertions may function to communicate ideas, but not on a Platonic, Cartesian, or positivist basis. Thiselton sublates traditional insights into a new critical-synthetic frame.

Finally, there are hints of a rejection of neo-pragmatist approaches to truth and language in Thiselton's critique of Paul van Buren. This ties in with Thiselton's passing affirmation of K.-O. Apel, a socio-critical theorist opposed to the neo-pragmatism of Rorty.\textsuperscript{138} We conclude that by 1970 Thiselton's hermeneutical programme was underway, and that 'widened dialogue towards critical synthesis' was an implicit hermeneutical axiom in his approach.

\textsuperscript{134} Thiselton, 'Theology and the Future', 11.
\textsuperscript{136} Thiselton, 'Crossroads for Theology', 4.
\textsuperscript{137} Thiselton, 'The Parables as Language-Event', 452.
Chapter 2.


A. Preliminary Comments: How to Continue

Despite one comment concerning his “Sheffield period from 1970 to 1985”, Thiselton’s ‘second period’ of hermeneutical endeavour may be taken to be between 1970 and 1978 or 1980, depending on which criteria are considered.\(^1\) The start of Thiselton’s ‘second period’ is easily defined. Thiselton speaks of his move from Bristol to Sheffield University in 1970 as a “decisive turning point” in his career.\(^2\) Between 1970 and 1971, Thiselton was a Sir Henry Stephenson Fellow at Sheffield University whilst, in 1971, he was instated as a lecturer in biblical studies at Sheffield, and as a Member of the Church of England Faith and Order Advice Group.\(^3\) Since Thiselton only publishes book reviews in 1971, we can consider these to roughly represent the start of his ‘second period’. The end of Thiselton’s ‘second period’ is represented by publications from 1980 - the last to represent a major theoretical endeavour concluding around the end of 1978, after Thiselton’s first critique of structuralist approaches. Around 1979, Thiselton began work on articles published in 1981 and 1982, but these represent a theoretical endeavour post-dating that of The Two Horizons. It would contradict Thiselton’s autobiographical remarks in ‘Thirty Years of Hermeneutics’ to include these in Thiselton’s ‘second period’ since he ends sections two and three of this paper in 1980 with the publication of The Two Horizons;\(^4\) and sections four and five in 1992 with the publication of New Horizons in Hermeneutics.\(^5\) The symmetry is obvious: two periods of endeavour each concluded by a major work. Thiselton’s recounted illness around 1980-1, then, does not terminate his ‘second period’ of endeavour, but interrupts his ‘third period’.\(^6\) The end of his ‘second period’ is represented by the dearth of new

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*The Two Horizons* modifies the latter, it does so only with reference to material written by the end of

1978.7

During his ‘second period’ Thiselton embarked upon an inter-disciplinary expansion, in his concern
for education designing probably “the first final-year Honours degree course in hermeneutics”8. In
terms of contexts, Thiselton went from teaching in the Department of Biblical Studies and Theology to
also teaching in English, Linguistics, and Philosophy Departments. In terms of courses, Thiselton went
from teaching Biblical Studies, to also teaching Biblical Studies and English, and Philosophy and
Theology. In terms of academic content, Thiselton “offered public lectures on Wittgenstein in 1971-
1972”, going on to teach literary theory and semantics. Thus, “the stage was set for teaching a full

critical survey of hermeneutical theory”.9

Specifically, Thiselton’s course on hermeneutics developed between 1970 and 1980 as follows. Initial
foci included “[R.E.] Palmer’s book *Hermeneutics* (1969)” and “several others, especially on Bultmann
and myth”. During the early 1970s, the course expanded to include “the origins and development of
hermeneutics”, “the foundation of the modern discipline with Schleiermacher and Dilthey”,

“Bultmann and demythologising”, “Heidegger, Gadamer and the New Hermeneutic”, “functions of
language with reference to Wittgenstein and to speech-acts in Austin”, “the theological context and
the status of the Bible as scripture”, and “narrative theory and the relation between hermeneutics and
semantics”. The mid 1970s saw a “fresh topic on Latin American Liberation hermeneutics” and, in
the later 1970s, Thiselton included Ricoeur, Habermas, and Betti. By this time, Ricoeur’s *Freud and
Philosophy*, Gadamer’s *Truth and Method*, and Bultmann’s works constituted “part of the constant central
core” of the course. By 1980, Thiselton had added “a further unit on reader-response theory”. Thiselton’s conclusion of his account of inter-disciplinary expansion in 1980 confirms our point that
his ‘second period’ ends by that time.10 Thus, Thiselton pursued a widening dialogue in line with our
discussion of his ‘hermeneutical programme’ in Chapter 1.

Reference to the Use of Philosophical Description in Heidegger, Bultmann, Gadamer, and Wittgenstein*. (Sheffield: University of Sheffield
Taking Thiselton’s 108 publications between 1971 and 1980 to represent his ‘second period’ of endeavour, questions arise related to our approach. Flat thematic approaches are susceptible to historical insensitivity, anachronism, and over-neat ‘consumer-packaged’ prior categorisation. Conversely, strictly chronological approaches are too repetitious and voluminous since, occasionally, Thiselton repeats himself year after year. Strict chronology also lacks communicative clarity, losing the ‘wholes’ amidst the ‘parts’. Specifically, such an approach would pay more attention to Thiselton’s PhD Thesis (1976) than to The Two Horizons (1980), which would seem odd. Thus, we defer treatment of the former until we consider both in Chapters 6 and 7. This is justified since The Two Horizons modifies Thiselton’s PhD Thesis only slightly, constituting a more mature version of the latter, and, in ‘Thirty Years of Hermeneutics’, Thiselton also consigns comment on The Two Horizons to a separate section having already broadly covered the period between 1970 and 1980.

Thus, we offer a ‘chronological-thematic’ approach, looking at themes for the sake of clarity, but treating each theme with appropriate chronological sensitivity. This looks less neat, admittedly, but, as Thiselton remarks later, historical consciousness faces the “messiness of it all”. Our themes divide into those relating to background context and those relating to theoretical content. In the rest of Chapter 2, we consider the former.

B. Background Context of Thiselton’s ‘Second Period’ Writings

To understand Thiselton’s ‘second period’ writings, we must look at Thiselton as an author, and at Thiselton’s historical context. As C. Conroy puts it, the “importance” of Thiselton’s work can only become “clear when one considers both its rich content and its Sitz im Leben”. Part of the difficulty in ‘hearing’ Thiselton, however, is due to his widening historical dialogue. David Olford, one of Thiselton’s former students, remarks, “Thiselton is so busy listening to and expounding the work of

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others, that it is very difficult to actually isolate his own thought”. The complexity and style of Thiselton’s work, then, is such that, without considering ‘background context’, it would be extremely difficult to isolate his own thought from that of the writers he considers.

1. More on Thiselton as an Author: Character or Caricature?

Considering Thiselton as an author, then, he enjoyed a period of stability from 1971 until 1977, when four changes occurred. First, he became Examinations Chaplain to the Bishop of Sheffield. Second, he joined the Doctrine Commission of the Church of England. Third, Sheffield University awarded Thiselton his PhD, and fourth, his paper, ‘Understanding God’s Word Today’, created a stir at the second National Evangelical Anglican Congress (NEAC ’77) in Nottingham. Meanwhile, Thiselton remained on the Church of England Faith and Order Advice Group, and continued as a lecturer in biblical studies at Sheffield University. In 1979, Thiselton also became Examinations Chaplain to the Bishop of Leicester, and was promoted to Senior Lecturer at the University of Sheffield.

His academic appointments and PhD award aside, then only the impact of Thiselton’s NEAC ’77 paper ‘Understanding God’s Word Today’ remains relevant to our purposes here since, clearly, this was a watershed in Thiselton’s development as an author, academic, and Anglican churchman.

Thus, Thiselton argued, first, that the defence of biblical authority depends not on “abstract and theoretical” assertion but on the Bible’s “practical cash-value” in “use”. Biblical authority and hermeneutics are interwoven, cohering with “Reformation” emphases, contrary to C.A.F. Warner’s charges of “heresy”. Thiselton insists he did not use “the word ‘hermeneutics’ from the platform at NEAC”, but affirms others’ use of the term to summarise his subject. S. Niell, however, remembers differently: Thiselton’s “introduction of this strange and barbarous word... set several cats among the pigeons”. Some thought Thiselton was advocating the New Hermeneutic and a “fresh bout of liberal scholarship”. R. Manwaring recounts that “hermeneutics became a ‘shocker’ at Nottingham and...

18. Verbal comments made to me personally in October 2001 at a conference in Cardiff.
Thiselton... produced the shock waves!” W. Bebbington implicates Thiselton and J.D.G. Dunn in a subsequent Church split over biblical authority. To the question, ‘For what is the Bible authoritative?’ Thiselton answered, “the Bible did authoritatively what it set out to do”, adding that we “may even have to... abandon some of our cherished conceptions because they are not... truly biblical”. Thiselton’s introduction of hermeneutics to defend biblical authority, then, was atypical for the evangelical setting of his address.

Second, on the issue of women’s ordination, Thiselton “offered two possible responses and invited his hearers to choose”. If we preserved “the claims of the old creation order”, there could be “no women ministers”. If we took “the view that the new age was crowding out the old”, then there could “definitely [be] women ministers”. This “left the audience (deliberately, on the part of the speaker) without any ready-made answer”, presumably since, for Thiselton, a desire for ready-made answers falls foul of Wittgenstein’s and Gadamer’s critiques of Enlightenment ‘method’ (see Chapter 3). Thiselton’s indirect Kierkegaardian dialectical approach, coupled with his Pannenbergian view that divine action changes historical ‘truth’ through time and his “programmatic” emphasis, only heightened NEAC ‘77 awareness that there was “much work yet to be done” on women’s

ordination. This, for many, “hermeneutics... preserved its forbidding image”. Thiselton’s philosophy-rich and implicitly ‘pro-women-ministers’ stance was, again, atypical of the evangelical setting he was addressing.

Third, Thiselton’s impact at NEAC ’77 also included strong opposition. Thus, one report recalls that hermeneutics was “lampooned and subject to ribald comment at almost every meeting”, where “many a clergyman at NEAC was found sheepishly avoiding anybody who might have pointed out to him that his hermeneutic had been defective for... years”. Delegates “will probably have a sigh of relief” that “the dreaded word ‘hermeneutic’ does not appear” in the Congress Statement, though hermeneutics rightly discourages “trying to force the Bible to answer distinctively modern questions to which the text does not refer”. John King rejoices in “the dubbing given to that pretentious term ‘hermeneutics’”, though he is probably reacting to a rebuke from Thiselton two months previously. Thiselton’s sitting on four NEAC planning committees gave him “a better vantage-point” for making judgments than “John King has”. Thiselton’s agreement with John Stott “from time to time” did not mean, contrary to King’s “journalese”, that Thiselton had no ‘intellectual integrity’. Whilst Stott, as Congress chairman, fended off opposition, however, Thiselton still spoke for “quite a number”, being considered an emerging evangelical leader.

Thus, fourth, many evangelicals were late-comers to hermeneutics, and reacted badly to perceived threats to existing interpretative practices. The NEAC ’77 report considers it “strange” that evangelicals had only now “stumbled upon such a vital topic”. “The reason” hermeneutics “has suddenly come into prominence (though I don’t think anybody really got the message delivered) is that non-Evangelicals have recently started interpreting the Bible in new ways” as in, for example,

liberation theology.\textsuperscript{37} Even in 1980 J. Macquarrie observes, “Thiselton has... to persuade biblicists and evangelicals that... [hermeneutics] is worthwhile”. Evangelicals are too ready to ignore historical distance and attempt to apply the Bible’s teachings directly.\textsuperscript{38} Similarly, in 1982, R.K. Johnston also tries to prompt evangelicals to adopt Thiselton’s hermeneutics.\textsuperscript{39} Historically, then, Thiselton is controversial, a trouble-shooter responding to problems in evangelical and Anglican settings.

Fifth, Thiselton’s impact at NEAC ’77 also included a deeper-level positive response. C. Buchanan called Thiselton’s address a “sensation” of “apologetics”. Some saw hermeneutics as “either so trivial we all do it anyway, or so recondite we couldn’t do it if we tried”. But, for others, “deep down, at the gut-level, something shifted”. Though some wanted to “dodge the demands of hermeneutics”, it is now “on our agenda. We have seen a shadow flit across a wall, and we cannot be quite the same again”. The “hermeneutics swing” “happened deep down”, and “we can never go back”.\textsuperscript{40} Whilst J.R.W. Stott had predicted the “crucial importance” of Thiselton’s paper for NEAC ’77,\textsuperscript{41} however, some neglect to mention it in their reports.\textsuperscript{42}

Thus, Thiselton made an impact at NEAC ’77, entering the evangelical world on the familiar issue of biblical authority, but subverting that world by re-casting the issue in unfamiliar terms: ‘to defend the biblical authority you embrace, you need the hermeneutics you avoid’. Thiselton employed a device not too distant from ‘parable’ to expose, enchant, and enrage different sections of his audience,\textsuperscript{43} successfully altering evangelical attitudes to hermeneutics.\textsuperscript{44} Yet, Thiselton is strangely silent in ‘Thirty Years of Hermeneutics’ about NEAC ’77. Partly, this could be humility, a quality his pupils affirm in him.\textsuperscript{45} Partly, however, it could be painful alienation. Thiselton was clearly misunderstood and rejected by many, and pursued a stance still unacceptable to many others during the 1980s.\textsuperscript{46} Thus, during his ‘second period’, Thiselton is an atypical evangelical, a controversial character - humble and prophetic to some, subversive to others, but certainly very important in introducing evangelicals to

\textsuperscript{40} Buchanan, C., ‘The Shifts at Gut Level’, CEN 6 May (1977), 11.
\textsuperscript{43} Thiselton, ‘Understanding God’s Word Today’ (Longer Article), 90-122.
\textsuperscript{45} D. Olford, J. Thurgood, and M. Lovett have all affirmed that humility is one of Thiselton’s qualities.
hermeneutics. He is not simply an academic, but an involved and leading churchman. Yet, he seems painfully alienated from ‘right wing’ conservatives. Indeed, we may ask, ‘just how ‘evangelical’ is Thiselton?’

Whilst Thiselton warns against easy ‘consumer’ ‘pigeon-holing’ of thinkers’ ‘positions’,47 he is nevertheless sometimes pigeon-holed as ‘evangelical’, ‘liberal’, or ‘Anglican’. Indeed, during the 1970s, Thiselton identifies himself as a ‘self-critical, moderate, conservative, evangelical’. Thus, he writes in 1971, G.E. Ladd, a “conservative”, will hopefully encourage “evangelicals” to be “more faithful” to Scripture, “weaning us away from... short-cuts to ‘devotional’ applications”.48 Certainly, Thiselton takes his “cue from the theologians of the New Testament”.49 Further, he asserts, “conservatives” pay more attention to “non-conservatives” than vice versa.50 Yet, following Pannenberg, Thiselton rejects “conservative” authoritarianism, Platonism, fideism of the word, and separation of faith and rationality.51

In 1973, Thiselton applauds N. Anderson’s “conservative conclusions about the Bible”, his “evangelical conclusions about... doctrine”, and his critique of Bultmann’s “undue scepticism about... the historical Jesus”. Yet, many evangelicals also “bypass” proper exegetical practice.52 Thus, evangelical ordinands need to take “biblical criticism” and “philosophical theology more seriously”, not “treating Scripture as a bran-tub of timeless oracles”.53 Many evangelicals avoid “patient... careful theological debate”, despite its being “a solemn obligation implied by being ‘under’ Scripture”.54

In 1974, Thiselton is still part of the evangelical church, but critical of it.55 He commends “evangelicals” for at last looking to broader “world problems and ethics”, but neither for avoiding

proper “theological resources” and “method”, nor for one-sidedness when addressing key contemporary questions. Thiselton attacks “naive pietistical” antipathy to “doubt”, since doubt can engender “self-criticism, change, and progress”. Some evangelicals “ransack the Bible... for isolated proof-texts... The phrase or sentence is a timeless oracle, cut loose from its... original historical and literary context”.56 Thiselton prefers “the ‘ecclesiastical’ type of church favoured by Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin, and reflected in Lutheranism”, to “the ‘sectarian’ churches of the evangelical radicals” or “enthusiasts”.57

In 1975, Thiselton applauds M.D. Goulder’s challenge to “traditional pietism”,58 and praises C.K. Barrett’s commentary on 2 Corinthians.59 Contrary to A.T. Hanson, however, whilst “modern writers” successfully underline “difficulties” in “traditional Christology”, their insights still “fall far short of replacing” the creeds.60

In 1976, Thiselton affirms R.P. Martin’s “conservative” New Testament scholarship, which will annoy “right-wing conservatives”, but please “moderate conservatives”.61 Elsewhere, Thiselton attacks a “trendy” Anglican focus on “dialogue” that precludes “proclamation” since the Christian “is... committed” to “practical whole-hearted submission to the authority and truth of Christ”. Christians should “stand in continuity with the New Testament” and “believe that they have received an insight into truth which has the status of divine revelation”. This is neither “arrogance” nor “egotism”, but “honesty and integrity” that acknowledges the “grace of God”.62 In his 1976 revision of Thiselton’s ‘New Testament Commentary Survey’, D.A. Carson writes, “although both author and reviser are evangelicals, neither of us are simplistically partisan”.63

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In 1977 Thiselton praises I.H. Marshall’s “intellectual... integrity” in accepting “the New Testament evidence about Jesus of Nazareth” as historically authentic. Marshall rightly invokes “critical scholarship... in the service of Christian faith” without resorting to the wrong “harmonising” of some “conservative[s]”.

Thiselton was also involved in ‘Dialogue 77’, an evangelical students’ Christian outreach at Sheffield University.

In 1978, Thiselton affirms R.C. Roberts’ attacks on Bultmann’s dualisms, since there are “objective grounds” for New Testament faith in historical facts, miracles, and “the resurrection of Christ”. Roberts rightly highlights Bultmann’s indebtedness to “the spirit of the age”, and his problematic “view of language and meaning”. Yet Roberts’ “one-sided” polemic misses Bultmann’s “complexity and subtlety” and his debt to “Hermann, Dilthey, Neo-Kantian epistemology, nineteenth-century Lutheranism and... dialectical theology”. And yet, Roberts’ work is still “one of the better” conservative treatments of the subject.


Thus, in describing Thiselton, the use of the term ‘evangelical’ requires four qualifiers, where the broad use of the term ‘evangelical’ recently makes qualifications important. First, he is ‘conservative’, regarding biblical authority and tradition highly. Second, Thiselton is ‘moderate’ as opposed to ‘right

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wing’, and very critical of much evangelicalism though, third, thereby also ‘self-critical’. Fourth, awkwardly but unavoidably, Thiselton is ‘historical-hermeneutical’. His programmatic historical approach opposes the ‘evangelical’ desire for fast answers; his hermeneutical approach moves beyond Enlightenment epistemology by acknowledging the experiential, inter-subjective, and temporal dimensions of understanding, 70 and by his deliberate attempts to creatively initiate understanding through ‘indirect’ communication. 71 Thus, he transposes ‘epistemology’ into a larger frame (see Chapter 3). 72

Therefore, Thiselton cannot simply be caricatured as ‘evangelical’ during his ‘second period’. And yet several reviewers perhaps fall into this trap. 73 J. Pereppadan, for example, caricatures Thiselton, writing “the theological thinking of...[the evangelical] community seems to have exerted great influence on him...”. 74 Conversely, N.L. Geisler bemoans Thiselton’s “liberal tendencies”. 75 Thiselton, however, is neither simply ‘evangelical’ nor ‘liberal’. But is he simply ‘Anglican’?

If the category ‘Anglican’ can be assumed at all, then Thiselton’s Anglicanism also requires careful qualification. In two papers from his ‘second period’, he actively contributes to the ecumenical debate between Anglicans, Lutherans, and Methodists. 76 Thiselton also notes “the vast theological influence


on Anglican thinkers of Bultmann, Tillich, Althous, Bornkamm, Käsemann, Ebeling, [and] Schlink". 77 Yet, Thiselton cannot be viewed as belonging to any of these thinkers' respective traditions. 78 He diplomatically speaks of "common ground among Anglicans", but is certainly not 'Bultmannian' as we have seen. 79 Thiselton also recommends the Roman Catholic writer Karl Rahner to "Protestant readers". 80 Even during Thiselton's early years, therefore, he cannot be shelved under the generalising category 'Anglicanism', and we reject M.G. Brett's later comments that Thiselton's "transcendental hermeneutic" is "enshrined in Anglicanism". 81

Thus, a contrast emerges between Thiselton's policy of listening and widening dialogue with multiple traditions - though he also works towards critical synthesis - and hermeneutical foreclosure (i.e. coming to premature interpretative conclusions based on prior categorisations without or before sufficient listening in dialogue) amongst some who respond to his work. One begins to wonder: how well has Thiselton been heard? Yet, which historical traditions or currents, in academic thinking and debate, in contemporary Church practice, and in broader secular culture does Thiselton's widening dialogue embrace in his 'second period'? And so our focus shifts from Thiselton as an author to his Sitz im Leben.


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2. Historical Context: Thiselton's Immersion in Processes of Traditions

Thiselton's hermeneutical concern for widened dialogue engenders his 'immersion in the processes of traditions' (cf. Gadamer's notion of "understanding... as participating in an event of tradition").

Thiselton's immersion in multiple traditions also relates to his later Wittgensteinian concern for multiple angles of view or a "change of aspect" on any given issue.

a) Philosophy, Hermeneutics, & Philosophical Theology

Thus, in his 'second tradition', Thiselton responds to traditions and debates in philosophy, hermeneutics, and philosophical theology - there are close links between philosophical studies and hermeneutics in Thiselton. For Thiselton, hermeneutics is "an absurdly neglected study in English theology at all levels"; where The Two Horizons answers the "desperate need of the English-speaking world for a sympathetic, thorough, yet critical survey of the German hermeneutical tradition and its relation to linguistic philosophy". That is, "the Anglo-American theological tradition in general remained 'extrêmement réfractaire à la tradition herménéutique continentale'", particularly in Britain.

Thiselton dialogues between hermeneutics, theology, and philosophical advances in relation to history, epistemology, language, the human self, and interpretative practice. R.L. Maddox notes Thiselton's foci on history, theology, and language in The Two Horizons in this respect, though some wrongly imply that Thiselton's hermeneutics centre only on these three axes. Historically, Thiselton finds nine points of departure in relation to philosophy, hermeneutics, and philosophical theology, as follows.

First, Thiselton responds to the Greek, Enlightenment, and positivist legacies of 'traditional' approaches. Thus, (i), in traditional theology, Thiselton attacks the notion of 'timeless truth', approving

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84. Nicholson, G., 'Transforming What We Know', RasPhen 16 (1986), 57.
85. Sykes, S.W., 'Review of A.C. Thiselton's The Two Horizons', Chman 96.2 (1982), 156.
J.A.T. Robinson’s rejection of “fifth century” metaphysical ‘substance’ categories” and the ‘natural versus supernatural’ ‘dualism’.\(^{90}\) (ii) Against a positivist view of history, Thiselton employs Pannenberg’s critique of E. Troeltsch to reject D.E. Nineham’s “cynicism over... historical relativity” and distance.\(^{91}\) (iii) Thiselton also criticises traditional epistemological ‘objectivism’ and the correspondence, coherence, redundancy, semantic, and performative theories of truth. He criticises the Cartesian ‘scientific method’ of “classification and generalisation”,\(^{92}\) though B.J. Walsh exaggerates in suggesting that Thiselton simply ‘rejects’ the Cartesian tradition.\(^{93}\) (iv) Thiselton largely rejects ‘prescriptive’, ‘natural’ (cf. ‘dynamic’), ‘Lockean’ (cf. ‘dianoetic’), or ‘positivist’ (cf. ‘logical’) approaches to language.\(^{94}\)

‘Traditional’ approaches rest on false assumptions, and over-stress vocabulary, grammar, and style.\(^{95}\) Semantics must not presuppose ‘referential’ or ‘ideational’ theories of meaning since,\(^{96}\) following Gadamer and contrary to E.D. Hirsch, a text’s “meaning... always goes beyond its author”.\(^{97}\) Communication is not primarily ‘informing’ statements ‘clothing’ prior inner concepts,\(^{98}\) and translation does not presuppose “one-word/one-concept” correspondence.\(^{99}\) (v) Interpretative practice should not employ generalising exegetical ‘rules’ to perpetuate already-accepted understandings of texts.\(^{100}\) Being rid of “the fallacy of... atomising exegesis which pays insufficient attention to context” is urgent.\(^{101}\) Traditional theological opposition to hermeneutics wrongly rejects the role of pre-understanding in interpretation,\(^{102}\) and wrongly argues that the Holy Spirit replaces hermeneutics.\(^{103}\)

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98. Thiselton, ‘Semantics and New Testament Interpretation’, 76 (para. 4); cf. 79 (para. 3).
M.I. Wallace's challenge of Thiselton's critique of Karl Barth in this respect is over-simplistic.104 Contrary to C. Van Til, Thiselton's use of "philosophical concepts and categories" does not corrupt the biblical message but elucidates it.105 Thus, Thiselton defends "the legitimacy and necessity of hermeneutics... against various biblicistic or fundamentalist objections".106 (ii) Thiselton challenges Freud's positivist epistemology, but agrees that the human self is self-deceptive.107

**Second,** Thiselton attacks the legacy of "Neo-Kantianism" in 'existentialist' hermeneutics,108 especially the dualisms or dichotomies pervading Bulmann's biblical hermeneutics, but also E. Cassirer's 'Enlightenment' view of myth.109 Neo-Kantianism is linked to the epistemological and linguistic 'problem of objectification'.110

**Third,** Thiselton dialogues with the "Anglo-American tradition of philosophical analysis".111 In particular, the later Wittgenstein, J.L. Austin, and D.D. Evans inaugurate speech-act theory, which Thiselton later includes within his 'hermeneutics of self-involvement'.112 However, Thiselton's "horizon" is not predominantly "populated by the typically British concerns of philosophical analysis of language".113

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106. Conroy, 'Review of *The Two Horizons*', 564
Fourth, Thiselton responds to general linguistics and semantics in Saussure's tradition, where J. Barr and J.A.F. Sawyer become important influences.114 Thiselton's contention is that "New Testament exegetes have not availed themselves sufficiently of the fruit of semantic study", and "have maintained false assumptions about language".115 Thiselton responds to this problem with his article, 'Semantics and New Testament Interpretation' where,116 like A. Gibson, he "felt compelled to reiterate Barr's work" since many biblical scholars had "not appreciated" its potential impact.117 Thiselton urges both preachers and colleges to note the "immediate relevance" of the work of E. Güttgemanns, and R. Kieffer on semantics although,118 in 1978, he also responds critically to structuralist approaches,119 attacking the 'ideological' structuralism of Lévi-Strauss, R. Barthes, E. Leach, and E. Güttgemanns (sic), but partly affirming 'methodological' appropriations of the work of Saussure, V.I. Propp, and A.J. Greimas.120 More 'mid-range' or "eclectic" structuralist approaches (e.g. that of D.O. Via) receive a mixed response.121

Fifth, "Continental European traditions" of hermeneutics loom large in Thiselton's historical context.122 J. Bleicher speaks of three major 'schools' of thought within the "contemporary..."


117. Porter, S.E., '2 Myths, Corporate Personality and Language Mentality Determinism', SFT 43.3 (1990), 301-302.


122. Thiselton, 'Thirty Years', 1560.
philosophical discussion of hermeneutics”, but Thiselton responds to six schools in Continental European hermeneutics alone during his ‘second period’. Thus, (i), Thiselton later identifies the work of Schleiermacher, Dilthey, and Betti as a ‘modern’ hermeneutics of understanding, but engages with these thinkers in his ‘second period’, finding H. Kimmerle’s work on Schleiermacher important. (ii) Thiselton later includes broadly ‘existentialist’ thinkers within his ‘hermeneutics of self-involvement’. Theological and ‘secular’ strands include Kierkegaard, Bultmann, and Tillich, and, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Jaspers, and Sartre respectively, though Thiselton acknowledges that Heidegger is not strictly an existentialist thinker. (iii) Thiselton appeals extensively to Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, but also responds to the New Hermeneutic of Fuchs, Ebeling, and H. Ott (which has links both to the later Heidegger and Gadamer), and its American counterpart in the work of R.W. Funk, W. Wink, D.O. Via, and J.D. Crossan. (iv) Thiselton later categorises Ricoeur’s work as the ‘hermeneutics of suspicion and retrieval’, but also responds to Ricoeur in his ‘second period’. (v) J. Habermas and K.-O. Apel belong to what Thiselton later calls ‘socio-critical hermeneutics’, though Thiselton had appealed to Apel by 1970, and taught on Habermas by the late 1970s. (vi) Thiselton identifies Moltmann’s ‘socio-critical’ eschatology and Pannenberg’s epistemological eschatology as ‘theologies of hope’ where Hegel is not far in the background.

123. Maddox, ‘Contemporary Hermeneutic Philosophy’, 519-520.
133. Thiselton, Thirty Years, 1563.
Pannenberg’s belief in the centrality of hermeneutics for theology is important for Thiselton.\textsuperscript{135} E. Schüssler-Fiorenza\textsuperscript{136} and J.P. Hogan note the close links between theology and hermeneutics in relation to Thiselton and Pannenberg respectively.\textsuperscript{137}

Already, then, prior to 1980, Thiselton had widened his dialogue to embrace several different traditions,\textsuperscript{138} which P.J. Cahill rightly links to Thiselton’s engagement with the rise of “historical consciousness” through Herder, Hegel, Ranke and Dilthey.\textsuperscript{139} Thiselton does not only stress “the historicity of human existence”, but also “the historical” and the “historic”.\textsuperscript{140} Similarly, Thiselton criticises ‘existentialist’ and ‘philosophical hermeneutical’ traditions for their epistemological oned-sidedness and linguistic dualism.\textsuperscript{141} Thus, M.E. Thrall cites Thiselton’s “perceptive” critique of “deficiencies” in the New Hermeneutic.\textsuperscript{142} J. Barr, however, wrongly urges that Thiselton accepts the New Hermeneutic “quite cordially” in a “profound abandonment of essential conservative territory”.\textsuperscript{143} However, Thiselton simply argues that “at the present there is more danger of neglecting the New Hermeneutic than of pressing its claims too far”.\textsuperscript{144} Nor does Thiselton succumb to Gadamerian “historical relativism”.\textsuperscript{145} Rather, as R.E. Palmer notes, Thiselton’s reception of Gadamer is critical (see Chapter 6). Yet, qualifying Palmer’s reading, Thiselton’s is not simply a “Pannenbergian critique” of Gadamer.\textsuperscript{146} D.J. Smit’s belief that Thiselton is “from the USA” may hark back to Thiselton’s sabbatical in North America from 1982 to 1984,\textsuperscript{147} and N.L. Geisler is simply mistaken to


record that Thiselton did his PhD in “Aberdeen”.148 W. Wink’s insinuation that ‘belief’, for Thiselton, does not go beyond “mere ‘behaviour’ and ‘words’” seems ignorant of Thiselton’s response to E. Fuchs’ treatment of Jesus’ parables in which the hearer is ‘grasped deep down’.149 That Thiselton has been deeply misunderstood in these and other ways will emerge fully in Chapter 7.

**Sixth**, Thiselton responds to three other philosophical or philosophical-theological trends in his ‘second period’. (i) By 1980, Thiselton had taught on “Reader-Response Theory”, though his main responses to American pragmatism and neo-pragmatism appear later.150 However, in 1978, Thiselton rejects the ‘pragmatic’ theory of truth originating with C.S. Peirce, W. James, and J. Dewey.151 (ii) Thiselton’s responses to Freud and M. Buber are juxtaposed, hinting at Thiselton’s ongoing interest in a hermeneutics of the self.152 (iii) T.F. Torrance influences Thiselton’s view of the relationship between Christianity and rationality.153 D. Cupitt’s early Neo-Kantian look at Christology, W.W. Bartley III’s work on morality and religion, and P.A. Bertocci’s personalist perspectives also receive consideration.154

**Seventh**, Thiselton responds to debates on the relationships between language, thought, and power. (i) Thiselton engages with the polarised debate between the tradition of W. Von Humboldt and B.L. Whorf, and, certain strands in general linguistics. The former hold that thought is determined by language, whereas the latter view thought as almost completely independent of language (see Chapter 4).155 (ii) On the ‘power’ of language, Thiselton attacks both ‘natural’ accounts of language and ‘dualistic’ accounts affected by ‘natural’ views. O. Procksch, G. von Rad, J. Pedersen, L. Dürr,  

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Grether, and H. Ringgren come under fire on the one hand; Heidegger, Gadamer, Fuchs and Ebeling on the other. In particular, the power of models, metaphors, symbols, and pictures concerns Thiselton, where M.E. Boring takes up Thiselton’s warnings about ‘controlling pictures’ (drawing on the later Wittgenstein).

Eighth, Thiselton extends dialogue between Heidegger, the later Wittgenstein, Saussure and general linguistics, and by 1978 brings structuralism into the discussion. Centrally, for Thiselton, Wittgenstein’s view of language-games “has... parallels with Heidegger’s understanding of ‘world’ and... Gadamer’s notion of... ‘horizon’.” Further, Heidegger’s notion of ‘saying’ is analogous to Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘showing’ - both reveal what is of true value. B.J. Walsh rightly commends Thiselton’s “unparalleled... crossing” of “traditional barriers between Anglo-Saxon and Continental thought” and his “appropriating and synthesising” of “insights” from “both traditions while avoiding their respective pitfalls”. Thiselton rejects “the oft-mentioned incompatibility of the ‘German’ philosophical tradition of Heidegger and the ‘English’... philosophical tradition of Wittgenstein... in favour of... fruitful comparison and interaction between the two”. Thus, in relating Wittgenstein’s thought to that of Heidegger and Gadamer, Thiselton helps demolish the dividing wall between “English and Continental thought”. Indeed, “many... have wondered why Wittgenstein and Heidegger have not been brought together” before. Nevertheless, for Thiselton “British philosophy... provides finer tools with which to approach language” than Heidegger.

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159. E.g. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 428-431.
Ninth, C. Conroy complains that Thiselton, during his ‘second period’, fails to respond to “the ‘crisis of hermeneutics’” associated with the “Habermas-Gadamer debate”, “the... Positivismusstreit (H. Albert and others)”, and “the deconstructionist grammatology of J. Derrida”. However, as we argue in Chapter 7, Thiselton lays down the groundwork for his later responses to Habermas, Gadamer, and Derrida by 1980. Thus, Conroy falsely presupposes that The Two Horizons in no sense addresses the issues he mentions. Further, Thiselton’s response to almost every hermeneutical trend appears in New Horizons in Hermeneutics (1992). Admittedly, Thiselton’s ‘inter-disciplinary expansion’ during the 1970s was a period of ongoing discovery. Thus, Thiselton writes, “I began to see” Ricoeur’s and Habermas’ importance in “the later 1970s”. Further, the 1976 date for most of The Two Horizons partly explains the lack of the extensive treatment of Ricoeur noted by Conroy, R.E. Palmer, and S.M. Schneiders. Similar arguments apply to the “Roman Catholic” hermeneutics that Conroy finds missing, notably those of K. Rahner, E. Coreth, H. Cazelles, and P. Grelot. Nevertheless, Conroy’s point that the “importance” of Thiselton’s work can only become “clear when one considers both its rich content and its Sitz im Leben” is proving true. We are beginning to expose significant misreadings of Thiselton, and to see his historical place in relation to traditions and debates in philosophy, hermeneutics, and philosophical theology.

**b) Biblical Interpretation**

In his ‘second period’, Thiselton also responds to traditions, developments, debates, and issues in biblical interpretation, though some overlap with the previous theme is inevitable. Thiselton’s responses divide into broader responses to traditions, schools, trends, and associated debates, and responses to specific exegetical issues.

Thus, broadly, Thiselton responds to early twentieth century biblical studies - the conservatism of P.T. Forsyth, B.B. Warfield, H.C.G. Moule, and J. Orr, the liberalism of A. von Harnack, W. Rauschenbusch, A. Loisy, and R.J. Campbell, the ‘History of Religions School’, and the work of A.

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Schweitzer and J. Weiss. And yet, Thiselton normally only responds to older movements whose legacy can be felt today. Conversely, he responds to fourteen recent movements, as follows.

First, as already noted, Thiselton has a mixed response to traditional, evangelical, and positivist approaches to biblical interpretation, including to the ‘Biblical Theology Movement’ (1945-1968) upon which evangelicalism draws. Notably, Thiselton critiques “traditional historical-critical” methods, not merely supplementing tradition with “new” approaches “which draw upon recent philosophical thought”. That is, Thiselton’s context included “recent attempts to go beyond historicism”. Indeed, The Two Horizons “must be viewed in the context of the trauma that has arisen in theological circles over the impact of a certain type of historical-critical study of the Bible” reflecting “a certain positivist philosophical bias” since “Ernst Troeltsch (1865-1929)”. Thus, Thiselton rejects D.E. Nineham’s approach as dated, positivistic, ignorant of Continental hermeneutics, too pessimistic about “the problem of historical distance”, and similar to an Enlightenment approach to myth in rejecting the supernatural as belonging to “a pre-critical worldview” - hardly the supposedly “value-neutral” phenomenology Nineham’s approach “superficially” resembles.

Second, Thiselton responds to Bultmann and his demythologisation programme. Indeed, "biblical hermeneutics in the last three decades has been dominated by Bultmann's... programme". Thiselton argues, in *The Two Horizons*, that "most of the distortions in Bultmann's" approach "come... not from Heidegger... but from a neo-Kantian dualism of fact and value". Thiselton thus rejects "Bultmann's 'esoteric' conception of meaning", appealing to "Wittgenstein's critique of language" in which 'meaning' presupposes public criteria. Thiselton complains that Bultmann has drawn from "too narrow a tradition of philosophy" (at the level of critical-synthetic filter constitution - see our Introduction) in his biblical interpretation, generating scepticism about knowledge of the historical Jesus, separating thought from language, and foreclosing in advance certain interpretative "possibilities". Bultmann's conclusions are "read off from the form of the argument, not from concrete particularities of exegesis". Thiselton also dialogues with the two major German volumes that respond to Bultmann's demythologisation programme, and D.F. Strauss also comes under attack. Nevertheless, citing E. Schillebeeckx and B. Lonergan, Thiselton applauds some of Bultmann's insights into Pauline anthropology and into hermeneutical understanding, defending

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him from conservatives who fail to appreciate his subtlety as a thinker. However, Thiselton rejects Bultmann's "individualism and radical subjectivism" (see Chapter 6).

Third, Thiselton attacks J.A.T. Robinson and M. Wiles of the British Bultmannian School for their Kantian or Dilthey-type dualistic separations of 'fact' and 'value', 'science' and 'myth', and 'non-objectifying' and 'objectifying' language. Further, Thiselton attacks the 'New Morality' of Robinson and others. Fourth, Thiselton criticises the Continental Post-Bultmannian Movement for failing to correct Bultmann's approach to history. Thiselton's response to the New Hermeneutic (E. Fuchs and G. Ebeling) is more extensive than that to the New Quest of the Historical Jesus (E. Käsemann, E. Fuchs, G. Bornkamm, G. Ebeling, and H. Conzelman). Importantly, for Thiselton, Fuchs asks, 'What does the Bible actually say to our own generation?' and, 'How does the message of the New Testament strike home today?'. Thiselton esteems the New Hermeneutic in relation to parable interpretation and preaching, though he also criticises its one-sidedness. Fifth, as noted above, Thiselton responds to the American counterpart to the New Hermeneutic, valuing the work of R.W. Funk, D.O. Via, and J.D. Crossan on Jesus' parables, and W. Wink's attack on contemporary New Testament studies, though criticisms applying to the New Hermeneutic also apply here.

Sixth, Thiselton responds favourably to Pannenberg's biblical interpretation in relation to myth, history, and the relationship between apocalyptic and eschatology, accepting Pannenberg's

198. Thiselton, 'Post-Bultmannian Perspectives', 89 (para. 6).
Modifications of B.S. Childs' conclusions in this context. Seventh, Thiselton applauds the application of the work of the later Wittgenstein and J.L. Austin to biblical interpretation by D.D. Evans and O.R. Jones. Thiselton believes himself to be the first New Testament scholar to appropriate the later Wittgenstein's work, though he is followed closely by D. Jasper and J.W. Voelz. In particular, Thiselton appeals to Wittgenstein against arguments that early Christians merely inherited their authoritative view of Scripture "as a cultural presupposition... accepted uncritically". A. Gibson approves both Thiselton's "introducing logical topics to biblical linguistics" and "Thiselton's judgement that philosophical semantics can supplement linguistic semantics", though Thiselton later criticises Gibson's work. Eighth, we have already noted Thiselton's response to Saussure's linguistics and their applications by J. Barr, J.A.F. Sawyer, and others. Traditional assumptions about language and translation come under fire, the relationship between semantics and hermeneutics is clarified, and valuable insights emerge for both academics and preachers. Ninth, Thiselton approves conservative reinstatements of the historical Jesus, particularly the work of G.E. Ladd, C.K. Barrett, I.H. Marshall, and F.F. Bruce. Tenth, we have already noted Thiselton's response to structuralist approaches. Eleventh, Thiselton responds to Latin American liberation hermeneutics and its appropriation of Marxist thought, including it in his hermeneutics course by "the mid-1970s". Twelfth, Thiselton


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notes the ‘contextualising’ approaches to biblical interpretation in African and Indian theology. 

Thirteenth, Thiselton criticises the ‘Death of God Movement’ of T.J.J. Altizer and Harvey Cox, where M.A. Noll rightly records Thiselton’s resistance to twentieth century “secular gospels”. And, fourteenth, by 1980, Thiselton covered Reader-Response Theory in his course on hermeneutics.

Thiselton also engages with specific issues related to biblical exegesis at four distinct levels. Thus, first, in biblical studies as a whole, (i), we noted Thiselton’s concern over the issue of myth in response to Bultmann. (ii) Thiselton also applauds the “growing interest in apocalyptic” literature from the 1950s to the 1970s. Apocalyptic is a “widely misunderstood” genre, where “Pannenberg and Molmann” are important in this context. (iii) Thiselton rejects problematic generalisations with respect to “uses of αισθεία and αἰσθήσει in classical Greek” and the supposed “clear-cut contrast between Greek and Hebrew concepts of truth”. Generalising distinctions between ‘Hebrew’ and ‘Greek’ presuppose erroneous approaches to language, where Thiselton criticises the work of T. Boman, J. Pedersen, G.A.F. Knight, and others in this context. (iv) Thiselton attacks O. Procksch, G. von Rad, J. Pedersen, L. Dürr, and H. Ringgren for relating the power of biblical (or any) language to a ‘natural’ view of the relation between words and the world. Many writers endorse Thiselton on this point, notably G.W. Ramsey who also summarises Thiselton’s arguments. (v) Thiselton contributes word-studies on biblical terms rendered ‘flesh’ and on those rendered ‘explain’, ‘interpret’, ‘tell’, and ‘narrative’. (vi) Thiselton implicitly criticises the ‘New Quest of the Historical Jesus’ for over-

stressing biblical diversity, and evangelicals and the 'Biblical Theology Movement' for over-stressing biblical unity.226 (vi) Thiselton criticises trends in form criticism and redaction criticism,227 where P. Greche notes Thiselton's appeals to the later Wittgenstein to modify form criticism in relation to "logical function".228

Second, in New Testament studies as a whole, (i), Thiselton criticises J.D.G. Dunn for over-stressing New Testament diversity at the expense of its unity.229 (ii) Thiselton argues that some writers over-stress passages that suggest an immanent Parousia was expected by the early Church.230 (iii) Thiselton's 'New Testament Commentary Survey' responds to the perceived needs of students and preachers,231 and Thiselton also argues that there is no adequate commentary on the then-new Anglican lectionary.232


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226. Thiselton, 'Age of Anxiety', 598-599; cf. 604-605.
230. Thiselton, 'The Parousia in Modern Theology', 31-35, (against Schweitzer and Werner); 35-40, (against Bultmann); 41-44, (against J.A.T. Robinson); 44-46, (against Conzelmann).
of Paul's futurist eschatology.\textsuperscript{234} (ii) In relation to New Testament Apocalyptic and the Parousia,\textsuperscript{235} Thielson finds D.S. Russell's affirmation of the relevance of apocalyptic to "our generation" both "sober and very convincing".\textsuperscript{236} (iii) In relation to the Gospels,\textsuperscript{237} Thiselton is particularly interested in parable research, as already noted.\textsuperscript{238}

Fourth, Thiselton's greatest 'second period' interest in biblical interpretation is 1 Corinthians, studies relating to this epistle constituting an important part of his historical context.\textsuperscript{239} Ultimately, Thiselton published a massive commentary on 1 Corinthians (2000) and is now considered a world authority on the epistle. However, his interest dates back to his 1964 Masters degree and his 1966 Tyndale Lecture.\textsuperscript{240} In his 'second period', Thiselton pens three articles on 1 Corinthians,\textsuperscript{241} where several writers follow his thesis on 'over-realised eschatology' at Corinth, though opinion is now divided over the thesis.\textsuperscript{242} In relation to 1 Corinthians 5:5, J. Murphy-O'Connor aligns with Thiselton's thesis that for the Corinthians to applaud the incestuous believer, they must have considered themselves to belong "entirely to the new age", disparaging "the standards and values of the unredeemed world as irrelevant".\textsuperscript{243} J.H. Neyrey accepts Thiselton's exposition of Paul's idea of a 'spiritual body', containing


\textsuperscript{236} Thielson, 'Review of Apocalyptic, Ancient and Modern', 219-220.


\textsuperscript{241} Thielson, 'The Meaning of SARX in 1 Corinthians 5:5', 204-228; Thielson, 'The Interpretation of Tongues', 15-36; Thielson, A.C., 'Realized Eschatology at Corinth', NTS\textit{w}d 24 (Jul. 1978), 510-526.

\textsuperscript{242} cf. flagged references in our bibliography for references relevant to the debate following Thiselton's 'over-realised eschatology' thesis in relation to 1 Corinthians.

the sense of "a total person controlled by God's Spirit."244 J. Osei-Bonsu, however, departs from Thiselton's exegesis of *sarx*, viewing the term as a reference to the physical body.245 Having noted Thiselton's appeal to Bultmann on Pauline anthropology earlier, we should comment that, for several writers, though not for W.O. Walker Jr., Thiselton rightly rejects the thesis that "1 Corinthians 11:2-16 is a post-Pauline interpolation".246

Thus, focussing on Thiselton's responses to traditions, developments, debates, and issues in biblical interpretation provides a further angle of view on his 'second period' *Sitz im Leben*. Admittedly, minimal overlap with Thiselton's responses to philosophical and hermeneutical trends was inevitable, since philosophy and biblical interpretation are interwoven.

c) Issues in Systematic Theology

Thiselton also responds to traditions, developments, debates and issues in systematic theology during his 'second period', though in *The Two Horizons* Thiselton notes the "dialogue" between biblical exegesis and systematic theology.247 Three specifically theological aspects of Thiselton's context may be clarified, however, as follows.

*First*, Thiselton names Barth, Reinhold Niebuhr, Bultmann, Bonhoeffer, and Tillich as the five major theologians of the twentieth century.248 Yet, we shall demonstrate that none of them are pivotal for his formative thinking (though Barth, Niebuhr, and Bonhoeffer have relatively secondary roles in Thiselton's later thought),249 and Thiselton's response to Bultmann and Tillich during his second

248. Thiselton, 'Age of Anxiety', 596-599; (Barth, Reinhold Niebuhr, Bultmann); 602-604, (Bonhoeffer, Tillich).
period is very mixed.\textsuperscript{250} Thiselton also responds to more recent theological developments in the 1960s and 1970s, where we have already noted K. Rahner, J.A.T. Robinson and the 'New Morality', the New Hermeneutic, the 'New Quest of the Historical Jesus', the 'Death of God Movement', the 'Biblical Theology Movement', Latin American liberation theology, and African and Indian theology.\textsuperscript{251} Most important for Thiselton, however, are the 'Theologies of Hope' of Pannenberg and Moltmann,\textsuperscript{252} 'intelligent conservatism',\textsuperscript{253} and T.F. Torrrance's 'scientific' theology.\textsuperscript{254}

Second, Thiselton specifically focuses on \textit{Christology}, notably debates about the Incarnation, Christ's pre-existence,\textsuperscript{255} and traditional Christology.\textsuperscript{256} Thiselton's response to J.A.T. Robinson's \textit{The Human Face of God} is mixed, whilst his response to Moltmann's \textit{The Crucified God} is more positive.\textsuperscript{257} In Thiselton's view, A. Schweitzer underlines the importance of Christology relative to eschatology in Pauline

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251. Thiselton, 'Age of Anxiety', 608.
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257. Thiselton, 'New Problems for Old', 8; Thiselton, 'Great Compassion and Heart', 9; Thiselton, 'Review of \textit{The Crucified God}', 148-149.
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thought. Nevertheless, Thiselton's main theological focus is eschatology. We have already noted Thiselton's interest in biblical apocalyptic, Pauline eschatology (especially in 1 Corinthians), and the 'Theologies of Hope'. Thiselton eschatological dialogue is wide, however, and includes Schweitzer, Werner, Bultmann, Conzelmann, Tillich, J.A.T. Robinson, the process theology of J. Cobb, S. Ogden, and D.D. Williams, and the Teilhard de Chardin School of P. Hefner, D.P. Gray, and C. Mooney. However, Thiselton rejects "the evolutionary cosmologies of the nineteenth century".

Third, we have already noted Thiselton's interest in biblical anthropology, sin, and the problem of evil in the context of his positive appeal to Bultmann, and his responses to Freud and Buber. Yet, his responses to A. Hodes and P.A. Bertocci also reflect an interest in biblical anthropology, and he considers the problem of evil in response to J.W. Wenham, and the importance of 'integrity' and of 'correspondence between word and deed' in his article, 'Truth'.

Hence, Thiselton's emphasis is truly that of 'historical response'. His theological tradition is recent, aligning more with the 'younger' Continental theologians, particularly Pannenberg and Moltmann, than with the 'big names'. Thus, Thiselton is perhaps best characterised as a 'theologian of hope' which, as we shall see, is very important for his hermeneutics.

d) Issues in the Church

Thiselton also engages with recent or contemporary issues, debates, trends, or situations within the Church. First, globally, Thiselton detects an unfortunate "polarisation" between over-emphases on past and present. Thus, New Testament studies often has an "exclusively objectivistic concern with past facts... or... information for its own sake". In traditional preaching there can be a contrived, artificial, over-formal, and over-generalised approach to finding 'applications' - almost a postscript to historical interpretation. Conversely, the "'contextual' emphasis in the World Council of Churches",

258. Thiselton, 'Schweitzer's Interpretation of Paul', 136, (para. 3).
263. Thiselton, 'The Meaning of SARX in 1 Corinthians 5:5', 204-228; Thiselton, Contribution to 'Flesh', 678-682; Thiselton, Two Horizons, 275-283.
the emphasis on “present experience” of the modern charismatic movement, and the distorted activism of some aspects of Latin American theology all over-emphasise the present.\textsuperscript{267}

Second, Thiselton bemoans the individualism of the Western Church, linking it to Kierkegaard and Bultmann, and to whimsical and arbitrary or ‘private’ interpretation apart from the community of tradition.\textsuperscript{268} Third, with Pannenberg and J.A.T. Robinson, Thiselton criticises the Platonic legacy in the traditional (cf. ‘orthodox’, or ‘conservative’) Church.\textsuperscript{269} R.K. Johnston takes up Thiselton’s distress over traditional domestication and taming of the Bible in reading, liturgy and preaching.\textsuperscript{270} Fourth, having already noted Thiselton’s responses to the Anglican church, we need add only that he criticises some Anglican scholars for exaggerating the problem of historical distance between textual and reader horizons.\textsuperscript{271}

Fifth, we have already noted Thiselton’s challenge to evangelicals over their use of the Bible, but may detect eight specific criticisms: (i) treating interpretative tradition as more authoritative than the Bible; (ii) flattening the distinctiveness of different biblical authors through over-pressing biblical unity; (iii) flattening multiple language-functions to ‘teaching’ or ‘information’; (iv) making rushed applications prior to properly listening to biblical texts; (v) falling behind contemporary theology and its hermeneutical focus;\textsuperscript{272} (vi) resisting hermeneutics; (vii) making naive claims about self-evident textual meanings; and, (viii), ignorance of other interpretative approaches.\textsuperscript{273} Nevertheless, Thiselton still defends evangelicals against undue criticism as we have seen.\textsuperscript{274}

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{266} Thiselton, ‘Truth’, 879, 883-884, 886.
\item \textsuperscript{267} Thiselton, ‘The Use of Philosophical Categories’, 98; cf. Thiselton, ‘Understanding God’s Word Today’ (Longer Article), 95-97.
\item \textsuperscript{271} Thiselton, ‘Understanding God’s Word Today’ (Longer Article), 94-95; cf. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 432-438.
\item \textsuperscript{272} Thiselton, ‘Understanding God’s Word Today’ (Shorter Article), 6.
\end{itemize}

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Sixth, Thiselton rejects several trends in the Pentecostal and charismatic movements, including experience-centredness, naively labelling the ‘merely human’ as the ‘Spirit’s work’, threatening church order,275 and abusing biblical metaphors in preaching.276 However, Thiselton does not interpret Paul as wanting ‘tongues’ to be “abolished”. Rather, tongues is a gift for young Christians that should be replaced by the gift of articulate speech as the speaker matures.277 Seventh, Thiselton criticises the subsuming of ‘genuine experience of God’ beneath the ‘merely human’, experience-centredness, and loss of Church order in Harvey Cox and the radical church,278 and the ethical problems of the ‘New Morality’ of J.A.T. Robinson and H.A. Williams.279 In conclusion, Thiselton neither provides ‘hermeneutics in a vacuum’, nor merely localised criticisms, but wishes to see world-wide reform of biblical hermeneutics in the Church.

e) Issues in the Broader Secular Culture of Britain and the West
Finally, Thiselton responds to recent trends in Western culture, affirming Pannenberg and Tillich for having ‘broader concerns’ beyond the church.280 We will pick up this point in Chapter 4,281 but may note L.P. Barnes’ comments here concerning Thiselton’s particularly critical response to relativism - whether “cultural”, “historical”, or “epistemological”.282 We may now conclude the present chapter.

C. Concluding Comments: Ever-Widening Dialogue of Historical Response as Implicit Hermeneutical Axiom Contra ‘Hermeneutical Foreclosure’
We opened the chapter with discussions concerning: the dating of Thiselton’s ‘second period’ of theoretical endeavour; how his inter-disciplinary expansion reflected the widening dialogue of his hermeneutical programme; and our ‘chronological-thematic’ approach to Thiselton’s writings. Moving on, we distinguished between Thiselton as an author and his historical context, noting C. Conroy’s point about the need to understand the “Sitz im Leben” of Thiselton’s work in order to assess its

"importance". We linked this to D. Olford's comments on the difficulties of isolating Thiselton's "own thought", concluding that a patient historical study was required if we wished to differ from those who, it would be argued, had not heard Thiselton properly.

Turning to Thiselton as an author, we found him to be a controversial character - to some humble and prophetic, to others heretical and subversive. He could not be caricatured as simply 'evangelical', 'liberal', or 'Anglican', but stood out as a unique and independent thinker, particularly on biblical authority, his implicit promotion of women in ministry, and his theological distance from Bultmann, Tillich, and the Post-Bultmannian movement. Thiselton's uniqueness lay partly in his widening dialogue with multiple traditions, which contrasted sharply with the hermeneutical foreclosure of those who had caricatured him. We began to ask: 'how well has Thiselton been heard?'

Next, turning to historical context, we plumbed the true scope of Thiselton's 'second period' 'widened dialogue' with, or immersion into the processes of, multiple traditions and angles of view. Thiselton was a complex thinker, responding to a whole range of traditions, trends, debates, and problems in philosophy, hermeneutics, philosophical theology, biblical studies, systematic theology, the church, and Western culture. Notably, Thiselton's concern was that traditional, 'positivist', 'existentialist', 'philosophical hermeneutical', and 'structuralist' schools of biblical interpretation should, through widening dialogue, attain more philosophically adequate stances in relation to history, epistemology, language, the human self, and interpretative practice. However, Thiselton received a mixed reception, even being caricatured by J. Barr, R.E. Palmer, and W. Wink. Admittedly, some highlighted Thiselton's lack of dialogue with the likes of Derrida and Ricoeur. Retrospectively, however, The Two Horizons appeared to be a deliberately constructed launch pad for Thiselton's response to these thinkers. Thiselton was ahead of the game and not behind.

For Thiselton, then, biblical interpretation needed a philosophical update to tackle its various Platonic, 'positivist', Neo-Kantian, and deterministic legacies. The main sources of that updating were to be Pannenberg, the later Wittgensteinian and Saussurian traditions, and aspects of Continental hermeneutics. Thiselton's criticisms emerged from his own practical involvement in biblical studies, particularly his studies in 1 Corinthians.

284. Verbal comments made to me in October 2001 at a conference in Cardiff.
That Thiselton meant business when he spoke about shaking off old philosophical legacies emerged starkly in his theological distance from every one of the major theologians of the day. Instead, Thiselton was closest to the 'new blood' of the time, namely Pannenberg and Moltmann, T.F. Torrance's 'scientific' theology, and 'intelligent conservatism'. His three main emphases were eschatology, Christology, and biblical anthropology.

Finally, Thiselton's voice may be considered to be genuinely prophetic, opposing problems with biblical interpretation at the levels of global, Western, traditional, Anglican, evangelical, charismatic, and radical 'Church' - not to mention his mission-orientated and socio-critical engagement with Western culture. We conclude that Thiselton practices an ever-widening dialogue of historical response as an implicit hermeneutical axiom, and set this in opposition to the hermeneutical foreclosure of some of his critics.
Part 2

Problem-Solving Theoretical Construction from A.C. Thiselton’s Formative Work on Hermeneutics

1959-1978/80 and Up to the Present
Chapter 3.

Relating Theology & Philosophy: Toward a Unified Critique of Epistemology

A. Preliminary Comments: Approach to Chapters 3 to 7

We may now turn from consideration of the “Sitz im Leben” of Thiselton’s work to what C. Conroy called its “rich content”. Both are relevant for assessing Thiselton’s “importance”.

Approaching Thiselton’s ‘second period’ hermeneutical theory, however, involves real difficulties. With D. Olford, we acknowledged Thiselton’s dialogic historical approach and the problem of isolating “his own thought”; where “sometimes the trees obscure the forest”. Nevertheless, J. Bowden’s remark that reading Thiselton is “like trying to hold a serious conversation... in the middle of a noisy party” exaggerates matters. Rather, Thiselton’s deliberate Kierkegaardian indirectness and ambiguity invites his readers into active thoughtful self-involvement, like a mathematics professor who leaves his students to ‘fill in’ missing intermediate steps between equations hastily chalked on a blackboard. Thus, readers are “left somewhat” to their “own resources in formulating a solution”, or in re-organising material. Further, Thiselton’s expanding theoretical hermeneutics lags behind his historical responses. Thus, he had read Habermas prior to 1980, but mentions him only briefly in The Two Horizons. We made a parallel point with respect to Ricoeur in Chapter 2.

In approaching Thiselton’s hermeneutics, then, we have accepted Thiselton’s invitation to self-involvement, applying a Chomskian-like ‘back-transformation’ to Thiselton’s work, rendering its ‘deep

2. Verbal comments made to me in October 2001 at a conference in Cardiff.
structure’, followed by a chronologically sensitive thematic or ‘analytical’ re-organisation. In this, our ‘historical-structural’ approach avoids the pitfalls of ‘back-transformation’ that Thiselton himself notes.\textsuperscript{11}

Admittedly, imposing order like this sometimes takes us beyond what Thiselton actually says. Some interpretative deductions reach ‘behind’ Thiselton’s text to a denotative level; others are connotative, ‘in front of the text’ - and it is impossible in every instance to discern which is which.\textsuperscript{12} It is we, rather than Thiselton, who speak of ‘Thiselton’s’ genuine critique of epistemology or of his ‘second stratum’ of thinking. Yet, such terminology primarily clarifies Thiselton’s thinking and only secondarily our own.

Our ‘historical-structural’ approach yields the chronological themes\textsuperscript{13} of Chapters 3 to 7. Themes belonging, \textit{first}, to what we call Thiselton’s ‘first stratum’ of thought, concern the complex relationships between biblical studies, systematic theology, and hermeneutics. Inter-disciplinary dialogue, notably between theology and philosophy, is the focus. \textit{Second}, themes belonging to Thiselton’s ‘second stratum’ of thought centre upon his ‘five major theoretical hermeneutical critiques’ - of history, epistemology, language, Western culture, and the self. \textit{Third}, themes belonging to Thiselton’s ‘third stratum’ of thought centre on his ‘critique of hermeneutical understanding’, his clarification of the hermeneutical task, and the hermeneutical circle. Thiselton’s ‘third stratum’ of thought unites his most theoretical works,\textsuperscript{14} drawing on all five hermeneutical theoretical critiques, and his simplest practical works, in which his critiques are largely implicit.\textsuperscript{15}

This three strata structure constitutes the basic ‘steel-work’ of Thiselton’s thinking as a whole. Admittedly, Thiselton speaks of his “systematic volume setting out my own hermeneutics”, namely \textit{New Horizons in Hermeneutics}.\textsuperscript{16} However, our 1275 page analysis of this work found it, again, to be


\textsuperscript{13} Thiselton, A.C., \textit{New Horizons in Hermeneutics: The Theory and Practice of Transforming Biblical Reading} (London: HaperCollins; Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992), 92-103.

\textsuperscript{14} Chapter 2.

\textsuperscript{15} For example, Thiselton, ‘The New Hermeneutic’, 308-333.

\textsuperscript{16} For example, Thiselton, ‘Understanding God's Word Today’ (Longer Article), 90-122.

\textsuperscript{16} Thiselton, 'Thirty Years', 1567.
largely historical responses to others' work, rather than a systematic exposition of Thiselton's own views. Thus, our imposed organisation remains useful for explicating Thiselton's thinking. Conversely, failure to appreciate the character of, and interplay between, Thiselton's three 'strata' and five 'critiques' has produced questionable readings of his work, as we shall demonstrate.

In the present chapter, we expound Thiselton's 'first stratum', his dialogue between theology and philosophy, before moving directly to his 'second stratum' 'hermeneutical critique of epistemology'. Whilst Thiselton's 'critique of epistemology' is less fundamental than his 'critique of history', the latter only emerges in his PhD thesis and in *The Two Horizons*. So, we expound it in Chapters 6 and 7, where we shall also return to a 'stratum one' discussion of pre-understanding, contrasting widening dialogue with hermeneutical foreclosure. In Chapter 4 we expound Thiselton's 'second stratum' hermeneutical critiques of 'language', 'Western culture', and the 'self' - though the latter two 'critiques' only mature in the 1990s. In Chapter 5, we expound Thiselton's 'third stratum' 'critique of hermeneutical understanding' which builds on, but also goes beyond, his critique of epistemology. In Chapter 7, we return to the 'stratum one' discussion of the relationship between theology and philosophy.

**B. Relating Theology & Philosophy in Hermeneutics during Theory Construction**

1. Dialogue between Biblical Studies and Hermeneutics in Thiselton

In chapter 2 we saw the interwovenness of Thiselton's engagements with biblical interpretation, systematic theology, hermeneutics, philosophy and philosophical theology. Understanding biblical texts necessarily involves philosophical hermeneutics - otherwise the genuine problems of historical distance, readers' prior understandings, and the "rise of historical consciousness" are ignored. The

'Bible' that merely reflects back the reader's prior tradition has not truly 'spoken', but is domesticated, making reading dull, repetitive, or boring.\(^1\)

Hermeneutics, then, need not impose alien philosophical doctrines onto the Bible.\(^2\) Rather, 'hermeneutics' involves 'philosophical description'\(^3\) of the hermeneutical task, clarification of the biblical texts, and liberation of the Bible to transform readers' self-understanding.\(^4\) But this means that we must also ask: 'how does a liberated Bible transform Thiselton's own hermeneutics?' Since 1 Corinthians constitutes Thiselton's main focus in biblical studies,\(^5\) we now outline its impact on his hermeneutics.

The argument for a Pauline critique of 'over-realised eschatology' at Corinth\(^6\) is perennial in Thiselton's thinking, appearing in his Masters dissertation (1964),\(^7\) in his Tyndale lecture (1966),\(^8\) in 'Realized Eschatology at Corinth' (written 1976, published 1978),\(^9\) and in his commentary on 1 Corinthians (2000).\(^10\) Certainly, in 'Realized Eschatology at Corinth', Thiselton views Paul's critique of Corinthian 'enthusiastic theology' and 'over-realised eschatology' as key to interpreting 1 Corinthians.\(^11\) However, it is also suggestive in relation to Thiselton's five major hermeneutical critiques, hinting at a dialogue between Pauline eschatology and Thiselton's hermeneutics.

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22. Thiselton, 'The Use of Philosophical Categories', 87-100, cf. 89; cf. 98.
26. Relevant articles are highlighted in the bibliography.
Thus, first, in Thiselton's view Paul's 'realistic' eschatology holds 'realised' and 'futurist' eschatology in tension. Corinthian 'enthusiastic' theology, however, defends an 'over-realised' eschatology unqualified by the future. This is suggestive of Thiselton's appeal to Pannenberg's eschatological critique of history and of his criticisms of charismatic spirituality and of Bultmann's non-futural eschatology and Geschichte versus Historie dualism.

Second, in Thiselton's view, Paul's 'realistic' eschatology holds definitive revelation and ambiguous hiddenness in tension. Thus, valid truth-claims are possible, but future-orientated open-endedness renders them provisional. Corinthian over-realised eschatology, however, engenders over-certain, premature judgements and assessments. This contrast is suggestive of Thiselton's appeal to Pannenberg's eschatological epistemology (combining 'givenness' and 'hiddenness') over and against both Enlightenment objectivism, and the relativisms of Continental existential, post-structural, and American neo-pragmatic approaches.

Third, Thiselton draws on the later Wittgenstein, arguing that Paul's 'realistic' eschatology provides the 'home' setting that gives his language-uses their currency or meaning. Thus, 'spirituality' reflects both present day-to-day human conduct and future-orientation consistent with the Holy Spirit's transforming activity. Corinthian over-realised eschatology, however, re-defines terms through 'persuasive definition', up-anchoring them from their 'home' settings. 'Spirituality' now refers

34. Thiselton, 'Realized Eschatology at Corinth', 514.
primarily to present ‘experience’ of the Spirit. This contrast is suggestive for Thiselton's later appeals to the later Wittgenstein, J.L. Austin, and speech-act theory in criticism of J. Derrida and S. Fish in relation to language and meaning.

Fourth, in Thiselton’s view, Paul’s ‘realistic’ eschatology has implications for responsibility and freedom. The believer, as ‘new creation’, still belongs to the ‘natural order’. Thus, freedom in Christ is qualified by the constraints of responsibility, both to contemporary social conventions and to eschatological imperatives to embrace transformation. Corinthian over-realised eschatology, however, in regarding law and convention as pre-eschatological, espouses freedom as ethical licence and ‘autonomous’ liberation from responsibility to others. This is suggestive for Thiselton’s later critiques of ‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’ Western Culture in relation to ‘autonomy’, ‘power’, and ‘fragmentation’.

Fifth, in Thiselton’s view, Paul holds together both divine transformation of the self by the Holy Spirit and day-to-day conduct that ‘builds’ towards the same eschatological goal. Corinthian over-realised eschatology, however, stresses ‘experience’ of the Spirit’s ‘presence’, but neglects ‘building’ towards the eschaton. This is suggestive for Thiselton’s later exposition of the self as transformed by divine promise-fulfilment in contrast to the ‘postmodern’ self, determined by its socio-historical situatedness in the ‘fleeting moment’.

44. Thiselton, Interpreting God and The Postmodern Self, 106; cf. 127-135.
Hence, theology and eschatology contribute to the shape of Thiselton's hermeneutical philosophy, via the dialogue of theoretical construction. If Thiselton's five 'hermeneutical critiques' are thereby eschatologically unified, then there is provisional evidence for the "more integral hermeneutic" that B.J. Walsh and others suggest is missing in Thiselton.44 In Chapter 6 we will repudiate H.C. White's view that Thiselton fails to overcome the "bifurcation between collective, objective history (Historie) and individual, existential history (Geschichte)" bequeathed by Bultmann.46 Certainly, Thiselton's Pauline eschatological approach contrasts with P.J. Cahill's 'literary' and B.J. Walsh's textual-ontological and response-related unifications of hermeneutics.47 It also undermines C.S. Rodd's, B.J. Walsh's, J.C. McHann Jr.'s, and R.E. Palmer's respective charges that Thiselton has succumbed to 'Gadamerian' relativism,48 to 'Wittgensteinian' relativism,49 to neglect of the 'third horizon',50 or that Thiselton is simply 'Pannenbergian'.51

Nevertheless, Thiselton's emphasis on eschatology should not be overstressed. Thiselton affirms Pannenberg's point that Christ is the proleptic, provisional, and partial anticipation of the 'End',52 but also criticises Pannenberg's Christology with reference to Hebrews.53 That Thiselton's eschatology is grounded in Christology is also suggested by his complaint that A. Schweitzer over-stresses Paul's eschatology at the expense of his Christology.54

52. Thiselton, 'Review of Basic Questions in Theology, Vol. 1', 121, (para.1); cf. 120, (para. 2); cf. Thiselton, The Parousia in Modern Theology, 50; cf. Pannenberg, Basic Questions 1, 137-181.
54. Thiselton, A.C., 'Biblical Classics: VI. Schweitzer's Interpretation of Paul', ExTIm 90 (Feb. 1979), 136.
2. Dialogue between Systematic Theology and Hermeneutics in Thiselton

Thus, speaking about the relationship between biblical studies and hermeneutics in Thiselton’s thinking inevitably brings in systematic theology. Therefore, we shall explore further how Thiselton’s systematic theology shapes his hermeneutical theory, proposing that Thiselton’s considerable eschatological emphasis during his ‘second period’ (see Chapter 2) was not merely a ‘side-line’, but his grounding of hermeneutical theory.55

For Thiselton, however, process theology neglects the parousia, and he rejects J.B. Cobb’s notion of the “future... transcending of personality”.56 Thiselton complains that the Teilhardian school also neglects the parousia, accepting Molmann’s criticism that it fails to begin with present transformation.57 With Pannenberg and Molmann, “the future may confront, and even run counter to, the present” - not being simply “a development of present trends”.58 Tillich also neglects the parousia.59

Positively, Thiselton applauds these schools for espousing a “dynamic” heaven and a “living God” “of the future”, rejecting the more static, Platonic, “timeless” views of traditional theology. The schools


rightly advocate a “dynamic forward-looking” perspective in which humanity is “motivated and activated” from ahead, where “only the future gives genuine meaning to the present”. They also rightly define the future in terms of a cosmic-scale “kingdom of love”, and not individualistically. 60

In Thiselton’s view, further, A. Schweitzer, F. Buri, and M. Werner rightly note the primitive Church’s belief in an imminent parousia, though over-stress its influence, incorrectly claiming that Jesus held this belief 61 and being selective in their treatment of the New Testament. 62 Thiselton thus denies that the “de-eschatologisation of Christian doctrine” followed in the history of theology. 63 Later, similarly, Thiselton bemoans the eschatological splits projected between “Paul” and “Luke-Acts” by E. Käsemann. 64 Yet, Schweitzer and Werner correctly relate apocalyptic to “the context of... parousia-expectation”. 65

Thiselton also rejects Bultmann’s view that ‘supernatural’ divine intervention is ‘myth’, since this depends on Bultmann’s disparagement of cognitive language relative to its self-involving functions. Thiselton rejects Bultmann’s view that the New Testament supports de-mythologisation and that Jesus mistakenly believed in an imminent parousia. 66 Thiselton also rejects H. Conzelmann’s and J.A.T. Robinson’s argument that “the traditional doctrine of the parousia” only reflects “later... New Testament thought”. 67

For Thiselton, then, New Testament apocalyptic is relevant today. It “safeguards the objective, public, act-of-God side of Christian theology” in which God enters world-history at the cosmic level against evil, bringing new creation, judgement, and resurrection. A. Nygren is commended for viewing “history as moving towards a pre-destined goal”, from the old age to the new. 68 However, Leon

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62. Thiselton, Schweitzer’s Interpretation of Paul’, 135, (para. 5).
64. Thiselton, Schweitzer’s Interpretation of Paul’, 135, (para. 5); cf. Thiselton, ‘The Parousia in Modern Theology’, 31-32; cf. 36-37.
68. Thiselton, ‘No Horns on the Pope’, 5.
Morris, the church generally, and especially “pietism” over-stress individualistic “inner states”, whilst K. Koch avoids this error. Yet Thiselton acknowledges that apocalyptic is self-involving.69

In Thiselton’s view, the ‘theologies of hope’ of Pannenberg and Moltmann are ‘visionary’,70 espousing a delayed parousia (neither a first-century myth, nor an embarrassment resting on a mistake) and a future-oriented, eschatologically-structured Christianity.71

Specifically, Thiselton draws three points from Moltmann: First, ‘history as a whole’ should govern Christian attitudes, against Bultmann’s man-centred individualistic subjectivism.72 Second, ‘now’, the ‘hidden’ God comes to us in our ambiguity, ignorance, and fragmentation. At the ‘End’, the ‘unveiled’ God brings truth, knowledge, integration, and rest.73 Third, the Christian’s ‘horizon of expectation’ is marked by both yieldedness, openness, acceptance, and faith in the promise-fulfilling God, and by faith as activity, pilgrimage, exodus, change, readiness, and even unrest. This contrasts with the presumption of ‘enthusiastic’ over-realised eschatology and the despair of Bultmann’s non-futural eschatology (after Kierkegaard).74 Drawing on the later Wittgenstein, Thiselton adds that ‘expectation’ is no mere state of mind, but an active practical attitude consistent with trust in God.75

Thiselton also criticises Moltmann, however. Thus, Moltmann often views nature as “hostile”, “something to be overcome”, disparaging “natural” gifts and “cultural achievements”.76 Further, Moltmann’s biblical hermeneutics are “precarious”.77 Neither the cross nor the Exodus “call us... to abandon our religious traditions whatever these” are. This is a “prescription for eternal flux”.78 Thiselton applauds Moltmann’s “compassion for the suffering and oppressed, his desire for a theology that is socially and politically relevant, and his correlation of a theology of hope with that of

the cross”. However, for Moltmann “the experience of poverty or suffering is almost a religious ‘work’ which guarantees salvation”, and capitalism could be “combined with sufficient compassion” to negate Moltmann’s call “for a totally new social order”. Moltmann subsumes Christian identity beneath “contextual theology” - but we do not “find Christian identity only when we lose it”.

By contrast, Thiselton’s ‘second period’ appeals to Pannenberg are full of praise, and we recall Thiselton’s comment in 1998: “Pannenberg has always remained a major influence on my thinking”.

Thus, for Thiselton, Pannenberg is “probably the most important of all the younger Continental theologians”, one of “the most important theologians today”. He is “one of the most constructive, stimulating, and important theologians of our time”, and “has done more than anyone else in the last twenty years to open a new era in theology”. Other praises abound.

Nevertheless, Thiselton may prefer Pannenberg’s systematics to Moltmann’s but, in biblical studies, he is critical of both thinkers. Thus, for Thiselton, God’s cosmic arrival at the parousia brings about ‘history-as-a-whole’ to which the unveiled (apocalypse) divine verdict is applied, breaking through disguises, deceptions, and ‘misunderstandings’. Yet God’s revelation in Christ now has more ‘verdictive’ finality than Pannenberg allows, and there is a cosmic- and ecclesial-level destruction of the negative at the parousia beyond what Moltmann’s socio-political focus allows.

Further, Thiselton argues that Pannenberg gives the “impression... that even Christian revelation may... be called in question by the future”. Whilst “the interpretation of revelation is... ongoing”, however, “in these last days God has spoken to us by his Son”. It was “revelation in the days of the prophets” that “was ‘partial and piecemeal’” (Hebrews 1:1,2). Thiselton applauds Pannenberg’s view

that the truth of God is not ‘finished’ in a Platonic or mathematical sense,\textsuperscript{90} but the provisionality of historical contingencies does not subsume divine identity-stability or the truth of God in Christ.\textsuperscript{91} Rather, mutual qualification is required between viewing God as a “static... unchanging timeless Being” and viewing God as dynamic, “moving ongoing love, who calls, invites, and acts in ever-new ways”. God does not “suddenly” change “his nature”. Correlatively, heaven is “rest, finality, completion, goal”, and promise-fulfilment, in contrast to “all that is toilsome, laborious”, and “frustratingly incomplete”. But it is also “vibrant, fresh, creative”, in “contrast to... stagnation and decay”\textsuperscript{92}

Thus, Thiselton is neither simply ‘Pauline’, ‘Pannenberian’, nor ‘Moltmannian’, but transposes their insights into a larger developing biblical-theological template. Nevertheless, Pannenberg's work is important for Thiselton’s hermeneutics, and so we must consider it in more detail. In particular, Thiselton’s positive appeals to Pannenberg suggest parallels with his appeals to Paul in 1 Corinthians: both sets of appeals are highly suggestive of Thiselton’s five major hermeneutical critiques (noted above).

Thus, first, following Pannenberg, Thiselton agrees that the Bible does not reflect ‘timeless’ Platonic ideas or mathematical equations.\textsuperscript{93} Rather, the biblical God is living, against the purely static “traditional notion of God as a transcendent being”,\textsuperscript{94} and we are “to understand all being in relation to God”.\textsuperscript{95} God is both a God of “promise, purpose... meaning”, “the expected” and “predicted” and of the ‘new’. Consequently, Christ’s resurrection both fulfils apocalyptic expectation and is “radically new and unique”. Thus, biblically, and in Thiselton’s critique of history, history juxtaposes “continuity and unity”, and, “contingency, novelty, and openness of the future”.\textsuperscript{96} History allows for the particular case, but not \textit{a priori} “types”.\textsuperscript{97} Past, present, and future horizons are linked by the “totality of history”

\textsuperscript{90} Cross-referencing to Thiselton, ‘The Theologian Who Must Not Be Ignored’, 11.
\textsuperscript{92} Thiselton, ‘Creativity of Heaven’, 5.
\textsuperscript{95} Thiselton, ‘Review of Basic Questions in Theology, Vol. 1’, 121, (para.2). Cf. Pannenberg, Basic Questions 1, 1, 156-161.
of New Testament eschatology. God is "the power of the future", an "object of hope and trust", giving freedom to humanity - the "capacity to go beyond what [it] already has". Christian hope, therefore, is not escapism but involves active "shaping [of] the future". The 'totality of history' is equated with "all [created] reality", or "all temporal process", but not with God - though God remains involved in it. Thiselton's assimilation of Pannenberg's critique of history, we argue in Chapter 6, helps overcome Bultmann's dichotomy between Geschichte and Historie.

Second, following Pannenberg, Thiselton urges that God and the 'totality of history' ground "the unity of truth", where "the meaning of the present becomes clear only in the light of the future". However, Christ's resurrection constitutes a proleptic, "provisional and anticipatory" revelation of the 'end', and hence of the 'whole' in which the 'parts' have meaning, though present knowledge is necessarily provisional, by faith, correcting Hegel. Thus, in his critique of epistemology, Thiselton agrees with Pannenberg that truth should be approached through "biblical history and eschatology", "beginning 'from below', with historical enquiry". The 'meaning' of an event, text, or act, is its particular relationship to other events, texts, acts, within traditions and the historical whole. Meaning is not a separable human projection, against the neo-Kantian fact-value dualism of Bultmann and Kähler, but united with event. Contrary to Dilthey and "Troeltsch's... dependence upon known analogies to fix the limits of historical knowledge", meaning and event are unique, being "decisively

100. Thiselton, 'Meaning and Myth', 8; cf. Pannenberg, Basic Questions 3, 80-98.
102. Thiselton, 'Meaning and Myth', 8; cf. Pannenberg, Basic Questions 3, 144-177.
111. Thiselton, 'Review of Basic Questions in Theology, Vol. 1', 120, (para 1, cf. 2); cf. 121, (para 1).
112. Thiselton, 'Head-On Challenge to Doubt', 8; cf. Pannenberg, Basic Questions 1, 81-95, cf. 96-136.
conditioned by historical context”.

Yet, with Pannenberg and Gadamer, Thiselton agrees that historical continuity allows overlap between “two... horizons”, and hence the “fusion of horizons”.

**Third**, it is in this theological-historical framework that Thiselton, following Pannenberg, reinstates “propositions”, against Continental hermeneutics. Thus, Thiselton does not return to the “analytical abstractions of a timeless Platonism”. This contributes to Thiselton’s **critique of language**, complementing our earlier comments on 1 Corinthians.

**Fourth**, Thiselton agrees with Pannenberg that “historical reason” assesses its ‘object’ in relation to the whole of history, so far as possible. This demands serious dialogue with other world religions, philosophy, biology, sociology and psychology as an “intellectual obligation”. Thiselton argues that Moltmann, Metz, and Pannenberg rightly “relate biblical teaching about the future to present political and social action” in contemporary culture. Thus, the socio-criticism of Western Culture, integral to Thiselton’s **critique of Western Culture** (see Chapter 4), is grounded in an eschatologically-framed epistemology. It is in this context that Kierkegaard’s and Bultmann’s individualism is rejected.

**Fifth**, Thiselton agrees with Pannenberg that, “man’s openness to his environment, his vulnerability and encounter with the future, and his centredness upon himself” are “expressed in defensiveness and self-assertion”. Contrary to Bultmann’s separation of faith and “objective ‘historical’” events, faith is linked both to past historical events (cf. knowledge), and to future promise-fulfilment (cf. trust).

Thus, liberated selves are not merely self-centred, defensive or assertive (reflecting bondage to the

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past), but exhibit ‘future-orientated openness’, tying in to Thiselton’s *critique of the self* (see Chapters 4 and 6).\(^{122}\)

Summarising, Thiselton dialogues with several eschatological traditions, but favours ‘theologies of hope’, particularly Pannenberg and Moltmann. Whilst favouring Pannenberg over Moltmann, Thiselton criticises both on the grounds of biblical exegesis. Nevertheless, Thiselton’s appeals to Pannenberg’s eschatology are suggestive of his five major hermeneutical critiques (history, epistemology, language, Western culture, and the self) paralleling and ‘fleshing out’ his appeal to Paul in 1 Corinthians. Therefore, biblical studies, systematic theology, and hermeneutics are combined in Thiselton’s inter-traditional dialogue, aligning with his view of the theologian’s task.\(^{123}\)

Thus our provisional argument for a unifying eschatological grounding for Thiselton’s five major hermeneutical critiques is strengthened, and our rejection of criticisms of Thiselton’s work made by B.J. Walsh, H.C. White, P.J. Cahill, C.S. Rodd, J.C. McHann Jr., R.E. Palmer, and others is reinforced. Walsh also fails to appreciate the significance of Thiselton’s appeal to Pannenberg, falsely suggesting that Thiselton is still under the spell of Continental dualisms.\(^{124}\)

Further, J.C. McHann Jr. falsely suggests that Thiselton has not engaged with Pannenberg’s eschatology.\(^{125}\) Thus, in 1992, Thiselton recalls J.C. McHann Jr.’s criticism in 1985 that he needed to pay “more attention to Pannenberg’s eschatological horizon”.\(^{126}\) Surprisingly, given our observations, Thiselton “did not dissent” from McHann’s criticisms when he “examined his doctoral dissertation”.\(^{127}\) Thiselton speaks of McHann’s “allowing some of my claims in *The Two Horizons* to interact with Pannenberg’s theology”. Further, “McHann argued that hermeneutical theory needed to move beyond the notion of ‘two horizons’, to take account of the three horizons of ‘past, present, and future’”, thereby grounding “hermeneutics more adequately in ontology and eschatology”.\(^{128}\)

\(^{125}\) Thiselton, *New Horizons*, 26; cf. 251; cf. 337; cf. McHann Jr., *The Three Horizons*.
\(^{128}\) Thiselton, *New Horizons*, 251; cf. 337.
This leads to a contradiction, however: Thiselton’s other ‘second period’ writings manifest his extensive engagement with Pannenberg’s work prior to *The Two Horizons*, the “mature *Summa in which [Thiselton] draws together his thinking*. We have also noted Thiselton’s retrospective comments that, “Pannenberg has always remained a major influence on my thinking”, at least from “1969”. Hence, Thiselton has deliberately glossed over a misreading of his work, probably to allow a valuable hermeneutical point to be reiterated more explicitly. McHann, though, has missed what R.E. Palmer calls “the reception - and at the same time a Pannenbergian critique - of Gadamer in *The Two Horizons*”. R.S. Hess thus falsely argues that Thiselton follows “his student” McHann (Hess mistakenly calls McHann ‘Luckmann’ - A. Schutz’s pupil). W.J. Heard Jr., similarly, mistakenly argues that it is in McHann’s “work that Pannenberg’s notion of eschatologically oriented ontology is wed with Thiselton’s two horizons, resulting in a third horizon”. Actually, this ‘wedding’ occurs in Thiselton’s thinking a decade earlier, and Thiselton’s ‘post-Wittgensteinian’ and ‘post-Gadamerian’ framework could not incorporate McHann’s, which builds on E.D. Hirsch’s work. In Chapter 6 we propose that *The Two Horizons* radiates from modified Hegelian criteria in development of Pannenberg’s work. Thus, we repudiate N.R. Gulley’s comment that J.C. McHann Jr. goes “one step further” than Thiselton’s “two horizons” by including “the future”. The ‘future’ and eschatology are central to Thiselton’s thinking long before McHann’s thesis.

Having said this, R.E. Palmer’s comment about Thiselton’s ‘Pannenbergian critique’ of Gadamer, whilst it sufficed to ward off McHann’s mistake, is probably a caricature. Palmer is correct in that B.J. Walsh, C.S. Rodd, and J.C. McHann Jr. all falsely presuppose that Thiselton is under the ‘spell’ of the Continental hermeneutical tradition, particularly Gadamer. Yet, Palmer may have missed the

131. Thiselton, ‘Thirty Years’, 1560. But in Chapter 1, we deduced a date as early as 1967 if not even earlier.
complexity of Thiselton’s critique of Continental hermeneutics, which is hardly simply ‘Pannenbergian’. Thus, H.C. White records Thiselton’s “incorporation of insights from Austin and Wittgenstein” to strengthen Ernst Fuchs’ “concept of language-event” (though even White’s remark is not immune from criticism - see Chapter 4).141

A question now arises: does Thiselton’s dialogue between theology and philosophy, his eschatological unification of hermeneutics, establish that he is straightforwardly ‘fideistic’? S.D. Moore, writing later, speaks of how “Thiselton’s theological and pastoral interests dominate” New Horizons in Hermeneutics and earlier work.142 Here, though, F. Watson’s comment that theology is often not the “centre” of Thiselton’s discussion is significant.143 In our next section we argue that Thiselton attempts to philosophically warrant his appeals to theology, that he is not ‘fideistic’ in any simple or straightforward sense.

C. Dialogic Theory-Construction: Towards a Unified Critique of Epistemology


We begin by clarifying our anticipated uses of the terms or phrases ‘dialogic’, ‘resonance’, ‘warrant’, and ‘straightforward fideism’ and their cognates throughout the remainder of this study.

First, by ‘dialogic’ we mean ‘conversational’ or ‘of or in dialogue’. By ‘resonance’ we mean ‘reinforced or prolonged by reflection or synchronous vibration’. By ‘dialogic resonance’ we mean that two (or more) conversation partners, through argument, find points of agreement with one another such that one or more of these is reinforced to enjoy a prolonged status of cogency or relevance. For example, if ‘biblical theology’ and ‘the philosophy of history’ found, through debate, that there were points of agreement and similarity over how ‘history’ was conceptualised, then such a view of ‘history’ would be doubly reinforced and likely to enjoy a relatively prolonged status as cogent. If the term ‘consensus’ could imply a lack of argument, ‘consensus through dialogue involving argument’ is closer to our meaning.

Second, by ‘warrant’, we mean ‘authorisation’. By ‘dialogic warrant’ we mean ‘that which is authorised by two or more conversation partners’ through ‘dialogic resonance’ (as just defined) as opposed to

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mere 'consensus' or 'agreement'. 'Dialogic warrant' is almost synonymous with the traditional epistemological notion of rational 'justification' except that 'dialogue', implying inter-subjectivity, moves away from a purely Cartesian notion of an isolated 'knowing subject' and from too abstract a notion of 'rational' or 'internal' coherence. Coherence can be purely 'logical' from a positivist viewpoint, whereas we envisage concrete 'resonance' between two horizons in life. 'Warrant' in this context can also be mutual or two-way. That is, philosophical argument could resonate with, and thereby 'warrant', the inclusion of certain theological points into a conversation with philosophy. Conversely, theological argument could resonate with, and thereby 'warrant' the inclusion of, philosophical conclusions into a conversation with theology. In this setting, we will not argue that 'dialogic resonance' warrants the acceptance of biblical 'authority', but that it warrants acceptance of the relevance and cogency of the biblical texts for hermeneutical discussions. Nevertheless, this argument still contributes to the background of Thiselton's discussion on 'biblical authority' (a slightly different issue - see Chapter 7).

Third, our introduction of the phrase 'straightforward fideism' counters over-hasty assessments by some of Thiselton's critics that seem almost to imply that Thiselton is 'fideist' in a fundamentalist way that refuses to allow theological beliefs to be critically tested. We are not quite saying that the term 'fideism' could never be applied to Thiselton in any sense, but only that any use of the term would have to be very carefully qualified (see Chapter 7).

2. Straightforward 'Fideism' or Warranted Inclusion of Theological Considerations?
Superficially, admittedly, Thiselton sometimes seems straightforwardly fideistic. Thus, first, in the longer of his two articles entitled 'Understanding God's Word Today', Thiselton argues, appealing to the later Wittgenstein, that if the biblical texts were an ultimate 'authority', they could not appeal to a 'higher' authority than self-attestation. Hence, biblical writers affirm biblical authority, and biblical and apostolic authority are the only criteria sufficient to authenticate the genuinely 'Christian'. Divine speech-action through the Bible makes the Church and the Christian, not just 'informing' them. Hermeneutics confirms that biblical texts can operate across historical distance to transform

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today's readers, despite the problem of pre-understanding. The Holy Spirit's giving gifts to facilitate exegetical scholarship and creative inspiration of understanding hardly undermines biblical authority or hermeneutics, but acts through them. For Thiselton, then, the Bible, as authoritative multiform address from God, demands obedient response. Second, in the shorter article, Thiselton identifies Christ as God's Word. The biblical writings are both human and historically conditioned and God's active Word of address, challenge, judgement, correction, re-creation, and transformation which brings Christ and salvation. Therefore, we must understand the Bible accurately, responsibly, faithfully, honestly, sensitively, and obediently, employing hermeneutical theory to allow it to speak. Thiselton criticises evangelical hermeneutics in this context.

Thus, it seems, for Thiselton, the Bible is authoritative, first, because we experience God's help in interpreting it and in changing us through it and, second, because it provides criteria that authenticate the genuinely 'Christian'. Third, these points are not undermined by arguments related to historical distance or conditioning, self-attestation, or the Spirit's work. We can imagine a critic's response: 'this is merely the experience of being conformed to coherence with something accepted as 'true' or 'authoritative' in a straightforwardly fideistic manner. Epistemological warrant requires more than considerations of religious experience, conformity, coherence, and performative endorsement'.

Whilst accepting this criticism of these two articles taken in isolation, however, it flounders on the dialogic inter-relationships in Thiselton's thinking between biblical studies, systematic theology, and hermeneutics. Thiselton attempts to approach the Bible through hermeneutics, or 'from below, in history'. Thus, Thiselton warrants the assumption of 'biblical cogency for hermeneutics' (not unrelated to questions of 'authority') as a working hypothesis on the ground of its resonance with

151. Thiselton, 'Understanding God's Word Today' (Shorter Article), 6, 4th-5th cf. 1st columns.
152. Thiselton, 'Understanding God's Word Today' (Shorter Article), 6, 5th cf. 1st columns.
criteria emerging through dialogue with extra-biblical approaches to epistemology\textsuperscript{156} associated with the rise of historical consciousness in the Western philosophical traditions.\textsuperscript{157} If the Bible resonates with, or even improves upon, a transformed historically configured epistemology, then it attains credibility. Thus, for Thiselton, following Pannenberg, "the theologian's" "intellectual obligation" is "to relate Christian thought to all truth", including "philosophy and the sciences".\textsuperscript{158} Thiselton attempts this in his article, 'Truth' (1978), as we shall see below.\textsuperscript{159} Thus, Thiselton avoids a straightforward "fideistic defence of the claim of religious language to its own realm".\textsuperscript{160} His popular-level articles must be read against the background of his more theoretical works, as follows.\textsuperscript{161}

3. Philosophical Problem: Disunity between Understanding & Conceptualisation

In this section, we argue that part of the problem Thiselton faces in moving towards a unified critique of epistemology is the lack of an adequate philosophical subtext in broadly 'existentialist' and 'philosophical-hermeneutical' approaches for bringing historical understanding and subject-object conceptualisation to unity, and to their proper contexts of mutual functioning, without polarisation. But first, we introduce Heidegger and Gadamer more formally.

Gadamer recounts that "Martin Heidegger [1889-1976] changed the philosophical consciousness of the time with one stroke", powerfully effecting "every direction of scholarly research" and making "everything that preceded... seem feeble".\textsuperscript{162} A "founder of existentialism",\textsuperscript{163} Heidegger's "aims" were "ultimately ontological",\textsuperscript{164} seeking to answer the question of 'Being' through his existential analytic of Dasein (human 'being-there'). In this way Heidegger followed Nietzsche in attempting to uncover and overturn the "metaphysics" of "Western philosophy from Plato to the present".\textsuperscript{165} Heidegger obtained

\textsuperscript{156} Thiselton, 'The Theologian Who Must Not Be Ignored', 11; cf. Thiselton, 'Head-On Challenge to Doubt', 8; cf. Pannenberg, \textit{Basic Questions} 2, 1-64; cf. Thiselton, 'The Use of Philosophical Categories', 87.


\textsuperscript{158} Thiselton, 'Head-On Challenge to Doubt', 8; cf. Pannenberg, \textit{Basic Questions} 2, 1-64, 1-27.

\textsuperscript{159} Thiselton, 'Truth', 874-902.

\textsuperscript{160} Contradicting, Maddox, 'Review of The Two Horizons', 137.


two doctorates from Freiburg before becoming a professor of philosophy at Marburg and being appointed "the chair of philosophy at Freiburg". Heidegger's early thought - pre 1930 and especially his book *Being and Time* (1927) - elevated "hermeneutics... to the centre of philosophical concern", whilst his later thought reached "its more or less final form in his 1935 lectures, *An Introduction to Metaphysics* (1953)". Heidegger's early influences include "Schleiermacher, Droysen, and Dilthey", whilst the influence of Husserl's phenomenology should not be over-stressed (see Chapter 6). Heidegger was also in dialogue with Bultmann at Marburg both before and after the publication of *Being and Time*, which also draws heavily on Kierkegaard. Heidegger's "destruction' of metaphysics", particularly Cartesianism, affected "every important Continental movement today", particularly influencing Gadamer's "more conservative" philosophical hermeneutics and Derrida's "more radical" post-structuralism.

Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002), Heidegger's pupil, was also influenced by the thought of Heraclitus, Plato (cf. Gadamer's "logic of question and answer"), Aristotle (cf. Gadamer's linking of "finite knowing" to "tradition"), and Kant (cf. Gadamer on the "the limits" of philosophical truth). Augustine, Höllderlin, Hegel, Dilthey, Husserl, Rilke, Celan, N. Hartmann and P. Natorp are also key influences. In his seminal work, *Truth and Method* (1960), Gadamer makes "language the essence of hermeneutics" for all of life, drawing on both the earlier and later Heidegger to inquire into the "consequences for human understanding and self-knowledge" of our situatedness in "a history articulated in linguistic tradition". This constitutes Gadamer's criticism and regrounding of the human sciences, which have experienced an identity crisis through reliance on a hermeneutics too preoccupied with the Cartesian 'method' of "scientific understanding". Thus, "philosophical hermeneutics" 'turns' from "methodological" to "ontological" concerns. Gadamer trained in "philosophy and classics" at Marburg, before teaching at Marburg, Leipzig, Frankfurt, and Heidelberg.

174. Linge, 'Editor's Introduction', xi.
Habermas and the Frankfurt School attacked Gadamer's lack of a “transcendental” dimension, whilst E. Betti and E.D. Hirsch sharply separated a text's “meaning” from its “significance”, rejecting Gadamer’s view that understanding involves ‘application’. Derrida argued that Gadamer’s notion of “(good) will in understanding” presupposed an inadmissible “metaphysics of will”, whilst Rorty also claims that Gadamer succumbs to “metaphysical idealism”. Gadamer approved Wolfhart Pannenberg's development of his work, except Pannenberg's assumption of “the absolute historicity of the Incarnation”. Thus, socio-critical, historicist, post-structuralist, neo-pragmatic, and theological responses to Gadamer’s work may be noted.

Returning to Thielson then, for Thielson, hermeneutics, almost by definition, questions “the Cartesian subject-object dichotomy” of traditional epistemology. He agrees with Heidegger's, Gadamer's and Wittgenstein’s rejection of the “post-Cartesian... isolated worldless ‘I’” - the “human subject is always the participant in a community prior to... objectification and subjectivism”. Thus, Thielson rejects “objectivist epistemology, the correspondence theory of truth, and the referential theory of meaning”: “knowing is grounded beforehand in a Being-already-alongside-the-world”; “aesthetic consciousness” does not simply ‘confront’ an object; and “the concept of knowing is coupled with that of the language-game”. Thus, against J.W. Montgomery, Thielson argues that to

182. Heidegger, Being and Time, 88.
184. Wittgenstein, On Certainty, 74e.
imperialise the subject-object model is "facile", "naively objectivist", "Cartesianism". Thiselton also
follows the later Wittgenstein's and Gadamer's attacks on Enlightenment rationalist 'method' which
seeks immediate answers that conform to a system of foreclosed a priori categories. There is no
"antithesis between tradition and historical research", nor "a philosophical method", but "methods,
different therapies". Nevertheless, Thiselton also rejects the replacing of one dualism with another. Thus, Bultmann places
"too much weight on the subject side of the subject-object relation", mirroring Heidegger's
relativism. Correct understanding must still accompany deep understanding. For Bultmann, though,
historical study centres on realising "the possibilities" afforded for "understanding... human
existence". Thus, for Thiselton, subject-object conceptualisation and experiential historical
understanding must be held together, and B.J. Walsh's charge that Thiselton falls into a
'Gadamerian' or 'Wittgensteinian' subjectivism must be queried.

But how does Thiselton hold together 'objective' subject-object conceptualisation and 'subjective'
historical understanding? In B.J. Walsh's view, Thiselton is 'dualistic' here, merely qualifying
'objectivism' by stressing 'subjectivity', or 'subjectivism' by stressing 'objectivity', to thereby create a
'balance' of 'objective testing' and 'subjective listening'. However, Thiselton's correcting of one-
sidedness occurs within a larger complex and unified 'whole' that is neither dualistic, nor compatible
with Walsh's generalisations about Scriptural-textual "ontology" or appropriate "interpretative
stance". (Thiselton rejects even a generalised 'ontology' of parable texts, let alone of the whole
Bible. Since even a single parable can engender multiple 'appropriate responses', how much more the

185. Thiselton, 'The Use of Philosophical Categories', 94, cf. 95; cf. Yeh, J.Y.H., 'Cultural Reading of the Bible: Some
Chinese Christian Cases', in Text and Experience: Towards a Cultural Exegesis of the Bible (ed. D.L. Smith-Christopher;
186. Thiselton, 'Thirty Years', 1560-1561; cf. Thiselton, 'The Use of Philosophical Categories', 91-92; cf. Wittgenstein,
Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem', in Philosophical Hermeneutics (H.-G. Gadamer; ed. D.E. Linge; London:
188. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 51e.
190. Thiselton, 'The Use of Philosophical Categories', 94, cf. 95.
192. Thiselton, 'The Use of Philosophical Categories', 93, cf. 94.
whole Bible?) Rather, Thiselton's 'whole' is the developing Christo-eschatological framework which, we suggested earlier, unifies and grounds his five major hermeneutical critiques. In this context, we may respond to P.R. Keifert's criticism of Thiselton's reading of Heidegger and Gadamer:

"Thiselton critiques Heidegger's emphasis on world-hood to the exclusion of subject-object thinking... However, in his critique of Gadamer, he transposes too much of this failing... onto Gadamer's concept of the fusion of horizons. The possibility for the historical and linguistic distanciation of the text in Gadamer's thought is far more prevalent than Thiselton suggests".

Here, Keifert rightly notes Thiselton's critique of Heidegger's failure to stress both 'worldhood' and subject-object thinking. Thus, Thiselton notes that, for Heidegger, subject-object conceptualisation is tied to the "split... perspective" of Platonic-Cartesian "dualism" in which "Being as idea" is exalted relative to "mere appearance". Given historical and linguistic "conditionedness", however, imposing concepts onto Being is problematic, and turns the critical testing of truth into a circularity of "artificial correspondence" between sets of concepts. Whilst Thiselton complains that this makes "what is true for me" the only "criterion of 'what is true'", he simultaneously accepts Heidegger's rejection of the Plato-Descartes-Kant framework and "the correspondence theory of truth", which merely amount to finding "an agreement between 'contents of consciousness'", missing "the Being-uncovered" of an "entity itself". So Thiselton asks,

"How do we escape the difficulty that when we try to test the truth of our judgment about a fact with the fact itself, all that we can really do is to compare our first judgment with some second judgment, not with 'the fact itself' independently of any human..."

201. Heidegger, Being and Time, 261.
judgment? To borrow a simile used by Wittgenstein... it is like buying a second copy of
the morning paper in order to test whether what the first copy said was true.”

Thiselton’s conclusion is that subject-object conceptualisation can only be reinstated within a
theological framework consonant with a philosophy of history that modifies that of Heidegger so as
to re-configure historical conditioning and ‘linguisticality’. In Thiselton’s estimate, the later Heidegger
configures the latter fatally so as to trap thought when, in reality, ‘thinking’ releases us from
linguisticality. Challenging Heidegger, “apprehending” is not just “for the sake of being”. Opposing
“thinking to Being”, extending “its dominance... over Being”, need not be just a Western distortion.

Rather, interpretations and ‘language-events’ can be critically tested against the ‘truth-criteria’ of
tradition, of which Heidegger is overly suspicious. Thus, Thiselton attacks Heidegger’s near-Buddhist
“pseudo-humility” and “sheer irrationalism” and E. Fuchs’ “ontology of psychological illusionism”.
By contrast, the “New Testament” emphasises “the use of reason or ‘mind’”. The New Hermeneutic
is wrong to follow Heidegger’s disparagement of subject-object conceptualisation.

Keifert is incorrect, however, to suggest that Thiselton neglects Gadamer’s notion of ‘distancing’.
Rather, Thiselton asks how Gadamer, given his stress on ‘distancing’, can completely reject the
Cartesian model in his third section of Truth and Method. Can the ‘other’ assert “itself in its own
separate validity”, whilst totally detaching “ourselves from the Cartesian basis of modern science”?

Thiselton argues, with Dilthey and Gadamer, that the Cartesian ‘scientific method’ of “classification
and generalisation” is of limited scope, especially in the humanities. Gadamer rightly highlights a
broader notion of ‘rationality’ in the history of Western philosophy that accounts for history, real-

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life experience, creative wit or ridicule, common sense, and intuition. Such ‘rationality’ makes “judgements” by entering and eventfully experiencing a situation, and by drawing on past “experiences of life”. ‘Rationality’ operates within history and the unconscious “pre-judgements” of tradition, filtered through ‘effective history’ (later translated as ‘history of effects’), that more fundamentally affect interpretation than “conscious” judgements initially,\(^{209}\) being “justified prejudices productive of knowledge”.\(^{210}\) Understanding a work of art, then, involves “modes of experience in which truth comes to light” in real-life. Such ‘understanding’ is “progressive”, remaining “classic”, even over centuries, and transcends “the conscious intentions of the artist” - the literary ‘classic’ is “never fully understood”. Understanding enters the ‘world’ of an artwork, and is “gripped by it”, as its object. Similarly, the seriousness, purpose, and presuppositions of a game - not the conscious thoughts of the “players or spectators” - “create the reality” or world that the player “stands in” and experiences.\(^{211}\) Thus, “play fulfils its purpose only if the player loses himself in play”.\(^{212}\) Thus, in Thiselton’s view, Heidegger, Gadamer, and the New Hermeneutic rightly move beyond Cartesian “knowledge” towards ‘deeper’, ‘creative’, experiential, historically located understanding.\(^{213}\) Gadamer rightly urges the need for a new ‘historical’ paradigm for rationality, “practical knowledge”, or “phronesis”.\(^{214}\)

However, contrary to Keifert, Thiselton’s additional stress on Gadamer’s notion of ‘distancing’ (i.e. highlighting the historical particularity of textual horizons relative to that of reader horizons) shows that Thiselton also aligns with Gadamer’s highlighting of historical ‘otherness’, or “strangeness”.\(^{215}\) It is in the context of the issue of the critical testing of traditions that Thiselton criticises Gadamer, who disowns “the role of prophet... Cassandra... preacher... or... know-it-all”.\(^{216}\) In Thiselton’s view,


\(^{212}\) Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 102.


\(^{216}\) Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, xxxviii.
“tradition may affect understanding either positively or negatively... The later Heidegger convincingly shows that... a given language-tradition may... distort truth... But Gadamer also convincingly shows that tradition may serve as a filter, passing on truth that has stood the test of time [i.e. ‘effective history’]... Both sides must be taken into account...” 217

Gadamer’s problem, then, in Thiselton’s view, is more his failure to reinstate the role of subject-object conceptualisation in the ‘metacritical’ evaluative testing of traditions than, contrary to Keifthert, in relation to the ‘critical’ distanciation of textual ‘otherness’. To reinstate subject-object conceptualisation at the ‘metacritical’ level, Thiselton believes that a theological framework is required. This is because metacritical evaluation is, ultimately, the comparative subject-object evaluation or testing of traditions against transcendent ‘criteria’ with content. Philosophy - specifically that of Heidegger and Gadamer - fails to provide transcendent criteria in Thiselton’s estimate.218 For Heidegger, “the way of Being of the ideal, Objectivity... are opaque”,219 for Gadamer, hermeneutical “consciousness” is not “eschatological”. 220

Summarising: for Thiselton, the Continental philosophical traditions rightly criticise Cartesianism and, in Gadamer, rightly re-establish subject-object conceptual distance at the level of historical difference. But they fail to provide a replacement philosophical subtext or criteria to re-ground the reinstatement of subject-object conceptualisation in its role in a metacritique of traditions. Thus, theological exploration is ‘warranted’ as an attempt to resolve the situation - though it could only retain credibility if it dialogically resonated with philosophical concerns or provided credible solutions to philosophical problems. This brings Thiselton back to Pannenberg. First, however, we pause to allow Heidegger to reply to Thiselton’s reading (deferring our response to Thiselton’s reading of Gadamer until Chapter 6).


4. Allowing Heidegger to Respond to Thiselton

Roger Scruton writes of Heidegger’s *Being and Time*, it “is formidably difficult... I... have read no commentator who even begins to make sense of it”.221 Thus, we venture forth tentatively in allowing Heidegger to reply to Thiselton.

On our reading, Heidegger retains ‘conceptualising’ *per se*, but not that ‘conceptualising’ in Western philosophical tradition that fails to presuppose an adequate phenomenological analytic of Dasein. Heidegger rejects a pre-phenomenological reduction of Dasein to a ‘subject’ and ‘entities’ to ‘objects’ that ignores concrete temporality and relationality. For Heidegger, ‘conceptualisation’ is “grounded beforehand in a Being-already-alongside-the-world”,222 presupposing that Dasein must ‘hold back’ “from any kind of producing [or] manipulating” and put “itself into... the mode of just tarrying alongside”, to encounter “entities... purely in the way they look”. Thus, “looking explicitly at what we encounter is possible” as “dwelling autonomously alongside entities within-the-world” such that “the perception of the present-at-hand is consummated” as “an act of making determinate” “expressed in propositions”.223

Thus, conceptualisation and assertion can belong to authentic knowing. This also relates to historical difference and relationality. ‘Knowing’ persons are not artificially abstracted from historical reality but already embedded in history, though still perceiving that which is ‘other’. In ‘knowing’, Dasein “does not somehow first get out of an inner sphere in which it has been proximally encapsulated”, but “is always ‘outside’ alongside” “already discovered” “entities”.224 Conversely, it is problematic “to start with spatiality”, where ‘subject-object’ conceptualisation seeks to cross space, as in “Descartes’ ontology of the ‘world’”. Rather, conceptualisation operates within “the ‘around’... constitutive for the environment” which is not “primarily ‘spatial’”. Of course, “spatial character... incontestably belongs to any environment”. But this “can be clarified only in terms of the structure of worldhood”. ‘Space’ does not separate historical realities but is part of a world in which ‘knowing’ links already related historical realities.225

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Initially, admittedly, such ‘knowing’ is not “bare conceptual cognition”, but manipulative and instrumentalising “concern”. Thus, “achieving... phenomenological access” to encountered “entities” “consists... in [first] thrusting aside our interpretative tendencies”. 226 “To lay bare what is just present-at-hand... cognition must first penetrate beyond what is ready-to-hand in our concern” or “circumspection”. 227 Thus, conceptualisation is de-centred relative to ‘circumspection’, and yet “observation... is just as primordial as... action”. For Heidegger, “theoretical behaviour is just looking, without circumspection”. 228 Nevertheless “cognition” is a “founded mode of Being-in-the-world” with “ontological meaning”. 229

Thiselton, then, may sometimes conflate Heidegger’s disparaged ‘subject-object’ conceptualisation of the Western philosophical tradition with Heidegger’s de-centred but not disparaged primordial notion of conceptualisation. For Heidegger, the “concept of Being” must be “conceptually grasped”, 230 and science genuinely advances through revising its “basic concepts”. 231 Heidegger’s notion of ‘Care’ (see Chapter 6) is also “an ontological structural concept”. 232 Admittedly, Thiselton acknowledges Heidegger’s description of his own ‘conceptuality’. 233 Admittedly, Thiselton notes the consistency of Heidegger’s early thought with a contemporary scientific paradigm, implying Heidegger’s retention of some form of ‘conceptualisation’ (see Chapter 7). However these caveats only lend further urgency to Thiselton’s need to be more specific about which kind of ‘subject-object conceptualisation’ he sees as too disparaged by Heidegger. If it isn’t the ‘subject-object conceptualisation’ of an a-historical Cartesianism that is missing from Heidegger, then which is it? Our best answer to this question given our earlier observations is that Thiselton, in effect, argues that Heidegger, without Gadamer’s developed perspective on tradition, in some senses does not sufficiently stress the historical ‘other’ or difference, and hence does not reinstate a historically grounded ‘conceptualisation’ in the right way. Further, Heidegger lacks ‘conceptualisation’ as part of a metacritique of traditions. Yet Thiselton remains too vague when he speaks of reinstating “subject-object thinking in hermeneutics” as a criticism of Heidegger. 234

228. Heidegger, Being and Time, 99.
231. Heidegger, Being and Time, 29.
232. Heidegger, Being and Time, 83-84.
234. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 441.
Having said this, there is no choice but to align with what Thiselton affirms: historical understanding and conceptualisation need to be held together in hermeneutics. Arguably, Thiselton may also go too far to view Heidegger's negative assessment of Western tradition as a hermeneutical principle underestimating the capacity of tradition to transmit truth: Heidegger's "destruction" of Western metaphysics does not merely have "the negative sense of shaking off the ontological tradition", but also stakes out "the positive possibilities of that tradition".23 Again, however, Thiselton’s positive point, that tradition both transmits and distorts truth, is hard to contest.

5. Towards a Theological Solution: Pannenberg’s Eschatological Epistemology

Broadly, then, we may affirm Thiselton’s appeal to a theological framework so as to address the problem of a metacritique of traditions left by Heidegger and Gadamer. As we began to note earlier, Thiselton appeals to Pannenberg in this context. Thus, in Thiselton’s view, Pannenberg “invites travel in the right direction”, though without providing a “final or definitive solution”, in relation to questions of truth, rationality, knowledge, and faith.236

Thus, following Pannenberg, Thiselton relates ‘truth’ to the truth of God,237 historical contingencies, human subjectivity, revelation or manifestation, appropriation,238 and to truth-claims and verdicts (the evaluative dimension).239 The truth of God is neither Platonic, nor “already existing... as a finished product” divorced from history, nor like the logical necessity of “geometrical theorems”, nor “simply an object of assent”, nor like a thing “presently at hand”. Biblical truth is neither detached from “ordinary” life like “Plato’s timeless ideas”,240 nor ‘analytical definition’, nor mere local salvation-history or religious truth.241 The unity of truth excludes Neo-Kantian fact-value or event-proposition dichotomies.242 Already, then, theology addresses certain philosophical problems.

Following Pannenberg, Thiselton advocates historical rationality, beginning from below with historical inquiry, and manifesting the historicality of knowing: critical judgement (relating to past and present, involving subject-object conceptualisation), ever-widening dialogue and open-ended creative imagination (relating to the future and anticipations of 'history-as-a-whole'), and awareness of mystery (especially relating to God). ‘Reason’ is neither Greek, nor a matter of “preconceived categories and questions” into which Christianity must be fitted, nor merely theoretical rationalism, nor Protestant orthodox deductive reasoning, nor “the speculative reason of idealism”, nor neokantian. Again, theology addresses philosophical issues.

For Thiselton, following Pannenberg, historical knowledge of past and present historical continuities and particularities, extends beyond analogy with present experience, and is provisional on future confirmation. The pastness of the past and the Christological anticipation of ‘history-as-a-whole’ stave off complete relativism or context-relativity, but historical relativity, subjectivity, and human historicity remain in some form. Knowledge is provisionally warranted not by logical necessity but by evaluations of truth-claims or verdicts against as broad as possible a historical dialogue, including comparative religion. Warrant also includes performative endorsement. Warranted claims become ‘criteria’ against which relatively unwarranted claims are tested. Again, theology addresses philosophical issues.

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244. Thiselton, ‘Head-On Challenge to Doubt’, 8; cf. Pannenberg, Basic Questions 1, 51-52.
Finally, for Thiselton, following Pannenberg, faith (in one of its senses), is structured like knowledge, uniting historical knowledge of the past, rational justification or warrant, assent to cognitive content, trust in relation to present and future, and future-orientated active commitment and decision.255 Faith is not belief in the “absurd” justified by authoritarian or irrational appeals to the Holy Spirit.256 Nor, is it “absolutely certain” belief,257 nor authoritarian belief in a “self-authenticating Word”. (Barth makes a “desperate evasion” of Feuerbach’s critique of religion: Christian truth relates to all truth, including philosophy and the sciences, because God “is the ground of all truth” as supported by “the abundance of analogies between biblical and non-biblical concepts of God”).258 Contrary to Kierkegaard and Bultmann, faith is not ‘sheer decision’ divorced from knowledge and warrant.259 Again, theology addresses philosophical issues.

Hence, through appeal to Pannenberg, Thiselton begins to show that theology can be relevant to philosophical questions related to epistemology, resonating with certain philosophical conclusions and providing credible solutions to philosophical problems without transgressing philosophical criteria - for example, the effect of ‘history’ on ‘knowledge’. Thus, Thiselton begins to authorise (or warrant) the inclusion of theological considerations in hermeneutical discussion in relation to epistemological difficulties emerging from philosophy. Thiselton further warrants this theological exploration by finding ‘resonance’ between theology and philosophy in relation to rationality, perception, and self-deception - as follows.


Thus, Thiselton notes that T.F. Torrance’s work on ‘scientific rationality’ is consistent with Pannenberg’s theology. Certainly, a discredited Cartesianism of “disinvolvement from one’s task” or the “general scepticism” commonly confused with ‘rationality’ are inconsistent with Pannenberg’s theology. Certainly, the ‘rationality’ of the Kantian/Neo-Kantian framework of Dilthey, Bultmann, Tillich, and J.A.T. Robinson with its “disastrous dualisms” or dichotomies (events vs. values or ideas,

object vs. subject, nature vs. God, historical Jesus vs. the Christ of faith) is inconsistent with Pannenberg's theology. However, Torrance's notion of 'rationality' is philosophically cogent and properly 'historical', combining "willingness to respect the claims of the given [i.e. the historical past] as over and against one's own prior assumptions" with "openness to the truth [including the future]". That is, on the issue of a properly 'historical' notion of rationality, there is dialogic resonance between philosophy and theology: a 'rationality' that satisfies biblical-theological criteria also satisfies philosophical criteria. Thus Thiselton affirms Torrance's work, *God and Rationality* as "a book which should not be ignored" finding it strange, given the resonance just noted, that Torrance has not appealed to Pannenberg. It only makes Thiselton's case more convincing, however, if Torrance and Pannenberg arrived at mutually compatible solutions independently of one-another. Thus, Thiselton's reading of Torrance between 1969 and 1971 seems to vindicate Thiselton's earlier excitement about Pannenberg's work. By contrast, P.A. Bertocci's notion of 'rationality' both transgresses philosophical criteria in its Enlightenment "rationalistic spirit" and transgresses the "Hebrew-Christian conceptions of eschatology and history... exemplified in... Molmann" by appealing to "process thought".

A. Morton 'confirms that 'perception' is an epistemological issue. In this context, Thiselton argues that appeal to philosophy is warranted because it provides solutions to theological problems, both exegetically and practically. Thus, exegetically, Thiselton argues that the later Wittgenstein's notion of 'seeing as', and D.D. Evans' parallel notion of 'onlooks', resolve the supposed "logical problems" associated with Paul's doctrine of justification. How can a believer be both 'righteous' and 'sinful'? How is 'justification' both past and future? How can 'faith' exclude 'works' yet remain in a different

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logical category? Rejecting existing solutions, Thiselton argues that how I ‘see’ something depends on its function within “a system, frame of reference, or setting in life”. With “more than one... frame of reference”, we see something as something. Thus, whether we ‘see’ Jastrow’s ‘duck-rabbit’ drawing as a duck or a rabbit depends on whether we imagine ponds or fields. Frames-of-reference render concepts intelligible; grammatical statements explicate or extend these frames. Thus, the Old Testament renders ‘redemption’ intelligible as ‘deliverance from bondage’. Similarly, for D.D. Evans, x is ‘looked on’ as y when placed “within a structure, organisation... scheme”, or “future... context” and given a “status, function, or role”. Thiselton contrasts the logic of valid or invalid ‘verdicts’ with that of ‘true-or-false’ flat assertions, where Thiselton’s exposition of ‘seeing as’ in The Two Horizons appears in four further places in his ‘second period’. In summary Thiselton argues that, in Paul’s doctrine of justification, there is no contradiction between assertions about ‘righteousness’ and ‘sinfulness’. Rather, competing verdicts are each ‘valid’ in their frames of reference. Eschatologically, the believer is ‘looked on’ as ‘righteous’ - justification is a ‘pre-dating’ of what is “really an eschatological act”. Historically and legally, the believer is ‘seen as’ ‘sinful’. Since the eschatological verdict “corresponds with future reality”, however, it is decisive. ‘Faith’, then, (in this context) is part of the ‘grammar’ of the concept of justification, and involves a “future-orientated outlook” “effectively relevant in the present”. Faith steps from the ‘historical’ system into the ‘eschatological’ system, accepting the ‘righteous’ verdict of Judgement Day as “valid for faith now”, appropriating the eschatological future in the present. Conversely, ‘works’ is part of the grammar “of the concept of law”. Since justification and law as concepts “stand in contrast to each other”, then so do ‘faith’ and ‘works’: hence “faith is not a special kind of work”. Thiselton repeats

270. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 418.
these points elsewhere. Wittgenstein's and D.D. Evans' philosophy of perception aids doctrinal interpretation, and hence resonates with theology and eschatology.

Practically, Thiselton argues that the philosophy of language also provides solutions to the problem of irresponsible communication in preaching and also to problems encountered in translation, linking the later Wittgenstein's remarks on 'controlling pictures' to I.T. Ramsey's comments on 'models and qualifiers'. For Thiselton, 'models' have power to help or "lead... astray". Thus, preachers over-minimising the "model of wind" for the Holy Spirit negate human effort. The 'wind' model requires qualification by the model of the "labourers in the vineyard". Over-extended, each model could contradict the other and engender contradictory attitudes. Hence, Thiselton agrees, following Ramsey: "models must be qualified and their applications limited". Though models are important for doctrine and preaching, their over-extension transmits a false "way of seeing the world", beguiling "uncritical minds". Models or metaphors "are not just illustrations" but "deliberately ambiguous devices", sometimes enabling us to see 'new' truth, or old truth differently. They should neither be used totally ambiguously, nor be "replaced by flat prosaic similes" that remove their power to create new vision. Speech about God must use models, but responsibly, because of their power. Thiselton agrees with Ramsey: "every model requires its qualifier", since an unqualified 'picture', citing Wittgenstein, can 'hold us captive': Similarly, Thiselton expounds C.S. Lewis' notion of 'master's metaphors' as those that are used consciously and helpfully. Conversely, Lewis' 'pupil's metaphors' may captivate, bewitch, seem like 'keys', or control as unseen 'axes' about which thought or action turns, causing us to speak nonsense. Metaphor becomes doctrine when its metaphorical status is forgotten. Hence, metaphors need to be used responsibly by combining multiple mutually qualifying metaphors and theological explanation. In translation, very ambiguous or 'dead' metaphors require explanation, but 'live' metaphors should be left alone, allowing them to provoke self-involvement. 'Bad' metaphor can over-extend meaning or involve inappropriate stylistic register - like a bad joke. Thus, the Spirit searches us, but is hardly 'radar'.

Thus, the philosophy of perception in the later Wittgenstein, D.D. Evans, I.T. Ramsey, and C.S. Lewis, finds resonance with, and thereby warranted application in relation to, exegetical and practical concerns in theology. Thiselton’s employment of the philosophy of language here is not a return to linguistic formalism, epistemological positivism, or philosophical idealism. Rather, Thiselton accepts A. Kenny’s rejection of ‘picture’ and ‘use’ as “contrasting slogans for the earlier and later writings” of Wittgenstein - the later Wittgenstein modified his picture theory. Propositions’ “relation to reality... differs from one language-game to another”. Thus, Thiselton’s appeal to Wittgenstein’s later notion of ‘pictures’ is not ‘formalist’,283 where he argues similarly in The Two Horizons284 and elsewhere.285 Since language is multi-functional and performative, what language is depends on what a speaker is doing in a particular language-game.286 Hence, an extra-linguistic critique of linguistic-uses is needed to prevent pictures (including religious symbols) holding us captive or language being used irresponsibly without extra-linguistic 'backing' or 'currency' in life.287 Language-habits can perpetuate spellbinding ‘pictures’ that strongly condition thought. For Thiselton, however, spells can be broken. Language-games and forms of life are not logically isolated, as the phenomenon of inter-translatability shows.288

Finally, in Thiselton’s thinking, biblical-theological teaching on ‘self-deception’ resonates with but also improves upon the approach of Freud. Thiselton argues that Freud’s atheism need not detain us, since it is not based on ‘scientific’ psychological observation but on philosophical speculation in the ancient sceptical tradition of Lucretius and Hobbes. This contradicts Freud’s own positivist ‘doctrine’, drawn from Comte and Feuerbach, that only scientific observation yields valid knowledge. Further, Freud’s hatred of his Jewish father may have caused him to repress God’s reality into his unconscious. Nevertheless, Thiselton argues that Freud’s exposition of the human capacity for self-deception, the unconscious as a reservoir of strong feelings and inner urges, and the need for rational assessment of the unconscious as part of health and maturity resonates with biblical teaching about sin and the

287. Thiselton, ‘Language and Meaning in Religion’, 1127 (para. 3); cf. 1132 (para. 2); cf. 1134-1135, 1135 (para. 2,3,4); cf. 1137 (para. 2) re. symbol-use; cf. 1138 (para. 1); cf. 1143 (para. 3).
problem of the human ‘heart’. Indeed, the Bible is more sceptical and realistic than Freud about the human condition: given the divorce between ‘self-consciousness’ and ‘self-understanding’, only the Holy Spirit can unmask and heal the heart’s self-deceptions and inner conflicts respectively.

In conclusion, Thiselton’s theological explorations into historical rationality (including subject-object conceptualisation at a metacritical level), historical knowledge, truth, faith, and self-deception are ‘dialogically warranted’ in relation to philosophical problems and criteria. Conversely, philosophical explorations into perception are ‘dialogically warranted’ in relation to exegetical and practical theological problems and criteria. We may now return to Thiselton’s approach to the question of ‘truth’ in more detail.

7. Philosophical Problem: The ‘Spell’ of Kierkegaard’s One-Sided Notion of ‘Truth’
Thiselton highlights a second major problem in philosophy that, in his view, provides a further arena in which theology proves its relevance to the epistemological discussion: Kierkegaard’s legacy constitutes a controlling picture that bewitches subsequent ‘existentialist’ approaches to ‘truth’. Admittedly, Thiselton argues, Kierkegaard rightly reinstated two dimensions of truth missing from the Danish Church of his day. First, ‘truth’ relates to the transformation of the historical life and subjectivity of the individual - an emphasis intermittently missing from Anglicanism. This corrects Descartes’ artificial abstraction of subjects from concrete history and relationships in which they are reduced to ‘reason’. It also corrects Kant’s generalising, abstract, a priori, and a-historical universal moral law. To an extent, Kierkegaard’s criticisms also apply to Hegel. Second, Kierkegaard rightly stressed the dialectical self-involving ‘indirect’ manner in which truth is often best communicated, as in Jesus’ Parables.

Nevertheless, Thiselton finds six deficiencies in Kierkegaard's approach to truth. First, without theology, it fails as a self-contained philosophical epistemology, sliding into scepticism and relativism in Nietzsche, Heidegger, Jaspers, Sartre, and the 'new morality' of radical 'theology'.

Second, Kierkegaard is individualistic, neglecting the corporate dimension of community. Third, Kierkegaard neglects rationality and logical coherence in relation to faith and truth-assessment. Fourth, Kierkegaard neglects 'truth' as contingent historical events, following Lessing's separation of 'reason and the eternal' from the 'historical'. Thus, Kierkegaard neglects more 'direct' communication, notably historical report. Fifth, Christian truth involves both rational intellectual beliefs with cognitive content and practical response. It is not either/or, but both/and. Sixth, Kierkegaard was too negative about Hegel's historical rationalism, which improved on earlier rationalisms. The background here is Thiselton's juxtaposition of Pannenberg's qualified appropriation of Hegel's work and criticism of Kierkegaard's "anti-rational" individualism. Through appeal to Pannenberg, therefore, Thiselton holds qualified appeals to Hegel and Kierkegaard together.

Despite these problems, Thiselton prefers Kierkegaard's approach to the broadly secular 'existentialism' of Nietzsche, Jaspers, Sartre, and Heidegger. First, following Karl Barth, Thiselton argues that these thinkers misappropriate Kierkegaard's work. Thus, for Kierkegaard, God calls Abraham to sacrifice his 'hope' through a paradoxical decision to obey that contradicts external ethical criteria. Yet, for the secular existentialists, the self decides to actualise its 'hope' in an egocentric decision to rebel that contradicts external ethical criteria. These changes generate the secular existentialists' sceptical and relativistic readings of Kierkegaard.

300. Thiselton, 'Kierkegaard and the Nature of Truth', 104.
301. Thiselton, 'Kierkegaard and the Nature of Truth', 104.
and Sartre are self-contradictory, citing the ‘paradox of scepticism’. If ‘truth’ is only my truth, and ‘relativism’ only ‘my’ relativism, then the universal claim that all persons cannot ‘know’ cannot be made. Third, we have already noted Thiselton’s agreement with Heidegger’s rejection of a correspondence theory of truth, and his criticism of the fatalistic passivity of Heidegger’s notion of truth as ‘eventful disclosure’. Thus, under Kierkegaard’s ‘spell’, secular ‘existentialism’ only augments Kierkegaard’s problems in relation to ‘truth’.

Conversely, Thiselton argues that Bultmann and post-Bultmannian ‘theological existentials’ only perpetuate the strengths and weaknesses of Kierkegaard’s approach, whereas the ‘New Morality’ of H.A. Williams and J.A.T. Robinson perpetuates the problems of secular ‘existentialism’. Thus, Williams views ‘prostitution’ as a potentially daring faith-venture, but thereby reduces Kierkegaard’s ‘subjectivity’ to an egocentric subjectivism of doing ‘what seems true for me’, making the human subject the arbiter of truth.

Hence, Thiselton rejects secular and theological ‘existentialist’ appropriations of Kierkegaard’s epistemology as one-sided, instead holding Kierkegaard’s and Hegel’s positive insights together within a framework that appeals to Pannenberg. Thiselton argues that truth is ‘multiform’, dependent upon its home ‘form of life’. ‘Forms of life’ involve rationality, community, history, daily life, individual subjectivity, and faith. Thus, adapting later Wittgensteinian insights to a part-Pannenbergian frame, Thiselton again brings these two thinkers into juxtaposition.


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Summarising, Kierkegaard’s legacy in philosophy and theology presents difficulties in relation to ‘truth’, thereby warranting a further theological exploration. Widened dialogue between philosophy and theology is required to search for a multiform notion of ‘truth’.

8. Theological Exploration: A ‘Biblical Multiform Notion of Truth’

Thielson takes up this widened dialogue and search for a multiform notion of ‘truth’ in his article, ‘Truth’ (1978).\(^{317}\) Thielson begins with a complaint:

> “for many years there has been a tendency in biblical studies to over-generalise about the uses of *aletheia* and *alethēs* in classical Greek... partly with a view to drawing a clear-cut contrast between Greek and Hebrew concepts of truth. It is then argued that whilst some NT writers preserve the Hebrew concept, other writers, especially John, achieve a fusion of these views”.\(^{318}\)

Thus, Thielson continues, “traditional... biblical scholarship” has understood the supposedly ‘classical Greek notion of truth’ as follows: *First*, “truth in contrast to mere appearance” (“in Hebrew the parallel word [*met*] denotes stability or faithfulness”); *second*, truth as “extra-historical”, “timeless... above the temporal... material world”; *third*, truth as “unhiddeness or unveiling”.\(^{319}\)

Whilst this is “valid up to a point”,\(^{320}\) two problems emerge. *First*, drawing on J. Barr, Thielson highlights the need to account for “different contexts in which *met* is employed in the OT”,\(^{321}\) against ‘etymologising’ (see Chapter 4).\(^{322}\) Thus “*met* means ‘truth’ in some contexts, and ‘faithfulness’ in

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other contexts”, respecting “polysemy, or multiple meaning”. Second, again drawing on Barr, Thiselton stresses that this semantic phenomenon does not constitute a distinctive Hebrew ‘conceptual connection’ between ‘truth’ and ‘faithfulness’.323

In response, Thiselton conducts a context-specific study of uses of words translated as ‘true’ or ‘truth’ in classical Greek, Old Testament, post-Canonical, and New Testament writings. From Thiselton’s exegesis, we may note, first, that ‘biblical truth’ is neither timeless, immaterial, abstract, eternal, changeless, nor supra-historical ‘ideas’, nor purely ‘theoretical’. Second, all the remaining senses of ‘truth’ in classical Greek, Old Testament, and post-Canonical Jewish writings reappear in the New Testament.324

Comparing the first and second parts of Thiselton’s article325 implies that he, in effect, then uses his ‘biblical multiform notion of truth’ (which we will explicate below) to correct and unify a series of allegedly one-sided approaches to truth in extra-biblical (i.e. everyday, ‘religious’, philosophical, and theological) contexts.326 This does not produce a larger ‘dualistic’ whole, contrary to B.J. Walsh’s reading, but a multiform fleshed-out ‘biblical multiform notion of truth’. Within this multiformity, the varying dimensions are inter-related in a way “closer... than mere family resemblances”, highlighting the strictly limited application of the later Wittgenstein’s thought in this area of Thiselton’s epistemology.327 In each case where Thiselton corrects an ‘extra-biblical’ ‘one-sidedness’, he does so with a dimension of ‘truth’ already present in his ‘biblical multiform notion of truth’ (see below), which has implications for warrant.

Thus, first, Thiselton corrects a one-sided stress on ‘multiformity’ in everyday and religious notions of ‘truth’ with the comprehensiveness of “the truth of God” which “embraces all this particular variety”.328 Second, Thiselton aims to correct a one-sided emphasis on ‘empirical correspondence’ by dislodging ‘the correspondence theory of truth’, which is tied to ‘formal’ ‘descriptive’ approaches to language. Rather, language is both embedded in history and multifunctional. Here, Thiselton draws on

the later Wittgenstein and, implicitly, on Pannenberg's critique of Neo-Kantianism. The
correspondence theory, even J.L. Austin's weakened version, is also tied to an idealist philosophical
subtext vulnerable to collapse into relativism. Here, Thiselton draws on Heidegger and P.F. Strawson.
For Thiselton, theology allows 'empirically informative communication' without collapse into
relativism.\textsuperscript{329}

\textit{Third}, Thiselton corrects a one-sided emphasis on totalising abstract truth-systems. Since a
comprehensive system corresponding to "the whole of reality" cannot be constructed, the 'coherence
theory of truth' (from Leibniz, Spinoza, Hegel, and Bradley), that assesses statements against their
coherence with a prior system, cannot claim comprehensiveness. Nevertheless, 'coherence' as a
criterion applies to provisional, expanding, open systems "on the way to" truth, such as systematic
theologies, historical reconstructions, or mathematics.\textsuperscript{330} \textit{Fourth}, Thiselton corrects a one-sided
emphasis on 'practical usefulness' in the 'pragmatic' theory of truth by stressing trans-contextual
criteria and critical testing.\textsuperscript{331} \textit{Fifth}, Thiselton corrects a one-sided emphasis on the performative action
of 'making a truth-claim' in the 'redundancy', 'semantic', and 'performative' theories of truth with an
emphasis on cognitive content.\textsuperscript{332}

\textit{Sixth}, cross-referencing Thiselton's earlier writings, we may deduce that he corrects one-sided
emphases in the Continental hermeneutical traditions. Taken together these traditions rightly
emphasise individual active decision and lived-through transforming appropriation; truth-as-
manifestation and listening in openness; practical wisdom; eventful experience and actualisation at the
pre-conscious, pre-cognitive level of hermeneutical 'worlds'; and self-understanding (cf. 'subjectivity').
However, they neglect subject-object thinking; critical testing; theological truth; the corporate
dimension; historical knowledge; public criteria of meaning transmitted in traditions; multi-functional
assertions; and criteria of truth beyond the human subject.\textsuperscript{333}

Revelation of God in Jesus of Nazareth', 125-131; cf. Larkin Jr., \textit{Culture and Biblical Hermeneutics}, 236-237; cf. Heidegger,
\textit{Being and Time}, 56.
\textsuperscript{330} Thiselton, 'Truth', 896.
\textsuperscript{331} Thiselton, 'Truth', 896-897.
\textsuperscript{332} Thiselton, 'Truth', 896-897.
\textsuperscript{333} Thiselton, 'Truth', 897-899; cf. Thiselton, 'Kierkegaard and the Nature of Truth', 90-91, cf. 95, cf. 104; cf. Thiselton,
\textit{New Testament Hermeneutics}, xxii-xxviii, conclusions, 5.2b, 5.2d, 5.3c, 5.3b, 6.1, 6.1a, 6.1b, 6.6b, 1.2a, 1.2b, 1.2c, 8.2, 8.3, 8.2b,
8.2c.
Seventh, Thiselton corrects the one-sided relativism, “extreme pessimism”, and “skepticism about truth” in contemporary Western culture. Thus, (i), secular theories of truth need correcting by theological approaches. (ii) The emphasis on subjectivity and the resulting fragmentation of truth associated with the German philosophical tradition needs correcting by reinstating subject-object thinking embedded within a unifying scientific theology. (iii) Trivialising attitudes to truth require correction by a biblical attitude of epistemological seriousness. Thiselton returns to these issues at the end of his article.

The third major point in Thiselton’s article, ‘Truth’, is its sympathetic yet critical treatment of Pannenberg. Pannenberg makes “over-generalising remarks about the contrast between Greek and Hebrew concepts of truth”. Nevertheless he has “pointed the way forward to recovering a sense of the unity and comprehensiveness of truth in theology”. Having already commented on “the truth of God” in Pannenberg’s work, we add that, for Pannenberg and Thiselton, the truth of God “embraces all other truth”, where Jesus Christ, as divine and as “the proleptic revelation of the End”, links the ‘truth of God’ to the truth of ‘history-as-a-whole’.

Before we expound the multiform fleshed-out ‘biblical multiform notion of truth’ connoted by Thiselton’s work (though we do the construction), five preliminary points should be noted, as follows.

First, our construction cross-references those of Thiselton’s writings that constitute part of the historical background of his article, ‘Truth’, including his PhD Thesis. Second, our construction juxtaposes Thiselton’s appeals to the later Wittgenstein in relation to ‘public criteria of meaning’ and ‘paradigm cases’, to T.F. Torrance’s ‘scientific theology’, and to Pannenberg. Third, Thiselton’s multiform notion of truth is not a pluralistic competition of incommensurable contents, but a ‘whole’

consisting of complementary notions of truth inter-related more closely than ‘family resemblances’ by
the unifying and comprehensive dimension of the truth of God.\textsuperscript{345} \textit{Fourth}, Thiselton urges that his
philosophical excursions aim to clarify the hermeneutical task and the Bible itself.\textsuperscript{346} Extra-biblical
approaches to truth are thus evaluated in dialogue with ‘biblical’ notions of truth and vice versa. Thus,
Thiselton is not straightforwardly fideistic.\textsuperscript{347} That a ‘biblical multiform notion of truth’ can correct
philosophical and other approaches warrants, in Thiselton’s thinking, an exploratory working
assumption of the relevance of including biblical approaches to truth in the epistemological
conversation.\textsuperscript{348} \textit{Fifth}, Thiselton again rejects certain notions of truth. \textit{(i)} Truth is neither a Platonic
timeless, immaterial, eternal, changeless, finished, supra-historical) ‘reality’ contrasting with ‘mere
appearance’, nor identifiable with \textit{a priori} generalisations about ‘Greek’ or ‘Hebrew’ concepts of
truth.\textsuperscript{349} \textit{(ii)} Truth is not fragmented, against Kantian or Neo-Kantian rational vs. moral, fact vs. value,
history vs. faith, or history vs. will dichotomies.\textsuperscript{350} \textit{(iii)} Truth is not Hegelian though, Thiselton argues,
Pannenberg rightly transposes some of Hegel’s insights into a different frame. Truth is not merely
abstract or theoretical.\textsuperscript{351} \textit{(iv)} Truth is not Kierkegaardian though, in Thiselton’s view, Pannenberg
rightly transposes some of Kierkegaard’s insights into a different frame.\textsuperscript{352} Human ‘subjectivity’ is not
the main criterion of truth (contra Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Bultmann).\textsuperscript{353} \textit{(v)} As we noted above,
Heidegger rightly rejects the ‘correspondence theory of truth’ in Thiselton’s view, but Thiselton
simultaneously argues that “there is still a place for subject-object thinking in hermeneutics”\textsuperscript{354} \textit{(vi)}

\textsuperscript{345} Thiselton, ‘Truth’, 894.
\textsuperscript{347} Thiselton, ‘Head-On Challenge to Doubt’, 8.
\textsuperscript{349} Thiselton, ‘The Theologian Who Must Not Be Ignored’, 11; cf. Thiselton, A.C., ‘New Problems for Old. Article
\textsuperscript{351} 351. Thiselton, ‘Review of \textit{Basic Questions in Theology, Vol. 1}’, 121 (para.1); cf. 120 (para. 2); cf. Thiselton, ‘The Theologian
cf. Pannenberg, \textit{Basic Questions} 3, 144-177.
\textsuperscript{352} 352. Thiselton, ‘The Theologian Who Must Not Be Ignored’, 11; cf. Thiselton, ‘Meaning and Myth’, 8; cf. Thiselton, A.C.,
\textsuperscript{353} 353. Thiselton, ‘The Theologian Who Must Not Be Ignored’, 11; cf. Thiselton, ‘The Use of Philosophical Categories in
Truth is not simply 'pragmatic usefulness', but satisfies other criteria.\textsuperscript{(viii)} Truth is not reducible to performative acts of assertion, but involves cognitive content.\textsuperscript{(vii)} Truth is not as elusive as contemporary scepticism and relativism suggest.\textsuperscript{(vii)} Thiselton's multiform notion of truth may now be expounded as follows.

First, for Thiselton, the comprehensive, unifying notion of truth is the truth of God's 'Being', reality, or actuality.\textsuperscript{(i)} This is identified with the Father, with Jesus Christ (who 'is the truth'), and with the 'Spirit of truth'.\textsuperscript{(ii)} Jesus, as 'truth', is the 'Word made flesh' - a non-abstract personal historical life and valid witness to the truth of God.\textsuperscript{(iii)} The truth of God is personal, where God creates, judges, is faithful, just, and wills. Combining 'dynamic' and 'static' emphases, God is creatively active, but has a stable identity consonant with integrity: there is a correspondence or oneness between God's words and deeds, where God is faithful to his covenant.\textsuperscript{(iv)} The truth of God is revealed publicly through his speech (including biblical speech-acts) and action in creation and the 'narrative' of history (especially in Jesus Christ), proving itself 'anew in the future'. Everything does not rest on faith and decision.\textsuperscript{(v)} The truth of God is experienced by his people.\textsuperscript{(vi)} The truth of God is comprehensive, bringing to unity and evaluating the other dimensions of truth.\textsuperscript{(vii)} The truth of God in Jesus Christ is the key to the truth of the eschatological fullness of history.\textsuperscript{(viii)} The truth of God contrasts with deceit, idolatry, dishonesty, concealment, falsehood, and the antichrist.\textsuperscript{(ix)} The truth of God is theological, offsetting the human subject as central criterion of truth.\textsuperscript{(x)}

\textsuperscript{355} Thiselton, 'Truth', 896-897.
\textsuperscript{356} Thiselton, 'Truth', 897.
\textsuperscript{357} Thiselton, 'Truth', 899-900, 901.
\textsuperscript{359} Thiselton, 'Truth', 890-891; cf. 892-893.
\textsuperscript{361} Thiselton, 'Truth', 880; cf. 883; cf. 884; cf. 886; cf. 888; cf. 892; cf. Thiselton, 'Creativity of Heaven', 5.
\textsuperscript{362} Thiselton, 'Truth', 884-885; cf. 891-892; cf. 893; cf. 901.
\textsuperscript{363} Thiselton, 'Truth', 886; cf. 887; cf. 888.
\textsuperscript{364} Thiselton, 'Truth', 893; cf. 894.
\textsuperscript{366} Thiselton, 'Truth', 884; cf. 885; cf. 886; cf. 887; cf. 889; cf. 890; cf. 891; cf. 892; cf. 893.
\textsuperscript{367} Thiselton, 'Truth', 893; cf. Thiselton, 'The Parousia in Modern Theology', 49.
Second, for Thiselton, truth is also history itself - historical contingencies, including the future and the eschatological gathering of contingencies into relation. (i) A human subject itself is a ‘historical contingent truth’, and not divorced from other historical contingencies, such as past events.368 (ii) The truth of history is ultimately ‘history as a whole’: past, present, future, process, particular contingencies, continuities, and eschatological ‘End’. (iii) History is revealed proleptically in Christ, the eschatological revelation of the End.369 (iv) History again offsets the human subject as central criterion of truth.370

Third, for Thiselton, truth is further identified as the divine speech-acts of revelation: effective, functional (including descriptive and promissory) divine speech-action into human history, paradigmatically through the Bible.371 (i) The truth of revelation includes the authoritative, valid, authentic, effective, non-provisional speech-actions (including verdicts and judgements) of Jesus and of the Spirit, which accord with and shape ‘reality’.372 (ii) Revelation includes the paradigmatic public traditions of the Bible: doctrine, precepts, prophecy, historical report, and promises (cf. the later Wittgenstein’s ‘public criteria of meaning’). Revelation thus includes ‘cognitive content’, and presupposes truth as ‘correspondence to states of affairs’ (to be distinguished from ‘the correspondence theory of truth’ which tends to reduce ‘truth’ to only ‘correspondence to states of affairs’).373 (iii) Revelation is specifically identified with the Gospel: its message, doctrine, historical report, promises, and its ‘true to reality’ character.374 (iv) Revelation - as divine speech-action - is functionally effective to bring about human transformation towards the future. Truth exposes lies, and falsehood; it cleanses and consecrates from sin, leading to wholeness.375 (v) Revelation, therefore, accords with authentic human existence.376 (vi) Revelation stands in contrast to falsehood, deception,

368. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 250-251.
delusion, idolatry, mere surface appearance, concealment, mere human imaginings, and lies.\textsuperscript{377 (vii)}

Again the human subject is de-centred as criterion of truth.\textsuperscript{378}

\textit{Fourth}, for Thiselton, truth also relates to existentially, or eventfully, ‘encountering reality’, including ‘being addressed by God’, transcending the mere receiving of information. Engaging with ‘self-involving’ textual language also comes under this heading, though language does not communicate ‘reality itself’, but rather engenders apprehension of the ‘real’, for example, self-understanding.\textsuperscript{379 (i)}

The truth of ‘encountering reality’ presupposes existential self-involvement as effective communication and actualisation, both individually and corporately.\textsuperscript{380 (ii)} ‘Encountering reality’ presupposes existential self-involvement at both pre-conscious, pre-cognitive, and pre-conceptual, and at conscious, cognitive, and conceptual levels.\textsuperscript{381 (iii)} ‘Encountering reality’ involves the eventful experience of the happening or manifestation of reality (as in art) and the truth conveyed in it though, again, language does not communicate ‘reality itself’, but operates powerfully on the basis of convention.\textsuperscript{382} A parable can grasp the reader ‘deep down’, drawing the reader into a hermeneutical ‘world of new values, engaging with pre-cognitive attitudes and presuppositions’. The reader is ‘addressed’ and carried through a process of ‘discovery’, even ‘transformation’.\textsuperscript{383 (iv)} ‘Encountering reality’ involves ‘creative intuition’ or ‘hermeneutical understanding’, rather than merely ‘theoretical reason’, presupposing a broad notion of ‘rationality’.\textsuperscript{384 (v)} ‘Encountering reality’ presupposes ‘listening’ and ‘openness’ on the part of the reader, without abandoning critical assessment.\textsuperscript{385} This facilitates distancing and fusion between two horizons as part of the process of understanding. The

\textsuperscript{377} Thiselton, ‘Truth’, 883; cf. 884; cf. 885; cf. 886; cf. 887; cf. 889; cf. 890-891; cf. 892; cf. 893.


\textsuperscript{384} Thiselton, ‘The New Hermeneutic’, 317.

hermeneutical circle or spiral also involves both movement between ‘parts’ and ‘wholes’ and the logic of question and answer,\(^{386}\) transforming ‘pre-understanding’, ‘presuppositions’, and ‘pre-judgements’.\(^{387}\) (\(i\)) ‘Encountering reality’, whilst ‘existentially self-involving’, does not reduce truth to ‘what is true for me’ since it is de-centred relative to other truth-categories and criteria.\(^{388}\) (\(ii\)) ‘Encountering reality’ does not presuppose a devaluation of subject-object thinking or assertions.\(^{389}\)

**Fifth**, for Thiselton, truth also relates to authentic human living in accordance with divine revelation.\(^{390}\)

(\(i\)) The truth of ‘authentic living’ presupposes correspondence between actuality, words, and deeds: i.e. honesty, integrity, sincerity, and faithfulness.\(^{391}\) (\(ii\)) ‘Authentic living’ includes existential self-involvement as ‘appropriation’ and ‘faithful response’ or ‘application’, individually and corporately.\(^{392}\) In authentic living, life ‘backs’ or gives ‘hard currency’ to words.\(^{393}\) Commitment to the Gospel brings transformation towards the future.\(^{394}\) (\(iii\)) ‘Authentic living’ includes existential self-involvement in fully inter-personal transparent relationships.\(^{395}\) (\(iv\)) ‘Authentic living’ includes true or reliable speech, whether factual or historical report, or wisdom. This presupposes honesty, transparency, and straightforwardness.\(^{396}\) (\(v\)) ‘Authentic living’ presupposes ‘reverence’ and ‘submission’ to truth. With T.F. Torrance, this presupposes a ‘scientific’ approach, a “readiness to submit all pre-conceptions to the test of truth”.\(^{397}\) (\(vi\)) ‘Authentic living’ stands in contrast to: deceit, hypocrisy, idolatry, dishonesty, impurity, falsehood, secretiveness, lying, concealment, and manipulation;\(^{398}\) the “other-than-serious attitude to truth” of contemporary culture, “mass advertising”, “party-political propaganda”, and the

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388. For example, Thiselton, ‘The New Hermeneutic’, 326-327.


“mass media”;399 the “pseudo-cynicism of our own age which tries to ‘unmask’ everything”; denial of the possibility of encounter with the real;400 unredeemed “insecure” “self-defensiveness and self-assertion” that “give rise to falsehood”;401 drawing from only “one theological tradition”.402 (iii) ‘Authentic living’, so far as it is a corporate and submitted response, places constraints on the individual. Again, the human subject is no longer the decisive criterion of truth.403

**Sixth**, for Thiselton, truth also means correspondence with the facts, or just the facts, whether current (‘factual truth’) or historical report (‘historical truth’).404 (i) This does not presuppose the ‘correspondence theory of truth’, or ‘natural’, ‘referential’, ‘idealational’, or ‘positivist’ theories of language and meaning.405 Rather a biblical subtext and approach to language are presupposed.406 (ii) ‘Correspondence’ presupposes an interweaving of historical events, meaning, and faith, and is more secure in a theological context than in a secular one.407 (iii) ‘Correspondence’ presupposes that “there is still a place for subject-object thinking in hermeneutics”, correcting Heidegger.408 (iv) ‘Correspondence’ is not free of value-judgements, especially when such truth corresponds to human experience.409 Nevertheless, again, the human subject is not the only criterion of truth. In historical

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report, for example, internal coherence is another criterion.  

Simplified, for Thiselton, truth can mean ‘logical’ or ‘internal’ ‘coherence’ in relation to truth-systems. (i) ‘Logical coherence’ has application in abstract truth-systems, as in mathematics and tautologies. (ii) ‘Logical coherence’ also has application in historical truth-systems. (iii) Last, ‘logical coherence’ has application in theological truth-systems.  

(iv) All truth-systems, however, are “corrigible, incomplete, and open-ended” towards the future. Further, competing systems can be internally coherent. (v) This dimension of truth secures a place for theoretical reason, contrary to Kierkegaard. (vi) This dimension of truth has more stability within a theological framework.

Eighth, for Thiselton, truth can relate to the ‘genuine’, ‘real’, or ‘valid’, in contrast to the counterfeit. (i) Genuineness can be proven through critical evaluation or testing. Thus, Thiselton shows limited approval for A. Flew’s falsification principle. (ii) The genuineness of tradition relative to biblical paradigms requires testing through a critique of traditions. (iii) The genuineness of a religious experience requires testing at the level of subject-object thinking according to the same paradigms. (iv) With T.F. Torrance, “the subject-object relationship” is presupposed in all objectivity, and all knowledge, even knowledge of God. What is needed is a “scientific theology”. (v) Critical, comparative, testing is relevant to all understanding.

Ninth, for Thiselton, truth has the functional sense of that which facilitates liberation from external manipulation or self-deception.\(^{424}\)\( (i) \) This need not only be associated with divine speech-act.\(^{425}\)\( (ii) \) We are brought back to the critique of traditions (cf. above). \( (iii) \) That which seems to liberate in the short term, however, may not be ultimately liberating. Against pragmatic theories of truth, liberating ‘truth’ requires critical testing against trans-contextual criteria.\(^{426}\)

Tenth, for Thiselton, truth also relates to the performative dimension of asserting the ‘truth’, of making a truth-claim, or of using the adjective ‘true’. \( (i) \) Critical testing is required if an assertion is to be given a status beyond a mere ‘value-judgment’ or speech-act.\(^{427}\) \( (ii) \) Linguistic performance must not be sharply divided from linguistic content, since the former often presupposes the truth of the latter, as in J.L. Austin’s and D.D. Evans’ logic of self-involvement.\(^{428}\) \( (iii) \) The multi-functional character of language requires that attention be given to ‘what is going on’ when an assertion is being made.\(^{429}\) This ties in to Thiselton’s later call for an extra-linguistic critique of language.\(^{430}\)

Concluding, we reject W.J. Larkin’s view that Thiselton’s notion of ‘truth’ is only five-fold and reducible to a ‘correspondence theory of truth’. Rather, Thiselton’s ten-fold multiform notion of ‘truth’ both corrects one-sidednesses in philosophical and extra-biblical approaches and critically synthesises what is useful from them. Again, theology’s corrective role in theoretical construction warrants its inclusion in hermeneutical discussions, alongside philosophy.\(^{431}\)

D. Concluding Comments: Towards a Unified Hermeneutical Critique of Epistemology through Dialogue between Philosophy and Theology

We began by explaining Thiselton’s difficult style of writing in terms of his historical responses to others and his invitation to reader involvement. Accepting this invitation, we outlined our historical-structural approach to imposing order on Thiselton’s work. We proposed three ‘strata’ of

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431. Larkin Jr., Culture and Biblical Hermeneutics, 236-257.
hermeneutical reflection: inter-disciplinary dialogue, five hermeneutical ‘critiques’, and a ‘critique of understanding’, relating these to Chapters 3-7.

Next, we expounded Thiselton’s widened dialogue between biblical studies, systematic theology, and hermeneutics. Thiselton grounded and unified his hermeneutical theory in eschatology and Christology, contrary to charges of ‘disunity’ or ‘dualism’, to other ways of unifying hermeneutics, and to charges of ‘Gadamerian’ or ‘Wittgensteinian’ relativism. Thiselton had neither neglected Pannenberg nor the ‘third horizon’ of eschatology. Rather, these are pivotal in the paper to which Thiselton appeals (i.e. ‘Truth’) in updating his PhD Thesis to *The Two Horizons*. Nevertheless, calling Thiselton simply ‘Pannenbergian’ was also a caricature.

Having defined our uses of the terms ‘dialogic’, ‘resonance’, ‘warrant’, and ‘fideism’, we then demonstrated that Thiselton viewed his theological unification of hermeneutics as a provisionally warranted working assumption. Thiselton’s popular writings on biblical authority did not justify charges of straightforward ‘fideism’ when read against the background of his more theoretical work. Nor did Thiselton simply ‘balance’ ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ dimensions ‘dualistically’. Rather, Thiselton warranted theological exploration on the ground that Continental philosophy failed to reinstate ‘subject-object conceptualisation’ in a metacritique of traditions. There was a need for further specificity over which notion of conceptualisation Thiselton wished to reinstate in critique of Heidegger, and a question over Thiselton’s reading of Heidegger’s view of tradition. Nevertheless, we could affirm Thiselton’s overall point.

Thiselton’s theological exploration centred on an appeal to Pannenberg, but moved beyond this, demonstrating the resonance of theological considerations with T.F. Torrance’s ‘scientific rationality’ and with Freud’s emphases on self-deception and the unconscious. Conversely, solutions to exegetical and practical problems in theology were provided by theories of ‘perception’ from the philosophy of language. Thiselton also demonstrated that theology, specifically a working biblical multiform notion

of ‘truth’, cogently corrected various kinds of one-sidedness in extra-biblical approaches, not least the ‘controlling picture’ of Kierkegaard’s one-sided approach to truth that had bewitched secular and theological ‘existentialist’ traditions. This did not prevent the ‘fleshing out’ of a biblical multiform notion of ‘truth’ by extra-biblical approaches. Thiselton’s biblical multiform notion of ‘truth’ constituted a non-dualistic ‘whole’ that corrected ‘one-sidedness’ with different kinds of grammars.436

Thiselton’s theological framework subordinated the contributions of Gadamer and Wittgenstein: he had not succumbed to ‘Wittgensteinian’ ‘perspectivism’, ‘subjectivism’, or ‘relativism’,437 or to ‘Gadamerian’ relativism.438 Thiselton’s view of truth was inconsistent with a ‘pluralism’ of competing incommensurable contents.439 Several writers charged Thiselton with relativism,440 though others rightly highlighted Thiselton’s polemic against relativism.441 Thiselton’s ten-fold critique of truth also reinforced our opposition to the caricature that Thiselton was ‘Pannenberian’. For Thiselton, Pannenberg “invites travel in the right direction”, but does “not” provide a “final or definitive solution”.442 In passing, Thiselton’s framework militates against both understating or overstating his objections to the New Hermeneutic.443

Finally, we propose that whilst Thiselton has looked into ‘truth’, ‘rationality’, ‘historical knowledge’, ‘perception’, and so on - all ‘epistemological’ concerns444 - there is a string of epistemological

terminology absent from his ‘second period’ writings. This is partly accounted for by Thiselton’s broader hermeneutical ‘language-game’, his programmatic approach (he engages with Alvin Plantinga and others in his ‘fourth period’ and more recently), and his move beyond the Cartesian subject-object model. However, there are still issues that Thiselton has not addressed, for example ‘Bayesianism’, suggesting the need for a more extensive dialogue between hermeneutics and epistemological traditions. C.G. Bartholomew’s point that Thiselton has given Spinoza too little attention may have some relevance here.

In conclusion, even before we move on to consider the hermeneutical circle, construction towards a unified hermeneutical critique of epistemology provisionally warrants the widened dialogue between philosophy and theology that Thiselton begins.

Chapter 4.

Relating Theology & Philosophy: Toward Unified Critiques of Language, Western Culture, and the Self

A. Preliminary Comments: Justifying 'Theoretical Construction' in Chapter 4

Having examined Thiselton's critique of epistemology, we now turn to his critiques of language, Western culture, and the human self, after six preliminary remarks.

First, in the present chapter our concern with 'philosophical description' is justified as follows. (i) No exposition of Thiselton's critique of language exists in the literature, which has led to misreadings of Thiselton. (ii) Thiselton's critique of language will prove to be a viable alternative to post-structuralism\(^1\) - it is important for Christian theology that this is explicated. (iii) Exposition of Thiselton's critiques of language, Western culture and the self opens up fresh 'angles of view' on his formative thinking, helping to reveal his five major 'second stratum' hermeneutical critiques (i.e. of 'history', 'epistemology', 'language', (Western) 'culture', and the 'self'). (iv) Philosophical description 'shows' the major critical conversations within hermeneutical theory itself so as to clarify a complex discipline and 'show' its grammar - historically, not 'formally'.

Second, for Thiselton, philosophical description neither presupposes sharp 'fact-value' or 'description-evaluation' dichotomies,\(^2\) nor bypasses the hermeneutical circle.\(^3\) Whilst Thiselton draws on Bultmann, he avoids "positivistic aspects of his theology".\(^4\) Nor does 'philosophical description' necessarily impose philosophical categories onto biblical texts.\(^5\)

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Third, our theoretical construction in the present chapter is justified in that we find ten points of contention with Thiselton readers. Again Thiselton, though a world-renowned thinker in hermeneutics, has not been properly received in the literature.

Fourth, our approach in the present chapter develops two other arguments further - that Thiselton's work supports a Christo-Eschatological unification of hermeneutics, and our query into Thiselton's continued use of Continental (and other) terminology given his criticisms of Continental hermeneutics.

Fifth, we address the question of 'language' only after that of 'epistemology' for three reasons. (i) Thiselton's critique of epistemology relates 'truth' to history, eschatology, and God, following Pannenberg's critique of Gadamer in which theology and history, rather than language, become the ontological ground of hermeneutics.6 (ii) Thiselton rejects Tillich's Heideggerian notion that language may transcend subject-object conceptualisation. All intelligible language involves conceptualisation, semantic opposition, or contrast. Since thought and language are interwoven, epistemological questions are not merely 'derivative' relative to linguistic questions.7 (iii) Later, Thiselton draws on the later Wittgenstein to urge that an extra-linguistic epistemological critique of traditional language-uses

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is required in order to avoid the “bewitchment of our intelligence by... language” - an emerging point in Thiselton’s ‘second period’.

Sixth, reading our section on ‘language’ will be facilitated by a preliminary overview, as follows. (i) We will demonstrate that Thiselton’s ‘critique of language’ functions so as to explicate what he perceives to be a prior ‘biblical and theological account of language’. (ii) We will then argue, in line with Chapter 3, that Thiselton’s critique of language is grounded in history, eschatology, and Christology - that there is a dialogue between theology and philosophy at the level of theory in Thiselton’s critique of language. (iii) We will then explicate how Thiselton’s appeal to the later Wittgenstein ‘resonates’ with theology, eschatology, history, and ‘religious’ language. (iv) We will show how Thiselton brings his ‘critique of language’ more widely (including his appeals to J.L. Austin, D.D. Evans, the philosophy of language more broadly, and to the Saussurian tradition) to internal coherence, facilitating that ‘resonance’ whereby ‘philosophical’ and ‘theological’ hermeneutics mutually, dialogically, ‘warrant’ or ‘authorise’ one another. (v) We will explicate how Thiselton further dialogically validates his critique of language through critical testing, whilst still drawing positively on the Continental hermeneutical tradition of language study.

**B. Dialogic Theory-Construction: Towards a Unified Critique of Language**

1. **On a Prior ‘Biblical and Theological Account of Language’**

In chapter 3, we argued that Thiselton’s ‘second stratum’ critiques were grounded in his ‘first stratum’ dialogue between theology and philosophy. Philosophical description clarified New Testament texts, but biblical studies and systematic theology also shaped Thiselton’s hermeneutics. We may now revisit this dialogue with respect to Thiselton’s approach to language.

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Thus, Thiselton’s *critique of language* functions as philosophical description that clarifies what he later calls a “biblical and theological account of language”. Retrospectively he writes:

“one reviewer of my work appears to believe that my insistence on the major importance of speech-acts stems from being seduced by the later Wittgenstein. The reverse is the case. Since 1970... I have produced a series of writings urging that a biblical and theological account of language gives weight and currency to the importance of speech-acts”.

Thus, Thiselton moves dialogically between the Bible, the later Wittgenstein and speech-act theory, noting biblical

“acts of declaring (kerygma);... worship (hymns and psalms),... pronouncement and legal direction (laws and commissionings); and... acts of promise (for Paul, Hebrews, Luther, and Tyndale, the... heart of... the liberating gospel)”. Further, in “John and in 1 John, emphasis is put on ‘doing’ the truth... on lifestyle”.

Thiselton then insists:

“It is not that Wittgenstein ‘invents’ this view of language; he rescues it from its burial beneath an abstract Cartesian tradition that tends to equate language with argument or description alone. In Jesus Christ the word was made flesh; Cartesian Protestantism threatens to turn flesh back into abstracted word again”.

This undermines the notion that Wittgenstein is dispensable in biblical hermeneutics. Rather, the later Wittgenstein and speech-act theory facilitate hermeneutics as ‘philosophical description’, clarifying a prior ‘biblical and theological account of language’ grounded in Christ as ‘enfleshed word’.

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This 'prior theological account' is not exhaustively clarified by philosophy. Divine speech-acts form a special category, functioning effectively with powerful causal force simply because they are divine. Nevertheless, philosophical description remains important, where Thiselton cites two works from his 'second period' in connection with speech-acts. His article on Paul Tillich is also relevant in this respect.

Thus, first, in 'The Supposed Power of Words in the Biblical Writings' (1974), Thiselton draws positively on the philosophy of language (the tradition of the later Wittgenstein, J.L. Austin, and D.D. Evans), general linguistics (the Saussurian tradition), and modern semantics (especially J. Barre). Further, he stresses the resonance between these approaches and biblical language.

Second, Thiselton also comments on "biblical" language in 'The Theology of Paul Tillich' (1974), and is critical of Tillich in three ways. (i) Thiselton draws on Saussur and general linguistics, arguing that biblical symbols do not relate 'naturally' to reality but, like all language, are grounded in conventional speech-habits. (ii) As already noted, Thiselton draws on the philosophy of language and general linguistics to argue that all intelligible language, including biblical language about God, involves conceptualisation grounded in semantic differences. Tillich's single allowed predicate, "God is being-itself", says nothing, being set in opposition to nothing. (iii) Thiselton argues, drawing on P. van Buren and W. Hordern, that God's unique personhood can only be distinguished by the "particularising language" of biblical historical report and narrative, and not by symbols alone. God


acted in specific ways in "history", and is not just an amalgamation of 'qualities'. Drawing on general linguistics and structural semantics following Saussure and Trier, Thiselton insists that the basic "unit of meaning" is not the "word", but the "the speech-act".  

*Third*, in *Language, Liturgy and Meaning* (1975), Thiselton again draws positively on the philosophy of language, and on general linguistics and semantics. The later Wittgenstein's work clarifies biblical language, being consistent sometimes with that of Gadamer and the New Hermeneutic. Thiselton's friendliness to the latter, however, is qualified by his criticisms elsewhere. His responses to Heidegger, Bultmann, and Braithwaite are more negative than positive.

Summarising: Thiselton draws positively on the philosophy of language, general linguistics, and modern semantics, but has a mixed response to Continental approaches. Taken together, these appeals constitute Thiselton's *critique of language* which, in turn, functions as 'philosophical description' to clarify a prior 'biblical and theological account of language'. Thus, in 'Language and Meaning in Religion' (written 1977, published 1978), Thiselton combines appeals to Saussure and general linguistics, the later Wittgenstein and Anglo-American linguistic philosophy, and the Continental tradition of Heidegger and Gadamer. He argues that this dialogue between appeals resonates with biblical language.

2. Thiselton's Dialogue between Theology and Philosophy Revisited

Returning to Thiselton's dialogue between theology and philosophy *per se*, then if Thiselton's critique of language clarifies a prior 'biblical and theological account of language', then we shall demonstrate

26. Thiselton, 'The Theology of Paul Tillich', 100 (paras. 2,3,4).
that theology also shapes Thiselton's critique of language. That is, Thiselton's Christo-eschatological framework generatively grounds and unifies his five major 'second stratum' critiques, so that 'language' too finds its ontological ground in Christology, eschatology, and history.

Thus, first, Thiselton allies appeals to Pannenberg and the Later Wittgenstein in his critique of language. Thiselton notes that both thinkers bridge the gap between Anglo-American analytical traditions and Continental traditions where, in 1970, Thiselton combines appeals to both in his linguistic critique of Continental hermeneutics. In 1971, Thiselton notes that both thinkers reinstate "propositions" but not the "analytical abstractions of... timeless Platonism", and "above all others... cannot be dismissed with [Don Cupitt's] patronising nod". They "deserve criticism, if at all, only" after "very long and careful discussion".

In 1973 Thiselton's defence of historical report anticipates his later appeal to Pannenberg and the later Wittgenstein against positivism. Similarly, Thiselton approves appeals to both thinkers against "Kantian or Dilthey-type dualism". Conversely, Thiselton rejects the reduction of apocalyptic language to existential categories, since this contradicts later Wittgensteinian insights into linguistic multi-functionality and Pannenberg's high estimate of apocalyptic. Further, Thiselton interweaves Pannenberg's typological paradigmatic events and the later Wittgenstein's 'public criteria of meaning' when disambiguating the language of 'redemption'. Finally, Thiselton appeals to both thinkers against Gadamer's linguistic dualism and Bultmann's 'private language' about 'inner states'.

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Between 1974 and 1978, Thiselton appeals to Pannenberg on eschatological furturity and the later Wittgenstein on "public criteria", distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate vagueness in theological formulations. Thiselton also interfaces Moltmann's eschatological expectancy, Pannenberg's eschatological epistemology, and the later Wittgenstein's grammar of expectancy. Elsewhere, Thiselton combines implicit appeal to the later Wittgenstein, with a citation of Pannenberg in validation of his (i.e. Thiselton's) hermeneutical programme. In Thiselton's view, Pannenberg and the later Wittgenstein both rightly reject the Neo-Kantian dualism underlying Enlightenment and existentialist approaches to myth. Thiselton's critique of structuralist approaches combines appeals to the later Wittgenstein and Schiwy, who probably 'stands in' for Pannenberg. Summarising: Thiselton allies appeals to Pannenberg and the later Wittgenstein: language is grounded in history and eschatology.

Second, the notion of Christ as 'Enfleshed Word' is a critical criterion for Thiselton. Thus, in 'Truth' (1978), Thiselton links the notions of 'enfleshed Word' and 'correspondence between words, deeds, and reality'. Enfleshed words, or responsible language-uses, have the 'backing', 'hard currency', or 'cash value' of actions in authentic historical life, unlike irresponsible, self-deceptive or manipulative language-use. By 1985, Thiselton locates "texts in a nexus of responsible actions".

Further, for Thiselton, regular patterns of 'enfleshed words' (interwoven social behaviour and language-uses), experiences, events, and divine interventions, form historical traditions. Language-uses


54. Thiselton, 'Language and Meaning in Religion', 1127 (para. 3); cf. 1132 (para. 2); cf. 1134-1135, 1135 (para. 2, 3, 4); cf. 1137 (para. 2); cf. 1138 (para. 1); cf. 1143 (para. 3); cf. 1142-1144; cf. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 26-27.
- for example, about God - lacking consistency with traditions are inauthentic relative to those
traditions.\textsuperscript{56} Traditions, in turn, reside within a larger historical-eschatological framework,\textsuperscript{57} and are subject to metacriticism: even tradition-backed words may not accord with Christ as the 'Enfleshed Word'.\textsuperscript{58}

Finally, Thiselton later contrasts language embedded in concrete history (cf. 'enfleshed word') with D. Cupitt's idea of biology embedded within language (cf. 'en-worded flesh'). The self is not merely biological or animal "energies and responses" with "cultural inscriptions [signs] written over its skin",\textsuperscript{59} where Thiselton similarly criticises Derrida.\textsuperscript{60} Thus, the Christological notion of 'enfleshed word' remains pivotal in Thiselton's critique of language.\textsuperscript{61} In conclusion, Thiselton's critique of language is ontologically grounded in 'history' understood Christologically and eschatologically. But precisely how does Thiselton's appeal to the later Wittgenstein resonate with theology?

3. Appeal to the Later Wittgenstein Resonant with Theology and Eschatology

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) is possibly "the greatest" twentieth century "philosopher... in the English-speaking world",\textsuperscript{62} and the "leading analytical philosopher".\textsuperscript{63} He studied in Berlin, Manchester, and Cambridge, exercising "considerable influence" over Bertrand Russell in Cambridge


\footnotesize{60. Thiselton, New Horizons, 127-129.}


(1912-1913). Controversy exists over the nature of the “discontinuity” between Wittgenstein’s “early [1912-1928], transitional [1929-1932], and late [1933-1951]” work where some, notably H. Staten, view the later work as “deconstructive” (but see Chapter 7). Wittgenstein’s \textit{Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus} (1921, 1922), though not strictly positivist, made him one of the “the intellectual fathers” of the Vienna Circle, along with Einstein and Russell. Here, Wittgenstein argued that meaningful language included statements of fact and tautologies - metaphysical and ethical propositions were “nonsense” though could ‘show’ a realm of ‘value’. In \textit{Philosophical Investigations} (1953), however, Wittgenstein argued that language was multi-functional, that it occurred in “endless kinds” of “language-games” linked by “family resemblances”. Thus, philosophy solves linguistic “puzzles”, not metaphysical “problems”. S.E. Fowl identifies R. Rorty’s and J. Stout’s ‘therapeutic’ development of Wittgenstein’s and J.L. Austin’s work, focussing on conventional language-use in context, and J.R. Searle’s, K.J. Vanhoozer’s, and Thiselton’s development, seeking a “philosophy of language... a metaphysics or ontology”. Thiselton, however, after K.-O. Apel, actually belongs to a third ‘metacritical hermeneutical’ stream that rejects both metaphysical or idealist, and, context-relative, ‘therapeutic’, or ‘open’ developments of Wittgenstein and Austin - insisting that a properly ‘historical’ development of Wittgenstein’s work can respect ‘trans-contextuality’. By the early 1970s, the later Wittgenstein’s work had strongly influenced Thiselton, because of its ‘hermeneutical’ character. By 1977 Thiselton views Wittgenstein as “one of the most original

73. Thiselton, ‘The Use of Philosophical Categories’, 89.
thinkers in twentieth-century philosophy’’, and always affirms Wittgenstein’s later work. An exposition of Thiselton’s appeals to the later Wittgenstein can be handled synchronically since Thiselton’s stance changes little throughout the 1970s. Caution is required, though, since Wittgenstein repeatedly failed to systematise his later work. Importantly, for Thiselton, appeal to the later Wittgenstein is dialogically warranted because of its resonance with theology and eschatology - and vice versa.

Thus, whilst following the later Wittgenstein’s stress on ‘the particular case’, Thiselton does, with Wittgenstein, preserve a more general, a posteriori linguistic axis resonant with a posteriori trans-contextuality in theology and eschatology. Language as ‘language’ requires “enough regularity”. Thiselton accepts that there are trans-contextual factors related to ‘language’, so long as these are after-the-fact ‘historical’ and not understood as a priori ‘formal’. (Similarly, a posteriori trans-contextuality in theology and eschatology, in this context, means after-the-fact historical continuities extended forwards provisionally in eschatological anticipation). Thus, first, language is not abstract, but interwoven with extra-linguistic, active, socio-historical human life - “only in the stream of thought and life do words have meaning”. Many first-person utterances are ‘self-involving’, and not just ‘reports’ or ‘information’ about inner ‘mental’ states. Hence, the utterance ‘I am in pain’ is often pain-behaviour - “the verbal expression of pain replaces crying”. Similarly, ‘I expect’, ‘I repent’, ‘we praise thee’, and ‘I believe’ often involve action, and ‘expecting’, ‘intending’, ‘understanding’, and ‘believing’

77. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 82.
presuppose an extra-linguistic grammar. Conversely, “I believe falsely”, having no possible behavioural backing, is meaningless. That is, language is communicative action, involving “different levels and dimensions of language use”.

This grounds Thiselton’s later ‘action models’ and his rejection of Bultmann’s fact-value dualism (see Chapter 6). For Thiselton, history and action are more fundamental or ‘basic’ categories than language - prior to interpretative considerations. Second, what Wittgenstein calls “the common behaviour of mankind” grounds the trans-contextual interrelatedness of ‘language-games’ (see below) and the inter-translatability of languages. ‘Interrelatedness’ is like “family resemblances”: no a priori generalising character assessment of these can be made without considering specific examples. Thus, language-traditions condition but do not totally determine thought or world-view.

Third, after Wittgenstein, Thiselton distinguishes between linguistic ‘form’, ‘rules’, ‘uses’, and ‘content’. By ‘form’, Thiselton means the “physical properties” of language - notably vocabulary. By ‘rules’ Thiselton means something analogous to ‘rules’ in chess - notably grammar as traditionally understood. By ‘uses’, Thiselton means something analogous to chess ‘moves’, often closely related to grammar as philosophically understood (logical grammar, function) or


to questions of style or speech-action - for example, 'promising'. By 'content', Thiselton means that which is transmitted by, for example, concepts or historical report. Thus, "words can... be compared to chess men". Fourth, language is multi-level where, after Wittgenstein, Thiselton "distinguishes surface-grammar ['form', 'rules'] from depth-grammar" ('uses', 'content'). Fifth, language is also multi-functional at the level of depth-grammar. Thus, texts may 'act' on readers, contrary to Cartesian views of texts as passive objects of scrutiny and to "the idea that language always functions in one way". Thiselton criticises form-criticism for neglecting linguistic functions, though 'performative' language may still convey information or cognitive content, as in New Testament confessions. Sixth, linguistic 'rules' presuppose the sociality of language: language is 'public', not 'private' (in Wittgenstein's senses of these terms), contrary to Bultmann. It is impossible "to obey a rule 'privately'", yet Bultmann opposes "kerygma" to "general truths" and "historical... facts".

For Thiselton, the later Wittgenstein's approach to language also resonates with a hermeneutic of traditions in theology and eschatology (see Chapter 6). Thus, less generally, against logical formalism, language is a posteriori interwoven with trans-historical, trans-cultural, socio-historical 'forms of life' or 'traditions', or always grounded in a 'form' or 'stream of life', or socio-historical 'world', or tradition. "forms of life" are "given". Thus, first, language-traditions embody trans-temporal continuity - regular patterns of language-uses. Existing vocabulary, grammar, and structure constitute non-prescriptive 'rules' reflecting past concerns, language-habits, and conceptuality, and strongly

89. Thiselton, 'Language and Meaning in Religion', 1127; cf. 1126 (para. 2); cf. 1138 (para. 1); cf. 1134 (para. 3); cf. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 15, 20-21, 80-81, 231; cf. Wittgenstein, Zettel, 16.
94. Thielson, 'The Use of Philosophical Categories', 97-98.
influencing but not absolutely determining future concerns, language-habits, and conceptuality.\textsuperscript{100} Again, 'language' as 'language' presupposes "enough regularity".\textsuperscript{101} 

Second, language-traditions embody trans-temporal change, refinement, and enrichment - presupposing open-endedness towards future experience and new creative language-uses in a changing world. Changes in vocabulary, grammar, and structure show that they are conventional:\textsuperscript{102} we may "alter them - as we go along".\textsuperscript{103} Third, language-traditions include larger-scale discourses - notably narrative, myth, historical report, parables, or discursive argument - which transmit 'public criteria of meaning' (see below)\textsuperscript{104} and potentially act on readers.\textsuperscript{105} Fourth, language-traditions strongly condition "the way we look at things", and can "hide or disclose reality", necessitating an extra-linguistic critique of traditions.\textsuperscript{106} Negatively, a language-tradition can hold us captive at a dispositional level, controlling our 'seeing' (see Chapter 3), having power over the whole person, not just the intellect.\textsuperscript{107} Thus, "forms of expression prevent us... from seeing".\textsuperscript{108} Positively, strenuous thinking can break the 'spell' of language-traditions, allowing "us to notice" what was before "unnoticed" though "always before our eyes". Linguistic philosophy constitutes "a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language". Thus, analytical or grammatical statements extend existing frames of reference, functioning in a liberating way to "show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle".\textsuperscript{109} Such statements "constitute the subject-matter


of Wittgenstein's whole work. They do not merely convey information, but "elucidate the logical grammar of a concept", making "possible a new way of seeing", being "directed at the scaffolding of our thinking" so as to "expand the horizons of the reader's understanding" and alter his or her actions.\(^\text{10}\) Thus, "believing is not thinking. (A grammatical remark).\(^\text{11}\) Therefore, the later Wittgenstein is relevant for hermeneutics\(^\text{12}\) in the first of four senses highlighted by Thiselton. The others will emerge as we go along.\(^\text{13}\) Fifth, language-traditions embrace smaller, less extensive, 'language-games' - which have parallels with logical contexts, surroundings, settings, or contexts-in-life.\(^\text{14}\) Thiselton does not promote a "facile equation" between "Gadamer's 'language as tradition'" and the later Wittgenstein's "language-uses".\(^\text{15}\)

For Thiselton, the later Wittgenstein's approach to language also resonates with a focus on socio-historical-linguistic context and reconstruction that Thiselton wishes to see retained in biblical hermeneutics. Thus, on a particular axis, language is interwoven with temporally located, sometimes culturally specific, socio-historical 'surroundings', thought, and action within given language-communities: the resulting ' wholes' are 'language-games',\(^\text{16}\) grounded or "embedded in forms of life".\(^\text{17}\) Wittgenstein remarks, "look on the language-game as the primary thing".\(^\text{18}\) Thus, first, language-games are "open-ended towards the future", and "change with time". Thus, for Thiselton, the later Wittgenstein is relevant for hermeneutics in a second sense.\(^\text{19}\) For Thiselton, then, language-games can, sometimes, be linked to culture-relativity, but may also be trans-contextual. Thus, "lying is a language-game". Language-games are not normally so 'trans-contextual', however, as to allow B.J. Walsh's talk of the whole Bible as "a particular kind of language-game". Walsh similarly over-extends


Heidegger's partly parallel category of 'world' (also confusing it with "world-view") in speaking in the singular of the Bible as "a book with its own world", "the biblical world". Second, language-games strongly condition "the way we look at things", necessitating an extra-linguistic critique of potentially context-relative language uses, or of "what we do in our language-game" which "always rests on a tacit presupposition". Third, language-games are the proper logical 'homes' for specific concepts and word-uses: "when language-games change", so do concepts and word-meanings. Hence, viewing concepts "outside a particular language-game" confuses matters. Concern for "the particularities of specific language-situations" displaces "the generalities of formal logic" which constitute "a mythological description of the use of a rule". This is the third way in which the later Wittgenstein is relevant for hermeneutics in Thiselton's view. We have already noted Thiselton's application of this point to Paul's doctrine of justification in conjunction with 'seeing as'. Some words have several 'home' language-games, linking with the notion of 'polymorphous concepts', though there is no one-to-one relationship between words and concepts. Wittgenstein asks how a word is "used in... the language-game which is its original home". Thiselton applies this to Paul's use of σαρκί and to the terms 'oneness' and 'sameness' in ecumenical debates. The notion of 'polymorphous concepts' and Wittgenstein's notion of 'concepts with blurred edges' are also related: language-games can completely change a concept or merely condition its 'edges' respectively. Thiselton also argues against 'persuasive definition': lifting language from its 'home' language-game into an alien language-game


129. Thiselton, 'The Ministry and the Church Union', 45; cf. 46.

changes its meaning. Thiselton expounds Paul's critique of Corinthian practice in this context,\textsuperscript{131} and tackles Bultmann's demythologising programme along similar lines.\textsuperscript{132} Finally, whole passages can be irresponsibly given meanings incongruent with their 'home' settings.\textsuperscript{133} Thiselton also distinguishes between 'textual' and 'readers' language-games.\textsuperscript{134}

For Thiselton, the later Wittgenstein's approach to language resonates with the biblical notion of 'enfleshed word', in which Jesus' extra-linguistic action disambiguates his specific utterances. Citing Wittgenstein, "interpretations by themselves do not determine meaning".\textsuperscript{135} At the most particular level, language manifests itself in specific utterances (cf. speech-acts).\textsuperscript{136} Thus, first, specific utterances may perform several overlapping functions simultaneously.\textsuperscript{137} They do not just convey 'facts' or 'concepts', and even propositions can act creatively on hearers.\textsuperscript{138} Thus the cognitive, descriptive, and performative, dimensions of language are interwoven.\textsuperscript{139} "The logic of description" and "the logic of evaluation" are theoretically distinct, but overlap in practice.\textsuperscript{140} Communication does not depend on vocabulary alone,\textsuperscript{141} since a single surface-grammar may represent a multiform depth-grammar.\textsuperscript{142} Wittgenstein speaks of "the multiplicity of... tools in language, and of the ways in which they are used".\textsuperscript{143} Second, specific utterances show that what 'language' is depends on what a speaker is doing in a particular language-game.\textsuperscript{144} That is, the meaning of a stretch of language often cannot be disambiguated without looking at extra-linguistic action. Therefore, there can be no single, uniform, or


\textsuperscript{134} Thiselton, 'Language and Meaning in Religion', 1138.

\textsuperscript{135} Wittgenstein, \textit{Philosophical Investigations}, 80.

\textsuperscript{136} Thiselton, 'Language and Meaning in Religion', 1131 (para. 1).


\textsuperscript{143} Wittgenstein, \textit{Philosophical Investigations}, 12.

\textsuperscript{144} Thiselton, 'Language and Meaning in Religion', 1131 (para. 2); cf. 1126.
comprehensive theory or definition of language in an ‘idealist’ sense.\textsuperscript{145} Wittgenstein brings “words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use”\textsuperscript{146} Thus, we query B.J. Walsh’s suggestion that Thiselton’s approach is dualistic as though it only ‘balanced’ Continental linguistic dualism: for Thiselton, assertions are interwoven within a larger linguistic multi-functional ‘whole’.\textsuperscript{147} Third, specific utterances may employ metaphors, models, or symbols that strongly condition “the way we look at things”\textsuperscript{148} Therefore, again, an extra-linguistic critique is necessary - at the level of ‘pictures’\textsuperscript{149} - to investigate... the application of the picture”\textsuperscript{150} Earlier observations need not be repeated,\textsuperscript{151} including those to do with responsible and irresponsible language-uses.\textsuperscript{152}

For Thiselton, the later Wittgenstein’s approach to meaning (moving from considerations about language to considerations about meaning) resonates with a traditional focus on original historically particular socio-historical context in biblical hermeneutics, resisting an over-emphasis on reader-horizons without retaining false traditional assumptions about meaning. Citing Wittgenstein, “for a large class of cases... the meaning of a word is its use”.\textsuperscript{153} Thus, first, on a particular axis, the basic units of meaning are not abstracted words, sentences, or ideas (meaning is not grounded in abstract logic or “essential meaning”), but specific utterances (cf. ‘speech-acts’) in their particular ‘frames-of-reference’ in life.\textsuperscript{154} Again one must ask how a word is “used... in the language-game which is its original home”.\textsuperscript{155} For Thiselton, ‘frames-of-reference’ include, (i), the linguistic and conceptual context (cf. room, net, network of co-ordinates) at both narrower and broader (cf. ‘universe’ of discourse) levels; (ii) the extra-linguistic historical situation, setting, context-in-life, or context of situation (cf.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{146} Wittgenstein, \textit{Philosophical Investigations}, 48.
\item \textsuperscript{147} Walsh, ‘Anthony Thiselton’s Contribution to Biblical Hermeneutics’. 234.
\item \textsuperscript{150} Wittgenstein, \textit{Philosophical Investigations}, 116.
\item \textsuperscript{152} Thiselton, ‘Myth, Paradigm, and the Status of Biblical Imagery’, 12; cf. Thiselton, ‘Language and Meaning in Religion’, 1127 (para. 3); cf. 1132 (para. 2); cf. 1134-1135, 1135 (para. 2-3,4); cf. 1137 (para. 2); cf. 1138 (para. 1); cf. 1143 (para. 3).
\item \textsuperscript{153} Wittgenstein, \textit{Philosophical Investigations}, 20.
\end{itemize}
(iii) There is also the 'home' or 'working' language-game (cf. logical context) presupposed by the language-community and tradition, embracing both speaker and hearer. Second, the meaning of an utterance or word is usually its use in its 'home' language-game and language-community. Thus, the term 'God' cannot be defined abstractly, but only in terms of paradigmatic uses by Christian communities, in traditions of experiences and language-behaviour, in life. In certain particular cases, meaning can still be seen in terms of 'reference'. But, even then, "many different kinds of thing are called 'description'". Thus, Thiselton may, in some contexts, seem positive about a 'referential theory of meaning' (see below), but he rejects this theory at anything like a 'comprehensive' level: there is no comprehensive theory of meaning or uniform relationship between meaning and language.

Third, meaning is thus not grounded in vocabulary or surface-grammar alone. Hence, the vocabulary of "What about the points?" is simple, but does the utterance relate to railways, electric wiring, cricket or other settings in life? Similarly, the surface-grammar of "This is poison" is simple, but does it function as an imperative ('Quick, fetch a doctor!'), a reproach ('You forgot to put sugar in my tea'), or a warning ('Watch out!')? Wittgenstein concludes, "no wonder we find it difficult to know our way about". Fourth, meaning is grounded in an interwoven whole embracing language-uses, actions, particular life-contingencies, forms of life, and so on - in "how given words function within the total real life setting of a community". Again, "only in the stream of

159. Thiselton, 'Language and Meaning in Religion', 1131 (para. 2).
161. Thiselton, 'Language and Meaning in Religion', 1131 (bottom of page), cf. 1130; cf. Thiselton, 'Behind' and 'In Front Of the Text', 102-103; but cf. 103-104.
thought and life do words have meaning".166 Fifth, meaning interweaves self-involving force (multiple overlapping functions) and content (cf. report, concepts). Thus, liturgical speech-acts are not just flat statements, but embody self-involving functions of acclamation, proclamation, exclamation, pledge, phatic communion, and so on. Yet, they also include historical report.167 Sixth, the meaning of religious language depends on the relation between everyday words and special kinds of use in logically peculiar language-games, settings, or traditions, between which there are unusual family resemblances. Thus, ‘hearing God’ reflects normal vocabulary put to a special use: “you can’t hear God speak to somebody else”.168 Thiselton also considers the examples of “birth” (Jn. 3), “living water”, “meat” (Jn. 4), “bread”, “eat and drink”, and “come down” (Jn. 6).169 To avoid problems related to controlling ‘pictures’ (see Chapter 3), Thiselton advocates using multiple models in mutually or reciprocally qualifying inter-relations. Unwanted meanings are thus ‘cancelled’, and remnant meanings superimposed to form new semantic fields or markers. These can only be built by communities, and not by individuals, where here Thiselton also appeals to Ian Ramsey, Paul van Buren, James Barr, and others.170 Thus, Thiselton avoids straightforwardly “interpreting Wittgenstein’s ‘language-games’ as a fideistic defence of the claim of religious language to its own realm”.171 Language-games are linked by “a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing”.172

For Thiselton, linguistic ‘meaning’ not only relates to historical particularities, but also to historical continuities. Thiselton argues that the later Wittgenstein’s approach to meaning resonates with the way New Testament language-uses derive their meaning in relation to Old Testament paradigms. Thus, on a general (i.e. a trans-historical) axis, meaning depends on ‘regularities’ in language-traditions known as ‘public criteria of meaning’, not on ‘inner’ ‘mental’ processes independent of external events.173 Thus, “there exists a correspondence between the concepts ‘rule’ and ‘meaning’”174 This

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174. Wittgenstein, On Certainty, 10e.
point qualifies the context-relativity of meaning for Thiselton.175 Thus, first, all language, everyday or religious, presupposes public criteria of meaning.176 (i) Public criteria of meaning embrace non-prescriptive rules (regularities, customs, patterns, and habits).177 “rules... are needed for establishing a practice”.178 (ii) Public criteria of meaning are observable and accessible, (not ‘private’):179 calling “meaning a ‘mental activity’... would encourage a false picture”.180 (iii) Public criteria of meaning are trans-temporal, exhibiting both historical continuity and change.181 We can follow “definite rules at every throw” or “alter them - as we go along”.182 (iv) Public criteria of meaning involve extra-linguistic language-behaviour, historical events, and kinds of occasions, situations and contexts that ‘back’, give ‘hard currency’ to, and are conventionally correlated and interwoven with, certain language-uses.183 This, “is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false”.184 (v) Public criteria of meaning transmit linguistic, conceptual content - also subject to continuity and change.185 Thus, “when language-games change, then there is a change in concepts, and... the meanings of words”.186 (vi) Public criteria of meaning are exemplified in historical paradigm-cases or model language-games - often in narratives:187 “examples are needed for establishing a practice”.188 Second, public criteria of meaning constitute the necessary frames-of-reference and pre-conditions (cf. Gadamer’s ‘common world’ and Fuchs’ ‘common understanding’) for, (i), the intelligibility and communicability of language-uses or language-behaviour, where patterned correlations between

177. Thiselton, ‘Language and Meaning in Religion’, 1134 (para.3); cf. 1127 (para. 3); cf. 1135 (para. 3); cf. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 80-81.
188. Wittgenstein, On Certainty, 21e.
“language-uses and given situations” are pre-conditional for understanding. Wittgenstein asks, “How am I to know what he means, when I see nothing but the signs he gives?” Public criteria of meaning are pre-conditional for the teaching of, learning of, or training in, language-uses or language-behaviour. Conversely, ‘private’ language unrelated to “observable... behaviour” is “necessarily unteachable” - against “Bultmann’s ‘esoteric’ conception of meaning” whereby “all spiritual attitudes are unobservable”. Rather, “one learns the game by watching how others play”, such that “there is no logical a priori behind training and upbringing in human life”. Similarly, in Thiselton’s final connection between the later Wittgenstein and hermeneutics, Heidegger’s “Dasein is something prior to subject-object thinking and to cognitive propositions”. “scientific research” is not “the manner of Being... which lies closest” to Dasein. (iii) Public criteria of meaning are pre-conditional for the checking, testing, or authentication of language-uses or language-behaviour, providing ‘paradigm-cases’ against which testing can be carried out. Thus, “the word ‘agreement’ and the word ‘rule’ are related to one another”. Third, applying these points to religious language, then, experience, behaviour, notions of identity (human or divine), speech, and language-use (e.g. symbols) are only authentically ‘Christian’, and only have intelligible teachable ‘meaning’, if they relate positively to Old Testament ‘public criteria of meaning’. Thus, Bible-reading is important as a ‘first step’ in clarifying paradigm settings. (i) Old Testament paradigm-cases or foundation events render New Testament salvific events intelligible, giving these and modern Christian identity and language-

190. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 139.
195. Heidegger, Being and Time, 32.
198. Thiselton, Language, Liturgy and Meaning, 4-6.
uses their currency and meaning. Conversely, contrary to Bultmann’s “stripping away the mythological garments”, demythologisation, which re-defines terms, confuses and undermines Christian identity. However, “I must not saw off the branch on which I am sitting”. And, contrary to Tillich, symbols require embedding within and authentication against broader cognitive discourse.

(ii) Thiselton thus prioritises past settings over present settings in tradition, although both contribute to an over-arching frame-of-reference (cf. H. Ott’s ‘hermeneutical arch’). D.S. Dockery rightly stresses Thiselton’s “simultaneous emphasis on both horizons”, but wrongly argues that Thiselton grounds the hermeneutical circle in the modern horizon. (iii) Responsible Christian language-use has authentic ‘backing’ and a ‘hard currency’ of behaviour in line with public criteria of meaning (cf. Christ as ‘enfleshed Word’). Conversely, irresponsible or trivialised language-use is ‘unbacked’, and leads to circularity and relativism, having no anchorage in reality. Thiselton does not remove “theological concepts to a safe place outside history”.

Thiselton also approves of the later Wittgenstein’s attack on the “craving for generality” and “the contemptuous attitude towards the particular case” of post-Enlightenment thought. This emerges in Thiselton’s response to F. Ferré, to structuralist approaches (see Chapter 5), in The Two Horizons, and later. Thiselton’s appeal to the later Wittgenstein to ground meaning in the public sphere also


resonates with a traditional concern for, but not with traditional psychologicist or mentalist approaches to, authorial language-use and thought:207 “nothing is more wrong-headed than calling meaning a mental activity”208 The criteria involved in discovering “what mental processes are going on” during speech are different to those presupposed in understanding sentences.209 Later, Thiselton argues that authorial intention is not a mental “action or process separable from the linguistic act or process itself”, agreeing with Schleiermacher, Wittgenstein, and Searle.210 Rather, as F. Watson rightly notes, it is a matter of “the ‘directedness’ of the text within the linguistic conventions with which it operates” where a “text... constitutes a communicative action proceeding from an author”.211 Thus, G.R. Osborne’s view that “Thiselton remains firmly within the intentionalist camp” requires qualification,212 and E.E. Johnson’s view that Thiselton rejects consideration of authors’ intention requires correction.213 Thiselton avoids an over-emphasis on readers.214

Finally, resonances between Thiselton’s appeals to the later Wittgenstein and Pannenberg mutually warrant each side of the dialogue, whether theological or philosophical. Thus, grounding language in historical life resonates with grounding it in eschatology as ‘the totality of history’. Grounding meaning in public criteria resonates with the interweaving of event and meaning, against Bultmann’s dualisms (see Chapter 6).215 Paradigmatic language-uses resonate with paradigmatic typological events. For both thinkers tradition embraces continuity and change, stability and open-endedness towards the future. Thus, Thiselton legitimately employs the later Wittgenstein’s insights as philosophical description to describe language used within a theological framework.216 Nevertheless, Thiselton’s

'presuppositions' are not Wittgensteinian, since Thiselton does not marginalise theology. R. Papaphilippopoulos and R.W.L. Moberly both correctly argue for the decisive role of theology in Thiselton's thinking. In Chapter 6 we evaluate Thiselton's appeal to the later Wittgenstein. But now, we turn to consider Thiselton's appeal to J.L. Austin and D.D. Evans.

4. Broader Appeals to the Philosophy of Language Resonant with Theology and Eschatology

The later Wittgenstein aside, Thiselton also appeals to J.L. Austin, D.D. Evans, and to the philosophy of language more broadly during his 'second period'. Appeals to these thinkers are dialogically warranted in Thiselton's view because selected insights from their work resonate both with biblical and theological language and with appeal to the later Wittgenstein.

Thus, in the early 1970s Thiselton's hermeneutics course featured "speech-acts in Austin". Austin also helps reinstate "statements from the past" and undermine "post-Troeltschian theology". Austin's and Evans' 'logic of self-involvement' threatens J.A.T. Robinson's separation of descriptive statements, interpretation, and linguistic function. Thiselton also draws on Austin to find different speech-acts in 1 Corinthians.

In 1973, Thiselton's appeals to Austin and Evans remain unqualified whilst those to Heidegger, Bultmann, and Gadamer are mixed. Thus, if traditional approaches reduce language to flat assertion and information, 'existentialist' approaches wrongly reduce it to performative categories "without factual remainder". Following Austin and Evans, however, effective performative utterances presuppose that appropriate states of affairs, circumstances and conventions are true. Thus,

220. Thiselton, 'Thirty Years', 1562-1563.
224. Thiselton, 'The Use of Philosophical Categories', 89; cf. 96-98; cf. 87-88; cf. 90-91; cf. 93 cf. 94, cf 95; cf. 96.
225. Thiselton, 'The Use of Philosophical Categories', 88; cf. 89; cf. 90; cf. 91-94.
226. Thiselton, 'The Use of Philosophical Categories', 95; cf. 97-98.
cognitive and performative dimensions are interwoven. Austin speaks 'hermeneutically' to argue that linguistic philosophy sharpens our 'awareness of words', and Evans' notion of 'onlooks' is valuable.

In 1974, Thiselton approves Austin's and Evans' belief that language can perform actions beyond speaking itself. Effective illocutions, for example ship-naming, presuppose accepted conventional procedure, an appropriate authorised person, and the appropriate situation. Thiselton relates Austin's sub-classes of illocutionary acts to biblical language, for example, behabivatives (e.g. bless, curse), exercitives (e.g. 'proclaim', 'announce', 'warn', 'enact', 'grant', 'repeal', 'pardon', 'choose'), and commissives ('promise', 'swear', 'undertake', 'covenant', and 'champion'). Effective illocutions can have powerful "conventional effects" (Austin), creating new "institutional state[s] of affairs" (Evans). With Austin, "no single theory of language" can be comprehensive since language is multifunctional. With Austin, the speech-act is the basic unit of meaning. With Austin, performative linguistic functions presuppose descriptive linguistic functions, though language does not relate to reality 'naturally'. With Evans, contrary to Tillich, Christian commitment aligns with biblical "commmissive language", such as 'I believe', or 'I promise'.

In 1975, Thiselton agrees with Austin and Evans that language is multi-functional, being grounded in multiform speech-action. Thiselton argues that Austin's commissives (e.g. promising), behabivatives (e.g. thanking), and exercitives (e.g. baptising) are relevant to liturgy, and that Austin and Evans rightly urge that exercitives do not operate with causal force (cf. 'word-magic'), but presuppose complete

228. Thiselton, 'The Use of Philosophical Categories', 95; cf. 97-98; cf. Thiselton, 'Performative Utterances', 251.
229. Thiselton, 'The Use of Philosophical Categories', 89.
237. Thiselton, 'The Theology of Paul Tillich', 90 (para. 2,3); cf. 95 (para. 2); cf. 87 (para. 3); cf. 102 (para. 3).

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execution of the relevant conventional procedure by the appropriate speaker.239 Drawing on the later Wittgenstein and Austin, Thiselton extends semantic considerations beyond lexicography to take autorial thought and extra-linguistic context into consideration.240 Similarly, Thiselton expounds the grammar of 'belief' in terms of commissive bodily action.241

In 1977, Thiselton notes that Pannenberg, J. Macquarrie and the Anglo-American tradition reject the dualisms underlying existentialist approaches to myth. Contrary to Bultmann, the 'logic of self-involvement' depends on 'the logic of description', drawing on Austin and Evans.242 Thiselton also argues that the power of human blessings and cursings depends on the existence of certain accepted procedures, following Austin.243 Again, effective illocutions depend on certain states of affairs (conventions, institutions, etc.) being true, not on 'causal force', such that propositional content is connected to linguistic performance.244 Thus, eschatological language is both descriptive and self-involving.245

Thiselton also makes appeals to the philosophy of language more broadly. In 1973, Thiselton urges that primitive New Testament confessions involve both "cognitive credal content" and performance.246 Thiselton also argues that, "to say... that Africa was hot but the welcome was cold... is not to oppose two sets of things" but to make "a poor joke".247 Elsewhere, Thiselton argues that Bultmann's demythologising is logically impossible since language about God "must include symbol

244. Thiselton, 'Language and Meaning in Religion', 1125 (para. 3); cf. 1139 (para. 2).
and analogy". Bultmann's stance is "a flight from the evident", and his "definitions [of myth]... incompatible" with one-another.248 (We discuss Thiselton's reading of Bultmann's work in Chapter 6).

In 1974, Thiselton makes appeals to philosophers of language in relation to polymorphous concepts,249 and in countering 'natural',250 and 'ideational' views of language (see below): language is conventional and multifunctional.251 We have already noted Thiselton's thought in relation to models and qualifiers252 and in relation to particularising language and unique personhood.253

In 1975, Thiselton repeats his observations on models and qualifiers, and also argues that communities can extend the 'edges of language'.244 For Thiselton, 'belief' is not primarily an 'inner mental state', 'cognitive' and 'performative' dimensions of language are interwoven,255 and several philosophers fruitfully explore the "broader implication of Wittgenstein's work for the language of religion".256 In 1976, Thiselton agrees with the exposition of 'I-thou' relationship in terms of 'falling in love': this presupposes particular persons, not just the general classes 'female' and 'male'.257 Further, for Thiselton, the meaning of the word 'God' is inseparable from its history of uses in Christian tradition and community life.258

In 1977, Thiselton warns of the semantic distortions and inversions that occur when biblical language is lifted into an alien frame of reference,259 again rejects 'ideational' theories of language and meaning,260 and repeats his comments on 'models and qualifiers'.261 In 1978, after P.F. Strawson, Thiselton cites J.L. Austin's failure to distinguish between "empirically informative" communication

and the use of the word ‘true’, but rejects P.F. Strawson’s “performative theory of truth” (see Chapter 3).

In conclusion, a resonance emerges between our observations in this sub-section and the thought of the later Wittgenstein. Thus, first, language is extra-linguistically grounded and conventional. Second, language is multi-functional speech-action, against ‘comprehensive’, ‘uniform’, or ‘dualistic’ theories of language. Third, the interweaving of ‘performative’ and ‘cognitive’ functions of language, coupled with the ‘logic of self-involvement’, reflects textual effects beyond the merely intra-linguistic dimension. Fourth, viewing the speech-act as the basic unit of meaning resonates with Wittgenstein’s stress on ‘use’. Fifth, language undergoes temporal changes. Sixth, ‘frames of reference’ involving both extralinguistic and linguistic dimensions shape meaning, perception, and conceptual grammar (see Chapter 3 on Wittgenstein’s ‘seeing as’ and Evans’ ‘onlooks’). Seventh, the philosophy of language functions hermeneutically.

Similarly, resonances emerge between Thiselton’s appeals to the philosophy of language and biblical and theological language. Thus, first, the interweaving of linguistic functions is exemplified in language about God. Personal identity links to the ‘particularising language’ of narrative and historical report, yet language about God cannot avoid symbols and analogy. Second, multiform speech-acts are relevant to the analysis of biblical utterances. Third, temporal change in language resonates with temporal modifications within biblical traditions.

Thus, Thiselton finds ‘dialogic resonances’ between a prior ‘biblical and theological account of language’ and his appeals to the later Wittgenstein, J.L. Austin and D.D. Evans, and the philosophy of language more broadly. That is, these theological and philosophical approaches to language mutually, dialogically, and reciprocally ‘authorise’ or ‘warrant’ one another. We may now turn to Thiselton’s appeal to the tradition of Ferdinand de Saussure.

5. Thiselton’s Accommodations of the Saussurian and Continental Traditions of Language Study to the Later Wittgensteinian Tradition

Here we propose that Thiselton critically adjusts insights from the Saussurian tradition to engender a unified resonance with, and fleshing out, of the later Wittgensteinian tradition. Then, in effect,

Thiselton tests, and thereby dialogically reinforces, his decision to adopt this alliance by using it to
criticise traditional approaches to language, contribute to biblical interpretation and practical theology,
and sublate certain insights from the Continental Heideggerian-Gadamerian tradition of language-
study.

Thiselton’s appeal to Saussure, general linguistics, and modern semantics is very complex. In one
article alone he draws on eleven writers positively, on five writers in a qualified way, and on a
further seven writers in relation to biblical interpretation. Elsewhere, Thiselton only extends the
breath of these appeals. Notably, Thiselton speaks of the “epoch-making” work of J. Barr, where
J.F.A. Sawyer “takes the discussion further than... James Barr”, providing principles “fundamental for
all biblical exegesis”. We start with Thiselton’s appeal to Saussure.

Thiselton argues that Saussure’s “four principles” are fundamental for general linguistics, modern
semantics, and all structuralist approaches, and that Barr rightly adopts at least three of them.

1. Thiselton adopts Saussure’s conventionalist approach to language. Signs (or vocabulary-stock) and
grammar are arbitrary, rooted in “use, social tradition, rules of convention”, and are “accidents” of
word-history, not related ‘naturally’ to the world. This is the “first principle of language.” After
Saussure, language is grounded in extra-linguistic social activity and (largely) unconsciously-formed

265. Thiselton, ‘Semantics and New Testament Interpretation’, 79-89 (Saussure); cf. 83, 90 (Trier); cf. 76, 84, 92 (Ullmann);
cf. 82 (Baskin); cf. 75, 77, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 87, 88 (Barr); cf. 75, 83, 87 (Lyons); cf. 76, 87 (Black); cf. 90 (Ogden);
cf. 85 (Robins); cf. 84 (Joos); cf. 82, 87 (Crystal).
266. Thiselton, ‘Semantics and New Testament Interpretation’, 83 (Stern); cf. 78, 96-97 (Chomsky); cf. 78, 84, 86, 90, 96,
97, 98 (Nida); cf. 78, 95 (Wonderly); cf. 96ff (Taber); cf. 90-98 (re. Trier & Nida).
267. Thiselton, ‘Semantics and New Testament Interpretation’, 75, 77, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 87, 88 (Barr); cf. 75, 83, 88, 89
(Güngemanns); cf. 75 (Kieffer); cf. 75, 79 (Sawyer); cf. 75, 83, 97 (Burres); cf. 90 (Katz and Foder).
268. Thiselton, ‘Language and Meaning in Religion’, 1124 (Korzybski); cf. 1129-1130 (Pelc). The front cover of Language,
Liturgy and Meaning reflects R. Jacobson’s influence; cf. Thiselton, Language, Liturgy and Meaning; cf. Thiselton, New Horizons,
487.
269. Thiselton, ‘Semantics and New Testament Interpretation’, 84; cf. 75 (para. 2); cf. Thiselton, A.C., ‘Enthusiasm Not
330; cf. 331.
272. Thiselton, ‘Semantics and New Testament Interpretation’, 85; cf. on this first axiom, Saussure, F. de., Course in General
Linguistics (eds. C. Bailey, A. Sechehaye, & A. Reidlinger; trans. W. Baskin; Philosophical Library; New York: McGraw-Hill,
273. Thiselton, ‘The Supposed Power of Words’, 287, cf. 289 (para. 3); cf. 290 (paras. 1, 2); cf. Thiselton, Structuralism and
Biblical Studies', 330; cf. 331.
habits that display continuity yet admit change, and relate arbitrarily to the world\(^{274}\) (cf. 'rules' in the later Wittgenstein and 'recursive mechanisms' in N. Chomsky\(^{275}\)). Thiselton does not ignore "the relationship between language and reality",\(^{276}\) but defends Saussure's conventionalist stance on three grounds: considerations relating to translation,\(^{277}\) the relationship between thought and language,\(^{278}\) and everyday linguistic phenomena.\(^{279}\)

On translation, then, *first*, the same semantic value in two different languages is generated by completely different vocabulary stock and grammatical structures.\(^{280}\) Further, to render "translation-equivalence" between two languages, both linguistic and extra-linguistic contexts of utterance have to be accounted for.\(^{281}\) *Second*, the same semantic force can be generated using different vocabulary and grammar within the same language.\(^{282}\) The real logical structure of an utterance may differ from its surface or "apparent logical form".\(^{283}\) Arbitrary surface-grammar is distinct from 'depth-grammar'.\(^{284}\) *Third*, if a language has no 'word for it', 'it' may still be 'said', even if a given concept is harder to express in one language than in another. Languages are inter-translatable.\(^{285}\)

On the relationship between thought and language, then whilst existing vocabulary, grammar and structure reflect a culture's past concerns, language habits, and conceptuality, they do not absolutely determine these in the future, though strongly influence them. This is due to the possibility of creative language-use in a changing world: such changes demonstrate that language is merely conventional.\(^{286}\)

Certain 'everyday' linguistic phenomena also demonstrate the conventionality of language. These include: homonymy, polysemy, opaqueness in vocabulary, diachronic change in language, hyponymy, arbitrariness in grammar, and the use of different words for the same object in different languages".

\(^{274}\) Thiselton, 'Language and Meaning in Religion', 1123; cf. 1124; cf. 1126.
\(^{276}\) Contradicting, Keifert, 'Review of The Two Horizons', 409.
\(^{277}\) Thiselton, 'Semantics and New Testament Interpretation', 75 (para. 1); cf. 76, 77, 78, 85 (para. 3), 86, 87 (para.2), 88, 96-98.
\(^{278}\) Thiselton, 'Semantics and New Testament Interpretation', 87-88.
\(^{279}\) Thiselton, 'Semantics and New Testament Interpretation', 85 (para. 3).
\(^{281}\) Thiselton, 'Semantics and New Testament Interpretation', 87 (para. 2); cf. 75 (para. 1).
\(^{282}\) Thiselton, 'Semantics and New Testament Interpretation', 76-78; cf. 96.
\(^{283}\) Thiselton, 'Semantics and New Testament Interpretation', 77; cf. 76. After B. Russell.
\(^{284}\) Thiselton, 'Language and Meaning in Religion', 1141, cf. 1127, cf. 1124.
\(^{286}\) Thiselton, 'Semantics and New Testament Interpretation', 87-88.
The conventionality of language, then, is not just a 'modern' Western view, but "absolutely demanded". 287

2. Thiselton adopts Saussure's axiom that 'langue', the community's "language-system", linguistic "repertoire" or "reservoir", must be distinguished from 'parole', concrete actual speech-acts. Langue embraces publicly agreed conventions, is produced socially, known completely only collectively, and inferred from parole. Thiselton notes E. Guttgemann's distinction between the synchronic laws of langue and the diachronic laws of the growth of oral traditions. Thiselton compares langue with N. Chomsky's 'competence' or 'generative grammar', and parole with Chomsky's 'performance'. Similarly, E. Guttgemanns distinguishes between "generative matrix (competence)" and "performance", though the 'code' versus 'message' distinction of ideological structuralism distorts Saussure's langue-parole distinction (see Chapter 5). 288

3. Thiselton adopts Saussure's axiom that a language is a self-contained self-justifying structural system of interdependent parts that only function and acquire semantic values through inter-relationships within the whole. 289 This precludes word-centred approaches, since meaning depends on the simultaneous presence of two basic kinds of inter-relationships (involving "similarities and differences") between systemic elements. 290 Combining elements creates 'syntagmatic' or juxtapositional relations between words in sentences. 291 A term's 'correct' meaning contributes least to the total context, where words limit each other reciprocally. 292 Substituting a chosen element for another in a sentence brings them into 'associative' (cf. later, 'paradigmatic') 293 relationship. This presupposes that meaning is 'choice', in terms of paradigmatic selections made by speakers from the possibilities of langue. R. Jakobson and anthropological structuralism expounded these relations in terms of 'metonymy' and 'metaphor' respectively. In literary structuralism, systemic elements include words, narrative and mythological

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elements, or "any unit of semantic significance". 294 Thus, words have meaning only within a semantic "field", 295 or in 'sentences'. 296

4. Thiselton adopts Saussure's maxim that 'synchronic' considerations are prior to, pre-requisite to, and distinct from 'diachronic' considerations at every stage of interpretation. A word's meaning in a given utterance at a given time is determined by investigations into linguistic and extra-linguistic contexts of the same time, and not by investigations into contexts of other times. 297 That is, 'synchronic' linguistics involves the study of langue and parole belonging to a given point in time. 'Diachronic' linguistics involves the study of langue and parole as they change over time.

Mostly affirming Saussure's approach, Thiselton highlights five negative implications of Saussure's work for traditional approaches to language. Thus, first, words are neither the "basic units of meaning", nor of "translation-equivalence", 298 and there is no isomorphic "one word/one concept" relationship between language and thought. 299 This precludes atomising "word by word" exegesis. 300 Second, the arbitrary and historical-accidental distinctions of grammatical structure and vocabulary stock (cf. langue) and the range of possibilities of language-uses encompassed by parole do not allow generalising conclusions to be drawn about the distinctive thought of a 'nation' or people (e.g. 'Greek' cf. 'Hebrew'), or about the 'richness' of any given language. 301 Third, surface-grammar is not parallel to logical function or depth-grammar, against "logico-grammatical parallelism". Thus, the surface-grammar of "This is poison" is indicative, but the utterance may mean, "Quick! Fetch a doctor!", which is imperative. Conversely, "rejoice in the Lord" is not necessarily a command. Against


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Bultmann's demythologising, descriptive aspects of language cannot always be reduced to imperatival aspects exhaustively and without remainder. 302 Fourth, a sentence’s meaning is not the sum of the complete range of possible meanings of each of its constituent words taken individually, against over-analytical “word-by-word” approaches. Such ‘illegitimate totality transfer’ fails to apprehend “polysemy in language”, as though the ‘word’ was an “autonomous linguistic unit”. 303 Fifth, a word’s meaning is not found through “etymologising”. Etymology only uncovers a word’s history. 304

Thiselton, however, also makes seven extensions and/or qualifications of Saussure’s work. To this end, crucially, Thiselton draws from the later Wittgenstein and the philosophy of language. Thus, first, Thiselton extends developments of Saussure’s third axiom regarding the structural character of language, focusing on J. Trier’s field semantics. 305 Thus, Trier’s insights into semantic relations supplement valid traditional concerns over “historical and literary context”. A word has meaning only through semantic inter-relations within a field, lexical sub-system, system, or ‘whole’. Trier established fields in terms of syntagmatic relations, paradigmatic relations, similarity (synonymy), opposition

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(complementarity, antonymy), and inclusion (hyponymy). Thiselton extends and modifies these categories as follows. (i) Synonymy involves context-specific interchangeability (cf. the later Wittgenstein's emphasis on 'use'). Some terms are synonymous only in certain contexts, at certain times in history, or cognitively but not emotively, or in terms of register or attitude. (ii) Opposition includes complementarity (two-way exclusion; cf. C.K. Ogden's 'opposition by cut'), antimony (one-way opposition, gradable by scale; cf. C.K. Ogden's 'opposition by scale'), and converseness (e.g. buy cf. sell). (iii) 'Vagueness' embraces inclusiveness or hyponymy, lack of specificity, lack of clear cut-off point, polymorphous concepts, and metaphor. Thus, Thiselton argues, Paul's concept of 'faith' is polymorphous (i.e. used in several ways with several senses), precluding generalisation. Further, Thiselton argues that New Testament language is sometimes deliberately vague (no so much generalising as non-specific). Thiselton argues that 'live' metaphor (i.e. metaphors that are still used today) extends accepted uses of terms in logically odd ways, both creating a tension that draws readers into active thought, and enabling them to 'see' through a new frame of reference. Live metaphors should not lose this ambiguity and force through translation, though 'dead' metaphors (i.e. metaphors that are no longer in common use) are better explained. Thiselton insists that metaphor is not inferior to non-metaphorical discourse, and should not be confused with 'myth', contrary to Bultmann. In Thiselton's view, finally, Jesus' parables function as metaphor. Second, Thiselton's biblical lexicology extends the development of Saussure's structural semiotics. Syntagmatically focussed traditional approaches to lexicology require complementation by a focus on paradigmatic relations as well (cf. the later Wittgenstein's emphasis on 'use'). Thus, Thiselton examines pneuma, hermeneia, and migrãs, and notes J.F.A. Sawyer's distinction between lexical fields and associative fields. Third, qualifying Saussure's axiom about the structural character of language, Thiselton agrees with S. Ullmann that,


despite words not being the basic units of meaning, they still often have a "hard core of meaning" that can only be modified within certain limits by context. Thus, word-studies have value. However, dictionary-entries are only "rule-of-thumb generalisations based on assumptions about characteristic contexts". With J.F.A. Sawyer, "generalisations about meanings always depend on particular uses of words in particular contexts" (cf. the later Wittgenstein). Fourth, drawing on J.F.A. Sawyer, Thiselton extends Saussure's grounding of language in social habit and history, urging that linguistic structural considerations of context (cf. verbal context, broader literary setting, genre, and structural semantics) must be matched by extra-linguistic historical considerations of context (cf. context of situation, Sitz im Leben, and setting). The speech-act is more strictly the "basic unit of meaning" than the sentence. In biblical studies, cutting propositions loose from their situation in life is not only Platonising ("bad theology"), but meaning-distorting ("bad linguistics"). Parole actualises possibilities allowed by langue. References to Thiselton's applications of this extension of Saussure appear in the footnotes. In effect, Thiselton embeds Saussure's insights into his extended later Wittgensteinian framework. Fifth, commenting on E.A. Nida's and C.R. Taber's application of N. Chomsky's "transformational grammar" in Bible translation, Thiselton is reluctant to view language in terms of a few basic structures, "transforms" or 'kernels' of 'universal grammar' from which more elaborate structures are derived. Such kernels are too close to the earlier Wittgenstein's 'elementary' propositions. Further, 'back-transforming' language to kernels (i.e. reducing a complex sentence to a sequence of simple 'logical' component sentences) loses "emotive, cultural, or religious overtones".


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viewing semantic equivalence in purely cognitive terms.\(^{321}\) Positively, however, back-transformation reveals "the arbitrariness of surface grammar" and demonstrates the creative side to translation. By elucidating the "contrast between surface grammar and deep grammar", back-transformation eliminates ambiguities by highlighting the previously implicit. However, an interpreter may judge something to be implicit when it is not; "translation.... becomes interpretation", inseparable from hermeneutics.\(^{322}\) In effect, Thiselton modifies 'back-transformation' by liberating it from quasi-positivism and from ignoring 'context-of-situation'. Again, he embeds extensions or qualifications of Saussurian insights into his later Wittgensteinian framework. Sixth, Thiselton extends and qualifies his point about the negative relation between surface-grammar and national conceptuality. With Saussure and others, Thiselton agrees that surface-grammar and vocabulary-stock (linguistic rules and form) have little influence on thought, being arbitrary or accidental conventions (contrary to B.L. Whorf). Thus, Thiselton applauds J. Barr's rejection of T. Boman's distinction between 'Greek' and 'Hebrew' thought, E.A. Nida's denial that grammar shapes national views of gender or time, and D. Crystal's denial that the presence or absence of a word determines the presence or absence of a concept. Yet, Thiselton argues that tradition and language-habits (linguistic content and use) do condition thought, world-view, or pre-understanding (with Whorf), without absolutely determining them (contrary to Whorf). In line with Wittgenstein, language-habits may hold us captive, but their spell can be broken since they are not logically isolated. Thus, for Thiselton, the debate between Whorf and Barr et al about the relationship between language and thought has become unnecessarily polarised through a failure to distinguish between 'form', 'rules', 'content', and 'use'.\(^{323}\) Thiselton does not advocate "the almost complete identification of language and thought",\(^{324}\) but qualifies a trend in general linguistics, admitting a "half-truth" in the Whorf hypothesis, substantially through appeal to the later Wittgenstein.\(^{325}\) Seventh, qualifying ideological structuralist extensions of Saussure's notion of associative relations, Thiselton urges that E. Gütgemanns rightly relates meaning to choices between

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deep structure alternatives, but wrongly restricts choices to those options admitted by the a-historical binary oppositions allowed by his idealist anthropological determinism (see Chapter 5).\textsuperscript{326}

Thiselton, then, critically assimilates or sublates insights from the post-Saussorian tradition into his extended later Wittgensteinian framework. Three further points confirm this observation. \textit{First}, Thiselton rejects semantic approaches that contradict the later Wittgenstein (see shortly).\textsuperscript{327} \textit{Second}, in Thiselton’s view, the philosophy of language addresses the question of meaning more profoundly than general linguistics does, though both traditions contribute positively.\textsuperscript{328} This reverses J. Barr’s perception that Thiselton argues that ‘philosophical semantics’ should supplement ‘linguistic semantics’.\textsuperscript{329} Rather, for Thiselton, linguistic-structural considerations supplement those to do with ‘use’, \textit{Sitz im Leben}, public criteria and tradition, and eschatological anticipations of ‘history-as-a-whole’ - grounding language in history, just as Thiselton embeds appeals to the later Wittgenstein’s ‘semantics’ of ‘expectancy’ in eschatological co-ordinates.\textsuperscript{330} \textit{Third}, we noted that Thiselton’s appeal to S. Ullmann’s notion of ‘hard-core’ word-meanings countered Saussurian linguistics for taking the criticism of words as units of meaning too far.\textsuperscript{331} This parallels Thiselton’s earlier appeal to Ullmann in approval of the later Wittgenstein’s work on ‘concepts with blurred edges’: if some words have hard-core meanings that vary only a little from context to context, then so do some concepts. Thus, Thiselton allies appeals to S. Ullmann and the later Wittgenstein in mild correction of points from general linguistics.\textsuperscript{332} For Thiselton, then, hermeneutics is not “part of the larger field of literary criticism”. The reverse is true.\textsuperscript{333} Thiselton unifies his critique of language by accommodating the Saussurian tradition to the later Wittgensteinian tradition. Hence, the ‘dialogic resonance’ or ‘mutual warrant’ between philosophy and theology that we noted earlier is undisturbed. Thiselton’s philosophical description of biblical and theological language has simply been ‘fleshed out’ with

\textsuperscript{328} Thiselton, ‘Semantics and New Testament Interpretation’, 98-100.
\textsuperscript{331} Thiselton, ‘Semantics and New Testament Interpretation’, 83-84.
further angles of view. But how does Thiselton test and validate this later-Wittgensteinian-Saussurian alliance?


1. Thiselton tests, and thereby dialogically validates, his adoption of a later-Wittgensteinian-Saussurian alliance through demonstrating its critical power in relation to other approaches to language. Thus, in 1971, Thiselton rejects T. Fawcett’s naturalistic view of language and his “referential or ideational theory of meaning.” Fawcett has “virtually ignored” Wittgenstein, linguistic philosophy, and general linguistics.

Similarly, in 1974, Thiselton rejects “false” traditional linguistic assumptions including viewing language as external ‘clothing’ for ‘prior inner concepts’, word-centred views of meaning, etymologising, logico-grammatical parallelism, “prescriptive” views relating language naturally or logically to the world, viewing a word’s meaning as the object or concept to which it refers, and viewing statements, assertions, propositions, description, or information as the “basic kind of language-use”. In this context, Thiselton criticises several writers, especially the traditions of W. von Humboldt and Bultmann.

338. Thiselton, ‘Semantics and New Testament Interpretation’, 76 (para. 4); cf. 75 (para. 1).
339. Thiselton, ‘Semantics and New Testament Interpretation’, 76 (para. 4); cf. 80 (para. 5,6), cf. 81 (para. 1.3), cf. 82 (para. 1).
340. Thiselton, ‘Semantics and New Testament Interpretation’, 76 (para. 4-6), cf. 77 (para. 1-2); cf. 78 (para. 1-3).
344. Thiselton, ‘Semantics and New Testament Interpretation’, 76-77; cf. 86-87 (Boman); cf. 81 (Jacob, Snaith); cf. 86 (Pedersen, Knight); cf. 84; cf. 75 (para. 2) (Kittel).
Elsewhere in 1974 Thiselton rejects, first, ‘natural’, ‘primitive’, ‘traditional’ or ‘dynamic’ approaches to language as ‘word-magic’. Language may be power-laden, but is not a “material” “force which irresistibly achieves its end”. Words should not be confused with the material thing (or ‘names’ with ‘objects’), or linguistic effects with “physical cause and effect”. Language may be dynamic, but remains conventional, following Saussure. Again, Thiselton does not neglect “the relationship between language and reality”. Second, Thiselton rejects an ‘ideational’ (in Locke) or ‘dianoetic’ (in O. Procksch and G. von Rad) view in which language is primarily a vehicle for expressing intellectual concepts, information, or psychological inner “private mental states”. Rather, language is multifunctional, where the conveyance of conceptual or empirical content is only one possible function, following the later Wittgenstein and others. Third, Thiselton rejects the dualistic prioritisation of supposed ‘richer’ biblical ‘dynamic’ aspects of language relative to supposedly ‘poorer’ ‘Greek’ or ‘modern Western’ ‘dianoetic’ aspects, contrary to O. Procksch, G. von Rad, Fuchs, Ebeling, and Heidegger. These are false alternatives. Fourth, Thiselton appeals to Saussure and J. Barr in rejecting arguments that the Old Testament presupposes a ‘natural’ view of language on the basis of the etymology and semantics of the Hebrew word *dābār*.

Still in 1974, Thiselton again criticises Heidegger, Fuchs, and Ebeling for holding to a ‘natural’ view of language. Rather, with Saussure, general linguistics, Austin, and Korzybski’s general semantics, even performative language is conventional. We noted Thiselton’s parallel critique of Tillich above.

In 1975, Thiselton, appealing to the later Wittgenstein, denies that children learn by ostensive definition, and complains about flattening symbols and metaphor to ‘description’, ignoring self-involving dimensions of language, and about pre-occupation with generalisations, rules, guiding principles, universal maxims, categories, or classes. Thiselton unfavourably compares ‘traditional’ approaches with the early Wittgenstein’s positivist-like approach.

In 1977, Thiselton again rejects ‘natural’, ‘referential’, ‘ideational’, and ‘positivist’ approaches to language and meaning. First, against ‘natural’ approaches, linguistic power does not spring from a ‘natural’ relation between language and reality but from potentially involving the ‘whole person’, not just the intellect, and from connecting individuals to communities (past or present) in potentially transforming communication. Criticising Tillich, Thiselton argues that symbols are not ‘naturally’ related to the world, but that they can be powerful, facilitating the necessary “interplay between conscious and unconscious”, resonating with childhood or national memories, opening up the ‘soul’, or holding us under their spell. Thus, responsibility is required: not all ‘powerful’ symbols appropriately symbolise God, but require authentication against public criteria and broader cognitive discourse. Second, ‘referential’ theories tend, (i), to view the basic unit of meaning as the ‘word’, (ii), ground word-meaning in the ‘objects’ to which words refer and, (iii), propose that meaning is learnt through ostensive definition. We addressed (i) earlier. In regard to (ii), Thiselton counters that not all words are like names since, drawing on the later Wittgenstein, many words do not refer to ‘objects’ (e.g. Water! Away! Owl! Help! Fine! No!). Further, Thiselton argues, drawing on G. Frege, that words with different meanings can refer to the same object, and, word-meanings change in different contexts. Since language does not operate “solely, or even primarily, on the basis of

361. Thiselton, ‘Language and Meaning in Religion’, 1124-1126 (‘natural’ approaches); 1127-1129 (‘referential’ approaches); 1129-1130 (‘ideational’ approaches); 1135-1137 (broadly positivist approaches).
362. Thiselton, ‘Language and Meaning in Religion’, 1123-1124
reference". Thiselton draws on E. Schillebeeckx to argue that a word's meaning is not its verifiable relation to an 'object'. In regard to 'iii', Thiselton argues, following the later Wittgenstein, that ostensive definition remains ambiguous prior to linguistic 'training'. Thus, Wittgenstein asks, what does "this is love" mean, when "pointing to a pencil"? Does love mean "wood", "hard", or "pencil"? Meaning is learnt by being 'trained', by 'watching how others play' (see above). Thiselton concludes: re-labelling biblical terms in liturgy will not make them intelligible. Further, referential theories cannot serve as comprehensive approaches to meaning, against approaches in semantics that presuppose them, notably those of C.W. Morris, A. Tarski, and R. Carnap, which divide 'semiotics' or 'semantics' into syntax (intra-linguistic relations), semantics (narrower sense: denotation, reference), and pragmatics (use). Third, Thiselton criticises ideational theories of meaning for grounding meaning in the relationship between words, concepts, and the objects to which both words and concepts 'refer'. Drawing on the later Wittgenstein, this presupposes too sharp a division between language and thought. Drawing on D.M. High, we do not always experience a mental 'motion picture' parallel to speech. Further, there are no 'causal links' between extra-linguistic objects, mental concepts, and linguistic symbols. Thiselton concludes, contrary to C.K. Ogden, I.A. Richards, and others, that approaches in semantics presupposing ideational theories inherit all the problems of referential theories and add the further difficulty of a 'mentalist' approach. Fourth, Thiselton rejects positivist (cf. 'logical', 'empiricist') approaches since they presuppose referential or ideational theories of meaning. Contrary to G.E. Moore, B. Russell, and the Vienna Circle, meaning cannot be restricted to empirical facts and tautologies. Although A.J. Ayer also allowed potentially verifiable statements to have meaning, his verifiability criterion was seen as empiricist 'special pleading', failing to have 'meaning' on its own terms. After H.J. Paton, Ayer's stance was merely scepticism in linguistic dress. Thiselton has some sympathy with A. Flew's falsification principle - there are empirical or cognitive aspects of meaning in some religious utterances. Discerning the meaning of 'God is love' requires

376. Thiselton, 'Language and Meaning in Religion', 1136.
different criteria, however. Generally, in Thiselton’s view, referential, ideational, and positivist approaches tend to wrongly disparage imagery relative to so-called ‘literal’ discourse. Along with ‘natural’ approaches, they also tend to wrongly argue that revising Christian vocabulary is the solution to the problem of the intelligibility of religious language in the modern setting.

In his paper, ‘Tongues’ (1979), Thiselton concludes that tongues cannot mean ‘foreign languages’. ‘Tongues’ has neither the ‘surface-structure’ of language, nor the ‘symbolic code of a linguistic deep-structure’. However, Thiselton does not read Paul as advocating the abolition of tongues.

2. Thiselton tests, and thereby dialogically validates, his later-Wittgensteinian-Saussurian alliance by putting it to positive use in biblical interpretation and practical theology. Thus, first, he combines appeals to the synchronic-diachronic distinction with appeals to semantic ‘vagueness’ in his paper on 1 Corinthians 5:5 (1973). Second, in 1974, Thiselton appeals to semantic opposition and synonymy in regard to preaching, lecturing, and Bible study. Third, also in 1974, Thiselton combines appeals to Pannenbergian futurity, to polymorphous concepts, ambiguity and vagueness, and to later Wittgensteinian and general linguistic critiques of ‘meaning’ in relation to ecumenical issues. Fourth, in 1978, Thiselton combines an appeal to the synchronic-diachronic distinction with an appeal to J. Barr’s comments on ‘etymologising’ and the separation of arbitrary surface-structure from notions of ‘national’ thought. Fifth, in 1979, Thiselton applies Saussure’s synchronic-diachronic distinction with

respect to authorial, linguistic, socio-historical-situational, inter-authorial and inter-textual, literary, and anthropological considerations in his paper on 'tongues'.

3. Thiselton tests, and thereby dialogically validates, his later-Wittgensteinian-Saussurian alliance by using it to expose flaws in the 'Heideggerian-Gadamerian' tradition of language-study, whilst still drawing positively on that tradition. By 1977, as noted earlier, Thiselton stressed that dialogue with a third tradition of language-study was required - that of Heidegger and Gadamer extending discussion beyond later Wittgensteinian and Saussurian traditions. Nevertheless, Thiselton's response to the Continental tradition is mixed. In particular, against Continental thought, Thiselton reinstates assertions and critical testing where, "interpretation must be creative, but also faithful and true". He retains the "theoretical, objective, and assertive side of language" which neither reflects a "derivative mode of interpretation" (contra Heidegger) nor "one of the relativities embraced by language's relation to the world" (contra Gadamer). For Thiselton, Continental linguistic dualism privatises language so that it cannot be tested against a "public criterion of language intelligibility". However, all language, including religious language, relates "to human life in a public and observable way". This contradicts J. Barr's claim that Thiselton accepts the New Hermeneutic "quite cordially". Further, whilst H.C. White argues that, for Thiselton, insights from Austin and Wittgenstein complement those drawn from E. Fuchs, the reverse is the case. Crucially, Thiselton's responses to Heidegger, Bultmann, Gadamer, and the New Hermeneutic turn on the question of whether each manifests resonance or dissonance with the later Wittgenstein.


387. Thiselton, 'Language and Meaning in Religion', 1123; cf. 1140-1142 (Saussure and general linguistics); cf. 1130-1135 (later Wittgenstein and Anglo-American linguistic philosophy); cf. 1137-1140 (Continental tradition of Heidegger, Bultmann, Gadamer, Fuchs and Ebeling).


Hence, first, Thiselton, finding parallels in the later Wittgenstein (see above), affirms Heidegger for grounding language in human activity, relating meaning to horizontal concerns and not to abstract 'naked, present-at-hand objects'. Heidegger rightly argues that language-habits condition, but do not totally determine, world-view, since language-uses are open-ended towards future experience. Thus, "only... the temporality of discourse... can... make the possibility of concept-formation... intelligible". Heidegger also rightly bemoans Western technological, functional, and conceptual trivialisation and compartmentalisation of language for use as a mere tool, since this destroys our authentic relation to things, in a "progressive mutilation" of language. Whilst acknowledging 'creative' eventful language and adapting Heidegger's notion of 'world', however, Thiselton argues that Heidegger's view of language is too like 'word-magic' (i.e. a 'natural' view of language), and too disparaging of cognitive dimensions (e.g. assertions). Heidegger sets up a false antithesis or 'dualism' between a disparaged so-called 'ideational' dimension of language and a promoted so-called 'dynamic' dimension of language, viewing "assertion as a derivative mode of interpretation".

Second, in Thiselton's view, Bultmann, like the later Wittgenstein (see above), rightly rejects abstract treatments of language. How a text is understood or questioned relates to a reader's 'pre-understanding': "the presupposition of understanding is the life-relation of the interpreter to the subject matter". However, Thiselton argues that Bultmann's three approaches to myth are tied to false views of language. Thus, (i), Bultmann complains that New Testament writers uncritically use

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396. Thiselton, 'Language and Meaning in Religion', 1127 (para. 3); cf. 1131 (para. 2); cf. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 400-401.
'mythical' imagery to express the other-worldly in terms of this world: "some... representations are mutually disharmonious". But this confuses myth and analogy, and New Testament writers competently employ a necessary diversity of analogies, models, and metaphors. (ii) In Bultmann's view, New Testament writers subscribed to the mythical "world-view of a pre-scientific age" which needs to be stripped away to reveal the real Kerygma: their world-view was "not yet formed by scientific thinking". But this presupposes too sharp a distinction between 'thought' and 'linguistic form'. The New Testament is not a decipherable code to be discarded but an indispensable 'masterpiece' inviting endless visits (Thiselton cites I. Henderson). (iii) In Bultmann's view, myth concerns self-understanding and not "an objective picture of the world", not wanting "to be interpreted in cosmological terms but in anthropological terms". But, drawing on the later Wittgenstein and Austin, eschatological language is both descriptive and self-involving.404

Third, in Thiselton's view, Gadamer, like the later Wittgenstein (see above), rightly acknowledges the open-ended futurity of language, distinctions between use, form, and content, and the way in which language-habits condition, without totally determining, thought and world-view.405 Citing Gadamer, "tradition does not limit the freedom of knowledge but makes it possible".406 Thiselton also adapts Gadamer's notions of the 'fusion of horizons' and "common world". And yet, like Heidegger, Gadamer's approach falls victim to 'word-magic' - disparaging cognitive dimensions of language (e.g. assertions)407 - where, "whoever has language 'has' the world".408

Fourth, in Thiselton's view, Fuchs and Ebeling, like the later Wittgenstein (see above), rightly urge that language does not merely 'inform', or 'convey concepts', but acts creatively on hearers. The New Testament does not just speak 'about', but functions as part of, God's 'love' or 'salvation', and is not merely sifted into pre-conceived concepts by detached observers. Thus, parable language potentially draws readers into Jesus' world, impacting them deep down through language-events, transforming


their horizons. And yet, the problems of ‘word-magic’ and the disparagement of the creative role of cognitive dimensions of language remain. The New Hermeneutic is only of use for some parts of the New Testament.

7. Concluding Comments: Theoretical Construction towards A Unified Critique of Language by Appeal to Thiselton’s Formative Work

In conclusion, Thiselton’s critique of language functions as philosophical description to help clarify a prior ‘biblical and theological account of language’. Yet, it also finds its ontological ground in history, eschatology, and Christology. Thus a dialogue between theology and philosophy exists at the level of theoretical-construction in Thiselton’s work. Consistently, Thiselton’s appeal to the later Wittgenstein resonates with theology, eschatology, a hermeneutic of tradition, a historical grounding of language, ‘religious’ language, and biblical interpretation. Thus, ‘theological hermeneutics’ and ‘philosophical hermeneutics’ are mutually dialogically ‘warranted’. Thiselton critically allies appeals to the later Wittgenstein and the philosophy of language, and to Saussure and general linguistics. Within this alliance, the Saussurian tradition is mildly qualified by appeals to the later Wittgenstein, ensuring the unity of Thiselton’s critique of language. Thiselton then dialogically validates his unified critique of language through critical testing. Applying the alliance, Thiselton finds ‘natural’, ‘referential’, ‘ideational’, ‘dualistic’, ‘traditional’, and/or ‘positivist’ approaches to language and meaning inadequate whilst, elsewhere, Thiselton applies his alliance positively in biblical studies and practical theology. ‘Dualistic’ approaches include those of the Continental hermeneutical traditions, though Thiselton also seeks to draw positively from the latter. Thus, Thiselton does not simply combine “postmodernist notions of language with more traditional representational perspectives”.

This analysis has implications, however. That Thiselton continues to use Continental terminology (i.e. ‘horizons’, ‘world’, ‘fusion’ etc.) given his thoroughly mixed response to the Continental tradition means that the grammar of this terminology is no longer that of their ‘home’ language-games. Moving beyond holding traditions in tension towards critical synthesis, Thiselton reinstates subject-object conceptualisation, transmitted truth-criteria, the creative function of certain assertions, and the

ontological priority of history over language. 412 As we argue below Thiselton also, in effect, transposes the Heideggerian categories of historicality, futurity, intention, possibility, and potentiality into an eschatological framework of promise. 413 Admittedly, Thiselton is still holding traditions in tension to an extent, reflecting his programmatic approach (some of the critical synthesis is inevitably ours). 414 Further, it is difficult to improve on Continental terminology. Yet, the grammatical changes implicit in Thiselton’s critical synthesis require more explicit demarcation, where a partly parallel but much less significant argument could perhaps be offered with respect to Thiselton’s use of Wittgensteinian terminology, such as ‘language-games’. This would liberate Thiselton from being caricatured as ‘Pannenberian’, ‘Gadamerian’, or even ‘Wittgensteinian’. 415

We should also add that, whilst Thiselton emphasises the role of language study with respect to clarifying textual horizons, 416 he also links language study to the elucidation of readers’ pre-understandings. 417 Readers’ pre-judgements (cf. ‘scaffolding’ 418) and questions are interwoven with, if not absolutely determined by, the language-habits of the traditions in which they are situated. Hermeneutics and translation concern both sets of horizons. 419 Thus, language study is part of ‘the grammar of hermeneutics’ (our phrase): 420 Thiselton addresses “the multiform problem of the relation of language to understanding”. 421

Finally, in the light of our exposition, Thiselton’s approach to language has not been properly expounded in the literature. The Continental traditions to one side, sometimes only Thiselton’s indebtedness to the later Wittgenstein is noted. 422 Others only note his indebtedness to the later

412. Also drawing on Chapter 3.
413. cf. Heidegger, Being and Time, 424-455; cf. 437; cf. 279-311; cf. 312-348.
415. cf. Chapter 3 and the present chapter.

More seriously, several commentators over-emphasise the later Wittgenstein's importance for Thiselton, when the later Wittgenstein is most important only in Thiselton's critique of language. As we saw in Chapter 3, Wittgenstein's role in Thiselton's critique of epistemology is only secondary. Further, as R. Papaphilippopoulos and R.W.L. Moerby rightly note, Thiselton's theological framework is more fundamental than his appeal to the later Wittgenstein such that he does not fall into 'Wittgensteinian presuppositions', 'context-relativity of meaning', or 'perspectivism'. We may now turn to Thiselton's critique of Western culture.

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428. Metzger, 'Review of The Two Horizons', 208-211.
C. Dialogic Theory-Construction: Towards a Unified Critique of Western Culture

1. Thiselton’s Critique of Western Culture Only ‘Embryonic’ by 1980

Since Thiselton’s critique of Western culture only begins to reach maturity in the 1990s, we only explicate the critique at its embryonic ‘1980’ level here. Again, at the level of theory-construction, philosophy and theology are brought into dialogue. Further, importantly, the critique is not just socio-critical, but theorises about the relationships between culture and global history, tradition, historical conditioning, and speech-acts. Notably, Western culture, with its Enlightenment legacy, uniquely obscures the hermeneutical task itself.

2. Thiselton’s Dialogue between Theology and Philosophy: Six-Axis Critique

Thus, first, Thiselton views Western culture as ‘part’ of a larger provisional frame-of-reference, namely global history unfolding towards the eschatological ‘history-as-a-whole’. Therefore, Western culture must be evaluated through as wide a historical dialogue as possible with other cultures, traditions, religions, philosophies, and so on - for God makes himself known through history.

Second, with Moltmann, Thiselton argues that Western culture must be subjected to a socio-critique of traditions and human experience. With Heidegger, Thiselton agrees, people require liberation from conventional determinism, where ‘truth’ may liberate people from external manipulation or self-deception. Thus, hermeneutics concerns how “our own cultural environment conditions... our

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344. Including The Two Horizons.

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words and... thinking”, 441 where the philosophy of language may, similarly, facilitate liberation. 442 Thiselton also applauds Tillich’s emphasis on understanding Western culture in the context of Church mission, 443 and asks, with E. Fuchs, “What does the Bible actually say to our own generation?” 444 (we noted Thiselton’s involvement in ‘Dialogue 77’ 445). Yet, the Church should also be subjected to tradition-criticism relative to biblical paradigms, 446 though ‘culture’ and ‘tradition’ are not synonymous for Thiselton. Thus, he contrasts ephemeral “cultural presupposition[s]” with the temporally continuous consciously thought-through ‘theological convictions’ of tradition, 447 and accidental ‘cultural’ linguistic ‘form’ with the trans-temporal language-habits of ‘tradition’. 448 (‘Tradition’ is not the major axis in Thiselton’s hermeneutics, but part of his critique of history (see chapter 6), qualifying Young Hwan Ra’s view). 449

Third, on the specifics of a socio-critique of Western culture, Thiselton contrasts the cosmological and corporate dimensions of eschatology 450 with Western individualism, 451 where African theologians rightly cite individualism and abstract theory as Western cultural ‘additions’ to the gospel. 452 Thiselton agrees with J. Miranda that Western Christians tend to read the Bible theoretically, neglecting practical questions. 453 Further, with Moltmann, Thiselton bemoans power abuse, depersonalisation and alienation in modern (especially Western) societies. 454 With M. Buber, Thiselton attacks the instrumentalisation of the ‘other’ as an ‘it’ and the reduction of persons to anonymous units of production, cogs in the economic machine, or ‘insignificants’ in a vast impersonal universe. 455 Thiselton also exposes problems behind contemporary relativism, “extreme pessimism”, and

443. Thiselton, ‘The Theology of Paul Tillich’, 104 (para. 3); cf. 105 (para. 1.2); cf. 87 (para. 5); cf. 88 (para. 1); cf. 89 (para. 2).
449. The conversation with Young Hwan Ra took place at the annual conference of the Society for the Study of Theology, 8th-11th April 2002, Lancaster University.
“scepticism about truth” in the West. Thus, (i) theories of truth have been transposed into “an entirely secular context”. (ii) German philosophical tradition since Kant has precipitated the “fragmentation of truth” over the issue of ‘objectifying’ thinking, generating a “mood of uncertainty”, and affecting Western theology, biblical studies, and culture more broadly. (iii) There is an “other-than-serious attitude to truth” pervading “mass advertising and party-political propaganda, through mass media”, an unredeemed and insecure “self-defensiveness and self-assertion” that “give rise to falsehood”, and a “pseudo-cynicism… which tries to ‘unmask’ everything”, believing “no-one… can genuinely lay claim to truth”. Thiselton, with Heidegger, also laments the seductive, trivial, manipulative, and relativised speech of mass advertising and social engineering and, with Kierkegaard and the later Wittgenstein, ‘unbacked’ irresponsible words that produce “circularity and… relativism” with “no anchorage in reality”. Positively, Thiselton urges, social ‘conventions’ may still rightly constrain individual freedoms. Again, contrary to Molmann, the Exodus message is not a call to “abandon existing structures… regardless of whether” they “may have built something worthwhile already”. “Capitalism”, combined with “compassion”, could be viable. Finally, Thiselton rejects unduly defensive, obscurantist, anti-scholarly, anti-intellectual or “anti-cultural” pietism and fundamentalism.

Fourth, Thiselton argues that Western culture uniquely obscures hermeneutical understanding, and must be critiqued. Thiselton rejects ‘Enlightenment’ approaches to history, epistemology, language, and interpretation, and still remains critical of Continental alternatives. With Fuchs and Ebeling,
understanding is not just a matter of applying ‘rules’ akin to ‘scientific method’. At best, ‘method’ only prevents false understanding; at worst it imposes prior alien categories onto the text. Understanding involves both ‘comparison’ and intuitive or ‘divinatory leaps’ into the hermeneutical circle; it is an art, and not just scientific.

Fifth, Thiselton argues that Western culture conditions the pre-understandings (cf. pre-judgements, ‘scaffolding’) of modern reading communities. Eliminating the modern context is impossible. Thus, (β), Western culture and traditions transmit and condition reader pre-judgements through ‘effective history’ and language-habits. After the New Hermeneutic, Thiselton acknowledges that readers’ attitudes and unconscious assumptions, being shaped by a changed situation and a long historical “tradition of biblical interpretation”, are very different to those of the New Testament. (ii) Negatively, pre-understandings may hinder genuine understanding and communication, as when a modern reader inadvertently reverses a parable’s intended function by tearing parable language out of its ‘home’ language-game and re-embedding it within modern categories. Therefore, Thiselton argues, the “tyranny of pre-understandings” must be challenged through proper engagement with “the history of... fusions found in Christian tradition” to prevent Bible reading becoming domesticated, dull, or boring. Biblical texts must be understood relative to biblical public criteria of meaning, which need not presuppose that the latter are immediately acceptable or objectivistically accessible. Rather, understanding proceeds according to the hermeneutical circle (or ‘spiral’), whereby modern readers increasingly understand themselves as conditioned by Western culture. Thus, textual language is allowed to function performatively, potentially liberating readers from oppressive aspects of Western

cultural conditioning,476 challenging and revising readers’ initial questions.477 (iii) Positively, Thiselton argues, pre-understandings, prior ‘common understanding’, or ‘horizontal overlap’ between, say, biblical and modern horizons, are preconditional for understanding and communication. Western culture contributes to one end of a ‘hermeneutical arch’ between two sets of horizons.478 (iv) Therefore, to be transformed by biblical texts Western readers require awareness of how Western culture has conditioned them and contributed to the processes of understanding. After Bultmann, reader subjectivity cannot be silenced during understanding.479 When Thiselton asks, with Fuchs, “How does the message of the New Testament strike home today?” his answer involves understanding Western culture.480

Sixth, Western culture conditions contemporary speech-acts. We have already noted Thiselton’s grounding of language, linguistic structure, and meaning in historical life,481 traditions and public criteria,482 context of situation or Sitz im Leben,483 and horizontal (and hence culturally conditioned) concerns.484 Thus, meaning is not simply ‘culture-relative’ but rather, Thiselton argues, “both... Biblical paradigms and contemporary life-experience... form part of an over-arching frame of reference within which religious uses of language become intelligible”.485 Western culture only contributes to a diachronic ‘whole’ in relation to which past and present religious speech-acts have to be understood.


480. Thiselton, 'Post-Bultmannian Perspectives', 89 (para. 3).

481. Thiselton, Language and Meaning in Religion, 1123 (para. 1), 1129 (para. 2), 1130 (para. 3), 1131 (para. 2), 1143 (para. 3).

482. Thiselton, 'Language and Meaning in Religion', 1132 (para. 2); cf. 1134-1135.


Further, speech-acts and habits also condition, without totally determining, Western culture itself: the relationship between culture and language is dialogic. We may now turn to Thiselton’s ‘critique of the human self’.

D. Dialogic Theory-Construction: Towards a Unified Critique of the Self

1. Thiselton’s Critique of the Self a Little More Developed by 1980

Thiselton’s critique of the self reaches maturity in the 1990s, but is already quite developed by 1980. Below, we offer a ‘snap shot’ of the critique in 1980, though we defer treatment of Thiselton’s appeal to Heidegger in *The Two Horizons* until Chapter 6. Again the unity of the critique reflects a widened dialogue between philosophy and theology, as follows.

2. Thiselton’s Dialogue between Theology and Philosophy: Five Axis Critique

*First*, Thiselton rejects the tradition running through Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, and the Enlightenment: the self is neither an ahistorical, abstract, isolated, impersonal, static amalgamation of *a priori* generalising ‘fixed properties’ nor split into soul-body, mind-body, reason-body dualisms, nor considered individualistically. Thiselton also rejects notions of ‘general humanness’ in the later Schleiermacher and Dilthey and the reductionism and determinism of ideological structuralism. Everything cannot be reduced to a self-referencing system of differential relations; thought does not consist of timeless, universal, natural, structures; and theology, existential uniqueness, and openness towards the eschatological future cannot be dismissed.

*Second*, Thiselton considers ‘situatedness’ and its implications. Thus, (i), selves are ‘situated’ within a larger theological-eschatological framework into which the personal sovereign God acts, shaping

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486. Thiselton, ‘Language and Meaning in Religion’, 1127 (para. 3); cf. 1131 (para. 2).
488. Thiselton, *Two Horizons*, 143-204.
history according to divine promise. Biblical apocalypse warns of an objective eschatological consummation, extending beyond Church and individual in its cosmic, corporate, scope, and including both divine judgement and the fulfilment of a Kingdom of love. Against this backdrop, human subjects are fragile, weak, fallible, finite in their creatureliness (cf. ‘flesh’), responsible, accountable, and unable to control their own destinies. The larger narrative of Hebrew-Christian tradition, with its temporal contrast between ‘now’ and ‘not yet’, situates all ‘human stories’, and precludes ‘over-realised eschatology’. (ii) Selves are also ‘situated’ within larger socio-historical, traditional, cultural frameworks, being historically and linguistically conditioned at a predominantly pre-conscious level. Traditions condition the pre-judgements (cf. presuppositions, pre-understanding, ‘world’, ‘horizons’, ‘scaffolding’), and language-games (cf. ‘-habits’, ‘-settings’) of selves. Heidegger’s notion of precognitive ‘worlds’ is prior to, and yet encompasses, subjective and objective dimensions, and interweaves language, thought, life, understanding, conduct, attitudes, assumptions, experiences, concerns, and reactions, being primarily linguistic. Thiselton implicitly qualifies Heidegger’s notion, however, to include subject-object conceptualisation, as already noted - also aligning with the later Wittgenstein’s less individualistic notion of ‘language-games’ in which


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'surroundings', action, language, and thought remain interwoven. 499 'Worldhood' and 'language-games' are partly parallel but not identical concepts. 500 (iii) 'Situatedness' precludes objectivism and subjectivism in favour of 'historical rationality'. Our 'worlds', 'horizons', 'conceptual frameworks' - from within which we employ rationality - are shaped by God, traditions, language-habits, shared pre-judgements, and horizontal concerns. 501 The sociality of language means that 'world' and 'horizons' are always already partly shared, and not entirely 'private'. The individual self is not the sole epistemological arbiter - since theological, eschatological, socio-historical, and linguistic 'situatedness' in traditions contribute to the shape of selves. 502 (iv) 'Situatedness' ensures that selves are always already acted upon from 'beyond' the horizons of the self, experiencing divine or others' creative action in encounter, address, challenge, and transformation, whether individually or corporately. Divine promise-fulfilment or speech-action, being loved by another, or being creatively grasped deep down at the pre-conscious level of values, presuppositions, or dispositions by art, games, or texts are examples. 503 Divine or others' speech-action potentially involves the hearers' whole person. 504 Contrary to L. Langsdorf's reading, others' speech-actions need not necessarily affect us mechanically.


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or causally in Thiselton's view. In 'openness' readers may allow a text to re-shape their horizons. Further, illocutions are only effective if certain states of affairs are true. Yet, language may 'trick' the reader into self-involved response through its pre-cognitive operation. Langsdorf, however, over-emphasises the cognitive, conscious aspect of understanding.

Third, Thiselton's critique of selves therefore dialogues between philosophy and a theology of creation where selves are of great worth, being created in God's Image. Thus, (i), by creation, selves are uniquely personal and vocationally gifted 'existential' individuals, each having a unique story and history distinguishable linguistically only by the particularising language of historical narrative. Narrative uniquely portrays unique personhood personally, uniquely involving readers. Thus, unique divine or human personhood in the biblical writings is not portrayed by mere information, general truths, or abstract treatise, but by narrative. With W. Hordern, one does not 'fall in love' with a general class, 'male' or 'female', but with a particular individual. Persons are not amalgamations of 'fixed' properties, impersonal 'types', 'categories', 'classes', standardising rules, principles, or universal maxims. (ii) By creation, selves have 'valued physicality' (cf. 'flesh') or concrete embodiedness - conceived individually and in relation to gender, where Thiselton's appeals to P.F. Strawson's 'M' (material-bodily) and 'P' (personal) predicates. 'Incarnation' unites mutually interpreting word and deed: obedience is not an 'inner' 'psychological reality' or 'private' affair, but a consequence-laden commitment to public-sphere action. Embodiedness also shapes phonetic repertoires. (iii) By creation, selves exhibit creative, self-involving decision and active agency - individually and corporately - whether as response to God or others, or as initiative, where Thiselton notes corporate language-construction and individual speech-action. (iv) By creation, selves exhibit temporality, being


activated from ahead by the unfinished, the unexpected, the ideal, or by promise. Heidegger’s notions of ‘historicality’, ‘futurity’, ‘intention’, ‘possibility’, and ‘potentiality’ are transposed into an eschatological framework of promise, thereby changing their grammar. Openness to the eschatological future liberates selves from conventional determinism.\(^5\) By creation, selves possess an ‘unconscious’ (cf. ‘pre-conscious’, ‘heart’), the locus of existential forces, strong feelings (e.g. fears, yearnings), and ‘moods’. Shared conceptualities (cf. ‘scaffolding’), ideologies, pre-judgements, ‘worlds’, ‘horizons’, pre-understandings, ways of asking questions, language-games, orientations, attitudes, perspectives, dispositions, and concerns are largely unconsciously inherited from traditions. Engaging with texts or others may transform the unconscious.\(^6\) By creation, selves function pre-reflectively, pre-cognitively, or pre-philosophically at the level of life-experience, reflexivity, or ‘living-through’, as when reading a novel or playing a game. This involves both unconscious and conscious aspects of subjectivity.\(^7\) By creation, selves consciously reflect, exercising ‘historical rationality’, though this Thielson appropriates the Continental contrast between ‘self-consciousness’ or self-awareness and ‘self-understanding’.\(^8\) By creation, the various characteristics of selves are


interwoven in Thiselton's concept of the 'whole person'. By creation, selves are social, relational, inter-subjective, and corporate, fulfilling their individuality or 'wholeness of personhood' in sociality, relationality, communication, and institution. Buber, argues Thiselton, whilst still too individualistic, rightly stresses the lived-out person-to-person encounter of 'I-Thou' dialogue in which the other is treated as a 'Thou' rather than instrumentalised and depersonalised as an 'it'. 'I-Thou' relationality, modelled by God as Trinity, Christ, and evident in the biblical writings, involves vulnerability, mutuality, reciprocity, dialogue, presence, listening, and giving and receiving. By creation, subjectivity is involved in inter-subjective understanding. After Heidegger, 'understanding' is a fundamental mode of existence for selves (see Chapter 6). After Bultmann, subjectivity is largely pre-consciously involved (not 'consciously silenced') in understanding at the level of worlds, horizons, presuppositions, pre-understandings, and questions (see Chapter 5). With Gadamer, unconscious pre-judgements are more fundamental for understanding and for human identity than conscious judgements (see Chapter 6). After Wittgenstein, selves 'see as' according to prior 'training' (see above). Thus subjectivity, in understanding and communication, shares a prior common or mutual world, horizon, language-community, language-game, pre-understanding, agreement, empathy, involvement, or Einverständnis with the speaker or writer at a predominantly pre-conscious, pre-cognitive, life-experiential eventful level. This contrasts with the later Schleiermacher and Dilthey, who emphasise conscious imagination and rapport, and with traditional emphases on conscious, cognitive exchange of language. With Bultmann, understanding presupposes a pre-existing "life-

1); cf. 1126 (para. 2); cf. 1127 (paras. 2,3); cf. 1129 (para. 2); cf. 1130 (para. 2,3); cf. 1131 (paras. 1,2); cf. 1132 (paras. 2,3); cf. 1134 (para. 3); cf. 1134-1135; cf. 1135 (paras. 2,3,4); cf. 1137 (para. 2); cf. 1138 (para. 1); 1140 (para. 1); cf. 1143 (para. 3); cf. Thiselton, 'Age of Anxiety', 601-602; cf. Thiselton, 'Post-Bultmannian Perspectives', 88 (para. 5); cf. 89 (para. 3,4,5); cf. Thiselton, 'Structuralism and Biblical Studies', 329-335; cf. Thiselton, 'Review of The Structural Revolution', 248; cf. Thiselton, 'The Interpretation of Tongues', 23-24; cf. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 3-10, 445.
513. Thiselton, 'Post-Bultmannian Perspectives', 89 (para. 5); cf. Thiselton, 'Language and Meaning in Religion', 1123-1124; cf. Dilthey, Selected Works 1, 80-81.
relation" between the interpreter's subjectivity and textual "subject-matters".516 We address the involvement of subjectivity in the hermeneutical circle in Chapter 5.

Fourth, for Thiselton, selves participate in, and are afflicted by, evil, sin, and divine judgement, whether individually or corporately. Thus, (i), Thiselton relates the biblical notion of the 'heart', as 'seat of evil', to the unconscious, as locus of existential forces (fears, yearnings), chaotic lawlessness, self-deception, counterfeit 'image' construction, and potential mental illness (we need not revisit Thiselton's response to Freud - see Chapter 3). Theological criteria are required to distinguish genuine experience of God from unconsciously generated experience.517 (ii) As Thiselton notes, Paul sometimes uses the term 'flesh' to denote sinful hostility to God as a mode of existence (not necessarily 'overt public behaviour', not a quasi-Platonic 'territory' within human 'nature'). 'Flesh', or 'selfishness', is multiform, but includes pro-active self-assertion and avoidant self-defensiveness. Citing Bultmann, Thiselton agrees that 'flesh' can denote "trust in oneself as being able to procure life by use of the earthly and through one's own strength and accomplishment" in independence from God. Self-sufficiency, self-reliance, self-definition, self-orientation, and self-actualisation are related notions. 'Flesh' can also denote self-righteous substitution of one's own rights and wrongs for God's law, or a futile attempt to obey God's law apart from God's grace in Christ.518 (iii) We need not repeat Thiselton's critique of Western culture corporately.519 (iv) For Thiselton, sin results in suffering or evil, notably predicament, estrangement, longing, anguish, alienation, isolation, loneliness, insecurity, loss of self-respect, escapist delusion, and crisis through adverse psychological, social, or even demonic pressures. Thiselton agrees with J.W. Wenham that there is no comprehensive, water-tight, neatly-packaged system of answers that adequately addresses the moral difficulties of the Bible or the


problem of evil.520 (i) Commenting on divine judgement, Thiselton notes sin’s consequence of vanishing possibilities culminating in death. Divine eschatological verdicts unveil all disguises, deceits, and misunderstandings and judgement may, as in Pannenberg, partly consist of the final consequences of being left to the desires of our own hearts.521 J. Osei-Bonsu argues that, for Thiselton, “punishment of the sinner [in 1 Cor. 5:5] may or may not have included physical suffering”.522 For Thiselton, though, God judges the “incestuous man’s... complacent self-sufficiency, not his physical body”.523

*Fifth*, Thiselton emphasises redemption. Thus, (i), selves are acted upon from beyond their situatedness by divine loving, saving action. Both Christian and Church are ‘made’ or transformed by divine speech-action, in part through biblical writings liberated by hermeneutics, as in Fuchs, to ‘strike home afresh’ in interpreters’ worlds, drawing them into biblical worlds, and exposing truth, lies, and falsehood, and consecrating interpreters to authentic, health-giving existence.524 As in Tillich, symbols may help integrate a person, evoking responsive echoes from the unconscious.525 As in Ricoeur, the Old Testament Exodus narrative may assist the reader’s own existential lived-through wandering from captivity to deliverance.526 As in Fuchs, the Gospel strikes home in interpreters’ horizons, taking hold of and actively transforming interpreters, enabling them to see differently.527 Thus, in Jesus’ parables, Jesus accounts for, creates, and enters the hearers’ world, horizons, and interests, but draws them into his world, inviting them to share in his life, attitudes, reactions, and perspectives at both pre-cognitive and cognitive levels. Hearers are thus grasped or taken hold of ‘deep down’, and their horizons are impacted and shattered such that they experience disorientation, discovery, or transformation.528 Thus, a hearer may find in the Bible all that is needed for salvation.529 (ii) Selves, being saved by God, experience the cleansing event of coming to the end of oneself and casting oneself on God alone,530

529. Thiselton, ‘Understanding God’s Word Today’ (Longer Article), 99-101, cf. 104, cf. 120.
becoming a ‘new creation’. As in A. Schweitzer, Paul’s notion of ‘being-in-Christ’ denotes the mystical relationship between Christ and believers prior to all other relationships. As in Buber’s notion of ‘I-Thou’ relationality, God evaluates, encounters, loves, names, and addresses the believer. The believer (not a mere case or number), receives full dignity and the only stable guarantee of personhood in this relationship of reciprocity and mutual presence in which she or he responds uniquely and personally to God as a ‘Thou’ in address, trust, and obedience. As in Schweitzer, Paul’s notion of ‘being-in-Christ’ involves sharing in the death and resurrection of Jesus. Thus, believers live in two eras - that of the visible natural world and that of the hidden Kingdom already inaugurated in Christ’s resurrection. Believers look back to redemption and forwards to future deliverance, implying a temporal contrast. Believers also receive the verdict ‘sinful’ in the historical juridical context, but receive the verdict ‘righteous’ in the eschatological context of justification (see Chapter 3). Believers also participate in two modes of existence - the ‘natural’ mode (cf. ‘flesh’) and the ‘Kingdom’ or ‘resurrection’ mode (cf. ‘spirit’). Life ‘in the Spirit’ involves an already inaugurated transformation in which believers are helped to sit loose to the sensuous, sinful, self-centred, transient world and adopt the ethical response of love. Finally, believers experience both suffering (even eschatological tribulation) and consolation (even eschatological glory). (iii) Thiselton develops the ‘now’ versus ‘not yet’ temporal contrast of Pauline promissory eschatology in terms of responsibility and freedom. Believers, belonging to the Kingdom era in which promise-fulfilment has already begun but is not yet complete, are under the freedom-constraining imperative of building towards the same eschatological goals as the Spirit who transforms them. Yet believers, still belonging to the natural era, remain under the freedom-constraining imperatives of corporate conventions. Therefore, ‘liberation’ cannot be conceived as Kantian individualistic ethical autonomy or as Heideggerian ‘possibility’. Rather, promise and responsibility qualify futurity and possibility. (iv) Regarding the believer’s ‘life in

532. Thiselton, ‘Schweitzer’s Interpretation of Paul’, 134 (para. 2).
534. Thiselton, ‘Schweitzer’s Interpretation of Paul’, 133 (para. 3); cf. 134 (para. 3).
535. Thiselton, ‘Schweitzer’s Interpretation of Paul’, 133 (para. 6); cf. 134 (paras. 3,7); cf. 135 (para. 1).
537. Thiselton, ‘Schweitzer’s Interpretation of Paul’, 133 (para. 7); cf. 134 (paras. 1,4); cf. 135 (para. 2).
538. Thiselton, ‘Schweitzer’s Interpretation of Paul’, 134 (para. 3).
the Spirit', Thiselton urges that Paul's notion of 'spirit' is not a quasi-Platonic territorial point of contact within human nature (cf. 'soul', 'mind', or 'inner life') for the work of the Holy Spirit. Rather, it signifies a mode of existence in alignment with the Holy Spirit's work in which the believer is given new desires, capacities, and horizons that begin to transcend sinful existence. Believers begin to experience liberation from the pre-conceptual conflicting forces and self-deceptions of the 'heart' or unconscious. Eschatologically, personhood is intensified and enriched, rather than dissolved, dispersed or transcended. The Holy Spirit creatively inspires understanding, and gives individuals gifts. 'Spirituality' recognises eschatological futurity, against enthusiastic over-realised eschatologies that over-stress present experience, fall into epistemological absolutism, conceive freedom as individualistic autonomy, or appeal to manipulative persuasive re-definition of terms.

For Thiselton, the Christian subject's 'life in the Spirit' is to be a life of faith, hope, love, and truth. We need not revisit Thiselton's points relating 'faith' (in one of its senses) to Paul's doctrine of justification or, with Molmann, to the eschatological promissory contrast between 'now' and 'not yet'. For Thiselton, 'faith' is polymorphous - though, as B.M. Metzger notes, faith in an important sense is broadly an entailment of "being united with Christ as part of the new creation". Nor is it necessary to revisit Thiselton's appeal to Pannenberg in relation to hope. Neither 'faith' nor 'hope' are wholly passive, or individualistic. For Thiselton, 'life in the Spirit' also involves loving self-involvement in fully inter-personal transparent relationships in contrast to manipulative deception,


455. Thiselton, 'On the Logical Grammar of Justification in Paul', 495 (para. 2); cf. 493 (para. 1); cf. Thiselton, 'The Use of Philosophical Categories', 90-91; cf. Thiselton, 'The New Hermeneutic', 324-325; cf. Thiselton, 'The Theology of Paul Tillich', 90 (para. 2.3); cf. 95 (para. 2); cf. 87 (para. 3); cf. 102 (para. 3); cf. Thiselton, Language, Liturgy and Meaning, 31-32; Thiselton, 'The Parousia in Modern Theology', 47, 48, 51-53.


concealment, and pietistic introspection - love and reconciliation are related. Earlier comments on Buber's 'I-Thou' dialogue need not be revisited, and we have already expounded Thiselton's notion of 'truth' as authentic human existence where Christ, as 'enfleshed Word', is the paradigmatic human being. 'Spirituality' backs or gives 'hard currency' to words in honesty, integrity, sincerity, transparency, and straightforwardness. Spirituality involves obedience to God, reverence for biblical truth, true speech, future-orientated commitment, faithfulness, and critical testing (including self-criticism) against theological and biblical criteria. 'Christ-crucified', as criterion, exposes false claims to apostolic authority. Spirituality employs mind and rationality to assess true versus false, correct versus incorrect, and authentic versus inauthentic against truth-criteria. With T.F. Torrance, spirituality includes 'readiness to submit all pre-conceptions to the test of truth'. Spirituality also distinguishes between 'spiritual' verdicts and 'natural' verdicts (cf. 'flesh'), though the latter are not all bad. Spiritual verdicts juxtapose thought, rational argument, a provisional biblical frame-of-reference, and the Holy Spirit's agency. We may now conclude the present chapter.

E. Concluding Comments: Towards Unified Hermeneutical Critiques of Language, Western Culture, and the Self through Dialogue between Philosophy and Theology

Having justified our approach in the present chapter - notably to philosophical description and theoretical construction - we moved on in our second section to expound Thiselton's hermeneutical critique of language. This has already been summarised above, where we highlighted the two-way


552. Thiselton, 'Truth', 883; cf. 884; cf. 885; cf. 886; cf. 887; cf. 892.

553. Thiselton, 'The Theology of Paul Tillich', 90 (para. 2.3); cf. 95 (para. 2); cf. 87 (para. 3); cf. 102 (para. 3); cf. Thiselton, Contribution to 'Flesh', 679-680; cf. Thiselton, 'The Parousia in Modern Theology', 47, 48, 51; cf. Thiselton, Post-Bultmannian Perspectives, 88 (para. 5); cf. 89 (para. 3); cf. Thiselton, Truth, 881; cf. 886; cf. 887; cf. 892.


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dialogue and mutually warranting resonances between theology and philosophy in Thiselton’s thinking, which were only validated further by the power of Thiselton’s critique of language to expose inadequacies in traditional and Continental views of language, and to solve problems in biblical interpretation and practical theology. Problems remained, however, over unmarked grammatical changes implicit in Thiselton’s continued use of Continental terminology. Finally, Thiselton’s critique of language had been inadequately interpreted in the literature.

In our third and fourth sections we expounded the relatively embryonic critiques of Western culture and the self in Thiselton’s formative work, showing dialogue between theology and philosophy to be present in both. In Thiselton’s critique of Western culture, the relatedness of ‘culture’ to tradition, historical conditioning, and speech-acts constituted theoretical axes of consideration that went beyond a simple emphasis on socio-criticism. Similarly, in Thiselton’s critique of the self, the issue of selves’ situatedness within a larger theological framework went beyond a mere psychosomatic focus on ‘subjectivity’ or even a socio-historical focus on ‘inter-subjectivity’ or ‘traditions’. Thus, we may conclude here that how theology and philosophy impinge on one-another powerfully affects how situatedness, subjectivity, inter-subjectivity, and traditions are conceived.

As anticipated, our exposition yielded at least ten points of contention with other Thiselton readers. Thiselton neither sits in ‘the intentionalist camp’ without qualification,556 nor neglects authorial intention.557 Thiselton’s appeals to Wittgenstein cohere with his theological framework,558 which is not marginalised.559 Thiselton is not simply ‘Wittgensteinian’. Nor does he fall into straightforward fideism, context-relativity, or ‘perspectivism’ on this basis. Some over-emphasise Wittgenstein’s importance for Thiselton, which is largely constrained to Thiselton’s critique of language.560 Thiselton does not espouse hermeneutics as a subset of literary criticism, but the reverse.561 Thiselton does not supplement insights from general linguistics with those from the philosophy of language, but the

reverse.\textsuperscript{562} Thiselton is not simply ‘Gadamerian’; nor does he accept the New Hermeneutic ‘quite cordially’. Rather, he is critical of Continental perspectives whilst still drawing positively on them.\textsuperscript{563} Thiselton’s is not primarily a ‘hermeneutics of tradition’.\textsuperscript{564} And he neither espouses an objectivistic view of the accessibility of biblical criteria,\textsuperscript{565} nor a ‘mechanical-causal’ view of the functioning of speech-acts.\textsuperscript{566}

Finally, the present chapter has strengthened the impression that Thiselton’s five major hermeneutical critiques (history, epistemology, language, Western culture, and the human self) are grounded Christologically and eschatologically. Failure to accept the necessity of these five ‘critiques’, according to Thiselton, is the problem with traditional hermeneutics, for example those of E.D. Hirsch.\textsuperscript{567} Further, we anticipate that failure to properly inter-relate or ontologically rank these five ‘critiques’, according to Thiselton, produces dualisms and dichotomies. Enter his critique of Continental hermeneutics.\textsuperscript{568} We also anticipate that failure to provide a larger framework of co-ordinates within which to properly inter-relate or rank these five ‘critiques’ may collapse them in on one-another. Enter Thiselton’s later critiques of post-structuralism\textsuperscript{569} and neo-pragmatic hermeneutics.\textsuperscript{570} Thus, we anticipate, Thiselton’s formative work connotes that Christology and eschatology provide a unifying yet tensorial (biology: ‘stretching’ muscle; mathematics: vector ‘direction’) ground for his five major hermeneutical critiques. That is, this ground stretches the five critiques apart sufficiently for mutual distinctiveness (contra uniformity, collapse into one-another, or imperialised extension of any given discourse), but only into an ordered, directed, arrangement of inter-relatedness with a specific

\textsuperscript{564} Qualifying verbal comments made by Young Hwan Ra at the annual conference of the Society for the Study of Theology, 8th-11th April 2002, Lancaster University.
\textsuperscript{566} Contradicting, Langsdorf, L., ‘Review-Article of R. Lundin’s, A.C. Thiselton’s and C. Walhout’s The Responsibility of Hermeneutics’, GTThReV 2 (Fall 1987), 152-154.
\textsuperscript{568} McHann Jr., The Three Horizons, 326; cf. Thiselton, New Horizons, 26; cf. 251; cf. 337; cf. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 301-302.
grammar (contra dichotomies or dualisms). These anticipations, if true, contribute towards warranting the inclusion of theological considerations in hermeneutics, providing a basis for critiquing hermeneutical traditions whilst still drawing positively from them. We aim to confirm these anticipations in Chapters 6 and 7.

571. Tulloch, S. ed., The Reader's Digest Oxford Wordfinder (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 1610. A 'tensor' is either "a muscle that tightens or stretches a part", or "a generalised form of vector involving an arbitrary number of indices". All vectors have direction. The term "tensorial" is the adjective given.
Chapter 5

Responsible Interpretation: Beyond Epistemology Towards a Unified Critique of Hermeneutical Understanding

A. Preliminary Comments: Responsible Interpretation

In this chapter we continue to respond to D. Olford's remark that, "Thiselton is so busy listening to and expounding the work of others, that it is very difficult to actually isolate his own thought".1 Similarly, S.W. Sykes requests that Thiselton "show us plainly the core of his argument".2 Allowing criticisms of Thiselton’s style up to a point, however, Thiselton’s thinking is further obscured by problematic readings of his work, as we will demonstrate in the remainder of this study.

We define Thiselton’s ‘third stratum’ conversation as his conceptualisation of responsible interpretation,3 including the hermeneutical task and the hermeneutical circle - his ‘critique of hermeneutical understanding’.4 This presupposes Thiselton’s ‘first stratum’ inter-disciplinary, dialogically warranted, grounding of hermeneutics in eschatology and Christology,5 and his ‘second

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stratum’ critiques of history, epistemology, language, Western culture, and the self. Thus, Thiselton’s theory aims at responsible interpretation. Thiselton’s ‘critique of hermeneutical understanding’ overlaps with, but goes beyond, his critique of epistemology. Thus, our focus in the present chapter on the hermeneutical circle in some senses continues our exposition in Chapter 3. Yet, questions alien to epistemology are also asked during interpretation - such as those relating to literary genre - taking us beyond epistemology.7

Thiselton’s ‘critique of hermeneutical understanding’ develops chronologically only slightly during his ‘second period’,8 introducing appeals to Ricoeur in his PhD thesis (1976),9 and in his response to structuralism (1978), noting the distinction between ‘understanding’ (more narrowly defined) and ‘explanation’.10 This aside, we can treat Thiselton’s work synchronically in the present chapter.

B. Historical Context and Motivation: Re-Addressing the Problem of Intelligibility across Historical Distance

Thiselton’s ‘critique of hermeneutical understanding’ is doubly premised upon the need to overcome the problem of biblical intelligibility across historical distance, and on the inadequacy of existing solutions to this problem.11 Thiselton stresses that since modern horizons are shaped by long


traditions of interpretation and by modern situations, then the original content, purpose, and function of the biblical message is often misunderstood, generating the concern: how can the biblical message 'strike home' today? Effective communication today demands that "the same thing must be said... differently". Thus, the question, "Can there be a fusion between... two horizons?... is the hermeneutical issue of the twentieth century".

However, Thiselton criticises several existing solutions to this problem. Thiselton bemoans the "unexamined philosophical presuppositions" and "philosophical naivety" of 'traditional' approaches to interpretation. Presupposing classical Platonic-Cartesian epistemology, these often reduce language to a propositional vehicle for transmitting thought-content, communication to a conscious exchange, understanding to subject-object conceptualisation, and interpretation to mere mechanical repetition of biblical language, prematurely appealing to the Holy Spirit's work, or to the Bible's capacity to interpret itself. Thiselton is certainly not "perpetuating a status quo".

Thiselton also rejects the approaches of E. Troeltsch and D.E. Nineham. Troeltsch imposes a modern, personal, horizon on the past. Nineham's pessimism over bridging historical distance presupposes a positivistic rejection of the 'supernatural' and a neglect of Continental hermeneutical traditions, where this persists in C.F. Evans' work. For Thiselton, however, "the problem of the pastness of the New Testament" should neither be ignored nor exaggerated. The New Testament is an "accessible source of authority".

Thiselton also rejects Bultmann's de-mythologising programme, which dominated biblical studies between the 1950s and the 1970s. Bultmann transposes biblical language into alien frameworks, out of the 'home' traditions that transmit the very public criteria that render it intelligible. Bultmann writes, "there is nothing specifically Christian about the mythical world picture" of the New Testament. However, for Thiselton, Bultmann creates misunderstanding, precipitates semantic distortion and inversion, falls foul of 'private' language arguments, and undermines the paradigms that authenticate the genuinely 'Christian'. Bultmann's substitution of modern paraphrase for biblical imagery misconstructs the relationship between language and thought, though he rightly argues that subjectivity, pre-understanding, and "consciousness of... pre-understanding" are necessarily involved in accurate interpretation: "no exegesis is without presuppositions". As S.M. Schneider writes, Bultmann's re-asking of "the hermeneutical question from the standpoint of contemporary philosophical thought and... historical consciousness" was of "real importance". Nevertheless, Thiselton argues, Bultmann's own pre-understanding is too narrowly (in our use of the term 'narrow') shaped by Neo-Kantian thought, a priori precluding certain interpretative possibilities. A much broader dialogue with philosophical traditions is required to allow the New Testament to speak more clearly in its own right. Bultmann's dialogue with W. Hermann and Heidegger is insufficiently broad in relation to "the problem of history and historicity", and collapses futural eschatology into 'realised' eschatology. Bultmann demonstrates "unwillingness to let his pre-understanding be...

challenged by the text". Thus, his hermeneutics becomes a threat to faith. Thiselton’s stress on philosophical dialogue, however, neither merely identifies nor “sort[s]... out” pre-understanding. Nor is it merely “inquiry concerning presuppositions”, but rather a refining and broadening of pre-understanding.

Whilst Thiselton agrees with the New Hermeneutic that hermeneutics needs to progress beyond historicism and Bultmann’s approach, he does not belong to, but moves beyond the New Hermeneutic, revising interpretation itself, not merely offering a “hefty apparatus” to yield minor adjustments in interpretative results. Thiselton argues, against Continental hermeneutics, that cognitive discourse, tradition, rational argument, linguistic content, and semantic and conceptual opposition remain important in relation to intelligibility. For Thiselton, intelligibility problems are overcome by highlighting the original frames of reference, or language-games and traditions, in which biblical language functions - i.e. by ‘watching how others play’. The need is to clarify correlations between situations, behaviour, and language in biblical 'language-games' against the background of the public criteria of meaning (including assertive language concerning events) embedded in biblical narratives. Such narratives disclose foundation events that are typologically and paradigmatically normative for the intelligibility and authentication of Christian language, religious experience, and identity. Again, Thiselton does not accept the New Hermeneutic “quite cordially” as J. Barr suggests, but appeals to the later Wittgenstein to counter its fact-value dualism: “the possibility of a language-game is conditioned by certain facts”. The New Hermeneutic, “and... the work of Funk, Via, and

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33. Contradicting, McNicol, ‘Review of The Two Horizons’, 188.
Crossan, is... one-sided”, too “subjective”, too “selective in its choice of texts”, and over-emphasises the ‘present’ versus the ‘past’. Thus, Thiselton responds to a “crisis in biblical studies”, but his response neither emphasises “compositional psychodynamics”, nor ‘structuralist’ solutions (we defer treatment of Thiselton’s response to structuralism until later in the present chapter).

Therefore, in effect, Thiselton argues for some kind of ‘transformed framework’ for hermeneutics at the level of philosophical subtext, though not necessarily on the scale of ‘paradigm-shifts’ as in science. We will examine Thiselton’s ‘transformed framework’ for hermeneutics in Chapter 6. We will demonstrate that many writers miss Thiselton’s argument for a ‘transformed framework’ for hermeneutics. Thiselton’s work is not “a monument to the conclusion of one stage in the hermeneutical debate”, but has a non-Bultmannian starting point. Thiselton does not “state a problem rather than solve it”. The Thiselton “reader” is not “left... to his own resources in formulating a solution to the [hermeneutical] problem”. Thiselton moves beyond “philosophical description of the understanding process”, and has neither merely demonstrated his “grasp of the hermeneutically significant literature”, nor simply shown that “an understanding of recent hermeneutics is necessary for modern biblical study”.

We will also demonstrate that other writers realise Thiselton offers something ‘new’, but misidentify it. Thiselton does not try to “cause a revolution in hermeneutics” merely by appeal to “the Tractatus and the Untersuchungen”. Thiselton’s new “proposal” is neither later Wittgensteinian “perspectivalism”, nor later Wittgensteinian ‘subjectivism’ grounded in a straightforward ‘fideism’, nor a “distillation of speech-act theory and Wittgensteinian philosophy”. F.H. Borsch believes that Thiselton’s work may well lead to a “paradigm-shift”, but still awaits a study presenting “more of [Thiselton’s] own approach”. W.W. Klein urges that, through Thiselton’s work, “hermeneutics has entered a new era”.

However, Thiselton does not simply offer "new rules", "guide-lines", "results, steps, or techniques".\(^{54}\) Nor is his later work "merely a matter of taming hermeneutical excesses".\(^{55}\)

Some writers speak of Thiselton's solution to the problem of intelligibility across historical distance in terms of a "new model for hermeneutics built upon the concepts of action and responsibility".\(^{56}\) Yet, as we shall see, in his 'second period' Thiselton revises the entire theoretical framework within which his later action model resides, attempting a "major step forward in hermeneutics" (N.B. Thiselton's 'action model' conceives authorial language-use and reading as actions, thus relating both to the same category).\(^{57}\) Thiselton does not appeal to his later action model to answer "all interpretative questions",\(^{58}\) querying L. Zuidervaart's reading.\(^{59}\) Indeed, Thiselton never simply presents "an argument for doing hermeneutics by the action model",\(^{60}\) as though this replaced "language as the locus of meaning".\(^{61}\) For Thiselton, action models cannot "obviate the need 'first and foremost to look at the text itself in its linguistic and historical particularity'.\(^{62}\) Thiselton, then, may not quite offer the "death and resurrection of hermeneutical practice" hoped for by V.S. Poythress,\(^{63}\) but does seek a transformed framework to go beyond the traditional, positivist, Bultmannian, and post-Bultmannian solutions to the problem of intelligibility across historical distance.

Three factors make the construction of a 'transformed framework' for hermeneutics an urgent task in Thiselton's thinking, where these have implications for how Thiselton understands the traditional notions of 'general' and 'special' or 'biblical' hermeneutics. First, Thiselton's assumption of the genuineness of biblical authority begins to emerge, in part, from the Bible's problem-solving capacity as it is progressively understood in widening dialogue with philosophical traditions. And, if it is really

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the genuineness of biblical authority that emerges, then the dialogue between the Bible and philosophy - unique to hermeneutics - needs urgent attention, not being left to languish in its present condition.\textsuperscript{64} Second, flawed hermeneutical theory and practice suppresses biblical content and function and hence suppresses God's Word. If biblical authority is genuine, then this 'suppression' urgently needs to be overcome.\textsuperscript{65} Third, if biblical theology helps us to understand hermeneutics itself, then the Bible needs to be understood urgently in order to refine the very interpretative strategies with which it, and other texts, are approached.\textsuperscript{66} For Thiselton "the problems addressed by philosophy and hermeneutics are issues raised by the [biblical] texts themselves".\textsuperscript{67} Thus, later, Thiselton argues that the \textit{biblical} principle of showing 'respect for the otherness of the given and giving Other' applies to \textit{all} interpretation.\textsuperscript{68}

Thus, in one sense, Thiselton's 'general' hermeneutic - his overhaul of Continental hermeneutics - attempts to be 'biblical'.\textsuperscript{69} Conversely, his 'biblical' or 'special' hermeneutic is not always 'general', partly because Thiselton rejects \textit{a priori} 'generalisation' (re. categories, textual models, notions of 'language', notions of 'truth', interpretative strategies, etc.). Thiselton's notion of a 'general' hermeneutic only applies to broad factors relating to most responsible interpretation of most texts - for example, the hermeneutical circle.\textsuperscript{70} Partly, Thiselton views the biblical texts as unique in their


\textsuperscript{65} Thiselton, 'Understanding God's Word Today' (Longer Article), 92-99.


potential functioning as divine speech-acts to ‘build’ Christians and the Church. Thus, we query R. Papaphilippopoulos’s later talk of Thiselton’s “desire to provide first a general... hermeneutic and then apply it to biblical texts”. We may now expound Thiselton’s ‘critique of hermeneutical understanding’.

C. Dialogic Theory-Construction: Towards a Unified Critique of Understanding as Responsible Interpretation

1. Thiselton on Involved Subjectivity: the Issues of Relativism, Solipsism, & Individualism

Thiselton argues that understanding involves human subjectivity without necessarily leading to absolute relativism or subjectivism, solipsism, or individualism. First, Thiselton affirms Bultmann’s stance that understanding presupposes a life-relationship between the interpreter’s subjectivity and textual subject-matter. Bultmann writes, “I understand a novel only because I know from my own life what is involved, for example, in love and friendship”. ‘Objectivity’ cannot be attained by ‘silencing’ subjectivity through a supposed “detached attitude” that appears ‘scientific’, since “pure” exegesis,


 uncontaminated by philosophical and theological presuppositions", is impossible, \(^{77}\) (cf. "fore-sight" in Heidegger, "pre-understanding" in Bultmann, and "prejudice" in Gadamer). \(^{78}\) Arguing otherwise evades one's own philosophical stance and pre-understanding, \(^{79}\) which then hinders understanding though, initially, pre-understanding constitutes an indispensable point of contact with the text. \(^{80}\) Thus, Thiselton argues, the hermeneutical circle begins with the modern horizon, but is not 'grounded' there. \(^{81}\) The "goal of interpretation" is not "to do something to the text, but... to let the text do something to the interpreter". \(^{82}\) Modifying the grammar of Bultmann's notion of pre-understanding, \(^{83}\) Thiselton argues that pre-understanding (cf. 'scaffolding', 'training', 'pre-judgements') need not embrace merely an uncritically accepted "present cultural framework" or language-game, but also theological criteria or the thought-through convictions of tradition as corporate rational responses to histories of effects. \(^{84}\)

Second, Thiselton argues that understanding, whilst conditioned by subjectivity, need not be completely relativistic or subjectivistic. \(^{85}\) Since the rise of historical consciousness, particularly Heidegger's work, some historical relativity is undeniable. Thiselton allows that historicality, linguisticality, and horizontal concerns condition understanding. \(^{86}\) With Heidegger, "historicality... is constitutive for Dasein's

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\(^{77}\) Conroy, 'Review of The Two Horizons', 563.


\(^{79}\) Erickson, 'Review of The Two Horizons', 372.


‘historizing’. 87 But, with Gadamer, the historically mediated unconscious pre-judgements (cf. ‘prejudices’) of tradition initially influence interpretation more than conscious judgements: “history does not belong to us; we belong to it”. Further, for Thiselton, Christological and eschatological revelation qualifies historical consciousness, de-centring individual subjectivity as the arbiter of truth. 88 Thus, absolute relativism and subjectivism, which imperialises ‘what is true for me’, and hand-to-mouth pragmatism, which imperialises ‘what works today’, are precluded. 89 Thiselton’s hermeneutical programme, then, is more a polemic against relativism and subjectivism, 90 against reducing the Gospel to self-understanding or to an anthropocentric ‘sell-out’. 91 Thiselton rejects E.D. Hirsch's view that acknowledging ‘present meaning’ engenders subjectivism. 92 Accepting “legitimate interpretative impediments” is not to leap to an “epistemological” stance, 93 and respecting both textual and reader horizons is not to grant them “equal respect” authoritatively. 94 Thiselton invokes the later Wittgenstein to reinstate assertions and public criteria (see Chapter 4), thereby avoiding “the trap of subjectivism and vacuous statements whereby faith has no content and revelation reveals nothing. Such a hermeneutic... privatises language and therefore cannot be subjected to testing or have public meaning”. 95 Conversely, however, Thiselton avoids objectivism, arguing that all interpretations are provisional on future confirmation, and ultimately on apocalyptic unveiling. 96 Thus, Thiselton allows room for “the hiddenness or non-demonstrability of faith and its ‘objects’”, 97 but not for evangelical authoritarian appeals to a block of revealed truth, enthusiastic over-certainty, or positivism. 98

87. Heidegger, Being and Time, 41.
Third, Thiselton argues that understanding, whilst conditioned by subjectivity, need not be solipsistic. Rather, understanding, as inter-subjective communication, (i), presupposes a prior shared ‘world’ (cf. *Einstimmlich*, ‘language-games’) that “provides and sustains” over-lapping horizons - such ‘overlap’, extended diachronically, constituting a ‘hermeneutical arch’. ‘World’ here may presuppose shared community, language, definitive settings of tradition, involvements, experiences, and attitudes (cf. E. Fuchs’ example of a close-knit family). Interpreters are not locked “into a localised ethnocentric world” since “inter-subjectivity reaches beyond particular communities”. Thus, contrary to R.A. Harrisville, Thiselton’s use of ‘world’ avoids “the solipsism lurking behind” Heidegger’s use: traditions and language-habits positively condition ‘worldhood’. Understanding, (ii), presupposes prior shared understanding (cf. pre-understanding) within such a ‘world’, including the thought-through convictions of tradition, as noted above. Nevertheless, (iii), understanding presupposes inter-subjective communication between existentially unique persons, rather than ‘general humanness’. (iv) Communication involves both the concrete, practical, pre-conscious, pre-cognitive, pre-conceptual, and experiential level of subjectivity (pre-judgements and attitudes) and the more abstract, theoretical, conscious, cognitive, conceptualising, reflective level. This corrects the later Schleiermacher’s and Dilthey’s over-emphasis on conscious rapport and imagination, and the under-emphasis and over-emphasis on conscious (e.g. ‘informing’) dimensions of communication by later Continental hermeneutics and traditional approaches respectively.

communication, presupposes address from beyond the horizons of the self, a reversal of interpretative direction limiting the role of subjectivity. Interpreters can be interpreted and transformed by divine speech-action through biblical texts, and ancient legal texts may lead modern lawyers to new applications. This presupposes openness, receptivity, listening, and waiting, and precludes conceiving interpretation merely as the active scrutiny and manipulation of passive texts in which information is sifted or ‘netted’ into pre-conceived categories by ‘detached’ observers. Understanding, (iv), conceived as inter-subjective communication, coheres with Thiselton’s later “model that locates texts in a nexus of responsible actions”, avoids the dichotomy between author- and reader-orientated approaches, grounds Thiselton’s critiques of Ricoeur, Barthes and Derrida, and potentially links “interpretation and composition theory”. Thus, understanding texts is inseparable from “the life of the communities that produce and read literature”.

Fourth, Thiselton argues that ‘understanding’, whilst conditioned by subjectivity, is not individualistic. For Thiselton, Gadamer rightly views “communal life and tradition”, not just “the existential nature of the individual”, as preconditional for understanding. Thus, “belonging to a tradition is a condition of hermeneutics”. Biblical interpretation is to be corporate, performed by the whole church community of tradition (young and professional alike) in dialogue with the full resources of scholarship. This aids faithfulness to the text, and avoids the pitfalls of individualistic interpretation. Pitfalls include anti-rational authoritarian interpretations, appeals to the Holy Spirit to justify absurd

beliefs, suppressing the dialogue that rationally justifies biblical cogency, appeals to a ‘self-authenticating’ Word, whimsical and arbitrary ‘private’ interpretations, narrow pietistic introspective obsession with inner states, and self-centred individualistic interpretations of the future or of the parousia. Yet, for Thiselton, the individual can still find all that is needed for ‘salvation’ in the Bible.\textsuperscript{113} Further, not all corporate interpretations are correct.\textsuperscript{114}

2. Understanding as a Progressive Process: The Hermeneutical Circle (or Spiral)

Thiselton argues that understanding proceeds according to an ongoing process, the hermeneutical circle (or spiral), displacing Cartesianism without disallowing subject-object conceptualisation itself.\textsuperscript{115} Interpretation is neither a once-for-all act of knowledge, nor capable of rendering final abstract formulations of truth, but involves continuous, progressive, dialogic movements within and between multiple polarities or axes.\textsuperscript{116} The superimposition of these axes constitutes a non-dualistic overall structure.\textsuperscript{117} We may expound Thiselton’s hermeneutical circle, as follows.

\textit{a) Historical-Experiential Understanding and Subject-Object Conceptualisation}

In Thiselton’s hermeneutical circle, there are continuous, progressive, dialogic movements between eventful historical-experiential understanding and critical subject-object conceptualisation, beginning with the latter. Creative (cf. ‘deep’) understanding and critical (cf. ‘correct’) understanding (cf. ‘testing’) - taken together as ‘understanding’ in its broadest sense - are interwoven aims for theologically and

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eschatologically framed ‘historical reason’ (see Chapter 3). Traditional imperialisation, or Continental disarray, of subject-object conceptualisation are both precluded.118

Picking up where we left off in Chapter 3, then Thiselton’s notion of historical-experiential or hermeneutical understanding, with Gadamer, constitutes the subjective, existential, self-involving ‘actualisation’ of the ‘effects’, or ‘truth’, of the eventful manifestation of reality, or of the eventful function of texts, engaging with the pre-cognitive ‘moods’, ‘attitudes’, and presuppositions of hearers’ hermeneutical worlds: “understanding is... participating in an event of tradition”. Interpretative openness, listening, and creative intuition, rather than theoretical reason alone, are pre-conditional for actualisation. Such ‘concrete’ understanding, presupposed in all effective communication, is initiated apart from abstract theorising. Gadamer’s examples of understanding art and playing games, Fuchs’ example of placing a mouse in front of a cat, Pannenberg’s notion of God’s ‘proving’ himself in contingent historical events, and M. Buber’s view of counselling are relevant here.119 Corporate actualisations, over time, constitute histories of ‘effects’ which are filtered through ‘effective history’ and contribute to the stable patterns of tradition. Effective history thus filters the judgements and pre-judgements of historically-grounded ‘practical rationality’ (see Chapter 3). Thiselton, as noted already, corrects Gadamer here: tradition may transmit ‘truth’ (with Gadamer), or distort it (with Heidegger). Responsible interpretation does not always reinforce tradition since “theological mistakes can be made”. Yet, for Thiselton, Gadamer’s stress on tradition corrects the individualism of Heidegger and


Bultmann.120 Both “the historical text and the present-day interpreter stand in ongoing historical traditions and contexts”.121

Thiselton’s notion of subject-object conceptualisation is no longer tied to Platonic-Cartesian dualism, Neo-Kantian epistemology, the correspondence theory of truth, or to referential and ideational theories of language and meaning, and so no longer collapses into relativism. Subject-object conceptualisation, rather, is tied to a rationality broader than Cartesianism, but still to conscious reflection, cognitive content, public criteria, description, and critical testing. Thiselton argues, with H. Jonas, that thought liberates us from Heideggerian passive situatedness (see Chapter 3), where we have already noted Thiselton’s appeal to T.F. Torrance.122 For Thiselton, Pauline ‘reason’ allows language to extend or clarify “concepts for understanding”, such that subject-object conceptualisation may function creatively.123 Hence, Thiselton does not re-assert subject-object thinking as though Heidegger’s opposition to it were merely excessive, but reinstates it within a different framework, not simply appealing to Heidegger to overcome Cartesianism (see Chapter 3).124

Thiselton’s broadest notion of ‘understanding’, therefore, diverges from Gadamer’s.125 First, the two poles of understanding are interwoven within a theological-eschatological framework.126 Gadamer, however, rejects a “utopian or eschatological consciousness”.127 Here, Thiselton’s reinstating of subject-object conceptualisation also seeks to correct Heidegger.128 Further, understanding both “seeks to give a comprehensive alternative to the epistemological dualism between subject and object” and “takes full account of the autonomy of the object and the ‘historicality’ of the subject” (but see

121. Borsch, ‘Review of *The Two Horizons*,’ 89.
Chapter 3. Second, drawing on Pannenberg and the later Wittgenstein, Thiselton reverses Gadamer's ontological prioritisation of language over history: "The 'bedrock' of language is human life". For Gadamer, though, "the basic ontological view [is] that being is language". Third, understanding is conditioned by revelatory and eschatological factors, not only by effective history. Fourth, Thiselton corrects Gadamer regarding the ability of tradition to distort truth. Fifth, against Gadamer's linguistic dualism (see Chapter 4), and with the later Wittgenstein, assertions play a role in eventful understanding. Wittgenstein notes the "difference... between the utterance of fear, 'I'm afraid!' and the report of fear, 'I'm afraid'". Hence, again, Thiselton changes the grammar of Continental terminology. He is less 'Gadamerian' than some suggest, and his critique of Gadamer is more complex than R.E. Palmer's suggestion that it is 'Pannenbergian'.

This returns us to Thiselton's use of Continental terminology (e.g. 'world', 'horizons', 'fusion', 'language-event'). If the grammar of these terms changes in Thiselton, a critic could ask whether Thiselton was guilty of something similar to the 'persuasive definition' that he expounds Paul as attacking in Corinth. Shouldn't Continental terminologies be left in their 'home' language-games? We reply, however, that Thiselton seeks a critical "synthesis of insights from broadly different...

traditions”. In Chapter 6, we demonstrate that  Thiselton is arguing for ‘tradition-modification’ rather than rhetorically asserting a ‘persuasive definition’.

b) Hermeneutical Understanding (cf. Particular) & Scientific Explanation (cf. General)

In Thiselton’s hermeneutical circle, there is continuing, progressive, dialogic movement between particular and general axes, where these are partly tied to ‘understanding’ (narrow definition) and ‘explanation’, with Ricoeur. The focus has partially shifted from performance (textual effects, actualisation, critical testing) to include inference of structure (particularly cf. understanding, generality cf. explanation). Whilst Thiselton allows for a ‘general’ axis in an *a posteriori* ‘historical’ sense, however, he attacks all forms of *a priori* generalisation in ‘idealist’ or ‘formalist’ approaches. Thus, Thiselton attacks the pre-occupation with ‘scientific’ ‘method’ (general exegetical ‘rules’, ‘principles’, abstract theory) of Enlightenment rationalism and ideological structuralism by reinstating historical particularity. All generalisation that does not first respect historical and textual particularity is false. Traditional approaches, early 20th century liberalism, and positivism are also targeted.

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140. Webster, 'Review of The Two Horizons', 220.
In particular, Thiselton attacks ideological structuralism since Lévi-Strauss\textsuperscript{143} for disparaging historical and textual particularity. Thiselton argues that the ‘general’ axis is not ‘more objective’ than the particular axis, and that biblical textual particularity should not be subsumed by mechanically applying general models derived from the narratives of folk, classical, or scholarly literature.\textsuperscript{144} Thiselton urges that literary criticism should not displace historical criticism, though the distinction between ‘story’ and ‘plot’, together with R. Jacobson’s model of addressee, context, message, code, and addressee, remain valuable. Though H. Frei is not an ‘ideological structuralist’, Thiselton attacks Frei’s ‘history’ versus ‘history-likeness’ distinction for presupposing false alternatives between either ‘report presupposing referential theory’ (then discounted) or ‘intra-linguistic constructs divorced from history’\textsuperscript{145}

Thiselton argues that, in its pre-occupation with an \emph{a priori} general axis, ideological structuralism artificially divorces texts and meaning from historical particularity through a misappropriation of Saussure’s work. \textit{Language} is up-anchored from history to become ‘code’. Historically particular \textit{parole} is disparaged as ‘message’. Contrary to R. Barthes, however, message is not a by-product of code, but the pre-condition for its derivation: ‘code’ only partly shapes ‘message’. Saussure’s prioritisation of synchronic over diachronic linguistics cannot justify neglecting historical particularity since its function was to guard it. Since texts are not just intra-linguistic phenomena, then meaning is not just ‘function within a self-referring system of relations and differences’, but relates irrevocably to historical particularity where, with the later Wittgenstein, Thiselton insists, language is “part of a [historical] form of life” (see Chapter 4). Authorial horizons and intentions, historical background, the results of form criticism, message content, textual transmission, authorial language-uses and actions, and the public criteria of tradition cannot be ignored. Meaning only relates secondarily to linguistic system.\textsuperscript{146} This shapes Thiselton’s view of ‘textuality’ and use of the phrase, ‘the text itself’.\textsuperscript{147}

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Watson summarises: “a text is not... an autonomous, self-contained entity... separated from the broader context of the ‘life-world’ within which it constitutes a communicative action”.

Ideological structuralism, finally, reduces theology to anthropology, historical continuity to determinism (excluding novelty and eschatological transformation), and language-use to the unconscious dimensions of language. But interpretation cannot ignore theological, eschatological, historical, conscious, and particular dimensions.

c) Distancing & Fusion: Re-Configuring Historical Objectivity & Self-Involvement

In Thiselton's hermeneutical circle, adapting Gadamer's work, there is continuing, progressive, dialogic movement between the axes of ‘distancing’ (cf. Gadamer's “tension between the text and the present”) and ‘fusion’ (cf. Gadamer's “fusion of horizons”). This embraces movements between ‘textual’ and ‘reader horizons’ (cf. the ‘two-sided’ problem and task of hermeneutics), between synchronic and diachronic considerations, between various dimensions of ethical responsibility, between different kinds of ‘context’, between textual ‘action’, ‘actualisation’, ‘appropriation’, and ‘application’, between ‘questions’ and ‘answers’, and between ‘parts’ and ‘wholes’.

Both texts and


149. Thiselton, 'Structuralism and Biblical Studies', 331 (paras. 5, 6); cf. 334, (para. 4, cf. 6-7).

interpreters are historically conditioned, correcting traditional over-emphasis on the former. Hence, Thiselton both respects “the integrity of the biblical text” (cf. distancing) and explores “possibilities for responsible appropriation” (cf. fusion). This reflects his later concerns to unite biblical studies and pastoral theology, and raises questions about the locus of meaning. We propose that ‘distancing’ links to a historical re-configuring of the notion of ‘objectivity’ (see also Chapter 7), and that ‘fusion’ historically re-configures the notion of ‘self-involvement’. Thiselton’s emphasis on distancing and fusion precedes that in C. Kraft’s book, *Christianity and Culture* (1979), and not vice versa. We now look at Thiselton’s notions of ‘distancing’ and ‘fusion’ in more detail.

For Thiselton, ‘distancing’ explicates the ‘objective’ historical distance, difference, or tension between textual and reader horizons or language-games, shedding light on intelligibility problems. This demands continuous critical study and testing, but also creative intuitive understanding. Three points concern us, as follows.


First, for Thiselton, in biblical hermeneutics, distancing aims at understanding the Bible accurately, honestly, faithfully, responsibly, and obediently, providing “critical control over interpretation” and averting premature fusion of horizons in which interpreters’ prior horizons or generalisations are projected or imposed onto texts. Premature fusion, or ‘hermeneutical foreclosure’, over-selectively cites and fragments the textual message. Thus, A. Schweitzer’s notion of an ‘immanent parousia’ projects splits between Paul and Luke-Acts (followed by E. Käsemann). Premature fusion also reflects reader horizons back from texts, rendering texts innocuous and potentially boring. Reader pre-understanding thus potentially stifies original textual function and effective communication.

(Several references for Thiselton’s examples of premature fusion are cited in our footnotes.) Thiselton admits that interpreters can only approach texts with existing pre-understandings initially, but insists interpreters are not “at the mercy” of their “tyranny.” Absolutising one’s own “cultural and philosophical assumptions” is an ‘idolatry’ that suppresses the ‘past.’ Interpreters can be held


158. Thiselton, ‘Schweitzer’s Interpretation of Paul’, 135 (para. 5).


163. McNicol, ‘Review of The Two Horizons’, 188.
under the ‘spell’ of “narrow philosophical bases” or traditional language, but texts can ‘speak anew’ and break that spell. “Theological understanding” need not merely serve prior “states of consciousness”.

Second, Thiselton adopts Gadamer’s view that distancing jogs readers into conscious awareness of their previously unconscious pre-judgements - “encounter with a traditionary text can provide this provocation” - grounding the ethical responsibility of faithfulness to the text against imperialising reader horizons. “Freshier, more accurate, and deeper understanding” emerges through growing awareness “of the modern context and its influence”. F.H. Borsch cites R.E. Palmer’s illustration of the invisibility of water to fish, where the interpreter’s ‘task’ “is to make the contextual medium as visible as possible”. Thus, readers’ horizons are clarified through the emergence of self-understanding, presupposing hermeneutics of selfhood, Western culture and traditions. To hear a text’s challenge without distortion, there must be continuous movement between assessments of the particularities of both textual and reader horizons, transcending traditional concerns with historical and literary context.

Third, for Thiselton, distancing involves painstaking exegesis and critical scholarship (whether biblical, theological, historical, linguistic, literary, or philosophical), though any ‘modern reader’ may find in Scripture all that is necessary for ‘salvation’. Distancing “allows us to notice what was already there

to be seen".\textsuperscript{172} Intellectual integrity need not undermine the Christian faith, but serves faith.\textsuperscript{173} Distancing prioritises synchronic over diachronic investigations,\textsuperscript{174} respecting three over-lapping spheres of context (B.J. Walsh blurs these into two\textsuperscript{175}) relating language-use to its environment,\textsuperscript{176} as follows.

1. Thiselton modifies inquiry into extra-linguistic historical background or context of situation,\textsuperscript{177} not treating texts abstractly or making generalisations that suppress historical particularities.\textsuperscript{178} Whilst modifying historical criticism and reconstruction,\textsuperscript{179} Thiselton still employs the criteria of logical coherence for comparative testing of hypotheses\textsuperscript{180} and of correspondence to states of affairs.\textsuperscript{181} Historical inaccuracies can be corrected\textsuperscript{182} through textual and archaeological evidence,\textsuperscript{183} and socio-historical analyses.\textsuperscript{184} Thiselton’s modification counters contemporary over-stress on present horizons to reinstate historical considerations differently - in three ways. (i) Appealing to the ‘logic of self-involvement’, historical criticism legitimately seeks to highlight the background states of affairs (institutional or conventional procedures, speakers, circumstances) presupposed by the effective operation of speech-acts.\textsuperscript{185} (ii) Appealing to the later Wittgenstein, Thiselton also reinstates author-profiles,\textsuperscript{186} including authorial orientations, pre-judgements, language-uses, and interactions with wider cultural settings (refer Chapter 4).\textsuperscript{187} Nevertheless, with Bultmann, Thiselton rejects ‘positivist’

\textsuperscript{172} Grech, ‘Review of The Two Horizons’, 573.
\textsuperscript{176} Thiselton, ‘The Meaning of SARX in 1 Corinthians 5:5’, 205; cf. 215.
\textsuperscript{180} Thiselton, ‘Truth’, 896.
\textsuperscript{181} Thiselton, ‘Truth’, 894-896.
\textsuperscript{182} Thiselton, ‘Schweitzer's Interpretation of Paul’, 136 (para. 3).
\textsuperscript{183} Thiselton, ‘Age of Anxiety’, 606-607.
\textsuperscript{184} Thiselton, ‘The Interpretation of Tongues’, 17.
\textsuperscript{186} Thiselton, ‘Schweitzer's Interpretation of Paul’, 136 (para. 4).
\textsuperscript{187} Thiselton, ‘Age of Anxiety’, 595-596.
biographies of Jesus' 'psychological development'.

(iii) Appealing to Saussure, Thiselton makes broadly synchronic *inter-authorial and inter-textual comparisons* related to authorial presuppositions and language-use, textual content, historical background, and directedness of argument. Diachronic comparisons, though of secondary importance, help establish textual relevance across historical distance.

2. Thiselton argues for inquiry into 'shared working frames of reference', 'language-games', or 'common worlds of understanding'. Thus, (i), Thiselton reinstates inquiry into texts' original settings, attacking 'persuasive definition', infinite polyvalency, irresponsible recontextualisations, abstract generalising treatments of meaning, and atomising exegesis. Word-meaning is not 'essential', but normally related to 'use-context' or "the particularities of language-uses". Thus, appealing to the later Wittgenstein, Thiselton argues that interpreters must be 'trained' in how words and concepts were used in their 'home' language-games and communities of tradition (cf. logical contexts, surroundings, settings, world, contexts in life). "the sense" is not "an atmosphere accompanying the word". Here, Thiselton cites apocalyptic or religious language more broadly as examples.

New Testament concepts should not be defined "outside a given context or language-game" - Thiselton


does not remove "theological concepts" "to a safe place outside history". Rather, where language-games change, then so do word-meanings and concepts. Interpreters need to be aware of polysemy, polymorphous concepts, linguistic functions, grammatical statements that explicate concepts, and other kinds of propositions. (ii) Thiselton reinstates inquiry into linguistic functions within original settings on new grounds. We have already corrected J. Barr on the relationship between philosophical and linguistic semantics in Thiselton. Thiselton argues that specific authorial language-uses need to be placed in their original inter-personal setting of communication with original audiences. Appealing to the later Wittgenstein, Thiselton argues that traditional reduction of language to 'information' fails to detect multiple linguistic functions 'behind' surface-grammar. language does not always function "in one way... to convey thoughts". (iii) Thiselton reinstates inquiry into authorial intent on new grounds, inquiring into the linguistic 'directedness' of authorial argument without conceiving purpose, intention, meaning, or thought in psychologicist or mentalist terms. Communicative 'intention' is embedded in textual language. Thus, Thiselton does not neglect

authorial intent.\textsuperscript{210} Indeed, the issue separates Thiselton from Gadamer,\textsuperscript{211} where Thiselton stresses the ethical responsibility of faithful communication as a ground for critiquing authorial action,\textsuperscript{212} particularly in relation to preaching, ecclesial language-use, and Western language-use more broadly.\textsuperscript{213} For Gadamer, however, "subjective intentions" or "the \textit{mens auctoris}" are 'left behind'.\textsuperscript{214} (iv) Thiselton reinstates inquiry into transmitted textual content, particularly historical report and assertions.\textsuperscript{215} Criteria of logical coherence and of authenticity relative to public criteria are relevant to testing interpretative hypotheses, as in Thiselton's exegesis of 1 Corinthians.\textsuperscript{216} Interpretation addresses specific debates in relation to content (e.g. Paul's view of tongues\textsuperscript{217}), where theological, philosophical, and linguistic tools are used for clarification.\textsuperscript{218} Thiselton criticises Bultmann's disparagement of biblical 'content' and attempts by others to over-press biblical unity or diversity.\textsuperscript{219} For Bultmann, though, "Christian preaching... does not offer a doctrine which can be accepted either by reason or by a sacri".


\textsuperscript{212} Thiselton, \textit{New Horizons}, 410-470.


\textsuperscript{214} Gadamer, 'Aesthetics and Hermeneutics', 103.


\textsuperscript{217} Thiselton, 'The Interpretation of Tongues', 15; cf. 16; cf. 17-18; cf. 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34-36; cf. Thiselton, 'Schweitzer's Interpretation of Paul', 136 (para. 4,5).

\textsuperscript{218} Thiselton, 'The Use of Philosophical Categories', 89-91; cf. 95-98; cf. Thiselton, 'The Meaning of SARX in 1 Corinthians 5:5', 224.

"intellectus". Thiselton's stress on 'content' reflects his attempt to neither over-emphasise nor under-emphasise reader-response.

3. Thiselton modifies inquiry into broader and narrower literary and linguistic contexts, which are inseparable from extra-linguistic considerations. Thus, (i), Thiselton argues against over-generalisation with respect to literary questions about setting, manuscripts, genre, and style. Different 'text-types' have to be accounted for. The communicative function or style of a text can be more 'direct' or 'indirect', more 'closed' or 'open'. Thiselton avoids both over-generalising models of texts that suppress the particularity of function, of content, or of genre (cf. language-game), and over-generalising strategies of interpretation (cf. rules, guiding principles, universal maxims, 'method'). (ii) Thiselton promotes the ethical responsibility of finding appropriate interpretative 'strategy' (singular) through using multiple models, strategies, and critical tools (plural) in each particular case. That is, text-types - for example parables, metaphors and models, 'biblical' myth, narrative, typology and analogy, imagery, and apocalyptic - require different approaches. The "integrity of any particular

literary genre must be respected" where, later, Thiselton also stresses the particularity of reading goals and situations. In contrast to J.G. Jeanrond's search for general 'textuality', partly in critique of Thiselton, Thiselton advocates using a plurality of models of 'textuality', strategies of interpretation, and of critical tools, so as to maximise the number of vantage-points on a given problem and hence maximise hermeneutical sensitivity and faithfulness to the text. Later, Thiselton rejects viewing single models "as overarching interpretative keys" - each model is only exploratory. Thus, Thiselton applauds multiple kinds of 'criticism', yet also corrects these where they transgress his major hermeneutical critiques, or where they are imperialised as controlling models that suppress textual particularity. His criticisms of 'positivist' historical-critical methods, of Bultmann's 'existentialist' Sachkritik, and of 'traditional' form criticism are examples. Later, Thiselton argues "that neither one's interpretative tradition nor newer hermeneutical models should take precedence over the text of Scripture". Each should be "tested and if necessary modified in the actual process of interpreting particular texts". In 1992 he also writes, "we must... evaluate theories of texts on their own terms". Thiselton's 'transformed framework' for hermeneutics is emphatically not a single 'textual model', interpretative strategy, reading-goal, or critical tool, but a dialogically broadened theological-philosophical 'subtext' that allows such plurality. (iii) Thiselton extends semantics beyond traditional lexicographical concerns about vocabulary and surface-grammar to include consideration of semantic field relations. We need not repeat our observations from Chapter 4 on syntagmatic, paradigmatic, or other semantic relations. Thiselton is concerned to clarify semantic systems, semiotic elements, oppositions, relations between oppositions (employing structuralist methods

without adopting structuralist ideology), and the effect of sign-relations (\textit{language}) on possibilities of language-uses (\textit{parole}).\textsuperscript{247} Thiselton argues that semantic considerations aid exegetical precision, honesty, and faithfulness, providing objective 'scientific' controls regarding textual particularity. Thus, it is necessary to discern semantic relations in a donor language prior to translating to equivalents in a receptor language.\textsuperscript{248}

For Thiselton, 'fusion' allows readers to be addressed and transformed from 'beyond' their own historical horizons. By contrast, asking stereotypical questions reflects back, supports, clarifies, or secures prior convictions, understandings, or traditions. In biblical hermeneutics, fusion should overcome the domestication or taming of texts that renders them predictable or boring, and facilitate textual action or effects.\textsuperscript{249} Thus, fusion is pre-conditional for "genuine understanding",\textsuperscript{250} encompassing the existential self-involvement of readers (individually or corporately) during eventful, continuing movement between actualisation, appropriation, and application (see below).\textsuperscript{251} Thiselton sometimes uses the term 'understanding' almost synonymously with 'fusion', developing Gadamer's notion of understanding as 'always already applying',\textsuperscript{252} whereby "all reading involves application".\textsuperscript{253} Fusion avoids a dualism between 'inner' and 'outer' response.\textsuperscript{254} Like distancing, fusion also involves continuous movement between textual and reader horizons.\textsuperscript{255} Unlike distancing, fusion largely involves creative intuitive understanding, though critical testing is not absent.\textsuperscript{256} Fusion introduces Thiselton's notion of the ethical responsibility of practical response to texts, in line with a "concern

\textsuperscript{247} Thiselton, 'Structuralism and Biblical Studies', 329; cf. Klein, 'Review of \textit{The Two Horizons}', 74.
\textsuperscript{250} Kleinig, 'Review of \textit{The Two Horizons}', 89.
\textsuperscript{253} Gadamer, \textit{Truth and Method}, 340.
\textsuperscript{255} Thiselton, 'The Use of Philosophical Categories', 93-94.
for the role of the Bible in church and world". 257 Four emphases require further explanation, as follows.

1. For Thiselton, fusion liberates textual action and effects. Thiselton argues for moving beyond semantic concerns and intra-linguistic effects towards textual speech-action and extra-linguistic effects that liberate. Following Ricoeur, Thiselton moves beyond the ‘closed self-sufficient linguistic universe of the text’ to account for the ‘open state’ of textual signs and intra-linguistic effects that excite human possibility. But Thiselton goes further to stress the extra-linguistic effects of speech-acts, for example promise-fulfilment, or the ‘conventional’ effects of creating new ‘institutional’ states of affairs (e.g. baptism). 258 Thus, partly through the Bible, the Holy Spirit transforms human subjects in the extra-linguistic domain towards eschatological goals. 259 Textual language does not necessarily ‘master’ or ‘affect’ readers, however - contrary to the later Heidegger (for whom “man speaks in that he responds to language”) and against L. Langsdorf’s ‘mechanical-causal’ reading of Thiselton. 260 As Thiselton argues later, “Jesus’ own explanation of parabolic speech... suggests that his parables demand a readiness to respond”. 261 Fusion also presupposes the diachronic relevance of biblical texts to modern horizons - their ‘rights’ or ‘primacy’ in addressing the present. 262 Non-biblical texts also have the ‘right’ to be heard but, in Thiselton’s view, biblical-textual ‘rights’ extend further. Fusion liberates the Bible to address us autoritatively as God’s Word, involving genuine encounter with God’s voice, 263 and a

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fresh coming-to-speech (cf. speech-act)\textsuperscript{264} in the language and ‘worlds’\textsuperscript{265} of hearers, involving them as whole persons as the texts’ ‘objects’.\textsuperscript{266} Contrary to N.L. Geisler, Thiselton does not espouse a ‘soft’ view of biblical authority here (see Chapter 7), but speaks of how biblical authority becomes concrete.\textsuperscript{267} Hearers are drawn into textual worlds that interpret, judge, and transform their present life-experiences, conceptual frames, and self-understandings.\textsuperscript{268} Biblical texts act creatively on hearers, bringing Christ and salvation, that God might build both the Church and Christians themselves.\textsuperscript{269} The New Hermeneutic is important for Thiselton in this context - particularly Fuchs’ work on Jesus’ parables.\textsuperscript{270} Thiselton also notes, citing Ricoeur, how the Exodus narrative opens into readers’ existential lived-through wandering from captivity to deliverance. Yet, for Thiselton, this has more to do with extra-linguistic effects than it has in either the New Hermeneutic or Ricoeur (see Chapter 6).\textsuperscript{271}

2. For Thiselton, fusion involves \textit{actualisation}. Thiselton argues for moving beyond hermeneutics as ‘rules’ and ‘indoctrination’ without losing critical testing, stressing effective communication and individual and corporate self-involvement in the eventful transformation of self-understanding and expansion of horizons. ‘Actualisation’ is very close to ‘hearing’, involving listening, openness,
experience, participation, and transformation.\textsuperscript{272} Thiselton urges that ‘fusion’ should not be premature, but involve the active engagement, inter-relation, dialogue, communion, or merging of textual and reader horizons (cf. Fuchs’ notion, \textit{Einverstandnis}) such that there is continual movement, enlargement, transformation, and even re-orientation of both textual and reader horizons. In genuine fusion, each set of horizons embraces what was initially beyond it, fusing into one new horizon, though never completely.\textsuperscript{273} Fusion “expands... texts” as well as “the vision of the reader”.\textsuperscript{274} Following Schleiermacher, Thiselton urges that hermeneutics no longer be conceived merely in terms of ‘rules’, but in terms of the making possible and deliberate creative initiation of new understanding.\textsuperscript{275} With Luther, “verbal transaction” should have an “inherent vitality” that ‘alters’ “the disputants”, where God’s Word may come to us uncomfortably as \textit{adversarius noster}, subverting our ‘worlds’.\textsuperscript{276} Further, Thiselton makes a plea for education as opposed to indoctrination. With Buber, education opens and expands horizons whereas indoctrination (cf. propaganda) closes and stunts the mind, directing it to pre-packed answers, the mere mechanical repetition of received systems.\textsuperscript{277} Finally, Thiselton also urges that the liberating function of grammatical utterances be recognised. Following the later Wittgenstein, grammatical remarks directed at “the scaffolding of our thoughts” make possible a “new

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understanding of things” that “extends the horizons of the reader”. Assertions can thus function creatively through ‘language-events’, altering Fuchs’ notion of ‘language-event’. Also, further correcting the New Hermeneutic, Thiselton argues that ‘actualisations’, ‘language-events’ and interpretations need to be critically tested or authenticated against cognitive criteria. This introduces the ethical responsibility of the critical testing or authentication of actualisations as to their alignment with a text’s original purpose and function. Similarly, we noted in Chapter 2 that Thiselton criticised H. Cox and the charismatic movement for neglecting the critical testing of religious experiences. Experiential ‘actualisation’ may be under- or over-emphasised in Thiselton’s view, against traditional and Corinthian practices respectively. Deep understanding and correct understanding must be held together.

3. For Thiselton, fusion in biblical hermeneutics involves appropriation. Thiselton argues that hermeneutical practice, without losing critical testing, should move beyond what could become a hedonism of self-affirming ‘event’ and ‘experience’ towards facilitating the individual and corporate self-involvement of obedient commitment, surpassing L. Brodie’s notion of the “achievement of a new self-understanding”. Obedience constitutes a changed relationship to a new self-understanding and to textual function and subject-matter. ‘Appropriation’, then, is akin to ‘obedience’ in biblical hermeneutics. Thus, later, Thiselton criticises Stanley Fish: interpretation is not simply “a phenomenology of religious self-discovery”. Thiselton also attacks the instrumentalisation of biblical texts as ‘information’ or ‘sources’ for historical criticism. This is like a Pharisaic power-bid for sovereignty in which interpreters refuse to be the ‘interpreted’ or accept ethical responsibility.


Rather, God, Christ, biblical paradigms, the Gospel, and the New Testament have authority to command trust and practical, bodily, committed, faithful obedience. Mere intellectual assent to concepts or to information ‘about’ God will not suffice. Appropriation involves the corporate, subjective, active, personal decision and lived-through transforming appropriation of ‘real’ knowledge, though Thiselton corrects the individualism of Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Bultmann. Admittedly, for Thiselton, eschatological promise-fulfilment lessens the emphases presupposed by Heidegger’s notions of futurity and possibility on merely human ‘brute effort’ or on “resoluteness as authentic Being-one’s-self.” However, appropriation is still authentic cruciform human existence, or ‘living out’ the truth, reminiscent of Kierkegaard - though the character of appropriation varies depending on the texts, readers, and situations concerned. We have already expounded Thiselton’s emphases on integrity (correspondence between actuality, convictions, deeds, and words), love (fully interpersonal transparent relationships that manifest faithfulness, transparency, and straightforwardness), faith, hope, and truth, including true, reliable speech. Appropriation places constraints on human freedoms, contrary to the individualistic egocentric humanist subjectivism of ‘doing what seems true for me’. Appropriation presupposes an openness, reverence, and humble submission to truth, and the displacement of the subject as arbiter of truth. Appropriation also involves critical testing and a readiness to submit all pre-conceptions to the test of truth. This introduces Thiselton’s notion of the ethical responsibility of the critical testing or authentication of appropriations. Such testing goes beyond, but includes, pragmatic performative endorsement. Finally, we reject W.

Wink's and V.S. Poythress' respective suggestions that Thiselton neglects appropriation\(^{297}\) or religious commitment.\(^ {298}\)

4. For Thiselton, fusion in biblical hermeneutics involves *application*. Thiselton argues for moving beyond Western individualistic religion, again without losing critical testing, towards the individual and corporate self-involvement of liberating socio-critical praxis, and towards a changed relationship to broader issues in the contemporary world. In biblical hermeneutics, ‘application’ is akin to ‘mission’.\(^ {299}\)

Three points merit attention. *First*, there is a hint in Thiselton of a polemic for the extension of the traditional distinction between ‘understanding’, ‘explanation’, and ‘application’ to include the term ‘appropriation’ so as to avoid mere activism. Certainly, Thiselton uses both terms - 'appropriation' and 'application'. If the term ‘application’ - and hence the distinction between ‘explanation’, ‘understanding’, and ‘application’ - lacks the deep overtones of obedient existential self-involvement suggested by the term ‘appropriation’, then ‘appropriation’ lacks the overtones of ‘external task to be done in the world’ afforded by ‘application’. Conversely, however, Thiselton, both in his ‘second period’ and later, still uses the ‘explanation’, ‘understanding’, ‘application’ distinction, in which the term ‘understanding’ is used in its narrowest sense to mean something like ‘actualisation’\(^ {300}\). Nevertheless, since Thiselton’s stress on appropriation is never far away, it would be harsh to suggest there was an inconsistency as opposed to a lack of systematisation.\(^ {301}\)

*Second*, in biblical hermeneutics, application involves biblical interpretation of the world, where eschatology is essential to interpreting the present. This explains Thiselton’s insistence on the relevance of biblical apocalyptic today.\(^ {302}\)

Thiselton argues, with Heidegger, that since culture and traditions can distort truth ('idle talk' is “gossiping and passing the word along''), then a socially and politically relevant theological critique of culture and traditions is needed. Thus he asks, with E. Fuchs, ‘What does the Bible actually say to our

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297. Wink, ‘Review of *The Two Horizons*’, 507.
generation?" and appeals to J. Moltmann and J. Miranda as already noted. Similarly, later, Thiselton insists "on the critical potential of scripture", and on "the responsible use of Scripture in the modern world". Nevertheless, following Gadamer, Thiselton also rejects complete iconoclasm since traditions can transmit tried and tested convictions, abolishing any "antithesis between tradition and historical research". Third, in biblical hermeneutics, application also involves liberating action or 'praxis' in the world where, with Moltmann, Thiselton argues that hope begins with the transformation of the present. Ultimately, application aims to establish God's Kingdom on earth, whether through 'building' Church or through mission. This places Thiselton's concerns for proper liturgical practice and responsible language-use in the Church in context. But Thiselton is also concerned about honest dealings with one's neighbours, about dialogue between the Gospel, modern hearers, and cultural thought-forms, about social justice, and about compassion and solidarity with the poor, the suffering, or the oppressed. This contrasts with over-abstract Enlightenment rationalism, what Thiselton views as Bultmann's individualistic subjectivism, and biblical studies that focus exclusively on past horizons. Conversely, in opposition to calling everything 'praxis' for cosmetic reasons, Thiselton argues that applications should be critically tested, introducing the ethical responsibility of the critical testing or authentication of applications. Finally, Thiselton also argues, with J.W. Wenham, that Old Testament laws should not be re-imposed today, thus respecting the limits of application.

In Thiselton's thinking, then, 'distancing' and 'fusion' are equally necessary, and should be practised together in dialogue continuously and progressively during interpretation, in contrast to an over-focus

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either on distancing or fusion, or on past or present horizons. Therefore, Thiselton criticises Continental hermeneutics for viewing critical distancing as a mere preliminary to interpretation,315 and “liberation theology” for evaporating “past meaning” in “the horizon of the present”.316 Thiselton provides three examples of the dialogic relationship between distancing and fusion, as follows.

First, for Thiselton, translation is inseparable from hermeneutics. Thus, distancing is involved in clarification of textual particularity prior to assessments of translation-equivalence.317 Such assessments, in relation to cognitive, emotive, cultural, and religious factors, also involve the creative judgements of fusion: the aim is effective communication, not surface-grammar reproduction.318 Second, for Thiselton, the work of the Holy Spirit includes giving gifts to scholars that are relevant to the kinds of criticism involved in distancing. The Spirit, however, also inspires the creative, transforming understanding involved in fusion. This precludes over-emphasising ‘prophetic’ appeals to the Spirit that bypass hermeneutics, where the Spirit mainly works through the normal processes of understanding, not apart from them.319 As Thiselton writes later, “In a co-operative, shared work, the Spirit, the text, and the reader engage in a transforming process, which enlarges horizons and creates new horizons”.320 Third, for Thiselton, engagement with interpretation histories preserved in theological traditions involves both distancing and fusion.321 Intellectual integrity considers both sides of historically debated questions in relation to textual content (cf. distancing) and appropriate response (cf. fusion).322 This emphasis emerges in Thiselton’s assessments of A. Schweitzer’s ‘historical’ approach to Pauline thought-content, and in his assessments of historical responses to Schweitzer.323

323. Thiselton, ‘Schweitzer’s Interpretation of Paul’, 132 (para. 3, cf. 5); cf. 133 (para. 1); cf. 135 (para. 3,7) - 136 (para. 1,2,4,5).
In The Two Horizons, “Thiselton argues that each generation requires its own fusion of horizons, and thus hermeneutics remains an ongoing task”. Present ‘fusion’ is aided by consideration of “the history of... fusions found in Christian tradition”. This anticipates Thiselton’s later stress on posthistories or reception histories as part of a focus on the ‘whole history’ of a text.

d) Question and Answer

Both distancing and fusion, for Thiselton, with Gadamer, involve continuous, progressive, dialogic movement between question and answer: “the essence of the question is to open up possibilities and keep them open”. This movement should not be linked too exclusively to fusion as B.J. Walsh seems to do. Initially, in Thiselton’s thinking, readers’ questions yield inadequate understandings. Thus, they ought to be progressively re-shaped, questioned, challenged, and revised through an ongoing dialogue of two-way question and answer between interpreters and text requiring both study and reflection (cf. distancing) and openness, listening, and response (cf. fusion). Intermediate and better questions and conclusions lead to progressively clearer or deeper understandings, and eventually to ‘right’ questions that allow the text to ‘come-to-speech’ and transform readers. Thus, texts are not mere objects of knowledge. This is how “transformation through openness to Scripture... affects the way Scripture is interpreted”, answering R.W.L. Moberly’s later concerns.

c) Wholes and Parts

Last, in Thiselton’s thinking, drawing on the early Schleiermacher, ‘distancing’ and ‘fusion’ involve continuous, progressive, dialogic movement between ‘wholes’ and ‘parts’. Parts are understood in relation to wholes, and vice versa (e.g. words, sentences, paragraphs, books, authors, linguistic communities, traditions etc.). Ultimately, for Thiselton, drawing on Pannenberg, historical ‘parts’ are to be understood in relation to anticipations of the eschatological ‘whole’, and the latter in relation to God, where Christ is key to both, and hence to the whole hermeneutical enterprise. B.J. Walsh’s

charge that Thiselton succumbs to ‘Wittgensteinian subjectivism’ misses this latter point. That is, for
Thiselton, the hermeneutical circle concludes at the eschaton although, until then, “interpreters can
never escape... the circle”. For Thiselton, movement between ‘parts’ and ‘wholes’ is both critical and
intuitive, where time is needed to allow texts to ‘speak’. Thus, Thiselton agrees with Dilthey that
understanding is an art as well as a science. For Thiselton, drawing on H. Ott, movement between
‘parts’ and ‘wholes’ clarifies the relationships between exegesis (cf. parts), systematic theology (cf. pre-
understanding, ‘whole’), and the Bible as a ‘whole’.

D. Concluding Comments: Towards A Unified Critique of Understanding and Responsible
Interpretation through Dialogue between Philosophy and Theology

After preliminary remarks focussing on questions of style, definitions, and approach we argued that
Thiselton’s major concern was the problem of biblical intelligibility across historical distance given the
failure of existing interpretative approaches - notably ‘traditional’, broadly ‘positivist’, and broadly
‘existentialist’ (Bultmann and the New Hermeneutic) approaches - to address this problem. Thiselton,
then, urgently sought a ‘transformed framework’ for hermeneutics, but this had been missed,
misidentified, or over-narrowly defined by many commentators. We deferred exposition of
Thiselton’s ‘transformed framework’ until Chapter 6.

Turning to our exposition of Thiselton’s ‘critique of hermeneutical understanding’ as ‘responsible
interpretation’ we noted that, for Thiselton, Bultmann correctly insisted on the involvement of
subjectivity in understanding. However, this did not necessarily lead to absolute relativism or
subjectivism, solipsism, or individualism. Understanding was progressive, and proceeded according to
the hermeneutical circle, embracing continuous, progressive, dialogic movements within and between
multiple polarities which need not be revisited here. Notably, though, Thiselton modified Gadamer’s
grammar of ‘understanding’, rejected all a priori generalisation, and argued against ignoring past
horizons in the context of ‘distancing’ and against ignoring present horizons in the context of ‘fusion’.
Further, Thiselton’s emphasis on ‘plurality’ in relation to textual models, interpretative strategies,


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reading goals, and critical tools, meant that his ‘transformed framework’ could not refer to any single practical ‘method’. Finally, an ethics of ‘responsible interpretation’ can be set in opposition to premature fusion or ‘hermeneutical foreclosure’.

Thus, criticisms that Thieslton fails to tell us “what we ought to do” during interpretation,\(^{331}\) or that Thieslton neglects a “practical” demonstration of how pre-understanding affects the interpretative process,\(^{332}\) must be rejected. But what of S.D. Moore’s complaint about the “interminable intellectual detour” that Thieslton interposes “between the biblical text and its practical application”? Has Thieslton denied the Bible to so-called ‘ordinary readers’?\(^{333}\)

We must answer negatively. \textit{First}, much of Thieslton’s ‘detour’ concerns grounding and unifying hermeneutical theory, not interpretative practice. \textit{Second}, Thieslton argues that only some in the corporate body of the Church would have to take those ‘detours’ that did remain part of practical interpretation, providing appropriately pitched tools for others.\(^{334}\) \textit{Third}, the very category ‘ordinary readers’ sometimes seems patronising. D.A. Carson records times when shoe-makers learnt Greek whilst they worked.\(^{335}\) Admittedly, though, “by 1525... Luther appears to have retracted his earlier view that anyone could interpret Scripture”, disenchanted with “the Peasant’s Revolt”.\(^{336}\) Nevertheless, Thieslton maintains that a “modern enquirer” can find through the Bible everything necessary for salvation.\(^{337}\) \textit{Fourth}, sometimes so-called ‘ordinary readers’ are not ‘innocent’, if Thieslton’s complaint about ‘other-than-serious attitudes to truth’ in Western society is accepted.\(^{338}\) \textit{Fifth}, sometimes so-called ‘academics’ are not innocent either. Later Thieslton complains, “I am not asking that the living address of the gospel today be buried under layers of dry academic argument”. Such a view of hermeneutics “is based on misinformation and fallacy”.\(^{339}\) Elsewhere Thieslton repudiates those who “irrationally regard hermeneutics as intrusive and inhibiting... as overlaying the text with unnecessary and intimidating theory”. Rather, after Terry Eagleton, “antipathy towards theory usually means hostility towards other people’s and oblivion of one’s own”. Conversely, “hermeneutics” exposes

\(^{331}\) Contradicting, Metzger, ‘Review of The Two Horizons’, 211.
\(^{332}\) Contradicting, Keift, ‘Review of The Two Horizons’, 409.
\(^{333}\) Moore, ‘Review of New Horizons in Hermeneutics’, 287.
\(^{334}\) Thieslton, ‘Understanding God’s Word Today’ (longer article), 92, cf. 99-100.
\(^{337}\) Thieslton, ‘Understanding God’s Word Today’ (longer article), 92.
“self-interest” and the instrumentalisation of texts that serves “a will for power”. Therefore, hermeneutics “liberates” texts “to speak not with the perlocutionary force of a seductive Hermes who has ‘thieved’ the text, but with the illocutionary force of an authority appropriated in faith and validated finally at the last day”. The only caveats we add to these comments are our arguments that hermeneutics requires organisation and that its distinct conversations require clarification.

Finally, the construction of a unified theory of hermeneutical understanding from Thiselton’s formative work is suggestive for the validation of dialogue between theology and philosophy. That is, in constructing Thiselton’s unified model of interpretative responsibility, we have seen how Thiselton combines appeals to philosophy and theology.

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Chapter 6

Widened Dialogue Towards a Philosophical-Historical Unification of Hermeneutical Theory as Precondition for Responsible Interpretation

A. Preliminary Comments: Justifying a Fresh Interpretation of *The Two Horizons*

Here, in Chapters 6 and 7, we consider Anthony C. Thiselton’s most famous work, *The Two Horizons* (1980) - variously misunderstood in the literature, and pivotal for understanding Thiselton’s work on hermeneutical theory as a whole. It is our main point of departure in response to Thiselton’s recent critics, and for demonstrating the untapped value of Thiselton’s formative work for hermeneutics as a discipline. An accurate understanding of *The Two Horizons* also facilitates genuine criticisms of Thiselton’s work. *The Two Horizons* is similar enough to Thiselton’s PhD for the two works to be approached together.²

*The Two Horizons* deserves special attention as a classic work by a leading thinker with whom, as we noted in our Introduction, “there has been surprisingly little thorough interaction”, despite his being “one of the major contemporary Christian authorities on hermeneutics”.³ We also noted that *The Two Horizons*, despite our argument that it has been misunderstood, is widely viewed as authoritative⁴ - “the most important work” on hermeneutics,⁵ a “classic work”⁶, a “first-rate study”,⁷ of “unusual scope and


depth"; addressing "all the major issues that enter contemporary debates about interpretative theory"; an "exception" amidst much unimpressive 'evangelical' scholarship. That the work had been misunderstood, we noted, was not our view initially but, according to A.K.M. Adam, Thiselton's.

If, to Adam, the "Thiseltonian path" was clearly a "distillation of speech-act theory and Wittgensteinian philosophy", however, we will find this to be yet another misunderstanding.

In our Introduction we also noted complaints about the style of The Two Horizons as being "enigmatic"; "tough going", "daunting", "unintelligible"; "insights are buried in scholarly rubble"; or "stylistic clumsiness". Thus, "it is easy to lose one's way" in "the barrage of encyclopaedic details" in the "labyrinth". Similarly, Thiselton's later contribution to The Responsibility of Hermeneutics is, supposedly, "wrapped in a cloak of academic jargon", his correlative contribution to The Promise of Hermeneutics "dense and abstruse". In Interpreting God and the Postmodern Self, "the incessant introduction of new interlocutors... disturbs the flow of argument...", turning "the prose into an unpalatable mosaic". Thus, "one must plough through... to arrive at Thiselton's position"; "his own thought". His method is not "logical" but dialogical, "pitting one theologian or philosopher against another". Thus, his argument is "non-polemically expressed", his structure "complex", and "difficult to discern", recalling S.W. Sykes' plea for Thiselton to "show us plainly the core of his argument".

Nevertheless, hermeneutics is a complex problem-solving discipline engaging with difficult traditions of discourse. For one writer, the intelligibility problem is not Thiselton's, but "due... to the complexity of... hermeneutics" itself.26 Indeed, "philosophical hermeneutics" is "notoriously complex",27 "intrinsically difficult",28 explaining why The Two Horizons "demands a serious intellectual effort", or why New Horizons in Hermeneutics is "advanced and difficult".29 T.E. Pickett rightly contrasts "the relentless demand" of the "consumerist reader" for certainty, indeterminacy, or the new, with the "hard-won hermeneutical via media put forth by Lundin, Walhout, and Thiselton" in The Promise of Hermeneutics.30 A consumer demand for 'simplicity' may also be an issue.

Some, like A.K.M. Adam, claim to find The Two Horizons easy to understand, but seem invariably to misunderstand it. For B.J. Walsh, "Thiselton has cleared a path... through the jungle of contemporary hermeneutics".31 For V.S. Poythress, "Thiselton's remarkable clarity of expression seems to make it easy."32 F.H. Borsch finds Thiselton's arguments "remarkably lucid", but then calls for "a study which presents more of [Thiselton's] own approach".33 In Chapters 6 and 7 we challenge each of these thinkers' readings of Thiselton.

As noted in Chapter 5 others, missing or misunderstanding the polemical character of The Two Horizons, variously describe it as a "comprehensive review", a "helpful" or "introductory survey", an "overview", one of five "major surveys of contemporary hermeneutic reflection",34 "largely descriptive", almost a "philosophical biography". One writer asks, "to what extent does... Thiselton... move beyond" expounding "the [hermeneutical] problem to its solution?"35 As though "solutions" to the problem of "justification by faith" were Thiselton's entire object, J. Kleinig complains that these

do not require the “hefty apparatus fashioned to yield them”.

P.R. Keifert speaks of Thiselton’s “failure to develop the full range of implications of Heideggerian pre-understanding” as though Thiselton were uncritical of Heidegger.

C.S. Rodd complains, “we have to descend from high philosophy and offer Christ... to those he came to save”, as though Thiselton’s concerns were unrelated to mission,

and N.L. Geisler mistakenly views The Two Horizons as an exposition of “the philosophical forces” behind the ‘New Hermeneutic’.

If our arguments below prove correct, then The Two Horizons has been genuinely misunderstood. If it was “the most comprehensive discussion of hermeneutical theory in print” of its day, then a fresh response to The Two Horizons is an urgent priority. To this we now turn.

B. The Direct Affect of Theory on Practice: Broader Philosophical and Theological Dialogue as Precondition for Responsible Interpretation

1. Thiselton contra Biblical Misinterpretation due to ‘Narrow’ Critical-Philosophical Dialogue

One major argument in The Two Horizons, we have begun to note, is Thiselton’s ‘first stratum’ polemic for widening philosophical and theological dialogue to critically broaden the pre-understandings with which hermeneutical problems are approached beyond those reached by traditional, broadly positivist, Bultmannian, post-Bultmannian, and structuralist schools. Because of the dialogic narrowness of the pre-understandings of these approaches at the level of ‘critical-synthetic filter constitution’ (see our Introduction), they misinterpret the Bible. If the Bible is, in whatever sense, the Word of God, then this constitutes a problem requiring urgent resolution.

For Thiselton, then, hermeneutics is “urgent” and “full of promise” because “God speaks through the Bible today” – Thiselton does “recognise the... presence of God in the universe”. Later, Thiselton urges that biblical hermeneutics “relates to the very identity of Christian faith and stands at the heart

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of Christian theology", having "importance" in relation to "theological integrity", "the nurture of the faith and its communication in the modern world". So, Thiselton asks, why is hermeneutics neglected in English theology and biblical studies? This is to ignore 'pre-understanding' and misinterpret the Bible.

Thus, 'purist' approaches dismiss the category of pre-understanding, advocating a "detached attitude to the Scriptures", naively equating conscious self-awareness with 'self-understanding' (which includes the unconscious), and ignoring "philosophical and theological presuppositions". The latter are not merely "cultural and personal" in Thiselton's view, but relate to tradition, though Thiselton argues later, drawing on S. Fish, that the potentially context-relative status of so-called 'natural' meanings cannot be ignored. (Thiselton is less negative about reader-response theory than S.R. Briggs or J. Ashton suggest).

46. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 3-10; cf. Thiselton, New Testament Hermeneutics, xxii, conclusions 1.1; cf. 1.2, 1.2a.
47. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 8-10.
Thiselton also attacks ‘traditional’ ‘theological’ objections to hermeneutics, notably those of Helmut Thielicke.\textsuperscript{53} Thus, first, the Holy Spirit works through, not apart from, normal processes of understanding. To deny this misunderstands the Spirit, asserts that understanding can proceed directly to its object, and risks irrational authoritarianism.\textsuperscript{54} Theological hermeneutics remains pneumatological\textsuperscript{55} without discounting reason,\textsuperscript{56} or hard thinking.\textsuperscript{57} In this context, Thiselton critiques Karl Barth (see Chapter 3).\textsuperscript{58} Second, Thiselton argues that since the Bible creates faith, understanding does not presuppose only faith - even if pre-understandings informed by systematic theologies facilitate exegesis\textsuperscript{59} - (Thiselton’s notion of pre-understanding is not just pre-cognitive).\textsuperscript{60} Third, Thiselton argues that biblical truth is not timeless in the strong ‘Greek’ sense,\textsuperscript{61} or thereby ‘instantly intelligible’, but only ‘timeless’ in the weak sense of ‘applicability to all generations’ which, since generations change, still invokes hermeneutics.\textsuperscript{62} Fourth, Thiselton argues, God’s Word only strikes home with compelling force on the basis of prior points of contact in readers’ pre-understandings - a hermeneutical issue.\textsuperscript{63} Fifth, affirming Bultmann, Thiselton argues that pre-understanding is unavoidable as a category, despite the dangers potentially accompanying its acceptance.\textsuperscript{64} Thus, “pre-understanding governs what one perceives in the text” initially,\textsuperscript{65} and “inquiry concerning


\textsuperscript{58} Thoselton, \textit{Two Horizons}, 88-90.


\textsuperscript{60} Thoselton, \textit{Two Horizons}, 94-95; querying, Walsh, ‘Anthony Thoselton’s Contribution to Biblical Hermeneutics’, 227-228.


\textsuperscript{62} Thoselton, \textit{Two Horizons}, 95-101.

\textsuperscript{63} Thoselton, \textit{Two Horizons}, 101-103.


\textsuperscript{65} Dockery, ‘Review of \textit{The Two Horizons}, 134; cf. Thoselton, \textit{Two Horizons}, 114.
presuppositions is... the domain of philosophy”. Therefore, Christian reflection must engage with ‘secular’ thinking - theology is “an inherently hermeneutical enterprise”.

Thiselton then argues that broadly positivist approaches and broadly existentialist approaches artificially ‘narrow’ pre-understanding through inadequately wide dialogue with philosophical traditions at the level of critical-synthetic filter constitution (see our Introduction). Deferring treatment of Thiselton’s response to ‘positivism’ until Chapter 7, we begin with Thiselton’s detailed critique of Bultmann.

2. Thiselton’s Argument for the Direct Affect of Hermeneutical Theory on Interpretation: Bultmann’s ‘Narrow’ ‘Dualistic’ Pre-understanding

W. Wink names the work of Rudolf Bultmann (1884-1976) as “the foundation” for “all subsequent interpretative theory”.


68. Hogan, ‘Hermeneutics and the Logic of Question and Answer’, 263.


70. Wink, ‘Review of The Two Horizons’, 507.


theology” and closely read Kierkegaard, Schleiermacher, Troeltsch, Otto, and Dilthey.76 From 1923 onwards at Marburg, Bultmann dialogued with Heidegger, whose influence is clearest in Bultmann’s interpretation of Pauline anthropology in his major work, Theology of the New Testament (1948, 1953), which also reflects “the Marburg Neo-Kantian philosophy of Hermann Cohen... and P. Natorp... with its radical” fact-value “dualism”.77 This and other ‘dichotomies’ opened Bultmann to criticism. Thus, R.C. Morgan attacks Bultmann’s separation of “human existence... from the physical world”.78 The New Quest of the Historical Jesus (notably E. Käsemann) attacked Bultmann’s scepticism regarding the historical Jesus,79 whilst the New Hermeneutic (notably Fuchs and Ebeling) modified Bultmann’s hermeneutical insights.80

Turning to Thiselton’s reading of Bultmann then, positively, Thiselton argues, Bultmann rightly stressed the category of ‘pre-understanding’ and developed Dilthey’s work in this respect.81 Citing Bultmann, “any interpretation is... sustained by a... pre-understanding of the subject-matter”.82 Earlier, we noted Thiselton’s affirmation of some of Bultmann’s views. Thus, a prior “life-relation” between interpreter and author or text was pre-conditional for understanding.83 “interpretation always presupposes a life-relation”.84 Understanding was an art involving the interpreter’s subjectivity without excluding objectivity,85 against the “absurd” “demand that the interpreter has to silence his or her subjectivity... to achieve objective knowledge”.86 Prior shared understanding was the necessary starting-point for further understanding (rendering pre-understanding and hermeneutics

78. Morgan, ‘Rudolf Bultmann’, 82.
unavoidable).\textsuperscript{87} Interpretation involved self-understanding since the interpreter, and the interpreter’s initial questions, could become a text’s ‘object’ (contrary to the Cartesian schema).\textsuperscript{88} the New Testament word “is addressed directly to existential self-understanding”.\textsuperscript{89} Pre-understandings were to be expanded and informed through dialogue with traditions of philosophy - otherwise Bultmann’s own fruitful biblical hermeneutics would be lost. Such an ‘expansion’ allowed a biblical text to “speak more closely in its own right”.\textsuperscript{90}

Negatively, however, in his “masterly critique”,\textsuperscript{91} Thiselton argues that Bultmann, in practice if not in theory,\textsuperscript{92} absolutises a theological pre-understanding that combines the following dualisms or dichotomies:

(i) ‘transcendental Beyond’ versus ‘this-worldly’ (Neo-Kantian)\textsuperscript{93}

(ii) ‘revelation, justification by faith’ versus ‘objectified knowledge by ‘law’ as ‘works’” (from nineteenth-century Lutheranism, not ‘existentialism’)\textsuperscript{94}

(iii) ‘Kerygma, revelation, faith’ versus ‘dogmatics, myth, information’ (from liberal theology and then-current New Testament scholarship)\textsuperscript{95}


\textsuperscript{89} Bultmann, 'The Problem of Hermeneutics', 87-88.


(iv) 'transcendent God, divine action, God's Word, Christian faith' versus 'this-worldly' (from dialectic theology).\(^{96}\)

For Bultmann, 'myth' failed the test of contemporary "cosmological correctness" (cf. "political correctness"),\(^ {97}\) hindering his evangelistic desire to bridge "the gap between... the New Testament and the twentieth century".\(^ {98}\) "Christian proclamation today" cannot "expect men and women to acknowledge the mythical world picture as true".\(^ {99}\) For Thiselton, however, Bultmann's theological dichotomies almost reduce theology to 'anthropology plus the word of the cross',\(^ {100}\) where even "the resurrection cannot be an authenticating miracle".\(^ {101}\) Thiselton's juxtaposition of four dualisms undermines W. Wink's criticism that he misunderstands "Bultmann's distinction between 'this world' and 'the beyond'" in spatial terms.\(^ {102}\)

Next, Thiselton argues that Bultmann's theological dualism seemed to make New Testament interpretation centre upon de-objectification, where "the terms of the hermeneutical problem were set for Bultmann prior to his engagement with Heidegger's philosophy".\(^ {103}\) For the early Bultmann, "we may not see [God] as we have conceived him".\(^ {104}\) Nevertheless, especially after H. Jonas' work on myth, the 'objectification' issue made Heidegger's conceptuality seem to Bultmann to be tailor-made for biblical hermeneutics.\(^ {105}\) Bultmann praises "Heidegger's demonstration" that "understanding [is]

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something existential".106 Thiselton's contention here is not that Bultmann dialogued with the early Heidegger, but that Bultmann's philosophical dialogue failed to widen towards a critique of its own Neo-Kantian, Diltheyan, Heideggerian shape.107 Consequently, Thiselton argues that Bultmann's hermeneutical thinking is pervaded by further dualisms or dichotomies,108 and criticises these "time after time".109

Thus, for Thiselton, Bultmann's *historical 'Geschichte versus Historie' dualism* stresses present individual subjective existential possibility at the expense of past historical facts, failing to relate the two poles. Bultmann's appeal to Collingwood, who more properly interweaves the two poles, fails to prevent his sharpening of this problem inherited from Dilthey and Heidegger.110 For Thiselton, though, a a more unified philosophy of history is required: Bultmann - cut off from "certain aspects of reality" - fails to do justice to a text's "relationship to external events",111 often 'giving up' biblical texts' "content as objectifying representations".112

For Thiselton, Bultmann's *epistemological dualism*, with Heidegger, sets the 'truth' of subjectivity, worldhood, feeling states, and ontological disclosure (see below, and cf. encounter, address, certainty, decision, transformation) against the 'truth' of cognition, report, concepts (including psychological concepts), and critical testing - failing to relate the two poles. Thiselton argues, however, that worldhood and feeling states are not logically prior to, or more reliable than, cognition. Epistemology should include and inter-relate pre-cognitive and cognitive dimensions,113 but Bultmann sharply

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separates "existential self-understanding and... existentialist knowledge",114 "prescientific understanding" and "objectifying procedure".115 Thus, Bultmann has merely replaced "the epistemological dualism between subject and object" with different dualisms, for example that between 'primary' and 'secondary' historical knowledge,116 or between "genuine historical understanding" and "objective' historical knowledge".117 Thiselton also argues that Bultmann has over-sharpened Dilthey's distinction between historical understanding and scientific explanation, whereas Collingwood rightly maintained a place for subject-object reflection in history.118 Thus, Bultmann sharply separates "existential understanding" and "objectifying presentation".119 Thiselton, then, does not find a way out of subject-object dualism "in Heidegger".120

Thiselton also argues against Bultmann's three-fold linguistic dualisms. First, Bultmann fails to relate New Testament meaning or 'value' to Old Testament objectifying traditions or 'facts', despite appeal to Dilthey's category of 'life'. This renders revelation unintelligible on the basis of the later Wittgenstein's 'private' language argument.121 Thus, Bultmann finds "numerous instances where the Old Testament text only becomes of use" to "the New Testament" when "understood... contrary to its original meaning".122 Second, Bultmann divorces self-involving functions from objectifying functions, despite their being interwoven in practice:123 myth supposedly 'wants' "to be interpreted"
"in existentialist terms".124 Third, Bultmann divorces thought and inner intention from linguistic expression when, again, they are interwoven.125 Supposedly, the "real intention" of myth "is... obscured" by its "objectifying character".126

Further, Thiselton argues against Bultmann's three-fold *anthropological* dualisms. First, Bultmann stresses individual subjectivity at the expense of corporate inter-subjectivity:127 "only in radical loneliness does man find himself".128 Second, 'worldhood' inappropriately displaces the logically prior concept of the 'whole person':129 "Paul... did not... describe man as a phenomenon in the... objectively perceptible world".130 Third, imperatives and existential questions about responsibility and decision displace the material world in which they have currency:131 "eschatological existence... must actualise itself in the concrete deed", yet "all spiritual attitudes are unobservable".133

Thiselton also argues that Bultmann absolutises and claims comprehensiveness for his *generalising* form criticism and *Sachkritik* (cf. his definitions, disparagement, and de-objectification of myth) at the expense of painstaking exegesis of the *particular* case.134 Bultmann monopolises "demythologising as a hermeneutical method".135 But this so loads "the terms of the discussion that any exegetical conclusions would seem to support his claim", reflecting "his unwillingness to let his pre-

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understanding be sufficiently challenged by the text". Thus, “Bultmann absolutizes his philosophical ‘pre-understanding’ in such a way that he decides in advance what the New Testament writings may or may not really say”. Later, building on his critique of Bultmann, Thiselton argues that “the Christian story is not rightly called a ‘myth’”, even if it does “contain mythical elements”. Since the term ‘myth’ “suggests untruth”, it should be abandoned, especially since Bultmann views “mythical thinking [as] the opposite of scientific thinking”.

Finally, Thiselton argues that Bultmann’s theologically and philosophically dualistic pre-understanding produces one-sided biblical interpretation even at its most fruitful. Thus, Bultmann’s fruitful exegesis of the unity of the human self (Bultmann: “man does not have a soma; he is soma”), modes of being and possibility (Bultmann: “a double possibility exists” for man - “to be at one with himself or... estranged from himself”) in relation to Pauline anthropology is flawed, since soma, sark, and pneuma have a broader range of meanings than Bultmann allows - though some scholars disagree with Thiselton as to what those meanings are. Thiselton’s main point is that dialogically narrow pre-understandings (at the level of critical-synthetic filter constitution) cause problematic interpretations. Bultmann rightly stresses the category of pre-understanding, beginning philosophical dialogue, but wrongly narrows that dialogue critically. Particular philosophical traditions only yield particular insights and not comprehensive hermeneutical theories. Thus, changes in “hermeneutical theory” can lead directly to changes in “interpretative practice”. Theory directly affects practice. We may now pause to allow Bultmann to respond to Thiselton’s criticisms.

3. Allowing Bultmann to Respond to Thiselton

Given Austin Farrer's comments that only “one” person in “five thousand” has the sophistication to understand Bultmann,\(^{145}\) we proceed with caution in allowing Bultmann to reply to Thiselton. Significantly, Farrer believes that Bultmann “caricatured himself” in ‘New Testament and Mythology’, only presenting his arguments precisely in his essay, ‘A Reply to the Theses of J. Schniewind’.\(^{146}\) Here, contrary to Thiselton’s remarks about ‘dualisms’ (see above), Bultmann argues that “Geschichte and Historie... are closely connected and yet distinguishable”.\(^{147}\) He writes, “it would... be wrong to run away from Historie and take refuge in Geschichte”. To have “an encounter with” the historical Jesus, “I must rely on certain historical documents”. Yet studying these “can bring us to an encounter with... Jesus’ only on the basis of one phenomenon of past history”. That is, such study allows us “to recognize the historical phenomenon ‘Jesus’ only on the basis of one’s own historic (geschichtlich) encounter”.\(^{148}\) In other words, “historical research” is affirmed - as a supplement that ties ‘encounter’ to the historical Jesus. Alone, it cannot “encounter... the epiphany of God in Christ”, which comes “only” through “the Church’s proclamation”, but it can “confront us with the Jesus of history”.\(^{149}\) 

Geschichte and Historie are allied in recognizing Kyrios Christos in historical texts.

Admittedly, for Bultmann, “the ultimate purpose” of historical research is “to realize consciously the possibilities it affords for... understanding... human existence”.\(^{150}\) If it merely “reproduces facts of the past in their purely worldly actuality”, or “in memory”, it “can imperil and even destroy ‘historic’ existence”. The historian must have a “personal encounter” with “his own history”, “encountering in... events of the past... human existence and its interpretation”. The kerygma, “as a sacramental event... re-presents the events of the past” so “that it renews them”, becoming “a personal encounter for me”. Questioning the “reliability” of the kerygmatic “tradition” is precluded, since this implicates “the eschatological event to which the kerygma testifies... in the relativity of all historical knowledge”.\(^{151}\) History more broadly, or “many sided” “historical phenomena”,\(^{152}\) should not just be

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viewed “as a happening in the past”, but raised “to the level of the present” to facilitate the realisation of human possibilities. Nevertheless, taking “the text to be a source” can still properly serve “genuine interpretation”. Admittedly, “the knowledge acquired... emerges out of... the living participation of historians in history”. But, their “existential encounter with it shifts into the role of a means for acquiring ‘objective’ historical knowledge”.

Thus Bultmann disparages ‘historical knowing’ that destroys ‘historic’ existence by presenting past facts in their ‘bare actuality’, but values a ‘trusting’ ‘historiography’ in relation to the ‘reliable’ texts of tradition that supplements encounter. He values ‘recollection of the kerygma’ as a ‘sacramental’, ‘eventful’, ‘re-presenting’ or ‘renewing’ of past events that lets them become a ‘personal encounter’ ‘for me’. Further, there is a valued ‘encounter’ with my own ‘human existence and its interpretation’, and a valued appropriation of ‘the past’ in relation to human ‘possibility’ that relates to the historical past more broadly and which can also treat texts as ‘sources’ for ‘objective’ historical knowledge, though this is de-centred.

Thus, in Bultmann, there is a disparaged ‘objectifying historiography’ and a de-centred but not disparaged ‘objectifying historiography’. The latter belongs to a broader historical ‘knowing’ in which the historical past is also either appropriated existentially, or appropriated existentially through encounter, or appropriated existentially through sacramental encounter. Thus, more specificity is required in Thiselton’s reading as to how and when Geschichte and Historie are ‘sharply separated’ ‘in’ Bultmann. The Historie belonging to the ‘hegemony of historicism’ attacked by Bultmann is sharply separated from Geschichte because here Geschichte and Historie belong to different historiographies - the ‘dichotomy’ is not ‘in’ Bultmann, but between Bultmann’s view and positivism. Within Bultmann’s own framework then, at least according to Bultmann himself, Geschichte and Historie are closely related in his notion of appropriation. Nevertheless, largely but not entirely reinstating Thiselton’s reading, our present chapter implies that problems remain for Bultmann at the level of the philosophy of history. That which Thiselton affirms - that Geschichte and Historie should be better united theoretically - is surely correct. We now turn to focus on Thiselton’s response to the New Hermeneutic.

4. Thiselton's Argument for the Direct Affect of Hermeneutical Theory on Interpretation: The Less 'Narrow' But Still 'Dualistic' New Hermeneutic

Thiselton's 'first stratum' argument about pre-understanding progresses from a critique of Bultmann to a critique of the New Hermeneutic (E. Fuchs and G. Ebeling) and its American counterpart (R. Funk, D.O. Via, and J.D. Crossan). Thiselton applauds how these thinkers extend dialogue to include the later Heidegger and Gadamer, and appeals to the work of H. Diem, H. Ott, and P. Stuhlmacher to show the benefits in relation to exegesis and systematic theology. Thiselton knows the New Hermeneutic is not simply "built on R. Bultmann",156 with Gadamer, the movement emphasises "the linguisticity of understanding" or "of Being",157 attempting to "correct and carry forward the programme of Bultmann", though S.M. Schneiders misses that, for Thiselton, this is a correction of dualisms, dichotomies, or one-sided emphases along certain axes.158 Nevertheless, Thiselton warns that the dialogue exercised by the New Hermeneutic, though broadened, is still too narrow at the level of critical-synthetic filter construction, and still leads to problems during interpretation. Only some of Bultmann's difficulties are resolved.159

Thus, positively, for Thiselton, first, the New Hermeneutic tries to unite the Jesus of history with the Jesus of faith, reinstating the past horizon.160 With Gadamer, "respect for the otherness of the horizon


of the other" is fundamental — Thiselton does not espouse a view of the New Hermeneutic in which readers are the only 'object' of interpretation. Second, therefore, relating history to epistemology, the 'truth' of the historical past is better reinstated in the New Hermeneutic, potentially transforming interpreters' 'worlds' from 'beyond' their own horizons. Third, like Gadamer, the New Hermeneutic views language and thought as interwoven and, fourth, reinstates corporate community against an over-emphasis on individual subjectivity. Pre-cognitive dimensions and existential questions are also more firmly related to concrete 'life'. Fifth, Thiselton also approves the later Heidegger's complaints against standardisation (cf. generalisation) and the suppression of the particular in Western culture. Widening philosophical dialogue, therefore, improves interpretation.

Negatively, however, problems remain for the New Hermeneutic along most of these axes in Thiselton's view. Thiselton is less 'open' to the movement than W. Russell implies since it perpetuates more than just the epistemological and linguistic 'dichotomies' that B.J. Walsh notes.

Thus, first, historical 'distancing' is only granted a preliminary role during interpretation: the present


still displaces the past, and a history versus nature dichotomy persists.\textsuperscript{172} Second, epistemologically, ‘what is true for me’ still subverts the challenge of ‘truth’ from beyond the horizons of the self, and subject-object conceptualisation is insufficiently restored. “Depth, creativity, and contemporaneity” are rightly stressed, but ‘correctness’ of interpretation is under-emphasised.\textsuperscript{173} The “problem of the status of objective historical knowledge persists”,\textsuperscript{174} and “tradition, the church, [and] history after the event of the cross” are still neglected.\textsuperscript{175} Truth disclosed through the self is in danger of being reduced to disclosure of the self.\textsuperscript{176} Third, ‘authentic’ language grounded in Being displaces the supposedly ‘inauthentic’ language of propositions, even if Fuchs’ most fruitful work on Jesus’ parables which rightly challenges routinised repetition of religious statements.\textsuperscript{177} Thiselton rejects the later Heidegger’s notion of language as the “house of Being”,\textsuperscript{178} appealing instead to the later Wittgenstein and J.L. Austin and retaining “an extra-linguistic component that is necessary to check for correct understanding”.\textsuperscript{179} Fourth, anthropologically, existential predicament is too sharply divorced from thought, setting ‘language-event’ in opposition to “the discovery of objective truth”\textsuperscript{180} Fifth, the ‘New Hermeneutic’, applied as a generalising model, is not suitable for all biblical genres.\textsuperscript{181} Foreclosing philosophical dialogue, therefore, harms interpretation. Taking his critique of Bultmann into account as well, Thiselton concludes that artificially ‘narrowed’ (in ours and Thiselton’s use of the term ‘narrow’) pre-understandings produce one-sided, partial, or selective New Testament interpretations.


\textsuperscript{176} McHann Jr, The Three Horizons, 221; cf. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 355-356.


\textsuperscript{179} Dunn, Beyond Dialogue and History, 17, cf. 22; cf. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 379-385.


\textsuperscript{181} Goldingay, Models for Interpretation of Scripture, 7; cf. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 353-354.
Concluding: hermeneutical theory directly affects interpretative practice: widening dialogue theoretically is the only way to avoid hermeneutical foreclosure practically and is therefore pivotal for preventing irresponsible interpretation. Positively, the New Hermeneutic begins to demonstrate the validity of Thiselton’s argument for the widening of philosophical dialogue, but, negatively, it also demonstrates the validity of Thiselton’s argument against ceasing to continue to widen such dialogue. This theme persists through all Thiselton’s writings, where he constantly attacks “the prevalence of hermeneutical foreclosure”. For Thiselton, the philosophical pre-understanding of the New Hermeneutic is still too narrow or ‘foreclosed’ at the level of critical-synthetic filter constitution, and must be expanded further. Widening dialogue programmatically with philosophical traditions stands in opposition to hermeneutical foreclosure and interpretative irresponsibility. Thus, Thiselton does not offer a “comprehensive” or “normative” hermeneutical theory. We return to the theme of ‘hermeneutical foreclosure’ in Chapter 7.

5. Thiselton’s Argument for Widening Philosophical & Theological Dialogue Beyond that of the New Hermeneutic to Improve Biblical Interpretation

Part of Thiselton’s whole point in *The Two Horizons*, therefore, is to programmatically widen or extend philosophical and theological dialogue beyond the place reached by the New Hermeneutic (his critique of structuralism appears only in an appendix), thereby rectifying the remaining dualisms or dichotomies in its pre-understanding and facilitating improved biblical interpretation. His argument is

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183. Qualifying, Klein, ‘Review of *The Two Horizons*’, 74, cf. 75.
cumulative,” involving “comparative appeals”. Hermeneutics must ‘critically compare what each tradition has for or against it’.

Thus, we reject J. Barr’s view that *The Two Horizons* builds on the New Hermeneutic “entirely uncritically”, and qualify W. Wink’s view that Thiselton simply offers “a corrective to Bultmann” or that Bultmann is ‘the foundation’ on which “all subsequent interpretative theory must be built”. Thiselton neither merely looks for parallels or “points of contact” between traditions, nor merely draws on ‘several sources’, nor simply provides “four illustrations of the employment of philosophy” in hermeneutics that lack “interconnection with one another”. Nor does Thiselton in any sense to define the “limits” of philosophical dialogue.

More seriously, Thiselton’s appeal to Wittgenstein is explicitly tied to an attack on dichotomies and dualisms in Continental hermeneutics that greatly affect biblical interpretation in practice. Incredibly, however, even by 2001 “relatively few writers” had applied “Wittgensteinian resources” to biblical interpretation, exposing a widespread arrest in biblical hermeneutics that Thiselton had highlighted twenty years earlier, but which was largely ignored. Thiselton’s appeal to Wittgenstein is not “arbitrary”, and its “omission” is “a serious lack” - of historical proportions.

Almost anticipating such a reaction, Thiselton justifies his appeal to Wittgenstein on four other grounds: *First*, others have interfaced the work of Heidegger with that of Wittgenstein, notably K.-O. Apel. *Second*, others have noted Wittgenstein’s relevance for hermeneutics, notably B.I. Premo. *Third*, others have noted affinities between the early Wittgenstein’s work and Continental philosophy.

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Thus, Neo-Kantianism influences both Bultmann and the early Wittgenstein. Fourth, parallels exist between the work of Heidegger and Wittgenstein. Both deem traditional approaches wrong to reduce linguistic function to 'description'. And both argue that language discloses 'world', that language is powerful, either destructively or creatively, and that subjects participate in conditioning communities prior to objectivism or subjectivism.

And yet Tischel does not merely extend dialogue to include Wittgenstein. Rather, as we shall demonstrate, Tischel widens philosophical and theological dialogue beyond that of the New Hermeneutic in no less than six ways. First, in his critique of history, Tischel dialogues with a Pannenbergenian modification of three Hegelian axioms, exposing difficulties in broadly positivist and broadly existentialist historiographies. This has direct implications for Tischel's grounding of his critiques of epistemology and language in history. Later, C.G. Bartholomew notes Pannenbergen's importance for Tischel's "theology of history", but our point here concerns the philosophy of history. Second, Tischel appeals to Continental hermeneutics to ground his critiques of the self and of corporate tradition (and hence of Western culture) in his critique of history. This grounds the hermeneutical circle in a modified Hegelian dialectic, and sheds light on questions concerning culture-relativity. Third, Tischel appeals to Dilthey, Pannenberg, the Saussurian tradition, Schleiermacher, Heidegger, Bultmann, the later Wittgenstein, and the philosophy of language more broadly to modify Gadamer's hermeneutical circle. Fourth, Tischel appeals to his later Wittgensteinian-Saussurian alliance (see Chapter 4) to ground his critique of language in his critique of history, thereby unifying...

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203. Tischel, Two Horizons, 183, 184, 185, 229, 245, 250-251, 304-308, 312, 314, 81; cf. 67.


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language and history and qualifying his reception of Continental hermeneutics. Here, post-Saussurian linguistics and semantics provide further angles of view absent from both the philosophy of language and from Continental hermeneutics. Fifth, following Pannenberg, Thiselton argues that New Testament theology is consistent with, and improves upon, insights drawn from dialogue with philosophy in that it provides explanatory and evaluative metacriteria. Thence, Thiselton unifies philosophy and theology in hermeneutics. Dialogue must ultimately be widened beyond philosophy. Sixth, Pannenberg, T.F. Torrance, Heidegger, Gadamer, and others are important for Thiselton's approach to 'objectivity', from which we construct a unified critique of historical objectivity, further reinforcing the grounding of a critique of epistemology in a critique of history, and thereby unifying history and epistemology in hermeneutics. We will demonstrate the first four of these expansions of dialogue in the present chapter, and the final two in Chapter 7.

If this analysis proves valid then, for Thiselton, the major theoretical hermeneutical critiques ('stratum two') come to unity in a hermeneutical critique of history, and hermeneutics as a whole comes to unity in theology. Further, Pannenberg and Hegel are more fundamental to Thiselton's thinking than the later Wittgenstein and Saussure: history grounds language and not vice versa.

6. Earlier Arguments Reinforced and Further Anticipated Developments

Here we may pause to note that some of our earlier theses are being reinforced by our exegesis of The Two Horizons so far. First, our 'three strata' scheme has proven useful for explicating Thiselton's thinking and that of other writers, bringing order to a disorganised discipline. Positing the 'first stratum' of hermeneutical reflection highlighted Thiselton's inter-disciplinary dialogue: F.H. Borsch rightly notes Thiselton's "thesis that hermeneutics must be a multidisciplinary art" as do other writers. Positing five 'second stratum' hermeneutical critiques (of history, epistemology, language, Western culture, and the self) and a 'third stratum' 'critique of hermeneutical understanding' clarified Thiselton's responses to Bultmann and the New Hermeneutic. It is on these six axes that Thiselton

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opposes what S.R. Briggs calls “false dichotomies” in hermeneutical theory (though Briggs focuses too exclusively on the linguistic axis of Thiselton’s thought, and S.M. Schneiders speaks only of “the three major axes of the hermeneutical problematic” in Thiselton’s thinking). The six axes, together with the ‘first stratum’ conversation on ‘dialogue’, constitute seven spheres of hermeneutical conversation or discourse, clarifying the complexity of hermeneutics. Second, expounding Thiselton’s work is proving useful in relation to unifying hermeneutics. Each hermeneutical discourse becomes a unified theoretical construction when it combines appeals to philosophy and theology. Theory and practice are unified in that theory directly affects practice. Third, expounding Thiselton’s work is proving useful in relation to responsible interpretation. Responsible interpretation and widening dialogue are positively related, and stand in opposition to irresponsible interpretation and hermeneutical foreclosure, which are also positively related.

In Chapter 3 we anticipated that Thiselton’s hermeneutical critique of history was his most fundamental ‘second stratum’ critique. In our next section we will demonstrate this to be so. For Thiselton, (i), the historical question is more complex than the problem of historical distance and, (ii), a linguistic or “literary universe” cannot unify hermeneutics - hermeneutics is not “part of the larger field of literary criticism”. Rather, for Thiselton, (iii), a critique of history extended by eschatological and Christological considerations unifies hermeneutics. (iv) This is not simply “grounded in the Christian faith” - straightforward ‘fideism’ is absent from Thiselton. Rather, (v), history - and ultimately eschatology - unifies hermeneutics because history is ontologically prior to language. The Two Horizons focuses on “the phenomenon of language”, but the philosophy of history is its deepest focus, revealing a deeper problematic. Thus, “history is crucial to

[Thiselton's] topic\(^{222}\), where *The Two Horizons* is "an analytical discussion of the relationship of philosophy to hermeneutics with particular reference to how present knowing has to do with history".\(^{223}\) Contrary to Gadamer and the New Hermeneutic, "universal history", and not language, is the "horizon of a hermeneutic ontology", provided the "ultimate ontological ground of hermeneutical understanding" is understood to be God.\(^{224}\) Thiselton does not follow Gadamer's "ontological turn toward language";\(^{225}\) but with J.L. Austin "grounds language-use in something that is extra-linguistic, a... reality outside the language-event itself".\(^{226}\) (vi) In our view, the notion that all historical experience is mediated through language is problematic. On this basis R. Hannaford, at the 2002 conference of the Society for the Study of Theology held at Lancaster University, was forced to argue that to properly declare eschatological promises is to experience their fulfilment. However, promise-making and declarations of promise-fulfilment can only be effective through historical promise-fulfilment. Not even God fulfils a promise merely by making it.\(^{227}\) (vii) For Thiselton, further, it is *not* just action that unifies hermeneutics. His 'action model' in *The Responsibility of Hermeneutics*, we propose, is grounded in his critique of history in *The Two Horizons*. It is the latter that links "an author-oriented hermeneutic and a reader-oriented hermeneutic".\(^{228}\) Since L. Zuidervaart looks only to Thiselton's critique of action, however, small wonder he fails to find solutions to "any major problems", any "new model of hermeneutics", or any theoretical co-ordinates for Thiselton's notion of 'the text itself'. He has missed Thiselton's entire framework.\(^{229}\)

Finally, we will develop our earlier criticism that if Thiselton critically dialogues with a wider philosophical spectrum than the New Hermeneutic, then his continued use of "favoured" Continental terminology\(^{230}\) carries with it implicit changes of conceptual grammar that must be highlighted more clearly. Thiselton does not merely hold traditions in tension but attempts a "synthesis of insights from

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222. Van Voorst, 'Review of *The Two Horizons*', 220.
broadly different... traditions”, 231 “while avoiding their pitfalls”. 232 For Thiselton, contrary to Gadamer and the New Hermeneutic, ‘language-events’ can involve assertive language that ‘shows’, and the ‘linguisticality’ (see above) of ‘worlds’ cannot presuppose a word-magic that reverses the ontological priority of history over language. 233 Yet, Thiselton is not explicit enough about either the critical synthesis or the changes in conceptual grammar. R.L. Hubbard mistakenly views ‘horizon’ as “Anthony Thiselton’s metaphor”, and others, as already noted, mistakenly view Thiselton as merely ‘adopting’ Gadamer’s, Wittgenstein’s, or Fuchs’ and Ebeling’s views. 234 We question R.E. Palmer’s use of the term ‘explicitly’ in his otherwise valid comment that Thiselton “puts together so many things that needed to be explicitly related”. 235 Below, we shall argue that if Thiselton had developed more specificity in relation to his analysis of grammatical utterances in Wittgenstein, then he could have clearly marked his changes of Gadamerian grammar as ‘tradition-refinement’. As it is, he leaves himself open to the charge of ‘persuasive definition’, even though this would be an erroneous charge. 236 We may now expound the second line of argument in The Two Horizons: Thiselton’s unification of hermeneutical theory in his critique of history.

C. Dialogic Theory-Construction: Towards the Unification of ‘Stratum Two’ Hermeneutical Theory in a Critique of History

Here, we argue that Thiselton’s critique of history constitutes his unifying philosophical subtext for hermeneutics, developing Pannenberg’s qualified dialogue with Hegel, and avoiding Hegel’s dualistic idealism and totalisation. 237 Thus, we propose that The Two Horizons as a whole implicitly unfolds from the following modified Hegelian criteria:

(a) History-as-a-whole is the universal context for understanding

-Modification: ‘whole’ anticipated from within history, not at its End 238

231. Webster, ‘Review of The Two Horizons’, 220.
(b) The unity of historical reality grounds the possibility and unity of understanding and language.

-Modification: historical understanding and concrete self-understanding interwoven

(c) The dialogic, dialectic process of creative historical synthesis generates historical continuities and particularities.

-Modification: dialectic is earthed in a hermeneutic of traditions

If Thiselton's hermeneutical theory in The Two Horizons radiates from this basis, then his stance is neither 'later Wittgensteinian perspectivism', nor simply an 'anti-essentialist' "application of... the Tractatus and the Untersuchungen". Nor is Thiselton forcing a Hobson's choice between the old "failed" "historical method" (actually there are several historical-critical methods) and "a more recent hermeneutic which... tends to shelve or avoid problems of history". Rather, Thiselton is trying to improve, not 'abandon', historical criticism - by offering a widened philosophical dialogue (outlined above and demonstrated below) that transforms the hermeneutical paradigm bequeathed by Continental hermeneutics. Nor, for Thiselton, could 'compositional psychodynamics' resolve the problem of historical distance. This is too close to Dilthey's over-emphasis on the continuity of human psychology, a proposed solution that has already failed. We now examine each of Thiselton's modified Hegelian criteria in turn, demonstrating their central role in Thiselton's philosophical thinking in The Two Horizons.

1. Anticipated History-as-a-Whole: Universal Context for Understanding

Thiselton's first modified Hegelian criterion, following Pannenberg, is that history-as-a-whole is, or will become, the universal context for understanding but, against Hegel's idealist 'totalisation', the 'whole' is anticipated from within expanding historical horizons, not from the end of history. Interpreters can only interpret from within history. Historical particularities are to be understood in relation to anticipations of history-as-a-whole, the 'End' of history, or eschatology. By contrast, Thiselton

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239. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 245-251; cf. 66-67; cf. 75; cf. 77-78, 80; cf. later, Thiselton, A.C., A Concise Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Religion (Oxford: One World, 2002), 126; cf. Fuchs, 'The Reflection which is Imposed on Theology by the Historical-Critical Method', 39; cf. Dilthey, Selected Works 1, 161.


241. Contradicting, McNicol, 'Review of The Two Horizons', 188.


argues, broadly positivist and existentialist approaches focus too exclusively on present horizons (though Dilthey, Collingwood, and Bultmann rightly associate meaning with 'historical relatedness'). Thus, in 'positivist' approaches "the interpreter's own experience of life becomes the test of all historical truth", the criterion of historical probability. 'Existentialist' approaches over-stress present human 'historicality', failing to maintain proper tensions between past, present, and future even if, on account of expanding horizons, Dilthey, Collingwood, and Bultmann know that interpretation can never be final. Contrary to Hegel, Thiselton also follows Pannenberg's distinction between 'history-as-a-whole' as the "totality of all reality" and God: these are "not interchangeable". Nevertheless, "speaking about God and... the whole of reality are not entirely different matters, but mutually condition each other... It is not... possible to speak of the whole of reality without in some way thinking of God". Thus, as already noted, Thiselton rejects Bultmann's sharp separation between God and the world.

2. The Unity of Historical Reality as Ground for Understanding and Language

Thiselton's second modified Hegelian criterion, following Pannenberg, is that the unity (not uniformity) of historical reality grounds the possibility and unity of understanding and language though, against Hegel's idealist abstraction, historical understanding is interwoven with concrete self-understanding (remembering Kierkegaard's criticism that Hegel "had forgotten existence"). Historical understanding cannot become a pure, albeit developing, 'system' abstracted from the concrete 'life' of human selves. The unity of historical reality is reflected in the a posteriori universal correspondence, correlative connections, or analogies existing between historical contingencies, and grounds the general axis of historical inquiry. For Thiselton, followed by J.I. Packer, D.E. Nineham's preclusion of ethical appeals to biblical texts because of historical distance violates this philosophical

251. Packer, 'Infallible Scripture', 331.
axiom. It is not a case of Thiselton’s “hopes and optimism” versus Nineham’s “pessimism”. The “success of... communication” depends on “shared life-structures in... human experience”, not “spatial and temporal proximity”. Thiselton outworks the unity of historical reality in at least three ways.

First, Thiselton rejects historical dualisms or dichotomies, notably Bultmann’s, between ‘history’ (human reality) and ‘nature’ (non-human, impersonal reality), and between Geschichte (human historicality - see below) and Historie (facts, report). By contrast, Collingwood rightly softens Dilthey’s dualism between human and natural forces. Thus, Thiselton’s stance is not dualistic, specifically in relation to Geschichte versus Historie, but also in relation to subject and object - though distinctions remain. Following Pannenberg, Thiselton also rejects the ‘salvation history’ versus ‘general history’ dichotomy of the Biblical Theology Movement.

Second, Thiselton rejects epistemological dualisms or dichotomies, notably Bultmann’s sharp separations of ‘primary’ historical and theological understanding from ‘secondary’ historical understanding, and of faith from its rational, even ‘scientific’, basis in history, where Bultmann follows G. Lessing’s divorce of theology from history. Faith is not blind credulity to authoritarian truth-claims, and Bultmann wrongly sharpens Dilthey’s distinction between historical understanding and scientific explanation. Historical understanding and self-understanding are also interwoven, though distinct,

252. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 57-58; cf. 60.
256. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 243-244; cf. Dilthey, Selected Works 4, 268.
263. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 248.
and Thiselton endorses Heidegger's critiques of Husserl's attempt to dualistically partition consciousness from history, and of Hegel's idealist abstractions.265

Third, Thiselton rejects linguistic dualisms or dichotomies - notably Bultmann's 'value versus fact' dualism (which has historical as well as linguistic aspects - see above; an event's or 'fact's' 'meaning' or 'value' - its internal structure aside - is its relation to its nexus of historical surroundings).266 Thiselton also opposes the early Wittgenstein's partly parallel dualistic or dichotomous separation of 'showing' from 'saying'. For the early Wittgenstein, 'saying' concerns the structural correspondence of elementary propositions to states of affairs - his 'picture theory' of meaning.267 However, for Wittgenstein, since language-limits determine world-limits, language cannot 'say' anything about existence, the mystical, logical form, or 'language' itself - but can only 'show' this realm of 'value',268 which Wittgenstein sought to protect "from reduction to the level of empirical propositions".269 'Showing', then, means allowing interpreters to 'notice' what cannot be 'said'. However, 'showing' also includes the analytic explication of concepts,270 a point not "remote from the main theme" of The Two Horizons,271 but valued by Thiselton (see below).272 Nevertheless, Thiselton draws parallels with the later Heidegger's dualistic separation of 'Saying' (cf. Wittgenstein's 'showing') from objectifying propositions (cf. Wittgenstein's 'saying'). For Thiselton, Heidegger's 'Saying' - the non-objectifying 'letting-be-seen' of 'what really matters' (cf. 'value') - also has its merits, but not as 'authentic' language supposedly grounded in 'Being' relative to disparaged objectifying language.273 Thiselton, then, opposing the early Wittgenstein's formalism and Heidegger, denies that 'showing' can be a-historical, or a priori, or divorced from assertions. Rather, drawing on the later Wittgenstein, he transposes 'showing' into a new unified historiographical framework, reuniting it with assertions (cf. 'saying') -

270. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 361, 367-369; cf. Wittgenstein, Tractatus, 72, cf. 89.
both are ‘historical’ actions. Thus, it is not simply that in the later Wittgenstein Thiselton “sees a
deliverance from the dualism of fact and value”\textsuperscript{274}. Rather, the underlying historiographical framework
of ‘life’ is also at stake. Thiselton’s historiographical framework transformation grounds his linguistic
framework transformation.\textsuperscript{275} The unity of language is grounded in the unity of history.\textsuperscript{276}

Returning to the second of these points, Thiselton develops his linking of ‘historical understanding’
and ‘self-understanding’ in three ways. First, Thiselton argues that historical understanding emerges
through self-understanding,\textsuperscript{277} agreeing with Heidegger and Bultmann that historical understanding
always begins with self-understanding - the interpreter’s questions, life-experience, or pre-
understanding - even if it then moves on.\textsuperscript{278} Initially, understanding ‘sees’ something ‘as’ something relative to prior horizons, and is not ‘neutral detachment’. Hence, speaking of God begins with speaking about ‘man’.\textsuperscript{279} Thiselton is critical of Dilthey, Heidegger and Bultmann, however, for whom historical understanding too easily collapses into self-understanding. Collingwood better preserves the distinction between ‘I’ and ‘Thou’\textsuperscript{280}. Second, Thiselton argues that self-understanding emerges through a
detour into historical understanding, identifying the self in relation to, and by contrast with, the
historically ‘other’.\textsuperscript{281} Thiselton partly accepts Dilthey’s view that the ‘I’ is rediscovered in the ‘Thou’,
but follows Collingwood’s criticism that Dilthey comes too close to identifying ‘I’ and ‘Thou’.
Similarly, Thiselton partly accepts Dilthey’s view that self-understanding does not come through
introspection, but through a projection of the self into others’ past experience so as to re-live it.\textsuperscript{282} Yet,
following Collingwood’s criticism, such ‘re-living’ is not ‘actual’ - though it is experiential and
existential, making Dilthey’s term ‘life’ more appropriate than Collingwood’s term ‘thought’.\textsuperscript{283} With
G. Yorck, Thiselton agrees that history involves critical self-examination via texts, enlarging
interpreters’ experience.\textsuperscript{284} Similarly, with Gadamer, ‘distancing’ jogs unconscious pre-judgements,
which contrast with texts, into conscious awareness, leading to self-understanding and

\textsuperscript{274} Querying, Harrisville, ‘Review of The Two Horizons’, 216; contradicting, Schneiders, ‘Review of The Two Horizons’, 307-
309; cf. Wittgenstein, On Certainty, 2c.

\textsuperscript{275} Bartholomew, ‘Before Babel and After Pentecost’, 137.


\textsuperscript{277} Thiselton, Two Horizons, 105, 107, 149, 152, 154-155, 157, 163-164, 165, 166, 176, 196-197, 228, 232, 236, 237.

\textsuperscript{278} Thiselton, Two Horizons, 105, 107, 109-110, 197, 232, 236-237; cf. Bultmann, ‘The Problem of Hermeneutics’, 239-
243; cf. Bultmann, ‘Is Understanding Without Presuppositions Possible? (1957)’, 149; cf. Heidegger, Being and Time, 188-
195.

\textsuperscript{279} Thiselton, Two Horizons, 39, 165-166, 230-233; cf. Owen, Revelation and Existence, 91.

\textsuperscript{280} Thiselton, Two Horizons, 196-197, cf. 291-292, cf. 242,243; cf. Heidegger, Being and Time, 84; cf. Bultmann, ‘On the
Problem of Demythologising (1952)’, 104.

\textsuperscript{281} Thiselton, Two Horizons, 236, cf. 237-238.

\textsuperscript{282} Thiselton, Two Horizons, 235-236, cf. 242-243; cf. Dilthey, Selected Works 1, 347-351f.

\textsuperscript{283} Thiselton, Two Horizons, 241-243, cf. 243-244.
transformation. Third, Thiselton argues that self-understanding is an aspect of historical understanding, since the self is 'historical': Thiselton grounds his hermeneutical critique of the self in his hermeneutical critique of history. With Dilthey, Thiselton regards human life as the subject of history though, with Collingwood, not as its only subject. Chapters 6 and 7 of The Two Horizons continue Thiselton's philosophical dialogue in relation to his hermeneutic of the self. Thus "the early Heidegger focussed primarily on man" and, "in connection with... theologians influenced by him" i.e. Bulmann especially, Thiselton provides "valuable discussion of Paul's anthropology". Not able to accept Heidegger's analytic of Dasein in every respect, Thiselton later widens this dialogue considerably. However, Thiselton is more critical of what Heidegger neglects to say than of what he does say, arguing that Heidegger correctly re-grounds consciousness historically, in critique of Husserl. Thus, Thiselton refuses to approach Heidegger through Husserl. Citing Gadamer, just as the later Wittgenstein criticises "Anglo-Saxon semantics" for being a-historical, so Heidegger criticises the ahistorical art of phenomenological description.

It is fruitful here to expound what D.S. Dockery calls Thiselton's "very complex" appeal to Heidegger, since it "leaves the reader wanting further explanation". Further, Thiselton's grounding of an extension of his philosophical dialogue in relation to a critique of the self in his critique of history is one of the ways in which he makes concrete, and thereby modifies and sublates (not in

284. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 238, cf. 235.
286. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 250-251.
287. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 239-240; cf. 243; cf. 244-245; cf. 250-251.
289. McHann Jr., The Three Horizons, 224.
292. Erickson, 'Review of The Two Horizons', 372; cf. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 144-145.
Hegel’s idealist sense), the Hegelian criterion of the unity of history which, by itself, is too abstract. 295 Bearing in mind Thiselton’s rejection of dualisms in Heidegger and Bultmann (see above), together with our critical response to Thiselton’s reading of Heidegger in Chapter 3, then his appeal to Heidegger is best summarised as follows.

First, Thiselton argues that Heidegger rightly grounds Dasein in ‘history’, but wrongly disparages the historical past. Thus, ‘history’ includes Dasein as a contingent historical reality or ‘truth’, against empiricist notions of the self as ‘object’ and rationalist notions of the self as ‘subject’.296 Yet, for Heidegger, Dasein’s “historicality... is prior to... ‘history’ (world-historical historizing...)”.297 Nevertheless, with Heidegger, historical ‘truth’ is not just abstract propositions or ‘information’, or the passive undergoing of present-at-hand objects, or disowned reified temporality split off from ‘reality’.298 History is the continuously created happening of contingencies, chiefly manifest in, and partially unveiled but partially hidden to, historically finite selves (Thiselton does not sacrifice “hiddenness”):299 “the theme of historiology is... the possibility which has been factically existent”.300 Thus, history is pre-conditional for the concrete possibility of the recurrence of human existential possibility.301 Whilst Thiselton departs from Heidegger’s near reduction of ‘history’ to Dasein,302 ‘history’ does include selves.303

297. Heidegger, Being and Time, 41.
300. Heidegger, Being and Time, 447.
303. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 250-251.
Second, Thiselton argues that Heidegger rightly analyses Dasein temporally in terms of ‘worldhood’, grounded in the past and present, and ‘historicality’, relating more to the present and future. Worldhood relates to “the structure of that wherein Dasein as such already is” and “historicality” is “the repetition of the heritage of possibilities by handing these down to oneself in anticipation.” Thus, the “horizon of temporality” is “the ontological meaning” of “Dasein’s Being”.

Thus, for Thiselton, Heidegger rightly affirms pre-cognitive worldhood though, wrongly, at the expense of cognitive factors. Thus, with Heidegger, each historical Dasein manifests ‘worldhood’, a pre-cognitive a priori to reflection ‘conditioned’ by Dasein’s historical ‘situatedness’, ‘facticity’, and ‘thrownness’ into a pre-given concrete historical ‘world’ or ‘heritage’ of tradition, culture, attitudes, perspectives, and practical concerns. Dasein’s “thrownness” suggests “the facticity” of Dasein’s “Being-delivered-over to the ‘there’” a priori to “the factuality belonging to presence-at-hand”. Dasein’s situated and conditioned worldhood - closely linked to Dasein’s possibilities of understanding - is provisionally bound” by its pre-cognitive ‘horizons’, which are not (therefore) just a matter of ‘world-view’, or ‘perspective’, or ‘understanding’. ‘World’ and ‘worldhood’ are Existentialia, or fundamental characteristics of Dasein, which has “Being-in-the-world as its essential state”. For Thiselton, the “notion of pre-cognitive ‘worlds’” is the earlier Heidegger’s “most valuable” contribution, and is developed later in Ricoeur’s “narrative-worlds of possibility”.

Still on the subject of worldhood or embeddedness within the ‘world’, Thiselton argues that Heidegger rightly stresses tradition’s capacity to distort ‘truth’, but underplays its capacity to transmit truth (but see Chapter 3). Thus, Heidegger stresses Dasein’s “fallenness” (not the biblical notion) or

305. Heidegger, Being and Time, 120.
306. Heidegger, Being and Time, 442.
311. Contradicting, Macquarie, Theology, Church and Ministry, 30.
313. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 155; cf. 161; cf. 169; cf. Heidegger, Being and Time, 84.
314. Heidegger, Being and Time, 80.
“Being-lost in the... ‘they’” of popular culture. ‘Fallenness’ involves “idle talk”, or blinding language perpetuating received perspectives; “curiosity”, the crowd-pleasing novelty of what one ‘must have seen or read’; “ambiguity”, the sense of ‘familiarity’ and ‘accessibility’ associated with a counterfeit sense of ‘having understood’; and ‘lostness’, being under the spell of “absorption in” the “everyday” of inauthentic fascination with the Dasein-with of others (cf. gossip). S. Perry links ‘Idle Talk’ to Stanley Fish’s “pragmatist hermeneutics”, finding it “curious” that Thiselton does not. ‘Idle Talk’, however, relates to distortions perpetuated by the language of traditions, whereas Thiselton’s later critique of Fish centres on the historical, epistemological, and linguistic problems of contextual-relativism. Nevertheless, Perry has a point.

Thiselton agrees with Heidegger that each Dasein manifests historicality (cf. ‘existentiality’), where “Existenz” is Dasein’s “ontically distinctive” mode of “existence” in contrast to that of mere objects. Eksistenz is Dasein’s unique ability to stand apart from itself to inquire about Being, though Thiselton - since he unifies historical reality - distinguishes ‘ontological’ inquiry into selves from ‘ontic’ inquiry into objects less sharply than Heidegger, for whom “ontological inquiry is... more primordial” than “the ontical inquiry of the positive sciences”.

Thiselton approves aspects of Heidegger’s analysis of existentialia associated with historicality, but not what he perceives to be Heidegger’s disparagement of subject-object conceptualisation, comparative testing, and assertive language. Thus, positively, Heidegger rightly links pre-cognitive ‘feeling-states’ (cf. “state-of-mind”, “mood”, not mere feelings) to truth-“disclosure”, “understanding” (pre-cognitive awareness prior to logic and “interpretation”: seeing as “for-the-sake-of-which” relative to the horizons of ‘world’ - cf. ‘life’ in the later Wittgenstein) to the hermeneutical “circle” and projected

future "possibility" related to Dasein's concerns;321 and "discourse" (cf. "language") to inter-personal "communication" (cf. the later Wittgenstein's notion).322

Third, Thiselton argues that Heidegger rightly views the self as a unified 'whole', but that Heidegger wrongly insists that "Dasein reaches its wholeness in death". Further, Heidegger rightly grounds ethics concretely, but is too individualistic, lacking the relational dimensions of accountability to God and others, making his "analysis of conscience" too "distant from a theological exegesis of conscience". Thus, (i), for Heidegger, 'Care' ("the Being of Dasein itself is... made visible as care"), brought to light by "anxiety" (as opposed to "fear"), binds existentialia into a unified "whole" with three overlapping two-fold structures. Care's two-fold temporal "structure" is "thrown projection" or 'conditioned historicality' in which, whilst bound by finitude and conditioning, Dasein simultaneously instrumentalises its "heritage" (relating to itself in 'self-understanding'), reaching towards the future and towards self-transcendence or "Being-ahead-of-oneself" (cf. Paul's contrast between 'body' and 'spirit' in Bultmann).323 Dasein as "essentially ahead of itself... has projected itself upon its potentiality-for-Being before... any mere consideration of itself".324 Care's two-fold inter-active structure is Dasein's care about the non-human, or "concern", as distinct from its care for other Daseins, or "solicitude".325 Care's two-fold self-relational structure (which Thiselton later explicitly qualifies with reference to inter-subjectivity) either falls into self-betrayal and evasion (Dasein at odds with itself "loaded down with the legacy of a 'past' which has become unrecognizable") or obeys the 'Call of Care' (Dasein at one with itself in "resoluteness against the inconstancy of distraction").326 This 'Call' is not abstract, but part of Dasein - the silent discourse of conscience - meaning that ethics cannot have an abstract

“intellectual” basis. Dasein is “the caller of the call of conscience”. The ‘Call’ directs Dasein from the ‘forfeiture’ of “the everyday they-self” (so far as is possible) to ‘futurity’ and, despite its “uncanny mode of keeping silent”, discloses to Dasein both its historical heritage and its projected possibilities or “the ‘whither’” (cf. counselling, where words are found to ‘disclose’ prior ‘silent’ ‘uncanny’ feeling-states). (ii) Obedience to the ‘Call of Care’ is the ‘historical motion’ of Geschichte: by repeated decisions, Dasein moves through self-understanding towards an appropriation of historical heritage that transcends that heritage - “the resolute taking over of one’s factual ‘there’”. This is ‘freedom’, a ‘free shouldering of destiny in active happening self-extension’. Whilst always limited by heritage and the practicalities of finitude, ‘freedom’ projects possibilities in openness towards the future horizon of death as ‘whole’. Thus, “Dasein hands itself down to itself, free for death, in a possibility... it has inherited and yet... chosen”. Geschichte is thus “Being-towards-death”, authentic historical motion in the face of the possibility of being-itself, of the horizon of one’s “ownmost” possibility as “the possibility of the impossibility of... existence”. Geschichte gives up the self-protective hold on existence that characterises the evasions of “lostness in the everydayness of the they-self”. Thus, Geschichte re-paradigms Dasein’s mode of existence into ‘futurity’, transforming pre-occupations, concerns, and discourse, and ‘individuating’ the self out of lostness in the ‘they’, whilst simultaneously allowing it to become authentically relational in ‘solicitude’. Yet, “the transcendence of Dasein’s Being” distinctively involves “radical individuation”. Thus, Thielson still regards Heidegger’s notion of authenticity as too individualistic - a double self-centredness marked by absence of accountability to God and others. Further, for Pannenberg, contrary to Heidegger, “death does not ‘round out man’s

328. Heidegger, Being and Time, 321.
331. Heidegger, Being and Time, 434.
337. Heidegger, Being and Time, 62.
existence into a whole’ but rather ‘breaks off our life, so that even... the successful life remains a fragment’... human beings’ intention toward wholeness, toward well-being, necessarily reaches beyond death’”. 339 Similarly, Thiselton’s eschatological emphasis prevents him linking ‘death’ and ‘wholeness’ too closely. 340 Thus, later, he locates the ‘narrative’ of a human life within the larger temporal narrative ‘whole’ of divine fulfilment of eschatological promise. 341

Fourth, Thiselton agrees with Heidegger’s stress on Dasein’s uniqueness and particularity, though there is more room for an a posteriori general axis at the level of inter-subjectivity. Since “Dasein has in each case mineness... one must always use a personal pronoun... ‘I am’, ‘you are’”. Whilst Heidegger has posited some ‘general’ characteristics of Dasein, these are a posteriori to that which is particular: Heidegger does not offer a ‘transcendental’ notion of selfhood in the Kantian sense, though “does not completely escape the problematic of transcendental reflection”. Thus, Dasein is more fundamental than ‘subjectivity’ in Kant or Kierkegaard, and to speak of Dasein as an ‘object’ is depersonalisation. 342

In this context, Thiselton rejects an over-stress on the continuity of ‘human nature’ in the later Dilthey. 343

Fifth, Thiselton gives qualified approval to Bultmann’s adaptation of Heidegger’s thought in relation to Pauline anthropology. Bultmann rightly overturns perennial quasi-Platonic interpretations of Pauline anthropology in terms of parts, substance, nature, object, properties, or mind versus body dualism. With Bultmann, Thiselton does not think in terms of the “essence of persons”. 344 a “person as a

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whole, can be denoted by *soma*".345 For Thiselton, Bultmann rightly follows Heidegger in relation to “two fundamental modes of existence” (though Thiselton again qualifies ‘self-relationality’ with a stronger emphasis on inter-subjectivity), and rightly notes that *sorx* can signify an inauthentic self-reliant mode of existence in which the self, at odds with itself (in contrast to the futurity of authenticity), clings to evasive strategies and false securities, particularly the past.346 Bultmann’s Christian can choose “to live ‘according to the flesh’ or... ‘according to the Spirit’”.347 The former is a “sinful self-delusion that one lives out of the created world”.348 Bultmann also rightly notes that ‘body’ and ‘spirit’ can signify the self as a whole, unified person:349 “when Paul speaks of the *pneuma* of man” he means “simply his self” (on *soma* see above).350 Thus, “Bultmann saw in Heidegger a way of expressing the gospel in twentieth-century language: God speaks an existential word of address that calls humanity into grace-filled holistic living (*Dasein*), though Heidegger’s ‘Dasein’ is not identical to Bultmann’s, nor Bultmann’s to Thiselton’s ‘self’.351 For Kierkegaard, Bultmann and Thiselton a hermeneutic of the self relates to an important goal of hermeneutics: obedience to God, who calls from beyond even the conscience of the self.352 Heidegger, however, “does not characterise the attitude of resolution as submission”.353

3. The Process of Historical Dialectic as Earthed in a Hermeneutic of Traditions

Thiselton’s third modified Hegelian criterion, following Pannenborg, is that the dialogic, dialectic process of creative historical synthesis generates historical continuities and particularities. Historical truth is not ‘timelessly unchangeable’, but full of contradictions.354 Thiselton’s ‘modification’ is that, along with Gadamer, Hegel’s dialectic is earthed in a hermeneutic of traditions (a subset of Thiselton’s

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critique of history).\footnote{354} Contrary to Hegel, historical understanding cannot become a pure, albeit developing, ‘system’ abstracted from the concrete ‘life’ of human traditions. Gadamer complains that “Hegel sees Bildung [culture] brought to completion through the movement of alienation and appropriation in a complete mastery of substance, in the dissolution of all concrete being”. However, history ongoingly and creatively synthesises chronologically developing concrete traditions that, in turn, constitute socio-historical extensions of the hermeneutical circle (or spiral).\footnote{356} Thiselton also modifies Gadamer’s thinking, however, in relation both to tradition and to the hermeneutical circle. Thus, first, whilst “language [is] the medium of understanding” (citing Gadamer), “it is so via the intertwining of language with history in tradition-history, specifically the history of the transmission of traditions, in such a way that language is grounded in historical reality” (correcting Gadamer).\footnote{357} Gadamer’s hint of something behind language in his adaptation of the “verbum interius” is inadequate.\footnote{358} Second, Thiselton does not just ‘take over’ “Gadamer’s phrase ‘the fusion of horizons’”,\footnote{359} but modifies the very grammar of ‘fusion’ and ‘distancing’ - more important than alterations such as using the term ‘spiral’.\footnote{360} Six sub-headings will help us here:

\section*{a) Traditions as Interwoven ‘Wholes’: Diachronic Life-Contexts for Understanding\footnote{362}}

For Thiselton, traditions are wholes: life-contexts for understanding, subsidiary to history-as-a-whole, which interweave thought, culture, actions, language, events, meanings, and interpretations. Facts and meanings are interwoven in an inseparable unity, against E. Troeltsch’s broadly positivist abstraction of ‘brute facts’ from interpretation and meaning, and against Kähler’s and Bultmann’s broadly

\begin{thebibliography}{99}

\footnote{356}{Thiselton, Two Horizons, 321-326, 80, 81, 83, 66-67; cf. Conroy, ‘Review of The Two Horizons’, 564; and, Conn, ‘Normativity, Relevance, and Relativism’, 194, 198. Citation from Gadamer, Truth and Method, 15.}
\footnote{360}{Thiselton, Two Horizons, 313, cf. 342-352, 386-407.}
\footnote{361}{Blomberg, C.L., ‘Interpreting the Parables of Jesus: Where are We and Where Do We Go from Here?’, CBQ 53.1 (1991), 59; cf. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 104.}
\end{thebibliography}
existentialist abstraction of theological or existential interpretation from historical facts and Old Testament tradition. For Thiselton, traditions should not be artificially disintegrated in these ways.

For Thiselton, traditions also bridge past and present horizons as *diachronic frames of reference for meaning* such that, with Gadamer, meaning goes beyond authorial intent without adding new textual content:

"the *mens auctoris* does not [completely] limit the horizon of understanding." The issue of 'present meaning' is unavoidable since understanding never merely 'repeats' the past, but creates new relationships between texts and successive generations of readers as traditions develop. Hence, Thiselton agrees with Gadamer that understanding is placing oneself in the process of tradition, with a dialectic emphasis on past and present horizons that also, in line with Pannenberg, reaches towards the future: "understanding is... participating in an event of tradition, a process of transmission".

This grounds Thiselton’s later criticism of Stanley Fish (and some approaches in pastoral theology) for locating meaning solely in present horizons. In 1999 Thiselton, unfairly to himself, comments that he had previously “failed to identify... the fundamentally a-historical viewpoint of reader-response theory”. However, in 1985 and 1992, he clearly notes the loss of the ‘two horizon’ perspective in Fish’s stance. Thiselton’s dialectic emphasis on two horizons also grounds his later attempt “to steer between the Scylla of mechanical repetition and the Charybdis of radical polyvalency and unconstrained textual indeterminacy”. For Thiselton “a text is not restricted to one meaning; yet the text must be respected as Other, and it embodies communicative action, while its readers are situated in community and tradition.” For Thiselton, in *The Two Horizons*, history retains its ‘operative influence’ despite an emphasis on readers, where he argues that the biblical writings reflect this

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hermeneutic of tradition. Thus, New Testament writers placed Old Testament texts in the context of the Christ-event, but also vice versa. The ‘double context’ for interpreting Scripture is God’s past salvific action and contemporary happenings. Thus, in the tradition of prophetic promise new events give old words new meaning.\footnote{371}

\textbf{b) Traditions as Developing Dialogic Processes: Extending the Hermeneutical Circle} \footnote{372}

For Thiselton, traditions are also chronologically developing \textit{traditio} - dialectic processes of dialogue between \textit{traditum} and community that ground, and constitute socio-historical extensions of, the hermeneutical circle: tradition is not a passive deposit.\footnote{373} Tradition ‘moves on’ through communities’ active corporate engagement (\textit{actus tradendi}) with biblical texts, a handed-on process of reading and re-reading the past in the light of the present (so N. Lash), giving rise to new subject-matter or ‘truths’ that transform pre-understandings, tradition itself, and the wider world. Readers are far from passive.\footnote{374} With Gadamer, Thiselton agrees that past and present horizons are continuously fused in a “history of... fusions” (Gadamer: “past and present are constantly mediated”),\footnote{375} and in readers’ quest to understand authors better than they understood themselves (a point to which Gadamer’s “inquiry lends... new importance”).\footnote{376} Thiselton makes this more explicit later, as L.M. MacCammon summarises. Thus, “authors and readers collaborate in ‘communicative actions’, generating a history of textual effects [cf. ‘post-history’] that... mediate judgements regarding textual content” and function as a “conversation partner with the present community or with successive communities in the re-actualisation of the text”.\footnote{377} Thus, G.R. Osborne’s recognition of “a dynamic, constant interaction of text, community, and context through time” does not go “beyond” Thiselton’s ‘two-horizon’ perspective.\footnote{378} Challenging D.S. Dockery’s reading, Thiselton’s hermeneutical circle begins from, but is not “grounded in”, the present horizon. Rather it is grounded in a dialectic between past and

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present. This is not "simply a refinement" of formulating historical distance, since openness to the future and historical relationality remain in view. Later, we will expound how Thiselton modifies Gadamer's notion of the hermeneutical circle through appeals to other thinkers.

c) Traditions as Embracing Continuities: Public Criteria, Convictions, & Judgements

For Thiselton, chronologically developing traditions generate and embrace continuities - including public criteria, convictions, and judgements - relating closely to both extra-linguistic and linguistic dimensions.383

First, public criteria interweave stable patterns of extra-linguistic events, behaviour, and non-prescriptive linguistic rules, customs, or habits.384 We need not repeat earlier points about their status as 'pre-conditional' for the intelligibility and teachability of language, providing authentic language-uses with their logical grammar.385 For language to be 'language', it must have meaning relative to corporate public conventions grounded in tradition and 'life', and cannot be based upon individual experience alone.386 Later, Thiselton argues that language can only 'count as' functioning intelligibly within a tradition or 'Lebenform' (form of life) on the basis of public criteria of meaning. Conceptual grammar concerns extra-linguistic stance rather than 'mental' state,387 rendering Bultmann's notion of 'private' 'subjective' 'language' and his 'esoteric' conception of meaning untenable, despite his adoption of Dilthey's category of 'life' (see above). New Testament language is only intelligible against the background of Old Testament criteria.388 Later, correcting Heidegger, Gadamer, and Bultmann, Thiselton argues that public criteria necessarily embody assertions and can guide "present action".389

385. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 381-383; cf. 123.
Thiselton’s appeal to public criteria informs his later attack on the Protestant “myth of the unbiased, private reader”, where R. Lundin takes up Thiselton’s argument more recently.

Second, traditional continuities also include, following the later Wittgenstein, “scaffolding” convictions (see below), where these may be ‘traditional’ and ‘theological’ rather than ‘culture-relative’, contrary to D.E. Nineham and ‘pluralistic’ readings of the later Wittgenstein (see Chapter 7 and below). Similarly, a given language-game can occur in several theological traditions over many centuries. Thiselton makes this point in relation to biblical authority (see Chapter 7).

Third, with Gadamer, Thiselton stresses the stable role of “communal judgements, ‘the classic’ and traditions of tested wisdom”. It is “hermeneutically trained judgement”, not “universal scientific method”, that grounds “respect for the horizon of the Other as other” and “disciplined movement towards... fusion between... two horizons” - “historical consciousness must not rely” solely on “critical method”. Thus “Thiselton notes with Gadamer that a ‘hermeneutically trained mind’ should ‘distinguish between those pre-judgements which are fruitful for the understanding of the text and those which are unfruitful’”. This “filtering process” “lets local and limited prejudices die away” and “those that bring about genuine understanding... emerge”.

Thus, whilst Thiselton retrospectively remarks that he perceived ‘similarities’ between Gadamer and the later Wittgenstein in this context, he nevertheless grounds the continuities of tradition, including linguistic continuities, firmly in extra-linguistic history, correcting Gadamer’s more ambiguous intra-linguistic mediation of historical judgements in which, “Being that can be understood is language”. Language is grounded, in part, in historical continuities.


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d) Traditions as Embracing Particularities: Uniqueness & Difference

For Thiselton, chronologically developing traditions also generate or embrace historical particularities and novelities, uniqueness and difference. We have already noted the uniqueness of human selves, but there are other implications, as follows.

First, drawing on Pannenberg, Thiselton agrees that historical particularities are unrepeatable, non-exchangeable, and non-homogeneous. Historical unity precludes dualisms or dichotomies, but allows distinctions, between human and non-human, God and world, general and particular, and between historical understanding and scientific explanation. The historically ‘other’ is not so alien as to prohibit understanding, but different enough to prohibit its complete assimilation into modern horizons. For Thiselton, then, historical particularity limits the scope of historical analogy. Contrary to E. Troeltsch and D.E. Nineham, analogy with interpreters’ present experience is not the criterion of historical probability.

Second, similarly, for Thiselton, historical particularity means that historical understanding and self-understanding, though linked, are still distinct. ‘Not self’ cannot be reduced to ‘self’. Yet, Diltzhey tends to subsume ‘Thou’ beneath ‘I’, and ‘divine’ beneath ‘human’, whilst Heidegger tends to subsume ‘past’ beneath ‘present possibilities’, truth encountered through Dasein to Dasein, and collective destiny beneath individual destiny. As well as following Heidegger, Bultmann also subsumes the ‘not yet’ beneath the ‘now’, and objectivity beneath subjectivity. In Thiselton’s thinking, conflating historical- and self-understanding raises difficulties for liberation theology and

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some reader-response theories, particularly for "neo-pragmatist philosophy", which reduces theology and history "to the status of a commodity shaped by consumer tastes". Scholars should not neglect "the implications of their own world view for their work"; nor should pastors force "the biblical text to fit their own cultural and/or practical agendas". Thiselton attacks the "polarisation" of over-stressing either present horizons (as in these cases) or past horizons as in British New Testament studies.

Third, for Thiselton, historical particularity means that language and meaning are grounded in life-diversity. With K.-O. Apel, against the early Wittgenstein's formalism, Thiselton argues that the later Wittgenstein was right to shift the a priori ground of language from abstract formal logic, system, calculus, 'self-evident' propositions, and generalisations independent of the future to the temporally changing stream of life diversity (historical particularities, forms of life, training and upbringing, language-games, language-situations, actions, world, life-settings, attitudes, etc.). "Heidegger's belief that the world of Dasein is something prior to subject-object thinking and to cognitive propositions" is parallel to the later Wittgenstein's shifting of the 'a priori'. Thus, Thiselton argues, surroundings, training, and applications - which are open-ended towards the future - become important for assessments of meaning. Drawing on the later Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Gadamer, Thiselton argues that corporate creativity and changes in life situations generate changes in historical particularities, language-uses, linguistic worlds, and concepts and thus free us from imprisonment within the same. Nevertheless, all language-uses belong to given language-games, so we cannot ask


413. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 372-373.


416. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 376-378.

questions outside the latter. This undermines “earlier scholarship oriented towards finding the essential meaning of a key word or term, since the use-context is of decisive importance”.418 In particular, Thiselton applies this principle to the biblical polymorphous concepts, ‘faith’, ‘flesh’, and ‘truth’, to the problem of justification by faith in Paul, and to the inseparability of faith and works in James.419 Thiselton notes that the early Heidegger similarly views signs as “ready-to-hand” “equipment”, discourse as inter-personal communicative action, and meaning as signs’ ready-to-hand purpose. Again, the ‘logic prior to life’ relation is reversed to ‘life prior to logic’, though Thiselton argues that the later Wittgenstein rightly avoids Heidegger’s historical, epistemological, and linguistic dualisms.420

Fourth, for Thiselton, links between language and historical particularity preclude the imposition of generalising models onto texts found in the early Wittgenstein, linguistics, and structuralist approaches, although Thiselton remains ‘sympathetic’ to Saussure.421 In his problematic criticism that Thiselton neglects a “discussion of the purpose (or purposes) of the New Testament texts”, 422 B.J. Walsh may have missed Thiselton’s resistance to generalisation. The “multi-purpose nature of the biblical text must be recognised”.423

Fifth, Thiselton’s linking of meaning to historical particularity does not undermine his view that ‘present meaning’ reflects the dialogic relationship between two horizons.424 ‘Present meaning’, and even aspects of past meaning, change as new relationships are forged between old and new historical particularities.425 Later, K.J. Vanhoozer asserts, “what fixes the meaning of a text is what the author said/did… this does not change at the behest of the reader”. Vanhoozer complains that Thiselton

425. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 303, cf. 80, cf. 67, cf. 175, cf. 312.

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“misleadingly associates me with those who see meaning in terms of reference”. However, Thiselton is perhaps criticising Vanhoozer's point that 'what the author said/did', as 'referent', 'fixes the meaning of a text'. Vanhoozer sees Thiselton's later development of a dialogic approach: "Thiselton explores Ricoeur's (and Hans Robert Jauss's) suggestion that the meaning of a literary work rests on the dialogical relation between the work and its audience in each age". But Vanhoozer may miss its earlier development in *The Two Horizons*. Further, for Thiselton, the Bible is not "merely literature"; it may be "different... from other literary creations", but it also contains 'everyday' language.

Sixth, Thiselton's grounding of language and meaning in historical continuities and particularities confirms that his critique of *history* is more fundamental than, and constitutes the ground for, his critique of *language* - Thiselton's critique of history is thus his most fundamental 'second stratum' critique. For Thiselton, this point also helps to confirm the ontological priority of history over language. Thus, the conceptual core of *The Two Horizons* is a historical unification of major hermeneutical critiques, exposing later misunderstandings of the place of the philosophy of *language* and speech-act theory in Thiselton's thinking. Thiselton does not have 'later Wittgensteinian presuppositions'; "Wittgenstein and the speech-act theory of Austin and Searle" are not his "central" conceptual tools in New Testament interpretation; Thiselton does not follow J.R. Searle's "attempt to use Austin's work to develop... a metaphysic or ontology". Certainly, Thiselton's "goal" is not simply to show "how speech-act theory enables an understanding of how life can be transformed by communicative action in relation to the biblical text".

Seventh, we may accept K.J. Vanhoozer's, R.S. Briggs', and C.G. Bartholomew's reading of Thiselton in this context, but challenge Vanhoozer's refutation of Thiselton's stance. For Vanhoozer's 'Thiselton', "speech-act analysis is most helpful in understanding particular parts of the Bible". Conversely, Vanhoozer views "speech-act philosophy as contributing categories for a full-fledged interpretation

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theory that resonates well with properly theological themes”. 433 Thus, according to Briggs, Vanhoozer views “speech-act theory as an overarchin perspective within which different genres are at work”. By contrast, “Thiselton’s view” is “that even without a vantage point exterior to the hermeneutical debate one may still make good use of speech-act theory in cases where it addresses issues appropriate to the texts in hand”. 434 C.G. Bartholomew also adopts this supposed contrast between Vanhoozer and Thiselton. 435

Superficially, as in A.K.M. Adam’s reading of Thiselton (see Chapter 7), Thiselton can sometimes seem to align with Vanhoozer’s perspective: for Thiselton, since language is communicative action of different particular kinds with multiple functions, speech-act theory is almost ‘over-arching’ at one level, being almost always relevant. 436 However, the focus here is narrower than that of hermeneutics as a whole. In the latter context, Thiselton’s argument for the non-‘over-arching’ status of speech-act theory seems irrefutable. On ‘stratum one’, Thiselton stresses the need for dialogue with multiple disciplines and approaches, including speech-act theory which, therefore, cannot be ‘over-arching’. 437 On ‘stratum two’, ‘language’ is only one of Thiselton’s five spheres of discourse, and less fundamental than ‘history’. So, again, speech-act theory is not ‘over-arching’. 438 During interpretative practice (stratum three), Thiselton employs multiple interpretative models. 439 Again, action or speech-acts cannot “provide a comprehensive model for the solution of all hermeneutical problems. No theoretical model provided by hermeneutical theory can obviate the need first and foremost to look at the text itself in its linguistic and historical particularity”. 440 Thus, B.D. Ingraffia and T.E. Pickett caution Vanhoozer elsewhere, noting Thiselton’s refusal to imperialise any single hermeneutical

438. Cf. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 51-84.

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model.441 Overall, the issue turns on historical particularity, which cannot be reduced to linguistic particularity - even that of historical speech-acts.

c) Traditions as Conditioning Contexts: De-Centring Individual Subjectivity442

For Thiselton, chronologically developing traditions also condition texts and readers, where Gadamer’s link between conditioning and tradition complements Heidegger’s and Bultmann’s link between conditioning and individual subjectivity. Subjectivity is thus ‘de-centred’, but not ignored.443 Several points should be made, as follows.

First, for Thiselton, “historical conditioning is two-sided: the modern interpreter, no less than the text, stands in a given historical context and tradition”.444 Some extend this to include a pastoral ‘third’ horizon (not to be confused with an eschatological ‘third horizon’) of those to whom the interpreter ‘ministers’, but this only adds a further understanding event between ‘two horizons’. Thiselton’s work


on translation precludes W.C. Kaiser’s criticism that he has neglected “a cross-cultural perspective in the work of interpretation”.

Second, for Thiselton, historical conditioning presupposes historical finitude, or situatedness within a larger socio-historical and theological framework. Situatedness is not just about context-relative identity “bound up with the fashions of the day”, but limits individual subjectivity’s interpretative arbitration since the self is always already addressed from beyond its own horizons. Thus, against an over-emphasis on individual subjectivity and the historical present in Heidegger and Bultmann (see above), or on culture-relativity in D.E. Nineham, the character of conditioning forces corporate tradition and the historical past to be taken into account. Thiselton’s emphasis on divine address and promise-fulfilment extends this theologically and towards the eschatological future.

Third, for Thiselton, with Gadamer and the later Wittgenstein, the interweaving of action (cf. training, praxis), language-habits, and thought in traditions and pre-understandings is prior to and preconditional for the possibility of conditioning. Language-habits, intentions, and acts of concept-formation, mutually condition, or even create, one-another - and are inseparable. Against ‘scientific’ instrumentalisation of language by ‘thought’, language-habits are the universal transmission medium for understanding. Against Bultmann’s linguistic dualism, no pre-given abstract system of thought-


452. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 217, 287, 313, 319, 326, 341, 342-347, 347-352, 354-355; cf. 82-84.

possibilities exists prior to language.\textsuperscript{454} Thiselton’s reversal of Gadamer’s ontological prioritisation of language relative to history remains in the background.\textsuperscript{455}

\textit{Fourth}, for Thiselton, with Gadamer, the dialectical process of interaction between a community’s prior language and an interpreter’s prior consciousness is also pre-conditioned for historical conditioning: tradition ‘comes to speech’ only in the language and concepts of the interpreter.\textsuperscript{456} Thus, for Thiselton, with Fuchs and Ebeling, “the same thing must be said in a new time differently”.\textsuperscript{457} And, with W. Wink, the common world of tradition is pre-conditioned for the possibility of language, communication, and fusion. Thus, conditioning involves multiple eventful fusions of horizons through which interpreters are interpreted and transformed.\textsuperscript{458}

\textit{Fifth}, for Thiselton, historical conditioning occurs non-cognitively and cognitively.\textsuperscript{459} Interpreters are conditioned \textit{pre-cognitively} through \textit{a priori} participation in traditions and communities.\textsuperscript{460} Thiselton draws parallels between Heidegger’s notion of “world”, Bultmann’s notion of “pre-understanding”, Gadamer’s notions of “horizon”, “tradition”, “linguistic tradition”, “linguisticality”, pre-judgements or “prejudices”, and institutional “signs”, and the later Wittgenstein’s notions of “form of life”, “language-games”, “training”, “community”, and “scaffolding”.\textsuperscript{461} Interpreters are conditioned \textit{non-conceptually} through practice, in relation to appropriation and application.\textsuperscript{462} Thus, Thiselton is not only interested in “dialogue between the... mental horizons of past and present”.\textsuperscript{463} Interpreters are also conditioned \textit{cognitively}, where pre-understanding may include systematic theologies as well as attitudes.\textsuperscript{464}


\textsuperscript{460} Thiselton, \textit{Two Horizons}, 305-306, cf. 188, 190-191, 194; cf. 324-326.


\textsuperscript{463} Correcting, Brodie, ‘Review of \textit{The Two Horizons}, 481.

\textsuperscript{464} Thiselton, \textit{Two Horizons}, 315.
Sixth, for Thiselton, historical conditioning occurs, in part, through both non-assertive and assertive linguistic functions, where these are interwoven. In Chapter 1 we examined Thiselton’s appeal to the later Wittgenstein in this respect, and will develop this point later in the present chapter. Seventh, Thiselton argues that historical conditioning may either facilitate or distort understanding. We defer comment on this point until we formulate a ‘hermeneutic of objectivity’ (see Chapter 7).

Pausing momentarily, we propose that Thiselton’s argument in The Two Horizons requires an extension relating to the complexity of historical conditioning that, even now, he has not completely carried out. By his ‘fourth period’ (1993-2000) Thiselton realises that any given ‘self’ is conditioned by complex arrays of traditions and communities and not just by single traditions or communities. In his ‘third period’ (1981-1992) Thiselton notes Stanley Fish’s work in relation to ‘multiple contexts’, though this is absent from The Two Horizons. Nevertheless, we propose that, theologically, different kinds and levels of fall-generated isolation - what C.E. Gunton called ‘disengagement’ - make historical conditioning even more complex. Dysfunctional relationship, for example manipulative strategies, avoidance strategies, and the agendas they serve - and complex combinations of these - are relevant to conditioning at both concrete and theoretical levels. Admittedly, in The Two Horizons, Thiselton appeals to M. Buber on depersonalisation, in which the ‘I-Thou’ relationship becomes an ‘I-It’ relationship. Thiselton also has qualified approval for Bultmann’s development of Heidegger’s notion of inauthentic existence in which selves either evade obedience to God, or more proactively attempt to procure life apart from God. Thiselton also looks at persuasive definition, which relates directly to manipulation, and at Freud’s emphasis on self-deception. Yet even in Thiselton’s later work, including his socio-critical comments paralleling Corinthian and Western ‘postmodern’ societies, there remains more scope for dialogue between Thiselton and pastoral theology in relation to the interaction between a hermeneutic of fallen relationships at a more immediate level and

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467. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 314.
472. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 403-404; cf. 113-114.
historical conditioning. We reject Nietzsche's point that, "It is invisible hands that torment and bend us the worst". Interpreters have relational 'histories' of the kinds investigated by counsellors, and dialogue could be extended to include the likes of R. Hurding, P. H. Ballard, S. Pattison, J. Woodward, D. Browning, E. Farley, P. Goodliffe, and others.474 In fairness, Thiselton realises this and has begun this dialogue, notably with C.V. Gerkin and D. Capps.475 His forthcoming publications also show encouraging signs in this direction.476

4. Focus: Thiselton’s Tradition-Refinement of Gadamer’s Hermeneutical Circle

Having expounded Thiselton’s hermeneutic of traditions, we return to its second axis to examine Thiselton’s modification of Gadamer’s hermeneutical circle. We will show how Thiselton sublates Gadamer’s hermeneutical circle into a larger framework of wider philosophical dialogue, both affirming Gadamer’s thinking in some ways, but also modifying Gadamer’s thinking in others. This has implications for how we perceive Thiselton’s ‘transformed framework’ for hermeneutics.

As the title ‘The Two Horizons’ suggests, Gadamer’s work is important for Thiselton’s formulation of the hermeneutical circle: understanding is a dialogic process that is never final; the hermeneutical circle is simply ‘true to life’477 - as “the interplay of the movement of tradition and the movement of the interpreter”.478 We need not revisit Thiselton’s concerns to move beyond sterile interests in either historical-critical or linguistic-critical ‘objectivity’,479 or beyond a “single preoccupation with historical

475. Thiselton, Interpreting God and the Postmodern Self, 53-54, 75-78.
method” since the Enlightenment.\(^{480}\) We should, however, add to our observations in Chapter 5 that, in *The Two Horizons*, (i) Thiselton expounds Gadamer’s notions of ‘distancing’ (‘foregrounding’ “temporal distance and its significance for understanding”) and ‘fusion’ (where “old and new are always combining into something of living value”) in relation to exegesis and systematic theology. Systematic theologies constitute “the end process, to date” of traditions of biblical exegesis and fusion, and help shape the pre-understandings out of which subsequent exegeses and fusions are initiated. The latter, in turn, re-shape pre-understandings and systematic theologies, and so on, round the hermeneutical circle. Thus, Thiselton bemoans the artificial “separation of... biblical exegesis and systematic theology”,\(^{481}\) and R.W.L. Moberly’s request that Thiselton provide a “fuller treatment” of the relationships between the Bible, Christian tradition and doctrine, reading, openness, and transformation is redundant.\(^{482}\) (ii) Thiselton again stresses creative reader effort and openness to textual action. Fusion cannot be expected simply to ‘happen’ during distancing.\(^{483}\) Again, Thiselton attacks semantic theories that artificially narrow linguistic function to ‘reference’, or to the transmission of cognitive content or truth, even if such functions remain important.\(^{484}\) Again, Thiselton argues that even semantic theories free from these problems still only concern textual horizons, not ‘present meaning’, and so cannot equate to the whole task of hermeneutics.\(^{485}\) Even translation, once liberated from an erroneous stress on surface-structure correspondence, necessarily involves interpretative judgements that amount to fusion. Thus, contrary to D.E. Nineham, fusion is not only possible but also unavoidable.\(^{486}\) As J.B. Webster puts it, “both hermeneutics and linguistic and semantic investigation” are necessary - though this is not Thiselton’s “underlying thesis” in *The Two Horizons*.\(^{487}\) (iii) Thiselton still implicitly holds to his four-fold ‘grammar’ of fusion (textual action, actualisation, appropriation, and application), where each aspect should be understood corporately as


\(^{484}\) Thiselton, *Two Horizons*, 121-124.


\(^{487}\) Webster, ‘Review of *The Two Horizons*, 219.
well as individually. This analysis of fusion contributes to what Thiselton will later call his hermeneutic of self-involvement.

Further supplementing our findings in Chapter 5, we turn to note how Thiselton develops his appeal to Gadamer’s hermeneutical circle in The Two Horizons. Crucially, as already noted, Thiselton does not simply find Gadamer’s hermeneutical circle ‘persuasive’, but modifies it. Certainly, as R.E. Palmer notes, this modification includes Thiselton’s appeal to Pannenberg. Thiselton appeals to Dilthey’s transposition of Schleiermacher’s ‘wholes’-‘parts’ polarity into a temporal historical key, further transposing it, after Pannenberg, into eschatological terms. This aligns with Thiselton’s later appeals to Dilthey’s work. Yet, possibly correcting Palmer, Thiselton’s ‘reception’ of Gadamer is not simply a ‘Pannenbergen critique’, as follows.

First, in The Two Horizons, some of Thiselton’s major emphases with respect to ‘distancing’ re-emerge with a slightly different slant. Distancing presupposes the accessibility of historical knowledge, against D.E. Nineham’s pessimism. Distancing employs corporate checks and accountabilities (against individualism), multiple models or angles of vision (against single controlling paradigms), rigorous historical-cultural (including sociological) reconstruction, and linguistic (including literary)

488. Cf. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 324-326.
496. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 15, 21, 68-69, 74-84, 86, 353.
Second, in two respects, Tischelton’s modification of Gadamer’s hermeneutical circle is less subtle, involves appeals to the later Wittgensteinian and Saussurian traditions. Deferring our look at the former (see below), we may note here that Tischelton appeals to the Saussurian tradition of language study to modify of Gadamer’s notion of distancing. That is, Tischelton appeals to the Saussurian tradition not only in relation to ‘language’ (‘stratum two’ - see Chapter 4), but also in relation to ‘understanding’ (stratum three) - Tischelton does not neglect this tradition. Thus, diachronic linguistics (see Chapter 4) are valuable for recovering lost dimensions of meaning, as in Herder’s recovery of the notion of truth as ‘uncovering’, where an entity ‘shows itself just as it is in relation’. Synchronic linguistics and semantics (which should precede diachronic linguistics - see Chapter 4), extend the traditional notion of ‘literal sense’ in terms of meaning within a text’s own horizon, aids distancing, safeguarding textual particularity and preventing premature fusion. Our ‘Jesus’ not merely reflect “our own viewpoints and assumptions” (so J. Macquarrie), since this would be “idolatry” (so J.I. Packer). Thus, for Tischelton, “meanings” are not “grounded in prejudice”.

Enter Tischelton’s major question in *The Two Horizons*: “How do the two horizons of the ancient and of modern readers actively engage with each other creatively without merely bland,

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entirely “endorsed Barr’s view”. Further, most reviewers miss the dialogue-widening significance Thiselton’s appeals to the tradition of Saussure and Barr. Thiselton is concerned to expand merely to ‘see’, readers’ pre-understandings. Thiselton does not just stress the “limited semantics”, but also its positive role in widening dialogue.

Third, Thiselton appeals to Schleiermacher to counter what he views as being Gadamer’s emphasising of the role of individual subjectivity (both that of authors and that of reader respect to the hermeneutical circle: for Gadamer, “subjectivity is a distorting mirror”. Thus, *(ii)* Horizons in Hermeneutics, Thiselton does not just show how Schleiermacher “changed the direct content of hermeneutics”, but defends Schleiermacher’s interpretation of texts against the linguistic backgrounds (including their authors). This is not the ‘genetic fallacy’, but concerning ‘other’, where Schleiermacher’s work also anticipates Saussure’s langue-parole distinction.

Watson summarises, "the quest for authorial intention... does not attempt to reconstruct... [an] unknowable psychological process but investigates" a text's "directedness" within its "linguistic conventions". This "can help... preserve a text's otherness against the self-absolutising tendencies of hermeneutical pragmatism and of the (post)structuralist proclamation of the death of the author".  

Thiselton does not focus on "texts and reader-responses" instead of upon "author's intention", but stresses both horizons, against over-emphasising the present horizon in existentialist hermeneutics.

(ii) We now propose that Thiselton's reinstatement of Schleiermacher is present in embryo in The Two Horizons. For Thiselton, admittedly, Schleiermacher's stress on "the strangeness of the other which eludes 'system'" anticipates Gadamer's respect for the 'other' and rejection of the "imperialising 'general method' of science". Citing Gadamer, "one does not... argue the other person down". Nevertheless, for Thiselton, Schleiermacher's emphasis on authors as 'whole' conscious persons qualifies (and is qualified by) Gadamer's emphasis on corporate tradition, unconscious pre-judgements, and a de-centred individual subjectivity. For Gadamer, though, "tradition... is always part of us" - selves are "dominated by prejudices", against Schleiermacher's supposed "psychological narrowness".


518. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 67, 103-107, 113, 166, 300-301.


Fourth, for Thiselton, appeal to the stress on individual selves in Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Bultmann also qualifies Gadamer’s hermeneutical circle (on Kierkegaard, see Chapter 3). For Heidegger, “historiology... has Dasein’s historicality as its presupposition”; for Bultmann, “history” concerns “the possibilities of... self-understanding”. Admittedly, Thiselton allows Gadamer a reciprocal correction of individualism in Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Bultmann: for Gadamer, “self-reflection and autobiography... are not primary”. We have also already noted Thiselton’s attack on Heidegger’s ‘solipsism’ (see Chapter 5). Heidegger neglects ‘inter-subjectivity’ and corporate responsibility; his hermeneutics are still rooted in “the orphaned Cogito”, requiring a “shift... to the interactive, relational self” ultimately “rooted in the divine/human relation”. As Gadamer argues, “Heidegger is not sufficiently aware of... the... dialectic that attaches to all... Heideggerian assertions”. However, Thiselton rejects Gadamer’s reduction of ‘consciousness’ to a mere “flickering in the closed circuits of historical life”. For Thiselton, the hermeneutical circle is doubly grounded in tradition and selfhood. Understanding is both a community’s dialectic inter-action with traditum in traditio, and it is ‘thrown projection’ - a future-orientated historical motion seeking to transcend situatedness whereby “existence and understanding are coterminous”. Thus, in 1981, possibly reflecting Ricoeur’s influence, Thiselton speaks of “the dialectic between the corporate and individual aspects” of understanding. Thus, for Thiselton, there is a reciprocal correction of Gadamer provided by Heidegger and Bultmann. This point is missed by commentators. Certainly, Thiselton does not simply present Gadamer’s “hermeneutics” as ‘Heideggerian’. We need not revisit earlier observations of Thiselton’s mutually reciprocal appeals to Heidegger and Gadamer with respect to the

capacity of tradition to distort or transmit truth respectively. We should note, however, that Thiselton’s hermeneutical circle includes a stronger place for critical testing than that of either Heidegger or Gadamer (see Chapter 3).

Fifth, Thiselton’s appeal to the later Wittgenstein also qualifies Gadamer’s hermeneutical circle. Wittgenstein’s ‘way’ (i.e. way of approaching philosophical ‘puzzles’) of ‘conditioned description’ (i.e. describing language-uses ‘philosophically’ whilst acknowledging that ‘description’ is historically conditioned) embraces notions of ‘showing’ and ‘noticing’. Wittgenstein asks, “how can we show someone that we know truths?... conduct exhibits the thing we are concerned with”. Elsewhere he writes, “noticing and seeing. One doesn’t say ‘I noticed it for five minutes”’. In Thiselton this alters Gadamer’s grammar of distancing (cf. ‘noticing’) and fusion (cf. ‘showing’) because the later Wittgenstein reinstates so-called ‘propositional’ language, highlighting what J.L. Austin would later call its many varied ‘performative functions’: a “grammatical proposition” can “show... the length of a rod”. Admittedly, ‘noticing’ and ‘showing’, like ‘distancing’ and ‘fusion’, contrast with hermeneutical foreclosure or mere assent to prior categories. Yet, in presupposing the active functioning of grammatical propositions in creatively extending understanding, ‘showing’ and ‘noticing’ contradict Gadamer’s devaluation of assertions, where S.R. Briggs rightly notes Thiselton’s two precursor articles to The Two Horizons in this respect. For Wittgenstein, “the role which propositions play in a language-game” is important whereas, for Gadamer, “meaning... reduced to

537. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 90e.
what is stated is always distorted".540 Hence, for Thiselton, the notion of 'language-event' is "strengthened... by the incorporation of insights from Austin and Wittgenstein".541 Similarly, Pauline argument uses propositions to clarify and extend concepts, contrary to R. Funk's dualistic prioritising of parable as 'metaphor' over against 'assertions'.542 Thus, for Thiselton, "showing' in the parables... and 'argument' in... Paul are two modes of discourse quite related to one another".543 And Thiselton's "discussion of parable and metaphor... is... relevant to Wittgenstein's concern to use language... to help others see what is already there".544 "philosophy... leaves everything as it is".545 Propositions, of course, may still 'say' - communicating information or arguments within existing frames of reference. Thiselton accepts "the distinction between grammatical and factual utterance" without dismissing the latter.546 But propositions may also 'show': citing Wittgenstein, "I can't imagine the opposite" may "look like an empirical proposition, but... is really a grammatical one".547 Summarising: Thiselton believes 'noticing' and 'showing' qualify Gadamer's notions of 'distancing' and 'fusion' respectively.

Thiselton argues that 'noticing' and 'showing' characterise the later Wittgenstein's 'whole' approach: Wittgenstein's whole approach is, in important ways, like the hermeneutical circle.548 Wittgenstein writes, "I should not like... to spare other people the trouble of thinking".549 In contrast to Heidegger's passive yieldedness, but aligning with hermeneutics broadly, Wittgenstein wishes to stimulate purposeful strenuous thought and inner change in his readers, training them in a new 'way' of handling problems, using conceptual tools to generate fresh angles of vision.550 Wittgenstein's goal is to "have changed your way of seeing".551 The 'familiar' is re-arranged (cf. 'gathering' in Heidegger) to break the spell of traditional ways of 'seeing' (cf. 'idle talk' in Heidegger), allowing the previously

545. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 49e.
547. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 90e.
548. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 370-372.
unnoticed to 'show' itself and be 'noticed' (cf. 'unveiling' in Heidegger). This contrasts with the mere information, explanation, deduction, or indoctrination of 'saying'.\textsuperscript{552} Citing Wittgenstein, "philosophy" is "description alone" prior to "all new discoveries and inventions", abolishing "grammatical illusions".\textsuperscript{553} 'showing', which elucidates or extends the logical grammar of language-games, concepts, or applications, is pre-conditional for finding new information in some senses, and is tied to understanding, extending understanding, and 'seeing as'.\textsuperscript{554} Wittgenstein writes, "determine how long an impression lasts by means of a stop-watch. The duration of knowledge, ability, understanding, [cf. the grammar of these concepts] could not be determined [i.e. shown, understood] in this way".\textsuperscript{555} And if 'showing' is tied to 'understanding' then, again, it relates to 'fusion'.

In relation to 'distancing' then, (i), Thiselton in effect appeals to the later Wittgenstein's notion of 'polymorphous concepts' to enable readers to 'notice' the variable grammar of 'faith', 'flesh', and 'truth' in the New Testament.\textsuperscript{556} (ii) Thiselton also appeals to Wittgenstein's notion of 'language-games' to allow readers to 'notice' conceptual clarifications in Paul's doctrine of justification by 'faith' as compared to 'faith' in James.\textsuperscript{557} (iii) 'Distancing' should also 'notice' how meaning relates to depth-grammar (i.e. language-games, uses, habits, content - see Chapter 4) as well as to 'accidental' surface-grammar - in critique of form criticism. Thus, Thiselton extends J.F.A. Sawyer's parallels between \textit{Sitz im Leben} and 'context of situation' to include parallels with 'language-games'. Summarising: 'distancing' includes 'noticing' concept-uses, concept-clarifications, and linguistic functions (including, in critique of Gadamer), the functioning of assertions. For Thiselton, Wittgenstein 'shows' how Gadamer's notion of 'distancing' requires modification. Thiselton wishes to 'notice' "biblical truths which are hidden only because we do not know how to look at them".\textsuperscript{558} Wittgenstein asks, "how do I employ the sentence?... a picture... can... serve a purpose".\textsuperscript{559}


\textsuperscript{553} Wittgenstein, \textit{Philosophical Investigations}, 47e, cf. 50e.


\textsuperscript{555} Wittgenstein, \\textit{Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology}, 11e.

\textsuperscript{556} Thiselton, \textit{Two Horizons}, 408-409, 409-411, 411-415.


\textsuperscript{559} Wittgenstein, \textit{Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology}, 114e.
In relation to ‘fusion’ then, in *The Two Horizons*, Thiselton argues, in effect, that biblical reading should ‘notice’ three classes of grammatical utterance that ‘show’, as follows. (i) Thiselton’s ‘class-one’ utterances ‘show’ by allowing readers to ‘notice’ trans-contextual rationality, or the processes within conceptualising itself, for example the mutual exclusion implicit in Paul’s grammatical utterances concerning ‘grace’ and ‘works’. Here, Thiselton is emphatically not returning to philosophical idealism or to the epistemological formalism of logical positivism, but talking about that ‘historical rationality’ for which historical ‘life’ is the *a priori* and which is *a posteriori* operative in all historical traditions. That is, all traditions employ ‘mutual exclusion’.  

560 “I cannot observe myself unobserved”,  

561 or “be in doubt at will”.  

562 Thiselton is not saying that what ‘class-one’ utterances ‘show’ or conceptually elucidate about ‘grace’ and ‘works’ is ‘universal or topic neutral’, but that what they show about ‘historical rationality’ is ‘universal’ or topic neutral. Class-one utterances *secondarily* serve as “an elucidation of the subject” that extends understanding,  

563 where P. Ellingworth thus misses Thiselton’s main point to complain that ‘grace’ and ‘works’ are ‘culture-relative’ concepts.  

The distinctive contexts or ‘settings’ of class-one utterances are dialogically open-ended, never-concluded, arguments - appealing to common sense, rationality, strict intellectual probity, wisdom, judgement; aiming at effective understanding; and uncommitted to any tradition of theology or ethics. Thiselton’s examples include Old Testament Wisdom literature and Pauline diatribe as expounded by Bultmann.  

564 Summarising: assertive language not only ‘shows’, thereby modifying Gadamer’s notion of ‘fusion’ - it also shows (or allows readers to ‘notice’) the very broadened ‘historical rationality’ that Gadamer himself articulates as operative within aesthetic consciousness. Gadamer’s disparagement of assertions detracted from his own work on the hermeneutical circle (see Chapters 3, 4, and 5).

This reading contradicts that of S.E. Porter, who likens Thiselton’s class-one utterances “to the analytical or *a priori* utterances of logical positivism” which are “not culturally relative”.  

566 However, Thiselton’s class-one utterances are ‘analytical’ without being *a priori*, positivist, or formalist, since they occur in language-games. As noted earlier, Thiselton transposes ‘showing’ into a different

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historiographical framework. Porter, however, makes Thiselton seem to be drawing on the early Wittgenstein or A.J. Ayer. On this false basis, Porter then imputes to Thiselton the notion that "ethics should be based upon first-class utterances" or "self-evident statements" which, since "the verifiability principle itself is unverified", they cannot. Porter then argues for the historicity of analytical statements, referencing the faith/works distinctions in Paul and James. All this, however, converges with Thiselton's own line of argument, since Thiselton's resolution of the Paul-James 'conflict' distinguishes between different language-games. Porter's attack on Thiselton's supposed attempt to base ethics on class-one utterances converges with Thiselton's sympathies with the Continental tradition for regaining a non-abstract basis for ethics.

(ii) Thiselton's 'class-two' utterances 'show' the 'scaffolding' convictions of traditions - for example, the utterance 'God is good'. Thiselton argues that when 'traditional' or "theological content" is involved (i.e. the "actual traffic" that "scaffolding sustains") class-two utterances are not merely 'culture-relative' - "scaffolding" convictions may survive "for unthinkable ages". This is unrelated to linguistic formalism or the early Wittgenstein, but rather relates to a posteriori historical trans-temporal continuities; "the same language-games could be employed in [different] traditions". 'Scaffolding' convictions are interwoven axiomatic assumptions that Wittgenstein likens to twigs in a bird's "nest". They reside on an "unused siding", unconsciously isolated from the normal "traffic" or "route" of "enquiry". They are immobile "doctrines seen as facts", typically exempted "from doubt", denial, or testing. They are not 'seen', but 'seen through', as an unconscious controlling frame of reference, 'foundational' for subsequent inquiries, statements, and "action" - the "bedrock" against which one's "spade is turned". Outside their tradition, 'scaffolding' convictions lose their grammatical status of 'showing' tradition. Thus "theology [is] grammar" only within the tradition. 'Scaffolding' convictions relate to Thiselton's discussion of public criteria and paradigm cases - the

569. Porter, Wittgenstein's Classes of Utterance', 89.
571. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 426-427.
573. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 180, cf. 387.
575. Wittgenstein, On Certainty, 29e.
'supporting branches' for the intelligibility and authentication of later language-uses. Distinctive settings include dialogic argument presupposing common understandings, particularly theological or ethical argument. Summarising: assertive language not only 'shows', thereby modifying Gadamer's notion of 'fusion' - it also 'shows' (or allows readers to 'notice') the very pre-judgements that Gadamer insists are operative initially during understanding. Again, Gadamer's disparagement of assertions detracts from his own work on the hermeneutical circle.

S.E. Porter, however, builds on his misreading of Thiselton's class-one utterances in this context. Denying that "every view of God qualifies as a second-class utterance", Porter views Thiselton's notion of class-two utterances as too context-relative and "outside the parameters of investigation". Yet, for Thiselton, class-two utterances about divine attributes are not necessarily relativised because they mediate traditional 'scaffolding' convictions. Porter confuses an utterance's function (cf. force) within a tradition with its theological truth-value, a distinction Thiselton retains without descending into Bultmann's dualism. Nor does Thiselton immunise class-two utterances from criticism from outside their traditions. Rather, they remain provisional and subject to revision. Porter also falsely argues that Thiselton 'equates' class-two utterances with 'language-games' when, in fact, for Thiselton, a class-two utterance or a theological or traditional conviction may appear in several language-games. Neither does Thiselton espouse the separateness and isolatedness of language-games, nor base ethics on class-two utterances thereby relativised. Rather, Thiselton stresses a posteriori family resemblances (after-the-fact historical similarities between traditions and language-games) and rejects a socio-pragmatic basis for ethics though, admittedly, the latter point is clearer in his later work.

580. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 396-397, 399-401.

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(iii) Thiselton’s ‘class-three’ utterances are linguistic recommendations (i.e. for redefining linguistic terms and concepts) that may alter ‘scaffolding’ convictions and, therefore, traditions. They ‘show’ both the process of alteration itself and the new way of thinking recommended, where “the predicate is not merely a tautology of the subject but its hermeneutical explanation” and redefinition.\footnote{Thiselton, \textit{Two Horizons}, 402, cf. 403, 404-407. Citing, Grech, ‘Review of \textit{The Two Horizons}’, 574; cf. Wittgenstein, \textit{Philosophical Investigations}, 47, 48, 101-103; cf. Wittgenstein, L., \textit{The Blue and Brown Books. Preliminary Studies for the Philosophical Investigations} (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958, 2002), 57.} Wittgenstein speaks of “the use of this expression in connection with these criteria”.\footnote{Wittgenstein, \textit{The Blue and Brown Books}, 57.} The utterance, ‘the true motorbike rider never wears a crash-helmet’ would be an example. Class-three utterances often presuppose extra-linguistic institutional facts, and often cause profound but sometimes unnoticed extra-linguistic effects on the ordering of life and experience. Hence, with J. Searle, contrary to A.J. Ayer, Thiselton argues that class-three utterances are not just ‘verbal’.\footnote{Thiselton, \textit{Two Horizons}, 402-402, 404-406.} They presuppose and attack the power of linguistic habits (cf. ‘pictures’, ‘spells’) to control how things are ‘seen’ or ‘seen as’ (see Chapter 3), where this power is grounded in the interweaving of language-habits and thought. In this context, Thiselton notes Wittgenstein’s notion of a “fly” caught in a “fly-bottle”.\footnote{Thiselton, \textit{Two Horizons}, 402, 403-406, cf. 137-139, cf. 310-314; cf. Wittgenstein, \textit{Philosophical Investigations}, 103.} It misses the point to look for ‘real’ (i.e. ‘formal’) frames of reference since all ‘seeing’ is ‘seeing as’ relative to a given framework. Thus, Thiselton, following Wittgenstein, rejects “essential” “super-concepts”, against Bultmann’s translation of \textit{sarx}.\footnote{Thiselton, \textit{Two Horizons}, 405, cf. 407, 408-409, 409-411; cf. Thiselton, A.C., Contribution to ‘Flesh’, in \textit{The New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology, Volume 1} (ed. C. Brown; Exeter: Paternoster; Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1975), 678-682; cf. Cramer, R.N., ‘Commentary on ‘the Flesh’ (Greek: \textit{sarx})’ (1997), at \textit{http://www.bibletools.com/terms/flesh.htm}; cf. Wittgenstein, \textit{Philosophical Investigations}, 43, 44; cf. Bultmann, \textit{Theology of the New Testament 1}, 314; cf. Fuchs, ‘Jesus and Faith’, 50.} Apparent ‘objectivity’ may be merely a matter of tracing around one’s own framework. ‘Spells’ may perpetuate traditions, but also ignorance or confusion:\footnote{Thiselton, \textit{Two Horizons}, 404, 406.} “one thinks... one is tracing the outline of the thing’s nature... and one is merely tracing round the frame through which we look at it.”\footnote{Thiselton, \textit{Two Horizons}, 401-402, 404-406.} Imposing order on Thiselton’s thinking, we can detect at least four sub-categories of ‘linguistic recommendation’, as follows.

Linguistic recommendations may ‘break spells’ or ‘captivating pictures’, or “show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle”, engendering new appraisal and insight by re-arranging the familiar and giving it new conceptual grammar. Thiselton argues that Paul uses ‘spell-breaking’ (cf. code-switching) against Corinthian persuasive definition, challenging “the audience’s pre-understanding of what... [given]
terms might mean" (e.g. Thiselton’s example of the term ‘spirituality’ cited in Chapter 3). Thiselton also attempts ‘spell-breaking’ himself in relation to models of biblical authority and to Paul’s doctrine of justification. Heidegger’s critique of Western philosophical tradition is a parallel: “everything... primordial gets glossed over”. Spell-breaking is also closely associated with socio-critical liberation - the very dimension of distancing and fusion that Thiselton (later, more explicitly, with Habermas) argues is missing from Gadamer.

Linguistic recommendations can refine traditions, preserving continuity with tradition against the background of institutional facts, yet introducing a kind of novelty still related to tradition. This relates closely to Gadamer’s notion of the ‘new’ emerging within the dialogic process of conversation, or of tradition itself: “no one knows in advance what will ‘come out’ of a conversation”. Thus, public criteria and paradigm cases admit modification: even as ‘scaffolding’, they are still only a way of ‘seeing’, contrary to G.E. Moore. Yet, they should also be respected as providing the rock-bottom currencies for the grammar of terms, for example ‘redemption’. To disrespect them is, to “saw off the branch upon which I am sitting”. Later, Thiselton agrees that “such ways of seeing” function “as a foundation for research and action”. Hence, “American ‘non-foundationalism’... often mistakenly appeals to Wittgenstein”. The “foundation reality” of the Christ-event is not merely “symmetrical with subsequent moments in the hermeneutical process, least of all... the present situation”. In The Two Horizons Thiselton cites T.S. Kuhn and I. Barbour in relation to scientific paradigm-shifts, and Paul’s redefinition of the term ‘Jew’, as examples. Summarising: assertive language not only ‘shows’, thereby modifying Gadamer’s notion of ‘fusion’ in which the “statement” supposedly ‘conceals’ the “horizon of meaning” - it also ‘shows’ (or allows readers to ‘notice’) the very process of tradition-

595. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 432-434; cf. 415-422.
597. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 110-114.
598. Thiselton, New Horizons, 381-383.
599. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 401-403; cf. 405-406.
refinement implicit in Gadamer's notion of 'effective history' in which "temporal distance... performs [a] filtering process". That is, 'tradition-refinement' through linguistic recommendation can be a positive process that constitutes an extension of the hermeneutical circle. Yet again, Gadamer's disparagement of assertions detracts from his own work on the hermeneutical circle.

Linguistic recommendations can constitute manipulative 'spell-formation' or 'persuasive definition'. A term with favourable (or unfavourable) connotations can be used to carry a different content, seducing hearers into ignorance or confusion. Manipulative re-definition of traditional criteria 'saws' off the 'supporting branch', disguising discontinuity as 'continuity'. Thus, Thiselton attacks Bultmann’s rejection of Old Testament criteria (see above), since New Testament terms, such as 'light', 'bread', or 'life', acquire their currency from their Christological setting and background of Old Testament institutional facts. Thus, Thiselton's positive valuation of 'illocutions' grounded in 'institutional' facts relative to self-assertive 'perlocutions' that function through causal power is not blindness to 'institutional' power-abuses, or to the need to ethically evaluate public traditions. Thiselton merely distinguishes 'I baptise', presupposing the 'institutional fact' of baptism, from, say, 'the resurrection is myth', which subverts tradition by stealth. Summarising: Gadamer's hermeneutical circle does not adequately account for 'spell-formation' - the capacity of tradition to distort truth. Gadamer admits, "I have emphasised the assimilation of what is past and of tradition".

Linguistic recommendations can shatter worlds, where this link slightly modifies Thiselton’s thinking. In the example, 'his marital faithfulness' now includes having affairs', it is not just a 'spell' that is broken, but a life-world. As Thiselton comments, for Heidegger, when a world is shattered, something's pre-cognitive 'ready-to-hand' meaning can suddenly be reduced to its 'present-at-hand' 'properties'. Thus, 'the ring no longer means 'she loves me' - it is just a piece of metal'. Citing Heidegger, "circumspection comes up against emptiness", "we merely stare at something, our just-having-it-

610. Thiselton, New Horizons, 410-470; cf. Thiselton, Interpreting God and the Postmodern Self, 137-144.
before-us lies before us as a failure to understand it any more’. L. Langsdorf later questions Thiselton: “why would understanding the text as action... account” for “its power to ‘mould and control’ our lives?” Langsdorf complains, “we can recognise [a text’s] appropriateness to a present situation and choose to adopt it, or not”. But the utterance ‘your wife/husband is having an affair’, with its world-shattering potential, undermines Langsdorf’s stance, which suggests that a text can never have the ‘upper hand’ over a reader. Sometimes, though, texts are bombshells. Thus, Andrew Teel writes of the collapse of the cult of the ‘Nine O’clock Service’ (NOS) in 1980s-1990s Sheffield that, “two worlds or realities” met “head-on, and as NOS reality met normality it simply collapsed”. R. Howard reports, “NOS members’ trauma was such that some people were hitting themselves against walls and mutilating themselves”. ‘World-shattering’, then, can be so ‘extra-linguistic’ that it includes biological effects. Nevertheless, G.R. Osborne goes too far to write, “Thiselton reasons that texts themselves control the process of reading, “some demanding a referential interpretation, others a reader-oriented approach”’. Rather, for Thiselton, textual particularity, interpretative goals, and reading situations all play a part. World-shattering, then, has a different grammar to spell-breaking. It is not so much ‘liberation’ from a false reality as ‘rude awakening to a new and unwelcome true reality’, where in some cases it is the world that has changed. Linguistic recommendation as ‘world-shattering’ is unwelcome news with a decidedly extra-linguistic grammar. Again, Gadamer’s notion of ‘fusion’ - in which “the dimension of statements” falls short of “linguistic experience” - is modified.

Our reading of ‘class-three utterances’ contradicts that of S.E. Porter. Porter argues as if, by ‘linguistic recommendation’, Thiselton only meant that one ‘picture’ (e.g. ‘a Jew is X’) can simply be ‘replaced’ by another (e.g. ‘a real Jew is Y’) without regard for their truth-value. However, this misses the significance of Thiselton’s comments on scientific ‘paradigm-shifts’ in this context, in which more true ‘pictures’ legitimately replace less true ones. Actually, Thiselton explodes Porter’s reading by attacking ‘persuasive definition’, the illegitimate way in which a tradition can be modified through

616. Howard, The Rise and Fall of the Nine O’Clock Service, 131.
‘linguistic recommendation’ (see above).\textsuperscript{621} Porter also argues that whilst, for Paul, say, an utterance could have ‘class-two status’, it could have a ‘class-three status’ for Paul’s hearers. However, for Thiselton, the status of an utterance is not ‘formal’, but relates to its function within a given language-game. Porter mistakenly links Thiselton to the formalism of the early Wittgenstein in which “a picture is a fact”.\textsuperscript{622}

In conclusion, there are many potential grammatical utterances that ‘show’ in many different ways. Assertions play a role in ‘showing’: broadened historical rationality; the pre-judgements from which understanding begins; socio-critical, liberating, or ‘spell-breaking’ re-definitions; the kind of ‘tradition-refinement’ implicit in Gadamer’s notion of ‘effective history’; manipulative ‘spell-forming’ perlocutionary ‘persuasive definition’ or propaganda; and rude-awakening through world-shattering news. Sometimes assertions ‘show’ in ways that support Gadamer’s thinking, except that he devalues assertions. At other times assertions ‘show’ in ways that potentially correct Gadamer’s thinking. Thus Thiselton’s appeal to the later Wittgenstein considerably modifies Gadamer’s notion of the hermeneutical circle. This leaves us with two further points.

(i) At the end of his paper, Porter misleadingly argues that Thiselton later “dismissed the... formulation” of ‘three classes’ of utterance due to the “several significant difficulties” Porter claims to have exposed.\textsuperscript{623} The non-existence of these ‘difficulties’ aside, what Thiselton actually dismisses is the prescriptive notion (which in any case is not necessarily implied by \textit{The Two Horizons}) that the possible range of hermeneutical functions of propositions could be no wider than simply ‘three types’ of utterance.\textsuperscript{624} Speaking in ‘threes’ can look ‘idealist’ or linguistically ‘formalist’, which Thiselton does not want, being somebody who argues against idealism and linguistic formalism.\textsuperscript{625} Indeed, our explication of four types of ‘class-three’ utterance ‘shows’ that \textit{The Two Horizons} already suggests the collapse of the notion of a ‘triad’ of utterance types. The three classes are valid - it is just that there are many more than ‘three classes’. Assertions function in many ways that can be ‘shown’ and ‘noticed’.


\textsuperscript{623} Porter, ‘Wittgenstein’s Classes of Utterance’, 93, cf. 87.


\textsuperscript{625} Thiselton, \textit{Two Horizons}, 387-388.
(ii) Thiselton's continued use of Continental terminology (fusion, horizon, language-event, etc.) carries with it grammatical modifications consistent with 'tradition-refinement', not 'persuasive definition'. Gadamer's linguistic dualism, for example (see above and Chapter 4), genuinely requires modification since propositions can indeed function creatively during fusion. 626 Had Thiselton further explicated his analysis of 'class-three' utterances, he may have seen the need to clearly mark his grammatical modifications as 'tradition-refinement' for his readers, since many of the caricatures of Thiselton, in effect, amount to a false charge of 'persuasive definition'.

Sixth, we may also find hints that Thiselton appeals to the philosophy of language more broadly in modifying Gadamer's hermeneutical circle. Whether we are talking about 'fusion' in relation to textual action, actualisation, appropriation, or application (see Chapter 5), further modifications of Gadamerian 'grammar' can be highlighted, as follows.

(i) For Thiselton, openness to textual action means placing oneself into the process of traditions of textual effects (cf. the later Heidegger's 'saying', the later Wittgenstein's 'showing' - see above). 627 However, Thiselton's emphases on life, tradition, inter-subjective communication, speech-acts (including divine speech-acts), and reader activity mean he does not adopt a strong notion of 'textual autonomy' (the notion that a 'text' can 'act' on its own). Admittedly, Thiselton argues that 'texts' do still 'act' on interpreters: biblical texts may draw readers into a textual 'world' - interpretation "cannot be reduced to mechanics". 628 Further, 'truth' may "possess and remould the church". 629 And yet, "fresh insights occur within reading traditions" (so R. Parry) - as Thiselton argues explicitly later, the three metaphors, of 'behind', 'within' and 'in front of' the text, are inseparable (so C.G. Bartholomew; sometimes Thiselton introduces a fourth component involving a historical notion of 'inter-textuality', which we could characterise with the metaphor 'alongside' the text). 630 Thus Thiselton, altering

Gadamerian grammar, takes us more convincingly beyond the “mimetic world” of intra-linguistic effects into the ‘life-world’ of extra-linguistic action, where J.L. Austin’s and D.D. Evans’ speech-act theories are not far in the background (see Chapter 4). For Gadamer, however, “that which comes into language is not... pre-given before language”. Some writers almost seem to deny any notion of textual ‘autonomy’ in Thiselton, whilst others radicalise his notion. Certainly, Thiselton does not reduce textual ‘performance’ to the “commissive realm” or ‘understanding’ to “location”.

(ii) Thiselton also re-emphasises actualisation, during which textual action (for example, ‘promising’, ‘declaring’, ‘convicting’ etc.) changes self-understanding and understanding of textual subject-matter. Admittedly, with Gadamer, Thiselton argues that truly ‘new’ ‘truth’ emerges through conversation with texts, where both reader and text are active but not in control. Citing Gadamer, “a genuine conversation is never the one that we wanted to conduct”. Hence, with Gadamer, Thiselton acknowledges the need for ‘openness’ to textual action on behalf of readers. Citing Gadamer, to “question is to open up possibilities and keep them open”. Textual ‘forces’ do not necessarily “guide the reader to the text’s ‘intended meaning’” or “produce ‘intended’ effects”. In this sense, Thiselton should not be placed “firmly within the intentionalist camp”. Yes, Thiselton’s action-model and ‘adverbia’ notion of intentionality “rehabilitates the author” whilst avoiding “the old Cartesian...

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...intentional fallacy", 639 but aspects of 'present meaning' and actualisation could never have been foreseen by authors. 640 Hence, Thiselton approves Kierkegaard's notion of 'repetition' that is not simply repetition, and Gadamer's point that fusion can never be complete, but "is continually going on". 641 And yet, Thiselton's emphasis on the 'logic of self-involvement', where effective actualisation in line with authorial purpose presupposes the truth-value of linguistic reference, again presupposes Thiselton's appeals to J.L. Austin and D.D. Evans (see Chapter 4). Actualisation is not in every respect comparable to involvement in the "performance of a... piece of artistic endeavour". Reading the line, 'There's a ship in trouble off Red Wharf Bay on Anglesey' in a novel is different to reading it in a bulletin from a coast-guard. 642

(iii) Thiselton's view of appropriation, where the community or self changes its relationship to its self-understanding and textual subject-matter through self-involving action, admittedly draws on Gadamer's and the later Wittgenstein's concerns for 'inner change' and outward 'knowing how to go on': 643 "language games exist where we, as learners - and when do we cease to be that? - rise to the understanding of the world"; and "an 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria". 644 With Bultmann, "hermeneutics is 'never only a matter of understanding, but also of hearing and... appropriation"': "genuine obedience... includes a new understanding of oneself", 645 though Thiselton does not "isolate... reading... from the life of the communities that produce and read literature". 646 And yet, Thiselton's 'reversal' of Gadamer's ontological prioritisation of language over history (for Gadamer, "the word gives" "that which comes into language... its own determinateness"), 647 further ensures the holding together of the textual 'world' and the 'life-world' of appropriation. 648 Here,

Thiselton's modification of Gadamer's thought is not simply 'Pannenbergian'. As J.C. McHann Jr. notes, "Pannenberg argues that the fusion of horizons is not... produced by language, but rather language is the result or 'the expression of the fusion... accomplished by understanding'".  

However, in line with his broader appeals to the philosophy of language, Thiselton refuses to sharply separate language and understanding like this. Fusion only occurs when tradition 'comes to speech' in the language and concepts of interpreters (so Gadamer: "the interpreter's own horizon is decisive, yet not as a personal standpoint that he maintains or enforces"), even if language remains part of a more fundamental context of inter-subjective historical action (correcting Gadamer for whom "man's relation to the world is absolutely and fundamentally verbal"). Thus, Thiselton alters Gadamerian grammar.

**(iv) On the one hand,** Thiselton's view of application, in which readers transform the wider world, is admittedly similar to that in Gadamer's legal examples in which a judge "has an orientation to his own history"; (application, with appropriation, is closely linked to what Thiselton will later call 'appropriate recontextualisation'). Thiselton also aligns with Gadamer by retaining a distinction, but not a sharp dichotomous categorical division, between 'past meaning' and 'present meaning'. For Gadamer, there would be "no such thing as... distinct horizons" were it not for "temporal distance". By contrast, for B. Kallenberg, following D. Davidson, the "interpretative community... strives to embody [i.e. incarnate]... target language-games by conforming... to the underlying communal form of life". This hardly "points us further" than Thiselton, however, since Thiselton rightly notes that present 'application' remains in tension with past forms of life. Historical distance remains real, where Thiselton preserves the distinction between what the text meant and what it means, though K. Duffy rightly notes that he later criticises it. The apparent contradiction here dissolves once it is realised

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that what Thiselton is criticising is E.D. Hirsch's too "clear-cut contrast" between the two poles (i.e. 'past meaning' and 'present meaning') and his failure to explain "the relation between" them. Similarly, we may criticise W.J. Larkin Jr.'s Hirschean attempt to argue for a clear distinction between 'meaning' and 'significance'. For Thiselton, past and present meaning are not separate categories, but different to one another only on account of the continuous creation of new historical relationships.655 'Past meaning' is a matter of semantic and historical relationalities and contexts, as is 'present meaning'; it is just that relationalities and contexts develop in the process of tradition.656 Hence, Thiselton argues that 'past meaning' is prior to a text's 'present meaning', though meaning still extends to embrace present horizons.657 On the other hand, Thiselton modifies the grammar of Gadamer's notion of 'application' (and 'universal law') by linking it to divine speech-acts. As noted already, Thiselton also links divine speech-acts to textual action, actualisation, and appropriation. Thus, Thiselton does not sharply separate "what God will do" and "the goodness of God" from the "contingent historical" dimension of "transformation" or from "what we will do". Nor should Thiselton be contrasted with Moltmann here (see Chapter 3).658

In conclusion, Thiselton's notion of the hermeneutical circle is a substantial and complex refinement of Gadamer's notion. Yet, Thiselton's 'tradition-refinement' of Gadamer's thought has been missed in the literature. It is not simply that Thiselton's 'sympathies' lie with Wittgenstein and Gadamer,659 or that "Thiselton lets Gadamer down very lightly", supposedly challenging only his view of 'effective history'.660 Thiselton is not simply 'Gadamerian'.661 Nor does Thiselton's appeal to the later Wittgenstein prove irrelevant for biblical hermeneutics.662 R. Van Voorst also misses Thiselton's

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656. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 77-84, cf. 44-45.
660. Contradicting, Packer, 'Infallible Scripture', 419.
tradition-refining polemic in *The Two Horizons*. Other writers merely hint that Thiselton criticises Gadamer's hermeneutical circle. Thus, Thiselton has "critiqued and adapted" the 'two-horizon' perspective, bringing to light the "hermeneutical implications" of Wittgenstein's thought.

But to what extent has Thiselton offered a 'transformed framework' for hermeneutical theory? In Chapter 5 we refrained from F.H. Borsch's view that Thiselton brought in a 'pradigm-shift' in hermeneutics analogous to paradigm-shifts in science. Thiselton notes Karl Popper's critique of T.A. Kuhn in this respect. Popper "insists that there has never been any one particular paradigm which has dominated scientific inquiry". Thiselton agrees that several 'paradigms' always co-exist. With Popper, "a critical discussion and a comparison of... various frameworks is always possible". However, Thiselton also acknowledges the reality of predominant 'paradigms' and of 'paradigm-shifts' between them. Thiselton, then, by appeal to the later Wittgenstein and others, further modifies a predominant Gadamerian 'paradigm' that Pannenberg has already begun to modify. Admittedly, Pannenberg also dialogues with the later Wittgenstein - in *Theology and the Philosophy of Science* (German: 1973). However, E.F. Tupper's book *The Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg* (also 1973) does not cite Wittgenstein, suggesting that Pannenberg does not dialogue with Wittgenstein in any substantial way before 1972. Further, reference to *Theology and the Philosophy of Science* is absent from *The Two Horizons* (though not from *New Horizons in Hermeneutics*). This is not surprising since Pannenberg's work did not appear in English until 1976, when *The Two Horizons* had already largely been written. Whilst Thiselton could read German before 1973, he may have preferred to use English texts. Besides, as we saw in Chapter 1, Thiselton had become 'familiar' with Wittgenstein's work by 1963. Thus, Thiselton's appeal to the later Wittgenstein pre-dates, and is independent of, that of Pannenberg. J.C. McHann Jr. almost suggests as much in an extended footnote.

That Thiselton's 'transformed framework' for hermeneutical theory, his 'tradition-refinement' of Gadamer's paradigm, is a 'paradigm-transformation' rather than a 'paradigm-shift', is not to deny that

663. Van Voorst, 'Review of *The Two Horizons*', 221.
670. Thiselton, 'Thirty Years', 1560.
it could well constitute the most important hermeneutical ‘paradigm’ at the present time. Certainly, Thiselton brings together more detailed engagements with more traditions or ‘paradigms’ than anybody else known to us. He could well be the strongest candidate for providing a working solution to the problems of existing ‘out-worn’ paradigms or philosophical subtexts in hermeneutics.672 Certainly, Thiselton contributes to the attempt to solve the hermeneutical problem, offering conceptual tools new to this context,674 seeking to move beyond the “philosophically illiterate” positivist and existentialist “paradigms” associated with “post-Enlightenment philosophies of history”,675 towards a “more solid status for historical knowledge”.676 Certainly, “the task of historical studies must now be reassessed”,677 explaining Thiselton’s continued engagement with “the intricate... philosophical issues involved in an epistemology of historical knowledge”.678 For Thiselton “an ancient text should be read in light of the philosophical problems emergent with the rise of historical consciousness”.679 Thiselton argues that even ‘the rise of historical consciousness’ is ‘historical’, and too entangled with broadly ‘positivist’ and broadly ‘existentialist’ approaches. Thus, developing Pannenberg’s stance, Thiselton criticises E. Troeltsch and D.E. Nineham, and, Bultmann and the New Hermeneutic respectively.680 Some commentators emphasise Thiselton’s response to


673. McNicol, ‘Review of The Two Horizons’, 188.


positivism, others his response to 'existentialism', whilst W.W. Klein and D.S. Dockery rightly note both. Thus, Dockery writes, if past scholarship focused on "the historical meaning of the text" (cf. positivism), then "more... philosophical approach[es] have concerned themselves with the meaning for today" (cf. existentialism). Thiselton, though, emphasises both horizons. Historically, Thiselton's 'paradigm' is an attempt to unify hermeneutics, via widening dialogue, in a historiography that allows emphasis on both past and present horizons to be maintained in criticism of a discipline that is polarised between emphasising (even imperialising) either past horizons or present horizons. Thus, for Thiselton, widened dialogue leads to a historical (as opposed to linguistic) unification of hermeneutics that is preconditional for responsible interpretation.

This reading of Thiselton distances us from readings of Thiselton by others. Thus, Thiselton neither regresses to positivism, nor aligns with H. Frei's approach. Thiselton does not 'move away' from 'history' in The Two Horizons, contrary to S.E. Porter's reading, but grounds action models within his transformed historiographical paradigm. This is not 'parallel' to Porter's apparent attempt to reconcile what he calls an 'anti-formalist' critique of W. Iser with a plea that "biblical scholars need to develop as 'close readers' (... in formalist analysis)". "Porter" (even more than Thiselton!) "does not make his position at all clear". Nor does Thiselton merely seek "to replace the... framework of meaning" of 'salvation-history' with a new focus on "application". Nor does he offer merely a single 'model' of interpretation. Nor does he simply follow the late twentieth century shifts toward 'methodological pluralism' or from 'historical' to 'literary' paradigms. Nor does he simply 'combine' appeals to Wittgenstein, speech-act theory, and an 'action' model, or follow a 'middle ground' between

682. For example, Grech, 'Review of The Two Horizons', 572.
686. Porter, 'Reader-Response Criticism', 100; cf. 97; cf. 99.
a ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ and E.D. Hirsch’s approach. Thiselton neither proceeds “without any... reconceptualisation of the task of exegesis”, nor merely ‘accommodates’ historical and linguistic study to recent hermeneutics, nor leaves historical critical methods unaltered. It is false to argue that Thiselton in no sense offers a solution to the hermeneutical problem. Before concluding the present chapter, we pause to respond to Thiselton’s readings and applications of the work of Gadamer and the later Wittgenstein.

5. Allowing Gadamer and Wittgenstein to Respond to Thiselton

Gadamer’s *Truth and Method* is one of the twentieth century’s “most important” philosophical works, “but undeniably difficult”. Thus, we proceed tentatively in allowing Gadamer to reply to Thiselton.

For Gadamer, “subjectivity is a distorting mirror”, the individual’s “judgments” and “self-awareness... only a flickering in the closed circuits of historical life”. Conversely, “prejudices” primarily “constitute the historical reality of his being”. Earlier, we noted how Thiselton criticised this as being too reductionistic, as “pointing towards a postmodern view of selfhood” “as an opaque product of variable roles and performances” imposed by “society” and “inner drives and conflicts”. H.H. Kögler, similarly, opposes Gadamer and Derrida for whom the “critical” “reflexive subjectivity” of “individual agents” is merely the “unteachable philosophy of consciousness” of Western metaphysics. Pervasive “trans-subjective background” “structures” or “forces” (“being, language, dialogic event, *differance*, force fields of power” etc.) are ‘hypostatised’ or ‘reified’ “into macrosubjects” operating “independently of agency”. However, Gadamer and Derrida overlook their own “high level of reflexivity” and that “transsubjective forces are... reproduced only through individual interactions”. But how fair are Thiselton and Kögler to Gadamer? Some observations are helpful as follows.

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(a) Following Heidegger, Gadamer argues that Dasein and ‘understanding’ are only “possible” because “there is a ‘there’, a clearing in being... between being and beings” called “nothingness”. 701 ‘Nothing’ is ‘the veil of being’, 702 calling “attention to” the “being” or “contingency of beings”, their “possibility of... not being”, and hence to “the marvel of all marvels, that beings are”. 703 ‘Being’ is “historic”, preconditional for “the possibility of the history of thought”. It repeatedly “clears out the underbrush of thinking... to make itself clear to thought”. 704

(b) For Gadamer, “continuity” (i.e. common to all Daseins) includes “self-understanding” and “an experience... Heidegger calls being”. This pre-cognitive dimension “transcends thinking” and “subjectivism”, is experienced “as limiting”, and frames dynamic “human existence”. Yet, it neither eradicates “the discontinuity intrinsic to aesthetic being and aesthetic experience”, 705 nor means “the extinction of one’s self”. 706

(c) After Heidegger, Gadamer views “understanding” as Dasein’s “mode of being”. 707 It presupposes Dasein’s “fore-structure” of “existential futurity”, 708 “potentiality-for-being and ‘possibility’”, 709 and includes both “thrownness” and “projection” 710 - though Gadamer admits emphasising “the assimilation of what is past and of tradition”. 711 Thus, the “concrete bonds of custom and tradition and the corresponding possibilities of one’s own future become effective in understanding”. 712 Projection, though, involves “transcendence... moving beyond the existent”. Thus, “a person who understands, understands himself... projecting himself upon his possibilities”. 713

(d) For Gadamer, a “hermeneutically trained consciousness” remains “sensitive to [a] text’s alterity”, through “the foregrounding and appropriation of one’s own fore-meanings and prejudices… of one’s own bias, so that the text can present itself in all its otherness”.\textsuperscript{714} Thus, “historical knowledge” “remains… adapted to the object”, precluding “homogeneity”.\textsuperscript{715} Yet, both “the knower and the known” have the “mode of being of historicity”: “belonging to tradition belongs… to the historical finitude of Dasein”.\textsuperscript{716} Thus, Gadamer speaks of “the interpreter’s belonging to his object”.\textsuperscript{717} Hence, “history does not belong to us; we belong to it”. “Self-reflection and autobiography… are not primary and… not an adequate basis for the hermeneutical problem, because through them history is made private once more”.\textsuperscript{718}

Summarising, Gadamer preserves individual subjectivity against the background of ‘beings’ (as opposed to being), ‘discontinuity’ (as opposed to Dasein’s ‘continuities’), ‘projection’ (as opposed to ‘thrownness’), and ‘otherness’ (as opposed to ‘belonging’). Does this background justify Thiselton’s concerns about Gadamer’s move towards a ‘postmodern self’? We make three points in reply.

\textit{First}, Gadamer retains individual ‘being’, ‘discontinuity’, ‘projection’, and ‘otherness’ - it is transcendental subjectivity as an idealist metaphysical foundation that he rejects. What “remains important” for Gadamer is “that a self can be formed without breaking with or repudiating one’s past”.\textsuperscript{719} Admittedly, Thiselton stresses Gadamer’s emphases on ‘dialogue’ and historical ‘otherness’, but this does not quite square with his fears over a ‘postmodern self’. \textit{Second}, Thiselton is right to argue that individuality or ‘private’ autobiography are de-centred for Gadamer. D.J. Schmidt observes “the extraordinary reticence… with which Gadamer reveals himself to his readers”, citing Bacon’s motto, “de nobis ipsis silemus” (“of ourselves we remain silent”).\textsuperscript{720} \textit{Third}, our earlier point about the complexity of historical conditioning through immediate fallen relationships seeks to reinstate ‘autobiography’ further than Thiselton. Thiselton already affirms the focus on personal narrative in socio-pragmatic hermeneutics whilst repudiating its lack of a metacritical dimension. Our point was

\textsuperscript{714} Gadamer, \textit{Truth and Method}, 269.
\textsuperscript{715} Gadamer, \textit{Truth and Method}, 261, cf. 262.
\textsuperscript{716} Gadamer, \textit{Truth and Method}, 261, cf. 262.
\textsuperscript{717} Gadamer, \textit{Truth and Method}, 264.
\textsuperscript{718} Gadamer, \textit{Truth and Method}, 276.
\textsuperscript{719} Weinsheimer and Marshall, ‘Translators' Preface’, xii.
slightly different to this, however, reinstating autobiography at the level of theory.\footnote{721} We may now respond to Thiselton’s reading of Wittgenstein.

Having failed his PhD, Wasfi Hijab reports that Wittgenstein, his tutor, “destroyed his intellectual foundations... religious faith and... powers of abstract thought”\footnote{722} So, in evaluating Wittgenstein’s suitability for Thiselton’s purposes, we proceed cautiously.

‘Trans-contextual’ categories are present in Wittgenstein’s work. They include, “the common behaviour of mankind”,\footnote{723} “forms of life”,\footnote{724} “family resemblances”,\footnote{725} “concepts with blurred edges” and “scaffolding” convictions and,\footnote{726} (so Thiselton), “public criteria of meaning”.\footnote{727} We must approve Thiselton’s rejection of neo-pragmatic readings of the later Wittgenstein.\footnote{728} Yet, two factors suggest that Thiselton slightly over-extends the ‘trans-contextual’ side of Wittgenstein’s thinking, as follows.

First, Wittgenstein’s epistemological observations focus mainly but not exclusively on the present horizon. Thus, a “figure can always be what I see it as”;\footnote{729} “don’t say: ‘There must be something common, or they would not be called ‘games’ - but look and see”.\footnote{730} “Metaphysical truths” are just “rules for the use of words”.\footnote{731} so bring “words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use”.\footnote{732}

There is “no philosophical knowledge”,\footnote{733} since “problems attach to the words ‘to know’”.\footnote{734} “the grammar of the word ‘knows’ is... related to that of ‘can’, ‘is able to’... ‘understands’. (Mastery of a technique)”.\footnote{735} Thus, “one cannot guess how a word functions. One has to look at its use”,\footnote{736} though

\footnote{721}{Thiselton, New Horizons, 430-439.}
\footnote{722}{Edmonds, D., and J. Eidinow, Wittgenstein’s Poker: The Story of a Ten-Minute Argument between Two Great Philosophers (London: Faber and Faber, 2001), 9.}
\footnote{723}{Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 82e.}
\footnote{724}{Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 8e, 11e, 88e, 174e, 226e; cf. Wittgenstein, On Certainty, 46e.}
\footnote{727}{Thiselton, Two Horizons, 379-385; cf. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 38e-40e, 84e-120fe}
\footnote{728}{Thiselton, New Horizons, 395-405.}
\footnote{729}{Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, 69e.}
\footnote{730}{Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 313.}
\footnote{732}{Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 48e.}
\footnote{733}{Hacker, ‘Wittgenstein, Ludwig Joseph Johann’, 915.}
\footnote{734}{Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 15e.}
\footnote{735}{Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 59e.}

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this is made ‘difficult’ by “the prejudice which stands in the way.” Thus, philosophy’s ‘task’ is “conceptual clarification”; its ‘goal’ “is not knowledge but understanding”. Language is not “chained to the world of objects”, but “autonomous - it runs free”. Thus, “philosophical questions” are not “problems” regarding Russell’s “hidden logic” but “puzzles” concerning “how language is actually employed”. Concluding: strenuous ‘puzzle-solving’ can ‘look and see’ or ‘notice’ what is ‘shown’ by everyday immediate historically particular concrete language-uses through removing the ‘prejudice’ of ‘seeing as’. But what about accessing the historically continuous through report?

Second, for Wittgenstein, Vienna-style metaphysical ‘problems’ are misleading - only the ‘puzzles’ of immediate linguistic confusions matter. Karl Popper, however, likened Wittgenstein’s “interest in language” to “cleaning spectacles”, when for “serious philosophers... the only point of... cleaning is to... see the world” better. Bertrand Russell similarly dismissed the view that “philosophical worries were merely puzzles”. We are “not” trying to understand “only sentences” but “the world”. Citing Wittgenstein, though, our “puzzlement” is, for example, about “the use of the substantive ‘time’” not “the nature of time”. The “facts about time” that “concern us lie open before us”.

For Thiselton, however, there are ‘serious’ philosophical ‘problems’, not merely ‘puzzles’. Allowing God’s word to ‘strike home’ today is a philosophical and “not only a theological” issue. Nevertheless, Thiselton’s ‘historical dialectic’ between ‘contextually contingent life-world’ and ‘developing metacritical system’ attacks logical positivism. Whilst affirming Popper’s emphases on “critical thought”, “openness” to revising hypotheses, “testing”, and on filtering out “unwarranted” “metaphysical” assumptions, Thiselton approves Pannenberg’s appeal to T.S. Kuhn in criticism of Popper: “theories” or “hypotheses” involve “anticipatory” “conjecture”, remaining in dialogue with other competing systems, “contexts or bodies of knowledge”. They are not “mirrors’ of nature” but

741. Edmonds and Eidinow, Wittgenstein’s Poker, 186.
742. Edmonds and Eidinow, Wittgenstein’s Poker, 188.
744. Thiselton, Two Horizons, xx.
“explanatory devices” that remain distanced from ‘the truth’ of ‘life-world’.746 Thiselton’s ‘serious philosophy’ is not positivist, but properly ‘historical’.

Thus, Wittgenstein’s focus on ‘puzzles’ opposes Popper’s ‘seriousness’, but does it also oppose Thiselton’s? Admittedly, Wittgenstein’s emphases on historical contingency and trans-contextual continuity leave an opening for Thiselton’s approach. Yet Wittgenstein is retrospectively attacking logical positivism through this opening rather than looking forward through it. The more trans-contextual Wittgenstein’s categories are, the less he develops them or their implications, failing to properly establish the dialectic between ‘looking and seeing’ at the contextually contingent practical level of ‘life-world’ and ‘looking and seeing’ at the level of ‘truth-system’, ‘trans-contextual tradition’ or ‘anticipations of history-as-a-whole’.

Admittedly, Wittgenstein writes, “perhaps one day this civilization will produce a culture. When that happens there will be a real history of the discoveries of the 18th, 19th and 20th Centuries, which will be deeply interesting”.747 Thus, he realises that the recent war-time brutality and prevailing a-historicity of his cultural and philosophical climate is prohibitive of ‘real history’. However, Wittgenstein also believes the gospel should only be “averagely historically plausible”. Its historicity is not “the essential, decisive thing” and “should not be believed more strongly than is proper” because this “might distract attention from what matters”, which is “the spirit”.748 Even if the gospels were “historically speaking... demonstrably false... belief would lose nothing... because historical proof... is irrelevant to belief”. The “believer’s relation to” the gospel is “neither the relation to historical truth (probability), nor yet that to a theory consisting of ‘truths of reason’”.749 Wittgenstein, therefore, does not work out the historico-epistemological entailments of his own ‘trans-contextual categories’. Unlike Thiselton, he is still awaiting Gadamer’s philosophy of history, largely - though not exclusively - confining his epistemological concern to the ‘momentary present’, still reflecting a remnant of the legacy of Neo-Kantianism.

In one place Thiselton allows K.-O. Apel’s notion of ‘meta-institution’ to be equated with Wittgenstein’s notions of ‘language-game’ and the ‘common behaviour of mankind’,750 comparing a

747. Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 64e.
748. Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 31e.
749. Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 32e.
750. Thiselton, New Horizons, 404.
trans-contextual emphasis in Wittgenstein with a trans-contextualism in Apel that also presupposes discussion with C.S. Peirce and J. Royce beyond a ‘reading’ of Wittgenstein. Possibly, Thiselton imputes a little too much of the force of Apel’s trans-contextual emphasis to Wittgenstein. Yet, this is only to say that Thiselton seems unwittingly to correct an imbalance in Wittgenstein, who does not offer a developed philosophy of history like Thiselton’s. Thiselton provides a transformed hermeneutical paradigm that presupposes the end of Wittgenstein’s and Gadamer’s waiting for one-another.\(^{752}\) Undoubtedly, though, if Wittgenstein were around we would share Wasfi Hijab’s fate. We may now conclude the present chapter.

D. Concluding Comments: Widened Dialogue Towards a Philosophical-Historical Unification of Hermeneutical Theory as Precondition for Responsible Interpretation

Having begun the chapter by justifying a new interpretation of Thiselton’s *The Two Horizons*, we then expounded a major argument in this work - that, in biblical studies, inadequate hermeneutical theory had led to problematic interpretative practice. Ignoring ‘pre-understanding’ (in ‘purist’ and ‘traditional’ approaches), or ‘narrowing’ (in our use of the term) pre-understanding through too narrow a dialogue with philosophical traditions at the level of critical-synthetic filter constitution (in broadly ‘positivist’ and ‘existentialist’ approaches) led to interpretative problems. Deferring treatment of broadly ‘positivist’ approaches, we showed that Thiselton attacked problematic dualisms or dichotomies along six different axes in the pre-understandings and interpretative practices of Bultmann and the New Hermeneutic. Though more specificity was required in Thiselton’s analysis of Bultmann’s *Geschichte-Historie* dichotomy with respect to Bultmann’s view of appropriation, we anticipated affirming Thiselton’s criticisms of Bultmann at the level of the philosophy of history. Thiselton, then, sought a philosophical and theological dialogic widening of pre-understanding beyond that of the New Hermeneutic, aimed at removing dualisms or dichotomies, restoring or enabling responsible interpretation, and liberating the biblical texts’ functions as ‘God’s Word’. We found further support for our ‘three strata’ and ‘seven discourses’ schema for organising and clarifying hermeneutical issues, and for our arguments concerning the unity between theology and philosophy during theoretical construction and concerning the direct links between theory and practice. We also noted the positive relationships between responsible interpretation and widening dialogue on the one hand and between irresponsible interpretation and hermeneutical foreclosure on the other. We anticipated that

Thiselton's critique of history would prove to be his most fundamental unifying 'second stratum' critique, and that we would gain further clarity on the issue of unmarked grammatical changes implicit in Thiselton's continued use of Continental terminology.

Moving on, we explicated Thiselton's grounding and unification of second (and third) 'strata' hermeneutical critiques in a critique of history springing from three modified Hegelian criteria. Historical process generated continuities and particularities, earthed in a hermeneutic of traditions understood as socio-historical extensions of the hermeneutical circle. Language was grounded in historical continuities and particularities. 'Selves' were contingent historical particularities. 'Culture', we may now infer, was a synchronic snap-shot of diachronic processes of traditions. Understanding and language were unified and made possible by the unity (not uniformity) of historical reality. 'Understanding' and 'language' engendered 'meanings' by progressively relating 'particularities' to the diachronic interwoven 'wholes' of authors' language-use, linguistic systems, concrete historical situations, language-games, concrete traditions embracing public criteria of meaning, and to anticipations of 'history-as-a-whole' - from within history. Historical conditioning presupposed participative continuity between selves and traditions, yet allowed for particularity and thence for objective historical 'difference'. Conditioning was more sophisticated than Thiselton had yet allowed, however, and the effects of immediate fallen human relationships for each of us had to be considered. Nevertheless, Thiselton's widened dialogic modification of Gadamer's hermeneutical circle precluded his being caricatured as either 'Gadamerian' or 'Pannenbergyan'. Notably, Thiselton appealed to the later Wittgenstein to reinstate the functioning of assertive language in 'distancing' (cf. 'noticing') and 'fusion' (cf. showing'). Thiselton's analysis of Wittgenstein's grammatical utterances explicated several kinds of 'showing'. Some of these would have supported Gadamer's own thinking; others would have modified it. Later, Thiselton dismissed only the 'triadic' character of this analysis, since this could look like linguistic formalism. In fact, assertive language could function in many ways, where we showed that The Two Horizons already began to move in this direction. Thus, class-three utterances admitted further modification and sub-division that might have alerted Thiselton to the necessity of marking the grammatical changes implicit in his continued use of Continental terminology more explicitly given his criticisms of Continental traditions. Nevertheless, Thiselton's widened dialogue constituted a needed 'transformation' or 'tradition-refinement' of the Gadamerian hermeneutical paradigm that went beyond Pannenberg's transformation of that same paradigm. Thiselton's 'paradigm-transformation' was needed partly because responsible interpretation could neither neglect nor imperialise 'past' or 'present' horizons. A historical (as opposed to a linguistic) unification of
philosophical hermeneutics was preconditional for responsible interpretation. Thiselton perhaps slightly exaggerated Gadamer's disparagement of individual subjectivity and the maturity of the later Wittgenstein's historical consciousness, but in each case we supported what Thiselton affirmed - the role of subjectivity and the historical ground of language. In stressing the theoretical relevance of 'autobiography', we perhaps went beyond Thiselton. Nevertheless, Thiselton perhaps provided the first unified post-Wittgensteinian, post-Gadamerian hermeneutical paradigm.
Chapter 7

Evaluation, Responsibility, and Description: Towards A Christological Unification of Hermeneutics and A Unified Critique of Historical Objectivity

A. Preliminary Comments: Unitig Philosophy and Theology

In the present chapter we continue our exposition of *The Two Horizons*. In Chapter 6 we argued that Thiselton, at least implicitly, unified 'second' and 'third' strata hermeneutical theory in a 'critique of history'. In Chapter 3, however, we argued that one of the reasons Thiselton explored *theological* contributions to hermeneutics was Gadamer's failure to provide 'metacriteria', or transcendent criteria, for a socio-critique of traditions. Thus, whilst 'philosophical hermeneutics' comes to unity in a 'critique of history', there is still a missing metacritical dimension, warranting theological explorations. Could theology, then, bring hermeneutics as a 'whole' into unity, including the metacritical dimension, so as to unite philosophy and theology? (In our 'Introduction' we noted that whilst philosophy and theology were interwoven in the history of Western thought, there had developed a schism between them in hermeneutics). The criterion by which theology could 'earn' a place in the discussion would relate to the question of whether or not theology 'resonated' with, or even improved upon or solved problems in relation to, issues emerging from philosophical hermeneutics. A viable theology would not disrupt the unity of the philosophical hermeneutic in its grounding in a critique of history.

We will begin the present chapter by attempting to show how Thiselton brings unity in this way to hermeneutics as a 'whole', arguing that this constitutes the background against which his views of 'biblical authority' should be understood. Then, we will develop our argument from Chapter 6, that Thiselton links irresponsible interpretation to hermeneutical foreclosure, by highlighting a progression in criticisms of Thiselton: from straightforward foreclosure, through socio-pragmatic asserted 'legitimisation' of foreclosure and post-structural 'canonisation' (celebration, 'authorisation', exaltation) of foreclosure, to a hostile 'disowned projection' of foreclosure. In particular, socio-pragmatic and post-structural criticisms falsely charge Thiselton with linguistic-philosophical 'idealism' or 'formalism'. Finally, we will construct a unified critique of historical objectivity or 'description' based on *The Two Horizons*, uniting philosophy and theology. We posit eight overlapping axes along which historical considerations affect 'objectivity', both negatively and positively in each case.
B. Towards A Provisional Christological Unification of Hermeneutics Embracing Metacritical Explanation and Evaluation

1. Thiselton's Concern to Widen Dialogue with Theology in a Way Coherent with Widened Philosophical Pre-understanding

In *The Two Horizons*, Thiselton seeks to widen dialogue with theological traditions in a way that coheres with his philosophical discussions. This contradicts the charge that Thiselton is straightforwardly fideist. Correlatively, Thiselton attacks E. Troeltsch and D.E. Nineham for *a priori* narrowing, absolutising, or precluding warranted theological discussion. Again, Pannenberg's work is Thiselton's point of departure - widening theological dialogue beyond that of positivist theology, Bultmann, and the New Hermeneutic. But, again, Thiselton is not simply 'Pannenbergian', extending Pannenberg's discussion by appealing to the philosophy of language.

2. Contrasting Evaluations of Whether Thiselton is Straightforwardly Fideist

Some writers charge Thiselton with a straightforward 'fideism' or with 'privileging' theology. Thiselton supposedly espouses "a fideistic defence of the claim of religious language to its own realm", or supposedly simply 'privileges' the Bible or Christian theology over other religious texts orologies. Supposedly, Thiselton lacks a "sustained... argument for the reclamation of theism", simply defends the 'traditional' theological enterprise, or merely 'feels' from 'postmodern' questions to a trinitarian "theology of promise", failing to relate the two spheres.

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However, P. Ellingworth notes Thiselton’s “dialogue” between “philosophy”, “linguistics”, “systematic theology and biblical exegesis”. And R. Morgan accepts Thiselton’s affirmation of “the critical potential of Scripture” though, elsewhere, Morgan is ambiguous. J.S. Reist observes that, for Thiselton, Freud, Marx, and Nietzsche rightly highlight human self-deception since this “resonates with biblical and theological assertions about the deceitfulness, opaqueness, and duplicity of the human heart”. ‘Dialogue’, ‘resonance’, and ‘critical potential’ take us beyond straightforward ‘fideism’.

3. Dialogic ‘Warranting’ of Theological Considerations in Hermeneutics

Thus, in *The Two Horizons*, Thiselton’s stance is that, since theology ‘resonates’ with, or even improves upon, conclusions emerging from expanded philosophical dialogue, then theology is ‘warranted’ as a potential working framework for hermeneutics. Theological considerations earn a place in hermeneutical discussion by addressing philosophical demands. To deny this is to evade the implications of philosophical dialogue. Conversely, narrowing philosophical dialogue hinders theology. Thiselton does not merely attempt to make Wittgenstein ‘fit’ a ‘biblical framework’, but ‘shows’ a better ‘biblical theology’ to be consistent with Wittgenstein’s comments about language (see Chapters 4 and 6). Philosophical description provides new angles of vision on the biblical texts themselves.

Thiselton’s whole work presupposes this kind of argument for including theological considerations in hermeneutical discussion. K.J. Vanhoozer records that, in the 1990s, he, C. Bartholomew, F. Watson, and Thiselton “argue for a theological hermeneutic... that is itself formed, informed, and reformed by Christian doctrine” (though Thiselton began this in the 1970s). Thus, Thiselton’s use of philosophical description to clarify biblical texts is met with a counter-flow in which biblical theology shapes and

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corrects philosophical findings - a dialogue takes place linked to warrant. Theology is a “hermeneutical enterprise”, and vice versa. Thus, in some senses, Thielson leaves theology on “the margins of the discussion”, holding even his metacritique of the cross in tension with “pluralities of readings”. His theology is a working framework in progress, refined by dialogue with philosophy. Conversely, Thielson admits that, “from the standpoint of pluralism”, his Christian interpretations “appear ‘privileged’”, and that “a conflict of truth-claims may be inevitable”. Thielson’s ‘faith seeking understanding’, however, should not blind us to his dialogue. Admittedly, as J. Goldingay observes, in 1992 Thielson speaks of Scripture as a ‘gift’ from God. However, the context is Thielson’s demonstration of the resonance between theological ‘tradition’ and philosophical views of textuality even if, in turn, ‘giviness’ becomes a reciprocal critique of other philosophies of textuality. Philosophical ‘warrant’ (admitting theological considerations because they address philosophical questions) is again implicit.


4. Christological Metacriteria and Broadened Philosophical Dialogue

Following Pannenberg, Thiselton’s argument in *The Two Horizons* - that theological considerations relevant to hermeneutics should not be *a priori* excluded - applies, centrally, to the Christ-event.23

The Christ-event, in anticipating *history-as-a-whole*, presumes a universal context for understanding. Meaning becomes a matter of historical relationalities.24 As J.C. McHann Jr. writes, “In... Jesus Christ we have a proleptic provision of a tentative conception of the terminus of the hermeneutical circle”.25 As E.A. Dunn notes, this extends Gadamer’s metacritical appeal to tradition and ‘effective history’ to constitute Thiselton’s “temporal metacritique” in relation to Christ’s Resurrection. Following Pannenberg, Thiselton raises “history and tradition to the next level” - namely eschatology.26 Dunn’s exposition of Thiselton’s critique of history is valuable, though he under-emphasises Thiselton’s other six hermeneutical axes. Nevertheless, Dunn rightly observes Thiselton’s reversal of Gadamer’s ontological prioritisation of language over history (cf. Chapter 6).27

For Thiselton, the Christ-event’s claim to universal ethical authority presupposes the unity of historical reality. There is no absolute dissociation of past from present (this would exaggerate ‘historical distance’) to make Jesus’ teaching on ‘love’ irrelevant for today.28 The strongly relational emphasis of the Christ-event (i.e. on ‘love’) resonates with a hermeneutical critique of understanding which Thiselton supports later by appeal to Gadamer and E. Betti: listening in openness to the ‘other’ contra manipulative Enlightenment ‘method’. Hermeneutics becomes a biblical way of relating, transposing questions about ‘validity and correctness’ into questions of ‘ethics’. The Christ-event is thus a dialogically warranted working model for an evaluative metacriterion for understanding,

eschatologically extended in the coming Kingdom.\textsuperscript{29} Meaning relates to divine verdictive judgements on the quality of historical relationalities relative to Christ’s historical relating as criterion (i.e. love for God and neighbour). Drawing on E.A. Dunn again, this extends Gadamer’s metacritical principle of understanding as ‘dialogue’ to embrace trinitarian relationality - love and the emergence of the ‘new’ through a critique of power.\textsuperscript{30} Dialogue with other traditions (‘stratum one’) must be ‘dialogue’ as love for neighbour (‘stratum three’).

Thus, historical and evaluative ‘explanation’ are now one in Christ, who anticipates both a view of the ‘whole’ and ‘parts’, and a critique of the whole, in terms of quality of relationship.\textsuperscript{31} Thus, Thielson’s “theology of the cross and resurrection... criticises human self-seeking and manipulation and opens the way for genuine transformation”.\textsuperscript{32} For Thielson, “the Cross of Christ... becomes a socio-critical principle”, where Thielson appeals to “Jürgen Moltmann”. Whilst this theological appeal dates back


to the mid 1970s (modifying E.A. Dunn’s reading), it is more explicit after Thiselton’s appeals to Jürgen Habermas’ philosophy, continuing the pattern of dialogic warrant. Admittedly, though, ambiguities remain over how the ‘Christological principle’ of interpretation should function.

For Thiselton, in line with Pannenberg, the Christ-event, manifesting continuities with Hebrew tradition, yet paradigmizing the ‘truly new’ of unrepeatable historical novelty, presupposes tradition-refinement resonant with the dialogic, dialectic process of creative historical synthesis. J.C. McHann Jr. rightly notes that Pannenberg ties this point to his eschatological doctrine of “plurality and unity in creation”.

For Thiselton, the Christ-event presupposes distinctions between past, present, and future, and an anticipation of history-as-a-whole from within history. It does this as historical actuality, present focus of faith, and as eschatological event with future significance. Faith (in three of its senses) in the Christ-event rests on historical events (past), involves repeated decisions based on progressive understanding of experienced divine faithfulness (present), and involves trust without sight grounded in promise (future). This resonates with the provisionality, openness to the future, and progressiveness of the hermeneutical circle and, drawing on Pannenberg, with “the proleptic structure of knowledge.” Thus, Thiselton neither sacrifices “the hiddenness... of faith and its ‘objects’”, nor so stresses ‘hiddenness’ that nothing is revealed now. Thiselton only writes that “divine transcendence is

37. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 249, cf. 82-84, cf. 345-346.
38. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 249, cf. 172, 179, 181, 194, 264, 287; cf. 382, 121; cf. 82-84, 247-248, 265-266, 274.
39. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 104, 166, 197, 303, 305-310, 315, 323, 382.
disclosed more openly in a promised series of future events” than in the cross. He does not confine
the cross to “the level of immanence”, and does view “the cross [as] an indirect communication of
divine transcendence”.

Summarising: the Christ-event of Thiselton’s theology resonates with, but goes beyond, the modified
Hegelian criteria emerging from his widened dialogue with the philosophy of history. There is warrant,
therefore, for experimenting with biblical-theological systems as working frames of reference for
hermeneutics. Thus, Thiselton does not fail to warrant his appeals to divine intervention in history,
to the cross, or to the ‘third horizon’ of eschatology.

Admittedly, the objection could be raised that since Hegel’s philosophy is linked to Christian theology
anyway, it is not surprising that ‘modified Hegelian criteria’ resonate with ‘the Christ-event of
Thiselton’s theology’. However, the point is that the modified Hegelian criteria also unify philosophical
hermeneutics. Thus, it is all the more fitting that one whose thinking was both theological and
philosophical should contribute - albeit in a heavily modified way - to overcoming the present artificial
divide between philosophical and theological hermeneutics bequeathed by tradition(s) since Kant.

5. Dialogic Warrant as Background to Thiselton on ‘Biblical Authority’
Against R.A. Harrisville’s charge of ‘fundamentalism’, Thiselton’s comments on biblical authority at
the end of The Two Horizons are backed by his developing warrant for including theological
considerations in hermeneutical discussions. It is in this context that Thiselton speaks of ‘biblical
authority’ as ‘independent of situations in the present horizon’, or as presupposing the truth of Jesus’
divinity and of ‘God’s relationship to the world’. The philosophical background (i.e. Thiselton’s
philosophical discussion) surfaces when Thiselton argues - aligning with J.L. Austin’s ‘logic of self-
involvment’ - that God’s reality and Jesus’ divinity are presupposed by the effective operation of
bibilical language.

43. Contradicting, Vanhoozer, First Theology, 372; cf. Thiselton, Interpreting God and the Postmodern Self, 147.
44. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 51-84, cf. 440.
47. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 436-437.
48. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 437; cf. Larkin Jr., W.J., Culture and Biblical Hermeneutics. Interpreting and Applying the Authoritative
Word in a Relativistic Age (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1988), 103; cf. Austin, J.L., How to Do Things with Words. The William James
Thiselton also argues that Old Testament public criteria are required to identify authentic ‘Christian’ conceptuality and experience. The ‘inauthentic’ ‘saws off the supporting branch’, artificially evading the process of tradition. New Testament writers, in Thiselton’s view, engage in tradition-refinement - critically adopting traditional and theological ‘scaffolding premises’ that are not merely ‘culture-relative’. Jesus’ critique of Moses, ‘secularising’ in Jesus and Paul, the debate about Gentiles and Jewish law, and Paul’s resistance to Corinthian ‘enthusiasm’ support Thiselton’s point. New Testament tradition-refinement resonates with a philosophical criterion of tradition as dialectic process.

For Thiselton, further, biblical language is neither abstract, nor monolithic, nor mere ‘information’, but an activity in the stream of life, experienced eventfully on different levels as dynamic speech-acts wherever inter-relation between authorial and reader language-games occurs. Thus, in and through the Bible, divine authority comes-to-speech in human language-games. Thiselton argues that the Chalcedonian model of biblical authority, whilst accounting for divine and human dimensions, is too static - missing the polymorphous character of biblical truth. Multiple models of biblical authority are required, providing different angles of view, since single controlling models seduce, blind, and polarise the debate. Thiselton attacks polarisation between ‘hard’ (propositional) and ‘soft’ (non-propositional, subjectivist, existentialist) views, and between ‘wholly divine’ and ‘wholly human’ models (whether ancient or modern). Hence, later, Thiselton argues that “hermeneutical theory and the philosophy of language... draw... divergent views of Scripture together”. Thiselton’s philosophical background keeps surfacing, against charges of straightforward ‘fideism’.

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49. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 437-438.
52. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 437-437.
54. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 433.
6. Problems with Broadly ‘Positivist’ and Broadly ‘Existentialist’ Approaches

Our exposition of Thiselton’s view of dialogically warranted ‘Bible-relevance’ for hermeneutics is validated by his responses to broadly ‘positivist’ and broadly ‘existentialist’ approaches. Thiselton argues that, unlike the New Testament, the ‘positivism’ of E. Troeltsch and D.E. Nineham and the ‘existentialism’ of Kähler and Bultmann fail to satisfy the demands of wider philosophical debate.²⁷ Thus, both traditions a priori endorse narrow conceptions of reality that exclude such categories as “miracle” on what are now outdated philosophical premises.²⁸ Troeltsch endorses an empirical positivist metaphysic grounded in the philosophies of Vico and Hume - the product of Troeltsch’s era.²⁹ Nineham endorses similar contemporary philosophical assumptions.³⁰ Conversely, Bultmann presupposes a dated pseudo-scientific view of a closed universe that almost transposes theology into anthropology.³¹ Dilthey, before him, a priori reduces God and transcendent realities to humanly projected ciphers that serve self-knowledge.³²

Such philosophical premises have anti-Christian, but also anti-historical, implications. Troeltsch, followed by D.E. Nineham, disparages uniqueness per se - not just the unique interventions characteristic of transcendental divinity (e.g. the resurrection) - a priori assigning ‘this-worldly’ mechanical causation to all events. Only ‘ordinary events’ count as ‘historical’.³³ Thiselton responds, however, that certain phenomena suggest both mechanical and teleological causation, and that even natural laws are only progress reports - descriptive generalisations regarding the past, not prescriptive for the future.³⁴ Conversely, Kähler and Bultmann, whilst correctly defending the biblical intention to witness to divine acts, are also still too influenced by fact-value dualism (see Chapter 6).³⁵

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²⁸. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 75-76; cf. Larkin Jr., Culture and Biblical Hermeneutics, 88.
²⁹. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80.
³⁰. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 70-74.
³⁴. After D. Cairns and A.B. Gibson respectively; cf. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 260-261.
Therefore, Thiselton rejects positivist claims concerning 'value-neutral' description. In line with Dilthey, appeals to analogy with life-experience can never be value-neutral where, in Thiselton's reading, the later Wittgenstein's critique of Sir James Frazer's *The Golden Bough* makes a similar point. It is not 'value-neutral' to *a priori* exclude theological considerations warranted by widened philosophical pre-understandings.66

7. Response to Critics on Thiselton's View of Revelation

Our observations in this section force us to contradict several writers. Thiselton does not espouse a 'soft' view of Scripture,67 and his rejection of a 'propositional' view is not a rejection of propositions or cognitive language.68 Thiselton does not endorse an 'existentialist' "neo-orthodox encounter-view of Scripture" that disparages biblical 'content' or 'propositional' 'truth'.69 Whilst Thiselton omits an overt discussion on "the place and significance of the New Testament in the Church" from *The Two Horizons*,70 J. Bowden ignores Thiselton's famous contribution at the NAEC '77, for which the precursor to *The Two Horizons* - Thiselton's PhD thesis - was foundational.71

We also depart from D.G. Bloesch's and G.J. Laughery's critiques of Thiselton's view of revelation.72

First, Bloesch argues that, "for Thiselton, revelation seems to be a progressive unfolding of eschatological wisdom as we move forward in the quest for greater understanding of God and the self

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70. Contradicting, Bowden, 'Review of *The Two Horizons*', 57.


through relating biblical texts to cultural change". Actually, this is closer to Thiselton’s notion of human transformation through revelation. For Thiselton the Bible, employed in divine speech-acts by God’s Spirit, together with unfolding history, serves as ‘revelation’ repeatedly, transforming believers. This is compatible with God’s having “spoken once for all in human history”. Second, Bloesch views “revelation as a decisive interruption of human interpretations by the self-disclosing God, who addresses sinful humanity”. By contrast, supposedly, Thiselton contradicts “Barth’s contention that the event of the Word of God is discontinuous with all human thought and experience". However, Thiselton merely argues that God’s Word can only ‘strike home’ when it ‘comes to speech’ in the hearer’s prior language and concepts. God is ‘discontinuous’ with human creatureliness; revelation is ‘discontinuous’ with the ‘human’ in coming from God, functioning authoritatively, bearing a new content, and in subverting worlds or expectations. Yet, God and revelation are not ‘discontinuous’ with the ‘human’ in using human language. Third, our observations in Chapter 4 counter G.J. Laughtery’s reading of “an absolute division between religious language and other language” in Thiselton’s work. We may now respond to more major criticisms of Thiselton’s work to date.

C. Plea for Responsible Interpretation Contra Kinds of Hermeneutical Foreclosure: The Two Horizons and A Response to Thiselton’s Major Critics

In this section, we shall demonstrate the pivotal importance of The Two Horizons for responding to Thiselton’s critics, even his recent critics. Thiselton’s emphasis on widening dialogue and responsible interpretation contrasts with different kinds of hermeneutical foreclosure and interpretative irresponsibility.

73. Bloesch, Holy Scripture, 220.
77. cf. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 310-314.
1. Friendly Critics: Straightforward Hermeneutical Foreclosure

Thus, C.G. Bartholomew bemoans Thiselton’s failure to define ‘philosophy’. Yet, for Thiselton, no ‘generalised’ ‘formal’ definition of ‘philosophy’ exists - only diverse uses of the term in relation to particular thinkers. More substantially, we reject the notion that Thiselton is ‘fideist’ in any straightforward sense, against Bartholomew’s notion of there being a faith-reason dichotomy in Thiselton as follows.

First, Bartholomew possibly misses Thiselton’s polymorphous view of ‘faith’. Thiselton argues that ‘faith’ cannot be defined abstractly, but only in line with the language-game in which it is being used. Thus, (i), in Romans 4:5, ‘faith’ is an ‘activity’ or ‘disposition’ of trusting in God for justification, in opposition to ‘works’. (ii) In 2 Corinthians 5:7, ‘faith’ is set in opposition to ‘sight’, implying a future orientation. (iii) In Romans 10:9, ‘faith’ combines intellectual conviction, self-involving confession and, therefore, obedience. (iv) In Galatians 1:23 ‘the faith’ is simply ‘Christianity’. (v) In 1 Corinthians 13:2, ‘faith’ that can ‘move mountains’ is a gift given to some Christians.

Second, none of these notions of faith are divorced from ‘reason’ in Thiselton. In sense (ii) ‘faith’ coheres with ‘historical rationality’. This is not seeing “a little way ahead”, but future-directed trust in openness to promise and possibility, partly grounded in past historical events. In sense (iii) ‘faith’ is progressively, rationally, dialogically warranted and understood belief in revelation (including ‘received content’) as an ‘intellectual conviction’, leading to a choice to confess and obey. This is consistent with the Spirit’s work. In sense (iv) ‘faith’ as ‘Christianity’ includes the dimension of the ‘received faith’.

On the one hand, this contributes to a priori ‘pre-understanding’. Any conscious ‘reasoning’, then,

83. Thielson, Two Horizons, 408-409.
begins from 'faith' - as 'faith seeking understanding' (though this includes sense '(iii)' also). However, on the other hand, the 'scaffolding' convictions of received 'tradition' are not necessarily transmitted or accepted 'uncritically', but are filtered through 'effective history' in the past, are open to critical testing in the present, and are (certainly in Thiselton) provisional upon future confirmation (see above and Chapters 4 and 6). And, as Gadamer argues, respect for the process of tradition is not 'irrational', but profoundly more 'rational' than trust in the limited sight and self-deceptions of an allegedly isolated Cartesian 'T': "there is no... antithesis between tradition and reason". In sense '(i)' 'faith' may be an 'activity' or 'disposition' of trusting in God grounded in 'faith' in senses '(ii)', '(iii)', and '(iv)'. In sense '(v)' 'faith' may be treated as a special case of sense '(iii)' - obedience to a particular command in particular circumstances.

Third, therefore, Thiselton does not espouse a straightforward 'fideism' divorced from 'reason', contrary to Bartholomew's intended point in paralleling Thiselton with P. Jewett and K.J. Vanhoozer. Nor does Thiselton presuppose Bultmann's "nature-grace dichotomy" as we have seen. Bartholomew correctly argues that "Christian scholarship in philosophy should always operate as faith seeking understanding" but, falsely contrasting this with Thiselton's stance, asks why Thiselton invokes "hermeneutics from the other end" only at the end of philosophical dialogue? This confuses dialogic theory-construction with dialogic warranting of inclusion of theological considerations in hermeneutical discussion. In the former, there is two-way dialogue between theology and philosophy 'from the beginning' in Thiselton: his 'pre-understanding' ensures that he begins with 'faith seeking understanding' (which is not divorced from rationality). In the latter, Thiselton first listens to the 'other', and then 'shows' theology to be warranted as a dialogue partner in relation to philosophical concerns. Bartholomew also grounds Thiselton's supposed "faith-reason dichotomy" in a supposed "too-ready appropriation of Gadamer". Yet, as already argued, Thiselton criticises Gadamer on multiple levels, re-shaping the very grammar of "Gadamer's two horizons".

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95. Thiselton, *Two Horizons*, 82-84.
Fourth, the question remains, however, of whether there is any sense in which Thiselton remains 'fideist' given these considerations. Part of the problem here is that 'reason' is itself a polymorphous and historically changing concept, and cannot be defined 'formally'. We need not revisit Chapter 3 when we noted Thiselton's appeal to Pannenberg's rejection of all a-historical notions of 'reason', whether 'Greek', 'rationalist', 'empiricist', 'idealist' and so on. 'Rationality' has to take the rise of historical consciousness into account if it is to be conceived in a philosophically literate way. Hence, we noted Thiselton's adoption of Pannenberg's notion of 'historical rationality' or 'historical reason', which is consistent with 'faith' in all its senses, as we have just argued. If Thiselton is, in any remnant sense, 'fideist', then it is only with respect to his choosing acts of faith over acts of scepticism in the face of the inevitability of the fallibility of deductive reasoning in relation to 'proving' an open future. Thiselton's acts of faith accord with 'historical rationality' and, as R. Kearsley expresses it, only "resemble other 'fideisms' operating in critics of all persuasions". The proleptic structure of knowledge itself demands the operation of 'faith' of some kind: there is never a 'present' in which one can arrive at deductive 'closure' concerning an open future. The hermeneutical circle is simply true to life, and, contrary to Bartholomew's reading of Thiselton, faith of some kind is part of the grammar of Thiselton's historical rationality.

Bartholomew also argues, of *New Horizons in Hermeneutics*, that "Thiselton, like Gadamer, will not outline a unified hermeneutic" but that he advocates multiple interpretative models. Similarly, E.A. Dunn documents Thiselton's "hermeneutical pluralism", and W. Russell his different "critical norms". However, as already demonstrated, Thiselton presupposes a 'unified' theological-historiographical hermeneutic that encompasses methodological diversity. Hermeneutics "stands in

98. Comments made in a personal communication.
relation to interpretation as a meta-discipline". Indeed, Thiselton criticises J. Derrida’s and S. Fish’s failure to submit interpretation to historical criteria. Bartholomew, however, asserts that, “the closest we get in... [The Two Horizons and New Horizons in Hermeneutics] to a comprehensive... unified hermeneutic are Chapters 15 and 16” of the latter. Actually, though, these methodological chapters are furthest from such. Bartholomew may also miss Thiselton’s historical-eschatological understanding of the ‘third horizon’, since Bartholomew speaks only in terms of “God and the world”. Contrary to Bartholomew’s reading, the ‘third horizon’ already is ‘integrated’ into Thiselton’s hermeneutic. Bartholomew has missed Thiselton’s historiographical unification of hermeneutics in The Two Horizons.

Space prohibits detailed responses to W. Olhausen, H.A. Harris, and D.R. Stiver. In particular, however, Olhausen wrongly complains that Thiselton holds to “a referential theory of meaning” whilst Olhausen simultaneously espouses a tradition of semiotics which Thiselton rejects precisely because it depends on ‘a referential theory of meaning’.

Olhausen also criticises Thiselton for neglecting several matters of which Thiselton is already aware, though space precludes our listing these. Further, there could possibly be idealistic connotations in Olhausen’s appeals to Brown and

Levinson's distinction between 'negative' and 'positive' 'face'. Communicative action is of many kinds.111 H.A. Harris complains about Thiselton's supposed 'unhermeneutical' categorical distinction "between American... and European... postmodernism";112 possibly confusing Thiselton's *a posteriori* categorisation with *a priori* categorisation fixed by prematurely foreclosing dialogue.113 D.R. Stiver's critique of Thiselton also prematurely foreclosures dialogue.114 Whilst admitting that the 'postmodern' has yet to be defined, he criticises Thiselton's "common" "misidentification of postmodernism",115 simultaneously diverging over definitions against others writing in the volume to which he contributes.116 Stiver's supposedly "excellent overview of the varieties of postmodernism"117 seems at odds with his own definition, which employs a simplistic and prescriptive *a priori* calculus of generalisations to do with 'ruling in' or 'ruling out' certain thinkers,118 'objectivism', 'relativism',119 or 'modernist criteria of knowledge.'120 The term 'objectivist' is not fitting for Habermas,121 however, and, contrary to Stiver's predominantly epistemological focus, considerations of what could count as 'modern' or 'postmodern' include at least seven axes of ongoing conversation: dialogue, history, epistemology, language, (Western) culture, the self, and understanding (including the "aesthetic"

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120. cf. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, 89.
dimension). Stiver also *a priori* generalises about Thiselton's readings of Derrida, Gadamer, and Fish; about the scope of the 'postmodern' for Thiselton; and about Thiselton's 'evangelicalism'. Other writers apply pre-dialogic categorisation to Stiver's paper, still further distorting Thiselton's actual perspectives.

Since Bartholomew, Olhausen, Harris, and Stiver undoubtedly agree with Thiselton over the matter of hermeneutical foreclosure, then we could call their misreadings relatively 'straightforward' hermeneutical foreclosure. There is no conscious attempt to justify 'hermeneutical foreclosure'. This cannot be said for our next group of critics.

2. Socio-Pragmatic & Post-Structural Criticism: Asserted, 'Legitimised', and Canonised Hermeneutical Foreclosure

In *The Two Horizons* Thiselton responds neither to reader-response theory nor post-structuralism. Yet, by 1980, Thiselton had included "reader-response theory" in his course on hermeneutics at Sheffield University and had responded to structuralist approaches. Retrospectively, Thiselton acknowledges that "reader-response criticism provided a valuable hermeneutical model for correcting" an over-emphasis on historical reconstruction and cognitive content. Further, in *The Two Horizons*, Thiselton's hermeneutical paradigm overcomes the polarisation between focusing too exclusively on

131. Thiselton, 'Communicative Action and Promise', 158.
either past or present horizons.\textsuperscript{132} \textit{The Two Horizons} is thus the deliberately constructed historiographical ground for Thiselton’s later critiques of socio-pragmatic reader-response theories and of post-structuralism.\textsuperscript{133} In particular, Thiselton later speaks of Fish’s “fundamentally a-historical viewpoint”.\textsuperscript{134} \textit{The Two Horizons}, then, rightly grounds our reply to socio-pragmatic and post-structural criticisms of Thiselton, and to what G. Fackre calls “contextual orthodoxies”\textsuperscript{135}

In 1994, A.K.M. Adam urges that, in \textit{New Horizons in Hermeneutics}, Thiselton overlooks the most “pertinent critiques of speech-act theory” by Fish and Derrida. Since, supposedly, Thiselton’s framework is a “particular distillation of speech-act theory and Wittgensteinian philosophy”, then Thiselton supposedly ‘disregarded’ “these pointed critiques”, answering only with “silence”.\textsuperscript{136} In 1997, Adam repeats the charge.\textsuperscript{137}

Adam, however, has misunderstood \textit{The Two Horizons}. Thiselton’s broadened dialogue with the philosophy of history is central to his hermeneutics, not his appeals to speech-act theory or even to Wittgenstein.\textsuperscript{138} Thiselton’s later appeals to J. Searle, F. Recanati, and J.G. du Plessis are sublated into the framework of his critiques of historical and linguistic idealism and formalism.\textsuperscript{139} The ‘pertinent’

essays by Derrida and Fish cited by Adam also attack idealism and formalism, displaying affinities with Thiselton’s stance. Where Thiselton, Fish, and Derrida differ turns on what they replace idealism with. Here, The Two Horizons is Thiselton’s most relevant work. A consideration of the essays cited by Adam will validate our points.

We begin with Stanley Fish’s essay, ‘Normal Circumstances, Literal Language, Direct Speech Acts, the Ordinary, the Everyday, the Obvious, What Goes without Saying, and Other Special Cases’. Here, for Fish, ‘meaning’ is determined by a given interpretative community in their context, not by “acontextual language or an independent world”. Such ‘meaning’ will be the ‘ordinary’ (cf. ‘natural’, ‘everyday’, ‘literal’, ‘straightforward’, or ‘obvious’) meaning(s) for the community, not a matter of ‘free-play’. As the context, or sub-context, changes ‘ordinary’ meaning(s) change. For Fish, readers’ pre-existing pre-cognitive “verbal and mental” categories constitute the “content” of perceived ‘entities’. Perceptions only seem to relate to the external world. Unconscious “primary” interpretative activities alone produce “what is perceived to be ‘in the text’”. When a community changes, textual content changes - content is never “independent of” or “prior to interpretation”. Thus, Christ “was not ‘in the text’” of Samson Agonistes “for anyone” prior to “the typological interpretation of the poem”.

For Fish, authorial intention is not accessible to yield a ‘correct’ ‘literal reading’ of a text. Other textual ‘sources’, since they are also “interpreted”, cannot yield ‘intention’ either. They too are inaccessible to “a literal reading”. No accessible “irreducible content... survives the sea change of situations”. For Fish, only the present extra-linguistic context can render stable plain meanings. No “degree of [semantic] explicitness will ever be sufficient to disambiguate [a] sentence” so as to “render it impossible to conceive of a set of circumstances in which its plain meaning would be other than it appears to be”. Indeed, “we never know a sentence except in the stabilised form a context has

141. Fish, ‘Normal Circumstances’, 268.
143. Fish, ‘Normal Circumstances’, 271.
144. Fish, ‘Normal Circumstances’, 273.
145. Fish, ‘Normal Circumstances’, 272.
146. Fish, ‘Normal Circumstances’, 274.
already conferred".149 For Fish, illocutionary force is "the way [a sentence] is taken", which "varies with circumstances".150 Yes, "listeners always know what speech-act is being performed", but only because "illocutionary force... will already have been determined" by the readers' context.151

Fish rejects J. Searle's "distinction between direct and indirect speech-acts", since the notion of 'direct' or 'normal' speech-acts or sentence meanings "reinstates... a class of utterances... that mean independently of situations, purposes, and goals" - a problem J.L. Austin rightly tried to overcome.152 For Fish, 'normal' is "context-specific", not "transcendental" or independent of circumstances.153 H. and E. Clark also, similarly, try "to anchor language in... independent and formal constraints" such as "literal meaning", "straightforward discourse", "direct speech acts", "the letter of the law", "normal circumstances, or the everyday world". Yet this presupposes that constraints are "specifiable once and for all".154 For Fish, however, "there are no inherent constraints" on sentence meanings. Meanings cannot be "objectively fixed".155

Hence, Fish allows present historical context, but not past historical context, to determine meaning, suppressing the historical diachrony of 'context' and the historical operative influence of textual action on reader pre-understandings. As with 'hermeneutical foreclosure', progress beyond initial pre-understandings via the hermeneutical circle is prohibited. Yet Fish provides no argument from the philosophy of history to justify implicitly rejecting the criterion of the unity (not uniformity) of historical reality, the criterion of dialectical process, or the criterion of historical continuities in his disparagement of historical understanding relative to corporate self-understanding.156 By assertion

149. Fish, 'Normal Circumstances', 283.
150. Fish, 'Normal Circumstances', 285.
151. Fish, 'Normal Circumstances', 292.
153. Fish, 'Normal Circumstances', 287.
154. Fish, 'Normal Circumstances', 292.
155. Fish, 'Normal Circumstances', 292.
only, Fish prohibits the shaping of the ‘pre-existing categories’ of perception by texts, splitting ‘understanding’ and ‘perception’ by splitting ‘history’. By assertion only, ‘objective’ authorial intention and textual content are rendered inaccessible through a power-play that imperialises reader voices. Fish also only allows present historical contexts to disambiguate sentences. However, all sentences are always already used prior to re-contextualisation - meaning is always at least a matter of historical relationality between two horizons. Fish lacks an argument to justify precluding historical relationality and unity. Fish also only allows present historical context to determine illocutionary force. But if, historically, the utterance was a certain speech-act, how could present readers impute a different force to the utterance without misreading the text? Hermeneutical foreclosure is legitimised by Fish, almost canonised.

Thiselton agrees with Fish’s rejection of epistemological and linguistic ‘formalism’, drawing on the later Wittgenstein’s rejection of an a priori transcendental logical ground for language (see Chapters 4 and 6). However, rejecting a-historical transcendental idealism need not lead to historically radicalised contextual-relativism. Fish sets up a false antithesis, almost a ‘formal binary opposition’, between the two, as though there were no other historical traditions to choose from, failing to fully escape idealism. But “what lies ‘behind the biblical text’ will not go away” so easily - it is not ‘formal’ but historical. The ‘other’ is historically particular - historically, not formally, ‘objective’ as ‘not self’. Fish’s asserted hermeneutical foreclosure of dialogue with the philosophy of history contrasts with

161. cf. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 117-121; cf. 370-379, 379-385; cf. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 94-120.
Thiselton’s widened dialogue. Thus, Adam misidentifies Thiselton as ‘idealist’ or ‘formalist’, yet misses Fish’s failure to leave formalism completely behind where Thiselton succeeds.

These arguments have serious implications for those appealing to Fish for their criticisms of Thiselton. W.G. Jeanron seems sometimes to align with a Fish-type stance. Confusing the work of meaning-construction with its shape or content, Jeanron urges that Thiselton’s “criterion for interpretative responsibility” is “itself a result of (his own) interpretative activity”. But this suppresses textual particularity and the operative influence of the historically ‘other’ as address from the past. M.G. Brett’s assertion that Thiselton practices the very ‘imperialising’ that he criticises in socio-pragmatism ignores Thiselton’s argument and dialogue, notably from the philosophy of history. V.S. Poythress’ urges that Thiselton’s trans-contextual metacritique could be “just one more idol... the illusion of transcendence... all the more dangerous because it is masked”. However, if the historical ‘other’ can impact selves, then selves’ ‘constructs’ are not necessarily their own. Poythress misidentifies Thiselton’s ‘trans-contextual metacritique’ as Thiselton’s appeals to Wittgenstein, Austin, Searle, and Recanati, who become more important for Thiselton’s critique of language than for his critique of epistemology. S. Perry argues that it is “in Fish’s model that Thiselton’s request for an overriding rank structure is granted”. However, Thiselton’s metacriteria resonate with a widened dialogue with the philosophy of history.

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W.J. Lyons, following Fish, argues that 'the text itself', including its historical horizon, cannot be accessed,\textsuperscript{180} against Thiselton's appeal to "the adjudicative text".\textsuperscript{181} Nevertheless, Lyons notes "flaws" in Paul Noble's reading of Fish, presupposing access to the 'real Fish' and the 'real Noble'.\textsuperscript{182} Further, he asks "please don't misunderstand me here", presupposing an accessible 'W.J. Lyons'.\textsuperscript{183} Moreover, Thiselton does not assume a "neutral text" free from historical conditioning - Lyons' complaint here betrays a false antithesis between objectivism and context-relativity,\textsuperscript{184} accompanied by a historical dichotomy analogous to Bultmann's *Geschichte* versus *Historie* dichotomy (except it is not individualistic),\textsuperscript{185} and by a linguistic dichotomy disparaging linguistic reference.\textsuperscript{186} Lyons' hermeneutic disintegrates into historical, epistemological, and linguistic dichotomies. These reappear in S. Woodman's criticisms of Thiselton, which further presuppose, (i), a false dichotomy between completely 'fixed' and completely 'fluid' meaning,\textsuperscript{187} (ii) a dismissal of the accessibility of authorial intent and,\textsuperscript{188} (iii) of textually transmitted criteria.\textsuperscript{189} (iv) There are also misreadings of Thiselton in relation to 'formalism' and 'anti-formalism',\textsuperscript{190} the work of the Spirit, and textual autonomy,\textsuperscript{191} coupled with claims similar to M.G. Brett's (addressed above).\textsuperscript{192} However, (i), assuming every aspect of 'meaning' is fluid ignores linguistic rules and habits, public criteria, historical continuities, the insusceptibility of the past to alterity, the progressiveness of understanding, and promise-qualified
futural openness.\textsuperscript{193} (ii) Dismissing the accessibility of authorial intent depends on asserted lack of engagement with the philosophy of history bolstered by viewing intentionality solely in psycholgistic or mentalist terms. However, asserting "the fact that no... communication can truly transform 'from outside'", because it operates "with already defined conceptual systems",\textsuperscript{194} is like saying one cannot add bricks to a toy building-brick set. The 'rules' for connecting bricks may not alter, but 'brick-form', 'set-content', and 'construction-habits' vary considerably. And even 'rules' alter when the bricks are exchanged for woodwork. Tradition comes-to-speech in interpreters' language and conversation produces the truly 'new'.\textsuperscript{195} (iii) Dismissing the accessibility of textual criteria, further, transgresses the logic of self-involvement (see Chapter 4),\textsuperscript{196} and banishes the possibility of authenticating the genuinely 'Christian' in contrast to fears, wishes, manipulative power-plays,\textsuperscript{197} idolatrous linguistic constructs,\textsuperscript{198} systematic mistakes in doctrine-in-practice, corporate power-abuse, self-centredness, and self-deception.\textsuperscript{199} (We need not return to 'iv').

With respect to Jacques Derrida's essays, we confine ourselves to 'Limited Inc a b c' since it reiterates 'Signature, Event, Context' and sums up the Searle-Derrida encounter.\textsuperscript{200} In 'Limited Inc a b c' Derrida clarifies fourteen points of agreement with Searle, who has unwittingly borrowed from 'Signature, Event, Context' in order to critique it. Derrida experiences "perplexity at finding myself... often obliged to argue with a discourse moving from/to Sec [i.e. Signature Event Context], seeking to


\textsuperscript{194} Woodman, 'Untitled Contribution to MLitt Thesis', 17.


repeat against See what it has taken from See. 201 Nevertheless, Derrida attacks Searle's quasi-phenomenological bracketing out of those supposedly 'parasitic' features of language that methodologically aggravate the idealistic, abstract, logical, formal centre of his theory of 'normal' speech-acts which, in turn, depends upon certain 'Continental' metaphysical presuppositions. 202 In Derrida's view, Austin's work was far subtler than Searle's, at least attempting to leave idealism/formalism behind, whereas Searle goes backwards towards it. Thus, Derrida applauds Austin, admitting affinities with his work, though N. Murphy reminds us of the differences between them. 203 Derrida argues that whilst speech-act theory requires a "general transformation" because of its idealism, some kind of theorising about speech-acts is legitimate. 204

Like Derrida, Thiselton rejects idealism and formalism, though for Thiselton this is through appeal to the later Wittgenstein. 205 He does not engage with Derrida's two essays because they do not directly attack his stance. What Thiselton does do is transpose the early Wittgenstein's notions of 'showing' and 'saying' into a different historiographical framework (see Chapter 6), 206 similarly importing Searle's notions of 'force', 'content', 'background', and 'direction-of-fit' (from Austin) into a non-formalist, non-idealist scheme. 207 Thus, the difference between Thiselton and Derrida turns on grounding language in history. 208 For Derrida, 'iterability' (i.e. susceptibility to repetition) and 'altarity' (i.e. susceptibility to alteration) contribute to the intrinsic or "functional structure" of the 'mark' - where

Derrida often makes related points.209 Whilst recognising present context,210 however, Derrida marginalises the selves who repeat, and by repeating alter, language-stretches - the “human subject is a function of language”211. Iterability and altarity are ascribed roles only within the linguistic sphere, where Derrida writes, “the graphics of iterability inscribes alteration irreducibly in repetition”.211 Thiselton, however, might write, ‘as historical horizons expand, historical agents, constrained by the historicity of iterability, irreducibly inscribe both alteration and continuity in the process of repetition’. ‘Iteration’ is ‘historical’ and concrete, forming patterns of difference (altarity) and continuity which, as they become ‘past’, become unalterable, rendering iterability and altarity finite. Altarity is not a property of language only (one discourse), but of historical language-uses by persons in cultures that include traditions that potentially transmit knowledge (five discourses). Thus, not too unlike Foucault, Thiselton opposes the potential collapse of language into something ‘docetic’ through the narrowing of discourses - though Derrida does not oppose the notions of ‘historical speech-action’ or of human ‘subjects’ in every sense.212

Analysing Thiselton’s critique of Derrida in New Horizons in Hermeneutics confirms this assessment. Thiselton argues that the historical extra-linguistic embodiment of language qualifies any purely intra-linguistic process that places signs under erasure.213 Historical inter-subjectivity and particular judgements and speech-actions by human subjects correct a-historical emphases on subjectless inter-textual systems.214 Concrete meaning possibilities constrained by historical parole displace irreducible polyvalency (what G. O’Collins and D. Kendall call “an uncheckable range of alternative

interpretations") depending only on infinite philosophical possibility.\textsuperscript{215} The historical development of langue and parole overturns the a-historical philosophical notion of infinite series of dissociating systems and difference.\textsuperscript{216} (Here, J. Goldingay plausibly posits Derrida's contra-theological attack on "homogeneity" as stimulating Thiselton's response that "deconstruction is a worldview masquerading as an approach to interpretation" and semiotics).\textsuperscript{217} Historical particularity of text type and function displace the imperialism of hedonistic play and deconstruction as single models of textuality and/or interpretation - though deconstruction of a modified kind is a useful interpretative model for some kinds of biblical texts.\textsuperscript{218} For Thiselton, positivistic notions of reference are not the only alternative to an iconoclastic approach to meaning, or to the complete determination of meaning by readers.\textsuperscript{219} Questions also remain over Derrida's prioritising of writing over speech, and of 'connotative' system over 'denotative' system: the latter half of each couplet must be retained in its historical otherness.\textsuperscript{220} Finally, theoretically speaking, biblical 'promise' is inconsistent with the infinite deferral of meaning.\textsuperscript{221}

Thiselton concludes that Derrida's (and Barthes') semiotics are not the only possible development of Saussurian semiotics, but constitute a semiotic cloaking of (in our language) an a priori absolutised pre-understanding characterised by narrowed philosophical dialogue - at the level of critical-synthetic filter construction - with Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, Freud, Saussure, and C.S. Peirce. In Thiselton's view, this has led to an anti-metaphysical 'world-view' partly parallel to Madhyamaka Buddhism. Historical events are radically dissociated from one another, the respective ontological priorities of history and language are reversed, and historical subjects are reduced to fluxing linguistic constructs projected onto biological drives.\textsuperscript{222} However, if 'histories' are generated within 'language' as its


\textsuperscript{216} Thiselton, \textit{New Horizons}, 94-97, 125-127, 127-129.


\textsuperscript{218} Thiselton, \textit{New Horizons}, 120-123, cf. 129-130.


\textsuperscript{221} Thiselton, \textit{New Horizons}, 123.

constructs, then isn’t a quasi-idealist ‘temporal’ realm - divorced from ‘histories’ - implicit as the pre-condition for flux? Historical dichotomies remain. Again, if critiques of history, epistemology, language, culture, and the self are mis-ordered in relation to one-another, then they either collapse into one-another, or unity shatters into dichotomies. The theological-historical grammar of the inter-relationship of hermeneutical critiques or discourses is pre-conditional for the avoidance of theoretical implosion or explosion. Thiselton has more successfully left idealism behind than Derrida.

A.K.M. Adam, then, has misinterpreted New Horizons in Hermeneutics as well as The Two Horizons, overestimating Thiselton’s reliance on a “particular interpretation of Wittgenstein” and on the “unsurpassed cogency of speech-act theory”.223 Thiselton supposedly ‘fails’ to answer the ‘hard question’ posed by pragmatist hermeneutics: “how is a particular historical individual or community ever to reach a position from which it could recognise valid metacritical standards?” But is it not Jesus Christ who is being talked about here? Given how Thiselton’s engagement with the philosophy of history warrants at least the provisional acceptance of accessible theological criteria, we might ask Adam how Christians could ever fail to recognise Jesus? Clearly, though, anything is possible through a neo-pragmatic avoidance of dialogue between the philosophy of history and biblical hermeneutics.224 Adam also complains that “over and over again” Thiselton cites J.L. Austin’s utterance, ‘he promises, don’t you, Willie?’ However, this citation occurs only in two examples in over 600 pages, though it is cited twice in the second example.225 Adam also cites Thiselton’s use of ‘sic’ in relation “to the title of an article on Derrida and Barth”, meaning that “Thiselton is calling our attention to a misspelling of Roland Barthes’ last name”. However, “the article in question is not about Roland Barthes, it is about Karl Barth, a fact which Thiselton could hardly have missed if he were familiar with the article”. Surely, though, since Thiselton closely associates Derrida and Barthes, he is highlighting to the student that the cited article is about Derrida and Barth, contrary to his normal grouping of Derrida with Barthes! It is Adam’s familiarity with Thiselton’s work that is doubtful, and Adam who is employing “partisan pleading”.226 Supposedly, New Horizons in Hermeneutics “provides an impressive rationale not for ‘transforming biblical reading’, but for perpetuating a status quo”. But Adam misses the whole

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point. Thiselton is building on the historiographical paradigm-transformation suggested in *The Two Horizons.*

Others also misunderstand Thiselton’s response to Derrida. Thiselton does not criticise Derrida primarily through grounding hermeneutics in speech-act theory or an action model. Yes, for Thiselton, “action is a larger and more basic category than language. Language is... a product of human action”. Yet, Thiselton prioritises history, not merely ‘action’, over language. Thus, hermeneutics is not “part of the larger field of literary criticism”, (though hermeneutics may only be a small aspect of the curriculum of some English departments).

Specifically, J.R. Searle’s work does not ground Thiselton’s “way forward” in rejecting post-structuralism. Again, “Thiselton’s favoured linguistic approach” is not “through speech act theory”, especially not through “Searle’s” (here, R., Papaphilippopoulos, S.E. Fowl, and T. Ward misread Thiselton in ways parallel to A.K.M. Adam).

In *The Two Horizons*, Thiselton almost completes his critique of language with hardly a reference to Searle.

In *New Horizons in Hermeneutics*, Searle is mentioned only once in Thiselton’s chapter on post-structuralism. Thiselton’s main linguistic focus is the later Wittgenstein. Finally, Thiselton does not make a merely ‘rhetorical’ “move” in favour of speech-act theory or “realism” - his prolonged philosophical dialogues preclude such caricature.

Summarising: in socio-pragmatic ‘hermeneutical foreclosure’, there is more at stake than ‘straightforward’ misreading. The pseudo-theoretical legitimisation of complete textual inaccessibility at the level of practice (stratum three) rests on a hidden asserted foreclosure of dialogue with the

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philosophy of history at the level of pre-understanding (stratum one) that results in theoretical

dichotomies in critiques of history, epistemology, and language (stratum two). In post-structural

‘hermeneutical foreclosure’, there almost seems to be a canonisation of foreclosure or interpretative

irresponsibility. Adam seems to hedonistically, playfully, and instantaneously ‘bin’ Thiselton in the

‘idealism’ or ‘formalist’ pigeon-hole. However, Adam potentially fails to recognise Jesus Christ as the

emerging metacritical standard. Conversation almost seems to have broken down.

3. Hostile Criticism: ‘Disowned Projected’ Hermeneutical Foreclosure?

According to M.W. Nicholson, however, Thiselton’s appeals to Wittgenstein are actually an ‘abuse’ of

Wittgenstein.237 Yet, given our observations in Chapters 4 and 6, we must counter all ten of

Nicholson’s criticisms. First, Thiselton’s appeal to Wittgenstein does not ‘centre’ on “language-
games”.

Second, Wittgenstein does not argue that “no gap occurs between the way the world is’ and

the way we see it”, but speaks of ‘seeing as’, ‘showing’, ‘noticing’, and ‘scaffolding’, as Thiselton notes

(see Chapters 4 and 6). Third, Nicholson’s “reasonable extrapolation” that ‘form of life’ is “a socio-
cultural term” embracing “customs” supports Thiselton’s association of ‘forms of life’ with

‘traditions’.

Fourth, Thiselton does not espouse “a Wittgensteinian framework”, but imports

Wittgensteinian insights into a historiographical frame. Fifth, Thiselton does not ‘equate’ language-
games, context, and Sitz im Leben, but only notes ‘parallels’.

Sixth, Thiselton does not thereby render language-games “superfluous”, but argues that they generate and shape linguistic action upon

readers.

Seventh, Thiselton does not argue that “Wittgensteinian linguistics” can “rise above relativism” unaided,

as though he grounded his critique of epistemology on a “Wittgensteinian foundation”, but only stresses that Wittgenstein’s work is consistent with historical trans-contextuality. Unlike Nicholson,

Thiselton notes the trans-contextual connotations of language-habits, linguistic rules, forms of life,

public criteria of meaning, ‘scaffolding’ convictions, concepts with blurred edges, family resemblances,


239. Nicholson, ‘Abusing Wittgenstein’, 620; cf. for example, Thiselton, Two Horizons, 415-422, 368-370, 386-407, 7, 139,

361, 371, 380-385, 386-406.


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and the common behaviour of mankind (see Chapters 4 and 6).\(^{244}\) (As E.A. Dunn notes, "the presence of... public rules... allows Thiselton to conclude that 'effective language presupposes a distinction between correct and mistaken application of words'\(^{245}\).) B.J. Walsh, misreading Thiselton in similar ways to Nicholson, believes Thiselton arrives at Christ's cross as a "universal criteria of meaning" by extending Wittgenstein's notion of 'public criteria of meaning'. Walsh then argues that because of the different language-games, "forms of life, traditions, and corporate memories" pertaining to different worldviews, "truly public criteria of meaning cannot be established" this easily. Buddhists, for example, interpret the cross according to different criteria.\(^{246}\) However, as we saw, Thiselton arrives at the cross as an epistemological criterion primarily through his critique of history, not his critique of language. Further, Walsh confuses the plurality of public criteria embedded in different traditional pre-understandings when interpretation begins with the singular set of public criteria that may re-shape pre-understandings and therefore become accessible as interpretation proceeds.\(^{247}\)

*Eighth,* Nicholson's point that Wittgenstein rejected "any attempt at grounding language in a real world existing-in-itself apart from human linguistic interaction" presumably means that Wittgenstein rejects philosophical idealism or referential or ideational theory. But this is no criticism of Thiselton (see Chapters 4 and 6).\(^{248}\) *Ninth,* Nicholson's criticism that, on the basis of Wittgenstein, there can be no possibility "of passing judgement on any form of life, no matter how bizarre" is redundant.\(^{249}\) It is precisely because thinkers like Wittgenstein and Gadamer fail to provide adequate evaluative trans-contextual criteria that Thiselton *a posteriori* suggests theological solutions, as we have demonstrated.\(^{250}\) Thus, R. Papaphilippopoulos notes that Thiselton offers theological criteria at the end of *New Horizons in Hermeneutics*, though she erroneously suggests that Thiselton relies on Wittgenstein's notion of the 'stream of life' to provide a "trans-contextual" "bridge between contexts".\(^{251}\) Rather, it is Thiselton's philosophy of history that forms a bridge between theological meta-criteria and his appeals to

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Wittgenstein. 252 _Tenth_, Nicholson also seems to view language-games as only ‘context-relative’, and then to argue that context-relative linguistic function precludes the possibility of trans-contextual truth-value being ascribed to concepts - despite Wittgenstein’s notions of ‘family resemblances’, the ‘common behaviour of mankind’, ‘scaffolding convictions’, and ‘concepts with blurred edges’ (see Chapters 4 and 6). 253

Another serious ‘hermeneutical foreclosure’ in relation to Thiselton’s work is that of L. Woodhead. 254 In _Interpreting God and the Postmodern Self_, Thiselton’s ‘critique of the self’ widens dialogue to include Dilthey, Ricoeur, and others. 255 This is not simply a ‘via media’ between ‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’ notions of ‘self’, but further extends Thiselton’s dialogue with Heidegger in _The Two Horizons_. 256 This has implications for our response to Woodhead.

First, Woodhead decries Thiselton’s ‘blanket condemnation’ of ‘modernity’, the ‘postmodern world’, and the ‘postmodern self’ or ‘quest for selfhood’, which supposedly denies the postmodern self “all possibility of agency” - though she admits that Thiselton “allows postmodern suspicion and deconstruction a place”. 257 However, Thiselton’s redemptive aims aside, 258 Thiselton uses the phrase ‘postmodern self’ to mean either persons shaped by ‘postmodern’ culture, or ‘postmodern’ interpretations of selfhood. Thiselton rejects aspects of the latter, but displays no hostility towards the former, 259 even affirming aspects of ‘postmodern’ culture, of the work of Barthes and Derrida, 260 and of ‘postmodern’ critiques of selfhood, 261 without dismissing all ‘agency’. 262 For Thiselton, ‘postmodern’

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259. For example see respectively, Thiselton, _Interpreting God and the Postmodern Self_, 130-135; cf. 105-110.
hermeneutics of 'de-centred' selfhood are more realistic than their 'modern' predecessors,\textsuperscript{263} and instructive for theologians, ministers, and counsellors - Thiselton is 'critical' yet 'sympathetic',\textsuperscript{264} particularly in relation to deconstruction\textsuperscript{265} and to a 'postmodern' 'hermeneutics of suspicion'.\textsuperscript{266}

Second, Woodhead decr\'\textsuperscript{es} Thiselton's "broad-brush characterisations of modernity and postmodernity",\textsuperscript{267} in which 'postmodernity' is a 'unified', 'simple', yet self-contradictory 'whole' constructed from only an "aspect" of 'postmodernity' and a "random selection" of post-modern thinkers (including "Don Cupitt, Colin Hart and Anthony Freeman"), but otherwise set in simple opposition to a 'triumphal' 'Christianity'.\textsuperscript{268} However, Thiselton's meticulous generalisation-free engagements with specific thinkers ground his \textit{a posteriori} categorisations, say, about modernity's 'optimism'.\textsuperscript{269} Further, Thiselton's 'postmodernity' includes strands in post-structuralism, Continental hermeneutics, socio-criticism, socio-pragmatism, reader-response theories, liberation hermeneutics, and cross-fertilisations of these.\textsuperscript{270} Admittedly, Thiselton has not systematically engaged with every 'postmodern' thinker or rejection of theism.\textsuperscript{271} Thiselton has yet to dialogue significantly with "Martha

\textsuperscript{262} Thiselton, \textit{Interpreting God and the Postmodern Self}, 111-117.


\textsuperscript{271} cf. Browning, 'Review of \textit{Interpreting God and the Postmodern Self}, 221.
Nussbaum, Bernard Williams, [and] John Milbank", 272 or substantially with M.C. Taylor. 273 Yet
Thiselton does not dialogue ‘only’ with D. Cupitt, and Thiselton’s philosophical-historical warranting
of theological discussions genuinely provides problems for Cupitt’s a-historical starting-points. 274

Third, Woodhead decries Thiselton’s ‘uncritical acceptance of the fragmentation thesis’ in relation to
‘postmodern’ culture and selves. 275 Appealing to the ‘empirical’ research of S. Tipton and P. Heelas, 276
she suggests “four conflicting construals of modern selfhood” from socio-cultural theory 277
‘bestowed’/’authoritative’, ‘rational’/’liberal’, ‘boundless’/’expressive’, and ‘effective’/’utilitarian’
which can nevertheless contribute to a more integrated “Christian anthropology”. 278 However, this
possibly confuses Thiselton’s sophisticated critique of selfhood with his critique of Western culture.
Thiselton’s critique of selfhood engages with dozens of thinkers, most importantly Ricoeur. In this
context Thiselton favours the terms ‘forces’ and ‘conflicts’ over ‘fragmentation’, 279 arguing for inter-
disciplinary dialogue to allow interaction between diverse models and angles of view. Thiselton would
agree with Woodhead’s call for the inclusion of socio-cultural models of selfhood in that dialogue. 280
However, Woodhead seems to lack a widened dialogic pre-understanding in relation to philosophies
of selfhood, suggesting a smuggled-in ‘value-neutral objectivism’ behind her ‘empirical’ appeals. 281
Further, her ‘conflicting’ construals of self may themselves project a pre-dialogic socio-ideological


‘fragmentation’ onto ‘historical reality’ (her phrase), despite her goal of integration. However, Thistlethwaite has been aiming at an integrated notion of the self since the 1960s - hardly an uncritical adoption of the ‘fragmentation thesis’. Thiselton's critique of Western culture allows that societies would indeed fragment into competing sub-groups driven by interests if certain ‘postmodern’ trends were left unchecked. But this critique is also grounded in a wide dialogue.

Fourth, Woodhead complains that Thiselton, in his “smug” power-play and one-upmanship, “deliberately attack[s]” “vast numbers of fellow Christians” and their “different persuasions”. However, this misidentifies ‘legitimate criticism’ as ‘personal attack’. Refusal to ‘criticise’ or ‘judge’ others sounds ‘fair and humble’. But disallowing criticism of myself could be anything from self-deceptive denial, to authoritarian self-assertion, to what Paul Tournier calls “defensive aggressiveness” - precisely the kinds of strategy that Thiselton exposes.

Fifth, Woodhead decries Thiselton’s neglect of the tough questions entailed in his supposed acceptance of a ‘bestowed selfhood’ model. However, Thiselton does not neglect feminist hermeneutics, dependence upon God, freedom, human agency, relationality, dignity, or sinfulness. And he largely accepts Nietzsche’s criticisms of power abuse in ecclesial institutions. Admittedly, Thiselton has yet to thoroughly engage with a “specifically feminist contribution to the debate about selfhood”. Yet, by 1997 Thiselton already aligns with Judith Gundry-Vol’s exposition of gender distinctiveness, and develops it in his commentary on 1 Corinthians. Thiselton is sensitive to the issue.

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286. Woodhead, Theology and the Fragmentation of the Self, 71.
290. Woodhead, Review of Interpreting God and the Postmodern Self, 537.
Sixth, Woodhead views Thiselton's "Christian conception of the self" as the "organising centre" of Interpreting God and the Postmodern Self against which Thiselton selects postmodern protagonists "to serve as foil and mirror image". However, The Two Horizons confirms that Thiselton's critique of the self is grounded in his critique of history, appropriating "the Ricoeurian hermeneutic of detour"...

Our response to Woodhead fits R.I. Hall's self-contradictory talk about Thiselton's wholesale "English" contempt for, and yet "seduction" by, 'postmodernism'. Hall also speaks of Thiselton's failed appeal to Ricoeur to 'recover' theological truth. Actually, Thiselton criticises Ricoeur in this sphere. Hall's talk of Thiselton's "working hypotheses" approach to theological claims is a redeeming point.

Summarising: in these cases, a 'disowned' hermeneutical foreclosure is projected onto Thiselton. Something more is happening than straightforward misreading or the theoretical questioning of whether 'texts' can 'speak'.

4. Interpretative Irresponsibility & Kinds of Hermeneutical Foreclosure
In conclusion, there are several kinds of hermeneutical foreclosure or irresponsible interpretation. There is foreclosure through straightforward misreading, through 'theoretical' level 'legitimisation' that masks assertion, through the canonised 'dance' of playfully side-stepping conversation, and through the 'disowning' of projection. Conversely, widened dialogue, Christ-like relating, and responsible interpretation are co-incident.

D. Dialogic Theory-Construction: Towards a Unified Critique of Historical Objectivity and Description
1. Need for Re-Appraisals of 'Method', 'Certainty', 'Meaning', and 'Objectivity'
In our final section on The Two Horizons, we observe how Thiselton's 'paradigm-transformation' further develops re-appraisals by Heidegger, Gadamer, and Wittgenstein relating to 'method',

'certainty', 'meaning', and 'objectivity'. For Thiselton, these re-appraisals resonate with the Newtonian to Einsteinian scientific paradigm-shift. Thus, Thiselton defends Heidegger's philosophy as not "anti-scientific", but "highly compatible with truly modern science" - despite Heidegger's disparagement of subject-object conceptualisation (see Chapter 3). We begin with a few comments about 'method' and 'certainty', and with a few further comments about 'meaning'.

Thus, first, we have already noted Thiselton's rejection of the a priori universal or generalising 'method' of Enlightenment thought. 'Method' is irreducibly multiform - depending upon the object and frame of reference of inquiry. With Heidegger, a 'scientific' frame of reference must not always be privileged. Second, with Heidegger and the later Wittgenstein, Thiselton ties 'certainty' not to an Enlightenment notion of 'scientific objectivity', but to attitudes, life-practices, concrete relationship with others, and subjectivity. Thiselton does not miss the link between appropriation and certainty.

Third, for Thiselton, with Heidegger, 'meaning' is not a secondary level present-at-hand significance stuck onto naked 'objects', but often the irreducibly multiform 'ready-to-hand purpose for the sake of which' of something, or of signs, in relation to horizons of concerns and experiences in life. The issue of 'present meaning' is unavoidable (L. Brodie rightly notes Heidegger's significance for Thiselton here).

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2. Towards a Unified Critique of Historical Objectivity and Description

The question of Thiselton's notion of 'objectivity' is more complex. He rejects several approaches to 'objectivity': "the interpreter" cannot "eliminate his modern context by... pure objectivism". Against Cartesianism, the subject cannot leave behind its finite, corporate, tradition-conditioned horizons to become an isolated worldless 'I'. However, Thiselton does not overcome Cartesianism by merely "reversing... the subject-object schema", but by replacing the entire framework within which conceptualisation is conceived. Thiselton, accounting for 'life-world', also dismisses the knowing subject of Locke, Hume, and Kant, as well as the Cartesian or Kantian naive 'common sense' equation of 'truth' with 'objectivity', and 'error' with 'subjectivity', which artificially separates 'perceptions' from a 'fixed' world, and can be found in W. Wrede, A. Schlatter, and A. Von Harnack. Thiselton also rejects the over-abstractions of Hegel and Neo-Kantianism, as already seen. Further, nineteenth century naturalistic accounts of the 'knowing subject' focusing on 'properties' ignore temporality, historicality, and openness to the future. A. Von Ranke illegitimately appeals to a theology of history to escape historical finitude, where Dilthey's modified idealism similarly appeals to a standpoint above history. Finally, with R.G. Collingwood, Thiselton rejects pre-occupation with 'statements' in modern universes: this ignores historical process. In summary, Thiselton considers it naive to ignore the rise of historical consciousness.

Whilst Thiselton nowhere presents a replacement notion of 'objectivity', or 'description', systematically, The Two Horizons is a very 'productive' text in relation to how 'history' affects 'objectivity'. Our ordered account moves beyond what Thiselton achieves, yet nevertheless co-


311. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 189, cf. 303, 358.

312. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 159-160; cf. 319-323.


316. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 309; cf. 63-69.
ordinates components he provides.\textsuperscript{317} The problem of ‘description’ is a major focus in \textit{The Two Horizons},\textsuperscript{318} and Thiselton’s stress on “the objectivity issue” persists in later work.\textsuperscript{319} Thiselton’s “two horizons” do not lead to absolute “historical relativism”,\textsuperscript{320} though cultural, historical, and epistemological relativity are inevitable to an extent, qualifying L.P. Barnes’s otherwise correct view of Thiselton’s “objections to... forms of relativism”.\textsuperscript{321} G.R. Osborne correctly highlights Thiselton’s attacks on the “illusion of textual objectivism”, but Thiselton goes beyond the “four” hindrances to ‘objectivity’ Osborne finds in Thiselton. Osborne rightly notes the negative effects on objectivity of pre-understanding, historical distance, ‘literary’ language, and absence of shared understanding. However, Thiselton grounds a critique of ‘objectivity’ in his critique of history along eight axes of overlapping polarities, each of which contributes both negatively and positively to the problem of objectivity, contrary to Osborne’s exclusively negative focus.\textsuperscript{322}

Thus, \textit{first}, for Thiselton, historical \textit{situativeness} generates ‘relativity’ between provisional interpretations.\textsuperscript{323} Historical ‘hiddenness’, the ‘now’ versus ‘not yet’ tension,\textsuperscript{324} and openness towards the future,\textsuperscript{325} render historical knowledge provisional upon further discoveries, where even ‘natural laws’ are only progress reports.\textsuperscript{326} Nevertheless, \textit{second}, for Thiselton, situatedness is also theological - ‘history-as-a-whole’ is prophetically anticipated in the Christ-event and the horizon of promise.\textsuperscript{327} Theology aside, historical unveiling and tradition-development are progressive: diachronic frameworks of reference are not entirely ‘open’ and some objectivity is possible.\textsuperscript{328}

\textsuperscript{324} Thiselton, \textit{Two Horizons}, 175, cf. 264-265.
\textsuperscript{325} Thiselton, \textit{Two Horizons}, 82-84.
\textsuperscript{326} Thiselton, \textit{Two Horizons}, 197, 323-324; cf. 260-261.
\textsuperscript{327} Thiselton, \textit{Two Horizons}, 66-67, cf. 82-84, 265.
For Thiselton, first, historical unity limits objectivity. Interpreters are always already immersed in history and tradition and cannot attain an Archimedean point above history. Nevertheless, second, for Thiselton, historical unity is pre-conditional for prior shared understanding which, in turn, is pre-conditional for intelligibility and ethical relevance, - i.e. for further understanding to begin. Objectivity depends on historical unity.

For Thiselton, first, historical process ensures that understanding is never immediate, once-for-all, or final. Initial understanding is always distorted, since it is impossible to proceed directly to the object of understanding. With Schleiermacher, “lack of understanding is never totally removed”. Understanding is always an incomplete “process”, further hindered when interpreting ‘literary’, as opposed to ‘everyday’, language. As F. Watson remarks, Thiselton’s focus on “originating historical context” almost results in a Derridean infinite deferral of meaning. Nevertheless, second, for Thiselton, historical process can aid objectivity: only final understanding is deferred, not progressive understanding - particularly once widening dialogue and multiple interpretative models are employed. These yield mutually and reciprocally cross-referenced and correcting angles of view, clarification of the hermeneutical task, awareness and modification of interpretative pre-judgements, enlargement of interpreters’ critical capacities and experience in history, and clarification of biblical texts themselves. (ii) Widening dialogue precludes a priori absolutist narrowing of pre-understanding through blinkered adherence to single over-generalising interpretative models that falsely claim comprehensiveness, polarise debates, and paralyse and control understanding. Widened dialogue, therefore, reduces the incidence of over-selective and partial one-sided interpretations.

337. Thiselton, Two Horizons, 292, cf. 4-6, 445; cf. 303-308; cf. 235, 238; cf. 6-7; cf. 386-427.
For Thiselton, first, historical continuities inhibit objectivity when interpretation becomes a service discipline perpetuating fossilised traditions of interpretation and preventing texts from coming to speech afresh to refine tradition. Thus, Bible-reading can become dull, uneventful, or boring, endlessly ‘repeating’ ‘familiar’ and potentially distorted interpretations. Nevertheless, second, for Thiselton, historical continuities - judgements, convictions, and public criteria - also aid objectivity, providing pre-conditions for intelligibility, teachability, and constraints as to what may count as ‘authentic’, ‘objective’, interpretation.

For Thiselton, first, historical particularities - the ‘other’ or the ‘alien’ - resist assimilation. Strangeness, difference, uniqueness, distance, tension, or ‘relativity’ can inhibit objectivity. Genuine difference cannot be reduced to sameness, limiting historical analogy. Distinctions remain between cultures, linguistic functions, ‘self’ and ‘not self’, theology and anthropology, past and present, pre-understanding and prior conscious self-awareness, and between ‘truth’ and ‘what is true for me’. Nevertheless, second, for Thiselton, historical particularities and tension jog interpretative pre-judgements into conscious awareness (cf. ‘historical objectification’) through juxtapositional contrast with the past. Historical distance can make texts “easier to interpret”. After F. Schelling, “encountering the strange, the alien, the unfamiliar, the different, ...the Other” is pre-conditional “for interpreting and understanding persons and selfhood”.

For Thiselton, first, historical conditioning can distort truth. Interwoven practices, language-habits, and thought delimit pre-cognitive ‘worlds’ and pre-judgements, and may perpetuate disguised ‘spells’ or distortions. The coming-to-speech of tradition is further conditioned by selves’ life-experiences,


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practical concerns, interests, idiosyncrasies, and stages of development.\textsuperscript{349} Language-events can misleadingly suggest encounter with ‘objectivity’,\textsuperscript{350} and an over-extended cognitive emphasis evades textual transforming action in the present and dimensions of objectivity yielded by appropriation and application.\textsuperscript{351} Nevertheless, second, for Thiselton, divine speech-action re-shapes hearers’ traditions.\textsuperscript{352} After Gadamer, ‘effective history’ allows “history” to become a “source of correction” of traditions of interpretation (see Chapter 6).\textsuperscript{353} Thus, pre-understanding may be informed by systematic theologies\textsuperscript{354} - for Thiselton, the “end process to date” of developing traditions.\textsuperscript{355} Comparative testing against public criteria, fruitful appropriations, and applications can transmit fruitful pre-judgements to be further refined through fresh language-events.\textsuperscript{356} Dialogue or ‘conversation’ can bring forth the truly ‘new’, and ‘distancing’ can expose pre-judgements to cultivation.\textsuperscript{357} ‘Spells’ can be broken, and ‘persuasive definition’ can be ‘shown’.\textsuperscript{358} ‘Feeling states’ can disclose truth.\textsuperscript{359} Later, Thiselton criticises R. Rorty’s neglect of the positive effect of conditioning on objectivity. For Rorty, “all claims to knowledge” arise “only from within some given social tradition, in which the context of convention determines what is acceptable or ‘rational’”.\textsuperscript{360} K.J. Vanhoozer misidentifies this as Thiselton’s complaint against ‘Gadamerian and Ricoeurian relativism’ - however, Gadamer, Ricoeur, and Thiselton all note tradition-aided objectivity.\textsuperscript{361}

For Thiselton, first, historical individualism hinders objectivity, since idiosyncrasies, interests, concerns, blind-spots, lack of accountability, lack of dialogue and cross-referencing, lack of respect for tradition,


\textsuperscript{354} Thiselton, \textit{Two Horizons}, 314-319; cf. 94-95.


\textsuperscript{358} Thiselton, \textit{Two Horizons}, 304, 386-392, 392-401, 401-407.

\textsuperscript{359} Thiselton, \textit{Two Horizons}, 161-163, cf. 191-194.

\textsuperscript{360} Thiselton, \textit{New Horizons}, 395.

self-deception, and lack of expertise remain unchecked. Thiselton cites the legacy of Plato, Descartes, Hume, and the Enlightenment as exalting individual 'critical reason' above supposedly unreliable traditional 'opinion'. Nevertheless, "the dialectic between the corporate and individual aspects" of understanding retains a place. Conversely, second, Thiselton notes that contemporary philosophy and science stress the individual's dependency on "other people's acquired knowledge" "transmitted" by traditions. Interpretation should be corporate, provided interpretative communities engage in widened dialogue beyond their own horizons. This caveat is important, and Thiselton later attacks corporate self-interest and fallibility. Socio-pragmatic strands in liberation and feminist hermeneutics fail to develop a socio-critical principle or self-critique. A wealth of literature proves Thiselton's 'interests' are not misogynistic at this point - precisely the opposite.


For Thiselton, first, historical fallibility hinders objectivity. Thus, with Bultmann, the term ‘flesh’ can involve the self-deceptive suppression of truth through various evasions, especially hiding in the crowd. Thiselton criticises Heidegger’s ‘resoluteness’ as doubly self-centred, suppressing responsible relationship and the call of God. Heidegger’s later stress on passive listening denies the strenuous thought involved in transformation. Thiselton neglects neither the effect of sin on understanding, nor divine judgement of sin. Thiselton’s concern over sin remains to this day, where he attacks the duality of reactive ‘evasion’ and pro-active ‘self-reliance’ or ‘self-assertion’. Both sins involve deception, and therefore influence understanding. Thus, Thiselton bemoans the evasions of “virtual reality”, and sympathises with “the postmodern ideology critique” of “the motives of power and manipulation disguised in almost every discourse”. Later, Thiselton contrasts sinful relating with the Trinitarian love manifest in Jesus, and with relational inter-personal hermeneutics. And yet, second,
historical redemption aids objectivity in Thiselton's view, liberating fallen interpretative capacities and attitudes. The Spirit gives exegetical gifts, and creatively inspires fusion. Scholary integrity proceeds in the direction that inquiry itself leads, remaining open to challenges to interpretative pre-understandings.

Building on Thiselton, we propose that every human relationship or discourse reflects the influence of varying instantiations, at both individual and corporate levels, of complex superimpositions of strategies of both evasion and manipulation in relation to different aspects of life, depending on the person or group in view. Further, we suspect that the Platonic, Cartesian, Humean, Kantian, Neo-Kantian legacy has led to the de-relationalisation of biblical exegesis and the suppression of the relational grammar of Scripture, over-individualising what is meant by 'sin' and 'righteousness'. Thiselton hints at this in his approval for the use of certain 'existentialist' categories in biblical hermeneutics as, for example, in G.V. Jones' use of 'stranglement', 'longing', and 'anguish' to interpret the Parable of the Prodigal Son. Persons are not 'types' to be treated by standardised approaches.

This relates to our earlier argument: there remains still more scope for a hermeneutic of fallen relationships that moves beyond Thiselton.

In conclusion, by a process F. LeRon Shults describes as aufhebung or 'sublation' ("to cancel... to take up and use", cf. relever in Derrida - "to relieve, to displace, to elevate, to replace and to promote, in one and the same movement") after Hegel and Pannenberg, Thiselton's historiographical paradigm-transformation assimilates the question of 'objectivity', bringing it into itself and into a relation of dialectic with his transformed paradigm without annihilating it. Thus, Thiselton transcends the Enlightenment framework of epistemology, yet preserves Enlightenment concerns for objectivity and the justification of knowledge. Shults writes, "If we strip away any Hegelian overtones, this concept of sublation might be applied to the post-foundationalist attempt to relate epistemology and hermeneutics". Thus "Thiselton uses language reminiscent of aufheben, without the Hegelian metaphysical baggage". We depart from Shults' stripping too much of Hegel away, though certainly Hegel's idealism is cancelled, and Hegel's idealist notion of 'sublation' is itself sublated into a non-idealist framework in our use of the term. We also depart from Shults' use of the generalisation 'post-

foundationalism’ to describe Thiselton. Yet, Shults’ use of aufheben begins to capture what Thiselton does with both Hegel’s thought and with post-Enlightenment epistemology.382 Thus we query T.A. Hart’s view that Thiselton ‘defends Enlightenment ideals as much as he criticises them’ in relation to ‘objectivity’. Rather, Thiselton sublates such ‘ideas’ (concerns) into a non-idealist framework that is thoroughly historical and hermeneutical. Ultimately, this framework constitutes an a posteriori philosophical description of something much more ancient, the “Judaico-Christian faith matrix” that emerges “genuinely intact” from the collapse of “anthropocentric humanism”.383

E. Concluding Comments: Dialogic Resonance, Metacritical Evaluation, Interpretative Responsibility, and Description as Warrant for a Provisional Christological Unification of Hermeneutics

Having anticipated our main arguments in the present chapter, we began by arguing that the philosophical unification of ‘second strata’ hermeneutical critiques connoted by Thiselton’s work warranted further dialogue with theological considerations. Thiselton was not straightforwardly fideistic. In particular, the Christ-event dialogically resonated with Thiselton’s three implicit modified Hegelian criteria and their entailments. Further, the Christ-event surpassed and completed philosophical hermeneutics, providing metacritical explanatory and evaluative criteria that (after E.A. Dunn) extended Gadamer’s notions of ‘tradition’ and ‘dialogue’ respectively. Thus, the Christ-event unified hermeneutics as a whole (all three strata), linking ‘responsible interpretation’ with ‘Christ-like relating’. Thiselton’s view of biblical authority was not ‘fundamentalist’ once viewed against the background of his appeals to the philosophies of history and language and as, thereby, militating against broadly ‘positivist’ and ‘existentialist’ approaches. Various misconceptions of Thiselton’s view of ‘biblical revelation’ were highlighted.

Next, we applied Thiselton’s contrast, in The Two Horizons, between the widened dialogue of responsible interpretation and the foreclosed dialogue of interpretative irresponsibility to Thiselton’s

critics. The foreclosed dialogue of 'friendly critics' was straightforward misreading. Socio-pragmatic approaches, however, attempted to legitimise the dialogic foreclosure of pre-understanding, but this presupposed a prior, asserted, hidden, foreclosure of dialogue with the philosophy of history. Ernst Fuchs rightly speaks of "certain naïvetés which... establish themselves as a result of an undisturbed development".\(^{384}\) A.K.M. Adam's combined socio-pragmatic and post-structural appeals hedonistically 'binned' Thiselton as an 'idealist' or 'formalist', potentially canonising dialogic foreclosure through incredulity over the possibility of recognising meta-criteria. With Schleiermacher, however: "that much is created from little produces only pleasure" since, in effect, Adam failed to allow recognition of Jesus.\(^{385}\) M.W. Nicholson and L. Woodhead went further, towards a 'disowned' projection, in which their own hermeneutical foreclosure was marketed as Thiselton's problem.

Finally, we rejected G.R. Osborne's attributing of an entirely negative four-fold critique of historical objectivity to Thiselton in favour of Thiselton's actual eight-axis critique of historical factors that affected 'objectivity' both negatively and positively. Enlightenment concerns for 'objectivity' were sublated into a transformed framework that drew on both theology and philosophy. In conclusion, drawing on Thiselton, we have attempted to justify an exploration towards a provisional Christological unification of hermeneutics by appeal to dialogic resonance or relevance, the provision and unification of metacritical explanatory and evaluative criteria, and the facilitation of responsible interpretation and objective description.

Conclusion

The Value of Thiselton’s Formative Thinking for Hermeneutics

A. Repeating the Question
In the ‘Introduction’ we asked: what innovative contributions could be made to the discipline or theory of hermeneutics if Anthony C. Thiselton’s own formative hermeneutical reflections were pieced together systematically from his responses to other thinkers? That is, what potential milestones, theoretical advances, or critical dialogues with other schools of thought would be made possible or available, or what blind-spots would be uncovered, if Thiselton’s thought were rendered more visible?

B. Approaching the Question
Answering these questions required a very difficult historical-structural procedure, moving beyond Thiselton’s work by building hermeneutical theory from components he provided and by being led through the path of self-involvement into which Thiselton invited his readers. This enabled movement towards a unified critical synthesis or hermeneutical theory directly relevant to the six significant contemporary unsolved difficulties in the discipline of hermeneutics highlighted in our ‘Introduction’.

C. Six Criteria for the Contemporary Relevance of Thiselton’s Hermeneutics
Thus, first, we asked if Thiselton’s work could help bring order to hermeneutics as a disorganised discipline. Second, we asked if Thiselton’s work could help clarify hermeneutics as a complex discipline by explicating the different kinds of conversation presupposed in hermeneutical discourse. Third, we asked if Thiselton’s work could help with the problem of abstraction in hermeneutics by bridging the gap between hermeneutical theory and interpretative practice. Fourth, we asked if Thiselton’s work could help address the problem of theoretical disunity in hermeneutics: by providing a transformed philosophical subtext to replace obsolete post-Enlightenment paradigms, by overcoming philosophical dualisms or dichotomies associated with obsolete philosophical subtexts, and by attributing appropriate ‘ontological prioritisations’ to language and history within any transformed theoretical unification. Fifth, we asked if Thiselton’s work could thereby help bring harmony to the inter-disciplinary polarisation in hermeneutics by reuniting its philosophical and theological traditions.
Sixth, we asked if Thiselton’s work could help address the current disarray over what constituted ‘responsible interpretation’, practically speaking.

D. Answering the Question

1. Bringing Order to a Disorganised Discipline: ‘Three Strata’ Scheme

On the question of bringing order to hermeneutics, Thiselton’s work connoted a ‘three strata’ scheme for organising hermeneutical theory that, further, proved very useful for expounding the various axes in others’ work where either Thiselton, or the present study, found problems. The first stratum of hermeneutical reflection focused on historical dialogue, seeking to widen dialogue with as many historical traditions and approaches as possible so as to gain the widest possible range of ‘angles of view’ on any problem. Notably, Thiselton established a broader two-way dialogue between philosophical and theological traditions. The second stratum of hermeneutical reflection centred on dialogue around five major theoretical axes of philosophical and theological conversation: history, epistemology, language, (Western) culture, and the self. If Thiselton was not talking about ‘dialogue’ itself, or about ‘responsible interpretation’, then he was discourse in one or more of these five spheres. The third stratum of hermeneutical reflection concerned ‘responsible interpretation’ - all that was involved in understanding and interpreting texts and persons in practice. Our ‘three strata’, then, turned on the breadth of inter-disciplinary dialogue, the philosophical and theological theoretical foundations for responsible interpretation, and responsible interpretative practice respectively.

2. Bringing Clarity to a Complex Discipline: Seven Hermeneutical Conversations

On the question of clarifying complexity by expounding the different kinds of conversation presupposed in hermeneutical discourse, then Thiselton’s work connoted seven spheres of hermeneutical discourse. On the first stratum, there was Thiselton’s critique of Bultmann’s work for presupposing too narrow an inter-disciplinary dialogue, particularly between different theological and philosophical traditions. Bultmann lacked critical openness, exhibiting hermeneutical foreclosure of dialogue with philosophical traditions. Thiselton’s whole work battled against hermeneutical foreclosure, explaining his introduction of so many interlocutors. The present study, similarly, dialogued with as many writers as possible, attacking different kinds of hermeneutical foreclosure amongst Thiselton’s critics and linking it to irresponsible interpretation. On the second stratum were Thiselton’s major conversations with the philosophies of history, epistemology, language, with the socio-criticism of Western culture, and with philosophies of the self. These conversations flowed out of, or were informed by, his broadened inter-disciplinary dialogue, and were reflected in our chapter.
headings. Hermeneutical conversation moved beyond a rhetoric of asserting the need to ‘dialogue broadly’ - often simply a device for perpetuating philosophical pluralism - attempting to answer questions about how ‘history’, ‘epistemology’, ‘language’, ‘Western culture’, or ‘selves’ affect what ‘understanding’ is. Thiselton did not merely hold different traditions ‘in tension’, but moved towards critical synthesis. Thus, certain traditional assumptions about ‘history’ and ‘language’ really did produce inadequate interpretations. Or, a biblical ‘multiform’ notion of ‘truth’ really did rectify certain one-sidednesses present in various traditions of philosophical speculation about ‘truth’. In Chapter 7, we noted how the conversation about ‘history’ was extended to include ‘eschatology’. On the third stratum, Thiselton conversed about what was actually involved in ‘responsible interpretation’. Thiselton criticised both approaches over-emphasising past horizons and approaches over-emphasising present horizons - hence his adoption, but also modification or refinement, of Gadamer’s notions of the ‘two horizons’, of ‘distancing and fusion’, and of the ‘hermeneutical circle’. In Chapter 7, we extended Gadamer’s notion of ‘dialogue’ in this context to include considerations of trinitarian (or Christ-like) relationality. Thiselton’s work, then, connoted seven broad overlapping categories of hermeneutical conversation or discourse - on dialogue, history, epistemology, language, (Western) culture, the human self, and understanding. We suggested that the term ‘postmodern’ could denote changes in or criticism of ‘post-Enlightenment’ thought and culture along these seven axes, and that conversations about ‘history’ and ‘understanding’ ultimately embraced eschatology and Christ-like Trinitarian love respectively. The latter then looped back to define the character of ‘stratum one’ dialogue.

3. Tackling Abstraction: Bridging the Gap between Theory & Practice
On the question of tackling abstraction by bridging the gap between hermeneutical theory and interpretative practice, then the three strata and seven conversations connoted by Thiselton’s work shed light on the matter. We noted Thiselton’s constant battle to convince biblical interpreters that hermeneutics was an urgent priority because it actually did greatly affect interpretative practice, findings, and textual function. Conclusions emerging from philosophical and theological discourses on history, epistemology, language, Western culture, and the self had indeed, historically, directly affected interpretative practice, the results of exegesis, and textual function. Thus hermeneutics was not merely abstract theory divorced from practical interpretation, but a way of highlighting both what was problematic about interpretative practices and what interpretative practice missed in, or misconstrued from, texts themselves. Thiselton highlighted how both broadly ‘positivist’ interpretation and Bultmann’s broadly ‘existentialist’ approach could discount certain discourse as ‘not historical’ or as
‘myth’ not on the basis of painstaking exegesis, but on the basis of too narrow a philosophical dialogue at the level of the philosophies of history and language. Similarly, in Thiselton’s view, the New Hermeneutic needlessly disparaged assertive language as ‘objectifying’ and less important than ‘non-objectifying’ language. Thus, the movement had more success with Jesus’ parables than it did with, say, Pauline arguments. A principle emerged: inadequate philosophical dialogue produced problematic dualisms or dichotomies on the five major theoretical axes of philosophical and theological reflection which, in turn, directly caused practical interpretative difficulties. This was the problem Thiselton sought to solve: narrow philosophical and theological dialogue led to inadequate interpretative theory which, in turn, led to misleading, one-sided, or selective interpretative practice. *Dialogue* affected *theory* affected *practice* - directly.

4. Tackling Theoretical Disunity: Subtext, Dichotomies, & Ontological Priorities

On the question of overcoming theoretical disunity in hermeneutics at the level of philosophical subtext, then Thiselton’s work connoted a unifying philosophy of history grounded in a modification of three Hegelian criteria: ‘history-as-a-whole’, ‘the unity of historical reality’, and ‘historical dialectic’. Whilst Pannenberg’s work was Thiselton’s point of departure, the way in which Thiselton developed hermeneutical theory from these modified Hegelian criteria went beyond Pannenberg. Anticipations of ‘history-as-a-whole’ were always themselves ‘historical’, from ‘below’, ‘within’ history, and not at its End. These constituted the largest diachronic frames-of-reference for understanding. ‘The unity of historical reality’ grounded the possibility and unity of understanding and language, where historical understanding and concrete self-understanding were interwoven. Self-understanding was an aspect of historical understanding; historical understanding began with self-understanding; and yet self-understanding came through a detour into historical understanding. ‘Historical dialectic’ constituted a dialogic process of creative historical synthesis that generated the historical continuities and particularities of the concrete traditions in which it was earthed. Traditions constituted both diachronic frames-of-reference for understanding (subsidiary to anticipations of ‘history-as-a-whole’) and socio-historical extensions of the hermeneutical circle, where language was grounded in the continuities and particularities of those traditions and not ‘formally’. Thus, epistemology was historically structured, language was historically grounded, Western culture was an instantiation or snap-shot of certain traditions at given points in their histories, and the self was understood as a historically structured historical contingency. Thus, Thiselton’s work connoted that theoretical hermeneutics (stratum two) was brought to unity within a new modified Hegelian subtext.
On the question of overcoming theoretical disunity in hermeneutics at the level of philosophical (and theological) dualisms or dichotomies, then Thiselton's work proved useful. Thus, for example, the 'unity of historical reality' criterion contradicted Bultmann's 'history versus nature' and 'Geschichte versus Historie' dualisms or dichotomies in the historical sphere. The grounding of the unity of understanding in the unity of historical reality contradicted Bultmann's epistemological dualisms or dichotomies between subjectivity, worldhood, feeling states, and ontological disclosure on the one hand and cognition, concepts, and critical testing on the other. The grounding of the unity of language in the unity of historical reality contradicted Bultmann's dualistic or dichotomous separations between 'meaning' (cf. 'value') and 'facts', between 'self-involving' and 'objectifying' functions, and between 'inner thought' or 'intention' and 'linguistic expression'. The grounding of the self in socio-historical reality, on the basis of the criterion of the unity of historical reality, contradicted Bultmann's anthropological dichotomies, which remained despite Bultmann's notion of personhood as a unified 'whole'. These included Bultmann's stress on individual subjectivity at the expense of corporate inter-subjectivity, on 'worldhood' at the expense of conceptualisation about the self, and on imperatives, existential questions, responsibility, and decision at the expense of the material world in which they had their currency. Thiselton's unifying of historical continuities and particularities within a notion of tradition as an extension of the hermeneutical circle contradicted Bultmann's dichotomous stress on generalising form criticism and Sachkritik at the expense of painstaking exegesis of the particular case. Finally, Thiselton's development of Pannenberg's notion of how God is neither identifiable as 'history', nor entirely separable from 'history', contradicted Bultmann's separation of God and divine action from 'this world'. The same historical criteria allowed dualisms or dichotomies to be addressed in the New Hermeneutic, and eventually in 'socio-pragmatic' and 'post-structuralist' approaches as well.

On the question of overcoming theoretical disunity in hermeneutics at the level of the relative ontological prioritisation of history and language then, first, that Thiselton's work connoted a historical and not a linguistic unification of hermeneutical theory meant that history was ontologically prior to language. All seven hermeneutical spheres were profoundly historical and came to internal unity, and to unity with one another, within Thiselton's modified Hegelian framework. Notably, the later Wittgenstein's unified view of language resonated with the view that history was ontologically prior to language. Conversely, we found an implicit historical dichotomy in Derrida's attempt to prioritise language over history. Second, the notion of the ontological prioritisation of history over language implicit in the historical unification of hermeneutics affected the structure of the chapters of the
present study. Initially, the methodological decision to defer treatment of Thiselton's PhD thesis and *The Two Horizons* to Chapters 6 and 7 seemed a necessary inconvenience: it left Thiselton's most fundamental critique - i.e. of history - until the end, leaving the other critiques unrelated. Ultimately, however, the grounding of the other critiques in history, and hence the historical unification of hermeneutical theory, eventually became part of a natural climax to the project. Third, the connotation of a historical unification of hermeneutical theory provided the opportunity in the present study to actually begin to rebuild critiques of history, epistemology, language, Western culture, the self, and of the hermeneutical circle without dichotomies and dualisms. If Thiselton both attempted critical syntheses and held traditions in tension for further dialogue, but emphasised the latter, our emphasis was the reverse: explicating and continuing his critical synthesis. This was not to close down further dialogue or return to idealism, but merely to pause and reflect on a possible critical-synthetic route forwards towards a unified hermeneutical theory. The claim is not made that a completely unified hermeneutical theory has been constructed from Thiselton's work, but only that a definite move has been made towards this. In particular, since our study has focused on Thiselton's formative work, then the critiques of 'Western culture' and the 'human self' are only embryonic, reflecting where Thiselton had reached by 1980.

5. Tackling Inter-Disciplinary Polarisation: Inter-relating Philosophy & Theology
On the question of inter-disciplinary polarisation between philosophy and theology in hermeneutics - really a further aspect of the problem of disunity in hermeneutics - then Thiselton's work was fruitful in three ways.

First, Thiselton's philosophical critique of history was suggestive for the provisional adoption of a working Christological and eschatological framework for the unification of hermeneutics more broadly. If philosophical unification lacked an adequate ground for metacritical explanation and evaluation, then New Testament theology did not. Thiselton's engagements with the philosophies of history, epistemology, and language, particularly his development of Pannenberg's work, provided resonances with biblical theology, such that bringing a theological discussion of metacritical explanation and evaluation into dialogue with philosophical criteria could be warranted at the level of working hypothesis without bringing disunity. That is, the Christ-event already presupposed something like Thiselton's modifications of Hegelian criteria. That Hegel's philosophy was linked to Christian theology anyway only strengthened our point: since Thiselton's modifications of Hegelian criteria unified the philosophical discussion as well it was fitting that a qualification of Hegel's thought
be used to overcome the artificial divide between philosophical and theological hermeneutics. Thus, Christ as ‘enfleshed Word’ resonated with appeals to the later Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language which, in turn, could be grounded in a critique of history. ‘Faith’ in Christ, in one of its senses, was structured similarly to ‘historical rationality’. The Christ-event, as anticipation of history-as-a-whole, extended Gadamer’s appeal to traditions as contexts for understanding (we drew on E.A. Dunn here). The Christ-event, being related to prior tradition as prophetic-fulfilment and yet genuinely unique, reflected ‘tradition’ as a process generating both ‘continuity’ and ‘novelty’. Christ’s embodiment of love for God and neighbour provided the ethical ‘metacriterion’ against which all other relationships could be evaluated. This infused Thiselton’s critique of history with respect for the historical ‘other’, his critique of epistemology with the ‘truth’ of authentic humanity, and his critique of language with responsible speech ‘backed’ by actions. Similarly, his critiques of Western culture and the self were infused by reflection on sin and redemption, and his critique of responsible interpretation was infused by a critique of human relationship. Proper understanding was an aspect of Christ-like relating, extending Gadamer’s notion of dialogue to a description of the embodied Christ (again drawing on E.A. Dunn). Thus, the warrant for including theological considerations was the introduction of a viable metacriterion for ethical evaluation that resonated with, and improved upon, the fruits of extended philosophical dialogue. However, the conversation of warrant, that brought theology in at the end, was qualified by the conversation of theory-construction, which brought theology in from the start. If Thiselton’s work reflected this balance, the present study attempted to maintain it.

Second, Thiselton’s Christological and eschatological extension of a historical unification of hermeneutics provided a ‘tensorial’ (‘tensor’: stretching muscle in biology, cf. vector with direction in mathematics) framework for holding theoretical critiques in their proper inter-relationships, structure, or grammar. This grounded Thiselton’s opposition to dualisms in the Continental hermeneutical traditions on the one hand, and his opposition to the de-historicisation of language in post-structural and neo-pragmatic traditions on the other. Heidegger, Bultmann, and the New Hermeneutic made the human subject too central, leading to historical, epistemological, and linguistic dichotomies. Bultmann’s construction of his philosophy of history ‘within’ his theory of epistemology split ‘history’ into Geschichte and Historie. Alternatively, Derrida constructed ‘history’ ‘within’ a theory of language, splitting history into an inaccessible temporal realm for linguistic flux on the one hand and successive ‘histories’ as shifting linguistic constructs on the other. Fish constructed implicit theories of history, epistemology, and language ‘within’ the present horizon of corporate selfhood, splintering ‘history’, ‘epistemology’, ‘language’, and ‘Western culture’. The historical past was rendered inaccessible,
historical knowledge was rendered impossible, and textual assertions were disparaged. Further, we mentioned Thiselton’s stress on the inevitable conflicts between competing sub-groups that would result - fragmenting Western culture. By contrast, Thiselton’s Christological and eschatological ‘tensorial’ framework, though only an anticipation of the ‘whole’, de-centred human selfhood, epistemology, language, and Western culture relative to a history stretched out from the present horizon towards the past (cf. ‘two horizons’) and towards the future horizon of promise (cf. ‘three horizons’). In this framework, problematic dichotomies disappeared from theoretical hermeneutics - only further warranting the inclusion of theological considerations in hermeneutics. Thus, in the present study, the elimination of dichotomies was presented as a key to interpreting Thiselton’s programme.

Third, the relationship between philosophy and theology in hermeneutics now became clear. The philosophical subtext that unified hermeneutical theory was a highly modified Hegelian framework. Despite its metacritical inadequacy, this framework resonated with biblical Christology and eschatology, thereby warranting the inclusion of theology in theory construction. This inclusion did not disrupt the unity of hermeneutical critiques internally or in their inter-relations, but improved the situation by infusing the ‘whole’ with the metacriterion of ethical evaluation - namely the Christ-event - that had, until now, still been ‘divorced’ from the ‘whole’. Thus, theology extended the unity provided by philosophy. The ‘philosophy’ that unifies theoretical hermeneutics is the ‘philosophy’ that coheres with Scripture. By contrast, philosophy dissonant with Scripture fragments theoretical hermeneutics. The unification of hermeneutics occurs when philosophy and theology come to unity.

6. Confronting Irresponsible Interpretation: Responsible Practice Contra Foreclosure
On the issue of the disarray over what constituted ‘responsible interpretation’ practically speaking, then Thiselton’s critique of hermeneutical understanding and clarification of the hermeneutical task amounted to an exposition of ‘responsible interpretation’ and the hermeneutical circle. This was grounded in his hermeneutic of tradition and, in turn, in his critique of history, though it presupposed all five of his theoretical critiques. Thus, fundamentally, Thiselton’s critique of ‘responsible interpretation’ presupposed widened dialogue with philosophical and theological traditions and respect for the other as ‘Other’. Thiselton’s hermeneutical circle was a substantial modification of Gadamer’s, and constituted continuous movement within and between different polarities. These embraced the kinds of human capacities used in interpretation (cf. ‘historical rationality’ - not unrelated to the kinds of structure encountered in interpretation: historical ‘particularities’ cf. ‘understanding’; and,
'continuities' cf. 'explanation'), and the kinds of tasks performed in interpretation (especially 'distancing' and 'fusion').

Thus, first, historical rationality was, (i), both critical, involving cognition and comparative testing, particularly in relation to historical reconstruction (cf. 'parts'), language-uses, and to events of fusion, and creative, involving intuiting 'wholes' (especially persons) and forging relationships between past, present, and anticipated futures. (ii) Historical rationality was also, therefore, experiential and conceptualising, pre-cognitive and cognitive, where interpretative judgements and pre-judgements proceeded from traditional conditioning and towards transformation. (iii) Historical rationality was, therefore, both corporate and individual, historical and theological, and moved between the historically particular and the historically general.

Second, distancing and fusion included, (i), movement between textual and reader horizons - not just a sterile interest in texts as historical sources. (ii) Distancing and fusion involved movement between synchronic and diachronic considerations, refusing to divorce texts from historical particularities and processes. This included broader synchronic investigations in which a text could be compared with other texts from the same period, and broader diachronic considerations, in which a text could be located within the traditions of its composition and reception history. (iii) Distancing and fusion involved several dimensions of ethical responsibility. There were obligations to be faithful to texts, to communicate faithfully, to use interpretative strategies appropriate to textual particularity and interpretative goals, to practically respond to texts, and to test responses at the levels of actualisation, appropriation, and application. (iv) Distancing and fusion involved movement between three or more levels of context involving linguistic and historical considerations - yet establishing these on different philosophical grounds. Here, we noted Thiselton's polemics for reinstating inquiry into background states of affairs, author profiles, inter-authorial and inter-textual comparisons, original settings, linguistic functions, authorial intent, and transmitted textual content. (v) Distancing and fusion involved movement between textual action, actualisation, appropriation, and application, emphasising not only 'eventful' interpretation intra-linguistically, but 'eventful' interpretation at the extra-linguistic level of personal or corporate response and action in the wider world. Here we noted Thiselton's polemic for moving beyond semantic concerns and intra-linguistic effects towards liberating textual speech-action and extra-linguistic effects; beyond hermeneutics as 'rules' associated with 'indoctrination' towards widening horizons and education; beyond a hedonism of self-affirming 'event' and 'experience' towards obedience; and beyond Western individualistic religion towards
corporate involvement in the wider world. Distancing and fusion also involved, (vi), movement between questions and answers and, (vii), between parts and wholes. Distancing and fusion, (viii), required respect for historical particularity against a priori generalisation; for multiple text-types and functions, multiple interpretative models and goals, and multiple critical tools; and for extended structural semantic considerations. No single interpretative or critical model could claim to be comprehensive.

E. Secondary Question: Has Thiselton Been Adequately Heard?

Whilst the main aim of the present study concerned Thiselton’s positive value for hermeneutics we also asked, in our Introduction, why a theorist of his stature had been neglected in contemporary research. We concluded, however, that not only had Thiselton been neglected, but that he had also been seriously misunderstood in various ways in the literature. There were problems of misleading caricature in which Thiselton was falsely or over-simplistically labelled as ‘Gadamerian’, ‘later Wittgensteinian’, ‘Pannenbergian’, ‘evangelical’ or ‘Anglican’. Thiselton’s stances on authorial intention, language, and the relationship between theology and philosophy had been misunderstood. Thiselton’s ‘third horizon’ was also misunderstood, where the innovation of appropriating Pannenberg’s thinking had been wrongly attributed to somebody else. Thiselton’s philosophy of history was also unrecognised, despite his offer of a philosophically transformed paradigm of historiography in The Two Horizons and not just ‘action models’ or a hermeneutic of traditions. Some thought that Thiselton grounded metacriticism in the later Wittgenstein’s work, missing Thiselton’s Christocentric perspective. Others called Thiselton ‘subjectivist’, ‘relativist’, ‘perspectivist’, or ‘fideist’, missing his subtle notions of ‘objectivity’ and ‘warrant’. In particular, ‘objectivity’ was not only affected negatively by historical factors. Some misunderstood the place of J.R. Searle, and speech-act theory in Thiselton’s thinking. Yet, Thiselton was not ‘formalist’, but imported just a few of Searle’s, Saussure’s, and J. Barr’s insights into a non-idealist paradigm quite different to Searle’s. Further, the subtlety of Thiselton’s engagement with the ‘postmodern’ had not been appreciated. Other problems centred on Thiselton’s understanding of the hermeneutical task. Thiselton did not simply follow, but considerably modified, Gadamer’s hermeneutical circle. Thiselton’s responses to views of textual context, textual autonomy, models of general textuality, the role of the Holy Spirit in interpretation, and the link between interpretation and appropriation had been misunderstood. There was also the notion that hermeneutical theory did not affect practice, when Thiselton demonstrated conclusively that it did - in positivist historical criticism, in Bultmann, in the New Hermeneutic, in structuralism, in post-structuralism, and in socio-pragmatism. This was not to deny the Bible to the ‘ordinary reader’,
but a statement that *some* in the corporate body of the Church would have to take ‘intellectual detours’ in order to provide appropriately pitched tools to others. Finally, whilst problems with Thiselton’s style could not be entirely dismissed, the difficulty of Thiselton’s writing was at least partly due to the complexity of the discussions at hand, repudiating consumer demands for novelty, indeterminacy, certainty, or simplicity. The dialogue and careful listening exercised by Thiselton was absent from his critics. Thus, ‘irresponsible interpretation’ was closely linked to various kinds of ‘hermeneutical foreclosure’, whether due to straightforward misreading, or to the supposed ‘legitimisation’ (though this was only asserted) and canonisation of foreclosure in socio-pragmatic and post-structural approaches, or due to a projection of ‘disowned’ foreclosure by hostile critics. In conclusion, there was no thorough engagement with any of Thiselton’s hermeneutical theory in the literature. Thiselton had not been properly heard.

**F. Giving Thiselton a Proper Hearing, and Legitimate Criticisms**

1. **Directions for Widening Philosophical & Theological Dialogues Still Further**
   It was the aim of the present study, therefore, to overcome these problems and give Thiselton a proper hearing. Only then could six genuine points of criticism perhaps be levelled at Thiselton, where four of these related to the need to extend dialogue further than Thiselton had yet managed. Thus, there was more scope for dialogue with epistemological traditions, with philosophies and models of selfhood and culture, with major ‘postmodern’ thinkers, and with pastoral theology and theological anthropology. For example, perhaps a dialogue with the likes of John Milbank could contribute towards Thiselton’s hermeneutic of Western culture. In relation to selfhood, it was suggested that a much more sophisticated hermeneutic of human fallenness as it worked out in relationships was required, not least because a person’s relationships were the main way in which that person was conditioned, which certainly wasn’t just ‘philosophical’ or ‘traditional’. What, for example, would Thiselton make of F. LeRon Shults’ book, *Reforming Theological Anthropology: After the Philosophical Turn to Relationality*, or of M. Shuster’s work, *The Fall and Sin: What We Have Become as Sinners*?

2. **Specificity & Thiselton’s Readings of Heidegger, Bultmann, Gadamer, & Wittgenstein**
   We also found minor problems with Thiselton’s readings of Heidegger, Bultmann, Gadamer, and Wittgenstein. More specificity was required: over the kinds of ‘conceptualisation’ and their respective frameworks that Heidegger affirmed or rejected; over Bultmann’s dichotomy between *Geschichte* and *Historie* in relation to his notion of appropriation; over Gadamer’s heralding of a ‘postmodern’ notion of selfhood given his stress on ‘otherness’; and over the extent to which the later Wittgenstein had
outgrown the Neo-Kantian legacy towards properly 'historical' philosophy. Nevertheless, we affirmed Thiselton's emphases on conceptualisation, historical unity, individual subjectivity, and the historical grounding of language - though we laid more emphasis on the theoretical role of autobiography.


Finally, the present study concluded that the main problem with Thiselton's formative work was that his important tradition-refinement of Continental hermeneutics was hidden behind his continued use of Continental terminology. He would be potentially open to the understandable, though erroneous, charge of 'persuasive definition' if it were not for the fact that his modifications of Continental grammar were so well hidden. The charge of 'persuasive definition', though, would ultimately be false since Thiselton was actually making what might be called a linguistic recommendation to refine a tradition that genuinely required refining. Nevertheless, if Thiselton had provided a little more specificity in relation to his own analysis of grammatical utterances, it may have alerted him to the danger of the character of his own modifications of Continental grammar being misunderstood. In short, Thiselton's main weakness was that he contributed towards the hiding of his achievement. This aligned with D. Olford's remark that, 'Thiselton is so busy listening to and expounding the work of others, that it is very difficult to actually isolate his own thought'. And what was Thiselton's 'hidden achievement'? It was his provision of the components for a paradigm-transformation and unification of hermeneutics historically, eschatologically, and Christologically and, within these co-ordinates, for unifying each of its constituent theoretical conversations, both internally and with one another, in the first truly integrated post-Wittgensteinian, post-Gadamerian hermeneutical paradigm. Once systematised, Thiselton's hermeneutics could potentially provide a devastating exposure of the problems of philosophical dichotomies associated with the Continental hermeneutical tradition, with structuralism and post-structuralism, and with socio-pragmatic reader-response theories. If this is so, then the construction of a hermeneutical framework from Thiselton's formative thinking provided by the present study has been worthwhile.
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