THE DEEP SEABED REGIME: AFRICA’S CONTRIBUTION TO ITS EVOLUTION AND SYSTEM OF MINING.

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DECLARATION

This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not being concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.

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STATEMENT 1

This thesis is the result of my own investigations, except where otherwise stated.

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SUMMARY OF THESIS

This thesis seeks to add to the existing literature by specifically attempting to examine from an African perspective, the regime of the Area, having regard to the changes introduced by the 1994 Agreement. It seeks to explore what Africa’s contribution to the evolution and development of the regime was and to place this contribution in the context of certain historical, social, political and economic factors not only before and during Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), but also after the coming into force of Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) 1982, as well as the 1994 New York Implementation Agreement. Further, the thesis seeks to suggest that for African states the regime went beyond a mere set of legal rules, but rather had undertones that epitomise the recurring antagonism in international law and politics between the African states, as part of the developing states of the south, and the developed industrialised states of the north. In addition, the thesis considers the degree of African participation in the regime, and the possible hindrances to the actual participation of African states in deep seabed mining activities and the prospects of such participation in the near future.
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21. The Electronica Sicula Case (ELSI), (United States of America/Italy) ICJ Reports 1987, p.3.
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ABBREVIATIONS

A.U – African Union.
ACP – African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries.
AEC – African Economic Community.
AFERNOD - Association française pour l'étude et la recherche des nodules.
CAMRDC – Central African Mineral Resources Development Centre.
CLB – Continuous Line Bucket.
CLCS – Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.
CM – Continental Margin.
CNRST – Committee on Natural Resources and Science and Technology.
CNTS – Algerian Centre National des Techniques Spatiales.
COMESA – Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa.
COMRA – China Ocean Minerals Research and Development Association.
DOD – Department of Ocean Development, India.
E.E.Z – Exclusive Economic Zone.
EC – European Community.
ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States.
EE- Eastern European States.
G-77 – Group of 77.
GATT – General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
GEF- Global Environment Facility.
HIPCs – Highly Indebted Poor Countries.
HMS – Hydraulic Mining System.
I.S.A – International Seabed Authority.
ICJ- International Court of Justice.
ICNT – Informal Composite Negotiating Text.
IFREMER – Institut français de recherché pour l’exploitation de la mer.
ILC – International Law Commission.
IOI – International Ocean Institute.

IOM – Interoceanmetal Joint Organisation.

IOMAC – Indian Ocean Marine Affairs Corporation.


IPRs – Intellectual Property Rights


Km – Kilometres.

KORDI – Korea Ocean Research and Development Institute.


LAC – Latin America and Caribbean States.

LDCs – Least Developed Countries.

LLDCs – Landlocked Developing Countries.

MIT – Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

MMS – Modular Mining System.

MMUs – Non-member Major Maritime Users under the IOMAC.

MOI – Mauritius Oceanography Institute.

n.m – Nautical Miles.

NAM – Non-Aligned Movement Organisation.

NEPAD – New Partnership for Africa’s Development.

NGOs – Non-Governmental Organisation.

NIEO – New International Economic Order.

NILOS – Netherlands Institute for the Law of the Sea.

NNPC – Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation.

NPDC – Nigerian Petroleum Development Company.


P.C.I.J – Permanent Court of International Justice.

P.I.P – Pioneer Investor Protection Scheme.


PSCs – Production Sharing Contracts.

R & D – Research and Development.

ROVs – Remotely Operated Vehicles.
SADC - Southern African Development Community.
SCN - Special Commission of the PrepCom.
SEAMIC - Southern and Eastern African Mineral Centre.
SIDs - Small Island Developing States.
SINOPEC - China National Petrochemical Corporation.
SNT - Single Negotiating Text.
SOLAS - International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea.
SPLOS - Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention.
SYSMIN - Special Financing Facility under EC/ACP Lome IV Convention.
TNCs - Transnational Corporations.
TRIPs - The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.
UN - United Nations.
UNCTAD - United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
UNECA - United Nations Economic Commission for Africa.
WEOG - Western European and Others States.
WIOMSA - Western Indian Ocean Marine Science Association.
WTO - World Trade Organisation.
INTRODUCTION

Africa.
Africa is the second largest of the seven continents on earth.\(^1\) For the purposes of this thesis it includes not only the continental African states, but also the fringe island states of Cape Verde, Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Sao Tome and Principe and Seychelles.\(^2\) There are 54 states in the continent, of which 39 are coastal states with coastlines of varying lengths,\(^3\) while 15 are landlocked developing countries (LLDCs).\(^4\) The state with the longest coastline is Madagascar (4,828km), while the Democratic Republic of Congo has the shortest (37km). Of the states in the continent 34 are classified as least developed countries (LDCs),\(^5\) while 6 are small island developing states (SIDs).\(^6\) Although Africa consists of different states at varying stages of development, both coastal and landlocked, sometimes distinguished as Africa north and south of the Sahara,

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\(^1\) Asia is the largest Continent.
\(^2\) See Art. 1(2) of the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity, 479 UNTS 39; 2 ILM (1963)766. 53 of the states were members of OAU. Morocco, the only state that was not a member of OAU, withdrew in 1985 following the admittance into OAU of Western Sahara (now the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic) in 1984. The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic is not listed in the table of the United Nations Ocean Affairs Division on the status of the LOSC and the 1994 Agreement because it is not a member of the United Nations. The O.A.U has since 2001 been replaced by the African Union (AU) established by the Constitutive Act of the African Union, which was adopted 11 July 2000 and came into force on 26 May 2001. See http://www.africa-union.org/home/welcome.htm [Accessed on 7 September 2004]. Presently, like the OAU, there are 53 member states of the AU. (Morocco is not a member).
\(^3\) Algeria (998); Angola (1600); Benin (121); Cameroon (402); Cape Verde (965); Comoros (340); Democratic Republic of Congo (37); Republic of Congo (169); Cote d'Ivoire (515); Djibouti (314); Egypt (2450); Equatorial Guinea (296); Eritrea (2,234 total- mainland on Red Sea, 1151 and Islands on Red Sea, 1083); Gabon (885); Gambia (80); Ghana (539); Guinea (320); Guinea-Bissau (350); Kenya (536); Liberia (579); Libya (1770); Madagascar (4828); Mauritania (754); Mauritius (177); Morocco (1835); Mozambique (2470); Namibia (1572); Nigeria (853); Sao Tome & Principe (209); Senegal (531); Seychelles (491); Sierra Leone (402); Somalia (3025); South Africa (2798); Sudan (853); Tanzania (1424); Togo (56); Tunisia (1148) and Western Sahara (1110). All the lengths are calculated in Kilometres (Km). Figures from C.I.A - The World Factbook 2004. See http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html [Accessed 26 August 2004].
these states located in the continent, along with the fringe island states mentioned above, regard themselves as a bloc, especially under the auspices of the Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U), now replaced by the African Union (AU). Over the years these states have become recognised at various international forums as the African grouping.

Africa is bounded on the north by the Mediterranean Sea, the Atlantic Ocean on the west, the Red Sea on the north-east and the Indian Ocean on the south-east. The sea, with its multifunctional use, is therefore of great significance to the continent. It provides a link for transportation and trade between various coastal states, both within and outside Africa. Also through fishing it serves as a source of food, contributing greatly to the protein content of the diet of the various indigenous peoples of Africa. Further, the tremendous offshore mineral resources of certain African coastal states provide much-needed income for the development of these states.

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8 For example, see the United Nations Organisation and the International Seabed Authority.


10 Recently archaeologists from UCLA and the University of Delaware have uncovered evidence indicating sea trade involving spices and other exotic cargo between India and Egypt during the Roman Empire. See http://www.popular-science.net/history/india_egypt_trade_route.html/ [Accessed 26 August 2004].


In terms of adverse memories, the sea also plays a role in two landmark events in African history - the slave trade and colonialism. The sea served as a slave trade route by which many Africans were carted off as slaves to other continents. It was also through the sea that the colonisers came to colonise and subjugate the continent. These twin events of the slave trade and colonialism have radically affected the African continent and the effects are still being felt presently.\(^1\)

In the context of international law, the issues concerning the sea provided one of the avenues for newly emergent African states to challenge the existing status quo of international law and relations.\(^2\)

**Literature Review**

African states made significant contributions to the evolution and development of the regime of the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction (the Area), the subject matter of this thesis. This innovative regime was one of the main reasons for the convening of the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III). The deep seabed regime, as contained in Part XI of the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC) 1982 \(^3\) and the New York Implementation Agreement 1994,\(^4\) introduced rather intricate rules to regulate the Area.

There has been extensive literature on the LOSC, including a number analysing the deep seabed regime.\(^5\) The challenge in writing this thesis, therefore, was not a dearth of materials, but rather the task of sifting through a vast number of materials with a view to deducing those especially relevant to the topic of the thesis, which is specifically to examine the role of African states in the evolution and development of the regime. Such literature include materials focused on a general study of this regime, an example being

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\(^{15}\) 21 ILM 1245(1982).

\(^{16}\) 33 ILM 1309(1994).
E.D. Brown’s book, *Sea-Bed Energy and Minerals: The International Legal Regime, Volume 2, Sea-Bed Mining* (2001). This book appears to be the most recent extensive and detailed study of the regime. It examines the background leading to the regime, the whole concept of the common heritage of mankind, the specific provisions of the regime contained in Part XI of LOSC as modified by the 1994 Agreement and the work of the Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) and the institutional framework and activities of the International Seabed Authority (ISA) as at 2001 when the book was written. Though this book served as a very important resource material, the present thesis differs from Brown’s book to the extent that it seeks to examine this regime not from a general perspective, but rather a regional perspective. The thesis specifically seeks to examine the regime from the perspective of African states. In so doing, the thesis seeks to pinpoint the underlying factors that influenced and possibly still influence the attitude of African states towards this regime, as well as certain peculiar problems or limitations faced by these states in actual participation in this regime. Inevitably this thesis, in looking at this regime from an African perspective, considering that the whole approach of African states to the evolution of the regime was to challenge the status quo, also differs from Brown’s study which, in many respects, examines the regime from the standpoint of developed industrialised states. This can particularly be discerned from his stance on whether seabed mining of the Area was one of the freedoms of the high seas, and whether the common heritage of mankind principle, in view of the various resolutions supporting it in the 1960s and 1970s, assumed the status of customary international law. As far as Brown is concerned, until the 1994 Agreement that ended the conflict between the principle of freedom of the high seas and the principle of the common heritage of mankind, seabed mining amounted to one of the freedoms of the high seas. He is also of the view that prior to the 1994 Agreement the principle of the common heritage of mankind incorporated in its original form in Part XI did not amount to customary international law binding on non-parties.\(^\text{17}\) Earlier works in support of the developed, industrialised states’ viewpoint include Kronmiller, Theodore G., *The Lawfulness of Deep Seabed Mining, Volumes 1 and 2* (1980) and Schmidt, Markus G, *Common

\(^{17}\text{See Bibliography.}\)
Heritage or Common Burden? The United States Position on the Development of a Regime for Deep sea-bed Mining in the Law of the Sea Convention (1989), both books concentrating on the position of the United States of America towards this regime. These books can be contrasted with two studies, namely, Said Mahmoudi, The Law of the Deep Sea-Bed Mining: A Study of the Progressive Development of International Law Concerning the Management of the Polymetallic Nodules of the Deep Sea-Bed (1987) and Yuwen Li, Transfer of Technology for the Deep Sea-Bed Mining: The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and Beyond (1994). The latter books take the view that seabed mining did not fall under the freedom of the high seas and that the common heritage of mankind was a new creation to govern a part of the sea not regulated by the traditional international law. Both Mahmoudi and Yuwen Li were also of the view that the common heritage of mankind principle assumed the status of customary international law as a result of the overwhelming support of the various United Nations General Assembly Resolutions, especially the Declaration of Principles Resolution 2749(XXV) of 1970.19 These books, though having an emphasis, in the case of Mahmoudi, on polymetallic nodules and that of Yuwen Li on transfer of technology, are both general studies of the regime. Mahmoudi's book, written in 1987, when the LOSC had been adopted but had not yet come into force, is limited to materials before the 1994 Agreement. Yuwen Li's book, written in 1994, when the 1994 Agreement was adopted but yet to come into force, includes materials covering also the Agreement. The present thesis, written at a time when the Agreement has come into force and there is a near universal ratification of the LOSC, differs from these studies in not being a general study, but rather a region specific one, looking at the peculiar position of African states in relation to the regime.

There is also literature looking at the regime from the perspective of developing states. For example, R.P. Anand's The Legal Regime of the Sea-Bed and the Developing


Countries (1976) examines the deep seabed regime from the point of view of developing
countries, of which African states are a part, but is limited to the position before and during
UNCLOS III up to the time that the book was written. Since it was written prior to the
adoption and coming into force of both the LOSC and the 1994 Agreement, the book is
limited to an examination of the factors that led to the UNCLOS III and the negotiations
at this Conference up to the time of the author's writings. Further, though developing
states do have certain common interests, as reflected in the unity of purpose of the Group
of 77 on the regime of the Area at the UNCLOS III, the current situation, revealing an
active participation of certain Asian developing states in deep seabed mining activities in
contrast with the non-participation of developing African states, discloses that the
challenges confronting the latter states are not exactly synonymous with those facing the
former states. For instance, the recent article by Keyuan Zou, “China’s Efforts in Deep
Sea-Bed Mining: Law and Practice”(2003),20 reveals that China, a developing Asian state
and a pioneer investor in seabed mining activities, is at present not only actively engaged
in seabed mining activities but is taking steps to consolidate and build upon its present
position. Though African states can clearly learn from the experiences and expertise of
Asian seabed mining developing states, there is a clear difference in status as regards the
regime. This therefore points to a need for a separate work, like this thesis, specifically
directed towards examining the regime from the viewpoint of African states.

There are also materials that generally examine African states’ contributions to the law of
the sea, and look cursorily at the issue of the deep seabed. Such literature includes
Penelope Simoes Ferreira’s article, “The Role of African States in the development of the
Law of the Sea at the Third United Nations Conference”(1979);21 Nasila Rembe’s book,
Africa and the International Law of the Sea: A Study of the Contribution of the African
States to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (1980) and Barbara
Kwiatkowska, “Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea in Africa: Towards the 21st
Century” (1993).22 This literature, in its examination of the deep seabed is not sufficiently
detailed and is written before the Part XI provisions, and the momentous 1994 Agreement

21 (1979) 7(1-2) Ocean Development and International Law, pp.89-129.
modifying the original Part XI provisions, came into force. Also there is the article of Richard Payne, “African Economic Problems and the African Position on the Law of the Sea in Relation to Manganese Nodules” (1980). The article analyses certain political, ideological and economic factors that influenced Africa’s position on manganese nodules in the Area, but again this article, written in the 1980s, is limited to materials before the adoption of the LOSC in 1982 and also the 1994 Agreement that introduced fundamental changes to the regime. A more recent book on the law of the sea and African states, namely Tayo Akintoba, *African States and Contemporary International Law: A Case Study of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and the Exclusive Economic Zone* (1997), though having a very useful chapter examining the history of the law of the sea from an African point of view, deals with a different regime, the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The EEZ, falling within national jurisdiction and not the common heritage of mankind, is subject to a totally different set of rules from the Area.

**Aim of thesis**

This thesis seeks to add to the existing literature by specifically attempting to look at the regime of the Area, having regard to the changes introduced by the 1994 Agreement, from an African perspective. As a result of certain similar interests of developing states, of which Africa is part, in the law of the sea generally and the regime of the Area, the discussion will in some regards reflect the position of not only African states but also other developing states, but for the most part the thesis is intended to particularly focus on the position of Africa in relation to this regime. A position, which reveals that Africa, after a very enthusiastic support of the whole idea of the regime at the UNCLOS III, is not presently participating in actual deep seabed mining activities. This thesis therefore seeks to examine why this is so. In so doing the thesis will seek to examine what Africa’s

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24 See Chapter V of LOSC.

25 See the Group of 77(G-77). This group was established on 15th June 1964 and is the largest Third World Coalition in the United Nations. Anand has described it as “.... a consortium of developing countries...” See Anand, R.P., *International Law and the Developing Countries: Confrontation or Co-operation?* (Dordrecht/Lancaster, Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), p.111. It is currently made up of 133 members but the original name was retained because of its historic significance. Out of the 133 members about 51 are African nations. [http://www.g77.org/main/gen_info_1.html](http://www.g77.org/main/gen_info_1.html) [Accessed 26 August 2004].

contribution to the evolution and development of the regime was and to place this contribution in the context of certain historical, social, political and economic factors not only before and during UNCLOS III but also after the coming into force of LOSC 1982, as well as the 1994 Agreement. Further, the thesis also seeks to suggest that for African states the regime went beyond a mere set of legal rules, but rather had undertones that epitomise the recurring antagonism in international law and politics between the African states, as part of the developing states of the south, and the developed industrialised states of the north.26 This point is reflected in the statement of Bamela Engo, an African and chairman of the first committee of the UNCLOS III, mandated to examine the deep seabed issues:27

"...we are not here merely to write a business arrangement to facilitate exploitation of the sea-bed resources by the industrially rich and powerful nations. We are here to design a new relationship among states and between them and the International Sea-Bed Authority we seek to establish to ensure that the declared common heritage benefits all of mankind."

The thesis considers whether these aspirations of African states were met. Finally, the thesis considers the degree of African participation in the regime, and the possible hindrances to the actual participation of African states in deep seabed mining activities and the prospects of such participation in the near future.

**Structure of thesis**

The thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter one seeks to analyse the role of African states in delimiting the Area and examines the mineral potential of the Area. Chapter two examines historically the contribution of African states to the development and evolution of the regime of the Area. It also examines whether the bedrock of the regime, the common heritage of mankind principle, as contained in the LOSC and 1994 Agreement, has become part of customary international law. Chapter three then proceeds to examine

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27 See Report to the Plenary by the Chairman of the First Committee, Mr Paul Bamela Engo (United Republic of Cameroon), UNCLOS III, *Official Record* Vol. X,p.18
the provisions of the LOSC retained by the 1994 Agreement and those provisions changed by the Agreement with a view to pinpointing how they affect African states. Chapter four examines the institutions of the regime as established by Part XI of the LOSC and the 1994 Agreement and seeks to identify the influence of African states in terms of membership, decision-making and financing. Chapter five examines the system of mining in the Area under the LOSC, 1994 Agreement and the Mining Code 2000, as well as certain relevant provisions of the Mining Code and the proposed rules on the system of mining polymetallic sulphides and cobalt crusts, vis-à-vis African states. As a result of the distributive role of the ISA under Article 82, the chapter also has a section on the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles and the system of exploitation in relation to African states. Chapter six thereafter proceeds to examine the problems hindering the participation of African states in seabed mining activities and prospects for overcoming such hindrances. Finally chapter seven, the conclusion, summarises the prior six chapters, identifying certain findings, and also volunteers certain recommendations which, in the view of the writer, would encourage the participation of African states in deep seabed mining activities.
CHAPTER ONE

THE SCOPE OF THE REGIME OF THE AREA AND AFRICAN STATES.

The determination of the limits of the Area, as distinct from the seabed and subsoil within national jurisdiction, is crucial for the purposes of determining where the regime applies. African coastal states, 39 in number, have a role to play in determining the limits of the Area by ascertaining the outer limits of their continental shelves as required by the provisions of LOSC. This chapter starts off by examining what part of the seabed constitutes the Area and then proceeds to examine the geographical scope of the Area and the role of African states in demarcating the Area. Thereafter it examines the possible economic significance of the Area.

1.1. The Area.

The “Area” means “the sea-bed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.” This is distinguished from the seabed and subsoil within national jurisdiction consisting of the territorial sea, exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf. The Area commences beyond the continental shelf and consists of the generally flat areas of the deep ocean floor, mountain ranges, ridges and deep trenches that usually start at the 3000 to 5000 metre depth.

In the tradition of trade-offs, which characterised the whole of UNCLOS III, resulting in the LOSC 82, states were allowed a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles in certain instances. This, along with the new concept of the EEZ, had the effect of incorporating into national jurisdiction what would otherwise have been part of the Area and thereby reducing the resources, which would have been the common heritage of mankind.

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2 See Arts 2(1) and (2) (territorial sea); 55, 56(1) and 57(EEZ); and 76(1) (continental shelf) of LOSC 82.

3 Ogley, op.cit.pp.4-5 and Mahmoudi, op.cit.p.27.

4 See Arts.76 (4)-(6) and Part V of LOSC.
1.2. **Geographical scope of the Area.**

The definition of the Area in itself incorporates the idea of the outer limit of the continental shelf since the area beyond the limits of national jurisdiction will only be known if the outer limit of the continental shelf is identified. For the regime of the Area to be effective, there has to be clear indications of where national jurisdiction ends and where the Area commences. The continental shelf begins beyond the territorial sea and extends throughout the natural prolongation of the coastal state's land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin or to a distance of 200 nautical miles if the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance. According to Judge Shigeru Oda in the *Case concerning the Continental Shelf (Libya/Malta):* 

"...the concept of natural prolongation for the continental shelf was suggested with a view to defining the International Sea-bed area."

Under Article 76 of the LOSC the continental shelf of a coastal state could either extend to a distance of 200 nautical miles or beyond 200 nautical miles up to a maximum limit as provided in Convention. The continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles is governed by certain rather technical rules contained in the LOSC. Further, the baselines of the continental shelf may not be a border to the Area in the case of neighbouring states with opposite coasts, especially when the distance is less than 400 nautical miles.

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5 See Arts. 1(1) and 134(3) and (4) of the LOSC. Section 1.2 of this thesis is an updated version of an earlier work of the author of this thesis. See Egede E., "The Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf: African States and the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention" (2004) 35 Ocean Development and International Law, pp.157-178. Also on outer limits of the continental shelf, see generally Brown, E.D., *Sea-Bed Energy and Minerals: The International Legal Regime, Vol.1 (The Continental Shelf)* (Dordrecht/Boston/London, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1992), pp. 18-45. It must, however, be pointed out that the outer limit of the continental shelf may not be a border to the Area in the case of neighbouring states with opposite coasts, especially when the distance is less than 400 nautical miles.

6 For a historical perspective on the issue of the outer limit of the continental shelf, see Ogley, op. cit. pp.98-133. Also see Judge Shigeru Oda's dissenting opinions in *Case concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya)* ICJ Rep.1982, p. 18 at pp.173-197 and *Case concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta)* ICJ Rep.1985, p.13 at pp.151-156.


8 Supra at p.154, para.55.

9 Art.76 (1) and (5) of LOSC. See Judge Shigeru Oda's dissenting judgement in the *Case concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya Arab Jamahiriya)* I.C.J, supra, at pp.212-213, para.101, where, commenting on the then draft Convention, he points out that the continental shelf is divided into two areas—that within 200 nautical miles and that beyond 200 nautical miles, and that for the latter some of the profits are dedicated to the international community, especially developing states.
territorial sea play a very significant role in determining the outer limit of the continental shelf, not only to the distance of 200 nautical miles, but also in cases where the continental shelf extends beyond 200 nautical miles up to a maximum limit of 350 nautical miles.

1.2.1. The Continental Shelf Beyond 200 nautical miles

The original position of African states was in favour of an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) which would totally subsume the whole idea of a continental shelf. However, at the end of the Conference, while the EEZ was incorporated into the LOSC, the continental shelf was also included. This situation therefore brings about an overlap between the EEZ and the continental shelf, where the latter does not extend beyond 200 nautical miles.

Further, during the negotiations on the outer limit of the continental shelf at UNCLOS III, African states were generally opposed to the extension of the outer limit beyond 200 nautical miles because of its reduction of the international area and resources therein that would be subject to the common heritage of mankind. The Kenyan delegate criticised the attempt to extend the outer limit beyond 200 nautical miles by observing:

"One of the major weaknesses of the concept of the [continental] margin as the outer edge of the area of national jurisdiction was that neither the scientists nor its proponents were in a position to state with any degree of certainty where the margin ended. It would be a tragedy if States were allowed to determine for themselves how far the natural prolongation of their land territory extended, because they would then be tempted to claim areas in which there were valuable deposits, particularly hydrocarbons, and the International Sea-Bed Authority would be deprived of all but the sea-bed

11 Part V, Arts.55-75 of LOSC.
12 Part VI, Arts.76-85 of LOSC.
13 The ICJ in the Libya/Malta Case, Supra at p.33, para.33-34 points out "...the two institutions-continental shelf and exclusive economic zone – are linked together in modern law.... [a]lthough there can be continental shelf where there is no exclusive economic zone, there cannot be an exclusive economic zone without a corresponding continental shelf."
minerals. If that happened, the Authority would not be able to generate sufficient revenues to assist developing countries."  

Eventually at UNCLOS III African states conceded that broad-shelf states could extend their continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. This concession was based on the understanding that such states would make contributions or payments to the International Seabed Authority (ISA) from mineral resource production in the shelf area beyond 200 nautical miles, to be used for the benefit of mankind, with special consideration to be given to developing states. The statement of the Ghanaian representative at the Conference, Mr Vanderpuye, captured the African compromise position:

"...international law could only impel, and since there was no means of compelling those States to relinquish their hold on those areas of the continental shelf outside the proposed 200-mile limit, [my] delegation would support any proposal aimed at the establishment of an equitable system of revenue sharing to ensure that the international community obtained some benefit from the exploitation of what would otherwise have fallen within the international zone."

The idea of payments or contributions from production in this extended part of the continental shelf is to offer something in return for the concession to such extension, a kind of quid pro quo. This was incorporated into the LOSC in Article 82 – broad-shelf states are to make annual payments or contributions in kind at a specified rate from production in the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. The specified rate takes effect only after the first five years of exploitation. Developing states, which are net importers of a mineral resource produced from their continental shelf, are, however,

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16 The original position of most African states at the Conference was based on the 1974 Declaration of the O.A.U which was that the EEZ of 200 nautical miles should replace the continental shelf concept and therefore national jurisdiction should be limited to 200 nautical miles. See UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol. II, p. 160, paras.1-2 (Gambia); ibid. p.161, paras.12-19 (Kenya); ibid. p.163, paras. 32-36 (Tunisia); and ibid. p.165, paras. 62-65 (Ghana). However, see Mauritius which appeared to have accepted that the EEZ should be without prejudice to the continental shelf, ibid. p. 163, para. 39.
19 From the sixth year the rate of payment or contribution shall be 1 per cent and this progressively increases by an additional 1 per cent for each subsequent year until it stabilises at 7 per cent in the twelfth year. Production does not include resources used in connection with exploitation. Art. 82(2) of the LOSC.
exempt from making such payments or contributions. These payments or contributions are to be made to the ISA, which is required to distribute them to states parties on the basis of an equitable sharing formula. In doing so, the ISA is required to take into account the interests and needs of developing states, particularly the least developed and the landlocked ones. Under the list of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) of the UN office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States, 50 states are listed, of which 34 are African states. It is therefore expected that African states will particularly benefit in the event of any such distribution under Article 82.

The LOSC permits broad-shelf states to have a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles up to a maximum limit of 350 nautical miles from their baselines or 100 nautical miles from the 2,500-metre isobath with very technical details set out on how to establish the outer limit. Article 76 provides:

"4(a) For the purposes of this Convention, the coastal State shall establish the outer edge of the continental margin wherever the margin extends beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, by either:

(i) a line delineated in accordance with paragraph 7 by reference to the outermost fixed points at each of which the thickness of sedimentary rocks is at least 1 per cent of the shortest distance from such point to the foot of the continental slope; or

20 Art. 82(3) of the LOSC.
21 Art. 82(4) of the LOSC.
23 For more on Art. 82 of LOSC and African states, see section 5.1 of chapter five of this thesis.
24 See Art. 76 (5) and (6) of the LOSC. At UNCLOS III over 30 States were identified as potentially being able to extend their continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles and thereby utilise Article 76. These States are Angola, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Ecuador, Fiji, France, Guinea, Guyana, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Myanmar, Namibia, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, the Russian Federation, Seychelles, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, United Kingdom, United States and Uruguay. See McDorman, T.L., "The Entry into Force of the 1982 LOS Convention and the Article 76 Outer Continental Shelf Regime", (1995)10 The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law(IJMCL), pp. 165-187 and "The Role of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf: A Technical Body in a Political World", (2002)17 IJMCL, pp. 301-324 and Kwiatkowska, B., "Creeping Jurisdiction beyond 200 miles in the Light of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and State Practice," (1991)22 Ocean Development and International Law, pp.153-187.
(ii) a line delineated in accordance with paragraph 7 by reference to fixed points not more than 60 nautical miles from the foot of the continental slope.

(b) In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the foot of the continental slope shall be determined as the point of maximum change in the gradient at its base.

7. The coastal State shall delineate the outer limits of its continental shelf, where that shelf extends beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, by straight lines not exceeding 60 nautical miles in length, connecting fixed points, defined by co-ordinates of latitude and longitude.

This wording reflects complicated methods of delineation known as the "Irish formula"\(^{25}\) and the "Hedberg formula"\(^{26}\) to calculate the outer limits beyond 200 nautical miles.\(^{27}\) Authors such as Professor Brown have criticised these highly technical methods. In his criticism Brown attacked the practicality of applying the Irish formula - Article 76(4) (a) (i). Relying on the criticism first noted by Professor Hedberg, he pointed out that the "thickness of sediment" option is undesirable for, amongst other reasons, the fact that such thickness could not generally be determined with sufficient accuracy to meet the needs of a clear demarcation of national/international boundaries. This, he suggested, would lead to confusion and highly controversial outer limit situations.\(^{28}\) In further support of his criticisms he refers to a Secretariat study prepared for the UNCLOS III in 1979, which indicated the considerable difficulties and costs involved in establishing the foot of the continental slope.\(^{29}\) There are unquestionably complexities involved in

\(^{25}\) Article 76 (4) (a) (i) of the LOSC. This was based on a complicated “informal suggestion” by Ireland in 1978. See Ogley, op.cit. at p.119. Also see the exception to the Irish formula contained in the Statement of Understanding, adopted by UNCLOS III on 29th August, 1980, in favour of States like Sri Lanka with peculiar continental shelves.

\(^{26}\) Article 76 (4) (a) (ii) of the LOSC. This formula was named after Hollis Hedberg, an American geologist. See Smith, R.W. and Taft, G., "Legal Aspects of the Continental Shelf", in Cook, P.J. and Carleton, C.M. (eds.), Continental Shelf Limits - The Scientific and Legal Interface, (New York, Oxford University Press, Inc., 2000), pp. 17 at 19.


\(^{29}\) Brown, ibid. at p. 143.
determining the exact limit of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, and whatever the apparent detail in the LOSC, the criteria and methods have been criticised as being imprecise.

Studies have identified seven African states - Angola, Guinea, Madagascar, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles and South Africa - as being amongst those states with the potential to utilise extended continental shelf provisions under Article 76. Prescott has identified 29 areas with potential claims to extended continental margin beyond 200 nautical miles, excluding Antarctica, which appears to include more African states. Kwiatkowska also names Ghana as being a state with a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. She points out that though Ghana has the potential to extend its continental shelf beyond 200 miles; its 1986 Maritime Zones (Delimitation) Law claims a continental shelf only up to a maximum limit of 200 nautical miles. More recently, the report of the United Nations Secretary General to the fifty-ninth Session of the General Assembly indicates that Nigeria is also a broad-shelf state since it is reported that it would make its submissions before August 2005. The exact number of African broad-shelf states does not appear to

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30 Article 76 (5) of the LOSC.
33 Prescott, V, “Resources of the Continental Margin and International Law”, in Cook and Carleton, (eds.) Continental Shelf Limits - The Scientific and Legal Interface, op.cit. at pp. 64 at 66-71, especially Figure 5.3 and Table 5.1 therein. African states included in the areas identified by Prescott to have potential claims to continental margins beyond 200 nautical miles are Angola, Cape Verde, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Republic of Benin, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo and Zaire. A 2004 United Nations press release estimates that there are between 30 and 60 states that may qualify as broad-margin states, though it admitted that the actual number would only be determined as the CLCS examines the submissions of coastal state. United Nations Press Release, SEA/1800 of 27 May 2004.
35 Para. 20 of the Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on Oceans and the Law of the Sea to the fifty-ninth session of the General Assembly-Addendum, A/59/62/Add.1 of 18 August 2004. There is no legislative framework under Nigerian law defining the Nigerian continental shelf in line with Article 76 of LOSC since the existing legislation, S.14(1) of the Petroleum Act Cap.350, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990, still defines the Nigerian continental shelf in terms of the 200 metres or depth of exploitability criteria under the 1958 Geneva Convention. However the depth of exploitability criterion
be clear. The onus, therefore, is on any African state, which seeks to claim an extended continental shelf, to demonstrate to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) that its continental margin extends beyond the 200 nautical miles limit.\textsuperscript{36} All the African states parties to the LOSC with such an extended continental shelf are bound by the provisions of Article 76 paragraphs 4 to 8.

Those African states with a continental shelf exceeding 200 nautical miles are, as a first step, to submit the particulars of their extended continental margin, along with supporting scientific and technical data, to the CLCS. The CLCS then makes recommendations based on these submissions to the submitting state. Article 76(8) indicates that the outer limit of the continental shelf determined by a state "based on" the recommendation of the CLCS "shall be final and binding."\textsuperscript{37} In the 1992 Case concerning Delimitation of Maritime Areas between Canada and the French Republic (St. Pierre and Miquelon) (Award),\textsuperscript{38} the arbitrators emphasised that it is the CLCS which has the exclusive jurisdiction to consider and make recommendations on the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical. In the Award the tribunal said:

\begin{quote}
This court is not competent to carry out a delimitation which affects the rights of a Party which is not before it. In this connection the court notes that in accordance with Article 76, paragraph 8 and Annex II of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, a Commission is to be set up, under the title of 'Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf', to consider the claims and data submitted by coastal States and issue recommendations to them. In conformity with this provision, only 'the limits of the shelf established by a coastal State on the basis of these recommendations shall be final and binding'.\textsuperscript{39}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{36} Para.2.2.3 of the Scientific and Technical Guidelines of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Doc.CLCS/11 of 13 May 1999.
\textsuperscript{37} Article76 (8) of the LOSC. See McDorman, "The Role of the Commission etc.", op.cit at pp. 313-317.
\textsuperscript{38} 95 International Law Reports, p. 645. For critical comments on this decision, see Boyle, A.E., "Dispute Settlement and the Law of the Sea Convention: Problems of Fragmentation and Jurisdiction", (1997) 46 ICLQ, p. 37 at 45-46.
\textsuperscript{39} International Law Reports, ibid. at p.674, paragraph 79.
The CLCS is made up of technocrats representing various geographical regions and scientific disciplines, with powers under the Convention to make recommendations upon submissions made by broad-shelf states. However, this in itself raises some issues that are not clearly answered by the Convention. For example, it is difficult to determine the exact scope of the power of the CLCS vis-à-vis the submitting state. While the LOSC clearly acknowledges the sovereign power of a coastal state to determine the limits of its boundary lines, it goes on to say that such determination is to be “on the basis of” the recommendations of the CLCS. It is not clear what will happen if the CLCS makes a recommendation unacceptable to the coastal state. Is the coastal state allowed to reject such recommendation? What is the effect of such a rejection? Will it mean that the submission of the coastal state would be invalid and not recognised under international law? In cases of a disagreement between the coastal state and the CLCS, what is the machinery for settling such a dispute? Is it the procedure under Part XV of the LOSC? In the event of such dispute, can the ISA, as the custodian of the Area, indicate an intention to join as a party to any settlement procedure as an interested party?

Mahmoudi suggests, and rightly in this writer’s view, that any unilateral act of a coastal state which is not on the basis of the recommendation of the CLCS may not gain international recognition and would not be considered as final. This is in line with Article 76(8), as a contrary view would reduce the CLCS to a powerless and toothless

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40 Article 2 of Annex II of the LOSC states that the Commission is to consist of 21 experts in the field of geology, geophysics or hydrography appointed for five years in their personal capacities from nationals of State Parties with such appointment reflecting geographical representation. On 23 April 2002, the twelfth meeting of the State Parties to the Law of the Sea Convention elected 21 members of the Commission for a term of five years commencing from 16 June 2002. Three of the members are from Africa – Awosika, Lawrence Folajimi (Nigeria); Betah, Samuel Sona (Cameroon) and Fagoonee, Indurlall (Mauritius). See http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/commission_members.htm#Members [Accessed 17 December 2004]. It is interesting that there is no provision for lawyers to be members of the Commission considering that they have to apply the LOSC, a treaty. Also it is interesting that the ISA is not in anyway represented in the Commission though they remain a very interested party in the determination of the outer limits for the purpose of determining the scope of the Area.

41 Article 76(8) of the LOSC.


44 Mahmoudi, ibid. p. 78.
body, which would defeat the clear intention of the Convention in trying to attain certainty of such outer limits. It has been suggested that, in the light of Article 8 of Annex II, when there is a disagreement between the coastal state and the CLCS, a “ping-pong” procedure is created, whereby when the CLCS rejects an unacceptable submission, the coastal state has to go back and make a revised or new submission until there is a convergence. However, this raises the issue of whether this “ping-pong” can go on ad infinitum, or whether there is a definite end point considering that the LOSC, by making provision for submissions to be made within 10 years of the entry of the Convention for the submitting state, shows a clear intention for such issues of the outer limit to be resolved within a reasonable time frame.

Where there is no convergence between the CLCS and the submitting state, can there be recourse to the compulsory settlement of dispute mechanism in Part XV? It is doubtful that the Part XV dispute settlement mechanism would normally be available, in the event of a disagreement between the CLCS and the submitting state, since the way and manner Part XV is couched gives the impression that generally the dispute settlement procedures, except in certain exceptional cases, apply as between states parties. The CLCS, obviously, not being a state party, would not as a general rule be in a position to avail itself of or be a party under the dispute settlement mechanism of Part XV. However, there are certain exceptions; for example, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) can hear disputes involving entities other than states. Article 20 of Annex VI, after stating in paragraph 1 that the Tribunal is open to states parties, goes on in paragraph 2 to provide:

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45 See McDorman, "The Entry into Force etc.", op.cit. at p. 178.
46 See Article 4 of Annex II of the LOSC.
"The Tribunal shall be open to entities other than States Parties in any case expressly provided for in Part XI or in any case submitted pursuant to any other agreement conferring jurisdiction on the Tribunal which is accepted by all the parties to that case." (Emphasis added)

In the light of this provision it is arguable that the ITLOS would have jurisdiction if the CLCS and the coastal state were to agree. Although the ITLOS might be utilised in the event of a protracted disagreement between the CLCS and a submitting state, the significance of the role of the CLCS, which would assume more prominence as more states make submissions, should have led to the inclusion in the Convention of explicit provisions on dispute settlement to deal with sustained disagreement between the CLCS and a submitting state if the “ping-pong” procedure fails to bring about a convergence.

States parties, including African states, were originally required by LOSC to make submissions on their extended continental shelf within 10 years of the entry into force of the Convention for that state.\(^49\) However, at the Eleventh Meeting of the states parties to the Convention (SPLOS) in 2001, a decision was taken that the commencement period for calculating the 10-year period for states, which became parties to the Convention before 13 May 1999 (when the Commission adopted its scientific and technical guidelines), would be 13 May 1999.\(^50\) Broad-shelf African states that became states parties to LOSC before 13 May 1999 are therefore required to make submissions within 10 years from that date, while those that became parties to the Convention after this date would be required to make submissions 10 years from the date they became parties.

Thus far, no African state has made a submission to the CLCS. The complicated procedure for determining the outer limit beyond 200 nautical miles, which requires

\(^{49}\) Article 4 of Annex II of the LOSC.

\(^{50}\) See Para. 81 of the Report of the Eleventh Meeting of the States Parties to the Law of the Sea Convention (SPLOS), SPLOS/73 of 14 June 2001. Recently, however, Law Ministers of Small Commonwealth Jurisdictions, concerned about the impending deadline of 2009 for a number of Small Commonwealth Jurisdictions, and noting the expense and expertise required to make the submissions within the time limit, have recommended that all Commonwealth member states be encouraged to lobby the General Assembly and the SPLOS for an extension of the 2009 deadline. See Meeting of Law Ministers of Small Commonwealth Jurisdictions- Final Communiqué, 22 October 2004 [Accessed on 20 December 2004].
advanced marine technology, will certainly be a challenge to broad-shelf African states. Fortunately a trust fund has been established to provide assistance for states, especially the least developed and small island developing states, so they can meet their obligations under Article 76, and also to provide training for preparing submissions to the CLCS. It is hoped that African states will take advantage of such assistance and training, which will not only help as regards submissions but also in marine scientific and technological capacity building within these states. Also they can take advantage of the provisions of the Convention to obtain scientific and technical advice from the CLCS, especially from African representatives who may be more acquainted with the African situation. However this can only be done if an African state, in the course of preparations for a submission, specifically requests such advice.

Five of the African states acknowledged to have the potential to extend their continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, have domestic legislation that acknowledge the possibility of having a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. Under the South African Maritime Zones Act, No.15 of 1994, the South African continental shelf is as

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52 See General Assembly Resolution A/RES/55/7 of 30 October 2000, Para.18, which mandated the United Nations Secretary-General to establish this trust fund. http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/commission_trust_funds.htm [Accessed 25 June 2003]. As at 31 December 2003 the Fund had a balance of $1,137,053. From this Fund candidates from six developing states have been sent on a training course designed by the CLCS. Also seven developing states have requested assistance from the fund to send their nationals to a similar training course offered by the Southampton University Oceanography Centre, United Kingdom. See Paras. 105-107 and 129 of the Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on Oceans and the Law of the Sea to the fifty-ninth Session of the General Assembly, A/59/62 of 4 March 2004.

53 Article 3(1) (b) of Annex II of the LOSC. There is a Standing Committee of the CLCS on the provision of scientific and technical advice to coastal states currently composed of the following CLCS members: Lawrence Folajimi Awosika (Rapporteur); Noel Newton St Claver Francis; Philip Alexander Symonds (Chairman) and Kensaku Tamaki (Vice-Chairman). As at the end of April 2004 there had been no formal request for advice by the CLCS by any state. See Para.25 of the Statement by the Chairman of the CLCS on the progress of work in the Commission, CLCS/39 of 30 April 2004.


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"defined in Article 76 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea." This definition and the lists of coordinates in schedule 3 of the Act incorporate the provisions of Article 76, including those dealing with the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. On 27 October 1995, the South African government published charts indicating the maritime zones claimed by South Africa, which portrayed the continental shelf area beyond 200 nautical miles. Prescott, in his analysis of these charts, suggests that South Africa must have relied upon the thickness of sedimentary rock formula. He goes on to point out certain difficulties South Africa may face when it eventually submits its information to the CLCS, especially as regards the claim of more than 200 nautical miles from Marion and Prince Edwards Islands. Prescott states:

“If the South African claim to the continental shelf more than 200 nautical miles from Marion and Prince Edward Islands is submitted to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf particular attention will need to be paid to the nature of the ridge on which the two islands stand. Marion and Prince Edward islands are twin peaks of a submerged volcano. If they are standing on either the Atlantic-Indian Oceanic Ridge or the Southwestern Indian Oceanic Ridge the claim will probably have to be modified. This view is held because of the stipulations in Article 76."

South Africa will have to show that such ridges are not part of the “deep ocean floor with its oceanic ridges or subsoil thereof”. Also it has to show that the outer limits do not exceed 350 nautical miles or that it falls under the exception of “submarine elevations that are natural components of the continental margin, such as its plateaux, rises, caps, banks and spurs.” South Africa is in the process of carrying out the preparatory work needed to prepare its submission to the CLCS. It became a party to the Convention on 23 December 1997 and therefore should make its submissions to the CLCS by 13 May 2009.

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55 Section 8(1) of the South Africa Maritime Zones Act, No. 15 of 1994.
57 Ibid. at p. 565.
58 Article 76(3) of the LOSC. Note that Section 11(3) of the Seychelles Maritime Zones Act No. 2, 1999 says that the Seychelles continental margin does not include “the deep ocean floor with its oceanic ridges or the subsoil thereof.”
59 Article 76(6) of the LOSC.
The Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act No. 3 of 1990 of Namibia says the continental shelf of Namibia shall be "as defined in the Convention [LOSC 1982], or as it may from time to time be defined by international Convention and binding on Namibia." This legislation, in essence, incorporates the definition of the continental shelf in Article 76, including the provisions dealing with the extended continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, into the domestic law of Namibia. Hamman, in his criticism of this provision, argues that the Act does not determine the outer limits of the shelf and therefore creates uncertainty as regards the limits beyond 200 nautical miles. However, it would appear that by incorporating the definition in LOSC Namibia would be precluded from claiming, in respect of its continental shelf beyond 200 miles, a maximum limit beyond that stated in the Article 76 provision of LOSC. The Namibian government has recently asserted that it has a legitimate claim to a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles up to 350 nautical miles in some parts of its continental shelf margin. It also contends, as regards Walvis Ridge, which continues beyond 350 nautical miles, that a political decision is needed to determine whether the claim should be limited to 350 miles or if it should go beyond. While it lies within the sovereign right of any state to make unilateral claims as regards its maritime boundaries, a claim to the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles will be deemed problematic by the CLCS if it is not in line with the wording of the Convention. Under the Convention, the outer limit of the shelf may exceed 350 nautical miles if such extension is as a result of submarine elevations such as plateaux, rises, caps, banks and spurs that are natural components of the margin. To succeed in such claim beyond 350 nautical miles, the onus will be on Namibia to inform and satisfy the Commission that Walvis Ridge falls within the

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60 See the comments of the South African representative, Mr Hoffmann, at the fifty-eighth session, 64th plenary meeting of the General Assembly. A/58/PV.64, Official Records, 24 November 2003.
61 Section 6(1) of the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act, No. 3 of 1990.
64 See Media Release from cabinet chambers, ibid.
exception. Namibia became a party to the Convention on 18 April 1983 and is therefore required to make a submission to the CLCS by 13 May 2009.66

Madagascar in its legislation claims a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles up to a limit of 100 nautical miles from the 2500-metre isobath. Article 7 of its Ordinance determining the limits of the Maritime Zones (Territorial Sea, Continental Shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone) states:

"The continental shelf of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar shall comprise the sea-bed and its subsoil beyond the territorial sea to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, or to the limit determined by agreement with the adjacent states or else to 100 nautical miles from the 2,500 metre isobath."67 (Emphasis added)

This wording does not appear to be compatible with Article 76 in that it fails to refer, in any way, to the foot of the continental slope formula of either paragraph 4(a) (i) or (ii). Although, Madagascar is reported to have done little work in establishing a potential claim to an extended continental shelf, especially because of funding constraints, the issue of the extended shelf has been discussed at various relevant governmental bodies.68 Madagascar became a party to the LOSC on 22 August 2001, and is therefore required to make submissions to the Commission by 22 August 2011.

In the case of the Seychelles, its Maritime Zones Act 1977 defines the continental shelf as comprised of:

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65 Art.76 (6) of the LOSC. This is however still subject to the 100 mile from the 2,500 metre isobath criterion. See Art.76 (5) of LOSC.
66 Namibia, with the assistance of Brazilian consultants, is taking steps to prepare its submission to the CLCS. According to the Report of the United Nations Secretary-General to the fifty-ninth session of the General Assembly it has indicated that it would make its submission in 2007. See Para. 20 of the Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on Oceans and the Law of the Sea to the fifty-ninth session of the General Assembly-Addendum, A/59/62/Add.1 of 18 August 2004.
Ian Kawaley argues that this definition, by extending the continental shelf to the outer margin without stating any limits, confers on the Seychelles a continental shelf more extensive than that envisaged by the Article 76 limit of a maximum of 350 nautical mile or 100 nautical miles from the 2,500 metre isobath.\textsuperscript{70} The subsequent Seychelles Maritime Zones Act No. 2 of 1999, however, by implication appears to correct this anomaly by stating that "wherever the continental margin extends beyond 200 nautical miles ... the outer limits of the continental shelf shall be established and delineated with due regard to the requirements and limitations of international law."\textsuperscript{71} This, in essence, incorporates the requirements and limitations of Article 76. Seychelles became party to the LOSC on the 16 September 1991 and is therefore required to make submissions to the Commission by 13 May 2009.

Finally, Mauritius, another African state with the potential for an extended continental shelf, by its Maritime Zones Act 1977 adopts an identical definition of its continental shelf as the 1977 Seychelles Act. It does not appear that this legislation has been amended to make it subject to international law. To this extent, the criticism of Kawaley, noted above, is relevant to this legislation. Mauritius, which became a party to LOSC on 4 November 1994, would have to make a submission by 13 May 2009.

Seychelles and Mauritius are reported to be in the process of preparing their submissions. In the case of Seychelles, the government has commissioned various consultancy reports to establish its entitlement to an extended continental shelf, and has also embarked on preliminary desktop studies. However, there are constraints in terms of obtaining the

\textsuperscript{69} Section 5(1) of the Maritime Zones Act 1977.
\textsuperscript{70} Kawaley, I., "Implications of the Exclusive Economic Zone and EEZ Management of Seychelles, A Small Midocean Island Commonwealth Territory," (1998) 26 Ocean Development and International Law, p.225 at 244-245.
relevant data and competent human resources.\textsuperscript{72} Mauritius, on the other hand, through its Mauritius Oceanography Institute (MOI), has since June 2002 completed survey work on the extended continental shelf. It is reported to have contracted out through international tender the acquisition of bathymetry and geophysical data necessary to substantiate the claim to an extended continental shelf.\textsuperscript{73}

1.2.2. Baselines.

The baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured is relevant in determining the outer limit of the continental shelf, particularly in cases of the 200 mile outer limit and where the outer limit extends beyond 200 nautical miles to a maximum limit of 350 nautical miles.\textsuperscript{74}

Mahmoudi rightly points out that while the LOSC provides definite methods for constructing baselines just like the 1958 Convention,\textsuperscript{75} there is still a lot of imprecision in the application of these methods which may result in coastal states creatively determining their baselines and thereby extending the outer limits of their continental shelf.\textsuperscript{76} For example, the charts published by South Africa on 27 October 1995, which drew straight

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{71} Section 11(2) of the Maritime Zones Act No. 2 of 1999. For similar formulations, see Section 1 of the Federal Law on the Continental Shelf of the Russian Federation adopted by the State Duma on 25 October 1995 and Section 17(1) (a) of the Canadian Oceans Act of 18 December 1996.


\textsuperscript{73} The Mauritius Oceanography Institute (MOI), established in January 2000 by legislation (MOI Act No.24 of 1999), which has as one of its functions the formulation of a claim to an extended continental shelf to the CLCS. http://moi.gov.mu/institute.htm [Accessed on 20 December 2004].


\textsuperscript{75} See Art. 5 and 7 of the LOSC and compare with Art. 3 and 4 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 1958.

\textsuperscript{76} Mahmoudi, op.cit. p. 73. However, see the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (1951), International Law Reports, 86 at p. 95 where the I.C.J. pointed out that: “The delimitation of sea areas has always an international aspect: it cannot be dependent merely upon the will of the coastal state as expressed in its municipal law. Although it is true that the act of delimitation is necessarily a unilateral act, because only the coastal state is competent to undertake it, the validity of the delimitation with regard to other states depends upon international law.”
baselines along about 540 nautical miles of its Southern coast from Cape Deseada, north of Cape Town, to Cape Padrone, east of Port Elizabeth, have been criticised by Prescott as a contravention of the wording contained in Article 7 of the LOSC. He argued that apart from a short section of this coast that is deeply indented, the remaining coast is neither deeply indented nor fringed with islands as required by Article 7. He pointed out that certain other states, including the African states of Algeria, Kenya, Madagascar and Senegal, had earlier similarly drawn straight baselines contrary to Article 7.

The LOSC requires that baselines be shown on charts of a scale or scales adequate for ascertaining their position or through a list of geographical co-ordinates of points specifying the geodetic datum. The coastal state is to give due publicity to such charts or lists of geographical co-ordinates and to deposit a copy of such charts or lists with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Virtually all African coastal states have legislation designating the baselines of their territorial sea as either the low-water mark and/or straight baselines. Some of these legislation describe the baselines in detail, while others merely make a bald statement that such baselines are either the low-water mark or straight baselines without details. The intention usually, in the latter cases, is that such details would be contained in separate official government charts or list of co-ordinates.

For example, the Tanzanian Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1989, after stating that the baseline of the territorial sea is the low-water line, goes on to require such to be marked on a large-scale chart or map officially recognised by the government. Further, under the part of this legislation dealing with the EEZ, the relevant minister is required to cause the boundary lines of the zone to be marked on a sealed map or chart,

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78 Ibid.
79 Article 16(1) of the LOSC.
80 Article 16(2) of the LOSC.
81 See Table 1. Article 14 of the LOSC gives a coastal State the discretion to determine its baselines by any of the methods provided for in the LOSC.
82 See Table 1.
83 Section 5 of the Tanzanian Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act. See also section 11 of the Maritime Zones Act No. 13 1977 of Mauritius.
which is to be judicially noticed and kept with the Director of Land Surveying in the ministry responsible for lands. In the case of Nigeria, it is not clear if such officially recognised charts are available. The Nigerian Territorial Waters Act, as amended in 1998, states that the baseline of Nigeria’s territorial sea is the low-water mark, but, unlike the Tanzanian Act, it does not specifically contain provisions requiring the baseline to be marked on an officially recognised chart or map. Recently a dispute arose before the Supreme Court between the Federal government (the central government) and certain State governments within the Federation of Nigeria as regards “ownership” as between themselves of the Nigerian offshore zones for the purposes of revenue allocation. This case was an opportunity for the Federal government to produce before the Court charts or maps marking Nigerian baselines and the various maritime zones within national jurisdiction. However, despite an objection filed by certain unit States on the failure on the part of the Federal government, as plaintiff, to put before the Court any evidence to show the exact offshore zones of Nigeria, the Federal government declined to tender any charts or co-ordinates preferring to argue its case on points of law. From the actions in this case it is not clear if the Nigerian government has large-scale charts indicating the low-water mark. Events subsequent to the decision of the Supreme Court, involving the establishment of a task force by the Revenue Mobilisation and Fiscal Commission to determine the low-water mark, appear to suggest that at the time of the decision of the Court, there were either no officially recognised charts, or whatever was available did not adequately delimit the low-water mark.

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84 Section 8 of the Tanzanian Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act.
86 Act No. 1 of 1998.
88 See the lead judgement of Ogundare, JSC, ibid. at p. 644, which agreed with the Federal government that it was a point of law before the court and therefore the Federal government did not need to tend any evidence. On this point also see the comments of the writer in Egede, E., “The Nigerian Territorial Waters Legislation and the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention,” (2004) 19(2), The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, p.151 at 156-161.
90 The decision of the Supreme Court of Nigeria in A.-G. Nigeria v. A.-G. Abia State, supra, was delivered on 5 April 2002.
The precise determination of the baselines of the territorial sea of African coastal states is a prerequisite for the effective determination of the outer limit of their continental shelves. In spite of the various statutes enacted by African states regarding the baselines of their territorial sea, only a handful of these states have complied with the requirement of submission of charts or co-ordinates under Article 16(2).91 The convenient excuse of lack of technology and expertise cannot, in this writer’s view, be a justifiable reason for non-submission, especially in the light of the willingness of such United Nations bodies as the Division of Ocean Affairs to render the necessary assistance.92 The explanation for this failure by African states, like most other states including developed states, is sometimes attributable to the manner in which Article 16(2) is worded. While clearly imposing an obligation on states parties by using the mandatory word “shall”, Article 16(2) is open-ended in that it specifies no time limit for states parties to comply with the obligation. However, in spite of this, it is only to be expected that a submission should be done within a reasonable period of the state becoming a party to LOSC. Unfortunately this has not been the situation as a number of states, including African states, have been parties to the LOSC for a long period and have yet to make such submissions.

1.2.3. Continental Shelf Legislation in Africa

Several African states have enacted legislation dealing with the outer limit of their continental shelf. While some in their legislation unequivocally declare the limit of their continental shelf to be 200 nautical miles,93 others have declared their outer limit to be the edge of the continental margin or 200 nautical miles where the outer edge does not extend to 200 nautical miles.94 Some, like South Africa and Namibia, as reviewed above, 91 Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Madagascar, Sao Tome and Principe and Tunisia are recorded as having submitted charts. See United Nations Website; See http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/depositpublicity.htm [Accessed 17 December 2004]. These figures are as at 28 October 2004. The total number of states parties, including developed states, which have complied with the obligation under Article 16(2) is quite low considering the number of states which have become states parties to LOSC.
93 For example, see the legislation of Cape Verde, Ghana, Republic of Benin and Sierra Leone. See Table 1.
94 For example, see the legislation of Cameroon, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Senegal and Seychelles. See Table 1. If these states are able to establish their entitlement to extended continental shelf it is expected that if they are parties to the LOSC the outer limit would be the maximum provided in Art.76 of LOSC.
provide that their continental shelf is to be as defined by the relevant Convention in force and binding on them, and thereby incorporate the Article 76 provisions.\textsuperscript{95} Other African states, in spite of being parties to the LOSC, still have in their national legislation the provisions in Article 1 of the 1958 Geneva Convention which uses the depth of 200 metres or exploitability as the outer limit of the continental shelf.\textsuperscript{96}

\textit{Table 1 - Country Information (Africa)}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Legislation on baselines/ Type</th>
<th>Deposit under Art.16 (2) Y/N.</th>
<th>Legislative Claims of outer limits of C.S.</th>
<th>Claims of EEZ.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Algeria*</td>
<td>Straight baselines (d) (Arts 1-2 of Decree No. 84-181 of 4 August 1984)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Angola*</td>
<td>Low-water line and straight baselines (Arts. 2-3 of Law No. 21/92 of 28 August 1992)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Art. 7 of Decree-Law No. 47,771 of 27 June 1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Republic of Benin*</td>
<td>Low-water mark and with respect to estuaries from the first obstacle to maritime navigation as defined by maritime regulations in force. (Art. 1 of Decree No. 76-92, 1976)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>200 N.M. (Decree No. 76-92 of April 1976)</td>
<td>Decree No. 76-92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{95} See Table 1.
\textsuperscript{96} For example, see the legislation of Egypt, Nigeria and Sudan. See Table 1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Maritime Border Mark</th>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Jurisdictional Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4. Cameroon*</td>
<td>Low-water mark and</td>
<td>CM/200(Legislation N/A)</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>for gulf, bays and</td>
<td>(Art.1 of Decree No.71/DF/416 of 26</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<td>roadsteads decrees</td>
<td>August 1971 and Art.5 of Act No.</td>
<td>(Art.1 of Decree</td>
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<td>to be made fixing</td>
<td>74/16 of 5 December 1974)</td>
<td>No. 71/DF/416 of 26</td>
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<td>the lines.</td>
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<td>August 1971)</td>
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<td>(Art.1 of Decree</td>
<td></td>
<td>and Art.5 of Act No.</td>
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<td>No.71/DF/416 of 26</td>
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<td>74/16 of 5 December</td>
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<td>August 1971)</td>
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<td>1974)</td>
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<td>Art.5 of Act No.</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
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<td>74/16 of 5 December</td>
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<td>1974)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Cape Verde*</td>
<td>Straight baselines(d)</td>
<td>200 N.M. (Art.17 of Law No.60/IV/92</td>
<td>Art.12 of Law No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Art.24 of Law No.</td>
<td>of 21 December 1992)</td>
<td>60/IV/92 of 21</td>
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<td></td>
<td>60/IV/92 of 21</td>
<td></td>
<td>December 1992</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Comoros*</td>
<td>Low-water mark and</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Art.6 of Law No.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>straight baselines(d)</td>
<td></td>
<td>82-005 of 6 May 1982</td>
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<td>(Art.3 of Law No.82-</td>
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<td>December 1992</td>
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<td>005 of 6 May 1982</td>
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<td>December 1992</td>
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<td>and Arts.2-3 of</td>
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<td>December 1992</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ordinance No.049/77</td>
<td></td>
<td>December 1992</td>
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<td></td>
<td>of 20 December 1997)</td>
<td></td>
<td>December 1992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Cote D’Ivoire*</td>
<td>Lowest water mark</td>
<td>200 N.M.(Legislation N/A)</td>
<td>Art.2 of Law No.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and straight baselines</td>
<td></td>
<td>77-926 of 17 November</td>
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<td>(Art.1 of Law No.77-</td>
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<td>1977)</td>
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<td>926 of 17 November</td>
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<td>December 1997</td>
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<td>1977)</td>
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<td>December 1997</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Congo</td>
<td>Low-water line</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(Art.2 of Ordinance</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
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<td>No. 049/77 of 20</td>
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<td>December amending</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
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<td>article 2 of</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ordinance 26/71 of</td>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18 October 1971)</td>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Democratic</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Art. 2 of Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Congo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>proclaiming an EEZ</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>of 4 November 1992</td>
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</table>

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>10. Djibouti*</th>
<th>Low-water mark and straight baselines(d) (Art. 4 of Law No.52/AN/78 1978 and Arts. 1 and 2 of Decree No. 85-048 PR/PM of 5 May 1985)</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>N/A</th>
<th>Art. 12 of Law No. 52/AN/78</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11. Egypt*</td>
<td>Low water line and straight baselines(d) (Art.6 of Decree concerning Territorial Waters of Egypt 15 January 1951, as amended by Presidential Decree of 17 February 1958 and Arts. 1-3 of Decree of President No.27(1990))</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>200 metres or depth of exploitability. (Presidential Decision No.1051 of 1958 concerning the Continental Shelf)</td>
<td>Declaration accompanying Law of the Sea Convention ratification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Eritrea</td>
<td>Extremity of seashore at maximum annual high tide of Eritrea’s continental coast (Maritime Proclamation No.137 of 1953 and Proclamation 7- Transitional Maritime Code of Eritrea, 15 September 1991)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Gabon*</td>
<td>Low-water line and straight baselines(d) (Art.2 of Act No.9/84 of 1984 and Arts 1-5 of Decree 002066/PR/MHCUC DM of 4 December 1992)</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Art.2 of Act No. 9/84</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>17. Guinea</strong></td>
<td>Low-water line (Arts.1 and 4 of Decree No.336/PRG of 30 July 1980)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>18. Guinea-Bissau</strong></td>
<td>Straight baselines (Art.1 of Acts No.2/85 and Art.2 of Act No.3/85 both of 17 May,1985)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>19. Kenya</strong></td>
<td>Low water lines and straight baselines (S.2 of the Territorial Waters Act of 16 May 1972 as revised in 1977 and S.1 of Presidential Proclamation of 28 February 1979)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>200 metres or depth of exploitability(Legislation N/A)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>20. Liberia</strong></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>200 metres or depth of exploitability.(Act to Establish Continental Shelf 1969)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>21. Libya</strong></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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See Nationmaster.com2003, Ibid.
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Low-water line or EEZ Definition</td>
<td>Compliant with international law</td>
<td>Relevant Law/Reference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia*</td>
<td>Low-water line and any other rules recognised by LOSC 82 or any other convention binding on Namibia or any other international rules. (S.2 of Territorial Sea and EEZ Act No.3 1990 as amended in 1991)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>As defined in LOSC 82 or subsequent international convention binding on Namibia. (S.6(1) of the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act No.3 of 30 June 1990)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sao Tome and Principe*</td>
<td>Straight baselines/archipelagic baselines (Art.2 of Law No.1/98 of 1998)</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Art.4 of Act No.3 of 30 June 1990
EEZ Act No. 28 of 5 October 1978.
Arts. 4-6 of Law No. 1/98 of 1998
SS. 9-14 of Act No. 2 of 1999.
SS. 8-10 of Maritime Zones Decree 1996
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Low-water line and straight baseline (Art.2 of Law No.37 of 10 September 1972)</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>34. South Africa*</td>
<td>Low-water line and straight baseline (S.2 of the Maritime Zones Act No.15 of 1994)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>As defined in Art.76 of LOSC 1982. (S.8 of Maritime Zones Act, No.15 of 1994)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35. Sudan*</td>
<td>Lowest water line and straight baselines (S.5-6 of Territorial Waters and Continental Shelf Act 1970)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>200 metres or depth of exploitability. (S.2(k) of Territorial Waters and Continental Shelf Act 1970)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36. Tanzania*</td>
<td>Low-water line (S.5 of the Territorial Sea and EEZ Act 1989)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37. Togo*</td>
<td>Low-water line (Art.1 of Ordinance No.24 Delimiting the Territorial Waters and creating a protected Economic Maritime Zone of 16 August 1977)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38. Tunisia*</td>
<td>Low-water mark and straight baseline (Art.1 of Act No.73-49 of 2 August 1973)</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39. Western Sahara</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key

Y-Yes
N-No
d-Detailed description of co-ordinates of baselines in legislation.
N/A-Not available
N.M.-Nautical Miles
* Parties to LOSC

1.2.4. Deposit of Information on the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf with the United Nations Secretary-General.

Under the LOSC, coastal states are required to deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations charts and lists of geographical co-ordinates designating the outer limits.

For more details on when the states became parties to LOSC, see Table 2 in chapter 2 of this thesis.
of their continental shelf.\textsuperscript{101} With the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles this is done after such has been established by the coastal state on the basis of the recommendation of the CLCS. This information deposited is to be given due publicity by the Secretary-General and is to “permanently” describe the outer limits of such continental shelf.\textsuperscript{102} No state has so far made a deposit under Article 76(9), although six states, including an African state, have made such a deposit under Article 84(2) of LOSC.\textsuperscript{103} This requirement again has no set time limit for compliance although it is expected that states parties should endeavour be do this within a reasonable time.

\subsection*{1.3. Mineral Resources in the Area}

The Area assumed great prominence in the UNCLOS III as a result of the discovery that certain minerals found in this zone during the 1873-6 Challenger expedition had economic value and the subsequent technological development which showed that the mining of such minerals could be accomplished.\textsuperscript{104} These minerals, known as polymetallic nodules, have been found to be scattered in all the oceans, though those of greatest economic interest are generally located in the centre of the north central Pacific Ocean, the Peru Basin in the south-east Pacific Ocean and the centre of the north Indian Ocean. These nodules, located at depths of 4000 to 5000 metres, contain certain strategic minerals, including manganese, nickel, copper and cobalt.\textsuperscript{105}

Although the initial focus by potential miners of the seabed was on polymetallic nodules, recent scientific research has aroused interest in other mineral resources in the Area. Such minerals include polymetallic sulphide deposits and cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts.\textsuperscript{106}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{101} Article 76(9) of the LOSC.
\bibitem{102} Ibid.
\bibitem{103} Belgium, Chile, Finland, Italy, Norway and Seychelles. See United Nations, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/depositpublicity.htm [Accessed 17 December 2004]. In its Maritime Zones (Establishment) Decree 1996, Sierra Leone in Section 12(2) claims that, “Copies of the official charts and relevant information, including geodetic data, permanently describing the outer limits of the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf may be obtained from the Secretary-General of the United Nations with whom they have been deposited in compliance with the Convention.” There is no indication on the United Nations database that this has been done.
\bibitem{104} Ogley, op.cit.pp.12-24 and Mahmoudi, op.cit.pp. 26-36
\bibitem{105} For recent data on polymetallic nodules, see \url{http://www.isa.org.im/en/publications/IA_ENG/ENG7.pdf} [Accessed 9 August 2004]
\end{thebibliography}
The polymetallic sulphides, located at water depths of up to 3700 metres as a result of volcanic activities, are found mainly in mid-ocean at the East Pacific Rise, the southeast Pacific Rise and the northeast Pacific Rise. Several deposits are also known to be located at the mid-Atlantic Ridge, but so far only one has been located at the ridge system of the Indian Ocean. These sulphides contain high concentration base metals such as zinc, lead and copper, as well as precious metals such as gold and silver. Cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts are located at water depths of about 400 to 4000 metres. Based on grade, tonnage and oceanographic conditions, the central equatorial Pacific region appears to have the best potential for mining this resource. In addition to cobalt, it is said to be an important potential source of manganese, nickel, platinum, titanium, phosphorus, thallium, tellurium, zirconium, tungsten, bismuth and molybdenum. The polymetallic sulphides and cobalt crusts located in the Area, unlike the polymetallic nodules, would, however, have to compete with sulphides and crusts located within national jurisdiction as there is already evidence that certain states have the potential of recovering such within their national jurisdiction. There has also been a call for the ISA to give attention to methane (gas) hydrates. They are ice-like crystalline compounds consisting of gas (usually methane) and water molecules said to be widespread both on continental margins and in the Area. It is believed that the extraction of the hydrates could provide one of the most important energy sources for the future. Again it is expected that the

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109 For example exploration licences have been issued to a company, Nautilus Minerals Co-operation Ltd., in respect of Manus Basin off the coast of Papua New Guinea for exploration and development of sulphides.
110 See ISA Press Release, SB/6/21 of 5 July 2000 where Indonesia, commenting on the ISA Secretary-General’s report, suggested that more attention be given to Methane Hydrates.
methane hydrates located in the Area would have to compete with methane hydrates
thought to be located within the continental shelves of certain states.\textsuperscript{112} Although the ISA
has not done much work on this, there is ongoing research by certain states, including the
United States of America, to identify, explore, assess and develop methane hydrates as an
alternative source of energy.\textsuperscript{113}

The issues related to the regime of the deep seabed were the most heated in UNCLOS
III. The intensity and passion surrounding issues of this regime were magnified by the
reports available in the 60s and 70s that gave the impression of a colossal amount of
mineral wealth in the deep seabed just waiting to be picked up by any state with the
requisite technology.\textsuperscript{114} For the developed industrialised states there was an expectation
that it would open up the possibility of access to a new source of strategic minerals for
their industries, which was outside the monopoly of any particular state. On the other
hand, for the developing states there was anticipation that it would provide access to
additional revenue useful for achieving development and a more equitable world
economic order. In addition, for developing land-based producer states the regime
governing the Area was a particularly important issue because of their dependence on
export revenue from land-based mineral resources, which would have to compete with
those from the deep seabed if exploitation eventually commenced. These developing
land-based producers included African states like Zambia, Botswana, Morocco, South
Africa, Namibia, Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire) and Zimbabwe, which

\textsuperscript{112} For instance Chile and India have been identified as potentially having methane gas hydrates in their

\textsuperscript{113} On 2 May 2000 the President of the United States enacted the Methane Hydrate Research and Development Act 2000, Law 106-193 requiring the Secretary of State to commence a Methane Hydrate research programme. This programme has since been commenced as the National Methane Hydrates R&D Program. http://www.netl.doe.gov/sceng/hydrate/ [Accessed 25 August 2004]. Others that have begun assessments and research on deep water methane hydrates are Canada, the European Union, Japan and India. See Desa, "Submarine Methane Hydrates-Potential Fuel Resources of the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century," op.cit.pp.549-550.

\textsuperscript{114} See for example Mero J.L., The Mineral Resources of the Sea, (Amsterdam, Elsevier, 1964,)
are land-based producers of copper and cobalt. For Morocco and the Democratic Republic of Congo, cobalt can be mined independently and not as a by-product, while South Africa is also a land-based producer of manganese. At present, as a result of the indefinite postponement of commercial exploitation of polymetallic nodules, such mineral resources in the Area do not pose an immediate threat to the economy of these land-based producers. However, it is opined that it would be rather short-sighted for these states not to still maintain concern and interest in the regime governing the Area. Further, the discovery of other possible resources in the Area, such as sulphides, cobalt crusts and methane hydrates, though like polymetallic nodules not likely to be commercially exploitable in the near future, should similarly raise concerns for African land-based producers of comparable resources. The cobalt crusts should still be of interest to African land-based producers of cobalt. Sulphides, which contain gold, should be of concern to African states, such as South Africa, which are significant producers of gold. For significant African producers of oil and gas, currently a major source of global energy, such as Nigeria, Angola and Gabon, the possibility of methane hydrates being a viable alternative to other sources of energy, such as oil and natural gas, should raise concerns for these states.

Beyond the economic perspective that contributed to the passion displayed in respect of the deep seabed issues at the UNCLOS III, it must be pointed out that the innovative regime also provided an avenue for African states to address a broader issue of changing the existing legal order of the sea in particular and international law in general, which in their view leaned more in favour of the northern industrialised states.

116 Mahmoudi, ibid.
117 Ibid.
1.4. Conclusion.

The proper delimitation of the outer limit of the continental shelf is a *sine qua non* for a determination of what part of the submarine zone falls within national jurisdiction and what part constitutes the Area. For the outer limit of the continental shelf, the determination of the baseline is significant. While the determination of the baselines of African states remain within their sovereign decision, the major challenge they appear to face is that of ensuring that their baselines are in line with the criteria set out in the LOSC, including giving such baselines appropriate publicity, and also making the required submissions under Article 16(2). Submissions under Article 16(2) provide a reliable means of achieving certainty as regards coastal states' baselines, yet only a few African states have complied with Article 16(2). Also very few African states have deposited charts and other relevant information on the outer limits of the continental shelf with the United Nations Secretary-General as required by Articles 76(9) and 84(2) of LOSC. It must however be pointed out that African states are no worse than states in other geopolitical groupings since, generally, only a few states have made such deposit.

African states with the potential to claim a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles have to satisfy the highly complex demands of Article 76, along with the requirement of submission of information to the CLCS within the time limit. The preparation of a submission to the CLCS requires both sophisticated technology and expertise. This highlights the necessity for assistance by the relevant international organisations and bodies to broad-shelf African states to enable them comply with their international obligations under the Convention.

The domestic laws of African states, again like other states in other geopolitical groupings, are divergent on what constitutes the outer limits of the continental shelf, but it does appear that some African states have updated their legislation to claim a continental shelf in line with Article 76 of the LOSC, though there is a need for adjustments in some of the legislation. However, it is also noteworthy that some African

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Seabed Committee and the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, "(1977) 31 International Organization, p.159 at162. For more on this see chapter two of the thesis.
states still adhere to the depth and exploitability test in their legislation, though they are parties to the LOSC. It is hoped that such states will be encouraged to amend their legislation and align it with the wording of Article 76.

Further, this chapter discusses the economic potential of the Area. It suggests that although commercial exploitation of the resources in the Area has been postponed indefinitely it would be in the interest of African states, especially land-based producers, which may upon commercial exploitation in the future have to compete with resources in the Area, to maintain concern and interest in the regime and activities in the Area.
CHAPTER TWO

THE EVOLUTION OF THE REGIME OF THE AREA AND AFRICAN STATES.

In order to appreciate the intricacies of the regime and institutions of the deep seabed and what at one stage was quite a serious conflict between the developed states and the developing states, including African states, it is helpful to have an historical perspective of the law of the sea. This chapter therefore examines the historical development of the regime from an African perspective.

2.1. Historical Development of the Regime of the Area: An African Perspective

2.1.1. The euro-centric nature of the traditional law of the sea.

Historically, though this is sometimes blurred by first the Arab and subsequently the European influence on the African continent, there is some evidence of the involvement of certain African ethnic groups in maritime activities long before the slave trade and colonialism. For instance, there is evidence to suggest the presence of "vessels of black men" (kun-lun bo - a description by Chinese authors writing between the third and the ninth century) sailing in the Indian Ocean and manned by crew suspected to have come from modern Madagascar at a period before and after the seventh century. These vessels are described as ships with woven sails averaging 50m in length, and able to transport between 500 and 1000 people as well as cargo of between 250 and 1000 tons. Also there is evidence that between the seventh and the eleventh century there were some ship

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2 Eurocentrism has been defined as “settled habits of thought which have led to the acceptance, mostly uncritical, of European [and Western] intellectual and social cultural traditions as the invariable if not superior framework of inquiry.” See Rembe, N.S., *Africa and the International Law of the Sea*, (Alphen aan den Rijn, The Netherlands, Sijthoff & Noordhoff International Publishers B.V., 1980), p.30. According to Okoye: "It is suggested that the consequence of the Eurocentric origins of international law is that much of classical international law sought not only to regulate the balance of power between relatively powerful and modernised states, but also gave them special privileges and rights which frequently ran against the interest of non-European colonised peoples, then regarded as objects rather than subjects of the law.” See Okoye, F., *International Law and the New African States, (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1972), p.176.

captains on the Indian Ocean who were Negroid and Bantu-speaking (described as Zandj by Arabic authors), suspected to be indigenes of the ethnic groups located on the East African coast and the Comoro Islands. Amongst the boats said to have been used by these African seafarers were the mtepe (a sewn boat) and ngalawa (a rather narrow dugout boat). The latter would have been unstable and dangerous in open sea but an outrigger-balancing device overcame the lack of stability. Similar evidence appears to abound amongst different ethnic groups located along the west coast of Africa. However, since for a long time these ethnic groups were regarded more as objects rather than subjects of international law, they were not consulted and had no input whatsoever in the origin of the law of the sea. R.P. Anand, affirming that Asian and African states had little or no contribution to the origin of the law of the sea, describes the modern law of the sea as not only the “product of the European mind” and “European beliefs,” but also “based on European State practices which were developed and consolidated during the last three centuries.” This much was admitted by Professor Verzijl who pointed out that the whole gamut of international law, of which the law of the sea is a part, was “the product of the conscious activity of the European mind, but has drawn its vital essence from a common source of European beliefs and in both these aspects it is mainly of Western European origin.”

Professor Umozurike, an African international law jurist, putting this rather forcefully and without mincing his words, states:

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4 Masao, F.T., and Mutoro, H.W., “The East African Coast and the Comoro Islands,” in El Fasi and Hrbek (eds), ibid. at pp.586 at 600-602 and 609-610.
5 Ibid. at 609-610.
6 For instance the Aworis, Efiks and the Ijaws (Izon), ethnic groups located along the west coast of Africa in modern day Nigeria, have oral tradition of extensive maritime activities, especially fishing, deep in the Atlantic Ocean even before the “white man” came to their land. Affidavit evidence to this effect in respect of the Aworis and Efiks were deposed to by His Royal Highness, the Oba of Lagos state, Oba Adeyinka Oyekan, and the Obong of Calabar, Edidem Professor Nta Elijah Henshaw VI, respectively, in the Nigerian Supreme Court case of Attorney-General of the Federation v. Attorney-General of Abia State & 35 ors.[2002] 6 N.W.L.R (Part 764), 542 at 722-723. Also the writer has been told by his father-in-law, Professor J.P. Clark-Bekederemo, a renowned Nigerian playwright and authority on Ijaw (Izon) tradition, that there is oral tradition of extensive maritime activities by the Ijaw people in the Atlantic Ocean even before the Europeans came to Ijaw land.
"... international law developed by western powers before the 20th century served as a buttress for the colonisation of African peoples. It connived at the subordination of African dignity to western economic interests. It was essentially racialist and therefore contrary to the basic norms of the law applicable to all mankind. In creating the relevant rules of international law, Africans were not consulted for the law was specifically directed against them. The colonisers agreed among themselves that African communities were 'objects' of the law unprotected by it. The law applied to the Africans by the Europeans may indeed, be properly called European colonial law, for international law by its very nature should and does protect all peoples regardless of race, creed, religion or colour..."  

This perception, as will be pointed out later in this thesis, accounts for the eagerness by African states for the convening of UNCLOS III, as well as the general attitude of these states during the conference to the existing law of the sea in general and to the issue of the deep seabed regime and its institutions in particular. Another African international law jurist, Professor Ajomo, captures the attitude of African states to the existing law of the sea prior to and during UNCLOS III, by explaining as follows:

"... it must be realised that existing norms governing rights on the sea, like most norms of customary international law, were formed from practice among Western European States before the accession of the new African and Asian States to independence. Many countries of the Third World were not parties to the development of these norms. Further some of these norms have been considered as unfavourable to many countries of Africa and Asia and their aspirations." 

2.1.2. Traditional Law of the Sea.

By the 15th century certain European states had by virtue of their dominance over the seas assumed the position of originators of the rules governing the sea. In 1494 by the papal bull of Pope Alexander VI, which was given legal effect through the Treaty of Tordesillas, a line was drawn down a meridian of longitude through Brazil dividing the sea between Portugal and Spain. The area east of the line was to be the Portuguese sphere...
of expansion while that to the west of the line was the Spanish area of expansion. This
treaty is one of the earliest attempts to codify the law concerning the sea.\textsuperscript{12} This, of
course, led others like the Dutch, with a concern for freedom of communication as a
result of their trading interests, to advocate the doctrine of the freedom of the high seas.
The Dutch state practice was reflected through the writings of the famous Dutch writer,
Hugo Grotius, who in his book, \textit{Mare Liberum} (1609), advocated the freedom of the high
seas.\textsuperscript{13} It has been said that this book is "\textit{the first and classic exposition of the doctrine of the freedom of the seas}".\textsuperscript{14} Grotius published this book to defend the right of the Dutch,
through the Dutch East India Company, to navigate in the Indian Ocean and other Eastern
seas in order to trade with India and the East Indies over which Spain and Portugal
claimed a commercial monopoly and political domination.\textsuperscript{15} This was therefore a
situation where the Portuguese and Spanish desired closed seas (mare clausum), while
others like the Dutch desired open seas (mare liberum).

The English also challenged the claim by Spain and Portugal to sovereignty over the seas.
In reply to Spanish protest over Sir Francis Drake's violation of its alleged sovereignty
over the Pacific and Indian Oceans, Queen Elizabeth of England is reported to have said:

"Neither nature nor public interest permit the exclusive possession of the sea
by a single nation or private individual, the ocean is free to everybody; no
legal titles exist whatever that would grant its possession to anyone in
particular; neither nature nor usage permit its seizure; the domains of the sea
and of the air are common property of all men".\textsuperscript{16}

However it is interesting to note a change of policy by the English from the open sea
policy of Queen Elizabeth to a closed sea policy by her successor, King James. For as

\textsuperscript{11} Ajomo, M., "Third World Expectations", in Churchill, Simmonds & Welch (eds.), \textit{New Directions in the
p.302.
\textsuperscript{14} See W.S.M. Knight, \textit{Seraphin de Freitas: Critic of Mare Liberum}, Transactions of Grotius Society, vol.
II p. 1(1926) quoted in Anand, \textit{International Law and Developing Countries: Confrontation or Co-
operation?} op. cit. p.53.
\textsuperscript{15} Anand, ibid.pp.53-56.
\textsuperscript{16} Queen Elizabeth's reply to the Spanish envoy Mendoza in 1580 in Christian Meurer, \textit{The Program of
the Freedom of the Sea}, (Translated from German by Leo J. Frachtenberg) p. 11 (1919) quoted in Anand,
cit.p.95.
long as the English, under Queen Elizabeth, were interested in having a share in the East India trade like the Dutch, as against the Spanish and the Portuguese, they supported the mare liberum policy. However by the reign of King James, when England was more interested in curtailing the benefits accruing to the Dutch, who had powerful merchant and fishing fleets, they started to pursue the policy of mare clausum. The Crown commissioned an English man, John Selden, to make a strong case against mare liberum. In reply to Grotius’s Mare Liberum, Selden wrote his treatise, *Mare Clausum, seu de Dominio Maris Libri Duo* (The closed sea or two books concerning the Rule over the sea). This book was published in 1635 by the express command of the King “for the manifesting of the right and dominion of us and our royal progenitors in the seas which encompasses these our realms and Dominions of Great Britain and Ireland.”\(^\text{17}\) However, by the 19\(^{th}\) century, when Britain had strengthened its maritime capability, thereby becoming a leading maritime power, it reverted again to mare liberum, and has thereafter, along with other leading maritime powers, consistently “pursued and consolidated a policy of freedom of the seas.”\(^\text{18}\)

This lesson from history gives an idea of the constant conflict between advocates of mare liberum and those of mare clausum that to this day permeates the law of the sea. This conflict was clearly reflected in the UNCLOS III in the antagonism between the developed (advocating freedom of the seas) and developing states (advocating closed seas) in various areas of the law of the sea, including the issue of what type of regime and institutions should apply to the Area. It points to the underlying political and economic self-interest of states that determines the policy they adopt on the law of the sea generally and the deep seabed regime in particular.

According to Brown:

“... many of the principal features of the international law of the sea have been formed by the interplay between two opposing fundamental principles of International law: the principle of sovereignty and the principle of the freedom of the high seas. The ascendancy of one over the other during any

\(^{17}\) Anand, ibid.p.105.

particular historical period has tended to reflect the interests of the predominant powers of the day."\(^{19}\)

It must also be pointed out that while the whole history of the law of the sea is about the conflict between mare liberum and mare clausum, the negotiations of the regime of the deep seabed, as will be seen later, introduced a new variant to the conflict. Rather than the usual situation of a state claiming sovereignty over a belt of the sea, we see, in the deep seabed regime, a situation where the international community jointly appears to be claiming a type of communal sovereignty over the deep seabed.

2.1.3. UNCLOS I and II

In 1930, the League of Nations convened the Hague codification conference. However one of the critical points on which the participating states failed to reach an agreement was on the breadth of the territorial sea.

In 1957 the General Assembly of the United Nations, by Resolution 1105(XI) of 21 February, convened the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I). This Resolution required the UNCLOS I to examine the law of the sea taking into account the legal, technical, biological, economic and political aspects and to embody the results of its work in one or more international Conventions or other instrument. The conference was also required to study the question of free access to the sea of land-locked states as "established by international practice or treaties".\(^{20}\) The General Assembly Resolution also referred to UNCLOS I the report of the International Law Commission (ILC) covering the work of its 8th session, which in essence formed the basis for the various 1958 Conventions. Other materials referred to the conference were the verbatim records of the relevant debates in the General Assembly; comments by governments on the draft articles on the law of the sea prepared by the ILC; the memorandum submitted by the preliminary conference on land-locked states held in Geneva from the 10 to 14 February 1958; and preparatory documents prepared by the United Nations secretariat, along with certain specialised agencies and independent

experts.\textsuperscript{21} UNCLOS I was held at the United Nations office at Geneva from 24 February to 27 April 1958, with eighty-six states participating, out of which only six states were from Africa, namely Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, South Africa and Tunisia. The gross under-representation of Africa can be explained by the fact that most African states were still under the subjugation of foreign colonial “masters”. Also involved in the Conference were seven specialised agencies\textsuperscript{22} and nine inter-governmental organisations\textsuperscript{23} invited by the General Assembly as observers.

The four 1958 Conventions on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone\textsuperscript{24}, the High Seas,\textsuperscript{25} the Continental Shelf\textsuperscript{26} and Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas,\textsuperscript{27} products of the UNCLOS I, have been described as “the first completed attempt of the International Law Commission to place a large segment of international
law on a multilateral treaty basis." African states became parties to these Conventions by succession or accession, with some incorporating into their domestic legislation certain provisions of these Conventions. There was also an optional protocol on dispute settlement.

Despite the success of the 1958 conference, which led to four major Conventions on the law of the sea, the parties failed to reach any agreement on two fundamental issues, namely the breadth of the territorial sea and fishery limits. As a result of this, a second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS II) was convened in 1960 at Geneva. The conference, with 88 states in attendance, including 10 African states, was held for ten days from 17 to 27 March 1960 and had as its agenda the examination of the question concerning the breadth of the territorial sea and the delimitation of a fisheries zone. This conference, unlike its predecessor, failed to produce any new Conventions, and in particular failed to agree on the issue of the breadth of the territorial sea and fishery limits.

30 For example, the Nigerian Petroleum Act, enacted as far back as 1969, vests ownership and control of petroleum located in the continental shelf in the Federal government of Nigeria and defines the continental shelf as "the seabed and subsoil of those submarine areas adjacent to the coast of Nigeria the surface of which lies at a depth no greater than two hundred metres (or, where its natural resources are capable of exploitation, depth) below the surface of the sea, excluding so much of those areas as lies below the territorial waters of Nigeria". See SS. 1(1) and 14(1) of Petroleum Act Cap.350, Laws of The Federation of Nigeria, 1990. The definition of the Nigerian continental shelf in this Act, which came into force on 27 November 1969, is in line with the Continental Shelf Convention 1958. See also Art.2 (k) of the Sudanese Territorial Waters and Continental Shelf Act 1970 and Egyptian Presidential Decision No.1051 of 1958 defining their continental shelf in line with the 1958 Convention.
32 The African states in attendance were Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia and South Africa. See UNCLOS II Official Records.pp.xiii-xxiv
At the 1958 and 1960 Geneva conferences, as at the time of the 1930 Hague conference, the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction (the Area) was not regarded as an issue of note because of the limited technology at that time. In its preparatory work on the 1958 conference the ILC commented that it had not put forward any proposals on the exploration and exploitation of the bed of the high seas because it did not consider the question to be of practical significance.34

2.1.4. Prelude to UNCLOS III.

By the 1960s a growing number of African states had begun to emerge as independent states.35 These states became members of the General Assembly of the United Nations and, along with Asian and Latin American developing states, by sheer numbers, if nothing else, became extremely influential in the Assembly.36 Most of these African states, which were still under colonial rule during UNCLOS I, did not have an opportunity of a direct input into the formulation of the 1958 Conventions. Consequently these states were dissatisfied with the existing law of the sea and viewed it as being tilted in favour of the western industrialised developed states. This perception, common to most developing states that did not participate as independent states in UNCLOS I as a result of colonialism, is well expressed by one commentator when he pointed out that:

"Most of the impetus for dramatic departures from the law as expressed in the Geneva Conventions has come from developing countries and, in particular, developing coastal countries. Many of these nations had no part in the formulation of the existing codified law, regard the customs on which it was based as closely identified with the colonial regime, and feel that its legal arrangements often work to their economic disadvantage."37

Another commentator, talking specifically about Nigeria, explained that: “Like many other Third World States, Nigeria happens to be one of the post-colonial states which never had any say in the drafting of the Geneva Conventions of 1958.”38

35 For example, by 1960 Nigeria, Senegal, Niger, Togo, Republic of Benin, Gabon, Chad, Mali, Cote d’Ivoire and Central African Republic had emerged as independent states.
2.1.4.1. Organisation of African Unity/African Union.

With independence, a number of African states felt a need for a common forum, amongst other things, to voice their views in the international community. This led to the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) on 25 May 1963 at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia by 32 independent states. Its purpose was to promote the unity and solidarity of the African states; to defend the sovereignty of its members; to eradicate all forms of colonialism; to promote international co-operation having due regard for the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; and to co-ordinate and harmonise member states' economic, diplomatic, educational, health, welfare, scientific and defence policies. This Organisation was open to all independent sovereign African states and the neighbouring island Malagasy states.

This organisation, working along with other developing states from Asia and Latin America in forums such as the Group of 77, exerted a great influence in the development of a new law of the sea that culminated in the LOSC 1982.

The expressed intention by African states to promote international co-operation having due regard to the United Nations Charter, a product of the existing international law, was an indication that they were ready to be part of that law. Their determination was to work within the existing framework of international law to bring about a change, in what they perceived was the euro-centric nature of the existing international law, in order to incorporate the interest of African states.

40 See Art. I and II of the Charter of the OAU.
41 See Arts. I and V of the Charter.
Georges Abi-Saab pointed out, concerning African states, that:

"While adhering to the existing system of international law, they started to contest it "from within" striving for its development with their participation – particularly within the UN and its ILC - to make it more responsive to the new needs, and more "universal" or "oeumenical" in its approach as well as the values and interests it purports to protect and promote".43

Another commentator noted:

".... It is the view of the newly-independent states that, since they were under the rule of foreign powers during the formative era of international law, it was clear that their interests could not have been taken into account. Consequently, they insist on reviewing and reshaping those laws that are clearly anti-African."44

On 2 March 2001 the African Heads of State at an Extraordinary OAU Summit in Sirte, Libya declared the establishment of the African Union (AU) to succeed the OAU. Under the Constitutive Act of the AU, adopted by the thirty-sixth ordinary session of the Heads of State of the OAU on 11 July 2000 in Lome, Togo, it was specified that the AU would come into force thirty days after the ratification by two-thirds of the member states of the OAU.45 On 26 April 2001, Nigeria became the 36th member state to deposit its instrument of ratification and the Constitutive Act came into force on 26 May 2001.46 The Act has since been ratified by all the member states of the OAU and the AU has replaced the OAU. The objectives of the Union includes achieving greater unity and solidarity between the African states and peoples; to promote and defend an African common position on issues of interest to the continent and its peoples; and to establish the necessary conditions which would enable the continent to play its rightful role in the global economy and in international negotiations.47 So far there is no indication that the AU has any significant interest in promoting a unity and common position in law of the

46 By 9 July 2001 the Constitutive Act had been signed by all OAU Member States and has since been ratified by all 53 member states of the O.A.U.
sea matters, including the seabed regime and its institutions, in a manner similar to the position of the OAU during the UNCLOS III. In the vision of the African Union and the mission of the African Union Commission, the 2004-2007 Strategic Framework of the African Union Commission and the Action Plans of the various Departments of the Commission, three documents intended to map out a programme for the period 2004-2007, there is no evidence of an articulated position by the AU on law of the sea issues. However, recently there appears to be an indication of some interest by the AU in the regime of the Area as it put forward a candidate, Ambassador Charles Manyang D’Awol (Sudan), for the position of Secretary-General of the ISA.

2.1.4.2. Africa’s dissatisfaction with the traditional law of the sea.

African states were clearly dissatisfied with the traditional law of the sea, which in their view, was tilted in favour of the technologically developed maritime states. This dissatisfaction came to a fore when Senegal denounced the Geneva Conventions on the Territorial Sea and Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas. This denunciation was brought to the notice of the Secretary-General of the United Nations by a formal notification from Senegal on 9 June 1971 and was to take effect on 8 July 1971. According to Rembe, one of the major reasons for the denunciation was because Senegal felt there was a “technological gap between her and the treaty partners.” The Secretary-General, upon receipt of the denunciation, took the view that he was not authorised to receive such denunciation since there were no specific clauses authorising denunciations in the Conventions, neither was there any specific instruction in that regard by the parties to the Conventions. He therefore referred the issue to the parties to the Conventions. Only one party, the United Kingdom, replied. It took the view

47 Art. 3 of the Constitutive Act.
49 See http://www.africa-union.org/home/Welcome.htm [Accessed on 7 September 2004]. There are, however, moves by the International Ocean Institute (IOI), South Africa, a non-governmental organisation, to develop an African Implementation Action Plan for Oceans and Coast. Nothing concrete has come of this because of lack of funds. [Personal Communication of Dr. Kim Prochazka, Director, International Ocean Institute (IOI), South Africa – on file with the author].
52 Rembe, op. cit. p. 167.
that the Geneva Conventions were not susceptible to unilateral denunciation by any of the
parties and therefore rejected the validity and effectiveness of this denunciation and
regarded Senegal as still being bound by the Conventions.53

All this merely strengthened the resolve of African states to press for a new law of the
sea. With the improvement of technology and the possibility of mining the seabed
beneath the high seas, it became necessary to look at the issue of a regime to regulate any
eventual mining in this part of the sea. This led the international community to give
attention to this part of the sea and its resources. Developed, technologically endowed,
states started to take an interest in the possibility of mining the seabed under the high
seas. African states, fresh from colonial domination resulting from the scramble for and
the partition of Africa by western developed states, were averse to another land grab of
the seabed of the high seas by these same states. Interestingly, the American president,
Lyndon Johnson, was able to identify with this fear of African states when in 1966 he
warned that:

"Under no circumstances, we believe, must we allow the prospects of a rich
harvest of mineral wealth to create a new form of colonial competition among
the maritime nations. We must be careful to avoid a race to grab and hold the
lands under the high seas. We must ensure that the deep seas and the ocean
bottom are, and remain, the legacy of all human beings"54

2.1.4.3. Arvid Pardo's Proposal and United Nations Common Heritage Resolutions.
The stage was therefore set for the speech of Dr. Arvid Pardo, Maltese ambassador to the
United Nations, in 1967. This speech proposed that the deep seabed beyond national
jurisdiction and the resources thereof should be declared as the common heritage of
mankind and used for only peaceful purposes.55 This brought to the fore the need to have
a legal regime for the seabed beyond national jurisdiction.56 The speech appears to have
acted as a clarion call for developing states, including African states, within the General

54 "Remarks at the Commissioning of the Research Ship Oceanographer, 13 July, 1966", quoted in Payoyo,
P.B, Cries of the Sea: World Inequality, Sustainable Development and the Common Heritage of Humanity
55 See Maltese Note Verbale of 17 August 1967 to the U.N. Secretary-General (A/6695, 18th August, 1967;
vol. II, Doc.12.1) and Dr. Pardo’s speech to the General Assembly’s first Committee on 1st November
Assembly. Thereafter a number of General Assembly Resolutions concerning the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction were adopted, including the Resolution on the importance of preserving the seabed beyond national jurisdiction from actions and uses which might be detrimental to the common interests of mankind; a Resolution that the exploitation of the resources in the seabed be carried for the benefit of mankind as a whole with special consideration for developing nations; the Moratorium Resolution; the Resolution on the Declaration of Principles governing the seabed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction; and the Resolution for exclusively using the seabed beyond national jurisdiction for peaceful purposes. The Moratorium Resolution, which clearly revealed the divide between the developed and the developing states, declared as follows:

"Pending the establishment of [an international regime including appropriate machinery]

(a) States and persons, physical or juridical, are bound to refrain from all activities of exploitation of the resources of the area of the sea-bed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction;

(b) No claim to any part of that area or its resources shall be recognised."

Whilst it is almost impossible to say that the Moratorium Resolution established customary international law, considering the level of objections and abstentions even from certain African states, there is no doubt that this Resolution served as the launch pad for subsequent Resolutions, including the Resolution on the Declaration of

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56 It has been said that the proposal for a legal regime for the deep seabed was already in place before Arvid Pardo's speech. See Rembe, op. cit. p.36.
57 General Assembly Resolution 2340 (XXII) of 18 December, 1967
58 General Assembly Resolution 2467A (XXIII) of 21 December 1968.
59 General Assembly Resolution 2754 (XXIV) of 15 December 1969.
60 General Assembly Resolution 2749(XXV) of the 17 of December, 1970
61 General Assembly Resolutions 3029 (XXVII) of 18 December 1972 and 3067 (XXVIII) of 16 November 1973.
63 62 states voted in favour of this resolution including African States such as Mauritius, Tunisia, Ethiopia, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Lesotho, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zambia.
64 28 states objected, including such African states as Ghana and South Africa.
65 28 states abstained, including such African States as Cote d'Ivoire (then Ivory Coast), Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Sierra Leone, Togo, Sudan, Malawi, Swaziland, Burkina Faso (then Upper Volta) and even Nigeria.
Principles of this regime that was adopted without any objections. All these Resolutions eventually culminated in the entrenchment of the principle of the common heritage of mankind, along with the regime of the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction, in the LOSC, as modified by the 1994 Implementation Agreement. Despite the watering down of the principle of the common heritage of mankind by the Agreement, there is no doubt that the principle, which requires that special consideration should be given to developing states, is an accomplishment for developing states, including African states.

2.1.4.3(I). Legal Status of the Area

For a long while there was confusion as to the legal status of the Area - whether it was res nullius, an extension of the continental shelf or res communis, or whether it enjoyed a totally different status as the common heritage of mankind. The argument that the Area was res nullius, and therefore susceptible to appropriation by anyone who asserted legal control and effective occupation, did not seem to gain much support in the international community. In 1974 an American company, Deep Sea Ventures Inc., filed a ‘Notice of Discovery and Claim of Exclusive Mining Rights, and Request for Diplomatic Protection and Protection of Investment’, in respect of a specified nodule site in the Clarion fracture zone, with the US State Department. The State Department was, however, not prepared to grant or recognise an exclusive claim to the site, which fell outside national jurisdiction.
There was also the argument that in view of the rather vague "exploitability" test enunciated in Article 1 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, each state could extend its continental shelf to include the deep seabed area. This argument was also not popular since it was felt that the "exploitability" test was qualified by the requirement that the seabed and subsoil of the submarine area exploitable by the coastal state should be adjacent to the coast.71

For some time the main issue therefore was whether the Area and its resources were res communis or the common heritage of mankind, two concepts with distinct legal effect. A territory that is deemed to be res communis is not subject to the exclusive appropriation by any one and therefore not subject to any sovereign claims or any national jurisdiction,72 it is therefore available to any entity willing and able to exploit the resources therein. This therefore permits a situation whereby whoever has the available resources for exploitation in terms of finance and technology can unilaterally exploit the resources therein.

On the other hand, the principle of the common heritage of mankind as Joyner points out consists of five principal elements.73 First, it deals with territories that are not subject to appropriation of any kind, public or private, national or corporate, and though no one owns it, everyone manages it. Second, in the view of Joyner, all peoples, with states acting in a representative capacity, are expected to share in the management of the territory and therefore are to be represented in any international institution set up in this

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regard. Third, any natural resources exploited from the territory and any economic benefits are to be shared amongst all peoples. Fourth, the territory is to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. Fifth, it should be open to scientific research by any particular state, provided that such research does not adversely affect the environment and the results of that research are made available as soon as possible to other states which request for it.

He goes on to suggest out that there is a New International Economic Order (NIEO) variant of the common heritage of mankind principle requiring full legal ownership of the Area by the international community and that developing states should be given preferential rights in the distribution of the revenue accruing from the Area. In addition, this NIEO variant, in the view of Joyner, requires the setting up of international machinery with immense powers to serve as trustee for the Area.74

The present writer is of the opinion that the so-called NIEO variant of the common heritage of mankind represents the essence of the principle since ownership of the territory, albeit communal not individual ownership is a crucial attribute of the common heritage of mankind principle. Therefore though ownership cannot vest in any individual state, it is vested in the international community as a whole.

The implication of communal ownership of the Area by the international community appears to be inherent in the use of the word “heritage” to describe the principle of the common heritage of mankind. This word “heritage,” which it is suggested was used deliberately, connotes, in itself, something that allows for ownership and capable of being inherited by future generations. The Somali delegate, suggesting communal ownership under the common heritage of mankind principle, pointed out at UNCLOS III that:

“The aim of the General Assembly in using the expression “common heritage of mankind” was clear and embodied the notion that the resources of the seabed and ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction belonged to all peoples and should be used for the benefit of all.”75

Also the Tanzanian representative at the UNCLOS III was emphatic about the Area being "jointly owned by all mankind." 76

Communal ownership by the international community of the Area and its resources, in the view of the present writer, is the legal basis upon which the international community is able to set up international machinery to administer this part of the sea in a role akin to that of a trustee for mankind. This communal ownership of the Area is implicit in Article 137(2) of the LOSC, which says, “All rights in the resources of the Area are vested in mankind as a whole, on whose behalf the Authority shall act.”

Communal ownership of property, implicit in the common heritage of mankind, is a familiar concept to African states. There are examples of African states where under native law and customs land is not subject to individual ownership, but rather communal ownership by the family, village or community. Individual ownership appears to have been introduced as a result of the contact with Europeans.77 According to a chief in Ghana, the late Nana Sir Ofori Atta, “I conceive that land belongs to a vast family of whom many are dead, a few are living and countless hosts are still unborn.” 78

The communal nature of land ownership in West Africa has received judicial support in the case of Amodu Tijani v. Secretary, Government of Southern Nigeria.79 In this case

76 See UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol. II, p.33, para.33. See also the view of the representative of Madagascar that the Area belongs to the international community as a whole. UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol.II, p.59, para.78. Contrast, however, with the view of the Libyan representative who appeared to be more focused on joint management rather than joint ownership and advocated that the Authority should exercise jurisdiction and not sovereignty over the Area and its resources. UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol.II, p.43, para.79.


78 Ollennu, ibid. p.7.

79 [1921] 2 A.C. 399. This case was cited with approval again by the Privy Council in Sunmonu v. Disu Raphel [1927] A.C. 881.
Lord Haldane of the Privy Council quoted, with approval, Rayner C.J.'s Report on Land Tenure in West Africa, as follows:

"The next fact which it is important to bear in mind in order to understand the native land law is that the notion of individual ownership is quite foreign to native ideas. Land belongs to the community, the village or the family, never to the individual. All the members of the community, village, or head of the family have an equal right to the land, but in every case the chief or headman of the community or village or head of the family, has charge of the land, and in loose mode of speech is sometimes called the owner. He is to some extent in the position of a trustee, and as such holds the land for the use of the community or family. He has control of it, and any member who wants a piece of it to cultivate or build a house upon, goes to him for it. But the land so given still remains the property of the community or family. He cannot make any important disposition of the land without consulting the elders of the community or the family, and their consent must in all cases be given before a grant can be made to a stranger." 80

There is an interesting parallel between the communal ownership of land in Africa and the common heritage of mankind principle.81 The community under native law and custom jointly owns the property. Any person who wants to use the communal land applies to the head for use and not ownership. The ownership is, however, always, at every point, vested in the community with the head of the community or family acting as a type of trustee for this communal land. This can be equated with the situation where the International Seabed Authority (ISA) acts as trustee of the Area and its resources for the benefit of mankind under the common heritage of mankind. It is not out of place to say that even before the famous speech of Arvid Pardo, African indigenous communities had a form of common heritage in respect of community or family land. Therefore it was not surprising that the African states could identify with the speech of Pardo and were willing to embrace the concept of the common heritage of mankind in respect of the Area, a concept in many ways similar to African cultural values in respect of ownership of land.

80 Supra at pp. 404-5.
81 Rembe, op.cit.p.53.
2.1.4.3(II). Res Communis vs. Common Heritage of Mankind

The General Assembly Resolutions on the matter declared the Area and the resources therein as the common heritage of mankind. However, despite these Resolutions, certain developed states still argued that the Area and its resources were res communis and that the resources were exploitable as one of the freedoms of the high seas. As far as they were concerned, while no state could exercise sovereignty over any part of the Area, they were entitled to free use of the Area and the exploitation of the resources therein. Their arguments have been put forward by jurists such as Kronmiller, Murphy, Burton and Brown. They based their arguments mainly on Article 2 of the 1958 High Seas Convention that says:

"The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to subject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by these articles and by the other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and non-coastal States:

(1) Freedom of navigation;
(2) Freedom of fishing;
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
(4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.

These freedoms, and others which are recognised by the general principles of international law, shall be exercised by all States with reasonable regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas"

As far as these jurists were concerned, the provisions of the 1958 Convention, by using the phrases "inter alia" and "others which are recognised by the general principles of international law", made room for additional freedoms of the high seas recognised by international law. In their view these additional freedoms include freedom of deep seabed exploitation. They also rely on the travaux preparatoires of the ILC in support of this

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84 (1958) 52 *AJIL*, pp.842-851.
view. However, Van Dyke and Yuen raise very lucid and cogent arguments against the view that deep seabed mining was a freedom of the high seas. One of their most cogent arguments is to the effect that there is no evidence in terms of state practice to show that deep seabed mining had been established as a freedom of the high seas under customary international law. Ambassador Elliot Richardson, the United States Ambassador to the UNCLOS III, in a statement to Congress explained the rather limited acceptance of deep seabed mining as a freedom of the high seas by states. He said:

"We [the United States] insist that there is a right under international law to engage in seabed mining as a high seas freedom, but there are only a dozen or 15 countries that take that position..." 88

The representative of Canada at the Sea-Bed Committee had earlier on in 1972 also pointed out that the attempt to classify deep seabed mining as one of the freedoms of the high seas was a minority position. He said:

"While there were those who lament the death of the traditional unrestricted freedom of the high seas, there are many more who rejoice that the traditional concept of freedom of the high seas can no longer be interpreted as... a legal pretext for the unilateral appropriation of sea-bed resources beyond national jurisdiction". (Emphasis added) 89

It is difficult to see how the position of only "a dozen or 15 countries" in the international community can be sufficient to make deep seabed mining a freedom of the high seas under customary international law. Mahmoudi, for his part, also agrees that the omnibus phrase of "other freedoms which are recognised by the general principles of international law" in the High Seas Convention, does not include deep seabed mining

85 The ILC in its commentary on Art.2 of the High Seas Convention said: "The list of freedoms of the high seas contained in this article is not restrictive; the Commission has merely specified four of the main freedoms. It is aware that there are other freedoms, such as freedom to explore or exploit the subsoil of the high seas and freedom to engage in scientific research therein." See (1955) 2 Year Book of the International Law Commission, p.21. Brown, for example, alluded to the ILC travaux preparatoires in his contention that seabed mining in the Area at one time was one of the freedoms of the high seas. See Brown, Sea-Bed Energy and Minerals, Vol.2, op.cit.pp.21-22.
87 Ibid at pp.512-513.
because there is no evidence that this was generally accepted by state practice. He points out that the other freedoms in Article 2 that the ILC must have had in mind were the freedom of scientific research and freedom of undertaking nuclear tests on the high seas for which there was sufficient state practice. On the question of whether the freedom of the high seas could be extended to deep seabed mining because it was not expressly prohibited, Mahmoudi was of the view that for an act to be valid under international law it must not only satisfy the status of non-prohibition but must also be generally accepted by state practice. His position is premised on the point that though the travaux preparatoires of a treaty play a role in the interpretation of the treaty, they cannot replace the requisite state practice in determining whether a principle is one of customary international law. The idea that deep seabed mining was one of the freedoms of the high seas, as pointed above, was rejected by a majority of states and therefore could not be validly said to be a freedom “recognised by the general principles of international law”.

The view of the developed states, surprisingly, seemed to have been endorsed by Professor Ajomo, a Nigerian jurist, when he said:

“The legal status of the seabed should not present any difficulty as there is general agreement that the ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction is governed by the same regime as the high seas. As a result it is subject to Article 2 of the Convention on the High Seas, by which no State may assert its sovereignty over any part of the high seas. The ocean floor and subsoil may therefore not be occupied by a state or otherwise subjected to national jurisdiction either temporarily or permanently. It is res communis. A fortiori the natural resources of the ocean floor and the subsoil are the common heritage of mankind.”

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90 Mahmoudi, op. cit. pp.103-115.
91 Ibid. p.109.
93 Mahmoudi, op. cit. pp. 112-115.
The position of the learned jurist appears to mix up the two concepts of res communis and the common heritage of mankind and does not adequately represent the position of developing states, including those in the African continent. The position of developing states, as posited by the Group of 77, was that the existing international law of the sea, including the High Seas Convention 1958, did not cover the regime of the seabed beyond national jurisdiction. In the view of the Group of 77, the regime was an innovative one based on the common heritage of mankind, which had been developed and become part of customary international law through the various Resolutions in the sixties and the seventies, including the Moratorium Resolution.\textsuperscript{98} The statement of the learned jurist appears to be based on a misunderstanding of the difference between res communis and the common heritage of mankind.\textsuperscript{99} Res communis, while preventing states from appropriating a region as part of their national jurisdiction, does not prevent a free for all exploration and exploitation of the resources by any state that has the capacity to do so.\textsuperscript{100} It was exactly this situation that the developing states desired to guard against with the common heritage of mankind concept. Under the common heritage of mankind states are not only disallowed from appropriating the region but also precluded from unilaterally mining it. Rather the mining is to be a collective and regulated one.\textsuperscript{101} The Nigerian position, which was in line with that of the O.A.U. and the Group of 77, was put by the Nigerian delegation at the 22\textsuperscript{nd} session of the General Assembly in the following words:

"... it is our view that the known resources of the seabed and ocean floor, which are vast, should, as far as they lie outside the limits of present national jurisdiction, be exploited collectively for the sole benefit of the world community. As a developing country Nigeria's renewed fear is of the incalculable dangers for mankind as a whole if the seabed and the ocean

\textsuperscript{98} See Letter dated 29 August 1980 from the Chairman of the Group of 77, E.K. Wapenyi of Uganda, to the President of the Conference, UNCLOS III, \textit{Official Record}, vol.XIV, pp.111-114. This letter was in response to the unilateral legislation by certain developed industrialised states and it articulated the Group of 77 position on the regime applicable to the deep seabed Area.


\textsuperscript{100} See Churchill & Lowe, op.cit. pp. 143 and 225.

floor beyond present national jurisdiction were progressively and competitively appropriated, exploited and even used for military purposes by those countries which possess the necessary technology." 102

These varying interpretations of the legal status of the Area by developed and the developing states explain their diverse positions at the UNCLOS III on various issues concerning this regime.103

2.1.4.4. Seabed Committee.

After the speech of Arvid Pardo, various African bodies started to issue statements on various issues of the law of the sea, including the regime of the Area. Such statements included the O.A.U Declaration,104 the Resolutions of the third conference of heads of state and government of non-aligned countries held at Lusaka, Zambia from the 8 to 10 September 1970,105 the Report of the sub-committee on the law of the sea of the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee, 1971;106 the Conclusions in the General Report of the African states regional seminar on the law of the sea held in Yaoundé, Cameroon from 20 to 30 June 1972, 107 and the Kampala Declaration, 1974.108

Upon a draft Resolution sponsored by ten African states, namely Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan and Tunisia, an ad hoc committee was established to study the peaceful uses of the seabed and ocean floor.109 The General Assembly subsequently reconstituted this committee as a standing committee named "The Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed beyond the Limits of National

108 Doc. A/CONF.62/631. UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol.III, p.3. This was a declaration by developing landlocked and other geographically disadvantaged States who meet in Kampala, Uganda.
Jurisdiction’. The committee was originally made up of thirty-five members out of which seven, namely Egypt, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Senegal, Somalia and Tanzania, were African states. The committee was later enlarged to forty-two and the African representation was increased to thirteen with the addition of Cameroon, Madagascar, Mauritania, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Sudan. Subsequently the committee was enlarged first to eighty-six then to ninety-one members. By this time the African states in the committee had increased to twenty-six namely Algeria, Cameroon, Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Zambia and Zaire. All of them were coastal states except for the landlocked states of Mali and Zambia.110

2.1.5. UNCLOS III

The speech by Arvid Pardo set the stage for the calling of a Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III).111 UNCLOS III was made necessary not only to deal with the issue of the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction, which had assumed prominence with the speech of Arvid Pardo and the improvement of technology that opened up the possibility of mining this part of the sea, but also to deal with the unresolved issues from UNCLOS I and II, such as the breadth of the territorial sea and fishery zones. In addition, the fragmentation of the 1958 law of the sea Conventions resulted in an uncoordinated law of the sea policy whereby states had the latitude to choose to sign one Convention and reject another. As a result it was felt that, since the problems of the sea are closely interrelated and needed to be considered as a whole, there

110 See Rembe, ibid. pp.36-80.
was a need for a single Convention covering the various aspects of the law of the sea.\textsuperscript{112} Further, the UNCLOS III was a response to the need to accommodate the developing states, a large number of which were from Africa, which were under colonial domination at the time of UNCLOS I and II, and felt that the Geneva Conventions did not cater for their interests. The dissatisfaction of African states, along with other developing states, the bulk of which had become members of the United Nations, gained ground, and as a result of their numerical strength they succeeded in passing various Resolutions in the General Assembly, which culminated in UNCLOS III.\textsuperscript{113}

The General Assembly by several Resolutions requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene the UNCLOS III.\textsuperscript{114} This Conference, involving diverse states from various parts of the globe, including African states, lasted for nine years (1973-1982). The first session of the Conference met at the United Nations Headquarters in New York from 3 to 15 December 1973.\textsuperscript{115} This session approved the rule of consensus for the Conference, which was later inserted in its Rules of Procedure of 27 June 1974. By this rule the Conference was required to \textit{“make every effort to reach agreement on substantive matters by way of consensus; there should be no voting on such matters until all efforts at consensus have been exhausted.”} \textsuperscript{116}

The Conference worked through four main Committees - the First Committee (dealing with the regime of the seabed and ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction); the Second Committee (dealing with the general regime of the law of the sea and related topics); the

\textsuperscript{112} See the preamble of the LOSC 82 which says the states parties were inter alia: “Prompted by the desire to settle, in a spirit of mutual understanding and co-operation, all issues relating to the law of the sea and aware of the historic significance of this Convention as an important contribution to the maintenance of peace, justice and progress for all peoples of the world ... Conscious that the problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be considered as a whole...”


\textsuperscript{114} See for example General Assembly Resolutions 2749(XXV) of 17 December 1970; 3029 (XXVII) of 18 December 1972 and 3067 (XXVIII) of 16 November, 1973.


Third Committee (dealing with the marine environment, scientific research and the development and transfer of technology) and the General Committee (acting as a clearing house involved inter alia in preparing the draft documents for the Conference and giving advice on these drafts). An African, P.B. Engo (Cameroon), headed the First Committee.\textsuperscript{117}

By the third session the chairmen of the First, Second and Third Committees had each produced a single document on the subject matter of their Committee. These documents were merged together as a single document called the Single Negotiating Text (SNT). By 1976 this document had evolved into what was known as the Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT). This text, after further negotiations and revisions by 1980, was produced as an Informal Draft Convention and in 1981 became the Draft Convention.\textsuperscript{118}

At the eleventh session the United States of America demanded a vote on the Draft Convention. The vote resulted in 130 votes in favour, 4 against, including the United States, and 17 abstentions, including 7 Western European states.\textsuperscript{119} No African state voted against the Convention or abstained from voting.\textsuperscript{120} The Final Act, together with four Resolutions of the UNCLOS III, was finally adopted on 10 December 1982 in Montego Bay, Jamaica.\textsuperscript{121} This brought to an end the UNCLOS III.

\textsuperscript{117} Bemaerts, op.cit. pp.8-9.
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid.pp.16-19. Israel, Turkey, United States of America and Venezuela voted against the Convention, while Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Mongolia, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Thailand, the Ukraine, the USSR and the United Kingdom abstained. See United Nations Press Release SEA/493 of 30 April 1982.
\textsuperscript{120} For African states that voted to adopt the Convention, see UNCLOS III \textit{Official Records}, Vol.XVI, at pp.152-167.
\textsuperscript{121} Resolution I attached to the Final Act of the UNCLOS deals with the establishment of a Preparatory Commission for the International Sea-Bed Authority and for the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, while Resolution II deals with the Preparatory Investment in Pioneer Activities relating to Polymetallic Nodules. Resolution III, on the other hand, deals with territories whose people have not attained full independence or self-governing status and Resolution IV deals with Liberation movements and their signing status of the Final Act.
2.1.6. Factors influencing the attitude of African States in UNCLOS III.\textsuperscript{122} Magdy Abdel Moneim Heftry\textsuperscript{123} argues that Africa, when viewed from geographical, historical and cultural criteria, is a continental whole that defies any division arbitrarily made. He opposes the division of Africa into ‘white’ and ‘black’, or Africa north and south of the Sahara. He then went on to allude to an African personality.\textsuperscript{124} This rather sweeping contention may tend to suggest something of a “United States of Africa” having an African personality, with a common cultural affinity and completely devoid of any division. Consequently, one might be tempted to use this as a basis to justify the relatively united stance of African states at the UNCLOS III. However the reality on ground does not entirely reflect this position. Whilst there are pockets of ethnic groups sharing a common cultural affinity who were arbitrarily divided into different nation states by artificial boundaries created by the partition of Africa, there also exist in the continent certain ethnic groups having no cultural affinity whatsoever with each other and having different languages and way of life. This diversity amongst ethnic groups in Africa sometimes constitutes a strain in the attempt at unity not only as between states in their interaction with each other, but also within the domestic setting of the different states where different ethnic groups were arbitrarily lumped together by colonising states.

Even in the sphere of marine matters this diversity is reflected in that some are coastal states while others are landlocked states with different interests to protect.\textsuperscript{125} Further, as

\textsuperscript{122} See generally Rembe, op. cit. 36-85.
\textsuperscript{123} At the time of writing the article in note 124 below, he was Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Egypt in Norway.
\textsuperscript{125} In the 1973 session of the Sea-Bed Committee two landlocked states, Uganda and Zambia, openly took a contrary position to the OAU on the Economic Zone by proposing the creation of regional economic zones where fisheries would be reserved for the exclusive use not of only the coastal state but all states in the region, including landlocked states, and mineral resources would be exploited and managed exclusively by a regional authority on behalf of all the states in the region. This proposal was eventually withdrawn as a result of pressure from the OAU at the instance of African coastal states. See Akintoba, T.O., \textit{African States and Contemporary International Law: A Case Study of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and the Exclusive Economic Zone}, (The Hague/Boston/London, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997), p.74. Also see the Kampala Declaration, Document A/CONF.62/63 of March 1974, UNCLOS III, \textit{Official Records}, Vol.III, p.3, where the landlocked states of Africa joined forces with other landlocked and geographically disadvantaged developing states to emphasise the need for a special consideration to be given to the peculiar interests of landlocked and geographically disadvantaged developing states vis-à-vis the issues of the law of the sea.
regards deep seabed mining, some are land-based producers while others are not. Also the fact that African states are at different stages of development, with some being more developed than others, affects their ability to engage in marine activities. As Gonidec posited:

"...can one ignore the fact that the history of African societies resulted in creating contemporary States that are basically unequal as far as their power is concerned, with the consequence, among other aspects, that there have appeared in Africa poles of power, as has been demonstrated. Taking into account this phenomenon may help in understanding the difficulties encountered to achieve the ideal of African unity."  

Views such as that of Magdy Hefny, with an emphasis on one Africa, can be traced back to the call for "Pan-Africanism" by Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana in the 1960's. Pan-Africanism leading to an African unity, though a worthwhile aspiration remains a goal towards which African states aspire. Regional organisations, such as the now defunct Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the present African Union (AU), have been established to promote this aspiration of African unity. The preamble of the Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) declares as follows:

"Inspired by the noble ideals, which guided the founding fathers of our Continental Organisation and generations of Pan-Africanists in their determination to promote unity, solidarity, cohesion and co-operation among the peoples of Africa and African States."  

The question then arises as to what accounted for the relative unity of African states on the deep seabed and other issues at the UNCLOS III despite the occasional divergent interests of these states. This writer would prefer to attribute this to certain common interests amongst African states derived from historical, economic and political factors rather than a unity arising out of an African personality. The writer agrees with Rembe when he pointed out in respect of developing states generally that:

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"The common heritage of mankind received a welcome support from the developing countries because it is attuned to their desires and modern conditions; it appeals directly to their basic problems and needs, as it has as its emphasis development, peace, and equality of treatment of all State."  

It must be pointed out that an examination of some factors would be better appreciated within the background that at the time of the UNCLOS III negotiations African states were of the view that commercial exploitation of the seabed mining was imminent.

- **Historical.**

The generally common historical experience of colonialism greatly influenced the attitude of the African states to the regime of the Area. The attempt to put forward seabed mining in the Area as a freedom of the high seas by developed industrialised states was, in the view of African states, a prelude to these developed states partitioning the Area and the resources therein amongst themselves as a result of their superior technology. The previous experience of the partitioning of the African continent by these industrialised states was still fresh in the memory of African states. After the era of the slave trade the African continent had been partitioned by these industrialised states at the Berlin conference of 1884-5, leading to a long period of colonialism of the continent. This experience of the slave trade and colonialism is virtually the same in most African states and has left a deep-rooted wound in the psyche of African states. The attendant effect of this is that any action perceived by African states as being akin to oppression or colonialism serves as a unifying force for these states.

Judge Ajibola aptly explained these historical unhealed wounds in his separate opinion in the *Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad)* case, when he said:

"For about a century, perhaps since 1885 when it was partitioned, Africa has been ruefully nursing the wounds inflicted on it by its colonial past. Remnants of this unenviable colonial heritage intermittently erupt into discordant

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129 Rembe, op. cit.p.52.
131 On the influence of the slave trade and colonial experience on African jurisprudence see Sanders, op. cit. pp.49-135.
social, political and even economic upheavals, which some may say, are better forgotten than remembered. But this "heritage" is difficult, if not impossible to forget; aspects of it continue, like apparitions, to rear their heads, and haunt the entire continent in various jarring and sterile manifestations: how do you forget unhealed wounds?"  

The memory of these events led African states to have a common desire to change the existing international law, which not only supported but actively encouraged the slave trade and colonialism. It was therefore not surprising that African states together resisted the attempt to promote deep seabed mining as a freedom of the high seas since they perceived it would lead to a modern day partition, similar to the partition of Africa, by the western developed states, with the aim of monopolising the resources of the Area to the detriment of African states and other developing states. The representative of Ghana at UNCLOS III pointed this out when he said:

"[h]is delegation supported the establishment of an autonomous regime with legal bodies of its own and in effective control of all activities in the area of the seabed and ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. That position stemmed from memories of the 18th and 19th centuries when, in the scramble for overseas territories, the colonialists had parcelled out African lands which it had taken over a century to recover from them."  

Also Bamela Engo, the chair of the First Committee, said: "The race for the resources of the deep sea-beds was seen as a maritime repeat of the despicable scramble for Africa and, as such, provocative of contemporary economic and social misgivings."

This common historical experience, leading to a common determination to challenge the "oppressors" and "colonisers", served as a shared point for African states to support wholeheartedly the declaration of the Area and its resources as the common heritage of mankind, thereby precluding any unilateral exploitation by the technologically superior industrialised states.

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133 See Umozurike and Ajomo in notes 9 and 11 above.
The emergent African states, upon independence from their colonisers, were still economically dependent on the former colonial and other western industrialised states. It became clear to the African states that political independence without economic independence amounted to an inchoate independence. The resources of the Area, the commercial exploitation of which was erroneously believed at the time of UNCLOS III to be imminent, raised the possibility of additional revenue that these states felt would enable them to achieve economic independence, resulting in full political independence.

With the widening economic and technological gap between developed and developing states, the latter, including African states, were determined to make a concerted effort in international fora to push for measures that would reduce this gap. The common factor of under-development therefore acted as a unifying force for African states, together with other developing states. In 1974 three Resolutions were passed by the General Assembly calling for a "New International Economic Order (NIEO)" to address the economic imbalance between the north and south. These Resolutions, which were overwhelmingly supported by developing states, influenced the position of African states at international fora, including the UNCLOS III.

As far as the African states, affected similarly by economic under-development, were concerned, the resources of the Area provided a means to obtain additional resources to effect the NIEO. The idea of the Area and its resources being the common heritage of mankind, coupled with the requirement that special consideration should be given to the interests of developing states, was therefore widely canvassed and supported by the

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136 See the comments of the representative of Morocco at UNCLOS III that the concept of the common heritage of mankind was intended to help under-developed states and to breach the gap between developing and developed states. UNCLOS III Official Records, Vol.IV, p.58, para.40.
African states, all in need of extra income for development. The desire to correct the economic imbalance between the developed states of the north and the under-developed states of the south clearly influenced the arguments of the African states on the nature of the regime of the Area, and was evinced by their stance on issues such as financing the mining activities of the Enterprise and the transfer of technology.\footnote{See Nelson, L., "The functions of Regionalism in the emerging Law of the Sea as Reflected in the Informal Composite Negotiating Text", in Johnston, D. (ed.), \textit{Regionalization of the law of the sea: Proceedings Law of the sea institute, Eleventh annual Conference, November 14-17, 1977, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, Hawaii}, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, , Barlinger Publishing company, 1978),p.18 and Engo, "Issues of First Committee at UNCLOS III," op. cit. p.38.}

Further, a number of Africa states were heavily reliant as land-based producers on certain minerals located in the Area. Naturally these states were concerned about the adverse effect seabed mining would have on their economy. Consequently they were united in the common agenda of ensuring that seabed mining would be regulated in such a way as to protect land-based producers against competition from resources to be derived from the Area.\footnote{See Rembe, op. cit. pp. 68-73.} Other African states’ solidarity with the land-based producers is explicable on the ground, not only of their sympathy with the land-based producers’ cause, but also their own interest to protect the ability of developing states, vis-à-vis developed states and their multinational corporations, to effectively exploit and develop mineral and other natural resources located within their jurisdiction.\footnote{See Rembe, op. cit. pp. 68-73.}

- **Political.**

The UNCLOS III provided an opportunity for the newly emergent African states to exercise their sovereign rights of legal equality as stated by the U.N Charter and to seek to establish themselves as a regional force to be reckoned with in the international community. This is reflected in their insistence on the principle of one vote per state in the institutions of the regime of the seabed. This in itself gave them the opportunity to manifest their sovereignty and equality with already existing members of the international community. As new participants in the international community, they discovered that the existing international institutions were under the control and dominance of existing members of the international community, especially the developed
states. They were therefore interested in achieving, together with other developing states, a shift in control from developed states to developing states in the various international regimes and institutions, including that of the Area. Oxman rightly identified this when he said:

"...for many countries the Committee I negotiations are not about the deep sea beds or the minerals involved. They are about the future structure of the United Nations, totally unrelated commodities, and the role of multinational corporations in the development of national and off-shore resources ... The stated objective is "control". This emphasis on abstraction hides three underlying objectives of far broader scope: first, greater "control" of international organisations by developing countries; second, greater "control" of raw materials by producers; and third, greater "control" of natural resource development projects by the state." 142

With the large number of developing states, including African states, in attendance at UNCLOS III they were able to effect, though not to the full extent intended, certain changes in the traditional law of the sea.143 The negotiations and the success in pushing through a distinct regime for the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction at the conference demonstrates that African states, teaming up with other developing states, were able to exert a significant influence on the UNCLOS III negotiations generally, as well as that in respect of the regime of the Area in particular.

The Convention was the result of a package deal involving trade-offs and compromise.144 As a single comprehensive document, the 1982 Convention was designed to offer in one single package all aspects of the law of the sea arrived at through compromise by the various parties.

141 Ibid.pp.69-70.
Part XI, which turned out to be the most controversial aspect of the Convention, establishes a regime for the seabed and subsoil outside national jurisdiction (the Area). The Area and its resources, the common heritage of mankind, are to be used only for peaceful purposes. Part XI, consisting of five sections, details this extremely complicated but unique regime and its institutional framework. The Area and its resources are declared to be the common heritage of mankind and therefore not subject to claims of sovereignty by any state nor subject to appropriation by any state or natural or juridical person. All rights in the resources are vested in mankind as a whole with the International Seabed Authority (ISA) acting on behalf of “mankind” as a type of trustee. Activities in the Area are to be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole represented by states, irrespective of such states’ geographical location or whether they are coastal or landlocked. The Convention, however, gives special consideration to the interests and needs of developing states and of peoples who have not attained independence or self-governing status. This provision appears to have a discriminatory bias in favour of developing states though the same provision goes on to say that the ISA shall provide for the equitable sharing of financial and other economic benefits derived from the Area on a non-discriminatory basis. The apparent contradiction of this provision is reconcilable on the grounds that it would be discriminatory to treat unlike situations in the same way. Therefore, in this particular case, since developed and developing states are not alike they should not be treated in the same way. Wolfrum depicts this as, “a legal form of discrimination.” The only difficulty with this is that even among the broad category of developing states there are some that are more developed than others. For instance, it is difficult to classify developing states actively engaged in seabed mining activities in the same category as others that are not due to a

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146 Arts.136 and 141 of LOSC.
147 See Arts. 136 and 137 of LOSC.
148 Art.137 (2) of LOSC.
149 Art.140 (1) of LOSC.
150 Ibid.
151 Art. 140(2) of LOSC.
lack of the wherewithal to do so. Even in the African continent there is a disparity in
development between states. Some, like Nigeria and South Africa, are more developed,
while others, like Sudan and Somalia, ravaged by internal conflicts and natural disasters,
are less developed. The issue therefore arises whether extremely poor developing states,
especially landlocked states and geographically disadvantaged states, should not be given
an extra advantage over and above more “developed” developing states in enjoying the
benefits derived from the Area. The African continent is replete with such extremely poor
states as up to thirty-four African states are classified as highly indebted poor countries
(HIPCs). The need to distinguish between the special consideration given to extremely
poor developing states, in contrast with other developing states, in respect of the benefits
of the Area appears to be useful since such distinction is implicit in the provisions of the
LOSC on the effective participation of developing states. This provision requires that
in promoting effective participation of developing states in activities of the Area due
regard should especially be given to landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states.
Though the emphasis of this provision is on geographical disadvantage, in reality quite a
number of these landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states, especially those in
Africa, are amongst the poorest developing states.

The Convention also created the International Seabed Authority (ISA) with a mining arm,
the Enterprise, to organise, carry out and control activities in the Area on behalf of
mankind, and a judicial arm, the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) to determine disputes in respect of the Area. The

Mining in the Area is by a rather complicated process known as the “parallel system” or
“site-banking.” Under this system a state party or its entities or nationals, both natural
and juridical(hereinafter called “the applicant”), seeking the approval of the ISA to carry

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154 Art.148 of LOSC.
155 Arts. 153 and 186 of LOSC. See section 4.1.3.2 of chapter 4 of this thesis on institutions for the
settlement of disputes under the deep seabed regime.
156 Art.153 (2) of LOSC. The United States proposed this system in April 1976. See Anand, R., “Odd Man
and Confrontation: The United States and the Law of the Sea Convention, a workshop of the Law of the Sea

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out mining operations is required to make an application in respect of two sites of equal commercial value. Upon approval of such application by the ISA, the applicant is authorised, based on the terms of the contract, to mine one site, while the other site is "banked" for mining by the ISA through the Enterprise or in association with developing states. This process anticipates mining by the applicant and the ISA working side by side. Therefore the Convention made provisions for the mandatory transfer of technology to the ISA and developing states interested in deep seabed mining and access to finance on very liberal terms to the Enterprise, provisions that have been significantly modified by the 1994 Agreement. The ISA is empowered under the Convention to acquire for itself and to promote and encourage the transfer to developing states of the requisite marine technology from the technologically developed states parties.

Further, the LOSC made provision for the adoption of production policies by the ISA, in respect of mining of the seabed, to protect developing states that are land-based producers of these minerals. This provision has also been modified by the Agreement. Also, subject to the retention of certain fundamental principles of the regime, such as the common heritage of mankind principle, there are provisions for review by the Assembly of the system of mining after five years from the entry into force of the Convention, and by a Review Conference after 15 years from 1 January of the year that the earliest commercial production commences in the Area. Amendments by the Review Conference were to be by consensus. However, in the event of a failure to reach a consensus, the amendment could be adopted by a three-fourths majority of the states parties and such amendment would come into force 12 months after three-fourths of the

\[\text{Institute, Honolulu, Hawaii, January 9-13, 1984, (Honolulu, Hawaii, the Law of the Sea Institute, University of Hawaii, 1985), pp.82-83.}\]

\[\text{157 Art 153 of LOSC.}\]

\[\text{158 Annex III of LOSC and Section 5 of the Annex to the 1994 Agreement. See section 3.2 of chapter 3 of this thesis on the modifications introduced by the Agreement to the LOSC.}\]

\[\text{159 Art.144 of LOSC and Section 5 para.1 of the Annex to the 1994 Agreement.}\]

\[\text{160 Arts 150 and 151 of LOSC.}\]

\[\text{161 Section 6 of the Agreement.}\]

\[\text{162 Arts.154 and 155 of LOSC.}\]
state parties had deposited their instrument of ratification or accession.\textsuperscript{163} Again these provisions have been modified by the Agreement.\textsuperscript{164}

In addition, the LOSC has eight annexes attached to it, of which annex III (Basic Conditions of Prospecting, Exploration and Exploitation), annex IV (Statute of the Enterprise) and annex VI (Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, especially the part on the Seabed Disputes Chamber) are particularly significant to the regime. Annex II (Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf) also has some incidental significance since the Commission, as has been discussed in chapter one, is charged with receiving submissions from states with extended continental shelves which is relevant in determining the scope of the Area.

Further, the LOSC is accompanied by four Resolutions with two, Resolutions I (Establishment of the Preparatory Commission [PrepCom] for the ISA and the ITLOS) and II (Preparatory Investment in Pioneer Activities relating to Polymetallic Nodules), being particularly significant to the regime.\textsuperscript{165} Resolution II established and introduced the Pioneer Investor Protection (P.I.P.) scheme to give preferential treatment to certain pioneer investors, especially from the developed industrial states that had invested substantial amounts in seabed mining.\textsuperscript{166} The idea of this P.I.P. scheme was to give an incentive to these developed industrialised states to become parties to the Convention. These concessions, however, failed to achieve their desired objective of achieving universal participation, as states such as the United States of America, the United Kingdom and Germany still refused to ratify or even sign the Convention. These industrialised states then proceeded to enact similar national legislation providing for comprehensive regulation of seabed mining by their nationals and thereby established the “Reciprocating States Regime.”\textsuperscript{167} This unilateral regime by these industrialised states

\textsuperscript{163} Art.155 (2) and (3) of LOSC.
\textsuperscript{164} Section 4 of the Annex to the Agreement.
\textsuperscript{165} See the Final Act of UNCLOS III.
threatened to bring about a dual regime on seabed mining that would have undermined the entire work of UNCLOS III and the resultant Convention.\textsuperscript{168}

2.2.1. PrepCom.

The Preparatory Commission for the International Seabed Authority (ISA) and for the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) (PrepCom), established under Resolution I of the Final Act, headed at various times by two Africans - Joseph Warioba (Tanzania) and Jose Luis Jesus (Cape Verde) - commenced in 1983 the drafting of rules to bring the ISA and ITLOS into operation.\textsuperscript{169} It was also mandated to implement Resolution II.\textsuperscript{170} The PrepCom at its first session established four special Commissions, one of which was Special Commission 3(SCN.3) charged with the responsibility of preparing the rules and regulations for the mining of polymetallic nodules in the Area.\textsuperscript{171} Despite the amount of work put in by the PrepCom resulting in Draft Regulations on Prospecting, Exploration and Exploitation of Polymetallic Nodules in the Area, the informal consultations of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to meet the objections of the developed states to Part XI, which took place simultaneously but independently of the PrepCom, appears to have taken the wind off the efforts of PrepCom.\textsuperscript{172}

\textsuperscript{168} Churchill & Lowe, Ibid.


\textsuperscript{170} Art.5 (h) of Resolution I.

2.3. The New York Implementation Agreement

With the end of the UNCLOS III and the adoption of LOSC, the issue of ensuring the universal application of this new constitution of the sea became the focus of attention. The United States of America and certain major Western European maritime powers made it clear that they were not going to ratify the Convention as it then stood because of the provisions of Part XI. On 16 November 1993 Guyana deposited the sixtieth ratification with the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Convention came into force on 16 November 1994. However despite this, the reality of the “America-Euro” centric nature of the present international law came to the fore. It was realised that the Convention despite the overwhelming support of states, especially of the developing states, including African states, was not workable without the support of the United States of America and other western industrialised states. Apart from a desire for universal participation, the more pragmatic consideration was that these states, together the major contributors to international institutions, were needed to fund the institutions of the new regime. This points to the fact that as long as the western developed states continue to provide the bulk of the contributions to the United Nations system and other international institutions, they will continue, to a large extent, to dictate the nature and content of international law. The African states, together with other developing states, though having the numerical strength to bring the Convention into force, were not

174 See Art. 308 of LOSC.
176 The top six contributors to the United Nations for 2000-2001 are the USA (25%); Japan (20.573%); Germany (9.857%); France (6.545%); Italy (5.437%) and the United Kingdom (5.092%). Together they account for over 72% of the regular U.N budget while the rest of the world, including African states, accounts for less than 28% of the U.N budget. See <http://ceb.unsystem.org/documents/FB.reports/ACC55.525/2000TAB3.pdf> [Accessed on 20 September 2004]
able to proceed without the industrialised states because of the lack of financial and technological wherewithal.\textsuperscript{177}

In July 1990 the erstwhile Secretary-General of the United Nations, Javier Perez de Cuellar, embarked on informal consultations with a view to ensuring that there was universal participation in LOSC 1982.\textsuperscript{178} One of the major reasons identified by the Secretary-General for the need to re-evaluate the regime of the seabed was the transformation of the general political and economic climate in favour of free market principles.\textsuperscript{179} In addition Nelson identifies the shortcomings of the PrepCom in dealing with the seabed mining provisions in the Convention and the absence of the United States of America from participation in the PrepCom.\textsuperscript{180} The importance of the United States of America to the regime can be traced to the fact that U.S companies were one of the major custodians of seabed mining technology and also because the U.S had, with the collapse of the former Soviet Union, become the only authentic "super power" in the world. Annick de Marffy-Mantuano also points out that the developing states, which included African states, co-operated in the 1994 consultations because of the loss of influence by these states due to their "tragically depressed" financial situation, which reduced their ability or desire to fight the developed states.\textsuperscript{181}

The Secretary-General commenced these consultations after he had bilateral exchanges with the key non-signatory states. These consultations, continued by Mr. Perez de Cuellar's successor, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, an African from the coastal state of Egypt, led to fifteen rounds of consultations from July 1990 to June 1994. The consultations identified certain issues including Costs to states parties; the Enterprise; Decision-


\textsuperscript{179} See Report of the Secretary-General etc., ibid.p.1.


making; the Review Conference; Transfer of technology; Production limitation; Compensation fund; Financial terms of contracts and Environmental considerations. During the round of negotiations from 2 to 6 August 1993, a paper dated 3 August 1993 was prepared by representatives of several developed and developing states and was distributed amongst the delegations to assist with the process of consultations. This paper, known as "boat paper," did not necessarily reflect the position of those that prepared it but was used as a basis for negotiation in the subsequent consultations. By the end of the last round of consultations from 31 May to 3 June 1994, a draft General Assembly Resolution and draft Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the 1982 Convention were ready. At the resumed forty-eighth session of the General Assembly the Agreement was adopted by 121 votes in favour, none against, with only 7 states abstaining. Interestingly, no African state voted against or abstained from the adoption of the Agreement, though twenty-three African states did not participate in the voting. Thirty African states, however, voted for the adoption of the Agreement. As at 1 February 2005, 26 African states had become parties to the Agreement. Unlike the UNCLOS III leading to LOSC 1982 that had the benefit of a statement of common purpose by the OAU in the form of the 1974 Declaration, there is no evidence of any such common purpose as regards the consultations that led to the 1994 Agreement. This

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183 The paper was an anonymous paper, which was called the boat paper for the simple reason that it had a picture of a boat on the cover. For the boat paper see Secretary-General’s Informal Consultations on Outstanding Issues Relating to the Deep Seabed Mining Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Collected Documents, ibid. pp.167-191.

184 The states that abstained were Colombia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Russian Federation, Thailand and Venezuela.


186 Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Congo, Cote D’Ivoire, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Tanzania and Zimbabwe.

187 See Table 2 below.
may account for what appears to be a lack of evident cohesiveness, in contrast with UNCLOS III, on the part of African states during the consultations.\(^{188}\)

The 1994 Agreement provides different procedures by which a state or entity can signify its consent to be bound, provided such state or entity has previously or at the same time established its consent to be bound by the LOSC 1982.\(^{189}\) Consent to be bound by the Agreement can be through:

- Deposit of an instrument of ratification, formal confirmation or accession to the LOSC after the adoption of the Agreement;\(^ {190}\)
- Signature without the need of ratification, formal confirmation or the procedure set out in Article 5 of the Agreement(Simplified procedure);\(^ {191}\)
- Signature subject to ratification or formal confirmation which is thereafter followed by such ratification or formal confirmation;\(^ {192}\)
- Signature by simplified procedure under Article 5;\(^ {193}\)
- Accession.\(^ {194}\)

The procedures of: signature without the need of ratification or formal confirmation, if so intended by the parties;\(^ {195}\) signature subject to ratification or formal confirmation;\(^ {196}\) and accession,\(^ {197}\) are relatively familiar procedures under the Vienna Convention on the Law

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\(^{188}\) See section 3.3 of chapter 3 of the thesis.

\(^{189}\) Art.4 (2) of the Agreement.

\(^{190}\) Art.4 (1).

\(^{191}\) Art.4 (3) (a). Whilst there is no specific requirement under this head for the state to declare its signature as definitive, the practice of the United Nations Secretariat requires a formal written indication of this by the state. See Brown, E.D., "The 1994 Agreement on the Implementation of Part XI of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea: Breakthrough to Universality?" (1995) 19(1) Marine Policy pp.5 at 6-7.

\(^{192}\) Art.4 (3) (b).

\(^{193}\) Art.4 (3) (c).

\(^{194}\) Art. 4(3) (d).


\(^{196}\) See notifications consenting to be bound by signature subject to ratification of Sudan and United Republic of Tanzania, Ibid.p.111. Also Cameroon, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa and Tunisia have consented to the Agreement by ratification. Sudan is yet to consent to the Agreement. See http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/status2005.pdf [Accessed on 6 May 2005].

\(^{197}\) Botswana and Mozambique consented by accession.
of Treaties (VCLT), commonly utilised by states to indicate consent to treaties.\(^{198}\) The other procedures are, however, rather unusual and adopted because of the peculiar circumstances surrounding the Agreement. However, it is must be pointed out that the VCLT also gives states the leeway to agree on other means outside the usual procedures.\(^{199}\)

Article 4 paragraph 1 procedure says:

"After the adoption of this Agreement, any instrument of ratification or formal confirmation of or accession to the Convention shall also represent consent to be bound by this Agreement." (Emphasis added)

This provision appears to suggest that a state would be deemed to have consented to the Agreement, which in reality is an amending instrument,\(^{200}\) when it deposited its instrument of ratification or formal confirmation or accession to the LOSC, after the adoption of the Agreement even before it came into force.\(^{201}\) This would seem to be at variance with Article 40(5) (a) of the VCLT that states:

"Any State which becomes a party to the treaty after the entry into force of the amending agreement shall, failing an expression of a different intention by that State:

\(\text{(a) }\) be considered as a party to the treaty as amended;
\(\text{(b) }\) " (Emphasis added)

First, the provision of Article 40(5) (a) of the VCLT makes it clear a state is only bound by an amending agreement if it became a party to the principal treaty after the entry into force of the amending instrument. Second, Article 40(5) (a) gives such a state the opportunity to choose not to be bound by the amending instrument through "an expression of a different intention", unlike the 1994 Agreement that gives no such opportunity under Article 4(1). Since the adoption of the Agreement the following African states have become parties to Agreement through the Article 4(1) procedure: Algeria, Benin, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mauritius and Sierra


\(^{199}\) Art. 11 of VCLT.

\(^{200}\) See section 2.4 below.

\(^{201}\) The Agreement was adopted on 28 July 1994 and came into force 28 July 1996.
Leone. Of these Algeria, Mauritania, Mauritius and Sierra Leone became parties through this procedure after the adoption of the Agreement but before it came into force.

The other procedure, Article 5(1) of the Agreement, provides:

"A State or entity which has deposited before the date of the adoption of this Agreement an instrument of ratification or formal confirmation of or accession to the Convention and which has signed this Agreement in accordance with article 4, paragraph 3(c), shall be considered to have established its consent to be bound by this Agreement 12 months after the date of its adoption, unless that State or entity notifies the depositary in writing before that date that it is not availing itself of the simplified procedure set out in this article".

By this provision a state, which before the Agreement was adopted had become a party to the LOSC, automatically became a party if it had signed the Agreement and did not within 12 months of the adoption of the Agreement notify the depositary in writing of its intention not to avail itself of this procedure. This automatic consent by signature through omission is also not a normal procedure utilised by states to indicate their consent to treaties, though there are instances when a state may be a party to a treaty by just the signature of its representative. Under the Article 5(1) procedure the intention to be bound by a mere signature is implied, rather than express, since all that is required is for a state party to LOSC to sign the Agreement during the adoption stage, do nothing at all for 12 months and thereafter be deemed to have consented. Brown explained that this procedure of states becoming parties by implied or tacit consent was inserted to avoid the need for such states to revert to their legislatures before becoming parties to the Agreement.

The Article 5(1) procedure has been utilised by the following African states: Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Namibia, Nigeria, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. However certain African states such as Cape Verde, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia and United Republic of

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202 See relevant United Nations website in note 196 above.
203 See Art. 12 of VCLT.
205 See note 196 above.
Tanzania have specifically notified the depositary in writing of their intention not to avail themselves of this simplified procedure.\textsuperscript{206} As at 1 February 2005 Cape Verde had yet to become a party to the Agreement. In its notification, as required by Article 5(1), Cape Verde declared that:

"The Government of the Republic of Cape Verde, having signed the Agreement adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 48/263 of 28 July 1994, is not availing itself of the simplified procedure set out in article 5, paragraph 1, of the Agreement, and will establish its consent to be bound by the Agreement after fulfilling the requirements set forward by its national laws and regulations, in accordance with article 5, paragraph 2, and article 4, paragraph 3(b) of the Agreement." \textsuperscript{207}

In the event of a state declining to utilise the procedure under Article 5 paragraph 1, its consent would be required to be by signature subject to ratification or formal confirmation and thereafter followed by the said ratification or formal confirmation.\textsuperscript{208}

The Agreement eventually came into force on 28 July 1996, 30 days after the consent of the fortieth state, including at least seven states which were pioneer investors,\textsuperscript{209} of which five were developed states.\textsuperscript{210} Thereafter every state or entity establishing its consent to be bound shall have the Agreement come into force for it on the thirtieth day after the date it established its consent.\textsuperscript{211}


\textsuperscript{207} See Law of the Sea Bulletin Special Issue IV, op. cit. p.47. Egypt and Sudan are also yet to become parties to the Agreement.

\textsuperscript{208} Art.5 (2) of the Agreement.


\textsuperscript{210} See Art.6 (1) of the Agreement.

\textsuperscript{211} Art.6 (2) of the Agreement.
2.4. The Status of the Convention and Implementation Agreement and African states.\textsuperscript{212}

The Agreement, though called an Implementation Agreement, is actually an amending instrument. The decision to tag the Agreement as an "implementing" rather than an "amending" one has been attributed to the political reason of avoiding the need for states, which had already ratified the Convention, to go back to their legislatures for a subsequent approval of the Agreement. A fresh approval of the legislature would necessarily be required if such instrument was an amendment but would not be obligatory if it were merely an implementation instrument.\textsuperscript{213} However, as Brown rightly pointed out, this was merely a play with words as in substance the Agreement was actually an amending instrument.\textsuperscript{214} The Agreement made certain fundamental changes to the regime as enunciated in the LOSC.\textsuperscript{215} It amended the provisions of the LOSC on the Enterprise,\textsuperscript{216} Transfer of technology,\textsuperscript{217} Economic assistance,\textsuperscript{218} Decision making in the institutions,\textsuperscript{219} Production policy,\textsuperscript{220} Financial terms of contracts\textsuperscript{221} and the Review conference.\textsuperscript{222} It also amended the institutional framework by merging some institutions\textsuperscript{223} and including new institutions such as the Finance Committee.\textsuperscript{224} The amending nature of the Agreement is also confirmed by it declaring that certain provisions of the LOSC "shall not apply."\textsuperscript{225} As an amending document, the Agreement


\textsuperscript{214} Brown, Ibid. p.10.

\textsuperscript{215} For a full analysis of the provisions of the 1994 Agreement vis-à-vis African states see chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis.

\textsuperscript{216} Section 2 of the Annex to the Agreement.

\textsuperscript{217} Section 5 of the Annex to the Agreement.

\textsuperscript{218} Section 7 of the Annex to the Agreement.

\textsuperscript{219} Section 3 of the Annex to the Agreement.

\textsuperscript{220} Section 6 of the Annex to the Agreement.

\textsuperscript{221} Section 8 of the Annex to the Agreement.

\textsuperscript{222} Section 4 of the Annex to the Agreement.

\textsuperscript{223} Section 1 paragraph 4 and Section 2 paragraph 1 of the Annex to the Agreement.

\textsuperscript{224} Section 9 of the Annex to the Agreement. This was, however, anticipated by the LOSC in Art.162 (2)

\textsuperscript{225} See, for example, Section 3 paragraphs 8, 11(b) and 16; Section 5 paragraph 2; Section 6 paragraph 7 and Section 8 paragraph 2 of the Annex to the Agreement.
fundamentally transformed the earlier regime contained in Part XI of LOSC. The whole process therefore of hiding under the mask of calling the Agreement an Implementation Agreement could also be attributed to a desire not to formally acknowledge that the Convention had been amended, since the amendment procedures under the LOSC were not followed.

Article 2 of the Agreement, dealing with the relationship between the Agreement and Part XI of LOSC, declares the superiority of the former over the latter by providing in paragraph 1 as follows, "The provisions of this Agreement and Part XI shall be interpreted and applied together as a single instrument. In the event of any inconsistency between this Agreement and Part XI, the provisions of this Agreement shall prevail."

The 1994 Agreement, in trying to encourage the participation of states in LOSC, as well as ensure the immediate application of the Agreement vis-à-vis the LOSC, made provision not only for the provisional application of the Agreement but also for provisional participation in the regime by non-states parties to the LOSC. Four categories of states were allowed to apply the Agreement provisionally before it came into force:

- states which had consented to the adoption of the Agreement unless they had notified the depositary in writing before 16 November 1994 that they would not so apply the Agreement or that they would consent to such application upon subsequent signature or notification in writing;

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26 See section 3.2 of chapter 3 for further discussion of the changes introduced by the Agreement.
28 Art.7 of the 1994 Agreement.
29 Cameroon by notification chose that the provisional application of the Agreement would only apply to it upon subsequent signature or notification in writing. See Law of the Sea Bulletin, Special Issue IV of 16 November, 1994, p.45.
• states and entities which signed the Agreement unless they notified the depositary in writing at the time of signature that they would not so apply the Agreement; 230
• states and entities which consented to its provisional application by so notifying the depositary in writing; and
• states which acceded to the Agreement. 231

A state which applied the Agreement provisionally also automatically became a provisional member of the International Seabed Authority (ISA). Upon the entry into force of the Agreement on 28 July 1996, the provisional application of the Agreement terminated. This also meant that the provisional membership of states, which had not at that time become parties, terminated on that date. However, the Council of the ISA was empowered to extend the provisional membership of a state, if it so requested in writing and the ISA was satisfied that the state concerned had been making efforts in good faith to become a party to LOSC 82 and the Agreement. The latest date for such extension was 16 November 1998 and thereafter all provisional application lapsed, 232 and all provisional membership ceased. 233 Such provisional members had participated on the same basis as the states parties to the Agreement. For example, they had voting rights, contributed to the administrative budget and had a right to sponsor an application by their citizens for approval of a plan of work. The aim was to encourage the participation by the major industrialised states at whose behest the Agreement was formulated, while they took steps to become parties to the treaties. As at 16 November 1998 the United States of America, the major objector to the original Convention, had not become a Party to the Convention and the Agreement and therefore its provisional membership and

230 Morocco by notification chose not to apply the Agreement provisionally. See Law of the Sea Bulletin, Ibid.p.46.
231 Art. 7 (1) of Agreement.
233 The provisional members were Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Canada, Chile, European Community, Gabon, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Mozambique, Nepal, Poland, Qatar, Russian Federation, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States of America. All the African States which were provisional members have since become parties to both the LOSC and the Agreement. See Marffy-Mantuano, “The Procedural Framework of the Agreement Implementing the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”, op. cit. 821-824.
participation lapsed. On the other hand, two African states, Gabon and South Africa, which extended their provisional membership, became parties to both the LOSC and the Agreement before the deadline.

Anderson has described the provisional application of treaties as a fairly recent development in international practice, where there is an urgent need for the application of a treaty in order to avoid delays that necessarily arise in securing the various states' ratifications. Whilst provisional application of treaties is not a common practice, it has, however, always been recognised under the law of treaties as codified in the VCLT. Article 25 of the VCLT says:

"1. A treaty or a part of a treaty is applied provisionally pending its entry into force if:

(a) the treaty itself so provides; or
(b) the negotiating States have in some other manner so agreed.

2. Unless the treaty otherwise provides or the negotiating States have otherwise agreed, the provisional application of a treaty or a part of a treaty with respect to a State shall be terminated if that State notifies the other States between which the treaty is being applied provisionally of its intention not to become a party to the treaty."

Presently the United States of America, along with forty-six states, including fourteen African states, has since assumed the status of observer to the ISA. See http://www.isa.org/im/en/members/default.asp [Accessed on 23 September 2004]


Table 2


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Angola</td>
<td>Y-5 December 1990</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Burundi (L)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N透</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Cape Verde</td>
<td>Y-10 August 1987</td>
<td>N透</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Central African Republic (L)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N透</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Chad (L)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N透</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Congo</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N透</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Djibouti</td>
<td>Y-8 October 1991</td>
<td>N透</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Eritrea</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N透</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

 See note 196 above. Western Sahara is not included in the United Nations list of states and therefore it is not included in Table 2 and the consideration of the number of states in the African grouping in this and subsequent chapters.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Country</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Ethiopia (L)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Y - 7 June 1983</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.</td>
<td>Lesotho (L)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
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<td>27.</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
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<td>28.</td>
<td>Libya Arab Jamahiriya</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>Y - 22 August 2001</td>
<td>Y - 22 August 2001 (p)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>Malawi (L)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.</td>
<td>Mali (L)</td>
<td>Y - 16 July 1985</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34.</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35.</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Y - 13 March 1997</td>
<td>Y - 13 March 1997 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37.</td>
<td>Niger (L)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39.</td>
<td>Rwanda (L)</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42.</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Y - 12 December 1994</td>
<td>Y - 12 December 1994 (p)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43.</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Y - 24 July 1989</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
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<td>45.</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Y - 23 January 1985</td>
<td>N</td>
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<td>46.</td>
<td>Swaziland (L)</td>
<td>N</td>
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<tr>
<td>47. Togo</td>
<td>Y - 16 April 1985</td>
<td>Y - 28 July 1995 (sp)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49. Uganda (L)</td>
<td>Y - 9 November 1990</td>
<td>Y - 28 July 1995 (sp)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53. Sao Tome &amp; Principe</td>
<td>Y - 3 November 1987</td>
<td>N</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Key.**

1. Y - Party to the treaty and the date the State became a party
2. N - Not a party;
3. L - Landlocked State;
4. p - States bound by having ratified, acceded or succeeded to the Convention under Article 4 paragraph 1 of the Agreement;
5. sp - States bound by the Agreement under the simplified procedure set out in Article 5 of the Agreement;
6. ds - definitive signature;
7. a - accession.
Table 3

*United Nations Regional Groupings – A Comparative Tabular Analysis of Parties to LOSC 82 and the 1994 Agreement*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African – 53 States.</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian – 54 States.</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) – 33 States.</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western European and others (WEOG) – 29 States.</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern European (EE) – 22 States.</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

239 There is an unofficial United Nations General Assembly list dividing United Nations member States into regional groupings for General Assembly election purposes. The author was unable to get access to this unofficial list which is not available for distribution to the public. However, a break down of the United Nations regional groups was obtained from the United States of America, Department of State 2003 Report on Voting Practices in the United Nations (Report to Congress submitted on March 31, 2004 pursuant to U.S. Public Law, 101-246), pp. 95-100. [http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/31561.pdf](http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/31561.pdf) [Accessed 24 August 2004]. The breakdown in table 3 above on regional groupings of course does not include the European Community which is also a Party to both the LOSC 82 and the 1994 Agreement. See also “Indicative List of States Members of the International Seabed Authority which would fulfil the criteria for Membership in the Various Groups of States in the Council in Accordance with Paragraph 15 of Section 3 of the Annex to the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982,” Prepared by the ISA Secretariat, ISBA/10/A/CRP.2 of 5 March 2004, p.15 and *International Seabed Authority Handbook 2004* (Jamaica, International Seabed Authority, 2004), pp.8-9, breaking down into regional groupings the members of the ISA.

240 The *International Seabed Authority Handbook 2004* includes the Cook Islands under the Asian Group. Therefore the Cook Islands, an entity with a special status under international law, is also included in table 3 above under the Asian Group.

241 Israel was admitted as a member of WEOG in 2000 for a renewable period of 4 years because the Arab members in the Asian group, to which it normally should belong, blocked its membership. The Department of State Report of course did not include the USA in the WEOG group but this was included in the total number in Table 3 above.

242 The United States Department of State 2003 Report, op.cit. did not include Estonia but this was included in the total number for Eastern European (EE) group.
As at 1 February 2005, 148 entities had become parties to the LOSC, including 39 African states,\(^{243}\) six of which are landlocked.\(^{244}\) In the case of the Agreement, as at the same date 121 entities have become parties,\(^{245}\) including 26 African states, five of which are landlocked.\(^{246}\)

It can only be speculated why certain African states have failed to become parties to these treaties.\(^{247}\) For some, pressing domestic issues have perhaps engaged their focus and therefore the ratification of these treaties is not a priority.\(^{248}\) Also quite a number of African states are going through economic crisis and a number are having difficulties meeting their financial obligations to international organisations such as the United Nations. It is probable that a number of them are yet to be parties to the treaties because it would involve additional financial obligations to the institutions of the regime, which in their view will not yield any immediate economic returns. With the indefinite postponement of commercial exploitation of minerals in the Area, contrary to the assumption during UNCLOS III of its imminence, the need to ratify the LOSC, a large part of which has become customary law, acceptance of Part XI, as well as the Agreement, has perhaps lost its economic and strategic relevance for these states. Also, there is little in the LOSC for landlocked states, which comprise 8 of the 14 African non-

\(^{243}\) See note 196 above. Denmark, Latvia and Burkina Faso are the latest parties to the LOSC having become parties on 16 November 2004, 23 December 2004 and 25 January 2005 respectively.

\(^{244}\) These States are Botswana, Burkina Faso, Mali, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

\(^{245}\) See note 196 above.

\(^{246}\) These States are Botswana, Burkina Faso, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

\(^{247}\) Although Tunisia in its declaration when ratifying the LOSC declared that it would not be a party to any Agreement which derogated from the principles of the common heritage, it actually became a party to the 1994 Agreement on 24 May 2002 though the latter watered down and in some regards derogated from the common heritage principle as enunciated in Part XI. See http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXXI/treaty6.asp. [Accessed 7 March 2002].

\(^{248}\) For example, Rwanda is not yet a party to the LOSC and Agreement has recently been embroiled with the genocide which led to the setting up of the ICTR. With some other African states that are non-parties perhaps dealing with the critical problem of internal conflicts, poverty and under-development within their borders has made the need to ratify the LOSC and Agreement less of a priority.
parties. In addition, certain African states have, perhaps, failed to become parties to these treaties simply because of bureaucratic inertia.

2.5. The Common Heritage of Mankind: Treaty Provisions or Part of Customary International Law?

The deep seabed regime is founded upon the principle of the common heritage of mankind. This section seeks to examine whether the common heritage of mankind contained in Part XI, as modified by the 1994 Agreement, is merely a concept limited to treaty provisions or whether it has crystallised into customary international law. This section shall not dwell on the issue of whether such principle emerged as a rule of customary international law prior to the LOSC and 1994 Agreement as a result of various General Assembly Resolutions. Much has been written for and against whether this principle crystallised into customary international law as a result of the various General Assembly Resolutions. This writer would restrict this discourse to whether or not the common heritage of mankind, as stated in the LOSC and 1994 Agreement, has crystallised into customary international law since 1982. It must, however, be pointed out that those provisions of the LOSC and the 1994 Agreement setting up institutions under the regime of the Area cannot become customary international law. The establishment of institutions and membership by a state of such institutions can only be through treaty-based obligations; therefore the analysis as to whether the common heritage of mankind principle is part of customary international law would not include the institutional framework of the regime of the treaties.

The relevance of the question raised by this section is pertinent as regards the legal effect of Part XI of LOSC, as modified by the 1994 Agreement, vis-à-vis states that are not


250 For a general reading on the generation of customary international law from treaty provisions, see Villiger M.E, Customary International Law and Treaties, (Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985), pp.183-205.

parties to these treaties. Ordinarily by reason of res inter alios acta, non-parties to a treaty are not bound by it.\textsuperscript{252} Therefore if the principle of the common heritage of mankind as enunciated in Part XI, as modified by the 1994 Agreement, is merely a treaty provision that has not crystallised into customary international law, non-state parties will not be bound by the obligations therein, neither can they share in the distribution by the ISA of the benefits of deep seabed activities.

As a result of the present lack of the requisite marine technology and finance, any access by African states to the resources of the Area is totally dependent on other states having the necessary technology and finance.\textsuperscript{253} It is therefore in the interest of African states for all states, including developed industrialised states, to be bound by the legal regime of the seabed that emphasises a community-based, rather than an individual, approach to mining the Area. Also it is in the interest of African states that this community-based approach, as captured by the common heritage of mankind, is regarded as part of customary international law binding on all states, including non-states parties. This is particularly germane since the United States of America, with a tremendous marine technological capability and the ability to embark on unilateral mining of the Area, is not yet a party to LOSC and the Agreement.\textsuperscript{254} Further, the provisions of LOSC allow a state party to denounce the Convention upon written notification addressed to the Secretary-General. This denunciation takes effect on the expiry of one year after the receipt of the instrument of denunciation by the Secretary-General or at a later date if the instrument so specifies.\textsuperscript{255} Once the denunciation comes into effect, the provisions of the treaty cease to bind the denouncing state, unless it can be shown that such provision was not merely

\textsuperscript{252} Art. 34 of the VCLT.
\textsuperscript{255} Art.317 (1) of LOSC.
treaty-based but has become part of customary international law. As Article 317(3) of the LOSC says:

"The denunciation shall not in any way affect the duty of any State Party to fulfil any obligation embodied in this Convention to which it would be subject under international law independently of this Convention"

The possibility of a unilateral action by states contrary to the LOSC and 1994 Agreement and denunciation would appear not to be a figment of imagination, in view of contemporary situations where there are examples of unilateral action by states and also examples of states withdrawing from negotiated treaties or denouncing treaties to which they are parties, in what can be regarded as a move towards unilateralism rather than communalism.256

Further, the issue of whether the provisions of the deep seabed regime are treaty or part of customary international law would also be relevant in determining whether African non-states parties can enjoy the benefits of the activities on the ground that the regime is part of customary international law.

The generation of customary international law from treaties is, of course, not new. It is endorsed by Article 38 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 and also has judicial backing, notably in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases.257 In this case it was pointed out that for a treaty provision to generate customary international law it must satisfy the following conditions:258

- It must have a fundamentally norm-creating character such as could be regarded as forming the basis of a general rule of law;

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258 Ibid. at pp.41-44.
• It must enjoy a very widespread and representative participation in the treaty, including that of states whose interests are specially affected;
• It must enjoy extensive and general uniformity of State practice evidencing a general recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation is involved; and
• The passage of time, though on certain occasions it may be a short one.

The common heritage of mankind principle as contained in the LOSC and 1994 Agreement is a generalised norm imposing duties and conferring rights upon all states. For example, it makes provisions imposing a duty upon all states to use the Area for only peaceful purposes and to refrain from claiming or exercising sovereignty over the Area or its resources. It also confers rights by declaring that the activities of the Area are for mankind as a whole (represented by their states), irrespective of the geographical location of states, with preferential treatment given to developing states. The combined effect of this, as well as the widespread participation in the LOSC and the 1994 Agreement by states from every regional grouping, coastal and landlocked, including big maritime states with the requisite marine technology, lends further credence to the fact that the principle of the common heritage of mankind in relation to the Area, if not a principle of customary international law by virtue of the various General Assembly Resolutions, has now become such and is binding on all states, including non-parties.

According to Joyner:

"The prime determinant of how, when or whether that norm-creating process will happen rests in the conduct of States. When sufficient State practice

\[259\] According to the ICJ in the Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua/United States), (Merits) ICJ Rep. 1986, p.14 at 98; 76 ILR, p.349 at 432:
"In order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of states should, in general, be consistent with such rules, and that instances of state conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally have been treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new rule."

\[260\] In the majority decision in the North Sea continental Shelf Cases, Supra at p.42, it was said that "the passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily, or of itself a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary international law."


\[262\] Art.141 of LOSC.

\[263\] Art.137 of LOSC.

\[264\] Art.140 of LOSC.
indicates clear, widespread acceptance of the CHM [common heritage of mankind], its legitimacy in international law will be fixed''.

Also, Brown whilst arguing in his writing in 2001 against the norms of the LOSC on the common heritage of mankind being part of customary international law, however, acknowledged the possibility that such could be transformed into universal international customary law through developing state practice.

In this writer’s opinion it would be safe, as a result of the present widespread acceptance of the LOSC and 1994 Agreement, including virtually all developed states initially opposed to the LOSC, to conclude that there is sufficient state practice at this stage to transform the treaty provisions into universal customary international law binding on both states parties and non-states parties. Even the United States of America, a major maritime state that is yet to become a party to the treaties, appears to generally accept the common heritage of mankind as a principle of international law. The United States Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Act 1980 alludes to a support of the common heritage of mankind vis-à-vis the Area subject to it being legally defined under the terms of a comprehensive law of the Sea treaty. Whilst the term “common heritage of mankind” is not specifically defined in the Convention, the combined effect of the provisions in the LOSC and the Agreement explains the principal features of this principle in such a manner as to make sufficiently clear the obligations imposed and the rights conferred upon states. Moreover, even the United States of America is presently taking steps that indicate that they may in the near future become party to the LOSC and Agreement.


Another author, Jennifer Frakes, argues that as a result of the varying interpretations by various states of the principle of the common heritage of mankind, it cannot be deemed to be part of general customary international law.\(^{269}\) It is contended that this argument is not convincing. To accept the variance of interpretation by states as a pre-condition to determine whether the common heritage of mankind is part of customary international law would have far-reaching and rather unsafe effects. The result would be that certain clearly established principles of customary international law could be excluded. For instance, with the principle of self-defence, an established principle of customary international law,\(^{270}\) there are varying interpretations by states as to the scope of such principle, whether it is limited to a response to actual armed attack or whether it can be extended to include a pre-emptive strike in self-defence. This variance in interpretation does not make it any less a principle of customary international law; neither can it be a pre-condition to exclude the principle of the common heritage as a rule of customary international law. It is contended that variance of interpretation is not a precondition to determining whether a rule has emerged as a rule of customary international law: rather the issue centres on whether there is the requisite state practice and *opinio juris*.\(^{271}\) The widespread ratification of the LOSC and Agreement, it is contended, evinces the necessary state practice and *opinio juris*.

The common heritage of mankind provisions of LOSC and the 1994 Agreement, it is argued, are binding on all states, both states parties and non-states parties. Therefore it is suggested that no state can unilaterally embark on mining activities in the Area. Further, it is contended that all states, inclusive of non-states parties, are entitled to receive the benefits of activities in the Area.\(^{272}\) It therefore follows that African non-states parties are entitled to enjoy the benefits of seabed mining activities and are bound by the obligations


\(^{270}\) See *Nicaragua Case, Merts*, Supra, para.176.


\(^{272}\) See Art.140 of LOSC. For African states that are non-states parties see table 2 above.
set out in Part XI and the 1994 Agreement (except such obligations related to the institutional framework of the regime).

2.6. Conclusion.
The historical evolution of the deep seabed regime has indeed witnessed a great contribution to the development of the international law of the sea by African states working with other developing states. This evolution, as we have seen, reflects very vividly another arena for the “battle” at the international sphere between the rich technologically developed northern states and the generally poor less technologically developed southern states. The clash, which initially emerged as mainly an economic one when it was thought that seabed mining was imminent, spiralled into a political one with the two sides jousting for control of the regime and the institutions therein. The happenings in the seabed regime is only an aspect of a multifaceted conflict on different issues of international law, still ongoing and rehashed in various international fora such as the United Nations, World Trade Organisation (WTO), and the Commonwealth Organisation, between developing states, including African states, and developed states. On the part of the African states, working together with other developing states, it is a fight for global equity in an international community made up of rules and regulations leaning in favour of the more developed economies.

The 1994 Agreement has made certain fundamental changes to the regime vis-à-vis African states, as will be analysed in more detail in chapters 3 and 4. However, though the common heritage of mankind has been substantially watered down by the 1994 Agreement, the retention of the common heritage of mankind of the Area and its resources, with an emphasis on a community-based approach to the regime, is a significant achievement for African states, to whom communal ownership of property is a familiar concept under native law and custom.
CHAPTER THREE
THE REGIME OF THE AREA AND AFRICAN STATES.

This chapter seeks to examine the regime of the Area under Part XI, as modified by the 1994 Agreement, with the aim of pointing out its effect on African states. The aspect dealing with the institutions of the regime shall be examined in chapter four, whilst the system of mining would be dealt with in chapter five. This chapter starts off by examining the provisions of Part XI that have not been changed by the Agreement. Thereafter the chapter proceeds to examine specific aspects of the Agreement that have modified Part XI. There will be an attempt to contrast these provisions of the Agreement with the original provision of Part XI with a view to pointing out the effects on African states. Finally, the chapter seeks to suggest why African states were prepared to go along with the 1994 Agreement, considering their original and unequivocal position on the issues changed by the Agreement during the UNCLOS III.

3.1. Unchanged Provisions of Part XI

Despite the monumental changes introduced by the 1994 Agreement, which shall be discussed in section 3.2 of this chapter, there are certain parts of the regime under Part XI which remain intact. However, it must be pointed out that in relation to certain aspects of the regime, such as the legal status of the Area (section 3.1.1.) and the special regard for developing countries clause (section 3.1.2.), although formally there is no change, the practical effect of certain changes introduced by the 1994 Agreement (for example, the downgrading of the role of the Enterprise and the alteration of certain other institutional features of the regime, changes relating to the transfer of technology and financial provisions) is to significantly reduce the impact some of the unchanged provisions on African states and other developing states.

3.1.1. The Legal Status of the Area and Its Resources.

The declaration of the Area and its resources as the common heritage of mankind, and therefore not subject to the sovereignty of, or unilateral appropriation or exploitation by, any state, remains the focal point of the regime, though certain changes introduced
by the Agreement have the effect of watering down the whole principle of the common heritage of mankind.¹

Despite this, the significance of the retention of the principle of the common heritage of mankind can perhaps be better appreciated in the light of the initial position of developed states in favour of res communis, in contrast with that of developing states, including African states, insisting on the Area and its resources as being the common heritage of mankind.² Whilst the principle of the common heritage of mankind has been criticised in certain quarters as not being a totally precise legal concept,³ and has indeed lost its original "lustre and soul" as a result of the 1994 Agreement, it certainly marked a shift by the developed states from their original position that mining in the Area was one of the freedoms of the high seas.⁴ The Netherlands, in a paper presented at the informal consultations of the United Nations Secretary-General, which led to the 1994 Agreement, captured the importance of the common heritage of mankind to the deep seabed regime when it said:⁵

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¹ See Arts. 136 and 137 of LOSC and preamble 2 of the 1994 Agreement. However, see section 3.2 and chapter 4. Also see Anand, R.P., “Common Heritage of Mankind: Mutilation of an Ideal” (1997) 37 (1) Indian Journal of International Law, p.1 at p.17 where the author said, “Although the area of the deep seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction is still called and declared as the common heritage of mankind, the term has lost its original meaning and substance when it symbolised the interests, needs, hopes and aspirations of a large number of poor peoples. The principle has lost its lustre and soul.” Further, see the Asian African Legal Consultative Committee (AALCC) [now Asian African Legal Consultative Organisation (AALCO)] Secretariat Document, “Law of the Sea”, AALCC/XLI/ABUJA/2002/S.2, para.79, p.11.

² See Section 2.1.4.3 of Chapter 2.


"The concept of common heritage is central to the current provisions of Part XI. Any generally acceptable and simplified deep seabed regime produced by these informal consultations must equally include the acceptance of the common heritage principle, i.e., the regime must strike a balance between a deep seabed regime based on sound commercial principles and the interests of the international community."

The final outcome of the informal consultations was to produce a situation where the developed industrialised states, though accepting that the Area and its resources are the common heritage of mankind, have through the 1994 Agreement modified its contents and effectively altered the original meaning of the principle.6

3.1.2. Special Regard for Developing Countries Clause.

Part XI in certain places requires that special regard be given to developing states, which include African states, by providing that:

"Activities in the Area shall, as specifically provided for in this Part, be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole, irrespective of the geographical location of states, whether coastal or land-locked, and taking into particular consideration the interests and needs of developing States and of peoples who have not attained full independence or other self-governing status recognised by the United Nations in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514(XV) and other relevant General Assembly resolutions."7

"The effective participation of developing States in activities in the Area shall be promoted as specifically provided for in this Part, having due regard to their special interests and needs, and in particular to the special need of the landlocked and geographically disadvantaged among them to overcome obstacles arising from their disadvantaged location, including remoteness from the Area and difficulty of access to and from it."8

The activities of the Area are to be carried out for the benefit of all mankind but in distributing any benefit derived from such activities, special regard is to be given to developing states, over and above the developed states. Also the Convention requires that the effective participation of developing states in activities in the Area shall be

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6 Preamble 2, G.A. Res. 48/263 of 17 August 1994 and Preamble to the Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area ISBA/6/A/18 of 4 October 2000. See Resolution issued by the Asian African Legal Consultative Organisation at its fortieth session, RES/40/2 of 24 June 2001, which states in para. 1 as follows: "Reaffirms that in accordance with Part XI of the Convention and the preambular paragraphs of the Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI and Regulations, the Area is the common heritage of mankind and should be used for the benefit of the mankind as a whole."
7 Arts.140 (1). See also Arts. 160(f) (i) of LOSC.
8 Art.148 of LOSC.
promoted. These concessions to the less economically endowed developing states were not modified by the 1994 Agreement. This legal discrimination in favour of developing states is an aspect of international development law and it recognises the reality of inequality amongst the states in the international polity.\(^9\)

However, this \textit{"positive discrimination"}\(^{10}\) loses its significance if the developing states do not have the wherewithal, especially in terms of technology, expertise and finance, to take advantage of this. Therefore while the \textit{"reasonable regard for developing states"} clause is not formally altered by the Agreement, the effect of the provisions of the Agreement withdrawing the advantage given by the LOSC to developing states as regard the mandatory transfer of the requisite technology and the downgrading of the role of the Enterprise appears to diminish the impact of this clause on African states and other developing states.\(^{11}\)

3.1.3. \textit{The Use of the Area for Peaceful Purposes Only.}

Part XI states that the Area shall be open to use exclusively for peaceful purposes by all states.\(^{12}\) One of the fears of the developing states, including African states, was that the developed states with their destructive military arsenal, including nuclear weapons, would use the Area as a testing field. This fear was expressed by the Nigerian delegation at the 22\textsuperscript{nd} session of the General Assembly when it said:

\small
\begin{quote}
"As a developing country Nigeria's renewed fear is of the incalculable dangers for mankind as a whole if the seabed and the ocean floor beyond present national jurisdiction were progressively and competitively appropriated, exploited and even used for military purposes by those countries which possess the necessary technology".\(^{13}\)
\end{quote}

\normalsize

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\(^{10}\) Bulajic, ibid.

\(^{11}\) See Sections 2 and 5 of the Annex to the 1994 Agreement and section 3.2 below.


This fear was heightened by the cold war between the United States of America and the then USSR, and the growing acquisition of nuclear and other sophisticated armaments, especially by the developed states. Prior to the UNCLOS III, an attempt to allay this fear led to the 1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil thereof, which was adopted by an overwhelming vote of 104 in favour, 2 against and 2 abstentions. The treaty entered into force on 18 May 1972 and presently has 93 state parties, 22 of which are African states. The treaty, which is still in force, requires states parties to undertake not to emplant or emplace on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond 12 miles from the baselines any nuclear weapons or any other type of weapons of mass destruction, as well as structures, launching installations or any other facilities specifically designed for storing, testing or using such weapons. However, the treaty makes provision for any state party to withdraw from the treaty based on the rather vague ground that it had decided “that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardised the supreme interests of its country.” It is merely required to give three months notice of such withdrawal to all the other states parties and the United Nations Security Council. Such notice is to include a statement of the extraordinary events, which it considers to have jeopardised its supreme interests.

Although the peaceful use provision of Part XI is basically similar to Article 88 of the LOSC dealing with the high seas, it is not superfluous since its inclusion in Part XI...
emphasises that peaceful use is not just confined to the waters of the high seas but extends to the seabed, ocean floor and subsoil thereof. According to the representative of Madagascar at UNCLOS III, Mr. Rabetafika,

"... new concepts such as 'the common heritage of mankind' and the 'exclusive economic zone' gave a new dimension and importance to the Conference's task of drafting a comprehensive, global Convention covering, inter alia, political issues relating to the peaceful use of ocean space and the creation of zones of peace and security." 19

The LOSC, while emphasising that both the high seas and the Area are to be utilised for "peaceful uses," does not define the ambit of this phrase. Various states therefore interpret it to suit their national interests. Some, including African states, have interpreted it to mean all military activities are prohibited. Others, especially the developed states that are nuclear powers, have interpreted it as prohibiting only military activities for an aggressive purpose, whilst other nuclear states take the view that it only prohibits military activities that are inconsistent with the United Nations Charter and other obligations under international law. 20 This highly political issue that the Area should be used for peaceful purposes was not altered by the 1994 Agreement, nor did the Agreement in any way clarify the exact scope of the "peaceful uses" of the Area.


The regime gives all states and competent international organisations the right to conduct marine scientific research in the Area. This scientific research is to be carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of mankind as a whole. 21 This is in line with the requirement that the Area should be used only for peaceful purposes, but again it raises the issue of the interpretation of the phrase "peaceful purposes." This raises the issue: does this exclude scientific research with a military objective? Arguably, since the research in the Area is to be carried out exclusively for

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18 Ibid. To the knowledge of this writer, so far, none of the states parties have invoked this provision.
peaceful purposes, by implication this should exclude research with a military objective.

States parties are required to promote international co-operation in marine scientific research in the Area through participation in international programmes and encouraging co-operation in research by personnel of different states and the ISA.\textsuperscript{22} The objective of such programmes, to be developed through the ISA or other relevant international organisations, is principally directed towards helping developing states and technologically less developed states to strengthen their research capabilities; to train their personnel in the techniques and applications of research, as well as to foster the employment of their qualified personnel in research in the Area.\textsuperscript{23} It also is to train personnel of the ISA on the techniques and applications of research, which would enable the Authority to carry out marine scientific research concerning the Area and its resources either directly or through contracts entered into for that purpose.\textsuperscript{24} The results of such scientific research and analysis are to be effectively disseminated through the ISA or other international channels. In the latter case the ISA is to co-ordinate such dissemination.\textsuperscript{25} The effect of these provisions on scientific research is to encourage the transfer of technical and scientific information to developing states, including Africa states.

The 1974 Declaration of the Organisation of African Unity on the Issues of the Law of the Sea,\textsuperscript{26} had wholeheartedly advocated for international co-operation in marine scientific research in the areas beyond national jurisdiction. In Article 14 of the Declaration it was said:

\textsuperscript{22} Art.143 (3) (a) of LOSC.  
\textsuperscript{23} Art.143 (3) (b) of LOSC.  
\textsuperscript{24} Art.143 (2) and (3) (ii) of LOSC.  
\textsuperscript{25} Art.143 (2) and (3) (c) of LOSC. In promoting and encouraging marine scientific research the ISA has organised several expert workshops, seminars and meetings. See Para.123 of the Report of the Secretary-General of the International Seabed Authority under article 166, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, ISBA/10/A/3 of 31 March 2004. Also see the ISA Data Repository providing technical information on the resources of the Area obtained from marine scientific research activities http://www.isa.org.im/en/default.htm [Accessed on 15 October 2004].  
"States agree to promote international co-operation in marine scientific research in areas beyond limits of national jurisdiction. Such scientific research shall be carried out in accordance with rules and procedures laid down by the international machinery.»

Presently, the ISA is actively engaged in promoting collaboration in research on the environmental implications of mining activities in the Area. There is, however, no indication of the involvement of African states or their research institutions in such research activities neither is there any indication of any plan to specifically encourage the participation of African scientists and researchers in such research efforts.28 Recently Kenya, on behalf of African states, appealed to the ISA to conduct some of its training seminars and technical workshops in Africa as a way of exposing African scientists and researchers to issues related to the deep seabed.29

The provisions on marine scientific research within the Area were not affected by the 1994 Agreement, rather they are endorsed by clear implication through the provisions of the Agreement requiring states parties, as a general rule, to promote international technical and scientific co-operation with regard to activities in the Area.30 However, as will be seen in the next part of this chapter, the provisions of Part XI relating to the transfer of the actual marine technology, which would have enabled the developing states, including African states, to effectively participate in deep seabed mining activities, were affected, to the detriment of developing states, by the 1994 Agreement. The Tunisian representative at the tenth session of the Assembly emphasised the importance of making every effort to preserve the balance established under the LOSC by providing for the transfer of the requisite deep seabed mining technology to developing states.31

3.1.5 Protection of the Marine Environment.

The protection of the environment has become a major issue because of its intrinsic link with human life and existence. The International Court of Justice rightly pointed out that "the environment is not an abstraction but represents the living space, the

27 In this same article the OAU also supported the right to carry out marine scientific research within national jurisdiction as long as it was done with the consent of the coastal state concerned.
30 Section 5, para. 1 (c) of the Annex of the Implementation Agreement.
quality of life and the very health of human beings, including generations unborn." 32

The protection of the environment has therefore become a major concern to virtually all states, though there may be some variance in the way and manner they advocate such protection. It is therefore not surprising that the Convention in Part XI includes provisions on the protection of the marine environment from harmful effects which may arise as a result of activities in the Area. 33 The ISA is required to do this by adopting appropriate rules, regulations and procedures to, inter alia, prevent, reduce or control pollution and other hazards to the marine environment, including the coastline, and interference with the biodiversity of the marine environment through mining activities in the Area, as well as to protect and conserve the natural resources of the Area. 34 States’ participation at the domestic level is also required through the adoption of municipal laws and regulations to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from activities in the Area undertaken by vessels, installations, structures and other devices flying their flag, or of their registry or operating under their authority. 35 The common interest of both developed and developing states, including African states, in protecting the marine environment, including that of the Area, was summed up by the then Secretary-General of the AALCC (now AALCO), H.E. Mr. Frank X. Njenga (Kenya), when he said: "... such issues as the environment are a delicate balance which if upset could spell disaster of no mean dimension for the future of mankind." 36 In the OAU Declaration African

34 Art. 145, Part XII- specifically in relation to the Area Art. 209- and Art. 17(1) (b) (xii) of Annex III of LOSC.
states recognised that every state “has an obligation in the prevention and control of pollution of the marine environment.”

The provisions of the LOSC on the protection of the marine environment in the Area were not modified by the 1994 Agreement. Although environmental consideration was one of the issues initially identified as an area of difficulty during the consultations leading to the 1994 Agreement, it was subsequently agreed that it was not a controversial issue. Rather, the Agreement emphasises the importance of taking appropriate steps to protect the environment from activities in the Area, by requiring an application for approval of a plan of work to be accompanied by an assessment of the potential environmental impacts of the proposed activities and by a description of a programme for oceanographic and baseline environmental studies in accordance with the rules of the ISA. The Legal and Technical Commission Recommendations and the Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area (the Mining Code) have gone further to make provisions on the protection of the environment from activities in the Area. A large part of the work of the ISA is currently directed towards ascertaining the environmental implications of mining in the Area, especially the need to apply the precautionary principle.


40 See Recommendations of the Legal and Technical Commission for Guidance of Contractors for the Assessment of the Possible Environmental Impacts Arising from Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area. ISBA/7/LTC/1/Rev.1.

41 See Regs. 1(3) (c) and (f), 7, 21(4) (b) and Part V of the Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area (hereinafter called the Mining Code). ISBA/6/A/18

42 Reg.31 (2) of the Mining Code. See generally Lodge, M.W., “Environmental Regulation of Deep Seabed Mining,” in Kirchner, A. (ed.), International Marine Environmental Law: Institutions, Implementation and Innovations (The Hague/New York, Kluwer Law International, 2003), pp.49-59. See also the comments of the South African representative, Mr. Hoffmann, to the 64th plenary meeting of the fifty-eighth session of the General Assembly where he said that South Africa welcomes, “…the steps the Authority has taken to develop a better understanding of the biodiversity of the seabed and
The whole mining process in the Area is expected to have a tremendous impact not only on the marine environment and biodiversity of the Area, but also, as a result of the nature of environmental pollution which is difficult to localise, it may spread to the marine environment within national jurisdiction. It is therefore in the common interest of states, including African states, to ensure that effective measures are taken by contractors in the Area to guard against damage to the marine environment. For example, African states bordering the Indian Ocean, where India as a pioneer investor has been allocated a pioneer site, are susceptible to the effects of possible environmental pollution emanating from seabed mining activities taking place in pioneer mine sites located therein. The Convention for the Protection, Management and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the Eastern African Region (Nairobi Convention) provides that “The contracting parties shall take all appropriate measures to prevent, reduce and combat pollution of the Convention area resulting directly or indirectly from exploration and exploitation of the sea-bed and its subsoil.” Whilst this provision is more focused on the seabed and subsoil within the Convention area, arguably, it could be said, from the way and manner it is couched, that it is wide enough to permit the states parties to take appropriate measures to prevent, reduce and combat any pollution of the Convention area resulting from deep seabed mining activities.
3.1.6. Protection of Human Life.

Under Part XI necessary measures are expected to be taken to ensure the effective protection of human life with respect to activities in the Area. The ISA is required in this regard to adopt appropriate rules, regulations and procedures. The provisions of the LOSC are not meant to be exhaustive, but merely to supplement the existing international law as embodied in relevant treaties. An example of such a treaty is the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1974 as amended by various protocols. In view of the importance attached to the right to life, this provision was, not surprisingly, in any way modified by the Agreement.

3.1.7. The “Reasonable Regard” Provision.

Part XI, while providing for seabed mining activities in the Area, recognises that reasonable regard should be given to other activities. Mining activities in the Area are required to be done with reasonable regard to the rights of other states to enjoy the freedom of the high seas, including freedom of navigation, freedom of over flight, freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations, freedom of fishing and freedom of scientific research. The LOSC, under chapter VII dealing with the high seas makes it clear that the freedoms of the high seas should be exercised with due regard for the rights under Part XI with respect to activities in the Area. In the same vein activities under Part XI are required to be “carried out with reasonable regard for other activities in the marine environment.” For instance, installations used for carrying out activities in the Area should be erected in accordance with regulations laid down by the ISA, and with a permanent warning and appropriate markings of their presence to other users. Also, they may not be established where they would interfere with the use of recognised

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47 Adopted on 1 November 1974 and entered into force on 25 May 1980. This Convention has so far being ratified by 153 states, including African states. However certain African states, mainly landlocked states, have not become parties to this Convention, namely, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Guinea Bissau, Lesotho, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Swaziland, Somalia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. See http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=248 [Accessed on 18 October 2004].
50 Art.147 of LOSC.
51 Art.87 (2) and Art.147 (3) of LOSC.
52 Art.147 (1) of LOSC.
53 Art.147 (1) (a) of LOSC.
sea-lanes essential to international navigation or areas of intense fishing activities.\textsuperscript{54} In addition, activities with respect to deposits in the Area that overlap into the limits of national jurisdiction of coastal states are to be conducted with due regard to the rights and legitimate interests of any such state across whose jurisdiction such deposits lie. This involves consultations with, including prior notification to, the state concerned. In cases where such activities in the Area may result in the exploitation of resources lying within national jurisdiction, the prior consent of the state concerned must be obtained. \textsuperscript{55} The reasonable regard provision is also not modified by the 1994 Agreement.

3.1.8. Archaeological and Historical Objects in the Area.

All archaeological and historical objects found in the Area are to be preserved or disposed of for the benefit of mankind as a whole, having particular regard to the preferential rights of the state or country of origin, or the state of cultural origin, or the state of archaeological or historical origin of such objects.\textsuperscript{56} A prospector or contractor is required to immediately notify the Secretary-General of the ISA in writing of any object of an archaeological or historical nature and its location. Thereafter the Secretary-General is to transmit such information to the Director-General of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO).\textsuperscript{57} Neither the LOSC nor the Mining Code defines what "archaeological and historical" objects are. However, the UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage,\textsuperscript{58} which at the draft stage played a part in the

\textsuperscript{54} Art.147 (1) (b) of LOSC.
\textsuperscript{55} Art. 142 of LOSC.
\textsuperscript{56} Arts.149 and 303 of LOSC.
\textsuperscript{57} Regs. 8 and 34 of the Mining Code. See also Art. 11(2) of the UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage 2001 which requires states parties to notify both the Director-General of UNESCO and the Secretary-General of the ISA of such discoveries.
inclusion of the provision on archaeological and historical objects in the Mining Code, defines “underwater cultural heritage,” as “all traces of human existence having a cultural, historical or archaeological character which have been partially or totally under water periodically or continually for at least 100 years.” It includes sites, structures, buildings, artefacts and human remains, as well as vessels, aircraft, other vehicles or any part thereof, their cargo or other contents and other objects of prehistoric character. It, however, does not include pipelines and cables placed on the seabed that are still in use. The UNESCO Convention also deals with protection of the underwater cultural heritage in the Area. The Southern and Eastern Africa UNESCO Maputo Conference on the Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage held from 6 May to 9 May 2003, while encouraging states to become parties to the Convention, recommended that: “International, national and private assistance programs should facilitate the implementation of the Convention by States Parties, in particular by developing countries.”

The provision dealing with archaeological and historical objects has not in any way been modified by the 1994 Agreement.

3.1.9. Parallel System or Site Banking.

Generally, the system of mining requiring a contractor to designate an area sufficiently large and of sufficient estimated value to allow two mining operations, with the ISA having the first option to pick one of these sites which is banked or reserved for mining by ISA either through the Enterprise or in association with developing states, remains unchanged by the Agreement though the provisions of the

59 See comments on Regulation 34 in Draft Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area (Annotated version of ISBA/6/C/2*-Prepared by the Secretariat), ISBA/6/C/CRP.2 of 21 June 2000 which says the “provision was added in the light of the provisions of the draft UNESCO Convention on the protection of the underwater cultural heritage.” See however Art.3 of the UNESCO Convention on the relationship between the Convention and LOSC 82, requiring that the UNESCO Convention must be interpreted and applied in a manner consistent with international law, including the LOSC.

60 See Art.1 (1) of the UNESCO Convention.

61 See Art.12 of the UNESCO Convention.


63 Art. 153 and Art. 8 of Annex III of LOSC and Section 1, Para.10 of the Annex to the Agreement.
Agreement on transfer of technology and the downgrading of the role of the Enterprise have significantly watered down the practical effect of the system of mining.\(^{64}\)

**3.2. Provisions of Part XI that have been modified by the 1994 Agreement.**

As has been stated in Chapter 2 of this thesis the 1994 Agreement introduced some fundamental changes to the provisions of Part XI.\(^{65}\) This section will examine such changes (excluding those affecting institutions),\(^{66}\) as it affects African states.

**3.2.1. Transfer of Technology.**

As a result of the distance of the Area from land and its rather difficult terrain, highly sophisticated technology is required for the prospecting, exploration, exploitation, transportation and processing of the resources therein.\(^{67}\) The development of the necessary technology in respect of seabed mining activities is still on going.\(^{68}\) However, the capacity to develop the requisite technology lies with certain developed industrialised states,\(^{69}\) through government institutions and private entities.\(^{70}\) Presently African states do not possess such technology.\(^{71}\) It was therefore not surprising that at the UNCLOS III the issue of transfer of technology for seabed mining activities in the Area was a fundamental issue for African states and was also one of the major points highlighting the north/south conflict at the Conference.\(^{72}\) One of the objectives of the African states during the Conference was to achieve transfer of marine technology

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\(^{64}\) See chapter 5 of the thesis on system of mining vis-à-vis African states.

\(^{65}\) See the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee, Law of the Sea: Report of the Secretary General, Doc. No. AALCC/XXXIV/DOHA/95/5.

\(^{66}\) See chapter 4 of the thesis on Institutions of the Regime.


\(^{70}\) For a list of various entities and institutions that have been involved in deep seabed mining activities see [http://www.ifremer.fr/drogm/Realisation/Miner/Nod/texte/consortium.html](http://www.ifremer.fr/drogm/Realisation/Miner/Nod/texte/consortium.html). [Accessed on 18 October 2004]

\(^{71}\) For the effect of technology on the prospects of African states' participation in deep seabed mining, see section 6.2 of chapter 6 of this thesis.

\(^{72}\) On negotiations at the UNCLOS III on the transfer of technology, see Ogley, *Internationalizing the Seabed*, op.cit.pp.148, 154, 156, 162-163, 171-175, 227 and 230.
generally, inclusive of that relating to the Area, from the developed states to the developing states, including African states. The OAU Declaration on Issues of the Law of the Sea clearly evinced the interest of African states in the transfer of marine technology by stating in paragraph 13 that:

"... African States in order to benefit in exploration and exploitation of the resources of the seabed and subsoil thereof shall intensify national and regional efforts in the training and assistance of their personnel in all aspects of marine science and technology. Furthermore they shall urge the appropriate United Nations agencies and the technologically advanced countries to accelerate the process of transfer of marine science and technology, including the training of personnel."

This desire for the transfer of technology by African states was one of the means towards attaining a New International Economic Order (NIEO); therefore they advocated such transfer not only at UNCLOS III but also at various other international forums. The representatives of African states at the Conference were vocal about the issue of transfer of technology from developed to developing states. The statements of the representatives of Somalia and Guinea capture the general attitude of African states. The Somalian representative said:

"... All delegations recognised the urgent need to bridge the ever-widening gap between developing and developed countries. The Conference would fall short of its objectives if it did not agree upon precise terms for the transfer of technology to the developing countries. The General Assembly at the sixth special session had emphasised the need for the transfer of technology within a new international economic

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76 Such international forum also includes UNCTAD, UNIDO, UNESCO and FAO conferences and meetings.
order: the basis could be laid only through international co-operation if all mankind was to share in the use of advanced technology. 78

The Guinea representative adopted a more moral and ethical stance, stating that: “the transfer of technology was a means of rectifying past injustices and bringing about a more equitable distribution of the world’s wealth.” 79

Beyond the desire to rectify past injustices and to bring about more equitable distribution, the whole attitude of African states to transfer of technology during the UNCLOS III could, in the opinion of this writer, also be attributed to the communal outlook of many traditional African societies to knowledge and innovations. According to Lewanika and Echols, a number of African traditional societies believe that knowledge and innovations derived from traditional knowledge systems should not be credited to a single inventor but rather to the community as a whole. For these societies, unlike the developed industrialised societies, the motivation for such innovations should not be based on individual profit or gain, but rather the more altruistic purpose of the welfare and common good of the community as a whole, including future generations. 80

At the end of the Conference the developing states were able to wrest major concessions on the issue of transfer of technology and include them in the LOSC. This became one of the major grounds upon which certain developed industrialised states initially refused to ratify the Convention. 81 The LOSC provisions on transfer of technology have been significantly altered by the 1994 Agreement.

79 Ibid. p.103, para.33.
I. The Position under Part XI.  

The original provisions of Part XI actively promoted the transfer of seabed mining technology and even leaned in favour of the developing states, including those from the African continent, by making such transfer mandatory.  

Article 144 of LOSC, emphasising co-operation in the transfer of technology, states:

"1. The Authority shall take measures in accordance with this Convention:
(a) to acquire technology and scientific knowledge relating to activities in the Area; and
(b) to promote and encourage the transfer to developing States of such technology and scientific knowledge so that all States Parties benefit therefrom.

2. To this end the Authority and State Parties shall co-operate in promoting the transfer of technology and scientific knowledge relating to activities in the Area so that the Enterprise and all State Parties may benefit therefrom. In particular they shall initiate and promote:
(a) programmes for the transfer of technology to the Enterprise and to developing States with regard to activities in the Area, including, inter alia, facilitating the access of the Enterprise and of developing States to the relevant technology, under fair and reasonable terms and conditions;
(b) measures directed towards the advancement of the technology of the Enterprise and the domestic technology of developing States, particularly by providing opportunities to personnel from the Enterprise and from developing States for training in marine science and technology and for their full participation in activities in the Area."

Although Article 144 emphasises co-operation, Article 5 of Annex III imposed a mandatory obligation to transfer technology upon applicants who desired to be involved in deep seabed mining activities. The applicant was required to give an undertaking "to comply with the provisions on the transfer of technology set forth in article 5," the term "technology" being defined as meaning "the specialised equipment and technical know-how, including manuals, designs, operating instructions, training and technical advice and assistance, necessary to assemble, maintain and operate a viable system and the legal right to use these items for that purpose on a non-exclusive basis."

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83 See Art. 5 of Annex III of LOSC.
84 See Art. 4, para. 6(d) of Annex III.
Under Article 5 of Annex III the following obligations, which were to be included in contracts until 10 years after the Enterprise had begun commercial production,\(^8^6\) were imposed on applicants:

- The applicant when submitting its proposed work plan was required to make available to the ISA a general description of the equipment and methods to be used by it in seabed mining, as well as other relevant non-proprietary information about the characteristics of the technology and where such technology was available. The applicant was also to inform the ISA of any revisions in such description and whenever there was a substantial technological change or innovation.\(^8^7\)

- The seabed mining contract was to contain undertakings by the contractor that it would:
  - Make available to the Enterprise, at the request of the ISA, the technology that it used for seabed mining activities and which it was legally entitled to transfer. This was to be done on fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions. This commitment could only be invoked by the ISA if the Enterprise was unable to obtain the same or equally efficient technology on the open market on fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions. Such transfer was to be done by way of licences or any other appropriate arrangement negotiated between the contractor and the Enterprise which was to be set forth in a special agreement supplementary to the main seabed mining contract.\(^8^8\)
  - Obtain a written assurance from the owner of any technology not covered by that mentioned in the first undertaking above, which was not generally available on the open market, that such owner would, at the request of the ISA, make the technology available to the Enterprise to the same extent as it was made available to the contractor. The technology was to be made available to the Enterprise on fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions under a licence or other appropriate arrangement. In the event of the failure of the contractor to obtain such assurance, the contractor in seabed mining was to be precluded from using such technology.\(^8^9\)

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\(^8^5\) See Art.5, para. 8 of Annex III.
\(^8^6\) Art.5, para.7 of Annex III.
\(^8^7\) See Art.5 paras. 1 and 2 of Annex III.
\(^8^8\) Art. 5, para. 3(a) of Annex III.
\(^8^9\) Art.5, para. 3(b) of Annex III
• Acquire at the request of the Enterprise, whenever it was possible to do so without substantial cost to the contractor, a legally binding and enforceable right to transfer to the Enterprise any third party technology used by the contractor in its seabed mining operations that it was not legally entitled to transfer and which was not generally available on the open market. In cases where there was a substantial corporate relationship between the contractor and the owner of the technology, such closeness in relationship, degree of control or influence was to be relevant in determining whether all feasible measures to obtain such legally binding right to the transfer had been taken by the contractor. Where the contractor exercised effective control over the owner of the technology, the failure to acquire the legal rights from such owner should be considered relevant to the contractor's qualifications for any subsequent proposed plan of work. This was to discourage contractors whose subsidiary company owned the technology from using the excuse of corporate separateness from the owner of the technology as a reason for not obtaining the legal rights in favour of the Enterprise.\textsuperscript{90}

• Facilitate the acquisition by the Enterprise under licence or other appropriate arrangements, on fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions, any technology covered by the second undertaking mentioned above, if the Enterprise decided to negotiate directly with the owner of the technology and requested such facilitation.\textsuperscript{91}

• Take the same measures as those described in the first, second, third and fourth undertakings mentioned above for the benefit of a developing state or group of developing states that applied for a seabed mining contract. However, such measures were to be limited to the area reserved for the developing state(s) under the site-banking method in article 8 of annex III. Also such a developing state was restrained from transferring such technology to a third state or its nationals. This obligation only applied to the contractor when such technology had not already been requested by, and transferred to, the Enterprise.\textsuperscript{92}

• If the Enterprise was unable to obtain the appropriate technology, on fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions, to commence in a timely manner the recovery and processing of minerals from the Area, the Council or the Assembly

\textsuperscript{90} Art.5, para. 3(c) of Annex III
\textsuperscript{91} Art. 5, para. 3(d) of Annex III
\textsuperscript{92} Art.5, para. 3(e) of Annex III.
of the ISA was empowered to convene a group of states parties composed of those engaged in activities in the Area, those who had sponsored entities engaged in such activities and those having access to such technology. This group was to consult together and take effective measures to ensure that such technology was made available to the Enterprise on fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions. Such states parties were to take all feasible measures within their own legal system to ensure such transfer.\footnote{\footnote{Art. 5 para.5, of Annex III.}}

- In the case of joint ventures between a contractor and the Enterprise, such transfer of technology was to be in accordance with the terms of the joint venture agreement.\footnote{\footnote{Art.5 para. 6, of Annex III.}}

Article 5 further provided that the compulsory dispute settlement mechanism provided in Part XI was to be utilised for settlement of disputes in respect of the above-mentioned undertakings of the contractor and other terms of the contract.\footnote{\footnote{See section 4.1.3.2 of chapter 4 of this thesis on dispute settlement procedures under Part XI.}} However, disputes as to what constitutes "fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions", could be submitted by either party to binding commercial arbitration in accordance with the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules or such other arbitration rules as might be prescribed under the rules, regulations and procedures of the ISA. In the event of a negative finding against the contractor by the arbitration panel, it was given a period of 45 days to revise the offer in order to make such offer fall within "fair and reasonable terms and conditions". Failure to do so would result in the ISA making a determination as to whether or not to impose penalties for such a violation of the contract.\footnote{\footnote{Art.5 para. 4 of Annex III.}}

The mandatory provisions of Part XI on the transfer of technology contrast with the "best efforts" commitments on the part of possessors of technology, based on international co-operation, to transfer technology to developing states, commonly found in treaties.\footnote{\footnote{The provisions of Art.144 on the transfer of deep seabed technology and Part XIV of LOSC, dealing generally with the transfer of marine technology, appear to emphasise "best efforts" international co-operation in the transfer of technology rather than making it mandatory. See UNCTAD Issues Note by the Secretariat, International Arrangements for Transfer of Technology: Best Practices for Access to and Measures to Encourage Transfer of Technology with a View to Capacity Building in Developing}} The effectiveness of such mandatory provisions in a treaty is

\footnote{\footnote{97 The provisions of Art.144 on the transfer of deep seabed technology and Part XIV of LOSC, dealing generally with the transfer of marine technology, appear to emphasise "best efforts" international co-operation in the transfer of technology rather than making it mandatory. See UNCTAD Issues Note by the Secretariat, International Arrangements for Transfer of Technology: Best Practices for Access to and Measures to Encourage Transfer of Technology with a View to Capacity Building in Developing}}

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doubtful. Such provision is confronted with the issue of protection of the intellectual property of the possessor of the technology. This in turn raises the extreme difficulty of attaining a balance between encouraging innovations by individual inventors through the protection of intellectual property, on the one hand, and meeting the communal interest of the international community through transfer of technology to developing states, constituting a large chunk of the international community, on the other hand.  

The tilting in favour of the encouragement of innovation through intellectual property protection in respect of deep seabed mining led to the 1994 Agreement provisions on transfer of technology.99

Another pertinent issue that arises about the feasibility of such mandatory transfer of technology in relation to African states concerns the capacity of these states, to utilise such technology. It is not enough for recipients of technology to merely receive the technology, in terms of the hardware (in the form of machinery) and the licence to use it. For the recipients to make effective use of the technology they must also acquire the skills and technical know-how concerning the technology.100

Countries, Especially in Least Developed Countries, TD/B/COM.2/EM.9/2 of 1 June, 2001, pp.5-6 that examines various treaties on “best efforts” international co-operation. Examples of such treaty provisions include Arts. 9 and 10A of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 26 ILM 1550(1987); Art.16 of the Biodiversity Convention, 31 ILM 818(1992); Art.66 (2) of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), 33 ILM 1197(1994) and Art. 10(c) of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 37 ILM 22 (1998)


99 See below the section dealing with the position on the transfer of technology under the 1994 Agreement.

100 See the example of South Korea, which embarked on the practice of importing technology and then acquiring the know-how of these technologies. See generally Enos, J.L. and Park, W.H., The Adoption and Diffusion of Imported Technology- The Case of Korea (London/New York/Sydney, Croom Helm, 1987). The Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, (WSSD) Johannesburg, South Africa, 26 August – 4 September 2002, as one of the means of achieving sustainable development in Africa states, in para.62(c) points out that action must be taken at all levels to, “Promote technology development, transfer and diffusion to Africa and further develop technology and knowledge available in Africa centres of excellence.” See also para. 62(d)-(f) of the Report. http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/636/93/PDF/N0263693.pdf?OpenElement [Accessed on 10 February 2005] Also see “An Outline on the Implementation of Strategy and Programme of Action Adopted by Regional Leadership Seminar on Marine/Ocean Affairs in Africa – Addis Ababa 28 March-2nd April 1994” in Mensah, T. (ed.), Ocean Governance: Strategies and Approaches for the 21st Century: Proceedings, the Law of the Sea Institute, Twenty-Eight Annual Conference, Honolulu, Hawaii, July 11-14, 1994(Honolulu, University of Hawaii, the Law of the Sea Institute, 1996), pp.540-549. Paragraph 3 of the outline points out that for there to be marine/ocean development in Africa, amongst other things, the following is needed:
A mandatory transfer of technology provision in a treaty without a corresponding capacity by the recipient to make effective use of such technology is, in the opinion of this writer, meaningless. It is therefore necessary for the recipient states to consciously develop an environment in their domestic setting to promote and encourage the development of skills and technical know-how that would encourage the effective use of such technology. Most African states at present do not have the right environment for the promotion of the development of the requisite skills and technical know-how by their nationals due to a complexity of factors. These factors include the non-existence of the necessary institutional framework for the promotion of science and technology, as well as under-funding and lack of encouragement and incentives to trained personnel to achieve any significant technological feats. For the transfer of marine technology, inclusive of deep seabed mining technology, to be effective there should be a complementary effort on the part of African states to provide the right environment within their domestic settings that would encourage and promote the effective use of marine technology.

The LOSC has rather ambitious provisions for the ISA to establish national and regional centres to promote and enhance skills and technological capabilities of developing states, including African states, in respect of marine technology. These centres would require large scale and consistent funding. However, the provisions

"(iii) a well thought out technology acquisition policy within a reasonable period of time leading to national or regional self-reliance;
(iv) a human resources development policy which leads to the creation of critical masses of skills at national, subregional and regional levels."

on funding of these centres are rather vague. Although the LOSC provides that states, especially developing states, which need and request technical assistance, will be assisted in the acquisition of the necessary equipment, processes, plant and other technical know-how "through any financial arrangements provided in this Convention," the provisions are not too clear as to how such funds will be raised. This can be contrasted with the situation in certain environmental treaties where there are clear and specific provisions on the provision of funding for developing states as regards acquisition of the requisite technology. Perhaps it would not be far from the truth to say that in environmental matters the provision of a clear funding mechanism for developing states is based on the integrated nature of environmental issues that necessarily requires both developed and developing states to work together to protect the global environment. Unfortunately this is not the same in respect of deep seabed mining activities.

II. The Position under 1994 Agreement.

Some developed states that declined to ratify the LOSC as a result of the original Part XI provisions expressed certain concerns at the Secretary-General's informal consultations on outstanding issues relating to Part XI about the mandatory requirement for the transfer of technology. One of such concerns related to the practical difficulties, including the issue of the protection of intellectual property rights, which this mandatory transfer of technology would raise for commercial

105 Art.274 (d). See Arts 171-175 on the financial arrangements of the ISA.
106 See Art. 3(d) of the Proposal of the Group of 77, A/CONF.62/C.3/L.12, UNCLOS III Official Records, Vol.III, p.253 which proposed the establishing of a special fund to assist developing states with the acquisition of the necessary equipment and know-how for the exploration and exploitation of marine resources. This proposal was not incorporated into the LOSC provisions. See ,however, Art.4 of the Resolution on the Development of National Marine Science, Technology and Ocean Service Infrastructures adopted by the UNCLOS III at the 182nd meeting on 30 April 1982, Document A/CONF 62/120 of 7 May 1982, UNCLOS III Official Records Vol. XVI, pp.176-177. This resolution recommends the participation of the World Bank, the Regional Banks, the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Financing System for Science and Technology and other Multilateral Funding Agencies in the funding of marine technology development of developing states. See also Yuwen, Li, op.cit.pp.156-162.
108 See Borgese, the Oceanic Circle, op.cit.pp.145-149
operators, especially those who were not owners of the technology in question. The 1994 Agreement sought to address the concerns of these developed states. Although the provisions of the Agreement retained Article 144 of LOSC, with its focus on co-operation, it declares that the mandatory provisions on transfer of technology under Article 5, Annex III, "shall not apply." The Agreement says that transfer of technology shall be governed by the following principles:

(a) The Enterprise, and developing States wishing to obtain deep seabed mining technology, shall seek to obtain such technology on fair and reasonable commercial terms on the open market, or through joint-venture arrangements;

(b) If the Enterprise or developing States are unable to obtain such technology, the Authority may request all or any of the contractors and their respective sponsoring States or States to co-operate with it in facilitating the acquisition of deep seabed mining technology by the Enterprise or its joint venture, or by a developing State or States seeking to acquire the technology on fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions, consistent with the effective protection of intellectual property rights. State Parties undertake to cooperate fully and effectively with the Authority for this purpose and to ensure that contractors sponsored by them also cooperate fully with the Authority;

(c) As a general rule, States Parties shall promote international technical and scientific co-operation with regard to activities in the Area either between the parties concerned or by developing training, technical assistance and scientific co-operation programmes in marine science and technology and the protection and preservation of the marine environment.

The 1994 Agreement witnessed a swing from the position of mandatory transfer of technology to a position that merely required "best efforts" co-operation. This can be deduced from the fact that the Agreement did not in any way alter the provisions of the LOSC encouraging the transfer of technology by way of international co-operation.

The Agreement, in dealing with the transfer of technology, emphasises the issue of "effective protection of intellectual property rights." The Agreement on Trade-

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110 Section 5 paras 1 and 2 of the Annex to the Agreement.
111 Section 5 para 1 of the Annex to the Agreement.
112 See Art.144 and Part XIV of LOSC.
113 Section 5, para. 1(b) of the Annex to the Agreement.
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Agreement dealing with intellectual property rights, provides as one of its objectives that the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to "the transfer and dissemination of technology." However, as pointed out in the previous section dealing with the position of transfer of technology under Part XI, the difficulty is in achieving a balance between this and the objective also mentioned in TRIPS of promoting technological innovation. The whole gamut of the TRIPS leans more in favour of the promotion of technological innovation, with rather stringent protection in favour of the possessors of the technology, the bulk of who are in the developed states. According to Carlos M. Correa:

"The Agreement [TRIPS] was also regarded as a component of a policy of 'technological protectionism' aimed at consolidating an international division of labour whereunder Northern Countries generate innovations and Southern Countries constitute the market for the resulting products and services."116

Correa further points out that the TRIPS, which strengthens intellectual property rights protection, does not exactly favour the transfer of technology to developing states. He gives certain reasons for this proposition. He points out that the TRIPS results in the increase of royalty and other payments required by the technology holders for the use of their technology, thereby reducing the resources available to receivers, mostly developing states, to apply towards promoting local research and development (R&D). He also opined that it may result in technology holders refusing to transfer their technology because in their opinion an effective system of compulsory licences has not been put in place by the receiving developing states, thereby blocking industrial initiatives by such developing states. Further he was of the view that it restricts reverse engineering and other methods of imitative innovation by the receiving developing states, thereby making it more difficult for such states to catch up technologically. The exceptions to the stringent provisions on intellectual property rights protection provided by the TRIPS in respect of developing states, such

114 Art.7 of the TRIPS Agreement. 33 ILM 1197(1994). See also Art.8 (2).
115 See again Art.7 of the TRIPS Agreement incorporating these two almost opposing objectives-transfer of technology and promotion of intellectual innovation - in the same article.
118 Ibid. p.19.
119 Ibid. See, for example, Art.26 of TRIPS.
as the need to promote public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development\(^{120}\) and the transitional arrangements granting exemptions to developing states for determined periods,\(^{121}\) would have been a way out if such states had the capability and the finance required for the extensive R&D necessary to acquire technology. Unfortunately most African states do not have such capability or finance to acquire technology. They therefore survive on the largesse of the technologically developed states, which insist on a strict application of TRIPS under the domestic laws of such African recipient states, usually to the advantage of the technology holder and to the detriment of local interests of the recipient states.\(^{122}\)

The 1994 Agreement, by deleting the mandatory provisions on transfer of technology in LOSC and placing an emphasis on protection of intellectual property rights, has eroded any perceived leverage that developing states, including African states, would have derived from the provisions of Part XI on the transfer of technology.

3.2.2. Production Policy.

Economic considerations based on a belief in the imminence of commercial exploitation of the deep seabed Area, were the main reasons why there was enthusiasm during the UNCLOS III for the establishment of a legal regime for the Area. One of the concerns of African states was that such commercial exploitation in the Area would affect the price of similar minerals, and therefore the earnings of land-based African producer states.\(^{123}\) This, of course, was at variance with the stance of most developed states, mainly consumer states, interested in access to alternative sources of such minerals, with a view to driving down the prices of such minerals and also to obtaining security of supply of these minerals.\(^{124}\) During the Conference the Secretary-General of the United Nations was asked to prepare a preliminary study on the possible impact of the Convention on developing states that were producers and

\(^{120}\) Art.8 (1) of TRIPS.

\(^{121}\) Part VI, Arts 65-66 of TRIPS.

\(^{122}\) See generally Correa, op.cit.pp.30-31

\(^{123}\) See para. 5 of the 1970 Lusaka Statement on the Seabed by Non-Aligned Countries, Doc. NAC/CONF.3/Res.11, which required the regime to, "... make adequate provisions to minimise fluctuation of prices of land minerals and raw materials that may result from such activities [production activities in the Area]."

exporters of the minerals to be extracted from the Area.\textsuperscript{125} Although this report expressed doubt about the viability of commercial exploitation of nodules in the Area in the near future, it pointed out that such exploitation would have an impact on the earnings and income of certain developing states, including certain African states, which depended mainly on the exportation of such minerals as the mainstay of their economy.\textsuperscript{126} The following extracts from the report point to the highly dependent position of certain African states on the export of land-based minerals, similar to those contained in the Area:

"The economy of Zaire is highly dependent on the export of a diversity of minerals (copper, cobalt, diamond, tin, zinc, gold and others), but, of these, the most important are copper and cobalt, which account for approximately 70 per cent of the total value of exports, though in 1979 the high price of cobalt raised it to over 80 per cent."\textsuperscript{127}

"Minerals are the most important exports of Zambia and have consistently been responsible for about 98 per cent of the total export earnings. Copper usually represents 93 per cent of export earnings, with other metals such as lead and zinc representing about 3 per cent to 4 per cent and cobalt about 1 per cent. However, since 1976 there has been an increasing trend in cobalt prices, with quite a dramatic rise in 1978-1979, and at the same time copper and other base metal have remained static or even been recessional. The result of these changes is that in 1979 copper represented 85.1 per cent of total export earnings and cobalt represented 11 per cent."\textsuperscript{128}

"Gabon is dependent for its foreign exchange to a large extent on the export of mineral products. This is mainly in the form of petroleum products, but manganese ore also plays an important part. In 1977, the total value of exports was $1,218 million, of which $988 million (81 per cent) was from petroleum products and $109 million (9 per cent) was from manganese."\textsuperscript{129}

Certain African states still remain amongst the major land-based producers of certain minerals located in the Area.\textsuperscript{130} The major producers include Botswana (nickel);
Democratic Republic of Congo (cobalt); Gabon (manganese); Mauritania (iron ore); Morocco (cobalt); South Africa (aluminium, gold, manganese, iron ore, titanium mineral concentrates and nickel); Zambia (copper and cobalt) and Zimbabwe (nickel).  

It was not surprising that land-based African producer states at the UNCLOS III were interested in the issue of production control. The issue of production control and the protection of land-based producers also came up during the PrepCom as a thorny issue and it was assigned to the PrepCom’s Special Commission 1(SCN.1). Although substantial progress was made by SCN.1, there were still areas of fundamental disagreement between the developing land-based producer states and the developed, mainly consumer, states. The production control provision in the LOSC was one of the reasons for the refusal of certain developed states to ratify the Convention.  

I. The Position under Part XI.  

The Convention in Part XI contained highly technical rules on production policies. These rules can, however, be classified under three heads – commodity arrangements, production controls, and a compensation system. The aim of the production policies is clearly stated as the protection of developing land-based producer states from adverse effects to either their economies or their export earnings, resulting from a
reduction in the price or the volume of exports of the affected mineral due to seabed mining activities in the Area.\textsuperscript{137}

(a) Commodity Arrangements.

The ISA was empowered to enter into commodity arrangements, whether through existing forums or new arrangements or agreements, involving all interested parties, including both producers and consumers.\textsuperscript{138} The essence of these arrangements was to take necessary measures to promote the growth, efficiency and stability of markets for those commodities produced from the minerals derived from the Area, in a bid to arrive at prices remunerative to producers and fair to consumers. All states parties were required to co-operate in these arrangements.\textsuperscript{139} The ISA had the right to participate in any commodity conferences involving those commodities, along with all other interested parties, including both producers and consumers. In this regard it had the right to become a party to any arrangement or agreement resulting from such conferences. However, it was emphasised that such participation of the ISA was not general but limited to arrangements or agreements in respect of production in the Area and in accordance with the relevant rules of those organs.\textsuperscript{140} In carrying out its obligations under such commodity arrangements or agreements, the ISA was required to do so in a manner which assured a uniform and non-discriminatory implementation

\textsuperscript{137} Art. 150(h) of LOSC. See Brown, ibid., pp.124-125
\textsuperscript{138} In UN General Assembly Resolution entitled, “Strengthening and Development of the World Market and Improvement of the Trade Conditions of the Economically Less Developed Countries”, G.A. Res. 1421/ XIV of 5 December 1959, it was said that “it would be desirable to work out, within the United Nations and other appropriate forums, measures to promote the stabilisation of the commodity markets and the development of trade between the highly developed and the less developed countries on a reciprocally beneficial and non-discriminatory basis, including, where appropriate, short, medium or long-term trade international commodity agreements and the establishment of international study groups” http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/142/44/IMG/NR014244.pdf?OpenElement [Accessed on 25 October 2004].
\textsuperscript{139} Art. 151 (1) (a) of LOSC.
\textsuperscript{140} Art. 151(1) (b) of LOSC.
in respect of all production of the relevant minerals in the Area. It was required in this regard to act in a manner consistent with the terms of existing contracts and approved plans of work of the Enterprise.141

(b) Production Controls.
The Convention contained a highly technical and complicated method of production controls.142 With the production controls, it was not enough for an operator to have obtained an approved plan of work; it had to also obtain a production authorisation. This production authorisation was to be issued so that the amount of production of such operator, along with that authorised for other operators, fell within the limits determined by the ISA under Article 151. The Convention then proceeded to elaborate in some detail the methodology for arriving at the production ceiling level for nickel production with a requirement that a certain quantity of nickel be reserved to the Enterprise for its initial production.143 The level of production of other metals extracted from the polymetallic nodules, such as copper, cobalt and manganese, was required not to be higher than the maximum level of nickel that would have been produced by the operator. The ISA was to establish rules, regulations and procedures to implement these production controls.144 In respect of minerals, other than minerals from polymetallic nodules, the ISA was simply given the power to limit the level of production by adopting regulations in this regard.145

(c) Compensation system
Under the LOSC, the Assembly, based upon the recommendation of the Council, which in turn was to act on the basis of advice from the Economic Planning Commission, was empowered to establish a compensation system. This mechanism was directed at assisting developing land-based producers of certain minerals produced in the Area that suffered serious adverse effects to their export earnings or economy resulting from either a reduction in the price or the export volume of such minerals due to seabed mining activities. The ISA was to initiate, on request, studies of the problems faced by such states likely to be most seriously affected by activities

141 Art.151 (1) (c) of LOSC.
142 Art.151 (2)-(9) of LOSC.
143 Art.151 (4)-(6) of LOSC.
144 Art.151 (7) of LOSC.
145 Art.151 (9) of LOSC.
in the Area with a view to minimising their difficulties, and to assist them in their
economic adjustment.\textsuperscript{146}

II. The Position under the 1994 Agreement.

The whole production policy contained in Part XI raised concerns for certain
developed states. In their view the original LOSC provisions on production policy
were based on regulatory principles evincing central planning, rather than free market
principles which they preferred. Further, they felt that these provisions gave the ISA
unnecessarily wide discretionary powers in selecting which applications would get a
production authorisation to embark on commercial production in cases where the
competing applications for production authorisations exceeded the production limit.
In addition, they were of the opinion that the detailed formula provided by the LOSC
based on nickel consumption alone had become unrealistic in the light of the
recession in the international metals market. Also, they felt that the production policy,
especially the commodity arrangement, under Part XI was protective in favour of
land-based producers to the detriment of seabed producers and therefore did not
encourage investment in seabed mining. On the issue of the compensation funds,
these states were concerned that it would be very costly for all states parties. These
concerns were raised at the Secretary-General's consultations on Part XI. The 1994
Agreement therefore modified the original Part XI to meet these concerns.\textsuperscript{147}

(a) Commodity Arrangements and Production Controls.

The 1994 Agreement, a document embodying free market principles, in one fell
swoop set aside the provisions of Part XI on commodity agreements and production
controls.\textsuperscript{148} It advocated a development of the resources of the Area in accordance
with "sound commercial principles."\textsuperscript{149} The Agreement, restricting itself to merely
stating general principles, incorporated the provisions of GATT and the successor

\textsuperscript{146} Art.151 (10) of LOSC. For a similar compensatory mechanism, see the special financing facility
(SYSMIN) under the EC/ACP Lome IV Convention. This was an EC compensatory finance scheme to
stabilise export earnings in respect of mineral resources of ACP States. See Arts. 214-219 of Lome IV

\textsuperscript{147} See "Information Note concerning the Secretary-General's informal consultation on outstanding
issues relating to the deep seabed mining provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, New
York, 25 March 1991" in Secretary-General's Informal Consultations on Outstanding Issues Relating
Collected Documents, op.cit.pp.16-17.

\textsuperscript{148} Section 6 para.7.

\textsuperscript{149} Ibid, para.1 (a).
WTO Agreement.\textsuperscript{150} It went on to prohibit subsidisation of activities of the Area except in a manner permitted by the GATT/WTO Agreement.\textsuperscript{151} The 1994 Agreement further allows a state party to request the Council to take appropriate measures on the ground that one of the states parties is engaged in subsidisation that is prohibited or has resulted in adverse effects on the interests of another state party and appropriate steps have not been taken by the relevant state party or other state parties.\textsuperscript{152} Any acceptance of prohibited subsidies by a contractor is said to constitute a violation of the fundamental terms of the contract forming a plan of work for carrying out activities in the Area.\textsuperscript{153} Again in line with GATT/WTO, the 1994 Agreement further states that there shall be no discrimination between minerals derived from the Area and from other sources. Neither shall there be preferential access to markets for such minerals or for imports of commodities produced from seabed minerals, in particular by the use of tariffs or non-tariff barriers, given by states parties to minerals or commodities produced by their states enterprises or by their nationals, both natural or juridical persons, as well as juridical persons controlled by such state or their nationals.\textsuperscript{154} The plan of work for exploitation in the Area approved by the ISA is to indicate an anticipated production schedule, which should include the estimated maximum amounts of minerals to be produced per year under such plan of work.\textsuperscript{155}

The GATT/WTO Agreement, incorporated into the 1994 Agreement, in the view of most developing states, including African states, tends to lean in favour of the developed states.\textsuperscript{156} According to a Declaration by the Ministers of State of the Organisation of African Unity/African Economic Community (OAU/AEC):

\textsuperscript{150} Ibid, para.1 (b).
\textsuperscript{152} Section 6, para.1 (g) of the Annex to the Agreement.
\textsuperscript{153} Ibid, para. 3. See Art. 3-6 of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures on prohibited subsidies and remedies available to affected member states.
\textsuperscript{154} Section 6, para. 1(d).
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid, para.1(e)
"We reiterate our concern with the imbalances in the WTO Agreement. We underscore the difficulties that many African countries face in adapting their laws and regulations and improving their institutional capacities to meet their WTO obligations." 157

Although generally the GATT/WTO Agreement makes provision for Special and Differential (S&D) treatment for developing states members, such S & D treatment is usually temporary in nature; does not constitute a binding commitment on the part of developed states; can be withdrawn in whole or in part, either unilaterally or following international negotiations; and gives room for the developed states to select the particular developing states they want to grant S & D treatment. 158

The whole idea of incorporating the GATT/WTO principles into the 1994 Agreement was in essence a move by the developed states to set aside the regulated regime of production policy under the LOSC in favour of a more laissez-faire, free market oriented regime. This is reflected in the statement of the representative of the President of the United States of America on the law of the sea to the effect that:

"The United States believes that its interests... will best be served by developing the resources of the deep seabed as market conditions warrant. We have a consumer-oriented philosophy." 159

The GATT/WTO regime infused into the 1994 Agreement, with its strong emphasis on free market liberalism, is reflective of a system that fails to accept the crucial need for special, generalised, legally binding protection for economically weaker states, such as African land-based producer states, in order to bridge the inherent inequality between these states and the industrialised, economically strong states.160

(b) Economic Assistance.

The Agreement, while recognising the possible adverse impact of activities in the Area on the export earnings or economies of developing land-based producer states, jettisoned the idea of a generalised compensation system in favour of such states. Rather, it merely outlines principles on the establishment of an Economic Assistance Fund by the ISA.\textsuperscript{161} This Fund is to provide assistance, where appropriate, in cooperation with other international organisations, whether regional or global, which have the infrastructure and expertise to carry out such assistance programmes.\textsuperscript{162}

Only developing land-based producer states whose economies are determined to be "seriously affected" by the production of minerals from the deep seabed are to be assisted from the Fund.\textsuperscript{163} The Agreement provides that the Fund is to be established from the portion of the funds of the ISA over and above its administrative expenses.\textsuperscript{164} The Fund is to receive monies only from payments received from contractors, including the Enterprise, and voluntary contributions.\textsuperscript{165}

The amount to be set aside for the Fund is to be determined by the Council from time to time acting upon the recommendation of the Finance Committee.\textsuperscript{166} The composition of the Council and the Finance Committee \textsuperscript{167} gives room for certain developed industrialised states to determine what amount actually goes into this Fund and thereby influences whether or not the Fund is effective. Brown argues that the composition of the Finance Committee puts the industrialised states in a position to ensure that excess amounts are not set aside for the Fund.\textsuperscript{168} It does appear by extension that this will mean that such industrialised states are also in a position to

\textsuperscript{162} Ibid. para.1(c).
\textsuperscript{163} Ibid. para.1 (b).
\textsuperscript{164} The Fund has since been established. See Regulation 5.8 of the ISA’s Financial Regulations which became effective on 23 March 2000, ISBA/6/A/3, of 28 March 2000. See Brown, \textit{Sea Bed Energy and Minerals} Vol.2, op.cit, p.130.
\textsuperscript{165} Section 7 para. 1(a) of the Annex to the Agreement.
\textsuperscript{166} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{167} See section 4.1.3.1 of chapter 4 of this thesis.
determine the extent of economic assistance a land-based producer state may get. The strong position of the industrialised developed states in the Council and the Finance Committee, coupled with the requirement that the extent and period of the assistance be determined on a case by case basis,\(^{169}\) exposes the Fund to the inherent danger of it being used as a subtle tool by developed industrialised states to control developing land-based producers' domestic policies.\(^{170}\) This has been the experience of African states in respect of international multilateral financial institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank, that are dominated by certain industrialised states. African states seeking financial assistance from these organisations have had to comply with rigid conditionalities imposed by these organisations, amounting in certain cases to interference with these states’ domestic policies, in order to have access to the financial assistance.\(^{171}\)

The 1994 Agreement, through its provisions on economic assistance to developing land-based producers, has in essence entrenched the influence of the industrialised states over the regime.

### 3.2.3. Financial Terms of Contracts

The LOSC lists six objectives that should guide the ISA in adopting rules, regulations and procedures concerning the financial terms of contracts between it and contractors. These objectives are namely: to ensure optimum revenues for the ISA from the proceeds of commercial production; to attract investments and technology to deep seabed mining; to ensure equal financial treatment and comparable financial obligations for all contractors; to provide incentives for contractors on a uniform and non-discriminatory basis with a view to encouraging joint ventures between the contractors, the Enterprise and developing states and their nationals in order to stimulate transfer of technology and expertise to the Enterprise and developing states; to enable the Enterprise to engage in seabed mining effectively at the same time as

\(^{169}\) Section 7 para. 1(d) of the Annex to the Agreement.

\(^{170}\) On how internal policies of African nations are controlled by industrialised nation dominated international aid bodies see Lancaster, C., *Aid to Africa – So Much to Do, So Little Done*, (Chicago/London, University of Chicago Press, 1999), pp.74-82;

other contractors; and to ensure that seabed mining contractors are not through financial incentives subsidised so as to give them an artificial competitive advantage over land-based miners.\(^{172}\) A perusal of these objectives, as rightly pointed out by Brown, indicates that some of them are rather contradictory.\(^{173}\) The LOSC sought to accommodate, on the one hand, the interest of developing states to have a financially buoyant and independent ISA, with its commercial corporation, the Enterprise, able to effectively embark on seabed mining, as well as the need to protect land-based producers from a diversion of investment from land-based mining to deep seabed mining.\(^{174}\) On the other hand, there was the interest of developed, industrialised states to have minimal and non-discriminatory financial terms that would encourage investment in seabed mining. The aim of accommodating these divergent interests in the objectives was to achieve compromise, a hallmark of UNCLOS III.\(^{175}\)

Brown identifies, as one of the reasons for the developing states’ stance on financial terms, that:

"...the developing countries were concerned to ensure not only that the overall share of the Authority in the proceeds of deep-sea mining should be substantial but also that a significant part of the Authority’s share should take the form of 'front-end' payments, that is, payments made at the beginning or in the early years of the contract before commercial production has started to generate income for the contractor. The reason for this preference was the need, as then perceived, to provide funds to enable the Enterprise to commence operations without too much delay."

In addition to a desire for funds to enable the Enterprise to commence operations promptly, it does appear that the whole idea could also suggest a yearning on the part of developing states, including African states, for some level of financial independence of the ISA from contributions of member states. This in itself suggests an attempt on the part of developing states to reduce the influence of industrialised

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\(^{172}\) Annex III, Art.13 (1) of LOSC.


\(^{174}\) See the statement of the Chairman of the Working Group of 21, UNCLOS III *Official Records* Vol.XII, p.78.


developed states, which through financial contributions to international organisations generally exert considerable influence. An international organisation, able to generate its own funds independently of its members' financial contributions, would certainly be more independent of control of high contributing states parties. This in essence, along with the original composition of the institutions of the regime, would have created an environment whereby the developing states, including African states, by working in concert through fora such as the Group of 77, would through numerical strength effectively influence the agenda of the ISA.

I. The Position under Part XI.

In a bid to be as detailed as possible concerning the financial terms of the contract, the Convention, in Annex III, embarked on a rather complicated and longwinded elucidation of such terms. In essence the provisions required three kinds of payments from the contractors, namely:

- An administrative processing fee of $US 500,000 per application, provided that if the cost of processing an application was less than $US 500,000, the difference was to be refunded to the applicant. This fee was to be reviewed from time to time by the Council;

- An annual up front fixed fee of $US 1 million from the date of entry into force of the contract, provided that if the approved date of commencement of commercial production was postponed because of a delay in issuing the production authorisation, this annual fee would be waived during the period of such postponement. However from the date of commercial production the contractor was to pay either the production charge or the annual fixed fee, whichever was greater;

- Within a year from the date of commencement of commercial production the contractor could either choose to continue to pay the ISA a production charge or a combination of production charge and a share of net proceeds calculated in accordance with certain complicated methods stated in Article 13. These latter

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177 See Chapter 4 of this thesis.
179 Art.13 (2) of Annex III to the LOSC.
180 Art.13 (3) of Annex III.
181 Art.13 (4) of Annex III.
payments could either be in convertible currency or equivalent market value of processed metals.\textsuperscript{182}

Along with dispute settlement procedures over the financial terms of contracts, complex rules on the calculation of production charges and net proceeds, accounting and auditing procedures, they constituted rather detailed provisions on financial matters for a venture which was not anticipated to be undertaken on a commercial scale in the near future.\textsuperscript{183}

\textbf{II. The Position under the 1994 Agreement.}

The financial terms of contracts were also a matter of concern to some industrialised states, concerns that were raised at the Secretary-General's consultations on the original Part XI provisions. These states were of the view that the up front fixed fee had become a disincentive to investment in seabed mining. Further, some states expressed concerns at the rate of taxation on profits, though it compared favourably with the rates paid by those engaged in land-based production of similar minerals.\textsuperscript{184}

These concerns were addressed by the 1994 Agreement.

The provision dealing with application fees was modified and the fee reduced from US$500,000 to US$250,000.\textsuperscript{185}

Although retaining the objectives of the financial terms contained in Part XI, the 1994 Agreement swept aside the detailed provisions of Article 13 of Annex III,\textsuperscript{186} and opted for merely laying down general principles. These principles are as follows\textsuperscript{187}:

(a) \textit{The system of payments to the Authority shall be fair both to the contractor and to the Authority and shall provide adequate means of determining compliance by the contractor with such system;}

\textsuperscript{182} Art.13 (12) of Annex III.
\textsuperscript{183} Art.13 (5)-(15) of Annex III.
\textsuperscript{185} Section 8 para.3 and Section 1 para. 6(a) (ii) of the Agreement.
\textsuperscript{186} The Agreement in Section 8 para. 2 states that the provisions of Annex III article 13, paragraphs 3 to 10 shall not apply.
(b) The rates of payments under the system shall be within the range of those prevailing in respect of land-based mining of the same or similar minerals in order to avoid giving deep seabed miners an artificial competitive advantage or imposing upon them a competitive disadvantage;

(c) The system should not be complicated and should not impose major administrative costs on either the Authority or on a contractor. Consideration should be given to the adoption of a royalty system or a combination of royalty and profit-sharing system. If alternative systems are decided upon, the contractor has the right to choose the system applicable to its contract. Any subsequent change in choice between alternative systems, however, shall be made by agreement between the Authority and the contractor;

(d) The annual fixed fee shall be payable from the date of commencement of commercial production. This fee may be credited against other payments due under the system adopted in accordance with subparagraph (c). The amount of the fee shall be established by the Council;

(e) The system of payment may be revised periodically in the light of changing circumstances. Any changes shall be applied in a non-discriminatory manner. Such changes may apply to existing contracts only at the election of the contractor. Any subsequent change in choice between alternative systems shall be made by agreement between the Authority and the contractor;

(f) Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of any rules and regulations based on these principles shall be subject to the dispute settlement procedures set out in the Convention.

Whilst the objectives of the financial terms of the contract under LOSC were not touched by the Agreement, the potency of such objectives favourable to the developing states, including African states, has been effectively watered down by the general principles enunciated in the Agreement. The payment of up front fixed fees has been suspended by the Agreement and is payable only upon commencement of commercial production. This in essence removes any hope in the near future of the ISA having funds independent of members' contributions. Therefore the ISA would still depend on members' contributions with the inevitable fall out of having to succumb to the dictates of the major contributors. This, together with the power conferred by the Agreement upon the Council (where western industrialised states have significant powers to block unfavourable decisions) to determine the amount of the annual fixed fee due upon the commencement of commercial production, effectively diminishes any hope of the developing states, including African states, assuming a more influential role in a financially independent and self-sufficient ISA.

Brown, in examining the modification by the Agreement of the original Part XI
provisions on financial terms, points out that the Agreement “reflects a change in the balance of influence as between the developing and developed states....” 188

3.2.4. Review Conference.

According to Mahmoudi the possibility of a review of the parallel system of mining was “a sine qua non” for developing states’ acceptance of this system of utilisation of the resources of the Area. 189 He identified two possible reasons for the importance attributed to the review scheme by developing states. First, he pointed out that it was partly because, in accepting the parallel system, they were accepting something which had not yet been tried in practice, and second, because the whole idea of the parallel system was contradictory to the idea of joint management under the common heritage of mankind. 190 The idea of the review system, which interestingly had its origins in the proposal of the Secretary of State of the United States of America, 191 was to create an opt-out route for the developing states after a certain period of time, in the eventuality that the parallel system, which they had conceded as part of the mechanism of compromise, did not ultimately accomplish the essence of the principle of the common heritage of mankind. 192

I. The Position under Part XI.

The LOSC made provision for a review mechanism, consisting of a Periodic Review and a Review Conference. While the Periodic Review provisions of Part XI have not been modified by the 1994 Agreement, this is not the case for Review Conference provisions as will be seen in the section below. It appears that the crux of developed industrialised states’ objection to the review mechanism, in view of the retention of the Periodic Review provisions in the Agreement, was not an objection to the idea of the review per se. Rather, their objection was in respect of the possibility that a review introducing amendments would be binding upon a state party that had not consented to such amendments. Under the Periodic Review, the developing states dominated Assembly 193 is given the power every five years to undertake a general and systematic review of the manner in which the regime of the Area has operated in practice.

189 Mahmoudi, op.cit.p.222.
190 Ibid.
192 Ibid. II.4 7-10.
However, there is no indication that such review will be binding on states parties without their consent. All that the Periodic Review provision says is that the Assembly may thereafter, in the light of the review, adopt, or recommend that other organs adopt, measures in line with the provisions of Part XI and the annexes related thereto, which will lead to the improvement of the operation of the regime. The first of such review was to take place in 2000, during the sixth session of the ISA. However, the Assembly accepted the advice of the Secretary-General of the ISA that as a result of the brief experience in implementing the regime such review would be rather premature. The Periodic Review is expected to be taken up at the Eleventh Session of the ISA in 2005.

The Review Conference, on the other hand, was more contentious. It was to be convened fifteen years from 1 January of the year in which the earliest commercial production commenced under an approved plan of work. The Assembly was also given the power to convene this Conference to review the provisions of Part XI and the annexes thereto. In reviewing these provisions, the Conference was to consider certain issues, in the light of the experience gained during the fifteen years, namely:

"(a) whether the provisions of this Part which govern the system of exploration and exploitation of the resources of the Area have achieved their aims in all respects, including whether they have benefited mankind as a whole;  
(b) whether, during the 15-year period, reserved areas have been exploited in an effective and balanced manner in comparison with non-reserved areas;  
(c) whether the development and use of the Area and its resources have been undertaken in such a manner as to foster healthy development of the world economy and balanced growth of international trade;  
(d) whether monopolisation of activities in the Area has been prevented;  
(e) whether the policies set forth in articles 150 and 151 have been fulfilled; and  
(g) whether the system has resulted in the equitable sharing of benefits derived from activities in the Area, taking into consideration the interests and needs of the developing States."

193 See Chapter 4 of this thesis on institutions.  
194 Art.154 of LOSC.  
196 Ibid.  
197 Art.155 (1) (a)-(f) of LOSC.
Whilst the focus of the Conference was to review the system of exploitation, i.e., the parallel system, it was to also ensure the maintenance of certain “core” matters, including the principle of the common heritage of mankind; the equitable exploitation of the resources of the Area for the benefit of all states, especially developing states; the power of the ISA to organise, conduct and control activities in the Area; the exclusion of claims or exercise of sovereignty over any part of the Area; the prevention of monopolisation of activities in the Area; the exclusive use of Area for peaceful purposes; and the principles of Part XI concerning marine scientific research, transfer of technology, protection of environment and human life, rights of coastal states and other states in respect of the Area, and the legal status of the waters superjacent to the Area and the air space thereof.\textsuperscript{198}

The decision-making procedure for the Review Conference, like that of the UNCLOS III, was to initially make every effort to arrive at an agreement concerning any amendments by way of consensus.\textsuperscript{199} However, if five years after the commencement of the Conference such consensus was not arrived at in respect of the system of exploration and exploitation, in the ensuing 12 months a three-fourths majority of the states parties could adopt and submit for ratification or accession amendments changing or modifying this system. Thereafter, such amendments would enter into force for all states parties, whether or not they consented to it, 12 months after the deposit of instruments of ratification or accession by three-fourths of the states parties.\textsuperscript{200} It was, however, emphasised that such amendments adopted by the Review Conference were not to affect rights acquired under existing contracts.\textsuperscript{201}

The negotiations during the UNCLOS III concerning the review system sought to achieve a compromise between the developing states and developed states.\textsuperscript{202} Despite certain concessions on this issue by the developing states, including for example conceding to the increase from two-thirds to a three-fourths majority the threshold for adoption and ratification of amendments, certain developed states remained unsatisfied.

\textsuperscript{198} Art.155 (2) of LOSC.
\textsuperscript{199} Art.155 (3) of LOSC.
\textsuperscript{200} Art.155 (4) of LOSC.
\textsuperscript{201} Art.155 (5) of LOSC.
II. The Position under the 1994 Agreement.

Certain developed industrialised states expressed concerns at the informal consultations that amendments under the Review Conference could be binding automatically on a state without its approval. They expressed the view that any amendment under the review system should only be effective if ratified or acceded to by all states parties.203 The objections of these states were not surprising, since under the general law of treaties an amending agreement, as a general rule, does not bind a state party which has not consented to such amending agreement,204 although the original treaty may deviate from this general rule by providing otherwise.205

The Agreement, in addressing the concerns of the industrialised states, starts off by saying that the "provisions relating to the Review Conference in Article 155, paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 shall not apply."206 However, the requirement under Article 155, paragraph 2 of LOSC that certain core principles207 be maintained, along with the provision of paragraph 5 preserving the existing rights of contractors after an amendment, are retained by the Agreement.208 The Agreement then declares that the amendment procedures in Articles 314, 315 and 316 of the LOSC shall apply to amendments relating to the Agreement and Part XI.209

Under Article 314 a proposal for amendment made by a state party after having been circulated by the Secretary-General to all states parties, may be adopted subject to the

204 Art.40 (4) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) 1969 provides “The amending agreement does not bind any state already a party to the treaty which does not become a party to the amending agreement...”
205 Art.40 (1) of VCLT states “Unless the treaty otherwise provides, the amendment of multilateral treaties shall be governed by the following paragraphs.”(emphasis added).
206 Section 4 of the Annex to the Agreement.
207 See text at note 198 above.
208 Section 4 of the Annex to the Agreement.
209 Ibid. These formal amendment procedures have so far not been utilised by states parties to the LOSC. See Freestone, D, and Oude Elferink, “Flexibility and Innovation in the Law of the Sea- Will the LOSC Amendment Procedures ever be used?”, Paper presented at the Third Verzijl Symposium, Stability and Change in the Law of the Sea: Selected Issues, Utrecht University, The Netherlands, 3 December 2004.
approval of the Assembly, following the approval of the Council. In considering whether to approve any such proposed amendment, the Council and the Assembly are to ensure that it does not prejudice the system of exploration and exploitation of the resources of the Area, pending the Review Conference.\(^{210}\) However, the Agreement provides that notwithstanding this latter provision "the Assembly, on the recommendation of the Council, may undertake at any time a review of the matters referred to in article 155, paragraph 1, of the Convention." \(^{211}\) The representatives of states parties in the Assembly and Council are deemed to have full powers to consider and approve the proposed amendment.\(^{212}\) This may seem to suggest that since decision-making in the Assembly and the Council can be by a qualified majority, if an attempt to arrive at a decision by way of consensus fails, such amendments, if approved by a qualified majority in those organs, would be binding even on states parties that had not consented. However, this is not the case. Under the LOSC decisions of the Council, in respect of the adoption of amendments to Part XI, must be taken by consensus.\(^{213}\) Thus amendments could not be adopted if they were not acceptable to the industrialised developed states.

Article 316(5) of LOSC goes on to state that any amendment relating exclusively to activities in the Area and Annex VI (the statute of ITLOS) "shall enter into force for all States Parties one year following the deposit of instruments of ratification or accession by three fourths of the States Parties." This provision appears to suggest that any such amendments shall enter into force for all states parties, including states parties that have not consented to such amendments. It is not clear if the retention of Article 316(5) by the Agreement is an oversight. However, it does appear that any such amendments, as mentioned earlier, would need the approval of the Assembly, following the approval of the Council, to be adopted. It is unlikely in practice that Article 316(5) would raise any significant concern for developed industrialised states since the prior approval of the Council, where consensus is required for such approval, would be required before such amendment is adopted.

\(^{210}\) Art.314 (2) of LOSC.
\(^{211}\) Section 4 of the Annex to the Agreement.
\(^{212}\) Art.314(1) of LOSC
In theory, therefore, although the review of the matters referred to in Article 155(1) can be done at any time and could result in amendments utilising the procedures of Articles 314, 315 and 316, the power of the Assembly to unilaterally embark on a review has been curtailed since it is required to act upon the recommendation of the Council. In reality it is doubtful if the Council, where the industrialised developed states have a strong position, would make any such recommendation for review that would be against the interest of the developed industrialised states. The Agreement has therefore effectively curtailed the ability of African states and other developing states to use their numerical dominance in the Assembly to unilaterally embark on a review of matters of interest to them in respect of the system of mining.

3.3. Factors influencing the decision of African states to concede to the 1994 Agreement.

As a result of the refusal of certain industrialised states, including the United States of America, United Kingdom, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium and Italy, to ratify the LOSC as a result of the original Part XI provisions, the then Secretary-General of the United Nations, Javier Perez de Cuellar, in a bid to pave the way for universal participation in the Convention, initiated informal consultations to consider and take steps to address the concerns of these states. These informal consultations, which commenced in 1990 and went on till 1994, were in two phases. The first phase, from 1990 to 1992, involved a small closed group of some 30 key states, including the industrialised states objecting to certain provisions of the original Part XI, and was to identify the concerns that had led to the industrialised states' refusal to ratify the Convention. Thereafter, the second phase, from 1992 to 1994, was thrown open to all interested states and about 90 delegations were represented at the consultations in this phase. Ambassador Frank Njenga holds the view that the initial closed door meetings (1990-1992) of the informal consultations, during which period negotiations

213 Art.161 (7) (d) of LOSC. See section 3, paragraph 5 of the Agreement which excludes decisions that under the LOSC must be taken by consensus in the Council. See section 4.1.3.1(II) (iii) of chapter 4 on decision-making in the Council.
214 Section 4 of the Annex to the Agreement.
advanced far, excluded most developing states, including African states and gave an unfair advantage to the industrialised states, a number of which were part of that meeting. He further opines that even the second stage of the consultations, which was thrown open to all states, witnessed a situation where developing states, especially African states, were inadequately represented, either due to lack of funds to send any representative or, in cases where there were representatives, to the absence of experts of high quality on the subject, as was the case with UNCLOS III, to represent the interest of these nations. According to him this resulted in the Agreement, which has "... far-reaching consequences and [involve], to a large extent, one-sided concessions to industrialised countries with hardly any corresponding obligations on their part." He further pointed out that the Agreement made "... significant concessions to industrialised countries without any tangible benefits for developing countries." Although it may be the case that African states were not significantly represented in the first phase of the consultations, there is some evidence of the attendance of representatives of African states.

In this writer’s view the significant, almost one-sided, concessions made by African states during the consultations goes beyond the exclusive nature of the first phase of the consultations and the quality of the African representatives. It is suggested that two broad reasons can be identified for these concessions. First, unlike the UNCLOS III negotiations where the African states had articulated a common position in the form of the O.A.U. Declaration on the law of the sea issues, there was no clear cut

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218 Njenga's intervention from the floor, ibid. at pp.271 and 273. See, however, contradicting this position the intervention from the floor of Barbara Kwiatkowska and Wesley Scholz at ibid. pp.267 and 263 respectively.
219 Njenga, ibid.p.262.
220 Ibid.
221 For example, at the informal consultation held on 19 July 1990 the Secretary-General of the United Nations acknowledged the presence of Ambassador Jose Luis Jesus of Cape Verde (also chairman of the PrepCom) and even at the informal consultation held on 23 July 1991 the Tanzanian Ambassador is recorded to have raised some procedural points. See “Introductory Remarks by the Secretary-General for the Informal Consultation on the Law of the Sea, 19 July 1990” and “Mr. Nandan’s summary at the conclusion of the Secretary-General’s Informal Consultation on outstanding issues relating to the deep seabed mining provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 23 July 1991” in Secretary-General’s Informal Consultations on Outstanding Issues Relating to the Deep Seabed Mining Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Collected Documents, op.cit.pp.9 and 32.
written articulated position taken by African states in these informal consultations. It is suggested that this lack of a common articulated position on the deep seabed issues, under the auspices of the then O.A.U, significantly weakened the standing of African states in such negotiations and therefore it is not surprising that they appear to have made substantial concessions during the consultations. Second, the concessions on the part of African states could be attributed to certain factors arising from economic and political changes emerging in the global sphere as well as the domestic setting of these states. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, in seeking to justify the informal consultations, identified certain reasons for them, including the fact that, contrary to the expectations at the UNCLOS III, commercial mining of the Area was no longer imminent; the evolution of international relations from tension and confrontation towards co-operation; the change of the global economic climate favouring the free-market oriented policy; and the work of the PrepCom, which gave more understanding of the practical aspects of deep seabed mining. While these reasons generally explain the informal consultations and the eventual 1994 Agreement overwhelming adopted by a number of states, including African states, at the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly, the following analysis seeks to pinpoint certain factors that could have particularly influenced the decision of African states to concede to the Agreement. In so doing, the writer is not unaware that the different states in Africa would have their own peculiar reasons based on national and/or foreign policy interests for becoming parties to the Agreement. This analysis therefore does not purport to be a state by state examination of such peculiar reasons that have caused these states to concede to and become parties to the 1994 Agreement, though it is at variance with certain hard-won victories in favour of developing states, including African states, contained in the original Part XI, which were attained after

223 "Introductory Remarks by the Secretary-General for the Informal Consultation on the Law of the Sea, 19 July 1990" in Secretary-General's Informal Consultations on Outstanding Issues Relating to the Deep Seabed Mining Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Collected Documents, op.cit.pp.9-10. Also see at the 100th meeting of the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly the comments of the Kenyan representative, Mr. Muthaura, basically rehashing the reasons given by the Secretary-General as the reason why many states, including those that had already ratified the LOSC, accepted the draft 1994 Agreement. General Assembly, forty-eighth session, Official Records, A/48/PV.100 of 27 July 1994, p.5.

224 Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Tanzania and Zimbabwe voted in favour of the Resolution. See Law of the Sea Bulletin, Special Issue IV, 16 November 1994, p.7. There are presently 24 African states that are parties to the Agreement. See Table 1 in Chapter 2 of this thesis for the number of African states that are parties to the Agreement.
excruciating and time-consuming negotiations in UNCLOS III. Neither does it profess to be an exhaustive examination of all the possible factors influencing the decision of African states as regards the 1994 Agreement. Rather, the analysis seeks to pinpoint certain crucial broad factors, including certain changes in the international polity, which either directly or indirectly influenced the decision of African states to accept the Agreement.

3.3.1. Emergence of the market-oriented economy as the dominant world policy.

In the Report of the Secretary-General on the informal consultations, the shift to a more market-oriented economy was one of the reasons given for the informal consultations on issues affecting Part XI. According to the Report,

"The general economic climate had been transformed as a result of the changing perception with respect to the roles of the public and private sectors. There was a discernible shift towards a more market-oriented economy".

This shift to a market-oriented economy, which emerged as the dominant world policy with the collapse of the former USSR, had a strong influence in altering the perception of African states of the deep seabed regime. A market-oriented policy, that advocates a more deregulated economy and discourages state-owned enterprises, has emerged as an important element in the domestic policy of most African states. Not surprisingly it is reflected in the present international policy of African states on the deep seabed.

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226 See, for example, the comments of the representative of Algeria, Mr. Lamamra, to the 100th plenary meeting of the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly as follows: “It should be noted that, at times, some provisions of the draft Agreement [1994 Agreement] go well beyond mere implementation of certain provisions of Part XI of the Convention and often introduce substantive modifications of the original text. Yet realism led my delegation to agree with the terms of the draft Agreement, which in the circumstances are the only possible basis for promoting universal acceptance of the Convention, in particular by the world’s largest maritime Powers.” General Assembly, forty-eighth session, Official Records, A/48/PV.100 of 27 July 1994, p.26.


228 Ibid.
Prior to the current shift to a market-oriented economy policy, most African states had on independence, mostly in the fifties and sixties, established a number of state-owned enterprises and thereby had mainly a regulated government dominated economy. By the eighties these states found themselves in dire economic condition mainly as a result of corruption and mismanagement of the economy. Consequently, many of them approached international financial institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank, for financial aid. These institutions prescribed deregulation of the economies for these African states, largely in the form of government divestment from state-owned enterprises (Privatisation). The reasoning of these international financial institutions, based on their ethos of promoting a free market economy, was, amongst other things, that deregulation promotes economic efficiency. Over the years the policy-makers in most African states appear to have accepted that regulation as exemplified in state-owned enterprises leads to economic inefficiency. They believe that deregulation in order to promote a free-market milieu will lead to economic efficiency and cost-effectiveness. For example, President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria in support of deregulation through privatisation declared that state enterprises "suffer from fundamental problems of defective capital structure, excessive bureaucratic control or intervention, inappropriate technology, gross incompetence and mismanagement, blatant corruption and crippling complacency." Another top policy-maker in Egypt contends that "Public opinion is different today from ten years ago. People used to be afraid of privatisation. They thought the intervention of the government was crucial." He went on to remark that, "After many successful privatisations people have become convinced that it is good. Many people tell us we are not going fast enough."

It is therefore not surprising, in the light of the various domestic policies of African states embracing deregulation through privatisation, that a number of African states

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230 Harsch, ibid.


232 Ibid.
were not averse to accepting the 1994 Agreement in the international sphere. The basis of the Agreement is that the original Part XI, which in many ways involved much regulation by the ISA, would lead to economic inefficiency. The 1994 Agreement purports to promote economic efficiency in the deep sea bed regime through free-market principles and cost-effectiveness.

3.3.2. Lack of finance.

The effect of lack of finance cannot be overlooked as one of the critical factors influencing the decision of African states to concede to the Agreement. Njenga, relying on a United Nations Office of Ocean Affairs background note on the Administrative Arrangements, Structure and Financial Implications of the ISA, and also the proposal of the AALCC and IOI, argued that the financial requirements of the new institutions could be effectively met by developing states. The reality on ground suggests the contrary. In the international sphere the bulk of the financial contributions that ensures the effective day to day running of global international institutions, comes mainly from the developed industrialised states, the instigators of the need to alter the original Part XI. The attempt by developing states to reduce this influence by trying to evolve an institutional framework able to generate its own income independent of financial contributions of member states, was flawed in the sense that this income was to come from contractors' fees to be derived mainly from the entities of the industrialised developed states that had refused to be parties to the

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233 See, for example, sections 5, 6 and 8 of the Annex to the Agreement.
234 See Section 1 of the Annex to the Agreement.
237 As at 31 March 2004, 52 members of the ISA, mainly developing states, were in arrears for a period of two years or more in respect of payment of their contributions, out of which 23 were African states (Benin, Cape Verde, Comoros, Cote d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Somalia, the Sudan, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe). See para. 58 of the Report of the Secretary-General of the International Seabed Authority under article 166 paragraph 4, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, ISBA/10/A/3 of 31 March 2004.
238 See Part II of Chapter 4 of this thesis.
LOSOC, as a result of the original Part XI provisions.\textsuperscript{239} If such states are not parties to the LOSC, their entities cannot apply for contracts to undertake seabed mining.\textsuperscript{240}

The other side of the coin concerning the issue of lack of finance, which in many regards must have been a determining factor in the unwillingness of African states, along with other developing states, to go it alone, was what Marffy-Mantuano describes as the "tragically depressed situation" of these states.\textsuperscript{241} Around the eighties and the nineties most African states found themselves in dire economic crisis, not even able to meet the costs of their domestic needs, as a result of scarce resources. This made international commitments, including supporting international institutions, an additional strain on scarce resources. These states were therefore in no position to wholly support the institutional framework of the deep seabed regime even if cost effective measures were adopted. This was all the more so since seabed mining was unlikely to be undertaken on a commercially profitable scale in the near future.

3.3.3. The effect of the collapse of the U.S.S.R. on the international balance of power.

In his report on the informal consultations leading to the Agreement, the United Nations Secretary-General also pointed out that beyond the shift to a free-market economy "certain significant political" changes also underpinned the need for the consultations.\textsuperscript{242} The collapse of the former U.S.S.R., as a result of Mikhail Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika, can certainly be regarded as one of the "significant political" changes which led to the informal consultations, eventually culminating in the Agreement. The effect of the collapse of U.S.S.R. in the international balance of power was described by Margaret Thatcher who, as the former Prime Minister of Britain, had the privilege of being involved in real politik, in the following words:

\begin{quote}
''As the jargon of the experts in geopolitics has it —and in such matters a certain amount of jargon is permitted— we have moved with the end of the cold war and the implosion of the Soviet Union from a 'bipolar' to a 'unipolar' world. Today America is the only superpower — not even the
\end{quote}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{239} See 3.2.3. above.
\textsuperscript{240} See Art. 153(2) (a) of LOSC.
\end{flushleft}
Roman, Habsburg or British Empires in their prime – had the resources, reach or superiority over its closest rival enjoyed by America today.”

This shift from a ‘bipolar’ to a ‘unipolar’ world had an impact on African states’ ‘clout’ in the international sphere. For as long as there were two “superpowers”, both trying to expand their sphere of influence, African states were able to utilise the conflict between these “superpowers” to induce favourable concessions from one or the other of them. It has been argued that during the Cold War the two “superpowers” were attracted to Africa for strategic reasons, an attraction that has since waned with the end of the Cold War. For instance, as a result of the United States interest to maximise the freedoms of the high seas, especially as regards navigation and overflight, in order to counter any perceived threat from the former USSR, the developing states, including African states, were, as a result of the package deal approach in UNCLOS, able to eke concessions, including those on the deep seabed, from the United States of America. However, during the course of the informal consultations African states were faced with a situation where the existing unipolar world left “the lesser powers” with little choice but to accept the dictates of the only “super power” and its “allies.”

245 This is not, however, to suggest that even in the heat of the Cold War the two superpowers did not in certain situations, even including the issue of the seabed regime, have common interests to protect. For example at the initial stages of negotiations at UNCLOS III, the then two superpowers both took the position that the Authority should not have the exclusive right to explore and exploit the Area. The only point of divergence appears to have been based on ideology. For the USA its preference was for private companies to be the ones to engage in seabed mining while the then USSR wanted it to be only States that should be engaged in such mining. See Ogley, *Internationalizing the Seabed*, op.cit.pp.34-36 and 148-149 and Mahmoudi, *The Law of Deep Sea Bed Mining*, op.cit.pp.180-182.
3.4. Conclusion.

There is no doubt that the 1994 Agreement has significantly altered the original Part XI provisions. Apart from altering the institutional framework, which is discussed in more detail in chapter 4 of this thesis, the Agreement has substantially modified the original Part XI provisions on transfer of technology, production policy, financial terms of contracts and the review conference. These alterations, in most part, tend to favour the industrialised developed states to the disadvantage of developing states, including African states. While some of the provisions of the original Part XI are unchanged by the Agreement, it does appear, in the light of the 1994 Agreement and divergence in interpretation, these provisions are not in practical terms what was originally envisaged by African states. For example, the principle of the common heritage of mankind, although unchanged, has been significantly watered down by the Agreement. Also the principle of the use of the Area for only peaceful purposes appears to be weakened by the fact that certain states argue that it does not preclude the use of the Area for military activities in certain situations. The natural question, therefore, is why African states, which had taken a vocal position in the UNCLOS III on these issues, were ready to make concessions during the informal consultations that culminated in the 1994 Agreement. This chapter suggests two broad reasons for this. The first is the lack of an articulated common position on deep seabed issues during the informal consultations, similar to the OAU Declaration during the UNCLOS III, to serve as a base point for a common negotiating stance by African states on the concerns raised by certain developed industrialised states in respect of the original Part XI provisions. Second, certain economic and political changes in both the international sphere and the domestic setting of African states led to a change in their perception of the issues of the deep seabed regime. These economic and political changes identified in this chapter are the emergence of the market-oriented economy as the dominant policy in most African states; the lack of finance to go it alone for most African states, most of which from the eighties were already going through dire economic crisis; and the collapse of the former USSR, which had the effect of diminishing the ability of African states to play the then two superpowers against each other in order to get concessions in international fora.
Although African states have accepted the Agreement, which has as its bedrock free market principles, it is recommended that the Agreement in its application needs to take into consideration the peculiar disadvantaged position of the African continent in relation to deep seabed mining. In applying free market principles, unequal parties cannot be treated alike. Even in the domestic setting of virtually all the industrialised states involved in bringing about the 1994 Agreement, the application of free market principles clearly recognises that certain disadvantaged members of society require special dispensation based on clear-cut guidelines to enable them to enjoy the benefits of a free market economy. There is no reason why similar special consideration should not exist in the international society for the continent of Africa in respect of deep seabed mining activities. The concessions under the Agreement are vague and appear to be based on the arbitrary largesse of the industrialised states, rather than on clear and specific guidelines. While it is arguable that general, rather than detailed, principles may be more appropriate for the Agreement, especially at this stage when commercial exploitation of the deep seabed is not imminent, it is suggested that the ISA start to fashion out detailed rules and policies that would not only encourage African states and other disadvantaged developing states to participate in deep seabed mining activities, but would also provide effective protection for African land-based producers.

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248 For example, in the domestic setting of most industrialised states operating the free market economy there are certain social security benefits for poor persons and also special provisions for disabled members of the society.

249 See Art.160(2)(k) of LOSC that gives the Assembly the power "to consider problems of a general nature in connection with activities in the Area arising in particular for developing states, as well as those problems for states in connection with activities in the Area that are due to their geographical location, particularly for landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states." On the participation of African states in deep seabed mining, the issues will be returned to in chapter 5 and 6.
CHAPTER FOUR

INSTITUTIONS OF THE DEEP SEABED REGIME AND AFRICAN STATES.

This chapter shall limit its scope to considering institutions established in respect of the legal regime of the deep seabed under Part XI of the LOSC, as modified by the 1994 Implementation Agreement, having regard to the contributions and role of African states. It is divided into three parts. The first part of the chapter will examine the institutional framework of the regime and the role of African states. This part is divided into two sub-parts, Part A deals with the International Seabed Authority (ISA), while Part B deals with the dispute settlement mechanism. The second part of the chapter examines the issue of funding of these institutions and the contributions of Africa states, having in mind the influence exercised in an international organisation by the states parties that are the major financiers, while the third part is the conclusion.

Part I

4.1. Institutional framework of the deep seabed regime.

The institutional framework of the regime of the Area was a critical part of the agenda in the course of deliberations and negotiations during the UNCLOS III. The negotiations at the UNCLOS III on the status, composition, powers, functions and decision-making in the various institutions once again manifested the great friction in the law of the sea between the interests of the international community as a whole and national interests; between mare liberum and mare clausum; and between the north (represented by technologically superior developed states) and the south (represented by the technologically less endowed developing states). By the end of the conference a rather comprehensive and complicated institutional framework was put in place by the LOSC 82, which was later modified by the 1994 Agreement. The regime established an institutional framework, an “international government” over the seabed,¹ consisting of

¹ Allott, P., “Power Sharing in the Law of the Sea”, (1983) 77(1) AJIL, pp.1 at 13-14. These structures can be equated to the structures contained in a typical democratic setting found in municipal governments. The Assembly could be said to a type of legislative arm, while the Council, with its Commissions, could be placed as the executive. Of course the Seabed Chamber of the ITLOS would be the judicial arm. However, despite this analogy with the municipal democratic system it must, of course, be pointed out that whatever similarities exist between the international and municipal law systems, there are peculiarities which
the ISA and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), Seabed Disputes Chamber.

4.1.1. The African position on institutions of the seabed at UNCLOS III.

African states favoured at the UNCLOS III a deep seabed Authority with considerable powers that was autonomous, strong and in complete control of deep seabed mining activities. This was in contrast with the position of certain industrialised developed states that wanted a weak Authority, acting merely as a licensing or registry body for seabed miners. The African position was articulated in the 1974 Declaration of the Organisation of African Unity on Issues of the Law of the Sea, which declared as follows:

"That the African States affirm that:
(a) The competence of the international machinery shall extend over the seabed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction;
(b) The machinery shall possess full legal personality with functional privileges and immunities. It may have some working relationship with the United Nations system but it shall maintain considerable political and financial independence;
(c) The machinery shall be invested with strong and comprehensive powers. Among others it shall have the right to explore and exploit the area, to regulate the activities in the area, to handle equitable distribution of benefit and to minimise any adverse economic effects by the fluctuation of prices of raw materials resulting from activities carried out in the area; to distribute equitably among all developing countries the proceeds from any tax (fiscal imposition) levied in connexion with activities relating to the exploitation of the area; to protect the marine environment; to regulate and conduct scientific research and in this way to give full meaning to the concept of the common heritage of mankind;
(d) There shall be an assembly of all members which shall be the repository of all powers and a council of limited membership whose composition shall reflect the principle of equitable geographical distribution and shall exercise, in a democratic manner, most of the functions of the machinery. There shall also be a secretariat to service all the organs and a tribunal for the settlement of disputes between states and between states and private entities."
The Nigerian delegation in its statement before the First Committee of UNCLOS III emphasised the African position, by stating:

"This broad concept [common heritage of mankind], translated into practice; calls for the establishment of an international machinery which should have jurisdiction over the uses of the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, with properly defined powers, functions and authority. The functions and powers of the international machinery must not, in our opinion, be restricted to those of a simple registration or licensing office, as some would wish. On the contrary the international machinery should have extensive and far-reaching powers and functions".

An underlying consideration of African states as regards the institutional machinery of the Area as reflected by the OAU Declaration that advocated an "Assembly of all members which shall be the repository of all powers" was that it should be a democratised institutional framework, devoid of the dominance of developed industrial states. This was in contrast with the situation in the United Nations where the General Assembly, the plenary body, rather than being the repository of all powers, appears to be more of a deliberative organ only able to make non-binding recommendations, with executive powers being conferred on the Security Council of limited membership, including the permanent members. The deliberations at the UNCLOS III on the institutional framework of the regime of the Area were in essence a struggle for the control of the decision-making mechanism of these institutions. African states and other like-minded developing states, coalesced under common interest groups such as the

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5 See Conclusions in the General Report of the African States' Regional Seminar on the Law of the Sea, Yaoundé, 20-30 June 1972, 12 ILM 210 (1973), Recommendations III(4) & (5) and IV(1) that stressed the necessity for the Authority to function democratically devoid of any veto and weighted voting system. Also for the Authority to be structured and operated in such a way that the developing states would be the primary controllers and beneficiaries.
Group of 77, pushed for a more democratic institutional framework that would enable them exert influence by reason of their numerical strength. On the other hand, industrialised developed states, which already had extensive control over existing international organisations, were of course interested in retaining such influence in the institutions of the deep seabed regime in order to protect their financial, political and other strategic interests.\(^7\)

The decision-making structure of the original Part XI, which vested a lot of powers in the Assembly, the plenary organ, was therefore one of the reasons why certain industrialised states initially refused to ratify the LOSC. According to Oxman, these states wanted "a decision-making role in the deep seabed regime that fairly reflects and effectively protects the political and economic interests and financial contributions of participating States."\(^8\) In other words, they wanted a decision-making process in which they, as the providers of the technology and finance, would have control. This is more bluntly expressed by Ambassador James L. Malone, the special representative of the President of the United States, in his statement to the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee when he said:

"The decision-making system should provide that, on issues of highest importance to a nation, that nation will have affirmative influence on the outcome. Conversely nations with major economic interests should be secure in the knowledge that they can prevent decisions adverse to their interests."\(^9\)

The refusal of certain industrialised developed states to ratify the LOSC eventually led to the 1994 Agreement, which accommodated their concerns. The whole of section 3 of the annex of the Agreement deals with various rules on decision making by the organs of the ISA to ensure that the interests of the minority industrialised developed states are adequately protected. Under the 1994 Agreement there is an emphasis on decision-making in all the organs of the ISA, as a general rule, being by consensus.\(^10\) Thereafter it provides various rules on decision-making in the event that the organs are unable to reach

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\(^7\) Rembe, *Africa and International Law of the Sea*, op.cit. pp.64-68
\(^9\) Ibid, p.690.
\(^10\) Section 3(2) of the Annex to the Agreement.
a decision by consensus.\textsuperscript{11} While providing for various means to arrive at decisions through voting in the event of a failure to arrive at a consensus, certain inbuilt provisions effectively weaken the powers of the Assembly. Such inbuilt provisions include a requirement that decisions of the Assembly on certain matters shall be based on a recommendation of the Council, and that decisions of both the Assembly and the Council related to financial and budgetary matters shall be based on the recommendations of the Finance Committee.\textsuperscript{12} This, coupled with the fact that the Agreement has effectively, as will be seen subsequently in this chapter, carved out a strong position for the industrialised developed states in the Council and the Finance Committee, has had the effect of weakening the influence of the Assembly. Oxman points out that the Agreement: "...increases the influence of the United States and other industrial states in the Sea-Bed Authority, and reflects their long standing preference for emphasizing interests, not merely numbers, in the structure and voting arrangements of international organizations."\textsuperscript{13}

4.1.2. Decision Making and Voting Rights in International Institutions.

Although international organisations are usually set up with the altruistic idea of implementing a common goal of the member states which make up the organisation, in actuality these states are by and large interested in protecting their narrow national interests in such organisations, sometimes even to the detriment of the common goal. In order to protect such national interests a strong influence is required in the decision-making process of an international organisation.\textsuperscript{14} Such decision-making may be by unanimity,\textsuperscript{15} majority voting,\textsuperscript{16} weighed voting\textsuperscript{17} or consensus.\textsuperscript{18} The last three methods are utilised in one way or another in the LOSC and the 1994 Agreement.

\textsuperscript{11} The voting procedures include the requirement of a majority decision in respect of procedural matters and two-thirds majority in respect of substantive matters. See for example Section 3(3) and (5) of the Annex to the Agreement.
\textsuperscript{12} Section 3(4) and (7) of the Annex to the Agreement.
\textsuperscript{13} Oxman, "The 1994 Agreement and the Convention", op.cit.p. 695.
\textsuperscript{15} This requires the agreement of all members. See, for example, Art.5 of the Covenant of the League of Nations which stated: "Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant or by the terms of the
4.1.3. Institutions of the Seabed Regime.

Examination of the institutions of the deep seabed regime will include an examination of the membership of African states and their role in the decision-making process of each institution under the LOSC, as modified by the Agreement, with a view to determining the extent of the influence of African states, if any, in the various institutions.

4.1.3.1. International Seabed Authority (ISA).

I. International personality

As far back as 1949 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) confirmed that international organisations could have international personality, if so conferred expressly or by necessary implications by the constituent treaty. The ICJ, giving an advisory opinion specifically related to the international personality of the United Nations, said:

"That is not the same thing as saying that it is a State, which it certainly is not, or that its legal personality and rights and duties are the same as those of a State ... What it does mean is that it is a subject of international law and present Treaty, decisions at any meeting of the Assembly or of the Council shall require the agreement of all the Members of the League represented at the meeting."

This may be by way of a simple majority or a qualified majority such as two-thirds or three-quarters. See for example Art.18 (2) and (3) of the United Nations Charter which states: "Decisions of the General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting." "Decisions on other questions, including the determination of additional categories of questions to be decided by a two-thirds majority, shall be made by a majority of the members present and voting."

This is a system whereby votes are allocated to members of an international organisation on the basis of political, economic, financial or other predetermined relevant criteria. This usually gives certain members of the Organisation a veto over certain decisions of the organisation. See for example Article V section 3 of the Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which states: "(a) Each member shall have two hundred fifty votes plus one additional vote for each share of stock held;(b) Except as otherwise specifically provided, all matters before the Bank shall be decided by a majority of the votes cast." http://www.worldbank.org/ [Accessed on 20 May 2005].

This is when the decision is made in the absence of formal objection by any of the Parties. See for example Article IX of the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation, 33 ILM 1144(1994), which states: "The WTO shall continue the practice of decision-making by consensus followed under GATT 1947. Except as otherwise provided, where a decision cannot be arrived at by consensus, the matter shall be decided by voting." This method of decision making was adopted by the UNCLOS III. See Buzan, B., "Negotiating by Consensus: Developments in Technique at the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea", (1981) 75 AJIL.324-348. On decision making in international organisations generally, see Sands & Klein, Bowett's Law of International Institutions, op.cit. pp. 263-275.

capable of possessing international rights and duties, and that it has the capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international claims.”

In the case of the ISA, Article 176 of the LOSC provides: “The Authority shall have international legal personality and such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment of its purpose.”

II. Membership

All states parties to the LOSC are automatically members of the ISA.\(^{21}\) As of 1 February 2005 there were 148 members of the ISA, consisting of 147 states, including 39 African states, and an international organisation, the European Community.\(^{22}\) The LOSC also makes provision for certain states to participate in the ISA as observers.\(^{23}\) Currently there are 44 observer states, including the United States of America and 13 African states, mainly landlocked states.\(^{24}\) The ISA is based on the principle of sovereign equality of its members.\(^{25}\)

III. Seat of the ISA.

Under the Convention the seat of the ISA is located in Jamaica, a state which belongs to the Latin American and Caribbean regional grouping.\(^{26}\) However, the ISA is empowered to establish such regional centres or offices as it deems necessary for the exercise of its functions.\(^{27}\) Presently the ISA has not exercised its powers to establish regional offices.

On 26 August 1999 and 17 December 2003 the Headquarters Agreement and the Supplementary Agreement was signed between the government of Jamaica and the ISA.

\(^{20}\) Reparations Case, Supra at p.179.
\(^{21}\) Art.156 (2) of LOSC.
\(^{23}\) See Art.156 (3) of LOSC.
\(^{25}\) Art.157 (3) of LOSC.
\(^{26}\) Art.156 (4) of LOSC.
\(^{27}\) Art.156 (5) of LOSC.
to regulate the relationship between the ISA and the host state, as well as the facilities to be utilised by the ISA in the territory of Jamaica.28

IV. Powers and Functions of the ISA.

The ISA is a creation of the LOSC as modified by the 1994 Agreement, and these treaties determine the scope of its powers and functions. The LOSC makes it clear that the powers and functions of the ISA shall be those expressly conferred upon it by the Convention. However, it adds that the ISA shall also have such incidental powers, which are consistent with the provisions of the Convention, that are implicit in, and necessary for the exercise of, its powers and functions with respect to activities in the Area.29 The "implicit" and "necessary" test must be satisfied before the ISA can exercise any powers or functions that are not expressly conferred by the LOSC, as modified by the Agreement. A literal interpretation of the provisions of the LOSC on incidental powers would seem to suggest that such powers are available only for the exercise by the ISA of its powers and functions in relation to activities in the Area and not in respect of its powers and functions under Article 82 in relation to the extended continental shelf. However, in the view of this writer, there is no logical reason why the ISA should not have similar incidental powers in respect of its functions and powers under Article 82.

i. The Area.

The ISA is established as the body through which states parties are to organise and control activities in the Area, particularly with a view to administering the resources therein.30 It is also to provide for the equitable sharing on a non-discriminatory basis of the financial and economic benefits derived from activities in the Area through any appropriate mechanism, giving special consideration to the interest and needs of developing states and peoples that have not gained independence.31

29 Art. 157(2) of LOSC and Section 1 paragraph 1 of the Agreement.
30 Art. 157(1) of LOSC and Section 1, paragraph 1 of the Annex to the Agreement.
31 Arts.140 and 160(f) of LOSC.
The LOSC defines the resources of the Area as "all solid, liquid or gaseous mineral resources in situ in the area at or beneath the sea-bed, including polymetallic nodules," which when recovered are referred to as "minerals." This rather restricted definition of the resources of the Area limits the ISA to mineral-related activities of the seabed under the high seas. Presently, it appears that use of the Area for other activities, such as pipeline and cable laying and scientific research, unconnected with exploitation of seabed mineral resources do not fall within the competence of the ISA and therefore can be freely carried out as part of the freedoms of the high seas. Although this is so in theory, in reality there are potentials for overlap between the freedoms of the high seas and the functions of the ISA in the Area. The Secretary-General of the ISA alludes to this possibility when he says:

"The problem is that, while there is a freedom to engage in marine scientific research on the high seas and in the seabed, mineral resource prospecting and exploration in the Area are regulated through the Authority. The Convention fails to adequately distinguish between the terms "marine scientific research", "prospecting" and "exploration", nor does it make a distinction between "pure" and "applied" scientific research. The problem becomes even more acute when we consider the new scientific discoveries that have been made in recent years, particularly the deep sea vents, which comprise both mineral resources (polymetallic sulphides) and genetic resources in the form of rich biological communities of unknown potential use to science. Here we have not only a very real conflict between true marine scientific research and mineral prospecting, but also the potential for multiple use conflicts between, for example, deep seabed miners, so-called bioprospectors, and the proper conservation and management of the deep ocean environment. Clearly, there is a close relationship between the conduct of activities relating to non-living resources, for which the Authority has responsibility and the sustainable use of living resources of the deep ocean."

The limited role of the ISA in relation to natural resources, with an undue emphasis on polymetallic nodules, has been criticised by Elizabeth Borgese who makes a case for an

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32 Art. 133 (a) and (b) of LOSC.
33 Art. 112 of LOSC.
34 Arts. 143 and 256 of LOSC.
expanded role for the ISA. She takes the view that there is undue emphasis by the ISA on manganese nodules, the exploitation of which is uneconomical in the foreseeable future. She advocates that the ISA should in addition examine other mineral resources such as sulphides and methane hydrates, the exploitation of which in her view is more imminent. At present the ISA is working on a request submitted to it in respect of the adoption of regulations for the exploration of polymetallic sulphides and cobalt-rich crusts. Borgese also suggests an expanded role for the ISA in respect of the tremendous genetic resources within the Area with vast potential markets in such industries as the pharmaceutical, the waste treatment, food processing, oil-well services and paper processing industries. She argues that, although the present definition of natural resources in the Area does not seem to cover these genetic resources, it is a lacuna that must be filled through a regime of rules and regulations, which would allow for not only the conservation of bio-diversity in the Area and also sustainable use of its components, but would also provide for the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the use of genetic resources, the participation of developing states in the bio-industries and international co-operation in technology development in this sector. Borgese further suggests an expanded role for the ISA with regard to the service sector being developed

41 The restricted definition of the resources of the Area can be compared with the wider definition of the natural resources of the continental shelf under Article 77 of LOSC which not only includes minerals but also “....other non-living resources of the sea-bed and subsoil together with living organisms belonging to sedentary species, that is to say, organisms which, at the harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under the sea-bed or are unable to move except in constant physical contact with the sea-bed or the subsoil.” See Borgese, The Oceanic Circle: Governing the Seas as a Global Resource, op.cit. pp.170-171.
42 Borgese, “Caird Medal Address,” op. cit.p.395. More recently Professor Tullio Scovazzi of the University of Milano-Bicocca, Milan, Italy urged closer scrutiny of the mandate of the ISA in the exploration of genetic resources since this would be a more immediate and profitable activity on the seabed. See International Seabed Authority, Press Release, SB/10/20 of 4 June 2004. See also Scovazzi, T., “Mining, Protection of the Environment, Scientific Research and Bio prospecting: Some Considerations on
within the Area. She argues that the ISA should have a regulatory role over the telecommunications industry in respect of cables laid in the Area and in return be entitled to impose a minimal tax in respect of these cables that would generate income.\[^{43}\] She compares this with the regulatory powers exercised by coastal states in respect of the laying, routing and maintenance of cables on their continental shelves.\[^{44}\] Also she identifies certain developed states that are using the Area for the construction of permanent deep-sea ocean floor observatories to aid deep-sea research. She then advocates that the ISA be given the mandate to keep a register of these observatories and also generate additional income by charging a fee.\[^{45}\]

However, these suggestions for an expanded role for the ISA, as recognised by Borgese, suffer from the constraint of the rather limited scope of the definition of natural resources under the Convention, which cannot be interpreted to include her suggested expanded role. Such an expanded role for the ISA ordinarily could only be conferred by either amending the LOSC through the so far unused and rather complicated amendment procedures of the Convention, or through the utilised, but similarly complicated, means of an "implementation" Agreement, in reality an amendment instrument similar to the 1994 Agreement.\[^{46}\] In practice there is indication that when there is consensus amongst the states parties it may be possible to amend provisions of the LOSC, without utilising the formal amendment procedures or the mechanism of a so-called implementation agreement, through the role of the Meeting of States Parties to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (SPLOS).\[^{47}\] It is suggested that obtaining such a
consensus would be difficult in respect of an expanded role of the ISA concerning genetic resources since industrialised developed states, whose entities would be interested in unhindered access to these resources, could arguably claim that bio-prospecting and exploitation of these resources fall under the freedoms of the high seas. Similarly, it is not likely that there would be consensus on the other propositions of Borgese in respect of regulating cables in the Area and marine research since these also would be contrary to the freedoms of the high seas. Recognising the limitations of her suggestions, she advocates as follows:

“If, through an evolutionary and co-operative approach and the adoption of protocols as may be required, the Authority could adjust its scope to changing times and circumstances while remaining faithful to the principles on which it was founded, in particular, the principle of the Common Heritage of Mankind establishing that the Area its resource base and services must be used for the benefit of humankind as a whole, with particular consideration of the needs of poor countries, the conservation of the environment and biodiversity and that it must remain reserved for exclusively peaceful purposes, this really may be the beginning of the building of a new economics of peace.”

An expanded role for the ISA capable of generating, in the near future additional, income would certainly be of great benefit to African states, which stand to gain from any income generated from activities in the Area, since special consideration is to be given to developing states in the equitable distribution of such resources amongst states parties. Despite the difficulties that may arise with obtaining consensus amongst states parties, it is suggested that African states, perhaps through the avenue of the African Union (AU), should develop an articulated plan towards promoting at the ISA, SPLOS and the General Assembly of the United Nations the agenda of expanding the scope of the ISA’s role in the Area.

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49 Art.88 of LOSC.


51 Art.140 of LOSC.
Apart from its principal function of regulating the mining of the deep seabed, the ISA has
the ancillary, though crucial, function in the Area of protecting the marine environment
from pollution as well as protecting and conserving flora and fauna and protecting of
human life.\textsuperscript{52} Also the ISA is to promote and encourage marine scientific research on
deep seabed mining and to co-ordinate and disseminate the results of such research.\textsuperscript{54}
However, under the LOSC, such ancillary functions must be related to “activities in the
Area,” which has been defined to mean all activities of exploration for, and exploitation
of, solid, liquid or gaseous mineral resources in the Area.\textsuperscript{55}

Under the 1994 Agreement, the ISA, between the entry into force of the Convention and
the approval of the first plan of work for exploitation, is to concentrate on processing
applications for approval of plans of work for exploration; implementing the decisions of
the PrepCom on pioneer investors; monitoring compliance with the approved plans of
work for exploration; monitoring and reviewing trends and developments relating to deep
seabed mining activities, including regular analysis of world metal markets conditions
and metal prices, trends and prospects; continuing with the work of the PrepCom studying
the potential impact of mineral production from the Area on developing land-
based producers with a view to minimising such difficulties and assisting in economic
adjustment; adopting rules, regulations and procedures necessary for the conduct of
activities in the Area; adopting rules, regulations and procedures for the protection and
preservation of the marine environment; promoting and encouraging scientific research,
especially research on the environmental impact of activities in the Area, and the
dissemination of the results of such research; acquiring scientific knowledge and
monitoring the development of deep seabed mining technology, especially technology
relating to the protection and preservation of the marine environment; assessing available
data relating to prospecting and exploration; elaborating rules, regulations and procedures

\textsuperscript{52} Art. 145 of LOSC. See Kaye S., “Implementing high seas biodiversity conservation: global geopolitical
“Precautionary management of deep-sea mining,” (2002) 26(2) Marine Policy, pp.103-106 and
\textsuperscript{53} Art. 146 of LOSC.
\textsuperscript{54} Art. 143 of LOSC.
\textsuperscript{55} Arts.1 (3) and 133 of LOSC.
for exploitation, including those related to protection and preservation of the marine environment.\textsuperscript{56}

Significant achievements of the ISA include the approval in July 2000 of the Regulations for prospecting and exploration for polymetallic nodules in the Area.\textsuperscript{57} This approval opened the way for the ISA to issue exploration contracts for a period of 15 years, in line with the Convention and Agreement, to the seven registered pioneer investors, namely Institut français de recherche pour l'exploitation de la mer (IFREMER)/Association française pour l'étude et la recherche des nodules (AFERNOD) (France); Deep Ocean Resources Development Co. Ltd. (DORD)(Japan); Yuzhmorgeologiya (Russian Federation); China Ocean Minerals Research and Developmental Association (COMRA) (China); Interoceanmetal Joint Organization (IOM) (Bulgaria, Cuba, Czech Republic, Poland, Russian Federation and Slovakia); the Government of Republic of Korea and the Government of India.\textsuperscript{58}

Further the ISA has been actively engaged in research and studies in respect of the implications for the marine environment of deep seabed mining activities.\textsuperscript{59}

The LOSC emphasises that in the exercise of its powers and functions the ISA should avoid discrimination, although it is required to engage in "positive discrimination" by taking into consideration the interests and needs of developing states.\textsuperscript{60} This special consideration for developing states, a sort of affirmative action in favour of these states, is intended to encourage the participation of developing states in seabed mining activities. However despite this "positive discrimination" African states are yet to be involved in seabed mining activities. This indicates the need for the ISA to take positive steps to

\textsuperscript{56} Section 1, paragraph 5 of the Annex to the Agreement.
\textsuperscript{58} For more on pioneer investors, see section 5.2.3 of chapter 5 of this thesis.
\textsuperscript{60} Arts. 152 of LOSC.
specifically encourage the direct involvement of African states in deep seabed mining activities.\textsuperscript{61}

\textit{ii. Extended Continental Shelf.}

Beyond its functions in the Area, the Convention also gives the ISA certain powers and functions in relation to the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles.\textsuperscript{62} Under Article 82 of the LOSC, the ISA is to receive the payments or contributions of broad margin states. Upon receipt of the payments or contributions the ISA is required to distribute them among states parties on the basis of equitable sharing criteria. In doing so, the ISA is to take account of the interests of developing states, particularly the least developed and the landlocked states which are states parties.\textsuperscript{63} This in essence gives the ISA a distributive role in respect of benefits derived from a maritime zone outside that of its field of primary competence, the Area.

\subsection*{4.1.3.1.1. Organs of the ISA.}

The powers and functions of the ISA are exercised through a number of organs, namely the Assembly, the Council and the Secretariat.\textsuperscript{64} There are also subsidiary organs of the Council such as the Legal and Technical Commission, presently also carrying out the role of what was to have been the Economic Planning Commission,\textsuperscript{65} and also the Finance Committee. Further, there is the Enterprise, which is the seabed-mining corporation of the ISA, whose functions are presently being carried out by the Secretariat.\textsuperscript{66}

The ISA, under the 1994 Agreement, as a result of the insistence of the developed states, is a lean and cost-effective institution. This has an attendant effect on the frequency, duration and scheduling of meetings of its organs, and the evolutionary approach to the setting up and the functioning of certain organs. One of the concerns of certain industrialised states, which initially refused to ratify the LOSC, was that the structure

\textsuperscript{61} See Art.148 of LOSC.
\textsuperscript{62} See section 1.2.1 of chapter 1.
\textsuperscript{63} Art. 82(4) of LOSC.
\textsuperscript{64} Art.158 (1) of LOSC.
\textsuperscript{65} Section 1 paragraph 4 of the Annex of the Agreement.
\textsuperscript{66} Section 2 paragraph 1 of the Annex of the Agreement.
under the original Part XI was too elaborate and therefore the running costs of the ISA would be considerable. They therefore favoured an evolutionary approach to establishing the organs, having in mind their functionality, a position that was adopted by the Agreement. As will be seen subsequently in the examination of the various organs of the ISA, the issue of cost effectiveness is reflected greatly in determining the priority in terms of setting up the relevant organs. The developing states, including African states, not being in a position to effectively fund the institutional framework of the ISA, had no choice but to concede to the evolutionary approach of establishing the organs.

4.1.3.1.1(i). The Assembly

i. Membership

The Assembly is the plenary organ of the ISA consisting of all the states parties to the LOSC.

The attendance of states at meetings of the Assembly has so far generally been poor, such that there has been difficulty in securing a quorum at the meetings. The Secretary-General of the ISA attributes this to the fact that many states parties have little direct or even indirect interest in the exploratory stages of deep seabed mining. A perusal of the attendance of African states at the last four sessions of the Assembly confirms the poor attendance. At the seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth sessions of the Assembly the

68 See Section 1, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Annex to Agreement.
69 See Arts. 159-160 of LOSC 82 and Section 1, paragraph 4 of the Annex to the Agreement.
70 See Art. 159 (1) of LOSC.
71 A majority of the members of the ISA constitutes a quorum. Art. 159(5) of the LOSC. See Paras. 12-14 of the Report of the Secretary-General of the International Seabed Authority, ISBA/10/A/3 of 31 March 2004.
72 Para. 14 of the Report of the Secretary-General of ISA, ibid.
attendance record of African states were 10 states (out of a total attendance of 52 states); 10 states (out of a total attendance of 53 states); 12 states (out of a total attendance of 55 states) and 18 states (out of a total attendance of 73 states), respectively. The Sierra Leonean representative at the 58th session of the General Assembly, while encouraging states parties, including African coastal states, to attend and participate in meetings of the ISA in order to ensure that their views are articulated and reflected in the work of the ISA, attributed the lack of participation of many states, presumably including African states, to mainly financial constraints. It is suggested that though finance is an important consideration, the main reason for the poor attendance of African states parties in the Assembly could be attributed more to the lack of sufficient interest in the activities of the ISA, as a result of the indefinite postponement of commercial exploitation of the Area.

The current President of the Assembly, Mr. Dennis Francis of Trinidad and Tobago, is nominated from the Latin American and Caribbean group. Since its establishment there have been two presidents from the African group, namely Mr. S. Amos Wako of Kenya (1997) and Mr. Martin Belinga-Eboutou of Cameroon (2002).

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77 United Nations General Assembly, Fifty-eighth session, 64th plenary meeting, Monday, 24 November 2003, 3p.m, New York, Official Records, A/58/PV.64, p.14

78 Paras. 12-14 of the Report of the Secretary-General of the ISA. See note 71 above.


A Comparative Tabular Analysis of the Representation of each Regional Grouping in the Assembly

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional grouping</th>
<th>Number</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African Group</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Group</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) Group</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western European and others (WEOG) Group</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern European Group</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ii. Powers and Functions

The Assembly is empowered to establish the general policies of the ISA in collaboration with the Council. Apart from this, the Assembly is given the following additional powers and functions:

- to elect the members of the Council in the manner required by the Convention and Agreement;
- to elect the Secretary-General from the candidates proposed by the Council;
- to elect, upon the recommendation of the Council, the members of the Governing Board and the Director-General of the Enterprise, as and when it commences independent operations;
- to establish such subsidiary organs as it finds necessary for the exercise of its functions, and, in prescribing the composition of these organs, to take account of the principle of equitable geographical distribution and of special interests, as well as the

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81 See note 22 above. The analysis of representation of regional grouping in Table 4 above does not include the European Community which is an international organisation member of the ISA.

82 See Section 3, paragraph 1 of the Annex of the Agreement.

83 Art.160 (2) of LOSC.
need for the members to be qualified and competent to deal with the questions within the competence of such organs;

- to assess the contributions of members to the administrative budget of the ISA in accordance with the agreed scale of assessment, based on the scale used for the United Nations budget, until the ISA is able to raise sufficient income from other sources to meet its administrative expenses;\textsuperscript{84}

- to consider and approve rules and regulations, upon the recommendation of the Council, concerning the equitable sharing of the financial and other economic benefits of seabed mining having regard to the interests and needs of developing states. If the Assembly does not approve the recommendations of the Council, it is obliged to return the matter back to the Council for reconsideration in the light of the views of the Assembly;\textsuperscript{85}

- to decide upon the equitable sharing of financial and other economic benefits from seabed mining in accordance with the Convention, subject to the recommendation of the Finance Committee;

- to consider and approve rules, regulations and procedures of the ISA adopted by the Council concerning seabed mining, financial management and internal administration of the ISA;

- upon recommendation by the governing board of the Enterprise, when it commences independent operations, to transfer funds from the Enterprise to the ISA;

- to consider and approve the annual budget of the ISA as submitted by the Council;

- to examine periodic reports from the Council and from the Enterprise and also special reports which it requests from the Council or any other organ of the Authority;

- to initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of promoting international co-operation concerning activities in the Area and encouraging the progressive development of international law relating thereto and its codification;

- to consider problems of a general nature in connection with activities in the Area arising in particular for developing states, as well as those problems for states in

\textsuperscript{84} On issues of finance and budgetary matters the Assembly can only act upon the recommendation of the Council and the Finance Committee. See Section 3, paragraphs 4 and 7 of the Annex to the Agreement and below on decision-making.

\textsuperscript{85} Art.160 (f) of the LOSC and Section 3, paragraph 4 of Annex to the Agreement.
connection with activities in the Area that are due to their geographical location, particularly for landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states;

- to establish upon the recommendation of the Council, which in turn is to act on the recommendation of the Finance Committee, a system of economic assistance for developing land-based producer states which are seriously affected by the production of minerals from the seabed;

- to suspend the exercise of rights and privileges of membership of a state party once it has been decided by the Seabed Disputes Chambers that that state party has grossly and persistently violated the provisions of Part XI;

- to discuss any question or matter within the competence of the ISA and to decide which organ shall deal with any question or matter not specifically entrusted to any particular organ provided such distribution is consistent with the distribution of powers and functions among the organs of the ISA.

The Assembly under the LOSC is said to be the supreme organ of the ISA to which all other principal organs shall be accountable. This provision was in line with the desire of African states for a democratic supreme plenary organ. The O.A.U. declaration on Issues of the Law of the Sea called for "... an assembly of all members which shall be the repository of all powers...." A supreme plenary organ, as conceived by the African states as regards the Assembly, is in many regards similar to the institutional structure under the O.A.U Charter. Under the latter there was an institutional structure consisting of the Assembly of Heads of State; the Council of Ministers; the General Secretariat and the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration, with the Assembly, the plenary body, being the supreme organ, with each state having one vote and decisions on substantive matters being by resolutions passed by a two-thirds majority. All other organs, including the Council of Ministers, were inferior to the Assembly. Such institutional framework consisting of a supreme plenary organ appears to be the more familiar structure in most African based international organisations. Apart from the OAU,

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86 Art.160 (1) of LOSC.
87 Para. 22 of the O.A.U. Declaration. See note 3 above.
89 Art. VII.
other African based international organisations, such as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Southern African Development Community (SADC), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and even more recently the African Economic Community (AEC) and the African Union (AU), though having a plethora of institutions, appear to have a common institutional structure of a supreme and democratic plenary organ called the Assembly, Authority, Summit or Conference.

Although the Assembly is still referred to as the supreme organ of the ISA, the 1994 Agreement has greatly reduced its powers by removing its authority to act alone and make decisions. This in turn has reduced the capacity of developing states, including Africa states, with their numerical strength in the Assembly, to exercise considerable influence upon the regime through the Assembly. According to E.D. Brown, Article 160(1) of the Convention which talks about the Assembly being the supreme organ of the ISA, "... is largely an empty formula designed to satisfy the demands of the group of 77 in form, if not in substance, and is not matched by any residual powers whereby the
Assembly may assert its authority over Council in central areas of decision-making."\textsuperscript{102} This appears correct in the sense that the Agreement, as will be seen subsequently in the decision-making section of the Council below, gives considerable powers in the Council to the minority developed industrialised states to veto certain decisions unfavourable to them. However, the powers of the Assembly should not be underestimated since the Agreement makes provision for the Assembly to reject the recommendations of the Council. Upon rejection, the recommendation is returned to the Council which should reconsider it in the light of the views expressed by the Assembly.\textsuperscript{103} While this power may not be as far-reaching as desired by the developing states, including African states, a wise and effective use of this tool in an Assembly where they command a numerical majority would certainly give a leeway to exercise some level of influence in the regime.

iii. Decision-making

At the meetings of the Assembly each member, irrespective of size, stage of development, resources, geographical location or any other factors, has only one vote.\textsuperscript{104}

Under the LOSC decisions on questions of procedure, including the convening of special sessions of the Assembly, are by a simple majority of the members present and voting. On the other hand, decisions on questions of substance are by a qualified majority of two-thirds of the members present and voting, provided that such majority includes a majority of the members participating in the session. Whenever there is contention about whether an issue is a question of substance or not, it will be treated as a question of substance except where otherwise decided by the majority required for decisions on questions of substance.\textsuperscript{105} Further, the Convention provides for deferment, in certain instances, of voting concerning questions of substance. This is done either by the President of the Assembly, at his discretion, or if there is a request by at least one fifth of the members of the Assembly, the President is obliged to defer such voting. Such deferment can be done only once in relation to any particular question and should not exceed five calendar days.

\textsuperscript{103} Section 3 paragraph 4 of the Annex to the 1994 Agreement.
\textsuperscript{104} Art.159 (6) of LOSC.
It should also not result in a deferment beyond the end of the particular session of the ISA where the question is raised.\textsuperscript{106}

The decision-making process in the Assembly has been modified by the Agreement which requires that all organs of the ISA, including the Assembly, should as a first step make efforts to arrive at decisions by way of consensus.\textsuperscript{107} However, if all efforts to reach a decision by way of consensus fail, the Agreement requires the Assembly to revert to the voting procedure under the LOSC to arrive at a decision.\textsuperscript{108}

The voting procedures of the Assembly requiring a majority of votes, and excluding any weighted voting on the part of certain industrialised states, appear to be in line with the desire by African states for a plenary organ that is democratic. However, any significance of the role of the decision-making procedures of the Assembly is diminished by the 1994 Agreement, which has extensively cut down the powers of the Assembly. The numerical advantage of the developing states, including African states, in the Assembly appears rather meaningless as a result of the provisions of the Agreement on the relationship between the plenary Assembly, the limited Council and the Finance Committee. First, the Agreement limits the powers conferred on the Assembly to establish general policies\textsuperscript{109} by requiring such policies to be established by the Assembly "in collaboration with the Council."\textsuperscript{110} Second, the Agreement states that decisions of the Assembly on any matter for which the Council also has competence or on any administrative, budgetary or financial matter shall be based on the recommendations of the Council. In situations where the Assembly rejects the recommendations of the Council, it cannot substitute its own decision but must return the matter to the Council for further consideration in the light of the views expressed by the Assembly.\textsuperscript{111} Third, any decisions by the Assembly having financial or budgetary implications must be based on the recommendations of the

\textsuperscript{105} Art.159 (7) and (8) of LOSC.
\textsuperscript{106} Art. 159(9) of LOSC.
\textsuperscript{107} Section 3(2) of the Annex to the Agreement.
\textsuperscript{108} Section 3, paragraph 3 of the Annex to the Agreement.
\textsuperscript{109} Art.160 (1) of LOSC.
\textsuperscript{110} Section 3, paragraph 1 of the Annex to the Agreement.
\textsuperscript{111} Section 3, paragraph 4 of the Annex to the Agreement.
Finance Committee. In reality under the Agreement the real repository of significant powers under the institutional framework of the regime is not the Assembly but rather the Council. This differs from the original conception of the African states for a supreme democratic plenary body with considerable decision-making powers. The whittling away of the powers of the Assembly has undermined the advantage of numerical strength enjoyed by the developing states, including African states, in decision-making in the Assembly.

4.1.3.1.1(II). The Council

i. Membership

The Council is a smaller organ of the ISA in terms of representation but it is the executive organ of the ISA. It is composed of 36 members elected by the Assembly for a four-year term. The Agreement made significant modifications to the original Part XI provisions of the LOSC on the Council by declaring that the original provisions of the LOSC on the composition of the Council "shall not apply". The Agreement, after declaring the categorisation set out in the LOSC shall not apply, breaks down the categories of Council membership into an almost identical but significantly modified five group structure, namely, the consumer/importer states; investor states; major exporter states; developing states representing special interests; and states elected to ensure equitable geographical representation.

112 Section 3, paragraph 7 of the Annex to the Agreement.
114 Art.162 (1) of the LOSC.
115 Section 3, paragraph 5 of the Annex to the Agreement.
116 See Art.161 (1) of LOSC and Section 3, paragraph 16 of the Annex to the Agreement.
117 Section 3, paragraph 15 of the Annex to the Agreement.
118 There were, however, some changes in the consumer/importer group [the deletion of the word "socialist" and an addition that the state from the Eastern region should have "...the largest economy in that region in terms of gross domestic product" as well as replacing the largest consumer state with "the state, on the date of entry into force of the Convention, having the largest economy in terms of gross domestic product," if such states wish to be represented in this group]; the investor group [the deletion by the Agreement of the phrase in the LOSC; "...including at least one state from the Eastern European (Socialist) region"]; and developing states representing special interests [the Agreement includes island states as part of this group]. See Art.161 (1) (a) (b) and (d) of LOSC and compare with Section 3, paragraph 15(a) (b) and (d) of the Annex to the Agreement.
Each group of states is to be represented in the Council by those members nominated by that group. Each group is to nominate only as many candidates as the number of seats required to be filled by that group. However, when the potential candidate states in each group of the Council exceed the number of seats available to that group, states satisfying the criteria are required, as a matter of principle, to apply the rule of rotation to ensure that all states satisfying the criteria in the particular group have the opportunity to be represented therein at one time or the other. It is, however, left to each group of states to determine how they will apply the principle to their group.\textsuperscript{119} Also if a state fulfils the criteria for membership in more than one group, it is only to be proposed by one of the groups for election to the Council.\textsuperscript{120} For the purpose of determining the states members fulfilling the criteria for the various groups in the Council, an indicative list of states fitting the criteria for each group has been prepared by the ISA Secretariat.\textsuperscript{121} It was agreed that this list would be regarded as an indicative guide only and not as establishing definitive criteria. This list is also without prejudice to the right of states parties to submit or use other criteria.\textsuperscript{122} The Assembly uses this indicative list as a guide in establishing the lists of states fulfilling the criteria for membership of each group for the purposes of electing the members of the Council.\textsuperscript{123}

\textit{Group A (The consumer/importer states)}\textsuperscript{124}

This group is composed of four members from among those states parties which, during the last five years for which statistics are available, have either consumed more than 2 per cent in value terms of the total world consumption or have net imports of more than 2 per cent in value terms of total world imports of the commodities produced from the categories of minerals to be derived from the Area. It is, however, required that amongst the four members there shall be a guaranteed seat for the state from the Eastern European

\textsuperscript{119} Section 3 paragraph 10 of the Annex to the Agreement.
\textsuperscript{120} Section 3 paragraph 9(b) of the Agreement.
\textsuperscript{121} See Indicative List of States Members of the International Seabed Authority which would fulfil the Criteria for Membership in the Various Groups of States in the Council in accordance with Paragraph 15 of Section 3 of the Annex to the Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, ISBA/10/A/CRP.2 of 5 March 2004, prepared in line with Section 3 paragraph 9(b) of the Agreement.
\textsuperscript{122} See Para. 18 of ISBA/10/A/3 of 31 March 2004.
\textsuperscript{123} See Rule 83 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, ISBA/A/L.2 and Para. 22 of ISBA/10/A/3.
\textsuperscript{124} Section 3 Paragraph 15(a) of the Annex to the Agreement.
region having the largest economy in that region in terms of gross domestic product and also for the state, on the date of entry into force of the LOSC, having the largest economy in terms of gross domestic product, if such states wish to be represented in this group.

In this group the Russian Federation presently fits the criterion laid down for the guaranteed seat for the state from the Eastern European region, while the United States of America satisfies the criterion for the second guaranteed seat, as and when it becomes a party to the LOSC and the Agreement. The guaranteed seat for the United States of America, as and when it becomes a party to the relevant treaties, is a permanent seat since the cut-off date for having the largest economy in terms of gross domestic product has been frozen at the date of entry into force of the LOSC (hereinafter called "the freeze date"). Therefore, even if there is a change of the position in the future, it does not in anyway debar the United States of America when it becomes a state party from assuming its seat in this group if it so wishes. On the other hand, it is significant to note that from the language in which the freeze date is couched, the seat given to the state with the largest economy in the Eastern European region does not appear to confer a permanent seat to any state from that region. Presently, although the Russian Federation qualifies for this seat, there is the possibility of another state from that region replacing it as the largest economy in terms of gross domestic product (GDP). Since certain states from that region have become part of the European Union (EU), a major economic union aimed at promoting the economy of its member states, it is conceivable that the GDP of one of these states might one day overtake that of the Russian Federation.

Five African states are included in the indicative list of members of this group prepared by the ISA Secretariat, with Zambia, Democratic Republic of Congo(cobalt) and South

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125 This is reminiscent of the permanent seats in the Security Council of the United Nations. See Art. 23 of the United Nations Charter. See, "Senate Testimony Regarding the U.S. Adherence to Law of the Sea Convention", (2004) 98 AJIL, pp.173 at 174, where arguments in support of the U.S. adherence to the LOSC, referring to the guaranteed seat of the U.S in the Council of the ISA, alluded to the effective veto it would have (in combination with two other consumer states).

126 Note the positioning of the phrase incorporating the freeze date suggesting that it applies only to the state with the largest economy i.e. the United States of America.

127 On 1 May 2004 10 new member states were admitted into the European Union, including states in Eastern Europe such as the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
Africa (manganese) listed under major consumers and Botswana, Zimbabwe (nickel) and again South Africa (cobalt and nickel) listed under major net importers.\textsuperscript{128}

**Group B. (Investor states)\textsuperscript{129}**

This group is composed of four members from among the eight states parties which have made the largest investment in preparation for and in the conduct of activities in the Area either directly or through their nationals. No African state is represented in this group as African states have not yet made any significant investment in seabed activities.\textsuperscript{130}

**Group C. (Major producer/exporter states)\textsuperscript{131}**

This group is composed of four members from among states parties, which on the basis of production under their jurisdiction, are net exporters of the categories of minerals to be derived from the Area. The membership of this group is to include at least two developing states whose exports of such minerals have a substantial bearing upon their economies.

The group allows for representation by African land-based producer states, provided that they can show a high dependence on the foreign exchange proceeds of these minerals for the sustenance of their economy. In the indicative list prepared by the ISA Secretariat, the following African states are included in this group: Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo and Morocco (cobalt); Ghana and Gabon (manganese); Zambia (cobalt and copper); Zimbabwe (nickel) and South Africa (cobalt, manganese and nickel).\textsuperscript{132}

**Group D. (Developing states representing special interests)\textsuperscript{133}**

This group is composed of six members from among developing states parties representing special interests. The non-exhaustive list of special interests includes states

\textsuperscript{128} See ISBA/10/A/CRP.2 of 5 March 2004.
\textsuperscript{129} Section 3 paragraph 15(b).
\textsuperscript{130} See ISBA/10/A/CRP.2 of 5 March 2004. Under Art.161(1) of the LOSC, which Section 3 paragraph 16 of the Agreement declares shall not apply, this group was required to include at least one state from the Eastern European (Socialist) region.
\textsuperscript{131} Section 3 paragraph 15(c).
\textsuperscript{132} ISBA/10/A/CRP.2 of 5 March 2004.
\textsuperscript{133} Section 3 paragraph 15(d).
with large populations; landlocked or geographically disadvantaged states; developing island states; states that are major importers of the categories of minerals to be derived from the Area; states that are potential producers of such minerals; and least developed states. A number of African states fit into these criteria in one form or another under the indicative list prepared by the Secretariat of the ISA. In the category of special interests as major producers and net producers of relevant minerals the following African states are listed: Botswana (cobalt and nickel); Democratic Republic of Congo, Morocco and Namibia (Cobalt); Ghana and Gabon (manganese); Zambia (cobalt and copper); Zimbabwe (nickel); and South Africa (cobalt, copper, manganese and nickel). The only African state included in this group as a developing state with a large population is Nigeria. For developing states which are landlocked or geographically disadvantaged the African states included are Botswana, Mali, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe (landlocked) and Algeria, Cameroon, Djibouti, Gambia and Sudan (geographically disadvantaged). For the category of developing island states the following African states are listed: Cape Verde, Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Sao Tome and Principe, and Seychelles. In the category of the developing states which are major importers of the categories of minerals to be derived from the Area, Botswana and Zimbabwe (nickel) and South Africa (cobalt, manganese and nickel) are the African states listed. While in the category of developing states that are potential producers of the categories of minerals to be derived from the Area, the following African states are listed: Botswana and Cote d’Ivoire (nickel); Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia (copper); Uganda (cobalt); South Africa (copper and nickel) and Zimbabwe (cobalt, copper and nickel). Under the least developed states category, out of the 33 states listed, 23 are African states, namely: Angola, Benin, Cape Verde, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia.\textsuperscript{134}

\textsuperscript{134} ISBA/10/A/CRP.2 of 5 March 2004.
Group E. (Equitable geographical representation)\textsuperscript{135}

This group, the largest, has eighteen members elected according to the principle of ensuring an equitable geographical distribution of seats in the Council as a whole. There is, however, a proviso that each geographical region shall have at least one member in this group. The geographical regions, just like the practice in the United Nations General Assembly, are Africa; Asia; Eastern Europe; Latin America and the Caribbean; and Western Europe and others. At the time of the adoption of the General Assembly resolution on the 1994 Agreement there was an informal understanding that once there is widespread participation in the ISA and the number of members of each regional group is substantially similar to its membership of the United Nations, each regional group would be represented in Group E by at least three members.\textsuperscript{136}

\textsuperscript{135} Section 3 paragraph 15(e) of the Annex to the Agreement.

## Council Membership 2003-2006

**Table 5**

**Group A (4) - (The consumer/importer states)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy(i)</td>
<td>Italy(i)</td>
<td>Italy(i)</td>
<td>Italy(i)</td>
<td>Italy(i)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>China</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) With the possibility of relinquishment to the United States of America once it becomes a party to the Convention;

**Table 6**

**Group B (4) - (Investor states)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>United</td>
<td>United</td>
<td>United</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7

**Group C (4) - (Major producer/exporter states)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Gabon(2)</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) It is the understanding within the African Group that for 2005, South Africa will be elected to the seat in Group C that is to be occupied by Gabon in 2004 (ISBA/8/A/10).

Table 8

**Group D (6) - (Developing states representing special interests).**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Fiji</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

International Seabed Authority, *Press Release, SB/10/17 of 3 June 2004*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Group E (18)-(Equitable geographical representation)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Nigeria, Nigeria, Nigeria, Nigeria, Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Cameroon, Cameroon, Cameroon, Cameroon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Cote d'Ivoire, Cote d'Ivoire, Cote d'Ivoire, Cote d'Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Algeria, Gabon, Gabon, Gabon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Namibia, Namibia, Namibia, Namibia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Senegal, Senegal, Senegal, Senegal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gabon, South Africa, Kenya, Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Myanmar, Myanmar, Myanmar, Myanmar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Czech Republic, Czech Republic, Czech Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poland, Poland, Poland, Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Honduras, Honduras, Honduras, Honduras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chile, Chile, Chile, Chile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Argentina, Argentina, Argentina, Argentina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago, Trinidad &amp; Tobago, Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guyana, Guyana, Guyana, Guyana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Malta, Malta, Netherlands, Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spain, Spain, Spain, Spain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The tables above reveal the highly complicated\textsuperscript{138} and extremely politicised nature of the system for the composition of the Council under the Agreement. A perusal of the composition of the Council reveals that the African group has the largest number of the seats, but the 1994 Agreement totally undermines any advantage of numerical superiority, especially when combined with other developing states in the Asian and Latin American and Caribbean groups, and appears to put the real clout in the hands of the minority industrialised states through the decision-making mechanism as will be seen in the discussion below on decision-making.

By the March 1996 elections to the Council it was agreed that the regional groups would have the following number of seats in the Council – 10 seats for African group; 9 seats to the Asian group; 8 seats to the Western European and others group; 7 seats to the Latin American and Caribbean group; and 3 seats to the Eastern European group.\textsuperscript{139} The total number of seats under this arrangement adds up to thirty-seven, although the total membership of the Council is thirty-six. This led to another rather complex procedure, invoking the principle of burden sharing, called the "floating seat" system. Under this system each regional group is expected to give up one seat during the term of four years. The only exception to this is the Eastern European group, which had expressed reservations about the application of the system to it because it would result in its share being less than the minimum number of three members from each regional group as envisaged by the informal understanding. The relinquishment of a seat merely disentitles the member from voting though it may participate in the deliberations of the Council.\textsuperscript{140} The question that has rightly been asked is whether this result could not have been reached through a simpler procedure of revision of the composition of the Council.\textsuperscript{141}

Members of the Council are to be elected for four years. However, at the first election, in order to ensure continuity of membership, half of the members of each group were

\textsuperscript{138} Borgese describes it as a three-dimensional jigsaw puzzle. See Borgese, \textit{The Oceanic Circle: Governing the Seas as a Global Resource}, op. cit. p. 175.


\textsuperscript{140} Ibid, pp. 300-301.

\textsuperscript{141} Borgese, \textit{The Oceanic Circle: Governing the Seas as a Global Resource}, op.cit.pp.176-177.
elected for a two-year term. Upon the expiration of their term, the next election was for a four-year term. In order to avoid confusion, although the first elections took place on 21 March 1996, it was decided to harmonise the terms of office with the calendar years. The terms of office the members elected in 1996 for a two year term ended on 31 December 1998, while that of the members elected in 1996 for a four-year term ended on 31 December 2000. Thereafter the terms of office of elected Council members commence on 1 January and continue for a period of four calendar years to expire on 31 December.

The current President of the Council, Mr. Biady Diene of Senegal, is nominated from the African group. The other President emerging from the African group was Charles Manyang D’Awol of Sudan, who was President in 1999.

ii. Powers and Functions.

The Council, the executive arm of the ISA, though a body of limited membership, has been conferred with immense powers that are even further enhanced by the 1994 Agreement. The LOSC describes the Council as “…the executive organ of the Authority, having the power to establish in conformity with this Convention and the general policies established by the Assembly, the specific policies to be pursued by the Authority on any questions or matters within the competence of the Authority.” The Agreement, expanding the powers of the Council, states that; “The general policies of the Authority shall be established by the Assembly in collaboration with the Council.” (Emphasis added)

The plethora of powers of the Council includes the supervision and co-ordination of the provisions of Part XI and the Agreement and to draw the Assembly’s attention to cases of non-compliance; to propose a list of candidates to the Assembly for election as Secretary-General of the Secretariat; to recommend to the Assembly candidates for election as members of the Governing Board and Director-General of the Enterprise; to

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144 Art.162 (1) of LOSC.
145 Section 3 paragraph 1 of the Annex to the Agreement.
determine when the Enterprise should operate independently of the Secretariat; to issue
directives and approve plans of work submitted by the Enterprise and other operators; to
recommend to the Assembly the rules, regulations and procedures for sharing of the
benefits of the Area as required by the LOSC and the Agreement; to adopt and apply, subject
to approval by the Assembly, rules, regulations and procedures relating to prospecting,
exploration and exploitation in the Area and also the financial management and internal
administration of the ISA; to make emergency orders including suspension or adjustment of operations; to disapprove of certain areas for mining by operators, including the Enterprise, in order to prevent harm to the marine environment and to determine, upon the recommendation of the Finance Committee, the amount to be set aside to assist developing land-based producers.146

The LOSC and the Agreement confer upon the Council extensive recommendatory
powers in respect of the Assembly on any administrative, budgetary or financial matter.147 The issue arises as to whether the Assembly can act on these matters without the recommendation of the Council. A similar issue came up in respect of the United Nations in the Advisory Opinion of the International Court on Justice (ICJ) on the 
 Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations.148 In this case, the ICJ had to look into the question of whether the General Assembly of the United Nations could make a decision admitting a state as a member of the United Nations without the recommendation of the Security Council as required by Article 4 paragraph 2 of the United Nations Charter. The Court, by a vote of twelve to two, was of the opinion that the General Assembly could not make such a decision without the recommendation of the Security Council. In arriving at this opinion the ICJ alluded to the fact that both the General Assembly and Security Council are principal organs of the United Nations, with neither of these organs being subordinate to the other.

146 See Art.162 (2) of LOSC and Section 1 paragraphs 6 and 15; Section 2 paragraph 2, Section 3 and section 7 paragraph 1(a) of the Annex to the Agreement.
147 Art.162 (2) (s) of LOSC and Section 3 paragraph 4 of the Annex to the Agreement.
This appears to have influenced the Court, in certain regards, in arriving at its opinion.\(^{149}\)

Under the regime of the Area, the provision of the LOSC, which remains unchanged by the Agreement, in stating that the Assembly is "the supreme organ" of the ISA,\(^{150}\) appears to suggest that the Council is subordinate to the Assembly. However, the requirement under the Agreement that the general policies of the ISA shall be established by the Assembly "in collaboration with the Council"\(^{151}\) reveals that in reality the Council is no longer in a subordinate position to the Assembly. The Assembly, it would appear, can only act upon the recommendation of the Council. In situations where the Assembly disagrees with the recommendations of the Council, as has been pointed out earlier in this chapter, it has no powers to substitute such recommendation with its own decision but rather must return it to the Council for reconsideration in the light of the views expressed by the Assembly.\(^{152}\)

### iii. Decision-making

For the purposes of decision-making the five groups in the Council are divided into four chambers. While each group of states elected under groups A (consumer/importers), B (investors) and C (major producers/exporters) each form a separate chamber, developing states under groups D (developing states representing special interests) and E (equitable geographical representation) are lumped together to make up the fourth chamber.\(^{153}\) This in itself reveals the upper hand of the industrialised states in the whole negotiations, culminating in the Agreement's provisions on decision making. The Council, through its enhanced powers under the Agreement, as well as the chamber system of decision making, has entrenched the control over the regime by the industrialised developed states and thereby weakened the influence of developing states, including African states. Under the LOSC the decision making process of the Council was favourable to the numerically advantaged developing states since each member of

\(^{149}\) Ibid.p.329.

\(^{150}\) Art.160 (1) of LOSC.

\(^{151}\) Section 3 paragraph 1 of the Annex to the Agreement.

\(^{152}\) Section 3 paragraph 4 of the Annex to the Agreement.

the Council was to have one vote with decisions being by way of a majority on procedural matters and by way of a qualified majority of either two-thirds or three-fourths on varying matters of substance.\textsuperscript{154} There were, nevertheless, certain decisions that were required to be taken by way of consensus. These included decisions concerning the exercise of control over activities in the Area to ensure compliance with the LOSC and the requisite regulations and plans of work; recommendations to the Assembly on compensation and economic assistance for developing land-based producers; and the adoption of amendments to Part XI.\textsuperscript{155}

The 1994 Agreement, however, as with other organs of the ISA, requires that decision-making should be by consensus as a first step.\textsuperscript{156} As a result of the pre-eminence given to decision-making by consensus, the Agreement additionally makes provision for the Council to defer the taking of a decision in order to facilitate further negotiation whenever it appears that all efforts at arriving at a consensus have not been exhausted.\textsuperscript{157} However, in the event that the Council is unable to arrive at a decision by consensus, the Agreement, while retaining the decision-making process of the LOSC on questions of procedure, discards the elaborate process enunciated by the Convention on questions of substance\textsuperscript{158} and provides that "... decisions of substance, except where the Convention provides for decisions by consensus in the Council, shall be taken by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting, provided that such decisions are not opposed by a majority in any one of the chambers referred to in paragraph 9."\textsuperscript{159}

As an exception to the decision-making procedure just described, the Council, under the Agreement, is required to approve a plan of work recommended by the Legal and Technical Commission, unless a two-thirds majority of its members present and voting, including a majority of the members present and voting in each chamber, disapprove it. However, if the Council does not take a decision on a recommendation for approval of a

\textsuperscript{154} Art.161 (6) and (7) of LOSC.
\textsuperscript{155} Art.161 (7) (d) and (f) of LOSC.
\textsuperscript{156} Section 3 paragraph 2 of the Annex to the Agreement.
\textsuperscript{157} Section 3 paragraph 6 of the Annex to the Agreement.
\textsuperscript{158} Section 3(8) of the Annex to the Agreement states that the provisions of Art.161 (8) (b) and (c) of the LOSC "shall not apply."
plan of work within a prescribed period (60 days unless the Council prescribes a longer period), approval is deemed to have being given at the end of that period. If the Legal and Technical Commission recommends the disapproval of a plan of the work or does not make a recommendation, the Agreement empowers the Council, through the decision-making process on matters of substance, to override the Commission by approving the plan of work.\textsuperscript{160}

The decision-making process of the Council under the Agreement undermines any benefit of numerical advantage of developing states in the Council and puts the minority industrialised states in an advantageous position. This was rightly identified by Brown when he said:

"The considerable emphasis on the representation of special economic interest groups (as opposed to a straightforward representation based on equitable geographical distribution) has to be seen as favouring the minority of industrialised states which will always have predominant representation in Chambers A and B (‘consumers’ and ‘investors’ groups) and, of course, if the United States accedes to the UN Convention, it will be guaranteed permanent membership of the Council under the formula for membership of Group A, provided only that it ‘wish[es] to be represented in this group’. Taken with the voting rules..., the composition of the Council places those states in a significantly advantageous position."\textsuperscript{161}

Although the Agreement enjoins that in taking decisions the Council should seek to promote the interests of all the members of the ISA, the reality is that it effectively creates a situation by which a majority of states in any of the chambers could veto the decision of the Council.\textsuperscript{162} This gives developed industrialised states a potent weapon to block any decision in the Council they perceive to be detrimental to their interests. According to Oxman: "This approach to voting enables interested States (including the United States) to block undesirable decisions. Because blocking power encourages

\textsuperscript{159} Section 3 paragraph 5 of the Annex to the Agreement.
\textsuperscript{160} Section 3 paragraph 11(a) of the Annex to the Agreement. Paragraph 11(b) of this section declares that the provisions of Art.162(2)(j) of LOSC that categorically require the Council to act upon a plan of work within 60 days of its submission by the Legal and Technical Commission “shall not apply.”
\textsuperscript{162} Section 3 paragraph 5 of the Annex to the Agreement.
negotiation of decisions desired by and acceptable to the States principally affected, it enhances affirmative as well as negative influence.\textsuperscript{163}

Whilst the Agreement certainly gives the industrialised states a veto power to block unfavourable decisions, it also gives developing states, which together form the fourth chamber, the same veto power to block unfavourable decisions. In the course of the negotiations of the Agreement there was a view that the chambers for decision making should be restricted to the consumer, investor and exporter states to the exclusion of the developing states special interest group and equitable geographical representation group. However, a better view prevailed that this right of veto should be extended to all the categories on the grounds that to do otherwise would be discriminatory.\textsuperscript{164} This concession of a veto to the developing states shows that, although the Agreement drastically diminishes the influence of the developing states arising from their numerical advantage, there still remains some vestige of influence for such states in the Council. However, the task of achieving a veto is made more difficult for developing states as a result of the greater number of states required to attain the necessary majority in this chamber to oppose unfavourable decisions.

It is, however, important to point out that whatever benefit both developed and developing states will derive from the provisions on decision making in the Council will depend on whether they are able to maintain a cohesive front without certain states breaking ranks. In the reality of international relations there are possibilities of states breaking out of the bipolarity of the north/south divide as a result of their peculiar national interests, with certain developed states supporting the position of developing states on certain issues and vice versa. For example, at the WTO November 2001 trade summit held in Doha (Qatar), the United States of America backed the developing states

\textsuperscript{163} Oxman, "The 1994 Agreement and the Convention", op. cit. p. 691.
in their protest against European farm subsidies, while the European Union supported the stand of the developing states against United States of America’s anti-dumping rules.165

4.1.3.1.1(II) (A) Subsidiary Organs of Council.

The institutional framework of the regime makes provision for the Council to act through subsidiary organs. The LOSC established two such subsidiary organs - the Legal and Technical Commission and the Economic Planning Commission. However, as a result of the 1994 Agreement, the latter’s functions due to the goal of cost effectiveness in the operation of the organs of the ISA are at present being carried out by the former.166 In addition, the Agreement establishes the Finance Committee.167 Further, the Council is given powers to establish additional subsidiary organs if it is appropriate and having due regard to economy and efficiency.168 So far, no additional subsidiary organs have been established.

(1) Legal and Technical Commission.

i. Members

The Legal and Technical Commission, like the Economic Planning Commission whose functions it has presently assumed, is composed of 15 members elected by the Council in their personal capacity upon nomination by the states parties. The Council is, however, empowered to increase the size of the membership having regard to economy and efficiency.169 In 1996 the Council increased the size of the Legal and Technical

166 Art. 163 of LOSC and Section 1 paragraph 4 of the Annex to the Agreement. The Legal and Technical Commission is to perform the functions of the Economic Planning Commission until the Council decides otherwise or until the approval of the first plan of work for exploitation.
167 Section 9 of the Annex to the Agreement.
168 Art. 162(2) (d) of LOSC states that the Council shall “establish, as appropriate, and with due regard to economy and efficiency, such subsidiary organs as it finds necessary for the exercise of its functions in accordance with this Part. In the composition of subsidiary organs, emphasis shall be placed on the need for members qualified and competent in relevant technical matters dealt with by those organs provided that due account shall be taken of the principle of equitable geographical distribution and of special interests”. This is not tampered with by the Agreement. See also Art. 162(2) (y) of LOSC that empowers the Council to establish a subsidiary organ to deal with financial matters. Under Section 9 paragraph 9 of the Agreement the Finance Committee is deemed to be established under Art.162 (2) (y) of LOSC. On subsidiary organs under the United Nations, see Sarooshi, D., “The Legal Framework Governing United Nations Subsidiary Organs”, (1996) LXVII B.Y.I.L. pp. 411-478.
169 Art.163 (2) of LOSC.
Commission to 22 members; subsequently in 2001 the membership was further increased to 24. A comparative analysis of the number of members from each regional grouping shows a membership leaning heavily in favour of the Asian and African groupings. The attendance record of members from developing states at the meetings of the Legal and Technical Commission has been generally poor. To seek to encourage attendance the Assembly in 2003 approved an exceptional one-time authorisation for the Secretary-General of the ISA to advance up to $75,000 from ISA funds for the purpose of helping to defray the costs of attendance by developing states members of the Commission as well as the Finance Committee. Further, the Secretary-General has been authorised to advance up to $10,000 in 2005 from ISA funds to help defray the expenses of such developing states members, if so required.

Members of the Commission are elected by the Council for a five-year term and are eligible for re-election for a further term. As a result of the specialised and technical nature of the Commission, members are required to possess appropriate qualifications in respect of the area of competence of the Commission. Such qualifications are those relevant to exploration for and exploitation and processing of mineral resources; oceanology; protection of the marine environment; or economic or legal matters relating to ocean mining and related fields of expertise. Presumably, since it is presently carrying out the functions of the Economic Planning Commission, its members may also possess the appropriate qualifications related to that Commission, namely, qualifications relevant to mining, management of mineral resource activities, international trade or international economics and including at least two members from developing states whose exports of the categories of minerals to be derived from the Area have substantial

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170 ISBA/C/L.3.
171 ISBA/7/C/6.
172 See Table 9 (comparative analysis of the number of each regional grouping in the Legal and Technical Commission) below.
173 Para.33 of ISBA/10/A/3 of 31 March 2004.
175 International Seabed Authority, Press Releases, SB/10/11 of 1 June 2004.
176 Art.163 (7) of LOSC.
177 Art.165 (1) of LOSC.
bearing upon their economies.  

The qualifications required of the members of the Legal and Technical Commission, overlap to some extent with those of the Economic Planning Commission. This probably explains why it is convenient to merge the two Commissions for the time being. Despite the requirement of certain specialised and technical qualifications, it is emphasised that in electing such qualified members due account should be given to the need for equitable geographical distribution and the representation of special interests. In the event of the death, incapacity or resignation of a member before the expiration of the term of office, the Council is obliged to elect a member from the same geographical region or area of interest to serve for the remainder of the term of the previous member. In order to ensure transparency and impartiality, no member is to have any financial interest in any activity relating to exploration and exploitation in the Area. Also the members are bound during and after the termination of their term of office to a duty of secrecy concerning any industrial secrets, proprietary data or any other confidential information coming to their knowledge by reason of their duties for the ISA. 

A critical issue that arises, which is of course not new to nominated technocrats in international organisations, is how to maintain a balance between the loyalty to the nominating government and the Legal and Technical Commission. Further, to what extent can a member of the Legal and Technical Commission from a developing state whose term has ended use the knowledge acquired during tenure for the development of his or her home state’s marine technology?

The current Chairman of the Commission is Albert Hoffman (South Africa). The Commission presently also includes five other Africans from Cameroon, Mozambique, Senegal, Egypt, and Namibia.

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178 Art. 164(1) of LOSC.
179 Art. 163 (4) of the LOSC. Certain members of the Council have expressed concerns that the requirements for equitable geographical representation and representation of special interests were not being respected in the present composition of the Legal and Technical Commission. See Para. 30 of ISBA/10/A/3 of 31 March 2004.
180 Art.163 (6) of the LOSC.
181 Art.163 (8) of the LOSC.
182 Ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baidy Diene</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sami Ahmad Addam</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shahid Amjad</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frida Maria Armas Pfirter (Vice-Chairman)</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helmut Beiersdorf (1)</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arne Bjorlykke</td>
<td>Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferry Adamhar</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galo Carrera Hurtado</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
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<tr>
<td>Walter de Sa Leitao</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
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<tr>
<td>Miguel dos Santos Alberto Chissano</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mohammed M. Gomaa</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivan F. Glumov</td>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albert Hoffmann (Chairman)</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoshiaki Igarashi (2)</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jung-Keuk Kang</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Marie Auzende (3)</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lindsay M. Parson</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Ravindran</td>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giovanni Rosa</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alfred T. Simpson</td>
<td>Fiji</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rodrigo Miguel Urquiza Caroca</td>
<td>Chile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yuwei Li</td>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inge K. Zaamwani</td>
<td>Namibia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samuel Sona Betah</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Deceased since 30 May 2004 but yet to be replaced at the time of writing this thesis.
2. Elected to replace the earlier member from Japan, Mr. Yuji Kajitani, for the remaining part of his term.
3. Elected on 24 May 2004 to fill the vacancy caused by Jean-Pierre Lenoble’s resignation.

Table 11

A Comparative Analysis of the Number of Members from each Regional Grouping in the Legal and Technical Commission (2002-2007).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Grouping</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African group</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian group</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin American and Caribbean (LAC)Group</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western European and Others Group(WEOG)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern European (EE) Group</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ii. Powers and Functions**

The Legal and Technical Commission is given quite a number of advisory and recommendatory powers in relation to the Council, including making, at the request of the Council, recommendations with regard to the exercise of the ISA’s functions; to review formal written plans of work and make appropriate recommendations to the Council; to supervise at the request of the Council, either solely or in conjunction with other entities or states, activities in the Area and report on the same to the Council; to prepare assessments of, as well as formulate and submit to the Council draft rules, regulations and procedures on, the environmental implications of activities in the Area and to make recommendations on the protection of the marine environment to the Council; to make recommendations to the Council regarding the establishment of a monitoring process to guard against the risks or effects of pollution of the marine environment from activities in the Area; to recommend to the Council when proceedings should be instituted by the ISA at the Seabed Disputes Chambers of ITLOS and, upon a decision by the Chambers, what measures should be taken; and to make recommendations to the Council on emergency measures to be taken to prevent serious harm to the marine environment from mining activities in the Area.184

184 Art. 165(2) of the LOSC and Section 1 paragraph 6 of the Annex to the Agreement.
The Legal and Technical Commission played a crucial role in the preparation of the Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area (the Mining Code) 2000.\(^{185}\) It also plays a very active role in assessing the possible impacts on the environment arising from mining activities in the Area.\(^{186}\) Further, it engages in the evaluation of annual reports received from contractors.\(^ {187}\) The Commission has also been active in the current attempt by the ISA to prepare Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Sulphides and Cobalt-Rich Crusts in the Area.\(^ {188}\)

\textit{iii. Decision-making}

Under the LOSC the decision-making procedures of the Commission are to be established by the rules, regulations and procedures of the ISA.\(^ {189}\) Anticipating the possibility of divergent opinions in the Commission, the LOSC goes on to provide that recommendations from the Commission to the Council should be accompanied where necessary by a summary of the divergent opinions.\(^ {190}\)

The 1994 Agreement is, however, more specific on decision making by the Commission. It says that decision by voting in the Legal and Technical Commission shall be by a majority of members present and voting.\(^ {191}\) If this provision is read along with the consensus rule,\(^ {192}\) it means that the Commission must first make an attempt at reaching a consensus and only if this fails will the decision be reached by voting. This is confirmed by the Rules of Procedure of the Commission, which clearly state:

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\(^{185}\) See, for example, Draft Regulations on prospecting and exploration for polymetallic nodules in the Area—Proposed by the Legal and Technical Commission, ISBA/4/C/4/Rev.1 of 29 April 1998.

\(^{186}\) See, for example, Recommendations for the guidance of the contractors for the assessment of the possible environmental impacts arising from exploration for polymetallic nodules in the Area, ISBA/7/LTC/1/Rev.1** of 13 February 2002.

\(^{187}\) See, for example, Status of Annual Reports received from Contractors, ISBA/10/LTC/2 of 10 May 2004.

\(^{188}\) See Report of the Chairman of the Legal and Technical Commission on the work of the Commission during the Tenth Session of the ISA, ISBA/10/C/4 of 28 May 2004.

\(^{189}\) Art.163(11) of LOSC

\(^{190}\) Ibid.

\(^{191}\) Section 3 paragraph 13 of the Annex to the Agreement.

\(^{192}\) Section 3 paragraph 2 of the Annex to the Agreement.
"As a general rule, decision-making in the Commission should be by consensus. If all efforts to reach a decision by consensus have been exhausted, decisions by voting shall be taken by a majority of members present and voting".

Whatever impact the voting procedure may have in favour of African states and other developing states, which together have a majority in the Commission, is eliminated by the fact that decisions of substance by this body are subject to approval by the Council.

Under the Agreement, for instance, the Council is not bound by the recommendations of the Commission and is allowed to approve plans of work even if the Commission recommends disapproval of such plans of work or has made no recommendation at all.

(2) Finance Committee

i. Members

The Finance Committee is established by the 1994 Agreement and is deemed to be a subsidiary organ established by the Council to deal with financial matters, as required by the LOSC. The Committee consists of 15 members nominated by states parties, with the requirement that they have appropriate qualifications relevant to financial matters and are persons of the highest standards of competence and integrity. They are not to have any financial interest in any activity relating to matters upon which they have the responsibility to make recommendations. There is also a duty of secrecy requiring them, even on termination of their functions, not to disclose any confidential information coming to their knowledge by reason of their duties for the ISA. No two members of the Finance Committee shall be nationals of the same state party. The Assembly, and not the Council, elects the members of the Committee, unlike the position with the members of the Legal and Technical Commission. In electing the members, the Assembly is to have due regard to the need for equitable geographical distribution and the representation of special interests. In addition, the four different groups in the Council

194 Art. 165(2) of LOSC and Section 1 paragraph 6(a) of the Annex to the Agreement.
195 Section 3 paragraph 11 (a) of the Annex to the Agreement.
196 Section 9 of the Annex to the Agreement.
197 Section 9 paragraph 9 of the Annex to the Agreement and Art. 162(2) (y) of the LOSC.
198 Section 9 paragraph 1 of the Annex to the Agreement.

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(consumer/importer; investor; major producer/exporter; and developing states representing special interests) are each to be represented by at least one member in the Committee. Furthermore, until the ISA has sufficient funds other than assessed contributions to meet its administrative expenses, the Committee is to include the representatives of the five largest contributors to the administrative budget of the ISA.\textsuperscript{200} Members of the Committee shall hold office for a term of five years and shall be eligible for re-election. In the event of the death, incapacity or resignation of a member before the expiration of the term, the Assembly shall elect for the remainder of the term a member from the same geographical group or interest group.\textsuperscript{201} Again, as with the Legal and Technical Commission, the attendance of members from developing states has so far been poor.\textsuperscript{202}

The current chairman of the Finance Committee is Mr. Hasjim Djalal (Indonesia) of the Asian group and there are only two members from Africa, namely from Nigeria and Uganda.\textsuperscript{203}

\textsuperscript{199} Section 9 paragraph 6 of the Annex to the Agreement.
\textsuperscript{200} Section 9 paragraph 3 of the Annex to the Agreement.
\textsuperscript{201} Section 9 paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Annex to the Agreement.
\textsuperscript{202} Para.33 of ISBA/10/A/3 of 31 March 2004.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domenico Da Empoli</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernd Kreimer(1)</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivo Dreiseiti</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boris G. Idrisov</td>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
</tr>
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<td>Tadanori Inomata</td>
<td>Japan</td>
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<td>Jian Liu</td>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Pierre Levy</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juliet Semambo Kalema</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Wood(2)</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Ghandi(3)</td>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coy Roache</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djalal Hasjim</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Htoo Aung</td>
<td>Myanmar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florentina Adenike Ukonga</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Samih Matta</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Elected to replace Mr. Peter Dollekes (Germany). ISBA/7/A/7
2. Elected to replace Mr. Paul Mckell (United Kingdom). ISBA/8/A/3
3. Elected to replace Mr. Narinder Singh (India)ISBA/9/A/1
Table 13
A Comparative Analysis of the Number of each Regional Grouping in the Finance Committee (2002-2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional grouping</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African group</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian group</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) group</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western European and others group (WEOG)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern European (EE) group</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ii. Powers and Functions

The 1994 Agreement requires that in taking decisions on the following matters the Assembly and the Council must take into account the recommendations of the Finance Committee:204

- Draft financial rules, regulations and procedures of the organs of the ISA and the financial management and internal financial administration of the ISA;
- Assessment of contributions of members to the administrative budget;
- All relevant financial matters, including the proposed budget of the Secretary-General of the ISA and financial aspects of the implementation of the programmes of work of the Secretariat;
- The administrative budget;
- Financial obligations of states parties arising from the implementation of Part XI of the LOSC and the Agreement, as well as the administrative and budgetary implications of proposals and recommendations involving expenditure from the funds of the ISA;
- Rules, regulations and procedures on the equitable sharing of financial and other economic benefits derived from activities in the Area and the decisions to be made thereon.

204 Section 9 paragraph 7 of the Annex to the Agreement.
The Finance Committee was involved in the preparation of the Financial Regulations for
the ISA which were approved by the Council on 23 March 2000. It has also since its
establishment considered and recommended to both the Council and Assembly the
budget of the ISA and the scale of assessed contributions. Further, it has been engaged in
reviewing the audit reports of the ISA’s finances and making reports on such to the
Council and Assembly as well as making recommendations on the appointment of
auditors. Also, recently the Assembly mandated the Committee to review modalities to
defray the cost of participation at ISA meetings of members of the Legal and Technical
Commission, as well as of the Finance Committee, from developing states.

iii. Decision-making

The Agreement states that decisions of procedure in the Committee shall be taken by a
majority of the members who are present and voting, while decisions of substance shall
be taken by consensus. The Agreement does not state what steps should be taken if
consensus is not possible. In the other organs consensus is used as a first option and if
this fails, a decision is arrived at by voting. In the case of the Finance Committee,
consensus is the only option on matters of substance. This no doubt would lead to a
stalemate in cases where there are divergent views of the members. To avoid such
situations, the draft rules of procedure of the Committee produced in 1996 recommended
that in the event of a failure to reach a consensus within a reasonable time, the Committee
should prepare a report reflecting the different opinions. This in essence means that the
Committee makes no final decision, whether by way of simple or qualified majority, in
such a situation, but rather appears to push the task of going through the divergent

205 See Appointment of an Auditor, ISBA/9/FC/1 of 25 July 2003 and Para.28 of ISBA/10/A/3 of 31 March
2004.
206 Modalities to defray the cost of participation of members of the Legal and Technical Commission and
Finance Committee from developing Countries, ISBA/9/FC/2 of 25 July 2003.
207 Section 9 paragraph 8 of the Annex to the Agreement. See “Senate Testimony Regarding the U.S.
of the U.S. adherence to the LOSC alluded to the absolute veto it would have in the Finance Committee
with respect to any decision with financial and financial implications as well as the distribution of all
revenues generated from the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles.
Legal Regime, op. cit. 316.
opinions and arriving at its own decision to the organ to which the Committee is making a recommendation. It is difficult to reconcile this with the requirement under the Agreement that the Council must take into account the recommendations of the Finance Committee in certain matters.\(^\text{209}\) Which of the diverse views will the Assembly or the Council have to take into account? This position was, however, not followed in the final Rules of Procedure adopted on the 20 August 1999, which merely restate that decisions of substance should be by consensus.\(^\text{210}\) This is understandable since to do otherwise would amount to utilising the Rules of Procedure to amend the Agreement, which would be contrary to the amendment procedure prescribed by the LOSC and the Agreement.\(^\text{211}\) Fortunately, so far the Finance Committee has always been able to arrive at decisions on matters of substance by way of consensus.\(^\text{212}\)

4.1.3.1.1(III). Secretariat\(^\text{213}\)

I. Membership

This is the third principal organ of the ISA.\(^\text{214}\) This organ, an administrative organ, is intended to be independent and secluded from politics; consequently it is not significantly tampered with by the 1994 Agreement, except that it is given the additional role of performing the functions of the Enterprise until the latter begins to operate independently.\(^\text{215}\) It has been opined that the efficient functioning of a secretariat of an international institution is, to a large extent, contingent upon it being independent, impartial and not serving any particular interest of a particular member or group of members.\(^\text{216}\)

\(^{209}\) Section 9 paragraph 7 of the Annex to the Agreement
\(^{210}\) ISA/00/01 of 20 April, 1999, Rule 22(2).
\(^{211}\) Section 4 of the Annex to the Agreement and Arts. 314, 315 and 316 of LOSC
\(^{212}\) Para. 28 of ISBA/10/A/3 of 31 March 2004.
\(^{213}\) See generally Paras. 36-53 of ISBA/10/A/3.
\(^{215}\) Section 2 paragraph 1 of the Annex to the Agreement.
The Secretariat of the ISA is headed by a Secretary-General who is its chief administrative officer and is organised into four functional units, namely the Office of the Secretary-General; Office of Legal Affairs; Office of Resources and Environmental Monitoring; and Office of Administration and Management. The Secretary-General is to be elected for a four-year term by the Assembly from candidates proposed by the Council and is eligible for re-election. The LOSC does not seem to make specific provisions for the qualifications of the Secretary-General but says that all the staff of the Authority shall be persons who have the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity and who also have the scientific, technical and other qualifications which may be required to fulfil the administrative functions of the ISA. It appears that discretion as to the exact qualifications of the Secretary-General, subject to the provisions of the Convention, is left to the Council, which compiles the list of qualified candidates before sending it to the Assembly. The Secretary-General is empowered to appoint the staff of the Secretariat who are subject to the same personnel standards, methods and arrangements as the United Nations. However, in making such appointments due regard should be paid to recruiting staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible. The Secretary-General and the staff of the Secretariat are international civil servants who are not to seek or receive instructions from any government or source outside the ISA. In the United States v. Egorov and Egorova, a United States court, in respect of the staff of the United Nations, held that, "[e]mployees of the United Nations are separate and distinct from persons designated by foreign governments to serve as their foreign representatives in or to the United Nations". The Secretary-General and the staff are not allowed to have any financial interest in any activity relating to exploration and exploitation in the Area. Also there is a duty of

217 Art. 166(3) of LOSC.
219 Art.167 of LOSC.
220 See Art.11 of the Agreement concerning the Relationship between the United Nations and the International Seabed Authority annexed to General Assembly Resolution A/RES/52/27 of 26 January 1997 which was adopted by consensus on 26 November 1997. Also see generally the Staff Regulations of the ISA, ISBA/6/C/10 of 13 July, 2000 and ISBA/7/A/5 of 10 July 2001.
221 Art.167 (2) of LOSC.
222 Art.168 (1) of LOSC.
secrecy imposed on them not to disclose, even upon the termination of their functions, any industrial secret, proprietary data or any other confidential information coming to their knowledge by reason of their employment with the ISA.\textsuperscript{224}

The current Secretary-General is Satya N. Nandan (Fiji) who was elected for a four-year term in March 1996, re-elected for another four-year term in 2000, and only recently in 2004 was further re-elected for another four year term.\textsuperscript{225} Interestingly, during the election of the first Secretary-General of the ISA in 1996, one of the four candidates proposed by the Council to the Assembly was an African.\textsuperscript{226} The candidate, Mr. Joseph Warioba of Tanzania, the first President of the PrepCom, following a secret indicative vote, withdrew and the current Secretary-General was elected by the Assembly.\textsuperscript{227} Also recently for the 2004 elections an African candidate sponsored by the African Union, Mr. Charles Manyang D’Awol (Sudan), was proposed along with the present Secretary-General by the Council to the Assembly, which elected the latter by a vote of 48 to 29 with one spoilt vote.\textsuperscript{228}

\textit{ii. Powers and Functions}

The main functions of the Secretariat are administrative and include:

- Preparation by the Secretary-General of an annual report to the Assembly on the work of the ISA;
- Arrangements by the Secretary-General, on matters within the competence of the ISA and subject to the approval of Council, for consultation and co-operation with international and non-governmental organisations recognised by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations;
- Distribution by the Secretary-General to states parties of written reports submitted by non-governmental organisations with special competence on matters related to the work of the ISA;

\textsuperscript{224} Art.168 (2) of LOSC and Regulations 35 and 36 of the Mining Code, ISBA/6/A/18 of 4 October 2000.
\textsuperscript{226} The candidates were Satya N. Nandan(Fiji); Luis Preval Paez (Cuba); Kenneth Rattray (Jamaica) and Joseph Warioba (Tanzania)
\textsuperscript{227} See Para. 36 of ISBA/10/A/3 of 31 March 2004.
• Preparing and submitting draft texts, reports and other documents, analysis, research findings, policy suggestions and recommendations etc.;

• Providing secretariat services to the Assembly, the Council, the Legal and Technical Commission and the Finance Committee; providing information and advice to the bureaux of those organs and bodies and to delegations; and assisting in planning the work of the sessions, the conduct of the proceedings and drafting of reports;

• Providing meeting services (including interpretation, translation, document reproduction services and press releases);

• Producing publications, information bulletins and analytical studies;

• Organising and servicing expert group meetings, seminars and workshops;

• Disseminating information on activities and decisions of the ISA;

• Programme planning and allocating resources for the effective, economic and efficient performance of the services and functions of the Secretariat;\(^{229}\)

• In addition, it presently performs the functions of the Enterprise. These functions, which are listed by the Agreement, are merely administrative functions.\(^ {230}\)

\(iii.\) Decision-making

The Secretary-General, as the chief administrative officer, is responsible for decisions in the Secretariat, including recruitment and employment of staff, determination of their terms of employment and dismissal based on the recommendation of the appropriate tribunal.\(^ {231}\) In reaching his decisions the Secretary-General is subject to the rules, regulations and procedures of the ISA, and the provisions of the LOSC and the Agreement.\(^ {232}\)


\(^{230}\) Section 2, paragraph 1 of the Annex of the Agreement. See discussion below, section 4.1.3.1.1. (IV), on the Enterprise.

\(^{231}\) Art.167 (3) and 168(1) and (3) of LOSC.

\(^{232}\) Arts.167 (3) and 168(3) and (4) of the LOSC and Art.2 of the 1994 Agreement.
4.1.3.1.1(IV). The Enterprise. \(^{233}\)

**i. Legal personality and seat of business.**

Another organ of the ISA, the Enterprise, an international mining corporation, has, within the framework of the legal personality of the ISA, such legal capacity as conferred upon it by the Statute of the Enterprise annexed to the LOSC. \(^{234}\) Its principal place of business is to be located in the same place as the seat of the ISA, Jamaica. \(^{235}\)

**ii. Membership**

As a result of the concerns expressed by certain industrialised states and the indefinite postponement of commercial exploitation of the Area, the 1994 Agreement conferred the functions of the Enterprise on the Secretariat, until such a time as the Council issues a directive permitting the Enterprise to function independently. \(^{236}\) Consequently the Enterprise is presently composed of the staff of the Secretariat with the Secretary-General of the ISA specifically given the power to appoint from one of his staff an interim Director-General. \(^{237}\) It is interesting to note that the Secretary-General under this provision is not required to liaise with any other organ of the ISA in making this appointment. The present interim Director-General is an African, Nii Allotey Odunton (Ghana), the Deputy to the Secretary-General. \(^{238}\)

Prior to this the LOSC had made elaborate provisions, which will be applicable if and when the Enterprise starts to operate independently of the Secretariat, on the composition of the Enterprise. Under the LOSC its membership is to consist of a Director-General and a fifteen member Governing Board. An attempt by France during the UNCLOS III to ensure that the selection of the Board, for a certain period, be made by the major

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\(^{234}\) See Art. 170(2) and Art.13 (2) of Annex IV, LOSC. The creation of the Enterprise as the operational arm of the exploitation system was first proposed in 1971 by thirteen Latin American Countries who submitted to the Seabed Committee a working paper on the seabed regime. See A/AC.135/49 of 1971. This later was adopted by the group of 77. See Lee, Ibid.p. 62.

\(^{235}\) Art.170 (3) of LOSC.

\(^{236}\) Section 2 paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Annex to the Agreement.

\(^{237}\) Section 2 paragraph 1 of the Annex to the Agreement.

contributors to the funds of the Enterprise was scuttled by the Group of 77, which insisted that the Board should be elected by the Assembly.\textsuperscript{239} The members of the Governing Board are to be elected in their personal capacity by the Assembly, upon the recommendation of the Council, for a period of four years with the option of being re-elected, although consideration is to be paid to the principle of rotation of membership amongst nominees from different states parties.\textsuperscript{240} The LOSC, however, emphasises that the members of the Board should be of the highest standard of competence having the requisite qualifications in the relevant fields needed to effectively and successfully direct the operations of the Enterprise.\textsuperscript{241}

The day to day running of this international mining corporation, inclusive of the organisation, management, appointment and dismissal of the staff of the Enterprise, is vested in a Director-General. The Director-General is to be elected for a fixed term, not exceeding five years, by the Assembly, upon the nomination of the Governing Board and the recommendation of the Council, and may be re-elected for further terms. Although not a member of the Board, the Director-General is directly responsible to the Board, and may participate in its meetings, as well as those of the Council and the Assembly when they are dealing with matters concerning the Enterprise, but has no right to vote.\textsuperscript{242}

The staff of the Enterprise are to be persons of the highest standard of efficiency and technical competence but due regard is required to be paid to the importance of recruiting staff on an equitable geographical basis.\textsuperscript{243}

\textit{iii. Powers and Functions}

Under the LOSC the Enterprise had extensive powers to embark on seabed mining, transportation, processing and marketing of minerals recovered in the Area.\textsuperscript{244} According

\textsuperscript{240} See Article 5 of Annex IV of LOSC. The members of the Governing Board are to continue in office until their successors are elected. See Article 6 of Annex IV of LOSC for the powers and functions of the Board.
\textsuperscript{241} Art.5 (1) of Annex IV of LOSC.
\textsuperscript{242} Art.7 (1) and (2) of Annex IV of LOSC.
\textsuperscript{243} Art.7 (3) of Annex IV of LOSC.
to Nelson this organ was viewed by the Group of 77 "as a mechanism for translating into reality, so to speak, the idea of the common heritage of mankind." The modification introduced by the 1994 Agreement has, however, significantly limited the powers of the Enterprise. Under the LOSC, the Enterprise was given significant powers to embark on seabed mining, either on its own or jointly with willing and qualified entities, including those from developing states, using technology, which initially the industrialised developed states were obliged to transfer to the ISA under fair and reasonable terms. The United States of America had during the UNCLOS III, in a bid to arrive at a compromise on the system of mining the Area, indicated that the developed states would be willing to finance and provide technology for the Enterprise in return for the acceptance of the parallel system of mining by the Group of 77.

The provisions of Part XI of the LOSC on the Enterprise became one of the concerns that led to the refusal of certain industrialised developed states, including the United States of America, to ratify the LOSC. These industrialised states were of the view that the provisions of the LOSC on the Enterprise would inhibit free market principles and thereby adversely affect seabed mining. As far as they were concerned, the advantageous financial and compulsory transfer of technology provisions, along with other operating conditions, provided the Enterprise, under the LOSC, with an unfair advantage over other commercial operators. The 1994 Agreement addressed the concerns of these industrialised states by limiting the powers and functions of the Enterprise. It excludes the application of provisions of the LOSC on mandatory transfer of technology and requires the Enterprise and developing states to obtain seabed mining technology on fair

244 Art. 170(1) of LOSC
246 Arts. 153, 144 and Annex III, Arts.5 and 9 of the LOSC.
and reasonable commercial terms and conditions in the open market\textsuperscript{249} or through joint venture arrangements between them and the commercial operators.\textsuperscript{250} The obligation under LOSC requiring states parties to finance the operations of the Enterprise is declared by the Agreement not to apply, and the latter imposes upon this organ the same obligations applicable to other contractors.\textsuperscript{251} Further, in the interim, it is made an appendage of the Secretariat with mere administrative functions, namely,

- Monitoring and review of trends and developments relating to deep seabed mining activities, including regular analysis of world metal market conditions and metal prices, trends and prospects;
- Assessment of the results of the conduct of marine scientific research with respect to activities in the Area, with particular emphasis on research related to the environmental impact of activities in the Area;
- Assessment of available data relating to prospecting and exploration, including the criteria for such activities;
- Assessment of technological developments relevant to activities in the Area, in particular technology relating to the protection and preservation of the marine environment;
- Evaluation of information and data relating to areas reserved for the Authority;
- Assessment of approaches to joint-venture operations;
- Collection of information on the availability of trained manpower;
- Study of managerial policy options for the administration of the Enterprise at different stages of its operations.\textsuperscript{252}

In the event of actual seabed mining the Enterprise is required to conduct its initial operations through joint ventures.\textsuperscript{253} Upon the receipt of the approval of a plan of work for exploitation by any of the commercial operators or on a receipt by the Council of an application for a joint venture with the Enterprise, the Council shall consider the issue of

\textsuperscript{249} Compare with Article 144 (2) (b) of the LOSC that merely requires transfer to be, ".... under fair and reasonable terms and condition".
\textsuperscript{250} Section 5 paragraph 1 of the Annex to the 1994 Agreement.
\textsuperscript{251} Section 2 paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Annex to the 1994 Agreement.
\textsuperscript{252} Section 2 paragraph 1 of the Annex to the 1994 Agreement.
\textsuperscript{253} Section 2 paragraph 2 of the Annex to the Agreement.
the independent functioning of the Enterprise. If the proposed joint venture operation with the Enterprise accords with sound commercial principles, the Council shall issue the directive providing for the independent functioning of the Enterprise. It is not too clear exactly what is meant by sound commercial principles, but what is clear is that the question of whether or not the Enterprise would be independent has been answered by putting it under the effective control of the Council where the industrialised states have a strong veto power. In his comments on the Enterprise the Namibian representative at the Forty-eighth Session of the General Assembly maintained as follows "... unless the Enterprise is granted favourable conditions for its proper and effective functioning, it will be unable to fulfil its intended role. Therefore, the evolutionary approach and joint venture envisaged in the Agreement is quite acceptable to my delegation, but this should not be used to undermine the early and effective operation of the Enterprise." 

iv. Decision-making

The Enterprise, which is an international mining corporation, has a decision making procedure akin to most multinational corporations. The Governing Board, which is to direct the operations of the Enterprise, is akin to a Board of Directors of a multinational corporation. The Board is required to meet as often as the business of the Enterprise requires and a quorum is formed by two thirds of the members. Each member of the Board has one vote and matters before it are decided by a majority vote, with members having a conflict of interest on a matter required to refrain from voting. The members of the Board, although to be appointed in line with the principle of equitable geographical distribution, are to act in their decision making, not as representative of such region, but in their personal capacity.

The Director-General is to be responsible for decisions on day to day operations, such as the organisation, management, appointment and dismissal of the staff. The decisions of

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254 Section 2 paragraph 2 of the Annex to the Agreement.
256 Arts. 5 and 6 of Annex IV to LOSC.
257 Art. 5 (7) of Annex IV to LOSC.
258 Art. 5(8) of Annex IV to LOSC
the Director-General, however, are to be subject to the relevant rules and regulations of the Assembly and the provisions of the Statute of the Enterprise.\textsuperscript{260}

At present, as pointed out earlier, the functions of the Enterprise are being performed by the Secretariat with the interim Director-General being a staff member of the Secretariat appointed by the Secretary-General of the ISA.\textsuperscript{261} Naturally this appointee, as a staff member of the Secretariat, is subject to the normal decision-making process in the Secretariat and directly accountable to the Secretary-General.

\textbf{4.1.3.2. Institutions for the settlement of disputes under the deep seabed regime.}

The LOSC provides generally for a comprehensive and compulsory dispute settlement mechanism, with the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) being the main dispute settlement forum for disputes arising under the deep seabed regime.\textsuperscript{262} The regime in addition to the Seabed Disputes Chamber provides various dispute settlement options, namely the Ad Hoc Chambers of the Seabed Disputes Chamber and the Special Chamber established by the ITLOS, as well as commercial arbitration and the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. This section shall, however, be more focused on the Seabed Disputes Chamber and its Ad Hoc Chambers, though brief mention shall be made of the other dispute settlement mechanism.

\textbf{4.1.3.2.1. (I) (A). ITLOS dispute settlement mechanism.} \textsuperscript{263}

\textit{i. Seat}

The ITLOS is an independent judicial body established by the LOSC to adjudicate on disputes and applications submitted to it in accordance with the constituent treaty or by any other agreement which confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal.\textsuperscript{264} Although it is located

\textsuperscript{259} Art. 5(1) and (4) of Annex IV to LOSC.
\textsuperscript{260} Art.7(2) of Annex IV to LOSC.
\textsuperscript{261} Section 2 paragraph 1 of the Annex to Agreement.
\textsuperscript{264} Art.21 of Annex VI to the LOSC.
in Hamburg, Germany, there is provision for the Tribunal to sit and function elsewhere whenever it considers this to be desirable.

**ii. Members**

The tribunal is composed of 21 Judges, elected by the Meeting of States Parties (SPLOS), in their personal capacity from among persons enjoying the highest reputation for fairness and integrity, as well as having recognised competence in the field of the law of the sea. In electing these judges, consideration is to be given to the need to represent the principal legal systems and also equitable geographical distribution. Further, no two members of the tribunal may be nationals of the same state and there shall be no fewer than three members from each geographical grouping. In addition no member of the tribunal may exercise any political or administrative function or associate actively with or be financially interested in any of the operations of any enterprise involved in seabed mining activities; neither shall they act as agent, counsel or advocate in any case. The judges are elected for a term of nine years and may be re-elected, with the terms of one third of the members expiring every three years.

Out of the 21 judges of the ITLOS, five are from Africa, namely Thomas Mensah (Ghana); Paul Bamela Engo (Cameroon); Mohamed Mouldi Marsit (Tunisia); Tafsir Malick Ndiaye (Senegal) and Jose Luis Jesus (Cape Verde). The African representation

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265 Art. 1(1) and (2) of Annex VI to the LOSC.
266 Art. 1(3) of Annex VI to the LOSC. This is similar to Art. 22 of the Statute of the ICJ which was used for the first time in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project Case (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgement, (1997) I.C.J. Rep. 7.
267 Art. 2 (1) of Annex VI of LOSC. Compare with Art.2 of the Statute of the ICJ which states: “The Court shall be composed of a body of independent judges, elected regardless of their nationality from among persons of high moral character, who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices, or are jurisconsults of recognised competence in international law.”
268 Art. 2 (2) of Annex VI to the LOSC. Compare with Art.9 of the Statute of the ICJ which states that the electors should in addition to the professional qualifications of the candidates also take into consideration “...that in the body as a whole the representation of the main forms of civilisation and of the principal systems of the world should be assured.”
269 Art.3 of Annex VI to LOSC.
270 Art. 7 of Annex VI to LOSC. Compare with Arts. 16 and 17 of Statute of ICJ
271 Art. 5 of Annex VI to LOSC. Compare with Art.13 of the Statute of the ICJ. At the first election the terms of seven members expired at the end of three years and the seven more members expired at the end of six years. Lots were drawn by the secretary-general immediately after the first election to choose these members. See SPLOS/9 of 31 May 1996.
at the ITLOS, when contrasted with the current representation on the ICJ, reveal a slight percentage increase.272

Disputing state parties which do not have a national as a judge may appoint a suitably qualified person as judge ad hoc.273 The current president of the tribunal is L. Dolliver M. Nelson (Grenada), while the registrar is Philippe Gautier (Belgium).274

Table 14
Current Judges of the ITLOS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name (Order of Precedence)</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date of Expiry of Term of Office</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>L. Dolliver M. Nelson</td>
<td>Grenada 30 September 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice-President</td>
<td>Budislav Vukas</td>
<td>Croatia 30 September 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judges</td>
<td>Hugo Caminos</td>
<td>Argentina 30 September 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vicente Marrotta Rangel</td>
<td>Brazil 30 September 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alexander Yankov</td>
<td>Bulgaria 30 September 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Soji Yamamoto</td>
<td>Japan 30 September 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anatoly Lazarevich Kolodkin</td>
<td>Russian Federation 30 September 2008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


273 See Art.17 and also Arts. 2, 8 and 11 of Annex VI to LOSC. Compare with Art.31 (2) of the Statute of ICJ.

274 He became registrar on 21 September 2001 for a term of five years to replace Mr. Gritakumar E. Chitty (Sri Lanka) who resigned on 30 June 2001.

275 See General Information-Judges http://www.itlos.org/start2_en.html. The agreed allocation of seats to each regional grouping is African group(5); Asian group(5); Latin American and Caribbean group(4); Western European and Other States group(4) and Eastern European group(3). See SPLOS/34 of 21 April, 1999
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Choon-Ho Park</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
<td>30 September 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Bamela Engo</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>30 September 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas A. Mensah</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>30 September 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P. Chandrasekhar Rao</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>30 September 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Akl</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>30 September 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Anderson</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>30 September 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rudiger Wolfrum</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>30 September 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tullio Treves</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>30 September 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohamed Mouldi Marsit</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>30 September 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tafsir Malick Ndiaye</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>30 September 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jose Luis Jesus</td>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>30 September 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gungjian Xu</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>30 September 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Pierre Cot</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>30 September 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthony Amos Lucky</td>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>30 September 2011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 15

ITLOS- Number of Representatives of each Regional Grouping

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional grouping</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin American &amp; Caribbean (LAC)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western European &amp; others (WEOG)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern European (EE)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 16
Comparison of the Number of Representatives of Regional Groupings on ITLOS and ICJ

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Grouping</th>
<th>ITLOS (21 Members)</th>
<th>ICJ (15 members)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>5 (23.81%)</td>
<td>3 (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>5 (23.81%)</td>
<td>3 (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin American &amp; Caribbean</td>
<td>4 (19.05%)</td>
<td>2 (13.33%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(LAC)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western European &amp; Others</td>
<td>4 (19.05%)</td>
<td>5 (33.33%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(WEOG)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern European (EE)</td>
<td>3 (14.29%)</td>
<td>2 (13.33%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ITLOS is given the power under the LOSC to establish Special chambers. The LOSC however specifically mentions and establishes the Seabed Disputes Chamber to exercise jurisdiction over Part XI matters.

I. The Seabed Disputes Chamber.

At UNCLOS III the possibility of the Seabed Disputes Chamber being an organ of the ISA was considered but eventually abandoned. It was discarded in favour of a comprehensive system of settlement of disputes for the whole Convention with the Seabed Disputes Chamber as part of the ITLOS. A perusal of the Statute of the ITLOS shows an attempt to make clear that the Chamber is an integral part of the ITLOS. This is conveyed in the provisions on its composition, which comprises judges of ITLOS, and

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276 Art. 15 of Annex VI to LOSC. Compare with Arts.26 and 27 of Statute of ICJ. Pursuant to Art.15 the following chambers have been formed – the Chamber of Summary Procedure, the Chamber for Fisheries Disputes, the Chamber for Marine Environment Disputes and at the request of Chile and the European Community, a special chamber was formed to deal with the Case Concerning the Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the South-Eastern Pacific Ocean. See General Information-Overview: International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea [Accessed on 6 December 2004].

277 Art.186 of LOSC and Art.14 of Annex VI.

also that its judgement is regarded as that of the ITLOS.\textsuperscript{279} Although the Seabed Disputes Chamber is not an organ of the ISA, Gudmundur Eiriksson points out that it maintains links with the latter organisation in three specific aspects:\textsuperscript{280} first, through the role given to the Assembly of the ISA to adopt recommendations of a general nature in relation to the composition of the Chamber;\textsuperscript{281} second, as a result of the relationship between the Chamber and the Assembly, as well as the Council of the ISA, on advisory opinions;\textsuperscript{282} and third, with regard to the amendment of the Statute of the ITLOS in relation to activities in the Area, where the approval of the Assembly and Council is required.\textsuperscript{283} In addition, such link is maintained through the provision requiring the ISA to be partly responsible for the expenses of the ITLOS on such terms and manner to be decided by the Meeting of States Parties (SPLOS).\textsuperscript{284}

\textit{i. Members}

The Seabed Disputes Chamber is composed of 11 judges selected by a majority of the members of the ITLOS from amongst themselves for a term of three years. They may also be selected for a second term.\textsuperscript{285} In selecting the judges due consideration is to be given to the need for representation of the principal legal systems of the world and equitable geographical distribution.\textsuperscript{286} The Chamber elects its own President from amongst its members to serve for the tenure of the selected members.\textsuperscript{287} A quorum of seven (7) judges is required to properly constitute the Chamber.\textsuperscript{288}

The current members of the Chamber were selected in October 2002 and their tenure is due to end on 30 September 2005. It includes three African judges, namely Mohamed

\textsuperscript{279} Arts. 35 and 15(5) of Annex VI.
\textsuperscript{280} Eiriksson, op. cit. pp. 68-69 and 283-285.
\textsuperscript{281} Art.35 (2) of Annex VI.
\textsuperscript{282} Art.191 of LOSC.
\textsuperscript{283} Art. 314 of LOSC and Art. 41 of Annex VI.
\textsuperscript{284} Art.19 (1) of Annex VI.
\textsuperscript{285} Art. 35(1) and (3) of Annex VI. Art.22 of ITLOS Rules of the Tribunal, ITLOS/8 of 21 September 2001.
\textsuperscript{286} Art.35 (2) of Annex VI.
\textsuperscript{287} Art.35 (4) of Annex VI; Art.26 of ITLOS Rules of the Tribunal, ITLOS/8.
\textsuperscript{288} Art.35 (7) of Annex VI.
Mouldi Marsit (Tunisia), who is also the President of the Chamber, as well as Thomas A. Mensah (Ghana) and Jose Luis Jesus (Cape Verde).289

Table 17
Composition of the Seabed Disputes Chamber (2002-2005).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mohamed Mouldi Marsit</td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugo Caminos</td>
<td>Argentina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexander Yankov</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P. Chandrasekhar Rao</td>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choon-ho Park</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Mensah</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Anderson</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jose Luis Jesus</td>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guangjian Xu</td>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Pierre Cot</td>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthony Amos Lucky</td>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 18
Seabed Disputes Chamber – Number of Representatives of each Regional Grouping

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional grouping</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin American &amp; Caribbean (LAC)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western European &amp; Others (WEOG)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern European (EE)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ii. Jurisdiction.

The Seabed Disputes Chamber allows access not only to states parties, but also to institutions such as the ISA and the Enterprise, as well as state enterprises and natural or juridical persons.\(^{290}\) It is set up to deal with disputes that may arise from seabed mining activities and has compulsory jurisdiction over states parties\(^{291}\). It has jurisdiction over the following types of dispute: \(^{292}\)

- Disputes between states parties concerning the interpretation or application of Part XI and the Annexes relating to it. Presumably this would include also jurisdiction to interpret the 1994 Agreement since the states parties "undertake to implement Part XI in accordance with this Agreement" and the provisions of the Agreement and Part XI are to be "interpreted and applied together as a single instrument." \(^{293}\)

- Disputes between a state party and the ISA concerning:
  - acts or omissions of the ISA or of a state party alleged to be in violation of Part XI or the annexes or the rules, regulations and procedures of the ISA, presumably this would also include such acts or omissions in violation of the 1994 Agreement; or
  - acts of the ISA alleged to be ultra vires its jurisdiction or a misuse of its power. In exercising this jurisdiction the Chamber, however, cannot pronounce on the question of whether the rules, regulations and procedures are in conformity with the LOSC, neither can it declare them invalid. Its powers are merely limited to determining whether the application of such rules, regulations and procedures would be in conflict with the contractual or conventional obligations of the parties in the particular case before it. \(^{294}\)

- Disputes between parties to a contract, whether states parties, the ISA or the Enterprise, state enterprises and natural or juridical persons concerning;
  - the interpretation or application of a relevant contract or a plan of work; or

\(^{290}\) Art. 20 of Annex VI and Art. 187(c), (d) and (e) of LOSC. Compare with Art. 34(1) of the Statute of the ICJ which allows only states to be parties to contentious cases.

\(^{291}\) Art. 287 (2) of LOSC.

\(^{292}\) Art. 187 of LOSC.

\(^{293}\) Arts. 1(1) and 2(1) of the 1994 Agreement.

\(^{294}\) Art. 189 of LOSC.
• acts or omissions of a party to the contract relating to activities in the Area and directed to the other party or directly affecting its legitimate interests.
• Disputes between the ISA and a prospective contractor sponsored by a state party, which has fulfilled all the conditions as required by the Convention, concerning the refusal of a contract or a legal issue arising in the negotiation of a contract;
• Disputes between the ISA and a state party, a state enterprise or a natural or juridical person sponsored by a state party where it is alleged that the ISA has incurred liability as a result of its wrongful acts in the exercise of its powers and functions;
• Any other disputes for which jurisdiction is specifically conferred on it by the Convention.295

The Chamber is also competent to give advisory opinions on legal questions arising within the scope of the activities of the ISA, when the Assembly or the Council so request.296

The LOSC does not appear to specifically allot jurisdiction to the Chamber in respect of the ISA's role under Article 82. Allot, however, points out that:

"Disputes relating to the ISA's role under Article 82 would appear not to be within the contentious jurisdiction of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea under Article 187, but some matters arising under Article 82 might in some circumstances be the subject of a request for an advisory opinion under Article 191 or (if they involved a "dispute" between states, in the technical sense) of proceedings under the general provisions of part XV." 297

The reason for this is clear because the jurisdiction of the Chamber in contentious cases is limited and specific,298 whereas its advisory jurisdiction appears wide enough to cover ISA activities under Article 82 because it extends to "...legal questions arising within the scope of their [the Assembly and the Council] activities".299

295 For more on the jurisdiction of the Seabed Chambers see Brown, Seabed Energy and Minerals: The International Legal Regime, op. cit.pp.357-369.
296 Art.191 of LOSC.
298 See Arts.187 (f) and 288(3) of LOSC.
299 Art.191 of LOSC.
concerning Article 82 would therefore have to be resolved through utilising the general dispute settlement mechanism available under Part XV. However, the latter cannot generally be used in respect of any dispute between the ISA and a state party arising from Article 82 since Part XV applies mainly to disputes between states parties.\textsuperscript{300} In the view of this author there is no reason why the ITLOS, though not the Seabed Disputes Chamber, cannot have jurisdiction to hear such dispute under Articles 20, paragraph 2 and 21 of Annex VI of the LOSC, if such jurisdiction is conferred upon the Tribunal by the express agreement of the disputing parties.\textsuperscript{301} Further, there is no reason why such a dispute could not be submitted to arbitration or conciliation under the general rules of international law, if the ISA and the state party so agree.

2. Ad Hoc Chambers of the Seabed Disputes Chamber

The Seabed Disputes Chamber is empowered to form an Ad Hoc Chamber but only in the case of disputes between states parties.\textsuperscript{302} This is to be done at the request of any of the disputing parties, within three months from the date of the institution of proceedings, to deal with the interpretation or application of Part XI of the LOSC and the related annexes, and presumably the 1994 Agreement.\textsuperscript{303} This Ad Hoc Chamber is composed of three members to be determined by the Seabed Disputes Chamber with the approval of the parties.\textsuperscript{304} If however the parties do not agree on the composition of the Ad Hoc Chamber, each party is allowed to appoint one member and the third member is appointed by them in agreement. In the event that this fails, the President of the Seabed Disputes Chamber is to make the appointment after consultations with the parties.\textsuperscript{305} The

\textsuperscript{300} See generally Art. 279-296 of LOSC.
\textsuperscript{301} Art.20(2) of Annex VI says: “The Tribunal shall be open to entities other than States Parties in any case expressly provided for in Part XI or in any case submitted pursuant to any other agreement conferring jurisdiction on the Tribunal which is accepted by all the parties to that case.” (Emphasis added). While Art.21 of Annex VI provides that, “The jurisdiction of the Tribunal shall comprise all disputes and applications submitted to it in accordance with this Convention and all matters specifically provided for in any other agreement which confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal.”
\textsuperscript{302} Art.188 (1) of LOSC.
\textsuperscript{303} Art. 188(1) (b) of LOSC and Art. 36 of Annex VI. See also Art.27 of ITLOS Rules of Procedure of the Tribunal, ITLOS/8 of 27 April 2005.
\textsuperscript{304} Under Art.27(2) of ITLOS Rules of Procedure of the Tribunal,ITLOS/8, if within a time-limit fixed by the President of the Seabed Disputes Chamber the parties do not agree on the composition of the Ad Hoc Chamber the President shall establish a time-limits for the parties to make the necessary appointments.
\textsuperscript{305} Art.36 (2) of Annex VI.
members of the Ad Hoc Chamber are not to be in the service of, or be nationals of, any of the disputing parties.  

Schwebel talking about the Ad hoc Chambers of the ICJ describes it as a "... halfway house between adjudication and arbitration." Brown has criticised the inclusion of the Ad Hoc Chambers in the dispute settlement mechanism as an attempt to solve political problems through "institutional proliferation." However, it does appear, at least for the ICJ, the Ad Hoc Chamber system has enjoyed some measure of success amongst states, including African states. Perhaps, such proliferation might just be the price to pay to encourage states parties to bring their disputes concerning the seabed to the Chambers. Arguably, since the Seabed Chamber is dominated by judges from developing states, unlike, for instance, the ICJ which is western dominated; African states ought to have confidence in the full Court of the Seabed Chamber. However, in view of certain divergence of interests between developing seabed mining and non-seabed mining states, it is possible that African states might not have confidence in Asian judges from seabed mining states, and might opt in certain instances for the Ad Hoc Chamber system. There is, of course, a possible disadvantage of the use of Ad Hoc Chambers since its widespread use might lead to differing interpretations of the LOSC, especially if a Chamber consists of two ad hoc judges and an ITLOS judge.

So far no such Ad Hoc Chamber of the Seabed Disputes Chamber has been constituted, neither have any of the procedures for settling seabed disputes been used.

306 Art. 36 of Annex VI.
308 Brown, Seabed Energy and Minerals: The International Legal Regime, op. cit. pp. 356-357; Also Brown, Dispute Settlement and the law of the Sea: the UN Convention Regime, op. cit. p. 38
310 However, Judge Mensah disagrees that a proliferation of international tribunals would necessarily lead to a danger of fragmentation of jurisprudence or conflicting decisions. He argues that such a view on the danger of fragmented jurisprudence is based on mere speculation, with no evidence in support. See Mensah, T., "The Role of Peaceful Settlement in Contemporary Ocean Policy and Law" in Vidas, D and Ostreng, W.(eds.) Order for the Oceans at the Turn of the Century, (Hague/London/Boston, Kluwer Law

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3. Special Chamber of ITLOS.

The ITLOS is empowered to form a Special Chamber composed of three or more members to deal with particular disputes submitted to it.\textsuperscript{311} The establishment of this Special Chamber can only be done at the request of the disputing states parties, and the composition is determined by the ITLOS with the approval of the parties.\textsuperscript{312} Such Special Chamber may be formed in respect of the deep seabed regime, at the request of disputing states parties, as regards disputes concerning the interpretation or application of Part XI and the relevant annexes to the LOSC,\textsuperscript{313} and presumably also in respect of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the 1994 Agreement. The judgement of the Special Chamber would be considered as that of the ITLOS.\textsuperscript{314} No such Special Chamber has been formed in respect of the deep seabed regime.

4.1.3.2.1(B). Decision-making for ITLOS dispute settlement Bodies

The decision-making process of the ITLOS, which includes the Seabed Disputes Chamber, in respect of cases before it is by a majority vote of the members present and voting.\textsuperscript{315} There is, however, provision for judges to attach a separate or dissenting opinion to such decision.\textsuperscript{316} In the event of an equality of votes, the President or any member who acts in his place has a casting vote.\textsuperscript{317}

Although there has been no decision on the part of the Seabed Disputes Chamber, which presently has not heard any case, it is arguable that in such decisions there would be an implicit role of ideological considerations founded on the north/south divide that would influence the decisions of the judges of the Chamber. While there is no allusion to any possibility of overt bias on the part of the eminent judges, one cannot dismiss the sociological/extra-judicial factors that come in to play in the decision of each particular

\textsuperscript{311} Art. 15 (1) of Annex VI and note 276 above.
\textsuperscript{312} Art.15 (2) of Annex VI and Arts.29 to 30 of ITLOS Rules of Procedure, ITLOS/8 of 27 April 2005.
\textsuperscript{313} Arts.187 (a) and 188(1) (a) of LOSC.
\textsuperscript{314} Art.15 (5) of Annex VI.
\textsuperscript{315} Art.29 (1) of Annex VI and ITLOS, Internal Judicial Practice, ITLOS/10 of 31 October 1997. For the ITLOS the quorum of sitting judges is eleven, while for the Seabed Disputes Chamber it is seven. Of course for the Ad Hoc Chambers all three members must be present and voting.
\textsuperscript{316} Art.125 (2) of ITLOS Rules of Procedure of the Tribunal, ITLOS/8.
\textsuperscript{317} Art.29 (2) of Annex VI.
judge. It is suggested that the deep rooted ideological basis of the deep seabed regime, founded on the north/south divide, as reflected in the UNCLOS III and the United Nations Secretary-General’s consultations, would be implicit in the decisions of the individual judges of the Seabed Chamber. This view is further strengthened by the fact that some of the present members of the Seabed Disputes Chamber, as well as other members of the ITLOS who are potential members of the Chamber, including certain African members, were actively involved in the UNCLOS III negotiations that clearly manifested the north/south divide. The tacit influence of the north/south divide is, in some regards, reflected in the tendency of certain African judges in the ICJ to be unsympathetic to a viewpoint that appears to perpetuate what they perceive as a Eurocentric view of international law. An obvious example of this concerns the position of certain African judges in the ICJ on the effect of colonial laws in contemporary international law. For instance in the Case concerning Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, the joint dissenting opinion of three African judges, Bedjaoui (Algeria), Ranjeva (Madagascar) and Koroma (Sierra Leone) was critical of the reliance by the majority on a 1939 colonial decision of the British government as the sole basis for awarding title to the Hawar Islands to Bahrain. These judges, identifying the absence of consent on the part of Qatar to the colonial decision, alluded to the inequality of relationship that necessarily existed during colonialism between the occupying power and the occupied state by pointing out as follows:

"In the present case, the indivisibility of the consent has not been established: it is simply presumed. In political terms, the nature of the relationship between the protecting Power and the protected State did not permit the use of the colonial decision as the sole basis for determining the delimitation of the maritime boundary."
of any language other than the deferential terms in which the local rulers expressed themselves; thus to interpret that language as evidence of consent to the renunciation of territorial jurisdiction is in reality to give the opposite sense to the natural meaning of the words and conduct in 1939. In legal terms, when the judgement invokes against Qatar its consent to the substance of the 1939 decision – a consent that was in reality hypothetical –, it reproaches Qatar with its failure to abide by a decision with which it had already been threatened in veiled terms since 1937. Independently of the fraudulent nature of the manoeuvres of the British representatives, the question is whether Qatar was legally bound to abide by the decision. The answer must be a negative one.  

The Ad Hoc Chamber of the Seabed Chamber, constituted by three members, would appear to have the same rules on decision making applicable to it as the Seabed Chamber. However Schwebel, in discussing the Ad Hoc Chamber of the ICJ, points out that the size of the Ad Hoc Chamber tends to give more room for a particular judge to exercise influence than when it is a full court sitting. This could also be said to be the same concerning any Special Chamber to deal with disputes related to the deep seabed regime, as and when they are established at the request of disputing states parties.

Other decisions that have to be taken by the ITLOS include the determination of whether any member of the Tribunal is involved in incompatible activities or should participate in a decision in a case in which he has previously participated as agent, counsel or advocate or as a member of a national or international court or tribunal. This decision is to be taken by a majority of members of the Tribunal present and voting. Further, decisions on the election of the President and the Vice-President, Registrar, Deputy Registrar and Assistant Registrar of the ITLOS are to be by a majority of the judges composing the Tribunal at the time of the election. On the other hand, decisions on the removal of the Registrar, Deputy Registrar and the Assistant Registrar from office require

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323 See also Judge ad hoc Georges Abi-Saab (Egypt)'s separate opinion in the Chamber of the ICJ decision in the Case concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Republic of Mali), (1986) ICJ Rep. pp. 554 at 659-663, especially at p.659, para.4
324 Schwebel, op. cit. p.846.
325 Art. 7 of Annex VI.
326 Art. 8 of Annex VI.
327 Arts.7 (3) and 8(4) of Annex VI.
328 Arts. 11(2) and (3), 32(4) and 33 of ITLOS Rules of the Tribunal, ITLOS/8.
the approval of two thirds of the members of the Tribunal. The removal of these officers requires a higher majority than that required for their appointment. Eiriksson points out that it is unclear whether the removal of these officers merely requires the approval of two thirds of the judges present at the meeting or of all the judges composing the Tribunal at the time. He takes the view that in the light of the requirement for the election of the officers, it should be the latter. This appears to be the position since the provision clearly intends a higher threshold to apply in the case of removal. The selection of the members of the Seabed Disputes Chamber is by a majority of the members of the Tribunal, while the election of the President is by a majority vote of the members of the Chamber.

The decisions of the Chambers shall be enforceable in the territories of the state parties as judgements or orders of the highest court of such party in whose territory it is to be enforced.

4.1.3.2.1(II). Dispute Settlement under Unfair Economic Practices Multilateral Agreements

The LOSC makes it clear that rights and obligations relating to unfair economic practices under relevant multilateral Agreements shall apply to seabed mining in the Area. It allows states parties to the LOSC, which are parties to such Agreements, to have recourse to the dispute settlement procedures under such Agreements. The 1994 Agreement declares that the provisions of the GATT, its relevant codes and successor or superseding agreements shall apply with respect to activities in the Area as regards production policy of the ISA. The WTO rules have since superseded the GATT provisions. Therefore, in respect of disputes concerning the WTO rules which involve states parties that are members of the WTO, recourse shall be had to the WTO dispute settlement procedures.

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329 Arts.39 (2) and (3) of ITLOS Rules of the Tribunal, ITLOS/8.
331 Art.35 (1) of Annex VI.
332 Art.26 (1) of ITLOS Rules of the Tribunal, ITLOS/8.
333 Art.39 of Annex VI to LOSC.
334 Art.151 (8).
mechanism. However, in the event that such dispute involves one or more states parties which are not parties to the WTO recourse shall be to the dispute settlement procedure under LOSC. Presently there are 148 members of the WTO, including 41 African states. These member states of the WTO are therefore required in respect of disputes concerning the WTO rules on seabed mining activities to have recourse amongst them to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. A perusal of the cases so far involving the WTO dispute settlement mechanism reveals that the bulk of the disputes are actually initiated by developed industrialised states against themselves, with very few disputes involving African states.

4.1.3.2.1(III). Commercial Arbitration.

Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of a relevant contract or a plan of work related to the deep seabed regime can also, at the request of any of the parties to the contract or plan of work, be submitted to binding commercial arbitration, unless otherwise agreed by the parties. In the absence of any provision in the contract on the arbitration procedure, the case shall be conducted in accordance with the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules or such other arbitration rules as may be prescribed in the rules, regulations and procedures of the ISA, unless the parties to the dispute otherwise agree. However, the commercial arbitral tribunal shall have no jurisdiction to decide on questions relating to the interpretation of the Convention. In any situation where an arbitral tribunal determines, either at the request of a party or of its own accord, that its decision depends

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335 Section 6 paragraphs 1(f) (i) and 4.
336 Section 6(1) (f) (ii) and 4.
340 Art.188 (2) (c) of LOSC.
upon the interpretation of Conventional provisions it shall refer such question to the Chamber for a ruling. Thereafter its award must await the ruling of the Chamber and must conform to such ruling.\textsuperscript{342}

Part II

4.2. Funding the institutions of the deep seabed regime (The impact of African member states’ contributions.)

The financial aspect of international organisations is crucial, since proper funding is required to enable an international organisation effectively to carry out its aims and objectives, as well as to meet its operational costs, such as salaries of staff, printing, meetings, travelling expenses, conferences, seminars etc.\textsuperscript{343} Usually the financing of international organisations is derived mainly from the contributions of members, thereby providing for an avenue of influence in the organisation for member states that are the major financiers.\textsuperscript{344} The significance of the influence of major financial contributors to international institutions is indicated in the United Nations Secretary-General consultations that led to the 1994 Agreement following the refusal by certain industrialised states, major contributors to international organisations, to ratify the LOSC because of the original Part XI provisions.

4.2.1(I). The ISA

Up until 31 December 1997 the funding of the ISA was from the regular United Nations budget. However from 1998 the ISA started to operate its own budget derived from the contributions of the member states in accordance with the provisions of the LOSC, the

\textsuperscript{341} Art.188 (2) (a) of LOSC.

\textsuperscript{342} Art.188 (2) (b) of LOSC.

\textsuperscript{343} See generally on financial aspects of international organisations Sands & Klein, Bowett’s Law of International Institutions, op. cit. pp. 565 – 580.

1994 Agreement and its financial regulations. Initially the ISA operated an annual budget but by the sixth session the Assembly decided to move to a biennial budget cycle.

The funds of the ISA are to be derived from assessed contributions made by its states members; agreed contributions, as determined by the ISA, made by international organisations which are its members; funds received by the ISA in connection with activities in the Area; funds transferred by the Enterprise, when it commences commercial operations, under Annex IV, Article 10(2) of the LOSC; funds borrowed pursuant to its borrowing powers under Article 174 and Section 1 paragraph 14 of the Agreement (such borrowing should not be used to finance the ISA’s administrative budget); voluntary contributions made by members or other entities; economic assistance funds; and such other funds which the ISA is entitled to receive, including income from investment.

Presently, the main source of funding for the ISA is from the assessed contributions of the states parties in accordance with an agreed scale of assessment based on the scale used for the regular budget of the United Nations. The Secretary-General of the ISA prepares the draft budget which he submits to the Finance Committee. Thereafter, the Finance Committee prepares a report with its recommendations and submits it to the Council for consideration. The Council, after its consideration, passes it on to the Assembly for consideration and approval. Any decision made by the Council or the Assembly on the budget must “take into account recommendations of the Finance Committee.” This appears to suggest that by being required only to take account of

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345 Art. 171-175 of LOSC and Sections 1 paragraphs 1(12)(c)(i) and 14; 2 paragraph 3; 3 paragraph 7 and 9 paragraph 7(c) of the Annex to the 1994 Agreement as well as the Financial Regulations, ISBA/6/A/3 of 28 March 2000.

346 The budget has been between the range of $4,697,100 for 1998 and $10,509,400 for the 2003-2004 financial years. For details of the exact amount of the budget of the ISA from 1998 to 2004 see the Part IV of the Report of the Secretary-General of the International Seabed Authority under Article 166, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, ISBA/10/A/3 of 31 March 2004. For the 2005-2006 financial year the Assembly has adopted a budget of $10,816,700. See ISBA/10/A/8 of 2 June 2004.

347 Art.171 of LOSC; Section 7 paragraph 2 of Agreement and Reg. 6.1 of the Financial Regulations

348 Art.160 (2) (e) of LOSC and Section 1 paragraph 14 of the 1994 Agreement. The present United Nations scale is capped at a maximum assessment rate of 22% and a minimum assessment rate of 0.01%.

349 Section 9 paragraph 7 of the Annex to the Agreement.
such recommendations the Council and Assembly are not bound by them. However the further provision of the Agreement stating that: "Decisions by the Assembly or the Council having financial or budgetary implications shall be based on the recommendations of the Finance Committee," suggests that the "recommendations" of the Finance Committee are of immense weight in such decision of the Council and the Assembly. The recommendatory powers of the Finance Committee under the Agreement appear considerable since, unlike the Council, there is no provision for the Assembly to refuse to accept such recommendations and thereafter send them back to the Committee for further consideration. The Finance Committee, which has a guaranteed place for the representatives of the five largest financial contributors to the administrative budget (at least until the ISA has sufficient funds other than the assessed contributions to meet its administrative expenses), is dominated by the developed industrial states. This therefore ensures that these states protect their "financial interests" in the organisation and exert considerable influence over the ISA.

Despite the rather modest budget of the ISA, as at 31 March 2004, 52 states member, including 23 African states, had been in arrears for a period of two years or more. Under the LOSC and the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly a state in arrears for two or more years shall have no right to vote in the Assembly. It is not very clear if this rule is being applied, however at the tenth session of the Assembly two African states, Comoros and Somalia, who were in arrears are reported to have sought and successfully obtained a dispensation to allow them participate in the elections of the Secretary-General. It is, however, doubtful, in view of the current poor attendance of states parties at the

350 Section 3 paragraph 7 of the Annex to the Agreement.
351 See Section 3 paragraph 4 of the Annex to the Agreement which allows the Assembly to refuse to accept the recommendations of the Council and to return such to the Council for further consideration in the light of the views expressed by the Assembly.
352 Oxman, "The 1994 Agreement and the Convention", op. cit. p.689
353 The African states in arrears were Benin, Cape Verde, the Comoros, Cote d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, Somalia, the Sudan, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. See Para.58 of ISBA/10/A/3 of 31 March 2004.
Assembly meetings; if this rule is being stringently applied as otherwise nearly 40% of the Assembly members would not be able to vote.\textsuperscript{355}

For as long as the ISA depends on the assessed contributions of members, the industrial developed states by virtue of their contribution and "financial" veto in the Finance Committee, as a result of the requirement of consensus in decision making, will continue to have more influence in the ISA's affairs. The developing states, including African states, will only be able to overturn this state of affairs if the ISA has other sources beyond members’ contributions. As a result of the indefinite postponement of commercial exploitation of the Area, any such independent source of funding for the ISA is not probable in the near future.

4.2.1(II). The Enterprise

As has been mentioned, the Enterprise has not yet commenced independent operations since its functions are currently being performed by the Secretariat.\textsuperscript{356} However, it is pertinent to point out that upon commencement of its independent functioning\textsuperscript{357} it would have its own budget separate from the ISA. This arises from the fact that it has its own legal capacities distinct from those of the ISA.\textsuperscript{358}

The Enterprise is to derive its funds from the following sources:\textsuperscript{359}

- amounts received from the ISA funds outside the assessed contributions, after payment by the ISA of all its administrative expenses, to enable it carry out its functions;
- voluntary contributions made by states parties for the specific purpose of financing the activities of the Enterprise;
- income derived by the Enterprise through its operations;
- amounts borrowed by the Enterprise under the powers stated in its Statute.

\textsuperscript{355} Art.184 of LOSC and Rule 80 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly. See Para. 58, ISBA/10/A/3 of 31 March 2004.
\textsuperscript{356} Section 2 paragraph 1 of the Annex to the Agreement.
\textsuperscript{357} Section 2 paragraph 2 of the Annex to the Agreement.
\textsuperscript{358} See Art. 170(2) and Arts.2 and 13(2) of Annex IV, LOSC.
\textsuperscript{359} Art. 11 of Annex IV.
Under the original Part XI provisions, states parties were under an obligation to provide interest-free long-term loans to assist in financing the Enterprise’s first mining operations and its initial expenses. However this obligation, which was felt by the developed states to be a form of subsidy, thereby giving the Enterprise an unfair advantage over other operators, has been declared not to apply by the 1994 Agreement. Also the original provisions of Part XI giving the Enterprise an advantage over other operators, by exempting it from any payments to the ISA, do not apply because all the obligations applicable to contractors are to apply to the Enterprise.

The financial provisions under the original Part XI provisions were intended to place the Enterprise in a position where it would have been able to compete with other operators which have the tremendous advantage of possessing the necessary technology and finance. The 1994 Agreement, by deleting the relevant provisions of LOSC giving the Enterprise favourable financial terms, has in essence placed the Enterprise in a position of disadvantage vis-à-vis other commercial operators from developed industrialised states. The representative of Iran at the 48th Session of the General Assembly identified this by stating:

"Despite the fact that the Enterprise is to conduct its initial deep seabed mining operations through joint ventures, it has been deprived of any preferential treatment from the Authority...In accordance with Article 11(3), of annex IV to the Convention, the financing of the Enterprise’s operations in its first mine site is to be borne by states parties so that it can initiate activities as quickly and effectively as possible. With the deletion of these provisions, one can hardly conceive of a situation where the institution could reach the stage of being able to engage in commercial activities and compete with other operations, as the principle of the common heritage of mankind requires."

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360 Art 11(3) of Annex IV.
361 Section 2 paragraph 3(b) of the Annex to the Agreement.
362 Art. 10 (3) of Annex IV and Section 2 paragraph 4 of the Annex to the Agreement.
4.2.2. ITLOS

The expenses of the ITLOS are to be borne by the states parties to the LOSC and by the ISA on such terms and in such manner as determined by the meeting of the states parties (SPLOS). However, presently the expenses of ITLOS are borne entirely by the states parties, as well as international organisations that are parties to the LOSC, and not the ISA. The contributions of the states parties are based on the scale of assessments for the regular budget of the United Nations for the preceding financial year.

The budget of the ITLOS is approved by the SPLOS based on a proposed budget by the President of the Tribunal. The budget proposals are first considered by an open-ended working group under the chairmanship of the President of the SPLOS. This working group deliberates on the overall budget proposals and carries out an item-by-item examination. After consideration by the working group, it is brought before the plenary body which approves the budget. Such approval shall be by a two-thirds majority of the states parties present and voting, provided such majority includes a majority of the states parties participating in that meeting. A proposal by the United Kingdom to raise the qualified majority to three-fourths in respect of decisions on financial and budgetary matters was eventual withdrawn due to reservations expressed by certain members. This therefore means that, like Article 17(2) of the United Nations Charter, the numerous developing states contributing an insignificant amount to the budget are able to exert

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365 Art.19 (1) of the Statute of ITLOS. The first meeting of SPLOS was convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in the exercise of his powers under Art.319 (2) (e) of LOSC in New York on 21 November 1994. SPLOS/3 of 28 February 1995.
367 See Decision on the scale of assessments for the budgets of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea for 2004 and 2005-2006, SPLOS/97 of 12 June 2003. The 2004 budget is to use a ceiling rate of 24% and a floor rate of 0.01%, while for 2005-2006 the ceiling rate is 22% and the floor rate 0.01%.
368 The working group is a compromise solution to arrive at a balance between two groups at the SPLOS, on the one hand those which wanted a Finance Committee to be set up to serve as a subsidiary organ to consider the budget and other financial matters and thereafter make recommendations to the SPLOS, and on the other hand those which wanted no such body but wanted all the details of the budget to be considered by the plenary body. See SPLOS/71 of 17 May 2001 and SPLOS/73 of 14 June 2001, pp.8-9, paras.47-50.
369 SPLOS/73, at p.7, para.38
371 SPLOS/73, at p.8, paras. 45 and 46.
immense influence over the budget. Again, like the ISA, the response of states parties to the payments of their assessed contributions has been poor. As at 31 December 2003, 78 states had not made payments of their assessed contributions for 2003.

When an entity other than a state party or the ISA is a party to a case submitted to the ITLOS, the Tribunal shall fix the amount which that party is to contribute towards the expenses incurred by the Tribunal. The latter situation is obviously in view of Article 20 of the ITLOS Statute, which gives the ITLOS competence over non-state entities under Part XI, including state enterprises and natural and juridical persons. It also deals with situations where a case is submitted to the ITLOS pursuant to an agreement by non-states parties. In fixing the contributions of such other entities, it is open to the Tribunal to take into consideration such factors as the circumstances of the case, the travel and subsistence of witnesses, production of evidence and administrative costs.

Part III
4.3. Conclusion
This chapter has sought to examine the institutions of the regime of the Area from the point of view of African states. The regime created a number of new international institutions. In a bid to please the developed industrialised states certain provisions of the original Part XI relating to the institutions of the regime have been significantly altered by the 1994 Agreement. Despite the changes made by the 1994 Agreement the African group generally appears to be favoured in terms of numerical composition in the various institutions.

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372 It is however pertinent to note that at the second meeting of the SPLOS it was agreed that the principle of cost effectiveness would apply to all aspects of the ITLOS's work. See SPLOS/4 of 26 July 1995, p.9, Para.25 (e).
373 As at 1 November 2004 there was an unpaid balance of assessed contributions covering the period from 1996/97 to 2004 amounting to $2,569,684. See Para.17 of the Statement by the President of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea on Agenda item 49(a) at the Plenary of the Fifth-Ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly on 17 November 2004.
374 See Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea for 2003, SPLOS/109 of 8 April 2004, Para.69. There is, however, no indication as to the exact defaulting states in documents in the public domain, unlike the ISA. Efforts to obtain the details of the defaulting states from the ITLOS in order to determine the number of defaulting African states were unsuccessful as the ITLOS was not inclined to make the information available to the public. (Personal Communication with Ms Julia Pope of the Press Office, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. (On file with the author).
375 Art.19 (2) of Annex VI to LOSC.
376 Eiriksson, op. cit.p.282.
institutions. This in itself, at least to a limited sense, is indicative of some level of influence of the African “late comer” states on the international scene, including the deep seabed regime. However, with the extensive amendments to the ISA made by the 1994 Agreement the numerical strength of African states, even when combined with other G-77 developing states members, has not translated into considerable influence in the decision-making processes of the ISA.

Although the original Part XI provisions, by vesting significant decision-making powers in the plenary institution, the Assembly, opened up an avenue for African states and other developing states to exercise substantial influence over the ISA, the alterations introduced by the 1994 Agreement have overturned such influence. The Assembly has been rendered largely impotent by the Agreement stripping it of its powers to take independent action. The Assembly, however, still retains some influence, albeit limited, since it is still under the Agreement allowed to reject the recommendations of the Council and send them back for reconsideration “in the light of the views expressed by the Assembly”.

In the Council, the developed industrialised states, although a minority, have a virtual veto to block any decision unfavourable to them through the chamber system of decision making under the Agreement since a decision cannot be taken if opposed by a majority in one of the chambers. The Agreement lumps developing states representing special interests and the equitable geographical representation group, with its potential to include a number of developing states, together as merely one chamber while the other groups, namely the consumer/importer, the investor nations and major exporters groups, are given separate chambers. This in itself, by reason of the criteria for the composition of the latter groups, gives the developed industrialised states the potential to control one or more of these groups/chambers in order to veto unfavourable decisions. In the same vein African states, along with other developing countries, could in theory also have a veto in the fourth chamber to block decisions unfavourable to them. This would, however, require a greater number of states to achieve a majority to block such a decision. While

377 Most African states started to emerge as independent states and active participants in the international community in the 1960s. See section 2.1 of chapter 2 of this thesis.
this might appear a daunting task, the level of unity displayed by African states, along with other developing states in the G-77, during the UNCLOS III indicates that this is not an impossible task to accomplish.

As for the Legal and Technical Commission, a subsidiary organ of the Council, its powers are merely recommendatory and can be accepted or rejected by the Council. The Finance Committee, on the other hand, another sub-organ of the Council, is conferred with considerable powers in respect of decisions relating to financial matters since the Assembly and Council are to act in such matters based on its recommendations. Further, through the insistence that decisions of the Finance Committee on matters of substance should be by way consensus the Agreement appears to have vested in industrialised developed states the ability to block decisions that they perceive are unfavourable. On the other hand, the requirement of consensus could also allow members from developing states, including African states, to block financial matters that are unfavourable to the interests of developing states. Unfortunately, the Agreement gives no indication as to what happens when there is a failure to reach a consensus in the Finance Committee. Fortunately, so far there has not been an instance of such stalemate in practice. However, it would be appropriate to have clear provisions as to what should be done in the event of a failure to arrive at a consensus decision.

The regime of the Area provides a dispute settlement mechanism for the resolution of disputes, significantly through the Seabed Disputes Chamber that has compulsory jurisdiction. So far there has been no case brought before this Chamber, although it has, in line with the Statute of the ITLOS, been constituted, with the present membership including three African judges. While conceding the eminent qualifications of the judges of the ITLOS from which the members of the Seabed Disputes Chamber are chosen it would be interesting to observe, in the eventuality of cases coming before the Chamber, whether decisions of the various judges would have the implicit influence of the ideological position of the north/south divide that was manifestly prevalent in positions taken at the UNCLOS III. This is especially so, since a number of the judges of ITLOS, including certain African judges, were active and direct participants in UNCLOS III.
Would there be a divergence as between the decisions of developing states judges, including African judges, and judges from developed states in certain respects in the interpretation of the regime of the common heritage of mankind as embodied in LOSC and the 1994 Agreement?

Presently, the funding of the institutions of the regime of the Area is derived from assessed contributions of member states. While there are suggestions in certain quarters for an expanded role for the ISA in the Area which could be used to derive alternative funding, through, for instance, providing access to genetic materials of the Area for a fee, the present definition of the role of the ISA under the constituent treaty appears to limit its role to one over non-living resources defined as "all solid, liquid or gaseous mineral resources in situ in the Area at or beneath the sea-bed, including polymetallic nodules." Any expansion of such role would necessarily entail an amendment of the LOSC, a process that is complicated and has not presently been utilised. It only suffices to say that it would be in the interest of African states, which are likely to be amongst the major beneficiaries of any benefit of the Area, to have an articulated plan, perhaps through the auspices of the AU, to promote in the ISA, the SPLOS and the General Assembly of the United Nations an agenda for such an expanded role for the ISA.

Presently, the ISA, along with the ITLOS, continues to rely on the assessed contributions of member states, a large chunk of which comes from developed industrialised states, with a number of developing states, including those from Africa, defaulting in paying their assessed contributions. The major contributions of the developed industrialised states to the budget of these institutions assure them of an immense influence over the policy direction of these institutions.

378 Art.133 (a) of LOSC.
CHAPTER FIVE.

EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION OF THE AREA AND AFRICAN STATES.

This chapter will start off by looking at the system of exploration and exploitation of the seabed within national jurisdiction beyond 200 nautical miles. While strictly speaking this is not part of the Area, the peculiar nature of this part of the seabed, involving a role for the ISA, the custodian of the Area, under Article 82 of the LOSC 1982, makes it necessary to also examine the system operating therein. Thereafter the chapter will examine the peculiar system of mining involving the parallel system in the Area proper, the contributions of African states to this and its effect on such states. In addition, the chapter will scrutinise the Mining Code 2000 as regards the system of exploration of the Area and its impact on African participation in seabed mining in the Area will also be considered. Finally, the ongoing negotiations at the ISA on regulations for prospecting and exploration for hydrothermal polymetallic sulphides and cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts and certain implications for African states will also be examined.

5.1. Article 82 of the LOSC.

As pointed out in chapter one of this thesis, certain portions of the seabed beyond 200 nautical miles were conceded to national jurisdiction. As a result of the inherent and exclusive rights vested in the coastal state over its continental shelf, under customary international law and conventional law, a coastal state with such extensive continental shelf has the exclusive sovereign right to exploit the outer continental shelf by whatever arrangements it determines. The only role the ISA plays in the extended continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles is one of merely distributing certain payments or contributions derived from production in this part of the sea, therefore the coastal state in the exercise of its sovereign rights over this part of the sea would have to utilise the system of exploitation it deems fit.

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1 See Section 1. 2.1 of Chapter 1 of this thesis.
3 See Art.82 of LOSC. However, see also Art. 142 of LOSC in respect of resource deposits in the Area which "lie across limits of national jurisdiction." Here the ISA is to conduct activities in the Area giving due regard to the rights and legitimate interest of the relevant coastal state with consultations, including a system of prior notification, being maintained with the coastal state. In cases where
5.1.1. Economic Potential of the Seabed subject to Article 82.

The claim by broad shelf states to the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles is largely premised on economic considerations based on the perception of great prospects of valuable natural resources located therein. However, until actual exploitation is embarked upon in this part of the seabed, this perception is largely speculative.4 The rich discoveries of natural resources in the continental shelf of certain coastal states, especially with the improvement of technology, are indicative of the potential of the seabed beyond 200 nautical miles to be replete with natural resources.5 Earney conjectures that four main classes of nonliving resources are likely to be discovered in the continental margin: hydrocarbons; construction aggregates and sand; minerals in placer deposits such as diamonds, gold, and ilmenite; and industrial chemicals such as sulphur and phosphate.6 From the current commercial value of these resources, it appears that the potential cache of hydrocarbons and industrial minerals, including those contained in polymetallic nodules and sulphides, to be found in the seabed beyond 200 miles would be of great interest to potential offshore miners.8

activities in the Area may result in the exploitation of resources within such coastal state’s national jurisdiction its prior consent must be obtained.

4 This potentially rich part of the continental shelf is estimated to cover approximately 59 million square kilometres with certain states such as Australia, United States of America, Canada, New Zealand, Russia, Argentina and Indonesia enjoying the lion’s share. See Prescott V., “Resources of the Continental Margin and International Law,” in Cook, P.J. and Carleton, C.M., (eds.) Continental Shelf Limits: The Scientific and Legal Interface, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 66-71 and Murton, B.J., Parson, L.M, Hunter, J.H., and Miles, P.R., “Evaluation of the Non-living Resources of the Continental Shelf beyond the 200-Mile Limit of the World’s Margins” in Minerals other than Polymetallic Nodules of the International Seabed Area, Proceedings of the International Seabed Authority Workshop held on 26-30 June 2000 in Kingston, Jamaica (Kingston, Jamaica, International Seabed Authority, 2004), pp.667-751. Certain broad-margin states have issued exploration licences in respect of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. For instance the Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board (CNOBP) has issued several exploration licences and at least one significant discovery licence to various petroleum companies. However, it appears that most of the wells drilled under the exploration licences and the North Dana 1-43 well in respect of the discovery licence have been abandoned. See Chircop, A., and Marchand, B.A., “International Royalty and Continental Shelf Limits: Emerging Issues for the Canadian Offshore,” paper presented at the Canadian Petroleum Law Foundation, Second East Coast Seminar, September 18-20, 2003 at Terra Nova Park Lodge and Golf Resort Newfoundland and Labrador,p.8.


5 Prescott, ibid. p.75.

7 Earney, F.C.E., Marine Mineral Resources (1990, London) referred to in Prescott, Ibid. Studies have shown potential for phosphate deposits on the continental shelf off North Carolina and the Blake Plateau of Florida and in the Chatham Rise east of New Zealand, as well as polymetallic nodules and sulphides in the East and Southeast Pacific Ocean, Manus Basin between New Ireland and New Britain in Papua New Guinea. See Prescott, ibid. pp.79-80

8 Prescott, ibid. pp.75-80.
5.1.2. African states and Article 82.

In the eventuality of seabed production taking place in the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, African states would certainly be amongst the preferred beneficiaries. Under Article 82, in distributing the payments or contributions amongst states parties, the ISA is required to take into consideration the interests and needs of developing states, which includes African states. It is especially required to take into consideration the interests and needs of the least developed and landlocked developing states, the bulk of which are in the African continent. From the current trend of offshore mining it is unlikely that African states will get any revenue from this source for a while to come. Even in the eventuality of offshore mining beyond 200 nautical miles, it is difficult to imagine that the amount of revenue from this source will have any significant impact on their economy.

However, some African states with continental shelves extending beyond 200 nautical miles may obtain considerable revenue from exploiting their shelves, although they would also have to make payments or contributions in kind as required by Article 82 unless they could show that they were net importers of the mineral resource in respect of which the payments or contributions are to be made. Recently for example, the Namibian government indicated its interest in claiming a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles as a result its potential for heavy mineral sands, diamonds, phosphites, manganese nodules, hydrocarbons, gas hydrates and gas seeps. According to the Namibian Minister of Land, Resettlement and Rehabilitation, Hon. Hifkepunye Pohamba, a move by Namibia to extend its continental shelf up to 350 nautical miles, “will benefit the country’s economy now and in the future.” Also Southern Africa generally is reported to have extensive potassium and phosphorus-rich mineralization

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10 Art.82 (3) of LOSC and Section 1.2.1 of the thesis.
on the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. With rapidly improving
technology for offshore mining of natural resources, the possibility of exploitation of
the seabed beyond 200 nautical miles in the future may be quite feasible. However, it
suffices to say at this stage that this area of the seabed remains of interest to broad
margin African states because of its economic potential.

The present onshore and offshore production mining activities in African states
involve mainly the participation of Transnational Corporations (TNCs). It is therefore
likely that such TNCs, as a result of being possessors of the required technology for
seabed mining, will be involved in the eventuality of production in the continental
shelves beyond 200 nautical miles of African states. Most African states enter into
various contractual arrangements with such TNCs for the exploration and exploitation
of the natural resources onshore and offshore. One issue that would likely arise from
this is whether the resources, especially in the form of the natural resources produced
that are allocated to the TNCs to meet the costs incurred by them under such
arrangements as Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs), would qualify as "resources
used in connection with exploitation." Presumably they should, because such
allocation to the TNCs are intended to be part of production costs rather than profit,
and should therefore be excluded for the purposes of determining payments or
contributions. This may need to be clarified by broad-margin African states either by
domestic legislation or the terms of the contractual arrangements entered into with
TNCs. Further practical issues that might also arise include the following: Would

Environmentally Sound Development of Marine Deposits of Potassic and Phosphatic Minerals
13 Such arrangements include Joint Ventures Agreements (JVs), Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs)
and Risk Service Contracts. See generally Omorogbe, Y., The Oil and Gas Industry: Exploration &
Production Contracts, (Lagos/Oxford, Malthouse Press Limited, 1997) and Asante, S.K.B.,
14 By this arrangement the TNCs that bears all the risk of exploration is allowed recoup its investments
from a portion of the oil which is often referred to as cost recovery oil upon discovery of oil in
Agreements in Developing Countries: Structures and Substance”, (1975) 69(3) AJIL. p.560 at 585-588
15 Art.82 (2) of LOSC provides, “… Production does not include resources used in connection with
exploitation.”
16 Recently exploration licences issued by the United States of America in respect of the Gulf of
Mexico includes a clause cautioning industry that a special royalty charge may be applicable in relation
to future development beyond 200 nautical miles. See Chircop and Marchand, “International Royalty
and Continental Shelf Limits: Emerging Issues for the Canadian Offshore,” op.cit. p.23 quoting a
personal communication from Michael W. Lodge, the then Chief, Office of Legal Affairs, International
Seabed Authority, Kingston, Jamaica, dated 10 July 2003,
the calculation of the percentage of the payments or contributions by the ISA under Article 82 include also the resources allocated to the TNCs as their share of the profit under the contractual arrangements or would it be limited to the share of the states parties? For payments in cash, in what currency are such payments to be made? Obviously, whatever currency is utilised must be convertible. In the case of contributions in kind, how is the ISA to make arrangements for distribution of such contributions? Should the ISA sell such contributions at site or arrange to transport them and store them at an ISA storehouse? At whose cost should this be done? How is the value of the contribution in kind to be determined? These issues, which are not clearly dealt with by Article 82, would be of interest to broad-margin states, including African states that are not exempt from making payments or contributions. In the eventuality of commercial exploitation of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, the ISA would have to formulate necessary regulations to clarify these issues.

5.2. The System of Mining in the Area – the Parallel System

5.2.1. Position of African states in UNCLOS III

The original stance of African states, like most other developing states, favoured a system whereby a strong international organisation would have the exclusive right to mine the Area. Mahmoudi points out that this was based on the view that there was a direct relationship between the issue of “who owns the Area and the resources therein” and “who should exploit” the resources. The argument of African states was to the effect that since the Area and its resources were the common heritage of mankind, an international institution (the ISA) as “agent” or “trustee” of mankind should have the exclusive right to mine the Area. This was, of course, without prejudice to the right of the Authority to choose, at any stage of production, to enter

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17 Chircop and Marchand, ibid.pp.21-25.
18 The Secretary-General of the ISA had recently indicated that the ISA would need to consider the implementation of Art.82 (4) of the LOSC. See Paras. 60 and 61 of the Report of the Secretary-General of the International Seabed Authority under article 166, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, ISBA/9/A/3 of 4 June 2003.
into contract, by way of joint ventures or other form of association, with any other person, whether natural or juridical. The developed industrialised states took the contrary position that private entities were to be allowed the exclusive right to mine the Area with the ISA acting merely as a licensing body. Even the then USSR, while opposing the position that exploitation should be by private entities, was of the view that only states and not the ISA should have the right to mine. At one point in the course of negotiations three possible systems of exploitation of the Area were posited by the diverse interests at the UNCLOS III, of which two represented the extreme positions of the developing and developed countries mentioned above. The third view, which was proposed as a way out of the deadlock of the two extreme positions, was an attempt to find a middle course, in the usual manner of compromises permeating the UNCLOS III. This compromise was in the form of the parallel system, proposed by the then Secretary of State of the United States of America, Henry Kissinger. Under this compromise system the Area was to be exploited both by the ISA (through the Enterprise or in conjunction with developing states) and either individuals (natural or juridical) or state enterprises. The individuals or state enterprises, in applying for a contract for exploitation of the Area, were to propose to the Authority two alternative sites of equivalent commercial value. Thereafter the Authority would have the right of first choice to select either one of the sites, which it would bank to be exploited by the ISA either through the Enterprise or in association with interested developing states. The applicant, on the other hand, would mine the other site. This compromise proposal of the United States of America, in order to get the developing states to budge from their original position, came with the additional incentive that the United States of America would ensure that the Enterprise was in a position to participate in exploitation by giving it access to the requisite finance and technology. Further, the


22 Mahmoudi, ibid, pp.181-182.


United States of America indicated its willingness to agree to a periodic review of the system.\textsuperscript{26} The parallel system was eventually incorporated into the LOSC.\textsuperscript{27} However, as has been pointed out in Chapter 3 of this thesis, while the parallel system has been retained by the 1994 New York Agreement, this Agreement appears to have pulled the carpet from under the feet of developing states, including African states, in respect of the system of exploitation, by effectively amending the provisions of the LOSC on the transfer of technology, as well as the Review Conference and also by downgrading the role of the Enterprise.\textsuperscript{28}

5.2.2. African states and the Parallel System: LOSC 82 and the 1994 Agreement.

Part XI of LOSC 82,\textsuperscript{29} the 1994 Agreement\textsuperscript{30} and the rules, regulations and procedures of the ISA, presently the Mining Code 2000,\textsuperscript{31} govern the parallel system.\textsuperscript{32} This part will examine the provisions of Part XI of LOSC, as modified by the 1994 Agreement, on the parallel system of mining as it affects African states. Thereafter, in part 5.3 below, the Mining Code 2000 and its effect on African states will be examined.

As pointed out in 5.2.1 above, one of the main controversial issues as regards the system of mining was to determine who should mine the Area.\textsuperscript{33} This, as also pointed out, was resolved through a compromise between the initial divergent views. The Convention, while recognising that activities in the Area shall be “organised, carried

\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{25} As a result of this, the parallel system is also called “site-banking”.}
\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{28} See Sections 2, 4 and 5 of the Annex to the 1994 Agreement discussed in sections 3.2 and 4.1.3.1(IV) of this thesis.}
\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{29} See Art. 153 and Annex III of the LOSC.}
\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{30} See Section 1 paras. 4-17; Section 2 paras. 2-6 and Section 3 paras. 11-12 of the Annex to the 1994 Agreement.}
\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{31} ISBA/6/A/18 of 4 October 2000.}
\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{32} For detailed examination of these provisions on prospecting, exploration and exploitation under the parallel system, see Brown, \textit{Sea-Bed Energy and Minerals: The International Legal Regime, vol.2}, op.cit. pp.96-243.}
\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{33} Mining involving a non-exclusive right to prospect, extending to any part of the Area except those covered by an approved plan of work or a reserved area, and an exclusive right based on an approved plan of work issued by the ISA to explore and then exploit. While the LOSC and the Agreement acknowledge three stages of mining- prospecting, exploration and exploitation - it was not till the Mining Code 2000 that these terms were actually defined. See Reg.1 of the Mining Code.}
out and controlled by the Authority on behalf of mankind as a whole," goes on to incorporate a mixed system, whereby mining of the Area is to be done not only by the Authority, through the Enterprise, but also by "states parties or states enterprises, or natural or juridical persons which possess the nationality of states parties or are effectively controlled by them or their nationals, when sponsored by such states or any group of the foregoing." The activities of states parties or enterprises and natural or juridical persons are to be done "in association with the Authority." This appears to emphasise the role of the ISA as the organiser and controller of activities in the Area. As was pointed out by Mahmoudi, "...the Convention has a consistent patent tendency to give, though sometimes unsuccessfully, the Authority as the agent of mankind a status superior to the States and private entities." However, the reality is that the ISA cannot mine the Area without the technology and finance of developed, industrialised states parties. The attempt by the ISA to acquire this technology for itself and developing states, through mandatory transfer of technology, and to obtain the necessary finance, as has been pointed out earlier, has been thwarted by the 1994 Agreement.

5.2.2.1. Non-Reserved Areas.

While all states parties to the LOSC, including African states, or their enterprises or nationals, natural or juridical, are prima facie qualified to apply for an approved plan of work to carry out activities in the Area, the issue of lack of technology and finance, in itself, creates a problem as regards the participation of African states in mining activities in the Area. The LOSC, in laying down the qualification standards for applying for a plan of work, requires the applicant not only to have the nationality or be under the effective control of at least one state party and be sponsored by such state party, but also to have the requisite financial and technological capabilities. The applicant, except in the case of a reserved area, is to indicate in its application a total

34 Art. 153(1) of LOSC. However under the 1994 Agreement in Section 1 para. 1 however the role of the ISA is limited to merely "organising and controlling" (it excludes "carrying out") activities in the Area. It is however not clear if this was deliberately done to curtail the activities of the ISA or if it was just an oversight.
35 Art.153 (2) of LOSC and Reg. 9 of the Mining Code.
36 Ibid.
37 Reg. 14(b) of the Mining Code.
39 See note 28 above.
40 See Art. 4(1)-(3) of Annex III to the LOSC and Regs. 12 and 21(3) (c) of the Mining Code.
41 See below 5.2.2.2.
area, not necessarily a single continuous area, which is sufficiently large and of sufficient estimated commercial value to allow for two mining operations. Such application shall indicate the co-ordinates dividing the area into two parts of equal estimated commercial value and be accompanied by necessary data relating to mapping, sampling, the abundance of nodules and their metal content. Thereafter, the ISA is to designate which part of the area is to be the reserved area for conduct of mining operations by the ISA through the Enterprise or in association with developing states. This requirement of designating two sites, of course, merely confirms the need for an applicant to have immense financial and technological capabilities.

The current trend, in respect of both onshore and offshore mining within national jurisdiction, reveals a dearth of such financial and technological capabilities on the part of African states. This in itself shows the constraints such states will face in terms of meeting “the financial and technological capabilities” requirement in a sector that would certainly require even more financial and technological capabilities than onshore and offshore mining activities within national jurisdiction. Virtually all major mining activity within the national jurisdiction of African states is conducted by transnational corporations (TNCs), which possess the requisite technology and finance. Usually these TNCs incorporate local subsidiaries within these African states under the latter’s domestic laws, with such local subsidiaries being ostensibly nationals of such African states; though in reality they are controlled from a base, usually located in a developed industrialised state. Under international law the nationality of a corporate entity, like that of natural persons, falls within the domain of states’ domestic jurisdiction. However, the traditional rule is that corporations have the nationality of the state of incorporation, though certain states determine nationality by different tests, including the place of central administration (siege

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42 Art 8, Annex III to the LOSC and Regs. 15 and 16 of the Mining Code.
43 For more on the constraints on African states’ participation in deep seabed mining, see Chapter 6 of this thesis.
44 See section 6.2 of chapter 6 of this thesis.
46 For instance under Nigerian domestic law all TNCs engaged in mining operations within Nigeria have to be incorporated under the Companies Act of Nigeria, as Nigerian companies. See the Nigerian Companies and Allied Matters Act No.59, 1990.

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social) or the place of effective control or the nationality of the majority shareholders.\textsuperscript{48} In this regard, the issue arises if an African state party to LOSC can participate in deep seabed mining through the subsidiary of a multinational company incorporated under the domestic laws of that state? Can an African state sponsor such a multinational subsidiary company as a juridical person possessing its nationality?\textsuperscript{49} Technically, a subsidiary of a multinational company once incorporated in an African state, if so recognised as such under the domestic laws of that state, becomes its national. The Convention provides that each applicant for an approved plan of work shall be sponsored by the state party of which it is a national; or in the case where the applicant is effectively controlled by another state, by both the national state and the state of effective control; or in the case where the applicant has more than one nationality, such as the case of a partnership or consortium, by all the states parties involved.\textsuperscript{50} Can African states therefore participate, albeit in a nominal role, through the subsidiaries of multinational companies incorporated within their jurisdiction? There seems to be no reason under the Convention why this cannot be done, provided the application is sponsored not only by the African state but also by the state(s) whose nationals have effective control of the corporation.\textsuperscript{51} This is all the more so when this is not expressly prohibited, unlike the provision under Resolution II of the LOSC where a pioneer investor made up of two or more components could not have the different components registered separately as pioneer investors in their own right or under the concession provision in the Resolution [paragraph 1(a) (iii)] for developing states.\textsuperscript{52} The situation would be straightforward in cases where effective control is with nationals of just one other state, but it becomes rather complicated if such effective control is spread between nationals of a number of states. In such a


\textsuperscript{49} In applying for the approval of a plan of work for exploration, such an entity under Reg.10(3)(a) of the Mining Code is to give sufficient information to determine the nationality of the Applicant or the identity of the state or states by which, or by whose nationals, the Applicant is effectively controlled. \textsuperscript{50} Art. 4(3) of Annex III of LOSC and Regs. 10(3) (a) and 11 of the Mining Code.

\textsuperscript{51} Art. 4(3) of Annex III of LOSC and Regs.11 (2) and (3) of the Mining Code.

situation, presumably, just like the case of partnerships and consortiums, all states with effective control would be required to be involved in the sponsorship.\textsuperscript{53}

However, the question arises as to the likelihood of TNCs incorporating local subsidiaries in African states in order to engage in seabed mining. It is doubtful how attractive this option would be considering that, unlike the present onshore and offshore mining within the jurisdiction of African states, the natural resources concerned are located outside the jurisdiction of such states. The likelihood would only be feasible if there was some kind of advantage, such as a favourable tax regime or proximity to the mining area, which TNCs could obtain by incorporating a local subsidiary in an African state in order to participate in deep seabed mining.\textsuperscript{54} It is not likely that African states would be able or willing to give the kind of favourable tax regime that would attract TNCs to participate in such a capital intensive project as deep seabed mining, an industry that would not in any way yield immediate economic benefits. The advantage of proximity to the mining area does not appear to lean in favour of African states.\textsuperscript{55} For polymetallic nodules the bulk of the potential locations are at the centre of the northcentral Pacific Ocean and the Peru Basin in the Southeast Pacific Ocean, both considerable distances from the African continent.\textsuperscript{56} While there are potential sites of polymetallic nodules in the centre of the north Indian Ocean, which in comparison to the Pacific is closer to the African continent, such potential sites do not appear extensive. It is, however, recorded that India, since it started survey and exploration for deep seabed polymetallic nodules in 1981, picked up the first nodule from 4800m water depth from the Seychelles-Somali basin in the SW Carlsberg Ridge,\textsuperscript{57} an indication of the existence of some limited level of nodules close to the African continent. As for cobalt-bearing ferromanganese crusts, the richest deposits are also found in the Pacific Ocean, with fewer resources located in the Indian and Atlantic Oceans, with only a few having relative proximity to African

\textsuperscript{53} Art.4 (3) of Annex III of LOSC and Regs. 11(1) and (2) of the Mining Code.
states such as South Africa, Namibia, Morocco and Western Sahara. Polymetallic sulphides are also mainly located in mid-ocean at the East Pacific Rise, the Southeast Pacific Rise and South western Pacific, while relatively fewer quantities are located at the mid-Atlantic Ridge. Even fewer are located at the Central Indian Ridge. All these factors, coupled with the general political and economic instability in most African states, makes the option of TNCs incorporating local subsidiaries in African states to participate in mining in the Area a very remote possibility.

Further, a situation whereby African states purport to act as nominal sponsoring national states would raise the issue of responsibility, as the sponsoring states, to ensure that the activities of the sponsored entity in the Area were carried out in conformity with the LOSC, the 1994 Agreement and regulations issued by the ISA. A failure by a sponsored entity to carry out its activities in conformity with the LOSC, 1994 Agreement and ISA regulations which results in damages would result in joint and several liabilities on the part of all the sponsoring states, unless such a state could show that it had taken all necessary and appropriate measures to secure effective compliance. Taking such necessary and appropriate measures in a sophisticated and intricate deep seabed mining industry would constitute a major challenge for any African state with any design to sponsor an entity for deep seabed mining, especially one over which it does not exercise effective control. It would also entail putting in place the necessary legislative framework to ensure effective domestic compliance by the applicant entity with the rules and regulations of the regime.

In addition to the rather remote possibilities of participation by African states in deep seabed mining through subsidiaries of TNCs, it is argued that any such nominal participation would defeat the provisions of the LOSC that encourage the promotion

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61 Art. 139 of the LOSC and Reg. 11(3) (a) of the Mining Code.
of effective and direct participation of developing states in activities in the Area.\textsuperscript{63}

The reality is that as long as African states lack the requisite technological and financial capabilities, their direct participation in such activities in the Area would be remote. In her comments at the 64\textsuperscript{th} plenary meeting of the fifty-eighth session of the General Assembly the Nigerian representative, Ms. Wadibia-Anyawu, said:\textsuperscript{64}

"We would like to underscore the fact that developing states are disadvantaged in terms of the acquisition of technology and expertise relating to many aspects of activities in the oceans and seas, particularly in the seabed...There is no doubt that developing countries need help through co-operation, partnership and technical assistance in line with article 140 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which states that activities in the area are to be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole, taking into consideration the interests and needs of developing countries."

5.2.2.2. Reserved Areas.

Once the plan of work, in the form of a contract, for the non-reserved area is approved, the other area is reserved solely for the conduct of activities by the ISA through the Enterprise or in association with developing states.\textsuperscript{65} Under the LOSC:

"Any State Party which is a developing State or any natural or juridical person sponsored and effectively controlled by it or by another developing State which is a qualified applicant, or any group of the foregoing, may notify the Authority that it wishes to submit a plan of work...with respect to a reserved area. The plan of work shall be considered if the Enterprise decides, pursuant to paragraph 1, that it does not intend to carry out activities in that area."\textsuperscript{66}

The Enterprise shall be given the first option of carrying out activities in the reserved areas, either solely or through joint ventures with interested eligible states or entities. Under the 1994 Agreement the Enterprise has become an appendage of the Secretariat carrying out purely administrative functions until such time that "the Council shall take up the issue of the functioning of the Enterprise independently of the

\textsuperscript{63} Art.148 of LOSC. See Art.9(4) of Annex III of LOSC, in respect of a developing state applicant for a reserved area, which emphasises that the juridical person sponsored by a developing state must be "effective controlled" by the developing state or by another developing state, which is a qualified applicant. See also by way of analogy, in respect of exploitation of the living resources within the EEZ, the conclusions in the General Report of the African states regional seminar on the Law of the Sea, Yaoundé, 20-30 June 1972, where it was said "The exploitation of the living resources within the economic zone should be open to all African states both land-locked and near land-locked, provided that the enterprises of these states desiring to exploit these resources are effectively controlled by African capital and personnel." (Emphasis added). 12 ILM 210(1973).

\textsuperscript{64} General Assembly, fifty-eighth session, Official Records.A/58/PV.64 of 24 November 2003, p.27.

\textsuperscript{65} Art. 8 of Annex III of LOSC and Section 1 para. 10 of the Annex to the 1994 Agreement.

\textsuperscript{66} Art.9 (4) of Annex III of LOSC.
Secretariat". The independent functioning of the Enterprise, which is tied to the approval of a plan of work for exploitation for an entity other than the Enterprise or the receipt by the Council of an application for a joint-venture operation, is not likely to take place in the near future.

The ability of the Enterprise to determine its joint venture partners has been curtailed by the Agreement insisting that the contractor that contributed the reserved area should have the right of first refusal to enter into a joint venture arrangement with the Enterprise. Further, the ability of developing states to apply to undertake mining activities in the reserved areas is curtailed since it appears that these states, in the event that the Enterprise declines to carry out activities in the reserved area, are put behind the contributing contractor, in terms of priority right to mine such area. The Agreement provides that:

"If the Enterprise does not submit an application for a plan of work for activities in respect of such a reserved area within 15 years of the commencement of its functions independent of the Secretariat of the Authority or within 15 years of the date on which that area is reserved for the Authority, whichever is the later, the contractor which contributed the area shall be entitled to apply for a plan of work for that area provided it offers in good faith to include the Enterprise as a joint-venture partner."

However, the Mining Code, in what appears to be a slight modification of the Agreement, states that the obligation to apply for a plan of work within 15 years is not limited to only the Enterprise, but also applies to developing states (or their natural or juridical persons) interested in submitting a plan of work for the reserved area. It is not too clear what is the legal basis for extending this obligation, considering that the Agreement is given a position of primacy over the original Part XI provisions under which the Mining Code is made. Perhaps it could be argued that since the original provision of LOSC in article 9(4) of Annex III (which allows a developing state party or any natural or juridical person sponsored and effectively controlled by it or any other qualified developing state to submit a plan of work in respect of a reserved area if the Enterprise decides not to carry out activities in that area) is not specifically

67 Section 2, para.2 of the Annex to the 1994 Agreement.
68 Ibid.
69 Section 2 para.5 of the Annex to the 1994 Agreement.
70 Section 2 paragraph 5 of the Annex to the Agreement.
71 Reg. 17(3) of Mining Code.
72 Art.2 (1) of the Agreement.
stated by the Agreement "not to apply," the Mining Code does not amount to a deviation from the provision of the Agreement, but rather amounts to an elaboration, reconciling the provisions of the Agreement with article 9(4) of Annex III. It could be said that paragraph 5 of the Agreement implies that the application by developing states under Article 9(4) of Annex III must be within the 15 year period and the Mining Code makes this implication explicit.

There appears to be more potential for African states to be involved in direct participation in reserved areas where conditions for direct participation are less onerous. This is so for several reasons. First, by participating in a reserved area, African states are not in competition with consortia or states enterprises from developed industrialised states parties, by reason of the concession given to developing states to apply for a plan of work in a reserved area if the Enterprise declines to carry activities in such an area. Second, such developing states are saved the expense necessarily involved in prospecting to locate an area of sufficient estimated commercial value to permit two mining operations; also in demarcating such an area and collating the necessary data. However, while the possibility of carrying out activities in the reserved area may be a plus for African states' participation, it still remains a highly capital intensive project requiring sophisticated technology, which most African states lack. Nevertheless, this does open up the possibility of African states’ direct participation in activities in the Area, by forming a consortium with other developing states, such as India, Korea and China, which as pioneer investors have the ability to carry out such activities.

5.2.3. Pioneer Investors and Africa

The Pioneer Investment Protection (P.I.P) Scheme was introduced into the LOSC under resolution II in a bid to encourage the principal industrialised states, which were pioneer investors in the Area and had objected to Part XI, to become parties to the Convention; while at the same time retaining the essential features of the common

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73 Art.9 (4) of Annex III of LOSC and Reg. 17 of the Mining Code.
75 These states have been registered as pioneer investors pursuant to resolution II of UNCLOS III. See International Seabed Authority Handbook 2003, (Jamaica, The International Seabed Authority, 2003),
heritage regime to satisfy the developing states. The amount of money expended by a state or its entities in mining activities in the Area, pegged at an equivalent of $US 30 million, by a certain date was used as a yardstick to determine what states or their entities were eligible to apply to be registered as pioneer investors. The resolution divided the pioneer investors into three categories:

- France, India, Japan and the then USSR (now Russian Federation), or a state enterprise or one natural or juridical person which possessed the nationality of or was effectively controlled by each of those states, or their nationals, provided that such a state had signed the Convention and either through itself or its state enterprise or its national, whether natural or juridical, had spent before 1 January 1983 at least $US 30 million in pioneer activities in the Area, of which not less than ten per cent must have been expended towards location, survey and evaluation of the mining area;

- Four entities, whose components being natural or juridical persons possessed the nationality of one or more of the following states or were effectively controlled by one or more of them or their nationals: Belgium, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, United Kingdom and the United States.


Para. 2 of Resolution II, Governing Preparatory Investment in Pioneer Activities Relating to Polymetallic Nodules. Also see Para. 5(h) of Resolution I, Establishment of the Preparatory Commission for the International Sea-Bed Authority and for the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, listing the functions of the PrepCom.

Para. 1(a) of Resolution II.

Para. 1(b) of Resolution II defines “Pioneer activities” as “undertakings, commitments of financial and other assets, investigations, findings, research, engineering development and other activities relevant to the identification, discovery, and systematic analysis and evaluation of polymetallic nodules and to the determination of the technical and economic feasibility of exploitation”. This paragraph goes on to say that it includes, “(i) any at-sea observation and evaluation activity which has as its objective the establishment and documentation of the nature, shape, concentration, location and grade of polymetallic nodules and of the environmental, technical and other appropriate factors which must be taken into account before exploitation; and (ii) the recovery from the Area of polymetallic nodules with a view to the designing, fabricating and testing of equipment which is intended to be used in the exploitation of polymetallic nodules.”
of America, provided the certifying state(s)\textsuperscript{80} signed the Convention and the entity concerned had spent before 1 January 1983 the amount referred as above;

- Any developing state which signed the Convention or its state enterprise; or a natural or juridical person which possessed the nationality of such state or effectively controlled by it or its nationals, or any group of the foregoing, which had spent the amount referred to above before 1 January 1985.

Such qualified state or entity was to apply to the PrepCom which was to register it, if such state, or in the case of other entities the sponsoring state, had signed the Convention; the application was accompanied by a certificate by such state certifying the level of expenditure; and the application covered a total area large enough and of sufficient commercial value to allow two mining operations in line with the system of “site banking.” The applicant was also to ensure before it applied that there was no overlap with another applicant’s area or with that previously allocated as pioneer areas. This interim regime under Resolution II in itself failed to satisfy certain major industrialised states, which proceeded to unilaterally enact domestic laws to regulate seabed mining in the Area\textsuperscript{81}. This, along with the need to resolve the issue of possible overlapping claims amongst various claimants, led to a series of rather intricate and complicated understandings and agreements\textsuperscript{82}. Eventually, on 17 August 1987, the PrepCom registered India as the first pioneer investor. The pending applications of France, Japan and the then USSR were delayed until the complex Midnight Agreement, which Brown described as being “part of an interlinked network of agreements\textsuperscript{83},”\textsuperscript{84} resolved the overlapping claims between the then USSR and certain industrialised states, including non-signatory states.\textsuperscript{84} With this Midnight Agreement that committed all the states concerned, both signatories and non-signatories to the

\textsuperscript{80} Para. 1( c) defines a “certifying state” as “a state which signs the Convention, standing in relation to a pioneer investor as would a sponsoring state pursuant to Annex III, article 4, of the Convention and which certifies the levels of expenditure specified in subparagraph (a) [at least $US 30 million by the date specified].


\textsuperscript{83} Brown, ibid.p.227.

\textsuperscript{84} Belgium, Canada, Italy and the Netherlands (signatories to LOSC); and Germany, United Kingdom and United States of America (non-signatories to LOSC). See Brown, ibid. pp.226-228.
LOSC, to respect the boundaries as laid down by the Agreement, the applications of France, Japan and the then Soviet Union (now the Russian Federation) were considered and approved by the PrepCom on 17 December 1987. Subsequently, PrepCom approved the application China as pioneer investor on 5 March 1991. On 4 March 1991 a group of Eastern European states, namely Poland, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and the then Soviet Union (now the Russian Federation), along with Cuba, a developing socialist state, applied to the PrepCom through a multinational organisation, the Interoceanmetal Joint Organisation (IOM), to be registered as a pioneer investor. This was approved on 21 August 1991. In 1994, the Republic of Korea applied to be registered as a pioneer investor and the application was approved on 2 August 1994. The approval and registration gave the pioneer investor the exclusive right to carry out pioneer activities in the pioneer area allocated to it. It is important to note that no African state or group of African states qualified nor applied to be registered as a pioneer investor, despite the category three concessions under paragraph 1(a) of Resolution II to developing states. This is in spite of the fact that the Third Regional Conference on the Development and Utilization of Mineral Resources in Africa, held in 1988 at Kampala, Uganda, encouraged the formation of an African deep seabed mining company. No such company has in fact been set up.

85 Applying through Institut Francais de Recherche pour l'exploitation de la Mer/ Association francaise pour l'etude et la recherche des nodules (IFREMER/AFERNOD).
86 Applying through Deep Ocean Resources Development Co. (DORD).
87 Applying through Yuzhmorgeologiya.
89 Applying through China Ocean Mineral Resources Research and Development Association (COMRA).
93 Ibid.p.231.
Originally, under Resolution II a registered pioneer investor was to apply to the ISA for an approved plan of work for exploration and exploitation within six months of the entry into force of the Convention.\(^{97}\) However in 1990, with the adoption of the Understanding on Pioneer Investors' Obligations,\(^{98}\) it was agreed that this deadline would be reviewed as a result of the delay in the likelihood of commercial production in the distant future. The New York Agreement subsequently extended the deadline for pioneer investors to apply for a plan of work for exploration to thirty-six months of the entry into force of the Convention.\(^{99}\) Between 2001 and 2002 the ISA, in consonance with the Mining Regulations 2000, entered into the first fifteen year contracts for exploration for polymetallic nodules in the Area with the former pioneer investors\(^{100}\), namely IFREMER/AFERNOD\(^{101}\), DORD\(^{102}\), Yuzhmorgeologiya\(^{103}\), COMRA\(^{104}\), IOM\(^{105}\), the Republic of Korea\(^{106}\) and the Government of India.\(^{107}\) A perusal of the pioneer investors reveals that all regional grouping, except the African group, are in one way or the other represented in pioneer activities in the Area.

\(^{97}\) Resolution II, Para. 8(a). The fee paid was US$250,000. Resolution II, Para.7 (a).


\(^{100}\) See International Seabed Authority Handbook 2003, op.cit. pp.29-30. Reg. 23(3) of the Mining Code requires that subsequent contracts with any State or entity shall include arrangements that shall be similar and no less favourable than that agreed with any registered pioneer investor. Also if such subsequent contracts are granted more favourable arrangements than that of the registered pioneer investors the council shall make similar or no less favourable arrangements in favour of the pioneer investors provided such arrangements do not affect or prejudice the interests of the ISA.

\(^{101}\) Signed on 20 June 2001 between the Secretary-General of the ISA and Ambassador Pierre-Antoine Bernardi on behalf of Mr. Jean-Francois Minster, President of IFREMER.

\(^{102}\) Signed on 20 June 2001 between the Secretary-General of ISA and Mr. Toshio Takada, President of DORD.

\(^{103}\) Signed on 29 March 2001 between the Secretary-General of ISA and Mr. Ivan F. Gloumov, Deputy Minister – State Secretary of the Ministry of Natural Resources, Russian Federation.

\(^{104}\) Signed on 22 May 2001 between the Secretary-General of ISA and Mr. Jin Jincai, Secretary-General of COMRA.

\(^{105}\) Signed on 29 March 2001 between the Secretary-General of ISA and Dr. Ryszard Kotlinski, Director-General of IOM.

\(^{106}\) Signed on 27 April 2001 between the Secretary-General of ISA and the Minister for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries of the Republic of Korea, Mr. Woo-Taik Chung.
Table 19: Regional Groupings and Pioneer Investors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Group</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Entity</th>
<th>Date of Registration as Pioneer Investor/Contract of Exploration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African Group</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Group</td>
<td>India; China; Japan and Republic of Korea</td>
<td>Department of Ocean Development (India); COMRA (China) DORD (Japan) and the Korean Ocean Research and Development Institute (Republic of Korea).</td>
<td>India- 17 March 1987/25 March 2002 COMRA-5 March 1991/22 May 2001 DORD-17 December 1987/20 June 2001 Korea-2 August 1994/29 March 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern European Group</td>
<td>Russian Federation; Bulgaria; Czech Republic; Poland and Slovakia</td>
<td>State Enterprise Yuzhmorgeologiya (Russian Federation) and IOM(Bulgaria; Czech Republic; Poland; Slovakia and Russian Federation)</td>
<td>Yuzhmorgeologiya -17 December 1987/29 March 2001 IOM-21 August 1991/29 March 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western European and Other States(WEOG) Group</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>IFREMER/AFERN OD.</td>
<td>IFREMER/AFERN OD-17 March 1987/20 June 2001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.2.4. Regulations on prospecting and exploration for polymetallic nodules and African States.

In July 2000 the ISA approved a set of Regulations on the Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area (the Mining Code),\(^{109}\) made up of

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\(^{107}\) Signed on 25 March 2002 between the Secretary-General of ISA and Mr. H.K. Gupta, Secretary of the Department of Ocean Development.


\(^{109}\) ISBA/6/A/18 of July 2000. For analysis of the regulations see generally, Lodge, M., “The International Seabed Authority’s Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules
40 regulations, and divided into 9 parts, along with 4 annexes. It deals with only prospecting and exploration of polymetallic nodules in the Area.

The Code is largely founded upon the work of Special Commission (SC) 3 of the PrepCom upon which the Secretariat of the ISA based its prepared draft that was the initial starting point of the Legal and Technical Commission’s work.\(^{110}\) Thereafter the Legal and Technical Commission, after working from 1997 through to March 1998, produced a draft Mining Code containing 33 articles.\(^{111}\) This draft Mining Code was afterwards transmitted to the Council, which adopted it on 13 July 2000 after a paragraph by paragraph review of the regulations.\(^{112}\) The Mining Code, a product of rather complicated and sometimes contentious negotiations, was finally approved by the Assembly on 13 July 2000 as “the first set of regulations to be issued by the Authority since its conception as the custodian of the ‘common heritage of mankind’ more than 30 years ago.”\(^{113}\) During the negotiations Nigeria, for the African group, had misgivings about the draft Code balancing the interests of protection of investment vis-à-vis the protection of the interests of mankind.\(^{114}\) This section will examine the provisions of the Mining Code in order to determine whether, with the adoption and approval of the Code, such balancing of these diverse interests was achieved in respect of African states. In doing this the section does not purport to embark on a detailed examination of all the provisions of the Code but will merely restrict itself to three pertinent areas of the Mining Code which, in the view of this writer, are of relevance to African states’ participation in mining in the Area.\(^{115}\) These are the Code’s provisions in respect of the finance and technology of prospective applicants; confidentiality of data and information; and the obligation to train personnel of the ISA and developing states. The reason these three aspects are

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110 Ibid. p.5.
selected is because the finance and technology provisions are crucial to the
determination of the capability of African states to participate in seabed mining, while
confidentiality is relevant as regards the access by these states to information relevant
to acquisition of the necessary know-how. The obligation to train, on the other hand,
is relevant in the development of the requisite manpower in these states that would
apply the know-how and utilise the necessary technology in participation in mining
activities in the Area. The question that this section in essence seeks to answer is
whether, in this regard, the Code, as an elaboration of the LOSC and 1994 Agreement,
in any way provides any optimism for the participation of African states in deep
seabed mining.

5.2.4.1. Finance and Technology Provisions.

Like the provisions of the Convention, the Mining Code, though in more detail, makes
financial and technical capability an important precondition for the approval of an
application for a plan of work for exploration. The provisions apply to applicants
other than registered pioneer investors. They require an application to be accompanied
by a certification of the sponsoring state(s) that the applicant has expended the
equivalent of at least US$ 30 million in research and exploration activities, of which
no less than 10 per cent must have been expended on the location, survey and
evaluation of the area referred to in such plan of work. In addition, such sponsoring
state(s) is to certify that the applicant has the necessary financial resources to meet the
estimated cost of the proposed plan of work. The application is to be accompanied
by copies of audited financial statements, including balance sheets as well as the
profit and loss statements of the three years immediately preceding the application,
which are “in conformity with internationally accepted accounting principles” and
certified by a qualified firm of public accountants. For newly organised entities where
a certified balance sheet is not available, a pro forma balance sheet certified by an
appropriate officer of the applicant will suffice. In the case of an applicant which is a
subsidiary of another entity, what is required are the financial statements of the parent
entity and a statement from such parent entity, in conformity with internationally
accepted accounting principles duly certified by a qualified firm of public

116 Regs. 12 and 21(3) (c) of the Mining Code.
117 Reg. 12 (2) of the Mining Code.
118 Reg. 12(4) of the Mining Code.
accountants, that such applicant will have the financial resources to carry out the plan of work. In the case of an applicant controlled by a state or a state enterprise, the applicant is required to submit a statement from such state or state enterprise certifying that the applicant will have the financial resources to carry out the plan of work.\textsuperscript{119} In situations where the applicant intends to finance its plan of work by borrowings, it is also required to submit the amount of such borrowings, the repayment period and the interest rate.\textsuperscript{120}

In addition to evidence of its financial capability, the applicant is also to show its technological abilities by giving a general description of its previous experience, knowledge, skills, technical qualifications and expertise; a general description of the equipment and methods to be used and other relevant non-proprietary information about the characteristics of the technology to be used, and a general description of its financial and technical capability to respond to any incident or activity which causes serious harm to the environment.\textsuperscript{121}

In cases where the applicant is a partnership or consortium each of the members therein are to provide all the information required by the Code on their financial and technological details.\textsuperscript{122}

These twin requirements of finance and technology, which are no doubt crucial requirements for deep sea bed mining, merely highlight the difficulties, in view of the dearth of finance and technology amongst African states, arising with regard to Africa’s participation in actual direct activity in the Area.\textsuperscript{123} Perhaps there is a need to lower the threshold in respect of African states and their entities to encourage them to actually participate, especially in co-operation with other entities that are already participating in seabed mining activities.\textsuperscript{124}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{119} Reg. 12 (5) of the Mining Code.
\item \textsuperscript{120} Reg. 12 (6) of the Mining Code.
\item \textsuperscript{121} Reg. 12 (7) of the Mining Code.
\item \textsuperscript{122} Reg. 12 (8) of the Mining Code.
\item \textsuperscript{123} See section 6.1 and 6.2 of chapter 6 of this thesis for more details.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
5.2.4.2. Confidentiality of Data and Information.

The Mining Code, in seeking to elaborate on the rather vague and obscure provisions of the Convention on confidentiality of data and information, was faced with the need to balance diverse interests in this regard. There was the need to balance the interests of the seabed mining states and their entities, concerned about protecting industrial secrets and proprietary data from competitors, on the one hand, with the interest of the ISA wanting to utilise such data and information in order to carry out its functions effectively, on the other hand. In addition, there was the need to balance the competing interests between seabed mining states and their entities, interested in keeping confidential as much information, especially commercially valuable information, and those of non seabed mining states (including African states) interested in having access to such information and data, in order to use it as a launch pad to acquire technology. During the negotiating process the attempt to reconcile the competing interests and to fine-tune the provisions of the Code raised the need to resolve three main issues: Who decides on what is confidential? How should such confidential information be handled? For how long should confidentiality be maintained?

Under the Code it is left to the contractor “in consultation with the Secretary-General of the ISA” to decide on what information and data is confidential. This designation of data and information as confidential is, however, subject to some exceptions where such confidentiality is excluded, namely: data and information that is generally known and available from other sources; that had been previously made available by the owners to others without an obligation concerning its confidentiality; or that which is already in the possession of the ISA with no obligation concerning confidentiality. It appears that the Secretary-General is under a duty to refuse to

124 See section 6.3 of chapter 6 of this thesis.
128 Reg. 35(1) of the Mining Code.
129 Reg. 35(1) (a) of the Mining Code.
130 Reg. 35(1) (b) of the Mining Code.
131 Reg. 35(1) (c) of the Mining Code.
accept that data and information are confidential if the conditions for the exceptions exist at the time of the consultations. In respect of the second exception in relation to data and information made available previously by the owner to others without an obligation concerning its confidentiality, this would appear not to include subsidiaries of the owner, but should be limited to autonomous persons. Presumably, it would be sufficient if such disclosure was made to just one other person. Evidently non sea bed mining states, including African states, will favour an interpretation of the exceptions to confidentiality of data and information in such a way that would make as much information and data accessible in the public domain.

Once information and data are successfully designated as confidential, it may only be used by the Secretary-General and, under his authority, by the staff of the Secretariat along with members of the Legal and Technical Commission. The access of the staff of the Secretariat and the members of the Legal and Technical Commission to such data and information is required to be authorised by the Secretary-General only for limited use in connection with their respective duties and functions.\(^{132}\) The Secretary-General therefore has the responsibility to maintain the confidentiality of such data and information, and he cannot release it to any person external to the ISA, except with the prior written consent of the contractor. To carry through this responsibility, he is to establish procedures, consistent with the Convention, concerning the handling of confidential information by members of the Secretariat, members of the Legal and Technical Commission and any other person participating in any activity or programme of the ISA.\(^{133}\) Such procedures include the maintenance of such information or data in secure facilities and the development of suitable security procedures to prevent unauthorised access to or removal of such data or information; development and maintenance of a classification, log and inventory system of all written data and information received, including its type, source and routing from the time of receipt until final disposition.\(^{134}\) The Secretary-General is to require all persons authorised to have access to such confidential data and information to make a written declaration witnessed by the Secretary-General or his authorised representative, acknowledging his or her legal obligation to maintain confidentiality.

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\(^{132}\) Reg. 35(2) of the Mining Code.

\(^{133}\) Reg. 36 of the Mining Code.

\(^{134}\) Reg. 36(1) (a) and (b) of the Mining Code.
and to comply with the applicable regulations and procedures.\textsuperscript{135} Members of the Secretariat and members of the Legal and Technical Commission are not to disclose any confidential information coming to their knowledge by reason of their assignment with the ISA even after the termination of their employment or functions, as the case may be.\textsuperscript{136} Failure on the part of the ISA to maintain the confidentiality of such data and information will result in the ISA incurring responsibility or liability for any damage arising from such breach,\textsuperscript{137} though the ISA may subsequently take appropriate action against any such person who directly breaches the duty of confidentiality.\textsuperscript{138}

In the course of the negotiations of the Code, certain delegates wanted confidentiality to remain indefinitely, while others wanted it to be for a limited period.\textsuperscript{139} Eventually the Code set a confidentiality period of ten years from the date of submission of the data and information or the expiration of the contract of exploration, whichever is later, at the first instance. Thereafter the Secretary-General of the ISA and the contractor are to review the data and information every five years to determine whether they should remain confidential. Such data and information will remain confidential as long as the contractor is able to establish that there is "a substantial risk of serious and unfair economic prejudice" if such data and information were to be released.\textsuperscript{140} No such data and information shall be released until the contractor is given a reasonable opportunity to exhaust the judicial remedies available to it under Part XI, section 5 of LOSC.\textsuperscript{141} If on the expiration of the contract of exploration, a contract of exploitation is entered into in respect of the exploitation area all such confidential data and information will remain confidential.\textsuperscript{142} Without prejudice to the various provisions requiring confidentiality, the contractor is given the discretion at any time to waive its right to confidentiality.\textsuperscript{143}

\textsuperscript{135} Reg. 36(2) of the Mining Code.
\textsuperscript{136} Reg. 36(3) and (4) of the Mining Code.
\textsuperscript{137} Art.22 of Annex III of LOSC.
\textsuperscript{138} Reg. 36(5) of the Mining Code.
\textsuperscript{139} See ISA, Background Press Release, SB/6/1 of 17 March 2000. Also Lodge, "The International Seabed Authority’s Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area," op.cit. p.23.
\textsuperscript{140} Reg. 35(3) of the Mining Code.
\textsuperscript{141} See section 4.1.3.2 of chapter 4 of this thesis on dispute settlement mechanism under the regime.
\textsuperscript{142} Reg. 35(4) of the Mining Code.
\textsuperscript{143} Reg. 35(5) of the Mining Code.
In respect of prospecting the Secretary-General may at any time, either with the consent of the prospector or if he determines that such prospector no longer exists or cannot be located, release data and information that would otherwise be confidential.\textsuperscript{144}

The detailed provisions on confidentiality, covering also members of the Legal and Technical Commission, including those from African states, who are nominated by states parties, restrict information available in the public domain. This restriction limits the accessible information available to developing states, including African states, on seabed mining. Since an integral part of technology is the know-how,\textsuperscript{145} which arises from access to relevant information, this restriction hinders the transfer of technology to African states. However, the crucial issue that arises is the delicate and difficult balance between the need to transfer technology and the protection of the intellectual property rights of the contractors through the confidentiality provisions. In line with the 1994 Agreement, the rather stringent confidentiality provisions of the Code appear to tilt the balance in favour of the protection of the intellectual property rights of the contractors.\textsuperscript{146}

5.2.4.3. Obligation to train personnel of ISA and developing states.

Under the Code each contract for exploration shall include as a schedule what is tagged "a practical programme" for the training of personnel of both the ISA and developing states by the contractor.\textsuperscript{147} This programme is to be drawn up by the contractor in co-operation with the ISA and the sponsoring state(s). Such programmes are to focus not only on training of such personnel but also provide for their full participation in all activities covered by the contract. The Code further provides that such training programmes may be revised and developed from time to time as may be necessary by mutual agreement, presumably between the contractor, the ISA and the sponsoring state(s) who work together in drawing up the original training programme. This regulation is pursuant to Article 15 of Annex III of LOSC that states that, "The

\textsuperscript{144} Reg. 6 (2) of the Mining Code.

\textsuperscript{145} See Art. 5(8) of Annex III of LOSC which defines technology as not only including "technical know-how." Also Borgese, E.M., \textit{The Oceanic circle: Governing the Seas as a global resource} (Tokyo/New York/Paris, United Nations University Press, 1998), p.149, who explains that new technology is all about, "...information, knowledge, development..."

\textsuperscript{146} See section 3.2.1 of chapter 3 of this thesis.

\textsuperscript{147} Reg. 27 of the Mining Code.
contractor shall draw up practical programmes for the training of personnel of the Authority and developing states, including the participation of such personnel in all activities in the Area which are covered by the contract, in accordance with article 144 paragraph 2." Since the Mining Code was adopted, the annual reports of the pioneer contractors received in 2002 and 2003 indicate that the contractors are yet to carry out any training in accordance with the programme of work.\textsuperscript{148}

However, an examination of the training programmes of the pioneer investors pursuant to Resolution II, paragraph 12(a)(ii), which similarly required the registered pioneer investors to provide personnel training at all levels, indicates that the African region is likely to benefit immensely when such training is commenced as required by the Mining Code. Of the twenty-two personnel trained pursuant to Resolution II, eight were from the African region.\textsuperscript{149} Prima facie this obligation to train appears to be favourable to developing states, including African states, since training of personnel is an effective way of transferring knowledge, and eventually technology. The transfer of technology through personnel training is encouraged by the LOSC which requires co-operation between the ISA and states parties in promoting the transfer of technology and scientific knowledge, through inter alia:

"measures directed towards the advancement of the technology of the Enterprise and the domestic technology of developing States, particularly by providing opportunities to personnel from the Enterprise and from developing States for training in marine science and technology and for their full participation in activities in the Area." \textsuperscript{150}

Despite this, the provisions on training still raise certain issues. The way in which training programmes are drawn up, while including the ISA, excludes the direct involvement of developing states, even though at the end they are meant to be the final beneficiaries. This reduces them to the position of rather passive participants in a training programme that appears to have the altruistic aim of advancement of their domestic technology for the purpose of participation in activities in the Area. Some level of involvement of developing states earmarked as possible beneficiaries in


drawing up the training programme would enable such states to give their input in order to produce a programme that would actually be relevant to their peculiar milieu and developmental needs. It is arguable that this would also encourage them to play a more active role, not only in picking the personnel, but also in the effective utilisation of the skills of such personnel in domestic technology advancement. Another issue is as regards the selection process of candidates. In selecting the candidates for training, the ISA is to be guided by the guidelines set out in the final report of the Training Panel to the General Committee of the PrepCom. First, the ISA requests by note verbale that the states members should nominate candidates for the training. Thereafter, the applications received are considered and a short-list of the applicants is drawn up, based on their qualifications, professional experience, and their reasons for seeking the training and how the training would benefit the nominating government. Upon selecting the most appropriate applicants based on these criteria, the ISA is then to consider geographic representation, with priority to be given to candidates from developing states. Although the selection emphasises geographic representation after the short-listing of applicants with qualifications and experience, it is argued that as a result of the relatively limited amount of skilled manpower in Africa in this area, as compared to other developing regions such as Asia, it is likely that a number of African candidates may not make the short-list in the first place. Further, a perusal of the list of those trained pursuant to resolution II reveals no clear-cut equitable geographical distribution. Although Africa had the second highest number of trainees, second only to Asia, the list does not reveal that the pioneer investors adhered to any rule of equitable geographical distribution in respect of the trainees. It is not very clear from Regulation 27 of the Mining Code whether the African region would have any guaranteed place in the training programmes of the contractors based on equitable geographical distribution. It is suggested that in view of the non-participation of African states in deep seabed mining activities, African

150 Art.144 (2) (b) of LOSC.
153 ISBA/7/LTC/2 of 25 June 200, 1 Annex I. For example, Japan had 3 trainees, all of whom were from the Asian regional grouping.
154 See ISA, Press Release, SB/5/9 of 12 August 1999 where some states requested that the Regulation on training to be more detailed by outlining the number of programmes, scope of training, the funding of programmes and the number of trainees.
candidates should be given special consideration in selection in order to encourage African states' participation in these activities.

Despite the shortcomings of Regulation 27, the prospect of personnel training for developing states is laudable. However, African states have the primary responsibility of putting in place domestic policies for the efficient management of these skilled human resources if any such training is to produce domestic technology advancement in real terms.\(^\text{155}\)

5.2.5. Draft Regulations for prospecting and exploration for hydrothermal polymetallic sulphides and cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts and African states.

As far back as August 1998 during the resumed fourth session of the ISA,\(^\text{156}\) the Russian delegation requested that the ISA adopt regulations for the exploration of hydrothermal polymetallic sulphides (polymetallic sulphides)\(^\text{157}\) and cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts (cobalt crusts).\(^\text{158}\) Under the LOSC and the Agreement such regulations, when so requested, were to be adopted within three years of such request.\(^\text{159}\) However, from 1997 up to 2000 the ISA had to focus on the regulations for polymetallic nodules. Upon the approval of the latter regulations in 2000, the need to adopt regulations on polymetallic sulphides and cobalt crusts again came to the fore. Two major views emerged in this regard.\(^\text{160}\) One view, supported by states such as Belgium, China, Japan, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea and the United Kingdom, contended that work on such regulations would be premature, fundamentally because the possibility of commercial exploitation of such resources

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\(^\text{155}\) See Mutharika, P.A., "The Role of International Law in the Twenty-First Century: An African Perspective" (1994-1995) 18 Fordham International Law Journal, p. 1706 at 1716, where the author identifies "efficient management and equitable distribution of national resources, and the centrality of the human person in development planning", as some key issues African states have to deal with in order to rise out of economic stagnation.

\(^\text{156}\) ISBA/4/A/18, para. 14.


\(^\text{159}\) Art. 162 (2) (o) (ii) of LOSC and Section 1 paras. 15 and 16 of the Annex to the Agreement.

lay in the distant future, and also because more research was needed by the ISA to devise such regulations. Another group, including African states such as Cameroon and Nigeria, along with Argentina, Chile, Fiji, Jamaica and Papua New Guinea, took the view that work on such regulations should begin immediately. As far as the latter group was concerned, such regulations were imperative because some states had already begun prospecting for some of these minerals. Further, they were of the view that such regulations were essential to guard against possible adverse effects on the marine environment and to consider the needs of developing states. In their view, insufficient knowledge about the resources could not be a basis for delaying work on the regulations since knowledge could be acquired while the Legal and Technical Commission deliberated on the regulations. Eventually the Council in July 2001 agreed to start work on the regulations and the Legal and Technical Commission was directed to “commence consideration of the issues involved in the elaboration of regulations.” The Council, however, required the Legal and Technical Commission to adopt a flexible approach to the formulation of the regulations, particularly because of the lack of scientific knowledge of the possible effect of exploitation of these resources on the deep sea ecosystems. Despite this flexible approach, the Commission was at the same time required to ensure that the regulations would be consistent with the LOSC, the Agreement and the existing regulations on polymetallic nodules.

Work on the regulations is ongoing. The major challenge the Commission appears to face at this stage is the task of preparing regulations that do not detract from the provisions of the Convention and the Agreement in respect of the system of exploration, but yet cater for the peculiar variance between these resources and polymetallic nodules. For instance, as a result of the nature of these resources, unlike the polymetallic nodules, it is virtually impossible to determine two sites of equal estimated commercial value without substantial and costly exploration work on the

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161 See SB/7/14 of 11 July 2001. The Russian Federation, which had earlier requested for the regulations and supported the latter position, was of the view that there were no valid juridical or technical arguments for postponing the commencement of work on the regulations.

162 Ibid.


part of the contractor. Furthermore, the exploration of these resources in the Area, unlike the nodules, would be in competition with the exploration of such resources located within national jurisdiction of certain states, in much shallower waters. This has led the Commission to examine more innovative ways concerning the system of exploration which would be in line with the spirit of the LOSC and the Agreement.

At the ninth session of the ISA the Commission convened four informal working groups of its members to examine various issues: environmental issues; size of the exploration areas and the system by which the contractors will relinquish some of the areas to the ISA; the form of the work plans to be submitted by prospective applicants; and the type of arrangements between the contractors and the ISA, whether it should be like the parallel system applied to polymetallic nodules or should be a more innovative arrangement to meet the peculiar nature of these resources. The working group on the size of the areas for exploration recognised that due to the nature of polymetallic sulphides and cobalt crusts it would not be appropriate to allocate broad areas to the contractor, as is the case with polymetallic nodules. Rather, it showed a preference for allocation by way of a block system much like that adopted by certain mineral producing states in respect of domestic exploration and exploitation, especially in offshore zones. This group considered that the elements that should be taken into account for the purpose of the regulations include the size and maximum number of blocks to be available per contractor, the spatial definition of blocks, spatial organisation, the geometry/dimensions of blocks, the selection process, relinquishment procedures, timescale, encouragement factors for contractors and the economics of the number of mining sites necessary to sustain contractor

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165 See Consideration relating to the regulations for prospecting and exploration for hydrothermal polymetallic sulphides and cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts in the Area, ISBA/7/C/2 of 29 May 2001, para. 12.


167 See generally ISBA/7/C/2 of 29 May 2001 and Summary presentations on polymetallic massive sulphide deposits and cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts, Eighth Session, ISBA/8/A/1 of 9 May 2002.

operations. The working group was of the view that whatever the size of the mining site and the relinquishment period, it must be flexible enough to motivate the contractors to carry out effective exploration.\textsuperscript{169} The working group on the form of work plans to be submitted by prospective applicants, while of the view that it should be as close as possible to that of polymetallic nodules, was of the firm opinion that there should be a number of adjustments to reflect the peculiar nature of these resources. The significant differences, as far as the group was concerned, would relate to prospecting, the size of the area allocated, the application of the site-banking system and the procedure for dealing with overlapping claims. Further, the group was of the view that it would be more practical and manageable to have only one form of contract for both polymetallic sulphides and cobalt rich crusts.\textsuperscript{170} The working group on the type of arrangements needed to give effect to the parallel system took the position that site banking would be difficult to apply to polymetallic sulphides and cobalt-rich crusts. This group therefore looked into other alternatives that would reflect the \textit{"spirit of the parallel system"} and suggested that an applicant could propose one of three options to the ISA, namely, the option of contributing to a reserved area in line with strict site-banking; the option of a joint venture system involving a 50-50 equity participation between the Enterprise and the contractor; a production sharing contract whereby the contractor would recover its cost of production at the end of each year and thereafter profit-sharing would be on a 50-50 basis.\textsuperscript{171} It is not clear from the last two options how the participation interest of developing states, including African states, required to be promoted by LOSC, would be catered for.\textsuperscript{172} Would such developing states be allowed to have a certain share in the equity participation of the Enterprise in either the joint venture or production sharing arrangement proposed? If so, what would be the percentage? The practicality and feasibility of the production sharing option are, however, doubtful considering that the regulations are meant to address the issue of prospecting and exploration and not exploitation. Therefore it is not too clear how the contractor would recoup its cost at the end of each year, certainly the contractor cannot recoup its profits until commercial exploitation takes place.

\textsuperscript{169} Ibid. para. 8.
\textsuperscript{170} Ibid. para. 10.
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid. paras. 11 and 12 and Regulation 19 of Draft Regulations, ISBA/10/C/WP.1 of 24 May 2004.
In these deliberations on the proposed regulations to govern prospecting and exploration of polymetallic sulphides and cobalt-rich crusts, the Commission has been guided by relevant national legislation dealing with both land and offshore mining, including that of African states.\textsuperscript{173}

Despite the contributions of African states in the push for the regulations and also the input of the domestic mineral resource legislation and mining agreements of certain African states in the discussions of the Legal and Technical Commission, the remoteness of the actual participation of African states in mining for these resources also arises. Whatever innovative system is eventually adopted by these regulations, the twin requirements of technology and finance would in many regards limit such participation by African states.\textsuperscript{174}

5.3. Conclusion.

This chapter has sought to examine the system of mining in the Area vis-à-vis African states. While strictly speaking the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles is not part of the Area, the system of mining has been examined as a result of the Article 82 provisions, which through a compromise mechanism give the ISA a distributive role in line with the principle of the common heritage of mankind. As a result of the inherent exclusive sovereign rights vested in a coastal state to explore and exploit its continental shelf and to regulate and authorise drilling therein, African states with extended continental shelves have the right to determine the system of mining in this

\textsuperscript{172} Art. 148 of LOSC.


\textsuperscript{174} The present reports appear to indicate that these resources, as a result of the relative scarcity of information compared to polymetallic nodules and their peculiar physical characteristics, would require even more capital and more sophisticated technology for mining activities. See generally Parts II and III of ISBA/7/C/2 of 29 May 2001 and also Parts II and III of ISBA/8/A/1 of 9 May 2002. See section 6.1 of chapter 6 of this thesis.
part of the seabed. The current practice of offshore mining in much shallower waters of African states reveals that this is likely to be mainly carried out by TNCs, working in tandem with these states through various contractual arrangements, such as joint ventures and production sharing contracts. Under the provisions of Article 82, which requires payments or contributions to the ISA from exploitation in the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, African states with extended continental shelves would be exempt if they can establish that they are net importer of the mineral resources produced in their continental shelf. However, for African states that are not exempt, in the eventuality of commercial production in the extended continental shelf, it is suggested that they would need to clarify, through domestic legislation or the terms of the contractual arrangements with the TNCs, certain practical issues that would arise from Article 82. For instance, the role of TNCs (engaged under a contractual arrangement e.g. production sharing contract) in payments or contributions under Article 82 would have to be clarified. Also the ISA would have to formulate necessary regulations to address certain practical issues that would arise in the eventuality that it has to carry out its distributive function under Article 82.

Further, as potential beneficiaries of such payments or contributions, African states are in good stead as developing states in a region where quite a number of the states are amongst the least developed and land-locked states. It is, however, doubtful if such amount when distributed amongst all states parties, even with the special consideration for developing states, would make a significant impact on the economy of African states.

In the Area proper, under the compromise parallel system, African states technically have access to participate in mining activities once they are states parties to LOSC. However, in reality the twin requirements of sophisticated technology and substantial finance needed to embark upon mining in the Area severely limit the possibility of direct participation of African states in such mining. The example of pioneer investors, where, despite the concession to developing states under Resolution II, Africa failed to produce any such pioneer investor(s), confirms the remoteness of direct participation in seabed mining by African states. The possibility of African states participating indirectly through TNCs incorporated within those states was also examined. However, the nature of the resources in the Area, which are located in "no
"man's land" and for the most part a considerable distance from the African continent, along with the generally unstable economic and political conditions in Africa, make such possibilities rather dim. While the possibility of African states' participation in deep seabed mining is remote, there are sparks of hope if such states embark on south-south co-operation with other developing states that have the potential to actually participate in deep seabed mining activities, especially as regards the reserved areas, an issue that is examined in more detail in the subsequent chapter. The regulations, dealing with polymetallic nodules, which have been adopted and those on polymetallic sulphides and cobalt crusts currently being formulated, do not generally enhance the possibility of participation of African states but rather, as instruments to elaborate the LOSC and the Agreement, tend to magnify the remoteness of such participation. Perhaps, if contractors are encouraged under the practical training provision of the regulation to train more personnel from African states this may result in the acquisition of expertise by these personnel and hopefully help in the transfer of marine technology to such states. However, for such training to be meaningful there is a need for African states to have the political will to provide suitable domestic environment for such trained personnel to make use of their expertise. This can be done, for instance, by making available appropriate research and development (R&D) facilities for trained personnel to embark on R&D to develop their expertise.\(^{175}\)

\(^{175}\) For more on this, see section 6.2.2 of this thesis.
CHAPTER SIX.

PARTICIPATION OF AFRICAN STATES IN DEEP SEABED MINING: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS.

The twin requirements of adequate finance and sophisticated technology imposed by the LOSC and the Mining Code as an essential precondition for participation in deep sea bed mining activities in the Area in themselves constitute a major constraint to actual, direct and effective participation by African states, their entities and their nationals. While the LOSC provisions enjoin that effective participation of developing states in activities in the Area should be promoted having due regard to their special interests and needs, especially as it relates to those which are land-locked and geographically disadvantaged, the reality on the ground as regards Africa, a continent having several landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states, appears to point to a rather bleak possibility of such participation. This chapter seeks to examine these preconditions of finance and technology in respect of deep sea bed mining activities vis-à-vis the poverty and lack of sophisticated technology in Africa in order to lay bare the problems militating against the actual, direct and effective participation of African states in deep seabed mining. The chapter subsequently attempts to examine various possible co-operative endeavours that African states may embark upon to overcome some of the constraints in order to advance the prospects of their actual, direct and effective participation in deep seabed mining activities.

6.1. Finance.

The deep seabed mining industry, which is capital-intensive, does not hold prospects of imminent commercial exploitation. Therefore at best states, their nationals and entities, investing in such seabed mining, are engaged in long-term investments with no certainty of when or whether they will yield profitable returns. At worst such states are engaged in such mining, not really for commercial gains but rather for the purpose of the prestige of being acclaimed as one of the seabed mining states,

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1 See Arts. 148 and 160(2) (k) of LOSC.
symbolic of the maturation" of its scientific, technological and industrial capabilities. Can African states afford to engage in such long term or prestige investment? This section seeks to examine the problem militating against African states' participation in seabed mining by considering the capital-intensive nature of seabed mining operations vis-à-vis the dearth of financial resources resulting from acute poverty, which in turn requires such scarce finance to be diverted to pressing and immediate priority areas.

6.1.1. An examination of cost estimates for seabed mining operations.

As commercial exploitation of the Area is yet to commence, the total cost estimates of seabed mining operations (except perhaps those related to research and development(R&D) and prospecting and exploration which are ongoing) is largely a matter of conjecture based on cost estimates proposed by certain experts. As far back as 1979 Ronald Katz opined, though without any reference to any specific data, that seabed miners must invest an approximate amount of between $500 million to $1 billion in order to embark on seabed mining. In a more detailed scrutiny of the issue of cost estimates for seabed mining, J.D. Nyhart and M. Triantafyllou, of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in a 1983 presentation, examined a hypothetical nodule mining project presumed to have begun in 1970 and proceeding to commercialisation, by a consortium of companies based in the United States of America with processing facilities on the west coast of America relatively close to the proposed mine-site located in the Clarion and Clipperton area of the Pacific Ocean, where the bulk of the polymetallic nodules are situated. Their analysis covered various stages ranging from what they tagged "pre-production or up front work" (R & D to get the technology together and the prospecting and exploration work); "the contract and construction or investment phase" (actual assembling of facilities and equipment necessary for recovery, transportation and processing of target metals) and the commercial operations (construction of the equipment for mining, transportation.
and processing activities and actual commercial exploitation). Based on existing knowledge at the time of the presentation, in the eighties, they arrived at an estimated colossal sum of $1,121 million as capital costs after the preparatory costs of $172 million. In addition they projected annual operating costs of $217 million. IFREMER, one of the pioneer investors, giving a cost estimate in 1988 money terms, projected the total investments in seabed mining at about $950 million with additional operating costs of $240 million per year. In an in-depth joint study conducted in 1989 by the International Ocean Institute (IOI) and the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee (AALCC), after examining the expenditure and budgeted outlay of various states involved in seabed mining activities, including Japan, India, USSR, France, Korea, Norway, Sweden and Finland, it was estimated that a minimum budget of $200 million over four years could cover exploration, R&D and training.

The LOSC, the Agreement and the Mining Code give an indication of the immense costs involved by requiring an applicant for a plan of work, both pioneer and other prospective investors, to show evidence of having expended the sum of £30 million in pre-exploration activities. From available records it appears that seabed mining operations for polymetallic sulphides and cobalt crusts would be even more expensive in view of the peculiar geological characteristics and the relative lack of knowledge of these resources as compared with polymetallic nodules. For example, in an estimate based on 42 research cruises from 1981 through 2001 in respect of cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts, it is suggested that a minimum expenditure of about US $32

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7 Ibid p.382.
8 Ibid p.426.
9 See http://www.ifremer.fr/drogm_uk/Realisation/Miner/Nod/texte/txt18.html [Accessed on 19 December 2003] [Translated from French to English by Mrs Valerie Taylor].
11 Art.4 of Annex III to the LOSC, Section 1, para.6(i) of the Annex to the 1994 Agreement and Reg. 12 of the Mining Code, ISBA/6/A/18 of 4 October 2000.
million for ship and associated scientific operations related to field operations would be required. Shore-based research in addition is estimated to be US $42 million, bringing the total investment to about $74 million.\textsuperscript{12}

What clearly comes forth is that deep seabed activities involve large investments by a state or person, natural or juridical, engaged in such activities. Can African states afford to make such investments in such activities?

6.1.2. Poverty in Africa.

Africa, especially the sub-Saharan part, is inundated with poverty. Only about half its population, living on less than $1 a day, has access to basic requirements of living such as health care, nutrition, access to safe water and education. The HIV/AIDS pandemic, internal conflicts and war, the overwhelming burden of foreign debts,\textsuperscript{13} as well as corrupt and visionless governance, aggravate this poverty.\textsuperscript{14} This problem of poverty in Africa remains, although there have been different initiatives that seek to eradicate the scourge of poverty in Africa. These initiatives include the recent Cotonou ACP-EEC Agreement and the purely African initiative of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD),\textsuperscript{15} which have as their central objective the reduction and the eventual eradication of poverty in Africa.\textsuperscript{16}

The natural consequence of the poverty level in Africa is that high-risk, capital intensive and non-immediate profit yielding ventures like the deep seabed mining


\textsuperscript{13}Out of the list of the World Bank of 42 Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), a whooping 34 are from Africa. http://www.worldbank.org/hipc/about/map/map.html [Accessed on 16 January 2004].


\textsuperscript{15}The Cotonou Agreement was signed on June 23, 2000 between the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Countries and the European Economic Community, the seventh of such Agreements (Others were Yaounde I and II, Lome I, II, III and IV). The Cotonou Agreement is for 20-year duration subject to review every 5 years. See Art.95. http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/cotonou/agreement_en.htm [Accessed on 5 May 2004].

The NEPAD is an initiative of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (now replaced by the African Union) and the NEPAD Strategic Framework document was formally adopted at the 37\textsuperscript{th} Summit of the OAU. See http://www.nepad.org/en.html [Accessed 5 May 2004].

activities cease to be a priority. Priority matters revolve around what in developed industrialised states are mundane matters, sometimes taken for granted, such as providing basic food and portable water, basic education, shelter and health care.\textsuperscript{17} The poor education level in Africa, a fall-out of poverty, results in an abysmal research and development (R&D) culture in African states, a sine qua non to effective participation in deep seabed mining activities. All these relegate African states to a position where they are disadvantaged in participating in deep seabed mining activities,\textsuperscript{18} but rather would appear to be destined to merely look towards the distributional benefits hoped to be derived in the distant future, under the common heritage principle, from the engagement of other states in deep seabed mining activities.\textsuperscript{19}

Presently, it does appear that as a result of the current poverty crisis in Africa, the active interest of African states lies mainly in aspects of international law that are considered as contributing to the immediate developmental needs of the region.\textsuperscript{20} For as long as mining in the Area appeared to be imminent, with the likelihood of the distribution of revenue to African states under the common heritage of mankind and the effect it would have on land-based producers, African states took a great interest and were proactive in formulating the regime. However, with the postponement of commercial exploitation of the Area to the distant future, the interest of Africa appears to have waned in the light of more pressing priority needs. While this appears to be perfectly justifiable in view of the national interest content of international law,\textsuperscript{21} this approach may in many regards leave African states in a position where in certain areas of international law they are perpetually reduced to a position of being mere observers and not actual direct participants. The immediate development

\textsuperscript{18} Art.148 and 153 of LOSC.
\textsuperscript{19} Art.140 of LOSC.
approach to issues of international law is reflected in the fact that African states’ marine policy have a rather restricted focus on such areas of ocean use and utilisation as the development of near offshore mineral resources; exploitation of fisheries resources, protection of their immediate marine environment and shipping. This can be contrasted with the marine policy of states such as Korea, China and India which, while not ignoring immediate developmental needs, have adopted a broader policy that does not neglect such long-term areas as deep seabed mining. While Africa must rightly, as its priority, address its immediate developmental needs, it cannot afford to close its eyes to high tech, high risk, non-immediate profit-yielding areas as deep seabed mining. Such participation in deep seabed mining cannot be based solely on the prospects of immediate monetary returns. Other strategic policy considerations have propelled certain developing states to get involved in deep seabed mining. For states like Korea, China and India such considerations include the possibility of long term procurement of strategic metals as an alternative to land-based minerals and the possibility of utilising R &D into deepsea bed mining technology to enhance their marine science and technology capabilities and to expand their capacity to use and exploit the oceans. As was pointed out by Shyam, in respect of India’s participation in deep seabed mining activities, such participation, apart from the political prestige arising from the dynamics in the international sphere where the perception of power is influenced by a nation’s perceived scientific, technological and industrial capabilities, also provides a goal and challenge to indigenous scientists to have an “ocean-oriented focus.” This type of focus would be most useful for the African continent. Beyond deep seabed mining such ocean-oriented focus would be beneficial in acquiring indigenous technology for offshore mining of mineral resources replete within certain


24 Seoung-Yong, Ibid. p.97 at 104-105; Wang, Zhixiong, ibid. Shyam, Ibid. and Ford, Ibid.
African coastal states' national jurisdiction. This would also be useful to African states with continental shelves beyond 200 nautical miles to enable them to acquire the technology that would empower them to exploit the natural resources located in this extended continental shelf. Wang Zhixiong, writing about China, comments as follows:

"Deep seabed mining involves many fields of science and technology. The exploitation of deep seabed polymetallic nodules relates to geology, meteorology, the electricity industry, the mining industry, the transport industry, the metals industry, the chemical industry, and so on. It has played a significant role in the development of these technologies and industries. Therefore, deep seabed mining could promote the development of marine science and technology in China."

Further, with the 1994 Agreement that has watered down the protection for land-based producers of resources in the Area, some of which are African states, it would perhaps be of strategic interest for these states to look towards participation in a competing industry as a means of diversifying their production base, while for African non-land based producers it would be judicious to look towards participation as a means to obtaining alternative direct access to such resources in the Area. It is suggested that the prudent far-sighted strategy would be for African states, acting and pooling resources together, to have some level of participation in the development of human resources, technology development, prospecting and exploration, so that in the eventuality of commercial mining in the Area they would be able to participate not only as beneficiaries under the common heritage of mankind, but also as actual participants in activities in the Area. It may be easy to argue that African states can actually defer their participation until such commercial mining is imminent. However the drawback of this, as a result of the long-term nature of investment in deep seabed

26 “Alternative Cost-Effective Models for Pioneer Co-operation in Deep Sea-Bed Exploration, Technology Development, and Training, Joint Study by the International Ocean Institute (IOI) and the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee (AALCC) 1989”, op.cit. p.566, where it was pointed out, "...R&D in deep-sea mining technology does not take place in a vacuum, but is heavily dependent on progress in all the "new" or "high" information-based technologies of the so-called Third Industrial Revolution and its application to mining technology."
27 See sections 1.2.1 and 5.1.2 of this thesis.
29 Art.140 of LOSC.
mining, is that African states would continue, as in other areas such as space technology, to trail behind all other states that have opted for an early involvement.

6.2. Technology.

As a result of the peculiar terrain of the Area, which is located a great distance from land with rough seabed topography, extreme physical and chemical conditions and largely unfamiliar biodiversity, deep seabed mining requires highly sophisticated marine technology. This is even more so with polymetallic sulphides and cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts, for which research and development (R&D) on the necessary technology in comparison to polymetallic nodules are at infancy stage. Presently the search for technologies, which would make seabed mining commercially viable, is ongoing.

6.2.1. Deep Seabed Mining Technology.

The technologies required for deep seabed mining include those for surveying and prospecting, exploration, exploitation, as well as for transportation and processing of the resources, since the whole essence of mining is not only to win the resources but also to transport them to a place where they can be processed into a commercially viable state in order to put them on the commodity market for sale. Such technologies include state-of-the-art multi-purpose research vessels having sophisticated equipment like multi-beam swath mapping systems, manned or unmanned research submersibles or remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) equipped

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30 See, for example, the Nigerian National Space Policy (2001) http://www.nigeriafirst.org/uploads/national_policy_on_space.pdf [Accessed on 20 January 2004], where the preamble of the executive summary in what appears to be an emphasis on the need to catch up in this area stated: “Over the years, mankind has benefited from the advances in space technology in diverse areas such as satellite communication, remote sensing and meteorology among others. The benefits have however accrued to us mostly indirectly as consumers of products and services engineered and provided either by multi-lateral companies or intergovernmental agencies such as INTELSAT, INMARSAT, RASCOM, COPUOS, etc… There is no nation that can call itself developed in the 21st century that does not have indigenous critical mass of trained space scientists and engineers who contribute actively to the solution of the nation’s problems. Such critical mass can only be acquired through a well-defined and developed country space programme.” Nigeria is reported to have an annual budget of $22.4 million to finance its space policy. See Mustafa, N., “A new race for space: Its crowded up there,” Time Magazine, February 16, 2004, p.18.


32 See Paras. 6, 8 and 9, ISBA/7/C/2 of 29 May 2001 and Paras. 12 and 14, ISBA/8/A/1 of 9 May 2002.

33 However see Art.1 (3) of the LOSC which defines “Activities in the Area” as “all activities of exploration for, and exploitation of, the resources of the Area.” See also Yuwen Li, Transfer of Technology for Deep Sea-bed Mining: The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and beyond, (Dordrecht/Boston/London, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994), p.142.
with photographic and video systems, TV-guided grasps for controlled geological sampling and portable drilling and coring devices to embark on surveying, prospecting and exploration of the Area. To understand the terrain, computer-generated maps, produced by reconstructing sonic images from sonar and seismic sounding equipment, are utilised. The kinds of rock and the depths of its layers in the Area are identified by seismic profiling. For the actual mining of polymetallic nodules three possible, rather complex, technologies have been developed – the hydraulic mining system (HMS), the continuous line bucket (CLB) and the modular mining system (MMS). It is indicated that technology for nodule mining had actually been developed to the stage where, but for the crash of relevant metal


37 A system involving the introduction of a specially produced pipe from the surface vessel to the ground of the Area and through specially contrived hydraulic means the nodules are transported from the bottom of the Area through the pipe to the surface ship. It consists of a collector linked to the end of the pipe, which is laid on the floor to move about the oceanfloor to dislodge nodules from the floor and then feed it to the pipe. Thereafter the nodules through a hydraulic pump and airlift are channelled to the surface ship. See Yuwen Li, ibid. p.143; Morgan, et al, ibid. pp.311-313 and Lenoble, J., “Technological Aspects of the Operation of Transport Vessels and Mining Ships” in Koers, A.W., & Oxman B., (eds.), The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, op.cit. at p.377. This appears to be the current focus though the primary challenges are in keeping a steady ship position because of the distance at sea, ensuring that the pipe does not snap and that the collector is not lost or permanently stuck to the ocean floor. See Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALOS), The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (A historical perspective), http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective.htm#Third%20Conference [Accessed 18 August 2004].

38 A system based on the classic dragline principle whereby empty buckets, with specially contrived teeth intended to be used to dislodge the nodules from the ocean floor, are let down from the surface ship(s) by special cables (made up of fibres that are light yet with strength as great as steel) to dredge the ocean floor for nodules. Once the buckets are filled they are hauled and emptied into the surface ship(s) having storage facilities. Yuwen Li, ibid. Morgan, et al, ibid. pp.313-316; and Lenoble, ibid.p.376. However, it appears to have been largely discarded because of low recovery rates. See DOALOS, ibid.

39 A system whereby unmanned submersible collectors with ballast materials are launched from the surface ship and propelled downwards to the ocean floor by thrusters. On arrival at the bottom they shuttle around and collect the nodules. As they collect the nodules part of the ballast is released to adjust their buoyancy. Eventually when the collector has collected sufficient quantities of nodules and is filled up, mining is terminated. Subsequently they release the remaining ballast materials until they are propelled by thrusters to the surface and with the aid of remote control mechanism docked with the surface ship where they are unloaded, serviced, reballasted and sent down again to collect more nodules. See Yuwen Li, ibid. pp.143-144 and Lenoble, ibid. pp.377-378. This has largely been shelved.
prices and the poor global economic climate, it would have been possible to utilise such technologies, though they would still require more refining, for actual seabed mining.\textsuperscript{40}

In the mining for polymetallic sulphides and cobalt crusts it appears that technology has not yet been specifically designed for this. However, in respect of polymetallic sulphides it is speculated that the technology is likely to focus more on continuous recovery systems using rotating cutter heads combined with airlift of the ore slurry to the surface vessel for onward transportation to the processing plant.\textsuperscript{41} For crust mining it is anticipated that the technology will be more difficult to develop than that for nodule mining because, unlike nodules which sit on soft-sediment, crusts are either weakly or strongly attached to substrate rock. It is suggested that mining operations for crusts would involve fragmentation, crushing, lifting, pick-up and separation. It is therefore proposed that the technology for exploitation should consist of a bottom-crawling vehicle attached to a surface ship through a hydraulic pipe lift system. Some have also suggested that this should include additionally technology for water-jet stripping of the crusts from the substrate rock, in situ leaching techniques and even sonic removal of crusts from the substrate.\textsuperscript{42} In developing technologies for deep seabed mining, the major challenge is to develop such technologies that would make seabed mining commercially viable in relation to the mining of similar resources onshore or in offshore locations closer to the landmass. What clearly comes out is that highly sophisticated technology and well-equipped surface vessels would be required for actual mining. In addition, surface vessels would have to be well equipped with adequate space for storage and geared either towards providing facilities on board to process the resources or to transport these resources for processing on land. Also the processing stage would require sophisticated technology. In respect of processing polymetallic nodules, Valsangkar identifies that certain international consortia have already developed pyrometallurgical and hydrometallurgical techniques to conduct such processing. He points out that India has developed the process for recovering metals from nodules and is currently

\textsuperscript{40}Yuwen Li, ibid. p145.
\textsuperscript{41}See Para.6 of ISBA/7/C/2 of 29 May 2001.
\textsuperscript{42}See Para.14 of ISBA/8/A/1 of 9 May 2002.
establishing a 500-kg per day processing plant. This plant is to recover metals from nodules through a complex process based on the principle of reductive leaching of the nodules.\textsuperscript{43}

The complexities of the whole surveying, prospecting, exploration and eventual exploitation and processing activities merely point to the fact that deep seabed mining requires immense technological capabilities.

6.2.2. Deep seabed mining technology and Africa.

The dearth of technology, though a common characteristic shared by most developing states, appears to be very pronounced in Africa, where a combination of factors, including poverty, internal strife resulting in political instability and poor governance, result in a poor environment discouraging R&D, a necessary prerequisite for the acquisition of technology. The African continent has been identified as being the region with the lowest scientific and technological capabilities,\textsuperscript{44} a situation that remains the same to date despite growing technological exploits by certain states in other regions of the World, especially industrialised western states and to a lesser extent certain Asian states.\textsuperscript{45} This poor technological record of the African continent is also evinced in the area of marine technology.\textsuperscript{46} This is all the more so in terms of the “high” marine technology required for deep seabed mining.\textsuperscript{47} The initial strategy, to require developed industrialised states to compulsorily transfer such technology to


developing states, having failed with the 1994 Agreement, African states, if they were to participate in deep seabed mining, would have to adopt a different strategy towards acquisition of such technology. There would be a need to move from a rather laid back and passive approach of waiting for the transfer of technology to a more proactive one of acquisition of such technology through a more dynamic, integrated and forward-looking marine technology policy. Perhaps lessons could be learnt from the experience of developing seabed mining states such as Korea, China and India. A common trend of these states is what appears to be a determined and forward-looking technology policy, towards the development and acquisition of deep seabed technology, leading not only to progress in that regard but also general technology capacity building in other marine areas, including fisheries, shipping and port development and near off-shore minerals exploitation. Such technology capacity building in these states can be traced to concrete governmental initiative, involving not only the establishment of appropriate institutions to promote and encourage R&D into deep seabed technology, but also provision of government funding to bring this to reality. For instance in India, with the return of Indira Gandhi to power in 1980, the Department of Ocean Development (DOD) was established in 1982, having as one of its mandates the duty to promote the development of marine technology, including deep seabed technology. While it appears to be a paradox that a state like India, when dealing with social issues like mass poverty and deprivation, would have embarked on acquiring deep seabed technology, there is no doubt that with its registration as the first pioneer investor and its general development of marine technology, it has the international prestige of being regarded as part of the elite possessors of high technology.

48 See section 3.2.1 of chapter 3 of this thesis.
49 Levy, J, “Towards an Integrated Marine Policy in Developing Countries,” (1988) 12(4) Marine Policy, p.326 at 336-337. See also the Interim Report of the Task Force on Science, Technology and Innovation, op.cit.p.p.50-52 which contends that technology transfer is an outmoded concept and suggests that technology should be “acquired, retained, diffused and improved” upon through “complex interactions between nations” involving not only governments but also NGOs and corporations.
51 For Korea there is the Korea Ocean Research and Development Institute (KORDI) and for China, the China Ocean Mineral Resources Research and Development Association (COMRA).
If Africa is to have any meaningful role in the regime of the Area, which it played an active role in formulating, in the eventuality of exploitation in the distant future, it needs to start to take steps towards acquiring and understanding the dynamics of deep seabed technology through a well-articulated, diverse but integrated marine policy oriented towards marine technology development and improvement, establishing an appropriate institutional framework, and providing adequate funding and governmental support towards promoting R&D in this area. This is not in any way to suggest that there are no institutions dedicated to developing marine technology in African states, but rather to point out that as a result of the lack of political will and commitment on the part of these states to these institutions, unlike their counterparts Korea, China and India, they have not been able to accomplish any feats in marine technology, including deep seabed mining technology. This lack of political will and commitment on the part of African states towards the development of marine technology generally, and that for deep seabed mining in particular, can perhaps be discerned in the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community (AEC), which, while making provisions on the promotion of science and technology, appears to focus more on the application of science and technology to the development of agriculture, transport and communications, industry, health and hygiene, energy, education and manpower and the conservation of the environment, without specifically mentioning the need to use such science and technology for the development of marine resources. While the areas mentioned are no doubt pressing areas in need of technology application in the African continent, the failure to specifically mention marine resources appears to be symptomatic of the short-sightedness of African states towards marine technology development. Although,

54 See, however, Watt, D.C, "An Integrated Marine Policy: A Meaningful Concept?" (1990) 14(4) Marine Policy, pp.299-304, where it was pointed out that there is no ideal organisational structure for the co-ordination of marine policy-making and that the priority to be given to the various aspects of this policy was ultimately a matter of political choice.

55 This includes government bodies, university organisations and even NGOs such as Institut des Sciences de la Mer et de l’Aménagement du littoral (Algeria); Institut National des Sciences et Technologies de la Mer (Tunisia); Nigerian Institute for Oceanography and Marine Research (Nigeria); The Marine Geoscience Unit (located at the University of Natal, Durban, South Africa) and Western Indian Ocean Marine Science Association (WIOMSA)(an NGO based in Zanzibar, Tanzania, dedicated to developing educational, scientific and technological development of all aspects of marine sciences in the Western Indian Ocean region consisting of Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, South Africa, Comoros, Madagascar, Seychelles, Mauritius and Reunion).

56 Snoussi and Awosika, op.cit, p.214.


58 Art.51 (1) (b).
there have been occasions where certain African states have indicated a desire to acquire deep seabed mining technology, it does not appear that significant steps have been taken by these states to actually acquire such technology. For instance, prior to the AEC treaty, at the First Meeting of the Group of Experts on the Law of the Sea of the States Members of the Zone of Peace and Co-operation of the South Atlantic in Brazzaville, Congo in June 1990, attended by experts from 17 African states, the development of the expertise and technology needed to exploit marine resources including seabed resources beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, was canvassed as one of the priority areas for African states.\textsuperscript{59} More recently, the Nigerian representative to the 64\textsuperscript{th} plenary meeting of the General Assembly appealed for assistance to developing states to acquire the necessary marine technology, including that which would enable them participate in activities in the Area.\textsuperscript{60} It is doubtful, in view of the deferment of commercial exploitation of the Area, that the development of expertise and technology for exploitation in this regard is generally regarded by African states as a priority.

While it is easy to brush aside the need for African states to be involved in deep seabed mining in view of its capital and high technology intensive nature, the deferment of commercial exploitation and the pressing problems presently faced by the African continent, it is suggested from the experience of developing states like China, India and Korea, that some level of participation in this industry along with the R&D involved would be useful in promoting marine expertise and technology. It is proffered that such participation of African states in deep seabed mining activities would be best undertaken through strategic alliances and co-operative efforts.

6.3. Strategic Alliances and Co-operative Efforts.

As a result of the phenomenal amount of capital and the expertise required not only for R&D towards acquiring the requisite technology, but also the actual participation in surveying, exploration and other deep seabed activities, any participation of


\textsuperscript{60} General Assembly, Fifty-eighth session, \textit{Official Records, A/58/PV.64} of 24 November, 2003, p.27.
African states in deep seabed mining can only be practical and feasible through strategic alliances and co-operative efforts.61

Strategic alliances and co-operative efforts are within the contemplation of the LOSC, which has extensive provisions encouraging international co-operation in respect of marine issues generally62 and deep seabed mining in particular.63 The 1994 Agreement also encourages co-operation by providing that “as a general rule, States Parties shall promote international technical and scientific co-operation with regard to activities in the Area either between the parties concerned or by developing training, technical assistance and scientific co-operation programmes in marine science and technology and the protection and preservation of the marine environment.”64 However the declaration by the Agreement, that the mandatory transfer of technology provisions of the LOSC shall not apply, implies that any such co-operation is intended to be merely voluntary and non-obligatory.

Such alliances and co-operative efforts can range from African states just sharing with other entities engaged in seabed mining activities experiences, information and facilities, including research facilities and equipped ships, as well as human and financial resources, to a more formalised co-operation by way of partnership or a consortium. An example of the latter can be seen in Interoceanmetal Joint Organisation(IOM), a multinational entity controlled by Russia, Poland, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Czech Republic and the developing state of Cuba, which has been registered by the ISA as one of the pioneer investors.65


62 See, for example, LOSC, Art.100 (co-operation to repress piracy on the high seas); Art. 118 (co-operation in the conservation and management of living resources of the high seas); Arts.197-201 (co-operation on protection and preservation of the environment); Arts.242-244 (co-operation on marine scientific research); Arts.270-274 (co-operation on development and transfer of technology).

63 See, for example, LOSC, Art.143 (3) (co-operation in marine scientific research in the Area); Art.144 (2) (co-operation in promoting transfer of technology and scientific research relating to activities in the Area); Art.150 (co-operation to ensure over-all development of all countries, especially developing States, in carrying out activities in the Area).

64 Section 5(1) (c) of the Annex to the Agreement.
This section seeks to examine possible strategic alliances and co-operative efforts, which African states may embark upon to ensure some measure of direct participation in deep seabed mining activities. In so doing the section seeks to pinpoint certain pros and cons of such alliances and co-operative efforts.

6.3.1. *Intra-African Co-operation.*

Attempts at co-operative action amongst African states are nothing new. With the attaining of independence by most African states in the 1960s, the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) provided an avenue to encourage intra-African co-operation in different fields, including the scientific and technical domain.\(^{66}\) The OAU, as has been pointed out earlier in this thesis,\(^{67}\) played a significant role in mobilising African states to adopt a relatively united stand in respect of the law of the sea issues arising in UNCLOS III, including those touching on the Area.\(^{68}\) While the OAU played a significant role towards the evolution of the regime of the Area, it does not appear that it played any significant role towards ensuring the actual participation in deep seabed mining activities of African states. As a result, while all other geo-political regions, including the Latin American and Caribbean region (though this representation is only minimal through Cuba's involvement in Interoceanmetal consortium), are represented in the pioneer investor scheme, Africa is not represented.\(^{69}\) This is not to suggest that there was a lack of opportunity for this as the OAU had entered into a co-operation agreement on 4 March 1992 with the the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee (AALCC) (now known as the African-Asian Legal Consultative Organisation-AALCO), a body that had done extensive work on cost effective ways to participate in deep seabed mining activities.\(^{70}\)

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\(^{67}\) See section 2.1.4.1 of chapter 2 of this thesis.


\(^{69}\) See section 5.2.3 of chapter 5 of this thesis.


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The OAU has since given way to the African Union (AU). The treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC) and the constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) still provide a treaty basis for intra-African co-operation.\textsuperscript{71} The latter treaty enjoins the AU, as one of its objectives, to promote research in all fields, especially science and technology, in order to advance the development of the Continent.\textsuperscript{72} The treaty establishing the AEC provides even more detailed provisions encouraging co-operation among African states not only in the development of science and technology but also in respect of mineral resources development.\textsuperscript{73} The treaty provisions, which are wide enough to cover co-operation in respect of natural resources in the Area, require member States to "co-ordinate and harmonise their policies and programmes in the field of energy and natural resources".\textsuperscript{74} Furthermore there is the Convention of the African Energy Commission (AFREC) adopted on 11 July 2001 at Lusaka, Zambia, under the auspices of the then OAU and now the AU. This Convention establishes the AFREC\textsuperscript{75} to co-ordinate, amongst other things, the actions of African States in developing energy resources.\textsuperscript{76} The term "energy" is defined under this treaty as "new and renewable or non-renewable resources of energy in the natural state or processed, harnessed by humankind."\textsuperscript{77} This definition is wide enough to cover methane (gas) hydrates, a resource located in the Area, which is believed to be an important energy source for the future.\textsuperscript{78} In addition, the AFREC Convention confers on the AFREC the function of assisting in "the development and utilization of new and renewable sources of energy,"\textsuperscript{79} therefore it is competent to


\textsuperscript{72} Art.3 (m) of the AEC Constitutive Act.

\textsuperscript{73} Arts.51-57. Under the AEC treaty certain specialised Committees including the Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, Energy, Natural Resources and the Environment are established to prepare, co-ordinate and harmonise, within their fields of competence, projects and programmes. See Art.7 (1) (g) and Art.25 (1) (d) and Art.26. See also Art.14 (1) (d) of the African Union Constitutive Treaty.

\textsuperscript{74} Art.54 (1).

\textsuperscript{75} Art.2.

\textsuperscript{76} Art.4.


\textsuperscript{79} Art.4 (m).
engage in research in methane(gas) hydrates, a potential source of energy, for which a call has been made for the ISA to give its attention to.80

Steps have at various times been taken to encourage intra-African co-operation in respect of the development and utilisation of mineral resources, though the focus appears to be more related to mineral resources within the African Continent.81 Such initiatives include the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) sponsored Regional Conferences of African Ministers Responsible for the Development and Utilisation of Mineral and Energy Resources in Africa. These Conferences, which initially took off as an intergovernmental forum to promote only mineral development and utilisation, held in Arusha (1981), Lusaka (1985), Kampala (1988)82, Zaire [now Democratic Republic of Congo] (1990),83 were expanded to include energy resources and culminated in the Conference in Accra (1995) and the last session in Durban (1997).84 Thereafter a Committee on Natural Resources and Science and Technology (CNRST), established in April 1996, took over the functions of the Conference of African Ministers Responsible for the Development and Utilisation of Mineral Resources and Energy. The CNRST, which meets on a biennial basis, is composed of high level experts from a broad sector including government, academia, R&D institutions, private sector and NGOs and serves as a forum for the promotion of co-operation amongst African states in natural resources development and utilisation as well as science and technology.85 Beyond this attempt at continental

80 ISA, Press Release, SB/6/21 of 5 July 2000. See section 1.3 of chapter 1 of this thesis.
82 The prospect of such intra-African co-operation was broached at the Third Regional Minerals Conference at Kampala which encouraged the formation of an African deep seabed-mining corporation. However, nothing came of this as no such corporation was ever formed. See Kwiatkowska, “Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea in Africa,” op.cit.p.29.
83 See Kwiatkowska, ibid. p.28.
85 See http://www.uneca.org/cnrst/cnrst_main.htm [Accessed on 5 April 2004]. The first and second CNRST were held in Addis Ababa in 1999 and 2001 respectively.
co-operation in mineral resources development, there have also been sub-regional initiatives. In the 1970s and 1980s two subregional centres (in the South Eastern and Central part of Africa) were established to encourage sub-regional co-operation in Africa in terms of mineral resources development - the Southern and Eastern African Mineral Centre (SEAMIC) in 1977 and the Central African Mineral Resources Development Centre (CAMRDC) in 1981. The latter has since become defunct, though the former is still in operation. Sub-regional organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the South African Development Community (SADC) provide forums for the sub-regional member states to deliberate and co-operate on issues of science and technology, energy and natural resources development.

An obvious advantage of such co-operative action by African states in a capital-intensive industry as deep seabed mining is the advantage of economies of scale arising from a pooling together of resources, including finance and manpower. This would in turn diminish the pressure on scarce resources of individual states. Whether such co-operation is feasible can perhaps be determined, by way of analogy, through examining certain co-operative arrangements by African states in respect of offshore mining within national jurisdiction. Despite the various treaty provisions and forums providing a basis for such co-operation, there is, to the knowledge of the writer, no actual tangible multilateral co-operation by African states with regard to the exploitation of natural resources in the seabed even within national jurisdiction. There is certainly no evidence of actual co-operation amongst African states in respect of participation in deep seabed mining. Several reasons have been suggested for the absence of effective co-operation in the African continent. Pierre Adama Traore, in examining the challenge of building an effective co-operation for the sustainable

88 See Arts.106-109 and 122 of the COMESA Treaty. 33 ILM (1994) 1067
89 Art.21 of the SADC Treaty. 32 ILM (1993) 116
99 African Affairs, p.553 at 556 -570.
development of natural resources in Africa, identified a significant hindrance to such co-operation as the "political non-existence of common goals."\textsuperscript{92} This hindrance can, perhaps, be attributable to African states' failure to perceive an immediate common and mutual benefit for such multilateral co-operation. However, in a situation where there is such perception of immediate and mutual benefit, as in the case of exploitation of a mineral rich overlapping seabed within national jurisdiction, there are examples of African states engaging in tangible bilateral and joint co-operation efforts, although it must be pointed out that such co-operation to some extent was forced on the parties concerned because of the inability to arrive at agreed boundary delimitation.\textsuperscript{93} An example of such bilateral co-operation, in line with Article 83(3) of the LOSC, can be discerned in the treaty between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe on the Joint Development of Petroleum and other Resources, in respect of Areas of the Exclusive Economic Zone of the two states [hereafter called the Joint Development Treaty].\textsuperscript{94}

Therefore for intra-African co-operation to be effective in the case of deep seabed mining there must be a perception by African states that there is some kind of immediate and common benefit in embarking on such co-operation. Presently, with the indefinite postponement of commercial mining of the Area there appears to be generally apathy by African states to the whole issue of deep seabed mining. However, as has been argued elsewhere in this chapter that while there is no immediate benefit from actual seabed mining there can be certain beneficial common interests that can be fall outs from embarking on research and development in respect of the deep seabed.\textsuperscript{95}

6.3.2. \textit{Africa-ISA Co-operation.}

Under the original provisions of the Convention the Enterprise, the mining organ of the ISA,\textsuperscript{96} was at liberty to enter into joint venture arrangements with eligible and willing entities in respect of the reserved areas.\textsuperscript{97} In considering such joint ventures it was obliged to offer developing states and their nationals the opportunity for effective

\textsuperscript{92} Traore, op.cit.p.8.
\textsuperscript{93} Art.83 (1) and (3) of LOSC.
\textsuperscript{95} See sections 6.1.2 and 6.2.2 above.
\textsuperscript{96} Art.170 (1) and Art.1 of Annex IV of LOSC.
participation. In the same vein the Convention encouraged joint arrangements in respect of even non-reserved areas between contractors, the Enterprise and developing states or their nationals by making room in the rules, regulations and procedures on financial terms of the contract for the contractors to receive some financial benefits for such joint undertakings. These attempts to encourage developing states' participation, coupled with the extensive favourable terms in the original provisions in favour of the Enterprise as regards compulsory transfer of technology, along with preferential financial terms, including contributions and debt guarantees from states parties, and interest free loans, would have provided a good chance for the effective participation by African states through such joint venture arrangements with the Enterprise. However, with the 1994 Agreement downgrading the Enterprise to an appendage of the Secretariat and removing certain provisions favourable to the Enterprise as regards compulsory transfer of technology and favourable financing, the feasibility of such co-operative action between African states and the Enterprise, especially as regards initial deep seabed mining operations, has become impractical. In order for the Enterprise to function independently, it must satisfy the Council that its joint venture operations accord with “sound commercial principles,” a requirement that appears to lessen the incentive for the Enterprise to embark on joint ventures with entities, including African states, with no deep seabed mining experience and technology. Further, in respect of reserved areas the Agreement gives the contributing contractor the right of first refusal to enter into a joint-venture arrangement with the Enterprise for exploration and exploitation of that area. The Agreement has substantially weakened the position of the Enterprise to embark on co-operative efforts on its own towards deep seabed mining with developing states, including African states. However, the Agreement has left untouched the provisions of the LOSC that rules, regulations and procedures concerning financial terms of contracts should take into consideration the need to

97 Art.9 (1) of Annex III of LOSC.  
98 Art.9 (2) of Annex III of LOSC.  
99 Arts.11 and 13(1) (d) of Annex III of LOSC.  
100 Art.5 of Annex III of LOSC.  
101 Art.11 of Annex IV of LOSC.  
102 Section 2 of the Annex to the Agreement. See section 4.1.3.1(IV) of Chapter 4 of the thesis.  
103 Section 5(2) of the Annex to the Agreement.  
104 Section 2, para.3 of the Annex to the Agreement.  
105 Section 2, paras. 1 and 2 of the Annex to the Agreement.  
106 Section 2 para. 5 of the Annex to the Agreement.
provide uniform and non-discriminatory financial incentives to encourage contractors to undertake joint arrangements not only with the Enterprise, but with developing states or their nationals.\textsuperscript{107} It is suggested that the ISA should put in place certain financial incentives that will encourage contractors to enter into joint arrangements with entities from states, including African states that presently lack the capability to participate in deep seabed mining activities.\textsuperscript{108}

It must also be pointed out that the LOSC requires the ISA and states parties to co-operate in promoting the transfer of technology and scientific knowledge relating to activities in the Area so that the Enterprise and all states parties may benefit.\textsuperscript{109} In particular the ISA is required to initiate and promote programmes for the transfer of technology to the Enterprise and developing states, including African states, on fair and reasonable terms and conditions. Also it is to take measures towards the advancement of the technology of the Enterprise and the domestic technology of developing states through providing opportunities for personnel of the Enterprise and developing states to be trained in marine science and technology to enable them participate fully in activities in the Area.\textsuperscript{110} The Agreement, however, makes it clear that in the case of transfer of technology the obligation of states parties to co-operate is limited. First, it must be shown that the Enterprise and such developing states are unable to obtain the technology on fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions on the open market or through joint-venture arrangements. Second, such acquisition must be consistent with the effective protection of intellectual property rights.\textsuperscript{111} It is therefore doubtful if developing states, including African states, would receive any tangible benefits from such co-operation since it leaves a lot of room for the owners of such technology to insist on the transfer being on a purely commercial basis only.

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{107} Art.13 (1) (d) of Annex III to LOSC and Section 8, para.2 of the Annex to the Agreement.
\textsuperscript{108} See Art.160 (2) (k) of the LOSC that gives the Assembly the powers to consider problems of a general nature militating against developing states' participation in activities in the Area.
\textsuperscript{109} The ISA, which is presently engaged in considering the environmental implications of deep seabed mining, is encouraging States to collaborate on research to consider the environmental implications on biodiversity in the Area. This collaboration is envisioned to occur through the Kaplan Fund Project. See Report of the Secretary-General of the International Seabed Authority under article 166, paragraph 4 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, ISBA/10/A/3 of 31 March 2004 at pp.41-44.
\textsuperscript{110} Art.144 of LOSC and Reg.27 of the Mining Code.
\end{flushleft}
6.3.3. *Africa-Developing Seabed Mining States (South-South) Co-operation.*

The possibility of south-south collaborative initiatives between African states and developing seabed mining states has considerable potential as a result of such forums as the Group of 77, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Asian African Legal Consultative Organisation (AALCO) where they regularly interact and adopt common fronts on diverse issues.\(^{112}\) Shyam, while advocating collaboration between India and other developing countries as a feasible option in respect of Indian seabed mining activities, suggests the following as a hindrance: \(^{113}\)

"... winning the confidence of decision-makers to accept the idea of a South-South collaborative venture. North-South collaborative ventures in which the developing countries provide the land and the low-cost labor have become so much a part of the landscape that it requires considerable adjustment to think of other possibilities."

He, however, rightly identifies the key to the workability of such co-operation as "... a political willingness to explore opportunities for South-South collaboration and to exploit economic complementarity..." \(^{114}\)

The desire for such south-south co-operation has been expressed, at least on paper, in various forums.\(^{115}\) However, there is still a tremendous "gap between the set

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\(^{111}\) Section 5(1) (a) and (b) of the Annex to the Agreement.

\(^{112}\) Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) consists of 131 states, including several African states and India, a deep seabed mining. China, another deep seabed mining state, is an observer state in the NAM. [http://www.nam.gov.za/](http://www.nam.gov.za/). Group of 77, the largest third world coalition in the United Nations, consists of 132 states, including African states and China as well as India. [http://www.g77.org/](http://www.g77.org/) While the AALCO consists of 47 states, including African states and China, India and South Korea. [http://www.aalco.org/](http://www.aalco.org/) [All websites were accessed on 22 April 2005].

\(^{113}\) Shyam, op.cit. pp.345-346.

\(^{114}\) Ibid.p.346

\(^{115}\) See, for example, the Tehran Consensus - South-South Co-operation: a common imperative adopted on 22 August 2001 at the Tenth Meeting of the Intergovernmental Follow-up and Co-ordination Committee on Economic Co-operation among Developing Countries of the G-77, attached to the Letter dated 7 September 2001 from the Ambassador of Iran to the United Nations and addressed to the Secretary-General, General Assembly Doc. A/56/358 of 14 September 2001 and Ministerial Declaration adopted at the Twenty-sixth Meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the G-77, held at the United Nations Headquarters in New York on 19 September 2002 attached to the Letter dated 23 September 2002 from the Permanent Representative of Venezuela to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, General Assembly Doc. A/57/444 of 8 October 2002 and the G-77 Marrakech Declaration on South-South Co-operation 2003 [http://www.g77.org/marrakech/Marrakech-Declaration.htm](http://www.g77.org/marrakech/Marrakech-Declaration.htm) [Accessed on 6 April 2004]. See also Ohiorhenuan, J.F.E., and Rath A., "The History and Urgency of South-South Co-operation in Science and Technology"; Hassan, M.H.A., "Challenges, Opportunities and Strategies: South-South Co-operation in Science and Technology in the 21st"
objectives and agreed actions and the actual implementation.\textsuperscript{116} The success of any co-operative efforts amongst states, including south-south co-operation would depend on the political will of the states involved. Such political will would usually be stimulated, as a result of the strong national interest content of international relations, when co-operative arrangements are not one-sided but rather of mutual benefit to the parties. It is opined that any co-operative arrangement between developing seabed mining states and African states could be strengthened through a quid pro quo arrangement. It is suggested that this can be achieved by the developing deep seabed mining states providing the training, access to requisite technology and the wherewithal for African states to actually participate in deep seabed mining activities, while the African states would in turn open up their domestic mining industry for participation by deep seabed mining developing states in the development and utilisation of the vast untapped natural resources available within the continent. The opening up of African domestic mining industries to such developing deep seabed mining states would also serve as an avenue to create a more competitive environment in this industry, presently dominated by the industrialised states-based TNCs, thereby providing a basis for African states to wrest some concessions in respect of transfer of the necessary technology from the latter. The possibility of the developing deep seabed mining states entering into such co-operation with African states can be discerned in a recent situation whereby the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), the Nigerian state oil corporation, has entered into a service contract agreement with China’s state oil firm (SINOPEC) for the development of two shallow water oil fields along with the Nigerian Petroleum Development Company (NPDC), a subsidiary company of NNPC.\textsuperscript{117} This is in line with the Beijing Declaration and Programme for China-Africa Co-operation in Economic and Social Development issued at the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation, a Ministerial Conference held in Beijing, China from 10 to 12 October 2000 between ministers from China and 44 African states.\textsuperscript{118} Paragraphs 12 and 13 of the Beijing Programme for China-Africa Co-operation in Economic and Social Development call for co-operation in the

\textsuperscript{116} See Tehran Consensus, Ibid.

mining of natural resources and science and technology, which by interpretation could be inclusive of deep seabed mining and the requisite technology. There is also indication of this since COMRA, as a pioneer investor, under its obligation to train has actually trained personnel from two African states, Algeria and Sudan.\(^{119}\) Though this is a good start, more can still be done not only under its training obligation as a pioneer investor but also under the general China-Africa Co-operation.

In the case of South Korea, Dr. Jung-Keuk Kang of the Korea Ocean Research and Development Institute (KORDI), as far back as 1989, had advocated for Korea to co-operate not only with states with much experience in deep seabed mining but also states with a poor experience having a keen interest in engaging in the deep seabed mining industry.\(^{120}\) However, there is no indication if this is actually the official position of the South Korean government, neither is there a broad-based co-operative forum between South Korea and Africa similar to the China-Africa forum that could provide a framework for such co-operation in deep seabed mining.

An international organisational framework pointing to the possibility of such south-south co-operation in relation to deep seabed mining is the Organisation for Indian Ocean Marine Affairs Co-operation (IOMAC) established by a multilateral Agreement entered into at Arusha, the United Republic of Tanzania on 7 September 1990.\(^{121}\) This intergovernmental regional organisation can be traced to the initiative of Sri Lanka at the 1981 22\(^{nd}\) Session of the Asian-African Consultative Committee (AALCC) held in Colombo, requesting the Committee to embark on a study of economic, scientific and technical co-operation in the use of the Indian Ocean. This initiative led to the convening of the First Conference on Economic, Scientific and Technical Co-operation in the Indian Ocean in Marine Affairs (IOMAC-I) in July 1985 at Colombo and a host of other meetings, which culminated in the signing of the


treaty establishing IOMAC. This Organisation has its membership open to any coastal or hinterland state of the Indian Ocean. Membership includes certain East/South African landlocked and coastal states. It is intended to provide a forum for a rather broad spectrum of co-operation not only amongst member states but also between them and other states, including, though not limited, to developing states, in various marine affairs in the Indian Ocean, including marine science, ocean services, marine technology and non-living resources. The non-living resources in the Indian Ocean include not only those within national jurisdiction, but also those located in the Area where India has been allocated a site as a pioneer investor. As far back as 1988 at the First Meeting of the IOMAC Technical Group on Offshore Prospecting for Mineral Resources in the Indian Ocean held in Karachi, Pakistan from 11-14 July 1988, there was indication that the co-operative effort desired by IOMAC on the exploration of non-living resources was not limited to national jurisdiction but extended also to the Area. India, the only pioneer investor with a mining site in the Indian Ocean, is not from the evidence available to the writer as at the time of writing this thesis, a member of IOMAC. However, IOMAC member states, including certain Africa states, can seek co-operation with India on deep seabed mining since the IOMAC Agreement encourages co-operation between the members and non-member major maritime users (MMUs) such as India. In September 1990 at Arusha, Tanzania, the Second Conference on Economic, Scientific and Technical Co-operation in the Indian Ocean in Marine Affairs (IOMAC II) Resolution, adopting the 122 For more on IOMAC see Indian Ocean Marine Affairs Co-operation Conference (IOMAC) in NILOS, International Organizations and the Law of the Sea, Documentary Yearbook Vol. 3, 1987,(London/Dordrecht/Boston, Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1989), pp.714-788 and Kwiatkowska,B., “Institutional Marine Affairs Co-operation in Developing State Regions, Part 2: The Indian Ocean and IOMAC”, (1990) 14(5) Marine Policy,pp.378-462.
123 Art.5 of the Agreement. This article in itself leaves room for membership of Australia, a developed state which is a coastal state of the Indian Ocean.
125 See Arts. 3 and 4.
constituent Agreement, emphasised that it was desirable for even non-member states active in the Indian Ocean, which are not coastal states and hinterland states of the Indian Ocean, to participate in the activities of the Organisation "for the purposes of ensuring the widest possible international co-operation." 128 India has since participated in the activities of IOMAC.129 Barbara Kwiatkowska, as far back as 1990, was of the opinion that with India's pioneer site being located in the Indian Ocean, the Indian Ocean states should look towards collaborative efforts with India in respect of dissemination of knowledge and transfer of deep seabed mining technology.130 The limited number of member states of IOMAC, both African and Asian, a region consisting of about 38 coastal States and 12 landlocked States,131 including the non-membership of India, the only seabed mining State on the coast of the Indian Ocean, may be indicative of a preference for an informal and non-legally binding framework of co-operation that would encourage collaborative efforts in respect of developing the natural resources of the Indian Ocean, including those in the Area.

6.3.4. Africa-Developed Seabed Mining States (North-South) Co-operation.

With the bulk of the technology needed for deep seabed mining residing with the western industrialised states and their consortia, it could be profitable for African states to also explore the possibility of co-operation with such states and their entities. The initial attempt spearheaded by developing states, including African states, to have a north-/south co-operation, based on the mandatory requirement of transfer of technology under the LOSC, was jettisoned by the 1994 Agreement, an Agreement at the behest of the developed industrial states. The present regime provides a voluntary basis for such co-operation. There is evidence of such co-operation between developing states, especially seabed mining states, and developed industrial states. For example, there are the co-operative efforts between India and Norwegian, as well as Finnish, companies in the development of deep seabed mining technology.132 Also there is the ongoing joint collaborative effort between India and the Institut for

127 Art.3.
128 Jayewardene, H.W., "The Indian Ocean Marine Affairs Co-operation (IOMAC)," op.cit.
129 Ibid.
131 Ibid.p.400.
Konstruktion (IKS), University of Siegen, Germany for the development of a mining system capable of operating at 6000 metres depth with a mining capacity of 25,000 tonnes of nodules per year. This north-south co-operation on deep seabed mining is probably explicable on the grounds that it is mutually beneficial since India is a pioneer investor, actually involved in seabed mining activities. There is no evidence, to the knowledge of the writer, of such co-operation between non-seabed mining developing states, especially African states, and developed states. However, there exist some co-operative north/south frameworks, such as the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states and the European Community (EC) arrangement encompassing 78 ACP states, including 48 African states. The earlier Lome IV Convention between ACP states and the EC appears to have provided a framework for such co-operation since it covered exploitation of “all types of mineral resources in a way which ensures the profitability of mining operations in both export and local markets while meeting environmental concerns.” However, in a subsequent provision of this Convention such co-operation appears to be limited to only onshore and continental shelf mining, and therefore seems to exclude deep seabed mining. The present Cotonou Agreement appears to diminish the emphasis on co-operation in respect of mineral exploitation since, unlike some of the previous ACP-EEC Agreements, it does not devote a whole section to such co-operation. However in Article 23, dealing with economic development, it advocates co-operation to support sustainable policy, institutional reforms and investments including the “development of competitive industrial, mining and energy sectors, while encouraging private sector involvement and development.” It is doubtful whether deep seabed mining would presently fall under the category of “competitive mining”, since commercial exploitation is not likely in the near future. Therefore it is unlikely that African states

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133 Ibid.

134 Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, the Comoros, Congo (Brazzaville), Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Gabon, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Madagascar, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, the Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa (not fully), Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. See http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/1/vb/r121100.htm [Accessed on 14 May 2004]. There have been 7 such Agreements including the present Cotonou Agreement.


136 Art.101.
can presently rely upon this Agreement to seek co-operative arrangements with EC states in respect of deep seabed mining. Such co-operation between African states and developed seabed mining states, including EC states (France, Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia presently are the only EC states that are involved in entities which are registered pioneer investors) may however be sought under the provisions of Part XI and the 1994 Agreement which encourage such co-operation.138

There are examples of such north-south co-operation in other capital and technology intensive high-risk sectors, such as the peaceful uses of outer space. For example, there was co-operation between the Algerian Centre National des Techniques Spatiales (CNTS) and the Surrey Space Centre in the United Kingdom for the design and construction of an enhanced microsatellite, AlSat-1, which was launched on 28 November 2002.139 Similarly, there was collaboration between the Nigerian Centre of Satellite Technology and the same Surrey Space Centre to fabricate and launch Nigeria’s first orbital satellite, called NigeriaSat-1, which was launched on 27 September 2003.140

6.4. Conclusion.
The limitations on African states’ ability to participate in deep seabed mining as a result of a lack of finance and technology are rather glaring. Understandably, there are other pressing social problems presently confronting the African continent, such as poverty alleviation, the fight against the AIDS pandemic and the provision of basic amenities. This, coupled with the fact that commercial exploitation of the deep seabed is not imminent, makes participation in deep seabed mining activities unattractive to African states. However, this chapter, while recognising and noting that the pressing social problems should and must be given priority attention by the governments of African states, makes a case for some level of participation in deep seabed mining activities. The chapter argues that though commercial exploitation is not imminent, it

138 See notes 62 and 63 above.
would be prudent for African states to have some level of participation in such mining activities as a long-sighted policy for effective positioning in the eventuality of commercial exploitation. Also, since deep seabed technology cannot be developed in isolation from other marine technology, it is argued that such participation would help in acquiring the know-how of offshore mining technology, which would come in handy in a continent where several African coastal states, including those with an outer continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, have valuable offshore resources. It would also contribute in general to marine technology capacity building.

As a way to overcome the hindrances of a lack of technology and finance the chapter suggests co-operation of African states amongst themselves, but also involving a reaching out to other states already engaged in deep seabed mining activities. In view of the capital-intensive nature of deep seabed mining, it is advocated that African states should not embark upon this individually, but rather as a bloc, in alliance with entities with the capacity and technology for such mining activities. Further, the chapter suggests possible strategic alliances and co-operation that African states could embark upon to achieve some level of participation in deep seabed mining activities, some of which appear to be more feasible than others. All in all, it does appear that the non-participation of African states, despite the rather daunting requirements of finance and technology, should be attributed primarily to a lack of interest rather than strictly speaking a lack of finance and technology. For as long as it was thought that commercial exploitation was imminent, African states appear to have shown interest in participating in seabed mining activities. However, with the indefinite postponement of commercial exploitation to the distant future, such interest appears to have evaporated. This contention can be deduced from the fact that certain African states, namely Algeria and Nigeria, in strategic alliances, are already engaged in similar capital and technological intensive activity as the launching of satellites into space. The lack of interest in deep seabed mining activities but positive interest in outer space activities can be attributed to the simple reason that these states believe that deep seabed mining has no immediate tangible benefits unlike space activities. Nigeria, in seeking to justify its national space policy, has this to say: \[141\]

\[141\] See Nigeriafirst-Official Website of the Office of Public Communications, the Presidency, State House Abuja at note 125.
"...Nigeria desired the technological know-how to become a space services provider and an active participant in space-related activities. This desire was borne out of the need to manage its landmass and the environmental challenges it poses to the country's social and economic development. With an area that covers 924,000 square kilometers and a wide range of agro-ecological zones...the country is richly endowed and is classified as having abundant natural resources. At the same time, she increasingly faces the challenges of growing environmental degradation, desertification, soil erosion as well as loss of biodiversity. Nigeria therefore needed urgent geological information to face and surmount these challenges, enhance decision-making and grow its economy. Thus, acquiring space technology became a necessity, in order to master, develop and use its products to address the diverse socio-economic challenges."
CHAPTER SEVEN.

GENERAL CONCLUSION.

7.1. Summary of Chapters.

The main objective of this thesis has been to examine the contribution African states have made to the evolution and development of the deep seabed regime. The thesis is divided into six substantive chapters. The first chapter discusses what part of the seabed constitutes the Area. The proper delimitation of the outer limit of the continental shelf is a sine qua non to a proper determination of what part of the seabed constitutes the Area. This chapter therefore examines the practice of African states in determining the outer limits of their continental shelf. It has been discovered that only a few of these states have deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations the charts and relevant information indicating the outer limits of the continental shelf as required by the LOSC. This scrutiny also reveals that some African states possess the potential of extending their continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles. So far none of the broad-margin African states have made submissions to the CLCS, as required by the LOSC, though it must be pointed out that these states are still very much within the ten-year limit to make such submissions. However, it must also be pointed out that the complexity of the provisions of Article 76 on submission in respect of the extended continental shelf and the technology required to prepare such submissions, would make it difficult for African broad-margin states, most of which have a low technology capacity, to achieve compliance within the ten-year limit. Fortunately, certain support systems, including a voluntary trust fund intended to provide assistance towards the training of personnel from developing states, including African states, have been put in place. This, along with the provisions of the LOSC which give the CLCS the additional function of providing scientific and technical advice to coastal states, if they so request, should greatly assist such broad-margin African states in complying with the obligation to make submissions to the CLCS. There is already growing evidence that suggests that a few of the broad-margin African states, most of which are not due to make submissions before May 2009, are already taking steps to prepare their submissions. However, it remains to be seen whether these states will be able to meet the ten-year deadline for submissions. The
chapter further examines certain domestic legislation of African states on the outer limit of the continental shelf and discovers some divergence between the laws of these states and the provisions of the LOSC. While a number are, to a large extent, in line with the LOSC provisions, a handful of African states, though parties to the LOSC, still retain legislation that apply the rather vague criteria of depth/exploitability in the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention. Ultimately, for a clear demarcation of the Area to be achieved, African states along with other coastal states, would have to comply with the LOSC provisions on deposit of charts and relevant information of the outer limits of the continental shelf, with broad-margin states making such deposit in line with the recommendations of the CLCS. Equally, African states that are parties to LOSC and which have not yet adjusted their domestic legislation to reflect the Article 76 of LOSC definition of the continental shelf should be encouraged to do so.

The second chapter examines the historical evolution of this regime. Historically, the input of African states to this regime was considerable. They rallied behind the call by Arvid Pardo that the seabed beyond national jurisdiction (the Area) and the resources therein be declared as the common heritage of mankind. This can be attributed to a number of reasons, including, the fact that communal ownership of property is a familiar concept under African traditional property law. Moreover, the common colonial experience of African states arising out of the scramble and partition of the African continent by developed western powers raised a common determination by African states to oppose any such similar scramble and partition of the Area. Besides, the development of a new regime to govern the Area gave these states an opportunity to call for a comprehensive review of the traditional law of the sea that evolved without their input. The call for a regime for the Area evolved into the comprehensive and rather lengthy third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), where the vast majority of African states were for the first time able to be a part of the fashioning of a “modern law of the sea”, including the emergence of the regime of the Area. African states under the auspices of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), together with other developing states’ forums such as the Group of 77, were able to project a relatively united front on issues relating to the regime of the Area. This can be attributed to the fact that
African states, most of which at that stage were (and are still) in a state of underdevelopment, erroneously assumed that there were immense natural resources in the Area that could provide immediate and alternative sources of income towards the continent's development. Further, the whole issue raised by the regime, in the view of African states, provided another forum in which to address what were perceived as growing economic inequalities between industrialised western states and developing states. While initially this confrontation had a paramount economic aspect, when it was thought that the Area had immense natural resources and commercial seabed mining was imminent, it was also political, since African states, along with other developing states, wanted to exercise control over the regime and its institutions. African states, like other developing states, took the position that it was a fight for global equity in an international community made up of rules and regulations, which leaned more in favour of developed industrialised economies. Notwithstanding, certain concessions made to developed states under the package deal during the UNCLOS III, the regime of the Area carved out under the original Part XI of LOSC, appeared to lean, in many regards, in favour of developing states, including African states. This was primarily due to the strong input of developing states during the negotiation process. However, this was short-lived as certain industrialised developed states refused to ratify the LOSC due to concerns about the original Part XI provisions. As a result, the United Nations Secretary-General from 1990 to 1994 embarked on consultations to address the concerns of these developed industrialised states, which culminated in the formulation of the 1994 New York Agreement. With the exception of the United States of America, virtually all the industrialised states that initially declined to ratify have since become parties to the LOSC and the Agreement. Despite the fundamental changes introduced by the Agreement to the regime under Part XI, an appreciable number of African states have become parties to the LOSC and the Agreement.

The third chapter examines the changes introduced to the regime of the Area by the 1994 Agreement. Although the Agreement modified certain aspects of the Part XI regime, it still retained certain provisions of the LOSC championed by African states, including those dealing with the legal status of the Area as the common heritage of mankind. Yet,
the practical effect of the changes introduced by the Agreement has been to water down
the impact of the large part of the retained provisions vis-à-vis African states and other
developing states. For example, the Agreement modified provisions championed by
African states during UNCLOS III such as the mandatory transfer of technology,
production limitation, compensation fund, a preferential role for the Enterprise and a
more democratically based institutional framework. Yet as earlier stated, a number of
African states have accepted these changes and become parties to the Agreement. The
chapter then examines certain factors that could have influenced such acceptance, namely
the lack of finance and technology on the part of these states to go it alone; the recent
inclination by most African states to adopt domestically the free market principles, as
opposed to a regulated type economy depicted in the original Part XI provisions, due to
the strong influence of multilateral agencies such as the IMF and the World Bank; and
also the collapse of the former USSR, which effectively eroded African states’ basis,
arising from the Cold War, of achieving favourable concessions. The chapter argues that
though most African states have accepted the Agreement, which is founded on free
market principles, it is imperative that in its application special consideration be given to
the peculiar disadvantaged position of African states in participating in deep seabed
mining activities, since even in a typical free-market developed domestic economy,
unequal parties cannot be treated alike. All free-market developed economies clearly
recognise that certain disadvantaged members of society require special concessions,
based on clear-cut guidelines, to enable them enjoy the benefits of a free market
economy. There is no reason why similar concessions should not exist in the international
society for African states in the deep seabed regime, as modified by the Agreement.

Chapter four examines the institutional framework of the regime vis-à-vis African states.
While the original Part XI provisions, in some regards, sought to create a democratic
institutional framework, it has been modified by the 1994 Agreement. For instance, the
plenary body (the Assembly) where African states, along with other developing states,
have numerical strength has had its powers diminished by the Agreement which requires
it to act along with the Council. The composition and decision-making procedures of the
non-plenary bodies have effectively strengthened the position of the developed
industrialised states, which provide the bulk of the finance, thereby curtailing any move by developing states, including African states, to control these institutions as a result of their numerical strength. However, an examination of the composition of the institutions, except the Finance Committee, reveals that the African group vis-à-vis other regional groupings is relatively well represented, though current attendance at the meetings of the organs of the ISA by members from African states has not been very impressive. The reduced representation at these meetings has been attributed to the financial inability of these states to sponsor regular and consistent attendance. It has also been suggested that due to the indefinite postponement of commercial exploitation in the regime, there is currently no economic incentive for these states to attend ISA meetings.

Chapter five proceeds to examine mining of the Area in relation to African states. While, strictly speaking, the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles is not part of the regime of the Area, due to the special distributive role of the ISA in line with the principle of the common heritage of mankind under Article 82, this chapter still examines the system of mining in this part of the continental shelf. In light of the present experience, it is expected that broad-margin African states, in the eventuality of exploitation of this part of the continental shelf, would do so through TNCs working in tandem with these states through various contractual arrangements. In this situation the issue arises as to whether African states, not exempt from making the percentage payments or contributions with respect to production in the extended continental shelf, are to make such on the totality of the production or whether they can exclude the allocation going to the TNCs under the contractual arrangement as part of the “resources used in connection with exploitation.” In the Area proper, where the compromise parallel system of exploitation applies, though in theory African states parties to LOSC have access to participate in mining activities, the reality on ground as a result of the twin requirements of sophisticated technology and substantial finance makes it difficult for African states to participate in deep seabed activities. A perusal of the list of registered pioneer investors reveals no iota of representation of the African regional grouping, despite the concessions to developing states under Resolution II of the Final Act of the UNCLOS III. The possibility of African states participating indirectly, through TNCs, is examined but discountenanced since the
resources are located in "no man's land", the bulk of the commercially viable fields of which are located in the Pacific Ocean, a considerable distance from the African continent, as well as the general unstable economic and political conditions in the continent would not likely encourage such investments. The regulations dealing with polymetallic nodules that have been adopted, and those for polymetallic sulphides and cobalt crusts currently being formulated, as mere elaborating instruments of the LOSC and the Agreement, do not generally enhance the possibility of participation by African states but rather tend to confirm the remoteness of such participation. Chapter six, while looking at the limitations in terms of finance and technology to African states' participation in deep seabed mining activities, however points out certain possible co-operative framework that could enhance the ability of African states to participate in such activities. However, it is suggested that these co-operative frameworks, some of which are more feasible than others, would only be practical if there was an active interest in deep seabed mining on the part of African states, an interest that presently appears to be lacking because of the perception that such mining activities have no immediate economic benefit. This point is emphasised by fact that in another equally capital and technology intensive activity, the launching of satellites to space, certain African states have through co-operative efforts achieved some level of participation because of the perception that it would yield certain immediate benefits.

7.2. Appraisal
A study of the evolution and development of the regime of the Area reveals that African states contributed greatly to the emergence of the legal regime of the Area, including the central principle that the Area and the mineral resources therein are the common heritage of mankind. After the momentous speech of Arvid Pardo, African states, working closely with other developing states, rallied behind the declaration of the Area and its resources as the common heritage of mankind, mainly perhaps for the self-interested reason, acting on the erroneous perception of the imminence of commercial exploitation, that it would provide a source of "free" money for development, as a result of the distributive aspect of the principle that gave a preference to developing states, including African states. Further, the formulation of the regime in the UNCLOS III provided an avenue for
African states to seek to put their "*stamp of influence*" on the international law of the sea, by being part of the introduction of a regime that was not in existence under the traditional law of the sea that had evolved without their input. Largely, the position of African states on this regime could be said to be a "*power-show*" to confront the status quo and to seek to water down what appeared to be the overbearing domination of western industrialised states in the law of the sea.

In addition, it is suggested that the position of African states on certain issues in respect of the regime could be attributed to certain implicit cultural influences. For instance, as pointed out in chapter two of this thesis, the idea of the Area and its resources being the common heritage of mankind, with its rather communal inclination, has significant similarity to the communal ownership of property by a village, community or family under native law and custom in some African states' domestic setting. This, it is further suggested, has led these states to impute not just joint management, but also joint ownership of the Area and its resources under the principle of the common heritage of mankind. Also, the original position of African states on the mandatory transfer of technology, as pointed out in chapter three of the thesis, arguably, could be said to be influenced by the traditional African outlook that any innovative work should not be credited to a single inventor, but rather the community as a whole. These African perceptions are antithetical to the western industrialised states' position of a more individualistic ownership of land and technology. In some regards, it is suggested that the positions of African states and the western industrialised states in the UNCLOS III, leading to the Part XI provisions, and the informal consultations culminating in the 1994 Agreement, represent a clash of cultures: communal cultural outlook versus a more individualistic one. The 1994 Agreement, while retaining the common heritage of mankind, apparently endorsing a communal approach to the regime of the deep seabed, in having as its core principle the free market philosophy and endorsing the intellectual property rights of individual innovators over the community, appears to adopt a more individualised approach as compared to the original Part XI provisions.
The role of African states at the UNCLOS III in respect of the regime reveals a high
degree of influence, especially with an African, Bamela Engo, heading the First
Committee that had the responsibility of looking into the issues on the deep seabed
beyond national jurisdiction. The long negotiations of UNCLOS III disclosed a very
active role on the part of African states, though in many regards they appeared to have
wavered, obviously in the whole spirit of compromise, on their original position in
respect of certain critical issues arising from this regime. For instance, though the original
position of African states was for a much larger Area to be achieved by limiting the
seabed within national jurisdiction to 200 nautical miles, their concession to the extension
of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles greatly reduced the extent of the Area
and also the volume of the resources subject to the common heritage of mankind
principle. Although some broad-margin African states may benefit from this, it does not
appear, compared to the total number of states in the continent, that this number is
appreciable. Whilst Article 82 of the LOSC provides for distribution by the ISA, amongst
states parties, of payments or contributions from commercial production in the extended
continental shelf in line with the common heritage of mankind principle, as a compromise
measure, the distributable percentage is very limited. The LOSC provides for payments
or contributions from the sixth year of commercial production of 1 per cent of the value
or volume of production at site (excluding resources used in connection with production),
progressively increasing by an additional 1 per cent for each subsequent year until it
stabilises at 7 per cent from the twelfth year. This, along with the possibility of
exemption of developing states able to establish that they are net importers of the mineral
produced in the extended continental shelf, would limit the distributable income
available, unlike what would have been the case if such part of the seabed, believed to be
mineral rich, had remained as part of the Area. Also, from an original stance advocating
that a strong international institution would have the exclusive right to exploit the Area,
African states, especially in the light of the attractive possibility of access to marine
technology and know-how, as well as finance for the Enterprise, the ISA’s seabed mining
corporation, from industrialised states, conceded to a parallel system of exploitation. All
these concessions, it is suggested, encouraged the trend of the gradual watering down of
the principle of the common heritage of mankind in respect of the Area and its resources.
This culminated in the 1994 Agreement that seriously modified the original regime as enunciated in Part XI, thereby further diminishing the whole concept of the common heritage of mankind. The whole process leading to the 1994 Agreement merely confirms the rather obvious truism that in spite of the numerical strength of developed states, including African states, the real centre of influence and control of the regime is vested in the industrialised developed states.

Despite the initial enthusiastic participation and contribution to the development of the regime by African states, their interest presently appears to have degenerated to apathy. This is evinced by the fact that African states are in no way represented in the list of pioneer investors, neither is there any evidence of any African state involvement in research, prospecting and exploratory activities in the Area. Also this apathy is reflected in poor attendance of African states at meetings of the Assembly and other organs of the ISA, as well as the non-payment of contributions to the budget of the ISA. This is explicable by the fact that commercial exploitation is not imminent. Further, the non-participation in seabed mining activities is also attributable to the fact that virtually all African states, in the face of the scourge of poverty, lack the financial, as well as technological, wherewithal to engage in a high risk, capital and high technology activity such as deep seabed mining. However, this may not be the case for all African states, since a handful have embarked on the similarly capital and high-technology intensive venture of sending satellite to space. Perhaps for these states the main reason for non-participation in deep seabed activities is more attributable to the lack of interest, as a result of the indefinite postponement of commercial exploitation. The thesis, while conceding that there are pressing priority issues confronting the African continent such as poverty, the AIDS pandemic and internal conflicts, contends that there should be some level of participation on the part of African states in deep seabed mining activities. Although commercial exploitation is not imminent, the thesis advocates that some level of participation by Africa states in research, prospecting and exploratory activities, would have an incidental effect of helping in marine technology capacity building that would
come in useful in mining activities even within national jurisdiction. While conceding that it may not be feasible, in view of other priority areas, for African states to embark on deep seabed activities individually, in view of the enormous financial implications and technology required the thesis suggests various co-operative frameworks between African states as a bloc, under a framework such as African Union (AU), and other entities engaged in deep seabed activities and having the necessary wherewithal. However, there is a preference for co-operation under the south-south framework between African states as a bloc and developing seabed mining states (India, China and South Korea), since their common status as developing states would provide a vantage position of certain shared forums, such as the Group of 77 and the Non-Aligned Movement, and certain common experiences.

7.3. Recommendations.
The following recommendations are made concerning African states’ participation in deep seabed activities:

- **An articulated Ocean and Coastal Policy**, under the auspices of the African Union (AU), mapping out an African common policy on the law of the sea generally and the deep seabed regime in particular;

- **An Institutional framework** similar to India’s DOD, China’s COMRA and South Korea’s KORDI, but in this case a continent-based institution, again under the auspices of the AU, to provide an institutional framework for carrying out joint research and other activities on law of the sea issues, including those concerning the Area;

- **A deliberate and articulated move** with regard to pushing before the ISA, the SPLOS and the General Assembly an agenda towards looking afresh at the definition of “resources of the Area” under Article 1(1) of LOSC. This should be with a view to pushing for its amendment, in order to expand the definition to include other deep seabed activities that have more immediate prospects of exploitation and profitability, such as the exploration of genetic resources, thereby accelerating the prospects of benefits for less developed states, including African states, under the principle of common heritage of mankind;
A push during the impending review under Article 154 of LOSC, expected to be taken up at the Eleventh Session of the ISA, for the Assembly to adopt, or recommend to other organs to adopt, measures that would encourage the actual participation of African states in deep seabed mining activities, including research and actual exploration of the Area, in line with Article 148 of LOSC, which declares that "the effective participation of developing states in activities in the Area shall be promoted."
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