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Delegation and strategic trade policy

Collie, David Robert 1997. Delegation and strategic trade policy. International Economic Journal 11 (3) , pp. 35-46. 10.1080/10168739700000017

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Abstract

In a trade policy game where the domestic government uses a tariff and the foreign government uses an export subsidy, it is shown that the domestic government should delegate to a policy-maker who attaches less weight to the profits of the domestic firm than the welfare maximizing government. This makes domestic trade policy less aggressive and increases both domestic and foreign welfare. It is even possible that the optimal policy-maker attaches a negative weight to the profits of the domestic firm [F12, F13]

Item Type: Article
Date Type: Publication
Status: Published
Schools: Business (Including Economics)
Publisher: Taylor and Francis
ISSN: 1016-8737
Last Modified: 04 Jun 2017 06:37
URI: http://orca.cf.ac.uk/id/eprint/62825

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