Sotto voce

Translating the phenomenon…

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Gratefully dedicated to my Mom
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**SUMMARY**

Language establishes through its canonical force categories in which *life* and *world* are determined and in which translation fulfils the ideology of universal readability. In *Sotto Voce. Translating the phenomenon* ... I argue that the politics of universal appeal of language is with the question of forming, a formalisation of content that must be thought outside of linguistic fixation, on the grounds of a *linguistic happening without content*. This paradoxical happening wrestles with the concepts of belonging, becoming and engaging. The perplexity of no referentiality and no translatability is indeed a hyperphenomenon that enacts multiple stories of an untold life in an untold world. It is about an oblique answer that grazes through the materialisation of the phenomenon by referring to a phenomenology of language that boldly unfolds the traces of (its very own) indexicality: the powerful structure of the *signifié-signifiant* operation in which the subject and the object can be contracted lays suddenly bare and provokes a vulnerable exposition of *life* and *world*. On this basis, the phenomenological attempt of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty teases up reading possibilities in which the metaphorical gaze shifts the power play of fixation and denomination and invites us to emphasise on the dynamic options of translation and its linguistic usage. By emphasising the *enactment* of language we have to shift the optics from *grammar to performance*, from *index to style* and from *explaining to story telling*. Hence, translation in a world full of dispositions is a life full of compositions and pleas therefore for biographical writings by emphasising: *eccohomo ... or probably very not!*?
PRELIMINARIES

“trans late better nie als gar nicht zu spät in den brunnen mon
enfant die federn und der snowman im sommer tu danses on the
bright side of life
über setzen und stehen zu besseren stunden trop tard in the
fountain my child you’re born sans plumes und der scheemann
schmilzt im tanz der lichtjahre”
Heike Fiedler

The *movens* of this thesis is to outline how a *phenomenon without content* operationalises transfer practices and how translation-figurations shape the fashion of *life* and *world* without *having* language; it is an attempt to foster daily life practices without *having necessarily* *life* and *practice*. A *phenomenology of writing* is thus the description mode that cannot describe within its semantic framework *life* and *world* but rather writes the immersive power of the phenomenon in its oblique gesture: the subsidiary is suddenly in the centre – a fragile centre – without being aware of it. *Yes*, a phenomenological reading of translation exposes *life* and *world* in *shame*, since *there is no language, no grammar, no canon:* this psychopathological *credo* happens when the (linguistic) mimicry of the phenomenon is suspended in its synthetic practice; indeed, we have to declare that the exposition of life-world is never the *compositum* of *life* and *world*. On the contrary, we should state firmly that the *compositum* life-world is the phenomenological ground reality in which *philologia* moves out its artillery by pronouncing the *gestalthafte* content of the *phenomenon without content*: the lexeme is the *archè* of life-world and therefore it is the symptom of translating life-world as the regulation of its regulative; the negation *no* is the very negativity of *yes* and *shame* is just another expression of the therapeutic healing process – indeed, the radical position of having no language is for a tiny moment suspended. This ambiguous situation is the phenomenological attempt of being in life-world and it is the very starting point of writing a phenomenological project in which the hermeneutical power of language colours up the frozen life of the unknown: the categories of *life* and *world* (HUA XXIX

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1 Cf. Heike Fiedler’s *langues de meehr* (Fiedler 2010: 72).
142) are the healing procedure of the historical spectrum by writing life-world. Hence, the Garden of Eden as methodological reference point describes the mirror effect of the phenomenon and eases up the spectrum as concretisation of the criterion. Indeed, the fixation of history is the explosive operation of the linguistic feature enabling a particular Auffassungssinn (HUA XIX/1 430ff) that arises (HUA XIX/1 79f) in its particularity the very criterion of life and world. In these contact-zones the phenomenological endeavour resembles a playful child in its playpen: there are plenty of possibilities to discover the (playpen) world but the regulative force of possibilities is given by the construction of the playpen. The construction conditions the entanglement of possibilities enhancing regional settings of life-worldly features as momentum of translation. Hence, understanding the unknown and the known is not given by top-down patterns but as a lateral proposition in which possibilities are inter-mingled; it is where life-world is outlined as unity in difference (Waldenfels 2005: 31). These lines enable us to write the mimicry of the phenomenon since the adaptability of the phenomenon towards life-world is only limited by its degree of incorporation. As consequence, it remains a descriptive product of the life-worldly arché. The logoi of the topography are the reduction of the grammar in their practice and they are measured by the formalisation of episteme through the ego. Hans Blumenberg writes that this kind of notification is the basic understanding of human beings and therefore a product of formalisation (Blumenberg 1963: 26). In concreto, Husserl turns the formalisation of life-world into a phenomenological panoptic of transcendental epoché: life-world is not only the phenomenological fundamentum of facticity, the essence of life-world is rather underpinned by the transcendental reduction in which the ego is clothed with a transcendental coat. Hence, a typology of life-world is incorporated by the very responsibility realm and by the devices of transcendental condition features. In other words, the transcendental turn within Husserl’s phenomenology is very much due to its Macht der Selbstverständlichkeit (HUA VI 183) and due to the synchronised feature of having an exit-strategy that is inscribed in the appellation of exit – this kind of circularity is indeed the organon of Bewusstsein-analysis. And therefore, the transcendental regulation is the recourse of the linguistic arché that clutches generously with the means of life and world. In the wake of transcendental epoché the psyche of bios serves as formalisation of the life-worldly project. The landscape of Husserl’s phenomenology tames the instrument of linguistic practices into the playpen of
experiences, in which the economy of *out there and in here* are ruled by the taxonomy of order.

For this kind of phenomenological spectre, *the phenomenon without content* is completely indifferent and just a grotesque vision of an emblematic signification of seeing, tasting, smelling and hearing *life* and *world*. The *dia-legein* of the expression experience is subsumed under the formula of transcendental singularity in which the incomprehension is colonialised by a *signifié*. The *arché* of the *signifié*-singularity will be questioned and perverted by Merleau-Ponty’s essentialism: the singular is never singular and the *arché* is never *arché*. His turn describes indiscreetly the possibility of a *linguistic arché* as *savage being*. It is a practice in which phenomenology greets the Selbstverständlichkeit by holding a scattered mirror towards it; the scattered reflection is Merleau-Ponty’s oblique understanding of life-world in which a linguistic *arché* is never given but translated indirectly. Yielding the economy of *out there and in here* conditions a third partner who is actually never a stakeholder; Merleau-Ponty will embed the indirectness of the third partner within our very corporal existence as a *pre-subjective* and *pre-objective* settlement that strives for ambiguity as *modus vivendi*: *the visible and invisible is also the tactile* (VNV 175). The threshold of these zones enables us to live with the tactility of seeing as the amplitude of life-worldly practices. The ambiguity of life-world is not the re-arrangement of the economic relationship in which the phenomenon is negotiated in correspondence to its *content* but rather a phenomenon *without content* is the enactment of *phenomenon without content*. This radical line, turning the existence of being into its very own interrogation will be enacted by a third corporal partner who extends her-/him-/itself into *chair du monde*². With reference to Merleau-Ponty’s essay *Le cinéma et la nouvelle psychologie* (SNS 61-75), we have to say that *the phenomenon without content* takes possession of our very own perception *somewhere else*. This *somewhere else* is the code for the impossibility of perceiving *phenomenon without content* directly – it is a *punctum caecum* (VNV 295) that begs for the indefinite wideness in which the savage corporal being is extended to itself. The amplification of phenomenology with Merleau-Ponty reaches a quality that radically excludes the dialects of positivities and qualities while wrapping the carnal body as

² Cf. Merleau-Ponty’s remark on the carnal body: “Or le domaine, on s’en aperçoit vite, est illimité. Si nous pouvons montrer que la chair est une notion dernière, qu’elle n’est pas union ou composé de deux substances, mais pensable par elle-même, s’il y a un rapport à lui-même du visible qui me traverse et me constitue en voyant, ce cercle que je ne fais pas, qui me fait, cet enroulement du visible sur le visible, peut traverser, animer d’autres corps aussi bien que le mien, (...)” (VNV 183).
savage existence into a theology of becoming the voice. This gestalthafte rapprochement is the non-existent becoming of life-worldly practices and enables us to grasp sotto voce as a practice to hear the scent of the voice while hushing through the scenery of life and world. Nevertheless, Merleau-Ponty’s scattered life-worldly perceptions are finally fixed by the sprout of life-worldly presence – this presence writes on the other hand the coordinates of life and world. A phenomenology of a willenlose co-presence is definitely another transfer within the transfer zone. However this transfer zone remains, in its phenomenology, as working basis within the psychosis of linguistic practices – phenomenology as language fluctuations between foundation and becoming presence. Who says phenomenology says paronym but means homonym; this reduced totality claims that in lingua esse est percipi. Nothing is willenlos and definitely in phenomenological life-worldly presence, the co-presence is translated in situ. The very transfer zone and in extension the very translational practice of language remains within esse. The hermeneutical practice of life-world remains a descriptive instrument of translation insofar as the transfer zone illuminates each corner of a life-worldly scenery. However, we have seen with Merleau-Ponty that a particular reading of phenomenology enables us to graft the graphein of a transcendental epoché in its transfer-practice. In the progress of this thesis we might be able to see how the graphein of phenomenology undermines in its linguistic practise the coordinates of translation.

We will deconstruct the linguistic theology of authority through its very lack. Indeed, it will be a cross examination of phenomenological practice by exploring the Ideenhimmel of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty but it will also be a cross analysis of German transcendental phenomenology and French ontological savagery.

By reading phenomenological features through the lenses of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, we can observe how translation practices infiltrate knowledge, power and life. And it might be also a clue for how language fosters the colouring act of the scenery through its smelly lack. We will approach a translational zone not simply by analysing the analogia zone of phenomenon and without content but rather by assuming its identity in practice and in life-world. Thereby we do not only have to consider the relationship of nature and culture but we have to go much more further by questioning the relatum of nature–nature’–culture–culture’ as the practice of utterance. This doubling remembers the impossibility of reality in which the filters of episteme (language), praxes (practise) and poiesis (performance) overrule Paul de Man’s politics
of “(...) [the] necessary phenomenality of any positing (setzen)” (De Man 1997: 113). The triple filter of this vacuum marks the translational zone in which the positing of semiosis is the corrupted movement from \(A\) to \(B\) and therefore an inadequacy. The inadequacy stumbles the very linguistic practice that writes \textit{a phenomenon without content}. It is not only Freud’s battle call \textit{Fort Da!} (Freud 1967: 11-15) but it is much more about an inadequacy that nevertheless writes the name. The inadequacy of \textit{graphein} is the \textit{Einfall} of the dialectics of language, in which wording stumbles over writing the name – it is the indefinite over the stumbling that writes the material of the name. Language is therefore the \textit{locus} for citation; it is the citation of the name that courts the \textit{arché} of language while violating the fault line of \textit{dia-legein} in its \textit{dia-logoi}: it is the non-linearity of language that writes the name of incongruency. Or to put it in other words, the citation stumbles over the \textit{logos of dia} in which the \textit{punctum of legein} writes the material consumption of the name. Hence, language is not archaeology nor is it the extrapolation of the \textit{arché} in space and time. The dialectics of language is the frozen citation in which materiality flows out the \textit{Einfall} of inadequacy. The history of the material is thus a long citation that cannot simply be captured by the sign of the name, in which the generalisation of history is the fall of \textit{ars signorum}, of \textit{semiosis} and of \textit{episteme-praxis-poesis}. It is the radical friction with the normative understanding of Humboldt’s \textit{language eudaimonia}: no grammar enables us to travel through life, world and history. It is this radical friction in which translation cannot fulfil the role of being a mediator, surveyor and a marker of the citation. Through the inter-connection of \textit{life-language-translation-world} we have to revise the formula of translation fundamentally; translation is neither the linear movement from \(A\) to \(B\) in which the continuum of history is imprinted nor is it Walter Benjamin’s \textit{Umschlagplatz}. The dramaturgy of writing \(A\) to \(B\) is the fall of the long citation that writes the inadequacy of the name – \textit{phenomenon without content} whilst nameless will be named not by translating the \textit{less} but by marking a \textit{name} for it; the nameless of the name is the stumbling over the citation and it is therefore not an institution of continuity in which process, production, network and differentiation write the formatting of the name and in which we pretend to know what is transported. The features of rhetoric, the art of allegories, metaphors, synecdoche and the realms of metonymies are the forgotten practices in history, while the fall \textit{episteme-practice-poesis} is actually the \textit{Einfall} of inadequacy. Thus, the act of translation is a resentful undoing that is neither \textit{dispositum} nor \textit{compositum} but \textit{positum}:
Indeed, translation is not the historised universal acclaim where my name is a citation, the phenomenon without content of remo reginold is probably the permanent graphein of a citation-anagram that never happened.  

Tanja Stähler outlines the potential of phenomenological translation practices in her Translator’s preface of the German version of Antony Steinbock’s Home and Beyond (1995): “Es wäre ein überaus interessantes und fruchtbares Projekt, über die Implikationen der husserlschen Theorie von Heim- und Fremdwelt für eine Phänomenologie der Übersetzung nachzudenken” (Steinbock 2003: 20). This thesis and especially its compositional rhetoric of the citation that never happened might be an answer to Stähler’s attempt.
Overview

Chapter I: Husserl’s *epoché* system in *progressum*

In this chapter, I will examine how the universality of language fixes a transcendental life-world by reflecting Husserl’s unitary prediction of *reducing*. The *epoché formula* is not the transformation of *A to B* but rather the intensification of *A as A’*. It is the echoing of Plato’s totality that writes the intensification of founding *life* and *world* in life-world. But it does not only echo Plato’s universality, it also refers to Aristotle’s compulsion of classification scheme that combines and translates the categories *A* and *B*; it is this *organon* of universal classification writing the *panopticon* of phenomenological reduction in which the categories of *A* and *B* are reduced to the ability of intuition by subjecting it to the unitary-predicate. The conversion of Plato and Aristotle will be reflected upon the translation formula *A as A’* while accepting the *pregnancy* of the *dynamicon AS*. The figuration of the lived space is the *topos* from which the centre and its selection configure the transfer as *dépassement*. The *dépassement figura* is inscribed in the *AS-formula* of complex synthetic acts (HUA XX/II 239) and decision-meaning processes (HUA XX/II 283) in which the reference of language will serve as eidetic instrument. The secure soil of referring to references is secured by the unity of the predicate and is translated by the copula: the copula *is* is the execution of the reduction in which life-worldly holism is fixed by the categories *A* and *B*. Therefore, we will see that in Husserl’s life-worldly project the transfer zone will be always empiric; indeed, we have to work off the transcendental depiction of the essence in *life* and *world* by reducing the empiric *figura of dépassement* to the very existence of the copula *is*. It is this institutionalised consensus of forming the hidden variations of possibilities that makes our task visible. The act of translating is therefore a theorised empirical facticity of using linguistic features in *life* and *world*.

Chapter II: Merleau-Ponty’s savagery

The *AS-figura* of *being pregnant* will be Merleau-Ponty’s *pregnancy test* in which the preposition *as* will be overruled by the ontology of the preposition *IN*. The horizon of writing a non-language is the pregnancy-test that will trouble Husserl’s
phenomenological life-worldly project insofar as Merleau-Ponty starts much more
deeper than by testing the values of life and world via linguistic features. The corporal
body shovels much more deeply than a phenomenology of language could bear and the
copula could fix life and world. The circumventing of the categorising copula is the
deepness that does however not mean that une ontologie sauvage will end up in the
universality of language. The phenomenological translational zone happens somewhere
else where the fragility of the moment re-addresses the reality by telling the other story,
to which you will not be willing to listen. It is an approach towards senses which break
with the ego and its corresponding Bewusstsein. Merleau-Ponty’s corporal rhetoric is
probably deeply imbedded in the very difference of form and materia that can only be
translated chiastically as a kind of religious mediation. It is probably the very scholastic
tradition that reveals the translational zone: with Merleau-Ponty we will discover that
the Gestalt redeems form and materia of the corporal body in which chiastic
entanglements of passivity and action, of human beings and God, of living and dying,
etc. are inscribed into sarx. It is this pathological anathema that keeps the corporal
language of life-worldly stability instable. We have already expressed with the
phenomenon without content that the relentless reality of ambiguity will not be resolved
in magnificat … let us see!

Chapter III: Perplex Coenesthesia

This chapter re-depicts Husserl’s transcendental reduction force of the copula and
Merleau-Ponty’s pathology of sarx by overriding the relation-formula: I will
fundamentally reject the transcendental dialectics of linguistic relations; there is no
signifié-signifiant-mastery but there is also no signifiant flottant (Lévi-Strauss 1950:
XLIX). My phenomenological approach is going outwards, leaving the re-assuring
transcendental soil and the playful ontological savagery of describing possibilities
behind me by questioning the phenomenon without content. In fact this undertaking
strips off the logos of phenomenology – we rather have to say that a phenomenology of
writing is under these circumstances phenomenografhein. It is about a willenloses
Beiwerk that writes translation by bearing its co-presence – translation is in that sense
the ultimate disintegration with grammar and knowledge. The figuration of writing a
phenomenon without content is the spur of non-existence: a catachresis that rather
provokes than reconciles. But ultimately, a translation practice of writing the non-existence of punctum is the paradoxon in which the translation practice fosters the non-content of linguistic usage by actually using language with content: indeed, translation remains our drama!
I. Husserl’s *Epoché System ad progressum*

The task of transcendental foundation is to outline how knowledge can be possible or more precisely how *objective knowledge* (HUA XVII XXVII) tames *life-word* realities; it is very much about the question of how the realm of this world’s materiality is translated into netherworld ideas and how life is the *Limesidee* (HUA VIII 162 and 309) of formulating the very *facticity* of a secularised world. It is much about the *facticity* calling out the equivocation of *life* and *world* as its regulative consumption while the premise of *limes* draws the transcendental line of the *signifiant* to its mundane *signifié*. By associating *dynamis* with the premises of *signifié-signifiant*, we have to consider how the realms of thought could engineer the act of declaring the *signifié* and the *signifiant* in respect of life-worldly practices. In reference to this life-world *panopticon*, we will be aware that transcendental circumstances explain the conditions of dependency between the realms of *A and B*, *eidos* and *eidolon* and *the actor and the act* since the transcendental task tries to capture the liminal *dynamis* of knowledge-conditions for producing its respective (life-world) object: *objective knowledge is the grid for subjectivity, its perception-forms and its practices*. The immanent task of transcendentality yields the very obvious movement of nourishing the moving grid from *subject contingency* to *object facticity*; the transcendental line is much more about a differentiation *in vivo*, the difference of *subject and object*, of *A and B* and *actor and act* is more about a differentiation *as* interaction: the grammatical *as* – not only a conjunction but also a function of *analogia entis* – reflects the ground-reality of analogical forces in linguistic productions where we do not simply translate *A to B*, or *A as B* but *A as A’*; the apostrophe is the operation engineering the vividness of the *fatum* by stabilising the practices in *life*. In other words, the apostrophe is the *Limesidee* that bridges *life and world* while writing the very prolepsis of knowledge. Therefore, the *differential* inflecting apostrophe is far more of a dense and frictional happening writing *A as A’ to B* than *A as A’. The intensification and excess of *A’* reflects the twist in reading transcendental lines: the *a priori* conditions of possible experiences are simultaneously the condition possibilities of any object of experience (KrV A 111). In accordance to this *catabasis* of peregrination, the objective target of translation is not

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4 The *signifié-signifiant* structure enforces the idea of an anthropological constant in which human beings are able to perceive themselves from another point of view through the means of language by assuming that the last reflective mode of any human being is its cognitional condition.
the out-of-my-range-perception but the perception of an object, a translated B that has an intrinsic necessity of how the out-of-my-range-perception happens. An objective deduction of the A and B relationship is therefore inevitable and has to accept ex negativo that subjective foundation is up to a certain point the out-of-this-world-contingency while dreaming of the prolepsis of in-this-world-facticity. Hence, the condition possibilities of experience should be alike the condition possibilities of the objects as experience; this is where A to B turns into A as A’ to B.

Hence, these introductory remarks outline that translation is lately based on the firm foundation of objectivity (KrV A 111). The objective deduction offers intrinsically (life-world) categories to signify the transcendental apperception of the utmost principle stabilising life-world; pure transcendental apperception, the character of A’ outlines in my reading the conditio humana and the condition of classifying knowledge as bedrock of life-world while depicting the condition possibilities of being bios, and in extension, enacting in its bios ability its linguistic ability. Within this kind of theoretical practise, language complies with a special role and links to Husserl’s endeavours for phenomenological readings: language and transcendental phenomenology follow special movements of mutual illumination – in particular, we have to read transcendental phenomenology as a setting that includes and encompasses language as a part of phenomenology while fulfilling phenomenological functions.5

In respect thereof, translation is a theoretical theme of reflection and in the same moment a reflexive practise by being constantly involved in the dynamic of transcendental enactments, in which language finds its own determinacy. This kind of conditioning follows its own velocity: it speeds up the understanding of the translation-process but it slows down the agent of expression and meaning; this retarded synchronicity acts in a particular mode of formality and circularity but also in a particular mode of vividness. Though, on the one hand this mode serves as a figuration of a phenomenological approach, but on the other it suggests a hint that exceeds its formal function and formulates its own velocity out of the phenomenological box. At this very point language connects with the constitutional and revealing turn of the transcendental phenomenological fact: language determines an index of life-world and

5 Language influences not only Husserl’s phenomenological sketches but also the relationship of psychology and life-world in general; I refer especially to Karl Bühler (1933) and Roman Ingarden (1931). The trias phenomenology–language–psychology is an important constellation of re-thinking life-world and will be constantly re-negotiated in this thesis.
likewise is a practise of life-world – *linguistic practices stabilise vividness*. Henceforth, theory and practise manifest a new relationship and it would be an obviously misleading exposition if the *said* would be exclusively understood in relation to *saying in theoria* and not also in relation to *saying in praxis*. Consequently, language is an intrinsic part of the transcendental ego / actor / translator and it is not solely a coincidental exterior. It is part of the transcendental ego itself while living the *as well as structure*: it is *A as A’* but it is *A as A’ to B* as well. In correspondence to this line, the egoistic transcendentality offers, deciphered by language, the decisive *wherein* for any kind of theory, the *a priori*, the trespass and its life-world *wrap-around* that discloses the figure *AS* while being stabilised by the preposition *to*. The translation formula *A as A’ to B* can be pinned down to the synchronicity of life-world in which the transcendental (ego) should outline its framework as life-worldly reality or expressed in a pointed manner, the question reformulates how the transcendental (ego) pre-conditions language in vivo?

In the following, I do not want to approach language solely as agency of phenomenological life-worldly reality and as a ready-made solution for the *significant-signifié topos* but rather attempt to unfold Husserl’s urge for the transcendental cause in order to read it as a cipher of linguistic necessity in life-worldly practice. In other words, I do not want to outline a Husserlian language theory. My aim, by close-reading Husserl’s transcendentality, is to highlight language as outflow of transcendental causes; therefore, a theory of language lays out my transcendental phenomenological moves. The transcendental cause – understood as the substrate – enables us to reverse and to indicate the phenomenon of language and translation. A transcendental phenomenological language is the attempt to form language as the pure and transparent *topos* of *logos*. Accordingly, I want to close-read its influence on language, on translation and especially on phenomenological linguistic practices by attempting to graft Husserl’s transcendentality-concept: *my approach will be a phenomenological one*.6/7.

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6 This means that my argumentation lines may have circular and zigzag moves, aiming to reveal on several rounds discoverable aspects and layers – a certain redundancy will be inevitable (cf. Husserl’s remarks on zigzag methodology in phenomenological work practise (HUA XIX/1 22 and HUA XXXV 94)).
7 My exegesis of Husserl’s transcendental line and its relationship with language has been written in reference to Heinz Hülsmann (1964); principally, I follow his argumentation lines by analysing the impact of transcendental lines for translational matters; also, I complement Hülsmann’s reading by close-reading the transcendental interpretation of phenomenology by Elisabeth Ströker (1987) and Wolfgang Röd (2004).
1. A first attempt to write phenomenology – language – translation - transcendentality

We may consider that the characteristics of language can be stated, analysed and translated and the mechanics of stating, analysing and translating in return is making use of a linguistic mode whose features have just been stated, analysed and translated. This double reading sets up its own phenomenon while taming the double standards mediating solely its own insights and references. This circular formula is immune to explanation-attempts and at the same time offers a certain practice of focalisation: *we are in paradise and we definitely have always been living in paradise*. Translating *paradise* means to amble within the bounds of *paradeisos*. The ambling of each step is the transferal move from *here to there*, but this move is still within the same realm of opulence. Hence, the opulence of the *Garden of Eden* is the linguistic act of reflexive and conflictive practices. Therefore, we have to admit that grammar occurs as a medium, where the distinctions, between *form* and *content* but also subjective and objective settings are permanently (inter)-penetrated by the one and only *paradeisos*. Reading the double structures of language and living in *paradeisos* is the necessity of life-worldly practices. In other words, language is the phylogenetic *paradeisos* of thinking and expresses itself by constantly outlining the creation of what we label an everyday life form. The creational product of language-creativity is a first attempt and a rough characterisation of mingling with the transcendental condition of transferring the phenomenon language. It creates lines in which the necessity of *language and mirror* characterises not only daydreams of the *Garden of Eden* but also daily features of life-worldly realities. Therefore, discussing language through language evokes the mirror as the intrinsic reflection of mapping dreams of paradise and practices in life-world. This double reading is the above outlined phenomenon which will occur in a phenomenological reading as a permanent *stimulans in vivo* that cannot be taken as grown and fixed evidence by mirroring its necessity. Its knowledge significance is evident through what was *said* while mirroring its effect. By thematising linguistic performance and by speaking *A, A’ or B* through the mirroring language, the phenomenon will be itself a carrier of processing the *said*. The carrier function however is a fundamental part of the transcendental ego while the phenomenon is not at all a simple contingent appearance, but rather the double standard enclosing the phenomenon.

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8 In this context paradise does not refer to a utopian constitution. *Paradeisos* is rather a *topos* in which a sentinel figure enables us to language.
which will be revealed by the *ego transpono* within a life-worldly language setting. The transcendentality of the ego transpires linguistics and unveils the vividness of life-world by offering for the mirroring *said* the decisive *a priori* horizon. Hence, a phenomenological language is the attempt to install the linguistic operator as the pure and transparent place of the transcendental ego.

Nevertheless, the decisive horizon *in paradiso* questions what kind of *phenomenological language* is concealed behind the phenomenon and what does it mean while the transcendental ego reels in the vividness of purity? We might consider that language can be in service and an attribute of phenomenology but it is also an everyday language and therefore a technical pre-condition of phenomenology. These questionings are solely important if we consider an empirical ego in the aftermath of life-world history; in contrast, the transcendental ego does not refer to this kind of connection, it rather conditions the possibility for the empirical ego and his / her ability to question the practice of language (in a historicised life-world). However, the vividness of the transcendental ego can go astray by using language without consulting it. At this very point, we will see that we might disclose the thin line of *ego cogito* and *language* while the concrete intention offers linguistic realms for the possibility to apply, to express itself and to translate the expression of thinking for oneself and for the vividness of life-world. Thereafter, language will be terminological as well a reflexive theme due to its phenomenological requirements and therefore also the agent for *A as A'*. From this stance, the precondition for phenomenological translation may be outlined but so far does not consider language as language. Hence, there is still a certain kind of dialectic tension between thinking and speaking by considering the difficulty of language as an immediate form of mediating *A to B*. Consequently, we have to consider language as a medium and an everyday language, a precondition for phenomenology but we do not consider to which extent language is *per se* phenomenology. The *per se* clause considers the *logos* for deploying the different paths of the phenomenon fostering its preconditions: it may be the *logos* of the active uttering *in persona* who stimulates *A to B*, or a *logos* wherein thinking and speaking are an appearance of it as well as the *logos*, which is its own being by producing its own thought and linguistic tools. This is where the difference between *logos, thought and language* enables us to outline that *logos* is its logic-correspondence and has to be considered as an epistemic determination.

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9 Cf. Hülsmann’s characterisation of different linguistic forms (Hülsmann 1964: 50ff.)
of phenomenological work-practises. Thus, the *logos* of differentiation would be the *logos* of the logic. This difference can be reversed through an antecedent identity by considering *logos* as the unity of language and thinking, but it can also be the *logos* of language that will be manifest through its twofold exposition of thinking and uttering. Finally, *logos* can be seen as a mind setting that constitutionally precedes any form of language (Hülsmann 1964: 17) – the mind setting can therefore be thought subjectively or objectively, as *I* or as *I-ness*. Henceforth, the act of thinking outlines the linguistic *facticity* of translating *A* and *B*.

A phenomenology of language is in this regard an exegesis of a linguistic template by deploying structures of appearance and appeared appearances. In that non / coherent phenomenology, *facticity* already causes translation while its linguistic expression is ineluctably a translation of the translation or an interpretation of the interpretation. Meaningfully, we should separate being and language and understand each of them from their very particular stance. In other words, the template reduces the translation formula *A to B* to a phenomenon outlining *being* as its vivid bridge in which language is simultaneously reduction and description. From that point on we have to consider a phenomenological language as a *strolling* language by making use of an everyday language. Basically, this means that language speaks out the evidence of language itself. Phenomenology does not promote a language in aesthetic features but rather a language that should talk out the essence of language by itself; phenomenological utterance should be a form of talking by expressing its evident originality. This kind of linguistic line up does not consider the materiality of expression but aims to perform its essence: *A as A’*. The performance of *A as A’* in its original evidence refers to objective features of a phenomenological language framework. This setting is neither a poetic nor an everyday language: a phenomenological language receives from its linguistic setups important impulses but not by aiming to form a formalistic system or a meta-language. It is labelled as a language that has emerged from an apodictic power and nevertheless is within the evidence of its being. Hence, the dissection of this topos stating vivid *being while funding the transcendental ego* will be a critical reference in Husserl’s reading.

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10 A phenomenological language is always part of an everyday and ordinary language within life-world, which is in a mode of *epoché* and has lost its channelling force (cf. Hülsmann 1964: 18).

11 We may consider that Husserl tries to develop a coherent theory that takes different directions, but it is ultimately marked by continuation. A theory of language can be outlined and paraphrased by assuming that Husserl considers language in a correlative-reflexive mode towards the constitutional question by problematising its polarity. Finally we may consider his approach towards linguistic models of genesis.
So far we can sum up that linguistic practices, consciousness forms and being frames are in a common and dynamic flow. The origin of language frames almost an intellectual, an almost logical and an almost cognitive way of consciousness. Differently put, language is the original appearance of logos and therefore is intrinsically an element of recognition and finally a genesis of logic itself. The parallelism of logic and language while stating paradeisos deploys however an aporia; therefore by proceeding within the realm of analogia, language has to be preceded by a transcendental aporia: any kind of correlation is continuing within its own framework without having the possibility to solve it by exceeding its very realm of action. The question of translation and mediation cannot be challenged by methodos: the phenomenon-character is deprived of its historical and social situation and is deferred from aiming pure and transparent possibilities, language as model features therefore a static-telos oriented character of severe assignments. As a signifiant cipher, the expression is related to a certain meaning, which is believed and attached to the word in its strict identity. This kind of affiliation has to be considered within the act of life-world. The designation function, qualified by the act of expression, is a correlation to it. However, the sphere of severe identity and the expression as intentional act enforce the questioning of their inter-relation and their relatedness; continuity and consistency seems to evoke the question of translating ideation and abstraction as well as mediating the act – this transcendental aporia will be a recurrent idiosyncrasy while outlining the phenomenon language.

In a first attempt, it seems clear that this constellation dissects the relationship of being and (linguistic) facticity, but actually the dissection conflates on another layer. From this point of view, the constitution of a factual world and the presence of being can be declared literally as an impartial expression. Life-world, translated from being, is kat exochen a world full of expressions. Thus, there is a reversing effect between being and facticity by considering that the factual can be exceeded by its corresponding being – this anabasis is however preconditioned and signifies a possibility and not the constitution as such. By considering this possibility, the factual event remains in a peculiar contingency and cannot be hurdled; language cannot hurdle its being-firmness by referring to elements of contingency. We may consider that a phenomenological language resembles rather features of a dynamic enactment, the strict isolation of the

(cf. Lübbe 1957: 225-237). Indeed, it is a transversal setting: from logical, ontological to a transcendental setup.
object-matter, and consequently any sphere of meaning loses its pertinence. The subjective and objective organisational forms are intertwining the effect of dynamising while the linguistic act cannot only be described satisfactorily by stressing dynamism; it needs the instrument of over-viewing its dynamic status by considering the role of translation as a tool of enacting language. Gradually we have to consider an alternative foundation: the relation of implication and explication, of synthesis and analysis, evokes a genetic consideration enforced by the problem of constitution and by different forms of intentionality (perception-intentionality, propositional-intentionality, and decisional-intentionality (Hülsmann 1964 25)). In this respect, language stresses the intentional life under the aegis of the logical or expressed, the linguistic act is per se the logical perceiving intentionality. The generating act rests on the transcendental ego which shapes layers of creational, constitutional and achieving intentionality. Language keeps up the tension of a mundane and transcendental world by considering that the event of epoché is a constitutional part of the transcendental ego. The constitution of language, its historical consciousness, its dynamic and subject oriented figuration, is part of a deploying unity. It is not an a-temporal constitution; far more it stresses a dynamic constitution of language and it forms a mixture of language, consciousness and being. The foundational sense of language is almost the consciousness of logical, cognitive and mental issues; indeed, productive and genetic issues will be deployed by questioning the logical character – language as such disposes the area of logical judgements while depicting the Garden of Eden. The experienced consciousness will find its experience while language is the fundamental appearance of logos and represents the event of recognition12. This view is so far outlined by Husserl in Logische Untersuchungen (HUA XVIII – XX/2), in Phänomenologische Psychologie (HUA IX) and in Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie (HUA VI); he evokes the question of history and linguistic cognition, of culture and sociality, the relationship of somatic and logical structures and therefore the question of translating life-world.

By drafting A as A’ to B, we may consider that Husserl tries to solve the phenomenological challenge by stressing an analogical aporia13/14: any formations of

12 Cf. the foundational model of language outlines per se the logical sphere and the area of logical judgements. The master pattern of the foundational layer is at the same moment occurrence, generic appearance of the logical and constitution of a logical consciousness.
13 Indeed, this is my alternative reading to the transcendental aporia in linguistic practice.
parallelism and correlation can be solved on its own basis. The constitution problem of language and its transcendental consciousness however is actually a practice of suspension since the problem of Husserl’s approach is primarily conditioned by the phenomenal character of language, which relieves its historical condition and displaces it into an area of pure and transparent possibilities. Hence, a linguistic framework would consist of enacting mono-logical enforcements and can be characterised by a static (precluding) character: the object denominates and the expression opines. The expression and the signifies relate towards meaning, which in turn expresses and aporetically attaches to the identity of the signifiant: indeed, its denomination function is a correlative happening. This element yields the identity of the logic and its severe meaning. The sphere of meaning characterised by identity and the expression as intentional act evokes the question of the relation and relatedness of A to B, while stating A as A’ – in other words, the phylogenetic interconnection of A to B states being and acting while transferring A as A’. The relationship of entity and facticity evokes a grammatical character due to the fact that a factual world outlines by its own accord the constitution while including the presence of the entity as the premises of a life-worldly language. The world is from its own status an expression-world per se, but however its constitutional grammar is hidden due to the codification of the transcendental ego. Hence, we can evoke a certain mutuality since we may move from an entity to a factum and vice versa by using its grammar as securing pretext. This kind of basis should be understood in the sense of possibilities and not of constitutions: within the horizon of possibilities the factual event remains contingent; however, the contingent element within language does not yield its entity-determination. The rigour isolation of the factual world and the sphere of meaning will be blurred due to phenomenological reflections leading to the constitutional question of linguistic usage by highlighting this double relatedness: the relatedness of linguistic acts to each other and the constitution of itself. The expression-sphere unifies the expression- and meaning-function of denotation and believing insofar as the translational act of linguistic expression cannot be satisfied by its correlation and attached descriptions. Therefore the foundation of language and translation may find an approach by highlighting the relatio of the genesis of implication and explication. A genetic consideration conditioned by the constitution-dilemma reflects its relation and stresses its intentional momentum of being grammar. The logical event of writing grammar figures as a continuous momentum of

15 Cf. The constitutional problem by Hülsmann (Hülsmann 1964: 24).
16 Cf. Hülsmann stresses the tension between synthesis and analysis (Hülsmann 1964: 25f.)
the intentional act: language signals the unique intentional phase, which achieves by itself the emergence of the logical, the logical of the whole intentional life. The linguistic achievement is its logical cognitive intentionality per se. However, the original performing stage is still hidden: the logic cognitive intentionality is about the generating doing, its means and its principle cause of performance. The principle revealed as the transcendental ego is structural as well as generative, constitutional and intentional in its aporia. The transcendental event rests in the tension between synthesis and analysis, implication and explication and can be understood as an undefined sphere of mirroring effects: language is a decisive part of being in between the reflection of mundanity and transcendentality and as well in the reflection zone of the empiric and transcendental ego. We may anticipate and read that the motivation of the constitution is in fact a transcendental issue but subliminally it is about the self-givenness of the ego as a transcendental fact. Reason is therefore not a contingent effect, but rather a universal entity oriented structural form of transcendental subjectivity. It is the institution of making things evident and keeping it evident (HUA I 92). Whilst reality finds its essence in the mode of reasoning and happens as a self-given fact, the ego has necessarily to be seen as the genius locus of truth seeking; reading the ego is a locus classicus for the origin and the generative practice of the transcendental question. Hence, as mentioned above, language can be outlined as the structure of a genetic form, in which the process occurs by encompassing language, by considering the enforcement of the act of utterance via a transcendental speaking person; it is the momentum where the mirroring totum occurs as linguistic happening. In this regard, language is in its

17 We may differentiate between (I) perception-intention, (II) utterance-intention and (III) decision-intention (Hülsmann 1964: 25). The logical line, which is obviously present in phase III, is already present in step I as a special intentional effort and attention. Therewith we consider three grades of converse implications. This kind of genetic relationship is definitely a teleological concept.

18 The spheres appear simultaneously as different steps and phases of the reductive revealing moment of the egoistic life. Thereon language is an important stakeholder.

19 The language issue is in a phenomenological reading simultaneously a transcendental and egoistic theme and consequently, this linguistic constellation represents the spatial apodictic evidence of timing.

20 On this basis we should neutralise ourselves from the world to understand the phenomenon in its reduction (HUA III/1 151f); we may describe the problem by highlighting the fact that there is a continuity of the empiric and transcendental ego, but this generative case should be given up. At the same time we should ask, how could we use a language, if we have to leave the mundane world? Is the act of speaking part of the transcendental world? Do we not have to reduce language and the act of speaking? And on the other hand, do we not have to find within language the element for a trans-mundane utterance (Hülsmann 1964: 31)? Having this kind of internal continuity and the corresponding discontinuity, we may consider the double relationship. The one medium of language is present as it is friction and correlation. Language is in that sense the translation of reflection per se.

21 Consequently the transcendental question is therefore the reduction of facticity to its essence – it is about an unholy alliance between ontic and transcendental genesis writing its grammar.

22 If you consider the ego-cogito-cogitatum as the a priori characteristic of linguistic practice, we have to accept that language as form of its essence has to be written as ego-speaking-spoken. As consequence,
genetic constitution never object, but rather a permanent translation in which the transcendental life has its own possibility of appearing as grammar insofar as language as phenomenological issue is a unity-constitution \textit{ad progressum}. The language-flow proceeding in a phylogenetic mode is always as a constitutional element present and can be finally considered as an identic unity (\textit{aka} grammar). However, the genesis happening constitutes in language the unity of the transcendental life and its corresponding life-world. The emergence of its history is its linguistic appearance of history: language is the transcendental history of facts in its evident authentication and therefore it is all about \textit{A as A' to B}.

This alignment shows us the \textit{continuum} possibility of relating language, the transcendental ego and the constitutional \textit{facticity} of the mirror to life-worldly practices\textsuperscript{23}. Hence, a transcendental phenomenological language is a matter of how the differentiation-sense between valid and merely pretended knowledge can be drawn; the opposition does not depend on cognition acts but rather on the objectivation of knowledge. In both cases, they intend to be real and existing issues; nevertheless, the intention is in the one case accomplished and in the other dismissed. But how does one case fulfil the conditions and on the other fail it since the facticity of cognition and objectivation has nevertheless to be in a certain relation to its being? Through the factual life-world, we may have the possibility to close-read the transcendental sphere of \textit{a priori} conditions which lead to any kind of forming facticity. The validity claim of epistemology shimmers in Husserl’s work and has so far invited the reception\textsuperscript{24} to different versions of Husserl’s knowledge aspiration\textsuperscript{25}. Hence, the transcendental attitude of the \textit{epoché} transforms the subject to a disinterested spectator who does not have her / his / its goals in the mundane world. The facticity of life-world does no longer encourage the empirical ego to emancipate from the mundane world, since she / he / it is always trapped by the \textit{flashing} mirror. While I am talking about the mundane chains of the flashing mirror, Husserl considers that the trap is due to the transcendental problem emanating from a general transformation of natural circumstances (HUA IX linguistic translation practices are constant expressions of their own entity – again it is about this unholy alliance.\textsuperscript{23} In the following we are going to discover if this topic is too overemphasized and how the transcendental element conditions and disciplines a phenomenological language.\textsuperscript{24} Especially I refer to the explanation of Dermot Moran (2005), Herman Philipse (1995) and Wolfgang Röd (2004).\textsuperscript{25} The dilemma between considering an act and withdrawing us from any (our) natural mind-set (HUA III/I 151f) causes contingent conclusions. This \textit{aporia} by referring to the element of liberty is not simply a contingent game, but it is an act of its own entity and its own \textit{a priori}. 


\textsuperscript{11}
331). Henceforth, I suggest we have to turn the translational bind by overrunning the premise that the mundane world is not the outburst of a transcendental spur but rather the other way round, the mundane world provokes the transcendental ego, galvanising the transcendental ego from her / his / its slumber. This provocation is the guiding line that leads thinking towards reduction in vivo. Negotiating the vivid line within Husserl’s transcendental setting gives attention to the fact that transcendentality is in reception strategies more than just woolly. In the following, I want to look closer how the hint of life-worldly vividness and transcendental reality crystallises Husserl’s work and how a close-reading of Husserl’s phenomenology highlights the transcendental line as its undeniable condition of translational matters and as its vehicle of language: it is necessary to outline the importance of understanding transcendental phenomenology in its revealing progress by turning language itself into a transcendental issue due to the fact that language is on a decisional basis an index, a grammar, taxonomy and itself a linguistic practise. Nonetheless, Husserl’s phenomenological project is situated on different layers in which the transcendental line can be interpreted as the anchor of Husserl’s thinking and in which Husserl follows Descartes by understanding the transcendental idea in an extensive manner. By referring to Descartes, the sub-textual question is to outline how the relationship or more precisely how the how-relation of subject and object drafts Husserl’s programme of transcendental vividness. The bind of this antagonistic movement in which nature provokes the transcendental cause, recon瑟s Husserl’s ethos of truth seeking (HUA XVIII 13). The path of understanding successfully the proof of how Bedeutungsintentionen correlates with the idea of truth can be seen as Husserl’s movens to rethink and reformulate constantly the purity of taxonomy and grammar. This kind of historical comments are not accidental – we will see that science, phenomenology and cultural thinking are eminent for linguistic themes. We might highlight that all kind of problems will be systematically part of this amalgamation and will be from there on seen from another view. The relation of thinking and speaking, the structure of language as form shows the

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26 Undoubtedly, we have to consider that this kind of thinking is already in the line of preconditions.
28 Cf. In comparison to Kant’s line in Critique of Pure Reason: the condition of possible knowledge is enabled via a transcendental subject where the phenomenon can be turned into noumena (KrV A 236ff).
29 We have to recall that Husserl’s way of working resembles a zigzag methodology and shifts in an ongoing process permanently the perspectives. This entails a certain redundancy within the explanation line.
30 Phenomenological thoughts stimulate within linguistics and philosophy a critical reflection on what language and thinking could be. Prominently within the German linguistic discourse phenomenological thinking offered decisive impulse, cf. Karl Bühler (1933), Friedrich Kainz (1946) and Peter Hartmann (1958).
characteristics of the logical purpose. General, necessary and ideal form units are in it and with it visible. There is obviously a certain correlation of form and content; it is intrinsically a fact that language and through it insight and cognition are mediated in stratum.

2. Reading Husserl’s transcendental dream

A The Logischen Untersuchungen: apparently a breakthrough investigation

Die Logischen Untersuchungen (LU) ³¹ (1900/1901) is Husserl’s first serious phenomenological analysis and is declared by himself – in consideration of phenomenological methodology – as his breakthrough work (HUA XVIII XIII and 8) ³². By considering Husserl’s methodological attempt, language and especially the act of translating will be an interesting operationalisation factor, insofar as language has to be read within the tension of an analogical or equivocal framework of longing and simultaneously framing the expression of the phenomenon A and B. The enactment of this constellation densifies the task of formulating translation; it is about the transmission from an idealistic telos towards its significant other that produces this dense fabric of life-world. While considering this speculative framework, we have to be aware that the process of mediation and transfer has to be dissected carefully, since the genus locus forces us to believe in the regulative act of squeezing. By considering the topos regulation of squeezing, we have to be aware that drafting a phenomenological reading of translation means resorting to intentional experience(s) (of language), which will be read in continuation of being the object of linguistic framing ³³: Husserl explores the intentional phenomenon as the important stakeholder for phenomenology but he will nevertheless consider the transcendental element as the foundational twist in

³¹ The LU are separated into two parts and volumes. Volume one bears the title Prolegomena zur reinen Logik (HUA XVIII) and Volume two is entitled Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis (HUA XIX/1).

³² Husserl’s Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie (HUA III-V) shows clearly that the LU are not at all the end of his phenomenological thinking, but rather the start of it. The systematic foundation within Husserl’s early work can be considered, as it does not find any end of his developed method of pure and transcendental phenomenology. However, Husserl highlights in LU that a systematic rising from a lower to a higher level has to be achieved, cf. Ströker (1987).

³³ Only the V. Untersuchungen introduces the phenomenological theme; it lays the foundation of phenomenology, whereas the VI. Untersuchungen can be understood in relation to a systematic approach as the more important one. However, whilst evolving Husserl’s oeuvre, both of them mark the transition towards the figure of phenomenological understanding as pure and transcendental task.
experiencing A and B. The constitutional issue is thereby a matter of transcendental reflection which considers the problem of identity and difference while problematising language as language and while finding through the transcendental condition its idiosyncratic figure in such a way that analogical and equivocal elements of linguistic ability correlate to each other in situ: the correlation of the conjunction as is not only given by writing A as B, it is rather stabilised by the preposition to in reference to A as A’ to B. This operation is lately embedded within the subject-framework of expressing life-world-stabilisation by apostrophising life matters. However, the subject-layer is hidden due to the prepositional clause to dealing with the very stratum language. Therefore, language considers its identity and difference within the realm of unity rhetoric that has to be labelled as the productive part of ego. The livelihood of the subject is the ego presenting itself through language and gains therefore its constitution in life-world. Language cannot be disassociated from ego and the transcendental realm while language presents its own characteristics transcendentally. This is indeed a first attempt of reading language in a phenomenological way and therefore the transcendental line necessarily composes the stratum of intention-language-ego.

Husserl refers to this kind of knowledge-production by considering logos as its corrective, which highlights directly the universal attempt and the seriousness of objectivity. This issue can be outlined by pure logic and is a revised continuation of Husserl’s first monograph Philosophy of Arithmetic (1891) 35 in contrast to his explanations in Philosophy of Arithmetic, where mathematical numbers and their set theory are psychologically founded (HUA XII 163), through the act of linking, Husserl reconsiders the psychological status in LU negatively. In Prolegomena he suggests

34 Pure logic does neither stand in opposition to the notion of simple logic nor is it an addition to it. It is rather the theoretical foundation of logic. Pure logic outlines a field of analytical truth. It is all about the epistemology of laws and theories whose truth is founded exclusively in the meaning of its fundamental notions and where its validity is based on its form(ation). Pure logic is therefore not only a discipline among others. It is the discipline of the most general and formal condition of knowledge-possibilities (HUA XVIII 214 and 238-246).

35 Husserl does not outline logic in a narrow sense but rather his philosophy of logic includes epistemology as well.

36 Walter Biemel’s comment on Husserl’s Philosophie der Arithmetik: “Die Rückfrage nach diesen Grundbegriffen, genauer gesprochen nach dem Grundbegriff der Arithmetik – der Zahl, ist also der eigentliche Anstoss für Husserls Philosophieren, hat den Stein ins Rollen gebracht” (Biemel 1959: 190).

37 Husserl outlines in the preface of the first LU-edition: “Wo es sich um die Frage nach dem Ursprung der mathematischen Vorstellungen oder um die in der Tat psychologisch bestimmte Ausgestaltung der praktischen Methode handelte, schien mir die Leistung der psychologischen Zusammenhängen des Denkens zur logischen Einheit des Denkinhaltes (der Einheit der Theorie) vollzogen wurde, wollte sich keine rechte Kontinuität und Klarheit herstellen lassen” (HUA XVIII VII). The effort consists of outlining the transformation of the psychic act to the unity of theory, which stresses the logical entity.
that psychological perception has to be – from a logical point of view – similar to any other empirical evidence and therefore has to be based on inductive generalisation. From this perspective, the psychological approach of ego does not read comfortably with any forms of causal laws. The passage from the psychological momentum to the unity of logical thinking does not find any kind of satisfying continuation. Indeed, Husserl doubts categorically the foundation of the logical by considering psychological reasoning (HUA XVIII 6f), mainly due to the inconsistency of transition-readings from psychic and contingent acts to objective and sober lines of theory: the subjectivity of recognising and the objectivity of knowledge contents has to be questioned. In reference to the preface of the second edition of LU Husserl explains that the analysis of logos is an emerging study from lower to higher grounds (HUA XVIII 11); meaning that internal experiences executed by psychological descriptions are similar to the descriptions of the external nature, but this interpretation is in opposition to phenomenological descriptions, in which the transfer from the internal to the external facticity is not the movens in which the transcendental ego would fulfil to condition the (phenomenological) description in life-world (HUA XVIII 12). Hence, Husserl rejects empirical psychology due to the fact that the exposition of the objective has to be solved within the logic of (pure) consciousness (HUA XII XXVf.). Husserl’s pure logic outlines a realm of analytic truth, whose sense of fundamental notion and validity is based on its very formation. Logical laws are formal laws and free of psycho-material intentions and therefore have to be declared as independent of any kind of (psychological) experiences. Hence, pure logic is not a way to explore the condition possibilities but it rather is the most general condition of knowledge (HUA XVIII 238 ff). It can only be recognised by the fact that it is valid – but its validity is independent and not conditioned by having been recognised by somebody. Therefore, pure logic (HUA XVIII XIII) is literally the operator (HUA XVIII: XII-XXIV), which is able to define systems of knowledge and on that point is the most principle evidence writing

38 Cf. Trespassing the setting of a psychological mode towards a logical setting of thinking (unity of theory) remains uncanny and does not permit a clear continuation of a theoretical setting.

39 It is uncertain if Gottlob Frege influenced Husserl. Manfred Sommer draws a unique genesis of Husserl’s phenomenological idea, which is only driven by the transcendental telos; Sommer refers to the fact, that the transcendental idea has been already the main movens within Husserl’s first work *Philosophie der Arithmetik* (Sommer 1985: 98ff). And in a letter dated the 19th February 1936 Husserl explains that Frege seems to have an odd character and does not have added any substantial benefit to philosophy and mathematics (Patzig 1981: 252f).

40 In particular, his conception of pure logic derives from Bolzano and Lotze, and ultimately from Leibniz’s theory of methesis universalis (HUA XVIII 222ff).

41 Husserl declares thirty years latter in *Formale und transzendente Logik* that he was not purely against psychology; he was only against the version that logic correlates with judgement-experiences. In a logical sense judgement has an identical sense within the multitude of acts of judgements (HUA XVII 175ff).
trans in life-world; it stands for theory in its very fundamental notion while combing $A$ as $A’$ to $B$. Hence, the evidence of objective knowledge does no longer pretend the relationship of thinking subject and life-world (HUA XVIII 240). The realm of an a priori setting allows outlining the scope of reality-experiences by overwriting the mirror of the empirical subjects by the facticity of a theoretical subject\textsuperscript{42}. From LU on, Husserl disputes the possibility of psychological supremacy. The various psychic acts of empiric subjects do not permit the interpretation of a priori facticity; subjective objects are an interpretation of the object and therefore already a translation of the a priori fabric. The question of intentionality (Brentano 1874: 124) will be reversed, with recourse to intentional experiences, in which the materiality of knowledge turns into reality; it is this trans from the act of intentionality towards material knowledge where we are able to translate before the translation has been written. In other words, logical evidence, understood as the universal and the total mode of consciousness, is related to intentionality but produce simultaneously universal teleological structures: indeed, the grammar is there before Port-Royal has been localised. The tugging of life-world is now re-considered on the ground of knowledge-production in life-world. Henceforth, an idealistic analysis is based on validity whereas the psychological approach captures just a picture or an empty signification, which can only be analysed in a second step through grammatical causal-genetic causes: $A$ as $A’$ is an empty clausal, its validity is only enforced by the causality of to $B$. Hence, on this stage, the relation of the correlated subject and object investigation within logic has to be required since the mediation of intentionality is something else than the production of linguistic evidence. The subject has to be read as the condition possibility if knowledge of logic wants to be the mediating part of justifying any given $A$ or $B$. These conditions are a priori and therefore we have to be aware that they are unquestionably not subject-depending. But ultimately they cannot be understood as real, empirical conditions without thinking the theoretical subject. The Limesidee of conditioning the facticity is rather the a priori requirement, commissioned by a theoretical subject (HUA XVIII 119). In this stance, the subliminal question of the relationship of an ideal language of logic and the a priori

\textsuperscript{42} Up to this point, Husserl was persuaded that psychology could deliver the framework of pure science and pure logic. Influenced by Brentano, Husserl outlines psychology as the foundation of philosophy and knowledge. Brentano on his side understood empirical psychology as an answer to promote philosophy as an exact science. Knowledge should be produced and based on a direct line. The introspection as movens describes direct experiences and has been later labelled by himself as descriptive psychology whose aim is to understand: “(...) fully the basic components out of which everything internally perceived by humans is composed, and … [to enumerate] the ways in which these components can be connected” (Brentano 1995: 4). Further, Leibniz and Bolzano have influenced Husserl; cf. (HUA XII).
epistemological conditions of subjectivity open up the *Limesidee* to a field of duplicity by compressing its common concern: *from its principle conditions how can we grasp the validity of objective linguistic means?* On this basis, translation loses its idealistic pertinence and has to be considered as an empty shell: it is an air-evacuated cloud-caste since its *facticity* is, so far, nothing else than the permanent reinsurance of its epistemological duplicity. Hence, by following Husserl, we have to create a fully new foundation: his novelty consists of presenting the nucleus of the problem by blasting the exposure of the common idea of knowledge and referring to the idea of an *embodied knowledge-production*43 (HUA IV 158-160).

Thus, we have to consider Husserl’s chapter *Ausdruck und Bedeutung* in *LU* in which he redefines the correlation of consciousness meaning (*Bedeutungsbewusstsein*) and its logical purposes. Husserl outlines that the embodiment of *expression* and *meaning* are from this angle the reduction of occasional meanings by offering a straightforward answer: the answer is the fulfilment of the reduction line while writing *A as A’ to B*. The clarification of truth has to be fulfilled within the horizon of the *Wesens-analysis* that enables us to the prepositions *as* and *to* as its correlation for reduction. This correlation seems to be tension filled due to the fact that by discussing the language phenomenon the question of logic will turn immanently into a linguistic issue: *unambiguity* and *discriminability* are the features from where we might be able to develop the purposes of language. Hence, language as an applicable sign-system should be the *movens*, formulating translation and therefore logic has to seal not only its own purpose but its expression, being taken as the *signum* of translating *A as A’ to B*44. This focus refers elements of intentionality of *noetic-noematic* structures while writing the necessity of *A as A’*. The logical system executing the ending of the formula *to B* underlines linguistic-free structures that do not need grammar, since the *analogue aporia* is the reduction of the *transcendental a priori* by its *Wesens-analysis*. By radicalising the language phenomenon, we have to read language as the consciousness embodiment of life-world and its translation. The correlation of consciousness and language are in this sense phenomenological cohesions in which the transcendental regroups the formation of

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43 Husserl stands in a long tradition which somehow incorporates the double feature of body and knowledge, cf. Schelling: “Dieses erste Leibliche hat aber in sich selbst eine leibliche und eine geistige Seite” (Schelling 1993: 148).

44 We have to consider that by reading logic and language, I juxtapose the sign realm with features of logical evidence. Foucault makes a similar attempt when he co-reads sign and logical evidence within the lines of the *Logic of Port-Royal*. This construction is reference for further questions and critics, which cannot be explored in this thesis (cf. Müller 2004: 437-447).
This kind of reducing the *Wesen* should be described and outlined by expressions and meanings as an outburst of phenomenological investigations. This inquiry will challenge the linguistic attempt by turning grammar into an index where \( A, A' \) and \( B \) makes perfect sense. This attitude towards the concept of perfect sense is important while questioning linguistic issues. Language as such outlines the pre-requirements to secure logic, in a way that thoughts are expressed in an appropriate manner by means of well distinct and definite signs (HUA XVIII 22). The system of language ensures – not only by its causes – its expression, which is used in this case as signs. Uniqueness and discriminability are the points from where the question of language has to be deployed in facticity. At this very moment the task of translation supersedes language and therefore the foundation of language has to be measured by its capability of transferring: the moment of the dynamic act deploys the idealistic embodiment of language. In this sense *LU* handles a universal problem that discusses the (eternal) linguistic relationship of logic and expression in a dynamic setting. Language as an applicable sign-system is consequently the purpose of the index in life-world. The question of language as the question of the linguistic applicability and this, in turn, as a clear and available system of signs, confines this debate in a certain way.

Having considered the dynamic token, the *LU* is hinting – from these circumstances on – to find the *a priori* setting by declaring how the *telos* of purity could be grafted and the phenomenological project launched: phenomenology finds its explications not within causal-genetic psychological causes but rather by the task of describing and analysing. The aim is to advance to the source(s) where idealistic laws of pure logic are issuing from. The logical judgment is based on that very principal of *eidos*, idea or origin (HUA XIX/1 8f) in which the description and analysis cause the formation of the *Wesen* in life-world. Phenomenology is in that sense a pure eidetic analysis to discover the structures of experiencing consciousness and therefore a method questioning the

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45 On that issue, Husserl revises in his second edition of the *LU* in 1913 the clear and net separation of phenomenology and psychology and outlines that transcendentiality is not only about epistemology but above all act-intentionality. Logical laws should find their foundation in psychic acts (HUA XVIII 189). This turn should not be interpreted as a logical or psychological act but rather as a phenomenological consequence. To comprehend this disconcerting turn we have to understand on which basis Husserl transforms logical truth. By reconsidering the relation of subjectivity of recognising and the objectivity of the content of cognition (HUA XVIII 7) the clear and evident outlined boundaries turn into unclear settings.

46 The theory of forms (cf. *eidos*) stays in relation with the idea of conceptualism. Conceptualism is the very idea that universalism is the notion which is produced by subjects. Therefore Husserl’s theory of form is far away from what we could call Platonism (cf. also Blumenberg 2001: 12ff).
possibility of idea in a translational outfit. The intrinsic element of logic consists in a unity of reasoning and the systemic form appears as pure embodiment of the idea of knowledge. Consequently, the nucleus of logical truth is the ambition and the aim for all kind of knowledge-production in its fulfilment – only within systematic construction knowledge is founded and is foundational. In correspondence to the logical line, recognising knowledge means to construct creatively alongside rules and laws. It is obviously an emancipation of the consciousness and the logical causality from the contingent event of facticity. However, any systematic form needs an element of foundation. Within this setting, logic acts as a tool of mediation (HUA XIX/2 537f). Consequently, we can say that logical truth is able to formulate objective knowledge via the linguistic relationship between Begriff and Gedanke (HUA XIX/2 538): linguistic tools and knowledge are therefore correlated in its reduction and deliver the possibility of founding literally a grammatical body. Indeed, linguistic signs are compulsory conditions to compose pure logic since reflexive, constitutional, and therefore ultimate grounding requires language. Hence, linguistic considerations are an essential part of the preparation of a pure system of logic, since the translation-process of language is only able to graft its proper objectives: language translates logical objects into templates; it translates issues and their differences for the sake of reduction. Consequently, the logical clarity cannot figure within language but rather by linguistically gained objects. The gaining effects of logical objectivity are simultaneously the objectivity of language. This is possible due to the analogical aporia that finds itself within language: recognition happens within language and through its act it will be self identified – A as A’ to B. This kind of cognitive language processing considers language as something that evokes its Wesen in reduction. At this very point translation is the permanent process of equation-seeking, which turns A’ (in)to B. Henceforth, linguistic considerations are not related to empirical arguments but rather to considerations via generic tasks by leading to an objective theory of knowledge and pure phenomenological thought-experiences. The vividness of the lexeme has to be considered in this line as the enforcement of itself and its appearance. Obviously, this kind of approach does ultimately refer to the empirical experiences of empiric subjects.

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47 Husserl outlined after 1912 principle reasons for excluding psychology from phenomenology (HUA III 3f.). Indeed, this remark is related to transcendental phenomenology, while an eidetic approach towards phenomenology understands very well an eidetic psychology as the eidetic fundament of empirical psychology (HUA IX 52 f).

48 Language cannot find reflection and self-knowledge through itself – it attains it by the consciousness of life.
However this does not classify the empiric evidence by schemes and orders, as the empiric subjects would suggest it in descriptive psychological approaches. In considering the evidence as subjects and objects as clear and net distinctions, we can follow Husserl’s transcendental project: this relation is at the core of knowledge evidence, since the mode and the manner of their relationship characterise elements. In other terms, the intentional meaning is part of the linguistic canon: the concrete psychic experience is the copula of grafting meaning and expression and has to consider therefore its mode by considering its act-character. The phenomenological analysis should reveal the relatedness of expression and meaning and therefore, the objective would be given in an incomplete figure (HUA II 5), since the notion seems to be in a volatile mode and the evidence looks like its depending on its Wesens-analysis. The phenomenological analysis should stress its pure idea by overcoming its simple intelligibility of words and its equivocations. By aiming for the setting of meaning and expression in logical readings, we may anticipate that the act of translation within transcendental settings will have a diffracted significance: transcendental reasoning decides the energetic place for any lexeme – there is no longer the translation of $A$ to $B$, since $A$ is always $A'$ and $B$ is always $B'$; yes this means that the linguistic act drafts an aporetic way of writing equivocations.

This complicated double-relationship of $A$ as $A'$ and simultaneously $A$ to $B$ or $A'$ to $B$ remembers the speculative aspect of Wesens-analysis in which the psychological and theoretical ego are the energetic aporia. Husserl is persuaded that objective knowledge recognised as objective and independent is only given via the condition of logical constructions. Therefore, knowledge depends on the direction from where it is perceived from to establish a certain kind of sense. This kind of linking will be Husserl’s phenomenological issue and therefore, the phenomenon of expression and meaning refers to consciousness settings of and from language: the relatedness of meaning and expression by the event that meaning will be meant by its expression – it is about a how-zone of circular reproduction ($A = A / A' = A'$). From this point on, we have to reconsider the correlation of logical thinking of subjects and objects and state that psychological evidence does not stand for logic, but rather signifies the foundation of researching the sense of truth in logic. The consequence of reading phenomenology in a concrete and psychological way, in which meaning and expression belong transcendently together, is now what edges into the middle of phenomenological
thinking: a lexeme can be an expression and relies simultaneously on intentions. Therefore the unholy alliance of psychological drive and transcendental composure outlines the framework in which the expression documents its meaning. By clarifying the doubling of transcendentality and psychology, the correlation of wording, knowledge and its transfer zone might be squeezed again into my reading of a vivid life-world that somehow enables us to the aporetic continuum. This kind of phenomenological analysis highlights language as a pure fact insofar as evidence and clarity will be an important part of its Wesen. By considering language as meaningful expression of its intentionality and by outlining the array of meaning and expression, we have to focus on the whole linguistic setting. To define this kind of relationship as being-relationship preconditions that the act has an in-between-function and manages the trope from-to as the intrinsic part of translating its energetic reduction. The phenomenological task is to figure out, how this from-to constellation could succeed in the analysis of life-worldly Wesens-analysis. It seems to be obvious that language can be taken as an appearance of its meaning. But however, how does the objective meaning transform itself to a subjective expression? The translation of itself and for me is therefore the prevalent question in which the aporetic continuum upholds the embodied vividness of life-world. Language as feature of transporting and as permanent transgression phenomenon thus should offer in its phenomenological analysis the possibility to bring logic and psychology into contact⁴⁹: the language-task considers the transition of the act (for me), which is at the same time a function (itself) and vice versa. The psychic experiences as function should enable us to the being-relationship of expression and meaning within intentional life and likewise the Wesen of phenomenological description as an act that will declare its being-clearness. Husserl’s generic twist is to stress that the empirical and individual experience is only possible due to a priori structures of consciousness. Hence, the empirical evidence is important on the path towards pure knowledge and at the same moment truth is an epiphenomenon of eidetic evidence. This complex linkage of the phenomenon and the epiphenomenon streaks the orientation of phenomenology while writing consciousness of and language from. The analysis of LU attains by this step not only a universal problem but also the issue evokes the correlation of legein and aporein (Hülsmann 1964: 46).

⁴⁹ By considering this line, we may underline that language should be the medium that tries to solve the question of phenomenological reflections.
**B Interlude: A as A’ to B**

As a preliminary conclusion, we can admit that Husserl starts his phenomenological project by attempting to highlight the transcendental issue as the main operator towards pure knowledge and on the other side he emphasises the downsizing of the psychological momentum as the barrier to squeeze the act of transformation. He fulfils this shift by introducing the theoretical subject and, in an even more powerful manner, the vision of experiencing consciousness. This clear liminal evidence is elusive due to the fact that Husserl and the ethos of phenomenology is driven by moments of enhancing and extrapolating the phenomenon to re-find and re-shape – on an archaeological basis – what was initially intended. A linguistic code within the horizon of consciousness has to find necessarily a character of a foundational-sense: consciousness cannot be speechless. On a profound basis, consciousness and language belong to each other and this matter of fact is an evidential fact of Husserl’s thinking. He outlines it as a descriptive phenomenology and refers to a dismissive sense of non-constructional linguistic evidence. Far from explaining theories and speculative interpretations, it is about outlining the evident understanding of what thinking and recognition could be (HUA XIX/1 25)\(^{50}\). Husserl’s methodological claim is a clear rejection of theoretical approaches of constructivism and deconstruction *avant la lettre*. By contrast, Husserl stresses the momentum of gazing that gets disciplined by the revealed, the displayed, the exposed, etc. and is *per se* the enactment of translation *kat exochen*. Hence, this re-setting is not simply gazing and not simply disciplined by translational processes, it rather correlates with a procedure of reflection: the phenomenological task refers to the intentional relation of *the recognition to the recognised*\(^{51}\). In other words, this *conisation* outlines the above-mentioned correlation of acting and its function of translation. The generic element of this challenge is an effect of the contradiction of perception and thought (HUA XIX/1 9) while squeezing life-world into *paradeisos*.

We can say now that phenomenology knows / gazes from real, ideal, existent, fictive, etc. entities nothing less than that they are imagined, intended or supposed in

\(^{50}\) Cf. Husserl postulates the principle of *presuppositionlessness* (HUA XIX/1 24ff).

\(^{51}\) By excluding heritage and tradition, Husserl neglects the status of language within tradition. Language cannot be alien to any kind of heritage, if it does not want to be ineffectual as a medium of phenomenological description. So far, Husserl has not problematised the *aporia* of pure description and linguistic interpretation.
consciousness. But if this kind of imagination has any descriptive characteristics of intentional experiences, the sense of imagination has to be found exclusively by vivid (and embodied) experiences – any other perspective description will not be possible (HUA XIX/1 25f). This seems to be accurate, however, does this specific act-moment, of intended intensions represent Husserl’s sense of objectivity? This question – again relying on this noteworthy aporetic evidence – will be the movens for Husserl’s shift towards a remodelled transcendental phenomenology pure et dure. It is obvious that the feature of phenomenological working is addressed by the self-liberating momentum of our own activitas. The consequence of this methodical shifting is referred to as the instrument of reduction dissolving the correlation of legein and aporein in which the psychological feature of transcendentality enables us to read from-to.

C Back to entities!

The elaboration of the transcendental grafts Husserl’s dictum back to entities and therefore he enhances the method of reduction or the so-called epoché. By reducing the object to its pure essence, a phenomenon should expose its Wesen. Pure phenomenology stands for this kind of reasoning; it is present für mich through its reflexive and eidetic manner of noetic-nomatic structures of an sich while purifying A, A’ and B. To understand this task we have to consider that Husserl makes a difference between pure eidetic phenomenology and transcendental phenomenology and therefore introduces ontological considerations into transcendental arguments. This issue is one of the main contents of LU: the second tome Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis tries to condense this exposition by exploring once more the idea of transcendental phenomenology.

In Untersuchung V Husserl refers systematically back to descriptive psychology and tries – in reference to the above mentioned – to rehabilitate its stance. This re-setting however could provoke misunderstandings, but Husserl’s intention of depreciating the psychological issue has to be understood in relation to a special way of psychological understanding: psychology henceforward should be separated from phenomenology by the fact that its task should only consist of describing and analysing for the purpose of

52 Especially V. and VI. Untersuchungen of LU II (HUA XIX).
advancing to the sources of knowledge and only from there on the law of pure logic could arise: it is about an *ideal or pure eidetic analysis*. In turn, the eidetic turn can be interpreted on the basis that it does not sit comfortably with the psychological realm, since the principal reason for exclusion is based on the relation with transcendental phenomenological features. However, eidetic phenomenology allows very well to consider psychological realities. *Eidos* is not only the *forecourt* of transcendental considerations; it can also stand for the foundation of empirical psychology (HUA IX 52 ff).

The point of eidetic phenomenology is a plea to reconsider the phenomenon of gazing and translating, as mentioned above. Husserl’s principle of *presuppositionslessness* indicates this kind of direction by attempting to exclude all kind of theoretical pre-Opinions and historical burdens. This does not mean that there is no tradition and no history, but rather history and theory are part of the phenomenological issue. Husserl wants to go back to the things (XIX/1 10) by cultivating the event of seeing in history and in theory. This cultivation is based on *the act of intuition* as it has, in its relation with things, its unique expression of characteristics. From this point on, we can see that phenomenological analysis has the expression of the unique, which wants to express *the thing itself*. The revolutionary issue is to relate intentionality on objectivity and from that stance to present it systematically (HUA XIX/1 21 and 33). There is a correlative character of intentionality and objectivity by outlining the attribution of the psychic and logic sphere on a common basis: *paradeisos*. The *relatum* does not pretend to understand language as a correlative and translatable issue but rather language is itself a sphere of translation, in which the logical and the psychic are mutually interpenetrating and thereby forming the act of language in its eidetic purity. The reflection on translatability is at the same moment the constitution of phenomenological talking and seemingly the acting premise of linguistic foundation: phenomenological utterance is to speak out the linguistic knowledge since the phenomenological language is actually the entity, which maintains the relation of expression and meaning. Therefore the phenomenological approach is based on *claims*. But referring it to analytical and descriptive drafting (which is based on intuition) we certainly have to accept that experience offers the explication (HUA XIX/1 25) for lining up expression and meaning. At the end of *Untersuchungen VI* Husserl clarifies what analytic *a priori* reality should mean and how the evidence of the *signifié* could be outlined. Therefore
Untersuchungen V starts with drafting the complex theme by attempting to grasp the nomination of logical truth and evidence by examining it without relying directly on these features: Untersuchungen V grafts the incipient stages of act-intentionality. We can read that intentionality is for Husserl one of the most interesting and obscure features (HUA III 180), especially when he replaces the abstract act-intentionality by the concrete intentional life in consciousness (HUA XIX/1 388ff). By considering this epistemological framework, phenomenological language is no longer naïve insofar as its intentionality will be fulfilled consciously and characterised as pure meaning. In this line the act has to be understood exclusively as an intentional experience or as a mode of consciousness, where intentional issues are defined not in their enactments but rather in their ideal relationship of a common ground of validity: the transfer from $A$ to $B$ via $A'$ is validated through evidence of the prepositions as and to. As identical act of intentions we may recognise them in their particular evidential act of reflection (HUA XVI 44). This seems to be the character of evidence that is experienced in the identical realm of transcendentality. Nevertheless, the V. Untersuchungen has not been focused on the intended Gegenständlichkeit; its focal point is directed towards the enactment and therefore Husserl’s phenomenological expectations have to be re-read in the line of an ambivalent correlation between the phenomenon of knowledge (cf. the knowledge of Erscheinen and Erscheinendem)\(^53\) (HUA II 14). Nevertheless, the bias of act-phenomenology reveals the idea of questioning the translation-mode by given conditions of any intended entities. This enables us to differentiate real from intentional contents (HUA XIX/1 411ff) and provokes at the same time a paradoxical turn: if the real content constituted by the effect that the imprecise and depending part in their relatedness ensures the function of any act, than the act has to be considered as a qualified act, since we have the stabilising feature of material knowledge that secures facticity. The coordinates of the securing facticity will be found within the transcendental approach by grasping the a priori correlation of noesis and noema. From this point of view, we have to accept that consciousness is the summa of all kind of acts (understood as an act of relational and intentional moments)\(^54\).

\(^53\) The double meaning of the notion of phenomenon is a result of a correlation of appearing Gegenständlichkeit and its associated acts, which appear for their part in act-reflection.

\(^54\) At this point it is unclear on which basis Husserl establishes his phenomenon of act intentionality; is consciousness related to an egoity and on which basis can we talk about time due to the fact that the unity of consciousness is part of a process of change while writing ego (HUA XIX/1 369)?
Along the bulge of *consciousness-summa*, the present-sense of the intentional content draws questions. We have remarked that the intentional scenery of life and world could be perceived. Declaring it as intentional content, within the context of consciousness and as the element of translation, is not justified due to the fact that things in consciousness are even in that case not real moments of acts as they do not concern real, but rather fictive realms in an environment where *life* and *world* form life-world. Hence, the difference of the real and extra-real does not at all affect the intentional structures of translatability and therefore, subliminally, the question is how Husserl could throw light upon the difference of intentional and true *Gegenständlichkeit* without sacrificing the transcendence of consciousness of a real A or B, that is taken for a real intended thing in the consciousness-immanence-setting. The instruments of *Untersuchungen V* do not permit us to solve the difference of transcendence and immanence, but it shows that any real composition of act and the intentional *Gegenständlichkeit* has to be expanded. Nevertheless, the thematic of the mode of given conditions leads to interesting insights and focuses on a unique issue in Husserl’s phenomenology: critical clarification of knowledge does not only rely on intentional relations of consciousness-acts and their entities, but rather on multiple ways of *gegenständliche* conditions⁵⁵. Based on the penetration of the perceiving consciousness, the sense of translation will be significant for Husserl: not the identification of A as A’ is important but rather As matters. Hence, the categorisation of acts does no longer bother, due to the fact that the separation of entities, which is intended and the way in which it is intended will be prevalent. The belonging of an act to a common composition of sense(s) (irrespective of its qualitative differences) evokes the bonding formula: neither A nor A’ counts but rather the line is about the *compositum* As. Hence, Husserl stresses in the *V. Untersuchungen* that the essential of any act is not its quality but rather the intentional being of an act that reflects the unity of quality (HUA XIX/1 431) and therefore we can say that the idea of translating will be valorised as process. Language is neither a momentum of exterior perception nor a product of human relationships but rather it is an agile happening and expresses meaning. A, A’ and B will be captured as simply perceived, but the perceived is rather an identic fact that is already expressed via the meaningful act: AS.

Hence, the *VI. Untersuchungen* outlines the mode of consciousness from where on the question of the *Limesidee* can be fixed as conditional reality of AS. It does not mean that

⁵⁵ The idea of multiple modes stands for a given *Gegenstand* that refers to different modes of consciousness by appearing differently to its relative *Gegebenheit.*
fixation of the *Limesidee* and *Gegenständlichkeit* are equal, as we could imagine. But the question of a *truth-seeking* theory is based on the mode of given conditions that – in a phenomenological way – seeks to discover its correlative mode of consciousness; the mode of consciousness on its part has the specificity to be not only *act-nor-thing-specific* but rather the mode can be found in any act or *Gegenstandsbereich* of its own realm; therefore the idea of the experience of self-giveness of any given issue defines it as its *evidence*. It refers to act-phenomenological characteristics, from where the evidence is taken apart of any other intention as a radical synthesis. This act meaning is substantial and as such is constantly a dynamic medium of linguistic performances; in addition it is comprehensible in that sense that it denominates its meaning. In another sense it means that however the idea of truth is given – by the fact that even evidence could be declared as the experience of truth – it will be understood as forming act-identity in a self-given-mode. This needs methodological clearance insofar as the self-giveness of evidence infiltrates the act of objectivation; Husserl differentiates in this respect the notions *Bedeutungsintention* and *Bedeutungserfüllung* (HUA XIX/2 572ff and 582ff). A given fact is *per se* never an evident fact but it rather depends on the work of a regulative *AS*. Husserl’s translational work refers therefore to procedures of self-giveness in which the transfer is its regulative momentum in which the intention of the fulfilment is the approximation of life-world. Hence, to intend an act of evidence means however not to be able to recognise it, since the correlative life misses in the world. The given has to be given in a specific way: *A* is *per se* not an object but it is given by its way of its givenness. This is the phenomenon translated by its givenness and in such a specific valence that it cannot *a priori* be declared *A, A’* or *B*. Meaning conditions therefore the work of translation as *something* – *something* is the cipher in which intentional-meaning meets meaning-fulfilment. Hence, this comes into focus of vivid fulfilling and displaces the *limes-formula* into an unknown centre; the event of simple meaning is from this point on the intention in the fully pregnant sense (HUA XIX/2 572ff). The notion of intuition corresponds with the notion of objects, but it is understandable by taking into account what the intuition uses for vivid fulfilling. The result of such fulfilling meaning-procedures of self-giveness of things, is at the same time that which is important for the evidence and therefore it is not just a random effect

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56 The experience expression could mislead; note: the experiences of evidences are often the synthesis of categorical orders.

57 The idea of self-giveness can irritate but will however show that it is not a unilateral act; there is a danger that the concept of self-giveness may postpone to the other extreme by reading realism or *Ding an sich.*
of acting, it rather is a *multiple complexion of action*: the force of phenomenological
translation is to show us that we are not capable of controlling our environment but
directs us to a better perception of our environment. Literally, we are not able to observe
a scenery and say that we have an arsenal of elaborated language features to describe
the setting, rather the setting of the topography surprises us; the abstention allows us to
understand and to perceive in a deeper and denser way.

Ergo, the evidence of a deeper and denser life-world *self* has for Husserl normative
signification due to the fact that he formulates the concept of evidence as one of the first
methodological principles (HUA XVII 209ff). It is all about phenomenological
clarification and securing subsistence of the *self*, which is not based on a verdict, but
rather is valid through *itself in reductio*. His phenomenological clarification of grasping
*A as A*′* to B* falls behind the classic theory of levelling *A as A*′* to B* as the *adequation
for life* and *world*. Husserl’s analytical clarification of the relationship of evidence, self-
giveness and truth does not even serve as a special explication for an exclusive
definition of life-world, but serves as a clarification of the fundamental condition for
such kind of definitions. Therefore evidence is not a criterion for truth and reality (HUA
XVII 163f). Evidence does neither stand in opposition to any linguistic canon nor does
it serve as its correction. Husserl’s aim is totally different: it is about the agreement of
how the sense of utterance could be formulated. The explanations in *LU* are a first
approach towards the transcendental project; a lot of traces are outlined but they evoke
clarification and densification: we have undertaken some clarifying investigation to the
realms of *intention, evidence* and *vivid fullfilness* in which the battle cry *back to entities*
is the hidden *cantus firmus*.

**D Declaring transcendental phenomenology**

After having published *LU*, Husserl develops in *Ideen I* (1913) (HUA II) the very
systematic foundation of the transcendental task. The above outlined phenomenological
analysis does not only continue but rather has to systematically be ordered: it is about
how *evidence, vivid fullfilness* and *intentionality* constitute systematically the path of
founding the *AS* of the subject, the objects of language, of the reason being etc. in order

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58 In critical reference to Elisabeth Ströker’s notes (especially Ströker 1987: 34-115).
to justify a linguistic set up in life-world. Henceforth, we might say that language is *per se* a transcendental theory. In other words: a linguistic framework and the usage of language itself cannot be understood in *analogia entis* by declaring its conditions within this framework. At a first glance, language has in correlation with consciousness-intentions a descriptive function or more precisely in our case the function of *analogue aporia*. Everything is given as consciousness-content and as an act happening out of consciousness. Recognised by its reduction, phenomenology has so far been the momentum of a consciousness-giveness. The phenomenon is the given-condition of consciousness, it is the donation of a certain specific consciousness, which exists by its invading language; the process of language invades by re-referring to the sphere of consciousness — this kind of invasion is the outlined process of *epoché*. In this sense reduction does not simply mean an acceptance, on the contrary, it is a movement of thought in which the phenomenon finds its vivid fullness of intentionality and fulfilment. Reduction means therefore to bring the element of *what* as a *how* phenomenon to the sphere of consciousness and to produce it in a pure manner, i.e. to set up its generic and evident constitution in *epoché*. From its evidential point the act of reduction restrains its evident entity of the phenomenon whereby its evidential fact is clarified (ideation means that the entity of possibility finds its own condition). However, no operations, which refer to the transcendental line can be part of the undertaken investigation, rather phenomenological knowledge tries to outline the clarification lines of what the difference of *Sein* und *Seiend* could reasonably mean. Therefore, we have to relate the acts of ontological perceiving to each other, since ontological knowledge production cannot be separated from the *Sein* and the *Seiende*. Its perceiving feature will be the reason to define what being could actually mean in life-world (HUA VI 9f). Husserl is persuaded that only epistemological production delivers clarification of ontological and apophantic pretensions (HUA II 22ff). The hint arguing with a knowledge setting is to start with the idea of reduction by arguing that phenomenological methodology does not have any link to knowledge within tradition, science and philosophy. Reduction, understood as a step-by-step movement, demands an abstention of scientific, philosophical and linguistic positions and on the other hand it shifts its significance towards a transcendental existence of writing philosophical, scientific and linguistic possibilities. Insofar, this kind of reduction is not yet specifically of phenomenological provenience. This has to be mentioned as Husserl has

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59 This mistake is often made in argumentation lines of everyday life, of positivism and especially of ontological discourses.
not a clear distinct denomination and separation of forming reduction. Hence, the notion reduction can be used as the ontological engine that enables us to the vividness of *aporia*. This operator however opens the transcendental-phenomenological field towards the transcendental consciousness of reality. By considering this iteration, we have to assume that the constitution of the intentional is fulfilled by phenomenological reflections of reduction and ideation. Whilst givenness and constitution are unified present, their evidence happens in their self-givenness. We may assume that the evidence is the constitutive givenness of any *A, A’ or B* that will be squeezed in life-world; constitution is act-constitution and exactly this given constitution is the essence, wherein phenomenology may be fulfilled as *vivid fullfilness of intentional self-giveness*. This refers to the theoretical-subject as act-performer, in which all phenomena are constituted and performed while the empirical ego stumbles with *A as A’ to B*. Thus, the existence of the subject effects the action of consciousness\(^6\). Accordingly, phenomenology has to seek its way down by considering its regressive path and delivers therefore traces for translation. From this point on, we can no longer consider phenomenology as it has been practised so far: *there is no simple experience of consciousness*. The origins are only on a reflexive level present, but they are nevertheless given without mediation – we have to declare the foundation of linguistic codification as a direct *Erschaubarkeit*. Up to now, we investigated that *A, A’ and B* act analytically, but from now on we can no longer handle them only on reflexive purposes. It turns out that they signalise a fundamental problem in so far as they grasp deep-rooted epistemological self-evidence. Hitherto, the self-evidence of words, grammar, syntax, etc. are so far ontologically given and are not simply the verdict of a self. But everything gets changed if we no longer accept the fact that in translational practice this kind of natural knowledge is no longer obvious, but rather linguistically reflected. In that sense, the translational knowledge astray is a riddle: how is it possible to reach knowledge, considering that the subjective entity is irreconcilably separated? Knowledge is therefore mystified with the riddle of transcendence. Within his sceptical argumentation, Husserl does not care if knowledge is in an appropriate relationship to the objective issue (HUA II 24), his main concern is to know how it is possible to capture what is important and what the idea of knowledge, its validity, could signify. This is his fundamental way to query language and translatability and is the

\(^6\) Husserl’s phenomenology of language cannot be taken as an existential hermeneutics; however, the thematisation of an existential hermeneutics is instantly raised – the question, remains if an existential hermeneutics is the purpose of phenomenology. In reverse we may consider that a hermeneutical writing may overcome language within a simple analogical setting.
methodological basis for Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and gives us
nevertheless an interesting view of how language and translation could be formulated.

Therefore, the question of how we understand the Gegenstände – or to be more precise,
how we understand the lexeme – of transcendental consciousness and in relation to this
Gegenständlichkeit, we need to analyse the enigmatic fact of how the intentional act and
language are related to each other in terms of translational activities. This relationship is
able to draft the intentionality of knowable acts. Hence, it is not only a relationship as
something but it has also the line of to(wards) something. This directed intentionality –
different to the sheer intentionality – foster the intended entity: it is all about the
authentic entity. But it is as well uncontested that the intended entity can only been
mediated by intentional entities (cf. the noesis and noema relationship). Therefore we
have to see that the problem of knowledge is not simply a problem of the act and its
Corresponding entities but rather a problem of the relation from two forms of
Gegenständlichkeit and their translatability. As outlined above, a fulfilled act of
knowledge would be presented as a correspondence or as an equation. It is
representation insofar as an intentional entity has to be understood as an imagination of
the real and as an intended entity within the realm of evidence. There are some sorts of
theoretical burdens by creating such an image from these real entities: according to the
image, we should show and review the entity as a separate issue – we write A, A’ and B
and not AA’B. Therefore we need a position apart from them but actually the relation
can just be possible through other intentional relations in life-world. The
Gegenständlichkeit of consciousness is an immanent intentional correlation, whereas a
real entity has always a transcendental appeal of consciousness. This separation from
immanence and transcendence conceals a translational ambiguity: the real entity is on
the one hand transcendent in terms of its corresponding immanent entities, but not at all
exterior to its intended acts, and on the other hand it would be simply unrecognisable.
As a matter of principle, the relation between intentional and real entity is just the
negative expression of the fact that not only the intentional and immanent Gegenstand,
but rather the difference of immanent and transcendental Gegenständlichkeit, is itself
part of the recognising consciousness; it is very much again about the fulfilment of the
intention in its squeezing momentum.
As a result, another notion of intentional immanence emerges. It does not belong per se to the problems of natural knowledge and language, but rather it is about its reflection. Therefore it does not solve the previous evoked ontological difference of meaning-intention and meaning-fulfilment while writing the evidence in transcendental real language. On the contrary, the realm of \(A, A'\) and \(B\) will be Gegenstand and part of the epistemological reflection, in which the immanence of consciousness is understood as transcendental immanence; hence it will be part of Husserl’s phenomenology and does not signify a contradiction to the transcendence of the meaning fulfilling of a real Gegenstand. Husserl’s transcendental approach refers now in its difference to the mere intended; the enlightening of consciousness can only be understood by its redundant consciousness act: on the one side, it is a fact that language has to be intended to transcendental objects to get them determined and on the other, language is oriented to the transcendence of Gegenstände to define them. In the first case, knowledge is related to Gegenstände whose real existence is an unreflected premise. In the other case, it is based on the existence of Gegenstände, which has not its real predicate and therefore requires an epistemological proof\(^61\). As a result, translating figures are a permanent circular topos of knowledge-production \((A = A')\). The analysis of how Sinnaufklärung of knowledge can be developed by a constitutional theory will reflect the \(A = A'\) scheme. This drafting will be weighty for Husserl’s approach, since phenomenology, as a descriptive method, occurs as transcendental perspective while incorporating the intentional consciousness in its transcendental consciousness. The effort will be to make this stance analytically accessible for reading \(A\) as \(A'\) to \(B\).

3. The other breakthrough: transcendental reality

So far we have seen that static-receptive considerations do not sit comfortably with phenomenological lining, i. e. we have considered that Husserl thematises the relationship of essential different acts of meaning and therefore undermined the momentum of rigidity. Instead, we have to consider that Husserl highlights the event of

\(^61\)In relation to Kant: objective reality of entities needs epistemological proof; hence, having no real predicates means there is no epistemological proof. The relation to Kant’s transcendental questioning is not accidental. Husserl tries to shape the conditional questions for possible gnoseological effects as the foundational condition for phenomenology, which reviews the critics of reason. However, the difference between Kant and Husserl is obvious: the conditions of possibilities are in phenomenological discourse not only related to knowledge but as well to the Gegenstände of knowledge. Kant, for his part, fixes a transcendental-subjective a priori.
translation, mediation, the process-character of consciousness and the teleological dynamics in order to obtain the transcendental reality in life-world. Hence, in Grundlegende Untersuchungen zum phänomenologischen Ursprung der Räumlichkeit der Natur (Husserl 1968: 307-325), Husserl intensifies this line by highlighting his aim for a transcendental language. The possibility-conditions of valid predications are the condition possibilities for any lexeme in such a way that the latter is constituted by the first and its unity outlines the identity of the therein-prevailing-possibility-conditions. This implies that the condition-possibilities are considered as the capabilities to encompass the predications and the continued conditional-ground. Therefore we may assume that the predications are the given possibilities of any object formulating $A, A'$ or $B$. At present, we consider that predictions cover the expression realm of objects and conversely, any categorical objects can be taken by the prediction. Language as prediction accomplishes the synthesis a priori that founds the categorical object as such. Consequently, they are the subjective accomplishment, in which the formal objects are predetermined for any kind of thoughts. Language as phenomenon offers the area of constitution for other and further formalisation activities. Therefore, language signifies in such a framework a content-producing sphere of different layers. It is a material- and formal-sphere, which gradually turns from its own form-constitution into the material content of logical spheres. In this respect, language signifies a producing and material sphere that relies on its form-constitution as a second-level material. Herein this marks a certain structural relation: whilst form will be on a next level content, it will be at this point its material content. In that sense, meaning as form is at once the matter of categorical certainty. In other words, the entity of the form is its possibility to be content. This kind of form-substance-relationship is as a consequence a phenomenon in actua; it outlines the continuation-principle that conditions the overall structure of acts among themselves and the consciousness in toto. Henceforth, the ground operations of the act-structure are the utterance of the imperatives give and take.\textsuperscript{62}

By considering give and take, we consider simultaneously the relationship that corresponds to the revised framework of language: language refers therefore on the one side to the predicativum of the perception-act and on the other to the category of perception. Perceptions interpenetrate in such a way that the realms $A, A'$ and $B$ grasp the content of the perception sphere, namely by giving them as (formal) idea. Therewith

\textsuperscript{62} Cf. also Hülsmann (Hülsmann 1964: 147).
the problem of identity and difference occurs insofar as the *taken* and the *given* correspond to each other and that the *given* feature signifies the *a priori* of an act, and in contrast, the *taken* realm gathers from a given fact, which occurs as a categorical form of evidence. The identity of form and difference, in its different act-spheres, is therefore questioned in its procedure. The densification of life-worldly linguistics is the result of being double taken by its identic reading – the identity of the syntax of $A$, $A'$ and $B$ produces therefore the dynamic act of translation: identity is the presence as it is *the other in ones own*\(^\text{63}\). The possibility of this identity is the being of an object that is present in both imagination and perception and will be performed in the acts of the imaginative $A$ as $A'$ while perceiving to $B$. The possible unity formation of imagination and perception is the intrinsic idea of identity and therefore we have to consider that language represents indeed the sphere of happening, whilst outlining identity. To put it differently, the possibility of the acts and the possibility of contents indicate the linguistic condition-possibilities that can only be found in its identity of grammar and syntax while writing life-world. It is the way in which the linguistic act provides identity in its peculiar way of essence, by referring to its transcendental function of *give* and *take*: the dynamic act of giving linguistic terms is taken by the phenomenon of *analogical aporia* as its transcendental issue. At this very point the transcendental phenomenology of translation takes its corresponding partner for producing life-world. The correspondence of form and category, of formation and meaning, and the exchange of an index to its indicated grammar however, induces the translational act of *give* and *take*. The *anologia* is the forgottenness of the subject as the foundational actor of *analogical aporia: analogia* as such, as recurrence and correspondence, forgets how it is *squeezed in* and *anologia* further on forgets to recognise itself. This is the reason why the translational task is often not considered and will be taken for granted\(^\text{64}\).

We have seen that *language* means to approach its *being* by enacting it. I tried to outline this line up by re-considering *action* and *knowledge*: transcendentalty of language is

\(^{63}\) The perceived is within the envisaged in imagination. But the perception is far from being the perceived, it rather offers the identity of the perceived as the perceived in imagination; i.e. if I perceive a chair and after that imagine it (without having the possibility to re-see it), I have to resume that the imagination of the chair is in correspondence and simultaneously the unity within the perception of the chair. The identity of imagination and perception is therefore the identity of the chair. Neither the imagined nor the perceived chair corresponds to the identity; only the chair as chair is as such its identity.

\(^{64}\) From this point we may assume to create a new analogy-thesis, which corresponds to an *analogia transcendentalis*. However, there are no such signals in Husserl’s oeuvre. He emphasises that language is given by language and we make ourselves out of it as well as we are often used by it. But can we assume that we possess language?
subjectivity and its happening-character is the content of its linguistic being. We can also say that subjectivity as agent considers language as possibility and on the other side it is definitely the possibility of language. By considering language as possibility we have to read it, it does not analyse the conditions of language, but rather presents itself intentionally as possibility. In this perspective language offers the possibility to express something – this resembles the phenomenological qualities which Husserl is so keen of: *the neutrality of place, where the manifest will be manifest, where the meant can be the meant, where the totum can enact its presence, etc.* Henceforth, from a phenomenological stance, language offers the possibility to say nothing and to say the truth; any utterance can occur in language as a multitude of possibilities. Language has therefore no distinct setting. The linguistic indifference concerns language as form, which offers in its formality of emptiness the possibility to imagine and to express its content and at the same moment to be content in its form. Pure formal language or language as pure language is alienated from any content as we have seen it above. This tension of fullness and emptiness, this kind of excess and lack conditions language as the intrinsic feature of translation. In other words, the richness of language-neutrality signifies the hyperbolic event of reality and outlines the striking moment writing the possibility of language: language is not a copy of a pretended world, language is not bound to an actuality and a necessity but it is far more the possibility that trespasses the instant actuality. *In concreto*, it is the possibility in which every kind of modality can be expressed. The neutrality of language invites us to use language as a possibility. It offers in its neutrality and indifference against psychic and individual moments, the possibility to leave their conditions behind it. Hence, language as phenomenon outlines a certain distance, an overcoming of the affective, a suppression of emotions, imitations, psychic elements etc. that leads toward knowledge. In this relationship, language can be considered as the logical, as the deliberation of logos and as a step towards the realms of knowledge and reasoning. Language as possibility means therefore the logic of language, since the logos of language defines its intrinsic possibility of linguistic happenings; possibility of language is therefore its own being as unity of senses and as the meaning of the permanently opening process of relation- and order-structures. The sensual sphere of perception is not the possibility of meaning, senses and not at all the possibility of contents but rather the sensual world of perception, which found a linguistic world within the setting of a world *per se* that is in the same moment the
object of transcendental condition-possibilities. The possibility-analysis as linguistic *a priori* cannot be understood as an autonomous process; it can only be captured as a transcendental process. However, this does not mean that language as possibility and the possibility of language are deployed as a unity of an analytic-synthetic *a priori* and *a posteriori* setting in order that this process of phenomenological act highlights transcendental hermeneutics. It is the transcendental ego that delivers the performance of hermeneutics. However, the possibility of language and language as possibility are not sufficient to capture its being. The being of the act is insufficient and phenomenologically hardly developed. The act, in which the possibility of language has its own being, outlines the transcendental issue by being its own possibility – this possibility is provided by the subject as its intrinsic *relatum*.

### A The equivocation that never lasts

The problem of this translational setting faces the problem that a *signifié* is the outburst of varied meanings; this aporetic momentum is caused due to the acting difference of *meaning-fulfilling* and *meaning-providing*. The analysis shows us that language is literally the translation of the conferred meaning in its apprehended form that is for the moment the empty formula of squeezing (cf. *aporetic analogia*). Providing and fulfilling happens linguistically between the *signifié* and the *signifiant* as a cipher of translation: *as* and *to*. The element of equivocation plays therefore an important role and leads to the above outlined act-momentum. This means that on the one side the relatedness of its being and on the other the engagement of the respective relationship of perception and notion as well as the connexion of content and form – literally both elements are interconnected and therefore deliberately an act of transfer: the expression as intentional act is not a simple fact, but rather a permanent event of translation.

Hence, it is not accidental that a translational framework replies to the phenomenon of equivocation; the equivocation is the dilemma of language, since it withdraws quasi itself. But this withdrawal is practically the consideration of the linguistic act as its

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65 In reference to Manfred Sommer (Sommer 1985: 91ff).
66 The simple description of intentionality and *erfüllende Anschauung* shows the complexity and entanglement of their enactment. The act of knowledge and the cognitive-function of expressions play therefore a major role (HUA XIX 56f and 61f). Emptiness and fullness refer primarily to read that expressions and intentions can be both and therefore in their fullness separable.
forced meaning-fulfilling and meaning-providing\textsuperscript{67}. As its equation language brings itself into reflection insofar as the equation is nothing else than the self-disclosure of language in its transcendental setting. Indeed, this self-disclosure manifests on its own ground its equivocation\textsuperscript{68}. This kind of reflection is shown within the reflection of equivocation as such, since it means the material of an equivocation; an objective that means itself as the objected issue. By considering language, as a proto-type of the equivocal framework, we can consider that we have to understand it simultaneously as a theoretical and practical phenomenon. Henceforth, any expressi verbis is a possible equivocation: the equivocation faces the tension of being in a translational mode of \textit{from-to} that could be understood or not and will, if it turns out to be, a system of a permanent transcendental need. We may suggest evoking an analogical sphere of mutual translation. To understand this correspondence and as an addition to the previous chapters, we have to consider that a linguistic expression is significant and stresses therefore once more the \textit{facticity} of significance: any linguistic act signifies \textit{something}. This something can be considered in its most extensive way as the content that will be expressed in its very style. As we have already outlined above, the process of translation is highlighted by its style, by its manner, how something is expressed\textsuperscript{69}. Only within or as its relationship, language articulates the content and the form by referring to the act of translating. The equivocation considers therefore the extensive life-world-arena, which is language: translation is the intrinsic articulated sense-unity\textsuperscript{70}. This is where the internal structure and translation occur as meaning and as expression. Language is therefore common as well as solitary, in its proper name as in its generic term: the tension between this two positions is the ground-reality of translation in its pathic expression and the simultaneous emptiness and abstractness. By considering this matter of fact, translation in its pure sense is possible and enables us to its possibility of language. Hence, translation reconsiders to enact the phenomenon of language as language insofar it is revealed by itself. The equivocation is the constant release of language; its practise is however always clearance and as well differentiation.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{67} By performing it, it emerges – as long as it is reflective – as its own being.
  \item \textsuperscript{68} As we have seen, language as language is the universal and extensive equivocation. With other words, language is necessarily an equivocal field, in which the dynamics and statics of the equivocal occurs to itself.
  \item \textsuperscript{69} The intentional expression-meaning does only mean that intentional acts are meaningful, but it does not express anything about the internal structure and the disposition of its presentation. Language as equivocation means that anything could be meaningful and therefore linguistic. Finally, it signifies the primordial relationship of content and expression and as well of speaking and being in its furthest sense.
  \item \textsuperscript{70} This sense unity is highlighted by Husserl mentioning the totum of language, the name for the no-named and the universal name as well as the situatedness of an expression in its subject(ivity), contingency, situation, etc.
\end{itemize}
Translation faces a dialectic *movens* by suspending stabilised moments and creating simultaneously new fixations. It seems to be pertinent to evoke that the structure of equivocation offers at the same moment the possibility of linguistic revealing and developing. The translational structure is permanently peaked by constantly offering the possibility of unfolding and developing\(^{71}\). This evidence outlines the fact that unambiguity and ambiguity are related to each other in a suspense-packed condition and finally signifies nothing less than the appearance of a dynamic and contingent translational activity\(^{72}\). The emptying offers in the same line fullness by realising new categorical contents in such a way that there will not be an *emptiness of content*. The performed abstraction however entails in the sense of universality a new form of translation: each kind of abstraction contains in its conditions a fullness that can be taken as a special and individual content.

Most commonly, the outlined task is in its everyday language considered as the conversion of the realm of objects, meanings and expressions. These three realms are often thought mutually and are mediated by the linguistic sphere, albeit language is not able to offer such kind of translational power. The more appropriate *téchne*, facing the *analogical aporia* of thinking about the different realms by their own means and negotiate them thereafter via language, will be discussed by the figure of knowledge (-production) insofar as distinct knowledge can be sorted out, well-defined notions presented and attributions proposed\(^{73}\). Nevertheless, we cannot pretend that language is the coordination-authority and the realm of objects, in which meanings are reflected. It is not possible to relativise the sphere of perception, objects, notions, etc. to the sphere of language and to declare language as the genetic code. As outlined above, the *aporia* can be resolved by discussing the difference as an equivalent fact; we may consider that language is always a dense enactment of expressions, feelings, intentions, contents, etc. The enforcement of translation offers therefore the possibility to write the equivocation as its *locus amoenus*. The process of translation in its equation-framework highlights

\(^{71}\) So far we have not considered the notion of univocation. The univocal expression can be outlined as the ultimate destiny of language – as mentioned this consideration is weak, since *de facto* univocation can be debated as a border case of equivocation. It is literally in suspension the negation of it. Or in other words: the univocation shifts permanently its being into the sphere of equivocation, in particular by remodelling itself as the negative part of equivocation. Henceforth, that means that any expression contains the negativity by convening the univocation and the equivocation.

\(^{72}\) The relationship of perception and notion and as well of emptiness and fullness condition language.

\(^{73}\) If there is a possibility to discuss the issue in such a way, we would crystallise two different and language-free spheres: objects and meanings. The linguistic realm however is primarily the representation, assignment and coordination of the expression.
the relationship of constitution and genesis and therefore the achievement of the transcendental ego by logical purposes. Language happens by considering it as the context wherein the relationship and the foundation of possibilities find its manifestation: the enacted translation-production reveals the constellation of categorical and objective realms, by considering the phenomenon of equivocation in potentialis.

**B Metabolē: a subversion of translation?**

In broad lines, we find that the entanglement of objects, meaning and expression outlines the possibilities of translation. Hence, there is a mixture of similarity, identity and difference in which language has to be seen as transcendental figuration of primarily a priori unity while facing its translation as its first act. This means that there is a certain semantic setting of equivocation and synonyms, which are systematically pre-existing and conditioning our relationship of the self, the similar and the different.

The semantic precondition – led by a language of similarities, identities and differences – outlines denomination formulae for pre-existing logical categories. It is a special framework in which equivocations and synonyms are the hidden but guiding element for expressions by conditioning identity and difference, especially then, when we may assume that in language we do not only have a pre-existing setting but an activity that is its own identification and differentiation. Equivocations and synonyms are therefore linguistic pre-determinations and they have to be analysed more carefully, especially in correspondence to their character. Husserl outlines the expression-character of names: the phenomenon of expression is primarily a relationship of meaning and objects that are shown above all by the acts of expressions. The expression has to be understood as the translational act of two different spheres of intuitive and significative acts. It is translation in the sense that it mediates between perception and meaning. Hence, the duality is the content of the expression, but the identical, the idealistic unity of meaning and the objectivity are dispersing (HUA XVI 30ff). However, there is a certain striking necessity to keep a certain correlation between the different acts, as the expressed is related to partial identification (HUA XVI 33ff). Equivocation and synonymy evince the independence of meanings, which could be therefore empty and without any corresponding objects. Equivocation and synonyms are meaning-awarding, meaning-complying and therefore the intrinsic happening of language. We have to argue that
translation evinces the mediation of ideal and real realms as the result of identity and
difference. Therefore the expression can be considered as a dynamic fulfilling-
and identity-happening: the intentional being of the act of perception assimilates with the
meaning of the expressing act of $A$ and $B$ (HUA XVI 32). The sphere of expression is
therefore a sphere of *adequation* of translational identities – language is a consequence
of translating identities but not by considering it exclusively as a linguistic
consciousness and it should not only be discussed by consciousness-aspects either.
From this standpoint, we may consider that language and its intrinsic consciousness can
be considered as the very transcendental condition. As we have outlined, language is not
its own content but rather a part of its being that expresses issues that are not owned by
language itself\(^74\). The predicative element is therefore necessarily the horizon from
where the category of language is enacted. The world is the believed universal feature,
it is the perceiving of the whole and as well of the singular. This kind of believing is the
articulation of the believed intuitive, originated perception of life-world as the very
formulation of the *ur-doxa*\(^75\), represented as the dialectic pair of perception and
imagination. This dialectic entanglement is neither a psychological nor a physiological
explanation, but rather – as the phenomenon of consciousness-process might presume –
the transcendental life as such\(^76\). If *ur-doxa* outlines a pre-predicative moment, we may
assume that believing finds its explication in its categories; in other words, language is
*per se* a synthetic event of *squeezing life* and *world* into a realm of pure seeing. By
analysing language through the perceived life-worldly language, we are able to create a
new order and new rules for a new linguistic transcendental synthetic *a priori*. This
implies as well that the dynamic enactment of language is actually a transcendental
enactment, insofar as its logic is fostered by its *linguistic facticity*. As consequence, the
phenomenological understanding of language can never grasp its own standpoint and
hence, the act of translation remains in its very stop ($A = A'$). The horizon of the *ur-
doxa* is not at all an immanent sphere that excludes transcendentality. The pre-
consciousness is not at all the *topos*, where we are able to understand but rather the spot
where evidence should arise. It evokes further steps – this step is finally the epochal
step leading towards a *front* or, euphemistically pronounced, it leads to *paradeisos*. The

\(^74\) If language faces its own content, it will be the content of language – it can no longer be *act* and
*happening*. That would mean that we would have left language.

\(^75\) The *ur-doxa* is exactly the absolute coincidence of existence of the human being and the consciousness
of itself, which is subsequently revealed as the transcendental ego.

\(^76\) In that sense, we do not consider psychological effects but rather discuss the psychic phenomenon as
such and examine the evident self-giveness of a being as a being. The appearance in its doxic
consciousness poses the transcendental question.
act of translating as an enactment of consciousness evinces *epoché* that yields any standpoint and invokes the *fatum* of any given phenomenon.

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**C Life-world: the anthropological figuration of translation**

We have seen that transcendental reduction undertakes the formation and setting of pure consciousness. This kind of consciousness architecture has been established as pure life and as *Erkenne Dich selbst* formula (HUA VIII 121) against any forms of natural or psychological reasoning. Husserl has analysed so far (cf. *LU*) this setting by considering the experience-phenomenon (of language) and the *experimentum* of *aporetic analogia*. This condition was the initial purpose for pure phenomenology and consequently as well the relationship towards a life-world full of experiences. In correspondence to this lining, the ego as its theoretical agent has been tacitly accepted (HUA II 44). The very fact of hidden acceptance questions if consciousness-intentionality is really given while consciousness is related to language or is it rather the question of the relation to its ego, which could have given insights to Husserl’s transcendental-phenomenological preliminaries. By naming the *cogitations*, Husserl has so far and especially in *Ideen I* not considered the ego as a possessing subject of consciousness; the ego is rather an *epiphenomenon*. But if we add to the ego a specific unity-form of intentional consciousness, we have to consider that the unity of consciousness is given from its very beginning by my perspective: the ego will be a constitutive part or in other words, it is its origin of all operations – the ego, is dictator, scholar and translator. This kind of self-certainty is at least nothing else than a reflective certainty, but understood as a doubling of being a subject and an object and therefore the formation of forming unity: *the translator will become translation*. By grasping this condition, the identity of any ego cannot be comprehensible: the subject turning to an object by self-devotion is always and in any case of self-reference already ahead of its own conditions. Not much different is the case for the transcendental ego. Hence, the identity of the ego does not correspond to how we perceive words – indeed an identity-entity is conditioned through its multitude: a word is not at all identical due to the fact that it simply exists. Identity is the result, a process of identification; from a phenomenological stance, it is a special translational synthesis from where on different giving meanings of a word will be canalised as word and in extension as language. In reference to the subject, the object-
identification has already a certain kind of a non-actual identity-consciousness of the identified subject as conditioning feature translating life and world. The basic question will be in relation to condition possibilities by outlining its linguistic identity-consciousness, how is it constituted or do we have to accept a complete different identification-concept to define the self-identification of language and the ego in which \( A \text{ as } A' \text{ to } B \) means \( A \text{ as } A' \text{ to } B \)?

The pure ego has so far been presented as a peculiar form of transcendental reflection in immanence and the phenomenological standpoint presents therefore the given stands in correspondence with its pure consciousness. We have to note that Husserl does only consider the given issue as an empty pool of experiences; it is inexplicable in the form of a pure ego and nothing else. Therefore the phenomenological view sheers off from the experiences having ego towards the abstinent I perspective. In \textit{LU} and in \textit{Ideen I} Husserl describes the ego as thinking from nobody (HUA XVI 41). His theory of essence and its intended function manifests therefore further information: the essence of consciousness and the extraction of its invariant structures is – through the ideation of the experience-reflection of the one’s own ego intentionality – given structurally and in this manner my consciousness, how I find it as my essence-setting, is just an exemplary isolation of an entity-generality that is completely indifferent, compared to any empirical consciousness.

The ego is no longer an empiric ego, but rather the ego has to be understood as pure ego or as theoretical subject as we have outlined above, which contains a multiplicity of experiences within ideal possibilities (HUA V 71) and on its part has to be thought from a contingent existing ego. But the pure ego in the sense of a pure, idealistic essence-constituent of consciousness-structures does not deliver the possibility to be my very own \textit{bios}. My ego translates and requires another ego and henceforth, the other stresses in a phenomenological sense the very mutual sense-implication (HUA III 8f and 70f). In reference to Husserl, the eidetic spur does not signify the \textit{telos}; rather the transcendental reduction, which leads to origins of sense and hence, the transcendental ego has to be considered as the filter of life-world: \textit{any pre-phenomenological sense of the ego understood as the mundane ego has to be excluded while the ego has to be understood as a pure transcendental ego}. However, the analysis has already exceeded the status of an ego, which does not describe it as ineffable and nothing more than just the
benchmark of its acts. The transcendental ego of Kant, understood as transcendental apperception, is disenchanted by my view of Husserl’s transcendental ego\textsuperscript{77}. The ego, understood as transcendent ego, could only be declared as my own by having another transcendental ego, which is different and somehow similar to my ego. The otherness as well as its sameness causes nevertheless problems due to questions of how the otherness has to be linguistically founded: if another subject should be within my own consciousness-field, I will not be able to understand it as my own kind – this serious break with any semantic or hermeneutical precondition will overcome Husserl by rethinking the dependence of the alien-empirical-ego within my ego and the status of the alien transcendental ego in its being-sense by blasting the own sphere of transcendentality, if the other ego has to be understood in its fundamental meaning as the other. Therefore the formation of translation is the formation \textit{ex negativo}\textsuperscript{78}.

Husserl’s \textit{ego cogito} has its source within the invulnerable basic position, which seems to be an \textit{aporia} within its un-evolved structure: whatever is given to me is a giveness of language for me, whatever is presented to me in its being, has to be understood as a being for me. Therefore, any other \textit{I} is hence, another \textit{I} to me. But this \textit{aporia} has, as we have outlined, been given up due to the fact that any being is every being as such, but rather it is only a possible sketch of what \textit{Sein} and \textit{Seiendes} truly are. This turn is the fundamental phenomenological approach: its emphasis on accepting only my \textit{ego cogito} as the foundational embodiment of any judgement (HUA I 7) has only started by the method of transcendental reduction. My \textit{Ebenbild} is the ego writing \textit{A} as \textit{A’} and never \textit{A} as \textit{B}. The idea of an immanent perception, which does only exist in me, is a comfortable starting position for any ego (HUA III 85f and Ströker 1987: 139). However its qualification can only be understood, if it does not exist for me and for others, but just only for its own purpose. The transcendental effect highlights this theoretical effect of solitude: by accepting that the inhibition of world-believing allows the principle possibility of thinking that another ego does not exist, the effect will be that this reduction conditions a transcendental singularity of my own ego (and this effect can not even be mediatised through its being-demand). In our analysis, the theoretical solipsism

\textsuperscript{77} In the following I attempt to draft the transcendental ego by attempting to shift a phenomenology of consciousness towards a phenomenology of subjectivity.

\textsuperscript{78} Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology can be declared as the first transcendental path, which has rethought the status of inter-subjectivity: the abstract multitude of empty egos will be transformed towards a transcendental inter-subjectivity of any concrete egos as the first sense-foundation and being-validity. Husserl presents in the \textit{V. Cartesian Meditation} and in \textit{Ideen I} a very narrow presentation of the idea of inter-subjectivity, but only to transform it in \textit{Krisis} (HUA VI 136ff and 187-193).
is stabilised by the preposition to. This result leads to a transcendental solipsism (HUA VIII 238 ff), which has to be read in the line of to B. As a sequel to this methodological solipsism, the constitution-analysis forms the framework of the ego-multitude, which is given in my field of experience as a transcendental phenomenon. Additionally, we can say that transcendentality is per definitionem translation due to the mediating requirements of the subject to subject relationship.

A sideline to this stance considers how Husserl separates the own and alien subjectivity. He focuses it on the description of the difference of Unmittelbarkeit and Mittelbarkeit by introducing therefore the notion of empathy (HUA VIII 134 and HUA I). The notion could be misleading, but does at least signify the oppositional sense of the original meaning of my own: the other is present as unified with his / her / its body too, but nevertheless she / he / it is another ego with it / her / his inner life and this inner life is not given as like his / her / its body is given as original to me (HUA III 8). Empathy is phenomenologically speaking a perception act, even if it is no longer an original act of perception; but as an act of perception it is a constitutional act of translation (Ströker 1987: 140). Hence, language is from the perception of its intention in a certain way an ephemera but however an ephemera that finds a constitutional basis – the consequence is that the ephemeral other is simultaneously A, A’ and B while writing give and take in life-worldly empathy. Therefore, as we can outline in theoretical and practical terms now, language happens as a result of translation within / without a life-worldly reality. As a consequence, the human consciousness and its objective status are outlined by a linguistic consciousness in style-formation. Thus, language is the outlined language as language and in language by trans-lating and re-enacting it. The re-enacted language questions the field of my own linguistic use that can no longer be seen in its pure imitative sense. The equation A = A’ is sensu stricto more than a perfect imitation; it is the paradoxon of a linguistic interaction with life-world79. Language as life-worldly phenomenon leads to the constitutional question of the foundational setting of being-with-one-another. The figure of translation can take over this task as a Wesens a priori and outlines the importance of stressing that any question of a social phenomenon leads to neither sociological nor psychological insights but to a paradoxon that will be revealed in transcendentality while writing the above outlined from-to. To understand

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79 Considering the imitation as an act, it would signify that the re-enactment has to be enforced by an appropriation: the connections will be thematic such in a way that the social relations have to be considered as a human constitution. Considering its a priori setting can enact a performed language between human beings.
this kind of relation-possibility it does not demand a deconstructive or genetic aspiration: neither historical, biographical nor psychic-psychological aspects prevail, but the essence as possibility for it has been taken into account to foster what Husserl will call life-world. Henceforth, the foundation of translation is not at all a historical or psychic moment of the ego but rather it is as such present and operated in any linguistic efforts. In this reading translation is a monadic operation and as we can now anticipate transcendental meaning, it can be characterised as a *sui generis* operation. The sense of translation is therefore a process of movement from *A as A’*, whose *dynamis* is not bound directly to *A’* but rather it is from its possibility bound to *it*; the *Wesensallgemeinheit* of this *it* is the grammatical code of its universality to *B*. Hence, meaning is consequently the capture of having *in actua* the content *per se*. Only the performance of meaning meanings can be considered as actual – this is true only if the *per se* is the codification of life-world. The content of life-world understood in correlation to the act as the *what-question* has its *a priori* foundation within a setting in which the content is just the content of the act and cannot be taken from it as a transcendental moment *in* life-world – that means that the content of any act is the foundational layer of explication. Content of acts are therefore *act-ish*, since they are the material moment of their own. Thus, *content* is the *what* of the translational act: the translational act of phenomenological analysis is not simply the performance of meaning, but it rather signifies the essence of *signifié* and *signifiant*. By defining its meaning contentwise, the act of translation is able to constitute it as content – however, the translation is not part of the content: we can never see literally the translation *A as A’ to B*. As the act constitutes meaning contentwise, it is able to create the content in the manner as it defines it as *a priori* setting, such in a way that the translational act is a new style of the content. Translation that is intended to *signifié* and to be a *signifiant* is the *a priori* act of its being. The act of its essence can be kept retrospective as the current being. In other words, the *signifiant* is the enactment of the *signifié* as an *a priori* sphere of language. The transcendental translation can henceforth be seen as the synthesis of *signifié* and *signifiant* that drafts at the same time the translated figuration in its reduction. The transcendental *logos* of this translational task is the act from which

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80 In a phenomenological analysis we may consider the constitutional question of founding the meaning of language. The meaning act evokes and intends a general *a priori* giveness. This given fact of linguistic meaning can be seen as an intentional sphere. In this constellation it is not important if the act can be taken simultaneously as meaning-providing or meaning-fulfilling.

81 Translation seems to be a reactionary and tautological act: content will be content, but indeed in such a manner that the meaning has always been meant; its enactment is however that which emerges whilst it is thought as meaning.
the phenomenon emerges from itself and find its own way. Therefore, the transcendental element sets itself free as the essence of translation by performing the act of reduction. A transcendental approach that reduces, is likewise the act, which produces: it is the unity of the historic and the present future or in other words, the translational productive force is highlighted by its enforcement and its re-enactment – translation can be outlined as being-as-translation\(^{82}\)/\(^{83}\).

### 4. Transcendental phenomenology of translation

My reading of phenomenological transcendentality and its relationship to language and translation stays primarily in addition and likewise in opposition to Jacques Derrida’s approach\(^{84}\). The transcendental ego is not, as Derrida claims, a function of language\(^{85}\): words are not emerging apart from the ego; language and words are generated through their actors and by enacting them – we may consider and direct towards them in action (HUA XVII 366f). Hence, this thus not disseminates the translational cause. Derrida implies that Husserl’s idea of purity is an expression of a groundless will and of a pure essence that is still present through his reading of transcendental considerations. In reference to this reading, Derrida is highlighting Husserl’s privilege of monologues as a wish for purity in life-world. Claude Evans stresses in contrary that in Husserl’s communicative interaction meaning is always related (Evans 1995: 43ff). In other words, Husserl stresses not the privilege of monologue; it is rather the derivation, the essence of meaning-expression in its ideality. Rudolf Bernet (1995) and Derrida (1973) are signalising in their readings that Husserl’s expressions rely on the expressed signs and are therefore based on empirical substance. This means that Husserl’s ideal language cannot be pure transcendental nature. This highlights the correspondence of

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\(^{82}\) Language as a medium is in a permanent process of correction. This means, it is in a permanent process of constitution thus a result of intervening and transforming tendencies (cf. chapter II Merleau-Ponty’s savagery of this thesis).

\(^{83}\) The enactment can be seen as an inner-translational process. The translation of the object (A) and the objected (A’) demands the disclosure of the subject. This kind of disclosure is an interpretative happening through its circumstances. The other / the circumstances include dia-logical in the monads setting, but however in a monad-logical analogon (A’). This highlights as well the fact that the dynamic element of translatability is actually the transcendental life that is brought to itself in such a way that the idea of logos is connected with facticity. Henceforth, the transcendental encompasses all sorts of transcendental features and connects by the language of the ego all kind of transcendental labels.

\(^{84}\) Cf. L’introduction and Notes critiques of Derrida’s translation of Husserl’s L’origine de la géometrie (Derrida 2010).

the empiric and the transcendental. Hence, a transcendental world is in Derrida’s view a non-founded project.

In contrast, my reading outlines a transcendental phenomenological approach towards a theory of translation that enforces an *epoché* that brackets the mundane world and whereas the cipher of an empiric world is content of a transcendental procedure – transcendentality is therefore not the antipode of *life* and *world*, rather the hyphen between *life-world* is the enacted transcendental vividness of translating. The *epoché* is a requirement of content and is likewise a transcendental life itself. Henceforth, it is the transcendental foundation that yields the contingent world towards an intrinsic-necessity that releases itself the universal possibilities of life-world. It is this very moment where Kant’s paradoxical *Weltanschauung*\(^86\) (KUK B 92, 93) is superseded by the *vividness* of life-world in its *facticity*. Language as such is therefore the mediating partner insofar as it remains in itself and likewise outlines the translation from the mundane to the transcendental sphere – nevertheless: it remains the universal possibility of transcendence in which language is the aesthetica comprehension (KUK A 86) of life-world. Language and in its extension translation have the ideal requirement for outlining at the end the idea of the transcendental in Husserl’s phenomenology. Henceforth, the achievement of a linguistic phenomenological setup is an examined transcendental life out of a mundane world and *vice versa*, by referring to the fact that the *epoché* precondition is finally also a linguistic issue. The *epoché* is the mind setting, the finding-to-oneself of the ego within the I-ness that happens by the enactment of language; this kind of qualification is the possibility-framework that deliberates the transcendental movement of thinking. In other words language is in its translation-performance a trespassing moment, where the contingent phenomenon overcomes its facticity and from where the difference of *facticity* and essence will be revealed: the reduction is its methodology. In other words, language is the permanent translation of continuity wherein the transcendental enforcement leaves the world in its source and simultaneously enacts it within its mundane realm: this is the translation task of

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\(^86\) Cf. Kant in *Critique of Pure Reason*, § 26 *Von der Grössenschätzung der Naturdinge, die zur Idee des erhabenen erforderlich ist*: “Das gegebene Unendliche aber dennoch ohne Widerspruch auch nur denken zu können, dazu wird ein Vermögen, das selbst übersinnlich ist, im menschlichen Gemüte erfordert. Denn nur durch dieses und dessen Idee eines Noumenons, welches selbst keine Anschauung verstattet, aber doch der Weltanschauung, als blosser Erscheinung, zum Substrat untergelegt wird, wird das Unendliche der Sinnenwelt, in der reinen intellektuellen Grössenschätzung, unter einem Begriffe ganz zusammengefasst, obzwar es in der mathematischen durch Zahlenbegriffe nie ganz gedacht werden kann” (KrV 92, 93).
transcendentality where the leap of leaving and arriving is trained constantly; the contingency of facticity is simultaneously the appearance of the essence that in its random effect is necessarily present. This kind of translation and its likewise simultaneous-coincidence-effect and necessity is the comprehensive possibility that defines the appearance of facticity. Language and its enactment through translation are able to do so, while transcendence happens in it and while it is the occurrence of the transcendence. In other words, the questioned relationship of subject-object cannot longer be taken for granted and not at all been taken as an objective issue. Any kind of objectiviation of language is likewise a subjective practise and vice versa. In this redundancy language and epoché condition them mutually in an apodictic essence: language is the idiosyncratic possibility to outline the whole world wherein the transcendental life can express itself. Or to put it in other words, the transfer $A$ as $A'$ to $B$ is not the history of notions rather it is the fate of notions. This kind of intrinsic necessity – not allowing to work off its historical layers – is the qualification of the translational task in vividness; the universal possibility of anonymity, homonymity and equivocation are the vivid requirement of translating the lexeme into life-world. However, the translational task is not the converse of implication and language not the loom of identity. Thus, the idea could be easily brought up that a phenomenological methodology is settled in a self-referential formal scheme, as the dynamic in translation and linguistic work would be a pendular movement around a static point of identity. Even if we assume that the transcendental idea has a certain teleological aspect, the consequences are specific: linguistically, in which the logos reveals as the identic principle of language, cannot be taken as a formal phenomenon. As Husserl discusses the relationship of phenomenon and logos as its fundamental question, we have to understand its phenomenal sphere, in which the showing of the logos is a happening – directed towards the ultimate experience of life-world (HUA IX 55ff) or in our case directed towards the ultimate possibility of writing to $B$. Indeed, it is the result of the self-given logos: the content is not revealed as such, translation sets it free, generates it, and produces its genesis, which is evoked within the principle of transcendental-identity. By considering translation, language performs in its original identity all kind of content in penetrated aporetic vividness. The relation of the phenomenon and logos leads to the relation of eidos and logos insofar as the eidos outlines the presence of the logos in the very phenomenon of life-world. This kind of presence is what we have

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87 This is the very realm where translation happens.
evoked as identity of A as A’ to B. The identity is the unity of eidos and logos as it happens in the phenomenon of reduction: originally and generatively by giving fullness to the content. Hence, from a phenomenological standpoint the identity as principle of identity preserving content in the phenomenological reduction, offers in its description and analysis not a formal and abstract world but a anamnesis that is rather the ekphrasis of life-worldly utterance: everything has to be content, everything is given to the element of thinking and is therefore within the sphere of life-world. In this respect, we may approach phenomenological translation more like a drawing; as one pencils, one may approach what one has in mind without ever having reached a point where precision naturally coincides with completion (Mattens 2008: X). That the whole should be content of thinking evokes in a linguistic approach that translational performance can reveal everything as a linguistic immanent fact and therefore we have to say that the very unconditional condition of life-world is the very transcendental nucleus in which the process of translation is the indestructibility of the vivid facticity (HUA IX 63). It is all about this vividness of density that has been examined by the reduction of the transcendental reduction or to keep it short: translating the transcendental life-world = the enthymeme of an examined life.
II. Merleau-Ponty’s Savagery

By considering chapter I, transcendentality can be read as an operation of dynamism, creativity, acceleration and as a coniunctivum of linguistic framing; the transcendent effect enables us to create a momentum of knowledge-creation within the realm of positivity: linguistic practice finds a corresponding setting by enhancing the figure of creativity. Nevertheless this creational element is attached to a given life-world and remains finally circular within the horizon of A as A’ to B. It is a deliberation shaped by a given transcendental framework and attributes therefore a distorted dynamism in linguistic practice. In other words, the linguistic element of process will be retained by its transcendental order: A will be always A’ and B will be always B. 88 Within this context, the connection of A and B is for Husserl not the operational feature to understand linguistic productions. It should be more likely that language talks out the essence of language by itself without referring to an aesthetic immanentism. Husserl heavily supports that language should offer linguistic intelligibility since the enactment of reduction creates a realm of pure knowledge and pure language – subliminally we could label Husserl’s phenomenological achievements as a Critique of Phenomenological Reason highlighting linguistic considerations as stylisation of the art of possibilities89. Husserl operates – even though unconsciously – in the very tradition of scholastic principles: ad impossibilita nemo tenetur. He reformulates this principle to shape theory and language by considering the epoché as a shift from a natural setting towards a transcendental consciousness, in which language, its translation from A as A’ to B and its corresponding life-world will be given transparently and not as an impossibility – it is a speculative corpus, in which its realm will be mediated in a harmonic manner. Merleau-Ponty criticises this position by outlining that B will be an empty formula, as soon as you are reducing my existence to consciousness categories (PhP VII). The reduction of monadic consciousness leads towards a simplification of life-world, in which the so-called I regains its status in its actual life-worldly embodiment. Nevertheless the embodiment of the world cannot be thought from the

88 By using idioms, we tend to view our mode of expression as a corresponding feature to its semantic framework. Therefore, we look for the equivalent meaning in foreign languages insofar as we are satisfied by their semantic (mirroring) expression. However, Husserl has forgotten to outline that it is not sufficient to establish a universal grammar, which is the carrier of the language that he actually speaks (Prosa 43f).

89 This kind of reasoning can only be promoted by its historic possibility since pure knowledge is in this context recognised as project. It is a central category of scientific reasoning, since an idealistic canon formulates categories for a future theory of knowledge and society (Hinkelammert 1994: 17).
outside, we are drawn on it since being in a *linguistic mode* and simultaneously in life-world. Hence, by accepting this stance reduction does not lead to linguistic and transcendental purity, but rather the linguistic label offers an almost broken fact in an almost broken reality: reduction is the impossibility of a complete reduction (PhP VIII). My reading of Husserl’s transcendentality, mediated by language-objects and language-subjects, redeems the possibility of a non-elaborated reduction, but however the non-elaborated reduction, and this is the important twist in Husserl’s reading, remains meaningful for linguistic categories à la Husserl. The category of meaningfulness is the crucial point to understand Husserl’s language concept and the translation of *A as A’ to B*. Merleau-Ponty, influenced by the later works of Husserl, develops – in opposition – his theoretical reflections on *dynamis* by deconstructing the *topos* language as an operator of diffraction and neglects therefore the continuation of categorical imperatives. He tries to shift Husserl’s overwhelming category of transcendental consciousness-phenomenology towards a deep description of ontological life-world as *locus amoenus* of experience and expression in which the index (of meaning) is not a settlement of causal links but rather the multiplication of meaning by its physical embodiment. The line up of a non-meaningful language setting will be important for Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological framework; it is about an *experienced* language that is at work, that overhelms us and ekes out its presence – it is about language that is on the threshold of passivity and activity. This very idea of hesitation at the border of continuation ties up with Husserl’s phenomenological setting but in the same time ruptures also with Husserl’s linguistic index. Merleau-Ponty disposes neither intellectual nor empirical considerations but refers to the body and in addition to the ontological set-up of the carnal body as the new nucleus of knowledge. In contrast to Husserl, we are tempted to denominate Merleau-Ponty’s approach as a *Critique of Embodied Reasoning* and outline therefore an idea of an embodied language in fragility by involving its processes of translating: the acts of *expressis verbis* rearrange through

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90 In *Krisis* Husserl strives for the recovery of life-world, by referring to the concrete capability of experience and subjectivity (HUA VI).
91 Cf. Merleau-Ponty’s lecture on Husserl at the Collège de France (RC 159-170).
92 Husserl outlines in a similar way and in the wake of Bergsons’ *experienced space* and *experienced time*, the idea of an *experiencing I* and the concept of *serving bodies* (Merleau-Ponty 1993: 7).
93 Merleau-Ponty is not the only thinker who stresses the body as a philosophical theme at the dawn of the 20th century. In Merleau-Ponty’s immediate intellectual neighbourhood we might highlight Henry Bergson (cf. Bergson 2012), Edmund Husserl (Theunissen 1965: 57-70), Gabriel Marcel or Jean Paul Sartre (Maier 1964: 1-20) who also refer to the category of body. However, in comparison to these thinkers Merleau-Ponty may have outlined the body in the most rigorous manner and as a category of flesh (cf. Good 1998: 14 and Danzer 2003: 84-112).
94 Merleau-Ponty stresses notably in *Le visible et l’invisible* (VNV) the richness of the fleshy body.
the streams of perception and offer an alternative to intellectual or empiric reading, thinking and speaking. The empowering of the language phenomenon does not only reveal the visible realm, it writes at the same time the appearance of the invisible and unsaid. This kind of translational morphine will no longer be able to re-shape the predominant western theorem of eidos and eidolon. In contrast, by supporting the conventional transcendentality, Husserl lingers in this circular mind setting. The reflection of the grammatical As in A as A’ to B within Husserl’s dispositive of translational practice does not solemnly reflect its twist in reference to the transcendental issue: the a priori condition of possible experiences are likewise the condition possibilities of any objects of experience and its corresponding intrinsic necessity by highlighting how something takes place and how something is happening. Nonetheless these conditions reflect within Merleau-Ponty’s framework nothing else than a second reality. However the conception of an intrinsic validity of a second reality has to be understood with caution: language occupies a semantic space as the dotted note prolongs rhythm to an unexpected dilatation; language offers the possibility to rely on the echo of its already said, its extra-linguistic support and will be nourished by the unsaid (Merleau-Ponty 1993: 8). Hence, in the vein of Merleau-Ponty we can say that the principles of mediation, representation and reflection, which has been so far fundamental to understand the very idea of language, has to be yielded by considering the fact that the idea of a new concept of mimesis and translational act does not nourish its overwhelming life-world. However, the translation of A has to be read as a condition of possibilities; it could be the offspring to B, B’, B’’, C, D, E, Z or even ∞. The possible figures of B, B’, B’’, C, D, E, Z or even ∞ are anchored in the uneven topography of life-world and present a nature beyond nature. In the wake of Proust, Merleau-Ponty describes that speaking and writing means to translate an experience that still has to be become a text (RC 41). The texture of the lexeme will evoke its very text though. By yielding the idea of nature, Merleau-Ponty tries to outline a reality that neglects the binary code of subject and object as well as the original and its copy. The strange relationship of perceiving and expressing is the effect of articulating a lateral style, by featuring hesitation on the threshold where the sign will be history. Merleau-Ponty reminds us that we have to understand that language is not an obstacle for

95 However, in Le visible et l’invisible (VNV) Merleau-Ponty complains that he as so far accepted a kind of dualism, which has to be yielded. By accepting it, one remains subliminally within this circularity, since the rejection is constructed against it.

96 Merleau-Ponty tries to draft a theory of expression in his essay La science et l’expérience de l’expression (Prosa 15-65).
consciousness and consciousness is not the difference of *s’atteindre* and *s’exprimer* (Prosa 26). Hence, it is all about how are we able to understand and perceive the *signifié* and *signifiant* and consequently it is about how are we able to shape the very act of translating. And therefore, is it not simply an a-rational game of coincidences and arbitrariness? The transcendental stake does not at any point enable us to change this feature but somehow the momentum of genesis and historicity of language might overcome the binary code of language by stressing the crystallisation of its being; the sublimation of language refers in Merleau-Ponty’s reading to the carnal body without being its condition of possibilities but sketches rather the articulating possibilities of expressions. This difference will be important if we want to rethink the task of language, since the grammar of condition possibilities refers to the static momentum in language and in opposition, the articulating possibilities will be the vivid and perverted momentum of language. We will observe that Merleau-Ponty dwells within the tension of fixation and motion, while considering linguistic practices – indeed, an *aporia of possibilities*\(^\text{97}\). In this sense, Merleau-Ponty can be labelled as a phenomenologist: he considers perception as the embodied *modus operandi* and the *sine qua non* of gnoseology; gazing as the horizon of the phenomenon and of meaning neglects in Merleau-Ponty’s configuration the immediate sense of lexemes (Merleau-Ponty 1966: VII). In other words, there is never a complete idea and never a whole setting of grammar that is given immediately. Merleau-Ponty rejects positivities by considering the body transformation of perception as principle that is ahead of life-worldly reflections while bearing its inalienable presence and while *being here* within its very own corporal transformative practice of life-world. The phenomenological perception of worldly features is so to speak the momentum of realising perception. Seeing is not at all seeing from something, in the sense that seeing owns the viewed; seeing is rather acting simultaneously: it is an act of getting hold of something and simultaneously being different – phenomenological seeing is neither at all a certain mode of thinking nor a self-presence; it is my own medium to be absent from my own being by participating within the separation of being from a inner-perspective and therefore having the possibility to become me myself (cf. *le charnel* in OE 81). The event of seeing shows us how outer and strange beings are quite related and it shows that seeing is not related to entities but rather overtakes an event of gazing, by helping to express its mute status. Phenomenology as a non-central-perspective offers the transcendental

\(^{97}\) The *aporia* of possibilities is similar to Husserl’s aporetic *analogia* and yet it is something completely else. This difference will be a recurring momentum, while reading phenomenology.
intersection of being, life-world, truth and the unspoken expression, in which being will be transcendental in its shattering. In accordance to language, silent words double the expressed language by evoking the absent present (OE 85). Therefore, Merleau-Ponty outlines that fixation of attention cannot be formulated as a pure consciousness category but the uncertainty might give us strands to understand the fragility of the phenomenon: the translation from A to B is a transgression of expressivity and not a chain of logical meaning. In other words, the appearance of language happening is the simultaneity of the visible and in-visible and of the meaningful and meaningless inflection – we should think consciousness in contingency of language and not simply as its opposition. It offers the chiastic experience of phenomenological perception that refers to a paradoxical double layer of seeing: the appearance of the invisible. Nevertheless simultaneity is not within the Hegelian synthesis-telos, it is a radical form of perception insofar as it follows to carnally any hollows and considers any traces in absentia (Signes 217). The perception of life-world and its translation into linguistic expressions are the entanglement and involvement resulting from lively engagements. In accordance with Cezanne, Merleau-Ponty claims to develop a sense of seeing that is beyond linear perspectives (SNS 8 and 19f). Perception is a primordial event of sense brut as an indirect consequence of language and can be formulated as grammar of constructio ad sensum. Nevertheless in Merleau-Ponty’s sense the feature of perception enhances the element of structural enforcement. He introduces therefore the concept of a world-ray, which tackles the Greek optics and enables us to trespass the perception of elements, dimensions and rays (VNV 253 and 267); rays are figuration of trespassing literally the line up of lexeme-body-world by outlining the crystallisation of non-coherent associations of the immer wilder (VNV 254). These dense discretions are hyperboles, which cannot be grasped by causal noema-noesis structures or by symbolic representations. Inflection is in this sense the arrangement and entanglement of settings that enhance hyper-amnesias of associations. Consciousness is the revision of worldly

98 Cultural practice attempting to think simultaneity enters new paths (since the eidos eidolon topos will be within the space-time matrix heavily contested) but, on the other side, this new path has to be aware of not destroying the harmony of simultaneity by stressing the identity of simultaneity. As we can follow Merleau-Ponty’s reading, he questions the perception believing while having a deferred answer, since no idea of an invariable can answer it adequately and therefore, the existent world exists only by questioning its forms. Phenomenology is in this sense perception believing that questions itself and thus, it is literally neither a pre-scientific nor a primitivism in the sense of a postulated naturalism. The receiving answers within natural settings from questioned entities and life-world are above of all kind of facts and underneath of any substance within rough and wild realms of a meaningful life-world. Meanings and substances of revealing phenomenological working are not enough in themselves, they are gained from its raw being, while the simultaneity of substances and meanings are somehow refundable in its wild constitution.
relationships: meaning elements are the enactment of the immediate and pre-positional occurrence of lateral collaborations; words and their corresponding grammar are therefore the dense description of the bodily Überstieg (VNV 307). Language is the enactment of an indirect language: it is not grammar accuracy that explains the linguistic framework but it is about the differentiation and lateral morphemes between signs and phenomena which reveals its connotation (Signes 53f) – the characteristics of language are its possibility to remain unnoticed (Prosa 16ff). Nevertheless, the spur of the chiastic experience of perception and of linguistic expressions will be re-discussed, insofar as Merleau-Ponty offers the lining of speaking otherwise.

Hence, pluri-potentiality of expression is translation, a migration of scattered senses into a new body, in which it may find its new expression. The act of expression is a translation without pre-text – the expressed finds its expression in the act of expressing. Hence, perception might be already an expression (RC 14) by considering a thin line between natural and cultural realms. Therefore the linguistic act of expression does never start as tabula rasa – the expression A is a distortion of social codified and existing expression-systems or une déformation cohérente of B, B', B'', C, D, E, Z or even ∞ possibilities. These lexemes create a new arrangement of equivalent systems, which are never equivalent systems kat exochen but evoke a deepness which encompasses me by having fleshy words as its totum simul (VNV 268f). This provokes a new kind of style that makes an indelible mark on the life-worldly project; to express my intentions in words and in its semantic-guise, my fleshy body uses a linguistic style – an innere Stimme (Humboldt) – that arranges and precedes its expressivity without having the duty to realise it (Signes 110f). Hence, we have to stress the capability to see how un moyen de style (Prosa 83) emerges within points of contact between the writer / speaker and her / her life-world and likewise it is about how this requirement can be enacted that swamps its writers / speakers (Prosa 84f). It is not about intellectual transparency but about its gesture and the possibility to be surprised by its enactment.

99 However the obsession of newness and creativity is enrolled within the conception of universality-perceptions. It features the explication and guideline of Kant’s transcendental deduction but at the very same moment Kant does not outline its origin. By stating if there is a world we have the feeling that Kant has a pre-knowledge of life-world, of its development and likewise of fixing its condition a priori (PhP: 74f).

100 This re-considers Husserl’s understanding of the intrinsic structure of language.

101 Merleau-Ponty shows in his psychological analysis that a child’s ability to speak is not the sum of morphological, syntactical and lexical meanings; these skills are neither used nor are they adequate for acquiring language. The act of language does not evoke comparisons between my expressions and the denomination-arrangement of my used means of expression (Signes 110).
In other words, Merleau-Ponty’s hypothesis is a trial to leave the transcendental-rhetoric of linguistic setting and its powerful methodological articulation of representation and structure behind its condition possibility. Hence, this kind of incaptiousness is only possible due to Merleau-Ponty’s pathic openness by considering the movement of existence itself (PhP 105). The openness is caused by the possibility of perception; we might have phatic worldly experiences due to our force of perception. The idea of être-au-monde does not only signify that language is anchored in its world, it is likewise essential to its existence to surpass the environment, to rewrite possible worlds, which pervert the immediate environment. As consequence, the twilight effect of shifting between real and imaginative worlds is not able to find a unifying operator, the articulation mode of texture and style, will be rather experienced; Merleau-Ponty compares this unity-perception with human beings due to the fact that I recognise any evidential happening, before I am able to outline its characteristics, since this situation keeps in all its expressions and behaviour its genuine style, even if the milieu or its idea should change (PhP 377f). The unity of the environment is not at all enhanced through reasoning but it is experienced as materialised style of a given text / texture. The force of synthesis is only given by the materialised historicity as an involvement of disclosed meanings (Prosa 154). Husserl’s polyphony and dynamic linguistic footage remains within predicative knowledge settings. Merleau-Ponty tries to yield this linguistic noema-noemsis linkage by attempting to capture its phatic responsiveness as an outburst of linguistic silence – it is about language as a mode of existence that attempts to describe its genesis by its ambivalent responsiveness. Translation is not the reduction of the sum of linguistic transfers.

We will see that language is in Merleau-Ponty’s consideration the enactment of diversity and lateral coincidences; it does not offer a grammar, rather language reveals, re-opens, transforms and re-arranges A and B; language follows the principle of in statu nascendi within the embodied life-word prospectus. Language and its transformations are not process oriented and do not have an immanent structure; Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of language is a happening that works and reveals in its daily practice every other day another layer of distortion and erection. The translation of the very morphological cosmos has no location within the landscape of grammatical inflection: language is neither simply the representation of facticity and certainty nor is it the

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102 Bernhard Waldenfels’ phenomenological reading outlines a responsive phenomenology (cf. Waldenfels 2007).
generative dynamis of a linguistic matrix – language is the translation of the chiastic experience of lack and excess in the sense that it relies on non-linguistic realms and likewise refers to the already expressed and said.

In the following I will re-consider Merleau-Ponty’s framework and use it for the benefit of understanding linguistic and translational practices. As I have outlined, translation can be read as a constitutive part of Merleau-Ponty’s writing but his architecture and understanding challenges are notably challenged by the fact that he confounds permanently the very idea of intelligible conditions and keeps it as a western ideology out of order. In addition, most of his final manuscripts are fragmentary and invites us to a multitude of speculative moments. However, reconsidering the ambivalent relationship of Merleau-Ponty with Husserl and the consequences of rearticulating phenomenological approaches, will be a hidden guiding line for this chapter: by continuing phenomenological lines within the weakness of Husserl and at the same time contrasting it with Merleau-Ponty’s understanding, I hope to create a close-meshed net of a theoretical framework to capture the vivid perception of phenomenology and its understanding of linguistic grammars and language possibilities; I attempt to show that Merleau-Ponty’s oeuvre can be read in relationship with Husserl’s thoughts and that this link yields likewise Husserl’s transcendental ego by highlighting that Merleau-Ponty’s chiastic ontological stance relies on the very idea of transcendentality. The eagerness of this reading might offer a setting to bear the paradox of grammar and expression. Along Merleau-Ponty’s study and work we might have sceneries, in which reflection on language and translation can be re-drawn. This topography gives us the coordinates and strands to develop Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of morphology and linguistic enactments. I have separated my analysis into two parts: In Prima Vista I attempt to outline Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical thoughts and refer them to a possible theory of language. Secondly, in Coda I shift the focus more specifically to the practice of language by analysing its linguistic and translational features. We will again experience a certain redundancy; these kinds of repetitions are inevitable and offer the possibility to mediate the analysis from different angles by stressing that within the realm of

103 I refer and follow Paul Good (1998) and Remigius Kwant’s (1963) interpretation lines of Merleau-Ponty and, in particular, I am debating Good’s reception of Merleau-Ponty’s savage ontology in relation to linguistic and translational matters.

104 Merleau-Ponty’s oeuvre is unfortunately not complete. Le visible et l’invisible (VNV) and La prose du monde (Prose) are fragmentary works and have lead to various interpreting strands. Hence, the debate about Merleau-Ponty’s late work lasts therefore a fragmentary issue and evokes different reception strategies.
repetition the unformed reality and multiple possibilities might be able to seep in. Hence, in the section *The transgression from Husserl to Merleau-Ponty or the dilemma of transcendentality* I attempt to outline their intellectual relationships by stressing that Merleau-Ponty will re-interpret Husserl’s theoretical nucleus and on that basis he will re-articulate the relationship of life-world and translation. Re-framing these relationships offers in the section of *The Cartesian Idea* new ties between Descartes’ *res cogito* and *res extensa* and might launch a subtle transcendental line in Merleau-Ponty’s framework, as in the content of *Merleau-Ponty’s Post-Cartesianism, Body language* and *The idea of savage being*. In *Coda* I will reveal, in *Language and translation: a lateral affair*, the question of a phenomenology of language and translation by considering the *paradoxon* of language and the correlative problem of evidence and expressions. As consequence, I radicalise the lateral project by attempting to follow literally the lateral trickle in linguistic translation in *The hyperbolic difference of lateral encounter*. Hence, the *aporia* or hyperbole of lack and excess will be my opening question and critical operator to engineer Merleau-Ponty’s theory of language. Therefore, close readings of *La Phénoménologie de la Perception* (1945), his posthumously published *Le visible et l’invisible* (1964) and *La prose du monde* (1969) are the foremost sources of revelation.

1. Prima Vista

**A The transgression from Husserl to Merleau-Ponty or the dilemma of transcendentality**

In the following I am going to sketch the problematic relationship between Husserl and Merleau-Ponty by reconsidering that Merleau-Ponty can be read in the continuation of Husserl’s phenomenology but at the same time we can also read in Merleau-Ponty’s setting a rupture with Husserl’s transcendentality. Hence, sensitised by this problematic relationship we should neglect the labelling concepts of Husserl’s

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105 This kind of work-practice resembles Husserl’s zigzag methodology (cf. chapter II of this thesis).

106 I resist to read into the relationship of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty any form of continuity; yes, there is a relationship and at the same time there is no stringent correlation between these thinkers. Merleau-Ponty suggests in *Le philosophe et son ombre* (Signes 201-228) that his thinking has an inner relationship with Husserl’s system. In other words, combing Husserl with Merleau-Ponty offers layers, which are beyond the merely positive aspect of relatedness. It is not only that Merleau-Ponty wants to radicalise Husserl’s trajectory, by making the anti-Cartesian concept of phenomenology explicit (Romdenh-Romluc 2011: 16).
phenomenology here and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology there: yes, Merleau-Ponty hesitates to accept transcendental readings within phenomenological approaches but nevertheless, his counter-project savage ontology enables us to some extent a reading which could offer transcendental lines that uplift Husserl’s original notion of style (Prosa 79). However, this undertaking offers the possibility to approach Merleau-Ponty’s reading by attempting to create a virtual and highly speculative diffracted relationship between Husserl’s and his thoughts107.

The articulation of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology can be revealed and reframed by referring to the difference between translation and mediation. So far, we have used translation and mediation almost as synonymous and as evidence of linguistic practices. By outlining Husserl and Merleau-Ponty’s language framework we will re-articulate the setting of these two notions by referring to slightly different meanings created by ortho-practical distinctions. The theoretical framework of mediation is shaped by the force of a third party that observes the transaction of A as A’ to B and finally offers from that position the amalgamation of horizons. This is indeed the task of Husserl’s transcendentality: it outlines the condition possibilities to grasp the motion within the setting of A as A’ to B and suppresses any forms of excess, trans-passing or hyper-motions. It is not only about having a grammatical corpus (without relying on its facticity) but locating the intrinsic logos of the lexeme (Prosa 7 ff). It is this kind of universal grammar or grammaire générale et raisonnée108 that incorporates everything within the possibility feature of determining life-worldly bodies (VL 172). Husserl’s life-world is an accelerated enactment of language within the very horizon of life and world. In references to linguistic realms the intention of the signifié is not beyond words, but it is within the embodied reality of word(ing) (HUA XVII 26f)109. This might be the reason why Husserl refers in Ursprung der Geometrie (Husserl 1939) to linguistic features as a fundamental search for clarity in ideas and truth (VL 176). In contrast, Merleau-Ponty’s understanding could be affiliated with the notion of

107 Especially by re-considering Husserl’s point of subjectivity in Krisis (HUA XXIX): “the subject-matter of phenomenology is not the content of one’s own experiences, conceived as independent of an externally existing world and capable of being known with absolute certainty. Instead, phenomenology studies an inter-subjective world about which an individual phenomenologist may be mistaken” (Romdenh-Romluc 2011: 13).
108 In reference to Antoine Arnauld and Claude Lancelot’s seminal Grammaire générale et raisonnée (Arnauld 1810).
109 This very section influences Merleau-Ponty’s envisioning of the inner-ontological reality of language (cf. Prosa 7 ff).
translatio\textsuperscript{110}: language is the permanent enactment of its ontological anchoring; nevertheless anchoring and enactment trespass the horizon of life and world, since linguistic actions disappear at the very moment of transporting vernaculars in totality (VL 173). Hence, the mediator as director and actor will always be apart while mediation and conversion of $A$ as $A'$ to $B$ evokes $B$, $B'$, $B''$, $C$, $D$, $E$, $Z$ or even $\infty$\textsuperscript{111} cannot be grasped by the mediator. The slippery moment evinces the circular reality of mediating linguistic signs. Merleau-Ponty denominates this very event of $C$ as a chiastic experience or as an event of reversibility. The intentional motion from $A$ to $B$ engineers the realm $C$. If we believe that translation is a repetition of linguistic realms, we are simultaneously implying that language is a purely positive and legitimised – inventory that defines its – content of belonging\textsuperscript{112}. Therefore, we may understand translation in a Merleau-Pontyian sense as a radical translation: a realm $A$ will be trans located beyond latio – the transgression goes beyond the understandable $B$. The figure $C$ is the factor of the chiastic event in translational practice as latio brings something in, beyond realms. Translatio is an event that refers to somewhere else which is not intended in its practice; the multiplicity and linguistic variability of connections do not evoke the dilemma of objective and contingent translation, since the enactment of translatio is not within the setting of fixed objects (of thoughts); analytical investigations and rational thinking de iure would destroy the richness of translation and the use of evocative languages. Hence, the representational definition of thought and language mistakes a second-order possibility for the primary process of expressive transformations. Translatio as such deals with the invisibility of the visible within the realm of linguistic motion and its very expression. In other words, mediation presumes an a priori of language whilst translation offers an a posteriori setting. This might give us the idea of the tiny but powerful distinction and twist between mediation and translation. However, we should be aware that this thorough distinction is a weak distinction, as it is sensu stricto not definable a posteriori and can be re-shaped and differently articulated within other connotations and figurations a priori\textsuperscript{113}.

\textsuperscript{110} Cf. Latin, latio, lationis: the bringing but also the approval (cf. legum latio: legislation) (Baier 2013: 2827).
\textsuperscript{111} To facilitate reading fluency, I am going to use in the following $C$ as representative for $B$, $B'$, $B''$, $C$, $D$, $E$, $Z$ or even $\infty$.
\textsuperscript{112} In contrast, Heidegger explains (in reference to Leibniz and Kant) that in any thoughts there are layers of Noch-nicht-Gedachte (Heidegger 1957: 123f). Thinking does not mean to possess the realm of thoughts but to paraphrase the realm of thoughts.
\textsuperscript{113} In reference to chapter III Perplex Coenesthesia of this thesis.
With respect to *translatio*, we can discover in Merleau-Ponty’s oeuvre the shifting from transcendental to ontological realms\textsuperscript{114}. In extension, phenomenology outlines in its framework the capability to transgress the objectivation of natural settings without ending in naïve empiric world-references. Phenomenology is enforceable and discernible as manner and style by referring to a movement, which is not enclosed by a *panopticon*. The realm of language has rather to be understood as an amalgam of different layers and not the possibility of enactment(s). Along these lines, we have to read the continuation and the difference of Merleau-Ponty and Husserl\textsuperscript{115}. Merleau-Ponty outlines that causal explanations and reflexive analysis combined with linguistic signs are insufficient and carry implicitly a contradiction. Therefore, transcendental reduction highlights two distinct and oppositional moments at the same time: nature will be transformed into entities of thoughts and intentional objects, likewise it will be transformed by intellectualising nature, since the features of natural setting will be still preserved. As we have seen, the immanence of nature contains its very own clarity and evidence (Signes 224ff). Hence, linguistic explanations of the world referring to consciousness offer an *ur-doxa* where *a fortiori* cancels the common understanding of the Cartesian dualism of a relative nature and its mediated pure consciousness. Therefore, transcendental categories do not function as operator for phenomenological considerations. As we have seen, Husserl outlines transcendentality as an instrument to reproduce a setting of certainty in which language and knowledge are capable of representing the very idea of the contingent nature, the corresponding life-world and consequently, yield the contingent world towards an intrinsic-necessity that releases its universality. In short, transcendental foundation is the instrument to denominate *Wesensallgemeinheit* (HUA XVII 8) or *ursprüngliche Sinnauslegung* (HUA XVII 13), in which language is an intrinsic part and an act of transcendental egoity by highlighting language as being itself a sphere of translation, in which the logic and the psychic oscillate and form *kat exochen* the act of language. Husserl evokes a reading that promotes invariant entities by relying on them on a transcendental consciousness line and therefore stressing subliminally the position of idealism since structures and its being are thought independently of its sources – this is what we might call the *logion* of phenomenon. The *logion* can be however understood as the expression of the

\textsuperscript{114} However this shifting and labelling might be too tendentious, since it offers a purely positive and determined historic label: transcendentality *versus* ontology.

\textsuperscript{115} There is an ongoing debate on the intensity of Merleau-Ponty’s reception of Husserl’s phenomenology; cf. Toadvine and Embree’s *Merleau-Ponty’s reading of Husserl* (Toadvine and Embree 2002).
phenomenon, which tries to interfere with the so-called objects by going back to itself without hoping to reconstruct and analysing its content. In this sense, experience does not start within entities and subjects. On this principle, Merleau-Ponty can be distinguished from Husserl by re-evaluating Husserl’s a-temporal and transcendental ego. Merleau-Ponty’s aim is to describe the operation of perception as the generative body that is related to the world and is not the offspring of an a-historical plan, drafted by a transcendental ego. Hence, the linguistic perception is not a defined description; it is rather the fundament from which the enactment of language and daily practice can be carried out (PhP V). Insofar, the description is in front and before any canonising taxonomy. In this radical sense, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology evokes a certain impossibility in its enactment, while the relationship and entanglement of language and world cannot be grasped by a reduced I perspective. The transcendental reduction of the ego, within the lines of an absolute consciousness, misleads and is finally not able to capture the overwhelming richness of the enacted life-world and its situated ego. Hence, phenomenological reduction is for Merleau-Ponty not an effect of transcendental idealisms but rather the impossibility of a complete reduction (PhP VIII). Within the linguistic framework, language, syntax and grammar are never language, syntax and grammar – they slip away as soon as we want to capture them. The enacted style tells us a lot more about language, syntax and grammar. In extension, Merleau-Ponty yields the entity foundation to perceive and understand our world-relationship without entering into the realm of facticity. The apeiron of grasping the un-reflected grammar in reflection will be the main guiding line for Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological understanding (PhP Xf). In this sense, a phenomenological approach à la Merleau-Ponty is the art of creating truth (PhP XV), the pre-existing logos offers the possibility to understand and mediate life-world-reality. The linguistic expression however resembles the myth of Sisyphus by strongly attempting to offer a platform of understanding and meaning. However, if the phenomenological stream wants to be loyal to its expressive features, its motion has to always be unknown (PhP XVI). In this sense, translation as the historic trial to transform res extensa into res cogitans remains in a circular movement of idealistic and speculative setting in which the eidos and the eidolon enter a pre-configured setting of mimesis. Entering life-world will be acted in Merleau-Ponty’s eyes by the perception of the un-reflected existence in life.

116 Husserl’s Cartesianischen Mediationen refers to Augustine’s Noli foras ire, in te redi, in interiore hominis habitat veritas (HUA I 183).
A closer look at Descartes’ subject / object theorem might give us a more comprehensible understanding of Merleau-Ponty’s ambiguous relationship to translation, its possible transcendental stances and its correlation to language. Furthermore, the analysis of Descartes re-articulates Husserl’s interpretation of transcendentality (HUA I) and offers the possibility to draft a bridge between Husserl and Merleau-Ponty on behalf of understanding the translational work-practise of \( A' \) to \( B \). As we can imagine, within Husserl’s setting, the Cartesian mode was the generic point of modernity, insofar as Descartes designed perception and representation strategies as a concept of pure egology. Husserl’s \textit{Erste Philosophie} (HUA VII and VIII) stresses subliminally throughout the two monographs that within \textit{Mediationes} (Descartes 1904) Descartes reveals an important discovery to understand transcendental philosophy: it is about establishing and re-editing a pure and absolute transcendental understanding of subjectivity within an absolute doubtlessness constitution (HUA VII 61ff). In Husserl’s Cartesian reading, Descartes might deliver the possibility to understand our (life)-world, although the position which Husserl ultimately reaches has more in common with Kant’s transcendentality: Descartes’ aim of grammar includes to establish the human being as the master of nature (HUA VI 62) by separating an inner subject from an outer subject. His theory drafts an epistemology of translation and mediation, which highlights the \textit{par l’intermédiaire de}\textsuperscript{117} as the main operator to approach life-world – understood as an \textit{a priori} relationship – wherein an external realm will be \textit{significant} through something that has internal components\textsuperscript{118}. Hence, the internal status mediates its means to recognise the external world. This conceptualisation offers the setting for objective thoughts\textsuperscript{119}. The almighty figure of metaphysics, underpinned by the approval of a thought-independent material outer-world, delivers the condition possibilities of knowledge production for objective thoughts – \textit{in summa}: the order of any being-entity as well as the order of reasonable thoughts depend on a common ground or on generosity of the scholastic God, wherein

\textsuperscript{117} Descartes writes to Gibieuf: “(...) assuré que je ne puis avoir aucune connaissance de ce qui est hors de moi, que par l’entremise de idées que j’en ai eues en moi” (DES III: 474).

\textsuperscript{118} Descartes denies any organic perception of the outer world and rejects therefore the Aristotelian holism by arguing that the \textit{physis} of the \textit{rex extensa} will be \textit{produced} by force and pressure. The replacement of organic approaches by causal means is due to Descartes’ influence on mechanic theories. In other words, the dualistic conception is driven by the technique of a mechanic apparatus that executes its order literally by the digital-code 0 / 1: “Knowledge of things outside the mind / agent / organism only comes about through certain surface conditions, mental images, or conceptual schemes within the mind / agent / organism. The input is combined, computed over, or structured by the mind to construct a view of what lies outside” (Taylor 2005: 27).

\textsuperscript{119} Descartes’ Metaphysics is primarily a theory of experiencing I, God, nature, etc. and delivers therefore the basis to justify objective validity (Descartes 1904).
the order of $A$ and $B$ are able to co-exist. To understand this line, we might have a closer
look at Descartes’ representation theory and how his system might offer implode-
strategies for Merleau-Ponty’s theoretical considerations. As we can retrace now,
Descartes is an important stakeholder for phenomenological reasoning: his *cogito / sum*
figuration offers the framework to re-shape and re-draft the appearance of the
phenomenon by being confused, since it is so far considered as the realisation of being-
evidence. It is about showing that the transcendental setting within Descartes’ system
supersedes intellectual (*subject*) and empiric (*object*) positioning and offers therefore
the condition-possibilities to enter life and life-world as an expression of its very (own)
style. Thus, the simple opposition of subject and object misses out Descartes’
tonological-systemic resonance of transcendental entanglement of subjects and objects
and in addition, it anticipates Merleau-Ponty’s blurring effect of subjects and objects. In
the following, my intentions are to re-articulate the abyss between Descartes and
Merleau-Ponty by showing that the transcendental figuration offers a hidden *fil rouge*
and considers likewise the very condition of translating the inflection of the lexeme in
life-world\textsuperscript{120} – it is about showing that Descartes can be read in a broken manner. The
synoptic reading of Descartes and Merleau-Ponty discloses the possibility to highlight
the paradox of perception and expression not as a simple possibility, but as vivid
paradox: ergo, the act of translating is a paradox in life-world.

**B The Cartesian Phalanx**

Descartes is driven by the commitment to differentiate random opinions from the
undeniable *veritas* and to install the human being as lord and master of nature by
destroying theories and concepts\textsuperscript{121} (Descartes 1984: 349). His systemic forming is
based on the *principium cogito* that outlines the midpoint from where his setting can be
drawn. He promoted firmly that epistemology supersedes ontology by considering self-
existence and self-knowledge as *fundamentum* of certainty. Nevertheless, I am
persuaded we should not use epistemology against ontology, since it offers aspects of
Descartes’ setting by recognising that epistemology is foremost another quality to speak
about ontology (e.g. intellectual ontology). Hence, the existence of a thinkable
consciousness is the expression of reality and Descartes’ very first principle: *ego cogito,*

\textsuperscript{120} My reading of Descartes’ transcendental line is inspired by the work of Franz Bader (1979 and 1983).
\textsuperscript{121} Especially he tries to break with scholastic traditions and its reception of Aristotle.
As consequence, Descartes tries to avoid any forms of obscurity and contingency by introducing a methodology of doubt: the operation of disbelief is henceforth the groundwork of his metaphysical understanding and the feature to re-articulate objective validity of judgements within independent thinking. Engineering disbelief is the examination of the correct transfer of the idea to its objects by so-called cogito operations; the ego is not a pure body but a thinking entity (cf. ego cogito, ergo sum) in the sense that I am able to assess it within the realm of metaphysics. In a certain way, it is a form of doubting the appearance in my very own anabases of egoity and pointing to distances between the object and its ontological realm by considering its epistemological condition and by outlining therefore its transcendental reflection. We might consider that doubting the relationship of knowledge and being has to be re-considered by translating the expression of knowledge; idealisation of its doubt is henceforth articulating the possibility of being. Within this tension Descartes’ understanding of metaphysics is in general the treatment of first things, which can be discerned by its order. It is prima philosophia insofar as it is conceived by its methodem universalis: scientia generalis sive universalis (DES IX–2, 16.14–16). The ontological stance is therefore no longer an abstract configuration but rather the continuation of knowledge and evidence by transferring the subject / object dualism to a transcendental unity of being. Ipso facto, language can be understood in actua by its content, by its cogito / sum architecture and therefore in its relative and absolute correspondence of mind characters. Linguistic signs are directly known as a product of an active cogito, in which the realms of res extensa and res cogitans are fluid. In Descartes’ eyes, the non-negotiable mediation and directness of evidence do not permit us to outline a more vivid understanding of language. Prima philosophia and therefore prima lingua is prima cognition and vice versa. As consequence we may assume that ideas are non-visible notions and that the existence of objects, as a consequence of ideas, has to be negotiated by its cogito in a priori et non ab effectu. The cognition is the principium of knowledge and does not refer to any other pre-predicative entities—

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122 Descartes explains clearly that his understanding of metaphysics has not primarily and exclusively to be understood as a fundamental involvement of God and soul (DES III, 235. 10-18). In this sense, metaphysics does not deal with ontological and objective articulations without referring to the conditions of knowledge. Objects have to be known from just another entity and not by the ontological classification of genus, ordinis, species, etc. It is a clear rejection of Aristotle and Aquinas’ vertical structure of society and knowledge and their inherent teleological causality.

123 The corresponding parts of subjects and objects are the twisting features, which Merleau-Ponty radicalises by introducing the carnal experience as the incursion into Descartes’ transcendental framework.
any ontological order can from that point on exclusively understood as gnoseological momentum.

It is worth while to decipher Descartes’ particular methodological line up to understand Merleau-Ponty’s rejection of the Cartesian holism which puts world and the body in the seer as in a box (Haas 2008: 12) – however, it is not important if Descartes follows holism but it will matter how he follows it. Descartes’ scepticism insists, similar to Husserl, that beliefs are random ideas and appear in front of my mind while it might be possible that an evil demon deludes my very fundamental thoughts (Descartes 1984: 13). The – in intellectual history – powerful notion of cogito introduced in the II. Meditation, (Descartes 1904) outlines the necessity of an ego, since the ego is able to doubt and to accept the possibility of an evil demon (Descartes 1984: 15). At this very point, Descartes conditions the importance of the internal mental representation for an external world. This configuration allows him to emphasise the concept of mind as a thinkable issue and likewise to outline the difference between body and mind124. Hence, mind is the main operator of representation125 and the formula to effectuate synthesis. In opposition to the very scholastic tradition126, perception will be a cognitive translation of unified and shaped homogenous pattern and defines external objects as being conceived with her / his cogito. This line (re-) introduces the element of idea and is primarily shaped by the perception of thinking and by the judgement made by the mind’s faculty of understanding: seeing is solely the capability of executing judgments, which are in my mind (Descartes 1984: II 21). But however, there is also an idealistic founded doubt that criticises the relativity of knowledge through its appearance and linguistic expression. The dissolution of the outer world / life-world evokes the question if cogito, in its oppositional force, has not also to be questioned in its translation

124 However the difference of subject and object or body and mind cannot be drawn definitely, since Descartes argues “(...) We say that we see the wax itself, it is there before us, not that we judge it to be there from its colour or shape; and this might lead me to conclude (...) that knowledge of the wax comes from what the eye sees, and not from the scrutiny of the mind alone” (Descartes 1984: 21).
125 Cf. Descartes: “(...) it is the soul which sees, and not the eyes” (Descartes 1985: 172). This very inner-related approach underpins Merleau-Ponty’s turn: any corporal existence can be doubted and likewise we have the very profane perception of our own body and hence, this perception has to be thought. Hereto Descartes: “I know that even bodies are not strictly perceived by the senses (...) but by the intellect alone, and that this perception derives not from their being touched or seen but from their being understood, (...)” (Descartes 1984: 22f).
126 The theory of Galen and Plato follows the idea that the act of perception is primarily an optic operation, from the eye to the object. Insofar we may subsume that Descartes’ approach is a breakthrough as it contrasts with the scholastic tradition. Nevertheless he approaches Thomas of Aquinas by considering his deus as an object per se (quoad se) and likewise as per nos (quoad nos) (cf. Summa 2, art. 1).
capability, since knowledge is part of *res extensa*. The gnosiological force within Descartes’ setting is to understand life-world as knowledge *from* something and as an emanation of being. The idealistic doubt questions the imminent force of knowledge in its immediacy, by evoking a second form of mediated revelation; the *mediation in knowledge* is the indirect medium of being simply *doxa* and random lexeme constructions. The dissolution of reality through knowledge, by considering the translational operator as momentum of contingency, offers Descartes the insight that unconditional knowledge is *per se* universal and it is therefore even the idealistic doubt of the universal doubt (even of knowledge itself). In other words, the *doxa* and its attached doubt are within eternal regress. The un-doubtable *cogito* is only possible if a gnosiological framework sets its very own being. Hence, the unity of *cogito* and *sum* is not simply a state of mind, which highlights something that is not at all intended by its *cogito*. Indeed, this is what Descartes drafts as the distinction between primary (belongs to matter) and secondary (added by the mind) qualities. The transcendental condition is therefore the remedy for Descartes and the *unde autem scio* (DES Med. I., AT VII, 21.3), wherein the unity of knowledge and objects are translated in knowledge. In opposition to Kant and in addition to Husserl, we can read that Descartes does not only apply the transcendental condition to the grid of the external world but he also refers to knowledge as if it is in its unity translatable and consequently knowledgeable.

*Res extensa* is the materiality of *res cogitans* and will be mediated through an internal linguistic corpus. Therefore, language is in Descartes’ setting an *auxilium* or a *sine qua non* for knowledge-production. Hence, within this idealistic setting the transcendental element prefigures tacitly its stake: it offers the conditions for reasoning by stressing that perceiving stands for conceiving with his / her very own mind (Descartes 1984: 18). Having established the ego, Descartes uses perceptions as an internal translational instrument to outline the undoubted idea. Hence, the translational task is not within a translational setting, rather mediation will be trapped in endless repetitions: A (*res cogitans*) to B (*res extensa*), A (*res cogitans*) to A’ (*re-assurance of res cogitans*) and so forth. Hence, transcendental condition depends on the circularity of re-assuring *res cogitans* and thus, ideas offer a transcendental setting, which incorporates a double-layered flaw. To understand this flaw we might resume Descartes’ chain of reasoning by highlighting (a) that we may doubt the possibility of a body by having as counter-argument the evil demon, (b) as a thinking being we know that we have the perceptions
of worldly things and hence (c) perceptions must be *sensu stricto* thoughts (Haas 2008: 16). By summing up we may remark the double feature of the mundane world – (a) one can doubt the body and its materiality and (b) the synthesis of having those elements is kept in one’s mind – fosters an ambivalent position, since I am not aware if I have a body and in addition to that if the translation of \( B \) (\( \textit{rex extensa} \)) from \( A \) (\( \textit{rex cogitans} \)) can be defined *de jure* that \( A \) is not \( B \). The certainty to translate \( A \) to \( B \) remains in a flaw condition, since Descartes requires that perception remains doubtful and likewise, within a contingent world, the ego as a counterpart should establish the un-failed basis for truth. This *aporia* is only possible if he accepts a certain metaphysical stance, if not it will end up in *petition principia*. Within this kind of flaw, Merleau-Ponty rejects idealistic theories, while ideas supersede living exposures; indeed, the representation of mere ideas is a mechanic operation and does not consider the brokenness of perception possibilities.

However, Descartes’ subject-object separation should be, in my reading, understood as a *united* disjunction of subject and object, in which the subject and the object are in a permanent flow of re-configurating their own setting. This kind of re-articulation stresses the opposition to realistic or idealistic perspectives by pointing to transcendentality as a veritable alternative reading of Descartes. The empiric and the intellectual poles corroborate isomorphic abstractions, in which the realistic approach is conditioned by a partial and preformed pre-understanding of objective thoughts and in opposition, the idealistic understanding tries to understand objective thoughts through mere subjective operations. The decisive figure for reading a transcendental line within Descartes’ reflection is to understand the systematic principle of an *a priori* unity of subject and object, of \( \textit{res cogitans} \) and \( \textit{res extensa} \), which outlines the methodological principle of *ego cogito, ergo sum*. The interconnection of *in* and *out* is the pivotal point for a transcendental reading that acknowledges the superseding epistemological transformation of the sensual experience into gnosiological contents. In other words, the translational task is not the motion from \( A \) as \( A' \) to \( B \) by offering a methodological framework, in which any principle of reality could be translated. We rather should

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127 For this trap, Bernhard Williams introduces the expression *the masked man fallacy* by referring to an *analogia*: (1) I do not know who this masked man is, (2) I do know my father, therefore (3) this masked man is not my father (Williams 1978; especially *chapter IV*).


129 In this understanding Descartes is neither an extension of Parmenides’ *aletheia* and *doxa* rhetoric nor a conception of Plotin’s truth thought; cf. Wolfgang Röd (1969) and Franz Bader (1979) support the reading of transcendental evidence.
expect that it is a possibility to read Descartes not simply as the ontological *ergo sum* by considering therefore the presence of reflection but as the imminence of an *a priori* unity; if the *a priori* will be still A as A’ to B might be questionable at this point. It is questionable, since the means of the consciousness consequence of *cogito / sum* is a pre-figure of the internal translation of consciousness. Thereafter, the consciousness subsidence cannot be outlined as a function of (subjective) reasoning – this is Descartes’ pre-caution and the above outlined disbelief. The *a priori* of a universal epistemological justification principle can be grasped by the fact that the object, the body, the mind, etc. are never only ontological entities, but are *consciousness-beings*. This is how we might read Descartes’ subject-object-craftsmanship, not as fissure but as an *a priori* unity, since the translation of objects has to be part of any translating process\(^{130}\). This translation-process supersedes the immanent *aporia* of a pure intellectual or pure empiric world and offers the breeding ground for transcendental methods. The understanding of transcendental reading is within the realm of Husserl’s dynamised transcendental approach but does however take another curve. So far, we have seen that Husserl’s *A as A’* and his motion of *as* fixes the transcendental task as the offspring of pure ideas and is therefore a transcendental setting of the supremacy of ideas\(^{131}\); the *epoché* does not challenge the presence of the empiric implication. The reduction is the trail to reduce appearance to its (idealistic) pure essence. In Descartes’ framework we might stress the relationship and inter-connection of subject and object and of the *signifié* and *signifiant* by re-considering that the transcendentality is not a draft of idealistic realms but an epistemological setting that translates in knowledge. Merleau-Ponty presents very similar characteristics while re-considering the savage ontology as the chiastic experience, in which *life* is curled up, knowledge is produced in its genesis and translation is the process in language.

In reference to Kant and in extension to Husserl we are able to grasp that the transcendental method is based on its *mediation* by questioning the *a priori* conditions of its possible knowledge (KrV B XVI, XVII); it is about revealing metaphysical stances by questioning the *a priori* conditions of how we know and how we achieve knowledge (KrV B 9, 10), alias *A as A’*. In this vein Husserl reduces knowledge to the transcendental reduction of sensual experiences by explaining with Kant that the limit

\(^{130}\) Cf. Reinhard Lauth (1965).

\(^{131}\) Husserl’s reading resembles the Marburg-tradition of reading Descartes and is predominantly outlined by Ernst Cassirer in his doctoral thesis *Descartes’ Kritik der mathematischen und naturwissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis* (Cassirer 1899).
of human knowledge is based on the mixture of seeing, *a priori* conditions and reasoning (KrV B 41ff). Hence, the transcendental apperception of the ego is due to its self-regulative *ego cogito* a circular and regulative figure of its very own. Fichte on his side prolongs Kant’s transcendentiality by superseding Kant’s mirroring effect. Fichte considers not only the sensual experience but also knowing knowledge (FICH II 3 329). Fichte’s *nova methodo* (FICH I 4 217) consists of drafting the realm, in which knowing finds its own considerations. Therefore, the capability to translate the *signifié* by its *signifiant* is the extended understanding of transcendentiality. In other words, the self-consciousness is the reversible operation of reflecting subject and object. This is what we outline above as its mediation-process and not as its translational act, while self-consciousness reflection is not only identical but will also be perceived as identical (FICH I 4 276). The transcendental reflection is in its realm a form of self-translating self-consciousness. The mediated *B* is this double-featured identic entity: *the simultaneity of ontological and phenomenal knowing*. The *genetivus subjectivus* and its mediated *genetivus objectivus* are therefore reversible reflections. Hence, we have to consider an *ego* that is its own reference without separating the slash between the *ego* and its *sum*, since subjective organisation is an intrinsic part of the epistemology of objects. I am not a simple expression, but rather the expression is itself full of life, while the determination is nothing more than the expression of related translations. No content is un-mixed with other identical certainty, since the linguistic expression, is the permanent general confluence of impressions. This is precisely what Merleau-Ponty outlines in his inner-ontological relationship\(^\text{132}\) – Descartes might outline this inner-ontological relationship by genetising the *relata* out of the *relation* (Bader 1983: 109)\(^\text{133}\). The transcendental answer to the *signifié* in its *signifiant* is probably the *parousia* to understand the *paradoxon* of linguistic expression. In other words, the transcendental self-consciousness is the ambiguity of doubting and therefore the factual and immediate evidence of expression. It is this positive disjunction of empiric and intellectual entities, in which the mediated *B* is never a transcendental identity (*A* as *A’*) but it is indeed an apodictic evidence. In other words, the transcendental framework is

\(^{132}\) Cf. Part II of this chapter: *Language and translation: a lateral affair.*

\(^{133}\) Cf. also Cassirer: “Das ‘Ding’ erscheint demgemäss nicht nur den verschiedenen Sinnen selbst als ein Verschiedenes, sondern es ist auch für das gleiche Organ, je nach dem Zeitpunkt und den wechselnden Bedingungen der Wahrnehmung, ein grenzenloses Veränderliches. Denn all seine Bestimmtheit hängt völlig von den Verhältnissen ab, unter denen es sich uns darstellt. Kein Inhalt ist uns in der Erfahrung unvermischt mit anderen in identischer Bestimmtheit gegeben, sondern was sich uns darbietet, ist immer nur der allgemeine Zusammenfluss der Eindrücke. Nicht das eine oder andere, das ‘Dies’ oder ‘Jenes’ einer bestimmten Qualität, sondern nur die wechselseitige Beziehung des einen auf das andere, des anderen auf das eine, ist hier das allein Bekannte, ja das allein Kennbare” (Cassirer 1977: 43f).
the permanent option of differentiation of the appeared without substantialising it. The absoluteness of transcendental conditions is the material facticity of the inner-ontological dis-reality. The transcendental evidence is not apagogic – evidence enacts in immanence without valid counter-parts. The objective world will be mediated as inner-ontological forms of my own: it is about a subjective objectivity or an objective subjectivity. It is closer to you than you might think. The act of $A$ as $A'$ to $B$ is non-translated, the motion is un-conditional (WL 196ff). In other words, the motion of $A$ as $A'$ to $B$ has its very own crack; this is what Merleau-Ponty understands as the reversibility of expression. Descartes might stress it as the evidence of a factual genesis. The expression is a consequence of the leap out of the factual moment and is in its facticity the un-translatable evidence of genesis. The absolute evidence of transcendental reflection-structure is the appearance of the eidos-eidolon unity of a relative disjunction. This is the evidence of appearance, which is present by its absolute evidence-foundation and likewise the reflection-structure interferes qualitatively with the ego cogito. This is how the factual will be genetic and the genetic factual: $A$ as $A'$ to $B$ is the pre-deliberative appeal for $B$ in $A$ as $A'$. The synthesis of $A$ as $A'$ to $B$ cannot be executed or in other words, the synthesis of the formal and material will be suspended by the fact that $B$ conditions $A$ as $A'$ and vice versa. This kind of essential relatedness is, in its inseparable condition, the impossibility of differentiating $A$ as $A'$ from $B$. The impossibility is the theoretical framework, in which the disjunction finds its original unity. As a logical consequence, if we do not have the disjunction index within the unity the function of differentiation would be simply an aporein. The linguistic expression is keeping its own absoluteness; the word appears insofar as the appearance of the word can happen\(^\text{134}\). This absolute non-relatedness is however a qualitative relatedness insofar as the validity of facticity is given by realising its validity and not simply by mediating it: language as such can neither be outlined by intellectual-subjectivity nor by the empiric-objectivity, we have to admit a new unity as condition of language and expression-capability: it is a vivid language, since its framework is outlined by the a priori identity of subjectivity and objectivity. As consequence, a grammatical corpus loses its independent status and the possibility of objectivity; the sense-capability and sense-objectivity is uploaded by the a priori commitment of linguistic-relationship. And

\(^{134}\) However, there is an important restriction that is completely different to Merleau-Ponty’s stance: there is no how function within the different scales of appearance and within the non-relation of the absolute.
this is how we articulate the transcendental framework as the foundation of *metaxy* as the transcendental condition of language.\(^{135}\)

The grammatical body is in consequence for Descartes a reality of the non-knowable, since *veritas* and the operation of misbelief is the linguistic expression of its total identity in immanence. The total correspondence presumes two different realities but however, it offers in its *A as A’ to B* distinction a withdrawal and uncontrollable rest of translation. This withdrawal of language has to be seen as the impossibility of objects and as consequence of the transcendental condition, in which *res objectiva* and *res acutalis* finds its genesis. This linguistic setting is the transcendental explanation that is not the output of subjective knowledge, but also the identity of the subjective knowledge opposed grammatical matrix by stressing its difference in unity. This is lately Descartes’ formula of *ego cogito, ergo sum* or more precisely the *cogito in esse*. Merleau-Ponty outlines that Descartes and the possibility of *cogito* is the possibility to be thrown into the act of thinking. Therefore, I can pass out from the psychological *cogito* without locating me as universal entity. I am not simply a constitutive event or a product of nature but I am embraced by a form of thinking that is within the flow of ideality, which can never deliver the causality-reasons. It is about thinking that affects clarity without having it. This is what Merleau-Ponty outlines as the very third sense of *cogito*.

From this stance, we can easily draw a constitutive line from Descartes’ transcendental understanding to Husserl, by considering that Descartes’ monad will be transformed into a dynamited being. The idea of *translatio* in its mediating character can be founded in Descartes’ writings. Outlining Descartes’ transcendental analysis gives us the opportunity to follow the genesis of his *cogito in sum* relationship by assuming that the transcendental framework is not purely the methodological act of capturing objects but the act in which the subject correlates with its objects. Merleau-Ponty will not start with Descartes’ premises but he will end up within a framework that resembles Descartes’ vision. Merleau-Ponty states that Descartes was espousing his theory of body-mind separation but thereby he showed the paradox of unity in the very daily life. Descartes’ mind setting is not surrounded with borders, its state digresses in an area of vagueness, in which objects are infirmly articulated but nonetheless featuring a kind of presence.

\(^{135}\) Descartes writes that God reveals nature in the same way as God creates nature (DES AT XI, 36/37).
(Prosa 130). Hence, Merleau-Ponty’s carnal body language can be read as an emanation of Descartes’ epistemology of presence: we are capable of writing a theory of translation, which is beyond naïve realism and does not reveal the expression of its being, where another embodied self emerges, where our perspectives meld, cross or intertwine. Hence, Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of translation will be subsumed under the premises of transcendentality – transcendental categories are not the effect of a lined up harmonic transcendental setting; we need to read Descartes under the premises of losing the very external form and offering thereby a notch that invites us to frame a landscape of pluripotentiality (Prosa 112)\textsuperscript{136}.

\textbf{C Merleau-Ponty’s Post-Cartesianism: another grammar}

Merleau-Ponty can be considered as a phenomenologist who has re-thought Husserl’s phenomenological lines by superseding the transcendental reduction of linguistic grammar and by corroborating on the other side the aporein of an ontology that tries to yield the dualism of aletheia / doxa and grammar / expression. This reading will trap within the paradoxon of expression and language and remains within epistemological repetitions. My understanding, and especially by studying the linguistic considerations in Merleau-Ponty’s oeuvre, is to read his savage ontology as a synopsis of transcendentality; in other words, the transcendental package offers revealing moments for morphological structures, in which the aporia of radical ontology is described as linguistic excess that rejects the separation of immanence and transcendence. This kind of excess breaks up the postponement of the signifié and the signifiant by offering a lateral enactment of the expression while lacking its intelligible grammar. This hyper-phenomenon is not the explosion of words and significations but it tries to break up with the line-up of aletheia and highlights in opposition the immanent matrix of multiple references, in which the excess might be tracked. Understanding translation as a process of tracking can be seen as a policy of transcendental taxonomy. It is the activity of the reversal body that outlines a transcendental setting by dealing with linguistic expressions in a similar way as Descartes has done it with his cogito / sum architecture. The key to Descartes and in extrapolation to Merleau-Ponty is to consider the simultaneity of transcendentality and ontology, without their being corresponding

\textsuperscript{136} We can say that Descartes and Merleau-Ponty face a relationship that is not intellectually hostile but it is a subtle battle, in which both are patricides and child killers by using the same weapons (Prosa 132ff).
partners. Transcendental considerations and ontology are the linguistic matrix in which translation and understanding finds their topography of *khôra* in such a way that Merleau-Ponty has difficulty accepting language but in the same moment he has to separate it from its expression to bring it to its signification. His momentum of simultaneity might offer a vivid *aporia*, in which the chiastic experience of separation and alliance can be possible. In the following I am attempting to outline that transcendentality could be the missing link for Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the translational motion of *A’ to B / C* as well as the *visible* and the *invisible* by evoking the possibility to reorganise the chiastic experience: the heuristic neutralisation by the act of polymorphology re-figures the *facultas aliud linguam*. Nevertheless, it would be absolutely misleading to accept that transcendentality will be the clarification of grammar and language in general. Transcendentality might be *extra logica*. By having Descartes in our luggage we can evoke another reading of Merleau-Ponty and phenomenology that does not evade the transcendental realm but offers a topography to stress another transcendentality, in which language and expression are not the objects of words, grammatical structures and personal feelings.

Hence, Merleau-Ponty’s aim is to rely on the relationship of materiality and foundation, since the phenomenological life-world is not constituted by a pure being but rather by a realm of sense(s) (PhP XV) that outlines the foundation and access of grammar and truth. Merleau-Ponty does not speak of transcendental categories while formulating grammar and knowledge; he outlines in his earlier stage the importance of relying on *Gestalten* and on ontological spheres. By referring to gestalt-psychological methods, Merleau-Ponty discovers the body as a place, which is anchored in a sensual-sense-related world, which was always its homeland or a *milieu écologique* (VNV 262). A phenomenology of phenomenology leads to the discovery of a silent consciousness; the expression as a silent expression leads towards the effect to understand disparate moments from a reading that ultimately could lead to his ontological project accompanying world- and subject-becoming and understands thereby flesh as an element of its process. By referring to Merleau-Ponty we should imagine a labyrinth of spontaneous steps, which finds its way through a clutter of disorder. The behaviour of phenomenological *Gestalten* yields a doxographic separation of *res extensa* and *res cogitation*, insofar as the *res* is not capable of being separated *partes extra partes* and

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likewise it supersedes *cogitation* as it does not signify the revealing of the entire being. However, my reading of Descartes offers the possibility to go along with Merleau-Ponty’s *cogitation* understood as a specific way to understand life-world and its corresponding lexemes. Along these lines, transcendental reduction does not lead out of the world and into an idealistic inflection, since it includes its transcendental actor / reducer / orator / translator; the idea of reduction reproduces *per se* a new setting of holism that underpins on another level the status of the transcendental actor. The effect will not be a deliberated consciousness, rather another mode of a pre-configured mind setting. The problem of reduction is therefore not simply an epistemological foreplay but it concerns the integrity of a linguistic grammar, while searching its being in a permanent mode of commencement. Language and in addition translation do no longer require causes but rather gradually emerge as genesis and phenomenon of expression and life-world. The entanglement of *language-translation-action-perception-disruption* are the ontological stakeholders and they do not appear as determined and isolated tasks that have not yet outlined their definite characteristics. Merleau-Ponty does neither propose to reconsider the linguistic realm in which form is reduced to content, nor content subsumed in form. In this line, Husserl’s universal transcendental relationship of form and content or the mediation of *A as A’ to B* is a passive synthesis of identification as association (HUA I 142). Merleau-Ponty understands that performing transcendental reduction makes it difficult to know the assumptions of objective thoughts, since nothing is more difficult than to know precisely what we see. Hence the usage of linguistic tools such as phonemes, morphemes and syntax has to be rewritten by the chorus of chiasm (Signes 294) and busts therefore the classical notion of a proper language. Nevertheless, the structure of reversibility offers a transcendental reading beyond classical hermeneutics. The hermeneutical trap is outlined by the fact that the *signifié* is always out of the *signifiant*, since *B / C* is exterior to the unity of knowledge; *A’ to B / C* is formulating another reality of knowledge beyond the realm of *A’*; it claims an absolute abyss and

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139 This interpretation reunites Merleau-Ponty with Husserl: reduction has to be taken under the wings of idealistic interpretations. The typoscript of *Cartesian Meditation VI* highlights the world-entanglement of phenomenological thinking. We have to be aware that reduction does not lead univocally from natural mind setting to transcendental thinking. It is rather a succession, based on transcendental given meanings, which arises from natural meanings; natural attitudes are not alone the *where-of-from*, but rather the *wherefore* (cf. Fink 1988: 109).

140 In other words, “(...) after performing the transcendental-phenomenological reduction, experience is considered in isolation from its worldly objects. The experiencing subject is conceived as a transcendental ego that is not part of the world, and whose doings / states are uncaused. Husserl’s (...) conception of phenomenology thus presupposes the Cartesian view of experience as inner representations whose qualities remain the same whether or not they present the world correctly” (Romdenh-Romluc 2011: 13).
contradiction by neglecting any form of unification. An orthodox reading of Merleau-
Ponty might lead us to a similar understanding: the reversibility is the eternal trap of
unity. The unity-aporía, however, is the hidden taxonomy of transcendentality and
keeps the chiastic experience together: the exteriority, the translated or with Descartes
the res extensa is not exterior but a disjunction in unity or a chiasm in unity. In other
words, the absolute disjunction of A’ to B / C is not the eternal disjunction of knowledge
and being, since the difference of A in B / C is in principle like any other difference,
only understandable by a transcendent unity that destroys the original difference and
the possibility of making something different. The chiastic experience of
transcendentality is inspired by Merleau-Ponty’s Le visible et l’invisible and can be read
as a radicalisation of Descartes’ transcendental cogito / sum, since the original
difference conditions in its radicalism a linguistic index. This is how Merleau-Ponty’s
reversibility is kept by the principles of transcendentality. Hitherto, the transcendental
modification of the sum by its cogito will be modified by Merleau-Ponty. He transforms
the radical expression by its vivid excess, which is operated by tracing it without index
and monopolisation: the original action and its expression are signified by
transcendental realms and are likewise signified through a transcendental enforcement.
Any other form is a trial of objectivities from the exterior and therefore a non-objective
cause. Hence, the chiastic experience is probably the (new) structural-logical of
transcendentality that writes A in B / C – translation is the lateral in-vasion of
implosions, in which the lexeme is not a contingent appearance. The chiasm is the
excess in its body expression by enhancing simultaneously several semantic
relationships that works commensurably in non-coincidence. The notion of associations
will be therefore the movens of the translational force in its transcendental gown. This
commensurability of words in its non-coincidental form formulates the transcendental
lining in its expression. Therefore, the very idea of chiasm takes Descartes’
transcendental melange to a radical extreme, it can be grasped within the horizon of
Husserl’s Urdoxa and Merleau-Ponty’s shifting towards savage ontology. In opposition
to Husserl and his transcendental reduction, Merleau-Ponty starts in Le visible et
l’invisible with the initial pretence (feinte) of any thinker: to find the expression of
things within the silence of the world, the actor, the orator and the spectator does
pretend to know any phenomenological reduction and does pretend to see any possible
entities in the world (VNV 18f). Au contraire, the aim for Merleau-Ponty is to reveal
the semantics of life-world by formulating sceptical arguments independently from
ontological prejudices: the world is no longer explored as a closed system of relations but rather as an open totality, in which translation and synthesis remain unfinished (PhP 253), and therefore language is likewise an open and non-deliberative setting, since I always perceive the world from my own fluid perspective. Merleau-Ponty’s ontological twist does no longer denominate neither the subject nor the object but tries to sketch the origio and the genesis of subjectivity and objectivity, regrouping Descartes’ transcendental reading \(^{141}\). Merleau-Ponty’s a priori is not knowledge beyond experience but an a priori repositum based on contingency and language (PhP 255). This new form of a priori is the enactment of the silent logic of facticity (PhP 255). His onto-phenomenological draft is within a movement that presupposes in a circular manner already the toto of the movement reading it through its oblique gesture. In other words, it is the concrete momentum of an extensive configuration of life-world (PhP 256) that suppresses the container of esse. This framework visualises the aporia, which seems to be anchored in the concrete world. Hence, the epistemological fragility reconsiders language as a silent enactment of the uncertain: the linguistic expression is therefore not somewhere else, but an a-language\(^ {142}\) that is curled up by bodily expressions that will be enacted in pluripotentiality and by the execution that is beyond causal reflections and commands.

By analysing the mode of reflection, Merleau-Ponty wants to reveal consciousness and its forgotten history – before consciousness could be an intrinsic part of ego and life-world, he affirms and stresses the necessity of backgrounds, in which consciousness and the very idea of subject can appear as Gestalt. The personal existence of consciousness follows the – in life-world anchored – body; not much different is the case for linguistic usage. Consciousness is not at all the universal mean incorporating the decision-making body of what is semantically relevant and what not. Semantic features and grammar exist even before consciousness can interfere; by corresponding to life-world, we are condemned to semantics in life-world and nothing can be expressed that is already expressed in history (PhP XIV). Nevertheless, linguistic consciousness is not a simple

\(^{141}\) Kant outlines that not consciousness on the one side and pure being on the other side are theoretically lined up, but rather knowledge is referred to the experience of the subject in the world and the being of entities. On this very point Kant and Merleau-Ponty do agree – hence, Kant however introduces the element of transcendental categories, which conditions the a priori and leads to a transcendental apeiron, since transcendental aesthesis and transcendental logic evoke discrepancy. The insertion of a transcendental ego levels this apeiron off. This system of an integral ego denies any mundane anchoring and therefore Merleau-Ponty rejects transcendental settings by considering that the foundation and origins of transcendental conditions are not reflected from our historical experience (PhP 255).

\(^{142}\) Please note: a-linguistic expressions are not founded by a non-linguistic grammar.
field of pre-consciousness or magical expression (PhP 419). As we have seen, Merleau-Ponty tries to offer a transcendental justification for his phenomenological description, but this kind of reflection does neither discover an absolute transcendental sphere nor the real forgottenness of rhetoric. The event of être-au-monde and the transcendental foundation do not claim an additional and second field of semantic investigation, which lies beyond previous descriptions. Transcendental foundation is in itself a momentum of phenomenological description. My reading of Merleau-Ponty is to radicalise this very point: descriptions have to be the grounding work for an understanding that is more radical than objective knowledge could be; the cogito has to be re-grasped in order to shape a more fundamental logos than objective knowledge might offer (PhP 419). By highlighting the element of time, Merleau-Ponty is able to stress the ambiguity of body, world and language within cogito – not in a Cartesian sense but rather in the sense of a silent cogito. His ambitions revealing the genesis happening and the conditioning possibilities of ambiguity are the result of a deferred cogito. Therefore, his reflections do not only rely on Husserl’s simple reference to its own phenomenological stance but rather he refers to a phenomenology of phenomenology 143 (Signes 224). In Phénoménologie de la Perception (PhP) the transcendental stance can be outlined in its consciousness-conception as the being based on the entity through the means of body (PhP 160) and as an experience-being of mediating the world with the body and the Other (PhP 113). Consciousness can no longer be dissolved by a cogito, an object of linguistic knowledge, but rather it is experienceable as je peux (PhP 160) that cannot translate Je in an absolute sense (PhP 241). A fundamental logos can only be sure if the own language is a cognitive perception that funds its own grammar. Consciousness is not at all a stance for itself, it is rather a constant and active transcendence: it is the original movement of the transcendental that is my own-being – it is the equi-primordial touch with my linguistic being and with the linguistic being of the world. In other words: seeing is not seeing-thinking-expressing, it has rather to be described as an exceeded happening of the seen objects, in which the event of seeing can be captured – although it will never be transparent (PhP 432) 144.

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143 By highlighting the event of a phenomenology of phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty refers to Eugen Fink’s remark that phenomenological foundation of thinking has to be examined via a very unique transcendental analytical feature by highlighting its transcendental self-understanding, which can be only executed of the existence of and in relation to the être au monde (Fink 1988: 8f).

144 In accordance to Descartes’ ego cogito, ergo sum, Merleau-Ponty does not stress the causal determination of the ego. Ego cogito and ego sum are two equivalent statements of the same phenomenon. Equivalence does not mean to be a synonym rather consciousness is integrated into the transcendence of my being (PhP 438f).
Hence, the *movens* of Merleau-Ponty is to show that life, life-world and language are beyond idealistic and empirical transparency and the spectacle of the secret knowledge of the artist spurs him / her to re-settle. His remedy is the repeatedly mentioned idea of the *Gestalt* – it is about a form of existentialism, which escapes permanently and cannot fit within operative thinking. Words, pictures, signs and symbols do not stand for themselves – their immanence is an intellectual construction of an un-constructible world. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology tries to *invade* into morphemes, describes them and does not construct their semantic characteristics: translation is therefore the process of A’ *in-vading* B / C. His descriptions are not idealistic regressions to a pretext and the condition of possibilities – Merleau-Ponty outlines that experience can neither be understood in isolation from its worldly objects nor does it reconstruct it, far more phenomenological operations are delivering a chiastic description of it. Descartes’ transcendental reading offers the subject-object unity, which Merleau-Ponty radicalises as the enacted world experience: life-world is synonymous with embedded transcendentality, it is where the *unity* is getting *enacted*. The un-reflected can be grasped by the description of perception that considers the original contact by facilitating the creation of acts and likewise presuming it and therefore, world is neither an object of knowledge nor an issue of consciousness (PhP V). Husserl’s reduction from natural expression into transcendental consciousness squeezes directly to a sense world and loses the secrets of the world while melting to a unique horizon. In opposition, it is this radical relatedness to genealogy and facticity that breaks with Husserl’s transcendentality and offers another reading of transcendentality that is enacted by its sheer expression. In other words, the expressed is within a non-linguistic grammar of the paradox, in which the expressed is not expressed and writes therefore the entanglement of expression and grammar within a non-outlined lateral oriented transcendental life-world. Hence, phenomenology considers the appearance of being in relation to its consciousness setting as *une opération créatrice* (PhP 74) and it can be therefore outlined as the reflection of the un-spoken C or to put with Rimbaud: *being directed to life-world by having consciousness* (PhP 68f). Thus, by following Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty uses the label *être-au-monde* in separation to any transcendental setting and outlines in his later stage that his ontological considerations cannot be read in relation to Husserl’s phenomenology (PhP 61 and VNV 224). This ontological shift is probably the most significant shift away from Husserl by offering an
ontological interpretation of phenomenological reading – however, Merleau-Ponty is not aware that his ontological setting introduces transcendental categories through its very own backdoors. The ontological shifting will be important to understand the systematic shifting where words are the enacted experience of life-world and perverts the very idea of translation.

D Ontological seismograph

In *Le philosophe et son abri* (1959) Merleau-Ponty outlines that the natural being cannot be an exterior event within the realm of phenomenological thinking, but rather it has to find a place in its own realm\(^{145}\) (Signes 194f). Merleau-Ponty wants to establish an ontological set up that is not based on a figure of non-related ideas and which inductive explications are not tasks of linguistic empiricism. And he neither wants to prove the existence of the world (OE 60f) nor highlights classification schemes of subjects and objects, which could figure as a generic subject- and / or object-being (VNV 41). His procedure rather follows the aim to trace a *Sein im Seienden*. This line up can be seen as an ontological difference but not in a fundamental-ontological Heideggerian way: it enhances a being that invokes the depth and layered value of expressions. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty remains trusty to phenomenological working – he tries to elaborate a being, which is neither hidden beyond facticity nor the almighty translator who engineers the coordinates of life-world. He develops an ontological concept that takes its starting point from Husserl’s life-worldly perception by grasping the experiences of a natural and pre-theoretical life(s)\(^{146}\). Hence, Merleau-Ponty refers to a being that is not strange to the so-called natural life but is still hidden, since it is itself a medium of natural life. He looks for an ontological field that is different to the *per se* and cannot be derived from a constituted order (Signes 206). He shifts the perspective of ontological work practices by referring to *il y a* (OE 12) and from there on capturing, on the basis of the perceiving-perceived world, the pure sense that will not be accepted by produced institutions such as language. The descending movement

\(^{145}\) Admittedly, phenomenology critiques the natural attitude but nevertheless it has simultaneously tried to rehabilitate natural settings; we have to consider that Merleau-Ponty tries to explore a totally new kind of ontological thinking.

\(^{146}\) Merleau-Ponty’s concern corresponds to Heidegger’s reflection of his sense of being / life. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty starts by Husserl but he does not end up by Heidegger. The differentiation of *Sein* and the *Seiende* are always an expression of the fundamental – even when Heidegger tries to show its impossibility and negates all kind of *Scheinbilder* (RC 156).
towards a *Sein* of the *Seiende* is not at all to find its solution on a common ground. The foundational question leads Merleau-Ponty to a field of foundation that is not down or up, here or there but rather in the middle of its linguistic circumstances. It is a direction towards a life-sense within the *Seiende* and a *Sein* in semantics. Merleau-Ponty treats the opening towards the world as a silent relationship of life-world, which shows that there is translation (VNV 57); it is a change and a trans-substitution of visibility from where seeing by the middle of its entities will be entangled and will have happened (OE 16). This stance shows clearly the change in Merleau-Ponty’s theoretical perspective and he criticises his 1945 published monograph *Phénoménologie de la Perception (PhP)*, especially by the fact that the idea of a phenomenology of phenomenology is shaped by a certain design of phenomenological foundation while *Phénoménologie de la Perception* reveals actually its ontological necessity (VNV 234): he is doubting the difference of consciousness and object (VNV 250) and therefore he tries to retain a philosophy of consciousness; the outlined silent *cogito* is consequently impossible due to the fact that there is no correlation between silence and the event of speaking (VNV 227f): there are neither *as* nor *to* clutches. Thereto, Merleau-Ponty is not able to reveal how, in the following of Husserl, the silent experience can be outlined as pure utterance of its own sense (VNV 169). Consequently, he tries to draft the being-sense of an ontological medium by extrapolating it from its natural life-worldly understanding. Therefore, his reflections are re-shaped and transformed in his latest thoughts and stand clear in opposition to bare reflections and constructions; he analyses a certain degree of artificiality in science, which could never be the foundation of its construction, its natural believing of life-world and its obscurity (OE 10 and VNV 32) – science experiments with entities without participating in and with it (OE 9). His starting point consists of there is *being*, there is *life-world* or more generally *qu’il y a*

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147 Merleau-Ponty’s idea of the middle, of a medium or a dimension and his expression of an intra-ontology (VNV 275) could be misleading. The middle, the medium is unlikely the transmitter of *A* and *B*, rather he speaks in a metaphoric language by attempting to capture the ontological atmosphere, the ontological medium, which is owned by its natural life while it is in the world and therefore knowable and likewise aware of its distance.

148 Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological ontology can be read in accordance to Eugen Fink’s intentions. In *Sein, Wahrheit, Welt* (Fink 1958), Fink outlines the idea of a philosophical questioning thinking that has to question itself (Fink 1958: 9) and that the absolute medium of appearance has to be different from its being. As long as the movement of appearance is anchored in the envisaging human being, truth and life-world are consequences and results of the appearance. The importance consists in its turnaround by highlighting the appearance of the *Seiende* and its truth as a consequence of a space- and time happening in the world.

149 Nevertheless, Merleau-Ponty is not opposing science in its practice, his concerns are related to a forgotten interpretation of itself, which ends up attributing a being-monopoly to the object of knowledge.
quelque chose (VNV 119). An ontology, which is based on literally nothing, is based on a shaky fundament, while the nothing and the pure being / Gebilde is always somewhere else (VNV 246ff). Merleau-Ponty’s principle follows the idea that there is a being and a life-world as consequence of an impossibility of non-sense or ontological emptiness (VNV 154). A direct oriented ontology, a philosophy of negativity and naïve forms of reflections are not able to mediate Merleau-Ponty’s aim of presenting the ontological medium as a being-sense within life-world. He approaches this fragile idea by introducing the concept of simultaneity. The natural attitude is characterised by comporting une vérité supérieure (Signes 206). In opposition to Husserl’s Ideen (HUA III 52 and Signes 206) he interprets the natural attitude as a pre-reflexive stage in which the human being is in opposition to entities and things and oppositional to sheer differences of the I and life-world and consequently, any as-compositions will fail. Merleau-Ponty fosters the natural human being as an actor, who acts simultaneously: he thinks that his perception penetrates the objects but at the same time the actions are happening in their bodies: nevertheless, these convictions are able to survive in everyday life, although they dissolve and create entrelacs as soon as they are formulated as thesis or as statement (VNV 24). Merleau-Ponty constitutes ontology by highlighting the event of revealing and interpretation and by stressing the element of questions that will find its reply from life-worldly features and their entities. But these kinds of replies are not at all outlined to find a confirmation of a transparent knowledge; they are more focused on the fact and the certainty that there are answers – answers, which are emerging from life-world. The status of being is therefore in a doubled status of visual and non-visual happenings or in other words, it is being in a mode of speak-ability and non-speak-ability in life-world. These kinds of dispositions fund the act of seeing and speaking. By having this possibility, the act emerges from the bodily (flesh) Gestalt of life-world – its body foundation is based on material, from which the world materials are wrapped up. Merleau-Ponty radicalises Husserl’s understanding that any original given perception is a source of knowledge and that our bodily intuition has to be taken for granted, insofar as the perceived entity is perceived bodily – this dictum has to be taken literally due to the fact that the flesh of sensuality represents my own

150 This stance stays in clear opposition to classical interpretations of the being-status and especially it is in opposition to Parmenides’ ontological design and his concept of being and non-being.

151 Merleau-Ponty’s stressing of chair could be misleading. The chair of life-world is not an anthropologic constant of world-descriptions; chair does not denominate the spirit or the substance as being-atoms. It is not chaos and has no name; the chair of life-world is a forming milieu for subjects and objects and therefore an element of being (VNV 181ff and 191).
incarnation and simultaneously its counter-part (Signes 211). There are no such things as abstract morphemes in phenomenological working and in the same line phenomenology is only able to problematise the Seiende on the basis that phenomenological thinking shares its being-constitution. Therefore the possibility of representation and translation is conditioned by the body-constitution of the world and the human being (VNV 175). In the intervening spaces, the flesh, as element of being, renders the presence of life-worldly possible – meaning that my body is made by the same flesh as the world and this flesh of my body is further on shared by the world by reflète\textsuperscript{152} its status (VNV 297). While body is in relation to perception, it is indeed in relation to life-world, in such a way as its reflecting status of overtaking and grasping is translated by its fleshy moment. Hence, the carnal body is open towards the world, while the body is made by the same material as life-world is created\textsuperscript{153}. And this is also the reason why touching and touched flesh is my only instrument to enter into the chiasmus of entities: while I perceive the realm of language and words, there will be flesh. Nevertheless, the reversibility of touching and touched is however une identité toujours manquée (VNV 320). It is nonetheless a simultaneity that I tried to show with Descartes’ commensurability of cogito / sum and which Merleau-Ponty outlines as a double agency of language\textsuperscript{154} or a sous-entendu (Prosa 42).

By outlining this reading we can follow that Merleau-Ponty breaks with his precedent by neglecting the difference of subject / object and of signifié / signifiant and above all of translating A to B. Husserl’s transcendental framework and its corresponding transcendental ego is therefore definitely perverted: reflection is not a setup without referring to experience and history. The signifiant and signifié are not only operators but far more they find their consciousness through the enactment itself (cf. un défait et refait (PhP 254)). Hence, what does that mean for language and its enactment? So far, language and translation find their enactment in their immanent movens by neutralising their circumstances and by referring to the pointing force of the resuming actor. Merleau-Ponty stresses in opposition a matrix that allows multi- and divers-entries without fixing-points. Language is the amalgam and performs its translation by

\textsuperscript{152} Merleau-Ponty insists on the fact that my body is – as like the world – the emanation of the same chair: “(...) et que de plus cette chair de mon corps est participée par le monde, il la reflète (...)” (VNV 297).

\textsuperscript{153} Cf. “(...) chair répondant à la chair” (VNV 259).

\textsuperscript{154} It is about our own happening in linguistics settings and likewise we cause moments of happening by our socius (Prosa 29).
highlighting a ruling body that slips constantly. Nonetheless, the task of language and thinking in general is so to speak the duty to establish lexemes, which subsequently enact sens(es); consequently one might assume that the principle of anything goes guides us to Merleau-Ponty’s thoughts. This is far away from Merleau-Ponty’s aim, his epistemological project is to point to the drawer, speaker and actor behind and beyond texts, symbols, pictures and stories – this is the price for a life-infected language (Prosa 126f). Therefore, the historic response to life-world is materially restricted to producing and affixing lacuna and fissures in the amleness of life-world. We have to include the most foreign issues to the realm of life-world by enacting its intrinsic sense as the most remote issue (Prosa 84f). Therefore, Merleau-Ponty’s telos is a diverted telos or t’: the task of radical reflection – a reflection which would like to understand itself – is paradoxical to (re-) discover the un-reflected experience of life-world and to transfer back the verification and reflexive operations by attempting to highlight reflection as a possibility of my being. Hence, radical reflections have to (re-) consider its un-reflected origins: the observation of world facticity evokes a possible denomination of subjects and objects. From this point on, Merleau-Ponty reveals his very theoretical horizon: the translation of genealogical words, languages, stories and phantasms are historical without having had an enacted presence. This tension offers Merleau-Ponty a whole new arsenal of criticism: the constant explosion in its implosion will be the chiastic movens of Merleau-Ponty’s discovery of language and translation.

**E Body language**

Merleau-Ponty’s reversibility of linguistic morphology will be more accessible and comprehensible through his conception of the carnal-body: two theoretical extremities intellectualism – the intellectual capability (subject) to reduce the world into categories – and empiricism (object) – the positive comprehension of facticity – are mediated and synthesised by the bodily engaged existence. Body is for Merleau-Ponty another way to provoke the ontological foundation of reading the transcendental line of

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155 In these circumstances Kant would refer to the ability of synthetic apperceptions. This categorisation might have been as well the movens in Merleau-Ponty’s head and it seems compelling that he would have introduced the ability of synthetic apperceptions through the back door without referring to it explicitly. The synthetic apperception summarises and categories a posteriori subjects-objects and Merleau-Ponty to focus on, to communicate and to translate on a very tiny spot, the dramatic scene in life-world. Hence the pre-reflexive phase does not enable us to synthesise since we can only synthesise where diversity exists.

156 Merleau-Ponty introduces in *Le visible et l’invisible* the idea of chair.
linguistic practices, especially by having the possibility to follow literally the footprints of bodily traces in life-worldly promises in which *paradeisos* is so keen of. The embodiment declares that the vivid, the sad, the pathic, the suppressed, the laughter, joy squeeze life-world but simultaneously it is also the squeezing of the *paradeisos* in lack and excess. This formulation will keep on following us and will erase the body as an essence while impelling the embodiment of the body; the paradigm body will shift the *epistemologie appliqué* into non-application. Hence, the enacted language is non-essentially embodied and therefore performs a certain way of merged combinations by outlining its in motion developed scheme (since life-world exists before any form of analysis and therefore, any derivation from principles remains definitely artificial (PhP IVf)). This is what Merleau-Ponty understands as the *résumé* of our body-experience (PhP 114) and the constant performing constellation that leads to Merleau-Ponty’s setting of *Gestalt* (PhP 116). The very idea of *Gestalt* is a non-fixed variation of appearance and develops through its genesis its cybernetic body-language: body language *speaks* through its positioning (PhP 116f) and in addition, it is the spontaneous organisation of sensory fields that the so called elements of wholeness are dependent, which are in a larger sense again integrated into new modulations. This kind of *bodyness* is not a form that imposes on its heterogeneous materiality – there is certainly no materiality without form. However, there is only more or less stability or more or less articulated organisation (PhP XV). The translation of the *Gestalt* will be a *being* for C, but far from the idea of agility in negativity – it is rather the inscription into an open register (VNV 236). The meaning of *Gestalt* evokes a facticity that yields the pathos of entity by opting for structures beyond causal circularities; it is a hierarchy of comportments that follow a genesis of embodied structures. Language as structure is therefore neither an object nor content of knowledge, it is neither exclusions nor inclusions and it is certainly not an idea. Hence, the positioning of body and language is not simply within a positive grammatical reference-system and in addition to that, positioning is *de iure* not an operator for objective settings but a system for intersections (VNV 114). Body language is rather the very first pointing in confrontation with its task and its translation. To understand body in contrast to subjectivity, we need to reject the understanding of body as a mere object and likewise deny the capability to be grasped as an object. It is Merleau-Ponty’s transcendental re-interpretation of the Cartesian

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157 Leonardo’s interpretation of the world is given by his bodily and vital situatedness. He has performed his artwork by shifting the dimension of happening to expressing. This shift does not mark a change – it is still the same life-world (Prosa 105f) but mingled to another meaningful system.
dualism-framework\textsuperscript{158} / \textsuperscript{159} or Husserl’s difference of *noesis* and *noema* – the concept of the engaged body as nucleus and operator for language refers likewise to withdraw itself and remain language as a mute transcendental facticity. The idea of *Gestalt* is therefore not an objective entity of different parts and not the result of subsuming the universal law (PhP 74); it is not a mechanism of identity but rather a figure of accidental touches in my very own *cubic* corporality (VNV 252f). The morphological structure of the *Gestalt-fluidum* assembled through its activity, in which they might express a common style, is about to write a participating commensurability. Hence, the *Gestalt* is neither a grammatical body for linguistic features nor the content of consciousness. In other words, the morphological *Gestalt* of language is already its own translation by encountering life and world: the *signifié* and the *signifiant* are therefore non-separable and revealing likewise there translation C without losing the time-space-relationship of *A and B*: *A and B* are an entanglement of consciousness as a flow of individual events and as consciousness-tissue of intrinsic meanings (SC 232). The linguistic *Gestalt* is therefore not constructed by a subject but is constituted, transformed and re-organised like a scene (SC 241). Hence, the common style is framed on the background of entangled collective circumstances. In other words, the presence of style in its miniatures are never elements of resemblance but look for causal strands in history or of a pontiff-translator, who spurs on the very happening of translating. If we draw on principles of resemblance, we approach the problem wrongly; the resembling moments are minimal to the differences and diversity of cultures (Signes 84). Hitherto, there is on the threshold of schematising the shade of an own grammar, in which the expression of the *Gestalt* may follow its *Gestaltung*. We might restate, that linguistic expressions are modifications of the grammatical result, since possible linguistic deviations are built on the grammatical framework of being; the upholding of the entangled situation is the grammatical and historical variability of linguistic range as it is again not homogenously defined. Hence, the function of slash between the *signifié* and *signifiant* does not mean a *carte blanche* for synthesis but rather the *signifiant* is the side effect of the *signifié* without offering an immediate picture of being *here* (PhP 117). The *Gestalt* undertakes the position of an amalgam that represents the integration-force of sick / healthy, *signifié* / *signifiant* or the understanding / non-understanding by outlining that

\begin{footnote}
\textsuperscript{158} The classical understanding of Descartes admits that his experience does not present him as being in his body like a captain is dwelling in a ship (Descartes 1993: 53). However, Descartes presumes that the body is divided from the \textit{res intensa}.
\textsuperscript{159} This kind of rejection is the reason why Descartes and Merleau-Ponty are quite close; it is about a new relationship of entities in its cybernetic story telling.
\end{footnote}
no reference can be made absolutely and independently. As we can follow, the *Gestalt* might be the structural predecessor of Merleau-Ponty’s carnal body and the link to outline his phenomenological system within the realm of transcendental lining. This is an important reference to grasp Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of life and language: *translatio* in its vivid enactment remains silent; the realm of no and silence will be transported into an *area of doxa and non-being* in which words, figures and entities will be the carnal body; the uncanny movement of this kind of infraction is to offer an exit of mute cultural settings (Prosa 170f). This kind of positivity of the negative highlights the *plasticity* of language, insofar as translation exists in correspondence to its task and to its very own reversibility – it is this *être-au-monde* in which the linguistic ontology slumbers. In opposition to Heidegger’s *In-der-Welt-Sein*, understood as a relative movement of a pre-theorised relationship and synthesis of the world, Merleau-Ponty characterises being relationship as a body and perspective experiences. Therefore, body and life-world are a peculiar entanglement of language, object, subject, etc. (VNV 197). In addition and as a specification, the body is a form of consciousness and likewise embedded in the objective world of language, life-world and history, but it is only *understandable* by the enacted translation motion. Therefore, the foundation for translational enactment within knowledge-categories will be yielded: transcendental knowledge-production will be re-interpreted by the mere fact of being in a mode of vivid body-language experiences without falling into a naïve reading of realism. The event of shifting *A as A’ to B* will be exceeded by having a body that offers a scenery of non-located spots: knowledge will be produced by multiple ways via body action and therefore, the concept of *A to B or A as A’* is re-articulated by highlighting elements, which deprive epistemological settings. The unthinkable of phenomenology finds its corresponding partner by describing the body as the primordial function of being-in-the-world. From this point on, Merleau-Ponty turns the transcendental subject and its idealistic entities back to the world by declaring the *serving* body as the *topos* of

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160 Merleau-Ponty’s early study of aphasia and pathology offers him the structural insights for his late manuscript of *Le visible et l’invisible* (VNV).

161 By criticising Husserl’s phenomenology of transcendental consciousness, Heidegger refigures the phenomenological setting by prioritising the ontological framework. Nevertheless *Being* and *Phenomenology* are complementary insofar as philosophy should be seen as universal phenomenological ontology: “Phänomenologische Wahrheit (Erschlossenheit von Sein) ist veritas transcendentalis” (SZ 38). Merleau-Ponty refers to Heidegger’s stance and modifies his *In-der-Welt-Seins* to Merleau-Ponty’s *inner ontology*. Nevertheless Merleau-Ponty marks a difference by translating *être au monde* instead of *être dans le monde*.

162 Heidegger’s relationship to *Sein* and *Da-Sein* is marked by its temporal situatedness. *Sein* means *Anwesenheit* in the sense of being in the mode of presence (cf. VNV 230ff).
practise\textsuperscript{163} (PhP 119). In other words, not the universality of language is the point of reference but the serving language practice as peculiar existence will translate its content and at the same time it will be translated; the orientation from \textit{A} to a possible translation \textit{B / C} cannot be fixed: the carnal body is a junction of lively meanings and not the law of a particular number of variables related to coefficients (PhP 177). The situated body translates and orientates a linguistic content within life-world since the fleshy being is constantly deprived of causal-logics and the topological relationship \textit{objects – background}\textsuperscript{164}. In this line, translation breaks again with the powerful hermeneutical circle by pointing to \textit{C} on the very scene of \textit{A to B}\textsuperscript{165}: translation is the action of vivid richness by referring to \textit{A, B and C}, which is not permitted to understand it as separated and to rip apart its actuality by its linguistic enforcement. This kind of mixture and curious practice, in which enactment and omission create language, offers a dispositive for a weak linguistic and translational theory, since so-called clear and transparent ideas are not important, but the confused enactment in its motional existence matters most. Hence, language as embodied activity and as a matrix of history, psychology and speculation cannot be captured by the extension of causality clauses. Language and translation are slippery moments or, in reference to Merleau-Ponty, the carnal body of language and translation are elements \textit{à l’état naissant} (PhP 140). The embodied strand however does not only engineer the post Cartesian entanglement of subjects and objects but also drafts new forms of transcendentality by referring from afar to my reading of Descartes: the enlarged subject-object-matrix outlines the transcendental category. The \textit{embodied} transcendentality refreshes the linguistic starting point without pointing to its carnal language. Therefore, the transcendental deduction cannot be followed since the Demiurge cannot produce anything but, however he evokes, a being in an embodied life-worldly association. The categorised system cannot be the foundation, rather Merleau-Ponty yields the transcendental premises, in which the \textit{a priori} of time and space is suspended and will be replaced by the genealogy of our

\textsuperscript{163} The combination of \textit{Gestalt} und \textit{être-au-monde} includes to some extent the universal formation – nevertheless and this is the striking moment language and body are not at all depending components.

\textsuperscript{164} To understand the importance of \textit{foundation}, Merleau-Ponty refers to the analysis of the \textit{proper motion} of the body by the famous case \textit{Schneider} (Gelb and Goldstein 1928). Merleau-Ponty interests the examination of Schneider, who was injured cortically by a shell splitter. He outlines the effect and penetration of the disturbed structures into the so-called normal function. In other words, his \textit{movens} was a trial to understand the separation and reference-relationship of the pathological and the normal by stressing the fact of deeper penetration of outer- and inner-perspectives. The case Schneider shows him clearly that the dis-function is not related to the representational function of perception but rather by the intentionality (PhP 158), in which we are situated.

\textsuperscript{165} Body language is to some extent an operator which outlines the figure as a restriction to a determined perspective by making the relationship one of the residuum and its vanishing background.
worldly entangled experiences in which the emergence of linguistic expression is starting underneath and within its very registrar of the space-time continuum. In this context, transcendentality is a derivate and disfigurement of the translational act insofar as neither form is reduced to content or its content subsumed in form. Language and translational practice grasp their very own legitimation through the genesis of their underpinning-relationship as their new a priori feature (PhP 255). The transcendental body setting is the breeding ground in which intellectual a posteriori practices integrate and hyper-form the entanglement of nature-history-language-body. This kind of a posteriori sublimation offers in its radical contingency the possibility to enter the being-zone or the être-au-monde as a new form of an a priori setting. The carnal body signifies the locus amoenus in which the body-phenomenology offers transcendentental possibilities and material realities – the embodiment of the intellectual realm reveals language and its being in life-world. In Le visible et l’invisible Merleau-Ponty radicalises the pivotal character of body by stressing its carnal character as the much more fundamental operational setting of being than the function of body would do it in relation to language and to the world (VNV 308). This radicalism is the embedded constitution of flesh as chiasm. The fleshy translation of reversibility (VNV 264 and 311) underpins the matrix character (VNV 270) of linguistic usage. The translation $A’$ to $B / C$ is that which Merleau-Ponty outlines as the momentum of silence. Therefore, the carnal modifies the very principle of being in the world: the carnal-body is perverted insofar as I am not in the world, but the world is embedded into the carnal condition of extended and porous reality possibilities. In other words, his approach of an inner-ontology is conditioned by the inherence of carnal translation and its design of a savage and raw being. The idea of an inner-ontology is shaped by the surrounding-surrounded being of vertical and dimensional territories (VNV 276). It is about an inner-ontology that leads to a realm of in-betweeness that provokes an indirect reading of an indirect ontology. Therefore, the primal intention is not related to consciousness or thinking but to the displaced carnal body itself. In reference to Merleau-Ponty, I would describe the activity of the enacted morphology of language through its translation as going pregnant (PhP 178). It is a lateral and oblique entering of the translational motion, by

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166 Hence, this relationship is not a causal relationship of mutual exchange but rather a function of mutual enrichment. Merleau-Ponty does not refer to Hegel’s synthesis; his synthesis is rather a compression of description, in which facticity and contingency are so to speak a vivid apeiron of mutual existence (PhP 148).

167 The a priori is the understandable and explained factum of its silent logic (PhP 255f).

168 Cf. the French original: “(... qui est déjà ‘pregnant’ (...)” (PhP 178).
being *there* while having multi-varied entry-possibilities. Hence, the carnal body and language are located within a local and grammatical setting but they do not act as objects of the space-time-continuum. This non-grammatical fixation, within an embodied morphology, outlines language as a linguistic existence within space and time (PhP 164). It is a porous system of infinite equal positioning in other orientations (PhP 166). In other words, an embodied carnal language is translation *per se*, since it is a system of equivalences (PhP 166), which is not embedded in an objective grid of coordination points but in a grammatical context where the sense-connection is permanently snatched by carrying the origin, its excess and the lack of a linguistic grammar (VNV 266f). This experience is outlined by the corporality of the carnal body, since it does not offer predicative possibilities but rather marks the new transcendentality of extending its possibility. The non-identical equivalence of $A'$ to $B / C$ is an experienced correspondence of lack and excess\(^\text{169}\). The hermeneutical horizon is only given by the immersion of an experienced consciousness within the density of world and the syntactical setting of language\(^\text{170}\). Therefore, words and their linguistic meaning are given by the parts of my flesh and not by a natural logical setting of *pre* determined categories.

We are aware that the *Leibkörper* as the *Gestalt* of phenomenological argumentation expresses its ambiguity-form. Human beings are on the basis of their bodies an entity of entities and the lexeme is only an inflection while being situated in the world. This body is nevertheless not simply a body – life-world is for the body simultaneously sensual and meaningful. Hitherto, the body cannot be taken as the hub of life-worldly understanding and it does not simply swap from ratio and facticity to carnal facticity. Instead, he succeeds Husserl by highlighting the question of how consciousness develops an understanding of entity, space and time; it is about how the body engages in this process of qualifications; in Husserl’s reading the carnal body is on the one side a physical entity and on the other side it is a body that carries its *I* (HUA XVI 161f). This kind of duality, or let us say the carnal *I*, is the *aporia* that translates the subject-object means into another reading of transcendentality. In other words, this kind of duality outlines the synthetic power that within the unified body subject and object are differentiated and, at the same time, the serving *organon* mutates to an object (HUA I

\(^{169}\) Antje Kapust outlines this event as the paradox of translation (Kapust 1999: 293).

\(^{170}\) Hence, this framework rejects the postulate of the immanence of entities and the *a priori* meaning of objects. The transcendental stance as such will be in Merleau-Ponty’s case re-articulated and might be characterised as ontological transcendentality.
128f). Merleau-Ponty adopts Husserl’s view but he does not read it in connection with Husserl’s transcendental arguments; Merleau-Ponty emphasises to outline the transcendental motive of the body by interpreting and describing it – it is far from being described by a higher authority and therefore, Merleau-Ponty fears that the *fleshiness* of the *I* will be erased. The *movens* of Merleau-Ponty is the demonstration of an anonymously executed and bodily-mediated life-world, which strips off analytic reflections. This kind of settlement remains ambiguous due to its tension line of reconstitution of the already constituted. The ambivalence of inner and outer perspectives, in which world with its subjects and objects are articulated and rearticulated, endows the *aporein* of excess and lack. The body-compartment in its diverse shades can show and explain the hyperbole and doubled aporetic feature: the carnal body as objective body constitutes itself as consciousness on the basis of capability of an already existing body: one hand touches the other and through this act will be touched (VNV 183ff). The translation of the body ends up by the nonconclusive event of the overwhelming fleshy event in its life-worldly transgression: the elucidation of the primordial function helps to intensify the articulation of space, objects and time as a consequence of body-language. A body-epistemology can be recognised primarily as the issue of *être-en-monde* and on a second track as a paradigmatic ambiguity-case of sense and sensuality. Finally, Merleau-Ponty drafts ambiguity as an original-experience since it simply supersedes to think in alternatives such as subjects and objects – he discovers the place of origin at the heart of our fleshy experiences, to describe the appearance of being and learn to understand the *paradoxon* how something can exist as such for us (PhP 86) without being able to write the carnal juiciness of the *I*. Meaning in this context is *meaning in motion* (PhP 166) or knowledge, which is *en main* (PhP 167f) looking for the enactment of the intended possible language. Linguistic meaning expresses the deepness of carnal body expressions: *I am grasping a word as my hand touches my painful wound* (PhP 210).

The carnal body as such is insofar important as Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology symbolises the negation of hasty objectivation-temptations and discovers positively, how the body-perception outlines the phenomenon of subject-object-ambiguity. Therefore, the act of expressing is not a process of selection and option rather the

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171 Husserl’s constitutional event outlines the effect that constitution is in service for the consciousness, in which the body has no more than just a privileged position.

172 The body-language is the *translatio* and the realization of life-world.
rhythm of wrath offers an imaginary body as an equivalent setting of his on setting (Prosa 124f). In relation to that, subjectivity meets its historical duty, insofar as sensuality and thinking enact an unintentional communion – a commensurability of non-existence and existence, of *per se* and *pro se* in which subjectivity is removed from any kind of body empowerment. In other words, Merleau-Ponty explains that the density shared between me and the surrounding intentions of an original acquaintance does not offer the transparency of experience. The surrounding perceptions are modalities of a general existence that are exposed to a world while penetrating me without being myself the source of its forces (PhP 115) – this is dirty translation or it is about translating the *odeur* (Prosa II).

In this stance, phenomenological descriptions precede rational, scientific purposes and on the other side the idea of fleshy incorporated ambiguity questions any kind of dualism such as subject and object, form and content, ratio and nature, etc. By the regression to the one’s own, the carnal body shows that it is an incorporated pivotal point in its perspective of perception; but nevertheless perspective-knowledge is not about a subjective deformation of entities (SC 201) and does not lead towards a perception of subject-factors. To the contrary, it leads to the certainty to communicate with a world, which is richer than our presupposed knowledge of it (SC 201). Nevertheless, perspectives cannot explain the body from its stance; it bounds our knowledge and therefore it develops and perceives the world as such; therefore it declares that any entity cannot be ever completely constituted (PhP 108). And especially, the body as such is difficult to be caught up rationally, while the meaningful body in its action disappears and the body-mediation is not present in relation to it. In the case of consciousness-knowledge, Merleau-Ponty refers to the event that consciousness has the tendency to posit the objects as they are. This kind of setting is already the ossification of consciousness, since it freezes experience to objects (PhP 86). The firm achievement of body was such that it has to be focused on its genesis, its starting perception. The event of being *in statu nascendi* is literally spoken the melting-effect of the freezing consciousness moment: language, consciousness or body do not exist as such – it is more about the fleshy happening of perception, the experience of speaking and mediating or the effect of becoming consciousness\(^\text{173}\); the *progressum* of

\[^{173}\text{This kind of reflections lead towards the shifting from atomistic theories in psychology towards Gestalt-psychology (SC 100ff.) representing the stress of the gestaltpsychological perception; in opposition, Phénoménologie de la Perception (PhP) does no longer highlight the idea of an alien}\]
consciousness is not because we have a fleshy body but because we are in carnal corporality: again, it is about $A'$ to $B / C$. As consequence, the outer-perspective, mistakenly understood as an objective perspective, does not offer an understanding of phenomenon, but rather it is the entanglement of phenomenological perspectives, which is not in opposition to inner- and outer-perspectives. It is an eternal shifting of in and out by describing the function and comportment of its genesis (cf. être-au-monde). The phenomenological body is in its outlook the opposition of objective psychology and physiological bodies. The phenomenological body has a peculiar-structure and an immanent meaning; it stands for a pivotal-point of lively-meanings (PhP 177) and functions as the anchorage in life-world. The body as the subject of perception (PhP 260) has therefore an unspecific form of understanding. This kind of understanding and knowledge is not an understanding of knowledge, not a logical subjugation of ideas or classification of rules, which has to be explained: the body has as such an undeniable grasping moment and has in accordance to it an anonymous sense-founder.¹⁷⁴

The outlining effect of the carnal body as natural ego, which is prior to any kind of personal and transcendental ego, drafts structures of senses by enhancing further repertoires; the phenomenological body contains two layers within itself: explaining the habitual and the actual body (PhP 98). Merleau-Ponty is persuaded that the categories of the habitual and actual body compose the whole entity, since the habitual body incorporates the entities, which are the basis for maniable entities (PhP 98). The habitual body embodies the antecedent capability of être-en-monde and in opposition the actual body is no longer capable of managing the entities of the world; it is rather a zone of silence (PhP 97). Within this tension-field, the meaning of the phenomenon as an expression of être-au-monde corresponds along its phenomenon by understanding it as the consisted engagement in the world. But simultaneously, it manifests a contradiction, which Merleau-Ponty classifies as the paradox of être-au-monde. It is about the insolvable contradiction of sense-foundation and sense: on the one side the perceptive and practical intentions of the world, which are prior, are from another perspective just existing insofar as they are connected throughout the power of thinking spectator but rather the position of the perceiving person; it is not about the status nascendi but rather Merleau-Ponty develops the structures of perception directly from the view of the starting perception.¹⁷⁴ In addition, cf. Heidegger explores the lumen naturale in Sein und Zeit (SZ 133).
and willing (PhP 98). This paradoxon can be detected but not dissolved\textsuperscript{175}. As we have seen, Merleau-Ponty does not at all outline the idea of être-au-monde as thetic, object based thinking quasi as mode of res extensa. Etre-au-monde signifies a realm in-between simple objectivity and subjectivity and therefore, a description of the world from where on the thetic act of consciousness will be executed by the body laterally.

Hence, the notion être-au-monde makes in statu nascendi terms such as body, consciousness or language intelligible understandable and insofar it is a notion that describes certain phenomenological phenomenon in-adequate. Indeed, this notion indicates the possibility to describe the phenomenon as phenomenon. Nevertheless, the ambiguity persists as figuration: it is a tool of phenomenological description, insofar as the body or the I is in the world and simultaneously is the perspective, which rend the realm of description accessible insofar as être-au-monde is the third figure of psychic and physiological setting that Merleau-Ponty discusses as existence. The subject-object relationship is no longer the condition of knowledge, but rather a paradoxical being-vividness, in which the subject exchanges with its life-world (SNS 89). The serving and acting body exists in such a way that it designs in correspondence être-au-monde and incorporates its structures. In this context, Merleau-Ponty uses the signification of être-au-monde in a broader sense. The existence and the être-au-monde through the body can be interpreted as the subject of perception. The body expresses the existence, while it creates first of all the actual reality of the existence and it is in the same line the actual reality of the existence itself. By following these lines we can highlight that the very phenomenon of existence incarnates itself and hence the separation of inner-and-outer perspectives, signs and meanings can no longer be theorised by different entities, but are abstract moments of l’être soi (PhP 193). The actual and serving body is outlined on sediments of knowledge, which simultaneously has been deposited in-adequately. The permanent shifting is the characteristics of the existence, which can lead towards a certain kind of pathology of nascendi. This kind of knowledge is never a cognitive knowing that that can be attached to a cognisant I but rather a knowing how\textsuperscript{176}, whose explications remain incomplete. The sedimentation of knowledge remains anonymous and remains in the mode of the anonymous one. Language is therefore an apperception (VL 175) that is not self-being but a kind of relationship of flesh and body that evokes a

\textsuperscript{175} If we attempt to analyse this paradoxon, it might be resolved. Its clarity and transparency have to be the price to pay for contradicting the original experience. The ambiguous reality of body inspired reality would disappear in favour of the idea body and the idea of the world.

\textsuperscript{176} The notions knowing how and knowing that are explained by Gilbert Ryle (Ryle 1986: 26ff).
linguistic form of spontaneous apperception within a kind of being that is not self-being: it is much about to figure out how a self-being can modulate a savage being of expression.

F Yes to savage being

In Merleau-Ponty’s later work and especially in Le visible et l’invisible (VNV) he reshapes his phenomenological considerations by favouring an ontological approach (VNV 219f) reformulating and radicalising perceptual considerations and work practises. Nevertheless, he does not abandon the reflections of his earlier thoughts; it is rather a new cocktail in which the entanglement of visible perceptions and expressions are related somehow to the invisibility of thoughts. Due to Merleau-Ponty’s unfinished work, the unfolding of Merleau-Ponty’s ontology is quite difficult and polyvalent. His being experience is primarily a carnal experience, offering a pre-conditioned reality and is in opposition to Heidegger’s pre-predicative availability. Outlining its vivid dimensionality and openness in correspondence to being will reverberate carnal achievements. Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of an ontology-within-the-world offers an intra-ontology that relies on the mediation of the carnal consortus. Hence, I attempt to line up glimpses of ontological framing by relying on his rejection of causality – his ontology is not at all the source for the casus accusativus. In this sense, the silent cogito, the non-axiomatic consciousness will be rejected by the mere fact that the intrinsic power of consciousness is a theoretical evidence that needs words, expressions, inflections and practices. In this reading, the tiny line of perception and expression remains un-resolved; the enactment of translating phenomenological perceptions into morphological entities and henceforth linguistic structures remain a lively existing apeiron. In other words, the order of perception does not create defined and determined objects and therefore linguistic signs are non-corresponding derivations. The act of expression yields its given grammar into a pre-condition in which we are already embodying the metamorphosis, which we are going to undertake (Prosa 97ff). Hitherto, the problem of Merleau-Ponty’s reasoning is that he considered language as a

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177 Merleau-Ponty follows Heidegger’s approach by considering the ontological project as a mixture of phenomenology and ontology; it is a way to understand the world by questioning its origin and it is likewise the setting, in which it reacts (SZ: 38 and PhP V).

178 Even though words are in their enactment as well a pluri-potential fragmentation.
positive setting\textsuperscript{179} and therefore he aims for strands or for polyphonies of translation. It seems that in his very last period of thinking, he corroborates dual structures of perception and realisation. He tries to overcome this thetic failure by enforcing phenomenological stances and at the same time ontological embodiments. Parallelism enforces body expression, crystallises and fractures happening and therefore, he enforces the ontological project as a savage ontology or indirect ontology. This radicalisation is linked with final trails of denominations: Merleau-Ponty wants to know what is beyond the possibility of perception (VNV 20f). Nevertheless, his ontological reconsideration does not enforce causal strands: no intrinsic being, no representational being, no being for human beings, etc. The sceptic argument beyond ontological findings enforces its *conjunctivus* (VNV 21); language as such is therefore the *conjunctivus objectivus* and *conjunctivus subjectivus* without aiming for synthesising forces. The mere dialectic evidence is embedded within multifactorial diffractions by highlighting the hyperbolic experience of translating $A'$ to $B / C$. Merleau-Ponty tries to underpin this pending ontological stance by a radical withdrawal of consciences and perception entities, since they separate language into clear realms of $A$ and $B$ or *image* and *perception*. As we can understand now, Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of ontology is non-foundational and does not consider the ontological power of separation. His ontology is a radical description of an amalgam and is articulated within this slippery framework: the concepts of idea, *cogito*, and representation should be replaced by framing bodies such as dimensions, articulation, level, *charnières* or configurations. In other words, Merleau-Ponty wants to show that ontological characters, such as experience, sensations or judgments are in reality theoretical separations within the vivid ontological reality that is incarnated in the *corps de l’esprit*. Merleau-Ponty’s opting to a life-world that can neither be perceived as a positive entity nor as negative lively passage, is formulated as heavy *fleshy-body-being*. Henceforth, translation from $A'$ to $B$ is the multiple repeated reality of the deviation of $C$. This $C$ is not a $C$ but – let’s say – *fleshy $C$ in* life-worldly practice. In that sense, the existence of $C$ cannot be explained by transcendental characteristics but by the enactment of phenomenological experiences of $C$ as a kind of transcendental character\textsuperscript{180}. $C$ is not an expression of an isolated real, but the serving expression of its *fleshiness*. $C$ corroborates the fact that the translation of $A$ is a derivation of its expressional relatedness in life-world. The structure of $A'$ to $B / C$ cannot be understood as an entity-structure of expressions but rather as a

\textsuperscript{179} At least, Merleau-Ponty considers language as positive instrument in *Le visible et l’invisible* (VNV).

\textsuperscript{180} Cf. Alphonse de Waelhens (Waelhens 1951: 391).
style of being existent to(wards) life-world: style writes the outlining of meaning. Before the signifié will be common sense, there is a fruitful moment, where the enactment of the translated expression will be given through déformation cohérente (Prosa 85). The style of translating is therefore a kind of story telling and yet it is not history; the translator does not know anything about the difference of a difference between human beings and world, between the meaningful and the absurd, since the translated is only able to draft the translated by its mode of action and on the backslash of the world. In other words, the translation-style is not a positive figuration, a mode of representation or an object, rather it is a result of points of contact, in which the demands of the expressed translation looks for; the act of translation is therefore a system of resonance that is a possible deviational element of my body and my expression – the meaning of C is the genesis, in which the given life-world is undergoing a coherent deformation and the expressed regroups a bundle of elements. This kind of translation would be beyond and in opposition to structural and systemic settings. It is a latent translation that can never be re-grouped by positive figures or a linguistic framework in which sense and reality is seeping in and is shimmering like a flavour (Prosa 87). The new setting is the existence of the successful expression, in which the particular-entity will be refused181. Yes, translatio is an embodied expression of flesh, since the fleshy experience is the chiastic event of body and mind, body and world, you and me, life and world – it is yes to squeezing, while Husserl in opposition would analyse the process of squeezing in epoché. The difference between yes and analysing is the fundamental difference between Merleau-Ponty and Husserl. Hence, translatio is not stressed by any objective entity of wholeness but rather by a generality of visibility (VNV 171). Merleau-Ponty’s fleshy standpoint is the Urpräsentierbarkeit, openness (VNV 171) and reversibility (VNV 187) of the phatic situation of the translational-act: the transgression of A’ to B / C is not a matter of texts but of its texture. The generality of flesh evokes the concrete-general, its reversibility and it offers a platform to enact the translation of the Urpräsentierbare in its un-presented stage. The translated C is the emergence of the concrete, in which the general mode of being sensuality has to be taken seriously and is therefore the outburst of Merleau-Ponty’s outburst of savage ontology. As a consequence, language is not a setting of conventions

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181 Merleau-Ponty refers to an anecdote of the landlord of Cassis and Renoir by André Malraux: Renoir’s view was not a certain way to consider the sea but rather he was attracted by a hidden elaborated world that rises to the immeasurable (Prosa 87f). This immeasurable raising is where the fleshiness trickles down in the juiciness of life-world. Translatio is therefore the hidden act of living chiastically in the world.
or a well formed and organised grammar but rather an expression-happening in its sensuality of aporetic descriptions: the transcendental ego does not enter into a deeper *a priori* stage of sensuality. Hence, we have discovered that Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of ontology has to be read in the polyphony of flesh. It is a kind of *indirect language-ontology* that corroborates the force of expression as a form of differentiation-activity in its materiality and meaning-creations. Indeed, we do not have to value the meaning of *C*, rather it is about the expression-happening of *C* in its juiciness. *C* is not a synthesising force, it is about the approach to *C* in its metaphoric appearance. In that sense, Merleau-Ponty formulates the idea of reversibility as the impossibility to consider Parmenides’ *being*. He formulates that being can only be grasped by the *Seiende* describing its *Sein*. Indeed, between *C* and my flesh there is a special relationship of approaching the realm *C* but also by saying metaphors: translation is in that sense an ambiguous enactment, since the access to *C* is at the same time its withdrawal of *C*. The hermeneutical approximation of *C* is in each pronunciation a differentiation in non-differentiation. The experience of the translated *C* can be fetched by the fleshy-body and its state of surrounding juicy perception. Translational truth is the production of very fleshy experiences in its savage ontological appearance. The importance of this line is that the very evidence of ontological *compossibilité* (VNV 29) is in its enactment and stylistic figuration written in *incompossibilité*. Therefore, notions like equation, transparency, truth or representation are positively perceived by a mind setting that requires a transcendental ego that is able to enforce ideas – ideas, which are symbols that we never can grasp by their transcendentental sense but by their presence (PhP 18f). This might be the reason why Merleau-Ponty’s reflection is much more radical than any analytical observation could ever be: we can only translate the perspective, which we have read into it. In Merleau-Ponty’s setting, there is no vertical translation of *C*; any structure of *cogitationes* has to be withdrawn from its reflection of life by highlighting the silence of phatic openness of *être-au-monde*. Language is therefore less an operational skill than a thematic realm in which the enactment of sense-potentiality can be formulated. The task of the translator will be to use a grammar that is not given by norms and frameworks but will be the articulation of a motivation and hence, style is not a figuration of recognition but a practice of distortion: it is about finding the path that opens to the caveman without *having tradition in my hand-luggage* and this will be again the momentum where we are...

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182 This is where the juiciness of the fleshy body comes into account.
able to express the world. Merleau-Ponty formulates that the savage seeing is at the core of each translation since translation as such lacks and exceeds its very operationability: it lacks since C is not given per se and at the same time it exceeds since translatio evokes that we are able to read C. Within this, aporein language and its translation has to be articulated in its malfunctional originality – language has to be withdrawn to understand its hidden grammar. Language is in Merleau-Ponty’s context not a denomination-toolbox but rather it tries to catch the richness and fracture of life-world by considering that meanings do only exist in a non-differential difference. Nevertheless, language is not an unnecessary and useless trope, its grammatical lining has to consider that in each expression there is an unexpressed part – language as a diacritic knowledge-production\textsuperscript{183} of style and type is within a non-located field of life-worldly experiences. Within this framework, fields and world are for Merleau-Ponty not positioning in time-and-space but rather a flexible band, in which we are never able to say C but able to say it is not B; the invisible C is fixed by the visible B that is in its enacted translation of A’ to B / C an extension of C. Hence; the un-translatable is not the negation and not positioning – it is rather a negativity that is not a negation (VNV 273 ff). By this turn, Merleau-Ponty tries to overcome the dialectic setting by introducing a linguistic grammar of ambiguity and aporia: the sense of translation of A to B is invisible, but the invisible is not the opposite of the visible; the visible has itself a structure of invisibility – C is the non-ur-presentation of the translated text B or in other words, C is the virtual texture of the visible text B (cf. Weltlichkeit VNV 265). This structured non-structure is Merleau-Ponty’s essay of transcendental framing. This leads to a new kind of generality, if we have understood that the invisible is part of its (linguistic) reality. The translated B will not be qualified by a C since we understand that B can be a particularity and likewise its universality. In other words, the Gestalt of language erodes the morphology without that I am at the source of the erosion\textsuperscript{184}. This kind of chiastic experience of facticity and entity exceeds and lacks dual patterns and has to be grasped by the very idea of flesh – flesh as the Sichtigkeit and generality (VNV 171). Hence, the signifié and the significant are the entrelacs of l’envers. This architecture captures the picture that any operationalization of language contains in its silence the possibility of language. It is about using a language of another world but this does not mean that we are no longer in the life-world we pretend to be normally; it is a

\textsuperscript{183} Merleau-Ponty uses diacritic in reference to Ferdinand de Saussure.

\textsuperscript{184} In other words, facts and entities cannot be separated, since it emerges from the essence brute (VNV 153f).
life-world that is exempt from the burden of fixation. The linguistic act translates the prose of the world into the fiery conditions of poetry. Hence, savage ontology is the system of compression and de-compression in which the diacritic-momentum enacts its lateral conception. This passive structure is the silent shouting of savage ontology and on the other hand it outlines the conditionality of transcendentalism. Translation fulfils in this constellation the deviation and the avenue for being pregnant. Therefore, the access to the essence of language will be important since the chiastic life of immanence and transcendence will not be solved but encompassed. So far we have sorted out that linguistic schemes, their modulation and translation are the silent enactment of life-world. In Coda, I am attempting to outline Merleau-Ponty’s linguistic constellations in its pregnant life.

2. Coda: Language and translation: a lateral affair

In extension to the above mentioned, we might consider that sensual word-pictures and in general linguistic signs cannot be intellectually grasped by their intrinsic validity. Reasoning the ontological breeding ground is not answerable by the means of formation. The institution language is far from revealing the secrets of the world – though language exposes a linguistic world and by outlining a second power of life-world (VNV 129f), it does not exhibit emptiness but it outlines the perversion of life-world insofar as the second potency reveals the effect of doublets; questioning life-world is not about reflexio but the repetition and doubling force of immanence. In its initial and original perception and as a first theoretical approach – way ahead of linguistic absorption and denomination – sensual signs and their meanings are ideally not separable; the intellectual reflection is not able to introduce the spinney of life-world (PhP 48). The sensual sign can only be a sensual sign due to its inhabited sense and the initial perception fulfils it by the fact that it only perceives meaningful signs and entities due to its a-logical hyperbolic fertilisation. Neither can we rely on grammatical analyses, which indexes general linguistic elements, nor does language pose the necessary equivalence of expressions in other linguistic forms. Grammatical meaning

185 However our motion for transcendentality is not based on the facticity of transcendental narcissism (Waldenfels 1976 V).
186 In my reading the relationship of immanence and transcendence is not lined up as Michael Henry would put it: the immanence is the entity of its transcendence (Henry 1963).
and inflection are finally nothing else than a self-fulfilling approximation of the linguistic actor (Prosa 38ff). Hence, linguistic signs as such do not denominate and do not create the causality of sign and signification; in other words, signs are in a certain way lacking and exceeding their own meaning, since meaning-intentions are nothing else than a determined vide déterminé, which has to be filled with words (Signes 112). In another reading it seems to be plausible that sensual word-pictures cause a certain (psychic or physiologic) action that cannot conceive a specific meaning of signs, a perspective of life-worldly being (VNV 131) or a theory that constructs words by the acts of consciousness. Both theoretical approaches lack the fact that words might have sense: the first theory represents the mundane-effect of word-signification by having an active position of cogito (PhP 206) and the second concept yields it by referring to a speaker/user. Merleau-Ponty tries to extricate language from its theoretical burden and its instrumentalisation for positivity without considering its starting and aiming points – language is functional and likewise a diverse happening (Merleau-Ponty 1993: 7). In reference to Merleau-Ponty, the genesis of language is more than referring to an existing language, not only that it has an extra-linguistic backing, but it is subsisted by the already said and the unsaid through the modulation of life-world. In his vision, not language but rather the primal act of speaking as speaking behaviour matters most (PhP 208f). From this perspective, he is not able to identify a motive to separate the sensual sign from meaning and to relate it to an object. Au contraire, Merleau-Ponty discusses the possibilities of origin, genesis and the crystallisation of the linguistic phenomenon and he is not at all interested in determining the truth of expressions. In other words, the intelligible world is an imposition insofar as any attempt of reconstruction is primarily the imperialism of my own referentiality – truth is une idée-limite (PhP 222), which has forgotten its contingent linguistic elements in its utterance. Merleau-Ponty bases truth on the reality realm of speaking, in the sense that its foundation is layered in linguistic signs, which are developed by language in statu nascendi and concretised by the expression of original silence (PhP 214) – this is a practical shift in language but its force is only indicated by the act and its immediate fleshy coverage; we have to expel the idea of an original text, its translation is not our language – the concept of a complete expression is pointless, since its coverage is oblique or even silent (Signes 54). The wondrous silence follows the line that the linguistic act is not able to separate and categorise meaning due to its diacritic meaning but likewise it seems that language offers the possibility to pertain and foster meaning (Signes 109).
Language as a constituted, syntactic and vocabulary-based system as well as means of expression are sediments of its *written utterance*, in which the unformulated sense finds a way for outward expressions, since lively language has its vivid task underneath and beyond its expressions and likewise in its overwhelming noise. Lively language is living a mutual life like big creatures, unifying and separating just as its lateral and indirect meaning features long for (Prosa 123f) – language is silent in its lack and excess motion.

Hence, this sub-chapter is dedicated to understand the hyper-phenomenon of linguistic practices and the relevance of operationalising translation as toolkit for trespassing the diacritic relationship of perception and expression\textsuperscript{187} and as matrix in which linguistic signs are neither translation of idealistic prepositions nor representation of imaginary dreams: it is about positive ambiguity or positive dialectics (VNV 127). The translation of morphological elements is in Merleau-Ponty’s framework an accurate study of the phenomenon and its visibility by evoking that denominations are neither constituted by positivity and negativity nor the synthesis of it. There is not a third movement in linguistic usage, positive dialectic is not a matter of thought and behaviour that keeps an intimate relationship of its ontological breeding ground but it opens fields, in which acts can be inscribed, registered and enacted by the motion of linguistic polyvalence in historicity. For this reason linguistic intentions will be exhausted with its completion, since the expression will be expressed but never in its full range (Prosa 52). It is about self-mediation, in which ambiguity suspends the capability of denomination to be I by annihilating its very identity\textsuperscript{188}. Hence, the difficulty of this examination is within the realm of accuracy – is it accurate in *relation to what and to whom*? Since positivity such as accuracy are derivations, the chiastic moment of entering reality without denying its very own orientation and perception offers a brave new world; the identity of life-world and language has to be identical but not in an unifying sense, since the lack of

\textsuperscript{187} It is about the dialectic happening in which the expression can require the presence of *mind in nature* or *nature in mind* (RC 21).

\textsuperscript{188} Valéry’s linguistic richness can only be understood by considering his absence of writing – it is about this misbelief in language: “On voit par les cahiers de 1900 à 1910 (qui devaient plus tard constituer les deux recueils Tel Quel, I et II) que sa [Valéry] défiance envers le langage n’était qu’un cas particulier de sa défiance envers une vie qui ne se soutient que par des prodiges incompréhensibles. Le langage est clair quand on passe assez vite sur les mots, mais cette ‘solidité fondamentale’ s’effondre devant une conscience rigoureuse. Aussi la littérature vit-elle d’impostures : l’écrivain dit ce que veut son langage, et passe pour profond, chaque manque en lui, une fois mis en paroles, fait figure de pouvoir, et la somme des hasards qui collaborent à un livre passe pour intention d’auteur” (RC 24f).
difference, the element of motion and trespassing would therefore not exist. In other words, I attempt to draft the landscape behind the drawing by considering the paradoxon of the expressed language that is always underneath and above linguistic signs: how is it possible to draft a non-coherent grammar by using intended linguistic signs and how can the silent word double and translate the expressed language by evoking the absent present? It is about outlining, how we are able to translate without relying on nature, which is set previously and lies literally in front of our senses and it is about how we are able to communicate prior to communication and how meaning can be created before meaning (Prosa 79). I follow Merleau-Ponty’s strand that the evidence of the concrete perceived things is related to the texture of quality that its sensuality should be capable of drawing its odour (Prosa II). Drawing odeur is the tension between relying on already given expressions and using these expressions as figures to stand out from them and creates curiosity or sensation. It highlights a linguistic framework that is not a system of entities but tendencies, which distracts language from its lively presence. Accuracy is lively accuracy and it is the silent meaning that is inherent in life-world.

A The accuracy of language

In Le fantôme d’un langage pur (Prosa 7-15) Merleau-Ponty outlines that we are driven by the desire to have a language-machine that connects given codes and translates given evidence into well established and causal syntaxes (Prosa 8f). Therefore, Merleau-Ponty evokes structural premises of linguistic signs: language disposes a certain number of basic signs, which can be constantly regrouped into distinct expressions and translates its pre-determined meaning. This distinction leads towards a system of grammatical original equivalence of signs and meaning in its full transparency. In this case, language outlines the possibility of almighty-hood and intelligibility, since no thoughts are in words and no words remain in thoughts. Language will be transferred to a level, in which tension will be resolved (Prosa 69). In this circularity we will not be able to formulate alternative linguistic signs; life-world and its modus vivendi enact and supervise linguistic-combinations. The structure of signifié and significant does not consider or include (remote) possibilities. The other will be – as long as the space-time-continuum permits it – the other and the sun will be always the sun. And if the grammar
has to explain for a particular situation a new and unknown form, it does not dispose an equivalent setting; grammar introduces new definitions and symbols, which can be thereafter be translated within its very own setting. Even new forms do not distract the language machine and order the new elements in its linear syntax. Language guides us to meaning, even before it is meaning – as long as we attribute a minor function to language we bind language to a form of truth-consciousness, whose supporter it should be (Prosa 38): it is the hermeneutical encounter of two identic horizons. From that point of view, the remotest and non-located expressions will simply be replaced by expressions, which resettles our linguistic setting. We seek to synchronise perception and expression and provoking by translating that life-world is nothing less than a synchronised reality. The expression would be bound to unequivocal relations, in which thought finds out what actually already has been imported. The ego or more precisely the transcendental ego, in its ens rationes, is the nucleus of all possible meanings, since experience is already pre-registered in the a priori trope. This hermeneutical circle is that which we have outlined above: the translation from A as A’ to B. Husserl has not formed per se a theory of language but rather in his transcendental a priori he reduces linguistic signs and tropes to servants of the very coniunctio of eidos and eidolon. In addition, Merleau-Ponty describes that even pre-historic language settings are subscribed in the very time-continuum189 and reproduces life-world, even though it might be a pre and therefore invisible language190 that is not fixed to defined objects. The momentum of pre191 supersedes the element of cuniuncto and likewise it outlines a language of silence that evokes a porous and fluid ontological setting, but nevertheless pre does not mean a second order beyond time: it is the atmosphere of time itself192. Merleau-Ponty breaks with the immanence of language and replaces it with chiastic experiences of grammatical inflections that slip away as soon as we attempt to fix it – it is an invisible language in its visibility. Pure and universal language is simply the counter-project to the chiastic experience of linguistic being and a simple doubling or neutralisation effect of its essence: translating is in these circumstances not the line up

189 Cf. Merleau-Ponty Prosa 12 ff.
190 Merleau-Ponty explains in Le visible et l’invisible that the new ontological setting is the expression ante expression (VNV 219ff).
191 The translator is before language as well as before external realities, cf. trouver le langage (VL 172f).
192 Even language is not able to outline this blind spot due to the fact that in the expression the prior expression, which has to be executed, does not get expressed. The expressed cogito encounters a deferred silent cogito. This cogito is not at all a constructing cogito in the highest potency; it is the experience of my own through me that has got only a gliding indication in the world (PhP 462): the silent cogito is its pure existence if it gets expressed and simultaneously is reflected to the indeclinable event of the silent cogito. The silent cogito will be manifest if it has to deal – in its existence – its existence.
in which we translate the odour but rather we translate the ordure in life-world. Translating in is finally a cynic and blasphemous happening since the idea of a complete expression is a chimaera (Prosa 41). Hence, my movens is to follow the strand of sensations to find out how a non-thetic language can be expressed that does not end up in chaos. The ad libitum movens of chaotic settings are in its negativity already a rational concept and does not fulfil the non-thetic dispositive, since chaos is never chaos in its negative sense. And so is expression, never expression in its absolute sense and language never a grammatical composition that can be grasped conceptually. Perception and expression are a matrix of another past and another future. Language is therefore an a-transcend enactment of perception and thoughts, while my seeking for its semantic expression is always apart. Merleau-Ponty explains that the transcendental capability of language and perception results from its very own organisation. Therefore, the act of translating language and perception into meaning does not leap to an intellectual framework but into a meaningful setting in silence that enacts a transcendental framework, which is never ens rationes but is present in its a-part constitution – this other reading of transcendentality is the very silent moment of language and framework.

B Silentium

The silent enactment of language is the underpinning event of language: silence guides us to language insofar as it withdraws itself from ourselves through its activity. It gropes around meaning intentions, which are not guided by texts but which are about to be written; we have to be aware about the silence around the presence (Signes 58). Activated language is speaking to us and makes us blind for its enactment – in other words, language will be through us a non-identified vivid language of speaking and echoing (Prosa 16f). In opposition to any form of linguistic unifying stages, we should be attentive to the silence of language by discovering the pathic moment of life in its silent force of expressing. Merleau-Ponty recapitulates this double entrance of language and silence, by separating a langage parlé as the linguistic dispositive of spoken language and a langage parlant as the enacted language. This separation offers the possibility to operationalise a langage avant le langage or in other words language is meaning before it has meaning: the translation of A’ to B / C is in its enactment a permanent derivate of A and B or in other words C is always carved in A and B. The power of expression in its operation – langage operant – and enactment offers the
possibility to understand the above described double entrance of expression. The creativity and genesis of language is a palimpsest *in* silence and rewrites language, history and its expression possibility. The codification of possibility is its silence: we are not looking for positivity and facticity of an emergent linguistic expression but we are keeping our phatic openness as the dispositive for expressivity and morphemes: texts are no longer important we should highlight the texture as form of responsiveness\(^\text{193}\) but however I am reading a text, I am literally transforming the written text into speaking words in believing to have created the text by myself. Hence, I am already the translation of myself. This might be the ultimate form of translation in which the pathic responsiveness opens the possibility for A’ *in* B / C. The pathic setting responds to sign possibilities, in which C emanates from its very hints; the character of C has its own style-possibilities, which penetrate the common realm of *langage parlé*. This movement of penetration is not simply the act of invasion and capturing but rather the event of *translatio*. The *langage parlé* will be trans-ported into a *latio* of *langage parlant*. The translation is not a new text but the text is re-written. It is body engagement in which the translated text is the sedimentation of a texture and of body-enactments. This kind of body language is never new but accentuates aspects of its sedimentation. A translation is therefore never a new product or a copy of an original (con)text, it is rather a special relationship of text-body-texture, in which expression reverses the texture-body-text language: translation is a trope in which A’ *to* B / C is the chiastic experience of C / B *to* A\(^\text{194}\). The carnal body is the very special style and transcendental condition to capture the lineage of text-language-texture. In a certain way the transcendental offspring demands a double entrance of the body: it fosters and likewise limits its body enactment; the body operator reduces therefore visibility. However, if the operator body is the transcendental condition possibility of viewing, then it might mean that the reduction is itself the transcendental condition of its one possibility. The very condition of reduction is not a restriction but rather it outlines temporal body perspectives (PdW Vf). However, this transcendental setting is not positivity in the Kantian sense but rather the a-morph life-worldly possibility, in which body incorporates its double function of being its vivid expression and likewise its abstract foundation. This body ambiguity is therefore the very silent spur of translation: being already a translation is the silent shouter at the border of life-world and it is


\(^{194}\) Cf. the moment of expression is the happening in which the relationship will be reversed: indeed, the book possesses its reader.
therefore the amalgam of translational practice, which is never body, hybridity, text B / C or entanglement. It is not facticity, fatality but the phatic enactment of style-possibilities, in which being will be rough, savage and diffracted. The fragment of life-world offers an infinite amount of figures in which being can be unfolded by questioning the momentum of the chiastic tangency. Translation is therefore a ground operation that yields its own conditions of perception, expression (Prosa 83) and silence in life-world.

C Silent … immanence

Therefore, we can trace that in Phénoménologie de la Perception (PhP) Merleau-Ponty explains that body is able to translate a certain motoric entity into words, expounds the articulation-style of a lexeme into its vivid possibility and translates a possible movement-intention into real movements, since it is the sine qua non of natural expressions in time and space (PhP 211); yes, translatio is the silent polyphony in life-world – life-world has a disposition that probably enhances the spurs of elements, renders the relationship with being possibilities (Prosa 85). Its meaning-intention is not a mental transformation but rather a synchronic modulation of my own existence and therefore an articulation of my very être-au-monde. Nevertheless our daily communication does no longer cause problems and is not perceived as synchronic modulation of my own. Language is reflected and performed in its given world-reality without distortions and dilatations. In that sense, the institutionalised language as such presumes the chiastic experience of langage parlé and langage parlant as presumed. The experience of our body will be superficial as long as we do not re-schedule the linguistic phenomenon as the original silence of the word and its body expressivity that breaks with its silence. If the thetic reality of an original text is missing, the ability for an entire expression will be useless, since words would be allusive and finally silent (Signes 54). The gesture of language is the hidden facticity that refers to the ultimatum that meaning has language. Bodily experienced language has in Merleau-Ponty’s system nevertheless veins leading to the realm of immanent conditions: language and words have a certain inner and immediate meaning-sense that is however never given by its term but as style, affective value, modulator and as gesture. It is an immanent enactment that is existential in its organism insofar as the expression of the reader and
recipient calls for a new sense- and experience-formation. The immanent structure of language is not an intelligible structure (VNV 28); the expression of language is a signature of an unsettled and continued spur in its environment. In this case, linguistic structural elements can only be related to their network of impartial inflections. The internal logic creates hybrid constructions, which nevertheless affirms its *grammaire impérieuse* (VNV 143). According to Merleau-Ponty, linguistic signs are able to express their sedimentation on an inter-subjective basis by referring to its field of experience, in which material things become apparent and in which its appearance is measured by our capability to diversify (VNV 147); language founds therefore in us the idea of truth that re-groups pre-summative idealisation of notions and forgets its very contingency of facts – an ontology that is not a positive being but an in-variance that articulates an alternation in the ontological difference or absence (VNV 147). This is the immanent birth of what we have denominated as the silent language. Consequently, there is this eternal dream to stabilise the linguistic constitution by repeating the act of linguistic expressions. Nevertheless, the act of stabilising is not formalising, the aesthetic experience is rather existential and re-shapes its very natural attitude: expression is not simply translation but rather the realisation of meaning itself (PhP 209)\(^{195}\). We do not have the consciousness ability that constitutes words and inflections\(^{196}\). However, words and inflection are also not pre-ordered figurations\(^{197}\) (as realism could outline it) – phenomenological working does not inter-connect entities and mind and it is therefore on a very special mission while shaping transcendentality into another direction. At this very point we can witness the hyper-reality of formalism – formalism exceeds and lacks the act of translation – but simultaneously the transcendental corpus steps into the breach by reading a total other form of transcendentality. Therefore, the immanent structure does not resemble Husserl’s transcendental *A as A’* formation but it underpins my transcendental considerations on Merleau-Ponty’s perception framework. In its mode of expression, the question of equivocation and translation might be re-shaped by articulating that equivalency is the enactment of sense-dilatation and –transformation. In that sense, the preposition of body is not the specificity of having body: our senses, our views and our odours are

\(^{195}\) In correspondence, Merleau-Ponty uses in this context a very immanent and positive meaning of translation and does not correspond to his thoughts about experiencing language by its chiastic happening: “Personne ne contestera qu’ici l’opération expressive réalise ou effectue la signification et ne se borne pas à la traduire” (PhP 213).

\(^{196}\) We do not have the categories of idealism which would predict this kind of understanding.

\(^{197}\) We do not have the categories of realism which would predict this kind of understanding.
references, which overlay us by offering hints to grasp the criterion of being. The theorem of *habitude*198 is connected with the lexeme trans- *latio* and re- *latio*: it reflects the matrix of body, its inscriptions in(to) the *signifié*-box and its texture. In other words, we are all possessor of language and grammar, even though *habitude* is not the immanent offspring of pure facticity, our linguistic ability refers to a stock of a linguistic matrix that supercedes the individual lines of word-pictures. Hence, the body is not a unity but rather it is consistency with different layers and different empathic connotations. As we can see, there is a subtle tension between acknowledging the diffracted being of carnal language and at the same time accepting the carnal body as inner-ontological structure. In *Le visible et l’invisible* Merleau-Ponty favours the *ontological being* as its *habitude*, since this setup enables us to play with grammar and to vary with lexemes. Hence, there is a double reality beyond *A* and *B*: on the one hand *A* and *B* is a tool of action and on the other *A* and *B* is a disinterested, not *habitude* oriented, denomination-form. The unattached manner of speaking is an entity and inner-ontologically a process of reflection. The *eidos* *A* cannot be defined and translated in one category *A*. Therefore labelling something as *A* signifies to translate its particularity and individuality into the entity of *A*199; the ill person might have *A*, but he / she is no longer capable of fulfilling the translation from the concrete towards the categorical setting200 (PhP 205). Consequently, causality of being ill formulates that language is conditioned by causal links and finally by its transcendental ego.

**D The story of analogia entis**

This very paragraph invites us to close-read Merleau-Ponty’s theory of life-world in lining up another transcendentality. He is aware about the ambiguity of its intellectual stance and is therefore the *movens* to reformulate his phenomenology of perception in *Le visible et l’invisible* into a form of analogia entis. Nonetheless, it is an analogia entis that is never *stricto sensu* an analogia entis: the intelligibility of the world is not a *cosmos noetos* of *compossibilité* that bridges the perspectives in a sense that *A* is *B* and

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198 Merleau-Ponty makes a distinction between *being* and *having* and outlines it as counter-project to Gabriel Marcel’s *l’être* and *avoir* (cf. PhP 203).
199 This is Husserl’s transcendental project.
200 Merleau-Ponty refers to the example of colour-amnesia by outlining Gelb and Goldstein’s observations. He outlines an immanent distinction between the sick and healthy human being. Body entities are therefore probably no longer read in their fragility; cf. Gelb and Goldstein (1924).
B is A. The progress of adequation is not recurrent to an adequate thinking but a totality that is present before we are even able to grasp it (VNV 64). It is again the very idea of pre that seeps in the work of linguistic frameworks: it is a happening in which the artist exudes his style to invisible elements (Prosa 109). It is indeed a pursuit in which the translator has no clue about it and reminds us that the aporetic analogia ends with analogia: the aporetic is never the case of the transcendental and vice versa. Translation offers access to realm B, to which I was not able to grasp and to capture it; its process gives me the feeling that I am following strands which I was not aware of and which highlights via its movens the act of translation. The analogia will never be the scholastic entis – the social mechanism of ontogenesis drafting a common linguistic grammar will be deflowered by cracks of a contingent life-world. The antinomies of analogia will be another analogia; we have to reformulate the sceptic arguments above all ontological pre-justice, just to be capable of understanding l’être-monde, l’être-chose, l’être imaginaire and l’être conscient (VNV 21) as another l’être-monde, l’être-chose, l’être imaginare in its topology of compossibilité (VNV 29). The big object (VNV 31) is not the enactment of A to B / C, since the relation of pre-predicates and objects are the new predicatives that stress the amalgam of world legibility: the street is in its distance and proximity identic, nevertheless the transgression of the appearance to its reality is incommensurable; proximity and distance are in their contrast a system of relationships provoking the reality of perspectives. The phenomenological perception has in its enforcement a proximité absolue and likewise a distance irrémédiable that ironises its ontological stance. This ironic moment is perhaps the key issue that keeps Merleau-Ponty’s chiastic phenomenology together and can therefore be outlined as a transposition of Husserl’s phenomenological transcendentalità.\footnote{It is clear that the understanding of transcendentalità has not to be confused with its classical meaning. Transcendentalità is not a system of true statements. The existence cannot be explained by pure ideas and entities, but any phenomenological understanding has a transcendental character. The sexuality of our body is the very transcendental condition; it is a condition insofar as it is not an isolated fact but rather it is the expression and style of its entire existence towards life-world.} Merleau-Ponty criticises Husserl that he minimises by his transcendental / eidetic reduction friction and tension within life-world. The willingness to understand the drama of the world by its internal logic demands the abstention of perception (VNV 64). This order castrates the vitalising moment of expression and does not allow us to capture the collision of my body in life-world and in language. The ambiguity in life and language evokes transcendental settings that can be outlined as a counter-reality to systemic knowledge; the enacted translation of a lexeme is neither a variable of psychology nor of an idea,
since its intro-pection would mean self-knowledge and evokes a metaphysical belief of knowledge through *analogia*. Hitherto, by following Merleau-Ponty’s transcendental-understanding we might understand transcendentality as a *latente transcendentalité* that can never be understood by denominations. It shifts the understanding of transcendentality: I cannot be the translator, since the act of translating is enacted without my stringent competence and knowledge of the drama; the *pré-possession* of transcendentality is on the scene before I am able to figurate it: the act of translating is *inscribed* in its translation. In a radical sense, this might underpin the thin line of the tension between form and content\(^{202}\) which accompanies Merleau-Ponty’s theoretical setting; in other words that was probably his hidden *movens* while writing *Le visible et l’invisible*.

It is worthwhile to look closer to his inner-ontological breeding ground and its transcendental condition as its formulation of combinations – it is a micro-analysis of Merleau-Ponty’s hidden ingredients of his ontological-project, it is about deconstructing the meaning of gestures, which are the intrinsic part of language (PhP 209). The presence of language conveys to us how language itself moves laterally by entering a realm, which can be opened by its internal organisation (Signes 51). Nevertheless, the deconstruction does not lead to a brighter world and to its intrinsic value, since the cumbersome analysis of internal truth clings to its critical venture evoking the deconstruction. Searching for the immanence of language is not simply in opposition to truth and coincidence that could be part of language; language is coincidence insofar as it is a manner to bring things *into* language. It is about a linguistic framework that is not organised, words are not composed and arranged – they are inter-connected by its silent entanglement and through the secret use of pictures they are forging alliances\(^{203}\). Manifest senses and relationships are countless, lateral relationships and associations which are hidden present in their inflection and exchanges are the habitual reading in which the alien infraction opens up the possibility for consciousness settings (VNV 159f). The articulating-possibility of immanency transforms as well the strict separation of intellectual and empiric worlds and in extension re-shaped our translation-formula *A*

\(^{202}\) In *Phénoménologie de la Perception* Merleau-Ponty outlines this inner-ontological tension in various ways: the word is not *per se* the translation of given thoughts but evokes lexemes in its evolving thought (PhP 207) in which words are finally given by the words solely (PhP 208f).

\(^{203}\) It is about this incarnated logic, which evokes a new sense of linguistic being within the logic of contingency: Merleau-Ponty refers to it by attempting to work up random issues into a meaningful totality or simply incarnated logic (Signes 110).
as A’ in B / C by favouring a dualistic understanding of langage parlé and langage parlant: how is it possible to formulate a new inflection without referring to its existing inflection? The so-called new-ness or originality is the derivation of an institutionalised linguistic framework. In Phénoménologie de la Perception (PhP) Merleau-Ponty develops explicitly the conception that language is an emergent issue: words are not given in their pure remembrance or in an attenuated mode of perception: “(...) le langage (...) ne dit rien que lui-même” (PhP 219). Therewith, we inaugurate the ambiguous order of perceived ontology, in which functional dependencies are staring into space. The ambiguous status of language overruns the psychological status of order. A learnt word or un mot parlé is a Freudian imago, which is less perception and less an empiric setting but more a sublimation of an emotional constellation and likewise the process of concentration. The appearance of language has to be captured by its emotional gesture and its phantasmatic possibilities, in which human beings slip over a second monstrous-world; the second world becomes a narrative of a second and vulnerable nature by speaking monstrously. A denominator cannot fix the monstrous figure; it is a wandering picture that evokes modulation-effects within twilight and shades. Nevertheless, it is not an artificial expression of natural entities; its mode of remembrance is given by the presence of lexemes. They emphasise their own setting by the intangible presence of the denominator and by its contingent articulation- and sound-style. A monstrous body as such drowns out and overrules its biological entity, since it produces narratives of blind spots, which do not emphasise grammar and life-world. The hesitation of translation is the first condition of phantasmatic readings.

The simple psycho-physic existence offers a difference in a given life-world; it offers nutrition for its physic reality. It is this kind of life, in which the diacritic moment of inner-ontological reality does not fulfil its own purposes but actually is an act of

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204 Hence, it is no longer this epistemological play of internal versus external means which conditions the ontological status of knowledge: “Le ‘psychisme’ n’est pas objet; mais – notons-le bien – il ne s’agit pas ici de montrer, selon la tradition ‘spiritualiste’ que certaines réalités ‘échappent’ à la détermination scientifique: ce genre de démonstration n’aboutit qu’à circonscrire un domaine de l’antiscience qui, d’ordinaire, reste conçu, dans les termes de l’ontologie qui précisément est en question, comme un autre ‘ordre de réalités’. Notre but n’est pas d’opposer aux faits que coordonne la science objective un groupe de faits, – qu’on les appelle ‘psychisme’ ou ‘faits subjectifs’ ou ‘faits intérieurs’ – qui ‘lui échappent’, mais de montrer que l’être-objet, et aussi bien l’être-sujet, conçu par opposition lui et relativement à lui, ne font pas alternative, que le monde perçu est en deçà ou au-delà de l’antinomie, que l’échec de la psychologie ‘objective’ est à comprendre, – conjointement avec l’échec de la psychique ‘objectiviste’ – non pas comme une victoire de ‘l’extérieur’ sur ‘l’intérieur’, et du ‘mental’ sur le ‘matériel’, mais comme un appel à la révision de notre ontologie, au réexamen des notions de ‘sujet’ et ‘d’objet’” (VNV 40f).

205 Todorov explains that the transfer of the natural to the supernatural is not simply a facticity of translation: “D’abord il faut que le texte oblige le lecteur à considérer le monde des personnages comme un monde de personnes vivantes et à hésiter entre une explication naturelle et une explication surnaturelle des événements évoqués” (Todorov 1970: 36).
translation of diffused experiences (Prosa 81). We might draft that translation transforms the biological body but without denying its very corporal *drame qui le traverse* (PhP 231). This ambiguity, which cannot be resolved by dialectic synthesis, is the difficulty to grasp the concept of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and to read his understanding of transcendentality, since the resemblance of nature-culture does not synthesise its existence: it is over and over again the grid of the visible and invisible feature. Hitherto, style and manner are the offspring and development of genetic readings of lexemes. The existence of my body is the enactment of stylistic expressions and the depth of the carnal body enables us to ally the tissue of words, its texture of experience and its style in silence. The *mot parlé* is not a system of equivalences but rather the happening of a vivid body-presence that articulates the complexity of a non-present density of being (VNV 157). Expression is the equivalence of bodily presence. The very existence of body is in its time-space-continuum the ontological setting to articulate lexemes (PhP 210) and therefore an a-translatable happening of carnal juiciness. Nevertheless, the *time-lapse-life-world-time-space* oriented framework does not warn its approaching enactment. Hence, words do not have *per se* an internal materiality, the carnal body as *modus vivendi* operates as its transcendental necessity.\(^{206}\) This kind of transcendent reality is bound in its very materiality of life-world as a phatic experience of my être-au-monde. Communication is not an activity of hermeneutical politics but rather through my body I am able to receive love (PhP 216). Hence, the inner-ontological debate is not a diacritic deviation of the Seiende to its Sein, it is rather the material friction with history and the enactment of the modality in its space-time-continuum. In other words, Merleau-Ponty fulfils the Marxist turn-over from the *Ideenhimmel* to materiality or in other words, from Husserl’s *transcendental ego* to Merleau-Ponty’s *fleshy ego*. Hence, grammar, linguistic inflection and morphemes do not exist – however, language is the pathic backup of the body; body expression is the projection of its future historicity. In a hermeneutic sense, translation does not exist in any entity related sense and therefore, the sense of language can never be translated into another language (PhP 218). It is this very *translatio* of body in its slippery modulation of *langage parlant*: the empiric setting of grammar and syntax is not simply a facticity of expression, grammar and syntax are sedimentation of *langage parlé*, in which the unformulated sense does not subtly evoke the purity of *langage parlant* but aims its very *Dasein* in the sense of être-au-monde (PhP 229). The porosity

\(^{206}\) In reference to Sartre: if I am imagining the absent Peter, I do not have a numeric different picture of Peter. My imagination is bound within my very existence in the world (Sartre 1940: 148 and PhP 210).
of our carnal body enables us to the lateral enactment of expressions: in a radical sense, content is on a primary setting not existing; it is a synchronic modulation of my own existence in history (PhP 214). The morphology of expression is a matter of *hyle*. However, *hyle* is a (transcendental) condition possibility to draw a tiny line to the expression of content in its positive ambiguity. In this very status of articulating, weighting, wearing *hyle* and content we can setup Merleau-Ponty’s entire phenomenological project: seeing –language activity – *creatureness* intertwines the theatrical setting of life-world in a very odd and obscure manner. *Seeing –language activity – creatureness* are the new relational experience and the breeding ground for a new transcendental understanding. It is no longer about the horizontality or verticality but about the lateral insert of the body experience. Hence, body is not the very nucleus, but rather that what stands literally (VNV 43f) beside the body. The effectiveness of this totality is its non-physic reality. Body enactments are the very *stumble* moment of proliferation – a suspended form of *chôra*. Since the problem and articulation of my body last in me, we may consider in variation to Balzac that my usage of language is my death. Hence, the inner-ontological grid offers essentialism in its chiastic *basso continuo* of *chôra*. Indeed, it is a non-captivity of the *eidos* but nevertheless it still remains *eidos*: that means that the transcendental act of language is *per essentium A’* and not a feature of *A as A’*. In other words, the sublime is able to articulate the incompatible on the very screen of presence. This is what Merleau-Ponty understands, in the vein of de Saussure, as the *diacritic* moment or in my tautological expression *essentialism of structures* (cf. structures are products of doubling: they are not only the execution of being but are likewise its very own setting of being)\textsuperscript{207}.

This exegesis shows us that the phenomenological tradition has an affinity to ontological solutions by attempting to overcome the gridlock of ontological separatism. This ontological cipher is probably the theological desire to read and translate its very own foundation: *it is much about the presence of life-world*. In the succession of Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre, Merleau-Ponty tries to characterise the phenomenological project as ontological reality: ontology is therefore the language and the corpus to offer intelligibility, transparency and translatability. However, Merleau-Ponty’s non-thetic essentialism is beyond Heidegger and Sartre’s *In-der-Welt-Sein* and is notably discussed in *Le visible et l’invisible* (VNV). Sartre’s translation-force of

\textsuperscript{207} Heidegger refers to an ontological difference in this respect. However, this difference is not the featured nucleus of Merleau-Ponty’s ontology.
separating the I negativity and the positivity of the world (Sartre 1943: 51) cannot be resumed and synthesised by Merleau-Ponty’s chiasm; the chiastic experience is not a reciprocal fact of positivity and negativity but a massive life-world (VNV 77). In Sartre’s setting the transcendental ontologia mediates literally its very own analogia entis. As we already know, this option does not exist for Merleau-Ponty. The functional dependency of relationality is off project, since appearance and reality, the metabasis eis allo genos, are incommensurable (VNV 39f) and the partial, the marginal are not the absence of its totality and not only an inner-adequation (VNV 64) of Sein und Seiende. As evoked, Merleau-Ponty’s inner-ontological debate is a process of pré-possession of life-world, which is present before we are even able to think and categorise it. Hence, outlining the inner-ontological reality (eidos) does never incorporate our image (eidolon). Since we believe it, its literal Ent-sagung is actually its chiastic anticipation. The inner-ontological fracture of Sein and Seiende can never redeem Sartre’s analogia entis of the other, since the otherness is always the negativity of its very being (Sartre 1940: 298ff). The immanence of language is therefore a quasi-totality that highlights the appearance of Pour-soi as its absolute happening but also something that happens to En-soi as its very adventure: Pour-Soi, langage parlant and the translated are constituted by their consciousness of A while its immanence escapes and slips off the law of the Pour-soi and the langage parlé in which the signifié is covered by the signifiant. The absence of Pour-soi will be executed as the meaning of En-soi. In other words, A finds its meaning in the very slippery momentum in B / C. The translation is the reversal of its inner-ontological negation. The quasi-totality is happening to the evidence of En-soi. The event of En-soi is the adventure of being signifié and being translated. The En-soi, which has not the force to denominate or the ontological power of execution, has been enacted by the Pour-soi without having destroyed itself (VNV 80). Hence, the inner-ontological reality is a passive ecstasy of the very own En-soi that is not transformed but nevertheless enacted on its basis; it is the lateral way as it goes along the way with the analysing appearing of objects (VNV 43). Translatio is the very moment of moving A’ in B / C and not A’ to B / C. This basic fact and facticity are not

208 This is the very momentum of Merleau-Ponty’s transcendental translatio: “Puisque le néant est ce qui n’est pas, (…) la connaissance se résorbe dans l’être: elle n’est ni un attribut, ni une fonction, ni un accident de l’être, mais il n’y a que de l’être (…); nous pourrons même, à la fin de ce livre, considérer cette articulation du Pour-soi par rapport à l’En-soi comme l’esquisse perpétuellement mouvante d’une quasi-totalité, le surgissement du Pour-soi n’est pas seulement l’événement absolu pour le Pour-soi, c’est aussi quelque chose qui arrive à l’En-soi, la seule aventure possible de l’En-soi: tout se passe en effet comme si le Pour-soi, par sa néantisation même, se constituait en ‘conscience de …’, c’est-à-dire par sa transcendance même échappait à cette loi de l’En-soi en qui l’affirmation est empâtée par l’affirmé” (VNV 80).
reality but emanate within the mixture of positivities and negativities, which are never positivities and negativities\textsuperscript{209}. The ontological realm is the shimmer of the nothingness on its very surface\textsuperscript{210}. Hence, this is the lateral project of translation, in which notion, life, experience and aspirations are enacted in its savagery and situatedness. It is the ontological turn towards a savage ontology stressing that we can never faire de l’ontologie directe (VNV 231), since the rawness of the ontological tissue covers emergent associations of meanings (VNV 57). The consciousness of translation is therefore an expression of immanence, since it is invalid, empty, transparent and likewise open for immanency. This topos ontos is the chiastic summa plus one awaking multiple compossibilités. This theorem is nothing else than creating a momentum of possibilities; this reversibility is the ontological translatable of \(A' \text{ in } B / C\), since it keeps my very actuality and openness vivid. And this is only possible as long as I do not want to develop it in a reflexive way; reflection reduces meaning, life, truth, belief, etc. to realm entities of transparency and ens intellectualis. The richness of possibilities will be reduced to an immanency of an ideal-world by subsuming the realm of possibilities into the framework of the cogito. In other words, the cogito force is predominantly conditioned by the teleological hope to pursue a relationship of ego and its revealed world in harmony. This relationship is enforced by the belief of being able to create, craft and produce the world. In other words, the ingeniosus is perfectly able to translate its very own map. These kinds of life-worlds, maps and realities are not translation of possibilities, which Merleau-Ponty bears in mind: translatio is a form of relatedness of different strands and possibilities that are virulent but not coinciding with its actor. Nevertheless, the phenomenon of thinking is not withdrawn from Merleau-Ponty’s cosmos but has to be re-shaped and re-articulated: reflection as such is an aporia; by attempting to reveal the dense possibilities of life-world, life-world is literally reflecting its very own setting into curvy reflections. The cogitatum translates so to speak its cogito and shows therefore the silent reality of our original attention of être-au-monde. The enactment of the inner-ontological evidence shows us that translation is in its very fundamentum nothing\textsuperscript{211} and that there is no force that could separate realms. Cogito is not the cave in which it shows can be shown, since there is no entrance of the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{209}This reading might be a radical continuity of my transcendental re-unification of Descartes’ subject-object line by Merleau-Ponty. Descartes’ transcendental interdependence is obviously continued in a very different direction.
\item \textsuperscript{210}Merleau-Ponty follows so far Sartre’s understanding of L’être et le Néant (Sartre 1943: 248 ff). However, he rejects Sartre’s transcendental radicalisation.
\item \textsuperscript{211}Obviously, nothing has not the denomination formula of facticity; it is not the negativity of something. Nothing is the porosity of life-world.
\end{itemize}
very concrete scene of life-world in *cogito*. The translation is the ecstatic expression of being \( A' \) in \( B / C \) or the transgression to a *latio* to another possibility in its very condition of confining impossibilities (VNV 55). As we can follow, reflection as such destroys the experience of confused totality. The confusion will be replaced by parallel-consciousness with its very own causality. This is the reason why a translator and hermeneutist is able to dream of translation as an act of pureness and humanity\(^\text{212}\). This teleology is the *movens* to declare freedom and neutralise the *tohuwabohu* in life-world.

**E Pregnancy: philologia in phenomenology**

Hence, this archaeological digging shows that the capability of immanence is present but however it is silent and remote: the translator might find the reference to this very original presence in which the inward-turn and the outward-turn are simultaneously alive (VNV 92). What are the consequences? So far, we have discovered that language and its translation are the product of expressions and not simply the output of reasoning and the effect of *something*. Though expressions are bodily given, they are given as *propagation* in my very corporality and therefore a slippery presence of the savage ontology. Merleau-Ponty shifts the body into the realm of *chair / flesh*; flesh as ontology has a porous pulse and opens its tissues for *creux* and *entrelacs*. It is the possibility for *Sichtigkeit* and *généralité* (VNV 181) and therefore, the fleshy body is the attempt to outline a general setting which is beyond dualism and it is certainly not a category of mental idealism. Flesh is not the materiality of being-entities, substance, mind or facticity. It is a pregnancy of general things in the halfway of the individual *space-time-continuum*; it is the incarnation of style, introducing the character of being which is \( \text{à part} \) of its present. Again we can discover that the inter-ontological debate provokes chiasm and evokes reality. Merleau-Ponty evokes that the character of being is present; it is not possible to outline it in purity since it is *habillé* in its flesh (VNV 171). Hence, the grammar is *habillé* into a tissue of possibilities, which is the intertwining act of creating and meaning the presence of *habillé*; the inflection forms are an on-going derivation of the inauguration of possibilities while longing for facticity. This is literally the \( C \) in my formula \( A \ in \ B / C \). The sediment \( C \) is snuggling the translated into its translation. We might say that the fleshy body is the through route where the mimetic

\(^{212}\) The synchronism of consciousness is given by its ontological logic; its code is however not known to anybody, but its law is enforced by everybody (cf. VNV 90ff).
longing is diverted, since being is the very event of poly-morphology of dimensionalities and multiple entries. To paraphrase it, la chair is the very Urpräsentierbarkeit; it is in fact a phantasma and a withdrawal of any form of denomination (VNV 181f), it is not a thing, it is not substance, no material and it is definitely not a mind-setting. The fleshy expression is the very withdrawal of any expression; it is the hotspot and concrete-generality for the chiastic experience of the langage parlé and the langage parlant. Flesh is the approach and latent modality of approaching ontology in its reversibility. The tactility of fleshiness is the sublimation of thoughts and therefore the generality of being pregnant. Hence, the fleshy body is however not a neutral zone of transfer, rather it is a polymorph element in which the chiastic moment is enjambé – fleshy translation is therefore not a dialectic imprint but an enactment of it. Language is the enactment of the sensual and tactile event of the flesh in the world, again it is this very Kafkaesque momentum of chiastic exemplifications, which outlines the parallelism and synchronism of moments without relying on each other. Within this chiastic impossibility the translated B/C is preserved as B/C and is likewise literally enrolled in A. The fleshy condition is the revocation of alternative mediations, which I have outlined as translatio: A to B is not drafted by ontological instruments, but by enacting the excess of the polymorphic line in its fleshy moment of C. The future is therefore enrolled in its presence. We cannot simply question the phenomenon – the fleshy body is literally an ontological non-place by enabling language and expression without being itself present; flesh is a stylistic draft within and beyond our life-world and outlines expressions, which are silent and apart. The genesis of the linguistic Gestalt in the fleshy body formulates dimensions of the deep life by being open to the undertones of the un-structured life-world: the linguistic grammar bursts the common ground of onto-theology. Hence, the fleshy body is the

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213 Cf. Merleau-Ponty outlines: “Le corps interposé n’est pas lui-même chose, matière interstitielle, tissu conjonctif, mais sensible pour soi, ce qui veut dire, non pas cette absurdité: couleur qui se voit, surface qui se touche – mais ce paradoxe [:]? un ensemble de couleurs et de surfaces habitées par un toucher, une vision, donc sensible exemplaire, qui offre à celui qui l’habite et le sent de quoi sentir tout ce qui au-déhors lui ressemble, de sorte que, pris dans le tissu des choses, il le tire tout à lui, l’incorpore, et, du même mouvement, communique aux choses sur lesquelles il se ferme cette identité sans superposition, cette différence sans contradiction, cet écart du dedans et du dehors, qui constituent sont secret natal” (VNV 176f).

214 Merleau-Ponty questions if there is a separation between body and world, since the seen world is actually not in my body: “Où mettre la limite du corps et du monde, puisque le monde est chair?” (VNV 180). This very question suspends the actually in life-world since the conjunction is the cantus firmus of translatio in life-world.

215 Merleau-Ponty differs between a minor rationalism of the 19th century and major rationalism of the 17th century. The 17th century seems to be open for different regions of senses and is therefore not limited to consider merely an external level. In opposition, the 19th century seeks to complete rationality by
movement in which translation is registered as the fleshed expression. Language winds its way through life-world as a latent matrix in its chiastic evidence. This is the fleshy expression: a double-entrance, which is never a double-entrance. The expression is not an imprint but the genesis of a *gestalthafte* polymorphic language-body. The inner-ontological body is therefore a relief of the nameless and consequently the fleshy body offers the hideout for its status of non-pronounceability. In other words, the inner-ontological reality is a catastrophic happening in its radical questioning. Nevertheless, the (ontological) existence of the nameless *is* and will be touched by the very moment of fleshy porosity as a concrete *element of being*. Translation is an element of a general being-disposition of the in-betweens of the general and the special in which the momentum of translation is the enactment of multiple relations without determinacy; the *langage parlé* is left with its excess in *C* and opens therefore a relationship, which is not relational. Inner-ontological linguistics is therefore the fleshy possibility to speak from *another* enactment of its being – the immanence is *another fleshy element* of immanence. The transcendental being and the being of expressions are for each other back- and front-page insofar as the bias *C* is the visibility for *B* by outlining that the lexeme is not the adequate cause for all that which is in our life-world. Life-world is not the private ontogenesis of *A* but it is the amalgam that carries the translation in such a way as we participate through our translation – the transgression from *A′ in B / C* is the genesis of my flesh in a life-worldly experience. The renunciation offers the option to speak between lines and figures without referring to any fixed linguistic realms. Life-world will be discovered by its lateral pregnant setup as its source, and therefore its very deviation and raw dimensionality by highlighting the spreading of simultaneous reactions. The imaginary does not last, the phantasmatic experience of words is not observable, it vanishes as soon as we would like to use it as a lexeme. In other words, the event of lateral happening is the birth and genesis of transcendence and immanence, it is the very inauguration of the where and the when of facticity (VNV 182). The

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216 The fleshy expression is another reading of the Christian theology of incarnation and the carnal epistemology of *theologia crucis*. The co-reading of Merleau-Ponty’s flesh and the *ascesis* and mortification of the Christian body could lead to very interesting synoptic interpretation-lines; unfortunately this would go beyond the constraints of this thesis, cf. John Robinson (1977).

217 The relationship of the non-relational in *C* can be read synoptically to Walter Benjamin’s *Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers* (Benjamin IV: 9-22) but also to *Die Lehre vom Ähnlichen*; cf. “Die Wahrnehmung [der Ähnlichkeit] ist in jedem Fall an ein Aufblitzen gebunden. Sie huscht vorbei, ist vielleicht wiederzugewinnen, aber kann nicht eigentlich wie andere Wahrnehmungen festgehalten werden. Sie bietet sich dem Auge ebenso flüchtig, vorübergehend wie eine Gestirnkonstellation” (Benjamin II: 204-210).
explanation of translation is embedded in the simultaneity of the fleshy body and its very fleshy-selfness (VNV 298). Through the world-flesh, which is always embodied, I will be able to understand my body (VNV 299). The ontological stance of langage parlant might be the very enactment of langage parlé in which the density of my body and the density of the world is not mutually exclusive but rather the only possible feature to enter into language by enabling the genesis of flesh and world (VNV 176f). The translated is the act of translation and at the same time it is its very reversibility in presence. Hence, the un-conditional and the uncertainty translate being in its fluid momentum. The fleshy reading offers an ontological volatilisation of characters and words without referring to a vanishing point, in which the ontological shimmers and flashes. Merleau-Ponty brings the element of reversibility into the realm of changing the mirror, which is necessarily the prolongement of any entity to its pregnant body: to see something and to touch him / herself means to be an extract effect of him / herself. There is a fissure in the very process of touching (VNV 304) and this kind of essentialism is not able to outline any forms of hermeneutic equations. This ontological equation of signifié and signifiant is rather the permanent missed identity. It is the very moment of starting the happening, the pregnancy that suspends the upcoming meaning. This process of excess and lack outlines the ontological structure of a differential structure that emphasises its reversibility and not simply the exchange of eidos and eidolon. In this sense, the process of translation is the coincidence in its realm of possibilities and fleshy lateral dynamis. The pregnancy of language is enacted by the fact that a linguistic realm of A is meaningful, since its lacune and its écart are never located where B / C is actually based (VNV 239). It is the highly perverted diacritical structure, in which modulation and articulation happens. This structural element may offer a further perspective on translational matters by highlighting hyper-moments. The chiastic moment is not a concept or a theory, it is rather the sensual expression of a savage ontology that makes language speechless and likewise fruitful; it is an unconditional unity of incompossibilités (VNV 264) or a being that is dimensional (VNV 272f). In this very cluster flesh perverts the classical mechanism of translation by removing the possibility of denomination and localisation. As far as we can see, the setting of paradoxes is no longer within life-word features but fleshiness is the very specificity of life. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty starts in the middle of the slippery-moment; it is not a paradox but rather an emergence that starts to pick my pregnancy. Translations are an emergence of settings, which are underneath and above the fleshy-corpus by
corrod ing the tissue of the pregnant body. Language and translation are therefore passive exemplifications and cannot be subsumed within traditions, narrations and within the desire of classification. This very order is probably an inter-ontological momentum, where intensity and flesh intervene. Hence, this kind of intensification allows us to have flesh and simultaneously permits us to be a resistor; the fleshy grid outlines the possibility to always have an alternative, a matrix with multiple entrances as its totum simul (VNV 268). This coincidence, which splits the resistance of translational strategies and simultaneously the hyper-movement of flesh, is the removal and relief of the very inner-ontological status. The imminence is the in-compossibilité of its compossibilité and the fracture of any morpheme in its rhetoric.

F Re-articulating A’ in B / C

We have discovered that the inner-ontological debate highlighted the Urpräsenz of the carnal body as diacritical moment in which its porous structure outlines the very reversibility of the ens reale. The linguistic immanence is the pregnant endeavour (VNV 177) of a non-fixed cluster, which is within the cultural context of langage parlé anchored in a silent life-worldly presence. The mistake of semantics is to understand language as a substance that would speak of its own. The dimensionality of language is to articulate the Wesen, which doubles our perceptions and our thoughts. Likewise it has a doubler-effect by considering the inner-ontological debate in which the Wesen is meaningful and meaningful is the Wesen: the translation slips off the denomination taxonomy and nests laterally in its very dimensionality. Hence, we might say that the immanence of linguistic grammar is the pure phenomenon of excess and lack and has to be discovered in an oblique way. The carnal body-language offers therefore not the metaphor but the very reality in its transcendental condition: the act of translation is embodied in its (con)texture. The freshness ploughs therefore the furrows of the langage parlanl. It outlines the hotspot of happening and the very moment of expressing. What could therefore be the consequences for expression and its relationship to perception and taxonomy? What might be the genealogy of understanding language as process of expressing, since we know that the expression of

218 The very incorporation of the pregnant body as life-style of being in life-world reflects the parable in which the words of the Archangel Gabriel will impregnate the Virgin Mary (Luke 1:26-38, KJV). This is where the philos of légein starts to write the translatio embodied.
that which exists is an eternal task? It is quasi the essay to make the transformation from a phenomenological understanding towards an ontological line-up; it is about understanding Merleau-Ponty in the vein of a savage ontology that corroborates the phenomenological task as such and the linguistic event as new edition of the silent realm of *expressis verbis*. But however the transcendental codification is not simply the Kantian possibilities of conditions but rather the extension to the realm in which style and variations are possible life-worldly features. In that sense, Merleau-Ponty’s reference to the carnal-element is neither an idealistic-condition possibility nor the fulfilling of the silent existence in its crystallised life-world. The transcendental setting is not the pivotal point but rather the hiding place of a pregnant taxonomy, in which the a-grammatical structure performs its linguistic happening. The momentum of reclining on savage ontology, in which the visible and invisible is inscribed, refers to the epiphenomenon of transcendentality: language, in its sur-realistic happening, is language.

Language is about the curious entanglement of carnal and linguistic expressing in a visible and invisible continuum of time and space; the quasi-eternity of language will be mingled with the quasi-eternity of the incarnated body-existence and therefore, the carnal translation has a pre-experience of the impalpable body in history (Prosa 117). Therefore, the carnal perverts the setup of intellectual representation patterns and likewise silences the subject of language. The ontological background of *Sein* und *Seiend* will be re-articulated in a framework of savage ontology in which the fracture of *Sein* and *Seiend* is a very slippery momentum of being – it is a slippery moment that happens and is not pre-conditioned by a cogito-framework. The *cogito* is the secondary effect of expression and is identical in relationship to the outlined *langage parlé*. In opposition to that, the *langage parlant* is the primary sense of an expression and is the ontological stance of the *Urpräsentierbare*. This *Urprésentierte* is however, so far we have seen it, not the classical project of ontology, it stresses the possibilities of enactment: the force of language lies in the very presence insofar as it is able to arrange the so called keywords that they can say more than they ever have said (Prosa 58f). Hence, the expression of a morpheme is in Merleau-Ponty’s (con)texture given by another agent and evokes simultaneously the matrix of other entrance possibilities – translations are therefore implosions of a life-worldly rhetoric. In a free rendition we might say that translation is the very agency for the reverse net of expressions.
However, agency is not an active form and it cannot be read as a synonymous of translator, hermeneutist or explainer since language is not simply the hyle of thinking: as we have seen, langage parlé exposes in opposition hyle as positive entity of translation and cultural setting. Merleau-Ponty’s aim is to subvert this form of culturalism. The agency is not the ego, the cogito or the actor, the translation agent is a carrier of the Urpräsentierte in its very agency. Hitherto: A’ in B / C. And if you want to declare so, the act of thinking is the contemporaneous moment of the Nachleben of expressions: thoughts are embedded in the amalgam of the contingent expression and the sediment of life-world. Consequently, expressions are not separated from perception and perception is not simply a side effect; expression and thoughts are simultaneously and differently articulated in the carnal life-world. This is why Dadaistic expressions are not random expressions, but are meaningful scenes in life-worldly performances. Therefore, thoughts are not in the realm of immanency but the shape / form of the expressing gesture. The meaning of the morpheme is given therefore by its articulated style by modulating the carnal body (PhP 210). Hence, we might have differences of thoughts: there are not different thought degrees but different modulation and textures of thoughts; the diacritic element tears thoughts into the presence of life-world. In the context of langage parlé, Saussure’s coniunctivus of signifié and signifiant does not fit in Merleau-Ponty’s diacritical movement. The denomination of signifié and signifiant is the positivity in thinking and speaking. The diacritic event is nurtured by the arrangement of thoughts in its Gestaltwerdung of the carnal body. Hence, the expression has this element of presence, which pronounces silently its passive hyper-phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty outlines therefore the irrational capability of meaning-creation and meaning-communication (PhP 221). This chiastic momentum outlines the capability of carnal expressing not as form of schizophrenia but rather as hyper-schizophrenia219. My intention is to read Merleau-Ponty’s mode of expression and usage of language in life-worldly practices as a hyper-schizophrenic act. It is a psychotic understanding of phantasmatic supercharge in phenomenological translation. The trope schizophrenia is a map in which regions of semantic intentions are differed and laterally commingled220. To understand the pathogenesis of Merleau-Ponty’s savage ontology we have to examine the lineage of the output of the inner-ontological

219 Merleau-Ponty theorises the enactment of expressions in reference to the illness of Aphasia. This dysfunction is not simply the dys in its function, dys is rather the uncompromised lack and excess in linguistic practices.

discussion with the genealogy and processing of the *trans* – so far we have seen that ontology has a footnote by referring to transcendentality. This footnote causes in turn a cluster of schizophrenic happenings, which formulates a wholeness that is beyond and beneath vivid breathing and shocks the *paradoxon* of grammar and expression. The genesis of language shows us that the expression is not just the bodily expression; the enactment is rather the entanglement of linguistic expressions and therefore the very translation possibility to express and to mean. In the very carnal moment, we are able to enact meaning, although struggling with a semantic overcharged rhetoric while suffering from the very lack of life-worldly contingency. This is the very theological move of Merleau-Ponty and outlines his teleological aim of the carnal element, in which the ornament of linguistic happening is inscribed: expression is not a schizophrenic happening, it is the figuration of hyper-schizophrenia insofar as it enacts the transgression of semantics. The formula *hyper* distributes lines in which *trans* drafts the semantic excess and grammatical lack.

**G The hyperbolic difference in *transgression***

Indeed, linguistic necessity of expressing has to be modulated by the option of being interrupted and shocked\(^\text{221}\). This option outlines that realms such as *A, A’, B, C, etc.* do not deliver designed entities but rather questioning labyrinths by offering the draft for ontological savagery as its initial dimensions in which differences may appear. These possibilities are not explained and filled with rational designs and hermeneutical forces and do not receive transcendental signals for their very status of immanence. This inner-ontological moment is the clearing of distinction of denomination and the indescribable and cannot be captured by any trial of synchronisation – it is more about a suspended sense, a *déception* or a *déprise du sens* (Barthes 1964). This kind of procedure offers the possibility for chiasm where translation of another saying might be possible. Hence, the hyperbole of difference is the catharsis of grammatical lineage and it is a translation of a double *insubordination*, in which the ambivalence of openness and closure are simultaneous. This insubordination of the translational moment is the analectic moment of language and outlines the pathology of hyper-schizophrenia, which outlines morphemes in the sense of chiastic creations and expressions beyond expressions – it is

\(^{221}\) Cf. Marcel Détienne’s *shock of the incomparable* (Détienne 2000: 48).
an expression that does not mediate but keep it in its *translatio* as phantasmatic supercharge. The figuration of excess is the modulate tear in the dialectic structure of its chiastic *topos* and is executed by the ambiguity of articulating the *punctum caecum* (VNV 295); this might be the reason why Merleau-Ponty is able to consider the very short chiastic moment of unification in which the inflection of the lexeme is open towards the indescribable. It is this very lateral moment, in which Merleau-Ponty stresses the silent impossibility of dichotomy. The pre-conditional *forecourt* of reflexive dualism is the break up and *hyperbola* of language. The enactment of translation is therefore the process of being beyond methodological considerations, which are lacking words and getting involved in labyrinths: it is a withdrawal of being and denomination. This grammatical openness marks simultaneously the immanence of that which I outlined as inner-ontology and outlines the reality of pre-conditional *forecourt*. The immanence of the inner-ontological setting is exactly the idea that its transmission in superabundance provokes the immanence of the lexeme is given by its hyper-being and its non-being. The internal movement of the immanence is the *apeiron* of Merleau-Ponty’s *telos*: its revelation is the trans-mission and not the mediation of positive correlations. Hence, the force of inner-ontological immanence is not outlined by its opposition but by its pre-original difference of immanence. The linguistic immanence is not *per se* but rather *in trans-latio* – it is the immanent contact for a possible *otherness* (Goldstein 1933: 496 and PhP 229). The re-interpretation of immanence cannot be grasped by being and non-being, by in and out or by *aletheia* and *doxa*; linguistic immanence is therefore beyond the dualism of ontology. Merleau-Ponty’s savage ontology is the articulation of the one in the other and the other in one’s own. The savage ontology is therefore not the negativity and the anarchy, but it is a being in the amalgam of the *signifié* and *signifiant* that slips away from totality and denomination. Translation is literally the translation of experiences, which will be evoked as text through its wording. This invisible wording is literally the perversion of the *movens* of mimesis and installs a stinging response in its translation – the immanence of translation is the carnal sting of being in life-world and the a-aesthetic presence of language. In other words, the carnal chiasm modifies the possibility of inner-ontological identity and diversity by its diacritic hyperbolism, which does not simply mean a non-word and an antithesis of language but it does create *another* relationship. This *other* relationship is pre-conditional, pre-causal and cannot be synthesised by its very momentum of relationship – the relationship is the pull *in* of the expression in the carnal happening
and can therefore never execute it as operation. Thus, the carnal reversibility is the option to reverse a double meaning.

Translation is therefore not simply a determined act of expression but rather the style of translation is the modulation of sense-possibilities and therefore the possibility to overcome grammar by its figuration: a linguistic sentence cannot be understood as perceived but has to be seen as a gesture that touches the above outlined being of culture. The enactment of figuration is the immediate expression and pull in of the carnal body. We may understand now that the setting of expression is a tâche infinite and will be nurtured by life-world, understood as scenery of a pregnant organism. Merleau-Ponty declares that the expression cannot be an act of hermeneutical translation: there are no clear facts before expression happenings – it is rather that something is around us: the expressed is always the doubt of the carnal moment of expressing in hyper-schizophrenia. The carnal possibility of the savage ontology is the output of such a strand of translating the expression. In other words, the chiastic possibility of the carnal body is the effect of a double motion: the body is simultaneously the seeing and likewise the visible moment: it is the chiastic momentum of the evoked touching and touched. This double expressivity of the carnal body is the psychological (self-)referentiality of inner-ontological readings that highlights a self-carnal-body of confusion and perversion in inference. The phenomenological re-articulation of ontology highlights Merleau-Ponty to stress the very possibility to see from things by simultaneously enacting the momentum of seeing its pregnant body. This analeptic happening outlines the necessity of the inner-ontological stinging. Its invisible parts of reality will write the texture of the text. We might say that the immanence of expressing is the texture of being, which is the vividness of the carnal body and likewise the fascinosum of expressing the inspiration and expiration (OE 31f) – hence, the immanence is the nameless presentation of the universal being (OE 71). This non-determinate being is more than thinking and obeying to a grammatical canon, it is the absence of my own and a fission of my being. The perverted grammar offers an approach to a universal ontological lisibility; the doubler-effect is the riddle of being able to sketch the lineage of the absent in its silent being. The silent event of enactment is the evidence of expression happenings within the being-net; it is a being that is never fully a framework of is. Hence, the line up is not about the transgression from one realm to another; the transgression is within life-world and therefore a movement
without telos. The motion is pluri-phony and cannot be captured by its life-world, since its Nachleben offers the audition for a linguistic drip down that annihilates the first person or the first language. The translation of linguistic expression is the other side of the contingent visible and invisible that withdraws itself in its enactment. The double feature of expression is probably the aliquid of the force of the elements and the irrational capability of meaning-creation and meaning-communication in its very enacted sedimentation. The corroboration of the chiastic happening is the a-temporal event of the wound that cannot be healed; the translational happening is never the closing openness of the wounded lexeme. As consequence, translation is the enactment of the wounded in by highlighting the excess, the anticipation, the repetition and the modulation of its very existence (PhP 176).

My reading of Merleau-Ponty considers that the immanent linguistic expression is not a determined entity, a part of a grammatical discourse or the linguistic sublimation inscribed into the flesh of body language. The capability for expression is rather based on the possibility of expressing the lexeme in the pull in of the porosity of the carnal body. However, the pivotal point of linguistic expression is not reduced to the maximum of the carnal body; the carnal body is rather a loophole, in which linguistic expressions are pulled in and likewise diverted. This momentum of lack and excess creates a spark of another possibility, which is beside and probably more than the translation of $A'$ to $B / C$. Its translation is the pull in of $A'$ in $B / C$. With Husserl we have seen that translation is primarily the mediation of the conjunctivum as. With Merleau-Ponty we might be capable of considering that translation is the motion (trans-) to another topos, which is never the positivity of another topos (cf. latio). In other words our model $A'$ in $B / C$ is already the perversion of translation, since realms such as $A, A', B$ or $C$ do not exist but rather outlines schizophrenically transcendentality as the condition possibility of materiality and the carnal cut in. In other words, Merleau-Ponty shifts the transcendental setting from mind setting towards a material enactment within a twisting life-world: Husserl’s transcendental as will be the latio within its motion.

It is therefore interesting to consider that the idea of trans is a reliable partner to capture the latio in its inner-ontological breeding ground: the motion of trans offers latio its stumble logic (KV 98); the process of translating is never a process per se, it includes
rather the possibility of omission\textsuperscript{222}. Language is a spur that outlines a specific type of pre-language (VNV 166) in action. In other words, language is this mysterious layout that is neither simple essence nor a simple thing; aphasia is no longer able to keep the morpheme expressive (KV 25f). Hence, the expression of translation struggles while attempting to communicate with its alter ego and searching for its matching point. As for Merleau-Ponty, it is about a communication possibility that yields un sujet parlant. Hence, the motion of trans might be the key, which formulates a language that offers a sustained grammar, in which the diacritic moment is beyond its linguistic fabric; it is a diacritic act in open references. The consequences emanating out of such amorphic fabrics reformulate articulation modes which in turn evoke to trace the psychogenesis of its very own amorphic topos; it is about articulating by reorganising the transgression not simply as addition or as superimposition but as reorganisation\textsuperscript{223}. The chiastic reorganisation outlines a pathology of cenestopathic schizophrenia that measures language as a déformation cohérente in which old and new sedimentations are inscribed; latio is the embodied field or embodied communio in which the trans from A’ in B / C outlines its via eminentiae and via negationis. The translatio of cultural realms follows cenesthesia in its sense as it describes distorted bodily sensations, in which the level of consciousness are not able to translate its descriptions. The pathology of cenesthesia is the association of being unified by koinon aistheterion\textsuperscript{224}; translation is not only the unification but also drafts a sensorium commune in which sensations yield the perception of the five senses. The cenesthetic sense is the translation of the external sensory apparatus and the internal sensorium understood as the topos of Meinhaftigkeit (Fuchs 1995: 103-112) that overwrites the status of grammar. This topos asserts as the internal body is outlined by disturbances of bodily enactments and generates a psychosis of linguistic translation. In other words coenesthesia is a topos for communio in which the hyperbolic difference in the scope of grammar is a displacement and not a fixation of latio. The trans of linguistic communio is the radical transgression which deprives your linguistic order; this level of radicalness overrules and lacks the coenesthetic mode of schizophrenia. The transgression will surprise me by being in a certain way in life-world. Or to speak in a pathological narration, the motion of linguistic practice refers in its schizophrenic feeling a variety of deviations in their

\textsuperscript{222} Merleau-Ponty resumes in his study on children, that a child lives in the future but an adult may regress: indeed, childhood is never fully completed (KV 324).

\textsuperscript{223} Cf. Kurt Koffka’s theory of psychological formation (Koffka 1924: 102-111).

\textsuperscript{224} koinon aistheterion is Aristotle’s nucleus to explain the coordination of the senses to an unified image in its correlative soul.
embodied language-practice. It appears that the event of *trans* is not simply the disturbance of a canon but a linguistic phenomenon of passivity. In other words language is not about explication but about implication while referring to its lateral movement of being imposed. Hence, the act of translation is never between realms but it is the place where we meet everything; the framework of intentionality will burst openly by exploring a sense in non-sense and by displacing it to a phantasmatic here. *Per-capere* is the linguistic transgression from *A’ in B / C* by being alert of being surprised by its pathological appearing. Referring to Maldiney, the permanent deviation in language is primarily pathological nature (Maldiney 1973: 49). The schizophrenic transforms lexemes into bodily entities by outlining life-world in a counter-life-world-project and by referring the alert to the very existing body. The schizophrenic expression is within a very linear framework of neither internal nor external emptiness (Maldiney 1973: 79). The *communio* of schizophrenia is nonsense (Maldiney 1973: 56) and non-thematic (Maldiney 1973: 82f). The open categories of *coenesthesia* evokes the direction of motion through its style and its rhythm. The pathetic responsiveness is actually the *trans* of translational practice by highlighting that the identification is a success where it is unsuccessful and a failure where it succeeds (Maldiney 1973: 74). In other words the *trans* in linguistic practice is not only the marginal and un-thematised but it is its very abyss; the subject of expression will be superseded by a schizophrenic happening of expressions in which perceptual intentions of expression and the act of expressing transgress into a happening of expressions which are thoroughly formed. The linguistic happening is therefore formed by something / somebody that possesses us and not vice versa. Hence the motion of *trans* is a passive or more a pathetic event in linguistic practice and cannot be a leading force while translating. However, there is indeed a possibility to read my emphasis of passive actions as structural happening; the pathology of schizophrenia can be noted as an inscription into a field that is characterised by its transformation, the substitutional act and likewise shaped by its self-regulation that happens laterally. The act of *translatio* is no longer bound to objects but is literally the transgression to another structure that is beyond the setting of a second nature or a second structure. Structure as such is in Merleau-Ponty’s case not a positivity, it remains in a ambiguous status in which any dual forms are deprived and in which language is a *configuration in practice*. Transgression is the fold in the linguistic texture and will be enacted by its lateral movement. In this sense, the transcendental condition is not the entanglement of chiastic ontological acts and its carnal conditions
but transcendentality is to bear the ambiguity of immanence and transcendentality: grammar is a fleeting appearance in life-world and in translatio; the radical expression seeps into life-world. In other words, the trans is the wrapped in in the materiality of latio; translation is in Merleau-Ponty’s understanding the procedure of contexts and sense will be nothing else than the non-comparable comparative.\footnote{Paul Ricoeur pays also attention to this aporetic setting, while referring to Marcel Détienne’s 
Comparer l’incomparable (Ricoeur 2006: 36).}
III. PERPLEX COENESTHESIA

In the process of outlining *chapter I* (*Husserl and transcendentality*) and *chapter II* (*Merleau-Ponty and savagery*) we discovered how phenomenology could be close read in relation to shape translational realities as practice of interfering and engaged power within the realms of *life, world, language, pathology* and *practices*. Therefore, the *trias language – life-world – knowledge* enacts multiple stories of an untold world by dynamising the *latio* in correspondence to its stabilising *trans*: there is neither a continuum of *space* nor of *time* for any self-regarding life-worldly references. We are aware that grasping life-world in its translational practice has been outlined by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty as the *katabasis* of transcendentality – the openness or the *dynamenon* of life, its *latio* and its therefore used language is the phenomenological overcoming of the teleological movement *in life – world – language*. The chiastic experience overwrites, in the *dynamenon* of gazing, metaphysical aims while considering life-worldly practices: the chiastic experience of livelihood *in* life-world suspends the *movens* of metaphysics by considering its impossibility of tagging. But this very impossibility is simultaneously the very condition possibility of being within metaphysics. Translating *A in B* is therefore the transcendental *proteron* of a shared life-world *A as A’* to *B*. Hitherto as long as we speak in transcendental realms, the experience, *le vécu*, the practice, etc. is another story of the same world and of the same syntax. This other story or the pretended openness of life-world and its enactment is the spelling out of a dynamised *egoity*—Husserl outlines an *egoity* that is beyond the empirical, material subject and its contingent life-world. The translation of *A as A’ to B* is meant to be the transcendental *fasces* in which life-worldly probabilities are tested, moved, assembled and finally spelled out as *life-world egoity*. Newness is therefore namely just another expression of the on-going genesis of thinking and expressing *A as A’*. New is in reference to *A*, an *epoché* label of channelling forces that has always been the *egoity* of the *monde vécu*. In addition, the exterior facticity of *egoity* is just another form of the interior reality: metaphysics will be converted into linguistic *pragma* which *in situ* reports from another world – the other world is however the report *from* and *of* *egoity* that triggers the dynamised upside down effect of the schizophrenic usage of

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226 I use *egoity* not in an anthropological sense where I am able to write *I and world*. *Egoity* is rather an abstract entity that outlines the very Kantian condition of possibilities incorporating the past, the present and the future as well as the a-temporal normativity of facticity. In a pointed manner, we can say that *egoity* refers to a Kantian dynamised transcendental subject that writes the *difference of I and world*. 

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language: the possessive ability of in linguistic usage is secured by the life-worldly motion from. The circumventing of schizophrenic linguistics is the stimulus of enacting the materialised idealism of life-worldly topography as another reading of hermeneutics. Hence, the hermeneutical use of language is on the one side the intrinsic part of the transcendental ego but on the other side it is much more than a coincidental exterior, it is part of the egoity itself that is blind for the appositional schizo while writing of and from: transcendentality is the very institution of making things evident and keeps it evident (HUA I 92); it is the exegesis of the empirical subject in which the realm of language can be executed and where words are not emerging apart from a theoretical subject but are simply transcendental lexemes. Language and lexemes are generated through their actors and by enacting the transcendental unity of the subject-object (in)difference\textsuperscript{227} – it is where we direct towards them in action (HUA XVII 366f).

Nevertheless, this happening is not a copy of a pretended world, language is not bounded to an actuality, a necessity and it is far more the possibility trespassing the instant actuality. It is the possibility, in which any kind of modality can be expressed. The neutrality of language invites us to use language as possibility in which the organisation of life-world can be satisfied by its dynamenon. Hence, this stimulus considers the role of translation as a tool of enacting language and overviewing its dynamic status. Life-world, a world full of expressions and dynamics is however in its constitutional effect hidden due to its coding of egoity. In correspondence to this line, the egoity offers, deciphered by language, the decisive wherein for any kind of theory, the a priori, the trespass and its wrap-around. Hence, the dynamised transcendental ego is the ambiguous fabric of reducing life-world and likewise enabling life-world. This machinery is blind for differences, cleavages and overrides the crystallisation lines that schizophrenia causes while reporting from another world. The impossible double task of the appositions of and from in its dynamenon is why the Narcissist cries: she / he / it feels a dynamic experience within life-world but she / he / it is not able to express it, since \( A \) is constantly \( A' \) and therefore the tearing body of the hyper in which the schizophrenic movimento causes non-existing shivering moments. The causes of non-existence however enact a residuum of dynamis that enables us to distract the metaphysical note by the cipher of non-existence, since the transcendentality of egoity longs however to the chiastic slip away by perverting its very Gestaltwerdung. Reading the hyper-schizophrenic act of Gestaltwerdung is similar to that which Merleau-Ponty

\textsuperscript{227} The subject-object formula has been outlined in chapter II as a transcendental necessity of co-reading.
has recognised by prospecting the *anomalia* of double gestures while writing the experience of chiasmus in life-world.

We have recognised that Merleau-Ponty tries to discover life-world within the realms of *meaningless* diffractions in which translation is the offspring towards $B, B', B'', C, D, E, Z$ or even $\infty$ and in which syntax and grammar have still to become. Linguistic practice is wording in *nascondi* in which there is no mediator anymore; the translator as slippery agent evinces the circular reality of mediating signs by drafting the very code $C$ as a chiastic experience. But nevertheless, the processing and transformations are happenings that have been worked out and revealed in their daily practice and are in *situ* not *telos* oriented. Consequently, the carnal body is less the condition of possibilities than the articulation of expressions in a crystallised way of non-coherent associations. The body is no longer an object and denies the capability to be grasped as concept. The thin line between natural and cultural realms is therefore the last remembering line by transgressing from Husserl’s transcendentality to Merleau-Ponty’s savage ontology: the transcendental ego has been transformed into a carnal ego and outlines subsequently the doubling effect of life-worldly immanence in which $A$ in $B$ has as well its relevance while writing $B$ in $A$. This thin line evokes the possibility that we can no longer refer to culture and nature as transcendental positivity; grammar and syntax are deformed characteristics in coherence, in which the visible and the invisible outline the shift of inner-material materiality towards body as *modus vivendi*. This approach denies the stipulation of the transcendental colonialised seeing and evokes the gesture of being surprised by its *carnal* enactment – it is a way of living with secrets in life-world by doubling the questioning of life-world\textsuperscript{228}. The carnal enactment of doubling has to be read in reference to diacritic happenings: it is about *the essentialism of structures*. This turn re-invites transcendental affiliations while considering the double movement of nature-culture: transcendentality will be re-interpreted as an un-definable mixture of *carnal body* – *(world)* – *language*. Hence, it is about transcendentality which is never *ens rationes* but is present in its a-part constitution; it is about a shifting that outlines the pre-possession of transcendentality that is on the scene before I am even able to grasp it. This double structure of nature-culture makes it difficult to turn the transcendental fact into – a phenomenological approach of – mere seeing but nevertheless, what is at stake is the mode in which the transcendental setting is not the pivotal point but rather the

\textsuperscript{228} The doubling effect of *from* and *of* is the secret questioning of life-world and will be a liminal line of writing schizophrenia.
hiding place of a pregnant grammar. Hence, the transcendental motivation completes another feature that can be formulated with the ambiguity of carnal readings: Merleau-Ponty’s thoughts and especially the outlining of *Le visible and l’invisible* (*VNV*) rips up and longs for enabling the alienation of transcendental readings. The status of hesitance is outlined by hyper-schizophrenia: the pathogenesis of Merleau-Ponty’s savage ontology examines the lineage of the output of inner-ontological discussions while following the genealogy of *trans* – the anchorage of *trans* is Merleau-Ponty’s ontology that writes a footnote in referring to transcendentalism. This footnote causes in turn a cluster of schizophrenic happenings, which formulates a wholeness that is beyond and beneath vivid breathing and shakes the *paradoxon* of a grammatical reference in life-world. This radical awaking enacts the go away from (transcendental) grounds by stipulating simultaneously the very reality of going away as an ontological reality. As Merleau-Ponty draws attention and as we tend to point the drawer, speaker and actor beyond texts, pictures and stories, we have this picturesque reality of life-world that longs for an infected language. The longing for ambiguity is therefore a diverted *telos* of going along with the visible and the invisible as it does not exist as the synthesis of its very existence. The doubling of life-world is the inflection in which we have the strong feeling of leaving language, reality and world but at the same time we are keen on using language, reality and again language: it is the visible and the invisible that enacts in its very double nature transcendental questions (*language* and *life*) and *enactment*. This is what I outlined as the very *Kafkaesque* momentum of chiastic explications, which outlines parallelism and synchronism of moments without relying on each other. A negative theological reading of ambiguity is a phenomenological understanding that tries to supersede metaphysics, transcendentality and ontology by formulating layers for the *hyper* in the doubling of schizophrenic purposes. The *hyper* has in its utterance the non-ability of the ego and definitely it has not the transcendental ability to transfer the sounding effects of its very own utterance in relationship to the realm of *A and B*. Therefore, the story of the transcendental ego should rather be continued with the hubris of the Narcissist in which the *egoity* fixes the relationship *Narcissist and Mirror*. The practical line of this epic constellation (cf. *Narcissist and Mirror*) fosters the occidental hypocrisies of linguistic usage while creating the very schizophrenic momentum: the Narcissist is literally able to collect her / his / its rolling down teardrop from the mirror 229. Hitherto, the *lust* to jump between or over the hyphen of the *signifié*–

229 This is the arrogant momentum of the Narcissist where he / she / it is able to fix history. But
*signifiant* was so far the lustful play of the Narcissist but now – questioning the hyphen of *signifié-signifiant* – the teardrop of the Narcissist is the tearing *lust* where the relationship of the Narcissist and the Mirror is heavily hit by the hyper in *le monde vécu*. However, the introduction of the hyper-schizophrenic reading of *latio* enables us to say that there is no hypocrisies as such: by considering the utterance of the Narcissist there is no mirroring effect, no hypocrisies and thus the silent mirror is the very reason why teardrops roll down the face of the Narcissist into the dark of the night\(^{230}\) – the translation of the tearing sameness silences the Narcissist and makes him cry, since his / her / its copy is a grotesque face looking back to her / him / its with shady eyes. The attraction of gloominess captivates the Narcissist to the mirror of his / her / its grotesque figuration by bearing up against the tearing drops in the silence of the dark night. The break up with the Narcissist is on the one side a radical break with reading the epos, but it marks also the continuity of hyper-schizophrenia as the survival of *dramatis personae*. The weeping of the Narcissist is *NarcissistgrotesqueFace*: the deferring practice of writing practice. *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* is fertilised by the roll down of the tearing drop while listing to the liquid scream in the dark of the night – *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* is not the reality of a mirror which outlines the contours by freezing for a very moment space and time: *the liquid scream is literally the No to any kind of fixations*. Hence, the typographic writing of life-world can no longer rely on the index of grammatical frameworks, *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* is rather an *anaphoric catachresis* enacting multiple entries of linguistic and translational practices by deferring another story in another style. On that account, *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* is not the well designed, the formal reading or the shaping of life-world, *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* is the syllabic sedimentation of the erratic. This *modus vivendi* evokes *diabolic* \(^{231}\) *lust for* translation: to be directed is the genesis of the psychopathology of *(grotesque) lust* that leads to a suspended, mixed up, diverted and deferred *eschaton*; libido evokes an *Urkraft* of simultaneous complementary *Urkräfte*\(^{232}\) redeeming the pathological character of making the phenomenon transparent. Therefore simultaneously the Narcissist can also erase the archive by dashing away the very teardrop from the mirror. This ultimate hybrid turns the Narcissist into a very helpless being, since his / her / its transcendental emanation undermines the *hiatus* in life-world.

\(^{230}\) In terms of teardrops, we talk about the fall down by referring to the non-possibility of the teardrop to identify with nature.

\(^{231}\) In reference to *diabolic*, note the Greek verb *diaballein, diaballo*: throw or carry over or across (Lidell / Scott 1977: 389).

\(^{232}\) This might be the very sense of Derrida’s deconstruction; it is about the deconstruction of the phallus in our western society. And if I talk about translation, it might be the deconstruction of white male supremacy and its very reaffirmation. In other words, the *Ur-Kräfte* confirms the phallus in its disastrous situation: it is and it is not, the masturbating auto-confirmation (cf. VP 86ff).
practicing translation is a suspended libidinal movement; \textit{A and B are a matrix in which the detachment of A and B are deferred: the act of translating is an absurdity, it is all about translation}\textsuperscript{233}: \textit{trans(lating) A to B is the genesis of pathology, in which something heads forward and simultaneously, it is the pathological abandonment – it is the tautological aspect of \textit{lust} bearing silently the echo of \textit{NarcissistgrotesqueFace’s} tearing drops to its extremity by going under with their lingering sounds – as we have seen with Merleau-Ponty, translation is about pathic experiences of the grotesque figure of the Narcissist, in which translation is more than taxonomy. Remember, translational practice is within labile frameworks of carnal chiastic experiences or more precisely, \textit{NarcissistgrotesqueFace} is non corpora bearing up labile \textit{translatio}: executing lifetime-syntax kills the psyche of the Narcissist since it is at the very practice of formula where she / he / it decays into a grotesque scenery in which the Narcissist directs directly the murderous knife to the \textit{grotesqueFace}. This revolting \textit{gestus} is the dramatic act in which a broken mirror is nothing else than the \textit{translatio} of \textit{NarcissistgrotesqueFace}: linguistic practice is in its schizophrenic mode never able to point to the \textit{Narcissist} and to the \textit{grotesqueFace} differently; by pointing to the \textit{Narcissist} my utterance slips away and pronounces instead \textit{grotesqueFace}. Hence, the practice of translation is rather a \textit{modus vivendi} of becoming a translator-agent who is deprived of her / his / its agency – the institution will recognise the translator as an outlaw, a betrayer of agency and definitely as the schizophrenic figure of \textit{NarcissistgrotesqueFace}. But – and this is the very point – \textit{NarcissistgrotesqueFace} cannot bear the schizophrenic figure rather it is the hyper-schizophrenic act of linguistic practices: there is no vanishing point of anchorage where the translator is shaped as translator; the transfer of \textit{A to B} is not a form of mimicry but the very articulation of deferring practices in which non-differentiation are the necessary going astray to display \textit{translatio} within prefixed entities. With Husserl we have seen the pathological structure of how the \textit{AS} – while highlighting the movement in time – enables us to expose the \textit{arché} of life-world. With Merleau-Ponty we have discovered how linguistic practices enrol \textit{IN} – while highlighting space – life-world by embedding savage ontological practices in transcendentality.

We are more than aware that neither Husserl nor Merleau-Ponty have left transcendentality behind them, since phenomenological gazing is faith and expression

\textsuperscript{233} This is the very principle of deferring practices. It is about the daily life, in which time and space are deferred and in which the difference slips away as soon as we want to capture it.
of worshipping life-world – the alliance of faith and expression is the transcendental reading of Descartes’ subject-object life-worldly project and will be written as phenomenological translatio. Nevertheless, the phenomenological translatio in its double realms of of and from refers to the different reception strategies of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Recapitulating the weeping of the Narcissist does not redeem metaphysics but rather pushes the transcendental categories to the abyss of of and from. This double structure initiates the transcendental aporia, in which the outer reality presents itself as the con-stitutive part of inner reality. Therefore the apart is also a structural into one other in which the aporetic survives in tension en vécu: the linguistic cohesions of As and In deploys a referentiality of double realities without having a clear grammar, but, and this might be the life-worldly trick, it creates nevertheless the tautology of fact and reasoning by synthesising it in the very momentum of the chiastic vécu. This deferring trigger causes psychological pressure up in relationship to this schizophrenic longing of writing of and from. The enactment of schizo monde vécu is complemented by the decisive urge of having to be in the world; it is this relentless catalyst of a transcendental ruse that persuades me to recognise that I am in the world just to secure the survival of the logos of being anthropos. Foucault, Derrida and later on Deleuze are outlining in their respective critique on phenomenology the auto-affective reality of empiric and transcendental facticity (Foucault) without acknowledging that the mixture of urdoxa and doxa (Deleuze) in the presence of le monde vécu (Derrida) will be able to outline a phenomenological prospectus that writes an ambiguous and fragile layering underpinning the syncretic forces of life-world spelling234. Foucault points out that the finitude of the human being is conditioned by the outer reality of being an object of knowledge but simultaneously a subject that

234 Foucault, Derrida and Deleuze enable us to re-phrase the very idea of time and space or even though time in space and space as time, since their critique on phenomenological linings are regrouped around le vécu and its overwhelming physical presence: the living presence (Derrida VP 5f) writes an écart intime, mais invisible where the empiric and the analytic are mixed up (MC 388) and in where the décalage is mixing up the urdoxa and the doxa (or the foundation can never resemble the founded (Deleuze 1969: 120)). Hitherto, my transcendental reading of phenomenology emphasises as well the phenomenological imprudence of the life-worldly hiatus between the of and the from in its linguistic utterance but I will not deploy a dialectic strategy within the analysis of proceeding with phenomenological diglossia that materialises the potentiality of depicting the hiatus. We can therefore refer to a certain indexicality while reading Foucault, Derrida and Deleuze; especially the index repertoire strikes back if we ask: what kind of time are we talking about?

This chapter will be subliminally an attempt to read with Foucault, Derrida and Deleuze and against them the transfer from space and time, since the hiatus is a phenomenological reality in space and time but it is also an attempt to decipher that the little hiatus has a certain phenomenological tradition. The reception of phenomenological traditions by Foucault, Derrida and Deleuze are a guiding line for a kind of questioning that is important to my analysis but the parallel readings are tacit, since they would burst the framework of this thesis.
knows (MC 323). The *telos* of the double feature describes a phenomenological discourse in which the presentence of empirical facts and the past-tense of transcendental possibilities are mediated by life-world *itself*—the reflexive pronoun *itself* is the hidden third figure of affirming ambiguity of the fetter in phenomenological work practices (MC 332) in which form and content can be restored and structured as unity (PhP 451). Therefore *being in* life-world is the formal condition of translating the *out there*. This mixture is the cocktail in which *connaissance* is simultaneously *savoir* (MC 261) by enabling a nature of ambiguity (MC 332). Thus, the chiastic experience of ambiguity in deference pronounces Merleau-Ponty’s savage ontology but it does not ultimately rub *connaissance* against *savoir*. This non-frictional task, that should be frictional, is in Derrida’s perspective, and in addition to Foucault, the repetition or differing momentum of *being-before the object* and simultaneously *against the object* (VP 84); it highlights that the auto-referentiality of phenomenological grammar mixes up form and content at the same time. Temporality of the tautological fetter claims an auto-reference that neglects the *hiatus* between transcendentality and empiricism (VP 5). Therefore, Foucault and Derrida criticise that phenomenology does not give attention to the *hiatus* of an empiric and transcendental *repositum*; in other words, this *hiatus* is finally bridged by the *egoity* which is ultimately in its double constitution self-referential. Hence, this is the translator’s auto-reference who betrays the *modus vivendi* of tearing *analogia* by emphasising the *auto* of the *I*. The critique of non-differentiating is thus a limited: the formality of auto-reference is not just an entity or a realm as Foucault and Derrida tend to outline it; *the I, the we, the translator*, etc. is the hyper-schizophrenic enactment of a multiplied *hiatus*. The multiplicity of formality overrides Foucault and Derrida’s conception of *vécu* though it confounds strangely the empirical and transcendental task: *the I, the we, the translator*, etc. the formal outwardness by Foucault and Derrida is likewise the formal outwardness of language that fixes the double reference in which life-world and *in extentio* linguistic practices break under, since transcendentality does not have the sense for the side by side or the lateral acts in its linguistic practice; phenomenology is a kind of saying transcendentality while moving on ontological consequences: Merleau-Ponty’s savage

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235 The discourse of the *itself* in life-worldly correspondence to my Cartesian reading of transcendentality: the empirical is in reference to the transcendental and the transcendental is in reference to the empirical.

236 This self-reference is primarily possible through the acceptance of an acknowledged *I*. Foucault’s and Derrida’s critique is therefore primarily directed to Husserl and not to Merleau-Ponty.

237 It is interesting to see that especially Derrida does not refer to the *monde vécu* since the *monde vécu* is *per se differance* and an issue of differanciation (Marges 12).

238 Cf. my explanation of hyper-schizophrenia in *chapter II*. 
ontology and its chiastic experience have shown the non-fixation of *causa materialis*, but the immanence of Merleau-Pony’s *savage ontology* contains nevertheless a *rest momentum* of epiphany. The epiphany is consequently in Merleau-Pony’s writings re-interpreted through the hidden lenses of transcendentality: the *Janus-face* of differentiation is hooked up by the transcendental vanishing point. And therefore, Foucault and Derrida’s attempt of differencing the difference via *battle* and *time* echoes my transcendental reading, elaborated in *chapter I* and *chapter II*. However, Foucault’s *fighting* with the act of differentiating and Derrida’s concern of *time* are rather sneaking attempts to fix the deferring differences by subverting my reading of the transcendental *dynamiké* fetter in which Merleau-Ponty’s transcendental dynamism is in- and simultaneously excluding the conditional *hiatus* of *savoir* and *connaissance*. Questioning the status of the *hiatus* is finally nothing else but peeling the value of notions239 and therefore the positive calibration of coordinate axes is *mis en péril*. In consequence, my exegesis of phenomenology proposes a life-worldly cartography that outlines a potency of non-positivities enabling another story of time and space that cannot mingle spots, dots or realms into a new reading of (transcendental) relational space-time stories: the positive acceptance of space-time is not the calm anchor for reading *synthesis*. I would even go so far to say that the transcendental reduction is a phenomenological shouting for reaching far, beyond the necessity of special and temporal necessity and therefore, the *ontologie sauvage* of Merleau-Ponty discovers the phenomenological explosiveness of a life-worldly vacuum but hesitates to enact the knits of materiality. Henceforth, my fettle is a lax or even though a very radical fettle of phenomenology in which the *dynamiké* is a *parapraxis* of the broken transcendental almighty hood. It is worthwhile to close-read the phenomenological critique of schizophrenia by following the very concepts of *difference, time and space* as the practice of longing for enacting the *dynamiké of language and translation* as hyperschizophrenia in deferral.

We have seen so far, that the manifestation of deferring openings and deprivations write schizophrenic possibilities, in which the linguistic practice within the transcendental bracket is in its libidinal moment suspended: the *schizo* event is the very practice of straying in which the *hiatus* of inner realities and outer possibilities suspend language; in other words, to jar is simply another psychopathological way of producing life-

239 It is strange that Derrida embarks on the game of denomination formulas, since his deconstruction is the perversion of positivity and fixed terms.
world-matrixes in which the physiognomy of grammar is another form of materiality. Hence, the vehemence of *lust* while striding through the linguistic appearance in life-world imposes a linguistic grammar referring to its most remote reality in which the humus of hyper-schizophrenic moments perverts the necessity of *differance*. The remoteness is remote since *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* cannot be read in space and time realms in which the linguistic appearance in life-world can only be unravelled through the transcendental hyphen between the dramatic linguistic utterance and the stabilising grammatical code: *the Narcissist* (cf. linguistic utterance) *in* (cf. transcendental transmitter) *life-world* (cf. grammar) remembers the chiastic happening in which the schizophrenic reality fixes the grotesque masque of the Narcissist in her / her / its freezing mirror. Thus, *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* has rather to be read as the anaphoric reality, and this is close-reading the hyper-momentum, in which the *differed Gestaltverdung* of the screaming teardrop or *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* is not simply the act of the scenery – the *differed Gestalt* is the *metalepsis* of on-going deferring acts of hyper affiliations with schizophrenic practices of *A* and *B*.

Hence, the extended engagement of differing difference *A* and *B* in its hyper-schizophrenic practice is still a pending issue. It is still a pending issue insofar as life-world – language – translation are embraced by transcendental brackets, in which the mundane world and the world of ideas, the subject and object are simultaneously present, respectively mutually conditioned through the bastion of the *conjuncta AS* and *IN* that outlined a phenomenological prospectus of a syncretic life-worldly topography. Language as a schizophrenic experience can only be schizophrenic while subliminally there is a transcendental acceptance of a spatial and temporal relationship in which the very moment of *dia* turns into the utterance of the lexeme: *A as A’ to B* and *A in B* can only be schizophrenic in relationship to something else and this matters, since the *relatio in natura* is simultaneously the *relatio in rationis*. Therefore, the ur-syncretic formula *ti esti* is the redemption of translational schizophrenia since it creates the configuration of *who* (nature, culture, actress, etc.) and *what* (translation) and hence, NarcissistgrotesqueFace’s *who* and *what* cannot be analysed or associated with categories. In other words, the incomprehensible is only incomprehensible in

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240 And therefore remoteness as well as closeness are not notions of indexicality.

241 Cf. also Gayatri Spivak’s preface of *Grammatology* (Derrida 1976: xxix). We will see that differing difference is no longer applicable to categories (such as space and time), it is rather an exposition of possibilities in materiality that suspends the translation of *A in B*, but rather emphasises *A with B*. And therefore the differing enactments are not a dialectic *experimentum*. 
relationship to a linguistic grammar and sign language is only sign language in relationship to a symbolic tradition – the mute resistance is not an anarchic refusal, since the clinical authority would range it simply as the refusal of linguistic utterance. Hence, the redemption of the double structure of utterance claims heuristic practices, in which the reality of language was realistically there but not as an effected practice. This double structure creates the heuristic powerful rhetoric of positivities in such a way that the reality was on the scene but not effected and therefore not a positive factum; the negativity of language is therefore on another level just the circular No to its corresponding Yes such as the grotesque face is always stuck with mirror. NarcissistgrotesqueFace however slips from schizophrenic writings Yes and No while bearing the hyper in its reading. This is where Husserl neglects or overlooks the underlying and silent operational hyper in the very schizophrenic setting within the very loud rally of promoting As as an option of episteme: while reconsidering potestas as another expression of episteme, any proliferation and doublings of translational practice are told as a story of transcendental linearity. Additionally to Husserl, Merleau-Ponty reconfirms the circle by highlighting the ontological ambiguity as another way of expressing Heidegger’s ontological difference of Sein and Seiende. For Merleau-Ponty, there is an internal bond between the chiastic movement of Sein and Seiende, since essence is correlated intrinsically with potesta and will translate this relational power to layer the textures of A and B – the potestas incorporates again the taming of dia into the realm of life-worldly Prägnanz. This is why life-world as phenomenological principle is predominantly a lack of translation by Husserl and a lack from translation by

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242 In reference to Ernst Cassirer’s Symbolische Prägnanz and its procedural exposition of the immanent disposition of perception and representation (Cassirer 1982: 235ff): “Unter ‘symbolischer Prägnanz’ soll also die Art verstanden werden, in der ein Wahrnehmungserlebnis, als sinnliches Erlebnis, zugleich einen bestimmten nichtanschaulichen ‘Sinn’ in sich fasst und ihn zur unmittelbaren konkreten Darstellung bringt” (Cassirer 2010c: 250).

243 We might even say that Husserl outlines unwittingly schizophrenic practices while writing stumme Erfahrung and simultaneously reine Erfahrung (HUA X 75) and cf. also Giorgio Agamben’s Infanzia e storia. Distruzione dell’esperienza e origine della storia (Agamben 2001: 56).

Merleau-Ponty. Both prepositions confirm that the language of translation is the language of legislation.

Henceforth, the legislation of conditioning life-world does not question the hiatus, the hyper or NarcissistgrotesqueFace – the symptoms of writing life-world remain in the courtroom and they will be classified and finally disclosed. Unfortunately the judge aka the grammatical code does not question the double movement of symptoms and the symptoms of the duration or the length of the gap. The hiatus is an unqualified distance that interferes tacitly with the translation from $A$ to $C$ as the forma formans of linguistic practice; the forma formata, given via transcendentalism and ontology, rescues through the back-door the trans of trans-latio: the practice of AS as the epoché-answer by Husserl or the enactment of an IN language as the katabasis of Merleau-Ponty’s savage ontology secures in its deferring difference the Ur by accepting tacitly the possession of Urdoxa as Urdoxa. Therefore the transcendental economy of explication and comprehension has still the answer of producing realities as language in a given life-world. The aporia of stories as untold stories is therefore, hidden, captured by the transcendental sponsor. The $A'$ bias generates on the one hand deferring realities beyond the Aristotelian shelves while on the other hand, linguistic practices (re-)introduce the Platonic idea of wholeness as constitutive part of the enacted grammatical code of life-worldly sensuality. The taxonomy is dynamised but this dynamon is simultaneously the simple extension of the linguistic grammar in which the transcendental line fulfils its duty. We have seen that the translational activism is in the very case of Husserl maximised to the minimum while dwelling within the tension of synthesis and analysis: the transgression is actually nothing else than $A$ as $A'$. There is nothing more to do than to suppose the nature of agency as potestas of another world. From that angle the translational task is the organon of holiness. The translator is the high priest, the sacrificed figure of three who takes responsibility for the emerging transfer within life-world. She / he / it does not only take responsibility in the sense of responding to emerging constellations of $A$ to $B$ within life-world, she / he / it are rather the sainted third figure of being the denominator, dictator, master, who conditions and fosters, from a very hidden position, the transfer from $A$ to $B$, the interaction of subject and object or the interference of life and world as its double consistency. Or to put it in other words, life-world is the very political fulfilment of the bourgeois’ telos: the lawyer interprets law by responding (by taking responsibility) to the juridical canon as a learned person,
the engineer offers operations by defining the framework of the Euclidian geometry and the medical doctor predicates symptoms on the very basis of his medical training. This is the ugly antic of the bourgeois entelechy: translating life-world is the execution of an original body and his corresponding mind through the possession of transcendent wisdom as its political hidden reference. The master, written in capital letters, overruns, bleaches out and ignores NarcissistgrotesqueFace. The original knows just the original and it is a matter of originality of the master, who executes differences within a life-worldly setting as its venue of execution: Husserl uses therefore the notion of transcendental epoché and Merleau-Ponty refers to a carnal body as ontological savagery to compensate Crisis (Husserl) and Ambiguity (Merleau-Ponty) within life-world. In other words, Husserl and Merleau-Ponty refer in their phenomenological reading to a theological system in which the blessed and the sinners refer to a common code of conduct: the syntax of translation is the blessed instruction of a better life-world by adding the transcendental task as their inevitable metaphysical steering body of its very principle. It is finally the desire to transform the disorder into order: the savage and the dirt will be tamed by the force of translation and by the positivity of having a non-grammatical corpus. This act testifies the theological movens from the impure to the pure. The mythological containment from the violent to the sacred order is the theology of language: the movement towards the hallow is its phenomenological feature and at the same time its referral. In other words, the double-name Husserl-Merleau-Ponty has fit into the mould of transcendentality, which in turn dynamises the life-worldly project by highlighting secretly its positivity. This hidden track keeps Husserl’s tamed dynamism and Merleau-Ponty’s savage dynamism in strict discipline by operationalising phenomenology as an inflection of linguistic practices. The encompassing figure of reading the inflection in linguistic practice neglects, in its sublime ways, the authority of forms – although it is sublime and hidden present in the cloak of transcendentality – the neglecting of authority is the linguistic fulfilment of carrying out possibility forms and formation possibilities and therefore we can say that the genesis of forming possibilities is the discontinuity of transcendent symmetry and will be re-engineered via phenomenological readings by translating the continuity as and in life-world while re-considering its transcendental addendum. The comparative As and the preposition In referring to a grammar in which the chiastic deviation of positivities is caught up within the modification of taxonomy frames consistency of linguistic authority through the back door. Therefore phenomenological reading remains
– despite my previous adventurous readings of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty – in the aftermath of transcendental taxonomy hermeneutically without holes for escaping.

Stripping of transcendental categories from a hermetic phenomenological framework and therefore emphasising the battle of other means (Foucault 1973) or the spacing of time (Derrida 1976: 154) means to read articulation patterns and the gamble with dilatation possibilities of the signifié and significant in a deferred bundle. NarcissistgrotesqueFace is therefore the lateral attempt to break with the familiar feeling of hermeneutic intimacy of pre a priori conditions and of representational constellations. My exegesis of phenomenology is an attempt to get rid of the transcendental epos by attempting to outline how a non-hermetic phenomenological exegesis can be drafted without visibility, language without grammar and knowledge without history – it is an attempt to read phenomenology laterally without objects and therefore also without subjects; it is a prospectus with NarcissistgrotesqueFace, the pausing moment in which the appearance of the hyper-schizophrenic move on the stage is not a mise-en-scène but the mise-en-scène of the rolling teardrop into the dark of the night. It is the silent shouting of the nocturnal membrane that reverberates the flow of the non-existing shivering moment in translatio – the assembling translational bricolage speaks out symptoms of another inflection: the endeavour is to coble another metonymy in which the non-linearity of sym and hypo enacts an assemblage of translatio and in which the diastase of hyper-schizophrenia is life-worldly deixis.

The movens of sym with hypo is the experience of how translatio displays practices that intrinsically do not have language (no I, no us, no auto-reference) and subsequently no grammatical reference-point of distinguishing time and space from its content. It will be a trial to surprise the slumbering Merleau-Ponty, to shake him heavily and hoping therefore that he loses his transcendental fettle – by loosing the superficiality of denomination formulas and historical facticity, we might reach much more widely than the echo is even able to return to life-world and might tremble therefore not only the bedrock of Merleau-Ponty’s chiastic foundation but also Husserl’s transcendental

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245 The lateral trial is insofar NarcissistgrotesqueFace, since it is not the trigger and the pivotal point of reading life-worldly practices. All of a sudden the lateral presence rattles heavily the coniunctum with while reading A with B.

246 Note: content cannot be read in correspondence to form. Content is neither within the realms of reality nor an issue of positivity and therefore the formation of form via differencing realities in time and space is definitely an obsolete procedure.
womb. Rocking Husserl and Merleau-Ponty is touching hyper-schizophrenia while being written by its symptoms and while being played by the enactment of the unintended gnosis. Experiencing gnosis reconsiders linguistic usages in diacritic fabrics; it is about a carnal coenesthesia as topos noetos for communio that understands latio not as fixation but with Merleau-Ponty’s chiastic momentum as deferring trembling. The communio of language and grammar might be thus the transgression of a radical expression that deprives you of the very sense of communio – it is again about the cantus firmus in which symptoms graft onto the sheer abyss in hyper-schizophrenia. It is about an endeavour of subscription in which we are delivered to translatio and in which translatio of life-world can never catch up but will be continued. This unqualified continuum, the choreography of dancing with247 – with is the far-reaching that enacts translatio – is however neither simply the bridge from A to B nor a parallel structure of A and B and it is definitely not the relational co-reference. With is literally the a-poría, the alpha privativum of the very pace of existence in which the sym writes the ephemeral diastase. This ephemeral sym is the continuation of contiguus. The trope contiguus will be the echoing presence while dismantling transcendentality while bearing sym with hypo248. The contiguus praxis of sym with hypo is not only the correlation of the lexemes A with B, but it also writes the continuation of A with B while drawing mouth with vagina. It is all of a sudden the lateral presence of mouth and of vagina that rattles heavily the coniunctum with while exploring A with B249. The collocation of with defers the perplex co-presence that shivers while reading the liquidity of the Narcissist’s teardrop. Unfortunately, neither Husserl nor Merleau-Ponty pushed the edges of As respectively In to the ephemeral abyss of vagina with mouth by neglecting en passant the very existence of sym with hypo. The neglecting of A and B by Husserl via A as A’ to B and by Merleau-Ponty via A in B, C, D, etc. is the heavy denial of the tearing sym with hypo. The ponderousness of the denial is, on the

247 Dancing with has been used in reference to Natasha Myers (2008) and Donna Haraway (2008). We will discover that the preposition with of dancing will be slightly different in my reading.

248 Hypo is in my reading and within the context of sym with hypo the ephemeral phenomenon of co-presence.

249 The focus on with can also be read as an exegesis of Theologia Crucis in which the body creates the telos of being. In correspondence to my life-world with theological studies explore the corporal unity of Christ in its axiomatic reading that oscillates between the potentialis of unity and diversity. Thereby the debate between being in Christ and being with Christ writes, especially within the Pauline tradition, categories of enactments: “To use the idea of being with Christ conveys something more external than that of being in Him. But almost certainly it did not to Paul. In Gal. 2.20 he combines it with what is perhaps the closest of all his expressions of identification with Christ: I have been crucified with Christ; and it is no longer I that live, but Christ liveth in me and that life which I now live in the flesh I live in faith, which is in the Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself up for me” (Robinson 1977: 63f). In addition, we can read the preposition with as Merleau-Ponty’s theological in life-world.
opposition, the heavy acceptance of a transcendental framework; their criticism has been fired off, since Husserl and Merleau-Ponty’s life-world fulfilled the extravagance of language by replaying linguistic usage with a proper grammar and with an appropriated syntax within a proper world of the Narcissist; translation is therefore the very écart of the replayed game, saying: A and B. We will see that phenomenological translation shivers the écart to its lingering rolling of writing sym with hypo while the contiguus is the utmost practice of reading the conjunctum with: the juxtaposition of contiguus and conjunctum balances life-worldly stories over a debris of wording that impends suddenly to fall, since A and B is enacted via the contiguus rhetoric of the venereal engagement: A with B. Hence, the venereal juxtaposition writes stories of co-presence that heats up cataphoric stories that cannot be written in a plot. The impossibility of following a script will show us that the dissolution of A and B will research its utmost reality by calling A with B. However, the positum of with bundles in its radicalism the bearing with as the exegesis of phenomenological translation that spells out a remote residuum of situated story telling that cannot be transferred into history. The amorphic practice of A and B enters the very slippery entanglement of Sein und Seiende in which the morpheme of other – delirious – entrance possibilities mark the modulation of texture. Therefore, the story of the interference of the prefixes hypo in sym will circumnavigate the bedrock of the history that is written between Sein and Seiende; the simultaneous multiplicity of the hiatus will be at work while the lack and excess of psyche turns the clinical picture of the schizoid obsolete, since it writes apertures, constellations and shifts which are normally closed and formalised by the clinical corpus. The ethos of the clinic is therefore always the process of becoming fixed but processing in a non-clinical mode is rather writing paronyms. In other words, life-world is no longer readily understood through linguistic practices and grammatical moves – there is no locus amoenus of linguistic holiness, A and B of life-worldly experience and of an insoluble shift in which rivers, mega cities, the homosexual or the daily survival of the Cullies in South India have fulfilled their duties; Atlas is no longer suffering the severity of Zeus’s punishment, his practice has sophisticated another burden of another story, in which you and I are lovers and in which the latio of the trans is ironised and deprived of time and space. The practical utterances of paronomys are the very suspension of historical readings of materiality in my very situated historical play. The very moment of differing morphemes creates a tension that offers in their explosiveness a vacuum – a freezing moment in which the explosiveness of world
outbursts an implosion of grammars, theories, systems, images, ideologies, politics and histories through the raw surface of the Narcissist’s mirror: it is there where liquid screaming overrides grammar and telos. It is an a-historic momentum in which the paradise is, for a very second, possible – it is possible in its very disturbance of situated perversity and blasphemy in which our situatedness is lacking and exceeding the mirror: the vacuum writes lack and simultaneously it is exceeding Natureculture and natureCulture. This very moment at the very same momentum is nevertheless the impossibility of the paradise: the trace has in its directness lost its direction. The impossibility of possible writings of history, grammar and knowledge is my very reading of phenomenological translation A with B: the chiastic experience is never a passing happening, its trace touches and will never be touched\textsuperscript{250}. The trace, which is its very ironised reality of implosion, is a worldly glimpse with words and worlds. This incommensurability of translational practice, the deferring impossibility of its practice is the untold possibility of phenomenological work practice that does not care about entities and transcendental containment but about how they interfere with: there might be even grammar, systems or symbols but these entities are no longer at stake; it is how these entities are bearing with. In this vein, hyper-schizophrenia enables us to trans as movement in multiple chiastic directions, in which the act of distinguishing is simply trickling down; the hyper enables us to the attendance of slowing down, in which life-world is the symptom that never can be captured. In that very sense translatio is never able to catch up differences, it is diacritical in open relatedness and therefore beyond schizophrenic practices. The trans cobbles a linguistic hyper-pathology in which latio is a coherent deformation in communio. Translation of life-world cannot be pulled in but is able to be continued as the radical expression of seeping with life and world: with is not production, it is not positivity, it is not facticity, it is not formality, it is not…!

This no is not simply – as above outlined – the negation and the opposition of yes – it is a radical disengagement with the function No: my No is simply a void disillusion and therefore, it is a deeper No that is a silent shouting (or liquid shouting) at the materiality of this very mundane life-world – it is NarcissistgrotesqueFace. Thus, the dispersion of materiality of NarcissistgrotesqueFace in form and content will be twisted, twisted and again twisted as far as materiality is not simply the consequence of chiastic happenings but the montage of with that unlocks the non-relational of metonyms. It is about a

\textsuperscript{250} This is the difference in relation to Merleau-Ponty; indeed, there is no (ontological) revelation.
disturbing sensitivity of with in its historical affiliation with linguistic practices: materiality is bearing with and therefore the instrument for a differing translation of tearing materiality. Form and content will not be newly negotiated, there is no discourse; form and content are a juxtapositioning that rattles its translatio and therefore it is primarily No. Therefore the anticipation of the key function – which is always unintelligible, if not, it will not be a key function – of with is the ecstasies in Chi as hyper that writes the suspended translatio in venereal phantasma. We will see that the chiastic experience is a trial to shift from a transcendental subject (aka: non-translation, embedded in tautology despite the possibility to think variations) towards a carnal body (cf. translation, enacted in the hyper-schizophrenic reality of chiastic experience in symptoms); the lively feature of the carnal body is not simply the lively tune, it is in its lively practice a hyper-schizophrenic reality that opens up a differing hiatus and therefore again Derrida’s critique of le vécu as the fundament of phenomenology as metaphysics is literally a pending issue (VP 133). But le vécu is also not strictu sensu para-physic, since the para conditions physics and therefore Derrida’s je vécu is not the third figure (the phenomenological figure) that combines empiric and transcendental modalities. Phenomenological exegesis can be much more radical than Derrida’s critical sum up of transcendental and empirical constellations. The semantic horizon will be trespassed via Derrida’s enacting dissemination possibilities since its communication cannot be reduced to polysemy (Derrida 2001: 44). The trespassing is in my phenomenological layout already trespassed before we are able to recognise communio of trespassing communication. The malapropism of the material condition is a radical fraction with the transcendental condition of time and space; the power structure veiled by the generosity of (transcendental) possibilities will be unmasked by the futility of the time and space grammar: the inflection is the absurdity of life-world since there is no container labelled time or space. The hyper materialised through the carnal body might be worked off along the line of ambiguity of pathology, irresponsibility, pathos, ecstasies, montage, morphology, etc. in the aim of translating the carnal body not as entity but as flesh. Therefore, hyper-schizophrenia embodies an ontological friction with the formatting mixture of time and space and of content and form. Hyper-schizophrenia is therefore rather a read-out of cultural hyper-formation that cannot write the carnal body in its very juiciness. The assemblage of lack and excess is the alienation

251 This reference shows us that Derrida has however still a referential (cf. horizon) space-time exegesis. The possibility to trespass one world into another is enacted within the realms of space and time. Trespassing even before we are able to consider to trespass is in a certain time-line but we will see that the space-time continuum does neither bother nor constitute anything.
in which flesh is able to take position in its pathic narration. The pathic enrolment however, does not write a sensitive slope-shifting as there is no *with* between *A* and *B* – the hyper-phenomenon of *A with B* is the differing difference *without* time and space but *with* time and space: it is about the enactment of sensitivity as vulnerable language – it is about the enactment of the sensitivity of *NarcissistgrotesqueFace*. Phenomenological translation will be therefore a narration beyond phenomenological dualities while enabling a *with* that *is* and *has* a risky emptiness: it is about a risky translation that writes a lady, a cleaning lady, a black cleaning lady who is more or completely somebody else than the (imposed) attributes of her body are telling us. Story-telling bears the radicalisation of the tension of possibility and alienation in which the co-presence of a *black cleaning lady* and *black loving mother* is not a *possibility* but a queering *position*, in which the *story with* translates *A and B* as *queering positum*: it is literally the display between the position of the black cleaning lady / black loving mother against the *potentialis* of the black cleaning lady / black loving mother that perverts or queers the *positum*. Story telling of *translatio* is literally the trickle of life-world; it is an art of afterlife that slows down the telling of *le monde vécu*.

In the following *telling* will be the very notion of *bearing with* that writes *another* translation that is actually the *bearing with* of *No*. Writing *No* is however as exercise not marked by the *exemplum classicum* of decline life-world: *A* and *B* are not the reference of drawing the map of the landscape – *No* is not *nunc aeternitatis et temporalis* in shifting *gravitas* while the surveyor paces the mundane garden. We will see that the dispersion of *metathesis* of *le monde vécu* in *time* and *space* are *écarts* of language in its very fundamental self-understanding or in other words, the dispersion of *metathesis* writes *No*. Therefore, I will address – in a second line – the *hiatus* of doubling life-world, language and practice as the *écart* of hyper-schizophrenia in which the sensitive usage of a vulnerable language shivers *translatio*. Shivering life-world considers carnal bodies as queer *seeing* in which *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* replays to the mirroring effect of the Narcissist. We will see that the very beam of the reflecting mirror does not emanate from the face of the Narcissist but it emanates from the very juiciness of *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* while writing a choreography, in which *A is dancing with B*. It is a plea for a phenomenological practice that is oriented by a frictional surface of materiality – a materiality that defers as soon as we want to write *A* or *B*. Therefore we have to say that it is about promoting phenomenology that will go far way to show that
time and space are suspended within hypo-schizophrenic practices. This draft is a re-appreciation of Merleau-Ponty’s carnal body; it is a phenomenological reading with and far beyond Merleau-Ponty’s reading. The hyper-schizophrenic act deferring within a carnal body is an attempt to dig within the veins of writing without grammar. Within hypo there is a possibility for narrations but it is a narration that stands permanently apart. However, being apart does not correspond to the grid of space and time – this figuration provokes phenomenological readings to go far away: the hyper-culture of *translatio* is about this deferring without time and space but within time and space. It is about phenomenological story telling in its material enactment. The queer carnal body is the incitement to dance – in return, the queering invitation to dance is story telling that goes under the skin while displaying *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* – *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* will be hereafter declined to display the *graphos of trans* in its life-worldly practice. Et voilà, the *topos* of the tearing teardrop will disturb the transcendent reality of *yes* and *no* whilst *coenesthesia* reads the formula *A with B perplex*. The trigger of perplex reading is the redundant use of … *again and again*. The instruction *da capo al NarcissistgrotesqueFace* has the enactment of *chronos* and *topos* that cannot compose the *coda* of life-world. Therefore, the continuation of this chapter is the ornamental circumstances of *da capo al NarcissistgrotesqueFace* blowing *A with B* while writing A with B in *similitudo*: you will smell it – *bearing A with B* is the dirty smell of *disformation*.

1. Materialising the spelling out of the carnal body or the total refusal of life-world

A No Language is more than an Idiolect

The trope *far-reaching* (of phenomenological tautology) is a cry for *help* leaving notions, denomination formulas and the always-reassuring mother tongue behind their transcendent contact-zones. These contacts have so far produced chiastic moments through their capability to theorise by striving *inwards* for the possibility of utterance and for fixing the *lineage of signifié* and its *signifiant* while touching *outwards* the knot *A and B*. This line-up outlines schizophrenic constellations by accepting simultaneously – in time and space – the connection of *signifié* and *signifiant*; this double feature

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252 The Narcissist cries for help since she / he / it is at somebody’s mercy.
regroups the theoretical subjects I and we under the umbrella of egoity. Combing the theoretical subject with practical reality is the schizophrenic act for what the directive of infolding\textsuperscript{253} calls for. It is the very other possibility to grasp the hidden transcendental line, since the in of folding is the act of holing ex linguistic practices by me, the judge, the translator, the scholar, the blue collar worker and me the black cleaning lady. Therefore, the trope far-reaching calls materiality of carnal linguistic practices into question\textsuperscript{254}, since dissolutive linguistic realities disform carnal enactments: in its disruptive practice of trashing similitudo, hyper-schizophrenic enactments express the experience of deferring in its schizophrenic hiatus\textsuperscript{255}. The excess of materiality as disformation is consequently not tamed by mediating the signifiant to the signifié since the tie between language and logos is not simply repealed but rather differed through its practise of translatio. And consequently, materiality is as well dissolute as entity; there is no lineage outlining the relationship of pathos and logos, of materiality and text, of body and texture, of space and time, etc. Linguistic practices cannot be conceptualised as topos noetos and therefore they cannot be used to be read as localisation of the locus classicus; far more the carnal body is no longer the textual cipher for telling stories. The tension between the institution language and the difference in its deferring practice of writing fleshy A and B refuses to be conceptualised and therefore, it refuses to locate the material of the carnal body in the realm of life-worldly practices\textsuperscript{256}.

By following closely materia obstat, it is clear that the rejection of material linguistics is in its practice the deferral tension of the compositional figure institution with difference. This reading shifts the track of aesthetic sobriety towards the mask of

\textsuperscript{253}The in of infolding is the condition in which the folding can be processed and elaborated. As we have seen in Merleau-Ponty’s chapter the preposition in is not simply the condition of its very life-world possibility, it is rather the transcendental condition of its possibilities. Donna Haraway uses in references to Don Ihde Merleau-Ponty’s link that the practice of infolding suggests the dance of world-making encounters: what happens in the folds matters and she continues that infolding of the flesh is worldly embodiment and therefore the on-going formation of the infold writing dynamic, situated and historic realities (Haraway 2008: 249). In this last chapter I will develop tacitly how Haraway’s dance-figure and the process of embodiment layer the martyrium of practice. This martyrium can be read in Haraway’s commitment of natureculture (Haraway 2008: 16); I attempt to go with Haraway but also simultaneously beyond Donna.

\textsuperscript{254}The questioning of pathogenesis in reading hyper-schizophrenia is the political line of this chapter.

\textsuperscript{255}George Bataille reels the hiatus in by expressing the dynamis in agony (Bataille 1944: 296).

\textsuperscript{256}Obviously, life-world can no longer act as a unity of analysis. It will be a deferred figure of practice in which the life-worldly pattern cannot be repeated. So far we have seen that the ephemerid of hyperschizophrenic happening is written on the template of life-world that allows paradigmatic repetitions. From now on, the distortive reality of life-world will be utterly at the hyperschizophrenic disposition. This enactment will be the movens for understanding section III of this chapter.
NarcissistgrotesqueFace: the symmetry of the aesthetic totality is in other words the shifting from progress and the re-assurance of becoming literally the body that I want to be towards digress, disforming practice that reads NarcissistgrotesqueFace all in one breath – a stretto in extremis that is before any architectural groundwork and therefore beyond the ontological index of time and space. Or to put it in other words, the hypothesis of a philological body writing an aesthetic grammatical residue that indoctrinates the relationship and the reading of my very own life-worldly upsets the pathological body, upsets the aesthetic grammatical residue, upsets relationships, upsets the architecture of life-world and finally upsets NarcissistgrotesqueFace – and again the upset is not the reversal of a pathological body, of an aesthetic grammatical residue, of composition, etc. … it 258 NarcissistgrotesqueFace. To write is up side down is not violating the graph but indicates rather the distortion of reality by following the non-presence of its presence 259: A and B as life-worldly extensions and as pivotal extension of is, is bearing A and B which cannot be synthesised in presence. In other words, I am able to write is up side down since the presence of non-presence is written in time and space. A and B are not positing the typeface ex negativo, they write an experimental font that still has to be designed. Translatio of A and B learns to bear physically with A and B; however, the categories time and space are not simply categories, they are present without being there 260. And therefore, translatio distorts my authorship and suspends my ability to write the scenery in which the verbum being can be choreographed as trans-positional force: the copula is, the delegate of the verbum being cannot be the pivotal point from where sense, practice and life can be shaped in time and space, since the present tense of is is not the pre-condition of life-worldly agency; the fungous contours of the agent stumbles in her / his very practice and simultaneously she / he

257 The shift towards (...) is never towards NarcissistgrotesqueFace. The assumption that a shift has a direction towards NarcissistgrotesqueFace is overwritten by the very deferring need.
258 Please note: I intended to turn the crossed out words up side down but unfortunately my software programme does not have any graphic tools to rearrange it. Keep in mind, all crossed out words are meant to be up side down!
259 Derrida indicates the impossibility of arché by crossing out essential references. Derrida is only able to commit the act of crossing out due to the tacit acceptance of time and space. To turn the copula being upside down is the act of bearing with that acknowledges time and space. This is the very difference to Derrida’s position of différence; I agree that arché and différence are not features of a negative theological reading but nevertheless Derrida’s enactments cross out the copula due to temporisation and spatialisation and while turning the copula up side down we have to bear with being while neglecting time and space. The act of cutting is therefore the production of the letter a in différence. In opposition, NarcissistgrotesqueFace is not the product of differing difference.
260 My considerations can be again read in the line with Derrida’s La différence (Derrida Marges) but also with Signature, événement, contexte (Derrida Marges). In these texts Derrida stresses temporisation and spatialisation as the requirement of practicing différence. Hence, Derrida orient himself too much on the firmament of time and space. In my reading, I attempt to keep the framework time and space lateral apart without denying its existence. They are simply no longer important to translate life-world.
loses the grid of linguistic actions\textsuperscript{261} by following a strategy without tactics. As we can read again and again, the spatial tactics of time is not the salient point, since bearing life-world is not conditioned by a pivotal point (called \textit{being}) in time and space – time and space are present on and in \textit{translatio} of life-world but they do not formulate positive linings. The linguistic effect of \textit{A and B} is not conditioned; its practise is a reversed \textit{parasitos} by nurturing the host without weakening the parasite. In continuation, the verbum \textit{is} has no stimulating natural devices but is \textit{stimulans} in its distortion by resisting the protocol of dichotomies. Consequently, the copula \textit{is} is rather a symptom for reading efflorescence that crosses out the realms of \textit{time} and \textit{space} while changing its very own notions. Therefore … \textit{NarcissistgrotesqueFace} is the suspension of syntax and grammatical knowledge but nevertheless, \textit{NarcissistgrotesqueFace} involves simultaneously the enactment of lexemes that are non-sense – \textit{NarcissistgrotesqueFace} is literally the linguistic exhaustion that never had historical time to breathe (cf. the above written dot, dot, dot). The dramaturgical force of trembling linguistic behaviour considers linguistic aesthetics as pathogenesis of an unfilled \textit{plethora} that will be re-dressed by the outburst of irony, showing the absence of pathological mimesis: the bureaucratic affirmation of form and content will be perverted by a travesty that is convulsed \textit{with} laughter, \textit{with} correlations, \textit{with} logical set ups and \textit{with} architectural dispositions\textsuperscript{262}. Therefore, we have to make ourselves comfortable with a language of an infamous grammar that definitely does not transport its construction – it rather refers to its fissured differences. Its practice breaches radically, in its deferring reality, with the humanistic acclamation of \textit{pathos} and \textit{logos} or the semiotic necessity of \textit{body} and \textit{text}. The produced \textit{hiatus} is by its scaring abyss no longer discernable, since the positivity of words is at it ends suspended or it writes on the skin a lingering sound of simulacrum: the flying around \textit{cuticles} of Lucretius are the imprints on the scattered skin of the carnal body\textsuperscript{263} and therefore it is its permanent deprivation of any giving sense in reference to the scattered skin. Flying realities are looping their perspectives without being chased by the premises of a \textit{cat-and-mouse game}, since there is no \textit{premise A} (cat) and \textit{no premise B} (mouse). The figuration of simulacrum is the non-possibility of the psychological wish of having voice and being heard. The stumbling of our voices that are, in their material utterance loud but in their linguistic utterance senseless, twisting the pathological reduction into a loop of

\textsuperscript{261} The non-ability of handling the copula as agent of practice will be discussed further down.

\textsuperscript{262} The travesty ironises the psychopathological affirmation of time and space and it ironises the re-aesthetisation of aesthetics while documenting itself.

\textsuperscript{263} Cf. Lucretius, \textit{De rerum natura}, Book 4, V 30-53.
difference by forming a silent shouting at the practice of forming words; it is as the silent shouting derives from the psychotic error in which the shouting might be translated into life-worldly senses. Hence, \textit{(having) no language} is about a vestigium\textsuperscript{264} in which, fleshy words trespass the form of linguistic inflection and therefore betrays its transcendental loyalty\textsuperscript{265}: there are no possibilities to form the condition of linguistic recognition possibilities – words are literally \textit{epiphenomena} and refuse to be conceptualised through \textit{NarcissistgrotesqueFace}. The \textit{vestigium} commences where we stop to spell out the Narcissist and where we say \textit{No} to categories and systems of the Narcissist. The \textit{vestigium} is \textit{convulsing} with laughter that makes almost literally everything convivial\textsuperscript{266}. Thus, life-world seems to be a deprived \textit{zone of improvisation}, in which the \textit{vestigium} flashes \textit{en passant} and in which \textit{translatio} is the \textit{vestigium} clothed in a velvet texture; \textit{velvet} is the code for looking closer to the fabric of linguistic impossibility, since it needs the softness of its feel: the in-articulation of \textit{A', B, C, D, etc.} is not the dramatic denouement that will be followed by an apocalyptic doom of life-world. The tugging hold of life-worldly deflections are synonymous with \textit{translatio} and materiality and therefore, the twist of the trope \textit{far-reaching} is the con-lecture of \textit{translatio} and \textit{materiality} in which we turn the modern \textit{condition of possibilities} into the \textit{condition of impossibilities} up side down. The radical refusal of the graph of life-world is finally, at this very point, an attempt to go beyond the writing of the theologian Merleau-Ponty by dismantling the infolding placidity of the \textit{martyrium} of phenomenological constructions through \textit{NarcissistgrotesqueFace}. Therefore \textit{NarcissistgrotesqueFace} re-arranges morphemes in such a manner that up and down, right and left, reality and fiction as well as visibility and audibility float ironically around: non-linearity, anti-logical and fictional principles are from now on the inflection of grammatical impossibility. Therefore, the non measurement is the \textit{heretic position} in which \textit{translatio} is underneath \textit{neurotic obsession} and above \textit{canonical coercion}; translation without language is the \textit{organon} of deferring practice that deprives

\textsuperscript{264} \textit{Vestigium} is an index for neither space nor time; it is rather a \textit{sonderbares Gespinst} according to Benjamin (Benjamin II, 1, 378) that drafts the formation of \textit{le monde} as accidental competence in the invariance of \textit{le vécu}. The enactment of the \textit{vestigium} is not the discourse of \textit{forming} representation it is rather a \textit{gestus} of proliferation. And especially the scholastic debate on the relational \textit{imago} and \textit{similitudo} of God and the mundane creature (Bonaventura, Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Christi q. 4, c (24a) formulates the vestigium as life-worldly necessity. In this praxis Derrida talks of \textit{trace} (Marges 12), Benjamin \textit{aura} (Benjamin Briefe II 349) and in this tradition I will refer to \textit{vestigium} as a continuation of \textit{spur} and \textit{aura} but also as its acting contrast.

\textsuperscript{265} The loyalty of life-world is the presence in which the non-existence of spatialisation and temporalisation is overwritten by the non-presence of the \textit{gramme} (Marges 69) as its \textit{vestigium}.

\textsuperscript{266} In reference to Michel Leiris’ \textit{Exposition Hans Arp} (Leiris 1929: 340-32). Leiris describes how Hans Arp is transforming the universal understanding of material into ridiculous co-reading of particular materiality (cf. also Didi-Huberman 2010: 157).
its very own grammar and the focalisation of the hypnotic reality of taxonomy – hence, practice is deferring since reality grapples, stirs up and paralyses materiality but it definitely does not foster the very (bourgeois’) ideology of becoming, processing, and changing materiality. The reasonable language of the bourgeois occupies the historical scene without past life and with damped capacity for experiences. Becoming language is therefore the momentum where the transparent and the productive newness should be enabled. Hence, we have to consider from now on that translation and linguistic practice are kat exochen not (aesthetically) sense oriented but are rather the performance of materiality that has no script, no metteur en scène and no best time: the cynical certainty of tautological gazing will be overridden in presto accelerando through the enactment of the paradoxon language. The decomposition of the carnal body that so far – and especially with Merleau-Ponty – elaborated a minimal infolding of life-worldly practices will be from now on our dance floor or in other words, the decomposition of the minimal resemblance of materiality retains the montage of confusing words as the choreography of NarcissistgrotesqueFace. The decomposition-montage performance indicates not progression but digression that will not be able to give sense but will be taken out of its circumstances by arraying an ornament of symptoms: the material of the grotesque carnal body is no longer in the container life-world but the distorting material epigraph is with life-world. The synoptic exegesis of the material and life-world is far away from what we would commonly understand as com-unication, inter-relation, inter-embodiement or dia-log; it is rather the schism in language, in materiality and in life-worldly practice that includes in its incommensurability a with that does not strive for the prefix sym but for the explosive co-reading of the seismographic contingency of hypo: the alien will never be the one who provokes the discord of the dia in its logos – the stretto of the NarcissistgrotesqueFace will not be resolved by an andante maestoso, where we might be able to redirect the hidden facticity of time and space, it will be rather continued by a più stretto. We can say: A with B while co-reading mouth with vagina. The opening of the mouth is the initiation to life-world where stumbling with grammar ritualises the anthropos whereas the meatus of the vagina utters clearly the inflection of life-worldly legislation. The grotesque shift of meatus is actually convulsive (with laughing) that provokes us to make everything far too similar but also far too different. Hence, the NarcissistgrotesqueFace plays constantly on the juxtaposition of mouth with vagina by wishing to climb the vertical hierarchy of

267 Once more again, there is NarcissistgrotesqueFace!
practice. We might say that the vertical hierarchy ladder is rather the composition of a Fugue, in which the cantus firmus is followed by a second and third canto firmo that starts before the first cantus firmus has finished and rushes a densification by leading to fallacy: NarcissistgrotesqueFace is a Fugue without counterpoint; the baroque principle of punctus contra punctum has no punctum saliens, since the saliens has no punctum, it is the dancing of punctus cum puncto. The passing happening of the contingent onset is the impossibility to mount on the ladder and it is probably the intense scenery in which the theology of phenomenology can be twisted towards phenomenography. Writing with phenomena is the stage where the psychological process is the differed juxta position of life-world while telling NarcissistgrotesqueFace tout court.

As consequence, the refusal of the fleshy body as semeiotikon meros breaches a taboo by caricaturing the ontological certainty of a bourgeois society that puts its value, norms, historical writings and its juridical practice into the syntax of socially accepted codes: the bourgeois’ linguistic index is literally the graphos of porneia, since its illusionary show of being here is the bracket that holds the narration of a civic life-world together. Social practice is canonised through the imaginative reality of life-worldly penetration and therefore it is in this very glimpse of a momentum in which the linguistic practice of materiality follows its enactment that having sex with Teresa of Avila’s is the piety of experiencing trinity. Henceforth, the dirt of trinity is the story of hyper-schizophrenia in which the mucus of split glossa is about a with in its pornographic materiality: it is reality with imagination or in other words, it is literally a para-doxon – out of meaning, out of punctus contra punctum – it is about a paradoxon which is not an aesthetic, a rhetoric, psychological or metaphysical one, but about a punctus cum punctum, a parad-oxon with para-doxon where the lust of fornication translates Teresa of Avila with life-world. The phenomenon with is about holiness that messes up! Therefore, linguistic practices as graphos of transcendental hypostasis are an apocope by omitting the trans in the deadly abyss of deferring: it is about phenomenography experiencing the carnal body through procedures of dilacerations. The trans-valuation of Teresa of Avila wrests the organon of mediatio by taking the splendour of grammar, claiming the sobriety of life-world and suspends translatio in its fragility. This fragility of the body is actually the tiny gap in which history might be

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268 Phenomenography is a trial to read the phenomenon through the performance and the enactment of graphein. The act includes a certain reading of cybernetic entropy that is eliminated while referring to the logos of the phenomenon. Phenomenography has no references to the pedagogical paradigm developed by Ference Marton (1986) (cf. also Svensson (1997) and Bowden (2005)).
read – the history of NarcissistgrotesqueFace; indeed, it might be a trial to fill up the gap to claim the lost or to run after evidence and producing therefore the archives of Teresa of Avila’s afterlife. But the double bottom of historical evidence lives a tension filled life in which the (catholic) bourgeois possibility overrides the collection of the archives; but as we know now, the gap is not a gap in its customary sense (between the canonization of the Vatican and the fornication of Teresa): space and time of fornication are not in the gap. Hence, we have to learn to write the material in the echoing practice of non-recognition, since the archives are No to life-world!

B Somagraphies

The discarded language strikes materiality in its very suspension by going beyond the semiotic coercion in which the body has so far been the locus of semiosis of the subject-object construction. The non-sign, the non-semiosis and the non-materiality are the consequences of revealing the perversion of schizo-doublings by being deprived of neurotic fixations. At this very point we might understand (again) that the double charge is actually the mutual abolition of linguistic practices and cannot be bridged via translation: neither A’ nor B, C, D, etc. can hold the double reading or the multiplied sign together. Linguistic practice does not simply pervert the doubling by imaging a translated linguistic ritual but it is rather a neurotic practice in which the imitation of perversion covers up the reality of the Narcissist. The act of capturing knowledge via materiality and its translated meaning is suddenly interrupted. The psychopathological construction of the Narcissist is the semiotic lie that makes us believe that the architecture of the symbolic reference has found its materiality but actually it makes rather the position of the material impossible. The differed reading of translatio enacts the debris of the porous carnal body by suspending linguistic practices of neurotic fixations in ambivalence. Consequently, translatio provokes rather an apraxia of enactments and materiality: the openness of being read is the phenomenography / praxeography of materialising body in such a way that the hyperbole of materiality provokes us to enacted vulnerable readings and therefore, if the body is openly read, we

269 Cf. in reference to Jane Gallop’s seminal Thinking through the body (Gallop 1988): she reconsiders body beyond the object of thoughts. My somagraphic writings follow as well the idea of non-materiality and the impossibility to think body as an object of knowledge.

have to consider ways of different enactments for reading bodies in both specific and determinate double ways\textsuperscript{271}. Hence, the discharged language has subliminally not only schizophrenic double structures but the doubling of the doubling; the fourfold potency says \textit{schizo} but it says also \textit{bathos} and \textit{meiosis} to \textit{apraxia} of materiality. But to avoid misunderstandings: the hint for the fourfold composition is not the positive response to the fatigue of language but rather the quadruple framework mocks the stultification of translating the Narcissist’s mirror; the necessity for semiotic or linguistic openness\textsuperscript{272} and double metaphors is therefore suspended or rather replaced by the soil, dirt and foul of \textit{schizo}, \textit{bathos} and \textit{meiosis} in which vulnerability provokes the suspension of any sort of \textit{mediation} and in which combinations and entanglements of lively situations are not the guarantor of utterance – they are rather guarantor for literally \textit{diglossia}. The dirt scrapes at the linguistic reality by imposing \textit{hyper} readings queering literally the \textit{compositum} of the dirt. The \textit{No} to relation and structure is the \textit{schism} of my tongue and the enactment in which time and space are neither temporality nor spatiality. Therefore, the slippery withdrawal of the act of producing and mediating can no longer refer to the development of producing \textit{A} and \textit{B}, since it is in its extension a preference for something and indicates a relation in which the preposition \textit{for} has to aim \textit{for} \textit{A} and \textit{not} \textit{B}, since \textit{A} is \textit{of} my position. Henceforth, the preference for producing something neglects the friction and tugging by producing \textit{dead}\textsuperscript{273} bodies or blunt materiality. The phenomenon is no longer the discourse (of argumentation and transparency\textsuperscript{274}) and it is definitely far from being the pattern of analysis; therefore, \textit{bas matérialisme}\textsuperscript{275} of vaginal utterance has neither a defined history of form nor a process of the genesis of its very verbalisation: no philo-genesis nor onto-genesis either. The formation of the dead body is the apraxia of neither interpretative systems nor sterilised lab practices. The \textit{Gestaltwerdung} (of lexemes) is therefore not the simulated incarnation of materiality, it is rather a retarded second or embarrassed reading of materiality alongside \textit{bathos} and \textit{meiosis}; it is this kind of material enactment that has been compressed in the expression

\textsuperscript{271} Sara Ahmed and Jackie Stacey outline that “(...) If the skin is open to being read (and being read differently), we can also consider the ways in which these various techniques for reading produce skins in specific and determinate ways” (Ahmed and Stacey 2001: 1).

\textsuperscript{272} This contrasts fundamentally with the idea of \textit{being-with} outlined by Sara Ahmed and Jackie Stacey. The body is not always open to be read (Ahmed and Stacey 2001: 1), since the loss of syntax allows to outline the reading feature as a simple facticity – that simple facticity is the line up synthesis and linguistic nucleus.

\textsuperscript{273} Dead in this sense is a tautological reality by stripping oxygen of the fire.

\textsuperscript{274} In transparency we are able to die! Or in other words, transparency outlines the condition in which we are able to die.

\textsuperscript{275} In reference to George Bataille’s tropes \textit{figure humaine}, \textit{informe} and \textit{le bas matérialisme} (Georges Bataille, \textit{Le Bas matérialisme et la gnose}, In: Documents (1930), Nr. 1, 1-8).
of materiality. The *Gestalt* participates in the lie of everyday life of linguistic practices by accepting life-world as readable endeavour that is always deferred in its reality. In other words, the *Gestalt* is the product and it is the – well-reflected – answer to the oscillating nature of charging the schizophrenic practice of language. Consequently, the action of the suspended sign and the suspended language has to be read before discourse and before the becoming of life-world. It might be depicted in the scene where your mother catches you out before you use again a lie to allegedly save your own *life*: the surprise of being hit throws you out of the circularity of processing in words. The practice of *ante* (cf. *from* and *of*) is life-worldly reality in which I am caught up before the process of *nature-semiotics-culture-language* starts circulating: *A* and *B* is not a possibility for interaction of historical events and far more it is not a name for a thing itself. Linguistic practices are no longer the result and output of a system of hierarchy and distribution, efficiency and productivity, semiosis and translation as well as transparency and reality: no mother, no dictator and definitely no translator. Language *is No* to you and me but it *has* simultaneously you and me. This is where *No* is the *vestigium* of *bearing with NarcissistgrotesqueFace*; it is the non-articulation of using language and its correlated practices. *Translatio* or *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* is the refusal of writing the carnal body before language by emphasising materiality as the narration of travesty: narration is again *no, no* to *life*, *no* to politics and above all *no* to *language*; this *No* is underneath the opposition of being *yes* and *no* and it is also above its practical proliferation but nevertheless *No* is not a philippic condemning of materialised hermeneutic incapability. *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* is the inexhaustible narrative of permanently juxtapositioning the travesty of the material beyond psychological debris and semiotic empowerment.

However, the non-syntax and the non-grammar of the carnal body is hitherto not the equation for death – having no *linguistic ability* and having no *syntax productivity* is *not* the erasure of body materiality, it is rather the somagraphic writing of life-worldly *dirt*. Dirty hands are poisoned and cause not *per se* death, since writing dirt is the lateral co-presence that is deprived of relationships while writing non featured ontological

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276 The aspect of being in ‘Language *is* (...)’ and the element of having in ‘Language *has* (...)’ is subliminally my attempt to go underneath and above of problematising the separation of ontology and epistemology as a theoretical discourse.

277 The non-ability of linguistic grammar is highly perverse, since my writing *pre* requires a positive acceptance of an English grammar. The acceptance of this hermeneutical relationship outlines the (forced) commitment to write a dissertation. As consequence we have to read this tract literally as a performativa act.
evolutionary processes\(^{278}\): the vamp Teresa of Avila has not become the vamp Teresa nor is she liberated from her sins either, the story is rather Teresa of Avila with Teresa the Vamp. Or to put it in other words, dirt has no progressum of being and therefore it cannot mark the liberation\(^{279}\) of the carnal body from life-worldly necessity\(^{280}\). If we follow the rhetoric of being-progressum, we will be aware that progress does not only mean liberation but also the possibility to die, since the path of genesis is linked with the agonistic momentum where the evolution enters a zone of coercion; the coercive force of tautological movements are being overshadowed by the fuss of becoming but as soon as the corresponding life-worldly reality (and even in its negativity) is no longer semiosis, language and its translational practices are death: death is the nihilistic redistribution of life-worldly practices in which the carnal body is buried\(^{281}\). In other words, becoming with is in its evolutionary stage the deprivation of (fixed) objectivity, but on the flip side this deprivation is however in another time-space continuum the becoming of objectivity, since it exists on the formulation of (deadly) relations\(^{282}\) – the progress of time and life is the evolution of variations and the generation of the unpredictable, hence the difference is the concession to negation and absence. However, evolution is the bio-political affiliation where the mucus is able to formulate the body’s immersion in life-worldly fixations and narratives\(^{283}\). This formulation is championed by Haraway when she uplifts the contact zone of bio-political strategy of becoming with as world-making entanglements (Haraway 2008: 4) and declares consequently that figures are not representations but material-semiotic nodes in which different material nodes co-shape one another through lived reality (2008: 4). In her seminal essay Cyborg

\(^{278}\) My references to dirt and dirtiness are not made on the premises of differentiating, but in respect of NarcissistgrotesqueFace.

\(^{279}\) Elisabeth Grosz outlines in reference to Nietzsche and Bergson that the idea of evolution highlights a theory of time in which becoming marks the present but it also refers to futuristic features (Grosz: 2004: 157). The inclination of marking the present in the very idea of becoming in its futuristic aim is my understanding that you can only be death in relation to something; death is the anticipation of our present and therefore liberation is also the antedate of death.

\(^{280}\) The necessity of liberation can however also be read as the figuration and phantasma of ecstasy that destroys its production as soon as dead is anthropomorphised. “Toute oeuvre douée d’une valeur humaine en tant qu’essai d’affranchissement, isole et détruit le réel, toute forme étant équivalente à distinction, séparation, négation inquiète. Par ce moyen, l’artiste arrive, non pas au vide et à la généralité de Hegel, mais à la création de visions concrètes et autonomes” (Carl Einstein, Picasso. In: Documents, 1930, Nr. 3, 156).

\(^{281}\) This reference outlines the transcendental line of Merleau-Ponty’s carnal body in such a manner that we can follow now how the chiastic momentum in the carnal body is conditioned by its silencing.

\(^{282}\) Franz Hinkelammert’s understanding of Realutopie reflects the spirit of an essence that cannot be physically. This premise is the movens of liberation within the discourse of liberation theology; liberation is an un-conditional goal that can never be achieved kat exochen (cf. Hinkelammert 1994).

\(^{283}\) It seems to be that the body immersion has an inner truth which is given to our actual lives; a very privileged line to knowledge in western culture according to Haraway (cf. Haraway 1989: 3). However, “Nature’s biographical unit, the reproduction group had the moral and epistemological status of truth-tellers” (Haraway 1989: 41).
Manifesto (2004) she draws attention to the fact that co-shaping is highly motivated by communication means\(^{284}\), where communication sciences and modern biology are constructed by the translation of the world into a problem of coding that the heterogeneity of life-world summarises to disassembly and exchange (Haraway 2004: 23). The translation of the material-semiotic node, which is based on the *naturalcultural\(^ {285}\) legacy, is the acceptance of drawing life-world of potentiality / cybernetic moves\(^{286}\) that override the position of the subject by referring to the ability of writing internal difference(s) – these internal differences are however not *dia* but rather inflections. This potential is the intra-action of relational pattern (Haraway 2008: 17) in which we become who we are by the sometimes-joined sometimes-separated history (Haraway 2008: 25). This ontological choreography\(^ {287}\) of *becoming with* depends on the interaction of *natureculture* and its situated *in-the-making* of that joins texts and bodies referring to the material semiosis and semiotic materiality (Haraway 2008: 163). Situated knowledge is therefore a proposition to read the life-worldly knot as the activity of entangling performative process of generative bodies. The acceptance of the kinship *natureculture* and the semiotic charges are the condition to create figures\(^ {288}\) and to *play with* them by highlighting the shoving of concretisation that locates and substantialises (Haraway 2000: 94). Although the position is never a bio-political or a cultural entity\(^ {289}\), it has to be seen as the outcome of a complex of historical and political constructions in which the material-semiotic entanglement outlines life-worldly

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\(^{284}\) In *Reconfiguring Kinship in Technoscience*, Haraway concludes, “(...) networks of co-constitution, co-evolution, communication, collaboration abound to help us rethink issues of communication and control at the heart of the cyborg figure” (Haraway 2004: 315).


\(^{286}\) “In communication sciences, the translation of the world into a problem in coding can be illustrated by looking at cybernetic (feedback controlled) systems theories applied to telephone technology, computer design, weapons deployment, or data base construction and maintenance” (Haraway 2004: 23).

\(^{287}\) In particularly I refer to Charis Thompson’s monograph *Making Parents* (2005). Haraway says also in her text that “(...) the simple and obvious point is that nothing is self-made, autochthonous, or self-sufficient. Origin stories have to be about fraught histories of consequential relationships. The point is to engage ‘ontological choreography’ in the yearning for more liveable and lively relationships across kinds, human and non-human” (Haraway 2004: 317).

\(^{288}\) The companionship of creating figures is always at least twofold: “There cannot be just one companion species; there have to be at least two to make one. It is in the syntax; it is in the flesh. Dogs are about the inescapable, contradictory story of relationships – co-constitutively relationships in which none of the partners pre-exist the relating, and the relating is never done once and for all. Historical specificity and contingent mutability rule all the way down, into nature and culture, into naturecultures” (Haraway 2004: 300).

\(^{289}\) Haraway has understood how the reproduction of taxonomy and grammar has shaped western lineings of cultural knowledge production: “Simian orientalism means that western primatology has been about the construction of the self from the raw material of the other, the appropriation of nature in the production of culture, the ripening of the human from the soil of the animal, the clarity of white from the obscurity of color, the issue of man from the body of woman, (...) the emergence of mind by the activation of body” (Haraway 1989: 11).
engagement beyond established social customs and embodied modes of life (Haraway 1995: 23). Haraway’s perspective of partial or relational objectivity conditions the embodied reality as the *sine qua non* of life-worldly responsibility in which translation is the irreducible and local zone of enacting practises as power relations beyond discourses (Haraway 1995: 25 and 1989: 82). Nevertheless, the power of the un-closed practise is the contingent and vulnerable possibility to read the embodied knot of semiosis without relying on the activity of discursive power play. However, this perspectival reading is definitely the implosion of the very process of becoming partial objects by referring to the possibility of having the option of harmonising via the *topos* of semiotic-nature. We have to admit that, following my lines of the psycho-pathological lie of *diglossia*, Haraway’s reading overrides the hyphen between nature and culture too fast, since the condensation of our material and semiotic picture codifying the possibility of historic transformation (Haraway 2004: 8) stumbles. Conditioned by the embodiment of nature-culture, Haraway’s infolding of life-world is not the accelerated reading, before *nature-semiotics-culture-language* could happen. The bridging force of the hyphen remembers the *Gestaltwerdung* as its situated genealogy with nature and with semiosis. In contrast to Haraway but also with Haraway, I attempt to champion a reading of a hyphen in a silent pausing of gapping nature and culture by questioning not only the length of the pause between semiotics and nature but also the facticity of nature and cultures as semiosis. In other words, my material has no semiotic knots with nature, which offers the *sym*-biotic multiplicity of the singular. *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* is consequently neither the bio-political construction of death nor its translation, since constructing and translating are based on the *natureculture topos* in which different forms of practice are conditioned and challenged by the form of its very own system. As we know now, the prolongation of condition is in its multiplied construction-destruction framework literally death. The story of the carnal body and life-world is not simply a single story definite in its formation (its becoming) but it is rather a single story crafted and assembled as *aitiologia* of intervened narrations. Therefore, the practice of *becoming* narration and stories is the relational effect of shifting *is* as a statement towards being an element of *conjunction*. The copula *is* is not only the very fundament of Parmenides’ project to discover the western intellectual sphere but *being* is also the agent, angle point and simultaneously a time mark in which praxis is related and in which the relationships are

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291 Cf. Foucault (DE II 136).
continuously related to each other: the carnal body is henceforth the response to the material organisation of grounding life-worldly practices on a dynamised space-time discourse. This is the reason why Haraway understands translation as another possibility to read relations (Haraway 2000: 125) and can therefore claim to be engaged in *kinship* with her dog Cayenne on different communicational layers (Haraway 2008: 215-231). Consequently, the *relatum* is the response to a life-world that is not single-fixed and cannot be spelled out by one sentence. However the force of time is the selection of the process in which *being* is the producing product. This occupying difference is the redemption of Heidegger’s *Being* in its *Time*. In other words, the non-linearity of evolutionary explanations is from a narrative practice again the force of linearity. This setup allows us to investigate the uncertain and the ephemera within a non-closed and non-classified life-world: the translation of its layers guides us to an object that is multiple in its singularity. This multiplicity is the driving force of any kind of relations by enacting different places simultaneously and therefore considering multiplicity not as synonym of plurality but as a complex practice that implies that different realities overlap and interfere with one another: genesis might be therefore outlined as *being made* that differs from itself *in similitudo*. This complex practice neglects time and space but it does not deny it. This is the very point in which my death body is not death *per se* but mingled up in a partial *co-presence* of complex and messy *somagraphes*. The disregard or the change of scales in time and space allows me to talk about materiality that is not directly involved in a discourse of (hierarchical) difference. Ephemeral and frictional realities are therefore not only enacted by cutting the carnal body into pieces – *no*, fractional objects in a never ending story of life-worldly practices are the resistance of bearing the dirt of my forked tongue. A complex narration of the carnal body does not need the combining forces of translation: complex narration of bodies *is* *trans-lat*...  


293 The redemption is actually my response to Heidegger’s attempt to understand the relationship of being and time by introducing a new language and therefore to grasp the discourse of being. In addition to Heidegger, we can read by George Steiner that the *reale Gegenwart* is spatial-temporal limited: “(…) die Summe der Zeit, die das Sein erfährt ist endlich” (Steiner 1990: 77). We will see that my *movens* is led by the premise not to dismiss the space-temporal condition, but however to read other articulations which disregard space-temporal affiliations.  

294 Derrida and Foucault criticise that phenomenological considerations have not given attention to the difference in time and space. By neglecting for a very passing moment the time-space continuum we are able to approach materiality from a complete other spectre.
– again, the is, the denial of the *conjunctium being*: the complex narration of carnal bodies … *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* and … therefore the radical programme of partial connections. The omissions give us a hint in which the form of in-here processes and out-there contexts are enacted (Law 2004: 67) and show clearly how *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* is not a fetish of a non-linguistic language: *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* is beyond the discursive debate of fixed non-productive reality *versus* free floating material production. Nevertheless we have so far outlined that the trope *becoming* enables us to break out structural pre-fixations but the euphoria of the breakthrough will be narrowed down by the fact that words last *gestaltet* and are an idolect of becoming body.

Hence, we have to go further, by saying that *No* to language is a complete refusal of the material, the carnal body, the death body, the knowledge, the aesthetic, the *Gestaltet*, etc. but this refusal and its mindedness narrating and writing exercise – without having inflection and grammar – is the disformation of materiality**: although we have a body our writings are not the writing of our bodies – the *graphos* of the *soma* is *having* disformations. *Having disformation* is a kind of conducting experimental narratives by hatching a crack in the process of *having* disformation and therefore, we are martyred and paralysed following and telling the story of the crack to its very reverse of the carnal body: the disformed materiality *is* the labile and provocative enactment of tearing, jarring and crying – the material is not formless, it is not simply the change of scales but it is disformed. In other words, if we are talking about the carnal body as the *ephemera* of *translatio*, we are composing a rhythm in which the materiality of the carnal body is about to be the repetitive poly-rhythmic co-presence of *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* and *deus ex machine*. Though the frictional co-presence is not about symbio-genesis of coding natureculture, it is about schizophrenia that enacts in anger the experience of *translatio*, by writing phenomenological deformation as *paragraphos*. Liminal writing is the scenery in which the close shot of Teresa of Avila

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295 The Latin prefix *dis* refers to negative or reversing forces. I will deny this relational momentum in the following while attempting to outline a non-linear and a non-systematic formation of the material. It is about an anagram which permutation will be the palindrome of life-worldly practice: indeed, the palindrome is the change of scales without having scales and resemblances, cf. Bataille’s *bas matérialisme* (Georges Bataille, *Le Bas matérialisme et la gnose*, In: Documents (1930), Nr. 1, 1-8).

296 The friction of natureculture is not about the harmonising tendencies of the companion that find some potent transactions between nature and culture, as Donna Haraway suggests (Haraway 2008: 15).
as a vamp offers the translation of *ellipsis* in life-world\(^{297}\): materiality on the edge is disformed and evokes translation *in extremis*, this is when the *écart* is suddenly the centre – the centre of fragility. Disformation is the brachial *No* that decapitates the psycho-pathological lie of the *anthropos*. Hence, instead of talking with subjects there is the appearing of a self whose ability to act is not based on identity and barrier but on the matrix of embodiment and companionship beyond the human-machine and the human-animal cluster. With Haraway, we have seen that the fragile centre is the *Cyborg*, the *Oncomouse* or the kinship with the companion *Cayenne* that translates material nodes *in actua* – the fragile centre is the formulation where the psychopathology of creating material possibilities meets the vulnerability of alienating the essence of materiality. Therefore, the non-discourse of *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* creates blind positions that are not inherent in form and materiality but rattle form *with* materiality: this is literally the somagraphe with language before it gets mingled and mixed up in the categories of semiosis: *somagraphe are before corporal chronicles*, i.e. somagraphe are before sense-data, customs, pain and the *inamorata*. In other words, my *No* to carnal bodies and materiality explores the dirt and I attempt to *aufheben*\(^{298}\) the grit and dirt of word coining, which we normally are not able to experience. I am attempting to go really, really close to see the rottenness of what we drop (e.g. the story line in which Teresa of Avila is a vamp and where the black prostitute is also a carrying mom); these close-shots are however not a change of scales, close-shots are more radical than just shifting from *macro* to *micro* scales or something similar to that. *Halt!* This *something* is an assemblage of tearing bodies to whose mercy we are exposed. The close-shots or close-sho(i)ts are the phenomenographic *something* writing the montage of something. In correspondence to this feature, language bears the *bas matérialisme*\(^{299}\) and the grotesque figure that narrates a story of A *with* B, but rendering *A with B* that does not follow the rhythm of natureculture. As we have seen, the formula *becoming with* subsumes the whole rhetoric of production, newness, autogenesis, etc. and in contrast we may say now that the trope *bearing with* subsumes a poetic without producer, director and creator. However, this compression of *A and B* is not simply the antithesis to A and B,

\(^{297}\) Marcel Schwob outlines that art does not claim for general ideas, it simply describes individuality by declassing and not classifying (Leperlier 1992: 85). The non-possibility of classification is the *parerga* of breaching a taboo.

\(^{298}\) The German verb *aufheben* refers to the prefix *auf* and the verb *heben*. The paradox of *heben* (keeping) something while conducting the dialectic operation of *auf* (from) reflects the somagraphics writings of *NarcissistgrotesqueFace*.

\(^{299}\) In this respect, my reading of Bataille’s *bas matérialisme* has been inspired by Georges Didi-Huberman’s dialectic re-considerations (Didi-Huberman 1995).
rather it champions a *bas matérielisme* that tells us a story of A with B. As its consequence, the cartography of the carnal body takes another direction of translational practice: carnal *bas matérielisme* is not text, not texture, not sign, not figure, not metaphor, not symbol, not allegory, not transfer, not zone, not comfort zone, not transfer-zone, not death, not life-world, etc. … it is finally not and a no to the fact to find an agent who takes the position of somebody who possesses language and somebody who will be betrayed to play the master of translation for our very own purposes. *Bas matérielisme* is a vertiginous matter beyond the taxon of salvation-historical exercises!

2. Oikesis

**A Addendum sans cesse**

Suspending and even though refusing the syntax of material utterance is rather hurling materiality to materiality which has and is no language; having and being are actually the perfect operation of tautological readings: writing translation which is A or B or which has A or B is therefore per se tautological. In consequence, if *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* is targeted and run by the articulation of being, (then) we have to point out that the copula *is* is the up side down effect and cannot be crossed out as such but needs to bear with – we have to read that bearing with is the lateral act that does not admit the phenomenological play of parenthesising being and having and, it is not the calculation of relationships that writes *sui generis* realms in which A and B are appearing as the combination of the modulated *signifié* of being and having language. Modulation rends the possessum in its striking rhythm of capturing the verbs being and having in the very practice of writing the geography of life-world – No to grammar and corpus is however not the metabolic disease of life-worldly practices leading directly to the fall of clinical lethargy. Rending materiality questions rather its very behaviour and shifts the text of A with B to textural experiences, while the mangling texture – its fabric longing of smelling life-worldly words – is not simply given, it is rather *addendum sans cesse*. In other words, the attitude of No towards the bureaucracy of language is

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300 And again my No cannot be the superessence of a negative theological line up.

301 In the preface of *Grammatology* Spivak does not refer to the crossing-out politics put to the crossing through of being (in reference to Heidegger): “Language is indeed straining here” (Grammatology: XV).
definitely not able to draw a line from cause to effect, from the scent trail to the spur, from life to the clinic and from being to having, it is rather the task of sans cesse formulating translational and linguistic issues turning in nuce just to an additional / lateral outburst of writing the decadence of bas matérielisme.

The outburst of linguistic practices do not claim kat exochen nihilistic premises and can therefore not be the amor fati of its very retarded yes: No does not strive for compensation and it is not the dissolution of materiality, it is rather a disforming practice of writing – in its suspended materiality – not a formless material realm but the oxymoron mounted Sculpture. The merger of assembling bizarre non-relational materials is the curved out reality of sculptures – the mounted Sculpture can neither be materiality nor the composition of contradictory activities by shaping and mounting A and B. The mounted Sculpture is a juxtaposition of materiality that is deprived of any kind of activities related to material practices and in addendum it is deprived of its consequences: no production, no newness, no realism and no signifying telos. Hence, the material fabric of the mounted Sculpture while (juxta)positioning (itself) is not simply relying on the fatality of materialism but on NarcissistgrotesqueFace. This picturesque mounted Sculpture is practically a willenloses Beiwerk confirming a juxtaposition that does not formulate A as B or A in B but A with B. Hence, the operator with is the material connexion of materiality writing a willenloses Beiwerk and in addition, the conjunction with is the subversive ekphrasis of hyper-schizophrenia that can no longer formulate a transcendental figuration in which Husserl’s epoché and Merleau-Ponty’s immanentism would be possible transcriptions into grammar. Neither Deleuze’s becoming-zone (Deleuze 2000: 11) nor Haraway’s becoming with (Haraway 2008: 3) can be contacted or evolved into realms of singularity or into positions while referring to the means of mediation and translation; the prevented biographein of writing becoming-woman, becoming-animal is the rhizome which

302 Aby Warburg pays high attention to the readings of iconographic descriptions by outlining the transfer-stages from the libidinal agitation to cultural manifestation in Sandro Botticelli ,Geburt der Venus’ und ,Frühling’ (Warburg 2010: 39-124). Warburg follows the expression of everyday gestures and how they are transferred into the scope of things. He is a master of tracing the smallest and most useless out of descriptions that in turn trigger synoptic readings of realms that do not belongs together; cf. the transition of the bewegte Beiewerke Haar und Gewand (Warburg 2010: 45f). Translatio is therefore the trans of realms that can never write cum. The prefix cum is Warburg’s willenlose Beiwerk (Warburg 2010: 48) and my NarcissitgrotesqueFace.

303 Singularity and position are a consequence of materiality where the all-nothing composition would apply to (the all-nothing design has the transfer from no to yes and from material to form and therefore they have the performative ability of translation). The juxtaposition of NarcissitgrotesqueFace is deprived – as shown above – from material reality and therefore we have to say indeed no translation zone.
NarcissistgrotesqueFace is not able to write\textsuperscript{304}. Therefore, the act of translation and basically any form of \textit{trans} is the deprivation of active figurations between the so-called deferred poles A and B while the material non-dissolution of \textit{No} is literally writing the juxtaposition of \textit{disjecta membra}. To put it in other words, the juxtaposition of \textit{disjecta membra} overrides silently the premises of translation, while silently screaming at the borders of translational zones. This is the narrative \textit{auspicium} of hyper-schizophrenia that concert NarcissistgrotesqueFace as the \textit{membra} of \textit{mounted Sculpture} while writing voluptuous corporal aspects of skinny carnality. The \textit{mounted Sculpture} is the enactment of \textit{A with B} that cannot be read as chiastic corporal ontology that Merleau-Ponty has put up to reconcile the excess of grammar. The \textit{mounted Sculpture} is rather Merleau-Ponty’s ontology while being read non-ontologically: the \textit{mounted Sculpture} is the dramatisation of the dissimilar \textit{with} the similar. \textit{With} as stakeholder of the \textit{mounted Sculpture} is the mapping within deferring practices; it pierces glass fragments of \textit{disjecta membra} of NarcissistgrotesqueFace.

Hence, the pathological lie of linguistic usage is the capability of tearing the \textit{ego, the idea and especially the clinic of language}\textsuperscript{305}, but it is not however an institutional tear, it is rather the scribbling of the material heaviness of psychology and grammar that forms the crack of \textit{translatoio} in which the juxtaposition of \textit{with} enacts the deferral \textit{trans} of reading \textit{addendum sans cesse}. The tearing of I and \textit{latio} is therefore layering the overwriting praxis of \textit{hypomnemata} in which the mnemonic device is not simply a material corrective for reading the contingent content of future \textit{movens}, it is rather the spoken and written practice of lexemes\textsuperscript{306} that will never be \textit{ad manum} and therefore never be spoken or written \textit{in situ}. Thereby, the historical charge of the spoken and written echo is neither the utter singularity of psychological possibilities enabling the \textit{ego transpono}\textsuperscript{307} nor its relative \textit{anachorese}. Consequently, any forms of writing \textit{logos bioethikos}\textsuperscript{308} can create relational knots of forming the fragments of the \textit{logoi} by demanding to form the \textit{tranquilltiate animi}\textsuperscript{309} that in turn forms the humanistic \textit{telos}.

\textsuperscript{304} In reference to Deleuze (Deleuze 1993: 11).
\textsuperscript{305} This is the very possibility to read Kafka’s \textit{Tagebücher}. Maurice Blanchot reads Kafka’s \textit{Tagebücher} beyond the lines of the normativity of (linguistic) facticity and anecdotic descriptions. In \textit{La solitude essentielle} the \textit{topos beyond} marks the \textit{movens of writing itself} (Blanchot 1988: 20) thereby figuring that the author writes about something that he never can and will write.
\textsuperscript{306} Cf. Foucault’s \textit{Débat sur la poésie} (Foucault 2001: 418-434).
\textsuperscript{307} The writing of the impersonal singularity is not simply the deprivation of the I as Deleuze outlines it in \textit{Critique et clinique} (Deleuze 1993: 12-13).
\textsuperscript{308} Foucault uses \textit{logos bioethikos} to formulate the practice of self-writing (Foucault 2003: 356).
\textsuperscript{309} In reference to, Plutarch (1939) \textit{De tranquillitate} 464e.
sans cesse. The linguistic practice is the material I that does not know that I am I. Therefore the psychosis of the homonymic I is accompanied by dem willenlosen Beiwerk that admits NarcissistgrotesqueFace writing about my body without having (body)language. Suspending the biological practice of re-assuring my very ego can be read with Carl Einstein’s breaching of linguistic purity as the expansion of the lexeme to its biological proliferation: the description of A and B is the quarrel of falling out of the fetishists (Einstein 2013: 13) and therefore the carnal happening has to be read as the rest that is beyond the autotelic necessity of ego transpono and the framing of descriptions by rating its vivid and magic means (Einstein 2013: 16f). Henceforth, he was questioning if we do not have to subordinate language to the vivid force of (life-world) experiences (Fleckner 2006: 285). However, Einstein’s commitment to the vivid rest is the surrealistic telos of formulating an alternative style, another wording or of creating another language. Nevertheless, Einstein’s biographein is not the pathology of rebounding or jolting possibilities. In other words, the possibility of biographein will be linguistically enacted as the act of placement (graphein) through practice (gymazein) and ends up finally as grammar (legein) or even though grammatical rest. The mounted Sculpture of NarcissistgrotesqueFace is not the new rest, which has been created out of vital working grammars, the new rest is ad manum … sans cesse. Einstein’s biographical rest cannot say No to language, since No to language is literally bearing language while writing addendum sans cesse and therefore, we have to say that, the mounted Sculpture of A with B is not the daily atrocity that disables linguistic sceneries: there is No to such things as like the structure of style and aesthetics and therefore it is also No to the logic of biology and to the places of geo while enacting graphein. Language is radical; it is hyper-schizophrenic and therefore beyond aesthetics and it is definitely also behind the open outcry of Yes. As effect, you have to tell to your neighbour that NarcissistgrotesqueFace is not a neologism nor a metaplasm either.

As we can read or rather see now, the juxtaposition of A with B is not able to outline grammar and syntax as the intrinsic movement from pathos to logos, it is rather the practice of language that displays; NarcissistgrotesqueFace is a kind of display and description that is more than Einstein’s grammar of displaying and describing the biography of Gaia: the mounted Sculpture is that radical No and that radical shift in which there is No language of NarcissistgrotesqueFace but narcissistgrotesqueFace-istic language. This radical turnover is the drizzling rhythm of translatio that falls out of
rhythmic progressum and shows that non-mimesis does not simply mean disregarded access: by displaying \( A \) with \( B \) we will see that the description of \( A \) with \( B \) will be radicalised up to Eisenstein’s design of a biological rest that is per se not subjected to the structural addendum that finally releases the rest as the rest of nature – this is the orthodox practice of the humanistic project that aims for a rest that is effectively part of nature. My rest, my NarcissistgrotesqueFace, my mounted Sculpture is rather the garbled radicalism of graphein. Thus, the garbled language is the translatio that displays and that stumbles while displaying. This ever stumbling over Eisenstein’s rest is the biological connexion of the carnal body that chafes by writing \( A \) and \( B \). The chafing is however not the indicator for reference but displays the co-presence of the rhythm that is constantly stumbling. The stumbling copresence of seeing is consequently a No to Eisenstein’s attempt to create another possibility of formulating language. The morphology of forming pathetic possibilities is the echo and the resonance of verrichten\(^{310}\) the syntagma with that renders the ego transpono obsolete.

Hence, \( A \) as \( A' \) to \( B \) and \( A \) in \( B \) are conditioned by the realm of transcendentality allowing us to interweave between \( A \) and \( B \) in such a way that we stick to reference realms by enabling \( A \) as \( A' \) to \( B \) and \( A \) in \( B \). In opposition, the Verrichtung of \( with \) has no direction; there is no directive that leads towards realms in which \( A \) with \( B \) is an outburst of meaning. Bearing \( with \) is complex seeing that turns the realms of \( A \) or \( B \) obsolete while encountering \( A \) with \( B \) in another surrogate that reads the hyphen between the human-animal, human-nature, humature, humanimal, huma..., hum..., ...annature, ...ananimal in such a fast way that the biography sees perplexity and writes animalistic NarcissistgrotesqueFace. This perplex enactment provokes NarcissistgrotesqueFace to see with legs. Consequently, the biographein of the carnal body is the phenomenographical praxis that is not simply a mounted dispositive but perplexity that overrides the binary codes of space and time and the amor fati of nature: we have to learn to see with legs without shifting the anthropos-scale. The perplexity of bearing \( with \) by writing its Verrichtung is the – above mentioned dancing – of punctus cum puncto, that shakes the bearing of hyper-schizophrenia feeling how its pathetic No ensnares the texture of materiality: the NarcissistgrotesqueFace is therefore the

\(^{310}\) The German expression verrichten is composed by the verb richten and the prefix ver that intends to outline the transfer of one realm into the state of the stem. This semantic choice has to be read in my option as the addendeum that differs sans cesse and can also be read as die Aufhebung of translatio sans cesse.
forbidden witness who unfolds by *seeing choreography* the stumbling rhythm of the *mounted Sculpture* while writing *A with B*.

**B Revisiting *Ammonitore***

Displaying the *mounted Sculpture* is actually the feigned compression writing the unstable conjunction of *with* that subverts the difference between narration and materialisation in such a way that the thick description of *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* could rather be the storyline of the on-going taste of the forbidden fruit. The thickness of writing the forbidden fruit is with *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* the denouement of morphology in which we have to get the deep description out of it; perplexity is underneath and before morphology, where the thick description of space and time is no longer possible and therefore we can say reading perplexity is stumbling, stuttering, it is velocity, shorting or simply *hyper* beyond the space-time concentration. Thick description is *with* that does not conjoin precisely in such a way as the *interpretatio patris* would map our life-world. Writing *mouth with vagina* is not the disposition in which we have thought of in our life; it is not reality, it writes *translatio NarcissistgrotesqueFace*. The practice of *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* writes in turn *biographein* as its *Verrichtung*; this line corroborates the echoing bitterness of history and writes the tearing drops of the Narcissist in the dark of the night. Hence, *displaying* and *following* the Narcissist’s tearing drops is not the total construction of her / his / its biography but it is the total disallowance with her / his / its psychological spill over that will be dissected by the difference of reading time and space in life-world. Or to put it in other words, *bearing with* is Derrida’s *différance* of time-space *in extremis*: the bitterness of the forbidden fruit is the ungrounded juxtaposition of bearing *with* in which the *positioning of iuxta* is not the fetish of narcissistic satisfaction by leaping the gap of time and space in life-world but *bearing with* is time and space; this *tautological tautology* is in a perverted perversion, a circular movement that runs after its very own tail by creating simultaneously something that is labelled as *tail*. By running after reality (respectively running after the stylised tail) we are behaving actually like fools – basically, by forgetting our very own position, we are acting like children who have forgotten while playing their very (own) *persona*. Following mother’s wagging finger is the metaphoric stumbling of our *in situ* and has the innocence that does not have the
aftertaste of hiding my very positioning by tautological means. Thereafter, *iuxta* does not only *itch* me but hears the fruity bitterness of the *mounted Sculpture* through the perplexity of *A with B*. The performativity of having No language and No materiality tries to theorise what is actually practical: *translatio* will be the *act* (the weird spectre of space and time) that cannot be fixed. This act is never the alienation of time and space since the horizon of alienation creates in transcendental utopia dialectical relations that lead consequently to the – structural – grotesque figure. In contrast, the enactment of the *mounted Sculpture* is not the narrative of a grotesque figure, it is rather the hyper-schizophrenic *bearing with* that tears up Leon Battista Alberti’s *ammonitore*\(^{311}\): this is the very humanistic momentum of seeing in which the Narcissist is used by the chiselling of the plain of the marble (Alberti 2002: 111), while *ammonitore’s* medial gesture formulates the short cut of *commentator* and *histor*. *Ammonitore’s* gesture of looking is the testimonial short cut to *historia* while writing the *kairotic* code of the sevenfold psychic (hidden) peregrination from soul to body (by alienating the corporal figure to form its very own psychological abundance) (Alberti 2002: 135 ff). Hence, *ammonitore’s* quote of the grotesque-structural peregrination of the hidden nature is *NarcissistgrotesqueFace*’s deprivation of quoting. *NarcissistgrotesqueFace*’s seeing practice is not Alberti’s figure of the spectator, who follows hidden the dissemination of *histor’s punctum*.

Hence, my *No* to language and materiality is the radical aversion to any kind of commitment\(^{312}\), it might be even so heavily radical that it is deprived of theory or it might be literally *theorein*. That means that any fixation will hang itself by its hyper-schizophrenic capitalisation since seeing with my legs is the (visual) presence of *bearing with*. Therefore, we have to accept that *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* cannot be the Messiah who liberates linguistic practices from its psychotic lie of forming its very own double structure\(^{313}\) – at this very point we do not have to draw the rolling tears of the

\(^{311}\) *Ammonitore* theorises the alienation effect representing the retracted viewer in Renaissance paintings. As a guide line for any painter, Leon Battista Alberti formulates how the antrophormised nature (cf. “(…) maravigliosa artefice delle cose (…)” (Alberti 2002: 122)) of the viewer is hidden present: “E piacemi sia nella storia chi ammonisca e insegni a noi quello che ivi si facci, o chiami con la mano a vedere, o con viso cruccioso e con gli occhi turbati minacci che niuno verso loro vada, o dimosti qualche pericolo o cosa ivi maravigliosa, o te inviti a piangere con loro insieme o a ridere” (Alberti 2002: 132).

\(^{312}\) Victor Sklovskij outlines that words are not available for being used to express thoughts. We use words without sense (Hansen 1996: 111).

\(^{313}\) Franz Hinkelammert outlines that the *trans* from liberation to utopia has a transcendental *movens* and cannot be fulfilled within the line of *conditio humana*. Nevertheless, the *trans* is for the historic project necessary. Hinkelammert separates therefore two forms of captivity which negate the double structure of *trans*: we are captured in transcendental illusion, one the one side, and, on the other side, we are
Narcissist but we have to follow the wobbling tears into the darkness of the screaming night. The conducted night search is however not wresting the tears from the black night, its wresting leaves the glossy white dotted sketch of the tear as its *locus delicti* in the middle of the night. The liberating act of teardrops is in my reading nothing else than drawing on to the Narcissist’s mirror, since liberation is referring to relieving time from its chronological burden and unchaining space from its duty of hosting. Therefore, the structural duty of any liberator is limited to the very incident of cracking the chain of construction and unleashes it from causality. Nevertheless, there is a stronger reality that will question the accepted customs and overplays the overused whore called causality (Carl Einstein, *Expositions de Collages* (Galerie Goemans). In: Documents, 1930, Nr. 4). By realising the teardrop from its metaphorised hostage of dark melancholia, the liberator establishes another storyline of relationships; this other regime is the – above-mentioned – *lust* of the Narcissist for overused whores. Hence, the *mounted Sculpture* is not a palimpsest on which *description / space in history / time* are multiple layered and is not the divestiture of language within the context of the Narcissist’s construction. The liberating heroes are none other than the new commander in chain and will betray us by establishing in the name of *politics of montage* another grammar and syntax. Therefore, changes in language policy are basically re-visiting language and drafting life-world in its commonly accepted contingent mode. The hyphen between social contingency and grammatical collage writes the production of picturesque linings that in turn outlines grotesque possibilities without formulating another story.

Recalling the same story is the very *prosopopeia* of life-world; its connection *agendum* is therefore the revolutionary *credendum* that was outlined by the surrealist movement at Rue de Grenelle 15, Paris and by the formalistic OPOJAZ-group in St.

following transcendental mysticism. Hence, the transcendental illusion outlines that the eternal transformation is not only approaching asymptotic the utopian horizon but rather aims for its captivation. In opposition, the transcendental mystification is the operation capturing the utopian horizon with specific measurements (Hinkelammert 1994: 300). Hinkelammert has formulated these lines in an attempt of how liberation and materiality can be close-read. His liberation theological approach has very interesting hints to my schizophrenic / hyper-schizophrenic reading of language and power. Unfortunately a further analysis would exceed the framework of this thesis.

314 “(...) ce bureau s'emploie à recueillir par tous les moyens appropriés les communications relatives aux diverses formes qu'est susceptible de prendre l'activité inconsciente de l'esprit” (Breton 1987-99 I: 481). The Rue de Grenelle is my *pars pro toto* for Surrealism.
Petersburg. The guiding line of both movements is to disturb (social) self-sufficiency of linguistic practices by alienating the construction of grimaces against the purposeful usage of bourgeois’ every day practices. By loosing the daily grind of linguistic usage, both movements are not attempting to replace language with a new system of linguistic work practice but rather reading life-world as its metaplasm: it is about conceiving la matière première (au sens alchemic) of linguistic everyday practice (Breton 1962: 357) and to understand it as priem ostranenija. The acceptance in its modus vivendi is a special overriding of nihilistic reading that draws on the one side closer to my No. On the other side however, the alienating effects are primarily to point to the immediate origin of the surrealistic signifié and its psychological urging to write life-worldly possibilities; the surrealistic signifié is complemented by the formalistic ostranenija of stressing the signifié in its tension of form and materiality (Erlich 1973: 214). Thus, the alienation-act claims for difference-quality that in turn evokes Derrida’s le monde vécu in extremis. In contrast, the act of displaying No is the epipheton since translatio of A with B constructs neither life-world nor its pathological fixation. No is the deferral epipheton that cannot write addendum which actually foster the surrealistic credo of writing possibilities (Breton 1962: 48) – addendum is the cipher for possibility and construction. This option does not apply to No, since the structural vibration of addendum cannot be fixed on the map of NarcissistgrotesqueFace, mapping is rather sans sense while writing addendum. At this point we can say that the mounted Sculpture is effectively the tearing experimentum of a willenlosen Beiwerk

315 The young stream of Russian Formalists and Cubo-futurists analyse the phonetic-acoustic phenomenon (in linguistic practice) and its suppression by creating new forms of linguistic practice (Hansen 1996: 111f). OPOJAZ is my pars pro toto for the Russian Formalism.
316 Surrealistic and formalistic considerations contribute to our language analysis, since both movements have close links to the linguistic phenomenon.
317 André Bréton writes in the Premier manifeste du surréalisme (Breton 1962: 13-63) that human beings are reduced – in the impossibility to grasp the complexity of the world – to indifference and therefore they are a product of une impérieuse nécessité pratique (Breton 1962: 15ff).
318 Russian: procedure of the unfamiliar.
320 Pavel Medvedev remembers that linguistic Formalism uses predominantly the negation of the essential momentum as its basis (Medvedev 1976: 112).
321 “Il n’est rien sur quoi il devrait se refuser à parler, à écrire d’abondance. S’écouter se lire n’ont d’autre effet que de suspendre l’occulte, l’admirable secours” (Breton 1962: 48).
322 Cf. Victor Sklovskij’s Art as technique (Sklovskij 1965: 3-24).
beyond pathology and procedure, exactly: *addendum sans cesse*. The difference of writing surrealistic-formalistic *metalepsis* in translational practice and displaying *A with B* as *willenloses Beiwerk* that neglects any form of space-time presumptions, tells: *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* is not *crypsis* of writing *with*. Writing language as *with* is something else than having an emanating language of *matière première* (Breton 1962: 357) or a linguistic product of *free creation* that follows its very own conditions (Hansen 1996: 111). *A with B* will never be the *constitution* of framing life-world in which displaying *with* is the pivotal point while words die and the world remains eternally young (Hansen 1996: 112) – in this life-worldly words do not *dance with* articulated organs (Sklovskij 1994: 38); *translatio* is not *punctus contra punctum* where the dying *punctus* is contrasted by the *punctum* of eternal youth and where *élan vital*323 might be the *movens* of differentiating linguistic practice as reinforcement of translational realities. Phenomenography writes rather *A with B* beyond the spatial and temporal *dance* (Sklovskij 1994: 38) and henceforth, the phenomenon cannot be confirmed as the *historic a priori* of alienating semantics324: time is neither *intensified and contracted* nor *densified and contracted* as the movement of time325 that facilitates the haptic seeing of linguistics. Time-space relationality – outlined by Bachtin as *chronotopos* – is not the cultural semantics326 framing the *genre* (Bachtin 2008: 8) and is not usurped to write unity by highlighting a metaphorised path (Bachtin 2008: 180) as *NarcissistgrotesqueFace’s silver bullet* would do it, while following the contracted time of the firing line. The scattered path is the historic charged space abrading life-worldly practices since telling the infolding chapter of filling the flesh with blood of the *silver bullet* leaves the echo of the written behind the reverberating membrane of life-world: the deathly blood leaves the untold over to the echo. Hence, Bachtin’s *chronotopos* collects the contraction of time and space while writing the infolding of the *silver bullet* by finally spelling out the internal form of the lexeme (Bachtin 2008: 188) where *the untold over the echo* is tamed by the infold of the form. Thus, the *movimento* of *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* can only be the vivid consequence of entangling in life-world

324 Jean Cocteau explains that Sklovskij’s *s priem ostranenija* is very similar to the surrealistic movement. The criterion of the unfamiliar is that what the surrealistic outlined as *Wiedergeburt des Wunders* (Erlich 1973: 198). By quoting Cocteau we can see how Russian Formalism and French Surrealism can be close-read.
325 In reference to Kant’s understanding of time in *Critique of Pure Reason* (KrV B 33-73).
326 That does not depend on Kant’s space and Heidegger’s time construction.
the *signifié* and the *signifiant* to multiple possibilities. The *ostranenija of possibilities* contracting chronotopos twists the Thomistic principle of *multiplex est similitudo* (Summa Ia, 4, 3) and has therefore to be read in the narrative of a deferred Narcissist grotesque Face: the *similitudo of multiplex* reading re-deploys time in such ways that multiple linguistic locations where possible while the successively progress of the scenery *A and B* crystallises a flashback of stumbling chronicles alienating *A and B* from its motive. In formalistic turns, Boris Ejchenbaum replaces the structural realm of *A and B* through an evolutionary process of an immanent functional procedure; this procedure does not refer to any kind of real time and cannot be divided into chronological sections. By interrupting the very process of historicising the very nature of time, Ejchenbaum creates a kind of historic analysis of the persistent, steady, immutable and immovable in its shift and modification, whose objects are the rules of the dynamic of the occurrences, that is not simply its very facticity. The aporetic immovable in its movement is Ejchenbaum’s understanding of creating newness. Alexander Potebnjas’s notion of concreteness is, in addition to Ejchenbaum, the enlivenment of words since it liberates the lexeme from its bureaucratic knot and highlights allusively the connotative innerness of its very formation (Hansen 1996: 49). And Aleksej Krucenychs’ quotation *words are dying, the world remains eternally young* (Hansen 1996: 112) is therefore the capitulation in front of life-world, since death is actually the *sine qua non* for life in the world. That leads Roman Jakobson to say that the formalistic point is to stress that the form has overcome its material in such a way that the material is utterly covered up by its very form (Hansen 1996: 112)\(^\text{328}\). In other words, the formalistic breakup with the automation of language is the alienation for material on another potency and it is simultaneously the syntagmatic composition in which the ambiguity is interpretation (Hansen 1996: 228); it is this relationship formula of many with interpretation. Max Ernst underpins from a surrealistic perspective the formalistic *many with interpretation* by highlighting the poetic firing of random approaches as its vital liberation by scraping up the interior and outer life-world (Ernst 1934: 5). This kind of newness has the exciting news to have a liberator who is not a liberator in its structural sense, but nevertheless the immovable in its movement is the structural definition of historical analysis by accepting implicitly *chronotopos* that

\(^{327}\) Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson (1990) try to read Bachtin’s *chronotopos* as a multiplicity of definite terms of social spatiality.

\(^{328}\) The formalistic position reverses and dissolves the scholastic distinction of matter and form but nevertheless it still upholds Merleau-Ponty’s chiastic in. The cipher in turns the task of explaining to comprehension.
covers up the transcendental framework of recognition and reconciliation. Ejchenbaum is in this regard just another Merleau-Ponty who hides the transcendental precondition by the chiasm of the immovable in its movement: \( A \) in \( B \). In contrast, Ernst was exploring as well by psychologising liberation as its exit formula. Subliminally, we can read that decomposing liberation is predominantly the decomposition of time and space and therefore we might segue from condition to reification and therefore from fixage to the mounted Sculpture. This from to trope is the competence of writing relationships while creating grotesque figures of stumbling seeing as its deferral of \( \text{with} \). Nevertheless, the stumbling seeing is a qualified relation insofar as it runs the hidden nature of \( \text{ammonitore's seeing hand} \) and the possibility of writing the grotesque figures in the time-compression machine of chronotopos: the difference between \( A \) with \( B \) will be the stratagem of confounding the structures of the horizon \( A \) and horizon \( B \) in \( \text{with} \). Ammonitore’s translational act is within the aftermath of the scholastic premises matter cannot contact form – the consequentialism of matter and form enables us to explain life-word, since the meaningless matter is the conjunction of causality; matter with form is in opposition the conjunction where stories can be told without having the reciprocal necessity. Telling \( \text{No} \) is the juxtaposition of the willenlosen Beiwerk that has no strategy of structures and therefore the bitterness of the forbidden fruit has never been cultivated in the historical momentum of the paradise. The co-presence of \( A \) with \( B \) is the mounted Sculpture of NarcissistgrotesqueFace; seeing with legs is re-visiting Alberti’s cum while emphasising that ammonitore’s seeing with hands is not the compound of seeing with legs.

C The mounted Sculpture

The mounted Sculpture of bearing \( A \) with \( B \) has therefore not a disguised ontological foundation nor an immanentism of regional structures either; the disembodiment of art / tēchnē from its ur-syncretism was hitherto leading to producing the very ontological foundation; producing promotes an aesthetic of evolution in which the intransitive function (of self-value) towards transitive form (of alienation) has fixed chronotopos as reality producing relationship-machine. Bearing the mounted Sculpture is rather the vestigium of translational practice that passes by as we attempt to fix the relationship \( A \) with \( B \). Bearing vestigium is the mounted Sculpture NarcissistgrotesqueFace where \( A \)
with B cannot be aestheticised and materialised, respectively where the re-translation of the disformed towards outer-aesthetic phenomena is not possible or simply the grotesque distortion of life-world. *Translatio* of *A* with *B* has no vector-matrix that re-temporalises and re-fixes space. Hence, the formula *becoming with* in time and space, respectively the *becoming* of the *topos*, is present when I talk about *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* and do not value it as life-worldly reference; or to put it in other words, the prefix *re* disables to write the movement of the material necessity, since *A* and *B* is put upside down. Hence, the Kantian *a posteriori* geography is the *a priori* of space over time and Heidegger’s stressing of *timing* life-world will be replied in my study by consigning time and space without appreciating these two poles: the *translatio* of life-world as objective is relationally impossible and therefore, bearing *A with B* is its *willenlose Beiwerk* that stumbles with *NarcissistgrotesqueFace*’s silver bullet in Bachtin’s *chronotopos*. In reading perplexity, I read time neither as its timeless fiction of talking space nor its chronological facticity of shaping life-worldly stages.329 Its fragmentary character and its permanent feel of historical insufficiency cannot write narratives over time and space and in consequence, the transfer from *A to B* and its commutative property of re-translating the aesthetic disformed outer-aesthetic phenomena will be permanently in need of explanations (Hansen 1996: 423). We have to understand that *bearing with* and in consequence the *willenlose Beiwerk* are not an abstract and life-world-enraptured figuration but very much in time and space without its time-space-continuum. This is radicalism and this radicalism is neither able to have nor to be language, but *translatio* is *in* life-world – *in* is however lined up as *with* that is, literally in its remotest material niche, barbarian. *Translatio* lacking time and space is the *barbaric* dirt since the euphoria of *metaplasm* can only be written by an author, whose reference is fixed in time and space and therefore be translated into history and into the archives of life-worldly materiality. *Bearing with* in return has no fixed authorship and is not the outburst of immanentism but *bearing with* is *vestigium* that deprives itself of *becoming* history. The genesis of *becoming with* is not the figuration of translating its genesis; the force of ramification while writing the *becoming of A with B* is not *bearing translatio* – the upcoming relations of ramifying realities are schizophrenic options of pretending the *synergy* of pluripotentiality; the disformed materiality of *A with B* is not capable of writing the synergy as its translation.

329 Georges Didi-Huberman refers to Brecht’s *Kleines Organon für das Theater* in which neither timeless fiction nor chronological facticity can be found in *real* facts: experimental conditions are only able to play with the impure character of real facts to show the fragmentary conditions of the historical transformation of grammar (cf. (Didi-Huberman 2009: 76) and (Bertoldt Brecht 1967: 686)).
Henceforth, the epic telling of becoming is slightly shifted by small stories reading its bearing with that is written on the palm leaves of history but without locating translatio of A with B in the lining of time and space. The curved plastic NarcissistgrotesqueFace is therefore bearing stormy conditions while disforming A with B – the very prefix re – indicating the act of repetition – curves out the redundant bulk of the sculpture and simultaneously mounting the left over for crafting; this heroic resistance is the beginning of the story of NarcissistgrotesqueFace.

Hence, displaying NarcissistgrotesqueFace story is a stumbling seeing, it is stumbling not because there is a spatial hurdle in the dilatation of time but because seeing with legs is the immovable moving. The No to becoming with is a topos of vestigium that displays the non-reliance of structures and formation. Hitherto, the relying force of montage is the connection of the grotesque figure to its ornamental assemblage while the distraction of the grotesque face A with B is a mounted Sculpture. The tugging compositum of following the mise en abyme of the montage is in my reading no longer the urging density of life-worldly sculptures. Reading mounted Sculpture is cobbling the collapsed coherence while still stumbling A with B. The repetition of the scratch is the utterance of the oxymoron mounted Sculpture: mounting is the praxis in which the material of the sculpture is not simply taken and scattered by the assembler but is undergoing the assemblage of carving the material of a material monolith. Tearing the removal material by assembling its carvings and modellings and therefore undermining the attraction-lines of montages will divert the signature sculpsit. A disformed centre of sub-textures cuts off the line enacting the sculptural attraction, while the re-figuration of the ambivalent exhaustion is not the dissolution that leads to canonical realities. The enthumema assumes the re-vocation of language by its principals while referring to the stumbling reality that the mounted Sculpture is therefore disabling any forms of automatism in life-world. The deadly point of describing and translating life-worldly realities is overtaken by the vivid reception of word-seeds cracking the reality in which we used to be at home. If we turn once more to the framework of formalistic writing, we can read the homeland of enthumema as a synthesis of practice. Potebnjas was attempting to semantically differ (sdvig) the obvious while overriding the signifié-signifiant liaison by joining up inner and outer forms. The merging of the inner semantic composition and the outer phonetic reality writes the outlined schizophrenic

330 Vladimir Majokovskij outlines that we can find in Cechov’s writing conclusions which are maximised in their reductions in order to create lexemes (Hansen 1996: 112).
reality in which the formulations of the pathological parallels are for Potebnjas not causal relationships but anthropocentric life-worldly associations of the very well known (Hansen 1996: 45f). The syntactic *sdvig* rehearses the psychological parallelism that does not stumble like the syncope of the *mounted Sculpture*, since overriding the syncretism of the very nucleus via psychological double belongings leads to the phenomenon of *becoming with* that writes a quadruple pathology. The montage of the grotesque figure is the outburst of the economy of producing, formulating a chronology of *becoming with* that is from a relational point of view nothing else than the evolution of self-sufficiency towards the transitive grotesque / utilitarian functionalism of language\(^{331}\) – hence, it is again the ramification power of *fieri* that cannot read the co-presence of *bearing A with B*. The functionalism of dynamic totality (Hansen 1996: 369) is the disempowerment of the scholastic affinity towards *restitutio ad integrum*, in which the *possessum* of translation shows the teleology of the *vestigium*. The *integrum* is rather an oscillating practise of a *syn-*aesthetic stimulus (Hansen 1996: 59f) that over-turns the epic telling of life-world as totality while opting for *perplex co-presence*. This non-mediated confrontation with life-worldly situations – in which the reality of the surface exposure is the valence of things – is very similar to my reading of *No*. The act of mincing the canon is positively formulated, the formalistic reading in which the montage is articulated out of its material contrast and not as its summa (Hansen 1996: 95). The Russian formalistic tradition creates extracts that are formulated by an active subject; the *fractura* of the montage is the hepatic self-presentation between matter and material. This double reading ends up in a syntagmatic close up view that formulates *with* while writing side lines: *A* and *B* as diverted pictures of life-worldly drawings. *A with B* enacting side lines are very close to the synecdoche *mounted Sculpture* while radicalising the montage to its very detail. Nevertheless, the *syn* of Sklovskij’s syntagma proposes the activity of new creations and subverts my reading *A with B*; the *mounted Sculpture* is the sheer insanity that collides with the syntagmatic readings of Sklovskij and his fellows. The psychological *doublexity* of the syntagmatic acting will be imploded in my *hyper*-readings of carving out co-presence that yields the internal narration by filling out the void of the transition (Hansen 1996: 347).

\(^{331}\) Aleksandr Veselovskij’s framework of *becoming with* is driven by differentiating noetic and psychological modes. The *movens* for conceptualising aesthetics does not underpin its very quality. The automation of aesthetics leads not simply to the unity of tradition but to the unity of psychological procedure in the kind of *ars renovata forma dicendi* (Hansen 1996: 48).
One more once, the dissolution of time and space disables phenomenographic longing for discernment, the reading of *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* while *bearing A with B* swirls, runs high and goes down, it is dirty, pulverised and stretches in the chemical compound of *H2O* not a contact but an explosion of practice. Hence, the translation of *A with B* is more than a theorem, more than theory, more than aesthetics and even more than an optical phenomenon. The perplexity of *bearing with* enacts an elusiveness of display that is dramatic and heavily present, since it is in time and space *unhinged* from time and space. This is the point, where the *mounted Sculpture* is not simply an oxymoron but the *latio in trans* – yes, it is the point, where the *mounted Sculpture* is the heavy displaying coherence formulating *disjecta membra*. The radical longing of *with* is neither explaining nor comprehending, it displays; it displays the urging value of the impossible in such a way that the *No* to materialism is the raw appearance that is *bearing with* and is not the interpretation of excluding systemic settings that are founded on their fragments. The dissected elements are neither the historic remaining ambiguity of a surrealist montage anticipating the future nor the hepatic motor of alienating totality: *with* is not fragmented, it is not a *crypsis*, it is neither *teratological* nor is it an *epitheton*. The authority of the fragment will be suspended since the synecdoche *with* is the pending fragment that turns its diffracted mode into almost complete similarities: the *translatio* of *A with B* is getting pretty close without knowing what is closure – no space, no time in space and time – it might be *AwithB, AthiwB, A with B*, or it might be as well *A with B*: we laugh, but we do not know what we laugh about; *with* is not a *topos noetos* – the Narcissist’s teardrops might be the outburst of laugh and not the *aphansis* of *life-lust*. Or to put in other words, the sign, the lexeme, *A* and *B* are the *epiphasis* that is literally the *aphanisis* of slipping from *translatio*’s grid. The *mounted Sculpture* is exactly that above mentioned holy mess of *A with B* smiting the simultaneous, the urging, the inconsistent, the fu(n)ck(y), the messy, the Pope and the capitalist lesbian kiss of Madonna and Britney Spears. *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* is the sheer insanity where language is the palimpsest of a fleshy *non-design aka non-ramification*: *writing like a pussycat* or even though stronger, not only *writing* but also *being the curing sound of pussycat*332. Michel Leiris feels sorry for those people who are not able to feel the need to metamorphose themselves into table, chair, animal, paper, etc. (Wörterbuch 39): the transformation of the body into the possibility of a pussycat or an oyster-card is the pathology that was the pathological

332 The sheer insanity is the metamorphosis-project of Bataille by virtually depicting *animaux savages* (Georges Bataille, Chronique Dictionnaire, *Animaux Sauvages*. In: Documents, 1929, Nr. 6, 333).
virulence of the surrealistic *eidos*. The sheer insanity is therefore literally not the *descent* of sketching pussycat*Remo* or *Remopussycat* but the very fraction of the *willenlose Beiwerk*. *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* writes subsequently the detail that has been curved out of pussycat*Remo*. It is the perplex interruption of bearing that has no trim margins – *bearing with* of this trimmed margins are calling Bataille’s *fissure*, Brecht’s *detail* and can be read as Reginold’s *mounted Sculpture*. Hence, the dramatisation of differed margins is the *epitheton*, writing an aesthetic theatre of surrealistic potential and formalistic polysemy. And therefore, the fringes are rather the details which are interrupting the slip away of the *signifiant flottant*: Haraway’s fringing creature *OncoMouse* no longer relies on Trickster God, it is *Mouse* …….*Onco*; yes, dilatation twirled around. The antithesis of the holy and the impure is written by *A with B*, while the fissure is not possible without contact; the act of fissure starts with touching by materialising the touching surface as its fissure. *With* is the transgression from *A and B* while transgressing into the taboo of touching. This close up view is Brecht’s *detail* endangering the scream of the montage since the close view might reveal the secret of relations while writing the grotesque figure. The close reading of the montage overrides the perception of *A and B* and can therefore neither interfere with sub-texture nor its deferred praxis. Bataille’s depiction of fissure is *bas matérialisme* undermining the paraphrased body of materiality; his *matérialisme déclassé* is to some extent my *No* to language and materialism. The sheer insanity is the bounce of being touched by my eyes – *voilà*: the constellation of the bounce is actually the reading of constellating perplexity in which the historical *exposé* cannot follow the formal pattern of displaying alienation. The reading of *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* is the *experimentum* that queers the schizophrenic double-structure by the *hyper* that reads the non-archived character of history – the impurity of *bas matérialisme* – in its perforated shape, but on the other hand, the *hyper* as its gap subverts the *metalepsis* of *A with B* while displaying, not the documented *organon* of the historical *vestigium*, but snatching the *vestigium* that does not frame the extract *A with B*. The inconsistency of the symmetry within *with* is actually the *mounted Sculpture* that enacts the symmetry of a non-discourse that will be singularised in curiosity. Seeing singularity means displaying *bearing with* beyond the singularity of writing *with* as a historical necessity, which has been overlapped by the lacunae of *Blitzkriege*. This (revolutionary) potential of flipping over historic necessity mounts a historical setting that writes the combination of *A with B* as the disobedience of the exposed footage. The montage however exposes its footage by considering
exposing by exposing that we are exposing, and subsequently exposing, exposing and again exposing; the montage splits off to manifest the visual and temporal difference by exposing the juxtapositioning of *with* as its conjunctive imperative. The imperator of *with* transgresses in history with the very *conjunctum* dwelling, the psycho-pathological lie of doubling the progress in history to fill the gap of writing *with* by the *vestigium*. The prolonging of *bearing with* is not the practice in which the doublings of *A with B* is encoded by the art of differentiating but it is the historical abstrusity of *bearing* the decadence of doubling that *can do something – can trigger something – can extinguish something*. The *hypo* of this very schizophrenic reality is able to write a *bearing with* that implodes the perplex palimpsest of writing and re-writing the storyline of the fairy tail that can never pull the trigger, since its story-line redeems the oedipal dream of pulling *with of A with B into it*. This psychoanalytic measure is the feature of having the reliability of *with*, that is subordinated by the *in*, that in turn is able to bear the lie of doubling the *moven* for *A with B* while creating an extract of practice. The juxtaposition of *bearing with* beyond the scope of re-tracing life-worldly lines is the *willenlose Beiwerk* that I have been calling so far as mounted *Sculpture*. The co-presence of *A with B* longing for identity is neither a supplement nor complement. The desertion of the scholastic *vestigium* exposes legally the same material but speaks virulent from *NarcissitgrotesqueFace*. *Bearing A with B* is reading its *farewell* while fooling around with the montage. The earnest of depicting the excerption is the evidence of referring to the analytic positioning of the observer who points to the excerption while writing its *compositium* of life-worldly practices. The configuration of life-worldly perception will be the *decrescendo* of the screaming body that falls into the abyss of realities; the attention of the eye to capture the continuity of fading down the screaming body is the very epistemic *topos* in which *A with B* is the narrative pattern that includes the reading of the abyss as its historical momentum enabling the translation of life-world. The alimentation of *topos noetos* enables us to read *A with B* as a combination that allows to differentiate *A* and *B* due to the sensitivity of being able to listen to the screaming body, writing the darkness of the abyss as its legal potential of positioning *A with B* – the legality can be heard while the screaming body falls into the abyss, where history and the spotlight are suddenly *virile*. *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* is not the lengthiness of practicing its legal status while gaining the competence to read the screaming *fall*. Hence, the *chronotopos*, the supremacies of Kant’s space and Heidegger’s time are not able to read the synecdoche
NarcissistgrotesqueFace as the mapping force of bearing A with B. The mounted Sculpture is indeed radicalism that does not follow clichés and denies the authority, which is producing the montage as picture or yet as the excerpt of a falling picture. The authority of NarcissistgrotesqueFace is tomorrow or was yesterday but never today – there is neither the option to rely on the institution language nor legislation either. The non-reliance of with writes translatio but it is never the saviour of life-world physicality. The hyper-schizophrenic act overrides the call for liberation while bearing A with B; our mounted Sculpture is disforming, yet not playing the grotesque card of being signed by the surrealist authority of possibility, while writing the authority of formalistic compositions333; with is not a precarious ambiguity since there is no change of A and B. The taxon of A and B is telling while telling A with B. The pedagogical aim of how presenting the montage, which is lacking a raison d’être, has been overplayed by the disformation in which the contrast is the contact: aufheben is the co-presence of translatio.

D Co-presence

The co-presence of A with B formulates a paroxysmal semblance that can neither write a supplement nor a complement of relational practices in actua – the semblance is the disformation of A with B that transfers vital dilatations of the hyper-schizophrenic act in linguistic practices. Whether the supplement or the complement de-layers the semblance of A with B from its locus classicus, they rather enable us to see an essential dissimilarity baffling both the supplement and the complement of its semblance334. Hence, the baffling act can be read synoptically with – the above mentioned – affront of perplexity by understanding the imaginative reality of its locus classicus335. In operation, NarcissistgrotesqueFace is literally taking the baffling imago to its very own

333 The discussion of formalistic, surrealist and phenomenological traditions can outline interesting connections, which can unfortunately not been dealt with within this thesis. The texts of Bréton, Mallarmé, Ernst, Sklovskij, Ejchenbaum, etc. referring to a material reading of ostranenija and to a psychological formation of possibilities showing how Formalism and Surrealism incorporate the element of progress within the formation of montages. This progress is the parallel-lecture of NarcissistgrotesqueFace.


335 According to Merleau-Ponty, we might understand that the transformation of the locus classicus rephrases the essentialism of his carnal body. The unformed body cannot be read in its chiastic move. The non-reliance of the supplement and complement in semblance gets very close to reading NarcissistgrotesqueFace in an illuminative way of chiastic essentialism.
limits while expelling the perplexity of imaginative efficiency by yielding the authority of the locus classicus and its affiliated limits; in other words, reading metaplasm is not only a highly creative way to enter life-worldly scenes via oral expressions, they also reconfirm the locus classicus by suppressing orchestral attempts of vaginal barbaric writings. The performance of imaginative efficiency neglects to consider the translation of oral and vaginal utterance, since the correlative dictum of imaginative efficiency implodes while transgressing the linguistic picture of neologisms and its simultaneous condemnation of re-writing the potesta of metaplasm. Therefore, the co-presence of mouth with vagina outlines radically the paroxysmal semblance that features the fragrance of shining shit: the co-presence of A with B does neither decompose the formation of shit nor does it follow the odour of the shitty glance on the surface of life-worldly scenes – the supplement and the complement are hors categorie – A with B will be written with smelly fingers which were constantly fingering in the theoretical depth of (vaginal) excrements. Hence, the ordinary process of its very structural reality will be disturbed by the hyper of writing the abysmal of imaginative efficiency: fingerling the grotesque outburst as grotesque masque of metaplasm is the smelly ornament of writing history true the dilatation of reciting with – it is the very reverse augmentation of linguistic legacy. The historic progress streams constantly through my eyes while overriding the vestigium of the very told story. The dilatation of the story line writing with as co-presence sketches no comments about the violence of forming life-world while the hidden file of A with Bconcerts a compulsive anamnesis of latency. The trial for explaining the mounted Sculpture is now perplexity tout court that overrides the density of A with B while writing A with B. Hence, co-presence does not need its aesthetic counterpart to operate within life-world; the sun has been depicted as human being who transsects his / her throat her / himself and attacks the bearing of A with B as a society of mounted Sculptures. Therefore, we have to look very close to see the smell and grasp that the indefinite article a (of a mounted Sculpture) is precisely a No that is never Not – the act of an a-stage on which A with B are starring, bears the indefinite (article) to the perplexity of A with B when writing to its narcissistic lover No. The (love)story is therefore the very No of a gestalthafte anachoresis that turns with once more up side down. Thus, the co-presence does not need the presence and reality of materiality nor a montage that watches itself dialectically. The Narcissist has been

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336 The oral and vaginal relationality is inspired by Freud’s vision of Irmas Injektion and is re-negotiated by Lacan (Lacan 1978: 186).  
banned to the deathly desert in which she / he oscillates in delirium of diastole and systole and formulates hyper-schizophrenic activities that bear a kind of co-presence that does not simply bear the grotesque translation of bearing with as its contractual contradiction. Bearing with is not the rhetoric figure reading itself as the antithesis or the exclamation mark of prudery: sorry, the petting between A and B has already happened before you even had the chance to write A with B – the exclamation mark after A with B – A with B! – is the co-presence with NarcissistgrotesqueFace that is always translatio and never the hygienic need for language that considers life-worldly relationships and the consequences of its activities as translation. Therefore with does not long for the other by bridging A and B – the epitheton is the vistigium that implies the impossible subversion of a summarised taxonomy. This leads to a momentum to say that the willenlose Beiwerk tries to bring something to an equilibrium where actually no weights are – it writes a perfidious metric system that has the structure from the logical to a figurative point of view as its linguistic life to keep life-world even much more lively. Hence, the heresy of structural readings cannot write the grotesque figure of heterodox references; the co-presence or the mounted Sculpture is not the facilitating movens of reading polysemy, it is rather silence beyond polysemy. The schizophrenic sense of A with B is the silent shouting of the hyper where double entries of the linguistic-complex are literally bearing with of catachresis: co-presence-bearing with-translatio are rocking phenomenographic exclamation marks which are documenting historical legacy without having the chronos as its metric feet338. Therefore, the syn of synecheia chronou cannot be the with that is in charge of Hades: the historical gathering of A and B is unavailable since the experience of historicity is practically the obsession of co-presence and literally the salient point writing the latent perplexity as its hyper-schizophrenic outburst. Experiencing hyper-trop(ψ)e writes the vestigium as its close up view of the smelly detail that never existed.

Hence, vestigium draws a line that never has been drawn by the coercion of writing with at the end of the bottom line of A with B – it is the story where the efficiency overruns the economic ideology of the best cause by the presence of the authority of grotesque form(ation) and the convenience of possibilities in which the exclamation mark of hyper is not the spur of writing the logos. It is not simply the tension between two poles –

338 By correlating bearing with with metric feet, we can see similarities Bataille attaches to Le gros orteil (Georges Bataille, Le gros orteil. In: Documents, 1929, Nr. 6, 298). His idea is to write about a close up picture of a toe and not as a detailed view. The correlative friction between close up and detailed view is the possible screening of a non-chronological historiography.
identified by the condition of programming – but a *with* that triggers a morpho-pathetic echo of the exclamation mark\(^{339}\) that will not have the sensitivity for its spur nor the severity and abstraction of its morpho-phantetic practice either. Bataille would have used the *vestigium* of the *hyper* as an essay to read the universe as the hazy prospect of spit. This virulent change of perspectives leads Bataille to a *credo* while writing *bas matérielisme*, the non-alternative alternative to materiality – the deferral of materialism is the co-presence where the vagina and the mouth have been translated by the utterance of my nose and is therefore readily not the dense formation of *formless* encounters as Rosalinda Krauss and Yves-Alain Bois expound Bataille’s *informe* (Bois and Krauss 1996 and 1997). Displaying *A with B* is subsequently not the trace of grotesque urging of a formless spit, it is rather a reading of *bas matérielisme* that re-writes *translatio* of *A with B* as co-presence that cannot counteract by an *informe* reading but a disformed *vestigium* that stresses the form of the mouth while writing vagina. The emphasis on the form is however the *vestigium* that is not stranded on the shores of the translational realm but as the *hyper* writing *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* and therefore, I read Bataille’s *informe* as the disformation of perplexity bearing the material of *A with B*, not the summarised necessity of anatomy but as the bearing of physiognomy: *translatio* of *A with B* is the utterance of *apophatic* stories.

The line telling *apophatic* stories of *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* reverberates the *synecheia chronou* that cannot purge the remembrance into historical narratives – the impossibility of *synecheia chronou* is the edging force of reading *with* in the deferring practice of *No*. *Translatio* of life-world is more likely a *verrichten* than a disposition of the echo. That means that the formalistic formation and the surrealist possibilities are definitely not the *dis*-position of *translatio*, since they are dispositions. The difference of *A with B* is not written by the disposition of the typographic difference of *A* and *B* – the *vestigium* of *A with B* is enacted via the act of *bearing* its co-presence; in other words, the figuration of *bearing A with B* is the fermentation of hyper-schizophrenic linguistic practices in which the act of stumbling is the uncompromising perplexity of *bearing A with B*. The *apophatic* line writing the juxtapositioning of *A with B* while *verrichten* its fall is the fall out of favour that hitherto coerced dialectic labelling\(^{340}\), but nevertheless *falling* is not *falling*. The falling act has lost its velocity and it has lost its reference of \(^{339}\) Walter Benjamin would re-phrase the exclamation mark by the notion of *Aura*. \(^{340}\) This is the ultimate infringement with Kant; the Kantian *telos* of transcendentality is led by the *telos* of certainty. The certainty is the ethic notes on liberty, equality and codetermination.
displaying *A with B*, *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* is definitely not the monstrous spell out of *A with B*. The story *A with B*, is not the echoing line on which we might depicture the *sym* and *cum* of *mouth with vagina*; the non-portrayal *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* is therefore the denial of having *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* as totality. In reference to with Bataille, we have to read *le bas matérielisme* as the forsakenness of *bas* and *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* as the forsakenness of *with*. Hence, the juxtaposition of *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* and *with* is the *experimentum* of story telling that offends just to goad without dispelling *NarcissistgrotesqueFace*. It is much about Bataille’s ripping of materiality without cutting it into pieces (Bataille 1943); ripping materiality is the semblance of *A with B* while exposing the taboo: seeing the physiognomy of *mouth while writing vagina*. The exposure overrides the stigma of ground-realities by sapping the taboo of displaying its echo. The echoing seeing writes the epigraph of historic realities without knowing its *capitalis monumentalis* – there is no spirit of transition in it and no epigraphic depiction. The dialectic of montage is – while continuing – apophatic in such a way that the display of *bearing A with B* is not the structure of the material substrate: the *ordo naturalis* cannot be translated into life-worldly experiences that dismantle the *ordo* from *nature*. There is no tension of transgressing the montage in which dissolution and synthesis form the grotesque outlook of *NarcissistgrotesqueFace*. Dissolution and synthesis are not the material grounding for juxtapositioning *A with B*, *dissolutionsynthesis NarcissistgrotesqueFace* is the *ad manum of translatio* in which the mounted *Sculpture* disforms, while writing a juxtapositioning that is not made by chance but by its co-presence. The disformed writing is neither simply the negation of form nor the absence of it. Bataille’s *bas matérielisme* is the suspension of material and form, since it is neither the absence nor the negation of forming. Bataille outlines while writing *bas matérielisme* that the classic difference between material and form has to be rejected. This rejection is founded on the double structure of the abstract God and the abstract material (Georges Bataille, *Le bas matérielisme et la gnose*. In: Document, 1930, Nr. 1, 1). It exposes not only a dilemma while overwriting constantly the abstract God by the abstract material and the abstract material by the abstract God, it also oscillates with a structural reality in Bataille’s reading by enabling a new effect of progressing; we can summarise Bataille’s position by saying that after all any disturbing momentum in Bataille is a hidden germ for dialectics. Yes – for once – this play of dialectic supremacy is the hidden ticket for schizophrenia; hyper-schizophrenia is however not the answer to the dilemma, it is *perplex fall*, where the dialectic play drags
through the Narcissist-mirror of mire. The grotesque deprivation of the material towards NarcissistgrotesqueFace is not the hunching line for possibilities\textsuperscript{341}; the upswing of falling materiality is rather the transfer from life-world to No and to redundancy echoing the \textit{vestigium} of bearing life-worldly realities. Therefore, we have to say that bearing the upswing of falling subverts the grotesque masque of close-writing \textit{A with B}. The closeness of the echo is \textit{No} and neither the rejection of \textit{bas} as such nor the logic of scattered structures\textsuperscript{342}. The prefix \textit{re} of repealing life-worldly realms is the transfer of repealing \textit{A and B} towards \textit{A with B} while reading the process of transferring the juxta-positioning \textit{A with B} as its pealing materiality that is not scattered. The lingering sound of falling is not the living \textit{cantus} of legacy but the ligature enabling hyper-schizophrenic readings of \textit{with}. Bataille’s crunching tactics of material reads NarcissistgrotesqueFace as its pull on of informal qualities than constructive realities where the time-line of the kings is replaced by the cave of the villain. Consequently, we have to draw the line saying that the fetish of verrichten the \textit{willenlose Beiwerk} is the \textit{catacresis} of \textit{vestigium}\textsuperscript{343} – the fermentation of story telling is \textit{translatio} when \textit{translatio} reports \textit{I am hungry and Hitler has been constituted in 1933}. The \textit{willenlose Beiwerk} is the perverse swap in which bearing \textit{A with B} is the verrichtetete \textit{Aufgehobenheit} in which the translation of words can never be part of language.

Hence, the verrichtetete \textit{Aufgehobenheit} writing the \textit{willenlose Beiwerk} is not the excavation of teratology in which life-worldly practices are doomed to contingency where language and the directorship of senses are forbidden, the \textit{mounted Sculpture} and the practice of the \textit{willenlose Beiwerk} are rather story telling without having the spool of history. Story telling is neither the ability to describe the line of \textit{A with B} nor the utterance of non-constitutive fleshy words. \textit{Bearing A with B} is the juxtaposition of \textit{No} which hurts to tease the practice of life-worldly realities without hurting the lexeme – this is the \textit{paradoxon} that nourishes lack and excess of \textit{hyper-schizophrenia} enabling to

\textsuperscript{341} The difference to Derrida’s \textit{formal law of deferral}, Benjamin’s \textit{Wahlverwandschaft} and Reginold’s NarcissistgrotesqueFace are the impossibility of possibility; that means that the sense for possibility can only be evoked by the necessity of stressing the structured space-time rhetoric. The tearing body is within this framework simply the necessity for progress.

\textsuperscript{342} Cf. the conversation between Hal Foster, Benjamin Buchloh, Rosalind Krauss, Yve-Alain Bois, Denis Hollier and Helen Molesworth, in: \textit{The Politics of the Signifier II: A conversation on the ‘Informe’ and the abject} (Foster et al 1994: 3-21).

\textsuperscript{343} Bataille outlines in reference to Van Gogh that there is no value for transfer by stating that Van Gogh does not belong to history of art (Bataille 1970 1: 500). In addition, Bataille criticises the commercialising aspect of the Avant-garde by reading that its very production has been negotiated at the stock exchange (Georges Batailles, \textit{L’esprit moderne et le jeu des transpositions}. In: Documents, 1930, Nr. 7, 489-492).
break with boundaries of aesthetic dialectics. The figural reading of the story is therefore not existent and the classification of the paradox not described as the fleshy body; we have to consider that No of linguistic materiality is not willing to tell its grammar, it is rather the fall of perplex negations that mounts A with B to sequences of Sculptures telling NarcissistgrotesqueFace. The experimental dissection and clashes of mounting linguistic practices is the vestigium telling us about the chiastic story telling of with344. NarcissistgrotesqueFace is the notate of a linguistic intrusive happening that never had happened in life-worldly realities in concreto. The translatio of linguistic hyper-schizophrenia is the minimalistic rapport in which my arms are able to seize intimacy345. The copulation of my arm and intimacy or the copulation of mouth and vagina are the willenose Beiwerk that distresses the formal possibility of transgressing form by doing nothing (Georges Bataille, Le cheval académique. In Documents, 1929, Nr. 1, 30). Henceforth, perplex negations tell us the display in which the total view of the close shot is the non-portrayal squeeze of NarcissistgrotesqueFace. The non-intimacy of storytelling is the teasing act in which the detail is not the distance to write a linguistic-aesthetic synthesis346. In concreto, we might say that Bataille’s bas matérialisme has lost the virility of reading the baseness of materiality as swapping conjuncture of grasping by overlying the non-representable monstrosity of hyper. The linguistic pace through the haunted forest of life-world is the totality of a non-potrayable story of NarcissistgrotesqueFace. In continuation to that we can say with Carl Einstein that the biological monotony has been avoided (Hollier 1994: 84) by emphasising that the isochromatic tunes are never the picture into another life-world. NarcissistgrotesqueFace is the plunge of the picture that does not highlight another crystallography by scratching on the surface of life-worldly stories. The crack of the crystalline does not draw another crystalline prism, rather it is the utterance of bearing on the surface that trembles every single vein of crystallographic writings: analogia is no longer analogia, love is no longer love, historical writings are no longer historical writings, language is no longer the practice of grammatical directives and relationships are no longer the intimacy of lining up but … (the continuation however cannot be

344 Eisenstein was sure that the chocs are the predominant facilitator of communication since the event of art is lead by clashes (Eisenstein 1929: 9).
345 In reference to Jean Epstein, Pascal Bonitzer writes that the close shot changes the drama through the impression of proximity. Hands can grasp pain and in reality there is no air between us; I am literally consuming it. It is in me and it is a sacrament (Bonitzer 1971: 19 and 22).
346 Friedrich Schlegel’s linguistic-aesthetic synthesis or non-synthesis by destroying the form “(…) verletzt, um zu reizen – ohne zu zerstören” (Schlegel 1882: 58) ressembles my NarcissistgrotesqueFace (cf. Hansen 1996: 37).
written with words that referrers obviously to an existing grammatical corpus). The mounted Sculpture of NarcissistgrotosqueFace is therefore never the sum\(^{347}\) of its scraped out features; we are telling a story – without any hesitation – formulating *one plus one equals three*. The fall of summing up by the figure of three cannot be written as grotesque outburst, since the sum is no longer writing relations: *one plus one equals three* is the perplex bearing of telling *A with B* while acting as NarcissistgrotosqueFace! The burst of the crystal prism is the *translatio* of the mounted Sculpture of telling the never-ending story of the plunge of the picture. Or to put it in other words, *translatio* is not the peeling of the onion, it is not the act of coming into the lotus flower and it is definitely not the psycho-analytic setting of family dramas in which all of these examples deploy different layers of the non-portrayal by exploring oedipal relationships: as long as we peel of, as long as we read biological incidents and as long as we allow *my* cat we are accepting relations within a *space-time continuum*.

The idiosyncrasy of *with* as a narrative *conjunctium* can no longer be the continuity of life-worldly pictures. The *communio* of life-worldly progress can be read by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty while longing for *As* and *In* as its respective technical transformation. *Perplex bearing A with B* written by NarcissistgrotosqueFace negates the ability to draw liminal lines. The mounted Sculpture is much about the baseness that is not oppositional to the rhetoric of highness and therefore not relational but at the most the bearing of relations. The bearing of relations *A with B* is however the hyper-schizophrenic effect that highlights via the abyss of the *hyper addendeum* the exposure of *a* from *a*-bject and the *o* of *o*-bject. The *a* and the *o* are the dirty elements of relations that are never relational in a touching and smelling sense: *it is vagina with mouth*. The undressing abyss of *a* and *o* is neither the additive nor subtractive bit of forming relations, it is rather the undoing vividness of *bearing A with B* in bearing the *vestigium* of disformed materiality. The disformation of undressing the abyss packs the gap of *A with B* while literally *niedertrachten*. The German verb – a neologism – *niedertrachten* – referring to the verb *trachten* (*to be looking forward to and to aspire to*) and added by the adjective *nieder* (*base*) – confounds *A with B* by writing the *hyper* in reading the *Aufgehobenheit* of story-telling. Therefore we can see *niedertrachten* as the very point where we cannot grasp *A with B* but where we have to grab the perplexity of *bearing A with B*. NarcissistgrotosqueFace is not the subject of narration and description nor the

\(^{347}\) in reference to *Gestalstheorie*. 

fairy-tale depiction either – the perplex bearing A with B catches the scratching mounted Sculpture on bearing, on A, on B and finally on nibble off the rest of with. At this moment, grasping A with B is literally aufheben the crumbs of with – the transcendental eye of phenomenology is practically the phenomenography of picking and scratching on lexemes and therefore being beyond the breathing of A with B: the perplex bearing chops the air between me and A with B. In its latio we have to inscribe the graphos in which the NarcissistgrotesqueFace is the metaplasm of trans-graphos. The transvaluation of values has already happened before we even had been able to see the utterance of transgression – A and B are literally swallowed by NarcissistgrotesqueFace. Hence, the organon of NarcissistgrotesqueFace is the vivid decay cancelling the double standards of linguistic practices while writing the Aufgehobenheit of hyper-schizophrenia.

The tugging vacuum of linguistic self-determinacy and its practical need cannot be kept up by translating A with B. The tugging of the hyper-schizophrenic determinacy by writing NarcissistgrotesqueFace tells us another story of echoing that peals the statement there is / there was. Between the pealed lines there is this hefty bearing of one plus one equal three that echoes a symptomatic outcry of NarcissistgrotesqueFace that is literally the hefty dementia of the echoing rime. The story of A with B is the libidinous violence of the Narcissist while hearing the echo of the rime. The hi-story of rime is the inquiry of the membrane of re-membran(c)e where we have to leave the ur-syncretism of historical utterance. The suffering of libidinous violence is actually the accelerated experience of carnal physicality of NarcissistgrotesqueFace and the other way round the dynamics of physicality is the singular and dirty lexeme calling the symptomatic crises of cutting off representation: bearing A with B is the enactment of contradictory identifications that tells us about the smelly micro dirt on the street writing a-bjects and o-objects. To put it in other words, we have to commit that the form A with B is literally eaten up by NarcissistgrotesqueFace. The act of linguistic cannibalism is the insistency of translatio that enables us to be corroded while it is...
actually occurring and vanishing. Bataille outlines the figuration of occurring and vanishing as the *trias* of *thesis-antithesis-symptom*. His *trias* however is subverted by *bearing A with B* in such a way that the symptom of excess and lack is snitching off stories. The acting overrides the double *topos* of linguistic practices while drawing level with hyper-schizophrenia. The dilemma of syntactical aesthetics of the presence of $A / B$ and the form *with* is deferred while writing the *vestigium* of the hyper. The symptoms of *bearing A with B* is the association of *mouth and vagina* and not the anthropological trope and therefore we have to admit that the hidden anthropological pivotal point disables any life-worldly features, not to mention linguistic projects, since it outsources the production of representation: *ars renovate forma dicendi*! The re-membran(c)e of *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* is in that relationship the semblance of Bataille’s *formless* that formulates the contingent relationship of concrete forms (cf. *the spit*) and philosophical formula (cf. *being*). The contingency of *bas matérielisme* occurs since the accent marks the dirty mouth and the dirt of the vagina. The semblance of Bataille’s reading with the connection of the *rapport transgressive* is striking. Therefore we can say that the co-presence of antinomies does not avoid their pathological schizophrenia but keeps them alive by following the crumbs while telling about disformation that writes radically the symptoms of a non-humanistic foundation: *mounted Sculpture, NarcissistgrotesqueFace, translatio bearing A with B* are beyond phenomenological reach.

Telling stories of *perplex bearing A with B* is the phenomenographic *translatio* of *bas matérielisme* writing the co-presence of ambivalent and alternative valuations before even engineering the valuating practices of linguistic realms. It is the picturesque play of hyper-schizophrenia that does not engineer but bears the static contradictions and limitations of life-worldly sceneries. The co-presence of $A with B$ has this chiastic range of close-ups that are neither a hybrid nor a mixed up constellation of bearing the burden of life-world – the co-presence of *bearing A with B* tells stories without having the story-lines of *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* and therefore it cannot formulate within the linguistic setting any needs, presses, production processes, any feeling for newness and becoming story. It is the *willenlose Beiwerk* that is dirt since it cannot be translated into the carousel of categories. Instead, the *vestigium of hyper* tells us in its vertiginous distance that *bearing A with B* is the hyper clause of having too much of material

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349 In reference to Didi-Huberman’s *form-antithesis-symptom* or *form-antiform-symptom* (Didi-Huberman 2010: 326).
tautology and too little of forming daydreams. Hence, *bearing A with B* is the *translatio* or simply *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* and *perplex NarcissistgrotesqueFace* are therefore the change of emphasising dirty acts by deferring the ability of *translatio* and not primarily *A with B* as such. The *translatio* of *bearing A with B* is the blind *plethora* of capturing the picturesque *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* where you never would expect it – *translatio* is the inevitability of the emptiness of fleshy words. Hyper-schizophrenic writing of *translatio* is consequently therefore the story of dirty eyes which are in search of crumbs. Hence, the phenomenographic story is – without the dirt of *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* while *bearing A with B* – a close fisted eye of the very bourgeois transparent view. The dirt of bearing life-world is the ornament of linguistic hyper-schizophrenia that mounts the Sculpture in which the *perplex of bearing A with B* is the *niedertracht* of the mounted Sculpture. In a no-man’s land the *perplex éclat* allows us to write a sincerity of *translatio* since the heuristic of type-resemblances\(^\text{350}\) is pointless; co-presence is the buzzing of a lateral life-world in which the subversion and bearing of are not just attempting to bear the long shot of life-worldly practices. Hence, translation is neither *translatio militans* nor *translatio passive*, *translatio* of co-presence is not the oscillating attitude of *activa* and *passiva* and therefore it is deprived of fatalistic reading of *NarcissistgrotesqueFace*. Or to put it with other words, *translatio* is not an aggregate and therefore we can say *A is the translation of B*. Hence, we have to continue that storytelling *A with B* is neither synchron nor diachron, but is the co-presence of the *willenlose Beiwerk* that never alienates from the time-passing momentum. And therefore phenomenography is the noise in my eyes spelling out the carnal body while writing *NarcissistgrotesqueFace*.

\(^{350}\) It is about type-semblance of anthropological differences, while writing female and male.
The catharsis of this thesis is to portray how co-presence of NarcissistgrotesqueFace translates language without language and how No to language is the iconoclastic reading of the phenomenon. Indeed, the juxtapositioning of A with B radicalises the transfer-material of linguistic realms in life-world tampering without knowing its (relational) consequences: the utterly No is the radical position that makes the act of translatio literally perplex and immobile – there is no taxonomy of salvation and no token of aesthetic production. We have seen in chapter III Perplex Coenesthesia that grammar, taxonomy and wording are no longer the reference for linguistic practices and translation is not the transfer act by producing its corresponding realms in which the gaze of the phenomenologist reveals the organic unity of A and B. Translation is thus from chapter III on not a theory of gazing relations but rather it is bearing A with B that can never write the gaze in which the phenomenon of A and B becomes A with B. Yes, the perplex washes out the transcendentental epiphany of phenomenological reading and leaves us – the reader and writer – to use language and grammar but not understanding / accepting their (transformative) power. At this point, we have to learn to bear with since referring to language without accepting its consummation is the montage-practice of writing the phenomenon. And it is at this very point where my proposed NarcissistgrotesqueFace bears up the differing materiality in its Kafkaesque momentum: the material will neither be produced, disseminated, gazed at nor seen as fallen practice of neither linguistic nor epistemological realms but it has to bear the material of A with B in co-presence – the grotesque of co-presence is this melancholic appearance of affiliation that cannot be formulated in which I write NarcissistgrotesqueFace. Hence, it is about a translational void in its material disformation in which the introduction of NarcissistgrotesqueFace, mounted Sculpture, vestigium, willenlose Beiwerk, etc. are artificial figures or trickster gods which speak

out the deficiency of translating the linguistic material into life-worldly realms; the multiplied usage of these notions – which are actually in my reading not notions *kat exochen* – are *glossary lines*\(^{352}\) passing from behold the lexeme to verbosity of the told which has in turn nothing to do with an organised spook of juxtapositioning (Moholy-Nagy 1978: 75). Consequently, translating via the link of *with* is neither spooky nor nihilistic in which anything and everything can make sense out of it, it is rather a synoptic reading of Bataille’s *bas matérielisme* that turns out to be the material of bearing the disformed material. It is no longer about *reading-understanding* but it is more about the *proliferation* of the act: what are artificial figures doing with you – the reader – but also with me – the writer –, is therefore the *translational bathos* of being here and there. Thus, *chapter III* is not a theoretical tract of *disformation* but the enacted engagement *with disformation* in which the performance has been literally practiced in *perplexity*: it is no longer about the causal efficiency of explaining, understanding and gazing at the phenomenon, it is rather the performance in which the reference *reginold* is just another play figure of *you* that has never been written\(^{353}\). Therefore, *chapter III* is not the total collapse of references, it rather affirms that language and translation is a performative practice of the scenery. This invites us to read scholarly exegesis – in our case the exegesis of the translational phenomenon – not on the ground of fixed points but rather as an oblique practice of the subsidiary in which a sideline is actually the actor on the stage.

Hence, reading the trifold architecture of this thesis shows us how phenomenological translation has been evolved from a linguistic practice of the ordinary life in which life-world has been fixed by the reward of the transcendent line (Husserl) and its epistemology of the ordinary. The analysis of Husserl will point at the chiastic practice of reading language as the carnal fixation of *A in B* (Merleau-Ponty) and outline on top of that, hyper-readings of disseminating practices (Reginold) as the *No to episteme-transcendentality-ontology*. We have seen how this intervention transforms the self-rewarding transcendent line of *A as A’ to B* to the chiastic shimmering of ontological *A in B*. This chiastic practice of linguistic usage is the lateral position of language which


\(^{353}\) Edward Casey refers that “(...) to orient, after all, is to orientate to something other than that which does the orientating itself” (Casey 1997: 234).
is finally through its fixum somehow tamed by its transcendental conditions in which the voiceless possess voice, the homeless translates his homeless being into the night shelter for the homeless and in which the gaze finds finally its regard. In total contrast, No to translation is NarcissistgrotesqueFace – this life-word reality without taxonomy – that bears at the abyss with its repetition in absurdum; there is no essence of the phenomenon – no veritas ontologica – that will claim its translation since it follows the formula: to have everything as itself (Blumenberg 2001: 52). The transfer zone is therefore the capitalistic sold out of life-world: transferring A to B is the trade off of A’ as B and A in B. Hence, the translation of A with B or the anastrophe B with A cannot be dissected as phenomenon in life-world but has to be read all in one breath, in an accelerando that transfers before even the transfer has been gazed at. This is the performance of the translation that bears A with B before the epistemological dichotomy of life-world rolls out the speculative gesture of eidos and eidolon – the performance follows the wobble of Narcissist’s tear drop. This is the reason why the phenomenological attempt to translate life-world has been replaced by the graphein of the phenomenon – the act of translatio writes NarcissistgrotesqueFace as the wobbling of practice. Or to put it with other words, NarcissistgrotesqueFace is the untouchable figuration of wording the phenomenon. Consequently, the trajectory of this study shows us the shift of the perspectives: from doxographic analysis (Husserl and Merleau-Ponty) to biographical performance (Reginold). Hence, the reception of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, in reading the translation of life and world, shows us that Husserl’s A as A’ to B is very eager to explain the relationship in life-world. With Merleau-Ponty, the translation machinery of explaining the world has been more and more detached from a world full of explanation to a world full of understanding in which the preposition in declares the fusion of horizons and in which the empathy of living in this world is the movens for understanding the out there in the world. A world full of story telling contrasts with the corrective of linking in which neither explaining nor comprehending can grasp the practice of translating; my bearing A with B is the practice of telling without telos. Through the act of telling, we are exploring the scenery of life-world in

355 Sarah Ahmed refers still to phenomenology while writing: “This is how phenomenology offers a queer angle – by bringing objects to life in their ‘loss’ of place, in the failure of gathering to keep things in their place” (Ahmed 2006: 165). Her theorising practice of bringing is a phenomenological analysis; I suggested to turn towards the performance of writing, while loosing the contact zone of being with as
highly differing non-differentiating negotiations: not words will be translated but the bathos of styles. Story telling in its unpredictable feature will overrun the transcendental means of explaining and comprehending. Therefore the triad explaining – comprehending – telling tells us a lot about how the body of theory – especially in the humanities – has been used over time and under which paradigm the translation of the phenomenon has been captured to finally write there is no language. The 19th century was guided by Positivism in which Erklären via scientific discoveries was translating the objects into life-worldly features. Inspired by the Neo-Kantian Methodenlehre and by the physicist Ludwig Boltzmann, Husserl’s attempt was spurred on by the description of facts while attempting to analyse its coherences and figurative appearance. Under this aegis, notions of fixations were the response to physical accuracy: A as A’ to B is the logical formula of how life-world has to be translated. The hermeneutical tradition in turn has emphasised the relationship of psychological epistemology while addressing the relatum in life-world: this is Merleau-Ponty’s A in B that digs deeply into a lateral epistemology of Verstehen. In contrast to these traditions, my attempt to read the world via phenomenographical performance is an attempt to leave the fettle of phenomenological transcendentality far behind. The narrative endeavour of story telling is therefore literally the graphein of my biography in which acting is another name for the entanglement and situatedness of being a scholar. The Cartesian subject-object trope is the legitimation of academia to study and analyse what academia refers to as the intelligible object; referring the sober object to the practice of story-telling is in this context radically dismissed or messed up: the material of linguistic practice is not a feature of targeting and analysing A and B, it is rather a messy task of bearing A with B. This narrative practice is a critical continuation of science study, considered especially in reference to Science, Technology and Society (STS) and to scholars like Annemarie Mol (1998 and 2002) and John Law (2002a, 2002b and 2004) where the assemblage of gazing cannot write a single story but is looking for jagged story-lines (Mol & Law 2007: 102); this is where I the scholar is also I the percussionist or where my scholarly questioning is the translation of my daily drumming practice.

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feature of a phenomenology of bringing; Ahmed uses bringing objects to life rather in a descriptive sense and remains therefore phenomenologist.

356 It might be now clear that the mounted Sculpture of bearing A with B is in its material deferral practice flanked by the assemblage trope of (on the one side) Formalism and (on the other side) Surrealism.

357 In Beethoven’s 3rd Symphony Eroica, he perverts the role of being a composer: the composer is suddenly part of the composition and tries to master his own deficiency. It is a radical turn in which the
Thus, *translatio* in phenomenography is this kind of *translationess*\(^\text{358}\) that reads the material in jagged story lines in which the differed practice exposes not only the text but also the tissue of the text. Terry Eagleton outlines that materialistic readings of Marxism narrows the phenomenon of textual tissue to a simple output of generative happenings: “Marxism, as an inevitably ‘limited’, ‘text’, thus stands in ironic relation to the historical ‘text’ it exits to produce, and whose emergence will finally signify its own demise. Historical materialism stands to its object somewhat as a materialist criticism stands to its text. Its task is to refuse the phenomenal coherence of that text’s narrative presence so as to expose the generative mechanisms that produce its repressed heterogeneity” (Eagleton 2009: 69). This citation shows and makes it clear that my plea for materiality contrasts with any figurations of generative grammar by writing deferring practices, which do not follow the rhetoric of becoming and beginning. *Translatio* is not the generative mechanics liberating A and B through reading *with*. The quintessence of *chapter III* was subliminally to show that the material phenomenon cannot write the *relatum* mechanics of space and time and consequently, we have seen that the differing practice is this absurd immobility of language. Accordingly, the acceptance of the *space-time continuum* is the historicised temporality that outlines the generative line in which life-world produces on the one side A and B and on the other the difference of A and B – this differentiating practice is the *signifiant* which is able to construct life-world and therefore translating its concerns into grammar. However, my proposed *bearing A with B* practice will stumble over its two-dimensionality (2D) – *translatio* of the differed material is rather the three-dimensional (3D) lining in which the endogenic *space-time* narration (2D) is blasted out by *space-time-*! (3D). The exclamation mark is the jagged positioning in A *with* B. Or in other words, by introducing the 3D optic of *space-time-*! we have to read that the material framework applies the materialistic feature in a complete other way: *co-presence* of the *willenlose Beiwerk* is not the translated output of the organised world, it is rather the *vestigium* of a historic text that is never a quotation of history. *NarcissistgrotesqueFace* is the shortened citation or the sideline that we do not know. Phenomenographic seeing is this *noise in my eyes* that perverts the etiology of describing life *with* world as the shorted citation. Relating the trope *shorted citation* with practice is indeed Alice Walker’s *sewing machine* that has suffered an ineffable martyrdom: rape, being separated from

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\(358\) In reference to Terry Eagleton’s difference of *literature* and *literariness* (Eagleton 2008: 5).
children and sister, forced marriage and humiliation by the husband has not broken the sewing machine; Alice Walker, the sewing machine is the iconoclastic material of the phenomenon translating NarcissistgrotesqueFace. Thus, we have seen that with is the entropy of jagging materiality that writes the anastrophe either way and we can declare now that graphein is the credo in which the scenery of life-world is only passable but never an object of analysis. It is also a credo in which the mimesis line is the bodily sweat of which the figure NarcissistgrotesqueFace is made out of. Hence, translation is this praxeographic writing that goes beyond reginold and it is material that will be positioned as a shorted sideline of remo.
APPENDIX: SOTTO VOCE

The notation sotto voce is used in western vocal music\textsuperscript{359} to indicate the lowering of vocal volumina in order to create a certain atmosphere within the expression of sound compositions – sotto voce is an expressive agency to indicate, to emphasise, to redeem, to disturb a performance. Therefore affettuoso is notated to create another modulation in the expression of a vocal line. This transformative practice of exposing recalls the tension of theatrical scenes in which the actor is exposed to create a relatum with the audience but also in which the vocalist modulates an inner relatum with her / his very own tectonic of expressing. The transformative tension of this double relation pulls of an atmospheric necessitas progressing the compositum by integrating the modulated voice into the volumina of the soundscape. The scenery of relational necessitas is not simply the cantus firmus of the composition, the soundscape of sotto voce speaks out the affetto of a dramatic unsolved tension-rest: the affetto is actually the vacuum of the double relational line in the volumina of soundscaping. Exactly, it is about the volumina-vacuum in which the necessitas of the compound disturbs the rhythm of the vocal expression; the act of affetto evokes for a tiny fraction the soutenu of the cantus firmus – yes, it is indeed a fermata of the ornamental unknown. The continuum of the fermata is the necessitas of breathing out the distorted ornament and on the other hand it is likewise the struggle of how the vacuum of continuum and soutenu will enact the composition. The emphasis is not only on suspending the pulse of breath but also on the ornamental continuum as the nebulous incursion of the Unerhörte\textsuperscript{360}. The emphatic streak of the Unerhörte is thus the unerhörte crescendo transforming the compositional sotto voce as the unresolved rest of the volumina – it is a mobile vacuum of expressing in which sotto is clothed by the intonated pitch of voce or to put it in other words, the Unerhörte comes along with the presence of the bel canto voice. Hence, the mobile vacuum is the distortion of lingering sound-shreds that cannot be compromised by the dia-logoi of the composition; the twine feature is rather the marvellous transfer from the theoretical vacuum distortion into literally the Unerhörte silence of the expression. This transfer is radical insofar as the Unerhörte will neither guide nor liberate the double relation of the volumina-vacuum – the gesture of the Unerhörte is the Poltergeist who

\textsuperscript{359} Cf. for further readings: Sotto Voce (Honegger / Massenkeil 1982: 393).

\textsuperscript{360} Das Unerhörte has a twisting double meaning: 1. (literally) non heard and 2. enormous and tremendous.
will not consider the vocalist nor the auditor / the audience. In this vacuum volumina the Unerhörte is not the dialectic trick of a third figure who / which makes things happening. No, the Unerhörte is the very practice of sotto voce that can neither enact the telos of denouement nor practice the psychological performance of the vocalist; the performance of sotto voce yields definitely the psychological oikonomia of aesthetics – it is the unerhörte continuum of the suspension that has no cantus. The very frozen breath of the unerhörte is the punctum that neutralises space and time as its reference zone in which the audience and the vocalist might be simply a distorted practice of sotto voce. Therefore we have to declare that the latency of sotto voce is a perplex figure that expresses its non-existence; the tension filled silence, in which the figuration is much more imposing than the affetuoso might intend, does not follow aesthetic formations nor does it outline the hermeneutical horizon; the diachronic piano within sotto voce is never the performance of the synchronic volumina of piano and forte. The Unerhörte of sotto voce is the piano that is grotesque in its ornamental expression: it is the incredible pouring of the beguiling that stuns the flaneur while ambling along the written score. Practically, the punctum of the Unerhörte constrains to write the score and listen to its performance. The presence of a stimulus tearing the transfer from the sotto voce act to its score is the co-presence of sotto and voce which in turn will write a willenloses Beiwerk. And exactly this very constraint of the co-presence writing the willenlose Beiwerk, as the spur of the impossibility of the Unerhörte, is the transformation that will never happen kat exochen. The transformative act is the violence of the spur at the spur – yes, the violence of the spur at the spur is the duplex that writes sotto voce while following the scent in the nebula of its very taste. The nebulous longing is the transfer of sotto voce that tries to get on to the track with the scent of sotto voce while attempting to resound the utterance of its phenomenon. Hence, the transfer of the modulation does not happen in the expression of the very vocal part but is an oblique happening revealing the very incongruency of the act: the scent of the sound is transferring the modulation of sotto voce in a non-relational reality – it is the shatter of the unerhörte voice. The subliminal stimulation of sotto voce is in its unerhörte and non-fixed utterance fostering the non-mastery of irritation. The diachronic practice of non-mastery and irritation cannot be synthesised by a third figure which balances out the resistance in time. The non-mastery is the gasping vocalist who cannot capture the irritation of the spur at the spur. This aporia strikes sotto voce not by remembering the fetters of its intractability but by practising its transfer to modulations that are – for their
parts – in turn never the arché of expression and therefore never the topography of sounding. Thus, the subliminal line of the very trans that wants to express something before we are even aware is the messy situation that keeps us stumbling. But however, the sotto voce act is neither a situation nor a performance, it is rather a position that keeps its instability since it is at the mercy of disarming its position that actually has no positioning; this is why Wolfgang Rihm’s Dis-kontur (1974) is a great piece of music but it will never be a composition.

Hence, the emblematic position of the Unerhörte is the position where the vocal-expression is not the utterance of the written score and therefore never the practice of a response; the echoing effect of the mirror misses and therefore the rhetoric of anamnesis is fighting a loosing battle. The transfer of sotto voce dooms anamnesis since its possibility does not serve as cliché, as footnote nor as catalyst. It is the harsh discontinuity of its expression that bears with the scenery that has no voice, no vocalist, no composer and no audience. Sotto voce is nebulous present in where the scotoma of sotto voce is the sound of tasty seeing. It is this distorted co-presence of act and life that bears an instable position on stage although without having a position on stage. The juxtaposition of sotto and voce is therefore the unresolved phonographein that does not write the phoné of presentability but creates a phenomenological anticipation of the informed graphein where the instability of the positioning and the non-positioning are simultaneously bearing with... . The anticipation of … has – in a structural sense – no tectonic practice and consequently turns any mirroring effects into epiphenomena of the Unerhörte. The redemption of the Unerhörte as the other zone streaks next to Blumenberg’s Fliegenglas in which he – in reference to Wittgenstein – revises the trap of Plato’s cave allegory as the incorporation of the impossible in reality (Blumenberg 2001: 436). Hence, the trap of the phenomenon forces us to see that the impossibility of the Unerhörte is not the incorporation of the impossible but rather the impossible is the informed reality of the phenomenon sotto voce. This radical position always follows the other zone and it is this very other informed reality, where we are constantly struggling with the Unerhörte of the impossible other reality, and therefore we have to declare that anamnesis is definitely just another invective. The discontinuity of the invective is the appellation of the impossible reality. The movement of the Unerhörte is therefore No; it is a no that will not follow the composition, it is a no that does not reconcile the audience with the vocalist and it is a no that expresses the urgency of the score. This no
is about a translation that cannot follow form and content, it is about this informed translation that says no to the composition and no to the performance on the stage. Though, the *Unerhörte* translates the ticking of the watch on the performing stage. *Et voilà*, the phenomenon *sotto voce* is the immanent compositional pleasure of *cum* and *syn* that writes an incommensurability where the disturbance, the stage, the clothing of the audience, the make-up of the vocalist and the brick stones of the auditorium writes the act of *sotto voce*.

Hence, this diffracted *modus vivendi* is a plea for lively approaches wherein flexible modes of seeing, hearing, smelling and tasting are at the core and offer an arsenal of criticism against the substantial material of a composition: by the very act of seeing the sound cannot be understood – but it can be tasted! The imposition of the composition becomes therefore silent, since it is that which is still pending – and issue of formality; the engaged performance of the silenced voice is more readily a play of contradictions than a preservation of identities. Just as *anamnesis* is driven by a mimetic desire, which can never be satisfied, the transfer of *sotto voce* is a struggle, not with the concept of identities but with the deferring differences in writing a mobile vacuum of life-world. Writing an analysis on *sotto voce* and attempting almost to enact its *taxis* gives us a hint about the figuration of how translation interferes with the *Unerhörte*. A phenomenology of *sotto voce* shows us that the phenomenon can no longer be captured with denomination formulas, the *sotto voce* drama is an empty shell: a phenomenon without content.
ABBREVIATIONS

Benjamin: Benjamin: *Gesammelte Schriften.*

Benjamin Briefe: Benjamin: *Walter Benjamin Briefe Vol. I-II.*


DES: Descartes: *Oeuvres de Descartes.*

FICH: Fichte: *Gesamtausgabe.*

Freud: Freud: *Studienausgabe.*

HUA: Husserl: *Husserliana.*

KrV: Kant: *Kritik der reinen Vernunft.*

KV: Merleau-Ponty: *Keime der Verunft.*

KUK: Kant: *Kritik der Urteilskraft.*

Marges: Derrida: *Marges.*

MC: Foucault: *Les mots et les choses.*


PhP: Merleau-Ponty: *PhénoménoLOGIE de la Perception.*

PrW: Merleau-Ponty: *Primat der Wahrnehmung.*

Prosa: Merleau-Ponty: *La prose du monde.*


SC: Merleau-Ponty: *La Structure du Comportement.*

Signes: Merleau-Ponty: *Signes.*

SNS: Merleau Ponty: *Sens et non-sens.*

Summa: Aquinas: *Summa Theologiae.*

SZ: Heidegger: *Sein und Zeit.*

VNV: Merleau-Ponty: *Le visible et l’invisible.*

VL: Merleau-Ponty: *Vorlesungen I.*
VP: Derrida: *La Voix et le phénomène.*

Wörterbuch: Kiesow / Schmdigen: *Kritisches Wörterbuch.*
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