URBAN RENEWAL PROJECTS AND DYNAMICS OF CONTENTION IN ISTANBUL: THE CASES OF FENER-BALAT-AYVANSARAY AND SULEYMANIYE

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A Thesis Submitted in Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of a Doctor of Philosophy

Cardiff University
Cardiff School of Planning and Geography

September 2014
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This work has not been submitted in substance for any other degree or award at this or any other university or place of learning, nor is being submitted concurrently in candidature for any degree or other award.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This was a very long journey, a very intense learning process that could never have happened without the love, support and patience of many, many people.

I was a lucky student to be supervised by great academics throughout this thesis. First of all, I would like to give my sincere thanks to my supervisors Dr. Huw Thomas and Dr. Francesca Sartorio for their constant encouragement and advice to me. They helped me to find my way when I was lost in the process. I am deeply grateful to Prof. John Lovering, not only for all his encouragement, advice and belief in me since the very beginning of the project but also for our long discussions and his never-ending curiosity, which made me question everything I knew, saw and read. The process would never have begun without him. I am also grateful to Dr. Richard Gale, who contributed immensely to the formation of the focus and setting of this thesis. Without his great research insight, I could not have gone this far.

There are two other people who know the thesis as much as I do. Without their invaluable helps, efforts and comments, this thesis could not have been written; very special thanks to dear friends James Wakefield and Bahar Sakizlioglu. And I would also like to express my deepest thanks to Lila Haines, who has been a great friend, supporting me with her invaluable help in the writing up process.

I would like to thank Dr. Surhan Cam for his support and contributions throughout the thesis. And I would like to thank all the staff of CPLAN who have been very supportive throughout; but my special thanks go to the CPLAN research office manager Sian Moseley, who is always very helpful and welcomes you with a big smile. I must also mention the role of Cardiff University and CPLAN for their three-year research scholarship, which enabled me to carry out this research.

I am grateful to all of my contacts in the neighbourhoods who provided insights into their life and fight. My special thanks go to all my comrades in IMECE – People’s
Urbanism Movement, who taught me the meaning and importance of collective work and struggle. Without them, I would not have developed myself in this way.

I shared a lot with my housemates and friends in Cardiff. Many thanks to the crew of 103 Tewksbury Sabina, Kevin, Clio, Mariyani, James R. and James W. to their great friendship, and many thanks to the crew of 15 Rawden, my sisters Ioanna, T'abéa and Silvia - ‘Hi five’, girls! And thanks a lot to Agata Krause for her friendship in our Cardiff days, and Selyf Morgan for his kind friendship.

Some of my deepest thanks go to my dear friends Hatice, Gokhan, Ozlem, Ipek, Secil, Ayse, Necla, Ramazan, Ezgi, Ugor, Merve, Mehmet, Mert, Onur Kurt for standing by me, believing in me and never leaving me alone. And special thanks to the Ankara crew, Secil, Ozgur, Nihan, Mustafa and Utku for their loving friendship. I would like to mention my deepest thanks again to my ‘canim’ Richard Gale for standing by me, believing in me and supporting me endlessly.

I would like to give some of my deepest thanks to my uncle Fikret Uzman for all his support and encouragement in every stage of my life. And my utmost gratitude goes to my family, my parents Haluk and Demet Turkmen and my beloved sisters Gokce, Asli, Zeynep for all their support, love and patience throughout my life.

When I was writing up this thesis, in June 2013, the big Gezi Parki Uprising started in Istanbul to protect one of the last remaining green spaces from the government’s urban development plans, which then spread out across the country. It was very hard to watch the brutal attacks of the police forces on the protestors, some of whom are my most beloved friends. This thesis is dedicated to all those who were injured and lost their lives - Mehmet, Abdullah, Medeni, Ethem, Ali, Ahmet, Ferit and Berkin – during the June Uprising...
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SUMMARY

The main aim of this thesis is to examine urban movements in Istanbul, Turkey. More specifically, the research has two principal objectives: first, to expand the existing conceptual framework of urban movement studies by critically examining the present literature on urban movements and considering people’s experiences in the cities of global South; and second, to make an empirical contribution to the literature on urban movements in general and the developing literature on urban movements in Turkey, in particular by analysing political mobilisation surrounding contested urban regeneration projects in Istanbul, Turkey. The thesis argues that the research framework of current urban movements’ literature is too static and limited to be able to develop a dynamic, relational and comparative approach to the analysis of mobilisation in urban space in different geographies. The case materials presented demonstrate that the political and social relations established between actors of urban politics are enmeshed in a dynamic political process, and that the motivations that inform the development of urban movements can change over time. In addition, the issues causing conflicts and political mobilisation are perceived and experienced differently under different conditions, which results in a diversification of the ways in which mobilisation is pursued. As such, a-priori assumptions about the emergence and goals of political mobilisation in urban space – for example, assumptions that urban movements necessarily are progressive and a part of a wider political agenda – is shown to be inadequate for examining the dynamics of mobilisation in different settings. In developing these theoretical arguments, the research constructs a dynamic relational framework to the analysis of political mobilisation in urban space, contributing in turn to the existing conceptual framework of urban movement and political mobilisation studies.

Empirically, these issues were explored through case studies of two urban renewal areas in the historical neighbourhoods of Istanbul, Turkey, using a qualitative Critical Realist methodology. Like many other megacities, Istanbul has experienced an immense process of socio-economic and spatial restructuring in which the state
has played a fundamental role. Moreover, in these new urbanisation dynamics, urban renewal projects have become conspicuously contested, leading to mobilisation at a variety of spatial and governmental scales. This thesis focuses on the different responses of local people in two urban renewal areas in order to examine the factors that enable and inhibit mobilisation. Specifically, the research is framed around two contrasting cases: the Fener-Balat-Ayvansaray renewal area, which is taken as a case of political action, and the Suleymaniye renewal area, which is taken as the case of inaction. The research findings show that the intervention of the state is not the only factor causing mobilisation in the localities. Other factors include: the condition of the built environment and the formation of spatial relations in the localities; the condition of the property market and how property owners value their assets in terms of its exchange and use values; the political relations between the state and the residents; social relations within the localities; and the implementation process of the urban renewal projects. These factors are derived from the empirical findings of the research and combined into a dynamic conceptual framework that contributes to reconfiguring existing analyses of urban movements. As such, by its critical relationship to existing urban social movement theory and through its novel methodology, the thesis aims to make significant contributions both to the conceptualisation and empirical analysis of contentious politics in urban space.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGFE</td>
<td>Advisory Group on Forced Evictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKP</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBP</td>
<td>Great Unity Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDP</td>
<td>Peace and Democracy Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHP</td>
<td>Republican People’s Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoA</td>
<td>Chamber of Architects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoCP</td>
<td>Chamber of City Planners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWUMG</td>
<td>City Wide Urban Movement Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBA</td>
<td>Fener-Balat-Ayvansaray</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMT</td>
<td>Grounded Theory Methods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIC</td>
<td>Habitat International Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMDP</td>
<td>Istanbul Neighbourhood Associations Platform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMM</td>
<td>Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KUDEB</td>
<td>Directorate of the Inspection of Conservation Implementations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHP</td>
<td>Nationalist Movement Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFBDP</td>
<td>Rehabilitation of Fener-Balat Districts Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Neighbourhood Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RttC</td>
<td>Right to the City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saadet</td>
<td>Felicity Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPA</td>
<td>Special Provincial Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMMOB</td>
<td>Union of Chambers of Turkish Architects and Engineers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOKI</td>
<td>The Housing Development Administration of Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UM</td>
<td>Urban Movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USM</td>
<td>Urban Social Movements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>URP</td>
<td>Urban Regeneration/Renewal Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHL</td>
<td>World Heritage List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHS</td>
<td>World Heritage Site</td>
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<tr>
<td>WSF</td>
<td>World Social Forum</td>
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

1.1. The Motivation for the Study

The recent uprisings and urban unrest in cities all over the world have turned academic and political attention to conflicts in urban politics and urban movements (Marcuse 2009; Mayer 2009; Harvey 2012; Uitermark et al. 2012 among many). From Cairo to London, Delhi to Istanbul, Shanghai to New York, various movements, all opposed to the consequences of contemporary urbanisation, force themselves onto the political agenda. The extending geography of uprisings in cities opens up crucial questions for researchers of urban studies: How to study urban unrest and rising urban movements in different places? What are the similarities in these movements? What are the differences in the mobilisation and political process of these movements? Is it possible to develop a conceptual framework for different contexts? This research focuses on these questions and investigates them by looking at the dynamics of contention and mobilisation in urban space in Istanbul, a city which shares some of the experience of contemporary urbanisation with other megacities all around the world, but which also has unique factors shaping its own political process.

In many cities, movements opposed to the consequences of contemporary urbanisation occupy public spaces and voice their demands. With the rising unrest in cities in the last decade, terms such as ‘urban movements’ and ‘right to the city’, which came to prominence in another contentious period, the 1970s, have moved back to the forefront of contemporary urban studies.

One of the raising issues concerning the urban politics of various metropolises is how the conflicts emerging as a result of current urbanisation process manifest itself in different places under different political relations. Given the state’s central
role in implementing ‘neoliberal urbanisation’,¹ the power of the state and the ways in which power relations are established in different places and contexts are in central position in determining how this process plays out. Regarding the role of the state in the emergence of the current conflicts in urban space, it could be argued that although the tendencies in urban development in different countries are akin, the differences in the ways the projects are implemented reflect contrasting political cases due to the varied role and power of states in political conflicts in different countries. The different political dynamics emerging during the development and implementation of urban projects can be observed clearly in the countries of the global North and global South. The power relations between the urban political actors and the ‘strong and illiberal (authoritarian) states’ of the global South (Bayat 2012) would be different from those in the market societies of the advanced capitalist countries. In the analysis of neoliberal urbanisation and emerging conflicts around this process, then, the question “how do projects that have neoliberalising effects come to be established through the relationships between various actors at work in the urban arena?” (Lovering 2007: 359) must be added to the agenda of research addressing the actors in contentious politics, including urban movements and their relations with the other actors within urban politics.

In framing the process and dynamics of urban movements and struggles, I shall use the concept ‘contentious politics’ borrowed from Doug McAdam, Sydney Tarrow and Charles Tilly (2001) to refer a relational, episodic and interactive political process:

The contentious politics that concerns us is episodic rather than continuous, occurs in public, involves interaction between makers of claims and others, is recognised by those others as bearing on their interests, and brings in government as mediator, target or claimant. (McAdam et al. 2001: 5, emphasis is original)

¹ In the contemporary urbanisation process, which is defined in many studies as ‘neoliberal urbanisation’ (Peck and Tickle 2002; Brenner and Theodore 2002a; Munck 2005; Hackworth 2007; Lovering 2007), the state plays a central role in regulating the market and forming the dynamics of a new land and property regime, which is in fact contradictory to neoliberal ideology since the main argument of neoliberal ideology is the total freedom of market relations unaffected by the power of the state.
The aim to use this concept in this research is to emphasise the role of “at least one government” (ibid.) as a claimant, an object of the claims which are collectively and interactively raised by the public; and to stress the changing dynamics of the relations between the actors of contentious politics in the process of political mobilisation in urban space.

In the last decade, the biggest city in Turkey, Istanbul, has experienced immense socio-economic and spatial restructuring, which has brought many contested issues onto the urbanisation agenda. Istanbul is an exemplar of contemporary urbanisation trends in many cities located both in the global North and global South. As in many other cities all around the world, the urbanisation agenda and the spatial intervention of the government to transform the existing urban fabric have given rise to opposition movements of various kinds on different scales. This thesis sheds light on the dynamics of contentious urban politics and the factors that affect the dynamics of mobilisation in urban regeneration areas in Istanbul. The aim of the thesis is to frame and contribute to the studies of the dynamics of contention in contemporary cities by looking at the case of Istanbul.

Urbanisation in Istanbul on the one hand reflects the general trends and processes that have taken place in metropolises across the world. Istanbul is being consolidated in the global market with newly developed high-rise office buildings, luxury residences, gigantic shopping malls, mega urban projects designed by star architects, numerous touristic entertainment facilities and mega events, which are similar to urban development projects elsewhere (Bartu-Candan and Kolluoglu 2008; Lovering and Evren 2011; Unsal and Turkun 2014). Further reflecting many other countries’ experiences, the state in Turkey has played a central role in engineering the market and the form of these urban projects. The role of the state in the formation of the land and property market, its absolute authority in designating and implementing URPs, its power to determine terms and conditions of the projects without allowing any participation, define the current focus of
urbanisation as state-led urban development. As in the other cities, these projects have led to confrontation between the project holders – i.e. the public authorities and the private firms – and the urbanites who are affected by these projects and excluded from the project development processes.

In state-led urban development projects of various sizes on the urbanisation agenda of Istanbul, the urban regeneration projects (URPs) introduced in the gecekondu settlements, historical inner-city poverty areas and old social housing units are one of the most controversial topics in the current urbanisation scheme. URPs have become one of the primary means by which the public authorities restructure the city, transform the existing social and economic organisation of places and change the demography, and establish the new land and property market by supplying land to new developments in the city, where the land supply is scarce and the property market has not been fully established. URPs can be defined as state-led gentrification agents since the state uses its power for changing the demographic organisation of the designated areas by developing the URPs. For the actors of the market and public authorities, URP means a big transformation in the city’s urban fabric and property market. The former head of the Housing Development Administration of Turkey (TOKI), Erdogan Bayraktar, underlined the importance of the URPs in a speech that he gave at a summit of the Real Estate Investment Companies:

The regeneration process will improve the informally constructed and unplanned areas and also supply new and planned lands for prestigious projects. Consequently, the valuable lands in the city centres will be developed as new special project areas, which will increase the prestige of the city. As well as this, citizens will be provided with healthier housing services in other places which will be provided with proper urban functions. The urban transformation process is intended to create opportunities for new investments, new employment and production facilities, and to raise the quality of life in urban areas. (Bayraktar 2004; emphasis added)

2 Gecekondu, which literally means landed at night, is the name given to the self-help housing units built by the rural migrants on public or private lands in the absence of a housing stock in the big cities of Turkey. Gecekondu first emerged in 1950s but the number has increased massively in late 60s and 70s (Senyapili 2004).
While the projects generate new opportunities for the property market, for a huge part of the population of the city these projects mean violations of property rights, dispossession, forced eviction and displacement since the projects aims to transform the existing demography of the designated places by development projects. In many of the places designated as URP areas, inhabitants began to take action against the projects and established associations to fight back against the plans of the public authorities. Along with the organisations that emerged at the neighbourhood level, urban activists groups, which bring assorted topics to their agenda along with the URPs, have emerged as a non-traditional, novel organisational type in the urban political sphere. Professional organisations, such as the Chamber of Architects (CoA) and the Chamber of City Planners (CoCP), which were already established as important actors in urban politics, have been taking part in the development of the opposition on various levels. Together these groups contribute to the growing urban opposition movement opposed to the recent government-led urban development scheme in Istanbul.

To date, despite the growth of literature on mobilisation, urban movements and urban politics, there have been very few studies analysing the case of Istanbul. This research aims to contribute to the literature of urban movements by investigating the dynamics of contention and mobilisation in the URPs in Istanbul, which have yet to be investigated. The main objective of this research is to expand the conceptual framework of urban movements’ studies, which is mostly derived from the experiences in advanced capitalist cities, by analysing the people’s experiences of urban development and contentious urban politics in cities of the global South.

1.2. Research Rationale, Framework and Objectives

There are very few studies directly focusing on urban movements (UMs), and particularly those connected to recent urban unrest, in Turkey (Aslan 2004; Deniz 2010; Lovering and Turkmen 2011; Unsal 2013; Eraydin and Tasan-Kok 2014). The political mobilisation of people around urban issues has been included mostly in
studies focusing on contested issues, such as gecekondu or urban development agenda of the government, particularly URPs in residential areas (Cavusoglu and Yalcintan 2009; Kuyucu 2009; Baysal 2010; Kuyucu and Unsal 2010; Aslan and Sen 2011; Lovering and Turkmen 2011; Karaman 2013; Sen and Turkmen 2014). However, these studies focus on the responses of the groups and individuals at a particular time and under certain conditions, but give limited accounts of the dynamics of mobilisation and the framing of mobilisation processes.

The current promotion of urbanisation schemes, particularly URPs, is widely criticised in urban studies in Turkey (Kurtulus and Turkun 2005; Bartu-Candan and Kolluoglu 2008; Kuyucu 2009; Gough and Gundogdu 2010; Lovering and Turkmen 2011; Turkun 2011, 2014; Celik 2013; Karaman 2013, 2014; Perouse 2013; Sakizlioglu 2014a are some examples among many). In these critical studies, the process and possible consequences of URP projects are discussed, alongside the responses of the actors, on the basis of emerging struggles of the current; however, the political mobilisations which emerged in the urban space around contested urban projects have not been subjected to a deep analysis yet. In the most recent studies of urban struggle the dynamic nature of mobilisation, political processes and different episodes of contention (McAdam et al. 2001) are only briefly discussed, leaving a gap in the analysis of the characteristics of the mobilisation and evolution of the political process in urban space.

At present, some of the urban movements focusing on various issues are coming and acting together in Istanbul. Yet it is hard to talk about a single, and clearly defined struggle. In different localities, there are differences in the organisational structures, framing the problems, the demands that are advanced in the mobilisation process (in Chris Pickvance’s (1985: 31) saying the militancy of movements), and in the repertoire of actions (Tilly 1999). Furthermore, it is difficult to characterise the URPs as a priori ‘threats’ that the residents of the affected areas resist in the same way in each case. There are some areas where, in Chris Pickvance’s (1985) phrase, the ‘militancy of struggle’ against the URP is strong and
comprehensive and those involved in it are able to ‘expand opportunities for others’ (Tarrow 1994). However, there are some places in which the URP has not been resisted, or, as Tarrow puts it (1994: 19), the contentious issue is not enough to break the ‘habitual passivity’ of the residents. Hence, the huge variations in the responses of people and the resultant dynamics of struggle need further investigation in order to understand the dynamics of political mobilisation processes and contentious urban politics.

Concerning this gap, this research focuses on factors affecting the formation of the collective action and mobilisation processes in urban space. To this extent, the main literature that the research is based on is the literature on political mobilisation and political processes which emerge in urban space. In the analysis of political mobilisation around urban issues, urban movements’ literature and calls for a ‘right to the city’ are visited; however, this research argues that the established approach of the urban movements literature has difficulties for forming an analytical and dynamic research framework to be used in different contexts, times and geographies. This research aims to extend the conceptual framework of urban movements’ studies by suggesting a relational and dynamic approach for the analysis of mobilisation with reference to social movement studies and political relations in the cities of the global South.

Accordingly, the research has two main directions: first, to contribute to the literature of urban movements by suggesting some analytical tools to expand the conceptual framework of urban movement studies; and, second, to analyse the mobilisation and political processes around contested urban development projects in Turkey. In favour of these directions, the research is based on the conceptual framework of urban/social movements’ analyses. Regarding the contentious issues and actors involving in contentious politics, one could argue that other research frameworks examining the actors (such as the state or market agents) and issues of contentious urban politics (such as power relations between the actors of urban politics, means used in the state’s intervention in space, formation of the market
dynamics etc.), could also provide a conceptual framework in the present research alongside the urban movements and political mobilisation literature. However, a deeper analysis of the characteristics and the role of each political actor are not included to the present research framework; instead, actors of the conflicting cases are addressed in relation to each other; in other words, a relational, actor-based approach (McAdam et al. 2001) would be framed accordingly the aim of the research. Then, the research will use the conceptual framework of the urban/social movements’ analyses but will refer to other literatures focusing on the role of the actors in contentious politics and conflicting topics to develop a contextual background for the analysis of relations between the actors of contentious urban politics.

1.2.1. Research questions
In the formation of the research focus of this thesis, the beginning of the conceptualisation of the research framework was the ‘recent urban opposition in Istanbul’. As the research progressed, further attention was given to topics concerning, first, the literature on UMs, which is mostly grounded in urban conflicts and political relations in developed countries; second, the diverse responses of people to the state’s intervention in space; and third, the dynamic relations that emerged between the state and people living in the URP areas during the period of contention. These attentions raised more questions about the research agenda of contentious urban politics.

Observing the different responses and dynamic characteristics of the struggle as a researcher and an activist in UM groups in Istanbul, in this research, my main intention evolved into a search for a dynamic and analytical framework to investigate different responses derived from various factors that affect the mobilisation processes by looking at the literature and the case of Istanbul. Accordingly, the research is based on five research questions:
1. How might people’s experiences of urban development and contentious urban politics in the cities of the global South contribute to a reconceptualisation of urban movements and an expansion of the conceptual framework for the analysis of different cases?

2. Why have different (re)actions emerged in response to the state-led urban regeneration projects?

3. What limits and what encourages the development of collective action in contentious urban politics in Istanbul?

4. How do the different actors and their perceptions influence the mobilisation and collective action/inaction during the episodes of contention?

5. What are the main contextual features and dynamics that affect the responses and actions of individuals and groups in the urban renewal projects in Istanbul?

1.2.2. Framing the research questions

The research questions frame a relational approach to investigating the relations between the actors in the contentious urban politics. To do this, the research refers to the social and particularly urban movements’ literature.

The research investigates the collective action and urban movements in Istanbul in order to understand the dynamics of contention in current urbanisation processes in Istanbul and cities passing through a similar process in the global South. The theoretical framework of the research is grounded on urban movement theories and the most widely discussed concepts used in recent studies of contemporary opposition movements in the cities, such as Right to the City (RttC). The term ‘urban movement’ was first introduced by Manuel Castells in the 1970s, when political and social movements occupied the streets of Paris. Castells defined UMs as political movements that demanded better collective consumption services necessary for the reproduction of labour power from the state and the control of urban space. In the circumstances of that period, Castells claimed that UMs are agents of fundamental, in some cases radical, changes in the function and meaning of cities; in other words, UMs are political movements that have the power to change the
‘production relations’ and the ‘relations that emerge in the reproduction of labour power’ (Castells 1977).

Castells’ highly structured theory has been criticised and at the same time developed by subsequent researchers. His seminal conceptualisations of UMs paved the way for further studies and formed the basis of a research agenda. Castells was criticised for not establishing a comparative and relational agenda (Pickvance 1985; Miller 2006), making an a priori conceptualisation of the context from which UMs emerge (Pickvance 1985; Goonewardena 2004), and considering only progressive movements to the exclusion of conservative and ‘Not in My Back Yard’ (NIMBY) movements (Mayer 2000; Goonewardena 2004; Miller 2006). Some of these criticisms were addressed by later researchers (Pickvance 1985; Lowe 1986; Mayer 2000, 2009; Miller 2006; Staelhi 2006) but a conceptual analytical framework that could be applied to different contexts remains to be developed (Uitermark et al. 2012).

With the rise of urban unrest and inequality in the cities, another concept from the 1970s, Right to the City (RttC), which was developed by Henri Lefebvre, has been revisited by urban scholars, activist groups and some international institutions such as United Nations Habitat. There is a clear distinction between the conceptualisation of the RttC by institutions such as UN-Habitat, and critical urban scholars and activists. While the former present the concept as a participation mechanism, the latter present it as both a demand for control of urban development and resources and a call for struggle to contest neoliberal urbanisation (Harvey 2008; Marcuse 2009; Mayer 2009; Kuymulu 2013). Although the notion of RttC is described as a capacious abstract notion through which capaciousness "allows solidarity across political struggles while at the same time focusing attention on the most basic conditions of survivability, the possibility to inhabit, to live" (Mitchell and Heynen 2009: 616), it harbours ambiguities which make it hard to frame in practice (Attoh 2011; Turkmen 2011; Uitermark et al. 2012; Kuymulu 2013; Gough 2014). Furthermore, although the notion of RttC suggests a
framework to be developed in urban struggles, it does not provide an analytical and conceptual framework to analyse the dynamics of mobilisation (Uitermark et al. 2012).

As discussed in detail in Chapter 2, these two seminal theories about collective action in urban space do not provide analytical tools for investigating the dynamics of mobilisation. Furthermore, the conceptual frameworks of these theories are based on the experiences, political relations and processes of developed countries, which does not explain the political relations and processes in the developing countries of the global South. In the cities of the global South, conflicts over housing, property rights, occupation of land for housing and dynamics of the property market form the main issues in urban grievances. Neither collective consumption services nor the notion of RttC in the abstract provides a conceptual framework for the analysis of the dynamics of these contentious issues.

The main argument of the thesis is that the urban contentions and mobilisation around urban issues have dynamic structures which result in different political processes in different localities around similar issues; and these cannot be explained by a pre-determined set of assumptions. In this thesis, it is suggested that the research agenda for analysing collective action in urban space and the dynamics of mobilisation in urban movements should be based on a relational approach which accommodates various conceptual frameworks and expands the analytical framework of research on urban movements. This will enable the integration of different frameworks concerning the contentious topics in different places, expand the research agenda and furnish the literature with new concepts for use in future research.

Following this argument, in this research, a relational, dynamic and actor-based approach, which allows comparison among different cases, is applied to the research topic. In modelling this approach, the social movement studies concerning political processes and contentious politics are referred to (Tarrow 1994; McAdam,
McCarthy et al. 1996; McAdam et al. 2001). With reference to these frameworks the analysis of external and internal factors that affect the dynamics of mobilisation in the URP areas in Istanbul are examined.

In order to situate this framework in relation to the analysis of the dynamics of mobilisation in Istanbul, issues that affect the formation of political relationships in the global South, such as informality (Roy 2005), political clientelism (Auyero 1999a) and illiberal states of the global south and non-movements (Bayat 2012) are addressed, along with the issues that affect mobilisation globally in the current urban context. The contextual factors affecting the political processes are then analysed under the topics of ‘political opportunities’ or ‘external factors’, and ‘internal factors’ that affect the political process in the URPs. It is intended to contribute to the conceptual framework of the research agenda by applying this analysis to the Istanbul case.

1.2.3. Research objectives

This research aims to contribute to the conceptual framework and research agenda of urban movements’ literature by analysing the dynamics of mobilisation, by looking at the external and internal factors that inhibit/limit or enable/encourage the emergence and development of collective action. In order to evaluate these factors, the analysis will cover cases of action and inaction, success and failure in the areas of Istanbul where URPs have been implemented. As mentioned earlier, URPs are criticised and opposed from various perspectives; yet, the responses to these projects by different groups neither conform to a clearly defined pattern nor are the same in different localities. The research aims to explain these differences in order to understand the dynamics of contention.

Looking at ongoing cases to analyse the dynamics of mobilisation in urban space is a challenge for the research project, since the fluidity of that being analysed makes it difficult to reach concrete conclusions about the actions of any given actor participating in the contentious politics. This challenge partly determines the scope
of its research objectives. The demands and achievements of collective action cases and the framing in which the movement is situated are determined in the course of the political process. Therefore, this research does not propose to analyse the ‘success’ of collective action; rather, it focuses on the factors that cause the emergence of collective action and affect the progress of political relations formed during the time of contention.

To fulfil this aim in an ongoing process, two contrasting examples of URP areas, both from the historic district of Fatih, have been chosen for close examination: Fener-Balat-Ayvansaray (FBA) as the area of ‘action’, and Suleymaniye as the area of ‘inaction’.

The case study areas are chosen from the same administrative authority, subject to a similar state intervention in space via URPs, spatially proximate to one another.
and having ‘formal’ property titles, unlike gecekondu areas. In FBA, the residents of the area organised themselves soon after they heard about the URP in their neighbourhood. Eventually, they established relations with other actors of the UM and political actors and began to put pressure on the municipality, as the state agency responsible for the area’s designation as a URP site, through a variety of actions. In contrast, in Suleymaniye, which is one of the most important historical sites in Istanbul, listed on UNESCO’s World Heritage List, the URP process has been generated in silence compared to other URP areas. What were the conditions that gave rise to collective action in FBA? What limited the expansion of collective action in the future and by other groups in FBA? Why was the URP carried out without any opposition in Suleymaniye? What factors limited the emergence of collective action in Suleymaniye? By searching for answers to these questions, we will gain new insights into the factors that affect the dynamics of mobilisation in the contentious urban politics of Istanbul, the ways in which contentious politics in URP areas is perceived by local residents, and the processes by which political relations are formed.

Developing a joint analysis of action and inaction in the studies of collective action and expanding the conceptual framework of the UM literature would be the contribution of the thesis to the literature of contentious urban politics. There are studies analysing the inaction of people on contentious topics which are framed in the studies of political clientelism, informality and irregular settlements, encroachment of rights by occupation of public spaces (Bayat 1999; Roy 2005; Davis 2006; Auyero et al. 2009; Karaman 2013). However, a comparative analysis which allows the assessing of the impact of various factors on mobilisation is not a methodology often used in the analysis of mobilisation. Furthermore, there are already a very few studies focusing on urban grievances and mobilisation processes in Turkey, but joint analysis of an action and inaction case has never been done before. Hence, the methodological approach and research design of this thesis also contributes to the studies of contentious urban politics.
1.3. Structure of the Thesis

Responding to the arguments mentioned above, this thesis critically examines the literature on collective action in urban space, particularly UMs and RttC, and argues that a relational and dynamic research agenda is needed to expand the conceptual and analytical framework for analysing the dynamics of contention in different contexts and periods. These arguments are developed by reference to two case studies from Istanbul, which have been chosen to represent the range of external and internal factors that affect the formation of relations in the political processes that play out in these areas during the implementation of the state-led URPs.

In Chapter 2, a theoretical and conceptual background for the research questions is framed from the literature of urban and social movements. Why different responses emerge in the political process and how to establish an analytical and conceptual framework for the analysis of different responses are the main questions that the chapter addresses. The chapter first explains the early theories of UMs based on Castells’ studies and the criticisms raised against this early framing. This section is followed by a section highlighting the main features of the contemporary urbanisation process on the global scale. In this section, the most salient debates concerning the features and frameworks of the contemporary urban opposition movements are explained. In this section, recent discussions on RttC and the critiques of its framework are considered. This is followed by a discussion of the dynamics of urbanisation in the global South and some key concepts that determine political relations in these contexts. Here the authoritative, illiberal and informal characteristics of the state and political clientelism are highlighted in order to underline some crucial differences between the global North and global South. The discussion then turns to the necessity of an analytical and relational framework for studying contentious urban politics, with reference to the comparative analysis framework of Pickvance and the literature on contentious politics.
In Chapter 3, the dynamics of contemporary urbanisation in Turkey and the role of the state in the political process are explained in order to draw up the background of the external factors and political relations in urban politics. In this chapter, the third research question related to the contextual features that affect the emergence and progress of movements is discussed. The chapter aims to explain authoritarian urbanisation in Turkey, stressing the ways in which these affect the emergence, militancy (the types and weight of demands) and incidence (impacts of actions) of collective actions. The chapter also includes a brief summary of the urban movement groups that participate in the movements opposed to URPs, the groups’ features and repertoire of actions.

In Chapter 4, the methodology of the thesis is explained. In this chapter, how to set a relational and dynamic approach in order to analyse the impacts of external and internal factors on the political process of contentious urban politics is discussed with reference to Critical Realist epistemology and methodology. The questions of how the relational and causal approach of critical realism is applied and how the concrete and abstract concepts are established throughout the research are considered in this chapter. This chapter also explains the intensive qualitative case study research method chosen for the project. Following the discussions in the literature, the chapter focuses on the research design and rationale behind the selection of URPs and historical sites to analyse the dynamics of contention and mobilisation in Istanbul. A comparative analysis of gecekondu areas and historical sites and the reason for excluding gecekondu areas from the scope of this research are discussed in this part. A brief account of the process of data collection and their analyses is also included in the chapter.

Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 are the data analysis chapters of the research. In these two chapters, the findings of the field research are drawn upon to identify the factors which enable and limit the development of collective action in the episodes of contention in Istanbul. Different responses of the residents of these two areas to the URPs are explained with reference to field research findings. In Chapter 5, the
place of action, Fener-Balat-Ayvansaray, is analysed. After a brief overview of the setting of the area, the recent spatial interventions that affect the spatial relations in the area are explained. This is followed by a discussion of the key features of the controversial URP of Fatih Municipality, which caused an opposition movement in the area. This leads to an explanation of the establishment of the association as the centre of the opposition and organiser of the collective actions, and their actions. The analysis of the findings of the field research starts in the following section. In this section, first, the external factors that affect the militancy and incidence of the organisation are explained. Second, the internal factors that affect the unity, trust and commitment of the members of the association are examined. Finally, the discussion turns to the network of the association with other UM groups and political groups.

In Chapter 6, the place of inaction, Suleymaniye, is analysed. After setting the background of the area, the projects in Suleymaniye including the previous projects and the present are explained. Then, in the light of the observations in the area and interviews, the external and internal factors that structure the lack of collective action in this URP area are discussed.

Finally, in the concluding chapter, a comparative and relational analysis of the research findings is carried out to answer the main research questions of the thesis. The commonalities and contrasts between the factors that affect the dynamics of mobilisation in both areas are examined. The concluding remarks and comparisons of the comparison case studies’ findings will contribute to the conceptual and analytical framework of urban movement studies by raising the issues affecting the mobilisation processes in the periods of contention. The chapter also discusses the contributions of this research to the literature of urban movements and political process. The chapter concludes with suggestions for further studies that could build upon the results of this project.
CHAPTER 2: URBAN MOVEMENTS AND CONTENTIOUS URBAN POLITICS

2.1. Introduction

“To change life”, “to change society; these phrases mean nothing if there is no production of an appropriate space. (Lefebvre, 2009 [1968]: 186)

The increasing number of urban development projects around the world, together with the resultant cases of resistance, eviction and displacement, has brought ‘urban movements’ (UMs) to the forefront of contemporary urban political debates. While one part of the discussion concerns the nature of these spatial interventions, the other part concerns the ways in which inhabitants and governing bodies have responded to this process and in which the relations between the actors of contentious politics are established. This chapter focuses on the latter and aims to discuss conceptual frameworks in the urban movements and social movements’ literatures and to develop a relational and dynamic analysis approach to investigate the mobilisation taking place in urban space.

In this chapter, it is argued that spatial relations, political mobilisation developing in response to spatial issues and the forms of collective action following the mobilisation are complex social and political processes. Explaining these complex processes demands a relational, dynamic and analytical framework. Along with the discussions of mobilisation, in this chapter, immobilisation and inaction cases are also presented as parts of the political process in the context of contentious politics. It is argued that inaction cases may harbour factors crucial to the political relations from which we can gain a deeper understanding of contentious politics. The factors that encourage and discourage mobilisation and contribute to the formation of political relations can be better understood through the analysis of both mobilised and immobilised groups.
Social movements are actively engaged in constructing the meanings of their struggles and framing them in the ways most conducive to persuading power holders and supporters to help them achieve their goals and aims (McAdam, McCarthy et al. 1996). As they progress, they become engaged in several different frames, which determine their repertoires and both the means to and legitimacy of political action. Frames are presented as motivational elements that constitute the meaning of collective action through diagnostic elements that define the grievance and through prognostic elements that identify the solutions that collective action aims to achieve (Rutland 2013; McAdam, McCarthy et al. 1996).

Following this dynamic approach, in this chapter, I shall first examine the motivational frameworks that are discussed in the urban movements (UMs) literature. To do this, I turn back to early theories of UMs developed by Castells and his collaborators. After a brief discussion of the dynamics of contemporary urbanisation, I examine the idea of the Right to the City (RttC), which has been recently taken up by critical urban scholars, activists groups and international institutions. In the discussion of motivational frameworks, I aim to underline the political relations emerging in urban space, how the contentious topics emerge and how to approach these contentious topics and conflicts. In this part, I challenge some static approaches to the conceptualisation of motivational frameworks and mobilisation in urban space, arguing that a static conceptual framework is likely to fail in the analysis of different political and social contexts. This discussion is exemplified in the following section, which underlines the peculiarities of the urbanisation process and dynamics of mobilisation in the global South. The last part of the chapter presents a comparative and dynamic research agenda and outlines a conceptual framework for analysing contentious urban politics and different mobilisation processes. This shall serve as the analytical conceptual framework for this research.
2.2. The Evolution of the Term ‘Urban Movements’

In the 1970s, an era when the social and political movements occupied the streets, urban politics and conflicting interests in urban space were brought to the agenda of urban studies by scholars who looked closely at the capitalist relations and conflicts that emerged in the urban space. While the French philosopher Henri Lefebvre was in Paris, working on the idea of the Right to the City (RttC), elsewhere in the same city, the Spanish urban researcher Manuel Castells was developing the term ‘Urban Movements’ (UMs) to describe the collective actions that emerge in response to urban issues which might have a transformative influence on capitalist relations (The Urban Question; [1972] 1977). The approaches to and frameworks for the analysis of UMs have been developed massively since the research agenda was first developed by Castells. Here my aim is not to apply these older frameworks to the analysis of the present; however, since the conceptual framework used by Castells was seminal to the understanding of urban conflict, and was deeply influential on later UM research, the development of his approach and the criticisms made of it which improved the conceptualisation of UMs’ and urban conflict are discussed here.

In Castells’ early theories (1976, 1977), UMs were defined as political movements emerging in the ‘spaces of reproduction of labour’. They were framed as the actions of people around urban services, or what Castells calls collective consumption services, which are provided by the state to secure the reproduction of labour power (Castells 1977, 1983). Castells framed the UMs as a part of the political power struggles because they were motivated by the demand for services from the state for the reproduction of labour power. Grounded upon the power relations emerging in the urban space, UMs were seen as potential agents of a profound transformation in the meaning and function of cities; in other words, a transformation of the power relations, the use of space and urban services in the city.
The key terms in Castells’ works are ‘collective consumption’ and ‘reproduction of labour power’. The production process constitutes one side of the whole relationship between capitalism and labour, but, in order to sustain the process, the productive power, i.e. labour, needs to be reproduced. Reproduction of labour power demands the provision of what is needed to meet the vital needs of the labour force, such as sheltering, water services, sanitation, transportation, health services and security, which Castells calls ‘collective consumption services and goods’. According to Castells, collective consumption is demanded from the state by both the working class and the capitalist class, and these services are not completely commoditised, since the capitalist class has no power to sustain them on a large scale. However, these services are not delivered evenly and equally; which services are provided in what quality, on what scale and to whom are the questions subjected to contention in the capitalist cities, and, according to Castells (1977), it is as a result of this contention that UMs emerge. The basic idea in this work is that, since collective consumption is the means of reproducing the labour force, the tension between the labour force and the state for collective consumption goods and services is symptomatic of class struggle.

One can see two different conceptualisations of the mobilisation around collective consumption in the theory of UMs presented in Castells’ early works: ‘urban movements’ and ‘urban social movements’. UMs are defined as the mobilisation of people around collective consumption issues in cities, but these movements only become USMs if they aim at “structural transformation of the urban system or [...] a substantial change in the balance of forces within the political system as a whole” (Castells 1976: 155).

It should be noted here that these definitions were introduced under the political conditions of welfare state regulation in the advanced capitalist countries when the collective consumption services were carried mostly by the state on a non-profit base. In today’s conditions, as discussed in this chapter, the nature of the collective consumption services and the role of the state delivering these services have changed drastically, hence the meaning of these terms became null or transformed.
This highly structured view suggests that strong ties with political organisations such as labour-based organisations and political parties are needed to bring about fundamental transformation. Ties with political organisations are also a way in which UMs are embedded in class struggle (Pickvance 1976; Castells 1977). Castells argues that USMs empower the class struggle and bring it out of the factories and into the politics of everyday life: collective consumption is a cross-cutting issue in capitalist power relations, bringing together the production and reproduction processes (Castells 1977; Gottdiener 2001). According to Castells (1976, 1977), USMs demand fundamental change to the core logic of capitalist cities, which means a change from exchange value to use value of the urban space.

Box 2.1. Defining use value and exchange value

It is worth explaining the meanings of the terms exchange value and use value in order to understand the approach of critical urban studies to conflicts in cities. The use of these two terms is derived from Marxist literature, particularly Marx’s own use of the terms. Marx starts his masterpiece Capital Vol. 1 by defining the two factors of a commodity: use-value and value (substance of value, magnitude of value) (Marx [1867] 1990: 125-6):

The usefulness of a thing makes it a use-value. But this usefulness does not dangle in mid-air. It is conditioned by the physical properties of the commodity, and has no existence apart from the latter. It is therefore the physical body of the commodity (...) Use-values are only realised in use or in consumption. (...) Exchange-value appears first of all as the quantitative relation, the proportion, in which use-values of one kind exchange for use-values of another kind. This relation changes constantly with time and place. Hence exchange-value appears to be something accidental and purely relative, and consequently an intrinsic value, i.e. an exchange-value that is inseparably connected with the commodity, inherent in it, seems a contradiction in terms.

Marx claims that in the capitalist production process, “the exchange relation of commodities is characterised precisely by its abstraction from their use-values” (ibid.: 127). In determining exchange-value, the use-value of one sort of commodity is the same as another’s: “As use-values, commodities differ above all in quality, while as exchange-values they can only differ in quantity, and therefore do not contain an atom of use value” (ibid.: 128). Marx then adds labour power and labour time to the formation of the meaning of use-value. If the exchange-value is independent from the use-value, but the product of labour is inherent in both values, then the magnitude of the value of any commodity is
determined by “the amount of labour socially necessary, or the labour-time socially necessary for its production” (ibid.: 129):

In the 1960s, particularly in the works of Henri Lefebvre and Manuel Castells, the meaning of urban space for different groups and formation of urban social and political relations were interpreted by reference to use and exchange values (Katznelson 1992). Space is conceptualised in Lefebvre’s theories as the presentation of the concrete production process which is produced by social relations (Ronneberger 2008: 136). At the same time these relations are also produced by the spatial formation (Lefebvre [1968] 2009: 186). In this production process, Lefebvre centred the use-value and exchange-value. According to Lefebvre, use value is the city and urban life, and exchange value is spaces bought and sold, the consumption of products, goods, places and signs (Lefebvre 1991: 86):

City and urban reality are related to use value. Exchange value and the generalisation of commodities by industrialisation tend to destroy it by subordinating the city and urban reality which are refuges of use value, the origins of a virtual predominance and revalorisation of use. (ibid: 67-8; emphasis original)

Likewise, as mentioned above, use value and exchange value are determinants in Castells’ theory of urban movements. According to Castells, the provision of the commodities necessary for reproduction of labour power, i.e. collective consumption goods, is a capitalist commodity production process. In this circle, the production side is concerned with exchange value, while consumption side is concerned with use value. The contradictions that emerge from this production and consumption process result in urban movements (Castells 1977). According to Castells, it is the collective consumption goods and their use value that triggers the UMs.

In these theories of use and exchange value in urban space, a sharp distinction between use value and exchange value is observed. In the conceptual framework of this research, use value shall refer to the meaning and use of space and built environment in the everyday life, and exchange value shall refer to the value of the assets in the market for both the users and non-users.

Castells’ later prominent work The City and Grassroots (1983) marks a significant turn from his earlier structuralist approach. In this work, Castells emphasises cross-class alliances, gathered around issues of collective consumption (Ward and
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Collective consumption issues had been presented as the key factor in determining mobilisation in the urban space, but now he stresses various other factors, such as culture and identity, that might affect the urban-oriented movements. USMs are presented as urban agents taking part in the construction of “social change to transform the urban meanings” (Castells 1983: 305).

Castells identifies three major themes that the USMs developed: demands focused on collective consumption; defence of cultural identity associated with and organised around a specific territory; and political mobilisation in relation to the state, particularly to local government (Castells 1983: xviii). Castells underlines the importance of mobilisation around spatial issues and relations in challenging the state and dominant ideology of capitalism, but, in contrast to his previous works, he draws attention to the importance of culture and identity in the mobilisation process.

Castells still frames USMs as political movements, especially at the local level, due to their demands and transforming impacts in the local politics. He also stresses the potential of USMs to fulfil the demand for an alternative culture and politics (1983: 61). Here he separates the USMs from traditional class-based organisations and advocates USMs’ autonomy from labour-based and political organisations. He argues that the aims of parties and trade unions might conflict with the repertoires and aims of USMs. The shift in the interpretation of the political relations between USMs and other groups was seen as a shift towards the new social movement theories, which have been based on cultural and identity politics rather than traditional forms of class-based theory (Pickvance 2006; Miller 2006; Lake 2006).

An important difference between Castells’ earlier and later theories concerns the perspective on USMs’ ‘success’. In the earlier period, the success of USMs was defined as the transformation of the meaning and function of the city, whereas in the later period, ‘success’ is defined as the establishment of a long-term discussion about ‘what the city should be’:
As pioneering works, Castells’ UM studies had a big influence on the conceptual framework of UM studies. Further works have been developed within similar terms of reference, either as critiques of his approach or as contributions to his framework (Pickvance 1985; Lowe 1986; Lake 2006; Mayer 2006; Miller 2006).

There have been several criticisms of Castells’ theories. To begin with, he was criticised for giving non-discrete variables about UMs from various places without establishing a comparative and relational agenda in the analysis (Pickvance 1985; Miller 2006). Miller (2006: 209) points out that his works are enriched with “a series of very good, but nonetheless idiosyncratic, case studies” that do not clearly establish the relational mechanisms. Raising a similar concern about the lack of any comparative agenda in Castells’ approach, Pickvance (1985) also mentions the lack of a relational approach to contextual features that could provide the basis for a comparative analysis of different movements. According to Pickvance (1985), a priori conception of contexts and application of a particular conception to another case of UM would be unable to account for the mobilisation dynamics and impacts of the movements in different contexts, and make a comparative analysis between different cases difficult.

Another fundamental critical point about Castells’ framework is the focus on ‘progressive movements’ at the exclusion of other forms of urban grievances, such as ‘conservative’ (Miller 2006) or NIMBY movements (Mayer 2000; Goonewardena 2004). Miller highlights the significance of these sorts of movements by arguing that urban-oriented conservative movements are “not based on a politics of collective consumption and use value, but on the promotion of private consumption and exchange value” (Miller 2006: 209, emphasis in original) which bring about a

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4 NIMBY stands for “Not in my back yard”.

dramatic political shift in the political framework of UMs. It is suggested that private consumption and exchange value are mobilising factors in the emergence of UMs.

Referring to NIMBY movements, Mayer (2000; 2009) also points out that collective decisions and actions do not necessarily need to be ‘progressive’ as well as ‘homogeneous’. There could be exclusionary movements, such as ones based on ethnic segregation or exclusion of other groups. On that same topic, Goonewardena (2004) emphasises that the demand for collective consumption by a community might result in conservative collective action depending on the features by which the community defines itself. Such communities, writes Goonewardena, might be based on race, ethnicity or simply value of houses.

Another criticism focuses on changing patterns of provision of collective consumption services at different times and places. The factors and forces that affect the features of the delivery of the urban services vary between different contexts. This variance is not much discussed in Castells’ works (Pickvance 1985). Goonewardena (2004: 160) mentions that in the advanced capitalist countries, for example, collective consumption services, which are provided by the state as a means to the reproduction of labour power “are seen [in Castells’ theory] to generate a particular pattern (and a potential politics) of consumption, wherein spatially defined social groups share and jointly consume a given bundle of public goods.” In other words, the features of the services and the conflicts that emerge around them are assumed to occur in similar ways in different places. The differences in demands and the ways in which relations are established between the public and governing bodies are not described in detail. Goonewardena (2004) also notes that Castells’ theory of collective consumption and conflicts in the urban sphere did not include hegemonic power relations and the question of how political relations affect the reproduction of labour power and production of space.

Castells introduced a new agenda to urban studies and brought a novel approach to the mobilisation of people around urban issues. His conceptualisation of collective
consumption for the reproduction of the labour power has acquired a different
dynamic over time, and especially with respect to the changing power relations. It
can be argued that some of his approach is outdated. However, his conception of
urban services as an essential element of the reproduction of labour power, and
therefore a core political conflict around labour-capital relations in the capitalist
cities, is a significant generic explanation for reading the power relations and
contentious urban politics. The gaps in Castells’ studies, such as the lack of a
relational approach or a comparative framework and the exclusion of some other
forms of movements which are ‘non-progressive’, have advanced the research
agenda for the later studies.

Departing from this framework and the criticisms that have arisen in response to it,
in the next part, contemporary urbanisation dynamics and the factors that affect
the emergence, impacts and types of the demands of urban movements are
discussed along with the concept of the RttC.

2.3. Contemporary Urbanisation Dynamics and Urban Movements

Urban unrest is rising globally on different scales in response to various issues, but
mostly as a consequence of the last thirty years of neoliberal politics that have
dominated the political power structure and shaped the cities. From Cairo to Berlin,
Amsterdam to Istanbul, Shanghai to New York, Delhi to London, various
movements, all opposed to the consequences of contemporary urbanisation, hold
the attention in the political agenda. To understand these movements and their
demands, it is necessary to understand the dynamics of the current urbanisation,
which is different from those prevalent when the term ‘urban movement’ was first
introduced in 1970s.

In recent times, the term ‘neoliberalism’ has become increasingly contentious: the
meaning of the term and the practices identified with it are variously understood,
especially when the role of the state in market formation is taken into
consideration.\textsuperscript{5} However, since many researchers in urban studies have taken neoliberalism to be the political economic paradigm of the contemporary urbanisation, I also discuss the conceptualisation of this terminology in order to establish the current political and economic background.

Neoliberalism is often described as the ideology of free markets and private interests, as opposed to the state-regulated market (Peck and Tickle 2002; Brenner and Theodore 2002; Munck 2005; Hackworth 2007; Lovering 2007). In neoliberal ideology, the market symbolises rationality in terms of distribution of resources, whereas state intervention is viewed as an obstacle to the market’s efficiency and liberty.

Brenner and Theodore (2002: 350) define the neoliberal ideology dominating the current dynamics of urbanisation as “the belief that open, competitive, and unregulated markets, liberated from all forms of state interference, represent the optimal mechanism for economic development”. However, the practices of neoliberalism tell a different story than the one its theory assumes. Neoliberal programmes of capitalist restructuring have been introduced within political-institutional contexts, meaning regulatory arrangements, new agents, institutions and political compromises in the state structure (ibid.). The state has played a fundamental role in establishing and introducing relevant institutions and regulations for the establishment of new market mechanisms. In this process, urban land became an important asset for developing new markets and empowering existing ones. (Re)development plans for cities not only created new markets and change the urban fabric, but also they had a big impact in the transformation of social and economic structures and relations in cities. It is not possible to cover all aspects of neoliberal urbanisation here. However, for the purposes of this research,

\textsuperscript{5} One point of disagreement in the definition of neoliberalism is the role of the state in the establishment of the market. Although neoliberal theory suggests that the role of the state in the market should be reduced, it is observed in many places that the state has a crucial role in the establishment and empowerment of market.
it is important to underline the ways in which neoliberal urbanisation has triggered urban conflict and formed political relations.

The spatial organisation and urban reconfiguration of neoliberalism in the metropolises start with the shift from manufacturing to service industries, decentralisation of production and reorganisation of labour relations (Harvey 1989; Sassen 1991; Fainstein and Campbell 1996). This process suggests not only a transformation in the economic structures of the mega cities, but also a new societal order for the actors of the new economy. In the establishment of neoliberal market, the networks, ties and socio-spatial configurations inherited from previous times are dismantled (Kurtulus 2005; Harvey 2008; Brenner 2009; Mayer 2009; Brenner, Marcuse et al. 2009).

Investment in urban land and the formation of a speculative land market have had a tremendous impact on urban economies and the development of new urban projects. The urbanisation scheme has been formed on the basis of deindustrialisation of metropolitan centres, which are intended to serve as the bases of the finance and service sectors. This has given rise to state-led regeneration projects in the old industrial districts and working-class neighbourhoods, as well as gentrification of inner-city neighbourhoods and mega-projects including gigantic shopping malls, high-rise office buildings, gated residential communities and luxury condominiums.

In this urbanisation process, polarisation among various groups and spatial segregation have increased, while low-income urbanities have been faced with forced eviction in many cities because of mega-projects and urban regeneration or gentrification projects (Smith 2002; Lovering 2007; Kuyucu 2009; Hsing 2010; Sakizlioglu 2014a among others). Harvey (2006, 2008) defines this stage of capitalist accumulation as ‘accumulation by dispossession’ which means dispossessing people’s land, wealth and rights to make way for a new phase of capital accumulation:
It [accumulation by dispossession] is the mirror-image of capital absorption through urban redevelopment, and is giving rise to numerous conflicts over the capture of valuable land from low-income populations that may have lived there for many years (Harvey 2008: 34).

While urban land became highly commoditised, the regulation of land market became an important asset of governments in many countries, including Turkey (see Chapter 3). A new ‘urban alliance’ (Keyder 2005; Turkun 2011) emerged between the capital and the state, while the state also became an important actor in the market. From preparing the legislative ground for the new investments to supplying land to the urban development projects by privatisation of state-owned land, and from announcement of urban regeneration and development projects areas to (re)creating new agencies in its own organisational body to regulate the market, the state has evolved into one of the key actors in the market (Hackworth 2007; Keil 2009; Marcuse 2009; Unsal and Turkun 2014). As a consequence, the term ‘state-led gentrification’ was introduced to the literature to define the role of the state in transforming the built environment as well as the social and economic organisation of places (Smith 2002; Uitermark 2007; Watt 2009).

This process, however, manifests itself in contingent processes in different geographies. As Hackworth (2007: 11) argues, “The geography of neoliberalism is much more complicated than the idea of neoliberalism”. These differences are more obvious when we compare the developing countries with the advanced capitalist states. Bayat (2012), for instance, cites the “strong and illiberal states” of the global South and their increasing role in establishing and controlling the market in favour of privileged capital owners and their own power. From a similar perspective, Kuyucu (2009) argues that the establishment of the neoliberal market is best observed in the metropolises of the developing countries because of the irregularly developed land markets, such as in gecekondu areas, where the commoditisation process has not been completed. These areas have become primary targets of the newly emerging land market. In the Global South, the state has often taken on an authoritarian role in order to actualise the spatial

Lovering (2007: 359) argues that cities are formed not by the top-down intervention of structural bodies, but instead by both the conflicts and consensus of various political actors in the urban domain. He suggest that the question for the analysis of neoliberal urbanisation needs to shift from “how does neoliberalism impact on the various actors in the city?” to “how do projects that have neoliberalising effects come to be established through the relationships between various actors at work in the urban arena?”. This question also addresses the recent urban opposition movements and their power, demands and impacts in the search for the construction of contemporary urban politics. In the next section, the dynamics of contemporary urban movements are discussed, with the dynamics of neoliberal urbanisation moved to the background.

2.3.1. Discussions on contemporary urban movements

It is mostly observed that contemporary urban opposition movements have arisen due to ‘rapid urbanisation’ in the neoliberal era, which has resulted in the increasing rent value of the land, brought about through gentrification and flagship urban projects that cause further displacement; uneven urban development; restructuration of the market; and distribution of rent by the state in favour of privileged capital owners (Harvey 2008, 2012; Brenner et al. 2009; Hsing 2010; Bayat 2012; Uitermark et al. 2012;). Along with rising opposition to contentious urban development projects, the focus of urban movement research has been extended recently with the mass global-local uprisings, which occupied central places in the cities to voice demands for democracy and equality: examples include the occupation of Zucotti Park in New York by the Occupy Movement, Tahrir Square in Cairo and Gezi Parki in Istanbul. The roles of the urban space, as well as the political and collective relations of different movements and their alliances, have
been given greater attention in UMs studies (Nicholls 2008; Uitermark et al. 2012; Rutland 2013). Cities are hosts to various social movements which are related to each other, whether or not they are specifically oriented toward urban issues. As Nicholls puts it (2008: 842), “the role of the city for general social movements is in its function as a relational incubator, facilitating complex relational exchange that generate a diversity of useful resources for campaigns operating at a variety of spatial scales”.

With growing demonstrations in public spaces on a variety of topics and alliances of movements intending to ‘reclaim the cities’, the notion of Right to the City (RttC) has been revisited in the political sphere by critical urban scholars, grassroots UM activists and some international institutions. RttC framework is used prominently in the analysis of the destructive impacts of neoliberal urbanisation and the development of an alternative agenda for it (Harvey 2008, 2012; Brenner et al. 2009; Mayer 2009; Kuymulu 2013). It provides a comprehensive political standpoint for solidarity across political struggles while at the same time emphasising the ‘right to inhabit and the making of the city’ (Lefebvre 1996; Mitchell and Heynen 2009). However, the ambiguities in establishing the concept of rights in the practice and limited analytical and conceptual background for the analysis of local struggles and dynamics of movements are also discussed in the literature on RttC (Attoh 2011; Turkmen 2011; Uitermark et al. 2012; Unsal 2013; Kuymulu 2013).

### 2.3.1.1. Conceptualising the struggle for ‘Right to the City’

The notion of RttC was developed by the Marxist urban scholar and philosopher Henri Lefebvre in the late 1960s as a part of his critique of urban life in capitalist cities. Lefebvre focused on cities and urban societies and the ways in which capitalism reproduced itself, not only by organising the production in space but also using and developing the means for the production of space (Lefebvre 2009: 156). The city itself is defined as an oeuvre (a work of art), a work produced through labour and everyday actions of inhabitants who live in it (Lefebvre 1996: 66, 75-76). However, by producing and controlling the space, capitalist relations dominate the
oeuvre and promote the exchange value of the space over the use value, even though the oeuvre is related to the use value of cities.

The main concern motivating Lefebvre’s approach to urban conflict is the role of space in the production and reproduction of capitalism and capitalist relations. As a novel approach in Marxist literature, Lefebvre claimed that capitalism sustains its power because it has discovered the importance of space establishing its power in everyday life (Lefebvre 1996, 2009). The main conflict in capitalist cities, then, is that over the control of space. Space is not only formed as a result of conflicts within the social, political and economic spheres, but it also forms these relations by regulating everyday social relations (Lefebvre 2009: 186). According to Lefebvre, a radical transformation, a revolution, should be concerned with controlling the formation of space and spatial relations.

The idea of the RttC represents an attempt to take control of spatial formations and power relations by asserting a “transformed and renewed right to urban life” (Lefebvre 1996: 158). It is “a cry and a demand” (ibid: 158) for the future city to be which is freed from the strictures of capitalist relations and controlled by the residents. Lefebvre did not formulate RttC as a legal right or an individual entitlement to access urban resources (Harvey 2008; Mayer 2009; Attoh 2011; Kuymulu 2013), but as the right of inhabitants to shape their habitats, the right to the oeuvre, “the ability to participate in the work and the making of the city” and the right to urban life, “the right to be part of the city – to be present, to be” (Mitchell and Heynen 2009: 616, emphasis in original).

Lefebvre does not provide an agenda for actualising this change. However, he addresses the unity of the urbanites, who may have any profession, from the working-class population to the intellectuals and professionals. According to Lefebvre, it is the social relations that would form the new city (Lefebvre 1996: 150). Nevertheless, he stresses the crucial role of the working class in actualising
the change: “only the working class can become the agent, the social carrier or support of this [practico-material] realisation” (Lefebvre 1996: 158).

Overall, Lefebvre presented an abstract notion of rights, a theory, which promoted a transformation in the existing power relations in the cities and a right to urban life. Mitchell and Heynen (2009: 616) identify the value of this abstract term with its “capaciousness”, which allows for “solidarity across political struggle while at the same time focusing attention on the most basic conditions of survivability, the possibility to inhabit, to live”. On the one hand, the capaciousness of the term has provided a fruitful frame for contesting neoliberalism and enhancing the solidarity of various struggles across the globe (Harvey 2008; Mitchell and Heynen 2009; Mayer 2009; Kuymulu 2013). On the other hand, the ambiguity and vagueness in the definitions of rights and struggle around the slogan has itself become a discursive topic in the literature.

It can be argued that two approaches have been developed in the contemporary conceptualisation of the RttC. The first one is the ‘institutional approach’ (Mayer 2009: 369), which was embraced by international NGOs and some advocacy groups supported by UN agencies and programmes, such as UNESCO and UN-Habitat. The second approach, developed on the basis of a more explicitly Lefebvrian notion of RttC, has been taken up by critical urban theorists as well as some grassroots activists of urban justice (Kuymulu 2013). Both approaches are used to frame the demands and challenges in the current urban conflict.

In the First World Social Forum (WSF) held in Porto Alegre in 2001, activists and urban scholars discussed the prospects for using the RttC as a counter-strategy. Although it has been claimed that the UN’s notion of RttC is based on this forum, Kuymulu (2013: 932) notes that in 2002, the UN held the first World Urban Forum in Nairobi, in which the participants included governments and representatives of institutions along with some international NGOs. In the urban forum, the central theme was “how best to tackle the problems of urbanisation so that everyone, rich
and poor alike, can fully address their RttC” (UN-Habitat 2002). In 2005, during the WSF in Porto Alegre, the ‘World Charter on the Right to the City’, which was drafted by international organisations such as Habitat International Coalition (HIC), was released. RttC has been developed as a policy tool for local governance, suggesting certain rights to the policy agenda of local and national governments in order to sustain a participatory democracy and justice in the cities (Brown and Kristiensen 2009).

The institutional approach has been criticised by grassroots activists (Unger 2009) and urban scholars (Mayer 2009; Kuymulu 2013) for diminishing the radicalism of the slogan and suggesting a consensus about policies among the central actors of the urban politics, including the actors of the market. The charter does not refer to the political economy of the current urbanisation or the injustice and inequality that it provokes in the cities (Mayer 2009).

The second framing of RttC was developed with reference to Lefebvre’s notion of it and its radical political meaning (Harvey 2008; Brenner et al. 2009; Mayer 2009; Marcuse 2009; Mitchell and Heynen 2009; Attoh 2011). RttC is presented as a counterargument and political strategy against neoliberal urbanism. As a demand for the future city, RttC represents a politicisation process by which urbanites can transform the existing structure of the city and the power relations in urban space (Harvey 2008; Marcuse 2009). This process has a transformative meaning which is opposed to the capitalist form of urban relations rather than simple participation mechanisms.

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6 World Charter on the Right to the City: [http://www.hic-net.org/document.php?pid=2422](http://www.hic-net.org/document.php?pid=2422) (Last Access: 10.06.2014). RttC is defined in the Charter (Article 1.2) as “the equitable usufruct of cities within the principles of sustainability, democracy, equity, and social justice. It is the collective right of the inhabitants of cities, in particular of the vulnerable and marginalized groups, that confers upon them legitimacy of action and organization, based on their uses and customs, with the objective to achieve full exercise of the right to free self-determination and an adequate standard of living.”

7 In 2004, a draft World Charter for the Human Right to the City was presented under the leadership of the Habitat International Coalition (HIC) at the Social Forum of the Americas in Quito and the second World Urban Forum in Barcelona. For more information, see: [http://www.hic-net.org/](http://www.hic-net.org/). Last Access: 10.06.2014
As mentioned earlier, the ‘capaciousness’ of the concept (Mitchell and Heynen 2009) is seen as both an advantage and a disadvantage for the development of the concept. The openness of the slogan allows it to cover a variety of rights for which people struggle, such as the right to housing, the right to use and occupy public spaces, the right to participation, the right against police brutality, surveillance and state overreach, the right to decent urban services and so on (Dikec 2005; Marcuse 2009; Mitchell and Heynen 2009; Attoh 2011; Kuymulu 2013). Among others, David Harvey (2008) stresses that RttC cannot be constructed on ‘individual rights’, such as property rights, since it is a collective right to the democratic control of the surplus value:

The RttC is far more than the individual liberty to access urban resources: it is a right to change ourselves by changing the city. It is, moreover, a common rather than an individual right since this transformation inevitably depends upon the exercise of a collective power to reshape the process of urbanization. The freedom to make and remake our cities and ourselves is [...] one of the most precious yet most neglected of our human rights (Harvey 2008: 23).

Harvey presents RttC as a counterstrategy to the neoliberal urbanisation controlling the surplus value that emerges from the accumulation process in the cities (Harvey 2008). He stresses that what would be demanded by the opposition groups is “greater democratic control over the production and utilization of the surplus” since the cities are always the sites of the reproduction of the surplus value which provides the capital accumulation and circulation of capital that sustain the capitalist system (ibid.: 37). Greater control of the surplus value would obstruct the strategy of accumulation by dispossession, which would be a challenge to neoliberal urbanisation.

The conceptualisation of rights in the literature involves an ambiguity (Attoh 2011; Uitermark et al. 2012). Although critical urban studies do not theorise RttC as a legislative right to be achieved, the praxis of a struggle for rights faces serious difficulties, since defining rights in the struggle, whether in an abstract or legal sense, is itself a struggle. Jamie Gough (Celik and Gough 2014: 440) notes that,
given the notion of rights as political entitlements, it is hard to determine on what sort of right the struggle is centred. Is it right for housing, for education, for work or for transportation? And, whether it includes any or all of these, by what criteria can we know that different urban groups have been granted these rights? Attoh (2011) analyses the concepts of ‘rights and city’ and concludes that, although Lefebvre’s notion of RttC has a progressive and political meaning, rights are not commensurable, and the strategic fuzziness of the term needs more critical analysis. Likewise, Kuymulu (2013) emphasises that merely highlighting the rights not only confines the discussions to the legal sphere, but also limits the importance of Lefebvre’s analysis of Marxian labour theory of value in urban politics. These discussions of the notion of rights suggest that the radical political backbone of the notion of RttC should be retained in order to avoid the depoliticisation of the concept.

Above all the discussions on conceptualisation of rights, Wastl-Walter and Staeheli (2005, quoted by Attoh 2011) notes that the RttC is a critique of urban policy: “Urban policy and urban design are increasingly implemented in ways that are undemocratic, that exclude the poor and that create cities that ‘prioritize the ‘needs’ of business and the wealthy’ over the vast majority” (ibid.: 674-5). They stress that Lefebvre’s notion of RttC is useful both in reframing urban politics and in developing counteraction.

It can be seen from the literature and practices of urban activists groups that RttC is a developing slogan. Its meaning varies according to the interpretation of the person or group discussing it, and this in turn is informed by the actor’s identification with the slogan and the struggle. On a practical level, it is hard to determine the exact meaning and aim of RttC, and as a consequence it is hard to judge whether the urban insurgencies and emerging groups within cities are mobilised around it (Turkmen 2011; Uitermark et al. 2012). Although some activists
groups – such as New York RttC Alliance,\(^8\) or a Europe-based international alliance of Reclaiming the Spaces\(^9\) – present the slogan as a demand in their struggle arena, many of the social movement groups organised within cities have not yet articulated a demand for ‘RttC’ or ‘urban revolution’. The slogan retains its ambiguous meaning in practice.

RttC is both a political slogan that frames urban politics and a call for the democratisation of the spaces, as well as control of the making of the city (Harvey 2008; Attoh 2011). However, the ambiguities in conceptualising the slogan also limit understanding of non-collective and individual but not collective actions emerging in cities. As Attoh (2011: 678) notes, “group rights are not necessarily commensurable with individual liberty rights, nor in a world of limited resources can all socio-economic rights be addressed equally”. Kuymulu (2013: 927) also points out that grassroots community organisations have often mobilised around axes of social difference, such as race or ethnicity, which lead to what he calls collective individualism:

...this term [...] highlight[s] the tendency of social groups, small or large, to mobilize against a social problem, not because its logic is seen as ‘universally’ unjust, but because it is happening ‘particularly’ to them. In this context, the sort of collectivity produced through collectivist – yet simultaneously particularist – politics on the one hand and liberal individualism on the other seem to be the two sides of the same coin. In other words, political mobilizations around collective rights do not necessarily open a space for radical politics and such mobilizations do not automatically fall outside of the liberal tradition. (ibid.: 927)

In her research on urban resistance in Istanbul, Ozlem Unsal (2013) note that while the issues of property rights – which are a variety of individual rights, but have a

\(^8\) The group defines itself as the alliance of the marginalised against gentrification in New York: “Right to the City (RTTC) emerged in 2007 as a unified response to gentrification and a call to halt the displacement of low-income people, people of colour, marginalized LGBTQ communities, and youths of colour from their historic urban neighbourhoods. We are a national alliance of racial, economic and environmental justice organizations.” For more information see: [http://www.righttothecity.org/index.php/about](http://www.righttothecity.org/index.php/about) (Last access: 10.06.2014)

\(^9\) An international solidarity group established by the activist organisations in Europe. Greece, Turkey, Germany, Hungary, France, Belgium, Spain, UK, Portugal, Poland are the countries that the urban movements originated in this international alliance. For more information see: [http://www.reclaiming-spaces.org/language/en/](http://www.reclaiming-spaces.org/language/en/) (Last access: 10.06.2014)
very contested meaning, especially in cities of global South (Bayat 1997; Roy 2005; Kuyucu 2009; Turkun et al. 2014) – are one of the key mobilising factors that cause collective action in cities like Istanbul, the framework of the RttC, which is based on ‘collective rights’, provides a limited account of the analysis of mobilisation.

RttC is an important political concept to draw a motivational framework for grassroots mobilisation in urban space. However, the concept could not provide an analytical framework, or a method for understanding the impact of different contexts, mobilisation dynamics of UMs and their relations with other movements and political actors (Uitermark et al. 2012). In that respect, it is difficult to evaluate how the slogan is comprehended practically in urban contention.

In framing the urban struggles, it is crucial to analyse the contextual background and to consider political and economic structures of different geographies in order to understand the reasons for and priorities of urban insurgencies. Following this argument, in the next section, some contextual features raised in the literature about the dynamics of urbanisation in global South are discussed.

2.3.1.2. A conceptual framework for analysing the dynamics of contention in urban space in the political context of the global South

Conflicts over housing, property rights, occupation of land for housing and squatter areas, and dynamics of land market constitute the backbone of urban contention in many countries of the global South (Walton 1998; Goonewardena 2004; Bayat and Biekart 2009). This is not to say that the only movements to have emerged in these countries are in the squatter/slum areas; there are many other grievances, such as protests against mega events or projects, such as those witnessed in the summer of 2014 before and during the World Cup in Brazil, or the urban uprising triggered by the plans to destroy the Gezi Park in Istanbul in order to build a shopping mall. However, it can be argued that the ‘informality’ of politics in the urban areas,
‘irregular settlements’ (Bugra 1998: 304)\textsuperscript{10} and especially urban poverty enclaves constitute a key part of the historical background of contentious urban politics in many cities, including Istanbul. To understand the political dynamics of these areas, it is important first to make sense of the political context.

It can be argued that there is a constant tension in the relations of the dwellers of irregular settlements and either local or central government. The strength of tension in the conflict depends on the political relations and how the dynamics of the land and property markets affect these relations. Currently, as a part of the strategy of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey 2006, 2008), in many cities, irregular settlements and rural areas are becoming the primary targets of the newly emerging land markets (Nijman 2008; Bhan 2009; Kuyucu 2009; Hsing 2010; Lovering and Turkmen 2011). It is reported that in many cities, inhabitants of squatter settlements and inner-city slum areas and villagers face eviction, dislocation and dispossession due to the various kinds of urban development projects (AGFE 2009; Cabanne et al. 2010; COHRE 2010; Hsing 2010). The tension between the dwellers and developers (actors of the market or the state) is increasing. To illustrate, Hsing (2010: 17) notes that in China, between 1990 and 2002, an estimated 50–66 million peasants lost their farmlands to government land grabs and urban development projects. By 2005, the Chinese government had recorded 87,000 protests related to land grabs.

Understanding the formation of market and political relations with and within the state structure is important for analysing the processes of contentious politics (Tilly

\textsuperscript{10} In her article “The Immoral Economy of Housing in Turkey” (1998) in which Ayse Bugra discusses the moral dimensions of housing in Turkey, particularly between the form of the state intervention and the character of informal activities, she refers the gecekondu, the squatter settlements as “irregular settlements” to emphasise the recognition of the informally built houses as a generic provision of shelter for low-income families in the industrial cities of developing countries. This recognition resulted in contribution of the state to the solution of the problem through formal, institutional mechanisms, which on the one hand legitimised the informal housing and on the other hand regularised them, ended up with the growth of settlements and emergence of a housing market and stock irregularly developed. Therefore, although they develop within the informal political and market relations, these settlements are not informal, but irregularly developed, recognised settlements.
In understanding the above-mentioned urban conflicts in the global South, the conceptual and analytical frameworks developed on the basis of advanced capitalist, liberal democracies are of limited use. Scholars emphasise that the social, economic and political dynamics of the developing countries are distinctive and suited to theoretical frameworks different to those used to analyse the dynamics of liberal economies and democratic states. Anne Haila (2007), for example, contends that the arguments based on the liberal land markets of advanced capitalist societies miss the point of analysing the dynamics of land development and the role of the state in the countries like China. She criticises the existing research on land markets and urbanisation dynamics in countries like China, arguing that researchers focus on a ‘rising land market’ without defining the meaning of ‘the market’ in these countries. She adds that, while some scholars agree on the need for improved property rights, they do not consider the ideology behind property rights or the social and likely political consequences of actions taken in order to attain them. Another scholar, Asef Bayat (2012), frames the political structure in Middle Eastern countries as neoliberal, but also emphasises the ways in which ‘illiberal’ (authoritarian) states in these countries implement neoliberalism by oppressive means. In another context, Ananya Roy (2009) discusses the impossibility of planning in Indian cities and the ‘informality’ of state policy in the countries of the global South more broadly. These examples illustrate why neither a framing of collective consumption grounded on Castells’ theories nor a distinctive framing of struggle on the basis of a notion of rights developed in advanced capitalist societies can provide a comprehensive conceptualisation for the analysis of the dynamics of contention in the cities of global South.

The various levels at which state agencies are involved in spatial politics are some of the key reference points in the research of contentious urban politics. The role of the state can be framed from two sides: first, its role and power in the establishment of market and relations with the actors of the market; second, the ways in which it responds to opposition and the means it uses to control and establish consent.
The evolution of the market and the involvement of the state power in this process marks one of the basic differences between the illiberal\textsuperscript{11} states of global South and advanced capitalist states of global North (Bugra 1998; Walton 1998; Roy 2005; Haila 2007; Bayat 2012). As is shown in Chapter 3 in the case of Turkey, authoritarian and violent responses by governments in favour of emerging land markets are hallmarks of the current urbanisation process (Nijman 2008; Bhan 2009; Hsing 2010; Lovering and Turkmen 2011). The formation of the market and the relations within it is especially important in the conflicts emerging around property issues, such as violations of property rights, land occupations and urban regeneration projects (Kuyucu and Unsal 2010; Karaman 2013). The ways in which the political and social perceptions on property ownership are constructed become important matters in the politicisation of the conflicting issue. Overall, framing the development of market relations in the urban land market, especially with respect to the ways it is controlled and regulated in different political contexts, is a key element of any theoretically sound understanding of the dynamics of political and economic relations in a given context.

As a contextual feature determining the interactions between the economic structure, state policy and civil society, informality emerges as one of the key terms in the debates over urban conflict in the global South. Some scholars (Chatterjee 2004; Bayat 1997, 2012; Davis 2006) conceptualise informality in the context of urban poverty and marginalised population. Others (Roy and AlSayyad 2004; Roy 2005, 2011) portray informality as “a system of norms that governs the process of urban transformation itself” (Roy 2005: 148), which is not a sector distinct from the formal sector, but “a series of transactions that connect different economies and markets”.

\textsuperscript{11} Here, the concept ‘illiberal’, borrowed from Asef Bayat, is used to define limitations on freedom of expression, behaviours in societies and control on market tools and mechanisms. The use of the concept does not suggest that the private market is absent in the global South, but rather, it suggests that the state intervenes to a greater extent in market dynamics and controls the actors of the market compare to the states of the advanced capitalist economies. However, it should be noted that the intervention of the state in the market is not only observed in the countries of global South; but also it is taken place in the so-called ‘free-markets’ of the global North. Here, by using Asef Bayat’s concept ‘illiberal’, drawn from his analyses of the context of global South, my intention is to highlight the greater role of the state in the formation and regulation of market mechanisms and control of market forces and society in the global South, as compared to the global North.
spaces to one another” (ibid.). While the former view sees informality as a way for urban subalterns to survive in cities (Bayat 1997, 2012; Davis 2006), the latter includes the state as an actor in the process of (re)producing informality (Roy 2009, 2011). Informality, which characterises the political relations between the actors of contentious urban politics in cities of the global South, is not reflected in the centre of a contextual framework of the cities of the global North. According to Roy (2009: 85), informality is an “idiom of planning” and the informal cities are “where access to resources is acquired through various associational forms but where these associations also require obedience, tribute and contribution, and can thus be a ‘claustrophobic game’”. The rules of this game are the determinants of contentious urban politics in the South.

Along with centrality of informality, there are other important factors that affect the dynamics of contention that states use to establish their public relations, among which two have a crucial impact on mobilisation: the use of violent means by the state on the one side, and political clientelism on the other. These are closely connected to various other concepts, such as ‘informality’ for clientelism (Roy 2005; Keyder 2005; Bayat 2012), or authoritarian governments for violent state actions (Lovering and Turkmen 2011; Bayat 2012). Here I would like to stress the importance of these two frontiers of political relations in the emergence of collective action and dynamics of mobilisation.

Recently it has been observed that states, especially in the global South, have been restructured and empowered in order to enable the ruling groups to intervene in spatial development and control the urban land market (Haila 2007; Kuyucu 2009; 12 Ananya Roy discusses some ontological questions related to this topic which exceed the scope of this research. Roy criticises the “subaltern cities studies” (Bayat 1997, 2002; Benjamin 2008; Chatterjee 2004) for associating informality with “urban poverty” and celebrating the ‘informal’ areas, i.e. slum areas, as the achievement of urban poor grassroots movements (Roy 2011). According to Roy, informality is produced by the state itself and it is not an unregulated state of existence but it is deregulated by the state (Roy 2009: 83). She carries her critiques of conceptualisation of informality by ‘subaltern cities studies’ to an ontological and epistemological discussion in order to develop new categories in the analysis of the dynamics of urbanisation (Roy 2011).
Hsing 2010; Turkun 2011; Bayat 2012). As is shown in Chapter 3, legislative regulations that empower the state’s intervention in spatial formation are one of the means to this end. Furthermore, violent responses to the opposition by the state in the implementation of projects are also widely reported. Although the use of violence to suppress opposition is not unique to countries of the global South, it is widely observed in the urbanisation process of the cities of the South. The report published by the Development Planning Unit of University College London (DPL/UCL) on how people face force eviction in seven cities – one of which is Istanbul – in South America, Asia and Africa, shows that, in every place covered in the report, direct or indirect violence is used against the people by government forces (Cabanne et al. 2010). As an example of such violence, in 2008, inhabitants of the Basibuyuk gecekondu neighbourhood in Istanbul were subjected to a police siege and regular attacks over a period of two months because of their resistance to the urban regeneration project in their area (Kuyucu 2009; Deniz 2010; Lovering and Turkmen 2011; Sen and Turkmen 2014). During the nationwide Gezi Parki uprising in 2013 in Turkey, thousands of people were injured and five were killed as a result of direct police violence. It is observed in these cases, as in many others, that the use of violence by the state has a significant impact on dynamics mobilisation, a topic which demands further investigation.

A different aspect of the political relations between the state and the public, though one that has a major impact on mobilisation, can be seen in the establishment of


14 The report was prepared by Development Planning Unit of University College London (DPL/UCL) and the Building and Social Housing Foundation (BSHP) (2010), which describes how people face forced evictions in the cities of Buenos Aires (Argentina), Porto Alegre (Brazil), Durban (South Africa), Hangzhou (China), Istanbul (Turkey), Karachi (Pakistan) and Santo Domingo (Dominican Republic), and in the rural villages of Mirshaq and Sarandu (Egypt).

15 The excessive use of police violence during the protest was reported by various national and international institutions, including International Amnesty Organisation and the Turkish Medical Associations (TMA). According to a TMA report, five people were killed directly by police violence and more than 10,000 people were injured nationwide during the protests (TMA Report 2013: [http://www.ttb.org.tr/index.php/Haberler/veri-3944.html](http://www.ttb.org.tr/index.php/Haberler/veri-3944.html) Last access: 14.06.2014)
cliental and patronage relations. Political clientelism is a form of political party-voter relationship, and refers to the exchange of a citizen’s vote for material benefits such as goods, urban services, direct payments or access to employment (Gay 1990; Auyero et al. 2009; Szwarcberg 2013; Kusche 2014). Especially in the urban poverty areas, the impact of political clientelism on the emergence of collective action and everyday life politics is a salient topic on the research agenda. Political clientelism is distinguished by “hierarchical arrangements, as bonds of dependence and control, based on power differences and on inequality” (Simmel [1971] quoted by Auyero et al. 2009). Clientelist relations are seen as a way to access to urban services and employment, especially in the urban poverty areas, otherwise unavailable for those who are not able to engage with other networks (Gay 1990).

Clientelism is often seen as a demobilising factor in the emergence of collective action. Clientelist exchanges appear in “pyramidal networks, constituted by asymmetrical, reciprocal and face-to-face relations” (Auyero et al. 2009: 3), which suppress the engagement in horizontal relations necessary for collective action. However, researchers of this topic also claim that political clientelism and collective action can take place simultaneously in the same geographical context, usually in a conflicting way (Gay 1990; Auyero 1999, 2000, 2004). Clientelism is also a claim-making process and a reciprocal relationship with a dynamic nature that can change according to the episodes of contention. In other words, political clientelism itself is subject to contention. In their analysis of five case studies, Auyero, Lapégna and Poma (2009: 5) demonstrate that cliental relations are not mechanical relations but “result[s] of the habituation [they] generate[s] in beneficiaries or clients”. They contend that clientelist politics is not limited to material problem-solving, but includes a ‘way of giving’ that is constituted in a dynamic relation. As Charles Tilly explains (quoted by ibid.: 22), “contentious gatherings obviously bear a coherent relationship to the social organization and routine politics of their settings. But what relationship? That is the problem”. Hence, the challenge is to find out what kinds of relation emerge in the political process.
In terms of the relations emerging in the spaces of urban poverty and informality, Asef Bayat investigates both urban movements and “non-movements” of urban poor in order to frame the political relations and the ways inhabitants have developed to survive in cities of the Middle East (Bayat 1997, 2000, 2002, 2012). Bayat contributes to the literature by pointing out the non-collective strategies of urban poor in challenging the rules and regulations of the urban public sphere. He develops the concept of ‘quiet encroachment’, which is a non-movement strategy used by poor and marginalised people to access their needs. In the quiet encroachment approach, urban poor are political actors who gain what they need to survive and provide minimal standards of encroaching quietly and slowly (Bayat 1997). ‘Quiet encroaching of the ordinary’ means

> a silent, patient, protracted, and pervasive advancement of ordinary people on the propertied and powerful in order to survive hardships and better their lives. They are marked by quiet, atomised and prolonged mobilisation with episodic collective action – an open and fleeting struggle without clear leadership, ideology or structured organisation, one which makes significant gains for the actors, eventually placing them as a counterpoint vis-à-vis the state. (Bayat 1997: 57)

The aims of this ‘atomised’ action are based on the redistribution of social goods and the attainment of autonomy (Bayat 1997, 2002). In fact, it is a sort of collective action that aims at the acquisition of collective consumption services in time, such as water pipes, electricity by acquiring public spaces (e.g. street pavements where they can run their businesses, as in the case of street vendors), opportunities (favourable business conditions and locations) and other life chances essential for survival and minimal living standards. Bayat argues that these (non-) movements are based on the attainment of short-term benefits, rather than any long-term political aim to alter the ‘meaning’ of city, as Castells mentioned (1977, 1983). One of the important characteristics of these non-movements is that action is taken according to the need to survive and live a dignified life (Bayat 1997).

The crucial point in Bayat’s approach is the determination of the necessities by the *passive networks* in the streets, which makes these non-movements collective
movements. Bayat situates the emergence of these networks in the framework of ‘street politics’:

street politics is a set of conflicts and the attendant implications between a collective populace and the authorities, shaped and expressed episodically in the physical and social space of the ‘streets’ – from the alleyways to the more visible pavements, public parks or sports areas. The ‘street’ in this sense serves as the only locus of collective expression for, but by no means limited to, those who structurally lack any institutional setting to express discontent. This group includes squatters, the unemployed, street subsistence workers (e.g. vendors), members of the underworld (e.g. beggars, prostitutes), petty thieves and housewives. The term signifies an articulation of discontent by clusters of different social agents without institutions, coherent ideology or evident leadership. (Bayat 1997: 63)

Streets are the places from which collective identities emerge, are expressed and are reproduced for the subaltern groups. Bayat stresses the networks that the street users indirectly use in their everyday lives. In any collective action case, there is an active network between individuals that enables their mobilisation, but in the case of street politics, where the process of quiet encroachment is actualised by the atomised individuals, a passive network exists. The common identity of these individuals and its representation on the streets (like occupation of an area by the street vendors, a spot occupied only by groups of women etc.) are the fundamentals of street politics and passive networks. Although atomised individuals do not take action together against any issue, every individual in that group knows about the others, and these individuals silently form the collective identity of atomised individuals. Individuals can conflict with each other, but they also have the potential to act together.

Bayat claims that collective action can come about if the access and resources that people have already gained are under threat. Auyero et al. (2009: 7) similarly note that protests can emerge when there is a breakdown of clientelist arrangements, especially when a well-established patron-client relationship “crucial for the survival of the local population fails to deliver or suddenly collapses”. Such collective action might become political if there is a rationalisation of political action among atomised individuals and if there is an agent to organise it. In the politicisation process, Bayat stresses the importance of the political opportunities that provide
legitimacy to the protest and its leaders: institutional representatives, such as political parties, can develop and put forward the demands in political channels. The progress of politicisation process depends to a large extent on the characteristics of the political regime and the responses of the state. Bayat argues that quiet encroachment can transform itself into demanding collective action only if the state becomes more social, democratic and inclusive. In these respects, democratisation of the political regime is an embedded in the target of the movements in the global South.

Bayat’s arguments about the non-movements in the cities of the global South provide an insight into the establishment of political relations, networks and collective actions, which also display a dynamic different to the political relations of the institutionalised, democratic systems of the global North. Another significant feature of Bayat’s analysis is the stress on the importance of non-collective action in the formation of street politics and the role of these actions in urban contention. The means of providing short-term benefits needed to survive in cities must to be considered another major factor motivating people to mobilise.

So far, the discussion of the literature has provided some concepts to frame the political relations, contentious politics and, by extension, the dynamics of mobilisation in urban space. It is a dynamic research agenda that develops with experiences from different cases. Examining the internal dynamics of political mobilisation around urban issues and asking how and why people respond to political contention will contribute new concepts to this research agenda. In the next section, I shall discuss a research agenda for analysing the internal dynamics and mobilisation processes of UMs.
2.4. Developing an Analytical Framework in the Studies of Contentious Urban Politics

2.4.1. Joint analysis of actions and inactions, successes and failures

In this part, I attempt to develop a dynamic research agenda for analysing the UM in terms of mobilisation, collective decision-making processes and actions that also include ‘inaction’. Inaction in a contested political environment, I argue, may be a result of a political process in contention, which could be considered in the analysis of the relations between the actors involved in that contention. In this research which focuses on an ongoing contention in urban space, focusing exclusively on mobilised groups would limit the extent of the research, since these groups are likely to engage in different episodes of contention. As discussed below, “routine relations between the non-contentious actors” (McAdam et al. 2001) and failed collective actions and inaction cases provide a deeper understanding of action cases (Tarrow 1994; Goonewardena 2004; Bayat 2012). In this research I intend to extend the research framework of UM studies by looking at the non-mobilised inhabitants who experience similar urbanisation processes with the mobilised inhabitants. Thus, I intend to provide a comprehensive understanding of what factors affect the mobilisation process in the urban political sphere.

The motivations of collective action in urban space can vary hugely according to the diverse nature and impact of urban problems and the ways in which these problems are politicised and perceived. Depending on the dynamics and variety of conflicts, the incidence and militancy of collective action – that is, “the types of effect they achieve or the type of demands they advance” (Pickvance 1985: 31) – change over the course of the development of the movement. Therefore, it might be difficult to evaluate the final impact of an UM, especially on an on-going case.

The dynamics of mobilisation in UM are greatly affected by changes to the responses of the claimants (i.e. the state and other actors of the conflicts) and changing political and economic circumstances. To illustrate, a movement might
start with an uncompromising discourse demanding significant changes in the present conditions and leaving limited space for any negotiation of their demands; but this discourse and motivation of mobilised people can change in the course of the political process. For instance, an urban movement that emerges in response to demolition and eviction in a given neighbourhood might change its attitude when it is approached by the state agencies and a bargaining process starts (see, for example, Uitermark 2004; Kuyucu and Unsal 2010; Sen and Turkmen 2014). In such cases, it is difficult to analyse militancy and incidence of the mobilised group comprehensively, especially when the case has not come to a conclusion. Furthermore, changing contextual factors may affect the militancy of the movements, but this does not necessarily mean the movement has come to an end; rather, another stage of mobilisation may be on its agenda. It is difficult to judge the final impact of a movement and the types of demands and their weights that they have advanced in the process, especially in an ongoing process where the relations among actors may change over time. Correspondingly, a broader research project, covering the factors affecting mobilisation and relations between the non-contentious actors rather than focusing on definitions and achievements of UMs, would provide extended grounds for interpreting the dynamics of contention.

Another critical point that could be discussed in the UMs’ studies, or social movements generally, is the emphasis on the progressive and radical discourses and goals of the movements. Social movement activists, in particular, demand fundamental changes to the social systems or the issue they are struggling for (Tarrow 1994). Activists are capable of developing radical discourses or agendas for collective action, but the consequences of these actions can be reforms rather than fundamental or radical changes. In that respect, rather than defining a given ‘success’ framework in the start of analysis and selection of cases, it is crucial to analyse the short- and long-term aims, achievements and impacts of the movement on the contextual features objectively. There can be short- and long-term impacts of a movement that might affect and transform the existing situations, social and political relations and future actions of the actors of contention. Sydney Tarrow
(1994: 174) suggests three kinds of possible long-term effect in a movement process: first, the effect of protest cycles on the political socialisation of people who participate in them; second, the effects of the struggle on political institutions and practices; and third, the contribution of protest cycles to the political culture.

The short-term achievements and consequences of actions by a social movement are important not only for the mobilisation of people and strengthening of struggle, but also for the accumulation of power for future actions and long-term effects (Tarrow 1994). The achievements within the scope of movements’ targets have cumulative effects on the further actions of the people, as well as long-term effects on mobilisation. Short-term achievements are particularly important in the mobilisation dynamics of UMs since in many cases it is observed that mobilisation starts with a reaction to the actions of power holders, and if there is a change in the actions of power holders in the short-term, it would have an impact on the mobilisation.

2.4.2. A comparative research agenda and setting external factors
In his seminal work, Chris Pickvance (1985) suggests that rather than defining the concept of ‘urban movement,’ the researcher needs to focus on militancy (the type and strength of demands) and incidence (the effects of actions) of movements, which depend on the contextual factors, i.e. the reasons that trigger mobilisation and cause movements to emerge.

Pickvance (1985) suggests a typology for classifying movements for a comparative analysis in different contexts. According to this typology, there are four types of movements which might overlap each other. Type 1 movements are related to the provision of housing and urban services, and emerge when these collective consumption services are not sufficient or absent. Type 2 movements are also related to the housing and urban services, but in this second type, the reason for mobilisation is the demand for improvements to the services. Movements of Type 3 are related to control and management, either in housing and urban services, which
may overlap with the previous category, or in political institutions, which do not. The movements of this type are more closely related to demands for participation in or management of urban services. Lastly, Type 4 movements are about actions against physical threats (such as demolition of the neighbourhood, urban renewal or redevelopment) or social threats (such as ethnic tensions among different groups). Pickvance argues that, regarding the mobilisation of people and the question of who is involved in actions, spatial proximity is an important factor in the emergence of this last type of movement.

Pickvance also suggests five contextual features that cause UMs to emerge. The first is the *rapid urbanisation* process, which frames the capability of the state to provide urban services during times of rapid urbanisation. The second contextual feature covers the *state’s policy with respect to collective consumption services and its response* to the demands of UMs. The third contextual feature is the *broader political context*, which also covers the historical analysis of the evolution of political structures and relations between actors in this arena. With respect to this contextual feature, Pickvance mentions that the characteristics of political culture, cultural understanding of politics, the ability of formal political institution to express urban conflicts and the existence of broader political movements, which might allow UMs to carry out the urban issues in a broader political sphere, are critical elements that affect the emergence, militancy and incidence of UMs. The fourth contextual feature is the *role and involvement of the middle class* in UMs. Pickvance argues that for the middle class, the ‘city’ is not only a place that only provides employment opportunities; it is a living unit based on use values. Their involvement would have an impact on the politicisation of urban problems. Moreover, the middle class has both the time and opportunity to develop networks, as well as access to existing networks, which would strengthen UMs. The fifth and final contextual feature covers the *broader general economic, social conditions* that affect the dynamics of mobilisation. For example, in periods of affluence, when mega projects are on the agenda, defensive movements are likely to arise in response, whereas during periods of economic depression, movements are more
likely to be dealing with the decline in state provision of collective consumption services.

Pickvance provides a framework for a cross-cut analysis of movement mobilisation which also allows a comparative analysis of different movements that have emerged in different places. This framework can be extended to incorporate other approaches for a deeper analysis of dynamics of mobilisation. To do this, I shall address some key concepts of political opportunity and political process approach – which is mostly based on the studies of Charles Tilly, Sydney Tarrow, Doug McAdam, Hanspeter Kriesi, David Meyer – to set a conceptual framework for analysing the external and internal dynamics of political mobilisation in urban space.

2.4.3. Political processes and contentious politics
Tilly (1999: 257) defines social movements as “sustained challenge[s] to power holders in the name of a population living under jurisdiction of those power holders by means of repeated public displays of that population’s worthiness, unity, numbers and commitment.” Social movements require the involvement of three key actors: power holders, who are the objects of claims; participants; and a subject population on whose behalf participants are making or supporting claims. The dynamic of contention is, therefore, based on the relations between these groups, whose responses in the contention are transformed by the relations between the actors. In my analysis of conflicts and mobilisation in urban space, I use the term ‘contention’ in order to underline the interrelation between the actors of the conflicts in the formation of the political process and mobilisation.

The interaction between the claimant, i.e. the power holders, and the claimer, i.e. the makers of claims, exists in a complex social policy system (Tarrow 1994; Tilly 1999; McAdam et al. 2001) in which “the interests and actions of other participants come into play, and traditions and experiences of contention and conflict become the resources of both challenges and their opponents” (Tarrow 1994: 25). Political
opportunities and relations between actors are not static; rather, the actors develop their actions in relation to other actors’. Decisions in collective action are not made independently of the actions of other actors of contention. The interrelation between the power holders (state and its agencies), movements and other parties also determines the further steps of each actor. Not only are the actions of the state and its agencies effective in the mobilisation, but so too are collective actions that determine the subsequent steps of the state and other actors.

The relation between the actors of contention transforms the social and political process in contentious politics. In other words, as McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001: 14) put it, contentious politics consists of sequences and combinations of causal mechanisms. The analysis of contentious politics, then, aims to “identify causal mechanisms, the ways they combine and in what sequences they recur, and why in different combinations and sequences, starting from different initial conditions, produce varying effects on the large scale” (ibid.). The major aims of the approach taken in contentious politics are to identify the parallels between these sequences and mobilisation processes and to establish what drives contention in different directions.

The main questions of this dynamic approach are about how mechanisms and processes contribute to the formation of contentious politics and how these characterise the episodes of contention. The agenda of contentious politics is composed of mobilisation processes, actors and trajectories:

- With respect to mobilisation we must explain how people who at a given point in time are not making contentious claims start doing so – and, for that matter, how people who are making claims stop doing so. (We can call that reverse process demobilisation.)
- With regard to actors we need to explain what sorts of actors engage in contention, what identities they assume, and what forms of interaction they produce. Fortified by these contributions, we elaborate an approach to actors as contingent constructions as well as an approach to contentious interaction in terms of repertoires that vary as a function of actors’ political connections.
• When it comes to trajectories, we face the problem of explaining the course and transformation of contention, including its impact on life outside of the immediate interactions of contentious politics. (McAdam et al. 2001: 34)

The analysis of contentious politics starts by acknowledging that mobilisation is a dynamic process shaped within the changing nature of the relations between the actors. This starting point enables us to understand the trajectories of contention without embedded *a priori* conclusions. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001: 61-62) suggest five steps to precede the agenda of contentious politics:

• The first step is to recognise the contingent, collective and constructed character of actors, actions and identities. The variation in actions and identities would provide the background for how people mobilise, experience and deploy.

• The second step is to specify the routine relations between the ‘non-contentious’ actors, actions and identities as well in the contention. Signifying the similarities and differences between these relations in non-contentious and contentious periods would allow comprehension of the nature of the relations among the actors of contentious politics.

• The third step is to specify the connections between “(a) construction and appropriation of actors, actions, and identities and (b) relations of the relevant actors, actions, and identities to changing structures of power in the actors’ environments.”

• The fourth step is to analyse the ways in which contention transforms collective identities and also the ways in which this transformation alters the character and effects of contention.

• The fifth step is to consider how the creation, transformation, and extinction of actors, identities, and forms of action in the course of contention alter both transgressive and routine politics after a particular episode of contention ends.

In this framing process, supporters of the political process approach suggest that the analysis needs to start with the settings and the routines of the actors in order to determine the differences of actions of actors in the times of contention. Then, a
relational approach based on the connections of actors is developed in order to
determine what roles the actors play and how these roles are formed in the process
of contention. The development and transformation of collective identities in the
process and the analysis of the transformative impacts of collective action are also
central to this research agenda. I shall investigate the factors in this framework
under two categories: external dynamics of mobilisation which investigates the
external factors affecting mobilisation; and internal dynamics of mobilisation which
investigates the development of internal group relations in mobilisation. In the next
two sections, I shall discuss concepts for analysing these external and internal
relations in the mobilisation process.

2.4.3.1. **External dynamics of mobilisation**

As explained earlier, Pickvance suggests that variation in contextual features, i.e.
external factors, determines the militancy and incidence of UMs. The political
opportunity approach also emphasises the importance of external conditions in the
mobilisation or demobilisation of people. The mobilisation of social movements
commences when political opportunities arise (Tarrow 1994: 17-18). Tarrow defines
these political opportunities as follows (ibid. 18):

> By political opportunity structure, I refer to consistent – but not necessarily formal,
permanent or national — dimensions of the political environment which either
encourage or discourage people from using collective action. The concept of
political opportunity emphasizes resources external to the group — unlike money
or power — that can be taken advantage of even by weak or disorganized
challengers.

According to Tarrow (1994, 1996), opportunities take different forms for different
groups in the process of movement; one particular collective action launched as a
part of a system, on behalf of a particular goal, may create opportunities for other
groups (1996: 57). Tarrow generalises making opportunities during the process in
four general ways: expanding the groups’ own opportunities; expanding
opportunities for others, which means creating opportunities for other groups that
could be in alliance or counter position; creating opportunities for opponents; and
lastly making opportunities for elites, as occurs most often as a result of reformist
actions that create new elites in the polity system. This can be summed up as follows: new opportunities for different groups are likely to change the existing opportunity structure, dynamics of contention and even the actors in this process.

Tarrow (1994) points out that collective action is likely to emerge when people have the resources to escape their habitual passivity and the opportunity to use these resources. The most important point in the political opportunity structure is how people conceptualise and comprehend these opportunities. Opportunities and treads come onto the agenda only if they are recognized by the actors (McAdam et al. 2001; Meyer 2004). Therefore, how people mobilised, how social and political processes occur in the mobilising groups and how the internal dynamics are formed become fundamental.

### 2.4.3.2. Internal dynamics of mobilisation

People join social movements for a wide variety of reasons which make coordination within the movement much more difficult than in interest groups or other institutionalised forms of organisation (Tarrow 1994: 15). People are motivated to by a personal interests, commitments, group solidarity, but these vary considerably between individual people. For this reason, in order to sustain the continuity of a movement, it is important to develop a collective identity to match the collective action. This collective identity develops when the actors perform collective tasks with “greater ease, efficiency and expertise” (Nicholls 2008: 845).

Social movements are networks of various organisations and activists in an effort to achieve a collective goal through non-traditional means (Della Porta and Diani 2006). After people begin to converge on a common interest or issue, a network closure begins to emerge from the regular meetings and relations of the activists of movement groups. In his study of contemporary urban movements, Walter Nicholls (2008: 845-6) also identifies norms, trust, emotional energy and interpretive frameworks as ‘relational qualities’, which emerge in the networks and increase proportionally with the abilities of activists to perform together and to sustain the
mobilisation of collective action. Network closures (Coleman 1988; Nicholls 2008) allow the development of common norms which provide common expectations that inform the behaviour of collective actors in the decision making processes. Trust is another quality, developed in the networks, which “permits people to contribute their valuable and unique resources to a collective enterprise” (Nicholls 2008: 846). Nicholls (2008) also stresses that ‘emotional energy’ fuels dedication and solidarity in taking collective action and is increased when the individuals are bodily proximate. Network closures also enable actors to construct common interpretive frameworks to improve the abilities of actors to “perceive tacit information in similar ways and use it to mount common projects” (ibid.). Interpretative frameworks also strengthen the intellectual capacity of actors.

Tilly (1999: 261) argues that the strength of a social movement can be measured by reference to the worthiness, unity, number and commitment of its participants. By worthiness, he means the sobriety and respect in the relations with the important figures that may affect the collective action; by unity, he means the common way of acting among the participants; by numbers, he means the visibility and occupation in the public sphere and spaces, representation and financial contributions; and lastly by commitment, he means resistance to attacks and persistence when participating in costly and risky activities (ibid: 261). He formulates these values as:

\[
\text{Strength} = \text{worthiness} \times \text{unity} \times \text{numbers} \times \text{commitment}
\]

He also stresses that if any of these values falls to zero, the challenge loses credibility. High values on one value, on the other hand, increase the values of the others.

Social movements are not institutionalised groups and they do not have members but volunteers (Della Porta and Miani 2006). The ties between the participants and the movements are not strict or hierarchical but mostly in voluntary capacities. This makes the ‘structures’ of the groups more fluid than those of institutionalised
groups. The lack of permanent cadre in the groups is problematical (Tarrow 1994) since these activist groups are seen as a factor in grassroots mobilisation. In this mobile and dynamic structure, although there is no official leader, the leading people in the decision-making processes and mobilisation have a major impact on the formation of collective decision-making and actions. Tarrow (1994) states that leadership has a creative function in collective action since the leaders can motivate people to join the collective action when they might otherwise stay at home. In the analysis of the political process of mobilisation, it is important, in the absence of institutional characteristics, to ask by what means and processes new actors come to join social movements (McAdam et al. 2001: 8).

On this topic, one of the important concepts emphasised in the literature on the development and improvement of ties among different groups is ‘brokerage’ (McAdam et al. 2001; Nicholls 2009; Auyero et al. 2009). Brokerage occurs when a third party (the broker) mediates the relations between two or more unrelated agents within social movements (Nicholls 2009: 85). A broker can be a common acquaintance, organisation or ally that creates opportunities for activists and groups to meet with others that have similar concerns. Brokerage is seen as a strengthening mechanism for social movements because “[brokers] build bridges across geographical, social and institutional boundaries” (ibid.).

The historical background of the emergence of collective action also affects the repertoires of action and internal dynamics of group relations. Tarrow emphasises the importance of the historical and social background of the repertoires: “Each society has a stock of familiar forms of action that are known by both potential challengers and their opponents – and which become habitual aspects of interaction” (Tarrow 1994: 19). Collective action is formed within the given historical concepts and memories (Tilly 1999; McAdam et al. 2001). Tarrow notes that “collective action is culturally inscribed and communicated” (1991: 18). Tilly (1987, quoted by Tarrow 1994: 248) also mentions that those taking collective action do not act only on existing problems; rather, the decisions and actions are
formed in a way that the actors know ‘what they do, how to do and what others expect them to do’. The groups have particular histories and memories of collective action, and these affect the groups’ actions.

Last but not least, the visibility of groups and collective action in the public sphere is an important factor that strengthens the political process and mobilisation. People are more likely to join the collective action if the collective action groups are visible and there are organisations and leaders to motivate them. People also accumulate knowledge about collective action and copy the ways in which others act within and contribute to it (McAdam et al. 2001; Auyero 2004; Nicholls 2009). Furthermore, visibility in public sphere, via public meetings, events and demonstrations, helps to foster connections between potential allies and contributes to the emergence of networks (Nicholls 2009). In that respect, the visibility of collective action is a strengthening factor in the mobilisation process.

Overall, aside from the inner group dynamics, the relations between groups in a network that is able to develop norms, trust, energy and frameworks are influential factors that affect the dynamics of mobilisation. Hence, the factors that affect the mobilisation and demobilisation of people in a social movement can be used to construct an analytical framework to investigate the inner-group structures, roles and perceptions of actors and the trajectories that the movements pass through in their struggles.

2.4.4. The main conceptual framework of the research

In this section, I shall explain how the concepts that I have already discussed in this chapter shall be used in my analysis of the contentious urban politics in Istanbul. The diagram below suggests a relational and dynamic research framework for determining the variables in a political process, and concepts to analyse the external and internal factors that enable and inhibit collective action.
Box 2.2. Framing a relational and dynamic research agenda on political process and urban movements

Framing the interests in the emergence of urban movements

Collective Consumption (collective interest)  
Use Value  
Exchange Value  
Non-collective consumption (private interest)

Framing the actions

Movements: Collective action  
Breaking the habitual passivity of individuals  
Non-movements: Individual actions or collective inaction (e.g. quiet encroachment, street politics)

Like successes of collective actions, failures of them and also non-movements are part of the political process in contentious politics

Framing the impacts

Militancy and incidence of (non)movements: The types of demands the movements advanced and the types of effects they achieve

Framing the factors that enable or inhibit collective action

External Factors/Political Opportunities (Contingent Relations)  
Informality, cliental relations, the characteristics of the states (liberal vs. Illiberal, democratic vs. authoritarian)

Internal Factors (Necessary relations)  
Strength: worthiness × unity × numbers × commitment  
Norms, trust, emotional energy, interpretative frameworks  
Brokerage and brokers
To start with, figuring out the motivations and interests of the actors of contentions would enable us to frame the main dynamics of the relations that shapes the political process and mobilisation in different geographies and contexts. The motivation of people in mobilisation could be subjected to collective interest, private interest, or both. The relation between these two interests is also determined by the use-value and exchange-value of the subjects of contentious topics, such as neighbourhood, housing, which, I argue, are both important and determine one another in their impact on the emergence of mobilisation in urban space. The motivations for mobilisation develop dynamically through the political process. Hence, the analysis of mobilisation first aims to determine the actors and the main mechanisms that trigger the mobilisation.

After determining the interests and motivations in contentious topics, an analysis of the sorts of actions that emerge around these topics could be developed. Here, as a general starting point, I suggest investigating the non-movements and inactions along with the movements and action cases, since non-movements and inactions are likely to be part of political process and provide a deeper understanding of crucial stages of mobilisation. Concepts such as ‘quiet encroachment’ and ‘street politics’, used by Bayat (1996, 2002, 2012) in his analysis of urban movements in the global South, draw attention to the political and social relations emerging in non-movement cases, to which I refer in my analysis.

Another part of analysis is ‘framing the impacts’ of collective actions/inactions in political processes. In this frame, I refer to Pickvance’s analysis, in which he sets out to investigate the incidence and militancy of movements. As a result of this, the question of what factors affect incidence and militancy of movements comes onto the agenda.

The framing of the factors enabling or inhibiting collective action is another part of the analysis. I distinguish two main factor areas in the evolution of political process: External Factors/Political Opportunities and Internal Factors. These factors are
treated as the mechanisms of contentious politics, or, in other words, the relations that emerge between and within the actors of contention, and which constitute the mobilisation. As discussed in detail in Chapter 4, these relations can also be categorised as ‘contingent relations’ and ‘necessary relations’. In the analysis of relations and factors in the case of Istanbul, I use sets of concepts discussed in the literature, such as informality and clientelism, to understand the external factors, and I use sets of analytical tools and concepts such as norms, trust, emotional energy, interpretative frameworks in the group relations and strength of movements to understand the internal relations and roles of actors in the development of political processes.

In what follows, all these framing processes are treated as interconnected parts of a broader research agenda to investigate the mobilisation from a wider, relational perspective. In sum, this framing approach helps to develop a dynamic and analytical research agenda for analysing mobilisation and urban movements in different geographies, contexts and periods.

### 2.5. Conclusion

In this chapter, the frames and concepts used in the analysis of UMs were examined. Starting with Castells and Lefebvre, the main point in this analysis has been to highlight the motivational and conceptual framework of the urban movements and the ways in which these frameworks change between different contexts and periods of contention. Analysis of UMs cannot be separated from the analysis of the political economic paradigm of the present time and the power relations that have emerged around this paradigm. In order to analyse the UMs, a dynamic analytical framework needs to be formed to understand the formation of the relations between the actors of contentious politics emerging under a particular economic paradigm in a peculiar context.
The implementation of urban politics and the evolution of spatial relations have their own historical backgrounds in different geographies and contexts. For this reason, it is hard to adopt a pre-determined framework to define either the motivations behind the mobilisation processes or the goals and achievements of UMs. A striking illustration of this can be seen in the contrast between the different contentious topics and social, political and economic relations in the cities of the global South and North. As has been established in this chapter, although motivational frameworks such as Castells’ analysis of UMs and RttC help to theorise urban conflict, they provide limited conceptual and analytical tools for the analysis of dynamics of mobilisation in different cases.

The differences between the political processes of urbanisation in different context and periods are also the reasons for the varied responses of urbanites during episodes of contention. Regarding this point, in order to understand people’s different responses, a dynamic, contextual analysis of political process needs to be undertaken. In this chapter, two main issues were stressed in connection with the establishment of a dynamic research agenda: first, to examine the dynamics of urbanisation and the formation of political relations in order to frame the political opportunities/external factors that trigger the mobilisation and result in emergence of movements; and second, to examine the internal factors that affect mobilisation and thereby to provide the basis for an analysis of the social and political relations determining the political process used by groups in opposition. The internal relations explain the strength and militancy of movements as they progress.

In the last section of the chapter, I suggested a dynamic, analytical research framework based on the concepts discussed in the literature. This could be used in the analysis of the contentious urban politics in the case of Istanbul.

In the next chapter, the dynamics of urbanisation and contentious urban politics in Istanbul are examined to provide a background to the analysis of the external factors affecting the mobilisation process in URP areas.
CHAPTER 3 – CONTEXTUAL FEATURES: CONTEMPORARY URBANISATION DYNAMICS IN ISTANBUL

3.1. Introduction

This chapter aims to explain the dynamics of contemporary urban development and the actors involved in contentious urban politics in Istanbul, in order to provide a contextual framework and to identify the political opportunities for the analysis of the case studies. The role and responses of the public authorities in the dynamics of urbanisation are central in the formation of the mobilisation and are the external factors that affect the mobilisation process. This chapter aims to explain the external factors of the Istanbul case, i.e. the role of the state and the political economic background of the state interventions in spatial reorganisation processes which lead to the emergence of opposition movements. The characteristics of the contemporary opposition movements and the actors in those movements are also briefly explained in this chapter.

The main issues related to contemporary urbanisation in Istanbul can be traced back to the 1980s, when state-led economic development was radically realigned in accordance with the neoliberal economic model. The 2000s saw the beginning of a process of radical legal and administrative restructuring under the absolute authority of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), alongside changes to the spatial organisation of Istanbul. Urban regeneration projects (URPs), which were engineered by the state as an agent for intervention in the reorganisation of space and to establish a new land and property market (Kuyucu 2009; Celik 2013; Karaman 2013, 2014), became the contentious topic of the era which led to widespread resistance. In this chapter, how the contemporary urbanisation scheme has been framed, how the state became an absolute authority to actualise this agenda and how the opposition and resistance emerged and on what bases are discussed in order to map the contentious political climate in Istanbul.
The chapter has two main parts: In the first part, the dynamics of contemporary urbanisation and how the state has formed its role in the process are explained. The political economy and contentious character of URPs are also examined in this part. In the second part, responses to the URPs and opposition movement actors are briefly illustrated.

### 3.2. Dynamics of Contemporary Urbanisation in Istanbul

Coming to power in 2002, just after the drastic Marmara earthquake in 1999 and one of the biggest economic crises that hit the country in 2001, the AKP government targeted urban development as one of the priority agendas of its economic development programme which suggested a radical transformation in urban areas via developing urban projects on a massive scale. Although in Istanbul a transformation in the light of a global city vision had already started in the 1980s and the city saw investments in land and ‘urban entrepreneurialism’ (Harvey 1989) supported by the state (Bartu-Candan and Kollugoglu 2008; Karaman 2013); the AKP government took the existing agenda further and brought the city to the very centre of its new development programme and the space of its hegemonic representation (Tugal 2009).

In order to carry out this agenda in Istanbul, there was a need for a radical transformation of the existing urban tissue due to the city’s current development limitations. Among them, the geomorphological limits of the city are some of the most important. The biggest urban agglomeration in Europe and the most industrialised city of Turkey with more than 14 million residents\(^\text{16}\) has been developed on a west-east axis, on a narrow line surrounded by seas on the north

\(^{16}\) According to the 2013 population census by Turkish Statistical Institute, the population of Istanbul has reached 14,160,467 (http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=15974); however, one needs to consider the unregistered population and the temporary residents of the city. It could be claimed that the population of Istanbul is more than 15 million.
and south and has reached its ecological limits (Yapici and Ekinci in Azem 2010). The figures below from the Urban Age Istanbul report (2009) show the urban sprawl in Istanbul since 1950:

![Map 3.1.: Istanbul’s footprint](source)

To supply land for new urban development projects, the focus turned to the built environment which meant intervention in the existing urban fabric and so in the livelihoods of a large proportion of the city’s residents. Such an intervention targeting a radical transformation could only be performed by the state authority, and eventually, a coalition established around this authority to form the new land market. This new urban coalition included urban developers, credit institutions, and local and central government administrators, but excluded a huge part of the population (Kuyucu and Unsal 2010; Turkun 2011).

The primary sources of land supply for the new urban development projects and formation of the market were selected from the (ex)industrial places, since
deindustrialisation of the city in the global city vision context was already set as a target for the city; the working-class neighbourhoods surrounding these industrial areas, i.e. the gecekondu settlements; deprived inner-city historical areas where the urban poor and marginalised population lives; and the state-owned lands.

The primary aims of the urban development was not only to transform the existing fabric of the city and create a new power bloc to shape the space; but also to establish a new land and property market akin to other emerging neoliberal markets around the globe (Kuyucu 2009). The condition of the current property market in the city has not provided enough spheres for the formation of a new market and large scale urban development projects. In order to re-establish the property market relations and supply land for the new urban development, the state took a central role and started this process from the areas where existing market conditions are problematic (Turkun 2014). The current property market in these areas had not evolved in a way that supported the needs of the emerging neoliberal market (Turkun, Aslan et al. 2014). The formation of a new land and property regime in Turkey can be clearly observed in the URPs introduced by the state in gecekondu neighbourhoods and deprived inner-city historical areas.

Gecekondu (literally meaning ‘landed at night’) has emerged since the 1950s as a self-help housing solution in the absence of a social housing service for the rural migrants who became the labour force of the industrial cities (Senyapili 2004; Sengul 2009; Yıldırımaz 2011; Turkun, Aslan et al. 2014). When the political economic paradigm of the period was based on industrial development, gecekondu were perceived by both the state and the industrial investors as cheap solutions to the housing problem of the working class (Aslan 2004; Senyapili 2004; Keyder 2005; Turkun et al. 2014). The state turned a blind eye to the construction of the gecekondu, and in 1966, with the enactment of the Gecekondu Law (Law no. 735), they were to some extent ‘formalised’ in the legal sphere.

17 For a detailed discussion on establishment of the market and the role of the state, see Kuyucu 2009 and Sonmez 2013.
When the ‘urban entrepreneurism’ began to shape the politics of the city in the 1980s, the state made an important intervention in the formation of a land and property market in these reserve areas. In 1984, the first gecekondu amnesty law giving the land use right of the plot to the gecekondu owner was created. This law, which has been followed by several others which ‘formalised’ the ‘informal’ settlements, can be regarded as the beginning of property relations in gecekondu areas. The amnesty resulted in formation of an uncontrolled construction market and, eventually, the one-storey gecekondu buildings with small gardens turned into multi-storey apartment blocks. Yet, ‘legal’ property ownership and a controlled construction market have never been fully established (Bugra 1998; Turkun 2011, 2014). In the AKP period, these areas with ambiguous property rights and unregistered housing stocks have been included in the new urbanisation scheme as the land supply areas. The Emergency Action Plan of the first AKP government clearly indicated this new urban agenda: Gecekondus would be cleared away; land production and supply would be increased; a housing campaign would be put into action in response to the economic recession and high unemployment (EAP 2003: Article SP 44-45, 105).

Inner-city historical areas have property deeds and development rights, unlike the gecekondu settlements; however, concerning the impact of the contemporary market driven spatial transformation, a similar condition to gecekondu areas is observed in the historical areas and conservation sites. One common feature of the historical areas seen as land supplies for new development projects is that they are poor areas and market forces do not have enough power to transform these areas or develop big scale projects. Due to the socio-spatial development of inner-city historic settlements, their current socio-economic and physical environments, the strict conservation rules and complex property relations in these areas, the market does not have the power to transform these areas fully and change the property ownerships in these areas.
The social and economic fabric of these areas, particularly the residential areas where once non-Muslim citizens’ were dominant, changed massively in the early years of the Turkish Republic due to the exclusionary minority politics of the Turkish state and hostility towards the non-Muslim population, which culminated in the migration and deportation of the many non-Muslim residents. This tragic population change left a problematic and ambiguous condition behind, especially concerning the assets of the migrated/deported population. The buildings left from minorities were either occupied by the new migrants or left abandoned which increased the dilapidation in the areas. In the meantime, while the strict conservation rules, which make it harder to carry out any renovation, were adding to the deprivation in the built environment, the population living in these areas was also changing again. The new groups settled in these areas included Kurdish peasants from East and Southeast Anatolia regions who (forcedly) migrated from their lands due to the armed conflict between the Turkish army and Kurdish paramilitary group PKK from the late 1980s onwards. Most of the new migrants to the city could not access the benefits and the social and economic networks of the city, unlike the first wave of rural migrants, and ended up as tenants in the old gecekondu neighbourhoods or in deprived, neglected historical places like Suleymaniye, Tarlabasi and Fener alongside the most excluded and marginalised inhabitants of the city such as transvestites, bachelor workers and garbage collectors (Keyder 2005; Unsal 2013; Turkun and Sarioglu 2014; Sakizlioglu 2014). The inner-city historical areas began to host the most vulnerable, excluded and marginalised groups of the city.

18 In 1945, a ‘wealth tax’ was imposed on the minorities, which was introduced as a strategy to empower the newly emerging Turkish bourgeois against the power of the minority groups in the market. Ten years later, rising tensions between Greece and Turkey, arising from the power struggle in Cyprus, dominated the agenda of minority politics. On September 6th and 7th, 1955, after the broadcast of provocative news announcing that in Salonika there had been a bomb attack by Greek nationalists on the family home of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, properties of minority groups in Istanbul were attacked by Turkish people. A number of Greek families left the country due to the subsequent hostility. Another big population change came about in 1964 with the deportation to Greece of Greek families who held dual Greek and Turkish nationality. Almost thirteen thousand Greek-Turkish citizens were deported from the country without being allowed to take any assets with them. Another important event that affected the demography of the minority population of the city is the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 and the subsequent migration of a number of Jewish families heeding ‘the call of Israel’.
Although a market driven gentrification process in some historic centres started in the early 1990s (Sen 2005; Ergun 2006; Yavuz 2006; Behar 2006), this process did not create a huge impact on the property market of these areas and transformation in the historic areas. Then, in the mid-2000s, the state took on the role of revitalising market relations in these areas and exchange of property ownerships. In both areas, the residents were excluded from the project development process and faced with forced eviction from their neighbourhoods due to the projects, as discussed throughout this thesis.

After the AKP’s big success in the 2004 local elections, urban regeneration/renewal projects (URPs) in the gecekondu areas and historical residential areas were introduced. The new market would be formed, regulated and disciplined by the state agencies which were restructured and had their authorities redefined. Thanks to the AKP majority in parliament, many new laws concerning spatial development and large-scale projects in both urban and rural areas were introduced and new authorities both at the central and local state level were defined. Ultimately the decision-making process, the development of the projects and their implementation took on a highly top-down, even authoritarian character. The best examples of this process can be seen in the restructuring of the mass housing agency, The Housing Development Administration of Turkey (TOKI), and the development of renewal projects in the conservation areas by the local state.

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19 There are several words used for describing the regeneration projects in different areas. In gecekondu areas, it has taken the name ‘urban regeneration’ or ‘urban transformation’ (kentsel donusum in Turkish); in the historical areas, it is called ‘urban renewal’ (kentsel yenileme in Turkish). From the intervention in space by the state side of the projects, these projects in different areas have similarities. The differences between these projects derive from the differences in the land regime and regulations in these areas. I use the term ‘regeneration’ to clearly indicate the aim of the project, but I use this term in an interchangeable way.

20 Designation of URP areas, preparation of the plans and projects in the URP areas are regulated in these laws: Municipality Law (no. 5393), Metropolitan Municipality Law (no. 5216), Law on Northern Ankara Urban Regeneration (no. 5104), Law on the Protection of Dilapidated Historical and Cultural Real Estate Assets Through Protection by Renewal (no. 5366), Law on Protection of Cultural and Natural Assets (no. 2863), Gecekondu Law (no. 735), Mass Housing Law (no. 2985), Decree Law on Establishment of Ministry of Environment and Urbanisation (no. 644), Law on Transformation of Areas under the Disaster Risk (no. 6303).
In the next part, firstly, the local government structure and operation of the planning system is explained briefly, and secondly, the legislative amendments which happened in the power of central and local state agencies, changes in the regulations for intervening in space to implement URPs and the effects of these changes to the operation of the planning system, are discussed in brief.

3.2.1. Local government structure, operation of the planning system and changes for implementing URPs

There are three types of elected local government structure in Turkey: Special provincial administrations, municipalities (provincial and district municipalities, first-tier municipalities, and metropolitan municipalities) and villages (in rural areas).

Special Provincial Administrations (SPA) are intermediate local government organisations between the central government and municipalities, established according to Law No. 5302 and covering the boundaries of the province. As a local administrative structure financed by the central government, SPAs are established to provide public services and common needs of people to the larger areas outside the municipal boundaries in the provinces. The main decision making organ of SPAs is a general provincial council elected by the voters of the province in local elections. The elected council establishes the provincial executive committee of the SPA which is chaired by the governor who is the highest administrative chief in the province appointed by the central government. In the planning system, SPAs are responsible for preparing the province’s environmental plan (1/100,000 scale plans) unless there is a metropolitan municipality the boundaries of which cover the whole province.

Municipalities in the local government system of Turkey are established in a settlement with a population of 5,000 or more, and it is mandatory to establish a municipality at provincial and district centres. In this structure, a metropolitan municipality may be established in the provinces by law where the total population of the settlements located within the boundaries of a provincial municipality is over
The boundaries of a metropolitan municipality are the municipal boundaries of the city after which it is named (Law no. 5216, Article 5). Along with the duties given to the organs of metropolitan municipalities by the Law, they are responsible for coordinating the functioning of district municipalities and first-tier municipalities within their boundaries. With a recent legal amendment in 2012 (Law no. 6360), the number of metropolitan municipalities was increased from 16 to 30, out of 81 cities. Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality is one of the first metropolitan municipalities to be established, in 1984, and currently has thirty nine district municipalities.

The smallest administrative unit located within the boundaries of a municipality is a neighbourhood whose inhabitants have similar needs and priorities and maintain neighbourly relations with one another (Law. No. 5393, Article 3). The head of neighbourhoods, i.e. mukhtars, and executive committee are elected in the local elections by the voters of neighbourhoods. A neighbourhood unit is not a legal person responsible in planning and decision making processes but Law no. 5393 provides for participation of these units in local government to represent the common needs of the neighbourhood. They conduct relations with the municipality and other public entities, deliver opinion on matters of interest for the neighbourhood and cooperate with other institutions (Law. No. 5393, Article 9).

In the planning processes, municipalities are the main proceeding public entities unless the SPA is given the responsibility for planning by law. In compliance with the 1/100.000 province environmental plan which is prepared by the metropolitan municipalities (if there is one; otherwise SPAs are responsible for the plan), metropolitan municipalities draw up or cause to draw up, approve and implement the master plan of every scale between 1/5000 and 1/25.000 (Law no. 5216, Article 7). Other scale implementation and plotting plans are drawn up by district or first-tier municipality is “a municipality which is instituted within the boundaries of a metropolitan municipality without a district being established, and carries the same powers, privileges and responsibilities as a metropolitan district municipality without establishing a district scale governmental organisation structure” (Law no. 5216, Article 3).
tier municipalities; however, if the municipalities fail to draw up those plans within one year of the entry into force of the master plan, the metropolitan municipality takes on the duty of planning for the lower scale plans. After the plans are drawn up, they are taken to the main decision making body of municipalities, municipal councils, to be discussed and approved.

The discussions about plans first start in the planning commissions of the municipalities. At this stage, third parties may participate in the discussions according to Municipal Law; but participation is not a mandatory condition in the planning process as mentioned in Article 24 of the Law:

- heads of the neighbourhoods [mukhtars], heads of the public entities,
- representatives of the public professional organisations [such as Chamber of Architects or Chamber of Planners], universities and trade unions in the province and civil society organisations concerned with the items on the agenda may attend the meetings of specialist commissions discussing issues that lie within their spheres of responsibility and activity and state their opinions without voting rights.

The commission reports shall be public and publicised and if requested by the public, shall be provided. The accepted plans in the commission are, then, sent to the main decision making body of the municipalities, which is the municipal council. All the plans should be discussed and approved in the elected municipal councils of each municipality. After they are approved by the municipal councils, the plans are publicly exhibited for any objections and rejections.

The current interest in urban development which is embodied in the concept of ‘urban regeneration’ resulted in amendments in the planning system and redefined the role of the public authorities both at the central and local level in urban development. The numerous changes in laws reshaped the means of intervention in space that the state uses and allowed development of urban regeneration projects in different localities under various schemes. The legal changes and introduction of new regulations could be categorised under two points:
• Restructuring of the central state agencies, mainly the mass housing agency TOKI (see section 3.2.2.), in order to give the power to the central government to control the formation of the new land and property market via urban regeneration projects implemented in gecekondu areas, publicly owned lands and any other areas designated.

• Strengthening municipalities with more authority in the implementation of urban regeneration projects, especially in the historical, dilapidated, conservation areas.

The decision to restructure both local and central state agencies at different levels can be attributed to concerns about the diverse characteristics of possible URP areas, the bureaucratic procedures that those areas are subjected to, financial and technical capabilities of the state agencies and the involvement of the other actors of the market in URPs. The difference between the development and implementation of URPs in gecekondu areas and dilapidated historical areas is an exemplar of how the legal ground for URPs was engineered selectively but with the same aim which is to ease the implementation of URPs.

URPs in the gecekondu areas are declared by metropolitan municipalities within the boundaries of the metropolitan municipalities. If the metropolitan municipal council approves, district municipalities may implement URPs within their boundaries (Law no. 5393, Article 73). After the area is designated an URP area, the district municipality makes an offer to TOKI to implement the project and supply housing for the rightful owners from the mass housing projects of TOKI. Then, a protocol is signed between the municipality (and in some cases including metropolitan municipality) and TOKI, which defines the responsibilities of the district municipalities and TOKI. District municipalities are responsible for researching the area and collecting information about the ownership status of the residents, and then delivering the area to TOKI ‘empty’ which means ready for the construction of new project. Although the district municipality is responsible for preparing the area for the project, and negotiating with the residents of the area, the projects are
prepared by TOKI independently from the planning commissions of municipalities. Only after the project is prepared or caused to be prepared by TOKI, it is brought to the attention of the municipal councils. One consequence of this process that needs to be highlighted is that participation mechanisms for the development of the project are eliminated from the very beginning of the process unless the protocol is amended to allow participation.

For implementing the URP agenda in the inner-city historical settlements, in 2005, Parliament passed a new law called the Law on the Protection of Dilapidated Historical and Cultural Real Estate Assets through Protection by Renewal, or, for short, Law no. 5366. The law defines the regulation of urban renewal in the historical areas and gives the municipalities the power to develop URPs in the ‘derelict’ and ‘obsolescent’ areas in the conservation zones.

In the URP projects implemented in dilapidated historical conservation sites, the areas are designated as project areas by a resolution of general provincial councils if the responsible local unit is SPAs, and that of municipal councils in the case of municipalities (Law no. 5366, Article 2). If the area is in the boundaries of a metropolitan municipality, the decision passed by the district and first-tier municipalities is sent for the approval of the metropolitan municipal council. Then, these resolutions are submitted to the Council of Ministers for the final decision of designation of the historical cultural assets taken under the renovation projects. After the approval of the renovation area by the Council of Ministers, the local government body searches for private companies to develop the renovation/renewal projects. In the case of historical areas, the local government shall implement the project jointly with TOKI or search for other partnerships. In both of the case study areas of this research, in Suleymaniye and Fener-Balat-Ayvansaray, municipalities have awarded the development of the projects to private enterprises rather than TOKI. This highlights that the role of the state in the formation of the market in the URPs in historical areas is differentiated from gecekondu areas. However, although there are differences in the formation of the
market around URPs due to the involvement of different levels of state agencies, it is also noticed that the planning process of the URPs has similarities. In the dilapidated historical URP areas, the projects are prepared by the successful private firms and then submitted to the Regional Council of Conservation of Cultural and Natural Heritage for Renewal Areas (in short Renewal Boards)\(^{22}\) – which is a higher conservation board established for the approval of renewal projects and eliminates the authority of other conservation boards. After the approval of the project by the Renewal Boards, the projects are sent to the municipal councils. In this process, the law gives permission to the local government to prepare and implement the projects in partnership with the private sector and, furthermore, the local government has the right to invite firms, i.e. to award a firm by invitation rather than competition among them. Both the FBA and the Tarlabasi projects, for example, were given to the same developer (Calik Group) by invitation (see also Chapter 5).

In the whole process, no opportunity for participation of other actors was provided. The involvement of the ‘rightful owners’ in the URP areas to the project process could only become possible after the projects were approved by the municipal councils of district and metropolitan municipalities, and the negotiation processes between the rightful owners and public authorities had begun. The offers to the rightful owners and other terms and conditions were determined in the scope of projects, hence the participation to the project process may be varied in different project areas (for the general scope of the offers, see section 3.2.3). The differences in terms and conditions and offers to the rightful owners are also observed in the case study areas of this research which is discussed in the analysis chapters in detail.

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\(^{22}\) The Regional Boards of Conservation of Cultural and Natural Assets in the Renewal Areas are established in the scope of Law no. 5366 to investigate the proposed renewal projects, listing the cultural assets in the renewal areas, investigation of restitution and restoration projects in these areas and to evaluate the application from institutions and individuals. They examine and approve the renewal projects independently of the conservation boards and conservation rules. (For more information see http://www.korumakurullari.gov.tr/TR,89228/genel-bilgiler.html Last Access: 3.05.2014)
Law no. 5366 and the development of URPs have been criticised from various aspects. To start with, it has been claimed that the law is not based on conservation priorities in the historical areas but suggests renewal as a means to increase and redistribute the rent in these areas (Turkun and Yapici 2008; Dincer 2011). The law does not define a comprehensive conservation framework; rather it provides the local government in the conservation areas with the freedom to carry out rent-increasing projects, which have been developed in order to transform the existing social, economic and physical conditions of these areas.

Not only the Law no. 5366, but formation of the whole legal framework of URP, changes in the planning regulations and distribution of power among the public authorities are criticised by different actors. The critiques mainly underline that the changes cause centralisation of the planning processes, partial planning structure, abolition of participation mechanisms, a highly top-down approach to the spatial development and changed the dynamics of state intervention in space (Turkun 2011; Dincer 2011; Erbas and Erbil 2013; Celik 2013).

The restructuring of TOKI and TOKI’s URPs and mass housing projects supplied for the inhabitants of the URP areas demonstrate a clear picture of why a restructuring process in the administrative structure and changes in the regulations to implement URPs was needed by the state. In the next section, TOKI projects and how central government became the main actor in the newly emerging land and property market is discussed. How the discourse of URPs developed and why they have created tension are examined in the following section.

3.2.2. Formation of the new land market by the central state
The central state agency, TOKI was chosen to implement the new urban agenda and form the new urban land and property market. The restructuring of TOKI as a market disciplinary tool started shortly after AKP came to power. In 2003, TOKI was given the right to develop profit-making projects by establishing real estate companies or becoming a partner of private-sector actors. TOKI’s role is not
modelled as a developer; instead it is formed as the ‘land supplier’ to the market for a variety of housing and other projects. Since 2004, TOKI’s land stock and authority on the state-owned lands have increased enormously.\textsuperscript{23} TOKI also became the planning authority in many urban development projects including the URP areas. Hence, the central government took over not only the role of the land supplier to the market, but also the planning power on these lands.

The changing urbanisation pattern in Istanbul, reorganisation of the city and increasing land value can be read from the TOKI project carried out in Istanbul (Table 3.1.).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.1.: Projects of TOKI in Istanbul – May 2014</th>
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<tr>
<td>Project Type</td>
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<tr>
<td>Revenue Sharing/Resource Generating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emlak Konut REIC Projects</td>
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<tr>
<td>Administrative Housing/Housing+infrastructure projects</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urban Regeneration</td>
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<tr>
<td>Low Income/Poor Housing Projects</td>
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<tr>
<td>Housing for Disaster Victims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure/social complex/others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
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</table>

Revenue sharing/resource generating\textsuperscript{24} and the Emlak Konut Real Estate Investment Company (the joint real-estate company of TOKI)\textsuperscript{25} projects are the resource-

\textsuperscript{23} In 2004, the General Directorate of Land Office was abolished and all its land stock was transferred to TOKI relying on the Law no. 5273. By the end of this transfer, the land stock of TOKI had increased from 16.5 million m\textsuperscript{2} to 194 million m\textsuperscript{2} nationwide.

\textsuperscript{24} The housing projects developed on this model “targets mostly high-income families under the frame of profit-making characteristics [and] provide[s] short-term financial funds” \url{http://www.toki.gov.tr/english/3.asp} last accessed in 5.05.2014; also see the Clause 4 of TOKI Regulation released on 3.05.2006 in the Official Gazette: Revenue Share As a Compensation of Land Sale: The share of the revenue generated from the sales of the outcome of the final project or a part
generating projects of TOKI, or in other words the housing project of TOKI for high-income families. When the number of resource-generating projects of TOKI in Ankara is concerned, it is seen that there are nine projects of this sort; likewise in Izmir, there are only six resource generating projects. This suggests that projects in Istanbul are of primary importance to TOKI.

In the new development scheme under the TOKI authority, the central city has been proposed to be reorganised for (upper) middle class settlements, whereas the periphery has been planned as satellite cities for low income groups. To note, the housing supply for low income households was not introduced to the market as rental or free; instead, another housing market was developed for the low income families, which also included the residents of the URP areas (Kuyucu 2009; Karaman 2013; Unsal and Turkun 2014). Therefore, URPs have been designed both as part of a land supply mechanism for new urban development projects and as a way of including low income groups in the new housing market that TOKI has established.

of the project - which has sanctioned by the administration and all its expenditures compensated by the developer - between the administration [i.e. TOKI] and the developer according to the ratio determined in the protocol.

25 Emlak Konut REIC is the real estate investment company of TOKI which was inherited from the Emlak (Real Estate) Bank which was established in the early years of the Republic in order to support the construction sector and housing development. In 2001, the bank was liquidated by the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency and the real estate assets of the bank have been transferred to TOKI and in 2002, Emlak Konut Real Estate Investment Company was established. (for more information see http://www.emlakkonut.com.tr/Projeler/profil.html, http://www.tasfiyeemlak.com/sayfalar.asp?LanguageID=1&cid=2&id=11&b=detay Access: 05.05.2014).

26 TOKI defines the mass housing projects as ‘social housing’; but, the only distinguishing feature of these projects in the housing market is the long-term mortgage system that TOKI offers. Even the housing units built for the poor are built for sale to this income group. Therefore, a more accurate classification of TOKI’s projects could be ‘affordable housing’ which offers a ‘housing ownership programme’ (Karaman 2013: 723).
Figure 3.1.: Images from the satellite settlements, mass housing units and urban regeneration projects of TOKI

TOKI Kucukcekmece Bezirganbahce Mass Housing Project – Inhabitants of Ayazma-Tepeustu URP project were sold flats from this project area (Photo: Personal Archive, July 2009)

Istanbul Maltepe Basibuyuk Neighbourhood TOKI urban regeneration project. This project targetted the gecekondu owners living in the area but although the project was built, gecekondu regeneration could not be actualised because of the resistance in the neighbourhood. (Photo: Personal Archive, July 2009)
Some indications of the development scheme's meaning are given by Erdogan Bayraktar, the ex-chairman of TOKI, in a speech at the 4th Summit of Real Estate Investors in 2004:

TOKI considers urban regeneration projects in the gecekondu areas to be of great importance to the framework of its programme. The transformation process will improve the informally constructed and unplanned areas and also supply new and planned lands for prestigious projects and consequently the valuable lands in the city centres will be developed as new special project areas, which will increase the prestige of the city. Besides, citizens will have been provided with healthier housing services in other places which will be provided with proper urban functions. The urban transformation process is intended to create opportunities for new investments, new employment and production facilities, and to raise the quality of life in urban areas. (Bayraktar 2004, emphasis added)

In 2012, after the establishment of the Ministry of Environment and Urbanisation and transfer of the power of TOKI to the ministry, the scope of the urban regeneration project was extended with the Law on Transformation of Areas under Disaster Risk (Law no. 6303) and it became possible to designate any area as an URP area.

### 3.2.3. Development of the discourse and project scheme of urban regeneration projects

Spreading out all around the city, URPs plan to change the entire fabric and the social and economic relations of the designated areas, which would affect a big segment of the population. For many, URPs mean demolition, displacement, forced eviction and dispossession, and hence they are widely resisted by the residents of the URP areas and some other actors. What do URPs bring to the neighbourhoods, why are they perceived as a threat for many and how do they cause opposition movements? The answers to these questions are connected with the political economy of the current urbanisation process and the reasons for emerging opposition movements in the URP areas.

The below “Map of Evictions”, prepared in 2010 for the Open City Exhibition by a group of volunteers, shows the state-led URPs in Istanbul which had already caused
or are expected to cause large-scale demolition, increase in land value, dispossession, displacement and relocation of poverty (Bartu-Candan and Kolluoglu 2008; Baysal 2010; Kuyucu and Unsal 2010; Turkmen and Lovering 2011; Turkun and Aslan 2014):

As mentioned above, the URP areas were selected from the places where the market relations are not properly settled. These areas are working-class neighbourhoods, urban poverty areas and squatter settlements of the city, all of which are used in the construction of a legitimising discourse of the URPs by the state. The discourse used by the government for legitimising the projects is a story of exclusion and ignorance of a big part of society and of the historical development of the city. In 2006, in one of his speeches, PM Erdogan referred to gecekondus as “tumour-like structures surrounding the cities”\(^\text{27}\), and in another one in 2008, he

\(^{27}\) In this speech, he recommended people to buy houses from TOKI: “Go and buy a house for 200 TL instalments [per month]. They [gecekondus] are creating ghettos.” Şehri ur gibi sardılar niye zavallı
labelled the old Roman Gypsy neighbourhood Sulukule as ucube (freakish). The exclusionary but at the same time legitimising discourse of URPs and the necessity of state intervention in space can be seen in the speech of ex-chairman of TOKI, Bayraktar (2007):

> It is not possible to talk about any development in Turkey until the gecekondu problem is solved. It is known that the gecekondu areas, the paralysed places, are the root of terror, drug use, paralysed views about the state, illiteracy and health problems. Turkey certainly should get rid of illegal buildings that are not earthquake-resistant.

While the criminalisation of urban poverty areas and gecekondu neighbourhoods characterised the agenda of legitimisation of URPs, on the other hand, the occupants of these areas are regarded as customers of the newly emerging housing stocks of TOKI. The future’s displaced population is included in the URP scheme by engaging them in the newly emerging housing market.

As mentioned in the previous section, the URPs are prepared without informing property owners and other possible actors in the historic sites and without input from them; and inhabitants are left with little right to have a say about the project in their neighbourhoods. The opportunity to participate is made available only after the concept project has been approved. Dincer (2011: 47) argues that the law assumes an “authoritative planning attitude and project development methodology whereby professionals [i.e. the project stakeholders] are in charge of all decision making”.

In this process, the rights of property owners to decide on their own property are very limited which raises the problem of violation of property rights. There are several options offered to only property owners in the project scheme which are

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28 Prime Minister Erdogan said that people will be grateful for what their government did in Sulukule: “You will say that we are grateful to you for saving Sulukule from its freak condition and for bringing it to a modern, contemporary state, though covered with historic streets.” “Erdoğan: Sulukule’yi ucube halden kurtaracağız”, 20.03.2008, NTV, http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/439760.asp Last Access: 05.01.2014
strictly defined. These options are all formed in relation to the project without allowing any alternative or rejection option (see Chapter 5 and 6 for the offers). In this process, first, the municipality determines the ‘rightful owners’ who may negotiate the offers. Tenants, for example, are not included in the project scheme as ‘rightful’; this condition causes fragmentation among the residents of the URP areas at the very beginning of the project process by only including the property owners in the project process.

If none of the offers is accepted by the property owners, the responsible public authority can expropriate the properties in exchange for the minimum value determined by the expropriation board. Expropriation of the houses serves as an effective threat to property owners (Turkun 2011) and manipulates the opposition towards the discussion of the values of the houses (Kuyucu and Unsal 2010; Sen and Turkmen 2014).

The current URP scheme in Turkey appears to be an example of capital accumulation and circulation by dispossessing the lands of low income groups, which is an appropriate example of David Harvey’s (2006, 2008) analysis of “accumulation by dispossession” to explain the current global urban development projects (see Chapter 2). A state-led market has been created to run this accumulation process in which the public authorities have been given the absolute authority. At this point, it is worth noting the argument of Anna Haila (2007) about the developing land market and the role of the state in the cities of the global South and Asef Bayat’s (1997, 2012) framing of strong and illiberal states in these countries. As Harvey contends, ‘accumulation by dispossession’ is observed globally in the neoliberal urbanisation; but how the land market is created, given its meaning and how the actors of the market are positioned in the context of illiberal (authoritarian) states are topics that differentiate the development of the market relations and dynamics of contention in the cities of the global South, such as Istanbul, from the urban grievances that emerge in the global North.
The current urbanisation in Istanbul needs to be read within the political economic framework and the evolution of the land market in the context of a strong state regime which has immense power to establish and control the market dynamics. All this process, however, has not been experienced smoothly. Urban opposition movements have emerged and developed their capacity to organise collective action against the URPs and other contemporary transformation projects. It should be noted that, while the government interventions constitute the basis for the resistance, the resistance, on the other side, shapes the urban development agenda of the government. Hence, analysing the emergence, militancy and incidence of these groups and their relations with the state would provide a compelling argument about the contentious character of the current urbanisation agenda and how the urban space is shaped, perceived, conceived and reclaimed. In the next part, the actors of the contemporary urban movements in Istanbul are briefly explained in order to give an insight of different groups, their impacts and the network of the movements.

3.3. Urban Movements in Istanbul

There are very few studies specifically focusing on urban movements in Turkey. This is not due to a lack of urban movements (UMs); rather, opposition and resistance in the urban environment have been studied in the framework of contentious issues, such as the development of gecekondu settlements or currently the URPs. Recently, in response to the highly contested nature of contemporary urbanisation, there has emerged a growing literature about urban struggles, covering the opposition to mega projects, URPs, and the privatisation of public spaces. The Gezi Parki uprising (or June Uprising), which started in Istanbul in 2013 before spreading out across the whole country, had a transformative impact on this developing literature, especially in terms of the focus points and analysis of the

29 For a range of urban resistance and opposition case studies from past and present, see Aslan 2004; Turkmen 2006; Deniz 2010; Kuyucu and Unsal 2010; Sen 2010; Lovering and Turkmen 2011; Aslan and Sen 2011; Baysal 2011 Unsal 2013; Karaman 2013; Eraydin and Tasan-Kok 2014;
current mobilisation and power relations. However, this is a very young literature, which is only beginning to theorise urban movements in Turkey.

After the 2000s, the changing urban agenda and intervention of the state in spatial restructuring on a massive scale led to a rising grassroots movement. Mega projects surrounding the city, occupation and privatisation of public lands for new developments and urban renewal/regeneration projects in the residential areas, which are all state-led projects, have been resisted by various groups. Widely used slogans that neatly frame the motivation of the contemporary UMs are “Don’t touch” and “Take your hands off” my home, neighbourhood, school, hospital, park, forest and various other places targeted for the new urban development projects.

Figure 3.2.: “Don’t Touch My School”
The “Don’t Touch My School” (Okuluma Dokunma Platformu) was established in 2007 against the privatisation of the land of the blind people’s school. Picture was taken March 14, 2009 in a protest in front of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality. (Retrieved: www.sendika.org/2009/03/engelliler-bir-kez-daha-okuluma-dokunma-dediler/, Access: 09.05.2014)

Figure 3.3.: Urban Movements March
As a result of the contemporary urbanisation process, groups have been organised around various topics, either city-wide or within some specific locality. The number of groups, their focus areas, networks and repertoire of actions are changing quickly due to the increasing number of projects and changing dynamics of contention. A network of these groups has evolved in the process; however, it is still difficult to identify a unified urban movement that brings together all the actors of the UM groups.

In the post-2000 era, three kinds of organisational bodies directly oriented to the urban struggle can be categorised as the meeting point of various actors: professional organisations such as *Chamber of Architects* (CoA) and *Chamber of City Planners* (CoC); city-wide urban movement groups (CWUMG) such as *IMECE-People’s Urbanism Movement*, *Dayanismaci Atolye (Solidarity Studio)* and *SOS Istanbul*; and finally the neighbourhood associations (NAs) established to oppose the URPs in particular localities. In addition to these structures, some political groups and parties participate in the struggle in various ways. Also noticeable are the *Platforms*, which are umbrella organisations formed around particular projects/topics as alliances of the above-mentioned groups, as well as various kinds...
of other organisations such as trade unions, ecology movement groups. *Istanbul Neighbourhood Associations Platform, Urban Movements’ Forum, Haydarpasa Solidarity Platform, Life Platform instead of a Third Bridge, Defence of Northern Forests, Don’t Touch my School* are examples of these structures, which were established to defend particular areas. One important example is the *Taksim Solidarity Platform*,\(^{30}\) which was formed by 128 organisations and became the leading organisation of the Gezi Parki uprising, which began in Istanbul in 2013 and spread across the country.

In general, the movements of this era can be categorised as Type 4 in Pickvance’s categorisation, which emerge against physical threats such as demolition and displacement caused by URPs. However, the urban movement of this era includes a variety of groups taking action on various topics and using a broader repertoire of action. Therefore, other types of movements, such as those demanding the improvement of services or participation are also actors of the present contentious urban politics.

It is not possible to offer a comprehensive analysis of the mobilisation dynamics of all groups in this limited space. In what follows I shall highlight and summarise the contributions of the three categories of UM groups in the development of the opposition and resistance in the URPs: professional organisations, CWUMGs and neighbourhood associations. This brief summary was possible only thanks to my close association with and involvement in these groups since 2006. In summarising the involvement and contribution of these groups, I use the knowledge and experience I gained as an active member of these groups, as well as the emerging literature on UMs.

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3.3.1. Professional organisations

Professional organisations such as the Chambers play a fundamental role in UMs throughout their history. Chambers monitor and approve the projects developed by their members, follow the projects developed by the public institutions and take them to court if they have any objections. Chambers can directly raise legal objections related to their professional areas.

Chambers can take cases directly to the courts without the support of any other party, such as the property owners or any locals. Many cases show that projects have been suspended with the decision of the courts after the chambers have taken them to court.\textsuperscript{31} Especially in the case of mega projects, urban transformation projects and privatisation of public lands, the legal objection raised by the chambers has a crucial role in the repertoire of opposition. These areas are subjected to mobilisation processes different to those in the URP areas, since the issues here do not directly pose a threat to the local population.

Chambers have the right to object to the URPs on the grounds of urbanisation principles of conservation and public interest. As explained in Chapter 5, CoA went to court for the suspension and cancellation of the URPs in the historical sites of Sulukule, FBA and Tarlabasi. In FBA and Sulukule, the courts granted the suspension of the projects. At the time of writing, the Tarlabasi case has yet to be finalised.

Although legal action by Chambers is an important means of opposition, by itself it is not enough to stop or transform the projects. It does not bring about the immediate suspension of project implementation; the projects are continued and cause unlawful and irreparable damage to project sites until a decision is finally

\textsuperscript{31} There are many cases, from plans to projects, that the Chambers have taken to the court. For some of the court cases that Istanbul Metropolitan Branch of Chamber of Architects carried out between the years 1998-2010, see: \url{http://www.mimarist.org/application/uploads/assets/files/hukukcalismalari01.pdf} and \url{http://www.mimarist.org/application/uploads/assets/files/hukukcalismalari02.pdf}. For some of the court cases that Istanbul Metropolitan Branch of Chamber of City Planners carried out see: \url{http://www.spoist.org/dava-metinleri/blog} and \url{http://www.spoist.org/eksi-davalar/blog} (Access: 10.05.2014)
made. For example, in Sulukule, where the implementation of the URP began in 2008, the residents of the area had been evicted and the project was almost completed by the time the court cancelled the project in 2012. Moreover, the legislative power of the government which caused many changes has diminished the incidence of legal actions and made it difficult for the Chambers to take legal action. (Turkun and Yapici 2008; Turkun 2011).

3.3.2. City wide urban movement groups

CWUMGs are non-traditional, non-hierarchical organisational structures without compulsory membership rules which have emerged in the current contentious context. With their horizontal and semi-organised structures, CWUMGs have the ability to act in different areas and on different scales, put assorted topics in their agenda and bring activists from varied social and political backgrounds. This structural variety allows for a more flexible, proactive and political agenda, including a variety of topics and a wider repertoire of actions for CWUMGs.

Regarding the current activist profile of the CWUMGs, which is composed of academics, professionals and students, it could be argued that CWUMGs are middle-class activist groups. For example, IMECE was established in 2006, chiefly by urban planners and researchers who had common concerns about the current urbanisation dynamics (IMECE 2011b). Later, the group expanded with the participation of various other activists from different professional backgrounds. Another important activist group, the Solidarity Studio (DA), was established in 2006 by a group of academics and planning students, aiming to develop a progressive planning scheme in URP areas as an alternative to the project developed by the government (DPA 2007; Yalcintan 2007; Cavusoglu 2008).

32 For more information see: http://sulukulegunlugu.blogspot.co.uk/2012/06/sulukule-projesine-iptal-karar-verildi.html Access: 5.11.2013

33 For example, with the recent law on the Areas under Disaster Risk No. 6303, the state has been given an open-ended power to expropriate the private properties under condition that the agents of the state will determine.
The CWUMGs’ approach to the URPs and contemporary urbanisation dynamics as a whole is eminently critical. Although the repertoire of actions and short- or long-term targets aimed at these actions vary between the groups, current urban development and particularly URPs are perceived by these groups as a threat to the well-being of inhabitants and would bring about destruction of livelihoods, forced eviction, displacement, dispossession altering the social and economic organisation of the city for the benefit of a small segment of society (DPA 2007; IMDP 2007; IMECE 2011b; Cavusoglu and Strutz 2014). Even though the actions of the activist groups start from a critical perspective, the militancy and incidence of demands and actions of groups and their impact on the grassroots are diverse.

The frame of actions of CWUMGs, especially in the struggle against the URPs, can be summarised in three groups:

- Direct involvement in local actions in the particular areas in collaboration with the local organisation, i.e. neighbourhood organisations (NAs) (such as organising events and supporting the actions of NAs; participating in neighbourhood meetings and discussions; and preparing alternative plans with the contribution of residents)
- Development and support of networks among different areas of struggle, either among different neighbourhoods or between local struggles and other struggle areas (such as organising the visits of NAs to other neighbourhoods, organising meetings with different organisations)
- Promotion and discussion of problems affecting the local spheres in the national/international spheres by means of lobbying.

Regarding the range of actions and the means that CWUMGs use, the contribution of these groups to the struggle can be summarised as linking different struggle areas; developing the networks; politicising the problems; producing knowledge and making it accessible; organising actions; and increasing the public knowledge and visibility of the problem area and struggles. The repertoire of actions
undertaken by these groups includes making press statements; organising workshops, forums and other kinds of meetings to provide a public sphere for discussions and share knowledge; producing reports on contested topics for common sharing; participating in the activities of NAs as well as organising particular activities in the NAs; using social media channels to spread activities and information; developing and participating in national and international networks; video activism and documenting; organising mass demonstrations; and lastly using professional, technical knowledge to produce alternatives to current urban politics, such as alternative plans to those supported by state agencies.

CWUMGs typically establish relations with a particular locality if any broker (McAdam et al. 2001; Nicholls 2009) exists to develop relations throughout the process. In other words, a ‘call’ from the neighbourhoods by a representational body, such as an NA, or part of pre-established relations, is a precondition of the cultivation of these relations.

The relationships of CWUMGs to the other groups change according to the needs and development of the struggle. Both the CWUMGs and NAs advance the discourses and actions entailed in the process. The relations between NAs and the project holders, especially the state agency, have a profoundly important role in the evolution of these relations. There are cases, for example, where the CWUMG alters its relations with the locality if the struggle in the neighbourhoods is transformed into a process of individual bargaining over property rental prices (Kuyucu and Unsal 2010), or the struggle has exclusionary characteristics towards the non-property owners to increase individual benefits (IMECE 2011b).

Ultimately, the factors determining the dynamics of contention in the urban conflict are the public sphere, which allows discussions of urban politics and opposition, and the network created and occupied by these groups. CWUMGs are important actors in the opposition to the current urban development scheme and they have made a fundamental contribution to the struggles of the NAs. In particular, their efforts to
make knowledge accessible and understandable by the public have made a significant contribution to the opposition movements and to the development of alternative agendas. As McAdam et al. (2001) mention, opportunities and threats only come to the agenda if they are seen by the actors, and in Istanbul’s case, CWUMGs have an important role in publicising the contested topics. In Istanbul’s case, as mentioned in IMECE’s analysis (2011a), the public can only participate in discussion if they have been informed about the process. Similarly, DPA (2007) notes that people’s lack of knowledge about the legal or technical issues about the projects leads to a weak stand-point against the projects. In mobilising the people, therefore, producing the knowledge and making it accessible to the public are priorities.

Regarding the current conditions of the contentious urban politics in Turkey, the importance of publicising knowledge by the middle-class professions, either in the professional organisations or CWUMGs, could be included in the role of the middle-class groups in the urban struggle. In his analysis of UMs, Pickvance (1985) stresses the impact of middle-class involvement in UMs, suggesting that middle-class people have better access to urban resources and networks, as well as the social capital needed to respond to the problems. The knowledge produced by these groups in the context of Istanbul is both a mobilising and strengthening factor which helps to avoid the conditions created by the lack of information.

In this immensely contested ongoing struggle, it remains difficult to draw a clear conclusion from the incidence of these groups in the struggle of URP. Yet it is clear that the actions of these CWUMGs have increased the visibility, militancy and incidence of the urban movement groups as a whole.

### 3.3.3. Neighbourhood organisations

In many neighbourhoods designated as URP areas, residents formed neighbourhood associations (NAs) to organise collective opposition at the local level (see the Appendix A). NAs and their relations with other actors of contentious
politics are novel distinguishing features of the opposition movement, and are particularly characteristic of this period.

NAs against the URP scheme of the government were first established in the gecekondu neighbourhoods. Unlike the political characteristics of the struggle in the gecekondu areas during the 1970s, when there were stronger ties with the broader political movements particularly on the left, contemporary NAs are not politically and ideologically driven organisations. This does not mean that political issues or groups are avoided; rather, NAs’ framing of struggle is limited to a narrower set of issues, most of which concern the URP, and this focus brings different political views together around a common problem.

NAs are established against the threats coming with the URPs: violation of rights, dispossession and displacement. The struggle of NAs is grounded on the right to housing and property ownership, access to urban resources and collective consumption services and democratic representation and participation in local governance (see the Box 3.1. below). Militancy in performing this discourse changes according to the local dynamics and leadership of each NA.

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**Box 3.1.: Demands of neighbourhood associations**

In 2007, thirteen NAs (all from irregular settlements) issued a declaration after the symposium called “Neighbourhoods are Speaking” organised by the NAs with the help of DA:

- We think that (...) the state-led “urban transformation” projects and implementations intended to promote “distribution of rent” to the capital in the name of creating a global city.
- Although we are the citizens who carry out our duties of citizenship, we are neglected and expected to go into exile from our livelihoods.
- We, who built their neighbourhoods and friendships in a fifty-year period of labour and effort, do not concede the destruction of our lives and our futures of debt.
- We want equal access to sufficient collective urban services – from shelter to
infrastructure, transportation, health and education—without leaving our
neighbourhoods, and we demand that our urban rights to be met with legal assurance.

- We find these projects and implementations, which have great impacts on our lives but
at the same time neglect us, antidemocratic.
- We call for the state to produce projects which also assure the rights of our tenant
neighbours, to meet the duties of a social state.
- We support plans to protect the historical, social, cultural and ecological values of our
livelihoods and improve the quality of the space. In that regard, we want planning
works which are based on ‘in situ’ solution, value our necessities and opinions and
allow us to participate.

NAs base their struggles primarily on the local scale and the means each NA uses
and relations to other parties differ based on the historical, social and political
backgrounds of the neighbourhoods. Among the most distinctive factors affecting
the mobilisation and militancy of the neighbourhoods are the political structures of
the neighbourhoods which affect the framing of the problems, ability to take
collective action and develop the demands (Deniz 2010; Yildiz 2010; Lovering and
Turkmen 2011; Turkmen 2011). The neighbourhoods with histories of political
struggle, for example, have tended to be better organised, with a greater capacity
for collective action and better access to the networks. As one of the oldest NAs,
Gulsuyu and Gulensu neighbourhoods’ association, which became a leading
organisation in the struggle against URPs, is a good example of this case.

The Gulsuyu and Gulensu gecekondu neighbourhoods, located on the hills of
Maltepe district, have been organised by leftist political groups since the 1960s and
70s, and still have a politically active population. When the neighbourhoods were
designated as URP areas in 2004, Gulsuyu residents were able to organise
themselves quickly, contacting professionals who could inform them about the
process, and in a short while, the neighbourhoods got organised and raised
objections to the plans with a petition (Yalcintan 2009; Yildiz 2010; Lovering and
Turkmen 2011). This rapid response to the plans marked the beginning of a new
stage in the neighbourhood resistance. The NA in Gulsuyu and Gulensu
neighbourhoods became an important group in the evolution of the opposition network on a broader scale which eventually evolved into the Istanbul Neighbourhood Associations Platform (INAP).

The immediate response of Gulsuyu-Gulensu is directly related to the ability of residents to take political and collective actions and to their relations with the state authorities, which had developed through a series of controversies since the establishment of the neighbourhood (Lovering and Turkmen 2011). The politically conservative and nationalist Basibuyuk neighbourhood across the valley from Gulsuyu and Gulensu was also designated an URP area in 2004; however, the response of the residents did not evolve as in the case of their leftist neighbours. Due to the political fragmentation between the neighbourhoods, Basibuyuk also did not collaborate with Gulsuyu-Gulensu neighbourhoods in the beginning of the process. However, when the state attacked Basibuyuk violently with riot police in order to implement the project and the neighbourhood was kept under siege by police forces for two months, the neighbourhoods were united (Lovering and Turkmen 2011; Sen and Turkmen 2014). In this political process, it is observed that people of Basibuyuk neighbourhood began to contact different groups and also expand political mobilisation for themselves (Sen and Turkmen 2014).

In establishing the network between the neighbourhoods, two actors can be identified as the brokers: first, leading NAs, which are very well able to organise and access other groups and activists; and second, the CWUMGs and activists.
In March 2007, a number of activities organised in Sulukule by the Sulukule Platform against the URP project. One of the activities was organised by IMECE was to paint the houses as a contribution to the beautification of the neighbourhood. IMECE collected the wall paints from the other URP neighbourhoods as a mean of solidarity. This card on the left was sent to the neighbourhoods in solidarity. (Photo: personal archive)

It should be noted that the network of NAs is not firmly unified and does not have the strong capability of developing ‘interpretive frameworks’ (Nicholls 2009). Rather, the network still develops actions according to the intensity and urgency of the threat in a particular locality. To illustrate this, the weak relations between the gecekondu neighbourhoods and historical URP areas can be considered. Although the projects’ impacts on the inhabitants of both areas are similar, the differences in the formation of the struggle, differences in the project process and the property relations can be plausibly considered as the main reasons for the weak relations between these two categories of URP areas. It can be argued that gecekondu areas and historical places have separate networks shaped by their specific conditions, which is also observed in the case study areas of this research. The fragmentation of the struggle in these places and differentiation of the mobilisation dynamics also influenced the selection of the case study areas of this research (see Chapter 4).

The relations between the gecekondu URP areas and historic URP areas also highlight an important stigmatisation between the actors of the struggle. From the
perspective of the residents of the historical areas, gecekondu areas are seen as illegally occupied, paralysed places (Turkun et al. 2010). The gecekondu owners regard historical residential areas as criminalised places: according to the discourse of the state, these areas are closely associated with ‘terrorists’, ‘prostitutes’ and ‘drug users’ (ibid.). The stigmatisation of different places and lives of residents by others who are under similar threats and conditions is a reflexive behaviour to protect the stigmatising parties’ own existence and well-being against the threats, as Wacquant (2008: 239-40) mentions; it is observed among the actors in URP struggles and limits the possibility of a unified struggle.\textsuperscript{34}

It should be noted that these neighbourhoods came together on platforms such as the Urban Movements’ Forum, which was established during the 2010 European Social Forum held in Istanbul. It is difficult to say that all the neighbourhoods came together under a united banner, but, at least with the network of such platforms, the processes and actions in each neighbourhood are transferred to the agendas of other groups, enabling the emergence of collective action. Still, the actions by the NAs are mostly concerned with local problems. Most of the NAs appeal to traditional forms of action to defend their locality, such as objecting at the juridical level, petitioning, organising protest in prominent places, such as in front of the public institutions or central areas, and making press declarations.

The repertoire of action and the militancy of NAs are affected by the relations established with the state agencies. As mentioned earlier, in the scope of URPs, residents are first offered some options which are subjected to negotiations; and eviction and displacement follow these negotiations (Kuyucu and Unsal 2010; Karaman 2013, 2014). Negotiations over the value of property are always on the residents’ agenda and have an impact on the militancy and incidence of the movement (IMECE 2011a).

\textsuperscript{34} As observed in the case study areas of this research, people apply such stigma not only to members of other neighbourhoods, but also to members of their own, often in order to explain the dilapidated conditions in which they themselves live.
The existence of an NA in a URP neighbourhood does not mean that all the residents fully support the organisation, or that in general they resist the URP. As the case studies of this research suggest, NAs might not have the full support of the residents of the neighbourhoods or be able to organise the needs of the residents. For example, some perceive the URP as an opportunity for upward mobilisation or to increase the value of their property (Turkmen 2011; Karaman 2013; Cavusoglu and Strutz 2014).

This point leads the discussion regarding the representational power of the NAs. The inclusiveness of, and level of participation in the NAs are also key factors determining their impact on the politics of everyday life of the neighbourhood in question. During the Gulsuyu experience, for example, the low level of female participation in the meetings and decision-making processes was observed as a feature of the representation in the NA (DPA 2007; Cavusoglu 2008). Another factor that affects participation in the process is the technicality of the URP discussions, which excludes some people from the process (Cavusoglu 2008). When the discussion moves to technical issues, the residents tend to defer to the ‘knowledgeable people’, and this prevents them from participating directly in the decision-making process.

The development of opposition is nevertheless a very dynamic process, transforming itself in accordance with different conditions and experiences, which accumulate over time and cause changes in the militancy and incidence of urban movement groups (Perouse 2011). This research aims to contribute to the analysis of the factors that affect this dynamic process and to discuss the arguments and observations mentioned above.
3.4. Conclusion

Istanbul is undergoing a constant transformation process which takes shape according to the dominant political economic paradigm. The contention in each period has a different dynamic of mobilisation and repertoire of action.

At present, the strong state and ‘neoliberalism’ took the role of establishing market relations and reorganisation of space in Istanbul. Many urban development projects which aim to transform existing social, economic and physical structures of the city have come on to the agenda and a new urban land market, which has been hugely regulated by the state’s power, has been established.

Contemporary urban movements that have emerged in Istanbul demonstrate that the intervention by the state in spatial relations is the main triggering force of mobilisation; and along with the ways in which interventions are actualised, the social and political dynamics of the places are determining factors of the features of mobilisation.

The contemporary urban struggle is diverse, varied and developing remarkably according to the changing conditions. From professional organisations to local bodies like neighbourhood associations, opposition in the city spread out quickly. There are still problems and disadvantages in terms of a unified struggle, or a struggle for RttC, but in this process, the groups managed to advance their networks and repertoire of actions which also had an influence on the government’s politics. The government did not step backward from the core agenda of their economic programme and urban development; yet, in order to carry on this agenda, many alterations in jurisdiction have been realised. The evolving opposition and resistance cause changes in the strategies of the government and suspension of projects.
In the struggle against the URPs, there are three main bodies which establish a network: professional organisations, city wide urban movement groups and neighbourhood associations. In establishing the network of these groups, the *brokers*, who are the actors doing the brokerage between the groups, become important. However, the brokerage does not work in the same way between different groups and in different places. A network has been established with the help of some leading groups; yet, the ties in this network are still weak due to the nature of the problems and state of emergencies in some cases, and changable mobilisation dynamics in different localities.

Overall, it can be argued that the struggle is a process of accumulation of knowledge and developing the ability to take collective action and adapting to changing conditions. It is hard to reach a conclusion about the success or impacts of the UMs regarding this ongoing, very dynamic and transforming process. In these terms, what limits and encourages collective action, what affects the dynamics of mobilisation are important to know for analysing the contentious urban politics. In the search for these factors, the URP projects and the emerging and developing relations in two URP areas, Fener-Balat-Ayvansaray and Suleymaniye, are analysed in this research.
CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH QUESTIONS, METHODOLOGY AND METHODS

4.1. Introduction

In this chapter, the research rationale, methodology and methods used in the research process are set out. The overarching aim of this research is to contribute to the conceptual and analytical framework of the urban movements’ study area by considering the features of mobilisation in the cities of global South. To do this, the social and political relations underlying contentious urban renewal projects in Istanbul are examined and what limits and what encourages the emergence and development of collective decision-making processes and actions are figured out. In contrast to other collective action studies, this research also takes account of a case of ‘inaction’ in order to provide a deeper, comparative analysis of how people perceive urban issues and problems, and how action emerges in response to them. Thus, the dynamics of conflict in Istanbul are understood through not only the perspectives of the mobilised groups and their relations with other political actors, but also through the relations occurring in the ‘quiet’ places. To achieve these aims, two urban renewal project areas were selected: one where collective action has been developed and the other where it has not.

This research employed a Critical Realist epistemology and methodology. The research is based primarily on qualitative research methods, which are drawn together in a Grounded Theoretical approach. There are five sections in this chapter. The first section discusses the rationale behind the project. The second section discusses the theoretical and methodological considerations behind the chosen methods, explaining the theoretical rationale and critical realist methodology. The third section focuses on the research design and methods that were used in data collection, and gives reasons in favour of an intensive case study and qualitative research approach. The fourth part of the chapter focuses on the research ethics, implementation of data collection, the use of grounded theory and
the details of the methods that were used: the process, difficulties, challenges and limitations of fieldwork are also explained in this section. In the final section, the methods used in the data analysis are described.

### 4.2. Research Rationale

The early 2000s marked the beginning of a new era in the urban political structure of Turkey. The roles of urban political actors underwent redefinition and reform. State agencies, above all the Housing Development Administration of Turkey (TOKI), were given extensive roles in regulating the urbanisation process and establishing a new construction market (Kuyucu 2009; Turkun, Unsal et al. 2014). As discussed in Chapter 3, in this process, URPs became the main means of achieving spatial development and the redistribution of land in the newly emerging market. Though many URPs have not been completed in the time frame of this research, the experiences of completed ones, the given targets of URPs and social and economic analysis of these projects all suggest that the consequences of these projects are forced eviction, displacement and dispossession for at least a large proportion of the predominantly poor population living in the project area (Bartu-Candan and Kolluoglu 2008; Kuyucu and Unsal 2010; Lovering and Turkmen 2011; Sakizlioglu 2014; Turkun 2014). Still, this neoliberal ‘creative destruction’ (Harvey 2006) model of urbanisation is not implemented smoothly, but is resisted in many ways. Tension and conflict arises in the urban sphere but takes different forms in different places. The increasingly interventionist role of the state in the reconfiguration of space and spatial politics caused a significant change in the characteristics of the urban struggle.

In short, this urbanisation process in Istanbul, as in many cities worldwide, has given rise to opposition and struggle, with characteristics different to those of previous struggles in the urban realm. Since 2004, neighbourhood associations have been established to oppose regeneration projects in their neighbourhoods. These associations have established alliances, professional groups have taken action, and
activist groups have emerged with a specific focus on urban projects and issues. Yet it is not possible to frame a unique structure for the opposition groups and mobilisation processes in this contentious environment. The very first aim of this research is to understand the causes of different responses and dynamics of mobilisation in the urban realm.

Recently, URP projects in Istanbul have been widely studied. However, there are few studies on opposition movements which have emerged as a result of the current urbanisation process. Urban struggle has most often been focused on in studies of URPs, the role of the state, and the political economy of current processes of urbanisation. There has also been some comparative research about the mobilisation of neighbourhoods against the URPs (Kuyucu 2009; Deniz 2010; Karaman 2010; Unsal 2013). Overall, there is a critical literature about the current urbanisation dynamics which also provides an analysis of emerging opposition movements. Generally, current urban development projects are highly criticised in the academic sphere. However, the critical responses to the current urbanisation process mostly miss the detailed dynamics of the respective projects, in terms of how they have developed and been implemented, and the collective responses they have generated or failed to generate. Hence, this research aims to contribute to the literature on the dynamics of collective decision-making and mobilisation by taking into account various perspectives and limiting factors in the mobilisation process which have not been investigated so far.

Along with the discursive nature of contemporary urban projects and the role of the state in this contentious environment, the rise of struggle in Istanbul also gave rise to critical academic researches in Istanbul. Many researchers and academics share their works and knowledge in the struggle area. Not only sharing but also contributing to struggle against the current situation is very likely in Turkey. There are lots of examples of academics participating in these discussions; but one of the best-known examples of collaboration between the academy and neighbourhoods is the STOP (Autonomous Planners without Borders) project, which ended with an alternative project to the current project of Fatih Municipality in the famous Roman Neighbourhood Sulukule (for details visit http://www.sulukuleatolyesi.blogspot.co.uk/2009/11/alternatif-proje_06.html, access 12.03.2013). Though the radicalisation and repertoire of involvement by the academy to current urban struggle are varied, UR and other urban projects in Istanbul have been heavily criticised in the academic sphere.
In the construction of research objectives and the rationale of the research, my experiences in the urban struggle in Istanbul had a major impact. The choice of research questions, cases and research methods were informed both by theory and my experiences of the relevant social and political practices.

The involvement of the researcher in an environment where s/he is also a social and/or political ‘insider’ is an important topic of debate in the social sciences. This discussion exceeds the scope of this chapter, but it is important to mention the impact of this involvement on the implementation and practices of the research. As regards research ontology, it is now widely accepted in the social sciences that no research can be value-free. Presupposed values can have greater or lesser degrees of impact on research, but research can never be wholly independent of them (Sayer 2000; Flyvbjerg 2001; Atkinson et al. 2003). Consistent with the critical realist understanding of ontology adopted in the current research (Bhaskar 1989; Sayer 1998, 2000), I hold that the role of the researcher is not purely one of ‘showing the facts’ but of ‘knowing the reality’ and subsequently interpreting it. Knowing is a provisional activity in which the researcher takes part, but s/he is unavoidably a constituent part of the reality that s/he interprets.

In such an interactive process of social research, values have a level of influence comparable with that of ontology, epistemology, theory and practical considerations. Whether or not the researcher is actively involved in the research environment, his/her values influence the progress of the research at every level and from the very start: defining the topic, choice of research area, formulation of the research question(s), choice of methods, formulation of research design and data collection techniques, implementation of data collection, analysis of data, interpretation and conclusion. Researchers who acknowledge the influence of...

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36 I am actively involved in IMECE – Toplumun Şehircilik Hareketi (IMECE – People’s Urbanism Movement, hereafter IMECE) since 2006. I had studied about urban movements in my master degree (Turkmen 2006). But certainly the current dynamics in Istanbul and becoming an activist has had an enormous impact on my academic career. The topic of this research has been developed as a result of, first, my research interests and second, my active participation in the urban struggle in Istanbul.
values stress that, while the research cannot be value-free, the researcher’s existing values must not be allowed to determine which conclusions are reached. The influence of such values must be moderated through a reflective and flexible understanding of context (ibid.), which has been acknowledged throughout the process of this research.

My relation with urban movement groups in Istanbul provided me with insights from theoretical and practical perspectives. As a researcher and activist, I had access to both academic resources and ‘the field.’ My experiences in these two areas were interrelated in my academic and activist roles and each one continually informed the other.

My previous research experiences in relation to URPs and UMs (Lovering and Turkmen 2011; Sen and Turkmen 2014) in conjunction with my activist background allowed me to perceive the gaps in existing research area motivated me to investigate the dynamics of mobilisation and episodes of contention in URP processes. Both in the academic and political spheres, URPs are criticised widely, contested, and contextualised as struggle areas that mobilise local people around urban politics. However, as the present study investigates, in some URP areas, mobilisation in the locality did not emerge. Furthermore, the motivations of some of the mobilised groups have transformed and their repertoire of actions has also changed. Nevertheless, these changes, as well as dynamics of mobilisation and episodes of contention more generally, have not been closely investigated. My previous experiences as a researcher and activist, and the numerous discussions I have been involved in aroused my sense of the need - to go beyond existing critical research in order to understand more fully the dynamics of contentious urban politics, and investigate in detail how URPs are experienced in the localities, what motivates people to mobilise, and what enables or inhibits the emergence of collective action in different localities. Hence, my experiences provided the background for my research questions and the rationality of my research topic.
Being informed about the geographies of struggle in the city and the conditions that prevailed in different project areas helped me in the process of selecting the case study areas for the research. Moreover, at a more general normative level, it is demonstrably the case that my commitments as an activist were significant in how I came to frame the research and its focus on the social consequences of state-led regeneration. Nevertheless, I was aware of the need to distinguish my roles as an activist on the one hand and as a researcher on the other, to ensure my commitment as an activist did not carry over into the way in which I conducted the fieldwork or in how I interpreted the findings. The most important consideration here is that I consciously eliminated from my potential sample of field study sites the areas that I had directly engaged in as an activist. This helped to ensure that I could establish a robust and research-led relationship with all research participants, including government officials as well as members of local residents’ groups. (Details of the research design and use of qualitative methods such as interviews and participant observation are discussed in section 4.5.2).

My previous experience as an activist in relation to different areas of conflict also brought important research benefits. For example, it allowed me to make important comparisons during the interviews and observations that made up the field research. Being able to make these comparisons enriched my field notes and assisted with filtering the data during the research process. Here again, however, I tried to ensure that my political activism and experiences in other areas did not guide or dominate the conversations, interviews and other data collection processes (see section 4.5.1 on ethical concerns of the research). Rather, these experiences were useful in terms of assessing ‘background’ contextual factors, and hence in ensuring that I collected coherent and comprehensive data from the field.

As highlighted in the analysis chapters, the narratives of research participants might be speculative, judgemental about others, and open to misinterpretation. For a researcher who does not have contextual knowledge or experience in relation to the field of research, particularly in terms of how the social and political relations
are formed, interpreting the views and perceptions of respondents could be a major challenge leading to significant misinterpretation of events. Although my field research resulted in demanding and novel experiences for me, being able to draw on prior experiences in the field provided a clearer basis on which to evaluate data coherently (Delamont 2007).

4.3. Methodological Roots of the Research: Setting a Relational Approach

In order to achieve the aims of this research, a dynamic and relational approach, which allows finding out the underlying reasons for different responses, has been adopted. It is claimed here that a pre-determined approach to the mobilisation process in urban space would not provide to understand the detailed trajectories of urban movements in different geographies.

The literature on critical urban studies and urban social movements provides the theoretical and conceptual background for this research. However, as argued in Chapter 2, the conceptual framework of the literature on urban movements is limited in its understanding of differences in responses under similar spatial and political conditions. A fixed conceptual framework to define targets and actions of urban movements are not sufficiently flexible to enable us to analyse the ‘reality’ (Sayer 2000) of social and political relations in different localities which emerge in a dynamic process.

The methodology of the research is based on a critical realist approach. Critical realist epistemology enables an understanding of the structures and dynamics that underlie events and outcomes in the research environment. It is argued that the social world can be understood – and subsequently changed – only if the structures that give rise to events and discourses are also understood (Bhaskar 1989).
Critical realism argues that reality, including society and societal relations, is made up of “deep structures, which condition and make possible the ‘events’ we observe in everyday experience” (Lovering 1990: 39). The deep structures of society are not stable and immutable; rather these structures are transformed in everyday practices. In other words, while structures determine the relations, the relations that are transformed in everyday conflicts and practices also transform the deep structures of society. Besides, there are mechanisms referring to historically specific forms (such as traditions, historically existing institutional apparatuses etc.) which affect the formation of structures (ibid.: 42). It is, in short, a dynamic process in which all the constituent parts of an event are interrelated.

In this dynamic process, critical realism asks “how each element enables or constrains the working of another” (Lovering 1990: 42). In light of this question, the task of research is “to identify which structures are present, but also to show how their conditions of existence are satisfied by identifiable empirical mechanisms – how they ‘hang together’ (ibid.).

Given the limited scope of this chapter, it is not possible to describe all the distinguishing features of critical realism, but the conceptualisation of relations, structures, mechanisms and then causation and abstraction in the critical realist approach are given close attention in the following sections.

4.3.1. What is critical in Critical Realism? Stratification of reality and continuous search for reality
To start the discussion of critical realism, it is worth stressing the meaning of ‘critical’ in this approach. Critical realism suggests an approach in between positivism and relativism, which means both an objective and subjective perspective in the analysis of ‘facts’. The separation of critical realism from the other two approaches is the process of interpretation of facts. According to critical realism, facts (i.e. reality) can be understood if only the structures and mechanisms are understood. An understanding of reality can be achieved neither via pure
observation (positivism) nor speculation (relativism). According to critical realist methodology, it is a stratified process (Bashkar 1989; Sayer 1998, 2000).

Bashkar (1989) stratifies the reality into three domains: *actual*, *real* and *empirical*. The *actual* level includes the ‘events’ prompted by the objects which could be observed. Events can be observed but the causes that make events happen cannot. These are part of the ‘*real*’ domain (i.e. the structures) that is responsible for the occurrences in the ‘*actual*’ domain (i.e. events). According to the critical realist approach, reality cannot be observed, only interpreted (Bhaskar 1989; Sayer 1998, 2000). The structures and mechanisms that cause events are subject to interpretation and speculation. This interpretation, or speculation, pertains to the ‘*empirical*’ domain whereby social research draws conclusions from observations of the ‘*actual*’, i.e. through investigating observed reality. Hence, the *empirical* conclusions depend on the position of the researcher, who speculates about ‘*reality*’ by observing the ‘*actual*’.

Critical realists have two touchstone principals: first, theoretical frameworks that have been produced in the historical and contextual scopes for explaining the mechanisms and structures; and second, empirical analysis to tailor the contingencies and dynamic nature of the mechanisms and structures underlying the conflicts, tensions and contradictions between the structures (Lovering 1990; Peet 1998; Sayer 1998, 2000). Understanding the complexity of facts via scientific, empirical research is crucial in critical realist methodology, but this empiricism is different from the approach in positivism. Positivism holds the idea that the facts can be objectively known through observation, and that the duty of scientific research is to demonstrate these facts by using empirical methods. In contrast to this approach, critical realist epistemology claims that reality goes beyond the observable facts and it is not possible to carry out objective research in the sense that positivism suggests. In the complex world of facts, the duty of a researcher is to ‘understand’ the complexity of the structures that cause the facts, rather than claiming to ‘know’ it (Sayer 2000).
Critical realism is based on a relational approach and rejects *a priori* conditions and definitions because the relations that cause events are unstable, and vary between contexts. These relations are not independent from time and place (Sayer 2000, 1998) or ‘laws of history’ (Lovering 1990); thus, they are established in a dynamic process. The critical position of critical realism is not only about the interpretation of relations and structures, but also about continuing to investigate and interpret further relations that could appear in the emergence of the same ‘facts’ (Lovering 1990; Peet 1998; Sayer 2000).

### 4.3.2. Concrete and abstract

The analysis of reality begins with the distinction between the concrete and abstract and the establishment of the relations between them. According to Sayer (2000), there is a circular relationship between the concrete and abstract throughout the research process.

The concrete is conceptualised as the fact that is to be investigated. The crucial point in defining and setting the concrete is that it is not reducible to the ‘empirical’ (Sayer 1998). For interpreting the concrete at the empirical level, we need concepts to explain it. As Sayer puts it, the *conceptualisation of objects* is one of the fundamental bases of critical realist epistemology (2000: 85). Conceptualisation of objects entails *abstraction*.

A concrete object is a combination of many diverse forces or processes, which are explained by reference to abstract concepts. Unlike the diverse nature of concrete concepts, abstract concepts refer to one side or a ‘partial aspect’ of an object (Sayer 1998: 123). Abstract concepts are used to explain the complex nature of concrete objects. For example, consider the concept ‘household’: if we think only about the house, it would be an abstract, one-sided perspective on the concept. But if we ask questions such as ‘What constitutes a household?’ we would reach various abstract concepts such as gender, family, income, class etc. as constituents of the concrete
concept (‘household’) we mean to describe. Thus ‘household’ becomes a complex, concrete concept that is constituted by various relationships.

The conceptualisation of objects in critical realism starts from investigating the concrete level rather than from a set of abstract concepts. Abstractions are needed to explain the structures that lie behind the facts. Individual structures can be defined in theoretical abstractions (theories of the state, class etc.) but in the everyday setting of the ‘actual’, a pre-determination of these structures and theoretical abstractions challenges the reality. As Lovering says, ‘no a priori analysis can tell us which structure, if any, is key’ (Lovering 1990: 41).

According to Sayer (2000: 87), two actions are needed to understand concrete objects: the first action takes us from concrete to abstract, which means finding useful concepts that systematically explain particular events; and the second takes us from abstract to concrete which means to combine the abstraction with new or other concepts which grasp the concreteness of the objects. Concrete forms are complex structures that establish both necessary/internal and contingent/external relationships. Starting from one-sided abstract concepts to analyse this complex forms would result in failure to grasp the complexities of the concrete (Sayer 1998).

### 4.3.3. Relations and structures

Sayer (2000) distinguishes two types of relations in the emergence of events: external, or contingent relations and internal or necessary relations. External/contingent relations are defined as neither necessary nor impossible in any particular relation; but they may have significant effects in the formation of events. Internal/necessary relations, on the other hand, are necessary because each object is dependent on its relation to the other. For example, the relation between a tenant and landlord is an internal relation as a person cannot be a tenant without a landlord and vice versa. However, in the establishment of this internal relation, external relations can be very important. For example, the ethnic background of both parties might determine all the features of their relationships, which means a
significant impact on the formation of the concrete event between the tenant and the landlord (see Figure 4.1.). Hence, it is necessary to put contingent relations in to the frame in order to understand the concrete events.

In further elaboration of these relations, Sayer (2000: 89) stresses several important qualifications:

(i) First, though the objects of internal relations cannot exist without the others, this does not mean that each side could not be identified separately. For example, in the landlord-tenant relationship just described, the tenant is not only defined as the rent-payer, but also as the object which is in a material relationship. The conditions of this materiality could be identified separately from the other side of the object, i.e. separately from the landlord.

(ii) Second, internal relations mean interdependency, but this does not equate to their being stable and unchanging. Rather, any change on either side is tied to other.

(iii) Third, there is no distinction of importance or interest between necessary and contingent relations in terms of research. Some contingent relations might have been more important for understanding the concrete event than necessary relations.

Ultimately, relations are important but the relations of facts are not stable. Relations are not independent from time and space but are context-dependent: context determines the presence of types of relation and variety of ways they interact. This interaction between different relations makes it more difficult to acknowledge relations themselves. Both external relations and internal relations, as Sayer (2000: 90-91) argues, are context-dependent. In this context dependent world, understanding might be more complex and difficult than it is assumed.

To overcome the difficulties in understanding these complexities, Sayer suggests starting to analyse relations by asking simple qualitative questions about the
relations and objects: What does the existence of this object (in this form) presuppose? Can it exist on its own as such? If not what else must be present? What is it about the object that makes it do such and such? (2000: 91). Applicable to different topics, these questions aim to go further than general and mainstream knowledge and enable the development of a more flexible and dynamic approach. These questions draw attention to how and from what we abstract in the context of theoretically-driven empirical research.

If we apply them to the topic of urban renewal and resistance, these questions provide a perspective on different relations in the events, such as the forms of resistance and non-resistance of residents: What do state-led URPs presuppose? What is it about the URPs that causes people to resist them? Can this resistance exist everywhere in the same form? If not, what is distinctive about the conditions and sets of relations where resistance occurs? Asking these qualitative questions about the objects of research provided the impetus for an extensive understanding of the research area. It was also a direct consequence of the process of applying these questions that I hypothesised the relevance of ‘inaction’ cases in reading the characteristics of urban struggle against the URPs.

It is also important to understand the relations between relations since these constitute the structures. Internal and external relations of objects and practices constitute structures. The figure below shows a sample of structure in critical realism that is based on the tenant-landlord relation:

37 It is important to underline that this emphasis on structures is not similar to the one in the structuralist approach. In structuralism, large and overarching structures determine social, political and economic relationships. The structures in structuralism are settled in larger forms. Objects of these structures are varied but their roles and impacts within the structural relationships are determined. In critical realism, structure is not conceived as an overarching relationship model, but as the positions and roles of objects in the relationship and how these roles are occupied. Though structures are important in critical realism, the dynamics of relations that establish structures are more important because they determine the structure. According to Sayer, it is even more important to determine the occupants of a position than the position itself (2000: 92). In brief, critical realism focuses on relations as the defining features of structures, whereas the structuralist approach focuses on structures as the defining factor of relations.
Figure 4.1. demonstrates the internal and external relations and how the structure is defined by these relations. It is seen that both external and internal relations play important roles in establishing the structure, and that any change in these relations is likely to change the structure.

Structures, i.e. the set of relations, do not exist separately from social life. “There is a plurality of structures in social life and it is necessary to presume the existence of an ensemble of structures in any concrete situation” (Lovering 1990: 41, emphasis in original). The interrelation and interdependency of structures are complicated, even sometimes a challenge in social science (Sayer 2000: 95). The structures are investigated in relation to one another:

(a) because we usually need to rely on actors’ accounts which may confuse the effects of different structures, (b) because actions are informed by such understandings and have real effects in reproducing (perhaps inadvertently) those structures, and (c) because social structures are concept-dependent—often on systematically-confused concepts. (ibid.)
URPs in Turkey provide a good case for exploring the plurality of structures in a given context and some challenges these might present to the analysis. In an URP, for example, the property owners are likely to lose their existing properties because of the URP scheme and may complain about this fact. However, the blamed parties may be the municipality, different ethnic groups that the respondent does not like, or other structures (see Chapter 6). The blamed party changes according to claimers’ own relations.

The concept of ‘property ownership’ is also a good example to explain point (c). In gecekondu areas in Turkey, there is also a landlord-tenant relationship, though in these squatter settlements, it is not possible to be a landlord strictly legal terms as the buildings are not officially registered. However, although in legal senses the concept property ownership is different, there are structures based on property ownership which are highly influential in the formation of social, political and economic relationships in the gecekondu areas (Kuyucu and Unsal 2010; Turkun et al. 2010; Lovering and Turkmen 2011). In response to the challenging issue of establishing the relations between structures, we can ask what it is about the structures that might produce the effects for which we mean to account.

What is the position of individuals in structures? This is another key question of the critical realist approach that refers to the dynamic relations in society. Structures cannot survive unless they are reproduced in everyday relations (Lovering 1990; Sayer 2000). As mentioned earlier, structures are not independent from time, place and historically established mechanisms. Structures and societal relations are interrelated. In this interrelation, society is understood in terms of the transformational model (Lovering 1989: 7):

People enter into social relations not of their own choosing, but they engage in actions which entail volition, and the outcome is simultaneously the reproduction of social structure, and the exercise of creativity and autonomy.
The relations and hence the structures in the society are reproduced and transformed in everyday life. Following this argument, the dynamic formation of groups and communities cannot be reduced to stabilised relations.

### 4.3.4. Generalisation and causation

In the scope of this research, the critical realist view of generalisation is particularly illuminating. One of the challenging issues in the urban movement and collective action literature is the generalisation of the characteristics of urban movements in different places and times. For example, the literature on urban movements, especially the early studies, is based on western democracies, which makes reading the cases of collective action in developing countries difficult (Walton 1998; Álvarez-Rivadulla 2009; Bayat 2012). The urbanisation dynamics, historical background and formation of everyday relations within the power relations are different in developing and developed countries. However, although these differences are substantial, there is a tendency to generalise the emergence, militancy and incidence of urban movements (Castells 1977, 1983; Harvey 2008, 2012). This generalisation creates the problem of conceptualising collective action in different contexts (Pickvance 1985; Lowe 1986; Walton 1998; Miller 2006).

The critical realist view underlines possible problems in generalisation. Generalisation can be defined simply as predictions about similar events. In social research, interpreting social facts by generalisation is problematic, since it is possible to miss the relations between objects and structures as well as the historical and contextual background of concrete events. Generalisation brings out the substantial and formal relations rather than necessary and contingent relations. Substantial relations refer to the relations of connection and interaction between different events and formal relations refer to their similarity or dissimilarity (Sayer 2000: 88). Such an approach risks obscuring necessary and contingent relations while generalising the relations between objects and structures.
One of the crucial problems in generalising the social facts and making rough predictions is that of ignoring the historical background and contextual features that cause concrete events. As Sayer mentions (2000), generalisations are likely to fail in different places and times. Aside from missing the contexts in different times and places, these generalisations also de-historicise the facts. This problem in generalisation of social fact is actually one of the fundamental critiques of the urban social movement literature, and particularly the early works of Castells (1977, 1983) and fellow researchers. Generalised frameworks and schema do not explain the mobilisation dynamics of people in different places and times. Though there may be similarities in the causes of problems and the systems in which they occur, the structures have different external and internal relations in different settings. For example, an urban movement that emerged in a welfare-state system would have a different historical background from one that emerged in a developing country, though we could define both countries’ system as neoliberal and capitalist. The problems occurring in the social, political and economic structures are caused by these systems but the impact and projections of these problems might vary between places and times. Therefore, making a generalisation without undertaking a contextual and historical analysis to determine the external and internal relations is problematic. A historical reading to frame the dynamics of the context is crucial to understand the dynamics of contention (McAdam et al. 2001).

Another important point in the process of generalisation is assuming regularity in the emergence of facts. Critical realism rejects the idea of the regular occurrence of social facts (Sayer 2000) and criticises the idea of making causal claims to establish regularity between separate events.

Rather than making generalisations in the analysis of social facts, causation, i.e. finding the causes of concrete events, is one of the foremost aims of realism. In contrast to the positivist approach, this causation does not refer to a set cause-effect relationships. On the critical realist account, the conception of a cause-effect relationship is intended to establish a generalised relation between separate events.
and objects. Causes lead to effects, but there are cases when given causes do not consistently lead to the same effects (Sayer 1998, 2000). Causal powers exist necessarily by virtue of the nature of objects, but the question is whether this causal power would be exercised or activated in the occurrence of an event. This is to say that the activation of causal powers also depends on relations, and particularly the emergence of contingent relations:

The relationship between causal powers or mechanisms and their effects is not fixed, but contingent; indeed causal powers exist independently of their effects, unless they derive from social structures whose reproduction depends on particular effects resulting (Sayer 2000: 107).

In summary, causation is about the causal powers and liability of objects or relations (Sayer 2000: 104-5).

4.4. Research Design

In the formulation of my research questions, my involvement with urban movement groups and my previous research experiences were decisive. These factors were also important in the selection of my case study areas. After formulating my research questions, relevant areas were investigated and then two urban renewal projects were chosen in the historical Fatih district. Next, the field work was designed and the main data collection was carried out in Istanbul in May-October 2011 and April-May 2012 with a follow-up visit in September-November 2013. A more detailed account of this process is given in the next section.

4.4.1. Extensive vs. intensive case study

While this dissertation was written, there were approximately thirty-five neighbourhood organisations in Istanbul (see Appendix A). Neighbourhood organisations are not the only organisational forms taking part in the conflict around URPs. There are also professional groups, such as the Chamber of Architects and the Chamber of City Planners, which are important parties in this conflict. Moreover, there are urban activist groups and political groups taking part in the
political process. However, it is not possible to say that these groups constitute a unified body. All of these groups could be defined as part of a broad urban movement in Istanbul, but while there is a network connecting these groups, it is not possible to say that all movements are related and have similar characteristics. The relations of these groups with each other and within themselves are highly diverse. Additionally, the groups have different relations with different parties. This situation makes it difficult to read the dynamics of resistance as a whole and for each and every locality.

Studying all of the groups mentioned above would only be possible in the context of a more extensive research design than was possible within the scope of this thesis. By analysing both the common and differentiating features of collective actions across the city, it would be possible to develop a detailed typology that would comprehensively characterise Istanbul’s contentious urban politics. However, this kind of design would be likely to miss the impact of contingent relations that affect the development both of the urban movement groups and power relations in space. In order to establish what sorts of relations limit and encourage collective action in the contentious urbanisation process, an intensive case study approach has been applied in this research.

The fundamental differences between extensive and intensive research are the research questions, methods and definition of objects and boundaries (See Table 4.1.). Sayer (2000: 242) distinguishes the extensive and intensive case study approach without claiming that either is compatible with or superior to the other:

In intensive research, the primary questions concern how some causal process work out in a particular case or limited number of cases, while extensive research is concerned with discovering some of the common properties and general patterns of a population as a whole.
Since this research aims to understand the limitations and opportunities underlying the development of collective action in urban space, an intensive approach is needed to obtain information about both necessary and contingent relations.

The limitations of qualitative methods and the intensive case study approach have been overcome with the selection of the case study areas and methods. It is claimed that making a generalisation throughout the findings of case studies is problematic because the representativeness of the case selection is open to question (Sayer 2000; Yin 2009). However, determining the commonalities in different research areas, focusing closely on these commonalities, and then finding

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**Table 4.1: A summary of intensive and extensive research**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>INTENSIVE</th>
<th>EXTENSIVE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Research Question</strong></td>
<td>How does a process work in a particular case or a small number of cases? What produces a certain change? What did the agents actually do?</td>
<td>What are the regularities, common patterns, distinguishing features of a population? How widely are certain characteristics or processes distributed or represented?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relations</strong></td>
<td>Substantial relations of connection</td>
<td>Formal relations of similarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of groups studies</strong></td>
<td>Causal groups</td>
<td>Taxonomic groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of account produced</strong></td>
<td>Causal explanation of the production of certain objects or events, though not necessarily representative ones</td>
<td>Descriptive ‘representative generalisations,’ lacking in explanatory penetration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Typical methods</strong></td>
<td>Study of individual agents in their causal contexts, interactive interviews, ethnography. Qualitative analysis</td>
<td>Large-scale survey of population or representative sample, formal questionnaires, standardised interviews Statistical analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Limitations</strong></td>
<td>Actual concrete patterns and contingent relations are unlikely to be ‘representative’, ‘average’ or generalisable. Necessary relations discovered will exist wherever their relations are present, e.g. causal powers of objects are generalisable to other contexts as they are necessary features of these objects</td>
<td>Although representative of a whole population, they are unlikely to be generalisable to other populations at different times and places. Problems of ecological fallacy in making inferences about individuals. Limited explanatory power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Appropriate tests</strong></td>
<td>Corroboration</td>
<td>Replication</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sayer (2000: 243)
out the differences and demonstrating them would provide a justified representation in the selection of case studies. Furthermore, for a deeper analysis of relations, qualitative methods and an intensive approach are more appropriate (Sayer 2000).

This research also employs a multiple case study approach. It aimed to undertake a relational approach within two urban renewal areas which have different responses to similar projects. In multiple case studies, the time and place factors and the coherence of dependent and independent variables between the case study areas are all important. A major advantage of multiple case studies is that they enable the researcher to test hypotheses more robustly best testing them against different cases.

### 4.4.2. Formulation of research questions

This research aimed to analyse the dynamics of mobilisation and militancy and the incidence of the mobilisation (Pickvance 1985; McAdam et al. 2001). However, as the current urban struggle in Istanbul has emerged recently and is still developing, it is not possible to establish a comprehensive model of the characteristics, militancy incidence or successes of movements at this stage. It would be a mistake to make an extensive judgement about the movements and their targets while this process is still unfolding. Besides, collective action, if it exists, takes different forms in different localities; there are diverse dynamics of mobilisation and movement relations in different localities.

Regarding these points, rather than focusing on tentative targets of several urban movements, contrasting cases in the struggle against URPs have been considered and causes of different responses in similar projects have been investigated. Then five basic questions were formulated:

1. How might people’s experiences of urban development and contentious urban politics in the cities of the global South contribute to a reconceptualisation of
urban movements and an expansion of the conceptual framework for the analysis of different cases?

2. Why have different (re)actions emerged in response to the state-led urban regeneration projects?

3. What limits and what encourages the development of collective action in contentious urban politics in Istanbul?

4. How do the different actors and their perceptions influence the mobilisation and collective action/inaction during the episodes of contention?

5. What are the main contextual features and dynamics that affect the responses and actions of individuals and groups in the urban renewal projects in Istanbul?

4.4.3. Rationale behind selection of urban renewal projects and historical sites as the place of contention

There are several reasons for selecting URPs as the conceptual topic in the analysis of struggle in Istanbul and for selecting the historical areas rather than gecekondu areas.

It is claimed here that, rather than focusing on specific groups, focusing on a contested issue and the relations emerge between the actors of contention would provide better understanding of the dynamics of contentious urban politics. There are ‘hot topics’ in the urban agenda, including urban regeneration/renewal, mega projects, and privatisation of public lands and services, in which various groups including neighbourhood organisations, urban activist groups, professional organisations and individuals take part in different forms of militancy. Reading the contention from these struggle areas would provide the analysis of relations among the actors in a wider perspective. This research focuses on URPs, which are political and economic tools for the government but mean eviction, displacement, dispossession and restructuration of the landscapes of the city for many people. Rather than focusing on particular urban movement groups and their action areas, the focus was established through the struggle against URPs and the relations established around this topic.
Gecekondu areas constitute the main proportion of state-led urban regeneration projects and the core focus of the governmental efforts at restructuring the built environment. Except the projects in Fatih and Beyoğlu districts, which are the central and historical districts of Istanbul located through the Halic Coast, they are mostly gecekondu areas. However, there are several reasons not to include these areas in this research which are listed below.

To begin with, because this research aims to understand the dynamics of both ‘action’ and ‘inaction’ cases, and in turn the limiting and enabling factors of mobilisation in urban struggles, this could only be possible in the historical sites, since in every gecekondu area designated as URP area, residents have formed an organisation to raise their voices. Historically, gecekondu areas are more likely to resist, as these squatter settlements have been fighting against demolitions and for shelter and property rights since they have been established (Isitan 1977; Aslan 2004; Sen and Aslan 2011). The resistance in gecekondu neighbourhoods has taken different forms in different periods. This feature obviously forms the politics and relations of gecekondu areas within the neighbourhood itself and with the authorities and other parties. Therefore, research on gecekondu areas would need to pose different questions to that focused on the historical areas.

When considering the historical areas, it is seen that some areas of the historical districts are unorganised and do not have any attachment at all to opposition groups (e.g. see Appendix A). This is not a one-way relationship, but some of the areas affected by urban redevelopment are not in the agenda of urban movement groups while many gecekondu areas are. Why this situation occurs is another question that this research seeks to answer.

Designing a comparative study between gecekondu neighbourhoods and historical sites was also not considered in this research. Although the projects in gecekondu and historical areas have similar aims and consequences in the broader picture of the restructuring process of Istanbul, different factors affect the formation of
collective actions in each. There are significant differences between gecekondu areas and historical areas which affect the dynamics of mobilisation. These differences can be understood in terms of four defining topics: the legal framework and property ownership, differences in social structures, gentrification in historical areas, and the differential involvement of third parties.

First of all, historical areas and gecekondu areas are subjected to different legal frameworks. Although in most of the gecekondu neighbourhoods, the inhabitants have a legal right to use the land, the buildings are not registered, i.e. they are ‘unpermitted’. As Bugra (1998) puts, they are irregularly developed areas. This situation in gecekondu areas results in different regulations, property relations, market dynamics and relations with the authorities. Historical areas are legal residential areas in which residents hold the rights to their properties (though property ownership is still problematic in these areas), and, because of their historical status, they have distinctive construction regulations. The regulations in these areas are implemented by government agencies at different levels, which complicate the relations of the residents with the authorities and their impact on mobilisation. These regulatory differences affect the core points of the politics in each area differently and the relations between different actors.

Secondly, gecekondu areas and historical sites have different social structures. Dilapidated historical areas shelter the poorest population of the city and the rate of tenants is higher than in gecekondu areas. Gecekondu areas have comparatively settled and close communities since these areas were established by the current residents of the areas. Dilapidated historical areas shelter second wave migrants (Keyder 2005) who moved from the Easter regions of Turkey to escape the long lasting Kurdish and Turkish conflict (see Chapter 3). These areas have ‘transition zone’ characteristics as they are often the first stop for migrants arriving in the city. Therefore, belonging to the gecekondu areas as compared to the historical sites sharply differentiates the mobilisation processes in each area.
Thirdly, and independently of state-led urban regeneration projects, middle-class people have set about gentrifying the historical districts, but not the gecekondu areas. Such gentrification causes a class transformation via market forces in the historical areas. This new class has a different comprehension of political relations and the urban agenda. In some cases, the middle-class gentrifiers in the historical areas are also in danger of eviction and dispossession because of the state-led URPs. Thus, this population takes part in the conflict caused by state-led URPs in various ways. Gentrification is an important issue in the historical sites because it creates a property market with its own transformative dynamics in the neighbourhoods and affects the spatial economic and political relations. These issues caused by gentrification and property markets are not observed in gecekondu areas.

Fourthly, there are differences in the involvements of third parties in the conflict in gecekondu areas and historical areas. First of all, historical areas have certain commonalities that third parties can respond to various ways, putting cases onto the legal and public agendas in ways they cannot be achieved with gecekondu areas. For example, groups considering conservation in the historical sites could take action independently of the residents of these places as conservation sites are registered places. In fact, issues such as conservation, cultural and historical heritage bring different groups into the discussions in the historical sites and characterise the conflict in these areas. This concern makes the discourse of the conflict cover broader topics, and affects the mobilisation of various groups independently from the residents of the areas. In addition, the formation of politics and the relation of gecekondu neighbourhoods to political groups and parties are different from historical areas. The historical ties of the political groups in the gecekondu areas, for example, have an impact on the mobilisation process, formation of the discourse of the struggle, and the actions taken.

38 As discussed in Chapter 5, Fener-Balat-Ayvansaray URP is one of these cases.
All these points have important impacts on the formation of external and internal relations in the dynamics of mobilisation. Therefore, in an intensive case study research, it is hard to include both gecekondu and historical sites because the variables that determine the relations are varied and different in each case.

4.4.4. Selection of Field Research Areas

Beyoglu and Fatih districts include historical areas which have been designated ‘urban renewal project areas’ by the Council of Ministers relying on law 5366. There are twelve (see Map 4.1. and Table 4.2.) urban renewal areas\(^{39}\) in Fatih and four\(^{40}\) in Beyoglu. The project areas in these historical districts contain not only historical buildings and residential units, but also trade-function sites like the Grand Bazaar in Fatih. After a close investigation of these project areas, Suleymaniye and Fener-Balat-Ayvansaray (FBA), both in Fatih, were chosen as the representatives of other urban renewal areas.

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\(^{39}\) URPs in Fatih: Ayvansaray, Beyazit Aga – Eregli, Husambey, Kirkesme and Seyhresmi, Fener-Balat, Kucukmustafapasa – Haracci Kara Mehmet, Grand Bazaar and Surround, Kurkubasi – Davutpasa, Nisanca and Surround, Samatya, Suleymaniye, Yenikapi (Yedikule Coastal Line Renewal)

\(^{40}\) URPs in Beyoglu: Okmeydani Neighbourhood, Tarlabasi Area and Hacihsrev Neighbourhood, Bedrettin Neighbourhood
Beyoğlu municipality might have been an alternative choice of urban renewal project. However, among the many projects of this kind, some of which are completed and all of which are contested, Fatih district has been selected as a representative area of contentious urban politics. As shown in Table 4.2. (below) and the Map 4.1 showing urban renewal areas in Fatih (above), a holistic project has been implemented in this district. The Municipality claims to envision Fatih as a place:

> to promote the Historical Peninsula, the city of many civilizations, to the world with its touristic, trading and cultural values in order to contribute to the development of our district and our country at the same time\(^41\).

Fatih is already a popular tourist destination, but in the existing built environment there remains a great deal of trade and small-scale industry. The current vision of

Fatih Municipality would not allow the traditional trade and industrial activities. Though the urban regeneration projects are implemented locally, regarding the vision of the Municipality, a big transformation in Fatih is presumed which would change the existing use of space and its users. In this context, Fatih represents the characteristics of contemporary urban conflict in Istanbul in a holistic way.

Besides, in order to set the relations of residents and third parties with the authorities as a dependent variable, the case study areas were selected under the administration of the same local authorities. Being under the authority of different local governments is a significant independent variable which would shift the focus of comparison to the local governments’ position in the discussion of urban regeneration and their relationships with residents of neighbourhoods and other actors. For this reason, urban regeneration projects were chosen within the same local authority districts.

### Table 4.2.: Urban renewal areas in Fatih district

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Site</th>
<th>Do opposition groups exist?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ayvansaray Quarter</td>
<td>Yes (connect to Fener-Balat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beyazit Aga – Eregli Neighbourhoods</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husambey, Kirkcesme and Seyhresmi Neighbourhoods</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fener-Balat Quarter (Balat Karabas, Tahta Minare and Atik Mustafapasa Neighbourhoods)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kucukmustafapasa, Haracci Kara Mehmet Neighbourhoods</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Bazaar and its Surround</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurkcuhasi (Bulgurpalas Quarter) – Davutpasa Neighbourhoods</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nisanca and its Surround</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samatya Quarter (Koca Mustafa Pasa Neighbourhood)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulukule (Hatice Sultan and Neslisah Neighbourhoods)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suleymaniye Quarter</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yenikapi (Yedikule Coastal Line Renewal)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Among the urban renewal areas in Fatih, only the Sulukule project, which is internationally known and widely criticised as a result of the demolition of one of the oldest Gypsy settlements, has been completed; projects and negotiations have continued in Suleymaniye and Ayvansaray, but the demolitions and implementation
of projects have begun; negotiations have continued in Yenikapi; and only in FBA is there evidence of an observable resistance and objection to the projects. Among these projects, Suleymaniye and FBA were identified as suitable case study areas for this research.

An important reason for selecting Suleymaniye and FBA is also their spatial proximity. These areas are close to each other but they are not otherwise related.

The social structures of FBA and Suleymaniye reflect the main characteristics of the structures of other historical areas. Although the social structures of these areas have characteristics similar to those of other urban renewal areas, there are some differences between the profiles of residents in Suleymaniye and FBA. For example, Suleymaniye shelters the poorest population whereas FBA has a more settled and (low) middle class population. The differences between households are viewed as
independent variables that aid comparisons between the mobilisation processes of these areas.

4.5. Implementation of Data Collection

After selecting the case study areas, I began to collect relevant documentation and information from various resources. The discussions on internet forums and news were useful to frame the details of the projects as the official documents are limited to find the discursive topics. Then, in periods May-October 2011 and April-May 2012 the data collection process was carried out through interviews held in Istanbul. Further visits to the areas after the main data collection period were also taken in September-November 2013. Before discussing the methods of data collection in detail, the ethical concerns of the research are explained in the next section.

4.5.1. Ethical framework of the research

Every research project should take into account basic rules of research ethics from the beginning of the research: ensure that no harm, either intended or unintended, is incurred upon research participants; ensure that, unless there are ethically defensible reasons to the contrary, the principle of informed consent is upheld; ensure that any data generated are treated confidentially throughout all stages of the research and its dissemination; and ensure against misinterpretation or misuse of the research findings upon completion of the project (Ryen 2007; Wood 2007). Field research work needs more extensive ethical consideration since it directly involves people’s lives and privacy (Atkinson et al. 2003; Paoletti 2014). Furthermore, researchers working on contested topics in conflict zones that are highly related with the interests and welfare of the research participants should give further attention to the ethical issues concerning the welfare of the participants as well as their interaction with the research areas (Wood 2007).
The ethical dimensions of research do not start with the field work; in ethical considerations should be a guideline for the progress of the research throughout all its stages (Ryen 2007). Accordingly, ethical implications have been deeply engaged at every stage of the present research from its inception. As mentioned earlier, my background as a researcher and activist had a significant impact on the design of this research project (see section 4.2.). To avoid any misinterpretation in the relations emerged during the field research and later in the analysis, any political expectation or influence that might affect the relation between the researcher and participants, and any manipulation during the knowledge transfer, the areas that I have taken political action were excluded. Furthermore, no benefits from my political activist background has been used in the research or reflected to the participants directly.

This research focuses on a politically contested topic in conflict areas in where political and economic interests of various actors intersect and are interrelated with each other. Beyond, due to the poverty and dependency on patronage relations, a more fragile and vulnerable social structure is subjected. In such research environments, investigating political and social relations and analysing experiences of people is a demanding research project since the relations are fragile and concern interests of many different actors. Possible difficulties that might appear in accessing coherent data and various concerns of participants to take part in a research project considered in the formations of ethical framework of the research, research design and relations with the research participants.

As a part of research process in the Cardiff University, the ethical concerns of the research and research consent forms including the information about the research and contact of the researcher were prepared and presented to the ethical committee of the school. I went to the fields with the consent forms requires the signature of the participants of the research and the information about the research. Consent forms, especially ‘must to be signed’ ones, in the ethnographic research, especially in the field of anthropology, are debated by the researchers as
they are challenging means not suitable to the ethnographic research processes (Fassin 2006; Lederman 2006; Metro 2014). In this highly interpretive research method which is based on participant observation in many instances, bureaucratically prepared ‘do and do not’s are not seen helpful by the researcher as they affect the attitude of the participants and transform the research environment (Fassin 2006; Lederman 2006; Metro 2014). In my case, signing the consent forms were not welcomed and in some occasions rejected. In a challenging, corrupted political environment where interests are contested, people’s hesitations of signing any document is understandable regarding the concerns about protecting themselves from being responsible for anything because of their signatures. Furthermore, some of the participants were illiterate and it was not ethical to ask their signature on a document that they cannot read. Whether they signed or not, I informed the participants about the research, their right to withdraw and passed information and my contact details.

Ethics is a moral perspective rather than a practically or bureaucratically defined perspective. As Huw Thomas (2009: 34) notes, “it matters what kind of person we are – how we see things, indeed how we feel about things – not just what we do”. In challenging research environments and dynamic settings, immediate decisions either about ethical issues or research design should be made in order to achieve coherent and successful data (Wood 2007). The procedures may not address the dilemmas of the challenging and conflicting research settings; in these cases, Elisabeth Wood (2007: 206) argues, “ethical research inevitably depends on the informed moral judgement of the researcher”. This flexibility does not mean neglecting the basic research ethics; however, researchers need to find different ways of accessing coherent data.

As much as entering the field, leaving it is a crucial process in the participatory research, which also needs to be set ethically. Like in the start, leaving the area should be established on the same ethical concerns (Atkinson and Hammersley 1994; Delamont 2003). Research activities have impacts on settings and participants
of the study. In any research, entering the world of people would affect these people and researcher became a part of the research setting in anyway (Atkinson and Hammersley 1994; Paoletti 2014). Research ethics balances the impact of the researcher in the research settings. Besides the research settings and participants, researchers are also affected from the research environment and relation. Even in some cases, the researcher ‘going native’, abandoning the research perspective and adopting the views of the actors in the settings (Atkinson et al. 2003; Delamont 2007). Keeping the objective standpoint of a researcher is an ethical point that needs to be concerned throughout the research process, covering the periods of leaving the field, analysis and writing. In this research, although I kept my relations with some of the participants, I positioned myself carefully as a researcher rather than a voice of group of people in the localities.

All these ethical concerns developed throughout the research and implied during the data collection, analysis and writing. Except the publicly announced names which could be accessed in the official documents, the anonymity of the participants is provided. In the following sections, the data collection process in the light of the ethical concerns is explained.

4.5.2. Grounded Theory
The rationale for data collection was devised with reference to Grounded Theory Methods. Originating in the 1960s in the works of Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss, Grounded Theory Methods (GTM) (Glaser and Strauss 1999; Bryant and Charmaz 2007) have been widely used in inductive qualitative research in the social sciences. A key point in GMT is the ‘persistent interaction of the researchers with their data, while remaining constantly involved with their emerging analysis’ (Bryant and Charmaz 2007: 1). That is to say, data collection and analysis are implemented concurrently and in interrelation. This method entails theoretical sampling in which data is analysed during the data collection and further stages of data collection are determined and controlled by the emerging theory.
GMT suggests that the data of social research is not just people who are interviewed, but also events, settings and objects; these too constitute the sample. The combination of theory, events, settings, people and other objects provides points of comparison and maximizes the opportunities to draw conclusions about the hypothesis of the research. In GMT, data collection (observation, interviews, and collection of documents) is carried out until theoretical saturation is achieved. By theoretical saturation, it is meant that no new data seem to be emerging, categories for the analysis of the research subject are achieved, and relationships between the categories could be established. Here the category refers to abstractions, i.e. the concepts of the research.

GMT is appropriate to and projects the priorities of this research. In particular, the sampling of the research and the number of interviews conducted do not rely on quantitative priorities, but the theoretical saturation of the categories that were determined before and during the data collection. As well as the interviews, participant observations on various occasions were important means of data collection.

4.5.3. Primary data collection
The primary data collection methods used in the research included interviews and participant observation, both within and beyond the field research areas in order to include other actors in contentious urban politics.

The field research started with participant observation in order to become familiar with the research settings before the interviews began. Given the aim of this research to analyse the experiences of people in conflicted areas and to understand the complex dynamics of mobilisation, it was necessary to develop a deep understanding of the formation of the spatial relations in the selected localities. Participant observation, mostly referred to in ethnographic research, is a conducive research method suggesting continuous data collection in the field, and was useful for achieving the aims of this research. Delamont (2007: 206) defines participant
observation as a mixture of observation and interviewing in the field enabling researchers to investigate what the world looks like to the people who live in the selected research area:

The researcher need to discover what ‘their’ people believe; what they do at work and in their leisure time, what makes them laugh, cry and rage, who they love, hate and fear; and how they choose their friends and endure their relations. (ibid.)

The participant observation method suggests that the researcher interacts with people and lives in the research setting as much as possible in order to understand their social patterns, events and relationships. To do this, the researcher should be in the field and observe all that happens, taking notes of all observations for future reference (Bogdewic 1999; Atkinson et al. 2003; Delamont 2007). Even failures to access data, rejections by the participants and other problems should be noted since they are part of the research process (Delamont 2007).

“Observing the social settings is not a straightforward matter. One cannot just walk into a setting and ‘see’ sociologically” note Atkinson, Coffey and Delamont (2003: 246). What is emphasised in participant observation is the active data collection process in a dynamic research environment where the responses of people could change. Interviewing is a method that could provide limited data if it is limited to a number, format and structure. During the interviews, people tend to talk about “what people do, what they have done” (Atkinson et al. 2003: 105). This information does not provide a context for how the ‘events’ occur (ibid.). Events do not happen all of a sudden but emerge as a result of a relational process. Participant observation, which is a data collection process that continues until the data is saturated, provides data which could ‘escape’ from the researcher if a more static data collection method were used (ibid.: 98).

Accordingly, in this research both interviews and participant observation were used. The interviewees were visited several times under different circumstances and alongside the semi-structured interviews, relatively unstructured ‘conversational’ interviews were undertaken.
I classified the interviews into four categories (see Appendix B):

- FBA interviews (FBA Residents)
- Suleymaniye interviews (Suleymaniye Residents)
- Interviews with the Fatih and Istanbul Metropolitan Municipalities officials and project subcontractors
- Others (Professional Groups, Academics, Activists in Urban Movement Groups, Political Parties)

One of the challenges in data collection is to access appropriate data about the frameworks of the projects and processes, and the demographic and social features of the case study areas. The lack of information and clandestine attitudes of both the residents and the officials also lead to manipulation and speculation about the events. During the implementation of data collection in such a suppressive atmosphere, it is important that the researcher keeps in mind the possibilities of manipulations and speculations about data.

Another problem is the possibility of rejection by the relevant actors: while conducting this research, I was rejected by several officials after they were informed of my topic and study areas. Some of the officials did not volunteer to talk about the critiques and oppositions. This situation might create a challenge for the research; however, as implied in the discussion of GTM, the officials’ unwillingness to communicate constitutes data itself that can support or disprove the hypothesis of the research.

Another important detail during the interviews concerns the audio-recording of the interviews. Some interviewees did not want to be audio recorded, citing their fears of becoming involved in political topics. Some interviewees felt more comfortable

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42 Some municipal officials including the responsible official of project and some individuals taking part in the project implementation process such as the ex-negotiator of Suleymaniye project did not want to interview. It is important to mention here that, the research information and consent forms that I prepared as a procedure of research process in Cardiff University which is not a necessary case in Turkey, were not helpful to conduct the interviews because of the need for signature.
to talk about politics and raise their critiques when the recorder was switched off. In some interviews, I omitted to use the recorder so as to establish a more relaxed and conversational tone. During the interviews that I did record, I continued to speak to the interviewee after the recorder was switched off. This enabled me to see if recording had affected the interviewee. With some interviewees, I did several interviews, both with and without a recorder.

**Fener-Balat-Ayvansaray Interviews**

In FBA, I began by interviewing with members of the associations. I did six interviews with the board members of FEBAYDER and asked about the project, the neighbourhood’s characteristics, the struggle in the neighbourhood and opinions about the projects in Istanbul as a whole. I visited and interviewed some of them later for further questions.

I carried out a total of twenty five interviews with the residents of FBA. These interviews varied in content and length because the interviewees represented different categories of respondent such as property owners and tenants from inside and outside the project area. Interviewees were asked to describe their opinions of the neighbourhood, the project, the attitudes of government agencies and the activities of the association. It should be noted that the interviews with the residents from outside the project area were short as they were uninterested in the topic and uninformed about the process.

Aside from the residents of the area, I also interviewed members of NGOs working in FBA and architects of the previous EU-funded conservation project. They informed me about their observations in the area and problems that they had noticed.

**Suleymaniye Interviews**

The Suleymaniye interviews were performed differently to the FBA interviews because there was no organisational structure and I had no prior connection to the
neighbourhood and less knowledge of the built environment. To address these weaknesses, I visited the site several times before starting the interviews in order to carry out observations to help me structure my interview questions.

Suleymaniye is the biggest project area of all the historical areas in Istanbul. Two local governments are responsible in the whole project (see Map 4.3.). The first stage of the project is implemented by the Fatih Municipality and its contractor KIPTAS, and the rest is by Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (IMM). The first stage of the project mostly includes residential units and workshops. The stages that IMM is responsible for mostly comprise public and state buildings. In order to provide the continuity in responsible local government and include more private property ownership, the stage under the responsibility of Fatih Municipality was selected.

I began the interviews with mukhtars (heads of neighbourhoods elected by the neighbourhood residents). I interviewed all of the four neighbourhoods’ mukhtars of the stage-1 project area. Along with these interviews I also carried out visits to the site, met with residents and conducted interviews with some of them. My interviewees in the Suleymaniye area were mostly women who were making belts and socialising with their neighbours. There are seventeen interviews in this category. The interviewees were randomly selected, but I tried to do interviews with residents from different backgrounds. I also used snowball techniques for the interviews and after conducting an interview with a given resident, I interviewed his/her acquaintances.

Along with the residents, I carried out interviews with some associations and foundations located in the UR area. I interviewed with some foundations, which are located in Suleymaniye mostly because of the Suleymaniye Mosque and Istanbul University, in order to get information about their relations with the rest of the area and their approaches to the urban regeneration project. I conducted interviews with seven organisations which were all conservative and religious organisations, which is the main characteristic of the organisational bodies in the area.
Another important spatial use in Suleymaniye is that of the wholesale shops of the historical trade centre and small-scale workshops. I did nine interviews with shopkeepers, hotels and workshops but I stopped interviewing this group after a while as most of the workshops have already arranged their moving process and their owners were not interested in the topic.

Interviews with the representatives of the municipalities
I did four interviews with the Fatih Municipality’s officials, two of them with the vice mayors responsible for the FBA and Suleymaniye project areas, and two from the project team in the municipality. It was difficult to interview the vice mayors for the reasons mentioned above. However, I managed to secure interviews with them, although the rhythms of the conversations were dominated by their responses. Regarding the content of these interviews, additional sources such as press releases, news and forums that the municipality’s administrative team were involved in were consulted to corroborate the claims that were made. I interviewed three staff members of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality who worked in the conservation areas. These interviews were important to establish the reliability of the data and to analyse the projects from the broader framework.

I was not accepted for an interview by the ex-negotiator of the Suleymaniye project. Nor was I able to get information from either IMM or Fatih Municipality about the aids they provide to the residents in Suleymaniye and Fatih.43

Interviews with Professionals, Urban Movement Groups, Political Parties
Because the field research was undertaken in the historical areas, I conducted four in-depth interviews with academics from the conservation field and architects specialising in restoration. My aim with these interviews was to gather opinions about the URPs from a broader range of perspectives.

43 State aid is important in the development of social and political relations in the neighbourhoods.
In the case study areas, the Chamber of Architects (CoA) and the Chamber of City Planners (CoCP) play an important role in organising opposition. Accordingly, I conducted several interviews with two members of these chambers, including the lawyer of the CoA, and I used their archive for secondary data collection.

I interviewed four activists from different urban movement groups. I excluded the group with which I have been working. The interviews were about URPs in general, urban movements in Istanbul, their activities in relation to the URPs, and about the case study areas more widely. As well as questions focused on these themes, we also discussed the factors that limit and encourage the development of urban movements and what needs to be done in the future.

I also conducted interviews with the Fatih district branches of political parties to get their opinions and relations with the UR project areas. I did three interviews with three political parties Fatih District Branches: Republican People’s Party (CHP – main opposition party), Nationalist Movement Party (MHP – second opposition party), Peace and Democracy Party (BDP – Kurdish based party, third opposition party). As well as interviewing the district branch members, I collected the documentation related to UR and urbanisation processes prepared by the parties.

*Participation in events and meetings*

The meetings I joined before and during the implementation of field research were important for enabling me to observe both the responses of the state and the condition of the opposition. Among many, three of the meetings, marches and demonstrations I joined are particularly worth mentioning, since they highlight some key points of this research project: the Ayvansaray right-holders meeting organised by Fatih Municipality, Ayvansaray Neighbourhood demonstration in front of Fatih Municipality, Istanbul Urban Movements Forum and European Social Forum Urban Axis.
4.5.4. Secondary data analysis

The interviews could not be structured without support from the secondary data. In this research, official documents including plans, statistics and election results were used to gather the data about the physical, social and political conditions in the project areas. Documents were gathered from the Municipalities, the CoA, the CoCP, and the Turkish Statistical Institute. However, it is important to mention that the demographic data about the neighbourhoods is very limited, so it is not possible to give the exact demographic structure of the areas.

Aside from official documents, the news, forums and documentary videos were important secondary data resources. Previous research and project documents about the areas were also important resources in framing the settings.

4.6. Conclusion

In this research, a critical realist and relational approach was implemented to frame the dynamics of contention on the discursive topic of URPs in Istanbul. My involvement with UMGs in Istanbul had a decisive impact in the selection of the research topic and the field research areas, and this involvement also directed me to investigate the ‘reality’ in the URP areas beyond the scope of my activist engagement. Then, along with a mobilised area, an immobilised area was chosen to investigate the motivation of people in the mobilisation process and the dynamics of contention.

The critical realist approach helped to set the rationale of the research and the analytical elements of the intensive case study. Conceptualisation and the context driven approach of critical realism helped to overcome the problems of a static understanding of the mobilisation process, which is a topic covered in the literature in Chapter 2. Different contexts need different concepts in order to explain similar processes involving different actors. In that sense, establishing a relational and dynamic approach to figure out the concrete relations between the actors under
the impact of different external factors is important to read a dynamic process, such as urban movement mobilisation in Istanbul.

The dynamic nature of the research environment of thesis needed a dynamic, questioning, interactive and interpretive methodology to figure out the reality in the contentious relations. Grounded Theory Methods provided a ground for a dynamic research by suggesting an interactive and interrelated data collection and analysis approach. The relational, conceptualisation and reconceptualisation approaches of the Critical Realist Approach well associated with the open coding, comparative and questioning approach of the Grounded Theory (Oliver 2012). After the main data collection process finalised, the interaction with the data set and relations with the case study areas have continued throughout the analysis. This provided a better understanding of the relations emerged in both areas during the episodes of contention.
CHAPTER 5: FENER-BALAT – THE PLACE OF ACTION

5.1. Introduction

In this chapter the external and internal reasons that encourage and limit collective action and mobilisation against the state-led urban renewal project in Fener-Balat-Ayvansaray are discussed.

Fener-Balat-Ayvansaray (FBA) is one of the most prominent historical sites in central Istanbul, located on the west Halic coast. In 2006, Fatih Municipality awarded a developer a contract to design an urban renewal project in the coastal part of the area. The developer’s proposal suggested a large-scale and radical transformation of the existing built environment. Immediately after the project was announced, residents of the affected area formed an association called The Association for Social Cooperation and Protecting the Rights of Fener-Balat-Ayvansaray Property Owners and Tenants (FEBAYDER)44 to coordinate opposition to it. This chapter analyses this organised body and the relations that emerged around it, focusing on how the opposition has developed since the announcement of the project, what factors have affected the formation of external and internal relations, and the militancy, the types of demands advanced by the opposition group throughout the mobilisation process.

This chapter, first, outlines the historical development and key demographic features of the area. The second part examines the projects proposed for the area. The third part discusses the development of the opposition movement in FBA and its repertoire of actions, and explains the relations between the state and the residents of the area and the association's actions against the project. The following part analyses the characteristics of the movement by reference to the findings of

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44 FEBAYDER stands for Fener-Balat-Ayvansaray Mülk Sahiplerinin ve Kiracıların Haklarını Koruma ve Sosyal Yardımlaşma Derneği in Turkish.
the field research to identify the factors encouraging or limiting the development of mobilisation around urban issues. Who are the main actors at the local level? How did they establish their relations within the project area and with other actors of the contentious urban politics? What issues were highlighted in the development of collective action? How was the problem contextualised and politicised by the actors? What brought different political views together and what caused separation? How did the struggle expand the opportunities for different actors? In the light of these questions, this chapter addresses the dynamics of the contention in the project area.

5.2. Background Settings

The details of the historical development and current demographic and political structure of FBA are explained in Appendix C in detail. In this part, I shall highlight some important notes on historical development in the area which are crucial to understanding the motivations behind the mobilisation.

5.2.1. Spatial development

Located on the western part of the Golden Horn coastal area, FBA is an exceptional historical settlement as well as an archaeological site.
The demographic structure of the area has changed immensely over time. FBA became a truly multicultural and diverse place throughout the 20th century. Perhaps one of the most important spatial developments still having a great impact on the spatial politics of the area, is the establishment of the Christian Orthodox Patriarchate in Fener in the 16th century. The Ecumenical Patriarchate is the highest and holiest centre of the Orthodox Christian Church in the world. Since the 6th century, the Patriarch of Constantinople has been designated the ‘Ecumenical’ Patriarch, and since then its mission has been to unify Orthodox Christians. (See more at: http://www.patriarchate.org/patriarchate/about#sthash.KuxEmJKJ.dpuf, access 07.09.2013) In the Ottoman State, the Patriarchate was a powerful institution on which the Sultans depended, but it was also an influential political institution. The role and the influence of the Patriarchate changed in line with the changes in the power of the Ottoman State. When minorities became an issue in the Ottoman state structure in the 19th century with the rise of a nationalist movement, the political role and influence of the Patriarchate on the Christian minority became a contested topic in politics. Greece was one of the first states to separate from the Ottoman State in 1832. Then, the Ottoman State (later Turkey) and Greece took different sides during the First World War and later these two countries fought against each other during the Turkish War of Independence. Later they became ‘life-long national enemies’. In this context, the Patriarchate of Constantinople became a national problem in the newly established Turkish Republic because of its political power and influence on the Greek population (Macar 2004). The Turkish State no longer wanted the Patriarchate in Turkey and they carried this topic to Lausanne in 1923, where the Turkish State and the Allied States of the First World War signed the peace treaty. Although the Turkish State was unable to evict the Patriarchate from Turkey, it was given the power to control the Patriarchate (For the treaty see http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Treaty_of_Lausanne access 07.09.2013). The Turkish State
In the 19th century, population changes began in the old historical settlements of Istanbul. The wealthier inhabitants moved to newly emerged ‘modern’ settlements established in other parts of the city. Then, in 1923, a big demographic change occurred due to the population exchange agreement between the Turkish and Greek states. According to the agreement, Greek Christian citizens of Turkey and Muslim citizens of Greece were to be exchanged between the two countries, which caused the eviction of more than two million people in both countries (Gokacti 2005). Being a historical Greek settlement, the population exchange altered the social structure of Fener to a great extent. Other hostilities such as the wealth tax imposed on the minority groups in 1942, the attacks on the non-Muslim populations on September 6-7, 1955 and then the Greco-Turkish conflict in Cyprus in 1974 resulted in Greek citizens being forced to leave their lands in Turkey.

The properties left vacant in the wake of these migrations have become an important issue, which had an impact on the deterioration of the built environment in the historical sites. Some of the abandoned buildings have been transferred to the state treasury and either used or left to fall into dilapidation, and some of them became homes for the new working class of the city. The old, vacant houses of FBA began to host migrants from Anatolian towns and villages, mostly from the

rejected the ecumenical status of the Patriarchate, but it was named the spiritual leader of the Greek minority in Turkey. Also it has been ruled that the Patriarch could only be a Turkish citizen by birth. In 1971, during the Cyprus Conflict, the right of the Patriarchate to educate the clergy in Turkey was also abolished (Macar 2004). To sum up, the Patriarchate has been the focus of long-term discussion and its existence was cited as a threat to the Turkish nation. As explained in the following parts, it continues to play an influential role in the politics of Fener-Balat.

46 In this period, the wealthy families of Fener and Balat moved to newly-established ‘modern’ settlements around the new business districts: Pera (Beyoglu), Galata, Tesvikiye, Nisantasi, Tarabya (Narli 2006).

47 The properties left from minority groups were transferred to the Prime Ministry’s Directorate General of Foundations. In 1976, the minority properties and assets of foundations were regulated and “immovables which were taken by minority (community) foundations with endowment, legacy and purchase between 1936-1974 were returned to their ex-tenants and some of these properties were assigned to the Treasury, Directorate General or third persons” (for more detail see http://www.vgm.gov.tr/duyurudetay.aspx?id=42 Access 15 September 2013).
Black Sea region, predominantly from the cities of Kastamonu and Rize, which groups still dominate the area.

The Golden Horn coastal area was designated for industrial development in the early years of the Republic which then had an immense impact on the living conditions in the area. On the most positive side, industrialisation provided lots of jobs, as well as development of a variety of economic activities in the area. On the most negative side, however, industrialisation resulted in vast environmental degradation. Even today, the residents remember and talk about industrial contamination and the terrible smell of the Golden Horn.\(^{48}\) However, residents who lived there in those days also celebrate the lively and busy social and economic life in FBA which has disappeared with the deindustrialisation of the area.\(^{49}\)

Between 1984 and 1989, the Golden Horn coast was cleared of industrial premises under the responsibility of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (IMM). Although the process of cleaning the area was a necessary step toward improving environmental conditions, the loss of economic activities and jobs had devastating impacts on the area, including FBA. The lively neighbourhoods fell into misery, poverty increased and the historic building stock deteriorated rapidly (Fatih Municipality Plan Reports 2005).

Along with the loss of economic activities, strict construction regulations greatly affected the maintenance of buildings, damaging the built environment and making property owners move out of Fener (interviews FW-1, FW-2, FW-5, FW-6, FA-1). The tight bureaucratic processes in the maintenance of the historical houses became one of the biggest problems and complaints by residents. During my research, everybody I interviewed criticised the strict conservation regulations. One of the

\(^{48}\) It is a common approach in the interviews that people suffered in FBA as a result of exposure to industrial waste when they lived in this area. Now the area has been cleaned and become liveable and attractive.

\(^{49}\) All the inhabitants I interviewed in FBA spoke about the good old days of the market in Balat. One common report about the lively economic life of the area on those days is the number of different bank branches, seven then whereas today there is just one.
most commonly-cited examples of these rules became a cliché comment: ‘people were not allowed to hang even a nail in their houses’, referring to long and difficult bureaucratic processes to get permission for maintenance in the listed buildings.

In the early 1990s, a new group of tenants arrived in the area from Anatolia, mostly from South East and East Anatolian regions, due to the consequences of the armed conflict between the Kurdish paramilitaries and the Turkish army. While the residential population of the area was transforming, with the decision taken in the United Nations Habitat II conference in 1996 held in Istanbul, Fener-Balat was chosen as a site for a pilot renovation and restoration project. In 2006, while the pilot project was being carried out, the Council of Ministers signed a controversial decision which designated the area as an ‘urban renewal project area’. These two projects and the responses of various groups to them are discussed in the following sections.

5.2.2. Current social and physical environment

When we look at the profile of the current residents, it is seen that the area hosts mostly low income groups (see Appendix C). Although the education level in the area is generally low, it is also seen that the percentages of graduates and post-graduates is higher in FBA compared to the other deprived inner city residential areas, which can be read as the presence of a middle class residents population. Considering the impact of middle class involvement in urban movements, it is argued in this research that this group has an influence in forming the opposition in the area.

According to a survey carried out in 2004, 63% of the residents are tenants, 25% of them are property owners and 12% of them are either living with their relatives

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50 Ayvansaray neighbourhood was not included in this programme.

51 The survey was carried out by an NGO called Kadın Emegini Degerlendirme Vakfi (KEDV-Foundation for the Support of Woman’s Work) in 2004 with 300 women from different households.
or in properties that belong to the state treasury\textsuperscript{52}. As is seen, the tenant population is high in Balat district in general. Yet, the percentage of property owners living in the area is considerable compared to other historical areas (see Chapter 6), and this has a significant impact on mobilisation of residents against the URP.

The biggest problem of the area is mentioned in 2004 survey as the dilapidated built-environment. The survey demonstrates that most of the participants would like to move out from the neighbourhood, mainly because of the deprived built environment, although 56\% of them are happy with neighbourhood relations and the social environment (KEDV 2004: 15).

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure5.png}
\caption{Views from the neighbourhood}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{52} See footnote 47.
The comprehensive report of the Rehabilitation of Fener-Balat District Project (RFBDP 1998) shows that the majority of the housing stock is composed of historical houses. According to the investigation carried out in 1998, 13% of the buildings
needed heavy rehabilitation, 30% of them needed medium rehabilitation, 31% of buildings needed lighter rehabilitation works whereas 26% were in good condition. The current condition is expected to be better than it was since a number of restoration and rehabilitation works have been carried out in the area since then; however, there is no updated data about the latest situation. Although some buildings are dilapidated, still, as the head architect of the RFBDP, Burcin Altinsay (2007)\textsuperscript{53} mentions, FBA is in better condition compared to some other historical sites in Istanbul and not deprived.

Politically, FBA is known as a conservative, right-wing place including religious (Islamic) and nationalist groups (for the election results see Appendix C). It is situated very close to one of the most Islamist places in Istanbul, Fatih-Carsamba, which has an impact on politics and everyday life especially through the inner sites of the neighbourhood (Narli 1997; Bezmez 2009). Other important political tendencies in the area are predominant strains of nationalism, Ottomanism\textsuperscript{54} and Muslim communitarianism which refer to the non-Muslim and non-Turk past of the area as a constant threat. As shown in the following parts, the existence of the Patriarchate is an important tool for reproducing a nationalist and Ottomanist view for the area.

\section*{5.3. Projects in Fener-Balat-Ayvansaray}

\subsection*{5.3.1. Rehabilitation of Fener-Balat Districts Programme}

In 1996, the second United Nations Conference on Human Settlements was held in Istanbul, which ended with a rehabilitation project proposal for Fener-Balat quarter. The proposal was welcomed by UNESCO, and in 1997, the Rehabilitation of Fener

\textsuperscript{53} Interview with Burcin Altinsay the head architect in RFBDP (17.05.2012). Also see Yeni Mimar interview, December 2007, \url{http://www.yenimimar.com/index.php?action=displayArticle&ID=1279}. Access, 07.03.2012.

\textsuperscript{54} This view also has nationalist tendencies but more importantly it refers to the great Ottoman legacy and the glory of the historical Peninsula during the Ottoman times. But an Ottomanist view does not refer to the multi-cultural state structure of the Ottomans; the rising ideology of Ottomanism is based on and stresses the Islamic rules and religious ties in the Ottoman State.
Balat Districts Programme (RFBDP) began with intense research into the condition of the Fener-Balat area, jointly undertaken by Fatih Municipality, the European Union, UNESCO and the French Institute for Anatolian Studies.

![Map 5.2.: Borders of Rehabilitation of Fener-Balat Districts Programme](source: www.fenerbalat.org, retrieved 10.05.2013)

Although the RFBDP was formulated in 1997, the project was subjected to a long delay due to the election of the Islamic opposition party candidate as the mayor of Fatih District in 1999. The mayor was a supporter of the conspiracy discourse about an alleged Orthodox Patriarchate aim of transforming the area into the centre of the Orthodox Christian world, a discourse he used in his election campaign (Evci 2009). The rehabilitation programme could only be properly started in 2001.

In the scope of the programme, it was proposed to rehabilitate some buildings, which would be selected according to strictly determined principles, by allocating
money from the programme budget. Religious buildings, ruined buildings and those needing heavy rehabilitation works were excluded due to the budget and technical restrictions (Unlu 2008). Owners of the selected buildings were not asked for any financial contribution, but they would be asked not to sell their houses within five years after the rehabilitation works were finalised or, if the property was rented, not to increase the rent above the inflation ratio. The programme aimed to rehabilitate 200 buildings in the proposal but in the end, only 121 of those buildings could be rehabilitated.

The programme’s priorities included ensuring that local residents were able to continue to live in the districts, and avoiding possible gentrification (interview TP3; Unlu 2008). This principle introduced some restrictions to property market relations, which were not easily accepted by the property owners (interviews FW-6, FW-8). But to a certain extent, the principle was successful; when the rehabilitation project was completed, the inhabitants of the rehabilitated buildings were still living in the area. However, gentrification became an inevitable consequence of the project (Narli 2006, 2009; Evci 2009; Soytemel 2011). In all the three interviews that I conducted with the real estate agencies in the area, it was mentioned that the property market rose considerably in the late 1990s as a result of (upper) middle-class customers’ demands (interviews FW8, FW9, FW10). They mentioned that house prices began to rise shortly after the announcement of the project.

The RFBDP did not only concern itself with improving the built environment, but also included social and economic development programmes. These included establishing some workshops to enable, especially, women and youths to gain skills such as tiling, which give them opportunities to take part in the restoration works in the area (Narli 2006). However, proposed actions to encourage economic development did not work as expected, hence, improvements in the physical

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55 The main financial source for the project was EU funds, which contributed seven million Euros. It was expected that the Fatih Municipality would contribute 20% of the total costs, which was approximately two million Euros.
environment remained the main consequence of the programme (Duzcu 2006; Evci 2009; interview TP3).

Implementing the programme in the neighbourhood was not easy for the project team. No organised opposition emerged against the project but, as the project team members mention, it was difficult to establish trust between the inhabitants and the project team (Unlu 2008; interview TP3). One reason for the lack of trust was the long-standing conspiracy theory about the role of the Patriarchate in any spatial intervention (Unlu 2008; Evci 2009; interview TP3). The other hesitations on the side of the residents were first, about the project’s financial scheme and, second, about the professional capability of the project team to carry out the renovation works. Although no financial contribution was expected from the property owners, the restrictions on the properties and blocking property sales was not welcomed by the residents (interviews FW-6, FW-8, FW-10). Second, some residents were not satisfied with the objectives and works of the project team. I came across complaints from the inhabitants, especially the shopkeepers in the historic market area, claiming that the RFBDP team wasted the money (interviews FW-1, FW-3, FW-4, FW-5, FW-6). It is observed that even in such a project in which no financial contribution was expected from the residents, convincing people to participate and gaining their support were difficult, which could be read as a hostile approach to any intervention in space and their properties.

While the project was being carried out, a part of the area was designated as an urban renewal project (URP) area and Fatih Municipality, which was one of the partners of the RFBDP, was given the duty of carrying out this project. Although RFBDP was criticised from various aspects, as discussed in the following sections, in the meantime, the RFBDP experience became an anchoring point in the development of a counter argument to the URP scheme of Fatih Municipality and a part of an alternative approach to the current project.
5.3.2. Fener-Balat-Ayvansaray Urban Renewal Project

On April 22, 2006, the Council of Ministers signed a cabinet decision that announced urban renewal areas in Fatih district relying on the Law no. 5366. Fener-Balat-Ayvansaray (named in the list as the Balat Karabas, Tahta Minare, Atik Mustafa Pasa Neighbourhoods) was also on the list of URPs along with others from twenty-seven neighbourhoods. With the cabinet decision, Fatih Municipality has been given the responsibility to implement the URPs in the specified areas.

Almost a year later, on April 18, 2007, Fatih Municipality awarded the project development and implementation works in FBA to a private firm called GAP Insaat, which is owned by Calik Holding in which the Prime Minister’s son-in-law was the chief executive.\(^{56}\) The process of auction was one of the primary critiques of the opposition groups claiming that it was not held transparently (documents presented to Court 2010-2011, interviews TP-4, TP-9, FA-1). The designation of FBA as an URP area was announced in the public documents; however, after this, silence about the process reigned until the concept project\(^{57}\), which was prepared by GAP Insaat, was shared with the public in 2009.

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\(^{56}\) Calik Holding, where PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s son-in-law is the CEO of the holding company (Turkish Media Circulation Wars, May 8\(^{th}\), 2008. The Economist. [http://www.economist.com/node/11332305](http://www.economist.com/node/11332305) Access: 10.05.2012), has strengthened its position in the market with the latest rapid urban development. The holding was also awarded the Tarlabasi urban renewal project, which is very similar to the Fener-Balat project. It is important to mention here that the Tarlabasi URP was given to GAP Insaat on 16\(^{th}\) of April 2007, and then the project of Fener-Balat was given to the same firm on 18\(^{th}\) of April 2007. Hence, with a two-day gap between them, Calik Group was awarded two massive and central urban renewal projects by two different municipalities, Fatih Municipality and Beyoglu Municipality.

\(^{57}\) In the URP process, the first projects which are presented to the public before the final implementation project are named ‘concept’ or ‘preliminary’ projects. As discussed in the later stages, the municipality continually stresses that the presented one is not the ‘final’ project but the ‘concept’ project that constitutes the base for the final implementation project.
Map 5.3.: Borders of the urban renewal project and proposed facilities

Source: http://www.febayder.com/content/fener-balat-ayvansaray-alan-proje, retrieved: 5.12.2010; the legend has been translated by me.
Fatih Municipality’s project is delimited by the coastline and a part of the residential and old market areas. Nineteen out of the total fifty nine lots are in the old market and residential areas. There are 43 monumental buildings and 264 registered buildings in the project area.\(^\text{58}\)

In July 2009, the Municipality invited FBA residents to a meeting for a briefing about the project. In this meeting, the vision of URP became clear, which mainly suggests a new development in the historical site. According to GAP Insaat’s project proposal, the historical independent housing units will be merged and transformed into flats, which will convert the vertical use of space (multi-storey historical small houses) to horizontal use of space (apartment flats). The municipality legitimises the conversion of historical buildings by claiming that the current vertical use of space in the individual houses does not provide the necessities of a ‘modern’ lifestyle (interviews FM-2, FM-5).

**Figure 5.2.: Examples of architectural designs in the concept project**

[Image of architectural designs]


In the scope of the project scheme, the municipality has offered three options to the property owners: first, to become a shareholder in the project; second, the property owner her/himself reconstructs the building according to the new project; third, to sell the property to the developer; and if none of them is preferred, than the property is expropriated by the municipality.
The first option is based on a new model implemented in the current URPs, called ‘property value increase model’. According to this model, property owners will be shareholders in the new project with 42.32% of the shares, i.e. they will own approximately 42% of the final property. The logic behind this model is the expected value increase with the completion of the project, so the shareholders can expect to get a sound return on their investment. There are two ways of implementing this option: if the owners have a property of 100m\(^2\) they get 42m\(^2\) in the final project; or, if they want a bigger place from the final project, they need to pay the rest of the share to the developer. The logic of this option could simply be explained with the classic theory of ‘rent gap’ as a process and consequence of gentrification developed by Neil Smith (1979: 545):

> The rent gap is the disparity between the potential ground rent level and the actual ground rent capitalized under the present land use. (…) In the case of filtering, the rent gap is produced primarily by capital depreciation (which diminishes the proportion of the ground rent able to be capitalized) and also by continued urban development and expansion (which has historically raised the potential ground rent level in the inner city).

The possible consequence of this for the current residents and property owners is seen as an eviction. First, it is suggested to the property owners that they hold the right to 42% of their property, which means to lose 58% of their rights on the property immediately. Second, even if the property owners choose to continue living in the new development, like the value of the houses, the living costs will increase which would make it difficult for a current household to afford other expenses.\(^{59}\)

The second option relies on Law no. 5366 (see Chapter 3) which allows property owners to rebuild their houses according to the construction project on their plot. However, since it has been suggested in the concept project that the individual

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\(^{59}\) While the current value is said to be 1000 TL/m\(^2\), the average price at the end of the project is estimated 5000-6000 TL/m\(^2\) (Interviews FM-2; FM-5; FA-1; FA-2; FA-6; also see m\(^2\) (http://emlakkulisi.com/fatih-belediyesi-fener-balatta-metrekaresi-1100-tl-dedi/29522 Access: 10. 05. 2013). Hence, the prices of the final project are not affordable for many families.
buildings will be merged and converted to flats, the house owners do not have a chance to give an individual decision for their own property.

The municipal officers also say that the property owners would hold rights in the new project with respect to the size and functions of their properties. For example, if a property owner had a shop in the traditional area, s/he would be provided with a shop in the new project. However, the details about the business are not clear, nor are the rights of the current property owner. Also unanswered are questions about how small traditional shopkeepers are to survive in the newly built environment, or how the residents of the existing structure adapt to the new flats and new neighbourhood. When I put these questions to a member of the project team in the Municipality, she suggested that if owners cannot adapt to the new environment, they can sell their properties and use the money to move to another place where they can establish their business and continue to live as they did before (interview FM-5). This approach makes financial sense, but it nevertheless neglects the relations established in the space and legitimises the eviction of people from their livelihoods.

The third option for property owners is to sell their houses to the developer and resign from the project scheme. If the inhabitants do not accept any of these options, then the law gives the municipality the right to expropriate the property.

Unlike the RFBDP project in the area, the URP does not suggest a clear economic and social development agenda for the current residents. The improvement of the conditions in the area is only foreseen in the project via the renewal of the built environment. Furthermore it only suggests a spatial development in the coastal zone of the area and neglects the project’s impact on the rest, an approach which ruptures the social and physical relationship between the project area and its surroundings.

60 In this option, again, the minimum value of the houses in the current market is taken into consideration.
Since the beginning of the process, the project has been criticised widely and responded to by an organised opposition in the locality. One of the main critiques of the project scheme is the radical transformation that the project suggests in the built environment, which will have a destructive impact on the historical and cultural heritage. To actualise this spatial intervention, property rights of the current owners are violated to a great extent, which is another main critique of the project.

The clandestine approach taken by the municipality in the project development is another issue criticised widely. To begin with, the municipality has not informed and asked inhabitants and other actors about the project development process, which could be read as an example of top-down decision making about the livelihoods of inhabitants. Another critical issue regarding the power of the authorities and clandestine relations established in the project development process is the auction of the renewal project. Auction of the project development to a private firm was not publicly announced and organised in a manner that was open to all firms; instead, the developer was invited by the public authorities. The outcome of this process is that the developer has almost been given the whole rights to use of the land belonging to public and private owners by the public authorities.

The inhabitants of the area summarised their criticisms of this controversial development scheme in the court document as follows (2010):

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61 The auction process is ambiguous in the documents and it is hard to find coherent information about the process. In his letter to President Abdullah Gul about the project and how the inhabitants of FBA became victims, FEBAYDER chairman Hasan Acar mentions that in the public meeting of the municipality, his question about Calik Group and the problems of the auction was answered by the mayor, who said: “I called the Gap İnşaat linked to Calik Group. Our preference is in this direction” (Hasan Acar, letter to president, November 2009). So, the mayor is accepting that the developer was invited. However, in the announcement of Fatih Municipality on the official webpage, another firm’s name is declared in the auction process (http://www.fatih.bel.tr/icerik/265/en-buyuk-yenileme-alianinin-ihalesi-sonuclandi/ access: 3.06.2012); but no other announcement about the auction date or call is given. Another important document (dated 22.05.2012) that raises speculation about the project is a document sent by the GAP İnşaat to the Conservation Board about the other projects in the URP area. It is written in this document that the auction was carried out on 18.07.2007, but the developer and the municipality signed the contract on 30.04.2007. That means the auction was held after the contract was signed. This case also proves that the developer has been invited and given the project by the municipality.
the decisions taken in the project, which is the subject of this court, proposes residential, trade and shopping centres in a different architectural style than the current one on the basis of blocks by including additional floors and cellars independently formed from the conservation development plans and conditions of the structures, and excluding the pattern of parcel and block morphology; to clear away a big proportion of the region socially and physically, and force the citizens currently living in the area to migrate.

When the possible consequences of the project became clear, the episode of contention started for the locality. Inhabitants of the project area began to organise against the project. In the next section the development of opposition and a repertoire of actions in the locality are explained.

5.4. Development and Progress of Opposition against the Urban Renewal Project

Fatih Municipality called the property owners in the URP area for a meeting in July 2009 for the first time since the Renewal Board had approved the concept project. It was at this meeting that the inhabitants first heard about the details of the project.

I first heard about the [implications of the] project about my house at the meeting that the municipality organised on 7th July 2009. They had already carried out the auction of my house and I had not been informed of this. (Interview FA-1)

When residents of FBA began to receive notification of the project, there was widespread concern about the similarities of the project with the other URPs such as Sulukule and Tarlabasi, which had resulted in violations of rights, demolition of the built environment, dispossession and eviction for the locals (Karaman 2010; Kuyucu and Unsal 2010; Unsal 2013; Sakizlioglu 2014). After the meeting with the municipality, some property owners took the initiative to establish an association in order to develop a collective opposition to the URP in their neighbourhood. On 4th August 2009, FEBAYDER\textsuperscript{62} was established by thirteen charter members.

While establishing the organisational structure of the association, members utilised the experiences of other neighbourhood associations established against URPs, particularly in the historical areas. Notably, the organisational structure, principles and repertoires of the association established against the Tarlabasi URP were used as an example. For instance, drawing on the experiences of the Tarlabasi Association, FEBAYDER decided to restrict its membership to people who then lived or had property in the project area. It was part of a strategy to strengthen the association’s representative position and capability to act against the municipality and in the court cases because in the legal cases, the court investigates the interest of the plaintiffs. 63 This decision is critical since it excludes the inhabitants living out of the project area.

After a long process of determining the basic principles and rules of the association, the first general assembly of the association was held on October 18, 2009. Then, the demands of the association were made available to the public.

### Box 5.1. Highlights from the demands of FEBAYDER

- We do not want to move out from our neighbourhood. We would like to continue our lives in our houses, in the same streets and places, in our neighbourhood with its own cultural tissue and structure, by protecting our neighbourhood relations and traditional life style.
- We would like the small merchants and businessmen who feed themselves and make a living in our neighbourhood not to be victims of the ‘re-transformation project’ (...) we do not want luxury hotels, shopping malls and restaurants located in our

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63 Interviews FA-1, FA-2. One of the reasons for imposing limits on membership is to empower the association in the court cases by presenting the association with its specific aim and targets oriented to the UR project. In the process of suing, the court investigates the interests of the plaintiff in suing the administration. In order to eliminate any rejection by the court and strengthen their arguments about whether they are ‘the locals’, the association included only the inhabitants of the project area and focused its case only on the project and its scope. Another factor in this decision was the attitude of the municipality (as well as other state institutions and politicians) towards opposition groups. Blaming the opposition as being ‘ideological’, ‘political’ and ‘manipulative’ against the decision of AKP is a common response in the AKP rhetoric. Therefore, including only the individuals who are the victims of the UR project was a strategy by the association in order to demonstrate their position and lack of ‘ideological’ interests.
neighbourhood since this would be the announcement of the eradication of small enterprises as none of them would ever compete with luxury.

- We do not want to be an ETILER, a ULUS, a BEBEK, [or an] ORTAKOY (*upper-middle class quarters in Istanbul*); places of this kind, which have become homogeneous, similar to one another, concrete and soulless, and individualist, are all over Istanbul; places like ours, which have [their own] peculiar history and architectural tissue, neighbourhood structure, traditional relations and are still intimate are seldom found. For this reason, in fact, we think that quarters such as ours need to be kept alive and protected.

- The historic market of Fener-Balat is a common world heritage site, with unique traditional and historic structure and merchandise relations, and should be protected.

- Since our region and neighbourhood is already a touristic place in its nature and many tourists visit the area even though it is not advertised, the main aim should be to increase the number of small scale handicraft and touristic souvenir workshops which enable the youths to improve their skills.

- For sure, we want our houses to be repaired, restored, our neighbourhood to flourish, our buildings to be strengthened; however, we cannot accept and tolerate our houses, our homes being expropriated, auctioned, projected and then approved without any acknowledgement.

This is an abuse of our right to shelter!
This is an offence against our right to live!
This is an abuse of human rights and it is against the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

We would like to have the opportunity to restore our own houses. And we would like to do it by preserving their current historical and architectural features. For this reason, we are against the concepts ‘compound structures’ and ‘renewal on the basis of blocks’ which mean demolition.

The driving force behind the quick response of the inhabitants to the URP just after they had been informed is the decision given on their properties and livelihoods by the public authorities and the developer without any acknowledgement.

After determining the demands and the goals of the opposition in the locality, the association established its action arena concentrating on three spheres of action: to
organise opposition in the local level against the project, to make the demands visible in the public and political sphere, and to take legal actions against the violation of rights of inhabitants and destruction of the historical heritage.

One of the first actions was to prepare a handout summarising the possible project cycle and the possible consequences of the URP by reference to previous examples, such as those in Sulukule and Tarlabasi which serve as concrete and readily comparable examples. These handouts aimed to inform inhabitants about what is hidden from them (interviews FA-1, FA-2). They were useful for the inhabitants to associate the conditions of FBA with other areas and visualise the possible project cycle that they might face. Even the inhabitants who support the renewal projects to a certain extent and, for example, find the renewal project in Sulukule reasonable especially concerning the deprived built-environment (interviews FW-1, FW-2, FW-5), were critical of the conditions provided to inhabitants and their eviction from the area. During the case study, I noticed that people were well informed about the Sulukule and Tarlabasi cases particularly, but not much about the other areas. Nevertheless, the handouts about the project cycle and call for unity of inhabitants created a public sphere to discuss the conditions, which had a positive impact on mobilisation. Forming a public sphere for discussion is part of a protest cycle which helps to establish the ‘interpretive frameworks’ that enable people to perceive the information from a similar perspective (Nicholls 2008: 846).

Another important aim of the handouts distributed in the early days of the struggle was to publicise the association and call for unity of inhabitants under the FEBAYDER banner. From previous experience, association members were well aware of the strategy used by the municipality of negotiating with people individually and getting their consent and, by doing this, preventing or breaking the possibility of collective response. \(^64\) The municipality also confirmed its intention to

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\(^64\) This is an important strategy used by governing agencies in the URPs. In historical areas and gecekondu areas alike, the governing agencies call for individuals in the negotiation process. This strategy has a significant impact on the development of collective action and trust among the inhabitants. It is an exclusionary process that hinders the collective action and makes the process
respond to objections on a case-by-case basis, rather than addressing general or collective concerns on various occasions (Ayvansaray URP meeting 10.05.2011, interview FM-2, FM-4). The association’s call, then, is to unify the community on the local scale in order to take collective action against the municipality’s approach that would weaken common interests.

FEBAYDER also organised press releases and campaigns in order to inform the inhabitants and other actors about the project as well as about the association’s demands. They also created a website (www.febayder.com) for publicising their claims.

At the same time, the association developed contact with experts, professionals and academics and has been well informed about the project and its possible consequences. Some employees of the RFBDP team also supported the association from the beginning especially regarding the technical sides of the proposed project. The association organised public meetings with academics, residents of other URP areas and activists to share their knowledge and experiences regarding the process of other URPs. The establishment of relations with professionals and experts early on in the struggle not only strengthened the association’s argument about the negative sides of the project but also enabled the association to form its

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private and secret which degrades the level of trust (Baysal 2010; Lovering and Turkmen 2011). Individual negotiations with the municipality can break collective action, as the previous experiences show in Tarlabasi, Sulukule and Ayazma urban regeneration projects (Kuyucu and Unsal 2010; Baysal 2010; Turkun et al. 2010; Lovering and Turkmen 2011).

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65 On 10th of May 2011, I participated in a meeting organised by the Fatih Municipality for the property owners in Ayvansaray. The deputy mayor, who is also responsible for the FBA project, said that the property owners would be called individually to talk about their own situations. At the meeting there were some tenants who asked questions of the deputy mayor, who told them that they were not supposed to be in that meeting because it was organised only for the property owners.

66 One of the architects of the RFBDP, Emrah Unlu, and a popular architect Emre Arolat, who refused to be a part of Fener-Balat project and publicly announced the faults in the project, are some of the names who informed and supported the association. (Fener-Balat-Ayvansaray Yenileme Projesi Uzerine, 9.11.2009, http://v3.arkitera.com/h46956-fener-balat-ayvansaray-yenileme-projesi-uzerine.html. Access 07.03.2011
‘network closure’ (Nicholls 2008), which provides opportunity to extend the struggle arena.

The details of the project were not announced clearly in the first meeting organised by the municipality. Then, the association requested the concept project from the municipality in order to learn the details and decide on their actions, especially in the legal sphere. FEBAYDER asked for the project officially first in September 2009 and later several times but the municipality either ignored the association or found an excuse not to pass the project to it. Finally, after all FEBAYDER’s efforts, the municipality sent the project five months after the first request. On the one side, this case shows the reticent attitude of the municipality about the project and how the project was kept secret till the last minute. On the other side, it signals the importance of information and how it is utilised by both sides of the conflict.

The association’s relationship with the municipality has always been tense. Many points in the development and implementation of the project were not acceptable to the association. Besides, the reputation of the municipality in URPs was not credible enough to overcome the negative impression about the project. The press declaration that the association released after the meeting with the district mayor Mustafa Demir in November 2009, just after the association was established, exemplify the sceptical approach of the association towards the attitudes of the municipal officers:

> We saw the positive impacts of our activities up to now and the struggles against the URPs that were held before us. As is known, the resistance in Sulukule was not able to stop the demolition, but it created a strong reaction. Because of this, today, the Sulukule project is on the agenda again and the demands of the people are being reconsidered. Tarlabasi is still resisting and we hope there will be some positive developments there. (...) In the Fener-Balat-Ayvansaray case: if we are not wrong in our observations from the meeting with the Mayor, the other side stuck closely to its course and realised that this project cannot be realised without the support of the people. Our demands had been taken seriously. At least, the promises that the Mayor gave about the issues that we will never negotiate on were recorded.

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The members of the association know about the progress and consequences of other URPs and how resistance against these projects arose. This knowledge not only strengthened the association’s arguments against the municipality, but also made the municipality adopt novel strategies in response to the strong arguments of the association. The early struggles in other URPs, the poor reputation of the Fatih Municipality and close investigation by the association of these cases empowered the association in developing their arguments.

The association's mistrust of the municipality was vindicated in the protest held on the streets of FBA shortly after the meeting with the mayor. In December 2009, shortly before the concept project was voted on by the municipal council, FEBAYDER organised a demonstration in the neighbourhood and made a press declaration to voice their opposition to the project and call for council members not to vote for the project. Inhabitants of the neighbourhood held banners and posters saying ‘Don't Touch my House’.

**Figure 5.3.: Demonstration and press declaration in the neighbourhood**

During the neighbourhood protest, Mustafa Demir was interviewed by a national press channel 68 about the protest and he claimed that the people resisting this project were not from the neighbourhood, and their aim was to manipulate the content of the project because of their political opposition to the municipality. He also said the project process would not be suspended and it would be brought to the municipal council meeting as planned. Two days later, as the mayor mentioned, the concept project was accepted in Fatih Municipality Council.

**Box 5.2. The voting day: Residents and police forces in the municipality**

After the mayor’s provocative statement in the live broadcast, the association decided to organise a protest and press release on the day the municipal council voted on the project. Tension was high as reflected in the residents’ press release:

> It is very obvious what you want to achieve by hiding a project about the future of people from the people; you dream that you can seize our houses cheaply by using the power of the state and enable your favoured firm Calik Group to earn billions. We are asking you how you found the courage to ignore us and do this. (...) You will not only make the council pass the project, but will also attempt to take our houses from our hands. For this reason, we came here today to demand our rights and use our power to win our demands. We are here because we are suffering; we are here because the institutions from which we can demand our rights are violating our rights; we are expected to move out of our houses and neighbourhoods, to be deported.

After the gathering in front of the municipality before the vote on the project, members of the association and residents wanted to participate in the council meeting in order to witness the voting. However, the Mayor denied them access to the council, citing security concerns. While the tension was rising, CHP members of the council invited the residents to the municipality and expressed support for their demands. Still, the residents were not allowed to participate and were stopped by the police. At the end, only ten people from the neighbourhood were allowed to attend the council meeting. The council passed the concept project with the votes of twenty-four AKP members. All twelve members of the council from CHP and one from Saadet voted against the project.

68 CnnTurk broadcast live from the neighbourhood (07.12.2009 – CnnTurk). They also contacted the Mayor and asked about the project.
After the project was passed in the municipal council, FEBAYDER members held a meeting with the National Committee of the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) Turkey, Chamber of Architects, EU representatives and representatives of Tarlabasi and Sulukule URP areas, which ended with a declaration critical of the renewal projects in the historical areas.69

The common perspective in all three projects is that the public institutions accept the demands of the large-scale investors, who want to get maximum benefit from the increase in the value of the city centres, as the only solution for the problems exists in the historical fabric of cities. This perspective imposes two-sided threats:

- Intervention in examples of civil architecture which still prevents its distinctiveness, plan schemes and facades, by ignoring modern conservation approaches
- Eviction of the property owners and tenants living in these quarters without any consideration of their socio-economic conditions, by neglecting the modern renewal approaches and making decisions without acknowledging inhabitants

Under these circumstances, which cannot be accepted considering the historical heritage and social structure, the National Committee of ICOMOS Turkey brings the subject to the attention of the Minister of Culture and Tourism, Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, Fatih and Beyoglu districts municipalities in order to be considered again as a matter of urgency. If the public institutions do not show sufficient sensitivity regarding this subject, the historical buildings in Fener-Balat-Ayvansaray and Tarlabasi would disappear, demolished in front of the eyes of the world, as happened in Sulukule. Here, civil groups which would motivate the public institutions have big responsibilities. While the people of the quarters are trying to oppose these demolitions by forming associations, all the actors related to the topic should support these efforts. (ICOMOS Declaration, 2010)

Despite all the protests and opposition from the professional groups and institutions, the concept project of Fener-Balat-Ayvansaray was approved in the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (IMM) Council on 14th January 2010.

The approval of the concept project accelerated actions in the locality. Shortly after the IMM council decision, a big banner saying ‘Don’t Touch Our Houses’ was hung on the house of the chairman of FEBAYDER. Fatih Municipality’s police forces soon arrived and attempted to take it down claiming that the banner was not permitted although it was brought to the attention of the Fatih governor and the police. The

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first police attempt was obstructed by the residents; but almost a week later, four minibuses full of municipal police, with support from other police forces and the fire brigade, came to the neighbourhood in order to take down the banner. Faced with the police forces once again, the association decided to organise a press release and spread out the protest by hanging ‘Don’t Touch my House’ banners in their windows.

**Figure 5.4.: The Municipality’s attack to the banner ‘Don’t Touch My House’**

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**Figure 5.5.: ‘Don’t Touch My House’ banners**

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A street vendor has ‘Don’t Touch My Working Place’ banner. Photo Retrieved from: [http://febayder.com/content/isyerime-dokunma](http://febayder.com/content/isyerime-dokunma), Access 10.03.2011

The banner of ‘Don’t Touch My House’ on the windows of FEBAYDER building. Photo Source: Personal archive, July 2011
Another action was undertaken on 27th July 2010, when Mayor Mustafa Demir came to the neighbourhood to open a cultural centre that had been restored within the scope of RFBDP. The association organised the inhabitants, who wore shirts displaying the slogan ‘Don’t Touch My House’ and protested against the URP throughout the reception. Because of the protests, the mayor decided to visit the association for the first time. He again promised that the demands of the inhabitants would be considered.\footnote{Fatih Belediye Başkanı Mustafa Demir Geçikmeli De Olsa Derneğimizi Ziyaret Etti, 2010, http://febayder.com/content/fatih-belediye-baskani-mustafa-demir-gecikmeli-de-olsa-dernegimizi-ziyaret-etti, Access 10.03.2011.}

### Figure 5.6.: Visit of the Mayor to FEBAYDER

Protest during the visit of the mayor to the neighbourhood and his visit to FEBAYDER

Photos retrieved from [http://febayder.com/content/fatih-belediye-baskani-mustafa-demir-gecikmeli-de-olsa-dernegimizi-ziyaret-etti](http://febayder.com/content/fatih-belediye-baskani-mustafa-demir-gecikmeli-de-olsa-dernegimizi-ziyaret-etti), Access 10.03.2011

### Seeking Justice in the Court

The approval of the concept project in the municipal council did not only accelerate the actions of the association in the locality, but also gave a start to a long judicial process. The violation of property rights and destruction of historical heritage are considered to be characteristic of the project, and provide the fulcrum for the search for legal justice in FBA. During the interviews, members of the association often stressed their belief that the legal battle would bring about justice, since the project violates the residents’ basic rights, and as such is against the public interest.

The members of the association applied to the court in March 2010 claiming the following:
The subjected area is located in the urban conservation zone and this zone does not have a conservation plan yet; the project is against the decisions of the Higher Board of Conservation as well as planning principles and regulations; the concept project has proposed to knock down registered historical buildings; the project would result in the displacement of the inhabitants of the area, both physically and socially, by destroying the built environment (Court documents 2010).

In the legal process, the Istanbul branch of the Chamber of Architects (CoA) provided the association with knowledge and support in a professional manner. Aside from this, the CoA lawyer also represented FBA plaintiffs in court.

FBA residents encountered some difficulties during the legal battle. After a long process and wait, the experts’ report on the project arrived in March 2012; this supported the complainants and said that the project did not represent the public interest and violated the principles of urbanisation. On 20th June 2012, the court announced its decision to cancel the concept project with the following rationale:

...it has been discerned that: the area covered by the concept project, subject of this court, is a place that is deeply rooted in terms of historical tissue and rich in terms of architectural structures and for this reason, the state should take responsibility for regulating the development works in order to protect the historically and culturally high-value buildings without losing their architectural features; the concept project which is subjected to this court was only concerned with some buildings in the area which are old, ramshackle, derelict or having additional parts (on buildings) against the planning decisions but not the characteristics of the historical tissue of the area; by including the registered and architecturally significant buildings in the project, the whole area has been announced as an socio-economic and spatially immense dilapidated area, and a concept project has been prepared which would change the whole historical characteristics of the area and constitute the basis of the implementation project without considering current neighbourhood culture, the social structure which has lasted for several generations and the former attempts in the region to rehabilitate the built environment. It has been concluded that the submitted concept project and the subjected processes that have been undertaken for the approval of the project have not upheld urbanisation and planning principles, public interest and law. (Court document 2012)

The association welcomed the court’s decision as an important success for the struggle in the area. Immediately after a press declaration by the association was organised in the neighbourhood.
It should be noted that the decision of the court does not mean the cancellation of the urban renewal agenda in FBA, but only the concept project. Thus, since the area is still an URP area, the contention continues after the court decision. But the dynamics of the contention changed after the cancellation of the project, as discussed below.

Following the decision of the court, an unexpected decision about the area was made by the central government. In September 2012, on the request of the Ministry of the Interior, the Council of Ministers took a decision defining that ‘urgent expropriation’ might be implemented in FBA to be able to carry on the URP. It was a shocking decision for the residents of FBA but at the same time a

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71 Municipalities are dependent on the Ministry of the Interior for their central organisation. Hence, the demands of the municipalities are directed and implemented by the Ministry of the Interior on the central level. The other point that needs to be mentioned here is that ‘urgent expropriation’ decisions can only be made for any place by the Council of Ministers. This is also a very contested and discursive topic in the URPs. Urgent Expropriation, according to Expropriation Law no. 2942 article 27, is used as a method in case of the need for national defence or extraordinary cases such
proof of the decisive authoritarian attitude of the government in implementing the renewal project.

Shortly after the ‘urgent expropriation’ decision was published, a protest was held in Fener by inhabitants and some members of the association,\(^2\) alongside other urban movement groups, academics and professionals.

![Figure 5.8.: Protest in the neighbourhood after the Council of Ministers’ announcement of an urgent expropriation decision](image)


FEBAYDER immediately took legal action against the ‘urgent expropriation’ decision. However, the court rejected their application on the grounds that no action in the scope of urgent expropriation had been carried out; i.e. there was no practice to be judged. But, shortly after, the municipality expropriated some properties which action was subsequently taken to the court. The decision of the court was as in disasters. However, one of the means that AKP government uses in the urban project is the urgent expropriation choice if the consensus for the project has not been established. The article only covered the reasons for urgent expropriation in national defence and disasters situations, but in 2001, an amendment was added to the article, extending its scope thus making it more flexible.

\(^2\) The conflict between the members of FEBAYDER was on the agenda of the local resistance which ended up with the fragmentation of the opposition later. Due to the conflicts and disagreements within the association, this protest action was taken by some of the active members of the association, but the management board of FEBAYDER did not actively take part.
announced in September 2013,\textsuperscript{73} and entailed the cancellation of the Council of Ministers’ urgent expropriation decision as a whole. In the court decision, it was mentioned that there was no concrete explanation of public interest demonstrated in the urgent expropriation decision of the Council of Ministers; hence, the decision of the Council of Ministers was not lawful. This ruling of the court is also crucial for the other attempts to enact urgent expropriation in any URP area.

The legal achievements have resulted in changes in the militancy and dynamics of the current opposition movement in Fener-Balat. The area is still an urban renewal area, but since the cancellation of the current concept project, which was the ‘threat’, the struggle has become less active. Moreover, the conflicts between members of the association became more apparent, having been less apparent at the peak of the struggle because of efforts to present a united front against the municipality.

The association has a mixed political structure in terms of the political affiliations and backgrounds of the members, which affects the dynamics of mobilisation and militancy of activists in the struggle. After the courts’ decisions, the separation in the approach to problem areas in the association has become visible and has ended with the establishment of a new association called Association for Protecting the Cultural Heritage of Fener-Balat.\textsuperscript{74} In the next part, the inner dynamics of the mobilisation is analysed with reference to the research findings.

\textbf{5.5. An Analysis of Factors that Encourage or Limit the Mobilisation}

In this part, I try to chart the militancy and incidence of the opposition movement in FBA by analysing the external and internal factors that affect the dynamics of

\textsuperscript{73} Balat'taki kamulaştırma 'acle iptal', Radikal Newspaper, 03.09.2013, \url{http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/balattaki_kamulastirma_acele_iptal-1148960} Access, 07.09. 2013

\textsuperscript{74} Fener-Balat Kultur Miraslarini Koruma Dernegi, \url{http://fenerbalatimiz.wordpress.com/} Access: 07.09.2013
mobilisation. First, political opportunities affecting the rise of mobilisation in the locality – which are framed as the URP, its implementation process and the responses of the public authorities in this process – are analysed. Second, the internal dynamics of the association are analysed with reference to Tilly’s (1999) formulation of the strengths of social movements. The strength of a movement is calculated by reference to its worthiness (respect and trust in the inner relations), unity (common way of acting), number (visibility in the public sphere and representation) and commitment (persistence in the face of risks). And lastly, the network closures (Coleman 1988) of the opposition group in the locality and involvement of the third parties to the struggle arena as a factor affecting the mobilisation are focused upon. Taken together, these factors provide an analytical framework to analyse the FBA case.

5.5.1. External factors affecting the mobilisation in FBA

5.5.1.1. Urban renewal project as a ‘threat’ and responses of the public authorities

The peculiar character of the URP is the foremost reason that motivates people to participate in collective action in FBA. FBA residents tend to be politically conservative and have no history of involvement in the urban resistance. Yet, their concerns and militancy in the mobilisation process increased in response to the evidence of the URP’s characteristics as a state-led gentrification project which supplies land for urban development by violating the property rights of inhabitants and destroying the historical built environment (see section 5.3.2.). While the former become the main mobilising factor in the locality, the threat to the historical site at large – which goes beyond the threat to individual property rights in the area – has drawn the attention of various actors to the project and the mobilization. The militancy of the opposition has increased with the intractable and top-down development of the project by the municipality. The project was developed without presenting the public with any opportunity to discuss either alternative strategies for the conservation of historical heritage or ways to improve the living conditions
of the district as a whole. Participation of inhabitants has been restricted to
negotiations between the municipality and individual property owners about the
value of the properties. Even after the cancellation of the concept project by the
judiciary, the state has continued its relentless attempt to implement the project, at
both the local and central levels (see section 5.4.).

It can be argued that, if the project was not developed in a top down, to an extent
even authoritarian manner, the mobilization might be less militant. In fact, the
inhabitants have expressed an interest in discussing alternative conservation
projects. This passage from an article by an active member of the association
demonstrates the reaction to the project:

If the people who want to actualise these projects were a little bit fair, honest and
approached people with reasonable offers and did not do a lot of harm, there
would not have been such a reaction, and things could have been carried out
collaboratively for the beautification of Istanbul. Respecting the historical and
architectural tissue and cultural heritage of the city would be the most important
condition in implementing these projects. If that were the case [in FBA], neither
the Chamber of Architects, nor the Chamber of City Planners and other civil society
organisations, nor local people would have stood against them. (Sahin, 2009)

The project scheme has not only boosted the militancy of the opposition groups,
but also made clear for many people the correlation between urban development,
rent value of urban land and state-led gentrification. The observable relations that
the inhabitants have in their livelihoods provided grounds for collective action and
once the collective action around this topic emerged, it offered people the
opportunity to escape their ‘habitual passivity’ (Tarrow 1994: 81), which increased
the tendency to join collective action.

The project scheme and the responses of the public authorities in the FBA case
encouraged the unity in opposition of different political groups, both left- and right-
wing. The positions of these groups within the movement and their repertoire of
actions have varied, but one thing has been central for all groups involved:
opposition to the urban renewal project.
5.5.1.2. Previous experiences and accessing the information about URPs

An important external factor that affects the dynamics of mobilisation in the FBA case is the experience of the rehabilitation programme in the district. RFBDP provides an insight into the development of the discourse against the URP since it shows that there can be other ways to improve the quality of life and conditions in the built environment. The rehabilitation project was not approved of as entirely perfect, neither by the inhabitants nor by the professionals; but it was reasonable and for the benefit of the inhabitants.

As a strengthening factor for mobilisation, accessing information about the experiences in the other URP areas has a powerful role. The presence of the association and their access to information about other URP processes strengthens the association’s arguments about the consequences of URP, especially under the conditions of clandestine project management by the public authorities. The current project scheme is one of the most important mobilising factors in the area, but keeping the progress and aims of the project in doubt has a possible limiting impact on mobilisation by obstructing further discussions and actions. Predictions about the consequences of the project and the public authorities’ possible strategies could be made only by having knowledge of other URP processes. To access the information and publicise it, then, has an important role in the mobilisation process. In this process, the association’s relations with and support from other groups have become important resources for accessing this information and developing arguments against the municipality and the project (see section 5.5.5).

The use of knowledge derived from the experiences of other URP areas in developing the discourse against the project is important for mobilising the inhabitants; yet, the municipality’s control over information and time-management of the project in FBA caused ambiguities and restrictions on taking action. To illustrate, no response was given to the association’s attempts to receive the
concept project until it was approved by the municipal councils. Although the municipality responses have increased the militancy of the association, the resultant uncertainty forced the inhabitants who were not informed about the project to limit their participation in political actions. The municipality was able to manage this uncertainty, since they could determine the next step or how the relations were going to be established. For the association, on the other hand, this uncertainty and lack of clarity about the next step made it impossible to develop a long-term strategy. One association member claimed that

They [the municipality] talk about an imaginary project; they say that this is not the real project, we will negotiate on the implementation project. However, this is a lie, this is a putting-off strategy (...) the approval of the project in the renewal board, Fatih Municipality Council and Metropolitan Municipality Council show that this project has already become the implementation project. It is not certain in the municipality's discourse whether or not this is the final project. Actually, uncertainty is one of the most important strategies that they use. They create uncertainty in all topics. It is uncertain what is the project, or to what they have been committed. (interview FA-2)

This uncertainty also had a psychological impact, since people wanted to reach some kind of outcome eventually. During the interviews, residents also underlined the difficulties in living with the uncertainty about their houses and livelihood and carrying on with everyday life (interviews FA-1, FA-2, FA-5, FA-6).

Having the necessary information about the processes has an encouraging impact in developing collective identity and norms in the community; and the reverse conditions have a limiting impact on mobilisation. The non-transparent and uncertain project implementation process used by the claimant is a limiting external factor on the development of the opposition.

5.5.2. Internal relations affecting the mobilisation

5.5.2.1. Leading actors

In the development of the collective action, the role of the leading actors who had established the association and became the public faces of the opposition in the area is significant.
The association was established by eminent local figures who own property in the project area. The founders and first executive body of FEBAYDER came from different occupational and political backgrounds. Of the twelve members of the executive board, two are an author and an academic who moved to neighbourhood since the year 2000. There were three female members of the first executive board and two female members of the second executive board, whereas in the third, which was created after the association split, there was no female member. The members of the executive board were mostly from right-wing, nationalist, conservative backgrounds. There were members of the Felicity Party (Saadet), Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the far-right nationalist Great Union Party (BBP) in the associations. There is also one socialist member who was active in the association. In the second and third executive boards, only nationalist and conservative members were elected.

The role and approach of the leading members of the association became important in the militancy and incidence of the movement. In opposing the project and taking actions, three important roles of the leading members can be underlined: First, they deal with the issues about the project very closely and make an effort to follow the progress of the URP, which is crucial for the development of the collective actions. Second, they become representatives of people in the neighbourhood, set their demands and forward them to claimants, i.e. the public authorities. Third, they work to make the struggle visible and legitimate in the public sphere and they engage in the different networks to strengthen the discourse.

How some particular names among the inhabitants became leading opposition actors is a question to be investigated in order to understand the underlying motivations behind the mobilisation process. The common features of the backgrounds of leading actors can be highlighted as being property owners in the area, self-employed or retired or of white-collar occupational background, lack of clientelist relations in the economic and political spheres and their active political
lives. Independence from political clientelism, having fairly secure incomes and being property owners with long duration of residence in the area are observed as points in common among the active members of the association. The profiles of the members of the association’s board reveal a preponderance of economically settled residents, a condition which makes a difference in their political standing. As discussed at greater length in Chapter 6, in some cases the relations between the urban poor and the municipality is volatile due to the clientalist relations which create a sort of dependency between the opposite sides of contentious topics. In those cases, the urban poor are unlikely to stand against claimants unless this relationship is broken (Bayat 1999). In that respect, the presence of an ‘independent’ group from these relations in the resistance, as in the FBA case, is an important factor encouraging the struggle and expanding opportunities for others.

Despite its diverse structure, the association established a unity and started to develop its norms to take collective action. The members who led the association were politically active, but they had not participated in protests in such contexts (interview FA-1). Urban development was a novel contentious political topic for them. Although organising collective action on a novel topic in a diverse political environment is difficult, the threat to their livelihoods brought the different views together. Especially during the formation of the association, the members of the association maintained unity despite the conflicting views of the members (interviews FA-1, FA-2, FA-3, FA-4).

Division of duties and political action territories was one way to overcome the challenges resulting from the political diversity in the association. Different political groups and individuals supported the struggle by applying their efforts in the political and public environments that they know best (interviews FA-1, FA-2). Division of labour was made organically based on the mobilisation capabilities,

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75 During the interviews, especially when the interview was recorded, members of the association always stressed the unity of the members. However, when the recorder was off, some members criticised their fellows; most criticisms were about the attitude and political views of other members.
expertise and networks of the members. Each member of the association became a broker (McAdam et al. 2001; Nicholls 2008) in their own political network. The head of the association, for example, focused on the legal procedures that the association could apply as an action. A merchant member of the association lobbied in the neighbourhood, and another member acted as the association’s representative in the other urban movement groups’ network. At some meetings, however, some difficult questions regarding the representation of FEBAYDER were raised. For example, once the socialist-activist member of the association attended a seminar of a socialist party to talk about the government’s urban renewal politics and particularly the case of FBA, her participation as a member of FEBAYDER in this seminar was questioned by some members from conservative backgrounds. She defended her position by saying that she had been invited as an activist and an academic, which could not be questioned by the association. However, in the development of the network closures, these political differences and relations with institutional politics eventually became a problem.

5.5.2.2. The formation of spatial politics

The political discourse used by the residents about the role of the Orthodox Patriarchate in any spatial intervention in FBA is critical to an understanding of the dynamics of spatial politics in the area. People coming from nationalist and religious backgrounds explain the aims of the urban projects in the area with conspiracy theories about the Patriarchate’s alleged aim of converting the area into ‘a little Vatican’ that would be the centre of the orthodox Christian population (interviews FA-4, FW-2, FW-5, FW-6). According to a considerable number of people, one needs to appreciate the aims of the Patriarchate in order to understand the aims of the urban projects, both now and in the past. In January 2013, a group of Balat youths hung a banner on the outside of a building close to the Patriarchate. The banner read, “Balat is Turk, will stay Turk. Will never be Vatican” (see picture below).
This conspiracy discourse dominant in the spatial politics of the area evolves into a limiting factor. Although the association has never used this discourse in any rhetoric, there is evidence to suggest that some members of the association have opinions along these lines. Such rhetoric is a limiting factor in the development of opposition and the expansion of opportunities for others since it is based on speculative conspiracy theories and does not contribute to the discussion of the political economy of the projects on a wider scale. The example of politicising the spatial politics over a conspiracy theory and being against the spatial interventions due to belief in this theory is an example of non-progressive movement types referenced in the urban movement theories (Mayer 2000; Miller 2005).

Being aware of the limiting impact of strong political views in the evolution of collective identity and action, the leading figures of the association supported ‘de-politicisation’ of the struggle rather than establishing a political discourse. On the one hand, the local mobilisation around the problems involves a political process for many, but on the other hand, in order to avoid any possible exclusionary politics of existing political affiliations, a ‘de-politicisation’ approach to the problem has been
taken. The de-politicisation discourse helped in constructing unity among different political views: this struggle is not overtly or chiefly concerned with politics or law; it is instead an attempt to do (claim) justice and protect rights (interviews with FA-1, FA-3, FA-6). A member of the association, from a conservative, nationalist background voices this approach as: “We are completely outside of politics. We established the association and were chosen for the executive board. Our environment is that of rights, of violations [of rights], not of politics” (interview FA-3).

The hesitant word ‘political’ in the members’ use refers to wider political struggle against the state’s power and authority. The association never aims to be a part of a wider political struggle; rather, it limits the parameters of the struggle to ‘violation of rights’ at the local level. In the case of FBA, it can be argued that the use of the notion of ‘right’ refers to the right to control over property and then protecting the neighbourhood. This case could be considered as an example in the discussions on conceptualising the meaning and politics of the term ‘right’ (Attoh 2011; Uitermark et al. 2012; Kuymulu 2013; Celik and Gough 2014).

Perspectives of the association on ‘politics’ and ‘right’ have a unifying impact at the local level; however, they have a limiting impact on expanding the struggle against urban development projects around the city and establishing grounds for a common struggle with other groups. Social movements not only expand the groups’ own opportunities but also expand opportunities for other groups (Tarrow 1994, 1996). In the FBA case, diminishing the borders of the struggle to the local level has a limiting impact on expanding the struggle as a ground for others. The strategy of framing the struggle in the locality can also be considered in the framework of ‘Not in My Back Yard’ (NIMBY) actions elsewhere (Mayer 2000).

The decrease in the rhythm of the actions after the cancellation of the project signals the borders and limits of the struggle. After the decision of the court, FEBAYDER kept quiet and did not take any further steps either proactive or reactive.
about the neighbourhood transformation process. This situation is evidence of the main factor that mobilised the people in this politically conservative historical area: the renewal project’s threat to the neighbourhood.

The political differences in the association also have an impact on the sustainability of the mobilisation and repertoire of actions. While the conservative right-wing group mostly supports the judicial struggle, members who have a broader political perspective have a longer-term agenda: to transform the current spatial politics as a whole and develop the relations within the network. This divergence on choice of actions influences the militancy and sustainability of the opposition. For example, the conservative, nationalist right-wing member of the association is against the continuous opposition actions:

We have to convince the administration about its mistake by expressing ourselves in the legal sphere. If we constantly stand against, then we give the impression that we will cause an upheaval of the people (Interview FA-3).

He also points out that the repertoire of action should be taken through the legal channels at the right time on the right subject because their demand is legitimate, they are right to make these demands since they are not ‘occupiers’ (a word which is a reference to gecekondu areas) but owners of these properties:

I think that we have to believe in law and the administrators. We respond to the mistakes when we have detected them and are prepared for them. I see that when we respond and act at the right time and the right place, the agencies accept our rightfulness. Because we are not occupiers, our houses are not illegal and we cannot allow them to occupy people’s houses and ignore the people.76

Another member who is also nationalist but more open to other political groups and a variety of actions, shares a similar view about the legitimacy of their struggle and the power of judicial struggle:

We will keep on struggling. I believe that we will win by rights and justice. If there is right and justice in the Turkish Republic, these people [the project developers] should be imprisoned in light of the documents we have. (Interview FA-1)

76 This quota from the same interviewee is retrieved from an interview published on the website of the association: FEBAYDER Kentsel Donusumu Tartisti, 6.01.2011, http://www.febayder.com/content/febayer-kentsel-donusumu-tartisti, Access: 10.03.2011)
A counter view about limiting the struggle to legal actions is raised by the socialist member of the association.\textsuperscript{77}

My personal opinion is that people’s resistance is more important than the judicial struggle. Organised and decisive struggle, people standing firm is so important. It is more important to empower the idea of ‘I don’t have anything to give you’ rather than ‘how much I get’ in constructing the struggle. Resistance by the people, conscious people will prevent the projects from progressing.

Here, crucial questions arise: How did these different political views come together? In what respects and for how long was their collaboration sustained? Did they manage to construct an interpretive framework (Nicholls 2008), and if not, at what point did the separation occur?

The urgency of the problem was the glue that maintained unity among the different political views in this case. The meeting of different political views and the collaboration over a ‘concrete topic’ caused people to see others from a different perspective and listen to them. For example, while a conservative member of the association mentions that he can now understand why people on the left go to the streets, the socialist member talks about how she had joined the meetings of nationalist groups. She not only has relations with them but also she is respected and listened to at nationalist meetings about urban regeneration (see section 5.5.5).

If the individuals are unable to develop trust in the political sphere, the unity of the organisational structure would be likely to be damaged in the long term. In the FBA case, during the formation period of the opposition, the unity within the association was stronger than during the later stages of the opposition. The inner conflicts began to affect the trust level in time. One of the leading figures of the association stated during the interview that he was fed up with inner conflicts in the association and the clandestine behaviour of some members with the municipality and other actors caused his loss of trust in others (interview FA-1). The loss of trust between the members caused by the differences in the politicisation process of the problems

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid.
and developing separate relationships with other actors ended the unity of the association. The members who stayed in FEBAYDER’s organisational structure are those who are more focused on localising the struggle and not engaged in other areas and issues; the newly established association, on the other hand, grounded their approach in a broader framework.

Regarding the politicisation and understanding of the spatial political process in FBA, it is also worth looking at the relations with other project areas and neighbourhoods. Focusing on only the project area influenced the relations of the association with other project areas and other actors of the contention. It is known that FEBAYDER has relations with other similar URP areas and that the association benefited from their experiences, such as Tarlabasi, Yenikapi and Sulukule. However, the association has not developed relations with the other opposition groups, for example in gecekondu areas, or not taken action in other historical sites in which no collective action developed.

The Suleymaniye and Ayvansaray URP areas can be noted as examples of areas with which FEBAYDER did not make any connections. These urban renewal areas, which are very close to FBA, have not been given much attention by FEBAYDER, despite the fact that Ayvansaray is directly adjacent to Balat neighbourhood. A small part of Ayvansaray was included in the FBA project but another part of the neighbourhood has been designated as another URP area by Fatih Municipality. In my field research, I observed that FEBAYDER paid very little attention to developments in Ayvansaray. To illustrate, in the course of this research I attended several protests in and about Ayvansaray, but I saw only a few members of FEBAYDER and residents from FBA who attended these protests. When I asked about the project in Ayvansaray, two board members of the association told me at different times that the Ayvansaray project is not related to Fener-Balat, so they do not have interest in it (interviews FA-1, FA-3). This situation is also relevant for the other case study area of this research, Suleymaniye.
In explaining the lack of contact and interest of FEBAYDER in these two areas, it is an important to highlight that the residents of neither Ahyvansaray nor Suleymaniye URP areas have developed collective action nor organised. As is discussed in detail in Chapter 6, lack of collective action or an organisation in a locality is a limiting factor for the outsider groups to form any relationship or take action with that area. But besides the impact of lack of any organisation in these two areas on FEBAYDER to develop relations with them, there was a lack of interest in FEBAYDER’s approach to these cases, and even lack of information or misinterpretation of the projects in these areas. For example, in some FEBAYDER members’ views, Suleymaniye is not a state-let gentrification project but a restoration attempt to revitalize the neighbourhood, and Suleymaniye should be rescued from its current conditions (interviews FA-3, FA-4):

The views on regeneration projects and the oppositions that emerged in gecekondu areas are also noteworthy to frame the extent of the struggle in FBA. Gecekondu areas were not mentioned as similar resistance areas by the members of the association (interviews FA-1, FA-3, FA-4). The conservative members of the FBA association have made the separation between the historical areas and gecekondu areas clearly, which could be understood from the words of one.78

While they [municipality officers] are defining this area [FBA], they use statements such as “dilapidated area”, “lumpens”; but these are not true. (...) This area contains people who have their titles, occupations, workplace owners along with other people from all social groups and perspectives. People are living in the houses to which they hold the deeds, not in gecekondu.

The defensiveness in the struggle brings about stigmatisation of the others (Wacquant 2008). In the case of historical areas, gecekondu areas are one of the stigmatised issues: ‘I did not occupy any land, I am not living in a squatted place’ is a common claim in the discourse of people living in the ‘legal’ housing areas. The opposition that emerged against URPs is a ‘defensive movement’ (Type 4 in Pickvance’s categories (1985) see section 2.4.2). Sakizlioglu (2014: 219) defines

78 FEBAYDER Kentsel Donusumu Tartisti, 06.01.2011, http://www.febayder.com/content/febayer-kentsel-donusumu-tartisti, Access: 10.03.2011)
URPs’ functions as a “temporary medium to bring residents together around neighbourhood organisation to resist this process”. In these defensive movements, if the politicisation of the subject is not based on the wider scope and only focuses on the local scale, then the formation of norms and a common discourse with others on political grounds would not evolve.

5.5.2.3. Support of the residents for the association

Before the association was split, the association managed to gain the support of around 80% of the property owners in the project area (interviews FA-1, FA-2). The inhabitants supported the association well in the press releases and actions in the neighbourhood (section 5.4.). Nevertheless, association members complain about the inhabitants’ lack of interest in decision-making and the formation of collective action. Inhabitants participated in the actions of the association, especially at the street level, but the association was unable to establish a strong system of collective decision-making in order to break the habitual passivity of the local residents, which limited expansion of the struggle.

The limited and speculative information or lack of knowledge about the project is a factor that lessened inhabitants’ active involvement in the collective action. The ambiguities in the project scheme and the belief in their secure property rights influenced the dynamics of mobilisation and willingness of the inhabitants to take action. In other words, many of the inhabitants did not think that the project could be implemented (interviews FA-1, FA-2, FR-4, FR-5, FW-2, FW-5).

Notable here are the observations of the manager of Mavi Kalem Association (which is based in Fener and carrying out social research in FBA districts) about the inhabitants’ ability to mobilise and their relation with the association.79 She pointed out that the association’s members were rather disappointed with the lack of

79 This association has an office in Fener and carries out social research with women and youths of the area. I interviewed the manager of the project on 22.07.2011 to ask about the social profile of the area and their opinions about the URP.
interest in their struggle, especially since the active members thought that people would join the association willingly when their houses were under threat. However, she points out that the members of the association did not think that there is a very mobile population (i.e. the tenants) living in the area who do not have a similar level of attachment to space. She also mentions the relations between the poor and the municipality: because the municipality has provided poor people with aid, these people are disinclined to participate in uprisings against the municipality. This point about the established clientelist relations between the state institutions and the poor reveals a decisive factor in determining the extent to which people are willing to organise and participate in collective action. Although in the FBA case, the property owners who formed the association are less involved in clientelist relations, when it comes to the involvement of the people living in the area, it can be seen that the sense of belonging to space and clientelist relations both have limiting impacts.  

FEBAYDER is also aware of the condition of the poor residents of the area in taking political action. A member of the association voices opinions about the clientelist relations, how Fatih Municipality oppresses people to prevent them from joining opposition:

Fatih Municipality follows people; they have threatened people who put the banner ‘Don't Touch My House’ inside their houses. The tenants are victimised; they say: ‘if they [the municipality or the landlords] send us, we would go.’ They think they can get state aid wherever they go. Since we know this situation, we cannot go further with them. First they are very dependent on the municipality; second, if we expend energy on the tenants, we might lose our rights, too (Interview FA-2).

The dominance of the Kurdish inhabitants in the tenant population of the area should be noted here as an important factor that influences the mobilisation dynamics. There is a tension between the Kurdish tenant population and other residents of the area. The later arrivals (Kurds) are blamed both by the

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80 During an interview I conducted with a property owner living in the area, his wife joined the conversation and accused the municipality and ‘Kurdish’ population because of the clientelist relations that exist between the Kurdish poor population and the Municipality. Interview date, 22.07.2011.
municipality\textsuperscript{81} and some old residents for the dilapidation of the social and physical environment. Although the association has a unifying discourse, still involvement of the Kurdish tenant population in the opposition movement is a delicate topic.

Regarding the representation power of the association, it is also important to stress the narrow spatial focus of the opposition. The association confined its impact area to the residents of project sites and did not aim to organise beyond. FEBAYDER members used this strategy to limit the membership within the project area in order to be strong in front of the court. However, this strategy limited the prospects for expanding the struggle to cover a wider range of demands and interests as it also restricts the focus of the struggle only to the project. The defensiveness of the association has been reproduced by this strategy, and opportunities for the movement to adopt a holistic and proactive approach to resistance have been limited.

Expansion of the struggle outside of the project area, however, is not an easy task whether the intention of the association is to do so or not. Since the project does not have an immediate negative consequence for the residents living outside the project area, it is likely to see more support for the URP outside the project area (interviews FA-1, FA-2, FA-5). In fact, in the current situation, the project increases the expectation of the property owners outside the project area as the values of properties rise due to the possible consequences of the project. In this case, the significance of a threat to the mobilisation process can be observed also.

Despite the low level of participation in collective decision making and the limitations on expanding the demands of the opposition, the members of the

\textsuperscript{81}In the defence document that Fatih Municipality presented to the court (February 2011), people from South-eastern regions were declared to be one of the reasons for the dilapidation of the area: “Low-income people who migrated from the Southeast cause the area to become dirty and dilapidated over time” Retrieved from \url{http://www.haberinleri.net/pis-kurtler-demedikleri-kaldi-91997h.htm} and \url{http://haber.sol.org.tr/kent-gundemleri/guneydogudan-gelenler-kirletmis-haberi-39059} , Access: 02.09.2013. This sentence in the document was highlighted by the association, which then took action against the municipality, citing the document as evidence of how the municipality had formed a language of fragmentation in order to legitimise its actions.
association stress that there is unity in the neighbourhood, even though people are not actively involved in decision making processes in the association under the current circumstances. If the municipality decides to take action and brings the bulldozers to the neighbourhood, people will rise up against the municipality (interviews FA-1, FA-2, FA-3, FA-5).

From the above observations, it can also be concluded that short-term defensive actions can work against the expansion of mobilisation opportunities for others and may further entrench the habitual passivity of the inhabitants. Under these conditions, leading actors take on more duties to organise collective action and sustain the struggle.

5.5.3. Relations with third parties
The support of third parties representing a variety of political positions and professions for the association in FBA has increased the militancy and incidence of opposition. The relations with third parties can be examined from two points: how the relationships between the locals and the third parties are established; and what sort of support these groups provided to the local struggle affecting the militancy and incidence of the opposition.

The supporting groups can be categorised into three groups: 1- Professional organisations, architects and academics; 2- Political parties; 3- Urban movement groups including other neighbourhood associations.

*Professional Organisations, Architects and Academics*
Architects including the Rehabilitation of Fener-Balat Districts Programme (RFBDP) architects, professional organisations, particularly the Chamber of Architects (CoA), and academics have an important impact on the development of the opposition and discourse against the municipality’s project.
Architects who worked in the RFBDP were against the URP and supported the locals with technical knowledge from the very beginning of the process (Altinsay 2009; Unlu 2009). Their support has contributed to formation of alternative approaches equipped with technical knowledge.

In the FBA case, the role of the Chamber of Architects (CoA) as an opposition group and their impact on the militancy and incidence of the opposition has a greater importance. Chambers have a constitutionally defined right to object to projects in their professional areas, which means, whether or not any other group develops an objection, chambers can take legal actions in their professional area (see also Chapter 3). In the FBA case, CoA has collaborated with the association as well as taken individual actions. The knowledge and experience of CoA and their support have been used by the association to a great extent in developing the opposition and repertoire of actions.

Some academics who have opposed URPs in general also provided the association with knowledge about the conservation processes and the political economy of the current urban development projects. FEBAYDER organised events with the involvement of these academics to discuss the current government’s urban projects. The academics have laid particular stress on the damage that the historical environment would suffer if the project were implemented, the forced eviction of inhabitants by the state-led gentrification project and the changing characteristics of the area’s social, economic and class structure (interviews FA-1, FA-2, TP-1, TP-2, TP-3, TP-4; see also Arolat 2009, Unlu 2009).

The connection between FEBAYDER and this group of actors has a strengthening influence on the opposition movements. FEBAYDER was able to use strong and supportive arguments thanks to the help of professionals.
Political Parties

After determining their demands, FEBAYDER began to visit the district branches of the political parties in order to inform them about the project and their demands. These visits also made the association visible in the political sphere and informed the wider political community of the district about an organisational structure which aimed to bring together the locals. After these ‘public relations’ activities, members of political parties also visited the association in order to show their support. These relations were established in the early days of the association. Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), Great Unity Party (BBP), Felicity Party (Saadet) and Republican People’s Party (CHP) are the parties that visited the association and declared their support for them.

There are two suggestions for the association’s success in developing these relations. First, they took action very quickly and made their position and demands very clear to other actors in urban politics. The political parties could find respondents in the area and also were informed about the demands of the respondents. Second, the pre-existing connections that members of the association had with different political actors made it easier to secure the support of these actors when it was needed. Locally embedded political networks of the active association members made it possible to recruit support from the active political actors in the scene.

For political parties, the presence of an organisational structure in the locality is an important factor to form their institutional relations with the locals. The member of Fatih Municipality and IMM councils from CHP mentioned during our interview that he closely follows the project in FBA and has relations with the area; however, he does not have the same level of attention for Suleymaniye because of the lack of an association there (interview TP-11).
FEBAYDER has been involved in the network of urban movement groups and neighbourhoods even though there is no consensus among the association’s members about establishing and forming relations with other groups. The relations between the association and these groups have varied according to the other groups’ politics and action areas. For example, FEBAYDER has closer ties to groups which focus on historical areas, such as SOS Istanbul. As mentioned earlier, the association also had close relationships with the neighbourhood associations established in the other historical URP areas.

Although some of the members of the association are involved in the wider urban movements’ network, it is hard to say that an institutional link with the broader UMs network was provided. Indeed, the only ones who attend the meetings of other groups are those who stand on the left of the political spectrum and interpret the urban problems in connection with the political economy of the process (interview FA-2, TP-5, TP-8, TP-9). For some other members, priority is given to the establishment of local relations and with groups that might have an encouraging impact on this aim, rather than the relations with other groups and the network (interviews FA-1, FA-3, FA-4). In the development of the latter approach, the engagement of the members in the right-wing political tradition and the lack of experience of such struggles and of the social movement’s network have an impact more widely (interviews FA-1, FA-2).

The difference between the institutional politics and the politics of social movements can be observed in the attitudes of the members of the association who are engaged in political parties but have limited experience of social movement contentions. While these members have developed ties within their own political territory and become ‘brokers’ between the locals and the parties, they have not

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82 SOS Istanbul is an organisation which mostly focuses on historical sites. This group was a part of an organisation called Loyalty to Istanbul tours, and in this role they organised tours in the neighbourhoods.
been involved in other urban movement groups’ meetings. The differences between approaches of the right- and left-wing politics are also important to note in the evolution of the network relations. These differences and critiques are described by one far-right nationalist party member and the socialist member of the association:

Conservative people are mostly distant from organisational structures; we can say that conservative groups are unsuccessful in being organised, although they are on the side of justice. If you look at the left, [they] are very successful in organising civil society. There can emerge an organisational form claiming about everything, including intellectuals, but there is a disconnection between them and people. Left political aspects are not able to meet with conservative, right-wing people’s political aspects. People cannot make an organisational claim on the left, hesitate to get involved in politics. I think that people should not be left to a choice between white and black. By providing this balance, people should be presented with choices about energy issues, for example, or the occupation of people’s properties. How is that going to happen? There is a target; by following that target, the organisation should be formed in a very balanced structure. Otherwise, the logic of ‘I have established the organisation; come and join me’ is neither right nor democratic. For example, when an organisation tries to transform a struggle against corruption and hydroelectric stations into a struggle for freedom in the Southeast, they cause the right wing to react while we try to establish a balance. So, the target has disappeared, even the problem is legitimised because of the lack of reaction by people. By an appropriate organisational structure, the problem should be overcome. We achieved this in FEBAYDER.

A common struggle ground should be established, at the first hand because social opposition is organised on the left but the people who are victimised are on the right and mostly conservative. Or they are the ones who are afraid of politics or go a step backward when they are told to get organised. However, these masses are also very capable of getting organised and wriggling when they are attacked and hurt. We should not forget this.

People in the association are aware that urban movement groups and activist groups are mostly dominated by leftist or libertarian political activism, although the notion of ‘the left’ varies widely (interviews FA-1, FA-2, FA-4). The more radical political view of the urban movement groups is, the more hesitant the association members are to get involved in their actions. The activist and left-wing member of the association explains her experience and observations in different political arenas:

83 http://www.febayder.com/content/febayder-kentsel-donusumu-tartisti, Access 10.03.2011
Once, I managed to make our executive board participate in the meeting of the opposition groups against the 3rd bridge. Normally, they do not have any intention to go to other fields. Above all, they feel uncomfortable among the lefties. But when we protested in the neighbourhood, everybody participated, young to old. If Fener-Balat is the subject, they do not hesitate in the slightest. After all, they feel uncomfortable about the actions of the lefties. They feel alienated perhaps. I don’t know. There is no antipathy or hostility, but they know that they are not like them. I felt the same thing too. Once the ‘idealists’ [a group of Turkish right-wing nationalists] was organising a seminar in the neighbourhood and one of the members came to me and (...) it would be better for me to talk about the project to many people who do not know about it. I went but they were different from me. (...) Nobody could have made me go there for any other reason. However, my speech was so effective there. The representatives of the party were very interested and appreciative. Then everybody began to greet me on the street. Just as I feel odd among the idealists, they feel the same among lefties (interview FA-2).

She also points out the difference in the rhetoric used by the left and right which is a barrier in her eyes to constructing a common discourse among the victims of the project and left-politics dominated social movements:

The understanding of the urban movement groups where the social opposition is organised by the leftist rhetoric and the understanding of people who are victimised today are very different from each other. Unless we overcome this conflict, there will not be grassroots [support for] the urban movements. Because, whatever we, the urban movements, produce, say in the discourse, will not be taken seriously by the governing bodies unless we have the support of right-wing people.

The members of the association however, did not ignore the support of left-wing groups and their contribution to the debate about the struggle in the area. During our interview, the chairman of the association, who is a nationalist party member, mentioned that they had received more attention and interest from the left-wing media and groups than the right-wing groups. He also noted that left-wing groups know how to mobilize and struggle and have the experience of taking politics onto the streets. Those on the right wing, by contrast, including the chairman himself, are inexperienced about protesting and collective action.

Maybe some people laugh at us too, maybe they see us as the ones who are against everything. Before I would get angry with the leftist groups going out on

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84 There is an alliance of opposition groups against the construction of a third bridge on the Bosporus. This alliance includes trade unions, chambers, and urban movement groups.
the streets, but after I became the chairman of the association, I decided that we need to support everything. Besides, right-wing groups did not support us properly (Interview FA-1).

It is observed that the local struggle and contention emerged because the URP had a transformative impact on the comprehension of contentious urban politics.

However, these members of the association are very active members of the struggle and politically and socially more engaged with the process. Although it is seen that the local struggle has definitely a transformative and unifying impact on the street politics, the engagement of the people and the continuity of the actions to sustain a long-term collective identity is crucial for the militancy and incidence of this transformation. In the discourse of right-wing residents of the area, left and other activists are criticised for being ‘noisy’, not respectful of religion, critical of the ‘state’ and ‘nation’, and for being ‘political’ (not pragmatist but criticising from an ideological, wider political context) (Interviews FA-3, FA-4, FR-4, FR-5, FW-1, FW-2, FW-4, FW-5). It is observed that the more contact, discussion and collaboration develop with different political groups on the politics of the problem, the more militant, long-term and transformative collective action is likely to appear.

5.6. Conclusion

Once an economically lively neighbourhood surrounded by industrial premises, then left abandoned without a plan for the future, centrally located Balat neighbourhood is an exemplar of the state-led gentrification in the current urbanisation context of Turkey. FBA is a place where property owners and tenants from a wide range of income groups live side by side. The overall political domination in the area is conservative, religious and nationalist politics. It is observed in the scope of this research that in this conservative area, a threat (the possible consequences of the URP in this case) to their neighbourhood has a unifying impact on political views and different groups of residents if some leading actors take the initiative to act collectively. It is hard to make a concluding comment on the unity of different
political groups in this ongoing struggle; but the initial remarks about the factors effecting the dynamics of mobilisation and militancy and transformative impacts of the struggle can be highlighted.

The mobilisation of people about an urban issue emerged with the renewal project of Fatih Municipality. In this respect, the movement in FBA is a defensive movement rather than grounded on proactive demands. The project became an opportunity to break the ‘habitual passivity’ (Tarrow 1994) of the inhabitants. What encouraged the quick response of the inhabitants to the project were foremost the violation of property rights, non-transparent and clandestine development of the project and the destruction of the historical built environment if the project is implemented. All these factors play an important role in establishing the norms to perceive the problem from a similar perspective (Nicholls 2004), to give a collective response against the project scheme by the inhabitants from different political and economic backgrounds.

In this process, the response of the public authorities also had a determining impact. The relentless attitude of the authorities to implement the controversial renewal project increased the militancy of the struggle as well as the bond among the leading actors of the local struggle which developed unity in the association formed by people from different political backgrounds. During the peak time of the conflict between the authorities and the locals, the unity of the members was high although there were controversies among some members. This unity and the trust level, however, was not very strongly established in this reactionary contention ground, hence after some achievements as some of the members had expected, the conflicting views between the members could not be withstood and the association split.

Lack of information about the further steps and consequences of the project became a limiting factor affecting the dynamics of mobilisation. It can be claimed that this was a strategy used by the municipality to control and manipulate the
process, and it had a limiting impact on the dynamics of mobilisation. On the one hand, uncertainty affects the ability to develop long-term strategies and visions for the opposition; on the other hand, it is an obstacle to mobilising inactive residents under unknown conditions. One of the strengthening powers of the association was to access the information via various channels and spread this information to the public in order to create a public space to discuss the project scheme.

The previous EU-funded project implemented in the area was an advantage for the development of the opposition in FBA as it helped to develop the opposition discourse and interpret the project from different angles. Although several aspects of the rehabilitation programme were criticised, it was a project encouraging conservation in the historical built environment without violating property rights. This example was used to develop an alternative strategy against the municipality’s project.

There are two other important inheritances of the previous project that affect the dynamics of mobilisation in the area: First, the coordinators of the programme stood against the new renewal scheme and supported the opposition, which strengthened the local struggle. The second is derived from a controversial point which has been discussed in various arenas as an unexpected but inevitable consequence of the project (Narli 2009): the start of the gentrification of the area. The rehabilitation programme caused the emergence of a new property market in this dilapidated neighbourhood that the middle-income groups developed. The emergence of the property market in the area had an encouraging impact on the mobilisation of the property owners against the project because, under the current market conditions, the municipality’s offers did not offer any advantages to the property owners. The other impact of the gentrification is the involvement of the middle-class inhabitants in the local struggle as inhabitants of the area. Some of the gentrifiers became the victims of the new state-led gentrification project which made them mobilise in opposition. The involvement of the middle-class inhabitants in the local struggle provided better access to the network of UMs and information.
Furthermore, their involvement increased the militancy of the local action and varied the repertoire of action.

The role of the leading actors in the association is critical in the development of the collective action and the repertoire of action. The association was formed by the property owners and leading names of the neighbourhood. The political relations of the members and their independence from the ruling party’s political relations were important factors in developing the opposition and the discourse against the project as well as strengthening the inner structure of the association. They were from different political backgrounds, but in establishing unity against an urgent threat, these differences were overcome by the members in two ways. First, every member became a broker in their own political sphere and extended the area of the struggle. By developing relations with different political groups, the association also prevented domination of one political view in the organisation. Second, the ‘de-politicisation’ of the politics of the association was established as a strategy in order to prevent the political domination of any group. The struggle was grounded on ‘rights’ rather than ‘politics’ in the words of the association.

In the FBA case, the importance of the relations with third parties and their support to the evolution of the opposition at the local level is clearly observed. The support of the professional organisations and actors in various stages not only strengthened the arguments of the opposition but also helped in the technical and professional topics which eased the conflicting process. The relations with political parties increased the pressure on the public authorities in the political sphere and made the opposition more visible in the public sphere. The members of the association prioritised establishing relations with the political parties over their own political affiliations. The variety of the political backgrounds of the members also brought a ‘division of labour’ in establishing the relations with different groups; every member took the responsibility of establishing relations with their own impact area and political territory.
Establishing an institutional political network was preferred rather than engaging in social movement politics in the FEBAYDER case. Relations with other actors, such as urban movement groups and other neighbourhood organisations are established in a pragmatic way. FEBAYDER did not develop contact with gecekondu neighbourhoods, for instance, but they did with the associations of some other URP areas in the historical sites which are similar to the FBA case. The political background and practices of the members had an important impact on development of these relations which is observed in the separation of the right and left-wing political spheres. Nonetheless, the more collective action is taken for a common purpose, the more likely it is that contact points and a common discourse develop among different politics.

The opposition focused on the project area from the beginning of the process rather than building the struggle on an extended ground. As an encouraging factor, focusing on a limited area around a specific issue enabled unity of a variety of individuals around the specified target. On the other hand, focusing on a specific area is a limiting factor for expanding the mobilisation opportunities for other inhabitants living outside the project area and the possibility of proactive actions. This very specific aim of the movement lessened an extending political discourse for the short-term.

The opposition movement in FBA is a young and a developing case. Hence, it is difficult to argue certain and transformative impacts of the movement on the power relations, urban politics and politics of everyday life at the local level. Yet, it demonstrates some factors that affect the dynamics of mobilisation and what affects the responses of people in the short-term.
CHAPTER 6: SULEYMANIYE – THE PLACE OF INACTION

6.1. Introduction

In this chapter the external and internal reasons for the lack of collective action in a locality which is going through a state-led gentrification project are discussed.

On the first day of my field research in Suleymaniye, I approached a woman who was sitting on the pavement and making belts. “May I sit here?” I asked. “Of course you may,” she answered; “The streets belong to everyone.” I sat and we struck up a conversation. She was a middle-aged tenant who had come to Suleymaniye from the Southeast twenty-two years earlier. As the conversation went on, several passers-by stopped to join us. In this deprived historic neighbourhood the streets were lively, noisy and dynamic. This spontaneous first conversation established the background for my research in Suleymaniye quarter. What would this lively street be like if the ‘Ottomanesque’ municipal housing project is finalised?

Suleymaniye urban renewal project (URP) was announced in 2006 by the Council of Ministers. Since then its development, especially with respect to the actions of the state, has followed a markedly different course from that of the other URP areas. However, while the strategies and actors are different, the possible consequences are much the same: it is a state-led gentrification project resulting in the eviction of current residents from the area.

One of the distinctive features of the URP process in Suleymaniye is the lack of opposition to the state’s intervention into local space, which is unlike many other URP areas in the city. In this chapter, the factors that might affect the dynamics of possible mobilisation and emergence of collective action are discussed with reference to the findings of the field research carried out in September-November 2011 and April-May 2012. Here, it is not claimed that a collective action should have
emerged in this locality; rather the lack of mobilisation and collective action around a contested topic, namely the URP, is considered as a part of the ongoing political process and, in the scope of this case, I aim to discuss the dynamics of ‘inaction’. The field research aimed to answer such questions as: How do the features of the project and strategies of the public authorities affect the actions of the residents? How do the residents form their relationships with the area? How do they perceive the project? What are the main factors that affect residential relations in the area?

The chapter consists of three main parts. In the first part, the historical background of the quarter and setting of the area are described. The second part examines the features of the projects implemented in the area, explained with a critical assessment of the current URP. The third part focuses on the findings and analysis of the field research and develops arguments about the factors that might have had an impact on the lack of mobilisation and collective action in the project area. This third part contains two subsections: the first analyses the external factors, i.e. the political opportunities that affect the dynamics of spatial relations in the area; the second focuses on the internal factors that form social and political relations in the area.

6.2. Background Settings

The historical development and setting of Suleymaniye are given in Appendix D in detail. In this part, I shall highlight some important notes on historical development which are crucial to understanding the current social and political relations of the area that affect the residents’ remaining immobilised.
6.2.1. Spatial development

Suleymaniye quarter\textsuperscript{85}, covering eight neighbourhoods (Demirtas, Hoca Giyasettin, Yavuz Sinan, Haci Kadin, Molla Husrev, Suleymaniye, Kalenderhane, Saridemir neighbourhoods) is located in the historical peninsula, in Fatih District.

\begin{center}
\textbf{Map 6.1.: Location of Suleymaniye in the Historical Peninsula}
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\begin{center}
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{suleymaniye_location_map}
\end{center}

Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, Urban Renewal Areas Presentation, 2009.

Currently, the quarter has mixed functions including trade, manufacturing, housing, temporary accommodation, education and religious facilities.

\textsuperscript{85} Quarter is not an administrative unit but mostly refers to historically defined places and includes various levels of administrative units. Neighbourhood, on the other hand, is the smallest administrative unit in the Turkish local administrative system. Suleymaniye Quarter has been given this name because of the Ottoman spatial organisation of the area and Suleymaniye Mosque contains several neighbourhoods all of which have separate selected administrative representatives called mukhtar.
Along with the mixed use of the area, three important places and facilities give the quarter its characteristics: Suleymaniye Mosque and its complex; the commercial district Eminonu which is adjacent to Suleymaniye quarter; and Istanbul University.

Among them, Suleymaniye Mosque has had a big impact on the spatial formation of the area, which became a key reference point in the vision of the current gentrification project (see section 6.3.3.). Suleymaniye mosque and its complex were designed as a grand educational and cultural centre which turned the area

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86 Along with the mosque, there were five madrasas, a health centre, a higher medical school, a missionary centre, an inn and other small religious and trade facilities in the area surrounding the mosque (Fatih Municipality Plan Reports 2005).
itself into an educational centre and residential area where the Ottoman ulama (the higher-status religious leaders) and notable Muslim population, such as statesmen, lived during the 16th and 17th century. In the 19th century, due to the restructuring of the state and new spatial formation of Istanbul, the notables of the bureaucratic cadre began to move out from their mansions in Suleymaniye and socio-spatial transformation in the area started. Today, the area’s profile is quite different from its glittering times; but as is discussed in the following parts, this legacy has been carried into contemporary times within the formation of the new spatial development vision of the neo-Ottoman ideology (Tugal 2009).

The commercial district Eminonu has had a vast impact on the area’s spatial development. Connected to the markets in Eminonu, Suleymaniye quarter became itself a market and production place. Among various sectors, the dry and fresh food market, located in the Golden Horn port of Eminonu till 1985, had determined the residential profile and economic structure of the area for a long time. The wholesalers and workers of the market settled in Suleymaniye quarter. The young porters from the markets lived in bachelor rooms, which served as temporary accommodation for male workers. There are still many bachelor rooms in Suleymaniye, serving as a form of ‘traditional’ temporary shelter for young male workers in the surrounding areas (Kizilkan 2009). The market was of huge importance in all senses and its closure brought an economic recession to the area as mentioned by all interviewees who lived there when the market existed (interviews SR-3, SR-4, SM-1, SM-4, SS-1, SS-2).

Suleymaniye quarter is a unique, prominent historical site with monumental structures and historical timber houses. In 1985 Suleymaniye quarter, including Suleymaniye Mosque complex and the vernacular timber housing stock and traditional street forms, bazaars and vernacular settlements around it, was listed in the World Heritage List (WHL). After that, strict conservation rules were enforced

87 Listed historic areas of Istanbul are the Archaeological Park, at the tip of the Historic Peninsula; the Suleymaniye quarter, including Suleymaniye Mosque complex and the vernacular timber housing
for houses in Suleymaniye quarter; but, even though it was a requirement of the WHL, a comprehensive conservation plan was not developed and conservation of registered buildings was considered on a case-by-case basis until 1995 (Dincer et al. 2011). Along with the changing social and economic structure and increasing poverty in the area, the lack of a comprehensive conservation agenda caused immense deterioration of the built environment in Suleymaniye. In 2011 the site management plan of the area, which is a requirement of WHL status, was released. Although conservation plans have been worked up and finally released, a controversial urban development agenda, namely URPs, was drawn up by the state independently and apart from the planning processes (Dincer et al. 2011; Dincer 2011). Many areas in Fatih and Eminonu (which was merged with Fatih Municipality in 2008) districts, were designated as URP areas, including the Suleymaniye quarter in 2006.

6.2.2. Current social and physical environment

The whole URP area covers eight neighbourhoods in Suleymaniye quarter as mentioned before, but this research particularly focuses on the area in which the URP project was developed by Fatih Municipality as the administrative body and KIPTAS as the developer. This area covers four neighbourhoods, Demirtas, Hacikadin, Hocagiyasettin and Yavuzselim, on which this research focuses.

The population dynamics of the area have changed vastly over time. Three important points can be highlighted regarding the changes in the residential population: replacement of the state notables and elites with merchants and workers in the 19th c.; the departure of the settled merchants from the residential
site after the 1980s; and the arrival of second-wave migrants from the eastern Anatolian regions in the 1990s.

As in the other residential areas of Eminonu, currently the population in the residential areas in Suleymaniye shows a decreasing trend. Only one neighbourhood, Hocagiyasettin, shows an increase in settled population, which is a result of the migration of Kurds to the area. However, it should be noted that there is a considerable ‘informal’, i.e. unregistered population living in the entire area, mostly in the bachelor rooms. All the mukhtars (the heads of the neighbourhoods) I interviewed emphasised that although their neighbourhoods are populated, because many of the residents are not registered, some neighbourhoods officially appear abandoned. The ‘informal’ population gives a temporary (Kizilkan 2009) and informal character to the area (see also section 6.4.2.2). Since the URP was introduced in 2005, a further decrease in registered and settled population has been observed.\(^8\)

Informal working conditions and a deprived built-environment are parts of the temporality and informality in Suleymaniye. In this area of urban poverty (see Appendix D for the income distribution) many people work informally. One of the job opportunities is provided by local workshops, where people can find temporary, precarious work, especially in textiles and its side industries’ workshops. The spatial proximity of the workshops to houses makes it convenient, especially for young girls. Such informal work opportunities are an advantage for the area’s households, which can increase their income in the short term.

\(^8\) As discussed later, Suleymaniye attracts a very mobile population, mostly not registered. In the later stages of this research, for example, it is observed that abandoned buildings in the area have been occupied by Syrian refugees who escaped from the war in Syria.
Not only men of working age but also other household members join the informal labour force either in the workshops or by doing home-based piecework. Many household members, especially women and children, contribute to the production of items (such as belts), for which they are paid on a piecework basis. When I was doing my field research in summer and autumn 2011, it was common to see women sitting on the pavements either in front of their houses or those of their neighbours, making different parts of belts. “This is my office,” said a smiling tenant woman from the pavement in front of her flat; “I am coming down here from my home every morning, going back home for lunch and coming down again” (interview SR-11). Although it is poorly paid work\(^89\), it also serves as an opportunity for household members who do not ordinarily have the opportunity to join the labour force for reasons such as illiteracy, age, gender and spatial proximity to workplaces.

\(^{89}\) The prices are dependent on the work, but it is around 0.25-0.75 Turkish Lira (1£ = 3.66 TL) per piece of belt.
These precarious working conditions provide the residents with some advantages. Firstly, more household members, especially women, can join the informal labour market. Secondly, because household incomes are not registered in the state insurance system\(^90\), some household members can access state aids for poor people. Some households whose members have formal insurance complained that because of being registered workers, they were not given state aid, even though they earned less than other households whose members worked informally (interviews SR-3, SR-12, SR-15).

Considering income generating activities, aid from various state agencies should be noted as an important and at the same time one of the most contested topics in neighbourhood relations, which is discussed in section 6.4.2.2. There are mainly three groups of state agency which distribute aid in Suleymaniye:

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\(^90\) In Turkey, employees can only benefit from the state insurance if they are registered as workers. Then, they will register for the state pension and health system. The social security system for unregistered people works differently and they are excluded from state pension.
• Fatih District Governor – Distributes social aid, such as coal, from the central state agencies

• Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality – Shopping cheques and victuals

• Fatih Municipality – Catering

In their research about the new poverty in Turkey, Bugra and Keyder (2003: 11) stress that even a small amount of aid makes a crucial contribution to household income and is highly valued by households. Furthermore, the state aid mechanisms, which became central in the contemporary social policy system (ibid.), are a fundamental part of the formation of clientelist political relations. Suleymaniye is a place where accessing state aids is more organised and common among households compared to other areas of urban poverty, which also builds up clientelist relations in the area (see section 6.4.2.2.). The informal working conditions and unregistered household income empower the development of clientelist politics.

The deprived built environment and problematic property ownerships in the area are determining factors in the formation of the space and the relations of residents

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91 It should be noted that the use of stoves or fireplaces in Suleymaniye is forbidden due to the high risk of fire. However, the coal bags are still distributed to Suleymaniye households, and what mostly done by the households is to sell them to the coal traders, or use them. It is not possible that this condition is unknown to the state agency. State aid is a major issue in the area that determines social and political relations and many say that the ruling party establishes clientelist relations with this mechanism. The coal supply by the state agency in a coal-forbidden area can be used as a supportive variable to the arguments about formation of clientelist relations.

92 Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality provides a variety of aid. Some of them are provided by the Women’s Coordinating Centre which works like a civil organisation in the neighbourhoods. (For more detail: http://www.ibb.gov.tr/sites/SaglikVeSosyalHizmetler/sosyalyardim/Pages/BIRIMLERIMIZ.aspx Access: 5.04.2012). IMM and FM aid constitute the biggest part of the social aid in the area. I made applications to both institutions to get data about how many families access what sort of aid but the data was not provided. The staff member whom I first asked about the data said that I cannot access data whenever I want; I need to request it but she was not sure if I could get the data (April 2012). Then I applied to the Women’s Coordination Centre, as much of the aid is supplied via this centre by IMM, but my application was rejected as “The social aid works carried out by Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Women’s Coordination Centre contains private information of households, hence are not shared” (letter from IMM, 17.05.2012). Restrictions on access to basic data about a service provided by the state agencies raise questions about how the resources are used and distributed. This discussion exceeds the scope of this research other than to note here: this tool of the state is a contested topic that affects the formation of social and political relations in the area.
with their living environment and neighbours. The overall condition of the area is dilapidated which makes it harder to live in a secure and healthy environment.

Almost a quarter (24.8%) of the registered historical civil buildings from the earlier records has been lost over time. The condition of those remaining is also uncertain (Site Management Plan 2011: 46). The cultural properties located in the WHS are mostly used as commercial (40.5%) and residential units (36.8%), which emphasises
that commercial functions, including small-scale workshops and shops, are an important part of the area’s spatial figuration.

The deprivation has developed over time in line with changing economic conditions, property relations and lack of a proper conservation scheme. Property relations and inheritance systems are very influential in preventing people taking conservation action. Historical buildings were inherited by second and third generations, and along the way ownership was divided among many people, which made it difficult for the owners to live in the area or do maintenance work. When the property owners began to leave the area, deterioration in the built environment became entrenched.

As it became increasingly run down and ignored, the area lost its attraction for many people. The property market in the area was in deep decline. While few old, historic properties found buyers, the rental market boomed for poor households and bachelors. One owner bought her two-storey house in 1995 for 50 million TL, while another bought for 60 million TL (interview SR-5, SR-7) when the prices for flats in central Fatih ranged between 600 million and 1.5 billion TL.93 Houses built for single households were turned into shelters for more than one household and bachelors. The resultant damage to the structures of the buildings further exacerbated the area’s deprivation.

While some buildings were abandoned to run down, wrong renovation works and maintenance by property owners also negatively impacted on the condition of the built environment. In one interview, a property owner explained his father’s ‘renovation’ of the old timber house after they bought it in 1996 when they migrated to Istanbul from Southeast Region (interview SR-7):

> When we built the scaffolding, a woman came and said we could not do the construction like this, we should obtain permission. In those times, how could we know about the historical pieces or so on? Then we phoned an acquaintance, who was a lecturer in Elazig University [a city in South Anatolian region], to ask about

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permission. He told us not to destroy the structure of the house, keep it, and plaster the outside of it in concrete. I was young; I was standing at the corner and looking at the house and I was telling myself I would not give a penny to this house.

Since the new property owners were not informed about conservation actions and did not have sufficient knowledge and financial resources, they caused structural damage to the buildings but with the good intention of protecting the house and bringing it back to life.

The dilapidated physical environment has also received attention from the UNESCO World Heritage Committee (WHC) and the Turkish state was warned several times to take urgent action in order to keep Istanbul on the WHL (see Appendix D). While the discussions were carried on about the status of Istanbul in WHL, a renewal project in the area was developed.

6.3. Projects in Suleymaniye

Before and during the development URP in Suleymaniye, several attempts were made by the government to improve the conservation scheme. One was the Museum City Project, which formed the basis of the current urban renewal scheme, and the other comprised several small-scale maintenance and rehabilitation projects undertaken by the Directorate of the Inspection of Conservation Implementations (hereafter KUDEB). While the former establishes the scope of the renewal project, the latter can be read as controversial in relation to the URP scheme. Both are important in order to understand the intervention of the state in urban space and the contentious aspects of the current URP project.

6.3.1. Bringing the concept ‘Museum City’ to Suleymaniye

The 2004 warning by the UNESCO World Heritage Committee (WHC Report 2004) about the risk of Istanbul being placed on the ‘World Heritage in Danger’ list caused the state authorities to take some action. In May 2004, the Minister of Culture and Tourism, Istanbul Governor, Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (IMM) Mayor and
Director of the General Directorate of Foundations met to discuss the future of the historical sites in Istanbul, which led to what became known as ‘The Museum City Project’. Suleymaniye and Zeyrek were chosen to be the pilot project areas because of the rapidly deteriorating traditional timber housing stock.

The principles of the ‘Museum City’ approach focus on improving physical conditions in these areas and transforming them into new residential, cultural and tourism centres – which would change the profiles of the residences along with the current use of the space. This approach has been strongly criticised by conservation professionals for neglecting conservation techniques and the problems and requirements of the area and recreating the past form of the place by using modern techniques (Kuban 2005; Gumus 2005; Dincer 2009; Erkilet 2010). Critics termed the project “Disneyfication of the historical environment” (Kuban 2005).

‘Museum City Project’ was discussed as a concept developed in the Istanbul Metropolitan Planning Centre but has not been taken forward as a real project. However, this approach constituted the basis of the current URP in Suleymaniye.

6.3.2. KUDEB Rehabilitation Project

KUDEB rehabilitation project is based on an approach different to that of the Museum City and the current URPs. Its priorities are educating people about the

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96 KUDEBs (Koruma Uygulama ve Denetim Buroları - Directorate of the Inspection of Conservation Implementations) were introduced to the conservation agenda in 2005 as a new directorate working in the municipal organisational structure which would be responsible for the permissions and inspections of conservation and implementation of individual projects in the historical sites. One of the driving forces of the establishment of KUDEBs is to diminish the problems in conservation caused by the long bureaucratic processes which lead to deprivation in the historical sites. KUDEBs can give permission for small-scale maintenance works in the second level registered buildings; otherwise they can pass the project to conservation boards for permission.
traditional timber works and putting their skills into practice in Suleymaniye as an urgent protection action for the timber houses without affecting the social and economic structure.

In 2007, on the initiative of the head of KUDEB of IMM, a timber workshop was opened in Suleymaniye to train people from different backgrounds about traditional timberwork. It was subsequently decided that those trained at the workshop would put their skills into practice in Suleymaniye. KUDEB did not develop a rehabilitation scheme for the interiors of the houses; only the crucial rehabilitation works that would affect the lifespan of the timber houses were carried out. The project was expected to inspire the property owners to take further conservation action (Deniz 2009a, 2009b; interview IMM-2).

The scheme was concerned not to cause any eviction of occupants from the area while improving the physical conditions of the houses. Also, the occupants were not asked to make any contribution. The workshop ran well in 2008 and 2009, and by June 2010, 67 timber houses had been renovated by the KUDEB timber-training workshop. But in 2010, IMM stopped funding it, and financial resourcing of the workshop had to depend on private sponsorship (interview IMM-2). The renovation programme has slowed down and now almost ended.

KUDEB’s project was criticised from several aspects, some regarding the technical quality of the renovation works (Interviews TP-1, TP-3, TP-8), some regarding the ways the workshop carried out the works raised by the residents. The occupants did

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97 Istanbul was chosen as European Capital of Culture 2010 (ECoC) by the European Parliament in 2006. Along with the budget for the activities taking place in 2010, a significant amount of budget was allocated for the preparation prior to 2010 by the Turkish Government and EU agencies, including in the URPs. Some of the renovation works in the historical sites, for example the renovation of the public agencies’ assets in Suleymaniye, were funded from the ECoC budget. IMM KUDEB laboratory in Suleymaniye was also allocated a budget from the funding scheme of ECoC and took action for Suleymaniye and Zeyrek.

not welcome the limited scope of the renovation works, primarily the exclusion of interior works.\textsuperscript{99} Some residents also criticised the selection of houses for renovation; these were mostly people who asked that their houses be renovated but did not receive a response.

Although there are critics of the formation of KUDEBs, the works of IMM KUDEB in Suleymaniye represent crucial steps forward after a long period of inaction on the conservation of historical heritage in the area. However, a decent and sustainable conservation approach could not be developed.

When I carried out my research in Suleymaniye, I observed that people confused two projects: KUDEB’s historical houses programme and the ongoing urban renewal project. Some residents were still expecting their houses to be renovated by KUDEB (interviews SR-4, SR-16). This suggests, on the one hand, that residents were not fully aware of the scope of either project. On the other hand, as KUDEB staff members mentioned, KUDEB could not carry out a comprehensive social programme in the neighbourhood to raise awareness about conservation works and the aims of the programme (interview IMM-2). The project’s time and financial limits and the general social, economic and physical settings of the area prevented the formation of a comprehensive social programme focusing on the key conservation issues in the area. At the end of this project, some targets were achieved but inhabitants could not develop an approach relying on this project for future use and further renovation works have not been carried out to either the exterior or interior parts of the historical houses.

\textsuperscript{99} One of the occupants in Suleymaniye whose house was renewed by KUDEB gave an interview to a newspaper and told about his complaints: When I look from the street to my house, it is like a palace, old times decorations, painted windows. When I get into the house, with the severed timber pieces on the floor, it is like earthquake debris. The stairs are shaking; if I step in the wrong place I will fall. (Belediye onardi: Önden şahane, arkadan virane, 14.10.2009, Radikal (www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/belediye_onardi_unden_sahane_arkadan_virane-959147 , Access: 5 September 2010)
6.3.3. Urban renewal project

Suleymaniye quarter was designated an urban renewal project area by the Council of Ministers on May 24, 2006.\(^{100}\) However, as mentioned earlier, the discussion about a project in the area had started with the ‘Museum City’ discussion. The first indications of a possible project were given by IMM mayor Kadir Topbas in 2005: \(^{101}\)

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(...) \text{there will be a residential settlement here, which will reflect the last century. Here, either the property owners will renovate their buildings or we will expropriate properties and then restore them. But, the expropriation amount will be paid to property owners. Nobody will be victimised but nobody will be paid more than they deserve. (...) Certainly there will be some victims but I believe that they will show us sympathy. We should transform this area to produce surplus value. When this work is finalised, I want people who visit here to feel how it was 100-150 years ago.}
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This early declaration by the mayor signalled some of the features and possible consequences of the coming URP: emulation of the ‘past’, gentrification of the area and transformation of social and economic space.

The Suleymaniye urban renewal project process was designed differently from the other URPs in the historical sites. The current urban renewal project in Suleymaniye district is separated into five stages according to the functions of each area.

\(^{100}\) Suleymaniye quarter, including eight neighbourhoods, has been declared as an urban renewal area by the Council of Ministers on 24.05.2006 relying on law no. 5366 and the decision was published in the Official Gazette no. 26206 on 22.06.2006.

1st – The responsible agency is IMM, but the area outlined in black has been contracted to KIPTAS (Construction Company of IMM) under the responsibility of Fatih Municipality. Residential and commercial units dominate the functions of the area. Size: 348,502 m²; Registered buildings: 427; Unregistered buildings: 365

2nd - The responsible agency is IMM. It is mostly composed of workshop-inns and bachelor rooms. Highly rundown area. Size: 155,984 m²; Registered buildings: 134; Unregistered buildings: 472

3rd - The responsible agency is IMM. Mostly composed of workshops, commercial properties and inns. Size: 101,762 m²; Registered buildings: 167; Unregistered buildings: 402

4th - The responsible agency is IMM. The area of Istanbul Drapers Market (modern retail-shops market). Size: 68,532 m²

5th – Responsible agency is IMM. The area covers Istanbul University campus, Suleymaniye Mosque and its surroundings. Size: 263,938 m²

In Suleymaniye URP area, the IMM Historical Environment Conservation Directorate has overall responsibility for developing the renewal project. However, in September 2006, IMM and Eminonu (after 2008, Fatih) Municipality signed a protocol granting the district municipality responsibility for carrying out the implementation process in 39 construction blocks (the area shown by the black lines in Map 6.5.). In this area, the project is implemented according to Law no. 5366 by the district Municipality and the developer KIPTAS, which is a private

102 KIPTAS was established in 1987 in the name of İMAR WEIDLEPLAN with foreign partnership capital. After being inactive for some years, during the mayoralty of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the company of the municipality was reorganised and given the name KIPTAS (İstanbul Konut İmar Plan Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. – Istanbul Residential Development Plan Industry and Trade Inc.). KIPTAS was organised as the housing development and construction enterprise of the Municipality and became a
enterprise belonging to IMM. As seen from the map for spatial functional use, FM’s area of responsibility is dominated by privately-owned residential and commercial units. In the other parts of the Suleymaniye URP area, public institutions, such as Suleymaniye Mosque and Istanbul University, have properties which are under different regulations as public properties.

The main renovation actions defined in the project proposal of the 1st stage URP area are restoration of registered buildings; reconstruction of the lost buildings, if any record about these buildings is available; and construction of new buildings appropriate to the historical environment. Because the area is listed as a World Heritage Site, the original forms of the listed buildings are protected, unlike the other urban renewal projects such as in Fener-Balat-Ayvansaray (see Chapter 5).

![Figure 6.4.: Demonstration from Suleymaniye urban renewal project](http://www.fatih.bel.tr/icerik/1158/suleymaniye-bolgesi-yenileme-projesi/)


model during the restructuring and reorganisation of the mass housing agency, TOKI. KIPTAS is an incorporated company, in which IMM is a 35% shareholder. The areas of KIPTAS activity were determined as investing in real estate, such as buildings and land; trading, renting, making use of the properties, and developing projects ([http://www.ibb.gov.tr/tr-TR/Kurumsal/Birimler/Kiptas/Pages/AnaSayfa.aspx](http://www.ibb.gov.tr/tr-TR/Kurumsal/Birimler/Kiptas/Pages/AnaSayfa.aspx) Access 05.12.2011). KIPTAS is allowed to establish real estate investment companies or become a partner in established ones. Hence, KIPTAS is an important state-held company in the real estate market.
The FM’s and KIPTAS’s project offers three choices to property owners:

- The property owner can renovate the building according to the plans prepared by the project office, in the given time period. There are several funds that can be used by the property owners for renovation of their houses: TOKI (The Mass Housing Agency) provides loans of up to 70% of the cost of at 4% interest per year over the 10-year repayment period; Special Provincial Administration has funds which can be used by the district municipalities for renovation of registered buildings, and the Ministry of Culture has a funding opportunity for single buildings up to 50.000 TL (app. 15.000€).
• Property owners can be shareholders with KIPTAS, while KIPTAS owns 60% of the shares.
• If the property owners cannot afford to renovate the building, they may sell their houses to KIPTAS.

If none of the above options are preferred, the property is expropriated by the responsible state agency.

Tenants in the area are not offered any option in the project scope, but the FM provides a moving grant.

Although the above offers sound reasonable compared to other URP schemes (see Chapter 5), the process has not proceeded as it was described on paper. The developer, KIPTAS, has controlled the project process since the general framework of the project began to be discussed and the firm was considered the suitable body to manage its development. Since 2005, KIPTAS had been buying properties in the project area, although the project had not been officially announced yet nor any proposal for renovation works or concept projects prepared. In an interview in 2013, after eight years of property exchange in the area, the manager of KIPTAS mentions that KIPTAS owns 60% of the project area, which means over 200 buildings. Another reading of this statement is that the project developer becomes the main property owner in the URP area, hence the main actor in the property market.

In the following section, the sorts of problems which emerged and how the relations between the project stakeholders and property owners developed within this strategy are discussed.

103 Süleymaniye’de kentsel yenileme katılımcılığı muhtaç!, 1.11.2013, Zaman Newspaper, http://www.zaman.com.tr/ekonomi_suleymaniyye-kentsel-yenileme-katilimciliaga-muhtac_2160363.html. Access: 5.11.2013. In the interview that I carried out with one of the senior managers of KIPTAS, he also mentioned that KIPTAS owned more than half of the properties in the designated project area (interview KPT-1)
6.3.3.1. **A critical assessment of the URP**

Compared to other URPs, the general agenda of the Suleymaniye URP gives more priority to conservation of the historical buildings of the area. Yet, its social and economic effects are likely to be similar to those in other areas and it is still a state-led gentrification project. Main critiques of the project can be categorised according to the development of the project, role of the developer and the clandestine relations.104

The early criticisms of URP dated in 2005 and 2006 and grounded on the critiques of the Museum City Project, highlighted that the historical buildings are in danger but could be preserved with allocations of resources in different scales of renovation activities rather than constructing ‘new’ historical buildings (Kuban 2005; Gumus 2005; interview TP-8). It is claimed that the municipality aims to develop a new ‘building site’ and to gentrify the area by establishing a property market (Gumus 2005; interviews TP-4, TP-8).

The statement of the former mayor Nevzat Er clarifies the basis for the critiques and the process followed by the state-led gentrification project and the construction works in the area:105

> We are planning demolitions in that area. We will first determine which houses are derelict and risky in an earthquake, then demolish them. It is hard to do anything without demolition. First, all those messes need to be cleaned up. The works are at the demolishing stage at the moment. (...) With this project, the sociological structure [emphasis added] in this region will be improved. With these changes and transformations, the socio-economic structure will also change. There will be quality here. For example, at the moment, although that region is the centre of Istanbul, electricity is used illegally in some places. (...) Once upon a time, Ottoman elites were living there, now we are also targeting this. (...) We are going to these

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104 As an example of controversial relations in the urban renewal projects, the subcontracted architectural firm can be given as an example. One of the partners of H.E. Architecture Office, Halil Onur, is the head of the Istanbul Site Management Directorate of IMM, and is also the architect of the very controversial revitalisation project in Gezi Park, which resulted in the June 2013 uprising in Turkey. In the absence of more detailed evidence, it is arguable whether these amount to instances of corruption, but certainly these cases are examples of a significant lack of transparency in how some individuals have come to predominate in the development of state-led urban projects.

people [residents of Suleymaniye] and saying ‘look, this place here will be demolished’. In fact, 99% [of residents] are tenants. Find a house immediately, the money is ready, take it and go. I demolished forty houses like this.

In another speech in 2007, the mayor mentions that 700 buildings would be demolished in the area and rebuilt in the Ottoman architectural style. The contradictory statements of the mayor were criticised by UNESCO, ICOMOS, the Chamber of Architects, the Chamber of City Planners and the Turkish Timber Association. UNESCO Istanbul representatives recall the commitments that Turkey gave to UNESCO:

The 2005 Vienna Memorandum of UNESCO, of which Turkey was a signatory, mentions that historical buildings cannot be subjected to demolition and reconstruction and this way should be avoided. If they [the state] do not know this, they could have learnt it from us, they could have asked for our advice or support. However, to date, nobody has consulted us.

The Minister of Culture and Tourism and the mayor of IMM responded to the criticism and declared that damage to the historical environment was out of the question. However, while the discussions about conservation were ongoing, damaging events occurred in Suleymaniye. In August 2007, five fires were reported in the area. These were suspected to be arson attacks, and caused severe damage to the listed timber houses.

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108 In the UNESCO Vienna Memorandum, article 21 refers to this case: Taking into account the basic definition (according to Article 7 of this Memorandum), urban planning, contemporary architecture and preservation of the historic urban landscape should avoid all forms of pseudo-historical design, as they constitute a denial of both the historical and the contemporary alike. One historical view should not supplant others, as history must remain readable, while continuity of culture through quality interventions is the ultimate goal. UNESCO Vienna Memorandum on “World Heritage and Contemporary Architecture - Managing the Historic Urban Landscape”; 2005.
15), rumours circulated and concerns were raised about the increasing number of fires in the area after the URP started especially in the properties owned by KIPTAS. This relationship remains an open question.

Further damage to the historical site was reported in December 2007. Istanbul Urban Renewal Cultural and Natural Assets Conservation Directorate sued for listed buildings demolished illegally and without any notice. The directorate sued for nine plots, seven of which had been bought by KIPTAS. The demolition was also reported by the internet media.\footnote{Suleymaniye'de Neler Oluyor? 14.12.2007, MIMDAP, \url{http://www.mimdap.org/?p=2788} Access: 5.12.2010.}

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure 6.6.: A Demolished Listed Building</th>
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<td>Block 504, Plot 11 - 26.04.2007</td>
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<td>Block 504, Plot 11 - 26.11.2007</td>
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The role of the developer, KIPTAS, is the most critical issue in Suleymaniye URP, one which differentiates the project from the other URPs. Since 2005, KIPTAS has been buying buildings via negotiators which triggered the emergence of a new market in the area.\footnote{Along with KIPTAS, some other capital owners and negotiators bought buildings in the regeneration areas. In the interviews, residents of Suleymaniye talked about various negotiators in the area looking for blocks for the big capital owners. Some said that the big workshops were bought by foundations and some big trade names (interviews SM-2, SR-7, SS-6); in one conversation in a workshop, it was said that a Kuwait-based holding bought the inn his workshop was located (interview SS-6). It is hard to find exact data about this topic hence who bought what is just rumour;}

The dynamics of relations emerging between the actors of the URP have
evolved around this newly emerging property market. The critical point in the formation of this market is that it is a result and a strategy of the URP scheme which has developed with the absolute power of the public authorities. Therefore, the market has been formed by the state via the URP.

As mentioned earlier, the value of the properties in Suleymaniye was low, the property market was not lively, and unlike some other historical areas, such as Fener-Balat, gentrification in its original terms – i.e. middle-class residents moving to a poor working-class area by taking advantage of the property market – was not observed aside from a few examples in a very small area of the quarter. In sum, the state-led URP has formed a new property market in the area, and the developer assigned by the state became the main client of this market.

KIPTAS bought the houses via a negotiator who then became a very controversial figure and a symbol of the clandestine relations in the project implementation process. The negotiator introduced himself as the consultant to the IMM mayor and a KIPTAS staff member. In his neighbourhood activities, municipal police forces accompanied him. Eventually, some residents complained about the negotiator’s threatening behaviour in trying to convince the occupiers to sell and vacate their properties. In response to these complaints, the Metropolitan Municipality issued a statement in 2007 saying that this person did not have any official tie with either the municipalities or KIPTAS. The relation between the negotiator and the public however, it can be said that from all of this process, a property market which was unexpected by the residents was established in the area and is used as the main means of implementation of the URP.

113 In 1998, a project was prepared for a street called Ayranci, as a pilot project by the IMM. It was aimed to renovate 26 listed buildings in this area, but only renovated three of them. The owner of one of these three says in an interview in 2005: “I thought that unless Suleymaniye was saved, Istanbul was not saved. But now I see that, if Suleymaniye is not rehabilitated, the hopes of the people who try to do something individually like me, will be burnt out.” (Bu eşiz semt, İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası sonrasının bombalarla yerle bir edilmiş Berlin’i gibi, Ersin Kalkan, Hurriyet Pazar, 06.03.2005, http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2005/03/06/609609.asp . Access 5.12.2010).

114 These residents were mostly the owners of the workplaces in the area. They complained to their chamber, the Chamber of Trade, about the negotiator’s threatening behaviour. The Chamber forwarded these complaints to the Metropolitan Municipality. The response of the municipality ended the negotiator’s relations with the area.
authorities, and how the negotiations were carried out remained open questions. Even now, the municipal officers and KIPTAS deny that there was any such name in the context of the project.  

The property owners were offered 700-800 TL p/m² in the early days of the formation of the market. When the details of the project became more apparent and the market actors were more settled in 2008, the price per square metre rose to 3000-5000 TL (interview, SM-4, SM-3, SR-7, FM-1, FM-3), which exceeded the property prices anywhere else in Fatih district. Later in 2008, around forty property owners went to court to request the cancellation of the selling process on the grounds that the conditions were unfair. They claimed that they were forced to sell their houses to KIPTAS, and they were paid less than property owners who sold their properties later. This action was not taken collectively and did not lead to further action.

The strategy of establishing a market in the area worked well at the beginning but later property prices rose to a level that the project stakeholders could not afford.

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115 I tried to reach the negotiator for an interview but he rejected my request. I tried to access information about his duty in the municipality and in KIPTAS but neither of the officers talked about him; in fact, they said that they do not know anything about him. Although his involvement in the project and questions about him are open information, the responses of the officers pretending not to know about the negotiator could be read as trying to avoid discussion about him. Their response might also be read as a proof of non-transparent way of development and implementation of the project since the actors of this process and their responsibilities are not publicly known.

116 To note here, the emerging property market in Suleymaniye is different from the one in Fener-Balat-Ayvansaray. In Suleymaniye, the prices per square metre were determined over time in the bargaining process, whereas in FBA case, the value of the properties was determined by the project stakeholders without allowing any bargaining on prices. These different conditions in the project implementation constitute one of the main differences between the two cases, which also are determining factors in the emergence of a mobilisation.

117 The prices per square metre in Suleymaniye are higher than any other place. In FBA for example, the property owners were offered 1000-1500 p/m² which is lower than the market price in the area. For Suleymaniye residents, the offers by the project stakeholders were unexpected in the lack of a property market in the area. In one interview, the property owner who bought her house in 1995 for a very cheap price said that she could only sell her house if she could buy three flats in the Fatih district. This shows how the standards, expectations and bargaining power of people transformed over time. This topic will be discussed also in the following sections.

Against the challenge of high prices, the IMM Mayor and KIPTAS directorate called upon the property owners to collaborate with the stakeholders to continue making progress. Also, basically, the expropriation power of the authorities was used to overcome the challenge of high prices. The municipality expropriated some properties, but there remains a question about how the buildings were chosen for expropriation. Furthermore, some owners mentioned that although they informed the municipality that they wanted to take the initiative on their building, as offered in the project scheme, their request was not considered and their building was expropriated (interview SR-17). These owners challenged the expropriation in court but, before the case was concluded, their building was demolished.

Nonetheless, expropriation did not work for the project stakeholders either, since the expropriation prices and the number of buildings that needed to be expropriated were high. Later, IMM, FM and KIPTAS announced that they were suspending the project and asked for the return of the instalments paid to the expropriated property owners, which caused a very ambiguous and unpredictable condition in the project implementation. These conditions caused more trouble for the owners of the expropriated buildings and made them take another legal action against this last decision of the public authorities.

The expropriation process is highly complicated, unplanned and ambiguous; even the property owners could not understand the future steps (interviews SR-2, SR-17). In my research, I could not obtain answers to questions such as how the buildings were selected for expropriation, why the property owners were not informed about the process, and how the buildings were demolished while the court case was continuing. These questions are all connected with the discretionary power of the project stakeholders. What can be concluded is that the state has used its power to its full extent to make the state-led gentrification project happen.

The most distinctive feature of the project implementation in Suleymaniye is the establishment of a speculative property market where there had been no such
market before. The residents’ responses, therefore, were shaped by this newly speculative market. Although this forceful market strategy had certain advantages for the stakeholders, the rising prices also created problems. However, the use of other means, such as expropriation, demonstrates the discretionary power of the stakeholders and their ability to use all possible means to put the project into practice and thereby ‘free’ the market for itself.

6.4. Factors Limiting the Emergence of Collective Action in Suleymaniye

Regarding the experiences of the other URP areas and the main contentious topics of contemporary urban politics, it can be suggested that URPs have been a mobilising factor in the localities concerned. In Suleymaniye, the URP did not generate any mobilisation process in the locality or among other urban movement groups. The non-mobilisation in Suleymaniye is compelling because the ‘inaction’ in this place relates to a contested topic which dominates the current contentious politics in the city. If it is accepted that the inaction case is a part of a political process in the scope of the contentious urban politics, then it can be argued that the factors that prevented the locality mobilising would present some of the key features of the relations established in the dynamics of current contentious politics.

The streets of Suleymaniye are used by the inhabitants and there is a lively social environment. However, when it is closely observed it is seen that, rather than close social ties, what exists is ‘street politics’ in Bayat’s terms (1999, 2012) which means everybody is aware of each other but not inclusive of others in the politics of everyday life. One remarkable example of this was observed during the demolition, which demonstrated the conflicts and the inhabitants’ vulnerabilities, and possibly could have been resisted more elsewhere than in Suleymaniye (see Box 6.1.).
Box 6.1.: The demolition day
On 17th April 2012, residents of Yogurtcuoglu Street in Suleymaniye woke up to an announcement from a megaphone in the street that demolition would be starting soon. The occupants of the buildings were asked to vacate the area as soon as possible. There were tenants still living in their flats, workplaces and shops were running their businesses. Tenants in both residences and workplaces began to resist the Fatih Municipality’s forces, claiming that they had not been notified about the demolition and were not ready to move out yet. Nevertheless, the municipality started demolition in the early hours of the morning.

After I heard about the demolition in the morning, I immediately went to Suleymaniye. I went to the offices of the mukhtars of the Demirtas and Hocagiyyasettin neighbourhoods to get information. Hocagiyyasettin neighbourhood’s mukhtar was not in his office. Demirtas’s mukhtar was in her office, but she did not know much about the demolition. This surprised me because what I had witnessed in different neighbourhoods during contentious events was that people, especially leading figures take their places in the area. After talking with the mukhtar, I headed to the demolition site. On the way, I passed through the streets in which I had done my interviews; they were in their everyday rhythm. Then I arrived at the demolition site. The scene was chaotic. Bulldozers were working.

Figure 6.7.: Demolition day
The vice mayor of FM responsible for the Suleymaniye URP was surrounded by a number of tenants who claimed that they were not informed either by the municipality or the property owners and were asking for delay of demolition. FM officers said that they had sent notices to everyone months ago, and the last notification was sent twenty days previously, informing residents of the exact date of demolition.

Tenants were complaining not only about the municipality but also about the property owners. According to them, the property owners took the money from the municipality, but continued to collect rent and did not inform the tenants. Later, when I interviewed a property owner whose workshop inn was demolished, she said that the FM without any notification had expropriated her property, that she learned of it from the newspaper (interview SR-17).

There were dramatic scenes in the two residential apartment blocks in the demolition site. None of the ten households in these blocks were ready to move out from their flats. In these blocks, there were vulnerable families with sick or elderly members. In one, there was a disabled fourteen-year-old boy who was dependent on an oxygen supply from a machine which works with electricity. When the municipal forces arrived in the demolition area, they cut the water and electric supply of the apartment blocks, which turned the story...
into a more drastic one. When I arrived, the household managed to get the power back again. They insisted that they had not received any notification from either the municipality or the property owner. A man from one of the households in this apartment block was trying to convince the officer from the municipality that they were not insisting on living in the neighbourhood, but they needed time to find a place to move. However, the municipality officer was certain: “I sent the notification months ago!”

According to the vice mayor demolition was the toughest part of the process, and if it were delayed people would continue to live in the area forever. He said the municipality did not have any conflict with the property owners who had been generously compensated. Suleymaniye project was not a project from which the municipality could benefit, he said. It was a prestige project, but the project was almost stopped because of the costs. He stated that in order to secure the project process, they needed to transform the area into a construction site. “Life is over here, this is a construction site from now on!” he said to one tenant.

On that occasion, the demolition of the apartment blocks which still contained tenants and some of the workplaces in vulnerable conditions were delayed for a month thanks to the arrival of some Fatih Municipality residents.

When the situation was a little calmer on the demolition day, I walked around the streets and went into some workplaces. People were working normally; women were in the streets, assembling pieces of belts as usual, and they did not know what had happened at the demolition site.

During the demolition, besides observing the vulnerability and resistance of the residents, and how the stakeholders responded to them, I also tried to observe who was there, if I could recognise anyone from third parties, such as the urban movements network, political parties or other neighbourhoods. I did not see anyone. Only the next day, two Istanbul MPs of the Kurdish Party BDP visited the households in the apartment blocks and made a press declaration in the neighbourhood, but it was not well attended. A CHP Fatih Municipality council member spoke about the Suleymaniye URP on a TV programme. An urban movement group published a press release about how the rights of tenants were violated. But this demolition did not receive significant attention, in contrast to the demolitions or
conflicts that happened in the organised neighbourhoods.

The demolition day provided an important observation about the inaction and quietness of the area and when I compared it with my previous experiences in other neighbourhoods under threat of demolition, the question about this area became more significant: Why was this URP area so quiet even on the day of demolition?

The field research in Suleymaniye led to a rough conclusion that the only collectivism to emerge in this area takes the form of an unspoken agreement not to take action, which could be formulated as collective inaction. In this section, I discuss the factors that affect the emergence of ‘collective inaction’ by categorising the points I concluded from the field research. First, I shall discuss the external factors, i.e. the political opportunities, and frame the project process and its limitations on the emergence of collective action. Second, I shall discuss the limitations of the internal factors on the emergence of collective action. I use Tilly’s formulation of strength in collective actions (1999) as a base in the analysis of internal factors: Strength = Worthiness X Unity X Number X Commitment. Tilly argues that lack of any of these factors would diminish the strength of collective action. I analyse the lack of action in Suleymaniye by considering the local reflections of these factors. In these terms, respect and trust in the social relations (worthiness), the condition of the built environment and the residents’ attachment to the place (commitment and worthiness), social and political relations (worthiness and unity) and access to network and involvement of third parties (unity and number) are analysed. I argue that in Suleymaniye none of these factors could have been achieved by the community, and in rest of the chapter, I discuss this argument.

6.4.1. External factors affecting the inaction

6.4.1.1. The evolution of the URP and the property market

As mentioned earlier, Suleymaniye URP has been developed rather differently from the other projects in the historical settlements. Given that the destroying
intervention in the historical site is an important element in the arguments of the opposition network in FBA (see Chapter 5), the Suleymaniye URP scheme has fewer contentious elements with respect to conservation. This difference is substantially related to the status of the area as a WHS. The project has been monitored by the UNESCO WHC and related national bodies, which had an impact on the evolution of the scheme in this particular area.

These limitations regarding the historical built environment, however, have little impact on the social and economic restructuring targets set by the project stakeholders. The strategies and means implemented by the public authorities and the developer certainly determined the responses of the other parties. These strategies that have limited the possibility of the emergence of a public sphere can be summarised in four points: partial implementation of the project; the lack of information and public debate about the project; the formation of the property market by the developer; and the unlimited power of the public authorities to implement the project.

The property exchange in the area due to the URP project started in 2005, even before the announcement of the project in 2006, which caused a speculative market to emerge in the area. The architectural proposals for the particular blocks started to be considered by the FM Council only in September 2009 and this was still ongoing when this research was carried out. Thus, although property ownership exchanges and even demolitions were carried out, the final outcome of the project accepted by the public authorities and conservation boards for the whole area is still unknown; this made monitoring and a holistic analysis of possible outcomes of the project difficult.

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119 The projects of different blocks in the Suleymaniye URP area under the responsibility of FM were seen in the Fatih Municipality Council separately and over time, such as in September 2009, August 2010, October 2011, May and August 2012, March, April and May 2013 (http://www.fatih.bel.tr/meclis-karar-ozetleri-1475, Access 3.11.2013). The official architectural projects and details for particular plots and blocks had not been finalised yet when the actions were taken by KIPTAS in the area.
The partial development of the project was also characterised by a lack of information about the further steps and its terms and conditions. The property owners were left uninformed about details, such as what kind of renovation they needed to do, at what cost and any funding opportunities and technical support, information which they needed as the basis for making decisions about whether or not to participate in the project.

Besides all the ambiguities in the project process, the discreet and clandestine negotiations with the property owners and the spontaneity of the use of power by the project holders – which is well observed in the expropriation cases and the request for the return of the expropriation instalments paid by the public authorities (see section 6.3.3.1.) – limit the scope for actions for or against the project. The interviews I carried out in the area indicate that information about the project is very limited, even for the property owners who applied to take part in the project process (interviews SR-3, SR-4, SR-5, SR-7, SR-17). Even the difference between the URP and the project implemented by KUDEB was not widely recognised (interviews SR-4, SR-16).

When opposition actions emerged as a reaction, such as in the case of URP areas, having information about the details of the spatial intervention and taking them to the public sphere become crucial factors affecting the emergence and political process of opposition movements, whereas lack of information about the project and partial implementation limits the ground for collective action. The limiting impacts of lack of information can be well observed in the Suleymaniye case.

The other important external factor that affects relations in the area is the formation of a new property market by the developer which presents the property owners with an opportunity to increase the value of their property in this dilapidated built environment (interviews SM-1, SM-2, SM-3, SM-4, SR-3, SR-5). The critical point in the emergence of this market is the clandestine relations between the client and the property owners. The market has not been established ‘freely and
openly’ which might have equal opportunity to property owners. As mentioned earlier, some early sellers went to court to request the cancellation of the selling process claiming that they were deceived (Atayurt and Cavdar 2009; interviews SM-2, SM-3). However, none of these attempts turned into a collective response. Thus, the establishment of the property market was problematic and noticed by the property owners, but these problems were not taken to the collective sphere, rather attempts to deal with the problems were undertaken individually.

The mukhtar of the Hocagiyasettin neighbourhood – who was a tenant resident at the time, a 1990s migrant from one of the Southeast Kurdish cities, and was critical about the project mentioning that it was not for the people living in the area – said that because the project implementation has been grounded on individual interest, it was not easy to collaborate on differentiated individual interests: “The face of money is dirty,” he said; “People do not want to oppose anyone when the matter is in their interests.” He said he has neither supported nor obstructed the process: “Because it is an individual issue, we could not find any one to oppose the project” (interview SM-3).

The words of a Kurdish property owner – who moved to Suleymaniye in 1995 and is now prepared to sell her property if she is paid enough to afford three houses in Fatih district – support the arguments of the mukhtar:

> People are so wrapped up in their own issues, behave so individually. Nobody thinks about others; everybody thinks about their own interests. They make the agreement with KIPTAS but there is no collective action. Even people who sold their property do not tell others the terms of the agreements (interview SR-5).

The strategy of the project stakeholders to hold the relations over the property ownership, the exchange value of the properties and in the individual level is apparent in the Suleymaniye case. As the same property owner had experienced before with the KIPTAS negotiator (interview SR-5), the possibility of developing a relationship between the property owners was also obstructed to some extent by the project stakeholders.
The last point also demonstrates the discretionary power of the public authorities to control the whole process at all stages, which constitutes a challenge to collectivising actions in the locality. As described by the Hocagiyasettin neighbourhood mukhtar (interview SM-3), especially in a place like Suleymaniye where society was disorganised, timid and contains people whose political relations with the state are delicate in the public sphere due to the broader conflicts (Kurdish residents in the Suleymaniye case), the discretionary power becomes more effective at controlling the process.\textsuperscript{120}

Establishing the market and basing the process on individual interests has a limiting impact on the emergence of collective action. Yet, the centrality of individual interest does not explain the lack of collective action on its own, since these interests can also be defended collectively. It can be argued in the Suleymaniye case that, along with individual interests, how individuals relate to each other, project stakeholders and their properties becomes important to framing the alienation of the individuals from the collectives.

6.4.1.2. \textit{Physical conditions and built environment}

These areas seem like a scene from a historical movie to you, reminding you of the romantic stories of the past. But try to stay only one night in one house! I wonder if you can endure it!

These striking words came from a tenant who had lived in Suleymaniye for fifteen years (SR-8). It was a criticism of those who would romanticise the historical environment without considering the difficulties of living there.

\textsuperscript{120} In another interview that the mukhtar gave to a newspaper in 2010, he stresses that people were afraid of the police. Many residents came with the forced migration to the neighbourhood: “Although there are responsive people among them, things that they do are misunderstood and manipulated. Some others, on the other hand, say that whatever the state does is right!” Suleymaniye Yenileme Projesi: Yangindan Mal Cikarmak, 12.02.2010 Birgun Newspaper. http://www.birgunabone.net/city_index.php?news_code=1265975712&year=2010&month=02&day=12 Access: 10.12.2010
The built environment has been neglected; no steps have been taken to stop deterioration of the abandoned and collapsing buildings over time. Currently, people are living in conditions that are unhealthy and even dangerous. However, neither the property owners nor the authorities have taken action to improve them. During the field research, references to ‘cleaning the area’ were very common in residents’ descriptions of the conditions in Suleymaniye. None of the actors - from project holders to residents, from workshops to third parties – are happy about the conditions in Suleymaniye. The frequent calls for ‘cleaning’ reflect the residents’ frustration at the conditions in the area.

In a complex property ownership structure (see section 6.2.2.), perhaps, public authorities could be more effective at taking responsibility for regulating the situation. However, according to residents, the physical conditions in the area have become worse since the start of URP. Demolished or abandoned buildings are left untouched by the authorities, which creates more danger. These buildings become a dumping ground, or home to homeless or most vulnerable people, such as the new migrants to the city – the refugees from Syria who have escaped from the civil war. This situation also creates tension and fragmentation in the social environment of the site. It can be claimed that the decline in the built environment since the beginning of the URP was part of a spiral of decline to legitimise the renewal.
The discussion on abandoned buildings (either by the property owners or the new owner KIPTAS) and the role of the project stakeholders is important for understanding the nature of the URP in the area. For example, Fatih Municipality was given the right to expropriate the buildings on the URP site and did so on various occasions during the process. Curiously, however, the municipality did not use this method for the collapsing buildings which create danger, as the mukhtars of the neighbourhoods mentioned. Yavuzselim and Hocagiyasettin neighbourhoods’ mukhtars asked the municipality to start the renovation process on a smaller scale in order to allow people to take an interest in and even admire the project. However, the response from the municipality was not promising: “The mayor told me directly that if they were to make a sample, the value of the houses would increase” (interview SM-3). Similarly, the small-scale renovation works by KUDEB could also be considered, since these represented an effort to improve the site, but as mentioned earlier, funding for this project was stopped by IMM. The abandoned
buildings in the area could be seen as an example of the selective use of the public authorities’ power to leave the area to deteriorate. It can be argued that public authorities used disinvestment and deterioration as market-controlling mechanisms.

Under these circumstances, health, safety and security became significant concerns among the residents in Suleymaniye. Raziye says the conditions in the area are beyond recovery:

...What would it be like here if it were not demolished? You know, there are some people about whom others say “If they die the world will be safer...” Like, this is said as though some rubbish had passed away from the world. Right, here is like that! Here will be clean after it is demolished. Here will be clean after it dies (Interview SR-8).

On a similar note, the municipality officers say that “here is the centre of Istanbul, shall we leave it like this? It needs to be cleaned.” Still on the same note, the neighbourhoods’ mukhtars say: “here is the centre of Istanbul, we do not want to see here like this, whatever they do is welcome, just clean here and make this a liveable place again”. In sum, all think the area is not habitable anymore and all are waiting for action to improve the hopeless conditions. However, the inhabitants do not see improving conditions on their own initiative as a possibility.

6.4.2. The internal factors affecting the emergence of collective action

6.4.2.1. Property Ownership and Individual Interests

Property relations determine the approach of the inhabitants to the project process and their relations with the project stakeholders.

One of the factors that affect the project process in Suleymaniye is the lack of property owners living in the area and the exclusion of the main resident population
of the area, i.e. the tenants, from the project process. Tenants are not given any rights in the project and they are seen as a mobile population. "They do not have any rights. They are paying rent here already; so much so that, either here or somewhere else does not matter. But still they have been given moving out money by the municipality," said an older property owner in the area (interview SM-2). Tenants are excluded and also perceive themselves as outside of the conflict. One of the primary reasons for this perception is their relation with the space and unhappiness with living there because of the physical conditions of the area. The precarious and informal tenancy conditions - such as lack of contracts, relating to the area as a transient place - can be considered other underlying reasons of their perception of being outsiders.

The most important problem concerning property in Suleymaniye is the jointly owned properties which have been bought in partnership or inherited from the previous owner(s). Since all the owners of a single property are entitled to decide on the property, joint ownership becomes a serious problem when questions arise concerning the condition of the property. In cases of complex property ownership, such as properties that have as many as ten owners (examples given by the mukhtars of the neighbourhoods, SM-1, SM-4), it is hard to reach a consensus about issues such as maintenance or occupation. Moreover, selling the property did not mean much for the owners, since the market value of the properties was low (interviews SM-1, SM-4, SR-17). Furthermore, property owners could not develop a plan for the future use of their properties (interviews SM-1, SM-2, SR-17). Hence,

\[\text{121}\] I do not have data for of distribution of the property ownership and tenants but in all the interviews I carried out, the same story has been told. Besides, in the plan reports, it is also mentioned that the area has mostly been used by the tenants (Fatih Municipality Plan Reports 2005)\[\text{122}\] In several struggles against the urban regeneration and renewal projects, tenants are also considered as the rightful owners within the struggle. That is to say, efforts are made to include tenants in the formation of struggles. Fener-Balat-Ayvansaray and Tarlabasi associations which emerged against the URPs in these quarters can be given as examples of mentioning the word ‘tenant’ in their names, although tenants have not been much involved. In Sulukule and Ayazma URPs, which have already been implemented, the tenants were accepted as ‘rightful’ by the government and, at least, offered mortgages in the TOKI housing estates. In Suleymaniye case, tenants are not given any rights. But I did not observe any demand from the tenants to the state about the scope of the project.
while the exchange value of the property decreased, its use value also decreased. The properties were abandoned or left without any maintenance for a long time.

Under these circumstances, the formation of a new market by the developer KIPTAS has changed the conditions in the area. The Yavuzselim neighbourhood mukhtar explains these changes as “KIPTAS solved the property ownership problems in the area”. Given that both the exchange and use values of the properties were low, the newly emerging market offered property owners an opportunity. The rising exchange value in time changed the property owners’ perceptions of both the space and the value of their property (interviews SR-4, SR-5, SR-7).\footnote{A property owner, who bought her house for 5000 TL in 1995, said that they had been offered 250.000 TL for the house but she did not accept because she wants to buy three houses for her sons in Fatih district (interview SR-5). Similar stories were told by other property owners, too. With the rise in property values, they began to demand more and wait for buyers who could give more.}

It cannot be claimed that, however, all the property owners have developed a similar attitude. From the interviews with the property owners living in the area, it can be concluded that there is a difference between the early and later migrant groups. Property owners who are older residents of the area, i.e. not in the group of second-wave migrants, want to invest in their property if the existing conditions are improved (interviews SM-4, SR-3, SR-4). The later migrants’ group, on the other hand, is hesitant about staying in the area (interviews SR-5, SR-7). On the one hand, they are prepared to move out in exchange for a good price; on the other hand, if they are not offered a good price, they will stay in the area. What these two groups of owners have in common is that they are not happy with the existing conditions, and both groups have expectations of the URP with respect to improvement in conditions. However, since most of them still have not been informed about the exact project on their plots, the attitudes they would take is still ambiguous.

The role of workplaces is another important issue regarding the property relations. As mentioned above, Suleymaniye quarter has a highly mixed-use spatial profile including many small-scale workshops, workplaces and warehouses. The URP
proposes that these be removed from the area. Thus, the workplaces are also an important actor in the area.

To investigate the responses of the workplaces, I first tried to find out if workers or owners raised any objection. I started my investigation in Kucukpazar, the coastal part of the project site, and the answer was simply “no”. The workplaces located in the different parts of the project area do not have the same experiences of the project. Those in Kucukpazar told me that the municipality (which means the enterprise of the municipality, KIPTAS) had bought the properties in Hacikadin and Hocagiyasettin, but the project had not yet arrived in Kucukpazar. They only said that the area was planned as a tourism place and the municipality (IMM) will let them run their businesses if they convert them into touristic ones (interviews SS-3, SS-4). In the area where the project’s first steps have been taken, on the other hand, the workshops were bought by KIPTAS or other capital owners, or were expropriated by the municipality. Only at the beginning of this process did the workplaces react, and this concerned the actions of the KIPTAS negotiator and the subsequent conflict that resulted in the municipality distancing itself from the negotiator (see section 6.3.3.1.).

In her study about the socio-economic features of Suleymaniye quarter, Alev Erkilet (2010) highlights that there is a fragmentation among different sectors and some sectors might have an egocentric view about the issue of displacement and eviction of other sectors. Although they are opposed to their own displacement, they might state that decentralisation of other groups is necessary (ibid.).

The traditional small-scale business has a significant importance in the development of spatial relations in Suleymaniye and dislocating all the businesses would destroy both the working relations of the actors and the spatial characteristics of the place. Yet, these aspects of the project scheme have not been discussed publicly. It is only known that displacement of the workplaces is proposed in the project framework. It should be noted here that the small-scale manufacturers and traders still run their
businesses in the area although some of the textile workshops were moved and knocked down. The future of the business and the actions of the actors of this group will be more visible and certain when the project begins to be implemented in the other parts of the area.

### 6.4.2.2. Spatial relations and place attachment

Suleymaniye quarter has the characteristics of a transition zone or a ‘temporary space’ (Kizilkan 2009), or a place of transience, even though many of the households have been living in the area more than ten years. The condition of the built environment, deprived security and health conditions, precarious working and tenancy conditions, bachelor rooms are significant elements giving the area its characteristics of temporality. The inhabitants have also perceived transience as a spatial feature affecting their attachment to place (Lefebvre 1991).

The current spatial formation of the area depends on two developments: first, the changes in economic activities in the area, which can be summarised as the closure of the dry and fresh food market and increase in the number of warehouses and workshops all of which affected the labour market and residential profile; and second, the arrival of migrants from the Kurdish regions who had been forced to migrate due to the armed conflict in Eastern Anatolia (See Chapter 3). Their choice of Suleymaniye was not because of the area’s ‘outstanding values’ (UNESCO WHL 1985), but because of the necessities of migrants, such as cheap rent and property, the centrality of the area, and the opportunities the area has provided. Overall, in the last two decades, a new spatial relationship was established between the new residents of the area and the place.

It is observed that it was not easy for the second wave migrants to adapt to the historical site and the city. The mukhtar of Yavuzselim, who is an old resident of the area and supports a renewal project, mentions that some families continue their use of the space as they had been used to doing in villages and have difficulties
adapting to metropolitan life, but this cannot be “explained to them because they
do not feel they belong to this place” (interview SM-1).

A similar comment about the difficulties of adaptation to the social life and built
environment is voiced by the mukhtar of Hocagiyasettin neighbourhood who is
himself a migrant from Southeast region:

I know a family from my village; their house was always full of guests in the village
every day. Then they were obliged to live in a two-bedroom house here. These
people are living in very bad conditions here. They might have a shelter here, but
they did not find a social environment (interview SM-3).

These conditions that the second wave migrants faced and then adopted in the
deprived historical sites of the city can be associated with the term ‘quiet
encroachment’ developed by Asef Bayat (1997). Inhabitants of this migrant group
formed an enclosure and shaped the space and their social and political relations
according to their needs. However, the relationship they have developed with this
place did not meet with the requirements of the historical built environment; rather
it has been shaped around their necessities, mostly informally and sometimes
contentiously as the ‘quiet encroachment’ suggests.

The mukhtar of Yavuzselim mentions that the later migrants use this area as a step
to adapt to the city and make their conditions better to move to another place.
“When they improve and their children learn artisan works, they move to other
parts of the city and they are replaced by newcomers immediately,” he says
(interview SM-1). The places that the interviewees mentioned to live in Istanbul, if
they leave Suleymaniye, point to an important feature of the perception and
selection of spaces to live. Although Suleymaniye quarter is presented as the centre
of Istanbul and given importance widely by various actors, it does not have the
same value for some residents. “I would like to go Bagcilar [a district on the
periphery of Istanbul, close to industrial estates and dense with irregularly built
apartment blocks], there are nice houses there,” said a Kurdish tenant and the
statement was approved by the others when we were chatting on the street.
Especially, residents of the second wave of migrants (interviews SR-5, SR-8, SR-10,
SR-13, SR-14, SR-15) mentioned recently urbanised places, spatially proximate to industrial areas and with large Kurdish migrant populations since the 1990s. These areas are not close to the central city districts but surrounded by industrial premises and dense with apartment blocks. Besides, the relatives and fellows of the Suleymaniye residents live in these places.

Still, Suleymaniye contains some opportunities for the inhabitants - such as informality in various aspects, access to state aid, cheap living conditions and spatial proximity to labour markets – which contribute to the use value of the space for the inhabitants, but are not the subject of collective action to secure them.

**Informality:** It can be argued that Suleymaniye is one of the places of notable informality in Istanbul. First of all, the labour market in the area runs informally allowing many youths, including young women who would be disadvantaged in the labour market in the absence of such job opportunities, to find jobs in a precarious but spatially proximate market. Along with the workshops, home industries, such as belt-making, are an important part of labour relations in the neighbourhood.\(^{124}\)

Zerrin was a tenant who was paid to move out by the municipality, but later moved back to Suleymaniye although she had been living in better conditions elsewhere; she explained that “money is in Suleymaniye” (SR-13). Although making belts is very cheap, burdensome and temporary work, it still provides benefits to the households, since it is an opportunity that can be accessed in Suleymaniye in the short run. Hence, this already established network is regarded as an incentive for people to live there.

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\(^{124}\) The distributor of belts to different households is also living in the area. She and her husband pick up the pieces of belts from the main workshop in Eminonu-Yesildirek-Gedikpasa areas which are spatially proximate to Suleymaniye and distribute them to different households in Suleymaniye, then collect them again from these households to bring them back to the workshops. Belt production is a contingent choice of production; because, she, the ‘business woman’ who distributes the belts was working in a workshop for four years in informal working conditions and after she developed some contacts, she decided to be an agent between the workshops and possible labour force. Then, she began to distribute the belts to the neighbours. When I asked her if she can continue with the job if she leaves Suleymaniye, she was more relaxed than the others as she is the one who has contact with the main workshops.
Besides the advantages of informal and precarious working conditions, other informal practices, such as use of electricity, avoiding paying tax etc. are important benefits for household income in the short-term (interviews SR-3, SR-4, SR-8).

This informality is a way, sometimes a necessity, to survive in the city for the poor households of Suleymaniye – as the term informality is framed in scholars’ explanations for the survival of the poor in cities (Bayat 1997; Davis 2006). However, is this condition only about the users of the space? In other words, is the state outside of these informal relations in this internationally listed cultural heritage site? At this point, Roy’s (2005, 2009) argument regarding the state’s role in (re)production of informality is important in framing the relationship between public authorities and households in this place. For Suleymaniye specifically, the long-term neglect of the deteriorating built environment, social security issues and the condition of the labour market in the area can be given as examples of the role of the state. Hence, it cannot be said that the deprived conditions and informality which have been turned into advantages by the poor to survive in the city only relate to the inhabitants; these conditions are developed in a complex political-economic relationship which includes the state. Primarily, it is an inter-dependent relationship which cannot happen with the absence of any actor. Therefore, any contention between the claimant and the client is determined in the framework of these relations. The aid distributed by the state, discussed below, is a powerful example of the significance of these relations.

**State aid:** As mentioned in section 6.2.2., access to aid from the state or other institutions is a fundamental determining factor of the area’s economic, political and social dynamics. Any kind of aid makes an important contribution to household income in the ‘new poverty’ conditions and changing welfare regime of Turkey (Bugra and Keyder 2003).

The provision of social security aid to the poor by the state constitutes political clientelism in its simple form. In the interviews, the importance of aid was raised by
the interviewees, several of whom cited it as a factor determining their voting preferences. Zerrin, who came to Istanbul from Adana, said that when the ‘party’ – i.e. the Kurdish Party, BDP – knock on doors asking for votes, she says that she votes for them although, in reality, she votes for the ‘bulb’ – the symbol of the ruling party AKP – because AKP feeds them (interview SR-13). She mentions that she has not seen any benefit from BDP, but she has benefitted from AKP.

As Auyero et al. (2009) mentions, formation of clientelist relations and the ‘way of giving’ from the claimant side are fundamental to reading the dynamics of contentious relations in urban poverty areas. In the Suleymaniye case, it is observed that many households have access to aid from different government institutions and these relations are established in a sort of clandestine way. As discussed in section 6.4.2.3 in more detail, the benefits of the households as well as their incomes are kept private in order to avoid any loss of benefits. Similarly, the state institutions regulate these relations delicately. For example, information about the aid is not available from the public authorities. It can be said that there is an agreement between the client and claimant in the formation of this system which excludes other actors, such as third parties or any other political actor.

In a place of informality, deprivation and precarious conditions, keeping short-term benefits is more important than taking action causing any damage to the established relations. Living in Suleymaniye provides short-term benefits, but struggling for a living in this area under these conditions might not have a similar impact on the households.

_Cheap living conditions and spatial proximity_: Cheap rent and living conditions are further reasons for living in the area. In fact, the rents in the area are not as cheap as is assumed, and it is said that the rents have been increased since the URP
project was introduced. But living in the city centre reduces the cost of transportation. Besides, as mentioned earlier, people, especially youths have opportunities to work in the workshops and develop their skills to find jobs in other places (interviews SM-1, SM-4).

Residents do not want to live in this deprived area, but on the other hand, it provides opportunities for them to increase their household income. This informality is a survival and accumulation strategy for many households. However, these advantages, and ‘use value’ of the space, are not formalised as a target of collective action. If the informal conditions from which the residents benefit were formalised, then they would be lost. Therefore, because of the nature of the relations formed under these conditions between the client and the claimant and for the sustainability of the short-term benefits in this transition zone, these advantages of the area limit rather than encourage collective struggle in the locality. As Bayat (1997) claims, collective action in such places can only come about if the access and resources that people have already gained are under threat. In Suleymaniye, current users of the space do not currently objectify this threat.

6.4.2.3. Social and Political Relations

At first glance, the lively streets of Suleymaniye give the impression of involving close social relations. However, when the conversation goes further with the residents, it is possible to discern tensions between different social groups; a deeper conversation reveals a lack of trust, exclusion and even hatred in social relations.

The level of trust among the members of a community is one of the primary determinants of the formation of collective action, as well as its militancy and incidence (Tarrow 1994; Tilly 1999; Della Porta and Diani 2006). It is possible to talk

125 A household in Suleymaniye pays 400 TL rent which is average rent in the gecekondu areas such as Basibuyuk, Sultanciftligi (Turkun et. al 2010). However, there are also very cheap rental places, mostly rooms, in the area, around 100-200 TL.
about actions and decisions in cases of mistrust; however, it is much harder to form and sustain collective action if the trust level is low in the community. In Suleymaniye, the social and political relations among the residents are fragile and exclusionary, which creates tension and fragmentation in the living environment and limits the possibility of collective decision-making and actions.

The fragmented social relations between the Kurdish and Turkish residents can be observed in conversations with people of both sides. However, the exclusionary discourse is more decisive in older residents, i.e. the Turkish residents. In one of my early visits to the area, when I was talking with a Kurdish tenant on the street, an old lady came along and joined our conversation. She began to complain about the deprived conditions, and left after a short while. When I finished the interview with the Kurdish tenant, I saw that the old lady and her neighbours were beckoning me from the other end of the street. They welcomed me with a question about my birthplace. Then they said that they had understood that “I am not one of those [Kurdish people]”. I listened to their stories and opinions about the URP; but the conversation frequently returned to their complaints about and even hatred of the Kurdish households. Although they had conversations with their Kurdish neighbours in daily life, and as far as I witnessed these conversations are not tense, in their close group these Turkish inhabitants stated their discomfort and dislike for the others in a routine language. The residents, who are named as ‘shapely families’ by Erkilet (2009), see the newcomers, i.e. the Kurds and the bachelors, as the cause of the deprivation and potential criminals creating constant insecurity in the area. Erkilet phrases this tension as “the shapely families are against the newcomers” in Suleymaniye: The former are residents who are settled and feel they belong to the place (i.e. the old residents of the area, mostly identifying themselves as Turks)

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126 When I was interviewing a Kurdish tenant, other people, mostly women, began to join our conversation. We first became two, then four and there were also some distant listeners (men who were curious about what we were discussing).

127 In fact, my birthplace does not provide a certain answer to my ethnic background, but the relationship between ethnicity and birthplace is a historically, socially and politically constructed relation in Turkey that allows people make assumptions about one’s ethnicity over their birthplaces.
whereas the latter are the bachelors and the eastern and south-eastern immigrants. The former see the latter as the cause of deprivation.

Some of the topics mentioned repeatedly in the exclusionary discourse were how the Kurdish residents benefitted from the state aid by presenting themselves as poor even though they are wealthy; their political standpoint, which the Turkish group associated with terror; criminal cases in the neighbourhood; and lastly their lifestyles, which are not associated with ‘urban life’ and are regarded as a cause of deprivation. The last three issues can be seen also in the state's discourse, which is also experienced in other regeneration and renewal areas. In the establishment of the exclusionary discourse between the ethnic groups, the state plays a role by establishing the clientelist relations. Furthermore, to note the point again, the tension between the ethnic groups is not a plain consequence of the conditions in Suleymaniye, but is constructed and fed by the general political atmosphere resulting from the armed conflict lasting more than three decades.

On the one hand, Kurds have been seen as enemies of the unity of the state both in the state discourse and by many Turkish citizens for a long time; but, on the other hand, currently, there is a significant clientelist relationship between the ruling party and the Kurds, a situation which also incites tension in Turkish residents as well as anger towards the public authorities. The quotation below gives a sense of how poverty and clientelist relations are combined and constructed in the discourse in an accusatory way:

> Worthless people’s houses were renewed, you know that? This is what makes me resentful. My kids are ill; our income is minimum wage... I explained all this. I said if I could avoid it, I would not come to you [the KUDEB Rehabilitation Programme Office]. They rejected me. They maintained the others’ [houses]. (...) They say that they maintain the houses of poor people. No, they don’t, they always do the rich’s. I want the same as what everyone has. Treat people equally. They do not treat

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128 In Fener-Balat- Ayvansaray URP area, Fatih Municipality pointed to Kurdish migrants as the reason for the deprivation. Sulukule URP area was defined as a place of prostitutes. In one of his speeches in 2007, Erdogan Bayraktar, the chief director of the Mass Housing Agency pointed to the gecekondu areas as the sources of “terror, drug use, the paralysed looking to the state, psychological disorders, lack of education and health” (Zaman newspaper, 13.11.2007)
people as equals. We are running to the state, to the nation; the other man isn’t any good to the state, they maintain his house.

Nazmiye’s house was not renewed in the scope of the KUDEB project, hence, she constructed her anger by referencing the clientelist relations and how Kurds have benefitted, although she does not have any evidence about the process of selection of the houses.

Erkilet (2010) also gives a striking example about the view of some teachers from the schools in Suleymaniye quarter who mentioned that the migrants from Eastern regions are “uneducable”. According to these teachers, the Eastern origin migrants (i.e. Kurds) need to be “adapted to the city life” and “educated with some ethical values”. For them, Suleymaniye can only be renewed if the uneducated and uncultured people living in the area are moved (ibid.).

Another example of fragmented community relations based on ethnic background can be seen in the approaches of two Suleymaniye-born residents. The two elderly residents, who do not like the existing social and political structure of the area, stated that although rumours are circulating that non-Muslims are buying land in Suleymaniye, they welcome them because they want the area be ‘clean’ and ‘urban’ again. One of them, who is in her mid-70s, expressed herself as follows: “It is being said that they will sell these places to foreign people. Oh, I wish they would sell! I wish Greeks, non-Muslims would come here and these Kurds would leave!” (interview SR-3). As an old resident, she feels nostalgia for ‘old Istanbul’, where non-Muslims and Muslims, educated people (vis a vis the ‘badly educated, non-urban’ Kurds) were living.

In the FBA case, any demand from a non-Muslim community is perceived as part of a conspiracy theories about the aims of the Patriarchate for the area, and such discourse is used by FBA residents to justify their explanations of the aims of the project; however, unlike FBA, in Suleymaniye, the religion or nationality of the newcomers is not a concern for the old residents in the area; their wish is to see the
end of the deprivation which, according to them, is linked with the new residential profile of the area. This discourse overlaps with the promise of the URP about ‘cleansing of the area’ and ‘transforming it to glamorous past days’.

The biased ethnic tension is not only seen in the expressions of the Turkish residents; a marginalisation of Turkish residents can also be seen in the discourse of the Kurdish residents, although it is not as sharp as that on the Turkish side. While we were talking about the relations in the neighbourhood and if people shared their experiences about the project with each other, a Kurdish landlady said about her Turkish neighbour that “my neighbour, she was a Turk but she was alright, we were exchanging words, did not say anything to us while she was leaving” (interview SR-5). The fragmentation is reciprocal, which certainly affects the social relations in the neighbourhood.

The biased relations between ethnic groups are an obvious limiting factor in the emergence of a collective identity. But does this collective identity have an opportunity to emerge among the residents of individual ethnic groups? If the Kurdish population is dominant in the area, it could be expected that unity or collective decision-making would be seen since they are from the same ethnic background, and moreover, there is a rooted Kurdish party support in the area (see the election results in the Appendix D). However, what I observed in my field research is that variables, such as coming from the same ethnic background, need to be considered with other factors and not be taken separately. In other words, factors such as the dynamics of a deprived, poor area, where informality and clientelist relations are dominant in forming the politics of everyday life are more influential than common ethnic origins in determining the politics of everyday life.

To illustrate the social relations in the area further, I might give examples of how rumours about households’ assets are spread by other people in the neighbourhood. During the interviews, household members mentioned their working conditions, like precarious work and making pieces of belt, as well as the
rent they pay and other living expenses in Suleymaniye. However, the income level of the households, how many people in the household work and if they have any assets or not, were not directly mentioned. But in these interviews I was often told about assets of other households. For example, one tenant interviewee, who had left the area after the house they were living in had been sold to KIPTAS, told me that they moved to another rented place far away from Suleymaniye. I later heard from two other different households that that tenant household actually has a house somewhere else, most probably a gecekondu, but they do not want to leave Suleymaniye because of the access to state aid and job opportunities.

In the emergence of weak social relations, the social aid system has a big impact since it creates the perception that some people unfairly benefit more than others. An old Turkish resident claimed that people benefit from state aid although they are not vulnerable (interview SR-3):

They [in her rhetoric ‘they’ refers to Kurds] are served catering two times a week. They receive a cheque from the Metropolitan Municipality. They have pocket money in the religious festivals. They also have money normally. Well, why so do they leave here? (...) Yes, everybody has a right to live well. But they did not make any effort to find a job when they arrived. They are coming, bringing cannabis from there, selling here. They earn money, all of them have flats. But they do not tell this. Even some of them have two, don’t they?

I heard a number of stories like this from different groups. Some said that others had more than one house in Suleymaniye but still benefit from the state aid; some were said to have houses in different places in Istanbul, which they rented out while continuing to live in Suleymaniye because of the low cost of living and access to state aid. It is claimed by many of the residents that others misinform the state institutions about their income or assets to benefit from aid. It is hard to prove or disprove these arguments in this research, but these thoughts and claims are indicative of tension and mistrust among the residents.

In her analysis of social relations in Suleymaniye, Erkilet (2009: 94) mentions that Suleymaniye is one of the places where poor residents of the poor neighbourhoods marginalise and take an exclusionary position towards their poorer/poorest and
‘other’ (Kurds, poorest, occupiers of bachelor rooms) neighbours. She argues that this is embedded in the politics of fear (ibid.), which may be seen as a part of the (re)production of the legitimisation discourse of the necessity for regeneration/renewal schemes in order to destroy the areas of crime, poverty, and deprivation (Davis 2006; Bartu and Kolluoglu 2008; Wacquant 2008; Lovering and Turkmen 2011; Perouse 2011). The findings of this research are appropriate to the arguments of Erkilet and also demonstrate that the poverty, clientelist mechanisms and poor and deprived living conditions in the quarter create stigmatisation of one another independent from any ethnic background. In the words of Wacquant (2008), the stigmatised parties in the project discourse, i.e. the residents of Suleymaniye overall, stigmatise their neighbours who are living under the same conditions and under the same threat in order to protect their own welfare. The conditions and the mechanisms of clientelism fortify the stigmatisation of others.

### 6.4.3. Relations with third parties

The mobilisation and militancy in urban movement groups, as well as their ability to come together for different topics and a wider repertoire of actions, are in a developing tendency in Istanbul in general (See Chapter 3). However, when we look at the Suleymaniye case, almost no action was taken by the broader urban movement groups’ network. I interviewed the representatives of ‘third parties’, the group that I categorised as non-residents but actors in contentious urban politics, to ask about the lack of an opposition in Suleymaniye.¹²⁹

The most important factor contributing to this situation, according to the professional and activist group interviewees, was the lack of local mobilisation. One of the activists, Birhan, who takes part in various alliances both on international and national scales and had visited Suleymaniye several times says:

> If there is no mobilisation there, how will you construct it? If everything is in a mess and all over the place, where will you hold and construct it? Property owners sell; it

¹²⁹ To note here again, I have been active in the urban movements’ network since 2006, so the analysis in this section also includes my own experiences in this network.
is said that they are happy. The mukhtar says that they sold rundown buildings for good prices. Tenants do not have any rights at all. If there is a flame in there, you stand next to it, try to be a catalyst. But we have troubles even in the organised places, so what does it mean to apply effort to a place where nothing happens? (Interview TP-5)

The ambiguity in the project process and the lack of information and transparency about how the project is to be implemented are important points that limit the involvement of actors in this context, which Birhan describes as a ‘mess’. However, the most important connotation here for any group of activists is the significance of local mobilisation and a call from the locality to the other actors. Whatever the urban movement groups’ focus in the struggle area is, the important point is that the involvement of these actors of the contentious urban politics in the local actions depends on the call and demand of the locals – either property owners or tenants – for a struggle.

The involvement of the political parties in any discussion about the URP in Suleymaniye is also very limited. When the election results are considered (see Appendix D), it is seen that AKP has the majority, and is followed by the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP, Kurdish Party), Republican People’s Party (CHP) and Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). BDP has a critical standpoint about the urban regeneration process in general; however their actions in the localities are limited. A member from the Fatih district branch of the party, who is living in another URP area, mentioned that the party is very busy with the conflict in the Kurdish regions, and the party was unable to get actively involved in this contentious topic (interview TP-10). If their members ask for any advice or help, the Party gives them the support of their network; however, in Suleymaniye, the party has not taken an organised action concerning the URP.

The CHP member of IMM and Fatih Municipality Council follows the urban renewal projects in Fatih district closely and participates in activities of opposition in the URP

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130 In other researches and discussions among the urban movement groups, the passivity of BDP about the urban issues is also of concern (Turkun et al. 2010).
sites (interview TP-11). However, when it comes to Suleymaniye URP area, CHP does not have the political influence or contacts to support the residents politically. He also criticised his own party for its failure to engage fully with the project and work hard on it. He mentions that the problem should be politicised more effectively by the political parties and other groups. But in general, he links this lack of action in the area to the unorganised structure in Suleymaniye:

In Suleymaniye people have not been organised. Nobody told them about the notion of association, like the one in Tarlabası, or FEBAYDER. Non-organised people are the best thing that AKP can wish for. There are places that we call persuasion rooms. People were called there individually, told that they would benefit more if they did not talk to their neighbours, and so on... Everyone left those rooms satisfied somehow. But they didn't realise that actually none of them should be pleased if they look to the project in general.

According to him, people first think about short-term benefits to themselves, such as access to state aid, or negotiate directly with the project owners. The importance of clientelist relations and the impact of short-term benefits in the emergence of collective action and establishment of relations in the area are also cited by other activists (interviews TP-5, TP-6).

In a tour in Suleymaniye quarter, one would notice that there are many associations, mostly located around Istanbul University and Suleymaniye Mosque. These associations and foundations could be assumed to be a potential organisational structure to participate in the area’s spatial politics. With this in mind, I visited several of them to ask about their relations with the residents of the area and their opinions about the project. These organisations have mostly religious backgrounds, focusing on activities in the university area and scholarships, and some focusing on Islamic religious studies research.\(^{131}\) Except for rare occasions, such as meal organisations in Ramadan, no members of the associations mentioned their relations with the area especially concerning the URP project. The representatives of five associations were critical of the people in Suleymaniye, and were in favour of a transformation of the area. Their vision for the area could be

\(^{131}\) It is observed that the associations are mostly related with the Nursi Sect of Islam, whose founder is Said-i Nursi. This sect has a big influence on the ideology of the ruling AKP party.
defined as a cultural and educational centre, as it was in old times. Only one
association, MAZLUMDER, which is a human rights organisation with an Islamic
background, was critical of the eviction of people in the area; but in fact, they also
had limited information about the project scheme, and URP was not on their
agenda.

Academics and professional organisations, such as the Chamber of Architects and
the Chamber of City Planners, are not as influential in the Suleymaniye case as they
are in the other areas. As mentioned earlier, the role of the professional
organisations especially in taking legal actions against the projects is critical (see
Chapter 3). In the Suleymaniye case, however, the features of the project and the
strategies implemented by the project holders have limited the sphere of legal
actions in which the chambers and other parties could become involved in arguing
against the violation of public interest (interview TP-1, TP-2, TP-4, TP-9). Along with
the spatial restructuring features in the project, the individualised negotiations
actualised in the newly emerged real estate market kept the other actors from
becoming involved in the process.

The question if the residents have ever sought support from outside can be asked at
this point. It should be noted first that the residents’ silence with respect to the URP
process does not indicate that they fully support the URP. All the limiting factors
mentioned earlier have an impact on the silence of the residents and demands for
an extended rehabilitation of the area. However, when they are presented with the
details and possible consequences of the project, such as eviction of the current
residents and gentrification of the area, people do not fully support the project.

Pardon me but what will happen if they sell [our houses] to the rich?! The rich is a
man like us! They [the state party] don’t humiliate, insult poor people like us! They
should treat us like humans! I am not talking at the moment; but if I go to the
municipality somehow, I would kick up a fuss! (Interview SR-4)

Serife, an AKP-voting property owner, complains about the living conditions in the
neighbourhood, lack of security and uncertainty in the process, and was very angry
when we talked about the possible consequences of the project for her household
and the gentrification process of the area. She said if the project holders pay her what she wants for the property, she could move out from the area because she is very frustrated with the living conditions. However, she was livid when the conversation turned to the power of the project holders and the risk of her own forced eviction (interview SR-4). Raziye, an AKP-voting tenant who is also very frustrated with the conditions and looking forward to a big demolition in the area, also said that she had not heard that there would be luxury housing in the area, and she thought it was unfair to evict the poor and leave them in an uncertain condition. However, she still supports the project (interview SR-8).

As mentioned earlier, the discussions about the project, its future prospects and what people go through in this process have not been discussed in the public sphere in Suleymaniye. For these reasons, what the communities in other URP areas may be likely to face in the process and at the end was not widely discussed in the public sphere. When the possible long-term consequences of the project are discussed, residents show a reaction against the unfair conditions. This is to say that being informed about the process and being aware of the possible consequences and experiences of similar cases are crucial elements in the development of any action.

Some residents, however, clearly mentioned that they do not want the involvement of other parties, although they have the chance and reason to communicate with these groups. Gulay, who went to court for the cancellation of her property’s expropriation said she had taken advice from the Chamber of Architects, and she managed to make contact with some members of urban movement groups, but when she asked other respondents, who face similar conditions in Suleymaniye, to collaborate, she was not welcomed (interview SR-17). She and the shareholders of her property took individual actions, like the others did in Suleymaniye. A property owner also told me that he had talked to me because I was doing research, but he did not want any other people or press to involve him in any discussions. This interviewee (SR-2) mentioned that, like many others, he voted for AKP, and he took
legal action because of the expropriation, not because he was against the project or opposed to AKP. He and his friends experiencing similar conditions took individual actions to object to the process of expropriations. Thus, individual efforts are preferred to sort out the individual cases that occur in the project implementation, rather than collective actions.

The only group that can carry the conflicting topics to the agenda of residents and form relations with the other parties is observed to be the mukhtars of the Suleymaniye quarter’s neighbourhoods. In other words, mukhtars have the potential to be the leading force of the community in Suleymaniye. All of them took action especially about the dangerous, run down built environment either by contacting the property owners or the authorities. Residents go to them about their demands and problems in the area. However, the mukhtars have not established a leading role in this process. First of all, except Hocagiyasettin neighbourhood mukhtar, who is a Kurdish migrant, the other three are mostly satisfied with the scheme as they think that the area’s problems can only be solved with radical decisions by the authorities. According to them, the URP project should be carried on and finalised immediately in order to clear the area of the current problems.

Besides, they think that maybe some of the property owners had faced unfair conditions but in general the market worked well in the area. In addition, this is an individual process in which everybody decides on their own property. The three mukhtars have never talked about the possibility of their own household’s risk of eviction and dislocation from the area; they think that they will not be affected by the consequences of the URP like the other residents. One of the reasons for this perception can be traced to their conceptualisation of the problems and deterioration of the area which is grounded in the ‘other’ and external situations. Lastly, mukhtars are not concerned about the other URPs and struggle areas either in the historical areas or in the gecekondu neighbourhoods.
Overall, the residents of the area have no contact with the actors in contentious urban politics nor could those actors find a respondent in the area to take action (interviews TP-5, TP-6, TP-7, TP-8, TP-9). As mentioned in Chapter 3, the practices of the urban movement groups in the local struggles have a more reactive action base, and as observed in Suleymaniye, involvement in a local struggle requires a demand from the locality.

6.5. Conclusion

Being in the very centre of Istanbul, Suleymaniye quarter has an economically and culturally lively life, but at the same time it is a poor, socially fragmented and deprived place, which made it a target of the government's new urban development scheme. However, the uniqueness of the area and its status as a World Heritage Site pushed government to form a different project scheme compared to the other historical sites. Yet, it has been prepared as a state-led gentrification project which would have similar consequences to the other equivalent state-led projects.

Not only the project proposal, but also the state’s strategies have been structured according to the conditions in the area. Establishing a property market in this poor and devalued area was one of these strategies, which was started before the project had been announced and worked well especially in the beginning of the process for the stakeholders in exchanging their property rights. By this strategy, the developer became the main property owner in the area, which de facto eliminated any opposition raised around property rights by property owners. So, one of the most important reasons for the silence in the area is the agreement of the individuals with the stakeholders in the newly established market.

However, the lack of collective action and struggle in the Suleymaniye URP area does not mean that the evolution and implementation of the project, the market and the relations among the actors of this project area are unproblematic and
satisfactory for the inhabitants. The conditions of agreements were prepared, offered and controlled by the stakeholders without opening a space for a public discussion in any sphere. In fact, there are several conflicting points, such as the lack of transparency, information and participation in this state-led gentrification project. In this chapter, the external and internal factors that affect the collective inaction in this URP area observed during the field research were analysed.

The main external factor is, as mentioned, that the project and the property market were established and controlled by the state and the developer. Although there are fundamental critical points in the establishment of the market, the violation of property rights had not become a fundamental driving force in this project scheme. Yet, the bargaining process in this newly emerged market did not take place through public discussion; rather it was carried out in a discreet and secret negotiation process both by the state party and the property owners.

The property ownership in the area is another important dynamic that affects the collective action process. First, the absence of landlords as residents of the area, jointly owned properties, relations of property owners with their properties and their weak ties with the place are factors that affect the dynamics of mobilisation. Alongside the property ownership issues, Suleymaniye is a tenant-dominated area, and tenants have not been considered as rightful actors in the project scheme either by the public authorities, or the property owners or the tenants themselves. Under these circumstances, the project scheme and market establishing strategy worked efficiently.

On the part of the project stakeholders, establishing clandestine relations on an individual scale and avoiding public discussion are part of their strategy. Lack of information is also seen as an important factor in determining the dynamics. The inhabitants were unable to access the information, but another crucial point on this topic is that other resources that could provide access to the information and
evaluate it, such as actors in contentious urban politics, did not take part in this process.

The other important external factor that affects the mobilisation of people is the deprived physical environment. The deprived conditions and long term ignorance of the historical place prevent people developing alternative strategies to improve conditions in the area. The poor living environment itself is a factor discouraging residents from living in the area. Under these circumstances, an alternative strategy to URP for improving the living conditions is not likely to emerge.

Along with the external factors, the internal factors, which could be summarised as the individual household’s economic, social and political relationship to the wider locality, are also important in the non-mobilisation of the community. To start with, informality is a big part of the politics of everyday life in the area, which is also (re)produced by the claimant. The informal conditions keep the residents in the area; however, these informal spatial ties cannot be included in a resistance as a part of the claimant’s demands. It benefitted the residents in the short term but did not evolve into a long-term struggle. This informality was also nurtured by the political clientelist relations, which are clearly observed in the implementation of the state's social aid system. The clientelist relations are not based on contentious ground between the client and claimant; but they create contention and tension within the community. Therefore, they have a limiting impact on the emergence of collective action.

The tension within the community finds its voice in ethnic division in the area, mostly between the Kurdish and Turkish residents. The problems in the area are blamed on other groups which is in fact stigmatisation of the others for the welfare of the self. However, the tension is not only observed between different ethnic groups, but inside the ethnic groups, too. The tension in the community is not derived from the ethnic divisions, but the conditions and poverty management strategies. Overall, there is a social fragmentation which affects the possibility of
any collective action or inclusionary political discussion about the roots of the problems.

The last important point that the Suleymaniye case demonstrates is the role of third parties in the development of collective action. The contested topics in Suleymaniye URP could have been politicised and put on the public agenda by different groups despite the discouraging factors at the local level. However, due to the lack of local action or connection with the local actors, and the characteristics of the project, third parties did not develop an action concerning the area. It is observed in this case that without a demand from the local sphere, urban movement groups of the broader urban conflict do not manage to develop action about particular localities.

The Suleymaniye case demonstrates the importance of the inner dynamics of the locality in the emergence of collective action although no collective action has emerged in this area. It is not claimed here that collective action should have emerged in this context; rather, the aim is to demonstrate the absence of a collective sphere in a locality which lives at the extremes but at the same time is a part of the political processes of contentious urban politics.
CHAPTER 7 – CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE DYNAMICS OF CONTENTIOUS URBAN POLITICS IN ISTANBUL

7.1. An Overview of the Thesis

In this final chapter, I shall show how the aims of the thesis have been met over the preceding six chapters. To do this, I shall give a comparative and relational account of the case studies, and link them to the main research questions of the thesis.

The main arguments of the thesis are that the urban contentions and mobilisation around urban issues have dynamic structures that result in different political processes in different localities, and that current frameworks for analysing the dynamics of mobilisation are limited. Even when separate instances of mobilisation emerge in response to similar issues, the detailed trajectories that they subsequently follow cannot be explained on the basis of *a priori* assumptions. The issues that cause contention in the urban political sphere are experienced, perceived and politicised diversely by different individuals, prompting them to take different actions and engage with different political processes in response to the actions of the public authorities. Although different urban projects are engineered by the same authorities in order to achieve the same goals in different areas, and although the consequences of the projects are likely to have similar impacts on the actors driving the contention, the politicisation of the problems and the political processes that emerge from these issues prompt different responses from the various actors involved.

In this process, as in the controversy concerning common rights, individual interest can result in a mobilisation process around urban issues. In other words, individual concerns do not exclude the possibility of collective action. The militancy and incidence of all these mobilisation processes depend on various relational factors, such as market formation, implementation of the projects and socio-spatial
relations of the actors, which might vary between different contexts and periods of contention. Therefore, there is a need for a dynamic research agenda that expands the conceptual framework for analysis of urban contention.

Although the existing literature on urban movements and urban conflicts gives a general account of the political process in periods of contention, it offers little indication of how to analyse the dynamics of contention and set a research agenda that allows analysis of different contextual features and trajectories in mobilisation. This gap in constructing an analytical framework becomes more visible when the cases in the cities of global South are investigated according to the existing conceptual frameworks that have been mostly developed on the experiences of the cities of developed global North. On this argument, the overarching aim of this thesis was determined as to contribute to the conceptual framework of the UM studies and figure out a dynamic and comparative research framework for the analysis of mobilisation processes in urban space applicable to different places and contextual features, by considering the contentious cases and people’s experiences in the cities of global South. To achieve this aim, a comparative analysis of two contentious cases in Istanbul was carried out in the thesis.

We have seen that Istanbul has undergone a major transformation since the early 2000s. It is an exemplar of the contemporary neoliberal urbanisation dynamics that have played out in many cities, in both the global North and South. Urban opposition groups of various kinds have recently emerged in response to the ‘creative destruction’ of neoliberal urbanisation (Harvey 2006). Among the contentious urbanisation schemes, urban regeneration projects (URPs) have provoked the widest resistance. The central themes of this research, formed accordingly the overarching aim of the thesis, were the emergence of these opposition groups in response to the URPs in Istanbul, as well as the factors that affect their evolution, development, militancy (strength of demands) and incidence (degree of impacts). The research is grounded on five main research questions:
1- How might people’s experiences of urban development and contentious urban politics in the cities of the global South contribute to a reconceptualisation of urban movements and an expansion of the conceptual framework for the analysis of different cases?

2- Why have different (re)actions emerged in response to the state-led urban regeneration projects?

3- What limits and what encourages the development of collective action in contentious urban politics in Istanbul?

4- How do the different actors and their perceptions influence the mobilisation and collective action/inaction during the episodes of contention?

5- What are the main contextual features and dynamics that affect the responses and actions of individuals and groups in the urban renewal projects in Istanbul?

In order to set the conceptual background of the main argument and the research questions of the thesis, I began, in the theoretical framework chapter, by discussing the literature on the urban movements and collective action that have emerged in urban space. This chapter responded to the first and second research questions by exploring the literature on UMs, political mobilisation and urban political relations in the cities of the global South, showing that the responses of people in the urban space vary according to the political, social and economic relations established between the actors of the contentious urban politics prior to or in the course of the period of contention. This chapter also included a discussion of the methods for interpreting contentious urban politics in different geographies, specifically in the cities of the global North as compared to the global South. The formation of the political relations in the urban context defines the external factors of the mobilisation processes around urban issues, so, in order to frame the background of the field research analysis, it was crucial to determine the differences between the formations of political relations in the cities of the global North and global South. The chapter explained that external factors, such as the political relations between the actors of contentious politics, and internal factors, such as the social relations varies in different contexts and episodes of contention, and the relations between
these factors overall determine the dynamics of mobilisation. The main contextual and analytical framework of the research and a relational approach for analysing different responses of people during the episodes of contention were summarised at the end of the chapter.

In Chapter 3, in order to make sense of the political opportunities and external factors affecting mobilisation in Istanbul, the dynamics of contemporary urbanisation and the characteristics and roles of the actors of the contentious urban politics were explained. This chapter provided the background for the analysis of the external factors, the role of the state in the formation of political relations in the city and, last but not least, the actors and networks of the contemporary urban movement in Istanbul.

In Chapter 4, the rationale and methodology of the research were discussed. The reasons for grounding the research on a Critical Realist paradigm and qualitative research methods were examined. Later in the chapter, the ethical considerations relevant to the research were discussed and the selection of data collection and analysis methods were justified.

Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 addressed the third and fourth research questions, investigating the ways people responded to URPs and what factors affected these responses in two areas of Istanbul. The chapters aimed to establish a conceptual and comparative framework to analyse factors that affect the responses of actors. In Chapter 5, Fener-Balat-Ayvansaray (FBA) URP was presented as an example of a case of ‘action’, in which mobilisation occurred. Chapter 6 focused on the URP in Suleymaniye, which was presented as a case of ‘inaction’, in where no collective action had emerged.

In this final chapter, I carry out a comparative analysis of the main findings given in Chapters 5 and 6, and explain the contributions of the research to the studies of contentious urban politics. To achieve this, I shall first explain how the theoretical
discussion met the rationales of the research. Second, I shall briefly summarise the political economy of contemporary URPs in Istanbul in order to complement the background of the contentious urban politics in Turkey. In the third section of the chapter I cover the comparative and relational analysis of the research findings. The factors that trigger mobilisation and those that limit the emergence of collective action are summarised with reference to the case study findings. Among these will be identified factors that shape political and social relations in everyday life and mobilisation in the urban space. The conceptual framework of the study and concepts abstracted from the empirical findings of the research are discussed in the following section of the chapter as a contribution to the conceptual and analytical framework of contentious urban politics and UMs studies. The last section of the chapter offers concluding remarks and suggestions for future research.

7.2. Urban Movements and Dynamics of Contention

The present thesis investigated the dynamics of contentious urban politics in the contemporary urbanisation process, focusing particularly on the conflicts that have emerged from this process and the ways these are reflected in Istanbul. Investigating how the contemporary urbanisation process is established and how it forms different social and political relations in different geographies generated an answer to the first research question of the thesis, which asked why different (re)actions emerged in different places: the progress of the formation of social and political relations is diverse in the contentious urban politics, and this diversity determines the dynamics of mobilisation in different localities.

In order to conceptualise the research focus, the literature on UMs and contemporary discussions of collective action in urban space were addressed. It is investigated that why the existing literature on UMs could not provide a developed analytical framework for the analysis of different cases. This is because, first, the conceptual framework of the UMs is not sufficiently extended to analyse political relations and the dynamics of urbanisation in different contexts, particularly in the
global South, where more authoritarian states control the distribution of resources and formation of markets in the cities; and second, because the variety of demands that have emerged in urban struggles do not correspond closely to the abstractions of these frameworks, such as collective consumption and the RttC frameworks in particular.

The difficulties involved in drawing an analytical framework from the literature on UMs become more apparent when the special characteristics of contentious urban politics of the global South are taken into account. In order to underline the challenges of applying the conceptual framework of the existing literature of UMs, some concepts defining the contentious urban political relations in the global South were highlighted in the theory chapter. With this critical approach, the aim was not to separate the urbanisation contexts of the global South and North, but instead to emphasise some crucial concepts and approaches, such as the neoliberal urbanisation under the authority of illiberal states (Bayat 1999, 2012), informality embedded in the urbanisation process (Roy 2005, 2009), political clientelism as a determinant of political actions (Auyero et al.2009), that are less prominent in comparable cases in the global North. These concepts were applied to the development of a relational approach to the framing of contentious urban politics in Istanbul.

In order to analyse the dynamics of mobilisation in Istanbul, chart the evolution of the political process and determine what factors have affected the emergence, militancy and incidence of the urban movements in Istanbul, a comparative case study research was conducted. In this research, in contrast to many other studies, a joint analysis of an action case (a mobilised area) and inaction case (an immobilised area) was undertaken in order to bring out the factors that had encouraging and limiting effects on the dynamics of mobilisation. There are several reasons in favour of such a research design. First, social movement groups engage in various frameworks over the course of their activities, and focusing on only certain episodes of actions and relations between the groups would provide a limited account of
factors that affect the political processes. Furthermore, focusing exclusively on the *successes* and *achievements* of mobilised groups would narrow the scope of the research to an undesirable degree, since actors that remain *immobilised* and the *failures* of groups to achieve their aims in the progress of mobilisation also are parts of a political process that contribute to the contention through the their relationships established between the immobilised groups and other actors (Tarrow 1994; Goonewardena 2004; Bayat 2012). Therefore, including immobilised actors can deepen the understanding of the nature and dynamics of contention. The second reason in favour of this research design is that this investigation focused on the political mobilisation of residents of URP areas in Istanbul, which are in an ongoing process that changes the patterns of contention, political relations and the militancy of mobilisation. In an ongoing process, it is difficult to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the factors that affect the dynamics of mobilisation by looking at only a certain group and its progress in a certain episode. A research design that incorporates both action and inaction cases brings to light a range of political factors that can explain the dynamics of the ongoing process of contentious urban politics in Istanbul.

Several previous studies have analysed the inaction of people living in sites of political contention. These cases have been framed in studies of political clientelism, informality and irregular settlements and encroachment on public rights through the occupation of public spaces (Bayat 1999; Roy 2005; Davis 2006; Auyero et al. 2009; Karaman 2013). However, there has not been any comparative analysis, which would allow the researcher to assess the relative weighting of the factors on mobilisation. Indeed, very few studies of any kind have focused on urban grievances and mobilisation processes in Turkey. Hence, the methodological approach and research design of this thesis also contributes to the literature on contentious urban politics.
7.3. Political Economy of Urban Regeneration Projects

At present, most mobilisation and political activism around urban issues in Istanbul is in response to the intervention of the state in urban space. These interventions take the form of ‘creative destruction’ (Harvey 2006), and have been portrayed as means of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ in accordance with neoliberal urbanisation strategies (Harvey 2006, 2008). URPs are prominent examples of state-led spatial interventions and gentrifications that have prompted reaction and widespread resistance from many groups. Framing the politics of URPs is important for understanding the grounds of the mobilisation. With this aim, Chapter 3 provided the background of the role of the state, the conflicting nature of the current URPs and some UM groups that have emerged in response to this process.

The AKP government, which came to power in 2002, placed urban development at the centre of its economic programme. By restructuring the state agencies, such as the mass housing agency, TOKI, and introducing new laws and regulations, the state played a pivotal role in the formation and provision of the new land market. In this process, state-led gentrification projects embodied in URPs in gecekondu areas, working-class neighbourhoods left over from the industrial period of the city’s history, and the urban poverty areas in the historical city centres, became resources for establishing the new land and property market and for supplying it with land for new development. This new market has been established by means of dispossession and displacement of the existing residents of these areas.

The state took a top-down approach to the introduction of the URP scheme, without providing any sphere for public discussion or participation. Neither the process by which the projects were to be implemented nor the details of its aims and likely consequences for the inhabitants were firmly established before the projects were brought to the agenda. As local government authorities announced which areas were designated URPs, the process has been widely resisted by the local inhabitants, since the consequences of the project were expected to include
dispossession, displacement and indebtedness to the state or other project stakeholders.

Framing the contextual features of the current urbanisation dynamics in Istanbul addressed the fifth research question of the thesis: state interventions in the reorganisation of the urban space in a very top-down and exclusionary way are the main reasons for the contemporary opposition movement.

The UM groups that mobilised in response to the state’s spatial intervention have mostly defensive characteristics, which places them in the category defined in Chris Pickvance’s (1985) typology as movements that emerge in response to a physical or social threat. However, it is not possible to say that there is a single, clearly defined struggle against the spatial intervention of the state. Each locality that mobilised against the URPs has passed through a unique process of mobilisation, with features dependent on the social, political and historical background of the locality. The ‘interpretive frameworks’ (Nicholls 2008, 2009) of the struggle develop within both the locality and the urban movements network. However, these frameworks have not evolved in the same way and with the same degree of militancy. Furthermore, the politicisation and comprehension of the problems in the mobilisation process vary among different localities. While in some URP areas, residents’ responses have been rapid and militant, in others, hardly a voice has been raised either for or against the projects. In this research, it is argued that the differences in the responses to URPs demonstrate the dynamics of contentious urban politics and how the political process has evolved and taken form in the urban sphere. To understand the dynamics of contention in the Turkish context, the research was grounded on the analysis of the differences in residents’ responses to the spatial interventions of the state.

Suleymaniye and Fener-Balat-Ayvansaray (FBA) historical sites are two examples of contentious URPs in Istanbul. While in Suleymaniye, no collective action was initiated, in FBA, after being informed about the project, the residents of the project
area began to take organised action against the URP. In the following section, an analysis of the political processes, comparing the external and internal factors and relations with the networks of UM in these two areas, is carried out to identify the factors affecting the political process in the dynamics of contention in the Istanbul case.

7.4. Analysis of External and Internal Factors That Affect the Dynamics of Mobilisation in the Urban Regeneration Areas in Istanbul

The analysis chapters addressed the third and the fourth research questions of the thesis, which were about the limiting and enabling factors and the impact of the different perceptions of the urban issues on dynamics of mobilisation. In order to answer these questions, first the external factors determining the political and spatial relations; and second a comparative analysis of internal factors determining the social, political and spatial relations established within the localities were analysed in the two field research areas.

7.4.1. The external factors

The external factors affecting the mobilisation process, comprising the features of the projects, the development and implementation of URPs and the formation of the relationships between project stakeholders and residents were analysed.

Physical threat and limited option

Although the projects were both supported by the same general vision and could be expected to have similar consequences for local residents, there were marked differences between them in terms of intervention of the state in spatial relations.

In FBA, the concept project stipulated that the existing historical built environment would be demolished and only facades of the listed buildings would be kept. This proved controversial and was criticised by various actors, including the residents of the areas and others, such as conservation architects, from outside of the project.
area. In Suleymaniye, however, the concept project suggested that the existing forms and plots of the historical buildings would be kept as they were, thus presenting a less destructive scheme at first glance. This feature of the project in Suleymaniye prompted less opposition to the scheme, especially by actors from outside the project area.

FBA residents objected that the project would violate their property rights and result in the loss of their livelihoods. The project scheme offers the residents no convincing answer to these objections. This violating characteristic of the project in FBA, then, may be regarded as an accelerating factor in the mobilisation process since the residents had no option but to mobilise. In Suleymaniye, by contrast, because the project frame suggests retaining the existing the buildings in their existing forms, property owners were given the option to take responsibility for the renovation of their own properties, even if choosing and applying this option would be difficult considering the cost and the limited resources available to the residents. Nevertheless, the choices of FBA residents were limited by the demands of the concept project, and they were not given the option to carry out renovation work on their own properties, all of which left them without any option but to resist the project.

The project framework in FBA broke the ‘habitual passivity’ (Tarrow 1994) of the residents. It can be argued that if the project had not been developed in this way, mobilisation would not have occurred in FBA. Therefore, the ‘threat’ is the main external factor for the residents in FBA. In Suleymaniye, the project did not cause a discussion between the residents; however, as discussed below, the inaction of people in Suleymaniye could not be explained by only the features of the project.

It can be concluded from this external factor that the physical threat caused mobilisation; and, moreover, the limited and demanding offers given to the residents increased the militancy of the mobilisation.
Previous experiences in the formation of arguments

One important external factor that strengthens the arguments of FBA residents against the URP scheme is their experience in the previous rehabilitation project funded by the European Union and supported by UNESCO. The previous framework gave the FBA association the opportunity to develop an alternative to the current URP. Furthermore, once residents of the area learned that an alternative option was possible, the arguments against the current URP were able to evolve through widespread public discussion, which increased the militancy of the mobilisation. In Suleymaniye, such an opportunity to develop an alternative approach did not evolve.

FBA also benefitted from the experiences of other URP areas in developing opposition strategies. In Suleymaniye, however, the residents had never developed contacts that could provide them with support and guidance on the basis of similar experiences elsewhere.

To sum up: previous experiences of spatial intervention and information about other experiences strengthen the arguments of the opposition movement and mobilisation process.

Limited information about the project process and discretionary power of public authorities

One of the most important external factors that affected the process of mobilisation in both areas was the project development and implementation process, which was withheld by the responsible authorities. The discretionary power of the authorities in the development and implementation of the project process also affected the actions of the residents in both areas. This project development and implementation process and attitude of authorities prevented residents and other parties from being able to articulate a detailed response or form a public sphere in which collective action could be discussed. This process had a significant limiting impact on mobilisation, since much salient information about
the project was not known to the affected residents, so control over the process and discussions for alternative strategies could hardly be developed. In order to develop ‘interpretive frameworks’, i.e. perceiving tacit information in similar ways in a group (Nicholls 2008), unity and legitimacy of collective actions, it is necessary for actors to have sufficient information about the contested topic. The FBA case demonstrates that when this information is gathered, the discourse of the opposition is able to develop and build further strategies.

Although FBA had been informed by other URP areas, and could access the information about project processes in general from other actors of the urban movements, the uncertainty about their project process and clandestine political relations that the project stakeholders established in this process created doubts and tensions in the mobilisation process, and prevented people from mobilising or developing long-term strategies for those who had. Uncertainty about the project’s process and lack of information had a negative impact on the political process. Given the lack of certainty, the extent of the struggle could not be increased in either the internal or external relations.

From this we may conclude that lack of information about the contested topic and uncertainty of the situation limits the prospects for developing internal strategies and interpretive frameworks for the group in question, as well as the group’s capability to create opportunities for others.

The state’s control of the project process, which could be defined as the absolute power of the state agencies in the project process, is another influential factor in the mobilisation process. Aside from its role in planning the project, the state’s right to expropriate property is an example of its authority in the project process, which limits the expansion of collective action. In both FBA and Suleymaniye cases, if the property owners do not agree on offers of the project scheme, then the state has the right to expropriate the properties in exchange for its minimum value. This gives the state absolute power over decisions related to the project process. This is a
binding situation for the property owners, who are forced to choose between two undesirable options. Since they do not want to surrender their properties in exchange for a minimum value payment, their only real option is to accept expropriation. Under these circumstances, the owners’ input in the political process is restricted to bargaining with the state for greater compensation for the expropriated property.

In the Suleymaniye case, no collective attempt was made to challenge the absolute power of the state, and the state could take action any time. In FBA, however, the collective action taken against the state’s plans and the group’s efforts to publicise the situation made the state delay its actions and, later, some possible restricting actions were cancelled by the court.

The absolute power of the state over the project process limits the expansion of the struggle. However, a collective struggle is likely to have a weakening and postponing impact on the implementation of this power.

Partial development and implementation of the project
Regarding the extension of opportunities to others, another external limitation was the partial implementation of the projects in a limited area. In the Suleymaniye case, the final projects for plots were published separately and long after the property market had been established. In FBA, only a small area was chosen for redevelopment, which separated the rest of the quarter from the URP area. This method of implementing the project, as the FBA association mentioned, caused residents of the non-URP part of the district to support the project, since if it went ahead, the value of their properties would increase. Therefore, as external factors, partial implementation of the project and starting the project in a limited area has a lessening impact on the extension of opportunities to others.
In this research, it is observed that the main reasons for mobilisation in the URP areas are the intervention of the state in the private property sphere. However, intervention in the private property sphere does not constitute a *de facto* reason for opposition; the opposition is also related to how the state and other actors intervene in the private property sphere and, moreover, how people relate to the properties and how the property ownership is constructed its meaning in the social relations. Therefore, along with the condition of the property market, the social relations established around the property are important in the political process. While the former can be categorised as an external factor shaped around the exchange value of the property, the latter can be categorised as an internal factor shaped around the use value. It is observed in this thesis that these factors, or in other words, exchange value and use value are closely related.

In FBA, the project scheme affected and suspended the existing property market, prompting opposition from the residents. In Suleymaniye, however, the state and the other actors in partnership with it created a new property market, which did not cause opposition from the locality, where the properties have low values and property market was barely functioning. In that sense, for some Suleymaniye property owners, the state’s intervention in the property market was regarded as an opportunity.

As discussed in Chapter 5, the EU-funded project implemented in FBA formed a new property market in the area and initiated a market-driven gentrification process (Narli 2006; Evci 2009). In this process the value of the properties was raised and improvements were made to the built environment as a result of renovation works. State intervention in the property market then had, via the URP, a negative effect on the property market. In a way, the project framework abolished the property market in the project area by monopolising the future of the built environment and creating uncertainty for the area. Furthermore, residents’ property rights were to a large extent ignored, since the properties were taken to the expropriation scheme...
by the state for the new project and the future of the area and properties were left in ambiguity. Since then, existing properties have been absorbed into the market under the URP’s conditions. In the FBA case, the crucial point about the existing property market and the value of the property is that the property owners already had the opportunity to benefit from their properties within the market relations. The project served only to abolish a profitable property market.

In Suleymaniye, however, the property values were low and the property market was not profitable. Many properties had been abandoned or were jointly owned by several people. Many property owners lived outside the area. The URP in Suleymaniye established a new property market which was more profitable than the preceding one. Although the early sellers later complained that they had been paid less than the later sellers, as discussed in Chapter 6, the offers put forward by KIPTAS and other private actors were still higher than the existing market prices. Under these profitable conditions, property owners benefitted from the emerging market, and no effort was made to present the problems that emerged in the implementation of the project scheme and formation of the market relations as a collective issue.

In short, the project scheme in the FBA case caused a decrease in property values and the existing property market became almost dysfunctional, whereas in Suleymaniye, the project scheme caused a new, more profitable property market to emerge in the area. This suggests that the impact of the intervention of the state-led project on exchange value affects the responses of the property owners.

Although it is clear that issues related to the exchange value of the property have a fundamental impact on the responses of property owners, the evolution of this response and the role and importance of the exchange value still need to be considered in light of the social and physical conditions, or, in other words, the use value of the property.
It is observed in this research that the use value of the properties in Suleymaniye was lower than in FBA because of the deprived physical conditions, lack of property owners living in the area, and property ownership conditions. Although similar conditions could be observed in FBA, the latter was in a better condition and there were greater opportunities for improvements to the existing property market relations. In Suleymaniye, physical improvement due to the individual efforts was very rare and unlikely to become more widespread in the existing market relations. This situation caused a decrease in both the exchange value and use value of the properties.

It is not possible to draw a clear conclusion about whether the exchange value or use value has a greater effect on the mobilisation process. If, as in the Suleymaniye case, there had not been a market in FBA that gave rise to more profitable conditions and opportunities for the improvement of the physical environment, the current mobilisation process in FBA might not have occurred. If the use value of the properties for property owners in Suleymaniye had been higher, or, in other words, if the property owners had more social ties to the space, the obvious impact of the rise in the exchange value in the actions of the property owners might have been lessened. Thus the impact of exchange value on the political process is dependent on various issues. Exchange value and use value of the property are interrelated in the decision-making process. Yet, property ownership and sudden, dramatic changes in exchange value are overall decisive in the dynamics of mobilisation.

In the FBA case, threats to individual interests, and especially those related to the violation of property rights and the reduction of exchange value, prompted collective reaction and became the driving force of the mobilisation. In the Suleymaniye case, however, there was no attempt to present the sum of individual interests as a collective cause, so private interests were evaluated at the level of individuals’ personal relations with the project stakeholders. In Suleymaniye, exchange value and private interests had a limiting impact on the emergence of collective action. However, in FBA, individual interests, or, in Miller’s (2006) terms,
private consumption, contributed to collective action, created a public sphere for developing interpretive frameworks and led the local community to present a united front against a common threat. Thus, exchange value and private interests in the emergence of collective action are not de facto limiting factors in the expansion of opportunities for collective action. The impact of exchange value is partly determined by use value and vice versa. Urban movements emerge not only around collective consumption issues and use value, but also around personal interest and exchange value. Urban movements are the agents with the potential to collectivise individual interests and politicise the issues that threaten them.

The state’s approach to property rights and the ways it treats the interests of individuals also demonstrate the political aspects of property relations and the distinctive characteristics of the state. It can be seen that the basic right of the liberal markets, i.e. the right to private property, is violated in the scope of state-led URPs, which is an example of an illiberal state action (Bayat 2012) in implementing the global neoliberal urbanisation trends and formation of the property market. In that context, the discussions of property relations and the state’s treatment of property rights are not exclusively concerned with ‘private interests’, but also have a political dimension in the wider political-economic sphere. An analysis of the property relations in the Turkish context is beyond the scope of the present thesis, but we have seen enough to suggest that further studies of property relations would contribute to a deeper understanding of the dynamics of contentious urban politics and social and political relations in urban societies.

Two questions arise from this. How does the political process come to incorporate individual interests as part of collective strategy? To what extent do individual interests drive the dynamics of mobilisation? These questions are related to the politicisation of the problem and the political process. Analysing the internal factors and the impact of the network that affect the dynamics of mobilisation would provide some answers to these questions.
7.4.2. The internal factors

Call ‘internal factors’ those factors that characterise the relationships between the actors in each area and that determine the socio-spatial, political and economic settings thereof.

*Relations between property and space: the use value of the property*

Property relations include some *external relations*, since the framework of projects is based on property ownership; and some *internal relations*, since they determine and are determined by social, spatial and political relations. The relations of property owners with the area are different in each case, and this has an effect on the emergence of collective action.

As mentioned earlier, in Suleymaniye, many properties were rented or abandoned. The relations of the property owners with their property were weak. The poor condition of properties that were shared or jointly owned was a factor contributing to a decrease in their exchange value and use value. However, there were still property owners living in Suleymaniye. The ‘older residents’ who have owned and lived in the same properties since before the second wave of migration did not want to leave the area; however, the condition of the area, especially the physical deterioration of the built environment, unhealthy conditions and social relations, discourages them from living there.

The other main group of property owners that still live in the area, chiefly made up of Kurdish property owners bought their houses since the 1990s, were not as closely tied to the space as the older property owners. The ties of Kurdish residents, both property owners and tenants, with Suleymaniye can be summarised as ‘temporary’. Their arrival in the area was more often motivated by necessity rather than choice. This evidence discussed in this thesis suggests that neither the Kurdish property owners nor the tenants want to carry on living in the area. This helped the project stakeholders to establish a property market in Suleymaniye even before the project was under way.
In FBA, cases like those in Suleymaniye were less often observed. Property owners have continued to live in the area and maintain their relations with it.

An interesting comparison may be drawn between the property and spatial relations in Suleymaniye and FBA, particularly with regard to the relations that more recent arrivals have with their environments. As mentioned above, those who have arrived in Suleymaniye more recently, as part of the second wave of migration, are mostly Kurdish. In FBA, in addition to that group of migrants, there are also gentrifiers, who have not recently migrated from rural Anatolia, among the most recent arrivals. Although the most recent arrivals in Suleymaniye have generally lived there longer than the gentrifying group have lived in FBA, the latter group has maintained a stronger relationship with its neighbourhood. The association, for example, includes very active members from this group. From this we can infer that the strength of a given group’s ties to the area is another determining factor in the formation of spatial relations.

To explain further the role of social and political relationships in forming the property relations, we may consider the spatial relations established in both areas. As discussed in Chapter 6, Suleymaniye can be defined as a transition zone where many inhabitants benefit from the informal relations and cheap living costs. As mentioned in several of the interviews conducted in the area, many residents are reluctant to stay in the neighbourhood, although some of them have lived there for more than 10 years. Given the will of many long-term residents to leave Suleymaniye, the area can be characterised as a place of ‘permanent transience’. This situation in Suleymaniye is doubtlessly a limiting factor in the emergence of collective action. In FBA, however, these conditions are not observed. Even some of the more recent arrivals in FBA, and especially the ‘gentrifiers’, have strong ties to the area, although they have not lived in the area for as long as their counterparts in Suleymaniye. The association, for example, has very active members from this group. The residents’ desire and reasons for continuing to live in the area could be considered another determining factor in the use value of the property.
The relations of the property owners with their neighbourhoods demonstrate that there are several kinds of ‘property ownership relations’ that determine the decisions of the individuals. The social aspects of the formation of property relations are important in decisions about the property. The state’s approach to property relations is based on one definition, which is defined only by the exchange value. However, as the findings of this research show, property relations are socially formed, and not based only on the exchange value of the commodity. When the social and political relations that construct the property ownership relations are weak, the individual right of property ownership is less likely to evolve as a collective interest topic.

**Relations between the residents and the state**

Another internal factor that determines the social and political relations is the formation of the relations between the residents and the state. The field research results show that the residents of the two areas have different relationships with the public authorities. In Suleymaniye, informality and political clientelism determine how the parties relate to each other. In FBA, however, these relations are not widely observed.

The informal relations and political clientelism in Suleymaniye are a limiting factor in the emergence of political action. Although other cases have shown that informality and political clientelism need not preclude political mobilisation, especially if residents fear that they will lose access to the benefits (Bayat 1999, 2012; Auyero et al.2009), no such loss of benefits for the residents of Suleymaniye due to the spatial intervention of the state in space has been observed.

Informality and political clientelism do not contribute to ‘unity’ – the sense of common purpose and shared action (Tilly 1999) – among inhabitants of the area, although informality and clientelism are common issues of everyday life. Informality, cliental relations and transience of the space are shared issues in the community; however, the residents perceive and experience them as individual,
private issues, and the relations are established on that basis. In other words, rather than bringing about a sense of common purpose and shared action, these common issues cause individuals to act on the basis of self-interest.

**Social Relations**

In Suleymaniye, the political-economic relations summarised above also cause exclusionary social relations and a lack of trust in the locality. These factors further limit the possibility of collective action. The tendency for residents to stigmatise and blame others for the poor conditions of their neighbourhoods is exhibited clearly in Suleymaniye. The already strained or distant relationships between certain ethnic groups make it easier for residents to assign blame to others.

In FBA, the members of the association managed to establish unity, especially when faced with an emergency. But the stigmatising relations have a different dimension in FBA. The stigmatisation of gecekondu neighbourhoods is observed especially in the establishment of the discourse against the URP. Appeals to FBA’s ‘legal’ status, in contrast to the squatter settlements in gecekondu areas, are used to strengthen the argument against the state intervention in the neighbourhood. The establishment of this discourse is a limiting factor in extending the struggle to others and keeps it from expanding beyond the local level.

From this we may infer that stigmatisation limits the possibility of collective action on different scales. As seen in the Suleymaniye case, it prevents the emergence of a common ground for collective action in the locality; and as seen in the FBA case, it prevents the struggle to be unified with others, particularly in gecekondu areas.

Stigmatisation and lack of trust in the social and political relations are not related only to local contexts. The establishment of these relations is hugely affected by the broader political context and mainstream discourses. As Pickvance (1985) emphasises, general economic and political context has an impact on the dynamics of movements. In the two cases examined in this thesis, it is seen that the Kurdish-
Turkish conflict in the broader political agenda has had a particularly notable effect on the social and political relations in the locality. Furthermore, the exclusionary discourse of the mainstream politics, which is directed towards the gecekondu areas and can also be seen in the discourse by which the state has sought to legitimise the URPs, is effective in the FBA case.

In addition to the impact of the current political-economic agenda on the local relations, the historical development of the space in each locality also affects the formation of the social, political and spatial relations. This can be observed in the different responses in the two areas to non-Muslim, foreign population movements in the property market. While non-Muslim buyers are welcomed by the older residents of Suleymaniye, their arrival in FBA has become a long-standing contentious issue among conservative and nationalist groups, who have mobilised as a reaction to the non-Muslim history of the area and its proximity to the Orthodox Patriarchate. Hence when analysing the current socio-political spatial relations, it is important to consider the history of the neighbourhood, since this informs and provides key reference points for the current politics of the space.

Political Relations
The politically active FBA has a number of features that help the residents to take action and develop the political process. The association in FBA was formed by politically active people who are also property owners in the area. The members have political connections with different parties, including some from the centre-left of the political spectrum, but mostly from the nationalist, conservative side. To a certain extent, the association had a diverse political structure, but it was the right-wing element that determined the general framework of the association.

The members of the association continued their political works in their own political spheres. The members called this a ‘division of labour’. The politically active members continued to work within their own political and social sphere and carried the issues to different groups’ agendas. They already had a network of political
groups, and they could carry the topic to different groups’ agendas in order to garner their support, thereby strengthening the position of the association with respect to the municipality. These members became ‘brokers’ (McAdam et al. 2001; Nicholls 2008, 2009) of the association. From this we can infer that *the presence of politically active members in an association is an encouraging factor in the dynamics of mobilisation.*

The strategy of ‘de-politicisation of the action sphere’ is another important feature of the establishment of the internal political relations of the association. At the beginning of the struggle, when the association tries to establish unity, the group members restricted their focus to issues connecting to the URP, without taking broader political actions. In this way, the association reduced the likelihood of disagreement as a result of its members’ different political views. Accordingly the association presented its actions as responses to the ‘violation of rights’ at the local level. The violation of right in this context is the state’s violation of property rights and residents’ livelihoods.

The strategy of de-politicisation enabled the FBA association to establish unity and take collective action. But this strategy also limited the scope of the struggle and the prospects for expanding the opportunity for others, since any action beyond the narrowly ‘de-politicised’ agenda of the FBA would be regarded as a ‘political action’, and therefore potentially divisive.

With the decision of the court to cancel the concept URP, the association achieved a substantial goal, although the area was still an URP area. This achievement not only caused the activities of the association to decelerate, but also since some members were targeting only such an achievement in the legal sphere they began to fracture from the other members and in this process the differences between the members’ political backgrounds and conflicts between them became more of a problem. This shows that the political process did not result in lasting solidarity that would allow the development of long-term plans and a political strategy for spatial politics.
More militant action was taken in the early days of the struggle because of the need for members to stand strong and support their arguments against the municipality. However, this strength was dispersed when the main threat was removed.

Short-term and long-term motivations are different and need to be investigated separately. As discussed above, the association in FBA were able to establish unity, but this unity dispersed when the short-term target was achieved and the members who had mobilised specifically in response to the threat of the URP no longer felt motivated to take action. This shows that in setting the short-term and long-term targets and the repertoire of actions, the political backgrounds and action experiences of the members are important. The political background of the active members affects the political process of the mobilisation and the extent of the struggle.

A further lesson that may be drawn from the case studies is that the role of the leading people in the local struggle is an important factor in the formation of repertoire of actions and determines the militancy and incidence of these actions. The research showed that the leading actors have three important roles in establishing and organising actions. First, they focus closely on the progress of URP and actions of the state, which is a crucial under the discretionary power of the state. Second, they represent the public in the political sphere and forward the demands of the locals to other actors of the political arena. Third, they establish relations with other groups and increase the visibility of the opposition.

7.4.3. Network closures

These internal factors that affect the mobilisation process complement the network of urban movements and political groups outside the project areas. In the early stages of the formation of relations between network groups and the locality, it is seen that the presence of an interlocutor or broker is an important factor. Although in many other URP areas the residents have taken organised action against the state-led URPs, in those cases the neighbourhood association has the support of
other UM groups, which connect it to a broader network and increase the militancy and incidence of the groups and their alliances. However, hardly any other groups became involved in the Suleymaniye case. The main reasons for this situation were presented by the actors of the urban movements’ network as the lack of collective action in the locality and brokers in the area. Therefore, a demand from the locals to take collective action with other groups or a broker to establish links with the locals is one of the preconditions of linking the network.

In the FBA case, the association had the support and help of various groups, including professional groups and political parties. Given the lack of reliable information about the project process and the use of discretionary power by the state, the support and help of these groups, especially with regard to technical issues, possible consequences of the project and previous experiences, was precious in the formation of the association’s arguments. Moreover, the association’s relations with other groups also helped the formation of a repertoire of action, which increased the militancy of the association.

Among the key points concerning the formation of these relations and the extent of support from the network are the political backgrounds of members of the association and their experience of taking action. As mentioned earlier, although some of the members of the FBA association were politically active, the activities in the sphere of their political engagement did not overlap with those of the urban movements. The struggle against the URP was a learning process for many members of the association, and this process was made easier when the association could call upon the experience of others in the network of UMs.

This learning process had also an impact on the politicisation of the issues and the integration of different political spheres. Although this process is still ongoing and it is too early to make a clear judgement about the transformative impact of these relations on the politics of everyday life, the right-wing members of the association gained first-hand experience of left-wing politics, and vice versa, which was a novel
political relations in the political process. Therefore, a concrete problem that occurred in the urban space – in this case the state-led URPs – brought together different political views in the public sphere and created the opportunity for residents to take collective action. The ties and transformative impacts of the establishing relations on different politics could be evaluated in the long term by reference to other variables. For the purposes of the present project, however, it is enough to observe that contentious urban politics gives individuals and groups from various political backgrounds the opportunity to take collective action in order to achieve common goals.

7.5. Contributions to the Conceptual Frameworks of Urban Movement Studies

The overarching aim of this research is to contribute to the conceptual framework of urban movements and mobilisation studies in urban space by considering different experiences of people and contentious cases emerge around urban issues in the cities of global South. To achieve this goal, first, I attempted to underline some concepts of contentious urban politics literature in order to draw a framework for a dynamic analysis of mobilisation in urban space. In this research, the main conceptual framework used to investigate the mechanisms and structures that affect political process and mobilisation was presented in a diagram including some sub-frameworks that could be used to define variables for further research (see Chapter 2, Box 2.2.). The conceptual framework does not rank these variables by order of priority, but in relation to each other according to various dimensions and scales. The aim was to draw up an overarching conceptual framework to understand political process, relations between the actors of contentious politics and dynamics of mobilisation.

In the construction of this research, some general questions concerning the dynamics of contentious urban politics were asked:

- Why do people mobilise around urban issues?
• Why do people not mobilise in the periods of contention?
• Why do people stop taking action?

These questions guided the research through a dynamic and relational approach which needs to focus on a variety of kinds of action, including inaction. In the conceptual framework of this research, four sub-frames were suggested to find out variables of a research on UMs:

• Framing the interest in the emergence of UMs
  o Collective consumption/collective interest
  o Non-collective consumption/private interest

• Framing the actions
  o Movements: collective action
  o Non-movements: collective inaction

• Framing the impacts
  o Incidence (effects) and militancy (demands) of actions

• Framing the factors that enable or inhibit collective action
  o External factors/political opportunities/contingent relations
  o Internal factors/necessary relations

In the analysis of the cases in Istanbul, I organised the analytical framework according to the external and internal factors that affect the mobilisation in urban space. The aim was to understand the mechanisms that affect the mobilisation and political processes in urban space in Istanbul. The impacts of the external and internal factors on the mobilisation in the Istanbul case were given in detail in the previous part of this chapter. Out of the findings of this research, several topics could be abstracted for further exploration in future research. In the Istanbul case, the following points were identified as factors that affect the relations between the actors of contentious politics, political processes and dynamics of mobilisation:

• Physical threats to residents’ livelihoods
• The terms and conditions of the projects (i.e. the offers made by the project stakeholders)
• Power of the public authorities in the process of intervention in space and the means that they use to actualise the projects
• Transparency of the project process
• Availability of information about the project and strategies of the project stakeholders
• Previous experiences of the residents about spatial interventions and their knowledge about other struggle areas
• Physical conditions of the built-environment
• Condition of the property market in the locality
• Property relations; exchange value and use value of the properties
• Political relations between the residents and the state
• Social relations in the locality
• Socio-spatial relations and ties with the livelihood
• Leading actors and their political relations
• Network closures; support and involvement of middle-class and political actors in local actions

These factors have impact on the political process and dynamics of mobilisation in Istanbul in an interrelated way and at various levels. The range of factors could be expanded with contributions from other research areas, or deeper analyses might enable future researches to identify further factors or a detailed analysis of various factors which are also highlighted in this research.

7.6. Conclusion

The contributions of this research can be evaluated in three levels. First, with its dynamic methodological approach, the research contributed to the research agenda of the urban movement (UM) studies. Second, by taking into consideration the formation of the social and political relations and their impacts on the political process during the episodes of contentions in different contexts, the research
contributed to the existing conceptual framework of UM studies which might be useful particularly in the analysis of UMs in the global South. Third, this research contributed to the UM literature of Turkey, particularly of Istanbul, by analysing the dynamics of social, political and spatial relations that affect the political processes in the contentious urban politics.

The thesis has argued that any research into the dynamics of mobilisation, militancy and incidence of collective action in urban space needs a dynamic research agenda applicable to diverse contexts and periods in order to understand the political process of the mobilisation. Movements engage in different frameworks in the course of their mobilisation, and these frameworks vary between contexts and periods, and the factors that cause mobilisation change accordingly. The conceptual frameworks of movements are developed through their political processes, and the militancy and incidence of the movements, their targets and repertoire of actions vary in the different episodes of this process. Therefore, rather than starting from a pre-determined definition of a movement, already situated in a conceptual framework that provides a limited account of movement’s political process in different contexts and periods, research that focuses on the dynamics of mobilisation needs a relational and analytical research agenda to expand the conceptual frameworks to fit the changing contexts and episodes in which actions occur.

This research also showed that inaction cases are also results of a political process emerging in the dynamics of contention. The lack of collective action in an episode of contention does not necessarily mean that the relations among the actors of the contention are established on an uncontested and unchanging foundation. The lack of collective action may result from controversial issues other than the visible ‘threats’ (in the case of this thesis, the state-led URPs). Hence, the lack of mobilisation is also a political process that is determined by the dynamics of contention in the broader political sphere. Furthermore, the analysis of the immobilised areas also demonstrates the formation of the social, political, spatial
relations in these areas, which are important for reading the politics of space and everyday life.

This research design also allowed a better understanding of the political process in an ongoing situation. In an ongoing process, it is hard to distinguish what means success, what means failure in the short term and long term targets of a movement. If the analysis starts with a given success and failure definition, the priorities of the mobilised people and the political process could be misinterpreted. Concerning to these points, establishing a conceptual framework by comparing the action and the inaction cases contributed to determine the priorities of collective action in a certain place in an episode of contention and what affects the political process of this mobilisation. This approach also provided to make abstractions about the issues that would be effective in the political process of the areas in the longer term.

The mobilisation process in the URP areas was strongly affected by the intervention of the state in the private arena, or rather, when it was perceived to have violated residents’ private property rights. It has been argued that private property issues, individual interests, or, in other words, ‘private consumption’ can be defended collectively, and the threat to these interests can break the ‘habitual passivity of people’ and create a sphere for the development of ‘interpretive frameworks’ in the political process. In taking into account the role of individual interests in the dynamics of mobilisation, the ‘exchange value’ and the ‘use value’ of the same commodity needs to be considered together. This research showed that for exchange value to become a driving mobilising force in the URPs, there should be other factors that increase the use value of the commodity. In the cases examined in this research, the existence of a property market, socio-spatial relations and ties with the areas, physical conditions of the area and possibility of alternative means of improving the living conditions were identified as factors that affect exchange value, use value and the relations between them.
It may also be argued that, where individual interests are threatened, a mobilisation process that begins with the issues concerning the exchange value can only make progress if it is able to increase the use value. Otherwise, when the threat is dispersed, the dynamics of mobilisation are likely to be adversely affected, and as a result the political process may slow down or even disappear. Furthermore, concerning the mobilisation power of the urban movements, which brings together people from different political and social backgrounds, it is important to develop internal relations based on ‘collective interests’.

One of the key findings of this research is the importance of actors staying informed about the progress of the project and the actions of the state. Lack of information limits mobilisation and prevents the emergence of a public sphere in which further steps may be discussed. The greater the mobilised groups’ access to such information, the more the discourse of the opposition develops. In order for these groups to obtain information which is concealed by the state, there are two important agents: the leading members of the mobilisation process, or ‘brokers’, as they establish relations with other groups; and other actors of the contentious urban politics, such as professionals and other urban movement groups. While the leading members of the mobilisation process establish relations with others, they can also draw on the knowledge and experience that different groups have of various issues relevant to the struggle. Information is one of the most valuable resources of the mobilisation process. But when there is no mobilisation in a locality and no leading actors who can draw on networks of contacts, the information and support from other groups is not shared with the local residents, which contributes to the lack of mobilisation.

The discretionary power of the state to implement the project is a factor that has a limited impact on the dynamics of mobilisation and political process. However, this research has shown that collective action against it can transform the means that the state employs in intervention in space. On the one hand, the authoritarian power of the state has a negative impact on mobilisation, while on the other, when
people are able to mobilise and take collective action, the discretionary power and its impact on the political process in the locality could be lessened.

This research investigated the factors that affect the mobilisation in urban space in Istanbul and contributed to the conceptual framework of urban movement studies. Research findings demonstrate that people’s experiences of spatial relations and interventions varied according to various external and internal factors. Studies of different cases would expand the research agenda of mobilisation in urban space. Concerning the findings of the present study, more research into the formation of property relations and construction of meaning of property would provide further insight into the dynamics of contentious politics. More research into the use and production of space, as well as the construction of its meaning according to gender, would contribution to a more comprehensive understanding of political processes in urban space.
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APPENDIX A

Urban regeneration/renewal areas and neighbourhood associations

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<th>Neighbourhood</th>
<th>Organizations</th>
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<td>Beyazit Aga–Eregli</td>
<td>Not Exist</td>
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This list was prepared and last updated in May 2014 by me. There was not a publicly announced list of all urban regeneration/renewal project areas by the state agencies. Then, I used various resources - such as news, e-mail groups’ notifications and state agencies’ websites – to form this table.

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### APPENDIX B

**Fener-Balat-Ayvansaray (FBA) Interviews (FA- Member of FBA Association; FR- Residents in FBA; FW- Workplace in FBA)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee Code</th>
<th>Affiliation and Gender (Male/M – Female/F)</th>
<th>Interview Date(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1 FA-1           | Association - FEBAYDER's Ex-Chairman       | Interview 1: 11.06.2011  
                               |                                                      | Interview 2: 2.05.2012 |
| 2 FA-2           | Association - FEBAYDER- Resident- Property  | More than three interviews |
|                  | Owner- Activist- F                         |                   |
| 3 FA-3           | Association - FEBAYDER                     | 17.10.2011        |
| 4 FA-4           | Association - Fatih Haber – Journalist     | 06.10.2011        |
| 5 FA-5           | Resident - Property Owner- F               | 02.05.2012        |
| 6 FA-6           | Association – property owner- UNESCO house | 11.06.2011        |
|                  | owner- Activist- M                         |                   |
| 7 FR-1           | Resident - Propert Owner- Outside the Project Area | 04.10.2011        |
| 8 FR-2           | Resident - Propert Owner- Outside the Project Area | 04.10.2011        |
| 9 FR-3           | Resident - Property Owner- M               | Interview 1: 11.10.2011  
<pre><code>                           |                                                      | Interview 2: 02.05.2012 |
</code></pre>
<p>| 10 FR-4          | Resident - Property Owner- M               | 28.10.2012        |
| 12 FR-6          | Resident - Tenant- Outside the Project Area | 04.10.2011        |</p>
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<td>FR-7</td>
<td>Resident - Tenant - Outside the Project Area</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>FW-3</td>
<td>Shopkeeper - Property Owner - M</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>FW-4</td>
<td>Shopkeeper - Property Owner - M</td>
<td>28.10.2011</td>
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<td>Shopkeeper - Property Owner - M</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>FW-6</td>
<td>Shopkeeper - Property Owner - M</td>
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<td>20</td>
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<td>Shopkeeper - Property Owner - M-F</td>
<td>27.07.2011</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>FW-8</td>
<td>Shopkeeper - Property Owner - Resident - M - Estate Agent</td>
<td>27.07.2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>FW-9</td>
<td>Shopkeeper - Property Owner - Resident - M - Estate Agent</td>
<td>27.07.2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>FW-10</td>
<td>Shopkeeper - Property Owner - Resident - M - Estate Agent</td>
<td>26.07.2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>FW-13</td>
<td>Working in FB - Mavi Kalem Association Project Manager</td>
<td>27.07.2011</td>
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### Suleymaniye Interviews (SA- Associations in Suleymaniye; SM- Mukhtars in Suleymaniye; SR- Residents in Suleymaniye; SW- Workplaces in Suleymaniye)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 SA-1</td>
<td>Association – Mazlumder - F</td>
<td>3.10.2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 SA-3</td>
<td>Association- Union of Shirt Manufacturers -M</td>
<td>20.09.2011</td>
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<td>4 SA-4</td>
<td>Association- KOCAV- Nationalist- Religious Education Foundation -M</td>
<td>29.09.11</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 SA-5</td>
<td>Association- Suleymaniye Vakfi- Religious - Education Foundation - M</td>
<td>23.09.2011</td>
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<td>6 SA-6</td>
<td>Association- Religious - Education Foundation - Bilim ve Sanat Vakfi - M</td>
<td>20.09.2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>7 SA-7</td>
<td>Association- Ilim ve Kultur Vakfi- Religious - Education Foundation -M</td>
<td>3.10.2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 SM-1</td>
<td>Head of Yavuz Selim Neighbourhood – Mukhtar - M</td>
<td>8.06.2011</td>
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<td>11 SM-4</td>
<td>Head of Demirtas Neighbourhood – Mukhtar -F</td>
<td>Interview 1: 07.06.2011 Interview 2: 17.04.2012</td>
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<td>12 SR-1</td>
<td>Resident - Roman- Tenant -F</td>
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| 14 | SR-3 | Resident – Turkish - Property Owner -F | Interview 1: 16.09.2011  
Interview 2: 24.10.2011 |
<p>| 15 | SR-4 | Resident – Turkish - Property Owner – A couple; interviewed together | 16.09.2011 |
| 16 | SR-5 | Resident – Kurdish - Property Owner - F | 15.09.2011 |
| 17 | SR-6 | Resident – Turkish - Property Owner -F | 23.09.2011 |
| 18 | SR-7 | Resident – Kurdish - Property Owner – A couple; interviewed together | 24.10.2011 |
| 20 | SR-9 | Resident – Turkish - Tenant - F | 16.09.2011 |
| 21 | SR-10 | Resident – Kurdish - Tenant - F | 15.09.2011 |
| 23 | SR-12 | Resident – Turkish - Tenant - F | 17.09.2011 |
| 24 | SR-13 | Resident – Kurdish - Tenant - F | More than three interviews and conversations |
| 25 | SR-14 | Resident – Kurdish - Tenant - F | More than three interviews and conversations |
| 26 | SR-15 | Resident – Turkish - Tenant - F | 24.10.2011 |
| 27 | SR-16 | Resident – Turkish - Property Owner - F | 16.09.2011 |
| 28 | SR-17 | Resident – Turkish - Property Owner - F | 25.11.2013 |
| 29 | SS-1 | Trade - Hotel -M | 29.09.2011 |
| 30 | SS-2 | Trade - Hotel -M | 29.09.2011 |
| 31 | SS-3 | Trade- 3 shopkeepers- stationary shop, hardware dealer, sweetshop – property owners- | 17.09.2011 |</p>
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<td>Workshop – Glazer- Property owner -M</td>
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<td>Trade - Shirt workshop- Property owner -M</td>
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Municipality Interviews (FM- FAthi Municipality; IMM- Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality; KPT- KIPTAS)

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<td>IMM- Historical Sites Conservation Department</td>
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<td>IMM- KUDEB – Suleymaniye</td>
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<td>IMM-3</td>
<td>IMM- URP Directorate- Planner</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>FM-2</td>
<td>Fatih Mun - Vice Mayor - FB, Ayyansaray, Sulukule Projects</td>
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<td>FM-3</td>
<td>Fatih Mun - Suleymaniye Project - Project Team</td>
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<td>FM-4</td>
<td>Fatih Mun- Fener-Balat-Ayyansaray URP team</td>
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### Professionals and Urban Movement Groups (TP - Third Parties)

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<td>2 TP-2</td>
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<td>3 TP-3</td>
<td>Architect- UNESCO, FB Rehabilitation Project</td>
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<td>4 TP-4</td>
<td>Chamber of Architects Secretary</td>
<td>More than three interviews and conversation</td>
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<td>6 TP-6</td>
<td>Urban Mov. Groups – Activist</td>
<td>19.10.2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>7 TP-7</td>
<td>Urban Mov. Groups – Activist</td>
<td>17.05.2012</td>
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<td>8 TP-8</td>
<td>Urban Mov. Groups - Association - Conservation</td>
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<td>10 TP-9</td>
<td>Chamber of Architects - Lawyer</td>
<td>More than three interviews and conversation</td>
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<td>11 TP-10</td>
<td>Political Party BDP – Fatih District Branch</td>
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<tr>
<td>12 TP-11</td>
<td>Political Party CHP – Fatih District Branch and Councillor of Fatih District and IMM</td>
<td>02.05.2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>13 TP-12</td>
<td>Political Party MHP – Fatih District Branch</td>
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## Participatory Observations

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<td>Fatih Municipality</td>
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<td>2 The Ayvansaray Right Holders Meeting by Municipality</td>
<td>Fatih Municipality</td>
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<td>3 Istanbul Urban Movement Groups Forum</td>
<td>The Chamber of Architects</td>
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<td>6 Istanbul Meetings – Urban Movements Session</td>
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<td>12.10.2011</td>
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<td>7 The City Planners 9th Colloquium – Urban Movements Session</td>
<td>Yildiz Technical University</td>
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APPENDIX C

Historical Development of Fener-Balat-Ayvansaray

Located on the western part of Golden Horn coast, Fener-Balat-Ayvansaray (FBA) is an important archaeological site, including Byzantine settlements and monuments together with unique civil architecture of 19th and 20th c. Ottoman settlements.

The characteristics of today’s historical FBA trace back to the residential politics of the Ottoman State in Istanbul since the 15th century. According to these residential plans, Muslims were mostly settled in the inner sides of the area, whereas Greeks, Armenian and Jewish households dominated the coastal part. Greeks were settled in Fener, Armenians were settled in coastal area between Unkapani and Balat, and the Sephardim Jewish population, who escaped from Spanish and Portuguese Inquisitions in the 15th and 16th centuries, were settled in Balat area (Narli 2006). Along with these ethnic groups, there were Muslims and other religious and ethnic groups living side by side which made FBA and the Halic coastal zone a highly multicultural neighbourhood (Okay 2009).

The multicultural, multi-religious characteristics of the area were reflected in a variety of important religious places in FBA. First and foremost, the Christian Orthodox Patriarchate has been located in Fener since the 16th century. The Jewish quarter of the area, Balat, also has a prominent monumental synagogue called Ahrida, which is one of the oldest and biggest in Istanbul. Aside from these, there are other monumental churches and mosques spread all around the area along with the Byzantine ruins.

132 The Palace of Porphyrogenitus (Tekfur Sarayi), one of the important Byzantine buildings, is the only surviving palace from that period. It is located in Ayvansaray.

133 The Ecumenical Patriarchate is the highest and holiest centre of the Orthodox Christian Church in the world. In the Ottoman State, the Patriarchate was a powerful institution on which the Sultans depended, but it was also an influential political institution. When minorities became an issue in the Ottoman state structure in 19th century with the rise of nationalisation movement, the political role and influence of the Patriarchate on the Christian minority became a contested topic in politics. The Patriarchate of Constantinople became a national problem because of its political power and influence on the Greek population (Macar 2004). The Turkish State was unable to evict the Patriarchate from Turkey, but it was given the power to control the Patriarchate in Lausanne 1923 Treaty. Then, restrictions in the functions and status of the Patriarchate have been brought by the Turkish State which increased the tensions about the issue in both societies.
In the 19th c., the old settlements were drastically affected by the fires and earthquakes which resulted in changes in the population dynamics of the historical peninsula (RFBDP 1998; Fatih Municipality Plan Reports 2005). The wealthier inhabitants began to move to newly emerged, ‘modern’ settlements in other parts of the city\(^{134}\) whereas the average-income families of civil servants, artisans and small-scale merchants continued to live in the area.

In the 20th c., the Greek population of FBA evicted from the area after several historical events. First, in 1923, Greek and Turkish States signed an agreement of population exchange based upon the religious identity, which cause to ‘forced eviction’ of more than two million citizens of both countries, including 1.5 million Turks (Gokacti 2005). The population exchange altered the social structure of Fener as some Greek families had to leave the area. Other events that made changes in Greek population can be summarised as the wealth tax imposed on the minority groups in 1942, the attacks to the non-Muslim populations on 6th and 7th September 1955, and then the Greco-Turkish conflict in Cyprus in 1974, which resulted in Greek citizens being forced to leave their lands in Turkey.

The other dominant minority group in the area, the Jewish population also left the area over time due to several reasons. The establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 and the call for the Jewish population of the world to settle in Israel led to another migration from the area as the call was responded by some Jewish families who relocated from Turkey (RFBDP Report 1998). The tax imposed to minority groups in 1942, and the attacks to the non-Muslim population also affected the welfare of the Jewish population.

The social and economic structures which changed considerably in the early years of the Republic not only transformed the demography of the historical areas but also affected the built environment and property relations in the area demonstrably. The properties left vacant in the wake of the (forced) migrations have become a problematic issue concerning the built environment and property ownerships in the meantime.

Although many residents of the area moved out due to various reasons, the houses were not left vacant. In the early Republican period, Golden Horn was designated as an industrial development area by Henri Prost, who in the 1930s was employed by

\(^{134}\) The reformist transformation of the Ottoman State resulted in the emergence of a new capitalist class which formed their new livelihoods away from the historical city. In this period, the wealthy families of Fener and Balat moved to newly-established ‘modern’ settlements around the new business districts: Pera (Beyoglu), Galata, Tesvikiye, Nisantasi, Tarabya (RFBDP 1998; Narli 2006).
the state to plan Istanbul (Fatih Municipality Plan Reports 2005). The planning decisions for Golden Horn had two major consequences in FBA. Firstly, the empty spaces along the coast line were constructed with factories, workshops, depots and other buildings for industrial use, which destroyed the relation between the residential area and the waterside. Meanwhile, the industrial wastes became troublesome in the Golden Horn area. Even today, the residents of this area remember and talk about the terrible smell of Golden Horn and the difficulties of living in that area during the industrial times.

Secondly, the industrialisation of the area caused another change to the population dynamics. The labour force of the newly emerging industry began to settle in the historic area. The 1950s saw the beginning of the migration from Anatolian towns to the industrial cities, foremost to Istanbul. In the lack of a housing policy and supply for the new comers of the city, some migrants established neighbourhoods by building their own houses, i.e. gecekondus, around the industrial zones, some migrants settled in the historical areas where industrial estates were located. FBA is an example of the latter, where the migrant labour force was hosted.

After experiencing a heavy industrial period, the deindustrialisation and cleaning of the industrial waste in Golden Horn coast began under the responsibility of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (IMM) in 1984 (Fatih Municipality Plan Reports 2005). The docks were moved out, the industrial estates on the coast were demolished and dislocated. The empty buildings left vacant at the end of deindustrialisation were knocked down by the IMM regarding the plans prospecting to transform the coastal zone of Golden Horn into a green and recreational space. During the implementation of these plans, some of the residential units located in the coast were also demolished and residents were relocated elsewhere than FBA.

Although the process of cleaning the Golden Horn from the heavy industrial waste was a necessary step towards improving the environment and living conditions, the loss of industry and decrease in the economic activities had devastating impacts on the area. As the social and economic consequences of the deindustrialisation project were not taken into account, economic circulation in the area suddenly

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135 As being the first of its kind, the mass migration started in 1950s of the Anatolian peasantry, who then became the labour power of the newly emerging industries, has been called the ‘first wave’ of migration (Keyder 2005). The second vast migration started in the mid-1980s that further changed the demographic structure of the cities was from the Kurdish regions of the country following the war between the Turkish state army and Kurdish paramilitary forces. Between 1985 and 2000, more than three million people were subjected to forced migration in the wake of the armed conflict. As the characteristics of the migration and the conditions of the migrants are very different from the previous migration, the latter wave of migration to the metropolitan areas is called ‘second wave’ of migration.
stopped, and a decrease in quality of life began (Fatih Municipality Plan Reports 2005; Bezmez 2009).

Along with the loss of economic activities, strict construction regulations greatly affected the maintenance of buildings caused degradation in the quality of life in the area. The tight bureaucratic processes in the maintenance of the houses became one of the biggest complaints of the property owners in the area. Some of the property owners moved out form the area and the building stock became a supply for rental use.

In the meantime, like other historical sites, FBA has been one of the stops for the second wave migrants from Anatolia, mostly Kurdish from South East and East Anatolian regions after 1990s. Another population change started 1990s onwards in the area which affected the social and political relations in the area massively.

In 1996, in the second conference of the United Nations Habitat which was held in Istanbul, a decision of developing a pilot renovation and restoration project for Fener-Balat’s historical environment was taken which has changed the socio-political spatial relations in the area. This time, gentrification was also on the agenda of Fener-Balat (Narli 2006, 2009; Soytemel 2011).

**Demographic and Physical Structures**

According to the 2010 census, the population of Ayvansaray neighbourhood is 20,098, and Balat’s is 16,807. The majority of residents in both neighbourhoods belong to the working age group, as can be seen from the age distribution graphic below.

**Appendix C- Figure 1: Age Distribution and Population**

![Age Distribution and Population Graph](image-url)
According to the findings of 2004 research by the Foundation for the Support of Women’s Work (KEDV)\textsuperscript{136}, 58% of people in the Fener-Balat district emigrated from the Blacksea Region, mostly from Kastamonu province, and 18% of the population is from the East and Southeast regions (KEDV 2004: 11). According to the same survey, 41% of the sample group have been living in Fener-Balat district more than 10 years. 28% have been living in the area 5 to 10 years, and 27% percent is 1 to 5 years (KEDV 2004: 12).

The graphic below shows the education level in the two neighbourhoods according to 2010 census of Turkish Statistical Institute. From this table, we can say that the education level is low in both areas. In this data, the presence of university graduates and people with postgraduate degrees underlines an important feature of the area. It is rare to see postgraduates in the historical, dilapidated areas, but there are 35 masters-programme graduate and 21 doctoral studies graduates live in Balat and 44 masters-programme graduate and 22 doctoral studies in Ayvansaray.

\textit{Appendix C- Figure 2.: Education Level}

\textit{Household Demography}

According to the 2004 survey, the average household in the area is home to 4 or 5 people (62%). The survey shows that the income level is low in the neighbourhood.

\textsuperscript{136} Foundation for the Support of Women’s Work (Kadin Emegini Degerlendirme Vakfi – KEDV) carried out a social survey in 2004, with the support of the European Commission in the scope of the Fener-Balat Rehabilitation Programme. In the scope of the research, 300 women were interviewed and their household data was collected.
At the time that the survey was carried out, the minimum wage was 350 TL per month (approximately £145 p/m).\textsuperscript{137}

Appendix C - Figure 3: Income Distribution

The first survey carried out in 1998 in the scope of the RFBDP demonstrates that 60\% of inhabitants are tenants, and 40\% are property owners. In the 2004 survey of KEDV, the conditions of property relations are described in more detail, revealing a change in the ratios of the property ownership status of the inhabitants. According to this survey, 63\% of the sample population is tenants, 25\% is property owners, 8\% is people lives in properties belonging to foundations\textsuperscript{138}, and 4\% is people live in relatives’ houses. The high ratio of tenants is an important factor in the development of collective action against the spatial interventions in the area. It is rarely observed that tenants take action similar to property owners.

Built Environment and Physical Conditions

In FBA, the majority of the housing stock is historical houses. Although there are rundown and ruined buildings, FBA is still in a better condition than other historical areas. The rundown buildings constitute the main body of the discourse for

\textsuperscript{137} For the minimum wage rates visit: 

For the exchange rates visit: http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/kurlar/200402/05022004.html (access December 2012). It is worth mentioning that minimum wage is lower than the poverty line calculated by the trade unions. The poverty line for a 4 member household was determined to be 1,509 Turkish Liras in 2004 by one of the biggest trade union confederations, Turk-Is (see http://www.sendika.org/2004/11/turk-is-aklik-ve-yoksulluk-siniri-yukseldi/)

\textsuperscript{138} The Turkish Republic Prime Ministry Directorate General of Foundations has properties in the historical sites which are also rented. Some of these properties formerly belonged to members of minority groups (i.e. the non-Muslims of Ottoman times) and were appropriated by the Turkish State.
justifying the renewal project; however, FBA is not a dilapidated area according to experts (Altinsay 2007).

The comprehensive report of the RFBDP (1998) focuses on 1401 lots and 1267 buildings in the area. 102 (7%) of these lots were not used, 68 (5.4%) of the total buildings were vacant and 124 (9.7%) were partially empty. According to survey, there were 21 completely ruined buildings in the whole area, 157 buildings (13%) that needed heavy rehabilitation, 365 (%30) buildings that needed medium rehabilitation, and 376 (31%) buildings that needed lighter rehabilitation works. 304 buildings (124 of which were constructed recently) (26%) are in good condition. The current condition in the area is better than it was at the time of the survey since both in the scope of the programme and afterwards, restoration works have been carried out in the area. However, there is no updated data about the current condition of the physical environment.

Although the number of restoration works has increased in recent years and thirty percent of the houses in FBA have been rehabilitated and restored (Soytemel 2011), there are many buildings that have been lost their original structure (Unlu 2008). Residents in FBA live in historical houses which are varied in size and number of storeys but mostly sit on a small base of 45-60 m$^2$ and do not sufficient quality of life for more than one household. Some owners of historical houses have converted the buildings into flats in order to enable the use of the spare storey as another household. These flats are either rented or used by the other family members. Kitchens and bathrooms were added to some of these flats, but some others lack of these facilities and there are shared bathrooms and kitchens for more than one household (Soytemel, 2011). There are also other additions to the buildings which caused deformation in the historical characteristics. To note here, all these structural works were done without taking permission from the responsible agencies.

**Belonging to the Neighbourhood**

According to the survey carried out with 300 women in 2004, if the women had opportunity to move out from the district, they would prefer to leave especially because of the living conditions in the area. However, the survey also shows that although the sample group is not happy with the physical environment, but 56% of the sample group is pleased to live in Fener-Balat because of their neighbourhood relations (KEDV, 2004: 15). The most commonly-cited problems in the neighbourhood are the lack of health services (45%), followed by lack of infrastructure (15%), education (15%) and safety (15%) (KEDV, 2004: 16).
Political Structure

FBA is known as a politically right-wing place including religious (Islamic) and nationalist groups. It is situated very close to one of the most Islamist place in Istanbul, Fatih-Carsamba, where some well-known religious groups dominate (Narli 1997; Bezmez 2009). Other important political features of the area are the predominant strains of nationalism, Ottomanism\(^{139}\) and Muslim communitarianism. These ideologies are reproduced by constructing the non-Muslim and non-Turk past of the area as a threat.

2011 General Election\(^{140}\)

The below graphic shows the distribution of votes in FBA neighbourhoods. The total number of voters in Ayvansaray is 14,351, of whom 11,446 are eligible voters. In Balat neighbourhood, the total number of voters is 11,516, of whom there are 9,702 eligible voters.

Appendix C- Figure 4.: Distribution of Votes in Ayvansaray-Balat and Istanbul in 2011 General Election

The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has the biggest share of the votes in both neighbourhoods. CHP, Republican People’s Party, which is the central, Kemalist, secularist party, is in the second rank, but there is a massive gap between the ruling party and the others in FBA. The other parties, Saadet Party (Felicity Party) and MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) are conservative right-wing parties.

\(^{139}\) Ottomanism concerns not only about being Turks and Muslims, but also it refers to the great Ottoman legacy and the history of the Peninsula. But this view does not refer to the multicultural social life of the Ottoman state; rather the big legacy of the state.

\(^{140}\) In this election, AKP had the 49.5\%, CHP had 26\%, MHP 13\% and Kurdish and some socialist parties supported independent candidates had 6.5\% of the total votes in the nationwide. In Istanbul, AKP received 50\%, CHP 31\%, MHP 9\% and Independents 5\% of the total votes.
The votes of the Kurdish party – formerly DTP (Democratic People’s Party), then BDP (Peace and Democracy Party), currently HDP (People’s Democratic Party) – and left bloc supported independent candidate also shows that Kurdish politics has a ground in the neighbourhoods. Yet, the distribution of votes clearly demonstrates the political characteristics of the area as conservative, religious and nationalist.

**2007 General Elections**

The graphics below show the distribution of the votes in the 2007 General Elections in FBA and Istanbul. Total number of the voters in FBA is 25,668, of whom 18,683 are eligible voters.

**Appendix C- Figure 5.: Distribution of votes in Ayyansaray-Balat and Istanbul in 2007 General Election**

It can be seen from the Figure 5., there is a diverse structure in the distribution of votes. Saadet and MHP received remarkable ratio of votes in the 2007 general elections.

When we analyse both the 2011 and 2007 elections together, it is clear that both AKP and CHP increased their shares of votes in the neighbourhoods. On the other hand, nationalist MHP and Islamists Saadet Party received fewer votes in 2011 than

141 In 2007 general elections, AKP received the 46.5% of the total votes in the nationwide. AKP was followed by CHP with 20.8%, MHP with 14.2%. In Istanbul, AKP received the 45% of the votes, CHP 27%, MHP 10% and the independent candidates (majority of votes of independent candidates was for the Kurdish and left politics blocs supported candidates) received 6% in total.

142 In February 2008, the administrative borders of some districts and neighbourhoods were redefined and some neighbourhoods were merged. Five neighbourhoods, Tavkii Cafer, Hizir Çavuş, Tahta Minare, Hatip Musluhittin, Katip Musluhittin were merged and renamed as Balat neighbourhood. Another five neighbourhoods, Balat Karabaş, Atik Mustafa Paşa, Avcibey, Molla Aşki, Kasim Gurani were merged and named Ayyansaray. I calculated the results of all neighbourhoods together.
in 2007.\textsuperscript{143} The independent candidate received the same percentage of the overall vote which means a rooted number of voters.

\textbf{2009 Local Elections}

The last local election was held on 29\textsuperscript{th} March 2009. In this election, residents voted for the Fatih Municipality and Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality which announced the URP in FBA after the elections. The officials elected in this election were in duty when this research was conducted.

\textbf{Appendix C- Figure 6.: Distribution of Votes in Ayvansaray-Balat in 2009 Local Elections}

The distribution of votes in the local election shows that political choices can be different in the local elections from general elections. In the local elections, both in the metropolitan level and district level, AKP’s votes have decreased whereas votes for Saadet and CHP have increased. The Kurdish party DTP, has the same ratio of rooted votes from FBA. The main political opposition to the ruling party in FBA is from Saadet, CHP and MHP voters which is a condition also determines the dynamics of mobilisation in the area and internal political relations of the association, as it is discussed in Chapter 5.

In sum, FBA has a politically conservative structure which determines the dynamics of social relations and dynamics of the political relations in the area.

\textsuperscript{143} GP is the Young Party (Genc Parti) which was on the centre-right, but no longer exists. Others including nine parties, three of which are left-wing and the other six of which are conservative, religious and nationalist parties. Left-wing parties have a very small number of votes compared to the right-wing conservative parties in FBA.
APPENDIX D

Location and the History of the Space
Suleymaniye quarter, covering eight neighbourhoods (Demirtas, Hoca Giyasettin, Yavuz Sinan, Haci Kadin, Molla Husrev, Suleymaniye, Kalenderhane, Saridemir neighborhoods) has three important places and facilities give the characteristics of the quarter: the commercial district, Eminonu which is neighbour to Suleymaniye quarter; Suleymaniye Mosque and its complex; and Istanbul University. Eminonu district, has been the centre of trade for centuries because of the waterfront and transportation facilities (Eruzun 2007). Still, Eminonu district is associated with commercial functions, wholesale and retail shops selling various kinds of products. The coastal and inner-neighbourhoods of Suleymaniye area have especially close ties with trade in Eminonu.

The residential function of the area began to increase during 1477-1535, under the Ottoman rule of Istanbul (Plan Report 2003). The construction of Suleymaniye Mosque and its complex (Kulliyes) commenced in 1550 and lasted until 1558. Suleymaniye is not only a mosque; it was designed as a grand educational and cultural centre. Widely regarded as the masterpiece of the architect, Sinan, this huge complex has dominated and shaped the lives of people in the surrounding areas since it was built. During the 16th and 17th centuries, Suleymaniye district was the place where the Ottoman ulama (the higher-status religious leaders) and notable Muslim population, such as statesmen lived (Strutz 2009).

In the 18th century, the Ottoman State descended into a major economic and political crisis, which had an impact on social and economic life of Istanbul (Site Management Plan 2011, Strutz 2009). The changes to the spatial organisation of the city became more apparent in the 19th century. The modernisation of the State also prompted developments intended to make the city meet the modern planning.

144 In the mid-16th century, the head architect of the Ottoman State, Architect Sinan, was given an order by Sultan Suleyman the Magnificent to build a mosque on the third hill of Istanbul, representing the power and grandeur of the Sultan.

145 Along with the mosque, there were five madrasas, a health centre, a higher medical school, a missionary, an inn and other small religious and trade facilities in the same area which were surrounding the mosque (Plan Reports 2003).

146 German engineer Helmut von Moltke was employed to organize the transportation and main roads in the old city. The importance of his plan for Suleymaniye area is his suggestion to end building timber houses step by step and give priority to building brick masonry houses to avoid the fires in the city.
these modern planning thoughts, the timber housing stock became a concern because of the disastrous fires. In 1856 and 1865, the historical district faced two big fires that destroyed the built environment; then government decided to take urgent action against the risk which resulted in decrease in the timber housing stock of Istanbul. The places faced with the fires were not built with timber again. Yet, Suleymaniye managed to keep its unique timber housing stock throughout the time which makes the place an important heritage site today.

The 19th century also saw big changes to the social and political organisation of life in the old city. The notables of the bureaucratic cadre began to move out from their big mansions in Suleymaniye in the late 19th century due to the relocation of the Ottoman Palace. The end of the Ottoman State and the subsequent replacement of Istanbul with Ankara as the capital city prompted further changes to the population and spatial organisation of Suleymaniye. In the town plans of Istanbul prepared in the early years of Republic by French architect Henri Proust, trade and commercial facilities in the Suleymaniye region and coast were retained. This plan also detailed another important change for Suleymaniye: the establishment of Istanbul University.

Istanbul University was established in 1933. Suleymaniye area was chosen as the site for the new University, and this decision was not made arbitrarily. As mentioned above, the madrasas of the Suleymaniye complex were the higher education institutions in the Ottoman period. Istanbul University continues the higher education facilities in the area in the buildings of Darulfunun and several other buildings spread around Suleymaniye quarter. 147

Another important feature of the spatial organisation of the area, which still has an impact on the population dynamics of Suleymaniye quarters, is the dry and fresh food market, which had been located in the Golden Horn port of Eminonu district. 148 While the wholesalers were living in the area, the market workers also found temporary accommodation in Suleymaniye. The young porters from the markets, who were the members of the first migrant group to Istanbul, were living in bachelor rooms, which served as temporary accommodation for male workers. Still, there are many bachelor rooms in Suleymaniye, serving as a form of ‘traditional’ temporary shelter for young male workers working in the surrounding areas (Kizilkan 2009). The removal of the food market from Eminonu in 1985 had a drastic effect on the social and economic structures of Suleymaniye. Until that time,


the market was one of the economic driving forces in the area, as well as the main determinant of the population profile.

The lack of any comprehensive conservation agenda for historical places caused deprivation of the built environment (Dincer et al. 2011). In the early years of the Republic, modernisation and industrialisation of the city were the key driving forces of urban development. Historical areas were restructured to fit the needs of the new modern city; boulevards were opened in the historic peninsula, existing roads were extended in the 1950s, under the Menderes government. These were the key examples of urban development that brought about mass destruction and functional changes to the historic sites.149 Atatürk Boulevard, which was opened in 1925 and cut the connection between Suleymaniye’s residential areas and the rest of the residential areas through the west end of the land-walls, was also extended in this time. The consequence of this development was the separation of Suleymaniye from the Zeyrek and Cibali residential areas.

Suleymaniye was always concerned as a peculiar historical area. There were some attempts to develop a conservation agenda for Suleymaniye in the 1960s and ‘70s by conservation architects and Istanbul Municipality but these were not taken into consideration.150 The lack of a conservation approach in this prominent historical area led to the deprivation of the built environment, which continues to have a huge impact on living conditions in the area.

For Suleymaniye, the term ‘conservation site’ was first introduced in 1973 for Suleymaniye mosque but its complex and the rest of Suleymaniye quarter were designated conservation site status in 1981 (ibid.; Site Management Plan 2011). Yet, comprehensive conservation legislation was not established until 1995. The conservation plan announced in 1990 was cancelled by the administrative court. A new plan could only be announced in 2005. Prior to that, the conservation of

149 Two boulevards were opened in 1957, called Vatan and Millet which were caused to mass demolition in the historical built environment.

150 In 1962, Prof. Sedad Hakki Eldem, who was a professor in classical Ottoman architecture, prepared a conservation project for the Suleymaniye area; however this project was never carried out. Another renewal project was planned by the Istanbul Municipality which was included 2200 historical houses in 1977. Like the other project’s fate, this project was also not carried out. (Bu eşsiz semt, İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasının bombalarla yerle bir edilmiş Berlin’i gibi, Ersin Kalkan, Hurriyet Pazar, 06.03.2005, http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2005/03/06/609609.asp Access December 2010.; Süleymaniye’nin Akıbeti..., Ebru Bayram, 29.11.2005, http://v3.arkitera.com/news.php?action=displayNewstItem&ID=5893, Access: December 2010.)
registered buildings was considered on a case-by-case basis till 2005 (Dincer et al. 2011).

In 1983, the Turkish government signed the 1972 Convention of UNESCO concerning the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. In 1985, eleven natural and historical heritage sites in Turkey were listed in the World Heritage List (WHL), including four areas from Istanbul historical peninsula: the Archaeological Park, at the tip of the Historic Peninsula; the Suleymaniye quarter, including Suleymaniye Mosque complex and the vernacular timber housing stock and traditional street forms, bazaars and vernacular settlements around it; the Zeyrek area of settlement around the Zeyrek Mosque (the former church of the Pantocrator); and the area along both sides of the Theodosian land walls, including remains of the former Blachernae Palace.

In 2011, the Fatih District Urban Conservation Site 1/5000 Scale Conservation Plan and Site Management Plan of Historical Peninsula were released, which determined a series of priorities in the conservation of the WHSs in the historical peninsula, but, moreover, they also defined the surrounding area as a buffer zone which has an impact on the WHSs. However, the area also designated as urban renewal project area on May 24, 2006 by the Council of Minister, which brought a new legislative status to area along with the status of a listed world heritage site.

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151 The conservation plans were cancelled by the administrative courts after the objection of Chamber of Architects. A new plan for Eminonu and Fatih districts was released in 2005, which was also taken to the administrative court by Chamber of Architects and cancelled after the judiciary process.

152 “The “Convention Concerning the Conservation of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage” which was approved by UNESCO in its 17th General Conference in 1972 aims to introduce the cultural and natural properties in the world which have a Universal Outstanding Value as the common heritage of the whole of humanity, to establish the consciousness of protecting the universal heritage within the communities and to ensure necessary cooperation in order to maintain these values which have been corrupted and destroyed due to various reasons.” (Site Management Plan 2011: 21)

Demographic and Physical Structures

Population Dynamics

Three important points can be highlighted regarding the changes in the residential population: replacement of the state notables and elites with the merchant and workers; the departure of the merchants from the sites; and later, the arrival of second-wave migrants from the Eastern Anatolian regions.

Although the general trend in Istanbul, in terms of population dynamics, is for the population to increase due to migration\(^{154}\), the population of the Eminonu district has continued to decrease since the 1970s. The population of Eminonu peaked in 1955, at 146,896 people; but the population began to decrease drastically in the 1970s, and in 2000, the population had fallen to just 55,635 people (Murat et al. 2006: 10).

In the project area, the trend toward population decrease can be seen in all neighbourhoods except Hocakadin, which saw an increase between 1990 and 2000:

Appendix D- Table 1: Population of the four neighbourhoods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME OF NEIGHBORHOOD</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEMIRTAS</td>
<td>2261</td>
<td>1010</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HACIKADIN</td>
<td>965</td>
<td>1478</td>
<td>663</td>
<td>586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOCAGIYASETTIN</td>
<td>5240</td>
<td>3386</td>
<td>2027</td>
<td>1251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YAVUZSINAN</td>
<td>1269</td>
<td>1163</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At this point, it is important to note that the apparently drastic decrease in the population, especially between years 2000 and 2007, is partly a result of changes to the census system. After 2007, the census was prepared according to the address-based population registry system, and under this new system, many of the residents of Suleymaniye, especially those living in temporary accommodation, were not registered. People living in bachelor rooms or in other kinds of temporary accommodations do not register in Suleymaniye neighbourhoods, but instead remained registered in their hometowns.\(^{155}\) This situation is an important example of the temporary character of space for many in Suleymaniye.

\(^{154}\) Between the years 1935 – 2000 Istanbul’s population increased from 883.599 to 10.018.735. The census system in Turkey has changed in 2007 and address based population registry system was established. In 2007, Istanbul’s population was registered 12.573.836 and in 2013 the population increased to 14.160.467. It should be noted here that, as we noticed in Suleymaniye data, there is an unregistered population living in Istanbul, hence the population is estimated more than the registered number.

\(^{155}\) The head of the neighbourhoods all emphasised the unregistered population in their neighbourhoods during the interviews. Although their neighbourhoods contain many people,
**Literacy**

When we look the literacy level in the project area, we see that in Hacikadin (9.4%) and Hocagiyasettin (13.1%) neighbourhoods, the ratio of illiteracy is higher than the average of Eminonu area which is 8%. These two neighbourhoods contain the majority of most recent migrants and bachelor rooms.

**Appendix D- Table 2: Literacy in four neighbourhood**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighbourhoods</th>
<th>Illiterate (%)</th>
<th>Literate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demirtas</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>91.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hacikadin</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>90.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hocagiyasettin</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>86.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yavuzsinan</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>92.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The below graphic demonstrates the education level in the neighbourhoods. The majority of the literate population over 6 years old are primary school graduates. Overall, it can be seen from the graphic that the education level in Suleymaniye is low.

**Appendix D- Figure 1: Education Level**

because they are not registered, the neighbourhoods officially seem as abandoned. Hence, they have problems to access to services. Moreover, the population using the area gains an informal character from the very beginning. In her research, Kizilkan (2009) also emphasises the temporality of space for many of Suleymaniye residents, mostly for the bachelors.
Income Level and Working Conditions

Household income data in the base of neighbourhoods could not be accessed, although it was demanded from the Turkish Statistical Institute, thus, it was sought from other sources. This lacuna could be attributed to the informal labour relations in the neighbourhoods, which make it difficult to gain access to information about household demography.

Ozbay (2007) carried out a household research in 44 households located in the three neighbourhoods (Demirtas, Mollahusrev and Suleymaniye neighbourhoods) of Suleymaniye quarter that surround Suleymaniye Mosque and its complex. According to his survey, 50% of the participants live below the hunger threshold.

Appendix D- Table 3: Income Distribution of the Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Cumulative Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0–380 YTL</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>381–750 YTL</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>31,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>751–999 YTL</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000–1499 YTL</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500 YTL and above</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ozbay (2007)

The above figures demonstrate that Suleymaniye quarter is a place of urban poverty. The level of poverty is undoubtedly higher among those living in temporary accommodations or bachelor rooms.

Many people working and/or living in Suleymaniye quarter work informally. Not only men of working age but also other members of the households join the informal labour force in Suleymaniye, which makes it harder to estimate the total income of any given household.

Built Environment and Physical Conditions and Property Relations

In the whole Suleymaniye WHS, there are 960 registered buildings in the records, of which 809 still exist and 151 no longer exist (Site Management Plan 2011).

156 In 2007, the absolute monthly minimum wage was 419.15 TL. According to the survey of biggest trade union confederation, the hunger threshold for a household of four was 657 TL and the poverty threshold was 2141 TL in 2007. http://www.sendika.org/2007/10/aclik-siniri-657-ytl-yoksulluk-siniri-2-bin-141-ytl/
### Appendix D- Table 4: Cultural Properties in the WHS area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MONUMENT</th>
<th>CIVIL</th>
<th>TOTAL CULTURAL PROPERTIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Existing</td>
<td>Lost over time</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing</td>
<td>Lost over time</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing</td>
<td>Lost over time</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Suleymaniye Mosque and its associated Area</strong></td>
<td>438</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Site Management Plan 2011, p.46

The above table shows the need for taking action in the area. Almost quarter (24.8%) of the registered historical civil buildings from the earlier records have been lost over time. The condition of remaining ones is also uncertain.

The cultural properties in the area are mostly used as commercial (40.5%) and residential units (36.8%) in the WHS (Appendix D- Table 5), which emphasises that commercial functions, including small-scale workshops and shops, are important in the area. When we look at property ownership in the area, we see that 62% of the cultural properties are privately owned, 20% belong to foundations and 18% are owned by public institutions (Appendix D- Table 6).

### Appendix D- Table 5: Functions of the Cultural Properties of the Site Management Plan Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREAS</th>
<th>FACILITIES</th>
<th>COMMERCIAL</th>
<th>RESIDENCE</th>
<th>INDUSTRIAL</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Suleymaniye Mosque and its associated Area</strong></td>
<td>217</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>961</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Site Management Plan 2011, p.46

### Appendix D- Table 6: Ownership of the Cultural Properties of the Site Management Plan Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREAS</th>
<th>PUBLIC</th>
<th>FOUNDATION</th>
<th>PRIVATE</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Suleymaniye Mosque and its associated Area</strong></td>
<td>176</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>961</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Site Management Plan 2011, p.46

The deprivation in the area is not a recent phenomenon. It has developed over time, in line with changing economic conditions, property relations and long and complicated conservation regulations. Property ownership is an important factor in the evolution of this process. Historical buildings were inherited by the second and
third generations of the property owners, and along the way ownership was divided among many people, which made living in the area or doing any maintaining work difficult for the owners.

The dilapidated physical environment has also received attention from the UNESCO World Heritage Committee (WHC). The committee warned the Turkish state to take urgent action in order to keep Istanbul on the World Heritage list. The warnings were taken seriously by the state party and the URP project was born out of this consideration. It would be useful to see how the Suleymaniye World Heritage Site (WHS) is described in the UNESCO WHC Reports.

Suleymaniye in the UNESCO World Heritage Committee Reports
The WHC Reports describe the unique structure of the Suleymaniye World Heritage Site as being in danger and in need of urgent action (1999, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2013). Indeed, between 2004 and 2006, Istanbul WHSs have been threatened with inclusion on the ‘World Heritage in Danger’ list, which is the first step before removing the sites from the World Heritage List. The government was warned to take several urgent actions in order to prevent Istanbul from being added to the list. The warning in 2004 was taken seriously by the state and a new agenda was formed for the WHSs in Istanbul. In this new agenda, Suleymaniye was chosen as the pilot project area and a ‘Museum City Project’ began to be discussed. URP in Suleymaniye was formed out of this agenda.

Prior to the conservation of the timber architecture and vernacular streets forms, the committee suggested that the government collaborate with and encourage NGOs, universities and professional organisations to take ‘first-aid’ actions (WHC 2013) in order to prevent the decay in the short-term. It is important to note that the UNESCO WHC committee underlines the small-scale but necessary actions such as the works of KUDEB in Suleymaniye area in 2010 (WHC 2004, 2005, 2010). The other important point raised in the WHC reports is the development of an integrated and holistic plan including all the factors that affect the outstanding value of properties in WHSs. Request of UNESCO committee from the State is to take a collaborative approach with other actors to implement the regulations and necessary actions (WHC Report 2006).

However, the government did not apply these suggestions to the development scheme in the historic areas, and for this it was criticised by the committee (WHC Report 2007). Singled out for criticism were the Party’s failure to report the impact and consequences of large-scale projects such as the Golden Horn Metro Bridge. The urban renewal projects were criticised by the committee, which requested
revisions to the plans in order to mitigate the negative impacts of these projects on the outstanding value of the properties in the WHS (WHC 2007, 2008, 2010, 2011). The renewal projects, including the Suleymaniye project, were further criticised on the grounds that they involved demolition and rebuilding in the historical areas, which have been not assessed in the broader framework (WHC 2008, 2013).

**Political Structure and Political Tendency in the Area**

**2011 General Election**

The below graphics show the distribution of votes in four neighbourhoods of the KIPTAS project area, and Hocagiyasettin neighbourhood specifically as the most populated neighbourhood in the area in the General Election that took place on 12th June 2011.  

![Distribution of votes in 2011 General Election](image_url)

As can be seen from the graphics, the political contest in the project area is between the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the independent candidate, who was supported by the Kurdish Party BDP at that time and the left bloc. In Hocagiyasettin neighbourhood, the votes of AKP and independent candidate are particularly close to each other, which reflect the high concentration of Kurdish residents in this neighbourhood. The distribution of votes in four neighbourhoods shows that the Kurdish party supporters are mostly located in Hocagiyasettin Neighbourhood, whereas AKP supporters are dominant in the other areas.

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157 In this election, AKP had the 49.5%, CHP (Republican People’s Party) had 26%, MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) 13% and Kurdish and some socialists parties supported independent candidates had 6.5% of the total votes in the nationwide. In Istanbul, AKP received 50%, CHP 31%, MHP 9% and Independents 5% of the total votes.
2007 General Election

The results of the 2007 general elections in the four neighbourhoods of Suleymaniye and Hocagiyasettin neighbourhood are shown in the graphics below.\(^{158}\)

Appendix D- Figure 3: Distribution of votes in 2007 General Election

As can be seen from the distribution of votes, in Hocagiyasettin neighbourhood, the number of votes for the Kurdish Party-supported independent candidates is slightly less than the number of votes for the AKP. When the general distribution of votes in the neighbourhood is compared with the 2011 general election, the picture is more or less the same.

The biggest difference between the two election periods is the number of voters. It is seen from the graphics that the number of voters decreased enormously in four years in the four neighbourhoods. Between the years 2007 and 2011, the dynamics in the area were determined by the progress of the URP, hence the decrease in the number of voters is also connected to the URP.

2009 Local Elections

The last local election was held on 29\(^{th}\) March 2009. In this election, residents voted for the Fatih Municipality and Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality. The officials elected in this election were in duty when this research was conducted. However, the URP decision was given by the previous municipal administrations, which were elected in the 2004 local elections.

\(^{158}\) In 2007 general elections, AKP received the 46,5% of the total votes in the nationwide. AKP was followed by CHP with 20,8%, MHP with 14,2%. In Istanbul, AKP received the 45% of the votes, CHP 27%, MHP 10% and the independent candidates (majority of votes of independent candidates was for the Kurdish and left politics blocs supported candidates) received 6% in total.
Appendix D - Figure 4: Distribution of Votes for Fatih Municipality Election in 2009 Local Election

Appendix D - Figure 5: Distribution of Votes for IMM in 2009 Local Elections

The local elections highlight an important feature of the politics of the project area: namely, the stable Kurdish party votes. In both IMM and Fatih Municipality, although the Kurdish Party candidate did not have a chance to be elected (in IMM, the Kurdish Party DTP won 4.52% of the total votes, and in Fatih district, DTP won 4.26% of the total votes), the Kurdish voters voted for the DTP candidate in the local election.

In sum, the election results of different periods highlight that the political groups that determine the political relations in the area are the AKP, the ruling party and the Kurdish Party and its supporters.