Export taxes under Bertrand duopoly

Clarke, Roger and Collie, David R. 2006. Export taxes under Bertrand duopoly. [Working Paper]. Cardiff Economics Working Papers, Cardiff: Cardiff University.

Preview

PDF - Published Version Download (307kB) | Preview

Abstract

This article analyses export taxes in a Bertrand duopoly with product differentiation, where a home and a foreign firm both export to a third-country market. It is shown that the maximum-revenue export tax always exceeds the optimum-welfare export tax. In a Nash equilibrium in export taxes, the country with the low cost firm imposes the largest export tax. The results under Bertrand duopoly are compared with those under Cournot duopoly. It is shown that the absolute value of the export subsidy or tax under Cournot duopoly exceeds the export tax under Bertrand duopoly.

Item Type:	Monograph (Working Paper)
Date Type:	Publication
Status:	Published
Schools:	Business (Including Economics)
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Publisher:	Cardiff University
Date of First Compliant Deposit:	30 March 2016
Last Modified:	05 Oct 2015 15:02
URI:	https://orca.cardiff.ac.uk/id/eprint/77722

Citation Data

Cited 12 times in Scopus. View in Scopus. Powered By Scopus® Data

Actions (repository staff only)

Edit Item