BOOK REVIEWS


For a student who had to work his way through “traditional” textbooks on “Ancient Philosophy” and for whom, in the context of a Philosophy curriculum, “Ancient Philosophy” was equivalent to “Ancient Greek”, or more precisely, “Classical and Hellenistic Greek Philosophy” (with Plato, Aristotle, and “the Stoics” at the core, and a little bit of Cicero added on), the present volume offers a refreshing alternative. One could even call it an alternative history of Ancient Philosophy, or Ancient Mediterranean Philosophy, as the title aptly specifies. “Mediterranean” here stands for the cultural sphere which unites, historically and geographically, all the different influences that make up this “Western” phenomenon (as opposed, for example, to comparable phenomena in ancient South or East Asia). This is illustrated in the most fascinating way by a map (prepared by Stephen Ramsay and printed on p. xiii), which shows the Mediterranean not in the usual way with the west on the left and the east on the right, and a clear boundary between sea and land. Rather, on this map the east is on the top of the page and the west at the bottom, and the boundary between sea and land is merely indicated by a thin black line, while the actual boundary, which catches the eye and is indicated by a change in background-colour, runs between coastal land and low-lying plains, and “hinterland” of more than 200 m altitude. The sea and these low-lying areas are kept in white, the less accessible higher areas are shown in grey. These features illustrate far more compellingly than conventional maps the geographical factors that determine the importance of landscapes like Egypt, Cyrene, Libya and Numidia, the coastal lands of Italy, Sicily, the many islands, southern Gaul and the Iberian peninsula, and the proximity of places such as Elea and Syracuse, Miletus and Athens, Alexandria and Cyrene, Jerusalem and Heliopolis.

Not that traditional approaches to Ancient Philosophy had not shown any awareness of the fact that “the Greeks did not invent philosophy” (p. x), but they did seem to rely on the assumption that only Classical and Hellenistic Greek philosophy (with its scientific-rationalist tendencies) ultimately deserved the label, while everything outside that frame, be it earlier (in the “archaic” period) or later (in Late Antiquity), or geographically (and, moreover, linguistically!) outside the Graeco-Roman sphere (such as Egyptian, Semitic, Celtic, Persian and other traditions) was either a rudimentary or a decaying form of that “real thing”, especially when it did not keep to a narrowly rationalist stance but engaged in metaphysical speculation or religious ritual. Of course, as Clark points out (p. x, and see also p. 218f.), already many decades ago scholars such as Martin Bernal, Martin West and Thomas McEvilley demonstrated the strong dependence of Greek thought on African (Egyptian) and “Oriental” influences, but the controversies which some of these studies triggered, and which in some areas continue to this day, just underline the challenge that remains even today.

Stephen Clark is in an excellent position to take on this challenge. In his studies on Aristotle, Plotinus and on ancient philosophical anthropology and theology more widely he has for many years contributed to a widening of the view of what can or what should
be considered ancient philosophy. This book offers to some extent a synthesis of these efforts and a more comprehensive overview of a broad range of themes and historical developments. Obviously, an introduction can only do so much. In many areas it may only scratch the surface of what may in each case be a whole research area, open to a wide range of interdisciplinary possibilities (for example with Archaeology, Oriental Studies, Semitic Studies etc.), but the merit of this book is that these strings are held together in an attempt to outline possibilities and opportunities which they may provide, and also point to their deeper significance and anthropologically and theologically more relevant dimensions.

The book is divided into ten chapters. The first chapter, “Beginnings”, covers more or less the same ground which in traditional parlance is known as “Pre-Socratic Philosophy”. But Clark questions the traditional narrative which tends to depict this as a movement from “mythos to logos”, from a pre-rational to a rational approach to reality. The world into which the pre-socratic philosophers were born (from, say, the seventh century BC onwards) was already an ancient world. There were ancient cultures which for several thousands of years had tried to provide rational explanations for phenomena such as, for example, marine fossil finds in alpine rock formations (pp. 1-2). The fact that many of these explanations combined (Clark: “confounded”) down-to-earth reasoning with other-worldly fascination (note p. 19 the point that the Greek word for “god”, theos, originally meant “amazing”) does not per se make them less rational than say, the hyper-rationalist explanations (and applications) of some Hellenistic thinkers. “Even if Hippocrates of Cos (c450-c375BC) or his disciples helped to define the healer’s art, we had better not use their medicines,” Clark writes (p. 21). Our knowledge of ancient knowledge is patchy to say the least, he adds. We do not know in what way, if at all, theories influenced practical developments. We have next to no accounts of practitioners. Still, the few extant accounts of theoreticians might help us to put our present-day “world of science” in perspective. Who knows which of our cherished beliefs in “scientific truths” (which seem so obvious to many of us today) may yet turn out to be “entirely wrong”, or which “past philosophers may really have been correct” (p. 22)?

The second chapter (“Influence from outside”) considers this historical fact (namely that Greek philosophy, already from its outset, found itself in an ancient world) from a more historico-geographical angle. Greek myths contain elements of Mesopotamian epics which emerged more than a thousand years earlier, such as those of Atrahasis or Gilgamesh (p. 24). These epics also influenced the oldest layers of the Hebrew Bible. Already ancient Greek accounts drew links between ancient cultural founder figures (Hammurabi, Moses, Minos) and acknowledged their indebtedness to Babylonian, Persian, Egyptian and even Scythian cultural and scientific achievements (writing, mathematics, astronomy, poetry, askesis and divination). But there were also Greek accounts which belittled the barbarian achievements and in the name of reason proposed counter-myths according to which the savage cultures had no choice but to form modern states in order to survive, or else to end up as colonised subjects of modern states. Clark suspects that such “rationalist” counter-myths as formulated by a range of Greek thinkers (Clark cites a passage from Diodorus as an example), could be at least in part politically motivated (p. 54). Perhaps, Clark writes, “presently established powers found it convenient to suggest that there was no alternative to Leviathan, and that a ‘state-less’ society was a contradiction” (ibid.).

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Chapter Three (“Inspired Thinkers”) explores further the source of rational thinking, which is itself beyond reason and found in those who are divinely inspired. While some held (already in Antiquity) that man created gods in his own image, Clark points out that some of the most respected religions in Antiquity, among them the religion of the Jews and Zoroastrianism, “denied that God could be pictured” (p. 56). Divine knowledge was for those inspired by the divine, and even those had to empty and purify themselves and exceed the highest ethical and intellectual standards. The fact that in the case of Judaism this experience shaped a whole culture and its legal and social structure led ancients to conclude “that the Jews were a ‘nation of philosophers’” (p. 79). But the phenomenon was shared across virtually all ancient religions and includes such diverse personages as Pythagoras, Heraclitus, Isaiah, Diogenes and Parmenides.

Chapter Four (“Travellers and stay-at-homes”) contrasts those who as philosophers took up a nomadic way of life with those who “stayed at home”, in the service of their fatherland. Again, this leads to interesting connections: The Sophists as mercenaries of the truth, or whatever could be sold as such, Socrates and Plato as patriots; but Socrates was not above suspicion; for although he was a loyal resident citizen (and even soldier), he was also aspiring to a higher truth, which made his sophistries not just a nuisance, but a threat to Athenian self-delusion and literally intolerable to the harassed Athenians, who put Socrates on trial and condemned him to death. But prepared even for that eventuality Socrates, as recorded in Plato’s dialogue Phaedo, recommended the “practice of death” (p. 92) as a philosophical exercise, a way of purification to attain a higher state of being (and intellect). Towards the end of the chapter Clark once more draws a link between this exceptional attitude towards philosophy and the concept of purity in the Hebrew Bible as a necessary pre-condition of being close to God, as was the collective “call” of the people of Israel, the “philosopher-nation” mentioned earlier (pp. 97-101).

The following three chapters enter that “conventional” ground of the study of ancient Greek philosophy referred to at the beginning of this review. “Divine Plato” (Chapter Five) briefly introduces the Dialogues and discusses the notion of Form and the problem of the “two worlds”. It ends with a section on politics. “The Aristotelian synthesis” (Chapter Six) moves on to Plato’s greatest pupil, “the master of them that know” (p. 125). Much space here is dedicated to Aristotle the naturalist, to the question of slavery, and to the issue of Aristotle’s legacy, especially in view of what it means to be a philosopher, in “practical” (scientific, intellectual, ethical, religious and social-political) terms. This leads straight on to Chapter Seven, “Living the philosophical life”, an account of the Hellenistic Schools, which in the spirit of the present book includes not only Stoics, Cynics and Epicureans, but also Hebrews, Zoroastrians and Buddhists.

Chapter Eight, following the natural time-line, leads on to the Romans. It is entitled “Ordinary and supernatural lives” and begins with a discussion of the phenomenon that Romans worshipped abstract virtues as deities, such as Liberty, Faith, and Peace. Much of this chapter is devoted to a discussion of Cicero’s reserved scepticism in the light of his countrymen’s hands-on approach to religion in daily life, the widespread practice of divination and the link between religion (or superstition) and technology. This chapter is also covering the period when Christianity began to establish itself in Rome (during the second century AD) and to develop its doctrine of the incarnation of God’s eternal Son, or Word, as a special case of the above-mentioned proximity between God and humanity. As was mentioned earlier with a reference, for example, to Socrates, and as is reiterated
here with a reference to Apollonius of Tyana, the idea of philosophers achieving divine status through acts of extreme self-denial was not alien to the intellectual culture of the day. But the Christian claim that Jesus, on account of the story of his life and death, was identical with the eternal God, went way over the top in the view of many and was met with the deepest suspicion. Significantly, the question as to the exact nature of that claim was highly controversial among the Christians themselves, for centuries to come.

Chapter Nine moves on to “Late Antiquity”. Clark here begins with a brief reflection on the traditional view that this period was obsessed with Fate and its “management”, for example, through astrology. He believes that this view was exaggerated and he introduces a number of cases, Plotinus among them, who argued against the Fatalism of astrological practices. Still, late-antique philosophy lost some of its clarity and brevity and became cluttered with all manner of knowledge and wisdom accrued through many centuries of learning and from many cultures. Clark considers Oswald Spengler’s view that alongside Classical culture there existed in the late-antique Mediterranean a “Magian” intellectual culture which introduced emotional, communal and ritual elements into the essentially rationalist Classical philosophical tradition and thus developed it into a religion. Clark poses the question whether this pagan philosophical tradition might have been a more tolerant alternative to the ultimately victorious Christian Orthodoxy, or later, to Islam.

To some extent an answer to this question is given in Chapter Ten, “An end and a beginning”. Ancient Mediterranean Philosophy was not extinguished, but persisted, if only as a largely “hidden”, subtle, sublime, phenomenon. Jan Assmann recently coined for it the phrase religio duplex, a second, subliminal, layer of religion beneath popular beliefs and practices, the “religion” of those few in every given age who “know” that popular religion cannot provide final answers and that any belief to be in possession of the ultimate truth can be no adequate substitute for the honest and persistent pursuit of truth, the “love of wisdom” (which is the meaning of philosophy), which will never be complete in this life. Clark shows that in this respect philosophy has probably never held a dominant position in any society and he poignantly hints at the similarity of the rhetoric used by a modern scientist, who declares all previous worldviews erroneous and obsolete, with that of an early Christian Church Father, who presents his own doctrine as a victory of the enlightenment over the illusions and fantasies of a benighted past.

This relatively brief summary cannot do justice to the rich content of this book, be it the amount of historical material covered, or the level of philosophical investigation into individual questions. A brief section recommends further reading (pp. 217-219), and an extensive bibliography and index of names and subjects conclude the volume.

Ancient Mediterranean Philosophy is a fascinating and highly instructive book, which can be recommended to any reader at any level, who not only wants to “know about” the history of philosophy in Antiquity, but in the process of learning about it would also like to learn how to practise philosophy in their own lives.

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The present volume is the most substantial treatment of Tatian’s *Oratio ad Graecos* for some time. It offers a newly edited Greek text with an annotated translation (pp. 84-193) and introductory chapters on the following topics: 1) The author (pp. 1-8), 2) Date and place of origin (pp. 8-15), 3) The transmission of the work (pp. 15-24), 4) Its Structure (pp. 25-29), 5) Its Theology (including Creation, Logos speculation, Pneumatology, Demonology, Anthropology and Ethics, pp. 29-54), 6) Its merits as an Apology (including polemics against philosophy, mythology and astrology, and defence of the concept of a “Barbarian Philosophy”, pp. 54-71). In addition there are five appendices: 1) Was Tatian a pupil of Justin Martyr (pp. 195-203)? 2) Was he a Gnostic (pp. 204-219)? 3) Why is the name of Christ not mentioned in the work (pp. 219-224)? 4) Who were the addressees of the work (pp. 224-230)? And 5) What is the genre of the work (pp. 230-240)? The book concludes with a bibliography and indices of biblical, classical and patristic references, names and Greek words, ancient and modern authors, and subjects.

One of the most noteworthy features of the work is the new critical text: Trelenberg’s aim is to restore it to a more pristine condition, closer to the manuscript tradition, after it experienced a radical makeover by Miroslav Marcovich’s critical edition of 1995, which contains more than 300 additional conjectures. But Trelenberg also rejects a number of earlier conjectures found in Eduard Schwartz’s edition of 1888, some of them by Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Möllendorf and Robert Münzel, and some made by yet earlier editors. This strategy has its merits, but also its limitations, as some examples may illustrate. It also happens in a context. Already Aimé Puech, Edgar Goodspeed and Molly Whittaker, in 1903, 1914 and 1982, produced editions (or translations based on readings) which did not accept Schwartz’s philologically refined text but preferred manuscript readings and *lectio difficilior*. They all relied on Schwartz, though. Schwartz’s work was a pioneering achievement made possible in turn by a study of Adolf Harnack’s published in 1882 on the manuscript tradition. This had established that all extant manuscripts originate from one 10th c. manuscript, now lost, after the quires containing the text were removed at an early stage from the relevant codex, Paris, BnF, ms. gr. 451, the so-called *codex Arethas*. The extent to which the extant text of Tatian’s *Ad Graecos* could be improved with the help of manuscript readings was therefore rather limited. This had made Harnack very cautious. In a translation of the text based on von Otto’s edition of 1851, published in 1884, Harnack included text-critical notes which did not allow for a single conjecture. Trelenberg (p. 21, n. 108) is quite correct when he speaks of Harnack’s “valuable (partly ingenious) text-critical observations”. The emphasis here is on the word “observations”, as opposed to “interventions”. Harnack rejected those. In contrast, Schwartz, Wilamowitz and Münzel felt that the text could be significantly improved by some bold, philologically informed conjectures, and a century later Marcovich escalated this approach by making on average five additional changes on every page, one in every 20th word or phrase, thus in effect re-writing whole swathes of the work.

Against this trend Puech, Goodspeed and Whittaker followed the tradition of von Otto and Harnack, and they are now joined by Trelenberg, who states his editorial principles as follows (p. 21): “The manuscript readings are, wherever possible and tolerable, preferred to speculation. Moderate conjecture is used in unambiguous cases of textual corruption.
ard Kukula’s German translation of Lectio difficilior is not shunned, though exaggerations – as by Kukula – are avoided.” The reference here is to Richard Kukula’s German translation of 1913, which was very influential, but eccentric in places. But, as the following examples might illustrate, Trelenberg also adds his own touch. There are some significant changes compared to, say, Whittaker; and in some cases he even agrees with conjectures made by Marcovich. (Abbreviations used are of the three main manuscript witnesses: P = Paris, BnF, ms. gr. 174 (s. xi/xii); M = Modena, BE, GRE. 126 (s. xi); V = Venice, BnM, cod. gr. z. 343 (s. xi). Tatian’s Ad Graecos is abbreviated “or.”):

Or. 1.1: ὁ ἄνδρες Ἑλλήνες Π, Β, Τρελενμερυτετομοτέρῳ ... συμφύρδην ὑμῶν πεποιήκατε τῇ διάλεκτον Marcovich, Trelenberg; literally, “you have made your speech confused/messy” (scil. by importing foreign expressions). Here P, M and V read συμφύρδην, as do Schwartz and Whittaker, i. e. exponents of both “camps” of modern editors. Before Marcovich suggested συμφύρδην, only von Otto had come up with any emendation at all, συμφύρησαν. But no emendation is needed here. Both readings of the adjective, σύμφυρδος and σύμφυρτος, are attested in ancient literature. The ending too is correct; ή διάλεκτος is feminine. Marcovich’s intervention is gratuitous, albeit typical. It is the fact that Marcovich in this instance which comes as a surprise. It goes against his declared editorial strategy.

Or. 1.4: σύμφυρτον ὑμῶν πεποιήκατε τῇ διάλεκτον Marcovich, Trelenberg; literally, “you have made your speech confused/messy” (scil. by importing foreign expressions). Here P, M and V read συμφύρησαν, as do Schwartz and Whittaker, i. e. exponents of both “camps” of modern editors. Before Marcovich suggested συμφύρησαν, only von Otto had come up with any emendation at all, συμφύρησαν. But no emendation is needed here. Both readings of the adjective, σύμφυρδος and σύμφυρτος, are attested in ancient literature. The ending too is correct; ή διάλεκτος is feminine. Marcovich’s intervention is gratuitous, albeit typical. It is the fact that Marcovich in this instance which comes as a surprise. It goes against his declared editorial strategy.

Or. 7.4: Καὶ ἐπεαὶ ἦν ἐν φρονιμωτέρῳ ... συνεξηκολούθησαν καὶ θεόν ἀνέδειξαν ... οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ ἄγγελοι τῶν ἐπαναστάμασεν τὸ νόμῳ τοῦ θεοῦ... “But when men and angels followed someone who was cleverer [scil. than the other celestial beings, because he was πρωτόγονος] and proclaimed him a god, although he had revolted against God’s law...”. The issue here is with ἄγγελοι, which is absent from the manuscripts. Schwartz inserted it to fill the apparent lacuna between καὶ καὶ τῶν, and later editors, including Whittaker and Trelenberg, were happy to follow him. This reading reinforces the impression of Tatian’s account of creation through the Logos as a kind of Gnostic myth, which Trelenberg shares (pp. 34-40), but which is problematic. In an article published in 2005, not referenced by Trelenberg, Heinz-Günther Nesselrath suggested that Schwartz’s insertion of ἄγγελοι might be quite unnecessary if we read καὶ τῶν as καὶ ταί, “althought”. This is a possibility which points beyond Trelenberg’s text.

Or. 7.5: ἡ διὰ τὴν παράβασιν καὶ τὴν ἄνοιαν ὁ πρωτόγονος δαίμον ῥαδίκείνυται. “Because of his transgression and his madness the Firstborn was appointed [or ‘shown to be’] a demon.” Here Trelenberg, following a conjecture by von Otto, reads ἄνοια, “folly, madness”, but P, M and V read ἄνοια, “ignorance, stupidity”. According to Trelenberg’s stated editorial strategy there should be no reason not to follow the manuscripts here.


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Or. 9.5: "...έτατ πῶς πρὶν τούτους περὶ τὰς προειρημένας τάξεις γενέσθαι ἄκοσμητος ἦν ὁ οὐρανός: "How’s that, then? Was the sky without ornaments before these [scil. the constellations] emerged around the destined places?" Τάξεις, here “places”, was suggested by Wilamowitz and endorsed by Trelenberg (as it had been by Whittaker). P, M and V read πράξεις, “deeds”, which also makes sense; for in this passage Tatian ridicules the idea that the stellar constellations are manifestations of ancient myths, “deeds” committed by specific gods and men. In this case περὶ could be translated as “with regard to” or “in relation to”, so that the sentence could be translated: “...Was the sky without ornaments before these [constellations] emerged in relation to the aforementioned deeds?”

Or. 27.2: Διαγόρας ἄθεος ἦν Κυκολάς, Trelenberg: Διαγόρας Αθηναῖος ἦν P, M, V. In this case it is possible that ἄθεος is the original reading and that Αθηναῖος is the result of a copyist’s error. (The word Αθηναῖος occurs on the next line.) ἄθεος makes better sense, since Tatian continues to say that Diagoras poked fun at the Mysteries celebrated among the Athenians. It is generally known that this lead to the notorious trial against Diagoras for “Atheism”. But Tatian does not mention the trial, nor does he use the word ἄθεος in this technical sense anywhere else in Ad Graecos. The assumption that ἄθεος is the most authentic reading here is pure conjecture. Significantly, Schwartz and Whittaker stick to Αθηναῖος. But the word has troubled others; for Diagoras was of course not an Athenian, but a Melian. Friedrich Jacoby therefore suggested the reading Μήλιος for Αθηναῖος, while Marcovich, true to his editorial strategy, suggested Διαγόρας Αθηναῖος ἄθεος ἦν.

Or. 31.2: Μάρτυρας δὲ οὐ τοὺς οἴκοι παραλήψομαι, βοηθοῖς δὲ μᾶλλον Ἐλλησι καταχρήσομαι. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄθεος, ὅταν ὑμῖν διὰ ἄντερείδων ἀνυπόπτους παρ᾽ ὑμῶν τοὺς ἀντερείδως, ἔλέγχους παραλαμβάνω. For this passage, Trelenberg, following Schwartz, relies on the indirect transmission of the text in Eusebius, praep. ev. 10.11.1-5, which deviates from P, M and V in many details. But he does not follow Schwartz, and Schwartz does not follow Eusebius, in every detail. Take, for example, the expression in brackets. Here Schwartz, following P, M and V, reads ἣμών instead of ὑμῶν. Trelenberg may have intended to do the same; for his translation reads, “weil nicht einmal bei uns beweiskräftig”; but his text reads ὑμῶν, not ἡμῶν. Thus his translation follows the manuscripts, like Schwartz in this case, but his text follows Eusebius, against Schwartz. There is obviously some mistake here; but one could ask beyond that, as Nesselrath has done, whether it is at all necessary for this passage to resort to the Eusebius-tradition in order to “improve” the text of P, M and V. We can read χρήσομαι instead of καταχρήσομαι, παραδέκτεσιν instead of παραδεκτοῖς, ὅταν instead of ὡστεν, and λαμβάνω instead of παραλαμβάνο. A translation following these variants (provided by P, M and V) could read as follows: “As witnesses I will not take any of our own people, but rather make use of the partisans of the Greeks; for the former would be unwise (since not acceptable even by ourselves), while it might strike as rather impressive if I withstood you with your own weapons and resorted to arguments which are above suspicion even among you.”

Or. 34.3: διὰ τὸ συνελθέν Περικλέους Marcovich, Trelenberg; διὰ τὸ συνελθέν Π, M, V; διὰ τὸν συνελθέν Gesner (editio princeps), von Otto, Harnack, Schwartz, Whittaker. This may be a case of lectio difficillior against manuscripts. Clearly, the majority went with the
latter, making a slight emendation, while Trelenberg, following Marcovich, went in the other direction. (There are several more such cases in cc. 32-36.)

These few examples can only provide a glimpse of what is a most welcome and useful new edition. They suggest, however, that at least in some cases it may be worth comparing Trelenberg’s text with that of earlier editions, at least with Schwartz’s and Whittaker’s; for Trelenberg does occasionally make decisions that are not in line with his own editorial strategy and seem unnecessarily to depart from the manuscripts, or prefer a perhaps convenient but doubtful conjecture. One wonders whether it is an inevitable side-effect of the proliferation of critical editions (in this particular case) that ultimately none of them can be relied upon with certainty. A final verdict on this question will probably have to wait until the publication of the successor of Schwartz’s text by the Patristische Kommission, announced by Nesselrath.4

Just a few more notes on the introductory and thematic chapters: These too are of solid quality. But research is progressing fast and in many directions. It cannot be expected of a volume such as this to cover every possible angle in its treatment of the relevant sources. However, the omission of certain themes and topics has repercussions for the remaining material, and of this any reader should be aware. For example, there are no sections here on Tatian’s use of and engagement with the Bible, or on his rhetorical theory and method, or on the cultural-intellectual context in which these may have been conveyed. Tatian is believed to have stood in some kind of teaching tradition located in Rome. Justin Martyr is believed to have been a teacher of his, Rhodon one of his pupils. A discussion between Rhodon and Apelles, a pupil of Marcion, is recorded by Eusebius in his Church History. These things and many more are important to consider for the argument of Ad Graecos, but they lie beyond Trelenberg’s scope. Regarding the date and place of Ad Graecos, for example, Trelenberg merely records the different theories (Rome, Athens, “the East”) and is inclined towards “the East” and a late date, i. e. after 172 (p. 15), but then adds that this applies only to the “Endredaktion” of the work. He therefore implies that some parts of Ad Graecos may well have originated in Rome and its theological context, but when he discusses the relevant parts, this is not always sufficiently taken into account. The simple personification of the notion of λόγου δύναμις (“word-power”), for example, as a “Wesen sui generis” (p. 36) does not do justice to the complexity of this concept in the context of both the Christian Theology of the time and of the Second Sophistic with its rich culture of rhetorical theorizing. Trelenberg’s personification leads to a simplification of Tatian’s thought which does not do justice to the level of his hermeneutical thinking, evident, for example, in the way he explains the interaction of semantic meaning and physical sound in the acts of speaking and listening (or. 5.5). There is a danger here of “mythologizing” something which evidently is not meant to be mythological. Tatian’s “power of the word” is not a separate being in addition to God and the Logos, as Trelenberg’s account seems to suggest, but a theological concept developed to explain the relationship between God and the Word in analogy to what we know about the way human language works.

This tendency to read the theological parts of Ad Graecos mythologically is mirrored in the way heresiological accounts are taken at face value in the chapter dealing with the question whether Tatian was a Gnostic (pp. 204-219). There is a connection between the

4 Nesselrath, “Il testo,” p. 244.
two observations that all that ancient heresiologists have to say about Tatian’s Gnosticism and other heresies is ultimately derived from Irenaeus and that all that Irenaeus says about Tatian in that regard can be evidenced from Ad Graecos. “There is nothing in Tatian that cannot also be found in any other Apologist,” Trelenberg concedes (p. 217). Still, “only a well-meaning interpretation will situate him within ecclesiastical orthodoxy; in individual cases he definitely strays outside this context” (p. 219). Trelenberg may just try to be fair here and provide a balanced account, but recent studies such as Naomi Koltun-Fromm’s\(^5\) have shown that the view that Tatian was a heretic, which includes the charge that he was a Gnostic, is entirely a construction. There is no balance to strike here. As Trelenberg’s own evidence shows, it begins with Irenaeus and ends with Arethas, author of the tenth century Scholia Arethae, who saw Tatian as a proto-Arian on account of or. 5.2, where the Logos is called the “work” (ἔργον) of the Father. The fact that Trelenberg (p. 37f.) “defends” Tatian against this charge, while he nevertheless feels “irritated” by Tatian’s use of the expression indicates how close he still is to that tradition and how much he is in danger of simply continuing the heresiological narrative instead of subjecting it to a thorough critique. Yet again, admittedly, to provide such a critique may not be the primary task of an introductory chapter in a volume such as this.

Finally, some notes on the brief section dealing with the question of the genre of the work (pp. 230-240). On p. 15 Trelenberg rightly points out that Ad Graecos is composed of quite diverse elements (didactic, polemical, archival materials etc.), which originated over a longer period of time and were at some later point subjected to an “Endredaktion”. Tatian himself hints at this, when he speaks or. 37.2 of having begun to write that part of the work at an earlier stage and now taking it up again after abandoning it for some time, and or. 42.1 of having “arranged” (συνέταξα) his material rather than having written it in one go. On pp. 231-233, however, when he criticizes Kukula’s ideas regarding a possible school-context for an oral presentation of certain parts of the speech, Trelenberg seems to have forgotten his earlier observation and calls in question a possible school context on the ground that it is not at all certain that Tatian founded a school in “the East”. But if Ad Graecos contains earlier material as well, surely it could contain material which Tatian might have delivered at some point during his Roman period.

Then the question regarding addressees: Were they “outsiders” or “insiders”? “Real” Greeks (i. e. “pagans”) Trelenberg asserts, “would hardly have listened to his [Tatian’s] tirades” (p. 233). But then he concedes (p. 237) that Ad Graecos is at least at some level a protreptic, which “by definition is directed towards outsiders (Aussenstehende)” (ibid.). The outsider-insider question is also raised with regard to Tatian himself, a convert in constant need of “self-assurance” (“Selbstvergewisserung”), for himself as well as for those close to him. (Οἴκοι is a term repeatedly used in that regard, or. 1.3; 31.2.) Again, according to recent studies it is problematic to draw a clear line between Christian and non-Christian identities during this period. Tatian’s oration reflects a context of cultural encounter and exchange. The struggle between Greek and Barbarian philosophy is one in which the author of Ad Graecos is familiar with both sides. He is crossing borders, and his work reflects this. For the same reason “Apology” and the other possible genres such as protreptic, polemic, apodeictic etc. should not be considered mutually exclusive. The

The expression “apology” was used in Antiquity for a literary genre, as was, by distinction, *Ad Graecos*. Πρὸς Ἐλληνας. But the ancient approach to rhetoric was pragmatic and guided by “communicative strategies”. Thus a work could well be at the same time an ἀπολογία, a λόγος πρὸς Ἐλληνας, and a προτετακτικός, and even contain strong elements of ψόγος, a “speech of blame”. It all depended on the rhetorical strategy of the work, or different parts of the work, if the work was a composite, as is probably the case here, or on the author’s strategy of communicating with his audience.

Once more, it cannot be expected from such brief introductory chapters exhaustively to explore all the relevant aspects of the topics that suggest themselves from the study of Tatian’s *Ad Graecos*. The above remarks are merely hints to outline possible avenues of further inquiry, which Trelenberg’s volume will hopefully encourage.

To conclude, therefore, the merit of this volume is beyond doubt. It serves the study of Tatian’s *Ad Graecos* in so many respects and is warmly recommended to any student of early Christianity, the Second Sophistic, the second-century Greek Christian Apologists and related areas.

A (thankfully brief, though probably incomplete) list of errata: p. 20, l. 20: Whittaker; p. 23, n. [1]: praep. ev. 10,11,6-35 (the correct reference is given on p. 19 n. 101); p. 23, n. [2]: The last number on the line should be 41; p. 83, l. 26: For 1517 read 1592; p. 139, n. 220: Read “A. E. Osborne, Discourse”; also on p. 258: A. E. Osborne and E. F. Osborn (“From Justin to Origen”) are two different authors; p. 244: Stählin; p. 258: Pilhofer, P.: Presbyteron Kreitton.

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